
Studies in Modern European History

Wolodymyr Kosyk

The Third Reich and Ukraine

Translated by
Irene levins Rudnytzky

Peter Lang

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Frank J. Coppa
General Editor

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To
All Who Perished
in
The Quest for Freedom

Translator's Note

"A translator is to be like his author: it is not his business to excel him." These words spoken by Dr. Johnson about Dryden's translation of Virgil can be universally applied to any translation, including the one at hand. However, while the risk of excelling a poet (especially such a classic as Virgil) in translating his verse is practically non-existent, a translator of a scholarly treatise may well surpass the author of the original, especially when he or, as in this case, she speaks with her own voice while casting the facts and thoughts of the original into modern-day idiom of her own tongue.

In the translation at hand, Dr. Johnson's dictum applies. The English version of *L'Allemagne National-Socialiste et L'Ukraine* does not excel the original. The reasons for that are two-fold. This is not an adaptation, but a translation, and it was commissioned and authorized by the author who reserved the right to final approval of the English text. Bound by these constraints, I attempted to reproduce the content and the form of the original work in the English language as faithfully as possible, refraining from any editorial emendations. The translation, therefore, reflects not only the author's views, but also his stylistic idiosyncrasies and the rhythm of his speech. It is thus not only "true to the spirit" of the original, but, hopefully, an accurate and exact reproduction of it.

The publication of Wolodymyr Kosyk's work will help fill the void which exists in historical scholarship written in English. Its appearance is especially timely in light of two recent developments: the independence of Ukraine and the reunification of Germany. The wealth of information it offers as well as the 194 documents which it presents make it a most valuable source for the student of Ukrainian history and German-Ukrainian relations. It should be remembered, however, that while the author was writing the work, the archives of Eastern Europe were not

accessible to him. Today, following the demise of the Soviet Union, these archives are being opened to scholars everywhere. This facet of Ukrainian history has been quite neglected in American scholarship, accorded often only superficial treatment and more frequently biased and misleading interpretation. In this sense, Kosyk's work is a pioneering study which, I am certain, will be followed by many others. At the present moment, however, *The Third Reich and Ukraine* is the most comprehensive treatment available of that crucial period of modern Ukrainian history which needs to be studied in greater depth to facilitate a better understanding of our times.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my colleagues at Immaculata College for all the support I have received while working on this project. My special thanks to Sister Loretta Maria Tenbusch, of the Department of English for her careful, sensitive reading of the manuscript and her suggestions concerning stylistic changes, and to Sister Marie Roseanne Bonfini, of the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures and now President of Immaculata College, for her invaluable help with the mechanics of the manuscript.

Irene Ievins Rudnytzky

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List of Abbreviations

Abwehr	Intelligence department of the German Armed Forces: Abwehr I—espionage with specialist groups; Abwehr II—sabotage; Abwehr III—counter-espionage
APA	Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP
BBH	Bergbauernhilfe
DAF	German Work Front
Dulag	Transit camp
EK	Einsatzkommando, unit of security police and SD
EM	Reports of the Chief of the Sipo and the SD on events in the USSR
Gestapo	(Geheime Staatspolizei) Secret state police
Hiwi	(Hilfsfreiwillige) Auxiliary Volunteers in the German armed forces
La-Führer	Agricultural director in the east
NKVD	Soviet People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
OKH	(Oberkommando des Heeres) High Command of the German Army
OKW	(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) High Command of all the German armed forces
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—from 1940 there were two separate organization by the same name: one led by Stepan Bandera (OUN-B), the other led by Andriy Melnyk (OUN-M)
RKU	Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Commissariat of Reich Ukraine
ROA	Russian Liberation Army

RSHA	(Reichssicherheitshauptamt) The Reich Central Security Department
RSS of Ukraine	Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine
SD	(Sicherheitsdienst) Security and information service, directed by the Reichsführer-SS
Sipo, SP	(Sicherheitspolizei) Security police
SS	(Schützstaffel) Sections of protection of the Nazi party
SVU	Union for the Liberation of Ukraine
UNR	Ukrainian National (Democratic) Republic
UPA	Ukrainian Insurgent Army
UVO	Ukrainian Military Organization
Waffen SS	Combat formations, an elite force operating as a Nazi wing with the German army
Wehrmacht	The armed forces of Germany

Foreword

If it be true that the causes for World War II, to a large extent, go back to World War I, it is no less true that a new political and social phenomenon, Nazism, has to be added to the general political evolution in Europe. Nazism very quickly ceased "to be of unique Germanic significance to become with its indefinite and obscure designs, the principal international factor" (Beaumont 12).

Indeed, Hitler wanted to erase the humiliation of the "Dictate" of Versailles and force a revision of it. But his plan consisted also of regrouping the Germans into a "Great Reich," and then of conquering for this Reich *Lebensraum*, a huge living space to the east (Renouvin and Duroselle 349).

In fact, Hitler's Germany wanted to assure itself of an unquestionable hegemony of all of Europe and thus become the first world power. To realize this ambitious plan, Hitler needed all the resources of Continental Europe, particularly the resources of Ukraine. On 11 August 1939, before the campaign of Poland he announced: "I need Ukraine so that they will not be able to reduce us through famine as was the case during the last war" (*Das Dritte Reich* 276). In June 1943, in the middle of the war, the Reich's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, declared to the ambassador of Italy that to be able "to extricate itself from the difficulty," Germany and its allies "absolutely needed Ukraine." (Appendix, Doc.#180) And several months before the end of the war, an American journal asserted that the enormous conflict unfolding in Europe was, in fact, a "Ukrainian conflict," a conflict for the possession of Ukraine (*Saturday Evening Post*, 27 January 1945). The conquest of Ukraine was, however, part of a more extensive German ambition.

What exactly were the German plans concerning Eastern Europe and, more particularly, Ukraine? In what way did the Germans begin to execute these plans? What was the nature of the domination of National

Socialist Germany in Ukraine? How did the Ukrainian national forces react to this domination? To what extent did the Ukrainians contribute to the defeat of National Socialist Germany?

The present volume attempts to offer as accurately as possible answers to these questions; placing events in their actual context, and using document extracts of secret German archives, this work aims to reconstruct the policies of the Reich on the Ukrainian question and the occupation of Ukraine, against the backdrop of the general policies of Hitler regarding Eastern Europe.

Ukrainian geographic names can differ depending on the language used. Thus, for example, the city of Lviv is written Lwow in Polish, Lemberg in German, Lvov in Russian, Leopold in Latin. We have preferred the phonetic transcription of the Ukrainian names with the exception of Kiev (Kyiv in Ukrainian).

Chapter 1

UKRAINE BEFORE 1939

Before becoming the battleground of World War II, the Ukrainian territories were the object, notably from 1938 on, of a vast diplomatic and political wager. Newspapers and magazines of those days reported a great deal about the Ukrainian question and attributed to Hitler the most improbable plans concerning Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian question was generally a complicated one as it concerned simultaneously several states, since the Ukrainian ethnographic territory was divided among several powers: the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Each one of these countries interpreted reality to its own advantage, going so far as to deny the existence of the Ukrainian question, although this question existed.

Before approaching the evolution of this question in contemporary history, however, several words about Ukraine's historical development are appropriate. This is all the more necessary since certain periods of the history of Ukraine, generally inaccurately or very little known by the public at large, will be referred to by the Nazi leaders to justify their expansionist policy with regard to this country in particular and Eastern Europe in general. Moreover, understanding of some events which occurred during World War II in Ukraine is impossible without some rudimentary knowledge of its history and of what preceded the Ukrainian National Movement. Because these two aspects of the Ukrainian past before 1939 lie beyond the scope of this work, however, they can be treated only briefly.

From the Origins to Independence

The antiquity of the territory of Ukraine is lost in the obscurity of time. This territory experienced a remarkable cultural development through the ages from 5,000 B.C. to 1,700 B.C. (the Trypillian culture). Since then, Ukraine has been subjected to numerous invasions. Consequently, from epoch to epoch the country has been known by the names of the tribes and nomadic peoples who had invaded a more or less important part of Ukraine. These names disappeared with the nomads who, most often, blended in with the population.

Thus in the 8th century B.C., Homer labeled this area the country of the Cimmerians. During the following century the Scythians, about whom Herodotus spoke, established themselves on the steppes of the Southern Ukraine (5th to 3rd centuries B.C.). They founded the Scythian State and extended their authority over the other inhabitants of Ukraine. About 514-513 B.C., Darius attempted to conquer this State.

From the 8th century B.C. on, the Greeks established several colonies in the Crimea and on the northern coast of the Black Sea. During the 5th century, these colonies formed the Kingdom of Bosphorus. The importance of the Greek colonies declined progressively from the 1st century A.D. on.

Names of other tribes appearing in the southern Ukraine were often used to designate the country, including the Sarmatians (3rd century B.C. to 3rd century A.D.), the Roxolans, and the Alans, among others.

Northern Ukraine was part of the territory designated as the cradle of the Slavs. The formation of this linguistic group, begun toward the 5th to 3rd millennium B.C., probably came to an end during the 1st millennium B.C. Historians think, for example, that the farming Scythians of whom Herodotus wrote were native Slavs.

According to Jordan, in the 3rd century A.D., the northern coast of the Black Sea and the Crimea were invaded by Germanic tribes from the shores of the Baltic Sea: the Goths (Ostrogoths and Visigoths). Their State which succumbed in 375 A.D., did not resist the invasion of the Huns.

The Ostrogoths were also opposed by the Slavic tribes, the Antes, who inhabited the greater part of Ukraine. The State of the Antes,

which existed from the 4th to the 7th century A.D., was the precursor of the State which evolved in the middle of the 9th century around the city of Kiev (Kyiv in Ukrainian).

The State of Kiev took the name Rus' (Ruscia or Ruthenia in Latin), and Medieval Ukraine was known under this name. Rus' extended its frontiers to the west beyond the city of Peremyshl (Przemysl in present-day Poland). In the north, its expansion ended in the acquisition of some important territories and the formation of vassal principalities. Kiev became the center of a true empire composed of the mother country (Rus') and its dependencies, but the empire of Kiev disintegrated in 1132-1135, and the vassal principalities of the north became independent.

Practically at the same time the name "Ukraine" appeared: it was recorded for the first time in the Chronicle of Kiev in 1187, designating a region to the south of Kiev, the region located at the borders south of Rus', properly called the region of Pereyaslav. The name thus appeared at the moment when the State of Kiev (Rus') was still independent, and when there was as yet no trace whatsoever of Russia.

Even if at its origin the name "Ukraine" meant "borders" (of the State of Kiev and not of Poland or Russia), this term very quickly took on the meaning of "country," "our country." In 1213, it was used in the Chronicles of Galicia-Volhynia to designate the region on the River Buh, on the frontier with Poland. Next, it was used to designate the territories located in the center, on the River Dniepro (Dnipro). This name extended itself practically to the entire present-day Ukraine, especially in the period from the 14th to the 17th centuries.

Observing that the native population of Ukraine has been living on these lands for thousands of years and that it is this same population that called itself Ukrainian, Ukrainian historians consider that all history prior to the adoption of the name Ukraine, history concerning the civilization of Trypillia and of the Scythians as well as of the States of the Antes and of Kiev, makes up an integral part of Ukraine history.

Consequently, the State of Kiev, that is to say Rus' (from the 9th to the 13th century wrongly named by Russian and foreign historians "Kievan Russia"), is a Ukrainian State. Present-day Russia took shape in the course of the 14th and 15th centuries from the principality of

Moscow.¹ That the Moscovite-Russian princes were connected more or less to the princely house ruling in Kiev does not eliminate the existence of two distinct historical formations: that of Rus'-Ukraine (or Ruthenia Ukraine) and that of Moscovia Russia.

The Russian historians, however, do not share this conception of the history of Ukraine.²

Rus' (the State of Kiev) owes its power essentially to international commerce. One of the commercial routes which crossed the country was the fluvial route linking Scandinavia with Greece by way of the rivers Dvina, Volkhov, Dniipro, and the Black Sea. This route was taken by the Northmen (Varangians). One of the chronicles of Rus' attributes to the Varangians the role of founders of the dynasty of Rurik, who had also come to rule in Kiev, but this is legend. This legend and several linguistic facts have served to create an historical theory called the "Normanist theory." Created during the 18th century by German historians, notably by G.-S. Bayer, G. Müller, and A.L. Schlözer, then developed by certain Russian writers (Soloviev, Pogodin) and the Danish Slavist Thomsen, the Normanist theory aims to make it appear that the principality of Novgorod and the State of Kiev were the work of Northmen and that the term "Rus'" was also of Norse origin, but this theory is rejected by a great number of Russian and by practically all Ukrainian historians whose studies show that the Varangians in the service of the princes of Rus' did not play the role attributed to them by the supporters of the Normanist theory.³

For various reasons, the decline of the principality of Kiev began toward the middle of the 13th century, and the principality of Galicia-Volhynia took over the State of Kiev. In 1320, Kiev recognized the suzerainty of the king of Lithuania, while the western part of Rus', Galicia (Halychyna in Ukrainian), was conquered by the king of Poland in 1349. Rus'-Ukraine then ceased to exist as an independent state.

Several independent states were at that time in the north. Within one of these states (the Suzdalia) the vassal principality of Moscow established itself in the middle of the 13th century. Having become independent toward the end of that century, in the beginning of the 14th century this principality began to follow political expansion, progressively absorbing neighboring independent principalities. This expansion did not,

however, develop in the southern direction toward Ukraine. Moskovia (which later took the name Russia) did not begin its expansion toward Ukraine until the second half of the 17th century.

From the middle of the 14th century, the Ukrainian territories belonged to Lithuania, with the exception of Galicia, which had been conquered by Poland. Following the Lithuanian-Polish Union in 1569, almost all of the territories of Ukraine were united with the Polish crown.

Because the formation of the Ukrainian people (Rus' or Ruthenian) took place when Rus' was an independent state, the Ukrainians became aware that they were a people distinct from the Poles and from the Moscovites (Russians); this awareness remained even when the country was administered by Lithuania and by Poland and expressed itself notably in the Cossack movement, as the Ukrainian Cossacks become fighters par excellence for the liberty of Ukraine. One of the Ukrainian Cossack leaders, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in turning the people against the Polish crown, attempted to lay the foundations of a Ukrainian Cossack state, but its independence was short-lived (1648-1659).

Hoping to get support in his war against Poland, Hetman (head of State) Khmelnytsky placed his state under the protection of the Moscovite czar, but in 1667, Moscovia-Russia concluded a treaty with Poland, and Ukraine was divided (for the first time) between the two powers. Poland gave up to Moscovia Ukrainian territories east of the Dnipro, including the town of Kiev. Thus began the Russian domination over Ukraine.

An autonomous Ukrainian state (*Hetmanshchyna*) continued to exist, however, until 1764 in the major part of the territory ceded to Moscovia, although vestiges of this autonomy were definitely abolished by the Russian government in 1784. Ukrainian territories in the Russian Empire received the name "Malorossia" (Little Russia), while Moscovia took the name Great Russia. Only after the partitions of Poland (1772-1795), could Russia seize the other Ukrainian territories, with the exception of Galicia and North Bukovyna, which were united with Austria, and of Subcarpathian Ruthenia which had belonged to Hungary since the 11th century.

Despite the partition of Ukraine among several states, a rather pronounced feeling of ethnic unity persisted among the Ukrainian

people, a feeling which would contribute to the development of national consciousness, notably at the time of the awakening of nationalities throughout Europe, particularly in the second half of the 19th century. The longing for liberty and independence clearly emerged everywhere from 1890-1900 on, especially in the platform of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party (RUP) founded in the Russian part of Ukraine. The idea of a political struggle for the reunification of the people into a single nation and the creation of a Ukraine "one, indivisible, free, independent from the Carpathian Mountains to the Caucasus," in accordance with the expression of the author of the platform of the revolutionary party, M. Mikhnovsky, thus took shape.⁴

But independence could be realized only in case of the breakup of one or of two states occupying the Ukrainian territories. Thus World War I gave rise to enormous hope for the Ukrainians. The dreamt-of occasion presented itself to Eastern Ukraine at the time of the Russian Revolution in March of 1917, but Western Ukraine had to wait until the end of the war and the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Only several days after the fall of the czarist regime, the Ukrainians created a provisional parliament in Kiev, the Central Rada ("council"). On 23 June 1917, the Rada proclaimed autonomy and created an autonomous government for Ukraine (28 June). On 16 July, this autonomy was recognized by the Russian provisional government. Although the Russians eventually seemed to want to recant, the regime of the Russian provisional government was swept away by Lenin's *coup d'état* (7 November).

On 15 November 1917, the Ukrainians seized total power in Ukraine, emerging victorious from a test of force at Kiev between the Russian Bolshevik units, the troops of the provisional government, and the Ukrainian troops. The following day the Ukrainian government informed all interested parties that henceforth all power over Ukraine was in its hands. On 20 November, the Rada proclaimed the Ukrainian National Republic.

Soviet Russia recognized the Ukrainian Republic on 16 December. France, looking for allies to maintain the eastern front, *de facto* recognized the Ukrainian Republic on 4 January 1918, as did the British government several days later.

But attacked by the troops of Soviet Russia, Ukraine was incapable of waging war and had to adhere to the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk, begun in December by Soviet Russia. On 12 January 1918, Ukraine was recognized by the Central Powers. Then on 22 January, the Ukrainian government formally proclaimed the independence of Ukraine (Appendix, Doc.#1). On 9 February, when Kiev fell into the hands of Soviet troops, the Ukrainian government signed a peace treaty with Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

To compel the Russian government to accept their conditions, the Austro-Germans launched a general offensive on the entire eastern front on 18 February. Although Ukraine was freed, it was incapable of delivering the quantity of wheat promised, so the Germans installed an occupational government and favored a *coup d'état* which overturned the government of the Rada. On 29 April 1918, General Pavlo Skoropadsky took the title of hetman and became head of the Ukrainian occupied state.

The withdrawal of some German occupation forces incited peasant revolts, and the pro-Russian policy of the government of the hetman was combatted by powerful republican opposition. Finally, an insurrection in mid-November put an end to the regime of Skoropadsky. At the same time, the Germans left Ukraine; the Ukrainian Republic was restored, and power passed into the hands of the Directory (which until 1920 led the Ukrainian struggle for independence).

Meanwhile, on 1 November, while seizing power in Lviv, the Ukrainians of Austro-Hungary proclaimed the National Republic of Western Ukraine (Appendix, Doc.#2). Considering Western Ukraine an integral part of Poland, however, the Polish minority of Lviv and its surrounding areas opposed the decision of the Ukrainians; some violent battles ensued, and on 22 November the Ukrainians had to evacuate Lviv, moving the government of Western Ukraine to Ternopil, then to Stanyslaviv. Contact was established with the government in Kiev, and, after the first agreement reached in Khvastiv (on 1 December 1918) and the vote of the National Council of Western Ukraine (Appendix, Doc.#3), the reunification of the two Ukrainian states into a single republic was proclaimed on 22 January 1919. The dream of a unified and independent Ukraine thus became a reality, but not for long.

The forces of the government of Kiev could not resist the assault of the Red Army, superior in numbers. In the east a new enemy appeared, the Russian army of Denikin, supported by France and Great Britain. The Ukrainian army lacked equipment, arms, medicine. In the west, the Polish army continued to advance. Symon Petliura, head of the government and of the army, tried to rectify the situation. Hoping for effectual aid from the Polish government of J. Pilsudski to fight against Soviet Russia, Petliura agreed to cede Ukrainian Galicia to the Poles and signed a treaty with Poland on 24 April 1920.

The Polish-Ukrainian offensive ended in failure. Poland abandoned its Ukrainian ally (partially under the pressure of some Western powers) and in October signed a preliminary treaty with Soviet Russia, dividing with her Ukrainian and Belorussian territories and confirming the new Polish-Soviet border by the peace treaty between the two countries signed in Riga on 18 March 1923.

On 21 November 1920 Ukrainian troops had to leave the national territory and let themselves be disarmed on Polish territory. Thus ended the period of Ukrainian independence.

The system initiated by the Treaty of Versailles and completed by the Treaty of Riga resulted in the division of Ukrainian territories among four countries: Soviet Russia (approximately 767,000 km² of Ukrainian territory), Poland (132,000 km²), Romania (17,700 km²), Czechoslovakia (14,900 km²).

This parcelling did not prevent the Ukrainian National Movement from developing in the whole of its ethnographic territories. Although crushed in Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s, in Western Ukraine it experienced a remarkable development.

Soviet Ukraine between the Two Wars

Soviet Ukraine was not originally annexed directly to Russia, but formed the Socialist Soviet Republic of Ukraine, formally "independent," but connected with Russia by bilateral agreements.

On 30 December 1922, the representatives of the communist authority of Ukraine and of other Soviet republics (Russia, Belorussia,

Trans-Caucasus) signed a treaty to form the Soviet Union, and the SSR of Ukraine became one of the components of the new federation. Actually, the formation of the USSR did nothing but legalize the domination of the new Russia over the other republics.

Despite the difficult conditions in the 1920s, national life in Soviet Ukraine flourished. Ukrainization of the institutions of the state, of the press, of education, of science, and of cultural life progressed steadily. Although dominated in principle by the official doctrine, Ukrainian literature experienced an almost normal development. The New Economic Policy (NEP) contributed to the improvement of the social conditions of the population. National life, in spite of severe repressions, seemed to recapture a certain *élan*, and the national movement even touched certain circles of the Communist party of Ukraine.

Moscow did not appreciate such efforts in Ukraine from 1925, especially those made by the commissar of education of SSR of Ukraine, O. Shumsky, and his successor, M. Skrypnyk, who aimed to activate Ukrainization and make it obligatory. The critical remarks of the communist writer M. Khvylovy and his slogan "Let us turn from Moscow and let us turn toward Europe," (1925-1927), were resented in Moscow as an act of defiance. In 1928, the communist economist M. Volobuev and his friends went so far as to suggest that, because the Ukrainian economy was subject to a colonial exploitation as in the past, Ukraine had no reason to remain a member of the Soviet federation (Diachenko 314). The Ukrainians did not abandon the idea of a free and independent Ukraine. The national government in exile, Ukrainian associations and organizations in Poland and in emigration kept people active and conscious of Russian occupation in Ukraine and of the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for freedom.

But Russia refused to consider the feasibility of an independent Ukraine for it could not allow itself to lose the wealth of this country. In 1927, Ukraine's contribution to the overall production of the Soviet Union was tremendous: 70% of coal, 60% of magnesium, 75% of iron, and 70% of cast iron (*Istoria Uk. RSS* 2:298). Russian industry could not function without Ukrainian coal. Furthermore, Ukraine supplied 28% of the grain production of the USSR (*Istoria selanstva* 2:97).

The years 1926-1927 were marked by tension between Russia and the Western powers. Diplomatic incidents in China in April and May of 1927 (mandate inside the Russian embassy at the request of the English and the arrest of Soviet diplomats) and in London (mandates in the quarters of Russian commercial mission) and also the support granted by the Communist International at the strike of the English miners, led the British government to annul the treaty of commerce and to break diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia (27 May 1927). The Russians then spoke of economic strangulation, of the menace of military intervention or of war and decided to lessen their economic dependence on the exterior. Implementation of this plan, which corresponded with the ambition of becoming a world power, would be impossible without the resources of Ukraine.⁵

At the moment of the incidents in China, the commissar of military and naval affairs of the USSR, K. Voroshilov, declared that by their provocation in the Far East, the "English imperialists" wished to implicate the Soviet Union in a war and "hoped at the same time to weaken us economically and, finally, weaken our western borders which would permit our neighbors to launch [an attack] against Ukraine and Belorussia." (*Osnovne* 8)

The Russians seemed to believe that England was preparing an intervention against the USSR. They were not the only ones to think so. The German publisher P. Rohrbach wrote in April of 1927 that England, in focusing on Ukraine, was seeking to weaken or to destroy the Soviet Union.⁶ Other newspapers, among them *The Economist* of London, confirmed that Great Britain was supporting Poland and other neighbors of Soviet Russia in case of an intervention (*Ukraina i zarubizny svit* 214).

In August of 1927, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks declared that "in preparing war against the USSR and the workers of his own country, the conservative government of England was organizing a diplomatic struggle everywhere against the USSR, organizing a blockade in the area of economics and of credit, and supporting counter-revolutionary bands in the Caucasus, notably in Georgia, as well as in Ukraine" (*KPRS* 2:336).

In December of 1927, the 15th Congress of the Party adopted the first five-year plan. This plan was destined to develop "some key

industries able to increase in the briefest possible time limit the economic power and the capacity of defense of the USSR, to guarantee the possibilities of development in case of economic blockade, [and] decrease the dependency [of Soviet Russia] through ties with the capitalist world" (*Istoria SSSR* 8:459). This plan was to be realized through industrialization and collectivization. Moreover, believing the resources of Ukraine threatened, the Russian government decided to develop a second important economic base, similar to the one in Ukraine, but located in the interior of Russia, far from all exterior menace, i.e., the Ural-Kuznetsk basin. The beginning of the realization of this plan (1928) coincided with the beginning of the development of the Soviet concentration system, which was to provide the State with abundant cheap manpower.⁷

At the same time, Moscow tightened its hold on Ukraine. Efforts to break Ukrainian aspirations developed under the guise of social struggle and class struggle. Authorities held that rich peasants (the "kulaks") and Ukrainian peasantry in general ("the individual peasant ownership") constituted "the social basis of Ukrainian nationalism" (*Proletarska Pravda*, 30 January 1930). This base *must* be destroyed. "The Ukrainian nationalists and their agents within the Communist Party [Bolsheviks] of Ukraine," however, were opposed to socialist industrialization. For all these reasons and for its efforts to separate Ukraine from Russia, Ukrainian nationalism was proclaimed the main enemy of the social state (Kassymenko 279).

In 1929, the Soviet police arrested many Ukrainians accused of being part of an illegal association, the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU). Among these were seventeen members and correspondents of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (including S. Yefremov, Y. Hermaize, H. Holoskevych) and twenty-eight other known personalities (L. Starytska-Cherniakhivska, V. Chekhivskyj, A. Nikovsky, etc.) They were tried publicly in March and April of 1930 in Kharkiv, in the then capital of the SSR of Ukraine. Their activities were attacked as activities supported from abroad.

At the same time, the authorities destroyed the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, arresting and deporting the majority of its priests and bishops.

During the liquidation campaign of the kulaks as a class (1930-1931), an indescribable terror gripped the country. From 1928 to 1932 between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 Ukrainians were deported or imprisoned in concentration camps and 300,000 to 500,000 were killed (Marchenko and Woropay 22). But it is the famine-genocide of 1932-1933 which contributed to the ruin of the people. In little more than one year between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 Ukrainians died following a consciously organized famine combined with ruthless requisitions, economically planned isolation of the village inhabitants, the law on protection of socialist ownership, etc. (Marchenko and Woropay 22).

The famine practically coincided with the end of the first five-year plan. Assessing the situation, Stalin declared on 7 January 1933: "We possessed only one coal and metallurgical base, that of Ukraine, which we had great trouble exploiting. We have not only reactivated this base, but we have built a new coal and metallurgical base in the east, which is the pride of our country...[and] we have from this day forth increased our capacity for defense of the country to a desired level" (Stalin 84, 87).

Soviet Russia thus asserted itself as a world power. Edward Herriot, who visited Ukraine during the great famine but saw nothing of it and even denied its existence, is supposed to have said with satisfaction in Moscow that "the USSR is progressively becoming a country that will make a name for itself by the same means as the United States" (*Izvestia*, 15 September 1933).

In his report to the 17th Congress of the Party, Stalin made the following analysis concerning the situation in Ukraine: "Until very recently, the deviation toward Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the main danger in Ukraine, but when we ceased to fight it and permitted it to develop to the point of becoming allied with interventionists, this deviation became a principal danger" (*Pravda*, 28 January 1934).

Two well-known figures of Soviet Ukraine, the vice-president of the people's commissars and former commissar of public education, a strong supporter of Ukrainization, M. Skrypnyk, and the writer M. Khvylovy, deeply distressed by the extent of the disaster in Ukraine, committed suicide in 1933. Skrypnyk then was accused by the authorities of having suffered the influence of the "counter-revolutionary" nationalist organization UVO (Ukrainian Military Organization).

After the first "cleansing" of "undesirable elements" at the Academy of Sciences the authorities also attacked men of letters, of the theater, and of Ukrainian culture in general. In a single night from the 16th to the 17th of December of 1934, twenty-eight writers, poets, and literary critics were shot to death in the prison of Kiev. Authorities kept accusing members of the Academy of Sciences of attempting in their works to promote conflict between the Ukrainians and the Russians, of proving affinity for Ukrainians with the west, and of seeing in the social and economic features of Ukraine the foundation of a political independence to be realized. Ukrainization, which had been meeting with opposition since 1931, was stopped and banned. The Russian language was once more considered the dominant language, the language of authority.

In the course of the years 1932-1938, hundreds and thousands of Ukrainians were arrested practically every day and sentenced to death or to imprisonment in a concentration camp. Other people (those of whom authorities were unsure or those suspected of patriotism or of nationalism) were deported to Siberia or to Central Asia.⁸ The authorities also eliminated in 1937-1938 certain sincere communists, including Yakir, Balitski, Popov, Khatayevitch, Lubchenko, Zatonsky, who, if they were not accused of "Trotskyism," were accused of supporting or of tolerating "Ukrainian nationalism." Repression against Ukrainian patriots or suspected patriots continued in 1938 and in 1939.

In accordance with certain information, eighteen persons accused of being part of the nationalist organization "Independent Ukraine" were shot in the court of the prison in Kiev in January of 1938, among them the prima ballerina of the opera of Kiev. In September of the same year, 110 Ukrainian officers of the Red Army, also suspected of being members of the same nationalist organization, were arrested. Fifty among them were shot immediately. At the time of their arrest gun shots were exchanged, in the course of which a political commissar of the army was wounded (*Ukrainske Slovo*, 18 September 1938).

In 1939, on the eve of World War II, there was no longer a national political force in Soviet Ukraine. The only remaining political force was that of the Communist party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, a party integrated with the Communist party of the Russian Bolsheviks.

Western Ukraine

The Treaty of Versailles of 23 June 1919 had guaranteed all fundamental rights to national minorities in the Polish State. Likewise, in the Treaty of Riga of 18 March 1921, Poland promised to respect the rights of the Ukrainian nationality. In view of its ethnic composition (approximately 64% Ukrainians, 25% Poles, 10% Jews, 1% other nationalities), Ukrainian Galicia should have enjoyed a system of autonomy (George 2:901). But the Polish authorities did not consider it useful to respect the rights of the Ukrainian nationality which was placed under a rule of repression from 1919 on. Between 1919 and 1922 nearly 100,000 persons were arrested and detained in prison or in camps. Approximately 27,000 Ukrainians died in these camps because of detention conditions or illness (*General Uk. Encyclopedia* 3:658). The term "Ukrainian" was banned; Ukrainians had the choice of calling themselves "Ruthenians," "native," "orthodox," etc. In 1920, Ukrainian Galicia received the official designation of "Little Eastern Poland."

When Polish authorities refused them all form of autonomy, Ukrainians engaged in a long struggle for freedom which took two forms. The political parties, the social and economic associations and groups used legal means. But a large number of the young, notably former fighters of the national army, exasperated by the defeat and outraged by the policy of repression, decided to continue the struggle by illegal and violent means. Participants in the revolutionary struggle founded in 1920 a clandestine organization of fighting, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). UVO organized assassination attempts against representatives of Polish authority in Western Ukraine (against Marshal Pilsudski in 1921, O. Grabski in 1922, the president of the Polish republic, S. Wojciechowski in 1924, etc.).

The struggle by legal means through the channel of political parties intensified, particularly after the Council of Ambassadors' decision to recognize Polish sovereignty over Galicia. The most important of the Ukrainian political parties, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO), became the primary legal political force in Western Ukraine, extended its influence and took under its control different Ukrainian cultural and economic institutions (Prosvita, the Union of Control of

Cooperatives, the Central Union "Dnister."). It had at its disposal several newspapers (the daily *Dilo*, the weekly *Svoboda*, *Nedila*, etc.).

Second place in the Ukrainian political parties was filled by the Ukrainian Radical Socialist Party (US-RP), a member of the Socialists International from 1931 on. This party published a weekly and several periodicals. The third legal Ukrainian force, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (USDP), founded in 1900, took up its activities in 1929, publishing three periodicals. In 1930 the Ukrainian National Catholic party was founded. Other parties of lesser importance included the Communist party of Western Ukraine, part of the Polish Communist Workers party.

Besides the Ukrainian Military Organization, other nationalist groups, for the most part created by young students, appeared in the mid 1920s. Representatives of these groups and of UVO, united in congress on 29 January 1929, decided to combine into a single clandestine revolutionary organization, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Believing that only a sovereign state, consequently a political organization, best suiting the national interests of the Ukrainian people, "constitutes a condition able to guarantee the nation an active participation in international life," (Appendix, Doc.#4) OUN decided to pursue the revolutionary struggle without compromise until the restoration of independence lost to Ukraine and the reestablishment of Ukrainian sovereignty in all the territories of the Ukrainian people. Leadership of the OUN was entrusted to Evhen Konovalets.

While waiting for the decision from the Council of Ambassadors, Ukrainians of Galicia had boycotted the elections of 1922, while those of Volhynia and of north-western regions had been able to elect twenty Ukrainian deputies and nine Ukrainian senators. In 1928 the Ukrainian political parties (including Galicia) secured, despite certain restrictive measures taken by the authorities, forty-eight mandates in the Diet and eleven in the Senate (*Uk. Encyclopedia* 2:560). The representatives of the Ukrainian parliamentary group automatically had the right to hold the seat of the presidency of two assemblies.

At the time of the plenary session of the Polish parliament, D. Levytsky, on behalf of the Ukrainian group, declared that, having as natives on the Ukrainian territories attributed to Poland, the Ukrainians

considered the Treaty of Riga and the decision of the Council of Ambassadors a violation of the right of the Ukrainian people to dispose freely of themselves, so these decisions were not recognized by the Ukrainians. The attitude of the Ukrainian parliamentarians was thus founded on the right of the entire Ukrainian people to form a national state uniting all the Ukrainian territories. But the Ukrainian parliamentary group was not important enough to influence the actions of the parliament or the policy of the Polish State. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian parliamentarians used the platform of the Polish parliament to question the government and to inform public opinion in Poland and in the world on the situation of the Ukrainian people in Poland. They also participated in the congresses of the International Parliamentary Union and maintained contacts with the parliamentarians of European countries.

Evoking the historic right (Galicia had belonged to Poland from 1349 to 1772), however, the Poles considered Western Ukraine Polish land which should remain such. The Ukrainian population (close to 6 million, i.e., more than 64% of the total population of these territories) was destined to be Polish.

The situation in which Ukrainians found themselves was very difficult. The greater number among them were peasants (80%), generally very poor and illiterate. Overburdened with taxes, often scorned by members of the administration and Polish settlers, the Ukrainian peasants remained unimpressed by the advances of the Polish State and resisted Polonization. The workers' class was less numerous (approximately 5%) and that of the intellectuals was even less (2.5%). Nevertheless, this West Ukrainian society, seemingly docile and easy to Polonize, met the attitude of the Polish authority as a challenge. Helped by conditions of relative freedom, its response was characterized by a remarkable vitality.

To meet the agitation of the Ukrainian population, and to stop an increase of patriotism and of clandestine activity, the authorities decided to "pacify" the Ukrainian regions. The first "pacification" took place just before the elections of 1930. This "pacification" (like the subsequent ones) took on the semblance of a vast operation of repression: there were searches and confiscations; some people were severely beaten and several died. Arrests were numerous: 1,739 persons, including thirty

members of the parliament, 220 university students, 360 students of secondary schools (Iwanicki 31).

By such "pacification" and electoral manipulations, authorities were able to halt the advance of Ukrainians in parliament for a time. In 1930 there were not more than twenty-seven mandates in the Diet and only one in the Senate. Following elections in 1935, however, the Ukrainians had nineteen seats in the Diet and six in the Senate (UNDO thirteen deputies and four senators; UKNP one deputy and one senator; five deputies and one senator were elected in Volhynia) (*Uk. Encyclopedia* 2:563).

Response to the Polish challenge was remarkable, especially in the areas of education and economics. There had been 3,600 Ukrainian schools in Western Ukraine in 1918. Under the Polish rule, their number fell to 461, forty-one of which were private (Iwanicki 237). The Ukrainian schools were replaced with bilingual schools.

To remedy this catastrophic situation, the Ukrainians, with the help of the association "Ridna Shkola," developed private education. Toward the end of the 1930s, this school association administered thirty-three elementary schools (6,008 pupils), twelve secondary schools (2,499 pupils) and eleven professional schools (1,835 students). In addition, it made use of 605 Kindergartens (22,094 children) (Iwanicki 236). In the course of the academic year 1938/1939, there were fifteen private Ukrainian institutions of secondary education.

Polish authorities, however, never wanted to authorize a Ukrainian university, even a private one. The first attempt to create such a university was defeated by the authorities in 1919. In 1921 the Ukrainians organized a clandestine university (approximately 1,260 students in 1921/1922), but in 1925 under the pressure of Polish authorities, its courses were interrupted (*Uk. Encyclopedia* 4:1422-23).

Ukrainians, nevertheless, managed to develop economic, social and cultural life in a remarkable way: they founded banks, cooperatives, cultural associations, and mutual aid societies. The most important Ukrainian bank was the Tsentrobank (Central Bank). Between 1935 and 1938 this bank recorded an increase of 342% in its turn-over (its floating capital increased to 70,436,211 zloty in 1938). Three other banks (Ukrainbank, Prombank, Mortgage Bank) likewise had a turn-over

increase. Ukrainian cooperatives (Tsentrosoiuz, Maslosoiuz) also experienced an astonishing development. In 1938 the association of the farming peasants "Silskyi Hospodar" had sixty branches, 2,008 circles, and 199,977 members who had fifty-three agronomists and eighteen veterinarians at their disposition.

With private funds, the Ukrainians constructed a modern three-story 100-bed hospital in Lviv. The hospital, where some twenty Ukrainian doctors worked, became also a center for medical research. In the course of 1938, the out-patient department admitted 41,000 patients (68.8% Ukrainians, 22% Poles, 9.2% Jews and Germans).

In 1936 the cultural association Prosvita had 275,324 members, 3,071 libraries and reading rooms, 190 itinerant libraries, 377 theater groups, 2,043 amateur groups, 1,086 choirs, 124 orchestras, 122 women sections, etc. (Iwanicki 39-42, 61). The Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh) organized conferences and published scientific works on Ukrainian history and civilization.

Other associations worked on rebuilding the cultural level and on improving the standard of living of the Ukrainian population: the Association of Ukrainian Women (approximately 50,000 members in 1936), the Association of Teachers, the Association of Lawyers, the Association of Doctors, several associations of mutual aid and social aid, some sport associations.

Also in Poland there appeared eighty-three Ukrainian newspapers and periodicals, twenty-one of which were political publications. Despite rather severe censorship, Ukrainian political thinking was able to develop quasi-normally.

Under such conditions Ukrainian nationalism experienced an unprecedented development. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) increased acts of sabotage, attacks by main force, even assassination attempts. Several court proceedings of Ukrainian nationalists took place in the period from 1931 to 1939, the most publicized being that of members of OUN implicated in the assassination of the Polish minister of the interior, Bronislaw Pieracki, in June of 1934.

Despite repressions, the OUN extended its influence to various social strata of the population, particularly the young. This revolutionary organization became the main Ukrainian political force which also

influenced Ukrainian territories in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Efforts were made to extend its activities to, or at least its influence into, the Soviet Ukraine. In Poland, and eventually in Soviet Ukraine, the OUN operated secretly, but its political struggle in emigration (in Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, England, the United States, and Canada) took place openly, legally.

Germany, Poland, Soviet Russia, and the Ukrainian Movement

To reiterate, before World War II, the ethnographic Ukrainian territory found itself divided among four countries:⁹

1. *The Soviet Union*: 767,000 km², 42,200,000 inhabitants; the RSS of Ukraine comprised only 451,800 km², 32,568,000 inhabitants, 26 million of whom, or 80%, were Ukrainians.

2. *Poland*: 132,200 km², 10,200,000 inhabitants, of whom approximately 6,500,000, or 64%, were Ukrainians.

3. *Romania*: 17,700 km², 1,400,00 inhabitants, of whom approximately 875,000, or 63%, were Ukrainians.

4. *Czechoslovakia*: 14,900 km², 760,000 inhabitants, of whom approximately 560,000, or 73%, were Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian movement for independence constituted a menace to the integrity of each of these countries. Consequently, each of them opposed the Ukrainian national movement when it supported the national aspirations of Ukrainians living in its territory.

As each one of these countries considered the Ukrainian population only a simple minority without any other aspiration than that of being good loyal citizens ready to let themselves be assimilated, the Ukrainian movement was generally suspected of being urged by the neighbor, or else by a foreign power farther away.

In the 1920s, Soviet Russia generally refrained from accusing Germany in Ukrainian matters, but accused Poland, Romania, and France, for since 1923 Moscow had maintained good relations with Berlin, particularly in military, technical, and economic areas. A particularly close collaboration was established between the Red Army and the Reichswehr. German officers could study on Russian military

grounds the development of heavy armament and pursue tactical exercises with them (e.g., tanks, planes and heavy artillery, forbidden to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles). In return, the officers of the Russian army learned, most often in Germany, how to make use of German experience in the areas of strategy and military tactics. This collaboration gradually extended itself to weapons. The Russians authorized the Germans to build discreetly airplane factories and plants for the production of weapons in Russia. German plants collaborated with the reconstruction of Soviet Russia and its industrialization.

This cooperation, which contributed significantly to the reconstruction of the German armed forces, continued until 1933 (Renouvin 276; Schellenberg 44-47; Sivers 424). Commercial exchange between Russia and Germany also represented a very important part in the foreign trade of the USSR: 18% in 1924; 25% in 1928; 28% in 1931; 33% in 1932; 28% in 1933; 20% in 1934. The Soviet Union's imports from Germany were: 19% in 1924; 26% in 1928; 37% in 1931; 47% in 1932; 42% in 1933; 12% in 1934 (*Vneshnaya* 8-9; Fabry 30).

With Hitler's rise to power in January of 1933, however, Soviet Russia saw in Germany a formidable adversary. The National Socialist party was violently anti-communist, anti-bolshevist, and anti-Jewish. Moscow especially remembered that in 1927 in *Mein Kampf* Hitler had written that instead of dreaming of getting colonies elsewhere, Germany had to look for the solution to its problem of acquisition of territories for colonization in Russia and in neighboring countries (Hitler 316).

However, Hitler had never said or written that he approved of an independent Ukraine. Alfred Rosenberg, in a brochure which appeared before the Nazis' coming to power, had written that Germany should consider the possibility of supporting the national movements in the Soviet Union, notably in Ukraine and in the Caucasus (Rosenberg 97). The supposition that Germany was favorable to the independence of these nations was actually ill founded and the policies of Rosenberg were ambiguous. However, such ideas were attributed to him, hence the violent reaction in *Pravda* on 13 March 1933.

On 10 July 1933 *Pravda* affirmed that certain Polish circles were ready to cede to Germany the "corridor" and Upper Silesia, on condition that Berlin grant to Poland military aid to realize Polish "former claims"

on Soviet Belorussia and Soviet Ukraine. In fact, certain Polish circles, desirous of returning to pre-1772 partition borders, did not cease to covet Ukrainian and Belorussian territories. This desire prompted various calculations and speculations also among the Germans.

The foreign policy office (APA) of the National Socialist party, directed by Rosenberg, studied the situation and political groupings, and formulated recommendations regarding the policies to be followed. According to the 29 July 1933 memorandum sent by that office to the head of the Reich's press office, the National Socialist party was not suggesting at all that it supported the idea of an independent Ukrainian state. The memorandum stated significantly that since Germany, for the moment, was not able to revise its eastern borders by force, it might use other means, i.e., by increasing Poland's appetite for Soviet Ukraine and Lithuania. The policy of Polish expansion toward the east, in accordance with the memorandum, corresponded with English politics, since in 1931 England had secretly contacted the Polish government, suggesting that it attack Soviet Russia, but Pilsudski, uncertain of the attitude of Germany, had refused. Now, according to the memorandum, the situation had changed. Consequently, a joint Anglo-Germano-Polish intervention against Russia, with the consent of France and Italy, could bring about not only the destruction of the Soviet Union but also the revision of the eastern borders of the Reich. Poland would certainly consent to cede to Germany the region of Poznan and Upper Silesia in exchange for Lithuania (with the port of Memel) and a part of Soviet Ukraine. The remainder of the Soviet Union would be divided into two zones: European Russia and the Caucasus would constitute the zone of German-Polish interest; Asiatic Russia would be the zone of Anglo-Japanese interest. Germany could also envision claiming some colonies (National Archives).

This plan of special service for the National Socialist party was not based on the right of the peoples to determine themselves freely; it totally ignored the Ukrainian question.

The German and Polish desires concerning Eastern Europe were public knowledge. The French newspaper, *Le Temps* of 16 November 1933 claimed that certain German circles were dreaming of expansion toward the Baltic States, while they encouraged Poland to turn toward

Ukraine. All these speculations generally provoked an intensification of repression in Soviet Ukraine and caused Moscow to strengthen its defenses.

In the summer of 1933, General von Bockenberg visited the heads of the Red Army. His visit was the last contact between the two armies, for a little later, the Russian government changed its attitude, eliminating military Russo-German cooperation. The problem of this cooperation was discussed during the talks in Moscow on 31 October 1933 between the German *chargé d'affaires*, F. von Twardowski, and General Tukhachevski, vice-commissar of war. Tukhachevski explained to the German diplomat that despite regrettable changes in politics, the feelings of the Red Army regarding the Reichswehr and the German people remained unchanged; they would never forget that the Reichswehr had supported the Red Army in a decisive manner.

Fritz von Twardowski wanted to know if the change in attitude of the Soviet government were caused by the rapprochement between Moscow and France and Poland, but Tukhachevski claimed this rapprochement had nothing to do with the relinquishment of the "intimate" cooperation between the Red Army and the Reichswehr. Rather it was the "unfriendly or neutral, even anti-Soviet" attitude of the government in Berlin, and certain other events that had been happening for some time (e.g., activities of Rosenberg, anti-Soviet memorandum of the minister of economics Hugenberg, presented at the conference in London in June 1933, etc.). Tukhachevski assured von Twardowski that neither the Soviet government nor the Red Army had communicated to the French or to the Poles any information "concerning the military German-Soviet collaboration." He concluded, "N'oubliez pas, mon ami, c'est la politique, seulement votre politique qui nous sépare, pas nos sentiments, nos sentiments les plus amicaux pour la Reichswehr." ("Don't forget, my friend, it is politics, only your politics which separate us, not our feelings, our most friendly feelings for the Reichswehr") (BA-MA RW 5/V.461).

Although nothing indicated that Berlin had a favorable policy toward Ukrainians, the Polish press throughout 1933 led a campaign of defamation and accusations against the Ukrainians, more specifically against the OUN. Thus, for example, in May, 1933, by drawing attention

to a conflict within the management of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute of Berlin, the Polish press affirmed that the head of OUN, Konovalets, was in the pay of Germany (*Gazeta Polska*, 27 May 1933).

Actually, the conflict within the Ukrainian Scientific Institute of Berlin had another meaning. In May 1933, OUN made an attempt to take control of this institute which was directed by some partisans of P. Skoropadsky, the former hetman of Ukraine. An important member of the OUN, Riko Yary, who represented Konovalets, tried to secure appointment as a member of the Institute's administrative council. His candidacy received support from the delegate of the ministry of cultural affairs, who put pressure on General Groener, president of the administration council. But General Groener, with the support of the delegate of the National Socialist party which was very much opposed to Yary and the OUN, refused Yary's candidacy (BA NS 43/43 f. 367-369; R 43 11/155 f. 155).¹⁰

Spread by Ukrainian political adversaries of the OUN, this incident, concerning the struggle between the two Ukrainian political movements for the control of a scientific institution, was presented by Poles as proof that Konovalets and Yary were "agents" in the pay of the Germans. Newspapers such as *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny*, *Gazeta Poranna*, *Dziennik Poznanski* continued to carry this campaign for months. For example, *Dziennik Poznanski* on 28 October 1933 claimed that the OUN was directed by Berlin, had assumed the ideology and the program of the Nazis, and received financial aid from Berlin.

No well-founded proof to these allegations was ever brought forth by either Polish or Soviet authorities, although Polish authorities had an unexpected opportunity. From the Fall of 1933, they had in their possession the secret archives of the central direction of the OUN. The entire secret correspondence of the years 1928-1933, accounts of meetings, reports of activities, in total approximately 15,000 pages of typewritten records stored in a secret apartment in Prague, were stolen by the Polish counter-espionage agent with the complicity of the Czech police. In fact, the Polish authorities found nothing that could constitute proof for the assertions published in the press.

Poland, in turn, was beginning political rapprochement with Nazi Germany. Despite difficulties which created awkward problems for the

German minority in Poland, at Hitler's suggestion Warsaw and Berlin entered into negotiations in November of 1933, leading to the signing of the German-Polish agreement of friendship and non-aggression on 26 January 1934. This agreement would have direct repercussion on the Ukrainian question.

Responding to the allegations of the Polish press, the official organ of OUN *Rozbudova Natsii* (Development of the Nation #1-2/72-73, Jan.-Feb., 1934, p.50) declared that an invader needs not only laws, prisons, gallows, and army, but also lies ("disinformation"). He needs historians to lie to falsify the history of invaded oppressed people. He needs journalists to lie to repudiate oppression of a people. His ministers, his ecclesiastics, his institutions and his police are obliged to lie to hide the truth about the oppression. To damage and destroy it, the Poles claimed that the Ukrainian independent movement was a "German intrigue" and pretended that the Germans were behind all that happened in Western Ukraine (*Rozbudova* 50).

The essence of the memorandum of the APA of July 1933 appears in the 12 May 1934 memorandum of Rosenberg on Anglo-German relations. Rosenberg said that in case of a conflict between Russia and Japan, "...the question of southern Russia would again be topical and there existed a real possibility of collaboration between England, Poland, and Germany." In that case, one could "guarantee Poland its extension toward the Black Sea and negotiate in the framework of such an association certain economic compensations for Germany and some petroleum compensations for England" (IMT 049-PS; Seraphim 166). Rosenberg wrote in his journal that Hitler had read his memorandum with interest and approval (Seraphim 30).

Ukrainian national circles, in particular the head of the OUN, Konovalets, and most of the members of the Central Direction (PUN), realized that the policies of Nazi Germany were unfavorable to the Ukrainian cause. From 1933 on Konovalets aimed to strengthen the activities of the OUN in England, considering that, regarding the solution to the question of Eastern Europe, it was preferable to have the support of Great Britain and to cooperate with her (Lakhovych 915). Immediately after the signing of the Polish-German Agreement, Konovalets left Germany and settled permanently in Geneva (February 1934).

The London representative of the OUN, E. Lakhovych had some success. In April 1934, the British journalist Lancelot Lawton drew the attention of English statesmen to the fact that Hitler, contrary to his predecessors, did not look both toward the east and the west but only towards the east. "No one who studies the map of Eastern Europe can doubt that there are immense possibilities for a German-Polish compromise at the expense of others," wrote Lawton. And the German and Polish penetration into Ukraine would hurt the economic and strategic interests of Great Britain. Lawton suggested that Ukraine be included in the West European system because "an independent and autonomous Ukraine is indispensable for European economic progress and for world peace." A democratic Ukraine, according to him, would then be among the states with which Great Britain could maintain ties of friendship (Lawton, as quoted by Kamenetsky 13, 40; Seraphim 36).

At the same time, according to the Italian journalist Enrico Insabato who had just spent time in Warsaw, the desires of the Poles were "corridor to the Black Sea and common frontiers with Hungary." Insabato said this to Rosenberg, assuring him that Pilsudski "is in the process of gathering together the peripheral people from Finland to Turkey" and that he "is waiting to reply to Russia" (Seraphim 36).

In the beginning of January of 1935 fourteen members of the parliament and six British personalities sent a petition to the League of Nations concerning the persecutions of Ukrainians by Polish authorities; in May of the same year the Anglo-Ukrainian Committee was founded in London. On 4 June 1935, Konovalets sent a letter to the London representative of the OUN defining with precision the policies and the hopes of his organization. Translated immediately into English, the letter was handed over to the Foreign Office.

Konovalets expressed the conviction of the Ukrainian nationalists that independent Ukraine would be an important and useful factor in the balance of power in Eastern Europe and in the cultural and economic development of Europe as a whole, but certain agreements passed recently between European powers were violating the natural right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination and could lead to a conflict in which the Ukrainian people would suffer.

Among these agreements was the German-Polish Agreement of 26 January 1934, which, because it reinforced the Polish domination on the western territories of Ukraine, was contrary to the interests of the Ukrainian people. If this agreement contained, as the international press reported, plans of a colonial nature concerning eastern (Soviet) Ukraine, their realization would encounter, declared Konovalets, "strong resistance on the part of the Ukrainian nationalists who are fighting for complete independence of the Ukrainian State and against the colonization of Ukraine by anyone" (Lakhovych 916).

The head of the Ukrainian Nationalists criticized the Franco-Russian Agreement by which, he said, France, ignoring the Ukrainian people's hopes for independence, was contributing to the reinforcement of the *status quo*. France ignored "consideration the barbaric behavior of the Bolshevik regime in regard to the Ukrainians" (Lakhovych 916). The OUN, continued Konovalets, would do everything to prevent the Ukrainian people from shedding their blood in the interest of foreign countries. He stressed that instead of living happily in an independent national state the Ukrainian people found themselves divided among four states; if there were a conflict, the Ukrainians, as soldiers of these states, would be led to confront each other with weapons.

Although the OUN considered Russia the most dangerous occupant of Ukraine, concluded Konovalets, "henceforth we shall fight with all our forces all arbitrary attempts of armed intervention that might want to settle the affairs of Eastern Europe contrary to the wishes of the Ukrainian people or without their consultation, because such actions would lead to new partitions and enslavement of Ukraine and not to its liberation" (Lakhovych 917).

Because the Ukrainian aspirations were in no way contrary to the political, economic or strategical interests of Great Britain, Konovalets expressed hope that Great Britain would support the Ukrainian struggle for independence (Lakhovych 917).

At the time of a conference held for members of the *New and Middle East Association*, the representative of the OUN, Y. Lakhovych, remarked: "The breaking-up of Russia and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, whose development would be in accordance with British interests, would contribute to the elimination of the danger (which

Russian expansionism represents) and, in my opinion, would be beneficial to Great Britain" (Lakhovych 919).

The Assassination of Minister Pieracki

On 15 June 1934 on a street in Warsaw, a militant nationalist mortally wounded with several shots the Polish minister of the interior, Bronislaw Pieracki, whom the Ukrainians considered most responsible for the brutal actions of "pacification" in Western Ukraine. The assassination attempt was organized by the OUN, more exactly by UVO, the military branch of the OUN. Two members of the OUN, including M. Lebed, implicated in the organization of the assassination, hurriedly left Poland for Germany not knowing that since the signing of the Polish-German Agreement in January 1934, cooperation between the two powers had become a reality. The two men were arrested in Germany and extradited at the demands of Polish authorities. Other individuals who were in Danzig were handed over to the Polish police.

In all, twelve people were arrested in Poland by the police, among them Stepan Bandera, head of the executive committee of the OUN for Western Ukraine. Following meticulous investigation, their trial was held in Warsaw from 18 November 1935 to 13 January 1936.

In October of 1934, the Poles talked to Himmler about the close collaboration between the political police of the two countries to combat the "Ukrainian terrorists" (AA Polit. Beziehungen 198/4 IV Po 7221). In December of 1934, the president of the Polish Council, Kozlowski, declared to the German ambassador in Warsaw that "the question of relations between the Ukrainian terrorist organizations and Germany was permanently resolved," because, in delivering the "murderer of Pieracki,"¹¹ Germany had made it clearly understood that it "sincerely desired an entente with Poland" (AA Polit. Bez. 198/4 IV Po 9028).

During the investigation and trial of Bandera and his co-defendants, the Polish police used the secret archives of the OUN to confront the accused and disclose all the activities of the organization, but these archives did not carry any proof of collaboration between the OUN and the German services, or of German financial support. All that the

accusation was able to demonstrate was that the OUN had received a certain sum from the Lithuanian government (Zelenski 36). The members of the OUN were tried not for being "agents in pay of foreigners" but for having taken part in the organization of an assassination attempt which had cost the life of a Polish statesman.

Moreover, the communiqué of the UVO command, published after the assassination, specified that in killing the Polish minister, the perpetrator of the assassination had "carried out the sentence" of the Ukrainian revolutionary court. This communiqué accused Pieracki of having been one of the principal directors of political oppression in Western Ukraine, having organized the liquidation of Ukrainian schools and associations, undertaken Polonization of the Ukrainian Church, favored the influx of Polish workers into Ukrainian industrial centers, and organized anti-Ukrainian pogroms at the time of pacification from 1930 to 1934. The communiqué further declared that the execution of one of the responsible representatives of the occupation regime in Western Ukraine was only "a confirmation of the unwavering wish of the Ukrainian people to continue the struggle for liberation all the way to victory."¹²

The Warsaw trial ended in three death sentences commuted to life sentences (S. Bandera, M. Lebed, Y. Karpynets) and two life sentences (M. Klymyshyn, B. Pidhayny). The other accused were sentenced to seven to fifteen year prison terms. Stepan Bandera and Mykola Lebed welcomed the death sentence with the cry "Long live Ukraine!"

The Warsaw trial enabled the Polish people to learn of the struggle of the Ukrainians. As one Polish journalist wrote:

The trial against the Ukrainian terrorists which has been taking place for more than three weeks is changing its face little by little...These people have killed because they wanted to serve the cause of their people. We don't think that they have served his cause well by killing. It is at this moment that they are doing it successfully: three quarters of the Polish press, this press which for seventeen years (that the Polish state exists) refused to acknowledge the word "Ukrainian," during these three weeks has learned to do so, and it will never again forget

it. For seventeen years they have been instilling in us that to introduce the Polish language in the peripheral regions, even with the help of coercion, means...to bring about love for Poland. But these people here who do know Polish refuse to speak this language. Their hate for the Polish State, for the Polish minister, for the Polish publicist and police has carried over to the Polish language. We were taught that this "Ukraine" was only an artificial construction which was going to disappear with the disappearance of the Austrian State which had created it. However, it is this same "Ukraine" which—more so today than in the past—is exploding with its hatred toward us...(*Wiadomosci Literackie*, Warsaw, #50, 15 December 1935).

The organ of the Polish radical populists affirmed: "We others, Polish populists, have the duty to say out loud that the Ukrainian people exist, that they live and fight for their right to live. It is up to us to understand and to appraise this heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people, of these people who for centuries have not had a State, who have been Russified, Polonized and who, nevertheless, are still here" (*Svoboda*, Jersey City, #300, 26 December 1935).

The Warsaw trial only confirmed that the assassination attempt against Pieracki, ordered and organized by S. Bandera, as well as all actions of the OUN were part of the Ukrainian struggle for freedom and independence for their country. None of the assassination attempts had been masterminded from abroad. The accused appeared in court as Ukrainian patriots, as participants in a cause which they believed just.

Russia's Fears for Ukraine

Soviet Russia did not cease fearing for Ukraine. On 10 July 1934, the German consulate in Kharkiv informed Berlin that uppermost in the mind of the Soviet regime in Ukraine "are fears of a separation of Ukraine on foreign initiative, particularly that of Germany." The report continued:

It is asserted here that with the National Socialists' coming to power, the Ukrainian circles of emigrants, who see in Hitler the liberator of Ukraine, have again become very active. The plan of Ukrainian separation thus is becoming the key-point of international politics. It is said that German fascism has never abandoned the idea of an expedition to the east in the context of an imperialist intervention. The first stage of this will be Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the north and Soviet Ukraine in the south. At the moment when the government of Soviet Ukraine is moving to Kiev,¹³ a political [German] group in Berlin, with some White émigrés, is planning to invade Soviet Ukraine, indeed the entire Soviet Union (BA-MA RW 5/v.461, Tgb.147:12).

Having made clear that the National Socialists' coming to power had disappointed the Soviet Union, the consul general gave the following explanation of Soviet fears *à propos* Ukraine: "...many influential politicians, officials of the party and of the State and editors-in-chief [of newspapers] are Jews, who not only express their thoughts as Marxists, but also take a negative position full of hate because they are guided by racial instinct" (BA-MA RW 5 461:13).

Evidently argument that National Socialist Germany wished to separate Ukraine from Russia—a supreme argument for the Russian sensitivity—was used to mobilize the Russians around the regime and above all against the National Socialist regime.

In his report of 19 March 1935 the consul general cited the official explanations given on the occasion of the opening ceremonies of the ministry of the interior in Kiev:

À propos the creation of the ministry of the interior it is stressed that this reform does not signify any reduction of class struggle. Admittedly, the nationalists, the Trotskyists, and the counter-revolutionaries have been defeated, but they have not been permanently wiped out. They appear in Ukraine as conspirators against the dictatorship of the proletariat, as agents in pay of the capitalists, as spies and traitors to their

country, and they try to separate Ukraine from the great Soviet Union. The task of the ministry of the interior, newly created [in Ukraine], is to be the guardian of the revolution and the protector of the State (BA-MA RW 5/v.461, 57:4-5).

Yet, as the report pointed out, the Soviet constitution still was providing the right to Ukraine to leave the Soviet Union. But the Soviet authorities claimed that "it is the class enemies who, under the cover of nationalist slogans of liberation of Ukraine, stand up against the socialist enlightenment" and wish to separate Ukraine from the Soviet Union to deliver it into "slavery" (BA-MA RW 5/v.461, 57:9). The report adds that for some time now persecutions in Ukraine had been directed mainly "against the nationalists and the Trotskyists who make up a united block" (BA-MA RW 5/v.461, 57:10).

Speaking of the international situation, the president of the council of people's commissars of the SRR of Ukraine, P. Liubchenko, declared in the Supreme Soviet in Moscow that "the German fascists would have included in their program a territorial extension at the expense of the Soviet Union, and a special place has been reserved in these plans for Ukraine. The German fascists in Berlin are supporting Colonel Konovalts" (BA-MA RW 5/v.461, 57:12). Likewise, the newspaper *Visti*, official organ of the Soviet government of Ukraine, held that "German fascists, in their folly of imperialist grandeur, dream of destroying the Soviet Ukraine," this "sparkling pearl of the Soviet Union" (BA-MA RW 5/v.461, 57:12-13).

These attacks against Ukrainian nationalism reveal persistence of the national feeling which the authorities considered dangerous for the cohesion of the empire. By maintaining pressure, the authorities sought to assure peace in the population and eliminate people suspected of nationalism. According to the report, there lies the importance for the socialization of the economy in Ukraine (BA-MA RW 5/v.461, 57:20).

The newspaper *Visti* returned to the matter of Ukrainian nationalism in its issue of 12 June 1935, affirming that UVO, the military branch of the OUN, had extended its activities to the Soviet Ukrainian territory. The newspaper accused the head of OUN, Konovalts of having the support of Germany.

Moscow consistently accused all opposition movements of having the support or being in the service of foreign governments, especially the Nazis. At the time of the 1936 and 1938 trials Soviet justice formulated the same accusations against such communists as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Piatakov, Bukharin, saying that they had tried to seize power with the aid of foreign states. Accordingly, Trotsky "has engaged in negotiations with one of the leaders of the German National Socialist party in the common struggle against the Soviet Union" (according to Piatakov's confession, Trotsky had negotiated with Hess) (*Les procès de Moscou* 56).

The bill of indictment labeled Trotsky a "fascist agent" and the others "despicable fascists mercenaries," "who set for themselves the objective of spying for the benefit of foreign states" and "of carving up the USSR and of separating from it Ukraine, Belorussia..." (56-57). According to Piatakov, in exchange for aid which would facilitate gaining power, the "Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc" promised a favorable attitude toward German interests and "territorial concessions in a veiled form of non-resistance to the Ukrainian national bourgeois forces in case of their self-determinaion" (71).

If, to back up these accusations, the Soviet authorities did have at their disposal some confessions of Piatakov and of others accused in the case of Konovalets, excluding reappearing rumors of an indoctrination campaign, the accusation had no foundation.

Ukrainian communists, too, were labeled "nationalists" and "fascists" as soon as they made the slightest defense of the interests of Ukraine. In 1937-1938 authorities "discovered" an illegal organization which they called the "National Fascist Organization of Ukraine" among whose members would have been notorious communist leaders (former pillars of the Soviet regime in Ukraine such as P. Liubchenko, H. Hrynko, A. Khvyła, M. Popov, V. Zatonsky and many others). This organization was dissolved and the "traitors" punished—one other way of getting rid of adversaries, opponents and rivals.

The Incident of the So-called Renewal of the German-Ukrainian Treaty

The incident of the so-called "renewal of the German-Ukrainian Treaty of 1918" constitutes a classic example of the manner in which disinformation concerning the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement was put to use.

In the beginning of February 1937, the Polish magazine *Odnova* announced: "Approximately one month ago the German-Ukrainian Treaty of 1918, by which the German government had committed itself to finance the formation of Ukrainian military and terrorist groups on Polish territory, has been renewed. In the Ukrainian part of Poland, leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist organizations have formed illegal well-organized groups, whose members have to carry out any order whatsoever under the penalty of severe punishment" (AA Pol. V 522).

Odnova also affirmed that it was beyond all doubt that the Ukrainian nationalist organizations were "in case of a war in Eastern Europe, destined to stab Poland in the back. The German government which already looks upon Danzig as conquered, has just moved the center of its agitation to the southeast of Poland."

On 12 February 1937 this information was picked up by *Journal du Matin* of Luxemburg with this heading: "Renewal of the German-Ukrainian Treaty. Berlin finances Ukrainian terror organizations in Poland." The *Journal* wrote that according to *Odnova*, "the terrorist organizations in question are those of fascist Ukrainians: the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) and the UNAKOR (Popular Organization of Ukrainian Cossacks)." The *Journal* observed that the head of the first organization, Colonel Konovalets, "has recently left Geneva to settle in Berlin where General Skoropadsky, head of UNAKOR, who in 1918 had concluded a treaty with Germany that placed Ukraine under German control, also resides."

On 15 February this information from *Journal du Matin* was picked up by the Polish opposition daily *Wieczor Warszawski*, which added that, according to the German-Ukrainian Agreement, Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Poland and in the Soviet Union were receiving financial support from Germany and that in case of a "military expansion to the

east" they had committed themselves to undertake activities of diversion and sabotage. The newspaper added that with this financial support the Germans had under their control all the heads of the Ukrainian nationalists. Skoropadsky and Konovalets, each in turn, was hoping to become the head of an independent Ukrainian state under German control. After the renewal of the German-Ukrainian Treaty, continued the Polish newspaper, a second illegal organization, the UNAKOR, was active in the districts of Horokhiv and Volodymyrets. In reference to this, *Journal du Matin* asserted that "several trials against Hitler terrorists in Rowno and Gorochowo" (district of Volhynia) had demonstrated that "these organizations" were being financed by Berlin (AA Pol.V 522). The truth is different and simpler. Secret German archives confirm that in this incident the OUN was totally uninvolved, was not receiving any financial support from Germany and that Konovalets had not settled in Berlin. He was still residing in Switzerland and was trying to interest Western powers in the Ukrainian question.

Did the OUN have dealings with German services or the Nazi party? Under the Weimar Republic one of the leaders of the OUN, Riko Yary, was assigned to maintain contacts with the German ministry of war, e.g. the Reichswehr, but these contacts, certainly less important than those of the Soviet military authorities, were interrupted well before the Nazis' coming to power. Konovalets, as noted, had left Berlin in the beginning of 1934. On 15 May 1936 the Reich's minister of war acknowledged in a secret letter addressed to the Reich's minister of foreign affairs that "for years the ministry of war has had no contact with the Ukrainian nationalists" (AA Pol. V 523).

The attitude of the German Nazi party toward the OUN was actually hostile, constantly cautioning German political authorities against this organization.

Arno Schickendanz, a high official of the eastern department of the foreign policy office of the NSDAP (APA, directed by A. Rosenberg), in the 21 February 1938 memorandum addressed to the Reich's chancellery and to other political authorities in Berlin, pointed out that the head of the OUN, Konovalets, who had maintained "steady relations" with "certain services" in Berlin during the Weimar Republic had left Berlin

in the course of the second year of the Third Reich and had again taken up agitation work against the Germans among the Ukrainians.

Stabsleiter Schickendanz wrote that the May-June 1934 issue of the journal *Rozbudova Natsii*, official organ of the OUN, was denouncing the Nazi party as a party marked with fanaticism, intolerance, and an ideology based on race and blood (Appendix, Doc.#5).

The Ukrainian Nationalist organ renewed its attacks with still more vehemence after the extradition to Poland of Ukrainian political refugees, accusing Germans of deeming themselves a superior race that was not to be guided by the rules of ethics and honor. This attitude was the reason for the ruthless cruelty which they had been manifesting for a long time, especially in Ukraine in 1918 and in Austria in 1934. In his memorandum Schickendanz also recalled that Konovalets' press bureau in the United States had published interviews with some English people opposed to fascism. Then Schickendanz added that the anti-German attitude of the OUN could be explained by the fact "that a certain number of close collaborators of Konovalets have Jewish spouses" (Appendix, Doc.#5). The Nazi party thus had serious reservations in regard to the OUN.

Furthermore, prior to the publication of the press information concerning the so-called "German-Ukrainian Treaty," several trials had taken place in Volhynia, in particular six trials of members of the OUN in 1936 and one important trial in January 1937. None of the trials submitted evidence of any ties between the Ukrainian movement and the Germans.

For example, at the January 1937 trial which took place in Rivne just before the publication of the information in question, the court had tried thirteen Ukrainians accused solely for being members of the OUN (the very grave principal indictment) and having set fire to houses in Kostopil and Derazhne. On 15 January, the court passed down six sentences of two to seven year prison terms; three of the accused were acquitted (Mirchuk 455).

But the examination of activities of the second organization mentioned in articles cited above gives an answer to the riddle and reveals the source of the disinformation. This organization, *Ukrainisches Kosakentum* (UNAKOR), was practically unknown in Ukraine. It existed

in emigration. Its founder was a certain Ivan Poltawetz von Ostrianitza who had been living in Munich since 1919. In 1918, during the regime of Skoropadsky, he had carried out the functions of the general secretary of the Free Cossacks. After the fall of the Hetman government he had to emigrate to Germany. In the years 1923-1925 he tried to form Free Cossack groups in that country but failed. In Munich, where he had become acquainted with Rosenberg, he militated for the German Nazi movement (BA NS 43/2 f.296), and even spent some time in prison. He had no contact with the national organizations in Ukraine.¹⁴

In the 1920s, Poltawetz-Ostrianitza was a member of the Ukrainian émigré movement run by P. Skoropadsky, but he left this movement around 1932, and became violently opposed to Skoropadsky. In 1934 Skoropadsky was not the head of UNAKOR.

Poltawetz-Ostrianitza did not abandon his idea of forming Free Cossack groups, this time within the Wehrmacht. Thus, in May of 1935 he sent a letter to Hitler: "In the name of the Ukrainian Cossacks I declare that for the Ukrainian Cossacks the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, through which Germany and Ukraine have become allies, is still in effect" (BA R 43 11/155 f. 162).

He declared, moreover, that he was prepared to place the members of his *Ukrainisches Kosakentum* at Hitler's disposition. The Germans, of course, did not follow up this letter, but because Poltawetz-Ostrianitza continued to approach German authorities, the *Geheime Staatspolizei* (Gestapo), in a letter addressed to the Reich's ministry of foreign affairs in September of 1937, commented: "The Cossack organization UNAKOR, a venture that should not be taken seriously, exists in fact only on paper and has practically no members" (AA Pol. V 525).

According to another document in the German archives, Poltawetz-Ostrianitza was a frivolous megalomaniac and an adventurer, but he had two correspondents in Volhynia, a certain Doroshenko in Kovel and I. Voloshyn in Lutsk. According to the same document, these two correspondents were very simply "members of the Polish counter-espionage" (AA Algem. Angel. Ukraine 2).

The Polish secret service had supplied information to the Polish and the international press concerning the Berlin "financing" of the Ukrainian

nationalist organizations in Poland and in the USSR. Possibly Poltawetz-Ostrianitza had money sent to I. Voloshyn, but since he did not represent either Germany or the Nazi party, the German archives did not keep notes on such payments. Poltawetz-Ostrianitza probably had sent a copy of his letter to Hitler to one of his correspondents in Volhynia and this copy had fallen into the hands of the Polish services. Subsequently, in April of 1937 a group of forty-four Ukrainians, men and women, suspected of being members of UNAKOR organized by I. Voloshyn, were brought before the courts in Lutsk in Volhynia and accused of high treason (a charge never made for members of the OUN).

At a time when the Nazi party was formulating strong reservations toward the OUN, it seemed to trust Skoropadsky's movement which at the time constituted a considerable force abroad, especially in Germany and on the American continent. From 1926 on the government of the Weimar Republic had agreed to allocate to Skoropadky, who in 1918 had been the head of a state allied with Germany, financial assistance (*Ehrensold*). The Nazi party, once in power, declared itself favorable to this movement (BA NS 43/2 f. 297). In 1937, German authorities thought that this was the only group loyal to Germany (AA Pol. V 525, Doc.Pol V 8573). This movement, however, apart from some isolated sympathizers, did not exist in Ukraine.

Chapter II

BEFORE THE INVASION OF THE USSR

Hitler's march towards German hegemony over Europe began with the Anschluss (11 March 1938) and Germany's demands regarding the German minority in the Sudeten, which led to the Munich Pact (30 September 1938) and the relinquishment of Czechoslovakia.

Aiming to weaken, then upset, the balance of power in Europe and to institute a new order which would guarantee Germany predominance and well-being, Hitler knew how to manipulate the different political factions to the advantage of the German Reich, to focus on the rights of the German minority and the Bolshevik threat to Europe. The European political classes, beginning with those of Great Britain, strongly felt the threat which Soviet Russia represented. Hitler made this threat a key component in his diplomacy; he defended the rights of German minorities in Czechoslovakia and in Poland in accordance with a people's right to dispose of themselves freely, and at the same time made vague allusions to Germany's right to a *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe, a right incompatible with the right of a people to rule themselves.

The often hopeless situation of peoples or of oppressed minorities in Eastern Europe, more particularly of peoples subjected to the dictatorship of the Stalin regime, contributed to the belief of some that a change of the *status quo* by a war (one even provoked by Germany) could lead to freedom, to independence.

The Ukrainian independence movement decided to take advantage of all possible opportunities to bring about independence, if only for a part of Ukrainian territory. The first opportunity actually came with the Czechoslovakian crisis which had repercussions on the status of Carpatho-Ukraine.

The Question of Carpatho-Ukraine

Carpatho-Ukraine, most often called Ruthenia or Subcarpathian (Podkarpatska Rus, in Czech), had been granted to Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of Saint-Germain (September 1919). This treaty guaranteed the territory regional autonomy (Deak 453). Although written into the first constitution of Czechoslovakia, the autonomy was such a long time coming, that the first governor of this region, H. Zatkovich, resigned in 1921 in protest against the centralization of politics of Prague.

In Subcarpathian Ruthenia the Russophile and the Ukrainophile leanings clashed. The Czechs, notably those tending toward centralization, saw in the Ukrainian national movement a threat to Czech centralization and so preferred to support the Russophile leaning.

The Ukrainian national movement developed slowly. In 1924 only 12% of the Ukrainians were conscious of belonging to the Ukrainian nation (the Ukrainophiles), but by 1935 there were 36.3% (as opposed to 35.2% Russophiles) (Zlepko 20). From 1935 on increase of the national consciousness was constant. During this period the OUN extended its influence to this region. It was a period of steady development of Ukrainian socio-cultural associations and of the creation of cooperatives. The struggle for the Ukrainian language and education took on more and more importance.

Conscious of increasing difficulties that could come from the ethnic composition of Czechoslovakia, President Benes wanted to transform the Republic "into one state where nationalities, absolutely equal in rights, would govern themselves...Desirous of satisfying these demands [of national minorities], the government published on 20 February 1937 a special communiqué formulating the fundamental directives he intended to observe in the area of minority policies" (Benes 10, 14).

Although the leaning toward centralization in Prague was powerful, nothing was done to fulfill these promises. Referring to the guarantees of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and of the constitution, the National Ruthenian Ukrainian Council of Uzhhorod, the capital of this region, demanded autonomy on 29 May 1938. During this period the Sudeten-Germans and the Slovaks formulated similar demands. But while the demands of the Germans were supported by the Reich, the Ukrainians

demanded autonomy to satisfy their national aspirations without outside support. On 9 September 1938, a delegation composed of ten members representing the Ukrainian Central Council and the Ukrainian National Union went to Prague to negotiate the status of autonomy within the State of Czechoslovakia.

The matter of the Sudetengermans and the hesitation of the Western powers, however, ended with the famous Munich Pact (30 September 1938). On 1 October, the Wehrmacht crossed the borders and occupied Sudetenland. Alarmed by this aggression, the government of Prague tried to preserve the unity of the Republic by abandoning the question of the autonomy of the Slovaks and the Ukrainians. The situation became complicated, however, on 4 October when Budapest proposed to Germany annexation of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary (ADAP C:4 doc.#29).

On 8 October 1938 the Ukrainians presented a list of members of their regional autonomous government to Prague for approval.

Having become the arbitrator in the Czecho-Slovak matter with the complicity of Western powers, Hitler seemed to support the Slovak aspirations for autonomy, but he had no plans for Subcarpathian Ruthenia. He recommended on 8 October restricted dealing with the autonomy of this region, and the minister of foreign affairs of the Reich informed his ambassadors that Germany was adopting an attitude of reservation concerning the question of Carpatho-Ukraine (ADAP C:4 doc.##46, 40).

On the evening of 10 October, *Radio Prague* announced that Czechoslovakia was becoming a federation of three peoples: Czechs, Slovaks, and Ukrainians. The following day, the government of Prague officially granted autonomy and recognized the autonomous government of Carpatho-Ukraine (which relinquished the designation "Subcarpathian Ruthenia") (Stercho 60-61). This decision was confirmed by the parliament of the Czechoslovak Republic on 22 November 1938 (Stercho 235-242; Zlepko 99).

The autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine was proclaimed at the moment when Western diplomacy was unsure of Hitler's immediate plans and was debating means to protect the West-European countries from a possible conflict. As the idea prevailed that Germany was going to launch a

conquest of Ukraine, the conclusion followed that the autonomy of Carpathian Ukraine was a German idea, the first stage in the conquest of the Soviet Ukraine.

The autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine was especially alarming to Warsaw that feared repercussions on the already strong nationalist Ukrainian population in Poland. The Polish ambassador to Berlin informed the minister of foreign affairs of the Reich on 22 October 1938 that Poland considered Carpatho-Ukraine should become part of Hungary (ADAP 4 Doc.#80; cf. Appendix, Doc.#20). Thus Warsaw inaugurated the famous line of Polish action for a common frontier with its "historical friend," Hungary.

A special delegation of Carpatho-Ukraine delivered to the German government in Berlin on 24 October 1938 a memorandum on the Ukrainian demands. The memorandum began with the reminder that Carpatho-Ukraine was only a part of the Ukrainian territory and that its population was conscious of the duties which it had "toward the whole Ukrainian nation" (Appendix, Doc.#6). The autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, continued the memorandum, to avoid being a victim of aggression was "placing itself under the Czech protection while waiting to be reunited with Ukraine." The memorandum proposed that Carpatho-Ukraine become an independent state. Proclaimed independent, it would be placed under international protection, notably under the protection of the four big signatory powers of the Munich Pact. These would send small military troops charged to protect the frontiers side by side with the Ukrainian militia.

These Ukrainian demands remained unanswered despite the efforts of Ukrainian communities in Europe and overseas. Invoking the right of self-determination, but without accepting the demands of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, Germany and Italy decided to satisfy the Hungarian demands partially. As a result of the German-Italian arbitration of Vienna, Carpatho-Ukraine was obliged to cede to Hungary 1,856 km² of its territory with almost 180,000 inhabitants, including the two largest cities, the capital Uzhhorod and Mukachiv. The Ukrainians were forced to transfer their capital to Khust.

Following the order of the Führer, Germany distanced itself from Carpatho-Ukrainian affairs; the head of the political department of the

minister of foreign affairs of the Reich, E. Woermann, informed the German ambassador to Prague that the German press had received orders not to speak of incidents taking place in Carpatho-Ukraine and that the question of the creation of a general consulate in Khust had been postponed¹ (Appendix, Doc.#7).

At the same time, certain Western diplomats saw things differently. The American ambassador in Paris, W. Bullit, during a conversation with the Polish ambassador, Jerzy Potocki, seems to have affirmed that Germany had created "a Ukrainian staff headquarters" with a view "to take the power in Ukraine and to form an independent Ukrainian State" (Appendix, Doc.#8). While informing his government, the Polish ambassador took care to add that Bullit "was not *au courant* with the affairs of Eastern Europe and that his reasoning was superficial."

The fears that inspired the international situation and speculations about the Ukrainian question led Poland to approach the Soviet Union and to sign with Moscow a non-aggression pact.

Hungary, however, did not abandon the idea of annexing the entire Carpatho-Ukraine and proposed an immediate occupation by its forces, but the Axis powers refused to support this proposal. Poland, still maintaining the idea of a common frontier with Hungary, sent to Carpatho-Ukraine groups of saboteurs and guerilla groups, hoping that the provoked trouble would hasten the occupation of the region by Hungary.

Public order and defense of the Carpatho-Ukrainian territory were in principle assured by the Czech army, but in September of 1938 the Ukrainians organized a paramilitary self-defense unit ("Karpatska Sich") which by the end of December 1938 numbered approximately 2,000 men and in March of 1939 over 10,000 to 12,000 men.

All this time the diplomatic game continued. Everyone was asking what Hitler would do next? Everyone, or almost everyone, seemed to think that the next phase of Germany's expansion would be into Soviet Ukraine. This conviction was reinforced after Ribbentrop's visit to Paris and the publication on 6 December 1938 of the Franco-German declaration of a good relationship between the two countries. Western diplomats and statesmen made their beliefs known to Soviet representatives (Proektor 50-51).

At the moment when Hitler ordered to remain on the reserve on the Carpatho-Ukrainian question, not only Bullit believed that the German propaganda was slanted "in a Ukrainian nationalist direction," but Lloyd George, also, was convinced that Hitler, having undertaken an action against Soviet Ukraine, was going to detach Western Ukraine from Poland to unite it with Carpatho-Ukraine and found a Ukrainian vassal state. Mandel and Gamelin also believed that the probable objective of German expansion was Soviet Ukraine (Appendix, Doc. #8, 9, 10, 11). The French ambassador to Berlin, Coulondre, was practically of the same opinion. Germany, according to him, wanted to secure control over Central Europe, conquer Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and then set up a Great-Ukraine under German control (*Weltgeschichte* 3:359; Proektor 51).

At the time of Ribbentrop's stay in Paris, Bonnet did not raise the Ukrainian question, to avoid giving the impression that the French were alarmed "by these rumors." According to the Polish ambassador to England the general opinion of the English government was that the Munich Pact had been "the most just if not the only issue in a desperate situation" and that Chamberlain "had defended English goals, and had thus shifted the play to Eastern Europe" (*L'URSS* 87).

The Soviet representatives sensed in the attitude of Western powers a desire to allow Germany "freedom of action in the east." Souritz, a representative of the USSR to France wrote on 27 December 1938 that he did not doubt "that Bonnet and his ideological companions would let out a sigh of relief if Germany really attacked Ukraine" (*L'URSS* 95, 97; Appendix, Doc. #12). Litvinov, commissar of the people of foreign affairs, seemed to have reason to conclude that "the public campaign around the Ukrainian problem was initiated...not so much by the German press as by the press of other countries, notably of England and France" (Appendix, Doc. #14). According to his information, Hitler himself had expressed astonishment at such a campaign.

As far as Carpatho-Ukraine was concerned, an advisor to the German ambassador to Poland made clearly known to one of the Western powers that Germany had no intention of turning it into an embryo of the Ukrainian State (Appendix, Doc. #13).

The international press, especially the leftists, denounced the Ukrainian question as a bargaining chip in German politics. Although generally sensitive to the rights of peoples to dispose of themselves freely, this press ignored this right when it dealt with Ukraine. Oddly, it defended the integrity of countries, particularly when dealing with the Soviet Union, considering the Ukrainian question non-existent, an invention of the Germans who were using it to break up the States in Eastern Europe. Not the Ukrainians, then, wanted an independent national state, but Hitler. Consequently, he had created the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian State. This state, because it was the work of Germans, was inevitably a fascist state,² and collaborated closely with Germany. Granted, the Ukrainians had just signed an agreement with a German enterprise concerning the development and the exploitation of the substratum, but this agreement was never implemented. Spokesmen for the Ukrainian nationalists and the Sich protested against such an interpretation and attested that there was no "close collaboration" between Carpatho-Ukraine and Germany (*Nastup*, 11 December 1938).

The events in Carpatho-Ukraine echoed in Soviet Ukraine. The Western correspondent in Moscow revealed that the head of the GPU (political police) in Kiev had ordered the arrest of three Soviet generals of Ukrainian nationality (Tarasynski, Tassanko, and Mykhailov) and forty officers accused of belonging to an association seeking the independence of Ukraine and of having made contact with Carpatho-Ukraine. He claimed to have found 150,000 dollars in the home of General Mykhailov and correspondence with a representative of a foreign country (*Ukrainske Slovo*, 18 December 1938), but this assertion was rejected by a communiqué of the French Association of the Friends of the Soviet Union (dated 11 December) which maintained that "the loyalty of the Ukrainian population to the central government of the USSR was absolute" (Sidobre 37).

On 5 January 1939 Hitler assured Colonel Beck, the Polish minister of foreign affairs, that the world press wrongly attributed to Germany certain intentions regarding Ukraine. In fact, he affirmed, Germany was not interested in this matter, and Poland had nothing to fear in this respect. In return, Beck admitted to Hitler that Poland recognized in these agitators of Carpatho-Ukraine "old enemies," the Ukrainian nationalists,

and feared that this region would become a source of worry for Poland. Poland consequently wanted a common frontier with Hungary. For Beck, Carpatho-Ukraine was inhabited by Russians [sic] who had nothing to do with the Ukrainians. Furthermore, he assured Hitler that the word "Ukraine" was Polish for "eastern frontier lands" [sic] (Appendix, Doc.#15).

A little later, 25 January 1939, at the time of Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw, Colonel Beck formulated Polish demands concerning Soviet Ukraine and a passage to the Black Sea (Appendix, Doc.#16).

Soviet diplomacy closely followed the events and the machinations. The Soviet representative to Paris remarked in his report of 10 February 1939 that Bonnet's plan, looking for an entente with Italy and satisfying Germany's demands in the east "while diverting it completely from the west," was becoming more and more apparent. According to this report, "during intimate conversations which he had with his friends, Bonnet no longer concealed the fact that sacrifices to the east could not be avoided," that "it was necessary to provide a solution to the German expansion," that "putting at [Germany's] disposal a base of raw materials and food supplies was a necessity" (*L'URSS* 132).

If, according to the Soviet diplomats, Hitler pretended not to understand the Franco-English allusions *à propos* freedom of action in the east, he was waiting for assurances of a benevolent neutrality on their part. As to Poland, even if it did have claims on Ukraine, it would not oppose Hitler's campaign across Romania or Finland and the Baltic States (Appendix, Doc.#17).

On 25 February 1939, the Soviet representative to London made the point. He noticed that immediately after the Munich Pact the English and French press had begun "to boost the rumors and information according to which Hitler was going to move now towards the east," towards Ukraine. Some important statesmen, including some members of the British cabinet, "suggested directly to Hitler this venture to the east." The Soviet diplomat noted that the Westerners were deceived by Hitler's expectations which, according to him, "were steering clear by all means possible of a major war" (Appendix, Doc.#18).

Soviet diplomats noticed that it was primarily the French who were disseminating the rumors about Ukraine (Appendix, Doc.#20). In fact,

the French press was devoting a lot of space to the matter of Carpatho-Ukraine. Most of the French newspapers reported that Germany was supporting the Ukrainian cause. By affirming that "it is above all the creation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian State that was demonstrating how the Europe of Munich was fashioned solely by the whims of the German forces," Maurice Schumann, who signed his articles with a pseudonym, seemed to hold that all complications came from Ukrainians. For him, the "Carpatho-Ukrainians" were subsidiaries of the German Reich, "indispensable subsidiaries of today and above all of tomorrow." He went so far as to say that by labelling Subcarpathian Russia Ukrainian, "in his historical discourse of Nuremberg" Hitler "conferred his true and profound sense to the international crisis of September 1938" (Sidobre 9, 6). Today we know that this was far from the truth.

Undoubtedly, Maurice Schumann was expressing the opinion of a great number of western journalists who did their best to shape public opinion. He thought that Carpatho-Ukraine "backward and mostly illiterate," incapable of defining a national affinity, indeed, a national conscience, ought not form either an autonomous nor an independent state. He knew that the birth of an independent or autonomous Ukraine, even as small as Carpatho-Ukraine, with common borders with Galicia, was in itself a direct threat to the territorial integrity of Poland. For this reason he admired Colonel Beck who, with a desperate fierceness, did his best "to avert the Ukrainian threat, or rather, nip it in the bud," because "the only way to prevent the flag of Ukrainian independence from flying over New Europe," was "either to divide Carpatho-Ukraine between Poland and Hungary, or purely and simply to unite it with Hungary" (Sidobre 12, 14, 21).³

Strangely, Hitler was of the same opinion as M. Schumann. In the great game of the great powers, the right of the Ukrainian people to dispose of themselves freely was not taken into consideration.

Neville Henderson, the United Kingdom's ambassador to Germany, did not believe in an immediate conquest of Ukraine, but considered that Germany would attempt to detach this rich country (which it would prefer to see independent) to exert over it a dominating political and economic influence. Hitler had clearly indicated in *Mein Kampf* that only expansion towards the east could give Germany the *Lebensraum*, leading

to a collusion between Germany and Russia. "With the support of a benevolent England, Germany can consider this eventuality without too much anxiety..." (Appendix, Doc.#19)

In the meantime, the autonomous government of Carpatho-Ukraine attempted to meet all problems, especially endeavors at destabilization of the country. To prevent foreign interference by political parties of minorities, it authorized one single party regrouping Ukrainian tendencies. The elections to the Diet of 12 February 1939 took place in the calm with very high participation of 92.55%. The nominating list of the Ukrainian National Union received 92.4% of the votes cast (Zlepko 127).

Carpatho-Ukraine, comprised at that moment of 11,085 km², had 552,124 inhabitants: 70.6% Ukrainians, 12.5% Hungarians, 12% Germans, 2.5% Romanians, 1.3% Slovaks (Zlepko 134).

Coulondre, the French ambassador to Germany, learned on 5 February that a "dislocation" of Czechoslovakia was to be expected, Slovakia would become independent, and Hungary would annex "Subcarpathian Russia" (Appendix, Doc.#23).

On 9 March 1939, Rosenberg's office received a report on the Ukrainian question indicating the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine had spurred immense hope for 50,000,000 Ukrainians to see their dream of Great-Ukraine realized, but the arbitration of Vienna shook their conviction that Germany honestly believed in the realization of the right of people to self-determination.

The same report put forward Moscow's preoccupation with the subject of the Ukrainian question:

Without speaking of the purges of the past years which have struck in a particularly important measure the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, the Bolshevik propaganda continued to concern itself with Ukrainian "separatists," "fascists," "traitors"—always under the guise of their asserted relationship with Germany....One has the impression that bolshevism considers the Ukrainian question vital for the USSR and that it sees in a German-Ukrainian liaison a threat to itself....If at first the Russians have tried to conceal the Ukrainian question...in the course of the last months the existence of a distinct Ukrainian

people and their aspirations for independence are acknowledged, necessitating a federation with Russia if not autonomy (BA NS 43/43 66-69).

The report adds that "the esteem toward Germany by the still oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe will depend without doubt on the manner in which Germany will behave with regard to the Ukrainian question."

But the dice were already cast. On 6 March 1939, Hitler decided to liquidate the remaining part of Czechoslovakia, occupy Bohemia and Moravia, allow independence to the Slovak state, and allow Hungary to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine.

Regarding Carpatho-Ukraine, no argument could change the Führer's determination. When he was reminded that this region had given rise to great hope for the Ukrainians, Hitler, according to Ribbentrop, merely observed: "It is tragic, but inevitable." He rejected engagement in Ukrainian affairs: "If I had aligned myself with the Ukrainians and their political plans, we would not have passed the arbitrary judgment in Vienna that made Subcarpathian Ukraine non-viable" (Appendix, Doc.#21).

Coulondre indicated on 13 March that Czechoslovakia would be divided and that Germany would take the position in favor of Polish-Hungarian demands (Appendix, Doc.#22). On 14 March, the Czechoslovakian federation ceased to exist. Ceding to Hitler's ultimatum, the government of Prague agreed to place Bohemia-Moravia under German protectorate. Hitler gave Hungary, his ally, permission to invade Carpatho-Ukraine. Slovakia proclaimed its independence (Duroselle, *Histoire dipl.* 227-229; Appendix, Doc.#23). Coulondre noted that by ceding Carpatho-Ukraine, the Reich secured the gratitude of the Hungarians and the neutrality of Poland, "while freeing it from the danger which an independent Ukrainian province, the center of propaganda and irredentism, would pose at its southern frontier" (Appendix, Doc. #23).

Instead of agreeing with the new situation, the Carpatho-Ukrainian government announced its independence on the radio toward the evening of 14 March. The following day, 15 March 1939, the same day Hitler

entered Prague at the head of the German forces, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Soym (Diet) voted in the law promulgating total independence (Appendix, Doc.##24, 25).

In the early hours of 15 March, Hungarian troops crossed the Ukrainian frontier, meeting with a fierce resistance from hastily organized Ukrainian units, but in Khust, General Prchala, Czech minister of the interior, refused to deliver arms to the Ukrainians and ordered the Czech troops to take their staff by storm. After several hours of combat in which some fifty persons were killed, General Prchala proclaimed his neutrality in the Ukraino-Hungarian conflict, and still refused to deliver the weapons.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian government informed Berlin of its proclamation of independence and asked for protection from the Reich (Appendix, Doc.#26). The German government responded that Germany was advising the Ukrainians not to oppose the advance of Hungarian troops, because it could not take upon itself the protection of Carpatho-Ukraine (ADAP 4:237). The Carpatho-Ukrainian government then ordered general mobilization (*Nova Svoboda*, 16 March 1939; Stercho 218-219). The Ukrainians decided to resist.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister sent a telegram to the French embassy in Berlin requesting the French government to intervene in Budapest to settle the destiny of the country by diplomatic means, not by force. Coulondre pointed out that Berlin had invoked the right of the people to self-determination in the case of Slovakian independence "but the same right was refused to the Carpatho-Ukrainians" (Appendix, Doc.#27).

The Carpathian Sich, numbering approximately 10,000 to 12,000 poorly equipped and poorly armed men, transformed itself into the national army. Ukrainians resisted everywhere and refused to yield to Hitler's decisions, but Hungarians occupied the tiny state after five days of fierce fighting. Ukrainians continued partisan combat in the mountains for three more weeks. This "little" war cost them approximately 5,000 casualties.

Among the fighting young were numerous Ukrainian volunteers from Galicia, many of them members of the OUN. Their role in the Carpatho-Ukrainian resistance was highly significant. At the head of this

small army during the fighting was Colonel M. Kolodzinsky; his adjunct, Z. Kossak, was another prominent member of the OUN. Both were killed in battle.

The Polish press expressed joy at the liquidation of Carpatho-Ukraine, stating that the Ukrainians, who had counted too much on the Germans, got only what they deserved. The Ukrainian nationalist paper of Paris, *Ukrainske Slovo* responded on 18 June 1939:

We Ukrainians don't have to be taught a lesson by you, nor shown any kindness. We know ourselves very well, what is ours, who our enemy is, and what we can gain or lose. We have never thought of being able to receive any gift whatsoever from Hitler who is a well-known "carnivore." He is a Germanic representative of the "superior" race, a sworn enemy of the Slavic race....But we were expecting less from our neighbors, our "kind Slavic brethren."⁴

On 3 April 1939, several days after the liquidation of Carpatho-Ukraine, Hitler ordered preparations for the invasion of Poland.

At the time of these events in Carpatho-Ukraine, the head of the foreign policy office of the NSDAP, A. Schickendanz, delivered to different offices of the government of the Reich another report on the OUN: "We have always maintained that the OUN (Konovalets' group) is clearly anti-German and that its activities are, if not provocative, at least harmful, as well for the Germans as for Ukrainians. To support this position once more, we are including some quotes from our report from the Ukrainian press for the last two months which shed light on the attitude of this group such as expressed in their own newspapers" (BA NS 43/42 f. 339 ff.). The author of this report then gave some passages from articles which had appeared in the Ukrainian nationalist press criticizing the fanaticism and the racial theories of the Nazis, and Hitler's *Drang nach Osten* (push to the east). The author cited a further secret official newspaper of the OUN, *Rozbudova Natsii*, the daily *Svoboda* published in the United States, the OUN press bulletin of New York, the weekly *Ukrainske Slovo* of Paris, and *Novy Shlakh* of Toronto.

The report indicated that one Toronto member of the OUN had "maliciously" written that "insatiable Hitler" wanted to conquer Ukraine, but that the Ukrainians opposed this idea. The author of the report remembered also that the newspaper *Nastup*, the official OUN paper in Carpatho-Ukraine, had warned Ukrainians against too great a confidence in Germany.

The report stressed that the cited quotations proved sufficiently the anti-German attitude of the OUN including that in Carpatho-Ukraine. Whatever the reason for this attitude, concluded the report, be it the "influence of the Jewish wives of certain leaders of the OUN or a limitless stupidity of the leadership, the fact remains that its activities are directed against Germany" (BA NS 43/42 f. 339 ff.).

Rosenberg also expressed a very critical attitude towards the OUN in his 14 June 1939 memorandum on Eastern Europe. He marvelled that OKW, although it had been warned by his services, had formed ties with this organization (IMT 1365-PS; *Das politische Tagebuch* 174-176).

The Invasion of Poland and the Ukrainian Question

As stressed by the German historian Lothar Gruchmann, the success of Hitler was due not to his capacity to plan coups nor to clear thinking, but to his ability to profit from the international day-to-day situation and from the behavior and mistakes of his adversaries (Gruchmann 9).

In a situation where the English and French governments had no precise policy as to the Ukrainian question and were hoping that this question would lead Germany to a war against Soviet Ukraine, Hitler could do as he pleased.

After the events of Czechoslovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, while Coulondre wondered whether Hitler would attempt to return to the idea presented in *Mein Kampf* asserting that the Reich could realize its plans for the east only after crushing France and reducing England to impotence (*L'URSS* 183), Chamberlain and Bonnet hoped indeed to urge Hitler toward Soviet Ukraine (Appendix, Doc. #28, 29).

Instead of entering into a war for the conquest of Ukraine, however, Hitler found it advisable to secure the Ukrainian riches by an economic

exchange, engaging in commercial negotiations with Moscow. The first sign of a rapprochement was the speech made by Kremlin's master, Stalin, on 10 March 1939 in which he accused the Western press of wanting to provoke a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union (*Pravda*, 11 March 1939).

By permitting Hungary to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine, Hitler had demonstrated indisputably that he was not seeking a solution to the Ukrainian question. Stalin concurred. On 3 April Hitler secretly gave orders to the Wehrmacht to prepare for the attack on Poland for 1 September. On 17 April the Soviet ambassador to Berlin declared that ideological differences did not constitute any hindrance to the betterment of German-Soviet relations. Economic negotiations between Berlin and Moscow opened in May. By June, the German government learned that the Soviet government was prepared *not* to sign a treaty of assistance with the Western powers in case of war provided that Germany would sign a treaty of non-aggression with the USSR (*Beziehungen*, Doc. ##14,15).

Rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow was not a total surprise to Western diplomacy. Certain American diplomats had been mentioning this possibility from November 1938 onward. The American *chargé d'affaires* in Moscow indicated on 19 January 1939 that, following some assurances on the part of Berlin, expressed directly or through the intermediary of Warsaw, the Soviet press had ceased speaking of the German threat against Ukraine (*Foreign Relations* 731-732).

On 23 August 1939 Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the additional secret protocol. This latter set up the zones of influence of the two powers in Eastern Europe in case of "a territorial and political change." Germany abandoned all influence in Finland and in the Baltic States, while the eastern territories of Poland up to the Narva-Vistule-San line were to be annexed to the Soviet Union upon the demands of Moscow (Appendix, Doc.##30, 32).

At the conclusion of the ceremony of the signing of the treaty, the two delegations celebrated the event in Stalin's presence. Stalin proposed a spontaneous toast to the Führer of the German Reich. Molotov then claimed that they owed the change in German-Soviet relations to Stalin's

speech of March 1939 which had been well received in Berlin (Appendix, Doc.#31).

On 1 September the Führer praised the pact with Russia, a pact excluding resort to force, which obliged the two powers to consult each other on certain European questions and which facilitated economic collaboration. The West would not be able to do anything to change it, concluded Hitler (Appendix, Doc.#32).

Hitler could all the more delight in the German-Soviet cooperation for on the same day, at 4:15 a.m., he had begun the invasion of Poland. France and England committed themselves on the side of Poland on 3 September; Hitler had just started a European war.

The Abwehr (military intelligence), directed by Admiral Canaris, who had reestablished contact with the OUN in 1938, foresaw, prior to the invasion of Poland, the possibility of an uprising of the Ukrainians to precipitate its fall. But Canaris met insurmountable difficulty: how could he send weapons to Ukrainian territories in Poland?

Canaris, who was rather open to nationality problems in Eastern Europe and not opposed to their freedom, agreed to train in Slovakia a small Ukrainian unit of approximately 200 men. The training of this unit, called *Bergbauernhilfe* (BBH), began on 15 August 1939.

Three days later, A. Melnyk, successor to Konovalets as head of the OUN (Konovalets had been killed by a Soviet agent on 23 May 1938), was contacted by Commandant Stoltze of the Abwehr who asked him "to hold himself ready in case the political situation would demand" his presence. But the Germans were annoyed, because Ribbentrop was negotiating with the Russians. They, therefore, could not promise the Ukrainians anything (*Lahousen Tagebuch*, IfZ F 23, 1-3). The German-Russian pact was signed on 23 August. Berlin had anticipated with it "the dissolution of the Ukrainian movement," but German authorities decided otherwise and summoned Melnyk and Yary to Berlin (4).

The day following the signing of the pact in Moscow, official German authorities received the following orders: "The political situation demands an extremely prudent guidance and surveillance of everything that takes place in Ukrainian organizations" (5). The following institutions and persons were placed under surveillance: the Ukrainian Bureau of Confidence (*Vertrauensstelle*), the Ukrainian press service, Lieutenant-

Colonel Graebe—all in Berlin, and the Ukrainian Bureau in Vienna, the Ukrainian camp of Saubersdorf, and R. Yary. On 25 August the surveillance was extended to other Ukrainian establishments and to other leaders, notably Skoropadsky. The Ukrainian leaders were forbidden to leave German territory (5-6).

The assignment of the Ukrainian unit *Bergbauernhilfe* was precisely defined: "a purely defensive unit within the framework of the fighting unit in Slovakia." On 25 August because of the change of the political context, the plan to put Ukrainians into action was abandoned. On 28 August Lahousen issued the following order: in time of peace, the unit *Bergbauernhilfe* will be a labor unit, in time of war, it will not be used; an attempt will be made to find a use for it in keeping with the staff of the army. On 1 September, despite the war, Commandant Dehmel received orders to convert the "Bergbauern" into a labor force (4-11).

The unit *Bergbauernhilfe*, commanded on the Ukrainian side by Colonel R. Sushko, a prominent member of the OUN, remained in Slovakia for approximately two weeks, before being sent to Ukrainian territory, but it was not used at the front. After the invasion of the Polish territory by the Red-Soviet army, the Germans considered converting it into a policing unit on Ukrainian territory west of the Soviet-German demarcation line. Finally the unit was dissolved (Knysh 107-120, Hirniak 293-307).⁵

At the outset of the Polish campaign, A. Melnyk had an interview with the secretary of state in the ministry of foreign affairs of the Reich, Keppler, who explained that in the new situation the German government could not make any promises. On 11 September, the Abwehr still considered an uprising of Ukrainians in Galicia possible, but realized the risk of its deteriorating into an uprising against Russia. When questioned, Hitler finally decided not to resort to this possibility (*Lahousen* 15).

On 12 September, the responsible high command of the Wehrmacht (Keitel, Jodl, Canaris, Lahousen) and Ribbentrop met in a train of the Führer in Ilnau in Silesia. According to the notes of Lahousen, head of Abwehr II, Marshall Keitel, head of the staff of the Wehrmacht, spoke of three possibilities for Poland: 1) fourth partition of the Polish State and the cession of territories to the east of the Narva-Vistula-San line to the Soviet Union; 2) formation of an independent state with the rest of

Poland (Hitler's "most favored" solution according to Keitel); 3) disintegration of the rest of Poland with a) Lithuania's receiving the region of Vilnius, and b) "Galician and Polish Ukraine's" becoming independent, if the Soviet Union agreed.

Should this last possibility be realized, Lahousen was to look for an arrangement with the OUN, led by A. Melnyk, to provoke an uprising "in Galician Ukraine," an uprising directed against the Poles and the Jews, for "it is absolutely necessary to prevent the movement's political extension toward the Soviet Ukraine" (IfZ Fd 47 f.06 ff.; IMT 3047-PS; Groscurth 35). Again, this last would be subject to Soviet Russia's consent.

Shortly after the conference of 12 September, probably on 15 September, Canaris talked with A. Melnyk in Vienna, telling him of the possibility, even the probability of the independence of Western ("Galician") Ukraine. Melnyk, believing Canaris, ordered preparation of the list of members of the West Ukrainian government (Knysh 98-100). Canaris probably believed in this possibility if Moscow refused to attack Poland from the east, but when on 17 September the Russians invaded Poland, the situation changed drastically. In the meantime the German troops advanced quickly as far as Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainians did not rise up, contenting themselves with taking local action of self-defense before the retreating Polish troops fleeing in disorderly fashion toward Romania. These self-defense actions took place around the cities of Mykolaiv, Starchany and Stry.

The day President Moscicki and the Polish government were taking refuge in Romania (where they were interned), Moscow ordered its troops to cross the Polish frontier. Although Soviet Russia had made this decision in conformity with the secret German-Russian Pact of 23 August, it officially justified its aggression by claiming the necessity to "come to the aid of threatened Ukrainians and Belorussians." German troops that had advanced up to the Sokal-Lviv-Stry Line had to fall back behind the line of demarcation planned by the Hitler-Stalin pact. On 27 September Warsaw capitulated, and the following day Ribbentrop signed in Moscow an agreement of friendship and a protocol setting a definite frontier between Germany and the USSR following the Narva-Buh (Bug)-San line. This line corresponded closely to the Curzon line.⁶ The

USSR got a territory of 200,000 km² and 12,000,000 inhabitants (Gruchmann 37).

This territorial change had grave repercussions on Ukrainian political life. The Soviet regime denied the existence of any political force with the exception, of course, of the Communist party of the Bolsheviks. Consequently, Ukrainian political parties in Western Ukraine had to suspend all their activities and their leaders presented themselves to the Soviet authorities to inform them of the liquidation of their parties.

Only the OUN, a secret force needing no authorization to exist, was not affected by this political and territorial change. The OUN continued its secret activities and even tried to extend its influence to the Ukrainians who had come from the east, as well as to the territories of Soviet Ukraine. It ordered in several locations armed actions against members of the NKVD. A great trial against fifty-nine members of the OUN took place in Lviv in 1941. Forty-two of the accused, among them eleven women, were condemned to death and at least twenty of them were executed a short time after the trial.

Moscow had decided to annex the occupied territories, but the annexation had to take the form of "voluntary" decisions of the populations. Elections to the Popular Constituent Assembly of Western Ukraine were organized by General Tymoshenko, commander-in-chief of the front and took place on 22 October 1939. Of course, the one official slate got an overwhelming majority. On 26 October the Popular Constituent Assembly adopted a motion demanding the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to unite Western Ukraine with Soviet Ukraine. This demand was met on 1 November and reaffirmed by the Supreme Soviet of the SSR of Ukraine on 14 November. On 28 June 1940 following an ultimatum from Moscow, Romania agreed to "return" Bessarabia and North Bukovyna to the USSR.

This political upheaval in Eastern Europe resulted in the disappearance of the free Ukrainian press. Only the newspapers and publications which appeared in Paris and overseas had free expression.

What was the attitude of the free Ukrainian nationalist press? In its 24 September 1939 issue, *Ukrainske Slovo* of Paris attacked the policies of Germany, based on "cynicism, perfidy, baseness, lies, and exploitation

of the trust of others" (Appendix, Doc.#33). Accusing the Germans of haggling over Ukrainian territories to satisfy their own interests, the newspaper denounced the "diabolic plan of Germany" which consisted in the fulfillment of the *Drang nach Osten* to conquer the territories to the east. The newspaper recalled that although Hitler had spoken of this only vaguely in *Mein Kampf*, other Nazi leaders, for example, Rosenberg, had mentioned Ukraine by name.

According to the newspaper, everything indicated "that the Germans were not concerned about the creation of an independent Ukrainian State," or about self-determination of the nations. Germany thought only "about Ukrainian lands, Ukrainian coal and iron, Ukrainian wheat; it thought of Ukraine as a German colony," inhabited "by a *Dienervolk* (people of servitude)...and not about an independent Nation-State with its own leading and governing class, its own cultural circles."

Having labeled the cession of Western Ukraine to Soviet Russia a "pernicious crime" which would bring to Ukraine "an ocean of blood and of tears," the newspaper expressed the conviction that the Ukrainian nation that had lived for thousands of years on its territory and survived all the past invasions, would "survive as much the Asiatic empire of Stalin as the German empire." The reason for this was simple: the tanks and the cannons of Stalin and Hitler were incapable of destroying the spirit of the Ukrainians.

Since the signing of the Ribbentrop-Motolov Pact, the German government had reinforced its surveillance of the émigrés and their publications. The number of refugees, particularly Ukrainian refugees, had increased, following the Red Army occupation of the Ukrainian and Belorussian territories in Poland. On 25 October 1939, the Gestapo ordered to put on file separately all Ukrainian refugees to control them and to find for them possible work (BA R 58/ 1031 f. 27; R 58/459 f. 67).

Simultaneously, the Gestapo forbade Russian, Ukrainian, Cossack, and Caucasian émigrés to "express orally or in writing any hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union" (Appendix, Doc.#35). Practically all activities of associations of these émigrés were forbidden on the territory of the Reich and on the territory of former Poland (BA R 58/1031 f. 28). When the Ukrainian press service of Berlin, controlled by the OUN, published a brochure about Western Ukraine, the Gestapo, although well

aware that the authors had refrained from attacking the USSR, ordered its distribution stopped and confiscated all 1,500 printed copies because the "establishment of the line of demarcation" with the USSR had created a new situation (Appendix, Doc.#34).

The foreign policy office of the NSDAP was assigned to prepare a special report on the Ukrainian question. This report acknowledged that the Ukrainian question had taken on importance following the developments in Carpatho-Ukraine and that the Ukrainians had then been convinced that the Germans were going to support their plans. After the first deceptions, however, the German-Russian rapprochement provoked among the Ukrainians a feeling of indignation which the Western powers would exploit against Germany. Because the Westerners were trying to take over the Ukrainians, the report encouraged German authorities to take counter-measures. According to the report, the Western powers were already using in their anti-German propaganda Jewish, Czech and Polish arguments. It was, therefore, necessary that they not use "Ukrainian arguments as well" (BA NS43/42 f. 147ff.).

The report recommended finally close surveillance of "the evolution of the Ukrainian problem in the world, including in Soviet Russia" and assuring the Ukrainian emigration "cultural assistance," but this last request contradicted measures already taken by the Gestapo.

The foreign policy office of the NSDAP discerned three Ukrainian political forces. The first, according to the Bureau, was the UNR (Ukrainian National Republic), with centers located in Warsaw and Paris which, prior to the invasion of Poland, had been financed by the Poles. The second group, the OUN, was suspected of collaborating with one German service (the report alluded to the Abwehr). The report emphasized that although in Germany the OUN tried to pose as not anti-German, its press releases in Paris and New York proved an openly hostile attitude against Germany. The third group was Hetman Skoropadsky's group. According to the document, there was no doubt as to its alignment with German politics.

This analysis, once again, shows that the German government still had neither a definite plan regarding the Ukrainian question, nor a clear policy as to its relationship to Ukrainian political powers.

In October 1939 the Ukrainian nationalist newspaper of Paris again attacked German policies. While the West believed, wrote the paper, that the Germans intended to create a Ukrainian State, Germany, in fact, was following a path extremely dangerous to the Ukrainian cause. The paper stressed that the absence of a powerful Ukrainian state facilitated both the domination of the Germans over Eastern Europe, and the penetration of the Russo-Bolshevik influence in the east. Western states would have to favor creation of such a Ukrainian state, as this would mean "the refusal to recognize the hegemony of the Germans and the Russians in Europe" (Appendix, Doc.#36).

To improve the Ukrainians' image of Germany, German services diffused rumors suggesting that after having crushed England and France, Germany was going to turn against the Bolsheviks and then create an independent Ukraine. Taken up by the Havas Bureau, these rumors only served to confirm the West's impression that Germany did indeed have the intention of setting up an independent Ukrainian State. Protesting against these rumors, the Paris-based Ukrainian nationalist paper declared that the Ukrainians did not wish to receive anything from Germany, no independence, no aid. They only requested that the Germans stop busying themselves with Ukrainian affairs and that they forget that such people as Ukrainians exist (Appendix, Doc.#37). The same paper denied that the Ukrainians were pro-German (Appendix, Doc.#38).

Another Ukrainian periodical, published in Paris by UNR, also expressed a desire for victory by the western democracies (Appendix, Doc.##39, 41). Through the efforts of this group, and on the initiative of Alexandre Shulguin, the former minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, a special committee was formed to mobilize the forces of the émigrés against Germany. In an appeal to the Ukrainian emigration, Alexandre Shulguin's committee severely criticized German policies and declared that for the Ukrainians no hesitation was possible; their place was on the side of the Allies (Appendix, Doc.#40).

The new Soviet-German frontier and their respective spheres of influence were firmly established by the treaty of friendship and the secret protocol of 28 September 1939 (*Beziehungen* Doc.##83, 88, 89). A short time later, the German government resolved to incorporate into

the Reich northern and northwestern Polish regions, in all approximately 90,000 km² and 10,000,000 inhabitants, of whom only 2% were Germans (Gruchmann 38).

By the decree of 12 October 1939, Hitler created the General Government for occupied territories in Poland, thus converting the remainder of central Poland into a kind of colonial territory administered by the civil German government with a governor-general directly responsible to Hitler.

The General Government extended over 97,868 km² and had approximately 14,000,000 inhabitants (*Nowy Kurier Warszawski*, 24 May 1941). It also included approximately 16,000 km² of ethnographic Ukrainian territory (along the Soviet-German frontier) where more than 500,000 Ukrainians were living (*Uk. Encyclopedia* 2:580).

To escape Soviet persecution, after the arrival of the Red Army in Western Ukraine, between 20,000 and 30,000 Ukrainians took refuge west of the Soviet-German line of demarcation. Among these were numerous members of the OUN, leaders and organizers of political parties (UNDO, Front of National Unity, etc.). These leaders had no political role, for all such activities had been forbidden to them.⁷ Not wishing to antagonize their Russian allies, the Germans were erecting obstacles even to the cultural activities of the Ukrainians.

Only reluctantly did the Germans agree to recognize the existence of Ukrainian schools and cultural associations on Ukrainian territories along the frontier, because the numerous refugees and the local population needed help. The Ukrainians set up in many towns committees of aid and assistance which were legalized in June 1940. To coordinate their activities, the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCK) was established in Cracow with the consent of the Germans. Constructed along the German Führerprinzip, UCK became the only coordination center of Ukrainian socio-cultural life authorized in the General Government.

With the arrival of the Red Army, Western Ukraine was plunged into a heavy and stifling atmosphere of foreign occupation and frenzied Sovietization. All her political parties disappeared. All socio-cultural and economic associations, all enterprises, all institutions of aid which existed under the Polish administration were dissolved and their holdings

became the property of the state. The press, private schools, and commercial enterprises were liquidated; the lands of large landowners (for the most part Polish) were distributed to the peasants, but only for a few months; in the Spring of 1940 a vast campaign of collectivization began. To promote this campaign, peasants who were not collectivized were heavily taxed.

Education, Ukrainian at the beginning of Soviet occupation, quickly became the instrument of Sovietization and Russification. Religious life encountered unprecedented difficulties. The first deportations to Siberia took place. Numerous Ukrainian patriots were arrested by the secret police, the NKVD, and no one knew what became of them. In the atmosphere of terror, everyone expected to be arrested or deported. This situation remained unchanged until the German-Soviet war.

The Birth of Bandera's Movement

The war had radically changed the Ukrainian political situation in Ukraine and in the diaspora. In Ukraine, with the exception of the OUN, the political parties had disappeared. The leaders of these parties who had been able to emigrate could not pursue any political activities. In Germany, Skoropadsky's movement had lost its momentum. Only the OUN asserted itself everywhere as a predominate force. It took control of the Ukrainian National Union (UNO), the most important socio-cultural association of Ukrainian emigrants within the Reich and within the protectorate of Moravia and Bohemia. Despite opposition from the foreign policy office of the NSDAP, the OUN succeeded in having one of its members named head of the Ukrainian Bureau of Confidence (*Ukrainische Vertrauensstelle*) established in Berlin by German authorities, but in 1940 a split occurred within the OUN network outside of Ukraine.

Members of the Central Leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Provid ukrainskykh nationalistiv*, PUN) lived for a number of years abroad. The actual leadership of the organization in Ukraine was in the hands of the executive committee in Western Ukraine. A number of Ukrainian leaders, imprisoned by the Poles, regained their freedom following the fall of Poland, regrouping west of

the Soviet-German demarcation line at Cracow. Contact with the organization inside Ukraine was maintained through emissaries who crossed the frontier secretly.

Radical changes in Eastern Europe's political context and the threat of a German-Soviet conflict were instrumental in revealing profound divergence among the leaders of the OUN, notably between the PUN (Melnyk, Kapustiansky, Sushko, Baranovsky, Senyk, Stsiborsky, etc.) and the young revolutionaries in Ukraine or those who had just come from Ukraine (Bandera, Stetsko, Shukhevych, Tymchy-Lopatynsky, Lenkavsky and others).

The spokesman of the young revolutionaries, Stepan Bandera, had held important leadership positions within the organization in Ukraine, notably as a member of the Executive Committee for Western Ukraine from 1933 to 1934. Arrested in 1934, he was condemned to death for having ordered the assassination of the Polish minister of the interior, B. Pieracki, but his death-sentence was commuted to life-imprisonment; he was in solitary confinement in the Brest-Litovsk prison when war broke out. After the flight of the penitentiary authorities he was freed on 13 September 1939 by a group of Ukrainian political prisoners and returned to Lviv which had been occupied by the Soviet army several days earlier. In the second half of October the executive committee asked him to go secretly to the west.

At the beginning of 1940, the head of the executive committee for Ukraine, Yuri Tymchy-Lopatynsky, secretly crossed the frontier and rejoined Bandera in Vienna. In an attempt to resolve the differences between them and PUN, the two young leaders immediately went to Rome where at that time the head of the central leadership of the OUN, Colonel A. Melnyk, resided.

The young revolutionaries wanted to redefine the political thinking and the strategies of the PUN, free the OUN's politics of all dependency (notably on Germany), establish contacts with Western powers, and accord priority to the struggle on Ukrainian territory itself. Furthermore, the young activists were partisans of a widespread revolutionary struggle which was not restricted to losses inflicted by the Soviet repression (Bandera 171-188; *Bila Knyha* 7, 8, 28, 29). Members of the central leadership, who were older, generally favored more moderate activity.

The young activists expressed their suspicion also regarding certain members of the central leadership and demanded changes in the composition of PUN. Finally, they contested the manner in which the Second Congress of the organization had been called into session and conducted in Rome on 27 August 1939.

The talks with Melnyk brought no results; the movement split. The young leaders, reunited in Cracow, decided to give the nationalist movement a different leadership. Thus, on 10 February 1940 the Revolutionary Leadership of the OUN was formed and the presidency was entrusted to Stepan Bandera. From then on two distinct organizations of Ukrainian nationalists existed and often clashed.

In the middle of the 1940s, the OUN-B(andera) established not only permanent contacts with the movement within Ukraine but also contacts with representatives of other movements opposing the Soviet Union. The OUN-B intended to persuade other oppressed nationalities to join in the revolutionary activities, making the struggle for Ukraine's independence the pivot of a larger struggle for freedom for the peoples of Eastern Europe.

The German Nazi party watched the activities of the OUN closely. When a member of that organization was nominated to head the Ukrainian Bureau of Confidence in Berlin and when the split within the OUN occurred, the foreign policy office of the NSDAP again warned the authorities of the Reich against the OUN and openly proposed the banning of this organization. Stabsleiter A. Schickendanz sent letters to that effect to Stutterheim (Chancellery of the Reich), Canaris (Abwehr), and Heydrich (SD, Gestapo), reminding them that the Ukrainian national press attacked the Germans at every opportunity, proving that the OUN was "absolutely hostile" to Germany. He expressed amazement in his letter to Stutterheim that this organization which had "a coloration specific to Galicia" and which one could "describe as a young branch of the Great-Russian socio-revolutionary tree," was finding support from Admiral Canaris. He thought that all "preference" accorded to the OUN, be it only for "purely military matters, would result in political consequences for the future." Dissension within the OUN despite the support of German military authorities, according to Schickendanz, only confirmed the suspicion of the foreign policy office and emphasized "the

impossibility of making use of this group to realize the slightest political goal." (BA NS 43/43 f. 5^a; Appendix, Doc.#42)

In his letter to Heydrich, the head of SD, A. Schickendanz stressed that his service had always considered the OUN "a purely terrorist organization, without any political influence and without the slightest importance," an organization which had lost its political importance with the Soviet occupation of Galicia. Consequently, it should not be sustained artificially but dissolved especially since it was "endangering the security of the state." (BA NS 43/43 f. 20; Appendix, Doc.#43) Canaris responded that he did not consider this "the right time" to ban an organization that had certain influences on Ukrainian emigration and contributed to its cohesion (BA NS 43/43 f. 12).

What was the political program of the OUN-B? Presented in a manifesto made public in December 1940, the political program of the new leadership was extremely ambitious and even addressed itself to other peoples of the USSR.

The manifesto proclaimed in its preamble that the world characterized by oppression "of peoples of valor and capable of living" was in the process of collapsing under the blows of the struggle for liberty. The Russian empire, known as the Soviet Union, was condemning part of this world to disappear. Ukrainians had taken the initiative "in the struggle for freedom for the peoples and freedom for the individual" and they intended to create a new society on the ruins of the USSR.

The OUN-B advocated the disappearance of the Soviet Union, which it labeled a "prison of the peoples," and proclaimed its struggle against Russian imperialism for the freedom and independence of the Ukrainian people, calling upon other peoples to join the Ukrainians in this common fight for liberty.

Regarding the social program, the OUN-B stressed that Ukrainian nationalists were fighting against "the degradation of man," "the degeneration of the citizen," "the suppressing of women under the pretext of equality," "the stupefying effect on the children" by the propaganda of Stalin's regime; they were fighting against terror, deportations, economic pillages of Ukraine and other oppressed countries, servitude of the kolkhozes, etc.

The manifesto also declared that the OUN was fighting for the freedom and dignity of man, freedom of thought, conscience and religion. These freedoms, as well as the independence of Ukraine and of other peoples, would be realized only after an uprising of all the oppressed peoples and the disintegration of the Russian empire (Appendix, Doc.#44).

By calling the Second Congress of the OUN into session in April 1941, Bandera's revolutionary leadership made the split definite. This revolutionary leadership had control of the network in Ukraine and throughout part of the émigré community. Thus it had a good chance of becoming the primary Ukrainian political force. Melnyk's PUN retained control over a part of the OUN's members in emigration.

In summary, from 1940 on there existed two distinct Organizations of Ukrainian Nationalists bearing exactly the same name. While pursuing the same goal (the independence of Ukraine), they differed in political policies, strategies, and tactics.

The Second Congress of the OUN-B supported a revolutionary struggle founded on the strength of the Ukrainian people and rejected "all orientation leading to dependence on foreign forces." Only a national revolution would produce a sovereign Ukrainian State; the OUN-B had put into place a political revolutionary force capable of producing an armed uprising. Synchronized with the struggle of other peoples enslaved by Russia, such an uprising would have greater chances at success. This common struggle was to be placed under the motto of the OUN, "freedom for peoples, freedom for the individual!" (*OUN* 24-27, 31)

Among the resolutions adopted by the Second Congress one perfectly characterized the general tendencies of OUN-B: the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was going to continue the revolutionary struggle for the freedom of the Ukrainian people "regardless of territorial or political changes that could take place on the territories of Eastern Europe" (*OUN* 31; Appendix, Doc.#48), i.e., changes including the possibility of a German occupation.

Secret Preparations for the War in the East

The German-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939 suited both Hitler and Soviet Russia. Faced with an uncertain international situation which, despite the pact, did not exclude the possibility of conflict, Moscow was searching to improve its security by extending and reinforcing its frontiers to the west. By annexing the western territories of Ukraine and Belorussia (September 1939), Soviet Russia acquired an additional zone of security which it began to fortify. In the north, following the invasion of Finland (December 1939—March 1940), Russia succeeded in moving the Soviet-Finish frontier to 150 km from Leningrad (before the invasion this frontier ran at 32 km from that city).

On 11 February 1940, an economic agreement was signed in Moscow between the Soviet Union and Germany. In compliance with this agreement Russia delivered to Germany raw materials and wheat for the sum of 555,900,000 rubles (Jiline 206; *50 let* 50; *Beziehungen* 157). These supplies, which represented more than 40% of total Soviet exports in 1940, considerably eased the effects of the English blockade. By 11 February 1941 Soviet Russia had delivered to Germany merchandise worth 310,000,000 Marks. The following months the deliveries continued at an accelerated rate despite rumors of an imminent German-Soviet conflict. By 15 May 1941 Russia had delivered to Germany 632,000 tons of wheat, 232,000 tons of petroleum, 23,500 tons of cotton, 50,000 tons of manganese, 67,000 tons of phosphate and 900 kg of platinum. In addition, Germany received raw materials, particularly rubber, from the Far East by way of Siberia (*Beziehungen* 375, 391).

The French and the British would have liked to prevent the deliveries of these raw materials which rendered their blockade ineffective. At the beginning of the Fino-Soviet War General Bergeret, *aide-major général* of the French air force, proposed an attack by the Soviet Union. His plan made provisions for a vast pincer maneuver from Petsamo in the north and Syria in the south. The Allied forces from Scandinavia and from Finland were to take Petsamo and go meet Weygand's army which, having left Syria, was to take Baku and charge to the north. The two armies were to link up in Moscow. Another plan proposed the bombing of the refineries and the oil-wells of Baku,

Grozny, and Batum, but these plans were impracticable because the Allies did not have the means to execute such maneuvers adequately. Also they realized that by extending the war to Russia they risked aligning it more closely with Germany; this, obviously, was not in their best interest (Duroselle *L'abîme* 90-92, 117-120).

After the occupation of Norway and Denmark (April 1940), Germany launched a great offensive to the west in May 1940, sending troops through Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg. The offensive ended with the defeat of France and the armistice of 25 June.

When the German army entered Paris (14 June) Soviet Russia sent to the three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—an ultimatum demanding a change of regime and the opening of their frontiers to Soviet troops. Soviet rule was established in these States, and the new deputies voted "unanimously" to annex these three countries to the Soviet Union (July 1940). In the south, Soviet Russia forced Romania to cede to it Bessarabia, which was annexed to Moldavia, as well as North Bukovyna and the region of Ismail, populated for the most part by Ukrainians (June 1940).

Through such measures, Moscow fortified its western frontiers to the north and to the south. In this manner, while Germany was developing its offensive in the west, Russia advanced her western frontiers from 150 to 300 km (Jilinc 202-203), succeeding in creating a cover to protect Leningrad and Moscow. However, the Russians were unable to get an advantage in the Balkan region.

In July 1940 Hitler ordered the study and preliminary preparations for an attack against the Soviet Union. While trying to persuade Russia into a coalition against England, he ordered, on 12 November 1940, the continuation of military preparations regardless of the results of the negotiations in progress (IMT 444-PS; *Das Dritte Reich* 2:34, 41). In Hitler's directive no.21 of 18 December 1940 the plan received the code name "Barbarossa." According to this secret directive, the Wehrmacht was to be ready, even before the end of the war against England, "for an eventuality of defeating Soviet Russia in a *Blitzkrieg* (Plan Barbarossa)," i.e., to wipe out by rapid and daring operations the principal body of Soviet troops and take possession of economic centers, notably of those in Ukraine (with the Donbass) and in the North Caucasus (IMT 446-PS).

Probably in March 1941 Hitler for the first time explained the nature of the future war and of the occupation in the east. This war, according to him, was to be a war of pitiless destruction with brutal occupation power (Jacobsen "Kommissarbefehl" 2:139-140).

On 13 March 1941 the high command of the Wehrmacht (OKW—Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), following Hitler's concept, expanded directive no.21 with supplementary instructions concerning the executive power in "the occupied Russian regions." These regions were to be transformed "into states provided with their own government." The division of these regions was to be made "in conformity with the national principle." At first there would be three regions corresponding to the three segments of the army: North (the Baltic States), Center (Belorussia), and South (Ukraine). "In these regions, the political administration will be in the hands of commissars of the Reich who will receive their instructions from the Führer" (Appendix, Doc.#45).

The principal task of the German authorities was to exploit the resources of these regions for the needs of the German economy and for the maintenance of German troops. The "preparation" of these territories for political management (i.e., civilian) was entrusted to Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer-SS who was under no other authority. By a secret order of the high command of the troops (OKH—Oberkommando des Heeres) of 26 March 1941, the security police (Sipo or SP) and the security service (SD) were obliged to take charge of "the execution of the special tasks of security." The Sonderkommandos of the Sipo and of the SD were to undertake their tasks at their own discretion. One of the tasks was to execute saboteurs, terrorists, opponents, elements hostile to the Reich, etc. (Appendix, Doc.#46).

Four days later Hitler declared before the heads of the Wehrmacht that all the Bolshevik political officials and communist intellectuals were to be liquidated as carriers of the Bolshevik ideology (Jacobsen "Kommissarbefehl" 2:146). Orders, notably those dated 6 May and 4 June, concerning the behavior of the troops in Russia, made provisions for measures of repression against the guerilla groups, saboteurs, Jews, as well as collective measures against the localities (Jacobsen "Kommissarbefehl" 2:175-177 Doc.#5a; Appendix, Doc.#52). The execution of political officials was ordered in the note of 12 May (Appendix,

Doc.#49). By dispositions of 15 May, all actions against the Wehrmacht were to be suppressed with the brutality of executions, while actions committed by members of the Wehrmacht against the civilian population were not to be subjected to any legal proceedings (Appendix, Doc.#50). Thus the police and judicial mechanisms of repression were planned and organized before the invasion of the Soviet Union.

The definite date of the invasion—22 June 1941—was probably determined on 30 April of the same year. However, diplomatic circles of Moscow spoke of the imminence of the German-Soviet war from March on (Jiline 189; ADAP, D XII 1:235). Upon Churchill's request, the British ambassador to Moscow, S. Cripps, on 19 April delivered a message to Vishinsky, warning Stalin of the possibility of a German invasion (Jiline 209). The Turkish ambassador to Moscow, convinced that to realize its ambitions, Germany needed Ukraine and that it was going to launch a conquest of Ukraine, said so to a top Soviet official of foreign affairs. The German naval attaché in Moscow indicated in his telegram of 24 April that according to the English ambassador war would be declared on 22 June or else on 20 May 1941 (Appendix, Doc.#51). The Russian spy, Richard Sorge, sent from Japan on 5 March 1941 photocopies of secret telegrams of Ribbentrop to the Reich's ambassador to Japan, stating that aggression against Soviet Russia would begin in the latter half of June 1941. On 19 May Sorge sent to Moscow "almost exact data" on the concentration of 150 German divisions on the frontiers of the USSR. On 15 June Moscow received from Sorge the following message: "The war will commence on 22 June" (*Beziehungen* 378; Jiline 209).

German Intentions

Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union not only because he needed Ukraine's wealth and wished to conquer a *Lebensraum* (living space) in the east for Germany and acquire territories for colonization, but also because he believed that he had to destroy the Russian power, convinced that England, the enemy to be defeated, needed Russia and the United States as allies. Once Russia was defeated, England would

be isolated and then even the United States would refuse to enter the war.

Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, however, Hitler and his entourage remained rather vague as to their true intentions concerning the future political map of Eastern Europe.

By deciding in July of 1940 to attack the USSR in the Spring of 1941, Hitler formulated, according to the notes of General Halder, head of the general staff, the political goals to be attained: "Ukrainian State, Federation of the Baltic States, Belorussia, Finland..." These few words in no way indicate that Hitler then envisioned an independent Ukrainian State, because nine days later, on 31 July 1940, Halder again noted Hitler's war goals formulated in the following manner: "Ultimately, Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic States will be ours." Thus Hitler had annexation in mind (Halder 2:32-33, 49-50).

Indeed, Nazi Germany had no intention of freeing people or of permitting independent states. Destruction of Soviet Russian power was to improve Hitler's ability to set up his hegemony in Europe and in the world. To realize its ambitions, Nazi Germany did not want independent states that could constitute a difficulty for its politics, but it did need the economic resources of all of Europe and, more specifically, the resources of Ukraine and the Caucasus.

The 13 March 1941 instructions of the OKW on civilian administration of occupied territories of the USSR noted, nevertheless, that the occupied regions "were to be transformed into states provided with their own governments," implying that the Germans intended to create national states linked to Germany. However, the instructions clearly specified that the political administration in those regions would "be in the hands of the Reich commissar," i.e., that the planned "states" would be, in fact, commissariats of the Reich.

Germany's true intentions were revealed in Rosenberg's dossier "Russia" composed on the eve of the campaign and especially in subsequent declarations of Hitler.

Alfred Rosenberg seemed to understand best the problems of Eastern Europe. In 1927, before the Nazi party came to power, he probably thought that an independent Ukrainian State would arise in the near future, and he wrote that under such circumstances "Germany must

remain open to the possibility of an alliance with Kiev" (Rosenberg 97). But once in power, Rosenberg ignored this problem and followed Hitler's policies.

Rosenberg's dossier contained memoranda and documents that trace the evolution of Germany's political plans concerning European East. The unsigned memorandum no.1 of 2 April 1941 defined somewhat the goals of the war. The war would "lead to an extraordinarily rapid occupation of important parts of the Soviet Union" and would probably consequently lead to a rapid collapse of this State. The occupation of its territories would meet with administrative and economic difficulties. The main objective of the Reich was to obtain deliveries that Germany needed to wage the war. All other considerations were subordinated to this main goal. In Russia, a conglomerate of nations, seven "national and geographic units" had to be distinguished: Great Russia, Belorussia, the Baltic States, Ukraine, the region of the Don, the region of the Caucasus, Central Asia.

The political goal of the campaign, according to the memorandum, was the long-term weakening of Russia through "a temporary occupation of its territory" and especially through "a total destruction of the Judeo-Bolshevik administration," "through vast economic exploitation," and through "the attribution of important Russian regions to new units of administration, notably Belorussia, Ukraine, and the Don region." Russia itself could be used "as a region of expulsion *en masse* of undesirable elements" (IMT 1017-PS).

As to Ukraine, the memorandum made provisions for putting in place a national life appropriate to the possible creation of a political formation whose goal will be, by itself or with the Don and Caucasus regions under the form of a Federation of the Black Sea, "to hold Moscow constantly in check and to protect the German living space in the east" (Appendix, Doc.#47).

The planned "national units" including Ukraine were not independent states. Soviet territory, according to the memorandum, was to be divided into "Reich commissariats," and Rosenberg proposed to Hitler in the appendix of memorandum no. 2 of 7 April 1941 to name the first

Reich commissars: Gauleiter Lohse for the Baltic provinces (Ostseeprovinzen) and Belorussia, Stabsleiter Schickendanz for the Reich commissariat for Ukraine, the Secretary of State Backe for the Caucasus, and D. Klagges for the Don-Volga region. For Russia, where the occupation was to be of a harsher nature than in the other Reich commissariats, Rosenberg proposed a man reputed to be pitiless and cruel, the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch. The Reich commissariats were to be placed under the authority of a central bureau in Berlin, the "general protectorate for occupied territories in the east." The commissars of the Reich (possibly including those for Moscow and Turkestan) would "be named and recalled by the Führer on the suggestion of the general protectorate" (IMT 1019-PS).

Significantly, these plans concerning the future of Eastern Europe were made more than two months *before* the invasion of the Soviet Union.

On 20 April 1941 Hitler ordered Rosenberg to conduct a study in collaboration with the highest authorities of the Wehrmacht, concentrating on the issues relative to the organization of Eastern Europe. The head of the OKW delegated to this end to Rosenberg Generals Jodl and Warlimont. Study of these issues was to be conducted in strictest secrecy (IMT 865-PS).

In the following weeks Rosenberg drafted preliminary instructions for each Reich commissariat and general instructions for all commissars in the occupied territories of the east. According to the general instructions, Germany was to attack Russia to free the German Reich from the constant threat of the Russian power. This goal corresponded not only to German interests but also to "historic justice." The German Reich had to take care not to commit during the Russian campaign "historic injustice," i.e., reconstruction of another Russian empire in place of the destroyed empire. Consequently, regions corresponding to historical and national units would be reorganized into Reich commissariats. The Reich commissariat Ostland was to include the Baltic States and Belorussia, and this protectorate was to be Germanized. The Reich commissariat Ukraine was to become eventually an independent state linked to Germany. The Caucasus was to be a state federated under the German mandate. Russia was to determine its future. For centuries, the

Germans of Russia had contributed greatly to the well-being of these regions. Consequently, during the German occupation Russia's wealth was to become the property of the German people. All the despoiled Germans were to receive a compensation. Declarations concerning this policy were to be made at the appropriate time by the Minister of the Reich for the eastern occupied territories (IMT 1030-PS).

Instructions of 7 May 1941 to the Reich commissars for Ukraine were more precise. "The primary goal of the Reich commissar in Ukraine is to obtain for the German Reich foodstuffs and raw materials, and in doing so consolidate the conduct of war, and then establish a free Ukrainian state closely linked to Germany." This last goal was aimed to win the Ukrainians over to the cause of the war; in the end, it would be abandoned.

Nevertheless, Rosenberg thought it necessary to allow Ukrainians to develop their historic conscience, create a university in Kiev, develop literature, etc. The Jews, he said, would be dismissed from all public employment and regrouped into ghettos. Crimea, formerly inhabited by the Goths, would be detached from Ukraine; in compensation Ukraine would receive territories to the east, and her frontiers would be moved as far as the city of Saratov on the Volga. If Germany succeeded in putting this plan into practice, concluded Rosenberg, it would succeed in breaking the pressure of the Russian empire, and then Germany would "not have to fear any maritime blockade and its resupplying of foodstuff and raw materials will be guaranteed for all times" (IMT 1028-PS).

In May of 1941, Rosenberg's service established the administrative division of the four Reich commissariats: Ostland, Ukraine, Russia, and the Caucasus. The Reich commissariat Ostland was to include the Baltic States and Belorussia. The Reich commissariat Ukraine would be composed of eight general commissariats: Kiev, Lemberg (Lviv), Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Rostov, Saratov, Crimea. The general commissariat of Rostov would include Stalingrad, and that of Saratov would incorporate the regions of Saratov and Pokrovsk. The Reich commissariat Russia would include eight general commissariats: Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Gorki, Kirov, Kazan, Ufa, Sverdlovsk. The Reich commissariat Caucasus would be composed of five general commissariats (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kuban, Terek, the highland regions) and two

principal commissariats (Armenia and Kalmuckia) (BA-MA RW 41/v.759 f. 38-46).

Rosenberg's memoranda and instructions gave the impression that the possible creation of a Ukrainian state would be exclusively a German act, for the wishes of the Ukrainian people and their aspirations for freedom were totally absent from these plans. Germany did not accede to the desires and demands of the Ukrainians for independence; Germany was going to "create" one day a Ukrainian state. But Rosenberg's ideas were not always accepted or approved by Hitler and his closest collaborators. There is no indication that his ideas concerning Ukraine received Hitler's approval. Furthermore, Rosenberg had neither the opportunity nor even the necessary desire to impose his point of view, for he was to acquiesce constantly.

Hitler had planned a regime of pitiless occupation for Eastern Europe. From the outset his economic staff, following the directives of Herman Göring, expanded the plans for exploitation ("immediate and maximal") of resources to meet the needs of the Wehrmacht and to obtain support for the war effort (IMT 126-EC). Political considerations could not prevail over the economic goals. Secretary of state Backe, on 1 June 1941 (21 days before the attack) issued a dozen directives for the German officials charged with the economy in the east. He advised them to be pitiless because their task would be to acquire for good new territories for Germany and for Europe. "Be aware that you are the representatives for centuries to come of Great Germany and the standard-bearers of the national Socialist revolution and of the New Europe. For this reason you must apply with dignity all measures that the interests of the state demand, even the hardest and the most brutal." Therefore, no weakness and no sentimentalism, demanded Backe (IMT 089-USSR).

On 16 June 1941, six days before the attack, the army staff discussed various aspects of the campaign. That concerning propaganda can be summarized as follows: "The fight is being led not against the Russian people but against the Judeo-Bolshevik leaders; consequently [it is a] liberation of the Russians from the men in power. It is not desirable to speak of the independence of Ukraine" (BA-MA RH 24-3/134 Ic Besprechungen bei A.O.6).

These instructions were in conformity with the OKW's directives which stated that the enemy of Germany was not the people of the Soviet Union but the "Judeo-Bolshevik government, its officials and the Communist party which was aiming for world revolution." The German army was coming as a friend to deliver the population from the tyranny of the Soviets. Nevertheless, all resistance of the population, if it manifested itself, would be broken. Propaganda, centered on the disintegration of the USSR was not, however, to lead to premature conclusions concerning the division of the Soviet Union. Terminology used up to the present was to be modified.

The directives of OKW forbade the use of the terms "Russia," "Russians," "Russian Army," etc., and replaced them with "Soviet Union," "peoples of the Soviet Union," "Red Army," etc. For economic reasons kolkhozes must not be dissolved or the land be distributed among the people. The press would be under surveillance with vigilant censorship especially in the Ukrainian and Baltic territories (BA-MA RH 2/v.2082, f. 171-176; Appendix, Doc.#54).

On 20 June 1941, two days before the attack against the USSR, Rosenberg reported before a limited group of officers charged with the issues of Eastern Europe (Admiral Canaris, General Thomas, Admiral Fricke) and some dignitaries of the state and of the party (Lammers, Frick, Ley, Secretary of State Kundt, Heydrich, etc.). Rosenberg began by reviewing German-Soviet relations and then stressed the necessity to free the German Reich for centuries to come from the pressure in the east. To achieve this, the Russian empire must be dislodged and several political entities established in its place. He envisioned four large blocs: Great-Finland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, the Caucasus. As far as Ukraine was concerned, Germany's goal was to accord freedom to the Ukrainian people, but it was premature to say when and how the Ukrainian state would be formed and "to speak of it now does not make any sense" (BA R 6/6 f. 66).

Rosenberg thought that Germany's behavior toward Ukrainians should be benevolent for economic reasons: it was better to win the cooperation of 40,000,000 Ukrainians than to place a soldier behind each Ukrainian peasant. In reality, it would have been necessary to establish four large states (Reich commissariats): Baltenland (a protectorate),

Ukraine (a national state), the Caucasus (a federated state), and Russia. Ukraine would be divided into eight general commissionerships and would occupy a surface area of 1,100,000 km², with a population of 59,500,000 inhabitants. The four political units would be directed by commissars of the Reich who would represent the Reich's sovereignty over these countries. The Germans contemplated two gigantic objectives: the assurance of provisions of fresh supplies for the German troops and of all raw materials needed for the German war effort and the liberation for all time to come of Germany from all political pressures coming from the east (BAR 6/6 f. 61-72; IfZ Fd 47 f. 29-32).

The Idea of Living Space in the East

In addition to acquiring resources necessary for conducting the war, Hitler also thought, though vaguely, of securing living space (*Lebensraum*) in the east for Germany.

The idea of a *Lebensraum* must be disassociated from the idea of German hegemony. In attempting to conquer England, Hitler intended to establish a German hegemony in Europe for centuries to come. But to conquer England, he had to fight the English everywhere: in Europe, in Africa, in the Middle East, in Asia. Plan Barbarossa was a step in Germany's world expansion. The high command of the German Armed Forces noted in his journal on 17 February 1941: "With the Eastern Campaign finished, it is necessary to think about the conquest of Afghanistan and about the organization of the offensive against India." (Jilinc 165) Instruction no.32 of 11 June 1941 detailed plans for conquering the Near Eastern countries. German troops were already in Libya and were preparing to invade Egypt. Other troops were to converge towards the Near East through Bulgaria and Turkey as well as through the Caucasus and Iran. Russia should be totally vanquished by autumn of 1941 or winter of 1941/42, and German troops would be able to continue their course towards Iran.

Hitler was not the first to consider these conquests. Ludendorff had thought about them at the end of World War I. A high German official in occupied Ukraine (probably General W. Groner) commented in 1918

that in addition to the resources of Ukraine, Germany also needed the resources of other regions. He regretted that the Germans did not have enough divisions to charge "as quickly as possible as far as Baku and put their hands on everything that the German Reich absolutely needed" for warfare, especially the oil fields of the Caucasus. Moreover, he remembered the old Schlieffen strategy that claimed the final decision would be made on the Suez Canal. Unable to reach the Suez by way of Bulgaria, the Germans thought of reaching it through Ukraine and the Caspian Sea. And he added: "It is difficult to know how far we will go and if we are going to succeed in spreading our influence to Turkestan and Persia" (MA-BA N46/173 f. 151 ff.).

Undoubtedly Hitler entertained similar thoughts. However, his ideas concerning *Lebensraum* would become more precise with the launching of the war against the USSR.

The idea of *Lebensraum* was not a Nazi idea. Rather it was originated with the Pangermanic movement at the end of the 19th century, and centered on the existence of a strong German minority in the Russian Empire: descendents of the 13th century Teutons in the Baltic regions, city dwellers who came to Moskovia at the time of Ivan the Terrible (16th century), colonists who had come to settle on the Volga and in Ukraine from the second half of the 18th century on and in the course of the 19th century, etc.

In the early 1890s approximately 1,200,000 Germans lived in the Russian Empire: 550,000 in Ukraine, 500,000 in the Volga region, 150,000 in the Baltic provinces. The Pangermanic movement saw in this population an incentive for Germany's expansion towards the east and justification for the Germanization of a part of these regions, realization of the famous *Drang nach Osten*. Considering that all these Germans were to be incorporated into the Reich, the Pangermanic movement suggested from 1893 to 1895 annexation of immense territories to the Reich as a goal of the next war against Russia. The German frontier in the east was to come down from the Narva in the north towards Pskov, then follow the Dnipro, turn east as far as the Volga and from there descend towards the Black Sea. All territories west of this line, including Crimea, were to belong to the Reich (Fleischhauer 15). Some Pangermanic authors thought that the Slavs should be removed by force from

territories destined for German colonization. Others suggested establishment of a railroad link with Baghdad and colonization along this track (Fleischhauer 16).

In 1918, while occupying Ukraine and a part of Russia, German authorities had considered coming to the aid of the German colonies and regrouping them. There was even a plan to make Crimea a German colony and have colonists from the Volga and from other regions settle in that area, but the project was judged unreasonable and abandoned (BA-MA N 46/173 f. 41).

Approximately 120,000 Germans had to leave the territory of the former Russian empire at the outbreak of the revolution and the civil war. The majority of them emigrated overseas, but more than 55,000 settled in Germany. Among the latter were some future activists and leaders of the National Socialists, including Alfred Rosenberg, Georg Leibbrandt, and Arno Schickendanz.

After taking control of the Nazi party in 1920, Hitler acquired his knowledge on Eastern Europe precisely from the Germans native in Russia and in the Baltic provinces. In the years 1920-1923, his chief advisor was the émigré Max von Scheubner-Richter who introduced Hitler to Ludendorff. According to the German historian Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Scheubner-Richter and other German émigrés from Russia and the Baltic provinces conveyed to the Nazi movement not only the horrible image of "Judeo-Asiatic bolshevism" but also that of anti-Semitism with which certain German circles of Russia had been permeated since the 1890s (Fleischhauer 36-38).

Hitler was also swayed by another German from Russia, Karl von Manteuffel. Influenced by social Darwinism and by H. St. Chamberlain's racism, Manteuffel developed a concept of Russia founded on race and blood. The Russian state, according to him, had been the work of the Germans from the beginning. Germans (the Varangians) had founded the Russian state and had been directing it from that time on. They had colonized Novgorod and Kiev. Their troops had descended as far as the Volga, the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. The Varangians had conquered and colonized all of Russia, and it was their blood that had made the formation of the Russian upper classes possible.

Unlike the Slavic people, affirmed Manteuffel, Germans had the ability to organize and to construct a state. As soon as the upper classes in Russia mixed with the Slavs, their quality of blood and race degenerated, bringing about their decline, but Peter the Great and Catherine the Great (the latter of German origin) made the regeneration of the Russian upper classes possible through the infusion of new German blood. German colonists had played a positive role in Russia. Then the 1917 revolution caused the ousting of the decimated German elements, making renaissance of Russia impossible for a long time.

The Slavic character and Jewish domination were in the process of leading Russia to decay. The only solution was to send to Russia "a million [German] soldiers for the purpose of procreating children" (Fleischhauer 42). The historical vocation of Germany, according to Manteuffel, was to extend towards the east. Germany had to do this also for internal reasons of overpopulation. Russia was the country where Germany would find room for its excess (according to Clemenceau) 20,000,000 workers (Fleischhauer 36-38, 41-43).

Practically the same ideas recur in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, written several years later. The Germans, according to Hitler, instead of continuing their march towards the south and the west, had to take up their push towards the east, which they had given up six centuries before. The National Socialists were to go from a colonial policy in Africa and from commerce to a territorial policy: "When today we speak in Europe of new lands we think primarily of Russia and of the peripheral states subjected by it" (Hitler 2:316). Like Manteuffel, Hitler was convinced that the Russian state was the product of the "efficiency of the German elements in an inferior race" (2:316). For centuries the Russian upper classes had fed on the Germanic nucleus which was destroyed, and "in its place appeared the Jew" (2:317).

After the defeat of Poland, Hitler's ideas concerning Eastern Europe became more precise. On 7 October 1939, one day after announcing a "new order" in Eastern Europe, he entrusted to Himmler by secret decree the position of "Reich commissar for the Strengthening of the German Nationality." The decree mentioned further the "elimination of

harmful influences of all the parties of foreign population that represent[ed] a danger for the Reich and for the German community" (IMT 686-Ps.).

On 12 October, abandoning the idea of rebuilding a Polish state, Hitler gave orders to organize the part of Poland not annexed into a General Government into a sort of German colony (*Nebenland*). The handing over of this territory to the civil administration on 25 October 1939 marked the beginning of the policy of oppression, terror and extermination of the "inferior" Polish population to make room for the German "superior race."

The same policy, supervised by the SS and Himmler's police, was planned for the territories of the USSR and named *Generalplan Ost* (general plan east) at the end of 1941. Preparatory work for this plan began on Himmler's orders probably in January of 1940 (Cf. IfZ NO-2275). The central office of the security of the Reich (*Reichssicherheitshauptamt*=RSHA) and the Commissariat of the Reich for the Strengthening of the German Nationality were to implement this plan, intended to Germanize the greater part of Eastern Europe through colonization.

There were in fact two plans: a short-term plan (*Nahplan*) and a long-term plan (*Fernplan*). The former dealt with the Germanization of certain regions only; the latter involved Germanization of a larger part of the Soviet-occupied territories.

On 24 June 1940 Himmler put on paper the methodology for colonization. Millions of German colonists were to be taken into the regions in question. They would use the Slavic man-power but then drive out the Slavs. No mixing of German blood would be tolerated; rapport between the Germans and the foreigners would be punished (BA-NS 19/184). In the Spring of 1941, Himmler charged Professor Konrad Meyer to expand secretly a detailed plan of the colonization of Eastern Europe.

According to this plan, Rosenberg foresaw a change in the eastern frontiers of the General Government. The Germans also projected displacement of the entire Polish population of Wartheland (Posen and a part of the region of Lodz, attached to the Reich) farther to the east to the Belorussia frontier and even into the Smolek region (BA R 6/21

f. 23-26). On 7 May 1941, i.e., before the German-Soviet war, attaching Crimea directly to the Reich was discussed, as was a transfer of certain territories to Finland and to Romania (BA R 6/21 f. 50).

Ukrainian Preparations

Ukrainians were totally ignorant of Germany's intentions. During the months preceding the war they tried to prepare themselves for any eventuality without knowing what was in store. The two nationalist organizations were determined to take part in the war against Russia, the declared enemy of the independence of the Ukrainian people, but the plans and the tactical choices of the two Ukrainian political forces differed.

In the beginning of 1941 the OUN-B ordered Riko Yary to contact the representatives of the OKW to discuss the possibility of creating a Ukrainian unit that would be trained by the Wehrmacht. This unit was supposedly to fight on the eastern front against Soviet Russia. In reality, however, the OUN-B was trying to train a unit of men as the nucleus of a national armed force to serve the revolution in Ukraine.

But the OUN-B saw another reason for seeking to make an arrangement with the Wehrmacht. Under the conditions of banning striking activities for émigré associations in Germany, an arrangement with the Wehrmacht procured protection for Bandera's men that made certain political activities possible without much concern about the Gestapo.

A third reason for this arrangement with the Wehrmacht concerned the OUN-B's (like Melnyk's OUN) intention to penetrate Ukraine as quickly as possible and politically occupy the country immediately after the Germans had moved the front into Ukraine, but measures would be taken to render the displacement of émigrés impossible. Thus ties with the Wehrmacht would be useful. The OUN-B intended to create secretly small political action groups (also called marching—pokhidni hrupy—groups) designed to penetrate Ukraine and take power there—in total several thousand men who should be able to count on aid from the Ukrainian unit, created within the Wehrmacht and enjoying freedom of

movement. This unit would be able to furnish information and false papers, distribute propaganda materials, etc.

Talks between Riko Yary and the reserve officers of the OKW (professors Hans Koch, T. Oberländer, and G. Gerullis) ended in April of 1941. The Germans agreed to train approximately 700 men who were going to be divided into two battalions—"Nachtigall" and "Roland" (Illytzyk 2:140). These two units will be discussed later.

When the OUN-B succeeded in concluding a limited agreement with the representatives of the OKW, the OUN-M was considering the possibility of organizing a legion or a true Ukrainian national army made up of émigrés. Consequently, the OUN-M founded an association of former Ukrainian fighters and established a general council of former soldiers, hoping it would be charged with the organization of the Ukrainian army. It agreed also to send a certain number of persons to serve as interpreters in the Wehrmacht (Illytzyk 95-97, 105).

Simultaneously, the eastern service of the foreign policy office of the NSDAP continued to draw the attention of authorities to the anti-German activities of the Ukrainian nationalists abroad. The Paris center of Ukrainian nationalists had ceased to exist with the occupation of France, but Reichsleiter Leibbrandt alerted the head of Gestapo on 31 March 1941 to activities of Ukrainian nationalists of New York who had formed a support committee with the Allies. This committee, in an appeal addressed to the press and the allied governments, denounced Germany's and Italy's exploitation of the Ukrainian situation and Hitler's pretensions regarding Ukraine. The committee declared that Ukraine could very well be the next victim of "insatiable German imperialism." It expressed its confidence in the government of Great Britain and stressed Ukraine's hope to recover its independence after the victory over the dictators (BA NS 43/42 f. 217).

In the General Government in Cracow and on Ukrainian territories the OUN-B began in secret organizing and training the political action (*pokhidni*) groups, that, in the event of a German-Soviet war, were to penetrate Ukraine behind the German troops.

In May of 1941, the central leadership of the OUN-B sent to its leaders secret instructions outlining two possibilities in case of armed conflict on Ukrainian territory: immediate general uprising upon the

announcement of war (before the arrival of the German troops), and occupation of the country by German troops.

Should war provoke a general uprising, the OUN-B was to persuade soldiers of the Red Army to join the ranks of the insurgents. People of other nationalities would also be able to join the Ukrainian revolutionary army. The watch-word in that situation would be "Freedom for the peoples, freedom for the individual and social justice!" (Appendix, Doc.#53)

The authors of these instructions evidently had no specific ideas concerning this first eventuality, for they supposed that seizure of power had to occur before the arrival of German troops; in that case there would not be occupation by foreign troops who would come to Ukraine as allies only.

In case of outright occupation of Ukrainian territories by "foreign armies of victors," i.e., by German troops and by German allies, the OUN would prevent Ukraine from becoming a mere object of foreign domination. As soon as states in war against Russia ceased to be hostile to Ukraine, they would be regarded as allies of Ukrainians. Normalization of relationships between Ukraine and these states would be subject to one single condition: recognition of and respect for Ukraine's sovereignty and integrity.

The instructions specified that the construction of the Ukrainian State would be made "by our own means and by our own initiative." On the territory freed by the German army the OUN would proclaim without delay restoration of the Ukrainian State and would install an authority charged with organization and direction of national life (Appendix, Doc.#53). Thus the OUN-B was determined to proclaim an independent Ukrainian state without concern for the attitude of the Germans.

At the same time, Ukrainians tried to influence German leaders to think favorably of Ukraine's independence. Numerous memoranda arrived in the Reich's chancellery. The memorandum of the OUN-M of 14 April 1941 explained that this organization's goal was restoration of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state. This state was to include, besides the ethnographical Ukrainian territories, regions to the east of Ukraine stretching as far as the Caspian Sea. Extension of Ukraine's

frontier to the Caspian Sea and the town of Kamyshin on the Volga was justified by the need to increase the security of the Donbass' mine and industrial regions. Rosenberg must have known of this memorandum before writing his instructions of 7 and 8 May.

In the memorandum, the OUN-M foresaw the possibility of a close cooperation with Germany, but expressed a desire to know the real intentions of Berlin regarding Eastern Europe and to obtain official guarantees as to the future of Ukraine (BA NS 43/41 f. 1-7)

Besides, OUN-M was also preparing, although in a less significant way, to send to Ukraine political action groups charged with the continuation of the organization's activities in Ukraine.

The memorandum of the OUN-B, prepared one week before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, was handed over to the Reich's chancellery on 23 June 1941, the day following the outbreak of hostilities (Appendix, Doc.#55). The memorandum expressed a conviction that the solution to the Ukrainian question had to correspond to Ukrainian interests and that only then would this solution serve Germany also. However, German interests in this matter could not supersede interests of Ukraine. Because Ukrainian nationalists were defending primarily the interests of the Ukrainian nation, they could not accept any other terms.

The memorandum then declared that German troops would be welcomed as liberators, but "this attitude would change quickly if the Germans entered Ukraine without having the intention of permitting the re-establishment of the Ukrainian State."

Under no circumstances could the solution to the Ukrainian question, according to the memorandum, go against the interests of the Ukrainian people. "It is the attitude of the Ukrainian people that will determine whether Ukraine becomes the complementary part of a reorganized Europe or a place of danger."

The memorandum of the OUN-B noted that Ukraine found itself, in fact, in a political sense, not between Germany and Russia, but between Germany and England (alluding to Ukraine's consideration of this latter power as an ally).

Decade-long aspirations for independence, "will to fight and willingness to defend oneself against foreign influences" had created, according to the memorandum, a special type of Ukrainian who

distrusted all foreigners. The memorandum stressed that "all coercion [in Ukraine] would have only opposite effects."

The memorandum then analyzed with clarity the situation in Europe. "The European continent is today dominated by two imperialistic ideas [*imperiale Gedanken*]*—that of the Germans which is the idea of a Reich oriented towards a new order in Europe, and that of Russian imperialism based on world revolution.*"

The OUN-B argued that even from the economic and strategical point of view Ukraine was part of Europe. Only an independent and powerful Ukrainian state could guarantee the harmonious development of Eastern Europe. "In the long run, one cannot dominate Eastern Europe with the help of technical means of government and administration leaning on the powerful occupation army." According to the memorandum, there was only one possible conclusion: "The long-term military occupation of Eastern Europe is untenable." Only a political system based on the principle of nationalities and an independent Ukrainian state could guarantee the stability of a new order in Eastern Europe.

Ukraine, continued the memorandum, had to form within the European economic space its own independent economic region, but its center could not be in Berlin. An independent Ukrainian military power would guarantee a German-Ukrainian alliance and would alleviate the Russian pressure on Europe.

The Ukrainian State had to be truly independent and sovereign: Ukraine could not be treated like Slovakia and of Croatia. The memorandum finally stressed that the evolution of German-Ukrainian relations would depend not only on the manner in which the Ukrainian question would be resolved but also on the methods used from the outset.

In conclusion, the OUN-B refused a solution to the Ukrainian question matching that of the Slovak and Croatian questions, demanding total independence from Germany and total sovereignty of Ukraine. It proposed an alliance in the struggle against Russia, an alliance founded on powerful Ukrainian armed forces; it warned the Germans against unacceptable methods and solutions they might attempt to execute in Ukraine (BA R 43 II/1500 f. 64-77).

Chapter III

OCCUPATION AND BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE

Several hours before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler informed his ally, the Duce, of the imminence of the attack and added: "As far as the battle in the East is concerned, it will surely be a hard one. But I do not doubt for a moment its success. I am hoping above all that we will finish by assuring ourselves for a long time to come a common base for fresh supplies in Ukraine. It will furnish us with resources that we will need afterwards" (ADAP XII, 2, #660).

On 22 June 1941 at 3:30 am. 190 German and allied divisions which were massed on the frontier from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea—approximately 5,500,000 men—launched an assault against the Soviet empire.

At that time, Russia had an army numbering more than five million men. During the course of the first weeks of war the troops increased by 3,500,000 men (Jiline 186, 194, 227). The Soviet army was thus larger than the German army, but it lacked training; its officer staff was insufficient; the Soviet soldier did not have a great desire to fight to defend a feared regime of terror. Besides, the majority of the population of the national republics was hoping that the conflict would bring national freedom.

Rapid Advance of the Germans

German troops advanced rapidly despite resistance in places where fierce fighting occurred. Lutsk was taken on 25 June, Dubno on 27,

Rivne on 28, Lviv and Ternopil on 30 June, Drohobych and Stry on 1 July, Stanyslaviv on 2, Proskuriv on 8, Zhytomyr on 9 July. Within two weeks, the Germans had not only gone beyond the former Soviet frontiers on the River Zbruch but had reached, and in some places gone beyond, Stalin's line of defense that was approximately 350 km from the 22 June 1941 frontier.

According to German reports from the combat zone, prisoners were executed by the retreating NKVD. In the prison of Lutsk, "the Russians savagely massacred on 23 June 1,000 to 2,000 Ukrainian prisoners (members of the OUN)" (BA-MA RH 24-3/134 Meldung 92/29 d of 27 June 1941). "Atrocities confirmed in Rudky and Komarno. Approximately 200 Ukrainians (men, women, and children) killed in a bestial way" (7 July 1941). "In Berezhany, 30 Ukrainians killed by the Russians" (BA-MA RH 20-17/277 Meldung of 5 July 1941).

Gradually other massacres of Ukrainian political prisoners were discovered by the advancing German troops: 837 in Sambir, 500 in Dubno, 3,000 to 4,000 (according to other sources, ca. 10,000) in Lviv, 850 in Drohobych, 1,500 in Stanyslaviv. Mass graves and prison cells full of corpses, most often horribly tortured, were discovered by the tens, hundreds, and thousands in other towns and villages in Ukraine, especially in Peremyshl, Bibrka, Dobromyl, Zhovkva, Kaluzh, Mykolaiv, Stry, Ternopil, Chortkiv, Vinnytsia, Uman'.¹

German reports gave an account of numerous desertions of Soviet soldiers. "The number of deserters, especially of Ukrainians, is increasing" (BA-MA RH 20-17/280 Meldung of 3 July 1941). "Prisoners confirm the efficiency of [German] leaflets. The number of deserters—Ukrainians, but also Russians—is increasing incessantly" (7 July 1941). On 4 July, the Seventeenth Army captured six officers, 410 men, the majority of them Ukrainians (BA-MA RH 20-17/277 Meldung of 5 July 1941). On 6 July the number of prisoners of war was 1,370 (BA-MA RH 20-17/280 Meldung of 7 July 1941).

Germans dropped tens of thousands of leaflets on the Soviet troops. What did these leaflets say? They affirmed that "the Judeo-communist government" led by Stalin had violated the agreement concluded with Germany and that Stalin had provoked the war. The Soviet government, stated the leaflets, had attempted to set Bulgaria and

Serbia against the Germans. "The German army has received orders to drive away the communists who are torturing and exploiting the peoples of the USSR." After the fall of the Czarist regime the communists had promised land and freedom. In place of land, "they have made you slaves of Stalin and of his Jewish communists." In place of liberty, "they have put in place a regime worse than the Czarist regime." The leaflet continues:

Officers and soldiers of the Red Army, turn your arms and your bayonets against this power and you will free the world from the enemies of humanity. Hitler has driven the parasites from his country. Follow his example! To hell with the Jews and the communists! We will go to Moscow and to Kiev together. Through our common efforts, we are going to free all the peoples of the USSR from the communist yoke and the cursed Jews... (BA-MA RH 20-17/276)

At the bottom of the leaflet was a *Passierschein* (pass) in German that enabled a Soviet soldier to surrender with the assurance that he would be well treated. The leaflet did not attack the Russians and did not raise the question of national oppression in Ukraine or elsewhere.

The Russians retorted with a leaflet in German: "The German propaganda asserts that the Red Army is a horde led by Jews and communists and that it is forced to wage war against Germany. This is a lie invented to mislead the soldiers. The Red Army is the great Russian people, called to fight for its native land. These people set themselves up like a giant power that no force will be able to break" (BA-MA RH 20-6/489). The leaflet claimed that the Russian people had already defeated its adversaries: Napoleon in 1812, German occupation army of Eichhorn in 1918. Hitler would have to suffer the same. The war he had been waging against Europe for two years brought the German people only misery, hunger, destruction, death; that is why he did not want this war against the Russian people. But he was required to fight for the interests of the capitalists. The soldiers of the Red Army did not believe that the Nazis would bring freedom and happiness to the

workers of the Soviet Union, as they had not brought it to the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, or the Greeks (BA-MA RH 20-6/489).

The Soviet leaflet also had a *propusk* (pass) in Russian that permitted a German soldier to surrender.

While the German leaflet treated the Red Army as if it had no nationality and designated it as "Soviet," the Soviet leaflet insisted on the Russian national character of the Red Army.

A little later, Germans circulated another leaflet to the soldiers of the Red Army insisting that "the Germans are not fighting against the Russian people, they are fighting against the Bolsheviks and the Jews who have been oppressing and pillaging you for twenty years." The Germans were bringing "freedom from the Soviet yoke, a just sharing of work, peace and bread" (BA-MA RH 24-13/153).

After the reverses of the first days, Moscow decided to oppose the invasion with all possible means. The Communist party and the government adopted on 29 June 1941 special measures concerning the threatened regions. By their very nature, these measures (which had served as the backdrop of Stalin's 3 July 1941 speech) reenforced the particular and implacable character of the German-Russian conflict.

This war, declared Stalin, was no "ordinary war" but a "great war," a "patriotic war," of the entire "Soviet peoples" against fascist Germany, a war to decide the life or death of the Soviet regime. Stalin urged the population of the occupied territories to enter immediately upon a partisan war, to engage in acts of sabotage and destruction.

Furthermore, Moscow ordered the evacuation of directly threatened territories and the destruction of all that could not be evacuated (*Ukrainska RSR* 1:86).

Installation of the Police Apparatus

Hitler entrusted the political security of the occupied territories of the east to Himmler and to his Central Office of the Security of the Reich (RSHA). Approximately three weeks before the attack on the Soviet Union, special police units, the *Einsatzgruppen*, had been created by an agreement among the head of the security police (SP or Sipo), the

security service (SD), and the heads of OKW and the OKH. In all, four groups of the Sipo and of the SD were created: *Einsatzgruppe A* for the Baltic States, *Einsatzgruppe B* for Belorussia, *Einsatzgruppe C* for northern and central Ukraine, *Einsatzgruppe D* for southern Ukraine, Crimea and the Caucasus. Each group was composed of four or five *Einsatzkommandos* (EK) or at times *Sonderkommandos* (SK). A Sipo or SD group could have between 500 and 800 men, occasionally close to 1,000.

Their task was to guarantee "political security" in the military and civilian zones. The *Einsatzkommandos* were to "clean out" the regions of Jews, communist officials, and agents of all sorts, as well as socially, politically or racially undesirable elements. The *Einsatzkommandos* were also to handle the fight against the partisans. The *Einsatzgruppen* could receive, if the tactical or strategic situation demanded it, orders from the commander-in-chief, or the head of the high command of the army, or of the officer of the Abwehr. But all orders concerning the extermination of the "undesirable elements" came directly from Reichführer-SS Himmler or through the head of the RSHA, Heydrich (IfZ NO 2860: IMT XXII 32).

The upper echelon of the SS and of the police received oral instructions at the beginning of the offensive concerning their duties in the occupied territories. Those unable to come to Berlin (Jeckeln, von dem Bach, Prützmann) received a letter from Heydrich dated 2 July 1941 containing instructions for the *Einsatzgruppen* and the *Einsatzkommandos* of the SP and the SD.

This letter reminded them that the immediate object in the entire eastern region was "political, i.e., essentially policing pacification," the final objective being "economic pacification." Prescribed measures were to be applied with "ruthless vigor."

This letter indicates that the Germans, more specifically, those charged with political questions, were to dominate the countries of the East by applying to the maximum the principle *divide et impera* (divide and rule). Heydrich's letter demanded in particular that an account be kept of the differences of the peoples (Balts, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Georgians, etc.) and that these differences be used "to attain our goals."

As far as religious life was concerned, there was no question of preventing the Orthodox church from extending its influence over the masses, but formation of a unified church was to be prevented.

It is significant that this letter, which recommended each population be addressed in its own language (thus the Russians in Russian, the Ukrainians in Ukrainian, etc.) also demanded that members of the Red Army be addressed in Russian, yet Heydrich insisted that this army not be referred to as Russian.

So that soldiers would not think they were fighting the Russians, Heydrich's letter demanded that the term "Soviet army" or "Red Army" be used; the official bodies of Nazi Germany thus preferred to conform to the official Soviet terminology.

The letter stated next that psychologically it was a mistake to deny everything and to say that socialism should be destroyed in the USSR. Rather it should be said that "true socialism, that is to say, social justice for the worker, must be realized." But "a destruction of the collectivism does not enter into consideration for economic reasons."

Thus the Nazis decided from the outset of the fight against bolshevism, its worst enemy, to keep one of its foundations, collectivism.

Finally, the letter ordered the execution of all communist leaders, the peoples' commissars, the Jews of the party and of the administration, and all "radical elements" (Appendix, Doc.#58). The *Einsatzkommandos* began executions immediately upon their arrival in the towns of Ukraine.

Hitler and the German police viewed the massacres perpetrated by the NKVD during the retreat and Stalin's order to the population to take up a partisan war against the German invader godsend. Hitler particularly stressed that "the partisan war also presented some advantages: it permits us to exterminate all who oppose us" (IMT 221-L, XXXVIII, 88). Likewise, the atrocities of the communist regime were to be exploited in the persecution and the annihilation of the Jews who were identified as the main agents of bolshevism.

Einsatzgruppe C, charged with the "cleaning up" of central and northern Ukraine, left Bad Schmiedenberg on 23 June. This group was composed of the following *Einsatzkommandos* (EK): EK 4a, EK 4b, EK 5 and EK 6.² The first contingents of EK 4b arrived in Lviv on 30 June 1941 and the entire EK 4a and 4b arrived the following day.

The Proclamation of Independence

The OUN-B, convinced that German-Soviet war was imminent, decided to assemble all the Ukrainian political factions to face coming events. After preliminary talks, on 22 June it called in Cracow a conference of Ukrainian political leaders belonging to all movements (with the exception of OUN-M which refused to associate with this initiative).

The conference led to the creation of a center of coordination, the Ukrainian National Committee, whose presidency was entrusted to General Vsevolod Petriv, resident of Prague, and the vice-presidency to V. Horbovy who was, in fact, acting president (Ilnytsky 144-147).

This initiative was overtaken the same day by the events. The participants of the conference learned that the German-Soviet war had begun at dawn. The OUN-B profited from this occasion by announcing to the assembly that its underground political action groups were about to march in the direction of Ukraine and that their task would be to organize everywhere a Ukrainian administration, i.e., to take power.

On 23 June, the OUN-B representative in Berlin submitted to the German government a memorandum dated 15 June which included resolutions from the Second Congress of Bandera's movement (BA R 43 II/I 500 f. 60, 64-92). The Reich's Chancellery sent copies of these documents to the OKW, to Reichsführer-SS Himmler, and to Rosenberg. On 24 June, the OUN-B sent a copy to the Reich's minister of foreign affairs, Ribbentrop.

A high official charged with the preparation of a resumé of this document for Ribbentrop could only note that the memorandum, after reproaching Germany for "errors" committed during the 1918 occupation of Ukraine, advised Germany about the future of Eastern Europe, "in places in a tone of warning." Besides, the high official noted, the memorandum affirmed that the problems of this part of the continent could be resolved not by "a prolonged military occupation" but by the creation of a Ukrainian state sovereign in all areas, including economics. Without question, Ukraine's economy should be independent and not based in Berlin. The Ukrainian state should have independent armed forces that would be "the guarantee of the German-Ukrainian alliance."

The note of the high official of the ministry of foreign affairs continued: "To underline the demands for Ukraine from this important position of strength, the memorandum affirms that the example of the newly created states, i.e., Slovakia and Croatia, cannot serve as models for Great Ukraine."

The note concluded that the OUN-B warned that all powers pursuing their own interests, desiring establishment of a new order in Eastern Europe, should consider Ukraine's determination (AA Abt. Pol.XIII All.Akten 24; Appendix Doc.#57).

Put in place and instructed secretly on the eve of war, the OUN-B political action groups progressively infiltrated Ukraine behind the German army. There were between 5,000 and 8,000 men, divided into three large groups: "North," "Center," and "South." Each of these groups was composed of numerous small operational units, generally consisting of seven to twelve men. Group "North" was to reach Kiev and its region. Group "Center" had for its objective the town and the region of Kharkiv. Group "South" was to get as far as Odessa and Crimea. A special group, composed of about fifteen militants, was to reach the first important Ukrainian city, Lviv, the principal city in Western Ukraine, as quickly as possible, and proclaim there the restoration of the independence of the Ukrainian State.

A part of the political action groups began its march on 22 June; others followed shortly thereafter. To penetrate Ukraine, all means were acceptable. Most of the men were armed with false papers or false propaganda orders of the Wehrmacht which, at first, did not realize what the enterprising young people were doing in the zone behind the front. These young people organized the militia to maintain order and set up local administrations which *a priori* seemed a positive activity, but these young people were answerable only to the OUN-B and their sole task was to organize Ukrainian power in each locality.

The Soviet army evacuated Lviv in the evening of 29 June after several hours of combat with Ukrainian insurgents who had just attacked certain strategical points, including the prison where numerous members of the OUN were held. At dawn of 30 June, the Ukrainian unit *Nachtigall* and some German troops (notably from the First Alpine

Division of the Wehrmacht and the First Battalion of the Regiment z.b.V. 800 of the Abwehr) entered the city.

The OUN-B underground political action group, charged with taking power, arrived during the day. Men of the group convened an assembly of representatives of Ukrainian national life at the end of the day. The assembly approved the text of the independence proclamation prepared by OUN-B as well as the decree appointing the first adjunct of Bandera, Yaroslav Stetsko, head of the government.

At the end of the meeting, Stetsko gave two directives, charging I. Ravlyk with the organization of the militia to maintain the order and security of citizens and ordering radio transmission to announce the proclamation of independence.

The text of the proclamation stated that "in conformity with the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, directed by Stepan Bandera, is proclaiming the restoration of the Ukrainian State, for which entire generations of the best sons of Ukraine have sacrificed their lives." It asked the population "not to lay down arms as long as a Ukrainian power was not established on the entire Ukrainian territory" (Appendix, Doc.#56).

With the help of confusion, Ukrainians worked the transmitter and completed two transmissions, one on the evening of 30 June, the second late in the morning of 1 July. One of these broadcasts was picked up in Cracow. The day following the proclamation, 1 July 1941, the Ukrainian National Committee of Cracow published in haste its first (and last) bulletin of information (BA NS 26/1198). This bulletin recounted (in an extremely confused manner) the events of Lviv as picked up from the broadcast (which had also been very confusing).

This bulletin (which fell into German hands) suggested that the proclamation of independence had received approval or at least was tolerated by the representatives of the local German powers, but this was not so. The Germans in Cracow were dismayed; they did not know what was true or what was false.

On 2 July, the news of the proclamation of independence was made known in Berlin. The *Einsatzgruppe B* report of the security police and of SD pointed out "the endeavors of the Ukrainians under Bandera's command to put the German authorities before a *fait accompli* by

creating a Ukrainian Republic and by organizing the militia" (Appendix, Doc. ##59, 60; Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr.11, BA R 58/214 f. 58). The report added that Bandera's very active group was distributing leaflets to the population affirming that "the Ukrainian movement for liberation, formerly repressed by the Polish police, [would] henceforth be repressed by the German police" (f. 59).

The Reich's minister of foreign affairs received at that moment a letter from V. Stakhiv, the OUN-B representative in Berlin, informing him of the formation of the Ukrainian government in Lviv and of his appointment to the post of plenipotentiary representative of that government to the government of the Reich (AA Abt. Pol.XIII All.Akten 24; ADAP XIII, 1, Doc.#5).

On 3 July, to prevent the national movement from developing and to suppress Ukrainian political aspirations, authorities in Berlin placed certain Ukrainian leaders in Germany and in the General Government under house arrest, among them Bandera, and forbade them all political activities.

In Cracow on the same day, undersecretary of state, Kundt, assisted by Judge Bülow and high officials of the General Government, Föhl and Colonel Bisanz, summoned members of the executive bureau of the Ukrainian National Council (Horbovy, Andriyevsky, Mudry, Shukhevych) as well as Bandera. The talk turned into a cross-examination. Kundt announced that information in the bulletin distributed by the Ukrainian National Council was false, that the Ukrainian government had not been set up with the consent of the Germans, that the Reich and the Wehrmacht were not allies of the Ukrainians. He stressed: "The Führer is the only man to direct the fight....We are not allies, we are the conquerors of the Russo-Soviet territories" (BA NS 26/1198, 1-2), and he asked the Ukrainians "not to continue along these lines." Moreover, the Ukrainian National Committee had no legal existence as far as the Germans were concerned.

Kundt asked Bandera if he had been responsible for proclaiming independence and for the decree appointing the head of the government. Bandera admitted to having given the order "before the start of the war" to take the power and to set up Ukrainian administration and Ukrainian government. He had done this as head of the OUN. In the

vanguard of the Ukrainian people's struggle for freedom, the organization had the right to act in this manner. Kundt countered that "this right belongs to the German Wehrmacht and to the Führer who has conquered this country. It is he who has the right to establish a government."

Bandera took all responsibility upon himself by declaring: "while giving these orders, I did not rely on any German authority, on any consent of the German authorities but only on the mandate that I have received from the Ukrainian people" (Appendix, Doc. #61).

However, a brief presence of the two German officers, Major zu Eickern and Professor Koch, at the meeting of Ukrainian representatives in Lviv created some confusion *à propos* the proclamation of independence. The presence of these two officers was interpreted as German approval of the proclamation, and in this spirit the news was announced over the radio by a poorly informed announcer. When interrogated by the commission of inquiry, the two officers of the Abwehr declared that they had arrived at the Ukrainian assembly already in progress and that they had not in the least approved the proclamation of independence. Instead, after the reading of the decree appointing Stetsko head of the government, Professor Koch had warned the Ukrainians, reminding them that it was war, that the Ukrainians should not busy themselves with politics, that only Hitler could give orders in Ukraine (BA R 6/150 f. 5).

On 3 July Yaroslav Stetsko tried to inform Hitler of the formation of the Ukrainian government, but his letter, sent to the Reich's Chancellery two weeks later, was not passed on to the Führer.

The report on events dated 4 July contained a partial list of the members of the Ukrainian government (Appendix, Doc.#62). Its composition was completed the following day. The following were invited or joined the government: nine members of the OUN-B, seven without party affiliation, three social radicals, three national democrats (UNDO), one socialist revolutionary, and one from the National Unity Front. Principal members of the Ukrainian government were: Yaroslav Stetsko, prime minister and head of the department of social reforms; Doctor M. Panchyshyn, vice-prime minister and minister of health; Lev Rebet, second vice-prime minister; General V. Petriv, minister of defense; R. Shukhevych and O. Hasy, vice-ministers of defense; V. Lysy,

minister of the interior; M. Lebed, minister of the security of the state; V. Stakhiv, minister of foreign affairs; Y. Fedorovych, minister of justice; Y. Pavlykovsky, minister of national economics; I. Olkhovy, minister of finance; A. Piasetsky, minister of forests; V. Radzykevych, minister of national education and religious affairs; O. Hay-Holovko, minister of information; I. Klymiv-Leguenda, minister of coordination; N. Moroz, minister of post office and telegraph (Stetsko 226-227).

First Arrests

Taken by surprise, the authorities in Berlin were annoyed. Following Lithuania, this was a second country disrupting German plans by proclaiming independence and creating a government. But the Germans refrained for the moment from "taking energetic measures against the [Ukrainian] usurpers because of the situation at the front and in the entire region" (BA R 58/214 f. 69). In fact, they were hoping for an uprising behind the lines of the front in the Berdychiv-Zhytomyr-Kiev sector and feared that "energetic measures" would harm German interests.

Not wishing to reveal their intentions prematurely, the Germans decided to stop Ukrainian initiative by arresting the principal persons in charge. Stepan Bandera was arrested in Cracow on 5 July 1941, deported to Berlin for interrogation, and placed under house arrest (Appendix, Doc.#63). Also arrested were several members of the National Committee in Cracow (V. Yaniv on 5 July, V. Horbovy on 7). Other persons were placed under house arrest and forbidden all political activities.

On 5 July, a memorandum informed Hitler of the events in Ukraine. According to the memorandum, a similar situation existed in Lithuania where the people had set up a Lithuanian government contrary to the wishes of the Germans (who had planned to create only a bureau of confidence). The Lithuanian government collaborated with the German military authorities who recognized it *de facto* and relied on Lithuanian partisan groups in uniform. The note stated that the officers

of these partisans were impatiently awaiting the departure of the "German occupation."

In Ukraine, likewise, an independent government had been created in Lviv, contrary to the wishes of the Germans. "The Ukrainians who participated in this endeavor had to be picked up and incarcerated in Berlin." (IfZ ED 165) A group of officials directed by undersecretary of state Kundt were sent to Lviv to take control. Some police reinforcements were also sent to Poland.

At the same time, the note pointed out to Hitler certain irregularities that could compromise future organization of the eastern region. Among those cited were not only the collaboration of the Wehrmacht with the Lithuanian government but also rumors concerning the incorporation of Galicia into the General Government, a course not authorized by Erich Koch in the Baltic region, etc.

After Bandera's arrest, other measures were expected. The OUN-B leaders in Lviv (Stetsko, Lebed, Starukh, Klymiv-Leguenda, Rebet, Turkovsky) met to analyze the situation. Without means to launch an immediate general uprising against the Reich, they decided to focus on preparations in the psychological, military, and organizational spheres (Ilnytzky 193-194). All those responsible for the organization went underground with the exception of those who were to continue with their tasks in government at the risk of being arrested.

On 9 July, the day following the meeting, Yaroslav Stetsko and his colleague Roman Ilnytzky were arrested by the SD. After interrogation in Lviv and in Cracow they were handed over to the Wehrmacht (Abwehr) and deported to Berlin, where they were interrogated relentlessly by Colonel Erwin Stoltze of the OKW.

Colonel Stoltze used a rather curious argument with them. He maintained that by proclaiming their independence Ukrainians had complicated the situation in the east, letting it appear that Germany favored the break-up of Russia [sic]. Following this mistake, he said, Germany would face the strong resistance of Russian soldiers who would from now on fight for the unity of the empire. "Your politics will cost the lives of our soldiers," concluded this high official of the Abwehr.

Like many other Germans, this officer thought that the only way to vanquish the enemy was to avoid attacking the integrity of the Russian

empire. This theory, advocated by organizations of Russian emigrants, was supposed to guarantee neutrality, indeed Russian support, of Germany's plans. Consequently, the Germans could not support Ukrainians or other "separatists" to avoid provoking the Russians who wished to maintain the integrity of the empire which they incorporated into the term "Russia."

Stetsko answered Stoltze: "I see the situation differently. Your soldiers are going to lose their lives because of your erroneous policies toward the Ukrainian people. The Russians are totally against you, for the good reason that you have begun a war against their empire. Now you will also have the Ukrainians against you" (Illytzy 187).

Stetsko and Illytzy were placed under house arrest in Berlin. In Lviv, other members of the government, threatened with arrest, ceased all political activities. At the same time, all Ukrainian groups of Lviv, including the OUN-M, but with the exception of the OUN-B, agreed under pressure from the SD and other German services (Captain Koch of the Abwehr and Undersecretary Kundt) to assure German authorities of their loyalty and to promise their help in the reconstruction of the country (Appendix, Doc.#64).

The OUN-B refused to associate itself with this process because the Germans had not given it assurances on two points: the independence and future of Ukraine and the release of Bandera.

At the beginning of the occupation, as long as a territory formed the zone behind the front, it was up to the commander of the army to regulate life, make security arrangements for the population, and determine policies concerning the people. On 7 July 1941, the commander of the Seventeenth Army transmitted the following arrangements: "Ukrainian efforts regarding political independence in the sense of a Ukrainian national state and the creation of a Ukrainian army must be prevented in the occupied zone. Military authorities are not to give their opinion on this subject to the Ukrainians" (BA-MA RH 20-17/276 Armeeoberkommando 17 Gruppe Ic/AO,A.Gef.Sdt., 7 July 41).

In the zone behind the troops, in accordance with the instructions of the commander-in-chief of this ("South") zone of 11 July, the Germans were to "divert" political activities of the Ukrainians toward an activity of aid and assistance to the population, e.g., to families of the deported and

killed. Ukrainians could set up committees to this end, but their activities were not to go beyond the fixed locality; they were to be strictly local committees. Public demonstrations, especially in favor of independence, were to be forbidden (BA-MA RH 22/170 Bfh. rückw. H. Geb. 103 Abt. Ic 968/41 geh.).

The commander of the Seventeenth Army also made arrangements concerning the creation of self-defense and police groups in Ukrainian villages. Self-defense groups were to intervene against groups of Soviet soldiers, left behind or parachuted into the area, who were beginning to disrupt peace and order, especially after Stalin's 3 July call urging the population to destroy everything and to take up an intense partisan war against the occupation powers, but the number of police could not exceed the ration of one for each hundred inhabitants. The police could not carry fire arms.

Aware that guerilla groups were still brought to the *Dulags* (transitory camps), the commander of the Seventeenth Army reminded his officers that the guerilla groups were to be liquidated in combat or during their flight. Likewise, all civilian attacks against the Wehrmacht were to be punished with extreme vigor, even annihilation. It was forbidden to hide suspects; they had to be handed over to justice (BA-MA RH 20-17/557 f. 373).

Fugitive Soviet soldiers kept arriving in the zone of the Seventeenth Army: 200 on 8 July; 100 on 19 July; the majority were Ukrainians (BA-MA RH 20-17/280). Among the 400 Soviet soldiers taken prisoner on 15 July "were many deserters supplied with German leaflets" (BA-MA RH 20-17/280 16 July 41).

"Europe against Bolshevism"

Few Europeans viewed the attack on the Soviet Union as the beginning of a common struggle, as a "European crusade against bolshevism." Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, and Italy entered the war by mutual agreement on the side of the Germans. Hitler expressed his satisfaction on this subject in a letter of 1 July to Admiral Horthy, stating that voluntary participation of these countries in the fighting "is

not only going to free Europe from an immense danger but it will, above all, bring peace to this continent after the war." Hitler believed that although Romania and Finland had a particular reason for taking part in the fight against Russia, other peoples had decided to participate in it "in the name of European solidarity" (BA-MA RH 20-17/24 Schreiben des Führers an den Kgl. ungarischen Reichsverweser).

Hitler and the German press constantly spoke of the "New European order," without clarifying the term. Many were hoping for a new organization of Europe without knowing what this Europe would be.

That all of Europe would fight against bolshevism became a possibility before the German-Soviet war when the Germans had begun to organize units of European volunteers. From 1938 on Himmler was thinking of recruiting foreigners of "Germanic" blood into the Waffen SS. In 1940, after the occupation of the northern countries and France, he had been able to enroll Danes, Norwegians, Dutchmen, and Alsatians. Two SS regiments were thus formed (Westland and Nordland). In February-March 1941 recruitment for the SS Division Wiking began, principally in Finland, then in Belgium and Holland. Nevertheless, in June, Berger, under Himmler's orders, had recruited only approximately 2,000 West European volunteers, far fewer than expected (Stein 160).

Then Himmler decided to recommend the formation of national legions, but he never considered raising a European army. Germany simply needed troops, and as the Wehrmacht was mobilizing in the Reich, the Waffen SS had to look for volunteers elsewhere, especially in Flanders, Wallonia, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. For Nazi leaders, these were Germanic countries that sooner or later would be part of the Great Germanic Reich created by Germany.

Several days after the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler approved the formation of national legions for "fighting against bolshevism." These were legions composed of "Germans": Danes (Freiwilligenverband Dänemark), the Flemish (Freiwilligen Legion Flandern), Dutchmen (Freiwilligen Legion Niederlande), and Norwegians (Freiwilligen Legion Norwegen) (Stein 167-168; cf. ADAP XIII 1:104).

Nazi leaders hoped the war would be brief and believed a German victory was practically assured. They, therefore, were not thinking of recruiting volunteers in France. Initiative to form a "Legion of French

volunteers against bolshevism" came from the French. Its creation was announced on 7 July 1941 through a communiqué of Déat, Doriot, Bucard and Constantini (Ory 241, 291).

Russian émigrés, too, were hoping that Hitler would permit them to participate in the war against bolshevism. Russian demands and propositions from organizations as well as political personalities were numerous. Thus the former minister of the Russian anti-Bolshevik government of 1919 (Northwestern Army), Nicolas Ivanov of Brussels, proposed to the Führer, "the liberator of Russia," several concrete measures in a July letter: creation of a "Russian national legion" that would leave for Russia immediately; organization in Russia and in emigration of a "Russian National Socialist party"; creation of a "Russian national center" charged with preparing propaganda in Russia; publication of a Russian national daily to be the base for propagandizing Nazi ideas in Russia (BA R 43 II/1487a f. 30).

Ukrainians considered Soviet Russia the embodiment of bolshevism, their chief and hereditary enemy. They believed that they had suffered more than other peoples from the Bolshevik regime. Their determination to fight this enemy was strengthened after the discovery of massacres of political prisoners, mass graves full of corpses, and torture chambers in numerous prisons.

The population was relieved at the arrival of the German army and actually welcomed it. Before the arrest of Stetsko, the Ukrainian government, expressing the gratitude of the Ukrainians to the German army, declared that Ukraine, as a sovereign state, was determined to fight with other European states against "the domination of the Russo-Marxist terror" (BA R 43 II/1500 f. 103-105). But it made one condition for Ukraine's participation in this fight: the independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian State.

Nazi Germany, however, did not intend to allow such a state to exist. Nazi leaders considered Slavs an inferior race and had no plans to form Slavic legions, but Ukrainians did not know this. During the first weeks of occupation Ukrainians were divided into two schools of thought: the first, that of radical and revolutionary nationalism, made a condition for Ukraine's participation in the fight against bolshevism the recognition of the independence and the sovereignty of the Ukrainian

State; the second, more moderate, advocated participation without conditions, with victory bringing an acceptable solution. This trend was held mainly by around the OUN-M that had not supported the proclamation of independence, which they judged had been carried out in haste by a rival organization.

Those who favored unconditional participation, who were also grateful to the German army for having liberated Ukrainian territories, thought that it their duty to join the European struggle.

On 6 July, the day following the arrest of Stepan Bandera by the SD and his deportation to Berlin, Colonel Andriy Melnyk, head of the second Ukrainian political force, and several other former military men—for the most part Melnyk's collaborators—sent a message to Hitler through the OKW. Without broaching the question of Ukraine's independence, they formulated the following demands:

We, the freedom fighters of the years 1918-1921, ask for ourselves and for the Ukrainian young the honor of being allowed to take part in the crusade against Bolshevik barbarity....We ask to be allowed, together with European legions, to march side by side with our liberators, the German Wehrmacht, and to be allowed to form for this purpose Ukrainian combat units (BA R 58/214 f. 91).

At the same time, several sections of the Ukrainian National Union (UNO), an association of Ukrainian émigrés in the Reich and in the protectorate Bohemia-Moravia, expressed to Hitler their astonishment that in a time when "European peoples are fighting in a crusade against the destroyer of world order—Moscow—the Ukrainian people are not able to take part in this struggle under their own flag" and they asked his permission to fight side by side with the German army against bolshevism "for the freedom of our country and for the culture and well-being of Europe" ((BA R 43 II/1504b f. 5).³

This request remained unanswered. Only after Stalingrad did the Germans agreed to create an SS division composed of Ukrainians from Galicia.

During a secret speech delivered on 13 July 1941 in Stettin before the *SS Kampfgruppe Nord*, Himmler summed up National Socialist views of inhabitants of the Soviet Union:

A population of 180 million individuals belonging to all sorts of races, whose very names are unpronounceable and whose faces are such that one can knock them down without feeling pity or compassion. These evil beasts who torture and mistreat each prisoner and each wounded of our armies..., you will be able to see them with your own eyes. All these people were amalgamated by the Jews into a single religion, the same ideology called bolshevism whose objective is the following: "Seeing that we have Russia, half of Asia, and a part of Europe, we are going to engulf Germany, then the entire world." Very well, when you, my men, go to fight down there in the east, you will fight the same battle, against the same sub-humanity and the same inferior races, as those that appeared formerly under the name of Huns, then...Tatars...Mongols. Today they reappear under the name of Russians and under the political standard of bolshevism (Stein 143-144).

Hitler's Secret Plans

On 16 July 1941, during a meeting of German high officials at the Führer's general quarters, Hitler reviewed the grand strategical and tactical lines to be implemented (Appendix, Doc.#65).

Greatly annoyed, he offered a Vichy newspaper's assertions that the war against the Soviet Union was Europe's war, but he labeled this assertion "impudent." He suspected that it was designed to imply "that the beneficiaries of this war should be not only the Germans but all European states." Needless to say, that was not what Hitler wanted, but for tactical reasons he thought it necessary to let the people believe what they wanted. It was not necessary to disclose the true goals of Germany. All German occupation was to be justified by the necessity or "similar

things" to assure order and security. It was not necessary to show that this action involved "a permanent regularization." "We will continue to apply all necessary measures, such as executions, deportations, etc.; it must be clear that we will never leave these regions."

Consequently, Germans were to make secret preparations for permanent occupation of conquered lands. Germans were to take possession of this "great cake" to: 1) dominate it, 2) direct it, and 3) exploit it. The partisan war ordered by Stalin allowed for "the extermination of all those who oppose us."

Hitler spoke as if Soviet Russia were already defeated. He conceived plans concerning organization of the Soviet territory. Crimea, freed from foreigners, would be populated with Germans. Galicia would become a province of the German Reich. No military power would be tolerated west of the Ural Mountains, even if Germany had to wage war for a hundred years. Germany would assume defense of the entire space as far as the Urals but would "never permit anyone other than the Germans [to] bear arms....Only the German must bear arms and not a Slav, a Czech, a Cossack or a Ukrainian." Hitler emphasized this, citing the policy of the English in India.

Hitler promised to transform the eastern regions into a paradisiacal garden (*Garten Eden*) for Germans. In contrast, African colonies would have the appearance of second-zone colonies.

Where it would be necessary to annex certain regions to the Reich, Germans should determine formulae that would allow them to present themselves as protectors of rights and defenders of populations.

Rosenberg, for his part, thought that the attitude toward the populations should be different, in accordance with the commissariat of the Reich. In Ukraine, for example, Germany should permit cultural development, awaken the historic conscience, open a university in Kiev, and develop certain tendencies for independence. Göring objected: "First we should assure ourselves of the supplies, and the rest can come very much later."

When asked which regions of Ukraine had been promised to other states, the Führer responded that Romania was asking for Bessarabia and Odessa, with a corridor towards the northwest. No specific promises had been made to Hungarians, Turks, or Slovaks. Galicia, which was to

become a region of the Reich placed under the Governor-General Hans Frank, would be incorporated into the General Government, despite some objections. The entire Baltic zone would also become a region of the Reich, as would Crimea and the territory north of this peninsula. Rosenberg recommended compensation of Ukraine by adding to it a territory in the east, but the Führer did not support this plan. Hitler emphasized that the Volga region was to become a territory of the Reich, the Baku region a military colony of the Reich.

In the north, Finns were asking for Eastern Karelia and the Leningrad region. The peninsula Kola with its copper mines was to belong to the Reich. Finland was to be prudently transformed into a confederate state (*Bundesstaat*), cautioned Hitler. As to Leningrad, the Führer wanted to raze the city before giving it to the Finns.

A long discussion on the distribution of posts followed. Rosenberg, who had also received propositions from Lutze, head of the SA (assault group of the Nazi party), proposed different names to Hitler. Hitler decided: Lohse would be the Reich commissar in the Ostland, Kasche in Moscow, Koch in Ukraine, Frauenfeld in Crimea, Terboven in Kola, Schickendanz in the Caucasus.

Finally, the Führer broached the issue of security in the eastern occupied regions. He suggested that police regiments be equipped with tanks to strengthen police forces; Marshall Göring would be able to convert the training airfields in these regions and, in case of a revolt, bombardiers Ju-52 could take action. "The immense space is to be, of course, pacified as quickly as possible. The best way to do this is to shoot anyone who looks askance," said Hitler.

Keitel emphasized that the local population must be made responsible for "its own affairs," because it would be impossible to place a guard in front of each hangar, at each station. "The inhabitants must know that whoever remains inactive will be shot and that they will be responsible for each offense committed."

The Führer advised those present to permit publication of newspapers, for example in Ukraine "to be able to bring pressure on the local population." Finally, he remarked that Europe was a geographic concept because "in reality Asia stretches up to our frontiers," the frontiers of Germany (IMT 221-L, XXXVIII 86-94).

On 17 July 1941 Hitler created by decree the ministry of the Reich for eastern occupied regions and appointed Alfred Rosenberg head of this ministry whose sphere extended over all the USSR territories with the exception of those annexed either to the General Government or directly to the Reich, or those ceded to other states. The territories occupied by Germany were divided into Reich commissariats (*Reichskommissariate*), which, in turn, were divided into general regions (*Generalbezirke*), and these into districts (*Kreisgebiete*). Several districts formed a main region (*Hauptbezirk*). Each of these units was directed by a commissar: a Reichskommissar, a Generalkommissar, a Kreiskommissar, a Gebietskommissar, a Hauptkommissar, etc. Certain wits among the Germans observed that the Nazi regime fighting the commissars of bolshevism was appointing commissars of the Reich.

Parallel to the power of Reichsminister Rosenberg, the decree extended the power of Göring, charged from 29 June 1941 with the four-year economic plan for occupied territories, as well as the power of Himmler in security questions with which he was charged in a 17 July 1941 decision.

With a second decree, dated 17 July 1941, Hitler created the first commissariat of the Reich, *Reichskommissariat Ostland* (comprising the Baltic countries and Belorussia).

Lohse was appointed Reich commissar of Ostland. The same decree placed Galicia under the administration of the governor general Frank, i.e., under the General Government (BA R 43 II/685a (Braune Mappe) 41-43; R 6 p.I-III; R 6/21 f. 122-124; ADAP XIII, #119). The Ukrainian population of Galicia viewed this decision as an annexation to Poland.

Ukrainians' Refusal to Repeal Independence

The OUN-B's political action groups continued to appear immediately behind the front. The Germans realized that this organization was following "a well-established and well-reflected plan." After the proclamation of independence in Lviv, demonstrations for independence

were also organized in other localities. Political action groups systematically set up "bodies of administrative autonomy," i.e., an independent Ukrainian administration, and distributed posters, leaflets and illegal newspapers. According to the 17 July 1941 report of the events in the USSR, Berlin had ordered these newspapers to cease publication. Following this order, German authorities confiscated in Lviv some twenty printing machines used by the OUN-B (Appendix, Doc.#66).

Hans Koch, Rosenberg's representative to the Army Group South, also affirmed in his 26 July report that "despite measures taken by the police, groups of Bandera's Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists are advancing systematically in the entire territory of eastern Ukraine" (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 11, Vorläufiger Bericht 3).

The Germans wanted to stop this penetration at any cost. They were convinced that on the other side of the former Polish-Soviet frontier in eastern Ukraine, twenty-five years of Soviet domination had eliminated in the Ukrainian population all national feeling and killed all spirit for independence and political initiative (BA-MA RH 20-17/276, 12 July 1941). The Germans decided to profit from this "advantage."

On 21 July 1941, when the minister of foreign affairs of the Reich declared the proclamation of independence of the Ukrainian State devoid of "constitutional significance," (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 24) the OUN-B's political bureau in Berlin published a declaration stating that the proclamation "that is already an historic fact," as well as the establishment of the state power in Ukraine, had taken place not only in Lviv but also in other cities.

According to the declaration, the widespread establishment of state power bore witness to spontaneous aspirations of Ukrainian people regarding political sovereignty. Ukrainians had taken the administration of their regions into their own hands; the government had made provisions to organize the economy, militia, health, etc. The government was composed for the most part of persons who did not belong to the OUN.

The declaration suggested that "the sharp check against the Ukrainian government risked being interpreted by the Ukrainian people as a hostile act on the part of the German Reich regarding the notion of

the Ukrainian State." If Germany needed allies Ukraine could be one, but as an entirely independent state.

In conclusion, the OUN-B declared that the proclamation of the Ukrainian State was a *fait accompli*. The government continued to exist and act in the name of the state (AA Pol. XIII All.Akten 24, Zur Lage in Lemberg, Appendix, Doc.#67).

The Germans, however, decided to have Bandera and Stetsko revoke the proclamation of independence and dissolve the government. Pressure was exerted on the two Ukrainian leaders during July and the first half of August, particularly on the part of security police (SD) and Rosenberg's ministry.

The OUN-B responded to the latter in a memorandum, explaining once again that the Ukrainian government could not be dissolved and that it must exist "as a distinctive mark of the Ukrainian State." Its dissolution would signify that Germany was opposed to its existence. This government had been born of the will of the Ukrainian people, without Germany's taking a position in this regard. On the eve of the war, German authorities had declared their incompetence in this matter. Now they had not responded to the political questions concerning Ukraine.

The OUN-B declared that it had no legal right to dissolve the government and that only a national legislative assembly would be able to do so, especially since the Ukrainian government was not subordinate to the OUN. Finally, dissolution would be highly detrimental equally to Ukraine and to Germany, striking a blow at Ukraino-German relations and reconstruction of Eastern Europe (Appendix, Doc.#75).

To limit possible repressions, Yaroslav Stetsko, in a declaration dated 14 August 1941, assumed entire responsibility for the proclamation of the restoration of independence and its consequences, as well as for the radio broadcast on this subject in Lviv (Appendix, Doc.#76).

Refusing to repeal the proclamation of independence and to dissolve the government, OUN-B tried to convince the German government of the benefits of genuine cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the fight against bolshevism, i.e., against Russia, the enemy of Ukraine, on the basis of sovereignty. Cooperation could thus be founded only on recognition of complete independence of the Ukrainian State.

Nazi power, however, did not have the least intention of changing its attitude and its policies in Eastern Europe.

Break-up of Ukrainian Territory and the Creation of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine

The Ukrainian national movement, in spite of the break-up of ethnographical territory before 1939, aspired a common enthusiasm for unification of this territory. Its ultimate goal was the creation of an independent and united Ukrainian state, i.e., including the entire ethnographical territory.

Hitler was not concerned about the territorial integrity of conquered countries and still less about the ethnographical integrity of Ukraine. His collaborators shared his view.

On the day of the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Reich's office for the area's development (*Reichsstelle für Raumordnung*) completed a study of the General Government and the German frontier of interest on the Bug.³ This study began thus: "As soon as the situation permits, it will be urgent to improve the frontier of interest on the Bug" (BA R 6/21 f.150). The study proposed to move the eastern frontier of the General Government farther east for economic and strategical reasons, especially in the north (Niemen-Narev region), the center (toward Brest-Litovsk and Pinsk), and the south, where the study proposed annexation of all of the Ukrainian Galicia as far as Zbruch as well as Bukovyna. For the authors of this study, even if there had to be a Ukrainian state, it would be situated in the Ukrainian regions around Kharkiv and Kiev. It would not be difficult for this state to do without other regions, "unless it wanted to rise politically as a power against Central Europe, which, at any rate, is to be ruled out" (BA R 6/21 f. 150-157).

These suggestions came from a government service. Other Germans, who were not part of the official services, also suggested what the Reich's policy in the east should be. Werner Hasselblatt, an expert on the Baltic issues, for instance, sent a memorandum on 4 July 1941 concerning "the organization of space" in the east to the ministry of foreign affairs of the Reich.

His concept of the space (*Grossraumkonzeption*) consisted of a short-term economic plan, but took into account long-term goals. According to Hasselblatt, Germans should already know which territories they wanted to Germanize through colonization. They should take into consideration the number of Germans who would be available to administer these territories to constitute in some of them the leading class and to colonize the closed zones.

Hasselblatt thought that within twenty years the Germans could completely Germanize certain regions, especially the region of Danzig, Courland, Livonia, Western Lithuania, Bohemia and Moravia, and the region of Belgrad, Crimea, North Caucasus. He proposed driving back Poles, Lithuanians, and Letts farther east. He thought, however, that Baltic people (Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians) were capable, from a racial point of view, of Germanization. In contrast, "Germanization of Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Belorussians, Russians, Turko-Tatars, and Caucasians, etc. should neither be planned nor recommended."

According to Hasselblatt, German policy in the east should be founded on the principle *divide et impera*, the only principle capable of preventing peoples from uniting to constitute opposition to Germany. He proposed creation of a ministry of the Reich to administer in the east, and appointment of high representatives of the Reich for different regions (governors, etc.), but he advised against use of the title "commissar," because for non-Marxists this term "represents the devil" (AA Abt.XIII All.Akten 14).

This memorandum was dated 4 July 1941. On 17 July, Hitler incorporated Galicia into the General Government. The memorandum was, in fact, filed with other works on colonization, known under the name *Generalplan Ost*.

To clarify planning relative to the administrative organization of the European East, the principal dates should be recalled.

According to a report on the preparatory work concerning space in Eastern Europe, dated 28 June 1941, the decision to divide the eastern occupied territories into commissariats of the Reich was made in April 1941 (IMT 1019-PS). Projects of decrees worked out 28 May 1941 specify there would be four and that they would be further divided into

twenty-four general commissariats, approximately eighty main commissariats and more than 900 regional commissariats. The latter would consist of three to four districts (BA-MA RW 4/v.759 f. 25-46). A map identifying nationalities had been prepared to help determine frontiers of the commissariats (IMT 1039PS). All these territories came under the ministry of the Reich for eastern occupied territories (IMT 1056-PS).

Division of certain territories was the object of discussion during the 16 July conference. Crimea would be colonized, and Galicia would become a territory of the Reich under the General Government. Romania had asked for Bessarabia and Odessa with a strip of Ukrainian territory (IMT 221-L). The following day Hitler signed a decree on administration of newly occupied territories in the east by which he created a corresponding ministry and defined the precise structure of the administration of these territories. Reich commissars were appointed by Hitler, while other commissars were appointed by Rosenberg, minister of the eastern occupied territories (ADAP XIII, 1, Doc.#119; R 6/21 f.122-124).

Following the 17 July 1941 decree, the Polish region of Bialystok was annexed to East Prussia, Galicia to the General Government, and the Baltic regions with Belorussia were set up in the Reichskommissariat Ostland.

The western part of Ostland came under political administration on 25 July, and on 1 August 1941 Galicia came under the political administration of Governor General Frank.

Frank was very content with the extension of his fief (the General Government) and he promised to put the population immediately on a "productive job" in the service of the Reich, and, taking into account the long term colonizing work, to "make of the General Government a reservoir of manpower for the Reich, a pacified and economically well-balanced reservoir." He wanted "to put profitably to work all those elements that, in many cases, opposed his mission" (BA R 6/21 f. 136-137).

The head of the bureau of area development in Frank's government, in turn, established a project of developing territories east of the General Government. According to him, it was necessary to create "a vast region administrated by the Germans east of the already incorporated provinces

that was liable to join sooner or later, according to its position and structure, in the process of Germanization."

"While considering this principle, the new demarcation of administration in the east must in the future be designated 'frontier of the Reich' beyond which, properly speaking, begins the colonial economy and administration."

According to the memorandum, the frontier of the Reich must be established east of the cities of Ternopil, Rivne, and Pinsk. The regions of Lviv, Ternopil and Chernivtsi (Czernowitz) must belong to the General Government with eastern frontiers those of Central Europe. In all this planning, the ethnographic principle could not be taken into consideration. "Demands of the Great German Reich to have and consolidate for itself living space relative to its capacity must prevail over all other considerations and over the ethnographic principle," concluded the author of the plan (BA R 6/21 f. 138-148). This plan suggested, moreover, evacuation of the Ukrainian population from the Lviv region, i.e., from Western Ukraine, to central and eastern Ukraine.

Persistent rumors that Germany intended to create a Ukrainian state, had, doubtless, increased anxieties of Romanians. The Romanian ambassador to Germany informed the German government on 24 July 1941 that the Romanian government was asking that "the future Ukrainian State" not be too large. A Ukraine of forty million inhabitants would exert pressure on Romania and other European states. The ambassador asked especially that Galicia not be incorporated into Ukraine, but be made part of Germany and be able to have there "a direct liaison between Germany and Romania" (ADAP XIII, 1, Doc. #147).

Undersecretary Woermann, head of the political department of the ministry of foreign affairs of the Reich, responded that it was too early to speak about a development of territories of the "former Soviet Union." The German ambassador to Romania communicated to Berlin the following day Romanian reservations regarding Ukraine: "Vice-Minister-President Antonescu is interested in the question of future development of Ukraine and has declared that we should not create a large Slavic region on the Romanian frontier" (ADAP XIII, 1, Doc. #147).

As compensation for its loyalty to Germany, Romania received Ukrainian Bukovyna as well as, in conformity with the 19 August 1941 agreement, a strip of Ukrainian territory called "Transnistria," including the city of Odessa taken by Romanian troops on 16 October. Ukrainian Bukovyna, occupied by Romanian troops from the beginning of operations was declared Romanian territory on 14 July. A little later arrests of Ukrainian patriots began in this region. On 1 September, the Romanian government banned all Ukrainian organizations on Ukrainian territories under its control, but upon the intervention of the German government, Romanians had to moderate somewhat their ardor in the excessively ruthless requisitions in Ukrainian territories (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 24, DIX 228).

Rosenberg tried to convince Hitler's closest collaborators, especially Reichsminister Lammers, head of the chancellery, not to cede Odessa to Romania, arguing that it would be more advantageous for Germany if this port city remained Ukrainian (BA R 6/21 f. 128, 129-134, 159). He remarked, moreover, that incorporation of Galicia into the General Government was "a severe blow" for Ukrainian nationalists as well as for those of other leanings. Even if it were possible to compensate for this eastern incorporation later, one could not speak about it for the moment (BA R 94/9, letter to Frank of 26 July 1941). Frank urged Rosenberg to order officers of his ministry to combat all tendencies towards Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia "because it is evident that I will not tolerate in any case irredentist propaganda of Ukrainians of Galicia" (BA R 94/9, letter of Frank of 30 July 1941).

News of Galicia's incorporation into the General Government and the cession of North Bukovyna and Bessarabia to Romania was received by Ukrainians with surprise and amazement. "The entire Ukrainian nation is surprised and profoundly distressed by Galicia's incorporation into the General Government," declared Yaroslav Stetsko, under house arrest in Berlin, in a 3 August letter of protest addressed to the German government and signed "Head of the Ukrainian Government, temporarily in Berlin." On the same day Stepan Bandera also sent a letter of protest (BA R 43 II/1500).

The representative of Rosenberg's ministry to the Army Group South, Captain Koch, indicated in his 26 July report that the Ukrainian

population of Galicia had received news of annexation to the Polish territories with pain and disappointment but "calmly," the most severe protestations and criticism coming only from sympathizers and members of the OUN-B. The annexation had, however, created "an unmitigated joy with the Poles" (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 11, 323276 ff.).

From the first days of August 1941 on the Reich's chancellery received numerous letters of protest from local sections of the UNO (National Union of Ukrainians in Germany) and from Ukrainian refugees from Bukovyna and Bessarabia. Between 30 July and 16 September it received some thirty letters bearing approximately 270 signatures. The signatories were protesting the break-up of the Ukrainian "national organism" and asking that the decisions be reconsidered (BA R 43 II/1504 b.).

Parallel to this protest organized by the OUN-M activists, between 25 August and 8 September 1941 a similar effort to collect signatures was organized by the OUN-B activists. In addition to the request to revoke decisions concerning Galicia, the petition of the OUN-B signatories contained several other demands. It reproached Germans for having put an end to the Ukrainian government and for having arrested Yaroslav Stetsko and Stepan Bandera. The petition asked for liberation of the two Ukrainian leaders and their return to Ukraine. It asked, moreover, for authorization to create independent Ukrainian units able to take part in the fight against bolshevism. Members of Bandera's movement collected 1,224 signatures under the text of this petition in seventeen locations of the Reich, but Berlin obviously ignored the Ukrainian requests.

Other Ukrainian territories were set up by Hitler's 20 August 1941 decree in Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The border between the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the Reichskommissariat Ostland passed north of the cities of Brest-Litovsk, Kobryn, Pinsk, Lunynets. The eastern limits of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine were to be moved eastward as the Germans advanced farther.

Territory of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, at first rather limited, was placed under German political administration on 28 and 29 August 1941. As head of this Reich commissariat, Hitler appointed Erich Koch, reputed for his cruelty. For his headquarters Rivne (Rovno), the capital city of Volhynia was chosen, not Kiev (BA R 6/21 f. 220).

From 10 September 1941 on, all persons wishing to enter the Reichskommissariat Ukraine or leave it had to have special passes (BA R 43 II/690b f. 9).

Irresistible Progression of Revolutionary Nationalism

"The welcome of German troops was enthusiastic," wrote Hans Koch in his 26 July 1941 report. Other reports also affirmed favorable welcome by the Ukrainian and Belorussian population (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 11 323279; Appendix, Doc.#73). But the atmosphere would change quickly.

The most valuable source for the study of the evolution of the situation in eastern occupied territories is in reports of the *Einsatzgruppen* and *Einsatzkommandos*, especially reports on events in the USSR (Ereignismeldungen UdSSR, no.1-195, which covered the period from 23 June 1941 to 24 April 1942), reports on activities and the situation in the USSR (Tätigkeits— und Lageberichte, no.1-11 from 15 July 1941 to 31 March 1942) and reports from eastern occupied regions (Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, no.1-55, covering the period from May 1942 to May 1943).

According to these reports, Germans learned on 12 July 1941 that one of the OUN-B political action groups had been ordered to go as far as Kiev and to create there a national government similar to Lviv (BA R 58/214 f. 131). Germans noted that this organization was following "a well conceived plan." After the proclamation of independence in Lviv, demonstrations for independence took place in all towns immediately after the arrival of the OUN-B political action groups. These groups organized local administration and militia, published newspapers without authorization from occupation authorities, and distributed leaflets (BA R 58/214 f. 202) inviting the population not to surrender their arms to the Germans (BA R 58/215 f. 192). In Zoloshiv, important army supplies were seized and a young Ukrainian arrested (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 11 323280).

"The push toward independence appeared on all levels, particularly among the town population," noted one of the reports. The 31 July

report confirms that the *Einsatzkommandos* had to intervene repeatedly against distribution of OUN-B newspapers of forbidden publication. The *Einsatzkommandos* proceeded at once to dissolve the OUN-B-created militia, replacing it with a new German-created militia.

The same report estimated that the OUN-M was losing more and more ground both in Ukraine and in emigration. Melnyk's group is for the most an émigré organization and has little to link it up with Ukrainian ethnographic territory (Appendix, Doc.#68; BA R 58/214 f.200).

Despite police measures, "entire units of nationalists of Bandera's group were systematically spreading throughout the entire territory of eastern Ukraine causing there agitation for Great (velyka) Ukraine" (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 11 323274). Demonstrations for independence and for Stetsko's government were also indicated in the 6 August report. Mayors and militia commandants set up by OUN-B worked "arbitrarily," without acknowledging the presence of German authorities (BA R 58/215 f. 192).

Rosenberg instituted a forced labor policy in the eastern regions. In Ukraine, for example, all inhabitants ages eighteen through forty-five had to work (Appendix, Doc.#70). Forced labor for Jews included both men and women and extended from ages fourteen to sixty (Appendix, Doc.#77).

Arrests of OUN-B members continued. On 9 August 1941, Stepan Lenkavsky, in charge of propaganda services of the organization's central leadership, was arrested. The 9 August report noted that the rural population of Galicia was becoming extremely malcontented when influenced by the OUN-B. The report stressed that "the bearer of the hostile currents among Ukrainians remains, as before, Bandera's group." It distributed leaflets protesting Galicia's incorporation into the General Government. Germans realized that the OUN-B leaders had already gone underground (Appendix, Doc.#71).

On 12 August, Germans noted that the OUN-B was particularly active in Volhynia where it urged Ukrainians working for the Wehrmacht (for example, translators) to use their position to work in the national interest or in the interest of the party; OUN-B also strove to have its members appointed as mayors. This organization aimed to take control

of the Ukrainian militia. Its activity also extended to Polissia as far as Brest-Litovsk (BA R 58/215 f. 261).

Working always in secrecy, Bandera's movement, which followed German advances, moved beyond limits of Galicia and Volhynia, i.e., territories which had belonged to Poland between the wars. German authorities noted on 14 August 1941 that OUN-B political action groups were developing intense propaganda activity for "the creation of an independent and united Ukrainian state" in the center of Ukraine, especially in the Zhytomyr, Berdyshev, Vinnytsia regions, as well as in the regions of Uman' and Mohyliv-Podilsky. The tone of the propaganda of this organization was becoming more and more anti-German. Bandera's groups were distributing leaflets calling for the creation of a Ukrainian revolutionary army (BA R 58/216 f. 20; R 58/216 f. 71).

In Lviv the OUN-B collected funds for the struggle, and distributed from that city posters that proclaimed the necessity of creating a Ukrainian state in conformity with the principle "Ukraine for the Ukrainians." Orders of the Wehrmacht were often ignored (Appendix, Doc.#78).

Less than two months after the beginning of the German invasion, in mid-August 1941, "a Ukrainian gang," i.e., an armed group twenty to thirty men strong, "overran the Pinsk region" and "strongly disturbed the vicinity with the slogan 'German administration out! We want a free Ukraine without Germans, Poles, Russians'" (report of 20 August) (Appendix, Doc.#79; BA R 58/216 f. 98).

Propaganda for independence went on in many towns of Galicia and Volhynia: the resistance hung posters in Ternopil; in Lviv nine persons were arrested for making false passports; in Kovel someone wrote on the wall of a building "Down with foreign power! Long live Stepan Bandera!" A leaflet was distributed calling on the militia (that was in the process of dissolving) not to lay down arms (Appendix, Doc.#80).

This same Ukrainian population that initially had greeted the Wehrmacht as liberators was gradually changing its attitude. A political desire began to awaken in all Ukrainian provinces. The "desire for independence manifested itself more and more, as well as a determination to be free from German influence," according to one of the German reports (Appendix, Doc.#81).

Germans believed, however, that the twenty years of Soviet-Russian domination, following internationalist education, Russification, persecutions, and annihilation of the nationalist movement had resulted in a lessening, even a disappearance of Ukrainian national conscience. They were convinced that in regions, Soviet before 1939, Ukrainians thought neither of independence nor autonomy.

Numerous German high officials undertook reconnaissance trips into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and into Galicia. Some of them noted a difference in intensity of national feeling among Ukrainians on the two sides of the former Soviet-Polish frontier. Consequently, they congratulated themselves for having separated Galicia from Soviet Ukraine and for having incorporated it into the General Government. They considered that "for political security reasons" the frontier between the two parts of Ukraine should be firmly closed (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 14 219132). This separation, they thought, would prevent the strong sense of Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia from "infecting" other parts of Ukraine.

Germans greatly feared nationalist contamination in the Reichskommissariat. They distrusted Ukrainians of Galicia, those "Ukrainian Ruthenians" or "Austrian Ukrainians" who, according to them, for a long time had fought clandestinely and who wanted to extend their hold to Great Ukraine and "dominate" it. In a future Ukrainian state, dominated by these people, said Lieutenant von Krusenstiern in his report, "Germans would have no say, no more than the local non-Galician population....For this reason, not a single Galician-Ukrainian must be accepted into the administration of Ukrainian territories under German occupation." This lieutenant further stated that "the politization of Ukrainians must be combatted with all means" (BA-MA RH 24-3/135 f.187, report of 24 August 1941).

Other German observers understood, without approval or support, Ukrainian aspirations for independence, admitting, however, that such feelings were also appearing in central and eastern Ukraine. They knew that there was opposition between the Russians and the Ukrainians and that the Ukrainians of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine felt animosity; the desire to fight against Russians "is deeper than one supposes....For centuries Ukrainians had to lead a struggle for independence against the

Poles, Tatars, and especially against Russians" and after a brief period of freedom, they have never lost the nostalgia for a Ukrainian state, independent of Russia (BA-MA RH 20-6/492, report of Hauptmann H. F. Blunck of 4 September 1941:5-6).

But in his second report, after a visit to Galicia, the same observer, Colonel H. F. Blunck, approved annexation of this Ukrainian province to the General Government. He had noted that Ukrainian intellectuals of Galicia, while saying that Germany had done well in freeing Ukraine, thought at present it should leave this country. Since this would not occur, Germans would be considered enemies in the same way as Russians and Poles had been, and would be strongly resisted (BA-MA RH 20/6/492, report of 11 September 1941:2). Colonel Blunck also thought that the Ukrainian "radical movement" should not be permitted to extend beyond Galicia. Nevertheless, he thought it necessary to keep the population of Ukraine friendly and peaceful. If the Germans were to go as far as the Caucasus, they should not have an unfriendly Ukrainian population at their back. He admitted, however, that separation of Galicia had already provoked "some anxiety" among the population.

Germans retreated more and more into their contradictions, yet numerous reports indicated that the population of Soviet Ukraine was welcoming with pleasure young nationalists from the General Government and was immediately adopting the idea of Ukraine's independence.

Members of OUN-B political action groups continued to appear to some degree everywhere. They organized municipalities and militia. One of the German reports affirmed they "tried to infiltrate political administration and tried to awaken in the population the idea of an independent and sovereign Ukraine" (Appendix, Doc.#81). German authorities, determined to prevent this activity, pitilessly hunted down all nationalists from the west to drive them back toward Lviv. The Germans noted also that the young people had a precise economic and social program and were announcing liquidation of kolkhozes and sharing out of land (BA-MA RH 22/203, report Befh.rückw. H.Geb.Süd of 4 September 1941:2).

Somewhat overwhelmed, occupation authorities of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine asked Berlin for "some clear guidelines on how to

treat these elements" that "represented in the Russian territories a danger for reconstruction. Not only were they sowing trouble, but they also tried to undermine Wehrmacht's authority by insisting that local officials—mayors and heads of districts—are accountable not only to the German Wehrmacht but also to those sent from the Ukrainian state" (BA-MA RH 22/203, report Befh.rückw. H. Geb. Süd of September 1941:2). Propaganda of Bandera's group, according to the report, did nothing to appease the population. Germans decided that henceforth "political agitation by civilians going up and down the country without a valid pass would be forbidden by posting" (BA-MA RH 22/170 Tätigkeitsbericht Abt.Ic of 1 to 31 August 1941:2).

Dissolution of the militia set up by the OUN-B continued. Germans formed in its place German auxiliary police composed of Ukrainians. But the dissolution of the militia seemed to the people but "a prelude to repression of free development of Ukrainians" (BA-MA RH 20-11/333 AOK11, 10 September 1941). Posters demanding departure of foreign power and Bandera's return appeared in Klusk near Kovel. The 28 August 1941 report contained the proclamation of the Ukrainian State during a public meeting in Luboml (Appendix, Doc.#82). Significantly, this occurred in August 1941.

Several OUN-B members were arrested in early September after the assassination of two OUN-M leaders, O. Senyk and M. Stsiborsky, by a Soviet agent in Zhytomyr (30 August 1941). On 7 September the SD arrested Mykola Klymyshyn, head of the OUN-B political action group "North." After interrogation, M. Klymyshyn was deported to Auschwitz where he remained until the end of the war.

According to reports received in Berlin, an extremely critical attitude toward Germans and their policies predominated in OUN circles of the Vinnytsia region (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 12(1)). Reports indicated trouble in the part south of the Pinsk region (Volhynia), provoked by propaganda for independence which was increasing everywhere in Volhynia and in Galicia. In Lutsk, during a religious ceremony in memory of the victims of the Soviet regime, those present took an oath of loyalty to Bandera. Similar cases were occurring in Galicia (Appendix, Doc.#85).

In Galicia and Volhynia signatures were collected for the return of Bandera to Ukraine. Leaflets for Stetsko's government with Bandera's refusal to dissolve the government were distributed everywhere. OUN circles collected money and sold stamps bearing the date of the proclamation of independence (30 June 1941) (Appendix, Doc.#86).

"Emissaries of the OUN are distinguishing themselves with their determination, their modesty and their eagerness that can be sustained only by true idealism" acknowledged the 12 September 1941 report. These are people who have made life difficult for the *Einsatzkommando* 6, and the SD noted that a collaboration with them was impossible because they did what they wanted despite German authorities. The SD asserted: "As soon as the situation in Ukraine is to some degree stabilized, all West Ukrainians should be moved away because their activity is harmful from every standpoint" (BA R 58/217 f. 51). Reports noted that "in Eastern Ukraine, propaganda comes only from Bolsheviks and Bandera's groups" (BA R 58/217 f. 128).

In conclusion, report no.4 on the activity and situation stresses that the OUN-B activity "is more and more detrimental in other Ukrainian regions." This group, the report states "propagates national political ideas" that "represent an acute danger for present and future German interests" (Appendix, Doc.#87).

A representative of the ministry of foreign affairs of the Reich to the general headquarters of the Seventeenth Army noted that Bandera's people had penetrated into Soviet Ukraine, and "a political force is about to become firmly established between the occupation authorities and the population. This force makes our task difficult to administer and makes one fear that one day it could turn against us. Bandera's people are, therefore, undesirable in Ukraine, especially east of the former Soviet-Polish frontier. It would be advisable to forbid them entry [into these regions]" (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 12 199657).

Consequently, "appropriate measures were taken" against the OUN-B, specified the report. On 15 September 1941 members of the German police (security police, SD, Gestapo, secret military police, Abwehr) carried out massive arrests of OUN-B members in all of Ukraine and in emigration. Hundreds of persons were imprisoned and sent to concentration camps. On the same day Stepan Bandera and

Yaroslav Stetsko were transferred to the Berlin prison and later to the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen. The following day, dozens of other members of OUN-B were arrested at numerous locations. From this date on, repression against Ukrainian revolutionary nationalism became systematic.

After arresting thousands of persons, Germans believed the issue resolved, but they failed to see that East Ukrainians were immediately taking over and that revolutionary nationalism did not stop growing in central and eastern Ukraine.

Soviet Power and Ukrainian Nationalism

The rapid rise of the revolutionary national movement and its increase in popularity among the people drew the attention of the Soviet power. Determined to maintain their hold on the population of occupied territories, the Soviets decided to react. They could not meekly accept the fact that a struggle for independence and a movement violently opposed to Russo-Soviet domination of Ukraine could develop under German occupation.

What arguments was the Soviet regime going to use to combat Ukrainian nationalism in occupied territories?

The answer to this question appeared in the first issue of the Soviet newspaper in the Ukrainian language *Za radiansku Ukrainu* dated 31 July 1941, edited by the command of the southwest front of the Red Army.

In an article of a well-known Soviet Ukrainian writer, O. Kornychuk, the newspaper announced that "the German fascists, cruel enemies of the Ukrainian people enamored with freedom, have for a long time been dreaming of reducing it to slavery." By declaring war against the USSR traitorous, "the fascists were hoping to occupy the whole of Ukraine within ten days. But the battles have already lasted two months." Faced with this situation, "Hitler has called to his aid the traitors of the Ukrainian people, the Petliurists, the OUN-ists, and the hetmanists." He "has set loose his faithful dogs" aiming to deter the Soviet partisan movement. These "faithful dogs" of the "cannibal Hitler...are helping the fascist bandits to pillage our country, our property, acquired by the blood

and sweat of workers and to enslave our motherland that has been reunited into a great Ukrainian state" (AA Ukraine, Pol. XIII, 24).

This introduction of the patriotic element ("Ukrainian motherland," "great unified Ukrainian state") which was part of the nationalists' program was to serve as patriotic counterweight to the propaganda of Ukrainian nationalists.

The article concluded that "the Ukrainian people enamored with freedom" had only "one single response" for the nationalist "bandits and their head Stepan Bandera: Death!" (Appendix, Doc.#69).

In another article the newspaper ridiculed the Ukrainian government and suggested that Hitler had appointed the Ukrainian ministers and that he was giving orders to Bandera (Appendix, Doc. #74).

The Soviet campaign against the OUN-B did not escape Germany's attention. An 8 September 1941 memorandum from the Reich's ministry of foreign affairs charged that the Soviet newspaper in question was distributed mainly in occupied regions and was to serve to provoke the Ukrainian population into partisan warfare. This newspaper was not only thrown from airplanes and smuggled across the front but was also distributed by parachutists.

The memo stressed that the newspaper often mentioned Ukrainian nationalists, the OUN and their leader Stepan Bandera, "the only one named among the Ukrainian personalities, which means that the Bolsheviks see in him and in his organization the political representative of the national struggle of Ukraine. This is confirmed by the fact that Bandera is being compared to Petliura, whose name still has a specific political echo in all of Ukraine" (Appendix, Doc.#84).

In its 9 August 1941 issue the same newspaper claimed that according to a document that had fallen into the hands of the Red Army "the commandant of the 296th German Division has given orders to arrest all OUN members, Bandera's supporters, and prevent them from penetrating into territories occupied by German troops" (AA Ukraine, Pol. XIII, 24).

Actually, the commandants of German armies operating in Ukraine received orders at the beginning of August 1941 to arrest all "Ukrainian political agitators...in the first place the 'traveling' propagandists of Bandera's group" whose activities "are sowing trouble among the

population and causing difficulties in the rapport between them and the German troops" (BA-MA RH 20-17/276 AOK no.2784/41 geh.2 Ang. of 5 August 1941). The Seventeenth Army passed these orders to division commandants on 5 August 1941.

The Soviet newspaper, however, presented this order in the following manner: the German master was envious of his servants, Ukrainian nationalists "probably because no one has confidence in accursed traitors" who were totally disapproved of by the Ukrainian people (Appendix, Doc.#72).

Many other Soviet leaflets were distributed in occupied Ukraine. The first leaflet circulated by the Soviet government of Ukraine, signed by Nikita Khrushchev and dated 6 July 1941, called Ukrainians to destroy all that could be destroyed and to fight the German invader by waging partisan war. The leaflet added that Hitler "is coveting Ukrainian wheat, lard, coal and other riches of flourishing Soviet Ukraine." The Ukrainian people had a choice: "to live in a free Ukraine or fall into slavery under Hitler's yoke" (*Lystivky partynoho pidpilla*, Doc.#1).

One of the Soviet leaflets distributed in November 1941 was particularly strong about Ukrainian nationalism. Addressed to "dear brothers and sisters in temporarily occupied regions," this leaflet warned the population against "agents of German fascism, Ukrainian nationalist mercenaries" who "impudently pretended to fight for freedom and the happiness of the Ukrainian people." In reality, they were "mortal enemies of the Ukrainian people," who wanted to restore the former regime with its wealthy landowners and bourgeois. After the revolution Ukrainian nationalists had created the "counter-revolutionary" Central Rada which, after signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with German imperialists on 9 February 1918 to make Ukraine "a German colony," had placed the riches of Ukraine "at the disposition of Germany" (BA-MA RH 24-3/136 f. 256-257).

German fascists again appealed to Ukrainian nationalists to oppress, pillage, and torture Ukrainian people, continued the Soviet leaflet. Finally, the leaflet maintained that "German fascists need Ukrainian nationalists to turn the Ukrainian people against the Russian people, to break the eternal friendship between these two peoples, to make the

Ukrainian people slaves of the German barons, of wealthy Ukrainian landowners, and of the kulaks."

The leaflet called on Ukrainians to join the ranks of Soviet partisans and concluded: "Don't allow yourselves to be trapped by provocations of Ukrainian nationalists. Annihilate without pity these lackeys of German fascism. The motherland calls you to fight against the enemy, and you must do so without pity."

Soviet propaganda remained centered on this theme throughout the war. It tried to convince the population and western Allies that "Ukrainian nationalists" were collaborators par excellence of Germany. This propaganda warfare was part of a campaign directed against the national movement for independence which, by its very nature, opposed Russian domination in Ukraine, and was distressing for Moscow as well as Berlin.

Reaction to this leaflet by the head of high command of the Third German Army is significant. He appended a note to the translation of this leaflet, asserting that the recent past and the text of the Soviet leaflet justified "serious reserve" to ward the Ukrainian national movement and its participation in civil administration "with the viewpoint of ultimately forming an independent government."

In other words, this German general thought it necessary to prevent all influence of the nationalists on the Ukrainian people, for these people, according to the general, were "impassive," accustomed for centuries to being "an integral part of the large eastern space" (i.e., Russia), a people who "are not ripe politically" and who "should remain so." National awakening of the Ukrainian people or a national solution concerning it, according to this German general "would permit enemy propaganda, now as well as during the next dozen years (see the leaflet) to justify attack." Such a solution, according to him, would be detrimental to Ukrainians [sic] and "to the interests of Germany and Europe" (BA-MA RH 24-3/136 f. 255).

Although based on different motivations, the logic of the two adversaries at war on Ukrainian soil thus led them to oppose Ukrainian nationalism.

Battalions *Nachtigall* and *Roland*

Machiavelli once said, "No prince is safe if he does not have a force that is his own; to be without defense against an adversity, one's lot depends entirely on luck. Enlightened men have always thought and said that there is nothing as frail and fleeting as a trust that is not based on one's own might" (*Maximes* 209). Leaders of the OUN had reached the same conclusion. They were convinced that the Ukrainian cause would be victorious only if it relied on its own forces.

In peace time activity of an underground revolutionary organization can menace stability of the state; in times of war, when "trust" of the state is dependent on a powerful and omnipresent armed force, underground organization has to oppose the state with another armed force—its own.

Naturally, in time of peace the OUN could not have military units, but it aimed to have at its disposal the greatest number of men with military training who could constitute, when the time came, the nucleus of a Ukrainian national army. The OUN thought that without a Ukrainian armed force the idea of independence risked remaining for a long time to come still in the realm of wishful thinking.

Probable conflict between Germany and Soviet Russia seemed an excellent opportunity: Germany would agree to train Ukrainians and permit them to fight at the front against the hereditary enemy of Ukraine, or such was the supposition.

Thus the desire to have one or several military units of their own motivated OUN-B, in the person of Riko Yary, to contact Canaris and von Brauchitsch of the high command of the German army (the OKW) in early 1941. Both Canaris and von Brauchitsch were somewhat favorably disposed toward Ukrainian aspirations, and bargaining lasted several weeks.

Ukrainians posed different conditions: Ukrainian units would be subordinated to the OUN from the political point of view: its soldiers would not have to take an oath either to the Führer or to Germany, but rather to Ukraine and the OUN. Instructed by the Wehrmacht, on which it would depend in case of war in the east and in all military operations, it would fight against Soviet Russia and aid in restoration of

the independent Ukrainian State. This unit would pass over to the authority of the Ukrainian State as soon as it was created and would form the nucleus of the Ukrainian national army (*Druzhyny* 4-6; Lebed "Do zviazkiv" *Svoboda*, 10 June 1960; Stetsko 123-128, 133-140, 179, 189, 225; Ilnytsky 139-142).

Conditions posed by the OUN were more or less accepted by the OKW in March 1941 because of General von Brauchitsch and Admiral Canaris' support. As far as the training of a military unit was concerned, this arrangement was made only with OUN-B, but this informal agreement, concluded without authorization by the Nazi party and without the government's knowledge, was to remain secret, for representatives of the Wehrmacht had warned the OUN representatives of the possibility of a German policy different from the one for which Ukrainians were hoping.

Indeed, both parties were hoping to gain an advantage from this unusual arrangement. Ukrainians needed men to be instructed in the handling of arms. Germans doubtlessly thought of the propaganda effect on the population of a small Ukrainian "legion." But according to a document in the Eleventh Army archives, the Germans were hoping that the Ukrainian organizations "of Melnyk and of Bandera" would "organize an information system on the Soviet Union,...create partisan groups,...create military units to serve as guides and interpreters for German troops and rally Ukrainians and their political leanings and integrate them into their units" (BA-MA RH 20-11/485 Aufgaben für Ukrainer Organisationen, 12 June 1941).

Both parties shared in deception. German intentions did not correspond to the principles of the arrangement. The OUN-B, on its part, was wary of admitting its intention to use the Germans to attain its own objectives.

The OKW agreed to instruct approximately 700 Ukrainians divided into two battalions and recruited exclusively by the OUN-B. Ukrainians named them "Units of Ukrainian Nationalists" (*Druzhyny ukrainskykh nationalistiv*, DUN). Soldiers were instructed under protection and cover of the Abwehr (service of army intelligence). Without incorporating them into an existing military unit or assigning them a number, the Abwehr gave each of these battalions a different code name: the first,

"*Organisation Roland*" or "Venture Roland"; the second, "*Sonderformation Nachtigall*" (special formation Nachtigall).

Because one of these battalions, Battalion Nachtigall, received its instruction at the regiment camp z.b.V.800 Brandenburg formed for tasks specific to the Abwehr II (sabotage, special assignments behind the front lines, etc.), confusion arose after the war in the minds of certain German authors who thought these two units (or at least Nachtigall) were part of the Brandenburg regiment. In fact, their status was distinctive and their assignment did not correspond to the special unit assignments of the Brandenburg regiment. For this reason the Ukrainian units did not receive this regiment's company number.⁴

The mission of these Ukrainian formations, sometimes called "self-defense groups," was outlined as follows: "these formation units led by German officers, non-commissioned officers, or soldiers are to aid in establishing the marching security for German troops on grounds not occupied by German military, especially by disarming Russians who are on grounds off the marching route, and by overseeing transports of prisoners of war. This Ukrainian self-defense group, directed by German military, can increase to 500, possibly 1,000 Ukrainians who live in the Reich. It is desirable that these men be ready to begin marching just before D-Day" (BA-MA RH 20-11/485 Aufgaben für Ukrainer-Organisationen, 12 June 1941).

Battalion Roland was recruited in April 1941 by the OUN-B Vienna bureau under the supervision of Colonel Riko Yary and was commanded on the Ukrainian side by Commandant Yevhen Pobihushchy. It received its instruction in Austria (Saubersdorf, near Wiener Neustadt) from officers of the Wehrkreiskommando XVII of Vienna. The strength of this unit: approximately 350 men.

Battalion Nachtigall was recruited by the OUN-B Cracow bureau also in April 1941. Its instruction took place in Neuhammer in Silesia. The Ukrainian commandant of the battalion was Roman Shukhevych, head of the military sector of the OUN-B. Its strength: 330 men.

While Battalion Nachtigall changed into the *feldgrau* of the Wehrmacht, Battalion Roland wore a Czech uniform that resembled the uniform of the 1918 Ukrainian army.

Briefly, the history of Battalion Roland reads thus: On 7 June 1941, the main part of Battalion Roland left Vienna for Campulung (South Bukovyna), in Romania, arriving there mid-June. The Third Company joined the battalion approximately two weeks later. Having arrived in Romania, the battalion, like other Sonderkommandos of the sector, was placed on 18 June under the authority of the Army Group South, and on 27 June was attached to the German Eleventh Army (BA-MA RH 20-11/485 Heeresgruppenkommando Süd Ic/Nr. 208/41.g.Kdos., H.Qu., 18 June 1941; Armeekommandos 11, Abt. Ia/Ic/AO 66/41 g.Kdos., A.H. Qu., 27 June 1941; Nr.423/41 g.,A.H.Qu., 27 June 1941). On the German side it was commanded by Major Pitschmann, subordinate to Major Ernst zu Eickern, high command of the Army Group South.

On 27 June, the high command of the Eleventh Army defined the tasks of the battalion: participation in combat on the Prut to back up German troops; occupation and cleanup of the grounds off the main marching routes of German troops; organization of Ukrainian self-defense groups in occupied towns; protection of supply routes; aid in evacuation of prisoners of war; protection of industrial targets and transport (Abt. Ic/A.O. Nr.64/41 g.Kdos. Abw.II, A.H.Qu., 27 June 1941).

The marching orders of the commander of the Eleventh Army specified that Battalion Roland was to reach Botosani on 30 June 1941 taking as its route Campulung-Gura Humorului-Sucsava-Botosani; the advanced detachment was to present itself to the high command of the Eleventh Army in Stanoesti on 29 June (Nr.423/41 g.).

On 30 June, the day independence of the Ukrainian State was proclaimed in Lviv, while the main part of the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Siebert was marching from Frumosul to Botosani, a counter-order of Lieutenant-Colonel Stolze of the Abwehr II (OKW) forbade involvement of the battalion which was once more placed under direct order of Commandant zu Eickern (at the moment in Lviv). On 2 July, Lieutenant Charlé (of the Abwehr II with the Eleventh Army) asked Eickern for new orders. While waiting, the battalion returned to Frumosul, near Campulung (Fernschreibstelle A.O.K. 11, Nr.639, 2 July 1941; Abt Ic/A.O., O.U., 5 July 1941 Aktennotiz; Armeeoberkommando 11 Abt Ia/Ic/AO Nr.471/41 geh. A.H.Qu., 7 July 1941). It remained there

until the end of July. After the events in Lviv, Germans hesitated to deploy the two Ukrainian battalions.

Following the OUN-B plan, Riko Yary was to join the Battalion Roland with the entire staff of Ukrainian propagandists. But on 2 July, the OKW ordered dissolution of Yary's group. Some members of this group joined Battalion Roland as simple soldiers, while Yary, having arrived several days later "immediately declared himself independent" and left for Lviv (Abt. Ic/A.O. Abw.II., O.U., 9 July 1941).

On 26 July, the "organization Roland" was placed under the command of the 54th Army Corps and was to be deployed in Ukraine in the clean-up of the land and protection of communication channels east of the Dnister. At that moment, the strength of the battalion was nine officers and 260 men, divided into companies of sixty-five men each. Two companies were commanded by German officers, two by Ukrainian officers. The battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Siebert. The Germans wore Wehrmacht uniforms, the Ukrainians Czech uniforms with a yellow-blue armband bearing the inscription "*Deutsche Wehrmacht*" (German Wehrmacht). They were planning to increase the strength of the battalion in Ukraine by recruiting 150 additional men. The arms of the battalion were less than excellent: six Czech light machine guns and Russian guns. According to their training the battalions were to complete their armament with weapons taken from the defeated enemy troops.

The battalion was to begin its march on 29 July in the Kishinev-Wadu-lui-Woda direction (Armeeoberkommando 11 Abt.Ic/A.O./ Abw.II, 296/41 g. Kdos. A.H.Qu., 26 July 1941). According to former members of the battalion, the unit crossed the Dnister at Dubossary and continued its route as far as Untilivka on the Proskuriv-Odessa railroad stretch where it remained for three weeks (Ortynsky *Svoboda* 26 June 1960).

Ukrainians believed that they were finally going to be engaged at the front, but on 10 August the high command of the Eleventh Army received a telegram from Lieutenant-Colonel Stolze, sent the evening before, that read: "After consultation with the Reich's minister for the eastern occupied territories, the organization *Roland* is to be withdrawn from the campaign for political reasons" (BA-MA RH 20-11/485 Fernschreiben A.O.K., Nr.1152, 9 August 1941 Nr.1405).

On 14 August the commander of the Eleventh Army ordered the retreat of the Battalion Roland and its departure for Focsani in Romania. People recruited by Roland in Ukraine to form local self-defense groups were to be released and all Ukrainians who had arrived in the country with the organization Roland had to leave with it, with the exception of fifty men who were put at the disposal of economic services of the army as interpreters. The battalion was to reach Kishinev on foot at the latest on 26 August 1941 and immediately leave by train for Focsani. The strength of the battalion at the time of return was nine officers and 274 men. The fifty interpreters detached to the economic service were forbidden all political activities (Armeeoberkommando 11 Abt. Ic/AO (Abw.II) Nr 572/41 geh.A.H.Qu., 14 August 1941). They did not even remain interpreters for long. Several weeks later they were dismissed because "they previously had belonged to the Roland organization" (Ibid., OKW., Amt Ausl. /Abw.II 2 December 1941).

Once in Focsani, the "Organization Roland" was disarmed under the threat of German machine guns. The battalion was then sent to Mayerling near Vienna. Such was the end of Battalion Roland.

On 16 September 1941 the Gestapo arrested the leaders of the OUN-B Vienna bureau. Among them were the Ukrainian officers of Roland, notably Colonel Riko Yary, Captain Barabash and L. Ortynsky, as well as non-commissioned officers. They were accused of "activities directed against the state" (Ortynsky *Svoboda* 25 June 1960) and deported to a concentration camp.

Battalion Nachtigall met approximately the same fate. Its instruction, begun at the beginning of May 1941, ended on 17 June.

Command of the Seventeenth Army to be engaged in Western Ukraine (in the direction of Lviv) asked on 29 May 1941 that it be given "important segments of the first battalion of the regiment z.b.V. 'Brandenburg' and the special formation Nachtigall." Significantly, the two units were mentioned separately, the unit Nachtigall being named apart from the elements of the Brandenburg regiment.

According to the same document, "special tasks" reserved to these two distinct formations were: engagement in Lviv and its immediate vicinity "to take over and to guarantee security of important traffic installations, economic enterprises, and supply warehouses [railroad

installations, water works, factories, post and telegraph offices]" (BA-MA RH 20-17/276 Armeeoberkommando 17 Abt. Ia/Ic, Nr.282/41 g. Kdos. A.H. Qu., 29 May 1941).

In other words, they were assigned to protect installations, warehouses, and public buildings (including radio transmission facilities). Consequently, contingents of the first battalion of the Brandenburg regiment and the Nachtigall unit were placed first under orders of the Fifty-second Army Corps, then, on 16 June, under orders of the command-in-chief forty-nine (Gen.KdoXXXXIX) of the Wehrmacht, charged with administering Lviv after the capture of the city by German troops (Abt. Ia Nr. 322/41 g. Kdos Chefs. A.H., 12 June 1941; Ia Nr.345/41 g.Kdos, Chefs. A.H.Qu., 16 June 1941, page 2; RH 20-17/557 Armeeoberkommando 17, O.Qu./Qu.2,A.H.Qu., 29 June 1941).

On 18 June, four days before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Battalion Nachtigall was directed to the German-Soviet frontier. It was commanded by Roman Shukhevych and, in military operations, released from the authority of the commander of the first battalion of the Brandenburg regiment. During the night of 22 to 23 June, it crossed the frontier near Peremyshl (Przemysl) without being engaged and began its march in the direction of Lviv. For obvious reasons, the Ukrainian command of the battalion thought that it would be advisable from the political point of view for the unit to arrive in Lviv before or at least with the first contingents of the German army.

Battalion Nachtigall was not engaged in combat in Peremyshl or Lviv.⁵ It arrived in the area of Lviv with the first battalion of the Brandenburg regiment and some other German units. Arriving slightly ahead of German units, the battalion entered Lviv on 30 June at 4:30 in the morning. Following orders, it occupied certain economically strategic sites, including the radio transmitter which facilitated the broadcast that evening and the following morning with news of the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian commander of the battalion, R. Shukhevych, whose brother had been among the victims of the NKVD mass executions in the Lviv prison before the retreat, participated in the assembly of Ukrainian representatives who approved the proclamation for independence.

Following this proclamation, Battalion Nachtigall was removed from Ukrainian authority and placed directly under German command. It left Lviv on 7 July. On 14 July, after having passed through Ternopil and Hrymayliv, it arrived in Proskuriv.⁶ It was attached along with the first battalion of the Brandenburg regiment, to an Alpine division of protection and took part in important battles in the Brailiv region near Vinnytsia. After the capture of Vinnytsia, the battalion remained in Yuzvyn (today Nekrassove) for two weeks. There members of the battalion took advantage of the opportunity to organize Ukrainian administrations and do nationalist propaganda in the villages of the region.

Toward 13 August 1941, Battalion Nachtigall received orders to board a train and return to its camp of instruction in Neuhammer. Upon return to Neuhammer, it was disarmed and ceased to exist.

Prospects offered to the men of the two dissolved battalions were dismal. A short time after the dissolution of the two units, the Germans began mass arrests of OUN-B members and sympathizers. The men of the dissolved units were given a choice of release or service in a reformed military unit. Life was difficult and often miserable for foreign workers in Germany (Germans had warned the Ukrainians that they would not be authorized to return to Ukraine) with the possibility of arrest for belonging to the OUN-B; those remaining in the military, however, could hope that the new unit would be sent to Ukraine. The majority of the men, therefore, decided to remain; only about fifty asked to be released. The officers, feeling responsible for the men who remained, chose to stay with them.

In October 1941 the men of the two dissolved units were transferred to Frankfurt-on-the-Oder, and the units were reorganized into a single battalion. Although the men did not have to take an oath again, on 1 December 1941 each soldier had to join personally by signing an enlistment contract for a year.

The new unit received an order number: the 201st battalion of police protection (*Schutzmannschaftbatallion 201*). In March 1942 it was sent not to Ukraine but to Belorussia, where it and other similar units protected communication lines in the Mohylev-Vitebsk-Lepel triangle, then overrun by Soviet partisans. On 1 December 1942, at the expiration

of the contract, battalion 201 was dissolved and the Ukrainian officers were transferred under escort to Lviv and arrested or confined. Some of them, among them R. Shukhevyh, succeeded in foiling police surveillance and joined the national resistance.

Chapter IV

LETHAL MADNESS AND COLONIAL DELIRIUM

The Red Army was retreating on all fronts. The Russian government ordered evacuation of threatened regions from the Baltic to the Black Sea and evacuated part of the population (party members, teachers, specialized workers, a certain number of Russians and Jews), certain technical and professional schools, factories, plants, and tractor stations (MTS).

From July to December 1941 Moscow evacuated 1,250 industrial enterprises and more than 10,000,000 persons, including 3,500,000 from Ukraine, from the entire threatened territory into the interior of Russia, Siberia, and Central Asia (Bielikov 15).

From July through October 1941 Russians evacuated 518 Ukrainian factories (34% of all evacuated factories and (plants). From Kiev alone, 197 enterprises and 300,000 persons were evacuated. The tractor plant in Kharkiv, which had been transformed to produce tanks, was dismantled and evacuated with its 4,673 specialists and training personnel. Russians evacuated from Ukraine 30,212 tractors, more than 6,000,000 head of cattle, more than 1,600,000 tons of wheat, thousands of tons of leather, furs, etc. (*Ukraina RSR* 1:277).

The destruction ordered by Stalin in his speech of 3 July 1941 affected especially central and eastern regions of Ukraine. The Red Army destroyed harvests, factories that had not been dismantled, strategic targets, official buildings, historical monuments; they burned wheatfields.

Massive Executions

Ukraine was put to fire and sword. After the Ukrainian political prisoners' massacres perpetrated by the NKVD, the country experienced massive executions of the civilian population, especially of Jews, carried out by special Sipo and SD units.

The *Einsatzgruppe C* of the Sipo and the SD, charged with the "cleansing" of central and northern Ukraine, left Bad Schmiedenberg on 23 June, and its units arrived in Lviv on 30 June (a part of the EK 4b) and on 1 July 1941 (the rest of the EK 4b and the EK 4a).

According to the 1 July orders received by the *Einsatzgruppen*, "cleansing" was to be directed primarily against "Bolsheviks and Jews," the latter being presented as "principal supporters of bolshevism" (*Hauptträger des Bolschevismus*) (BA-MA RH 24-3/136 Auszugweise Abschrift aus Einzelanordnung Nr.17 der Panzergruppe 1 of 2 October 1941). The order to *Einsatzgruppen* read as follows: "As to Polish intellectuals, etc., their fate can be decided later, unless 'in particular cases,' there be an urgency to do so sooner for reasons of danger." While waiting, these Poles could be used at first as "elements of initiative" (limited according to local conditions) "for pogroms" as well as for obtaining information (BA R 58/214 f. 52-53). In Western Ukrainian towns of that time the Polish population was very large, often in the majority.

Germans tried to manipulate the anti-Bolshevik attitude of local populations (of Balts, Russians, Poles, Belorussians, Ukrainians, etc.) to provoke anti-Jewish pogroms by identifying Jews as "the henchmen of bolshevism." An atmosphere of horror and feelings of indignation following massacres perpetrated by the NKVD of which many Jews were members, and crimes of the Soviet power were deliberately exploited everywhere to incite the people against the Jews in general. Police reports, nevertheless, indicated that in Ukraine, with the exception of isolated cases, such excitations did not bring expected results.

The 12 September report of *Einsatzgruppe C* operating in Ukraine read "almost nowhere has the population been persuaded to carry out actions against Jews" (BA R 58/217 f. 46). Another report from Kiev issued in the first half of October 1941, while remarking that the

Ukrainians "were rejecting Jews because they were in general officials of the Bolshevik party," stressed that "anti-semitism of a racial and ideological character is absent among the population." The report added that "for a persecution of Jews the Ukrainian population lacks ringleaders and spiritual drive" (BA R 58/218 f. 157-158 report of 13 October 1941).

However, it was not through pogroms that the Nazi regime, in accordance with previously made decisions, intended to get rid of Jews. The principal means would be mass executions. While proceeding with these executions, the *Einsatzkommandos* (EK) and the *Sonderkommandos* (SK) of the Sipo and the SD gave their activities an appearance of reprisal (*Vergeltung*) for atrocities committed by the "Judeo-Bolshevik" regime, at least during the first weeks of occupation. In Lviv, for example, from the first days of occupation, according to one report, "security police rounded up and shot 7,000 Jews in reprisal for inhuman atrocities" (BA R 58/214 f. 191). In Lutsk 2,000 executions occurred "as measures of retaliation for massacres of Ukrainians" (f.85) Executions took place in practically every town of Ukraine: 1,000 in Ternopil, 238 in Korosten, 400 then 3,145 in Zhytomyr, 1,303 in Berdychiv. In the region of Kamianets-Podilsky, a *Sonderkommando* shot 23,600 Jews in two days. In Kiev, the EK 4a (renamed SK 4a), which distinguished itself by excessive activity across all Ukraine, in collaboration with two commandos of German police (zwei Kommandos des Polizeiregiments Süd) in two days, 29 and 30 September 1941, shot 33,771 Jews in the ravine called Babyn Yar (f.86; R 58/217 f. 28; AA Inland II g 431 f. 67, 55; R58/217 f. 165, 28; R58/218 f. 366; AA Inland II g 431 f. 55).

Jews were not the only victims of these executions. By the middle of October 1941 close to 10,000 non-Jews were shot at Babyn Yar. Similar executions of non-Jews continued until the end of German occupation. EK reports indicate numerous other executions or "liquidations" during the first months including 240 Bolsheviks in Rivne, twenty looters and fifty Polish agents in Lutsk, 187 Soviet Russians and Jews in Zhytomyr, 619 "persons" in Lviv (between 5 and 11 August 1941), 4,988 "persons" in Volhynia and Polissia (from 12 to 15 August), sixty "terrorists" in Narodyshche, 6,584 Bolsheviks, Jews, and anti-social elements in the region of Korosten and Bila Tserkva, thirty-nine officials and eleven saboteurs in Kryvyi Rih, fifty-six NKVD officials and agents,

and twenty-eight saboteurs and looters in Novo-Ukraina. In September, the EK6 executed 800 mentally sick persons of the 1,160 sick being treated in a Dnipropetrovsk lunatic asylum (BA R 58/214 f.127, 192, 267; R 58/216 f. 76, 98; R 58/217 f.28, 116, 117, 164; R 58/220 f. 195).

In Kiev, by 12 October 1941 executions by the *Sonderkommando 4a* rose to 51,000. The report specifies: "With the exception of special action which took place in Kiev on 28 and 29 September and in which two commandos of the police regiment South took part, executions to date have been carried out by the SK without any outside assistance. The executed are primarily Jews and of a less significant number [Soviet] political officials as well as saboteurs and looters." From 7 September to 5 October EK 5 shot 207 political officials, 112 saboteurs and looters. SK 4b executed 103 political officials, nine saboteurs and looters from 13 through 26 September. EK 6 killed thirteen political officials, thirty-two saboteurs and looters between 14 and 27 September (BA R 58/218 f.147), etc.

The grounds for executions listed in German reports include the following: political officials, looters (it will be seen later that the SD had ordered the secret execution of the OUN-B members as looters), saboteurs, active communists, persons freed from prisoners of war (PW) camps because of false declarations, NKVD agents, denouncers from the communist era, undesirable elements, anti-social elements, partisans, political commissars, persons who represented danger of an epidemic, of plague, etc.

A second group (part of the *Einsatzgruppe D*—SK 10a, SK 10b, EK 11a, EK 11b, EK 12) of police units was deployed in southern Ukraine while waiting to be able to go "clean up" the Caucasus. This group carried out executions and investigated the towns of Mykolaiv, Odessa, Tahanrih (Taganrog), Symferopil, etc. One of the reports on its activities during the period of 1 through 15 October 1941 stated: "In the period under review, the Jewish question was settled mainly east of the Dnipro. Furthermore, we were busy primarily looking for Bandera followers and [Soviet] partisans" (f. 212).

The Fate of Prisoners of War

The number of Soviet prisoners of war was growing rapidly. According to the letter of 26 August 1941 of the Reich's minister of foreign affairs, "the German Wehrmacht had taken to date 1,300,000 Russian prisoners of war" (ADAP, XIII, 1, Doc.#244). In September following the battle of Kiev that ended in the defeat of numerous Soviet army groups (Kiev was taken on 19 September), Germans took more than 665,000 prisoners of war (Carrel 114).

The fate of these prisoners of war was the result of ideological considerations and the political intentions of the German National Socialists. Before the launching of hostilities, Nazi leaders had only a vague idea of what they were going to do with prisoners of war. They saw, however, from March 1941 on "the necessity to render all Bolshevik leaders and communists immediately harmless" (Jacobsen 143). In March they adopted regulations giving full power to Reichsführer-SS Himmler in the zone of troop operation (Appendix, Doc.#45) that stipulated that "the Reichsführer be vigilant that the operations during the realization of his tasks not be hindered." On 17 March Hitler informed Halder, head of high command, it would be necessary to annihilate the intelligentsia that Stalin had set up (Halder 2:320).

Secret instructions concerning liquidation of representatives of political authority and Soviet commissars were put in writing on 12 May (IMT 1471-PS; Appendix, Doc.#49). Not recognized as prisoners of war, these leaders and commissars were to be handed over to the SD and executed in the Dulags (points of rounding up, transit camps).

On 6 June 1941 the OKW prepared the famous directives concerning treatment of political commissars. According to the directives, in the struggle against bolshevism, it was unnecessary to respect humanity and the rights of men. It was necessary to expect cruelty toward German prisoners of war from the political commissars. For this reason and because they were instigators of "Asiatic fighting methods" and "carriers of resistance," political commissars who resisted the German troops were not to be considered prisoners of war but were to be executed (BA-MA RH 2/v. 2082 f. 138 ff.). Certain German military leaders formulated

reservations on these directives, remarking that they led inevitably to reinforcement of enemy resistance (Jacobsen 153-154).

Before the aggression, the OKW had set up a special bureau, the AWA (*Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt*), charged with prisoners for the "case Barbarossa." Parting from the principle that "bolshevism is the mortal enemy of Nazi Germany," the OKW instructions of 16 June stipulated that "from this fact extreme reservation and the most severe vigilance" be observed. It was also necessary to expect a subversive behavior on the part of Asiatic prisoners. For this reason it was necessary to take pitiless measures at the least sign of disobedience. The instructions demanded "total annihilation of all passive and active resistance."

Certainly, the Germans considered the 27 July 1929 Geneva Convention rules binding in treatment of prisoners but with modification: prisoners would not be paid; their objects of value and money would not be restored to them; there would be a special order concerning their nourishment; the article concerning their contact with the outside would not be applied; punishment would not be limited to restrictions planned by the convention (IMT 888-PS).

During the first weeks that followed the 22 June 1941 aggression, the prisoners of war were treated in conformity with these directives. But from 17 July on, the chief of the security police and of the SD took measures that would reinforce repression and lead to the extermination of numerous categories of prisoners of war. Heydrich, indeed, ordered the *Einsatzkommandos* of the Sipo and the SD to proceed with screening of the Stalags and the Dulags. Prisoners had to be sorted out, civilians and military rounded up, suspected and undesirable prisoners separated, persons worthy of confidence who could work or give out information in the camps and later in the occupied regions sought out. Above all, it was necessary to seek out and liquidate all former Soviet state officials, officials of the Bolshevik party and the Komintern, peoples' commissars and their adjuncts, political commissars, all leaders, Soviet intelligentsia, Jews. Executions were to take place outside the camps and their proximity (IfZ NO-3414).

Certain nationalities were also to be rounded up. Thus the commander-in-chief in the Rear Zone South asked in his order of 18 July to collect, if possible, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Ukrainian

prisoners of war. But these prisoners were not to be given any special treatment (BA-MA RH 22/5 Korpsbefehl no.25). The Germans wanted to free a certain number among them for economic reasons, for they needed hands to assure the deliveries to the army and the Reich.

The 8 September 1941 OKW/AWA regulation that kept treatment of prisoners of war a political issue, stipulated that the Bolshevik soldier, by reason of his indoctrination against National Socialism, was capable of opposing it by all possible means, including sabotage, subversion, assassination; for this reason he had "lost the right to be treated as an honest soldier according to the [rules of the] Geneva convention." Pitiless measures were to be taken at the least sign of disobedience. All disobedience, all resistance was to be put down with the help of arms, and all escaping prisoners were to be shot without warning (Appendix, Doc.#83).

The same regulation ordered separation of "politically undesirable" prisoners and their return to the *Einsatzkommando* of the security police and the SD. All contact and all conversations with prisoners were forbidden and would be punished. To prevent conversations between civilians and prisoners, use of arms was authorized against the one or the other. While on work detail, Soviet prisoners of war were to be kept under very close surveillance (IMT 1519-PS).

This regulation provoked a reaction from Canaris. In a letter of 15 September addressed to the head of the OKW, Admiral Canaris expressed serious reservations: if Germany in the war against the Soviet Union could not abide by the Geneva convention, it could not ignore the human right of prisoners of war. Since the eighteenth century, man has been accustomed to regard captivity as neither revenge nor punishment, but safe detention intended to prevent the prisoner from taking part in combat. The regulation in question was making the prisoner not a man who had fulfilled his civic duty but a criminal. The measures of the regulation were leading to arbitrary treatment and slaughter. Moreover, Canaris estimated that bad treatment inflicted on the prisoners would increase their resistance and could be exploited by enemy propaganda. Such treatment would lead to strong resistance of enemy troops and would provoke identical treatment for German prisoners of war (IMT EC-338).

Approved by the head of the OKW, the 8 September measures were, however, carried out. In addition to the regulation, two other factors contributed to the aggravation of the prisoners' situation: housing and hygiene conditions and diet.

During an October 1941 trip to Ukraine, General Lahousen noted that large masses of completely exhausted Soviet prisoners of war were like "a herd of animals." Guards had no trouble maintaining order with blows of the stick. Because of lack of nourishment and bad housing conditions, many prisoners were collapsing. The Sixth Army gave the order to execute on the spot all those who could not walk. Prisoners were killed en route, even in villages in front of the population. Lack of food led to cannibalism, especially, as noted Wehrmacht commander-in-chief in Ukraine General Kitzinger, in the Rivne and Ostrih (Ostrog) camps. He specified in his October report that in each case cannibalism occurred among Uzbek prisoners (IfZ NOKW 3147; Fd 47; BA-MA RW 41/1 Bericht no.2:8).

Sipo and SD commandos were sent to each Stalag and Dulag to search out prisoners to be liquidated. Order no.14 of 29 October listed prisoners to be segregated: important officials of the state and of the party, officials of the Komintern, commissars of the people and political commissars, leaders of institutions of the state and economic life, intellectuals and Jews belonging to the following categories: politicians, writers, editors, officials, etc. (IMT 014-USSR).

According to SS Gruppenführer Müller, head of the Gestapo, by 5 December 1941 they had been able to round up 22,000 prisoners of war, of whom 16,000 were liquidated (IfZ NOKW-147).

Groups of prisoners destined to be executed by the Sipo and SD *Einsatzkommando* were generally transported to concentration camps. On 9 November the Gestapo chief indicated that 5% to 10% of these prisoners arrived at concentration camps dead or near-dead from exhaustion and malnutrition (IMT 1165-PS).

In October 1941 there were in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine ten prisoner camps for soldiers (*Stammlags* or *Stalags*) and one camp for officers. In the ten camps there were 445,000 prisoners in the beginning of October. At the end of the month that number had decreased by 125,000 (through release, escape, or execution). In November, the

number had gone from 320,000 to 243,000 of whom 140,000 were working in the military sector necessary for waging war. In December, their number decreased to 175,696: 33,713 died; 791 invalids were released; 4,500 were handed over to the air force; 3,100 escaped. Because of malnutrition and sickness (especially typhoid fever), only 112,000 prisoners could work (53,000 in the military sector and 59,000 in the civilian sector). In January 1942, the number of prisoners decreased to 141,675 of whom 90,000 could work. During January, camps received 3,300 prisoners from the zone behind the lines, but the total number during the month went from 144,975 to 134,000 (6,600 died; 1,100 escaped; 1,200 left for the Reich; 1,500 were released; 575 were handed over to the air force and the SD) (BA-MA RW 41/1 Bericht no.2:6-7; Bericht no.3:7; Bericht no.4:22-23; Bericht no.5:20; Bericht no.6:25).

In the following months, the number of prisoners in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine camps increased slightly: 137,000 in March, 194,384 in May 1942. A certain number of prisoners arrived in these camps from the zone of operations and from the zone behind the lines, while others left for the Reich, the General Government and other regions. At the same time some Soviet prisoners of war, wishing to survive, had begun (toward the end of 1941 and in the beginning of 1942) to enlist either in police protection (*Schutzmannschaft*) or eastern legions. Thus, for example, during May 1942 17,950 prisoners were sent to the Reich to work in the war industry and 4,500 enlisted in eastern legions (Bericht no.7:30; Bericht no.9:22).

In the summer of 1941, a certain number of prisoners of war from occupied territories, among them Ukrainians, were released to meet the needs of the local economy, but not all Ukrainians were released. A 21 December 1941 report for the four camps in the south zone behind the lines revealed that of the total number of 52,513 prisoners, 21,846 were Ukrainians. The mortality rate in these camps was as follows: Dulag #160—12,959 prisoners, on an average ten deaths per day; Dulag #182—7,507 prisoners, eighteen deaths daily; Stalag #346—22,776 prisoners, fifty deaths daily; Dulag #205—9,271 prisoners, twenty-one deaths daily (in the last three camps mortality reached the annual rate of 80% to 87%) (BA-MA RH 22/189 WB-766B).

In Stalag #346 there were 1,976 sick people because of malnutrition; of these 476 were in the hospital (250 Ukrainians, 170 Russians, 56 Asians) and 1,500 (1,150 Ukrainians and 350 Russians) in the infirmary and in the camp (BA-MA RH 22/189 WB-766B).

General Kitzinger, commander-in-chief of troops in Ukraine, declared to the Führer that in his territory 2,500 prisoners of war were dying daily (IMT 1517-PS).

Hitler was kept informed of the fate of prisoners of war. On 17 October General Reinecke made a report that in camps of the General Government alone there had been 9,000 deaths in the course of a month (Appendix, Doc.#98).

On 25 December 1941, the OKH authorized the release of Ukrainian prisoners from camps #171, #182, #205 under certain conditions. Only those could be released who before the war had worked in agriculture. The release did not apply to those in camps #160 and #346 because of the typhoid epidemic raging there (BA-MA RH 22/189 Bfh.rückw. H.Geb.Süd, Abt. Qu.Nr.3924/41).

Living conditions of the prisoners of war of the Red Army began to improve progressively from Spring of 1942 on, at least for those employed in the war industry in Germany which constantly needed more and more manpower.

General Terror and Execution of Hostages

In his 3 July 1941 speech, the first one after the German invasion, Stalin had called on the population of occupied territories to carry out destruction and sabotage, and to undertake partisan war against the invader. Red Army soldiers left behind the lines and the network of the Communist party were to become the nucleus of the partisan movement. However, the framework of Soviet partisan groups was more often constituted by men trained and equipped by the Red Army and parachuted by them into occupied territories. The first parachute groups were sighted in Ukraine on 6 July 1941 (BA-MA RH 20-17/277 f. 93).

During the first months, the population aided Germans in fighting Soviet parachutists and guerilla groups. A report of 22 August 1941

indicated that "Russian parachuted partisans had no influence on the population. Everywhere they appear they are taken prisoner by Ukrainians and handed over to Germans" (BA NS 33/42 f. 21; MA RH 20-6/491, Bericht über die Woche vom 15-22 August 1941).

Because the number of assassination attempts and *coups de main* had become significant, the OKH issued on 25 July 1941 special directives to thwart these actions. On 30 July the commander-in-chief of the Seventeenth Army, General von Stülpnagel, following these directives, ordered the army to strengthen the fight against guerilla groups, sabotage, and passive resistance to guarantee the safety of German soldiers. All attacks against the army must lead to pitiless liquidation of the enemy. Guerilla groups, if not killed in the course of the struggle, were to be shot. All persons arrested and found to possess or suspected to possess firearms or explosives, if the suspicion proved correct, would be considered guerillas; those refusing to do forced labor would be treated the same way. Suspects without arms, if they seemed dangerous, were to be handed over to the Sipo or the SD. In cases where those guilty of shooting, attacks, or sabotage were not found, the principle of collective responsibility was to be applied. In that case, it would not be necessary to arrest hostages beforehand. Persons aiding the partisans were to be treated as guerillas (BA-MA RH 20-17/276 WB 1780A).

If in the beginning the Germans tried to spare the Ukrainian population somewhat by directing repression against communists and Jews, soon the entire population became the victim of the principle of collective responsibility because of Soviet partisan activities and non-compliance to German orders.

Germans instituted the state of exceptional order. The population did not have the right to move outside their place of residence without authorization.

Curfews were imposed in most of the regions. Inhabitants had to register at their place of residence and were forbidden to provide lodging to persons foreign to the locality. The population had to inform the mayor immediately of the presence of all strangers in the village. Possession of arms and ammunition was punishable by death (Appendix,

Doc.#89; BA-MA RH 20-17/276 Vorläufige Überwachung der Zivilbevölkerung).

Keitel's order of 16 September reinforced the measures against a possible communist insurrectional movement for the Germans feared that "nationalist groups and others would profit from the occasion to provoke, in league with communist rebels, difficulties for Germany occupation authorities." This activity, according to the mentioned document, presented a growing danger because it created a climate of insecurity for the occupation troops and compelled Germans to send military forces to trouble areas. Consequently, the Führer ordered reinforcement of measures to crush the movement.

Keitel's order justified extreme measures in a very curious way: "It must be kept in mind that human life in the concerned countries often had no value, that dissuasive effects could not be obtained except through exceptionally cruel means" and that "only pain of death was the truly effective means of intimidation" (Appendix, Doc.#90).

A diabolical cycle was thus set in motion. All assassination attempts or acts of sabotage committed by men parachuted by Moscow or by nationalists immediately provoked extreme retaliation, i.e., execution of hostages taken at random. Thus, the nationalists' attempt on the life of a police and SD officer, Michael Sendega, that took place in Lviv on 19 September 1941, led to the execution of approximately 100 hostages of the OUN-B, among them engineer B. Piasetsky, member of the Ukrainian government (according to the German sources, only fifty hostages were executed (BA R 58/218 f. 231-232). In Kiev after conflagrations and acts of sabotage committed toward the end of October 1941, 300 hostages were taken at random in the streets and shot on 2 November. In Kharkiv, German soldiers had been killed by the explosion of a mine. The commandant of the city had fifty "communists" shot immediately and 1,000 hostages arrested to be shot in groups of 200 each time a new act of sabotage took place. Toward the end of November, after the destruction of the communications center, 400 other hostages were shot in Kiev (Appendix, Doc.##100,102; IMT 291-USSR).

In the village of Baranivka, 30 km north of Myrhorod, four German soldiers had been attacked on the night of 4 to 5 November. On grounds of retaliation, ten villagers were shot and the village burned to the

ground. Germans informed the population of that region by means of posters that it was up to them to protect themselves from partisans and to fight them by denouncing them to the occupation forces (Appendix, Doc.#105).

At the same time, in October 1941 Ukraine (and without doubt Europe) experienced the first *Oradour-sur-Glane*: the village of Obukhivka was burned and the entire population shot (Appendix, Doc. #107).

Besides hostages, Germans also shot "intermediaries," i.e., persons supposed to be or accused of being in contact with Soviet partisans. Villagers were warned that "anyone who is in touch with the bandits, offers them shelter, provides them with supplies, aids them by any means whatsoever or conceals their hiding places, will be punished with death. Moreover, he will bring misfortune on his family and on the village" (Doc.#107). On 2 December 1941 an attempt was committed against a German officer in Dnipropetrovsk. On grounds of retaliation, Germans shot 100 hostages taken from among the population (Appendix, Doc.#109).

Germans thought of attaining their goal through terror. The commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine affirmed in his 16 December 1941 report that the fight against Soviet partisans would succeed only if the population realized that all partisans would be killed. Several thousand partisans were indeed hanged or shot publicly; a number of suspects were also liquidated. "Since then the sabotage has ceased," announced the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine. From this he concluded that "measures that can frighten the population more than the terror of partisans leads to success" (BA-MA RW 41/31 Nr.2002 /404/ 41 Geh. of 16 December 1941; Appendix, Doc.#112).

In fact, the brutal measures applied by Germans did not have any dissuasive effect. A brief truce was due more to the rigor of winter than to victory over partisans or national resistance.

Hitler's Desire to Make Ukraine a German Colony

Hitler's ideas concerning Ukraine became clearer as German troops advanced. He expressed them during his famous "table talks" (*Tischgespräche*) with guests.

As the first measures were taken to break the OUN-B and to liquidate the free Ukrainian government, Hitler, on the night of 5 to 6 July 1941, was fascinated with the beauty of Crimea which, according to him, was going to become the "German Riviera," linked to Germany by a highway (*Hitler's Table Talks* 4). On 27 July the Führer speculated on the manner in which the enormous space in the east would be controlled. Germany would have to prevent formation of a military force west of the Urals. It would be necessary to arrive there to control hundreds of millions of inhabitants with the help of several hundred thousand German soldiers, "because Russian space would always have to be controlled by Germans." They would control the area following the example of English domination over India.

As to Ukraine, Hitler said: "We are going to take the southern part of Ukraine, especially Crimea, and we will turn it into a German colony." The local population would have to be driven out (15-16).

Hitler did not like the Ukrainians. He thought that "the Ukrainian peasant was unaware of the notion of duty." He affirmed that "Ukrainians are as lazy, poorly organized, and nihilistic in an Asiatic way" as Russians. These people do not understand the work and duty ethic, they react only to the whip. And Hitler added: "Stalin is one of the greatest men alive, because he succeeded through the hardest restraints to form a state from this family of rabbits" (*Hitler's Table Talks* Appendix, Doc.#91, remarks of 17 September 1941; Doc.#94, remarks of 24 September 1941).

Hitler was convinced that it would be a mistake to educate Ukrainians. He, therefore, was opposed to the opening of a university in Kiev. "It is better not to teach them to read," he said (Appendix, Doc.#91).

The Führer longed for a colonial empire in the manner of the nineteenth century. He exclaimed on 17 September 1941: "Russian space is our India. Like the English, we are going to govern this empire with

a handful of men." English control in India was presented by Hitler "as the most worthy objective for our gestation of the east" (Appendix, Doc. #92).

Because of its domination over Ukraine, Germany would be able to deliver grain to all of Europe, according to Hitler, while Crimea would give lemons, cotton, and rubber. "We are going to attract Danes, people from Holland, Norwegians, Swedes to Ukraine" (Appendix, Doc.#91).

Two days later he spoke about Ukraine again. His personal advisor Werner Koeppen noted: "The Führer and the Reich's commissar (Erich Koch) have rejected the idea of a free Ukraine." This was the occasion for Hitler to express his contempt for Slavs who, in his eyes, "are a family of rabbits" and who, if they are not pushed by "a class of masters" would never go beyond the family stage. Knowledge becomes for them semi-knowledge which makes them dissatisfied and anarchical. The idea of a Ukrainian university in Kiev was to be rejected, all the more since nothing of the city would remain. Hitler "sees the destruction of great cities as the determining factor in the duration of our power in Russia," noted his advisor.

This viewpoint suited Erich Koch who "intended to break the Ukrainian industry to force the proletariat to return to the country." Koch declared that he had been obliged to be brutal in Ukraine from the start. He did not wish to commit the mistake of 1917–1918, i.e., be alternatively accommodating and severe. General Eichhorn, commander-in-chief of the German troops in Ukraine, had been killed in Kiev in 1918 not by the Bolsheviks but by Ukrainian nationalists.

The Führer was favorably disposed to Koch. "Everyone believes him capable and considers him a 'second Stalin' who will be able to carry out his tasks in Ukraine the best way possible," notes Koeppen (Appendix, Doc.#92).

The fall of Kiev on 19 September brought immense joy to the general quarters of the Führer. On 20 September Hitler came back to the construction of the highway to Crimea which was to allow the German citizen to admire after the war the conquered regions from his Volkswagen. Hitler wanted the colonial idea to spread to all Germans, not merely to "some capitalists."

The Führer was literally fascinated with Ukraine. He said Germans had to extract with much trouble several meters of land from the sea and torture themselves to farm the swamps "while in Ukraine there is an inexhaustibly fertile soil with humus in places ten meters deep which is waiting for us." This marvellous Ukrainian soil was inadequately developed and was not producing the maximum it would be able to produce once worked by Germans. Then the needs of Germany as well as those of other states would be met (Appendix, Doc.##93,95).

With Ukraine, Europe could become economically self-sufficient. "Where is there a region able to furnish iron of a quality superior to that of Ukrainian iron?" exclaimed Hitler. "Where can one find more nickel, coal, manganese, molybdenum? Even America needs Ukrainian manganese. And the vegetable oils, plantations, and so many other possibilities" (Appendix, Doc.#96).

On 17 October Hitler related once again his vision of management of the eastern regions. First of all it would be necessary to construct roads. Reichsminister Todt would have to enlarge his initial plan. He would have at his disposition for twenty years 3,000,000 prisoners of war. In addition to the Crimea highway it would be necessary to construct other roads to the Caucasus and two or three others farther north in the most beautiful places. German cities, centers for the Wehrmacht, the police, the administration, and the party would have to be established on large rivers. "Along the roads there will be German farms, and the Asiatic steppes of monotone charm soon will have a different aspect." These regions of Ukraine will be colonized: 4,000,000 Germans are going to settle there ten years from now. These Germans would come from the Reich, from America, as well as from Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Flanders. Suddenly Hitler became generous: "Thus the rest of Europe would be able to take part in the development of Russian space" (Appendix, Doc.#98).

Hitler wanted to create for the German people conditions that would favor increase in population and would permit construction of "a bulwark against the Russian tide" (Appendix, Doc.#93).

He strongly opposed any education or assistance to the Ukrainian population. Knowledge of traffic signals would suffice, he said, so that the Ukrainians not be crushed by German vehicles. Freedom for

Ukrainians would mean that they would have to wash themselves only on official holidays (according to another version, once a month instead of twice). The only duty imperative to the Germans: to Germanize Ukraine through immigrants and regard the natives like Red Skins (*Hitler's Table Talks* 69; Appendix, Doc #98).

The Germanic Race against the Slavs

Hitler's anti-Slavic feelings did not seem to displease certain Romanians. However, when the brother of Antonesco declared that the present war was a war against Slavs he provoked a diplomatic incident. The attaché of the Bulgarian press left the conference room as a sign of protest. While recalling this incident during a conversation with the Führer, Rosenberg said that it was necessary to avoid such public declarations because "they can worsen the future handling of Ukrainians" (Appendix, Doc.#95).

Hitler declared that as Führer of the German people, he wished to realize his plans "while reasoning coolly." What Slavs thought of his policies was "totally indifferent" to him. He said that today no one was upset to know that the German wheat granary east of the Elbe had been taken over from Slavs by sword during the twelfth century.

In Eastern Europe, said Hitler, a process of conquest would take place similar to the conquest of America. The enthusiastic Führer regretted only that he was not ten or fifteen years younger "to be able to see the evolution of this process." Several ministers were already engaged in it, and it was necessary to plan demarcation of competences, especially between the Reichsministry for eastern occupied territories, and the office for protection of the German nationality, so that the task of Rosenberg's ministry would not be limited only "to pushing Slavs, gathered onto reservations, as quickly as possible to expatriate or to die" (Appendix, Doc.#98).

In Moscow, the Russians, even if they did not know all of Hitler's secret plans, had no trouble in thwarting German intentions. They knew they were threatened, in extreme danger. They decided to profit from

the mistakes of Nazism by calling for a solidarity of Slavs, by mobilizing the Slavs against the Germanic menace.

On 10-11 August 1941 a "Pan-Slavic meeting" was held in Moscow, as a result of which a long appeal was addressed to the "oppressed Slavic brothers."

The appeal of Moscow stressed that the war had been "imposed on the world" by "German fascism" and that "Hitlerism vows a particular hatred against Slavic peoples." It wanted to make slaves of Slavs, and German fascism was in the process of physically exterminating them. It had brought about the disintegration of the Czech state, had made a gift of a large part of Slovak and Ukraino-Carpathian lands to Hungarian "large landholders."

More than 100,000 Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Ukrainians are stagnating in prisons and concentration camps....German fascism has destroyed the Polish Republic and at the end of two years has annihilated close to 3,000,000 Poles.

Having attacked treacherously the Soviet Union, German fascism has met the resistance of the steel of the Red Army as well as the very powerful resistance of all Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian populations....

Thus, all Slavic peoples—Czechs, Slovaks, Carpatho-Ukrainians, Poles, Serbs, Croatians, Slovenians, Bulgarians, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians have been victims of the aggression of German fascism.

Oppressed Slavic brethren! Our lives are in great peril!

The moment has come for the Slavic world to unite to a rapid and decisive defeat of German fascism.

We unite as equals. Our goal is the same: defeat of Hitler's armies and destruction of Hitlerism.

Our warmest and universal common aspiration is for Slavic peoples as well as for other peoples to develop in peace and in freedom within the framework of their states" (BA-MA RH 24-3/134).

The appeal in conclusion stated that the signatories were rejecting the idea of Pan-Slavism as a "reactionary" idea, opposed "to equality of peoples and national development of states," used previously by Russian czarism. Furthermore, it asked the "oppressed Slavic brothers" to take up sabotage, destruction of communication links and everything that the Hitler regime needed, and to take up partisan war. Finally it demanded:

Blood for blood! Death for death! Pitiless vengeance against the enemy for enslavement of our countries, for destroyed villages, for burned cities, for deaths and tortures in prisons and concentration camps, for tears of the women and death of the children, for all outrages against our peoples!...The peoples of the Soviet Union and the Red Army are with us, as well as all democratic peoples and all of progressive humanity (BA-MA RH 24-3/134).

The appeal was signed by Russians and by eleven persons representing the following Slavic peoples: Ukrainian, Belorussian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Montenegrin, Bulgarian, and Macedonian. It bore, too, besides the signature of a representative of Czechoslovakia and a representative of Carpatho-Ukraine.

By turning at that difficult moment to the Slavic peoples, especially to Ukrainians and to Carpatho-Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, and Montenegrins but not to Yugoslavians, Moscow, however, had in mind not their freedom and their right to an independent national state, but rather unification of vengeful efforts against Hitler's Germany.

Russia was already conscious of the importance of support from western democracies from which she was benefiting. Russian efforts were not to be in vain. As in times of czarism, for certain Slavs, and more

particularly for Czechs and Serbs, Soviet Russia would represent the only hope for freedom.

The Occupation Administration in Ukraine

On 27 September 1941 the Germans had stated the true position of their advance. The conquests were as follows (in millions of inhabitants) (BA-MA RH 24-3/136):

	total number	occupied	not occupied
Russia	101.0	9.4	91.6
Ukraine	40.0	32.0	8.0
Belorussia	10.6	10.6	0.0
Moldavia	2.7	2.7	0.0
Estonia	1.1	1.1	0.0
Latvia	2.0	2.0	0.0
Lithuania	3.0	3.0	0.0
Finland	.5	.5	0.0
(autonomous Sov. Rep. of Karelia)			
other countries	32.7	0.0	32.7
total	193.6	62.31	32.3

As the chart indicates, by the end of September 1941, Germans occupied the Baltic States, Belorussia, Moldavia, and a major part of Ukraine. At that time only 9,400,000 Russians were under German occupation. The German advance, less rapid, continued until 18 November 1942, at which time Germans occupied a territory of 1,926,000 km², inhabited by 85,000,000 people (*Sovietskaya Uk.* 3:525).

The eastern occupied territories were divided into two main zones: the military zone (subdivided into three zones—combat zone, zone

behind the fighting army, zone behind the troops) and the zone of political administration (*Das Deutsche Reich* 4:1032). When the front and the zone of operations moved forward sufficiently, the zone behind the troops was to be handed over to civilian administration.

The Reichskommissariat Ukraine, established in August 1941 with only 71,000 km², by 20 October of the same year encompassed 176,000 km² and on 15 November 235,000 km². On 1 January 1943, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine extended over 339,275 km² (BA-MA RW 41/1 Bericht no.2:1, Bericht no.2:2, BA RG/70 f.108).

The Ukrainian territory divided between the General Government (64,000 km²), the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (339,275 km², without the eastern districts of the country that remained military zone), Romania (55,000 km²), and Hungary (14,900 km²), was subject to four different administrations during the war. Two of these, Galicia and the Reichskommissariat, although subject to different regimes, had one common trait: their administration was German, set up by Germans.


Galicia, proclaimed the fifth district of the General Government, headed by a district governor, was divided into cantons (*Kreis*) which in turn were divided into communes (simple or enlarged). The canton was headed by a German *Kreishauptmann*, and in the cities by a *Stadthauptmann*. While the mayors of the communes (*Vogt*) and the cities (*Bürgermeister*) were generally Ukrainians, administration at the canton and district levels was carried out by Germans.

Within the administration, economy and police force of the General Government and in the Reichskommissariat, Ukrainians could hold positions only on low or possibly middle levels.

German administration in the General Government on the canton and district levels included offices of security police (Sipo) and SD (commonly called Gestapo). These police forces were independent of civilian administration and came directly under Himmler; their power extended over all political questions. The police force charged with public order was composed of Ukrainians and bore the name "Ukrainian auxiliary police" (BA R 6/21 f.122-124).

The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was divided into six general regions (*Generalbezirke*): Volhynia-Polodia, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Crimea, headed by general commissars designated

(Map of Eastern Europe under German Rule 1991-1944)



Eastern Europe under German rule 1941-1944

by Hitler. The administrative division and the functioning of the administration in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine will be discussed later.

In the Reichskommissariat the administration of regions and districts included also security police and SD offices independent of civilian administration and subordinate directly to Himmler. Police charged with public order, composed of Ukrainians, bore the name "Ukrainian auxiliary police in the service of the German Wehrmacht" (BA-MA RH 22/204). A German police station was located in the county seats of regions, of districts, and of cantons. Economy and production were organized, overseen and run by German heads of rural economy (*Landwirtschaftsführer* or *La-Führer*).

In Galicia as well as in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Ukrainians were forbidden all political activities. Germans did not recognize any Ukrainian political party.

To survive and to be able to bring aid to the needy and to coordinate their social and cultural life, Ukrainians tried to establish an adequate socio-cultural structure. This was possible only in the General Government where they had obtained permission to form mutual aid committees headed by the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCK) with its seat in Cracow, capital of the General Government. But UCK's authority was at first confined to Ukrainian territory and to Ukrainian communities west of the 1939 Soviet-German line of demarcation. Besides the Ukrainian Central Committee (*Ukrainischer Hauptausschuss*) created in 1940, a similar committee was set up by Poles for the Polish population (*Polnischer Hauptausschuss*) and another one for the Jewish population, set up by Jews (*Jüdische Soziale Selbsthilfe*) (Kubiyovych 85).

In Galicia, after its annexation to the General Government, Germans demanded the creation of a body similar to that already existing in Cracow to coordinate the work of local aid committees. Thus it was in compliance with demands of the Germans that Ukrainians organized in Lviv the Ukrainian Regional Committee with tasks matching those of the Cracow Ukrainian Central Committee.

At the beginning of the German-Soviet war, shortly before the arrest of Yaroslav Stetsko and stoppage of activities of the Ukrainian government, Ukrainians created in Lviv a Ukrainian national council, initially called Council of the Elders. They tried to compel recognition from

Germans as a representative socio-political body of the Ukrainian people. The Germans refused to recognize it, but they tolerated its inoffensive and sterile deliberations until February 1942. Run by former parliamentarian Kost Levytsky, under the aegis of the moral authority of its honorary president Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the Ukrainian National Council, aside from never-ending discussions, did not play any effective role.

In February 1942 the Germans put an end to the Ukrainian National Council and ordered integration of the Ukrainian Regional Committee into the Ukrainian Central Committee of Cracow, headed from its inception by professor Volodymyr Kubyovych.

In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, except in the Volhynia region, no central body of aid or coordination was authorized or tolerated. An attempt in this regard was made, however, in Kiev. OUN-M members, having arrived in Kiev, succeeded in taking charge of the city administration and setting up their own men to supervise police charged with public order. They helped organize the socio-cultural life of the capital. In November 1941 they played a role in the establishment of the Ukrainian National Council and made efforts to have it recognized by the occupation powers.

In a memorandum addressed in November to the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, the Ukrainian National Council outlined its tasks:

1. to represent Ukrainian people to German authorities in Ukrainian occupied territories; 2. to fight bolshevism, its agitation and its propaganda; 3. to act against diversion activities of Bolsheviks by organizing protection; 4. to take charge of the moral, spiritual and physical education of the young; 5.a. to build the social life in the following areas: culture, education, and information of the people; religion and church; economy; rural economy; 5.b. to take charge of public assistance and social aid; 5.c. to coordinate manpower (AA Vertr.d.AA beim R.Kom. Ukraine, Denkschrift des Ukrainischen Nationalrates in Kiev 1:4).

The memorandum expressed regret at German refusal to give Ukrainians the opportunity to fight on the side of the German army with other peoples of Europe against bolshevism, and asked permission for emigrants to return to the Reichskommissariat.

While recognizing the need for central representation, Germans refused to recognize the Ukrainian National Council, and made known from the beginning of 1942 that this committee had to cease existing; it was dissolved.

Clearly, the Ukrainian Central Committee of Cracow, mayors, burgermeisters, Ukrainian members of the civilian administration and police charged with public order in the General Government and in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine as intermediaries between the population and the occupational authorities were bound to collaborate with these authorities. However, it was an individual and personal collaboration, not a collective political collaboration ordered by a Ukrainian government or political party.

The Dnipropetrovsk Administration Affair

The battle of Kiev (the city was taken on 19 September 1941) ended on 26 September in the defeat of several Russian army corps. Germans took 665,000 prisoners of war.

Assessing the situation, the German command estimated that of the 416 Soviet divisions existing at the beginning of the war or formed subsequently, by the end of September 1941 only 230 divisions, 4,600,000 men, remained (BA-MA RH 24-3/136).

Actually, this assessment did not yet signify the defeat of Soviet Russia. According to the statements of Soviet officers taken prisoner, in particular General Zerulenkov, commander of the Fifty-first Infantry Division and division commissar Filov of the 176th Division, Russians would be able to form 300 to 400 new divisions during the winter, equipped with American materials, including tanks. Furthermore, for approximately five to eight years Russians had been developing industrial bases in the Urals and Siberia. Numerous factories had been evacuated

from Ukraine. According to statements of General Zerulenkov, the industry of the Urals and Siberia was to provide the army with necessary equipment. Deliveries of supplies had also come from the United States and Great Britain.

Zerulenkov further stated that "the Russian army had been expecting war because of very important ideological differences. It was, however, surprised by the choice of the moment of attack. If the Germans had begun the war two or three months later, the success would not have been so easily attained" (RH 24-3/136).

In the beginning of September, during the battle of Kiev, the supreme command of the German troops (OKH) considered it necessary, in an effort to gain the good will of Ukrainians, to use in propaganda the affirmation that "Ukraine will be admitted as one of the greatest states within the European family of peoples." But the OKH order specified that at the same time it was necessary to make Ukrainians understand that it was German blood that had been shed that allowed them to organize their own state life (*staatliches Eigenleben*) and that, consequently, they must agree to sacrifices the Reich's government considered politically necessary (RH 29-6/492 Feindnachrichtenblatt no.38 of 4 September 1941; RH 24-3/135 Auszug aus Feindnachrichtenblatt no.23 of 11 September 1941).

The city of Dnipropetrovsk, center of an important industrial region, was taken on 25 August 1941. A little later, an OUN-B political action group arrived in the city. On its initiative and with its help, a Ukrainian regional administration was set up. Professor Oliynychenko, an inhabitant of the city, was appointed president of this body.

Setting up of regional administration took place with the consent and approval of Colonel von Alberti, military commander of the city. Encouraged by this recognition, the administration of the Dnipropetrovsk region became an official body.

Professor Oliynychenko, clandestinely sworn in as an OUN-B member, was actively aided in his duties by his adjunct, Vasyl Reguey, another OUN-B member. The two men succeeded in making their administration autonomous. They obtained from the military commander a document in German that claimed that Ukraine was going to be admitted shortly as one of the greatest states in the family of the peoples

of Europe (evidently, the military commander took the 11 September OKH instructions literally).

Having obtained this document, leaders of the Ukrainian administration believed they had the right to use, practically from the beginning of the existence of the administration, a state seal bearing the following inscription: "Ukrainian State—Territorial Administration of Dnipropetrovsk" (BA R 58/219 f. 45-46).

But political questions fell under the jurisdiction of the SD, not of the military commander. The SD, furious, wanted to attack the Ukrainian administration; the city's military commander, however, strongly opposed this action.

The SD report stated that, having obtained authorization from Colonel von Alberti, "the territorial administration, instead of doing practical work, has begun to busy itself with politics."

Moreover, the military commander of the city was about to authorize creation of Ukrainian clubs, "a sort of political party." According to their statutes, these clubs were to spread over the entire Dnipropetrovsk region and were to engage in national and political activities. Statutes allowed for the planning and organizing conferences and meetings. The idea of the clubs came from Oliynychenko. A former teacher, Sokil, was to be the president.

While verifying the background of the leaders of the territorial administration, the SD learned that Sokil had received a pension of 250 rubles under the Soviet regime "for special revolutionary merits" and other persons were suspected by the SD of "Bolshevik activities." At the time, when denunciations of Ukrainian nationalists by true Soviet agents, often in the employ of the SD were frequent, accusations against Sokil and other members of the territorial administration raised some doubt.

One day, either in late October or early November 1941, despite strong protests by Oliynychenko (who argued that the administration and its leaders had the full confidence of the military commander), SD *Einsatzkommando 6* arrested the adjunct of the president and six heads of departments of the Ukrainian territorial administration. The SD also seized the famous state seal.

The action of the SD was severely criticized by the military commander who demanded immediate release of the arrested persons.

The dispute lasted for some time, but the commander of the *Einsatzkommando 6* did not relent. The military commander, Colonel von Alberti, not only had to give in but also had to promise that henceforth all political decisions of the *Kommandantur* would be submitted to SD approval.

Colonel von Alberti, moreover, had authorized opening Dnipropetrovsk University on 25 October. Considering this venture "premature," *Einsatzgruppe C* of the Sipo and of the SD forbade opening the university, including the medical school, except for maintenance work and certain practical work (47-48).

These events took place when the city and region of Dnipropetrovsk were part of the zone behind the troops. They were placed under the Reichskommissariat Ukraine administration on 15 November 1941.

Change in the Attitude of the Population

Following the general line of Nazi policies in Ukraine, Alfred Rosenberg, minister of the eastern occupied territories, took measures that prevented Ukrainian political parties from existing or having political powers. Ukrainians could take part in self-management only on lower and middle levels while leadership of the country had "to remain in the hands of Germans" (AA Abt. Pol. XIII Ukraine 24, report for Weizsäcker of 29 September 1941).

Germans decided not to tolerate Ukrainian aspirations for autonomy also in the General Government, thinking that Ukrainians of Galicia should turn towards Cracow and Berlin, not towards Kiev. Ukrainian political parties were not recognized (AA Abt. Pol. XIII Ukraine 24, Cracow note of 27 September 1941).

During the conference held in the Führer's general quarters on 29 September 1941, Rosenberg reported on the political situation in the eastern occupied regions and formulated several concrete proposals. Certain particular points of this report, modified by Hitler, were retained for application.

Announcing that approximately 60% of the harvest in Ukraine had not been destroyed and that it was being brought in, Rosenberg raised

the question of dissolution of kolkhozes and transfer to private ownership, but Hitler did not agree. He thought, rather, that this should be done progressively and selectively. For the moment it was necessary to preserve large enterprises to maintain the level of food production in certain areas as well as in regions destined to receive German colonists.

As far as the fate of Ukraine was concerned, the following decision was made: "According to the Führer's concept, there could be no question of an independent Ukraine for decades to come. The Führer is thinking of a German protectorate in Ukraine for at least twenty-five years" (BA R 43 II/688 f. 126-128).

But on other occasions Hitler did not conceal his intention of turning Ukraine into a permanent German colony.

After this conference, the minister of eastern territories elaborated on directives concerning the course of action with regard to the Ukrainian population. Following these directives, "the Führer retained the right to decide on the political management of the territory inhabited by the Ukrainian people." Military authorities were not to interfere. In response to the protest of Ukrainians concerning the division of Ukraine, he admitted saying that this country "has been saved thanks to German blood, and for this reason Germany is reserving the right to dispose of these territories in accordance with general political demands."

Germans had to tolerate Ukrainian participation in the administration of the country on commune and canton levels, while positions of the higher levels were held by Germans. Some Ukrainians could, however, be employed as advisors. Ukraine was to become Western Europe's granary. If the Ukrainian population cooperated docilely, it was to be treated with benevolence. The Ukrainian language was permitted, and primary schools could be opened. The press was subject to German censorship. Religious practice was permitted but places of worship should not become centers of developments of an autonomist movement. Participation of Wehrmacht members in Ukrainian national feasts was to be reduced to exceptional cases linked with the occupational regime (Appendix, Doc.#88).

Furthermore, Rosenberg ordered "securing" the cultural riches of the eastern occupied regions. This new ordinance inaugurated a pillage of cultural riches by the occupation authorities (BA R 6/170 f. 14).

Germans met serious difficulties in their relationship with the population in Western Ukraine, while in territories east of the former Soviet-Polish frontier the population continued to welcome Germans as liberators.

Upon his return from a trip to Ukraine, General Lahousen expressed fear that this attitude might change soon "following the bad treatment" of the population. Lahousen had noticed during his trip that in "certain German services persons in charge thought it was time to put an end to the sentimental heedlessness and show the Ukrainians who the master is." Lahousen noted that Germans were using violence against inhabitants who were only defending their own possessions (furniture, paintings, etc.) and that the German behavior had already taken on an aspect of looting (IfZ NOWK 3147:3-4).

Deterioration of the discipline in the German army and looting had reached such proportions that the commander-in-chief of the Seventeenth Army had to sign an order on 24 August curbing the numerous infractions and acts of violence. German soldiers demanded civilian possessions under threat of weapons, were robbing private homes while the inhabitants were working in the fields. General von Stülpnagel ordered offenders be brought before a court martial to reduce the risk of an increase in the resistance of the population.

In fact, as Lieutenant Oberländer, liaison officer of Abwehr II with the Army Group South noted in his 28 October report, the situation was deteriorating perceptibly. The attitude of the population east of the former Soviet-Polish frontier, he wrote, changed several weeks after the arrival of German troops. Who was responsible for this? The Germans themselves, answered Oberländer. Doubtless tired from the third year of war, they inflicted their bad mood on the country and the population.

Oberländer indicated that Germans were treating Ukrainians in the same way as the Jews: "We often confuse Jews and Ukrainians; the treatment reserved for Jews is often applied to Ukrainians, which leads to a great bitterness." Certainly, says Oberländer, the population must be afraid of breaking the law, "but we often treat it in a manner that it does everything out of fear of being punished, as it had done under bolshevism." The consequence of this was that work efforts were not

satisfactory and that "the population will soon hate us," stated Oberländer (BA R 6/69 f. 69 ff.).

Oberländer also drew attention to numerous errors committed by the Germans: executions of exhausted prisoners of war whose bodies were abandoned at road sides, in villages, and in towns; the unresolved question of the kolkhozes; requisitioning to the last hen; defective supplies to cities where famine had taken firm hold. People were leaving the cities for the countryside where they became anti-German propagandists or joined the partisans. Oberländer warned that if the Ukrainian population were not treated properly, it would resort to passive or active resistance.

An official of the ministry of the east, Bräutigam, also cautioned in an 11 November 1941 memorandum, that it was not by using draconian measures that Germans could eliminate passive or active resistance of the Ukrainian population and reestablish peace and order to "extract the largest quantity of food products from the country [Ukraine]" (BA R 6/69 f. 28-29).

Rosenberg's Secret Instructions to Koch

In November 1941 Nazi authorities were sure of winning the war and made definite arrangements for the future.

The essentials of the directives that henceforth were to be applied in Ukraine can be found in the 18 November 1941 secret instructions sent by Rosenberg to the Reichskommissar Koch.

The war in Eastern Europe, according to these instructions, meant "defeat of bolshevism for good." This enemy of the world was in the process of being crushed by the Führer's Wehrmacht. But it was not just a matter of defeating bolshevism, it was also necessary to find a solution to establish a new order in the east and institute new relations between the German Reich and the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Rosenberg was convinced that Russia, which had become a great power during the nineteenth century, had deprived Germany of its freedom of movement. Germany should always fear being dragged arbitrarily into a conflict on two or three fronts. Consequently, the

present war was declared to free Germany from all pressure coming from Russia. It was conducted in the interest of Germany and corresponded to justice, for the Russian *Drang nach Westen* (push toward the west) could at any moment change into a political conquest and oppression. Germany could guard against this danger only by waging war against the USSR with the intention of permanent annihilation of the Russian empire. Here was the reason for the creation of the Reichskommissariats, each with its own government. "The Reichskommissariat Ukraine will have for its task the preparation of annexation of this region to Germany" (BA R 6/69 f. 104).

The mission to be accomplished in the east was essentially to prepare this new space for Germany, to push Russia back to its ethnic territory, i.e., to turn her eastward. This struggle against Russia aimed to obtain the guarantee of living space for life not only for the German people but also for all of Europe. This ideological struggle would develop a new concept of the continent and would make Europe advance eastward.

The task of the Reichskommissar in Ukraine, according to Rosenberg's instructions, would be especially difficult. Ukrainians have a national and historical conscience, but that is no fault of the German people if one notes the poverty of Ukraine, affirmed Rosenberg. The great sacrifice of German blood, the necessity to enlarge the area of Central Europe, as well as the desire to remove the continental British blockade for good" forced Germany to undertake extensive planning that could succeed "only due to authoritarian German administration....For this reason the project prior to the war to set up Ukrainians as a political force against Moscow had to be abandoned." In the new situation the Reich did not take upon itself the assistance of foreign peoples.

Consequently, Rosenberg's instructions to Koch continued, members of the German administration in Ukraine were to refrain from giving opinions regarding the ultimate organization of this country. When asked about the future, they were to answer that it was necessary to assess the damage in Ukraine caused by bolshevism and to make people understand that this damage necessitated "a long German administration.... Only the Führer will decide the long-term regulations after having

studied the entire situation and taken the attitude of the Ukrainians themselves into account."

Ukrainian protests concerning the division of Ukrainian territory were unacceptable because war demanded enormous sacrifices and enormous privations of German people. These people were living in a narrow area and through this war (which was saving all of Europe) Germany had the right to enlarge its living space. The peoples of the east, according to Rosenberg's instructions, possessed a larger living space than the nations in Central Europe without having the capacity of improving its riches.

The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was to extend beyond Ukraine's ethnographical boundaries. Ukrainians were to be relocated to northern and eastern regions because the southern territory of Ukraine was reserved for colonization. Likewise the relocation of the Ukrainians of the General Government was not to be considered as something unprecedented.

The ideas expressed by Rosenberg were also those of the famous *Generalplan Ost* which will be discussed later.

Ukrainians, according to Rosenberg's instructions, were to accept these sacrifices, because without Germans they would all be lost, exterminated. Germany took upon itself to defend Ukraine against the attacks of Moscow, because Germany alone was capable of assuring the protection of Eastern Europe.

Rosenberg no longer supported the idea of a Ukrainian university in Kiev. On the contrary, he said in his instructions that the opening of schools of higher education in Ukraine had to be denied. It sufficed to permit the opening of primary and professional schools.

Rosenberg affirmed that Ukrainian intellectuals of western regions had erred in proclaiming the Ukrainian State; their activity was to be stopped. So that economic reconstruction could take place normally in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, apt measures were to be taken to prevent these intellectuals from penetrating there. The Reichskommissar was the only master on his territory, and no parallel Ukrainian administration was to exist. Ukrainians were to be prevented from turning to any Ukrainian authority. They were to have limited administrative

autonomy only under German supervision limited to the level of commune and cantons.

Although the German language was to be used widely in the Reichskommissariat Ostland, in Ukraine this language was not to be taught. It would be more proper to limit the Ukrainians to the use of their native language (only some exceptions would be tolerated), and while Germans who were to make up the leading class of Ukraine would learn the language of the country, the Ukrainians were not to speak the language of the administration. Rosenberg continued:

The task of the Reichskommissar for Ukraine is to see to it that Ukrainians be devoted to Germany, and disposed to work as long as possible to provide necessities for the German war economy and supplies. This task necessitates a psychologically correct treatment of peoples toward voluntary aid and maintain occupation forces and police in a limited number....[But] there is nothing that prevents exploitation of the riches of mineral resources; on the contrary, it must be increased by all possible means (BA R 6/69 f. 111).

Rosenberg's instructions also treated the question of former German colonies in Ukraine. The German Reich considered products of the German colony to be German national property. The Reichskommissariat was to take measures to develop Crimea and the region north of the Black Sea into a German colony. Germans needed the entire region for strategic reasons, "to control the route of the petroleum passage from the Caucasus to the Danube."

Moreover, "the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was to expect fresh stirrings of Russians, indeed perhaps an uprising of the Ukrainians themselves." In that case Crimea, with a vast German colony, will be "of decisive importance for the protection of German domination."

With regard to religion, Reichskommissar Koch was to prevent churches and denominations from occupying themselves with politics and issuing public declarations. The Reichskommissar was not to receive a bishop as a representative of Ukrainian people, but was to receive all

persons of trust designated by the ministry of the eastern occupied territories. Germans were not to attend Ukrainian churches.

Furthermore, Rosenberg's instructions specified, measures intended to assure good functioning of the German war economy would be taken by Reichsmarshal Göring. State farms (*sovkhozy*) were short of workers and partially destroyed. Nevertheless, under German direction they were to be turned into bases of wheat production for Germany and countries dependant on her.

Rosenberg stressed in his instructions that the tasks of the Reichskommissar in Ukraine could have important world-wide consequence. For the first time the communication from the Baltic to the Black Sea were available. The granary of Ukraine would provide Europe with protection from all blockades. If the fixed goal were attained, the pressure exerted by the Russian empire for centuries on Germany would finally be broken, and favorable conditions for a policy of great consequences concerning European space under German direction would be created (BA R 6/69 f. 103; Appendix, Doc.#104).

On the day Rosenberg signed these instructions he received in his ministry representatives of the German press. He made a long speech to them on the importance of the war against Russia, on the reasons Russian power could not be permitted to build itself up again after the defeat of bolshevism, on the Reich commissariats created in the east, on the Jewish question in Europe. As to Ukraine, Rosenberg declared that because of it Germany was going to offer economic possibilities to the peoples of all Western Europe.

"We hope that this immense space will enlist not only German forces but will be available to all irreproachable men of Denmark, Holland, Scandinavian countries and that there will be engineers, agricultural farmers who are going to come to settle [in Ukraine]." This way Rosenberg hoped to stop the exodus of people to the United States. And the "savage East" (in comparison with the savage American West) was going to become "not only Germany's granary but also the granary of all of Europe." Then no sea blockade would have any effect on Europe. "This Ukrainian space, as a Reichskommissariat that will one day have an area of one million km², presents, in fact, possibility of an

engagement of all forces and all energies never before known to German history."

Rosenberg continued by declaring that the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410, in the course of which the Teutonic Order was defeated by the Polish-Lithuanian (and Ruthenian) coalition, had just been erased by the defeat of Poland; the Peace of Westphalia ended the campaign against France, but what had happened in the east at this moment was of an even greater significance. The year 375 (year of defeat of the Goths by the Slavs in Ukraine) was wiped out. "The Reich of the Goths extended from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea," said Rosenberg, "It lasted for 200 years. And we know that the descendants of the Goths still lived in the Crimea in the sixteenth century."

Rosenberg stressed that the year 1941 was a turning point in the history of the world. He concluded by saying that these commentaries were to remain secret because of the general situation. Finally he recalled that it was natural not to describe in the press the political goals of the German Reich (BA R 6/37 f. 15-30; Appendix, Doc.#104).

He took up the same topic in his 18 December 1941 speech in Berlin's sports palace (f. 31-64).

Intensification of Pursuit of Nationalists

Arrests of the 15 and 16 September 1941 did not break the OUN-B. On the contrary, they strengthened the attitude of this movement and inaugurated a new phase of fighting with reinforced measures of conspiracy and security. Terrorist acts were committed in some places (Galicia, Volhynia). On 19 September, an officer of the security police and the SD, Michael Sendega, was shot by a Ukrainian resistance fighter. According to the SD report, Germans shot in reprisal thirty hostages (BA R 58/218 f. 231-232), but according to Ukrainian sources, more than 100 hostages were killed, among them B. Piasetsky, a member of the Ukrainian government.

At the same time, in September, leaders of the OUN-B held their first conference to examine the situation. Leadership of the movement noted that the Ukrainian population, which had expected to be freed

from Bolshevik domination and given independent political life, was not prepared for widespread fighting. Moreover, they anticipated first the elimination of Bolshevik agents from Ukrainian regions so that fighting of the Ukrainians could not be exploited as fighting for the return of Soviet power.

Leaders of the OUN-B decided to set up an underground press, to develop at the same time anti-Soviet and anti-German propaganda, to encourage the population to conceal food supplies and all sorts of goods from Germans, to prepare for armed combat against the occupant, to collect and amass weapons, to proceed with training of leaders (Lebed *UPA* 17).

Penetration of the OUN-B members into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine worried Germans and arrests continued. On 17 September the high command of the Army Group South ordered arrest and "return," i.e., the handing over to the Lviv SD, of all Bandera "agents" in Ukraine who had arrived in the east following German troops with the intention of engaging there in political propaganda (BA-MA RH 20-11/333 Fernschreiben 29335 of 18 September 1941).

A German report stated that arrests as well as other measures undertaken by German authorities, such as dissolution of Ukrainian volunteer units (allusion to the battalions Nachtigall and Roland) and local militia in Galicia, were interpreted by Ukrainian public opinion as a prelude to suppression of Ukrainian national life in general (BA-MA RH 20-11/333 Ukrainische Nationale Organisation (Bandera) of 10 October 1941).

The foreign policy office of the NSDAP maintained its pressure on various services of the German state to warn against the OUN-B. It tried to reduce the OUN-B influence on emigration. On 8 October 1941, Schickendanz sent a letter to Bräutigam, head of the bureau of general politics of the ministry of the east, to which he attached a copy of his previous correspondence with Canaris. He regretted that Canaris had not taken his warnings seriously but had continued to support an organization "whose reverse side of the coin" was beginning to be seen, and asked Bräutigam to intervene with Canaris (BA R 6/69 f. 32).

But Canaris continued to take a rather broadminded view of this Ukrainian movement although his service, the Abwehr, too, was engaged in OUN-B repression in the same way as the services of Nazi police.

In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the OUN-B influence increased each week. In the beginning of October 1941 Germans noted there was little political agitation in the country and the agitation that existed was the result of OUN-B activities. For example, in Horodyshe (Cherkasy region) former members of the SVU (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine) who had "worked" with the OUN-B were formulating demands concerning a free Ukraine. An article that appeared in a local newspaper ended with the slogan: "Long live free and independent Ukraine and its leader Bandera!" (Appendix, Doc.#97)

But Ukraine is vast. Germans estimated that OUN-B members were not numerous. For them the Ukrainian population seemed to accept and find it natural that Ukraine belong to Germany. It thus sufficed, according to them, "to suppress completely Bandera's influence and launch a skillful propaganda campaign" to persuade the population to accept the solution proposed by Germany, especially German sovereignty over Ukraine. Because, they thought, the Ukrainian population in the Reichskommissariat was "politically completely inactive and, what's more, because of the absence of a leading class, it was incapable of national independence" (BA R 58/218 f. 159-160).

In Mykolaiv sixteen OUN-B members, including three leaders, members of political action groups, were arrested in the first half of October (f.213). Toward the end of October, in a letter addressed to the Lviv Gestapo and signed by the OUN, Ukrainians championed the idea of Ukraine's independence and accused Hitler of having deceived them. The letter affirmed that the United States, England, and Russia would support the creation of an independent Ukraine and that Germany would never be able to win the war without Ukraine. The letter also asked for the release of Ukrainian political prisoners (f. 323; Appendix, Doc.#99).

In a mid-October report, the occupation authorities reached the following conclusions:

As has been noted previously, activities of the Bandera movement have obviously intensified. Adequate counter-measures have been ordered immediately. Deportation of Bandera's followers for their undesirable political activities has been undertaken. Although for the moment no specific importance is being attached to these manifestations, one cannot ignore the fact that with the growing difficulties that are already coming to light with regard to securing supplies to the population, a fertile soil for radical propaganda is being prepared (BA-MA RH 22/203 Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt.VII of 1-30 October 1941:3).

Activities of the OUN-B members in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine continued to be under close surveillance. Investigations in Mykolaiv led to new arrests and seizure of important documents concerning the structure of this secret organization, its tasks, code names used by the leaders, and underground propaganda publications. One member of Bandera's political action groups, Matsilynsky, was hanged; three other persons, Yury Voytovych, and a brother and sister by the name of Lekhitsky were shot publicly (*L'Est Européen* no.81, February 1969:20).

Other members of this organization were arrested in Kherson where four members of the political action groups were executed. Germans noted that OUN-B propaganda had an enormous impact on the population in most localities, resulting in growing discontent and a decline in work enthusiasm. After consultations with the Abwehr, it was decided to order all German police stations to put an end to these activities as soon as possible (Appendix, Doc.#101; Shankovsky *Pokhidni* 141).

It must be emphasized that the OUN-B succeeded in recruiting many members in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the overwhelming majority of its followers originated from eastern Ukraine. The example of the city of Dnipropetrovsk, which was discussed earlier, is characteristic of this.

Preparations for the Uprising

The Ukrainian province of Volhynia serves as another example of the evolution of the situation. Its inhabitants were Orthodox, for before World War I this region belonged to the Russian empire. Between the two wars it was, like Greek-Catholic Galicia, part of Poland. This wooded region made an ideal terrain for partisan activities.

Contrary to the situation in eastern regions, between the two wars this Ukrainian province was subject, in varying degrees, to the influence of different Ukrainian forces, especially the OUN, the UNR, Skoropadsky's movement, and the Communist party. In 1941, the OUN-B gave this region particular attention as witnessed in secret German reports, especially of 14 November 1941.

Meticulous observers, the Germans noted that among all political trends in this region, the OUN-B "is developing as usual the greatest activity." Members of this movement always proceeded in the same way: "they acted on their own authority when the instructions of German authority did not correspond to OUN interests"; in some cases "they resorted to conscious sabotage of German measures."

Germans were aware that the OUN-M group was pursuing the same goals in Volhynia—creation of an independent and sovereign Ukraine—but it did so, according to them, in a less "crude" manner. Furthermore, the report on the Volhynia situation continued, "because of lack of initiative" which characterized this group "its existence did not represent for a moment any acute danger."

The UNR group, led by A. Levytsky, was also active to a degree, but, according to the report, it did not find any following except by some former officers of the Ukrainian national army of 1918-1920 (led at that time by Symon Petliura) and some Orthodox clergy.

Skoropadsky was known only by some old people and in some intellectual circles. Therefore, this political movement seemed condemned to disappear. The report concluded: "In summary, it can be said then on the subject of current Ukrainian politics in Volhynia that only the OUN under the influence of Bandera presents an acute danger." Germans admitted, however, that "the Melnyk leaning could one day be

dangerous if it is neglected too much while fighting against Bandera's leanings."

The German conclusion concerning other Ukrainian political movements was very significant: "As for other parties, they could even be assisted discretely, as long as they did not have a lasting success; they represent an essential element in the division of public opinion among Ukrainians" (Appendix, Doc.#103).

The Dnipropetrovsk matter, OUN-B activities in Volhynia, arrests and, above all, seizure of important documents in Mykolaiv led occupation authorities to take radical measures against the national revolutionary movement.

In effect, Germans realized that while "upon the arrival of German troops the population, freed from the bloody terror of the Bolsheviks, was full of hope, under current conditions they registered bad feelings among the people." Communist propaganda reached only a small part of the population, but the propaganda of the Bandera movement, according to Germans, undermined the people's confidence in German administration (BA R 28/219 f. 92).

Germans saw only one alternative: strike even more at the Bandera movement, all the more since reports of agents and seized documents confirmed that this movement was preparing an armed uprising. On 25 November 1941 the *Einsatzkommando C/5* stationed in Kiev ordered all security police and SD stations in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia) to arrest and secretly execute OUN-B members without a trial. The order read:

It has been indisputably established that the Bandera movement is preparing an uprising in the Reichskommissariat [Ukraine] whose goal is the creation of an independent Ukraine. All important activists of the Bandera movement must be arrested immediately and after intensive interrogation liquidated in secret as looters.

Transcripts of the interrogations must be sent to the *Einsatzkommando C/5*.

This letter must be destroyed by the *Kommandoführer* immediately upon reading it"³ (Appendix, Doc.#106).

At the beginning of December, the SD apprehended four nationalist activists in central Ukraine (in the zone just turned over to the Reichskommissariat). They had all come from Western Ukraine. Interrogations confirmed that OUN-B was pursuing its usual efforts: attempting to set up Ukrainian militia; appointing mayors and heads of militia; removing leaders considered unacceptable; setting up men of confidence in all key positions; recruiting for the organization. Bandera's men even deposed—and this was unthinkable!—a German mayor in Josefstadt.

Investigators of the *Einsatzkommando* could only record at what point OUN-B plans "had taken on a character directed clearly against the German Reich." One of the arrested, Semen Marchuk (alias Roman Marchak, head of the Bandera organization in the region of Zhytomyr), declared that members of his movement had "received orders to search for Russian guns and ammunition in the forests and to put them in a safe place so that they would not fall into the hands of the German Wehrmacht," because soon "at the moment the OUN leadership considered right and when the necessary partisan groups will have been formed (whence the creation of a militia loyal to Bandera), they were going to attack German occupation troops."

Thus Germans learned that nationalists of Bandera's movement were actually preparing an armed uprising. As they could not count on weapons being parachuted from the outside, their only method of procuring them was to shelter supplies of arms left in the forests by the Red Army.

Marchak admitted further that the OUN-B leadership regarded the Wehrmacht the principal enemy of Ukraine. It did not believe in German victory over Soviet Russia and England, but thought rather that after having defeated Russia Germany would be weakened and unable to continue to fight. Then the Ukrainian army set up by the OUN would "be able to give the German force a *coup de grâce* and create an independent Ukrainian state." Neither Russia nor England, rendered weak and drained by the war, would have strength to prevent the

formation of this state (Appendix, Doc.##110, 115; BA R 58/219 f.253ff.).

After the interrogations, Marchak and two other members of the regional leadership of OUN-B were executed.

Bander's political action groups continued to appear after the Germans set up local administrations. For example, they arrived in Zaporozhia on 8 October (four days after the city had been taken by Germans) and tried unsuccessfully to secure key positions in the already installed administration (BA R 58/219 f. 255).

The German report of 31 December stressed that during searches and the struggle against the resistance movement, the *Einsatzgruppen* ascertained "that outside the OUN-B group, no other resistance organization existed that represented a serious danger" (Appendix, Doc.#115; BA R 70 SU/31 f. 132).

Suppression of National Life

Germans noted that in Kiev a sort of indifference had replaced the enthusiasm of the first days of occupation as the population was disappointed by German politics. The catastrophic situation of supplies was also deeply resented. Inhabitants of the capital were receiving 200 grams of bread per week. Workers who were employed received from their place of employment 600 grams of bread on a supplementary basis (Appendix, Doc.#116). The population accused Germans of deliberately provoking famine by sending food products to Germany (BA-MA RH 22/10 Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt.VII from 1-30 November 1941).

In all Ukrainian cities the population was undernourished. Germans expected during the winter a rapid increase of mortality of aged and feeble persons, children, nursing infants, and sick persons. Contagious diseases were slowly beginning to develop everywhere.

Widespread execution of prisoners of war was very much resented by the population. Mortality in the prisoner camps was very high, and everyone knew that only robust people could survive the winter.

Generally Ukrainians felt that Germans considered them an inferior race. Restrictions concerning their political and cultural life contributed

to the growth of discontent (BA R 58/219 f. 243-244). Nationalist and communist propaganda was finding more and more fertile soil.

A great number of Ukrainians were still in PW camps while the country needed workers. Some of the prisoners could not be freed, however, because of contagious diseases raging in the camps. The birth rate fell noticeably in the land (BA-MA RW 41/31 Bevölkerungspolitik in der Ukraine, Brief vom 25 November 1941).

Execution of Jewish doctors and craftsmen contributed to disorganization of social and economic life. Industry that had not been evacuated was destroyed, and there was a lack of specialists for rebuilding it again. To remedy this situation, middle level schools and schools of higher learning would have to be reopened, but Nazi leaders were opposed to the opening of these schools for racial reasons and colonial planning. The rural economy also suffered from lack of manpower, but Hitler forbade release of any more Ukrainian prisoners of war (IMT 386-USSR).

All of these factors and immense deception made the Ukrainian population turn more and more to passive resistance which is described in the 17 December 1941 German report (BA R 6/8b f.10). Some Germans began to hold Reichskommissar Koch personally responsible for the deterioration of the situation.

Nazi leadership looked upon the eastern territories as regions to be exploited economically. "We are the master of this country conquered by us," declared the head of the Seventeenth Army while speaking about Ukraine (BA-MA RH 20-17/ 44 Verhalten der deutschen Soldaten im Ostraum). It is evident that the Ukrainian independence movement hampered this policy. During a meeting at the Reich's ministry of education, the representative of the Reichsführer-SS announced that the head of the SD had proposed a decree to stop all demonstration for independence and to put Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians on the same footing. For Nazi leaders, there were no loyal Ukrainians. Those from Western Ukraine, eastern Ukraine, Bukovyna, and Carpatho-Ukraine, all desired independence, declared the Reichsführer-SS representative (Appendix, Doc.#108).

At the end of this crucial and decisive year, Nazi powers, carried away by successive military victories, failed to realize the gravity of the situation, persisting with their plans. In November 1941 they reminded

their people that no promise was to be made as to the future of Ukraine (BA R 6/69 f. 10).

One of the officials of the ministry for the east remarked *à propos* Rosenberg's instructions concerning Ukraine that if this country were to become the granary of Germany and Europe, the greatest number possible of German peasants would have to be brought in because the current policing measures would not suffice for the Ukrainian peasant to produce what was necessary. For maximum productivity the application and know-how of the German peasant would be needed (f. 124).

Many Germans did not understand Berlin policies concerning Ukraine and Ukrainians, and they demanded explanations. Otto Bräutigam, another official of the ministry for eastern occupied territories, noted in a letter to the OKH that Germans generally believed that "Ukrainians should be treated like Negroes because this region will be exploited like a colony." Bräutigam did not agree. He said that Ukrainians were Europeans and thought it would be folly to treat them like Negroes or like slaves, all the more so because these people were grateful to Germany for having freed them from the Bolshevik oppression. According to him, however, the positive feeling of these people was in danger of changing into hatred. "Liberation from bolshevism should not lead to an enslavement by Germany but to cultural expansion corresponding to the richness of the country and the capacity of the people." He was not opposed to the exploitation of the economic resources of the country during the war, but was convinced that maximum benefits of this country could be reaped only if the population were cooperative and friendly, "never through draconian measures that enslave a people" (BA-MA RH 22/171 letter of 22 November 1941, 1/3338/41).

One week later, on 29 November 1941, a meeting of the members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science was called in Kiev by representatives of the Nazi powers. One of the party representatives, Reinhardt, reminded the twenty Ukrainian scientists that by crossing the former Soviet-Polish frontier (of 1939), the Germans entered not Ukraine but Soviet territory.... "We have not conquered the holy land of the Ukrainians but an integral part of the Soviet Union. We are in this country as conquerors of a Soviet Russian territory" (BA NS 30/85 Protokoll der Sitzung vom 29 November 1941:4).

Consequently, only the Germans could dispose of this territory and return it one day, the moment chosen by Hitler, to the Ukrainian people on the condition that Ukrainians have confidence in Germany and that all sectors of economic life be put to work immediately. Moreover, the persons in charge of Ukrainian sciences were invited to calm the minds "of all the Ukrainian national movements" and to commend patience towards what was going to happen. Reinhardt concluded: "Our goal is a happy Europe with a happy people and it depends on you to help us become happy or to cause your own unhappiness" (29 November 1941:4).

Nazi leaders were confronted with difficult choices: how to make conquered people work without granting them rights and political advantages. They chose firmness and terror, but some German leaders in the east tried to tone down the instructions, especially in the zone behind the troops.

In fact, the army was pulled between two tendencies. On 20 November General von Manstein defined the role of the German soldier who was to fight implacably on the front as well as against partisans, for "the destruction of the Judeo-Bolshevik system." He was to become an avenger of Bolshevik cruelty, help disarm the people and understand that if they must furnish necessary provisions to Germany, the local population must be hungry. The soldier must also understand the "atonement" of Jews, "the spiritual carriers of Bolshevik terror" IMT 4064-PS).

The commander-in-chief of the zone behind the troops, General Friderici, issued on 14 December to the military commanders OKW orders concerning treatment of Ukrainians. The order observed that army services were treating Ukrainians unequally. Some acted on the principle that Ukraine would one day be a partner equal with Germany, others according to the idea that Ukraine was only a colony to be exploited and that Ukrainian people were to be treated as colonial people. The OKW affirmed that as far as the army services were concerned, "the precise attitude to adhere to is in the middle of two extremes."

Furthermore, the order stressed that the Führer was reserving for himself the decision concerning the political future of the territory inhabited by the Ukrainian people. The army services were not to give any explanations on any points. All that they were allowed to say was

that the future of Ukraine essentially depended on the attitude and the cooperation of its population. The population was to be treated in a friendly manner as long as it worked and did not change its attitude. Ukrainians felt themselves freed from bolshevism and had contributed voluntarily to this liberation. This positive attitude of the population must be preserved. "The freeing from an unbearable yoke must not be following by fear of a new enslavement," concluded the order (BA-MA RH 22/10 Bfh. zückw. H.Geb.Süd. Abt VII/123/41 geh.)

In the meantime, the Ukrainian rural population in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine refused to tolerate the kolkhoz system (RH 22/203 Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt.VII of 1-30 October 1941:2), but occupation authorities wanted to preserve it. Ukrainian youth were deprived of education with abolition of classes and schools above the fourth grade. No higher education was authorized (Appendix, Doc.#114). In contrast, the situation in the Reichskommissariat Ostland was totally different because all levels of education were authorized there.

In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine creation of new associations was forbidden and, according to occupation authorities, existing associations were to be supervised, then dissolved. Public meetings and demonstrations were forbidden (Appendix, Doc.#113). Germans had decided to persecute not only the independence movement but also national life. This was demonstrated after the Ukrainian commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the execution of 359 soldiers of the Ukrainian National Army by Russian Bolsheviks which took place on 21 November 1921 in Bazar, a small town in the Zhytomyr region.

With understandable national enthusiasm, Ukrainian leaders, and more particularly OUN-M activists, wanted to honor the victims of this shooting because this concerned soldiers who had refused to join the Bolsheviks and defended the idea of a free Ukraine to the very end. Organizers limited themselves strictly to the plans for the commemoration, without any subversive motives. The commemoration was a huge success: approximately 40,000 Ukrainians came to Bazar from different regions of the Reichskommissariat. The extent of the manifestation surprised the Germans and the reprisal was immediate. After preliminary inquest, the SP and the SD *Einsatzkommandos* made massive arrests among the organizers and main participants of the manifestation. From

the end of November to the beginning of December more than 720 persons were arrested. Most of these Ukrainians were then shot or hanged. Among them there were many OUN-M members (Oryshchenko, Surmach and others), as well as some OUN-B members (*Orhanisatia Uk. Nat.* 268-270; Dobrivlansky 52-53).

After this manifestation German authorities increased surveillance of Ukrainian associations and forbade all public demonstrations.

Ukrainians, especially OUN-M members, succeeded in setting up and developing a cultural life full of promise in Kiev; the daily *Ukrainske Slovo*, the association of Ukrainian journalists, the literary review *Liuvry*, and the theater served to express Ukrainian patriotism. But the Germans decided to suppress the cultural renaissance in Kiev, firing a warning shot on 13 December when the SD and SP *Einsatzkommando* arrested a group of intellectuals and persons working in the cultural arena (I. Rohach, P. Oliynyk and others). After the inquest, most were set free for a time (*Orhanisatia* 29-54, 273; Dobrivlansky 52-54). Others, notably contributors to the daily *Ukrainske Slovo*, were shot, and the Germans took over the newspaper, changing the name to *Nove Ukrainske Slovo* (New Ukrainian Word) and entrusting the editorship to a man devoted to their cause.

In the General Government, the material situation of Ukrainians was better than in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, but politically, the future there also looked dim. On 16 December 1941 Governor General Frank declared that Ukrainians should not think that Germans were going to recognize a kind of Ukrainian state "inside the Great German Reich" because Galicia was considered an integral part of the Reich. The solution to the Ukrainian question, according to him, must be reached in the same manner as that for the Poles: "they must be at our disposal as manpower," while the territory of the General Government will be subjected to Germanization and German penetration (Appendix, Doc.#111).

Chapter V

INSURRECTION

From September 1941 on Soviet officers who had been taken prisoner reported that Moscow was going to form 300 to 400 new divisions in the winter to be equipped largely with American materials. Russia evidently attached great significance to aid from the United States and Great Britain.

In attacking the Soviet Union, Hitler had created a strange situation. One of the harshest dictators in the history of humanity, enemy of freedom and capitalism, was forced to look for support from democratic and capitalistic countries, and vice versa.

On 22 June 1941, the day Soviet Union was attacked, Winston Churchill declared over the radio that although he personally was retaining anti-communistic convictions, his government had to come to Russia's aid: "We grant Russia and the Russian people all possible aid because the danger that threatens Russia is the same that threatens us and the United States" (*The Times*, 26 June 1941). Not yet involved in the war, the United States shared this opinion, and the undersecretary of state, S. Welles, made a similar declaration on 23 June. On 24 June, Roosevelt declared that the United States was going to give Russia all possible aid and announced that he had just released Russian assets that had been frozen in American banks as guarantee of reimbursement of the \$635,000,000 debt Russia had refused to recognize after the Bolshevik revolution. The Soviet government could thus submit its first request for these funds (Dunajewski 24).

Western Powers, Polish Government in Exile, and Ukrainian Territories

The Ukrainians were experiencing the horrors of the occupation; their government was brought down, and they began to pay a heavy tribute in the fight against Nazism for national liberty and independence. Meanwhile, the Polish government in exile in London and the Soviet Russian government were engaged in a diplomatic battle for the possession of the western territories of Ukraine (and Belorussia).

At the beginning of the German-Soviet war, the United States and Great Britain had no precise idea what the political future of Eastern Europe would be; they were not even sure if it would be necessary to return to the *status quo* prior to 1939. On 23 June 1941, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, head of the Polish government in exile demanded over the radio the return of frontiers prior to that date, or more exactly, frontiers, according to him, set by the 18 March 1921 Treaty of Riga that were recognized by the Council of Ambassadors on 15 March 1923. Thus the free Polish government asked for the reinstatement of the division of Ukraine between Russia and Poland.

Several days later, on 4 July, Great Britain's minister of foreign affairs, Anthony Eden, informed the head of the Polish government in exile that Moscow had agreed to open negotiations with the Poles and to form Polish units on Polish soil composed of prisoners of war who were in Soviet camps. The negotiations began on 5 July and ended in the signing of the 30 July Polish-Soviet agreement. The first clause of this agreement stated that the USSR government considered the 1939 Soviet-German agreement null and void. The Polish government, in turn, agreed not to participate in any alliance directed against the USSR. Diplomatic relations between the two governments were established. The two governments promised each other mutual aid in the war against Germany. A Polish army would be organized on Soviet territory (it was assumed that there were several hundred thousand Polish prisoners of war and deportees in Russia and Siberia).

As the communiqué published after the signing of the agreement implied that the frontier question remained in abeyance, the United States government made clear that it considered this agreement as one that adhered to the policy of non-recognition of territorial annexation.

In an exchange of letters with the Polish government, the British government also maintained that it did not recognize the territorial changes that had taken place in Poland in September 1939. But so as to not offend the Russians, the British government publicly declared that the exchange of memoranda between it and the Polish government carried no guarantee as far as the eastern frontier of Poland was concerned. From this time on a trend of opinion developed in Great Britain and in the USA not to make the Russians "feel ill at ease."

On 12 July 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement of mutual assistance in the war against Germany was signed in Moscow. The Kremlin decided to profit fully from the good disposition of the western powers. In a letter to Churchill dated 18 July, Stalin wrote that the situation of the Soviet Union and Great Britain would improve if the western powers would open a second front against Hitler in the west (in northern France) and a third in the north (Arctic)¹ (Déborine 166-167).

Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's envoy to Moscow, sent a telegraph on 30 July advising Roosevelt to support the Russians. The following day Roosevelt announced that he had just given orders for immediate delivery of 200 P-40 planes to the Soviet Union. England promised to deliver 440 fighter planes. In the beginning of August, through an exchange of memoranda between the Soviet ambassadors in Washington and the secretary of state S. Welles, the Soviet-American commerce agreement was extended to 6 August 1942. The American memorandum accounted for the United States' decision thus: "the strengthening of the Soviet military resistance to the aggressor, who was putting the security and independence not only of the Soviet Union but also of all other nations in peril, was in the interest of defense of the United States" (Dunajewski 26).

On 14 August 1941 Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter which defined the war goals of the anti-Hitler alliance. The Charter proclaimed that the signatory countries "are not looking for any territorial expansion," "do not wish to see any territorial changes that are not agreed upon freely by the affected peoples," "respect the right for each nation to choose the form of government under which they are to live," "after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see peace established that will permit all nations to live in security within

their own frontiers and will guarantee to all men of all countries an existence free of fear and need" (Gascuel 55-56).

The right of all people to dispose of themselves freely was, however, not clearly defined. The Charter seemed to be destined to guarantee benefits only to existing states and was perfectly acceptable to Russia.

On 24 September the Soviet Union joined the Charter. But Moscow appended a reservation concerning the effective application of clauses of the Charter which, according to Moscow, were to take into account "conditions, needs, and historical particularities of respective nations." Russia, profiting from the leniency of the western powers, retained the right to interpret the Charter as it liked.

The Polish government in London also joined the Atlantic Charter.

In a 3 September 1941 letter to Churchill, Stalin declared that the loss of iron and steel and aeronautical industries of Ukraine had placed the Soviet Union "in mortal danger." He again asked for the creation of a second front either in the Balkans or France and the acceleration of military material deliveries. "Without these two forms of aid the Soviet Union will meet defeat or will be weakened to the point that it will be incapable for a long time to come to the aid of its allies on the battle front against Hitlerism," stressed Stalin (*Correspondence* 1:19; 2:12).

But the United States and Great Britain were unable to satisfy Russia's demands. A landing in Africa was planned for 1942 and in France only in 1943, although the western allies could furnish aid in armaments and equipment. At first this aid was limited, but in the beginning as well as later it was vital for Russia (Dunajewski 24).

The problem of military aid was the subject of discussion during the conference of the three in Moscow (29 September—1 October 1941). On 2 November the American government informed Moscow that it would loan 1 billion dollars to finance the Soviet purchases. On 7 November Roosevelt extended the application of the Lend-Lease Act to the Soviet Union.

After the 7 December Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the United States declared war on Germany (11 December 1941).

The Polish-Russian bargaining continued during General W. Sikorski's visit to Moscow in early December 1941. In accordance with the 14 August agreement, units of the Polish army had already been

organized in Siberia. With Moscow's agreement they were to be moved to Iran. Because General Sikorski had refused to discuss the question of the Polish eastern frontier with the Russians, Moscow decided to discuss it first with the British government. The Russians proposed to Anthony Eden, who had arrived in Moscow on 16 December, a two-part plan of agreement: one concerning mutual assistance in the military area during and after the war, the other related to the settlement of the political questions after the war.

At the moment when some observers thought the Soviet regime was going to collapse, Moscow was quietly formulating concrete propositions for the political future of Europe in the second part of the agreement. Stalin proposed the restoration of independence for all countries annexed and occupied by Hitler's Germany, the separation of the Rhineland from Prussia, the transfer of East Prussia to Poland, and Great Britain's recognition of the 1941 Soviet frontiers from Karelia to Bessarabia, i.e., the recognition of the territorial acquisitions obtained by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Moreover, Stalin asked for military bases in Finland and in Poland. Poland would be extended westward at the expense of Germany (Maiski 207-208, 241; Eden 290). But after consultations with his government Anthony Eden declared that for the moment he could not recognize the proposed frontiers.

A declaration of principles of nations at war with the Axis powers entitled *Declaration of the United Nations*, was signed on 1 January 1942 at the White House by representatives of twenty-six states, among them the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia. The declaration was similar to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. "Convinced that a complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence, and religious freedom as well as to preserve human rights and justice in their own countries as well as in other nations, and realizing that they are actually engaged in a common fight against savage and brutal forces that are trying to subjugate the world," the signatory governments promised to use all their military and economic resources against the Axis powers, and not to sign a separate armistice or peace (Gascuel 58). The chief effort was to be carried out against Germany.

On 6 January 1942 the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs sent a memorandum to diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow in which, among other things, Moscow protested against atrocities committed by the Germans in Ukrainian cities, especially in Lviv. The Polish ambassador in Moscow immediately reacted with a memorandum declaring that this must be a misunderstanding because, from the historical point of view and international rights, as well as by reason of its ethnic composition, Lviv was a Polish city (*Documents on Polish-Soviet* 1:260-266). But Molotov rejected the Polish ambassador's memorandum, just as all other Polish memoranda containing claims on Lviv had been rejected. The Russians, in turn, raised energetic protests against certain declarations of the Polish government in London relative to the eastern frontiers of Poland. Upon returning to London from his trip to Moscow and the Middle East, General Sikorski declared on 12 January that Poland recognized in the east only those frontiers that had been established by the Treaty of Riga, while in the west Poland was going to recover from Germany "the former Slavic lands."

Sikorski had private discussions with Churchill on 31 January 1942. The head of the British government told the head of the Polish government in exile that "as long as we do not have the victory, problems of European frontiers will not be discussed in any form whatsoever." But he also said that communism did not frighten Great Britain. If Europe were opting for this regime, London would not oppose this (*Documents on Polish-Soviet* 1:274-276; Irving 22).

A little later Churchill went even further. On 7 March 1942 he proposed to Roosevelt not to interpret the Atlantic Charter's principles in such a way as to challenge Russia's western frontiers as they were at the time of the German attack (Irving 22). On 9 March he telegraphed Stalin: "I have sent a message to President Roosevelt, urging him to approve the signing of agreement concluded with you concerning the USSR frontiers after the war" (23). However, under pressure from the Poles (who were very numerous in the United States), Roosevelt refused to approve Churchill's eagerness. This attitude of the president of the United States disappointed Churchill and, especially, Eden (who thought they should not risk Stalin's displeasure, because this could make him turn to Hitler and open talks for a separate peace).

This was also the argument of the pro-Russian pressure groups in Great Britain and the United States. Unable to open a second front on the continent or increase armament deliveries to the USSR, Great Britain thought it had to mollify Moscow and encouraged Russia in the resistance by granting Russia a compensation in the form of recognizing the 1940 western Soviet frontiers (*Documents on Polish-Soviet* 1:269-276, 336, 593-596).

During the 11 March 1942 talks, Sikorski warned the British government against the expansionist territorial demands of the Russians. Churchill responded that his opinion of Russia did not differ from Sikorski's but that Russia was fighting Germany successfully; "she had annihilated millions of German soldiers.... But at this time victory was less important than the life or death of the allied nations. If Russia reaches an entente with the Reich we are lost. Such an agreement must be prevented. If the Soviets win they will decide their frontiers without consulting Great Britain; if they are defeated, the treaty we are going to sign will be of no importance." This argument did not convince Sikorski who threatened to reveal to world opinion "the true face of Russia and her brutal imperialism" (1:295-299).

Thus the British government decided to recognize the western frontiers of the USSR with the exception of the Polish-Soviet frontier. London communicated its decision to the Soviet government in mid-April 1942.

Washington, meanwhile, worked out an operation plan against Germany. More than one million men were to be moved to England (*Operation Bolero*) to set up a beachhead (*Sledgehammer*) in Normandy by autumn 1942 to relieve the eastern front and to proceed with a large landing (*Round up*) in Europe in 1943. The English accepted the plan but held in reserve a plan for a landing in northern Africa (*Duroselle Histoire* 364).

In the beginning of May 1942, Maiski submitted to the British government counter proposals to the agreement stipulating that the Polish-Soviet frontier question be left exclusively to the USSR and Poland. In London negotiations continued between the English and Molotov who had arrived in the British capital on 20 May. The American government, opposed to the signing of the Soviet-British

agreement that included clauses related to territorial questions, announced that it was going to publish a declaration on this subject that would result in "a grave split within the United Nations." Moscow immediately reversed itself.

The treaty of the Anglo-Soviet alliance that was to last twenty years, signed on 26 May 1942, did not contain any clauses concerning frontiers and hardly distinguished itself from the 12 July 1941 agreement. The two governments agreed not to enter into negotiations with Hitler's government or with any other German government that did not renounce aggression; to act together after the war to avoid new German aggression; to collaborate politically and economically after the war; not to participate in any coalition directed against one of the two parties (Maiski 244-247; Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1:536-545; Duroselle *Histoire* 365).

On 5 August 1942 Roosevelt received the Polish ambassador Jan Ciechanowski in Washington. Their conversation centered on the Ukrainian and Belorussian western territories that the Polish government was claiming. On the question of the Polish army, Roosevelt agreed to have the entire army that was in the Soviet Union moved (Ciechanowski 112).

In February 1942, this Polish army commanded by General Anders numbered 75,000 men. It was moved to Iran in March (31,000 men) and August 1942 (44,000 men). There were many Ukrainians from Western Ukraine (Polish before 1939) in this Polish army. It was engaged in the Near East, in northern Africa, and in Italy.

Because of the insistence of the Poles in exile, the government of the United States temporarily prevented Great Britain's recognition of the annexation by Russia of Ukraine's and Belorussia's western regions. The Polish government in exile, however, defended the principle of Polish sovereignty over parts of Ukrainian and Belorussian territories.

More significantly, the American and English governments did not seem to be informed or were disinterested in the feelings of the populations of these regions. Neither the Polish government, nor Moscow, nor the western powers, no more than Berlin, thought to take into account the Ukrainian aspirations for independence and to respect them.

Interrogations of European Public Opinion

Part of European public opinion began to question the German political motives in the east and their consequences. Questions were raised because many people did not understand. In fact, no one knew exactly the Nazis' secret plans.

The newspaper *Helgendagsbladet* of 1 January 1942 printed:

A giant like Russia cannot be defeated quickly by exclusive use of military means. A well-balanced cooperation between military weapons and political weapons is necessary here, and one can only wonder that a country that gave birth to one of the founders of "political strategy," General Clausewitz, who used these political weapons during previous operations in the west and in Central Europe, has not taken advantage of any of the possibilities that offer themselves to him in this region.

The newspaper stated that Germany has done nothing more than conquer a territory militarily. Nothing or almost nothing was done to profit from the real weakness of the "interior Russian front." Of course, it stated, this interior front could not be a sort of "fifth column" in a country where everything unfamiliar was always closely watched and where the powers had deported approximately half a million Germans from the Volga region to Siberia shortly after the beginning of the war.² Yet a part of the population was not favorably disposed to the communist regime; especially the peasant wanted to free himself from the collectivist restraints. A de-collectivization, the newspaper thought, would be welcomed. But the Germans had done nothing along those lines. Although they had done away with the term "kolkhoz," they have retained the collective system that brought obligatory deliveries of products to the state.

The newspaper continued that two options were available to Germany: "the construction of a new national and anti-Bolshevik Russia and a German-Russian friendship in conformity with the political tradition of Bismarck," or a policy of "the liberation of minorities oppressed by Russia," i.e., the division of the Great Russian empire into small states

and support by every means possible of separatist aspirations that exist among the Ukrainians, Caucasians and other "peoples at the periphery" of this empire in which the Russians (Great Russians) make up "the greatest minority," approximately 80,000,000 out of 200,000,000. The many events, remarked the newspaper, that occurred in 1937 and in the course of which the chief accusation borne against Ukrainian, Caucasian and other communist leaders was separatism, showed that this leaning was very real.

But, the newspaper added, it seemed that Germany, too confident in the rapid results attained by its military power, chose not to use political weapons. Because of this, according to the newspaper, the Soviet peasant had no interest in preferring the German administration to the Russian. The creation of the Reichskommissariat Ostland has reduced the Baltic States' hopes for independence to nothing. In Ukraine no less than two partitions of the nation had taken place since the beginning of the occupation: one part of the territories was attached to the General Government, the other to Rumania where the Romanians forbade the use of the Ukrainian language in schools and in administration.

The newspaper suggested that this policy had promoted the stabilization of the "Russian interior front." While Russian patriotism had taken the upper hand over the discontentment of the population from the beginning of the war, now even other elements of the population, especially those who were hoping for de-collectivization or dreamt of national liberation with German help had gone over to the Bolshevik regime. According to *Helgendagsbladet*, "Stalin, [prior] to that time head of a numerically insignificant party, has become today a national hero in the strict sense of the word and Germany finds itself now facing a united front of a people 200,000,000 men strong." The newspaper saw in this the reason why the German offensive was marking time and the Wehrmacht troops even retreated in places to occupy their "winter quarters" (AA Abt Pol.XIII, All.Akten 17).

Strengthening of Soviet Resistance

Nazi leaders were hoping for a quick advance of the German troops and the rapid fall of the Soviet regime. In a document prepared on 15 July 1941, the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) foresaw a progressive return of the troops with repatriation to end before winter. This plan was based on the supposition that the bulk of the Russian armed forces would be destroyed west of the Crimea-Moscow-Leningrad line. The Russian units to the east of this line were to be pursued and destroyed by motorized units and the sixty-six divisions were to remain in place and make up the occupation force "of Russian space" (BA-MA, KTB/OKW 1:1022-1025).

But the Soviet Russian army continued to resist. Odessa was taken by the Romanian troops as late as 16 October. Then before a threat of direct attack against Moscow, Stalin proclaimed the state of siege and evacuated the central institutions of the state and of the party from Moscow to Kuibyshev, 850 km south-east of the Russian capital. In early December 1941, the German offensive against Moscow was stopped only twenty kilometers from the limits of the city and only thirty kilometers from the Kremlin. The Germans no longer had any strength to advance.

The tightening of the resistance of the Soviet Russian army was due not only to the political faults and the cruelty of the Nazis but also to other factors.

Popular opinion holds that the Bolshevik regime, believing itself in mortal danger, appealed in 1941 to Russian patriotism. This was not exactly true. Russian patriotism had diminished but never disappeared in Soviet Russia. They had only toned it down during the period of transformation from the Russian czarist to the Soviet empire, i.e., during the period in which Moscow recognized the peoples' right to dispose of themselves freely while doing everything to keep them within the boundaries of the empire. This is the reason for the official struggle in the name of Marxism-Leninism against the "Great Russian chauvinism."

As early as 1927-1928 the traditional Russian patriotism had begun slowly to take supremacy over the Marxist-Leninist ideology without renouncing it, but it lacked the catalytic element that constitutes appropriate teaching of history. In Russia and in other countries of the

Soviet Union the historical concept of the Russian historian M. Pokrovski, an eminent leader of the party, was dominant. Pokrovski thought that the foundation of the czarist power had been colonialism. The czarist Russian empire, built on a series of colonial conquests, had been a "prison of the peoples."

M. Pokrovski died in April 1932. A short time later Stalin, by submitting his concepts to an open criticism, started a rehabilitation process of traditional Russian history, including the Russian colonial conquests. The Russian leaders wanted to redefine past relationships among the various peoples of the Soviet Union and justify their common life in a Russian state before the adoption of the new constitution in 1936. Stalin did not act capriciously but because the Russian nationalist tendency had become predominant among the leaders of the Kremlin. This tendency was, of course, Marxist: the Russian people had become through the will of the Communist party leading people, the first, the guarantee of socialism and the unity of the Soviet state. They did not have to renounce the historic past of these great people but were supposed to be proud of their past. Russian history before this period had been a history of social oppression, of revolutionary movements, of revolts, of Stienka Razin, of Pugachev, but from 1936 on, rewritten history glorified princes and tsars who made Russia, constructed the empire: Alexander Nevsky, Minin, Pozharsky, Donskoi, Peter the Great, the czarist generals Suvorov, Kutuzov, etc.

The Russian rehabilitated past had to penetrate the popular conscience in Russia as well as in other republics of the Soviet Union. That was a Russification of the minds through the teaching of Russian history and culture. In 1937, the film *Peter the Great* (director V. Petrov) was released. The following year, the film *Alexander Nevsky* (by S.M. Eisenstein) appeared like a page of patriotic history, the era of Christian princes. Like Peter the Great, Nevsky, savior of Russia, was presented as the champion of social progress. In 1937 the 125th anniversary of the defeat of Napoleon's troops at Borodino was celebrated and on this occasion the Russians glorified the great leaders of war Suvorov and Kutuzov. Ironically, all this took place at the same time as the implacable fight against the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Georgian, etc. nationalism, at the moment when Moscow was beating pitilessly all those

who were suspected of wishing to set Ukraine or Georgia free from the Soviet Union. Stalin wrote in 1937 that the annexation of Ukraine, as later the annexation of Georgia, by Russia was "the least evil" (Krupnytsky 33-35; d'Encausse 77-85).

The Soviet army was educated in the Russian national spirit. The army publication *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) of 14 December 1938 published a long article on the liberation of Russia from Napoleon's troops. The commissariat of the people of defense immediately published this text in a brochure to be distributed by the propagandists of the army (cf. AA Abt. Pol.XIII, 13). In the summer 1939 they commemorated with splendor the 230th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, i.e., the defeat of Charles XII and Mazepa. Thus came a new Russian patriotism with the addition of the term "Soviet" to be acceptable to the other peoples of the empire. This "Soviet" patriotism was founded entirely on the Russian historical past and on the unity of the peoples in a state dominated by Russia where the past of these peoples tended to merge with the past of the Russian people.

Understandably, in 1941, despite the aversion of some classes of the Russian population to communism, Russia's national patriotism to which the powers made an appeal effectively played a significant role and contributed to the tightening of the resistance. The Russian press insisted especially on the anti-Russian leaning of the war in the east. *Pravda* of 21 December 1941, for example, after having accused the Germans of ridiculing the "monuments of the culture of the Russian people" in Yasnaya Poliana, Klyn, and Novgorod, wrote: "One simply cannot speak of the ignorance of these blackguards. This deals with an intentional policy of destruction of the Russian culture. This deals with the hate of German looters toward the Russian people, toward the Russian intellectuals....Our soldier sees in each fascist, in each soldier of the German fascist army, in each officer and each general of Hitler's band the destroyer of our cultural treasures. Death to those who profane our culture! Destroy the fascist serpents without pity!"

Among the elements contributing to the strengthening of Russian resistance, reinforcement of discipline in the army and the creation of special police units called checkpoint, that operated behind the front

lines and had the task of preventing all retreat or desertion, deserves mention. The soldier of the Red Army had to fight to the death.

Finally, the important action of the Russian Orthodox Church must be noted. The day of the German attack against the Soviet Union, 22 June 1941, when Stalin, according to Khrushchev, refused to admit that Russia was at war and that some leaders of the Kremlin thought that all was lost, the Metropolitan of Moscow, Serge³ who had not been heard of since his nomination in December 1927, addressed the faithful of the Russian Orthodox Church in a pastoral letter with astonishing political vigor.

After having evoked past invasions of the Teutons, the Tatars, Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, Metropolitan Serge called on the Russian people to defend their country: "The motherland will be defended with weapons in hand through the heroic efforts of the people and their general readiness to come to her aid in a moment of ordeal....Let us think of the great saints of the Russian people, Alexander Nevsky and Dimitri Donskoi who gave their lives for their motherland!" (Kischkowsky 75)

Four days later, Metropolitan Serge celebrated a solemn Mass in the Cathedral of Epiphany in Moscow for victory of the "Russian warriors"; called the faithful publicly to take part in the fight: "Our motherland is in danger and she calls to us: close ranks to defend the soil of the motherland, her historical sanctuaries, her freedom!" (77)

On 22 September 1941, in another pastoral letter, Metropolitan Serge went still further by declaring: "Every Russian who is not ready to betray the desires and the goals of its nation and the nation itself will not be able to join the enemies of the Soviets because the Soviets are at the head of our national Russian state and because they are fighting for its importance in the world and its international position..." (Teodorovych 50).

The 11 November 1941 pastoral letter of the Metropolitan of Moscow proclaimed: "Now [Russian] patriotism rises up against the enemy like a menacing wave. The hour is near when it will erase the brown dirt from the surface of the earth. Each Russian, all those who cherish the motherland, have only one goal: to defeat the enemy at all cost. The hand of a true patriot will not quiver during the extermination

of the fascist invaders. The heart of the Christian is closed to the ferocious fascist beasts; it feels only destructive and mortal hate for the enemy" (78, 50).

It is difficult to determine at what point the Russian Orthodox Church contributed to the strengthening of the resistance of the Russians. Some Masses were attended by as many as 12,000 persons and the role of the Russian Orthodox Church was significant. The Russian communist powers considered it advisable from September 1941 on to suppress all anti-religious periodicals, totally stop anti-religious fighting, and dissolve the League of the Godless. The Bolshevik state progressively engaged in a process "toward a recognition of the church's place in the Russian nation" (d'Encausse 139).

The Germans were in the habit of asking officers of the Red Army taken prisoner the following question: "Why do the Red Army and the Russian people continue to resist despite their enormous losses?" Lieutenant N.T. Vroniuk, captured in December 1941, gave three reasons:

1. The widespread notion concerning the poor treatment of prisoners of war and the civilian population in the occupied regions;
2. Aid provided by England and America (bloc of the three largest states); and
3. Iron discipline in the Red Army in the process of becoming even stricter (AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 17).

The same question was put to General M.F. Lukin, commander of the Nineteenth Army, also taken prisoner in December in the Moscow sector. Lukin listed similar reasons. He, moreover, explained that Russian peasants and workers did not favor bolshevism because they had endured misery and terror. They would gladly welcome their liberation from the Bolshevik yoke. But General Lukin did not believe in the possibility of an uprising or an armed opposition because of the existing terror. The Germans, he said, should not count on any support whatsoever from the Russian people. He added: "You speak of the liberation of the peoples. But we have not heard anything *à propos* the

freedom of Ukraine or Belorussia. That means that Russia, too, will see neither freedom nor independence."

General Lukin thought it necessary to create a Russian counter-government and assure the Russians that there would be a Russian state. "This new Russia need not be the same as the former one, and we think that it can exist without Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic States, but there should be one Russia, especially a Russia that could work together with Germany. The realization of this is in your hands not in ours" (BA R 6/77 f. 18-26).

Project to Create National Representations

While never having mentioned that he had read any memoranda from the OUN, Hitler did speak of having read a memorandum he received in September 1941 in which persons calling themselves Ukrainians asked him not to detach Ukraine from Russia (BA R 6/4 f.4). Some of the German military leaders and politicians were openly pro-Russian and would have preferred that Germany proclaim a struggle for a national Russia allied with Germany.

An unsigned German memorandum on the Russian question affirmed that "we [Germans] are waging war not only to fight England and America but also to create the foundation of a united Europe under the leadership of Germany" (BA R 58/13 f. 2). The continental European system, according to the memorandum, in collaboration with Japanese in Eastern Asia, would get the upper hand over Great Britain and the United States, and win the war.

Thus it was necessary, according to the memorandum, to unify Europe. In the east, it was a matter of winning the war in Russia and using this country to realize the goals of Germany. But its occupation necessitated an army of 2,000,000 men. Consequently, it was better to create a Russian national government allied with Germany and implement a policy relying on Russia herself, i.e., on the Russian ("Great-Russian") people. The memorandum particularly stressed that it was not necessary to rely on "national minorities." "It would be a mistake to fight

against bolshevism by basing oneself mainly on the Ukrainian opposition to Russia."

The author of the memorandum proposed the establishment of Europe's frontier on the Dnipro R. The Russian federation would extend east of this river; it would also encompass "Russian Ukraine" (always east of the river) and northern Caucasus. The Russian federal government would take orders from the Russian national socialist movement⁴ (BA R 58/13 f. 2-9; BA-MA RW 4/v.330 f. 133-134).

The staff of the troops of the arrears zone of the sector Center (between Kursk and Moscow) formulated on 1 March 1942 proposals concerning propaganda directed to the Russian population and the fight against the Soviet partisans. This document noted that "propaganda used to the present that promised the Russians only the defeat of bolshevism did not suffice, because this ignored the fact that the part of the Russian population that should be addressed in the first place had no palate for ideological struggles" (BA-MA RH 22/230 f. 134). The Russian population not attracted by the prospect of the defeat of bolshevism should be given concrete propositions; it was, therefore, necessary to speak to them of "the creation of a free national Russia," even if this Russia was to be created on a model proposed by Germany and placed under its dependency. But the Russian population would have a Russian national government "for peace and freedom." The western frontiers of Russia would be determined by taking into account German interests of colonization. The document continued:

The Russian national consciousness has always been particularly deep and this consciousness has been retained by the Bolsheviks. A Russian cannot put up with a Russia that has become a German colony; he prefers rather to submit to the Bolsheviks. One will be able to find some leading personalities among the intelligentsia of the occupied territories and among the officers taken prisoner (BA-MA RH 22/230 f. 134-137).

Further, instead of preserving the kolkhozes, the land should be divided among the Russian peasants, because even the partisans had already done this "in the name of Stalin" in regions that they control.

The religious needs of the populations should also be considered. According to officers taken prisoner and German expert opinion, "the population, indeed an important part of the Red Army, could be won over to the fight against bolshevism if the three preliminary conditions were put in practice." The memorandum concluded that to realize this policy, Russians, the mistrusting population, should be recruited. These Russians would work under the supervision of the Germans (BA-MA RH 22/230 f. 134-137).

In February 1942 the Reich's ministry for the eastern occupied territories developed a project to create national representation known as "National Union for the Liberation of the Motherland" for Russia with its seat to be in Orel, Smolensk or Briansk; a national representation for the Baltic regions (with jurisdiction limited to advise German administration); another for Belorussia; another for Ukraine; one for the Cossacks; one for the people of the Caucasus.

The duties of the Russian committee would consist of pacifying the regions (thus aiding in the struggle against Soviet partisans), ensuring deliveries to the Reich, de-collectivizing, organizing schools and cultural life, etc. (BA R 6/35 f. 161-167). The project cited as an example of such activity the Russian district of Lokot where an autonomous administration of auto-gestation was created with the consent of the German army in January 1942 (BA-MA RW/4 v.330 f. 135-137; BA R 6/18 f. 158-165).

In Smolensk a Russian committee of liberation was established. It was supported by officers of the general quarters of the Wehrmacht (Strik-Strikfeld 35-36). But the project of Rosenberg's ministry, the propositions for the Russian committee for liberation, and similar ideas expressed by different authors were not taken into consideration by the leaders of Nazi Germany. Suggestions of some Ukrainian personages as to policy regarding Ukraine were no longer considered.

While during the winter of 1942 Ukrainian national forces were preparing themselves for a partisan war against the occupant, German leaders compiled in March-April reports on the situation in Ukraine. These reports took into account the feelings of the moderate circles and of all those who had hoped that Germany was going to support Ukrainian aspirations for independence.

One of these reports on the situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine noted that the Germans had been misled by Russian émigrés who had convinced them that the USSR was Russia and that it was inhabited by a single Russian people. The Germans thought that the Russian people were going to rise up against the Soviet regime and help the German troops fight bolshevism and gain victory over England. As compensation for this help, however, the Germans "were not to permit the existence of an independent Ukrainian state" (BA-MA RW 4/v.330 f. 211).

The report continued: "But the first months of the war revealed that [in the USSR] there is not one single people, one Russian nation, and that there was no difference between Bolsheviks and Russians; these two notions had become identical. This was noted even by Russian émigrés themselves in an article, entitled *Na perelomie* (Between two epochs) that appeared in the Berlin newspaper *Novoye Slovo* on 24 August 1941."

The report criticized the plan that guaranteed the future of the German people for 1,000 years through the colonization of Ukraine that was to be then annexed directly to Germany "while the Ukrainians with other Slavs would be pushed behind the Urals" as soon as there would be enough Germans to fill the occupied space. The report considered such a plan a capital error. Ukrainians are not Negroes "but an old European people as the Germans" and they have known in their history eras of cultural blossoming comparable to that of the German people. It was not in the interest of Europe, continued the report, to humiliate the Ukrainian nation, this nation that was aspiring to statehood, and to reduce it to a mass of robots. The Ukrainians cautioned that such a policy only prepared the tomb of Germany, as had already happened in the past in Ukraine. Those in Ukraine joined the émigrés in declaring that "the German methods of domination applied at present in Ukraine are only a worsened form of the Bolshevik methods and have the same goal."

The Ukrainians, according to the report, no longer understood the Germans. They were wondering how the Germans could consider methods of oppression applied by non-Germans as the worst abuse and describe the same methods when practiced by Germans as "European culture." And the report stated: "Only a free people have a worthy goal

and an enthusiasm for work, and can raise from their soil the greatest productivity; this can never be so of a chained, enslaved people..." (BA-MA RW 4/v.330 f. 211-220).

As to the agrarian law, the report considered it a mistake to keep the kolkhozes under a different name. In Soviet times the kolkhoze worker got for his workday a little wheat. According to German agrarian law he had to receive four rubles, i.e., 0.40 Mark, but he could not buy anything with this money.

The cities of Ukraine experienced famine for want of supplies. "On all levels of the population one hears the same question: where is our liberation? What is the difference between the former Bolshevik domination and the present German domination? The answer is: Perhaps the difference lies only in the fact that at present the people can go to church" (f. 221-222). The inhabitants of the occupied regions did not know that Hitler had decided to permit only a very limited supervised religious life and that during a talk with Rosenberg on 8 May 1942 he had declared that after the war he was going to take measures against the eastern church (IMT 1520-PS 286).

German Impotence against Ukrainian Nationalism

The report of the head of the security police and the SD for the month of February described the situation in Ukraine as follows:

The defensive combat of the security police group and the SD in Ukraine is directed against two main enemies: the communists and their leaders and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists that reveals itself through very strong activities. It is a question of discovering the OUN members who have infiltrated the administration services, verifying their activity and confronting them at a given moment to render them harmless (BA R 70 SU/31 f. 178).

From January 1942 on, the central office of the security of the Reich (RSHA) began to fear a change in the attitude—moderate to date—of

Melnyk's organization, notably of his network in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The security services learned, moreover, that a rapprochement between the followers of Bandera and of Melnyk had taken place in the Mykolaiv region and that the goal of the two nationalist organizations in that location was "complete independence of the Ukrainian State" (AA Pol. XIII, 15, 218921). OUN-B's influence was also growing in Kiev, and there some collaboration between the two rival political forces took place. In mid-January 1942 the SD already knew that OUN-B had contact with and some influence on some Ukrainian militia members in Kiev led by OUN-M men, and that because of their complicity, Bandera's men arrested by the SD had been set free. The SD proceeded to arrest those responsible for this situation (Appendix, Doc.#118).

The SD still did not know that on 4 December 1941 the OUN-M network of Kiev had made a decision to resort to underground activities and "prepare themselves for a long stubborn fight against the German occupant"⁵ (*Orhanisatsia* 271). The change to underground fighting was to be effective as of January 1942.

In mid-January 1942, the SD admitted that the fight against the communists in Kiev was being replaced with the fight against Ukrainian nationalist who, like the communists, were working on the deterioration of the morale of the populations. In the beginning of February, the SD seized important OUN-B documents that, once more, proved that this organization would never accept collaboration. The SD concluded from this that "only one option remained, that of total destruction of this movement." The German security services learned that two important OUN-B leaders, one with the assumed name Kossar (Dmytro Maivsky), had come to Kiev, but they could not arrest them (Appendix, Doc. ##120, 118).

The SD already had an exact idea of the OUN-B method of penetration in the different regions of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Moreover, the German services began to understand that even the Ukrainian interpreters in the Wehrmacht were using their position for propaganda on behalf of the OUN-B and, of course, were helping to create underground networks. Other OUN-B members arrived directly from Lviv, propagated their ideas openly by means of posters in the town halls and elsewhere, appointed mayors that suited them, removed from

office those who seemed to them unacceptable and set up their people in important positions (BA R 58/220 f. 140,141).

Six OUN-B political action groups, each composed of six members, made their appearance in the Crimea, where they attempted to set up a solid network. One member of the group, whose destination was the Symferopil region, was arrested. Another group was very active in Kherson. In that city, assemblies organized by the OUN-B under the guise of self-defense activities supported by the Germans, often convened up to 2,000 persons (Appendix, Doc. ##115,117). The OUN-B followers regrouped themselves around the head of self-defense, Konrad. This group was in touch with another group that had formed within the Kherson municipal administration around the assistant mayor, Hryts. The two OUN-B groups were arrested by the SD (Appendix, Doc.#115; R 70 SU/31 f. 132-133).

Furthermore, the Germans noted a remarkable rebirth of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and they were uneasy to note that this Church relied on patriotic forces (BA R 58/220 f. 141-142).

In mid-anuary 1942, the most serious news began to arrive from Volhynia. In Klevan, a place located between Rivne and Lutsk, the SD had arrested several Ukrainians who had pursued underground military activities under cover of a militia school. One of the arrested, an old instructor of the school in Klevan, had given the names of some thirteen men, OUN-B members, who possessed weapons.

At that time armed OUN-B groups had been formed. The cross-examination of the arrested persons confirmed that the OUN-B was making preparations for an insurrection, and that it had already disposed of a large stock of weapons stolen from military camps or gathered in the woods (stockpiles left behind by the Red Army). The OUN-B had also succeeded in seizing large sums of money from banks to finance the interior and exterior networks (Appendix, Doc. #118).

When the OUN-M network in Kiev turned to underground activities, the SD was already informed in the beginning of February of the existence of one underground cell of this organization (Appendix, Doc.#117). The SD knew that the OUN-M in Kiev was led by Oleh Kandyba (Olzhych), head of the organization for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The German services knew that OUN-M controlled the

Ukrainian National Council of Kiev (whose president was Professor M. Velychkovsky) as well as several Ukrainian organizations, notably the Union of Writers led by the poetess Olena Teliha. OUN-M sympathizers were most prominent at the Academy of Sciences and in the official press in Kiev and in the provinces.

The SD decided to strike. On 9 February 1942 some OUN-M members suspected of taking part in underground activities were arrested in Kiev. Among them were two leaders, I. Rohach and Olena Teliha, who were to be shot several days later (Appendix, Doc.#120).

At the moment when the security services of the Reich were engaged in a fight to the death against the Bandera movement, T. Omelchenko, president of the national union of Ukrainian émigrés in Germany (UNO), controlled by OUN-M, on 1 January 1942 wrote to Hitler to remind him of the conditions of a possible participation of the Ukrainians in the construction of the New Europe. According to the letter, this participation could take place only if the German government guaranteed the independence of the Ukrainian State. Berlin was urged not to repeat the mistakes of 1918 when the Germans had applied colonial methods in Ukraine (BA R 43/II/1504b f. 162-163).

An identical letter was sent to the Reich's minister of foreign affairs and was also communicated to Rosenberg. Ribbentrop decided to regard Omelchenko's proposition as unreal and merely imaginative while the minister for the eastern occupied regions was of the opinion that it did not merit a response (AA Abt. Pol. XIII All.Akten 17, 221896).

On 29 January 1942, the Reich's chancellery received another letter concerning Ukraine, signed this time by five Ukrainian leaders, notably Archbishop Andrei Sheptytsky, president of the Ukrainian National Council of Lviv; M. Velychkovsky, president of the Ukrainian National Council of Kiev; Andri Livytsky, successor to Symon Petliura, president of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Exile; M. Omelanovych-Pavlenko, president of former Ukrainian soldiers; and Andriy Melnyk, head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Without posing the question of Ukrainian independence, the letter, dated 14 January 1942, asserted that Russian defeat by Germany would have to give Ukraine the opportunity to enter into the European political system. The attitude of the Ukrainian masses was friendly; many Ukrainian soldiers of the Red

Army were surrendering voluntarily thinking that the Germans were going to form Ukrainian military units and allow them to fight for the liberation of their country. Their disappointment was great.

Furthermore, continued the letter, Galicia's annexation to the General Government and the surrender of Odessa to Romania would destroy the "generous intentions" of the new order in Europe. The letter reminded the Germans that the Ukrainian people of the Reichskommissariat were deprived of all possibilities to develop their national and cultural lives, that the patriotic press and associations were experiencing enormous difficulties, that the schools were closed. The German authorities had stopped the activities of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev. The signatories of the letter asked the recognition and the respect of the Ukrainian people's right to national, cultural, economic, and political life and development, and the right of Ukraine "to an independent existence" (BA R 43 II/1504b f. 165-168).

In no way, however, did these letters influence the policy of Nazi Germany. On the contrary, Germany policy became more suffocating. Measures to limit the travelling of Ukrainians in Germany were reinforced despite protestations from the UNO. They evidently wanted to prevent Ukrainian émigrés from spreading "nationalist propaganda" in Ukraine. The admission of Ukrainian émigrés to schools of higher education in Germany had also been interrupted (BA R 43 II/1504a f. 4; AA Pol.XIII All.Akten 17, 448831).

Young Ukrainians in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, to compensate in some way for the restrictions imposed on their cultural life, joined in large numbers the sports association "Sich," an association with nationalistic tendencies (*Sich* had been the seat of Ukrainian Cossacks from the XVIth to the XVIIIth centuries and *Sich* also designated the military units of Carpatho-Ukraine). The Germans knew that in addition to sport activities, members of the "Sich" were taking courses in national education "to undermine confidence in Germany" (BA R 58/221 f. 42-43).

On 6 March 1942, the RSHA indicated, according to information from the *Einsatzgruppe C* (north and center of Ukraine) that in the group's zone of operations they had had to arrest a significant number of OUN-B members. The report in question for the first time classified "Bandera's group" (*Bandera-Gruppe*) under a new name: "Ukrainian

Resistance Movement" (f. 42). The RSHA reports of Berlin included henceforth this title, applying it exclusively to the national resistance activities in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian resistance developed progressively despite extremely harsh repressions and ever increasing arrests. Resistance took on diverse forms, beginning with simple passive resistance, for example, refusing to carry out German orders (three drivers were accused of endangering the safety of transport and regular arrival of supplies) (Appendix, Doc.#121) up to and including armed attacks.

The SD particularly fought the OUN-B. In March 1942 an action against this organization was undertaken in several cities and localities. In Zhytomyr, twelve members of the Bandera movement, among them members of the regional administration, were arrested between 10 and 13 March 1942. The head of the region, Roman Marchuk, was killed during an attempt to escape. This organization, however, had succeeded in penetrating all the administration branches in the district of Zhytomyr (Appendix, Doc.##121, 123).

Two OUN-B carriers who went from Poltava to Lviv and Cracow were arrested in Kremenchuk. In Poltava the SD arrested the mayor of the city and three other persons who took part in OUN-B cell meetings. During these secret meetings that took place in the offices of the town hall, the mayor, according to the report, "propagated the idea of the formation of a Ukrainian army to fight the German Wehrmacht" (Appendix, Doc.###121, 122, 124; BA R 58/221 f. 117, 137, 315-316).

Among the seized documents in Kiev, the SD found a list of leading OUN-B members in the capital. These were generally members of the local intelligentsia, "professors, teachers, students, poets." Several members of this organization were arrested in Rivne for they were peddling propaganda materials in the Kamianets-Podilsky region. A Bandera activist was also arrested in Stalino in the Donbass. In Ostrih, the mayor, his assistant and five other persons were arrested for having authorized in the city's print shop the printing of the "ten commandments of Bandera's movement." The Bandera movement was also active in the Vinnytsia region. The SD noted that "the movement had extended to large strata of the population in the country" in all the regions of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

The seized documents made clear that the work of the OUN-B during the winter months consisted of information activities and propaganda among all the levels of the population from cities to the smallest village. The OUN-B had set up an excellent information service which, according to the report, "sees to it that the heads of the regions receive information on the least event that takes place in the cantons and districts." Information that was usually coded was transmitted hundreds of kilometers by bicycle, on foot or even through the use of the vehicles of the German army. The SD also found that "the Bandera movement provided false passports not only to its members but also to Jews" (Appendix, Doc.#123; BA R 58/221 f. 189).

Until this time the Germans thought that the OUN-B was a movement composed solely of Ukrainians who had come illegally from Galicia or possibly from the Reich, but in March–April 1942 they began to realize that this movement had taken hold among the young all over Ukraine, especially in the Volhynia and Podolia regions. In Volhynia the OUN-B gave young Ukrainians "secret instructions of political and military character," and these young Ukrainians considered themselves part of the nationalist revolutionary army (Appendix, Doc.#124; BA R 58/221 f. 304-305).

In the General Government in Stanyslaviv, a "Ukrainian Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine" sent a letter to Hitler on 15 March 1942 which, according to an SD report "contained reproaches, demands and threats" (Appendix, Doc.#133).

Since the discovery of the illegal OUN-M organization in Kiev in the beginning of February, the SD closely followed the evolution of the activities of this organization in central Ukraine. The OUN-M strove to set up an underground network founded on the cell system of five members; its organization work extended from Kiev to a large part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The SD learned that the center of these activities was in Kiev, in the town hall of the city. They consequently proceeded to arrest the mayor of Kiev, V. Bahazy and several other persons (Appendix, Doc.#124). The OUN-M then tried to take control of the auxiliary police (formerly militia) that was subsequently placed under the command of the protection police (*Schupo*). They also tried

to develop the sports associations "Sich" and establish cultural associations "Prosvita."

By arresting Professor V. Bahazy, the Germans dealt a severe blow not so much to OUN-M activities as to an important group of the capital's Ukrainian patriots. Professor Bahazy and his friends from Kiev had organized the city's administration and created several municipal departments including one of aid for the population. Shortly after the arrival of the Germans they had created a social association of assistance which they named the Ukrainian Red Cross. This organization extended its activities to the entire region, especially to PW camps where it made regular inquiries concerning the treatment of Ukrainian prisoners. The Ukrainian Red Cross of Kiev wanted to know if they were tortured, mistreated, etc. It compiled a file of 60,000 Ukrainian prisoners of war.

According to the SD, this information and information gathered by the OUN-M concerning the economic mismanagement of the Germans in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine constituted a documentation liable to be exploited later abroad.

Bahazy and his friends had also set up a cooperative society to monopolize commerce outside the German control. Bahazy directed different raw materials and finished products (boots, soap, etc.) to this society and to private individuals. He delivered gasoline to the Ukrainian Red Cross in Kiev without being authorized to do so. Under the cover of this association his friends had gone by car, armed with passes delivered by him to Warsaw and Kholm to contact there the Orthodox Metropolitan Dionisiy and Archbishop Ilarion to discuss with them the organization of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church.

After the dissolution of the Ukrainian National Council of Kiev Bahazy set up within the municipal administration a bureau charged with religious affairs which, in fact, continued the political activities of the National Council. Bahazy's friends also pressured Bishop Panteleymon to be firmer on the national point of view.

According to a SD report, Bahazy had surrounded himself with persons of "chauvinist" leaning that "continued more and more a hostile and malevolent policy toward German measures." The SD wondered how this man who had never been in touch with the nationalist milieu under the Soviet regime had been able, immediately after the arrival of

the Germans, to surround himself with a circle of men of confidence with whom he strove to thwart German influence and push Ukrainian demands to the limit of conflict" (BA 58/221 f. 307-312).

The OUN-M profited from the anniversary of the birth of the great Ukrainian poet of the XIXth century, Taras Shevchenko, by distributing a leaflet recalling the past struggle for independence (Appendix, Doc.#122; BA 58/221 f.136-137). The OUN-M then circulated the text of a memorandum of the Ukrainian National Council of Kiev addressed to Reichskommissar Erich Koch. In Rivne, the German police confiscated and destroyed the entire 22 March 1942 issue of the daily *Volhyn* because of Ulas Samchuk's article, judged hostile to Germans (Appendix, Doc.#123).

The Germans retained a firm control of the official press. They appreciated the zeal of collaborators like a certain Shtepa, the new editor-in-chief of *The New Ukrainian Word* of Kiev, pro-Russian and pro-German. General Kitzinger, commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine noted with satisfaction in his report for the month of February 1942 that "some newspapers, for example *The New Ukrainian Word*, argued from their own initiative very positively and categorically for the idea of a new community of destiny of the European peoples and were not afraid to denounce publicly as false the old nationalist ideology." But, the general concluded, "The newspaper is meeting for this reason, understandably, lively opposition from the Ukrainian people" (BA-MA RW 41/1 Bericht Nr.6:15).

In Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism was also considered as the most influential political movement. There, too, according to an SD report, the OUN-B "which is the most active and the most important of all the nationalist groups, has become an organization essentially anti-German and illegal" (Appendix, Doc.#124).

In Eastern Ukraine, the Germans noted that the nationalists alerted "the Ukrainian population to the situation by affirming that the Germans intended to suffocate knowingly their national hopes and desires, indeed destroy physically all the national movements." And one of the SD reports concluded: "In this venture, the agitation of the Bolsheviks and of extremist nationalists meet" (Appendix, Doc.#124; BA R 58/221 f.295).

Ukrainian émigrés in Germany and in Bohemia-Moravia also participated in Ukraine's resistance efforts. The police found leaflets calling for sabotage in the mail of Ukrainians in Prague. The Prague SD, basing itself on the results of reviewing mail sent to Ukrainians, concluded in April 1942 that "we must seriously expect an uprising in Ukraine" (Appendix, Doc.#126; BA R 6/192 f. 53).

Worsening of Repressions and Colonial Regime

In the beginning of February 1942, Reichsführer-SS Himmler reminded the appropriate authorities of the famous decree *Nacht und Nebel* ("Night and Fog") signed by Keitel on 7 December 1941. This decree regulated "the pursuit of criminal acts directed against the Reich or the occupation forces" in the east.

The German high military command noted that in the occupied territories since the beginning of the Russian campaign "communists and other groups hostile to Germany had increased their attacks against the Reich and the occupation forces." The danger represented by these attacks was very great and consequently the "dissuasion" was to be severe. All criminal acts committed by non-German civilians and directed against the Reich or the occupation powers were to be punished by death. But such acts could be judged on the spot only if immediate condemnation and execution of the culprits were certain. Otherwise, the offenders were to be transferred to Germany where they would be subjected to military jurisdiction should the military interest demand it. They were simply to disappear without a trace. It would be said that they had been arrested and that the investigation proceedings did not allow one to speak about it.

The 2 February 1942 rider to the 7 December instructions specified that the dissuasive effect of these measures should be obtained through traceless disappearance of the accused and refusal to give the least information about them (IMT 090-L; Appendix, Doc.#119); they were to disappear "into the night and the fog." In addition to executions, extermination of prisoners of war through hunger, cold, sickness, and the

disastrous shortage of supplies in the cities, this new measure increased the misfortune of the Ukrainian population.

The German war economy required increased manpower, made evident not only by the intensified war effort, but also by the constant appeals of new classes of Germans. Berlin anticipated the need to increase the number of foreign workers in the Reich as of December 1941. Of course, they were satisfied with volunteers, but because these were not available in great numbers in Ukraine as elsewhere, Berlin decided to establish a forced labor service. In Ukraine this would simply be a forced deportation of young people taken by police during mass raids in the streets.

The mobilization of manpower in the eastern occupied territories began with the ordinance of 10 January 1942 on the use of manpower. Reichsmarshall Hermann Göring, charged with the four-year economic plan, turned special attention to the "*Russeneinsatz*," the "use of the Russians" in German industry and agriculture. The economic bureau of the east, in a letter of 26 January 1942 referred to the necessity to increase the effectiveness of manpower from the east, cautioning that if the objectives were not reached, the recruitment measures would have to be strengthened considerably "using all means at our disposal" (IMT 381-USSR). Later developments will reveal what these means were to be.

Thus in Germany appeared a new race of foreign workers, the *Ostarbeiter*, workers from the east. From 20 February 1942 on, Himmler took severe measures to reinforce the supervision of the foreign workers in Germany. They had to live in special places (camps equipped for them), be supervised by special guards, submit to severe punishment (public hanging, being sent to concentration camp, etc.) in cases of crimes, sabotage, relations with Germans or other foreigners, etc. (IMT 3040-PS).

The first extensive recruitment campaign of workers in the east began on Rosenberg's instructions to the Reichskommissars for Ostland and Ukraine on 6 March 1942. According to these instructions, Göring had ordered the recruitment (with the shortest possible delay) of 380,000 agricultural and 247,000 industrial workers for the Reich. The recruitment was distributed as follows:

Ostland:	industrial workers	10,000
	agricultural workers	<u>90,000</u>
	Total	100,000
Ukraine:	industrial workers	237,000
	agricultural workers	<u>290,000</u>
	Total	527,000

The recruitment in the east was to be based on volunteering, but if the required number was not attained, force could be used (IMT 580-PS).

The 1941-1942 winter was particularly severe. Even in Ukraine temperatures reached -30 to -35 degrees C (-20 to -30 degrees F). Hitler had thought that he could finish the war or at least put Russia on its knees and reach the Ural Mountains before the beginning of winter. Thus the German army was not prepared for such cold; it lacked warm clothing. Collection campaigns were organized everywhere in December 1941. In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine 340,905 pieces of winter clothing were collected (furs, padded jackets, etc.) and 85,693 pair of winter shoes (BA-MA RW 41/1 Bericht no.5:18). At the end of January 1942 the Ukrainian Central Committee of Cracow and the Ukrainian Central Committee of Lviv also launched a collection for warm clothing and winter footwear for the Wehrmacht. The more or less voluntary collection, which lasted until 15 February, yielded large quantities of clothing and shoes (*Krakivski Visti* 30 January and 3 February 1942).

Some Germans continued to disapprove of the Nazi policies in Ukraine e.g., a member of the Reichstag, Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld was surprised that German representatives in the east were called "commissars," a term used by the Bolshevik powers since the revolution (BA R 6/6 f. 73).

Generalkommissar Schoene drew Leibbrandt's attention to the situation in different sectors of Ukraine. He thought that the agrarian reform should favor the Ukrainian peasant as proof that life had indeed become better than it had been under the Soviets. Schoene thought that the adopted solution (the maintaining of the kolkhozes) was too risky, liable to cause the occupation administration worries. The closing of

schools was a gross mistake and the opening of four grades of elementary education from 1 March did not suffice to rectify the situation. He considered that the Germans had made many mistakes in this area. The idle children had learned to steal; the idle young people were inclined to all sort of agitation. It would have been preferable to allow them to study, especially in Germany to imbue them with the German spirit. Generalkommissar Schoene did not understand why the Germans had to keep Ukraine at such a low level while in the Baltic countries they were granting very high salaries. Schoene also was surprised that some German services seemed to want to support the OUN people while the OUN "did not want to collaborate but wanted to govern" (BA R 6/69 f.142-147).

The Volhynia Generalbezirk leaders met in Lutsk on 27 to 29 March 1942. The Generalbezirk, which also included Brest-Litovsk, numbered 4,600,000 inhabitants: 3,500,000 Ukrainians (75%), 460,000 Poles (10%), 280,000 Belorussians, 330,000 Jews, 33,000 Russians, 3,000 Germans (15%). Conforming to Rosenberg's instructions, schooling was offered to children from the age of seven on, but schools consisted of only four grades. Beyond that children could in principle take preparatory classes to learn a trade, but children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen who did not take any courses were to be put into groups for forced labor. Priests had no right to teach the catechism in schools; only approved teachers could do so. The Ukrainian Red Cross was outlawed. The penal legislation in the entire Reichskommissariat fell under German law (BA R 6/243 f. 9-12).

The attitude of the various German services (Wehrmacht, ministry of the east, and Reichskommissar Koch) was not uniform; on 16 March 1942, Rosenberg sent a memorandum to the Führer on this matter. The Führer, as a result of Rosenberg's memorandum, thus defined the goals of German policies in Ukraine: "Development of utilization of mining riches, German colonization in some territories, no artificial intellectualization of the population, maintenance of their capacity for work, but extensive disinterestedness as far as the rest of the interior is concerned" (IMT 045-PS, XXV:97)

However, wrote Rosenberg in his memorandum, some Germans drew from it a different conclusion, expressing in a brutal manner their

concept of German policies in Ukraine: "Colonial people who should be treated with the whip like Negroes," "slaves who must be kept in ignorance," "formation of churches and sects to set them one against the other," etc. This was especially Koch's policy who, according to Rosenberg, continued to use such language despite its effectiveness in increasing the desire for sabotage among the population and partisan activities. Rosenberg concluded that such phrases did not contribute towards pacifying the country and did not serve German interests (IMT 045-PS, XXV:97-98).

But Hitler did not want to decide in favor of Rosenberg's more accommodating arrangements, for he was always opposed to the education of conquered peoples. "If the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Kirgiz, etc. know how to read and write, this can only hurt us," he remarked in April 1942 (*Generalplan Ost* 136).

The situation became complicated in the military area; the Germans lacked troops to fight the Soviet partisans. They needed the regular army at the front; the only solution was to form small auxiliary police units composed of volunteers in each occupied country (Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, Belorussian, Cossack, Ukrainian). The military leaders relied on these units more and more, but Hitler found it difficult to approve this initiative, convinced that "one must never permit subjugated peoples in the east to bear arms"⁶ (137), even to fight bolshevism.

In March, Berlin adjusted the orders concerning the terminology to be used in the press and propaganda in the occupied regions. According to the directives, the General Government was not an occupied territory but a region dependent on the Reich (*Nebenland des Deutschen Reiches*). The term "Ukraine" was to be applied only in a geographic sense, never in a political sense. Germany was not an ally but a "defender" of Ukraine; the German Wehrmacht was not an "occupation" army "as Bandera's partisans pretended" but the "savior" of the Ukrainian people. Hitler was to be designated as "Führer-Liberator," etc. (IfZ Da46-03 Richtlinien für die Presszensur in den besetzten Ostgebieten, no.130; BA R 6/11 f. 2).

Yet the Ukrainian population in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was violently mistreated. Germans used the billy and whip at will to

punish and "stimulate." On 9 and 10 April 1942, the Reich's ministry for the eastern occupied regions had to publish orders reminding the troops that the goal of German policies was to obtain "voluntary cooperation" of the Ukrainian people and, consequently, the use of billy and whip was forbidden. This method, according to the circular, instead of encouraging the population to work, led them to passive resistance (BA R 6/206 f.124-125).

This passive resistance became more serious. A German report for the month of May 1942 concerning eastern Ukraine (Poltava and Kharkiv regions) stated that the attitude of the population was influenced by different factors including Soviet partisan activities, behavior of German authorities, poor supplying of cities, high prices, increase of arrests and excesses against the population, beatings of workers, absence of energetic fighting against the partisans, inhuman conditions during the transport of workers to Germany. The report stressed that the expression "cursed Germans" was becoming more and more commonplace (BA R 6/35 f. 82; Appendix, Doc.#130).

The arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in Kiev in February 1942 and the banning of Ukrainian cultural associations were interpreted everywhere as proof that the Germans wanted to suppress the national consciousness among the Ukrainians and that the Germans had no intentions of allowing Ukrainians to take part in the fight against bolshevism. Newspapers appearing in Ukraine were called "German newspapers in Ukrainian characters" (BA R 6/35 f. 87).

Germans also began to interfere in the religious life. There were two Ukrainian Orthodox churches in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the Autocephalous Church and the Autonomous Church. According to 19 May 1942 instructions of the military command, not only "the quarrel between the churches must be kept under surveillance" but also persons of confidence should be placed in them to know if they were undertaking anti-German, separatist or nationalist propaganda. Those orthodox priests and church members who favored Bandera's movement were to be identified to the SD (Appendix, Doc.#128).

Ideological Foundation of National Resistance

In April 1942 the OUN-B, during its second conference, adopted a series of decisions to strengthen its revolutionary activities and prepare for the insurrection army.

According to adopted resolutions, the OUN-B based its fight on the 30 June 1941 proclamation of the Ukrainian State. This proclamation was qualified as the manifestation of the will of the Ukrainian people to lead an independent political life. Furthermore, the OUN-B adopted a long-term policy envisioning different hypotheses for the end of the war and taking into account the next possibility of a large-scale armed struggle. But it did not favor the squandering of forces in partisan activities led by small armed groups (which it already had). It decided to channel the energies of the people to a vast popular armed movement.

Consequently, the OUN-B decided to continue organizing military and political forces in all sectors, basing all activities on the absolute independence of Ukrainian politics and on the use of all possible means that could lead to "the creation of a Ukrainian state" and "the formation of a common front with all subjugated peoples of East and West Europe" (*OUN v sviti* 62).

As far as the international political order was concerned, the OUN-B opposed "the Russo-Bolshevik concept of the International and the German concept called 'the New Europe'," maintaining its "own international concept of an equitable transformation of Europe on the national, political, and economic plan, based on free national states conforming to the principle 'Freedom to the peoples and to man!'" The OUN-B thought that "the equitable solution of the Ukrainian question," i.e., the formation of the Ukrainian State, "could balance the forces in Eastern Europe and guarantee a free life to the [oppressed] peoples."

One of the resolutions of the second OUN-B conference proclaimed "the fight against collaborators and opportunists" and rejected in advance all apparent concessions on the part of the Germans, whether in the realm of culture, economy, administration, or autonomy, as well as all other political combinations that the Germans could propose under

pressure; Germany's real goal was to raise false hopes to win over opportunist elements to German imperialist and colonialist policies.

The OUN-B did not expect any aid, any outside support. It reaffirmed that the Ukrainian people "fight for complete political and economic independence of Ukraine." To enlarge the front, it wanted to strive "to form relations with other oppressed peoples for cooperation and a common fight against the invaders" (Appendix, Doc.#127).

The position of Bandera's liberation movement was detailed regularly in leaflets and underground publications distributed in Volhynia and Podolia. One of these affirmed that "OUN-B's attitude regarding the other peoples, including Germany, was determined by the attitude of these peoples regarding the aspirations of the Ukrainians for independence." Germany could crush Russia, Ukraine's enemy, but this war was not entirely favorable to the Ukrainians because Germany was hostile to the idea of an independent Ukraine (Appendix, Doc.#134).

Issue no.4 of the OUN-B *Bulletin*, published toward the end of April 1942, noted that no change had occurred in Ukraine in the last nine months—the duration of the war. Nazi totalitarianism had replaced Soviet totalitarianism. The two totalitarianisms "are similar in their main goals, only their tactics are different. In the two cases, behind the alluring mask hides the same imperialism that is hostile to us—on the one side the mask of the social paradise and on the other, of the happy life in a 'New Europe'." The article continued by affirming that Nazi totalitarianism wanted "to de-politicize the Ukrainian nation, take away from it its political ideals and its faith," and annihilate all those who carried the idea of independence. The article continued: "After the liquidation of the activists, according to the plans of the new masters, only an uncouth mass will remain whom they need to serve as [*Arbeitsvieh*] pack animals." Through his exploitation policy, the occupant tried to lower the living standard to reduce man to the state where he would think only of survival and would "no longer have any possibility, desire, or strength to elevate his thoughts." In a country known as the "bread basket" men were already starving and hundreds of thousands of people had to leave to work in Germany. The article concluded:

Each Ukrainian must be aware of the fact that no neutrality, no loyalty, no compromise will be able to help him and his children escape slavery, because salvation lies in the victory of his own race. But our state can be created only by the efforts and the blood of millions of people of our nation under the leadership of our revolutionary organization. That is why it is necessary to do everything to strengthen our power and avoid all that can weaken us (Appendix, Doc.#135).

Armed resistance groups (called OUN-B's self-defense groups) appeared in the spring of 1942 in Volhynia and Podolia, two wooded regions, particularly favorable to guerilla operations. The regional leadership of the organization headed by Ostap Tymoshchuk was charged with organizing these groups. Following the last wave of arrests, the seat of the regional leadership was transferred from Rivne to the swampy region between Sarny and Pinsk.

The Germans were informed that in Rivne Bandera's organization owned several buildings and apartments in which secret meetings and sessions of military instruction took place under the cover of a legal militia school. After the exposure of this "school" in Rivne, the organization took up its activities in Klevan. The Germans obtained proof in Rivne "that the militia had been planned as a Bandera combat organization." Members of this organization were informed that instruction and activities of the liberation movement were illegal and that treason would be punished by death. The "militiamen" had stockpiled weapons and also had taken political courses during which, according to the German report, they were incited against the Germans. In brief, stated the report, these people were being prepared for combat "behind the backs of the German troops."

The Germans knew that Bandera's men each had one or several code names; their true names were generally unknown. To contact them, a pass word was needed. After having discovered one of these pass words Germans were able to arrest one of the instructors of the school in Klevan.

Beginnings and Expansion of Armed Resistance

Spring 1942 was unlike the summer of 1941 when the first armed groups of the nationalist resistance fighters, who were immediately annihilated, appeared in the Pinsk region. Despite mass arrests and terror, the OUN-B succeeded in strengthening its influence in various Ukrainian territories and at the same time undertook the preparation of the young people for an armed conflict. These preparations took place especially in Volhynia and Galicia, wooded region ideal for partisan activities.

OUN-B sent one of its members, Vasyl Sydor to Volhynia, charging him with setting up armed self-defense groups composed of members of the movement. The first two self-defense groups, commanded by Serhi Kachynsky-Ostap and Ivan Perehyniak-Dovbeshka respectively, were organized in April 1942. Other armed groups were set up gradually so that in the summer of 1942, the OUN-B already had more than 600 men to constitute the nucleus of the future insurgent army.

The Germans continued their repressive actions. They discovered a depot of OUN-B weapons in the Kostopil region in Volhynia: 600 guns, twelve machine guns, 254,000 cartridges, 20,000 shells, 4,000 grenades, 2,000 mines and other military equipment (Appendix, Doc.#129).

Furthermore, on 2 May 1942, a conference of the OUN-B regional leadership under the presidency of Ostap Tymoshchuk was held in the Rivne district (the Germans were informed of this). Ostap Tymoshchuk passed on the order of the central leadership to review and clean all stockpiled weapons (Appendix, Doc.#131).

According to German reports, instructions found during arrests in June and the beginning of July 1942 gave "a clear picture of the intentions of the illegal activists" who were OUN-B members. During the winter this organization aimed to extend its network and organize the political instruction of its members. It was preparing them to "have the last word in dealing with occupation forces."

Now "orders assign activist duties directly" to passive resistance of the entire population and sabotage of all German operations, especially the deliveries of agricultural products and the dispatching of manpower

to Germany, as well as the refusal to participate in German-Ukrainian manifestations. The Germans noticed that Bandera was glorified in the pamphlets as a martyr.

Furthermore, OUN-B members received orders not to enlist in the auxiliary police for protection (*Schutzmannschaft*) under penalty of being expelled from the movement (Appendix, Doc.#133).

While bringing down the OUN-B network in Sarny, the Germans found "orders concerning partisan warfare operations" (Doc.#133). In fact, they found an explicit text entitled *Partisan Warfare* which described this war as being led by small groups, liable to cause the enemy the most damage possible. But for an oppressed people such war was to be the beginning of a popular uprising. The text explained the duties of the partisans (destruction of railroad and telephone communication lines, surprise attacks on enemy installations and services) and stressed that if the partisan war was well led and supported by the well-disposed population, it could cause significant damage to the enemy with a minimum force (Appendix, Doc.#141).

These were not the instructions. On the contrary, the armed OUN-B groups had orders to engage in military action only if absolutely necessary, waiting for the moment when they would have at their disposal large forces. Because a confusion as to the partisan warfare began to take hold (because the term "partisan" was used to designate parachutists and members of the Soviet resistance as well as members of the resistance of the Polish minority in Volhynia and Galicia) the OUN-B was obliged to publish a pamphlet entitled *Partisan Warfare and Our Attitude Regarding It*.

The pamphlet, distributed from June 1942 on, explained that the Ukrainian people could belong neither to the movement of the Soviet partisans nor to that of the Poles because, in reality, the cutting edge of their partisan warfare was also directed against the Ukrainians, against their movement for independence. The OUN-B explained that Stalin's and Sikorski's partisans were not fighting for Ukraine. According to the pamphlet, "Stalin and Sikorski are pursuing two hares simultaneously: hurting the Germans and fighting the Ukrainians with German help." The Germans, continued the pamphlet, knew perfectly well that the Ukrainians did not support the Soviet partisans, nevertheless, the

Germans were profiting from the least presence of these partisans to exterminate Ukrainian villages.

The pamphlet specified that the OUN-B attitude was not "motivated either by interests of communist world revolution, i.e., by Russian imperialism, or by the idea of the 'New Europe', i.e., by German imperialism, but only by interests in Ukraine." The OUN-B thought that the Ukrainians should organize their forces, not by "partisan warfare of several hundred or even thousand men but [by] a national revolution of a mass of millions of Ukrainians" (Appendix, Doc.#143).

During the spring of 1942 the armed groups of Taras Bulba-Borovets, similar to those of the OUN-B armed self-defense groups, made their appearance. In August 1941 Bulba-Borovets had organized an armed detachment that took on the form of a Ukrainian militia unit. Authorized and armed by the Wehrmacht, his unit, approximately 3,000 men strong, called the *Poliska Sich*, was used to clean out the swampy and wooded regions of northwest Ukraine from the remnants of the Red Army and Soviet partisans (Appendix, Doc.#129). However, on 15 November 1941, probably because of SD pressure, but officially because of lack of equipment, the Wehrmacht dissolved and disarmed his unit. In May and June 1942 Bulba-Borovets gathered some of the members of the dissolved unit and created a partisan detachment.

All through spring and summer of 1942, the OUN-B continued its information service and propaganda among the Ukrainian youth. Its illegal newspaper, *Standard of the Youth*, of 1 June 1942 invited the young people not to believe German promises and to join the national movement to fight for the independence of Ukraine. The newspaper wrote: "For our wheat, our iron, our coal, as well as for our manpower, millions of soldiers are fighting. Entire hordes of Russian and German soldiers are destroying and pillaging our country." The article advised young Ukrainians not to let themselves be used, but to join the OUN-B which was fighting "for the grandeur of Ukraine" and to fight with them for the Ukrainian State (Appendix, Doc.#139).

To mark the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Ukrainian State, the head of OUN-B for the western regions of Ukraine, Damian Dmytriv, issued an order of the day intended to be read during secret cell meetings on 30 June 1942. The order of the day recalled facts

relative to the 30 June 1941 proclamation and the creation of the Ukrainian government by Yaroslav Stetsko. Under the leadership of this government, continued the order of the day, began the construction of the national life. But "this gigantic work of political creation did not comply with the political and military plans of the new 'liberators' of Ukraine" who had arrested Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko. They had forcefully liquidated the construction of the Ukrainian State and imposed a foreign regime. Arrests had increased, blood had begun to flow.

The order of the day stressed that the 30 June 1941 proclamation had shown to the entire world that Ukrainians had their own ideas, that they were "ready to rise up against anyone who wanted to transform our country into a colony and our people into slaves," that they wanted to continue to fight not for the New Europe but for their own state. Ukrainians thought themselves capable of setting up their state, and they were going to construct "their future with their own blood." The order of the day affirmed that the war in Eastern Europe between the former and the new oppressors of Ukraine for "the right to oppress the Ukrainian people" was going to continue and warned that the Ukrainians who were dying "in the prisons of the former and new occupation forces" had already paid a heavy price.

The order of the day called the OUN-B members to close ranks even more around the central leadership of the movement and to prepare the people because "Ukraine is on the verge of great decisions" (Appendix, Doc.#136).

According to reports from Rivne, the capital of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the activities of the nationalist partisans had extended from the Kobryn-Brest-Litovsk region to other regions in Volhynia-Polodia. One of German reports mentioned that "numerous bands that have made their appearance come from the General Government from across the Buh [Bugh]." Their attacks focused mainly on destroying telecommunications. Their methods made clear that they "wanted to build a resistance movement on a larger scale" (Appendix, Doc.#135).

The Germans continued their efforts to break up the resistance movement. The OUN-B head of the Ovruch district, Yuri Trotsiuk, and the head of the Chernihiv district, Diobko, were arrested and shot in the

beginning of July 1942. In Kiev, nine members of the 115 battalion of the auxiliary police were arrested because they belonged to Bandera's group. In Chernihiv the mayor and the commander of the Ukrainian militia were also arrested, as was a Bandera propagandist in Vinnytsia who was smuggling underground literature into Romania. The Romanians arrested nine Bandera agents (Appendix, Doc.#141).

In Volodymyrets, west of Sarny, a leaflet directed against the enrollment of workers for the Reich was posted in several places. The Germans arrested the secretary of the resistance movement of this area. Twenty-nine persons were arrested in the Zdolbuniv district following sabotage of the Lviv-Kiev railroad line, and fifteen others in Chemerytsi, north of Kamianets-Podilsky, among them the assistant to the mayor, the head of education, the director of the school and several teachers (Appendix, Doc.##134, 135).

One of the German secret reports noted on 24 July 1942 that "the head of the Bandera movement for Eastern Ukraine who used the code names Pip, Andri, and Mudry had been "found" in Kiev." The SD could not discover his real name. Wounded during an attempt to escape, he died a short time later. They found on his person a passport in the name of Vasyl Panasiuk (Appendix, Doc.#139). He was, in fact, Dmytro Myron-Orlyk, head of the OUN-B for central and eastern Ukraine.

Soviet agents tried to use the Ukrainian nationalism, especially to influence ideologically the nationalist circles or to penetrate them and then "give" them to the Germans. They probably manipulated the Ukrainian Nationalists Revolutionary Organization (RUNO), created in January and liquidated with their help in July with the arrest of Olexander Pohorily, head of this organization (Appendix, Doc.#139).

Nevertheless, in August 1942, the RSHA noted that "the Bandera movement continues to deploy efforts in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to influence the Ukrainian populace with written propaganda." "By acting in a particularly radical manner,...the illegal Bandera movement...tries to entice the active circles of the youth to remove them from German influence," noted one of the German reports. The OUN-B was using all means, continued the report, "to arouse aversion towards the Germans

among the Ukrainians through propaganda." All these leaflet, pamphlets, and secret instructions distributed by this organization "clearly demonstrate the hostile attitude of this movement." An order that had fallen into the German hands stated:

"No one must go to work in Germany. No one must take courses organized by the Germans....No one must agree to do military service. We do not want to fight in a foreign army for foreign goals. We will enter only a Ukrainian army that fights for the Ukrainian independent state. Let us remain in place, at our posts, in the service of Ukraine!" (Appendix, Doc.##138, 137).

The leaflet then referred to the Ukrainian army making allusion to the existing armed groups which constituted the base of this army.

Another leaflet of the OUN leadership found in Kiev stated that the German domination had destroyed all hope for independence; the Ukrainians should henceforth "enter the road of revolution organized under Bandera's command." Germany, according to the leaflet, was going to exhaust itself inevitably in the war against England and then OUN's chances would come. Ukrainians should not join Soviet partisans because their fighting and consequent losses profited only Moscow. The Ukrainians should rather unite their forces and wait for the hour of attack that would be given by the OUN central leadership (Appendix, Doc.#139).

A OUN-B document distributed in August 1942 cautioned that all foreign power in Ukraine had always in every crisis solicited the collaboration of Ukrainians. But once the crisis had passed the situation always ended in oppression and attempts to suppress national feelings and aspirations for independence. The document continued: "Naive are those who still believe that a foreigner will give them freedom and independence" (BA R 58/698 f. 174). The OUN-B pointed to the annexation of the Ukrainian territory to the General Government and Romania as proof that the Germans always did what they wanted. The Ukrainian people should hold themselves in readiness to fight for freedom and to win independence at the moment when the two giants would be mutually exhausted by the war.

Despite important successes already recorded, continued the OUN-B, Germany would "not succeed in establishing its world hegemony." In

addition to internal contradictions, Germany would have to fight on a second front in the west. The Ukrainian people should mobilize themselves around the following watchwords: "We want to be free citizens in our own state. Down with slavery! We want our own laws that correspond to the interests of all the Ukrainian people and guarantee their well-being" (Appendix, Doc. #138).

The OUN-B also used a humorous form of propaganda expressed in leaflets entitled "What People Say." This sort of propaganda was labelled by the Germans as "particularly heinous" regarding them (Appendix, Doc. #134).

Eight people suspected of being members of the resistance movement were arrested on 12 August 1942 in Kherson. Among them was Yaroslav Hrebeniuk suspected of having prepared false papers for "Pip" (Dmytro Myron-Orlyk). Four members of the order department of Mykolaiv and five members of the Kiev protection police, suspected of being activists of the Bandera movement, were also arrested. In mid-August an important piece of propaganda of the resistance movement was found in Kamianske (Dnipropetrovsk region). The Germans arrested three people. On 24 and 25 August leaflets, related to the commemoration of the first anniversary of the proclamation of the Ukrainian independent state, were found in the Rivne district. The leaflets boasted that the Ukrainians would never exchange their freedom for the "bread of the invaders," for a "new superior culture" or for "an inhuman idea." "Whatever might happen in Ukraine, whatever the ideas and theories the foreign invaders try to impose on us, the Ukrainian people will never be swerved from the right path," concluded the leaflet (Appendix, Doc. #142).

Generalplan Ost

When Hitler created the Reichskommissariat for the Strengthening of the German Nationality (RKF) on 7 October 1939 and later announced "a New Order" in Eastern Europe, he did not seem to have any precise idea of this "order." A brilliant improviser, he developed his

plans gradually from events, whence his mistakes. He charged Reichsführer-SS Himmler, appointed Reichskommissar for the Strengthening of the German Nationality (RFSS/RKF), to consider plans for Eastern Europe.

The services directed by Himmler—RSHA and the RKF—began to work. Possibly these services had been planned as early as January 1941; certainly in 1941 the plan received the name *Generalplan Ost*. Prepared by Bureau III B of RSHA (*Der Generalplan Ost* in "Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte" no.3/1958:285), the general policy of the *Generalplan Ost* was without doubt set by the end of 1941, containing short-term expectations (*Nahplan*) and long-term expectations (*Fernplan*). Discussions continued on different aspects of the plan. On 27 January 1942 Himmler charged Professor Konrad Meyer to develop a structural plan on all problems relative to the Germanization and colonization of the eastern regions. On 4 February interested representatives of various services met in Berlin to discuss the details of Germanization especially in the Baltic countries.

Himmler's *Generalplan Ost* caused Erich Wetzel, director of the central advisory council of the bureau of racial politics of the Nazi party, and official of the Reich's ministry for eastern territories, to take a position. Wetzel's memorandum, dated 27 April 1942, reviewed the main points of the plan, observing that the plan was not a program of immediate application but a proposal for the introduction of German colonists in the eastern regions which would require some thirty years after the end of the war. Apart from the colonization of Ingermanland, from the bend of the Dniro, Taurid and the Crimea, the plan called for the colonization frontier in the north from Lake Ladoga across the Valdai mountains as far as Briansk. Approximately 14,000,000 racially acceptable inhabitants would be the only ones permitted to remain there. Whether they would be Germanized or transferred to the Old Reich is uncertain.

According to Wetzel, lack of volunteers would make the repopulation of the eastern regions by Germans difficult. According to the plan, during the next thirty years some 4,550,000 candidates would be needed who would want to settle in the following regions: Danzig-East Prussia, Wartheland, Upper Silesia, General Government, south-east

Prussia, Bialystok, the Baltic countries, Ingermanland, Belorussia, and a part of Ukraine. To this number must be added the Germans already living in these regions who thirty years hence should increase to 6,200,000. In fact, thirty years later there would be in these regions approximately 8,000,000 Germans (not the 10,000,000 anticipated by the plan).

In addition to the 8,000,000 Germans, would be, according to the plan, 45,000,000 foreigners of whom 31,000,000 were to be "transferred." Wetzel contested the number 31,000,000. He thought that there would be between 60,000,000 and 65,000,000 foreigners in those regions. The number of racially undesirables to be "transferred" to western Siberia would therefore be considerable.

Wetzel, in contrast to Hitler, considered concentration of industry in the Reich and development of agriculture in the foreign regions a mistake. This policy would, in the long run, result in the biological death of Germany and the growth of the foreign peoples since industrialization brings a decline in births while the agrarian population always has an increase of births. "To allow the peoples of the east, especially Russians and Ukrainians, to have a purely peasant life practically means the suicide of the German people," wrote Wetzel. This decreased rate of birth in the Reich would also be accompanied by the influx of foreign manpower.

According to *Generalplan Ost*, only Germanization of the "racially worthwhile" peoples should be considered. The others, i.e., the Poles, the Ukrainians of the western regions, and the Belorussians should be transferred. The Poles (more than 20,000,000), were to be transferred to western Siberia during a period of thirty years, from 700,000 to 800,000 annually (100 to 200 trains annually). Wetzel estimated that this would not be easy. Were these Poles in Siberia to form a separate population and form a "Great Poland" or be dispersed or absorbed by the Siberians? Would it not perhaps be better to send these 20,000,000 Poles to the Americas, especially to Brazil, perhaps also to Central and North America. German emigrants in South America could be required to return and sent to colonize, for example, Taurid and Crimea.

Wetzel thought that Walloon, Czech, Hungarian and other immigrants could be made to come to the industrial regions of Kuznetsk,

Novosibirsk, and Karaganda (regions he considered reserved for European colonization and extraction of raw materials). Wetzel wrote: "The European idea in all its aspects has one sense, while it can be dangerous for us in the space to be colonized by the German people, because its consequences would signify that we have accepted the doctrine of the European racial integration." Siberia as far as Lake Baikal, according to Wetzel, has always been a region of European colonization. Siberia was to become a factor making the restoration of the Russian power impossible.

The *Generalplan Ost* anticipated the deportation of 65% of Ukrainians from Western Ukraine, more precisely, from Galicia. The 35% Ukrainians remaining were to be Germanized. Wetzel thought that these Ukrainians should not be deported to Siberia, as the plan anticipated, but to the territory of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine because "such an expulsion of racially undesirable Western Ukrainians to Siberia would alienate all Ukrainians from us; they would constitute a dangerous center of trouble for the German domination if they still comprised an intellectual strata in the European sense." But even the transfer of these Ukrainians to the east and north of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine would create difficulties.

The *Generalplan Ost* anticipated the transfers of 75% of the Belorussian population to western Siberia. As to the Russian population, the plan was less precise and Wetzel drew RSHA's attention to the biological vigor of the Russians. He referred to Professor Abel's opinion on this subject: procreation was stronger with the Russians than with the Germans; a new war in the east could take place in twenty-five or thirty years. Abel saw only two solutions to this danger: the extermination or the Germanization of a part—the northern part—of the Russian people. Wetzel was inclined to Germanization; extermination, in his opinion, being practically impossible.

The Germanization of the population, according to Wetzel, had as its goal the increase of the numbers of Germans because the German population was going to play a fundamental role in world politics, especially when the self-determination of the Asian peoples became a reality after the war. Thus, for example, Great Britain and independent

India would each have at their disposal hundreds of millions of inhabitants. Germany, as a world power, populated by only 80,000,000 to 85,000,000 Germans would be too weak. It would be able to keep the eastern territories only if it succeeded in increasing the number of Germans by Germanizing the populations. To do this, it would be necessary to introduce the German language into these regions and to take other similar steps (IMT NG-2325; *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 3/5 1958:297-324).

But, as already noted, Hitler had other ideas on the teaching of the German language to the Slavic populations.

On 28 May 1942 Professor Meyer presented to Himmler his memorandum entitled "Generalplan Ost, Foundation of the Judicial, Economic, and Territorial Reconstruction of the East."⁸ Himmler told Meyer in June, however, that his project did not entirely meet with his approval. The plan of total Germanization of Estonia, Latvia, and the entire General Government was to be realized during the next twenty years. Himmler asked Meyer to correct the *Generalplan Ost* in this sense and to offer him another project (IMT NO-2255; *Vierteljahreshefte* 325).

The colonization plan of the east was secret, but some related ideas became public and were picked up by the press, e.g., Himmler's declaration, made in June 1942, that Germany's task was to Germanize the east through colonization (Appendix, Doc.#132).

On 16 July 1942 Hitler transferred his general quarters from Rastenburg (East Prussia) to a location near Vinnytsia in Ukraine. Concrete colonization plans were adopted in August 1942 during a meeting held at the Führer's general quarters and the ministry for the eastern occupied territories. It was decided that 45,000 German colonists, dispersed into 486 villages of Ukraine, were to come to the district north of Hitler's general quarters. The district received the name Hegewald. These colonists were to be resettled into approximately one hundred villages of the Hegewald district immediately after the bringing in of the harvest. An additional goal of the "displacement of the Russians," i.e., Ukrainians of this region, was to make partisan activities impossible.

The Hegewald district was extended over the southern part of the Zhytomyr region to which 10,000 German colonists of Ukraine were to

be transferred after the bringing in of the harvest. Conforming to Hitler's orders, the German services personnel were not to live in Vinnytsia but outside the city. Himmler also set up his general quarters in the Hegewald district. Charged with the fight against the partisans and the resistance movements, Himmler wanted to get closer to the theater of operations.

The account given at the meeting held in Hitler's general quarters specifies that "in conformity with the Führer's orders, some parts of Ukraine will be entirely colonized by Germans during the next twenty years." The German population would be set up following the west-east and north-south axes along the super-highways and the new train tracks, especially the Cracow-Lviv-Zhytomyr-Kiev, Leningrad-Mogilev-Kiev, Zhytomyr-Vinnytsia-Odessa lines.

The Germanization plan of Ostland was confirmed during the same meeting in Hitler's general quarters. As to Crimea, entire German towns, numbering 15,000 to 20,000 inhabitants, were to be developed at all points of intersection (IfZ NO-2703). Himmler also approved of the plan of settlement by Germans from Palestine in the south of Crimea (IfZ NO-2417).

In November 1942 the population of seven villages close to the town of Kalynivka in the Hegewald district was driven out and deported to make room for German colonists who came from Volhynia. In December, Reichskommissar Koch announced that the Hegewald district which extended over 500 km² and numbered 9,000 inhabitants, was to be under the exclusive administration of the SS.

The work of the *Generalplan Ost* continued in the beginning of 1943. On 15 February 1943, after Stalingrad, Meyer asked Himmler for the opportunity to pursue this work. But in April 1943, on the Führer's orders, the plans were definitely interrupted. Instead of colonization, the Germans already had to think of retreat.

Soviet Partisans

During the first weeks of occupation the Soviet resistance movement in Ukraine was minimal. Aside from those who had participated in the

Soviet administration to varying degrees, the people were content to have been freed from the oppressive and dictatorial regime. But the Soviet power often left behind groups of Red Army soldiers who took up partisan activities and other soldiers were parachuted in. The local population frequently helped the Germans capture them.⁹ (BA-MA RH 20-17/277 Ferngespräch 6 July 1941; RH 20-6/491 Bericht über die Woche vom 15-22 August 1941) In some Volhynia regions and in the marshy Polissia region, the action of cleansing which lasted until November 1941, was entrusted by the Germans to the combat unit, organized by Taras Bulba-Borovets called "*Poliska Sich*."

By ordering extremely severe measures from the start against guerilla groups and partisans, the Nazi authorities hoped to prevent all partisan fighting (BA-MA RH 20-17/276 Armeeoberkommando 17, Gr.IC/AO.Br.B. 2784/41 geh., 30 July 1941). But because the sabotage and assassination acts had become more numerous with the advance of the German army, Keitel ordered on 16 September 1941 strengthened measures against, what he called, "the Communist insurgent movement," and prevention of nationalist circles from benefiting from the situation to cause difficulties for the occupation authorities (Appendix, Doc.#90).

Initially, the activities of the Soviet partisan groups were uncoordinated. From October 1941 onward the Wehrmacht noted that these partisans, especially in the north-east of Ukraine, were aided by the population, "partially of their free will, partially under force," specified one of the reports. Some military leaders thought it necessary to win the good will of the people, organize an information service, and create units to fight the Soviet partisans. But the fight was to be implacable, without mercy. Partisan leaders were to be hanged publicly for the sake of dissuasion (BA R 70 SU/31 f. 53; BA-MA RH 20-17/276 Armeeoberkommando 17 Ia/Ic/AO, Nr. 4020/41 geh. 20 November 1941.).

Because the Germans lacked troops, the Wehrmacht began to appeal for auxiliary units composed of volunteers recruited in camps of Soviet prisoners of war. The commander of the Sector North in the Reichskommissariat Ostland was the first one to begin the movement by asking on 6 August 1941 for authorization to form police protection battalions (*Schutzmansschafts-Batallione*), composed of Latvians and Estonians. A short time later, the commander of the Sector Center

(Belorussia) also began to set up unofficially auxiliary protection units composed of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian prisoners of war. At the beginning of October 1941, the OKH authorized the formation of the Don Cossack units and on 15 November Muslim units (IfZ NO 2271, NO 3300, NO 766,777, NO 1717, NOKW 820, 3012).

The report for the month of November 1941 of the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht, General Kitzinger, noted in several regions an increasing insecurity because of the Soviet partisan activities. During the cleansing of the marshy zone of Prypet, many partisans were killed, thirty-three suspects arrested, two partisan camps destroyed. In November alone 250 partisans were killed during the cleansing action (BA-MA RW 41/1 Wehrmachtsbefehlhaber Ukraine, Bericht Nr.3, 13 December 1941). Through such scare tactics, the Germans thought they halted the progress of the Soviet partisans. Several thousand partisans had been hanged or shot publicly in Ukraine since the beginning of the occupation. General Kitzinger concluded that "this experience teaches us that only steps capable of frightening the population more than the partisan terror can lead to success" (Appendix, Doc.#112).

In reality, the standstill in December 1941 and January 1942 was due rather to the severity of the winter.

Compared to the two other sectors (North and Center), Soviet partisan activities in Ukraine were insignificant. In the Sector Center (Belorussia) and in southern Russia the Germans had to fight the steadily growing number of partisan units constantly. From the beginning of the occupation until the end of February 1942, they had killed 63,257 partisans (BA-MA RH 22/230 f. 144), while in Ukraine they had killed only several thousand. In January 1942 the command of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine decided to form Ukrainian police protection battalions (*ukr. Schutzmannschaften*). Their training was completed only in April.

In February 1942, 550 Soviet partisans and other persons suspected of subversive activities were killed in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (BA-MA RW 41/1 Bericht Nr.6:1). In March partisan activities increased considerably in several regions of Ukraine, specifically in the north and in the general commissariat of Zhytomyr (BA R 6/378 f. 30). In the forests of Briansk, in southern Russia (to which several partisans groups that were operating in Ukraine had withdrawn), the leaders of these

groups decided to unite under the command of A.M. Saburov. The new detachment, including groups from Briansk and Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk (in Ukraine) totalled 1,720 men (Brechak 10:131). The majority of the partisans belonging to groups operating or destined to operate in Ukraine were thus not in Ukraine but in the forests of Briansk, in southern Russia.

During operations undertaken in March 1942 in the marshy region of Prypet that extends across some 3,200 km², the Germans killed 650 Soviet partisans and executed 2,500 suspects (BA-MA RW 41/1 Bericht Nr.7:1). In April, during an assassination attempt, Soviet partisans killed the Gebietskommissar of Yelske (south of Mozyr) (BA-MA RW 41/1 Bericht Nr.8:1).

In addition to Red Army soldiers, who had been left behind, and fighters parachuted in by the Russians, the Communist (Bolshevik) party played an important role in the organization of the Soviet resistance. A more or less important network of the party was reconstructed gradually in secrecy and the party became the essential organizer of the partisan groups. Repression of the German security services thus was primarily directed against the communists. In February 1942 several dozen members of the Communist party were arrested in Kiev, 350 in Kramatorske (of whom sixty were executed), 105 in Dnipropetrovsk, 100 in Symferopol, etc. (BA R 70 SU/31 f. 178).

According to the report of the Wehrmacht high command in Ukraine, the Soviet partisan movement did not become a serious concern until April 1942, since the supply lines to the Reichskommissariat Ukraine were neither threatened nor interrupted. The only important confrontation took place in April in the wooded and marshy zone around Snovske and Novhorod-Siversky. Despite preference given sometimes by the communists to operations conducted by units composed of 200 to 1,000 men, they tried to set up everywhere small well-armed groups which they used to extend their influence on the vaster regions. The nucleus of these small groups consisted of fighters who had received special training in Russia on the other side of the front, especially in Millerova and Voroshilovgrad. According to statements made by parachutists taken prisoner, the Russians could, when time allowed, daily effect several parachute drops of twenty men, forming mainly sabotage

and subversion commandos.

The Germans realized they could not detect all the parachute drops. Official statistics concerning these drops in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine since 1941 were: October—none; November—four; December—one; January 1942—four; February—none; March—forty-eight; April—eighteen (until 25 April). The high command of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine knew that these figures represented only a very small part of the Russian parachute drops.

The April 1942 Soviet partisan activities, according to a German report, were: south of Zaporizhia—three attacks, three parachute drops, three partisans killed; in the Myrhorod-Lubny-Hadiach region—fifteen attacks, six parachute drops, one confrontation, nine partisans killed, twenty-one taken prisoner (184 partisans were killed from 16 March to 12 April 1942); in the Nizhyn region—nine attacks, six confrontations, 117 partisans killed, twelve taken prisoner; in the Snovske-Novhorod-Siversky region—fifteen attacks, two confrontations, thirty-eight partisans killed, 239 taken prisoner.

In March the number of partisans in the Snovske region near Russia was estimated by the Germans to be approximately 800. At their head was A.F. Fedorov, who called himself General Orlenko. The partisans were in constant radio communication with the high command of the Red Army, had at their disposal a good information network and were generally forewarned of German actions. The Germans were also well informed and knew where the partisan encampments and bunkers were located (BA-MA RH 22/28 Bfh.H.Geb. Süd Abt.Ic Nr.433/42 g., 7 May 1942).

At that time the Soviet partisans were very active, especially in the zone behind the troops not far from the front: thirty attacks in January 1942; eight attacks in February; seventeen in March; thirty-nine in April; seventy in May; ninety-four in June (BA R 6/354 f. 9). In this zone between the front and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (civilian administration), there were in May, according to German sources, 1,092 partisans. According to Soviet sources, in all of Ukraine (military zone, Reichskommissariat, General Government) on 1 May 1942 there were 28,000 Soviet resisters (20,000 partisans, 2,000 members of sabotage groups) (*Ukraina* 1:436). The truth, undoubtedly, lies between the two

figures: perhaps some 10,000 to 15,000 Soviet partisans, especially in the north of Ukraine near Russia.

In the spring of 1942 Moscow decided to centralize and control directly the partisan activities in the occupied countries. On 30 May a central high command of the partisan movement was created under the supreme command of the Red Army, then the high command for each occupied country. The "Ukrainian" high command of the partisan movement was created on 20 June 1942 (*Radianska Entsyklopedia* 4:361).

German military authorities tried to influence the population by circulating brochures announcing exceptional measures in the fight against the partisans. In one of the brochures distributed by plane in July in the Hlukhiv, Putyvl, and Krolevets districts, they tried to reassure the population that the German Wehrmacht and its allies "have not come as enemies of the Ukrainian people" but as destroyers of "the Judeo-Bolshevik pest" that had oppressed the Ukrainians and constituted a threat for Europe.

The brochure continued, however, that while the majority of the people had a friendly attitude toward the "German liberators," in the back country "bandits" directed by Moscow were threatening the peace and reconstruction efforts among the local population and the weak who hesitated and played a double game. For this reason, all saboteurs, bandits, snipers, and partisans would be executed. Possession of weapons, ammunition, and explosives would be severely punished. Curfew was established from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m. All persons over sixteen were to carry an identification card. No one could leave his community without authorization. Persons who would hand over war materials of their own free will within the next two days would not be persecuted. Persons who gave information on the possession of war materials would be rewarded (BA-MA RH 22/45 f. 38-39).

In June 1942 the Germans launched a big offensive in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus. To alleviate German pressure, Moscow decided to intensify partisan warfare in Ukraine. In June and July, Saburov and Kovpak partisan units, composed for the most part of Russians or of Russified people, came down from the forests of Briansk and began to harass the garrisons and the communication links in the far north of Ukraine (Yampil-Hremiach). On 28 June, the Saburov

partisans took Yampol for several hours (Brechak 10:132) and withdrew carrying off much booty. Several weeks later the entire population of this region had to submit to a check by special police and SD units. On 9 July the special units questioned 808 persons in the Konotop-Krolevets canton, shooting 318 of them. In the Yampil-Seredyna-Buda district an SD-commando questioned 586 persons on 16 July, shooting 215. At that time the Kovpak partisan group (700 to 1,000 men) south of the Yampol station, withdrew into the forests. The checking and cleansing operations continued in the Novhorod-Siversky, Seredyna-Buda, and several other cantons of the region. The Germans arrested in all 3,624 persons of whom 1,508 were shot and 2,116 released (BA-MA RH 22/66 f. 42).

Until this time the Germans used in their reports and speeches the term "partisan," but on 31 July 1942 Himmler ordered his staff to eliminate the term "for psychological reasons" and because this term was glorified by the Bolsheviks. This decision was communicated to police and SD securities in the east through order number 24 of 13 August 1942 which specified that partisans were not soldiers but bandits (BA R 58/698 f. 42). On 17 August the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine also ordered the use of the terms "bandits," "gang," "group of Bolshevik bandits," etc. to replace "partisans" (BA-MA RW 41/18 Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Ukraine, Abt.Ia Nr.5729 [4262]/42 gen.).

On 23 August 1942 Kovpak, Saburov and several other Soviet partisan leaders held a conference near Trubchevsk in southern Russia and shortly received orders to go to Moscow. They flew to Moscow from a partisan airport located in Smielizh in southern Russia, and on 31 August took part in an important meeting in Stalin's presence at the Kremlin with Soviet political and military leaders. At that time a decision was made to improve coordination of partisan activities and those of the Red Army, and to intensify the partisan war by developing its activities in regions of Ukraine where it did not as yet exist.

On 11 September Saburov and Kovpak returned from Moscow to the forests of Briansk where their detachments were to prepare themselves for a march "westward." Armaments, including sixteen-mm canons, equipment, radios, maps, and uniforms, were delivered by planes that landed on the secret Smielizh airport. Gathered within Russia, in the Trubchevsk region, the two detachments (1,408 men in Saburov's

detachment, 1,075 men in Kovpak's) began their march on 26 October 1942 (Brechak 11:131-133).

Soviet partisan groups in the north-west of Ukraine had already been organized by parachuted agents. On the night from 22 to 23 August 1942, for example, a group of nine men was parachuted near Korosten to intensify the activities of the partisan groups there and to create new ones in the Ovruch, Bilokorovychi, and some other districts. The same group was assigned to take charge of operations to interrupt the Bilokorovychi-Korosten-Novhorod-Volynsky communication lines (*Zhytomyrshchyna* 67). According to a report of the group's leader dated 8 October, several partisan groups were already in this region: in Usove (25 men); Luhyny (100 men); Antonychi (25 men), near Bilokorovychi (200 men) (*Zhytomyrshchyna* 68).

On 18 August Hitler ordered that severe measures be taken against the "bandits" to eliminate this danger before winter. Rosenberg also recommended in a letter of 23 August addressed to the Reichskommissars in Ostland and Ukraine to strengthen repressive measures against anyone helping the "bandits." He proposed in addition "generous compensation" to those who collaborated in the fight against the partisans. To fight the partisans, the Germans were going to transfer five divisions from the front into the two Reichskommissariats. Rosenberg added that the Führer did not contest the formation of native units but had forbidden their use at the front (BA R 6/354 f. 67-70).

Anticipating Rosenberg's instructions, the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine and Reichskommissar Koch had already promised in posters on 5 July 1942 all persons supplying information leading to the capture of a "member of a gang," a saboteur or an escaped prisoner of war a choice of a 1,000-ruble reward, the priority right to receive food supplies, or even a plot of land (*Kievshchyna* 283).

In an order of 18 October 1942 Hitler asked that the fight against the partisans be strengthened and made most cruel: "In all the eastern regions the war against the partisans is a war for total extermination of one or the other," he said. On 16 December Hitler ordered action "without restrictions" against women and children (BA-MA RW 4/v.604 f. 21). All of these provisions also concerned the Ukrainian nationalist resistance.

In August 1942 the partisan activities increased considerably in northwest Ukraine. A report of the police headquarters of Brest-Litovsk of 5 September indicated that attacks on roads leading from this town to Kovel were taking place in broad daylight. On 18 August the "bandits" killed two high officials of the police headquarters of Lutsk and on 3 September three members of the German police. The attacks against German property increased everywhere in the region (BA R 94/7 Der Gend.-Gebietsführer Tgb. Nr.72/42).

At this time small armed groups of Ukrainian nationalists were already operating in the region south of Brest-Litovsk and Pinsk. Other groups were organizing in these regions or arriving from the General Government, but the Germans failed to distinguish adequately the Soviet "bandits" from the nationalist "bandits."

The Central Committee of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, which had taken refuge in Moscow, addressed the Ukrainians on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, reminding them of the "happy life" of Ukraine under the Soviet regime and of the terrible German oppression. The Communist party called on the Ukrainians to defend the acquisitions of the "great October Revolution" and to fight in a general popular war against the "German animals": "Kill the Germans! If each man and each woman kills a single occupant, there will not be enough Germans for all of us. If you want to live, kill the Germans!" concluded the leaflet (*Komunistychna partia Ukraïny* 2:12).

Ukrainian Nationality Not Recognized

Hitler and his close collaborators hoped to draw from Ukraine 7,000,000 to 10,000,000 tons of wheat (BA R 6/35 f. 93), although this number seemed exaggerated to many German experts for practical as well as for political reasons. If the Germans continued to mistreat the Ukrainians, these expectations were not going to be realized, but the Germans continued with discriminatory and repressive measures. In 1942 restaurants, train cars, newspapers appeared marked "Nur für Deutsche" ("Reserved for the Germans").

General Kitzing, commander-in-chief of the army in Ukraine,

repeated on 18 July 1942 the main rules of German conduct toward the natives: behavior was to be "friendly," but relationships with natives were to be limited because close contact was dangerous. The attitude of the officers and the soldiers was to be that of masters, not in the sense of superiority but of reserve, distance and exclusiveness.

Kitzinger wrote: "The Ukrainian was and remains a stranger to us. All exaggerated devotion and confidence toward the Ukrainians and all excessive interest for their art and cultural life weaken essential traits that make up Germany's power and grandeur." Consequently private invitations coming from Ukrainians could not be accepted unless they served the interest of the services. Attendance at Ukrainian performances was regulated by the local military authorities. Participation in German social manifestations in the company of natives was forbidden. A special reservation was recommended in relations with the female civilian population (BA-MA RW 41-18 Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Ukraine, Gr.Ic Nr.5771 [564]/42 geh.). On 6 August 1942, the commandant of Kiev forbade Germans to invite Ukrainians to restaurants and stadiums.

At the end of July 1942 Rosenberg desired to perfect the administrative division for the eastern occupied territories. He proposed that Hitler enlarge the Reichskommissariat Ostland to 550,000 km². Originally the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was to extend over 1,000,000 km² and include some purely Russian territories for strategical reasons (e.g., so that the railroad line Saratov-Briansk in the direction of the General Government would pass entirely through the Reichskommissariat Ukraine). Modifying this plan, Rosenberg proposed a new commissariat located between the Caucasus and Ukraine, the Reichskommissariat Don-Volga that was to cover 550,000 km² and encompass the Generalbezirke Rostov, Voronezh, and Saratov, the German colonies on the Volga and Stalingrad and the territory going as far as the Ural River, with Gurev near the Caspian Sea, as well as the Generalbezirk of the Kalmuks to the north of the Caucasus. The Reichskommissariat Ukraine would have little more than 600,000 km². Kursk and Tambov would become part of the Reichskommissariat Russia.

Rosenberg also proposed to Hitler a nomination list at the rank of

general commissars: Assistant Gauleiter Sieckmeier in Rostov; SA-Obergruppenführer Denecke in Stalingrad; SS-Gruppenführer Sporenberg in Saratov; Assistant Gauleiter Simon in Voronezh; SS-Brigadenführer Johst in Kalmukia. Rosenberg asked Hitler to decide where Kalmukia was to belong: to the new Reichskommissariat or to that of the Caucasus (BA R 6/18 f. 107-109).

When Moscow decided on 29 July 1942 to create three military medals bearing the names of the Russian national historical heroes—Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Alexander Nevsky—Rosenberg determined to submit to Hitler's approval the text of an appeal to the eastern peoples in which he proposed in some way to counteract this action.

In his plan of appeal, dated 4 August 1942, Rosenberg affirmed that the Bolsheviks had not kept any promises made since 1917. They had given the people neither bread nor land. The peasants were stripped of their possessions to profit the kolkhozes. The right to self-determination "of all the peoples, including Russians," had not been respected. Lenin's and Stalin's bolshevism trampled on the historical past of the peoples to turn them into fighters of world revolution. The policies of bolshevism consisted in provoking revolts and insurrection in the world. Instead of accomplishing the well-being promised to the peoples of the Soviet Union, communism was determined to bring the same misery, the same horrors to other peoples.

Having insulted the traditions of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, continued Rosenberg, Stalin "has since the beginning of the war begun to make appeals to the same [Russian] national consciousness that he had until now scorned" (BA R 6/35 f. 99-109). Peter the Great and the czarist generals, Suvorov and Kutuzov, suddenly became models for the people, especially for the Russians who had fallen "into this trap." Millions of people truly believed that they were going to fight for the motherland, but this was not the case. In contrast, "Germany, and all roused Europeans are not fighting against you but for you, against the Bolshevik exploitation of the peoples."

Germany, affirmed Rosenberg, abolished the kolkhoz system and restored religious freedom. "In the German Wehrmacht Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Kirgiz, and also a legion of Turkmen are already fighting in the east." Factories have been put back into working

order; work is guaranteed. National and cultural life has been restored. The German Reich is ready to construct a new life with the peoples in the east. Rosenberg ended his plan of appeal with the fervent cry: "Long live the cooperation of all the liberated peoples of Europe and social justice for all workers!" (BA R 6/35 f. 110).

Rosenberg's awkward and vague arguments in no way corresponded with the real plans of the Germans. They did indicate, however, that Rosenberg had abandoned his initial tactics of addressing the principle of nationalities of the Soviet Union. His plan of appeal, on the contrary, addressed the population of the USSR as if it were composed of Russians only, i.e., no promises were made from the nationality viewpoint to the peoples of Eastern Europe. Despite that, his plan of appeal did not seem to have been accepted by Hitler.

On 11 August 1942 Rosenberg drafted a report on the situation in the eastern countries for Hitler, informing the Führer that the birth rate in Ukraine had gone down, schools of higher learning had been closed since the autumn of 1941 with only four-year schools remaining. But the Germans needed primers that could be printed in Ukraine. Participation of Ukrainians in the administration stopped at the level of district heads and there was no question of a Ukrainian administrative autonomy; contrary to what Hitler had been told, "no such plan existed." As to the Führer's wish to see German cities built in Ukraine to welcome members of the German administration so that the Germans would not have to live in existing cities, Rosenberg explained that this was beyond German strength.

Rosenberg then raised the problem of the seat of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Hitler had never wanted it to be moved from Rivne to Kiev to keep from giving the impression that Kiev had once again become the capital of Ukraine. The seat of the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht was also located in Rivne, but the general quarters of the SS and of the police were in Kiev. Despite Rosenberg's intervention, Hitler did not want to change the *status quo*.

Reichsführer-SS Himmler, who had just visited Ukraine, labeled Rosenberg's idea to print Ukrainian primers pure "idiocy." As to the social question in Ukraine, Himmler was of the opinion that the only way to resolve it was "to kill the others and take their fields" (BA R 6/85

f.8-15; BA NS 19 neu/1446 f. 20-21).

Himmler considered the entire population of the Soviet Union Russian, a concept of many German politicians and military leaders, who in the manner of the Russian partisans of the empire considered all the peoples of the USSR, including the Ukrainians part of the Russian people. Speaking of Ukrainians, some of them often used the term "so-called Ukrainians." This is the manner in which Martin Bormann expressed himself in a letter addressed to Alfred Rosenberg on 23 July 1942 in which he reminded the latter that the populations in the east, including the "so-called Ukrainians," should not receive any higher education; it was sufficient to teach them only to read and write (*Das Dritte Reich* 2:209).

Considering on 13 September 1942 the future of the German race, Himmler worried that after the end of the war there would be only 80,000,000 Germans faced with a "mass of 200,000,000 Russians" who in twenty-five to fifty years would increase to 240,000,000. All these Russians (thus all the peoples of the USSR without exception) constituted, according to Himmler, "the avant-garde of Asia." The numerical inferiority of the Germans, according to him, was for the moment compensated for by the presence of the Führer, but fate gave such a leader only once every 2,000 years to a people (BA NS 19 neu/1446 f.24).

Himmler, like Hitler, considered the Ukrainians to be simply Russians. In conformity with instructions of Nazi authorities, especially the RSHA, the Ukrainian nationality was not recognized in the territory of the Reich with the exception of émigrés and civilian workers who had come to Germany from the General Government (they had the right to have Ukrainian certificates from the Ukrainian bureau of confidence in Berlin or from one of the committees of mutual aid functioning in the General Government). Consequently, all Ukrainians of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine deported to the territories of the Reich were considered *ex officio* Russian *Ostarbeiter* (workers from the Russian east) who did not have the right to have certificates of nationality issued by these Ukrainians organizations (BA R 58/1031 f. 81-83).

Ukrainians deported to concentration camps, including many OUN-B members, and other Ukrainian prisoners of war were obliged to

carry the nationality of their country of origin. During registration at the camp they were recorded as Russians (for the Soviet Union), Poles, Czechs, or Romanians. Those of the imprisoned who were Ukrainian and identified themselves thus during registration, were not recognized as such and were severely beaten because they claimed kinship with a nationality that did not exist (Marunchak 16-22; Fedoriv *Narodna Vol'a*, 1 November 1984).

This tendency to consider everyone Russian led some Germans to a sort of standardization of the Slavic population, along the principle that all of Russia is Slavic and everyone Slavic is Russian. By referring in his letter to Rosenberg of 23 July 1942 to the eight basic principles of the policies in the east, Bormann also classified all populations of the Soviet Union as Russian, but Peter Kleist, high official in the ministry of foreign affairs, could not understand this attitude. He thought that currently used expressions, such as "so-called Ukrainian," were eliminating all attempts to finding a political solution to the problems in the east. And he added: "We thus arrive at a notion of an unlimited Slavic mass that inevitably presents a danger since we maintain with it [the mass] the unitary concept imposed by Great Russians and the Bolsheviks" (BA R 6/85 f. 18-19).

Three days later, on 17 August 1942, the attitude of the Nazi authorities was criticized by another high German official who wrote: "If a Frenchman who arrived in peacetime in America saw himself called European by the Americans he would be very astonished. We provoke an even greater astonishment with the Ukrainian, Georgian, Estonian or Latvian who has come to Germany to work when we confuse him with a Russian" (IfZ ED 165). And this official made this impressive declaration based on reality: "We have allowed ourselves to be led into error by a superficial schoolish and blind notion as far as the problems of peoples whom we designate as inhabitants of the Soviet Union, i.e., the greatest prison of many peoples on earth, are concerned by considering them as one and the same people." He pointed out on this occasion the existence of the Baltic peoples, the Ukrainians, the Belorussians, and the people of the Caucasus (IfZ ED 165).

In another document containing criticism of Bormann's letter and Koch's policies in Ukraine, Peter Kleist made an inventory of expressions

and German attitudes that followed this policy: "The Slavs must work for us. If we don't need them, they can die...the Slavic fertility is undesirable....Every instructed man is a future enemy. We are leaving them their saints [of the church] as distraction. As far as food is concerned they receive the bare minimum. We are the masters, we have priority" (BA R 6/85 f.20RS).

"These [Ukrainian] people are very much inferior to us and they should thank God that we have left them alive. We have liberated them, and for this reason they should have no other goal than to work for us. There is no human bond with them. There is no question of following a lenient policy with them. They cannot have any confidence with the district commissars who maintain a good relationship with the population..." (declarations made by Erich Koch).

Peter Kleist affirmed that the editing of Bormann's letter in question was, actually, done by local German leaders who were in the habit of saying:

"We are here exactly as in the land of the Negroes" (discussion of the cultural section in April 1942).

"Those who show themselves to me to be intelligent will be shot" (Gebietskommissar Becher to Haysyn).

"We must always set one group against the other" (repeated in all the policies).

"We draw only what we need, the rest can disappear" (current expression with the officials of economy).

"Kiev is to be clean with the aid of an epidemic. The best would be if the surplus of the population die of starvation" (declaration of a German leader, BA R 6/85 f. 21). The Germans belonging to the same circles rejoiced, moreover, over the destruction, despite the SS supervision, of the historical Pechersk Monastery in Kiev, because to them the disappearance of this monument was going to weaken the national consciousness of the Ukrainians.

But other Germans in Ukraine realized that such a policy of colonization and oppression led only to hate toward the Germans. They said: "If this continues, a misfortune will occur" (BA R 6/85 f. 20-27).

In a long memorandum, another German official, Captain T. Oberländer, drew attention to the unfortunate consequences of German

policies in Ukraine, stating that "one must expect a blend of the agrarian and the national questions and, consequently, [a blend] of social and national intensification of the Ukrainian peasantry" (BA-MA RH 19 V/95, 16, 514/42 geh. Die Ukraine und die militärischen [psychologischen] Notwendigkeiten der weiteren Kriegsführung im Osten, besonders in Kaukasus 4). Excessive mandatory deliveries and requisitions provoked discontent; peasants spoke of German fraud and looting. They carried out German orders "with hate" and compared the German domination with that of the Bolsheviks. They were saying: "May the Germans choke on that which they loot." Or "We are waiting for the moment when we will make the Germans pay."

Other Ukrainians according to Oberländer said: "We are not Africans; we are not a colonial people; the Germans do not understand us and do not try to understand us. This is unbearable." The SD repressions against the Ukrainian intellectuals were interpreted as proof that the Germans wanted to liquidate the entire Ukrainian intelligentsia. It is in this sense that the Ukrainians understood expressions of some Germans who were saying, "The balls of the Ukrainians should be cut off." Oberländer concluded: "If a large part of the Ukrainian population grants an active or even passive support to the partisan movement, the partisans could cut the ground from under the German domination in Ukraine and make the continuation of the war in the east impossible." Theodor Oberländer thought that the "national and cultural aspiration" of the Ukrainian people should be satisfied and the population treated fairly. The Germans, he said, were not going to reach their goal in the east if they did not change their policies in Ukraine considerably. On this change depends the "result of the campaign in the east" (5-10).

At that very same time, however, Erich Koch reaffirmed his position in a letter, dated 25 August 1942, to his subordinates: "The Reich must get all it needs for the victory!...And if we are faced with a choice to know if our compatriots in Germany or the Ukrainians must suffer hunger then we will know without equivocation how to decide" (BA R 6/206 f. 151-152).

Like Himmler, Koch considered the Ukrainians Russians. During a meeting in Rivne from 26 to 28 August under his presidency came the question of agrarian organization, the goal of which was to "safeguard the

cooperation of the Russians" and to guarantee deliveries to the Reich and Europe. Koch accentuated the political principle he was applying in Ukraine: "There is no free Ukraine. Our task is to make the Ukrainians work for the Reich and not to make these people happy. Ukraine must supply everything that is lacking in Germany. This task must be carried out regardless of losses incurred" (BA R 6/70 f. 15ff; IMT 264-PS).

Koch who had just arrived from the general quarters of the Führer said that the education level of the Ukrainians was to be kept low, and he envisioned schools with three grades only. Next, it was necessary to keep the demographic growth rate low. Ukrainians were to work for the Germans at least eight hours a day. The Germans had not freed these people "to make Ukraine happy, but to assure Germany a living space and supplies that it needed" (Appendix, Doc.#140).

The Reichskommissar for Ukraine affirmed further that the situation in the area of supplies was better everywhere in Europe than in Germany. The Führer had ordered 3,000,000 tons of Ukrainian wheat for the Reich, and not to give out any supplies to the civilian population. The only criterion determining German policies in Ukraine, stressed Koch, was the conviction that "we are dealing here with a people inferior on all points." Consequently, it was forbidden to maintain relations with Ukrainians and, above all, to have sexual relations. Koch had already taken measures against this "abuse." He added: "It is not a question that the girls can stroll in the street of Rivne wearing shorts, make-up, smoking cigarettes." The police were to control the way of life of some women and, declared Koch, "at least ten of them will be publicly proclaimed as prostitutes." After the war, Koch continued, "the Russian space" up to Vladivostok will serve as an outlet for German industry, but only products of bad quality, kitsch, would be sold there. The prices would be high because "the occupied regions of the east would have to pay for the cost and the sacrifices of this war" (BA R/70 f. 16-18).

Rosenberg did not approve of Koch's severe stance and cruel policies. Above all, he did not enjoy the direct contact Koch had with the Führer, i.e. his refusal to go through the ministry for the eastern occupied territories. Moreover, Rosenberg was told that on 25 September 1942 Koch in a conversation with an official from his ministry on a

visit to Rivne had called him an "émigré who did not understand anything about the affairs in Ukraine" (BA R 6/481 f. 158). Offended, Rosenberg brought this to Hitler's attention, but the Führer refrained from taking sides.

Koch stressed in the same conversation that the Führer had decided "that Ukraine was to be treated and exploited as a colonial country" and for this reason he himself used the term "slaves" for the Ukrainians (f.159).

Hitler's and Koch's "secret" thesis and policies were regularly displayed in conferences held by German leaders in Ukraine. During a conference in Kiev (30 to 31 October 1942), for instance, Commissar-General Magunia explained that the liquidation of the kolkhozes which had taken place in the Reichskommissariat Ostland, was not to cross the frontiers of this commissariat because this system would be kept in Ukraine, and the Ukrainians would not have the right to land. The sovkhoses (property of the state) would be distributed after the war to German colonists. The Germans, according to Magunia, were in Ukraine as colonists among natives (BA R 6/35 f. 111-112).

All these plans for colonization, exploitation and Germanization were exhibited and shouted in the open-doored, open-windowed conference rooms so that the Ukrainian drivers and workers in the courtyard heard everything. A Ukrainian agronomist also participated in the Kiev conference. All of Ukraine soon was informed of the German "secret" plans. The news also passed through the front and arrived in Moscow.

The author of a report concerning this subject who was in Rivne in November 1942 wrote that in mid-June of the same year during his preceding stay there he had heard practically no talk about partisans, but by 29 November, the date of his report, he had seen orders issued by the Reichskommissariat bureau of nourishment instructing all members of the German services to provide themselves with guns and ammunition immediately because of the danger that the resistance represented (f.113).

Twentieth Century Slaves

To make its war economy function, the Reich had to make constant appeals for foreign manpower.

As far as the eastern territories were concerned, Göring who at the time belonged to the same group of Nazi leaders as Hitler and Himmler, (i.e., for whom all inhabitants of the USSR were Russians), put a particular accent in his order dated 10 January 1942 on the *Russeneinsatz*, the employment of "Russians" (IMT 381-USSR).

From January 1942 onward, the number of *Ostarbeiter* (workers from the east) in the Reich increased constantly. These workers were for the most part Ukrainians. In mid-January, the UNO (Ukrainian National Union) of Berlin protested to different ministries of the Reich, including the ministry of justice, against "restrictions to the freedom of movement of Ukrainians working in Germany and the ban on contact with young German girls" (BA R 43/II/1504a f. 4). The Ukrainian association referred to the severe punishment already being applied and to the threat of the death penalty German authorities issued in Basdorf for all sexual relations with German women (BA R 43 II.1504a f. 4). On 20 February 1942 Himmler made special provisions to increase surveillance of foreign workers and punishment for anticipated crimes (IMT 3040-PS).

The *Ostarbeiter* were to be housed in special camps and bear the word *Ost* ("East") stitched on their clothing as an exterior sign of recognition.

The mandatory recruitment of eastern workers began with the publication of Rosenberg's circular on 6 March 1942 stating that on Göring's request the eastern regions were to supply 627,000 workers (of whom 527,000 were to be recruited in Ukraine: 237,000 industrial workers and 290,000 farm workers) (IMT 580-PS). On 21 March 1942 Fritz Sauckel was put in charge of recruiting the foreign workers with the assignment to direct 1,600,000 foreign workers to the Reich before 24 July 1942 (IMT 1296-PS).

To reach the set quotas, German leaders in each district in the east resorted to harsh methods. Thus, for example, the Gebietskommissar of Brest-Litovsk shipped to Germany 200 women and 300 men who were

wrongly accused of being Bolshevik sympathizers, as well as 1,250 prisoners of war. Sauckel's service continued to call for workers. The "recruitment" continued, but the Gebietskommissar indicated in April that voluntary recruitment, in fact, made no sense because "no one here wanted to leave." Consequently, the Germans resorted to a census of people capable of working to send them to Germany. This measure provoked difficulties; the action did not work out because "a large number of peasants and workers disappeared into the woods" (BA R 94/7 Der Gebietskommissar, Monatsbericht, Brest-Litovsk 24 April 1942).

Recruitment continued everywhere, but it was hampered because of simultaneous efforts by many German leaders who laid claim to manpower to get local plants working. Dargel, Koch's assistant, had to warn them by stressing that the number of workers in the Reichskommissariat was not limitless and that the opening of plants was not to hamper the shipment of workers to Germany (BA R 6/19 f. 31). In July the lack of workers for local needs was already felt (BA-MA RH 22/47 Abt. VII Nr.386/42 geh.H.QU. 10 July 1942:6).

The population was hit everywhere with methods of recruitment and transport and working conditions in Germany. The mass forced recruitment was compared by the population to the Bolshevik deportation to forced labor in Siberia. Reports of the transport conditions and the treatment of the Ukrainian workers in Germany were alarming. Letters from the Reich told of separation of families, home sickness, fear of never seeing the family and Ukraine again, harsh conditions and difficult work in Germany (BA-MA RH 22/39 f. 87).

From 1 April 1942, Sauckel's service carried out the following "recruitment":

Workers from the east	971,832
Galicia	108,152
Soviet prisoners of war	<u>221,109</u>
Total	1,301,093

France	31,300
Italy	55,726
The Netherlands	31,300
Slovakia	15,265
Other countries	<u>55,075</u>
Grand total	1,489,759

On 24 July 1942 Germany had 5,124,000 foreign workers (of whom 1,148,000 had come from the occupied countries in the east), 1,576,000 prisoners of war, and 2,400,000 workers of different nationalities (IMT 1296-PS).

The German military leaders were the first ones to become alarmed at the treatment of the workers from the east. They saw two principal motives for the change in the attitude of the population: the absence of the key ideas that could mobilize the "Russians" around Germany and the news concerning the poor treatment of the "voluntary Russian workers" in Germany. These workers, stated the report, were enclosed in camps surrounded with barbed wire, were poorly fed, and wore the insignia "Ost" making them second-class people and giving credence to Bolshevik propaganda. They were poorly paid (three to four Marks a week), constantly beaten, and treated shamefully. Families were dispersed, and children were separated from their parents. Many of these workers wrote to their relatives in Ukraine: "The Soviet propaganda was right. We are being treated like slaves. Pray for the victory of the Reds" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2558 f. 34-35).

In November 1942, the head of the Wehrmacht high command in Ukraine decided to send an officer to the Reich to make inquiries in the camps of the workers from the east. The officer, Lieutenant Theurer, knew that Ukraine was far from being pacified and that it was to be expected "that a growing number of people go over to the bandits or Bandera's camp or to other enemy groups" (IMT 054-PS 102; Appendix, Doc.#146).

Other leaders of the army had reports drafted concerning the recruitment and treatment of workers. Captain Schmidt, director of a transit camp for qualified workers in Kharkiv, indicated in his report that originally there had been volunteers, especially qualified workers. Then,

to reach the imposed quota workers were taken by force. The Germans sought workers at night, without allowing them to take their belongings, even without shoes or clothing (the report cited one woman dressed only in a shift), and locking them up in cellars. The following day they were taken to the station and put on trains. They were also mistreated, threatened, beaten by the Ukrainian militia. The report stated that one woman had been beaten to the point that she could no longer walk. The report added the mayors and the militia were committing excesses in the name of the Wehrmacht.

Trains that took these people to Germany sometimes passed trains coming from Germany packed with sick, injured, wounded workers. Crammed into the railroad cars, they were left without food. Those who died were unloaded on the tracks before the eyes of those who were going to Germany.

The transport conditions of the workers being taken to Germany were appalling. People received very little food and water. The assistance staff in German railroad stations, especially the women of the Red Cross, adopted a malicious and hostile attitude. The report stated:

"Even food was refused with the remark that these are 'Russian pigs.' No one realizes that these were Ukrainians because no one understands these things" (IMT 054-PS, XXV:103). Moreover, the report continued, German police and security "passed limits permitted to them" and they "liken Ukrainians to Bolsheviks who, however, for years have been the natural enemy of bolshevism." The report added that unfortunately "a large part of the German people sees in the Ukrainian worker an enemy and a Russian Bolshevik and treat him accordingly" (IMT 054-PS, XXV:103-110).

A Ukrainian engineer who had gone voluntarily to Germany wrote in April 1942 to a friend in Kharkiv that instead of work in his line he was assigned to unload coal from trains. His nourishment consisted of three fourth of a liter of tea in the morning at 4 am, soup in the evening at 6 pm and 250 grams of bread per day. At the age of twenty-four, this engineer concluded that there was only the choice between escape and suicide (XXV:111).

Because the Führer had decided on a new armament program, von Sauckel had to increase the total number of workers in Germany. On 5

October 1942 he asked the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to supply him with an additional 500,000 workers (250,000 before 31 December 1942 and 250,000 before 1 May 1943). The "recruitment" of the workers, he said, was to take place by any means (IMT 017-PS 73).

The "Sauckel action" was followed implacably. The OKW pointed to cases where people were bound hand and foot before being transported to the station (BA R 6/79 f. 15). One woman, Antonina Sidelnyk, wrote in a letter, intercepted by the censor, the sequence of events in the Volhynia villages, especially in Bilozirka.

In this village twenty-five to twenty-eight persons had received notification to leave for Germany. All fled. Then the German police came and began to burn their houses. Six houses were already in flames. "The people got on their knees, kissed the hands of the policemen," begging them to spare the other houses. But the policemen beat them with rubber billies and continued to set fire to the houses (f.5-6). A letter from Kateryna Tokarchuk confirmed these happenings and added that instead of twenty-eight men the Germans took away forty-one persons (f. 9; Appendix, Doc. #150).

The neighboring villages (Shushkivtsi, Molotkiv, Osnyky, and Moskalivka) experienced the same fate. Schools were closed; the buildings burned, and the parents of these young people were taken to prison to force their children to surrender. The hunt for people to be deported to Germany lasted for several days. Those who were taken were locked up in the school without the possibility of leaving it even to satisfy their natural needs; they were to do so in the school. A group of pilgrims who had come to the Pochaiv convent was also taken to be deported. Among these were blind and old people¹⁰ (f. 5-6).

The authorities in Berlin knew of all these events because of censored letters sent from Ukraine to relatives working in Germany. These letters bore witness to the degradation of the population's morale and contained "description of appalling coercive measures."

To reach the imposed quota, the Germans organized roundups in the streets and marketplaces, during village festivals. Panic seized the population, people went into hiding. From the beginning of October 1942 on, the houses of refractors were systematically burned in reprisal (AA Pol.XIII 1040 Auslandsbriefprüfstelle Berlin, Stimmungsbericht,

Berlin, 11 November 1942). With the increased requisitions of the harvest, milk, livestock, it is not difficult to have a general idea of the desperate atmosphere into which Ukraine had been plunged.

On 21 December 1942 Rosenberg protested to Sauckel against the arbitrary methods of workers' "recruitment," but his letter had little impact (IMT 018-PS).

Approximately six months later, the army had a report drafted by an important official of Russian origin, or a German from Russia, who visited many camps of workers, on the conditions of the life of the workers from the east. His report is deeply distressing. The nourishment of the workers from the east generally consisted of a half-liter of rutabaga in the morning, a liter of rutabaga at noon, a liter of rutabaga in the evening, 300 grams of bread per day, as well as fifty to seventy-five grams of margarine, and twenty-five grams of meat per week. This diet and the lack of vitamins inevitably led to exhaustion and caused all sorts of illnesses (tuberculosis, eczema, nervous problems, etc.) In some camps children, ages four to fifteen, were without parents. Youngsters of fourteen years of age worked sometimes more than ten hours a day. They had even set up camps for children where they suffered from hunger and were learning to be delinquent.

The workers from the east received for their hard labor, besides food, between 17.50 and 39.50 Reichsmark per month (while the salary of a Germans was 180 RM per month). In conformity with the Nazi ideology, the Ukrainians and the Russians were *Untermenschen* (sub-humans), hence the severity of their treatment.

They were beaten during work. Women were beaten in the face with nail-studded planks; pregnant women were trampled on the stomachs. Men and women were often locked up in freezing solitary confinement practically without food or clothing.

Still, according to the same German report, Soviet agitators and agents in the camps caused trouble. They generally began by winning the confidence of the German administration and helped them to mistreat the workers (to intensify their hate against the Germans). They set up clandestine communist organizations and prepared sabotages. Some of these agents maintained contacts with partisans in the occupied territories and even with Soviet territories. They assured the workers

from the east that after the war everything was going to be fine in Soviet Russia. The workers, whose life in Germany was more unfortunate and more miserable than even under the Soviets, were ready to believe them.

This official studied the situation in several camps. He presented himself as a Russian, which made contact with the people easy. According to his report, in the camps of Berlin-Kaulsdorf and Berlin-Neuköln, and in other camps in the Berlin vicinity, the workers from the east were beaten while working and on other occasions. In the Berlin-Neuköln camp two workers who defended themselves were killed. In the Berlin-Halensee camps, three workers from the Kharkiv region, V. Guriev, D. Vashchenko, V. Shewiakine, who had stolen some rutabaga and potatoes, were shot behind a barrack and all the camps inmates were forced to walk past the corpses covered with blood. Those who hesitated to look at them were beaten. From all the workers who had arrived in a transport from Kharkiv in January 1942, by the end of the year approximately only fifty men remained alive; the others were dead from undernourishment. Three to four persons had died each day in that camp.

To survive, workers ate leaves from trees. In a camp near Katowitz (Katowice), every worker who came near the fence was shot at. In October 1942 one worker was killed, another seriously wounded. Recaptured escapees were generally thrown into blast furnaces. The German police were aware of this, but they did nothing about it. In the Berlin-Grünwald camp, workers from the east were sentenced to flogging before the assembled camp for having picked up food scraps or two to three potatoes. In December 1942, Shykiuk received fifteen strokes with a cane and Shienko twenty-five. Ivan Lechenko was beaten for having brought to the camp potatoes he had bought from a German farmer.

The workers were often sentenced to solitary confinement. Death because of exhaustion was frequent. In the Oranienburg camp, one of the commandants habitually made people go out naked in winter and doused them with water to "wash" them. In the Wildau camp of 400 persons, food for the workers of the east consisted of unwashed spinach with added sand. Near Berlin, in the Blaukenfeld camp, those incapable of working, the sick and wounded awaiting repatriation, had no beds,

mattresses, blankets, or medical supervision. Women gave birth on the floor. Among the many gruesome examples, the report cited the incredible case of rape of a young Ukrainian woman by a German hotel waiter with the help of his wife (BA-MA RH 2/v.2559 f. 55-72).

A significant number of women were among the persons deported to Germany. Hitler had given express orders to have 400,000 to 500,000 Ukrainians ages fifteen to thirty-five come to Germany for domestic work to relieve the German women. A large number of these Ukrainian women, according to his order, were to be Germanized. Hitler was in a hurry: it was his wish that in 100 years there be in Europe 250,000,000 persons who would speak German (IMT, cf. Vyzv. Ch.V/1964, 504).

On 18 September 1942 Reichsführer-SS Himmler and the new Reichsminister of justice, Thierack agreed that all the "antisocial elements" in prisons and places of detention in Germany, especially "all Jews, Gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians" in preventive or sentenced detention, as well as Poles sentenced to more than three years, Czechs, and Germans sentenced to more than eight years, be handed over to the Reichsführer-SS for their "annihilation through work." Further, "taking into account the goals set by the leadership of the state concerning the settling of questions of the east, Jews, Gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians would in the future no longer be brought before ordinary jurisdiction but would be liquidated by the Reichsführer-SS" (IMT 654-PS, XXVI: 200ff).

This agreement corresponded to the general plan of annihilation of the mentioned peoples, as Thierack admitted in a letter of 13 October 1942 to Bormann. He mentioned particularly in this letter that "despite the severity of condemnations," German justice "could contribute to the extermination of the nationals of these peoples only in a minimum measure." Consequently, he thought that the police who were not bound by laws would obtain best results. Thierack added that as far as such arrangements were concerned, they implied that the German national body be rid of these peoples and that it was necessary to "free the eastern regions annexed to the Reich as colonies for the German people" (IfZ NG-558; Krausnick 2:320). Following this agreement, 12,658 prisoners were transferred from prisons to concentration camps; 5,935 among them died within six months.

Formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Through seized documents and interrogations of arrested militants, the security services of the Reich began to know the workings and the structure of the OUN-B. They knew that at the head of this organization was a central leadership to which various regional leaderships were subordinated. Ukraine was divided into three regions: western territory (Galicia), northwestern territory (Volhynia), and central and eastern territories (regions of Kiev, Kharkiv, Donbass, and the entire south). In August 1942 in the Kiev region alone the OUN-B numbered at least one thousand members.

The Germans noted that the Bandera movement had been active first in Western and central Ukraine and that "its work had extended gradually over the rest of the Ukrainian territories" (BA R 58/222 f. 76). In September 1942 the RSHA admitted that "one should always consider the Bandera group as the most radical Ukrainian independist movement whose animosity toward the Germans is especially pronounced" (f. 76).

This movement, according to the RSHA reports opposed the departure of young Ukrainians for Germany and called on the youth not to give in to constraint. In Sarny, Germans seized from a female leader instructions of the OUN-B on strengthening its activities in each village, each factory, and organizing military training. Another instruction warned to expect massive arrests and its members were consequently told to increase vigilance. Members who were arrested were never to admit belonging to the Bandera movement. All German-Ukrainian manifestations were to be boycotted. The directives finally stated: "All collaboration with the occupying forces is considered high treason and will be punished with death" (Appendix, Doc.###137, 142, 141).

An OUN-B poster calling Ukrainians "to free themselves by their own means from the German madmen" was posted on a barn in the Horokhiv region. Extensive activities of this organization were noticed in September 1942 in the Zhytomyr district in Haisyn where seven persons were arrested, as well as in the Zaporizhia region and in other places. Some persons suspected of belonging to the OUN-B were arrested in Kiev. In Znamenska near Mykolaiv a sentinel and one other member of the Ukrainian protection police freed two prisoners, OUN-B

members, and fled with them carrying away a gun and ammunition (Appendix, Doc.##143, 145).

Bandera movement leaflets were distributed in Kharkiv. In Dnipropetrovsk fifteen persons were arrested on 6 September 1942 for having belonged to the secret organization "Prosvita" which aimed to fight against all foreign influence and for the "creation of an independent Ukraine" (Appendix, Doc.#147).

The German report concerning this period (September to beginning of October 1942) also mentioned "another more important gang," observed in the Sarny district "that was being led by a Bandera activist, Borovets." In reality they were referring to a detachment commanded by Ostap, not to Bulba-Borovets' detachment which at that time was in the Ludvypil-Kostopil region near Rivne. Taras Bulba-Borovets was then indeed maintaining close ties with the Bandera movement, but his detachment of partisans was independent. By confusing the Bulba-Borovets partisan group with the Bandera movement, the German report attributed to the Bandera movement and the Ukrainian movement of "national bandits" in general some of the activities of Bulba's independent group. The report affirmed especially that Bandera's resistance movement was manifesting "a kindly neutrality toward the Bolshevik bandits," that "the proclamation of war against the Bolsheviks was disappearing more and more from its propaganda," and that it now was directed only against the Germans. According to the same report, the leaders of Bandera's resistance movement believed, following the rapprochement between England, the USA, and the USSR, in "a rapprochement between the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the Bolsheviks" (Appendix, Doc.#148).

In reality, this confusion doubtless came from Taras Bulba-Borovets' entry into talks with emissaries of the central high command of the Soviet partisan movement. In his memoirs, Bulba-Borovets explains that he had been contacted by Soviet agents in May 1942, thus at the very beginning of the existence of his detachment of partisans. Soviet agents had proposed to him a contact with the high command of the Red Army. In June, Bulba and his collaborators accepted. In August, a Soviet partisan group under the command of Colonel D.M. Medvedev was parachuted into the Olevsk-Rokytno-Horodnytsia triangle. This group of the "Soviet

group of the "Soviet delegation" included Lieutenant-Colonel A.A. Lukin and Captain Brezhnev. In the beginning of September 1942, Lukin, Brezhnev, and three other members of the delegation, accompanied by a guard of fifteen soldiers, made contact with the general quarters of Bulba-Borovets. Their talks took place in the Stara-Huta hamlet not far from Ludvypil. Each delegate formulated proposals for eventual collaboration. Bulba accepted the proposal to stop hostilities and to proclaim neutrality. Although confirmed by the Soviet side at the end of November 1942, the neutrality between the two camps lasted little more than six months (Bulba-Borovets 215-222).

Bulba-Borovets, as head of independent Ukrainian partisans, also made contact with the Germans in November 1942. On 23 September he met Pütz, the head of the SD in Volhynia-Podolia, and then Beyer, another SD leader (223-234). During these talks and in his conversation with Pütz, Bulba-Borovets courageously defended the interests of the Ukrainian population, severely criticizing German policies in Ukraine and refusing to allow himself be manipulated against Bandera's resistance movement.

In October 1942 the Germans noticed that the OUN-B was continuing "to recruit among the population in an intense manner" to place its movement "on the largest possible scale." Furthermore, the Bandera movement accelerated the education of women and youth, trying at the same time to infiltrate all existing Ukrainian organizations and associations (Appendix, Doc.#148).

Before reorganizing its armed groups into large military units, the OUN-B took care to prepare the necessary framework. Three secret military schools were operating in Western Ukraine: two in Galicia (the school for officers near Mosty Velyki, under the direction of D. Hrytsai-Perebynis and the school for non-commissioned officers near Pomoriany, directed by Ivakhiv-Ros) and one in Volhynia (the Klevan school for non-commissioned officers that was discussed earlier and that was transferred to a location near Rivne). Various courses of military instruction were conducted also in Volhynia and Podolia (Osypenko 26).

The security service in Berlin had to admit that Bandera's resistance movement was quickly evolving into "an active fight." Since May 1942 this movement, "was seriously busy with setting up gangs, especially in the

western part of Ukraine." In July, according to the same report, "movements of these bandits had been observed in the Kamianets-Podilsky region." In the northwest of Ukraine, the OUN-B was instructing armed groups that they assembled "from time to time to train on the grounds" (Appendix, Doc.#148).

Finally came the order to muster. During September and the beginning of October 1942 a large detachment of Ukrainian national fighters assembled in the Sarny region. This muster was confirmed by a communication of the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine on 16 October (Appendix, Doc.#149). This was the detachment commanded by an important member of the OUN-B, Ostap (Serhi Kachynsky). Another detachment gathered under the command of Captain Dovbeshka-Korobka (Ivan Perehiyniak), also an important member of the OUN-B. Other detachments were formed gradually in the course of the following weeks in the districts of Kolky, Pustomyty, and Kremiannets. These were the national partisan units that became the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstanska Armia, UPA).

A report of the RSHA, dated 4 December 1942, still did not distinguish between the Soviet partisans and nationalist partisans, noting that in Ukraine the activities of the "bandits" had not diminished. In the Rivne and Zhytomyr region alone 150 attacks (aimed to obtain supplies) were recorded during the last week of November, also assaults with explosives and derailments. The activities of the Ukrainian insurgents and the Soviet partisans had already affected the requisition of grains. In the Rivne region, where these activities were not yet extensive, the seizure of the grains was 80% to 100%, but in other regions it had decreased noticeably: 28% in the Pinsk region, from 32% to 35% in the Kostopil region; from 25% to 30% in the Sarny region (Appendix, Doc.#158).

War between Ukrainians and Soviet Partisans

Groups of Soviet partisans were also active in Polissia and Volhynia where they fought against the installations of the occupying forces, attacking German soldiers. In reprisal, the Germans destroyed many

Ukrainian villages and killed their inhabitants. For example, on 23 September 1942 they destroyed the villages of Borky, Zabolotia, Borysivka and Kortelisy (Appendix, Doc.#144). Trapped in a church and other buildings, 2,892 inhabitants of Kortelisy perished in flames. The livestock, farm materials, wheat reserve of the destroyed village were confiscated.

The attitude of the Russian Communist party and the Soviet partisans regarding Ukrainian nationalism and the independist movement was unequivocal. The Ukrainian nationalists were, in their eyes, collaborators helping the Germans and, as was written in a leaflet of the Communist party "dreaming in their dull minds to get as compensation a 'free Ukraine.'" The members of the party and the Soviet partisans were thus fighting not only against the German occupant but also against the "Ukraino-German nationalists" (*Listivky* 22-23). Soviet propaganda was cleverly mixing the members of the Ukrainian police, the mayors, and all those who were working in German services with Ukrainian nationalism. All collaborators were thus automatically labeled "Ukrainian nationalists."

In the northwest of Ukraine, where detachments of Ukrainian national resistance were gathering, Soviet partisans needed a truce while they waited to reinforce their presence; thus came the talks between Soviet emissaries and Bulba-Borovets. Colonel D.M. Medvedev's Soviet partisan group, parachuted in the first half of August 1942, was really a special detachment of information and subversion, one of whose members was also the agent of Russian intelligence, M.I. Kuznetsov who was operating in a lieutenant's uniform of the Wehrmacht as Paul Siebert. One of the tasks of this group was to inform Moscow of the development of the Ukrainian national resistance movement. The talks between Bulba and Lieutenant-Colonel Lukin took place in the beginning of September 1942. On 11 September Saburov and Kovpak returned from Moscow to the forest of Briansk and began preparing their detachments for a march "westward." At the time when the OUN-B began setting up large detachments of the insurgent army (UPA), two Soviet detachments received orders to leave southern Russia and to proceed to the northwestern part of Ukraine (*Brechak* 11:132). The two well-equipped Soviet detachments, approximately 2,500 men strong, began to

march on 26 October 1942.

The parachute drops of partisan groups and Soviet agents, whose equipment always included powerful transmitters, continued. These groups usually took off aboard PS/84 Douglas planes from the Moscow airport. They were usually parachuted into the marshy regions between Korosten and Kovel. One of these groups was dropped in the night of 10 and 11 November sixty kilometers west of Korosten. Its mission was to pass into the outlying sections of Olevske; to take command of the groups already in the Zhytomyr region; infiltrate all establishments, cooperatives, education, religious communities, councils of the churches, police training, associations; systematically attack communication links between Sarny and Kiev, Rivne and Kiev, etc. (*Zhytomyrshchyna* 72-73).

According to information received by the German security services, a group of Soviet parachutists, dropped in the beginning of November into the marshes of Rokytno in Volhynia, fell on a UPA detachment ("a Bandera gang," according to the German report). During the combat several parachutists were killed, others wounded. The Ukrainian detachment seized important equipment, including a number of modern Soviet weapons (Appendix, Doc.#162).

On 28 November 1942, Saburov's detachment arrived in Holyshi, twenty kilometers west of Olevske. Approximately thirty kilometers from there, Kovpak's detachment destined for the Rivne, arrived. The detachment of I.F. Fedorov arrived in the Polissia region.

Moscow had thus decided to concentrate large Soviet partisan forces in regions where Ukrainian nationalists were. The plan of operations of 16 November 1942 assigned the following tasks to the Soviet partisan detachments: destroy railroads, supply bases, centers of communication; put in a landing strip for PS/84 Douglas planes; collect political and military information; infiltrate German institutions and "counter-revolutionary units" with the intention of demoralizing them and learning the measures they intend to take against the Soviet partisans and the Red Army (*Zhytomyrshchyna* 79, 75; Brechak 135).

The Soviet partisans, who had come for the most part from Russia and some from Belorussia, according to a publication of the Ukrainian resistance, occupied "without meeting too much resistance on the part of the Germans, the forests of the regions of Pinsk, Kobryn, Brest-Litovsk,

Kovel, Sarny, Kostopil and partially those of Zhytomyr, Lutsk, and Rivne" (*Liutopys UPA* 2:19). They requisitioned from the inhabitants everything that they needed to feed and clothe themselves and shot Ukrainian patriots who had nationalistic leanings.

The presence of these partisans continued to draw German repressions. About 100 Ukrainian villages were destroyed in October and November 1942 and the population of some of them massacred. In other villages the Germans shot only those inhabitants who had nationalistic leanings under the pretext that they were maintaining ties with Soviet partisans. They shot 120 Ukrainian families in Tsuman and hundreds of persons in other locations.

In January 1943 the village of Khozary in the Chernihiv region was destroyed with its 4,268 inhabitants. In February, 682 inhabitants of the village of Sribne in the same region were burned alive (*Liutopys UPA* 20; *Nimetsko-fashystsky* XIV-XV). These punitive operations, especially in Volhynia, were sometimes carried out with the aid of Ukrainian policemen who were forced to take part in the executions or dig graves. Because these policemen refused more and more to take part in these actions, in March 1943 the German authorities ordered a reorganization of the Ukrainian auxiliary police.

The OUN-B made overtures to the Soviet partisans to win them to the cause of Ukraine's independence. The German security services found in the Zhytomyr regions copies of a printed leaflet intended for the partisans. This leaflet, having certified that the fight against the German occupying forces, against looting, hunger, mistreatment of the Ukrainian people, deportation to Germany, was a common fight, asked the partisans what the definitive goal of their fight was: did they want the return of the Soviet regime? Yet, stated the leaflet, the Soviet regime resembled the German regime in everything. "Both are dictatorships directed against our people," continued the leaflet. "Hitler's imperialism and Russian imperialism are in conflict today, but both fight to destroy and enslave other peoples." The leaflet pointed then to the alliance between Stalin and Hitler and the Soviet's supplying the German army. It proposed to fight both regimes simultaneously "to build a new society," so that all peoples could "build their future according to their wishes." "An independent state, a free people, free workers—this is the new

society for which we must fight!" The leaflet proposed to "revive the national revolutionary movement" and invited the Soviet partisans to join in large numbers the ranks of a national organization to fight "for complete freedom and independence of all oppressed peoples." The leaflet ended with the slogan "Down with Hitler and Stalin! Long live the independent national states of the oppressed peoples!" (Appendix, Doc.#155).

From February 1943 on, detachments of fighters of the UPA began operations to take control of the land. The objectives were two-fold: to drive out the Soviet partisans and to prevent German punitive actions against Ukrainian villages.

Intensification of Ukrainian Underground Activities

According to secret instructions of November 1942 which had fallen into the hands of the Ukrainian resistance, the authorities of the occupation forces considered enemies of Nazi Germany in Ukraine "the communists, Bandera followers, partisans." The instructions specified that "potentially the most dangerous are the followers of Bandera. They must be destroyed at all cost" (Appendix, Doc.#152). They then summarized all the principles of the Nazi policies: schools up to grade four (to be closed in 1943); the cultural associations "Prosvita" (to be put under surveillance because they had been infiltrated by Bandera's followers); theaters, movie houses (to be taken away from the Ukrainians); the number of scientific institutions was to be limited; illnesses, delinquency, abortions, etc. were not to be opposed; an entente between the nationalists and the Soviet partisans was to be prevented; all institutions, enterprises, etc. were to be infiltrated (Appendix, Doc.#152).

The RSHA had established that the OUN-B, under cover of sports activities, was proceeding with military training of the youth and that all youth organizations were advocating "the idea of an independent Ukrainian state" (Appendix, Doc.#153).

Toward the end of 1942 the two Organizations of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B and OUN-M) intensified noticeably their underground activities, each in proportion to its importance. German

repression was directed especially against the OUN-B because it was more powerful and more active on Ukrainian territory.

On 17 October 1942 the German police discovered in Kharkiv an underground printing press, and a quick exchange of gun shots took place between the police and the OUN-B members. The police apprehended eleven members of the OUN-B militants and seized important materials. In Bila-Tserkva, four persons, including a schoolmaster, were arrested as were other OUN-B militants in Kherson and in Kiev. The Germans succeeded in arresting in the capital an important member of this organization, Ivan Shpak-Zaporozhets, and Dmytro Marko-Kravchenko (Appendix, Doc.#153).

In October and November 1942, the security services of the Reich continued with repression against the OUN-B members abroad. They had learned that this organization had restored its underground network in Germany. Numerous reports from different Gestapo headquarters on the activities in the Reich of Bandera's followers led Berlin to order arrests in the Braunschweig district (forty-eight persons were arrested in September) and in Dresden (ten persons were arrested in October). The Gestapo, by setting a trap in a OUN-B hideout in Berlin, succeeded in arresting the leader of this organization of Berlin who operated under the name Klym. After the police succeeded in decoding memoranda found on him, they uncovered the structure of the organization within the Reich. It was divided into ten regions; the regions were divided into districts; the districts into five-member cells. The memorandum also contained a number of names. The Gestapo immediately (in November) proceeded to arrest 210 persons in Leipzig, Berlin, Hannover, Hamburg, Hildesheim, and Potsdam (Appendix, Doc.#154; BA R 58/208 f.158-159).

In early November 1942, the RSHA officials, more precisely, officials of the SD, succeeded in arresting four couriers of the organization (who had come from Galicia) in a OUN-B hideout where a trap had been set by security officers. The couriers were carrying important propaganda materials, false passes, false papers with the letterhead of the German Institute for Foreigners from the University of Berlin, and false bread rationing coupons. The false papers and rationing coupons were intended to help numerous OUN-B members (who had been deported to forced labor) in their escape; the organization needed them for its

activities in Ukraine. It seems that one of the couriers, Yurko Kravchuk, talked and gave the addresses of the OUN-B meeting places in Lviv (Appendix, Doc.#154; Lobai 1:92-93).

The SD officers, therefore, concentrated their investigation in Lviv where, according to the confessions of one of the couriers, the OUN-B central leadership was located. First the SD succeeded in arresting the three Ukrainian students whose apartment served as the storage place and distribution center for the couriers of propaganda materials. Several days later, they arrested Volodymyr Lobai, head of the couriers of the organization center, on the street. Lobai took care of the interior couriers who came regularly from all regions of Ukraine, and the exterior couriers who assured the liaison with the network that was established outside Ukraine.

The SD set up a trap in Lobai's apartment which was serving as a meeting place for the OUN-B members, and succeeded in arresting six persons, including an official of the Ukrainian police who, in reality, was a secret courier of the organization. Despite terrible tortures during interrogations, Lobai miraculously survived and was sent to a concentration camp.

The RSHA officials of Berlin set a trap in another OUN-B apartment, on Zhulynski street. They succeeded in arresting there five OUN-B members who came to it. On 21 November 1942, in late afternoon, a sixth visitor, realizing that he had fallen into the trap, drew out his pistol and opened fire on the SD members dressed in civilian clothes. He fired two bullets into the SD official from Braunschweig and killed with one bullet in his head the SS-Sturmscharführer Gerhard Scharff of the Berlin RSHA before fleeing (Appendix, Doc.#155; BA R 58/208 f.172-174).

The sixth visitor was Dmytro Maivsky (Taras Kossar), one of the chief leaders of the Bandera resistance movement. Furious, the Germans shot in reprisal for the death of Scharff twenty-seven prisoners, OUN-B members in the Lviv prison (including Dmytro Shak and Yevhen Hryniv) and fifty-two prisoners in Yaholnytsia near Chortkiv on 27 November 1942 (Makar 97, 146).

All the prisons of Ukraine were filled with members of the Bandera resistance movement. After interrogations, a large number of them were

sent to different concentration camps in Germany where many died before the war ended. In September 1942 two brothers of Stepan Bandera, Oleksa and Vasyl, were beaten to death in Auschwitz. At that same time Andri Marchenko, one of the OUN-B leaders in Volhynia and author of the revolutionary songs, died in the Lviv prison (Lebed 20-21).

At the time of the arrests in Lviv, the Gestapo proceeded to arrest twenty-nine OUN-B members in the districts of Braunschweig and Magdeburg, twenty-one members in the districts of Dresden and Berlin, four members in Novy Sancez in the General Government (Appendix, Doc.#157; R 58/208 f. 174-175—the list of arrested persons f. 178-179; Appendix, Doc.#154).

The central leadership of the OUN-B was actually located in Lviv. The organization was directed by Mykola Lebed and his assistant, Ivan Klymiv-Leguenda. But the Germans did not know exactly the duties of these two men nor their places of residence. A search warrant for Mykola Lebed, indicating that he was armed and dangerous, was issued by the SD on 4 October 1941. At the time of the arrests in Lviv, the Germans knew only that the central leadership ran the regional leaderships, and that the center of the Eastern Ukraine was in Kiev, the center of Western Ukraine in Lviv, of Volhynia and Polissia in Rivne or in Lutsk, of Hungary and Romania in Chernivtsi or in Odessa, and of the Reich in Berlin (Appendix, Doc.#155).

At that time the RSHA reached the following conclusion: the arrest of Stepan Bandera in 1941 had not in the slightest lessened the activities of his organization. The tone of the OUN-B propaganda, moderate at the beginning, was becoming more and more aggressive. Its leaflets were directed against the Germans. The Bandera partisans were committing assaults against the Germans, especially against the members of the security police (Appendix, Doc.#156).

On 4 December 1942, the SD succeeded in arresting in Lviv two OUN-B leaders—Yaroslav Starukh-Syni and Ivan Klymiv-Leguenda (Semen Sud'ba). SS-Hauptsturmführer Schultze, Müller's assistant, and SS-Obersturmführer Wirsing of the RSHA of Berlin, immediately came to Lviv to interrogate the nationalist leaders. On 5 December (or at the latest 6) Ivan Klymiv-Leguenda was tortured to death by Wirsing. This SD official from Berlin, a German of Balto-Russian origin, was one of

the worst torturers of the Ukrainian nationalists. He, personally, had tortured to death at least five persons. Some dozen prisoners survived his tortures (Appendix, Doc.#159).¹¹

During their investigation in Lviv which ended with the arrest of eighteen OUN-B members, the Germans discovered at the 3rd commissariat of the Ukrainian police of that city weapons hidden in a secret room behind a wardrobe. They found out that various police of Lviv were infiltrated by Bandera's partisans and arrested five officials of the Ukrainian police.

In early November 1942, two OUN-B militants, dressed in German police uniforms, executed in Kiev in broad daylight two members of the SP and SD *Einsatzkommando* of Kiev, and a Ukrainian responsible for the arrest of Ukrainian nationalists and especially for the arrest of Dmyrto Myron-Orlyk who was killed during his escape attempt in July 1942. The two SD members had been on the trail of one of the leaders of the OUN-B in eastern Ukraine, Mohyla (Appendix, Doc.#160). Mohyla whose real name remains unknown to this day, was the head assistant of the regional leadership. At that time the Germans arrested twenty-nine members of this organization in Kiev and thirteen members in the Rivne region.

The OUN-B generally executed Ukrainians who were working in the SD. In the night of 3 October 1942, a death sentence was posted on the apartments of two Ukrainian members of the SD of Stanyslaviv in Galicia (Appendix, Doc.#160).

The Germans discovered an important network of the OUN-B in Sumy, east of Kiev close to the Russian border. They arrested the head of this region, Saprun, two district leaders, and thirty-eight men. According to information obtained, the OUN-B planned to construct in this region a munitions factory. A member of this organization was arrested in Poltava (carrying false official seals.) Ten others were arrested in Mykolaiv, twenty-five in Germany, five in Prague. On 11 December 1942, the SD arrested in Lviv a German priest, Joseph Peters, officially for failing to denounce the OUN-B, but in reality for collaborating with this organization. Father Peters who belonged to a Ukrainian religious order and knew the Ukraine language, had helped print OUN-B leaflets. He was sent to Dachau where he remained until the end of the

war (Appendix, Doc.###160, 161, 163; BA-MA RH 22/41 Reise des Herrn Befehlshabers vom 11-13 Dezember 1942; Makar 199).

In new leaflets distributed in Ukraine, the OUN-B called upon the peasants not to deliver anything to the Germans and affirmed that German economy policies were intended to transform the Ukrainian people—owners of the lands in Ukraine—into beggars. The Germans wanted to enrich themselves at the expense of Ukrainian labor. In Kharkiv another leaflet stated that "now every Ukrainian must understand that the only path to free human politically life is within us: the path of an organized revolutionary struggle of large masses for an independent Ukraine" (BA R 58/699, 226). The enemy of Ukraine, Russian imperialism, continued the leaflet, was losing its blood, Germany was wearing itself out, and the hour of Ukraine was approaching. Another leaflet declared that "Ukraine and Russia are separated for all times by a mountain of bodies and a sea of blood" (BA R 58/699, 277). In Rivne the resistance members circulated notes on which they had stamped the nationalists' slogans (Appendix, Doc.#162).

After the arrests in Kiev in February 1942, the occupation authorities noted a decrease of the OUN-M activities. But a short time later, the activities started up again, and the number of activists of this organization increased. In May 1942 the Germans refused to give the association "Prosvita" authorization to organize an exposition in memory of Symon Petliura. They also refused to authorize an association of aid to Ukrainian women because the initiative in the case of the exposition was coming from the Melnyk organization. The organization's periodical, *Surma*, which was distributed illegally, read: "Although the foreign powers try hard to destroy our determination and our national steadfastness the Ukrainian question still remains the most important question in Eastern Europe" and "the Ukrainians are not going to fight like mercenaries for foreign interests...,they will only go into combat for the right of an independent political life" (Appendix, Doc. ###129, 131, 133).

The growth of the OUN-M underground activities aroused the mistrust of the German security services. They noted in August 1942 that this organization which "externally appears to be a moderate movement,...must be placed on the same foot as the Bandera movement" (Appendix, Doc.#137).

In a memorandum sent at this time to Rosenberg, the head of this organization, Andriy Melnyk, formulated the following demands: the recognition by Hitler and his government of the right of Ukraine to its own national life; the return to Ukraine of regions annexed to the General Government; the creation of a representation for a unified Ukraine which would have the task "of proclaiming the definite detachment of Ukraine from Russia; to announce the Ukrainian state structure and an alliance with Germany"; the establishing of an Ukrainian army; the creation of a single political party in Ukraine (Appendix, Doc. ##137, 141).

The SD proceeded with its investigation of OUN-M activities in Kiev and in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. In September 1942, two persons were arrested in Kiev, five in Mykolaiv (including the head and two members of the protection police), and one person in Kirovohrad. A short time later, an entire OUN-M group was arrested in Kiev, among them the head of propaganda, Vasyl Kuzmyk-Petrenko. All were accused of anti-German propaganda and of distributing illegal literature regarding the Ukrainian struggle for freedom. Kuzmyk admitted in the course of the interrogations that the OUN-M had held three secret conferences in 1942: in Rivne (or Lutsk), in June in Proskuriv, and on 15 September in Kiev.

While arresting Kuzmyk, the Germans found leaflets, underground literature, and documents, including a letter from the person in charge of propaganda (K. Horsky) and a text of the OUN-M leader for Volhynia (Chyhyryn-Barda) which, as the German report stated, contained "malevolent attacks against the German occupation troops." According to the report, the OUN-M had become more active in Kiev in October, and now and then its propaganda surpassed that of the Bandera movement (Appendix, Doc.###143, 145, 147, 148, 154).

The Activities of Soviet Agents

A group of German officials, members of the ministry for the propaganda and that of the east undertook a reconnaissance trip into the eastern territories. These high ministerial officials also paid a visit to

Koch in Rivne. Koch told them without hesitation that his task was to exploit Ukraine for the Reich. Everyone had to contribute to this—men, women, and children. If the intellectuals offered opposition, they were to be eliminated. Koch acknowledged that he had some difficulties with the ministry for the eastern occupied territories which had ordered the printing of 2,300,000 school books "in Russian" [sic] which Koch had refused to do. He reproached the ministry of the east for favoring the cultural manifestations and for speaking "of an independent national Ukraine or a puppet government" (BA R 55/1434 f. 19).

But it is known that Rosenberg's ministry had never spoken of an independent Ukraine or a Ukrainian government.

Koch declared then that he had received the consent of the Führer to introduce into Ukrainian schools Latin characters in place of Cyrillic but that the ministry of the east still had not accepted this decision. Koch boasted of having furnished the Reich with an enormous quantity of wheat; besides, he was putting at the Führer's disposal 4,000,000 fifteen-pound packages of wheat which every German soldier on leave returning to Germany from the front could receive. Ukraine, reminded Koch, was feeding the troops. The report on the trip and the talks with Koch stressed that "Koch is known for his extreme manner of expressing himself," but as far as propaganda and culture were concerned, his visitors sided with him. The report spoke enthusiastically about the riches of Ukraine, "the land of milk and honey" where one finds rich, black soil, a warm climate, immense riches, especially of coal, iron, manganese, mercury, granite, marble, quartz, etc.

But the report acknowledged that "Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, etc. aspire to political independence" and consequently, it would be necessary "to grant them independence; at least, for appearance's sake [to create] a puppet government." The author of the report acknowledged at the same time that propaganda along those lines would require the Germans to accept concessions "which we will not be able to carry out during the war and which we might not want to grant even after the war" (BA R 55/1434, f. 41). Furthermore, he added, "these states in the east, for example, independent Ukraine, would immediately become allies of western powers against us." "Already today the slogan in these states is: rather the

Germans than the Bolsheviks, but still better the English rather than the Germans. For this reason all state organization that does not yet exist, must be prevented from doing so and all propaganda in that direction must be eliminated" (BA R 55/1434 f. 20-22, 41).

Then the report admitted that the German authorities should have a twofold language: "We must speak two ways, especially to our own people. On the one hand, pitiless work and deliveries; on the other hand, above all a happy future for the eastern people" (BA R 55/1434 f.41-42).

When retreating, the Russians had left behind many agents of special services and subversion, as well as many important communists and Soviet officials who remained loyal to the regime and its policies. According to a memorandum, dated 15 October 1942, whose author was a high German official (perhaps Bräutigam), the task of all those people in Ukraine was to penetrate the occupation administration and forcefully lead a quasi psychological war destined, on the one hand, to influence the population, on the other hand, to use the services of the occupation to exterminate nationalistic and independent elements.

The memorandum stressed that from the time of the arrival of the German troops, Moscow agents had spread rumors, according to which the Red Army was going to return soon and that those who had compromised themselves by collaborating with the Germans or held positions in the administration would be shot. Generating and maintaining fear, the Russo-Soviet agents could easily gain various positions in the local administration and they did everything to win the confidence of the Germans. They planted with the Germans interpreters who were dedicated and who took in hand other interpreters using threats and intrigues. The memorandum continued:

"In this manner the communists and [Soviet] activists could, under German rule, organize district administrations, raise themselves to the position of heads of local administration and economic societies [kolkhozes]. They kept the anti-Bolshevik population in constant fear of the return of the Soviets, and while hoping for this return, they counted on being congratulated and recognized" (BA R 6/70 f. 62).

The Russo-Soviet agents penetrated particularly the administration of forests, which allowed them to come to the aid of Soviet partisans and

parachutists. The local German representatives, stated the memorandum, were totally unprepared to face this infiltration and underground subversion; they thought it was sufficient to know that the former communists were carrying out their work honestly and that they were collaborating in a friendly way with the Germans or that they feared being shot if they did not collaborate.

"Furthermore," explained the memorandum, "certain representatives of the German administration openly declare that communism was not dangerous for the Germans and that it is rather the Ukrainian nationalism that represents a much greater danger. Consequently, one can go ahead and delegate the power in Ukraine to communists who, because of their hatred against the Ukrainian nationalists, are going to denounce them to the German authorities. Following the same reasoning, the [German] authorities also welcome gladly the Russians, i.e., the Russian nationalists" (f. 63).

The memorandum established that the Germans had an idea of the "threat coming from Ukrainian nationalism." The source of this idea was the OUN activities. But, according to the author of the memorandum, these young people, driven by "fanciful as well as unrealistic ideas, are only making blunders. Instead of joining forces "to fight Russian bolshevism and dedicate themselves to the economic and spiritual reconstruction of Ukraine with the help of the Germans, they show the effect of being hurt that Germany had refused to hand Ukraine over to their political group; they decided to reach their goal by using force and they began by approving the uprising against 'the German invader' and agitating for a Ukrainian national government..." (f. 64).

The author of the memorandum was convinced that the underground network of the OUN in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was infiltrated by communist agents who wanted to destroy these nationalist organizations from within "by delivering their leaders to the Gestapo." He thought that the Soviet agents were the ones who maintained the idea of a Ukrainian nationalist danger to be able to fight them better with German help.

Visibly opposed to Ukrainian nationalists, the author of the memorandum underestimated the importance as well as the power of the national movement. He thought that the nationalists were fewer in

number, that nationalism existed only in Galicia, and that the older generation was opposed to it, while its ideas were "incomprehensible and foreign" to the masses of the population of Ukraine. For this reason "the small group of the OUN, if not liquidated by the Gestapo, inevitably is going to disappear soon in a natural way." However, the communists who, according to the memorandum, persisted in certain strata of the population, represented a real and more important danger.

The Soviet agents worked at damaging the situation still more and, according to the memorandum, at spreading "rumors" about German plans of Germanizing the Ukrainian population, driving Ukrainians from their country to make room for Germans, "rumors" which, however, did correspond to the real plans of the Nazis.

Moreover, the Soviet agents worked only when they were covered by their relationship with German authorities, otherwise they used individuals who followed their instructions to the letter. According to the memorandum, they never worked with the help of mass organizations or large meetings, but rather through personal contacts. Because of their work, complaints of specific individuals whom they considered undesirable were presented as demands coming from the "Ukrainian nationalists." The Germans repressed these demands which served the plans of Soviet agents.

It often happened that people with anti-communist tendencies who had been persecuted under the Soviet power, returned home from PW camps or territories that had just been occupied by the Germans and could not take possession of their homes because they were occupied by local authorities and were in the hands of the Russian agents. The latter immediately obtained from the Germans forbidden entry or warrants. The matter often ended in a death sentence. The memorandum added: "The communists and the activists draw up against them the very same accusations as the Bolsheviks: Ukrainian nationalism. This accusation has become fashionable. Each time Bolshevik agents want to liquidate an undesirable person they have recourse to this accusation" (f. 68).

The fight against Soviet agents in Ukraine, according to the memorandum, was difficult because most German officials of the technical and economic sections openly admitted that they were not interested in politics. Furthermore, the SD, as protection police, had

access to information on suspected persons who merited being under surveillance. What was more serious, "many former collaborators of the commissariat of the interior (NKVD) or the former GPU had become members of the SD." Their assignment was to "eliminate, with German aid, all Ukrainian citizens whom communism considered undesirable and to divert the attention [of the German services] from the subversive activities of the Bolsheviks" (f. 69).

The author of the memorandum had knowledge of instructions found on Soviet agents. The latter themselves admitted that their mission consisted mainly in winning the confidence of the occupation authorities to set themselves off to advantage as friends of Germany and to eliminate, through provocations, all undesirable individuals. In a diary found on him, one of these agents, Yaremenko had written: "The war will be decided in Ukraine. It is here that the second interior front will be formed" (f. 70). The author of the memorandum thought that at least half of the districts of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine were under the influence of Soviet agents. The position of these agents was often so strong that they refused to allow the SD search their homes without special authorization from the *Kreislandwirt* (the case of Kayuk). In Cherkasy the Ukrainian police consisted of Soviet agents. Even when unmasked, the head of the police enjoyed such a position with the local occupation authorities that an intervention of the SD in Kiev was necessary to have him and his accomplices arrested (f. 71-74, 76).

Returning to the question of Ukrainian nationalism, the author of the memorandum wrote: "It is fitting to acknowledge that Ukrainian nationalists are effectively undertaking underground activities directed against Germany." But he thought that their slogan "proclaiming the fight on two fronts, against bolshevism and Germany," was not going to find any big echo and that Ukrainian nationalism was not getting any outside support (f. 76-77).

General and Religious Matters of Reichskommissariat Ukraine

The regions of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava and Kiev came under the administration of Reichskommissariat Ukraine on

1 September 1942. On 1 January 1943, Reichskommissariat Ukraine had a surface area of 339,275 km² and 16,910,008 inhabitants.

It was divided into six *Generalbezirke*, i.e., general regions (Volhynia-Podolia, Zhytomyr, Kiev, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Crimea with the Taurid) which in turn were divided into 114 *Kreisgebiete* or districts, of which five districts were cities, and into 433 cantons, i.e., administrative divisions including twenty-five divisions of cities (BA R 6/70 f. 108). At the head of each *Generalbezirk* was a general commissar (*Generalkommissar*). The district was headed by a district commissar (*Gebietskommissar*). The district commissars were appointed by Rosenberg and the heads of cantons by the commissar of the Reich. The eastern regions of Ukraine (regions of Donbass, Kharkiv, Sumy, Konotop, and Chernihiv), however, were not part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Situated too close to the front, this part of Ukraine remained under military administration.

The essential role in the occupation system (civilian administration) belonged to the commissars of the district and their homologues of the economic section, the *Kreiswirt* (responsible for the agriculture of the district)—all Germans. A German report of 20 October 1942 confirmed that "everything depends on the *Gebietskommissar* and the *Kreislandwirt* who have dictatorial powers. Everything is permitted to them, the notion of right in the West European sense does not exist in Ukraine today." The different Ukrainian heads and subordinate directors "have only to carry out orders of their German superiors and do not take any part in decision making" (f. 80).

The German authorities, according to the same report, often entrusted the positions of heads of sections or cantons to the worst local elements, to persons whose past was not clear, indeed suspect (former collaborators of the Polish services in the north-west, Soviet agents in eastern Ukraine). Moreover, quoting from the report:

German officials who are in charge of agriculture and who represent the essential factor and carry out the German economic policies on Ukrainian occupied territory are, for the most part, uncultured people (former hairdressers, butchers and other artisans or merchants) who have no idea of agricultural

matters and still less of matters of political administration or high politics. They behave against the Ukrainian population in an illegal and unjust manner (resorting to cruelty and beatings) and making use of this, they are progressively turning millions of Ukrainians who initially were favorably disposed to the Germans into convinced and bitter enemies of Germany (f. 83).

The Ukrainian employees of the occupation administration often worked from seven to seventeen hours, but they were paid only forty to sixty Reichsmark (approximately 400-600 karbovantsy) while one kilo of butter on the free market cost 30RM (the Ukrainians did not receive any rationing coupons for butter). In the country the quotas for deliveries were so exorbitantly high that practically nothing remained for the peasant. The products of the butcher shops (meat, cold-cuts, canned goods) were reserved for the Wehrmacht and other Germans. The report stressed that "the Ukrainian population has not received any meat products since occupation began." In all sections, in town as in the country, the remuneration for ten to eleven hours of work was forty to sixty Reichsmark.

Most of the district commissars were not any better than their subordinates. The report noted: "They are often poorly disposed to the Ukrainians or choose as collaborators the worst Ukrainian elements." Each district commissar determined his own policies, which explains certain differences among the districts. For example, in one district the Ukrainian auxiliary police wore the trident (Ukrainian national symbol); in another district the wearing of this insignia was forbidden and was replaced by the swastika.

In most districts there were schools of only four grades, but in some places schools still went up to seventh grade. In some districts the use of Ukrainian symbols (trident, national flag) and Ukrainian socio-cultural societies were at first more or less tolerated, but growing restrictions progressively put an end to this. Furthermore, Ukrainian establishments did not receive "any public subsidies" (f. 84).

The "mobilization" of manpower in Ukraine, according to the report, had reached its peak. Hundreds of thousands of men and women had already been taken to Germany and recruitment continued.

Every day one can see in Ukraine trains loaded with starving, barely dressed "white slaves." A certain number of these people who were taken by force west will never see their native land again. Many among them, totally exhausted, had to march hundreds of kilometers before being put on board trains; many died on route. In villages in Ukraine on the Dnipro only old people, children, and invalids remain—the others have been evacuated by the Bolsheviks, sent to Germany, or are working in the kolkhozes or sovkhoses which were preserved under a different designation (f. 85).

Attempts made by the Ukrainians to get working the production of enterprises that could provide for the needs of the population met with inflexible resistance on the part of the German authorities.

The same report stated that the German policy, in accordance with the principle of *divide et impera*, was implemented in the religious life. There were two churches in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine: the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Autonomous Orthodox Church. The canonical head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Archbishop Dionisiy, resided abroad in Warsaw. Consequently, this church was administered by Archbishop Polikarp of Lutsk. The Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church was administered by Archbishop Alexey. In principle, this church recognized the primacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. It numbered among its clergy and members many Russians and Russophiles. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, however, was a national church.

The German report stated that the Soviet regime had always opposed the unification of the two churches with the same rite, fearing the political influence of Moscow in Ukraine (f. 87-88). Moreover, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church had been liquidated in the early '30s. What this report did not state is that the Germans also took pains to prevent unification.

Religious matters in Ostland and in Ukraine were regulated by Rosenberg's instructions of 13 May 1942. They stipulated that religious communities could exist but that they were not to deal with politics, nor present a danger for the German administration. Consequently, the

instructions limited the structure of the church on the territory of the *Generalbezirk*. There were to be as many separate churches as there were general regions in Ukraine. At the head of each of these churches could be a bishop (possibly two bishops) whose jurisdiction could not go beyond the *Generalbezirk*.

The desired goal was to prevent the creation of a Ukrainian spiritual force that could have political importance. To prevent the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church from disintegrating into several units, Rosenberg proposed to give one of the bishops, Archbishop Polikarp, the title of "first among equals" (*primus inter pares*). The general commissars were thus vested with powers concerning religious matters, in the context of decrees made by the Reich commissar (BA R 6/18 f. 99-102). By carrying out Rosenberg's instructions, the assistant to Reichskommissar Koch, Dargel, stipulated by a decree of 9 June 1942 the limitation of the structures of the two churches on the territory of each *Generalbezirk*.

The implementation of these measures was not easy in practice. The occupation authorities learned that an "underground club of Ukrainian chauvinists" had formed around the new bishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Mstyslav (Skrypnyk¹²—consecrated bishop on 12 May 1942) and Bishop Nikanor (BA R 70 SU/5 Auszug aus dem Lagebericht des Generalkommissars Kiew, den 1.9. 1942). In fact, this was not a club but a group of Ukrainian orthodox persons who intended to give a normal structure to their church. To this end, and to settle a certain number of problems which the remarkable development of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church posed in the course of previous months, Ukrainians orthodox activists had decided to convene a synod of bishops for 4 October 1942.

German authorities decided to thwart this initiative, however. Mstyslav who was in Kiev, was bishop of Pereiaslav, on the left bank of the Dnipro. To prevent the synod, upon orders of Koch's assistant, Dargel, the assistant of the general commissar of Kiev, von Brünau, forbade Mstyslav on 22 September to sojourn on the right bank of the Dnipro and invited him to leave Kiev and the territory of the *Generalbezirk* (including the part on the left bank) before 27 September. Now the synod had to be held in Lutsk in Volhynia, the northwest of Ukraine. In the meantime summoned by the SD, Mstyslav succeeded in

obtaining a temporary suspension of the decision of the assistant general commissar. As the question of his removal was still unsettled by 27 September, the SD authorized Mstyslav to go to Lutsk for 4 October (BA NS 43/32 f. 183, 185).

On 1 October 1942, Dargel informed the general commissars that the activities of the churches henceforth were to be limited to each *Generalbezirk*. Archbishop Polikarp was not recognized as the administrator of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, no more than Archbishop Alexey as exarch of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church. The customary rights of the two archbishops were limited and they were put on the same level as the other bishops. Dargel asked each *Generalkommissar* to convene the bishops to tell them that their jurisdiction was limited to the *Generalbezirk* and that they were all equal, that there was no superior archbishop. All bishops were placed under the "protection" of the German administration and were responsible solely to their *Generalkommissar*.

Dargel decided to dissolve the episcopal synod of both churches. The general commissars took over the right to install and suspend bishops. Ordination and installation of priests was submitted to the authorization of the general commissars. And above all, stated Dargel's instructions, "henceforth we must see to it that we maintain the equilibrium between the position of the two churches. Consequently, it is necessary to oppose in an appropriate manner all union..." (BA R 6/178 f. 27-28).

On 3 October, the eve of the synod, when most of the bishops of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were in Lutsk, Dargel announced that the synod was forbidden. The Ukrainian bishops carried on regardless, and the work of the synod began as planned on 4 October and ended on 14.

On 8 October Bishop Mstyslav, secretary of the episcopal synod, and Bishop Nikanor went to Pochaiv, to the residence of Archbishop Alexey, head of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church. An agreement of union of the two churches was signed the same day. After the closing of the work of the synod, Mstyslav went to Rivne where he was invited to present himself to the SD headquarters. There Dargel, who had come expressly to see him, explained to him that the agreement of union of the

two churches, though meriting his compliments, was nevertheless an illegal act carried out during a forbidden synod. In conformity with instructions of the Reich commissar, a hierarchy of the Ukrainian church could be set up only after "complete pacification" of Ukraine. But he was going to see to it that the bishops who had signed the illegal agreement of union be excluded from the leadership of the church.

In the meantime, continued Dargel, no one could take the leadership of the Ukrainian bishops, i.e., there was no leadership in the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. There was one bishop in each Kreisgebiet, and all bishops were equal. Dargel reminded Mstyslav that the interdiction that had been given him to sojourn to Kiev and the right bank of the Dnipro was still in effect. He was to choose a place of exile and go there as quickly as possible. Mstyslav chose Pryluka, east of Kiev (*Generalbezirk* Chernihiv). He left Rivne on 19 October, Kiev on 22 October. In Pryluka the Germans forbade him all religious and political activities (BA NS 43/32 f. 184-187; R 58/699 f. 189-193).

Under the pressure of German authorities and because some bishops and leaders of his church, especially the Russians, had refused to follow him, Archbishop Alexey revoked on 15 December 1942 his signature under the agreement of union.

Each general commissar sent a letter to the Ukrainian bishop of his area in which he stated: "I appoint you as bishop in my general commissariat. I abolish your dependency on your ecclesiastical superiors. You are dependent only on me. The priests also are dependent on me. All suspensions and appointments of a priest will be communicated to the bishop" (*Liutopys UPA* 1:87).

In Moscow, the Russian Orthodox Church made clear its wish to consider Ukraine under its jurisdiction. The Russian Patriarch and the Metropolitan Archbishop Nikolai "of Kiev and Galicia," appointed after the annexation of Western Ukraine by the USSR, published in March 1942 a document condemning the Ukrainian autocephaly. Considering the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church an outlaw, the patriarch and the metropolitan addressed themselves directly "to the orthodox clergy and faithful" of Ukraine "on the subject of Bishop Polikarp, traitor to the country and the church" (*Ukrainian Review* 16:52).

Pretending to know well the feelings of the faithful of Ukraine, Metropolitan Nikolai sent in their name on 10 November 1942 a message to Stalin on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the birth of the Soviet regime, in which he offered the head of the Soviet state "in prayers to the All-Powerful" warm wishes for health and wished for the "country" an imminent liberation under Stalin's leadership (AA Vertr. d.AA beim R.-Kom. Ukraine 4; *Ukr. Review* 16:52-53).

German policies, following the principle of *divide et impera*, seriously complicated the situation in the northwest of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine where a rather important Polish minority (10% of the population) lived. The Germans conferred on many Poles high positions, especially in the police force. The Poles worked also as interpreters. One of the cited German reports explained that this was a question of Poles whose anti-Ukrainian feelings were well known. The Polish interpreters deliberately translated the answers of the Ukrainians incorrectly to cause them trouble with the Germans. These Poles enjoyed the same rights as the Germans and often made fun of the Ukrainians saying: "Oh well, you have it, your German Ukraine!" (BA R 6/70 f. 84-85) From all evidence, the propaganda spread in Poland before the war, presenting the Ukrainian cause as a German cause, had deeply marked the Poles.

Reichskommissar Erich Koch who was Gauleiter of East Prussia, came infrequently to Rivne, the capital of his Reichskommissariat. Dargel oversaw current affairs in his absence, but Koch had taken care to reserve for himself an immense forest in the region of Tsuman' east of Lutsk with the intention of turning it into personal hunting grounds. Consequently, on November 1942, he ordered the evacuation of fourteen villages of this region, and the peasants who refused to leave their land and homes, he ordered to be driven off by force (BA R 6/35 f. 112).

The German government did everything necessary to interest foreign entrepreneurs and workers, especially the Dutch, in exploiting the riches of Ukraine. Many Dutch thus visited Ukraine in 1942. At the beginning of September an important delegation composed of de Rost van Tonnigen, president of the Dutch bank; van Massdyk, representative of the chamber of economics; Roskam, head of the Dutch peasantry; K. van Leuwen, president of the chamber of commerce; and personalities from

the Dutch Eastern Company came to Ukraine on Rosenberg's and Koch's invitation to "study the possibilities of a more extensive engagement of Dutch workers" in this country (AA Vertr.d.AA beim R.-Kom Ukraine 2:342305).

During a conference which took place in Rivne on 11 December 1942, the Dutch and the Germans discussed different aspects of their cooperation in various areas, especially in the extraction of raw materials, commerce, agriculture, etc. (2:342214-342220, 342229-342232). The Dutch delegates also visited Belorussia and the Baltic countries.

Simultaneously, in the north of the Zhytomyr region where Soviet partisans were operating, units of German police, by way of reprisal, on 4 and 5 December 1942 burned down eight villages, leaving 2,847 persons without shelter. When many of the inhabitant fled to the woods, other inhabitants seized by the panic of the population of this region, left the villages and probably joined the Soviet partisans or Ukrainian insurgents. The German report on this subject regretted that the Germans had destroyed in this region peaceful villages which had previously carried out well their obligations toward the Germans.

Eastern Policies Sharply Criticized

The great German offensive begun on 28 June 1942 in the Sector South allowed the Wehrmacht to advance rapidly in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Hitler, by his order no.45 of July 23, assigned to the German army the task of reaching the Voronezh-Stalingrad-Astrakhan-Baku-Batum line. At the beginning of the offensive, the southern front extended across 800 km, and at the time of Hitler's order it already had stretched to 1,200 km. If the line designated by Hitler had been reached, the front would have been 4,100 km long.

Thus troops were a major problem. The German army had already lost more than 1,300,000 men (287,000 killed, 6,300 missing in action, and more than 1,000,000 wounded) (Grunchmann 198). Moreover, the Germans needed increasingly more troops to fight Ukrainian insurgents and Soviet partisans in the zones under civilian administration.

Contrary to the expectations of the high command, however, the Germans had to stop short of Stalingrad and in the south, at Elbrus, one of the summits of the Caucasus. They could not reach Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea, Baku or Batum. Moreover, the outcome of the battle for Stalingrad, begun on 26 August 1942, was uncertain.

Many German high officials disapproved of Hitler's policies in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe, some for humanitarian reasons, others because they realized that war could not be won without support of the European populations, especially those of Eastern Europe.

From October 1942 on, many Germans increasingly criticized the German policies in the east. Otto Bräutigam, an official in the ministry for occupied eastern territories, in a secret memorandum dated 25 October, vigorously opposed the manner in which the eastern people were treated. Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians, and the Balts, he said, had welcomed the German army. Volunteers of those nationalities serving in the Wehrmacht or the auxiliary police had fought well. Now the German policies were doing everything to turn these people against the Germans. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war were being annihilated through starvation and cold. The Germans were increasing the numbers of workers in Germany by hunting down men through methods recalling the worst period of slave trade. To this was added the inhuman treatment of the population of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

Bräutigam thought that if Germany did not want to have 40,000,000 Ukrainians rise up and provoke a partisan war against it, it had to modify her policies. Ukraine was not to be considered solely as a country to be exploited. The Ukrainian population had to feel that Germany was truly a friend and liberator. Bräutigam advised a change in policies toward all peoples in the East; otherwise there would be an increase of resistance by the Red Army and partisan warfare. Regarding Ukraine, he insisted on a more humane policy taking into account Ukrainian aspirations (IMT 294-PS).

A military official, Lieutenant Hofweber, also favored a change in policies in the east, but he recognized the right to exist only of Russia and the Russian language: "Our goal," he said, "is to conquer with tolerable losses and construct, under the leadership of a healthy and strong Great Germany, a new, satisfactory, economically independent

Europe protected on its frontiers, disposing of the best possible conditions for a final battle which one day will take place for [the domination over] the world. Russia must also be led to work towards this goal" (BA-MA RH 2/2089:57).

He proposed the outlawing of corporal punishment (the beatings) and he thought it necessary to satisfy some Russian aspirations. The Germans working in Russia should know Russian, and this language should be taught in schools in Germany. Lieutenant Hofweber was against all "dialects." He thought that "the idea of wanting to arrive at the point 'where Russians could no longer understand each other' because of the support of Ukrainian and Belorussian dialects, would be parallel to having the French impose on us at the Versailles the High Bavarian or the Low German dialects as a literary language." This German officer did not recognize any rights of peoples other than the Russians, with the false excuse that all Slavs understand one another very well without learning another language and because "only the Russian language has a true literature" (f. 63RS).

At the beginning of December 1942, B.P. Kleist, also presented to Rosenberg his criticism of the German policies in the east. Many Germans, he said, expressed the conviction that it was urgent to improve the "upheaval" of the policies toward the European peoples, because the German policies of unbridled exploitation and intolerance pushed the peoples into opposition.

In the east, said Kleist, "instead of proclaiming a free Ukraine and setting up a Ukrainian army," the Germans had divided Ukraine. Friendly governments had not been created in Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. Kolkhozes had been retained. The use of units of the different nationalities of the USSR led rather to a sort of civil war because on the German side there was no idea that could unite the peoples and offer them a choice for a better life. Kleist proposed a proclamation by the Führer announcing a change in policy to construct a New Europe that would include the East European peoples in the circle of European nations; abolition of the Reichskommissariats Ukraine and Ostland and creation of governments or national committees in these countries to be supervised by a Reichsresident; a call to the peoples of

the USSR inviting them to fight for freedom, total change of the economic structure, etc. (IfZ ED 165: 3, 9-10).

At the beginning of December 1942, the Reich ministry of foreign affairs received a memorandum from Giselher Wirsing, who also enumerated mistakes committed in the east by the Germans, especially the wrong ideas about people, colonial exploitations, repressive measures, persecution of Ukrainian nationalism, the question of foreign workers in Germany (AA Vertr.d.AA beim R.-Kom Ukraine 4:E 292527-292534).

Rosenberg tried to limit the damage in Ukraine. On 14 December 1942, he sent a letter to Koch asking him to respect his instructions, i.e., to abstain from closing four-grade elementary schools, moderate his language toward the Ukrainian population, behave in a friendly manner, compensate those who merited it, abstain from recruiting workers for the Reich by using inadequate means, such as roundups without distinction, so that thousands of sick taken to Germany had to be sent back (BA R 6/70 f. 89-96; BA-MA RH 19 V/95).

According to supplementary instructions of the Reichsministry for occupied eastern territories of 16 December 1942, the press in Ukraine had to maintain the Ukrainians' opposition to communism and Russians, but they had to be made to understand that a solution to the Ukrainian question could be reached only after the war. They had to be made to admit that this solution depended solely on the Führer and that it would take into consideration the attitude of the Ukrainians during the war. The press could assure the Ukrainians that they would have a local administration which would guarantee them religious freedom, support of the Ukrainian language, elementary schools, and doubled allocation of land for private use of the peasants (BA R 6/206 f. 159-161).

On 18 December 1942 an important conference took place in Berlin at the headquarters of the ministry for occupied eastern territories. Rosenberg and his chief collaborators, as well as the commanders-in-chief of the eastern military zones, participated in this conference. Having reviewed all aspects of the situation, they concluded that it was vital to win the collaboration of the populations of the east and the prisoners of war. This collaboration was considered "of decisive importance for victory." It was necessary to obtain a decree from the Führer allowing the engagement of volunteers from eastern countries.

They needed half a million volunteers, but this recruitment was impossible without political orders followed by immediate positive effects.

At the heart of discussions was, of course, the necessity of a new policy "in the Russian space." Bearing in mind the superiority of the German soldier, it was urgent, according to the conclusions of the conference, to supplement the shortage of troops, i.e., include the eastern peoples in the fight against the Soviets. Consequently, political conditions susceptible of giving the peoples motivation for participation had to be given. They would be ready to fight against the "bandits" and on the front the moment they could see that the present methods had been completely abandoned. The slogan of the moment toward the peoples of the Ostland, the Ukrainians, and the Caucasians should thus be: we accept the peoples as allies in the fight against the Soviets allowing them to attain an independent life consisting of political and economic importance (BA R 6/139 f. 13-14).

These conclusions led to further development of different political plans to be followed and possible instructions by the different services, more specifically, by Rosenberg's ministry, including plans for a possible appeal from the Führer to the Ukrainian people.

An unsigned analysis in Rosenberg's dossier explained that on the eve of the war, the Soviet Union seemed to present great interior weakness. Tukhachevsky's trial and the execution of thousands of officers, the stunning success of the Wehrmacht during the Polish campaign, the German-Russian Pact, and the Finnish war had led the Germans to believe in the Soviet Union's weakness. The Germans had the impression that the Soviet economy, weak and inefficient, could not resist the shock of war. The national oppression of the peoples, especially of the Ukrainians, Belorussians, the peoples from the Baltic States and the Caucasus had given hope of deep discontentment. All this had led the German observer to believe that the Soviet army could not stand up against the shock of war, that the shock would bring about disruption of transportation and means of production, that the peoples subjected to national and social oppression were inevitably going to rise up against the regime or, at least, offer passive resistance, and that the soldiers would in large numbers cross to the German side of the front.

But at the end of a year and a half of war, this apparent weakness of the regime turned out to be more and more false. Moreover, the idea that the population had supported the Bolshevik regime for twenty years had led the German observers to believe that this population was only "a lazy mass that would accept patiently any other regime as it had accepted bolshevism" (BA R 6/6 f. 6). The Germans supposedly had only to worry about profiting from the country and population (a view also propagated in the press, noted the analysis, was that of the majority of the Germans and of the Wehrmacht). Everyone grew accustomed to consider the "Russians" as third class people, moronic, easily satisfied, incapable of thinking and reacting in a European manner to offenses, injustice or contempt (BA R 6/6 f. 1, 6, 7).

The analysis stated then that henceforth it was necessary to correct the mistakes committed, do everything to win the populations to the cause of the war; otherwise the Germans must expect an increase in passive resistance and armed fighting which would engage a significant number of German forces. These peoples were not going to accept meekly colonial domination. It was necessary to give them a goal which could ennoble their existence and "which would allow them to be part of the European community, not as objects to be exploited but as partners" (f. 20). Even as the Soviet regime had recognized the national principle and formed national republics and autonomous republics within the USSR, permitting the development of national culture and a school system to each peoples, the Germans, in turn, must now develop the same participation of all these people within the framework of the New Europe: they must recognize their national statehood (*Eigenstaatlichkeit*) (f. 23-24).

The author of the analysis thought first of the Russian people and proposed a proclamation in which they would bring out the "historical duties of the Russian people." By turning away the Russians from their imperialistic goals toward the west and south, he said, one could take into account the historic expansion of the Russian people toward Siberia.¹³ Because "the regime of Stalin today appears as the only legitimate defender of the national [Russian] interests in the face of danger of becoming a colonial people," continued the author of the analysis, the German statement of intent to the Russian people must

include recognition of the national existence of the Russians and their vital interests, so that they could join the battle for liberation led by the German Wehrmacht, with the goal of constructing a new Russia.

One of the proposed measures was the creation of combat units composed of Russian deserters, a sort of "Russian People's Army," as the formation of a "National Organization on Russian Territory" or a "Union for the Liberation of the Homeland" or a "National Committee for the Liberation of the Homeland" to carry out the functions of a government (BA R 6/6 f. 27ff). These plans concerned only Russia herself; Ukraine and the other nations were to have their own national committees.

In reality, the training of the "Russian People's Army" had already been underway for several months under the patronage of the Wehrmacht, specifically in the military zone of the Center where a group of German officers were pursuing these efforts. The terms "Russian People's Army" and "Committee for the Liberation of the Homeland" already appeared in the memorandum sent by the Russian General Shilenkov from General Andrei Vlasov's entourage, to German military authorities in August 1942.

Shilenkov considered that to deprive Stalin's regime of the essential fight for the "defense of the homeland," the government of the Reich must publish a statement of intent to the Russian people including the following points: Germany did not intend to transform Russia into a colony, it rather guaranteed Russian political independence and the creation of a new Russian state; a "Committee for the Liberation of the Homeland" that had "the rights of a Russian government" was to be set up, and a "Russian People's Army" was to be created (BA-MA RH 2/v.2556 f. 82-83). A little later, units of the Russian people's army were actually created. With the help of German officers, the Russians set up a Russian committee shortly after a conference of German officials of the ministry of the east in Berlin. On 27 December 1942, this committee published an appeal to the Russian people, called the Smolensk Appeal. Signed by A. Vlasov, president, and V. Malyshkin, secretary of the committee, millions of copies of the appeal were distributed by the Wehrmacht on both sides of the front.

The Ukrainian question, however, did not have as powerful a support from the Germans as the Russian problem. On the contrary, the

Germans still thought it necessary to continue preparations for annexation of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to the Reich (BA R 94/2 f.792). Only in the second half of the month of January 1943 did the services of Rosenberg's ministry finally prepare a memorandum to the Führer proposing measures to win the different peoples of the Soviet Union for the fight against bolshevism. According to the memorandum, Hitler was to publish a statement announcing that the time had come to extend the new European order to the peoples of the Soviet Union. The proclamation of this statement was to take the form of the proclamation of a *European Magna Charta*, opposed to the Atlantic Charter. Through the publication of the *European Magna Charta*, Germany was going to confer on the peoples of the Soviet Union the status of partners of the European community.

The memorandum proposed to reform totally the administration in Eastern Europe. The Reichsminister for the eastern occupied territories would take the title of "Führer-Governor of the Liberated Peoples of the East." The Reichskommissariat Ostland would make room for three countries: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania each provided with a government and autonomy under the authority of a resident appointed by the Führer-Governor. In Belorussia a national committee would be under the leadership of a representative of the Führer-Governor.

In Ukraine, according to the memorandum, "the Reich commissar for Ukraine, the name of which is too closely linked to the actual methods, will be replaced by a Reichsresident, subordinate to the Führer-Governor." The *Reichsresident* would convene a national committee to set up local administration and "prepare the subsequent creation of a government" (BA R 6/6 f. 113).

For Russia the Führer-Governor was to invite the Russians to create a Russian national committee which, with the agreement of the military authorities and the Führer-Governor, would be charged with the administration of the Russian territories. Its seat would be in Smolensk. The Russian national committee would have all the attributes of an independent Russian government and would have at its disposition a "Union of Combat for the Liberation of the Homeland" as well as a "Russian People's Army" as an instrument for politics and propaganda.

The peoples of the Caucasus would have a political organization similar to that of other peoples (BA R 6/6 f. 110-113).

Rosenberg presented his memorandum to the Führer in early February 1943 (BA R 6/139 f. 28).

"The Fight for Europe"

At that time the Battle of Stalingrad was entering its final phase. Observers of the whole world, including the Germans, agreed that this battle would be decisive. The Soviet counter-offensive which began on 19 November 1942, ended three days later in the encircling of the German Sixth Army and parts of the Romanian Fourth Army (more than 239,000 men including 13,000 Romanians and 19,300 soldiers of auxiliary units composed of former Soviet prisoners of war of different nationalities). Since Hitler had forbidden General Paulus to abandon the positions and to attempt departure, this hard battle ended in the capitulation of the Axe's troops that had been cut by the Soviet army in two. The south section, with Paulus, capitulated on 31 January and the north section on 2 February 1943. The Russians took 107,800 prisoners, including twenty-one German and two Romanian generals. The Germans had succeeded in evacuating by air 42,000 wounded and sick. Approximately 80,500 German, Romanian, and USSR (of different nationalities) soldiers fell at Stalingrad, and an enormous amount of equipment (5,000 canons, 2,000 tanks, etc.) was seized by the Soviet army (Carrel 549; Grunchman 201, 203).

The defeat at Stalingrad contributed significantly to the shortage of troops and forced the national socialist leaders to modify their stance. They decided to mobilize German and European forces for the defense and reconstruction of Europe.

In his statement of 30 January 1943, Hitler asserted that the national socialists were fighting not only for Germany but also for all of Europe. On 15 February, Goebbels sent instructions concerning the new attitude to be adopted toward the population of occupied eastern territories to the leaders of the Nazi party. Berlin's intentions were formulated thus: it was necessary to mobilize for the fight against "Jewish bolshevism" not

only all still available forces of the German people, but also those of other European peoples, including the peoples from Eastern Europe. Consequently, German propaganda was to present the war as a war in the interest not only of Germany but also of all European peoples. The people of the east who were hoping for their liberation were no longer to be treated as "beasts," "barbarians," etc. It was no longer necessary to give the impression that the New European Order under the German leadership implied lasting oppression of these peoples, nor to speak of colonies of Germany in Eastern Europe since such statements could be exploited by Soviet propaganda to prove that Germany took the peoples of Eastern Europe for negroes, or colonization, deportation of populations, Germanization. "It is necessary not to give any hold to the enemy propaganda, particularly to Soviet propaganda which would have the consequence of strengthening the resistance of the peoples in the east," concluded Goebbels (*Das Dritte Reich* 212-213).

Did these instructions indicate a change in the attitude of the Nazi leaders? Actually no. They were simply concerned about the tactic to treat the peoples of Eastern Europe as equal partners, although some German circles really did seem to believe in this partnership.

On 10 February 1943 talks between Reichsminister Rosenberg and representatives of the OKW/WPr (OKW's department of propaganda) concerning the creation of a Russian national committee took place. The OKW/WPr had already published two leaflets calling the Russians to fight against Stalin, linking them "for the first time with the European whole." These leaflets had some success. The Wehrmacht department of propaganda proposed to Rosenberg immediate creation of a Russian national committee in the Sector Center of the army through a representative of the ministry of occupied eastern territories under the command of this group of the armies.

The Wehrmacht department of propaganda also was in the process of creating similar bodies for other important peoples of the Soviet Union, notably the Ukrainians and the Caucasians.

It was further agreed during the talks that the units of Russian volunteers who were scattered in the Wehrmacht would henceforth, on the proposition of the OKW/WPr, be designated under the common name of "Russian Liberation Army" (ROA) while units of Ukrainian

volunteers would be designated as the "Ukrainian Liberation Army" (UVV). The seize of each of the distinct armies would be determined by an agreement with the OKH and the Wehrmacht command in the east.

The intent was to unite the populations of the east and their volunteers to the Wehrmacht through these measures in a fight "for freedom and homeland," following the principle "that all the peoples of the Soviet Union are equal partners in the community of the European peoples. Thus the Russians will no longer be above but at the side of the peoples of the Soviet Union. In this way one can prevent Russian imperialistic aspirations in a manner acceptable also to the Russians" (BA R 6/35 f. 159-160).

Rosenberg gave his approval to the plans which were carried out in the Sectors Center and South of the army.

During the 10 February 1943 talks and also on other occasions, the leaders of the Wehrmacht, as far as the Russians were concerned, referred to the example of the existing "Autonomous Russian District of Lokot" (*Russischer Selbstverwaltungsbezirk Lokotj*).

Located in Russia between Trubchevsk and Orel in the Sector Center of the Wehrmacht, the autonomous Russian district was led by a Russian engineer of Polish origin, Bronislaw Kaminski. Kaminski had first commanded a Russian unit formed in 1941 with the help of the Wehrmacht to fight against Soviet partisans. He succeeded in cleansing out a large district of partisans which then was established as Autonomous Russian District of Lokot. The Wehrmacht authorized there an autonomous administration and management without direct intervention of the Germans, but under their supervision. Kaminski and his companions organized a Russian National Socialist party (*Nationalsozialistische Arbeitspartei Russland*) (BA R 6/309 f. 69). In the beginning of 1943, this district extended over an area inhabited by 581,000 people who, besides Russian elementary schools, had at their disposal a school of ten grades, a hospital, a newspaper with a circulation of 8,000 and a theater. Kaminski had a small army of 8,000 to 9,000 men equipped with nine tanks and artillery. According to a report from early January 1943 prepared for Hitler by Felix Schmidt-Decker, *Gaupropagandaleiter*, who had visited the district, "the army" of the "commanders of the squad"

Kaminski (made up of local inhabitants, thus Russians) was in fact a kind of people's militia divided into fourteen battalions, of which only four wore old German uniforms. The "other battalions gave the impression of being a savage pack of bandits." "Almost all commanders of the battalions were former Russian officers [of the Red Army]" (BA R 6/18 f. 159-160). Kaminski was assisted by a colonel of the Wehrmacht, Rüb-sam, who had at his disposal a battalion of German security. Kaminski gave his troops, designated also as "Kaminski Brigade" the name "Russian People's Liberation Army (RONA)."¹⁴

The Russian émigrés, supported by a powerful German pro-Russian lobby, were dissatisfied with plans based on the principle according to which all the peoples of the European part of the Soviet Union were to be equal partners in the European whole. Their reactions were numerous. Colonel Igor Sakharov of Berlin, who had joined the Vlasov entourage, for example, sent in February 1943 a memorandum entitled "Victory or Defeat" to the German military authorities reflecting the feelings of the Russian émigrés.

Sakharov proposed a change in the eastern policies in a way favorable only to the Russian people and Russia. He said that Stalin, realizing that the Russians were not attaching "any value to the idea of a communist world revolution," had ordered a stop to "revolutionary" propaganda and replaced it with the Russian national idea. He had proclaimed the "Great Russian Patriotic War" similar to the one of 1812 (against Napoleon), suppressing the institution of commissars, "pushing the Jews to the background, restoring czarist uniforms and guards as well as historical Russian orders. These new policies of Stalin, according to Sakharov, contributed to the birth of a new national spirit among the Russians; the number of deserters fell dramatically; the "Soviet soldier" was now fighting "for his homeland against the occupation" and "for the freedom from foreign slavery" (BA R II/683a f. 82).

Sakharov then affirmed that this new national spirit, aroused by Stalin's new policies, was manifesting itself not only in the Red Army but also in the occupied territories, and that this was why new policies must be similar to those carried out by Stalin.

Sakharov, however, implored the Germans to abandon the idea of "separatism" for non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union which he very

simply described as "tribes." He endeavored to convince the Germans that during the twenty-five years of Soviet power all these "tribes," these Ukrainian, Caucasians, etc. "had learned more or less voluntarily to think in a Soviet, i.e., Great Russian, manner" (BA R 43 II/683a f. 82-83).

Sakharov thus formally recognized that "Sovietization," voluntary or forced, meant "Russification" and that Soviet in reality meant "Russian."

As to the changes of policies in the east, Sakharov suggested publishing a statement of the Führer to the Russian people, to create a Russian people's army, and set up a provisional Russian ("Great Russian") government made up of Soviet generals taken prisoner who could immediately conclude peace with Germany.

The institution of political commissars of the Red Army had been suppressed on 2 October 1942, but it was replaced by the institution of "political assistants of unit commanders" (*zampolü*). This decision was officially supported by the need to unify the military and political command of the units. Shoulder straps identical to those of the czarist Russian army with the same distinct marks for rank were adopted by the Red Army on 6 January 1943, at the moment of the Battle of Stalingrad to flatter the national feelings of the Russians to whom Soviet power was according preference.

In the second half of March 1943, some levels of the Wehrmacht introduced the slogan, "Russia can be conquered only by the Russians," a slogan apparently suggested by General Vlasov. In mentioning the slogan, the author of the memorandum appended to the report of O. W. Müller, representative of the ministry of the east with the Army Group South, explained that he was knowingly leaving out the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union "because we are dealing primarily with Russians, among whom I also count the Ukrainians" (BA R 6/52 f. 30).¹⁵

This way of seeing things corresponded perfectly with the political tendencies of the Russian émigrés who were traditionally opposed to the right of the Ukrainians to dispose of themselves freely.

A detailed plan for the creation of the Russian national committee was ready in the beginning of March 1943. Many Russian generals, including Vlasov, as well as several other important Russian persons, including Kaminski, were to be part of it (BA R 6/72 f. 18-25).

Hope in an Unchanged Situation

Modification of the eastern policies was essential. The Soviet army, ready to pass the offensive in the sections of Kursk-Voronezh and Stalingrad, took the city of Kharkiv on 16 February 1943 and kept it for a month.

In the meantime, nothing changed in Ukraine. Koch continued to apply the same policies of terror and exploitation. On 20 February when he addressed his general commissars and district commissars, one part of Ukraine was already in the hands of the Soviet army. Koch declared that he wished to help the front which, as he said, needed soldiers and weapons, while Germany needed workers, both the front and Germany needed bread, all of which Koch had to draw from Ukraine. He knew that the transports of workers to Germany had slowed down considerably, and it was more difficult to fill a single train than had been "to fill ten of them last summer" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2558 f. 62-63). He recommended continued harshness because "the Slav interprets kind treatment as a sign of weakness." He asked for even more severity (Appendix, Doc.#169).

Germany was incapable of furnishing the necessary personnel to the countries in the east, especially medical personnel. All contagious diseases represented danger for the Germans who were in the east. When in March 1943 Hitler learned that the school of medicine in Vinnytsia had been closed, he disapproved of this measure and demanded the opening of schools of medicine not only in Vinnytsia, a city located close to his general headquarters, but also in Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and Minsk in Belorussia (BA R 6/181 f. 27, 32).

On 20 February 1943, Rosenberg still had no response from Hitler to his memorandum. State secretary of the office of the four-year plan, Körner, prepared a memorandum to Reichsmarshall Göring asking Göring to speak to Hitler and support Rosenberg's propositions, as Körner thought the key to success in the eastern policies lay in the treatment of the population. According to him the renunciation of the slave and sub-human theories was already manifesting itself in the steps taken recently by the Wehrmacht high command in the matter of volunteers from the east.

But Körner noticed that the Germans continued to make mistakes "especially in recruiting workers." Koch continued to pursue the knout policy. Körner proposed to take economic measures to stop the resettling of the population and evacuation of villages from regions "infested by gangs": to reopen high schools, technical and professional schools; to stop all discrimination and "Bolshevik methods." He said the freed population must be regarded as a friend, not as an enemy or slave (BA R 6/139 f. 28-31).

On 24 February 1943, Middelhaue, a high official in the ministry of the east, prepared a plan for the creation of a Ukrainian central committee in the zone behind the front (outside Koch's administration) following Rosenberg's memorandum. Normally the seat of this committee was Kharkiv where the army wanted to set up units of the Ukrainian Liberation Army on the model of the Russian Liberation Army they had organized in the sector Center of the front, but Kharkiv had been taken by the Red Army; the Ukrainians, in favor of organizing Ukrainian units and the national committee were evacuated to Kiev. Thinking the Germans would change their policies, they spoke of a "turning" in the German politics and submitted their conditions to the Germans, but their attitude provoked Koch's rage (IMT 192-PS XXV:271).

The Germans retook Kharkiv on 15 March. Although no Ukrainian central committee was created, broadcasts in Ukrainian from Radio Berlin announced on 24 and 25 March the creation of such a committee in Kharkiv and the formation of a Ukrainian liberation army.

The news caused a sensation in Kharkiv and in Kiev, bringing consternation to the Russians who, according to an Abwehr report, refused to believe that the Ukrainian people could participate in the fight against bolshevism "on the same basis as the Russian people." However, when the Ukrainian mayor of Kharkiv, Forostivky, who wanted to thank the German authorities, came with his collaborators to the commissar of the city of Kiev, the commissar declared ignorance of the affair. The SD informed these Ukrainians that they should not rejoice too much "because that could have bad consequences for them" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f. 132RS, 133). The Wehrmacht did create several units of the Ukrainian Liberation Army (UVV), but these were disbanded in August 1943.

From the end of 1941 the Wehrmacht used small units of HIWIs (*Hilfsfreiwillige*—volunteers), composed of Baltic, Russian, and Ukrainian nationals. The Waffen-SS did not favor accepting fighting units composed of nationals from Eastern Europe. In May 1942 Himmler refused to authorize the formation of SS-units composed of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, claiming that this idea, though tempting, was also very dangerous. Several months later, however, he changed his mind because the Waffen-SS felt shortage of soldiers, and by the end of August 1942 Himmler consented to the organization of an Estonian legion. In December a Latvian legion was formed (Stein 188-190). One Estonian and two Latvian divisions were organized at the beginning of 1943. The Stalingrad disaster caused the withdrawal of the racial principle in the Waffen-SS and the need to increase troops took precedence. In place of Nordic purity, SS-Obergruppenführer Berger formulated a new principle: "A German mother will not have to cry when a foreigner dies at the front" (192). In February 1943 Hitler authorized the setting-up of SS units composed of Moslems from Bosnia and Herzegovina (IfZ NO 5618; Grunchman 225).

At this time the governor of Galicia, SS-Gruppenführer Otto Wächter, saw the possibility of organizing a Galician SS-division. He wanted to contribute to the increase of troops and at the same time win Ukrainians from Galicia to fight against bolshevism. The idea received immediate support from the president of the Ukrainian Central Committee, V. Kubyovych, and the OUN-M circles in Germany and in the General Government. On 8 March 1943, in a letter to Governor General Frank, Kubyovych officially formulated a request to organize a Ukrainian division.

On the same day, Andriy Melnyk, from his residence in Berlin, sent a telegram to Hitler expressing himself on this matter. He stated that at this time when "a Ukrainian Liberation Army is to be organized and the Soviets are talking with Sikorski about the possession of Ukrainian territories, the Ukrainian people are waiting to hear clarification on German goals for Ukraine" (BA R 43 II/ 1504a f. 9). Melnyk asserted that it was time to put into practice the common declarations made by the Duce and Reichsminister von Ribbentrop on 1 March 1943 on the defense of Europe against bolshevism by including Ukraine. This

defense, said Melnyk would be strengthened when an independent Ukraine state would be created and the Muscovite danger eliminated for a long time to come.

This telegram did not change anything, however, and the clarification of German policies toward Ukraine was not issued.

The plan of SS-Gruppenführer Wächter in Berlin concerning the creation of a Galician SS division was realized at the end of March 1943 when it received Hitler's approval. But Himmler posed a condition: the division was not to call itself "Ukrainian" but "Galician" to prevent Ukrainians from thinking of a possible independence of Ukraine. In the minds of Himmler and Hitler a division would be composed of inhabitants of a country formerly belonging to Austria, thus the term "Austrian Galicians," not "Ukrainians."

On 15 April 1943 a Ukrainian military committee was set up to deal with recruitment of "Galicians"; on 28 April creation of the "*SS-Schützen-Division Galizien*" was announced in a statement by Wächter and an appeal to the young Ukrainians of Galicia by Kubyovych (Heike 15-18, 216-219; Kubyovych 58-60).

The reason why the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS set up such foreign units appears in the following statistics: between 1 November 1942 and 31 March 1943 the Germans had lost in the east 965,650 men (killed, wounded, missing in action or taken prisoner), and they could mobilize only 493,300 men to replace them (Proektor 517).

The Germans had only a minimal chance of victory. In March 1943, facing the 159 German divisions on the eastern front were 600 Soviet divisions. In the sector South the Germans had thirty-two divisions, the Soviets 341 divisions and fighting units. The ratio of forces in this sector was thus 1 to 7 in favor of Soviet Russia (Grunchman 248).

Intensification of Repression

In January 1943 the central leadership of OUN-B wrote in a small brochure, printed in memory of Myron-Orlyk, killed in Kiev by SD agents: "He died in the fight against German imperialism, the worst occupying forces of Ukraine....Germany, that presents itself as an ally

and liberator, does not want an independent and unified Ukraine; it wants to turn Ukraine into a colony and the Ukrainian people into slaves." The Ukrainian people, however, "continue to fight against all those who want to enslave her," and by fighting she will obtain the independence of the Ukrainian State "against the wishes of all imperialisms that try to appropriate for themselves the riches of Ukraine." The brochure stated that the German occupying forces, "dazed by his [Hitler's] victories on the front," did not see that "his demented policies of oppression, violence, and murder are leading him straight for catastrophe" (Appendix, Doc.#164).

The OUN-B continued its work with the help of leaflets. In February 1942 alone, the SD recorded the distribution of fifteen different leaflets of this organization in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, more precisely in the northwest (Appendix, Doc.#166).

Finding it necessary to state the true position, the central leadership of the OUN convened the third conference of its leaders from 17 to 21 February 1943. The resolutions, adopted at the close of this conference, identified the war in the east as a war between two imperialisms for the conquest of Ukraine. The two imperialisms, "the German national socialist imperialism and the Russian Bolshevik imperialism," both needed Ukraine "as a base for subsequent conquests," but through its imperialist policies, as well as terror and pillage, Germany had mobilized against itself all the peoples of Europe. Moscow was trying to profit from the German errors and was benefitting from the aid of the western Allies.

The OUN-B thought that Germany's attempts to make oppressed peoples support the fight against bolshevism and shed blood in its imperialist interests were "only a treacherous maneuver of an occupant and a belated attempt to escape the consequences of committed errors, as well as a means of strengthening its military potential" (Appendix, Doc.#168; *OUN v sviiti* 75-76).

Soviet Russia, in contrast, considered victory over Germany as "the first stage of the realization of the goals of Russian imperialism, i.e., the first stage of the conquest of all of Europe and the realization of world revolution..." (*OUN* 76).

The final document of the conference concluded that Ukraine found itself between the anvil and the hammer of two expansionisms. Consequently, the Ukrainian people had to fight the two imperialisms simultaneously by relying upon their own forces. Collaboration of Ukrainians with other peoples and states could be based only on the principle of the recognition by these peoples and these states of the right of the Ukrainian people to form an independent state. The OUN-B held this principle essential to preserve common interests with the peoples of the east and the west in their fight for freedom (Appendix, Doc.#168). Thus it declared itself ready to collaborate with other resistance movements if they recognized the Ukrainians' right to form an independent state that would encompass all of Ukrainian ethnographic territories.

The OUN-B declared itself categorically opposed to collaboration with the Germans. The final document of the conference stated that "all collaboration with the German occupying forces, i.e., all aid given to them in the competitive fight against Russian imperialism was only helping Russian imperialism in and outside of Ukraine. It gave the [Germans] the possibility of jeopardizing the struggle of the Ukrainians for their national freedom, of presenting this struggle as an instrument of German imperialism" (OUN 83).

Consequently, the OUN-B stood firm against the enlistment of Ukrainians in the German forces. Ukrainians were not to shed their blood nor give their lives in the imperialistic interest of foreign powers. Creation of Ukrainian units and German affirmation that the Ukrainians were "allies" in the fight "against Moscow's imperialism," sought only cannon fodder "to win the war; and after this war the Ukrainian people will be once more oppressed" (87).

The final document of the conference maintained that should the Soviets regain power, the OUN-B would continue the fight; without the creation of an independent Ukrainian state on the entire Ukrainian territory, the independence of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe was impossible (84-85).

The OUN-B did not content itself with verbal condemnation of the "personal and collective" collaboration with the Germans but it proceeded systematically with liquidation operations of SD and Gestapo agents, of Ukrainian policemen who had taken part in punitive anti-Ukrainian

activities, of members of protection units and Soviet agents in German service. One of the most famous commandos in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Ivan Bilyk-Kost', made himself known through a vast operation of liquidations in March 1943 in the Dnipropetrovsk region and in the south of Ukraine (Shankovsky *Pokhidni* 154-156).

The Gestapo and the SD continued to hunt down OUN-B members: in January 1943, two of its members were arrested in Vienna, ten in Oppeln, fifty-five in the district of Hannover. Seven among the latter were released, three committed suicide. The Berlin Gestapo arrested 136 persons. In Ukraine, the SD arrested thirty-eight OUN-B members. In March the SD arrested in Lviv one of the leaders of this organization, Dmytro Hrytsai, and two important members, A. Kuzminsky and V. Kovalsky. Many members of this organization were also arrested in Mykolaiv, in the Uman' region (twelve persons), in Kiev (forty-six persons), and in the Ostrih region (twenty-two persons). Because of the constant arrests and to limit losses, the Bandera movement changed from a cell system of five members to a cell system of three members (Appendix, Doc. ##164, 171).

Commander Dmytro Hrytsai-Dub, head of the military high command of the OUN-B, was kept in the Lviv prison. His assistant, Lieutenant Oleksa Hassyn-Lytsar, also arrested by the SD, was held in the Drohobych prison, but the central leadership of the OUN-B chose to free these two officers of merit whom they needed when the insurrectionary fight began on a vast scale. Two commandos of militants, armed with false order papers from the Berlin Gestapo, and dressed in SD uniforms, presented themselves at the same time to the persons in charge of the two prisons and had the two men handed over to them to take them, as stated in the false transfer orders, to Berlin.

The Bandera resistance movement continued with the build-up of underground depots of weapons and ammunition. According to some confidential estimates, this movement in March 1943 had 15,000 rifles, 45,000 grenades, and 1,550 pistols. According to the same reports, the Ukrainian protection police was often infiltrated by Bandera partisans. At the Lviv police academy, the instruction officers openly followed a course hostile to the Reich while the Ukrainian police sabotaged the service of forced labor (Appendix, Doc. #171).

In January 1943 the Germans noted OUN-M intensification in some localities, especially in Volhynia and they worried again about a "strong rapprochement between the followers of Bandera and Melnyk" (Appendix, Doc.#166).

The head of the Ukrainian Central Committee of Kharkiv, V. Kubiiovych, during talks with Governor General Frank in the beginning of January 1943, complained about German exactions in Galicia, and Frank invited him to communicate this in writing, which Kubiiovych did in a letter dated 25 February 1943.

Kubiiovych's letter enumerated many exactions: inhumane treatment, massive arrests and executions. Recruitment of workers, stated the letter, had often taken the aspect of a manhunt. In Galicia peoples were shanghaied everywhere, in the city, in the country, in the streets, railroad stations, churches, and homes. Moreover, the Germans were undertaking "cleansing" activities. During such an activity in December 1942, they arrested throughout Galicia a large number of people suspected of belonging to the Bandera movement who in March 1943, were still in prison under extremely severe conditions. In the prison of Chortkiv fifty Ukrainians had died of starvation and from detention conditions, yet the German police did not authorize any aid for the prisoners.

After 15 January 1943, in an operation directed against the so-called "anti-social" elements, the Germans arrested in Galicia approximately 5,000 persons. Hundreds of others were arrested as "incapable of work."

Executions without trials were frequent. Forty-six peasants, among them thirty-one Ukrainians, were shot in Lubycha Korolivska in October 1942; in November, twenty-eight Ukrainians were put in front of a firing squad in Lviv and fifty-six in Chortkiv. Dozens of Ukrainians were shot in the Lublin district: forty-five in Sumyn, including eighteen children ages three to fifteen; nineteen in Pankov and Sharavola, including eight children ages one to thirteen, etc. (IMT 1526-PS).

German reports of this period describe fully the repressions that continued unflaggingly in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. In February 1943, the SD of Brest-Litovsk arrested fourteen persons, including the famous writer, Fedir Dudko, suspected of belonging to the Bandera movement. In Kremianets, after the execution of Doctor Poshchensky, panic seized the Ukrainian intellectuals. People left their homes during

the night for fear of being arrested. On 23 February, many people were arrested in the district of Rivne, including twenty-three Ukrainians who were almost immediately shot (BA R 94/8 Der Gebietskommissar in Brest-Litowsk, P-I/GK, 25 February 1943; BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f.154-154RS).

The Germans often shot entire families. "Women, infants, the elderly, and even far-away parents are killed without any procedure immediately if there is the least suspicion that one of the members of the family has committed an offense," (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f. 146RS) stated one of the reports of the Abwehr, which specified that before March 1943 the Germans had already burned approximately forty villages in Volhynia, then villages of Lydivka, Borshchivka, and Remel were also burned. In Remel, the German police threw children and women into the burning houses, and burned bodies were later visible in the rubble.

One German report told that when the Gebietskommissar of Kremianets entered the movie house of his town, everyone had to stand, remove their hats and salute him. Sometimes he took pleasure in entering three times, and each time the ceremony was repeated. The *Kreislandwirt* (responsible for the agriculture of a district) of Dubno had beaten seven peasants because they had failed to greet him in passing (these peasants did not even know who he was). The *Kreislandwirt* of Tuchyn beat the Ukrainians frequently. Beating occurred everywhere (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f. 146RS-157, 152-153RS, 154).

In Zdolbuniv executions took place in the center of town at the market place. The gallows had been standing there since the summer of 1942. In Rivne the curious and passers-by could witness public executions on Bila Street. Public executions took place in almost all towns of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and in the General Government (for example, in Drohobych on Mondays, the weekly market day).

On 8 March 1943, a short time after the arrest of many Ukrainian workers in the districts of Rivne, Kostopil, and Sarny, a revolt, followed by an escape attempt, took place in the prison of Rivne; one German official and one guard were killed. In the night of 9 to 10 February, the Germans put in front of a firing squad all inmates of the prison, approximately 1,000 persons, among whom were many Ukrainian intellectuals, including a well-known bacteriologist (the German report

does not give his name). When announced in the local press, this shooting brought about panic in the population who feared other arrests. "Many Ukrainians," stated the report, "are leaving their homes in the evening to spend the night elsewhere. New arrests took place on 23 February [1943] in Rivne and its surroundings. The sixty-three apprehended Ukrainians were shot" (BA-MA RH 2/v. f. 23).

Among the victims were the former director of the Kostopil high school, Bachkivsky, whose father, the director the high school in Rivne, had been shot by the Bolsheviks, as well as Father Roman Danylevych, eighteen employees of the Gebietskommissar's office in Rivne, etc.

On 26 February three trains, carrying arrested persons, passed through Kostopil. During the passage of these trains people could be heard crying: "We are undoubtedly being taken to be shot!" (f. 23). On 28 February twenty-five Ukrainian families (with women and children) from Berezno were shot at five in the morning in reprisal for the death of SD members killed by a Ukrainian whom they had come to arrest. On 28 March the SD arrested in Kovel the mayor of the town, Pyrkhiv, and his assistant, V. Bachynsky, as well as their families.

One of the German reports noted that the German administration made no effort to understand the Ukrainian population. "The civilian administration has dug a deep chasm between the Ukrainians and the Germans, a chasm full of blood," concluded the report (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f. 23, 147-148).

The report cited many examples of manhunt, inhumane treatment and extreme misery of people shanghaied to Germany. The facts were known not only in Ukraine but also on the other side of the front, in Russia. The Soviet Russian government protested in a memorandum from Molotov, sent to all diplomatic representatives in Moscow (f.135-135RS, 137, 159-159RS, 160RS, 161RS).

A new OUN-B leaflet stressing once more the brutal methods of the Bolsheviks and the Nazis fell into the hands of the Germans in March 1943. Particularly violent toward the Germans, the leaflet called the youth to join the OUN combat groups and to fight for an independent Ukrainian state (Appendix, Doc.#172).

German Withdrawal

Ukrainian national units that were part of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) continually received reinforcements, but initially their activities were limited to attacks against the centers of German supplies. These activities, as well as those of the Soviet partisans, increased significantly from January 1943 on (Appendix, Doc.#165).

At the beginning of February 1943, the UPA units went into large-scale action on two fronts, against the Germans and against the Soviet partisans. The UPA had decided to push the Soviet partisans northward across the Prypait River and eastward across the River Sluch. It also undertook operations to force the Germans to leave their bases of operation and places protected by small garrisons. By occupying these grounds, the UPA wanted to prevent German punitive expeditions against the villages and to assume the protection of the Ukrainian population.

On 7 February, a company of the UPA, under the command of Dovbeshka-Korobka, took the town of Volodymyrets. The unit of the protection police, composed of Cossacks, was disarmed and all prisoners in the prison freed. On 22 February the same company attacked the town of Vysotske whose garrison numbered approximately 200 men and had received a reinforcement of 350 men. The attack failed. Commander Dovbeshka-Korobka (Ivan Perehiyniak) was killed during this operation.

In the second half of February, UPA units carried out several operations against the Soviet partisans. These operations continued during the following months.

On the night of 10 to 11 March, an UPA company attacked the factory in Orzhev where a large quantity of weapons and ammunition was located. Approximately sixty Germans were killed in the course of this operation. The UPA lost four men, including the commander of the company, Ostap (Serhiy Kachynsky). On 20 March an UPA unit attacked the PW camp in Lutsk freeing forty prisoners. Another UPA unit then attacked a rounding-up center for workers who were destined to be deported to Germany.

From March 1943 on UPA units appeared in the Kremianets region. On 10 April UPA detachments attacked simultaneously the prisons of Kremianets, Dubno, Kovel, Lutsk, Horokhiv, and Lubachivka, freeing hundreds of prisoners. One of the units attacked the PW camp in Kovel and the rounding up center for workers in Kivertsy. The freed persons generally joined the ranks of the UPA. In the second half of March, practically all units of the protection police composed of Ukrainians went over to the side of the insurgents. On 28 March an SS detachment, 1,500 men strong, carried out an attack against the city of Ludvypil where a UPA detachment was located which pushed back four assaults, forcing the Germans to withdraw to Kostopil with fifty-eight dead.

The number of the combat units of the UPA grew uninterruptedly. In the first half of April 1943, after hard combat, the Ukrainian insurgents succeeded in totally freeing many districts in Volhynia (Mizoch, Ostroh, Shumsk, Kremianets, Verba). The Germans launched against these places one division composed of two Hungarian regiments, one German SS regiment, and a regiment composed of Uzbeks and Kazakhs. The fighting lasted three days, and the Hungarian regiments were demolished. Finally the Germans had to withdraw (UPA 11:6-11).

In April, Ukrainian insurgent units also began operations in Podolia (Yarmolyntsi, Proskuriv, Kamianets-Podilsky), and the insurgent movement continued to expand.

On 2 May 1943, the head of the SA (assault section) of the Nazi party, Victor Lutze, on an inspection trip to Ukraine, was killed on the Kovel-Rivne route in an ambush by UPA fighters. The Germans, however, have never admitted the reason for his death, stating that he had been a casualty of an automobile accident (UPA 11:13; *Krakivski Visti* no.20, 16 May 1943:3).

The UPA reports on this phase of the Ukrainian insurgent war, which generally do not mention the consequences of this war for the Germans, must be supplemented by German reports. In the beginning, these reports were somewhat inaccurate. Thus report no.46 from 19 March 1943 from the eastern occupied regions first mentions only vaguely the appearance in the Sarny-Kostopil district of a "gang" of approximately 1,000 men under the leadership of Borovets and OUN-B "bandit groups" in the Kremianets district south of Dubno, where they

had perpetrated "attacks against the state property" (Appendix, Doc.#171; BA R 58/224 f. 42, 43). More precise information appeared in German reports from the beginning of April on. Thus a letter dated 1 April from a head of a German society for the conversion of wood, Schenk, indicated that north of the Kiev-Rivne-Kovel-Brest railroad line, besides Soviet partisans, there were many units of partisans with Ukrainian national tendencies that were constantly receiving reinforcements. Their attacks were frequent, even in broad daylight. The national partisans, for instance, attacked a train loaded with workers en route to Germany who were freed. Other national "gangs" south of the railroad line also disrupted the train traffic. The Germans could take the Zhytomyr-Kiev line only under military escort. Because of this, the economic life suffered tremendously and "in some of these regions there no longer was a German administration." The sawmills of the Rivne region were systematically burned down and about 400 workers were killed (Appendix, Doc.#174).

The Reichskommissariat report for Ukraine, dated 4 April 1943, confirmed that in the Zhytomyr region "people in charge of the economy have also had to withdraw to the county seats which they left only under powerful police escort." In the Volhynia region "only two districts remain free of these bandits." Of course, deliveries in these regions were perilous. The report specified: "The national gangs are especially dangerous in the regions of Kremianets-Kostopil-Rivne....During the night of 21 to 22 March they attacked simultaneously all economic centers of the Kremianets region and one of these centers has been totally destroyed" (Appendix, Doc.#175). During these operations twelve Germans were killed (BA R 6/492 f. 9).

On 3 April 1943, the services of the Reichskommissar had prepared maps of the general region of Volhynia-Polodia presenting the real situation of the German administration. From February 1943 on, this region, to a large degree, was dominated by the resistance. Now the Generalbezirk of Volhynia-Polodia extended from the Romanian frontier in the south (district of Kamianets-Polilsky) as far as Pinsk and Brest-Litovsk in the north (i.e., as far as the Belorussian frontier, or more exactly the frontier of Ostland), and encompassed 80,508 km² and

4,212,000 inhabitants. This region was important from the economic point of view.

In most of the districts of Volhynia, German administration was limited to the district centers; the countryside was entirely in the hands of the Ukrainian insurgents and, in the north, partially in the hands of Soviet partisans. In these regions, i.e., in more than half of Volhynia, as one of the maps showed, almost all districts, from where 50% of deliveries of supplies for the army and the Reich came, were lost. In the south of lightly wooded Polodia the situation was better; the German administration still maintained itself in most of the districts (f. 11-13).

On 30 April the general commissar of Volhynia-Polodia wrote several reports on the situation in the entire general commissariat. One of the reports indicated that the "less important gangs," "probably Ukrainian nationalists," had made their appearance in Polodia in the districts of Yarmolyntsi and Kaminets-Polilsky. While in the north and northeast, especially in the regions of Pinsk, Stolyn, Sarny, and Kostopil "Soviet gangs," that terrorized the population, were everywhere, the west and the south of Volhynia were dominated by "Ukrainian nationalist gangs." The report added: "In the regions of Horokhiv, Luboml, Dubno, Kremianets, and especially Lutsk one must speak of an uprising." Because the Germans had a hard time believing in the possibility of a Ukrainian national uprising, the report explained that "one must suppose that a part of the nationalist gangs are being maneuvered by Moscow" (BA R 94/17 Der Generalkommissar für Wolhynien und Polodien. Pl.Luzk, 30 April 1943, 1).

The report continued: "In Volhynia the nationalist propaganda has raised a large part of the population against us, and it ended in the creation of the above mentioned gangs. Now a large part of the population sympathizes with the gangs." The report stressed that the German administration had to withdraw from some of the district seats. One could no longer speak of normal German administration of the country (aside from the zones in the center and south of Podolia) because the far-off territories of Polissia and North Volhynia "are entirely, or in large part, controlled by the gangs, while normal influence of the district commissars is limited to half or one third, indeed still less of the territories that are under their authority." The report warned of

the danger of "progressive disintegration of the entire administration apparatus" if adequate steps were not taken (BA R 94/17 report V-I, 1).

Worsening of the Volhynia situation continued in March, according to the report, although the situation at the front improved. On 14 March the Germans, who passed over to counter-offensive, retook Kharkiv and on 21 March Bilhorod. These successes, however, had no effect on the Volhynia situation. The Ukrainian insurgent movement spread more and more into Podolia. The report stated: "The regions are constantly troubled by acts of sabotage, attacks, fires, and pillages. The movement of Ukrainian resistance has increased its activities in an extraordinary manner over almost the entire territory of the *Generalbezirk*. It manifests itself also in the regions of Proskuriv, Letyshiv, and Yarmolyntsi, which up to now had been comparatively calm." Finally the report added that a contributory factor to the aggravation of the situation had been "the compulsory levee of Ukrainian workers for the Reich which the enemy propaganda presents as deportation" (3-4).

The activities of the insurgents and partisans caused such a decline in deliveries that the Germans could no longer speak of normal planning. The regions of Horokhiv and Kremianets already had an organized insurrection of peasants; "one had to expect that other regions would follow suit if rigorous measures are not taken by the police and the Wehrmacht" (4-5).

The German services had been informed that there were Ukrainian national insurgents also in the woods of the Dubno-Slavuta-Shepetivka section. These were peasants of the vicinity ("recruitment took place on Sunday at the church doors, in a loud voice or by means of written notes") and, therefore, difficult to combat. During the day they normally worked in the fields, taking up arms only for particular actions. The German services concluded that if this insurgency were tied to the Ukrainian national movement, complete evacuation of the population of the infested regions would be necessary. The report indicated that the insurgents often had heavy weapons, even artillery (BA-MA RW 30/99 f. 23, 23RS).

A German report, dated 13 May 1943, confirmed that "in the Generalbezirk Volhynia-Polodia and that of Zhytomyr-North, the activities of the bandits had taken on such proportions that important parts

of these regions have passed more and more under their control and domination" (Appendix, Doc.#176).

Consequently, while during the summer and fall of 1942 deliveries and harvest had been rather good in many districts, from the end of 1942 on the situation was rapidly deteriorating. According to a report, dated 14 May 1943, most of the districts of the general region of Volhynia-Podolia had "to be considered completely lost for deliveries." The report, appended with a map, pointed out the lost percentages of land and deliveries: 42.21% of arable land (74.82% in Volhynia alone); 215,387 tons (44.68%) of wheat (76.45 in Volhynia); 613,183 (52.38%) head of cattle (77.86% in Volhynia); 438,824 (68.06%) sheep (88.96% in Volhynia); 284,348 (47.44%) hogs (71.45% in Volhynia); 111,824 liters of milk; 48,600,000 eggs, etc. In the remainder of the general region deliveries were still possible but could be disrupted by sporadic attacks. This region represented 25.18% of the total arable land in the general region of Volhynia-Podolia. There too, stated the report, loss of deliveries to the order of 30% to 40% in Volhynia and 20% to 25% in Podolia was to be expected (Appendix, Doc.#179; BA-MA RW 41/44 #1678/ 43 geh., Bericht 1-2). Likewise in the north of the general region of Zhytomyr (with the exception of the city of Vinnytsia and a zone along the railroad tracks and the cities of Mozyr, Ovruch, and Korosten) no supplies could be obtained for the troops (Bericht 2-3).

The report concluded, "While in the beginning of the year planning for supplies specified a levying of 6,000 tons a month from the territory of Volhynia [without Podolia], by the end of March this number had to be reduced to 1,920 tons and then, on the basis of new reports, further reduced to 800 tons." In the districts of Lutsk and Kovel, cattle could be loaded only under the protection of the troops. In the north of the Zhytomyr region the Germans could not get a single cow because of lack of security forces (Bericht 3-4).

The deliveries of cattle for the front decreased perceptibly. While in 1942 Ukraine had provided all meat necessary for the front (Sector South), the Germans now had to import 6,000 tons of meat from the Reich (Bericht 4).

According to another report, the following targets in Volhynia were attacked: 850 state properties, 118 dairies, seventeen distilleries, thirteen

district properties, two sawmills, sixty-one mills, one sugar factory. The following were complete destroyed: 178 stables, twenty-eight state properties, 220 warehouses, ten mills, 217 houses, eight dairies, etc. The assailants seized a large quantity of grain, vegetables, etc., as well as 2,451 horses, 5,887 head of cattle, 3,794 hogs, etc. (BA-MA RW 41/44 #1678/43, Der Wehrmachtintendant..., Luzk 13 May 1943, Auswirkung der Bandentätigkeit 3-4).

The same report indicated that 1,020 members of the protection police and surveillance services had crossed over to the side of the "bandits", often with weapons and ammunition (3,5).

In May 1943, in the regions of Volhynia, Polodia, and Zhytomyr, i.e., on a territory of 145,308 km² (42.8% of the territory of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine), the Germans lost 32% of arable land, 17% of wheat production, 33% of livestock, 28% of hogs, 52% of sheep, 26% of the milk quota, 18% of the egg quota (Appendix, Doc. #179). Other deliveries were disrupted.

Without precise numbers and specific data on the movement of the resistance groups, the German reports on territories that passed under the control of the resistance and on damages sustained to supplies, failed to distinguish between losses caused by the Ukrainian nationalist insurgents and partisans and losses caused by the Soviet partisans, but other German reports confirm that at this time vast regions of Volhynia, part of Podolia, and some districts of Zhytomyr were more or less in the hands of the Ukrainian nationalist resistance (which surpassed in numbers the fighters of the Soviet resistance). The latter generally controlled only zones in the north of Volhynia-Polissia and the region of Zhytomyr (as well as some districts in the northeast of Ukraine). Report no.53 on the occupied regions, dated 7 May 1943, indicated that in the north of Volhynia the activities of the Soviet partisans were decreasing while those of the nationalist insurgents were increasing (BA R 58/224 f. 154RS).

Furthermore, German reports on the Ukrainian Resistance Army (insurgents and non-Soviet partisans) generally made no distinction between the various tendencies within this resistance; in the spring of 1943 there were three Ukrainian resistance groups.

The most important of these was established in April 1942 by the OUN-B, taking the name "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA). By April 1943 it numbered between 8,000 and 10,000 men in fighting units. By June, their number had more than doubled.

The second movement, that of Taras Bulba-Borovets, in April 1943, had 4,000 to 6,000 men and could mobilize thousands of others. But in July–August 1943, during a unification action, ordered by the command of the UPA, almost all of Bulba's units were integrated into the UPA with the exception of one detachment which, commanded by Bulba himself, continued to exist as an independent unit until the arrival of the Soviet troops.¹⁶

The third movement of armed resistance (in Volhynia only) was the OUN-M armed group. One of these groups, led by Bily, a short time after its creation at the end of January 1943, had attacked the prison of Dubno and freed sixty prisoners (Appendix, Doc. #170). Less numerous, the OUN-M organized itself into partisan units in March–April 1943 after the defection of the Ukrainian police protection units swelled their ranks. By the spring of 1943, the OUN-M units had 2,000 to 3,000 men and ceased to exist in the summer of 1943.

Chapter VI

THE DOWNFALL

Because preparations for landing in Europe were delayed, Churchill went to Moscow on 12 September 1942 to explain the situation to Stalin, but Stalin resigned himself to accept the delay only with difficulty. The Allies did, however, promise to intensify aerial bombardments of the Reich and planned a landing in Northern Africa (*Operation Torch*).

During the Casablanca Conference (12-14 January 1943), England and the USA decided to confirm to Russia their willingness to continue the fighting. Following the propositions of the American president, they accepted the principle of total elimination of the German and Japanese war power, i.e., the principle of unconditional surrender (Duroselle *Histoire* 366-367; *Foreign Relations of the US*, Casablanca 727). Roosevelt assured Stalin that this was the only solution to insure world peace.

Eastern Europe Given to Russia

In a declaration, made public on 6 December 1942, the Polish National Council of London asked for a guarantee of restitution to Poland of Polish territories in the east. Sikorski further expressed hope that after the war, Poland would be yet more powerful and larger than before 1939. Polish-Soviet relations became even more strained when the Polish government in exile demanded specifics of the fate of the Poles deported to Siberia and the 8,000 Polish officers, prisoners of the Russians, about whom there was no news.

Molotov responded on 16 January to the Polish ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet government considered all inhabitants of territories annexed in 1939 Soviet citizens and, consequently, he felt no obligation to give out any information concerning Soviet citizens (*Documents on Polish-Soviet* 474). Because Sikorski and the Polish press in exile maintained their territorial claims, the Russians responded through a Ukrainian intermediary, the "faithful" communist O. Korniy-chuk, who claimed the population of Ukrainian territories, annexed in 1939, had chosen to become part of the Soviet Union. Published in a brochure form, his article was distributed to diplomatic representatives in Moscow (Irving 27).

Poles in exile, by taking on the defense of the "sacred frontiers" of Poland in the east, went so far as to evoke the right of Poland to extend as far as the Dniro R. and the Black Sea. These excessive claims highly irritated Russians who did not feel like ceding even a part of Ukrainian territory. The claims thus aggravated Polish-Soviet relations still further. On 3 May 1943, in a declaration published by TASS, Moscow accused the Polish government in exile of refusing Belorussians and Ukrainians the right to live "united" in their "respective national states" and of wishing to maintain their division. Moscow reminded people that even Lord Curzon, the British minister, in 1920 had recognized that Poland had no right to territories east of the line that he had established (the so-called Curzon line) (*Documents on Polish-Soviet* 501).

The Polish government in exile responded the following day by publishing a declaration in which it affirmed that the territories in question were Polish territories and that the Polish nation had always lived on these territories "in harmony with its Ukrainian and Belorussian compatriots." Thus these territories should revert to Poland. (The real sentiments of the Ukrainians on these territories regarding Poland were presented previously.) Moscow cunningly presented the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, which was no sovereign state, as a "Ukrainian National State," thus bypassing the right of the people to dispose of themselves freely.

Poles continued to believe that Americans were going to support their claims. In fact, during the Washington Anglo-American talks which took place from 12 to 29 March 1943 in which Franklin D. Roosevelt,

Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, Harry Hopkins, and Anthony Eden took part, it was decided, evidently on the insistence of Eden, that the Anglo-Americans accept, if need be, incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR while wishing for a new plebiscite on this question, and agree that Poland be limited to the Curzon line but that it would receive in return East Prussia from which the German population would be evacuated. Further, the English and Americans accepted incorporation of Bessarabia and Bukovina into Russia. As for Germany, Roosevelt and Eden planned its dismemberment according to the wishes of the possible separatist movements. Austria was to become independent once more (Duroselle *Histoire* 367).

The Polish government in exile had asked its ambassador to the United States, J. Ciechanowski, to intervene with the participants of the conference on behalf of the Polish point of view, but Eden refused to receive him, leaving this task to the head of the European affairs of the foreign office who informed Ciechanowski that because of pro-Russian sentiments of the public opinion in Great Britain, the government of London could not adopt a radical attitude with regard to the Soviet Union. Ciechanowski had the impression that the same situation prevailed also in the United States (135). Pretending to support with all possible measure the Poles, Roosevelt was willing to give in to Russian territorial demands.

On 13 April 1943 the affair of the German discovery in the forest of Katyn of common graves containing the remains of several thousand slain Polish officers exploded. Accused by Poles of having committed this crime, Russia decided on 25 April to break off diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile. From this time on the Russians elected a solution to the Polish question completely favorable to Russia.

For this purpose the Russians did give their support to Poles residing in the USSR. Under their impetus the Polish communists created a committee of Polish patriots that was charged with the organization of a Polish army in the Soviet Union (the first division was created in May 1943). From February 1943 on units of Polish partisans were set up within the Soviet partisan movement, especially in Western Ukraine, in northern Volhynia. Moscow thus set up a submissive Polish force which it could use against the Polish government in exile.

Members of the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR, directed by Wanda Wasilewska and leaders of the Polish army in the Soviet Union (including General Berling), supported a "democratic" Poland, "friend of the Soviet Union" accepting the Curzon line as the eastern frontier of Poland. In March-April 1943 a new situation in the Polish-Soviet relations thus developed, allowing Russia to exclude the Polish government in exile.

Return of the Russians

In January-February 1943 the Red Army began its recapture of Ukraine in the Donbass-Kharkiv sector. Soviet troops took Starobilsk (23 January 1943), Voroshilovgrad (14 February), Konstantynivka, Kramatorske, Sloviansk, Izium (5 February), Kharkiv (16 February), although some of these towns were recaptured by the Germans a month later (Kharkiv, Barvinkove, Sloviansk, Kramatorske, Kostiantynivka). For some German services, the re-occupied districts were to serve as a study of the behavior of the population before, during, and after the return of the Soviet army, then after the return of the Germans.

A report drawn up a short time later noted that the majority of the population of Kharkiv had welcomed the return of the Russians, but the majority of the population of this town was composed of Russians, not Ukrainians. Fear of Bolshevik revenge also entered in. The report specified that gun shots had been fired from windows and cellars on the retreating German troops and that red flags had appeared on the balconies as soon as the German army had left.

Representative from the Reichsministry of foreign affairs to Koch, von Saucken, hastened to see in this proof that Ukrainians "were neither in ideological contrast to the Bolsheviks nor in national opposition to the Russians" (in other words, that there was no difference between Ukrainians and Russians either in the ideological or national sense) and that "the idea of an independent Ukrainian state existed only among emigrants and in a very thin layer of the intelligentsia in ex-Soviet Ukraine who were practically without any influence" (BA R 6/70 f. 100).

Von Saucken was simply repeating ideas and convictions of Koch on the subject of Ukrainians and their aspirations. He admitted, however, that the attitude of the population and the increase of Soviet partisan activities with the approach of the front could be explained by fear of Russian reprisals.

Von Saucken and the representative of the ministry of the east with the Army Group South, O.W. Müller, further pointed out the downfall, indeed the headlong flight of Hungarian and Romanian troops. Approximately 40,000 Hungarians withdrew to the west, some through Kiev, congesting the northern roads of Ukraine, and 100,000 Romanians did the same in the south. Von Saucken had seen on the Kiev-Rivne road endless columns of Hungarian military "for the most part without weapons, uniforms in rags, some on foot, others in carts loaded with, among other things, beds and household implements" (f. 102). In spite of Koch's demands to dissolve these units, the Wehrmacht recouped them to use them in the fight against Ukrainian insurgents and Soviet partisans (BA R 6/70 f. 102; R 6/52 f. 3).

O.W. Müller observed that with the approach of the front, the attitude of the population changed. People refused to work; local police lost all authority or "had crossed to the enemy." This attitude began to manifest itself also in the areas of civilian administration. Müller thought the following elements brought degeneration of the morale of the population: the conviction that Ukrainians were a colonized people; contempt for the population and certain measures taken by the Germans during retreat (for example, in Rostov and in other places the Germans killed all prisoners of war and other prisoners) (R 6/52 f. 3).

After the recapture of some towns, including Kharkiv, Germans learned what had occurred in these regions after the return of the Soviet army.

In the Sloviansk-Barvinkove-Kramatorske-Konstantynivka sector the Soviet troops, too absorbed in their "march on Berlin"(!), did not bother with the population, but the following day the NKVD (political police) made massive arrests. All those who had been part of the militia or worked in the German administration or services, as well as women who had worked as interpreters or maintained relations with German soldiers were arrested, generally on the denunciation of members of the

Communist party who had stayed behind during the German occupation. Some of them were shot to death immediately; others were taken to Krasny Lyman. Women who had had children by German soldiers were killed immediately with their infants. After these massive arrests and executions the population changed its opinion about the Soviet regime.

According to the report of O.W. Müller, officers of the Red Army believed firmly in victory and were dreaming of the Russian march on Berlin. The report concluded that at the end of one week of Soviet presence the population, with the exception of the communists, of course, "was wishing for the return of the Germans" (f. 21-23, 24). Soviet authorities had no recourse to mobilization, contenting themselves with forcing men to volunteer.

The town of Kharkiv was almost completely destroyed during the passage of the front and by bombardments, especially by the Germans. Before the German retreat, the town had numbered 300,000 inhabitants, but by the return of the Germans it did not number more than 200,000. The missing 100,000, according to the report, were accounted for as follows: 10,000 had been evacuated by the Germans; 10,000 had been taken by the Bolsheviks; 4,000 had been shot by the NKVD (mostly women who had had relations with German soldiers, pregnant women, or those who had had children by Germans); 15,000 men, ages 15 to 45, had been rounded up for the army and sent to the front without any training, dressed in their civilian clothes, almost without weapons (one rifle for five to ten men); 5,000 girls had been taken by the Russians to be trained as intelligence agents; 35,000 inhabitants had left town to seek refuge in the countryside; and 21,000 had died during the fighting.

According to the report, after the retreat of the Red Army, inhabitants of Kharkiv had shown themselves friendlier toward the Germans than before the arrival of the Russians. Even the Russians of Kharkiv who had impatiently awaited the return of the Soviets were happy to see the Germans return (f. 40-40RS).

The German report noted, on the basis of testimony, that Soviet authorities strangely bore a great tolerance toward religion. In Kharkiv Bolshevik commissars had personally helped open churches. They had brought in icons and asked the faithful to pray for the "little Father Stalin."

According to German reports, by re-occupying the town, Russian propaganda services were able to organize the publication of a newspaper within several hours while the Germans usually needed at least ten days (f. 22, 56, 53).

Some information illustrated a state of extreme distress among those Soviet officers who did not approve of either the Soviet regime or the Germans. They were afraid of appearing fearful of being shot as communists and, at the same time, they did not support the Soviet regime and risked being killed by the NKVD. Under these circumstances, they said, the only choice left to them was to fight at the front. When a lieutenant saw himself allotted about a hundred unarmed youngsters to lead into fighting, he let them escape into the woods, saying that he refused to take children to their death; then he shot himself (f. 42).

Some officers of the Red Army thought that the war was going to remove both the National Socialists and Bolshevism and that only "American capitalism" would win, for aid from the United States and England preoccupied many Russians. Most said that Americans helped effectively, although insufficiently, by delivering planes and food supplies. Germans did have knowledge of a report concerning ally deliveries to Soviet Russia, which had reached 4,047,000 tons from October 1941 to March 1943, with 3,357,000 tons reaching their destination. During the first months of 1943 deliveries reached 675,000 tons of which 636,000 arrived at their destination. These deliveries were made by way of Murmansk-Arkhangelsk, the Persian Gulf, and the Far East. In addition to planes, tanks, and cannons, the quantity of which does not figure in the report, Americans delivered to Soviet Russia 94,000 tons of copper and other metals necessary for construction of planes and tanks, 92,000 tons of tracks and railway materials, 580,000 tons of steel, 46,000 tons of aluminium, 21,000 tons of zinc, 125,800 tons of dynamite, and chemical products to manufacture ammunition, 140,000 telephones, 99,000 military vehicles, 17,000 jeeps, 3,000,000 pairs of boots, 18,000 tons of leather soles, etc. (BA-MA RW 5/v.464 f. 14-15).

Soviet officers asserted that the English refused to aid Russia and were playing a double game. Mistrust toward the English persisted until the end of the war. According to statements of Soviet officers, the Russians were waiting with great impatience the opening of the second

front in the west because they were afraid they could not hold out much longer before German technological superiority (f. 42).

During the Washington Anglo-American conference in May 1943 the decision was made that the landing in western Europe (*Operation Overlord*) would take place on 1 May 1944.

Continuation of Slave Hunt

From 1 April 1942 to 31 March 1943, Fritz Sauckel, in charge of recruitment of manpower, had recruited 3,638,056 foreign workers: for armament 1,568,801, mining industry 163,632, construction industry 218,707, transportation 199,074, agriculture and forestry 1,007,544, other branches of economy 480,298. In addition, by 31 March 1943 the Reich's economy was using more than 1,622,829 prisoners of war (BA R 6/52 f.42).

But the enormous war effort of the Reich needed a still greater number of workers. The head of the organization of manpower then turned to Rosenberg on 17 March 1943 for new recruitment efforts. German agriculture and the armament plan ordered by the Führer, he said, demanded employment of 1,000,000 additional workers, men and women, to be recruited in the next four months in the occupied territories, if the program planned for the spring was to be assured. Transports of workers from occupied eastern territories were to be increased from 15 March to 5,000 persons per day and from 1 April to 10,000 persons per day. Sauckel appropriated the daily quotas of workers as follows: 500 persons per day from the Generalbezirk of Belorussia; 500 from the economic Sector Center; 3,000 from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine; 1,000 from the economic Sector South (under the control of the Wehrmacht). These quotas were to be doubled from 1 April (IMT 019-PS). Sauckel went to the eastern territories in the second half of April to speed up the recruitment.

Constant intensification of recruitment of workers caused distress in areas from which workers had been taken. Some economy experts in Ukraine indicated they would be short of workers for the spring work. On some state properties there were only nine to thirteen workers for

100 hectare land (BA R 6/52 f. 38). In the first five months of 1943 more than 800,000 workers had been sent to Germany (AA Vertr.d.AA beim R.-Kom.Ukraine 2 Der Reichskommissar für die Ukraine, G.Z.-VPI 18 May 1943). The recruitment process continued unflaggingly during the following months.

On 11 May 1943 the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, V. Molotov, sent to foreign representatives in Moscow a memorandum concerning the methods of recruitment and the wretched treatment inflicted on workers from territories occupied by Germany. After having consulted sixty-four secret official reports on this subject for the period from November 1942 to September 1943, the minister of the occupied eastern territories, Alfred Rosenberg, admitted that "Molotov had exaggerated on only very few points" (BA R 6/73 f. 117).

German reports stressed that recruitment had taken almost everywhere the form of a manhunt accompanied by ruthless repression. One Gebietskommissar described the recruitment effort as "a genuine slave hunt." A German official saw in the streets of the Kherson region whole columns of people who reminded him of stories he had read in his youth about the transport of African slaves (report of 14 February 1943) (f. 122).

In Pereiaslav, for instance, all people in a movie theater were carted off during a roundup (report of 22 March 1943). In Kryvyi Rih Germans invited young people to a camp for workers going to Germany to show them a film on the life of the workers in the Reich. After the viewing all the young people were kept under guard and sent to Germany. Germans proceeded in the same way in Bar and in other towns of Ukraine. In Mariupil some curious who were watching a fire at a German movie house were taken by surprise and sent to Germany. Many among them were beaten in the process (report of 24 April 1943).

During the boarding at the Kiev station workers were excessively injured and some even beaten. On the train their cars were locked from the outside, and they could not get out even to satisfy their physical needs (report of 7 April 1943). According to the head of SD, recruitment in Ukraine was carried out in all possible ways: roundups in the movie theaters, in encircled villages, churches, funeral processions. When some managed to escape, Germans set fire to the villages and

houses and arrested people who tried to extinguish the fires (report of 24 April 1943) (f. 118-123).

The transit camp of Kiev had a bad reputation. Inhabitants of the capital saw every day painful scenes, quarrels, beatings. This treatment was not reserved only for those who were to leave but also for relatives who accompanied them to the camp. The latter were often driven back into the mud with the butt of a rifle. Young girls were often violated. The commandant of the camp, Krügel, personally beat people and allowed his subordinates to do the same.

To escape deportation to Germany, girls of Borysiv entered into unconsummated marriages. In other places, people destined to leave for Germany were kept for days in barns, barracks, prisons, and prison camps without food or water. News spread everywhere that people were hurt, mistreated, beaten.

The medical school of Kiev was closed in May 1943 and the 2,000 students were invited to go voluntarily to the Reich. In Kryvyi Rih young people had to enroll at the office of labor under penalty of being deported to a concentration camp. To prevent her daughter from leaving for Germany, a mother doused her feet with boiling water, saying that she preferred to see her daughter alive and take care of her than see her leave for Germany to die. Everyone kept asking: "If the Germans behaved like this now how will they behave when they have won the war?" (BA R 55/1483 f. 30-33, 35).

In Sloviansk manhunts occurred at the exits of theaters and churches. Most people were beaten (report of 30 June 1943). In Znamenka all people working on tracks were rounded up at gunpoint and kept under guard until the following day. The report added that on 22 June 1943, the day proclaimed by the Führer as the "feast of liberation," cries and tears of those rounded up and their parents who were waiting near by were heard for hours. Among the persons in the railroad cars were mothers of young children whom they had left in the care of grandparents. As the train was leaving, one German amused himself by shooting into the air to keep the anguished parents at a distance (report of 22 June 1943) (BA R 6/73 f. 121).

According to military authorities, operations at Znamenka had been undertaken on their own initiative by the local German officials of the

railroad. The Generalkommissar of Mykolaiv intended to bring to justice the guilty officials, and the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht asked the leadership of the railways of Dnipropetrovsk to suspend them. But the intentions of the Generalkommissar may not have been motivated by humanitarian sentiments, for the same Generalkommissar simultaneously condemned to death ten young people who had not presented themselves to their place of work in the Organization Todt (OT). Sentence was carried out, and posters condemning the action were put up in Kirovohrad. This condemnation, according to the report of the military authorities, strongly affected the population who thought that a more moderate penalty should have been handed down. The same report noted, however, that punitive measures (burning down houses) were to be applied again. In Vasylykiv consequently, a local German official had six houses burned down, although military authorities informed the Generalkommissar of Kiev that at the time when there was a shortage of housing, burning of houses was a measure that was turning against the Germans themselves (BA-MA RH 22/102 f. 67-68).

At the Sharivka station loading of workers was carried out with brutality on the part of German soldiers and Ukrainian militia who prevented parents and children from coming close to the railroad cars to hand over to boarding persons personal effects and food. One German threatened people with his revolver; another beat all people who came near and broke his club on the head of one Ukrainian (report of 21 August 1943). In Olexandria on Sunday 5 September protection police encircled the market place and took away in a brutal manner all people who were there—men, women, children, old people. Two people were wounded by bullets. The person in charge of this operation claimed he was going to sort out the people the following day (report of 5 September 1943) (BA R 6/73 f. 118-123).

In Vinnytsia all pupils of the technical school were taken to the station and forced to board. In one village during the forced recruitment operation a part of the population, those who protested, was shot.

In Germany life of deported worker, the *Ostarbeiter*, was always very hard, unbearable, as witnessed in this excerpt from a letter sent to Ukraine: "We are in a camp that we have no right to leave. We get a loaf of bread per week and very little food, and we do not have sufficient

clothing. We are beaten and treated like animals" (BA-MA RH 2/v.1560 f. 11, 13, 14).

The camps were directed by German officials formed by the DAF, the German Work Front, of the National Socialist party. According to memoranda taken during the summer of 1943 during the training period in the camp of Wetzlar, camp leaders dealt harshly with workers from the east, forbidding all human relations with them. These workers were nothing more than manpower Germany needed. Women enjoyed no protective laws, especially those concerning maternity. Maternity protection law affected only women from Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, France, and Belgium; it did not apply to Polish women or other workers from the east. In principle, abortions were forbidden except for the Polish women. Infants of workers from the east were to receive, in food and clothing, half of what a German child received.

Germans were not to have any sexual relations with workers from the east. One of the instructors explained that these women represented a danger for the German women because German men were attracted to them because of their looks, fresh and full of health. Some instructors criticized the soldiers of the Wehrmacht who, nevertheless, had relations with the girls in the east and the French women in the west.

Political ideas presented during the training period were, of course, those of the National Socialist ideology. One of the instructors explained that "the [Germanic] train in eastern direction," put on tracks 1,400 years ago, would never stop and that it was in the east that new forces of Germany were forging themselves. For another instructor, German people must understand that they were called to lead Europe. "We are going to live and exist only if we hold Europe in iron tongs," he said. Because Germans had an aptitude "for order and socialism," they had no other alternative than to gather themselves into a Germanic Great Reich or perish.

The same instructor, Bienengräber, also had precise ideas concerning "Russians," whom he, like Hitler and Himmler, understood to be all peoples in the Soviet empire. The Russian, according to him, "is a beast of a docile herd" that must be mastered. He declared that, according to the Führer's plans, ten or twenty years after the war there would be only Germans in Germany. "Peoples of other origins will not

be able to live there, and no cross-breeding will be permitted." "No marriages between German soldiers and Ukrainian women will be tolerated" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2559 f. 46-53).

These forced and brutal requisitions of workers in the east and inhumane treatment of deported workers occurred when the Soviet army, having stopped the German offensive in the beginning of July in the Kursk salient, had passed over to counter-offensive, advancing in the direction of Ukraine.

Hitler's Refusal to Change His Policies in Ukraine

During a conference of members of the National-Socialist party in Kiev on 5 March 1943, Gauleiter Koch defined once again his policies in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine: "We are a master race and must administer severely but equitably....I am going to take everything from this country. I did not come here to distribute benediction but to help the Führer. The population, therefore, must work, work, and still work" (Appendix, Doc.#173).

Koch opposed concern for the people's not having enough to eat; one should rather remember the privations that had to be endured by "our heroes of Stalingrad." He continued: "We did not come here to distribute manna, but to create conditions for victory. We are a master race; the simplest German worker racially and biologically is worth a thousand times more than the local population." (#173)

In the meantime, the situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine degenerated steadily. In a memorandum dated 14 May 1943, sent to Rosenberg who was to have talks with Hitler, the Service Ukraine of the political department of the ministry of the east stated that the military and political situation of the Reich demanded "a change in German *Ostpolitik*, especially with regard to Ukraine," because the "bandits," whose number was increasing, were already controlling vast territories not only in Belorussia (Soviet partisans) but would "also in Ukraine" (Appendix, Doc.#177).

Consequently, there was a real threat "of interruption of deliveries of supplies coming from the back part of the country." Decrease of areas

suitable for cultivation and livestock in Ukraine due to the activities of these "bandits" was going to lead to "a new reduction of supplies" for the front, for Germany, and for the local population which, the memorandum added, "will constitute a handicap for our physical and psychological resistance forces" (#177).

Meat supplies from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine decreased constantly. In April 1943, forty railroad cars of meat from the regions of Volhynia and Zhytomyr and fifty-two from other regions were expected, but only seventeen and thirty-five respectively were received. (BA-MA RW 41/44 Chefintendant b.W BfH Ukraine, Towno 16 May 1943, 6).

Serious differences put Rosenberg and Koch in opposition. Rosenberg did not approve of Koch's methods and Koch often ignored Rosenberg's instructions, maintaining direct contact with Hitler. In the beginning of April 1943, Rosenberg brought to Himmler's attention Koch's private hunting grounds in Tsuman, Volhynia. Desirous of "developing a private reserve, Koch had ordered evacuation of the entire population from the district of Tsuman, an evacuation carried out in December 1942 during a very severe frost. Hundreds of families were driven from their homes to a location sixty kilometers away. During the evacuation process, police carried out numerous executions under pretext that the persons were communists, but Ukrainians were convinced that Koch had ordered this high number of executions to decrease the number to be evacuated to finish the operation in the planned time period and to decrease the number of departees to match the small location. Rosenberg added that after the evacuation the forest of Tsuman had become a true "paradise for the bandits" (IMT 032-PS).

Reichsminister Rosenberg went to Hitler on 19 May 1943. The Führer had also called Gauleiter Koch to appear. Present were also Reichsleiter Bormann and Reichsminister Lammer.

Hitler invited Rosenberg and Koch to explain to each other their differences. Rosenberg accused Koch of ignoring his ministry and his instructions, of making decrees without consulting him, of having accused him, Rosenberg, of conspiring with the émigrés and of expressing scorn for Ukrainians. Koch's policies, continued Rosenberg, had contributed to the creation of the partisan movement. Another policy would have given better results, as the creation of the Ukrainian SS division of

Galicia showed. Volhynia and Podolia soon would no longer assure any deliveries. Rosenberg considered Koch's policies irresponsible and harmful for the supplying of the front.

Koch attempted to refute all of Rosenberg's accusations. On the subject of partisans, he was definite: they were only in a "relatively small" region. Of course, there were also some "bandits" in Podolia, but these, according to him, had come from Ruthenia, i.e., Galicia. In summary, they were for the most part "Ukrainian national bandits." Koch affirmed that undoubtedly there would have been fewer of them if the Italians and other allies had not sold them weapons. As to the harshness of his policies in Ukraine, Koch explained its necessity to recruit workers. His education policy was also in conformity with the established principles (BA R 58/1005 f. 10-11).

After these explanations, Hitler once again drew up directives for German policies in Ukraine. He reminded those present that settlement with the population in the east could be made only by the Führer or with his consent and not by the head of any troops or army. Hitler then declared that "the situation is forcing us to use such harsh conduct that we can never expect Ukrainians to approve of our actions." Hitler did not think the reason for the origin of the partisan movement was German policy; otherwise there would be no partisans in zones where the Wehrmacht had applied leniency. But there partisans were in greatest numbers, said Hitler—a curious explanation for a commander-in-chief of the German armies, seeming ignorant that it was natural and easier for groups of Soviet partisans, composed for the most part of military left behind or parachuted in by the Soviet to operate in an army zone behind the front. Hitler was convinced that the partisan problem could be resolved only with the help of a necessary police force.

If one were to apply leniency, continued Hitler, one could never get the number of workers nor supplies necessary for the Reich. Thus, he concluded: "At a time when we have nothing that can prompt Ukrainians to increase their output, the only thing left for us is constraint."

As to the success in recruitment of volunteers for the SS "among the Ruthenians in Galicia," Hitler did not see any proof in it of a possible collaboration of Ukrainians because, he said, Galicia was a former Austrian country that has nothing in common with "Russian Ukraine."

Experiences of the Wehrmacht did not allow for any valid conclusion, for the Wehrmacht had established a Georgian and an Armenian battalion and both had crossed over to the Russians. Hitler reminded his listeners of a lesson in history—a subjugated people can never become an ally.

Consequently, the only valid policies, according to Hitler, were those that guaranteed Germany necessary supplies. Hitler advised Rosenberg to listen to local authorities (Koch) who had acquired some practical experience in the area.

As to Ukrainians, Hitler was definite: "There is no difference between Ukrainians and Great-Russians. Ukraine is the little mother of Russia, and Ukrainians have always been the greatest defenders of the Great-Russian empire." Strange assertion, contradicted by the reality of the fighting of Ukrainians and the extremely harsh repression to which they had been subjected since the conquest of Ukraine by Soviet Russia, as well as by statements made by Soviet leaders!

Hitler continued: "We are subject to the hard law of war, a law demanding that we draw from Ukraine supplies and manpower. Only weak generals believe that we can get workers with nice words....Being given the harshest demands that we are forced to impose on Ukraine, we cannot expect to find Ukrainian soldiers who would like to die for us." (BA-MA RH 2/v.2616 f. 0368474-5).

Hitler then contrasted Ukrainians and Germans. He could not understand how Ukrainian women could keep their look of health in contrast to German women who were working as much as the Ukrainians. Certainly, people were shot in Ukraine, but in Germany people died through aerial bombardments. Of course, in Ukraine there was forced labor, but in Germany the women also had to work although they were weaker by nature. Hitler added: "We cannot wait until the Ukrainians come voluntarily. Our production does not tolerate any delay!"

Further, explained Hitler, Germans were spilling their blood when others worked; they did not have to be ashamed to apply in the eastern countries "the same measures" that were applied in Germany. The ministry for occupied eastern territories was not to use any advisers from these eastern countries because if these employees were against their

own people they were without character, but if they were for their people they were dangerous for Germany.

As to education, Hitler reminded all that it was necessary to prevent too high a level in education. Even in Germany education considered useless had been suppressed. Hitler counseled: "All education beyond the traditional limits is dangerous. History has taught us that each time men acquire an education that is higher than their professions require they always belong to a revolutionary movement. It is, therefore, preferable that an intelligent Ukraine woman make detonators in Germany rather than study in Ukraine. We don't allow even the German woman the possibility of studying but demand from her that she do the work we ask her to do." (BA-MA RH 2/v.2616 f. 0368476; R58/1005 f. 12-14)

Hitler thus took Koch's side, approving of his measures in the economic, educational and political areas. He encouraged the two National Socialist leaders to continue with their efforts along his directives.

Thus Hitler did not accept any changes in the politics in Eastern Europe, especially with regard to Ukraine. As to Ukrainians, Hitler continued to think of them simply as Russians.

Under these circumstances all possible plans to create a Ukrainian national committee or a Ukrainian national army could remain only a dead issue.

After his talks with Hitler, Rosenberg communicated the results to concerned services. He explained in his memorandum that the Führer's directives confirmed the existing situation and that they invited Rosenberg and Koch to a closer collaboration. After the meeting with Hitler, the Reichsminister and the Gauleiter together discussed a trip that Rosenberg would take to Ukraine to evaluate the situation personally and determine the work to be done (BA R 6/18 f. 191).

Worsening of the Situation

On 29 and 30 May 1943, the Generalkommissar of Volhynia-Podolia, the SA-Obergruppenführer Schoene, called together his district

commissars in Lutsk to review questions pertaining to recruitment of workers, supplies, and the political situation. According to district commissars, recruitment of young people, ages 23 to 25, would encounter enormous difficulties. Schoene, nevertheless, ordered intensification of recruitment during the coming weeks. It was inadvisable to use leniency, for it was necessary to recruit even entire families, including even ten-year old children (BA R 6/243 f. 51).

As to the resistance movement, the head of the security police and the SD of the regions, SS-Sturmbannführer Pütz, identified three tendencies of the Ukrainian national movement in Volhynia and Podolia: "a) a group with radical tendency that fights anything German; b) a group that fights against the [German] civilian administration but still regards the Wehrmacht as protection against bolshevism and c) a group that hopes for Ukraine's independence through any legal means and that asks, for the time being, for the best living conditions for Ukrainians" (f.52). As for the "Bolshevik bandits," they are located primarily in the north (Polissia and northern Volhynia).

Concerning propaganda directed to the population, the meeting affirmed again and again that "the leaders of the illegal Ukrainian national movement" in reality were only some emigrants who had fled to foreign countries when difficulties and danger arose. Upon their return to their native land, they had undertaken activities on the level of crime and high treason against the security of the state, drawing thus misery and misfortune upon the Ukrainian people (f. 53).

Rosenberg went to Ukraine early in June 1943, holding meetings with the leaders of the Generalbezirk of Volhynia-Podolia in Rivne on 5 June. He began the talks by explaining that it was necessary to anticipate a long war which would cause new difficulties. Conscription of workers had to be continued despite harm to the economy of Ukraine. Harsh methods were necessary; forceful measures were being applied elsewhere, i.e., with the Dutch. But foreign specialists (Dutch and Norwegian) had to be sent to Ukraine to strengthen Germanic blood. The French also had to be interested in exploiting this region. After these initial opening remarks, Rosenberg invited the general commissars and district commissars to present to him the conditions of the area.

Generalkommissar Schoene began by admitting that the situation in his commissariat was very difficult. "The Ukrainian nationalists are causing more difficulties than the Bolshevik bandits," he admitted. His Generalbezirk had furnished 233,000 worker for the Reich in 1942 but only 52,000 during the first five months of 1943.

The Generalkommissar of Sarny said that in his district partisan activities had increased considerably since the fall of 1942. Destructions in agriculture and the forest industry were extensive. The Wehrmacht was powerless in the forests. Even towns were being bombarded with heavy weapons. Villages that had fulfilled their quotas were being destroyed. The Ukrainian protection police, cooperative in the beginning, had crossed over to the partisans. Recruitment of workers was possible only by force.

According to the Gebietskommissar of Lutsk, most of the "bandits" of his district were "Ukrainian national bandits" in the process of gathering themselves into strong detachments. Most of the protection police and members of the agricultural services had crossed over to their side. Almost all of the state properties were in the hands of the "bandits." Railway line were dynamited, roads could no longer be taken without escorts (BA R 6/310 f. 42-45).

The service of foreign troops in the east (*Fremde Heere Ost*), led by Colonel Gehlen, drew up reports on the negative aspects to the Germany policies in Ukraine. According to one military bureau, the reasons for the discontent among the Ukrainian population were:

- a) recruitment methods of workers for the Reich;
- b) preservation of the kolkhoz system;
- c) expropriation and transfer of people for the advantage of the Germans, especially the *Volksdeutsche*;
- d) incorrect handling of the prohibition of slaughtering and requisitions of livestock;
- e) encroachment and incorrect behavior of German officials and employees;
- f) preference for Russians and former communists in administration;
- g) arrests of all Ukrainians suspected of nationalism;
- h) suppression of all cultural organizations and Ukrainian theaters;

i) provocations of communist organizations and absence of adequate institutions in which peasants could assert their rights (BA-MA RH 2/v. 2560 f. 10).

Recruitment methods of workers for the Reich have already been described. Expropriation and resettlement of the population took place not only in Tsuman, Volhynia but also in other regions. In the Zhytomyr region, inhabitants of several villages, evacuated to the Dnipropetrovsk district were unable to take along their belongings or personal effects. One German report mentioned that during the resettlement operations (similar to other so-called "cleansing" actions) many Ukrainians, usually persons denounced "by neighbors or communist agents as Ukrainian nationalists," disappeared without a trace (f. 11, 13).

The presence of communists and elements hostile to Ukrainians in the occupation administration distressed the population. According to one report, communists "held almost all high posts (mayors, heads of kolkhozes and factories, etc.)" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560, f. 12). Some had even kept the same posts they had held under the Soviet regime. These communists, stated the report, used Bolshevik methods made even worse by German methods. The population felt it was being watched by the NKVD and had to follow the communists for fear of vengeance should Soviet power return.

Ukrainian intellectuals lived in fear. They were arrested for the least criticism, "as in the past." Many positions were held by Russians who, stated the report, "enjoyed the full confidence of the authorities" and were "naturally the fiercest enemies of the Ukrainian nation." They profited from the confidence accorded to them by the authorities to annihilate, with the help of the Gestapo, all undesirable Ukrainians (f.12,15). In the northwest of Ukraine Ukrainians were manhandled by Poles (*Volksdeutsche*) who were working in the special services (*Sonderdienst*). Poles told Ukrainians to thank Germans for that (f. 17).

Massive arrests and executions of Ukrainians in the Reichskommissariat, more particularly in the regions where the independence movement particularly manifested itself, continued, establishing an atmosphere of extreme terror. According to German reports, to the German terror was added the communist terror, i.e., the Soviet partisan. One of the reports stressed that "inhabitants of Volhynia fear daily for

their lives; they fear not only German authorities but also communist provocations and Soviet partisans" (BA-MA RH 2/v. 2560 f. 23).

In the first half of May, Germans burned down two villages in the Zdolbuniv district (Sviate and Derazhne) and one village in the Rivne district (Remel) with all their inhabitants including women and children. These reprisals were ordered because some young people of the first two villages had gone in the maquis and because weapons had been found in the third village (f. 24).

In May 1943 the services of the Vinnytsia municipality discovered new Soviet common graves at the eastern edge of the town—eighty to a hundred mass graves, most of which contained 100 to 130 corpses each. Ukrainian physicians and then an international commission of doctors, established that the corpses had been buried for more than four years.

According to medical experts, these people had been killed between the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1939. They had been arrested by the Russian NKVD in 1937 and 1938 and imprisoned in Vinnytsia where approximately 30,000 political prisoners were being held. The NKVD executed 11,000 to 12,000 of them, men and women, by shooting one or several bullets from a small calibre revolver (5.6mm) into the nape of the neck. Most of the prisoners had been terribly tortured. Most of the victims of torture were Ukrainians (AA Vertr.d.AA beim R.-Kom. Ukraine 4 f. 342541; *Le crime de Moscou* 20-25, 44-46.).

The massive graves were not discovered by Germans but by Ukrainian municipal services of Vinnytsia who followed up persistent rumors concerning unusual and suspicious nocturnal movements of trucks and NKVD agents in some part of the town during 1938.

While Goebbel's services had done everything possible to exploit abroad the Katyn Massacre to compromise the Russians and put them on bad terms with their western Allies, Berlin did not show the same promptness to reveal the massive graves of Vinnytsia, disclosure of which did not cause the same reaction in the western world.

After failure of their July 1943 offensive, however, the Germans had other worries; they had to evacuate Ukrainian territories east of the Dnipro River.

Ukrainian Resistance Struggling with Two Enemies

At beginning of May 1943 German authorities learned of a new OUN-B leaflet. Entitled "Face a Double Offensive," the leaflet was distributed among the people, usually by young boys and girls. The leaflet explained that the war in the east was in fact a war between two imperialisms—Russian and German pursuing the same goal: they wanted "to dominate and exploit the Europeans, including the Ukrainians" (BA-MA RH 2/v. 2560 f. 27). Knowing that Ukrainians refused to become "colonial slaves" and were fighting for their freedom and independence, the two imperialisms shared the same hatred and applied the same policy of cruel persecutions.

Soviet powers, according to the leaflet, although outside Ukraine, were interfering in the life of the country through the clandestine Communist party and Soviet partisans whose task was to fight primarily against the Ukrainian independence movement. Germans also considered their main adversary in Ukraine the Ukrainian nationalists.

Communists, continued the leaflet, had just started a propaganda campaign to announce that all nationalists were going to be shot upon the return of the Soviet regime. Actually the communists were doing so already everywhere they ruled. Many people had been executed in Polissia. In other regions, the Communist party was placing their members in the service of the Germans with the mission to annihilate nationalists with the help of Germans. Thus the nationalists, stated the leaflet, were facing a common front of two enemies against the Ukrainian independence movement.

Some Ukrainian opportunists, explained the OUN-B leaflet, thought that the only choice in this situation was to ally themselves with one adversary against the other, but the OUN-B labeled this attitude "cowardly," "opportunistic," and "naïve," claiming: "We, the nationalists, do not intend to capitulate to anyone because we do not want to put a slipknot around our own necks."

The OUN-B explained that it must consider that the two enemies were directing their blows not only against the organization but also against all conscientious and active Ukrainian people. By allying itself with one of the enemies against the other, the OUN-B would probably

limit its losses but, at the same time, would lessen its capacity to defend the people against the persecutions of the enemy, now an "ally."

The leaflet continued that not protection of the organization "but the people's well-being" was their goal. "Our political goal, as far as the future is concerned, remains simultaneously, as before, an uncompromising fight against German imperialism and Russian imperialism....But to strengthen our position outside Ukraine we are going to ally ourselves with other peoples who are oppressed by German and Russian imperialists..." (BA-MA RH 2/v. 2560 f. 27-30).

In this battle of ideas, Moscow had no desire to lag behind. On 21 May 1943 the Soviet authorities addressed themselves to the Ukrainians in occupied Ukraine. Having presented the situation of the front and given orders for the continuation of the fight against the Germans, they directed an appeal to the Ukrainian nationalists, explaining that the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists had come to Ukraine "in railroad cars of the German army" *Komunistychna Partia Ukrainy* 2:29).

Bandera, Melnyk, and other leaders were simply "direct agents of Hitler" who wanted "Soviet Ukraine to break its union with Russians, Belorussians, and other peoples of the USSR to form a separate state," wishing "to transform Ukraine into a colony of German imperialism and the Ukrainian people into slaves of German barons and squires" (2:29).

Moscow added that the nationalist heads did not concern themselves with the interests of the Ukrainian people, but had succeeded in organizing "armed bandits" to which they had drawn people who "had nothing in common with the Ukraino-German nationalists." For their sake Soviet authorities were affirming that Ukrainian nationalists had done absolutely nothing for the defense of people against the occupation, that they had never fought against Germans, but were "speculators" and "mercenaries" in Hitler's pay with the mission to "turn rebellious people from their true mission against the Germans." The appeal concluded: "On Hitler's orders the Ukraino-German nationalists are setting up armed nationalist units and presenting them as partisan detachments. They are setting up these so-called units allegedly to fight against the Germans...but it is a provocation of the enemy." Consequently, "all honest sons of the Ukrainian people" who joined them, should leave them and rejoin the Soviet partisans (2:29-30).

Despite Soviet and German propaganda, the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) grew. Its fighting units were set up along the principles of regular armies and subject to the same discipline (*Liopys UPA* 1:133-168). From its creation, the UPA was commanded by Colonel Savur-Klachivsky. The regional military staff of the OUN-B for the northwest region of Ukraine had been transformed into the UPA staff in that region; the post of the head of staff was first held by Vasyl Ivakhiv-Sonar, leading member of the OUN-B. Then, after his death during an engagement against the Germans on 13 May 1943, the post of head of UPA's staff was confirmed for Colonel Leonid Stupnytsky-Honcharenko, former officer of the 1917–1920 Ukrainian National Army, who was not a member of the OUN-B. Two other former officers of the National Army held position in the staff: Colonel M. Omelusik, head of operations and Colonel Lytvynenko, head of information services.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army had been formed in the northwest of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in Volhynia, and its first general quarters were established in the Kostopil district, north of Rivne, the "capital" of the Reichskommissariat. The UPA was initially divided into three groups according to the three military regions: Group North (commanded by Dubovy), Group NorthWest (commanded by Rudy), and Group South (commanded by Eney) (*Liopys UPA* 26-29). With formation of new detachments in Volhynia, then in Podolia and other regions, initial structure of the UPA underwent modifications.

The main military staff of the OUN-B which was in Galicia close to Lviv (thus in the General Government) and led by Roman Shukhevych-Tur from the spring of 1943, was changed into supreme command of the UPA. In August 1943, the supreme command was detached from the central direction of the OUN-B and became an independent command. Roman Shukhevych, elected president of the OUN-B on 25 August 1943 would also be the commander-in-chief of the all troops in the UPA.

A number of UPA units were permanently stationed in the woods; other units led raids, sometimes within the district, sometimes in districts farther away. In villages of zones occupied or controlled by UPA units civilian self-defense groups were trained. One report of the head of Sipo

and SD of Volhynia-Polodia, dated 19 May 1943, explained the functioning of the self-defense system by using the village of Horodets as an example.

Almost the entire population of Horodets was, according to the report, "favorably disposed to the bandits and hostile to Germans." Most of the young people were members of the Ukrainian national resistance. From time to time, they went to the nearby woods to receive training from a detachment of the "bandits." The village was quietly guarded, especially during the night, by watchmen who sounded an alert in case of danger (BA R 70 SU/37 f. 35-36).

Noting that the resistance movement of this Ukrainian village in Polissia, as of other Volhynia villages, was composed of inhabitants of the village and that it was directed by local leaders, the German report invalidated Koch's allegations, that Ukrainian resistance in the Reichskommissariat was the deed of "émigrés," Ukrainians who had come from Galicia.

In May 1943 the Germans undertook a series of operations against the UPA beginning first in the Horokhiv district, then extending them to the Berestechko and other districts. Police and protection units got reinforcements; planes and tanks were put into action. In Kolky, where five UPA hospitals were located, fighting lasted for several days. The UPA managed to evacuate the hospitals, but Ukrainians suffered severe losses. On 13 May Lieutenant Vasyl Ivakhiv-Sonar, Lieutenant Yulian Kovalsky, and Sub-Lieutenant S. Sniatetsky were killed.

In June 1943 Germans intensified their operations throughout Volhynia. In his 28 May order of the day (no.41), General Hintzler ordered a "curb to the insurrection," but insurgents had superior knowledge of the area and received information concerning German troop movements promptly, while Germans generally were less informed on the location of UPA detachments. The Germans lost dozens of men in the ambushes. In the night of 23 to 24 June, UPA units blew up the Rivne-Sarny railway line between Nemyrovych and Malynsk and attacked a train of German police returning from one operation. Approximately 150 policemen were killed (Shankovsky *Ukrainaska* 668-672; *Liutopys UPA* 2:13).

Activities of the UPA detachments were also strong in the districts between Rivne and Zhytomyr where communication lines between the authorities of the Reich and the front, particularly the Army Groups A and South, were located. A report of German military authorities dated 13 June 1943 indicated that "the cutting of the cables in Ukraine had particularly detrimental consequences because the main cable of liaison with the Army Groups A and South were passing there and the unavailability of this cable (most frequently destroyed between Rivne and Zhytomyr with the help of explosives) hurt the liaison with these army groups" (BA-MA RW 4/v.603 WFSt/Op.(H) No.03024/43 geheim, 1). Cutting of the cables was a frequent occurrence: from 1 to 11 June, for example, the cables were cut sixteen times.

The same report indicated that groups of Soviet partisans were about to descend from Belorussia into the territory of "the Ukrainian national bandits" and that fierce fighting was already taking place between Soviet partisans and Ukrainian nationalists in the Sarny region. Following the fighting, "the Soviets, having incurred losses, had to withdraw" (3).

UPA units also appeared in the regions of Zhytomyr and Kiev. In June near Zhytomyr they destroyed a police academy defended by 200 men. In June and July insurgent groups appeared in the forests of the Chornobyl and Kiev region. Armed self-defense groups and UPA units opposed Germans in regions of Galicia (Stanyslaviv, Kolomyia) (*Litopys UPA* 2:16-19.).

UPA units continued to fight Soviet partisans, pushing them north. Toward the end of July 1943 they totally defeated a sizeable partisan detachment of Mykhailov (500 to 800 men) operating in the Kamianets-Podilsky and Rivne regions. Other fighting between the UPA and Soviet partisans took place in the Zhytomyr and Kiev regions. In August 1943 more than 2,000 Soviet partisans again came down from Belorussia to try to take control in the Kovel and Luboml districts, but after several days of fighting, they had to withdraw, suffering heavy losses (more than 1,500 killed and wounded) (129).

Germans had as yet very little information on the UPA, although they had knowledge of the national partisans of Taras Bulba with whom they occasionally held talks, but they knew that the UPA was a vast

insurgent movement organized and led by the OUN-B. Only early in September 1943 did Germans receive more information, although report no.53 on the occupied territories (dated 7 May 1943) already indicated that activities of the Soviet partisans had decreased while activities of the "Ukrainian national bandits" continued to increase in the northern region of Volhynia-Polodia (BA R 58/224 f. 154RS).

Formation of SS Division "Galicia"

Formation of the "*SS-Schützen-Division Galizien*" (division of SS Galicia soldiers) was announced on 28 April 1943 on conditions already detailed. Recruitment took place in May and June in that part of Ukraine attached to the General Government, especially in Galicia. Only Ukrainians living in the General Government could volunteer.

According to some sources, by 18 June 1943 approximately 84,000 men had volunteered (BA R 6/70 f. 133); approximately 52,000 were accepted by the medical commission. One German report, however, put the number to 62,000 registered, noting that there would have been more volunteers had it been up to the Wehrmacht because "the population of Galicia felt a strong antipathy for the SS police services." The report added that the Bandera movement had undertaken a powerful "agitation action" against the formation of the division (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f. 16).

In the May 1943 leaflet, discussed above, the OUN-B proclaimed its hostility to a common fight with the Germans against bolshevism, labeling such an action "capitulation to the Germans" (f. 27-30).

In another document, the OUN-B declared: "The Ukrainian people do not want and will not save Germany at the price of their blood. If Germany finds itself today facing mortal threats from the east, it is because of the savage policies of German imperialism toward the oppressed peoples of the east. The Ukrainian people fight for their own independence; only for this independence will they engage in a decisive combat against one or the other invader" (Lebed *UPA* 45).

The Bandera movement saw numerous reasons for disapproving of the German project of a Galician SS division and listed these reasons in the no.11 issue of the underground *Bulletin* (1943) of its organization.

The project, according to the *Bulletin*, seemed already suspect because the Germans planned to create only one division. If it were truly a matter of fighting communism, why not create several divisions? The plan then had a different goal. Despite a "manhunt à l'africaine," continued the article, Ukraine still had a sizeable human reserve. The analysis of "German colonial policies" suggested that Germans wanted to mobilize active elements in Galicia to prevent them from joining the resistance and to send them to the front as cannon fodder. For which ideal were the Ukrainian volunteers to fight? For the detested "German New Europe?" For the bloody terror carried out in all parts of Ukrainian territories? For the colonial exploitations and famine terror brought about? For the extermination of millions of prisoners of war and other prisoners?

The OUN-B noted that Germans had completely eliminated the political aspect in the formation of the Galician division. The high command of the division and the language used by the command were to be German, proving the division was a "colonial unit," comparable to the Hindu units in the English army. In addition, the project, which limited recruitment of volunteers to Galicia attempted to divide the Ukrainian people into "Galicians" and "Ukrainians." Finally, this project was an opportunity for Bolshevik propaganda to present "proof" that the Ukrainian independence movement was a German creation. The project thus was harmful to the Ukrainian national cause on the international level. For all these reasons, the OUN-B was categorically against the creation of the Galician SS Division, considering that Ukrainian blood could be shed "only for the Ukrainian state in the ranks of a Ukrainian army" (*Suchasnist* 10, October 1963:106–110).

Thus formation of the Galician division met with considerable difficulty. Of course, many young people volunteered out of pure patriotism and idealism to fight the hereditary enemy of the Ukrainian nation which was directly threatening Ukraine, to fight to defend Ukrainian soil. But others, strictly speaking, did not volunteer; they simply enlisted because they did not have any other choice to escape a much less desirable fate, that of becoming a worker in Germany, or being mobilized for the service of a construction (*Baudienst*) camp in Galicia. The construction service camps were in reality camps of forced

labor, managed most often by Poles or Germans of Polish origin who hated Ukrainians. Other "volunteers" for the SS Division Galicia were later drafted by force. In 1944 one of the regiments of the division was formed with men rounded up in the streets and at railroad stations.

At first, according to reports, Germans handed the volunteers of the Galician SS Division the following certificate: "Given that the above-named has enlisted voluntarily within the planned time period and in conformity with the directives of the governor of the District of Galicia of 28 April 1943, he is not to be pursued for having shirked the previous order to leave to work in the Reich" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f. 18). Through this certificate the volunteers simply became "pardoned criminals," and many Ukrainians protested against these certificates.

One OUN-B newspaper announced on 1 June 1943 that during a meeting the governor of Galicia, SS-Brigadeführer Wächter had declared: "Ukrainians are not becoming our allies because of the creation of the 'Galician' division, and we will not be their friends. This division will be sent to the east to spare German blood. We are not taking on any political obligation regarding the Ukrainians. We remain the master race" (*Liutopys UPA* 2:125).

Finally, of the 62,000 registered volunteers, Germans enlisted only 9,000 to 12,000 men. The first group of the volunteers (200 officers and 1,700 soldiers) left for the training camp on 18 June 1943 (BA R 6/70 f.133). The regiments of the division, in all 9,000 to 10,000 men, made up of men brought together gradually during June, July, and August, were dispersed to different training camps where they remained until the end of 1943¹. Disappointments soon replaced the enthusiasm the creation of the division had created among the Ukrainian population of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Even in Galicia most of the Ukrainians thought it was too late to enlist on the German side. At the same time, the population feared the Russians, the Soviet power, the Bolsheviks and did not wish their return.

Those who favored the creation of the division would have preferred that it be called "Ukrainian," but in June 1943 Himmler forbade the use of this adjective, specifying that the division was "Galician," not "Ukrainian," that it was composed of "Galicians" (*Galizianer*), not Ukrainians. Moreover, the order for the formation of the division

specified that the language of the division would be "Galician" and the language of command German.

The governor of Galicia, Wächter, protested to Himmler, trying to make him understand that Galicia and Galicians were not a nation and that there was no such thing as a Galician language; Galicia and Galicians simply were part of the Ukrainian whole, of Ukraine. Himmler answered him on 11 August that, referring to "150 years of tradition," i.e., 150 years of "German" (in reality Austrian) domination in Galicia when it belonged to the Austrian Empire, he considered this territory part of the former empire which must be regarded as a former territory of the crown (*Kronland Galizien*).

Himmler thus supported his previous order. He considered it already enough that permission had been given to establish a university in Galicia, and expressed astonishment that the "Galician" intelligentsia who took this for granted, was as ungrateful and indecent "as the Slavs have always been," all the more since emissaries were going from Galicia to "Russian Ukraine" to cause unrest there.

But, magnanimous Himmler added, "Of course, I will not punish the Galicians for calling themselves Ukrainians, but I will not allow myself to be forced to call them anything other than Galician." On 14 July 1943 Himmler sent to the heads of the German chiefs of staff of the division a circular which formally forbade reference to the Ukrainian division or the Ukrainian nation regarding the division "Galicia" (Heike 17, 30, 36, author's archives).

Koch: "Ukraine - Territory for German Colonization"

During talks with the Italian ambassador on 10 June 1943, Ribbentrop declared that Russia without Ukraine would be condemned to a slow death (certainly an exaggeration), while Germany without Ukraine would encounter difficulties but would not die. When he broached the question of supplies from Axis countries, Ribbentrop appraised the situation as reassuring, adding: "...we need Ukraine absolutely," because the supplies from Ukraine for the European continent had to be maintained at a high level so as not to affect the

population's capacity for work. "To keep the diet above the subsistence level, supplementary quantities from Ukraine are of great importance and that is why we would not be able to manage without Ukraine" (ADAP, E, VI:163, 167; Appendix, Doc.#180).

On 21 June, Gauleiter Koch received fourteen German journalists who were visiting Ukraine. He told them that the task of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine consisted in obtaining as many workers and food supplies as possible. The commissariat had already furnished 1,000,000 workers. Deliveries of food supplies included: 5,950,000 tons of wheat, 148,000 tons of dried vegetables, 49,000 tons of butter, 1,372,000 tons of potatoes, 2,120,000 head of livestock, etc. (Appendix, Doc.#181).

Ukrainians, however, Koch declared to be a lazy people, marked by oriental influences. Alluding to Rosenberg's agrarian law, according to which the peasants were to receive a certain amount of the land, Koch said that he found this idea demented: how could one distribute property to Ukrainians at a time when millions of Germans were losing theirs because of aerial bombardments? Germans, according to Koch, were living less well than Ukrainians "whose women still have the appearance of being well-nourished, have large chests, etc., while German women must agree to endure sacrifice upon sacrifice..." (BA R 94/4b Mitteilungen des Reichskommissar, Gauleiter Koch, am Montag 21-6-1943, 1).

Koch added, that administrative autonomy in Ukraine was not timely. His political concepts matched those of Hitler. Koch reiterated that it would be a mistake to partition the immense space occupied by Germany into several areas, because, no matter how one looked at them, they are all Slavs. And Koch added: "...it is well known that Kiev and not Moscow is the mother of the Slavic cities. There can never be friendship between the Germans and the Slavs but only a relationship of the conquerors and the conquered!" Koch then drew the journalists' attention to the "biological strength of the Slavs" evidenced by the very high birth rate.

"We must make of Ukraine a territory of German colonization," continued Koch. In the future the territories between Königsberg and Vladivostok would offer the only possibility of export of German products. Ukraine could only be a source of raw material for Germany and Europe. As to the projected total numbers of workers, Koch shared

his views with Hitler: 500,000 Ukrainians had to be found to be sent to Germany to free 500,000 Germans from economic duties for duties at the front (1-3).

The OUN-B and UPA had knowledge of Koch's statements. One German officer who had been present at one of Koch's accounts talked about it at length during a conversation with Ukrainian friends in Stanyslaviv, Galicia, and they, in turn, passed on the information to the OUN-B intelligence service. According to information then published by the UPA, Koch had admitted that the action of the Ukrainian resistance was a serious obstacle to the realization of German policies, and all Ukrainian intellectuals had to be eliminated because they were chiefly responsible for the resistance movement.

Ukraine, according to Koch, had to feed the Reich and the front, and he, Koch, was assigned by the Führer to see to this, even if Ukrainians were to starve to death *en masse*. Koch admitted that some promises could be made to Ukrainians but only for "after the war." Dissention, especially in the church, was to be kept alive among them to prevent the education of intellectuals. Ukrainians were to work at least ten hours a day. Ukraine would not have any large cities; Germans would allow only smelting furnaces and refineries to function in this country to produce steel and petroleum (*Liutopys UPA* 2:204-205).

Among the fourteen representatives of the German press was Hans-Joachim Kausch who kept a rather detailed account of his trip, beginning with Reichskommissar Koch's talk, but Kausch complemented Koch's statements with impressions received by him and his colleagues during their trip.

The journalists considered the amount of deliveries astonishingly high and Koch asked them not to publish the numbers to prevent the adversary from learning the truth. Because the harvest of 1943 promised to be good, Koch hoped to furnish enough wheat in the fall of 1943 for Germans to receive supplementary rations and do away with bread rationing coupons during the fifth year of the war.

"Koch considered Ukraine simply a colony," noted Kausch. He did not wish to torture Ukrainians, but he demanded that they work. During their trip the journalists learned that he had done away with corporal punishment that had indeed existed during the first years of German

administration, especially in cases of even involuntary damage to German property (machines, cars, etc.). In those cases twenty-five blows with the whip had been administered on the exposed posterior, but such punishment went against the Ukrainian "strong sense of dignity" and was eliminated especially because it was not used by the Soviets. Nevertheless, Germans of subordinate authority, said Koch, still thought corporal punishment effective, but they agreed to restrict reprimands to slaps in the face (BA R 55/1463 f. 6).

Koch had learned that to carry out the task that had been assigned to him by Hitler, he often had to be at odds with instructions from the ministry of the east. He also went against decrees of this ministry, thus against Rosenberg, who was "giving too much to Ukrainians." He thought, still according to Kausch, that the situation in Germany was too serious for Germans to make many sacrifices "to treat Ukrainians with humanity." Ukrainians, according to Kausch, were living as they had during peace time and ate well. And Kausch added:

This notion of Koch is correct. From the first to last day of our stay in Ukraine, we saw everywhere, with the exception of some industrial districts, well-nourished people whose bodily strength had not been weakened. What catches the eye especially is the state of the health of the women who into middle age simply burst with spontaneous and natural strength, who have breasts like Diana of Ephesus, and for whom childbirth does not cause any problems. When approaching the frontier of the Reich we realized how inferior the health of the German women was in comparison: pale faces, under-nourishment apparent in the faces, in the posture, in the different expressions of life. The Ukrainian woman who plays a more important role than the Ukrainian man has within herself a strength that is puzzling to us (f. 5, 6-7).

Like Hitler and Koch, many Germans seemed to be astonished and irritated by the natural vivacity, beauty, and vigor of Ukrainian women. The physical power of the Ukrainian people really haunted the National Socialist leaders. Kausch noted that the population continued to increase

because the young women preferred being pregnant to responding to conscription for Germany. Koch told the journalists that he had thought of "stopping" the biological strength in Ukraine by providing women with an abundance of tobacco and vodka but this turned out to be impossible, partly because Ukrainian women, exemplary in their behavior, were not attracted to tobacco and vodka, and partly because the increasing need for workers in the future had to be taken into consideration. For this reason Koch even had to authorize in one of the regions of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine mutual aid associations for the young (f. 7).

Koch wanted to turn Ukraine into a German colony, noted Kausch. He asserted that following the "aerial terror" in western Germany, part of those regions probably would not be rebuilt. There would be a migration movement to the east (these ideas are in the *Generalplan Ost*). Koch was preparing the land in Ukraine for German war veterans and civilians and, according to Kausch's report, he intended to resettle a large part of the Ukrainian population "farther east." Kausch's report continued:

Koch declared that it was absurd to apply to Ukraine the principle of nationality and to admit her into the European family of nations. Ukraine has never been part of Europe; she has always been the suburb of every Pan-Slavic movement. For her, as for all Slavs, only the principle of victor and vanquished is valid. The German soldier has conquered Ukraine not to make the Ukrainian people happy but to place Ukraine under the German law, thereby creating the possibility of a residence for the descendents of the German soldier and for Europe, and to turn it into a territory of dispersal of the first order. If anyone says that Ukraine is not Russia and that there is a difference between these two countries, then he, Koch, must stress that it is Kiev that has shown itself always to be more Pan-Slavic and, consequently, more radical than Moscow (f. 8-9).

Like Hitler several days earlier, Koch strongly opposed the creation of national units (including that of Vlasov's Russian army). He thought

it would have been better to send to each *Gebietskommissar* an additional hundred German gendarmes. Maintaining that there were still too many people in Ukraine, Koch said that "Ukraine must provide workers and products." All political activities, including those connected with churches and mutual aid associations, had to be prevented. Approving of Koch's reasoning, Kausch added that Koch's ideas had the advantage of forming "a harmonious whole." He then added: "Koch does not wish any political ambitions in Ukraine," and for this reason he favored the mutual opposition between the Orthodox Autonomous and the Orthodox Autocephalous churches and, said Kausch, was carrying on a policy aiming at keeping the Ukrainian people "in a state primitive and useful for our work" (f. 9).

At first, acknowledged Kausch, Germans did not intend to develop manufacturing of finished products in Ukraine but intended to limit industrial activities to mining of raw materials and manufacturing of semi-finished products, yet as war continued Germans had to resuscitate Ukrainian industry. During the journalists' stay in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk, Reichsminister Speer, following the Führer's orders, came to these towns to reactivate Ukraine's heavy industry. For some months Germans had already been developing in Ukraine the program for the manufacturing of ammunition for all calibres. Hitler charged Speer to produce 2,000,000 tons of steel in the steelworks of Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk, and Stalino in 1944 (f. 10).

Germans had slowly re-started the Ukrainian industry of mining and finished products. In April 1943 they had mined 107,281 tons of ore of manganese and 8,722 tons of iron ore, and in June 124,589 tons of ore of manganese and 17,690 iron ore. The manufacturing of steel began in May.

Significant quantities of ore were sent to Germany on a regular basis: in June 1943: 232,871 tone of iron ore, 64,936 tons of ore of manganese, and 25,385 tons of manganese extract; in August: 120,522 tons of iron ore, 61,456 tons of ore of manganese, and 26,952 tons of manganese extract (BA-MA RW 30/99 f. 43, 22, 61, 79).

Kausch further indicated in his report that only 16% of workers sent from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to Germany had been volunteers;

the rest had been rounded up in villages surrounded by police. Kausch wrote:

Atrocious scenes took place during the departure of the transports of the recruited workers. They were not sent directly to Germany but remained for several days in transit camps on Ukrainian soil behind barbed wires. During this time whole villages gathered, screaming and crying "these poor banished ones." Places from which inhabitants had fled before the recruitment had to be set on fire. Women and men came to ask for pity. We tried hard to do away with these excesses, but we are aware that harshness cannot always be avoided (BA R 5/1463 f. 16).

According to Kausch, the commissars of the regions thought that to facilitate recruitment, Ukrainians working in the Reich should not be placed behind barbed wires and be better fed. People were assured each time that this was the last recruitment. When the next recruitment took place, Germans had no success unless they operated at night in surrounded villages (BA R 55/1463 f. 16-17).

According to data of the ministry for occupied eastern territories, this ministry had supplied the Reich from the beginning of January to the end of August 1943 with 550,000 workers (518,000 from Reichskommissariat Ukraine and 32,000 from Reichskommissariat Ostland), but only 417,000 had arrived in Germany. According to the senior member of the Council of State, Peukert, others had "left" the transport en route, i.e., they had been freed by the resistance or had escaped (BA R 6/25 f. 84).

Hitler's Opposition to National Troops

Germany had taken an impressive number of Soviet prisoners of war—5,300,000 by 1 April 1943 (BA-MA RH 2/v.1925 Unwiedergebliche Verluste der S.U. ab 22-6-1941). Almost three fourth of them died in camps from cold, hunger, sickness, or extermination by the SD. Those who survived and were used as workers made up a volunteer pool for the Russian Liberation Army (because more than half of these prisoners

were Russians) or for other national armies. Other volunteers could be recruited in the occupied territories and among workers from the east who were in Germany.

In 1943 there were many units of volunteers—Russian, Ukrainian, and other nationalities—totalling (by 1 May 1943) 400,000 to 600,000 men. But these units could not exceed the strength of a battalion under the same command; exception was made for the Cossack units, Kalmuk and Russian regiments. In addition, Russians trained a great number of battalions and companies, several larger national units, such as the RNNA (Russian Popular National Army), the RONA (Russian Popular Liberation Army), and the brigade Druzhina, wearing partial Russian uniforms and commanded by Russian officers (Hoffmann 14). To distinguish these Russian units from national units and units of other nationalities of the Soviet Union, from April 1943 they were officially given the name ROA (Russkaia Osvoboditelnaia Armia—Russian Liberation Army).

General Andrei Vlasov, divided between appeal of a new family of European peoples (supported by Rosenberg and his ministry) and the idea of territorial integrity of the Russian empire (defended by Russian émigrés and their German friends), seemed to lean toward the former. He thought that the idea of a European family of peoples could help find a solution acceptable to the Soviet Union's problem with nationalities.

In a memorandum dated 13 May 1943, Vlasov stated that since the majority of Russians thought "Russia could never relinquish Ukraine and the Caucasus," the idea of membership of each group of people directly in the European family, which demanded some sacrifices in the favor of Europe as a whole, could help resolve this problem because "in the scope of European economic space, the 'abundance' of Ukraine and the Caucasus would not be top priority." Vlasov asserted that "a national Russia, an equal member of the European family of peoples, even without Ukraine and the Caucasus, would not present any danger for Europe," while "a Russia, cast out of this European family and divested of Ukraine and the Caucasus, would constantly be a danger for Europe" (BA R 6/281 f. 167-168)

Ukrainians, however, did not share this reasoning. They wanted to be independent of Russia and of all other states. Moreover, the

Wehrmacht had already planned to establish for them a Ukrainian liberation army (similar to the Russian Liberation Army) as well as a Ukrainian national committee (Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten no.54 of 14 May 1943, BA R 58/224 f. 175-176).

Although establishment of a Ukrainian National Committee was stopped immediately by Nazi authorities, training of units of the Ukrainian Liberation Army (UVV) continued for two or three more months, then stopped in July 1943; in August the UVV was dissolved.

If Nazi authorities were able to block the Ukrainian National Committee project, they had trouble blocking similar projects for the Russians. The "Vlasov Action" of the Wehrmacht (OKW/WPr) proceeded as planned. Hitler, who thought that the enormous "Vlasov Action" of the Wehrmacht, with millions of leaflets, should simply remain a propaganda action without any practical side to it, decided to intervene.

On 8 June 1943, during talks on this subject with the chief of staff of the OKW, Keitel, and General Kurt Zeitzler, Hitler disapproved of the creation of a Russian national army. He thought that even if Vlasov's action were to engender a large number of deserters from the Soviet army, it would be better to make them work in Germany rather than enlist them into the Russian national army. Thus Germans could be freed from their work and sent to the front. Hitler agreed about the necessity for having results from Vlasov's action on the other side of the front (desertions), but he did not need Vlasov on this side of the front and demanded that Vlasov's propaganda be stopped.

Because the matter of national armies was connected with the future of those peoples, Hitler refused to enter into it: "I cannot set any goals for the future, anticipating the creation of independent or autonomous States," he said, because a semi-independent associate state becomes a totally independent state (BA-MA RW 4/v.507 f. 23, 25, 35, 41, 42, 46).

Hitler also opposed the regrouping of the scattered units of volunteers from different nationalities in national liberation armies. According to Zeitzler, these units together represented 220,000 men. They were to remain separate and, in principle, not exceed a battalion under the same command. Hitler also opposed establishment of national committees.

But Hitler spoke out especially against the idea of the establishment of a Ukrainian state, to obtain 1,000,000 Ukrainian soldiers. "We will have nothing, not a single man," he assured (f. 36, 29).

Nevertheless, pressure of German leaders favorable to the Russian Liberation Army and Vlasov remained. Some tried to reconcile the inclusion of Russians in the fighting with the principle of freedom for the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. Erich Dwinger, arguing for the necessity to support Vlasov, maintained in a memorandum that Vlasov, in principle, did not oppose the creation of national states for the peoples of the Soviet Union. Vlasov, he said, had declared that if Ukraine wanted to join Europe in the ranks of Russia, he would be in agreement, but if Ukraine and other peoples wanted to be integrated into Europe "as free states," "this right must not be taken from them." But Vlasov also said that now what was most essential was freedom from Bolshevik domination (BA-MA RH 2/v.2558 f. 121).

In another memorandum, Dwinger identified numerous contradictions in German policies. Practically each branch of the German military—army, air force, SS—was recruiting volunteers from the east, but without principles or common regulation governing this action: It happened that some of these units were withdrawn from the front after their engagement, and the soldiers were sent back to prison camps or camps for workers from the east. Rewarded in this way for their service, these men felt only hate toward Germany. Furthermore, continued Dwinger, the ministry for occupied eastern territories favored dividing Russia according to the different peoples, while for the heads of prison camps these peoples were all "Soviet." The establishment of national committees did not always follow announcements. Recruitment was carried out for the Ukrainian division in Galicia, but establishment of Ukrainian units was forbidden in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

Dwinger was not favorably disposed to Ukrainians, but he thought that if everyone was to be mobilized against the Bolsheviks, after the war all peoples must enjoy the right to dispose of themselves freely. Dwinger maintained that Vlasov did not favor the preservation of the Russian empire but was "rather for all peoples in Russia's becoming equal partners" of the European community. Vlasov, according to Dwinger, thought that, from the European point of view, the Russian empire under

the form of a centralized state "would always be a danger for Europe," while "national states within Russia, in the ranks of the European family of peoples, directed by Germany, would not represent any historical danger for Europe" (f. 126ff.)

General Vlasov had formally assured, continued Dwinger, "Russia does not oppose the establishment of Ukraine as an independent state"; Russia recognizes for all peoples the right to dispose of themselves freely. Dwinger saw in the creation of the European community under the leadership of Germany, on the condition that Germany change its policies regarding the peoples in the east, a guarantee for German victory and that of the Europeans (RH 2/v.2560 f. 70, 71, 73, 77, 81, 83, 85).

But most of the Russian émigrés did not share Vlasov's ideas. They violently opposed the "partition of Russia" and maintained it was premature to speak of the future while war was on. In a letter addressed to Vlasov, a Russian officer of the German army of the east, Colonel Boyarski, recently with the OKW/WPr, severely criticized the plan to set up committees for the different nationalities of the USSR. He said that one should not bother with political matters before the defeat of bolshevism, nor set up national committees during the war, i.e., Germany was not to embark upon the "division of Russia" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f. 90ff).

This point of view matched Hitler's. In the second half of July 1943, German leaders received instruction on this subject. On Hitler's orders, national committees were not to involve themselves with recruitment of volunteers; Vlasov was not to come to the occupied territories. No points of Vlasov's program could be carried out without the express authorization of the Führer (BA-MA RH 2/v.2558 f. 150).

The Wehrmacht and the ministry for occupied eastern territories had to comply. Implementation of plans concerning the eastern nationalities stopped. Only the Russian Liberation Army, despite Hitler's order, quietly continued its quasi illegal existence for the Wehrmacht could not bring itself to abandon this project.

The main leaders of the Russian liberation movement, Generals A. A. Vlasov, G. N. Zhilenkov, V. F. Malyskin, and F. I. Trukhin, tried to convince Hitler of the necessity to include Russians and other peoples in

the fight against Stalin and bolshevism. They reminded him in a letter dated 15 September 1943 that, in addition to their immediate goal which was the fighting at the side of the Wehrmacht against the "Bolshevik and Jewish plutocracy," their ultimate goal was "a free Russia, the well-being of our people in the ranks of a New Europe under German direction. Consequently, we reject all imperialism and are of the opinion that each non-Russian people, part of the Soviet Union, can receive the right to national freedom, including complete independence" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2559 f. 134ff).

But Hitler was not interested in the fate of the peoples of Eastern Europe and was opposed to their independence. The letter of the Russian generals and their propositions concerning their inclusion in the fight against Stalin remained without results.

Ukrainians' Denunciation of True Goals of National Socialism

The Ukrainian liberation movement, the OUN-B, had a different concept of the political future of Eastern Europe. At the time when some groups and movements wanted to make a common cause with National Socialist Germany against bolshevism, the OUN-B restated its position in the forty-eight page brochure "The Goals and Methods of the German Imperialist Politics in the Occupied Territories," published in the spring of 1943 (*Liutopys UPA* 1:56-102).

Well informed on the policies and designs of the Third Reich, the author of the brochure, I. M. Kovalenko, in analyzing the situation and goals of national socialism, pointed out that the German Reich had been trying to extend its hegemony in Europe and in the world since the nineteenth century, but it had clashed with England and its colonial empire. The rivalry between the two powers had turned to Germany's disadvantage at the conclusion of World War I when England was victorious. Since the National Socialists' coming to power, the aspirations of the German Reich for hegemony had as an ideological foundation the two fundamental principles of national socialism: the reunification of all German ethnic groups (thus the annexation of Austria, Sudetenland, etc.) and racism.

The idea of superiority of the Germanic-German race, continued the author, i.e., "bestial biological racism and national intolerance," had become a source of inspiration for German imperialism. According to this idea, humanity is divided into two categories: the dominant master race and the race of slaves. The former is creative, the latter destructive. Human beings are divided into supermen and sub-humans. The Germans constitute the superior race, destined to establish its hegemony, not through honest competition but through force and the destruction of an entire people who oppose German plans.

Later the National Socialists launched the idea of a unity of peoples of the Germanic race, hoping thus to get support from other Germanic peoples. National Socialist Germany promoted a new idea, the idea of "New Europe," linking all Europeans in the realization of its plans in the fight of the Great German Reich against other peoples, continents, and races and in the creation of a world where the German people would dominate all other peoples.

In other words, to dupe the Europeans better, the idea of the German nation was replaced by the idea of a Pan-European community, and the idea of Germany as a great world power by the idea of New Europe. In occupied Europe Germany kept up the fiction of independent states, limiting external policies to satisfy the German needs for workers, raw materials, and products necessary for waging war. Establishment of eastern legions did not yield anticipated results, for resistance in occupied countries of Europe was increasing.

For Eastern Europe, and more specifically Ukraine, continued I. M. Kovalenko, Hitler had no intention of allowing the formation of independent national states. The National Socialist *Ostpolitik* would be a purely colonial policy. However, as formerly Napoleon's plans concerning Europe had collapsed, "everything is indicating that Hitler's plans for 'New Europe', ignoring Ukrainian aspirations for their own independent state, will disintegrate on Ukrainian soil. The non-recognition of Eastern Europeans' right to an independent political life and the forceful suppression of aspirations for independence in the eastern occupied territories will inevitably lead German policies in the east to a catastrophe and the imperialistic plans of Germany to failure" (1:79).

I. M. Kovalenko thought that the European battle slogan against bolshevism which threatened Europeans and their culture, was insincere, because Nazi powers saw in Eastern Europe a territory for German colonization. Further, German statesmen had never specified what the form of their "New Europe" would be.

During political instruction and conferences, cadets, members of the SS, and German leaders in the east were always trained in the manner of "rambling" which the following German text, quoted by Kovalenko illustrates:

The road to German domination over Europe goes through the conquest of Eastern Europe. Here are the immense spaces, the land, raw materials, wheat. Here is Ukraine, fatherland of the Germanics where in the past existed the state of the Goths and the Varangians. Our future is here, in Eastern Europe, in this vast and fertile Ukraine. This is the holy land of the future of the German people [*heiliges Zukunftsland des deutschen Volkes*]. We are going to live here in well-being and abundance and our numbers will grow. Today we are one hundred million. When we will have conquered Ukraine and Eastern Europe and all these fertile territories, in a hundred years we will be four, perhaps five hundred million and we will be able to people all of Europe by ourselves. The principal danger lies in the reproductive strength of the Slavs, but after the war, the Slavs and all non-Germanic peoples will be driven out of Europe. All of Europe will become the fatherland of the Germanic race! (1:82).

The author had knowledge of many other secret German documents that had fallen into the hands of Ukrainian resistance, particularly the *Twelve Commandments Concerning German Behavior in the East and Their Attitude toward the Russians* of 1 June 1941, instructions concerning education, instructions for police, etc.

I. M. Kovalenko condemned alliance with Germans against bolshevism and the volunteer units. He spoke also against the establishment

of the Ukrainian Liberation Army. After the capture of Kharkiv, he wrote, Germans set up this army on the model of General Vlasov's Russian army. These units were used primarily to fight the partisans. Desertions were numerous because of deficient nourishment and bad treatment. In May recruitment began for volunteers for the SS Division "Galicia" on the principle that anyone who did not volunteer would be conscripted for work in Germany.

Kovalenko's study contained a description of the "recruitment" of workers for Germany: deportation of the Ukrainian population to different regions, terror, massive arrests, executions.

The author warned East Europeans against German policies consisting in arousing antagonism among the peoples and using them one against the other. Volunteer units from different countries of Eastern Europe were used to fight the Ukrainian resistance. These peoples should understand that the only alternative for them was a common fight "against the two—Russian and German imperialisms at war, for the purpose of setting up independent national states." German national socialism was fighting all progressive forces of humanity and, because of this, concluded the author, young forces of all peoples should mobilize and unite "in the name of freedom for all peoples of Europe and in the name of freedom for the individual" to be able to construct on the ruins of the "imperialist war" independent national states.

Offensive against Resistance

In a letter dated 25 June 1943, addressed to Alfred Rosenberg, minister for occupied eastern territories, Koch admitted that Germans had to abandon territory in the general region of Volhynia-Podolia (Lutsk and Zhytomyr regions) which extended over a 17,400 km² area. Soviet partisans were occupying the north of this territory, Ukrainians the south of Volhynia. The "Ukrainian national bandits," wrote Koch, have a "rigorous and able" leadership and have at their disposal "an astonishing amount of weapons." They were attacking objectives necessary for the exploitation of the country and for provisions for the front, as well as railroads, roads, bridges, state properties, dairies, wheat granaries, and

industrial enterprises. They were also attacking all Germans who ventured into the zone under their control (Appendix, Doc.#182).

The activities of Ukrainian insurgents and Soviet partisans slowed down timber industry. Thus, for example, production of pitwood, necessary for the mining industry of the Donbass, decreased considerably: ninety railroad cars during the first ten day in June, seventy during the next ten days, and only sixty during the last ten days (BA-MA RW 30/1000 f. 5RS). In June, July, and August 1943 German operations against the UPA took the form of a great offensive. According to Ukrainian sources, the Germans used against the UPA 10,000 men, ten motorized battalions with heavy weapons and artillery, fifty tanks and twenty-seven planes (Shankovsky *Ukrainska* 672). These troops were made up of SS units, units of the German and Polish police, Hungarian troops, police protection units, and battalions of former Soviet prisoners of war from various nationalities.

Supervised by SS-Obergruppenführer and general of the police, von dem Bach-Zalewski, charged with combatting partisans in the occupied territories, German operations were directed not only against the UPA but also against the civilian population. These operations were really punitive expeditions.

During operations on 14 July 1943, Germans burned the village of Malyn with its 850 inhabitants (Ukrainian and Czech). Screams of people locked up in the church, school, and elsewhere could be heard for many miles. Other villages were burned all over Volhynia; hundreds of peasants were killed. More than 2,000 intellectuals were arrested in the night of 15 to 16 July: 280 in Kremianets, 200 in Rivne, 160 in Lutsk, etc. All these Ukrainians were shot (*Liutypys UPA* 2:162-165).

In August Himmler was to send part of the police troops to the front, but SS-Obergruppenführer Prützmann, in charge of operations against the UPA, decided to "crush the Ukrainian national uprising in Volhynia" with the troops under his command (BA-MA RH 22/144 Fernschreiben vom 25-8-1943).

Constant threat of German operations and punitive actions in territories controlled by the UPA forced the Ukrainian command to turn each village into a defense post or a fortress. UPA commander Klym Savur took measures to strengthen the self-defense system in all

Ukrainian villages. On 30 August 1943 he gave orders that all men receive military training and be prepared to defend their village until it was evacuated or reinforcements arrived, or to prevent its being taken by the enemy. Villages received specific instructions about the military structure of self-defense, the system of dissemination of information, the mission of the commander of the village, etc. (*Litopys UPA* 1:135-140).

German as well as Soviet military operations against the Ukrainian national resistance were generally proceeded or accompanied by propaganda actions in leaflet form. The greatest German propaganda action took place in June 1943 during the great offensive when German leaflets, dropped from planes over villages of Volhynia, asserted that the OUN-B was an organization in Bolshevik service with orders from Moscow. "The Jews of the Kremlin have dealings with the OUN which, supposedly, is fighting against bolshevism," maintained one of the leaflets. There were many agents of Moscow, Stalin, and "Jewish brigands" in the OUN leadership; "their task is to incite the Ukrainian people against the German authorities and create chaos in the rear of the front lines" (Appendix, Doc.#183). The OUN-B was, according to the leaflet, "the instrument of Jewish bolshevism." After recalling the Bolshevik terror, deportations to Siberia, etc., the leaflet concluded that Ukrainian nationalists were in Moscow's pay and that "the OUN and bolshevism are the same thing, and that is why they must be annihilated!" (# 183)

Hoping to withdraw the population from the independence movement, Germans asserted in another leaflet that Bandera had been referred to as "topmost Bolshevik of Soviet Ukraine" and "Assassin of Vinnytsia and Katyn" in Stalin's name.

In their leaflets Germans enjoyed mentioning the defense of Europe's culture against Asia's Bolshevik barbarians. "The German Reich is speaking to you in the name of Europe and its grand and old culture," stated one leaflet addressed to "Ukrainians Gone Underground." Von dem Bach, who had signed this leaflet, maintained that "after victory in Europe, Bandera and his bandits will be subject to the same punishment as the communist bandits." He said that "this grand, good, holy war against barbarians, diabolic bolshevism and Jewish-infested nations of the whole world, its allies, demand sacrifices" and that

"in these days of great deeds and sacrifices, Bandera's and Co.'s politics are pure madness" (Appendix, Doc.#185; *Litopys UPA* 2:158).

Soviet propaganda asserted the exact opposite. Fighting the idea of an independent Ukraine, it explained that true independence and sovereignty of Ukrainian people were possible only in close union with the Russian people within the Soviet Union. Soviet leaflets maintained that the Red Army and the Bolsheviks did not have any imperialistic designs, did not aspire to conquering new territories, or subjugating peoples and, consequently, were not fighting against the liberation movement of the Ukrainian people. Statements of Ukrainian nationalists to this end were only slander.

Soviet leaflets presented Ukrainian nationalists as German collaborators. "Bandera arrived in Ukraine in a German vehicle," claimed one of the leaflets. He and his "flunkies" organized a "ceremonial journey" in Germany. The heads of the OUN, stated another leaflet, lived in Berlin, were fed by Germans who gave them money which financed Ukrainian newspapers. The leaflet continued: "OUN leadership, the followers of Bandera and Bulba, are in constant touch with the Gestapo, receive money and sell their people for thirty pieces of silver. They do this to turn people from fighting against the Germans and dispatch masses of Soviet partisans" (Appendix, Doc.#184; *Litopys UPA* 2:158).

In the meantime, engagements between German troops and UPA detachments continued through the summer of 1943: thirty-five engagements in July; twenty-four in August; fifteen in September. Losses during these three months totalled: 1,237 UPA soldiers and officers killed or wounded; at least 5,000 killed among the civilian population; more than 3,000 killed on the German side (Shankovsky *Ukrainska* 672).

Establishment of Resistance and Organization of Freed Districts

Since 1941 numerous Ukrainian publications and periodicals had been appearing clandestinely. The OUN-B had several underground printing works and had published the periodical *Za Samostiynu Ukraïnu* (For Independent Ukraine) since 1941; the newspaper *Ideya i Chyn* (Idea

and Action) since 1942; the *Bulletin* since 1942, the newspaper *Vilna Ukraina* (Free Ukraine), as well as the periodical *Informator* which was ceded to the UPA in September 1943. The UPA published the following magazines and newspapers: *Informator* (since 15 September 1943), *Do zbroyi* (To Arms) since October 1943; *Samostiynyk* (The Independent) since December 1943.

All these publications regularly informed their readers on OUN-B activities, German repressions, and the development of the armed fighting against Germans and Soviet partisans. A study of German archives revealed that very few of these publications had fallen into German hands or did not come to their attention without considerable delay. For example, issue no.8 of *Vilna Ukraina* of September 1943 which contained information pertaining, for the most part, to June-July of the same year, was not translated by the services of the eastern foreign troops (*Fremde Heere Ost*) until 7 July 1944.

Here is a resume of the information published in this issue:

Kiev region. UPA units have made their appearance in the Chornobyl woods. Germans are burning down Ukrainian villages. Ukrainian intellectuals are being arrested in Kiev. Historical monuments are being systematically destroyed. No cultural life is possible.

Kirovohrad region. The population, which is discontented with the Germans and afraid of the Bolsheviks, is very friendly toward the OUN and much interested in the UPA fighting. OUN propaganda against departure for Germany has brought good results; approximately 90% of the young people eluded enrollment. German terror continues. The village of Budy in the Chornobyl district was surrounded and all able-bodied persons taken to Germany.

Dnipropetrovsk region. Germans often carry out roundups in market places. Work day of the region is twelve hours. Part of the population is starving. To survive, people steal. Many people have been sent to concentration camps. Recruitment for Germany is not yielding expected results because of OUN propaganda.

District of Kamianets-Podilsky. Massive arrests among intellectuals and the patriotic element. Deportations to Germany. Villages burned down by Germans; looting, people killed. The magazine noted: "Herein lies German culture." Terror contributes to activization of the masses.

Population is for independence. Insurgent movement is becoming increasingly significant.

Crimea. OUN activities encounter tremendous difficulties but do not cease. Revolutionary sentiment wins Tatars of the Crimea who come out in great numbers for close collaboration with Ukrainians and other oppressed peoples. Ukrainian activities are combatted not only by Germans but also by Russians. The SD has closed the last Ukrainian theater in the Crimea. Germans have arrested many Ukrainians accused of independence propaganda or suspected of belonging to the OUN.

Lutsk. Many arrests among Ukrainians. Also among Poles. Planes have bombarded areas under UPA control which is conducting war against occupying forces.

District of Rivne. Harvest was brought in under UPA protection. Hungarian units and Poles in German services continue to attack Ukrainian villages (Povche, Suymy, Stupno). In Stupno the church and several other buildings were pillaged and destroyed. In Bilashev several houses were burned and six people killed. Arrests in the Ostriv district. The population is entirely on the side of the UPA.

District of Dubno. Only Dubno and Radzivil remain under German control. Germans use Polish units to carry out punitive actions against Ukrainian villages. Germans and Poles have destroyed the village of Malyn with all its inhabitants.

Districts of Volodymyr-Volynsky and Horokhiv. Germans have lost control in this region. Under UPA pressure, they evacuated the town of Volodymyr-Volynsky, taking with them fifty-five prisoners who were then executed. They are attacking Ukrainian villages everywhere. National minorities, with the exception of Poles, behave in a friendly manner toward the UPA. The Ukrainian population openly supports the fighting against all adversaries of Ukraine.

District of Kovel. Germans (with help from Poles) have set fire to the village of Tulychiv and have killed close to one hundred people. During an attack by the UPA Germans lost 180 men. Arrests have been made among the Ukrainian population of Kovel. In July the UPA defeated Soviet partisans who lost several hundred men and had to retreat to the north.

Districts of Pinsk, Sarny, Kostopil. Soviet partisans are arriving from the north (from Belorussia) searching for food. They spread terror, pillage, kill, and force young people to follow them. They have executed ten families in the village of Syrnyky and thirty people in Vychivka. They have burned houses in several other villages. The UPA is doing everything to force them to retreat to the north. Germans have lost all control over this region. The UPA is helping bring back normal life and administration; they are making preparations to reopen schools (BA-MA RH 2/v.2337 f. 16-18).

The OUN-B held its Third Extraordinary Congress from 21 to 25 August 1943. Leaders of the Ukrainian resistance needed to make a point. The two past years had been marked with great losses. Eminent leaders, such as Dmytro Myron-Orlyk, Ivan Klymiv-Leguenda, Mykola Lemyk, Serhiy Sherstiuk, Petro Shchepanivsky, and thousands of partisans had died fighting against Nazi Germany. Thousands of others were in prisons or concentration camps. Bandera and Stetsko were in the concentration camps of Sachsenhausen. At this time the deaths of Stepan Bandera's two brothers who had been deported to Auschwitz and that of many other members of the OUN and Ukrainian patriots was unknown.

One of the documents adopted by the congress stated that despite these losses, the OUN-B had, to some degree, been victorious in defending the positions of the Ukrainian people and had created concrete conditions to pass over to the offensive against the invaders. In the beginning it had assumed the task of preventing deportations of workers and deliveries of food products to Germany. Then it had moved into armed fighting, and units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army had gone into action in Polissia and Volhynia. From that time on the UPA had taken upon itself the defense of the Ukrainian population and had extended its activities into other regions, especially the regions of Kamianets-Podilsky, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kiev, and finally, from July on, Galicia (Appendix, Doc.#186).

Politically, the OUN-B reaffirmed once again that its main goal was the creation of an independent and united Ukrainian state, but it was also fighting for other peoples to live in their own independent national state because the elimination of all domination of one people over

another was a precondition to the construction of a just order in the world. Moreover, the resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN-B stated: "Consequently, the OUN is fighting very resolutely all programs and all international, fascist and national socialist political concepts because they represent the political instrument of imperialist conquest. For this reason the OUN is fighting against Russian communism and German national socialism. The OUN opposes the concept that, to realize its imperialist goals, one nation was going to 'free' and 'place under its protection' another nation because these hypocritical words always conceal the despicable reality of oppression, constraint, plunder." (*Oun v svitli* 107)

According to the resolutions, the regime of the future Ukrainian State had to be democratic, founded on social justice. The Ukrainian government was to occupy itself solely with the interests of the people. All systems of exploitation were to be abolished. Land was to become the property of the peasants. In the western regions, the land of large landowners, monasteries, and churches was to be given free of charge to peasants; heavy industry and transport were to be nationalized; workers were to be able to participate in the running of factories. Moreover, the Ukrainian State was to guarantee the following rights: an eight-hour working day; equitable pay; free choice of profession; freedom of the press, education, speech, thought, conviction; equality under the law for all citizens, including those of national minorities (BA-MA RW 5/v.464 f. 53-55; *OUN v svitli* 107-113).

OUN-B political program had become UPA's and as such was distributed in leaflet form under the signature "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" and dated August 1943 (republished in 1949) (*Litopys UPA* 1:126).

The Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN-B also discussed the possibility of the return of the Soviet regime. Its position on this subject was expressed in the last part of the resolutions. The OUN-B considered that in wartime with constant shifting of frontiers, oppressed peoples with their aspirations for national independence were the only organic and stable reality in Eastern Europe. The final resolution concluded:

"We are going to continue the fight to reach our goals regardless of territorial and political changes in the east. We are going to meet re-occupation of Ukrainian territories by Bolsheviks with fighting with all

possible means that can lead to the defeat of the government apparatus of the Russian imperialism" (*OUN v Svili* 120).

Leaders of the Ukrainian resistance and some of the public opinion were hoping that war would wear out the two belligerents to the point where they would be incapable of opposing aspirations of the oppressed peoples, especially the aspirations of the Ukrainian people. Consequently, these peoples would be able to rise up and snatch from the belligerents freedom and independence.

Leaders of the Ukrainian resistance were not the only ones who thought this way. Many Polish and Russian anti-Bolshevik leaders also thought that war would exhaust the two belligerents, and this conviction caused the western Allies fear to see Russia weakened to the point of trying to negotiate a separate peace with Hitler similar to the German-Russian treaty of 23 August 1939. This seemed to be the main reason for their willingness to give in to the political demands of the Russians.

As early as May 1942 a Polish newspapers in exile wrote that in August or September, German and the Soviet armies "would be neutralized." "They will destroy each other and then the hour of the Anglo-Saxons [Anglo-Americans] will come" (*Trybuna Wolnosci*, 1 September 1946 as quoted in Déborine 245).

The order of the day of 31 August 1943 of Klym Savur, commander of the UPA, asked for reinforcement of insurgent forces and their extension over all of Ukraine to prepare millions of Ukrainians for a general insurrection. "All of Ukraine has to become a military camp entrenched like those that protect us today from annihilation, a camp that will serve us tomorrow as a base from which to attack" (*Liutypys UPA* 6:93).

UPA command, following decisions made at the OUN-B congress, recommended that contact be made with representatives of oppressed nationalities in Ukraine and that they to be made to understand it was in their interest to form national units modeled on the UPA's which could join their respective countries, when the time came, to take charge of the national revolution of their peoples (*Liutypys UPA* 6:93; BA-MA RH 2/v.2545 f. 40, 40RS).

Progressively UPA authorities organized the administration and life of the villages in regions which they controlled. All villages received

precise instructions on defense against German attacks or attacks of other enemies (e.g., construction of barricades, chicanes, ditches, reconnaissance, rapid evacuation of the population into the woods, construction of shelter and underground lodgings, etc.) (*Liopys UPA* 1:141-148). On 15 September 1943 UPA authorities also ordered the reopening of schools. Medical assistance and care for children were re-established where possible (1:170-174).

In all districts under UPA's control German administration was replaced by a Ukrainian administration. Economic activities proceeded normally: concerns were started up; the manufacturing of necessary prime products (soap, paper, leather, alcohol for medicinal needs, etc.) was organized. These districts were freed from recruitment for Germany; no forced labor was done on the roads or in German defense work; no deliveries of products were made to the Germans.

Many auxiliary services working for the UPA were developed, such as the Red Cross, courses for nurses and surgeons, workshops for the clothing industry, shoe repair shops, etc. (Lebed *UPA* 29-30, 66).

From August 1943 the UPA structure was progressively acquired a definite form. It was divided into three armed territorially demarcated groups: UPA-North (regions of Polissia, Volhynia, Zhytomyr); UPA-West (regions of Kholm, Galicia, Bukovyna, Carpathia); UPA-South (regions of Vinnytsia, Kamianets-Podilsky and the south of Ukraine). The commanders of these groups were Roman Klashivsky-Klym Savur (UPA-North); Vasyl Sydor-Shelest-Vyshyty (UPA-West); Omelan Hrabets-Bat'ko (UPA-South).

In the fall of 1943 the supreme command of the UPA was bestowed upon Roman Shukhevych (alias Taras Chuprynka).

Plans were made to regroup the insurgent units of the regions of Kiev, central, and eastern Ukraine into UPA-East, but the advance of the Soviet troops prevented implementation of this project.

Germans' Loss of Initiative and Preparation to Evacuate Eastern Ukraine

From the military point of view, the summer of 1943 was the most important period in the history of the war in Eastern Europe. The Battle of Stalingrad was an important German military defeat and marked the psychological turning point of the war. But Germans retreated only very slowly. They still had a rather large striking force, and Soviet troops were marking time; they advanced with difficulty. They took possession of Kharkiv and Lugansk in February 1943, but they were pushed back a month later.

Germans thus still partially retained the initiative. On 5 July 1943 they launched an attack in the region of Kursk in Russia, an offensive which was stopped several days later. On 12 July the Soviet army moved to counter-offensive and kept the initiative until the end of the war.

During the crucial period for the Third Reich (October 1942 to August 1943) armed resistance of the Ukrainian independent movement developed considerably. Activities of the OUN-B and operations of the UPA from March-April 1943 and especially in subsequent months (particularly June-July) contributed significantly to the difficulties of German administration in Ukraine and the Wehrmacht on the eastern front.

In mid-May 1943 German authorities secretly ordered preparations for evacuation of economic resources from regions of eastern Ukraine and Kiev. In the region of Poltava this plan included not only the evacuation of food supplies and livestock but also of all able-bodied men ages fifteen to sixty-five (BA-MA RH 22/142 Oberfeldkommandatur 398 Ia 2382/40 geheim. St.Qu., 18 July 1943).

To evacuate Kiev, Germans planned to use 495 trains fifty railroad cars long (thirty-three trains per day leaving from six stations of the Ukrainian capital) (BA-MA RH 22/142 Fernspruch WKWU 2205 19 July 1943; Bfh. H. Geb. Süd Ia Nr. 5503/43 g.H.Qu., 28 July 1943).

During the second half of August the cities of Lebedyn (19 August), Kharkiv (23 August), Okhtyrka (25 August), Hlukhiv (30 August) fell into the hands of the Red Army. On 1 September the German high command ordered the commencement of evacuation from the entire

Ukrainian territory east of the Dnipro R. On 3 September Koch issued evacuation instructions to the general commissars of Kiev and Dnipropetrovsk and to the commissars of the regions east of the Dnipro.

Koch divided the regions east of the Dnipro into two zones. In zone one, close to the front (with the towns of Hadiache, Poltava, Berdiansk), all houses were to be burned down. Supplies which could not be evacuated were to be destroyed. All able-bodied inhabitants and all livestock were to be evacuated but seeds were to be destroyed. Similar measures were to be taken later in zone two (BA-MA RH 22/144 Der Reichskommissar für die Ukraine V-I-533/43 g.Rs., 1-4).

Koch had acted on orders coming from Berlin. Himmler had reminded Prützmann, head of the SP and SD in Ukraine, that he was to help in the destruction of everything in the Ukrainian evacuated territories. No living being was to remain there—not one single cow, not one kilo grain, or one meter of rail, or single house, or well with unpoisoned water, or factory not rendered useless for years to come. The enemy was to find the land totally burned, the country totally destroyed (Cf. photocopy of document in *America* 26 September 1985).

National Units within the UPA

Even during the OUN-B conference in February 1943 the question was raised on the necessity of establishing a collaboration in the struggle against the National Socialists and the Bolsheviks with the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe. The only preliminary condition for such a collaboration was recognition of the right of the Ukrainian people to independence and sovereignty. Cooperation, thus, was not possible with those who refused to recognize this right, including that of west Ukrainian territory. It was also planned to look for "common interests with peoples of the west and the east in the common struggle against German, Russian, and other imperialism" (*OUN v svitli* 77).

According to the OUN-B, National Socialist and Bolshevik imperialism, each in its own way, aimed to enslave "all peoples of Europe, impose chains on them." The OUN-B placed opposite these two

imperialisms "the idea of independent national states for all European peoples within their ethnographic limits" (81).

Insurgent fighting supplied the occasion for the application of theoretical principles on collaboration between the peoples of Eastern Europe.

Besides German units, the Germans regularly engaged battalions composed of volunteers, former prisoners of war from different nationalities (*Ostbataillone*) against the UPA. Among these battalions were those composed of Armenians, Georgians, Russians, Cossacks from the Don and Kuban, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars. From June 1943 on the high command of the UPA addressed these soldiers by means of a dozen of leaflets, bearing such titles as:

"Armenians and Other Peoples of the Caucasus!" "Georgians!" "Russians!" "Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Tadzhiks, Bashkirs, Tatars, Peoples of the Ural, Volga, Siberia, Peoples of Asia!" (June 1943), "Georgians!" "Volunteers for the German Army!" "Tatars of the Volga!" (September 1943), "Armenians!" "Uzbek Soldiers!" (October 1943), "Azerbaijanis!" "Cherkess, Kabardians, Ossetes, Chechenese..." "Russian Comrades!" (November 1943), "Belorussians!" (December 1943, this last leaflet was edited to be distributed in Belorussia itself) (*UPA v Sviuli* 103-113; *Litopys UPA* 1:103-119).

Goal of this action was not only to explain the meaning of the combat of Ukrainians, to demonstrate that the UPA was fighting by the principle "Freedom for the peoples, freedom for the individual!" but also to convince the East European and Asian volunteers not to take part in German oppression against the Ukrainian population or in the fighting against the UPA. Further, the leaflets were designed to rekindle among targeted nationalities aspirations for independence of their own people. The leaflets invited volunteers of the German army to join maquis to form national units in the UPA and fight together with the Ukrainians against the two imperialisms simultaneously for the independence of their nations. These often lengthy leaflets, written in Russian or the respective languages, ended in one of these appeals or a similar one:

"Oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia! Get in touch with the UPA! Pass over your weapons to the insurgents! Take part in the

fighting against the imperialisms! Long live the independent states of the oppressed peoples!" (*Liutopys UPA* 1:194).

"Peoples of the Caucasus! Get in touch with the UPA! Organize your national units similiary to those of the UPA! With our common efforts we will bring about a general revolution against the imperialist pillagers! For an independent state of the peoples of the Caucasus!" (*UPA* 104; *Liutopys UPA* 1:179).

"Armenians! Neither Russian imperialism nor German imperialism will bring freedom to oppressed peoples....Join the national units in the UPA; gather your forces to fight for a free Armenia....The prison of nations...the USSR...will be destroyed by the peoples oppressed by Moscow! Long live independent Armenia! Long live the independent states of the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia! Long live the Ukrainian State!" (*Liutopys UPA* 1:177-178).

These leaflets had remarkable success. Many deserters from the German army, sometimes entire sections, joined the maquis or formed autonomous national units within the UPA. From August 1943 on small units composed of Armenians, Georgians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars, and Lithuanians were created. Probably the largest were those of the Lithuanians and Georgians (several hundred of each nationality). Next came the Uzbeks and the Armenians.

In addition, reverses occurring on the eastern front during the summer and fall of 1943 brought about many desertions of Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, and German soldiers. These deserters usually contacted Ukrainians to reach their country of origin. Some, however, joined the UPA to fight on the side of the Ukrainians, almost all of them dying while fighting against the Germans.

Many Jews, escapees from the ghettos, simple fighters and doctors, were numbered in the ranks of the UPA (in the early 1960s several dozen of Jews lived in Israel who had been members of the UPA), as well as several fighters of other nationalities such as the Belgian from Bruges, Albert Hazebroekx, who had fled from Germany and, to reach England by way of the east, arrived in Dubno, Volhynia there deciding to join the Ukrainian resistance. He became a soldier of the UPA under the pseudonym "*Zakhidny*" (the Westerner) and in the fall of 1943 was assigned to the transmitting set for the Ukrainian resistance "*Vil'na*

Ukraina" (Free Ukraine, code name "*Aphrodite*") where he worked as announcer in French and English. This short-wave transmitter continued to function even after German retreat and in March 1945 was discovered by Russians. During a broadcast, two Russian soldiers burst into the underground shelter, throwing a grenade into it. One Ukrainian was killed immediately. Albert Hazebroeckx, lightly wounded, was captured and deported with many Ukrainians to the Vorkuta Concentration Camp in Siberia, not to be freed until 1953 (author's archives; cf. *La Libre Belgique* 1 November 1953; *Homine Ukraïny* 25 September 1983).

A small number of Russians also joined the UPA; some of them, when the opportunity presented itself, deserting to unite with Soviet partisans. The Russian general P. V. Sysoev, former professor of the military academy of Moscow and commander of the Thirty-sixth Army Corps of the Soviet army during the war, for example, having escaped the war prison camp, presented himself to a company of the UPA as a Ukrainian, former Soviet soldier, escapee by the name of Petro Skyrda. He kept this identity for two years in the rank of the Ukrainian resistance before deserting and joining the Soviet partisans in the fall of 1943 (Fedorov XXIII: May 1964; *L'Est Européen*, 90:12).

New Criticism of German Policies

On 16 September 1943 an important conference of the German military command and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine took place in Rivne. Because of Koch's absence, however, the RKU was represented by Dargel. Beside questions pertaining to evacuation of regions of the left bank of the Dnipro River, General Friderici and Paul Dargel reviewed the situation in regions of Volhynia, Podolia, and Zhytomyr.

Two essential problems preoccupied the Germans: harvest and combatting of "bandits." To protect the harvest, they had 15,000 men in these regions, including 3,000 police, 6,000 draftees and reserves, 3,000 men from the eastern troops, 3,000 men from the protection units.

According to the report of German counter-intelligence, the three regions were largely dominated by "bandits," in the north by more than 20,000 Soviet partisans and in the south by approximately 35,000

Ukrainian national partisans (BA-MA RH 22/104 f. 144). Germans included in the latter number the partisans of OUN-B, Bulba, and OUN-M. Actually these figures on Ukrainian partisans pre-dated August. In September 1943 the armed resistance of the Ukrainians consisted primarily of the UPA and several hundred Bulba partisans.

According to a report presented to the conference, attacks of the "Ukrainian bandits" were increasing: 295 attacks in July 1943, 391 in August; assassination attempts and railroad sabotages: 682 in July, 1,094 in August; economic sabotages: 119 in July, 151 in August.

General von Krause recognized that political pacification of these regions was no longer possible. Only military pacification remained. Von Krause also expressed his opinion on the general situation. According to him, everything possible must be drawn from Ukraine through "patriarchal" methods, if feasible, otherwise through force. He also declared that "the political goal of the Ukrainian population is complete independence" (f. 144-146).

Economic inspection of the Wehrmacht indicated that the greater part of the regions of Volhynia-Podolia and Zhytomyr had been "handed over to the bandits who were carrying out their activities as far as the borders of the large cities [Zhytomyr, Rivne]." Another part of the report stated that "on 20 September, one bandit dressed in a German uniform had killed in plain daylight Ministerial Counselor Höll (head chief of the finance services) and his companion in front of the permanent representative building of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine" in Rivne (BA-MA RW 30/100 f. 79RS-80).

Approximately three weeks later, according to Taubert's report, "at the same time and in the same location that same perpetrator attempted an assassination by means of explosives of Koch's adjunct, Regierungspräsident Dargel and the head of the [propaganda] department Paltzo." Taubert reported that "the circumstances forced the supposition that the perpetrator was a Ukrainian nationalist" (BA R 55/1483 f. 10), but, as later details will make clear, the perpetrator of the assassination attempt was a Russian agent provocateur.

This seems to have been the second unsuccessful assassination attempt on the life of Paul Dargel. The official newspaper of Rivne in the Ukrainian language, *Volhyn* dated 24 October 1943 informed its

readers that inquiry established "a relationship between the assassination attempt and certain circles of ideological instigators" and consequently a large number of prisoners belonging to these circles had been executed in the prisons of Volhynia.

Indeed, more than 500 Ukrainian nationalist hostages and prisoners, members or sympathizers of the OUN-B, men and women as well as several Ukrainian orthodox priests, were executed between 12 and 22 October 1943 in several prisons of Volhynia (Shankovsky *Ukrainska* 675-676). Approved by Koch, these reprisal executions were ordered by SS-Obergruppenführer Alfred Funk, head of the department of justice of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

Members of the OUN-B actually had nothing to do with this assassination attempt. They were simply victims of a Soviet provocation, as was learned later in March 1944.

In his report concerning the assassination attempts in Ukraine and Belorussia (where, after an explosion assault on an official building on 9 September, Reichskommissar Kube was assassinated on 23 September), Taubert remarked that *en masse* blind reprisals constituted a grave error; they only increased the number of malcontents and opponents. As an example, Taubert cited the Protectorate of Bohemia where the SD had always refrained from *en masse* reprisals against the innocent population. Consequently, in the country of the Czechs there was no "popular war as in Volhynia" and the war industry could work normally for the Reich, certainly not the case in Ukraine and Belorussia (BA R 55/1483 f. 12-13).

After the Soviet counter-offensive of July 1943 in the salient of Kursk changed to a general offensive, in August and September the front removed a considerable distance from Moscow and the main part of the Soviet army fell in the direction of Ukraine. As the Germans before, the Russians needed Ukraine. They captured Sumy (2 August), Horlivka (5 August), Stalino-Donetsk (8 August), Nizhyn (15 August), Novhorod-Siversky, Romny (16 August), Pavlohrad, Berdiansk on the Azov Sea (17 August), Lubny (18 August), Pryluka (19 August), Chernihiv (21 August). On 23 September the Soviet army took Poltava and on 30 September it reached the Dnipro River on the line going from the northern frontier of Ukraine as far north of Zaporizhia.

Criticism by German officials regarding Berlin policies in Ukraine increased. Former head of economic services of the general commissariat of Melitopol, Heinz von Homeyer, sent a long letter to Rosenberg on 15 October 1943 protesting Koch's policies.

Homeyer wrote that Germany had just lost part of Ukraine, and partisans made the rest of the country insecure. According to Homeyer both situations could be attributed directly to the policies followed in Ukraine. Homeyer, however, did not take the side of Ukrainian nationalists whom he seemed to ignore totally. Like many other Germans, he confused Ukrainians with Russians, considering the entire population in the east Russian, Slavic.

Homeyer levelled many reproaches against Koch. He reproached him especially for hatred of the eastern populations, the Slavs. He claimed it was not a matter of granting independence to Ukraine but of showing tact toward a population that was *a priori* against bolshevism, whom Germans were hoping to win for their cause. He proposed a change in policies (Ukraine, for its participation in the common effort, could be given the status of an allied European state; administration would be changed; total amnesty declared; consideration or labelling of Slavs an inferior race would be forbidden, etc.). But the new policies and reforms were to be entrusted to new men who did not participate in the present policies. Homeyer was convinced that Germans would never be able to change forty million Ukrainians "to whom nature has given a white skin, into Negroes" (BA R 6/15 f. 108-121).

Poles and Western Ukraine

After Mussolini's resignation and the creation of Badoglio's government (25 July 1943), Roosevelt and Churchill met on 17 August in Quebec. The two delegations discussed the problem of a second front in Europe. While Americans hoped to open the second front in the north of France, Churchill continued to defend his plan for a landing in the Balkans thinking, undoubtedly, that he could thus prevent Soviet penetration into this region. Americans did not support this idea, thinking that the Soviet army would be worn out and would cease

advancing so that Anglo-American troops could occupy not only western Europe but also the Balkans (Déborine 302). Thus the decision was made to land on the coast of northern France on 1 May 1944, with a supplemental landing in the south of France. They also discussed Germany's future: Germany had to be divided into several states after the defeat (Duroselle *Histoire* 369-370; Déborine 301-303).

Italy capitulated on 3 September 1943, the day of the landing by the Allies on the southern coast of that country. On 13 October, Badoglio's government declared war on Germany.

The Polish government in exile, since the tragic death of General Wladyslaw Sikorski on 14 July 1943 under the leadership of S. Mikolajczyk, continued its attempts to convince the western powers of the necessity to guarantee Poland its pre-1939 eastern frontiers, i.e., to guarantee Poland Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian territories coveted by the Russians. Ukrainian territories included the regions of Volhynia, Galicia, Kholm, and Lemkos, inhabited primarily by Ukrainians, concentrating the strongest force of the independent movement.

Roosevelt seemed to think vaguely that the eastern frontiers of Poland should pass to the east of the Curzon line, i.e., the city of Lviv, capital of Western Ukraine, was to be given to Poland.

Roosevelt, however, had fixed ideas on matters concerning Eastern Europe. He admired Stalin and the Russians and did not see anything improper in dividing with them the spoils of victory not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world. He revealed his policies and views on the world during a visit with Cardinal Spellman on 3 September 1943.

According to Spellman's notes, Roosevelt acknowledged that after victory the world would be divided in spheres of influence and that "Great Britain and Russia will divide Europe and Africa between themselves." Because Great Britain had its interest primarily in Africa, Russia, by Roosevelt's admission, would become master of Europe, but Roosevelt hoped that the intervention of the Russians in Europe would not be "too insufferable."

Roosevelt admitted that a conference with Stalin would take place, and he was convinced that he would be able to get along with him better than with the too idealistic Churchill, for he, Roosevelt, and Stalin were realists. Despite the desire that Stalin would not wish to extend the

limits of Russia beyond a certain line, it was to be expected that he would reclaim Finland, the Baltic States, half of Poland, Bessarabia. It would be useless to oppose Stalin's wishes seeing that he had the strength and power to fulfill them. And then, in Roosevelt's opinion, the population of eastern Poland wholeheartedly wants to become Russian (Gannon 222-223).

Although Roosevelt knew Russia wanted to install communist governments in countries occupied by the Soviet army, he questioned, "What can we do?" Cardinal Spellman asked him if countries such as Austria, Hungary, Croatia were to become Russian protectorates. Roosevelt answered affirmatively, adding with admiration that one should not forget the remarkable economic achievements in Russia. He was hoping that after ten or twenty years of European influence Russians would become civilized (Gannon 224).

Cordell Hull had received a memorandum from the ambassador of Poland on the eve of his departure for Moscow where a conference of ministers of foreign affairs of the three Allies was to be held. The Polish government in exile was asking the United States and England for guarantees concerning former eastern frontiers. The memorandum stated that if the advancing Soviet army occupied territories west of the former Polish-Soviet frontiers, these territories were to be returned to the Polish government in exile immediately. Moreover, American and English troops were to be stationed on the freed Polish territories to guarantee the country's independence.

Eden declared to the head of the Polish government that if he refused to give up the question of the eastern frontiers, there would be no hope for reestablishing diplomatic relations between him and Moscow. Mikolajczyk answered that Poland's eastern frontiers could not be a subject for discussion and that his government was opposed to having this matter discussed during the Moscow conference (Mikolajczyk 45; Ciechanowski 214; Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 381).

The conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of Soviet Russia, United States, and England took place in Moscow from 19 to 30 October 1943. In the interest of all nations, it was decided that it was important to maintain the close war-time collaboration in the period following the

end of hostilities. At this conference the declaration on the problem of collective security was worked out: creation of a universal international organization for maintaining peace and international security, an organization based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, with the shortest possible delay was judged essential.

Everything concerning regulation of European problems after the war was vague and obscure. A European consulting commission was to be created and meet in London the moment Hitler's regime would face collapse, to study the European problems and elaborate on recommendations. During the conference Molotov revealed Russian opposition to discussion of problems of central Europe after the war (western Allies proposed creation of a "Danube Federation" to center around Austria), maintaining that the choice of the form of the states must be left to the peoples themselves. It was not difficult to speculate what the regime in the countries occupied by the Soviet army would be.

Discussion also concerned capitulation and disarmament of Nazi Germany and punishment of Hitler's leaders for crimes committed in the occupied countries. Finally, Molotov particularly desired assurance that the invasion in northern France planned for spring 1944 not be delayed.

The question of Polish frontiers was not discussed in Moscow. American and English representatives tried hard to get the Russian government to establish diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile, but Moscow charged this government with hostility toward them and intent to establish "emigrant powers" in freed Poland (Déborine 316-319, 321; Duroselle *Histoire* 370-371). The Russians maintained that in their propaganda in the west the Polish army of the interior (AK), which depended on the government in London, was collaborating with Germans and fighting Soviet partisans.

Polish resistance in Poland received from the government in London continuous aid (parachute drops of men, supplies, money, weapons, and ammunition), but from mid-August 1943 the flights were suddenly reduced to the minimum by British authorities. In the following months there were very few flights (not a single parachute drop of weapons could be made in November) (Nowak 217).

The army of the interior (which acted effectively in liaison with the Polish government in London and which refused to accept the Curzon

line frontier) was considered by Moscow an anti-Soviet resistance. Although the English explained that the slow-down, indeed stoppage, of the flights to Poland as due to technical difficulties, their main reason was probably desire not to inconvenience the Russians.

A study of the Polish-Ukrainian relations in Western Ukraine is not the purpose of this book. Some aspects, however, will be touched on to illustrate the complexity of the situation.

The situation in Ukrainian territories reclaimed by the Polish government in exile became very complicated during 1943. The Polish minority and Polish resistance organizations considered these territories Polish. The military command of the Polish resistance had developed a plan for an uprising before the arrival of the Soviet army to seize power and confront Moscow with a *fait accompli* of Polish sovereignty in these territories (the Polish plan concerned not only Ukrainian territory but also Belorussian and Lithuanian territories annexed by the USSR after September 1939). In all Polish plans concerning Ukrainian territory, Ukrainians were considered enemies who had to be eliminated.

Elimination of Ukrainians, according to Ukrainian sources, had begun in 1942 in the border territories of ethnographic Polish territories (Hrubeshiv, Kholm, Volodava, and other districts located west of the rivers Buh [Bug] and San). More than 2,000 Ukrainians were killed in 1942 and 1943. From August-September 1943 on, in the expectation of taking power, Polish activities extended farther east into regions of Volhynia and Galicia (Lebed *UPA* 76-77). In Volhynia the situation was complicated by the many factors multiplying antagonism within the communities. Among them were the presence of Polish pro-Soviet or communist partisans and German use of Polish police in their repression of Ukrainians (a majority in the region).

German reports record these repressions. Thus, on 30 May 1943 in Derman (south of Rivne), after a shot from an unknown direction, Polish police burned down eighty houses and killed seventy Ukrainian peasants. Poles of Misoch took advantage of this situation to loot the Ukrainian village. During operations of this kind policemen confiscated clothing and objects of value. They forced the Ukrainians to speak Polish, to take off their hat in their presence, etc. under penalty of being whipped or killed. The battalion of the Klevan Polish police, following

the denunciation of one Polish woman, went to Novosilky and Novozhukiv to arrest many Ukrainians who were shot to death.

During this last operation Polish policemen locked up a Ukrainian priest, Alexandr Karbovysh, and his daughter in their barn and looted their home. On their way back, they killed five Ukrainians from Sukhovtsi and Holekhiv whom they happened to meet en route. When the battalion went through the village of Zastavne, a Polish policeman shot through the window of a house at a Ukrainian who was praying before an icon, killing him. The battalion returned with nine wagons of looted goods. The German report described the commander of the battalion as a particularly cruel man who liked to sever the arms of his Ukrainian victims personally or hang them without a trial (BA-MA RH 2/v.2560 f. 133 RS-134).

Ukrainian villages were often attacked by Soviet and Polish partisans who worked together, looting and victimizing many. In such situations Ukrainian self-defense and UPA units took on defense of Ukrainian villages and retaliated by attacking bases from which Polish attacks originated (Lebed *UPA* 78-79). Undoubtedly, excesses were committed by both sides.

Polish interventions, asserting possession of territories by eliminating Ukrainians, began to take place in Galicia, organized by the Polish command which sent reinforcement of men and weapons from Poland.

Thus four forces were confronting each other in Western Ukraine, fighting for the possession of this territory: Ukrainians, natives from time immemorial, the majority, who aspired to independence for the entire Ukraine; Germans as occupying forces; Poles, to manifest their presence and to annex this territory to the Polish State; and Russians who claimed this territory belonged to the Soviet State. Victory, as always in such a case, could be only on the side of the strongest from the military (local) and political (diplomatically) points of view. Ceding before Russian demands, the western allies only increased Moscow's chances.

Himmler's Racial and Colonial Delirium

German setbacks suffered on all fronts did not influence the main Nazi leaders in their way of looking at things. During a conference of the SS-Gruppenführer held in Posen (Poznan) on 4 October 1943, Himmler reviewed all problems pertaining to the war.

The fifth year of the war, said Himmler, would be a difficult one, but he firmly believed in victory. Nevertheless, he admitted that they had been wrong in thinking that Stalin's liquidation of his generals in 1937-1938 had weakened the Soviet army which was still resisting. Germans did not know exactly what human potential Moscow possessed—possibly between 170,000,000 and 250,000,000, perhaps 220,000,000 men. Stalin could, therefore, form some 400 new divisions this year, i.e., put on the line 4,000,000 men. But Himmler believed in Germany's victory because such was the "natural law."

Himmler did not believe Vlasov's slogan that "Russia can be defeated only by Russians" (by the term "Russians" Vlasov meant all the peoples of the Soviet Union). Himmler derided the assertion of some Germans that Vlasov needed an army of only 500,000 to 1,000,000 men to defeat the Russians. He judged this idea very dangerous. Like Hitler, he agreed to exploit Vlasov for propaganda purposes, but nothing more, because Slavs were not to be trusted. "The Slav is never capable of constructing something for himself." This race, descendent of a mixture, continued Himmler, is an "inferior race" (with the exception of Attila, Genghis-Kahn, Tamerlan, Lenin, and Stalin), a race which, even if it has some drops of German blood, is incapable of being a ruling race, to control itself, to maintain order. "It is capable of discussing, arguing, disintegrating, opposing authorities, revolting," said Himmler. "This specimen of inferior humanity is as incapable of maintaining order today as 700 or 800 years ago when these people made an appeal to the Varangians, the Rurikides."

Himmler did not understand why so much had been promised to Vlasov. Certainly, a Russian general could be bought, but it was not necessary to take him seriously, because Vlasov said during his conferences in Paris, Bruxelles, and Berlin that it was a shame that Germans were treating the Russian people so badly, using corporal punishment

(abolished long since in Russia); then a short time later, while explaining the strength of Russian nationalism, he bragged that it was a Russian general, driven by Russian nationalism who had defeated Marshall Paulus at Stalingrad, but had suffered corporal punishment in the GPU prison. It was difficult to understand the situation without admitting that in Russia corporal punishment was reserved for generals.

Himmler opposed the uproar made around the person and the "action" of Vlasov. He thought that the latter should be limited to propaganda directed toward Russia to provoke decomposition of the Russian army and weakness of its resistance. But how was one to understand that the same Russian patriotism to which Stalin had appealed and which continued to be his strength, could also serve Vlasov to fight Stalin? Himmler thought that a handful of men who prided themselves on a 300-year experience could rule nations (as the English were doing in India).

Then the Reichsführer-SS went on to the psychology of Slavs. According to Himmler such words as "loyalty," "to not betray," "not conspire" did not exist in the Russian vocabulary; Russians did not know their meaning. Certainly, these people were pious; the boatmen of the Volga sang well; Russians were good improvisors, good technicians. They could be workers and also idlers, but above else they were filthy beasts capable of torture and even cannibalism. Hadn't Russia always lived under regimes where denunciation was normal?

Members of the SS, said Himmler, should not concern themselves with how other peoples live, whether they are hungry or not. "The people interest us only to the degree that we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise they are of no interest to us." If during the construction of a trench for German authorities 10,000 "Russian women" succumb, the only thing of interest for Himmler is the moment this ditch is finished. Nevertheless, Germans should not always be rude and heartless; they like animals and thus will also have a proper attitude toward the human animals. But it would be inhuman to say that anti-tank trenches should not be built by women and children, because if they are not, German soldiers, sons of German mothers would perish. According to Himmler, this was the essence of the national socialist

attitude toward "non-Germanic peoples, especially toward the Russians....The rest is only soap bubbles."

Himmler preferred to see a Russian die rather than a German. A ration of 1:2 or 1:3 should always be maintained, i.e., one Russian for three Germans, closely supervised. Himmler did not consider the loss of and retreat from the Donbass a tragedy but saw it as a reinforcement of the German position.

Himmler said the 6,000,000 to 7,000,000, even 8,000,000 foreigners in Germany were not dangerous as long as they were dealt with severely. It was a trifle to kill ten Poles now rather than shoot tens of thousands of them later.

Concerning the international situation, Himmler noted that England and the United States were not united; England tried to use the Americans to eliminate Germany, and the two Allies had difficulties with Russia. Stalin, said Himmler, was cold-bloodedly pursuing a policy of power. He was saying to the Westerners: I carry the main burden of the war and I, therefore, want to decide what concerns Europe. Poland, the Balkans, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia constitute my zone of interest. Stalin's demands disturbed his partners who had entered the war to guarantee Poland's independence. While Bolshevik Russia wanted to rule Europe, England desired to safeguard the balance of power and did not want to allow the Bolsheviks to penetrate into Europe. In Himmler's eyes, this was a conflict of interests, opinions, intentions, and plans. He thought that Germany should continue the fighting because Germany had to become a world power and build a Germanic Reich.

After the war has been won, continued Himmler, the work of the SS would begin. It would be up to them to form a leading class for all of Europe in twenty or thirty years. The SS and the peasants, in a revolutionary drive without restraint to the east, in twenty years time would move the German frontier 500 km farther east. "We are going to dictate laws to the east. We are going to penetrate and open up a road as far as the Ural Mountains." Himmler hoped that his objective would be attained by his generation. For him what mattered most was the creation of conditions favorable for the German people in their fight to lead Europe against Asia. Thus, 250 to 300 million Germanic peoples, together with other peoples of Europe—in all 600 to 700 million

men—would be able to oppose a mass of one to one and a half billion Asiatics (IMT 1919-PS, XXVIII: 111, 114, 115, 117-124, 133, 136-137, 171-172).

Almost simultaneously, in a speech given on 14 October in Bad Schachen, Rosenberg also based his reasoning on the valor of the Germanic race. He was even proud that General Eisenhower, commander-in-chief of the allied troops in Sicily and Italy was "a former Swabian"; and General Spaatz was also a German descendent. Rosenberg insisted that it was the Normans who "had founded the State of Kiev."

Regarding the present situation, Rosenberg observed that the English, Russians, French, and Americans had divided the world among themselves, but when Germany had made claims, they had taken this as a provocation. After having repeated the arguments on the necessity of ruling Eastern Europe to guarantee Europe's autarky, Rosenberg concluded that after 1600 years it was Germany's duty to take up the road of the Goths and bring the eastern reserves into the German Reich and to Europe (BA R 6/6 f. 127, 138, 144).

Himmler's racial delirium and Nazi Germany's expansionist plans toward Eastern Europe, at a time when the Germans had lost the initiative in all theaters of operation, could be explained only by an unreasonable optimism stemming from feelings of racial superiority which were leading the Germans irreversibly to their ruin.

Moreover, reports of the forces from the front showed German disadvantages. German military experts drew up comparative tables, revealing that by 14 October 1943 Germans had in Ukraine in the sector of Army Group South (excluding Army Group A) 703,600 men at the front and 19,000 men in reserve, while the Russians had 1,694,200 men at the front and 125,000 men in reserve. If these numbers are translated into divisions, the Germans had in this sector fifty-eight divisions, of which fifteen were tank divisions. Facing them were 218 Soviet divisions, of which sixty-three were tank divisions (BA-MA RH 2/v.2543 f. 1). The Soviet army had more than 9,000 tanks (the Soviet industry could produce 1,700 a month); the German army had only some 6,000 tanks (Jiline 234; BA-MA RW 5/v.464 f. 35).

This constantly more marred imbalance of forces made clear that feelings of racial superiority would not determine the decision. Only technical superiority (rockets and the atomic bomb) could have improved the situation for the Germans, but the western Allies were preventing Hitler's technological advances from becoming decisive through steady bombardments of German industrial targets.

Fighting between Soviet Partisans and Ukrainians

The marshy territory, of the south of Belorussia, accessible only with difficulty especially along the Pripet (Prypiat) River, from the Ukrainian side of this river was, for all practical purposes, in the hands of the Soviet partisans. The greater part of their detachments withdrew to this place after their raids in the south, in Ukraine. There were several secret airfields, the most important of which was located in the district of Lelchychi at the northern limit of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (northwest of Ovruch). All supplies for Soviet Russian partisans who were operating in Ukraine (detachments of Saburov, Kovpak, Fedorov, Naumov, Begma, Melnyk, etc.) arrived at this airfield which had been made operational in March 1943. From May 1943 this field was also used by planes of the central intelligence of the Red Army and Moscow's war commissariat.

All planes (Douglas) came from Russia crossing the front. In the summer when nights were short the planes remained on the ground and waited for the following night to take off. They brought weapons, ammunition, military supplies, medicine. Moscow sent by this route also agents, doctors, technicians, and those responsible for the organization of the Soviet partisans movement in Ukraine (V. Begma, D. Korochenko). The head of the high command of Soviet partisans in Ukraine, General T. Strokach, made a short tour of inspection, holding a meeting with commanders and political commissars of the partisan detachments of the Zhytomyr region (Bretchak 125).

From 1 March to 26 June 1943 the airfield received sixty-five planes, not counting those in the intelligence service of the armies and those of the commissariat for military affairs. Moreover, sixty-four

parachute drops of equipment for Soviet partisans were made (121-123). Although destroyed by Germans in July, this field was made operational again in August 1943.

In June 1943, on orders from Soviet general quarters, Kovpak's detachment, came down from the forests in the south of Belorussia to carry out raids across Western Ukraine as far south as the Carpathian Mountains. This detachment, nearly 1,700 men strong, well equipped and with artillery, passed to the north of Rivne and came down between Rivne and Lutsk to the south and southeast, avoiding encounters with the UPA. Skirting UPA territories, it came down as far as Sataniv and, turning west, carried out a raid in Galicia.

But this detachment was defeated by Germans east of Kolomya in the beginning of August 1943. Not finding support from the population, what was left of the detachment divided into seven groups and reached Belorussia again in October (*Radianska Entsyklopedia* 2:314-315).

A raid of this size on that part of Ukrainian territory where Soviet partisans were practically nonexistent was carried out for propaganda purposes to show Soviet Russian presence in Western Ukraine which was traditionally nationalistic.

One of the tasks assigned to Soviet partisans in Volhynia was to fight against Ukrainian nationalists. According to Ukrainian sources, Soviet detachments from the north were conducting punitive operations against Ukrainian villages considered unfriendly. In September and October 1943, they thus burned about sixty houses in a village in the Vysotske district and killed about forty families there. Similar reprisals were carried out in other districts. UPA units had to fight to contain or prevent Soviet partisan penetration which increased in scope in October 1943, especially in the forests of Tsuman. Large-scale confrontations took place in several districts of this region where penetration of Soviet units was sometimes difficult to detect, especially when these units disguised themselves as Ukrainian insurgents, singing nationalist songs (Shankovsky *UPA* 673-674).

Increasing proximity of the front, as stressed in the report of the general commissar for Volhynia and Podolia dated 31 October 1943, had strongly contributed to the increase in activities "of the Soviet bandits as well as the OUN and Polish resistance movement." Deserters from the

Schumas (protection battalions), he wrote, generally joined Ukrainian insurgents. The "Soviet bandits" had several airports where the traffic was rather heavy. Planes were bringing in weapons, explosives, and propaganda materials and were carrying away certain products, mainly meat. Soviet partisans, according to the report, were located north of the Luboml-Kovel-Sarny-Korosten line. The territory south of this line was controlled by "Ukrainian national bandits" (BA R 6/310 f. 59-60).

The high command of the UPA decided to address the Soviet partisans. In a leaflet published in October 1943, the UPA showed approval of their fight against Germans. "To fight actively against Hitler's barbarians is an important and sacred duty of every honest man," stated the leaflet. But in destroying the evil, it was necessary to think of what would follow. Was the "New Europe" to be replaced by the USSR? No! answered the leaflet. "This is not the reason why we are fighting, we don't want this regime either in Ukraine or in the world." The leaflet then explained UPA's objectives, adding that in its ranks, fighting side by side with Ukrainians, were already national units of Georgians, Armenians, Tadzhiks, Azerbaijanis. "They all are fighting to destroy the German and the Bolshevik prison and to build independent national states." The leaflet ended in an appeal to the "red partisans" to join in this common fight of the peoples for freedom (*Liutopys UPA* 1:197-200).

In October and November 1943, the UPA fought the Germans forty-seven times and the Soviet partisans fifty-four times. More than 1,500 Germans were killed or wounded. The UPA lost 414 men (Shankovsky *UPA* 676).

Soviet Russia's Improvement of Military and Diplomatic Position

Germans began evacuation of the population from Kiev in section by section early October. All inhabitants had to leave, but some managed to take refuge in sectors not yet evacuated. Some evacuations involved clashes because of passive resistance on the part of the population. Evacuated sectors, left without protection, were thoroughly looted, according to a German report, by "non-German soldiers of the Wehrmacht."

Germans evacuated all museums and research institutes. Evacuation of cultural artifacts was carried out by Rosenberg's high command (charged especially with this task) and Koch. By the end of September nothing of importance was left in Kiev; in October Germans evacuated to Germany forty railroad cars filled with property belonging to research institutes. The Kommandatur of the city proceeded then to evacuate equipment from enterprises (BA R 6/170 f. 83).

Attempting to turn the Ukrainian masses from the independist movement, Moscow decided to play in the Soviet Republic of Ukraine the card of "sovereignty."

Having fled to Russia, the government of this republic (Council of the People's Commissars) was transferred to Kharkiv a short time after the capture of this city by the Red Army. On 10 October 1943, Moscow made the decision to create the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Order as Khmelnytsky was considered a national hero of independence of Ukraine by all Ukrainians, but for Russians he was the Ukrainian leader who in 1654 had signed a treaty of "union" with the czar of Moscovy-Russia. Moreover, because the Red Army was on the Dnipro River, Moscow decided to name the three sectors of the front on Ukrainian territory the First, Second, and Third Front of Ukraine. With these two decisions Russia tried to flatter Ukrainian national self-esteem.

The Soviet army continued to advance. On 14 October it took Zaporizhia, on 25 October Dnipropetrovsk, and on 6 November the capital of Ukraine, Kiev. On 7 November it took Fastiv and on 17 November Ovruch. Thus, it was at the gates of territories controlled by the UPA.

The day Kiev was captured, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of the People's Commissars, and the Central Committee of the Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine published a common declaration comparing the Battle of Kiev with the Battle of Poltava of 1709, asserting that this victory bore witness to the indissolubility of the "fraternal alliance" between the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples sealed in 1654 by the Hetman of Ukraine, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The declaration mentioned Kiev as the "cradle of the political life of the three sister nations: Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian (*Podvyh na Berehakh* 8-9).

On 27 November a large meeting of the inhabitants of the capital of Ukraine took place. A declaration, adopted at the end of the meeting, was drafted according to policies of the Soviet power in Ukraine.

Ukraine, stated the declaration, had reached the high stage of development of its industry, agriculture, science, and art only because it had been part of the Soviet Union, because it was led by Lenin's party and was living in friendship with the Russian people. Only due to the Soviet Union had "the age-old aspirations of the Ukrainian people to see its entire territory united into a single Ukrainian state" been realized. The declaration continued:

The Ukrainian people knew that without the aid of the great Russian people they cannot drive the German oppressors from their territory, that they will perish in German prisons, lose their freedom, lose their state, their language and their culture, that they will become cattle of the German brigands, their slaves...[But] thanks to the aid and friendship of the great Russian people, the territories of the left bank [of the Dnipro]...and the glorious capital Kiev, are free and Soviet, and soon all of Ukraine will be cleared of Hitler's filth...The Russian and Ukrainian people...will march side by side in history...We have united our paths for all eternity...This is the only just way. Those who want to push Ukraine onto a different path are enemies of Ukraine. The Ukraino-German nationalists who babble about the separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union and the Russian people are enemies of the freedom and honor of Ukraine. They care little for Ukraine's future! They wish to gain a cosy place among the oppressors of our people. The Ukrainian people know about the contemptible role of the nationalists and know how many Judas silver pieces they have received as price for their treason. Never will the Ukrainian people follow these mercenary traitors! (15-16)

The Polish government in exile continued its diplomatic efforts to have the Allies recognize as Poland's eastern frontiers those before the German aggression of 1939, i.e., including besides a part of Lithuania and Belorussia, the western territories of Ukraine, with Volhynia and Galicia. Hoping in November 1943 that American and British governments would succeed in convincing Moscow to reestablish diplomatic relations with it, this government warned western Allies against allowing Soviet troops onto "Polish territory," considering the crossing of the 17 September 1939 frontier violation of Poland's sovereignty. In that eventuality the Polish government in exile would adopt measures of self-defense and its army of the interior (AK), fighting against Germans, would continue its underground activities.

Polish pressure aimed to influence the Allies before the Teheran Conference of the three great powers of anti-Hitler coalition to take place from 28 November to 1 December 1943. Besides Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, Hopkins, Eden, and Molotov were to participate. According to Churchill, this was "the greatest concentration of power" the world had ever seen. "The personalities present hold in their hands the future welfare of humanity" (Duroselle *Histoire* 371-372).

In Teheran much discussion centered around the landing in Normandy of more than 1,000,000 men (planned for May 1944). A simultaneous landing in the Balkans, proposed by Churchill (with Turkey's participation) was abandoned because of Stalin's opposition, which meant elimination of any Anglo-American presence in the Balkans. Russia, thus, had the possibility of exerting all its weight in the settling of Balkan questions. In Teheran, regarding creation of an international organization after the war, Roosevelt proposed a United Nations Organization composed of three bodies: an assembly, an executive committee, and a policing committee (the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China).

The three heads of government spoke also about Germany's and Poland's frontiers. Their plans included the division of Germany. Roosevelt proposed creation of five autonomous states; Churchill envisioned the creation of three German states. Because of Stalin's skepticism, however, this question would be entrusted to a European advisory commission.

Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin discussed from 28 November of the frontiers of Poland. Stalin declared that Poland's frontiers could extend west as far as the Oder River; Roosevelt and Churchill agreed. As to the eastern frontiers, Roosevelt declared to Stalin, he favored the Curzon line but had to abstain from taking a position publicly, so as not to lose Polish votes in the United States during the coming elections. The Soviet delegation demanded recognition of frontier following the Curzon line, arguing that Ukrainian territories had to become part of Ukraine and Belorussian territories part of Belorussia. The ethnographic argument seems to have convinced the Anglo-Americans. Thus, the bases of future settling of Poland's frontiers would be the Curzon and the Oder lines. On 1 December Churchill promised to do everything necessary to convince the Polish government in exile to accept these new frontiers (Duroselle *Histoire* 372-373; Déborine 326-327).

Never was there a question in Teheran that the Soviet army had to stop at the 1939 frontiers or at the Curzon line, the new Soviet frontier. Soviet Russia had decided to continue its advances, to penetrate territories of countries of Eastern and Central Europe and advance as far as Berlin. The Anglo-Americans had no intentions of opposing this determination, considering the Russo-Soviet participation necessary for the defeat of National Socialism.

The Polish government in exile continued to hope without having many illusions. It knew that the British had recognized the partisans of Tito in May 1943 and suspended their support to the non-communist partisans of Michajlovic. A short time later, head of the Polish forces, General Sosnkowski, expressed his skepticism. He knew that the Anglo-Americans had rejected Hungary's and Romania's secret propositions of capitulation. They gave in to Stalin's demands because they were afraid Stalin might sign a separate peace treaty with Hitler. Sosnkowski did not even exclude the possibility that the Soviet army would stop on the Curzon line to permit Hitler to turn his forces against the Anglo-Americans. He added: "In any case, the configuration of the forces could change. The war is about to exhaust Russia and Germany, while the Anglo-American military potential is growing rapidly. Alliance with the Soviets will not last long. At the end of the war they [the British and the Americans] will no longer fear a separate treaty [between Stalin and

Hitler]; disputes could break out about the division of the spoils of war, even a conflict erupt, if Russia decides to annex all of Germany" (Nowak 200-202).

General Sosnkowski had in London ample information of the Anglo-American relations; he believed in the possibility of an armed conflict between the democratic countries and the Russo-Soviet dictatorship. It is, therefore, not surprising that Ukrainian resistance strongly nourished this same hope.

Conference of Oppressed and Diplomatic Negotiations

Germans began to devote more attention to the Ukrainian liberation movement and received more precise information concerning the UPA.² Their reports on the "situation of the bandits" indicated that the "movement of the Ukrainian national bandits" which consisted of "Taras Bulba's" and "Bandera's" groups, numbered approximately 40,000 men (BA-MA RH 2/v.2136 Vermutliche Bandengliederung zur Bandenlage Ost, Stand: 1 October 1943; *Liutopys UPA* 6:Doc.#26).

On 21 October 1943, in a memorandum to SS-Gruppenführer Berger, head of the main bureau of the SS and liaison officer between Himmler and Rosenberg's ministry for occupied eastern territories, made clear that "all of Volhynia is in the hands of partisans," (Ukrainian, not Soviet). The memorandum suggested that a *modus vivendi* with Ukrainian nationalists be investigated. Because Germans did not have sufficient police force, it would be necessary to enter into talks with different factions of Ukrainian partisans to play them one against the other and to make truce with one of the groups to know and then destroy them (BA R 55/1483 f. 22-23).

Taras Bulba, who had begun to reform his partisans under the name "Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army," had in the meantime made contact with Abwehr services to win support of the Wehrmacht against Soviet partisans. Bulba was invited to come to Rivne to negotiate and arrived on 11 November 1943. Under a pretext of inability to help him, Abwehr services suggested he go to Warsaw. After several day of talks in Warsaw, Bulba agreed to go to Berlin with an SD officer to

"continue the talks," but upon arrival in Berlin he was sent to the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen.

The few partisans of Taras Bulba who were operating independently of the UPA ceased to exist shortly after the Soviet army occupied the area in which they functioned.

On 15 November 1943, Russian agent Kuznetsov kidnapped General Ilgen. The following day, SS-Obergruppenführer Funk, responsible for execution of Ukrainian patriots in October 1943, was shot down in the middle of the street of Rivne. This last assassination attempt was probably the work of an OUN or UPA militant.

In Galicia which was part of the General Government, Ukrainian resistance developed as self-defense groups (UNS) from spring 1943 on. During the summer these armed groups, which would constitute the UPA-West increased considerably in strength. Toward the end of 1943 they had nine training camps, for the most part in the Carpathian Mountains. From spring 1943 the national partisans from Galicia fought the Germans several times.

Germans tried to liquidate the UPA-West camps located in the mountains (between Sukhodil and Lypovytzia). Fighting lasted for several days and ended on 30 September 1943 with a defeat of the Germans who, on that day alone, lost 200 men. The Germans left the mountains immediately. In mid-October they attacked a different UPA camp located in the mountains near Kosmach (Kolomya region), inflicting heavy losses on the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, they had to leave the sector after losing many men without being able to seize the camp. They returned in the beginning of November, however, and this time forced the Ukrainians to evacuate the camp.

Security of troops and members of the occupation administration had deteriorated or was at a point of doing so; on 10 October 1943 Germans decided to declare a state of siege in the entire territory of Galicia. Special courts were set up; public executions by shooting or hanging, less frequent before the state of siege, became very frequent. Germans continued forced recruitment of workers for Germany, vast roundups took place in Stanyslaviv (on 14 November) and in the regions of Kolomya and Nadvirna. Thousands of Ukrainians were deported to work camps or concentration camps.

Germans undertook then the cleansing of the region of Stanyslaviv ("Chorny Lis") and Sambir. During this operation Germans lost sixty men, one transmitter, military supplies, and a large quantity of ammunition. UPA units extricated themselves and left the encirclement only by hand-to-hand combat. In Nedilna, close to Sambir, Germans had to withdraw after losing 160 men. The UPA lost 34 men.

A third offensive against the UPA in Galicia occurred in December 1943 in the districts of Dolyna and Stanyslaviv. Germans took by storm and destroyed one of the Ukrainian camps, but learning that the Ukrainians had reinforced their positions around other camps, the Germans withdrew from the operation (Shankovsky *UPA* 688-690; *UPA v svitli* 2:29-30).

Among foreign units participating in operations against the UPA were Hungarian troops. During one operation in Volhynia, the high command of the Hungarian division, hard pressed and forced to take sides, contacted the UPA for a truce. Ukrainians profited from this and presented their conditions: Hungarians were to stop requisitions and pillaging, abstain from participating in punitive actions against the Ukrainian population by refusing to fight against the UPA or simulating combat by shooting into the air. In return, Ukrainians promised not to fight Hungarian troops but supply them with necessary food. Hungarians accepted these proposals. A similar contact between Hungarians and Ukrainian resistance took place in the General Government in Galicia where the high command of the Sixth Hungarian Army Corps also had to enter into negotiations with the UPA (Shankovsky *UPA* 692; Hryniokh 97-98; *Litopys UPA* 5:35-55, 63-65).

Because these local arrangements, beneficial for the population, were more or less respected and created possibility for an entente with troops on Ukrainian territory, the commander of the UPA-North, Klym Savur, asked the fighting units to stop all operations against Hungarian, Romanian, Slovak, Latvian, and other non-German troops. His order of 28 October 1943 specified: "We are fighting on our soil against imperialist Russia and Germany and against their agents, the Polish imperialists." This fighting was not directed against oppressed peoples. Because most of the members of non-German units were in Ukraine against their

wishes, fighting between these units and the UPA did not make any sense.

Therefore, difficulties and misunderstandings must be eliminated, continued the order of the day, and creation of a common front of the oppressed and exploited peoples for national liberation be attempted. The commander of the UPA-North ordered that contact be made with these units to negotiate their neutrality. If they accepted neutrality they could count on help from the Ukrainian population. Superiors were to be informed of all misunderstandings, conflicts, and pillages immediately. The main objective was the common fighting for independence of each people, for national states within the ethnographical limits of each of them (*Litopys UPA* 1:153-154).

OUN and UPA publications constantly insisted on cooperation among the oppressed peoples (1:46-47, 88-89, 99-102, 121-126, 153-145; 2:30, 201-202, etc.). To concretize this idea, to give a new dimension to cooperation, OUN-B leadership and the high command of the UPA convened a conference of the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia.

This conference was held on 21 and 23 November 1943 in the forest of the Zhytomyr region, in central Ukraine. Among the thirty-nine delegates who came to participate in the deliberations were five Ukrainians, six Georgians, four Armenians, six Azerbaijanis, two Belorussian, and five Uzbeks (2:295). The conference adopted a number of resolutions designed to serve as the political platform for each nation and as a manifesto for the oppressed peoples. The resolution stated: "The present war between National Socialist Germany and Russian bolshevism is a typical imperialistic war, a war of conquests for the domination of the world, for a new distribution of material wealth, for the conquest of a new basis of raw materials and markets, for the enslavement of peoples and exploitation of their manpower."

Then the resolutions explained that the two imperialisms were denying peoples the right to independence and were bringing them "political, social, and cultural enslavement." The conference considered that only "national revolutions of oppressed peoples would be able to stop the absurd slaughter" of war and "bring lasting peace to the world." For this, "the conference found it necessary to form a common front of

all oppressed peoples," and consequently, to create "a common committee of the peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia." Moreover, the conference saluted "the heroic struggle of the peoples of Western and Central Europe against German imperialism" and made "a declaration of solidarity in this struggle."

Addressing themselves to the oppressed peoples, soldiers of the Red Army, workers, soldiers of foreign battalions of the German army, and the intelligentsia, the manifesto of the conference presented in broad outline form politics to be followed and action to be taken against German imperialism, national socialism and "Hitler's riff-raff," and against "Stalin's imperialism" and Russian Bolsheviks. The only solution that could guarantee peace, according to the manifesto, was a common struggle for a new international order based on justice, liberty, and independence of each nation on its ethnographical territory (2:206-208, 226-229).

After Hungarian military authorities in Ukraine had informed Budapest of their contacts with the Ukrainian resistance, head of the high command of the Hungarian army, General Szombathely, proposed top level talks. After the central leadership of the OUN-B accepted his proposal, Mykola Lebed of the department of the external relations was charged with sending a Ukrainian delegation to the Hungarians.

The trip took place in great secrecy for the Hungarians did not want their German allies to know of talks that were contrary to the spirit of the German-Hungarian alliance. The Ukrainian delegation, under the leadership of Myron Lutsky, disguised as simple Hungarian soldiers, boarded a Hungarian military plane near Lviv early in December 1943, but arriving in Budapest without incident, the delegation had to wait for more than a week for the return of the head of the high command to the capital. The talks thus took place mid-December.

The Ukrainians began the task of explaining to the Hungarian representatives the goal of their fighting and Germany's disastrous political situation. Because the war could last still a long time, means to spare human lives and alleviate the suffering of the population had to be sought.

The two delegations easily agreed on ceasing hostilities between the Hungarian army and the UPA on Ukrainian territories, but the Ukrainians also asked the Hungarians to help them take possession of arms and ammunition stocks on Ukrainian territory under guard of Hungarian units and to supply transmission materials and other military equipment. The Hungarian delegation reached agreement on those demands only after long discussions. All of this was to take place without arousing suspicion of the Germans. Hungarian instructors assigned to teach the Ukrainians use of the technical equipment could fulfill their mission only as "deserters" or "prisoners of war" (Hryniokh 102-104, 7:188-192).

Soviet Authorities Address the Ukrainians

Germans still found it difficult to understand the situation Ukraine because it did not conform to their objectives, and information they received about it was sometimes inexact or poorly interpreted.

Not until September 1943 did German services seem to realize a change had occurred in the structure of the Ukrainian resistance with resistance centered around the UPA, described in reports as a popular movement. Reports began to establish that the UPA in reality was a "military instrument" of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists of Bandera.

Germans had just learned that the commander-in-chief of the UPA was Klym Savur and that head of the staff was Honcharenko. In reality, Klym Savur was the commander of UPA-North.

Germans also learned that the UPA Army Group, under Savur's command had 35,000 to 40,000 men. The report stated that Taras Bulba, considered by Germans as having moderate tendencies, had lost his influence and had only some 5,000 to 6,000 men (BA-MA RH 2/v.2339 f. 42; *Liutopys UPA* 6:Doc.#27).

A different German report stated that the structure of the UPA, more precisely of UPA-North, had three divisions: Division "Zahrava" with approximately 10,000 men, commanded by Eney; Division "Kovel-ska" with approximately 10,000 to 12,000 men, commanded by Zako-shtuy; and Division "Severnaya" with approximately 10,000 men,

commanded by Lytvynenko-Dubovy (BA-MA RH 2/v.2339 f. 45-46; *Liutopys* 6:Doc.#29).

In reality, UPA-North was divided into three military districts: North, North-West, and South. The commander of District North (code name *Zahrava*) was Ivan Lytvynchuk-Dubovy; the commander of District South was Petro Olinyk-Eney; the commander of District North-West was Yuri Stelmashchuk-Rudy.

German reports still designated Mykola Lebed as the chief leader of the UPA and Roman Shukhevych as his representative for Volhynia (BA-MA RH 2/v.2339 f. 33). In reality, Mykola Lebed (who was being sought by the German police since October 1941 and who had filled the function of head of the OUN-B central leadership after the arrest of Bandera early July 1941), was dismissed from this post in May 1943. At the time when the above mentioned reports were written (November-December 1943), leadership of the OUN-B and the UPA was in the hands of Roman Shukhevych whose code name was Taras Chuprynka. His direct collaborators were Rostyslav Voloshyn-Pavlenko, head of the rear, and Yosyp Pozychaniuk, head of the political department.

The struggle against the Germans cost the UPA much. The head of staff of UPA-South, Commander Anton, was killed on 24 December 1943 in Central Ukraine. One UPA battalion, commanded by Kruk, incurred heavy losses in the Borshchiv region in Galicia. But then, on 9 January 1944 the UPA units, under Bystry command, defeated a German column in Lysohirka in the Kamianets-Podilsky region. The seizure was large: seven machine guns; two trench mortar; ten guns; 30,000 cartridges; 500 grenades, three radios, etc. (Shankovsky *UPA* 682; *UPA v svitli* 2:31).

One of the leaders of Soviet partisans, Commander I. Kirpa, leading a detachment in the Nykopol (Nikopol) district east of Kryvyi Rih and taken prisoner by Germans in early November 1943, told them that "Ukrainian nationalists base their propaganda on the explanation that German socialism and Soviet socialism are the same" and that this was why Ukrainians had to fight for an independent Ukraine. Kirpa added that the Ukrainian nationalists were training guerilla regiments in the Chorny Lis, seventy-five kilometers northwest of Kryvyi Rih, and in the Kiev region. They were also hoping for foreign support. A segment of

the Ukrainian intellectuals and peasants were responding to the appeal of the nationalists, but, according to Kirpa, others were joining Soviet partisans because of the nearing of the front (BA R 6/77 f. 16).

The first combat between the Red Army and UPA units, according to Russian prisoners of war, probably took place in the Kiev region. The city of Kiev was deluged with UPA leaflets after the arrival of the Red Army, strongly impressing the Soviet soldiers (BA-MA RH 2/v.2545 f.109).

The Soviet army continued to advance, taking Korosten (28 December 1943); Zhytomyr (31 December); Novhorod-Volynsky (1 January 1944); Berdychiv (5 January); Kirovohrad (8 January); and Sarny (22 January). By mid-January 1944 it occupied almost half of Volhynia as far as the river Horyn. Thus UPA territory was cut in half by the front.

Germans moved the offices of Koch and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine from Rivne to Lutsk on 10 and 11 January. Economic inspection of the Wehrmacht was moved to Lviv (BA R 30/148 Kriegstagebuch, Monat Januar 1944:1).

With the approach of the front, the number of Soviet partisans increased appreciably, particularly because of parachute drops of entire groups. Likewise, combat between them and the UPA became more frequent, especially in the regions of Sarny, Kovel, and Rivne. According to a Wehrmacht report, UPA units, insufficiently armed and short of ammunition, had incurred heavy losses in the Sarny region (BA-MA RH 2/v.1939 f. 66RD, 125, 182; RH 2/v.65 Banden Ost).

In territories occupied by the Soviet army, fierce confrontations between the Red Army and UPA detachments, 3,000 men strong and with artillery, occurred at this time along the Korosten-Zhytomyr route (BA-MA RH 2/v.2545 f. 109). Large forces of the UPA were sighted also west of Kiev in the sector between Berdychiv and Korosten (BA-MA RH 24-13/172 Ic K. Gef. Stand, den 24 Januar 1944).

On the German side of the front, the bulk of the UPA forces was dispersed into Volhynia, Galicia, the Carpathian—in all numbering 40,000 men. Other German sources estimate that the UPA had 80,000 men under arms (BA-MA RH 2/v.65 Banden Ost; Appendix Doc.#188; RH 2/v. 2048). Hundreds of German soldiers and police were killed at

this time in encounters or during combat with the UPA (*UPA v svili* 2:28-31).

Soviet authorities realized what danger the Ukrainian insurgents and the independent movement in general represented. They knew that the Ukrainian resistance, fighting for independence, would never accept compromise. They also knew that the nationalist movement was enjoying an almost general support of the population. Bearing in mind that the bulk of UPA forces were in regions occupied by Germans, Soviet authorities decided to address the population of those regions. Their appeal, published on 12 January 1944, was signed by the president of the Supreme Soviet of the RSS of Ukraine, M. Hrechukha; the president of the Council of People's Commissars, L. Korniets; and the secretary of the Communist party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev.

Soviet authorities promised the Ukrainians immediate liberation and invited the population to intensify their struggle against "German fascism," join the Soviet partisans, and destroy communication lines and depots of the enemy.

But the major part of the appeal was devoted to Ukrainian nationalism. Soviet authorities tried to convince Ukrainians and the world (the appeal was published in the official press and broad outlines were repeatedly given to foreign representatives) that the enemy of the Ukrainian people was "not only the German bandits," but also "the gangs of Ukraino-German nationalists," "all these Bandera, Melnyk, Bulbists who have sold out to Hitler and who are helping him subjugate our people, our Ukraine" (*Sovietskaya Uk.* 174).

Thus, to distinguish Ukrainian nationalists from Ukrainians, Soviet authorities invented the term "Ukraino-German" for them. The "Ukraino-German nationalists," according to the appeal, were "traitors" whose hands were stained with the blood of Ukrainian "children, mothers, and sisters." They were "helping Germans steal from the Ukrainian people." And above all, these mercenaries pretended to fight against the Germans, training partisan detachments to fight against them, they say, but in reality, they were "in agreement with Hitler" (174).

The Soviet appeal, following the same tone, strongly maintained that Ukrainian nationalists had done nothing to free the Ukrainian people from Hitler's yoke, that they had not killed a single German, nor

destroyed a single German train. By influencing honest people in their detachments, the "Ukraino-German nationalists" wanted to weaken the people of Ukraine. These "accomplices of Hitler" wanted to "break the fraternal ties which link the Ukrainian people to the Russian people, detach Soviet Ukraine from the family of the Soviet peoples and put them into Hitler's power. They call this 'independence' for Ukraine." The Soviet appeal concluded that the Ukrainian nationalists wanted to transform Ukraine into a German colony (Appendix, Doc.#187).

Why such assertions not corresponding to reality? The reasons are manifold. This disinformation was dictated by the implacable hate of Russia for Ukrainian "separatism." Further, Soviet authorities wanted to determine the convictions of the Ukrainian people; they saw Ukrainian nationalism as their most dangerous enemy of the future. They also tried to sow doubt, undermine and break the power of the Ukrainian independist movement by separating it from the people. Finally, Soviet authorities considered it dangerous (and also offensive) to share, even in the slightest, the victory over the German invader with their worst enemy, Ukrainian nationalism.

Constantly repeated during the months and years, during meetings, in press and propaganda publications, the assertions formulated in the Soviet appeal of 12 January 1944 and in subsequent appeals were going to have some success, very little or none with the Ukrainian population; only the Russians and all pro-Soviet and pro-Russian circles, especially abroad, really believed this propaganda.

In 1944, the Ukrainian factor was still operative. Abroad there was always the problem of Poland's eastern frontier. On 5 January 1944, immediately after the crossing of the former Polish-Soviet frontier by Soviet troops, the Polish government in exile declared that Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia were part of Poland and that Soviet command had to turn over the power in these territories to the Poles in proportion to the advance made by Soviet troops.

The Russian government responded, however, that in conformity with the results of the "plebiscite" of 1939, these territories were part of the Soviet Union. The Polish-Soviet frontier thus roughly corresponded to the Curzon line. Moscow received support from the Polish Progressive Club of London in a declaration that the Polish people would

"continue the implacable and unconditional fight against Nazism," saluting the Red Army "as the liberation army" (*Ukraina i zarub. svit* 328-330).

The Russo-Soviet government progressively set up devices to eliminate the Polish government in London.

On the initiative of the Polish Communist party, a Polish national council was created secretly in Warsaw on 1 January 1944, foreseeing a struggle for an "independent and democratic Poland." The council worked to develop a policy aiming at reestablishing friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and on an equitable solution to the question of the Polish-Soviet frontiers in conformity with the people's right to self-determination. The Polish National Council announced that at a given moment a Polish provisional government would be created (330-331).

Within the Soviet Union, Moscow made arrangements that would benefit her both in the rights of the peoples and in international relations. On 1 February 1944 the Russo-Soviet government adopted a law confirming the right of the Soviet national republics to have diplomatic relations with foreign countries. The Soviet constitution was modified to include a new article (Article 18-a.) stipulating that from now on "Each republic of the Union has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, make agreements with them, and exchange diplomatic representatives and consuls" (*Sbornik zakonov* 1:138).

At the same time the Supreme Soviet adopted a law allowing the Soviet national republics to have their own military training. The new article (Article 18-b.) of the constitution stipulated: "Each republic of the Union has its military units" *Sbornik zakonov* 1:139).

The new arrangements would allow Russia to heighten its propaganda on the "independence" and "sovereignty" of the Soviet national republics, more precisely, of Ukraine. With these they hoped to remove from the Ukrainian nationalists their reason for existence. A book on Soviet rights about these arrangements states:

The restitution of the right to Ukraine to enter into direct relations with foreign states, make agreements with them, be represented at international conferences and in the bodies of

these conferences, i.e., carry out functions that it had voluntarily ceded to the Soviet Union in 1922 [during the creation of the USSR], is of great importance not only during war time but also in time of peace. During the patriotic war, Ukraine made an important contribution to the defeat of German fascism and has incurred enormous losses when compared to other countries. It is, therefore, natural that of all nations it is most interested in the guarantee of its security from aggressors (*Istoria derzhavy* 2:109-110).

Rapid Advance of Soviet Army

Concentration of Germans troops had increased in Volhynia, now a combat zone. Attacked constantly by large Soviet forces (partisans and elements of the Red Army), some UPA units found it impossible to attack German troops at the same time, especially because of shortage of arms and ammunition. These Ukrainian insurgent units were thus reduced to defensive actions against Soviet units superior in numbers, and they avoided combat with the Wehrmacht.

The Germans realized what the situation was, but they also knew, as noted in a 15 January report signed by Gehlen, head of *Fremde Heere Ost* that these "Ukrainian national bandits" had no "inclination to collaborate with the Germans." The report added that, consequently, "as long as no change in the attitude of Bandera's bandits could be observed," there was no possibility of an entente with them, "contrary to what had been achieved in some places with separate Polish bandits" (BA-MA RH 2/v.2115 f. 79-80).

Nevertheless, on 20 and 21 January talks took place north of Rivne between an officer of a combat group, Prützmann, and representatives of one UPA unit. The result, recorded in a German report, was as follows: "The detachment of the bandits continues to fight against Soviet bandits and regular Red troops, but it refuses to fight on the side of the German Wehrmacht or lay down its weapons." The Ukrainian unit agreed only to give the Wehrmacht information about Soviet troops.

The commander of the Thirteenth Corps of the German army concluded from this that, in no way, could Ukrainians be trusted; there could be no question of a common cause with the "Ukrainian national bandits." It was neither possible nor useful to disarm them nor push them to the rear. There remained only the opportunity to profit from the information procured from this UPA unit (BA-MA RH 24-13/172 Ic K. Gef. Std., den 21-1-1944; RH 24-13/171 Fernschreiben an PZ A.O.). The commander wrote the following memorandum:

The UPA forces are fighting for a free and independent Ukraine and unrealistically believe themselves able to attain this goal. Their enemies are the Germans and the Russians. If they now accept negotiations with us, it is because momentarily they consider the Russians more dangerous. Because of their disloyalty, there can be no question of making common cause with the UPA in the long run. They refuse to fight on the side of the Wehrmacht, but are not opposed to making local arrangements (BA-MARH 24-13/171 Generalkommando XIII A.K. Ia/Ic Nr.299/44 geh.).

The commander thought that in some cases delivery of "limited amount" of ammunition to the UPA units was possible, but otherwise, supplying the UPA with ammunition should "be ruled out." Where local arrangements were impossible, the UPA should be "fought and destroyed like all other bandits."

Upon learning that the Germans were proposing local arrangements and that the commander of one of the UPA-North units had held talks with the Germans, the high command of the UPA forbade all his units to negotiate with the enemy. On 7 February 1944 the commander of one UPA-North unit, P. Antoniuk-Sosenko, who had negotiated with the enemy, was condemned by the UPA military tribunal and executed twenty-four hours later (*Lebed UPA* 73; *Liutovs UPA* 5:192).

A report of the high command of the German army described well the situation in the Ukrainian territories remaining under German occupation: in addition to Soviet and Ukrainian "bandits," Polish "bandits" appeared in these regions. The three resistance movements fought

simultaneously against Germany and against each other. The report specified: "The Soviet bandits are fighting against the Germans, following orders from Moscow. They do not tolerate either the movement for an independent Ukraine or for an independent Poland." These partisans were concentrated between the Horyn and Styr rivers, and from there they infiltrated other regions. They often increased their size with regular Soviet units of the Red Army.

The "Ukrainian national bandits" fighting "for Ukraine's independence," constituted the second group. The report added: "Their fight is directed against Germany as well as Soviet Russia." Although there is fighting between Ukrainian insurgents and Soviet partisans, most of these "Ukrainian national bandits" vowed "a fantastic hate" to the Wehrmacht.

Polish partisans, continued the report, were fighting for an independent Poland. The Poles knew that they could not count on Germany's help to attain independence and were looking toward England and the United States. But Polish resistance was divided in its attitude toward Soviet Russia, one part fighting the Soviet partisans, the other friendly with the Soviets (BA R 6/52 f. 151-152).

On 5 February 1944, the capital of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (Rivne) and Lutsk fell into the hands of the Red Army. From 1 September 1943 Germans had lost almost half of Ukraine (east and north) and more than 13,000,000 inhabitants, including 1,500,000 men capable of serving in the army. Approximately 700,000 people had been evacuated by force, including 100,000 transported to Germany, or fleeing the combat zone (f. 148).

Although Germany was about to lose Ukraine, the National Socialist leaders continued to fear the Ukrainian question. They did not accept or tolerate any political activities, repressing underground activities of some OUN-M members. On 28 February, upon discovering anti-German writing published by that organization, the security services arrested Colonel Andriy Melnyk in Berlin where he was living lawfully, as well as most of the members of the managing office of his organization who, like him, resided in Germany, and some of his followers in Galicia and in emigration as well. Melnyk was interned in the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen.

In that camp Ye. Onatsky, an eminent member of the OUN-M who had resided in Rome was also interned. When an article of his appeared in the newspaper *Ukrainsky Visnyk*, published by the OUN-M in Berlin, criticized Italian fascism, Berlin had him arrested in Rome in September 1943 and he was deported to Sachsenhausen.

In Ukraine (more precisely in territories controlled by the UPA) Soviet power was met by the population with distrust and fear. People who in any way had collaborated with the Germans or held German citizenship (*Volksdeutsche*) were ordinarily shot. Able-bodied men under the age of sixty had to volunteer for the Red Army to "wash away the dishonor for having remained under fascist occupation." They were sent to the front, usually without military training or weapons, being told they would take weapons at the front from the enemy.

A certain number of Ukrainians, in the hope of saving their lives, tried to join the UPA units.

At first the UPA avoided all fighting with the regular troops of the Red Army, but behind the army came NKVD troops. In Volhynia, the first large encounter between a UPA unit and an NKVD battalion took place on 18 January 1944. From then on, confrontations and fighting became frequent. On 6 February, NKVD troops lost fifty men near Volodymyrets. On 10 February a Soviet general whose name was unmentioned in UPA reports, was ambushed and taken prisoner with his escort. Upon learning during the interrogation that the officer was beyond reproach and not a member of the party, the commander of the UPA detachment set him free (Shanvovsky *UPA* 714-717; *UPA v svitli* 2:32-34).

The UPA developed information and propaganda pieces for the soldiers of the Red Army. The first leaflets, intended for the Soviet soldiers, were published in October and November 1943. They informed them about the goals of UPA's fighting and asked them, especially the Russians, to refuse to fight against Ukrainian insurgents, instead supporting them in their fight for an independent Ukraine. In January 1944 a new UPA leaflet informed the soldiers of the Red Army that the Ukrainian insurgents were continuing their fight against the two imperialistic regimes, Hitler's and Stalin's (*Liutopys UPA* 1:113-116, 120-121).

On 12 February 1944 Soviet authorities launched a second appeal, this time directed to members of the UPA and signed by Nikita Khrushchev, president of the Council of People's Commissars and M. Hrechukha, president of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. The appeal announced the impending defeat of Hitler's Germany by the Red Army and armies of the Allies. In the war against Hitlerism the peoples of the USSR, especially the Russians and Ukrainians, were united. To dissolve this unity and set one people against another, Germans had resorted to deception and provocation in Western Ukraine. Their servants, the "Ukraino-German nationalists," "mercenaries" coming from Berlin helped Germans oppress the Ukrainian people, torture them, and burn their villages. Germans had created the UPA, maintained Khrushchev's appeal; Soviet authorities were calling on members of the UPA to surrender, to avoid the "terrible justice of the people." And then, the appeal explained, "The Red Army that has wiped out the enormous well-equipped German army can easily come to terms with small scattered and poorly equipped gangs of the Ukraino-German nationalists." "In the name of the government of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine," Khrushchev and Hrechukha promised pardon. The appeal concluded with these words:

The Ukrainian people have received their state, its freedom, and its independence within the great Soviet Union. Soviet authorities and the Bolshevik party have allowed the Ukrainian people to reunite all its territories into a Ukrainian Soviet state. For this reason each Ukrainian who is fighting for the great Soviet Union, is, at the same time, fighting for Soviet Ukraine, for the Ukrainian people (*Sovietskaya Ukraina v gody* 179-182).

On 20 February 1944 Soviets appealed anew to the Ukrainians of the occupied regions (regions of Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Chernivtsi, and Odessa) warning Ukrainians against the "nationalist valets who have sold their souls and their bodies to the German occupant and who are brainwashing you." The appeal once more invited Ukrainians to leave the "nationalist bandits" and cross over to the Soviet partisans or the Red Army. The appeal maintained that "the government of Ukraine

guarantees to all those who come over to our side a full pardon for all their offences" (119-120).

A few days later on 29 February 1944, some fifty kilometers from the front on the Soviet side close to Mylatyn (between Rivne and Slavuta), the column of the commander-in-chief of the First Front of Ukraine, General Nikolai Vatutin, fell into an ambush of a UPA unit. Severely wounded, Vatutin died on 15 April in a hospital in Kiev. In the column which had accompanied General Vatutin were Nikita Khrushchev, General Krainiukov and many officers. A part of the column was able to escape and reach Rivne, but to avoid informing to the Soviet regime the size of Ukrainian resistance, Soviet authorities concealed the real reason for Vatutin's death, pretending that he had been wounded during an inspection tour of the front. Only twenty years later did admission come that he had been wounded in an ambush of "Bandera's partisans" (Martchenko *La vérité* 10-18).

From 5 January to 5 April 1944 the UPA fought against NKVD units in the districts of Kostopil, Dubno, Kremianets, Berdychiv, and in the forests of Zhytomyr, killing 850 members of these police troops (*Liupys UPA* 8:170).

Germans' Loss of Major Part of Ukraine

The greatest battle between UPA detachments (approximately 5,000 men from Group South and Group North) and NKVD police troops (approximately 30,000 men with tanks and air force) was waged in Hurby, the Kremianets region. Attacked from several direction simultaneously, UPA detachments managed to escape the encirclement and dispersed after fierce combat which lasted for three days from 23 to 25 April 1944. In this sector alone Soviet troops lost 120 men; the losses of the UPA were also heavy (*Liupys UPA* 70-71).

The Russo-Soviet troops continued their advance in Central Ukraine. On 8 February 1944 Germans lost Nikopol and its mining region, rich in manganese. On 14 February the Red Army took Korsun'. On 24 February Germans had to abandon Kryvyi Rih and its industrial region.

In Galicia three Russian spies fell into the hands of the UPA on 2 March near the village of Verba located between Brody and Dubno. Among them was the famous secret agent, N. I. Kuznetsov, disguised as a German officer, Paul Siebert; he also had false Ukrainian papers in the name of Pukh. UPA counter-intelligence services found on him a report intended for his superior, a General "F" of the NKVD special services. The report mentioned the assassination Kuznetsov had just committed in Lviv of the governor-adjunct of Galicia, Otto Bauer. This act had provoked terrible reprisals on the part of the Germans: 2,000 hostages were shot and several hundred Ukrainian political prisoners hanged. Kuznetsov's report stressed with satisfaction that, as in Rivne, the provocation in Lviv had succeeded perfectly (Lebed *UPA* 70-71; Shankovsky *Pochatky UPA* 118).

Thus the Ukrainians learned that the assassination in Rivne of the ministerial counsellor Höll and Koch's adjunct Dargel had been committed by Kuznetsov to provoke German reprisals against Ukrainian nationalists. Operating under the identity and uniform of a German officer from Königsberg, Paul Siebert, the Russian agent Kuznetsov was assassinating German officials to provoke reprisals. At each assassination he purposely placed "clues" to direct suspicion towards the nationalists. He admitted to the assassination of Dargel and to having left a passport and identification papers of one of the OUN-B members who had been killed by the Medvedev's Soviet partisan group, of which Kuznetsov was a member. The "clue" had been sufficient for the Germans to loose reprisals against supposed members or sympathizers of the Bandera movement.

The provocation in Rivne was also vindicated after the war by D. N. Medvedev; head of Soviet partisans, he acknowledged in his memoirs that his "boys" had laughed in the Tsuman forest upon learning that, following Kuznetsov's deed, Germans had killed thirty-six nationalists (Medvedev 285). In reality, the number of victims of these reprisals was much higher. Kuznetsov probably had also killed Joachim Paltzo, head of propaganda for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in the first half of February 1944.

In addition, Kuznetsov had set up in Rivne a secret organization, directed by Teofil Novak, to liquidate Ukrainian activists. According to

Soviet sources, this organization killed nineteen of the thirty-three "nationalist leaders" on their hit-list (337-340).

Kuznetsov was shot by the UPA on 9 March 1944.

On 4 March the Soviet troops took up the offensive in the direction south and southwest. Cities of central Ukraine fell one after the other: Uman' (10 March); Vinnystia (20 March); Proskuriv (25 March). On 27 March the Red Army took Kamianets-Podilsky, reaching the Romanian frontier on the Prut with an eighty-five kilometer front. On 29 March it seized Kolomya and Chernivtsi (northern Bukovyna). From then on the offensive continued on Romanian territory.

In southern Ukraine the Red Army seized Kherson (10 March); Voznesensk (24 March); Pervomaysk (24 March); Mykolaiv (28 March); Odessa (10 March); and Yalta (16 March). On 15 April Soviet troops took Ternopil in Western Ukraine. In the middle of April 1944 almost all of Ukraine was in Soviet possession with the exception of a small strip of western territory. On 17 April the front, which began northeast of Kovel, came down in an almost straight line south (passing east of Brody) as far as the Carpathian Mountains, approximately sixty kilometers west of Kolomya.

While the Soviet army was already operating in Romania, on 20 April 1944 the Soviet government announced its decision to pursue the enemy to total defeat. The declaration specified that the Soviet Union intended neither to annex any part of Romanian territory nor to change Romania's social regime; the Soviet army, in carrying out its mission would continue its advance westward until the complete defeat of Germany and its satellites (Déborine 333).

At this time the Krajowa Rada Narodowa of Warsaw "deprived" the Polish government in London of its right to represent the Polish people. At the end of May 1944 it sent a delegation to Moscow to establish official relations with the Union of Polish Patriots in Russia and the Soviet government ("with the governments of the USSR and other Soviet republics," according to Soviet sources) (Cf. *Ukraina i zarub.* 331).

Reports from the front were more and more negative for Germany. According to Soviet sources, of the ninety-four divisions that comprised the German Army Group South and Army Group A (operating in Ukraine), fifty-nine had been destroyed (*Vtoraya mirovaya voyna* 551-554)

At this time the Americans intensified their aid to Soviet Russia. According to a Reuter dispatch of 2 April, their deliveries of war materials during the first two months of 1944 reached 1,000,000 tons (vs. 200,000 tons in January-February 1942 and 670,000 tons in January-February 1943). From October 1941 to 1 March 1944 Russia received from the United States: 9,500,000 tons of materials (not counting the 4,000 planes delivered directly by air). In all, Russia had received 8,800 planes; 5,200 tanks; more than 190,000 trucks; 36,000 jeeps; 30,000 other vehicles; 7,000,000 pair of boots; 2,600,000 tons of food products; 1,450,000 tons of steel; 450,000 tons of non-iron metals; 200,000 tons of explosive materials; and a number of unspecified wagons and locomotives (BA-MA RW 5/v.464 f. 124).

Study of changes in the number of Soviet prisoners of war taken by the Germans from the beginning of the German-Soviet war is revealing: 2,400,000 Soviet prisoners of war by the end of 1941 (six months of war); 3,600,000 by 1 April 1942; 5,150,000 by 1 November 1942. From this date on, however, the situation changed: Germans took only a small number of prisoners. Their total number henceforth was: 5,300,000 by April 1943; 5,500,000 by 1 October 1943; 5,600,000 by 1 January 1944; 5,700,000 by 1 November 1944 (BA-MA RH 2/v. 1925 Unwiedergebliehe Verluste der S.U. ab 22-6-1941).

Between Anvil and Hammer

Germany had just lost almost all of Ukraine. Many Germans, including members of the Nazi party, increased their criticism of eastern policies. Among these criticisms, the famous memorandum dated 10 February 1944, of the former Generalkommissar for Crimea, Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, stands out. Frauenfeld condemned the severity of Koch's policies and attitude in Ukraine (IMT 5394-PS; IfZ Fb 29/1-3; BA R 6/259 f. 2ff). He drew attention to the dangerous contradictions created by Koch's attitude. For example, while the Wehrmacht was training battalions of Russian and Ukrainian volunteers and Germans had to be in contact with Ukrainians on a daily basis, Koch, with his customary "wisdom," declared: "If I find a Ukrainian who merits to sit

next to me at the same table, I shall be obliged to have him shot" (IfZ Fb 29/1-3:7).

Other Germans (Heinz von Homeyer, Körner, Generalkommissar Magunia, Wilhelmi, Bräutigam), while criticizing policies that were being followed, attempting to propose remedies (BA R 6/258 f. 71ff; R 6/259 f. 39ff; R 6/259 f. 68ff; R 6/15 f. 146ff; R 6/267 f. 13-13RS; R 6/70 f.155-158; R 6/86 f.1-6). But these criticisms and proposals had no results on the policies of the Third Reich. All that the Nazi apparatus seemed to be able to do was draw up new guidelines—secret, of course—for the press and the propaganda.

These guidelines, formulated on 22 April 1944, included five points regarding Ukrainians that were to be made known through the press: 1) Germans will return; 2) Ukrainians belong to Europe; 3) Germany brought the Ukrainian people life, liberty, order, land, and bread; 4) after reconquest of Ukraine, refugees will be able to return home; 5) the duty at the moment is to enlist all forces of the Ukrainian people.

These five axioms outlined exactly the scope of Germans policies in the Ukrainian question. The press was invited to repeat them over and over to create an unshakeable conviction that German evacuation of Ukraine was temporary. It then had to reinforce among Ukrainians the feeling that their people belong to Europe. This idea, undoubtedly, was felt as a concession by the Nazi. They also said that it was necessary to denounce in the official Ukrainian press Soviet "federalist machinations" which intended to destroy the Ukrainian people. The guidelines did not say what the "federalism" of the "New Europe" was to be.

The guidelines, probably prepared by the ministry for occupied eastern territories, seemed to attach some importance to the changes Moscow had made in the question of the rights of the Soviet national republics. Germans claimed it was necessary to "present the [Soviet's] establishment of independent Ukrainian commissariats of war and foreign affairs [to the people] as a typical device of Bolshevik propaganda intended to blind the Ukrainian people to the Kremlin's brutal intentions of destruction" (BA R 6/70 f. 152). Ukrainians were also to be reminded of the mass graves of Vinnytsia and made to understand that, by defending Europe either with weapons or through work, they were working for the reconquest of their fatherland. It was necessary to

appeal to the national pride of the Ukrainians and declare that the Ukrainian people had the same rights as other peoples of Europe.

The guidelines recommended that people be reminded of recent decisions made by the Reichsminister for defense to treat eastern workers as other European workers were being treated in Germany and do away with the insignia "*Ost*."

Ukrainians were also to be reminded that Germany brought to them agrarian reforms and the right to property, that the kolkhoz system had been abolished, religious freedom guaranteed. After the reconquest, Ukraine would be reconstructed, misunderstandings of 1941-1942 would not be repeated, an outline of an administrative autonomy would be developed. At the "end of the great fight for liberty for Europeans and the destruction of bolshevism," all Ukrainians outside Ukraine (eastern workers, refugees, soldiers) would be able to return to their fatherland and take part in its reconstruction. "In a united and free Europe, the Ukrainian people will be able, like all other peoples, to find protection and security and develop its strength." But, for the moment, the duty of the Ukrainians, workers or soldiers, was to cooperate in the fight for the liberation of the European peoples (BA-MA RH 19 V/95 [11/3425 geh.]; BA R 6/70 f. 152-154).

Significantly, the new official propaganda neither addressed nor promised independence of Ukraine. The political promises were extremely vague. The place of Ukraine and of the Ukrainian people in Europe was undefined. The Soviets and the Bolsheviks were designated as the only enemy of Ukraine. Problems of rapport between Ukraine and Russia were passed over in silence.

In April 1944 a second UPA officer was executed for having reached a local arrangement with a German unit, an arrangement directed against Poles (Lebed UPA 74). In reality, precarious conditions in the Volhynia combat zone, as well as the insufficiency of weapons and ammunition of some UPA units, precluded a frontal war against two or three enemies simultaneously, even with one (the Germans) beating a retreat and thus becoming less dangerous, at least temporarily. Some local arrangements did save populations from German requisitions and looting or reprisals (BA-MA 24-13/172 Kampfgruppe Prützmann, 12-2-1944).

Further, some commanders of UPA units in Volhynia hoped to have Germans promise them through threats of combat or promise of information on the movements of Soviet troops arms and ammunition which the Germans could not evacuate during retreat.

In this situation the commander of the German Army Group Nord, on 20 April 1944 drafted instructions concerning the attitude to be observed toward the UPA. According to his instructions, even if Germans noticed among some UPA units willingness to accept local arrangements with German units, this was only because the Ukrainians thought that "temporarily the Soviets were a more dangerous enemy [than the Germans] for aspirations for independence." The instructions continued:

Because the essential attitude of the UPA is directed against all foreign domination, prudence toward UPA units [UPA Banden] should be observed. This does not exclude in particular cases cooperation proposed by UPA units for military ends; in some instances they could be given support to strengthen groups operating at the rear of the Soviets.

All demands of a political nature regarding possible co-operation, if the case arose during talks, are *a priori* to be refused.

Where UPA bandits show hostility toward the Wehrmacht, they are to be fought against ruthlessly as is done with any other gangs (BA-MA RH 2/v.2544 f. 6).

The situation in Galicia was somewhat different. Organization efforts had been deployed by the UPA in the Carpathian Mountains. Military camps and school were set up there. An officers' school, evacuated from Volhynia, was also installed in the Carpathian. In the winter of 1943-1944 the UPA established its control over the major part of the mountain zone located between Poland and Romania. By the end of March 1944, *Liegenschaften* (German properties) and bases of operation were progressively destroyed in the districts of Zbarazh, Ternopil, Skalat, and Kolomyia.

Garrisons of the bases of operation (which protected German property and the forest industry) were, for the most part, comprised of Belgian or Dutch soldiers who surrendered without fighting.

A Dutch group of officers who had escaped from the camp in Stanyslaviv came upon a UPA unit which took them to their encampment of Chorny Lis from which they were moved, after several days of rest, to Budapest. They awaited the end of the war in the Hungarian capital (Shankovsky *UPA* 691).

In April 1944, the Sixth Hungarian Army Corps appeared in the districts of Dolyna, Kalush and Nadvirna. After five days of fighting, the Hungarian staff contacted the Ukrainian staff. Their talks ended in a signing of an agreement of neutrality which was extended to all Hungarian troops in the Carpathian region (690-692).

Germans then learned that the UPA had just given the following orders for Galicia: all young men were to be mobilized; they were to present themselves to UPA encampments; German property and factories were to be destroyed; no deliveries were to be made to Germans whose retreat was to be made difficult by all possible means; no one was to allow himself to be evacuated; everyone was to arm himself at all cost and confront the Germans with weapons in hand (BA R. 70 Polen/76 f.5RS).

In May 1944 the SD learned of the existence of a brochure entitled *Revolution Is Breaking the Chains*, published by the OUN-M and dedicated to anti-German activities of that organization in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The SD suspected O. Olzhych-Kandyba of being its author. Olzhych who had been indeed the leader of these activities, had left Kiev and settled down in Lviv where he lived in hiding until he was arrested there, deported to Sachsenhausen and tortured to death during interrogation on 9 June 1944 (*OUN u viyni* 104).

Conversations on the highest levels between a UPA representative and a Wehrmacht representative on possible cooperation in some strictly military domain, took place in Lviv on 3 June 1944. UPA representative established several conditions for cooperation. First, the UPA reserved the right to instruct its units freely and use them without German interference. He condemned the behavior of the SD and the Wehrmacht regarding the Ukrainian population and demanded a complete halt to

brutality and punitive action. Further, the UPA demanded the freeing of all Ukrainian prisoners in concentration camps and prisons. If an agreement were reached, all German services, including the SD (Gestapo) were to be informed of it. Possible military cooperation was to remain secret to prevent the services of Soviet propaganda from exploiting it. The possible cooperation dealt exclusively with the fighting against bolshevism and Soviet Russia.

The Wehrmacht representative asked that these demands be put in writing that he might present them to higher authorities of the Reich that alone could make a decision (BA-MA RH 2/v.2544 f. 8-9).

One of the reasons why the Wehrmacht considered it useful to make an arrangement with the UPA was that its services were getting information on the fighting between the "Ukrainian nationalists," i.e., the UPA and the Soviet garrisons in the regions of Kiev, Zhytomyr, Proskuriv, Kamianets-Podilsky, and Slavuta. Reports stated that the situation in these regions was grave to the point where Soviet authorities had to order some restrictions on entry into Ukraine to citizens from other republics, especially Russia (f. 23).

In the meantime, fighting between UPA units and the Germans continued. According to a German report, during an engagement in the Mykolaiv region south of Lviv in June 1944 Germans killed twenty-nine members of the UPA and took 250 prisoners, seizing two canons, ammunition, trucks, horses, etc. (Appendix, Doc.#189). A short time later, one UPA unit attacked an SD commando near Hrubeshiv (Appendix, Doc.#190).

Terror tactics toward members and sympathizers of the OUN-B and UPA continued. Between 10 October 1943, the day special courts had been introduced into Galicia, and June 1944, these courts condemned to death 15,771 Ukrainians, men and women. Execution by shooting (sometimes by hanging) took place in public. The lists of people shot or hanged were posted in the streets, often mentioning next to the name of the victim the exact reason for his condemnation: "membership in the OUN," "membership in the UPA," "membership in the organization of Bandera" (*Litopys UPA* 6:242-245).

Continued Fight for Freedom

Ukrainian leaders realized the situation was evolving in such a way that the fighting for independence would be long. Soviet propaganda pounded against the movement for independence, the UPA, and the OUN. The end of the war was near. If no conflict arose between the western powers and Soviet Russia, the latter would have at its disposition large military forces to use against the UPA. The fighting promised to be extended both militarily and politically in the field of information. A coordinating political center was needed to regroup all Ukrainian forces and have the mandate to speak for all Ukrainians. The high command of the UPA exercised the initiative to create such a political center.

Preliminary negotiations began in the autumn of 1943. By March 1944, an initiative committee was created which worked out the political platform to serve as a base for negotiations with different Ukrainian leaders. Finally, representatives of all political forces in Ukraine (not in emigration) gathered in a congress from 11 to 15 June 1944 in the Carpathian Mountains south of Sambir under UPA's protection.

After reviewing the domestic and international situation, the congress, presided over by Rostyslav Voloshyn, created the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (UHVR) and approved three documents: a definition of the structure and function of the Council; a political platform; and a declaration of principles. The congress approved also the text of the oath for UPA soldiers.

Objectives were defined in the platform and the declaration of principles. The UHVR based its existence on the traditions of the independent Ukrainian State of 1917-1920, destroyed by foreign aggression, and on the conviction of the Ukrainian people that "only a sovereign national State constitutes the condition and guarantee of a normal life, development of the nation and its culture, as well as material and spiritual well-being of the popular masses" (*UHVR* 10).

The war "between the two totalitarian forces" was being conducted primarily for the domination of Ukraine which was to serve as base for domination of Eastern Europe and the rest of Europe. The UHVR realized that the two forces were "irreconcilable enemies to the idea of a Ukrainian independence."

In this total war, Ukrainian political forces had to defend the Ukrainian people, preserving them from annihilation and leading their fight for freedom. UHVR's objective was to unite and coordinate the efforts of the forces fighting for the independence of the Ukrainian people and direct the fight against both Russian Bolshevik imperialism and German Hitler imperialism.

The UHVR wanted to attain and guarantee in the independent Ukrainian State the following: freedom of education, thought, and religion; development of national culture; a just social program without class exploitation and oppression; law and equality under the law; civic rights of national minorities; free enterprise in the interest of citizens and the nation; free form of working the soil within planned limits; nationalization of main natural resources, industry, and heavy transport; return of light industry to cooperatives; freedom of commerce and cottage industry; right to work in one's chosen area. This was a democratic program.

By taking the oath before the Ukrainian people, the UHVR solemnly promised to fight for its main goal—an independent Ukrainian state within the ethnographical limits of the Ukrainian people—so that Ukrainians could be masters in their land. The UHVR also welcomed the fighting for freedom of all other oppressed peoples. The declaration continued: "We hope to live with them, particularly with our neighbors in good harmony and collaborate with them in the common struggle on the condition that they respect the Ukrainian fight for freedom." The UHVR called upon all national minorities on Ukrainian territory to join in this fight for Ukrainian freedom, guaranteeing them equal rights in an independent Ukrainian state (*UHVR* 3-16; *Litopys UPA* 8:27-41).

The congress elected the board of the UHVR: Kyrylo Osmak, president of the Council; Vasyl Mudry, Father Ivan Hryniokh, and Ivan Vovchuk, vice-presidents; Yaroslav Bilenky, general judge (justice); Roman Shukhevych, president of the office of secretary-general and general secretary of military affairs; Mykola Lebed, general secretary of foreign affairs; Rostyslav Voloshyn, general secretary of internal affairs.

The office of the secretary-general of the UHVR thus became the government of fighting Ukraine. The seat of the UHVR would be in Ukraine and all its members would remain in this country, but to

maintain contact with the outside world, the UHVR created an exterior representation of members who would go abroad. Especially Mykola Lebed-Ruban would go abroad to contact Western Allies, particularly the English (*Litopys UPA* 8:10; *Entsyklopedia Uk.* 9:3348; Lebed 90).

Events were, nevertheless, to determine differently. Rostyslav Voloshyn, who entered Soviet territory with Shukhevych and other delegates, was killed in combat with NKVD troops in August 1944. Vasyl Mudry, Father Ivan Hryniokh, and Ivan Vovchuk had to emigrate several months later. Others were called to replace them. Mykola Lebed did not make contact with the Western Allies until early 1945.

Germans did not learn about the creation of the UHVR until early October 1944 when they read part of the platform and declaration (BA R 70 Slowakei/222 f. 111-116). In November they became acquainted with the entire text the congress had adopted (BA R 6/150 f. 40-54; *Litopys UPA* 7:Doc.#30).

Two weeks after the congress, early in July, the Soviet army resumed its offensive against on the Zboriv-Kovel line. On 13 July 1944 it attacked in the Brody sector where, for the first time at the front, the Division SS "Galicia" was engaged. Brody fell into the hands of the Red Army on 18 July. Thrown into battle on 17 July, the division, 11,000 men strong, was cut to pieces and destroyed after five days of fighting. From 7,000 to 8,000 Ukrainians were killed or taken prisoner by the Russians. Possibly several hundred men were able to join the UPA. Some 1,500 to 2,000 men managed to escape the encirclement (Heike 95-96). The division momentarily ceased to exist but was re-formed in September.

Soviet troops charged to the west. Using pincer maneuvers, they took three large cities of Galicia on 27 July 1944: Lviv, Peremyshl, and Stanyslaviv (today Ivano-Frankivsk). After taking Drohobych (6 August) and Boryslav with its petroleum basin (7 August), the Soviet army stopped at the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains. Germans had thus lost all of Ukraine with the exception of this mountain chain and Carpathian Ukraine.

Soviet offensive continued also in the sector of the Belorussian front facing Poland. On 22 July the Red Army took Kholm a Ukrainian city west of the Curzon line (considered by Moscow as the first liberated Polish city) and on 24 July Lublin. On 23 July 1944 the Krajowa Rada

Narodowa set up in Kholm the Polish Committee of Liberation, a provisional organ of the "new popular and democratic power" of Poland.³

On 26 July 1944, the commissariat of the people of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union published a declaration, announcing the Soviet army was entering Poland alongside the Polish army to free "the brother nation" (Déborine 332-337). The fate of Poland was sealed, however, as soon as the Red Army began conquering Polish territory and the Polish government in exile could do nothing to change the course of events. Certainly, Anglo-Polish-Soviet discussions on the Polish frontiers continued in Moscow in August and September, but brought no results even though the Polish government in exile still refused to cede the Ukrainian and Belorussian territories.

Russia was not concerned with failures in negotiation. It knew that the Polish Committee for National Liberation had assured on 22 July in its manifesto that it was in favor of a "just" solution to the frontier question: the ethnographically Polish land was part of Poland, the ethnographically Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian lands belonged respectively to Soviet Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania. On 26 July, according to an agreement signed between the Soviet government and the Polish Committee of National Liberation, all civilian authority in Poland was to be handed over to the Soviets. The Polish Committee for National Liberation became the provisional government of Poland and it was officially made so on 31 December 1944 (Déborine 331-332).

Approximately 20 July 1944, Germans learned that the OUN-B and the UPA did not intend to leave Ukraine, that they were going to continue fighting, despite their lack of weapons and medicine (BA-MA RH 2/v.2545 f. 4).

At this time, a small part of the UPA was still on the German side of the front, in the mountains. There, in the district of Turka southwest of Boryslav, a meeting between representatives from the Wehrmacht and the UPA took place, ending in an arrangement which the head of staff of the Army Corps Nordukraine, General von Xylander, summarized in a document dated 18 August 1944: the UPA, if not attacked, would not attack the Wehrmacht, and the Wehrmacht would abstain from attacking the UPA; technical arrangements could be negotiated on a local level; the UPA would inform local authorities of the Wehrmacht of the

situation and would help German soldiers, caught behind the front line, reach their units. General von Xylander added, however, an important qualifier: "...despite agreement, one must bear in mind that the UPA, now as before, is working exclusively for its own interests and not for German interests" (BA-MA RH 2/v2545 f. 9)

This arrangement arrived at to spare Ukrainian soldiers' lives, involved only some UPA units located on the German side of the front. The UPA, of course, did not attempt to make this local arrangement which it considered "a tactical measure, not a true cooperation," public (f. 9).

General von Xylander then ordered, for such local arrangements, a necessary disclaimer to avoid the impression that UPA units received their missions for the interest of Germans. He stressed that no combat mission could be entrusted to them by the Germans and no negotiation of a political nature could be made with them (f. 9).

Wehrmacht units in the Carpathian Mountains received instructions dated 18 August 1944, which specified: the Ukrainian population, as long as it showed no hostility, had to be treated decently; "UPA units [the term 'gangs' was not to be used] that behave peacefully must not be attacked"; agreements made or to be negotiated could be only local agreements, limited to one village or one forest; it was forbidden to deal with political question (f. 10).

According to a German report, despite these agreements, the UPA did not cease all attacks against the Germans, especially against isolated soldiers or commandos (f. 11). In the first half of August, a UPA unit disarmed 180 Germans and fifty Uzbeks. Fighting took place on 15 August between the UPA and the Hungarian army at Zhabie (eleven Hungarians killed). A UPA unit attacked a convoy of arms escorted by a German unit in Lastivka, some thirty carts of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of the UPA (*UPA v sviili* 2:65, 69,70).

The last confrontation between the UPA and Germans occurred on 1 September south of Kolomya in the mountains. Germans lost six men (two killed, two wounded, two taken prisoner—one soldier and one captain). The UPA also lost six men (two killed, two wounded, two taken prisoner) (2:70). Two weeks later the front had advanced, so that the entire UPA territory became occupied by the Soviet army. On 24

September that front was on the former Polish-Czechoslovakian frontier and the Third Reich had lost all Ukraine for good. Almost all of Romania and Bulgaria were also occupied by Soviet troops.

The Soviet army continued to advance to the west across Carpathian Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. On 26 November 1944 the local "popular committees" of Carpathian Ukraine voted for a "reunification" of this region with Soviet Ukraine. Prague ratified this decision by a treaty with the USSR, signed on 29 June 1945 in Moscow.

Before Final Defeat

Although the Third Reich had lost Ukraine, it continued to deal with the Ukrainian question, hoping somehow to profit.

Early in September 1944, German services of information with the Hungarian army received a report on UPA plans to develop relations with England. The information was correct. The Hungarians, undoubtedly, had learned about it from the permanent UPA resident at the general quarters of the Hungarian army in Budapest (appointed to the Hungarian capital since the December 1943 negotiations). The same report stated that one of the heads of the UPA, Maxim Ruban (Mykola Lebed), was either about to leave or had already left for England by way of Spain.

The report stated that the UPA considered itself, next to the Red Army, the second strongest politico-military power in the east and was ready to form relations with foreign powers on the condition that they recognize Ukraine's independence within its ethnographical limits and agree to help it militarily. As far as Germany was concerned, one of the pre-conditions was the freeing of all Ukrainian political prisoners (BA-MA RH 2/v.2545 f. 109-109RS).

Commenting on this information, another German military service remarked that, as far as Germany was concerned, establishment of relations with the UPA could become a reality only if "present tensions between Germany and Ukraine are totally eliminated" (f. 107).

The Reichsministry for occupied eastern territories expressed itself on this subject in a letter dated 18 September 1944, addressed to the OKW and OKH:

"The moment there is no longer a [German] civilian administration in Ukraine and, consequently, no possibility of a military activity for the German civilians, there will be no opposition to making contact with the Ukrainian national bandits to support them in their fight against the Soviets" (f. 21).

As proof of this outburst of generosity, the letter, signed by Otto Bräutigam, head adjunct of the political department of the ministry, specified that it would be necessary to inform, by all possible means, the leaders of the Ukrainian "partisan movement" that "Germany had no intention of turning Ukraine into a German colony, but that it hoped to see a free and independent Ukraine in the framework of the New Europe" (BA R 6/354 f. 161; BA-MA RH 2/v.2545 f. 21).

From all evidence, the German circles tried to salvage a plan, rereading the memoranda of Frauenfeld, Körner, and other leaders (BA R 6/259 f. 1ff). The situation was grave. Ukraine was lost and the Ukrainian question no longer presented a danger for Germany. Some German military circles thought, in fact, that the Ukrainians could continue the fight against Soviet Russia and its Stalinist regime, that this question could even turn to Germany's advantage, allowing mobilization of Ukrainians in Germany and friendly countries (the *Ostarbeiter*, evacuees, and refugees).

The same reasoning was valid for the Russians and other eastern nationalities.

Two political conceptions confronted German political circles: mobilization of all forces of all "peoples of Russia" (meaning the Soviet Union) around the Russian movement of Vlasov; establishment of equal status national committees of peoples of Eastern Europe whereby each people, including the Russians, would have its national committee and national army (Cf. IMT Dokument Rosenberg 14). Rosenberg and the Reichsministry for occupied eastern territory supported the latter idea. The first idea had many more supporters in German circles, including Reichsführer-SS Himmler.

Since Ukraine was no longer occupied by the Reich, some German leaders thought that nationalist leaders, interned in concentration camps, should be freed and used to mobilize Ukrainian forces. The freeing of nationalist leaders had been suggested early in the year while Germans were still occupying Ukraine (BA R 55/1483 f. 61, letter of Taubert and Kurtz of 17-2-1944). But only in August 1944 was a decision made to attempt the experiment. The first person to be freed was Taras Bulba-Borotvets who, before his arrest, had tried to get help from the Wehrmacht for his partisans to fight Soviet partisans and the Red Army. But after he was set free in August, German leaders realized they could not profit from him. They chose then to create a Ukrainian national committee regrouping all Ukrainian forces in emigration.

These forces no longer represented anyone in Ukraine itself, with the exception of Bandera and his followers who could easily reestablish ties with the UPA and the OUN.

Those Germans who favored the formation of a Ukrainian national committee wanted to put at its head one of the leaders, capable of matching Vlasov and thus counter-balancing the famous "Vlasov Action."

On 25 September 1944, Rosenberg and Kaltenbrunner, head of RSHA and the SD, finally agreed on the need to free Ukrainian leaders. Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko were freed on 27 September. The same day some Ukrainian women were freed from Camp Ravensbrück and some OUN-B followers from other concentration camps (BA R 70 Slowakei/223 f. 2).

During talks with Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg had suggested asking Melnyk and Bandera if they would accept the nomination of Skoropadsky to the post of president of the Ukrainian National Committee (BA R 6/141 f. 32). The two leaders probably rejected this idea. The SD, which continued to play a decisive, even exclusive role in East European political affairs, tried to exploit the freeing of Bandera on behalf of the "Vlasov Action," because the SS and the SD, as well as some Wehrmacht circles aimed to unite all anti-Bolshevik forces into a single committee for the liberation "of the peoples of Russia", and thus to see Bandera and the Ukrainians follow the Vlasov movement (BA R 58/225 f. 272RS).

According to a memorandum of Bräutigam dated 28 September, creation of a Ukrainian national committee had the support of Sturmbannführer Arlt, charged with East European affairs in the main office of the SS, and Oberführer Kroeger. They thought also that a Ukrainian national committee, with Skoropadsky or Bandera or another leader at its head, should be created as quickly as possible.

But the creation of the Ukrainian national committee proved to be very difficult. Skoropadsky's candidacy was quickly abandoned because he had no influence in Ukrainian circles. As to Bandera, the Germans, particularly the SD, mistrusted his "free-lance" spirit, and were considering instead a man from his entourage.

Active German pro-Russian circles seemed to win out for their efforts were successful. On 29 September 1944, the Russian general A. Vlasov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Liberation Army (ROA), was received by the chief representative of Nazi racism, Reichsführer-SS Himmler. The communiqué published at the end of the interview stated that they had talked about measures to be taken for "engaging all forces of the Russian people in the fighting for liberation of their fatherland from bolshevism" (BA R 6/72 f. 27, 85).

Himmler consented to the creation of a "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" and the formation of new divisions for the Russian Liberation Army. On 4 October 1944, the official German agency announced that "a collaboration of the peoples of the Soviet Union was planned in the framework of the organization of common fighting against bolshevism" and that "there is a project, to be published shortly, a manifesto of a committee of peoples" (f. 86). In summary, the leaders of the Third Reich, with Hitler's consent, had decided to draw out the Russians against the Soviets.

But those who were convinced that each people of the European part of the USSR had the right to its national committee and would not be part of the Russian committee called "committee of the peoples of Russia," did not yield.

Bandera was consulted about the creation of a Ukrainian committee and its leadership composition, but he refused to be part of the German projects, proposing possibly the lawyer V. Horbovy, vice-president of the Ukrainian National Committee of Cracow in 1941. Attempts to contact

Horbovy failed for he had remained on Soviet territory. SS-Obergruppenführer Berger, head of the main SS (SSHA) office and head of the operational political staff of the eastern ministry, summoned Bandera on 5 October, but the talks were unproductive and Berger concluded Bandera would be a difficult partner. He commented that Bandera could be useful "for the moment, but dangerous in the long run" (IfZ EAP 1616-12/362).

The German leaders finally chose A. Melnyk who had been freed from Sachsenhausen on 17 October. They proposed he form a Ukrainian national committee and become its head. Melnyk accepted. One week later he presented a key document, worked out together and accepted by all Ukrainian factions, including Bandera. This document made clear that Germany was to declare officially that it was not interested in Ukrainian territories and that, in case German troops penetrated Ukrainian soil, it would respect the sovereignty of the State created by the Ukrainian people (IfZ NO-3040).

Thus, the OUN-B idea had prevailed in the drafting of the document presented by A. Melnyk. If it had been accepted, it would have implied Germany's recognition of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state within the ethnographical limits of the Ukrainian people, but the Germans refused to commit themselves along those lines. They rejected the Ukrainian conditions and resumed initial planning when Berger, the principal official on this question, fell ill and negotiations came to a standstill for three weeks (IfZ NO-3039).

Since Ukraine was definitely lost, Germans judged the moment had come for liquidation of enterprises created for the exploitation and evacuation of products and raw materials from eastern regions. Rosenberg's report indicated that the principal society "East" (*Ost*) had stock-piled and evacuated (mostly from Ukraine) 9,200,000 tons of wheat and a large quantity of other food products; their transportation to the Reich necessitated 1,418,000 wagons and boats judging on the total tonnage of 470,000. The monetary turnover of the society had been 5,600,000 marks.

By 30 June 1943, the society had in Ukraine a personnel of 4,500 Germans and Dutch for the handling of agricultural resources (Appendix, Doc.#191; IMT 327-PS).

The SS services (the SD, Kroeger, d'Alquen, Ohlendorf, Berger) continued to engage in a sort of battle on the question of using eastern forces (BA NS 8/132 f. 129). The Russian idea aiming to unify the forces in "unity with Russia" (i.e. Russian Empire) definitely seemed more influential. On 8 October 1944, the Russian émigré newspaper *Zaria* printed: "The day is near when the divisions composed of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Caucasians, Turkmen, and other peoples of Russia will charge the Bolshevik army rabble" (BA R 6/72 f. 37).

That same day Rosenberg learned that Hitler had consented to the "Vlasov Action" and had already in hand the soon to be published manifesto. Rosenberg became angry, demanding that Bormann prevent Hitler from deciding before having consulted him. Although Rosenberg wanted to see the Führer (f. 48), he could not, so on 12 October he sent (through Lammer) a long letter attacking the Russian idea.

This idea, wrote Rosenberg, tried to "submit to Russian dictate all non-Russian peoples." To use the term "peoples of Russia" was to recognize the Russians' right of ownership over all territories and nations of the Russian Empire, forcing non-Russian nations to integrate into the Russian idea. Creation of national committees and national armies of liberation (Russian, Ukrainian, etc.) was instead necessary.

Rosenberg adopted this position because of the influence, indeed pressure, of many officials and experts in his ministry who had come from East European countries. But Rosenberg did not go so far as to recognize the people's right for independence. Rosenberg's idea was that of a Europe of peoples, of nations in an ethnic sense. According to him, the German Reich had to take upon itself "the responsibility of never again letting Bolshevik centralism threaten the lives of East European peoples." As to the future, he added:

All nations of East Europe—the Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Northern Caucasians, Cossacks, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Armenians, Tatars...—will have their free countries; they will be able to reconstruct independently in all spheres of the life of the country, reconstruction that will be guaranteed by the German Reich...The name of Russia that had been blotted from history by the Soviet dictatorship, must

once again find its place beside the New Russia; other rejuvenated peoples of the east will after reconquest be able to begin their new existence in their freed homelands within the protected European continent (IMT Document Rosenberg 14, XLI: 187, 188, 192, 193).

Rosenberg was thinking of an integration of Russia, Ukraine, and other nations into a Europe led by Germany, not of the independence of these nations.

Some German circles stressed rallying the forces around the idea of Europe, especially when there were serious difficulties for the Reich. In September 1943, a commission of the ministry for foreign affairs developed guiding principles concerning unification of Europe,⁴ but the vague idea of a united Europe of peoples opposed Nazi racial and imperialistic ideology; and under occupation conditions the European ideas had no chance of being accepted, but would be an attempt to win over the émigrés and refugees from Eastern Europe, as well as Soviet prisoners of war.

Even in this Nazi leaders were ambiguous. Eventually, this idea, supported also by the European Bureau of SS-Hauptamt, found some sort of refuge in the ministry for occupied eastern territories (after these territories had been lost to the Reich). Rosenberg's ministry tried to mobilize eastern anti-Bolshevik forces around the concept of one Europe of nations in the ethical sense, with each nation, including the Russian nation, having its place.

Toward the end of 1944, however, the leaders of the Third Reich chose to play the Russian card, depend on Russian liberation rather than European unity.

Lammers informed Rosenberg on 13 November 1944 that Hitler approved of the Vlasov action and had delegated this matter to the Reichsministry of foreign affairs and the Reichsführer-SS (IfZ NO-3125).

Himmler was very much satisfied with the developments of the "Vlasov Action." He severely criticized Rosenberg and the activities of his ministry, going so far as to label them a "national calamity." He disapproved of Rosenberg and his service's ideas and initiatives, but he hesitated to put an end to the ministry for occupied eastern territories

(territories that were already lost) and thus deprive Rosenberg of his post of Reichsminister. Himmler ordered Kroegeer to continue with the Vlasov action in cooperation with the ministry of foreign affairs, but not to allow himself be influenced by Rosenberg's ideas. A German document on this subject stated:

...6) The Reichsführer-SS considered that, with time, the Vlasov action will become the constructive base for the organization of eastern space. He believes that the German Reich will be able to live in friendship with a strong Russia, if she renounces her imperialistic expansion to the west and concentrated rather on the east. 7) As far as national committees are concerned, the Reichsführer-SS is of the opinion that a united front with Vlasov will have to be reached by all the committees but these committees must not be forced to accept Vlasov's leadership (AA Inland II g.438, B.R. Hilger Nr.1, 404628-30).

The attitude of Hitler and Himmler regarding Russia and the Russian question had clearly changed, yet Himmler refused to lift restrictive and discriminatory measures regarding the workers from the east, or abolish wearing of the distinctive insignie "Ost."

In early November 1944, German services drew up a memorandum on the UPA identifying it as a OUN-B military organization. The UPA had come into existence at the end of 1942. After its fighting against the Germans and delaying its confrontation with Poles, the UPA had placed its main effort against the Soviet Union and the Red Army. According to the memorandum, its nucleus, after military instruction, had increased to approximately 80,000 to 100,000 men. The mass of insurgents could possibly increase from 400,000 to 2,000,000 men. A document, prepared on 17 November by Arlt, gave the number of UPA armed fighters as 60,000 (BA R 6/150 f. 55). UPA's activities posed a serious problem for the Soviet regime which tried to direct Ukrainian nationalism, through political concessions, to Soviet politics (Appendix, Doc. #192; R. 6/150 f. 23-23RS).

The numbers of the strength of the UPA were difficult to estimate. According to UPA archives, the UPA-West alone with approximately 4,460 fighters on 31 December 1943, was supposed to have close to 40,000 fighters toward the end of 1944 (Shankovsky *Pochatky UPA* 113; *Visnyk* 6:15) The total number of UPA fighters was somewhere between 80,000 and 100,000, but fighting conditions and the necessity to limit losses led the UPA high command to progressive partial demobilization. After the end of World War II, on orders of the high command Vasyl Sydor-Shelest, the UPA-West command, would reduce its strength to 12,000 seasoned troops, capable of carrying on a long guerilla war. The strength of other groups, especially of Group North, was also reduced.

During Berger's illness, SS-Standartenführer Fritz Arlt, head of the eastern bureau at the main office of the SS, continued talks with Ukrainian leaders, but they invariably commented that they had appointed Melnyk to conduct the negotiations.

Supported by Hitler, Himmler, and the highest authorities of the Reich, General Vlasov set up the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR), of which he was elected president on 14 November 1944 during a meeting held in Prague. That same day he proclaimed a manifesto of his committee—*Prague Manifesto*.

Other national groups became anxious after hearing of the creation of this committee. On 18 December 1944, in a letter addressed to Rosenberg, their representatives protested strongly against the creation and intentions of the Vlasov committee. They claimed that their people, "who have been fighting for independence against Russian imperialism" for long years, have separated themselves completely from Russia and were created independent national states in 1918. Annexed by the Soviet Union by force, these states have the right to become independent again.

Regarding Vlasov and his committee, representatives from national groups declared: "General Vlasov, as a Russian, must limit his action to Russia in the ethnographic sense of the term," not taking charge of Ukraine or other countries, not being in charge of non-Russian peoples, whose aspirations were not his. These peoples were fighting for separation from Russia and creation of independent states.

Representatives of peoples of the USSR asked authorities of the Reich to forbid Vlasov to extend his action to national groups, limiting

him exclusively to Russians, and recognizing the right of the peoples of the USSR to independence.

This letter was signed by the leaders of political groups representing Ukraine, Belorussia, the Caucasus, Turkestan, and the Tatars (of Crimea and the Ural) (BA NS 31/28 An den Herr Reichsminister..., Berlin, den 18 November 1944; R 6/281 f. 162ff).

This letter was addressed to Rosenberg, because the ministry for occupied eastern territories, after the loss of these territories, had become a kind of guardian of the peoples of Eastern Europe against the annexation tendencies of the Russians. Other authorities of the Reich were supporting the Russians and the "Vlasov Action."

Pressure from these authorities, more specifically from the SS services, to bring the nationalities to recognize the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia and place their committees under the authority of the Russian committee, was increased considerably, particularly on the Ukrainians, whom the other nationalities followed.

Summoned by Arlt on 17 November, Melnyk promised presentation of new proposals within five or six days, but he announced that he would not be a candidate for the presidency of the Ukrainian committee (IfZ NO-3039:2).

Simultaneously, a Ukrainian national council of sorts was being set up in Slovakia where the bulk of the new Ukrainian emigration (tens of thousands of refugees and evacuees) was concentrated. The German reports stated that Bandera, Melnyk, Skoropadsky, Livytsky, Kubiovych, Semenenko, Bulba, and Pankivsky were to become members of this council, but a division was apparent among the Ukrainian leaders: one, represented by Bandera, demanded recognition by the German government of the independence of the Ukrainian State; the second was ready to cooperate with the Germans against bolshevism, even if Germany were not ready to recognize Ukraine's independence (BA R 70 Slowakei /223 f. 5,143).

The Division SS *Galicia*, (which since 27 June 1944 was called "14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division SS (galizische Nr. 1),") was also in Slovakia, reorganizing and rebuilding itself. On 17 November 1944 Himmler authorized the designation "14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (ukrainische Nr. 1)." Thus it was in November 1944 when Ukraine was

no longer occupied by Germany and when the Ukrainian question had ceased to be dangerous for the Reich, that Himmler agreed that the *Galician* division be called *Ukrainian* (in parentheses!)

Vlasov's Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia started to control the Ukrainian press, in particular the weekly *Holos* (The Voice) edited in Berlin under the auspices of the ministry of the east. Arlt's office refused to accept this. While waiting for the creation of a Ukrainian national committee, Arlt proposed a liaison committee directed by Semenenko, head of the Ukrainian services with Rosenberg's ministry (IfZ NO-3039:2-3).

Rosenberg could not understand why the nationalities were not treated equally, especially since Vlasov's manifesto, for he knew that no representative of non-Russian peoples had taken part at the meeting in Prague. Furthermore, Vlasov's collaborators had informed the German authorities that their intention was to create a single Russian state which would encompass Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the other countries (BA R 6/38 f. 51-56).

One of the reports from Slovakia on this subject stated:

...General Vlasov will not be able to resolve the Ukrainian problem. The Ukrainian side is stressing constantly that Vlasov wants to include Ukraine in the future anti-Bolshevik Russia. The Ukrainians will never accept this, because they are not only anti-Soviet, but also anti-Russian. Moreover, it is to be feared that an anti-Bolshevik Russia would become as great a danger for the German Reich and for Europe as Bolshevik Russia... (BA R 70 Slow./221 f. 107RS).

The "Vlasov Action" provoked a reaction from the representation of the UHVR expressing the opinion of the fighting leaders of Ukraine and the UPA. The outside representation condemned the German policy regarding the East European nations, in particular the "Vlasov Action," and declared that Germany's defeat in the east was the result of its imperialistic policies. Germany should understand that it would never stop the penetration of Stalin's troops into Europe without the active participation of the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe. By

rejecting Vlasov in unequivocal terms, the representation labeled him an agent of "the new Russian imperialism, heir to the czarist and Stalinist policies." The document concluded that the Ukrainian people were working jointly with the other peoples of Eastern Europe in the fight for independence and freedom against all imperialists. The Ukrainians rejected German as well as Vlasov's Russian plans (f. 98-102).

Advised by the Germans, General Vlasov agreed to attempt a "diplomatic" maneuver to diminish Ukrainian opposition and, at the same time, take into account the struggle of the UPA.

In an interview published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* on 7 December 1944, Vlasov spoke of a liberation struggle in Ukraine which was a vast insurrection movement, the first step toward the liberation of Ukraine. Because annihilating bolshevism, without which there could be no liberation, required cooperation of all forces, they (Ukrainians and the Russians) should henceforth work together. Vlasov maintained that the *Prague Manifesto* "guaranteed" each people the right to a free development and political independence; everything should go well and all the peoples of "Russia" unite in a common struggle against bolshevism, because bolshevism was oppressing in the same way Russians, Ukrainians, and other peoples (V.B., 7-12-1944; BA R 6/72 f. 73).

In reality, the *Prague Manifesto* was intentionally vague on the future of the peoples of the USSR. It did not contain any guarantees as to their independence after their liberation from bolshevism. The goal of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia was defined as follows: "a) to overthrow Stalin's tyranny, free the peoples of our homeland from the Bolshevik system and give them the rights which they won through the popular revolution of 1917" (BA R 6/35 f. 24). The phrase "peoples of our homeland," means many peoples of the Russian homeland. The right for independence of these peoples was unmentioned.

The SD ordered all its posts to maintain close surveillance of the reaction in Ukrainian circles to Vlasov's interview, which was widely spread in the press and on the radio. To the SD, this interview took on special political significance at the moment of talks to create a Ukrainian national committee. The central office of the SD in Berlin confidently informed its posts that a Ukrainian national committee, which would

accept the authority of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia and collaborate with it, was indeed in the process of being set up under the presidency of the Ukrainian general Pavlo Shandruk (BA R 70 Slow./220 f. 122, telegram of 13-12-1944; /223 f. 9).

Nevertheless, the reaction of Ukrainians to Vlasov's interview was unequivocal. They saw him as someone who wanted to create a "Great Russia" matching Stalin's. "The Russia of Vlasov distinguishes itself from the USSR simply by its political color," said the Ukrainians. It would keep the same space, the same economic potential; the mentality of the Russian population would remain the same; the UPA would never allow itself to submit to Vlasov and his ideas. Circles close to the UPA declared that the UPA was going to fight Vlasov's army as soon as it appeared in Ukraine; it would fight the ROA the same way it was fighting bolshevism (/221 f. 110RS-111).

Ukrainians distrusted Vlasov all the more when they noticed in Bratislava, Slovakia, that the Russian emigration was generally very pro-Soviet, seeing in the Soviets defenders of the Russian homeland against German invaders who wanted to destroy Russia (the Russian Empire) (/223 f. 13RS).

Continuing their efforts to unite all anti-Bolshevik forces under the sole leadership of Vlasov's committee and to diminish the mistrust of Ukrainians, Germans arranged an interview of Vlasov over the radio for 5 January 1945. Referring to the *Prague Manifesto*, Vlasov declared during the interview that Ukraine could become independent. He said: "We recognize at the same time the right of Ukraine to political independence and an independent national development" (BA R 58/1005 f. 23).

However, Ukrainians did not believe this declaration to be sincere. They did not see why their struggle had to be placed under the leadership of a committee of "the peoples of Russia," when they did not consider themselves one of these peoples, did not want to be so, and did not want to be part of Russia.

Himmler, who wanted all nationalities to unite under Vlasov's leadership, but thought that they should not be forced to do so, decided to use all his authority to achieve the project. On 8 January 1945 he declared his opposition to the creation of an independent Ukrainian

committee, so prevent Vlasov from believing that the Germans were playing a double game (NA EAP 161c-32-10/9; Dallin 645). Himmler wanted to be loyal to Vlasov and his cause.

Reorganization, or more exactly, the new official Russian Liberation Army (ROA) began in September 1944. The first Russian division, with its formation beginning in November, numbered 13,000 men in December. They then formed a second division and planned a third. On 28 January 1945, Hitler appointed Vlasov commander-in-chief of the "Russian Armed Forces." Vlasov received full power to form new divisions and regroup already existing Russian units to incorporate them into the ROA. A German historian wrote: "Since 28 January 1945, the ROA had become an armed force of an allied state of Germany, whose units, from an operational point of view, can remain only temporarily under Wehrmacht's orders" (Hoffmann 32, 64).

At the beginning of 1945, Vlasov's Russian land force (*Landstreitkräfte der ROA*) numbered approximately 45,000 men and the air force (*Luftwaffe der ROA*) 5,000 men (Hoffmann 80).

Meanwhile, although the Ukrainian National Committee seemed to exist, it had neither legal status nor recognition. General Shandruk, designated by some Ukrainian circles as well as by some other Ukrainian leaders, as president of this committee, waited patiently, hoping that the Germans would allow the Ukrainian National Committee to organize a national army, and that the Division SS *Galicia* could be transformed into the first Ukrainian division (BA R 70 Slow./223 f. 26).

Time passed. The Ukrainians still did not want to be commanded by the Russians, be part of the Russian Committee or Vlasov's Russian army. Finally, on 23 February 1945, Rosenberg, with Berger's consent, went ahead with the Ukrainian National Committee, recognized General Shandruk as president of this committee and charged him with setting it up (Dallin 646).

Thus the Ukrainian National Committee was set up officially on 12 March 1945: General Pavlo Shandruk, president; V. Kubiovych (former president of the Ukrainian Central Committee of Cracow) and O. Semenenko (former mayor of Kharkiv), vice-presidents; P. Tereshchenko, acting secretary. The committee, which was going to be recognized by Rosenberg the same day (*Entsyklopedia Ukr.* 9:3435), was thus created

with the sole participation of leaders who had been part of the German civilian administration in occupied Ukraine or who had contact with the occupation authorities. Those who had resisted the German policies in Ukraine and demanded the recognition of Ukraine's independence had refused to associate themselves with this undertaking and had not been accepted by the Germans. Bandera and Stetsko went into hiding to escape SD surveillance.

Appointed by the Ukrainian National Committee as commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, General Shandruk ordered on 19 March 1945 the change of the name of the *14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division SS (ukrainische Nr.1)* to "*First Ukrainian Division*." The Germans, hard pressed, did not oppose this change, but they continued to use the former description.⁵

On 30 March 1945, the Ukrainian National Committee made public a declaration which, without making reference to Germany or the common fighting with Vlasov, declared the aspirations of the Ukrainians for their own sovereign state, and assumed power to organize the Ukrainian National Army. It promised to cooperate freely with other national committees of peoples oppressed by Russian bolshevism (*vom moskowitzischen Bolschewismus*) who, like the Ukrainians, were fighting for their independence and a free life (BA R 6/141 f. 53-54).

A short time later, while the Ukrainians, almost on their own authority, but receiving some support from the Germans, tried to form a national army independent of the Russian army (to be recalled that General Shandruk had not been appointed by Hitler), General Vlasov, at the head of an army organized with the help from the highest authorities of Nazi Germany, was swearing an oath of loyalty to "holy Russia, one and indivisible" (Hoffmann 84).

In the beginning of April the Ukrainian National Committee, still independent of Vlasov's committee, established its seat in Augsburg with the help of German authorities. The Ukrainian National Army, in the process of formation, remained independent of Vlasov's ROA, but Ukrainian leaders, conscious of the impending defeat of the Reich, decided to contact the Western Allies and succeeded in doing so early May 1945 before the capitulation of Nazi Germany. The Ukrainian division which had been engaged only on the eastern front, was

withdrawn from the Slovakia front and led to the west, surrendering to the Anglo-Americans and being interned in Rimini, Italy.⁶ With the fall of the Third Reich, the Ukrainian National Committee ceased to exist.

Ukraine's Contribution to War

Before leaving the question of losses incurred by Ukraine, losses of the Soviet Union have to be addressed briefly.

By 18 November 1942 the German army was occupying nearly 2,000,000 km² of the Soviet territories inhabited prior to the war by 85,000,000 people (Cf. *Sovetskaya Ukraina v gody 3:525*). The western republics of the USSR (the Baltic Republics, Belorussia, and Ukraine) were completely occupied by the German troops who occupied only 660,000 km² of the territory of the Federal Republic of Russia with approximately 27,000,000 inhabitants.

According to Soviet sources, more than 20,000,000 Soviet citizens lost their lives during the war. This number, including the losses of all republics of the Soviet Union, was made public for the first time in the early 1960s. Kept secret until then, it is perhaps an exaggerated figure as computations confirm. More probably the total war losses of the USSR were below 20,000,000.

Germans took approximately 5,700,000 Soviets as prisoners of war of whom only 1,000,000 survived to the end of the war and between 800,000 and 1,000,000 joined auxiliary units, protection police, eastern legions, etc. (*Anatomie des SS-Staates* 2:165, 232). Thus between 3,700,000 and 3,900,000 Soviet prisoners of war died in the camps.

According to official numbers, Germans also exterminated on Soviet territory approximately 6,000,000 civilians. To these 10,000,000 civilian victims (prisoners of war and civilians) must be added 10,000,000 military victims, bringing the total to approximately 20,000,000 (Urlanis 321).

But another Soviet source gives the number for military losses as 8,000,000 (Kozlov 159). In that case the human losses of the USSR did not exceed 18,000,000 (3,700,000 to 3,900,000 prisoners of war, 6,000,000 civilians, 8,000,000 killed at the front).⁷

As far as Ukraine is concerned, civilian losses (prisoners of war and civilians) exceeded military losses because of massive extermination of prisoners of war and the civilian population in ghettos, camps, and prisons and during activities taken against resistance and military operations.

According to Soviet sources, there were more than 200 concentration camps and camps of forced labor in Ukraine, several of them death camps. Here are some official numbers on the extermination of human beings in the camps in Ukraine: 102,000 in Rivne; more than 200,000 in Camp Yanivsky in Lviv; more than 100,000 in Babi Yar near Kiev; 140,000 in the war prison camp of Lviv; 150,000 in Gross-Lazarett Slavuta (Kamianets-Podilsky region); 340,000 in Darnytsia near Kiev. Women and children as well as men lost their lives in these camps (8,000 children in only two months in Camp Yanivsky) (*Sovyetskaya Ukraina v gody* 257, 262, 277, 289, 290; *Nimetsko-fashystsky okupatsiynyi* 340, 347, 353, 354).

The fate of the Czech village of Lidice and the French village of Oradour-sur-Glane are well-known. Germans burned them with hundreds of inhabitants. But who knows that Ukraine had 250 *Lidices* and *Oradours* (including ninety-seven in Volhynia; thirty-two in the Zhytomyr region; twenty-one in the Chernihiv region; seventeen in the Kiev region) (*Ukrainska RSR v Velykiy* 3:149). To this must be added public executions, executions in prisons, deaths resulting from fighting, disease and starvation, and the extermination of the Jewish population.

Victims of mass executions carried out by the *Einsatzkommandos* during the first weeks of occupation, the Jewish population was concentrated into ghettos of towns, and finally deported to concentration camps. An estimate of extermination of the Jewish population in all occupied territories of the Soviet Union varies from between 700,000 to 1,050,000 (Reitlinger *Die Endlösung* 573; Hofer 306-307) out of the 10,000,000 civilian losses. To this estimate, however, must be added 1,200,000 additional Jewish victims in the western territories of Belorussia and Ukraine, who are generally included among the losses in Poland. Then the losses would rise from 1,700,000 to 2,200,000. Other authors estimate the losses at 2,500,000 or even 3,000,000 (Ainsztein 383-384;

Rozenblum 44; *Kniga o ruskom Yevreystvie* 71). Soviet sources give the number as 1,200,000.

Losses of the Jewish population in Ukraine were probably between 1,500,000 and 1,800,000 (of the total 5,500,000 civilian losses).

A study of the overall losses of the USSR leads to the following statistics for Ukraine: more than 5,500,000 of civilians and 2,500,000 deaths at the front, bringing the total to 8,000,000 (19% of the total population). The official losses of Ukraine represent thus 40% to 44% of the total losses of the USSR.

But the demographical losses of Ukraine are higher. In January 1941 the RSS of Ukraine had 41,900,000 inhabitants 14,000,000 of them in cities. By 1945 there were in Ukraine only 27,400,000 inhabitants with only 7,600,000 in cities (*Ukrainsky Istorychny Journal* December 1973, 12:8). The total demographical losses thus rise to approximately 14,500,000 (emigrated; evacuated; deported; mobilized; lost through natural causes; died of illness or starvation; killed).

The 2,200,000 persons deported from Ukraine to Germany as workers must not be forgotten (most of them were repatriated after the war). In all, Germans had deported 2,800,000 persons from the Soviet territories. Those deported from the RSS of Ukraine represent thus 78.6% of the total number of the USSR (Koval 153).

In 1940 Kiev had 900,000 inhabitants. By 1945 the capital had only 186,000 inhabitants (*Radianska Ukraïnian* 13-10-1968).

Destruction due to war was enormous: 714 cities and towns and 28,000 villages destroyed or burned down; 10,000,000 people without shelter; 16,150 enterprises, almost 33,000 schools and instruction building and 18,000 hospitals and dispensaries destroyed, etc. (Appendix, Doc.#193). Material damage of Ukraine has been estimated at 286 billion rubles (the damage in the entire USSR: 679 billion with 255 billion for Russia; seventy-five billion for Belorussia, twenty billion for Latvia, seventeen billion for Lithuania, and sixteen billion for Estonia) (Dereviankin ; *Le crime méth.* 408).

The damages incurred by Ukraine thus represent 42% of those of the USSR. The Soviet government, while allocating in the years 1943-1945 seventy-five billion rubles for the reconstruction of Soviet territories

that had incurred damages, accorded Ukraine only 18,300,000,000 rubles—only 24% of the allocated sum (Dereviankin).

It is generally admitted that World War II cost humanity approximately 50,000,000 lives (21,800,000 military losses and 28,200,000 civilian losses). Ukraine had approximately 2,500,000 military losses and at least 5,500,000 civilian losses—a total of 8,000,000 dead. Severe losses were also incurred in Poland—approximately 5,000,000 dead. Germany, initiator of the war, lost 6,500,000 persons. Calculation of Russia's losses is difficult. Civilian deaths numbered 1,781,000. (vs. 5,500,000 in Ukraine). A total of 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 were killed at the front (of the 8,000,000 total military losses, including 2,500,000 in Ukraine and 1,500,000 to 2,500,000 in other republics); it can be estimated that Russia's total losses of human lives was between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000, thus fewer than those in Ukraine (Appendix, Doc.#194).

The official number of 20,000,000 Soviet losses obviously does not mean Russian losses.

CONCLUSION

Indisputably, Hitler sought to establish the hegemony of Germany over Europe and the world. In September 1941 he thought that the battle for this hegemony would "be decided by possession of the Russian space" (*Das Dritte Reich* 185). For him this space was not only a vital space for the German people but he also needed the wealth of Ukraine. Domination of Europe demanded domination of Eastern Europe. Even after Stalingrad, he was still convinced that the German Reich would one day dominate all of Europe and, according to him, the way would be open for German domination of the world, because "he who has Europe will seize the leadership of the world" (154).

By attacking the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany was counting not only on the power and technical superiority of its army but also on the aversion of the populations to the Bolshevik regime. Indeed, German troops were welcomed with joy in all countries of the USSR, in the Baltic Republics, Belorussia, and Russia, not only in Ukraine. But very quickly this joy was displaced by disappointment, fear, and resistance.

Inhuman behavior, terror, disproportionate exploitation of the population by the National Socialist authorities strengthened Soviet Russia's position which exploited fully all errors committed by the Third Reich (as well as weakness of the western powers). The mistakes of the Nazis contributed to the strengthening of the Soviet partisan movement in all occupied territories, but in Ukraine, besides Soviet partisans, other resistance, very powerful national resistance also appeared and was directed against Soviet as well as Nazi domination.

The scope of the independist national resistance in Ukraine surprised the Germans who expected national movement easy to subdue,

especially in the part of Ukraine that had belonged to Poland between the two wars. They did not think the Ukrainians of Soviet Ukraine (where the Soviet government seemed to have eliminated all possibility of resurgence of national feelings) were going to fight so quickly for independence, nor did they think the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists of Bandera (especially because Bandera remained imprisoned during the entire occupation of Ukraine), despite constant arrests and repressions, would establish itself in the entire Ukraine and set up the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

Soviet Russian authorities did not expect this either. They saw themselves forced to mobilize Ukrainian forces in their favor and prevent the Ukrainian population from falling under the influence of the Ukrainian independist movement, especially the OUN-B. They decided that the best way to attain their goals was to label the Ukrainian nationalists as Nazi German collaborators, thus discrediting them in the eyes of the population and international opinion, dooming the Ukrainian nationalists to opprobrium and destruction.

Nazi Germany was not content with breaking the Ukrainian endeavor of taking power in their country and suppressing the proclamation of independence but it proceeded to divide Ukraine, giving parts of its territories to Hungary and Romania, and attaching Galicia to the General Government, together with Poland. The rest of the Ukrainian territories were incorporated into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, a commissariat of the Reich.

Hitler refused to listen to Rosenberg's proposals concerning opening of a university in Kiev and granting some cultural freedom in Ukraine. He appointed Erich Koch Reichskommissar in Ukraine, because Hitler found him ready to follow his instructions to the letter and because Koch was a ruthless man. In Hitler's general quarters Koch was called the "second Stalin" and considered the only one capable of carrying out his duties in Ukraine.¹

In the political ranks of Nazi Germany there were two current ideas: one, an imperialistic, the other, moderate, European, more or less favorable to the independence of peoples. But the former, supported by Hitler and Himmler, predominated during the entire existence of the Third Reich. Strangely, Himmler, who distrusted the Russians and who

considered them the avant-garde of Asia, of a barbarian world, had from 1944 on advocated a "strong Russia," according to his own expression—a Russia incorporating the same countries as the USSR. Simultaneously, all the national committees as well as the national units of East Europeans were to be placed under the leadership of Vlasov's Russian committee. This concept differed from Rosenberg's and from other "pro-European" circles, especially the European office of the RSHA (Fritz Arlt, Otto Wächter, etc.). But the German processes and pressures to fit everyone under the Russian committee met with fierce opposition from the Ukrainians and some allies. Ukrainians never accepted this position.

Were the Western Allies of the anti-Hitler coalition interested in what was going on in Eastern Europe, the wishes and feelings of the peoples in this part of the world? No. Preoccupied with the demands of the war, they made continual concessions to Soviet Russia, displaying an astonishing lack of knowledge of Soviet reality and pro-Russian sentiments. Not only Roosevelt constantly gave in to Stalin. In October 1944 in Moscow, while discussing with Stalin the division of influences in the different countries of Eastern Europe, Churchill proposed a 90% Russian influence in Romania, 10% in Greece, 50% in Yugoslavia, 50% in Hungary, 75% in Bulgaria (Loth 52). In June 1942, during a crisis in his relations with the British government, General de Gaulle asked Bogomolov, the Russian ambassador in London if the USSR would agree to receiving him and his army on Soviet territory. He wanted to send the French division of Levant to the eastern front, but the British had opposed him for technical reasons. In December of the same year de Gaulle told the new Soviet ambassador in London, Maiski: "I hope that the Russians will be in Berlin before the Americans" (Duroselle *L'abîme* 347, 408). Russians did arrive in Berlin before the Americans, but they did a foreseeable thing: they took under their control the countries through which the Red Army had passed.

The Yalta Conference, held in the Crimea from 4 to 11 February 1945, confirmed the thus created situation. One of the consequences of the war was that Stalin's position became predominant in Europe and in the world. Roosevelt, sapped of strength by illness (he was to die several weeks later), was unable to supervise affairs appropriately. They agreed

on the zones of occupation in Germany. France, though absent, was given a zone of occupation taken from the British and the American zones because of British insistence.

As far as the Polish frontiers were concerned, Roosevelt favored the 1919 Curzon line. Churchill proposed a frontier farther to the east, but Stalin opposed this in the name of Ukraine's and Belorussian's rights. Poland was to receive compensation in the west.

In these transactions, concern about the wishes of the peoples affected and their aspirations found no place. At a time when they had no certitude of being able to return one day to Warsaw, the Polish government in exile in London continued its fight to restore the pre-war eastern frontiers, including Ukrainian territories where the Ukrainian independist movement was predominant, not thinking it expedient to try to understand the Ukrainians or their fight or to come to an agreement with them. In Yalta, the Western Allies could only note that the Russians had at their disposal a Polish government in Lublin. They thought they could get a constitution of a "Polish Provisional Government of a National Unity." History reveals the result. The Americans were primarily interested in Soviet intervention against Japan, hoping to save American lives.

In Yalta discussion also focused on the future of the Organization of the United Nations. From the beginning the Soviet government had demanded the admission of the sixteen Soviet republics as founding members. On 7 February Molotov declared that Moscow would be satisfied with the admission as founding members of two or three Soviet republics, especially Ukraine and Belorussia.

According to Molotov, this demand was based on the fact that these Soviet republics in February 1944 had received the leadership of their respective foreign policies; they were thus states with full rights. The two republics (Molotov spoke in the beginning of three republics including also Lithuania) had besides "borne in the war the greatest sacrifices, particularly Ukraine" (Stettinius 168). Stalin discussed this question with Roosevelt. Edward Stettinius noted: "The president told me this evening that Stalin felt his position in the Ukraine was difficult and unsure. Stalin had declared that Ukraine's right to vote was essential for the safeguard of Soviet unity. No one had been able to determine the

difficulties in Ukraine, but, it goes without saying, that during the German advance we have heard talk in Washington of the possibility of Ukraine's separating from the Soviet Union" (177).

Stalin's worry was caused by the strength of the Ukrainian movement for independence. The UPA and the OUN-B were at an apogee of their activities in Ukraine occupied by the Red Army. Ukrainians had seen the beginning conflict between the Western Powers and Stalinist Russia, a conflict they were hoping for wholeheartedly. Roosevelt and the American government, as well as the British government, however, had no idea of what was going on in Ukraine and so were not disposed to exploit the difficulties of Soviet Russia in that country. Hesitantly the western powers agreed to admit Ukraine and Belorussia as founding members of the Organization of the United Nations.

World War II ended in Eastern Europe with a spectacular retreat of western influence in all countries occupied by the Red Army and installation of dictatorships based more or less on the Soviet Russian model; in the gigantic battle for the possession of the riches of Ukraine, Ukraine suffered the worst destruction and heaviest losses in human lives. Ukrainians had fought vigorously for their freedom and, to a large extent, contributed to the defeat of Hitler's Germany.

NOTES

Notes to Chapter 1

¹The great Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) entitled his ten-volume work *The History of Rus'-Ukraine*. Cf. *Istoria Ukraïny-Russi* (Kyiv, 1905-1913); new edition (New York: Knyhospilka, 1954-1958). For the history of Ukraine see also *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*. 2 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963 and 1970).

²Cf. Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, *Two Conceptions of the History of Ukraine and Russia* (London: Ukrainian Publishers, 1968). Russian historians created confusion by translating the term "Rus'" as "Russia." Thus Rus'-Ukraine became "Russia," and the Ruthenians became "Russians." See N. Katliar, S. Koultschitski, *Kiev aux temps anciens et aujourd'hui* (Kiev: Editions politiques ukrainiennes, 1983). Russia in the true sense of the word did not yet exist.

³Cf. *Ukrainian Encyclopedia* (in Ukrainian) (Paris-New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1966) 5:1792; I. P. Chaskolsky, *Normanskaya teoria v sovremennoy bourgouaznoy nauke* (The Normanist theory in contemporary bourgeois studies) (Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1965).

⁴On the evolution of the national movement, see W. Kosyk, *La politique de la France à l'égard de l'Ukraine, mars 1917—février 1918*, 11-35.

⁵Stalin's point of view concerning the national question resembles Lenin's, but Lenin was always more nuanced and less arrogant.

In May 1917, after the Bolsheviks' seizure of power, Stalin declared that the national question in the Russian empire should be resolved in the following manner: "a) recognition of people's right to separation; b) for the people who remain...regional autonomy; c) for national minorities,—special laws guaranteeing them free development" (Stalin, *Marxism* 98).

In October of 1920, when Soviet Russia was on the verge of reconquering most of the territories of the former empire, Stalin wrote in *Pravda* of 10 October 1920: "Central Russia, the seat of world revolution, cannot hold on for long without aid

from the peripheral regions that abound in raw materials, combustibles, and foodstuffs" (Stalin, *Marxism* 114). Consequently the Russian Bolsheviks are "for separation of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and other colonies from the Entente, because then separation means liberation of these countries oppressed by imperialism, the strengthening of the positions of the revolution." But they are "against separation of the peripheral regions from Russia, because then separation means enslavement of these peripheral regions by imperialism, weakening of Russia's revolutionary power, strengthening of the positions of imperialism." Russian communists therefore ought to "fight against the separation of the peripheral regions from Russia" (114-115).

⁴*Danziger Zeitung*, 7 April 1927, quoted in *Ukraina i zarubiznyi svit* (Ukraine and external world) (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo politichnoi literatury, 1970) 213.

⁷6,000 prisoners in 1922; 200,000 in 1927; 2,500,000 in 1930; 4,500,000 in 1933; 7,800,000 in 1936. Cf. *L'Est Européen*, April – May, 1984; 26.

⁸On the subject of famine and repressions, see Maning 93-148; Sullivant 65-233; Conquest; Serbyn and Krawchenko.

⁹Kubijovyc and Zukovsky *Ukraina* 3; Almanach "Krynytsia for 1937, Lviv, 1937, 51; Sciborskyj 5; *Uk. Encyclopedia* 1:164-165.

¹⁰To give weight to his opposition to Yary's admittance, the Nazi party delegate recalled that Yary's wife was Jewish.

¹¹This is incorrect. The murderer, H. Matseyko, had left Poland and had sought refuge in Argentina where he lived under an assumed name. He died 15 August 1966.

¹²Certain writers tried hard to integrate the OUN activities into the policies of the German government and its agencies (APA, Abwehr). Thus, for example, while mentioning the assassination attempt in his "Chronology of the National Socialist Foreign Policies," Hans-Adolf Jacobsen suggests simply that this attempt was part of the Nazi foreign policy. In other words, the OUN killed Pieracki on account of Germany (Jacobsen 79).

We have found no indication in the secret German archives linking the assassination and the Germans, although some unsigned notes of July 1934 from Danzig contained some very fanciful assertions. Analysis of these notes revealed their source to be Osyp Dumin. Born in 1893, he had in the early 1920s held the position of head of intelligence services of UVO directed by Konovalts. In 1924, he rejoined

the Petroshevykh group that advocated a pro-Soviet orientation. Because Konovalts was totally against this orientation, Dumin tried to remove him from the leadership position of this movement. In 1925, after the conspiracy had failed, Dumin was excluded from UVO. From that time on Dumin relentlessly opposed Konovalts and his collaborator Yary, constantly plotting against them. Dumin was in constant touch with the German intelligence services and was a member of the German Institute for Eastern Studies in Königsberg in East Prussia.

Dumin claimed that the assassination plan against Pieracki had been conceived by Germans from General Schleicher's group who opposed the Nazis (Schleicher was killed on Hitler's order on 30 June 1934). The assassination was to have taken place in a conference room when Goebbels, who at that time was on a visit to the Polish capital, would be present. Dumin wanted to make others believe that the OUN had also wished to assassinate Goebbels at the same time to compromise Konovalts and especially Yary, Dumin's rival in UVO and the liaison with the Reichswehr in the 1920s. W. Zelenski, prosecutor at the Warsaw trial, who had knowledge of papers from the secret OUN archives, stressed in a work on this question that there was no proof that the assassination involved German services; rather "the Reichswehr had warned the Polish authorities before the attempt against Pieracki that there could be Ukrainian attempts in Poland" (Zelenski 61).

¹³Prior to that date, the capital of the RSS of Ukraine was Kharkiv.

¹⁴Jacobson writes on the subject of the relationship between the exiled and Rosenberg's bureau: "The interconnections probably led through some Baltic Germans, such as M. v. Scheubner-Richter, O. v. Kursell, Baron v. Manteuffel and Count v. Rewentlow to the former czarist general W. v. Biskupsky, who in Berlin represented the monarchist wing of the émigrés, e.g., the tendencies of Grand Duke Cyril Romanov, as well as members of Skoropadsky's group, Konovalts', Poltawetz-Ostrianitza's, etc." (Jacobson 449). Such a mixture could lead only to monumental errors of interpretation. Combining entire groups into one single set of émigrés, placing the followers of Skoropadsky, Konovalts, Poltawetz-Ostrianitza and, especially, mixing Russians and Ukrainians was a serious mistake. For example, Konovalts knew neither Biskupsky nor Poltawetz-Ostrianitza, nor any of the Baltic Germans.

Elsewhere, in referring to Alan Bullock's book *Hitler—A Study in Tyranny* (London: Adhams Books, 1952, 71), G. Reitlinger asserted that in 1923 Rosenberg and Scheubner-Richter had presented Skoropadsky to Hitler, adding: "It is asserted that Skoropadsky took part in financing *Völkischer Beobachter*, the first newspaper of the Nazi party, and it could be that therein lies the basic reason for Rosenberg's passionate intervention on behalf of the Ukrainian nationalists in 1941" (Reitlinger *Ein Haus* 155). This surmise concerning Rosenberg is false. Likewise unfounded is

the assertion concerning Skoropadsky's financing of the first National Socialist newspaper, for this has no confirmation either in German archives or in Ukrainian publications or archives. A. Dallin asserts, in contrast, that it was the Russian general Biskupsky, director of the Russian *Vertrauensstelle* in Berlin, close advisor of Grand Duke Cyril Romanov, who had aided in financing the Nazi newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter* (Dallin 113). How could Skoropadsky finance the Nazi newspaper when he had no wealth? He found himself in such need that in 1926 his German friends approached the German government to obtain financial aid for him. In their petition they specified that Skoropadsky, who found himself "in extreme financial poverty," had need of this aid "not to support his political efforts...but simply to allow him and his family to live decently" (BA R43 II/155 f. 80). This was not the case of the Russian general Biskupsky nor of Prince Cyril Romanov, yet certain writers, for example G. Reitlinger, omit with surprising finesse any in-depth study of the relationship between the Russian émigrés and the Germans, while stressing disproportionately the relationships—true or false—that might have existed between the Ukrainians and the Germans. They say nothing, for example, about the agreement that General Biskupsky had concluded with General Ludendorff in 1923, and the last paragraph that foresaw "the replacement of the USSR summit by a legal monarchist force of a fascist form—Russian National Socialism" (BA NS 43/35 f.48).

Notes to Chapter 2

¹G. Reitlinger's presentation of the events is unacceptable. He maintains: "In 1938, as the Germans were playing with the idea of setting up a Ukrainian state in Carpathia from the ruins of Czechoslovakia, Konovalets, as representative of the National Ukrainian Committee OUN, was negotiating with Admiral Canaris and the Abwehr" (194). Hitler never intended to create a Ukrainian state, and Konovalets was assassinated by a Soviet agent on 23 May 1938, about four months before Munich, i.e., at a time when the question of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy had as yet not been raised.

²This was the opinion, especially of the pro-Russian diplomats such as George Kennan.

³This text first appeared in *Cahiers d'information française*, no.2, February 1939.

⁴*Ukrainske Slovo* was the official organ of the OUN.

⁵The members of this unit dispersed. Some joined the police on Ukrainian territory west of the demarcation line; others rejoined factory protection units

(*Werkschutz*); still others returned to civilian life. Numerous writers, to prove the "close and steady" relations between the OUN and the Abwehr, exaggerated disproportionately and distorted certain facts concerning the BBH unit. Some of these authors remade this relative Abwehr-OUN relationship into an espionage novel far removed from with reality (Cf. Leverkuehn, Reile, Brockdorf *Geheimkommandos*, Brockdorf *Kollaboration*). Certain distortions are also found in the works of Dallin and Reitlinger already cited.

⁷The Curzon line was presented to the Russians by Lord Curzon, minister of foreign affairs of Great Britain on 11 July 1920 to demarcate the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Republics. In fact, the Curzon line was established in 1919 to demarcate the frontier between Poland and the Ukrainian state. It was recognized on 8 December 1919 by the Superior Council of the Entente. This line passed to the northeast of Grondo, Yalovka, Nemyriv, Brest-Litovsk, Dorohusk, Ustyluh; to the east of Hrubeshiv (Hrubieszow), to the west of Rava Russka; and to the east of Peremyshl (Przemysl) as far as the Carpathian Mountains. The Curzon line corresponds approximately to the ethnographic limits between the Poles and the Lithuanians, Belorussians and Ukrainians. It put the Ukrainians at a disadvantage leaving important Ukrainian ethnographic territories on the Polish side. Cf. Kubijovyc and Kosyk.

⁸In his directive no.4 of 25 September 1939 Hitler demanded: "3. From now on all flow of refugees from the east to the west across the line of demarcation is to be stopped with the exception of the Volksdeutsche and the Ukrainian activists" (ADAP, D, VIII, Doc.#135). A. Dallin tendentiously interprets this provision as proof for a "special status which the Ukrainian nationalists enjoyed in German eyes" (116). But this did not correspond with reality. Directive no.4 reflected the actual situation. The Germans were expecting a flow of 300,00 to 500,000 Ukrainian refugees (Lahousen 18). Western Ukraine was known for its anti-communist and anti-bolshevik feelings. Unable and unwilling to accept such a significant number of refugees, the German government had to take restrictive measures. Hitler's directive no.4 allowed the passage of at least Ukrainian activists, i.e., the anti-communists who feared repression, but not all the nationalists.

⁹The letter was dated 17 September 1940.

Notes to Chapter 3

¹Cf. *Zlochyny komunistychnoi Moskvy y Ukraïni vliii 1941 roku* (New York: Prolog, 1960). The press published much information on this subject, e.g., "A

Terrible Pogrom of Ukrainians," "Women and Children Victims of NKVD," "The Living Walled in with Cadavers," "Massacre in Dubno Prison" (*Krakivski Visti* of 8 July 1941); "Bolshevik Atrocities in Lviv," "Terrible Massacre of 1,500 Ukrainians in Luts'k" (9 July 1941); "Bolsheviks Burned 180 Ukrainians Alive in Stanyslaviv" (15 July 1941); cf. also Alfred M. de Zayas *Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle* (Munich, 1980).

²On activities of EK group C see the work of Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, *Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981) 186–195; Helmut Krausnick, *Hitlers Einsatzgruppen: Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges 1938–1942* (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Tagebuch Verlag, 1985) 162–169.

³This river constituted the frontier between the General Government and Ukraine.

⁴The first author to maintain that the two Ukrainian units belonged to the Brandenburg regiment is probably Paul Leverkühn (*Der geheime Nachrichtendienst der deutschen Wehrmacht*, Frankfurt a.M., 1951, 164–165). But when one reads in his book that Battalion Nachtigall was commanded on the Ukrainian side by "an old partisan by the name of Skoprynka, killed in 1951 at the time when he led a rebellion in the Kiev vicinity," the unreliability of his sources of information is evident. The single sentence quoted here includes at least five mistakes inadmissible in a work on history. The Ukrainian commander of the Battalion Nachtigall was Roman Shukhevych, who at the time was only a young Ukrainian officer, not "an old partisan." He took the assumed name Taras Chuprynka (not Skoprynka) in the fall of 1943 when he became commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurrection Army (UPA). He did not lead a rebellion but the UPA, and he died on 5 March 1950, not in 1951, in Bilohorshcha near Lviv in Western Ukraine during an assault of NKVD troops against UPA general quarters.

Paul Leverkühn's assertions were picked up by Gert Buchheit (*Der deutsche Geheimdienst*, Munich: List Verlag, 1966, 320), and amplified in Werner Brockdorf's book, in a chapter full of fantasies (*Geheimkommandos des zweiten Weltkrieges*, Munich: Verlag Welsermühl, 1967, 126–138).

Neither of the two Ukrainian battalions is mentioned in the composition of the regiment z.b.V. 800, presented in the serious work of Georg Tessin *Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1935–1945*, Band XII (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1975).

Remarkably, nothing is found on the two Ukrainian units in the journal of General Lahousen, head of Abwehr II. He says nothing about preliminary talks, nothing on instruction of the two battalions, nothing on their nature. The only time he mentions the two Ukrainian units, he does so under their Ukrainian abbreviations

DUN, noting that Riko Yary "who now presents himself as a colonel of the DUN and head of Group South, sent a telegram to the Führer, asking him to enroll the organization of the Ukrainian nationalists DUN in the formation of the German Wehrmacht to be able to take part in the fight for freeing of Ukraine" (*Ifz Kriegstagebuch Abwehr II*: 151).

³Cf. Yuri Lopatynsky, "Hrupa Pivnich t. zv. Nachtigall," *Svoboda* (Jersey City) 15 June 1960. Information found on this subject in the books of Werner Brockdorf *Geheimkommandos des zweiten Weltkriegs* 126-133 and *Kollaboration oder Widerstand* 213-229 is inaccurate and fictitious. The author is confused for he mentions among "Ukrainian collaborators" the Russian brigade of Kaminski (227) who has nothing in common with Ukraine and Ukrainians. Lokot, the district where Kaminski organized his brigade to fight against Soviet partisans is in Russia (south of Briansk). The district was officially called *Russischer Selbstverwaltungsbezirk Lokotj*. Kaminski, a Russian of Polish origin also organized the Russian National Socialist Workers' party (BA R 6-18 f. 158; R 6/148 f. 15).

⁴From 1959 on, Soviet, Polish, and East German propaganda bureaus have maintained that the Battalion Nachtigall had taken part in extermination of Polish intellectuals in Lviv. While spreading this information, Henri Michel writes in his book *La seconde guerre mondiale* (Paris: PUF, 1968) 1:265: "All conquered regions were areas of cold-blooded, premeditated extermination. Before the Nuremberg tribunal numerous examples were brought forth. The Gestapo had established a list of *a priori* condemned persons. A 'special' battalion called 'Rossignol' (nightingale), part of the 'Brandenburg' regiment, was charged with execution." "Nightingale" is in German "*Nachtigall*."

The first battalion of the regiment Brandenburg and Battalion Nachtigall had been charged only with security and protection of installations, warehouses, and public buildings in the Lviv. The SD *Sonderkommando*, that had arrived in Lviv on 30 June was charged with the executions of which Henri Michel speaks. Battalion Nachtigall has never been implicated in police actions, nor as taking part in executions; its name was never cited during the Nuremberg trials. Rather, the international tribunal of Nuremberg, based on the report of the extraordinary Soviet commission of inquiry on German crimes in the Lviv region (charge document no. USSR-6/1), established during the 15 February 1946 hearings that the executions were the work of special Gestapo units, thus of the SD (IMT, German ed., 7:540-541). On 30 August 1946 Soviet public prosecutor Rudenko declared during the Nuremberg process: "Intellectuals also were objects of Gestapo persecutions...These persecutions were carried out according to a previously adopted plan. Thus, for example, Gestapo units had a list of the most eminent representatives of the intellectuals of the city that were to be liquidated, from before the capture of the

city of Lviv by the German army. Massive arrests and executions of professors, doctors, lawyers, writers, and painters began immediately after the capture of Lviv by the German army...Inquiry made after the liberation of the city by the Red Army has established that the Germans have killed more than seventy scientists, artists, and engineers whose bodies were burned by the Gestapo" (IMT, XXII:394).

Books on this subject published in the Soviet Union and in Poland before October 1959 never blamed Battalion Nachtigall (cf. Tadeusz Cyprian and Jerzy Sawicki, *Nie Oszczędzać Polski* Varsovie [Warsaw]: Iskry Publishing House, 1959; English edition: *Nazi Rule in Poland, 1939 – 1945*, Warsaw: Polonia Publishing House, 1961, 112-115).

The change came after a press conference of an East German professor, Albert Norden, held on 23 October 1959 in East Berlin. Professor Norden blamed a West German minister, Professor T. Oberländer, accusing him of having ordered the liquidation of Jews and Polish intellectuals of Lviv.

T. Oberländer, appointed minister of expelled and repatriated Germans and war victims in 1953 by Adenauer, had drawn Moscow's and East Berlin's hatred because of his fierce anti-Communist and anti-Soviet position. To fight him, it was necessary to charge him with Nazi crimes. A search through Oberländer's past revealed he had been a liaison officer to Battalion Nachtigall in June and July 1941. Moscow and East Berlin conceived a plan to defame the West German minister by maintaining that Nachtigall had committed crimes on T. Oberländer's orders. Moscow did everything necessary to find "witnesses" and the affair was launched with a din. Professor Norden accused Oberländer and Nachtigall of having liquidated approximately 3,000 Poles and Jews. The campaign resulted in T. Oberländer's dismissal. The courts, however, could never find anything against him (Cf. Hermann Raschofer, *Der Fall Oberländer* (Tübingen-Neckar: Verlag Fritz Schlichtenmayer, 1962).

Objective Polish witnesses and writers invalidate accusations against Battalion Nachtigall (Cf. *Przegląd Lekarski*, XX, Seria II, no.1, Cracow, 1964; Albert Zygmunt, *Lwowski Wydział Lekarski w czasie okupacji hitlerowskiej, 1941 – 1944* Wrocław, 1975). See also on this subject official Soviet documents prior to the Oberländer affair, published in a recent noteworthy collection: 1) "Extracts of Acts concerning the Crimes of the Fascist Invaders in Lviv Maintained by the Regional Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the RSS of Ukraine" in *Sovetskaya Ukraïna v gody Velikoy Atiechestvennoy voyny, 1941 – 1945* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1980) 274-281; this document is published in *Nazi Crimes in Ukraine, 1941 – 1944* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka Publishers, 1987) Doc.##57, 207-225. "Information of the Special Commission of Inquiry on Crimes of German-Fascist Invaders in the Territory of the Lviv Region" in *Nimetsko-fashystky okupatsyny rezhyim na Ukraïni* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1963) 349-351. None of these documents accused Battalion Nachtigall.

Notes to Chapter 4

¹German writers give higher numbers: 12,500,000 to 15,000,000 evacuated.

²This document was produced with the documents of accusation during the Nuremberg Nazi Trials under number 014-USSR (7). IMT XXXIX:269-270.

Notes to Chapter 5

¹*Correspondence of the President of the Counsel of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945* (in Russian) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1957) I.

²By the decree of 28 August 1941, the Russian authorities deported more than 500,000 Germans from the Volga and suppressed their autonomous republic. They also deported a certain number of Germans from Ukraine. Cf. Walter Kolarz, *La Russie et ses colonies* (Paris: Fasquelle, 1954) 107-108.

³Elected Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church on 8 September 1943.

⁴A Russian National Socialist party was founded on 25 November 1942 on the Russian occupied territory.

⁵According to a different witness, the underground activities were decided on 7 January 1942 (page 335).

⁶*Generalplan Ost*, collection of texts, chosen and annotated by Jan Zaborowski (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwosci, 1977).

⁷With the help of a Ukrainian informer.

⁸The text of the Generalplan Ost is in the World War II Record Division, Alexandria, Virginia, USA (R.G. 1048 EAP 66-c-12-2/20).

⁹In Korovyinka, for example, close to Terebovla, and in other locations.

¹⁰Rosenberg learned of the events in the village of Bilozirka. On 15 February 1943 he ordered the removal from Kremianets of Gebietskommissar Müller who had

been responsible for this action (BA R 6/79 f. 32), but, in the end, Müller was not removed.

¹¹After the war, Willi Wirsing (who spoke Russian and was suspected by the Ukrainian circles of working for the Russians) held in 1948 and 1949 the position of a security officer of the 3rd Area of the UNRRA in Würzburg, not far from Frankfurt, in West Germany. Unmasked by his former victims, he was sentenced to five years of imprisonment. (Cf. V. Makar 101).

¹²Today—Patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church.

¹³Russia had to shift attention and principal national activities toward the northeast, i.e., Siberia. Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote that Russia simultaneously had to withdraw protection from Eastern Europe and give up border nations including the Baltic States, Ukraine, etc. (Cf. *Lettre aux dirigeants de l'Union soviétique*, Paris: Seuil, 1974, 24-28). However, it is true that since first writing this Solzhenitsyn has changed his mind.

¹⁴Cf. BA R 6/309 f. 69. The RONA was incorporated, first into the Waffen-SS during the Warsaw insurrection, and then into the Vlasov Army. According to some sources, it even reached the number of 20,000 men, divided into five regiments. RONA units were used during the repression of the Warsaw uprising in August—September 1944. The soldiers of the RONA were engaged in pillages and atrocities. Kaminski was tried before a court martial, condemned to death, and shot by the Germans. Cf. Joachim Hoffmann, *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee* (Freiburg: Hoffmann, 1984) 63. Some falsely claim (e.g., George H. Stein, *La Waffen-SS* 273) that the Kaminski brigade was composed "to a large extent" of Ukrainians.

¹⁵The author of this memorandum was probably O.W. Müller.

¹⁶From 29 July 1943 on the detachment of Bulba took the name "Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army" (UNRA).

Notes to Chapter 6

¹Consequently, neither the Ukrainian division nor any of its regiments could be engaged in Warsaw during the ghetto uprising (April—May), as some Polish authors claim.

²The name of the UPA appears for the first time in a German report dated 15 September 1943 (BA-MA RH 22/104 Abwehrstelle Ukraine, Tgb Nr. 16668/04010/43g III C2).

³According to the Soviet work *Ukraïna i zarub. svit* (331) the "decree" constituting the Polish National Committee for Liberation was promulgated by the Krajowa Rada Narodowa in Warsaw on 21 July 1944.

⁴For the text of the main leaders, see *Das Dritte Reich* 2:155.

⁵When on 23 March 1945 Hilter's generals summoned before him the Ukrainian division, he did not know if this was the Galician division or another division. He expressed his distrust regarding Ukrainians, especially the "Austrian Ruthenians" whom he labeled bad soldiers and pacifists, and advised to take away their weapons (Cf. *Höler parle à ses généraux* 340-343).

⁶Captured by the English, the soldiers of the Ukrainian division received the status of members of enemy armed forces who had surrendered voluntarily. After the inquest, the British government decided not to apply to them the secret clause of the Yalta agreements concerning forced repatriation of Soviet citizens. This decision was simple as most of the members of the division were Polish citizens before the war, and the secret clause in question referred only to Soviet citizens of pre-September 1939 frontiers. Ukrainian prisoners of war were freed during 1946 and 1947 and allowed to emigrate to Great Britain and abroad.

In contrast, most of the Russian and Cossack prisoners of war of the Vlasov Russian army were forcefully repatriated to the Soviet Union; many were killed, while others considered "traitors," were interned in concentration camps. Delivered to the Soviet authorities, Vlasov and his eleven generals of the ROA were judged in Moscow, condemned to death, and hanged early in August 1946. On forced repatriation of the 2,000,000 Soviet citizens, see Nicholas Bethel *The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944-1947* (London: André Deutsch), 1974; on repatriation of former soldiers of the Vlasov army, see Joachim Hoffmann, *Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee* 286-324).

⁷This number is perhaps rounded off by the officials to 20,000,000 to absorb losses, due not to the war but to internment conditions in the concentration camps and to Soviet regime repressions.

Notes to Conclusion

¹Erich Koch, responsible for the implementation of Nazi policies in Ukraine in the political, racial, economic, and cultural areas was never judged for the crimes he committed there. Following his orders the German commissars (or at least most of them) applied corporal punishment and recruited forced labor for the Reich, resulting in thousands of deaths. He was directly or indirectly responsible for the bloody repressions and the death of thousands of Ukrainians. Taken prisoner in the British zone of occupation, he was never demanded by the government of the RSS of Ukraine or Moscow for extradition, although Poland demanded his extradition in the early 1950s. Erich Koch was tried in Warsaw for the death of several thousand Poles in the Bialystok region, attached to East Prussia where Koch was Gauleiter. Condemned to death in 1959, he was not executed, claiming to be ill. A veil of mystery covered his ultimate fate. In the west, no one was interested in his case. One author says about him that he "symbolized the keenest and the hardest Nazi," that his name "gave nightmares to children" and that he could not speak on any topic without involving shooting. When it became known in 1949 that he was alive, however, "the memory [of the activities] of the Ukrainian nationalists was still too recent for a trial on behalf of the Ukrainian state to be desirable." The Russians, thus, did nothing to have Koch extradited. The author adds that Koch was "an ardent admirer of the Soviet Union," even after the coming to power of the Nazi Party (Gerard Reitlinger, "Le mystère d'Erich Koch." *Le Monde juif* 17, March 1959: 3-5). From all evidence, Moscow preferred to hold Koch safely in Warsaw, placing him in permanent oblivion. Koch, a privileged prisoner, lived quietly and died on 12 December 1986 in his ninetieth year. The Parisian newspaper *Liberation* (15 December 1986) wrote that Koch had been responsible for the deaths of 4,000,000 Russians [sic] and Jews and the deportation of 2,000,000 people.

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The English translation of most of these documents from Ukrainian, Russian, German, and French were submitted by W. Kosyk.

All notes (*) are those of the author.

Document #1

THE "FOURTH UNIVERSAL" OF THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA IN KIEV

22 January 1918

People of Ukraine!

By your efforts, your will, and your word, a Free Ukrainian National Republic has been created on Ukrainian soil. The ancient dreams of your ancestors—fighters for freedom and the rights of the workers—has been fulfilled...

Meanwhile, the Petrograd Government of the People's Commissars, in an attempt to bring back the Free Ukrainian Republic under its rule, has declared war against Ukraine and is sending its armies into our land...

We, the Ukrainian Central Rada, have done everything to prevent the outbreak of this fratricidal war of the neighboring peoples, but the Petrograd Government has not chosen to meet our efforts, and continues to wage a bloody struggle with our People and [our] Republic...

We, the Ukrainian Central Rada, elected by the congresses of peasants, workers, and soldiers of Ukraine, cannot agree to this at all; we will not support any wars, for the Ukrainian People want peace; and a democratic peace must come about promptly...

From this day forth, the Ukrainian National Republic becomes independent, subject to no one, a Free, Sovereign State of the Ukrainian People...

All democratic freedoms, proclaimed by the Third Universal* of the Ukrainian Central Rada are confirmed and proclaimed clearly: in the Ukrainian People's Republic all peoples enjoy the right to national and individual autonomy, which was guaranteed to them by law on 22 January [1918]...

XIII/ pp. 83, 84, 87 **

* Proclamation of 20 November 1917 instituting the Ukrainian National People's) Republic.

** Index of sources, see above.

Document #2**DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF WESTERN UKRAINE**

1 November 1918

Ukrainian People!

...By your will was created on 18 October [1918] on the Ukrainian territories of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy the Ukrainian State and its supreme authority, the Ukrainian National Council.

From this day forth, the Ukrainian National Council has taken the power in Lviv, the capital, and on all territory of the Ukrainian State...

To all citizens of the Ukrainian State, without distinction of nationality and confession, political, national and confessional equality is guaranteed.

The national minorities of the Ukrainian State—Poles, Jews, Germans—should send their representatives to the Ukrainian National Council...

The Ukrainian National Council

XIII/ pp. 159, 160.

Document #3

**DECISION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE
UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF WESTERN UKRAINE
WITH THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC**

3 January 1919

The Ukrainian National Council, exercising the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination, solemnly proclaims the merging from this day forth of the West Ukrainian People's Republic with the Ukrainian National [People's] Republic to form a single sovereign national republic...

XIII/ p. 169.

Document #4**RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS**

2 February 1929

I. General Considerations

...9. Only a sovereign state, that is a political organization best corresponding to the interest of national life, constitutes a condition able to guarantee the nation an active participation in international life...

13. The main demand for the subjugated Ukrainian nation is the creation of a political just organization called United Independent Ukrainian State...

IX. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

...3. Basing itself on the creative elements of Ukrainian society and together with the ideals of the Ukrainian national state, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists intends to normalize the prevailing conditions within the nation to arouse creative political efforts among the Ukrainian people, to demonstrate Ukrainian national strength in all its dimensions, and thus to ensure for the great Ukrainian nation its due place among the other nations of the world.

XIV/ pp. 4-5, 16

Document #5**MEMORANDUM OF NSDAP STABLEITER A. SCHICKENDANZ*
ON THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS**

21 February 1938

...What is characteristic of this group is that during the Weimar Republic and its well-known Rapallo Policies regarding Moscow, Konovalets** had maintained close relations with certain authorities and circles in Berlin, but, despite the fact that National Socialism had drawn up certain preconditions for a rapprochement between the Ukrainians and Germany, he left Germany during the second year of the Third Reich and adopted a decidedly anti-German policy of agitation among the Ukrainians.

The reason for this sudden volte-face was Germany's changing policies regarding Poland and this points only to the lack of statepolitical far-sightedness on the part of the leadership of the Konoalets group, as well as to its limited regional attitude.

The assassination of Pieracki,*** the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, with its many consequences, shortly after the conclusion of the German-Polish Friendship Pact, requires no special comment. Due to this fact, as well as its journalistic consequences, the Konoalets group openly joined the ranks of the atrocity propaganda front against the National Socialist Reich.

During the painstaking preparations for the German-Italian rapprochement, E. Onatskyi, Konoalets' representative in Rome...published an article in the main newspaper of the Konoalets group (*Rozbudova Natsiyyi*, no.5-6, Prague, May-June 1934) entitled "The Ideological and Tactical Differences between Fascism and National Socialism." It stated; "...there are vast fundamental differences between these movements, although, at first, when placed before the necessity of competition in the global arena, these movements appear to be similar...the internal and external politics of Fascism are distinguished by great flexibility; National Socialism is distinguished by fanaticism as well as intolerance...National Socialism identifies the nation with race and builds its foundations on only one element—blood. And thus on a purely materialistic biological element..."

After the assassination of Pieracki and all its consequences, the same author expressed even more hatred in an article entitled "The Cult of Success" (*Rozbudova Natsiyyi*, no.7-8, Prague, July-August 1934):

"...Generally speaking, the Germans think that power is the only precondition for success. For this reason, there is no room for their generosity or mercy. A superior race [German] cannot be ruled either by ethics or honor...the misuse of power by the Germans during the war, their relentless cruelty, their denial of any kind of mercy to their enemy...We know (at least we have experienced on our own skins during the time of Ukrainian statehood in 1918) how little imperial Germany reckons with the feelings of others. The racial theories of National Socialism corroborate clearly enough how little Hitler's Reich reckons with the feelings of others...The recent events in Austria [i.e., in the summer of 1934] are extensive proof of German tactlessness, which, regardless of the total success cult dominant in National Socialism, excludes the possibility of an ultimate success of any international action by Germany..."

The editor of the Konoalets newspaper added an even more biting note to this article:

"...This particular tactlessness and brutality came to light in the recent extradition of Ukrainian political refugees to Poland, an act unheard-of in international affairs...This is not an isolated act of barbarism."

Three years later, this same tone appeared in the Konoalets press although it was differently expressed and used for other purposes...

It is only a logical consequence of the attitude shown by the Konovalts group that the first reports of the newly-founded Konovalts press office in New York published, among other things, an interview with the Englishman, Davis, who came to the United States to spread propaganda against "Fascism" and a second interview with his notorious fellow-countryman, W. Steed.

In order to find the reason for this anti-German attitude, one must bear in mind the fact that a certain number of Konovalts' close colleagues have Jewish wives.

Yaryi - Jewish wife

Stsiborskyi - Jewish wife

General Kapustianskyi

I/ NS 43/41, f. 174-177

* High official of the NSDAP

** Founder and president of the OUN

*** Polish minister of the interior, assassinated by a member of the OUN in June 1934

Document #6

EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM OF THE DELEGATION FROM CARPATHO-UKRAINE TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR

24 October 1938

...I. Carpatho-Ukraine is a part of the territory of the Ukrainian people. Consequently, its population is aware of the duties which are imperative to her at the present time not only in regards to its own country but also the whole Ukrainian nation...

For this reason we are formulating the following demands:

a. The Carpatho-Ukrainian country will be entirely independent and it will be led by a purely Ukrainian government, which is ready to take charge immediately of the affairs which will be passed on to it by the present autonomous government appointed by Prague...

c. The [Ukrainian] government sets up a national militia that will take charge of the local police.

d. To prevent one of the neighboring countries from provoking conflict, Carpatho-Ukraine that has been placed under Czech protection while waiting to be united with Ukraine, now places itself under international protection, i.e., primarily under the protection of the four great powers represented in Munich....To put this action into concrete form, it proposes to the four mentioned powers sending small

contingencies that, with the Ukrainian national militia, will be charged with the protection of the frontiers and internal order...

This international occupation and support are in a position to prevent all conflict, consequently, all thorny questions could be regulated by means of negotiation.

For the Ukrainian people this solution means the realization of their right to self-determination, the application of which has been prevented until now, and the return of confidence in the given international guarantees...

III/ Ukrainisch-ruthenische Fragen

Pol. IV 134, f. 209, 215, 216

Document #7

TELEGRAM FROM THE REICHSMINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE AMBASSADOR OF THE REICH IN PRAGUE

19 November 1938

[In compliance with the Führer's orders and until new orders] caution in the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian question is to be observed. For this reason, instructions have been given to the press to publish nothing on unexpected incidents in Carpatho-Ukraine. Moreover, the question of the creation of a general consulate in Khust* has been postponed. Therefore, it is not desirable for the moment to use the term "Carpatho-Ukraine" and to treat Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia in like manner.

III/ Pol. IV 134, f. 153

Woermann

* capital of Carpatho-Ukraine

Document #8

LETTER OF THE POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES FROM THE POLISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

21 November 1938

...Then Bullit spoke of the Ukrainian problem and German claims on Ukraine.

He affirmed that Germany had formed and prepared Ukrainian staff headquarters which, later on, was to take power in Ukraine and to form an independent Ukrainian state under the aegis of Germany. This Ukraine, continued Bullit, would naturally represent for us a grave danger because it would exert direct influence on the Ukrainians in eastern Little Poland*. From today on, he said, German propaganda is completely orientated in the Ukrainian nationalist sense. Russo-Carpathian Ukraine, for which Germany has an undeniable interest, especially from the strategic point of view, will in the future serve as a base for its [German] activities.

It seems that Bullit is not particularly well informed on the situation in Eastern Europe, and his reasoning is superficial.

The Ambassador of the Republic of Poland
Jerzy Potocki

VII/ pp. 8-9

* Label given to Western Ukraine by the Poles

Document #9

EXCERPT FROM A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND LLOYD GEORGE

6 December 1938

...In the opinion of Lloyd George, shortly Hitler will begin a campaign. But in which direction?...Hitler's plan is to re-take the "corridor" and Silesia and detach from Poland its Ukrainian part and unit it with Carpatho-Ukraine and found with the two a Ukrainian vassal state, like Czechoslovakia. This is the immediate objective. In a more distant future, it is possible that Hitler is thinking of undertaking an action against Soviet Ukraine, but for the moment he will not risk this. His forces are insufficient, his army is far from being as brilliant as one thinks, the dissatisfaction in the country is great.

I. Maiski

IX/ p. 79

Document #10

**EXCERPT FROM A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO LONDON
AND THE HEAD DIPLOMATIC COUNCILLOR OF THE MINISTRY FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM**

8 December 1938

...In the British government circles, according to Vansittart's remarks, ideas are being circulated that Hitler will carry out his coup in the east, notable against Soviet Ukraine...Vansittart asked me what we thought of it...

I. Maiski

IX/ p. 80

Document #11

**TELEGRAM FROM THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE
IN FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF USSR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS**

8 December 1938

...Gamelin* ...completely shares his [Mandel's] views on the seriousness of Germany's intention and preparations as far as Ukraine is concerned. Like Mandel, Gamelin reckons that "the most probable and most immediate objective of German expansion will be Ukraine." Gamelin has information according to which the offensive is planned for the spring, and he shares Mandel's fears for Poland and Romania which could suffer the same fate as Czechoslovakia, "which would amount to an end of France." Mandel also asked me a strange question; he wanted to know if the USSR would defend "its part of Ukraine." I could only express astonishment that a man, as serious as Mandel, could ask me such a question.

The Plenipotentiary Representative

IX/ p. 81

* Chief of Staff of the French army

Document #12**EXCERPT FROM A LETTER OF THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY
REPRESENTATIVE TO FRANCE TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF
THE USSR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

27 December 1938

...Did he speak to Ribbentrop about Ukraine which is now a topical subject? Bonnet maintains that he did not and explains this silence with the desire not to "reinforce among the Germans the impression that the French are seriously alarmed by the rumors." All this is without doubt possible, but it is also possible that his silence is to give Germans the impression that the French are not interested in the fate of Ukraine. In any case, for my part, I do not doubt that Bonnet and his ideological companions would let out a sigh of relief if the Germans really attacked Ukraine....

Souritz

IX/ p. 97

Document #13**INFORMATION FROM THE ADVISOR OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR
IN POLAND INTENDED FOR THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF A
WESTERN POWER**

28 December 1938

...Poland's fears that Germany intends to turn Subcarpathian Russia into an embryo of a Great Ukrainian State are unfounded. Germany has already given appropriate orders not to give rise to such impression. Subcarpathian Russia will keep its independence within Czechoslovakia and not play any role in the international politics.

R. von Scheliha

IX/ p. 100

Document #14**LETTER FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE USSR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS TO THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE
IN FRANCE**

31 December 1938

...The publicity campaign around the Ukrainian problem was initiated...not so

much by the German press as by the press of other countries, notably of England and France. It is possible that all this was orchestrated from Berlin. I do not think that Hitler and his entourage really consider the Ukrainian question as a noteworthy political problem. Astakhov* informs us that Hitler expressed in a circle of intimate friends astonishment concerning this publicity campaign and had declared that the Ukrainian question would not be resolved before five or six years at the minimum, and without war. Even if he had not said that, this is probably what he thinks. The motives of this campaign...are presented in the editorial of the last issue of the Moscow Journal. However, it is possible that the supporters of Chamberlain and Bonnet themselves are stirring up this campaign, suggesting to Hitler a diversion in the easterly direction....

Litvinov

IX/ pp. 100-101

* Acting USSR Chargé d'affaires to Germany

Document #15

TEXT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN REICH AND THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND

5 January 1939

...The Führer indicates that the world press is trying to attribute to Germany certain intentions regarding Ukraine and declares that in all respects Poland has nothing to fear from Germany. Germany is not interested in the other side of the Carpathian Mountains, and what countries interested in these regions do there is indifferent to him....

As far as Ukraine is concerned, Beck recalls Pilsudski's words on the "Balkanization of Central Europe." Poland recognizes its old enemies in the agitators who are showing themselves in Carpatho-Ukraine and fear that this [area] might one day become for Poland a source of worry which would force the Polish government to intervene, which could bring about new complications. This is the main reason why Poland would wish the establishment of a common frontier with Hungary. Poland has tried to push Hungary into energetic action in a sense defined by the Führer himself. About his trip to Romania, he [Colonel Beck] told the Hungarians that the Romanians would not attack, and the president of Poland has declared to the foreign diplomats that, in case of serious difficulties, Poland would come to the aid of Hungary. But despite these statements, the Hungarians unfortunately have shown

no initiative. He like to note that the inhabitants of the aforementioned Carpatho-Ukraine—the Russians—have, strictly speaking, nothing in common with the population of Ukraine. "Ukraine" is a Polish word which means "eastern frontier lands."* For dozens of years the Poles have designated with this word lands situated to the east of their territory along the Dniepr....

Dr. Schmidt
Plenipotentiary Minister

IV/ Series D. Bd V, Doc. #119

* The term "Ukraine" is Ukrainian and appeared in the twelfth century, at a time when Ukraine was an independent state under the form of the Kiev Principality called "Rus'." Even if it originally meant "borders," meant are the southern borders of the Kiev State and not those of Poland or Russia. This term quickly took on the meaning of "country," "our country."

Document #16

TEXT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY AND THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF POLAND

Warsaw, 26 January 1939

...2. Then I spoke again with Mr. Beck about the Polish and Germany policies regarding the Soviet Union and...about the question of Great Ukraine; I renewed the proposition that Germany and Poland collaborate in this area.

Mr. Beck did not hide that Poland was laying claim to Soviet Ukraine and to an opening toward the Black Sea.... While speaking about the future of the Soviet Union, he expressed the opinion that it would either collapse as a result of a internal disintegration or, to avoid its fate, gather all its forces and carry out a coup.

Ribbentrop

IV/ Series D. Bd V, Doc. #126

Document #17**EXCERPT FROM A LETTER OF THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM**

19 February 1939

...For the moment, Hitler pretends not to understand the Franco-English allusions to freedom of action in the east, but perhaps he will understand them if, in addition to allusions, England and France propose to him something else or if, in case of conflict in the east, they promise him not only neutrality, even benevolent neutrality, but some active help, which I do not consider ruled out. The Polish and the Carpatho-Russian position seems checked because Poland continued to dream about its own sphere of influence in Ukraine. But in case of necessity it will be ready to abandon its dreams and not protest against a campaign of Hitler across Romania. One cannot count too much on Carol's* help. Neither would Poland oppose a campaign of Hitler across the Baltic countries and Finland, on the condition that it could intervene against Ukraine, while synchronizing all this with the policies of Japan....

Litvinov

IX/ p. 140

* King of Romania

Document #18**INSIGHT INTO THE EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
IN 1938, RAFTED BY THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY
REPRESENTATIVE TO LONDON**

25 February 1939

...Immediately after Munich, the English [and French] press began to boost rumors and information, according to which Hitler now was going to move towards the east, Ukraine being his next objective of importance. In the social and political circles, they discussed all this in every possible way. There is no doubt that certain important statesmen (including some cabinet members) suggested directly to Hitler this venture to the east, promising him at least benevolent neutrality on the part of

the "western democracies." But Chamberlain and his supporters were strongly deceived. Hitler who is steering clear by all means possible of a major war and who understands perfectly that all ventures against Soviet Ukraine would inevitably bring about a long war, for him hopeless, did not show any desire to march to the east (although he had thought it advantageous at a certain time to spread such rumors). In fact, Hitler began to put pressure on the West immediately after Munich.

IX/ p. 145

Document #19

TELEGRAM FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO GERMANY TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN LONDON

Berlin, 9 March 1939

...As far as Ukraine is concerned, although I think it's conquest an improbable hypothesis, it seems to me inevitable that Germany wants to remove this rich country from the vast state which it considers its principal enemy. In its own interest, it would prefer undoubtedly that Ukraine be independent and serve as a buffer state between it and its enemy; it is evident that it would like to exert there a dominating political and economic influence. I do not think that the USSR will submit docilely to the German intrigues, and it seems to me the less we work for one of the parties in this conflict, the better it will be...

17. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler clearly indicated that only expansion to the east could give Germany "living space," but expansion to the east means that, sooner or later, very probably a collusion would ensue between Germany and Russia. With the support of a benevolent England, Germany can consider this eventuality without too much anxiety....

Neville Henderson

VIII/pp. 214-217

Document #20

REPORT OF THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE TO GERMANY ON THE LIFE IN GERMANY IN 1938

11 March 1939

...*Expansion toward the Southeast and Subcarpathian Russia.* In October

Germany helped, to some degree, Hungary that was exerting pressure on Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the particular line of Berlin in the question of Subcarpathian Russia was already outlined thus. Berlin who no longer needed the Polish-Hungarian support conspicuously began to oppose the division of Subcarpathian Russia between Poland and Hungary. All efforts of Ambassador Lipski who tried to get Hitler's agreement on this variant of division and who had proposed in exchange a series of concessions in the question of the "corridor" and in the economic area, had no success. On 2 November, having become the arbitrator in the discussions between Prague and Budapest, Berlin, together with Rome (where Ribbentrop had reached an understanding on this subject with Mussolini on 27 October) sketched a new Hungary-Czechoslovakia frontier, leaving, however, Subcarpathian Ukraine to Czechoslovakia, which prevented the establishment of a common frontier between Hungary and Poland. This caused an obvious cooling in Hungary toward Berlin.

This situation fed all sorts of rumors about Berlin's new aggression plans in the east. They are talking of an impending pressure on Romania...; of a plan of establishing an "independent" Ukraine with the Carpathian part, to which would be added parts of Poland and Romania; of a subsequent expansion toward the USSR. The French, in particular, are multiplying the rumors about Ukraine....

The resistance which developed in Poland on the question of Ukraine forced Berlin to show more prudence in this matter. It is doubtful that Berlin has immediate serious plans for Soviet Ukraine. It is more probable that the French wanted to see expansion of Germany directed toward the east. However it may be, these rumors, as those of detachment from Polish Ukraine, were not confirmed and were later in January 1939 refuted by Hitler in talks with Csaky and Beck....

IX/ pp. 166-167

Document #21

TEXT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A GERMAN JOURNALIST WITH KLEIST, ADVISOR FROM THE OFFICE OF THE GERMAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

13 March 1939

...Kleist said that on 6 March 1939 Hitler made a decision to liquidate the remaining part of Czechoslovakia....

The war against the Soviet Union remains the ultimate and decisive stage of the German policies for the successive realization of German plans....It is probable that Poland first must be divided territorially (detachments of regions formerly belonging

to Germany and formation of a West Ukrainian State under German protectorate) and organized politically (nomination of leaders of the Polish State assured of the German point of view) before a war could be launch against Russia with Poland's help and across Poland....

Then Kleist said that, as special editor on Ukrainian problems in Ribbentrop's office, on Ribbentrop's order he had prepared during the week (from 6 to 11 March) for Hitler a document on the Ukrainian problems in preparation for action against Czechoslovakia.

In my memoranda and information for Hitler, said Kleist, I tried to safeguard Subcarpathian Ukraine. I pointed out the importance it has for German plans in the east. I stressed that indignation of the Ukrainians toward Germany would be immense if we give Subcarpathian Ukraine to Hungary. Finally, I pointed out that we cannot break abruptly with the Ukrainians after having awakened in them, especially in Subcarpathian Ukraine, great hopes for aid and support from Germany. These arguments made no impression on Hitler. As Ribbentrop had told me, Hitler confined himself to respond: "It is tragic, but it is inevitable." Ribbentrop maintains that Hitler also refuted the statements according to which he would be engaged to some degree in the Ukrainian affairs. Hitler said: "If I had aligned myself with the Ukrainians and their political plans, we would not have passed the arbitrary judgement in Vienna that made Subcarpathian Ukraine non-viable."

When I asked if Hitler, by adopting this position, had not totally abandoned the Ukrainian card, Kleist answered: "Hitler, from all evidence, intends to reintroduce the Ukrainian card in the German play when Germany's plans in the east would be in the process of being realized. He thought, undoubtedly, that the Ukrainians would again join us, because, in any case, they depend on German aid." The following confirms this interpretation of Hitler's words. To the memorandum intended for Hitler, I added as additional information a map pulled from a Ukrainian atlas where the future empire of the Great Ukraine was drawn. Hitler, Ribbentrop told me, put this map aside saying: "For the time being all this is still only a dream." If he says "still," he is thinking, undoubtedly, that this one day will become reality.

IX/ pp. 168-170

Document #22

EXCERPT FROM A LETTER OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO BERLIN TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

Berlin, 13 March 1939

...The evolution that has become apparent in the last several months in the

German attitude regarding its neighboring counties is becoming clearer. To all appearances, the vassalized Czechoslovakia is being replaced by a separation of nationalities that are part of it. It seems, moreover, that the Reich, while favoring the independence of Slovakia, is taking the position of favoring Polish-Hungarian claims on Ruthenia which must inevitably, after re-attaching itself from Czechoslovakia, fall into the hands of its neighbors....

Coulondre

XI/ 2943-PS, XXXI, p. 328

Document #23

EXCERPT FROM A LETTER OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE

Berlin, 14 March 1939

...This morning the Diet of Bratislava has proclaimed the independence of Slovakia, Hungarian troops have crossed the frontiers of Subcarpathian Russia....

A national socialist official, assigned to important duties in the immediate circle of the Führer, has declared to one of my collaborators that we must be prepared for the eventuality that the "breaking-up" [*Auflösung*] of Czechoslovakia is inevitable. In that case, he added, Slovakia would become independent, Hungary would annex Subcarpathian Russia, and the Reich, in one form or another, would have to secure control over Bohemia and Moravia....

On 7 January, while receiving Mr. Beck in Berchtesgaden, the Führer announced to him that in his eyes the Ukrainian question was not "topical."...

By giving in to the Hungarian-Polish wishes, the Reich insured the recognition of the Magyars, their possible support against Romania and, the day he would take up again his push to the east, the large Hungarian plains for his use in place of the narrow and difficult paths of the Carpathian Mountains. As far as Poland is concerned, perhaps those in Berlin were deluding themselves to have bought its neutrality in case of a European conflict, while freeing it from the danger which an independent Ukrainian province, the center of propaganda and irredentism, would pose at its southern frontier....

Coulondre

X/ p. 67 ff.

XI/ 2943-PS, XXXI, p. 330-333

Document #24**EXCERPT FROM A LETTER OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO
BERLIN FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE**

Berlin, 14 March 1939

...The events in Slovakia have had immediate repercussions in Subcarpathian Russia; Mgr. Volosin has proclaimed the independence of his country whose situation seems most complicated. Following skirmishes with Czech elements, Hungarian troops have penetrated into Ruthenian territory at the same time when the government in Budapest sent to Prague an ultimatum demanding the immediate retreat of the Czech troops from Subcarpathian Russia. Mgr. Volosin, in turn, in a telegram, asked for help from and protection of the Reich and Italy. It is not very likely that these two countries will accede to this request....

Coulondre

X/ p. 70-71

XI/ 2943-PS, XXXI, p. 335

Document #25**CARPATHO-UKRAINE'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE**

15 March 1939

The Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine adopts the following law:

Art. 1. - Carpatho-Ukraine becomes an independent state.

Art. 2. - The name of the state is Carpatho-Ukraine.

Art. 3. - Carpatho-Ukraine is a republic whose president is elected by the Diet.

Art. 4. - The official language of Carpatho-Ukraine is Ukrainian....

Art. 8. - The present law goes into effect upon passage by the Diet.

A. Shtefan

President of the Diet

A. Voloshyn

President of the

Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic

Document #26**TELEGRAM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE
TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GERMANY**

15 March 1939

We proclaim the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine and ask for the protection of the German Reich. At the same time, we are informing you that today at six o'clock Hungarian troops have crossed the borders near Mukachevo....

Augustin Voloshyn
Head of Government

III/ Politische Beziehungen
Pol. IV, 127, f.27

Document #27**LETTER OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN
TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE**

Berlin, 16 March 1939

...It is the principle of the right of the peoples to dispose of themselves that Germany invokes in favor of independence...of Slovakia, but the same right is refused to the Carpatho-Ukrainians who have been abandoned to Hungary, as well as to the Czechs who have been forcibly incorporated into the Reich....

On its part, Subcarpathian Russia has proclaimed its independence on 12 March and is seeking protection from Berlin. But the Hitlerian leaders remain deaf to the appeal from this country, which has placed all its confidence in them....

Subcarpathian Ukraine has been invaded by Hungarian troops. In its despair, the Government of Shust is offering the country to Romania. Mr. Revay, Prime Minister, in a telegram addressed to the French ambassador in Berlin is seeking help from the Government of Budapest to settle the fate of the country through diplomatic avenues and not by force of arms.

Everything seems to indicate that the Reich is disinterested in this state and is abandoning it to Hungary....

Coulondre

X/ p. 77 ff.

XI/ 2943-PS, XXXI, pp. 339, 342

Document #28

**TELEGRAM FROM THE USSR PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR**

9 April 1939

...It seems, Chamberlain and Bonnet still have not lost hope of being able to push Hitler toward Soviet Ukraine. I know that Simon has defended time and time again before the cabinet the argument, according to which the line of defense of British interests must pass through Turkey, Egypt, etc., and not through the Balkans.

The Plenipotentiary Representative

IX/ p.227

Document #29

**EXCERPT FROM A LETTER OF THE UNITED STATES ACTING
CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES TO FRANCE TO THE USA
SECRETARY OF STATE**

24 June 1939

...11. Influential circles firmly profess the opinion that France will be forced...to abandon Central and Eastern Europe to Germany in the hope that Germany will finally be at war with the Soviet Union and that France will remain safely behind the Maginot line. This opinion was brandied about on 15 March 1939. However, it still subsists.

Edwin C. Wilson

X/ p. 194

Document #30

**ADDITIONAL SECRET PROTOCOL OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET
NON-AGGRESSION PACT OF 23 AUGUST 1939**

Moscow, 23 August 1939

At the occasion of the signing of the pact of non-aggression between the German Reich and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics, the plenipotentiaries of the two parties have discussed during a strictly confidential conversation the question of

the demarcation of reciprocal zones of influence in Eastern Europe. This conversation ended in the following result:

1. In case of a territorial and political change in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern frontier of Lithuania will be also the frontier of the zone of interest between Germany and the USSR....

2. In case of territorial and political changes in territories belonging to the Polish state, the zones of interest of Germany and the USSR will be demarcated approximately by the line of the rivers Narva, Vistula, and San....

For the Government of the German Reich
von Ribbentrop

For the Government of the USSR

V/ pp. 90-91

V. Molotov

Document #31

THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT

Moscow, 24 August 1939

...

8) Toasts

During the meeting, Stalin spontaneously proposed a toast to the Führer saying: "I know how much the German people love their Führer and that is why I would like to drink to his health."

Molotov drank to the health of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Count v.d.Schulenburg.

Then Molotov raised his glass to Herr Stalin and noted that it was Stalin who, in his speech from March of this year, well understood in Germany, initiated the change in political relations.

Molotov and Stalin repeatedly drank to the Non-Aggression Pact, to a new era in German-Russian relations and to the German nation.

The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs raised a toast to Herr Stalin, to the Soviet government, and to the fortunate development in relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

9) Prior to his departure, Stalin told the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs these exact words:

The Soviet government considers the new pact seriously. He gave his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not deceive its partner.

Hencke

V/ p. 88

Document #32

**SECRET COMMAND MATTER
NAVAL WARFARE AND THE BUILD-UP OF THE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST RUSSIA**

...The conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact and the Border and Friendship Treaty between Germany and Russia took place on 23 August 1939, and 28 September 1939, respectively. The main issues of these pacts were:

1) that both States are obliged not to attack one another and to live on peaceful terms;

2) that the German Reich renounces any influence on its spheres of interest in Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia and that, at the request of Soviet Russia, the areas of the former Polish state up to the Narva-Buh-San Line are to be annexed...

* * *

Excerpts from a speech by the Führer on 1 September 1939:

...Therefore, we have decided to conclude a pact which excludes forever any acts of violence between us, which obliges us to consult one another on certain European issues, which enables economic co-operation and, above all, which guarantees that the forces of both of these great states will not be wasted against each other.

Every attempt by the West to alter anything in this regard will fail! And I would like to assure you of the following: this political decision marks an unprecedented and final turning point for the future!...

Excerpt from Molotov's speech on 1 September 1939:

...August 23 will go down in history as a great day. From this day on, Germany and the Soviet Union are no longer enemies...

XI/ 170-C, XXXIV, pp. 676-677

Document #33

**"AN ABOMINABLE CRIME AGAINST UKRAINE"
ARTICLE FROM THE NATIONALIST UKRAINIAN NEWSPAPER
UKRAINSKE SLOVO, PARIS, SEPTEMBER 24, 1939**

...And now the fall of Carpathian Ukraine threw light upon the German game. The Germans raised the bids to get a better price. German policies of speculation

and barter with the subjugated Ukrainian people were based on cynicism, perfidy, baseness, lies and the exploitation of the trust of others.

Exactly the same situation was repeated with the Ukrainian regions under Poland, the only difference being that they [the Germans] reckoned on selling them at the highest price to the Bolsheviks.

However, the abomination of the German crime does not stop here. If the fate of Carpathian Ukraine could leave some doubt as to Germany's procedure, then the sale of the Western Ukrainian territories—the Ukrainian Piedmont and center of Ukrainian aspirations for independence—reveals outright Germany's diabolical plan. What is this plan?

It is the *Drang nach Osten** and the intended conquest of "millions of square kilometers of territory in the East," as Hitler wrote on his book *Mein Kampf*, which has become the axiom of German imperialism. There is no doubt whatsoever that this imperialism will not satisfy itself with the conquest of the Czechs and the Slovaks, and the destruction of Poland. The recent moves against Hungary and Romania warrant the assumption that Germany will now, namely after the conquest of Poland, pursue its imperialist drive to an even greater extent, and that the Germans will aspire, one way or another, to turn these regions into goals of German imperialism. However, it is much more important to us that the German concept of the *Drang nach Osten** appeared long before the conquest of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles, and before the Germans thought about the aggression against Hungary and bordering nations. Hitler speaks of this in his *Mein Kampf*, whereas other National Socialists (for example Rosenberg) refer explicitly to Ukraine. Yet Germany's plans regarding Ukraine do not originate from the National Socialist period. They date back to 1918. Hitler's statement that the "National Socialists are the soldiers of the German people and not the defenders of poor suppressed nations," or Rosenberg's claim that Germany could, at least, exploit such nations in order to fortify Germany, are proof of the fact that the Germans were not interested in the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, and even less interested in any abstract solutions in the form of the self-determination of nations. Therefore, Germany's main concern is Ukrainian territory, Ukrainian coal and iron, Ukrainian wheat. Ukraine is to become a German colony, inhabited by vassals—a nations of servants to work for the master-race—according to Hitler, and not for an independent national state with its own leading and governing class, its own cultural circles.

A typical statement by Hitler in his *Mein Kampf* is that God himself directed the Germans towards the east where the Bolsheviks had exterminated the intelligentsia. The significance of this is that the more national consciousness is destroyed the fewer the governing class and intelligentsia and the fewer the signs of independence will remain, all the better for the German imperialism. And if the nationally conscious population is exterminated as soon as possible by a foreign power, then all the better.

Germany's diabolical yet completely revealing plan is that, on the one hand,

Germany poses as a protector and friend of the Ukrainian people, curbing its circumstances, while on the other, it forces up the price of the Ukrainian territories in order to sell them, as quickly as possible, to anyone who will exterminate all signs of Ukrainian life until the scheduled rule over the Ukrainian territories by Germany.

This happened in Carpathian Ukraine where, in the course of a year, the Ukrainian élite was destroyed on the battlefields and in the prisons. Who was not destroyed was forced to emigrate. This is now supposed to happen to the Western Ukrainian territories—to the Ukrainian Piedmont, which Hitler handed over to the Muscovite Moloch to destroy. He is to exterminate the centuries-long achievements and the national renaissance. A perusal of German military operations shows that the Germans, in actual fact, conquered the Western Ukrainian territories for the Muscovites, which were then ready for them to take over. Hitler handed these Ukrainian territories over in the name of German glory and in order to find on them, when reconquered from Moscow, only dispossessed and nationally broken mercenaries and proletarians.

However, even if Germany's abominable crime results in a sea of blood and tears for Ukraine, it will never fulfill Germany's hopes. The Ukrainian nation will continue to exist in spite of Hitler's and Stalin's diabolic plans. It was none other than Hitler himself who stated that:

"If an idea is justifiable and begins a struggle on this earth armed with these justifications, then it is invincible. Every persecution leads to its internal strengthening."

The Ukrainian idea is and remains invincible and will not be destroyed either by the Bolsheviks or the Germans.

Let us repeat what we have already stated: "We have been living on our territory for thousands of years. The Germans invaded us more than once and left again. Neither the Mongols, the Huns, or the Tartars, nor aristocratic Poland or Tsarist Russia, succeeded in destroying us. On the contrary, we survived the collapse of all these powers which were once the terror of Europe and some of them even to the world.

Our nation will survive. It will most definitely survive both Stalin's Asian Empire and Hitler's Empire, both of which are founded on violence, lies and pillage. History has proven that such empires never last long. We shall, and must, witness the collapse of Stalinist Russia and imperialist Germany, just as we witnessed how the German armies were driven in dishonor from Ukraine in 1918 by the Ukrainian peasants. For the spirit is more powerful than the tanks and guns, and neither Hitler nor Stalin can destroy it.

Document #34

LETTER OF THE HEAD OF THE GESTAPO WITH THE OKW
TO THE REICHSMINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE FOREIGN
POLICY OFFICE OF THE NSDAP

Berlin, 20 October 1939

Reichssicherheitshauptamt*
Nr. IV-II A-3-1067/39

...The bureau of the Ukrainian press in Berlin...has just published a brochure of 110 pages entitled *The Problem of Western Ukraine*....

...The authors refrained from concentrating their attacks on the USSR, but also considered that, to repair the deceit of Versailles regarding the Ukrainians, only one option existed, that of force....

Considering the entire political situation and the consequences of the establishment of the line of demarcation [with the USSR], it seems expedient to prevent the distribution of this brochure.

For the stated reasons, I have then forbidden the distribution of the brochure and confiscated the existing, approximately 1,500, copies.

By authorization,
(signature)

III/Angel. Ukraine
Pol. V, 524

* Central security service of the Reich

Document #35

LETTER FROM THE HEAD OF THE GESTAPO TO ALL POLICE POSTS
AND TO THE INSPECTORS OF THE SIPO* AND THE SD

Berlin, 25 October 1939

Reichssicherheitshauptamt
IV-II A 3-B. Nr 1066/39

...

Subject: Russian, Ukrainian, Cossack, and Caucasian emigration to the Reich.

The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact demands a change in the treatment of Russian, Ukrainian, Cossack, and Caucasian émigré organizations presently on the territory of the Reich....

Consequently, instructions to be followed until further notice:

a) It is forbidden to the émigré associations and their members to express, orally or in writing, any hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union.

b) It is forbidden to the émigré associations and their members to organize public expositions (including artistic), meetings, and public manifestations (gatherings, demonstrations, deposition of coat of arms, religious services at the cemeteries, etc.) as well as the use of flags and insignia in public places....

c) It is forbidden to émigré organizations and their members to give to the press, by way of public notice or circulars, etc., information on meetings and manifestations, and to publicize for their associations....

By authorization:

Müller

I/R 58/459, f. 67f.

* Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo or SP) = Security Police

Document #36

"THE PURPOSE OF WAR"

ARTICLE FROM THE NATIONALIST UKRAINIAN NEWSPAPER
UKRAINSKE SLOVO, PARIS, OCTOBER 29, 1939

...The Germans occupied extensive areas of Ukraine and then turned them over to the Soviets as a reward for the aid provided during the partition of Poland. This act, which followed the surrender of Carpathian Ukraine to Hungary, clearly shows what can be expected from the Germans. The Germans have introduced a direct system in which they barter with the Ukrainian regions. For them the Ukrainian people are slaves who can be traded for oil and coal, and the Ukrainian question is no longer an explosive with which enemy states can be eliminated. These facts and the pact with the Soviets make the Germans very dangerous to the Ukrainian question. It is surprising that the great powers did not realize this danger. On the contrary, they were afraid that the Germans supposedly wanted to create an independent Ukraine ready to guarantee the inviolability of the Soviet borders.

However, the methods of the Soviets began to open the eyes of the Western Europeans....

So it is our duty to ensure that the evolution of views should lead to the understanding of the fact that the creation of a Ukrainian state is a priority. Nothing promotes the domination of Eastern Europe by the Germans and the penetration of Russian Bolshevik influence in the west more than the absence of a Ukrainian state. A Ukraine battered, deprived of its rights, unarmed, without the possibility of

deciding its own fate, can easily whet the appetite of any thieves for an easy booty. A weak Ukraine is not in a position to offer resistance to foreigners who would take advantage of her natural resources and strategic position.

The creation of an independent Ukrainian state would correspond to the general goals of the Western states and could mean the refusal to recognize the supremacy of the Germans or the Russians in Europe.

I/ NS 43/42, f. 32-33

Document #37

"OUR INTERESTS LIE IN THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR" ARTICLE FROM THE NATIONALIST UKRAINIAN NEWSPAPER *UKRAINSKE SLOVO*, PARIS, NOVEMBER 5, 1939

...Having sold the Ukrainian territories to the Russians and opened all the doors for the Bolsheviks to contaminate Europe, Hitler is terrifying Europe and the world with the Bolshevik threat in order to strengthen his superiority and enforce a peace, which would suit him.

We, Ukrainians, have no reason to fear these threats because, thanks to Hitler, we are already in danger. At best we can urge others not to yield to this danger (for this will neither prevent nor curtail it) but, on the contrary, to face the threat squarely.

In order to keep us quiet, or to urge us to call for peace, the German agents resorted to a very naïve method. According to information from the "Havas," in the occupied countries Hitler's agents propagated the idea that if Germany destroys England and France in the spring, she will then throw herself against the Bolsheviks, drive them out of Poland and establish an independent Ukraine.

If the Germans want to frighten anyone with the Bolshevik threat, then they should do so to themselves, and should tell stories about the establishment of an independent Ukraine by Germany to someone else and not us.

...We can also clearly state: "We do not want anything from Germany, no 'independence,' no aid, no interest, and no speculation. Our sole desire is that the Germans stop worrying about us and completely forget about the existence of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian territory. We also need 'Lebensraum,' but only for ourselves and not for the Germans."

I/ NS 43/42, f. 34-35

Document #38**EXCERPT FROM AN ARTICLE OF THE NATIONALIST UKRAINIAN
NEWSPAPER *UKRAINSKE SLOVO*, PARIS, NOVEMBER 22, 1939**

The opinion that the Ukrainians are pro-German is ridiculous and does not make sense....

The Germans have always been the enemies of the Ukrainians or they have wronged them indirectly. They have worked at their decline and they have turned their backs each time that the occasion for an alliance presented itself.

III/ Angel. Ukraine

Pol. V, 524

Bericht über die ukrainische Presse

Document #39**EXCERPT FROM A UKRAINIAN PERIODICAL *TRYZUB**
PARIS, DECEMBER 10, 1939**

It must be clear that the victory of Stalin and Hitler means the end of free and independent states. This victory will reinforce the chains of the Ukrainian people. On the other hand, the victory of Western democracies offers us some hopes and opens new possibilities in the realization of our independence.

III/ Pol. V, 524, op.cit.

* The Group UNR

Document #40**APPEAL OF THE UKRAINIAN COMMITTEE OF PARIS**

February, 1940

...France and England have taken up arms to defend the rights of people and justice. For us others, Ukrainians, no hesitation is possible: our place is at the side

of the Allies. All our hopes are closely linked to the fate of the Allied armies. We must, with all our force, contribute to the victory of England and France....

To thank Moscow for its aid, Germany has delivered six million Ukrainians to our cruellest enemy, exposing us to the worst persecutions and martyrdom....

We must fight with all our force and all our energy for the liberation of Ukraine. We are not alone. Under Russian domination are the friendly peoples of the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Cossacks [of the Don]; under German oppression suffer the Czechs, the Slovaks, and now the Poles....All these peoples have only one task: the fight against the Russian imperialism and the German imperialism, against the Soviet imperialism and the national socialist imperialism, that have fraternally linked arms.

I/ NS 43/41, f. 78-79

Document #41

POSITION OF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE*

15 April 1940

...The content of the memorandum [of the UNR government in exile] can be summarized as follows:

1. The UNR Government of Paris falls in without reservation on the side of the democracies.
2. It supports the principle of the ethnographic frontiers of Ukraine.
3. It strives to bring about the independence of Ukraine, but is disposed to an entente in the economic, political, and military areas with the neighbors [of Ukraine].
4. In this war it backs France and England.

I/ NS 43/42, f. 24

* The Government of the UNR, i.e., the Ukrainian National Republic (Ukraïnska Narodna Respublika).

Document #42**LETTER FROM SCHICKENDANZ TO VON STUTTERHEIM**

17 September 1940

Secret

Sch./L. 5174/40

Herr v. Stutterheim
Reich Cabinet Advisor
Reich Chancellery

...In the meantime, I have taken the liberty of sending you excerpts from the Ukrainian émigré press, which we regularly follow. It clearly shows the political attitude of every individual group, particularly the completely hostile attitude of the groups of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which reside outside Germany. As you may perhaps already know, this organization had found particular support from the Abwehr [military intelligence] here in the Reich. This point was discussed during the negotiations between Reichsleiter Rosenberg and Admiral Canaris.

We have repeatedly drawn Admiral Canaris' attention to the fact that the unilateral preferential treatment of the OUN, even in purely military matters, will, in practical terms, have political consequences in the future. At the same time, we also pointed out to the Admiral that the OUN cannot hold any pretensions in any political appraisal. The OUN is nothing but a small terrorist group with a coloration specific to Galicia; it could be described as a national Galician off-shoot from the social-revolutionary Great Russian tree. After the occupation of Galicia by the Soviets, this group is actually losing almost all its political significance....

I/ NS 43/43, f. 5-6

Document #43**LETTER FROM SCHICKENDANZ TO HEYDRICH**

18 September 1940

Sch./L. 5172/40

Secret

To the Chief of the Security Police
Gruppenführer Heydrich

...Enclosed I am sending you the proclamations of the Organization of Ukrainian

Nationalists which were sent to me....

The evident discord within this group now shows that the nature of this group does not warrant our political support. We have always regarded it as a very limited, purely terrorist organization, without any political influence and without the slightest importance. More precisely, it is nothing more than a national-Galician off-shoot of the felled tree of the Great Russian social-revolutionary movement. After the occupation of Galicia by the USSR, this group [OUN] has lost the remainder of its political importance. At any rate, it is untimely and ill-advised to grant it any importance and to keep it artificially alive, inasmuch as its activity seems to be endangering the security of the state. Therefore, the only right thing to do is to dissolve this political organization....

I/ NS 43/43, f. 20f.

Document #44

MANIFESTO OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS OF STEPAN BANDERA

December 1940

...We are creating a new just world order and are laying the foundations for a new world political structure by dismantling the appalling prison of nations—the Russian empire.

I. We are fighting for the liberation of the Ukrainian nation and of all nations enslaved by Moscow.

We are fighting against Russian imperialism in all its forms, in particular against Bolshevism, which has led to extreme national-political, religious, cultural and social oppression, and economic exploitation.

II. We are bearers of a new just order in Eastern Europe and in Russian-dominated Asia.

We are the bearers of freedom for all the nations subjugated by Russia, so that they can live freely in accordance with their own will.

We are the bearers of security for all peoples threatened by Russia.

III. We call upon the revolutionaries of all nations subjugated by Russia to enter into a common front of struggle and cooperation with the Ukrainian nationalist-revolutionaries.

Only Ukraine is the true ally of all nations that are either subjugated or threatened by Russia in their struggle against Russian-Bolshevik imperialism.

...

VI. We are fighting:

against the extreme degradation of the individual at work and at home,

against the deprivation of the individual's happiness in life,

against the general impoverishment of the citizens

against the oppression of women, forced to do the most difficult physical labor under the pretence of "equal rights,"

against the criminal indoctrination of our children and youth with false Bolshevik "sciences" through newspapers, theaters, radio, cinema, meetings and all other types of senseless agitation of the Stalinist regime.

We are fighting:

for dignity and freedom of the individual,

for the right to freely express one's beliefs,

for freedom of religion, for complete freedom of conscience.

VII. We are fighting:

against the tyranny and terror of the Bolshevik clique,

against the brutal regime of the NKVD* in the kolkhozes, the factories, the army, the navy, the party, the Komsomol,** the schools and homes.

We are fighting:

for the right of the workers to freely express their political beliefs in word and print,

for the right to free assembly,

for the right to form political, social, and professional organizations.

VIII. We are fighting:

against the economic plunder of Ukraine and other nations subjugated by Russia,

against slavery in the kolkhozes, the sovkhoses, and factories,

against the plunder of the citizen's meager earnings acquired through hard labor,

against forced deportation from one's native land.

We are fighting so that every nation presently subjugated by Russia will be able to benefit completely from its own natural resources and its own achievements of daily labor in the future.

IX. We know and believe that the time is imminent when the cherished dream of our forefathers will be fulfilled and the fire of national rage will flare up from the

blood of our heroic generations.

Ukraine will rise and destroy the darkness of bondage.

Only through the complete dissolution of the Russian empire and through the Ukrainian National Revolution and revolutionary uprisings of all the subjugated nations shall we realize Ukrainian statehood and liberate the nations subjugated by Russia.

Ukrainians and all nations enslaved by Russia!

Stand up in an unmerciful struggle against Russian-Bolshevik slavery!

Destroy the Russian prison of nations!

Freedom for all subjugated nations!

XIV/ pp. 21-23

- Soviet political police
- ** communist youth

Document #45

ORDERS OF THE OWK ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OCCUPATION ADMINISTRATION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR

General Headquarters of the Führer, 13 March 1941

General Headquarters of the Wehrmacht

WF St/Abt. L (IV/Qu)

44125/41 g. K. Chfs

Secret matter of the Command

Matter of the Head!

For officers only!

Ref.: WF St/Abt. L (I) no.33408/40

g. K. heads of 18 Dec. 1940

Instructions on special regions for order #21 (Plan Barbarossa)

5 copies

4th copy

I. Zone of operation and executive power.

... 2. The Russian regions occupied during military operations, as soon as the progress of combat permits, must be transformed, following special instruction, into states endowed with their own government.

Consequently:

...b) In the zone of operations of the troops, the Reichsführer-SS will receive, on order from the Führer, a special mission of preparation of the political leadership resulting in the final confrontation between the two opposed political systems....

c) As soon as the zone of operations of the troops reaches sufficient depth, it must be delimited to the rear. Each newly occupied region in the rear of the zone of operations will receive its own political administration. It will be divided according to the national principle and then lines of demarcation of army groups into regions North (Baltic countries), Center (Belorussia), and South (Ukraine). In these regions the political administration will be in the hands of commissars of the Reich who will receive their instructions from the Führer.

3....in this capacity, he [the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht] is charged with the following tasks:....;

b) exploitation of the country and protection of its economic resources for the needs of German economy....;

c) exploitation of the country to supply the troops in compliance with the demands of the OKW;

d) military protection of the entire region....

Head of the OKW
Keitel

XI/447-PS, XXVI, p. 53 ff.

Document #46

ORDERS CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN OF THE SIPO AND THE SD DURING THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

26 March 1941

Draft

Army Staff Headquarters

Gen. St. d.H./Gen.Qu

Secret

In the zone of operations, the execution of special tasks of security outside the troops demands the installation of the Sonderkommandos of the security police (SD). With the consent of the head of the security police and the SD, intervention of the security police and the SD in the zone of operations will be regulated as follows:

1. Tasks:

a) In the rear zone of the army :

Security before the beginning of operations objects designated beforehand (materials, archive, files of organizations, associations or groups hostile to the Reich or the state, etc.), as well as important persons (émigré leaders, saboteurs, terrorists, etc.)...

b) In the rear zone of the troops:

Search and repression of tendencies hostile to the state in the Reich, in as much as they are not integrated into the enemy armed forces. Development of information on the political situation for the head of the rear zone of the troops....

2. Cooperation between the Sonderkommandos and the authorities of the command in the zone of the army (1a)....

3. Cooperation between the Einsatzgruppen or the Einsatzkommandos of the security police (SD) and the command in the rear zone of the troops (1b).

(Signature)

XII/NOKW-256

Document #47

MEMORANDUM #1 FOUND IN ROSENBERG'S RUSSIA FILES

2 April 1941

Copy

Re: USSR

Similar to Tsarist Russia, Bolshevik Russia is a conglomerate composed of different nations created by the annexation of related or even completely foreign countries.

A military confrontation with the USSR would lead to an unusually rapid occupation of large important areas of the USSR. It is very likely that if we make a military move soon, the military collapse of the USSR will follow.

...

The Eastern expert envisages the following national or geographical units from the population chart of Russia:

- a) Great Russia with Moscow as its center,
- b) Byelorussia with Minsk or Smolensk as the capital city,
- c) Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
- d) Ukraine and the Crimea with Kyiv as its center,
- e) the Don Region with Rostov as the capital city,
- f) the Caucasian Mountain Region,

g) Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan...

D) Ukraine (Borderland)

Kyiv became the main center of the dominant northern Varangian state. Thus, even after Tatar domination, Kyiv was for a long time the counter-pole of Moscow. Contrary to the allegations of Muscovite historiography, which dominated the whole of Europe, Kyiv's national sovereign existence was actually based on quite an unbreakable tradition.

The political mission of this region, either alone or together with the Don region and the Caucasian Mountain region as the Black Sea alliance, would be to promote a national way of life until the eventual establishment of statehood, with the aim of holding Moscow constantly in check, and to protect the German living space in the East. Economically, however, the purpose of this region would be to create a powerful source of raw material and supplementary food supplies for the Great German Reich...

XI/1017-PS, XXVI, p. 548 ff.

Document #48

RESOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS OF STEPAN BANDERA

April 1941

General Resolutions

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists declares that:

2. Only a completely sovereign Ukrainian state can ensure the Ukrainian people a free life and a general development of all its forces.

3. The Ukrainian people can succeed in creating their own state only by revolutionary means against the occupying forces.

...

7. The OUN is fighting against communist ideology, against internationalism and capitalism, as well as against all ideologies and movements that weaken the vitality of the people.

The OUN is fighting for the abolition of bondage, for the destruction of the Russian prison of nations, for the destruction of the entire communist system, for the abolition of all privileges and class differences, as well as all other conventional prejudices.

9. The OUN is striving to unite all Ukrainians in the liberation front of the

Ukrainian National Revolution. It is organizing and creating a political and military liberation force capable of executing an armed uprising in order to create the Ukrainian state and govern it....

Political Resolutions

1. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is fighting for a sovereign united Ukrainian state, for the liberation of the East European and Asian nations subjugated by Moscow, for a new just order established on the ruins of the Russian empire of the Soviet Union. The Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists will pursue the revolutionary struggle for the liberation of the Ukrainian nation with all its might, regardless of all territorial and political changes which may take place on the territories of Eastern Europe.

...

3. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is the vanguard of the revolutionary Ukrainian movement....

...The OUN recognizes as an ally of Ukraine any state, political group or force interested in the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of an entirely independent, sovereign and united Ukrainian state....

XIV/ p. 24-31

I/R 43/II 1,500, f. 82-92

Document #49

**EXCERPT FROM THE MEMORANDUM OF THE REPORT CONCERNING
POLITICAL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS TAKEN PRISONER**

OKW/WFST/Abt. L (IV/Qu)

General Headquarters of the Führer, 12 May 1941

Secret matter of the command

Concerning: Treatment of political and military officials taken prisoner

...

1. The representatives of the authority and political heads (commissars) are to be eliminated....

3. The political leaders of troops are not to be considered as prisoners of war and must be executed in the Dulags.* No return to the rear....

XI/884-PS, XXVI, p. 406 ff.

Walrimont

* Transit camps

Document #50

DECREE ON THE JURISDICTION OF WAR IN THE REGIONS
"BARBAROSSA" AND ON THE SPECIAL MEASURES OF THE ARMY

The Führer
and Commander-in-chief
of the Wehrmacht

General headquarters of the Führer, 13 May 1941

...This [the execution of tasks of the Wehrmacht] is possible only if troops defend themselves without mercy against all threats coming from the hostile civilian population.

Consequently, it has been decided for the region "Barbarossa" (zone of operations, zone of troops and territory under political administration):

I. Crimes committed by hostile civilians:

...

2. *Guerillas groups* are to be liquidated pitilessly by the troops during combat or during their escape.

3. All *other attacks of hostile civilians* against the Wehrmacht, its members or its escort are to be put down immediately by the troops with all means going so far as elimination of the attacker.

4. Against localities, from which the Wehrmacht is attacked by ambush or treachery,...when circumstances do not allow quick identification of the perpetrators, forceful collective measures are to be taken....

II. Crimes committed by members of the Wehrmacht or its escort against the inhabitants.

1. The actions, committed by members of the Wehrmacht or its escort against hostile civilians are not to be subjected to any legal proceedings, even when the act in question is a crime or a military crime....

Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht
Keitel

XI/050-C, XXXIV, p. 252 ff.

Document #51

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR TO
MOSCOW TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

15 May 1941

...German planes will certainly take to air one day to seize the regions of

Ukraine. It is only then that the peasant Stalin will discover the truth, that of German-Soviet confrontation which will begin with the appearance of German plans over the skies of Moscow. But it will be already too late....Germany who needs Ukraine to realize its idea of a Great Germany, needs also the petroleum sources of Romania and Baku. As I have already pointed out in my previous reports, I made several attempts to pass on my ideas to the [Soviet] Secretary General of the Exterior, Sobolev. I felt that this man, who passed on my opinions to the Kremlin, showed a remarkable indifference....I must say that the carried-off victories in the Balkans have hit the dismal skulls of the Soviets like lightning....There is no doubt that if Germany is victorious, it will annex as its living space Ukraine, the sides of the Black Sea and the basin of Crimea. It is only thanks to the remarkable system of organization of German economy that Ukraine will feed the German people.

IV/ Series D, XII, 2, p. 726 ff.

Document #52

EXCERPT FROM INSTRUCTION FROM THE GERMAN STAFF HEADQUARTERS CONCERNING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE TROOPS IN RUSSIA

QGA, 4 June 1941

...Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of the German National Socialist people. The fight of Germany is directed against this ideology of disintegration.

2. This fight demands energetic and pitiless measures against the agitators, guerilla groups, saboteurs, Jews, and a total elimination of the active and passive resistance....

XII/NOKW 1692

Document #53

POLITICAL GUIDELINES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

May 1941

Introduction. The OUN will take advantage of the war against the USSR to intensify the fight for a sovereign and united Ukrainian state and to accelerate its establishment.

II. *Armed Uprising.* The scope of the revolution: to rouse the masses to fight

against Moscow, the fight in every field of life and, above all, to rouse the masses to armed combat.

The armed units of all Ukrainians able to fight, organized by the OUN, would operate mainly against the NKVD and those sections of the army which support the government. At the same time, our propaganda is directed towards demobilizing military units of the enemy, convincing them to join our ranks, and, together with them, creating the Ukrainian Revolutionary Liberation Army which accepts all Ukrainians and members of nations subjugated by Moscow. We shall then proclaim the great aim of our fight: revolution on 1/6 of the globe's territory based on the ideal: "Freedom for the peoples, freedom for the individual, and social justice."

III. Invasion of Ukraine by Foreign Military Forces and the Establishment of Ukrainian Statehood.

1. If the front of a third state opposed to Moscow is shifting onto Ukrainian territory, then a military occupation of Ukraine by the victorious foreign military forces will be unavoidable.

2. In this situation, it is our duty: to prevent Ukraine from becoming a mere fighting ground between foreign forces and those of our enemy and, in consequence, from becoming an object of foreign rule. Instead, through our struggle, our efforts to establish our own state and our initiative, we must fight for the right to act as subjects, partners, combatants and co-creators of a new order on the ruins of the Russian empire. We refuse to act as observers. We refuse to remain passive to the events taking place on Ukrainian territory, particularly as regards to war of other states against Moscow and the order they have created.

3. Consequently, we consider those states at war with Moscow and not hostile to Ukraine as our natural allies.

4. The main prerequisite is the recognition and respect of the sovereignty and unity of Ukraine by these states and a truly positive attitude regarding Ukrainian statehood.

5. Ukraine's relations with these states will be determined by their treatment of and regard towards the rights and vital interests of Ukraine.

IV. The Establishment of the Ukrainian State.

...

2. The OUN will immediately proclaim the restoration of the Ukrainian State on the territories liberated from Bolshevik Russian occupation and will form a governing force which will organize and administer all aspects of national life.

3. Our mandate for the proclamation of Ukrainian statehood and the restoration of the governing forces is derived from the long revolutionary fight for freedom, from the national uprising, from our ability to initiate our political creativity and our real strength.

Document #54

INSTRUCTION OF THE OKW ON THE USE OF PROPAGANDA
DURING THE PLAN "BARBAROSSA"

Staff Headquarters of the Wehrmacht
144/41 g/ Kdos. Heads./WFS/WPr

Berlin, June 1941

...a) the enemies of Germany are not the peoples of the Soviet Union but only the Judeo-Bolshevik government. its officials and the Communist party, that intend world revolution.

b) As a result of the pitiless despotic power that the Soviets have exercised against the populations of the regions dominated by them, it is advisable to explain insistently that the German Wehrmacht did not come to the country as an enemy of the population. Rather, it wants to deliver it from the tyranny of the Soviets. However, if a resistance manifests itself also in the non-Bolshevik part of the population, the German Wehrmacht will be forced to break it, wheresoever and whatsoever it might be....

...

...such expressions as "Russia," "Russians," "Russian army," etc. must be avoided and replaced by "Soviet Union," "peoples of the Soviet Union," "Red Army," etc....

Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht

P.O.

Jodl

II/RH 2/2082, f. 171 ff.

Document #55

MEMORANDUM OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN
NATIONALISTS ON THE SOLUTION TO THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION

...

(15) June 1941

...[this memorandum] is based on the firm belief that the whole complex of questions is of grave importance not only for Ukraine, but also for the German Reich. Only a solution which is in complete accordance with the historical and national interest of Ukraine can also be of use to Germany, and a solution that is unfavorable for Ukraine would be equally detrimental to Germany....

Only those aspects concerning the German Reich will be brought out. This does not mean, however, that the interests of Ukraine have to be neglected. For the

Ukrainian nationalists safeguard, in the first place, the interests of their own nation....

III.

Even if the German troops were welcomed as liberators upon their arrival in Ukraine, this attitude can soon change if Germany shows no intention of restoring the Ukrainian State and of expressing corresponding words to this effect....

A new order in Europe is unthinkable without an independent Ukrainian state, especially not at the time when the opportunity arises to help the Ukrainian nation achieve its own statehood.

...

For the past twenty years, a politically hostile attitude has evolved within the Ukrainian national spirit. This hostile attitude will assert itself before any enforced foreign rule that will not take the national demands of Ukraine into consideration. At the same time, we must always proceed from the assumption that, nationally and spatially speaking, Ukraine has great problems to solve. The correct solution will be of decisive economic and strategic significance. Whether Ukraine becomes a supplementary sphere for the newly-organized Europe or a constant source of danger will depend solely on the attitude of the Ukrainian people. One must not forget that, in addition to German influence, Moscow and also England can influence Ukraine. For, in view of the present political situation, Ukraine is not situated between Germany and Moscow, geographically speaking, but rather between Germany and England as paradoxical as it might seem.

After twenty years of Bolshevik enforced foreign rule, the Ukrainian people have become very sensitive to all questions concerning their freedom. Not only is this psychological attitude understandable, but it must also be taken into account if one wants to find the Ukrainians as friends and allies. This boundless love of freedom had prevailed within the Ukrainian people for three centuries and not only for the past 20 years.

This drive for independence, the will to fight and the constant readiness to protect himself from foreign influence have created the contemporary Ukrainian who assumes a distrustful and disapproving attitude towards all foreigners. These characteristic traits were demonstrated, in particular, in the sabotage movements, as well as in the agriculture and industry of Soviet Ukraine. The social experiment of Bolshevism failed, particularly due to this attitude and not only as a result of its doctrinal rigidity. We must not forget, however, that sensible politics can transform this distrust into an even greater desire to build, if this matter remains left to the Ukrainian people themselves. The least coercion would produce the opposite effect.

Because the revolutionary movement of Ukraine is little or not at all known in Europe, many factors are not being taken into consideration at all. Others are underestimated or overestimated. It is the duty of the Ukrainian nationalists to point

out, even though modestly, the possibility of a solution to the Ukrainian question.

IV.

Apart from the respective interaction of German-Russian relations, the following must be made clear:

The European continent is today dominated by two imperial ideas: that of the Germans—the Reich's idea of a new European order—and that of Russian imperialism—based on the universal revolution. As long as Russia dominates Ukrainian territories with all her elements of power and incorporates them as the base of her power in order to invade Europe, until then we cannot count on the realization of a new European order in this war....

In the long run, Eastern Europe cannot be dominated by technical governmental and administrative means supported by a strong occupational army....

Conclusion: A military occupation of Eastern Europe is untenable in the long run. Only a new order built on the national principle can ensure a healthy development. Only an independent Ukrainian state will be able to maintain this new order.

V.

It is clear that Germany planned to bind Ukraine to the European continental system—mainly for economic reasons. Ukraine is presently the most important economic factor of the Soviet Union and the richest country in mineral resources in Europe. Ukraine will strengthen the greater European economic sphere through its independence and supplement the European economy with its products and capacity to absorb goods. At the same time, it will have to establish its own economic sphere because, according to its seize and economic significance, Ukraine demands it. It is also of paramount importance to note the economic independence of Ukraine.

...A transfer of the economic center to Berlin while maintaining a centralized economic system and without the assurance of the independence of Ukrainian economy cannot satisfy Ukraine in her aspirations for economic cooperation with Europe.

Conclusion: The Ukrainian independent state must be independent economically in order to be able to establish an organic part of the European open-plan economy and to supplement it.

VI.

Since the interests of both nations demand a natural alliance, German-Ukrainian

relations must be based on sincere friendship....

A Ukrainian military power is the best means by which to give shape to these military virtues and to make them useful in the protection of the Ukrainian state and the newly organized Eastern European sphere....

Conclusion: An independent Ukrainian military power which corresponds to the spiritual attitude of Ukraine will warrant the German-Ukrainian alliance and will back the Russian pressure on Europe.

VII.

...

It must be underlined that there is no analogy to a solution of the Ukrainian question. Two new states have been created in Europe since 1938: Slovakia and Croatia. Apart from the difference in size and population of the countries, the Ukrainian problem is of much greater significance because the solution to this problem will result in radical changes in the political and economic structure of the European continent and will give rise to questions of an intercontinental importance. However, the future development of German-Ukrainian relations not only depends on the final solution to the problem, but also on the methods applied from the very beginning.

...

...Every power must take this resoluteness into account, which, while pursuing its own interests, wants to give rise to a new order in the Eastern European sphere.

...

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

I/43II 1 500, f. 64-77

Document #56

ACT OF PROCLAMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN STATE

June 30, 1941

1. By the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera proclaims the restoration of the Ukrainian State, for which entire generations of the best sons of Ukraine have sacrificed their lives.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which under the direction of its creator and leader, Evhen Konovalets, during the past decades of bloodstained Muscovite Bolshevik subjugation carried on a stubborn struggle for freedom, calls upon the entire Ukrainian people not to lay down arms as long as a Ukrainian power is not established on the entire Ukrainian territory.

The sovereign Ukrainian government assures the Ukrainian people of law and order, multi-faceted development of all its forces, and satisfaction of its demands.

2. In the western lands of Ukraine a Ukrainian government, which will be subordinated to a Ukrainian national government to be created in the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, is being formed.

3. The Ukrainian national-revolutionary army, which is being created on Ukrainian soil, will continue to fight against the Russian occupation and for a sovereign united state and a new, just order in the whole world.

Long live the Sovereign Ukrainian State!

Long live the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists!

Long live the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Stepan Bandera!

The City of Lviv, 30 June 1941, 8 p.m.

Yaroslav Stetsko

XIV/ pp. 57-58

Head of the National Assembly

Document #57

REPORT TO THE REICHSMINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Berlin, 1 July 1941

...

...[The memorandum of the OUN] accuses Germany of "making mistakes" during her occupation of Ukraine in 1918. With regard to the future, it warns Germany, sometimes with a threatening tone, that the reorganization of Eastern Europe can only be maintained by the creation of an independent Ukrainian state and not by a lasting, determined military occupation. This Ukrainian state must also be economically independent and cannot have its military economic center in Berlin. Furthermore, it must also possess an independent military power which could act as "the guarantee of the German-Ukrainian alliance and block the Russian pressure." In order to emphasize Ukraine's claim for an important power position, the memorandum points out that the example of the newly created states of Slovakia and

Croatia cannot be used as a model for Ukraine.

III/ All. Akten
Pol. XIII, 24

Grosskopf

Document #58

**LETTER FROM HEYDRICH (SD) TO THE HIGHEST LEADERS
OF THE SS AND OF THE POLICE**

Berlin, 2 July 1941

Chief of Security Police and the SD

B. No. IV-1100/41 geh. Rs.

B. No. g. Rs 7/41

EK 3

20 copies

Secret matter of the Reich!

Preliminary remarks

The immediate objective of the whole of the operations is political pacification, i.e., policing of the newly occupied regions.

The final objective is economical pacification.

Although the measures to be taken eventually to stop at the final objective...being given the long Bolshevik formation of the country, they must be applied on the whole region with implacable rigor.

At the same time it will, naturally, be necessary to make...the distinction between the different peoples (notably the Balts, the Ruthenians,* the Ukrainians, the Georgians, the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis, etc.) and use them wherever possible to attain our goals....

4. Executions

To be executed:

all officials of the Komintern (as also absolutely all communist politicians);

all high and middle level officials of the party, the central committee, the committees of the regions and of the districts who have radical tendencies;

the people's commissars;

the Jews of the party and of other administrations of the state;

all other radical elements (saboteurs, propagandists, members of guerilla groups, perpetrators of assassination attempts, provocateurs, etc.)...

...

8. Church

Nothing is to be undertaken against the aspirations of the Orthodox church in order to extend its influence on the masses. On the contrary, they must be encouraged by insisting on the separation of the church from the state, but a formation of a unified church must be prevented.

9. Regulations on the subject of language

It is appropriate to address the Red troops in Russian and the civilian population in its own language. One is not to speak of the Russian army but the Red Army.

One must use Russians (not Great Russians), Ukrainians (not Little Russians), Belorussians (not White Russians), Soviet Union (and not simply Russia). Russia is only the zone of the habitat of the Russians.

...

Heydrich

I/ R 58/241 f. 314 ff.

* It should read: Belorussians

Document #59

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 10

Berlin, 2 July 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD
-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

II) Reports by the *Einsatzgruppen* and –kommandos

...

The staff of the *Einsatzgruppen* arrived in Lviv on 1 July at 5 a.m. Their office is in the NKVD central headquarters.

The commanding officer of *Einsatzgruppe* B reported that the Ukrainian insurgent movement in Lviv had been suppressed by the NKVD. Around 3,000 shot by the NKVD. The prison was set on fire. Barely 20% of the Ukrainian intelligentsia are still alive.

Elements of the Bandera group under the leadership of Stetsko and Ravlyk have organized a militia and created a municipal council. A Ukrainian and political

self-administration of the city has been created by the Einsatzgruppe as a counterbalance to the Bandera group.

Additional measures against the Bandera group, in particular against Bandera himself, are being prepared. They will be taken as soon as possible.

EK 4a and EK 4b have also arrived in Lviv with their staff.

I/ R 58/214 f. 53, 54

Document #60

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 11

Berlin, 3 July 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

-VI A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

1) *Political Summary*

...

b) *In the General Government*:*

On July 2 and 3, 1941, Einsatzgruppe B reported on the endeavors of the Ukrainians under Bandera's command to put the German authorities before *a fait accompli* by proclaiming a Ukrainian republic and organizing the militia.

In addition, the Bandera group has recently displayed great activity in distributing leaflets.

One of these leaflets states that the Ukrainian liberation movement, formerly repressed by the Polish state, will from now on be repressed by the German police.

Furthermore, Bandera has formed a Ukrainian National Committee in order to point out his position as leader of the Ukrainian liberation movement. He has understood it to unite almost all of the émigré groups opposed both ideologically and politically. Only the OUN groups under the leadership of Col. Melnyk and the UNO3 groups under Lt. Col. Omelchenko did not participate.

Because of the increased activity, obligatory residence permits were imposed on various prominent Ukrainian émigrés, particularly on the Bandera group.

Since the individual émigré groups naturally want to outdo each other in their activity, the following measures were taken on 2 July 1941:

- 1) Various prominent politically active Ukrainian émigrés, particularly in the

General Government, are being placed under house arrest on their word of honor, including Stepan Bandera;

2) The leaders of the Ukrainian émigré organizations residing in the Reich have been threatened against with stricter police measures if their members do not comply with regulations.

3) All the Ukrainians who remain in the General Government, although their permanent residence is elsewhere, have been instructed to leave the General Government immediately and return to their place of residence, otherwise they will be arrested.

...

I/ R 58/214 f. 58, 59, 60

* The General Government (Generalgouvernement), created by Hitler's decree of 12 October 1939 on part of Polish territory (center and south) extended over an area of 95,000 km² and had as its capital the city of Cracow. It also covered 16,000 km² of ethnic Ukrainian territory which was west of the 1939 German-Soviet line of demarcation (with approximately 1,200,000 inhabitants, of whom 700,000 were Ukrainians). By the 1 August 1941 decree, Hitler annexed to the General Government all of Ukrainian Galicia (capital Lviv, Lwow in Polish, Lemberg in German). The General Government was conceived as a colony of the German Reich, directed by a governor general who took his orders directly from the Führer.

Document #61

TEXT OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GERMAN ADMINISTRATION WITH MEMBERS OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE AND STEPAN BANDERA

[Cracow] 3 July 1941

Persons present:

From the German side: the Undersecretary of State, Kundt, Dr. Föhl, Assistant Judge von Bulow, and later Colonel Bisanz.

From the Ukrainian side: Dr. Horbovyi, Prof. Andriyevskyi, Mudryi, Dr. Shukhevych. Later Stepan Bandera.

Kundt: Gentlemen! I've asked you to come here not as members of the National Committee, but as private citizens. First of all, I would like to ask you

whether you signed this circular letter"

All the gentlemen present answered "yes."

Kundt: I would like to clarify this matter:

The content of this circular letter does not correspond to the facts. The German authorities, as well as Berlin, do not know of the existence of a Ukrainian government in Lviv. Such a government was not set up with their knowledge....

...This circular letter also states that the German Reich and the German Wehrmacht are your allies. This is incorrect; the Führer is the only person leading the struggle and Ukrainian allies do not exist. Perhaps the Ukrainians are full of enthusiasm and feel that they are our allies; however, according to constitutional terminology, we are not allies, but rather conquerors of the Soviet Russian regions....

...

Today I am going to Berlin where further decisions will be made. As is fitting, I simply wanted to inform you immediately so that you desist from matters of this nature and thereby not compromise yourselves in the eyes of your own nation.

The competent political authority of the Reich, appointed by the Führer, considers the creation of a Ukrainian National Committee on behalf of Ukraine premature....

I have forwarded your memorandum. However, only the Führer has the final say regarding this matter. Therefore, I am asking you to be patient. In the long run, you could only make matters worse, for if the press should announce that a Ukrainian government was formed, the Führer will not allow his ideas to be upset by certain impatient people, but would simply make sure that a similar situation never arose again.

...

First, we must win the war against the Soviet Union. For the time being, the entire area of operations is under the control of the German Wehrmacht. We do not know what the Führer will decide when the operations are over. In any case, he himself will solely decide. I believe that this is now clear. Now I want to ask Mr. Bandera a few questions.

This mysterious broadcast on Lviv Radio, or on one of the other enemy radio stations on the same frequency, maintains that Mr. Bandera has been appointed head of the free state of Western Ukraine and that, as a result, he read, or had someone read, a Decree no.1 in which he appoints Stetsko as Prime Minister.

1st question: Mr. Bandera, were you asked beforehand to take over the leadership of the Ukrainian state and did the proclamation on the radio station take place with your approval?

2nd question: Are you the author of Decree no.1?

Int.[erpreter]: Mr. Bandera requests to be allowed to add something about the Ukrainian viewpoint.

Kundt: I point out that only the German point of view is a determining factor.

Bandera: The Ukrainians have been fighting a war against Bolshevism for twenty years and until now in a revolutionary way. They led this struggle themselves. The leadership of the OUN had led a revolutionary struggle against the forces occupying Ukraine....

...

Ba[ndera]: In this present struggle everyone has joined in the fight for an autonomous, independent and free Ukraine. We are fighting for Ukrainian ideas and Ukrainian goals. I gave instructions for the immediate establishment of an administration and national government in the regions occupied by the German troops. I gave this order long before the war began.

...

Ku[ndt]: By virtue of these orders, did your people declare you temporary leader of this Ukrainian government in Western Ukraine after the arrival of the German troops in Lviv?

Ba[ndera]: I gave this order as leader of the OUN, that is to say, as leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, because this organization represents the Ukrainian people....The OUN was the only organization which led the struggle and, therefore, it is entitled to form a government.

Ku[ndt]: The German Wehrmacht and the Führer, who conquered this land, have the right to form a government. It is he who has the right to establish a government.

Ba[ndera]: I would like to reiterate and clarify the fact that in all of the orders given by me I did not appeal to any instructions or approval from any German authorities. In all of the orders given by me I did not rely on any German authority or any consent of German authorities, but only on the mandate that I have received from the Ukrainian people. The establishment and organization of Ukrainian life is only possible by Ukrainians in the areas inhabited by Ukrainians and this can only take place if Ukrainian factors are drawn in. I am of the opinion that this can happen provisionally only with the consent of the Germans.

Ku[ndt]: Only Adolf Hitler can determine what will happen there.

Document #62**EXCERPT OF THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 12**

Berlin, 4 July 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

Einsatzgruppe B

Garrison: Lemberg [Lviv] (FT-Connection)

Group leader reports:

The so-called national government declared that it wanted to establish its official seat in the University of Lviv.

The present composition:

Head of the Government—Stetsko, also known as Karbovysh and Belends; Minister of Health—Dr. Panchyshyn; Administration—Lysyi; Justice—Councillor Fedusevych; Security—Klymiv; Economics—Dr. Yatsiv; Press and Propaganda—the poet Holovko; Ministry of War— Rico Yaryi married to a Jew; Culture—vacant.

A Supreme Council is to function alongside the Cabinet. Dmytro Dontsov is the intended head*....

...There was no de facto recognition. However, we had to avoid taking severe measures against the usurpers because of the military situation and the frame of mind in the region. An outbreak of the predicted uprising around the Berdychiv and Zhytomyr-Kyiv areas is expected.

I/ R 58/214 f. 69

* On 4 July 1941 Yaroslav Stetsko had not yet completed his consultations; the list above, thus, is incomplete and with mistakes.

Document #63**EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 13**

Berlin, 5 July 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

b) *Within the General Government:*

As already reported, the prominent Ukrainian nationalist leaders have been placed under house arrest.

Bandera was transferred to Berlin. His interrogation is in progress.

I/ R 58/214 f. 75

Document #64

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 23

Berlin, 15 July 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD
-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

Apparently, at the suggestion of Riko Yaryi, who has travelled through the Chernivtsi region, notices were posted everywhere by the Ukrainian district leaders and mayors requesting all those liable for service to register into the Ukrainian army.

A censored newspaper which published pictures and information by the so-called "Stetsko government" is appearing in Stanislaviv. Stryi and Halych are the source of the Bandera agitation.

Reports on the situation in Lviv:

On 11 and 12 July 1941, all of the Ukrainian party groups in Lviv including the Melnyk group of the OUN—except for the Bandera group—have assured the liaison officer of the Wehrmacht Command [Capt. Prof. Dr. Koch] of their loyalty to the German authorities and informed them of their willingness to participate in the positive reconstruction of the country. Prof. Koch also contacted the Bandera group regarding this issue. The group stated that the clarification of two points was lacking:

- 1) the position of the issue of Ukraine's future [independence],
- 2) the matter of Bandera's release.

As regards to the first point, Koch explained that only the Führer can make a

decision on this issue. As to Bandera's release, Koch explained that he was not competent in this matter. In conclusion, Koch told the representatives of the Bandera group that the necessary reconstruction could be carried out even without the Bandera group....

I/ R 58/214 f. 173

Document #65

HITLER'S MEETING WITH ROSENBERG, LAMMERS, KEITEL, GÖRING, AND BORMANN

The Führer's Headquarters

16 July 1941

Bo/Fu

Secret matter of the Reich!

File entry

Today, on Hitler's orders, a meeting with Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reichsminister Lammers, Field Marshall Keitel, Reichsmarschall Göring and myself* was held at 15:00 hrs. in the Führer's headquarters.

In his preliminary address, the Führer emphasized that he wanted first of all to touch upon a few fundamental points. Different measures are now necessary; this is proved by an article published by an impertinent Vichy newspaper which claims that the war against the Soviet Union is Europe's war. Therefore, it is also to be fought for the whole of Europe. Obviously, this Vichy paper wants to point out that the beneficiaries of this war are not the Germans alone, but all the European states must profit by it.

...

The reasons for our actions in the face of the world must, therefore, be focused on tactical aspects. Here we must proceed exactly as we did in Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. Also, in these cases, we would not have mentioned our intentions and, wisely, we will continue not doing so.

We shall, therefore, point out again that we are forced to occupy a region to create order and protect it. In the interest of the population we had to ensure peace, food supplies, transportation, etc. These were the reasons for our settlement. It should, therefore, not be obvious that a final settlement is being prepared in this way. We are, nevertheless, applying, and will be able to apply, all necessary measures—executions, deportations, etc.

However, we do not want to make anyone our enemy prematurely and unnecessarily. We shall, therefore, act only as if we wanted to exercise a mandate. Yet, it must be clear to us that we shall never leave these regions.

Consequently, we must:

- 1) not obstruct the final settlement, but rather prepare it secretly;
- 2) stress the point that we are the heralds of freedom.

In particular:

We must deport all foreigners from the Crimea and resettle it with Germans.

This same procedure must be applied to Galicia—the former regions of the Austrian Empire. Presently, we have a good relationship with Romania, yet we do not know how it will be in the future. We must adapt to this situation and determine our frontiers accordingly. We should not be dependent on a benevolent third party. We must establish our relationship with Romania according to these guidelines.

The fundamental question is to cut the enormous cake skillfully in order to:

- firstly—dominate it,
- secondly—manage it,
- thirdly—exploit it.

The Russians have now been ordered to conduct a partisan war behind our lines. This partisan war also has its advantages: it enables us to exterminate everything which is against us.

The fundamentals:

The creation of a military power west of the Urals is out of the question even if we have to fight for a hundred years. All of the Führer's successors must know: that the security of the Reich is ensured only when no foreign army exists west of the Urals. Germany takes upon herself the protection of this region from any possible danger. The iron rule must be in force and must remain so:

Never allow anyone other than a German to carry weapons!

This is particularly important. Even if it initially appears easier to mobilize the military assistance of any subjugated foreign people—it is a mistake! One day it will absolutely and unavoidably turn against us. Only Germans are permitted to carry weapons, not the Slavs or the Czechs or the Cossacks or the Ukrainians!

In this respect, we must learn fully from the English. Accordingly, we must never make our attitude dependent on particular existing personalities: also the behaviour of the English in India towards the Indians princes, etc. is an example for us here. The soldier must always protect the regiment!

We must change the newly acquired Eastern regions into a Garden of Eden; they are of vital importance to us, the colonies, in comparison, play a subordinate role.

Even if we divide particular regions now we must always be considered the defenders of rights and the population. Thus we must choose the necessary

formulations now. We are not speaking of a new region of the Reich, but rather of a necessary duty created by the war.

In particular:

After an understanding with Field Marshall Keitel is reached, the Baltic regions as far as the D  na must be handed over to the administration. Reichsleiter Rosenberg points out that, in his opinion, a different treatment of the population is required in every commissariat. In Ukraine, we had to apply cultural care and supervision. We had to arouse the historical consciousness of the Ukrainians; we had to establish a university in Kyiv.

The Reichsmarschall claims to the contrary that we must first secure our food supplies. Everything else can be done much later.

(A second question: Is there still a cultural class in Ukraine or are there only intellectual Ukrainians in exile outside the present-day Russia?)

Rosenberg continues, saying that certain aspirations towards independence should also be promoted in Ukraine.

The Reichsmarschall asks the F  hrer to indicate which regions are promised to other states.

The F  hrer answers that Antonescu wants Bessarabia and Odessa, including a corridor which would lead west-north-west from Odessa.

In response to the objections raised by the Reichsmarschall and Rosenberg, the F  hrer points out that the new boundary requested by Antonescu goes only slightly beyond the old Romanian borders.

The F  hrer continues to emphasize that no specific promise was made to the Hungarians, the Turks, or the Slovaks.

The F  hrer then brings up the question of whether the old Austrian part of Galicia would be handed over to the General Government immediately or not. In answer to objections, the F  hrer decided not to transfer this region to the General Government, but rather only to place it under Reichsminister Frank's control (Lemberg).

The Reichsmarschall sees it fit to allot different parts of the Baltic regions, for example the Bialystok forests, to Eastern Prussia.

The F  hrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic region must become part of the Reich.

The same applies to the Crimea and the important hinterland area [regions north of the Crimea]. They must also become Reich territory. The hinterland must be as large as possible.

Rosenberg expressed some doubt on this point because of the Ukrainians who reside there.

(By the way: It has been shown several times that Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; he also wants to expand the old Ukraine considerably).

The F  hrer continues to point out that the Volga colony must also become a

territory of the Reich just like the regions around Baku; it must become a German concession (military colony).

...

The Führer points out that the most important region for the next three years is undoubtedly Ukraine. Therefore, it is best to appoint Koch to this territory; as regards Sauckel, it is better to use him in the Baltic region....

XI/221-L

XXXVIII, p. 86 ff.

* The author of this memorandum is unknown (it was probably Bormann).

Document #66

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 25

Berlin, 17 July 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

Individual national groups want their own press. Upon local suggestions, the Ukrainians were allowed to publish a politically colorless daily Ukrainian newspaper in Lviv. Other newspapers, as well as publications by party organs [Bandera group], were stopped.

...

d) *Propaganda of the OUN-Bandera Group*

The entire propaganda activity of the Bandera group adheres to a rigid and carefully studied plan. After the proclamation of "the Ukrainian national government" in Lviv, corresponding proclamations of independence were also made in other cities of the former Polish wojewody of Lviv, Ternopil and Lutsk. The Bandera group set up so-called propaganda units, which made so-called proclamations of independence in every larger conquered area, immediately after its occupation by German troops, and installed local self-governing bodies. Furthermore, placards, leaflets and illegal newspapers, which are presently being circulated, propagated the appeals [the proclamation of the Ukrainian government], broadcast on Lviv Radio

Station, and spread propaganda on behalf of the OUN, or rather the Bandera group. The publication of various OUN newspapers, published without authorization, has been stopped. The Bandera group has been deprived of the use of approximately 20 printing shops, which were immediately taken over by the group in the first days after the occupation of the city of Lviv....

I/ R 58/214 f. 202

Document #67

STATEMENT BY THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE OUN

Berlin, 21 July 1941

On the situation in Lviv (Lemberg)

I. Facts and Causes

1. The Proclamation of the Restoration of the Ukrainian State on June 30, 1941, in Lviv, has already become a historical fact that will become one of the most glorious traditions of the Ukrainian people. The proclamation of June 30, 1941 will become a symbol of the present liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation, just as the acts of January 22, 1918, in Kyiv, and November 1, 1918, in Lviv, became symbols of the Ukrainian war of liberation of 1917–1921.

...

2...Ukrainian statehood was not only proclaimed in Lviv. State power was established in those areas where the Moscow government had been eliminated; in some regions it was established even before the Lviv proclamation. This demonstrates the spontaneous aspirations of the Ukrainian people for their own state sovereignty.

As a result of the establishment of state power in the villages, towns, districts and regions, the entire administration was taken over by Ukrainians.

This also occurred in Lviv.

...

4...Two methods were subsequently used during the restoration of the state: the organization of national life from the top and at the same time from the bottom. The government immediately began to organize life in the country, establishing regional administrations, co-ordinating activity and setting up guidelines. The government organized the administration, economy, militia, public health, etc. It

organized everything that the Ukrainians, as well as the German occupying forces, needed in the first instance....

5. Although the OUN established the government, only a few government positions were occupied by members of the OUN; the majority of the portfolios were not given to OUN members, but to experts or well-known Ukrainian political personalities....

The attack against the Ukrainian government could run the risk of being understood by the Ukrainian people as a hostile act of the German Reich regarding the very idea of a Ukrainian state. If Germany needs sincere and faithful allies, then Ukraine will agree to be an ally, but only as an independent state.

...

II. Practical Conclusions

1. The Proclamation of the Ukrainian State in Lviv is already an accomplished fact. From now on, all actions will be taken on behalf of the Ukrainian state. This is valid for the whole ethnic territory already liberated.

2. The Ukrainian government established in Lviv under the leadership of Yaroslav Stetsko, Deputy Leader of the OUN, continues to be in force for the Ukrainian nation.

...

Political Bureau of
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
Department of Foreign Policy and Propaganda

III/ Ukraine, Pol. XIII, 24

Document #68

EXCERPT FROM A REPORT OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN OF THE SECURITY POLICE AND THE SD ON ACTIVITIES AND THE SITUATION IN THE USSR No. 1

Berlin, 31 July 1941

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

D) *Attitude of National Groups*

...

Ukraine

The national situation in Ukraine is still aggravated by Bandera's activist demands. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) under the leadership

of Stepan Bandera is the most significant military factor in Ukrainian political life. Its followers are represented in all parts of the world where a significant number of Ukrainians live....

The other group, under the leadership of Colonel Andriy Melnyk, is losing more and more ground among the Ukrainians residing both in Ukraine and in the Reich due to Bandera's militant policies. Melnyk's group consists mainly of émigrés and has few contacts with Soviet Ukrainian territory.

The aim of Bandera's group is to create an independent Ukrainian state with an absolute nationalist-orientated government; Bandera would like it to be headed by a politically impartial individual who himself lived in subjugated Ukraine....

The independence propaganda of the Bandera people, which is still to some extent continuing, is not without effect. In all circles, particularly among the Ukrainian urban population, a strong pressure for independence can be noticeably felt.

In the course of the proclamation of independence, the administration departments (mayors, district heads) were arbitrarily installed in many towns without the approval of the German authorities. At that time, illegal newspapers in which the proclamation made public by the Lviv radio station was published, were also circulated. The Einsatzkommandos have had to intervene several times against the distribution of these OUN newspapers. Approximately 20 printing offices, seized by the Bandera group immediately after the capture of the city of Lviv, were repossessed.

Presently, the Einsatzkommandos are engaged in the continuous dissolution of the public services created by the OUN, and in the formation of a new militia....

III/ Inland II G, 431, f. 39, 49, 50, 52

Document #69

DEATH TO THE TRAITORS OF UKRAINE

Article from the Soviet Newspaper *Za Radiansku Ukraïnu* (No.1)

July 31, 1941, organ of the Political Department of the Red Army
on the South-Western Front (Ukraine)

The German fascists, the cruel enemy of the Ukrainian people, have long dreamed of enslaving this freedom-loving nation. By traitorously declaring war on us, the German fascists hoped to occupy the whole of Ukraine within ten days. The battles have been raging for two months now....

Hitler has called upon the traitors of the Ukrainian people, the Petlurists, the OUN-ists and the Hetmanists, for help....

The cannibal Hitler has let loose his faithful dogs—the Petlurists, the OUN-ists and the Hetmanists—these disgusting traitors of the Ukrainian nation, and ordered them to hinder the partisan movement by means of lies and murder and to destroy the prominent patriots of our fatherland....

These liars, spies and murderers from the Gestapo call upon you to yield voluntarily to the yoke of fascist slavery. They are helping the fascist bandits to plunder our country, our property, which was acquired through the blood and sweat of workers, and to enslave our country, which was united into a great Ukrainian state.

For all the lies, provocations and murders, the freedom-loving Ukrainian people have but one response for the blue-and-yellow* bandits and their head Stepan Bandera: Death!...

Oleksandr Korniyчук

III/ Ukraine, Po. XIII, 24

* Colors of the Ukrainian national flag

Document #70

ORDINANCE OF ROSENBERG ON COMPULSORY WORK IN THE EASTERN OCCUPIED REGIONS

5 August 1941

In accordance with Decree no.8 of the Führer on the administration of newly occupied eastern territories of 17 July 1941, I order:

- 1) All inhabitants of the eastern occupied territories, age 18 to 45 are to submit to the obligation of work according to their capacity.
- 2) The Reichskommissars can extend or limit the work obligation to groups defined from the population.
- 3) A special rule is published for Jews....

Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories
Rosenberg

Document #71**EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 47**

Berlin, 9 August 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

Professor Lenkavskyi, propaganda leader of the OUN Bandera group, was arrested for his illegal authorization of an order for the requisition of a former Russian military printing office in Lviv....

II. General Morale in the District of Galicia

...The bearer of all the hostile tendencies among the Ukrainians is, as previously, the Bandera group. A leaflet ordering members of the OUN to resume their underground activities and to protest against the annexation of Galicia to the General Government is in circulation. Leading members of the Bandera group are still in hiding from the German authorities....

I/ R 58/215, f. 225-226

Document #72***THE DOG HAS NOT SATISFIED ITS MASTER***

Article from the Soviet Newspaper *Za Radiansku Ukraïnu* No. 5,
August 9, 1941

...Our newspaper already reported that the Germans have informed their soldiers that the "Ukrainian government" (a small group of paid individuals who side with Hitler's armies) does not constitute an independent power; it only serves as a means of liaison with the German military authorities....

A new document has fallen into the hands of the Red Army. The commanders of the 296th German division have issued an order that the members of the

OUN—the Bandera supporters—are to be arrested and prevented from entering the territories occupied by the German troops. Why then is there such malevolence towards a servant?

Probably because no one has confidence in the accursed traitors any more, and probably because the Ukrainian people are spitting with disgust into the face of all these vile Banderas. The following slogan is circulating among the people: "Bandera—cholera—fascist skin—just wait and this skin will be ripped off you!"

Semen Sokilskyi

I/ NS 33/42 f. 460

Document #73

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE SECOND SS CAVALRY REGIMENT

12 August 1941

...The Ukrainian and Belorussian population are very benevolent. This is evident particularly in that they denounce the bandits who have been plaguing this region for some time.

Another proof of this eagerness is that when the troops arrived, they brought them immediately milk, eggs and other food products which were put at the disposal of the soldiers free of charge and in a spontaneous manner....

I/ NS 33/42 f. 460

Document #74

HUNTERS AND GREYHOUNDS

Article from the Soviet Newspaper *Za Radiansku Ukrainu*, No. 7,
August 13, 1941

When Hitler set out to hunt for Ukraine, he looked for suitable greyhounds...

"To work, my Ministers," Hitler told them, "you are the government of 'united Ukraine'."

...Twenty-three years ago, Wilhelm gave the orders and Petlura signed them. Today, it is Hitler who gives the orders and Bandera who signs. The names are different, but the contents are the same.

K. Polonnyk

...

III/ Ukraine, Pol. XIII, 24

Document #75

MEMORANDUM OF THE OUN CONCERNING GERMAN DEMANDS TO DISSOLVE THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

Berlin, 14 August 1941

The OUN's Aim—The Ukrainian State

The military aim of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists —OUN—is solely the Ukrainian state, however, not a state in which the OUN would necessarily be a leading power. The OUN is subordinate to the Ukrainian state and not the contrary. It is important for the OUN that a Ukrainian government exist as an externally distinctive mark of Ukrainian statehood. It is not a case of a specific government made up of specific persons.

Had Germany proclaimed the restoration of the Ukrainian state of the restructuring of Eastern Europe on the basis of national states as its war aim in the struggle against Bolshevism, then the question of the existence of the present Ukrainian state government could have taken other forms. Irrespective of the fact by which method the restoration of Ukrainian statehood will take place under the demands of war, the Act of June 30, 1941, as a spontaneous expression of the will of the Ukrainian people, will be an external symbol of the restored Ukrainian state—a firm basis for Ukrainian-German friendship.

The dissolution of the existing government, which came into being on Ukrainian soil by the will of the Ukrainian people, without Germany's exploitation of its position with respect to the establishment of a Ukrainian state, can only mean that Germany does not desire a Ukrainian state.

The Act of 30 June 1941 and German-Ukrainian Cooperation

...All efforts made by the leaders of the OUN to contact the German political authorities of the Reich in order to create a political base and agree on joint tactics were in vain. The German authorities, which the OUN contacted, declared their

incompetence to act on these issues, as well as on the solution of the Ukrainian question, which depends on the development of events in Ukraine. Just before the war, Yaroslav Stetsko, the head of the political bureau of the OUN, the present Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government tried to arrange a meeting with the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP, through an authorized representative of the OUN in Berlin, on political issues concerning Ukraine. Unfortunately, this attempt remained unsuccessful and the OUN was unable to coincide its tactics and political line with the competent German political authorities. The OUN is in no way responsible for this course of events. Also, during the first days of the war, Capt. Prof. Dr. Koch was unable to answer the leader of the OUN on questions of a political nature.

The Relationship between the OUN and the Ukrainian Government

The Ukrainian government was created on the initiative of the OUN. This, however, does not mean that this government is dependent on the leadership of the OUN. The Prime Minister of the government is a member of the OUN. The members of the government, on the whole, were selected according to professional principles. The Ukrainian public recognizes the government and created a wide legal base for it. The government was recognized by the population residing on Ukrainian territories liberated from bolshevism. The mandate of the state government, which it had received from the OUN, has, therefore, become a mandate of the entire Ukrainian nation.

The OUN has no legitimate right to dissolve the state government. This can only be carried out by the Ukrainian state government.

The OUN and the government are today two totally independent factors: the government is above the parties and is constituted on an all-Ukrainian basis. It includes representatives of Eastern, as well as Western, Ukraine (the latter from Galicia and Volyn). The Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government is only subordinate to the leader of the OUN on organizational issues (party issues). Not only the OUN and its members, but also Ukrainians of various tendencies, are subordinate to the government.

Taking into consideration the emerging all-Ukrainian attitude, and the above-mentioned unfavorable moment for Ukrainian-German cooperation, the OUN can neither take a negative position towards the government nor recall its representatives.

Captain Prof. Dr. Koch, as representative of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions, justified the first two conditions laid down on the OUN pointing out that they are determined by the necessity to eliminate the party-political disunity and misunderstanding among the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian government constitutes an acceptable basis for all Ukrainians because entry into the government

is open to all Ukrainian patriots.

The OUN in Favor of Continuing Cooperation with Germany

...

The dissolution of the government would weaken the Ukrainian nation's enthusiasm to work and its will towards national reconstruction. This would greatly affect the economy. In their disappointment, the Ukrainian popular masses will not know for whom and for what they are working, since the Ukrainian state, which is the aim of their struggle at the present moment, is not being realized. The hostile attitude towards every occupational economy, formed throughout the years, as well as sabotage skills, developed at the highest level, with its invisible methods, will not diminish, but on the contrary, under the influence of the economy, which collapsed as a result of the war, will become even stronger. The question is why should new arguments be created for bolshevism. English and Polish propaganda in the struggle against the Ukrainian liberation movement and its cooperation with Germany.

The OUN supports further close cooperation with Germany and is of the opinion that the dissolution, or rather the disavowal, of the Ukrainian government established in Lviv would only place unnecessary burdens on this cooperation. The OUN can today already predict the kind of negative effect a public announcement of the dissolution of the government will have on the Ukrainian people, particularly if we must explain that the leadership of the OUN had to take this step on the suggestion of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions with regard to Ukrainian-German cooperation. It will be necessary to explain this matter in a particular way. As a result, the Ukrainians would lose all hope that Germany wants to aid the young aspiring nations in the establishment of their own state life.

Conclusion

The position of the OUN is the following:

The dissolution of the Ukrainian government founded on 30 June 1941 is highly detrimental not only to Ukraine, but also to Germany.

It is our opinion that such a decision would only obstruct German-Ukrainian relations, greatly impair the reconstruction of Eastern Europe, which is now underway, and would have a negative effect not only on political development, but also on economic development and cooperation.

The demand that the OUN should dissolve the government of the Ukrainian state contains long-range domestic political consequences: this means that the OUN must renounce its leading position in the struggle for liberation and its national aspirations in Ukrainian political life.

Document #76**STATEMENT OF THE HEAD OF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT
YAROSLAV STETSKO**

Berlin, 14 August 1941

...As associate leader of the OUN and head of the Ukrainian government, a post from which I have not been dismissed, I bear the entire responsibility for the proclamation of the restoration of the Ukrainian state and the consequences that ensued....

I did not ask for any consent from the German government authorities. I took charge of the affairs of the state on orders from the head of the OUN.

I asked for the radio transmission in Lviv and allowed the broadcast of the programs. The order to seize the transmitter was given by the head of the national leadership of the OUN as part of the general plan of OUN revolutionary activities in case of war before the launching of the war with the Soviet Union,...

III/ All. Akten, Pol. XIII, 24

Document #77**ROSENBERG'S ORDER ON COMPULSORY WORK FOR THE
JEWISH POPULATION**

16 August 1941

In accordance with Decree no.8 of the Führer on the administration of newly occupied eastern territories of 17 July 1941, I order:

#1

The Jews of both sexes, ages 14 to 60 inclusive, living on newly occupied eastern territories, are to submit to compulsory work. They will be gathered to this end into sections of forced labor....

Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories
Rosenberg

I/ R 26 IV/33b, p. 50

Document #78

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 56

Berlin, 18 August 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

In Lviv, the OUN is selling stamps in order to raise funds to finance its fighting, and distributing leaflets demanding Bandera's release. Placards, which state that under the leadership of the OUN a "Free and Independent Ukraine" based on the principle "Ukraine to the Ukrainians" must be established, are being distributed from Lviv. The Wehrmacht's orders are often ignored....

I/ R 58/216 f. 77

Document #79

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 58

Berlin, 20 August 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

As previously, propaganda calling for independence is presently being spread in Pinsk and Brest-Litovsk, although hope for an independent Ukraine was greatly shaken after the annexation of Galicia to the General Government.

...

...A 20-30 strong Ukrainian gang is going around the Pinsk region causing trouble. It is harassing the Pinsk area with slogans such as: "German administration out! We want a free Ukraine without Germans, Poles and Russians!"...

I/ R 58/216 f. 97, 98

Document #80**EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 60**

Berlin, 22 August 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD
-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich

...

...The underground activity is continuing. A leaflet urging the dissolved militia not to hand in its arms is presently being circulated. In Kovel, the following inscription was written on the wall of a house: "Down with foreign rule! Long live Stepan Bandera."...

I/ R 58/216 f. 133

Document #81**REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE**

213th Division of Security VIII

27 August 1941

1. Political situation**a) Volhynia**

The political situation in Volhynia has undergone a change since the stationing of the division. At first the Ukrainian population of Volhynia greeted the Wehrmacht as liberators....After the Ukrainians had begun to organize into committee of mutual aid and set up police contingent, a political desire began to awaken progressively in their ranks....Especially in the cities of Lutsk, Rivne, Kovel, Dubno, and Ostrih [Ostrog] that the desire for independence is manifesting itself more and more, as well as a determination to be free from German influence....Aspirations for an independent Ukraine is becoming very pronounced. These efforts are supported mainly by the intellectuals of the cities.

b) Russian territory

...Recently nationalist intellectuals from Western Ukraine, notably from the region of Lviv and the General Government, have made themselves felt. They tried

to infiltrate political administration and tried to awaken in the population the idea of an independent and sovereign Ukraine. These elements are forced back one by one towards Lviv. However, clear guidelines are needed on how to treat these elements. They present a danger for the reconstruction on the Russian territories; not only are they sowing trouble but, what's more, they try to undermine the authority of the Wehrmacht by asserting that the local officials, the mayors and heads of districts, are responsible not only to the German Wehrmacht but also to them as envoys of the Ukrainian state....

von Courbière

II/ RH 22/204

Document #82

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 66

Chief of the Security Police

Berlin, 28 August 1941

and the SD

-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

The dissolution of the Ukrainian militia is now taking place everywhere with the enthusiastic support of a large majority of the population. The activity of Bandera's followers is increasing. In Klusk, near Kovel, a slogan, calling to the elimination of "foreign rule" and the return of Bandera, was inscribed on a cooperative building. In Luboml, the well-known proclamation of Ukrainian statehood was supposed to have been read out publicly....

I/ R 58/216 f. 211

Document #83

EXCERPT FROM REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR

8 September 1941

1. *Treatment of Prisoners of War in General*

Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of National Socialist Germany. For the first

time the German soldier is facing an adversary trained not only from the military point of view but also from the political point of view in the sense of bolshevism. He already has in his blood the idea of a fight against national socialism. He leads this fight with all available means: sabotage, subversive propaganda, arson, assassination. This is why the Bolshevik soldier has lost the right to be treated as an honest soldier according to Geneva convention.

It is thus in conformity with the reputation and dignity of the German Wehrmacht that the German soldier keep the greatest distance from the Soviet prisoner of war....

Consequently, energetic and pitiless measures are to be taken at the least sign of disobedience, especially against Bolshevik agitators. Disobedience and active or passive resistance must be immediately put down with the help of weapons (bayonets, butts, and fire arms)....

Prisoners who flee are to be shot immediately without warning. ...

XI/ 1519-PS
XXVII, p. 275 ff.

Document #84

BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AGAINST THE OUN AND S. BANDERA

Since July 31, 1941, the Bolshevik newspaper *Za Radiansku Ukraïnu* [For the Soviet Ukraine], an organ of the political administration of the Red Army on the South-Western Front, has been published in the form of a leaflet. The editorial staff is composed of the prominent authors Mykola Bazhan, Oleksander Korniychuk, Andriy Vasylo, and Wanda Wasilewska [a Polish woman].

The newspaper is circulated mainly in the Ukrainian regions occupied by the German forces and is designed to instigate the population to partisan warfare. This leaflet is not only being dropped out of airplanes and smuggled across the front lines, it is also distributed by parachutists dressed in "Polish army uniforms."

Reports on the partisan war, reports on the Red Army, as well as important foreign political events which concern the Soviet Union (in particular an alliance with Great Britain, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the supply of arms by the United States), form the main content of the individual reports and articles.

The newspaper is richly illustrated and provided with poems of a political nature. The Ukrainian nationalists, the OUN and their leader Stepan Bandera, are frequently mentioned. The latter is the only one named among the Ukrainian

personalities, which means that the Bolsheviks see in him and in his organization the political representative of the national struggle of Ukraine. Bandera is also compared to Petlura whose name today still has a specific political popularity in all of Ukraine....

Enclosed are 3 articles about the OUN translated into German.

III/ Ukraine, Pol. XIII, 24

Document #85

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 78

Berlin, 9 September 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

-IV A1 - B. Nr. 1B/41 g. Rs.

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

General Atmosphere:

...

Pinsk: Disturbances in the southern part of the region caused by the propaganda for independence spread by the Ukrainians from Volyn....

In Volyn, the propaganda for Ukrainian independence, particularly on the part of the Bandera group, is being intensified....

Ethnic Groups:

Ukrainians:

...

...Two Ukrainian leaflets seized....

In Lutsk, Ukrainians swore a public oath to Bandera during the religious ceremonies commemorating the victims of the Bolshevik regime. Similar cases in Galicia. Furthermore, exploiting the present celebration (in Stanislaviv) on the occasion of the 22nd anniversary of the conquest of Kyiv. The Bandera group is presently making demands, particularly for a Ukrainian legion and on entry permit for Bandera into the Ukrainian settlement areas. Collection of signatures for Bandera's release in his home town: "Strayl Uhryniv near Stanislaviv."...

Document #86**EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 79**

Berlin, 19 September 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

Ethnic Groups:

Ukrainians:

...

...The Ukrainian intelligentsia is under a strong influence of the Bandera group. The renewal of the activity of the Hetman group has not been particularly successful. Attempts to create a national Church.

In Galicia and Volyn, the Bandera group is making vigorous attempts to get some of its members into German administrative departments as interpreters. More intensive propaganda in favor of Bandera. Signatures collected in order to obtain permission for Bandera to enter the Ukrainian settlement areas. Continuous circulation of old leaflets regarding the Stetsko government and the proclamation of independence. Similar circulation of Bandera's rejection of Prof. Koch's demands [Rosenberg's Ministry] to dissolve the Stetsko government. Collection of "combat funds" for the OUN; distribution of stamps bearing the date of the proclamation of independence [30 June 1941]....

I/ R 58/217 f. 10

Document #87

**ACTIVITY AND SITUATION REPORT No.4 OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN
OF THE SECRET POLICE AND THE SD IN THE USSR**

(Report from 1 — 15 September 1941)

...

The Bandera Group

The activity of the Bandera group (OUN) requires further attention. The activists of this group are distinguished by their extraordinary devotion and zeal. Further cooperation with them is no longer possible. All the demands placed in the

OUN-men are frankly promised and just as frankly broken.

The activity of the Western Ukrainian Bandera group is more and more detrimental in other Ukrainian regions. National political ideas are being propagated, although, up till now, a fertile ground for them has hardly existed. They represent an acute danger for present and future German interests.

Appropriate defense measures were taken....

III/ Inland IIg 431, f. 131

Document #88

GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCT REGARDING THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION

(September 1941)

1. The Führer reserves the right to decide on the *political development* of the territory inhabited by the Ukrainian population. The military authorities, in principle, are not to occupy themselves with these questions.

To all Ukrainian complaints on the subject of settlement on certain territories of Ukraine under the administration of the General Government or the Romanians, and to all other similar complaints, the answer must be that Ukraine has been saved thanks to German blood and that for this reason Germany reserves the right to dispose of these territories according to general political demands.

2. In case of need, the participation of some Ukrainians in the administration of the country at commune and district levels, in form of committees of confidence, will be tolerated in the future. To higher levels of administration, Ukrainians worthy of confidence cannot be called....

3. Final economic objectives is the natural development of Ukraine into a granary of Europe....the entire East European space is to become the principal outlet for West European industry, whose products will be paid for in food products and raw materials.

In conformity with this final objective and as long as it will consent to cooperate docilely in the agriculture under the direction of the Germans, the Ukrainian population should be treated benevolently. But the very widespread German aspirations to make accessible to foreign populations their own customs and manners... is formally forbidden.

The use of the Ukrainian spoken and written language is not to be restricted.

The Ukrainian press is authorized on the condition that it be held in check

within a limited range and submitted to censorship.

Nothing should be undertaken against elementary schools.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church as well as religious associations are authorized to the extent that they stay away from politics. However, it must be prevented that sacred places become places for pilgrimages and centers of movements for autonomy.

Religious representatives from other states must be expelled from territories under German administration.

Participation of members of the Wehrmacht at Ukrainian national feasts must be limited to exceptional cases, linked directly to the occupation by the German troops. Under no circumstances can the German authorities take it upon themselves to organize these feasts.

II/ RH 22/171

Document #89

NOTICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE WEHRMACHT ON PUNISHMENT FOR NON-OBSERVANCE OF ORDERS FROM GERMAN AUTHORITIES

1941

1. It is forbidden to the civilian population to go beyond its place of domicile without special written authorization (pass) issued by the nearest German military unit.

2. It is forbidden to the civilian population to be outside after nightfall without special written authorization (pass) issued by the nearest German military unit. Curfew hours will be published by the mayors.

...

5. All inhabitants must register. The lists of registered persons must be presented to the local commander or to bodies designated for control.

6. It is forbidden to give lodging to persons who are not part of the local population.

7. The population must immediately inform the mayor of the presence of all strangers in the village....

8. Persons guilty of possession of arms, spare parts, cartridges or other ammunition, of aiding the Bolsheviks and other bandits, or of damage caused to the German forces will be punished with death....

Document #90**KEITEL'S ORDER ON EXTREME MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AGAINST
RESISTANCE**

GQF, 16 September 1941

Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht

Secret matter of the Command

...

1. A communist insurrection movement came into life as early as the military campaign against Soviet Russia in all occupied regions....

Given that in these regions there is a great deal of political and economic tension, it must be expected that the nationalist and other circles will use this occasion to provoke difficulties for the German occupation authorities by aligning themselves with the communist rebels.

Thus, appears in an increasing measure a danger for the waging of war by Germany, which manifests itself, first of all, in the climate of general insecurity for the occupation troops and ends in the necessity to direct military forces to the main centers of trouble.

2....The Führer has ordered to apply everywhere the most severe measures to crush this movement with the shortest possible delay. ...

3....To nip this activity in the bud, it is necessary to take most severe measures immediately, from the first occurrence, to consolidate the authority of the occupation powers and to prevent the spreading of the movement. It must be kept in mind that human life in the concerned countries often has no value and that dissuasive effects can be obtained only with the help of exceptionally cruel measures.

...

Only pain of death is the truly effective means of intimidation. Especially in cases of espionage, acts of sabotage...the punishment must be death. Illegal possession of arms must also be punished with death.

XI/ 389-PS

XXV, p. 530 ff.

Document #91**HITLER'S OPINION OF THE SUBJECT OF UKRAINE**

(17 September 1941)

...The German peasant is driven by a task for progress. He thinks of his

children. The Ukrainian peasant ignores the notion of duty....

The Russian space is for us India. As the English, we are going to govern this empire with a handful of men.

It would be a mistake to want to educate the natives....

Neither am I for a university in Kyiv. It is better not to teach them to read....

We are going to deliver grain all over Europe where it is needed. The Crimea will give us lemons, cotton, and rubber (100,000 acres of plantations will suffice to guarantee our independence)....

We are going to attract Danes, people from Holland, Norwegians, and Swedes to Ukraine....

XVI/ pp. 100, 101

Document #92

HITLER'S TABLE-TALKS—Report No. 32

The Führer's Headquarters

Friday, 19 September 1941

Lunch 18 September

Guests: Reichsminister Dr. Lammers, Reichskommissar Koch

...

The table-talk revolved mainly around the topic of "free Ukraine" without presenting any particularly new arguments. The Führer, as well as the Reichskommissar, dismissed the idea of a free Ukraine. The Slavs are a family of rabbits who will never exceed the family unit if they are not conquered by a master race. General disorganization is their natural and aspiring state. Everything that they are taught becomes, at best, a half-knowledge which makes them discontented and anarchistic. On these grounds, the establishment of a university in Kyiv must now be rejected. Furthermore, hardly any part of the city of Kyiv will remain standing. The tendency of the Führer who sees the destruction of the large Russian cities as the basic requirement for the durability of our power in Russia was further stressed by the Reichskommissar who intends to destroy the Ukrainian industry as far as possible in order to compel the proletariat to return to the rural regions. The marketing potential of used and finished products of the Russian markets would give the Saxon industry an unexpected boost. And if one should take indispensable luxury items like alcohol and tobacco as a state monopoly, then he would have the population in the occupied regions in his grasp. Koch pointed out that he must be adamant and brutal

from the beginning and not repeat the mistake made in 1917–1918: sometimes to be complaisant and sometimes to be firm. General Eichhorn* was undoubtedly murdered by the Ukrainian nationalists and not by the Bolsheviks. The Führer portrayed English rule in India as the most worthy objective by our gestation [rule] in the East. Within the German nation: highest national community and possibility of education for everyone, but externally: the absolute point of view of the master race.

2) Reichskommissar Koch will give his speech first, before the Führer, on 19 September in the afternoon because General Field Marshall Keitel, who flew to the Army Group North in Pleskau on 18 September, is also supposed to be present during the meeting. The atmosphere in the Führer's headquarters was very much in favor of Koch. Everyone believes him capable and considers him a "second Stalin" who will be able to carry out his tasks in Ukraine in the best way possible.

Dr. Werner Koeppen
SA-Standartenführer and Personal Adviser

I/ R 6/34a f. 12 ff.

* In 1918 General Fieldmarshall H. von Eichhorn was the Commander-in-chief of the German Occupation Army in Ukraine. He was assassinated in Kiev in July 1918.

Document #93

HITLER'S OPINION ON THE SUBJECT OF UKRAINE

(22 September 1941)

...We extract with much effort several meters of land from the sea, we torture ourselves to farm the swamps, while in Ukraine there is an inexhaustibly fertile soil with humus in places ten meters deep which is waiting for us.

We must create for our people conditions which would favor their increase in numbers and, at the same time, construct a bulwark against the Russian tide.

...

Document #94**HITLER'S TABLE-TALKS—Report No. 37**

GQF, Wednesday, 24 September 1941

...

2. Dinner 23 September

Guests: Reichsprotektor von Neurath, Secretary of State Frank, Secretary of State Backe

...The Führer began to speak about the Russian national character and pointed out that the Ukrainians are just as lazy, unorganized, and nihilist-Asian as the Great Russians. It would be completely pointless to speak of a work ethic and obligation; these people would never understand this because they only react to the whip. Stalin is one of the greatest men alive because he succeeded in creating a state out of this Slav "rabbit family," of course only under severe force....

The boundary between Europe and Asia is not the Ural Mountains, but rather the place where the German settlements stop and the pure Slavs begin. It is our job to shift this boundary as far as possible to the east and, when necessary, over the Urals.

...

Dr. Werner Koeppen
SA-Standartenführer and Personal Adviser

I/ R 6/34a f. 28

Document #95**NOTE ON THE DISCUSSION WITH THE FÜHRER**

29 September 1941

Besides the Führer and me [Rosenberg], present were also Lammers and Reichsleiter Bormann.

The Führer stressed, by way of introduction, that it was extremely important that all work be done well in Ukraine....At this occasion the whole question of the future development in Ukraine was broached. The Führer spoke of the marvelous soil which, because of insufficient cultivation to date, has not yielded the maximum of what it could give under German cultivation. He returned to this subject several times saying that with the products and other riches the needs of Germany as well

as of other states could be filled....

The brother of Antonesco had stated during a press conference that the purpose of the present war was a fight against the Slavs. The Bulgarian press attaché, who was present, rose red with anger and left the room. I think that whatever the adopted solution, such remarks are not fair and can only worsen future handling of the Ukrainians....

I/ R 6/4 f. 4 ff.

Document #96

HITLER'S OPINION ON THE SUBJECT OF UKRAINE

(13 October 1941)

Except for Europe, there is no country that can be autarkical to any degree. Where is there a region able to furnish iron of a quality superior to that of Ukrainian iron? Where can one find more nickel, coal, manganese, molybdenum? Ukraine is a source of manganese even for America. And the vegetable oils, plantations, and so many other possibilities....

XVI/ p. 107

Document #97

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 112

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Berlin, 13 October 1941

Secret matter of the Reich!

III.

Politics

Specific political aspirations could only be vaguely determined. These few cases result from the propaganda of the OUN people. This is a limited number of people

who must cover vast regions in a very short span of time and, therefore, have left behind no profound lasting impression. It is predominantly considered that Ukraine now belongs to Germany, yes, that it has even become part of Germany. It was only in *Horodyshche* that former members of the SVU13, persuaded by OUN men, demanded a free Ukraine. An article published recently in the first issue of the local newspaper concluded with a "long live free and independent Ukraine and its leader Stepan Bandera!" These activities were immediately stopped.

The population is to be guided towards every desired goal and towards agreement and satisfaction with every solution proposed by Germany, particularly subordination to German sovereignty, since this population is politically inert and, owing to a total lack of any leading class, quite incapable of independent statehood....

I/ R 58/218 f. 159-160

Document #98

HITLER'S TABLE-TALKS—Report No. 45

GQF, Saturday, 18 October 1941

Lunch 17 October

Guests: General Reinecke

General Reinecke said that among the Russian prisoners of war in the General Government, in the course of the past months there have been 9,000 deaths....Almost all Russian prisoners of war want to work, provided that they had enough food. Then the Führer said that in the future the use of the Baltic Sea would be limited to war vessels of frontier states: Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark. The Black Sea too would have to revise the statute of Montreux to limit the passage to war vessels of Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania....

2. Dinner 17 October

Present: Reichsminister Todt, Gauleiter Sauckel, Ministerial Adviser from the office of Reichsmarschall Bötticher.

...Excited by Todt's report, the Führer once again recounted at great length how he sees the change in the new eastern regions. The most important changes are the roads. He told Todt that his initial project would have to be revised considerably. For that he would need for the next twenty years 3,000,000 prisoners. As for highways, today the Führer spoke not only about those in Crimea but also about a highway leading to the Caucasus and two or three highways more to the north,

crossing the most beautiful places. On the banks of the great rivers, cities would be born, centers for the Wehrmacht, the police, the administration, and the party. Along the roads will be German farms and the Asiatic steppes of monotone charm will soon take on a different aspect. Ten years hence, 4,000,000, and twenty years hence 10,000,000 Germans are going to settle there. They would come not only from the Reich but also from America, from the Scandinavian countries, from Holland and from Flanders. Thus the rest of Europe will be able to take part in the development of the Russian space....

The Führer then returned to the topic that "contrary to the opinion of some staff members," neither education nor aid must be permitted to the local population. Knowledge of traffic signs will suffice; the German school master will not have to go beyond that. Freedom for the Ukrainians means that they would not have to wash themselves more than once a month instead of twice....Here, in the east, a process similar to the conquest of America will be repeated....The Führer stressed several times that he would have liked to be ten or fifteen years younger to be able to see the evolution of this process....

...All inaccuracies that would weaken the Führer's decree of 17 July 1941 would consequently reduce the importance of the ministry for the east. Its task would be limited to pushing the Slavs, gathered onto reservations, as quickly as possible to expatriate or to die....

Werner Koeppen
SS-Standartenführer and Personal Adviser

I/ R 6/34a f. 50 ff.

Document #99

EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 126

Berlin, 29 October 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret Matter of the Reich!

...

II. *Occupied territories:*

General Government. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Lviv reports:

The Bandera group has sent to the Gestapo in Lviv a letter signed by the OUN

in which it, once again, defends the political independence of Ukraine.

The letter explains that Hitler had deceived Ukraine and that the United States, England, and Russia would allow the creation of an independent Ukraine from the river San to the Black Sea....The letter questions further the Germany's success in this war and states that Germany will not be able to win the war without Ukraine.

The letter also asks for the release of all arrested Ukrainians....

I/ R 58/218 f. 323

Document #100

NOTICE OF THE COMMANDER OF THE CITY OF KIEV ON THE EXECUTION OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY

Kiev, 2 November 1941

Incidents of arson and sabotage that have become more frequent in Lviv, have forced me to resort to the severest measures.

For this reason, 300 inhabitants of Kiev were shot today.

For each new case of arson or sabotage a greater number of inhabitants of Kiev will be shot. Each inhabitant of Kiev has to inform the German police immediately of all suspicious cases.

I shall maintain law and order in Kiev by all means and under all circumstances.

Eberhard

Deputy Chief of Staff

Commandant of the city

XV/ p. 105

Document #101

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 129

Berlin, 5 November 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD ...

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

3. The activity of the Bandera followers continues to be under observation.

Further inquiries, particularly in Mykolayiv, led to new arrests and to the seizure of important documents. Among these documents we seized an extensive outline of the organizational structure of the organization, with stanytsia being the lowest unit followed by the sub-district, the district, and then the region. Furthermore, it contains data concerning assignments, the use of code names, the purpose of propaganda, etc. Investigations in Kherson led to further arrests. In general, according to informers, the propaganda spread by Bandera's followers has such an impact on the population in some areas that the prevailing will to work is decreasing and is being replaced in certain places by major discontent arising from the measures taken by a particular LA-Führer. After the meeting with the IC AO, the AOK sent a memorandum to all units demanding that Bandera's activity be stopped and his followers dealt with as indicated....

I/ R 58/218 f. 363

Document #102

NOTICE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE CITY OF KHARKIV

Kharkiv, 14 November 1941

To the population of Kharkiv!

Today, as a result of the explosion of the Russian mine in Kharkiv, German soldiers have perished. This proves that the population did not respond to the repeated appeals and orders of the German armed forces to participate actively in the minesweeping. The German armed forces will from now on act without pity. Thus today fifty members of the Communist party were executed. Moreover, 1,000 persons have been arrested as hostages. If other acts against the German armed forces are perpetrated, 200 of these hostages will be shot.

The curfew for the citizens of Kharkiv is from 16:00 to 6:00.

Those who are found in the streets or on squares during these hours without a special pass will be shot. Each inhabitant of Kharkiv is answerable with his life for the security of the German armed forces. Those who from now on do not inform on acts against the German armed forces, endanger not only their lives but also those of all inhabitants of Kharkiv.

The Commandant of the City

Document #103

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 133

Berlin, 14 November 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

2) Bandera and other Ukrainian political movements.

Among the Ukrainian political movements the Bandera movement of the OUN is, as usual, engaged in a great deal of activity. The militia in the Rivne district seems to have come under the influence of this movement. The usual indications: arbitrariness where the regulations of the German authorities do not correspond with the interests of the OUN and, in isolated cases, deliberate sabotage of German measures.

Furthermore, all the political movements in Ukraine must be mentioned: the OUN-Melnik group pursues the same aims as the Bandera group, however, not as drastically, namely—the establishment of an independent Ukraine. Due to lack of initiative, characteristic of this OUN movement, the existence of the Melnik-OUN does not present any acute danger at this time.

The OUN under Livytskyi* is active, but meets with a favorable response only from the Petlura's few surviving officers and comrades-in-arms and partly from the clergy. We consider the officers' circles irrelevant, but we must focus our attention on the sympathy of the clergy. The people are indifferent to this OUN.

Skoropadskyi** enjoys a certain popularity among the elderly and the circles of the local intelligentsia. This political movement seems to be doomed to die out with the older generation because less sympathy could be noted among the youth.

To summarize about the Ukrainian political movements in Volyn, it can be said that only the OUN under Bandera presents an acute danger. Melnik could become dangerous if we disregard this branch of the OUN while fighting against the Bandera movement. As for other parties, they could even be assisted discretely, as long as they did not have a lasting success; they represent an essential element in the division of political opinion among Ukrainians.

V. The General Attitude of the Population

After the German troops marched in, the population, under the impression of being liberated from Bolshevik bloody terror, was full of hope, but, in consequence

of the conditions mentioned above, became filled with discontent. Even if Bolshevik propaganda has, on the whole, not met with any success, the propaganda of the Ukrainian political parties does not improve confidence towards the German authorities. This mainly concerns Bandera's propaganda, as well as Melnyk's. Apparently, the German administration has not yet succeeded in setting up an authority above the parties for the welfare of the Ukrainians....

I/ R 58/219 f. 87 ff.

* This is a typing error, because meant is the UNR (the Ukrainian National Government in exile) and not the OUN; Livytskyi was the president of the UNR in exile.

** Head (Hetman) of the Ukrainian State from May to December 1918.

Document #104

ROSENBERG'S INSTRUCTIONS TO REICHSKOMMISSAR KOCH CONCERNING UKRAINE

Berlin, 18 November 1941

Secret matter of the Reich!

The objective of the present fight is to guarantee life as well as to the German people as to the whole of Europe, a fight of an ideological character, a political war that contains a new concept of our continent and that will make Europe move eastward....

...It is not the fault of the German people if there [in the east] is general poverty everywhere. The great sacrifice of German blood, the need to enlarge the area of Central Europe, as well as the desire to break for all times the British Continental System force us to undertake a vast pacification. This can succeed only through German authoritarian administration. This is why the idea, that existed before the war of 1941, to set up the Ukrainians into a political force against Moscow, has to be abandoned. In the present situation, the German Reich can no longer take upon itself to help a foreign people whose present difficult situation did not come about through the doings of the Germans....

Consequently, the attitude of the German administration must be abstaining from making statements concerning a definite organization of Ukraine. To questions from the Ukrainians concerning the future, one must answer:

a) After the hard fighting, it will be necessary first of all to assess the damages caused by bolshevism in Ukraine.

b) Even today it is clear that these damages will necessitate a long German administration before they can be repaired.

c) Only the Führer will decide on definite regulations after a study of the entire situation and bearing in mind the attitude of the Ukrainians themselves.

2. To protests concerning the detachment of Ukrainian territories or territories considered as such, one must answer:

This war in the east demanded enormous sacrifices of German blood. The German people endured privations for many years. Guarantees must be found to prevent a situation as dangerous as that of 1941....

b) The German people live in a narrow area. They have saved all of Europe through this present war; they have the right to enlarge their living space. The people in the east have a much larger area than the nations of Central Europe, without enough people to develop the riches of this area.

c) In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine which, in realities, goes beyond the ethnographic limits of Ukraine, a resettlement of the population to the north and east is possible. If Germany has hundreds of thousands of its colonists return home, the resettlement of Western Ukrainians should not be considered as something unheard-of.

d) From the general point of view, the Ukrainians themselves must be ready to endure sacrifices, because without the Germans they would be lost, exterminated.

e) To prevent once and for all the attacks on Ukraine by Moscow the German Reich must take upon itself the protection of Europe, because only Germany is capable of taking care of this protection.

...

3)...It is sufficient to allow the opening of elementary schools to meet the general necessities of life....Moreover, professional schools of agriculture and cottage industry, with limited tasks, could be created....

4) German national property in Ukraine will play a decisive role. Around the Black Sea, German colonists made the soil fertile and have given Russia, and especially Ukraine, a great advantage. ...The German Reich is of the opinion that the products of this German colonization are German national properties, regardless of prior individual owners....In any case, measures must be taken to develop the peninsula of Crimea and to demarcate a region as far as the Dniro (Dniepr) and then, in an arch as far as the Asov Sea, into a German colony (General Commissariat of Tauride).

...The possession of the Crimea also appears to be a strategic necessity to control the passage ways of petroleum from the Caucasus to the Danube. In the third place, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine must expect the reawakening of the Russians, indeed a possible uprising of the Ukrainians themselves. Thus the

possession of the Crimea with outer lands reinforced by a vast German colony is of decisive importance for the protection of German domination....

Measures for the protection of the German war economy will be taken on the order of the Reichsmarschall....The properties of the state in Ukraine and in the regions of the black earth, properly called the sovkhozes, are today partially unusable because of the flight of the workers and the destruction of technical materials. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to restore these eastern properties under German guidance (with the help of the prisoners of war or other help) to make them produce grain for Germany and for people who are entrusted to her....

The duties of the Reichskommissar in Ukraine could be of world wide importance. For the first time the Ukrainian people are neighbors of the German territory of the Reich. For the first time communication lines from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea are really possible. And for the first time the prospect appears to put Europe in the next decades, thanks to the granaries of the east, in a safe place from all blockades. If, by using all adequate means, these goals are reached, then the pressure, exerted by the Russian empire on the German people for centuries, will also be broken and the preliminary condition for large scale policies for the European space under German leadership will be created.

A. Rosenberg

I/ R 6/69 f. 103 ff.

Document #105

ORDERS CONCERNING EXECUTION OF HOSTAGES AND DESTRUCTION OF A VILLAGE

GQG, 18 November 1941

Bfh. rückw. H. Geb. Süd
Abt. VII/503/41

The text of advise which follows must be brought to the public's attention. Wherever possible, this should be done through posters or on community billboards....

"On the night from 4 to 5 November 1941, in the village of Baranivka, thirty kilometers north of Myrhorod, four German soldiers and their landlord were attacked. By way of reprisal, ten inhabitants of the village were shot, the village burned and completely destroyed.

Ukrainians! If you want to spare your village a similar fate, you must protect yourselves against the attacks of the bandits who, prompted by feelings of lowly revenge, shrink back from nothing, endangering the lives and property of innocent people who are wiped out. Fight these bandits everywhere you find them and make them known to the German authorities."

Gen. Friderici

II/ RH 22/9

Document #106

EXECUTION ORDERS WITHOUT SENTENCE OF MEMBERS OF THE OUN OF BANDERA

Headquarters
25 November 1941

Einsatzkommando C/5 of the
Security Police and the SD
- Kdo-Tgb Nr. 12432/41

To the outposts of
Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Rivne, Mykolayiv, Zhytomyr, Vynnytsia

Subject: OUN (Bandera Movement)

It has been indisputably established that the Bandera movement is preparing an uprising in the Reichskommissariat whose goal is creation of an independent Ukraine. All important activists of the Bandera movement must be arrested immediately and, after intensive interrogation, liquidated in secret as brigands.

Transcripts of the interrogations must be sent to Einsatzkommando C/5.

Once read, this letter must be destroyed by the Kommandoführer immediately.

(signature - illegible)
SS-Obersturmbannführer

XI/ 014-USSR (No.7)
XXXIX, pp. 269-270

Document #107**NOTICE ON THE DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES AND EXECUTION
OF THEIR INHABITANTS**

28 November 1941

Ukrainian peasants!

These last days the German troops have destroyed a number of gangs whose members have been shot and leaders hanged.

It has been established that the bandits received help from the population. Consequently, the following measures have been taken:

1. the village of Baranivka has been burned down;
2. the village of Obukhivka has been burned down and the population shot;
3. many intermediaries have been shot in various villages.

Do you want the same fate to befall you?

Anyone who is in touch with the bandits, offers them shelter, provides them with supplies, aids them by any means whatsoever or conceals their hiding places, will be punished with death. Moreover, he will draw misfortune on his family and on the entire village....

Commandant of the Division

On my order for all village mayors

The Local Commandant, the Lieutenant

XV/ p. 108

Document #108**MATERIAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION, ATTITUDE, AND
TREATMENT OF THE POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED SOVIET REGIONS**

Berlin, 5 December 1941

From a reported dated 5.12.1941, from a departmental meeting at the Reich Ministry of Education regarding the possibility of Ukrainians to study at German universities: (D IX 25):

"One of the department representatives [the representative of the Reichsführer of the SS] reported that, according to present instructions, the Ukrainian attempts at independence are to be stopped and the Ukrainians are to be treated the same as the Poles and Russians. There are no so-called loyal Ukrainians. All Ukrainians

want the state independence of their national territory. It makes no difference whether they come from the Eastern or Western Ukraine or from Hungary [Carpathian Ukraine] or from Bukovyna. The so-called "loyal" Ukrainians are only those who know how to cunningly conceal these aspirations. A decision by the Führer concerning Ukrainian education will follow.

von Stechow

III/ All. Akten Pol. XIII, 17

Document #109

NOTICE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE CITY OF DNIPROPETROVSK ON AN EXECUTION

Dnipropetrovsk, 6 December 1941

On 2 December 1941 a German officer was assassinated in Dnipropetrovsk. In punishment, 100 hostages, taken from the population of Dnipropetrovsk, were shot.

In the event that similar deeds are repeated, more rigorous measures will be taken.

The population is called upon to help prevent similar incidents.

The Commandant of the City

XI/ p. 111

Document #110

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 143

Berlin, 8 December 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

Einsatzgruppe C
Garrison Kyiv

Activity of the Bandera Movement in the Zhytomyr Region

Four OUN members from the Lviv area were arrested by the Zhytomyr outpost of EK 5. Their interrogation provided additional incriminating information about the Bandera movement of the OUN.

The assignments of the arrested OUN members correspond exactly to the recently reported attempts of this political group: the formation of a Ukrainian militia, the appointment of mayors and commanders of the militia, the dismissal of officials not authorized by the Bandera group and the recruitment of members for the Bandera organization from among the population. As previously, particular attention is being paid to the appointment to all official posts only of those Bandera followers who are completely reliable.

For example, it has been established beyond doubt that Zielke, the acting Volksdeutsche Mayor of Josefstadt, was not willing to follow the OUN's instructions and, therefore, dismissed by the arrested persons. This measure proves once again that the Bandera group is inclined not to respect orders from anyone else if they do not coincide with the OUN's plans.

Statements by one of the arrested men, Semen Marchuk, clearly show to what extent these plans have already adopted an anti-German Reich character. M[archuk] stated that members of the OUN have been instructed to go into the forests and look for Russian guns and ammunition and store them away safely so that they don't fall into the hands of the German Wehrmacht. When the right time comes and the necessary partisan groups have been organized [hence the establishment of a militia faithful to Bandera], they will attack the German occupying forces. M[archuk] added that, according to remarks by leading personalities of the Bandera movement, the German Wehrmacht must be considered Ukraine's principal enemy. These leading circles of the OUN did not believe in Germany's victory over Soviet Russia and England. On the contrary, in their opinion, Germany will be weakened to such an extent after the victory over Soviet Russia that she will be unable to continue with the war. Taking advantage of this situation, the Ukrainians would form an army that would give the German armed forces a coup de grâce and create an independent Ukrainian state. Russia, exhausted by its defeat by Germany, would not be able to forestall this incipient state.

The investigation in connection with the arrest of the four OUN members mentioned above are continuing.

The Bandera Movement in Zaporizhia

In Zaporizhia, we succeeded in appointing Volksdeutsche, Ukrainians, and Russians to the most important administrative positions before the Western Ukrainians arrived. The first group of Bandera's men appeared around 8 Oct. 1941.

In the meantime, around fifteen of the people from Western Ukraine have been arrested, nine of whom are undoubtedly members or envoys of the OUN.

These people attempted to gain key positions in the administration [municipal administration, militia, etc.]....

I/ R 58/219 f. 253 ff.

Document #111

STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR GENERAL FRANK ON THE SUBJECT OF UKRAINIANS

16 December 1941

...The Governor General concluded the meeting of the government by giving the following speech:

...As before, the Ukrainians remain a problem. The Ukrainians of our district of Galicia must not get the impression that we, inside the German Great Reich, are going to recognize a kind of Ukrainian state. Moreover, I see the solution to the Ukrainian question to be the same as to the Polish, mainly they must be at our disposal as manpower....Nevertheless, it must be indicated that as far as the district of Galicia is concerned, this is a constituent part of the German Great Reich and not of some Great Ukraine even only in the intellectual sense....

One thought must always take priority: the territory of the General Government will, after the process of Germanization of the eastern regions of the Reich, be the nearest part to Europe and be totally subjugated to German penetration....

One day, a little further to the east Gótenland will be created and the General Government then can become Vandalengau....

XI/ 2233-PS

XXIX, p. 498-501

Document #112**REPORT FROM THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE WEHRMACHT
ON THE WAR AGAINST THE PARTISANS IN UKRAINE**

16 December 1941

The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine

Group Ic No. 2002 (4040/41 geh.

Subject: The Fight against the Partisans

Secret

The fight against the partisans succeeds only if the population realizes that the partisans and their sympathizers sooner or later are killed.

During the fight against the partisans, several thousand among them were hanged or shot publicly. Death by strangulation inspires fear more particularly. In this way much of the element that was training in the country was also eliminated, among whom were agents and informers of the partisans. Since then acts of sabotage have ceased.

This experience teaches us that only measures that can frighten the population more than the terror of partisans can lead to success.

The Army Group recommends to resort to such measures as needed.

For the Commander-in-Chief
Chief of Staff von Krause

II/ RW 41/31

Document #113**DECREE FROM SECTION VII OF THE WEHRMACHT FROM ZONE B
[UKRAINE] CONCERNING ASSOCIATIONS**

20 December 1941

Order no.33

...6. *Associations, meetings, manifestations.* The creation of new associations is forbidden. Exceptional authorization can be granted by the commander-in-chief of

the Army Rear South zone.

Existing associations are to be put under surveillance and must also be dissolved. Choral societies are authorized. The list of associations is held by the commandant of the locality. Authorized association are to be kept constantly under surveillance.

Meetings are forbidden with the exception of official conferences of offices of German administration....

II/ RH 22/205

Document #114

DECREE FROM SECTION VII OF THE WEHRMACHT OF ZONE B [UKRAINE] CONCERNING EDUCATION

29 December 1941

Order no.34

IV. *Education.* By order no.30 of 8-12-41, elementary schools are authorized. Authorized are also:

Professional industrial, agricultural, and forestry schools, as well as professional courses for female personnel to train for work in the house, in fashions, health and hygiene.

Not authorized are:

Schools of higher education: universities, technical schools; schools of middle education: seminaries, general middle schools; professional schools: general schools with specialization toward a specific trade.

All school of this category must be closed....

II/ RH 22/205

Document #115

ACTIVITY AND SITUATION REPORT No.8 OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN
OF THE SECURITY POLICE AND THE SD IN THE USSR
(Report from 1—31 December 1941)

Secret matter of the Reich!

V. Activity of the Bandera Group

The Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD are devoting particular attention to the investigation and combat of resistance movements among the population of the occupied regions. It has been established that outside the OUN-B group, no other resistance organization in Ukraine exists that represents serious danger. Therefore, investigations concerning the Bandera group have been greatly intensified.

It has been confirmed that the Bandera group has resumed its activity in the Crimea. It is spreading propaganda and attempting to form a strong organization. Six groups each consisting of 6 persons from Lviv have been assigned to carry out this task. One member of the group responsible for the Simferopol area has already been arrested.

The Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the SD was able to arrest 4 OUN members, also from Lviv, near Zhytomyr. Their assignments correspond to the aims of the Bandera group which are already known to us:

- setting up a Ukrainian militia;
- replacement of mayors and militia commanders with their own people;
- removal of unacceptable public officials;
- propaganda activity.

Statements by an arrested OUN member show to what extent these plans have assumed an anti-German Reich character. After that, the OUN members were assigned to search for Russian weapons and ammunition and to maintain them in safekeeping to that they would not fall into the hands of the German Wehrmacht. When the time the OUN leadership considers favorable, comes and the necessary partisan groups are formed, the attack against the German occupying forces will commence. The partisans were formed out of the militiamen faithful to Bandera.

The leading circle of the OUN do not believe in Germany's victory over Soviet Russia and England. They argue that, after the victory over Soviet Russia, Germany will be unable to bring the war against England to an end. The situation is to be exploited for the establishment of an independent Ukraine in the course of which the

intervention of Germany and Soviet Russia, as powerless nations, is hardly to be expected.

...

I/ R 70 SU/31 f. 132-133

Document #116

EXCERPT FROM A LETTER OF THE MAYOR OF KIEV ON THE SUBJECT OF FAMINE FOLLOWING THE LOW RATIONS ALLOTTED TO THE POPULATION

December 1941

At present time, the inhabitants of Kiev, on order of the commissariat, receive 200 grams of bread a week. In addition, workers who work receive from their place of work, as supplement, 600 grams of bread a week.

The population no longer received such products as fat, meat, sugar, and cases of oedema due to hunger are becoming more frequent in the city.

The mayor of Kiev

XV/ p. 117

Document #117

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 155

Berlin, 14 January 1941

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

Einsatzgruppe D:

Garrison: Simferopol

The OUN in Kherson and the vicinity

A confidential investigation revealed that the circle of Bandera's followers is

organized around Konrad, the first commander of the self-defense group.

The size of this group could not be determined at first. However, it was suspected that this group was connected with a second group in the Kherson municipal administration, whose focal point was reputed to be Deputy Mayor Hrize. Therefore, both of these groups were arrested during the course of an operation against the Bandera followers.

The arrests were made suddenly. During numerous protracted interrogations it was established that the circle of Bandera's followers was limited to a few people, who, through the shrewd abuse of their positions in the Ukrainian self-defense units, knew how to go about the active recruitment of the population into the OUN. The leader of this group, the self-defense commander, Konrad, acted with extreme shrewdness in not coming forward himself, but almost exclusively designated his assistance for the task. Meetings, at which up to 2,000 persons were present, were conducted in the country under the pretext of establishing self-defense units. At these meetings, people were recruited into the OUN and to Bandera, the OUN's aims were propagated, leaflets were distributed, and the people were urged to give their active cooperation....

The Ukrainian Self-Defense Unit in Kherson and the OUN

From several sources of information it was possible to deduce that the subversive activities of the Banderites within the Ukrainian self-defense units had already gained ground, which made the screening of the leading self-defense members necessary. During the investigations, however, it was established that Konrad's group was very cautious in its activity and, at first, had only hinted about the different Ukrainian organization so that even the section commanders of the self-defense units were not fully informed about the OUN. They were supposedly to be used without their knowledge for the purposes of Konrad's group. During the interrogations, it became evident that almost all of the remaining leading members of the self-defense unit were convinced about the impracticality and unlawfulness of Bandera's and OUN's plans, and that they have a tendency to actively oppose this agitation....

Document #118

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 156

Berlin, 16 January 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

The Activity of the OUN

Einsatzgruppe 5 has paid particular attention to the unlawful activity of Bandera's followers. The interrogation of several Ukrainians, who were dismissed from the militia school in Klevan,* has provided new information about the OUN's revolutionary plans and confirmed the accuracy of previous reports.

Presently, there are at least two important members of the OUN in Kyiv. One of the members, under the code name Zaporozhets or Kosar, is believed to be an appointed minister in Bandera's state. The OUN's connections extend as far as the militia in Kyiv, which is controlled by Melnyk's men. These connections were so strong that Bandera's men have, on several occasions, managed to free members of their party who had been arrested by the militia. We have succeeded in arresting some of the agents responsible for this state of affairs.

The Bandera group in Klevan, and apparently in additional bases of the OUN, use different code names. For example, we discovered that the leader of one group possessed three different code names. The Bandera followers are very cautious and it is possible to contact the middlemen only through the use of a password. They are partly employing younger people, who are unaware of the purpose for which they are being exploited.

We were able to obtain the following information about the militia school in Klevan:

The head of the school is either a certain Ostap or an instructor from the same school named Slavko. Ostap knows the contacts in Kyiv and is informed about the exact passwords. He must also know the hiding places for the weapons which are being stored for the uprising, as well as the places in Klevan and Rivne where the OUN's printed materials are hidden. Vasyl Shcherbak, an instructor from the Klevan militia school, was arrested in Kyiv and named thirteen Bandera followers who are believed to possess arms.

According to corresponding statements made by some of the arrested members of Bandera's group, the exact date of the planned revolution has not as yet been set. The signal for the uprising is to be given by Bandera. The OUN is counting on his

release. The supply of weapons comes either from military camps that have been discovered or from Red Army soldiers who have been killed. For the upcoming offensive the OUN pays equal attention to the arms depots left behind by the Soviets as it does to banks. The money from the banks is intended not only to finance the OUN, but also to cover the expenses of members working both inside the country and abroad. It has also been established that Bandera's men are always trying to advance further into the country either with the fighting troops or immediately behind them.

Arrested Bandera followers have confirmed plans to blow up bridges at the outbreak of the uprising.

...

I/ R58/220 f. 193-194

* This place is located half-way between Rivne and Lutsk in Volhynia.

Document #119

DECREE "NACHT UND NEBEL" [Night and Fog]

Munich, 4 February 1942

Reichsführer-SS and Head of German Police
Main Office of the SS Tribunal
1b 154/ 1 Tgb. No.70/42 geh.

Secret!

Subject: Penal Proceedings for Criminal Acts Directed against the Reich and the Occupation Authorities

...

**Orders of 7 December 1941 for Proceedings of Criminal Acts
Directed against the Reich and Occupation Authorities
in Occupies Territories**

In the occupied territories, from the beginning of the Russian Campaign, communist elements and other circles hostile to Germany have increased their attacks against the Reich and the occupation authorities. The extent and the danger of these intrigues force us, for reason of dissuasion, to take up most severe measures against the perpetrators. The following guidelines must now be applied:

I. In the occupied territories, criminal acts directed against the Reich or the

occupation authorities by civilians of non-German nationality, whose behavior or counter-attacks are dangerous, deserve the punishment of death.

II. Criminal acts mentioned in no.I are not to be tried in the occupied territories unless it is certain that the perpetrators, or at least the chief perpetrators, would be sentenced to death, and if the death sentence can be carried out as quickly as possible. Otherwise the perpetrators, or at least the chief perpetrators, must be transferred to Germany.

III. The perpetrators transferred to Germany are to be subjugated to the military jurisdiction only in cases where the military interest demands it. To questions from German and foreign authorities concerning these perpetrators, the answer must be that they have been arrested and that investigation proceedings in process do not allow speaking about them....

p.o.

Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht

*

Staff Headquarters of the Wehrmacht
Amt Ausl./Abw/Abt Abw III no.570/1-42

Berlin, 2 February 1942

In the future, in all cases the accused are to be transferred secretly to Germany where proceedings concerning their criminal acts must take place. Dissuasive effects of these measures must be obtained by:

- a) the traceless disappearance of the accused;
- b) no information released concerning the place of their detention or their fate....

XI/ 090-L
XXXVII, p. 571 ff.

Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht

Document #120

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 164

Berlin, February 4, 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

Einsatzgruppe C:

Garrison: Kyiv

In the Kyiv region, the battle against the communists has developed more and more into a struggle against the national Ukrainian formations....

...Furthermore, it has been established that the morale of the population has noticeably deteriorated due not only to the communist, but also national, Ukrainian formations....

Like the communists, the members of the Ukrainian national movement make repeated use of forged documents, code names, passwords, etc.

...

However, both movements agree on one point, namely, in their totally extreme nationalistic-chauvinistic attitude, which is directed against the Germans....

...The confiscated documents, as well as statements by various members of the Bandera group, who had been arrested in the meantime, prove once again that it is not possible to establish any kind of cooperation with the members of the Bandera movement. The total liquidation of this group remains the only viable option.

The relations between Bandera and Melnyk have become more acute.

Presently, the headquarters of the Melnyk movement in Eastern Ukraine is located in Kyiv. Its leader is a man named Dr. Kandyba who is supported by a number of known and unknown Ukrainians from Western Ukraine. In addition to this OUN center, there is a National Council set up by Dr. Kandyba and headed by Professor Velychkevskyi and his assistant Chudinov....

The interests of the Bolsheviks and Melnyk's followers are largely the same: to incite discontent among the Ukrainians, in which they are successful.

Where there are no valid reasons for discontent, it is artificially created. It is based on statements, which point out that the Germans had made promises to the Ukrainians, which they have not kept.

The enlistment of the youth to the Ukrainian national cause takes place through the sports organization Sich.

This sports club, which has numerous branches, is involved with political chauvinistic training rather than sport.

The Melnyk movement has gradually gained a leading position in the press. Although the Ukrainian newspaper in Kyiv has been purged by the numerous arrests and executions of the responsible editors, nationalist elements, still predominant in the editorial staff of the provincial Ukrainian newspapers, provide the OUN with illegal publications. It obtains part of its material from Berlin and Prague.

The existing Ukrainian Writers' Union in Kyiv, headed by the poetess Olena

Teliha* is also a strictly nationalistic organization. Presently, its function is limited to the material security of its members.

The Academy of Science in Kyiv is a powerful center of nationalist forces, whose first secretary is the above-mentioned Chudinov.

A further instrument of nationalist politics is the Autocephalous Ukrainian Church, which is essentially supported by the Livytskyi organization....

Hetman Skoropadskyi is still hoping to become leader of all Ukrainians in the near future. According to the Kyivan lawyer, Maikovskiy, who was invited by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to travel through Germany, and who established contacts with the leaders of different Ukrainian national movements, some of Skoropadskyi's followers maintain that they do not believe that Germany alone could help establish a Ukrainian national state, but also England, in the event that Germany loses the war.

...

I/ R 58/220 ff. 292, 295-298

* The poetess Olena Teliha (1907-1942), leading member of the OUN-M, was arrested on 9 February 1942 and shot several days later.

Document #121

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 183

Berlin, March 20, 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

On 25 February 1942, three Ukrainian truck drivers were arrested in Kyiv. Because of their failure to comply with existing orders and through carelessness, they endangered the safety of the municipal transport convoy and the delivery of food supplies to the city of Kyiv.

...

A larger, more extensive Bandera organization was arrested at the end of February 1942 in Zhytomyr. Twelve Bandera members were recently arrested during the operation held between 10 and 13 March 1942.

On 8 March 1942, a group of Bandera followers were arrested in Kremenchuk. Details are not yet available. According to the report from EK 6, a Bandera activist was arrested on 10 March 1942 in Stalino.

...

I/ R 58/221 f. 117

Document #122

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 185

Berlin, March 25, 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

A new illegal leaflet of the OUN-Melnyk group was seized in Kyiv. It succeeded in publishing and circulating 300 copies of the leaflet. The following slogans were repeated again in this leaflet: "Long live the Independent Ukrainian State! Long live the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists! Long live Captain Andriy Melnyk!" The remainder of the contents were dedicated to the anniversary of Shevchenko's death and presented an account of his fight for an independent Ukraine, his life, his struggle, as well as excerpts of his revolutionary freedom-fighting poetry. The leaflet concluded with the words: "Shevchenko perceived that only people with vigor, courage and pride could win their battle. Therefore, he chastises those who bow down before the occupants....Today, we are rushing to the holy grave on the banks of the Dnipro River. We want to vow to the eternal spirit, to the protector of the Ukrainian revolutionaries, that we will not rest until we have carried out his orders, until Ukraine becomes a free independent state.

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Rivne reports the arrest of several Bandera followers, who circulated propaganda material in the Kamianets-Podilskyi area. An appeal from the Polish resistance movement was seized in Lutsk. Fourteen people, who had made preparations together for the uprising, held meetings, trained and illegally possessed weapons, were arrested.

The Vynnytsia outpost (commanding office Zhytomyr) reports an increase in the

Bandera movement and a more intensified formation of cells in the city and the surrounding countryside. A raid by the Security police is expected in the near future. The headquarters in Kremenchuk intercepted two OUN carriers, who were supposed to travel from Poltava to Lviv and Cracow via Kremenchuk.

I/ R 58/221 f. 136-137

* Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), the greatest Ukrainian poet of the nineteenth century.

Document #123

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENT IN THE USSR No. 187

Berlin, 30 March 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

The Bandera Movement

In the sector of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Zhytomyr, the most important leaders of the OUN in this region were arrested. The regional leader, Roman Marchak, was killed during an attempt to escape. Two thousand pamphlets and leaflets were seized. A Nagant pistol with dum dum bullets was found under Marchak's bed. On the basis of a statement by one of the arrested members of the Bandera people, it was possible to seize in the cellar of a house which had been totally destroyed, a large amount of propaganda material, organizational plans and lists of members of the Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Poltava areas, as well as a complete passport forgery workshop which was stored in suitcases and knapsacks. Furthermore, two typewriters which were used to prepare propaganda material for publication were seized during the course of an investigation.

Today, it has been firmly established that the Bandera movement provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews.

As established from the orders that were seized, the activity of the movement during the winter months was concerned with propagandist reconnaissance activity among the largest classes of the population right down to the smallest village. An efficient intelligence service provided the regional leaders with information down to the least significant events in the districts and surrounding areas. The information

was often delivered to the regional leader, hundreds of kilometers away, either by bicycle, on foot, or by Wehrmacht vehicles. Most of these reports were coded.

It is worth mentioning that the reports were often rolled up, written on very thin paper and hidden in a fountain pen. Rounding up operations are being prepared and will be carried out as soon as possible.

...

In addition, during the investigation an organization called the "Free Cossacks" was uncovered. They also want to fight for an independent and free Ukraine and were already partly working hand in hand with the Bandera movement. The leading members of the Bandera movement belong mainly to the intelligentsia. As can be seen, the list of Kyivan members is comprised of professors, teachers, students, poets, etc. The movement has already spread to many strata of the rural population as a result of the propagandist activity of the activists from Western Ukraine. In the district of Zhytomyr, the organization has managed to penetrate all the departments of the administrative services.

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

According to the report from the Chief of Security Police and the SD in Kyiv, the illegal Melnyk-OUN group circulated a new 12-page pamphlet which contains the memorandum of the president of the (dissolved) Ukrainian National Council in Kyiv, Mykola Velychkiivskyi, to the Reichskommissar for Ukraine. There were 180 copies of the pamphlet. In the memorandum Velychkiivskyi criticizes various measures taken by the German administration. In Rivne, the Chief of the Security Police and the SD seized issue 32/51 of the newspaper *Volyn* from 22.3.42, because of a leading anti-German article by Samchuk, one of Melnyk's followers. 21,000 copies of this issue were destroyed.

In Ostrih (Chief of the Sipo and the SD Rivne), the mayor, the deputy mayor and five other persons were arrested for tolerating the illegal printing of leaflets with the "10 Commandments of the Bandera Movement" in a municipal printing shop.

...

Document #124

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT ON EVENTS IN THE USSR No. 191

Berlin, 10 April 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret matter of the Reich!

...

Einsatzgruppe C:

Garrison: Kyiv

Situation and Morale in Ukraine

Situation and Morale in Western Ukraine

(In Western Ukraine, general district of Volyn/Podillia),...

Ukrainian nationalism should be considered the strongest political movement among the ethnic groups. The Bandera movement, which is the most active and most significant of all the groups, has become a predominantly anti-German, illegal organization. In the Volyn/Podillia district, the development of matters concerning the Ukrainian church remains particularly significant as there is evidence of the possibility of national unity based on the national church.

...

The nationalistic tendency characterizes the attitude of this section of the Ukrainian population. After impatiently awaiting the military confrontation between the Reich and the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, particularly the students, believed that, according to different circumstances, they were entitled to hope for a future sovereignty of Ukraine. These circles have adopted a partly wait-and-see and partly increasing anti-German attitude.

There is, however, a notable difference in the attitude of the Ukrainian intelligentsia circles of the older generation on the one hand, and the younger generation on the other. The older generation tends to reach a compromise according to democratic-parliamentary standards and wants to be recruited in any way possible to cooperate with the German authorities. The young activist circles are in the OUN and have a more revolutionary-oppositional attitude. While the older intelligentsia is attempting to make up for the present lack of contact with the wide masses of the population through participation in the German civilian administration, the younger revolutionary circles turn directly to the rural population in order to make it more active. Nevertheless, the people are frequently warned against the older intelligentsia because they were prepared to "betray the Ukrainian cause."

Typical of the Ukrainian independence movement, as was noted during the

arrival of the German troops, is that the notion of an independent Ukraine in the regions which did not previously belong to Poland, was not at all widely spread....

...

...On the other hand, the situation is being skilfully presented to the Ukrainian population by the numerous émigré and Western Ukrainians who have arrived in the area in such a way as to make them believe that the Germans intend to deliberately suppress all national hopes and desires, or even to physically destroy all national movements.

In this venture, the agitation of the Bolshevik and extremist nationalist is very similar.

...

Ukrainian Chauvinist Groups

The Bandera group, whose core was formed from the beginning by the young intelligentsia of Western Ukraine (Lviv students), has gained ground among the youth, particularly in the Volyn/Podillia district. The organizational cohesion for the illegal activity was based on a secret course at the militia school on Klevan. The young Ukrainians received secret instruction of a political and military nature concerning their tasks as the nationalists "revolutionary army." The propaganda was to be disseminated among the rural population. During a larger raid, ten more members of the Bandera organization were arrested. They are young, adolescent boys, who have no permanent employment and who indulge in secret activity either out of habit or spirit of adventure, have no permanent residence, wander about and conspire. Church medallions, as well as Ukrainian chauvinist prayers, were regularly found in the possession of the arrested persons.

During the course of the Zhytomyr operation, interesting material about the organization was seized. It is still being assessed....

...

Concerning the Ukrainian Resistance Movement:

In Kyiv, on 26.3.42, 165 leaflets were again printed by the OUN (Melnyk). They contain the text of a memorandum sent to the Führer on 14.2.42, which is signed by Archbishop Sheptytskyi, Velychkovskyi (Kyiv), Melnyk and Omelianovych (Prague).

In Poltava the mayor and three other persons were arrested. The mayor had held meetings with the Bandera followers in his office and propagated the idea of the formation of a Ukrainian army to fight against the German Wehrmacht. A guard was attacked while they were being transported to Kremenchuk. He had to be taken to a hospital in Poltava.

...

Document #125**HITLER'S OPINION ON THE SUBJECT OF UKRAINE**

(11 April 1942)

...Not a single school teacher should get the idea of announcing to the subjugated people the obligation of going to school. If the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Kirgiz, etc. know how to read and write, this can only harm us....

The greatest absurdity that we can commit on the eastern occupied territories would be to permit the subjugated peoples to bear arms. History teaches us that dominant peoples have met their ruin after agreeing to give weapons to the subjugated peoples....

XVI/ p. 136-137

Document #126**TRAVEL REPORT**

Berlin, 14 April 1942

4) An additional meeting with the SD, Sturmbannführer Gubsch brought revealing information concerning the situation of the Ukrainian emigration as perceived by the SD military intelligence. The attitude towards Germany was initially favorable, but noticeably deteriorated later. Leaflets calling for sabotage were intercepted in correspondence between the Protectorate [Bohemia] and Ukraine. According to the Prague SD, we must seriously expect an uprising in Ukraine because the illegal activity there is very advanced....

Oberleutnant Krausskopf

I/ R 6/192 f. 53

RESOLUTIONS OF THE 2ND CONFERENCE OF THE OUN

April 1942

Introduction

Our present struggle is based on the principles of the Act of June 30, 1941. We consider it historically legitimate, revolutionary and a political demonstration of the will of the whole Ukrainian nation to live its own political life.

...

Political Resolutions

...

II. In the present complex and variable international situation, we are pursuing a long-term policy which takes into consideration various possibilities of ending the war. At the same time, we believe in the possibility of a general armed struggle in the near future (the destruction of Russia, general attrition, the internal and external collapse of Germany). In order that the energy of the people is not wasted on small partisan skirmishes, but rather that it take the form of a broader popular movement, which will enable total victory, we are, as of now, systematically organizing and mobilizing our forces in every area.

III. Our policy is based on:

a) the creation and expansion of our own revolutionary political and military forces;

b) the absolute independence of the all-Ukrainian policy of the revolutionary struggle based on the concept of independence;

c) the utilization of all the possibilities and forces likely to promote the establishment of the Ukrainian state. Above all, to form relations with other oppressed peoples in Eastern and Western Europe for cooperation and a common fight against the invaders...;

f) opposition to the Russian-Bolshevik concept—the International—and the German concept of a so-called "New Europe." We propose the international concept of a new, just, national, political and economic reorganization of Europe based on free national states, according to the principle: "Freedom to nations and the individual";

g) we are stressing the idea of an independent and united Ukrainian state, which is a vital necessity, and the centuries-old aspirations of the Ukrainian nation, because it is our opinion that only a just solution of the Ukrainian question can lead to a balance of power in Eastern Europe and bring freedom to the nations subjugated by Moscow....

Document #128**INSTRUCTIONS OF THE WEHRMACHT CONCERNING THE CHURCHES**

G.Q., 10 May 1942

...1. The quarrel between the Churches must be kept under close surveillance. We also must have men of confidence in the churches to verify if anti-German, separatist or even nationalist propaganda is carried on inside or outside the churches....If it is found that the priests or members of the Greek Orthodox Churches support the Bandera movement, they must be pointed out to the SD....

For the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army South
Chief of the General Staff

II/ RH 22/204

Document #129**REPORT No.4 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Berlin, 22 May 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD
- Command Staff -

Secret!

...

*Resistance Movement in Ukraine**a) The Bandera Movement*

According to the report from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD for Ukraine, the investigations have revealed that the headquarters of the illegal Bandera movement in Volyn and Podillia were located in Rivne. We believe that a certain Ostap Timoshchuk is the leader.

As a result of the arrests which had taken place, the headquarters and base in Rivne have been abandoned. These are indications that the leaders of the organization have withdrawn into the marshlands of Sarny and Pinsk.

The organizational structure of the Bandera movement has been disclosed by the

materials found during the arrest of Kovalchuk. According to the structure, Ukraine is divided into provinces, regions, larger districts, districts, sub-districts, and blocks. Each of these divisions has its own leadership. Every leadership consists of an organizational leader, a propaganda leader, a security leader, a training instructor, a youth leader, and a leader of the women's section. In addition, there are deputies. It was their task to organize public life in Ukraine and to take over the training and appointment of additional leaders after the victory of the Bandera movement.

...

In Rivne, the Bandera group owned several factories and apartments where the Ukrainian militia was trained and meetings were held. The illegal militia training was stopped and the militia school in Rivne dissolved. As a result, the militia school was illegally reestablished in the former castle in Klevan. On the basis of the materials seized during the liquidation of the militia school in Rivne, it has been incontestably established that the militia was conceived as a Bandera combat organization.

There were forty participants in the course given at the militia school. The participants were informed of the illegality of their future activity. It was made clear to them that it was a liberation struggle of Ukraine against Germany. In case of arrest, they were to refuse to make any statements. In case of betrayal, the participants were threatened with liquidation by the movement.

In the great hall, the participants learned to handle weapons. They were taught that a free, independent Ukrainian state could be attained only by force of arms.

...

At the end of October 1941, about 25 men from the group of participants, secretly trained in Klevan, were sent on clandestine missions to Eastern Ukraine. We were able to arrest some of these propagandists with the help of search measures by the Security Police.

...

The following equipment was seized in the arms depots in the Kostopil region and turned over to the Wehrmacht:

600 infantry rifles, 12 machine guns, 1,200 gas masks, 245,000 rifle rounds, 20,000 artillery shells, 4,000 hand grenades, 2,000 mines, 500 machine gun drums, and other military equipment.

It has been established that the Bandera movement has managed to gain a solid foothold in Volyn and Podillia, and to recruit a large number of members by exploiting the circumstances at the beginning of the war. However, the measures taken by the Security Police have deprived the Bandera movement of an additional impetus even though the propaganda activity is still continuing.

b) *The Melnyk Movement*

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Ukraine reports that, after the arrest of a number of Melnyk followers in Kyiv, the activity of Melnyk's movement did not

intensify. A large number of documents was seized. They contain mainly excerpts from memoranda to the German authorities which speak falsely of injustices against the Ukrainian people.

...

In Kharkiv, just as in other areas, the illegal Melnyk organization was organized by the émigrés from Western Ukraine, particularly by the numerous Ukrainian interpreters who were, or rather still are, employed by the German authorities.

...

c) *Poliska Sich*

The Poliska Sich is a kind of Ukrainian free-corps under the leadership of a Taras Bulba [proper name: Borovets]. In the autumn of 1941, with the approval of the German authorities, B[ulba] set up a special unit to fight against the [Soviet] partisans. Although this free-corps was dissolved in November 1941, we believe it has been secretly reorganized and has accumulated a large number of weapons.

...

I/ R 58/697 f. 61 ff.

Document #130

REPORT ON THE MORALE OF THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION

31 May 1942

Secret!

a) *The General Attitude of the Population*

Even if in some regions the tone of exchanged remarks seems to indicate an improvement, the fact remains that the attitude of the population as a whole is at present very tense. As previously, the morale is influenced by the activity of the partisans, and also by the behavior and measures taken by the German and allied authorities. In this regard, the essential causes are: the strained situation in the supply area, especially for the towns; the rise of prices for food products and essential necessities [also on the black market]; the increasing arrests; the excesses against the civilian population; and above all, the fact that workers are beaten, that promises are not kept. There is also an absence of an energetic fight against the partisans which is interpreted as a weakness of the Germans.

...More and more one hears such expressions as "cursed Germans" and the reports are that the morale of the population is low, compliance has diminished and

the people have lost confidence. Economic inspection of the zone South underlines the ill-starred effects of beatings of workers: "Each time the Ukrainians are beaten publicly at their place of work [at the Poltava airport, the railroad line from Kremenchuk to Kharkiv], news spreads immediately through the entire city."...The conditions under which workers are deported to the Reich also exert bad influence on the morale...

I/ R 6/35 f. 82 ff.

Document #131

REPORT No.8 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 19 June 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Resistance Movement in Ukraine

a) *The Melnyk Movement*

On 23 May 1942, 190 copies of the Melnyk movement's thirteenth leaflet were seized in Kyiv. It talks about the activity of the Ukrainian nationalist Mykola Mikhovskiy.*

The official membership in the Melnyk movement has recently increased. It has been confirmed that activists of this movement organized food supplies for the population.

...

b) *The Bandera Movement*

On 2 May 1942, the Rivne district organization of the Bandera group held a meeting in the village of Ponebel, district of Rivne. The regional leader of the Bandera organization for Volyn, Ostap, and adjutant Chorny, a certain Volodymyr Kubrynovych and three additional persons were present. On this occasion, Ostap informed [those present] of the orders from the senior Bandera leader of Volyn-Podillia, Pryimak, who leads the movement from Sokal/General Government. He stressed that the activity of the Bandera movement in the Rivne district must be intensified. At the end, Ostap informed [those present] of Pryimak's order that all the hidden weapons were subsequently to be checked and cleaned.

I/ R 58/697 f. 157-157

* (1873-1924) Precursor of modern Ukrainian nationalism.

Document #132**HIMMLER'S STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF GERMANIZATION**

June-July 1942

Our task is to Germanize the east, not in the ancient way when the people had to learn the language and respect the German laws, but in such a way that the east is inhabited solely by people whose blood is German, Germanic.

H. Himmler

XI/ 2915-PS, XXXI p. 281

059-USSR, XXXIX p. 332

Document #133**REPORT No.10 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Berlin, 3 July 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

A petition posted in Stanislaviv, district of Galicia, dated 16 March 1942, was sent to the Führer by a "Ukrainian Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine on behalf of the Ukrainian People." The return address on the envelope was given as "Ukraine" UKVU. The letter was signed: "The Ukrainian Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine!", "Long live Ukraine!", Ukraine, the 15 March 1942.

.....

The Bandera Group

A leaflet of the OUN-Bandera was seized in Kyiv. It contains instructions concerning the structure of the organization. Here is the introduction:

The following goal lies before the nation: to establish an independent national state. Without its own country, government, or army there is no life for the Ukrainian nation.

In this way it was possible to establish in Rivne that this organizational network was controlled by two headquarters in that area, that is, from a headquarters in

Sarny, which has, in the meantime, been liquidated, and another in the Horokhiv area, on the border with Galicia. The latter headquarters is more important because it maintains contact with the General Government.

...

The orders, seized during the latest arrests, give a clear indication of the intentions of the illegal activists. Whereas the plans seized in winter warned against any actions or provocations because all efforts were to be concentrated on the expansion of the OUN's network and the internal orientation of its members, and the preparation, as far as possible, for further successes until the moment when the "last word" is spoken with the occupying forces, the orders recently seized already specify immediate active assignments. The members have been ordered to engage in passive resistance and to sabotage all German measures. The martyrdom of Bandera and his friends "who are today languishing in dungeons for our ideas" is glorified in the leaflets.

Particular mention must be made of the propaganda and resistance against the delivery of agricultural products, against the deportation of manpower to Germany, against participation in German-Ukrainian events, etc.

...

During the liquidation of the Bandera headquarters in Sarny, detailed directives regarding the conduct of partisan warfare were discovered.

It was also established that the Bandera organization has ordered its members not to join the police. A member of the Bandera movement is automatically excluded from the movement if he joins the police.

The Melnyk Movement

No increased or special activity of the Melnyk organization has been observed in the past months. The Melnyk movement seems to have little contact with the rural population....

I/ R 58/698 f. 6-8

Document #134

REPORT No.11 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 10 July 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Rivne has seized illegal documents of the OUN-Bandera group which contain important programmatic instructions on the illegal tactics of the Bandera movement.

One of the documents points out that the disposition of the OUN regarding other nations, including Germany, is determined by their disposition towards the question of Ukrainian independence. The war is beneficial in that Germany can destroy Ukraine's old enemy—Moscow. However, it is unprofitable because this same Germany is hostile towards the idea of an independent Ukrainian state.

...

According to a report from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Cracow, a directive of the Bandera group in Lviv ordered closed cell meetings for 30.6.42 [the anniversary of the proclamation of the Stetsko government].

...

I/ R 58/698 p. 29 f

Document #135

REPORT No.14 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 31 July 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

According to reports from Rivne, the continuing activity of the partisans in the district of Kobryn has now spread to other northwestern districts of Volyn/Podillia.

The numerous bandit groups that have made their appearance came across the river Buh from the General Government. The men are all armed with sawn-off rifles so that the weapons can be carried concealed under their clothing.

...

The main objective of their attacks was to destroy telephone communications. Lines of communication were repeatedly cut and telephones destroyed.

Their methods, however, appear, first and foremost, to be directed towards setting up a large-scale resistance movement. Several school teachers were arrested during the course of the investigation concerning the Ukrainian insurgent movement in Kamianets-Podilskyi....

...

In Volodymyrets, a leaflet which urged people to sabotage the recruitment of a work-force for the Reich was posted in several places. The director of the labor office in Sarny, who had harbored the perpetrators, was arrested. He was the secretary of the Ukrainian resistance movement.

Fifteen persons, including the deputy mayor, the director of schools and education, the headmaster, and several teachers, were arrested during the liquidation of a group in Chemerists....

...

In Kamin-Kashyrskiy, three members of the Ukrainian police left their posts without permission taking their weapons with them. From the investigations we learned that they fled in order to take part in the training of the Ukrainian nationalist groups.

The Bandera organization is circulating issue no.4 of the illegal publication *Bulletin*. One of the articles makes a cunning attempt to gradually incite the Ukrainian population against the Germans. The statements about the apparent political intentions of the Reich with regard to Ukraine are particularly interesting. It says for instance:

"The year 1941 has brought a change. One totalitarianism has disappeared and another one has replaced it. Their basic goals are the same, only their tactics differ. In both cases, imperialism hostile to us, is hiding behind an alluring mask—socialist paradise on the one hand, and the happy life in a 'New Europe' on the other."

Another passage states:

"The Germans are taking steps to protect themselves against a surplus supply of foreign blood. However, in order to firmly establish their position in the east, they want to multiply at the expense of certain elements from among the subjugated nations as can already be seen today [permission to marry Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, etc.]. Elements will also be found among other nations [we also belong to this group] in which 'German blood' will be gambled against white bread."

...

The article concludes with the following statement:

"Every Ukrainian must be aware of the fact that no neutrality, no loyalty, no compromise will be able to help him and his children escape slavery, because salvation lies in the victory of his own race. But our state can be created only by the efforts and the blood of millions of people of our nation under the leadership of our revolutionary organization. That is why it is necessary to do everything to strengthen our power and avoid everything that can weaken us."...

Document #136

REPORT No.15 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 7 August 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

...

In commemoration of the anniversary of 30 June 1941, the day on which Bandera's followers proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state in Lviv, Damian Dmytriv, the regional leader of the OUN-Bandera movement in the Western Ukrainian regions, issued a directive which was to be read on 30 June 1942 during secret meetings of the cells. The directives reads as follows:

"It was one year ago, on 30 June, that the banners of the ancestors of this country proudly waved atop the towers of Lviv, the ancient city of the princes, and the radio announced the restoration of the Ukrainian state to the whole world." The OUN under Stepan Bandera fulfilled the wishes of the Ukrainian people and achieved the historical act of the proclamation of the Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941, in Lviv. Acting on the orders of Stepan Bandera, Yaroslav Stetsko formed a Ukrainian government in Lviv and, under his leadership, began the unrelenting establishment of the young state in the country and the Ukrainian hearts began to beat as one....The leader of the OUN, Stepan Bandera, and the head of the Ukrainian government, Yaroslav Stetsko, were arrested. The establishment of the Ukrainian state was forcefully liquidated and a foreign system, well-known to us all, has replaced it. More and more arrests followed, blood began to flow....

Fellow Nationalists!

30 June 1941 proves to the entire world:

a) that Ukrainians possess their own, unwavering ideas and that they are prepared to rise up against anyone who wants to turn our country into a colony and enslave our people;

b) that Ukrainians have fought for, are fighting for, and will continue to fight for their own state and not for a new Europe."

.....

Document #137

REPORT No.16 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 14 August 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

It has been established that the illegal OUN-Bandera movement is engaged in a radical campaign to grasp the active youth circles and pull them away from the spheres of German influence. Every means of propaganda is being applied in order to arouse hatred among the Ukrainians towards the German. Numerous confiscated leaflets and secret directives are clear evidence of this hostile attitude.

For example, the following passage appeared in the leaflet "The Latest News":

"On the one hand, the Germans talk of statehood with the aid of the Melnyk people, but on the other hand, they make every effort to liquidate everything connected with independence. Resentment is growing against the Germans, especially among the intelligentsia. Everybody hates the Germans and has ceased to fear them...."

The following remarks are made in a directive concerning training:

"No one must go to work in Germany. No one must take courses organized by the Germans because they can be captured and deported. No one must agree to do military service...."

The OUN-Melnyk group has the outward appearance of a moderate nationalistic movement, but its propaganda program and goals are equal to those of the Bandera movement....

In the course of the investigations against the Ukrainian resistance movement twenty-three persons were arrested in the Lubni area and transported to Kremen-chuk. An additional thirty-three persons who had been arrested were released.

.....

Document #138**REPORT No.17 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Berlin, 20 August 1942

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

The Bandera movement continues to make every effort in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to influence the local Ukrainian population by circulating illegal propaganda.

A document entitled "Ukraine" has been seized. It states:

"...Because the present war has dragged in the entire world, our people cannot remain idle. It must whet its sword and be prepared to raise it once the weakened giants fall to the ground and drop their arms, to fight for its freedom and to attain independence for Ukraine forever."

Furthermore, the "propaganda instructions" of the Bandera movement were seized. They state:

"All indications point to the fact that Germany will not succeed in establishing world-wide supremacy despite its great military success."

...

"We want to be free citizens in our own state. Down with slavery! We want our own laws that correspond to the interests of all the Ukrainian people and guarantee their well-being."

...

I/ R 58/698 f. 174-175

Document #139**REPORT No.18 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Berlin, 28 August 1942

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

An illegal Bandera publication entitled "The Standard of the Youth" dated 1 June 1942 has been seized. It urges the youth not to believe in German promises, but to

volunteer for the Bandera movement in its fight for the independence of Ukraine. The document stated among other things:

"Ukrainian women and men! The great imperialist powers are choking on your blood and that of other peoples."..."For our wheat, our iron, our coal, as well as for our manpower, millions of soldiers are fighting. Entire hordes of Russian and German soldiers are destroying and pillaging our country."

"Young Ukrainians! Are we going to deliver the fate of Ukraine into the hands of cruel foreigners? Are we going to accept the inhuman domination of the 'liberators' to that the German youth have a magnificent and sated life? We want to build our own lives for ourselves in Ukraine. The OUN, under the leadership of Stepan Bandera, is fighting for the grandeur of Ukraine. Young Ukrainian women and men! Place yourselves under the banners of the OUN! Fight for the Ukrainian state! Take the initiative! Educate your comrades and friends to become patriots of Ukraine!"

Furthermore, a leaflet of the provincial leadership of the Bandera movement for Western Ukraine was found in the Kyiv district. It maintains that Germany's callous colonial policies in Ukraine have aroused just indignation. Germany will have to do its utmost to fight against England. Therefore, the OUN's chances are increasing. The leaflet urges the Ukrainians not to follow Moscow's demands to form partisan groups because this would lead to heavy losses from which only Moscow would benefit. The crux of the matter is to unite all the forces. The leadership of the OUN will determine when to attack.

...

On 24 July 1942 the leader of the Bandera movement for Eastern Ukraine, who used the code names Pip, Andriy, and Mudryi, was captured in Kyiv. He was wounded during an attempt to escape and died shortly thereafter. His real name is unknown.* He had in his possession a presumably forged passport under the name of Vasyl Panasiuk, as well as an organizational directive of the Bandera movement, which had not been seized until now....

I/ R 58/698 f. 193-195

* His real name was Dmytro Myron (Orlyk).

Document #140

NOTES ON THE CONFERENCE IN RIVNE FROM 26—28 AUGUST 1942

1) *The Agrarian Order*

The following is a summary of the Conference on the Agrarian order:

The aim of the agrarian order is to safeguard the cooperation of the Russians in order to fulfill the delivery obligations for the Reich. The primary task of the La-Führer in Ukraine is to ensure the European food balance. All questions concerning the agrarian order must be considered from one point of view: how far can cooperation with the Russians be secured. Due to the lack of equipment, manpower is presently the most important production factor. Consequently, the treatment of manpower by the La-Führer is of paramount importance....

Speech by Gauleiter Koch

The Gauleiter arrived directly from the Führer's headquarters and expressed the Führer's gratitude, with the usual praise for the work done by the La-Führer. He pointed out his political viewpoint and his duties as Reichskommissar in the following manner: There is no free Ukraine. Our task is to drive the Ukrainians to work for the Germans and not to please this nation. Ukraine must provide what Germany lacks. This task is to be carried out regardless of losses. The question of food supplies in Germany is serious. Production is already falling as a result of poor food supplies. The increased food rations are a political necessity in order to successfully continue the war. The lacking surplus of grain must be supplied by Ukraine. The Führer has made the Gauleiter responsible for ensuring this surplus. In view of this assignment, the nourishment of the civilian population is of no consequence whatsoever. The Führer has demanded 3,000,000 tons of grain from Ukraine and they must be supplied. He did not listen to discussions about the lack of transport facilities. The problem of transport must be solved locally.

The delivery of 700,000 tons of oleagious fruit is just as important as the procurement of grain supplies. It is decisive in Germany's balance of fats. Everything down to the last must be extracted from the population.

The decisive viewpoint regarding the conduct of Germans in the Reichskommissariat is that we are dealing with an inferior race in every respect. Contact with Ukrainians is forbidden. Social contact is forbidden. Sexual contact is severely punishable. No one is permitted to "take it easy." The Führer ordered the establishment of the party here in the occupied eastern regions in order to make an explicit survey of the eastern behavior of the Germans. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Germans has made this absolutely necessary. Ruthless measures have been ordered by Gauleiter Koch in order to eliminate abuses. It is forbidden to girls to go walking on the streets in Rivne dressed in shorts, wearing make-up and smoking. Koch ordered the police to observe the moral conduct of all female personnel and finds it necessary that, at least, ten of them should be publicly declared as prostitutes.

The education level of the Ukrainians must be kept low. The educational policy must, therefore, be applied accordingly. Three-year schools already provide too high an education. Furthermore, every effort must be made to decrease the strong

birth-rate in this area. The Führer has provided special measures for this. Otherwise, the biological strength of this nation will push the German people up against a wall within a few generations.

Culturally speaking, we allowed the Ukrainians to retain both churches. Additional cultural work is forbidden. During the war work is only to be affected by the economy.

After the war the Russian territory from Eydtkune to Vladivostok will be only market for German industry. Of course, we are not going to deliver high quality products here, but the usual kitsch which is good enough for this population. These products will be accordingly expensive because the occupied eastern regions will have to cover the costs and pay for the sacrifices of this war.

If these people work 10 hours a day, then 8 of them must be for our benefit. All sentimental opposition must be stopped. These people must be governed with an iron fist so that they help us win the war. We did not liberate them to make Ukraine happy, but to assure Germany a Lebensraum and food supplies that she needed.

I/ R 6/70 f. 15-18

Document #141

REPORT No.20 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 11 September 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

a) The Bandera Movement

After protracted investigations, the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Zhytomyr arrested Yuriy Trotsiuk, the leader of the Bandera movement in the Ovruch district. Trotsiuk had in his possession a passport issued under the name Nazar Hlid. He confessed to having received the assignment to organize the Ovruch district from Andriy Lutsyk, the regional leader of the Bandera movement in Kostopil. In the course of the investigations, Trotsiuk disclosed the names of seven officials. They are all teachers.

In Kyiv, two members of Police Battalion #115, Arkhypevych and Vladyka, were arrested. They belonged to a group of Bandera supporters within the battalion. Seven of them were recently arrested.

In Chernihiv, at the beginning of July, the local mayor, Rebenok, the district chief, Diubko, as well as the commander of the Ukrainian militia, Turash, were arrested on grounds of economic sabotage.

In Novo Khrest, Rivne area, newspapers containing anti-German articles were found in the home of a Ukrainian named Petro Mizkevych, alias Buriachuk. Mizkevych has escaped and is suspected of belonging to the Bandera movement.

A Bandera propagandist was arrested in Vynnytsia. He had smuggled a large amount of illegal literature into Romania. The Romanian Security Division succeeded in arresting nine other sub-agents.

b) *The Melnyk Movement*

From the interrogation of the aforementioned Bandera official, Trotsiuk, who had from time to time worked for the Melnyk movement, we discovered a meeting point of the Melnyk movement in Rivne, in the apartment of the Ukrainian student Vasyl Shtul. There are also other Melnyk officials staying in Shtul's apartment.

A memorandum from the leader of the Melnyk movement, Colonel Andriy Melnyk, sent to Reichsminister Rosenberg, was seized in Cracow. In this memorandum, which deals in its introductory remarks with the deplorable state of affairs in Eastern Ukraine, Melnyk laid down the following demands:

1) The recognition of Ukraine's right to her own national existence in political-national forms either by a declaration of the Führer or the German government.

2) The incorporation of Ukrainian regions of the General Government into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the delimitation of Ukraine from Poland, as well as the regions occupied by the Romanian army.

3) The establishment of a representation for Ukraine in place of the prohibited national councils. The task of this representation would be the proclamation of the final separation of Ukraine from Russia, the proclamation of Ukrainian statehood, and an alliance with Germany.

4) The possibility of forming a national unitary party in Ukraine which would reorganize life in Ukraine.

5) The approval of a Ukrainian national leadership from within the ranks of the unitary party and its cooperation with the German authorities. This leadership should be authorized, primarily, to set up a Ukrainian army.

Ukrainian Propaganda Activity:

...

Two leaflets addressed to the youth were circulated in Volodymyrets. The read:

"Hitlerism sees its imminent death approaching. Therefore, it wants to secure the territories behind the front, and to reinforce its work there. It wants to send us, the Ukrainian youth, to a place which is being laid waste by the English bombers. It needs our work-force to clear away the ruins. If you go, do not expect to return

to your parents! If you return, then only ill or crippled. Never leave your village! Do not obey violence! Down with violence in our villages!"

During an operation against the illegal Bandera movement in Sarny, various directives by the regional leader of the OUN were found, as well as a detailed text on the partisan war hidden in the muff of a leader of a women's organization. One of the directives claims:

"The work of the organization must be consolidated in the entire region. Every village, every factory, every administration must be incorporated into the organizational network. We must not allow our work to be endangered by negligence. Training groups must be created everywhere."...

Another directive states:

"All comrades and members of the OUN must be more careful because mass arrests are expected. Do not allow yourself to be arrested. Try to escape instead. Those who are arrested must not admit that they belong to the OUN. No one is allowed to cooperate with the Gestapo; this is an enemy act against Ukraine. German-Ukrainian manifestations must be boycotted. Any collaboration with the occupying forces is high treason and is punishable by death."...

The text entitled: "The Partisan War" states:

"The partisan war is a war fought by small units on the territory occupied by the enemy. The purpose of this war is to harm the enemy as much as possible. It is the initial stage of a national uprising of an oppressed nation. The partisans' mission is the destruction of railways, the disconnection of telephone communications, as well as the execution of surprise attacks on enemy installations and units.

With the help of a sympathetic population, a well-organized partisan war has certain advantages. It can cause extensive damage to the enemy with very little means and strength.

This guerilla war forces the enemy to be constantly alert and makes him nervous. It compels the enemy to divide his forces. It also boosts morale among the subjugated people."

I/ R 58/222 f. 47-51

Document #142

REPORT No.21 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 18 September 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Bandera Movement:

Contrary to the previous month, there have been no fundamental changes in the activity of the Ukrainian resistance movement. It can generally be noted that the activity of the Bandera group is increasingly concentrating on recruiting every Ukrainian possible. The Bandera group should still be considered the most radical Ukrainian independence movement. Previously, the propaganda was circulated in Western and Central Ukraine. This activity is gradually spreading to the remaining Ukrainian territories. Hostility towards the German is particularly prevalent among the Bandera followers. They have already stressed several times the need to throw the Germans out of the country. During the liquidation of an attempted uprising in Kamianets-Podilskyi and the surrounding area it was established that it is not only members of the Bandera group who belong to the illegal resistance movement, but also the communist officials who work under cover within the Ukrainian educational organization "Prosvita"...

On 24 and 25 August 1942, leaflets were found near Shankiv, Rivne district, entitled "Address of the Ukrainian Nationalists on the Occasion of the First Anniversary of the Proclamation of the Independent Ukrainian State in Lviv on 30 June 41." The text reads:

"...We will never trade our freedom for a decent piece of bread from a foreign invader, for a 'new superior culture' or for the 'inhuman idea'. We want our own culture, our own bread; we want to be free and content. You will either achieve a Ukrainian state or die in the struggle for it. Ukraine exists and will exist. Whatever might happen in Ukraine, no matter what hordes pass through our country, whatever the ideas and theories the foreign invaders might try to impose on us, the Ukrainian people will not swerved from the right path. Ukraine has not yet died."

In Mykolayiv, after a long surveillance, four members of the Bandera group, who actively worked against the German and had in their possession various printed materials, were arrested. Some of them belonged to the militia of the Ukrainian municipal administration.

Five member of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, suspected of being activists of the Bandera movement, were arrested in Kyiv. Illegal materials, as well as a revolver, were found among the possessions of one of the men.

In Vorach, two Bandera supporters were arrested.

In Kherson, the increased activity of Bandera supporters in influential positions has been observed.

In Kyiv, eight persons suspected of participating in the Ukrainian resistance movement were arrested on 12 August 1942. Among them is a Ukrainian named Yaroslav Hrebenuik, who had apparently forged a stamp and identity cards for the Bandera official named "Pip," who was killed during an attempted escape.

The Melnyk Movement

Like the Bandera group, the Melnyk movement is also expanding its intensive activity in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Contrary to the Bandera supporters, the members of the Melnyk group are indeed more cautious. The Melnyk movement has realized that it has to include the Ukrainian Church in its activity. The Melnyk supporters were concentrated in Kyiv in the so-called National Council. Even today this group exercises a certain political influence, although the National Council has been dissolved in the meantime.

The Hetman Skoropadskyi Movement

Besides the Bandera and Melnyk groups, Hetman Skoropadskyi's movement in Kyiv also has a number of supporters. In most cases they are intellectuals and representatives of the older generation. Generally speaking, they practice moderate and pro-German politics.

...

I/ R 58/222 f. 76-77

Document #143**REPORT No.22 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Berlin, 25 September 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Cracow has seized a leaflet printed by the Bandera movement in which it takes a standpoint to the partisan warfare conducted by the Soviets and Poles. The leaflet is entitled: "Our Position Regarding the Partisan Warfare."

It states:

"The Ukrainian nation has convinced itself once again that the aims of those who want to 'liberate' Ukraine are always the same, whether their battle-cry is 'the defense of the Russian fatherland,' 'the New Europe' or anything else. For, under the guise of the battle-cies, they want to harness some of the Ukrainians to their wagon and to enslave them, to quickly liquidate as many of the disobedient ones as

possible in order to feel secure in the rich Ukrainian land after the victory.

The partisan warfare of the Poles and the Bolsheviks would not interest us and they can deploy their forces as they wish, provided the cutting edge is not directed against us. Stalin and Sikorski wanted to kill two birds with one stone: to harm the Germans and to deal a blow to Ukrainians with the aid of the Germans.

The Ukrainians did not and do not participate in the partisan warfare....

We consider the partisan warfare neither from the point of view of the communist world revolution (Russian imperialism), nor from the point of view of a 'New Europe' (German imperialism), but rather from the point of view of Ukrainian interests. We are fighting for the independent Ukrainian state and not for foreign imperialism.

We must preserve our forces for we believe that the war, in its final stages, will enable us to fight for and establish our own Ukrainian state. Our aim is not the partisan warfare of several hundred, or even thousand men, but a national revolution of a mass of millions of Ukrainians."

In the Horokhiv region, a notice signed Stepan Bandera was found posted on a barn. It calls on the Ukrainians to free themselves from the insane Germans.

A school teacher from Tyveriv, Zhytomyr district, was arrested as he was about to deliver illegal Bandera publications to Kyiv. He had in his possession forged identity cards.

In Haisyn, seven persons were arrested on the grounds of storing propaganda material for the Bandera movement. The house search resulted in the seizure of extensive propaganda materials. The leader of the group carried a Russian army pistol.

An intensification of the activity of the Bandera organization has been observed in the Zaporizhia region. In the district of Sofiyvka, a worker had to be arrested on the grounds of circulating illegal literature. Likewise, a tradesman from Kryvyi Rih was arrested on suspicion of recruiting Bandera supporters from among the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Two persons were arrested during the course of additional investigations concerning the Melnyk movement in Kyiv or rather in Eastern Ukraine.

Five Melnyk supporters were arrested in the Mykolayiv area. Among them are the chief and two members of the local Ukrainian police.

In Kirovohrad, a non-commissioned officer of the Ukrainian police battalion was arrested. Since he was a Melnyk supporter, he had promised to entrust recruiting material to other persons.

A copy of the Melnyk organization's statute was seized by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Cracow.

The following passage is of significance:

"It is essential for the Ukrainian people to be free, to have an independent state to which all the Ukrainian territories would belong. The precondition for the

attainment of our goals is an organized struggle."

...

I/ R 58/222 f.102-103

Document #144

ORDER FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES IN UKRAINE

22 September 1942

Secret!

15th Police Regiment
3rd Battalion

1. On 23 September 1942 the battalion destroyed the following villages located northeast of Mokriany that were contaminated by criminal actions: Borky, Zabolotia and Borysivka. The company "Nürnberg" destroyed Kortelisy.

2. To this end were designated: the 9th Company, excluding the section Frohn, with the motorized platoon of police of the 16th Regiment in Borysivka; the 10th Company, one non-commissioned officer and seven guard soldiers of the staff headquarters and three drivers, in Borky; the 11th Company with the section of Frohn and fourteen soldiers from the armored platoon of the 10th Regiment in Zabolotia....

5. Commencement of the operation: 23 September 1942, 5:30 am.

At 4:35 am. the locations must be encircled (internal encirclement).

6. The operation must be carried out in conformity with instructions given in my conversation with the officers on 21 September 1942.

7. Livestock, agricultural materials, wheat reserves, and other agricultural goods are to be confiscated as per my verbal instruction....

Holling

XV/ p. 132, 134

Document #145

REPORT No.23 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 2 October 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

*The Ukrainian Resistance Movement**The Bandera Movement:*

The illegal Bandera group has continued to influence the local population by circulating anti-German publications. Additional persons suspected of belonging to the Bandera group were arrested in Kyiv. They came mainly from the Rivne region and maintained that they intended to study in Kyiv.

On the night of 25 August 1942, two of Bandera's followers, who were serving a sentence in the Znamenska prison (Mykolayiv area) were set free by the guard and another member of the Ukrainian police. All four men fled, taking with them a gun and ammunition. The search measures are continuing.

The Melnyk Movement:

After extensive investigations, we succeeded in arresting an extremely covert and cautious group of Melnyk followers in Kyiv, who have been busy for months circulating illegal publications and setting up a secret organization. At the same time, the printing shop of the illegal Melnyk organization was uncovered in Kyiv. A publication entitled "The Birth of a New Ukraine" was seized. It contains disclosures about Ukraine's former struggle for freedom. On the same occasion, Vasyl Kuzmyk, propaganda leader born on 18 January 1916, who used the code name Petronko and who illegally resided in Kyiv, was arrested together with eight other activists of the Melnyk group. Kuzmyk's superior, a man codenamed Stepovyi, who was also supposed to be residing in Kyiv, has not yet been apprehended....

I/ R 58/22 f. 133

Document #146

LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF THE EAST
WITH THE ARMY GROUP B TO ROSENBERG ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION

7 October 1942

...The manner in which Ukrainians, who have been sent to the Reich as specialized workers, are treated has created great worries among the authorities of the Wehrmacht. The commander-in-chief has suggested to me that I personally visit some camps in the Reich soon and make out a report on the authorities concerned for the purpose of remedying the situation. The zone of the Army Group is not in the least pacified. All forms of discontent contribute increasingly to the growing number of people who go over to the side of the bandit groups or Bandera's camp or to other enemy [hostile] group....

Theurer

XI/ 054-PS

XV p. 101 ff.

Document #147

REPORT No.24 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Berlin, 9 October 1942

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

At the beginning of September 1942, illegal leaflets of the *Bandera group* were seized in Kharkiv. They were published by the "Regional Section of the OUN in the Eastern Territories of Ukraine." There are four different leaflets with the following titles:

- a) Ukrainian Nation, Fellow Countrymen, Workers and the Intelligentsia
- b) The Year 1943, the Year of Hunger and Death, Appears before Us Like a Heinous Ghost.
- c) A Word to the OUN!
- d) Ukrainians! The Germans have Evoked just Indignation among our People through their Barbarous Colonial Policies in Ukraine.

For the first time, these leaflets provide information that the Bandera group has a separate section for Eastern Ukraine and is appealing to the population of the east with propaganda. We have begun investigations to find the authors and propagators of the leaflets.

In the section of the Dnipropetrovsk command, fifteen persons were arrested on the night of 6 September 1942 on grounds of secret activity in the illicit "Prosvita" organization. Secret meetings took place, mostly on Sunday evenings, in the apartment of Drain—the Prosvita secretary.

...

The leader of the entire Prosvita organization is a Ukrainian named Dolenko. The leader of the Prosvita in Kharkiv is a certain Dubrovskiy. The establishment of local groups in Kharkiv and its vicinity has until now been prohibited.

According to confidential information, Dolenko indicated for the first time during a meeting that Prosvita's aim is to fight against bolshevism in collaboration with the German armed forces until the overthrow of the Soviet regime and then to fight against the Germans with the aim of eliminating German influence. He also reportedly talked about the need to set up arms and munition depots.

Three additional persons were arrested during an operation against the illegal *Melnik group* in Kyiv. Kuzmyk, the propaganda leader, admitted during interrogation that the Melnyk organization has held three conferences this year, in May in Rivne or Lutsk, in June in Proskuriv, and on 15 September in Kyiv. The general situation was discussed.

In Vynnytsia, a person was arrested on grounds of publishing and circulating pictures of Petlura and writings of the Ukrainian resistance movement...

I/ R 58/222 f. 179-180

Document #148

REPORT No.26 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Berlin, 23 October 1942

Secret!

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

The *Bandera movement* has recently turned more and more to leading an active struggle. As early as May, it was established that the Bandera movement was seriously busy with the setting up of bandit groups, especially in the western part of

Ukraine. In July 1942, the movements of a bandit gangs in which supporters of the Bandera group and Bolshevik elements* were represented were observed in the Kamianets-Podilskyi region. Recently, a larger group, which is led by Borovets, a Bandera activist, was located in the Sarny region. It has also been established that the Bandera movement is engaged in the military training of its members, assembling them from time to time for field training as part of the activity of the national bandit groups. It [the Bandera group] is exercising a kindly neutrality towards the Bolshevik bandit gangs. The proclamation of war against the Bolsheviks has been disappearing more and more from its propaganda. It is almost exclusively directed against the German authorities, or more precisely, against the German occupants. This attitude of the Bandera movement coincides essentially with the views of the prominent Bandera leaders who, after the rapprochement between England, the USA, and the USSR, are of the opinion that a rapprochement between the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the Bolsheviks is also necessary. This turn of events shows that the Bandera movement has taken a distinct position against Germany and is determined to wrest the independence of Ukraine by force, even through an armed struggle. Moreover, as previously, the Bandera group is endeavoring to expand its organization on a largest possible scale. The training of women and youth, and the infiltration of the economy is being realized through the formation of special sections at particular strong points of the Bandera movement. At the same time, there are attempts, with the aid of Bandera supporters, to infiltrate cultural, scientific and other non-political organizations in order to give them a nationalist orientation. The Bandera movement is paying particular attention to the cultural organization "Prosvita."

The *Melnyk group* has recently also become more active. Its propaganda is extremely brisk and in some cases superior to that of the Bandera movement.

...

I/ R 58/222 f/ 231

* This assertion is unfounded, but some former members of the Communist party did at times belong to the Ukrainian national resistance to fight for the independence of Ukraine.

Document #149

EXCERPT FROM REPORT No.21 ON THE ENEMY OF ARMY GROUP B
Period under Review: mid-August to mid-October

Headquarters, 29 October 1942

Commander-in-Chief H.Geb.B.
 Dept. Ic Nr.539/42 g.

Secret!

Bandit Groups

1) *Ukrainian Nationalists*

According to a report from 16 October 1942 from the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalists have combined their forces for the first time into a large bandit group in the Sarny area and are constantly receiving reinforcements.

...

II/ RH 22/175

Document #150

**EXCERPT FROM A LETTER CONCERNING THE DEPORTATION OF
 UKRAINIAN WORKERS TO GERMANY**

Group VIII
 Office for Foreign Letters Control—Berlin

31 October 1942

...

Sender: Kateryna Tokarchuk
 Bilozirka, district Kremianets
 Volhynia, Ukraine
 Addressee: Ulana Mazur
 Einswarden (Old.)

Date: 13 October 1942

...

They were supposed to take twenty-eight men from our village, but all of them did not want to leave. Then they set fire to the homes of those who did not leave and took forty-one men instead of the twenty-eight. In the neighboring village, four

houses were burned down with all the belonging of the people and in other villages still more.

I/ R 6/79 f. 9

Document #151

REPORT ON MORALE BASED ON LETTERS from 11.9. – 10.11.1942: Soviet Union

Berlin, 11 November 1942

Foreign Letters Control—Berlin

Registration no.7328/42 geh. Group VIII

A further, more drastic deterioration of morale can be determined from letters from Ukraine, and the impression of the intensified recruitment of manpower for the Reich has caused panic among the Ukrainian population....Terrifying descriptions of coercive measures by the administrative authorities as regards the recruitment of eastern workers constitutes the majority of the news from home received by those relatives who are working in Germany....

In order to assure the fixed quota for the transportation of workers, men and women, including the youth from the age of 15, are allegedly being rounded up off the streets, in markets, and at village festivities and deported. Therefore, the inhabitants hide in fear and avoid meeting in public places. According to the letters, in addition to the use of corporal punishment, houses or rather entire villages have been burned down since the beginning of October in reprisal for the communities' non-compliance with the request to supply manpower. The implementation of the latter measures has been reported in several areas (Encl. 1).

Bitter remarks that "freedom" appears quite different from that which the Ukrainians expected with the arrival of the Germans, are directly connected to the requisition of large amounts of grain, milk and livestock. The village population claims that not enough remains for its own needs, particularly for the autumn. The year's harvest is often described as poor. Many letter-writers expect a severe famine in the winter and coming spring (Encl.2).

...

III/ Vertr. d. AA

beim R.-Kom. Ukr., vol. 4

Document #152**EXCERPT FROM SECRET INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GERMAN POLICE
FOR UKRAINE**

November 1942

1. Our enemies are: the communists, Bandera's followers, and the partisans. Bandera's followers are potentially the most dangerous. They must be destroyed at all cost.
2. Four-grade schools at the most. They are to be closed next year (1943).
3. Watch the "Prosvita" institution. The B. [Bandera followers] are active there.
4. Close down cultural and educational institutions: theaters and cinemas.
5. As few scientific institutions, such as laboratories, as possible. Only those necessary for the armed forces.
6. Prevent church unity.
7. Avoid combating tuberculosis and typhus. Close hospitals to the population. Stop training additional resident doctors.
8. Only German law courts permitted. Every German is a judge. Court appeals for the population are planned only for a period of ten years.
9. Rowdiness is punishable only when it harms Germans.
10. Encourage immorality; abortion is not punishable.
11. Break every backbone. We want to develop a "nation of slaves."
12. Prevent agreement between partisans and nationalists.
13. Control the railroads.
14. Infiltrate secret agents into all factories, workshops, churches, firms, offices, etc. Watch Germany's enemies. Priests are to be used as tools.
15. Germans are not permitted to converse with the population.
16. No discussions regarding misunderstandings within the party are permitted.

Document #153

REPORT No.29 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 13 November 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Bandera Group

...

It has been established that the OUN conducts the political education of the youth through the youth association "Buy-Tur," "Yunatstvo" and "Prosvita." The Ukrainian youth, boys and girls, receive physical training during regular evening sessions and are oriented in the political line of the Bandera organization. After a short period of probation, they are sworn in on the ten commandments of the OUN. In order to give the organization an externally legal character, the meetings are described as hours of physical education and are also always opened with physical education training. Furthermore, it has been observed that military exercises are conducted together with the physical education training, for which the military training regulations of the OUN "The Internal Command," "The Field Command" and "The Security Regulations" are used. After a period of probation, the local youth groups are incorporated into the local unit of the OUN. In all of the Ukrainian youth associations the idea of an independent Ukrainian state as the ultimate political aim is propagated.

...Meetings of Bandera supporters took place in his apartment [i.e., in the apartment of a member of the OUN-Bandera]. The Bandera supporters in this group work according to the 5-man cell system and apparently intend to carry out acts of sabotage and terror. During the investigations concerning the group, an illegal printing shop of the Bandera group was uncovered on the night of 17 October 1942 in Kharkiv. Shooting commenced. Eleven Bandera agents were arrested. Extensive propaganda material and fourteen boxes of typed stencils were confiscated from the printing shop.

In Bila Tserkva, near Kyiv, four persons, including a teacher, were arrested for activities connected with the Bandera group. In Lutsk, a Bandera supporter was killed while attempting to escape.

In Kherson, a Bandera supporter, suspected of having stolen 6,000 Reich marks during a robbery, was arrested.

In Mikolayiv, propaganda materials of the Bandera group were seized once again.

In Kyiv, a Ukrainian, Ivan Shapk, who had in his possession a passport under the name of Zaporozhets, was arrested. Shpak has been a member of the OUN

since 1936. He came to Kyiv from Lviv on the orders of Leguenda, one of the top officials of the Bandera movement. Dmytro Marko, who held a passport under the name of Kravchenko, was also arrested.

The Melnyk Group

Among the literature seized in the apartment of Kuzmyk, a Melnyk supporter, was a leaflet entitled "One Part—Two Methods." The leaflet is noteworthy in that it concludes with the following words: "We hate the Bolshevik yoke, but we hate any other yoke just as much. Only a Ukrainian can be master over Ukrainian soil."

A letter from Konstantyn Horskyi, the propaganda leader, was found in Kuzmyk's apartment. It contains principal directives concerning propaganda

The National Ukrainian Party

In Popelnia, near Zhytomyr, fifteen persons, including a priest, were arrested during an attempt to form a National Ukrainian party.

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I/ R 58/699 f. 44-46

Document #154

REPORT No.30 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 20 November 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

Resistance Groups

a) The Bandera Group

After the operation against the illegal Bandera group in September of last year, during which all activists of this organization, including its leader Stepan Bandera, were arrested, the activity of the Bandera group on the territory of the Reich has practically come to a standstill. However, during the past few months, Bandera's followers who live in the Reich have slowly gathered together and began to organize themselves once again even though they are without a leader.

When the number of reports from individual state police headquarters about the renewal of the Bandera's followers' activity in the Reich increased, first the

Braunschweig State Police and then the Dresden State Police, in September and October respectively, were ordered to act against the illegal Bandera group in their respective districts....

During a surprise operation, forty-eight activists and members of the illegal Bandera group were arrested in Braunschweig and ten in Dresden. From interrogations it has been unequivocally established that they had maintained contact with a headquarters in Berlin.

As a result of surveillance on compromised meeting places and the occupation of safe houses it was possible to arrest Klym—the organizational leader of the illegal Bandera group on the territory of the Reich—in Berlin....More than 210 persons have been arrested to date in Leipzig, Berlin, Hannover, Hamburg, Hildesheim, and Potsdam. Additional arrests are expected to be carried out by the state police headquarters in Hamburg, Munich, Vienna, Prague, Breslau, Potsdam, Danzig, Frankfurt/Oder, Frankfurt/Main, Bremen, Chemnitz, Düsseldorf, Kassel, Cologne, Königsberg, Karlsruhe, Nürnberg, Magdeburg, Oppeln, Reichenberg, Stuttgart, Weimar, and Würzburg.

So far, four curriers from the district of Galicia were arrested in Berlin in the hiding places occupied by the Security Police officials. They had in their possession important materials. Besides a large number of slanderous documents, one of the curriers had a large number of forged passes, supposedly issued by the police president in Berlin and the District Chief in Goslar. Furthermore, forged letterheads from the "German Institute for Foreigners at the University of Berlin" were found in the possession of a currier from Lviv. Another currier had in his possession 100 forged bread coupons.

.....

It seems that the organization located in the district of Novyi Sanch had been set up by Stepan Bandera's brother. Myroslav Katovych, director of the Ukrainian boarding school in Krynytsia, was appointed district leader. He is presently a fugitive.

The Melnyk Group

...

Furthermore, materials written by Chyhyryn, alias Barda, the leader of the Melnyk group in Volyn, were found in Kuzmyk's apartment. They contain spiteful attacks against the German occupying forces. This material states that there is no difference between German liberation and Bolshevik liberation.

...

Document #155

REPORT No.31 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 27 November 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

Printed anti-German leaflets were found in the sector of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Zhytomyr. The leaflet* reads:

"Partisans! You have left your homes and your families and joined the fight. The damp cold is your home, and hunger your daily guest. Your lives are always threatened by surprise attacks and battles. You left your peace and comfort and have joined the difficult struggle. You did not choose this road for personal gains. By risking your life, you are fighting for a common cause against the invaders. What the German invaders are doing to our people cries out for vengeance and calls for resistance. The pillage of our country, hunger, unemployment, contempt towards our people, constraint and deportation of thousands of civilians—that is what the invaders have brought us up till now. It is our great and sacred duty to fight against them and it is worthy to sacrifice our blood and our lives. What do we want to replace the German occupying forces with? Should the former Soviet government return? Is there much difference between the Moscow regime and the German government? They are as alike as two peas in a pod: both regimes are dictatorships directed against our people.

Today, Hitlerist and Russian imperialism have collided. Both of them are fighting for the destruction and subjugation of nations. Not long ago, they joined together in the fight against other nations and shared the common booty. In September 1939, Stalin and Hitler's Germany entered into an alliance and helped each other destroy the West European states. They provided our bread for the German armies and our gasoline for the German tanks and airplanes. Is it justifiable to fight for one or the other government? No! It is our duty to fight against both regimes in order to build a new era. This can only be possible when both regimes collapse. Then each nation can build its future accordingly. An independent state, a free people, free workers—this is the new society for which we must fight.

Partisans, do not let yourselves be drawn into serving German or Bolshevik imperialism. Rouse the national revolutionary movement, organize the independent political struggle. Fight against the invaders, not alone, but rather in the ranks of the national mass organization, for complete freedom and the independence of all

oppressed peoples. Only then will our struggle be successful.

Down with Hitler and Stalin! Long live the independent national states of the oppressed peoples!"

On the basis of the investigations carried out in Lviv it was possible to arrest three Ukrainian students who are considered to be officials of the Bandera group. They occupied quarters in a building in Lviv which belonged to the cathedral. Extensive illegal printed material, ready for delivery, was found in this apartment. This is most probably a distribution center for illegal printed material where curriers evidently stop to pick up their material. During the investigations, clues were found regarding the location of printing and engravers' shops in which forged passes, forged papers, stamps, etc. were produced.

In the meantime, it was possible to arrest Volodymyr Lobay, born on 27 October 1911, the deputy leader of the organizational section of the main Lviv office. Lobay was also the leader of the entire courier network. He worked for the Bandera group on a full-time basis and did not practice another profession. His apartment, which also served as a safe house, was occupied and six additional persons, including a Ukrainian police officer who served as an external courier, were arrested. According to the interrogations, the headquarters of the Bandera group is located in Lviv. It controls the regional branches. There are regional branches in Kyiv for Eastern Ukraine, in Lviv for Western Ukraine, in Rivne or Lutsk for Volyn and Polissia, in Chernivtsi or Odessa for Hungary and Romania, and Berlin for the German Reich. A large number of addresses were seized.

During an operation carried out in Lviv late in the afternoon on 21 November 1942 against the officials of the Bandera group, SS-Sturmscharführer and detective secretary Gerhard Scharff from the Reich Central Security Office in Berlin were shot in the head by a Bandera supporter. Another detective, who belonged to the Braunschweig State Police, was wounded in the hip and upper arm. The officers had discovered an occupied safe house and had already arrested five Bandera officials upon their arrival at the apartment in question. Another person who entered the apartment immediately drew his gun, wounded the Braunschweig police officers and killed Scharff. The perpetrator managed to escape into the night even though he was wounded by two bullets.

The operation is still in progress.

I/ R 58/699 f. 87-89

* This was addressed to the Soviet partisans operating in Ukraine.

Document #156**FROM REPORT No.8 OF THE GESTAPO ON IMPORTANT POLICE EVENTS**

Reich Central Security Department
Office IV

27 November 1942

Very confidential!

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

The assumption that the arrest of Stepan Bandera, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, at the end of 1942, as well as the arrest of the leadership of the Bandera organization in the Reich and in the Lviv district, would lead to a noticeable decline in this group's activities did not come about as expected. The tone of Bandera's propaganda, which was quite moderate at the beginning, has become more and more aggressive. Recently, the propaganda leaflets have been clearly directed against Germany. This agitation has caused Bandera followers to become carried away by attempting assassinations of Germans, particularly members of the Security Police.

...

I/ R 58/208 f. 158

Document #157**FROM REPORT No.1 OF THE GESTAPO ON IMPORTANT POLICE EVENTS**

[Berlin] 1 December 1942

The Security Service of the Reich

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

...The Braunschweig State Police post, in collaboration with the Magdeburg post, arrested twenty-nine persons of the illegal Bandera movement.

The posts of the State Police of Dresden and Berlin have arrested in all twenty-one agents of the illegal Bandera movement.

...[followed by a list of names].

I/ R 58/208 f. 174

Document #158**REPORT No. 32 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Berlin, 4 December 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD**Secret!**

The activity of the bandits has not decreased in Ukraine. Within the past eight days, approximately 150 surprise attacks by the bandits have been recorded in the sector of the commander of Rivne and Zhytomyr alone. Their sole aim is to provide the gangs with supplies. There have been numerous bombings and derailments of trains.

The present result of the grain requisition in the sector of the Rivne Commander provides a vivid picture of the impact of the fight against the bandits. We were able to realize between 80% and 100% of the operation in the whole of this area, including the districts infiltrated by the bandits this summer. On the other hand, in the Pinsk, Kostopil, and Sarny regions the grain requisition has dropped severely due to the vigorous activity of the bandits: Pinsk 28%, Kostopil 32-35%, and Sarny 25-30%....

In the period covered by this report, approximately 100 attacks by the bandits, which served to provide the gangs with food supplies, were registered in the sector of the Commander of the Security Police and the SD in Rivne. Four state holdings, numerous town halls, and dairies have been completely destroyed. Several hundred hundred-weight of grain and large quantities of livestock were stolen.

During the gun-battles fought against the gangs, 594 bandits were killed, two earth bunkers and thirteen bandit camps were demolished or rather destroyed. German losses were three members of the police and ten Ukrainian policemen....

Document #159

FROM REPORT No.3 OF THE GESTAPO ON IMPORTANT POLICE EVENTS

[Berlin] 8 December 1942

Reich Central Security Department
Office IV

Very confidential

Ukrainian Resistance Movement

During an operation against an illegal Bandera group in Lviv, eighteen other persons were arrested....

On 4 December 1942 they managed to arrest in Lviv the leader of the propaganda of the main office of the Bandera organization, Starukh (called Syniy). His real name is not known.*...

On the same day arrested was also the deputy leader of the illegal Bandera group, Leguenda [Semen Sud'ba] whose real name is Ivan Klymiv. He must be interrogated as the intellectual leader of the entire Bandera organization.

As a result of this inquest in Lviv, weapons were found in the 3rd commissariat of the Ukrainian police of Lviv; they were hidden in a special room behind a wardrobe. Seized were ten rifles in excellent condition...two pistols, ammunition, Russian hand grenades....According to claims made to date, the Ukrainian police, the criminal police, as well as the security police have been infiltrated by Bandera's partisans. To date five official of the Ukrainian police have been arrested. The actions continues.

On the territory of the Reich, arrested were [eight] other agents of the illegal Bandera organization. [List follows].

I/ R 58/208 f. 199-201

* Meant is Yaroslav Starukh, code names: Syniy, Stiah, Orlane.

Document #160

REPORT No.33 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Berlin, 11 December 1942

Secret!

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

Eighteen additional persons were arrested in Lviv during an operation against the illegal Bandera group. They were mainly officials from the military section, the propaganda section, and the organizational section of the Bandera group....

Furthermore, on the basis of investigation, it was possible to uncover a branch of the main Lviv office of the Bandera group located in Kholm. The branch works only for the main office. The names of eight persons who work there are known; their arrest has been ordered.

On the evening of 4 December 1942 the SD succeeded in arresting Starukh (alias Syniy), the propaganda leader of the main office of the Bandera group in Lviv. His real name is still unknown. Starukh is the man who compiled the entire illegal material for the organization and solely composed the slanderous writings. During his arrest, he was in possession of several letters written on cigarette paper hidden in his clothing. They contained important information for the Bandera officials who had not yet been arrested.

The same day, in Lviv, we succeeded in arresting Leguenda, alias Semen Sud'ba, the deputy leader of the illegal Bandera group. His real name is Ivan Klymiv. Klymiv is regarded as the brains behind the entire Bandera organization.

In connection with the investigations carried out in Lviv, weapons were found in a special room hidden behind a cupboard at the 3rd station of the Ukrainian police. Seized: ten rifles in excellent condition, gun barrels, rifle bolts, two pistols, ammunition, Russian hand grenades, one high explosive shell, one mortar bomb, swords, 100 new scythes, which were undoubtedly to be used as weapons, six steel helmets with the Ukrainian insignia, and a mass of other military equipment.

As a result of this incident, a surprise inspection of all the police stations and posts in which Ukrainian police officers were stationed was carried out. Small quantities of arms and ammunition were also found there. It is important to note that the police had recently been inspected by the Security police and was ordered to surrender all existing weapons with the exception of official firearms.

According to present observation, the Ukrainian police in Lviv is infiltrated by Bandera supporters. So far five Ukrainian police officers have been arrested. The operation is still in progress.

In the meantime, a further eight activists of the illegal Bandera group were arrested in the Reich....

At the beginning of November, an SS recruit and a Ukrainian auxiliary policeman, both from the sector of Commander of the Security Police and the SD in Kyiv, were killed. The murder was committed by two persons in police uniforms. They were undoubtedly members of the Bandera group who acted on an order from their leader Mohyla. The two murdered men had been working successfully for several weeks in tracking down the illegal Bandera group in Kyiv and were on Mohyla's trail. The number of Bandera supporters arrested in Kyiv up till now has increased to twenty-nine.

In the Rivne area, thirteen persons were also arrested on grounds of propaganda activity on behalf of the Bandera organization.

On the night of 3 October 1942, a death sentence, written in Ukrainian, was posted on the apartment of two members of the SD in Stanislaviv. The text reads: "Our people and our homeland have sentenced you to death." Signed: OUN

We have no further detailed information about the perpetrators....

II/ RH 22/69 f. 51

Document #161

CONFERENCE HELD AT THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL COMMAND I/729
at 19:00

Sumy, 12 December 1942

The Political Situation

The resistance movement of the Ukrainian intelligentsia is becoming increasingly active. The SD has uncovered connections as far as Kyiv, the headquarters of the Bandera movement. To date, the regional leader, Sappuhn, two district leaders, and thirty-eight men have been arrested. The heads of the language school organize the OUN network [Bandera movement] and select suitable manpower whose services they then volunteer to the German authorities as particularly reliable personnel....

Wandering theatrical companies are promoting illegal propaganda and, linguistically speaking, are very difficult to monitor.

According to rumors, the OUN is said to be planning the construction of a munitions plant in Konotop.

The OUN headquarters are in Kyiv. The OUN has a ring-system structure. The outer circle is visibly exposed; the nucleus, however, cannot be apprehended....

II/ RH 22/69 f. 51

Document #162

REPORT No.35 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 23 December 1942

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

In Berlin, we succeeded in arresting the Ukrainian student Vasyl Bezkhlibnyk, alias Berkut, born on 27 February 1913 in Sykoliv, residing in Berlin—Ost Fischerstr. 25. He is the leader of the illegal Bandera group for the territory of Germany and is directly connected with the Bandera headquarters in Lviv.

According to confidential information, at the beginning of November, a number of Soviet parachutists were dropped into the Rokytno Marches. These parachutists apparently clashed with a Bandera group. They were not prepared to tolerate one another on this territory. Several parachutists were supposedly killed and others wounded during the fighting. The Bandera group has apparently gotten hold of a few modern Soviet weapons.

The following forged seals were found during the arrest of a Bandera supporter:

- The Mayor of the City of Poltava, Education Department
- SS-Ukrainian Public Law Service for the City of Poltava
- Reported on.....by the Poltava Headquarters

In the Mykolayiv district, ten persons were arrested on suspicion of belonging to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Among them was the director of a school, as well as a village chairman.

A large quantity of leaflets of the illegal Bander group have recently been seized in Ukraine....

A number of leaflets which were signed "District Leadership of the OUN for Eastern Ukraine" were seized in the sector of the Kharkiv Commander. They call on the nationally conscious Ukrainian population to join the Bandera movement unconditionally in order to fight against the German occupying forces. One of the leaflets reads:

"Ukrainians!

Through their harsh colonial policy in Ukraine, the Germans have created a just feeling of indignation among all the social classes of our people....During the short period of German rule...only ashes remain of our hopes. Thus every Ukrainian must understand that the only way to humane free political life lies in us—that is through

an organized revolutionary struggle of large masses for an independent Ukraine. Our hour is approaching. The world is embroiled in a huge war. Our strongest enemy—Muscovite imperialism—is bleeding to death. The longer the struggle, the more it will drain its reserves, the more Germany will be exhausted. England will also strain every nerve to its utmost. Our chances increase with the duration of the war. We cannot allow the right moment to slip by. Our success depends on our firm alliance and on our strength in our common struggle...."

Another leaflet reads:

"The Moscow prison is collapsing. And although, through his agents, blood-thirsty Stalin promised us a new paradise, we say that we have not yet forgotten all of his past horrors.

Death to the whole of Moscow. Ukraine's best sons have written the burning words of judgement on the walls of the Moscow prison: Freedom for Ukraine! Death to Moscow!

Ukraine has been separated from Moscow forever by a mountain of corpses and a sea of blood....

...Long live the OUN under the leadership of Stepan Bandera!"

In the sector of the Rivne Commander we managed to confirm that marked karbovantsi banknotes* were brought into circulation by the bandits. They bear two different stamps. One inscription reads: "Long live Ukraine!" "Glory to the heroes!" and the other "Long live Bandera!"

...

I/ R 58/688 f. 225-227

* Currency introduced by the Germans in March 1942.

Document #163

FROM REPORT No.8 OF THE GESTAPO ON IMPORTANT POLICE EVENTS

Reich Central Security Department
Office IV

[Berlin] 29 December 1942

Very confidential!

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

During the operation against the illegal Bandera group, the Braunschweig State Police, in cooperation with the Magdeburg and Gotha State Police, arrested an

additional twenty-five Bandera followers....

Vasyl Ivanovchuk, the regional leader of the illegal Bandera group, born on 17 December 1912 in Duchesne-Hall/USA, as well as five Ukrainian students, enrolled at the German Karl University in Prague, were arrested by the Prague State Police....

The investigation is continuing.

In connection with this, it is worth noting that on 11 December 1942, the German priest, Joseph Peters, born on 28 February 1905 in Siedlungshausen, had to be arrested in Lviv because he was engaged in anti-Reich activities together with the Ukrainian circles and had not reported the existence of an anti-German organization [the Bandera group] to the police....

I/ R 58/208 f. 244-245

Document #164

REPORT No.37 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 15 January 1943

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

A number of pamphlets printed by the illegal Bandera group were seized in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and the General Government. The contents of the pamphlets deal with Dmytro Myron, one of the Bandera officials recently killed in Kyiv. These pamphlets, which include a photograph of Myron, are aimed primarily at turning the executed party leader into a Ukrainian national hero.

In one of the passages the brochure stated:

"The Polish prison did not break Myron. The NKVD was unable to trap him. He died in the fight against German imperialism, the worst occupying forces in Ukraine. Germany, that presents itself as an ally and liberator, does not want an independent and unified Ukraine; it does not want the Ukrainian state to exist. It wants to turn Ukraine into a colony and the Ukrainian people into slaves. Yet, no one has succeeded in shackling the freedom-loving Ukrainian people. They have always fought and will continue to fight against all those who want to enslave them.

The Ukrainian people will achieve an independent Ukrainian state in their struggle against the wishes of all imperialisms that try to appropriate for themselves the riches of Ukraine. May the German occupant take delight in the success of this murder. Dazed by his victories on all fronts, he does not see that his demented policies of oppression, violence, and murder are leading him straight for catastrophe: The battle which we are now fighting is the battle of the entire Ukrainian people for the Ukrainian state, for the honor of the nation, for the dignity and welfare of mankind.

A notice by the illegal Bandera group posted on trees, fences, telephone poles, etc. caused considerable sensation among the Ukrainian population in the district of Yaslo. The leaflet comments on the Bandera issue:

"The Poles and the Bolsheviks can play partisans as much as they want; we would not care if the cutting edge of the struggle was not directed against us as well. Ukrainian soil is part of the Bolshevik partisans' area of operations.... Stalin and Sikorski have intentionally chosen our territory for this purpose. They foresaw that the Germans were going to pacify the population of these regions. They wanted the Ukrainians to pay the toll for the partisan activities. All of Stalin's efforts, immediately after the German invasion, to trigger off the partisan struggle were unsuccessfully. This is due to the OUN, which is leading the nation in the struggle for nothing else other than an independent state. However, this does not prevent the German punitive expeditions from retaliating, from burning down villages and executing unarmed Ukrainians. They are using this opportunity to destroy us.

What is our position regarding [Soviet and Polish] partisan warfare?

We have Ukrainian interests alone in mind. We are fighting for a Ukrainian state and not for a foreign imperialism. We must save our strength because we believe that the war, in its final stages, will enable us to fight for and establish the Ukrainian state. Every man who dies for the interests of Moscow or Berlin is a loss to us. Our attitude towards the partisans is hostile and that is why we are fighting them. The time is not yet ripe. It must find us united under the banner of the OUN and under one political leadership. Our goal is not the replacement of one occupying force with another, but independence; not partisan warfare, but the national liberation revolution of the Ukrainian masses."

During a further operation against the illegal Bandera group two more activists were arrested by the State Police in Vienna....

The State Police in Oppeln also arrested additional activists of the illegal Bandera group....

A total of fifty-five persons were arrested by the Hannover State Police on the grounds of special activity for the illegal Bandera group. In the meantime, seven of them have been released; three others committed suicide.

...

Document #165**REPORT No.38 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Berlin, 22 January 1942

Secret!

...

Situation with regard to the bandits in the sector of the Chiefs of the Security Police and the SD in Ukraine

The following is a list of the most recent figures on the activity of the bandits in the regions of Volyn-Podillia and Zhytomyr which are under particular threat:

Armed combat:

Volyn-Podillia 47

Zhytomyr 29

Local surprise attacks:

Volyn-Podollia 42

Zhytomyr 36

Acts of violence on railroad systems and other transportation installations:

Volyn-Podillia 26

Zhytomyr 13

On average, attacks on the railroad system occurred daily. In the past weeks, three railroad stations were completely destroyed.

The partial or complete destruction of six state properties caused considerable damage....

I/ R 58/222 f. 97

Document #166**REPORT No. 41 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Berlin, 12 February 1943

Secret!

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

As part of the measures taken against the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—Bandera group, the headquarters of the State Police in Berlin recently

arrested 136 persons on grounds of illegal activity. Additional arrests are in progress.

...

Furthermore, the Berlin section of the women's organization of the Bandera group was uncovered and the following people were arrested:

1. Vityk, Halyna..., 2. Ukarma, Lydia..., 3. Bilyk, Halyna....

An illegal propaganda leaflet of the OUN-Bandera group currently in circulation was seized in Kyiv by the chiefs of the Security Police in Ukraine....

...

The arrest of an additional thirty-eight persons from the intelligentsia of the OUN-Bandera group in Kyiv by the Security Police has enabled us to establish, among other things, that the organization controls large sums of money.

According to confidential reports, a strong rapprochement has recently taken place between the followers of Bandera and Melnyk. Their common aim is an independent Ukraine. Generally speaking, the intense radicalization of the OUN movement continues to be observed.

...

I/ R 58/222 f. 212-213

Document #167

PRODUCTION OF RAW MATERIALS IN THE EASTERN REGIONS

Berlin, 16 February 1943

Secret!

Memorandum for the Führer

The production of raw materials in the eastern occupied regions for the period from the beginning of the occupation to end of 1942 are as follows:

manganese ore	518,000 t.
bituminous schist	804,000 t.
schist oil	58,000 t.
mineral oil	
(including that from Eastern Galicia)	250,000 t.
coal	1,770,000 t.
peat	2,600,000 t.
brown coal [lignite]	280,000 t.
rubber	100 t.

leather	4,500 t.
yarn	110,000 t.
cotton	8,500 t.
wood pulp	20,500 t.
paper	52,000 t.
cement	300,000 t.
windowpane	900,000 t.
bricks	134,000,000 .pieces

The production of coal, manganese, and rubber comes exclusively from the Ukrainian regions. Ukraine has given approximately 6,000 tons of cotton. The extraction of manganese ore in Nykopol [Ukraine] has been strongly increased during the last months. There seems to be a guarantee that in the future German needs in manganese can thus be fully met if no trouble crops up.

I/ R 6/18 f. 171-172

Document #168

RESOLUTIONS OF THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS OUN-BANDERA

February 17-21, 1943

A.- 1. The present war, which was started in the name of German National Socialism and Muscovite Bolshevism, is primarily a war concerning Ukraine, which both imperialisms treat in their plans of conquest as the central problem of their imperialist policy in Eastern Europe and a springboard for further conquests....

2. Through its imperialistic policy towards all the European nations, with its terror and pillage of the occupied territories, Germany has mobilized all the nations of present-day Europe against herself, including her so-called allies. Thus, she has created the ideal political and material base for her own collapse. She is already wavering under the attacks of many million-strong enemy armies and under the influence of the growing revolutionary forces of the subjugated nations in Europe. Her efforts to win over or to force the subjugated nations into a greater struggle against Bolshevism...have proved to be only a treacherous maneuver, a belated attempt to escape the consequences of committed errors and means of strengthening its military potential with the strength of the subjugated nations.

...

6. Ukraine presently finds herself between the hammer and the anvil of the two

hostile imperialists—Moscow and Berlin. Both of them consider her a colonial objective. Thus, an irrevocable demand on the Ukrainian nation is to fight against both imperialisms with its own strength, and the precondition of cooperation with other nations is their recognition of our rights for our own statehood. The collective interests of the Western and Eastern nations in the joint struggle against the German, Russian, and other imperialisms are to be sought at this level.

...

B.- 18. ...We condemn all attempts to cooperate with the occupants, both individually and collectively, as detrimental and treason against the Ukrainian nation. We condemn all agents and henchmen, all secret service collaborators of the Gestapo and the NKVD, and all those who sell their fatherland for thirty pieces of silver, as traitors of the Ukrainian nation.

XIV/ p. 74 ff.

Document #169

KOCH'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF GERMAN POLICIES IN UKRAINE

Rivne, 20 February 1943

The Reichskommissar for Ukraine

...

...I know that the sending of workers of a certain category of the population has slowed down and that it is more difficult today to fill one single train when last summer there was no difficulty filling ten of them....

I ask that this rule of conduct be applied: severity and justice. Do not think that circumstances permit you to be less severe than before. On the contrary, he who thinks that he will find gratitude with the Slavs for a lenient treatment did not acquire his political experiences in the NSDAP nor in the east, but in some club for intellectuals. Slavs interpret lenient treatment as a sign of weakness....

...

Erich Koch

II/ RH 2/V. 2558

Document #170**REPORT No.41 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Berlin, 26 February 1943

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD**Secret!***Activity of the gangs in the zone of the Command of the SP and the SD in Ukraine*

...The prison of Dubno was the object of an attack, following which, after the protection police had been killed, sixty inmates were freed....

I/ R 58.223 p. 6

Document #171**REPORT No.46 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Berlin, 19 March 1943

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD**Secret!**

...

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

The formation of a new national Ukrainian group has been reported from the Lviv district. It emerged for the first time at the beginning of 1942 under the name "Ukrainian Fighters for Independence" in a leaflet entitled "Revolution is on the March."

The printed leaflet was sent out in large numbers mainly to the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Two distribution points have so far been established: Lviv and Ternopil.

The contents correspond to those of the Bandera group's leaflets: the establishment of an independent Ukraine can only be achieved through the united uprising of all occupied peoples. For this reason, the Ukrainian people must prepare themselves for this struggle. All Ukrainians who cooperate with the Germans are opportunists.

...

The severe radicalization of the *Bandera group* continues to be observed. Its members are collecting weapons and ammunition and setting up arms depots. Orders and instructions point out that the establishment of a free and independent Ukraine can only be achieved through an armed uprising. Commanders of the Ukrainian militia, formed after the arrival of the German forces, are obeying these orders and setting aside part of the arms and ammunition for the purposes of the Bandera movement. In the meantime, a directive concerning the military training of members, as well as a directive regarding the conduct of the partisan warfare, were found during the liquidation of the headquarters of the Bandera movement in Sarny....

The Bandera group has proceeded to put its propaganda about partisan warfare into practice....According to confidential information, the OUN-Bandera is in possession of:

- 15,000 rifles
- 45,000 hand grenades
- 1,550 pistols

We must seriously rule out the Ukrainian auxiliary police in the fight against the Bandera group because it is in part heavily infiltrated by Bandera people and in some cases its members have defected to the Bandera bandits. At the Ukrainian Police Academy in Lviv, the Ukrainian instructors publicly promote anti-German propaganda. The Ukrainian police is sabotaging the enrollment of labor on a large scale.

The following prominent Bandera people from the "military organization" were arrested in Lviv:

1) Dmytro Hrytsay, born 1 April 1907 in Doroshyn, residing in Lviv, 23/7 Obertiner St. He has been the leader of the military organization since the autumn of 1942.

2) Alexander Kuzminsky, born 17 August 1910 in Zulchyn, residing in Lviv, 12 Zulinka St. He illegally trained Bandera supporters in Mosty-Velyki.

3) Vasyi Kovalsky, alias Kopach, born 13 February 1915 in Strylkiv, residing in Lviv, 33 Zolkyiver St. He was the Commandant of the Military Training School on Mosty-Velyki.

Numerous arrests continued in the sector of the Kyiv Commander. Among others, two teachers were arrested, one in Rohoziv and the other in Mala Vilshanka, for belonging to the OUN-Bandera. A curator of a museum and a veterinarian were arrested in Mykolayiv. Twelve members, including one member of the Ukrainian police, were arrested in Rohizka and more than forty persons, mainly from the intelligentsia, were arrested in Kyiv. In the Ostrih district, twenty-two supporters of the OUN-Bandera were arrested.

In the meantime, the Bandera movement has changed from a five-man cell

system to three-man groups in order to minimize the losses. They are using the secure whispering campaign, spreading it mainly in the rural areas.

Groups of bandits recently appeared in the Kremianets area, sector of the Rivne Commander, and attacked state property. These attacks are connected with the activity of a section of the OUN-Bandera called the "Ukrainian Revolutionary Front." A large number of people have already been arrested.

In Uman, sector of the Kyiv Commander, new leaflets of the *OUN-Melnyk* were seized. They claim that the German occupation can only be temporary....

...

I/ R 58/224 f. 41-43

Document #172

EXCERPT FROM A LEAFLET OF THE OUN-BANDERA

[March 1943]

Copy of the Transcript of a Translation

Read and Pass On!

Conceal from Enemies and Traitors!

Ukrainians!

The whole world is raging in a new war of conquest. The imperialist powers have entered into a merciless war. Like insatiable blood-thirsty beasts they throw themselves upon armed nations in order to destroy them and then to fight the last decisive battle between themselves. Their aim is absolute world domination. They are treading on seas of the innocently spilt blood of nations. They want to wrap their plans of conquest in slogans, in slogans about liberation, a just international leadership, a better life....

...

These same Bolshevik methods of destruction are being put into practice by the new occupants of Ukraine—the German imperialists. The destructive colonial exploitation of the Ukrainian population, pillage, executions, arrests, shootings, degradation of human dignity, demoralization, deportation of people to Germany to face inevitable death and finally the use of the Bolshevik method—destruction by famine—these are the blessings which the Germans bestowed upon the oppressed peoples....

At the same time, when the Germans plunder the entire wheat, grain, and bread

supply which would have served the entire population of Ukraine and half of Europe in abundance, the Ukrainian people were fed a starvation ration of barley bread. The Ukrainian population has put so much sweat and blood into the ploughing, sowing, and harvesting of this bread....As payment for their work, the Ukrainian kolhospyky [collective farm workers] receive kopecks from the Germans, for which one cannot buy anything, instead of grain. The Ukrainian workers from the Donbass and other industrial centers were forced to work hard, 12 hours a day, although they live on starvation rations. Clouds threatening a new famine are hanging over the whole of Ukraine as far as the Caucasian Mountains.

Join the fight against this threat in the name of national solidarity!

The Ukrainian village must help the population of the Ukrainian cities in this fight!

The Ukrainian city must help the Ukrainian village defend its interests!

All non-conscious Ukrainians who have been hired by the Germans should stop and think. For the time being the Germans are throwing them a large piece of bread as they would to a dog. They want the blind Ukrainians to assist them in the destruction of their own brothers and sisters through denunciation, punishment, pillage, in order to help the Germans plunder our Ukraine, that they may help the "economy," in the words of Shevchenko, by removing the mother's patched shirt from her back.

...

We will fight for an order where there will never be any hunger. We will fight for an independent Ukrainian state which will protect the population from destruction. We will fight for a Ukrainian state in which the Ukrainian people will be the masters of their ancestral soil.

We will fight for a Ukrainian state which will enable all honest living and working people in Ukraine to lead a dignified life!

Bolshevism did not succeed in destroying us. Imperialism will not destroy us either. The enemy will not bring us any good. We will own only what we obtain ourselves.

Join the fighting unit of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists! [OUN]

Organize yourselves! Unite yourselves! Form a common front of the Ukrainian National Revolution against the imperialists!

Onward!

Long Live Ukraine!

To victory!

Glory to the Heroes!

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

Document #173**TREATMENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN UKRAINE**

Headquarters, 1 April 1943

High Command of Army Group B
 Headquarters/VII (Mil. Adm.) B.B. No. 83/43 geh.

Secret!

Ref: High Command of the Army/General Staff of the Army/ General Headquarters
 Department K. Administration (Qu.4).
 No. II/1736/43 geh. 23.3.1943

Dr. Claassen, the Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat, took part in the meeting of the NSDAP in Kyiv on 5 March 1943 and gave a verbal report on the contents of the speech by the Reichskommissar for Ukraine. Other particulars regarding the contents of the speech are not available.

I. In parts of his speech the Reichskommissar pointed out the following facts about the treatment of the population:

- 1) We are the master race and must administer severely but equitably....
- 2) I will squeeze the last drop out of this country. I did not come here to bestow blessings. I came here to help the Führer. The population must work, work and still work....Some people are worried that the population is not getting enough to eat. The population cannot make this demand. We only have to think about our heroes at Stalingrad who had to make sacrifices....We did not come here to distribute manna. We came here to create the preconditions of victory.
- 3) We are a master race which must remember that the lowest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the local population.

II/ RH 2/V 2560 f. 3 ff.

Document #174

**EXCERPT FROM A LETTER FROM THE MINING AND STEELWORKS
 COMPANY EAST UKRAINE—TIMBER (SCHENK) FROM 1 April 1943**

Danger from Partisans or rather Bandits

The undersigned had the opportunity to make enquiries about the situation in

Rivne. We must distinguish:

1. Partisans, who are nothing but Bolsheviks. They are located north of the railroad line Kyiv-Rivne-Kovel-Brest in the great forest and marsh regions on both banks of the Prypiat River....

2. There is a large number of national Ukrainian partisans who are also located in these forests. These people are demanding a free Ukraine and the immediate withdrawal of the Germans. They are led by a well-known Ukrainian leader. This group receives regular reinforcements. The Ukrainian Security Service from Kovel and Rivne have defected to this group. The alarm rang out when Herr Schenk was at the General Headquarters. All the employees were immediately armed and transported by car to the threatened area. Apparently, a train carrying workers who had been rounded up by the Sauckel organization had been attacked in order to liberate them.

The attacks are increasing on a daily basis, even in broad daylight. Even on the return trip Herr Schenk had to stop at Korets between Rivne and Zhytomyr because the main track was being threatened. Several infantry companies were assigned to the task and a company commander advised Herr Schenk to wait until the troops had occupied a few villages and reached the nearby edge of the forest.

Groups 1 and 2 are also fighting against each other.

3. There are some so-called bandits located south of the above-mentioned railroad line who are disrupting the mainline traffic. Even on the Zhytomyr-Kyiv railroad line the passage through the forest area on Monday was only possible under military protection. The Ukrainian liberation party is spreading intensive propaganda among these bandit groups in order to win them over to its cause. These bandits frequently appear in smaller groups and also attack individual cars in broad daylight. Yet when a police unit appears, these people disappear. They peacefully continue with their work. Therefore, travelling by car is today already extremely dangerous, and so a police officer explained to Herr Schenk "if you're lucky, you'll make it through." The economic situation is suffering greatly under these conditions to the point that there is no German administration left at all in many regions. The timber department in Rivne pointed out that the sawmills are continually being set on fire and that approximately 400 officials and employees have already been killed

Mining and Steelworks Company East
Department Ukraine—Timber
signed Schenk

Document #175

SITUATION REPORT ON THE ACTIVITY OF BANDIT GROUPS
IN UKRAINE

Rivne, 4 April 1943

The Reichskommissar for Ukraine
E I b

Peace prevailed in the lowlands and the work of the German agricultural authorities was not threatened until the breakthrough on the front throughout the whole of Ukraine with the exception of the northern forest regions. The situation has changed completely since January 1943.

The passive resistance of the population is greatly increasing due to the situation at the front and other circumstances. As a result of the events brought about by the war, the activity of the bandits is increasing everywhere and has spread even to the sparsely wooded southern regions....

...

c) The Zhytomyr General District

The situation is similar in the general district of Zhytomyr north of the railroad line Sarny-Korosten-Kyiv. The agricultural authorities have completely retreated into the regional cities and can leave these cities only under powerful police escort. The deliveries from this region, particularly of livestock, have decreased enormously and have lost their importance....

d) The Volyn/Podillia General District

...

Thus production and deliveries from these threatened regions are greatly impaired. In Volyn, there are only two districts free of bandits. The national Ukrainian bandits are especially dangerous in the regions of Kremianets-Dubno-Kostopil-Rivne. On the night of March 20-21, they [the national Ukrainian bandits] simultaneously attacked all the district agricultural offices and one of these offices was completely destroyed. Twelve Germans—farmers, foresters, soldiers, and policemen—were killed. Although the police, as well as the armed forces, were immediately made available, we have so far been able to occupy only two districts. The freedom of movement of the agricultural authorities in this district has still not been secured....

The losses suffered by the agricultural authorities in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine were all mainly incurred in the summer and autumn of 1942, but the greatest loss was incurred in January 1943....

Document #176**REPORT No.54 FROM THE OCCUPIED EASTERN REGIONS**

Berlin, 13 May 1943

Chief of the Security Police
and the SD

Secret!

B. The Population*General morale and the situation of the population in Ukraine*

...In Western Ukraine, the morale of the population depended and still depends, other than on the already mentioned facts, on the activity of the bandits, be they Bolshevik or nationalists. The center location of the bandits gangs is in the regions of Kyiv-Nord, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Rivne. In the Generalbezirk Volhynia-Podolia and that of Zhytomyr-Nord, the activities of the gangs have taken on such proportions that important parts of these regions have passed more and more under their control and domination....

I/ R 58/224 p. 10

Document #177**EXCERPT FROM A MEMORANDUM ON THE SITUATION**

14 May 1943

The present military and political situation of the Reich demands a change in the German Ostpolitik, especially with regards to Ukraine.

The bandits, whose number is constantly increasing and who already control vast territories not only in Belorussia but also henceforth in Ukraine, are threatening our front with an interruption of supplies coming from the hinterlands. The decrease of land in Ukraine suitable for cultivation and livestock will have as the consequence the new reduction of supplies as much for the front, for the Reich, as for the local population and will consequently constitute a handicap for our physical and psychological resistance forces during the coming winter....

I/ R 670 f. 120

FROM A REPORT ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTISAN ACTIVITIES

14 May 1943

Secret!

No. 1678/43 geh.

While in the summer and autumn of 1942 deliveries and harvest could be carried out from as far as the smallest region, because local attacks of the bandits were less numerous, the situation has deteriorated greatly from the end of 1942 on....

I. The General Commissariat of Volhynia and Podolia

a) [Most] of the districts must be considered completely lost for deliveries. The organizations set up by the economic authorities...are not in the position to obtain deliveries in any way from the zone of military bases and the district seats....

Thus completely or almost completely lost are:...78.82% of arable land in Volhynia, together 42.21% in Volhynia and Podolia; ...76.45% of the wheat quota from Volhynia, from Volhynia-Podolia 44.68%;...81.01% of dry legumes from Volhynia, 19.96% from Volhynia-Podolia; 77.86% of bovine livestock from Volhynia, 52.38% from Volhynia-Podolia;...88.96% of the sheep quota in Volhynia, 68.06% in Volhynia-Podolia;...71.45% of the swine quota in Volhynia, 47.44% from Volhynia-Podolia taken together.

II. General Commissariat of Zhytomyr (without city of Vinnytsia)

...With the exception of the railroad line to the north and the security zone, as well as the cities of Mozyr, Ovruch, and Korosten, no supplies for the troops can be obtained from this region. The Reichskommissariat Ukraine indicates that of the 64,800 km² of the land in this general commissariat 32,000 km², i.e., approximately 50%, is completely lost....

III. The exact data on the attacks of the different bandits is available only for the regions of Volhynia. Thus they attacked in total: 405 state properties, 94 milk and cheese dairies, 12 distilleries,...34 wheat and hay warehouses,... 7 mills...; sixty-eight state properties were destroyed. They destroyed or looted: 19,329 tons of grain, 2,841 tons of hay, 2,678 tons of straw, 4,732 head of cattle, 1,809 swine, 2,130 sheep, 2,745 horses....In the general commissariat of Zhytomyr 231 enterprises were destroyed...12,081 head of cattle, 294 swine, 130 sheep, 762 horses were stolen. The losses in this general commissariat are estimated to approximately 10,000,000 Reichsmarks.

IV....While in the beginning of the year the planning of supplies foresaw from the territory of Volhynia a taxation of 6,000 tons per month, this number had to be reduced to 1,920 tons by the end of March and then, on the bases of new reports, it was decreased to 800 tons. In April the real change in deliveries of cattle was shown

by the circumstances that trains could be loaded only if there were sufficient military protection on the regions near Kovel and Lutsk....

The situation in Zhytomyr is such that, because of a shortage of security forces, not a single cow could be gotten

Kissling

II/ RW 41/44

Document #179

GERMAN LOSSES DUE TO RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN THE THREE COMMISSARIATS OF UKRAINE: VOLHYNIA, PODOLIA, ZHYTOMYR

Zhytomyr, 17 May 1943

The Generalkommissar

E I I b 789/43

1. *Delivery completely lost* (in the three commissariats): 678,758 hectares—32% of arable land; 56,877 tons of grain—17% of the plan; 571 tons of vegetables—1% of the plan.

Delivery of the following percentages of the total livestock is not possible: 209,667 cattle—33% of the entire stock; 52,903 swine—28% of the entire stock; 11,465 sheep—52% of the entire stock.

From the total dairy quota: 62,106,000 liters—26% for delivery.

From the total egg quota: 16,927,000 eggs—18% for delivery.

2. *Delivery was only possible sporadically and under heavy military protection*: From 309,540 hectares—11% of arable land; 42,165 tons of grain—12% of the plan; 1,478 tons of vegetables—3% of the plan.

Of the following percentages of the total livestock: 97,981 cattle—16% of the entire stock; 35,354 swine—16% of the entire stock; 15,400 sheep—7% of the entire stock.

From the total dairy quota: 33,709,000 liters—14%.

From the total egg quota: 10,094,000 eggs—11%.

3. *Delivery was endangered by local surprise attacks*: From 448,000 hectares—17% of arable land; 77,000 tons of grain—20% of the plan; 13,450 tons of vegetables—26% of the plan.

Of the following percentages of the total livestock: 92,000 cattle—15% of the entire stock; 32,200 swine—15% of the entire stock; 27,900 sheep—13% of the entire

stock.

From the total dairy quota: 39,426,000 liters—18%.

From the total egg quota: 19,717,000 eggs—20%.

Therefore, only the following remain for regular cultivation, production and delivery:
993,036 hectares—40% of arable land; 179,058 tons of grain—51% of the plan;
33,923 tons of vegetables—70% of the plan.

From the total livestock: 232,813 cattle—36% of the entire stock; 79,622 swine—41% of the entire stock; 61,282 sheep—28% of the entire stock.

From the total dairy quota: 101,030,000 liters—42%.

From the total egg quota: 47,612,000 eggs—51%.

signed: Königk

II/ RW 41/44

Document #180

EXCERPT FROM A CONVERSATION BETWEEN RIBBENTROP AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR

Berlin, 11 June 1943

Secret matter of the Reich!

...In conclusion the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs declared:

1. From the supply point of view, the situation of the Axis is assured, but for that we absolutely need Ukraine. It cannot be said that Ukraine represents only a weak part of the supplying from the European continent and, consequently, she will not be very important. It is important to maintain the diet at an adequate level which represents the living wage, otherwise the output of the population can decrease rapidly. To keep the diet above the subsistence level, supplementary quantities from Ukraine are of a great importance and that is why we would not be able to manage without Ukraine.

Document #181**INFORMATION FROM KOCH ON THE EVACUATION OF
UKRAINIAN RICHES**

Very confidential.

Rivne, 21 June 1943

[The Reichskommissariat] Ukraine has provided up to March 1943:

wheat	5,950,000 t.
seed wheat	100,00 t.
dried legumes	148,000 t.
butter	49,000 t.
potatoes	1,372,000 t.
honey	3,100 t.
sugar	220,000 t.
fish	6,500 t.
cotton	5,000 t.
wool	5,000 t.
cattle	2,120,000 .head
swine	450,000 .head
sheep	406,000 .head
eggs	420,000,000 .units
fowl	14,000,000 .units ...

I/ R 94/4b

Document #182**LETTER FROM KOCH TO ROSENBERG ON THE SUBJECT OF
RESISTANCE IN THE REICHSKOMMISSARIAT UKRAINE**

Reichskommissar for Ukraine

Rivne, 25 June 1943

V-I-7422

Tgb. Nr. 378/43 geh.

Secret!**Personal****Subject:** the situation of the bandit gangs.

The northern part of the general regions of Lutsk and Zhytomyr is, for the most part, dominated by the gangs. In the last few days we have had to abandon in Volhynia the entire rectangle demarcated by the railroad lines Brest-Pinsk-Luninets,

Luninets-Sarny, Sarny-Kovel, and Kovel-Brest, with the exception of the district seat Kamin'-Kashyrskiy. This amounts to a surface of 17,400 km². The territory located to the north is also practically out of our hands....

The general region of Zhytomyr and the northern part of the general region of Lutsk is infiltrated exclusively with Soviet bandits. Ukrainian nationalist bandit gangs are in the southern part of Volhynia, with centers in Kostopil-Sarny and Horokhiv-Kremianets....

The Ukrainian national bandits have a rigorous and able leadership and an astonishing amount of weapons. It must be supposed that they began to collect arms and ammunition methodically immediately after the first passage of the German troops and that they were also supplied by the Soviets through well camouflaged middlemen.*...

The bandits attack targets vital for the exploitation of the country and provisions for the front, railroads, roads and bridges, state properties, dairies, wheat and hay granaries, as well as assessable industrial enterprises. Of course, the attacks of the bandits are directed also against every German who ventures into the zone under their control. Losses in the general region of Lutsk, for example, from the 9 to 15 June 1943, thus one week and in only one region—twenty-five soldiers, three members of the civilian administration, one member of the Organization Todt....

N A T 175 R 81

* This supposition is not true. The UPA weapons came solely from stocks stored up since the beginning of the war and from spoils of war that had fallen into the hands of the Ukrainians after combats with the Germans and with Soviet partisans.

Document #183

GERMAN LEAFLET DIRECTED AGAINST THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS

(June 1943)

UKRAINIAN PEOPLE, LISTEN!

Moscow gives orders to the OUN!

The secret orders and instructions which we have captured show that the Jews of the Kremlin are in league with the OUN which, supposedly, is fighting against bolshevism.

Moscow's agents, who receive and carry our orders from blood-thirsty Stalin and his Jewish henchmen, are at the head of the OUN. In these secret orders, which will

soon be made public, the OUN is described as a national Bolshevik fighting unit in disguise. Its task is to incite the Ukrainian people against the German authorities and create chaos behind the front lines.

The OUN is an instrument of Jewish bolshevism. The hideouts and headquarters of these rebellious elements of the OUN are known to us. We know the leaders of these bandit groups. They are Moscow's hirelings.

Ukrainian People!

Do you want to be destroyed by these Bolsheviks and national conspirators in disguise? Do you want to become the cannon-fodder of your own enemy?

Do you want to be the cause of the destruction of the people of Volyn?

Jewish Bolshevism can see that it is coming to an end and is attempting once again to stall its collapse with your great help and your blood.

Do you want to become the hangman? Do you want your women, children, your youth and elderly to fall victim to these brutal people?

Remember the suffering and torture that your nation had to endure for more than 20 years. Remember the murdered fathers and sons! Remember the millions of citizens, who were deported to the Siberian steppes! Remember the dishonored and murdered priests! Remember the desecrated church property and cultural treasures! The OUN can never represent the national interests of the Ukrainian people!

The OUN and Bolshevism are one and the same—that is why both must be destroyed.

The German Administration

XVII/ p. 101

Document #184

**SOVIET LEAFLET
DIRECTED AGAINST THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS**

25 June 1943

To all Nationalists...

The leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists who have proclaimed their fight to be a struggle for an "independent" united Ukraine, are deceiving the masses in the areas of Ukraine occupied by the German invaders and urging the Ukrainians to join their bandit attachments. These leaders—the Rubans, Melnyks, and Bulbas—are inciting the Ukrainians against the Red Army with their dissembling agitation and spreading

rumors that the Red Army is supposedly fighting not so much against the Germans, as against the so-called "Liberation Movement of the Ukrainian Nation." This is a lie....

The Red Army is the army of the workers. It fights for the freedom and independence of freedom-loving peoples to purge our country of the fascist conquerors, slave-holders and bandits. Therefore, the slanderous accusations of the nationalists against the Red Army and the Bolsheviks, that the Red Army and the Bolsheviks pursued imperialist aims and the conquest of new countries and territories and the subjugation of peoples, is even more absurd....

...Bandera arrived in Ukraine in a German vehicle. The Ukrainians remember well that, not long ago, Bandera and his retinue paid a "solemn visit" to the Germans in a special train. Here is a striking document about the complicity between Bandera and the Germans: in the village of Ozertsy and in many other villages in the Rivne area, crosses were erected and the inscription "In memory of the liberation of Ukraine" was carved on them instead of a prayer. At the foot of these inscriptions was the signature: "Hitler, S. Bandera..."

...For twenty-five years, Ukrainians have been the true masters of their country, their enterprises, their mineral wealth and their life. No one forced a foreign will or foreign interests upon them. They lived free, well, and enriched themselves on the surplus of their prosperity. To live a free life, free from the yoke of big landowners and farmers, without capitalists, with the freedom to determine one's own way of life, the right to employment, education, and recreation—this is the essence and significance of the autonomy and independence of the Ukrainian nation and of any other nation....

XVIII/ p. 121-124

Document #185

TO THE UKRAINIANS GONE UNDERGROUND!

The German Reich is speaking to you in the name of Europe and its great and ancient culture!

...Recently during the night, the Red vagrants circulated an appeal from Marshal Vasilevskyi, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army, which stated that in the name of the mass murderer of Vynnytsia and Katyn, Red Comrade Stalin, the Ukrainian bandit leader, Bandera, was solemnly appointed senior Bolshevik of Soviet Ukraine if he continues to fight with his bandits in the forests and marshes against Europe.

We wish only good luck to Bandera and his company in the forests and marshes of Volyn! When the time is right, when Europe is victorious, he and his bandits will receive the same punishment as the communist bandits.

The great German Reich and Europe, which are proudly fighting for their time-honored culture, will not allow themselves to be troubled any longer by a few worthless souls.

Vasilevskyi, Marshal of the Red Army, speaks clearly in his appeal, and even the most ignorant among you should be able to understand that Asia has joined the struggle to destroy Europe. This means that the steppe, uncouth and barbaric Central Asia, has joined the battle to destroy the blossoming gardens, churches, cathedrals, and thousand-year-old monuments of Europe's ancient culture.

...

The colossal battle of the Grand, the Good, and the Holy against the barbarism and diabolic bolshevism and the Jewish-infested nations of the whole world, its allies, demands sacrifices. Yes, even very great sacrifices....

The policies of Bandera and Co. are sheer madness in comparison with the tasks and sacrifices of such a great era.

...

So, come out of the forests and marches! All your former activities will be pardoned if you report to the German police authorities with the enclosed pass and your weapon.

Von dem Bach
SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Police

XVII/ p. 102-103

Document #186

RESOLUTIONS OF THE 3rd EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLY OF THE OUN

25 August 1943

...

The past two years were noted for their tremendous sacrifices. Dmytro Myron [Andriy], Ivan Klymiv-Leguenda, Mykola Lemyk, Serhiy Sherstiuk Shchepanskyi, as well as hundreds and thousands of other political fighters, fell in the unequal struggle and bore witness with their blood to the indestructible will of the nation to be free in their own homeland.

The mass arrests and executions near Zviahel, in Kyiv, in Yaholnytsia near

Chortkiv, in Rivne, and Lviv, the executions by firing squad in Kryvyi Rih, Kremenchuk, Zhytomyr, Dshankoy and other cities, covered Ukraine with fresh graves of brothers, which, together with the graves of the Cossacks, will bear eternal witness to the unbroken heroism of a great nation.

During these difficult years, the OUN not only defended the moral position of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian national revolution, but also created the practical preconditions to go over to the offensive and to achieve the final victory....

There were two axes around which the defense of the nation against the terror of the occupying force revolved: the deportation to Germany for forced labor and pillage of food supplies....

...The greatest successes were achieved in the north-western regions of Volyn and Polissia where the deportation of manpower was prevented from the very beginning—from the spring of 1942. The peasants in these regions also refused to let themselves be robbed of their food supplies....

The spring of 1943 brought a marked stability to the OUN's political campaign. The Germans encountered mass resistance in Volyn, Polissia, and Galicia, as well as in the central and eastern regions, during their attempts to recruit people for "slavery." The cities of Chyhyryn, Kryvyi Rih and Novomoskovsk stood at the forefront of the united and total resistance. Similar is true of the pillage of food supplies by the Germans.

...

In a short period of time, the movement of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [UPA] spread from the regions of Brest, Pinsk, Volyn, and Rivne into the regions of Kamianets-Podilskyi, Vynnytsia, Zhytomyr, and Kyiv. During the first days of July 1943, the armed units of the Ukrainian National Self-Defense [UNS] appeared in Galicia.

...

XIV/ p. 92 ff.

Document #187

APPEAL FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE UKRAINIANS

Kyiv, 12 January 1944

Dear Comrades, Farmers, Workers, and Intellectuals!

Your enemies are not only the German robbers. Your enemy is also the gang of German-Ukrainian nationalists. Having sold themselves to Hitler, all these

Bandaras, Melnyks, and Bulbas are helping to subjugate our people, our Ukraine. Their hands are stained with the blood of our children, mothers, and sisters. The Ukrainian-German nationalists, these national traitors and vassals of Hitler, are helping the Germans plunder the Ukrainian nation. These traitors pretend to be fighting against the Germans. They know how fiercely and uncompromisingly our people hate the German oppressors. After conspiring with Hitler, they are playing up to the people and claiming that they are also fighting against the Nazis. They are setting up armed groups of fake partisans and enticing the people with false allegations that these units are to fight against the Germans. Do not believe them! Ask them what they have done for the general cause of the liberation of the Ukrainian people from Hitler's yoke. Have they killed at least one German? Have they mowed down at least one German detachment? Do not believe them! They have recruited into their military groups people who had every honest intention of fighting the fierce enemy of the people—against Hitlerism. In this way, the Ukrainian-German nationalists wanted to weaken our people in its struggle to divide our forces and to set brother against brother. Do not let yourselves be deceived! Destroy these imposters, these agents of the German conquerors....

The Ukrainian-German nationalists are really Hitler's accomplices. They want to break the fraternal ties which link the Ukrainian people to the Russian people, detach Soviet Ukraine away from the family of Soviet nations and to throw Ukraine down Hitler's throat. And this is what they call creating "independence" for Ukraine. As agents of Hitlerism, the Ukrainian nationalists want to turn Ukraine into a colony of German imperialism and the Ukrainian people into slaves of the German barons and lords.

Ukrainians, with the brotherly aid of the great Russian nation, in a united front of all the nations of the Soviet Union—forward to victory!...

Chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of
the Ukrainian SSR
M. Hrechukha

President of the Council of
People's Commissars of
the Ukrainian SSR
L. Korniyets

Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party [of Bolsheviks] of Ukraine
N. Krushchev

Document #188**THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN THE FORMER POLISH REGIONS**

Army High Command
 General Headquarters of the Army
 Fremde Heere Ost (I/Bd)
 Nr. 421/44 g. Kdos.

Headquarters, 9 February 1944

...2. The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

The national Ukrainian resistance movement (Bandera) is also spreading to the parts of Galicia inhabited by Ukrainians. The military organization is the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Total strength in Galicia and Ukraine is said to be 80,000 men. The principal enemy in Galicia, besides the German administration, are the Poles. In the event of a German retreat from Galicia, the UPA is preparing for the ruthless exclusion of the Poles and to assume power on its own.

...

II/ RH 2/V 2048

Document #189

**FROM A GERMAN REPORT ABOUT AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN
 THE UPA AND THE GERMANS**

26 June 1944

Enemy Situation (Bandit Groups) No.469

...

2) Army Group North-Ukraine and the District Armed Forces Command, General Government

...

During an operation against the UPA gang north of Mykolayiv* twenty-nine bandits were killed, 250 were taken prisoner, two cannons, ammunition, a radio set, five trucks, as well as wagons and horses, were seized. The rest of the bandits retreated to the northeast. Approximately 300 bandits in German and Russian uniforms moved westwards from southeast of Kaminka-Strumilova...

II/ RH 2/V 1944 p. 146

* In Galicia

Document #190**FROM A GERMAN REPORT ABOUT AN UPA ATTACK
AGAINST AN SD UNIT**

11 July 1944

Enemy Situation (Bandit Groups) No.484

...

2) Army Group North-Ukraine and District Armed Forces Command, General Government

...Approximately 100-200 national Ukrainian (UPA) bandits attacked a search team of Sipo and the SD near a village ten kilometers SSW of Hrubeshiv. Several bandits were killed. According to information from agents, a bandit unit, said to be 12,000 men strong, has deployed in the Krasnystav-Kholm region....

...

II/ RH 2/V 1945 f. 63

Document #191**ROSENBERG'S LETTER ON THE LIQUIDATION OF SOCIETY FOR THE
EVACUATION OF PRODUCTION AND RAW MATERIALS FROM THE
EASTERN REGIONS**

Berlin, 17 October 1944

Secret!

Dear Party Friend Bormann,

To prevent obstacles that you do not want and delay the liquidation of societies which are under my supervision....I sent today to the Gauleiter the following telegram:

"So as not to delay the liquidation of societies which are under my supervision, I draw your attention to the fact that we are not talking about private firms, but about enterprises of the Reich. Thus, the application of various measures that concern them, such as regarding the official services, is reserved to the organs of the Reich. The following societies are under my supervision:...

The following banks, also placed under my control, are not private firms:...

The liquidation of these societies and banks has been worked out with the delegate from the Reich for the total mobilization and it must be completed by the

end of this year at the latest. An order was given to the military authorities and bodies of the war economy to implement the transfer of goods of these societies.

Appendix

...

For the use of agricultural resources of Ukraine, the Society ["East"], had one central office, six territorial offices (with five branches), 114 regional offices, 431 district offices, 2,870 bases of operations, and 400 local administrations....

The personnel of the Society, which on 30 June 1943 was composed of 4,500 Germans and Dutch, by 1 October 1944 was reduced to 410 persons of whom 248 had been dispatched or freed to carry out important military missions, notably in the General Government: twenty-eight work in the office serving 50,000 Ukrainian qualified and specialized workers; ninety persons...are occupied with the use and repair of agricultural machines, so that only forty-four person are involved with the definite liquidation of the businesses....

XI/ 327-PS

Document #192

GERMAN MEMORANDUM ON THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN SOVIET UKRAINE

(3 November 1944)

Copy

Secret!

OUN — UPA

The Nature and Objectives of the UPA

The UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) is a military organization of the Ukrainian political movement called OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) which, at present, is the strongest and which, in the struggle against the "occupants" of the Ukrainian national territory, wants to set up an independent Ukrainian state. It considers the Soviet Union or Russia and Poland* the principal and historical enemy of the Ukrainian people.

The OUN-UPA is convinced that the Ukrainian question has become a problem of the international politics which will find its positive solution in the course of the Second World War in a conflict with the Soviet Union either under the leadership of Germany or the Western powers.

Origin and Development of the UPA

The UPA was born at the end of 1942 in Volhynia through a merging of previously different independent combat groups. It moved into the attack on the territory of Galicia in the beginning of 1944 under the form of the UNS (Ukrainian National Self-Defense). It received its present structure and its political orientation through its membership in the OUN (Bandera) which imposed itself in a decisive fashion on the Ukrainian political life. It adopted the political guidelines from the OUN, which are: a) to lead a fight without compromise on a military plane against the Soviet Union and the Red Army; b) on the political plane, to preserve the national essence of the Ukrainian people.

Organization of Numerical Strength of the UPA

The division of the UPA, carried out in the summer of 1944, into groups West, North, and East correspond to the historical differences of the Ukrainian territories—Galicia, Volhynia, and Soviet Ukraine (within its 1939 limits)—as well as to geographical features of the military character of this space.

The organization of the troops and instruction are modeled mainly on the Germans.**

The numerical strength of the UPA can be estimated to approximately 80,000 to 100,000 men of regular troops (the military nucleus had received instruction).

The number concerning the bulk of the insurgent army possibly cannot be arrived at. The Ukrainian data fluctuates between 400,000 and 2,000,000 men.

Engagement of the UPA

The engagement of the UPA is subordinate to the political lines of the OUN. After the fighting against the Germans ended and confrontation with the Poles was suspended, the main effort is given to the fight against the Soviet Union and the Red Army. The form of this fight is principally a limited war or a partisan war in the Soviet manner (attacks, sabotage, agitation, liquidation of Soviet officials, propaganda, etc.). Some signs indicate that the UPA has not yet engaged all its forces.

The activity of the UPA constitutes a serious problem for the Soviet leadership which deploys against it considerable military forces (NKVD troops and Red Army units up to a division). Attempts are made to direct the Ukrainian nationalism, by means of concessions, on the track of Soviet politics.

I/ R 6/150 f. 23-RS

* This memorandum was written at the time when all of Ukraine was already occupied by the Soviet troops.

** This assertion concerning the organization and instruction is not confirmed by UPA documents. On the contrary, they had a specifically Ukrainian character.

Document #193

OFFICIAL SOVIET DATA CONCERNING DAMAGES CAUSED IN UKRAINE DURING THE WAR

1945

...The German fascist invaders have caused the following damages on the territories of the RSS of Ukraine.

a) They exterminated or tortured to death 4,496,547 citizens of whom 3,178,084 were peaceful inhabitants—men, women, and children—and 1,318,463 Soviet prisoners of war, and they deported to Germany for forced labor 2,023,112 citizens.*

b) They destroyed and burned down 714 cities and towns, 28,000 villages, and 2,000,000 buildings, depriving approximately 10,000,000 people of shelter.

The German fascist invaders destroyed 16,150 industrial enterprises that employed approximately 2,300,000 workers; they destroyed or evacuated 127,000 electric engines, 81,600 machine tools; they destroyed 29,800 km of railroad lines, 1,916 stations, 14,000 post offices, 18,000 hospitals, 32,940 schools, technical colleges, schools of higher education, research institutes, as well as 43,000 public libraries.

They destroyed or pillaged 27,910 kolkhozes, 872 sovkhozes, and 1,300 stations of machines and tractors. They requisitioned and sent to Germany 7,594,000 head of cattle, 3,311,000 horses, 9,333,000 swine, 7,317,000 sheep and goats, 59,297,000 fowl.

The damages cause by the German fascists in 1941 to the citizens and the national economy of the RSS of Ukraine reached the sum of 285 billion rubles...

XIX/ p. 286 ff

* These figures were later corrected to: 3,898,500 civilians killed, including 1,366,600 who were prisoners of war and 2,244,000 inhabitants of the RSS of Ukraine who were deported to Germany to do forced labor.

Document #194

LOSSES OF HUMAN LIVES DURING WORLD WAR II

The USSR lost from 17,000,000 to 18,000,000 persons (according to official estimates, more than 20,000,000). Without Ukraine, the human losses of the USSR were probably between 9,000,000 and 12,000,000. As to the national republics, the official figures mention only civilian losses (civilian population and prisoners of war): Ukraine 5,515,000; * Belorussia 2,198,000; Russia 1,781,000; Lithuania 666,000; Latvia 644,000; Estonia 125,000; Moldavia 64,000. In accepting that Russia lost between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 soldiers at the front, the total number of Russian losses would come to 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 at the maximum. This figure is lower than the losses in Ukraine.

* Cf. *Ukrainska RSR u velykiy* 3:149-150; B. Uralnis gave the number as 4,497,000 (Uralnis 316).

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF LOSSES IN UKRAINE AND IN LEADING
COUNTRIES
(without Russia)

country	number of losses (in thou.)			% in relation to population
	military	civilian	total	
Ukraine	2,500	5,500	8,000	19.1
Germany	4,500	2,000	6,500	9.0
Poland	123	4,877	*5,000	19.6
Japan	2,000	350	2,350	3.4
Yugoslavia	300	1,400	1,700	10.6
France	250	350	600	1.5
Italy	400	100	500	1.1
Romania	300	200	500	3.7
Greece	100	350	450	6.2
Hungary	136	294	430	4.6
Great Britain	290	60	350	0.7
Czechoslovakia	46	294	340	3.0
Austria	270	104	374	5.6
United States	300	-	300	0.2
Netherlands	12	198	210	2.4

country	number of losses (in.thou.)			% in relation to population
	military	civilian	total	
Finland	84	16	100	2.7
Belgium	13	75	88	1.1
Canada	42	-	42	0.4
Bulgaria	25	10	35	0.3
Australia	35	-	35	0.5

Cf. B. Uralis, *Guerres et populations* 319-323; *Das Dritte Reich* 2:404

* According to official statistics, the losses of Poland go up to 6,028,000. But this figure includes the losses of the Jewish population in the western regions of Belorussia and Ukraine which is included in the civilian losses for those two republics.

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
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Irene levins Rudnytzky, a native of Latvia, is an associate professor in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures at Immaculata College, Immaculata, Pa., and a free-lance translator.