

POLITICIZED

ECUMENISM

**ROME, MOSCOW
AND THE
UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH**

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**Politicized Ecumenism:
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**by
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PREFACE

The purpose of this short essay is to add a dimension not explored in my study of the relations between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and papacy entitled *Politics of a Church Union*. Furthermore, it is necessary to inform and stimulate the faithful of this church so that they might not be as apathetic to the woes of some of their ecclesiastical leaders as they are, and to inspire the search for new solutions to the leadership impasse facing the Ukrainian Catholic Church today.

R.P.M.

Note: Italics in all the quotations are by the author.

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I

ROME-MOSCOW DIALOGUE

The Ukrainian Catholic Church¹ on both sides of the "Iron Curtain" together with the Ukrainian people has been trapped in the grip of world political, ideological and religious processes from which she appears not to be able to loosen herself sufficiently to freely determine her historical and ecclesiastical destiny. The grip within the Soviet Union is exercised by the Soviet communist Regime and the Russian Orthodox Church, while outside it comes from the control of the Vatican under pressure, both religious and civil, from Moscow. Setting aside the political and ideological processes in play, this study focuses on the religious processes which have cast the Ukrainian Catholic Church into such a precarious situation.

Background. Even before the downfall of Constantinople in 1453 and the rise of Moscow in the subsequent centuries the Papal curia had always aspired, or perhaps conspired with the efforts of various religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, to "convert" and "unite" "Christian Moscow," or at least, to drag it into one or another of the papal schemes to liberate Eastern Christmas from the Islamic yoke.² In spite of the steady flow of emissaries to Moscow, Petersburg and then Moscow, the Russians managed to avoid being lured into these schemes or to be influenced by the papal curia. As a matter of fact on occasion they have managed to use these contacts to their benefit, both political and ideological, e.g. the Helsinki Accord (1975). Soon after the collapse of the Tsars in 1917, the first papal activists in the Soviet Union were Jesuits hoping to influence the Russian Orthodox Church, now in a most disadvantageous situation, to enter into some sort of relations with the Church of Rome. However, the Soviet Regime restricted religious activists, particularly Roman Catholic ones.³

Secretariat. In 1959 Pope John XXIII (1958-1963) announced the convocation of a general synod of the Roman Catholic Church for the purpose of "updating" the Church. One of his great wishes was to see the participation of the Orthodox churches, at least as observers, to the synod. To this end in 1960 the pope established a *Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity* with Jesuit biblical scholar, Augustine Bea, as its head.⁴ The purpose of this Secretariat was to promote unity among Christians and to soften the attitude of the Orthodox churches toward the Synod. The convocation of a general synod in the 20th century presented the Vatican with another opportune occasion to fulfil the longstanding papal aspiration to establish relations

with "Christian Moscow."

Mater et Magistra. Another attitude of the pope that helped to promote relations with the Soviet Regime was manifested in the publication of the papal encyclical *Mater et Magistra* in 1961.⁵ The pope discussed social issues in the sociological tradition of his predecessors, however, without discussing or condemning socialism or communism. The pope called for peace instead of confrontation. He appealed to all rulers to be conscious of "the dreadful responsibility before history and more importantly before God's judgement."⁶

Nikita Khrushchev was a bit skeptical about the "ecumenical" approach of the pope. He expressed his view on the pages of *Pravda* thus: "It is not that we fear God's judgement in whom as an atheist I do not believe, but we welcome an appeal to negotiate in the interest of peace, no matter where it comes from. Will ardent catholics like J.E Kennedy, Konrad Adenauer and others listen to the pope's warning."⁷

Exchange of Greetings. In spite of his skepticism Khrushchev was quick to grasp an opportunity when it presented itself. On the occasion of Pope John XXIII's eightieth birthday Nikita Khrushchev sent the following message to the pope through the Soviet ambassador to Italy: "In compliance with the instructions I have received from Nikita Khrushchev, may I express my congratulations to his Holiness John XXIII on the occasion of his eightieth birthday, with the sincere wish for his good health and success in his noble efforts toward strengthening and consolidating peace in the world by solving international problems through frank negotiations."⁸ The Pope's immediate reaction was: "...there is something going on in the world...Today we have received a sign of divine providence..."⁹ On November 27 the pope sent the following response to the Soviet Embassy in Rome: "His Holiness Pope John XXIII is grateful for your good wishes and, for his part, conveys to the entire Russian people (not Soviet) his heart felt wishes for the development and consolidation of general peace through positive understandings brought about by human brotherhood. For this he prays most fervently."¹⁰

Pursuit of Dialogue. With the creation of the *Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity*, the writing of the papal encyclical *Mater et Magistra*, the exchange of greetings on the occasion of the pope's eightieth birthday, there began a new era in the Vatican's relations with the Soviet Regime and the Russian Orthodox Church which was to have a profound impact not only on the Roman Catholic Church and the Western World, but most particularly, on the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

One of the reasons for the existence of the *Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity* was to make contact with the Orthodox Churches of the Christian East. With this in mind Cardinal Bea invited the patriarch

of Moscow to send observers to Vatican II. The patriarch firmly turned down the invitation in a politely formulated letter.¹¹ However, the Vatican persisted. Thus in August of 1962 Archbishop Nikodim of Leningrad, Head of the Foreign Department of the Russian Orthodox Church met secretly in Paris with Jan Willebrands, Secretary of the Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity¹² and then in Metz (Austria) with Cardinal Eugene Tisserant, Prefect of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches and the effective administrator of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.¹³ The Kremlin was interested in the invitation extended to the Russian Orthodox Church by the Vatican. However, it was not interested in theological rapprochement between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, rather it was interested in the neutralization of Catholic and Vatican anti-Sovietism in and outside of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev wanted to make it appear internally that even the Roman Catholic Church was not necessarily opposed to the communist form of government and externally give the impression that the Soviet Regime was not totally anti-religious. Thus Khrushchev hoped to soften the underbelly of the Western nations (using the Vatican as a tool) regarding communism, its intentions and its form of government. The Kremlin would allow the Russian Orthodox Church to send observers on one condition: that the synod did not become an anti-Soviet forum.

This historic opportunity and temptation was so great that the papacy could not resist. On September 27 (to October 2, 1962) Jan Willebrands travelled to Moscow to negotiate the terms of the Russian Orthodox participation and to guarantee the Kremlin that as much as will be in the power of the Vatican, the papal administration will not allow the synod to become an anti-Soviet forum.¹⁴ Several questions appear relevant in this context. Was the freedom of the synod impaired in advance by this agreement? If it was, then it was not by the veto of a Christian emperor or king, but of the world's first atheist regime. Furthermore, was the process of the synod as democratic as the voting on individual clauses and whole decrees would indicate?

In a letter of October 4, 1962, to the Kremlin, Cardinal Augustine Bea, S.J., suggested that political temperance would be exercised at the synod. Two days later, on October 6, 1962 Jan Willebrands telegraphed an invitation to the patriarch of Moscow.¹⁵

Pastoral Advice. In the meantime another stream of thinking was surfacing in the preparatory commission dealing with the *Ministry of Souls in Particular*. This line of thinking was inspired by Cardinal Alfred Bengsch of East Berlin. In a document dated May 4, 1962, the cardinal made the following recommendation amongst others to the preparatory commission on pastoral care — that certain words, although used quite correctly in political spheres, should not be used by the synod. These words were: "fear of Soviet power, free nations, hatred of communism, Iron Curtain, and

particularly, the *Church in Silence*."¹⁶ This was good pastoral politics for the Roman Catholic Church which could, to a degree, quite freely practice its religion. However, this type of "ecumenical" politics was completely unacceptable to the Ukrainian Catholic Church which was abolished by the "Robber-Synod" of Lviv in 1946 staged by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet Regime.¹⁷ Thereafter this Church has existed only in the underground as an illegal form of association in the Soviet Union. The Cardinal failed to recognize that there were degrees in the "silence" of the Churches. The Ukrainian Catholic Church had been not just partially but totally "silenced" contrary not only to the tenets of the Gospel, of the United Nations Bill of Rights, but even the Soviet Constitution itself (article 23 of the UkSSR Constitution). This is a classical case of the sacrifice of a minority for the sake of the majority. This sacrifice was made inspite of the fact that the moral and religious principle on which the decision was made is questionable and hardly in keeping with the spirit of the Gospel which these very decision makers appear to profess and uphold. Furthermore, the "silence" of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was brought about by a group of people who likewise profess not only the Soviet Constitution, but the very Gospel which constitutes their *raison d'être*.

On October 26 during the third session of the first sitting of the Synod the Canadian Ukrainian bishop Maxim Hermaniuk requested an explanation of the terms "persecuted" and "silent church." The Hungarian bishop Hamvas intervened and advised against any such explanations or discussions on the grounds that it would "irritate some governments, i.e. the Soviet regimes in the Eastern bloc, and thus worsen the situation of the Church which is just showing signs of improvement."¹⁸ Thus Hermaniuk's request fell by the wayside and the Vatican kept its promise to the Soviet Regime.

No Condemnation of Communism. In the opening speech of Pope John XXIII to the synod on October 11, 1962 the following words were a signal to Moscow that the synod would not condemn communism or become an anti-Soviet forum:

The Church has always condemned these errors. Frequently, she has condemned with the greatest severity. She considers that she meets the needs of the present day by demonstrating the validity of her teaching *rather than by condemnation*.¹⁹

Moscow, both civil and religious, picked up the signal of no condemnation. Promptly the very next day, and to everyone's surprise. Archpriest Borovoy and Archimandrite Kotlyarov arrived in Rome as observers at the synod.

An interesting question of synodal tradition and procedure arises. Was the papacy breaking with the centuries-old procedural pattern of all past Christian councils which had always condemned erroneous opinions and practices prevalent in their own times? Was this concession an impairment of conciliar freedom?

Cuban Crisis. The historical event that set the stage on which the

Vatican's newly developing Ostpolitik appeared to take on credibility was the Cuban crisis. On October 22, 1962 the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, ordered the American Navy to blockade the Russian ships carrying armaments to Cuba. All diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were severed and war appeared inevitable. On October 23 President Kennedy contacted the Vatican as the last resort to try and break the diplomatic impasse. Pope John XXIII worked all night with his aides on an appropriate message. On October 24, at the weekly papal audience, the pope closed his speech with a loosely connected passage about the good will of statesmen: "The pope always speaks well of all men of state who are concerned, here, there and everywhere with meeting amongst themselves to avoid the reality of war and to procure a bit of peace for humankind."²⁰ As the pope was delivering his speech, the papal message to Nikita Khrushchev was delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Rome. On October the message was broadcast on Vatican Radio. The core of the message was: "We remind those who bear the responsibility of power of their grave duties. With your hand upon your heart, may you listen to the anguished cry that from all points of the land, from innocent babes to the old, from people to communities, rises toward heaven: peace! peace! We today renew this solemn invocation. We beseech all the rulers not to remain deaf to this cry of humanity. May they do all that is in them to safeguard the peace. They will thereby keep the horrors of war from the world — a war those horrible consequences no one can foresee. May there continue to be discussions because this loyal and open attitude testifies to each party's conscience and stands as evidence before history. To promote, favor and accept discussion at all levels and in all times is a rule of wisdom and prudence that will call down the blessing of heaven and earth."²¹

That very same day the Soviet ships began turning back. October 26 *Pravda* carried the following message on its front page: "We beg all rulers not to remain deaf to the cry of humanity." Thus the diplomatic impasse was broken and negotiations were resumed. Khrushchev called the papal intervention a "humanistic assistance that will be recorded in history. The pope and I can diverge on many questions but we are united in our desire for peace."²² As a result the relations between Moscow and Rome became even more intimate.

Flurry of Visits. The dialogue between Rome and Moscow developed roots in mutual interest. The Soviets received assurances of no condemnation of communism and the Vatican that the Soviet Regime would be better disposed to Roman Catholics in areas under Soviet domination.

Thereafter a stream of Soviet visitors made its way to the Vatican to consolidate that good will. Those relations generated "ecumenical" opportunism and the potential exercising of influence. The full brunt of Soviet influence on the Vatican was most severely felt by the Ukrainian Catholic

Church in the "free world." The Soviet assurances of better disposition did not apply to the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine nor in the "free world." It would appear that the Vatican acquiesced to the Soviet position regarding the Ukrainian Catholic Church. It was sacrificed on the altar of Vatican Ostpolitik.

The stream of visits,²³ much to the dismay and discomfort of the Western World and the Ukrainian Catholic Church in particular, were:

- November 26, 1961, Pope John XXIII thanks Khrushchev in a telegram for the birthday congratulations;
- September 27 to October 2, 1962, Jan Willebrands of the Vatican Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity in Moscow;
- October 23, 1962, Pope John XXIII mediates between Moscow and Washington in the Cuban Crisis;
- December 13, 1962, Norman Cousins presents Khrushchev in Moscow with the papal request for the release of Metropolitan Josef Slipyj;
- February 5, 1963, Jan Willebrands accompanies Metropolitan Slipyj from Moscow to Rome;
- March 7, 1963 Pope John XXIII receives Alexei Adshubej, Khrushchev's son-in-law;
- October 4, 1965, Pope Paul VI meets Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, at the United Nations in New York;
- April 16, 1966, Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, in private audience with Pope Paul VI in the Vatican;
- January 30, 1967, Nikolai Podgorny, Soviet Head of State, in private audience with Pope Paul VI in Vatican;
- November 14, 1970, Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko in private audience with Pope Paul VI in the Vatican;
- February 25, 1971, In Moscow, Casaroli signs the Nuclear Disarmament Treaty and negotiates with the Soviet Director of the Church Office, Kuroidev;
- February 21, 1974, Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko in private audience with Pope Paul VI in the Vatican;
- June 28, 1975, Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko in private audience with Pope Paul VI in Vatican;
- January 24, 1979, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's fifth visit to the Vatican and the first meeting with the Polish Pope, John Paul II (Pope since October 16, 1978).

It would appear that atheist representatives of the Soviet Regime were received just about as often by the popes in that span of time as the Ukrainian Catholic Church leaders who were attempting to implement the decisions of Vatican II.

Pope Paul VI Refuses to Condemn Communism. June 3, 1963, Pope

John XXIII died and on June 21, 1963 Pope Paul VI was elected. He continued to maintain the relations with the Soviet Regime and the Russian Orthodox Church established by Pope John XXIII. However he cautioned against any misunderstanding that the style of his predecessor may have inspired that the Church was changing its position on widespread errors such as Marxist Atheism. He stated that there cannot be any "ideological co-existence." Yet what appeared to be denied at one moment seemed to be affirmed in another.

During the last sessions of the Vatican II Synod a petition from 297 council members (out of about 2300) requested that the so-called Schema 13 which dealt with the "Church in the Modern World" also treat the "problem of communism" so that the Synod might not be accused of silence as for example Pope Pius XII has been regarding the victims of Nazism. Among the 209 suggested amendments, some even called for the condemnation of communism. The Synod's preparatory committee rejected all the proposals on the direct instructions of Pope Paul VI.²⁴ To prevent any further misunderstandings, Pope Paul VI, shortly before the commencement of the last session of the Synod, summed up his approach to the Vatican's Ostpolitik:

The Holy See is avoiding raising a justified cry of protest and regret more often and more strongly, not because it mistakes or ignores the reality of the situation, but rather from a concept of Christian patience and so as not to provoke greater evil. It is always prepared for honest and dignified negotiations, for forgiving injustices suffered, also prepared to look into the present and the future and not the recent painful past, whenever it meets efficacious signs of good will.²⁵

It seems that the Roman Catholic Church had made up its mind several years after the historic birth of a communist state that communism per se was not objectionable provided it did not interfere with personal religious freedom. At an international conference in Genoa, February, 1922 at which communist representatives from the newly created communist state in Russia were also present, Cardinal Gasparri made the following remark during his opening statement:

The ultimate principles of the Church imply no objections on its part against a communist form of government. In matters of economics the Church is agnostic. Its spiritual interests have nothing to do with matters of economic organization, and their pursuit is hence not bound to a particular social climate. The Church merely demands that the organization of the state, of whatever nature it may be, must not interfere with the freedom of religious worship, nor with the freedom of the priests to discharge the functions of their office.^{25a}

Unfortunately communism turned out to be not only an economic system but a secular religion with a complete *weltanschauung* of its own.

II

IMPACT OF THE ROME-MOSCOW DIALOGUE ON THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Ukrainian Protest. It is not surprising that the presence of ecclesiastical representatives from the Russian Orthodox Church at the Synod did not meet with everyone's approval. Particularly embittered was the Ukrainian Catholic Church. There were several reasons. First and foremost was the historical fact that the Russian Orthodox Church participated (with the Soviet Communist Regime) in the forced liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and presided over its absorption into the "Mother Church" of Moscow by the staged "Robber-Synod" of Lviv (Ukraine) in 1946 (March 8-10).²⁶ Secondly, why were observers invited only from the Orthodox Church least favorably disposed to the Vatican II Synod, the Russian Orthodox Church, rather than from other more favorably disposed "separated" Orthodox churches? The Ukrainian community reacted to the appearance of the Russian Orthodox observers at the synod with a letter of protest to the pope. The Ukrainian Catholic bishops at the synod drafted the famous protest note which they presented to the Vatican administration. The Vatican administration ignored this note, because it had already set its ecumenical course and was determined to pursue dialogue with Moscow. It only attempted to downplay the apparent implications of betrayal inherent in its policy. In despair that their martyred church was publicly ignored and openly sacrificed on the altar of Vatican Ostpolitik, an "unauthorized" secretary of the Ukrainian Catholic Episcopal Synod leaked the protest note to the press. This note or rather excerpts were printed in *Giornale d'Italia* on November 21, 1962 by Filippo Pucci:

...The presence of two observer-delegates of the patriarchate of Moscow has confused the faithful (Ukrainian Catholics in the "Catholic" Church), has aroused amazement among many fathers of the council and has spread a feeling of unrest, of dissatisfaction and of discouragement among the clergy and laity entrusted to our care...it appears that some (ecclesiastical) sectors and part of the world public opinion exalt the presence of the two observers in Rome, while at the same time they pass over in silence the absence of Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj and his detention...Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, Archbishop of Lviv (Ukraine), was unjustly condemned for crimes he did not commit and today is deported contrary to all divine and natural rights of a human person...The patriarch of Moscow had directly fomented apostasy among the Ukrainian Catholic clergy and then as-

sumed the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the clergy and four and half million Ukrainian Catholics contrary to all divine, ecclesiastical and human laws, in open collaboration with the atheist civil powers without whose assistance it was impossible to suppress and liquidate the Ukrainian Catholic Church...From documents illustrating the activity of the Patriarch of Moscow in the years after the War (II), it is abundantly clear that the patriarch is a docile and useful instrument in the hands of the Soviet government which has only one aim regarding religion: to annihilate it. For this reason the dispatch of observers from the patriarchate of Moscow to the ecumenical council in such circumstances cannot be considered a fact of religious and ecclesiastical character. It was carried out by the Soviet Regime with the scope of instigating confusion.²⁷

The "confusion" referred to was the implied suggestion that the Communist atheist Regime is not as dramatically opposed to religion as opponents make it out to be. This is, cynically enough, true but with a twist. In the Soviet Constitution (in abstracto) religious freedom is allowed, in practice (in re) it is non-existent, unless and only pro tempore, in as much as religion serves or can serve the interests of the Soviet Union, internally and externally. For example, using the Vatican connection the Soviet Union hoped to soften the underbelly of Western political determination whenever it extended its tentacles of control into new territories or when it had to deal with a situation such as the case of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Vatican "Distancing". The reaction of the Vatican to the protest note of the Ukrainian Catholic bishops (and to all subsequent attempts of this Church to implement the recommendations of the conciliar decree *On the Eastern Catholic Churches*) was negative. The Vatican administration "distanced" itself from everything Ukrainian under pressure from the Russian Orthodox "separated" Church and the Soviet "atheist" Regime in order to facilitate "dialogue" with Moscow, both civil and religious. A point in view is the following statement of the Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity:

...The Secretariat for the Advancement of Christian Unity wishes to stress that all observer-delegates are guests of the Secretariat and should feel that the welcome extended to them is offered in a spirit of eager joy. They all, without exception, have shown a *truly religious and ecumenical attitude of mind*. It is for this reason that the Secretariate deploras all utterances that have been made in a spirit at odds with that in which loyal contacts has been established with the observer-delegates. The Secretariate cannot but *dissociate* itself from these utterances.²⁸

On the very day the protest note of the Ukrainian Catholic bishops was leaked to the press, Cardinal Gustavo Testa, Secretary of State for the Vatican, initiated negotiations with the Russian Orthodox observers for the release from detention of Josyf Slipyj, Metropolitan Archbishop of Lviv. In the negotiations Cardinal Testa made it very clear to the Russian observers, that the Vatican "separated" itself from the action of the Ukrainian Catholic bishops. The basic points of that first meeting were reported in *Corriere*

della Sera (February 12, 1962) by Fabrizio de Santis:

...The two Russian observers were very courteous and listened attentively to the Cardinal's declaration in favor of Archbishop Slipyj...he pointed out with what kindness the representatives of every Protestant and Orthodox denominations had been welcomed to Rome: with what fidelity the Pope had opened his arms to them as brothers even though separated: how the Secretariat for the Advancement of Unity had *separated* its own responsibility from that of the Ukraine(ian) bishops there present at the Council, who had drawn up the famous letter of protest against the presence of Orthodox Russian representatives; and how finally, that protest would have not been raised if the Catholic Church, too, enjoyed freedom of its cult in the Soviet Union, and if Slipyj and all the other Catholic priests still detained had regained their freedom...²⁹

Why does the Vatican administration "separate" itself from an integral part of the "Catholic" Church? It appears to sustain that historical craving for the "conversion" or perhaps even "union" with "Christian Russia." However, for the moment the Vatican will settle for "ecumenical dialogue."

A Protestant observer at the Vatican II Synod interpreted the events just described and the "distancing" of the Vatican from an integral part of the "Catholic" Church, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, in the following manner:

Immediately after the publication of the manifesto Italian and anticommunist publications elsewhere in the world reported that the observers from Moscow had threatened to leave if the Secretariat did not *take a stand against the Ukrainians* who had insulted their Patriarch, had attacked the Soviet Regime, and had permitted themselves the insinuation that the dispatch of the Moscow observers was a political maneuver of the Soviet government.

And so it happened. The statement of the Secretariat was an *unmitigated disavowal* of the Ukrainian (Catholic) bishops, issued for the sake of *undisturbed relations* with the Russian observers and the Patriarchate of Moscow. The Catholic Church invited them, welcomed them joyfully, and acknowledges their religious and ecumenical attitude of mind.

...I find it difficult to understand — in terms of the politics of the Church — this attitude toward the Uniat (i.e. Catholic) Ukrainians. Could it mean that what is wanted is peace with the Patriarchate of Moscow and its political henchmen at the expense of the suffering Catholic brothers in Russia (and Ukraine)? That would be a numbers game in Church politics (of the kind we Protestants know only too well from the tactical maneuvers of the World Council of Churches and German Protestant Churchmen). It would run something like this: 'The fifty-five million Orthodox (of which 20 to 25 million are ethnically Ukrainian) whom we wish to win over are more important to us for the moment than the more or less lost five million Catholic Ukrainians of the Byzantine-Ukrainian rite in the catacombs of Russia (and Ukraine) with their one surviving bishop Slipyj.' How can one accept such calculations? That, I should think, is hardly the apostolic way of dealing with suffering brothers and their suppressors (particularly when the suppressors believe and worship the same God as the oppressed). Until now we thought it was the questionable prerogative of Geneva to pursue *ecumenical* work and efforts of Christian unification at the expense of Christian charity and Christian truth.³⁰

Release of Slipyj. After negotiations between Cardinal Testa and the Russian observers, the latter agreed to raise the matter upon their return to Moscow after the termination of the first session of the synod. In the meantime Norman Cousins, who figured in the Cuban Crisis negotiations, surfaced in Rome and offered his services. The Vatican requested Cousins to continue the dialogue between the Vatican and the Kremlin. On December 13, 1962, Cousins entered Khrushchev's study where he had a three-hour discussion. During the discussion it was agreed that the Kremlin wanted relations with the Vatican, but only unofficially. Cousins also approached Khrushchev on the release of Metropolitan Slipyj. Khrushchev's response was:

I will have the matter reviewed...I remember the case...but I do not know where he is and whether he is still alive...Oh, it will create an enormous stink! But I will have the matter reviewed and if there is a guarantee that no political case will be made of it, I would not rule out a release. One more enemy in freedom does not scare me.³¹

On January 25, 1963 the Soviet ambassador to Italy notified the Prime Minister of Italy, Amintore Fanfani, that Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj would be released and allowed to travel through Italy to the Vatican. A confidential letter was also sent which declared that the metropolitan was guilty of complicity with the Germans during the occupation of Western Ukraine, that he was an enemy of the Soviet State and that his liberation was "an act of good will."³²

On February 2, 1963 the baffled metropolitan arrived in Moscow from Siberia. He was astonished to find Monsignor Jan Willebrands there. Willebrands had travelled to Moscow to formally guarantee the Soviet authorities that there would be no political exploitation derived from the release of Slipyj. When Willebrands arrived in Moscow he was met by Archpriest Borovoy, who revealed yet another condition. Since Metropolitan Slipyj was an enemy of the Soviet State he could not return to his eparchy in Lviv, but had to live in exile. When Jan Willebrands informed the metropolitan of that condition in the Moscow hotel, the latter was disappointed and refused to leave the hotel. Metropolitan Slipyj proposed a compromise. He would go into exile in Rome provided he could at least make one last pastoral visit to his metropolitan see in Lviv. The Soviets absolutely refused. Discussions dragged on for two days. Pope John XXIII's *Ostropolitik* hinged on Metropolitan Slipyj's response. If he refused, the years of carefully nurtured relations with the Soviet atheist Regime would or perhaps could have been dashed. Ultimately the metropolitan relented and acceded to the Soviet conditions. In the crucial moment of the delicately structured relations between the Vatican and the Kremlin, it would appear that Metropolitan Slipyj succumbed to pressure from the Vatican. Giancarlo Zizola writes:

In that duel the fate of the thaw between the Catholic Church and the Kremlin was at stake. Slipyj's refusal would have unthinkable consequences for the reli-

gious policy in all of Eastern Europe. Willebrands could not turn him back over to the Soviets without knowing that such a move would destroy in a single blow all the network of delicate relationships and also all the hopes of a better future for the Catholics (Roman) in the East. He understood the enormity of the sacrifice Slipyj had to make, but there was *no other way*.³³

Henceforth the historical road in the "ecumenical dialogue" between Rome and Moscow was clear. The popes would expect the Ukrainian Catholic Church to make sacrifices whenever necessary to serve the ends of the papacy and the Vatican Ostpolitik.

Continued "Distancing" of the Vatican. The release of Metropolitan Slipyj did not in any way eliminate or even lessen the "distancing" of the Vatican administration from everything that was Ukrainian Catholic. With or without the protest note of the Ukrainian Catholic bishops at the synod and their negative stance towards the "ecumenical dialogue" with Moscow, both civil and religious, the release of Slipyj would have taken place anyway as a demonstration of good will spawned by the papal intervention in the Cuban Crisis. The papal pursuit of "dialogue" with Moscow is as historical as the position of the Ukrainian Catholic Church on such a dialogue. One of the consequences of that "dialogue" was and still is that the Papacy has been maneuvered by Moscow into a negative stance towards an integral part of the "Catholic" Church, i.e., the Ukrainian Catholic Church. That is embarrassing, or at least ought to be. This negative disposition of the papacy towards the Ukrainian Catholic Church has manifested itself on several occasions in the post-Vatican II period.

In 1945 Patriarch Alexei of Moscow declared the Union of Berest (1595-96 between the Kievan Metropolia and Rome) invalid through the efforts and the leaders of the "Robber-Synod" of Lviv in 1946 (March 8-10), even though that position has not even a crump of historical or canonical substance to substantiate it. It was a purely political decision. However, when this invalidation was reiterated by Patriarch Pimen (1971) in the presence of papal envoys, Cardinal Jan Willebrands and Rev. John Long, S.J., they did not express any objection whatsoever. Some justified their lack of response on linguistic grounds. When this was brought to Cardinal Willebrands' attention he merely stated "We cannot share this thesis."³⁴ However, the fact remains that he did not deny it. What then is the meaning of this Vatican position. It would appear to be a signal that the Vatican is prepared to accede to the disappearance of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine and even in the "free world." Such a situation would facilitate and strengthen dialogue with Moscow, please the Kremlin and open further dialogue with the Orthodox churches which consider the Eastern Catholic churches as vestiges of papal imperialism and as an obstacle to dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church.

Cardinal Josyf Slipyj raised bitter reproaches during the 1971 World

Synod of Roman Catholic bishops gathered in Rome regarding this incident. "No one defends the Catholic Ukrainians...now because of the diplomatic negotiations they are put aside as embarrassing witnesses of past evils..." He suggested that a positive response from the powerful voice of the World Synod would instill the persecuted with renewed strength to "hold out to the final victory...For the world may perish, but there must be justice."³⁵ The response of the Roman Catholic World Synod was nil. A rather sad commentary on the state of Christian community consciousness and brotherhood in the West.

This "distancing" has been further witnessed in the course of the attempts of the Ukrainian Catholic Church to implement the recommendations of the Vatican II Decree *On the Eastern Catholic Churches*. In order to grasp the destiny of its own Church the Ukrainian Catholic bishops under the leadership of Cardinal Josyf Slipyj commenced synodally (September 29-October 4, 1969) the implementation of the recommendations of the Vatican II Decree *On the Eastern Catholic Churches*. The first item on the agenda was the erection of patriarchal structures in the Ukrainian Catholic Church for the more effective administration of a church scattered over five continents. While the Ukrainian Catholic Church was attempting to establish patriarchal structures, Cardinal Jean Villot, Secretary of State, met with Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad, Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Russian Orthodox Church. It is reported that Metropolitan Nikodim warned the Vatican administration against supporting the aspiration (recommendations of the Vatican Decree) of the Ukrainian Catholic Church to establish patriarchal structures³⁶. When the Vatican response to the request of the Ukrainian Catholic Church to establish patriarchal structures came on April 10, 1971, it was as one might expect after such "ecumenical dialogue", negative:

...the aspirations of establishing a Ukrainian patriarchate of Kiev-Halych, in spite of a favorable disposition, does not appear to be attainable and therefore the petition for the erection of the said patriarchate cannot be approved.³⁷

Three times the Ukrainian Catholics requested Pope Paul VI in person to agree to the establishment of patriarchal structures and thrice (July 7, 1971, 1975 and December 14, 1976) he personally refused.

Obviously the creation of a Ukrainian patriarchate in the person of Josyf Slipyj or any other Ukrainian prelate would be taken as a provocation by the Russian Orthodox Church as well as by the Soviet Regime. The Soviet Regime would interpret such an agreement as an attempt to revive the Ukrainian people as a nation at a time when it is engaged in the process of denationalizing Ukraine. Furthermore, it would give the Ukrainian people a potentially high profile leadership in the "free world," something it now lacks. On the other hand, the Russian Orthodox Church would view the

erection of patriarchal structures as a challenge to its absorption of fifty-five million Ukrainians and still worse pose a potential threat that all Ukrainians might rally around a Ukrainian Catholic Patriarch as a means of easing out of and eventually escaping from the Russian (Soviet) political and religious grip. Given the political fact that the Soviet Regime and the Russian Orthodox Church have firm control over the Ukrainian people, the Vatican opted to pursue the route of "ecumenical dialogue." It is obvious to the Vatican and to most observers that there is little, if anything, to be gained, at least politically, from the creation of patriarchal structures in the Ukrainian Catholic Church at this juncture. The question that arises, nonetheless is, who is gaining and who is losing in this "ecumenical dialogue" with Moscow. It is clear that the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet Regime benefit. They have the apparent recognition on the part of the Roman Catholic leadership and perhaps of the world (if not now then perhaps later) of the fact that the Ukrainian people exist religiously not as Ukrainian Orthodox, Ukrainian Catholics or Ukrainian Protestants, but as Russian Orthodox, and politically as Soviets. It is also clear that the "Roman" Catholic Church has benefited from the dialogue. The Soviets have eased their restrictions on the Roman Catholic Church in communist countries. It is also clear that the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian people have lost the most in that dialogue. Their basic rights to the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution and the right to implement the recommendations of the Vatican II Decree *On the Eastern Catholic Churches* have been outrightly abolished or drastically restricted. They have been sacrificed on the altar of Vatican Ostpolitik.

As followers of Jesus Christ (it is embarrassing to bring up His name in a discussion such as this) the Vatican administrators ought to be prepared to allow the principle of freedom to take its course and suffer the consequences. Instead it has embarked on a policy of determining and manipulating the course of history rather than letting it develop through the free creative action of the human community.

When Cardinal Josyf Slipyj requested Pope Paul VI to give a sign to a "Church condemned to death and that has been waiting for thirty years for a word of comfort from Your Holiness,"³⁸ the pope refused. In an audience for the cardinal and six Ukrainian Catholic bishops on December 14, 1976, the pope said:

You know very well that circumstances independent of the Holy See prevent compliance with your repeated request, because the Holy See follows a very prudent line of action, and this is — as you know well — also in the best interest of the Ukrainian Church itself.³⁹

The sign that Cardinal Slipyj was referring to was the nod he believed he needed to establish patriarchal structures in the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

First of all the papal response was an easy one to make given the

political situation in Ukraine. Even if the Ukrainian Catholic Church were to accept this Vatican policy of "the Holy See knows best," who really knows the ultimate intentions of the papacy. To whom are they know? If one were to judge from historical precedents, there is little if anything for any Church of the Christian East to put its trust in. Furthermore, in this cast there are other players who make free moves. The intentions of these are well known. This type of Vatican policy appears as complicity with the Kremlin in the annihilation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the free world, or at minimum, its reduction to, absorption and disappearance into the Roman Catholic Church. If the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the free world could be made to disappear then the Soviets would have eliminated the last significant thorny resistance to the total absorption of the Ukrainian faithful into the Russian Orthodox Church.

Unable to carry out the recommendations of the Vatican II decree *On the Eastern Catholic Churches* regarding the erection of patriarchal structures, the Ukrainian Catholic Church decreed synodally to establish a permanent synod as the most effective medium of administering the Church. This was the traditional and historically most typical form of ecclesiastical administration among the Eastern Churches and the one recommended by the Vatican II Decree. Even this less ambitious attempt at self rule was struck down categorically by the Vatican.⁴⁰ Instead it recommended the Latin version of ecclesiastical administration — the episcopal conference. Why? To appease the Orthodox "separated" Churches? To latinize? Why not accept the recommendations of the Vatican II Decree? Did Moscow perhaps object?

When that attempt at self rule failed the Ukrainian Catholic Church decided to draft a constitution as an effective means of administering a Church scattered over five continents. That attempt too was outrightly rejected by the papacy.⁴¹ Why? Such a constitution might stand in the way of the "canonical aggiornamento" taking place under the able direction of the Jesuits. In the new canon law code the position of the papacy is canonically strengthened and enhanced not only directly vis-a-vis the whole Roman Catholic Church and particularly the Eastern Catholic Churches,⁴² but indirectly vis-a-vis the Orthodox Churches and the non-Chalcedonian Churches.

Vatican Rhetoric. While keeping the "ecumenical dialogue" alive and well with the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church, the Vatican appears from time to time to defend the rights of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. However, only then and there, where there is little or no risk whatsoever to its "dialogue" with Moscow. For example, at the follow-up conference to the Helsinki European Security Conference in Belgrade (1977), Cardinal Casaroli's representative, Achille Silvestrini made the following statement on October 7, 1977 with the Ukrainian Catholic Church in mind:

There are also some serious wounds that we would like with a hope that we cannot abandon, to see put right and healed. It is the case for the Catholic Church of certain communities of faithful of the Eastern Rite which in the past had a

flourishing religious life rich in centuries old traditions and which in the new juridico-political post-war regimes have lost the civil rights to exist. This is all the more painful because it concerns specifically a central point of religious freedom, which is to profess a faith "according to the dictates of one's own conscience."⁴³

These apparently bold words are then counterbalanced by other statements signalling Moscow that nothing will be done without "dialogue" in an "ecumenical spirit."

Polish Pope. With the coming of the "Polish" pope, John Paul II, the Ukrainian Catholic Church renewed its attempts to establish patriarchal structures — perhaps a futile desire given the current political situation. Nonetheless, on November 3, 1978, Cardinal Slipyj appealed to the pope as a "Slav" who knew that the "Ukrainians and the Poles have a common enemy, which today is Moscow...Poles know how Russians make contracts and how they keep their word."⁴⁴ Cardinal Slipyj requested a re-examination of the "dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church which is based on false premises" and the establishment of a "Ukrainian Patriarchate." On November 20, 1978, the "Slav" pope rejected both requests.⁴⁵ However to alleviate the pain of rejection and to demonstrate his understanding of the Ukrainian situation he wrote a letter to Cardinal Slipyj dated March 19, 1979, (presumably for the occasion of the millenium of the Christianization of Ukraine, which event will only be commemorated in 1988).⁴⁶ The most important thoughts in the letter were:

1. the "authority" of the Union of Berest (1595-1596) is "still in force today;"
2. he appealed to the "ecumenical spirit," i.e. that both the Ukrainian Catholic Church "...whose traditions and formulas the Catholic Church and the Holy See regard with the utmost esteem" and the Russian Orthodox Church ought to respect each other;
3. no mention is made of the forced liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in 1946 by the Communist Regime and the Russian Orthodox Church;
4. however, a direct reference is made to the principle of religious freedom contained in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.

The letter created an uproar in the Vatican Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity.⁴⁷ The Secretariat was greatly upset because the pope failed to consult it on the Vatican policy regarding the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. The pope failed to realize how little the Ukrainian Catholic Church figures in the Vatican "dialogue" with the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. When it does, it is only as the sacrificial lamb on the altar of Vatican Ostpolitik. The question that arises is how does the pope or perhaps how can the pope speak on behalf of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and for that matter on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church when the "Secretariat" of his administration admonishes the "successor of Peter" and "vicar of Christ" so severely? Henceforth the pope commenced a balan-

cing act on how not to offend Moscow, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Catholics and his own Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity.

Moscow Demands. The Russian Orthodox Patriarch and the Soviet Regime were upset by the contents of the Pope's letter of March 19, 1979, to Cardinal Slipyj.⁴⁸ Their suspicion was further heightened by the fact that the Vatican did not publish it until June 17, 1979, several days after the termination of the pope's visit to Poland. In protest the Patriarch of Moscow cancelled the Fifth Theological Colloquium planned for April of that year in Odessa between Roman Catholic and Russian theologians.⁴⁹ Furthermore, Metropolitan Juvenaliy, Nikodim's successor as Head of the Foreign Office of the Moscow Patriarchate, sent a letter on September 4, 1979, to Cardinal Jan Willebrands, Head of the Vatican Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity, threatening "public criticism" if he did not communicate the "exact meaning" of the papal letter to Cardinal Slipyj.⁵⁰ The point that disturbed the Patriarch of Moscow most was whether the Union of Berest was going to serve as a model of future unions between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches and whether the ecumenical progress of the second Vatican Council was disavowed. According to the Russian patriarchate this request was dictated by its "ardent desire to avoid polemics and unnecessary misunderstandings after all the years of *brotherly* relations."

Cardinal Willebrands replied in a letter dated September 22, 1979:

I have called your letter to the attention of the Holy Father and spoken with him about its content and significance. He is aware of the thoughts that I am expressing here and I am writing to you in his name. The letter addressed to His Eminence Cardinal Slipyj (from the Pope on March 19) had a very limited objective. The Holy Father had no intention of expressing in it his concepts of the relations between the Roman Church and the Orthodox Church...The unity that we seek is not the absorption of the one by the other, but rather full communion between the churches...The Union of Berest has always possessed a special significance for the Ukrainian Catholics...The Pope wanted to *dissociate* this union *from political and national elements*. He had by no means any intention of presenting it as a model for our relations with the Orthodox Church today or for a future union. The Catholic Uniate Churches arose under circumstances different from ours, and were *inspired by a theology that is no longer current*. Within the Catholic Church they have been a concrete reminder that the Latin tradition is not the only authentically Christian one. In this sense, their existence has been and still is useful. On the other hand, one must admit that their foundation caused a breach and new tensions...We must profit from the teachings of the past. More than ever, our efforts must be *dissociated from every kind of political element* and from any intention that is alien to the single desire of fulfilling Christ's will for his Church. This is John Paul's intention. He does not demand that we orient ourselves to a model from the past, but calls for loyalty and obedience to Him who renews everything..."⁵¹

More Vatican "Distancing." September 21, 1979 Pope John Paul II appointed Miroslav Lubachivsky as Metropolitan of Philadelphia for the

Ukrainian Catholics in the United States against the wishes of Cardinal Josyf Slipyj,⁵² the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and contrary to the traditional ecclesiastical procedure of the Christian East, the Articles of the Union of Berest, and the recommendations of the Vatican II Decree *On the Eastern Catholic Churches*. It would appear that the Vatican administration under Pope John Paul II continued to pursue a policy of total legal containment and control over the Ukrainian Catholic Church contrary to the spirit and the law of Eastern Christian tradition and the Vatican II decree just mentioned. There are several factors that seem to explain this kind of approach. There is no doubt that this is an attempt of the papacy to maintain and even extend its total jurisdiction, in spite of the Vatican II Decree, over the Eastern Catholic churches, particularly over one that is the largest, and at present in the most disadvantageous political and social situation. Secondly, the Vatican has succumbed to the pressure from Moscow, both civil and religious, to make sure that in the future the Ukrainian Catholic Church does not run interference in the Vatican's "ecumenical dialogue" with Moscow. Thirdly, to facilitate dialogue with the Orthodox churches, the Vatican would like to see the absorption and dissipation, or at the very least, the total legal containment of the Eastern Catholic churches so that they would not have any traditional independent status.

Why was the Metropolitan of Philadelphia appointed in the unilateral manner he was, instead of according to the ecclesiastical tradition of the East and the Vatican II procedures? To have allowed the legal procedures of the Christian East and the recommendations of the Vatican II decree to take their course, would have emancipated the Eastern Catholic churches from domination by the papacy and would have set a precedent in recent history though not in tradition, where by these churches could elect their leaders without recourse to Rome. Secondly, it would have allowed the Ukrainian Catholic Church to select a strong leader who would continue to pursue the interests of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Miroslav Lubachivsky was not involved in the polemics surrounding the request to establish patriarchal structures in the Ukrainian Catholic Church, nor in the protests against the Vatican's Ostpolitik and the "ecumenical dialogue" with Moscow. He was perceived as one who would not oppose or interfere in the Vatican's "ecumenical dialogue" with Moscow, which thus far has sacrificed the interests and perhaps even the existence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. During John Paul II's visit to the United States in 1979 the pope was received coolly in the Ukrainian Catholic Cathedral in Philadelphia on November 13. The pope attempted to pacify Cardinal Josyf Slipyj and the Ukrainians with the following words:

"The whole church and the world recognize the uncommon witness you have given by your imprisonment for many years. Today you are with us free for many years...and can thus dedicate yourself to your people." The pope reminded Slipyj

of the duty of "mutual loyalty" and assured him that he would "with all my strength alleviate the trials of those who suffer because of their faith."⁵³

Moscow Embarrasses Pope. Recently the Russian Orthodox Church has manifested its determination to pressure the Vatican into maintaining a complete stranglehold on the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the "free world." This has become known from the "leaked" secret correspondence between the Patriarch of Moscow, Pimen and the pope. This secret correspondence was occasioned by a declaration of the Ukrainian Catholic bishops gathered in a synod in Rome, November 25 - December 1, 1980. The declaration stated that the so-called "synod of Lviv" (1946) that abolished relations of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with the papacy was not convened by the Ukrainian Catholic bishops. In fact the synod was organized by several apostate priests, some of whom had been consecrated bishops by the Russian Orthodox in time for the synod.

It would appear that Patriarch Pimen was not disturbed so much by what the Ukrainian Catholic bishops thought or said (for that was well known to him) as by the position of the "Polish" Pope on the declaration of a synod officially sanctioned by him. Since Pope John Paul II was personally not far away from the events of the so-called "synod of Lviv" in 1946, the Patriarch was eager to know whether the Vatican's "silence" of 1971 still held. When the patriarch failed to get a satisfactory response from the Vatican through his envoy, Metropolitan Juvenaliy, he wrote a letter to the pope dated December 22, 1980. Patriarch Pimen stated in no uncertain terms that the Ukrainian declaration threatened the "ecumenical dialogue" between Moscow and Rome. Furthermore, he requested that the Pope

initiate, without delay, such action that not only would not grant validity to this declaration but would also inform the churches that Your Holiness does not approve nor support the direction selected by the Ukrainian Catholic bishops in their dealings with the churches.⁵⁴

What was the papal reaction? The official Vatican press suppressed the existence of this declaration of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. It seems that to state historical facts is an improper "direction" for the Ukrainian Catholic Church to take. Pope John Paul II responded in a letter of January 24, 1981, thus:

Your Holiness, Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia...(the Holy See) immediately notified all nunciatures in countries where there are Ukrainian Catholic communities of the fact that these texts (the Ukrainian declaration) received no approval and therefore were deprived of all official character. At the same time, it was ordered not to publish nor circulate these documents. No official publication of the Holy See ever mentioned them.⁵⁵

Do the patriarchs of Moscow and Rome think history can be denied or covered up? Incredibly it would seem so.

Still not satisfied with the papal initiatives against the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Patriarch Pimen published the "secret" correspondence

with the intention of embarrassing the pope. However, not to embarrass the pope before the whole Roman Catholic world, yet make his point, the correspondence was published only in the Russian version of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, but not in the usually identical English version.⁵⁶ Are these the fruits of a "spiritually minded" "ecumenical dialogue" with "brotherly" Moscow?

Emerging Pattern. From the information presented in this brief study it is abundantly clear that the Ukrainian Catholic Church, at least for the moment, has become the sacrificial victim of the politicized "ecumenical dialogue" of Rome with Moscow. A pattern has emerged from this dialogue: (1) anytime the Ukrainian Catholic Church exercises its right of freedom of speech regarding historical events relating to its own history or to the Soviet Union and the Russian Orthodox Church, the Vatican "distances" itself from any such statements; (2) Moscow, both civil and religious, pressures the Vatican administration to contain the critical free speech and activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the "free world." (3) the Vatican unashamedly carries out the Kremlin will against the interests of an integral part of the "Catholic" Church, the Ukrainian Catholic Church; (4) the Ukrainian Catholic leadership, civil and religious, generally though not exclusively, just as unashamedly accepts the dubious explanations of the papal curia and its policy that "the Holy See knows best."⁵⁷

It is true some of this policy could be justified inasmuch as it relates to the establishment of patriarchal structures in the Ukrainian Catholic Church given the current political situation in the world. However, there is little justification where it relates to the establishment of a permanent synod or a constitution, which are internal vehicles of effective administration, unless and only, if these are seen as leading up to the former. There is not any justification whatsoever when it relates to the cover-up of historical facts.

NOTES

1. The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine survives only in the underground. It is an illegal form of association in the Soviet Union. About ten percent of the population (55 million) belongs to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The remaining Ukrainian population that is not communist belongs anomalously to the Russian Orthodox Church rather than the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In recent years various Protestant groups have shown remarkable grass-root strength in Ukraine.
2. M.J. Journal de Rouet, *Nonciatures de Russie d'après les documents authentiques*, 5 volumes, Città del Vaticano 1927-1952; L. Smurlo, *Le Saint Siège et l'Orient Orthodoxe Russe 1609-1654*, ed. "Orbis," Prague 1928; P. Pierling, *La Russie et le Saint-Siège. Études diplomatiques*, 5 volumes, Paris 1896-1912; P. Pierling, *Rome et Moscou 1547-1597*, Paris 1883; Oskar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest 1439-1596*, Rome 1958; O. Halecki, "Rome, Constantinople et Moscou de l'Union de Brest," *Irenikon* I, (1954): 44-74; A. Boudou, *Le Saint Siège et la Russie. Leurs relations diplomatiques au XIX Siècle*, 2 volumes, Paris 1921-1925; H. Gomez, *Rusia y el Vaticano*, Madrid 1961; I. Markovic, *Gli Slavi e i Papi*, 2 volumes, Zagabria 1897; E. Winter, *Russland und Papsttum*, 2 volumes, Berlin 1960-1961; A. Popov, "Snoshenie s Rimom s 1845 po 1850 g.," *Zhurnal min. nar. prosv.*, 1870.
3. Hansjakob Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917-1979*, tr. by S. Smith, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 1981, pp. 1-149.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
5. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* LIII (Rome 1961). English version by H.E. Winstone for Catholic Truth Society, London 1962.
6. Address of September 10, 1961. See Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 302.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
8. Giancarlo Zizola, *The Utopia of Pope John XXIII*, tr. by H. Barolini, Maryknoll, New York; Orbis Books 1978, p. 117. For quote see Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 300.
9. Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 301.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, p. 302. For the position of the Moscow Patriarchate see *Journal of the Patriarchate of Moscow* 1961.
12. Wilfried Daim, *The Vatican and Eastern Europe*, tr. by A. Gode, New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1970, pp. 65-66. Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
13. Zizola *op. cit.*, p. 133; Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 303.
14. Zizola, *op. cit.*, p. 133; Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 303.
15. Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

- 16 For complete text of document see Appendix in Stehle, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-445.
- 17 See *Politics of a Church Union*, Russel P. Moroziuk and the bibliography therein.
- 18 See "Notiziario" no. 2 in *Il Concilio Vaticano II*, Rome: Civiltà Cattolica 1968, vol. 2, p. 47; See also Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 306.
- 19 *Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II*, vol. I, periodus prima, pars I, sessio publica I, congregationes generales I-XX, Rome: Vatican Press 1970, p. 172.
- 20 Zizola, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- 23 See Chronology of important dates in recent Vatican Eastern Diplomacy (1961-1977) in Stehle, *op. cit.*, pp. 453-457.
- 24 *Il Concilio Vaticano II*, (ut supra), vol V, pp. 402-403; See G. Scantamburlo, *Perche il Concilio non ha condannato il comunismo*, Rome 1967; Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 312.
- 25 Address of September 12, 1965. See *Il Concilio Vaticano II*, vol IV, p. 502 and vol. V, p. 116; Text quoted from Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 312.
- 25 Daim, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
- 26 See my study *Politics of a Church Union*.
- 27 November 21-22 (Rome 1962): 2.
- 28 Daim, *op. cit.*, p. 64; Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 306.
- 29 Zizola, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
- 30 Max Lackmann, *Mit evangelischen Augen. Beobachtungen eines Lutheraners auf dem zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil*, Graz-Vienna-Cologne 1963, Quoted from Daim, *op. cit.*, p. 65-66.
- 31 B. Lomax, "Pope John's Ostpolitik," *The Month* (September 1974): 694; Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 307; Zizola, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
- 32 Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
- 33 Zizola, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
- 34 Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 367; See *L'Avvenire* (July 4, 1971); See also Giovanni Caprile, *Il Sinodo dei Vescovi*, Rome 1971, pp. 826...
- 35 Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 367, Caprile, *ibid.*
- 36 "La chiesa ucraina affosata della Curia Romana," *Specchio April 4* (Rome 1970).
- 37 *English version of document in Diakonia VII* (1971): 390-392.
- 38 Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 367.
- 39 *Ibid.*, pp. 367-368.
- 40 *Eastern Churches Review IV* (1971): 68-70.
- 41 R. Hyde, "Rejection by Rome of Proposed Constitution for the Ukrainian Catholic Church," *Eastern Churches Review VI* (1974): 64.

- 42 Victor J. Pospishil, *Ex Occidente Lex*, Carteret, New Jersey 1979, 101-109, 155-164 and passim.
- 43 For a more complete text of Silvestrini's declaration see Appendix in Stehle, *op. cit.*, pp. 448-451.
- 44 Text of Slipyj's statement in a Polish translation in *Kultura* no 12/78 (Paris 1978); See also Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 380.
- 45 Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 381.
- 46 *Osservatore Romano*, June 17, (Rome 1979); *Ukrainian Press Bureau: News from Rome* (Ukrainian) XVII, no. 2 (344) Rome, July 12, 1979 : 2-7; See also Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 381.
- 47 Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 381.
- 48 O. Clemen, "Language of Ukrainian Nationalists - John Paul II and the Orthodox," (In French), *Le Monde*, August 11 (Paris, 1979).
- 49 Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
- 50 *Ibid.*
- 51 Complete text first published in *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, November 11/12, 1979; *La Documentation Catholique* no. 1774, November 18 (Paris 1979); English text from Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
- 52 H. Stehle, "The Ostpolitik of the Vatican and the Polish Pope," *Religion in Communist Countries* XI (1980): 18.
- 53 *Osservatore Romano*, November 14 (Rome 1979); See Stehle, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-382.
- 54 *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* (Russian) IV (April 1981): 6-7.
- 55 *Catholic Press Agency, Information Services*, no. 21, p. 6.
- 56 See no. 54.
- 57 E.g. see article by H. Luznytsky in *Amerika*, July 21, 1981. See the accolades of some Ukrainian Catholic bishops and intellectuals in *Ukrainian Vatican Synod 1980. Pope John Paul II and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. A Documentary.* tr. and ed. by V.J. Pospishil, Stamford, Ct: St. Basil Seminary 1980. Many Ukrainian Catholic newspapers on principle praise and support decisions of the papal curia without ever judging them in the context of social and historical circumstances. Others remain silent.

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