

META

a quarterly journal of
Ukrainian affairs

no.1 fall 1975

\$2.00



Editorial

The current oppositional movement in the USSR emerged in the late fifties as a result of the deepening social and political contradictions of this system. Its primary expression for many years has been the struggle of the intelligentsia for democratic freedoms and of the oppressed nationalities against the Moscow centre. In the late sixties, workers began to respond with increasing frequency to attacks upon their living standards and their political impotence in the productive process. The numerous strikes described in clandestine literature and the reports on labour discipline in official Soviet publications testify to this fact.

One of the most explosive centres of opposition to the policies of the regime has been Ukraine. Here the political and social subjugation of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia is combined with a ruthless policy of Russification, exacerbating existing social divisions and intensifying political domination. Consequently, the activity and demands of Ukrainian oppositionists have become broad and the police measures against

them especially firm. The scope of the KGB (secret police) repressions in Ukraine in 1972 and the fact that the opposition remains active today exemplify this dynamic development.

Since the 1972 repressions, oppositional currents have ceased the public activity of appealing to the rule of law -petitions to state and party authorities- and have increasingly turned to clandestine work. One aspect of this new orientation, confirmed by the contents of issue no. 7-8 of the underground publication Ukrainskyy Visnyk (Ukrainian Herald) is more intensive political discussion on the nature of the struggle and the road towards its resolution. The 1972 events are a boundary between two periods of orientation -the end of appeals to the bureaucracy to reform itself and the beginning of a turn towards organising forces at the base of society. In this sense, we define the period since 1972 as a new one.

Numerous defence committees arose in the late sixties in North America and Europe to express solidarity with the actions of the opposition and to demand the release of the imprisoned. These committees have mobilised considerable support in their work and continuously act as transmission belts of information from the East to the West. Defence actions have simultaneously generated discussion on the Ukrainian question and Soviet society in their broadest dimensions. One of the important consequences of this initiative has been to raise the issue as a concern of the international non-Stalinist left and to seize it from the traditional grasp of anti-communists. This has greatly advanced the struggle on the international arena.

The resurgence of "unofficial" political activity by the intelligentsia and workers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe coincides with the rise of class struggles and national liberation movements throughout the world. For the Ukrainian communities in the western countries, and especially for those milieus which were deeply concerned with the course of the struggle in Ukraine, this process has had profound implications. Soviet writers claim that nationalist youth have rejected their socialisation, and thereby politics as such. This is not the case. The Ukrainian youth in North America have generally departed from their nationalist socialisation, a section of which has also rejected politics altogether. But many have embraced anti-Stalinist and anti-capitalist politics. The publication of Meta is partially a product of these developments.

Indeed, the events of the 1960s had a similar effect upon the youth of the Ukrainian CP communities. Many became depoliticised and some joined the ranks of the anti-Stalinist left. Soviet writers conveniently manage to avoid such embarrassing facts.

While engaging in defence and solidarity work the Ukrainian left milieu is beginning to develop a more rounded critique of Soviet society, its essential contradictions, and the opposition's impact upon these contradictions. In going beyond defence work, our discussion has produced several currents within the milieu as a whole. This process signals a new period of our development, presenting an opportunity for growth and consolidation.

As the struggle in Ukraine moves to a new

level of activism and as related political activity in the West begins to flourish and mature, the need for a continuous forum of discussion and information is posed. The idea of an English language left wing publication on the Ukrainian question has been considered for some time. We believe that the real pre-conditions for its production and distribution now exist- the need for a full and open discussion, a body of writers capable of taking the initiative in this work, the material and technical resources.

The objective of Meta is to concentrate this discussion upon a non-sectarian left wing basis. We invite all currents and individuals to participate, putting forward their ideas, information and proposals. The basic framework of the publishing group is defined by agreement on the following positions:

1. For an Independent Socialist Ukraine;
2. Solidarity with all anti-capitalist struggles;
3. Solidarity with anti-imperialist and national liberation struggles.

Meta will devote its attention to contemporary developments in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, international issues related to Soviet and East European politics, debates on historical and theoretical questions, news and reviews. In this issue, we are reviewing the new Ukrainskyy Visnyk (Ukrainian Herald) and presenting a series of documents related to the coup in Chile. A. Motyl's article on the Ukrainian nationalist movement begins an investigation into this important question. Future numbers will include discussions on anarchism, state capitalist and other theories of Soviet society, the 1917 Revolution, etc.

We invite you to join with us in this project. We welcome contributions in the form of articles, information, reviews and suggestions on available materials. Assistance in publicising and distributing Meta will be greatly appreciated.

META PRESS FUND

META is establishing a press fund to assist the journal in covering its printing and operational costs.

If you support the development of our publication, we ask you to assist us financially by contributing to our PRESS FUND.

Please make cheques/money orders payable to META, and please send them to the following address:

META,
P.O.Box 376,
Station B,
Toronto, Ontario,
CANADA.

The Meaning of the New Ukrainian Herald

by Taras Lehkyj

Issue 7-8 of the Ukrainskyy Visnyk (Ukrainian Herald) began to circulate clandestinely in Soviet Ukraine in the spring of 1974. One year later, it has been published in the West. Its contents indicate a break with the political framework of past compilers of Visnyk - from the reformist democratic current of the national opposition to a hardening nationalist orientation. Today's editor(s) is (are) not of the same group which published the first six issues. Furthermore, it is not known whether the former editors of the publication have themselves attempted to revive the journal in the reformist democratic tradition. Whatever the situation may be in Ukraine - and the lack of information makes it a difficult one to assess - the new Visnyk represents the emergence of a new nationalist current in the opposition. This phenomenon warrants further investigation.

The fall of P. Shelest as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine brought an end to the period of autonomous republican tendencies within the party apparatus and the measure of freedom en-

joyed by the republican intelligentsia. During the Shelest period, an oppositional current within the intelligentsia mobilised for democratisation of Soviet society and the implementation of reforms aimed at alleviating national oppression and Russification. At the same time, this intelligentsia utilised educational, cultural and other state institutions in taking independent initiatives to eliminate the worst vestiges of Stalinist rule in Ukraine - the suppression of the Ukrainian language in the workplace, strict censorship controls over publications, radio and television, the abysmal state of the humanities and scientific faculties of the educational system. This pressure from the new intelligentsia infected other sectors of the population, inspiring them to take part in actions protesting illegal trials against oppositionists. At the same time, notable figures, such as Dzyuba presented the demands of the opposition, not as aspirations of one social layer, but in the interests of the broad masses.

Throughout the 1960s, the full wrath of the KGB was blocked by the autonomous initiatives of 'shelestivshchyna' ('the reign of Shelest'). An explanation for this may be found in the relationship between the regime and the intelligentsia, where the latter's social weight was used as a lever by Shelest to assert his policies in the face of the Moscow centre. This partial shadow of protection over some oppositionists (particularly those in the Writers Union of Ukraine) did not affect the fate of outspoken activists and nationalist circles, such as the Ukrainian National Committee and the United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine, which were viciously suppressed.

With the fall of Shelest and the reassertion of control by the Brezhnev clique, far reaching purges of the Party and arrests of oppositionists began.

That section of the opposition which survived this dragnet has retreated underground in order to regroup for new actions. Significant in this period is not only the clandestine form of oppositional activity, but also the processes of ideological realignment taking place within these forms. A tendency towards regroupment along political lines, ideologically and programmatically is stimulated primarily by the failure of past strategies. Issue 7-8 of Visnyk represents the hardening of a nationalist force.

The editorial statement of Visnyk defines its line in the following way:

Our journal will adopt a clearly defined political position directed by an uncompromising, anti-colonial orientation. We shall try to unite all democratic, anti-colonial groups in Ukraine around our organ, because it is only in such a direction that we see progress in broadening the national liberation struggle and the struggle for democracy. (p.7)

This general statement of politics is not systematically elaborated; certain elements of the publication group's analysis and programme appear scattered throughout the two major articles 'Partial Collaboration and Clever Diplomacy' and 'Ethnocide of the Ukrainian People'.

The former article is devoted to an analysis of the current development of Soviet-American relations. The author, Sahaydak states that detente has strengthened the Soviet regime, providing it with economic concessions in times of agricultural and technological crises and with an effective international diplomatic cover for internal repressions. The US

government, Sahaydak writes, should demand human rights guarantees as part of economic and scientific exchange agreements. (p26)

The author is, nevertheless, cynical about the possibilities of such exchange agreements containing clauses on human rights. The article recognises that leading American circles are not motivated by humanitarian considerations. Rather than "stemming the tide of Stalinism", American capital is only interested in profiting financially from such agreements. The fact that such agreements have, on occasion, pulled the USSR out of economic crisis, food shortages and temporarily saved the bureaucracy from the full wrath of the masses are of little concern to American monopoly capital. (p.26)

Sahaydak represents a growing current within the opposition which has begun to understand the true nature of the American economic and political system. In the 1950s, when the international economic boom provided Soviet observers with an 'eternal paradise' scenario of the US, as a bourgeois democracy and healthy economic organism, few held a critical view of capitalism. Since 1969, this facade has begun to crumble and a new sober assessment of the international capitalist crisis has reached the oppositional circles. This assessment is not gleaned from the pages of Pravda, which no-one trusts as a source of 'truth', but via letters from Jewish emigres, and other first hand sources.

For the current represented by Sahaydak's writings, the United States represents no real alternative today:

Between the USSR and the American monopolies there are common threads:
the USSR - one gigantic monopoly

with a fascist state form of rule. In the USA the monopolies are smaller, but there are more of them. But all monopolies lead to totalitarianism. Taking into account the democratic political order in the US, the American monopolies cannot yet seize full political control; but that doesn't mean they do not want to. Some in the US state institutions have a taste for a political system like the USSR. (pp.29-30)

While calling for 'real universal co-operation' through international diplomacy, Sahaydak warns that such co-operation is impossible without the democratisation of the USSR. "Without this condition, the USA ends up in the position (how many times now) where it arms the hands of the vandal and thus becomes a partner in crime against humanity." (p.32)

At best, this first article betrays confusion on the issue of international perspectives for the struggle in Ukraine. On the one hand, Visnyk is for international co-operation between state powers. On the other, recent observation shows that the American state is interested in detente for economic gain, representing the interests of capital, and the Soviet bureaucracy cannot do without it in a period of economic and political crisis. The problem lies in the control of foreign policy by the bureaucracy in one country, and American capital interests in the other.

In spite of these disquieting revelations, Visnyk issue 7-8 ends with an appeal to Kurt Waldheim and the United Nations to investigate the closed trials, prisons and psychiatric hospitals, to send a supervisory team to Ukraine to observe new elections, to discuss the issue of 'Soviet-Russian colonialism' in the United Nations, etc. (p.146)

The article 'Ethnocide of the Ukrainian People' offers a deeper insight into the historical appreciation of the Ukrainian question that the authors hold and the lessons they draw for the struggle today. The article reviews the process of Russification in Ukraine since the October Revolution. There is nothing new in the empirical data, except for the most recent two years. The analysis of the roots of Russification is hardly original.

Apart from the poetry section appearing on the first pages of Visnyk, the critique of the Revolution of 1917 approximates most accurately the Dontsovian nationalist tradition. The authors condemn the establishment of the USSR, viewing it as an essential continuation of the policies of the Tsarist period. Lenin is considered to be the prime mover of the Revolution, being 'brilliantly capable of creating thundering slogans for every significant moment, which had a magical influence on the dark, ignorant masses.' (p.43) Stalin was his faithful pupil who 'solved' the national question in 'a truly Leninist manner'. (p.48, p.71) The actions of Bolsheviks throughout their history, writes Visnyk, have been guided by the Great Russian chauvinist traditions of the dominant nation. Those in Ukraine who followed the Bolsheviks were swayed by the 'illusions' of national communism. (p.48)

The authors call for an independent Ukrainian state. In posing the goal of statehood, they assert that 'without the resolution of the national question, it is not possible to solve the social question.' In the context of the whole article 'Ethnocide of the Ukrainian People', this position suggests that the primary obstacle to self determination for the Ukrainian population is its unequal alliance with the Russian nation. Statehood severs the ties between the nations - the task of altering social re-

lations inside Ukraine is a separate and second task of the Ukrainian revolution.

'The Generalised Pogrom', a section appearing in the same article provides new information concerning the purges in the Party since the fall of Shelest, the universities and polytechnics. By current East European standards, the police measure since 1972 have been massive against an equally massive discontent. In the Lviv area alone, there were one thousand arrests and searches from January to March 1972. Three thousand pieces of samvydav literature were confiscated. (p.125)

The brutality of the bureaucratic apparatus has been directed not only at political activists, but also at all expressions of national consciousness. Churches and historical monuments, symbols of a national identity, have been vandalised by gangs of hooligans paid by the KGB; popular institutions have been closed and gatherings dispersed. This practice has been especially severe during the yearly celebrations commemorating the return of Shevchenko's body to Ukraine and during Easter. (p.125)

Essentially, these repressions indicate the constant fear the bureaucracy has of the masses, their popular points of reference and resistance, and of the intelligentsia who seek to unite with the broad social layers. After the November 1972 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, an internal letter from the Central Committee was circulated to Party organs stressing that 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists were using the Ukrainian language as a means of nationalist propaganda.' (p.113) Nothing expresses the profound estrangement between the rulers and the ruled better than this hysterical fantasy of the bureaucracy's imagination.

There can be no doubt that the nationalist current will play an important role in the next period of oppositional regroupment. As long as Russification remains a major weapon against the Ukrainian masses, dividing it socially and culturally, denying it access to educational institutions under Stalinist control, it will create the appropriate conditions for nationalist activity. Great Russian chauvinism will be spontaneously countered by Ukrainian nationalism. The conditions in Western Ukraine provide its most fertile breeding ground. The tradition of armed struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is a powerful point of historical reference in this region.

In assessing the meaning and importance of the new Visnyk, several considerations should be noted. First of all, Visnyk confirms the view that the oppositionists in Ukraine have entered a period of political discussion and greater clandestinity. The effort placed into this publication is indicative of such appropriation of energies. This can only be greeted as a step forward in the struggle, regaining of balance after the 1972 crackdown. Its militancy and uncompromising spirit in the face of severe reprisals stand in sharp contrast to the tone of the sixties.

Secondly, the limited information in this publication is explained by two factors: the general atomisation of society and a self-imposed isolation of the Visnyk group. There are undoubtedly other new currents and groupings in the opposition. The present strength of the nationalist groups will only be properly assessed when information about other activities comes to light. It appears from the information provided in Issue 7-8 that the Visnyk group is limited largely to Western Ukraine.

A third consideration is the politics and perspectives of the nationalist wing. The 7th-8th Visnyk is not a statement of politics addressing itself to a solution of the Ukrainian question. Programmatic points (eg. independence) appear as commentaries in the article 'Ethnocide of the Ukrainian People'. The editorial's main points focus upon 'anti-colonialism' and 'democracy' and the stated aim of regrouping forces which agree with these vague positions. Notable in their absence are sections on the social question and the historical division between the Western Ukrainian nationalism and the Eastern Ukrainian proletariat. The national and social questions in Ukraine have suffered traditional counterposition in movements, and in programmes. The Visnyk group elevates the class question in Ukraine to the level of moralism, but fails to grasp its political implications in a national liberation struggle. Consequently, the unity between the different groups Visnyk is attempting to attract may be based on the moral indignation felt by nationally conscious intellectuals, and not by a programme and strategy which they forward to fuse with broader social layers.

The Visnyk group succeeds in projecting a healthy hatred for the bureaucracy and its repressive organs. If it wishes to regroup all 'democratic and anticolonial' forces around its journal, it has yet to state on what basis it wishes to do so.

Forthcoming in the Fall from the Committee
for the Defence of Soviet Political
Prisoners-

Inside Soviet Prisons

Contents

- Interview with Soviet political prisoners
in Perm Camp no. 35
- My Past Remembered (Excerpts) by Danylo
Shumuk
- Open Letter from Semyon Gluzman
- Statement of Baltic, Ukrainian and
Caucasian political prisoners to the
Supreme Soviet
- A Manual of Psychiatry for Dissidents
- Tatyana Khodorovych on Leonid Plyushch

Plus an extensive list of nearly 1,000
Soviet political prisoners; prisoner
biographies; appeals and petitions; more.

Price: \$2.00 per copy.

Order from: Committee for the Defense
of Soviet Political Prisoners
P.O. Box 142, Cooper Station,
New York City, NY 10003
USA.

Dossier:

Chile and Eastern Europe

by Ihor Tetelycky

Introduction

The September 1973 coup in Chile and the establishment of the military junta led by Augusto Pinochet aroused popular indignation throughout the world. The defence of victims of the junta and campaigns in solidarity with the resistance continue today. In addition to participating in defence and solidarity work, Ukrainian socialists are concerned with yet another dimension of this question. This dimension is the relationship between Eastern Europe and the events in Chile and the position taken by leading Ukrainian nationalist circles in the West on the Pinochet regime.

On the international diplomatic level, the response of the Soviet and East European governments did not extend much beyond verbal denunciations of the coup. The Chinese bureaucracy was draped in the infamous glory of having closed its embassy in Santiago to those seeking asylum throughout the coup. The Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, bewildered by the

sudden fate of the peaceful road to socialism, raised the call to defend incarcerated militants and trampled democratic rights.

Within the seemingly uniform camp of the Soviet and East European states, however, other voices were heard. In this dossier, we are printing two such documents. The first is the letter of thirty imprisoned Czechoslovak oppositionists to the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists. In this letter, the prisoners declared their solidarity with the struggle in Chile and condemned the junta. At the same time, they denounced the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists, who while denouncing the Pinochet regime, were silent about the repressions in Czechoslovakia itself. The second document, taken from the December 10, 1974 issue of the Chronicle of Current Events (Moscow) records the position of four Soviet Ukrainian political prisoners who took a stand in defence of junta victims.

The third document is an interview with Mrs. Yaroslava Stetsko, high ranking member of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) (Bandera wing), of the Anti-Bolshevik League of Nations, and of the World Anti-Communist League. Stetsko visited Chile in December 1974.

A heated debate arose within the nationalist emigration over the issue of Chile after the Ukrainian student newspaper Student (Toronto, Canada) published a denunciation of OUN activities in relation to the Pinochet regime. This denunciation was countered by a stream of articles and editorials in

the nationalist press from Canada, USA, Argentina and West Germany. The content of these articles amounted to "red-baiting" ("Trotskyist, Maoist, Titoist, Castroist"), denunciations of the Student editorial board as 'opportunist', 'russophile', 'suffering from an inferiority complex', and the like. Suprisingly, few facts and considerable distortion accompanied these articles. The following issue of Student responded with a longer article, reaffirming the validity of the original positions.

The OUN initiatives in Chile are not exceptional if viewed in the context of a growing right wing orientation of the nationalists on various international issues over the past few years. These are evident in the merging of one section of the traditional anti-communist East European leaderships in the West with indigenous reaction in Latin America, Europe and North America. The Stetsko leadership in OUN has been in the forefront of this steady merger.

During the debate on Chile within the Ukrainian community, two factors have been absent. One is the failure to understand the real impact which Stetsko's visit to Chile had upon the prestige of the Pinochet regime and upon the Ukrainian question internationally. There can be no doubt that the Stetsko visit, occuring at a time when the junta was uniformly condemned internationally - a fact known by Chilean workers and peasants - provided it with valuable ideological support to dangle before the demoralised Chileans (see interview for publicity surrounding Stetsko's

trip). Pinochet's agreement to defend Moroz and other prisoners in the Soviet Union did great harm to their chances for liberation.

The second unsatisfactory aspect of the debate on Chile, which manifested itself in the nationalists' attacks upon the Ukrainian left is a lack or conscious ignorance of the facts. The latter factor alone requires that we reproduce on these pages exactly what was said and done by Stetsko.

The first six months of the Unidad Popular in office saw major gains for the Chilean proletariat and peasantry.~ (The UP is a coalition whose two principle elements are the Socialist Party - of which Allende was a member - and the Communist Party, which in all important matters directed the political course taken by the UP). Unemployment and inflation went down and industrial production and real wages went up. A number of key industries (including copper) were nationalised; production and administration councils were set up in nationalised factories, and neighborhood committees were created. By the time of the municipal elections of April 1971, a whole layer of the urban petit bourgeoisie had joined the workers to give Allende a 50.9% victory, an increase of 14% over the September elections which had brought him into power.

The economic prosperity of the first few months soon passed as excess industrial capacity became exhausted, the unofficial blockade by U.S. imperialism and the internal

manoeuvres by the threatened bourgeoisie began to take their toll. The United States whose profits on one billion dollars investment were yielding 500 million dollars per year, was able to secure a drop in the world copper prices and ensure that Chile was to receive no more credits from world monetary funds.

In 1971, it was evident that Chilean capitalists would attempt to undermine the power of the UP government. On the occasion of Fidel Castro's visit to Chile, during which he warned the UP of the growing danger of fascism, the Right mobilised tens of thousands of women in the infamous "march of empty pots". By September-October 1972, the bourgeoisie, which by this time was heavily supported by the CIA, organised a strike of truck owners, shopkeepers, and professionals. The strike was quelled with strong support from the Chilean proletariat. However, the UP government had to make concessions, the most important of which was the installation of three top military figures in the cabinet.

By December 1972, inflation was the highest in the world at 164%. Nonetheless, the masses returned the UP back into office in the spring with 43% of the vote - a drop of 7% from the year before. The situation was stalemated: the UP was still unable to get control of congress, and big business (which could not allow the transition to socialism) realised that a relatively peaceful return to executive power was still out of the question.

The Right then began a process of concentrating and testing its strength. On July 29,

1972 such a test of strength manifested itself as an attempted coup by approximately 100 soldiers from the Second Regiment. There had been fears that such a coup was in the making. The Christian Democratic Party came out with the following statement previous to the attempted coup:

What we fear most is that some right wing group will go off half-cocked against Allende. That would be just what he wants. He could put on emergency powers, suspend the constitution, and rule by decree. We'd be finished as an opposition.

These fears have proven to be a bit exaggerated. Although the coup did occur and although Allende emerged from the situation in a strengthened position, such measures were not used. Following the failure of the coup, five top leaders of the fascist group Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Freedom) sought asylum in the Ecuadorian Embassy in Santiago. With the crushing of the revolt, Allende moved to consolidate the position of his Popular Unity government.

Opposition to the Popular Unity government was not, however, confined to the right wing. There were numerous strikes and demonstrations by the Chilean proletariat. One of the greatest problems facing the workers was the dizzying rise in the cost of living. A case in point is the strike by the Public Works employees. The government insinuated that this strike was initiated by the right wing, and later had to suffer the consequences when the facts proved such an insinuation to have no merit in the case

of these workers. In fact, it gave the workers a chance to demonstrate their anti-rightist determination in sharp contrast to the timidity of the Popular Unity. In turn, the government's anti-popular attitude made itself clearer to the workers.

Throughout this period, the revolutionary left in Chile - and internationally - sharply criticised the UP government's "Peaceful Road to Socialism". It was understood by the revolutionary left that in order to build socialism, the bourgeois structures of government and of the armed forces had to be overthrown; and that the proletariat must be allowed to organise in order to defend its gains against right wing attack. Capitalists in Chile would not stand by to witness their own expropriation and became increasingly willing to utilise the extreme right and the generals of the armed forces against a highly conscious workers movement. Fidel Castro foresaw this and at one of his meetings with Allende presented him with a machine gun. This was not only a suggestion for Allende himself, but a suggestion that the Chilean proletariat be prepared to defend itself. Armed defence did not take place in isolated areas by the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria - Movement of the Revolutionary Left).

On September 11, 1973 the forces of the Chilean army, air force, navy, and police united to topple the Popular Unity government of Salvadore Allende. The entire weight of the Chilean state was brought to bear against the workers movement and the revolutionary left. Working class militants

with arms in hand, thousands of workers as well as soldiers fell in the ensuing struggle. The Military Junta, cognizant of the hatred of its rule by the masses resorted to the most barbaric measures including aerial bombing, strafing of key factories and the summary execution of trade union and left wing militants.

In order to clearly demonstrate the events which occurred immediately after the coup, one need only study the reports which were released by the International Commission of Jurists. In May 1974, a delegation went to Chile to investigate the situation. This is part of the report which they submitted: "For every detainee who has been released in recent months, at least two new arrests have been made." From May to August, the junta made 700 known political arrests. Most of the arrests were carried out without warrants by unidentified persons in civilian dress armed with machine guns.

Six hundred arrests have been made since the killing on October 5 of Miguel Enriquez, leader of the MIR. In addition to these arrests of individuals, 10,000 to 15,000 persons have been detained in massive roundups in the shantytowns. The commission concluded that the roundups are an effort to intimidate the population, pointing out that most of those arrested in the roundups are released seven to ten days later. The commission's findings also stated that General Augusto Pinochet's announcement of September 11 that the "state of war" was being lifted and that most prisoners who were prepared to go abroad would be released was primarily

"designed for external consumption." The Chilean legal system, the commission reported "continues to contravene basic principles of justice accepted by civilian nations." More than 22,000 persons - 15,000 Chileans and 7500 foreign residents - have been driven out of Chile since the coup, according to a report in the September 22 issue of the Mexico City Daily Excelsior.

The International Commission of Jurists published its report just one day after the White House delegation abstained from voting on a UN resolution urging the Pinochet government to restore human rights and to free political prisoners. The basis for the abstention, according to W. Tapley Bennet Jr., a member of the American delegation, was that the resolution had not alluded to the improvement of the situation in the previous months.

The Contradictions of the New Regime

Some of the coup's supporters hoped for an "economic miracle", but to date they have been disappointed. The junta has produced an economic disaster. Inflation continues to run wild, the official rate being the highest in the world- 746% for 1973 and another 103% for the first five months of 1974.

This price rampage has shrunk wages at such a rate that even the ability of the workers to show up at the factories every morning and provide a day's labour has been called into question. The junta, realising that it is rather difficult to extract profit from a starving population, has made some concessions

on the wage front- approximately 400% across the board. Nevertheless, wages in real terms are the lowest in thirty years. The junta has sought for a year to cut domestic consumption, increase exploitation and encourage exports, but they must face the embarrassing reality that production is now below pre-coup levels. This condition will hardly attract foreign capital in the quantities so badly needed by the junta in order to bolster the private sector, swollen by the reprivatisation of formerly nationalised industries. Thus, even those supposedly benefiting from the coup- the big bourgeoisie, the largest landowners and the foreign capitalists- are not happy with the state of the economy, although it is clear that they have no alternative to Pinochet at the moment.

Failing to rejuvenate the economy, the generals have watched their social base dwindle. There were many middle class Chileans who found themselves caught between two great social forces as the coup approached. They naively believed that the junta would save them and their minor property holdings and return the country to a state of normality. Immediately following the coup, the junta received the support of these strata by a campaign of hysterical denunciations- against Marxism, foreign subversion, the corruption of the UP, the decadence of modern life, etc. But after the initial shock of the coup wore off, the appeal of such hysteria began to diminish. It became increasingly difficult to blame the Marxists and the working class for everything. At least under the UP, the middle classes were free to express their political opinions. The party which they largely supported, the Christian Democratic Party, was able to run in elections. Now they

are denied even this form of participation.

The shopkeepers, the small businessmen, the salaried employees and the professionals have also suffered a loss of real income under the junta; not as great as that suffered by the working class, but significant nonetheless. Moreover, the security promised by the generals has proven to be an illusion. Pinochet's generals are deeply hated by the vast majority of the population. The middle classes are beginning to realise just how insecure a regime based on naked terror really is.

The leadership of the Christian Democrats who supported the coup and came to power after it now openly chafes under the dictatorship which bans its activities and refuses to hold any form of show election in which it could participate. Hypocritically, the CD leadership now protests the repression in an effort to maintain control over its disaffected base. Even the Catholic bishops, who originally supported the junta have come out against its "excesses".

It would be incorrect, however, to view the Chilean defeat as total in character. In the first place, the national and international conditions do not permit stabilisation. Therefore, the social base and staying power of the regime is considerably reduced.

Secondly, Chile is distinguished from almost every Latin American country by its long history of very powerful working class organisations both on the trade union, but more importantly, political levels. Prior to the coup, the Chilean working class reached a level of poli-

tical consciousness and maturity unparalleled in Latin America.

Thirdly, despite the ferocity of the repression, the workers' movement has not been totally crushed. Its survival is reflected in the continued existence of the MIR, the Communist Party and clandestine factory and neighborhood centres of worker militants. Likewise, there are signs of resistance on a broader scale by the working class: production slowdowns, sabotage of machinery, massive absenteeism, and even more, strikes.

The fall in production below pre-coup levels is, in part, a result of this resistance. At first, resistance occurred as the isolated acts of individuals. Now, gradually, it is becoming better organised and planned by resistance committees formed on the shop floor. For example, techniques of slowdown and sabotage have been cooperatively organised so that it becomes impossible to detect where they are occurring, thus making it more difficult for the regime's informers to pick off individual militants.

In the final analysis, the most crucial problems of resistance are not merely ones of organisation and military preparation, however real and pressing these matters are. For who precisely is to be organised, on what terms and for what purposes? It is in developing clear answers to these questions, questions of political strategy, that the resistance ultimately moves forward or falters.

1.

Prague
June 18 - July 8,
1974.

To the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists,
Namesti Curieovych 7,
Praha 1. Stare Mesto.

On June 14, the Czechoslovak press published a petition of protest from the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists about the events in Chile. The document affirmed that the Association was gravely concerned by the news of the violations of legality and of the increasing terror against the patriotic and progressive forces in the country.

The Association condemned the persecution, torture and mass executions of the Chilean patriots. In its resolution, it called for the re-establishment of constitutional and democratic liberties, and stated that the representatives of the Chilean people are totally deprived of their civil rights and legal protection. The organisation of Czechoslovak Jurists demanded the right to attend the trial of Louis Corvalan (imprisoned leader of the Chilean Communist Party- trans.) in order to participate in his and other patriots' defence.

We are of the opinion that it is the task of all progressive people throughout the world to do everything in their power to give total support, both material and moral, to the revolutionary and democratic Chileans, in their struggle for a democratic and socialist society. If it is only today that we are expressing our views, it is because some of us have not previously had the chance.

Therefore, we now declare, that we are entirely in solidarity with the struggle of the progressive forces in Chile and that we unequivocally condemn the actions of the fascist junta. We believe that we have the full right to express this solidarity, because the ideals, objectives, and frequently a common lot, unify us with the Chilean progressives. But we refuse you this right, Gentlemen of the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists. We are not aware of any instance where your association has intervened to defend the rights of man, civil liberties, or to ensure that legality is respected in our own country. Do you think that it is correct from the point of view of legality and its social functions, that during the past few years tens of thousands of our fellow citizens have lost their jobs and have been forced to work in positions for which they are not qualified? Is this justice when the children to so-called "bad" (non-party members-trans.) parents have no right to go to high schools and universities? Do you think it is just that many of our fellow citizens have been slandered in our press for their political activities, and did not have a chance to defend themselves? Are you convinced, Gentlemen of the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists, that in our country freedoms of speech, of assembly, of organising, of travelling in and

out of the country, and the freedom of scientific research are guaranteed? Do you think that from the point of view of penal rights and their social function, that it is correct to condemn someone to death for leading "a particularly dangerous activity against the foundations of the republic.....if it results in very serious consequences", knowing from experience that all political activity which does not please the present group of leaders can be designated as hostile to the regime of the republic? Is it correct that, according to a still more moderate clause, 47 communists and socialists were condemned in 1972 to long prison terms (up to six and one half years)? For example, Milan Hubl, former rector of Higher Education in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Jaroslav Meznik and Anton Rusek, university professors, Alfred Cerny, Jaroslav Sabata and Jaroslav Litera, regional secretaries of the CCP, Jan Tesar, a historian, Jiri Muller, a student leader and many others. Are you convinced that these people were tried legally, that during the pre-trial "briefing" no physical or psychological torture was used? Do you think that the rules on the publicity of the debates at the trials was respected? Are you sure that lawyers from democratic organisations of jurists did not ask to attend the political trials which took place between 1969 and 1974, and if they did, were they allowed to attend? Are you convinced that political prisoners, communists and socialists, are not subjected to worse prison conditions than the criminals of common law? Are political prisoners sufficiently fed, do they suffer from vitamin deficiencies, do they have satisfactory medical care, is their basic development assured, or does one try to liquidate them by using the psychological

horrors of solitary confinement?

We all live in the same country and all of us know the real state of things. If the responsibility of this situation is incumbent on each one of us, then your responsibility is all that much greater, because you are better informed and you have more possibilities of changing or attenuating the present state of affairs. Moreover, we are convinced, and this is based on personal experience, that if you consider all the Czechoslovak jurists, your organisation clearly lacks a representative character.

Your resolution denouncing the fascist junta and supporting civil rights in Chile is hypocritical. Your statements can only ring false. We, political prisoners, who have been imprisoned in Czechoslovakia during the first half of the 1970s are united by a narrow thread of friendship, solidarity, and agreement or affinity of ideas and actions with the socialists, communists, revolutionary marxists, christians and other democratic Chileans, according to our different convictions. But you, nothing unites you with them, and hypocritical words will never hide this. Your role is only to maintain the state of affairs which prevails in our country, and this is characterised, amongst other things, by the growth of trade between Czechoslovakia and the fascist Chilean junta as well as by the refusal of Czechoslovakia to offer asylum to Chilean refugees.

We are convinced that the just struggle of our Chilean friends and comrades against fascism and terror, and their struggle for democracy, freedom and socialism will triumph. We would

be happy if they could learn that they have many authentic allies in Czechoslovakia.

Prague, 18 June - 8 July,
1974.

Copies sent to:

1. Miroslav Moc, editor in Chief of Rude Pravo, which published the resolution of the Association of Czechoslovak Jurists on June 14. We demand that Mr. Moc publish our letter in Rude Pravo.
2. Gustav Husak - for his information.
3. J. Nemec, Minister of Justice - for his information.
4. The Union of Chilean Students in Czechoslovakia - for their information.

CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL PRISONERS
SENTENCED BETWEEN 1969 and 1974.

Karel Bartosek	Josef Stehlik
Rudolf Battek	Jaroslav Suk
Ivan Binar	Jan Svoboda
Jan Dus	Jan Sabata
Karel Fridrych	Hana Sabatova jr.
Ladislav Hajdanek	Pavel Sremr
Jiri Hochman	Zdenek Sumavsky
Karel Kaplan	Petruska Sustrova
Vavrinec Korcis	Ales Richter
Anna Koutna	Zuzana Richterova
Bohmir Kuba	Petr Uhl
Vit Lepil	Zdenek Vasicek
Jan Lestinsky	Premysl Vondra
Vladimir Nepras	Radko Vyoralak
Jan Schopf	Vaclay Sabata

2.

Chronicle of Current Events, Moscow,
December 10, 1974.

NADIA SVITLYCHNA, IRYNA STASIV-KALENETS, NINA STROKATA and STEFANIA *SHABATURA, four Soviet women political prisoners, made an appeal to camp authorities of Labour Camp #3 in Barashevo, Mordovian ASSR, proposing that their wages at the hard labour camps be assigned to a fund for victims of the Chilean junta. They also demanded that a representative from the women political prisoners be allowed to attend the Congress of the International Democratic Federation of Women. Both demands were denied by camp authorities.

* For further information on the condition of these prisoners, see the NEWS section in this issue of Meta.

3.

Naumovych: Finally. my discussant Yaroslava Stetsko spoke about Chile:

Four days in Argentina passed quickly and it was already time to bid farewell in order to catch the plane for Chile in time. I don't have to tell you that this country, in the light of the recent upheaval there, interested me very much and the possibility of seeing the reality with my own eyes was very tempting.

At the airport, they hardly looked at my visa from the Chilean embassy in Argentina; the official immediately stamped it, no one searched my baggage, there was no sign of anything unusual. On the way to the centre of the capital my impressions were not the best; surrounded by grey mountains, the city with the same grey roofs looked rather depressing and sad. Right inside the city it was extremely hot. It was impossible to breathe. But the city reverberated with life: the streets were draped with Christmas tree decorations, and below them masses of people streamed out of stores with huge purchases, happy and content. Chile, a country of copper, wood products, and semi-precious stones, therefore, on the street bazaars everything aplenty--one was tempted to buy a copper plate, but there was neither time nor space in the queues.

It is as easy to get to the building of the Chilean President as it is, for example, to get to a bank. The policeman who stands at the entrance is only there to point to the corridor or the room of the person one requests. The President's Chief of Protocol works out of the second floor and we were directed that way by some internal army personnel of the building. The tall and personable Chief spoke classical French, and having already received a telephone call from a superior, immediately took to organising my stay in the country, placing the whole propaganda apparatus at my disposal: press, radio and television. Two of the most important (newspapers) Mercurio and Segunda took interviews from me. We got to the very director of the radio and television building without the least difficulty.

Taking all this into account, my view is this: there is no terror to be seen in Chile, the population is in no way worried. On the contrary; filling the entire park, people quietly listened to the music of an army band, and in the churches and cathedrals pre-Christmas masses were being celebrated.

I was very puzzled by the fact that the director of the interview was a Russian from the Don. He was born on the Don, lived for some time in France and came to Chile "apatriadum" (stateless) because he didn't seek Chilean citizenship. He was very polite towards us, and declaring himself an anti-communist, allowed me to speak freely while he recorded my speech on tape, giving me two personal copies.

On this occasion we learnt that Chilean radio broadcasts in various languages. After our

discussion it will now be possible to broadcast a Ukrainian language programme every week. But that will depend on the director and the content of our programme. (I chided in my heart our youth who go into medicine or engineering, and neglect such professions as those of mass communications!)

The same can be said of our enquiries to President Pinochet, who granted us an audience, thanked us for our memorandum prepared for him with all necessary informations, and assured us that he will continue to support the issue of release of political prisoners and also our request to the United Nations for the admission of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement on the same basis as the Palestinian. We greeted this sympathetic assurance with gratitude, and are now awaiting its results.

During our stay in Santiago de Chile, where, by the way, two Ukrainian families found us and hosted us - Mssrs. Didyk and Lyakhovych, owners of hide factories - there appeared interviews in the leading two dailies of the city.

I quickly looked over the articles from, up to now, two dailies, and have decided to introduce several excerpts.

La Segunda (21 Dec. 1974) giving a large headline, 'Wife of former prime minister asks for freedom for political prisoners in the USSR', and in the text we read, among other things: 'A woman who fights for the freedom of her country and for the release of thousands of political prisoners in the Soviet Union, in particular for her national hero Valentyn Moroz, is on a visit to Chile. Her life - devoted to the just cause of

Ukraine's liberation through work in ABN and publications - has made this woman a fine example of a fighter for the lost freedoms of the peoples of the USSR. This is Mrs. Slava Stetsko, member of the Central Committee of ABN and wife of Yaroslav Stetsko, prime-minister of Ukraine before her rich lands were plundered by Russia.

Her three-day mission to Chile has as its goal to convey Christmas greetings to the Head of State and to thank him for his intervention into the issue of the release of many political prisoners who languish in the cold prisons beyond the Iron Curtain.

This dynamic woman, who incidently edits Ukrainian Review since 1944,described in a few words her life from the moment communist Moscow seized Ukraine.

The free press of the Western world is infiltrated to the extent - continues Mrs. Stetsko, - that people often distort our thoughts. We believe that here in Chile we will be correctly understood because you had the opportunity to experience communism yourselves, on your own skin. And that isn't easy to forget. Ukraine's struggle is not well known, and it is falsely portrayed. Ukraine has a position in the UN, and someone may think its a free country. The reality is however quite different. Muscovite imperialism denies the Ukrainian people their existence It even changed the name once to Malorosiya (Little Russia) and banned the use of the language.

Las Ultimas Noticias (22 Dec. 1974) gives the article the following head: "Anticommunist fighter visits Chile", and in the article we read

"Primarily to thank President Pinochet for his decision to uphold the issue of political prisoners in the Soviet Union - Mrs. Slava Stetsko finds herself in Chile, brilliantly intellectual individualist, renowned fighter for the freedom of her people and country - Ukraine (...)

In addition to thanking the President of the state General Augusto Pinochet (...) Mrs. Stetsko is asking for support from the Chilean government in the attempts of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement (Ukrainskyy Vyzvolnyj Rykh) to get a place in the UN like Afarat did.

Las Ultimas Noticias further informs about the period and conditions in which ABN arose, its tasks and goal, and the number of people (150,000,000) that this Bloc represents. There follows an interesting section entitled 'The Chilean Reality'.

"Mrs. Slava Stetsko travels regularly around the world, giving speeches at anti-communist congresses. Her three-day visit to Chile helped her understand the real picture of the people and history of recent events in this country. "In all my future appearances," she said, "I will tell the truth about your beautiful land and will strive to contradict that distorted picture which your Muscovite enemies are spreading around the world". In the near future she will be giving a series of lectures in

Canada and the U.S., and quite recently she was in Brazil where the World Anti-Communist Congress is being prepared, and at which Mrs. Stetsko will forward a motion of thanks to the Chilean Republic for its blessed initiative for the release of political prisoners of all the captive Nations, including Cuba".

Caption under the photograph: Mrs. Slava Stetsko with Maria Poloz, representative of Ukrainians in Argentina who is accompanying her in Chile.

.



GERMAN ADMINISTRATION IN THE OCCUPIED EAST

It is an unfortunate fact that most works concerned with Ukrainian nationalism are marked by a singular lack of quality - primarily the result of a methodological approach that is too narrow in its scope and too simplistic in its analysis. The dynamism, fluidity and, what is of most importance, the complexity of Ukrainian nationalism are usually ignored with the consequence that an overblown and blurred picture is presented as the reality. The truth of this is most obviously apparent from even a casual perusal of Ukrainian emigre treatments of the subject (Soviet studies are not even worth commenting upon). An exaggerated sense of importance and isolation, along with the lack of any kind of historical perspective - a consideration of the socio-economic foundations of nationalism is almost blasphemous as regards its insinuations - are the least distasteful qualities of such treatments. What is more, even as serious a study as John Armstrong's "seminal" Ukrainian Nationalism, remarkable as it was for its many good points, was even more remarkable for its omissions, such as, for example, the lack of even a short discussion of Galicia, the "birthplace" of the nationalist movement. The final result is indeed curious: those studies which treat Ukrainian nationalism as a chapter within the context of a book only peripherally related to the nationalist movement often present it in a more multifaceted and therefore more accurate light than many studies that focus on the subject alone. Their one obvious drawback is, of course, that their discussions are much too short.

As was stated above, the most outstanding and, it would seem, most often unrecognised feature of Ukrainian nationalism is its complexity. This means three things: that the nationalist movement was not a monolithic movement; that it was not the only ongoing political and/or military phenomenon of its time; and that it was above all a product of the social (to be understood in the broadest possible sense) conditions existent in Western Ukraine in the inter-war period which had their roots in Galicia's distinct historical past.

A simple application of these three principles is that the popularly accepted scheme of linear development from the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) to the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and finally to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is in need of revision, that, to the contrary, the discontinuity and qualitative differences among the three groupings are as great if not greater than the continuity and similarities. Naturally, each organisation was vital to those that followed; this does not mean, however, that each of these groups was not in and of itself a singular manifestation of the conditions within which it arose.

A final clarification. The term "nationalist" will be used in a very broad sense in this article. It will refer not only to members of the OUN, who, if one's need for semantic distinctions is so pressing, may be more accurately termed "integral nationalists", but also to the inter-war Ukrainian legal

and moderate parties. An examination of non-OUN political writings of this period reveals their obviously "nationalist" character (a highly developed sense of Ukrainian distinctiveness expressed in some kind of cultural and/or political aspirations) and clearly justifies the use of this term. As will become clear, a broad sort of nationalism was endemic to wellnigh the whole Galician population and was not the "ideology" of OUN alone.

I

Although the UVO was chronologically antecedent to the OUN, it can by no means be considered an embryonic form of the later organisation. This is not to say that its goals were not objectively nationalist, yet the manner in which it was founded, the form which it retained throughout its existence, along with the almost complete lack of anything resembling an official ideology, strongly suggest that the UVO, closely related to the OUN as it was, nonetheless lived a very separate life of its own. For whatever else that the UVO may have been or evolved into, it was always primarily a "military organisation" that was to continue the unsuccessful armed struggle for a Ukrainian state initiated during the revolutionary period and, more specifically, that was to demonstrate to the world that Galicia, which was not formally integrated into the Polish state until 1923, was militantly Ukrainian and therefore foreign to Poland. Its organisers and first members were almost exclu-

sively former military men, for the most part soldiers and officers of the Ukrainian People's Republic's elite fighting force, the Sichovi Striltsi (Sich Sharpshooters), who banded about Yevhen Konovalets, himself colonel of the sharpshooters, in Lviv in 1920-21. These were soldiers, not intellectuals, who applied the only means they knew how, military, in their struggle for a free Ukraine. Practically, this meant an almost exclusive reliance on terrorism: assassinations, bombings, arson and robberies. In time, of course, as the UVO acquired roots in Western Ukrainian society, its cadres expanded to include non-military activists, primarily nationalists, as well, with the final result that student youth was soon to form the bulk of the membership. Organisational and ideological questions were largely ignored, for the emphasis was placed on action. Proof of this is the fact that the UVO did not acquire an official organ, Surma, until 1927, when the growing nationalist pressures inside and outside of the UVO forced the UVO leadership to take verbal stands on the questions of the day. It is only with the creation of the OUN in 1929 that organisation and ideology acquired their needed appreciation and that the resistance movement began to resemble an organised and directed mass movement of more than terrorist proportions. In fact, it was precisely because of the UVO's obvious limitations as an organisation without any organisation that the OUN had to be created - nationalism overflowed the narrow bounds of the UVO and required a more suitable form, the OUN.

The high incidence of student involvement in the UVO is not surprising. The groundwork for their political activism had already been laid in the pre-war and war years. As the Kruty myth neatly illustrates, students played a leading role in the revolutionary struggle. What is more, student activism had already been a feature of Austrian times (student disturbances at Lviv University in 1901 and 1906-7; student participation in organising an agricultural strike in 1902), when even then anti-Polish sentiments ran exceedingly high. Finally, sports and student clubs, such organisations as Plast, distinctly intended by one of its founders Ivan Chmola as a para-military organisation,¹ prepared the way for the more serious and overtly political student involvement of the 1920s and 30s.

Students were, of course, ideal candidates for such activism. Their greater awareness of and contact with the problems affecting the Ukrainian population at large, their location in the cities, particularly Lviv, where national tensions and a legacy of them were most obvious, along with their youthful impatience with developments that did not bring immediate rectifying results, led to their being quickly radicalised. (This process is of course even visible today). Not surprisingly, the focus, one might almost say, headquarters of UVO and later of OUN activity became the Akademichnyy dim (Academic Residence) in Lviv, the dormitory of and meeting place for Ukrainian students attending higher educational institutions in the city.

The distinctive student overtones of the UVO (and later of the OUN) gave the organisation a frequently unprofessional, romantic and somewhat incompetent character. Youthful enthusiasm was no substitute for the revolutionary professionalism that the OUN and UPA were to develop in the 1940s. The UVO's record is marred by a fairly large number of unsuccessful major assassination attempts, unexploded bombs and foiled post office robberies. What is more, each major action perpetrated by the UVO was usually followed by a crippling wave of arrests by the Polish police. The lack of an apararat that could give the UVO resiliency made such crises a feature of periodic consistency. Understandably, given the youthful character of the organisation, many UVO boyevyky (fighters) frequently broke under the pressure of police interrogation methods and torture.

The UVO continued to exist until 1931-32 when it more or less faded into obscurity. By this time, it had already completed an inner evolution whereby its membership was almost exclusively composed of nationalist youth, who had been attracted to the UVO in the first place as the only organisation which offered an outlet for their anti-Polish energies. Approximately a year before its final demise, the UVO's Western Ukrainian leadership had been almost completely decimated - thanks largely to the efforts of Roman Baranovsky, a high-ranking UVO boyevyk who turned police informer - a fact that hastened the dissolution of the now obsolete military organisation. Its cadres were automatically accepted into the recently organised OUN,

whose clear-cut nationalist profile was, moreover, better suited to their aspirations.

It is significant that the UVO and OUN coexisted for several years. Part of the rationale for this stemmed from a desire to protect the fledgling nationalist organisation from premature police repression; a more significant reason is the basic dissimilarity of the two organisations as organisations. Although nationalists were in the majority in both, their fundamental guides to action remained essentially different, because the two organisations were essentially different. The following simplification can be enlightening : the UVO became a military organisation for nationalists; the OUN became a nationalist organisation for disgruntled Ukrainians.

The UVO nachalna komanda (supreme command), meanwhile, which had been in emigration since 1922-23 when Konovalets had to leave Galicia in order to escape the police, was scattered throughout several cities in eastern and central Europe, primarily, Prague, Vienna, Berlin, and Geneva, the first three of which already served as centers for large groups of Ukrainian emigres and seasonal workers. Occasionally, members of the komanda would return clandestinely to the kray (lit. "country", i.e. Western Ukraine) (kray couriers, of course, who could legally travel to and from Poland, usually served as the means of communication), their activities, however, were mostly limited to emigre politics - a fact that was later to be also true of the OUN Provid (leadership). Contacts were sought out with those governments that had also felt

slighted by the Versailles Treaty and/or who regarded Poland as their enemy. Already since the early 1920s, the komanda had worked closely with the German military counterintelligence service (a tradition that was also to be continued by the OUN). In fact, it is generally agreed that a high-ranking member of the UVO komanda as well as of the OUN Provid, Richard Jary, was himself a German agent. (It should, incidentally, be remembered that until Hitler came into power in 1932, Germany remained a republic) Lithuania and Czechoslovakia also served as allies of sorts. Surma, for example, was printed in Kaunas and probably subsidised by the Lithuanian government. As regards Czechoslovakia, its attitude of paternal indifference to UVO as well as other nationalist activities made it a haven for political activists.

The city of Lviv acted as the hub of UVO and nationalist activity in the kray. Although it would be inaccurate to speak of a place where the nationalist movement "began", it is nonetheless true that Lviv, as the center of the intellectual, political and cultural life of Galicia's Ukrainians, was the point from which the nationalist movement radiated. It was this city with a population more or less equally divided among Jews, Poles and Ukrainians that was at the center of national tensions in November 1918 when Ukrainians and Poles vied for control of it; it was Lviv, where socio-economic competition between the three nationalities was greatest and where national discrimination and tensions were most obvious, that served as a symbol

for both Ukrainian and Polish pretensions to Galicia. Organised nationalism, it cannot be stressed too greatly, originated first in the cities and towns of Galicia, and only then spread to the countryside where it acquired a mass following and became a real force. This is not to imply that Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish tensions did not exist until the arrival of organised nationalism: street fights between Poles and Ukrainians, avoidance of contact with the "enemy" nationality, mutual recriminations were already a feature of pre-war times and only became exacerbated under the Polish occupation. Organised nationalism, however, gave such popular outbursts direction and form. (It is equally wrong to believe that the nationalist movement "grew out" of street fights and the like; rather, it harnessed them).

In the meantime, the population of Galicia was becoming progressively more "radicalised" - a fact of paramount importance for the nationalist movement. A short historical survey of the Western Ukrainian lands will place this fact in its proper perspective.

II

From the end of the Revolutionary period to the elimination of the UPA in the 1950s, Galicia acted as the center of the organised Ukrainian national movement. In terms of both intellectual ferment and revolutionary fervor, it was Galicia that played the role of the leading nationalist province.

As a result of the three Polish Partitions in the latter half of the eighteenth century, Galicia was incorporated into the lands of the Hapsburg crown, while Volhynia together with the formerly Polish East Ukrainian lands entered the Russian empire. This fact is significant, for it ultimately led to the development in Galicia of a politically aware Ukrainian population. Although Austria was hardly a "true" democracy, the Austrian and Galician Parliaments could and did provide some measure of political tempering. Ukrainian (Ruthenian) political parties did exist and the Galicians knew of and responded to their actions, particularly after a limited form of suffrage was introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century. An appreciable number of Ukrainian language publications existed, Ukrainian schools were fairly numerous, literacy was relatively high and a politically and socially conscious literature developed (e.g. Ivan Franko). These trends strongly contrasted with the situation in the Russian Empire where the Ukrainian language remained legally blacklisted until the twentieth century. Such legal channels, however, also offered opportunities for Polish-Ukrainian tensions to concretise and grow, for it was the primarily Polish land-owning class that governed autonomous Galicia (where, incidentally, the administrative language was Polish and not, as one may have expected, German) to the detriment of non-Poles in particular. The Ukrainian peasantry was

consequently able to develop a broader understanding, extending beyond socio-economic complaints to an unsophisticated but real political and national consciousness, of the sources of and reasons for its overall impoverishment.

In late 1918 on the eve of the defeat of the Central Powers, the "Western Ukrainian People's Republic" (ZUNR), encompassing Galicia, Transcarpathia and Bukovina, was proclaimed. Several months later on January 22, 1919, the ZUNR joined with the Kiev-based "Ukrainian People's Republic" (UNR) in a unified (soborna) Ukrainian state retaining the name of the UNR. But because Galicia had soon become the site of a losing front with the Poles, while the UNR was already being pressed on two sides by Denikin and the Bolsheviks, the UNR concluded the Treaty of Warsaw with Poland on April 22, 1920, whereby the Western Ukrainian territories were ceded to Poland in exchange for its official recognition of the UNR and a common front against the Bolsheviks. On October 18, however, the Poles and Bolsheviks agreed to an armistice and one month later the remaining Ukrainian resistance forces were crushed. Finally, the Treaty of Riga of March 21, 1921 formally concluded the fighting between Poland and Soviet Russia and gave Poland western Volhynia. Galicia's fate was left unresolved until the Council of Ambassadors decided on its inclusion in Poland in 1923.

Volhynia and Galicia remained within the

Polish Republic until September 1939, when Poland was partitioned by Germany and the Soviet Union and Western Ukraine was occupied by the Red Army. One month later, a "National Assembly" was popularly elected, and shortly thereafter it successfully petitioned for Western Ukraine's inclusion in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. A Soviet Galicia, however, did not last long for in the summer of 1941 German troops invaded and occupied the province.

The Galician Ukrainians responded to the new Polish okupant with extreme hostility: their pre-war anti-Polish sentiments were further compounded by the frustrations of the war years. As an indication of the Galicians' high level of political awareness, this hostility at first manifested itself in legal forms. In 1921, the Ukrainians of Galicia boycotted the Polish census; in 1922, they boycotted the elections to the Polish Sejm until 1928.² Interestingly, Volhynian Ukrainians, whose contact with Poles was minimal before the war, took an active part in the elections and sent twenty Ukrainians to the Sejm and five to the Senate. Following the fait accompli of the Council of Ambassadors, however, formal Ukrainian cooperation with the government began. Various parties formed, the largest of which was the united-front "Ukrainian National Democratic Union" (UNDO). Socialist parties (e.g. "Sel-rob") along with a "Communist Party of Western Ukraine" (KPZU) also existed, but their influence remained small.

Popular resistance to the Polish regime also

took on different forms. Acts of sabotage and arson, sometimes perpetrated and certainly encouraged by the UVO, at other times committed by the "masses" (occasionally under Communist incitement), were frequent throughout the twenties and assumed a particular intensity in 1930-31. The Polish authorities responded with a "pacification" of the troublesome areas and especially Galicia, thus exacerbating the already unstable situation. At the same time, Poland began experiencing the first effects of the worldwide Depression. By the early to mid-thirties, the country was in a full-fledged economic crisis: the number of strikes increased consistently and dramatically, reaching a high of 2074 in 1937,³ while workers' hourly wages dropped by close to 25% in this same period.⁴ Popular dissatisfaction with the regime clearly manifested itself in the election turnout to the 1935 Sejm - a mere 45.9% for all of Poland.⁵ The condition of the peasantry was worse still. In the period from 1928 to 1933, for example, the wages of daily "farm-labourers" dropped by close to 50%.⁶ In addition, the already depressed Ukrainian peasants of Western Ukraine had to face the hardships presented by the inimical national policies of the Polish government.

According to the 1931 census (which, in light of the "pacification" as well as of the then especially widespread popular resistance, was, as Soviet and non-Soviet Ukrainians claim, probably inaccurate by about 20%), those speaking Ukrainian and Ruthenian comprised 52.5% of Galicia's population; 39.7% spoke Polish and 7.0% Yiddish. Ukrainians constituted approxi-

mately 45% of both Lviv and Ternopil voivodstvos, and 68.9% of Stanislaviv voivodstvo.⁷ But because Ukrainians were almost exclusively rural dwellers, for cities were dominated by Poles and Jews, a correspondingly large number was involved in agriculture as an occupation. Ninety to ninety-one percent lived outside of cities, while approximately 89% were agricultural workers of one form or another.⁸ Only 5-6% of Ukrainians were industrial workers (equalling 28.4% of the total working class⁹ - an indication of its small absolute size), less than 1% were involved in commerce (where Jews had a disproportionately high representation), while 1% were involved in some field of "communications."¹⁰ The most striking aspect of these statistics is, of course, the enormous proportion of Ukrainian agricultural workers and rural dwellers. A further simple computation reveals that of all Ukrainian rural dwellers approximately 98% were agricultural workers, while 95% of all Ukrainian agricultural workers were rural dwellers, thereby establishing the occupational homogeneity of and importance of land to the Ukrainian countryside. The scarcity of agricultural land became one of the most explosive social issues of the 1920s and 30s. To make matters worse, Polish attempts at land parcelation often, if not usually, benefited the Polish peasant or the newly arrived Polish settler. The result was the creation of a huge, land-hungry Ukrainian rural proletariat. The Ukrainian village was to become a hotbed of social and national resentment - its residents, and particularly

the student youth who, in spite of their education, were frequently unable to find employment and therefore had to return to the frustrations of village life, became prime candidates for nationalist infection. Rich peasants or "kulaks" were, moreover, in a distinct minority. The 1931 census further shows that about 89% of all farm holdings in Galicia averaged fewer than five hectares (one hectare = 2.47 acres) of land thus qualifying their owners as non-kulak peasants, whereas about 10% averaged 5-15 hectares, achieving kulak status.¹¹ Although these data refer to both Poles and Ukrainians, the uppermost margin of error for either group can not have been more than 10% in either direction, assuming that the 1931 census correctly quantified the apparently equal numbers of rural Ukrainians and Poles. But because it is untrue that 100% of all Polish farm holdings had fewer than five hectares and, more important, because the proportion of kulaks in Poland proper (who most likely would have been Poles) was three times as great as the proportion of kulaks in Galicia¹² (whose ethnic composition is for the present argument left undecided), then it reasonably follows that a larger proportion (more than 10%) of the Galician kulak class belonged to the Polish nationality, while fewer than 10% were Ukrainian. In this case, M.K. Ivsyuta's fewer than 5% estimate for all Galician kulaks in 1921 probably still applied to Ukrainians at this later date.¹³

The Ukrainian in Galicia, however, overcome as he was with economic difficulties, had also to deal with a government that was

hostile to his national-cultural needs. The total number of Ukrainian language schools, for example, declined in the twenty year period of Polish rule from 3,662 to 144.¹⁴ Although there existed many bilingual schools, the practical effect was for instruction in Polish. Meanwhile, Ukrainian teachers and professors were consistently and purposefully transferred to educational institutions in central Poland. The cumulative effect of a poor school system and extreme economic deprivation was a relatively high school non-attendance rate for Ukrainians; for example, some districts in Western Ukraine experienced a 40-50% decrease in school attendance.¹⁵ This figure was even higher for Volhynia. Illiteracy was two to three times as high in rural (Ukrainian) than in urban areas of Galicia. The "Prosvita" (Enlightenment) Society, which often constituted the only link between a Ukrainian peasant and his culture, was drastically hampered in its work by official decree. Its reading rooms, concerts and other cultural activities, however, continued to provide a valuable if inadequate cultural service. The second-rate status of the Greek Catholic Church also served to irritate the highly religious Ukrainian population.

Socio-economic hardships, combined with and made intolerable by the overtly obvious national oppression, drove the already conscious Galician Ukrainian population to overexaggerate the importance of the national factor in their overall oppression. The small but active Ukrainian bourgeoisie

(professional, priests, intellectuals and businessmen) frequently acted as a carrier of nationalist ideas. The incipient Ukrainian capitalist class, excluded from participating from Polish economic enterprises, created its own distinctly Ukrainian economic formations on the cooperative basis. Such enterprises as the credit union Tsentrobank, the dairy union Maslo-soyuz and others, necessarily disadvantaged because of their Ukrainian character, served to highlight that the lack of an independent, if not autonomous, Galicia was the source of their economic problems. The professional intelligentsia, likewise, came up against national barriers that prevented its members from competing for the same jobs as Jews and Poles. The generally affluent priesthood, already at the center of a national-religious conflict, served as one of the few channels by which an ambitious young Ukrainian could make a successful career in an apparently hostile Polish-Jewish world, with the result that priests and sons of priests often played leading roles in the nationalist movement (an oft-used but revealing example is Stepan Bandera, the son of a priest). Generally speaking, however, the Ukrainian middle classes aspired throughout for a betterment of the Ukrainian position through legal, legislative means and rejected the radical alternative presented by the UVO and OUN. UNDO became the voice of Ukrainian moderate thinking. Its support, significantly, extended to the peasantry as well, which saw in this moderate party a group that could work for and offer real and immediate improvements, which the UVO or OUN neither could nor wanted to do. Popular support for terrorist actions

varied, of course. At best, it might be termed cautiously positive; at worst hostile. The latter was particularly true after actions that either failed disastrously (for example, the Horodok post-office robbery in 1932, which resulted in the hanging of two OUN youths, Bilas and Danylyshyn) or evoked harsh police repression of the population.

The broad sort of nationalism spoken of earlier gradually infected the Galician Ukrainian masses during the period of the Polish occupation. The radical or "integral nationalism" of the OUN-type nationalists began to be the dominant ideological and intellectual current in all of and particularly in eastern and central Europe in the 1920s. Interestingly, its Ukrainian theoreticians were primarily emigres residing in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Dmytro Dontsov is generally considered the nationalist ideologue par excellence, and rightly so, his writings and inflamed oratory were to be instrumental in the early years of the nationalist movement in Western Ukraine. Post-war events in Europe conspired to make integral nationalism the leading ideology: the threat of Bolshevism and of economic collapse, the necessity to concentrate on rebuilding one's own war-ravaged country and economy, the failure of western liberal democracies, the triumph of Mussolini and the hope offered by German national-socialist thinkers seemed to suggest that an authoritarian and closed nationalism offered real chances of national salvation. Such an ideology, of course, was tailor-made for the young Ukrainian activists in Galicia. It placed their actions in a broad scheme and suggested that more

powerful forces were working in the activists' favour. It would be a mistake to think that this ideology gave birth to the nationalist movement; rather, it was the social reality of Galicia, which gave rise to the radical terrorism and widespread popular dissatisfaction, that created an atmosphere suitable only for nationalism.

III

By 1929 there already existed a large but splintered group of nationalist individuals and nationalist organisations in the kray as well as in the emigration. A single political organisation was clearly called for, one that would both propagate the nationalist ideology and coordinate nationalist activities. On January 23, 1929, the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists was convened in Vienna. Talk of such consolidation had been widespread for several years by this time. In fact, two congresses of Ukrainian nationalists had already been held in 1927 and 1928, the first in Berlin, the second in Prague. A journal, Rozbudova Natsiyi (The Building of a Nation) was even initiated in 1928 to serve as a forum for nationalist discussion. Among the organisations that took part in the 1929 Congress were the UVO, the Lviv-based Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth and the Prague-based League of Ukrainian Nationalists. Significantly, it was only the UVO that continued as a separate organisation.

By the time that the Congress concluded on February 3, it had called into existence the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, whose

leader was unanimously declared to be Yevhen Konovalets. Its resolutions, extensive in the treatment of many, including socio-economic, issues, were most insistent about the semi-mystical and voluntarist nature of the OUN, which was to be "all-Ukrainian, supraparty and monocratic"¹⁶, while the "basis of its political activities" was the "idea of a 'United Independent Ukrainian State' (Ukrainska Samostiyna Soborna Derzhava)."¹⁷ As it was originally intended at least, the OUN was not to be a party, an expositor of narrow interests, but a direct extension of the national will.

The OUN's greatest achievement is that it institutionalised the nationalist movement. It extended its actions beyond the relatively narrow bounds of the UVO and other Galician organisations to include the whole of the Galician population, although the emphasis continued to be placed on youth. The OUN gave the everyday feelings of resentment, discontent and social and national animosity of Ukrainians a framework within which these petty actions assumed a much greater importance as component parts of a movement that was organised, disciplined, widespread and growing. As a result of the OUN, Western Ukrainian nationalism became a serious force to be contended with precisely because it became organised and coherent.

These remarks are not intended to convey an exaggerated impression of the OUN as a mass organisation of professional revolutionaries. On the contrary, in its initial stages the preponderance of inexperienced youths gave the OUN the same romantic and unprofessional

personality as had the UVO. In time, however, the OUN did become a serious organisation. Certainly, this was true by the latter half of the Second World War when it could boast of a truly mass membership whose elite had achieved a methodical precision and accuracy that was to pose real difficulties for the highly refined Gestapo and NKVD.

Very important to an understanding of the mentality and spirit of the OUN is the fact that the organisation was, after all, illegal and therefore highly conspiratorial, as indeed it had to be in order to survive. Small wonder that when authoritarian elements took root so deeply in the OUN- the very nature of such an organisation, one that had to demand absolute obedience and discipline from its numerous members, made the "fascist" mentality so appropriate.

This factor is only a part of the larger picture, namely, that the kray OUN was in fact a different organisation acting on different stimuli than the emigre OUN and Provid. The former's activity was based on day-to-day offensive and defensive actions, the immediate success or failure of which could mean the difference between life and death; the latter emigre group can be more appropriately termed a clique of politicians and statesmen. The much heralded split in the OUN ranks between Bandera and Melnyk of 1939 was already a tactical reality in the early thirties when Konovalets was still vozhd (leader).

Although the OUN continued the tactics of the UVO, it emphasised organisation and politicisation. Cadres were expanded, contacts were

deepened, legal organisations were infiltrated, popular support was sought out. The events of 1935-36, however, were to strike a severe blow to the young organisation. As a result of the successful assassination of the Polish Minister of the interior Bronislaw Pieracki in 1934, the OUN leadership, Bandera included, along with a vast number of lower rank members were arrested and imprisoned. For a while, the organisation ceased to operate. The network, however, was eventually rebuilt, and although the OUN maintained a low terrorist profile until 1939, its organisational and political work was continued and intensified under Lev Rebet, with the result that the OUN emerged to greet the oncoming war with an extensive and well schooled aparat, capable of surviving German and later Soviet pressure.¹⁸

Konovalets' death on May 23, 1938 at the hands of a Soviet agent was soon to precipitate a crisis in the OUN. The Second Great Congress that was convened in Rome on August 27, 1938 affirmed as Konovalets' successor his close friend Andriy Melnyk, a former colonel of the "Sich Sharpshooters". Melnyk, however, along with the policies that he and the new Provid represented did not meet with the approval of the kray leaders, recently released from prison with the Soviet-German invasion of Poland in late 1939. Reasons for this opposition included mistrust of two leading Provid members, Baranowsky and Senyk, charges of underrepresentation, personal animosities and, most important, a disagreement on a further course of action. The kray leaders insisted on an immediate continuation of a revolutionary policy in relation to the new okupant of Western Ukraine, and saw the new Provid as being indecisive, irresolute and therefore incompetent. As was

previously mentioned, these differences in approach and in mentality were a direct product of the division of the OUN into two groups, emigre and kray, which functioned and developed under dissimilar circumstances. Finally, on February 10, 1940, the upstart kray group declared Stepan Bandera head of the new "Revolutionary" Provid in Crakow.

By 1941, the OUN could boast of a total membership of 19,000- of these 11,000 were junior (under 21 years) members, while 8,000 were senior members (over 21 years).¹⁹ The nationalist rank and file was no longer concentrated in the larger population centres, but had effectively penetrated the Ukrainian countryside which, in the last analysis, became a zone of almost unanimous support for the OUN and later the UPA. Students and former students remained in the majority.

The OUN came to have an overwhelmingly peasant character. Given the lack of statistical information, however, it is very difficult to determine class delineations and extent of kulak participation in OUN- a question that is important if only because of the Soviets' insistence that the OUN was "bourgeois nationalist". If a secondary or higher school education is taken as the basic criterion of an OUN member (which is roughly true), then those social groups with the greatest opportunity for such an education may be expected to have made large contributions to the nationalist movement. Sons of priests and intellectuals obviously fit into this category, but so do peasants. Understandably, a wealthier peasant, a kulak, could have found higher education to be

much more financially feasible than would a peasant with under five hectares and, as a result, the relative figure (number of students in "x" class/number of people in "x" class) for wealthier peasant students is much higher than for poor peasant students. These calculations are based on data from the Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland for 1938 for "Pupils, According to Parental Occupation" in the schoolyear 1935-36. Although they refer to the whole of Poland, they can still offer approximations for Galicia because of the irregular class structure of its Ukrainian population. Whereas the percentage of Galician agricultural workers with under five hectares runs into the high eighties, the percentage of similar Polish workers is consistently lower throughout all of Poland by thirty to forty points. For Poland proper, this difference is made up by an unusually large kulak class. If, therefore, the absolute number of higher school students (4.1 thousand) is slightly less than the absolute number of non-kulak students (5.4 thousand)²⁰ for all of Poland where kulaks were not so thoroughly outnumbered as in Galicia, then this proportion may very possibly have been even more slanted in the direction of the non-kulak peasants of Galicia, where they exceeded kulaks by about seventeen to one.²¹

There is therefore no reason to believe that kulaks predominated in the OUN; in fact, they were very probably in a small minority. Although they were, as a class, better represented than non-kulaks, the OUN was by no means an instrument of this Ukrainian "bourgeoisie".

In the two years of the Soviet occupation of Galicia, both factions of the OUN, Melnyk's (OUN-m) and Bandera's (OUN-b), refrained from

any noticeably active policies in the province. Instead, the two warring groups in the kray as well as in the emigration concentrated on consolidating and expanding their respective cadre, and on preparing for the penetration of the eastern Ukrainian lands. Those within the German occupied territories cooperated with- as had been the OUN tradition throughout the thirties- and received assistance from the Germans. Some nationalists, no doubt, even served as German agents. Task forces (pokhidni hrupy, literally "expeditionary groups") were organised by both the OUN-m and the OUN-b. Their purpose was to follow the Wehrmacht and organise nationalist forces and national life in Eastern Ukraine.

On June 22, 1941, German troops invaded the Soviet Union. Both OUN factions followed in their wake and on June 30, 1941, members of the OUN-b, who were the first to arrive in Lviv as soldiers in the German-organised **batallion "Nachtigall"**, proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state (with the knowledge of the German military). The reaction of the SS, however, which was acting upon the instructions from Berlin, was swift and early in July there followed mass repressions of the OUN-b in Galicia. The self-appointed Ukrainian ministers along with Bandera who had remained in Crakow were arrested, the recently established local OUN-b administrations were closed, and the OUN-b cadres in Galicia were forced to go underground. Mykola Lebed' assumed control of the OUN-b and immediately ordered the Bandera faction to cease collaborating with the invading Germans. Lebed' acted as head of the kray Provid until May 1943 when, as a result of a power struggle, he was replaced by Roman Shukhevych,²² who remained in charge

of the nationalist underground until his death in 1950.

The OUN-b and OUN-m pokhidni hrupy continued their march east. In September, however, the German SS decimated the OUN-b groups, whose survivors, along with their local sympathisers went underground. At the same time, the OUN-b leaders originally arrested in July were placed in the concentration camp in Sachsenhausen, where most of them remained till the end of the war.

The OUN-m, whose collaboration with the Germans had always been much greater, continued to operate for the first time being in a more or less open fashion. The first German repressions of the OUN-m, however, occurred in late November of 1941 and were intensified in December. By February 1942, the OUN-m had also been forced underground in Eastern Ukraine (not, however, in Galicia, where, unlike the OUN-b, the OUN-m enjoyed and continued to enjoy a favoured status of sorts). Both OUN groups functioned in this manner in Eastern Ukraine for the remainder of the war. By late 1942, however, the primary area of contention had shifted to Volhynia and Polissya, to north-western Ukraine.

It was in north-eastern Volhynia that the first armed Ukrainian bands headed by Taras Borovets had begun to form as early as 1941. Borovets' group took on the name Poliska sich (Polissya Sich) and limited its actions to fighting Soviet partisans. By the middle of 1942, however, the Sich had grown considerably in size and included some anti-German activity as well. Meanwhile, popular resistance to the particularly cruel and repressive German policies

in this area was also on the upswing. What is more, the already extreme national animosities between Poles and Ukrainians, methodically inflamed by both the Germans and the Soviet partisans, soon flared into open fighting and mutual massacres. The result was the elimination of authority in and anarchisation of Volhynia. Understandably, nationalist interest in this area and in the national energies it was generating began to increase. In the fall of 1942 both OUN factions began organising their own partisan bands from among the local Ukrainian population in an attempt to gain control of this "spontaneous" popular resistance movement. The OUN-b partisans appropriated the name "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (actually Borovets' creation) and in a characteristic move, seized control of and united the various insurgent groupings under their own aegis in July, 1943. Until the German retreat, the forests and marshes of Volhynia remained in almost complete UPA control.

Although the UPA had become the focus of nationalist attention, the OUN still functioned as a far-reaching and effective organisation. It is the ideological evolution of the OUN-b that is one of the most remarkable developments to have taken place during the war (the OUN-m which progressively declined in importance need not be discussed). Symbolic of this change was the OUN-b's "Third Extraordinary Great Congress" held on August 21-25, 1943. Its resolutions marked a dramatic reversal from the OUN's past authoritarian ideology. A fairly elaborate socio-economic programme at times evincing socialist tendencies was proposed, the future Ukrainian state was declared to be democratic. This change, of course, did not occur overnight, but was the

result of a gradual shift in OUN thinking initially spurred by the German repressions in July, 1941. Neither was it a uniform process: "left-wing" thinking had already been represented by Ivan Mitrynga and his sympathisers in 1941, while in late 1944, several high ranking OUN-b activists began organising a "National Liberation Revolutionary Organisation" which advocated social revolution as the only means of dismembering the USSR.²³ These two examples should suffice to show that alternatives to the traditional OUN ideology and programme were being continually discussed. The addition of several outside factors helped to hasten this process: the influx of large numbers of socially-conscious East Ukrainians along with the experience gained in working in the Eastern Ukrainian social reality by the returning members of the pokhidni hrupy convinced the Galician nationalists, who themselves were coming to realise that they needed an alternative to the authoritarianism of the Soviets in order to survive, that deep-rooted ideological and programmatic changes were very much in order.

This democratisation culminated in mid-July 1944 with the creation of the "Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council" (UHVR), the intended government apparatus and coordinating body of the independence movement. Its principles were those of the Third Great Congress; its form, although at times vaguely delineated, was essentially democratic. Theoretically, the UHVR was to be unaffiliated with any party and was to unite all Ukrainians fighting for a "United Independent Ukrainian State," but the OUN-b, not surprisingly, played the dominant role.

This apparent democratisation of the OUN-b should not be accepted uncritically, however. Although the ideological change was sincere, it was only reflective of those OUN-b cadres who had taken part in or in some way been associated with the Third Great Congress or the UHVR Conference - a number that, at most, could have barely extended beyond the small OUN-b elite. This fact, however, does not negate the importance of these changes, because they were to have a great influence on the post-war ideological character of the Ukrainian underground.

The OUN emerged from the war a profoundly altered organisation. Its ideological evolution aside, the OUN also overcame the two major obstacles that had consistently impeded its effectiveness in the past. These were the development of a well-trained civilian and underground network and the attainment of mass support. The first was, above all else, the outcome of the experience acquired during the war; the second - mass support - became a reality to the extent that the nationalist underground was the only effective defender of popular interests. Lawful intervention was either ineffective or unsatisfactory under German rule, and armed self-defence provided the only means of resisting German and later Soviet repressions. And the nationalist underground, of course, was alone capable of offering the required leadership and coordination.

IV.

An extreme aversion for the Soviets, combined with the traditional Galician Ukrainian sympathy for Germany, resulted in the fact that the inhabitants of Galicia greeted the invading German armies as liberators. This popular enthusiasm for the Germans underwent a gradual erosion and only disintegrated into open hostility in 1943-44.

The German administrative division of the occupied Ukrainian territories deserves closer attention. Galicia was separated from Volhynia and Eastern Ukraine and included in the so-called "General Gouvernement" roughly equivalent to the Warsaw-Cracow-Ternopil triangle. Volhynia and the Ukrainian lands west of the Dniepr formed the substance of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine; the lands east of the Dniepr were controlled by the Wehrmacht. This singular division of Ukraine, similar in some respects to the Polish administrative separation of Galicia and Volhynia, was, of course, intentional. Cognizant of the nationalists' strength in Galicia, the German authorities purposefully isolated it from the Ukrainian lands intended for colonial exploitation, where nationalists could have proven an extremely dangerous and disruptive force (note the haste with which even the OUN-m pokhidni hrupy were disbanded). As a result, Galicia remained under the jurisdiction of the Governor General, Hans Frank, and of the Galician Governor, Otto Wachter, both of whom exercised a fairly moderate occupation policy toward the Ukrainian population

(Jews, of course, were excluded) of the province, largely motivated by the desire to defuse the nationalist cause by placating some popular nationalist aspirations. Some forms of organised Ukrainian life were permitted to continue, German repressions against the population and demands for Ost-arbeiter to Germany were hardly as extensive as in the Reichskommissariat. Ukrainians, moreover, continually collaborated with the authorities, thereby contributing to some semblance of normality. Dr. Volodymyr Kubijovyc, an OUN-m sympathizer, headed a Cracow-based "Ukrainian Central Committee", organised in 1940 as an apolitical grouping with jurisdiction over Ukrainian cultural life. Both nationalists and non-nationalists served in the lower administrative posts requiring a knowledge of Ukrainian as well as in the officially organized Ukrainian police (with which the OUN-b had a curious love-hate relationship: policemen were often the targets of OUN-b assassinations, yet many OUN-b cadres served in the police). The OUN-b, meanwhile, refrained from any open conflicts with the Germans. Occasional assassinations and ambushes were carried out, but the emphasis in OUN-b activity was placed on the organisation of soldier cadres, the accumulation of weaponry and the construction of bunkers and food and arms caches. The motivation for this passivity was twofold: steps had to be taken to rebuild a network weakened by the 1941 arrests; the OUN-b leadership soon came to realise that a German defeat was imminent and that the organisation's energies had to be conserved for the Soviets.

Typical of Galicia's position in German plans was the decision made early in 1943 and actively supported by Kubijovyc to form a Ukrainian di-

vision of the SS military, the "Galicia" (Halychyna), to be used exclusively against the Red Army. Significantly, the "Galicia" was the first such Slavic unit, reflecting, among other things, a German partiality for Galicians as former Austrian subjects. The division was pitted against the Red Army in late June, 1944, but was surrounded and almost completely destroyed at Brody. Some of its survivors emigrated, a large part joined the UPA.

This relative calm was maintained until early July 1943, when the Soviet Ukrainian partisan Sydir Kovpak attempted a daring raid on the oil refineries of Forecarpathia. Although his assault was unsuccessful, it sufficiently disturbed Galicia's relative tranquility to force the OUN-b controlled 'Ukrainian People's Self-Defence', a kind of semi-legal popular militia, to mobilize. In a short time, the "Self-Defence" was also fighting German units; by November 1943 it merged with the southwardly expanding UPA and shortly established itself in the Carpathians. From this time on, Ukrainian partisan activity encompassed most of Western Ukraine.

Kovpak's raid provided the immediate impulse that was to lead to the breakdown of order in the province. The rapidly approaching front which heralded the inevitable German defeat and retreat and reimposition of Soviet rule added to this anarchisation. Popular discontent with the increasingly repressive German rule began to take on outward forms of resistance, both the Polish and Ukrainian nationalist undergrounds began vying for control. Bitter national animosities, compounded the mutual charges of collaboration with the Germans, rose to the surface, mutual massacres on the pattern of Volhynia followed. Naturally, bandit elements took advantage of and thereby further complicated an already complex situation. The Ukrainian nationalists proved

strongest and it was they who virtually controlled Galicia upon its liberation by the Red Army in late 1944.

Although the OUN-b was instrumental in creating the armed movement that was the UPA, this was so only to the extent that it harnessed a dis-organised popular force already in existence. The OUN-b organised and gave form to the numerous people's local self-defence units, that had sprung up almost spontaneously in Volhynia and Galicia. It gave them a name, the UPA, and a direction -- to rid the country of the okupant and establish a free Ukraine. The nationalists were able to exploit the broad nationalism of the masses, spoken of earlier, in a revolutionary way that was compatible with popular interests, precisely because the nationalists' interests were identical with the people's interests. As the gradual and inevitable normalisation of the country took place under the Soviets after 1945, these interests were ultimately to diverge.

As may have been expected, members of the OUN usually served in the higher ranks of the UPA -- officers, propagandists, instructors, etc. The rank-and-file, however, was overwhelmingly non-"OUNite", probably ²⁴out-numbering OUN members by about four to one. It is significant that with time the proportion of nationalists was to increase drastically, so that an OUN document from 1947 claims a fifty-fifty ratio.²⁵ This fact serves to illustrate the point made above: when resistance to the Germans was already an affair of the past, and as continued resistance to the Soviets -- which only served to increase NKVD repression of the populace -- became all the more impractical, if not counter-productive, popular self defence, the basis of the UPA, lost its meaning, and the attitude of the population reverted to what it had been in the 1920s and 30s, one of passive hostility. The death of

Stalin in 1953 and the promise of improvement it offered, for example, was to deal a crushing blow to the remaining underground because it removed the rationale for its very existence. Popular support, of course, was vital to the underground during and after the war; it was inevitable that as active support diminished the underground should prove incapable of survival. One should not, on the other hand, underestimate the role played by the militarily superior Soviet troops and the lack of sufficient suitable partisan terrain in the final demise of the underground.

Statistical data culled from several original OUN documents ²⁶ suggest that the vast majority of the UPA came from the countryside, was involved in agricultural work and was male and very young. Approximately three-quarters would appear to have had a primary school education only -- a fact which suggests, but by no means conclusively, that the UPA soldier was probably a poor peasant (personal testimony of former UPA soldiers supports this conclusion). These facts further highlight the differences between the OUN and UPA, and make one point very insistently: that the former was nationalist, whereas the latter was national; that the OUN strove primarily for a Ukrainian state, while the UPA for self-preservation.

One final point. The UPA is frequently misrepresented as the democratic if not socialist antithesis of the OUN, on the rationale that, unlike the OUN, it stood for and was composed of the Ukrainian masses. It should not be forgotten, however, that OUN nationalists were also capable of democratic notions and, what is of greatest importance, that it was the nationalists occupying leading UPA positions that were responsible for the UPA's ideological bent, its democratism and populism. ²⁷

If the reader has grasped two points, this article will have achieved its goal; they are that an understanding of Galicia is vital to an understanding of the nationalist movement and, that the UVO did not "become" the OUN which, in turn, did not later "become" the UPA. Naturally, this survey is incomplete and can only suggest the many areas that still require adequate research -- the Polish underground, the Soviet partisans, the Jewish question, OUN-m/OUN-b relations, Ukrainian collaboration with the Germans, to name but a few. However, even an awareness of such problems and of the problematic nature of the nationalist movement is a large step forward.

Notes

1. Osyp Navrotsky, "Polkovnyk Yevhen Konovalets", in Sribna Surma (Toronto:Sribna surma),pp.132-39. Zynoviy Knysh, a former member of the UVO and OUN and compiler of this collection, has written a large number of unscholarly but valuable accounts of the UVO, which convey the atmosphere and spirit of the times very well.

2. Ukraine, a Concise Encyclopaedia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1963), pp.833-37.

3. Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 1938
(Warsaw:Chief Bureau of Statistics, 1938),p.271.
4. Ibid., p.258
5. Ibid., p.343
6. Ibid., p.251
7. Stanislaw Skrzypek, The Problem of Eastern Galicia
(London:Polish Association for the South-Eastern
Provinces,1948), p.20
8. Concise Statistical Yearbook 1938, pp.25,37.
9. Skrzypek,p.29
10. Concise Statistical Yearbook 1938,p.37
11. Ibid., p.63
12. Ibid., p.63
13. M.K.Ivasyuta,"Z istoriyi revolyutsiynoho rukhu
na Ternopilshchyni v roky okupatsiyi yiyi panskoyu
Polshcheyu (1926-39)", in Z istoriyi zakhidnoukrayin-
skykh zemel (Kiev:Vydavntstvo Akademiyi Nauk
UkSSR, 1957),I,pp.91-104. Although Ivasyuta's
estimate relates directly to Ternopil voivodstvo,
it can be taken as an approximation for Lviv and
Stanislaviv voivodstvos as well because of the
three voivodstvos' practically identical social
structures.
14. I.A.Pavlyuk, "Borotba za narodnu osvitu v
Zakhidniy Ukraini (1919-1939)," in Z istoriyi
zakhidnoukrayinskykh zemel,II,p.138.
15. Ibid., p.198

16. OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsiy ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955, (ZCh OUN:1955),p.6.

17. Ibid., p.15.

18. Lev Rebet gives a good account of this period in his Svitla i tini OUN published by Suchasna Ukraina in Munich.

19. Based on interviews with several OUN members of the war period.

20. Concise Statistical Yearbook 1938, p.311.

21. Estimate based on computations included in this article.

22. According to interviews with Shukhevych's friends, Shukhevych was a notorious ladies' man. I mention this bit of historical gossip to point out the degree of falsification that takes place in popular presentations concerning the man, usually depicted, as are other nationalist heroes, as nothing less than a saint. The only biography of Shukhevych by Petro Mirchuk is worthless.

23. Danylo Shumuk speaks of this organisation in his memoirs. Document C24.5-6 from the archive of the Foreign Representation of the UHVR testifies to its existence.

24. A personal estimate. The data at the bottom of p.75 of this article strongly suggest this. Also, if according to note #25, OUN activists comprised half of the UPA in 1947 after two years of particularly trying fighting against the NKVD and Red Army which resulted in a large number of deaths, desertions and dismissals, it is more

than likely that the surviving and hardier UPA elements would have been the more fanatical and devoted OUN cadres. Interviews with leading underground members support this view.

25. Jaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p.118.

26. Documents C30-11,C47-1 from the archive of the Foreign Representation of the UHVR.

27. Poltava and Hornovy are a case in point. As they themselves repeatedly stressed, they were first and foremost nationalists and not socialists. A closer examination of their oft-used term "classless society" will also reveal that it is largely without Marxist content. Read, in particular, Poltava's "Letter to Citizen Babenko" /Ivan Majstrenko/.

The IWY Conference

Following are the reflections of a member of Action for Women's Rights in the USSR on the IWY Mexico conference which took place between June 19 and July 2, 1975. Action for Women's Rights in the USSR, formed in Toronto in January of 1975, considers raising the issue of Soviet women political prisoners and researching the role and position of women in the Soviet Union as the main focus of its defence work.

In the past two years, the United Nations General Assembly has convened three large-scale conferences to discuss issues of international concern. All three - the World Food conference, the conference on World Population and the recent International Women's Year conference - have exposed both the potential and limitations inherent in projects which the United Nations has organised and co-ordinated.

Any attempt to evaluate the participation of a governmental or non-governmental organisation at the International Women's Year conference in Mexico City must include, to some extent, an evaluation of the UN's ability to identify problem-issues, formulate solutions and make resolutions legally binding for member nations.

In caricaturing the activities at the World Food conference in Rome last year, one correspondent for the Washington Post suggested reasons for the UN's inability to meet any proposed objectives at its international conferences:

At times it (WFC) seems as formal and self-important as a mini-United Nations. At others, it seems as chaotic and raucous as a university teach-in. At still others, it seems like a spaceship, carrying a chattering, hurrying, coffee drinking rabble of diplomats, farmers, crusaders, politicians, journalists, business entrepreneurs, lobbyists and bright kids towards some unknown destination.

Germaine Greer, reflecting on the IWY conference, echoed these observations:

The women of the world have been mocked by the jamboree in Mexico City. The UN declaration of human rights derides them by its witless confidence that no-one shall live in slavery or servitude or be subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment. Even less was accomplished in Mexico than might have been, if the conference had been held five years from now, if the UN had been less hypocritical in its own employment policies, and more

rigorous in the drawing up of its own verbal forms, if Luis Echeverria had been less interested in being the next secretary-general and the moral leader of the Third World, if nations had been given precedence because of their proven concern for women instead of their riches, or their power, or the fact that some of their delegates shared a bed with the head of state, if.....²

Ideally, the 1975 International Women's Year conference was meant to draw the delegates from 133 governments, 31 intergovernmental and 113 non-governmental organisations and 7 liberation movements to Mexico City for the purpose of amending and ratifying the World Plan of Action, a ten year blueprint meant to improve the status of the world's two billion women. Presentations and discussions at both the governmental conference and the non-governmental Tribune were to result in a critical appraisal of the document's proposals in the areas of: education and training, the political process, employment and related economic roles, health and nutrition, the family, population, housing and social services.

The World Plan of Action was a study conducted by the Commission on the Status of Women, one of six commissions comprising the Economic and Social Council at the UN. Its mandate was primarily to prepare recommendations and reports to the Economic and Social Council on promoting women's rights in political, economic, civil, social and educational fields. It was hoped that official delegates to the conference in Mexico would study the document in the light of various political and economic experiences and present critical evaluations of the outlined courses of action. Simultaneously, it was hoped that non-governmental delegates to the Tribune would

discuss the evaluations made at the conference by participating member nations.

It became increasingly obvious from the quality of the participation by governmental and non-governmental delegates at the conference and Tribune that only a few delegates had seriously studied the World Plan of Action. Instead, many official delegates eulogised the progress women had made in their respective countries, rarely evaluating the direction or quality of that progress.

"We have already obtained for our women everything that the conference is asking for" asserted, at one point, Vilma Espin de Castro of Cuba. Still other delegates exploited the international forum to dramatise solidarity on behalf of exclusive, political issues. During Mrs. Rabin's, the Israeli delegate's, official presentation, many Arab and "Communist" delegates walked out of the conference hall. At the Tribune, delegates were desperately lobbying to gain recognition and support for a variety of crucial issues. Among these was a delegation of Ukrainian women from Canada, the United States and Argentina lobbying on behalf of Soviet Ukrainian women political prisoners.

Many of the shortcomings inherent in any international discussion forum devoted to as diversely interpreted an issue as the women's issue will affect the degree and quality of participation of any defence group, itself, not always in agreement over a specific course of action. In other words, the theme of International Women's Year, "Peace, Equality and Development" was often refined to suit the needs and interests of a particular government, organisation or defence group. This

should not have meant that any one refinement was more or less important if it continued to reflect the general issue at hand - the exploration of the:

Status and role of women in society with special reference to the need to achieve equal rights for women and to women's contribution to the attainment of the goals of the Second United Nations Development Decade, to the struggle against colonialism, racism and racial discrimination and the strengthening of the international peace and of co-operation between States. 3

This should have meant, however, that the refinement remain in the interests of all.

The Ukrainian delegation, composed of thirty representatives from various established organisations, defence groups and news publications considered raising the issue of Ukrainian women political prisoners in the Soviet Union an expedient way of exposing the chauvinism inherent in the present Soviet system. It believed that revelations of violations of constitutional rights and demands of amnesty for Soviet Ukrainian women political prisoners were in the interest of all. With talks of detente for a backdrop, such revelations and demands were often criticised by observers of the conference as pretentiously naive. To witness the standing ovation which greeted the Committee of Soviet Women at the Tribune, such criticism was perhaps deserved. On the other hand, similar criticism may be launched against an audience, presumably composed of socially conscious women, which applauded a superficial exposition of the progress Soviet

women have made since the revolution. Only, the ill-prepared Ukrainian delegates challenged generalisations about the pattern of the sexual division of labour in Soviet production, stressing that these patterns closely follow those found in advanced capitalist countries: women are concentrated in non-productive, low-skilled and low-paid branches of the economy. Of course, apologists among the panelists argued that it was the low technological level of Soviet industry which prevented a more equitable division of labour. Here, representatives of the Ukrainian delegation failed to expose the extent of the Soviet regime's responsibility in maintaining this backwardness by the very nature of Soviet education, press and "scientific" research. Unfortunately, many of the women in the Ukrainian delegation failed to comprehend, prior to the conference, the necessity of researching claims made by official Soviet authorities.

Since the "World Conference of Free Ukrainians", the principal co-ordinator of the participating Ukrainian delegation had failed to achieve official governmental status at the conference, the Ukrainian delegation was forced to resort to a series of indirect actions in their attempts to gain some meaningful recognition and support for Soviet Ukrainian women political prisoners. The most successful of these actions included: granting a copy of a Memorandum to Dr. Ojeda, President of the IWY conference, summoning a press conference at the Tribune to announce a three day hunger strike and distributing literature on the condition of Soviet Ukrainian women political prisoners. However, even the quality of these actions are questionable when evaluated for

their long term effectiveness.

The Memorandum, composed by members of the "World Congress of Free Ukrainians" and translated into French and Spanish prior to the conference, included a short biography of each woman sentenced for alleged "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation", a description of prison conditions and an appeal to representatives of member nations at the UN to act in the spirit of IWY by demanding amnesty for these women. Helvi Sipila, assistant to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, refused to convey the Memorandum to official delegates at the conference, arguing that the UN collectively could not intervene in the internal politics of any member nation. Ironically, this rehearsed argument did not prevent the delegate from the Ukrainian SSR from exploiting the international forum to voice solidarity with the Palestinian liberation movement, nor, for that matter, did it prevent the conference from approving the "Declaration of Mexico", a document articulating the Third World's call for an undefined "new international economic order" and condemnation of Zionism.

In comparison to much of the literature distributed at both the conference and Tribune sites, the Memorandum presented a fairly logical and comprehensive argument:

As part of the campaign dedicated to achieving the goals of International Women's Year, this conference will consider the situation in which women find themselves in

different parts of the world, and after determining the facts, will address themselves to the conditions that prevent the integration of women as full and equal partners with men wherever they may live. Unfortunately, some governments misrepresent the situation that exists in their countries by concealing facts with self-serving rhetoric.

The strict curtailment of human rights, the punishment for political expression, the denial of national-cultural expression, the dangerous and debilitating circumstances in Soviet prison camps were listed among the major obstacles to be overcome by women in achieving equal rights and opportunities. To a great extent, this argument reflects a maxim which summarises the prerequisites necessary for the politicisation of women in any society:

Feminism as a political movement makes little sense when representative government and civil liberties exist or are in the immediate offing (as in the American or French revolutions) and women either have been excluded or find their equality honoured more in the breach than the observance. But where no one could vote or speak out, the fact attainment of these freedoms for all was a prerequisite to liberty for women seemed obvious. 4

Here, a comparison may be drawn between those governmental and non-governmental delegations which demanded a "new international economic order" and those which demanded an end to the violation of civil and constitutional rights. Without a degree of economic prosperity and civil liberty, the preoccupations of Western feminists may be understandably be dismissed as luxuries.

However, these demands were seldom articulated with any depth of understanding by their advocates. The symbolic hunger strike staged by nine members of the Ukrainian delegation on behalf of Soviet Ukrainian women political prisoners defeated its purpose when the participants could not demonstrate to the news media a comprehensive understanding of the women's issue and how it affected the condition of women political prisoners in the Soviet Union. Instead, they resorted to a vague, emotional demand for a "free and independent Ukraine." Understandably, the sensational character of this participation at the Tribune received considerable press coverage, as did the disruption of 200 women shouting slogans against imperialism and questioning Tribune women about their affiliations, but the long-term effectiveness of such participation remains questionable.

Given the limitations of any UN conference, the Ukrainian delegation must be credited with drawing the attention of many governmental and non-governmental delegates to the condition of Soviet Ukrainian women political prisoners.

The Canadian-based National Action Committee on the Status of Women, participants of the Feminists Caucus, the official UN representatives from the National Organization of Women and the International Alliance of Women were all sympathetic supporters of the actions initiated by the Ukrainian delegation. Predictably, this lobbying did not result in any significant demonstration of support at either the Tribune or conference sessions. Such lobbying, of course, must be done prior to any discussion forum. Non-governmental organisations must be approached to pressure governmental delegates to be truly representative by raising issues, such as that of women political prisoners, at international conferences - within the framework of discussions on resolutions such as those contained in the World Plan of Action. Simultaneously, those individuals and groups concerned with effectively exposing the chauvinism inherent in the present Soviet system must evaluate the quality and extent of their own politicization.

The Geneva Crime conference, with its narrower scope of interest, seems to offer the Ukrainian delegates a viable opportunity of utilising those experiences gained through their participation at the Mexico conference.

document

The Status of Women under Soviet Law

A regular feature of Meta will be a translation section, which will make available hitherto untranslated important articles and documents of recent Ukrainian history.

We begin this section with an article on "The Status of Women Under Soviet Law", written in 1925 by Prof. V. Bozhko. Needless to say, the tremendous advances made on the 'women's question' in the 1920s which this article outlines, were undone by Stalinist reaction.

The translation is by Maya Petrenko.

Long ago, the Romans had a saying: "Uxor non proprie est socia, sed speratum fore." This means: A wife, to speak realistically, is not presently a friend to her husband, but one can expect that she will become one in the future. Almost 2000 years have lapsed since that time. Lawmakers, and along with them society, have not abandoned hope during this interval that earlier types of marital relationships, wherein a woman was not regarded as a friend to her husband would substantially change.

Throughout the ages, various systems of material relations between spouses have undergone significant changes. Common property - originally brought into the family by the spouses - as well as that earned by mutual labour came to be held on the basis of equal ownership; a condition which wholly demarcated the sphere of control of each of the spouses. Conversely, at various points throughout history, this condition of equal status vis a vis common property gave way to equitable relations. However, an actual "comradely" equality between husband and wife has yet to become a living reality. There have always been too many historical factors impeding this goal.

Although I cannot restate all of these factors in this brief article, it will suffice to note (as proven historically) that an equitable divisibility of common property alone is far from adequate in freeing a woman from a practical

dependence on her husband. Along with this, there must be an individual, personal independence proclaimed and protected by law.

The legal system is, as is well known, a superstructure which develops upon the "base" or foundation of economic relations. Yet, being a result of production (socio-economic) relations, the legal superstructure, in its turn, influences the life of society; directing it upon one path or another, depending upon the class interests of the group which has power and control over that society. Within this context, every struggle for power, every revolution which seeks to capture political influence is, in a broad sense, a struggle for control of the legal system, so that with its aid, control can be preserved over the defeated class. The history of the struggle for women's emancipation clearly upholds this conception. No-one can dispute the fact that the economic aspect of this issue carries enormous weight; it often determines the status of women within familial and societal structures. But it is also true that personal status plays a very significant role. It is not essential to rummage through all of history here. It will suffice to introduce a well-known fact from one Russian history of family-legal relations focusing upon the divisibility factor of material relations between spouses- a product of pre-revolutionary legislation.

As everyone knows, the legal status of women prior to the 1917 Revolution was very difficult exactly for the reason that the same legislative actions which proclaimed a married woman

to be independent on the material plane, further imprisoned her and totally subjugated her person to the power of her husband. "A wife is obligated to acknowledge her husband as the head of the household, to give him love, respect and unlimited obedience, to offer him every comfort and total compliance," read one article in the tenth volume of A Compilation of Civic Law. "A wife is obligated to follow her husband (Statute 108), she cannot accept employment without his permission (Statute 102)..." etc.

This type of personal enslavement totally destroyed the difficult steps toward economic independence. Only Soviet law, having simultaneously proclaimed women to be independent both in the economic and personal spheres finally provided conditions for fulfilling the old dream of Roman lawgivers, transforming their aspirations into reality. And, in fact, only Soviet law gives a woman the opportunity for achieving friendly, truly amicable relations with her husband; guaranteeing her, at the same time, total independence and equality. It is true that the latter is not totally a factor of legal proclamation, but at every step, awareness (consciousness) is maintained.

Thus, a girl having reached 16 years of age can get married without parental permission. Thus, too, she can dissolve the marriage by a simple, personal announcement of divorce, whether or not her husband is in agreement with the action. In order to fully appreciate the significance of this aspect of the law, one must recall the difficulties which had to be overcome in order to obtain a divorce within the structure of the pre-Revolutionary legal system. It was necessary to institute a lawsuit in order to prove the fact of adultery on the part of the

spouse with the aid of dishonest and bribed witnesses, who were always ready to testify for a price. These witnesses were always indispensable "eyewitnesses" to the fact, having made their observations through a key-hole or slightly cracked door. How much determination had to be mustered in order to overcome the feeling of disgust and to decide to take such a step- so degrading to moral relations- in order to get a divorce! And how many, in the face of vital necessity, have sunk into this bog up to their ears, so that at least for the price of these unparalleled humiliations, and at least after 5-7 years, they could buy for themselves the precious freedom.....

In contrast to the old legislation, our present divorce process takes place within an orderly, ordinary type of registration structure- as opposed to a lawsuit- at which the cause of divorce may be either mutual consent or the desire of one party to gain a divorce. In the latter case, the petition for divorce is directed to the People's Court of the region where the summoned spouse resides, according to the Code of the RSFSR, and , in Ukraine, to the town subsection of the Community Registrar of Acts. On the occasion when the whereabouts of one of the spouses is not known, or if he cannot be located within the boundaries of the town or region, an entry is printed in the local newspaper announcing the petition for divorce, which can subsequently be legally recorded two months following its initial appearance. Also, the change of residence of one spouse- as is stated in Statute 104 of the legal code- does not necessitate that the other spouse follow. This type of obligation existed in pre-Revolutionary times when the husband could demand- and often did demand- that his legal wife be "installed"

at his residence, through police action, even if the procedure had to be repeated ten times. Thus, in Tsarist Russia, "family happiness" was enforced by the arm of the law.

In direct contrast, according to our code, a woman of any status has the right to demand an individual certification for a separate "permit of residence". In speaking of the personal rights of women, one must also note the right of choosing a surname upon marriage. At the same time as West European legislation- in the eyes of which a woman is still, in the words of the Communist Manifesto "regarded as an instrument of production; the private property of her husband"- deprives a woman of her maiden name, forcing her to use her husband's name, Soviet law postulates: "Individuals who have decided to marry will share the same surname (marital surname). At the time of marriage, they can specify as to whether they wish to use the man's or woman's surname, or some combination thereof.

Still, the greatest attention should be focused upon Soviet legislation as it concerns the material status of women. In this sphere, a woman is regarded as being totally independent. Statute 105 of the Soviet legal code does not generalise about the shared nature of common property but deals directly with mutual power and control over such property. The code dealing with "community status" emphasises the complete divisibility of common property. One spouse has the right to receive financial support from the other if the latter is in a position to provide such support (Statute 107), in which case, the amount of support should be established according to the needs of the one and the ability of the other to provide. Particular attention is directed toward the

woman who becomes pregnant out of wedlock. Establishment of paternity in such cases is covered by a separate statute. All children, whether they are born in or out of wedlock are protected by the same legal rights. In the case, where more than one man could potentially be the child's father, a specific statute exists. Whenever the court cannot establish the identity of the child's actual father, the court then levies child support responsibilities on all men who could possibly be the father. Ordinarily, the assumption of multiple-paternity does not reconcile itself with the principle of actual parentage, however, such a supposition is very characteristic of the protective attention which is given by our legal system to the socially-injured party, i.e. the woman who becomes pregnant and suffers financial hardship.

Women also enjoy equal rights under the law in areas other than family relations. According to the land code, women are guaranteed the same rights of participation in general meetings and in all divisions of agricultural production as are their male counterparts.

According to the present code, abortion is not considered to be a crime. Only persons performing abortions without adequate medical training are subject to prosecution. If the pregnancy of a criminally-convicted individual interferes with the serving of her sentence, the latter will be delayed until two months after childbirth.

Finally, the Soviet legal system is conducting the fiercest battle with prostitution as the most degrading of humiliations, destroying the human dignity of women.

In a word, the so-called "woman's issue" no longer exists in our land. No woman in the world has such rights as does a woman in the Soviet land. She need only to make full use of her new legal status in order to fulfill the historical vision; she has truly become an equal friend and comrade to her husband. And, in order to fully profit from this condition, she should first of all overcome the terrible illiteracy in which she finds herself to this time. One cannot forget that according to records from 1907, only 13 percent of women in Russia were literate, and that at the start of our revolution, there were 34 million illiterate women.

In general, whenever the discussion centers around the legal status of women, I am reminded of one painting: in a large meadow filled with spring sunshine, covered with bright poppies, stands a woman. She is blind and her hands are tied. The entire figure of this stately but powerless woman strives to express something - something suffered profoundly, something very painful. Can one think of a more eloquent symbol for the status of women in bourgeois society? Because, how else can one see a woman who is locked into the circle of bourgeois family ideals: kitchen, clothes, children, church (the famous four ingredients of German bourgeois family ideology: Kuche, Kleide, Kinder, Kirche). She neither sees nor understands anything of the broader social and political life which awaits her.

Her hands are tied - for how else can one imagine a woman in conditions of serf-like status under the bourgeois system, wherein she is still treated like an object, as an instrument of production which belongs to her keeper - whether it is her husband or her father, whose control ties not only her hands but her feet as well.

This is why a Soviet woman should be pictured in a completely different way: not blind, but with wide open eyes and head raised high; with hands not only outstretched, but performing great deeds of liberation, working alongside of her worker-husband, who along with her has experienced the same grief illicitd by a history of slavery in the course of thousands of years.

Note

1. This article originally appeared in the 1925, No.3 issue of the Ukrainian journal Zhyttya i Revolyutsiya (Life and Revolution) and appears here in translated form from the Ukrainian.

News from The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Meta Press Service (MPS).

A major strike erupted in Kiev this year (1975) involving over 20,000 workers. Employees at the Stanky Avtomat on Brest Litovsk Prospect struck following a decision to lower workers' wages. The drop in wage levels was intended to correspond to a price revision of products produced in the plant.

The strike immediately aroused panic in the authorities. On the second day of the strike, the Kiev city Party committee intervened and restored former wage levels. Leaders of the strike were not immediately harrassed, but administrative and other forms of repression were later utilised against them.

This is the second time in the past two years that a strike has erupted on Brest Litovsk Prospect in Kiev.

(Copyright-MPS)

The Chronicle of Current Events (Moscow), no. 33 released information concerning the proposal by four Ukrainian women political prisoners to have their camp wages assigned to a fund for victims of the Chilean junta and their demand to attend the Congress of the International Democratic Federation of Women. Additional information concerning their plight has been received.

Release from the Press Service of the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (New York):

Already at the end of 1974, Nina Strokata, Iryna Senyk, Stefaniya Shabatura, Dariya Husak and Nadiya Svitlychna, since their incarceration at the 4th zone of the 3rd camp point (Mordovia) have refused to participate in forced labour in connection with 1975 proclamation of International Women's Year, and have demanded to be released from the camp. The camp administration has punished Nadiya Svitlychna and Iryna Stasiv-Kalynets for this action with two weeks penal isolation, and Nadiya Svitlychna was denied a visit with her son, Yarema. On January 3, 1975, Nina Strokata and Stefaniya Shabatura were transferred to cell lodging- Strokata for three months and Shabatura for six months. When they refused to work, they were given the so-called norm 9b -starvation food rations- which brought them to total physical emaciation and which significantly worsened Nina Strokata's illness.

In a demonstration of solidarity with the women prisoners, Vyacheslav Chornovil, who is incarcerated at camp 17a in Mordovia, announced his refusal to eat breakfast throughout 1975. Parayil Ayrikiyan, an Armenian, expres-

sed solidarity with Chornovil's action by refusing to eat breakfast for as long as his countrywoman, Anayita Karepetiyan, remains imprisoned.

Release from The Chronicle of Current Events, no. 33, December 10, 1974. "This special edition is dedicated to the condition of political prisoners in the USSR and their struggle to secure their rights".

Two prisoners arrived in camp no. 19, Lubomyr Starosolsky, born May 8, 1955, and Roman Koslopatch, born November 12, 1954. On the evening of May 9, 1972, Starosolsky and Koslopatch hung out in the village of Stebnyk, Lviv oblast, two blue and yellow Ukrainian nationalist flags. On February 19, 1973, the Lviv Oblast court found them guilty under Article 62 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR and Article 187 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. Koslopatch was sentenced to 3 years and Starosolsky to 2 years in prison. (Article 187: defamation of state emblem or flag).

Groups:

Gavrylov, Genadi Vladymorytch; born 1939, a naval officer, member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1968, at a meeting of officers characterised the dispatching of troops to Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression. For this he was expelled from the party, fired from his job and discharged from the navy. In June, 1970, he was arrested and sentenced to 6 years in a camp for forming an illegal organisation called "The Union of

Struggle for Political Freedom" and for writing political theoretical articles in the underground newspaper Democrat.

Davedenko, Georgiy Mychalovich, 27 years old, worker from Nyzny Talig. Former member of the Communist Party. Sentenced to 4 years. Arrested in March, 1971- in the case of "The Revolutionary Party of Intellectuals of the Soviet Union"-the case was heard by the Sverdlov Oblast Court in September, 1971.

"The Revolutionary Party of Intellectuals of the Soviet Union"- formed as a result of a merger of intellectuals of an organisation called UROK (The Ural Regional Committee) which was formed in April, 1970. The secretary of the group was Ms. Lavrentia. At the Third Oblast Conference of Urok in August, 1970, Davedenko was elected president. They constructed a printing press, held meetings, wrote and distributed articles, among others- "The Formation of New Classes", and "The Struggle under Socialism". The following was mentioned about these articles at the trial...."that they wrote about the degeneration of socialist society and the degeneration of the komsomols (that the komsomols had outlived their usefulness)..."

Shantyrushvili, Teymyraz, born 1947, a Georgian poet. In 1969, he was accused under Article 70 and 91 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of having taken part in an attack on the cash registry at the militia station. According to a second version, he was accused of taking part in a nationalist organisation "Black Rose". Shantyrushvili explained the robbery attempt as an expropriation. Sentenced to 12 years.

Bondar, Mykola Vasylovych, born 1939, former lecturer of philosophy at Uzhorod University. Arrested November 7, 1970. During a demonstration on Khreshchatyk (in Kiev), Bondar unfurled a placard with a slogan against the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Sentenced to 5 years.

The case of Frolov and Grilus. Frolov, Oleh Ivanovich, born 1945(46), 4th year student at Ryazan Radio Technical Institute. Arrested in 1969. Sentenced to 5 years in the case of the "Communards".

1968- Victor Pestrof and Mykola Shaburov, two workers, formed the group called "Free Russia". November 7, 1969, distributed leaflets in Sverdovsk calling for the formation of a platform and programme of a Russian Workers Party. 1969-1970: distributed leaflets and the programme. They demanded the end of party absolutism, higher wages, higher scholarships, an increase in the rate of apartment construction and closer relations with the West.

Tchechovskoy, Alexander Konstantinovich, born 1947. Worker, former secretary of the komsomol organisation of Voroshilovgrad Trest (tractor factory), member of "The Party of Struggle for the Realisation of Leninist Ideas". Sentence-unknown.

Dionesiade, German Vasylovych, born 1938. Worker. The case of the group "Young Workers", arrested in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan SSR. Sentenced to 5 years.

Chamovskukh, Victor Petrovych, born 1940. Worker in a factory in Kertch, Ukrainian SSR, co-worker

in a newspaper Kertch Worker (official publication). Retyped the programme of the working class which was written by Yakybenko, in which, according to the court sentence...."contained false ideas and distortions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and called for the necessity of forming a parallel Communist Party". In addition, the two defendants wrote an article which, according to the court sentence "misrepresented the position of the working class in the USSR and its participation in controlling production and calls for workers to unite in the struggle for their rights. It is possible that either the programme or the article was signed "The Union to Defend Workers' Rights". During a workers' strike in Kertch, a leaflet was posted in Kertch, Zhdanov and Kharkiv which said; "Communards Will Not Be Slaves!" Chamovskukh was sentenced to 4 years camp and 3 years exile; Yakybenko was sentenced to a psychiatric hospital.

Lapp, Tomas Evirkovych, Estonian, born 1947. Worked in a laboratory at Tartu University; arrested in November, 1969. In the same case, arrested were: Visu, Andres, born 1945, chauffeur; Pavlus, N., born 1947, worker; Kev, Evald, born 1957, worker. According to the sentence..."having been of an anti-Soviet attitude, formed an anti-Soviet group whose goal was to collect weapons and to expand the group. Had an arsenal: 5 rifles, 1 carbine, 3½ kilograms of explosives, 8 detonators, 11 meters of detonating cord, 2 pistols, 4 mausers. They were planning to blow up a high voltage electric transformer, a monument to Soviet soldiers. Also charged with listening to German marches and Hitler's speeches.

Saarte, Vill, born 1942. Estonian worker. In 1957-58, he was in a concentration camp in the

city of Talin, Estonia. While in camp, Saarte took part in planning to organise an armed nationalist organisation. Once released from the camp he formed an organisation "Estee Rakhvusparten"- an Estonian Nationalist Party. Sentenced to 4½ years.

Kompov, Pavel Fedorovich, Ukrainian, born 1929. Mathematician, lecturer at Uzhorod University. In 1970, Kompov and three others were placed on an alternative list to the elections to be Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Kompov was placed on the list by a wood processing factory. About 100 leaflets were distributed on their behalf. On June 16, 1970, two days after the elections, Kompov was arrested. At a closed trial he was accused of distributing leaflets. He was also accused of writing a brochure in Ukrainian entitled "Twentyfive years of Hope and Disillusionment". Sentenced to 5 or 6 years.

"The Union of Ukrainian Youth of Galicia". August 9, 1973, the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast court, under the direction of Vaselenko, tried the case in a closed court- a group of five Ukrainians forming an illegal anti-Soviet organisation: The Union of Ukrainian Youth of Galicia. The accused were: Hryhkiv, Dmytro, born 1948, worker; Motruk, Mykola, born 1949, worker; Shovkovy, Ivan born 1950, carpenter; Dymydiv, Dmytro, born 1948, mechanical engineer; Chupriv, Roman, born 1948, 3rd year student at the Lviv Polytechnical Institute. All five were accused under Articles 62 and 64 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. Four of them were also accused under Article 223 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (storing

weapons). Shovkovy was also accused under Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (illegal possession and carrying side arms and explosives). They were charged with... "forming an illegal anti-Soviet organisation whose goal was to struggle against the Soviet regime and the separation of the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR and the formation of a so-called independent Ukraine, by recruiting new members into the organisation, of ideological indoctrination of members and other people in an anti-Soviet, nationalist spirit, of contacting other hostile anti-Soviet organisations, among them, groups abroad . The initiator of the organisation was Hrynkiv, who formed the organisation and gave it its name. Between February, 1972 and March, 1973 there were nine meetings of the organisation during which speeches were delivered and books of an anti-Soviet, nationalist nature were read; nationalist songs were sung. Hrynkiv was sentenced to seven years strict regime camp and three years exile. Shovkovy and Dymydiv were sentenced to five years strict regime camp, and Chupriv and Motruk to four years strict regime camp.

(the following item is not from the Chronicle)

March, 1973, twelve Armenians were arrested in the city of Yarman, Armenian SSR for the formation of a nationalist organisation "The United National Party". Trials took place in November, 1974. They were accused of disseminating leaflets calling for the unification of Armenia and its independence. The main defendant was Paydekyan; sentenced to seven years camp and five years exile.

META SEMINAR SERIES

The editorial collective of Meta will be holding an educational series, beginning in the second week of September. The purpose of the series is to offer a broad overview of Ukrainian history and current political issues to persons involved in different areas of work around the Ukrainian question.

The series is designed to deal with key questions of Ukrainian history in the twentieth century, in particular the period 1917-21, Ukrainian nationalism and the oppositional movement, and to offer a methodological approach towards understanding the general course of this history. Speakers will include Ukrainian activists and militants invited from other political organisations.

The series covers ten lectures over a twenty week period. Registration is \$5 to pay for printing and facilities costs. For more information, contact the editorial collective through our address.

DESCRIPTION OF SESSIONS

General Introduction to the series.
September 10, 1975.

Towards a Sociology of the Ukrainian Renaissance.
September 17, 1975.

The social structure in Ukraine in 1917; national consciousness in the intelligentsia, peasantry and working class; the political groups and their base in the revolution. Two views of the Ukrainian renaissance: Dontsovian and Marxist.

The Bolsheviks and the National Question.
October 1, 1975.

Why did the Bolsheviks come to power in Ukraine?
Views on the national question- the Ukrainian
Communist Party, the SRs, the Bolsheviks; the
role of the Russian middle class in Ukraine.

From Ukrainisation to Stalinism.
October 15, 1975.

Forces behind Ukrainisation; the peasantry and
the New Economic Policy's impact on the renaissance;
the Stalin - Trotsky fight and Ukrainisation. The emergence
of the Stalin faction, the republican purges, collectivisation
and industrialisation.

Ukrainian Nationalism I.
October 29, 1975.

The situation in Western Ukraine after the revolution;
the emergence of the nationalist movement- OUN;
the decline of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine.
Ukrainian nationalism and Western European fascism.

Ukrainian Nationalism II.
November 12, 1975.

The impact of the war in Western and Eastern Ukraine;
the Bandera-Melnyk split; the Mitranga group. The social
and political base of UPA, its role in the war. The consolidation
of the Soviet apparatus in Western Ukraine.

Eastern Europe in the post-war period.
January 14, 1976.

What kind of states were established in Eastern

Europe after the war? The role of the Red Army, local CPs and the indigenous populations. Soviet-East European relations; the crisis of the East European bloc: Germany 1953, Hungary and Poland 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Poland 1971. Ukraine in the East European configuration; the communities outside the Ukrainian SSR.

The Opposition in Ukraine 1959-1975.

January 28, 1976.

The social base of the opposition and its central political interests; the intelligentsia in the "shelestivshchyna". Dzyuba, Moroz. The 1972 repressions and the new period of oppositional activity.

The Women's Question in the USSR.

February 11, 1976.

The nature of women's oppression; sexual oppression. The status of women in the 1920s and today. The role of women in political struggle in the USSR. Towards a solution to women's oppression in the Soviet Union.

The Women's Question in the West.

February 25, 1976.

The nature of women's oppression in capitalist societies; the women's movement in North America and Western Europe. Two views on women's oppression: feminism and Marxism.

Prospects for the Ukrainian Revolution.

March 10, 1976.

The future of the intellectual opposition; the role of the working class; the question of programme and strategy. The international

REVIEWS

Pyat' opovidan'. By M. Khvyl'ovy. Toronto: The Working Group on Ukraine, 1975. \$2.95. (In Ukrainian).

The five stories in this collection trace Khvyl'ovy's development from his infatuation with Revolutionary Romanticism with its impressionistic portrayal of the heroic years of struggle to the biting, sardonic irony of his last stories.

"Vstupna novelya" brings across the atmosphere of literary life in Kharkiv, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR in the 1920s, where futurists, constructivists, proletarian writers grouped around the journals Pluh and Vaplite, and "fellow travellers" rubbed shoulders.

"Syniy lystopad" sketches the conflict between a young communist, Vadim, dying of tuberculosis and Mariya, an ardent nationalist, who is sceptical of the promises of the Revolution. Though the two are lovers, as far as ideology is concerned they are on opposite sides. This same conflict Khvyl'ovy was to explore further in his novel, Val'dshnepy, only the first half of which has survived.

"Ivan Ivanovych" is perhaps the best story of the five and takes up about half of the collection. It is a portrayal of a Stalinist and a bureaucrat and illustrates the moral hypocrisy of party-cadres of the time.

One of the most important cultural figures of the 1920s in Ukraine, Khvyl'ovy's ideas have been taboo in the Soviet Union until today. Even his name was not mentioned in histories of Soviet literature until a few years ago.

The collection includes a brief introduction which attempts to place the writer within the context of his time and some information on the development of the Communist Party of Ukraine. It is useful in acquainting the reader with the creative prose of a writer who continues to be compellingly relevant because he analyses some of the key contradictions in Soviet society and Soviet man.

Available from Working Group on Ukraine, P.O.Box 376, Station 'B', Toronto, Canada, or at Ukrainian bookstores.

JOURNALS IN EAST EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

The number of publications dealing with developments in Eastern Europe from a radical perspective has increased in the last several years. Such journals, as those listed below, provide a perspective on particular countries which is not available in the reading material of the Western bourgeois press and book publishers.

IN CZECH

Informacni Materialy is a quarterly publication produced by revolutionary socialists. Contents include analysis of contemporary developments in Czechoslovakia, general Soviet and East European news including the oppositional movements, historical and political documents, solidarity news, etc.

The Informacni Materialy publishers have also issued a series of lengthy pamphlets including the following:

Isaac Deutcher; On the Socialist Conception of Man.

E. Mandel; On Bureaucracy.

Kuron and Modzelewski; Open Letter to the Party.

Pavel Kohut, Josef Smrkovsky, Ludvik Vaculik; Roshorovy a Prohlaseñi. (Documents of the Czechoslovak Opposition).

For subscriptions and more information, write to: Informacni Materialy, c/o ISP-Verlag, Postfach 214 I Berlin 10 /West/, West Germany.

IN POLISH

Biuletyn 'Na Lewo' is a regular revolutionary Marxist publication dealing with the political situation in Poland and Eastern Europe as a whole. Na Lewo workers have also issued two important brochures:

Antytezy o nadziei-odpowiedz Kolakowskiemu - a debate on the current situation in Poland with the well known Polish intellectual Kolakowsky.

Chile- Dlaczego Faszyzm zwzciezyl? -an analysis of the coup in Chile and the resistance today.

These materials are obtainable from: Societe Internationale d'Edition, 10 Impasse Guemenee, 75004, Paris; Department d'Europe Orientale.

IN UKRAINIAN

Nashe Slovo (Our Word) is a yearly review published by the Ukrainian Socialist Party, affiliated to the Second International. Issue no. 4, 1975 includes Isaac Mazepa's polemic with D. Dontsov, the nationalist philosopher, "Natsionalizm bez natsional'noho zmistu" (Nationalism without national content). The publishers of this journal have also issued several important works on Ukrainian socialism and history.

For more information and subscriptions, write: Our Word, 8 Munchen 26, Postfach 26, West Germany.

IN ENGLISH

Critique is one of the very few journals dealing with the Soviet Union from a radical perspective. It is indispensable reading for all who wish to

develop an analysis of Soviet society and Eastern Europe in their historical and contemporary dimensions. The most recent issue (no. 4) contains a study of the new forms of political opposition inside the working class of the USSR- M.I. Holubenko's "The Soviet Working Class".

For subscriptions and back issues, write:
Critique, 31 Clevedon Road, Glasgow , G12 0PH,
Scotland.

CRITIQUE

Critique is an independent anti-Stalinist Marxist journal devoted to the analysis of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. With a circulation of 5,000, it is the most important journal of Soviet and East European Studies published in the West. Articles published in the last four issues of Critique include: H.H.Ticktin's "Towards a Political Economy of the USSR", M.Holubenko's, "The Soviet Working Class", Ernest Mandel's "Ten Thesis on Transitional Societies", R. Selucky's, "Marxism and Self-Management" etc. Each issue of Critique includes a Survey of major events in the East, an original translation of an important document, book reviews.

Be informed, subscribe to Critique.

Annual subscription: \$3.00 (.80 pence-U.K.)

Critique
31 Cleveden Road,
Glasgow G12 0PH,
Scotland.

tel: (041) 339-5267.

The following books are available from META:

1. Isaac Mazepa, Ukrayina v ohni i buri revolyutsiyi 1917-21. Vol.1 (\$3.00), Vol. 2 (\$3.00), Vol.3 (\$3.00) This is the first edition of this valuable account of the Ukrainian revolution. (Prometey,1951)
2. Isaac Mazepa, Pidstavy nashoho vidrodzhennya. Vol.1 (\$2.50), Vol.2 (\$2.50) First edition. (Prometey,1946)
3. G.Orwell, Kolhosp tvaryn. (\$2.50)
The only Ukrainian translation of Animal Farm. It contains an original introduction by Orwell to the Ukrainian edition. (Prometey,1947)
4. MUR- Al'manakh Mystetskoho Ukrayins'koho Rukhu. (\$15.00) First edition of this valuable collection.
5. M. Khvyl'ovy, Pyat' opovidan', (\$2.95) (Toronto,1975.)
6. Simen Pidhayny, Ukrayins'ka Intelihensiya na solovkakh. (\$3.00) First edition. (Prometey,1947)

English language books:

1. P.J. Potichnyj, ed. Ukraine in the Seventies. (\$6.95), (Mosaic Press,1975)

To order send cheque, money order payable to META,
Post Office Box 376,
Station 'B',
Toronto, Ontario, CANADA.

Meta is a forum for left wing analysis and discussion on the Ukrainian question, Eastern Europe and related international issues. Published four times a year in Toronto, Canada in English.

MANAGING EDITOR

Ihor Petelycky

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Toronto

Anhelyna Szuch

Taras Lehkyj

Maya Petrenko

New York

Adrian Karatnycky

Maria Mykolenko

Prices and Subscriptions

Canada, United States

\$2. per issue

\$8. per year (air mail)

United Kingdom

80 pence per issue

3.20 per year (air mail)

Prisoners, residents of

East European countries

Free

Editorial and Distribution Address

Meta, Post Office Box 376, Station 'B', Toronto,
Ontario, Canada.

Number 1

Fall 1975

EDITORIAL	1
The meaning of the new Ukrainian Herald	6
Dossier: Chile and Eastern Europe	16
The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Galician Reality	40
The International Women's Year Conference	80
DOCUMENT: The Status of Women under Soviet Law	90
NEWS	100
REVIEWS	112

(Cover illustration from Manifesto of
the Revolutionary Socialist Party,
Czechoslovakia; IMG Publication,
U.K. 1970).