

# NATIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN UKRAINE

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A paper to be presented at the Conference on Religious and Ethnic  
Oppression in the USSR, Marymount College, Arlington, Virginia,  
on May 17, 1984.

## INTRODUCTION

The subject of national discrimination in the USSR as practiced against the Ukrainian people is vast, and only a general discussion is possible here. Since a purpose of this conference is to marshal some of the evidence about ethnic repression in the Soviet Union, I shall attempt to present evidence of the most concrete and accurate kind available. Because of the limitations of time, however, this evidence shall be largely confined to that illustrating a few aspects of national discrimination only.

First, national discrimination must be defined. Here it is useful to cite the definition of racial discrimination used in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ratified, incidentally, by both the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR): "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life" (article 1-1). For our purposes, however, it will suffice to define national discrimination as follows: the differential treatment of persons, <sup>groups, cultures or</sup> institutions on the basis of their national or ethnic identity. We shall correspondingly divide national discrimination into four types: discrimination against individuals, against groups, against cultures, and against political institutions.

## II

Since the approach of this conference is critical as well as analytical, it is appropriate to mention that national discrimination

is explicitly prohibited by international law. The principles of the United Nations Charter include equal rights of peoples, sovereign equality of UN members, and respect for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.<sup>1</sup> The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims equal rights for all human beings, and grants freedoms without distinction of any kind, including race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, or national or social origin.<sup>2</sup> The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights<sup>3</sup> and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights<sup>4</sup> likewise grant certain rights to all regardless of race, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, and so on. In addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims equal protection of the law to all, and specifically grants protection against discrimination in violation of its principles, and against incitement to such discrimination.<sup>5</sup> It also grants everyone the right to a nationality.<sup>6</sup> The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mentioned above not only grants all persons the equal protection of the law, but requires the law of each country to prohibit any discrimination and to guarantee to all persons protection against discrimination on any ground such as those previously cited.<sup>7</sup> Under this Covenant, members of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities must not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their religion, or use their own language.<sup>8</sup> A UNESCO convention forbids discrimination in education,<sup>9</sup> and an ILO convention prohibits discrimination in employment and occupation.<sup>10</sup> Finally, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination provides that "no state, institution, group or individual shall make any discrimination whatsoever in matters of human rights and fundamental

freedoms in the treatment of persons, groups of persons or institutions on the grounds of race, color or ethnic origin."<sup>11</sup> Both the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR are parties to these instruments of international law.

Soviet law, too, forbids discrimination. Article 34 of the USSR Constitution proclaims all citizens equal before the law regardless of, among other categories, race or nationality, language, or place of residence. Article 36 specifically grants citizens of different races and nationalities equal rights. It makes restrictions of rights, the establishment of privileges on grounds of race or nationality, or the preaching of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility or contempt punishable by law. Under Article 64, every USSR citizen must respect the national dignity of other citizens and strengthen the friendship of the nations and nationalities of the USSR.

Quite apart from the question of enforcement, these legal guarantees must be seen in the light of Soviet nationalities policy--for Soviet<sup>law</sup> is at least in part an instrument of policy. The Constitution itself refers to some of the relevant policies: Article 36 declares that the exercise of equal racial and national rights is ensured by a policy of comprehensive development and rapprochement of all Soviet nations and nationalities, by educating citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by the possibility of using one's native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR. Article 19 announces that the state promotes the strengthening of the national homogeneousness of society and the all-round development and rapprochement of the Soviet nations and nationalities. Apparently, the theory of the development and convergence of the nations of the USSR, leading to their ultimate fusion <sup>which is</sup> not, however, mentioned

in the Constitution) into a single, uniform Soviet nation, remains in force. It seems to influence both administrative practice and the interpretation of laws. One may well ask whether this nationalities policy, now codified in the Fundamental Law of the Soviet Union, is in harmony with the spirit of the international legal principles set out above.

### III

Having outlined the legal framework, we can now proceed to examine the actual practice of national discrimination towards the Ukrainian people. A few words must be said, however, about its origins and nature.

Of the three heirs of medieval Kievan Rus', it was Muscovy that eventually subsumed its brothers under the rubric of "Russia." The process of imperial conquest and colonization inevitably involved discrimination against the Ukrainians as well as against other subjugated peoples, cultures and states. The fact that individuals could escape discrimination only by assimilating with the Russian people--that is, by participating in the gradual elimination of their group and their culture--illustrates the mechanism by which individual discrimination in colonial conditions is a factor in group and cultural discrimination. In a multi-national empire, this leads ultimately to the eradication of all national groups other than the dominant one. In a multi-national federation, it involves discrimination against entire political entities as well.

While the state structure of the USSR, with its fifteen republics and various autonomous republics, regions and national areas, is a concession to the aspirations of its nearly 100 nations and nationa-

lities, the actual administration of the Soviet government closely follows the colonial pattern. The doctrine of the drawing-together and ultimate fusion of nations referred to above provides a theoretical justification for continuing the policy of Russification begun under the Tsars, now ill-concealed beneath the slogan of socialist internationalism. Even a close examination of the formal constitutional structure of state power will reveal a high degree of centralism; the unitary structure of the ruling party reveals it even more.

In view of this, one may well ask, first, whether national discrimination is a systemic rather than an incidental problem of today's USSR, and second, whether national discrimination is inherent in any Russian successor state preserving the basic outlines of the Empire.

This is not to suggest, however, that colonialism serves the interests of the Russian people or that their interests are incompatible with those of the colonized peoples. Its national identity or affiliation is only one characteristic of the Soviet ruling elite. While this aspect does result, as we shall see, in discrimination against non-Russians, other characteristics of the Soviet elite place it at odds with the interests of the bulk of the Russians as well. In fact, it may be said that this elite represents the interests of no national group, and of no socio-economic or political group other than itself. All the same, this does not prevent it from carrying on certain practices which discriminate in favor of Russians and to the detriment of non-Russians.

#### IV

What are the forms of national discrimination against Ukrainians? In the category of discrimination against individuals, those persecuted

for asserting and exercising basic human rights such as free speech, press and assembly in defense of Ukrainian culture and national rights are best known. The members of the Ukrainian<sup>Public</sup> Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, for example, have been severely persecuted. At times, those who protest national discrimination are themselves discriminatorily punished; the sentences for Ukrainians convicted of political crimes like anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Criminal Code RSFSR art. 70, Criminal Code Ukr.SSR art. 62) have often been unusually long and have in some cases been imposed successively. Perhaps the most shocking example is that of Iurii Shukhevych, son of an anti-Soviet resistance leader, who has been imprisoned for thirty of his fifty years primarily for refusing to denounce his father's ideas and actions; 99% blind, he remains in exile near Tomsk. There is a further discrimination in that Ukrainian political prisoners must commonly serve their sentences of imprisonment outside the Ukrainian SSR.

While active dissidents are but a fraction of the Ukrainian population, ordinary citizens do not escape discrimination either. For example, in 1970 the share of Ukrainians in the USSR with higher education was only about 75% the share of Russians with higher education.<sup>12</sup> In 1970 the Ukrainian SSR had a smaller share of employment in the "non-productive" sector--health, education, science and art--and in the non-agricultural branches of the "productive" sector--such as industry, transportation, communication and trade--than did the Russian republic. It had a much larger share of employment in the agricultural sector. There, the share of collective farmers in the Ukrainian SSR was more than twice that in the RSFSR. It is well known that collective farmers rank at the bottom of the Soviet social and economic scale. While in 1970 the Ukrainian SSR provided a quarter of the

Soviet Union's agricultural labor force and nearly a third of its collective farmers, it had only a fifth of its agricultural specialists with higher or secondary specialized education. Higher education among the rural population of the Ukrainian republic was below that of the USSR as a whole.<sup>13</sup> In the 1960's and 1970's, Ukrainians had a smaller percentage of college graduates and students than did the Russians in the Ukrainian SSR. Only about 60% of the students in Ukraine were Ukrainians.<sup>14</sup>

National discrimination against Ukrainians as a group is evident in demographic and language-affiliation data. Here one can discern continuing Russification. While the overall number of Ukrainians in the USSR increased 3.9% from 1970 to 1979, the percentage share of Ukrainians in their own republic declined from 74.9% to 73.6%. At the same time, the percentage share of Russians increased from 19.4% to 21.1%. According to the 1979 census only about 86% of Ukrainians in the USSR lived in the Ukrainian SSR; 8.6% lived in the RSFSR.<sup>15</sup> A study of the 1970 census revealed that employed Ukrainians with a higher education tended to work outside their native republic.<sup>16</sup> In the 1960's and 1970's over a third of Ukrainian scientists in the Soviet Union worked outside the Ukrainian SSR, reflecting a policy of planned resettlement of Ukrainians to Russia and other union republics.<sup>17</sup> The majority of individual inter-republic transfers involving the Ukrainian SSR in 1968-1970 was between the Ukrainian and the Russian republics.<sup>18</sup> Generally, skilled, educated Ukrainians have been encouraged to move out of their country,<sup>19</sup> for example, to Central Asia and the non-black-earth region of Russia, while Russians have transferred massively into Ukraine.

In cases of Ukrainian out-migration to other non-Russian republics such as Latvia or Estonia, there is a triple Russifying effect. First,



the migrating Ukrainians lose touch with their language and culture; they are deprived of access to Ukrainian newspapers, libraries and theaters, while their children can no longer go to Ukrainian schools. In order to communicate with their new neighbors and co-workers they will use Russian, and will most likely send their children to Russian schools. This brings about the second effect of out-migration: Russification of the receiving country by the non-Russian migrants themselves.<sup>20</sup> Third, the out-migrants are commonly replaced<sup>at home</sup> by Russian or Russian-speaking immigrants, who thus contribute to Russification there. Indeed, from 1970 to 1979 the percentage of the population of the Ukrainian SSR claiming Ukrainian as its native language decreased from 69.4 to 66.3, while the percentage claiming Russian as its native language increased from 28.1 to 31.2. Of Ukrainians throughout the USSR, 85.7% claimed Ukrainian as their native language in 1970; in 1979 the figure dropped to 82.8%. In the city of Kiev, however, both the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian national consciousness apparently increased during that period--although there, too, the Russian language remained dominant.<sup>21</sup> It must be remembered that Kiev was heavily Russified well before Soviet rule.

The intensified teaching of the Russian language in the schools of the non-Russian republics announced at the All-Union Scientific-Theoretical Conference on the Russian language held in Tashkent in May, 1979 signalled a renewed policy of linguistic Russification. The recommendations of the Tashkent Conference prompted action on both the all-union and republic levels.<sup>22</sup> At the same time, the number of Ukrainian-language schools, generally held to be inferior to Russian-language schools, was declining in the heavily Russified, urbanized, industrial southeast Ukraine; the last Ukrainian school in Donetsk--a city of over a million inhabitants--was reportedly shut down in 1979.<sup>23</sup>

A distinct but related phenomenon is discrimination against the Ukrainian culture. This is evidenced by statistics on the number, language and content of Soviet publications in the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union as a whole. Such statistics were cited by Soviet <sup>Ukrainian</sup> literary critic Ivan Dziuba in 1965 in his work entitled Internationalism or Russification?<sup>24</sup> To properly assess the significance of these statistics it is necessary to keep in mind the following demographic statistics: in 1979 the population of the RSFSR was about 52.4% that of the USSR, with the proportion of Russians in the Soviet population likewise at about 52.4%; the population of the Ukrainian SSR was about 19.0% of that of the USSR, while Ukrainians constituted about 16.1% of the Soviet population; Russians made up about 21.1% of the population of the Ukrainian SSR, with Ukrainians constituting 73.6%.<sup>25</sup> The population of the RSFSR was ~~that~~ about 2.8 times that of the Ukrainian SSR; the over-all Russian population was about 3.3 times the over-all Ukrainian population. One should also consider the figures for native language affiliation cited above.

In light of this, let us examine some official statistics on publishing in the USSR in the year 1982. Of the books and brochures published by USSR publishing houses, some 70.8% of the titles were in the Russian language; only 22.2% were in the languages of the non-Russian Soviet republics. Only in the union republic publishing houses did the figures for book and brochure titles correspond roughly to the over-all population figures: 52.4% Russian-language titles, 44.3% titles in the languages of the non-Russian republics.<sup>26</sup> Out of the over-all number of books and brochures published in the USSR, 80.9% of the titles were in Russian. This far exceeds the 52.4% Russian population. Only 2.7% of the titles were in Ukrainian,<sup>27</sup> well under the 19.0% of the Soviet population living in the Ukrainian SSR and the 16.1% who are Ukrainians, as well as an estimated 13.3% (author's

estimate) of the Soviet population claiming Ukrainian as their native language. It is also less than the comparable figure for 1966, 4.1%.<sup>28</sup>

An index of the dissemination of national language and culture is the number of translations published. While in 1982 75.8% of the translations from languages of the USSR published in that country were from the Russian language, only 2.8% were from the Ukrainian language. Russian-language works were translated into 104 languages, while Ukrainian-language works were translated into only 20 languages.<sup>29</sup>

While the proportion of Russian literary works published--50.8%--corresponds roughly to the Russian share of the Soviet population, the number of Ukrainian literary works was only 7.3%, far less than the percentage of the Soviet population which is Ukrainian or which claims Ukrainian as its native language.<sup>30</sup>

An examination of the Soviet periodical press--excluding newspapers--indicates an even greater degree of Russification. Some 85.2% of the titles, 82.6% of the issues, and 81.0% of the copies per year published in 1982 were in Russian. Only 2.1% of the titles, 2.5% of the issues and 5.5% of the copies per year were in Ukrainian--again, to be compared with a 16.1% Ukrainian share of the population and an estimated 13.3% of the population claiming Ukrainian as its native language.<sup>31</sup>

Figures for Soviet newspapers, however, show a lesser degree of Russification in number of titles and issues published--64.6% and 63.6%, respectively, in Russian--but a similar degree in the number of copies per year--82.0%. The corresponding figures for Ukrainian-language newspapers follow the same pattern: 15.8% of the titles, 12.2% of the issues, and only 7.0% of the copies per year.<sup>32</sup>

Publishing in the union republics reveals Soviet linguistic policy in bolder relief. In 1982 approximately six times as many titles of

books and brochures were published in the Russian republic as in the Ukrainian republic, in some 10.6 times as many copies.<sup>33</sup> While in the RSFSR, Russian-language titles constituted some 91.5% of the total, Ukrainian-language titles constituted a mere 25.0% <sup>of</sup> the total for the Ukrainian republic.<sup>34</sup> This latter figure is well below the 40% reported for 1966,<sup>35</sup> and reflects a declining trend: 39% in 1968, 28% in 1977, 25% in 1982.<sup>36</sup> It compares most unfavorably both with the 73.6% Ukrainian share of the republic's population and with the 66.3% share of the republic's population claiming Ukrainian as its native language. On the other hand, while in terms of number of copies the share of Russian-language works published in the RSFSR is a high 95.3%, the share of Ukrainian-language works in the Ukrainian republic, 65.0%, is not so disproportionate to the percentage of the population that is Ukrainian, or especially to the percentage that claims Ukrainian as its native language.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, it reflects a decline from 1966, when the Ukrainian-language share of the number of copies printed was 72%.<sup>38</sup> The share of the number of copies printed in the Ukrainian SSR in Russian is 32.5%, well above the Russian share of the republic's population (21.9%) but very close to the share of the population claiming Russian as its native language (31.2%).<sup>39</sup>

The fact that the number of <sup>book and brochure</sup> translations into Russian published in the RSFSR exceeded that of translations into Ukrainian published in the Ukrainian SSR by a factor of over four and a half to one, while the number of languages translated into Russian (101) exceeded the number translated into Ukrainian (41) by a factor of two and a half to one, suggests that access to foreign literature is much greater for those reading in Russian than for those reading in Ukrainian.<sup>40</sup> This corresponds to the ideological principle that Russian culture is to be the non-Russians' means of access to world culture.

Some greater disparities are seen in the relative numbers of periodicals, excluding newspapers, published in the Russian and Ukrainian republics. Periodical titles in the RSFSR outnumber titles in the Ukrainian SSR by a factor of 19.7 to one, and the number of issues is some 18.7 times greater in the former, although its population is only about 2.8 times that of the Ukrainian republic.<sup>41</sup> While the percentages of Russian-language periodical titles and issues are very high in the Russian republic--93.3 and 93.5, respectively--the percentages of Ukrainian-language periodical titles and issues in the Ukrainian SSR are disproportionately low: 51.8 and 60.8. The figures for Russian-language periodical titles and issues in the Ukrainian republic are correspondingly high: 45.7% and 33.7%, respectively. In terms of copies printed per year, however, the figure for Ukrainian-language periodicals published in the Ukrainian SSR is a high 91.2%, as compared with only 8.7% for Russian-language periodicals.<sup>42</sup>

The statistics on union-republic newspapers reflect a near-normal pattern in terms of numbers of titles and issues published in the Russian and the Ukrainian republics. In terms of copies per year, however, the RSFSR outstrips the Ukrainian SSR by a factor of 6.8 to one, well over the relative sizes of their populations.<sup>43</sup> Within the Russian republic, the percentage share of Russian-language newspapers is high: 93.2% of titles, 90.7% of issues, and 98.6% of copies per year. The figures for titles and issues of Ukrainian-language newspapers in the Ukrainian republic--73.4% and 73.5%, respectively--are normal relative to the percentage of Ukrainians in its population and favorable relative to the share of the population with Ukrainian as its native language. The share of Ukrainian-language copies per year, however, is a disproportionately low 64.5%; the share of copies of Russian-language newspapers is, as expected, disproportionately high: 34.9%. This

exceeds the proportion in the republic's population of both Russians and those claiming Russian as their native language.<sup>44</sup>

The disproportion of Russian-language publications indicated by these statistics evidences an unequal treatment of the Russian and Ukrainian languages in the USSR. The discrimination is all the more glaring when it occurs within the republic of the disfavored linguistic group. It is true that in some cases, the share of Russian-language publications corresponds roughly to the share of Russians or Russian speakers in the population. That proportion, however, may itself be the result of Russification. Thus, a percentage of Russian publications seemingly appropriate to the nationality structure or language-affiliation pattern of a given population may simply mean that different forms of Russification have proceeded at similar rates.

A closely related phenomenon is the dearth of scientific and technical publications in the Ukrainian SSR. While 31 journals in electronics and related fields are published in the Soviet Union, not one is published in the Ukrainian language or in the Ukrainian SSR. Only one of the 49 Soviet journals on physics is published in Ukraine, and that in the Russian language; only one of the 40 journals of chemistry and related sciences is published in Ukraine and that, too, is in Russian. Not one of the 52 Soviet technical and manufacturing journals, not one of the 26 journals of biological science, is published in the Ukrainian language or in the Ukrainian SSR. Twenty-three industrial journals are published in the USSR, yet the only republic without its own industrial journal is the Ukrainian SSR.<sup>45</sup>

Less easily quantifiable is cultural discrimination in the fields of ideology and the arts. Broadly, it can be argued that the imposition of Marxism-Leninism on the Ukrainian people discriminates against native political and socio-economic traditions. The communal patterns

that arose to the north were neither necessary nor desirable in the warmer and more fertile Ukraine. The autocratic tradition of Muscovy was foreign to the heirs of Cossack democracy.

A more specific form of discrimination has been the renewed emphasis on the primacy of Russian culture. This has involved not only the exaltation of that culture, but the neglect and even the destruction of Ukrainian cultural and historical objects such as churches, icons, and documents. The murders of artist Alla Hors'ka in 1970 and composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk in 1979, bearing evidence of KGB involvement, <sup>seem to</sup> indicate the ferocity of the assault on Ukrainian culture. More subtle has been the falsification of religious, cultural and political history; cases in point are the anti-Catholic crusade, the observances of Kiev's 1500th anniversary, and the reinterpretations of Ukraine's alliance with Muscovy. The total suppression of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic churches, by contrast with partial official tolerance of the Russian Orthodox Church, is a form of religious discrimination along national lines.

The fourth type of national discrimination practiced towards the Ukrainian people is discrimination against the Ukrainian SSR. The centralized state and party structure of the USSR, in combination with the actual dominance of the Russians, nullifies the constitutional guarantees of union republic sovereignty. Thus, the Ukrainian SSR does not carry on significant diplomatic activity outside the East Bloc, and its somewhat anomalous membership in the United Nations invariably serves to support USSR positions. Its constitutional right to secede from the Union (article 72) is purely symbolic. In a strictly formal sense, of course, it is not treated discriminatorily vis a vis its fellow republics, since even the Russian republic has no United

Nations representation or major diplomatic contacts. But its membership in the Soviet Union has placed it at a clear disadvantage in relation to other nation-states.

The evidence of discrimination against the Ukrainian SSR is clearest in the area of economics. Broadly speaking, the policy of integration of the USSR into a "single economic complex" provided in Article 16 of the Constitution in effect promotes Russification along with centralization, and further subordinates the non-Russian republics to the desires and commands of the Russian center. In this "system of unequal exchange," the costs and benefits of production are unequally apportioned between the central government and the Ukrainian republic, while the allocation of resources and output is distorted, with a clear disadvantage to the latter.<sup>46</sup> It has been established that in the 1960's, enormous amounts of capital were transferred out of the Ukrainian SSR to other parts of the Soviet Union, with resulting detriment to the Ukrainian economy--for example, in the form of a lower standard of living for Ukrainians than would otherwise have been the case.<sup>47</sup> While in terms of absolute growth the Ukrainian republic has prospered, its relative position vis a vis the center is disadvantageous, involving an estimated 10% drain of Ukraine's national income --neither repayable nor interest-bearing--to finance Soviet military expenditures, the industrialization of Central Asia, and other ventures determined by the Moscow leadership without democratic consultation with the Ukrainian people.<sup>48</sup> While this does not of itself establish a discrimination against the Ukrainian SSR in relation to the other Soviet republics, which may likewise be victims of exploitative policies, it strongly suggests that it is deprived of the economic sovereignty enjoyed by comparable nation-states outside the Soviet Union.



As the above-mentioned data demonstrate, national discrimination is practiced against Ukrainians as individuals and as members of a group, as well as against their culture and their state entity. The evidence available is of course incomplete. Considering that the Soviet authorities are likely to release data favorable to them, the dimensions of the problem could be greater than we realize. Official Soviet sources naturally interpret these data differently, presenting de-nationalization as internationalization, and Russification as a choice freely made in the interests of universal brotherhood--and to that extent, they have no motive to conceal the evidence. They characterize both processes as natural trends--a rather disingenuous assertion in view of stated nationalities policy. There is in fact evidence that these processes are neither natural nor voluntary, but forcibly imposed. Besides, one may question whether in a tightly controlled authoritarian state there can be such a thing as a "natural" or voluntary process of de-nationalization and Russification. It is <sup>unreasonable</sup> to assume that an entire people will freely choose to abandon its identity and adopt that of its historical oppressors. Ethnocide, like its relative genocide, is rarely self-inflicted.

Billed by the Soviet government as socialist internationalism, Russification has elicited a growing solidarity among the non-Russian nations of the USSR. Born out of cooperation among Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish, Tatar and other political prisoners in the multi-national Soviet labor camps, it is well symbolized by the recent additions of the Estonian Mart Niklus and the Lithuanian Victoras Petkus to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. It suggests that the oppressive realities of the regime's avowed internationalism have given rise to an unofficial internationalism based on equality and mutual respect. In combi-

nation with the labor movement--likewise a response to centralism and institutionalized inequality--this new internationalism may indeed contribute to a peaceful yet radical transformation of the USSR.

Be that as it may, it is demonstrable that national discrimination against Ukrainians, their culture and state exists in many sectors of Soviet life; that it contributes to, and often takes the form of, Russification; and that it furthers the stated nationalities policy of the Soviet government. Such discrimination violates that government's freely undertaken obligations under international law. Its ultimate consequence--the disappearance of a nation--would be a loss to all.

#### N O T E S

1. United Nations Charter arts. 1-2, 2-1, 1-3.
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN Doc. A/811, 10 Dec. 1948) arts. 1, 2.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316, 16 Dec. 1966) art. 2-1.
4. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316, 16 Dec. 1966) art. 2-2.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 7.
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15.
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 26.
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27.
9. UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education (14 Dec. 1960).
10. ILO Convention No. 111 (25 June 1958).
11. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII) 20 Nov. 1963) art. 2-1.
12. TsSU, Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda, IV (Moscow 1972) p. 13, cited in Whitehouse & Bronson, "Manpower," in I.S. Koropec'kyj, The Ukraine within the USSR (New York/London, 1977) p. 143.

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- 14 R. Szporluk, Ukraine: a Brief History (Detroit: 1982) p. 118.
- 15 Solchanyk, "Ukraine and the Ukrainians in the USSR: Nationality and Language Aspects of the 1979 Soviet Census," The Ukrainian Quarterly Vol. XXXVI, No. 3 (Autumn 1980) pp. 272-273.
- 16 Whitehouse & Bronson, op. cit., p. 143.
- 17 Szporluk, op. cit., p. 118.
- 18 Whitehouse & Bronson, op. cit., pp. 148-149.
- 19 Szporluk, op. cit., p. 128.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Solchanyk, op. cit., pp. 272-275.
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- 23 Szporluk, op. cit., p. 126.
- 24 I. Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? (London: 1968) pp. 116-122, 222.
- 25 See Solchanyk, op. cit.
- 26 Based on Pechat' SSSR v 1982 godu (Moscow: 1983), Table 6, pp. 16-17.  
Based on
- 27 Pechat' SSSR, Table 10, p. 24.
- 28 Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 222.
- 29 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 11, pp. 28-29.
- 30 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 28, p. 98.
- 31 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 35, p. 107.
- 32 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 40, p. 117.
- 33 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 43, pp. 124-125.
- 34 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 45, p. 138.
- 35 Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 222.
- 36 Encyclopedia of Library and Information Science (New York: 1981) Vol. 31, p. 299.
- 37 Based on Pechat' SSSR, loc. cit.
- 38 Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 222.

- 39 Based on Pechat' SSSR, loc. cit.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 50, pp. 208-209.
- 42 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 51, p. 211.
- 43 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 56, pp. 233-234.
- 44 Based on Pechat' SSSR, Table 57, p. 237.
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- 46 Bandera, "External and Intraunion Trade and Capital Transfers," in Koropec'kyj, op. cit., pp. 262-264.
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- 48 Wiles, "Comparison with some Alternatives," in Koropec'kyj, op. cit., p. 311.