"Glasnost'" and "Perestroika" and Ukraine

POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND PERESTROIKA:
Changes in Communist Party Leadership in Ukraine
Under Gorbachev and Shcherbitskyi

by
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If the age of Brezhnev was a period of stagnation, corruption, and patronage, and that of Gorbachev is supposed to be one of acceleration, openness, and democratization, then what happens to patronage? Supposedly, patronage is swept away by the healthy forces of revolutionary reform. Since Volodymyr Shcherbitskyi was a client of Brezhnev's, he and all of his clients should now be on their way out, as should the whole system of clientelistic political promotions. The disappearance of personalistic ties among the Communist leadership in the Soviet Union generally, and in Soviet Ukraine in particular, however, depends on whether perestroika is more powerful than patronage and Gorbachev more powerful than Shcherbitskyi.

In order to see which is stronger, new-age perestroika or old-fashioned patronage, let us examine the case of the Ukrainian SSR in the 1980s, and whether the long arm of Moscow has been having an effect on the selection and circulation of Communist Party leaders. If it has, then perestroika definitely is more potent than patronage, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. In Ukraine, after the accession of Gorbachev, virtually nothing happened in the sphere of personnel changes during the

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balance of 1985.2 The political fallout of the Chornobyl' disaster in 1986 was infinitessimal.3 There was, of course, in 1987, a minor flurry of activity connected with the displacement of three oblast' party committee (obkom) first secretaries—Honcharenko in Voroshlyovrad, Boiko in Dnipropetrovs'k, and Dobryk in L'viv—which was commonly interpreted as an assault by Gorbachev on Shcherbitskyi,4 but by the time of the October 1988 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) the normal Brezhnevian tranquility seemed to have reasserted itself in the Ukrainian political leadership.5 With Shcherbitskyi still securely in place, either his clientelistic network is still there as well, or, if Gorbachev is having any influence on the situation and is able to bypass the First Secretary of Ukraine, that network is being gradually dismantled (perhaps replaced by another) and Shcherbitskyi is being slowly undermined.

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3The Kyiv obkom first secretary, Revenko, received the Order of Lenin on his fiftieth birthday on 28 April 1986, was criticized by name by the Politburo and by Shcherbitskyi for inadequacies in July 1987, but was nevertheless reelected to his post in December 1988. Pravda Ukrainy, 29 April 1986, p. 1; ibid., 14 July 1987, p. 1; Radians'ka Ukraina, 23 July 1987, p. 4; and ibid., 18 December 1988, p. 2.


To find out what is going on insofar as change in the political elite of Ukraine is concerned, I have collected information on the proceedings of obkom plenums conducted between 1 October 1982, and 31 December 1988, and on their relationships to the composition of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPU. This timespan begins with the sudden death of the republic's Second Secretary, just before the demise of Brezhnev, and ends with his successor's retirement. As the Second Secretary in a union republic is assumed to have responsibility for cadres and to serve as a check on the First Secretary, this definition of the time period therefore introduces an important element of control on our experiment. By including two and one half years before Gorbachev's accession, it also provides an opportunity to see if there has been any change associated with the new policy of perestroika. Other things being


equal, the promotion, demotion, retirement, and transfer of obkom first secretaries in this as in other republics may be determined by their links to patrons in the Politburo and Secretariat. If perestroika is having an effect on the political elite in Ukraine, these patterns of personal association should have been interrupted since 1985; if not, patronage along with Shcherbitskyi can be expected to survive in spite of reports of their imminent, or even recent, demise.

There are 25 oblasti in Ukraine; since in the political hierarchy the capital city, Kyiv, ranks as one of them, there are considered to be 26 obkomy altogether, an assumption followed in this paper. Plenary sessions of oblast' Communist Party committees are held every two or three years in order to elect (or to reconfirm) the obkom secretariat, consisting of the first, second and usually three other unranked secretaries. Sometimes these meetings are staggered, so that (usually during the winter) half of the republic's obkomy will have such report-and-election meetings in one year, and half the following year. In December 1988, all 26 units were reported as having held plenums at which elections took place (which again is a convenient end-point for the collection of data). Ordinary plenary meetings take place in the intervals, at a frequency of one to four times annually. According to the newspaper reports, all of these meetings are attended by a senior party official, most often from the headquarters in Kyiv, but also sometimes from Moscow. Over the course of the period in question, I have counted 187 obkom plenums in Ukraine, or an average of 7.2 each, which is a little more than one per year.

On the assumption that the visiting senior official, who represents or is himself the appointive authority, may have a personal tie to the
local first secretary, and based on the newspaper reports, I decided to carry out a series of tests to determine the extent of political patronage within this echelon of the Soviet Ukrainian political elite from the death of Brezhnev to the end of 1988. The first test was to see who among the senior Ukrainian and all-Union party officials had attended which meetings, whether they had done so with any regularity, and whether there was any association as between officials and particular obkomy or their first secretaries. The second test was to check if the Second Secretary of the CPU, Tytarenko, was linked in any consistent fashion with the changes of obkom first secretaries which would mean that he might have been plaiting his own string of clients among them and undoing Shcherbitskyi's. Thirdly, if perestroika is an actual and effective policy meaning openness and accountability in matters of cadres, and if Moscow has been displeased with its implementation in Ukraine and is taking measures to correct it, then public criticism of obkom first secretaries, as well as the presence at plenary meetings of apparatchiki from the CC CPSU, should be associated with dismissal or at the very least reassignment. This would be indicative of the power of perestroika over patronage, or at least over the old way of doing things. My fourth test involved looking for personal or career links between the newly-appointed obkom first secretaries and their ostensible sponsors. Alternatively, I attempted to see whether these sponsors might be tied to the outgoing first secretaries. Finally, I examined the changes that have occurred in the composition of the Politburo and Secretariat, and particularly whether those departing and arriving have had any plausible connection to Shcherbitskyi, whether there is a process of renewal in the Ukrainian leadership, and whether clientelistic connections have played
a part in the latest appointments. Since newcomers to the top two party bodies are drawn almost exclusively from among obkom first secretaries, the question of patronage requires an examination of that wider contingent of the elite and its interactions with its superiors if anything meaningful is going to be said. In general, the ultimate objective of these tests, if they have any validity, is to find out what has happened to the infamous Dnipropetrovs'k mafia in Ukraine now that Brezhnev is gone, but Shcherbitskyi remains. What, we may ask, happens to the clientela when the patron departs?

It was expected that there should be, if the sponsors were personally involved in the appointment and protection of their client-subordinates, and if patronage in the CPU and elsewhere in the CPSU were as prevalent as we have been led to believe, a clear and regular association between first secretaries and visiting officials at obkom plenums. At the very least, there should be a clearly discernible territorial division of labour such that certain officials regularly attend the meetings in particular oblasti, probably their own old stomping grounds. This would all be consistent with the normal assumptions of the study of clientelistic behaviour. After countless hours spent recording the visits of higher-level officials to obkom plenums in Ukraine from late 1982 to the end of 1988, however, these expectations were thoroughly shattered. Out of 187 plenums, there were 12
(or 6.4 per cent) at which the senior visitor was not identified. Of the remaining 175, only 30 were repeat visits where the outside official appeared two (but usually only two) or more times in the same oblast'. These repeat visits have occurred only in 12 of 26 obkomy; only 10 obkom first secretaries have been thus visited more than once by the same senior outsider or ostensible patron during this entire period of time. On the remaining 145 occasions, in other words, a different official each time has come to oversee the plenary meeting of any particular obkom. The only exceptional instance is that of Shcherbitskyi, who in the period examined here has participated on four occasions in meetings of the Kyiv City committee. From biographical data it was impossible to establish links

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8 From a comparison of some of the reports of the same meetings in two different sources, it is my surmise that: (a) at least one outside official attends every plenum; (b) only the senior of these is actually indicated as having made an appearance, usually with a report of his own; and (c) no mention is not indicative of absence. Hence, my reference to the "senior official," it being understood that other persons may or may not have attended.

9 Shcherbitskyi attended the Kyiv plenums in January 1986 and early April 1987, when Yel'chenko was still first secretary, in late April 1987 at the installation of Masyk, and again on Christmas Day 1988. Other top leaders have been present at most at two meetings in any single oblast'. Specifically, they are: (1) Hurenko in May 1987 and December 1988 in Voroshilovgrad; (2) Tytarenko (a) in January 1986 and February 1987, also in Voroshilovgrad, (b) in November and December 1985 in Kyiv Oblast, (c) in January 1985 and May 1987 in Khmel'nyts'kyi Oblast, and (d) in April and July in Volyn'; (3) Sologub in May 1987 and December 1988 in Ivano-Frankivs'kyi; (4) Liakhov and Merkulov together in Kyiv City in April and July 1986; (5) Kachalovs'kyi (a) in April 1986 and May 1987 in the Crimea, and (b) in April 1987 and December 1988 in Kharkiv; (6) Kachura (a) in April 1987 and October 1988 in Sumy, and (b) in June 1987 and December 1988 in Kherson; (7) Mozhovyi in October 1983 and December 1985 in Odessa; and (8) Gerasimov in July 1987 and December 1988 in Chernihiv. I have been unable to establish a connection between any of these officials' careers, the given oblasti, and the resident first secretary, except for Shcherbitskyi whose career overlaps and intersects with those of Yel'chenko and Masyk.
between local first secretaries and these high-level visitors, except for Shcherbitskyi himself. Relatively speaking, therefore, there is, according to these data, hardly any opportunity at obkom plenums or conferences for personal relations between officials and first secretaries to develop, nor for officials to cultivate personal fiefdoms.

So the principle of rotation, rather than territorial division of labour, seems to be followed in determining which central leader or apparatchik will officiate at a given obkom plenum. This is not conducive to the development of clientelistic relations. But then most obkom plenums discuss what is from the perspective of this study only routine business. Perhaps clientelism actually comes into play when a new first secretary is elected, and the sponsor on that occasion is in fact the patron. What do the data tell us on this score? Out of 26 obkomy, 19 changed first secretaries a total of 28 times. Ten different individuals shared officiating duties on these 28 occasions. Could the obkom first secretaries, then, be linked vertically by 10 or more chains of clientelism? This hardly seems plausible, since they can really have but a single boss. In fact, one central official, Tytarenko, attended the installation of 11 first secre-

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10 Biographical data on all individuals covered by this research were drawn from: Ukrains'ka Radians'ka Entsiklopediia (2nd ed., 1978); Lewytzkyj, Who's Who in the Soviet Union; Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii, 1971; and the sources cited in n. 6 above.

11 In Dnipropetrovs'k, there have been three changes: in February 1983, Boiko replaced Kachalovs'kyi; in April 1987, Boiko was dismissed and Ivashko stepped in; and in December 1988, Ivashko became CC CPU Second Secretary and turned over the job to Zadoia, until then the local second secretary. In Vinnytsia, Volyn', Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Odessa, and Ternopil', there have been two each. There has been one change of first secretary in Voroshlyovhrad, Kyiv Oblast, Kyiv City, Crimea, L'viv, Poltava, Sumy, Khmel'nytskyi, Cherkassy, and Chernivtsi, according to my count.
taries; another, Kachura, was present at 3; Mozhovyi, Pohrebnia and Shcherbitskyi assisted at two apiece; and Hrintsov, Kapto, Valentyna Shevchenko, Hurenko, and V. D. Kriuchkov oversaw one each. Again, the impression is one of sharing the burden of officiating among several Secretaries and Politburo members rather than a solitary patron dispensing on his own the favour of the obkom first secretaryship appointment.

If the relationship between obkom first secretaries and their apparent sponsors were really as personalized as is being assumed here, and if the sponsors were acting in these cases as true patrons, then the presence of the sponsor, especially in the person of the Second Secretary of the CPU, Tytarenko, should be accompanied by benefits in terms of career movement for both the outgoing and the incoming secretaries. In other words, the person replaced should be promoted and the new first secretary moving in should also be experiencing a promotion by comparison with his previous position. In reality, this is not the case. For the small number of changes of obkom first secretary on which I was able to find the relevant information—some two dozen—there is no significant relationship between whether (1) the outgoing secretary was being promoted, removed, or moved laterally, and (2) the senior official present was Tytarenko or someone else. If anything, the presence of the Second Secretary was indicative of the gravity of the situation in the locality and was more likely to be associated with the removal (through retirement, outright dismissal, or "transfer to other work") rather than the promotion of the incumbent. In these changeovers, the Second Secretary acts more as a disciplinarian than

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12 I was unable to identify the visitor for four of the installations.
a patron. This may be part of Gorbachev's perestroika as it applies to the party apparat. Likewise, there was absolutely no relationship between whether (1) the incoming secretary was being promoted, demoted or moved laterally, and (2) the presiding official happened to be Tytarenko or anyone else. In general, most newcomers were being promoted, and most incumbents were being removed without being promoted; the presence of the CPU's Second Secretary made absolutely no difference to any of this. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that Tytarenko was fashioning a clientelistic chain out of the obkom first secretaries whose turnovers he oversaw, any more than any of the other officials who were overseeing such turnovers.

If Gorbachev's perestroika is having an effect on political personnel in the party apparat in Ukraine, the source of recruits for the position of obkom first secretary should have perceptibly shifted, presumably from the localities to the centre in Moscow. Established patterns of clientelistic relations would thus be broken up, with local, Ukrainian cadres being replaced by outsiders, likely Russians. Of the 28 cases of obkom first secretaries newly-appointed between late 1982 and the end of 1988, they have come from sources that can be roughly classified as local or external. The local sources are: promotion from the position of second or unranked obkom secretary, or of soviet executive committee chairman; and transfer laterally from the same post in another obkom. The outside sources are: the apparatus of the CC CPU or CC CPSU; Secretary of the CC CPU; and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol. Interference by Moscow with the links of career dependency, particularly if prompted by Gorbachev's radical policy, should be evident in a significant change in the sources of new obkom first secretaries from local to external, and the change should appear some time
after the March 1985 CC CPSU plenum. In fact, the change is barely perceptible. Most newcomers are still drawn from the localities. What has happened since March 1985 which is unusual is that personnel are being appointed who come directly from the Secretariat of the CPU, or from the apparatus of the CC CPSU in Moscow. This could be interpreted as central intervention, if the individuals concerned were truly strangers to the obkomy in question. Actually, these persons are usually former second secretaries of the particular oblasti and cannot be considered total strangers—as Gennadii Kolbin might well be, in the case of Kazakhstan. There may be a tendency for the leadership in Moscow to vet new obkom first secretaries through the CC CPSU apparatus, but the individuals to whom this applies can hardly be considered Muscovites.

In the age of openness (glasnost'), it would be reasonable to suppose that an obkom first secretary who had been criticized openly in the press, or who had been visited by a CC CPSU (as opposed to CPU) apparatchik as participant in a regular plenary meeting might be in political trouble and liable to be removed from his post. Conversely, anyone who had received an award (such as the Order of Lenin on one's fiftieth birthday) should be in the good books of the top leaders and therefore immune to removal, all other things being equal. None of these expectations, it turns out, is justified. The chances of being replaced are even, whether an obkom first secretary has been chastised by name publically or not. Many of those re-
placed, even ones who had been criticized, were in fact promoted.  

There's no justice in the world. The presence of a CC CPSU official at a plenum or conference of the obkom provides no better an indication of the political health of the resident first secretary. It makes no difference at all; if anything, such a visit seems to ensure that the secretary will not be remove or replaced.  

As to awards, these did not immunize their recipients from being removed, nor did their absence interrupt the tenure of incumbents any more often than not. Incidentally, Shcherbitskyi himself, awarded the Order of the October Revolution on his 60th birthday, 16 February 1978, as well as the same order again in March 1982 ("for great ... work ... in ... 1981"), was conspicuously overlooked on his 70th in 1988, but is still going strong. His Second Secretary, Tytarenko, having been given an Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday in 1975, was, by

Eight incumbent first secretaries were never criticized, yet four of them were replaced. On the other hand, of the 19 who were criticized, only 10 were removed or replaced. Some of these were, of course, retired or dismissed, but others were even promoted. For example, Hrintsov, first secretary of Sumy obkom, was criticized by name in July 1987 by the Politburo for inadequacies, as well as at the CC CPU plenum, but was elected Secretary of the CPU in October 1988. One individual has been singled out by name no fewer than three times, yet was still in office at the beginning of 1989.

CC CPSU officials were present, according to my count, at least once during the incumbencies or terms of 20 individual first secretaries; only 7 of these were replaced. Of the remaining 11 incumbencies at which such officials were not present, 6 first secretaries were nevertheless replaced sooner or later.

During the period examined, 5 first secretaries received awards which were significant enough to be cited in the press; 3 of these were nevertheless removed or replaced. Twenty-two others received no awards; of them, 12 were removed or replaced. One award winner, Mironov, died in office.

contrast, regaled with yet another Order of Lenin, the Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal, as well as the title Hero of Socialist Labour on his 70th in 1987, but was pensioned off last December. Examining the entrails of Pravda Ukrainy and Radians'ka Ukraina does appear fruitless at times. None of these mechanisms—awards, criticism, or inspection (the CC CPSU official in the guise of revisor)—seems to work in regulating the selection and advancement of obkom first secretaries in Ukraine.

Our penultimate task is to see whether there is evidence of personal, local, or institutional connections between newly-appointed first secretaries of obkomy and their erstwhile sponsors (those officials from out of town who are in attendance when a new first secretary is elected). Also to be considered are any links between the ranking visitors and the outgoing secretaries, since these latter might well be clients of the former as well. The evidence is inconclusive, to say the least, although it does not overturn our expectations in the same abrupt manner as earlier tests carried out above have done. In brief, there is evidence for all three types of connections, but the data are not comprehensive and the conclusions to be drawn cannot be firm or systematic.

Here is what I found:

1. When Honcharenko was dismissed in February 1987 as first secretary in Voroshilovgrad, and replaced by Liakhov, Tytarenko attended. These three had nothing in common, except that Liakhov had been Tytarenko's subordinate as Head of the Organizational and Party Work (OPW) Department of the CC CPU since December 1985. Liakhov had spent the first decade of his working life beginning in 1958 in Voroshilovgrad, so he was in a sense coming home.

2. Shcherbitskyi's presence at the installation in April 1987 of
Ivashko in Dnipropetrovs'k probably had more to do with this being the First Secretary's home turf. Ivashko was ideology Secretary under Shcherbitskyi since February 1986. Boiko, the displaced first secretary, was assumed to have been part of the Dnipropetrovs'k mafia. In December 1988, when Ivashko was relieved (to return to Kyiv as Second Secretary) by Zadoia, another member of the Dnipropetrovs'k clan, Valentyna Shevchenko, attended.

3. Tytarenko's presence at the June 1988 installation of Vinnyk in Donetsk might have had something to do with the Second Secretary's career as party apparatchik having begun there. He also oversaw the election of Sazonov in Zaporizhzhia in December 1985, where from 1962 to 1966 he had himself been first secretary.

4. Pohrebniai attended the installation of Liakhov and Novitskii in December 1983 in Ivano-Frankivs'k, as first and second secretaries, respectively, with whom he had nothing in common. He had himself been, however, that obkom's first secretary from 1966 to 1969. V. D. Kriuchkov, Secretary of the CPU, came to Liakhov's successor's election two years later, and took Liakhov back to Kyiv with him as the new OPW Department Head. Kriuchkov and Liakhov both have Dnipropetrovs'k backgrounds.

5. Yel'chenko, and his successor as first secretary in Kyiv City, Masyk, have in common with Shcherbitskyi, who attended the turnover in April 1987, that they served in the capital and under the First Secretary. Yel'chenko was an inspector of the CC CPU in 1968-70, and Head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department from 1973 until being appointed the capital's first secretary in 1980. From 1960 to 1968, he was Komsomol first secretary for Ukraine. Masyk was Komsomol first secretary in Kyiv and the Ob-
last between 1965 and 1972, then a party raikom first secretary in Kyiv in 1972-74, and finally also an inspector of the CC CPU from 1974 to 1976, under Shcherbitskyi's aegis.

6. Tytarenko's presence at the election of Pohrebniak in L'viv in March 1987 may have had something to do with the two men's common roots in Donetsk.

7. Kachura's attendance in Sumy in October 1988 at the replacement of Hrintsov by V. A. Shevchenko, coincident with Hrintsov's joining him in the CPU Secretariat, might also be explained by the Donetsk connection. Specifically, Kachura began his working life in Donetsk as a factory engineer in 1954, and worked his way up to obkom first secretary, which position he relinquished in 1982 after six years to become Secretary of the CC CPU responsible for heavy industry and construction, replacing Tytarenko. Hrintsov rose from raikom first secretary to obkom secretary in Donetsk between 1967 and 1975, at which time he was installed as first secretary in Sumy.

Before 1967, Hrintsov may have worked in Voroshilovgrad, where he graduated in 1957, and where he may also have been acquainted with Liakhov, who started out there as a mine foreman in 1958, but served as a Komsomol apparatchik from 1962 to 1969, ultimately as obkom first secretary.

8. In February 1983, Tytarenko attended the election of Kornienko, until then Ukrainian Komsomol first secretary, as first secretary in Ternopil'. In March 1987, Kornienko was appointed Head of the OPW Department of the CC CPU subordinate to Tytarenko, replacing Liakhov.

What all of this boils down to is that there are fragmentary signs of association between some of the principals. There is a cluster of first secretaries around Shcherbitskyi, connected with Dnipropetrovs'k; another
with Tytarenko and Donetsk; and still one more tied to the central CC CPU apparat. But we do not have information on all of the first secretaries and their sponsors, nor do we know how important these coincidental or tangential resemblances might be.

There has been considerable fluidity in the membership of the CC CPU Secretariat, which may be indicative of a struggle to undermine the power of Shcherbitskyi, but his continued presence must mean that the net effect of these attempts has been failure if the ultimate objective has been the ouster of the First Secretary. Of the six Secretaries at the beginning of 1989, only three had been there in 1986, only two in 1983, and only one (Shcherbitskyi himself) in 1981. Thus the turnover in the Ukrainian Secretariat since Brezhnev has been remarkable, as has Shcherbitskyi's staying power.

The rate of turnover in the Secretariat shows some increase since the accession of Gorbachev. Between 1983 and the Party Congress in 1986, there was one new face on that body out of seven. From then until the end of 1988, there were three out of six. This accelerated rate of replacement might have been part of perestroika and renewal, but the picture is not altogether clear.

At the start of 1983, just after Brezhnev (and in Ukraine, I. Z. Sokolov, the Second Secretary) had passed out of the picture, the CC CPU Secretariat consisted, besides Shcherbitskyi, of the following: A. A. Tytarenko, first appointed Secretary in 1966, having been before that secretary and first secretary in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, as Second

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Secretary; B. V. Kachura, who had made his entire career in Donetsk, risen to obkom first secretary by 1976, and been appointed CC CPU Secretary in 1982, on Tytarenko's promotion; A. S. Kapto, a Dnipropetrovs'k alumnus and propaganda specialist, under Shcherbitskyi's eye while secretary in Kyiv from 1972, and CC CPU Secretary since 1979; I. O. Mozhovyi, an agronomist appointed CC CPU Secretary in 1980; and Ya. P. Pohrebnìak, another Donetsk product brought into the Secretariat in 1971. Their average age in 1983 was 58.

It should be noted that even at that time not all of the Secretaries could be clearly identified as Shcherbitskyi's clients. In fact, only Kapto seems to qualify. More impressive is the Donetsk cluster around Tytarenko--Kachura and Pohrebnìak. As though to redress the balance, in September 1984, V. D. Kriuchkov, Head of the OPW Department, was brought in. A Russian born in Tula, Kriuchkov had graduated as a mechanical engineer from the Dnipropetrovs'k State University. Then in an apparent move to counter this, Gorbachev appointed Kapto as Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, replacing K. F. Katuhnev. 18 After the CPU Congress in 1986, the only change to the Secretariat was the addition of V. A. Ivashko, an economist from Kharkiv where he had just spent 8 years as obkom secretary; the average age rose to 61. 19

During 1987 and 1988, the CC CPU Secretariat underwent a severe shakeup with a great many comings and goings. In March and April 1987,

18 Kapto has since resurfaced as first deputy head of an unnamed department of the CC CPSU in Moscow.

19 Ivashko could not be considered a protege of Shcherbitskyi; his only connection up to that time with any CC CPU Secretary might have been with Kachura--both studied at Kharkiv institutes in the 1950s.
Pohrebiak and Ivashko were released to take over as first secretaries in L'viv and Dnipropetrovsk, respectively (replacing the disgraced Dobryk and Boiko); S. I. Hurenko, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Yu. N. Yel’chenko, the first secretary in Kyiv City, were added. Hurenko, an economist, began as an engineer at the Donetsk Machinebuilding Works eventually becoming its director; from 1976 to 1980, he was a secretary of Donetsk obkom (under Kachura). In October and December 1988, Mozhovyi and Tytarenko were pensioned off, and V. D. Kriuchkov was released owing to his position having been abolished, as the official communiqué quaintly put it; Ivashko was brought back as Second Secretary (his place in Dnipropetrovsk being filled by the second secretary there, M. K. Zadoia); and another newcomer, I. H. Hrintsov, first secretary in Sumy since 1975, but prior to that also a Donetsk obkom secretary, was added. Hurenko’s year of birth is not known, but the average age of the remaining five Secretaries in 1989 was 60—not an overwhelming reduction from 1986, despite the considerable change in personnel.

Of the Secretaries who were let go in 1987 and 1988, only V. D. Kriuchkov can be clearly identified with Shcherbitskyi; of those brought on board, only Yel’chenko. The net result of the changes is a further stalemate: a majority clustering around Kachura (Ivashko, Hrintsov and Hurenko), facing a minority of two, but somehow Shcherbitskyi is still their common boss. If Gorbachev is undermining Shcherbitskyi, then he is certainly doing it indirectly and slowly; he is furthermore doing it without altogether destroying patron-client links, as far as we can tell, at the top of the political pyramid.
Turnover in the CC CPU Politburo has been noticeably slower than in the Secretariat. Out of 15 full and candidate members at the beginning of 1989, 10 had belonged to that body in 1986, and 8 had been there in 1981. In 1981, the Ukrainian Politburo consisted of: Shcherbitskyi, A. F. Vatchenko, I. G. Vashchenko, I. A. Gerasimov, B. V. Kachura, A. P. Liashko, I. A. Mozhovyi, I. Z. Sokolov, V. A. Sologub, A. A. Tytarenko, and V. V. Fedorchuk, all as full members; and V. F. Dobryk, Yu. N. Yel'chenko, O. S. Kapto, E. V. Kachalovskii, Yu. A. Kolomiets, and Ya. P. Pohrebniak, as candidates. The average age was 57. By 1989, the Politburo consisted of: Shcherbitskyi, Gerasimov, Yel'chenko, Kachalovskii, Kachura, Sologub, Valentyna S. Shevchenko, V. A. Ivashko, V. A. Masol, I. H. Hrintsov, and A. Ya. Vinnyk, as full members; and Kolomiets, Pohrebniak, S. I. Hurenko, and K. I. Masyk, as candidates. The average age in 1989 was 60, indicative of the more orderly renewal.

Between February 1981 and February 1986, the following changes took place. Sokolov and Vatchenko died, on 1 October 1982 and 22 November 1984, respectively. Fedorchuk was released in October 1982 due to his appointment as USSR KGB chief, and Vashchenko to another USSR post in April 1983. These vacancies were made up by the promotion to full membership of Yel'chenko in October 1982, and of Kachalovskii in April 1983. Those gaps, in turn, were filled by the election to candidate membership of S. N. Mukha in October 1982, V. P. Mironov in April 1983, and V. D. Kriuchkov in September 1984. Mironov was quickly promoted to full member in March 1984. Valentyna Shevchenko was named full member directly in March 1985, on the eve of her being elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.
After the 1986 Party Congress in the republic, the Politburo featured only two additions to the previous changes: V. A. Ivashko and V. A. Masol were elected to candidate membership. In 1987 and 1988 the following changes took place: Mironov died after a long illness on 11 July 1988. Liashko, Mozhovyi, Tytarenko, Dobryk, Kriuchkov, and Mukha were all retired or released or otherwise disposed of. Ivashko and Masol were promoted. Hrintsov and Vinnyk were elected directly to full membership in 1988; Hurenko and Masyk, to candidate membership in March 1987 and January 1988, respectively. The Gorbachev era has ushered in more releases and retirements from the Ukrainian Politburo than in the preceding intercongressional period, and has altered somewhat the clientelistic profile of that body.

In 1981, 5 Politburo members and candidates out of 15 could be connected to Shcherbitskyi through Dnipropetrovs'k, and five to Tytarenko through Donetsk; in 1989, 3 and 7, but this time without Tytarenko. Neither Shcherbitskyi's following, nor followings generally, nor Shcherbitskyi himself have been eliminated in the process of perestroika.

In conclusion, there is no doubt that the turnover of personnel has been somewhat accelerated in Ukraine since the advent of Gorbachev. But there has been no wholesale overturn of cadres or of the cadres system, and at the top of the pyramid we still see clientelistic links albeit fewer associated now with Shcherbitskyi than formerly. The idea that the at-

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20 Counting Shcherbitskyi himself, the former group in 1981 included, according to my count: Vatchenko, Dobryk, Kachalovskii, and Kapto. The latter, or Donetsk faction consisted of: Kachura, Liashko, Sologub, Tytarenko, and Pohrebniak. In 1989, again out of a total of 15, the Dnipropetrovtsi were: Shcherbitskyi, Kachalovskii, and Shevchenko. The Donetsk boys comprised: Kachura, Sologub, Masol, Hrintsov, Vinnyk, Pohrebniak, and Hurenko. The shift is not statistically significant.
tending sponsor at obkom plenums might be a patron has been disproved, and
the search for a better indicator must be carried on elsewhere. If any-
thing, this study has shown that the seniority of the outside official
paying a visit to an obkom probably has more to do with the centre's as-
essment of the gravity of local political problems than it does with pat-
ronage. Moscow has not been intruding obviously and directly into the
makeup of the political elite in Ukraine, perhaps because Shcherbitskyi
has been keeping nationalism well under control in the republic and Gor-
bachev, who has no policy on the national question except for the status
quo, must be grateful for small mercies. As Bohdan Nahaylo has written,
"despite its lip service to the reformist slogans advocated by the Gor-
bachev leadership, Shcherbitskyi's team is continuing to depict those
genuinely in favor of change in the Ukraine as 'demagogues,' 'extremists,'
'nationalists,' or simply 'politically immature' persons."21 Shcher-
bitskyi's anti-nationalism thus may serve as a cover for the status quo,
and may run contrary to the spirit of perestroika, but it ties in well with
Gorbachev's undeveloped policy on nationalism and serves to hold the finger
in the dyke.