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# THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

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LOWER INSERT: UKRAINIAN TERRITORY IN 1939      UPPER INSERT: DISMEMBERMENT OF UKRAINE AFTER THE WORLD WAR

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## THE POSPELOV—ACHESON CLASH

*(Editorial)*

In the last days of January, 1951, there was a diplomatic round in the clash between the Kremlin and Washington. The Kremlin was represented by Piotr Pospelov and Washington by the Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson. The round was staged in the presence and even with the aid of the full Moscow Politburo under the leadership of Stalin himself and of the American Senate. It was another play in the great game of mobilizing world opinion back of Moscow and back of Washington. There was mention made in the American press of the savage attack by Pospelov on America and also of the resolution of friendship for the Russian people and of the statement of the Assistant Secretary of State, Jack K. McFall in which he assured the Russian people of the unchanged desire of the American government to maintain the indivisibility of the Russian Empire as it had done in rejecting the peace of Brest-Litovsk in 1918. There was not a word in the press of the meaning of this clash, although it would have been most interesting to the American people.

First we must identify the participants. Dean G. Acheson as Secretary of State is known to all Americans. Piotr N. Pospelov is scarcely known in this country. Yet Piotr N. Pospelov is no ordinary Bolshevik agitator, no minor star in the Bolshevik pantheon. He is the grand inquisitor of Moscow, the guardian of the Orthodox Communist religion. His post is that of Director of the Moscow Institute of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the highest ideological training school of world Communism as well as of Russian. Such an institution in Russian reality is almost infallible, for it is the authoritative expounder of the party policy.

Piotr N. Pospelov challenged the leader of American foreign policy. He brutally attacked America at the exercises marking the 27th anniversary of the death of Lenin. These were held in Moscow in the Bolshoy Theatre in the presence of all the members of the Politburo headed by Joseph Visarionovich Stalin. In his speech, Pospelov raged at America for its "military-imperialist" preparations which were intended at the proper time to create a new intervention and attack on the Soviets and to bathe in the blood of the Russian people as thirty years ago during the civil war. "The Russian people", said Pospelov, "will never forget that the hands

of American imperialists are red with the blood of the Russian people". He further threatened that when America provokes the Third World War, it will end in a terrible catastrophe for America, such as the Second World War did for Hitler. Then giving up all pretence of the truth, he asserted that President Wilson at the Versailles Conference demanded the dismemberment of Russia and the violent overthrowing of the Communist government, the same goal as that of the present policy of America.

Any one who knows Soviet tactics, can easily understand that this provocative speech of Pospelov had its own clearly defined and prepared object. The director of the highest Communist academy, the theoretician of Communist tactics, does not throw around words and accusations without a purpose as the result of a temporary mood. His speech was certainly discussed in advance to the last syllable and his tactics were approved by the Politburo of the Kremlin. Its effect was aimed not only at the America which he attacked but even more at the nations enslaved by Moscow, that Achilles' heel of the Soviet Union which is even more sensitive now, when war threatens and the revolutionary movements of the oppressed nations are becoming stronger. For them the word "splitting from Russia" has especial significance. Pospelov was speaking also to the nations of Asia and Africa for whom the concepts of "imperialism" and "colonialism" are not empty sounds. He was bidding the satellite nations not to put their hopes on America but to count on the strength of Moscow. *His provocative speech was intended to draw America into the arena and to defeat it on the diplomatic field in the opinion of the entire world.*

Pospelov, as director of the Communist academy, certainly knows thoroughly the history of American intervention and the unfriendly attitude of President Wilson to the liberation movements among the peoples of Russia during World War I, despite his belief in the doctrine of self-determination of peoples. Pospelov knew that America had stood for an undivided Russia: he knows also that thanks to the influence of the White Russian immigrants and the American Russophiles educated by the Russians, the American State Department still takes the same attitude. But he wanted a spokesman for the American State to tell that to the entire world.

All the nations oppressed by the Soviets look to America as their liberator. They know that it is across their territory that the American attack in case of war will have to be made on Moscow, that their territories will become the dread theatre of an atomic war. Every one knows that without the destruction of the Ukrainian Donbas and Kriviy Rih, without the annihilation of the Azerbaijanian Baku and the Georgian Batum,

there will be no decision. The aid of these nations could be decisive for the outcome of such a war but they would have to pay an almost overwhelming price. Yet they would be willing to do so and to side with America, provided that they could cast off the yoke of Moscow. That is the general mood in the nations oppressed by the Soviet Union. *Their hope in America is a terrible weapon in the hands of the revolutionary anti-Moscow propaganda and it offers them moral support in their struggle with the Kremlin.*

The Kremlin, for its part, wants America to destroy this revolutionary morale of these nations and for them to lose their hope in the aid of America. It is very obvious that any statements made by Moscow to produce this effect directly through the words of the Politburo or the party press would have no result. The Kremlin therefore needed a statement from Washington itself which would declare against the liberation of the enslaved nations and take away from them any hope that they might receive aid in their struggle from abroad. This was the real aim of Pospelov's attack on America. He wanted to draw America into the ring and compel her to say publicly what her plans were as regards the establishment of freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe.

The tactics of Pospelov were well planned and skillfully executed. It elicited the reply from America that America had no plans, has none, and will not have them in the future. The Senate approved a resolution of friendship for the Russian people and indicated its willingness to spend billions for raising their standard of living. The representative of the State Department, Assistant Secretary Jack K. McFall, in a letter to Senator MacMahon explained the American foreign policy toward the nations enslaved by the Kremlin. *He pointed out that American foreign policy was not aiming at the dismemberment of Russia but at maintaining it intact just as the America of 1918 had denounced the "infamous" Brest-Litovsk treaty which had recognized an independent Ukraine in accordance with the declarations of President Wilson on self-determination.*

Here Pospelov won a great victory. He wanted America through the lips of its officials to declare that it was for the enslavement of almost one hundred million non-Russians by the Russians of the Soviet Union, that it was not planning to help them in their struggle for freedom and that all the declarations of America on the freedom of nations were not intended for universal application, for they did not apply to the one hundred millions enslaved by the Soviet Union. It is only natural that such a basic declaration will undermine the revolutionary morale among the enslaved nations, for it bids them grovel before Stalin, to seek within the orbit of Soviet

influences the solution of their most pressing problems and most of all to protect their country against an atomic war, since they can have no hope of liberation by the aid of America.

Pospelov succeeded in drawing the director of the American foreign policy into the arena and giving him a staggering blow which will weaken support for the United States. This statement of the American State Department will injure the efforts and the morale of the anti-Soviet underground and it will deepen the depression among the satellites of Moscow, for they have already come to the conclusion that without the shattering of Russia and the liberation of Ukraine there can be no free Poland, Rumania, or Czechia, no Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia.

There can be no doubt that the Kremlin will give as wide a circulation as possible to this utterance of the State Department, especially among the oppressed nations of the Soviet Union. We are convinced that in Ukraine Moscow will offer a few sops to the Ukrainian people, some temporary concessions, to prove to restless Ukraine that it can not look to America for liberation from the ruling Moscow. The Kremlin will be able to exploit this new diplomatic defeat for America exactly as it has done the American mistakes in Asia and the Near East.

The effect of this official policy of America in regard to Eastern Europe has been made clear by the reaction of the so-called Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations, an organization of the revolutionary centres of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. It is sufficient to read the analysis of this policy which appeared under the title, "The Throwing Away of Friends", in the journal, *L'Ukrainien*, which is published in Paris and is in close contact with the Anti-Bolshevik Nations and the Ukrainian Resistance within the iron curtain. For the information of our readers, we are printing a translation of this article in this number.

If the State Department is to maintain its present position, which is thoroughly undemocratic and at the same time there are to appear statements from the President, the Secretary of State and other persons in authority that America does stand for democracy and the freedom of all peoples, it is perfectly natural that America will lose the confidence of the world in its statements and that the Bolsheviks will be able to capitalize upon this in drawing up and carrying out their own policy.

William Henry Chamberlin points out this double standard in his last book, "America's Second Crusade". He questions how the American Sovietophiles, who call themselves liberals, can reconcile the deeds of Bolshevik tyranny with their liberalism. He calls them "totalitarian liberals". This type has not vanished from America but it has slightly

changed. A long series of responsible statesmen in America call themselves liberals and demand freedom for the half-developed Asiatic peoples, but they are equally zealous in demanding the preservation of Russia, the greatest prison of nations. This new type of "liberal supporters of the Russian Empire" can be satisfied with their egoistical phrases on democracy and liberty and the tolerated suppression of 100,000,000 people in a dozen nations. They form a truly amazing brand of "totalitarian liberals".

Meanwhile the duel between Moscow and Washington goes on. We believe that this is only the first round in the struggle for the public opinion of the world. We are convinced that in time Washington will learn to evaluate more correctly the situation in Eastern Europe and will wake up to the need of having allies behind the iron curtain, as the crisis develops. The American Russophiles who are influencing the policy of America to protect the Soviet Empire, are merely alienating from America millions of potential allies. They are gaining no friends, for neither the Soviet nor American Russians will respond to their frenzied attacks upon the Kremlin.

At present American public opinion is trying to prevent a Third World War which perhaps can be prevented, if America spends and is able to spend 70 billions yearly for some ten years. Meanwhile the Soviets are not only arming themselves but 450 million red Chinese and other Asiatics. Under such conditions dreams of a victory over Moscow along present lines are of doubtful value. What is the cause of the failure?

It will be impossible to overcome Moscow and the vast Eastern European spaces without the help of the masses of the local population and the foes of Moscow. The proper Russians (the Muscovites) are not and will not be the enemies of Moscow, for they will not overthrow their own empire and introduce a democracy which they have never practiced. The only reliable enemies of red Moscow are the non-Russians enslaved within the Russian Empire, for they can only achieve liberation by the ruin of that Empire. In its own interests America must maintain and strengthen the trust and confidence of these non-Russian peoples, must encourage them and support them, if it wishes to defeat Moscow in the final round of the struggle.

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## THE THROWING AWAY OF FRIENDS

*The Inevitable Fatal Consequences of the American Thesis of Support for the Indestructibility of the Russian Empire.*

by I. ZELENGO

(In our opinion it is to the vital interest of America that the American people be informed about the reaction of their potential allies in the struggle with Moscow, the nations oppressed by Russia, to the Russian policy of the State Department. We are therefore reprinting this article which appeared in the Parisian paper, "*L'Ukrainien*", on February 18, 1951, under the pseudonym of I. Zelenko. This paper has close relations with the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations especially with the Ukrainian underground. The article was written in connection with the statement of the American Assistant Secretary of State, Jack K. Mc Fall to the American Senate that the State Department is opposed to the dismemberment of Russia into national states. We are discussing this subject in the editorial. — *The Editor.*)

There is not always need of a physical club for there are words and declarations which sting worse than a lash. Such a political blow on the head has been given to tens of millions of patriots enslaved by Moscow by the recent official declaration of the American State Department that America has always been opposed and still is now to any plans for the dismemberment of Russia. The background and content of this declaration is published elsewhere in this number of our paper under the title "A fearful document."

A Russophile position of this character is the right of America; it is the right of every great, sovereign power. Every one who has the power, has the right — as America — to form a policy in accordance with its own interests. If the United States of America believes that its interests are better served by the existence of a great Russian Empire, the responsibility for the results of such a policy must in the last analysis fall only upon itself.

But the Americans must concede to others the same right to egotism and a policy along the lines of their own nearest interests. Let us omit from this discussion and calculation all superfluous platitudes about justice, democracy, humanity, human rights, etc. *The policy of a great*

*nation like the United States in accepting the view of the indestructibility of the Russian Empire, dooms tens of millions of people to the continuation of their historical slavery, degradation and exploitation, and such a policy is not just, it is not humane, and it is least of all democratic. To speak about the protection of the indivisibility of the Russian Empire and at the same time and in almost the same breath, to speak about the workings of democracy is not so much to be politically blind (to put it mildly) as to assume that the hearer is a political imbecile.*

To make effective this kind of American "democracy", 25 capitals of nations enslaved by Russia must grovel before Moscow or Petrograd as their super-capital; they must accept from there the rule of their life, decision as to what is good and evil, learn the "universally intelligible" Moscow language, be compelled day and night to listen to the wild howls of the "universalism" of Moscow "culture", pay heavy taxes for the food, clothing and enrichment of the ruling horde of Moscow sponging bureaucrats and be the subject of the great political and military experiments of Moscow imperial chauvinism. *But by democracy, i. e. by democracy as a right to life and the independence of every nation, we Ukrainians mean something else and something radically different.*

This thesis of the State Department as to the indivisibility of the Russian Empire indicates that the authorities in Washington during the 33 years of the Revolution have not yet come to understand and that it has not yet reached their consciousness that the revolution of 1917 began and is still continuing not only for a social order but also—and we put this first—for a national revolution; it was the uprising of dozens of nations enslaved and destroyed by Moscow during the course of centuries and for their appearance as independent and liberated States. ..

It is high time that Ukrainian public opinion should understand coldly and soberly the real aims and methods of American policy. We can establish very definite steps in this policy. The first and most important is not the annihilation of Bolshevism but the geopolitical and economic limitation of the influence of Bolshevism to the point where it will not menace the so-called natural sphere of American influence in the world.

America is ready at any moment to conclude with the Bolsheviks not one but one hundred pacts of peace, friendship and non-aggression, if it will only consent to limit its sphere of influence and of carrying out its doctrines to its own USSR. A proof of this historical readiness of America is shown in the four terms of Franklin Roosevelt as President of America.

At Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam America contented itself with a magnanimous gesture which cost nothing and even aided in the significant broadening of the influence of Bolshevism.

The American struggle with Bolshevism "as a principle" began on global proportions, not because it wished to effect its evil policy over one sixth of the world; that would not have hurt America, but it wished to do this over the *whole world*. Even today, without paying any attention to the events of the last 4 years, America would be ready to give up its world "liberation campaign," if only the Soviets would agree to withdraw to their own "natural boundaries" and leave the rest of the world in peace. The whole Atlantic strategy was founded by America not on the idea of a crusade against Bolshevism throughout the *entire* world but on the idea of showing to the Kremlin the absurdity of its attempts to expand further and thereby to compel it to return to its "natural boundaries" and to compromise.

But — better late than never — the Americans understood not only the local but also the universal threat of Bolshevism. Here our interests begin to coincide but unfortunately again with the qualification: at least so long as America will feel itself threatened by Bolshevism. That is something. It is beginning to sink into the heads of American political figures—senators, congressmen, cabinet ministers, generals, publicists, etc,—that *without the cooperation and sympathy of the broad popular masses of the USSR and the satellite states, there can be no talk of the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime*; the American-Atlantic A-bombs, airplanes, rockets and tanks cannot alone accomplish anything against Moscow.

But what could mobilize against Moscow and Bolshevism most widely the oppressed Soviet masses? If there is to be removed the idea of the liberation of nations, the idea of forming independent states of these nations, *there is automatically removed the most important stimulus for a possible anti-Moscow and anti-Bolshevik revolutionary movement of liberation*. If the nations enslaved by Moscow are not to be included, who would rise against the Kremlin and its government? Who would sympathize with the United States and the Atlantic powers?

The Russian people? If the Americans could only understand and comprehend that in the USSR, in "Russia", there is not one people but that there is one Russian people, the Muscovites, a ruling nation of some 90 millions; and that all the others, the non-Russian peoples, are oppressed nations, oppressed and exploited for centuries! If the Americans understood that the Russians, the Muscovites, will never under any con-



ditions revolt against Stalin, Communism, Bolshevism and dictatorship; but that on the contrary they will defend the Soviet system to the last extremity and to the last man.

The Muscovites are so intoxicated with their Stalin, his power, strength, cleverness, intrigue, and cruelty! Moscow has never revolted against its great tyrants, has never opposed the order of tyranny, but on the contrary has always approved, praised, grovelled before, listened and carried out the orders of this tyranny. Of course they have a panic fear of Stalin but they respect him still more and among the Muscovites, fear is the basis for love. The subservience of Moscow to Stalin is not only compulsory. There is much more in it than the world thinks, of sincerity, truth, even reverence. That same basis of power and of cruelty was the cause of the reverence and love which the Muscovites had for Ivan the Terrible and Peter I; it is on that same basis that they respect and glorify Stalin. Why should the Muscovites revolt against him?

Because he has won for Moscow a wider sphere of influence than any one else, and has carried them to their pinnacle of power and glory? Because as no tsar or prince before him, he is ruling "on the fear of his enemies"? — That is the highest dream of the old Russian national hymn! Because he has given them the possibility of plundering in the interests of Moscow one third of the population of the world? The Muscovites have never been accustomed to revolt against rulers like that.

Then who would struggle against the regime in the USSR and for what program? Where are those internal forces in the USSR without which the forces of United States and the Atlantic nations cannot dream of conquering? Since, in accordance with the position of the United States, the motive of national liberation of the oppressed nations of Russia falls away, *there fall away at the same time the tens of millions of potential revolutionary fighters!* The thought of the potential military-revolutionary forces of the oppressed nations runs as follows:

To be included in a contemporary *atom war*, to endure all the terrors of modern military technique, to risk the loss of the lives of millions of their countrymen and the atomic devastation of dozens of their most important national cities, so as to obtain in place of one Muscovite regime through the blessing of America, another government over them, which may be somewhat changed socially but is still a government by Moscow — No. No nation under the yoke of Moscow will participate in that kind of a "liberation".

One unshatterable truth has burned its way into the consciousness of these nations: no Muscovite should rule over Ukraine, the Baltic, Byelorussia, the nations of the Caucasus and Siberia, whether he be Communist or non-Communist, so long as he is a foreigner, a Muscovite, always an exploiter, always a dirty gangster with the pretensions of being a lord, always an oppressor; he has never been anything else and he never will be. If the American wishes to present a Muscovite as a "democrat", his remarks will only arouse laughter in the hall. The very nature of the Russian state, which has always been founded on violence and exploitation, on ruling over other nations, compels the Muscovite to terror and dictatorship. We have known on our own skins the rule of non-Communist Muscovites; it was no different or better than the rule of the present Communist Muscovites. It has always and in every form been fearful.

The tsarist regime was a time of decay, oppression, serfdom, darkness and slavery. The Russian "democracy" will be infallibly just the same; a time of decay, oppression, serfdom, darkness and slavery. The Russian "democracy" is as suspicious and hateful to us, as was the tsarist regime, and now Bolshevism. This "democracy" cannot be unsuspected by us; in 1917 we had only a half year of experience with it, but that was enough to form for us forever a clear picture of its attitude toward the problem of the nationalities of the empire. It must be to-day still more hateful, since it does not of its own accord give up its rule over Ukraine, as Ukraine wants, but it seeks all possible underhand and violent means of retaining Ukraine at all cost and under all conditions within the boundaries of the empire.

The Muscovite democracy is so clearly and bitterly condemned, its "chances" in Ukraine so ephemeral, its "guarantees" so undermined by the consistent treason of Moscow toward Ukraine during the past centuries that to bring about that democracy we would not risk the bones of a single soldier of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. *We will give no Ukrainian revolutionary forces for a struggle to make real a "Russian democracy."*

The approval by America of the idea of the preservation of the unity and wholeness of the Russian Empire is identical with the refusal of America to support the liberty-loving, liberational and national-state efforts of the oppressed nations of Russia. *The present declaration of the American State Department is without doubt a heavy blow to the ideas and hopes of these peoples.*

*On the other hand they should be grateful to the State Department for this blow.* It at least simplifies the situation. It makes clear what can be expected and what cannot be expected from America. It explains how far they can connect themselves with American policy, how far they can go with it and how much they can risk. These possibilities are minute and practically non-existent.

We think that a sober consideration of these facts will allow us to tear the masks from the faces of all those political false prophets and speculators, who at this or that price will try to persuade the Ukrainian public that "this is neither here nor there," "we must not throw stones into the machinery", "we must try to obtain what is possible in the situation". Besides, a sober consideration of this can help us at the decisive moment to save the lives of perhaps millions of our fellow countrymen and the existence of dozens of cities, which will not express their readiness to assume the risks of modern war and revolution for so narrow and limited purposes. The past war was not our war, despite the existence of many "patriots" and prophets, who tried to persuade us of the opposite, who gathered support and told us the meaning of Ukrainian patriotism! It does not seem now that in the present shaping of the ideological fronts for the coming war it will be our war either. We have not the slightest reason nor desire at the price of mass deaths and destructions to pine away in any new forms of Muscovite slavery. Ukraine will fight not for "Russian" democracy but only for a Ukrainian national, united, independent state. Ukraine is not alone in this position. It is the program of the other nations oppressed by Russia, the nations of the ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations).

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### **SALESTALK**

The artist Alexander Novakivsky had his own unmistakable style characterized by its dynamic line and vivid color. On one occasion when the artist was in financial straits, his friends wishing to help him tried to persuade a bank director to have his portrait painted by Novakivsky. The director, though nothing loath, nevertheless protested modestly:

"What will people say when they see the director's portrait hanging in the bank?—What will they think of me?.."

"But who ever will think of you," he was assured. "Every one will say: 'Look, what a beautiful Novakivsky!'" (S. H.).

## THE PERVERTED DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY OF UKRAINE

by STEPHEN PROTSIUK

*(Reflections on the Soviet economic plans for 1952—57)*

For years the economy of Ukraine has not developed normally. Thanks to the occupation of the country by Moscow, its scientists and technicians have been unable to plan the development of the national economy in accordance with its own needs. The last two five-year plans have shown clearly how brutally Moscow is imposing its will upon Ukraine in this field, on what unhealthy paths the development of its industry, power, transportation and agriculture has been pushed. It is true that there exists in Kiev as window-dressing the institution known as Derzhplan (State Planning Commission) of the Ukrainian SSR, but in reality it has no other function than to publicize the decisions of the all-powerful Gosplan of the USSR in Moscow. It is its branch office and it does not have even a consultative voice but it serves only as an instrument to perform blindly the will of the Kremlin.

The Gosplan in Moscow has been recently reformed to secure still greater centralization of all state planning and the universal subjection of all new construction throughout the entire USSR to the one, all embracing control of Moscow. Another step has been the stifling of all opportunities of criticism, especially by specialists and experts.

Profiting by this situation, the Politburo is imposing on Ukraine through the intermediary and with the aid of the Gosplan of the USSR changes of a national economic character, which not only do not aid in the development of Ukraine but on the contrary are extremely harmful to it, cripple it and drive it in an undesirable direction. These tendencies which are dangerous to Ukraine were not so clear in the two first five-year plans but in the new ones they have been most obvious. The projects of the fourth so-called five-year plan of reconstruction (1946-50) which have been largely but not fully carried out and especially the plans outlined for 1951-57 reveal fully the hostile intentions of the Kremlin toward the economy of Ukraine.

One of the most important new constructions in Ukraine which is to be finished in 1957 is *the hydro-electric plant on the Dnieper near Kakhivka and the closely connected network of irrigation canals in the*

*eastern part of the southern steppes of Ukraine.* Further there are definite plans for the agriculture in the regions surrounding this new construction. Let us try to analyze these for their effect upon the entire economy of Ukraine and compare them with other new constructions in the USSR, which make clear to us the "grandiose" character of these new works in Ukraine, as the party officials in Ukraine boast (See the article of T. Baryl'nyk, head of the Khersonoblv'ykonkom in *Izvestia*, September 26, 1950, p. 3, "Perspective of a Great Development").

The power of the hydroelectric plant (GES) at Kakhivka is to amount to 250,000 kw., and its yearly production with a normal water level will be 1,200,000,000 kwh. Along with the plant there are to be built: a dam, shiplocks, a pumping station and also a reservoir with a capacity of 14,000,000,000 cubic metres. We need only to compare these figures with those given for the Dniprel'stan (the present Dniiproges) from the prewar period to see that the plant at Kakhivka will not deliver even half of the power of the Dniiproges (566,000 kw.). When we compare the amount of power to be furnished at Kakhivka with that of the plants projected at the same time in the real Russia, we will conclude that there is nothing "grandiose" about them. We see that the plant now being constructed at Kuybyshev will produce in 1955 2,000,000 kw. and will reach 10,000,000,000 kwh. (See *Pravda*, August 21, 1950). When we take into account the production of the hydro-electric plants planned for 1952-57, we see that the industrialized Left Bank of Ukraine with the Donbas will receive *only* 6% of the new electric power, which the Moscow industrial center and the bordering, purely Russian districts will receive.

This figure of 6% shows us clearly what a subordinate position the re-building and development of the economy of the Ukrainian lands play in the economic plans of Moscow. A detailed analysis of the Moscow projects shows us still other interesting facts in the economic enslavement of Ukraine. These are characteristic not only for the building of the GES at Kakhivka and the so-called *southern Ukrainian canal*, but they are typical of all the present new constructions in Ukraine and of the economic policy of the Kremlin in the Ukrainian lands. We are informed by the reports of the decrees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR that a work eight times larger than Kakhivka, — the Kuybyshev GES is to be finished in 1955 and the work on the GES in Kakhivka only in 1956. Further specialists know that the technical construction of a plant like the Kuybyshev GES will take, under the conditions prevailing in the USSR, longer than 5 years. Since the Gosplan has arranged for full use of the

power of 2 million kw. in 1955, it only confirms the opinions held in the West that the construction of the Kuybyshev hydro-electric plant has been proceeding at full speed since 1946. This was one of the "ultra-secret" works which only now, after their existence has been publicized abroad, have been included in the published and widely advertised "projects". The uninitiated dweller in the Western world, reading in 1955 about the opening of the Kuybyshev GES, will be inclined to think that it has been built in five years and will thus have a favorable idea of the methods and tempos of Soviet construction. As a matter of fact the work on the Kuybyshev GES will have taken not less than 10 years, even if we do not count the fact that the preliminary plans were made during the war as a result of the loss of power centres either directly occupied or destroyed by the Germans in 1941-43. According to the official Soviet data, the Germans destroyed on the territory of the USSR electric plants of a total power capacity of 5 million kw. (*Technische Rundschau*, Bern, 5 and 6 February, 1948).

Returning to the plans for the GES in Kakhivka, we consider it very doubtful that it will be ready for use even in 1956. In the same decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Ministry of Power Plants (Minister Zhimerin) was instructed for January 1, 1952 to prepare a *plan* for the construction of the GES at Kakhivka. In accordance with the practice of the Gosplan of the USSR, this plan will not be at once approved, but certain changes will be made in it, which will be motivated by the official sabotage of the Ukrainian orders which is carried out by the Russian industrial centres, on which Ukrainian industry depends. It is well known for example how in the period of the fourth five-year plan, the Leningrad factory "Electrosila", which had received the order for new turbines for the Dniproges, crippled the repair of this most important source of power in Ukraine. The turbines for Kakhivka will have to be made in this same factory, for the Gosplan has not yet permitted the construction of such machine factories in Ukraine. The one possible Turbine-Generator Factory in Kharkiv can build only smaller units, thanks to the control and "protection" of Moscow. When we take this state of affairs into consideration, we can hardly hope that the actual building of the GES in Kakhivka can begin under the most favorable circumstances before the second half of 1952.

Ukraine has had sad proof already, when there is talk of tempos and decisions in new economic constructions. Take the story of the realization of the construction of the dam on the Dnieper at Kremenchuh. The Soviet press, especially the *Ohonek* and the *Pravda Ukrainy*, etc.

described this in 1947. They gave in detail a technical description of the dam, its length, its raising of the level of the water, etc., and also as in this case they spoke of the great importance which the dam would have in the irrigation of the neighboring regions and the improvement in the agricultural conditions there. But we know that the dam at Kremenchuh is unfortunately not only not yet completed but there is well-founded evidence that its construction has definitely fallen through, for the theoretical projects which on apolitical reasons the Gosplan of the USSR worked out without a study of the local conditions and without securing the approval, as usually happened, of the local officials apart from the technicians, have been found in fact to be technically impossible of execution. Political motives have played a role here. The dam and the GES in Kremenchuh would have improved, had it been finished, the economy of the *central regions of Ukraine, that is those regions which Moscow is trying to leave in a retarded condition. We will speak later in more detail about these efforts of Moscow.*

The building of the GES on the Dnieper at Kakhivka is closely connected with the construction of other projects which are intended to raise the level of agriculture in the steppe region of south-eastern Ukraine. Among these must be placed first the *south Ukrainian canal*, which is to run from Zaporizhzhya to the river Moloshne and then in the direction of Askaniya Nova (The report of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) to Syvash. In the northern Crimea the line of the canal will be continued from Syvash through Dzhanka to Kerch. The length of the canal will be 550 km., and it will receive from the Dnieper 600-650 cubic metres of water a second. Along the canal it will be necessary to build a dam on the river Moloshne, north of Melitopil, which is to produce a reservoir holding 6 billion cubic metres of water; a smaller hydro-electric plant at the dam will produce 10,000 kw. of electric power. So as not to affect the work of the Dniiproges, the water from the Dnieper will be drawn off to the reservoir at Melitopil in the spring during the season of high water.

The southern Ukrainian canal is to have a branch 60 km. in length from Askaniya Nova to Kakhivka; this branch will join the main canal with the reservoir of the Kakhivka dam. The subordinate irrigation canals will be 300 km. in length and will run from the reservoir on the Moloshne to Nohaysk, from the reservoir at Kakhivka to Krasnoznamenka, and from Dzhanka to Rozdilna (Crimea). The irrigation system of these canals will water 1,500,000 hectares of land in the districts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Mykolaivsk and Dnipropetrovsk and in northern Crimea, and

of these 600,000 will be watered by mechanical means. There is further connected with these projects the planting of protective belts of forest, which really was one of the previously announced projects (1948).

As a rule the Soviet press writes at length about the advantages which will come from the bringing into operation of new hydro-electric and power plants. It is fostering great hopes for an extension of the cultivation of cotton and the application of electric power to agriculture (electrotractors, the mechanization of animal husbandry, etc). Of the concrete goals we must mention the efforts to water the sandy flats (fields) which extend along the banks of the lower Dnieper for 135 km. from Kakhivka to the Black Sea, and cover some 209,000 hectares. If these flats can be removed, it will be possible in the best case to use 40,000 hectares for the cultivation of grapes and about 10,000 hectares for the growth of fruits and berries. In general by irrigating many areas in the districts of Kherson, Mykolaivsk and the vicinity, it is hoped in these regions to increase the cotton crop four and a half times in comparison with the harvest of 1950, of winter wheat two and a half times, and of vegetables and potatoes four times. But the execution of the plans for the GES at Kakhivka and the southern Ukrainian canal presents the builders and planners with a series of problems which are not easy to solve.

These problems are both of a technical, scientific and a practical character. Among the first must be considered the very important problem of the flooding of many salt fields, which are very common in the steppe area of Ukraine, especially the regions of Henichy, Chaplynsk, Syvash, Nyzhni Serohos, Ivanove, etc. On the solution of this question as to the improvement and cultivation of these fields will depend basically the effect and general value of the construction of the canal net, for it is known that under certain unfavorable conditions the flooding of these lands can wash off the salts necessary for agriculture and this has a bad effect on the fertility of the soil. There must also be solved the problem of incorporating into the work of the canals the systems of artesian wells which have been drilled in the past years at great expense, even though they have had little practical value.

Among the most important questions of a practical nature is the securing of the *labor force* for the execution of these new constructions and also the training of the technical staff to run them. The first problem can be solved by the Soviet officials in a typically Bolshevik way, that is by driving thousands and tens of thousands of members of the collective farms to the special digging and laying of concrete. The members



of the collective farms have to do this without pay as a "gift to the state." Yet there are difficulties in this "solution" of the problem, for the work of this type can be done best and most easily at those seasons of the year when the members of the collective farms are already overworked in the performance of the various "duties to the state," the spring campaign, the working of the fields, the harvest, the delivery of grain and other agricultural products, etc. Winter is not suitable for the building of canals and the laying of concrete, especially in the climatic conditions of Ukraine, although the "party and the government" can compel the Ukrainian villagers to dig in the frozen earth, removing each new layer of snow, a policy which Ukraine can expect under the present conditions of the Bolshevik occupation. As a matter of fact this was the situation in the building of the dam of the Dniproges in 1944-46, when masses of Ukrainian young people, and especially girls, were driven by force from the neighboring villages and were compelled to work even under wintry conditions up to their waists in the icy cold water and thousands of them lost their health forever and many even their lives.

The task of *preparing a qualified staff for the management of this complex* is much more complicated. The breaking in requires a definite period of time, especially if it is necessary to carry out training. There have been no great irrigation works hitherto in the USSR with the exception of a few districts of Central Asia, as the valley of the Fergana, the Zerasana, Khoresm, etc., and the number of responsible trained teachers is very small. The difficulties could be avoided, if a certain number of Ukrainian technicians and agronomists could be sent to Uzbekia, to become thoroughly acquainted with the system there and later to transmit their knowledge to wider circles of agriculturists in the steppe districts of Ukraine. As usual it is necessary to take into account all the changes and nuances and consider the differences between the climates, soils and plant growth of the steppes of Ukraine and of Central Asia.

Taking into account the need of acquaintance with the entire yearly cycle of work in connection with artificial irrigation, the schooling mentioned above would require at least two or even three years, and so the expected increase in the percentage of agricultural production in the irrigated areas should not be expected in 1957 but decidedly later. We are however most interested not in the details of construction or the questions connected with the utilization of these projects but in the fundamental bases of these projects, the fundamental aims of the present economic policy of Moscow. In connection with the announcement of the plans for the building of a hydro-electric plant at Kakhivka, and especial-

ly at Kuybyshev and Stalingrad, and also of the south Ukrainian canal and the chief Turkmen canal, which is to run between the Amu-Dariya and the Caspian Sea, we must place first *the turning of the leaders of the Politburo and the Gosplan to a mania for giant undertakings*. (The Turkmen canal is 1100 km. in length and involves the drying up of the river Uzboy with a dam on the Amu Dariya at the oasis of Tachiya Tash. The power of the stations involved in the construction is 100,000 kw. — (see *Pravda*, August 2, 1950).

The plan for the plant at Kakhivka cannot be really regarded as a gigantic structure (its power being only 250,000 kw.) but the connected building of the southern Ukrainian canal is in its proportions an extremely great undertaking. The turn to the giant is an interesting item for us, because this mania for size has been recently condemned sharply in the USSR, because of its harmfulness for the national economy, as Molotov emphasized at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party in 1939. We can explain this change by various motives. First it is a question of propaganda related to all the pretensions of the Kremlin. We know also that after a very short period of rest at the end of World War II, the peoples of the USSR fell again under the heavy psychosis of new military preparations, the psychosis of a permanent preparedness to beat off a new "aggression", or in other words, the psychosis of a permanent insecurity. The ill-considered Soviet propaganda was the cause for the development of this psychosis, for in its zeal it forgot that a condition of permanent insecurity harms the effectiveness of any economic plans. Thus an analysis of the separate stages of the realization of the fourth post-war five-year plan in the USSR shows that the reconstruction of the regions ruined by the war went much more rapidly and with a more lively participation of the population in the first years after the war than it did later, more or less after 1947, when the citizens of the USSR saw that without regard to all of their efforts, they would be compelled to continue hungry and ragged. Because of this new war psychosis, only the sector of heavy industry shows any growth, while the industry of the civilian sector lags further and further behind and completes only the really small published plans. Thus in the more important parts of the civilian sector, the production of cotton materials, which are the chief item in the clothing industry, amounted at the end of the last five-year plan (1950) to 3,8 billions instead of the planned 4,8 billions; the production of shoes was 197 million pairs instead of 240 millions, the production of stockings 426 million pairs instead of 580 millions, the grain crop which even to-day is of prime importance in the feeding of the population in the USSR,

amounted to 120 million tons instead of the 227 million tons called for by the plan, — a loss of some 127 million tons. (See "Plan Fulfilment in the Soviets is Spotty", by Harry Schwartz, *The New York Times*, October 30, 1950).

In all branches of the civilian sector, the production of 1950 is lower than was the production of 1940, although the population of the USSR has increased significantly in numbers during this period. To raise the spirits of the population of the USSR, to combat its growing loss of faith and its apathy, to assure it of its efforts to maintain peace, Moscow has announced as a whole the plans for 1951-57. The gigantic size of these projects is conditioned by and commensurate with the gigantic proportions and danger of the *spirit of displeasure* and also of *hostile indifference*, which as we have said, is engulfing ever wider circles of the population of the USSR, especially the non-Russian peoples.

The gigantic size of the new plans of the Gosplan should be considered as nothing but the result of the gigantic size of the psychosis of indifference, inertia, which have their roots among other places in the consciousness of the *permanent threat of the breaking out of a new armed conflict*. A proof that this is the object of the new projects of the Gosplan of the USSR is furnished by the contents of the recent speech of Marshal Bulganin, delivered in 1950 on the 33rd anniversary of the October Revolution (*Izvestiya*, November 5, 1950). On the other hand we know also that there is a deliberate attempt to impress the eye both at home within the USSR and abroad. It is clear that the state of the permanent threat of a new war is the direct result of the aggressive and imperialistic policy of Moscow toward the foreign world. The psychosis of apathy can disappear only when the policy of Moscow gives up its imperialistic character. Yet taking into account the essence of the Great Russian ambitions as shown in Moscow for centuries and the nature of Russian Bolshevism, which in the last years has become the most open expression and bearer of those ambitions, we must come to the conclusion that any change in the policy of the USSR is at the present stage of its "expansion" physically impossible and therefore it is certain that any "gigantic size" of planning cannot help the internal situation in the USSR.

The great plans of the USSR, proclaimed for 1951-57, have also economic causes. The most important of these are the impossibility of using *atomic energy for peaceful construction* and also the great doubts as to the *role and results of the protective forest belts*, planned recently in the USSR (1949). It appears that the noisy declarations of the Soviet

orators and especially Vishinsky at the November, 1949 session of the UN, in regard to plans for the utilization of atomic energy in the building of hydrological works in Cenral Asia are nothing but empty phrases. In any other case, why build the Amu-Dariya-Krasnovolsk canal in Central Asia? The same can be said about the works at Kuybyshev and Stalin-grad. In short the Gosplan by its action contrary to Soviet propaganda gives the proof that in the next decades there can be no talk of the use of atomic energy in the economy of the USSR.

The *action of planting forest belts* in the USSR has produced perhaps still greater stir, especially in official Soviet circles, than the present plans for power plants. The whole action is connected with the well-known purging of the opponents of Michurin and Lisenko in the agrobiological sciences in the USSR. The plan for planting forest belts was regarded as one of the proofs of the possibility of a fundamental change of nature by man, since the object of these belts was to secure constant large harvests of agricultural crops in the hitherto poorly productive regions of the steppe of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Volga area. The announcement of the building of a network of canals according to the plans for 1951-57 in the same regions speaks eloquently of the fact that the plan for planting forest belts fell through or has been shown so weak that it has been necessary to supplement it with those methods of irrigation not planned by Soviet innovators or "changers" of nature but well-known from the earliest historic times, when irrigation canals were first employed.

The results of the possibilities of the use of atomic energy in the USSR and of the effectiveness of the plan for forest belts are very interesting and instructive for us, but the plan for the building of a hydro-electric plant at Kakhivka gives us the basis for still another conclusion which very clearly and distinctly characterizes the economic situation in Ukraine, its colonial position in the USSR. This comes out in an analysis of the preceding five-year plans, especially the 3rd and 4th. The conclusion is that red Moscow, during its whole period of rule in Ukraine, has been investing its capital, which is only a small part of the profit which it has received by the reckless exploitation of the greatest resources of Ukraine, *only and exclusively in those eastern districts of Ukraine, which lie on the borders of Russia.* As a consequence of this policy, industrial stagnation exists in Ukraine within the limits bounded by the cities of Poltava—Sumy—Bakhmach—Chernyhiv—Sarny—Shepetivka—Proskuriv—Kamyanets Podilsky—Izmail—Kirovohrad—Poltava and the same condition prevails in Western Ukraine. The one exception in this

desolation is the city of Kiev, but when we look at the modern economic map of Ukraine in which each place is marked in accordance with its national economic significance to the national economy, then we see that even Kiev is marked in smaller letters than e. g. Makiivka or Mariypil. The execution of this plan for creating an "industrial desert" in these areas is malicious and harmful to Ukraine in the highest degree. After the annexation to the USSR of the Western Ukrainian districts in 1944 (1939) Moscow included in this waste area the districts of Volyn, Rivne, Ternopil and Stanislaviv. It did this for two reasons: economic-military and political.

The first reason led them to bring the industrial centres of Ukraine as close as possible to the basic Russian industrial centres. It is well known that these Russian centres live in a predominant degree, so to speak, on the juices of Ukrainian production, coal, iron, steel, and products of the machine and chemical industries of Ukraine. The developing of these centres only in the eastern districts of Ukraine, the so-called Lower Left Bank, reduces the cost and in general facilitates the reckless exploitation of Ukrainian resources by Moscow.

This concentration of the productive centres in the eastern districts of Ukraine will have further value in case of military operations, especially in case of an attack on the USSR from Europe for it will facilitate the evacuation of the most important objects to the east, to Russia and the destruction at least of the more important plants. By this means the liberated territories or more precisely a liberated Ukraine will find itself in the beginning stripped of its fundamental sources of power, instruments of transportation and connection, its important factories and plants. So we see that with the aid of its incorrect and perverted handling of Ukrainian industry Moscow is trying at the same time to produce a favourable political effect for itself in the uncertain future.

A consideration of the demographical effects produced by the absence of industry in the central portions of Ukraine shows us still another enormous damage that the economic policy of Moscow is inflicting upon Ukraine. The excess of population in central Ukraine, deprived of its natural overflow into industry, must emigrate to find work usually outside the borders of Ukraine, in the industrial centres near Moscow, in the Urals or even in Siberia.

The industrial centres of the Lower Left Bank are not able to absorb the entire overflow of the population of central Ukraine, the more as the industrialization of these, so to speak, privileged districts of Ukraine do not advance at proper tempos; it is artificially crippled by

Moscow, as we can see by a comparison of the power produced by the hydro-electric plant at Kakhivka and those in Stalingrad, Kuybyshev and elsewhere.

The overflow of the Ukrainian population can find no place in the industrial centres of eastern Ukraine, i. e. in the Donbas, the eastern Dnieper area and around Kharkiv because there has been for years an actual invasion of the Russian element sent in by the Kremlin and these newcomers fill not only the leading but even the minor posts in Ukrainian industry. This is done under the guise of "aid to a brother nation" at the very time when hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians are compelled involuntarily to wander outside of Ukraine to the east. In this way Ukraine loses each year a great part of its finest human material, for it is well known that these central regions are the home of the pure Ukrainian people.

The dooming of these lands by Moscow to become an industrial desert speak clearly of the aims of the Politburo, which desires to weaken the basic Ukrainian lands in every possible way. We must never forget that the industrial weakness of the central districts of Ukraine lowers also the level of the village economy, for it makes difficulties for the distribution of the productions of the village. As a result the prices for agricultural products are so low that it deprives the villagers, already ground down by the exploiting system of the collective farms, of any desire to secure any improvement or betterment of their production. It is Moscow that profits by the difficulties in transporting the products of the villages to the cities from the central areas, for it is able to secure these crops for itself at incredibly low prices.

So we see that Ukraine, groaning under the exploiting yoke of Moscow, is suffering tremendous damage not only in the political and cultural spheres but also in that of the national economy. Thanks to the perverted and unnatural directions forced upon the national economy of Ukraine by the Politburo and the Gosplan, the country in spite of its colossal natural resources and splendid possibilities for development, must struggle with various deficiencies, and its population endures great deprivations in all fields of life which are dependent upon the economy of the country. By an examination of the Soviet plans for Ukraine during the years 1951-57, we have come to the conclusion that there can be no hope for a change in this pitiable and unenviable condition of the Ukrainian national economy so long as it is under the heel of Moscow, and we are convinced also that the only remedy for the situation is the restoration of liberty to Ukraine.

## **FREE EUROPE AND UKRAINE**

*by* CLARENCE A. MANNING

The declaration of principles signed by the representatives of ten formerly independent nations in Philadelphia on February 11, 1951, marked a decisive advance in the great task of organizing and unifying the free world against the advance of Soviet Russian Communism. As such it can only be welcomed by all lovers of liberty and believers in democracy. Such an agreement in a public statement has been long overdue and now that the leaders in exile have solved their differences and have resolved upon a common platform, they will have a more influential voice in the free capitals of the world and will be able to send their messages with more authority within the Iron Curtain.

It is a salutary thing that the world should be reminded in 1951 of the principles of the Atlantic Charter signed on August 14, 1941 by President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. This document provided that in the future territorial changes would be made only by the will of the people and that every people would have the right to choose its own government. That document issued at the moment when the forces of Hitler had occupied all the countries that had been liberated at the close of World War I inspired the governments in exile very much as the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson had been the signal for the demand for selfdetermination that had doomed the great empires that were struggling in World War I. Yet it was almost at once nullified by the action of Stalin in agreeing to it and at the same time asserting that the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had joined the Soviet Union voluntarily and the tacit toleration of this act of aggression by the democratic powers was only a prelude to the abandonment of the governments in exile and the establishment of the iron curtain.

To-day the declaration of the leaders of ten countries, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia, has in a sense brought the record back to the position of the democratic powers in 1941, if means can be found to make it effective. The principles here enunciated declare again for the dignity of man and the liberty of nations and they furnish a basis on which a just world order can be built.

Yet this is not a final draft for a new world order any more than were the original Fourteen Points. It is often forgotten that in point 10 Wilson expressly stated that "the peoples of Austria-Hungary... should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development". It was not until some months later that the government of the United States and its associated powers definitely recognized the independence of the leading groups of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and permitted the various national committees to set themselves up as free and independent governments and thus doomed the old empire of the Hapsburgs.

The same hesitation is evident in this declaration. The same ambiguity exists that gave the excuse for the abandonment of the Atlantic Charter at the time when it seemed as if the free nations even in their moment of greatest weakness and danger were going to hold the strong democratic position that they had assumed.

Let us look a moment at some of the phrases in this new declaration. "The peoples of the East feel themselves brothers not only to all the free nations of the West, but also to the Russian people and all the other peoples of the Soviet Union aspiring to a common deliverance." Does that phrase mean what it seems to say! Does it mean that the representatives of the ten nations that have fallen under the control of Soviet Russia or Soviet Communism recognize the rights of the peoples of the Soviet Union to be free from Russian domination? Or does it mean that they are merely opposed to the regime of Stalin and care little about conditions within the Soviet Union?

In favor of the latter interpretation is the fact that the declaration was signed in some capacity by Alexander Kerensky, the leader of the Russian Provisional Government, who during his term of office resisted all attempts at self-determination on the part of the oppressed nations of the Russian Empire and who consistently fought for the unity of Russia without regard for the wishes of the non-Russian victims of the tsar. Ever since, as the nominal leader of the "democratic" Russians in exile, he has constantly opposed the claims of all the independence movements and the Russian newspapers that have followed his teachings have at least the good word for the Bolsheviks that they did not allow Russia to be dismembered.

In support of this Russian interpretation also is the absence of any representatives of those peoples who asserted their independence from Russia at the time of the collapse of the tsarist power and who were subdued and brought into the Soviet Union by Communist arms and chicanery. There were no representatives present of Ukraine, of the



Caucasus, of Turkestan. There were no representatives of any of those peoples who through their underground like the Ukrainian Insurgent Army are still carrying on an armed struggle for democracy within the iron curtain.

The significance of that struggle against overwhelming odds is only now beginning to sink into the consciousness of the Western world. When the first news of the activity of the Ukrainian independence forces first began to cross the iron curtain, it was received with incredulity. The victorious powers were only too willing to credit the story that they were merely bandits and it required the actual appearance of disciplined and armed detachments which had cut their way across Poland and Czechoslovakia into the American Zone and surrendered, claiming the rights of prisoners of war, before a doubting public even began to give credence to the idea that the people who had been forced into subjection to Russian Communism in 1919, 1920, and 1921 still cherished the hope that they might be liberated and resume that independent national existence which they had claimed on the downfall of the tsar.

Within the last few months the news has come that General Taras Chuprynka, the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, has fallen in battle but that this did not mean the end of the movement. Since that time reports have come of new attacks of these patriotic forces around Mukachevo in Carpathian Ukraine and the evidence is growing all the time that there is a potential, if not an actual, revolt in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Hardly a week passes, when Moscow does not make public some new plot, some new danger from the Ukrainian nationalists. The Soviets have come to regard Ukrainian nationalism as the most dangerous point in their entire internal system. In their efforts to create their monolithic state, subservient to the Russian and the Communist mode of thinking, they have liquidated nearly all of the creative geniuses of Ukraine, the leading writers and thinkers, yes, even the Ukrainian Communists, and yet they continue to find that the seeds of Ukrainian nationalism have not been extinguished. Does not that show that Ukraine through its representatives should be invited to sign this declaration of liberty which is in many phrases merely a repetition of the slogans developed and spread by the Ukrainian movement for liberation, which is working in close connection with those of Lithuania and Byelorussia?

We know less in the United States of the movement for national independence among the peoples of the Caucasus and of Central Asia. There have not come to the Western world so many of their leaders

but when we remember their long struggle against Russian tsarist imperialism and the efforts of the people after fifty years more or less of tsarist suppression to restore their liberty after 1917, we cannot doubt that there are similar forces in action and ready to come to the assistance of the free world. Many of these peoples are Mohammedan in religion. They are spiritually and racially allied with that world extending from Turkey to China which is one of those areas from which Communism must be debarred, as Governor Dewey has stated. To-day when the crisis of free civilization is unrolling before us on the Asiatic scene, nothing could more decisively check the action of Soviet agents than a frank statement of the willingness of the Western world to recognize the rights of these peoples to the blessings of freedom.

To-day when Americans, with their associates of the United Nations including the Turks, are fighting and dying in Korea, "the freedom and independence of our peoples (of Central and Eastern Europe) deserve to be defended with the same determination as that with which the United Nations are defending the freedom of the Korean people" and that is as true for the people of Turkestan, etc., as it is for the menaced Turks and Arabs and the already enslaved peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

Of course if Alexander Kerensky signed this document as the representative of all oppressed peoples of Russia, merely to cement the power of Russians, there is nothing more to say. Moscow, the Third Rome, under Tsar or President or Commissar, can still continue its divine mission to be the "elder brother of Eurasia" and can nullify all the hopes and aspirations of at least half of the population of the Soviet Union and can continue to menace the independence of those states which are represented in this agreement.

Yet there is no need for discouragement. As we have seen, even the original Fourteen Points did not proceed the entire way. President Wilson and his government could not bring themselves to recognize the independence of the peoples included within the Russian Empire. It is often forgotten in the United States that it was not until 1921 that the Baltic states were admitted to the League of Nations and not until 1922 when, under President Harding, they were formally recognized by the United States at a time when it is now believed that isolationism had already won the day.

This declaration of 1951 must be treated as what it is. It is a memorandum of citizens and former officials of countries that had secured for themselves international recognition and standing between the two

World Wars. It is a formal statement of the leaders of those peoples who were overthrown and subjected in the troubled times beginning with 1939 and ending with the final overthrow of the Czechoslovak democracy in 1948.

From this point of view it already represents a tremendous advance. The United States has refused consistently to recognize the Soviet absorption of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and continued to receive their representatives who were here when the Soviet blow fell. Yet it did not feel itself bound to insist upon their entrance into the United Nations as charter members. So long as the authorities still believed in the peace-loving aspirations of Stalin and his Soviet group, they were willing to temporize and to allow the Baltic states to continue in a sort of twilight midway between existence and absorption, — while the unfortunate population was being dragged away to execution or to concentration camps.

When the representatives of the next tier of states, taken after World War II, first began to gather together in Western Europe and America, they were very careful not to associate themselves with the representatives of the Baltic republics. They wanted to believe that the greed of the Soviets would be satisfied and that the full force of Soviet oppression would not be applied to their countries, if they were properly cautious. Those were the days when there was definite hope that Communism could be contained — at the cost of certain countries and freedoms. Again that hope was not fulfilled, even as the dreams that democratic governments could be set up under the aegis of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union had proved false and destructive.

It was only then and really after the issue was joined in Korea that the representatives of these states realized that they were in the same position as the refugees from the Baltic, that they were facing the same problems, and that they should act together. Now for the first time in a decade the representatives of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are openly brought in as nations that are enslaved by Communism along with Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

To-morrow it will be seen that even this too narrow a view. To-morrow it will be seen that all those peoples who are in revolt against Russian domination, be it tsarist or Communist, must be invited to attend and to sign their names and those of their peoples to a charter of human liberties. Just as it proved impossible at the time of the American Civil War for a country to exist half-slave and half-free, so it will be impossible for a world to exist half-slave and half-free. This is realized in the

present document when it says "The suppression of freedom in one part of the world endangers the freedom of all nations and of all men." Sooner or later the reality of that statement will sink into the hearts and minds of men and when it does, it will lead to the addition of many more peoples and nations to this declaration.

When that time comes, there will be a real answer to the Soviet propaganda as to the imperialistic policies of the West. Already countries like Tibet are beginning to approach the United Nations for protection against the new imperialism of Communist China. A fearless and ready acceptance of the idea that all men and all peoples are entitled to those rights guaranteed in the Fourteen Points, the Atlantic Charter and now this Declaration will be a powerful step in advance and a weapon against totalitarianism as strong as were the appeals to self-determination in 1918.

Yet there is a further point to be noted. During the troubled days after World War I and the uneasy years of peace that followed, there were several territorial disputes between those peoples whose representatives have now come together. The reopening of those clashes in 1938 and 1939 was but the preliminary to the holocaust that followed. To-day this Declaration is a sign that confronted with a still greater peril, the leaders abroad have decided to sink their differences, even though there are sporadic signs that they might be reopened under more favorable conditions.

The conditions of the present and the movement for a united Europe give us hope that these distinguished statesmen and scholars and thinkers may see their way clear to create some real organization that will weld central and eastern Europe, once it is free of totalitarian and imperial theories, into a real unity that will preserve the essential rights of the people and their cultural past and yet reconcile the conflicting claims of two or more groups to one and the same area. In the course of the last thousand years, there are few places in central and eastern Europe that have not been under two or more sovereignties. It was only natural in the days when patriotism meant local loyalty to a ruling house, a ruling religion, or a feudal lord.

To-day that is not enough. They must organize "a fraternal federation (which) must prize and respect the distinctive values of each nation, for the common good of our European civilization and for the cultural heritage of mankind throughout the world." It will be a difficult task to reconcile with this broad outlook the local patriotisms that have meant so much to Europe. No one yet has any idea how this is to be brought about, what are to be the actual terms for the organization of the

continent and the world. We know how it cannot be done. It cannot be done, if organization is to be a blind following of history, if territorial disputes are to be allowed to complicate men's thoughts and to fan new conflicts by old claims. There must be a new system which will maintain the old values and bring peoples together on truly democratic principles.

The founders of the American Constitution builded more wisely than they knew or dreamed. They bound the thirteen colonies together in a union that showed itself capable of expansion. That must be the goal of the leaders of the Europe of to-morrow. The old order in its most perverted form can be seen in the general policy of Russification advocated by the Tsars, by Kerensky, and by Stalin. The new order must create a living unity, a willing acceptance of the differences between peoples and the many points of agreement between them.

Still even if we take this document at its lowest value, we can see that it marks a tremendous advance over any of the statements issued after World War I or in the years between. *It contains at least the recognition of the fact that the iron curtain must be abolished and that human rights must be given to all men and independence to all peoples. That is a beginning.*

The small nucleus of countries that commenced this movement have grown, as their leaders have come to see the similarity of their problems. It will grow still larger, as they ponder more and more deeply and as events take their course. With America, Europe and Asia all involved in the present crisis, in the present effort to check the totalitarian onslaught of Russian Communism, it will be impossible to limit thought and cooperation to the map of 1939 or of 1918.

When that time comes, when the moment ripens for action, then we will see that Ukraine and the other nations enslaved by the Soviet Union and by Russian policy must be liberated and invited to take their part. To-day apparently abandoned, they are proving their devotion to democracy with their lives in the silent, never-ending struggle against the aggressor. To-morrow when the world is awake, they will be recognized and asked to join in the great crusade to make this one world truly one world and one free world. That is the significance and the meaning of this document and it deserves careful consideration even from those peoples who should have been asked to sign and have not been. It can easily prove to be a true beginning for a worldwide movement which will not end until man is truly free both in his national and personal existence.

## A GEOGRAPHER LOOKS AT EAST EUROPE

*By MYRON DOLNYTSKY*

As geographical factors quite often have great influence on the political development of a country, even though in many cases they are overlooked, we shall discuss in this article the independence of Ukraine and Eastern Europe entirely from the point of view of a geographer.


It is no secret that the Russian imperialists, formerly of the tsarist Russia and at present of the Soviet Russia, have imposed on the Western World their own conception of Eastern Europe. Even now we still meet politicians, newspapermen and also geographers who regard Eastern Europe as a unit — not only as a political unit, but also as a purely geographical unit. It is no wonder that the old bad habit of some one hundred years ago—of regarding the politically free States as geographical units—still persists in many minds.

Such a misconception leads to the absurd idea, of regarding a political unit, an independent State, as a geographical unit, predetermined by physico-geographical factors. How often Eastern Europe is even today identified with Russia by the use of such terms as Russia and Russian instead of Eastern Europe and Eastern European! Such misleading terminology is used not only by magazines and newspapers and in political discussions, but also by scholars. We dare state without hesitation that some non-European countries are even better known to some Western geographers than Eastern Europe. Quite often we are simply astounded by the ignorance of the West on matters relative to Eastern Europe.

In general we regard all territories of which we have inadequate knowledge as actual geographical units. But after we spend some time on studies of such territories we begin to realize their real nature and their real divisions. This is true in regard to Eastern Europe.

We can already present today many well-founded proofs which point to the fact that Eastern Europe, from the point of view of a geographer, constitutes a higher kind of a unit, a complex of countries, and each of its countries constitutes a separate geographical unit, made up of natural geographical forces. These separate geographical units differ from each other in such geographical factors as: their geographical positions, their

geological past, morphology, climate, flora, fauna, and population. These natural geographical units differ from each another, for instance, not less than Germany from Hungary.



**Natural regions of Eastern Europe**

The anthropo-geographical factors of Eastern Europe alone provide sufficient reason for its division into its natural geographical units and prove that Eastern Europe does not constitute a natural unit by itself. Man is an integral component of each country and is as adapted to its geographical conditions as its flora and fauna. Is it not significant that in Eastern Europe which, it is claimed, is a territory without natural boundaries several separate races of people came into being and still exist in spite of all empires that have existed in Eastern Europe, including Russia, and have tried their hardest to unify all of them in their „melting pots” to create one race of people? This fact, the very existence of different peoples in Eastern Europe, should alone provide sufficient proof that each terrain inhabited by a different people differs very much from the others. The local population has adapted itself to the geographical conditions of the land it inhabits not only in Western, but also in Eastern Europe. In the anthropological sense the population of Eastern Europe is probably even less intermixed than in the West and the South. The different racial groups are deeply rooted there. The ethnic cultures in Eastern Europe differ from each other more than in the rest of the continent. The same could be said, *mutatis-mutandis*, also about the languages of the region, and about the regional economic and political differences.

According to the present studies Eastern Europe can be divided into six natural regions: the Region of the White Sea (North Russia), Baltia, Muscovia (Russia), Uralia, Caspia, and Ukraine.

We shall give here only brief description of the first five geographical units of Eastern Europe, for it is our main objective to prove here that Ukraine constitutes a separate unit among the countries of Eastern Europe. In other words, we intend to define the natural geographical position of Ukraine in Eastern Europe.

The Region of the White Sea (North Russia) is a northern region, bordering on the White Sea. It includes the depression of the Arctic Ocean region. It is purely a sub-Arctic region, marked by its relatively low plateaus, with post-glacial soil, sub-Arctic climate, and extensive tundra regions of marshes and turflands. Its rivers flow into the Arctic Ocean. In its anthropo-geographical factors, this region is settled by primitive Finno-Samoyed tribes. At the same time it is also a region of the age-old Russian expansion and colonization which have given rise to special forms of Russian culture, in its ethnic and material elements.

Baltia, which includes approximately Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Byelorussia, is a region that is very similar in structure to the north-German lowlands, that is, it is covered with the eastern and the final



moraines left by the glaciers and with marshy lakes. The Eastern European continental climate of the Baltic region is greatly moderated by the influence of the oceanic currents and through its direct contact with the Baltic Sea. Baltia belongs to the wooded zone of the eastern Baltic region. It is quite definitely separated from the rest of Eastern Europe by its forests, marshes, marshy lakes, and by a chain of the final moraines. Baltia still remains a land of small Baltic peoples who have been living there for ages, quite well protected there by natural barriers from the mighty political storms of the world. At the same time it has been easy for the cultural influences from northern and central Europe to reach this region, to take root, and to be assimilated there.

*Muscovia* (Russia) is a purely continental, central region of the East European complex, including the central Russian and the Volga plateaus, the plateaus of the upper Volga and of Vyatka, the eastern lowlands along the Volga, and the Don depression. This region is dominated by the climatic influences of the Ural territory. Its absolute height is very low, and hence its surface structure lacks variety. Its climate is purely continental. The majority of its rivers empty into the Caspian Sea. Russia consists of several segments of the north European zone of mixed woods, of the Ural-Siberian zone, and of the north-eastern section of the bushland.

We can describe the anthropo-geography of Russia in this way: — It was formerly an outlying region of the Slavs. As there were no powerful and threatening neighbors in the immediate vicinity, as in Ukraine, the eastern Slavic tribes colonized with great ease and Slavized the Finnic tribes. This process gave rise to the largest Slavic people, the Russians. Muscovia occupied a convenient central position, for its woods separated it from the south-eastern steppelands. The nomads of the steppelands, who destroyed the ancient Ukrainian empire of the grand princes, kept Muscovy in subjection, too, without destroying it, and in fact even helped to consolidate it. After throwing off its Tatar yoke, Muscovy started to expand, and its central position gave it a chance to expand in every direction. The weakness of her neighbors served as the incentive. Muscovy's population kept on expanding too, by steadily absorbing great numbers of Finns through colonization and Russification.

The historically well-known "gathering of the Russian lands" by the Russian grand princes and tsars was obviously aided by the natural geographical factors and the conditions created by them. The favorable central position gave to this poor center of Eastern Europe a definite superiority over its more richly endowed neighbors. Through steady ag-

gression this center succeeded in conquering and annexing its richer neighbors. Thus the center of Eastern Europe grew into the center of the largest territorial State of the world.

*Uralia*, with its mountainous terrain, lies on the border between Eastern Europe and Asia. It reaches in the west to the Vyatka district and the lowland east of the Volga, and in the south to the Caspian prairie lowland. The climate here is extremely continental, a highland climate. Uralia is a region of the Uralo-Siberian woods and of highland flora. It is the homeland of the Finnic and Turkic tribes, subjected to a modern and ever more intensive Russian colonization.

*Caspia* is a region of the lowland plains and of the depression around the Caspian Sea. This is a young coastal region, with local mountains, numerous saltlands, salt-water lakes, and with a unique coastal development. Caspia is a region of the Aral-Caspian prairie desert climate, consisting of desert prairies and requiring artificial irrigation. It is a homeland for the remnants of the Turkic-Mongolian tribes who for many centuries roamed the steppelands of Eastern Europe. Formerly Eastern Europe was under their domination; at present they just manage to make a meagre living, dominated by a foreign civilization.

What place, then, does Ukraine occupy in Eastern Europe where it is the sixth geographical unit?

*Ukraine* is a southern region, the borderland of Eastern Europe on the Black Sea, including and based on the southern borderland mountains: the eastern branch of the Carpathians, the Crimean mountains, and the Caucasian mountains. It is evident that the boundaries of Ukraine, constituting a geographical unit, almost completely coincide with the Ukrainian ethnic boundaries.

The characteristic feature of Ukraine's morphology is the uniformity of the Ukrainian group of plateaus and belts of low plains. The structural lines of Ukraine run from west to east, that is, they follow the paths of the ancient glaciers. We do not meet such a zonal structure in any other place in Eastern Europe. Thus the relief features of Ukraine belong rather to the pattern of Western Europe. The relief pattern of Ukraine is more varied than in the White Sea Region, Baltia, Caspia, or even Russia. Many large tracts of Ukraine remind us in their relief pattern of the varied landscapes of the central or western Europe. Such features of Ukraine have resulted from the past geological upheavals which were different from the rest of Eastern Europe.

The climate of Ukraine is also quite different from the rest of Eastern Europe. It is peculiar to Ukraine. Four different climates meet in Ukraine: from the west the central-European climatic currents, still strongly saturated with oceanic moisture; purely continental influences from the north; dry desert currents from the steppelands in the south-east; and Mediterranean currents from the south. This mixture of four different climates provides Ukraine with a climate that is unlike the rest of Eastern Europe. It is so distinct from the others that a prominent French expert De Martonne has put it into a class by itself, and called it the Ukrainian climate. Ukraine has the most genial climate in Eastern Europe, where it occupies the same place as the climate of France in Western Europe.

In the hydrographical sense Ukraine belongs, with the exception of small strips of territory in the south-west and in the south-east, to the Black Sea basin. In this sense Ukraine is really the hinterland of the Black Sea and of the Mediterranean. This factor has had, as we learn from history, a special significance for Ukraine and at times had a decisive influence on Ukraine's cultural development. This fact that Ukraine is the only country that borders on the Black Sea in Eastern Europe will be of special significance for Ukraine in the future, in its political aspirations, its political relations, and its strategy. We should bear in mind that the Black Sea binds the lot of Ukraine closely with the Mediterranean countries and connects it with the network of the world's trade routes.

In Eastern Europe Ukraine stands by itself in its vegetation. Ukraine is mostly a region of prairies and bushlands, with a forest zone in the north-west where the woods of Central Europe meet with the woods of Northern Europe, and it has wooded districts in the Carpathians, in the Crimean mountains, and in the Caucasian mountains. The real steppeland occupies only a narrow zone of the black earth, chernozem, in the south. Due to the fact that Ukraine includes also the south-western zone of the black earth, which has a very genial climate, the cultivation of all kinds of plants in Ukraine is easier than in the rest of Eastern Europe. Ukraine is best suited for the growing of grains, vegetables, and fruits. This is the reason why Ukraine has been from times immemorial, quite often to her detriment, the granary of eastern and north-eastern Europe.

The anthropo-geography of Ukraine is very clearly marked. It was Ukraine, especially her bushland and wooded zones, that produced the Ukrainian people, who form a separate anthropological unit in Eastern Europe.

In the anthropological sense Ukrainians stand alone among the peoples of Eastern Europe. Their nearest relatives live in the Balkan peninsula (the so-called Dinaric race). Some ethnic characteristics indicate that they also belong to the cultural center of the Balkans and the Carpathians. They are related linguistically to the same center.

The special political conceptions and patterns of life of the Ukrainians were created by those special factors that are peculiar to the life on the borderland of the forests and in the bushland. That was the terrain where the Ukrainians came into being and grew to great power. Later they expanded along the rivers to the coast of the Black Sea. The cultural influences, extending there from the Mediterranean countries, provided them with the fundamentals of a higher civilization and of political organization.

The normal development of the Ukrainians was violently retarded by the incursions of the nomads from the steppeland. The constant attacks of the nomads so undermined the Ukrainian State and its people that the State, in consequence, came to a premature end. The Ukrainians were forced to retreat from the South and to live in a confined territory in the north. The decay of the power of the nomads brought to an end the continual state of war in Ukraine, and allowed the Ukrainians to expand again peacefully over the hinterland of the Black Sea. After regaining their former advantageous geographical position, the Ukrainians set out again, after an age-long retardation, on the road of normal national development.



Now we can see that the so-called natural unity of Eastern Europe, supposedly also determining the political unity of the area, is but a mere statement, without actual basis. It was the political uniformity of the Russian Empire, that grew up around the central State of Eastern Europe, that stamped that false conception upon the minds of the people in Western Europe. The strongly centralized regime of the Russian Empire left such a fascinating imprint on the West that Eastern Europe became in the eyes of the western Europeans synonymous with that Empire, and not a region of many geographical units, a complex of many countries, as it really is.

It was during the XIXth century, which was the first century when the whole of Eastern Europe constituted one political and economic unit, that one could notice more and more clearly how unnatural was the dependence of some of the countries of Eastern Europe upon its center. The population of Russia increased rapidly and overcrowded some districts.

But as its economic progress was very slow, this central country of Eastern Europe soon began to exploit mercilessly its outlying countries. It was in the interest of Russia to keep its subjugated countries weak, and unable to oppose its exploitation. Yet the people made some cultural progress. They became conscious of their own plight and in consequence their opposition to the center of the State increased. The outlying countries of Eastern Europe developed, in spite of all the rigorous measures of repression, strong aspirations for self-government in matters political, economic, and cultural. Such aspirations, which later on changed into separatist movements, should serve as the best argument for the West to revise its unlucky understanding of Eastern Europe as if it were an indivisible regional and political unit.<sup>1</sup>

**CONCLUSION:** *Eastern Europe is the same kind of a complex of several separate geographical units, that is, countries, as Western and Central Europe. One of the most distinct units of Eastern Europe is Ukraine.*

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### **THE NKVD GET THEIR MAN**

During a literature exam in a Soviet University the examiner turned to a non-party student and sternly asked: "Who wrote 'War and Peace'?"

"I didn't," answered the student, alarmed.

Appalled at such a display of ignorance he hastened to report the incident to the dean.

"Don't fret so Ivan Ivanovich. Maybe he really didn't do it," the dean was sympathetic.

This was too much for Ivan Ivanovich and he rushed from the dean's office in great consternation. On his way home he met an acquaintance of his from the NKVD who asked why he looked so worried. Ivan Ivanovich related to him the incident about "War and Peace". The NKVD officer asked him the name of the student and told him not to worry. The following day the dean and the student were absent from the University and a few days later Ivan Ivanovich received a telephone call from his friends in the NKVD.

"I told you not to worry," he announced with pride. "They've both confessed."

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<sup>1</sup> We hope that it is not out of place to mention here that the Bolsheviks exiled Prof. Stefan Rudnytsky, the well-known Ukrainian geographer, to the north, where he died. No doubt he was exiled because of his many geographical works on Ukraine in which he provided scholarly proofs to the effect that Ukraine is a separate geographical unit. His works dealt a powerful blow to the Russian imperialists, by destroying the idea that Russia is an indivisible geographical unit.

## UKRAINIAN ARCHITECTURE OF THE XVII AND XVIII CENTURIES

By VOLODYMYR SICHYNSKY

The period of the flowering of Ukrainian art, its golden age, is usually placed in the 17th—18th centuries, when the Ukrainian Kozak army had won the independence of Ukraine which had been lost since the princely period of the 10th—14th centuries. Living a common cultural life with Western Europe, Ukraine accepted the most recent artistic movement of the whole of Europe, the baroque style. This style, however, in Ukraine assumed such different forms and was so original, that it has acquired in the literature of the arts the name of "Ukrainian or Kozak Baroque."<sup>1</sup> Although this style as in Western Europe, was saturated with pathos, a supernatural scale, spiritualism, and in some forms decorativeness and a superfluity of ornaments, yet in Ukraine it was dominated by the constructive and functional principle. In buildings of the Ukrainian baroque the exterior appearance corresponds to the interior construction and there are no purely decorative elements, false forms and superfluous additions and overloaded ornaments. The architect works with general masses and individual forms to produce a certain expression, which presents an appropriate proportion and harmony among the separate parts. In church architecture this has been achieved most successfully in central types of structures where the eight-sided form dominates in the general planning, the towers, and the spherical domes. The symmetrical repetition of the construction on all four sides with a perpendicular axis of symmetry creates a mood to emphasize equality and the equal value of people before the higher truth, the higher idea. The centre of attention is directed not to the section with the altar but to the dome at the centre of the building, the unattainable and eternally incomprehensible height and space, where the highest power dominates. In general, in Ukrainian architecture, the problems of space have always received more especial attention than the basic problems of architectural art.

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<sup>1</sup> S. Hordynsky, *Ukrainian Architecture*. The Ukrainian Quarterly Vol. IV. 4.

From the middle of the 17th century, the centre of cultural and artistic life was definitely concentrated in the central Dnieper area, where the Ukrainian officer class, the hetmans, colonels and other officers who had come from the nationally minded population, became the endowers and the patrons of art. Very many buildings were constructed at the expense of the hetmans Samoylovych, Mazepa, Apostol and Rozumovsky and colonels Hertsyk, Myklashevsky, Mokievsky, etc. The first hint of the baroque style is seen in the buildings of the beginning of the 17th century, especially through the medium of Italian artists. Signs of baroque are evident also in buildings of the time of Hetman B. Khmelnytsky. Still the independent creation of Ukrainian artists begins in the second half of the 17th century and reaches its greatest height at the time of Ivan Mazepa. His most intensive building activity occurs in the years 1695-1700, when he built five majestic churches and restored and rebuilt 15 other buildings, among them the Academy in Kiev. In this school were trained the Ukrainian artists, painters, engravers, and architects. Among the Ukrainian architects, we know Fedir Starchenko, Stepan Kovnir, Yakym Pohrebniak, Ivan Zarudny, O. Yanovsky, etc. Among the foreigners, we must mention Adam Sernikau, who completed the University in Jena and worked in England (Oxford, Cambridge, London) and in Ukraine wrote 6 books about the building of fortresses and their defense.

The new character of Ukrainian architecture was shaped especially by two influences, the old tradition of stone architecture of the princely period (10th-13th centuries) and the wooden national architecture. Among the buildings that in the largest degree reflected the influences of the Western European baroque, we must place the great churches in Bezhany (Galicia), of the Holy Trinity in Chernyhiv (1679), the Mharsky monastery in Poltava district (1682), and also two buildings of Hetman Mazepa—the Cathedral of St. Nicholas in Kiev (1690) and the Church of the Brotherhood in the Kiev Academy (1695). Both churches of Mazepa were destroyed by the Russian Bolsheviks in the thirties.<sup>2</sup> If in the ground plan of these buildings there was concealed the character of the Western basilicas, the separate forms, the decorations and the details reveal national features, drawn from the folk art of the people. Especially original are the vaulted ceiling of the square base and the eight-sided towers, which are topped by an eight-sided dome. Of similar character are the many re-buildings and reconstructions of the older churches, as e. g. the Cathedral

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<sup>2</sup> See S. Hordynsky: *The Stones Cry Out*, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. IV. 1.

of St. Sophia, the Monastery of St. Michael, the chief church of the Holy Trinity of the Kiev Lavra and many other structures in Kiev and the provinces.

Of a second type are buildings which in plan and size follow the old tradition of Ukrainian architecture for three and five domed churches.

Especially original is the type of five-domed churches which were planned to consist of five squares in the form of a cross with all arms equal. Although the execution of the separate parts and the details of these buildings reveal the universal baroque style, still by the clear and logical construction and restraint in the use of ornaments, the Ukrainian churches greatly differ from the purely ornamental principles and often overloaded forms of the baroque style of both West and East. Among the finest examples of the three-domed churches are the Cathedral of the Holy Protection of the Mother of God in Kharkiv, with its extraordinarily slender domes, two churches of the Kiev Lavra, the Cathedral in Romny and smaller buildings in Sumy, Bohodukhivka, Slovyanske, etc.



Holy Trinity Church of the Hustyn Monastery, presented by Hetman Samoylovych 1672-1674.

The highest artistic expression and purity of form is displayed by the five-dome churches in the form of a cross. The origin of these original buildings goes back to the old Christian churches of the 4th—7th centuries in Chersonesus in the Crimea. The distinguished Viennese professor, J. Strzygowski, and other students believe that we must regard Ukraine as the source of these central structures. This type of building was known in Ukraine in the 12th—15th centuries but it became far more widespread



in the period of baroque. To the finer examples belong the Churches of All Saints in Kiev, founded by Ivan Mazepa (1696), of St. George, the Vidubetsky Monastery (1698), and other buildings in Chernyhiv, Baturyn,



Detail of window in the main church of the Lavra Monastery in Kiev

ings of the Kiev Lavra by the architect S. Kovnir. Often the churches themselves are covered with ornamentation of a purely civil character. Among the finer works are the details of the chief church of the Lavra, by the architect F. Starchenko, (1722-1729). Here we see types of Ukrainian ornamental motifs, the use of embroidered towels, as a decorative device, stylized plants, especially those much beloved in Ukraine, as sunflowers, mallows, pinks, etc.

The attractive form of the Ukrainian baroque and especially the technical knowledge of the Ukrainian masters aided in spreading the in-

Kiev, and Izyum. A further development is seen in structures in the form of nine squares topped with five domes, as the Church of the Holy Trinity of the Hustynsky Monastery — (1672-1674), in Pryluky — (1716), and Nizhyn (the beginning of the 18th century). All these structures have been for the most part destroyed, neglected, or completely taken apart by the Russian administration. Of the few surviving examples of civil architecture, we have the well-known house of Mazepa in Chernyhiv, (really his military chancellor), the buildings of Colonel Ya. Lyzohub in Sedniv, of Hetman Polubotok in Lyubech, of Colonel Halahan in Pryluky, etc. Typical examples of the Ukrainian baroque are the rebuilt Kiev Academy from the beginning of the 18th century, the house of the Metropolitan and the gate of Zborovsky in Kiev, the build-

fluence of Ukrainian architecture among neighboring lands and peoples. Especially in Moscow there rose a number of buildings based on Ukrainian models, such as the church in Fili near Moscow and the so-called Tower of Menshikov in Moscow, built by the Kiev architect Ivan Zarudny in 1705, who was called by Muscovite documents "inozemets" (foreigner).

After the middle of the 18th century, building in Ukraine diminished, but yet there were constructed several majestic buildings in a style that was transitional to the classical and the later rococo. Although at this period many foreign architects were employed, yet there are many native features in Ukrainian buildings, especially those with a religious purpose. Created in monumental form, the bell tower of St. Sophia in Kiev, completed in 1748, has quite original decoration but too overloaded, as the last manifestation of the baroque satiation with ornaments. In light and airy forms, with marks of the rococo style, were built the three most important churches of the middle of the 18th century: those of St. Andrew in Kiev, St. George in Lviv, and in Kozelets. The Cathedral Church of St. George in Lviv, which in its plan hides the old tradition of Ukrainian churches, is marked by its massive forms, the dynamic of perpendicular lines and the lightness of its azure ornaments.

Two other churches, — those of St. Andrew in Kiev and in Kozelets are marked also with great picturesqueness, for these maintain the forms of the five-domed church with the dominating central dome. The splendid bell-tower of the Kiev Lavra, by the architect Schedel (1736-




All Saints Church of the Lavra Monastery  
in Kiev, presented by Hetman I. Mazepa  
1696-1698

1740) in much stricter classical forms, gives a splendid example of masterly composition and harmoniously blended proportions. The tower has a symmetrical colonnade on each floor with rows of Doric, Ionic and Corinthian columns.

The trend toward classicism as a reaction against the strained and decorative baroque, came to Ukraine in the middle of the 18th century and is illustrated by the palaces and the city gates, especially in Western Ukraine. The buildings of the end of the 18th century all have a classical character. With the ending of Ukrainian self-government and the Russian supremacy, there is lost the independence of Ukrainian art. It is usually said that at this period the models of Russian architecture from Petersburg (the modern Leningrad) began to dominate. But these influences appeared because from Petersburg there came architects—German, French, and English who thus spread “Russian” architecture. Here are some names: the Italian Bartholomeo Rastrelli, the German Johann Schedel, the Frenchmen Menelas and De La Motte, the Italians Giacomo Quarenghi and Rinaldi, the Englishman Charles Cameron. In church architecture, usually the old Ukrainian tradition in the form of the ground plan and the domes was largely preserved, although the decoration followed the universal models, especially the style of Louis XVI. But these buildings hurt the eyes of the Russian administration. In 1801 there was issued an *ukaz* of the Russian government which forbade the building in Ukraine of churches of the Ukrainian type. Such a decree is unbelievable and unintelligible for people of Western education. Speaking more accurately, it was previously unintelligible, for they have now learned that in present day Russia the government dictates to the artists even their artistic tendencies and style!

Among the most important classic buildings are the majestic palace in Lyalychi in the district of Chernyhiv, built by the architect G. Quarenghi in 1794–1795. It is a whole complex of buildings, forming a great semi-circle but the main structure is in the refined forms of the so-called style of Palladio of the type of the Villa rotonda near Vicenza in Italy. This building was formerly the home of valuable museum collections and of world art. The French physician De La Flise in his *Memoirs* of 1812 describes “all the wonders of the palace”, which had 100 rooms. In the halls he saw marble statues, examples of world-famous Italian, Flemish, Dutch and other masters, French gobelins, etc. In the great orangery were whole alleys of orange trees, full of fruit and a great number of pineapples, which the French physician saw for the first time in his life.



Bell-Tower of the Lavra Monastery in Kiev 1736-1748  
(Center part of construction)

The greatest number of buildings of this last period of the autonomous order in Ukraine were the work of the last Ukrainian hetman Kyrylo Rozumovsky. The life of this man, with his title as count, was fantastic. Thanks to his brother Oleksi Rozumovsky, who came from a simple Ukrainian Kozak family and was secretly married to the Russian Empress Elizabeth, Kyrylo Rozumovsky, as a boy of fifteen, went abroad to "study". The simple village boy succeeded in amusing himself like a lord in Germany, France and Italy but also in acquainting himself with the art, architecture and in fact the whole mode of life of Western Europe. On his return to Petersburg, this boy of eighteen was appointed President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and at the age of twenty he became Hetman and ruler of Ukraine. In his efforts to rebuild the city of Hlukhiv and also Baturyn in the European manner, he invited a whole series of prominent Italian, French and English architects to visit him. In Hlukhiv he adorned his capital with palaces, a large park in the English style, and with Italian opera after the model of Versailles. It is interesting that after the liquidation of the Hetmanate, the Russian government at once pulled down the residence of Rozumovsky, in fear that some one of the "Mazepintsy" (followers of Mazepa) might acquire the government of the Hetmanate... Rozumovsky also built splendid palaces in Yahotyn, Pochep, Baturyn and a building in Baklan near Pochep in the form of a Roman villa. He erected also 11 churches in various cities and villages of Ukraine. His majestic palace in Pochep, built (in accordance with a sketch of De La Motte) by the Ukrainian architect O. Yanovsky in 1796, shows a broad complex of quiet architectural masses but with dry and monotonous lines in the details.

At the close of his life Rozumovsky played with the thought of reconstructing Baturyn still more and of founding there a University, a public library and other cultural institutions. The only structure fully completed was the palace of the hetman, which was a true work of art and the last achievements of Ukraine of the 18th century.

The author of the palace of the hetman in Baturyn, Charles Cameron, a native of Scotland, was not only a practical architect but also a student of architecture. He wrote in 1772 a great work, "The Baths of the Romans, explained and illustrated". Cameron's chief source were the drawings of the Roman baths by the Italian architect Palladio, which were brought from Italy in the 18th century by Count Burlington. About 1787 Rozumovsky invited Cameron to Baturyn, where during the last years of the 18th century he made plans for the residence in Baturyn. It is possible that in the building of the palace, particularly in the interior arrange-




Palace of Hetman K. Rozumovsky in Baturyn. Arch. of Charles Cameron  
1799-1803. Present Ruins

ment, the celebrated Italian architect already mentioned, G. Quarenghi, may have taken part. In the plan of the palace are traces of the French chateaus of the end of the 18th century. The whole building was constructed in the classic style with traces of the style of Louis XVI. The main facade with its massive lower part and its light arcade and pediment of Ionic style is one of the most beautiful palaces in Ukraine. The arcade open on two sides of the building and the semicircular wings on the two other sides are typical of Ukrainian architecture and, against the Ukrainian landscape, are strikingly picturesque. Individual architectural forms and details resemble the buildings of Palladio. The interior decoration comes near the style of Louis XVI, and yet in the ornamentation we see typical elements of Ukrainian patterns. Entirely in the style of Ukrainian ornamentation were the tiles of the stoves which were made by local masters in Baturyn. The building was finished in 1803 but was used only a short time by the descendants of Rozumovsky. The Russian administration regarded with suspicion and lack of confidence all possible

pretenders for the hetman's mace. Shortly after the death of Kyrylo Rozumovsky (1803), his family moved to Vienna, Austria, where there still exists the palace of the Rozumovskys on a street of the same name.

The abandoned palace in Baturyn remained without proper supervision and was constantly plundered by the quartering in it of a Moscow army and the neglect of the Russian administration. In 1923 the ruins burned and since that time there have stood only walls without a roof and interior wooden members as a symbol of the ruined and enslaved Ukraine. The ruins stand as if in a wilderness for the wonderful park and the linden alley which formerly led up to the hetman's palace no longer exist.

But the memory of the former Ukrainian self-government remains deeply embedded in the local population which is proud of its Baturyn and its once Free Ukraine.



Dome of the Holy Trinity Church  
of the Lavra Monastery in Kiev

*Drawings made by W. Sichynsky*

## THE POLITICAL POLICY OF THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

As a national American organization consisting of branches and affiliates in three-quarters of the United States and representing over a million citizens of Ukrainian descent and East European background, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America has, in the light of contemporary international developments, come to assume a unique role in the dissemination of fact and truth concerning Russian Communism and in the task of forming a realistic American policy toward imperialist Soviet Russia. Its practical service and achievements in these crucial fields are measurable to an impressive extent by the intensity of its manifold activity, the wide diversity of the innumerable demands made upon its ready resources, and the expanding breadth of its vital relations with countless groups and national leaders who have recognized its value in the gathering of authentic information leading to an accurate understanding of the political realities of Eastern Europe, particularly as they pertain to the fundamental American interest of genuine world peace. A most fitting expression of this was given by President Truman in his commendatory message to the organization on the occasion of its fourth convention which was held in Washington, D. C. in November, 1949.<sup>1</sup>

In the course of its existence over the past decade, the Committee has proved to be one of the most spirited and ardent anti-Communist organizations in this country. Even during the years of World War II it never permitted the exigencies and political expediencies of the moment to besmirch in any way its democratic ideology or to becloud its realization of the universal menace of Russian Communism. To its everlasting credit, the Committee resolutely maintained its logical position while, tragically enough, many other Americans were recklessly glorifying Stalin as a friend and even as a democrat, not to mention the other political vagaries, such as the ludicrous parallels drawn between the valueless Soviet constitution and our precious, living document. No more eloquent

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<sup>1</sup> "President Truman Congratulates Ukrainian Congress Meeting in Capital," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol II., Nos. 22-23, Nov. 15—Dec. 1, 1949.



testimony to this tenacious stand can be adduced than the glowing remarks of the Honorable Herbert H. Lehman, Senator of New York, before the tenth anniversary celebration of the organization on October 1, 1950.<sup>2</sup>

The justification of this last remark of the Senator rests ultimately, of course, on the numerous bonds existing between the membership of this organization and the enslaved Ukrainian people in the Soviet Union. Thus the ideas, notions, and conceptions formed by it on the nature and operations of Russian Communism are deeply rooted in the bleak and be-draggled experiences of the Ukrainian people with this pernicious brand of foreign oppression. Its comprehensive scheme of thought and deed is therefore founded on the broad plane of experience rather than on those temporizing sands of intellectual conjecture, unrestrained credulity, and unremitting wishfulness that so conspicuously mark much current opinion in this field.

The remarkably significant fact is that the established mode of Soviet domination and oppression is so basically stereotyped that, as a general proposition, it can be easily shown that the seemingly novel events which have occurred elsewhere under Soviet auspices possess in reality their historical precedents on the ravaged Ukrainian soil. The macabre record of Soviet aggression during this past decade is hardly a novelty to those conversant with Ukrainian affairs. When a patient study is made of the early Soviet rape of the independent Ukrainian National Republic in 1920, the deceptive technique of intensive national revolution during the 20's, the barbarous destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the same decade, the upsurge of Ukrainian "Titoism" in the late 20's, the ruthless collectivization program of 1930-33, the genocidal Soviet famine of '33, the mass deportations to slave labor camps then and now, and the earliest assault upon the Catholic Church in Western Ukraine in 1945, a mature outlook would seem to dictate the assumption of a stoical attitude toward the more recent outrages of Soviet perfidy. Yet while vast multitudes were being barely awakened to the stark realities of Soviet Russian intent and act, organized Americans of Ukrainian descent were well on the road of attempting to transfuse into the arteries of American political thought and action that vigilant spirit of anti-Communist opposition which they early acquired from their kinsmen

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<sup>2</sup> "Your activity against Communism merits the highest respect, admiration, and support of all freedom-loving peoples. I remember that in 1933 the Ukrainians were violently opposed to the recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States, because the Ukrainians know the Soviets best and know what can be expected from them." — "Highlights of Speeches Delivered at the Ukrainian Celebration at Carnegie Hall" — *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 20, October 15, 1950.

abroad. And without exaggeration this spirit is well nigh unmatched. For as the eminent American writer, William Henry Chamberlin, has candidly observed: "No people in Europe have a better fighting anti-communist record than the Ukrainians."<sup>3</sup>

### THE TEN POINTS OF POLICY

The origin and evolution of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America were naturally the result of certain aims, principles, and objectives. But, more important still, the broad development of the Committee itself served to stimulate a deeper perception of the issues which confronted it, and consequently inspired a more definite formulation of the ends to which it has dedicated its resources. I sincerely believe that the composite of these aims, ends, final principles, and objectives, in terms of which the political action of this Committee is rigorously charted, is so imbued with the liberal spirit of the American democratic tradition, both in its peaceable and more vigilant aspects, that no solid ground exists for any serious disagreement with these points of policy by those who passionately value our priceless liberal heritage. The ten points of political policy which guide the action of the Congress Committee, and which necessarily involve a rational application of fundamental democratic principles to the treatment of major Eastern European problems in so far as they stand in real relationship to the paramount American concern for freedom, may be clearly stated in the following order of operational importance:

#### 1. THE DECISIVE DEFEAT OF RUSSIAN COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM

The foremost objective, upon the realization of which all else depends, is the decisive defeat of Russian communist imperialism, a dual phenomenon which in its essence represents the acme of moral and intellectual degradation in the modern world and is fatal to the very cultural foundations of Western Civilization. This fundamental point formally underlies all the other tenets of policy. Furthermore, it implies that the sole effective source of catastrophic peril to world peace is Soviet Russia, regardless of the existence of certain military side-shows involving its satellites. It strongly suggests, too, the necessity of a sound and practical activist position toward exaggerated Soviet power with a natural

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<sup>3</sup> William Henry Chamberlin, "Ukrainian Fighters for Freedom," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. VI, No. 1, Winter, 1950.

view to the eventual eradication of this virulent hotbed of world tension, uncertainty, frustration, and indefinite irresolution which the limited course of mere attainment of comparability or superiority in armed strength is inherently incapable of bringing about. As indicated by the very phrasing of its terms, it denotes also the dichotomous character of the enemy, with a justified emphasis on the imperialist strand.

The conception that it is only communism against which the Western World is struggling is only partially valid, and in a minor degree. The motive force that has dominated Soviet international politics from the immediate post-Revolution period has been the traditional imperialism of the Russian Empire complex, and as opportunity has afforded, it has expressed itself with accelerated intensity. In the historical perspective the early Soviet Russian conquest of Ukraine, Georgia, Turkistan and other self-determined non-Russian states is not a chapter that can be arbitrarily omitted from the bulging record of Soviet Russian aggression. The fact is that the Russian Bolshevik enterprise was baptized in imperialist conquest, and no amount of obscurantist maneuver on the part of a few Russian emigres still steeped in the idolatry of mighty Mother Russia can conceal it. From a comprehensive institutional point of view alone, the frequently held notion that the so-called Soviet "experiment" represented an historical divorce from the shadowy background of Tsarist politics smacks of an historical myopia. Soviet political expediency may decide that the ideological trappings should be maintained for the gullible, the dogmatic, and the pseudo-intellectually obsessed, but, as one of the most encouraging signs of the moment, the continuity of traditional Russian imperialism in the substantial Soviet make-up is being at long last, soundly recognized in all quarters of free world opinion. This factually grounded thesis, which the submerged non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union have vainly endeavored to spread for the past thirty years, is now happily attaining wide circulation. As the able English political writer, Edward Crankshaw, recently put it in one of the finest brief analyses of the Soviet Union: "The most immediate enemy at every showing is Russian imperialism."<sup>4</sup>

## 2. MAINTENANCE OF WORLD-WIDE UKRAINIAN CONTACTS

An additional essential aim of the Congress Committee is the vital maintenance and expansion of its lines of communication with political organizations of Ukrainian background situated in other countries and

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<sup>4</sup> Edward Crankshaw, "The Supreme Fact About the Soviet Union," *The New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 12, 1950.

behind the Iron Curtain of both Europe and the Soviet Far East. Through the agency of the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference, of which it is a member, and through the media of its far-flung contacts with the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) behind the European Iron Curtain, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, the Ukrainian National *Rada* in Western Germany, and numerous other active units in various countries, the Committee comes into possession of the most vital data on developments within the Soviet orbit. Of equal importance, its viewpoints and plans of action, firmly based on the framework of its American orientation, are enormously enriched by its constant exchange of ideas with these strategically placed groups. It is fervently desired for obvious reasons to establish some form of contact with the ten to twelve million Ukrainians settled in well defined Ukrainian areas throughout Soviet Asia from the Urals to the Pacific, called "Gray Ukraine" in North Kazakhstan, "Green Ukraine" in the Far East.

This valuable network of communication enables the Committee to impart advance information which it deems to be of crucial importance to the work of certain governmental agencies and of associate anti-communist organizations in this country. Moreover, it facilitates an easy assessment of the inadequacies of many operations, notably in the fields of propaganda and intelligence, and explains much of the constructive criticism made by the Committee before investigating Congressional committees and interested responsible authorities. Of no minor significance, this wide base of information affords also a solid check on some of the fantastic claims and brazen misrepresentations concocted by irresponsible alien agents seeking American aid for an alleged underground movement. Thus the extension of this network and the intensification of the co-operative activity characterizing it cannot but be of paramount concern to this Committee, so that certain fundamental truths about Soviet Russian Communism may gain currency in the leadership of all Western nations, as was so well typified recently by the important utterance of Prime Minister Attlee of Great Britain: "The present rulers of Russia are the inheritors of Russian imperialism."<sup>6</sup>

### 3. POLITICAL COORDINATION WITH OTHER AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN BACKGROUND

In the considered judgment of the Congress Committee there is a pressing need in the American anti-communist crusade for an overall coordination of the political activities of the several activist American

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<sup>6</sup> *The New York Times*, January 26, 1951.

organizations of Central and East European background. A rich amassing of knowledge and data, the formation of a powerful bloc of representation amounting to about ten million Americans, and the concentration of effort on major issues pertaining to Soviet-American relations would be the impressive results of such an effective coordination. It requires minimal foresight and wisdom to envision the immense value of such a concerted effort in these troubled times, particularly since the ideological bases of these American groups are substantially identical. The glowing opportunities of serving as an infinitely important source of information and thought to our government agencies, of exerting a corrective influence on misguided plans of action, and of having its pooled views adequately represented in appropriate quarters have in the main inspired every reasonable gesture by this Committee to revivify and intensify the operations of the Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent, in which it sees brilliantly reflected the federative ideal for the Europe of tomorrow and the cooperative underground action of its anti-communist kinsmen abroad today.

This cosmopolitan outlook, expressed by a vigorous concern for all the enslaved peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, has been consistently upheld by the Committee, in its publications, notably *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, and in its manifold representations. It was amply manifested in the participation of the Committee in the Senate hearings on the Genocide Convention in February, 1950, the testimony of which Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut called a "magnificent presentation of the evidences of the diabolical extermination of millions of Ukrainians by the Kremlin..."<sup>6</sup> It was demonstrated again in the testimony of the Committee on the Wherry Resolution before the joint Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, which received this time the commendations of Senators Knowland, Wiley, Smith, and Connally, who acted as Chairman of the joint hearings.<sup>7</sup>

#### 4. ADVANCEMENT OF THE POTENT IDEA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

One of the basic convictions of the Congress Committee is that victory over Soviet Russian imperialism can never be attained merely by pursuing the passive policy of containment which serves to insure Soviet initiative

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<sup>6</sup> *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, October 15, 1950, Vol. III., No. 20, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Report by William Knighton, Jr., *The Baltimore Sun*, February 21, 1951, pp. 1, 5.

in all spheres of activity and logically entails the *reductio ad absurdum* of a suspended animation in the current struggle. With an appreciative understanding of the disequilibrative dynamism of historical development and an earnest desire that every practicable means be exploited to avert a third world war, the Committee has fully supported the potent and fearless idea of psychological warfare aimed especially at the intrinsic weakness of the pseudo-monolithic Soviet State.

The chief weakness that has been in effect completely overlooked by the agencies ostensibly directing the American ideological offensive is the multi-national composition of the Soviet Union and the predominant aspiration of the non-Russian peoples for freedom from the Soviet Russian imperialist yoke. It is most significant that when, as a result of the determined efforts of this Committee, a Ukrainian section was created in the "Voice of America" in November, 1949, the sensitive Kremlin plotters immediately began to tender bribes to the Ukrainian populace in the form of a new "Ukrainian" anthem, a flag and emblem of state, a pumped flow of scarce consumer goods, and the establishment of a Ukrainian War Ministry. Obviously the Soviets understand the import of their own frailties, if our political managers do not. In his intelligent comments on the exchange of letters between this Committee and the "Voice of America," the widely respected Mr. David Lawrence well emphasized the glaring inefficacy of VOA in making genuine appeals to the peoples of the Soviet Union, falling far short of what most people assume—"that the main objective of the broadcasts was to create inside the Soviet Union a feeling of antipathy toward international Communism, which, of course, nowadays is indistinguishable from internal Communism."<sup>8</sup> Heartening indeed is the constructive endeavor being made by Senator William Benton, who recently delivered on the floor of the Senate an outstanding statement on the independence of Ukraine, to overcome these inexcusable shortcomings in our freedom offensive against world-wide Soviet Russian imperialism.<sup>9</sup>

## 5. UNSTINTING AID TO THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA)

The fifth major point of policy in the work of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America is the obtaining of every measure of unstinting American aid for the underground Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),

<sup>8</sup> Syndicated column of October 4, 1950.

<sup>9</sup> "Senator Benton Commemorates Independence of Ukraine in Senate" — *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol. IV., No. 4, February 15, 1951, p. 1.

which is generally conceded to be in the vanguard of anti-communist resistance behind the Iron Curtain. With an inimitable record of gallant resistance against the Nazis and now the Communists since 1943, the UPA, whose composition is equally divided between Eastern and Western Ukrainians, carries on from its terrain-conditioned headquarters in the Carpathian Mountains sporadic guerilla warfare against Soviet MVD and MGB troops, infiltrates the fertile multi-national Red Army, foments peasant resistance to collectivization plans, distributes masses of anti-Soviet propaganda stamped with the Trident, the centuries-old emblem of the Ukrainian national state, collaborates intimately with the known Slovak, Lithuanian, Polish resistance systems, and attempts even to stimulate overt Russian underground resistance.

That this indomitable ally of Western freedom can serve not only the prayerful hopes of the subjugated peoples of Central and Eastern Europe for freedom from the scourge of Soviet Russian imperialism but also the freedom of America has been widely recognized. As the wise Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey observed in his comments on this Committee's statement honoring the tragic loss of the valiant UPA leader, General Taras Chuprynka: "The people of America and the peoples of the free nations... cannot but be inspired by the heroism of these fighters for freedom behind the Iron Curtain..."<sup>10</sup> Senator Irving M. Ives of New York has strongly urged that "the Ukrainian resistance against tyranny and the fight for freedom must be supported."<sup>11</sup> And the brilliant political writer, Professor James Burnham, who joined Senators Ives and Lehman in the program at Carnegie Hall, shared equally in their sentiments that "to keep even precariously alive a small detachment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is an unalloyed victory."<sup>12</sup>

## 6. ABEYANCE OF TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS IN TIME OF PERIL

Basic in the deliberations of this Committee is the prudent suspension of all relatively petty concern for territorial and cognate problems which sheer political sagacity dictates as insignificant in the face of the common, colossal peril and which theoretically may remain so in the happy event of the elimination of the common enemy and of the just political rearrangement of Europe. In quick answer to certain inaccurate and injudicious utterances made in October, 1950, by a military leader

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<sup>10</sup> The Congressional Record, January 17, 1951.

<sup>11</sup> "Highlights of Speeches Delivered at the Ukrainian Celebration at Carnegie Hall," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 20, October 15, 1950, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Author of the penetrating work, "*The Coming Defeat of Communism*."

of an enslaved East European nation, the Committee emphasized that "Today it is a grave error on your part, by such a statement, to play into the hands of the Soviet Russian misrulers of Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and other countries..."<sup>13</sup> There is every reason to believe that the goodwill animating an anti-communist comradeship in arms and the hopes of the new Europe of tomorrow will insure the just and democratic disposition of such problems in accordance with the principles of self-determination.

## 7. REJECTION OF COMMON GUILT OF THE RUSSIAN MASSES

In no uncertain terms the Committee's course of action is directed by a scrupulous observance, blessed with a vivid sense of Christian charity and compassion, of the well grounded distinction between an historically undemocratic Russian political leadership, now in the form of Soviet Communism, and the perennially victimized Russian common masses, so that no barbarous conception of common guilt can be countenanced with dire and unjust consequences and that adequate opportunity can be afforded for the materialization of effective Russian resistance, much in the manner sought for by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.<sup>14</sup>

Adhering to its solid democratic and genuinely American position, the Committee scrupulously abstains from any relations with outmoded and irresponsible Russian political emigres for whom the conservation of the Russian territorial empire appears in reality to be more important than the defeat of Soviet Russian Communism, and with much basis of fact regards the willful misrepresentations of these self-appointed reactionary political exponents as pernicious to the true cause of democratic Russian freedom, not to mention the respective freedoms of the non-Russian peoples who constitute one-half of the Soviet population. Spurious theses, circulated by them, as the current one that any aid given to the submerged non-Russian peoples will alienate the Russian people, not only falsely imply that the rank-and-file Russian is actually moved by imperialistic motives but also illiberally call for America to compromise its democratic faith in the struggle for freedom on the part of these heroic East European peoples. Violently imperialist Russian nationalists, who scarcely understand the meaning of democracy, may be passed over for what they are worth. But for those emigres who pretend to subscribe

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<sup>13</sup> "General Anders Criticized by Ukrainian Congress Committee," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 21, November 1, 1950, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>14</sup> "Ukrainian Resistance and Russian People," by O. Hornovy, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. VI, 4.



to the democratic ideal, the true admonition of a subsequently chauvinist Lenin is unfortunately in greater part still applicable, that "any Russian socialist who refuses to recognize the freedom of Finland and Ukraine is bound to degenerate into a chauvinist..."

## 8. THE NECESSARY DISMEMBERMENT OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE

The next logical objective in this operational context of enunciated policy is the necessary dismemberment of the Soviet Empire on the momentous occasion of the dissolution of imperialist Soviet Russian Communism. The Committee maintains that this indispensable objective can be justly and systematically realized and that reorganization on a true ethnographic basis will result in the permanent extirpation of the elite Russian imperialist mania, the swift accommodation of the principle of self-determination, and the institutional guarantee of everlasting world peace. The political system resulting from Russian military dominance in Eastern Europe has always been and continues to be unnaturally founded on force, fraud, and fear. Our former President Herbert Hoover has well observed that "Since Peter the Great they steadily have expanded their reach of empire over the largest land mass in the world. Their method was of a burglar going down a hall."<sup>15</sup> It was no doubt with this in mind that General Walter Bedell Smith wrote, "communism today is great Russianism." Plainly no amount of deceptive semantics on "separatism" can obscure the heterogeneous entity built over the centuries by the predatory exploits of traditional Russian imperialism. Today the burglarized Ukrainians, Balts, Georgians, Poles and others seek restitution in their unyielding struggle for freedom.

## 9. SELF-DETERMINATION, THE IDEOLOGICAL ATOM BOMB

Of the utmost importance in the democratic policy of this Committee is the sincere conviction that the liberal tradition of our country equips it with a power far greater in explosiveness, radius and repercussion than does the mere possession of the physical atom bomb. In the liberal principle of self-determination, expressly upheld for systematic application to all peoples, especially those in the Soviet Union, the United States has the unique possession of an ideological atom bomb, one that the Soviet Union cannot even begin to rival. Far-seeing political leaders of the

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<sup>15</sup> "Meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, New York, -- April 27, 1950.

stature of President Harold E. Stassen of the University of Pennsylvania recognize fully this potent truth, as evidenced by his recent policy proposal calling for "The establishment of separate national sovereignty and true independence of Ukraine, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary."<sup>16</sup>

Our advocacy of the natural political right of self-determination for the Ukrainian nation of 45 million people, as well as for the Baltic, Slovak, Georgian, Byelorussian and other prominent national organisms, is supported by incontrovertible historical evidence in addition to the basic principle at stake. The course of the historical events in Ukraine, such as the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918, the Titoist upsurge in Eastern Ukraine in the 20's, the creation of independent Carpatho-Ukraine in 1938, the declarations of independence both in Lviv and Kiev at the outbreak of the Red-Nazi conflict in 1941, the mass surrenders of Soviet Ukrainian troops to fight the Soviet Russians in 1941-2, and the Ukrainian underground of today extending in one form or another to all corners of Ukraine, furnish overwhelming evidence of the all-embracing passion for self-determined freedom on the part of the entire Ukrainian people. It is the sense of this liberal, democratic Committee that it is for the Ukrainian people themselves, living, fighting, and dying on Ukrainian soil, to determine their own reasonable destiny, without coercion or duress exerted by any foreign conspirators. By their mute silence or arrogant denial of the forthright application of this fundamental principle, the enemies of Ukraine and of similar nations—and of the ideal of democracy itself—can be easily discerned.

This Committee urges that victory over Soviet Russian imperialism cannot be achieved by the naked power of might alone, but necessitates also a spirited dedication to the surpassing power of right expressed in just aims and objectives now. Without the latter, any peace will have been tragically lost again, as after the two World Wars of this century. A revolutionary global policy of justice toward all peoples is demanded, and they will be undyingly grateful to us. The recent concern of this Committee in Korean freedom and self-determination met with the warmest response in the reply of the Honorable John M. Chang, that "we are likewise grateful for the support of such groups as the Ukrainian Con-

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<sup>16</sup> "Victory Without War"—*Round The World Report*—address over A. B. C., Washington, D. C., January 15, 1951, p. 8.

gress Committee of America, for we know that it represents people who have suffered—as we are suffering—at the hands of lawless and brutal forces.”<sup>17</sup>

## 10. THE GRADUAL FEDERATION OF EUROPE

Historically attuned to the political, economic, and technologic necessities of our century, the final major tenet of policy guiding the work of this Committee is the advancement of a scheme for the gradual federation of Europe. As we understand it, the satisfaction of this historical necessity is long overdue, and the mode of its effectuation, in the interest of expedient execution, should take the immediate form of a concurrent federalization of Western Europe and of Central and Eastern Europe, succeeded in time by a union of these federated areas to bring about the positive political and economic integration of all the peoples of Europe in an overall federated Europe and thus in the organic unity of European Society.

It is of singular importance that this idea of gradual federation has found manifest acceptance in the underground councils of Central and East European leadership, in the multinational membership of the already mentioned ABN, and among American organizations of Central and East European descent. It is widely recognized in enlightened and progressive circles that only by such a systematic course of political arrangement can the necessities of the present moment be satisfactorily met and the rich diversity of cultural interest and attainments of the numerous national elements be preserved and advanced. For Ukraine, culturally as a traditional Western nation, it would surely inaugurate a vibrant and prolific epoch of cultural and intellectual renaissance, and place its rich material resources at the peaceable disposal of all the peoples of Europe in a common endeavor toward greater spiritual and material prosperity.

## OUR CRUSADE OF TRUTH FOR FREEDOM

In conclusion, the essential keynote of this concise policy statement is that the political action of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America reduces itself basically to a crusade of truth for freedom. Genuine freedom presupposes truth, for freedom without truth is a mirage. The nurturing of true feelings of freedom among the oppressed peoples of

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<sup>17</sup> “White House, Korean Ambassador Thanks Ukrainians for Support,” *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 15, August 1, 1950, p. 1.

Central and Eastern Europe presupposes a true understanding of their respective history, their current struggle, their cherished and sustaining hopes. It is toward this sympathetic understanding on the part of our fellow Americans that the special labors of this Committee are primarily directed. It is with this purpose that the Congress Committee concludes alliances in thought and interest with all peoples opposed to Soviet Russian imperialism, in the Far East as well as in Europe. In short, the broad target of our crusade is the whole, untarnished truth for the continued freedom of our America and the regained freedom of all peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and of Asia. In this effort, we shall endeavor to remain deserving of the recognition and the many commendations given the work of this Committee.<sup>18</sup>

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#### **WHERE'S THAT REMBRANDT?**

In the first days of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine in 1939, all artists were required to enlist in the professional painters' unions and bring specimens of their work to the Soviet secretaries of the local unions.

In one out of the way provincial town, boasting a handful of artists, a girl student brought as specimens of her work portraits of the communist leaders done in charcoal on paper.

"But, comrade," he protested, "how can you make portraits of the great Bolshevik leaders in charcoal?.. They should be painted with the best colors on the best canvas!"

The frightened student tried to defend herself:

"Rembrandt also did portraits in charcoal," she pleaded.

"Who, — Rembrandt,?" asked the secretary, taken by surprise. — "And why don't I have him on my list?"

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<sup>18</sup> "Message of Governor Thomas E. Dewey, October 1, 1950, *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 20, October 15, 1950.

# **THE UKRAINIANS OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC**

*By V. CHAPLENKO*

There is a general opinion in the world that after Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine, and the Ukrainian regions in eastern Romania were united with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, a member of the Soviet Union, all the lands, that are mainly inhabited by Ukrainians, became part of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. This is not the truth. There are extensive territories bordering on the Ukrainian Soviet Republic on the east with Ukrainian majorities which were not included in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic but were annexed by the Russian Soviet Republic, which has subjected them to a well-planned system of Russification. Furthermore, there are very large districts with Ukrainian majorities in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union which do not enjoy even the rights of the autonomous districts for they have no right to cherish and cultivate the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian cultural heritage.


To the former group belong the southern districts of the Kursk and Voronizh regions, the western districts of the territory of the Don Cossacks, the Stavropol district, and the land of the Terek Cossacks in the North Caucasus. A Ukrainian majority also exists along the Kuban river.

The districts with Ukrainian majorities which have no direct contact with the Ukrainian ethnic territory in Europe lie to the east of the lower course of the Volga, in the northern part of Turkestan, and in the Far East, the so-called "Zeleny Klyn" (The Green Wedge), around the well-known port of Vladivostok.

## **UKRAINIAN COLONIZATION TO THE EAST**

The eastern region of the Ukrainian territory, included in the Russian Soviet Republic, was colonized by the Ukrainians in the age-long expansion of the Ukrainian settlers to the east. History mentions three main waves of Ukrainian colonization in this direction. The first was in the seventeenth century. The Ukrainians settled the north-eastern part of Kharkiv and the adjacent districts of Kursk and Voronizh,

which belong now to the Russian Soviet Republic. This is the so-called "Slobidska Ukraina" (The Ukraine of the Free Settlers). This was colonized by the Ukrainians partly before the Revolution of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648), partly during the revolutionary war against Poland, and in part after Khmelnytsky's wars, during the struggle between Russia (Moscovia) and Poland over Ukraine. The Ukrainian settlers of these regions were organized into military units and were used to defend the eastern borderland of Moscovia against the Tartar incursions.



*..Ukrainian Population out of the Eastern border of the Ukrainian SSR...*

1. Adyge Aut. Territory. — 2. Cherkess Aut. Territory. — 3. North Ossetia Aut. SSR.

The second wave of Ukrainian colonization extended to the North Caucasus. It started towards the end of the XVIIIth century, with the settlement in the Kuban region, of the former Zaporozhian Kozaks, who were then known (1792-1793) as the Army of the Black Sea. When the Kozaks of the Black Sea became "a living fence," as was then said, along the river Kuban against the Cherkassians and the Caucasian highlanders, the Ukrainian settlers began to settle in greater number.

The third wave of the Ukrainian colonization to the east began in the second half of the XIX century and assumed great proportions at the beginning of our century. It consisted mainly of the small landed peasants from the overpopulated central regions of Ukraine. It was partly a planned movement, directed by the Russian government, in order to populate the Russian possessions in Asia, but it coincided with the emigration of the Ukrainians to the still unsettled regions in Central Asia, in Siberia, and in the Far East, to escape from their poverty at home.

#### SETTLEMENT OF THE UKRAINIANS IN THE RUSSIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

It is impossible to state definitely how many Ukrainians there are in the Russian SFSR because of the unreliability of the Soviet census statistics. The census takers in 1926 were definitely instructed to give the questioned person's racial status, not only on the basis of his answers, but also on the basis of actual data about his racial origin. But there was a general tendency to classify all the non-Turkic people of the USSR, that is, all such Slavic peoples as the Russians, Ukrainians, and White Ruthenians simply as "Russkiye" (the Russians). But we find less reliable data in the census of 1937-1939, for at this period everything that could be labelled Ukrainian was put under a ban (1933) in the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and so almost all the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians were recorded simply as Russians. Thus within the span of ten years the number of Russians increased by twenty million and this increases the number of the Russians in the USSR to ninety nine millions. For this reason we still have to use as a basis the more reliable data of 1926 in order to get approximate estimates of the Ukrainians outside the Ukr. SSR. Eight million persons were recorded in 1926 as such Ukrainians with three million of these north of the Caucasus. Today the number, especially in Asiatic Russia, must have increased considerably because of events in Ukraine after 1930.

According to the geographer V. Kubijowycz the Ukrainians constitute 64.2% of the population in Eastern part of Slobidska Ukraine (East of Kharkiv), 76,8% in the Don region, and 63,8% in the North Caucasus.<sup>1</sup>

## THE UKRAINIANS BETWEEN THE VOLGA AND PACIFIC OCEAN<sup>2</sup>

To the east of the Volga the Ukrainian population is scattered in a broad strip which extends eastward from the middle course of the Volga to the river of Verkhnya (Upper) Tunguska. This strip includes the southern Siberian and north Kazakh steppes. Taking into account the enormous expanses and the character of the distribution of the Ukrainian population we can divide it into three smaller areas.

The westernmost of these embraces the land between the middle course of the Volga and the line Zlatoust-Chkalov (Orenburg). On this road to Asia in 1926 there lived 415,000 Ukrainians (8.5%). There are no great concentrations here of Ukrainians with the exception of the Mikolayevsk district on the Volga, a few other regions on the Volga and southeast of Uralsk. Nevertheless the line Mykolayevsk-Chkalov forms a narrow strip with more than 10% of a Ukrainian population, which is really on the path to the Kazakh-Siberian steppes.


East of this Volga-Uralsk area and east of Chkalov the percentage of Ukrainian grows as we see from Map 2. The strip settled by a Ukrainian population, narrow around Orsk and Aktyubinsk, broadens out as we go to the east. It includes the territory around Orsk and Aktyubinsk, the upper course of the river Tobol, the upper course of the River Ishim, the middle course of the river Irtysh and in general along the river Ob. This region covers some 240,000 square miles (the Ukrainian ethnographic territory in Europe is of around 300,000 square miles). Here in 1926 lived a population of 2,598,508, of which 914,037 (35.2%) were Ukrainians, 757,385 (29.2%) were Russians, 746,901 (28.8) were Kazakhs, and 180,185 (6.8%) were of other stocks. As we see from the figures, this is the greatest concentration of Ukrainians outside of the limits of the Ukrainian European national territory and the area might well be called the Ukrainian strip. Yet in the north, south and east of it the Ukrainian population forms a minority.

To the north and extending to the Siberian tayga and to the east from Slavgorod to the Khakas Autonomous Territory there lived 620,903 Ukrainians and in the border of the southern steppes from Aktyubinsk to

<sup>1</sup> Geography of Ukraine and the Neighboring Lands, Cracow-Lviv 1943, p. 31 sq. (In Ukrainian). See Map. I.

<sup>2</sup> This section of the article is written by M. Kulycky, author of both maps.





*Ukrainians between Volga and Pacific Ocean*

1. Russian SFSR. — 2. Karelo-Finnish SSR. — 3. Kazakh SSR. — 4. Kirghiz SSR. — 5. Tadzhik SSR. — 6. Turkmen SSR. — 7. Uzbek SSR. — 8. Bashkir ASSR. — 9. Buryat-Mongol ASSR. — 10. Chuvash ASSR. — 11. Karakalpak ASSR. — 12. Komi ASSR. — 13. Mari ASSR. — 14. Mordvin ASSR. — 15. Tatar ASSR. — 16. Udmurt ASSR. — 17. Yakut ASSR. — 18. Jewish Aut. Territory. — 19. Khakas A. T. — 20. Oyrat A. T. — 21. Tannu-Tuva A. T., annexed to RSFSR after World War II. — 22. Upper Badkhanan A. T.

the Oyrat Autonomous Territory lived 84,027 Ukrainians. In these two border regions the Ukrainian population lives only in oases in the steppe, in the southern among the Kazakhs and in the north Siberian border among the Russians.

Besides this in the region of Krasnoyarsk, we see the last strip with a Ukrainian population east of Lake Baikal, that of Chulym-Angara. There was here a Ukrainian population of 103,450, but it was still a minority.

To the south of the Akmolynsk-Slavgorod territory to the east and south and southwest of Lake Baikal we see from map 2 also a concentration of a Ukrainian population on the south Turkestan territory. Here the Ukrainian population is never in the majority but yet it shows a tendency to be concentrated on the borders of south eastern Kazakhstan, eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang) and the Kirghiz SSR. Beyond this strip there is also a Ukrainian population scattered along the boundaries of Iran and Afghanistan (Stara Poltavka) on the Afghanistan border. In these south Turkestan lands beyond Lake Balkash and the Sea of Aral in 1926 there lived 230,242 Ukrainians. We notice also that there are several regions around Frunze and Auliye-Ata and Mirzoyan where the Ukrainians are in the majority.

Thus we see that in 1926 between the Volga, Lake Baikal and the southern borders of the USSR there were according to the census of that year 1,852,659 Ukrainians, of whom more than half, 914,037, were on the territory of southern Kazakhstan, where the Ukrainians form a significant majority, and this area is dotted with the names of settlements brought from Ukraine as Poltavka, Kievka, etc. This was the situation revealed by the Soviet census of 1926 but it is well known that between 1926 and 1939 millions of the Ukrainian population, especially the so-called kulaks, were transported from their homes and settled in the region between the middle Volga and Lake Baikal, and so we must assume that in this region the number of areas with a Ukrainian majority in the population has increased.

According to Ivan Svit, a resident of the Soviet Pacific Far East territory and author, the Ukrainian population in the Amur region, North of Vladivostok, in the so-called Green Ukraine (Zelena Ukraina) constitutes around 80% of the total population.<sup>4</sup> The 1926 year census shows this relative majority of a Ukrainian population condensed in several islands where it forms the absolute majority of the total population.

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<sup>4</sup> The Green Ukraine (Zelena Ukraina), New York 1949, p. 5. (In Ukrainian).

**CULTURAL LIFE AND CUSTOMS OF UKRAINIANS IN THE USSR.**

It is very interesting to note that there are no zones of mixed population or language along the ethnic boundaries between the Ukrainians and the Russians. Both these two ethnic groups retain their own ways of life, their languages and their spiritual differences. An English traveller, E. D. Clarke, noted this fact in his book "Russia, Tartary and Turkey", published in London in 1811. He states that the Ukrainians of the Voronizh district are entirely different from the population of the rest of Russia. The Ukrainians are of a more noble race, and they are of stockier build and are better looking than the Russians. They are cleaner, more diligent, more honest, braver, more hospitable, and less superstitious. "...One can notice the difference between these two peoples without any questioning." A Ukrainian writer A. Zhyvotko,<sup>6</sup> who was born in the district of Voronizh, has this to say about the same differences between Russians and Ukrainians: "There was always much activity in commerce and trade between them. But in most cases they never went any further. During a period of many years it was hard to notice any intimate dealings between them. Such intercourse was not possible due to the distinct differences in the ways of life between them, in their cultural heritage and in their traditions. Especially there were almost no cases of intermarriage. 'She is a nice girl, but... Russian' " — was a common expression from a Ukrainian young man."

The author of this article has noted in Central Asia (in Kazakhstan) and in the North Caucasus that there are no cases of intermarriage between the Ukrainians and the Russians even when they live side by side in the same village. Even single Ukrainian or Russian families which settle among the people of different racial origin do not become readily assimilated. Thus a Russian family living in the Ukrainian village of Kolodyazne, in the Akmolinsk district of Kazakhstan, for instance, had to move from there because of their inability to adapt themselves to the Ukrainian way of life. Of course, there were also cases of Ukrainian families unable to adapt themselves to the way of life in the Russian villages.

Many historical facts from the life of the Ukrainians beyond the contemporary political borders of Ukraine show that not only the Ukrainians of the districts which border on Ukraine from the east, and the regions of the Don and the North Caucasus, but also the Ukrainians of such remote regions as Central Asia and the Far East feel them-

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<sup>6</sup> *Podon*, Prague 1943, p. 18. (In Ukrainian).

selves bound with such Ukrainian cultural and political centres as Kharkiv, Kiev and Lviv. This was especially noticeable during the period of the modern Ukrainian renaissance which began at the close of the XVIIIth century.

Even the very first works of the modern Ukrainian literature, especially the famous travesty of the Aeneid by Ivan Kotlyarevsky, were quite popular among these far-away Ukrainians. One could find such books until recent times, for instance, in the libraries of such cities as Krasnodar, Stavropil, etc. We must also emphasize the fact that all these distant places produced many Ukrainian cultural leaders, not only of local note, but also of all-Ukrainian significance.

Mykola Kostomariv, a historian and intellectual leader of the Ukrainian renaissance period in the XIX century, was born in the district of Ostroh (in the Voronizh region). J. Kukhareno, general of the Army of the Kuban, was a very close friend of Taras Shevchenko, the greatest writer of the Ukrainian renaissance. It is worth mentioning that even during the second half of the XIXth century, when all Ukrainian activities were put under a ban in Ukraine proper, there was considerable Ukrainian cultural activity in the Kuban region.

#### POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF UKRAINIANS IN THE RUSSIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC

Under the influence of the revolutionary movement of 1917-1920 these Ukrainians showed how well they understood their Ukrainian obligations. In all the Ukrainian settlements the people began to organize Ukrainian Clubs, establish publishing houses, and even create military formations for the defense of the young Ukrainian State. Furthermore, a new State was formed in the Kuban region, with most of the Ukrainian attributes, and this tried to form some kind of a union with the Ukrainian State. The county assembly and the peasant conference of the district of Ostroh passed in 1918 a resolution, recognizing the authority of the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council) and to have their district united with the Ukrainian National Republic. Mr. Olshansky, a peasant, was elected as a representative of this district; later, in 1918, he was killed by the Communists in his native village.

Very valuable information about the Ukrainian activity in the Far East is given in the pamphlet "Green Ukraine" by I. Svit. In the Far East the local Ukrainians also created in 1917 a governmental body, the Ukrainian Secretariat of the Far East, at the request of the people's

conferences. In the program for the fifth conference of the delegates from Green Ukraine there was a proposal that the Far East Country should be proclaimed as a Ukrainian State unit, with the status of a Ukrainian colony on the Pacific Ocean. But the conference itself never took place due to the Bolshevik occupation of the Far East.

What the people of the Far East thought at the time can be best understood from the following statement which we find in the local newspaper "Shchyre Slovo" (A Word of Sincerity), No. 29, of July 17, 1919: "The people's delegates have already declared several times at their conferences that they are not going to let their sons serve in a foreign (Russian) army. If there is a real need to have an army in the Far East, then it should be a Ukrainian army." At the Bolshevik trial in the city of Chita in 1923 of the Ukrainian patriots of the region a sentence was passed, condemning the accused to death. Later the sentences were commuted to ten years of imprisonment.

### CULTURAL FREEDOM AND RUSSIFICATION

In the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" — the Communists proclaimed the right for all the racial and ethnic groups to act and develop in freedom. However, as there was a need of attaining a higher degree of peace among the masses of the people excited by the revolution, Moscow was in time forced to make some concessions to the Ukrainians outside of Ukraine.

In the mid-twenties the Bolsheviks conceded to the Ukrainians of the Russian SFSR the right of "Ukrainization," that is, they allowed them to resume their cultural activities. This was the reason why it was quite natural then to hear from the official Soviet representatives such declarations as the one delivered in 1926 by Bazarnyk, secretary of the Communist Party organization of the North Caucasus: "The people of the Kuban region are Ukrainians. Their present speech is based on the Ukrainian language, which is here the primary, fundamental language, while the Russian language is the imported one. This statement denotes our policy." (Quoted from "The Red Banner" of May 3, 1926). The process of Ukrainization among the Ukrainians in the Russian SFSR was aided by M. Skrypnyk, the then commissar of education in Ukraine, who, as a Communist of long standing had a considerable influence even in Moscow. It will be of some interest to recall one incident from this period of Moscow's policy toward Ukrainization. We have in mind the Kremlin reception for the Ukrainian cultural leaders and their subsequent conversation with Stalin about the Ukrainian districts in the Russian SFSR.

The reception was arranged by L. Kaganovich who was formerly the secretary-general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolshevist) of Ukraine. The Ukrainian group at the reception consisted of more than thirty Ukrainian authors, actors, and painters, (such as O. Desnyak, V. Polishchuk, V. Antonenko-Davydovych, O. Dovzhenko, and others). The group was first received by Kaganovich. Later Stalin entered the reception hall, through the back door, at first unnoticed. After the guests had given Stalin a stormy ovation (which is a custom down there), he took part in the discussions on Ukrainian cultural development. In the discussions Western Ukraine then under Poland and its cultural life were mentioned, too. When Ivan Franko was mentioned, Stalin jestingly enquired: "Tell me, have Franko's works been translated yet into Ukrainian?" — O. Desnyak, who, perhaps, was the leader of the group, vehemently denied that there was such a need, as the works of the western Ukrainian authors were well understood by the eastern Ukrainians without the help of translation. As the talk turned to the status of the Ukrainians in the USSR, V. Polishchuk asked Stalin why the Ukrainian districts bordering on Ukraine had not yet been united to it. Stalin answered: "The Russians might feel wronged by such an act. However, the boundaries are of no importance to us." — By that he meant that the Ukrainians were free to develop their culture also beyond the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR.

After this reception the process of Ukrainization went on freely throughout the Russian SFSR. Wherever there were more or less compact masses of Ukrainians living together, up to the Far East, Ukrainian schools were established in villages, the reading halls for the grown people were Ukrainized, the pedagogical institutes at Krasnodar, the capital of the Kuban Region, established Ukrainian departments and a Ukrainian Workingmen's Faculty. A pedagogical technical school was established at the Poltava post in the Kuban region, a Ukrainian department was also established at the pedagogical institute at Voronizh, a Ukrainian pedagogical technical school was opened at Stavropol, and Ukrainian Workingmen's Faculties at Rososh and Pavlovsk. Ukrainian newspapers were established.

The village correspondents began to discuss and talk through the newspapers of the rights of the Ukrainians to develop their own culture in these parts of the Ukrainian ethnic territories. Such correspondents quite often fought very bitter newspaper duels with the local Russian chauvinists.

However, the Russians became perturbed by the cultural progress of the Ukrainians and began to feel "being wronged". *All of a sudden in the middle of the 1932-1933 school year the Ukrainization activity was stopped in the Russian SFSR.* In December, 1932 a secret instruction, signed by Stalin and Molotov, was sent out, saying: "Ukrainization activity has to be stopped, its management disbanded, and the Ukrainian offenders punished." In consequence, everything came to a standstill: Ukrainian schools had to teach in Russian, the publication of the Ukrainian newspapers was stopped, and Ukrainian departments in the libraries were suppressed. The so-called "offenders" were either arrested or ran away in search of safety.

No such absolute ban on Ukrainian activities was ever put into effect even by the tsarist regime. In the Kuban region, for instance, during the tsarist regime from time to time Ukrainian books were published and the local people received permission to hold Ukrainian social evenings and concerts, but after the secret instruction. Even the traditional Shevchenko celebrations had to be "forgotten". Ukrainians in the Russian SFSR were forbidden even to subscribe to any Ukrainian newspapers, such as "The Communist" or any others which were published in the Ukrainian SSR. Those pedagogical institutes which had formerly had Ukrainian departments were allowed to teach one of the following Slavic languages: Polish, Serb or Czech, but were strictly forbidden to teach Ukrainian, the local language.

A very typical incident took place in 1938 at the conference of dialectologists, arranged by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, at Rostov on the Don. A series of papers on the local dialects were to be read by the representatives from the district pedagogical institutes. One of these was to be given by an assistant professor B. of the Krasnodar pedagogical institute. Prof. B. was at a loss how to classify such local dialects. From the purely scientific point of view they could not be called Russian, and yet they could not be called Ukrainian, as the term "Ukrainian" was under a ban. This problem was referred to the Local Committee of the Communist Party and the conference was "advised" to drop the lecture.

*The result of the 1932 ban was that millions of Ukrainians within the Russian SFSR were spiritually buried alive, together with their own national culture and language.* They were not allowed even to list themselves Ukrainians. This was why the Ukrainians of the RSFSR were recorded simply as Russians in the census of 1937-1939.

## BOOK REVIEWS

THE NEW SOVIET EMPIRE, by David J. Dallin. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951. VI—215 pp. \$3.75.

This book, it appears to the present reviewer, need never have been written. A statement on the dust jacket boasts that "much of the information (herein contained) has never appeared in print before." This may be so. Precisely the figures given here, the exact information given (nearly all, by the way, unsubstantiated by such citation of authorities as we look for in a University Press publication) may never have been stated just this way in print before, but other facts and figures of similar nature have appeared, and anyone who keeps abreast of the times through the newspapers and weeklies, anyone, we may add, who besides this has read Masha Fischer's authoritative and revealing novel *The Nazaroffs*, will find little that is new in Mr. Dallin's latest work. It would seem that Yale University Press is trying in this venture to capitalize on the prestige enjoyed by the author on the basis of earlier works which, in contrast to this, offered genuinely new information and presented an arresting point of view.

It is well that we have the present volume however, if not for the information it contains, then for its warning. For warning there is here, not stated but implied: a warning as to what we may expect if the end desired by Mr. Dallin comes to pass and the present political system in the Soviet Empire collapses.

That the hoped-for collapse may occur, Mr. Dallin foresees as possible, provided the West will, as he says, ally itself with the "Russian people." Only the latter can break the present tyranny. No one from without will avail, for no one from without can ever conquer Russia. The fact has been demonstrated twice within a little over a century, and demonstrated so overwhelmingly as to discourage a third gambler from ever hazarding the enterprise.

As may be gathered from his title, Mr. Dallin sees the Russian bear again on the march: the Soviets taking up the old mission of the Tsars, assuming the burden of carrying to fulfillment the ancient "civilizing" mission of the Russians, the time-hallowed "Moscow the Third Rome" idea. Slogans left over from White Tsars are being invoked to make the present tyranny endurable to the Russian masses, and even worth sacrificing for.

To the author, collapse of the political system prevailing in Eastern Europe and beyond (Eurasia) is, as we have said, wholly desirable. With this we are, of course, in heartiest agreement. Mr. Dallin and the reader see, thus far, eye to eye. When, however, we find him speaking of Russia's "natural limits," as he does early in the book (p. 10), and when no condemnation of old Russia for its age-old drive to reach those limits is to be found anywhere in the book, no repudiation of Russia's swallowing up of western peoples, the reader begins to wonder whether it would do the masses of enslaved East Europeans any good at all, were the present regime to tumble. Would these peoples not still be considered by Mr. Dallin and



his school as belonging within the "natural limits" of the new Russia, as they were of both Tsarist and Soviet Russia? And how about Alaska? In the 19th century that great land mass also was embraced, along with Poland and Finland, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and parts of Rumania, within the "natural limits" of Russia. Is Alaska to be restored to that state, Alaska that is not Alaska to the Russian, but Russian America?

Here is the fallacious heart of Dallin's book, and its value to us. The tyranny currently prevailing in Eurasia is to be broken by the Russian people, of course with our help, poured in from without. This accomplished, the Russian people are to be rewarded, presumably, for their great deed, by being granted sway over all the masses of western folk who happen to live within the Russian "natural limits".

Of course the above is nowhere stated, but it is implicit throughout this newest of treatises on Russia's age-old tradition of expansion. Not for its new information, but for its warning to our western folk that tyranny is not relative but absolute, is *The New Soviet Empire* of value.

Alliance College, Cambridge Springs, Pa.

MARION MOORE COLEMAN

SOVIET IMPERIALISM, by E. Day Carman, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C. 1950, 175 pages.

Only recently have the American commentators started to realize that Soviet expansionism has its source not in any desire to secure the borders of the Soviet Union, as was often interpreted here during World War II by Russia's supporters, but in a prepared plan to conquer both continents. One influential American even went to the extent of stating some time ago that never in its history has Russia started any aggressive wars.

This political fog for the first time was dispersed by Prof. Philip Mosely in his article, entitled "Aspects of the Russian Expansion". (*The American and Slavic East European Review*, October, 1948). After Prof. Mosely several other writers expressed opinions in print along the line taken by Mosely in this treatment.

Among them Harmon's book, "Soviet Imperialism," merits attention. He portrays well the different facets of Russian expansionism during the past five years. His source material is up to date. Several chapters of this book are devoted to an analysis of the annexation by Soviet Russia of Western Ukraine and Byelorussia from Poland. The sovietization of the Baltic States, the grabbing of Finland, and the annexation of Eastern Rumania are also treated.

The author gives a very fine picture of the turning of several central European countries into the Soviet camp and the *de facto* expansion of the Russian borders to the mouth of the Oder river and to the Adriatic Sea in the West and in North China and to the approaches of Japan in the East.

Russian attempts to put their foot in Iran, Turkey and the Mediterranean basin were frustrated only by the big Western powers interested in those regions, especially Great Britain, America and France.

The assembled sources will be very helpful for any future researcher. "Soviet Imperialism" is a work carefully and industriously prepared by its author.

The only defect in his work is the interpretation of the intentions behind the Soviet annexations. The author is under the misapprehension that the Kremlin solved its own nationalities problem and is now collecting the fruits from this achievement. This is not true. After all, why did the Kremlin seize Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia from Poland? Why did the Soviets endeavor to annex Azerbaijan from Iran, the Armenian provinces from Turkey, etc.? The author answers: Stalin was under the heavy pressure of the Ukrainian nationalists, some of whom managed to get even into the Politburo, such as Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and others. Also, the nationalism of others was helped in the Soviet expansionism.

This interpretation is entirely wrong. The Soviets annexed the Western Ukrainian provinces from Poland and Rumania not for the satisfaction of the above mentioned members of the Politburo, but for the purpose of extirpating Ukrainian nationalism. Once they had all the Ukrainians under their thumb, it would be easier to combat Ukrainian nationalism. The mentioned members of the Politburo, although born in Ukraine, are, in reality, the most brutal enemies of Ukrainian nationalism and the most rabid Russifiers of Ukraine.

Mr. Carman is accurate in the statistics relative to the different nationalities in the Soviet Union. Here he treads on more familiar grounds and shows himself more honest than many other authors; but his interpretation of this data is faulty. Thus, he labels the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as "one of the most grasping, rapacious treaties of modern times"—when, as a matter of fact, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was an international agreement based strictly on the American principles of self-determination of nations.

By assuming that the period of the Ukrainian Kievan State and even the period of the Western Ukrainian State (Galicia-Volhynian State of the XIII and XIV centuries), belong to Russian history, the author follows only the old mistake so popular among American historians. For Mr. Carman, however, there is no excuse for making such a mistake.

Essentially fine and fundamental as Mr. Carman's work is, it is the best proof that in this country no serious and unbiased research work on the nationality problems of Eastern Europe and South-western Asia is being conducted. Such studies are of great importance in today's struggle between America and Russia. Without a fundamental knowledge of the nationalities problem of the Soviet Union, our practical foreign policy will make many mistakes. It will be unable to exploit the weakest point of the Soviet Union, — the struggle of the peoples subjugated by Russia for their national liberation.

At any rate, on the whole, Mr. Carman's work should prove to be a good and resourceful guide concerning Russian expansion for world domination.

N. CHUBATY.

**TWENTIETH CENTURY UKRAINE**, by Clarence A. Manning. Bookman Associates, New York. 243 pp. \$3.50.

This new book by the author of "The Story of Ukraine" and of "Ukrainian Literature," dealing with Ukrainian problems of the first half of this century, is a timely one. The problems of Ukraine and of the Ukrainian people are at the present time of paramount interest to figures in public life in America as well as on the interna-

tional scene. And the history of Ukraine in the past 50 years was the weightiest period since Khmelnytsky's war against Poland (1648-1654). Hence a good account and an analysis of this era was sorely needed. Professor Clarence A. Manning in his new book tries to answer those needs. He treats chiefly of historical and political issues of Ukraine during the past half century. He writes of the period during the World Wars I and II and in the intervals. He records the relations between Ukraine, Russia, Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia. Specifically he describes the relations with the Russian Communist aggressor, and the resistance of the Ukrainian people to Bolshevik enslavement. Dr. Manning likewise recounts the attainments of Ukrainian literature in that period and the uneven struggle of Ukrainian writers under Communist yoke for freedom of expression. He also mentions the DPs (Displaced Persons), those witnesses of Communist misrule and oppression.

A bibliography, special notes, and an index are added to the book.

As already said the book on the whole will fill in the needs for information on modern Ukraine. It may serve as a guide to the East-European problems, although not all chapters treat the assembled material with the same uniformity. Some are given encyclopedic treatment while others are treated in a more specific manner. The reader may obtain the necessary information on modern Ukraine, provided he studies the indicated literature in the bibliography. The book depicts what occurred in Ukraine during the past two generations, and its meaning as far as the world peace and security are concerned.

IRENE DOBUSH

"AMERICA'S SECOND CRUSADE", William Henry Chamberlin. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago 1950, 1-355 pp.

Finally, we have a political interpretation of World War II, the most turbulent in all world history, with even darker horizons for the future. This is W. H. Chamberlin's book: *America's Second Crusade*. The author brings out as every good American feels today — with deep sorrow — that the opportunity to bring to the world peace and a just settlement of the international order has vanished, mostly by our own negligence.

The author's conclusion is expressed best by the last chapter: "No War but no Peace." After reading the entire book, the reader has the impression that our participation in World War II was unnecessary. We intended to destroy inhuman Nazism but cultivated a several times more dangerous Communism. What is more, we were helpful in saving world Communism, under the savage leadership of the Kremlin, at a time when this same Communism brought oceans of sufferings to millions of innocent people.

Mr. Chamberlin analyzes the sources of World War II, the defects of the Versailles Treaty, the rise of Fascism and Hitlerism, as well as America's interference in the European cockpit.

The author emphasizes the ideological principles of the Big Three, the Atlantic Charter, and Four Freedoms, which were completely disregarded by the Big Three. Such a disregard of these principles was natural in an alliance where the Soviet Union was a member of the Big Three partnership.

Chamberlin's book sacrifices much time to the moral-political appraisal of the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam agreements, continually defending the victims of such policies. He defends Poland against Russian and German aggression. "Poland: The Great Betrayal," is the title of one chapter of his book, paraphrasing the title of a known book "Poland Betrayed" by the Polish Ambassador in Washington Ciechanowski. "Germany Must be Destroyed," is the title of another chapter, concerning Morgenthau's plan to convert Germany into a pasture.

At every step, Mr. Chamberlin confronts the political machinations of the Big Three with moral political obligations undertaken not only by the Wilsonian right of self-determination, but also by the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms doctrine of President Roosevelt.

Mr. Chamberlin is known as a journalist of high moral sense and justice. We are certain that all that is written in this book are his deep, noble convictions.

Unfortunately, we find in his book some statements, even proposals, which openly stand in contradiction to those defended by him (the Wilsonian democratic doctrine of self-determination of peoples, as well as the Atlantic Charter). We have in mind his viewpoint regarding two Western Ukrainian provinces—Galicia and Volhynia.

In several places the author states that Western Ukraine historically and ethnically is Polish territory. Lviv (Lwow) is a Polish city. This assertion stands in harsh conflict with the historical, ethnical, as well as statistical facts regarding the population of Western Ukraine.

It is true that an overwhelming majority of the population of Western Ukraine is strongly against Russian-Bolshevist domination over Ukraine — not only Western but over Eastern Ukraine as well. This population, however, is likewise against Polish domination of Western Ukrainian provinces. The overwhelming majority of the population of Western Ukraine already exercised its holy right of self-determination on November 1, 1918, by proclaiming its own Western Ukrainian Republic. On January 22, 1919, this Republic united with the Eastern Ukrainian National Republic, thereby incorporating the Ukrainian people into one state. The Ukrainian population was deprived of its holy right by brutal force.

An unbiased application of the Atlantic Charter (section 2) must leave the decision of the fate of these territories in the hands of the native population which, we are certain, will never favor Poland.

*Historically*, from the earliest times of East European history, almost a thousand years ago, Western Ukraine was a part of the Kiev Rus State and Halich-Volhynian State (X—XIV cc.). The boundaries of two Christian civilizations, Eastern and Western, are simultaneously the oldest boundaries between the Ukrainian and Polish peoples. They ran about 50 miles west of the present Polish-Soviet boundaries (fixed at Yalta) approximatively along the Wisloka, San and Wepr (Wieprz) rivers, from the Carpathian mountains to Polisia. This strip of land is a Polish acquisition at the expense of the Ukrainian nation for the past six centuries.

In 1349 (after the first futile attempt in 1340) the Polish King Casimir, in ceding the old Polish province, Silesia, with its capital Wroclaw (Breslau), to the Germans, invaded Western Ukraine, with its capital Lviv, and annexed it, not as

a Polish province but the "Ruthenian Kingdom", with its own lands and currency. ethnical Ukrainian character of this province, called "Ruthenian Voyevodstvo (Wojewodztwo Ruskie)," was never questioned by Poland until Poland's partition (1772).

The ancient Polish author of the history of the city of Lviv — Ziemorowicz (middle of 17 century) entitled his work "Leopolis Triplex" (Three-fold Lviv—Leopolis). Three-fold because the author divided the history of Lviv into three periods: The Ukrainian (Ruthenian) period of Lviv until 1349; the German period of Lviv (Lemberg or Leoburg or Lemburgia) 14th—16th century; the Polish period of Lviv (Lwow) middle of 16th century.

After the annexation of Western Ukraine to Poland (15th century), the Polish Government commenced a very intensive colonization of this Ukrainian territory with almost international elements. Lacking their own Polish merchants and artisans, they invited Germans, who introduced the German (Saxon) law into several towns, especially into Lviv, which for two centuries fell under German control (Ziemorowicz: — German Lemburgia). Only in the thirties of the 16th century Polish preaching was introduced for the first time in one of Lviv's Roman Catholic Churches.

Despite discriminations, the Ukrainian population of Lviv played an important role in the cultural development of the town during the 17th century, with a population of 8,000. The most attractive monumental edifices in Lviv are — the beautiful Renaissance campanile of St. Mary's Church (Woloska Tserkva); the Renaissance palace of Korniakt (16th century); the charming Rococo St. George Cathedral (18th century). — They were erected by members of the Ukrainian orthodox community of Lviv.

During the modern Polish regime, the administration of Lviv, a city of 330,000, was exclusively in Polish hands. By applying undemocratic methods to elections, not one Ukrainian was admitted to the City council during the last years of the Polish regime. Lviv, a strongly bureaucratic city, possessed only 50% of Polish population, and the other 50% was divided among the Jews and Ukrainians. Today, the percentage of Polish population in Lviv is negligible.

Lviv was the seat not only of Polish cultural institutions, but Ukrainian as well, such as the oldest Ukrainian research institution on arts and sciences — the Shevchenko Scientific Society — with its three museums and large library, the National Museum of Arts, Prosvita, a center for popular educational clubs, which number over 4,000.

*Statistically*, Western Ukraine, detached from Poland by Yalta, never in its history had a Polish majority in its population. The absolute majority of over 50% of population was continually Ukrainian.

As stated by authoritative researchers on statistics, the Polish census concerning ethnical facts was evidently biased; only the denominations data are approximately true. As is well known, all Christians of the Eastern rite (Catholics and Orthodox) are Ukrainian, and Christians of the Latin rite are Polish.

In 1931, even according to the official Polish census there were in Western Ukraine:

	Ukrainians Greek-Cath. Orthod. resp.	Poles Latin Cath.	Jews	Others
Galicia	60.6%	28.5%	10.3%	0.6%
Volhynia	71.5%	14.4%	10.1%	4 %
Western Ukraine	64.6%	23.4%	10.2%	1.8%

We are deeply convinced that the author of "America's Second Crusade," had the best intentions of serving the noble cause of the defense of betrayed Poland, a nation which fell from our ally to the role of subservient satellite of Communist Russia. We are even of the conviction that Poland for her sacrifices for the common allied cause should be compensated with an uninhabited U. N. mandatory territory, where overcrowded Polish populace can find opportunity for living and expansion. This nevertheless cannot be done at the expense of its Ukrainian neighbor disregarding the rights of self-determination and the Atlantic Charter. Only the lack of data concerning Ukrainian-Polish border problems induced the author to make propositions conflicting with his own, generally highly moral, political line.

NICHOLAS CHUBATY

THE ANNALS OF THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES  
IN THE U. S., Vol 1, No. 1, New York.

We have in our hands the first publication of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., Inc., edited by Prof. Michael Vetukhiv.

The first volume contains five articles, book reviews, obituaries, as well as a note on transliteration of Cyrillic characters into English.

The first article on the "*Historiography of Ukrainian Literature*," by Prof. S. Yefremiv (not Yefremov) is reprinted from an old publication of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, 1923. The article is supplemented to date by George Luckyj. This sketch of the historiography of modern Ukrainian literature does not embrace the period of the old Ukrainian literature written in a Ukrainized Church Slavonic language.

"*The decembrist milieu in the diary of Pelagia Rosciszewska*" by Volodymyr Porakyj, concerns the Decembrist movement in Ukraine. The events described in the Diary comment only on the activity of the Polish and Russian nobles; no mention is made there of the participation of Ukrainians in Decembrist revolution. More factual material concerning Ukrainian participation in this Revolution was collected in the publications of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences of Kiev in 1925, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Decembrist revolution.

The most valuable article in this issue is by Prof. Gregory Makhiv (not Makhov) a known Ukrainian soil scientist. His "*A new soil map of the*

<sup>1</sup> E. M. Kulisher: Population Changes Behind the Iron Curtain. — *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September 1950

V. Kubijowycz: *Geography of Ukraine*, Lviv-Cracow, 1943, p. 305.

*Ukraine*" is a good sample of scholarly research. Prof. Makhiv is known as a contributor on Ukrainian economics and agriculture to the *Ukrainian Quarterly* for several years.

At the end of this issue is a one page "Note on Transliteration" of Cyrillic written characters into English. The "Note" is an ineffective attempt at genuine transliteration. The problem of the transliteration of Cyrillic into English is not new in this country. It was deeply studied by the Library of Congress, by the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European languages, as well as by the Public Library in New York City, at the request of the State Department for practical reasons. The rules on transliteration, as accepted in America, follow strict lines of phonetics of each language employing Cyrillic characters. For instance Cyrillic "e" (ye) cannot be transliterated in American "je"; "a" (ya) by "ja"; "io" (u) by "ju", nor can "ж" (zh) by "z" with Czech accent; "x" (kh) by "ch"; "ш" (sh) by "s", "ч" (ch) by "c" with Czech accents etc. Such a plan is entirely foreign on American soil. But even the editor of the issue does not keep to the proposed plan on transliteration because the names of Makhov is written correctly, as well as that of Vetukhiv.

The Preface to the first issue of the *Annals* is a small informative article on the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S. The first part of this article concerning information on the well deserving All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev (1923-1929) is very informative, but the second part concerning the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences is not accurate. The editor writes: *"many former members and associates of the old Academy found themselves in Western Europe, and they succeeded in creating the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences which embraced most Ukrainian scholars and scientists on the free side of the Iron Curtain."* Actually, however, not one member of the Kiev Academy of Sciences escaped to the West. The humanistic and sociological department of the Kiev Academy were driven during the War, by the Bolsheviks to Ufa, the departments of natural and technical sciences to Kazakhstan where they were forced to work for the defense. The Free Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was established in Augsburg, Germany, in 1945 by a group of Ukrainian refugee intellectuals.

For the American public the remark — *"The aim of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States is to co-ordinate the efforts of Ukrainian scholars of all varieties of democratic thought and conviction,"* is not quite understandable. It looks as though this institution prescribes in advance, for scholars thoughts and convictions. In the countries of Western democracies there exist only the fundamental principle of absolute freedom of scholarly research and the absolute freedom in academic teaching. The only aim of any scholarly studies must be the search of pure truth. In a true democratic country a scholar does not need to reaffirm his adherence to the official political doctrine, as it happens in totalitarian countries.

The above statement limiting "thought and conviction" of scholars is by its spirit entirely strange to the traditions of Ukrainian scholarly research organized during the past three generations by the 77 year old Alma Mater of Ukrainian scholars—The Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, now established in exile with its headquarters in New York and in Paris. The Ukrainian researchers fought traditionally for freedom of scholarly research.

Beyond these shortcomings which can be overlooked in a debutante publication, the appearance of a new journal on Ukraine has to be welcomed inasmuch as the American scholarly world needs more information about Ukraine.

Steubenville College, Ohio.

BOHDAN LONCHYNA

**SPIRIT OF FLAME**, a Collection of the Works of Lesya Ukrainka. Translated by Percival Cundy, Foreword by Clarence A. Manning. Bookman Associates, New York. Copyright, 1950 by Ukrainian National Women's League of America. A picture of the poetess in Ukrainian national costume forms the frontpiece of this book.

We are very well satisfied with the contents of this collection. It contains two literary historical essays written by excellent experts on Ukrainian Literature and History which introduce the reader to the conditions of life and working of the famous Ukrainian poetess who died in 1913 after great physical suffering. Lesya Ukrainka is recognized as "one of the leading figures in modern Ukrainian Literature, second only to Taras Shevchenko, the incomparable master of the language, and on a par in her artistic productions with Ivan Franko" (C. Manning).

But we disagree with the opinion of Prof. Manning that Lesya Ukrainka's work was something isolated from the Ukrainian struggle for independence. On the contrary, her poems were for the Ukrainian youth the symbolic sign of the struggle for the right of national self-development and for independence.

The Introduction written by Dr. Cundy is an excellent and broad summary of her literary achievements. His estimation of the value of Lesya Ukrainka's knowledge, unbounded imagination, keen psychological insight, vigor and power is based on a serious study of her works.

The translated selections contain the most prominent lyric works divided according to the following subjects: 1. Love. 2. Nature. 3. Personal Experiences. 4. The Poetic Calling. 5. Love of Country. 6. Social Justice and Human Rights. — Then follows the selection of the Dramatic Poems and Dramas: On the Ruins. Babylonian Captivity. The Noblewoman. Forest Song. Martianus the Advocate. — The translation agrees with the spirit and characteristic of the original works of Lesya Ukrainka.

We recommend this important book, as this is the first attempt to acquaint the English-speaking world with the most important works of this Ukrainian poetess which "can be read as an invaluable contribution to world literature as well."

Dr. K. KYSILEVSKYJ.

**DEATH OF SCIENCE IN RUSSIA.** (The Fate of Genetics as Described in Pravda and elsewhere), edited by Conway Zircle, Professor of Botany, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949, pp. 315.

The publication of this work was prompted by the Conference on Genetics which took place in August, 1947 in Moscow. It is an objective study of the manner in which the official Communist school of thought attempts to make free and un-



restricted studies in the field of genetics follow the well known party line. What makes the book especially valuable is that it is illustrated by many examples and details of how this process is conducted. Its title truly reflects its contents.

The contents include the address made at the conference by T. D. Lysenko, the leader of the group attacking genetics, and his concluding remarks; talks by his supporters, who formerly differed with him but now recanted their former views; papers read at the conference from several American and British geneticists coupled with their resignations from the Academy of Sciences; several articles on the subject which appeared in "Pravda"; the resolutions passed at the conference; and finally the letter which the conferees dispatched to Stalin.

The book has twelve chapters and a good bibliography.

The work sets out the reasons for the Soviet attack upon genetics. However, more of these could have been added. The author writes that up to the time of Lysenko scientific studies were conducted in perfect freedom. Actually that is not true. From the very beginning scientific studies in the Soviet Union had to conform to the Soviet party line pattern.

In the first period, 1920-1930, the biologists were under official orders from the Communists to fight against the remnants of pre-revolutionary thought, primarily against the so-called idealism, religion and mysticism.

For this reason, the Soviets needed out and out materialists, whom later they persecuted as "vulgar mechanics". During this period the Kremlin supported the new materialistic school of thought, and pushed to the front young scholars who had not yet reached their prime, such as Vavilova, Filipchenko, Serebrovsky. The Red regime was quick to seize the opportunity of exploiting these young materialists in its fight against idealism and mysticism. That is why it welcomed with open arms the arrival of the young American scholar, Miller, who represented the Morgan school, and who brought with him cultures of a fecund mouse, *Dysophila melanogaster*, in order to broaden the Morgan research studies. During the first ten years genetic research had the full support of the regime and as a result it flourished.

Other fields of study and research which promoted the idea of idealism, however, found opportunities of development and expansion denied them by government restrictions. The well known academician Berg was one of the victims of these restrictions and persecutions. Professor Stanchinsky, one of the most prominent ecologists, was banished to Siberia. Lamarckism was a well-nigh forbidden word, in theory and in practice. Only a few were allowed to follow it, such as professor Vladimirovsky. Wiesman, Mendel, Morgan, on the other hand, were the favorites with the regime.

Early in the 30's, Moscow declared a cold war against the "bourgeois" West. Simultaneously it readjusted its policy on genetics and gave it new directions. The hypothesis was put forward, that the gene does not necessarily have to be solely the bearer of hereditary qualities of itself but that it should easily be subject to environment and the like. Once again Lamarckism became popular, and directives were given to engage as many researchers as possible who would be charged with the task of conducting various experiments to substantiate the theory.

They were warned, however, to conduct their experiments along original lines, Soviet lines, and eschew all German, British or American bourgeois schools of thought in the matter. Stalin himself began to take an interest in the genetics

problem. It was about this time that Lysenko forged to the front. A general about-face maneuver was executed by the regime in its previous view of genetics. Lysenko and his chief assistant, the ideologist Present, were ordered to ruthlessly destroy all the gains made thus far in genetics, and to start from scratch.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the work reflects in an able fashion what has been accomplished in scientific studies in Soviet Russia in particular and in totalitarian-regimented countries in general.

M. VETUKHIV.

Victor Kravchenko. *I CHOSE JUSTICE*. New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1950, pp. 458.

The first book of Kravchenko, *I chose Freedom*, created in its time a great stir. The author, a high official in the Soviet economic machine, had a greater opportunity than the ordinary Soviet Citizen to gain an accurate knowledge of the conditions that prevail in the "red paradise." This volume was slandered in articles in the Parisian newspaper, *Les Lettres Francaises*, in November, 1947 and as a result there came the widely publicized trial in Paris in the spring of 1949. This new book of Kravchenko deals with that trial.

By a criticism and an analysis of the testimony of the pro-Soviet witnesses, Kravchenko proves in this book that *Moscow can oppose to the frightful truth about the "red paradise" nothing but the idle chatter and fantastic delusions of some Western nervously unstable individuals of a psychopathic type and the obvious lying and falsification of its witnesses who have been corrupted or terrified by the NKVD*. As for the position of Ukraine under the slavery of the Kremlin, we find valuable data in the testimony of General Rudenko (the former Soviet prosecutor in the Nuremberg trial) and of Vasylenko, one of the chiefs of heavy industry in Ukraine and a former member of the government and the Executive Committee of the "Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine" (KP(b)U). The testimony of the former brings out the pitiable situation in the Ukrainian higher technical schools and also further in the industry which is at each step controlled by Moscow and does not have the slightest freedom of action.

From the testimony of Vasylenko we learn of the frightful persecution of the Ukrainians in the USSR, especially in the more important posts and, of the cruel purges which cost the lives of thousands and thousands of Ukrainian technical and agricultural leaders even within the ranks of the party. Vasylenko was compelled to admit, for instance, that of the eight members of the "government" of Ukraine (the people's commissars) during his term of service only one remained alive in 1949 and the rest had disappeared without a trace and of the 15 engineers of the factory in which Kravchenko was director (the Nikopol Pipe Factory) only three had escaped purging during the course of the ten years 1939—49. It is only a misfortune that Kravchenko as a Russian great power enthusiast did not make use of the testimony of other Ukrainian witnesses, new emigres from the Soviets, who offered him their services. The means by which the truth came out in Paris can be judged by the fact that all Soviet witnesses before their return to the USSR were compelled to take an oath that on their return to their "homeland" they would not say a word about the course of the widely publicized trial.

S. PROTSIUK

## DR. LONGIN CEHELKY

One of the most prominent Ukrainian statesmen of the older generation, Dr. Longin Cehelsky, Vice-President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian Pan-American Conference, died in Philadelphia on Dec. 13, 1950. Shortly before his death the Ukrainians celebrated his 75th anniversary. Dr. Cehelsky began his political career while still a student. His activities caused his arrest by the Austro-Polish authorities in Galicia. In 1913 he

was elected a representative to the Austrian Parliament in Vienna, and with the outbreak of World War I he became one of the organizers of the Ukrainian Legion, which in time developed into the Ukrainian Army. After the downfall of Austria Dr. Cehelsky became a member of the Ukrainian National Council, the Minister of Internal Affairs in the first Government of the West Ukrainian National Republic and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of the United Ukrainian National Republic. On Jan. 22, 1919 in Kiev, Dr. Cehelsky participated in the solemn historical act of uniting East and West Ukraine, which for centuries had been separated by foreign occupations. After the reoccupation of



Dr. Longin Cehelsky, † Dec. 13, 1950

Ukraine by Poland and Russia Dr. Cehelsky emigrated to the United States in 1920, where in due time he became an American citizen. Here he was one of the most active personalities. He participated in the organization and directing of the Ukrainian Congress Committee, the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference, and as the editor of the Ukrainian paper "America", printed in Philadelphia.

Dr. Cehelsky was a person of a deep culture, with an extraordinary talent of the orator; he was uncompromising in his convictions regarding the independence of Ukraine.



### VOLODYMYR VYNNYCHENKO

Another prominent Ukrainian, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, died in exile, far from native Ukraine, now occupied by the Red Russians. His name has to be added to other historical Ukrainian personalities. Previous to World War I, Vynnychenko was the most brilliant Ukrainian writer, and after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution (1917), a popular leader of the Ukrainian National Revolution. He died March 6, 1951, in Mougins, France.

Vynnychenko was born 1880 in Southern Ukraine, Kherson District bordering the Black Sea, son of a poor farmer. Suffering social discrimination from the Russian reactionary intelligentsia, Vynnychenko became socialist to which doctrine he remained faithful unto death. As a university student, he participated in activities of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party since its foundation in 1900 as left wing partisan. When the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party split into nationalist and socialist wings, Vynnychenko became one of the founders of the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party.

After the Russian Revolution in Ukraine was transformed into a national revolution aiming to liberate Ukraine from Russian domination, Vynnychenko was named the first Premier of the Ukrainian Government (1917), and later Head of Directorium of Ukraine (1918-1919). His political activity was both praised and relentlessly criticized by his kinsmen. The socialist wing of the Ukrainian political minds elevated him as an excellent leader while the nationalists condemned especially blaming him for the downfall of the short-lived Ukrainian independence.

Vynnychenko's position in modern Ukrainian literature is undisputable. He wrote several stories and dramatic works of great value. In his three volume work, "Nation's Rebirth", the history of Ukrainian National Revolution is excellently pictured.

Upon the occupation of Ukraine by the Red Russians, Vynnychenko went into exile. He returned for a short time to Ukraine during the NEP period. Not finding the opportunity for free activity, Vynnychenko returned to his place of exile in France where death claimed his life.

## DMYTRO DOROSHENKO

The prominent Ukrainian historian, Statesman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Doroshenko, died in Munich, March 19, 1951.

Doroshenko was born 1882 in Chernyhiv, Eastern Ukraine. He was of an old, noble family, a descendant of the brother of Peter Doroshenko, Hetman of Ukraine (1665—1676), leader of political orientation tending to preserve the independence of Ukraine with the aid of Turkey.

Doroshenko was graduated from the Petersburg (Leningrad) University. Thereafter, he worked in Ukraine (Kiev) as a teacher and journalist. He also did research work in Ukrainian history under the direction of the well known historian Wolodymyr Antonovych.

After the Great Russian Revolution he was appointed by the Russian Provisional Government the Civil Governor for sections of Western Ukraine, Austrian territory, temporarily occupied by the Russian Army.

Doroshenko was a man of great personality — a monarchist by convictions. When Pavlo Skoropadsky was proclaimed Hetman of Ukraine — Doroshenko became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Upon the occupation of Ukraine by the Russian Bolsheviks, Doroshenko went into exile, where he devoted his life to the scientific studies. He lectured on Ukrainian history at the Czech Charles University, Ukrainian Free University at Prague and finally as professor at the Orthodox Theological School at the Warsaw University.

For his scientific works in 1923 he was given active membership in the Shevchenko Scientific Society. He was the first director of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin, member of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw, and Chairman of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences.

Doroshenko was the author of over hundred works and articles. The most important were: *"Slav World"* (3 vol.), *"Illustrated History of Ukraine"* (1917-1923), *"History of Ukraine,"* translated into English, *"Survey of Ukrainian Historiography."*

In 1948, Doroshenko immigrated to Canada, but after a prolonged illness returned to Europe for a cure where he died.



† Dmytro Doroshenko

## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

**"THE SUPREME FACT ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION", by Edward Crankshaw. *The New York Times Magazine*, November 12, 1950.**

There can be little doubt that this lucid essay of an eminent English political writer represents one of the soundest and most balanced analyses which have been penned by an Anglo-American student of the unnatural political complex called the Soviet Union. He carefully distinguishes between the Russian and the numerous non-Russian inhabitants of the Soviet Union in order to depict accurately the peculiar mystical and irrational properties of the political mentality that generally prepossesses the former. Not taken in easily by the current emotional appeal for friendship with the Russian people, largely based on the tenuous assumption of a spiritual chasm between the people and an imposed dictatorial government, Mr. Crankshaw evinces a more intelligent sociological perspective when he emphasizes "that in the first instance it is the people who produce the institutions, and not the institutions which produce the people." Thus he is quite explicit in saying that "the Soviet Government is inevitably a product of the Russian people." Yet, despite the conspicuous lack of any concrete evidence of anti-Soviet resistance on the part of the rank-and-file Russian, one can be sure that the author would not underrate the importance of attempting to stimulate some form of opposition by certain sections of the Russian populace to their autocratic government.

It is particularly noteworthy that the writer, doubtless with much awareness of demonstrated fact, applies in part the properties of subservient alacrity to centralist government, the negativism implied by the national chauvinist desire to Russify, and the blind all-or-nothing dynamic even to Russians who detest Bolshevism. Needless to say, sufficient witness to this has been provided by certain Russians even here in the United States. Moreover, this analyst shows a remarkable familiarity with the unresolvable multinational problem in his cogent discussion of the traditional policy of Russification, among other things pointing to the basic weakness of the Ukrainian link in the Soviet imperialist chain. But certainly most illuminating in his comprehensive analysis is the central theme that "The

most immediate enemy at every showing is Russian imperialism," an elemental truth which fortunately has gained of recent date wide acceptance, although Ukrainians and others have almost in vain been teaching it for over thirty years.

"VICTORY WITHOUT WAR," address by Harold E. Stassen. *Round the World Report*, The American Broadcasting Company, January 15, 1951, Washington, D. C.

Those who are objectively conversant with the political realities of Central and Eastern Europe cannot help but view this address by President Stassen of the University of Pennsylvania as a masterpiece of American political leadership. Powerfully supported by authoritative and responsible reports obtained in the course of his global trip, Mr. Stassen states in no uncertain terms that "deep discontent and unrest" exist in the Soviet Union and in the Red Army itself, that border guards have been considerably enhanced and yet persons "slip through with amazing stories of tragedy among the thirty million Moslems, the forty million Ukrainians, the Poles, the Czechs, and all the others who are prisoners of the Kremlin," and, significant in the light of the comments made above, that "the whole world is rapidly awakening to the extreme evils of Communist imperialism."

It goes without saying that those who are honestly and with integrity familiar with the raw facts and would not misguide American opinion in regard to the actual political circumstances surrounding the Soviet regime are in perfect accord with Mr. Stassen's views that American foreign policy can achieve victory "over Communist imperialism, without a world war," but if one is forced upon us, we can defeat Soviet Russia in war as well. Furthermore, only a meager knowledge of the patent inefficacies of the Voice of America in the battle for the minds of men is sufficient to underwrite his advocacy that the "Voice of America should be taken out of the State Department..." But of greatest importance is his implicit advocacy of the principle of self-determination as expressed in his proposed long-range goal calling for "The establishment of separate national sovereignty and true independence for the Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary." The solid wisdom and breadth of objective understanding underlying this report are, without question, the true measure of President Stassen's character of sound statesmanship, and he can rest assured that millions throughout the world are profoundly grateful for it.

**"EAST EUROPE SPEAKS,"** an editorial. *America*, National Catholic Weekly Review, February 24, 1951, New York.

With reference to the common pledge made by many eminent exiled leaders from Central and East Europe on February 11 at Philadelphia in defense of a Declaration of Independence, the editors of this national Catholic publication hail the event as an overt fact that "East Europe was asserting its unity and solidarity with the free world." Commendable as this momentous event may have been, it is regrettable that the uncritical editors should speak of East European solidarity when no representatives of over 40 million Ukrainians, more than several combinations of the populations of the nations represented on this occasion, were asked to participate. The editors display little knowledge of the political actualities of East Europe and apparently no knowledge of the vague and pitiful policy, if the term may be properly used, governing the patchwork activities of the National Committee For A Free Europe which sponsored the event.

Yet how critical can one be of the shortcomings of these editors merely commenting on the event when not one of the so-called exiled leaders, whose knowledge of Ukraine, its people, and its current valorous underground operations against the Soviets is surely well founded, had even the courage or the long-range wisdom to urge the inclusion of Ukrainian representatives. Genuine statemanship, rather than the play of uprooted politicians, certainly demands such honest courage in the interest of true East European solidarity which doubtlessly will come in any event from those who are really struggling, fighting, and suffering for it behind the Iron Curtain today.

**"BEYOND THE KREMLIN ARE THE PEOPLE,"** by Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Review of "The New Soviet Empire" by David J. Dallin, *The New York Times Book Review*, February 25, 1951.

It has always been a source of curiosity to those who have followed the reflections and comments of the liberal Professor and humanitarian, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., as to why, in the face of much inescapable evidence, he consistently omits in the wide range of his expressed interests any benevolent concern for the plight of over 40 million Ukrainians. Several months ago, in chiding the United States on the Genocide issue, he rightly referred to the ghastly Soviet genocidal acts perpetrated on the several Baltic peoples but not a word concerning the equally substantial evidence that has been provided for Soviet genocide in Ukraine. It is



certain that Mr. Berle was not unaware of this spectacular evidence. So here, in this review, he appears to be so thoroughly overawed by Mr. Dallin's propaganda case for friendship with the Russian people that one leaves with the impression that in the scope of his humanitarian liberalism there is no place for the sufferings and truly liberal aspirations of the equally numerous non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union who detest the yoke of Russian imperialism and, as is being currently applied, the cognate policy of Russification.

With a far more objective and accurate orientation toward the paramount problems of the Soviet Union, Mr. Berle could have offered a more constructive appraisal of this supposedly scholarly work. For example, he accepts uncritically the author's expediently contrived enumeration of the six foreign wars fought by the Soviet Union since its presumed inception, commencing with the war against Poland in 1920. It is scarcely a tribute to the author's scholarship that, in effect, no such political entity as the Soviet Union existed then. Rather, in historical fact, it was Soviet Russia that fought not only against Poland but also against similarly foreign forces of the then existing independent Ukraine. Other examples could be cited with equal force, but the simple fact is that Mr. Dallin's illiberal Great Russian politics have for some time now impaired seriously his scholarship as demonstrated in this work by his treatment of Ukrainian liberation movement.

It is painful to observe that, for whatever reason, the expressions of Professor Berle's esteemed liberalism do not find broader and more liberal outlets, especially where they are needed most.

"THE WRONG RUSSIAN AGAIN," by David J. Dallin. *The New Leader*, February 12, 1951, New York.

Whatever may be said of Mr. Dallin's scholarly attributes, as evidenced by his several early works on Soviet Russia, it surely cannot be held that his more recent writings evince any adequate political sagacity. This most recent article, true as it is with respect to the hoax-like claims of the National Labor Union of NTS, its spurious representations and fanciful concoctions, which many responsible Americans are coming to realize, scarcely establishes Mr. Dallin and his kind as worthwhile assets in the common front of anti-communist opposition. He undoubtedly is correct in his assertion that "The ill-informed or misguided Americans discovered that none of the other national groups of the Soviet Union would cooperate with the violently nationalistic NTS, and that the Russian democratic groups viewed it with equal suspicion," but this

does not necessarily imply an absolute rejection of the NTS as a force, if indeed it is or can become one, in the ranks of the anti-communist crusade. Evidently Mr. Dallin believes it does, suggesting also that he is the right Russian to turn to, but political-minded Ukrainians who see a good use made of an evil medium think otherwise, at least for the immediate end of anti-communist solidarity.

**"RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM,"** an editorial. *Lithuanian Bulletin*, July-December, 1950, New York.

This unquestionably superb publication of the Lithuanian American Council presents an account of Russian imperialism which cannot be too highly recommended to the general reader. It diagnoses the charlatanic political mentality of certain Russian emigres posing as "liberals" and "democrats" with such uncanny insight that the instructed reader is well equipped to pierce through the subterfuge of such seemingly commendable objectives as a "democratic federation of the peoples of Russia," which for the vast non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union can only mean autocratic Russian hegemony and the rough outlines of traditional Russian imperialism. As this excellent editorial intimates, only when some of these Russian emigres are prepared in the way of true liberalism to uphold the sacred democratic principle of self-determination for all peoples, one can begin to recognize the clean integrity of their profession of the democratic ideal. Briefly, there is no more basic test to measure them by.

**"RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE,"** by Ryszard Wraga. *The Eastern Quarterly*, January, 1951, London.

Beyond any measure of doubt this highly prominent and widely respected Polish journalist performs an infinitely valuable service in presenting in compact form this lucid historico-analytic treatment of the organizational and ideological development of Russian emigres in the past three decades. The firm structure for such a study is provided with remarkable objectivity and clearness of thought in this very essay.

This writing unquestionably deserves the widest possible circulation in the United States, for several important reasons. In the first instance, it furnishes a concise historical background on the countless organizations formed by Russian emigres since World War I, on their unending divisiveness and internal dissensions, their ideologic perplexities and dilem-

mas, and their unique vulnerability to Soviet infiltration, a working background which is relatively rare among American students and "experts" of this important historical phenomenon. Wherever factual truth demands it, the author is creditably fair in emphasizing the many points of strength and political value of the considered successive emigre groups, as for example when he underscores the general fact that "from the very beginning the Bolsheviks made an enormous effort to destroy the Russian emigration as a political force," indicating thereby the anti-Communist threat by the latter. But he is equally honest and forceful when in considering such matters as Russian historiography and the like, he lays stress on the fact that "Fighting on every front to defend the past, the State interests and nationalistic aims, Russian emigration began to lose sight of its main political aim—the destruction of Bolshevism."

However, his treatment assumes brilliant proportions in its precise analysis of the two foremost problems dominating current emigre discussions, namely those of *the responsibility of the Russian nation for Bolshevism* and of a *"one and indivisible Russia."* Concerning the first intricate problem, he readily concedes that there is immense Russian hatred of the Bolsheviks, but on the basis of enumerated truths unknown to certain emotionally driven Americans given to the simple distinction between the Soviet government and the Russian people, he unhesitatingly declares that "In spite of everything, it is in the ranks of the Russian nation that Bolshevism, in its present form of State Fascism, has enlisted the greatest numbers of partisans and followers." The imposing truths that the Soviet Government itself is largely based on Russian elements, that the Red Army "is commanded above all by Russians," that Soviet domestic and foreign policy "follows the traditional paths traced by the Russian Empire," that "the national slogans of Soviet propaganda are agreeable only to Russian ears," and that "the strength of resistance against Bolshevism is much greater amongst other nations of the Soviet Union..." can scarcely be brushed aside by mere emotional utterances.

With respect to the second problem, the author manifests a penetrating insight into the chauvinistic and insular allegiance of all the Russian emigre groups to the traditional, imperialist idea of a "one and indivisible Russia." Because of their reactionary denial of the right to national freedom by the non-Russian peoples, Russian emigre groups of all political brands have seriously obstructed the formation of a completely united anti-Bolshevik front. Mr. Wraga is quite emphatic on this point which he supports with indisputable evidence. It would seem that the overwhelming events of the past thirty years more than adequately provide

their own conclusive lessons of political wisdom for the Russian emigration, but, unfortunately, as this remarkable study powerfully demonstrates, such has not been the case. However, quite fortunately, it can be safely assumed that the promising future will not tolerate the vestigial existence of such political emigre anachronisms.

**"LET PEACE NOT DIE OF NEGLECT,"** by George F. Kennan. *The New York Times Magazine*, February 25, 1951.

At the very outset of this essay the reader is properly instructed that much of current discussion on American policy toward Soviet Russia "is shallow or prejudiced message that will prove to be profound and unprejudiced and well-conceived. But much to his bitter disappointment, all that is essentially "thought" by this expert on Russian policy is that we must seek peace under all reasonable circumstances. As a matter of fact, such disillusioning outcomes of Mr. Kennan's oratorical or literary messages have not been out of the ordinary in these past four years.

Some of the points advanced in this adapted article really deserve ripe comment, especially in view of the reputation Mr. Kennan has carved out for himself as an expert on Russia and presumably on Russian Communism. For one, he contends that the power of Bolshevik hostility to the West could not have been curtailed or altered by us in the early years of the Revolution. This hardly speaks well for Mr. Kennan's historical knowledge of Eastern European events of that period. The plain fact is that we in effect helped the entrenchment of Bolshevik power by having aided reactionary Russian forces under Denikin and others to quell the democratic struggles of Ukraine and other independent nations to survive against both Bolshevik and Russian monarchist aggression. Another pitiful point arises in his reference to Bolshevik relations with other countries... For any informed person conversant with Soviet national genocide these past thirty years, this truly is an appalling statement.

When he speaks of aggressive Chinese Communism and its long known intentions, one cannot help but be amused by his vain attempt to exonerate the State Department, of which he was a member, for its tragic mistakes. His concluding remark on "co-existence" with Soviet Communism, basing its continued possibility on the enforced events of the past thirty years, is a perfect example of the common logical error of "misplaced concreteness." Thus even a quick survey of such inexcusable blunders causes one to wonder how informed Europeans view our publicly accepted authorities, especially when they wield or have wielded some degree of influence on the formation of our foreign policy.

L. E. D.

