
The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II




Edited by
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This volume, a collective study of the post-World War II Ukrainian emigrants in Germany and Austria, departs from the standard approach to immigration studies. Instead of focussing on the immigrants' adjustment to their host societies (the United States, Canada, Australia, the countries of Latin America and others), the approach in this volume assumes the primary importance of the pre-immigration experience. The twenty-five contributions to this book present a detailed analysis of the social conditions that shaped the Ukrainian displaced persons, with particular attention to the five-year period that many of them spent in internationally organized resettlement camps.

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after World War II

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Preface

This book is dedicated to a generation of people who were uprooted or fled from their homeland because of a war they did not start, and who, at a particular historical moment, struggled and fought for survival, freedom, and a chance to pursue their ideals.

The standard approach to the study of people who permanently leave their homelands has been to look at them as immigrants rather than emigrants. That is, their history in the country of settlement is considered in relation to the history of the host society, and their adjustment to this new society and their place in its social structure is assessed.

Our approach in this book assumes that in order to understand fully the processes within the immigrant communities in their places of permanent settlement, one must study their pre-immigration experience. One must look at them as emigrants first. The aim of this volume is to do this for one particular wave of emigration, the Ukrainian refugees in Germany and Austria. Most of them eventually immigrated to the United States, Canada, Australia, South America, and other countries, but first they had to spend up to five years in internationally organized resettlement camps. In this book we shall look closely at the Displaced Persons' (DP) camp experience of these refugees. Up to now there has been very little systematic, scholarly work on displaced persons in general or Ukrainian displaced persons in particular. We hope that this collective work will stimulate more interest and research on displaced persons in their time.

The studies in this work were first presented at a conference. They were, however, planned as a unified research project intended for publication. In the first phase of the project a bibliography of sources was prepared and published (Yuri Boshyk and Boris Balan, *Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons," 1945-1954: A Selected Bibliography and Guide to Research with Special Reference to Ukrainians*, Research Report No. 2 [Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1982]). It was then mailed to the

scholars to enable them to do research in their area of interest on the DP question. The conference was a byproduct of this research, and this book contains the revised versions of the conference papers.

The volume is divided into sections covering aspects of Ukrainian DP camp life. The introduction describes the organization of international relief agencies and the origins of the displaced persons. The next two essays place the Ukrainian DP phenomenon in the context of Ukrainian history before and during World War II and assess the demographic dimensions of this migration. This is followed by an examination of the camp economic and organizational structure, which represented the refugees to the outside authorities and provided a framework for their camp life. It also shows the community's personality and party politics. Two considerations of the community's system of political parties and the role of nationalist ideology follow.

The church has always played an important role in all Ukrainian communities. Hence two articles discuss the role of the Catholic and Orthodox churches in the camps. Schools also were a priority, so there is an essay on the educational system developed before the end of the camp period. The strong tendency to re-establish institutions and to form new organizations also was an important concern for women. Their movement has received individual attention in this volume.

Cultural activities in the camps involved a rich outlay of publications, scholarship, and theatre. Publications included literary works, a diversified press, and scholarly writings, which were often controversial. The essays on literature in this book themselves reflect some of this controversy by presenting criticism, even sharp criticism, of camp literary activity. The survey of the DP press offers a picture of a surprisingly large number of periodicals and efforts to overcome the difficulties of publication. A similar picture is given of scholarly work in the camps.

Two studies deal with the problem of Soviet efforts at repatriation. There have been a few comprehensive analyses of this problem, but it is still misunderstood in the West and archival material is scarce. Resettlement to the United States and Canada requires four essays. The Canadian government's policies toward DPs are discussed and evaluated in two separate chapters. The authors raise the question of how open the government was to the DPs. Also, the Ukrainian-American and Ukrainian-Canadian efforts to help the DPs are recounted. The American study focusses on the process and stages of these efforts, the Canadian study on the organizational problems and personalities involved. There is no comparable review of resettlement in other countries because much research remains to be done.

The last section is a sociological and psychological analysis and interpretation of the DP experience. Two chapters contain an exploration of the character of the camp community and the latent functions it performed in bringing together

Ukrainians of diverse backgrounds. Through its organizational structure it made possible a type of social-class mobility that was denied them by the general society at home. The last chapter is an interpretation of the refugee personality in terms of reactions to traumatic stimuli, with an emphasis on defence mechanisms. Finally, the appendix includes four memoirs that highlight details of the DP story and add an experiential dimension to it.

Not all facets of DP camp life are covered in this book. Many other facets can and should be explored. The studies here focus to a large extent on the organizational life of the DP community. This, of course, was the most distinctive aspect of Ukrainian camp life. More research, however, could be done on day-to-day interaction in camp life, including such things as black marketeering, leisure activities, family and sexual life, living conditions, and efforts to maintain privacy. We hope that this first systematic publication on Ukrainian DPs will stimulate further interest and work in this area.

Acknowledgements

This study began as a joint research project. We acknowledge the interest and assistance of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta and its former director, Manoly R. Lupul, who made it possible to undertake archival research, to bring the scholars whose work is contained in this volume to a conference, and to publish this volume in its present form.

The Multicultural History Society of Ontario and its first president, the late Robert F. Harney, also made the conference possible by providing organizational skills and helping to prepare the manuscript for publication. In particular, we acknowledge the work of Paula Groenberg, who planned and supervised the organization of the conference, and Ann McCarthy, who initially copy-edited the manuscript.

We would also like to acknowledge those who acted as chairmen of the sessions during the conference: Morris Diakowsky, Robert F. Harney, Manoly R. Lupul, Paul R. Magocsi, Myron Moroz, Peter Potichnyj, George Rawlyk, Roman Serbyn, and Rudolf Vecoli. Luba Pendzey organized an exhibit on DP camp life at the University of Toronto Robarts Library, with the assistance of the Ukrainian Librarians' Association of Canada, Robarts Library staff, and the University of Toronto Office of Public and Community Relations. We also wish to thank Bohdan Malaniak for lending us a film of the DP camps that was shown at the conference.

Orysia Hanushevska provided secretarial help during the editorial process. We thank Bohdan Krawchenko, the present director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, for his interest in the volume, and David Marples and Myroslav Yurkevich for their work in the final editing and processing of the manuscript for publication.

Finally, our gratitude goes to Helen Lozinski, who introduced the idea of the conference, to all those who attended it and made it a success, and to those who have acted as gadflies in the long process of its preparation for publication.

The Editors

Introduction

Refugees and the DP Problem in Postwar Europe

Wsevolod W. Isajiw and Michael Palij

The Era of Displaced Persons

World War II uprooted and displaced enormous numbers of people.¹ The first group to be displaced in large numbers were prisoners of war, captured by the Nazis in the early years of the War. They were first concentrated in large transitional camps, and subsequently, were distributed among smaller work camps in Germany and German-occupied territories. They were employed in agriculture, industry, road construction, and other public works. About 540,000 captives from the Polish campaign, including Poles, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians, were transferred to Germany.² Later, they were joined by the soldiers of other European countries. On 1 April 1941 there were 31,000 Danes and 1,400 Norwegian prisoners of war working in Germany.³ Prisoners from the Netherlands were gradually released and only the officers were kept in captivity. Some Belgians were also released, but more than 80,000 remained in the German camps.⁴ Most of the West European prisoners of war in Germany were French,⁵ but by 1 December 1941 there were also 3,806,865 Soviet prisoners.⁶

Hitler's government applied a harsh policy of deportation to the civilian population, particularly in Eastern Europe. Men, women, and even children were removed from their homelands. This policy was designed to make room for future transplanted Germans, but primarily to ease a manpower shortage. The war required ever-increasing production of matériel and food at a time when most young Germans had been called into military service. Consequently, the German government appointed a district governor, Fritz Sauckel, as Plenipoten-

tiary General for the Allocation of Labour and gave him virtually unrestricted power to recruit labour, particularly in Eastern Europe. By the end of 1942 about two million foreign workers, mostly East Europeans, were sent to Germany.⁷ Of these, 710,000 came from Ukraine.⁸ By January of 1944 foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war, totalled some 8.5 million.⁹ Hence, in the last years of the war, one-third of the German labour force was composed of foreigners. Fritz Sauckel later stated that out of 5 million foreign workers, only 200,000 were volunteers.¹⁰

Another source of displaced persons was the political prisoners in German concentration camps. These camps were not meant to offer a solution to labour problems, but to exterminate those who resisted the Nazi regime. Groups of people were also interned because the Nazis considered them undesirable on grounds of race, nationality, creed, or political opinion. The magnitude of the problem is reflected in the growth of the number of camps, from six at the beginning of the war to 500 by 1944.¹¹ The survivors were from every country in Europe and from every walk of life: men, women, and children; Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, and Protestant; farmers, workers, artisans, and professionals. Between 50,000 and 100,000 survivors were Jewish. Later, more came out of hiding or fled from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Romania—in total, about 247,000.¹²

Toward the end of the war, the ranks of the displaced increased as many people fled their homes in Eastern and Central Europe before the westward advance of the Red Army. These became the “unrepatriable” DPs. In Western Europe (including Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland, Italy, and northern European countries), there were roughly 58,700 Estonians, 153,300 Latvians, 78,800 Lithuanians, 250,000 Ukrainians, 200,000 Poles, and 125,000 Yugoslavs (mainly Serbs and Croats).¹³ This study focusses on the majority of Ukrainian DPs—those who were in the DP camps of Germany and Austria.¹⁴

Attempts at a Solution to the Refugee Problem: The Relief and Resettlement Agencies

The problems associated with displaced persons were foreseen by the Western Allies long before the war ended, but were underestimated. The three organizational phases of activity to solve the refugee problem in Western Europe centre around the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), and International Refugee Organization (IRO). The first phase was part of long-range planning for the liberation of Europe undertaken by the British and Americans, beginning in 1942. It resulted in the formation in 1943 of the UNRRA, conceived by the Americans as a broadly based international undertaking which was to involve close co-operation with the Soviets. The UNRRA's work was suppos-

ed to be rendering short-range assistance until all the refugees were repatriated.¹⁵

The UNRRA started limited work in 1944 in Italy, the Middle East, and North Africa. At the same time, however, the Allied military forces were conducting refugee assistance and repatriation as part of their movement into Western Europe. SHAEF created the Refugee Displaced Persons and Welfare Branch, which was the first to care for displaced civilians in France, Belgium, and Italy as soon as these countries were liberated. Then the UNRRA acted under SHAEF direction and its activities were based on various political agreements, such as Yalta and Potsdam.¹⁶

SHAEF's main task consisted of repatriating people to Western European countries. They included 1.5 million German prisoners of war returned from Allied countries, 305,000 Dutch nationals, more than 298,000 Belgians, 26,000 Luxembourgais, 12,000 Danes and Norwegians, 851,000 Italians, 367,000 Czechs and Slovaks in Germany and German-occupied territories, and 443,000 Yugoslav nationals.¹⁷ All in all, about 5.25 million persons were repatriated by June 1945. By the end of the war, the Western Allies started transferring large numbers of nominally Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union. By November about 2.75 million people had been handed over, many of them against their will.¹⁸

Eastern European Refugees: The Work of the IRO

The forced repatriation of East European refugees was the darkest hour of the entire postwar refugee and DP experience. It reflected a naiveté among the Western Allies regarding the aims, long-range policies, and methods used by the Soviets. It also reflected a Western eagerness to avoid conflicts with the Soviets and an attitude of disregard for the consequences, including the obvious loss of human life. When forced repatriation was finally stopped, it had showed the value of ethnic solidarity. Were it not for the efforts of the second-generation Ukrainians from North America, particularly Canada, forced repatriation might have continued much longer.

In 1946 it became apparent that the DP problem would not be resolved by 1 July 1947, when UNRRA was scheduled to end its operations. The Western Allies insisted that the United Nations be involved in finding a solution to the problem. The United Nations General Assembly therefore approved the constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) on 15 December 1946 to go into effect in 1948. In the meantime, responsibility for the DPs was assumed by the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO).

The establishment of the IRO represented a shift from the policy of repatriation to that of resettlement. Debates during its formation also illustrated fundamental differences in the goals, policies, philosophies, and mentality of East and West. The Soviet Union and its satellites continued to insist that the function of

the relief agency should be repatriation, regardless of the wishes of the DPs themselves. They refused to contribute to the resettlement of the refugees. The Western powers agreed that the new organization should encourage repatriation, but refused to continue forcible repatriation and specified that the IRO's functions include resettlement in addition to identification and classification of refugees, provision of medical care, transportation, legal assistance, and political protection. The IRO constitution also gave a new, broader definition of the term "refugee." It specified that refusal to return home could justifiably derive from "persecution or fear, based on reasonable grounds, of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, providing that these opinions are not in conflict with the principles of the United Nations." In the end, eighteen countries ratified the IRO constitution and became members of the agency. Neither the Soviet Union nor any Eastern European country joined or supported its work.¹⁹

In the early period of the PCIRO some 50,000 DPs were repatriated to East European countries, but by 1948 repatriation stopped and the IRO began an energetic resettlement program. When the IRO assumed control, 794,735 displaced persons were still in camps in the Western zones of Germany and Austria and in Italy, while 242,669 lived outside the camps. The number of DPs the IRO looked after, however, was ultimately higher because there was an influx of new DPs who claimed to fall under the definitions specified by the IRO.²⁰

The agency tried to fit resettlement to the economic needs of the respective host countries. Contracts between prospective employers and refugees were used. Refugees would agree to work for one or more years, and the employer would thus become an official sponsor. Many voluntary organizations became middlemen or sponsored refugees on their own. They included the World Council of Churches, Lutheran World Federation, National Catholic Welfare Conference in the United States, National Committee for Free Europe, United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, and American Polish War Relief.

Some countries, such as Canada and Australia, were reluctant to open their doors wide to DPs, but ultimately admitted respectable numbers. The initiative and leadership came from the United States. It contributed more than half of the IRO's operating funds and, after passing the Displaced Persons Act in 1948, admitted the largest number of refugees. Thus, by December 1951 the United States had taken in 329,301 refugees; Australia, 182,159; Israel, 132,109; Canada, 123,479; the United Kingdom, 86,346; France, 38,445; Argentina, 32,712; Brazil, 28,848; Belgium, 22,477; Venezuela, 17,277; Paraguay, 5,887; Chile, 5,108; New Zealand, 4,837; the Netherlands, 4,355; Sweden, 4,330; Bolivia, 2,485; Peru, 2,340; Uruguay, 1,461; French Morocco, 1,446; Norway, 1,105; and other countries, 13,094. Among them were 357,437 Poles, 113,677 Ukrainians, 82,090 Yugoslavs, 81,215 Latvians, 62,001 Hungarians, 55,165

Lithuanians, 41,375 Russians, 34,900 Czechs and Slovaks, 27,096 Estonians, and 23,010 Romanians.²¹

Still, a "hard core" of more than 100,000 refugees who could not be resettled remained in Germany and Austria. In 1950 the German and Austrian governments assumed responsibility for these. New refugees began to appear, however, from East Germany and Eastern Europe. There were also refugees in other parts of the world, notably the Middle East, and before too long new refugees appeared in Southeast Asia. In 1949 the United Nations established the post of High Commissioner for Refugees to deal with the world refugee problem. The IRO was dissolved in 1951, and its place was taken by the High Commissioner. Unlike the IRO, he was not empowered to carry out resettlement. His task was only to inform world public opinion about the refugee problem and to persuade countries to admit refugees.²² Later, the High Commissioner took on the function of protecting the legal rights of the remaining refugees in Western Europe.

The DP Camps

While their fate was being decided, DPs and refugees lived in camps provided for them by the military authorities. The era of DP camp life can be roughly divided into four periods: 1945-6, 1946-8, 1948-51, and post-1951. The first period can be characterized as a time of fear and chaos. In spite of such conditions, or perhaps because of them, the refugees stayed together and organized their lives. In these camps the population varied from fewer than 100 to more than 10,000 people. Housing was severely overcrowded. Food rations were limited, but amounted to more than what the German population had to eat. Each camp had its own aid station and some small hospitals staffed by more than 2,500 DP physicians and 2,000 DP nurses. A small staff of IRO medical personnel helped to maintain the health of the DPs. The camps were also practically self-administered by the DPs through elected camp committees, which carried out UNRRA instructions, maintained order, and distributed rations.²³ Life in the camps, however, was seriously disturbed by the Soviet repatriation teams, which visited camps in all zones searching for DPs from Soviet areas.

After the repatriation phase, the second period might be defined as an attempt to establish a normal life under abnormal conditions. The DPs faced the problem of fulfilling their cultural and religious needs in their isolated enclaves by forming churches and theatres. The need for education led them to establish schools for the young, vocational training projects,²⁴ and language courses (English, Spanish, and Portuguese) for adults. Some young people attended German universities. Books and newspapers were published in the larger camps as early as 1945.

During this period IRO officials conducted intensive screening to check personal background data about the DPs as a basis for final resettlement plans.

Of the 625,000 screened, 340,000, or 54 per cent, were employable. The remainder were children under sixteen, mothers of young children, and a small number of the ill and disabled. Of the males of working age, 33 per cent were skilled workers, 25 per cent were agricultural workers, and about 13 per cent were professional people. Among employable women surveyed, 19 per cent were skilled workers, and the remainder were largely agricultural workers. Of the camp inhabitants, 85 per cent were under forty-five years of age.²⁵

The third period is distinguished by the appearance of “resettlement fever.” As early as 1947 the possibility of emigration to Belgium, Britain, and France became apparent. However, the main stream of the emigration movement did not commence until the passage of the Displaced Persons Act by the United States Congress on 25 June 1948. It provided for the entry of 205,000 DPs over a two-year period. Shortly before its expiration in 1950, the act was amended by liberalizing its eligibility provisions, increasing the maximum number admissible to 341,000, and extending it to 30 June 1951.²⁶ During this period most of the DPs left West Germany and Austria to seek new homes outside Europe.

The last period began with the consolidation of people of different nationalities into fewer camps after most DPs had been resettled. Since the selection for immigration had been carried out on narrow preferential grounds rather than on the basis of humanitarianism, a core of disabled, old, and “uneconomic” families with many children was left behind—174,300 persons as of 1 June 1949.²⁷ Some countries had demonstrated that even the more unfortunate could be resettled.²⁸ The excellent work of the Dominican Georges Pire on behalf of the hard-core DPs was recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1958.²⁹

The Camps as Communities

Most refugees were in the camps for less than five years. Yet, in spite of this relatively short period and inadequate living conditions, the camps became centres of social, political, and cultural activity and developed into veritable communities, each with its own character. Several reasons may explain this quick community development in the Ukrainian camps. First, like all migrants, refugees and DPs were uprooted people who had just gone through a harrowing war experience. The camps, by placing people in controlled proximity without the threat of punishment, provided an opportunity freely to exchange feelings and ideas about the war and thus to restructure their shattered world.

The most active of those who refused to be repatriated were political refugees. They had opposed the Soviet, or both the German and the Soviet, takeover of their homeland. Most of the Ukrainian refugees were from Western Ukraine. They represented that section of society which had tried to establish an independent Ukrainian state.³⁰ In Ukraine they had been involved in establishing new organizations, building up their membership, and developing or carrying out their programs. Also, between the wars, they were involved in developing

Ukrainian educational, cultural, literary, artistic, scholarly, and religious institutions. Most of them saw their work as unfinished, brutally interrupted or crushed by the invading powers. The camps provided an opportunity for them to continue that work. The new element in the camps that stimulated this activity was the relative freedom of expression, association, and worship.

The camps also became communities in a primary sense of the word. There were many relatively young people in the camps. The end of the war provided an emotional release for everybody. Romance, marriage, and childbirth became an everyday pattern and preoccupation. Although they lived in Germany and Austria, the refugees were to a large extent insulated from local society. Young people were socialized into a camp culture that melded Ukrainian cultural values and norms with a temporary, makeshift daily and institutional life. It also involved feelings of strong commitment to the cause of independent Ukrainian statehood. In many ways this culture protected refugee youth from the anomie or cynicism that to some degree had emerged in the vanquished German society, but it also made them accept as normal many patterns of behaviour and thought that were characteristic of transitional, unstable social units. Nevertheless, for many young people camp life was not an unpleasant growing experience.

Camp culture left its mark on the Ukrainian community even after resettlement. It also influenced the culture and community life of those Ukrainians already established in the lands of immigration—the United States, Canada, and Brazil. Many institutions and organizations established in the camps were transplanted along with the immigrants. In North America the full character of this change is yet to be assessed. It can only be understood when we first grasp what happened in the camps.

Notes

1. Statistics on the total number of persons displaced during and after World War II are generally estimates and differ depending on the source. M. J. Proudfoot gives the total of both displaced persons and refugees in 1944 in Western Europe (excluding Italy, the United Kingdom and other countries), as 10,366,000. In another context, he cites 11,078,000 (including Italy, the United Kingdom, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, and other countries) as persons requiring repatriation after the war. He also estimates that a total of 40,475,000 European civilians were forced to move during World War II. Of these, 33,060,400 moved within their own country; 6,653,700 moved outside their own country; and 760,950 escaped from German- and Soviet-controlled territory. L. W. Holborn estimated that in early 1945, in Greater Germany, there were between 21 and 30 million Germans displaced by the war and 8.5 million nationals of other European countries, including prisoners of war. See Malcolm J. Proudfoot, *European Refugees, 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movement* (London, 1957), 34, 116, 189; Louise W. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United Nations. Its History and*

- Work, 1946-1952* (Oxford, 1956), 15; and Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1985), 299.
2. Eugene M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe* (Montreal, 1943), 135.
 3. *Ibid.*, 139.
 4. *Ibid.*, 143.
 5. According to official Vichy statistics, they numbered 1,426,000. *Ibid.*, 145.
 6. *Ibid.*, 152.
 7. *Ibid.*, 153, 137, 127. William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York, 1960), 948.
 8. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe*, 155.
 9. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 79-81.
 10. *Ibid.*, 85-6.
 11. *Ibid.*, 603-4.
 12. *The Facts about Refugees* (Geneva, 1948), 2; Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 341; Marrus, *The Unwanted*, 308, 335.
 13. The UNRRA and IRO records, which are generally cited, can be assumed to under-represent the actual numbers. The figures cited here are taken from two sources: Walter Dushnyck and William J. Gibbons, S.J., *Refugees are People: The Plight of Europe's Displaced Persons* (New York, 1948), 13-39; and Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (New Haven, 1953), 59-101. The figure on Ukrainians is taken from Stebelsky's work in this volume. Dushnyck and Gibbons give a larger total number, 323,000. Their figure of 206,871 for Ukrainian displaced persons in Germany and Austria roughly corresponds to Vernant's figure of 201,000 for the same two countries. See also Ukrainian Canadian Committee, *Ukrainian Refugees* (Winnipeg, 1946).
 14. The UNRRA and IRO accepted a distinction between the terms "refugee" and "displaced person." Louise W. Holborn summarizes this distinction thus:

"Historically the term 'refugees' had been used to refer to persons who had left their country of nationality or residence because of fear of danger to their lives or liberties, on account of their race, religion, or political beliefs; or who, if already absent from their country of nationality or residence, did not return to it because of such fear. Refugees were usually stateless, lacking in law or in fact the protection of any government. Whether stateless or not, they were considered to be refugees until they became re-established in their former country of nationality or residence, or became newly established in another country—with the right of nationality or, at least, the right of settled residence.

"The term 'displaced persons' had been used to refer to persons who were obliged to leave their homes by reason of the Second World War, either for places elsewhere within their country of nationality or residence, or for places beyond its boundaries. Some of those displaced within their country of nationality or residence, and most of those displaced beyond its boundaries, had been obliged to leave their

homes by deliberate action of an enemy power, either for purposes of forced labour or because of race, religion, or activities in favour of the United Nations. Most of the displaced persons, even those internationally displaced, had been, and still were, possessed of nationality; but they were considered to be displaced persons if they had not yet returned to their homes or found new homes, in their former country of nationality or residence.

“As accepted by IRO, the term ‘refugee’ was to apply to recognized pre-war refugees; exiled Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist régime in Spain; victims of Nazi, Fascist, or quisling régimes; victims of racial, religious, or political persecution, and persons outside their countries of origin or former habitual residence who were unwilling or unable to avail themselves of the protection of the government of those countries. In addition, and as a special category, the term applied to unaccompanied children 16 years of age or under who were war orphans or whose parents had disappeared, and who were outside their own countries. The term ‘displaced persons’ applied to a person who had been obliged to leave his country as a result of the actions of Nazi and Fascist authorities.”

Holborn, however, adds: “This distinction between a refugee and a displaced person was an innovation in that it extended refugee status to people who legally speaking were not stateless and whose governments wanted them to return. However, by refusing to be repatriated, these displaced persons became refugees, and in reality the initial distinction lost its meaning. Once repatriation ceased, the Organization had under its mandate only refugees.”

See Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization*, 47-8, and “Constitution of the International Refugee Organization,” Annex I, Part I, Sections A, B, C, and D, *ibid.*, 584-6.

15. Marrus, *The Unwanted*, 317-24.
16. *Ibid.*, 309-10.
17. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 191-204; Marrus, *The Unwanted*, 310.
18. Marrus, *The Unwanted*, 310.
19. *Ibid.*, 340-3. U.S. Department of State Office of Public Affairs, *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents* (Washington, 1950), 127.
20. U.S. Congress, *House Miscellaneous Reports, 81st Congress, 2nd Session*, vol. 1 (Washington, 1950), 7. According to Vernant, on 1 July 1947, when the PCIRO began its operations, it was assisting 712,000 persons, of whom 636,000 had been taken over from the UNRRA. However, by 31 December 1951, the date of the IRO's liquidation, more than 900,000 additional displaced persons had been registered by the IRO. The total number of IRO-registered displaced persons was over 1,600,000. See Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 36. See also IRO Office of Statistics and Operational Reports, July 1947 to December 1951, Table I, 7-8; and statistics in Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 411.
21. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 427.
22. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 41.
23. *The Facts about Refugees*, 8.

24. Vocational trainees were enrolled in fifty or more courses of a practical, artisan nature. In addition to these, training was also given for nurses' aides, cooks, bakers, typists, and numerous other occupations.
25. *Ibid.*, 13-19.
26. *The American Yearbook* (New York, 1957), 9.
27. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 429.
28. Norway, for instance, had taken some 450 old or tubercular and 41 blind refugees along with their families. Sweden had accepted more than 700 refugees suffering from active tuberculosis and their 600 dependants. Another 300 were hired by the Swedish State Archives. Zellerbach Commission on the European Refugee Situation, *European Refugee Problems, 1959: A Special Report*, 28.
29. Through his organization, Aid to Displaced Persons, Pire sponsored the adoption of some 15,000 refugee families and built three "European Villages" in Austria, Belgium, and Germany for rehabilitation of disabled and infirm refugees. There were plans for the construction of several more villages at that time. *Ibid.*, 34-5; Nobelstiftelsen Stockholm, *Nobel: The Man and His Prizes* (Amsterdam, 1962), 627-8.
30. See Yury Boshyk, ed., *Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath: A Symposium* (Edmonton, 1986).

Context and Dimensions of the Problem

Ukrainian Political Refugees: An Historical Overview

Orest Subtelny

The phenomenon of people fleeing their homelands to escape oppression is as old as the struggle for power. In modern times, the political refugee has become ubiquitous. In defining the key characteristics of refugees, most scholars agree that political events in a refugee's homeland should, indeed must, be accompanied by persecution or the threat of persecution against the refugee or the section of the population with which he identifies himself.¹ Because scholars usually neglect lost causes, however, political emigrations have not, in general, received the attention they deserve. Yet the flight of some of a country's most accomplished and productive inhabitants is not only an important historical event in and of itself. The unique experiences and insights that often come with exile also make an exceedingly valuable contribution to the historical consciousness of a nation.

This survey of the history of the various Ukrainian political emigrations focusses primarily on the circumstances that gave rise to Ukrainian displaced persons. Examining the predecessors of the Ukrainian DPs both establishes continuity in the history of Ukrainian political emigrations and emphasizes the uniqueness of this most numerous wave of Ukrainian refugees. Establishing the historical precedents that guided Ukrainian émigrés—the political alternatives, threats, and problems they confronted and the goals they hoped to achieve—makes it possible to comprehend why hundreds of thousands of individuals who were most deeply committed to their homeland felt compelled to leave it.

I

The first Ukrainian political émigrés, in the modern sense of the word, were the so-called Mazepists—the followers of Hetman Ivan Mazepa—who fled abroad after his unsuccessful attempt to break away from Russia in 1708-9.² This “first generation” of Ukrainian political émigrés, led by Pylyp Orlyk, consisted of about fifty of the most prominent members of the Cossack elite, their families and servitors, and approximately 4,000 Zaporozhians. After a failed attempt to return, Orlyk and a small group of followers wandered about Europe for decades, informing European courts of their homeland’s plight and warning them about the “Russian menace.”³ It is noteworthy that Ukrainian DPs identified themselves closely with Orlyk’s group because it was the first that stood for Ukrainian self-determination, considered Russia their worst enemy, and left their homeland as a result of Russian victories over their western invaders.⁴

During the nineteenth century there were only a few Ukrainian émigrés. Unlike their Cossack-starshyna predecessors, these spokesmen for the Ukrainian cause were from a new class, the intelligentsia. The most outstanding émigré intellectual of this period was Mykhailo Drahomanov,⁵ who emigrated to Geneva, where he founded the first Ukrainian political journal. Aided by about half a dozen colleagues—the “Geneva circle”—Drahomanov strove to alert European public opinion to the injustices of tsarist rule. Because Drahomanov, unlike most émigrés, was able to maintain contact with his countrymen, especially those in Austrian-ruled Galicia, he exerted a powerful intellectual influence over Ukrainian youth.⁶ Indeed, Drahomanov was a rare example of an émigré who achieved more abroad than was possible at home.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, a small group of Ukrainian intellectuals from Russian-ruled Ukraine sought refuge in Galicia. When World War I broke out, they formed *Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy* (SVU—Union for the Liberation of Ukraine).⁷ The SVU had notable success in publicizing the cause of Ukrainian independence in Europe. Moreover, it was very effective in raising the poorly developed national consciousness of many Ukrainian prisoners-of-war who were interned in Germany and Austria.

With the outbreak of World War I, the politically motivated displacement of civilians was practised on an unprecedented scale. This displacement can be explained both by the greater control that governments exercised over their subjects and by the real or perceived politicization of the masses. That phenomenon encouraged governments to relocate large segments of a potentially or actually unreliable population. In the case of Ukrainians, because there was no independent Ukrainian state to look after their interests, they were especially vulnerable to the arbitrary actions of foreign-based governments. Moreover, in both world wars, Ukraine served as a major battleground for the Germans and

Russians. Hence Ukrainians were shifted about much more than other groups in Europe.

The first few weeks of World War I provided telling examples of this vulnerability to displacement. In Galicia Russian troops inflicted a series of defeats on the Austrian army. The humiliated Austrian and, even more, the Hungarian authorities, abetted by the largely Polish provincial administration, pointed to the presence of a small Russophile party among the Galician Ukrainians and accused them all of being disloyal to the Hapsburg Empire. As a result, thousands of Galician Ukrainians were interned in the infamous Talerhof camp in Austria.⁸ It was the first of the many concentration camps in which Ukrainians would be incarcerated during the twentieth century. Between 1914 and 1916, Talerhof held more than 14,000 prisoners, most of them bewildered and apolitical peasants from Galicia. Owing to brutal administration, famine, and disease, more than 2,000 inmates died in Talerhof before public indignation in Austria-Hungary and throughout Europe forced the closure of the camp.

The Russian invasion of Galicia also gave rise to a wave of Ukrainian refugees who followed the retreating Austrian troops westward. To house these people, the Vienna government established several refugee camps in the Austrian towns of Gmünd, Wolfsberg, and Grödig.⁹ Gmünd, the largest of these camps, contained about 15,000 refugees. These refugees from Galicia and Bukovyna quickly organized a network of elementary and secondary schools as well as cultural and civic institutions in the camps despite repeated and devastating epidemics of typhus that took the lives of thousands. In addition to the Ukrainian deportees in Talerhof and the refugees in Gmünd and the other camps, thousands of Ukrainian émigrés, mostly intelligentsia from Galicia and Bukovyna, settled in Vienna in 1914. That city became the centre of Ukrainian activities for the duration of the war.¹⁰

When the Russians occupied Galicia and Bukovyna in September 1914, they adopted a systematic and all-encompassing policy of mass deportations and evacuations.¹¹ Convinced that they had gained permanent control of Western Ukraine, the Russian administration resolved to crush the region's fast-growing Ukrainian movement—*Mazepinstvo*, the Russians called it. Within days of the Russian arrival, the Ukrainian press and all Ukrainian institutions were shut down. The occupation forces then began a manhunt for Ukrainian activists. They were rounded up and shipped, via Kiev, to such isolated parts of the Russian Empire as Tomsk, Irkutsk, Astrakhan, and Siberia. Along with their drive against the political and cultural manifestations of Ukrainianism, the Russians also launched a harsh attack on the Greek Catholic church. Hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were exiled to Russia, while their places were taken by Orthodox priests imported from the east. The most famous of these clerical deportees was Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, the head of the Greek Catholic Church and the most respected Ukrainian in Galicia.¹² Thus, Western Ukrainians were vulner-

able to large-scale uprooting, exile, and frequent death at the hands of Habsburg officials (usually Hungarian officers and Polish bureaucrats) on one side and the Russians on the other.

The uprooting of Western Ukrainians reached even greater proportions in 1917, when the Russian armies retreated from Galicia and Bukovyna. In line with their traditional "scorched-earth" policy, the Russians encouraged or forced hundreds of thousands of Western Ukrainian peasants to abandon their homes and move eastward. Uncounted thousands perished from exposure, malnutrition, and disease. Those who survived returned, months later, to their demolished homes. During their retreat, the Russians also took about 150 prominent Galician citizens as hostages. Many of them never returned to their homes.¹³

World War I created yet another, very large, category of displaced Ukrainians—prisoners of war. Most Western Ukrainians who served in the Austrian army fought on the Italian front, and those who were captured were interned in Italy. Thousands more Western Ukrainians were captured and imprisoned in Russia. They were scattered throughout the Russian Empire and therefore could not engage in any organized, co-ordinated activities. When the Bolshevik Revolution broke out in November 1917, however, many of them escaped and made their way to Kiev, where they played a prominent role in the struggle for Ukrainian statehood.

In Germany and Austria, the situation of the Ukrainian prisoners was quite different. Convinced by the SVU that an independent Ukrainian state was in their interests, the Germans and Austrians agreed, as early as 1915, to form separate prisoner-of-war camps for Ukrainians.¹⁴ In these camps the members of SVU were allowed to prepare the largely illiterate soldiers for service in a potential Ukrainian state. In Germany there were three such Ukrainian camps—Rastatt, Wetzlar, and Salzwedel—with a combined total of about 50,000 inmates. In Austria, the camp in Freistadt contained about 30,000 men. Under the guidance of SVU these camps, which functioned from 1915 to 1918, became thriving centres of Ukrainian life. The prisoners elected their own camp administration and organized schools, libraries, drama groups, choirs, vocational courses, and churches. Great emphasis was placed on raising the level of national consciousness among the inmates. As a result, when the Germans and Austrians began to organize military units among the prisoners that could be put at the service of the newly established Ukrainian state in Kiev, volunteers were not lacking.¹⁵ By 1917 more than 200,000 Ukrainians serving in the Russian army had been interned in Austrian and German prisoner-of-war camps.

After the attempt to establish an independent Ukrainian state in 1917-20 failed, great numbers of Ukrainians fled abroad. Most of them were military personnel of the Ukrainian Galician and Ukrainian People's Republic (*Ukrainska Narodna Respublika*, UNR) armies. They were interned, respectively, in

Czechoslovakia and Poland. A minority of the émigrés was made up of civilians, mostly officials (and their families) of the Western Ukrainian and UNR governments. These people—estimated in 1921 at about 100,000—were political émigrés in the true sense of the word.¹⁶ Approximately 25-30 per cent of the émigrés were Galicians—adherents of the Western Ukrainian government of Evhen Petrushevych—who had fought the Poles and continued to consider them the primary enemy. The other 70-75 per cent were Eastern Ukrainians—mostly supporters of the UNR and Symon Petliura—who, in alliance with the Poles, had fought against the Bolsheviks. The Eastern Ukrainians also included leaders of the Central Rada, such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and the Skoropadsky government. To a great extent these Western and Eastern Ukrainian émigrés went their separate ways while abroad. The former gathered in Czechoslovakia, while the latter were initially interned in Poland. In both cases, however, their early years abroad were spent in internment camps.

The Galicians were the first to leave their homeland. In May 1919 a 5,000-man unit of the Ukrainian Galician Army, cut off from the main force by a Polish offensive, crossed into Czechoslovakia. Initially, these men were interned in camps at Deutsch-Gabel (Německé Jablonné) and Reichenberg (Liberec).¹⁷ Later, when their numbers were swelled by stragglers, they were moved to Josephstadt (Josefov). The Czechs, who maintained a friendly neutrality toward the Western Ukrainian government, allowed the Galicians to retain their military command structure and exercise autonomy in the camps. Because they believed that soon they would return to their homeland to fight again, the interned soldiers maintained their military preparedness and discipline. As the likelihood of a return faded, however, the numerous camp organizations turned to educational and cultural activities. They concentrated especially on the elimination of illiteracy, because about 30 per cent of the soldiers could not read or write. For most Galicians, exile came to an end in 1923. That year the Council of Ambassadors formally recognized Polish control over Galicia. Thousands of Western Ukrainians decided to return home. Many die-hards refused to live under Polish rule, however, and remained in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany as students or emigrated to North America.

It was the far more numerous Eastern Ukrainian émigrés who set the tone of the post-1920 emigration. In November 1920, when the army of the UNR crossed into Polish-held territory, it was interned in a series of camps located near Wadowice, Piotrków, Aleksandrów Kujawski, Łańcut, Strzalków, Kalisz, and Szczypiorno. Meanwhile, the officials of UNR, their families, and Petliura himself gathered in the Polish town of Tarnów. While some of the refugees accepted Bolshevik offers of amnesty and repatriation, the vast majority did not. By 1922 there were more than 40,000 Eastern Ukrainians in Poland alone. Thousands more were scattered in Czechoslovakia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and France.

Like the Galicians in Czechoslovakia, the Eastern Ukrainians in Poland enjoyed far-reaching autonomy in their camps.¹⁸ They maintained their military structure and organized an exceedingly wide range of activities to keep up morale. They formed committees and organizations for educational work, publishing, scholarly and cultural activities, sports, and physical fitness. In all the camps there were Orthodox churches and brotherhoods. The larger camps also had thriving co-operative movements. By far the most popular activities in the camps were educational and cultural. Illiteracy was as high among the Eastern Ukrainians as it was among the Galicians, and the drive to eliminate it was conducted with great vigour and success.¹⁹ Cultural activity was also encouraged. Inspired by Oleksander Koshyts and his internationally acclaimed Ukrainian Republican Choir, almost every unit in the camps established its own choir. In Kalisz the dynamic Vasyl Avramenko began the tradition of Ukrainian dance companies. Theatrical troupes were also widespread. This diverse activity did not completely shield the interned soldiers from the pain of defeat and exile, but it did keep their spirits higher than those of the generally depressed and apathetic civilian refugees who lived on their own in a foreign, Polish environment.

By 1923-4 the Eastern Ukrainian émigrés reached a point encountered by all émigrés: they had to abandon their temporary, ad hoc shelters and venture into the mainstream of their host societies. The Poles encouraged this shift by withdrawing financial support and diplomatic recognition from the UNR government, by dismantling the camps, and by advising the Ukrainian émigrés to seek refuge elsewhere. Because the Czechs remained hospitable, most of the émigrés moved on to Czechoslovakia, and it quickly became the centre of the Eastern Ukrainian (“Petliurist”) emigration. Not all émigrés, however, were willing to continue living in exile. Encouraged by Soviet promises and the newly instituted policy of promoting Ukrainian culture, a small but prominent segment of the emigration, led by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, returned to Soviet Ukraine.²⁰ Again, repatriation became an issue of controversy and debate among the émigrés. The legal status of those who decided against returning to the USSR was clarified, largely thanks to the efforts of Fridtjof Nansen, who served as head of the League of Nations Office for Refugees. He arranged for the issuance of the “Nansen passports,” which placed all émigrés from the former Russian Empire under the protection of the League of Nations.

Only one generation separated the DPs of the 1940s from the émigrés of the 1920s, and the relationship between these two emigrations was a close one. In the interwar period, many Eastern Ukrainian émigrés settled in Polish-dominated eastern Galicia and Volhynia, and especially in Czech-administered Transcarpathia. Their presence helped accustom many Western Ukrainians to the idea of politically motivated emigration, especially if it were undertaken to avoid Soviet domination. Moreover, many of the émigrés of the 1920s became the DPs of the

1940s. Thus, when World War II broke out, political emigration, refugee camps, and émigré life were hardly novel considerations for many Ukrainians.

II

Although World War I taught Europeans that modern warfare was likely to cause massive displacements of non-combatants, few imagined that the next world war would produce such horrifying statistics as 30 million fatalities, 30 million refugees in Europe, 5-6 million Jews exterminated, 16 million Germans expelled from their homes, and 8-10 million non-Germans forced to work as slave labourers in Germany. The primary agent of the unprecedented, massive destruction and uprooting of peoples that occurred in 1939-45 was totalitarianism. Positioned between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Eastern Europeans were exposed to both totalitarian regimes. Both regimes were ideologically primed and technically able to employ the most drastic means to attain their goals. Therefore, when they clashed in Eastern Europe, the region experienced the most massive upheaval that the world had ever seen.

During the Nazi-Soviet conflict, Ukraine served as a major theatre of war. It was, however, not only military concerns that drew the attention of the Nazis and Soviets to Ukraine. In Hitler's plans for a "New Europe," rich, fertile Ukraine was to provide *Lebensraum* ("living space"). Therefore, removing or exterminating the native, "racially inferior" population was desirable. Stalin was also greatly concerned about Ukraine because it was an extremely important component of the Soviet economic system. It was also, from his point of view, a politically unreliable area, because it was in Soviet Ukraine that the peasantry offered the greatest resistance to collectivization in the early 1930s and that the intelligentsia, despite the sweeping purges of the late 1930s, continued to nurture nationalist tendencies. When the Soviets occupied Galicia and Bukovyna in 1939, they discovered that Western Ukrainians were much more nationalistic, and therefore anti-Soviet, than their brethren in the east.

Of all the Ukrainians who were displaced by World War II, those who best fit the definition of political refugees were the DPs who congregated in Germany and Austria. Many of them went to Germany voluntarily, while many others were brought by force. When the war ended, many of them refused to return to their homeland because it was Soviet-dominated. The timing, rationale, and circumstances that governed the departure of the various subgroups of refugees from Ukraine varied considerably.

Phase One: Fall 1939

The first wave of Ukrainian émigrés of World War II appeared in September 1939. As Soviet troops moved into Western Ukraine, 20,000-30,000 Western Ukrainians fled to the *Generalgouvernement* (the German-occupied part of Poland west of the San River).²¹ Most of these refugees were intelligentsia or

students who were involved in Ukrainian social, cultural or political organizations. Members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) were especially numerous. The influx of thousands of young, energetic, and experienced activists into the south-eastern fringe of the *Generalgouvernement*, which was inhabited by 500,000-700,000 politically and socio-economically underdeveloped Ukrainian peasants, mobilized Ukrainian activity in the region. In November, the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC), headed by Volodymyr Kubijovyč, was founded in Cracow.²² The goal of that organization was both to aid Ukrainian refugees and prisoners of war in the *Generalgouvernement* and to raise the socio-economic and cultural level of the Ukrainian peasantry in the Kholm, Podlachia, and Lemko regions of German-occupied Poland. Soon these areas were covered by a network of schools, vocational courses, co-operatives, and cultural, youth, and religious organizations, largely staffed by the recent émigrés, whose work was co-ordinated by the UCC. Cracow became the centre of the UCC leadership and activity. Many of the OUN leaders were also based there.

While those émigrés with a higher education found employment in the many branches and sectors of the UCC, the less educated refugees, as well as many Ukrainian peasants from the *Generalgouvernement*, voluntarily moved to Germany as foreign labourers. In the first years of the war, the Germans treated their foreign labourers relatively well: their pay was equal to that of German workers; living conditions were bearable; and few legal restrictions were placed on them. By 1941 there were almost 100,000 Ukrainian workers in Germany. The early Ukrainian labourers in Germany were even allowed to establish their own cultural organizations. The largest of these was the Ukrainian National Alliance (UNO),²³ which was under the influence of the OUN.

Although the emigration of 1939 served as a precedent, it was primarily Soviet behaviour in Western Ukraine in 1939-41 that contributed most directly to the exodus of Western Ukrainians that occurred in 1944.²⁴ When they first arrived in September 1939, the Soviets attempted to create a favourable impression. They staged a carefully orchestrated election, Ukrainized the educational system, removed Polish landlords and colonists, distributed land to the peasants (while preparing to collectivize it), and provided access to many occupations and positions that had previously been out of Ukrainian reach. The Soviets simultaneously imposed their administrative system, party control, Marxist ideology, and the omnipresent secret police. They abolished the prewar political parties and disbanded the social, cultural, and economic organizations and institutions that Western Ukrainians had laboriously built up over generations. Many of the generally respected Ukrainian leaders of the prewar period were arrested and deported. As a result, antagonism toward the Soviets remained strong and widespread. This antagonism was greatly exacerbated in June 1941, when the retreating NKVD indiscriminately massacred its political prisoners. An estimated 10,000 Western Ukrainians perished.²⁵ As the mounds of corpses were

uncovered, many Western Ukrainians, overwhelmed by revulsion and hatred of the Soviets, resolved that they would never again accept Soviet rule.

Phase Two: 1941-3

By late October 1941, four months after the Germans invaded the USSR, their forces occupied almost all of Ukraine. Many Ukrainians expected things to improve under German rule. Peasants hoped that the Germans would abolish the hated collective farms, while the intelligentsia expected some form of genuine Ukrainian self-government. Thousands of young Western Ukrainian nationalists, many of them the émigrés of 1939, were eager to establish Ukrainian influence and administration, so they followed the German armies into Soviet Ukraine.²⁶ Meanwhile, members of the repressed Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia—those who managed to avoid the massive Soviet evacuation to the east—came forward to head the local administration, publish newspapers, form co-operatives, and organize cultural and scholarly activities. Hundreds of churches and parishes, headed by a reconstituted Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy, came to life again.

As the relatively liberal German military administration moved eastward with the front lines, however, and the Nazi civil administration—staffed by some of Hitler's most fanatical, arrogant, and inept bureaucrats—took over, the hopes of Ukrainians were quickly and brutally dashed. The Nazis subdivided Ukraine into administrative units: Galicia was attached to the *Generalgouvernement*; central Ukraine, including Kiev, became the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*; Bukovyna and part of south-western Ukraine were handed over to the Romanians; and easternmost Ukraine remained under German military administration. The Nazi bureaucracy made it clear that it had no intention of even considering Ukrainian national or socio-economic needs and, throughout 1941-4, the Gestapo systematically arrested and executed Ukrainian activists.

With characteristically brutal directness, *Reichskommissar* Koch informed the populace that Ukraine was a colony of the German Reich and that the sole function of the Ukrainians was to work for and obey their Nazi overlords. The most hated and widespread expression of these attitudes was the infamous *Ostarbeiter* program, which called for the massive transport of millions of former Soviet subjects to Germany to buttress the German work force.²⁷ Unlike the Western Ukrainian workers who came voluntarily in 1939-40, however, *Ostarbeiter* were treated as *Untermenschen*. Their wage was at best one-third that of the lowest-paid German worker, and most of it went to pay for the abysmally primitive, crowded quarters and starvation-level rations that they received. A host of demeaning restrictions, enforced by the police, included strict curfews, prohibitions against using public transportation and entering German stores, and the requirement that all *Ostarbeiter* wear the despised *Ost* insignia. In short, *Ostarbeiter* became synonymous with slave labour.²⁸

The *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* became the main source of *Ostarbeiter*. Beginning in the spring of 1942, when the program began to operate in full force, a steady stream of train transports crammed with young Ukrainians flowed to Germany. Because few volunteered for the program, Nazi authorities regularly organized massive manhunts. Often people were taken by German troops as they came out of churches or gathered at bazaars and other public places and were shipped off to the west. In other cases, the local administration was saddled with the painful duty of filling labour quotas that the Nazis set. In the thirty months that the Nazis ruled Ukraine, well over two million Ukrainians were forced to become *Ostarbeiter*.²⁹ In addition, millions of Soviet prisoners of war, a large percentage of whom were Ukrainians, were also employed as slave labourers in Hitler's Reich. Thus, Ukrainians were the largest group among the approximately 8-10 million foreign workers in Germany and Austria.

As might be expected, the vast majority of Ukrainians turned against the Nazi regime, yet it was not always possible to boycott or refuse to co-operate with it. In order to feed their families, many Ukrainians, especially from the intelligentsia, accepted low-level employment in the local bureaucracy, school system, co-operatives, and newspapers. Many young men became policemen rather than be sent to do forced labour in Germany. Thus, because of these contacts with the Germans, the number of Ukrainians who could not afford to fall into Soviet hands increased markedly.

Soldiers of the Galician Division were another important segment of the population that had to avoid capture by the Soviets.³⁰ In 1943, when it was already obvious that Germany could not win the war, the UCC concluded that in the chaos that would follow the German retreat, Ukrainians would need a regular, well-trained military force to protect their interests. To a great extent, this conclusion rested on the bitter memories many older Ukrainians had of the upheaval and Ukrainian military weakness at the end of World War I. Therefore, in the summer of 1943 the UCC agreed to the creation of a Ukrainian Waffen-SS (front-line) division that would fight only against the Soviets, not the Western Allies. From among 80,000 volunteers about 14,000, mostly Galicians, were accepted into the division. After this unit was badly mauled by the Soviets in July 1944, the Ukrainian leadership had the unit deployed to that part of the front where, without engaging the Western Allies in combat, it could surrender to them. Eventually these soldiers of the Galician Division became a significant part of the postwar Ukrainian emigration.

Two other categories of Ukrainians who found their way to Germany and Austria during the war were students and concentration-camp inmates. Among the most fortunate Ukrainians during the war were the several thousand students—almost exclusively from the less despotically administered *General-gouvernement*—who were given the opportunity to study at German universities.³¹ Among the least fortunate Ukrainians were those uncounted thousands

who were incarcerated in German concentration camps.³² Many of those who survived also chose not to return to their homeland after the war.

Phase Three: 1943-4

In the fall of 1943 the Soviet counter-offensive rolled into Eastern Ukraine, setting off the final wave of westward emigration, consisting primarily of the non-communist Ukrainian elite—professors, teachers and other professionals, artists, writers, and clergy. These groups, which were most vulnerable to Soviet persecution, were joined by merchants, wealthier peasants, and those who had already been persecuted by the Soviets or who were associated with the German administration. Intense revulsion toward the Soviet system was usually the single most decisive factor that led to the exodus.

Most of the many thousands of Eastern Ukrainians who joined the German retreat either found their way blocked by Soviet partisans or were apprehended by Soviet armies. In the fall and winter of 1943, about 10,000 members of the Eastern Ukrainian intelligentsia arrived in Galicia, which was still relatively safe and stable.³³ Three occupational groups were well represented: the Orthodox clergy (led by their hierarchy), the artistic community (including entire theatre companies), and scholars (among whom specialists in the humanities and social sciences were most numerous). Members of the well-organized Ukrainian community of Kharkiv were also prominent among the refugees. Since the UCC in Galicia was still functioning, it helped evacuate many Eastern Ukrainians and assisted them in finding work and accommodations in Galicia.

As German defences crumbled, however, it became clear that the stay in Galicia would be brief. In the summer of 1944, Soviet armies reached the borders of Galicia. It was now the turn of the Western Ukrainians to join the flight westward. Because they were closer to the west and had had more time to prepare, many more Western than Eastern Ukrainians managed to escape the Soviet onslaught. Primarily the intelligentsia, merchants, and prosperous peasants fled, but the families of members of the Galician Division, staff of the UCC, and Ukrainian members of the local German administration—mayors, civil servants and members of the auxiliary police—were included among these refugees. Although the OUN advised its members to remain and prepare to resist the Soviets, some of its best-known leaders either joined the flight or were dispatched to the West to establish contacts with the Allies. Close to 200 Uniate priests also emigrated, but the vast majority, following the example of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, stayed with their parishioners to share their fate. In sum, and this is only a very rough estimate, about 120,000 Western Ukrainians left their homeland in the summer of 1944.³⁴

The refugees did not flee in a compact, organized body. Families travelled singly or in small groups. Because the German military monopolized most means of locomotion, transportation was an immediate and universal problem. Initially,

people travelled by foot or horse-drawn wagons, but very rarely by car or truck. Later, with the help of contacts, bribes, entreaties or luck, most gained access to rough transport trains. At the outset, many believed that the Germans would counter-attack and the refugees would be able to return to their homes. Therefore in the first stage of their flight, in the late summer and fall of 1944, thousands of refugees paused on the westernmost fringes of Galicia, in towns such as Sambir, Turka, and, most frequently, Krynica. Others crossed illegally into Slovakia and Hungary and awaited developments there. When, in the fall of 1944, it became evident that the Soviet offensive could not be halted, these refugees abandoned the last patches of Ukrainian soil and began the long trek to Germany. The rationale for choosing Germany, and especially Bavaria, was formulated by Kost Pankivsky, one of the leaders of the UCC:

We were conscious of the fact that the Bolsheviks would not stop at the borders of Galicia, nor would they halt in Czechoslovakia or Poland.... None of us imagined at the time that Bavaria would become the main haven for refugees from all over Eastern Europe. We only knew that Bavaria, agricultural and centrally located, was the most appropriate area for us.... Many Galicians, especially those of the older generations, looked to former imperial Vienna. But Austria...was too insecure and too close to the east.³⁵

When World War II came to an end, Germany teemed with many millions of foreigners, more than two million of whom were Ukrainians. The overwhelming majority of these Ukrainians were *Ostarbeiter*, mostly young girls and boys who had been forcibly torn from their families and subjected to years of exhausting labour and demeaning treatment. During the repatriation process, most of the *Ostarbeiter* returned, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the USSR, but about 220,000 Ukrainians refused to return to Soviet-dominated Ukraine. They became the Ukrainian DPs.

The minority of these Ukrainian DPs, between 30 and 40 per cent, was made up of political refugees who fled from the Soviets. The majority were workers who were brought to Germany and decided not to return to their homes. The political refugees generally had university or secondary educations and, for the most part, arrived in Germany with their families. The workers who became refugees were generally poorly educated, young, single people, predominantly male. There was another distinction between the refugees that cut across the intelligentsia-worker division: approximately two-thirds of the Ukrainians were from Galicia and belonged to the Greek Catholic Church; the remaining one-third were Eastern Ukrainians and mostly Orthodox. Other important sub-groups among the DPs were the members of the "Petliurist" emigration of 1920, Ukrainian students in Germany, former Soviet prisoners of war who did not wish to return home, and released concentration camp inmates. In Italy, about 14,000 interned members of the Galician Division formed another significant part of the Ukrainian emigration. In 1948 the DPs were joined by several hundred Ukrainian

Insurgent Army fighters who fought their way from the Carpathians through the length of Czechoslovakia to Germany.³⁶

Thus, this largest political emigration in Ukrainian history, a diverse assemblage of all segments of Ukrainian society, was produced by extraordinary times and circumstances. Thrown together into the confined quarters of the DP camps, these representatives of Ukraine's various regional, religious, cultural, and political traditions did not always get along well together, but their experience constituted a unique chapter in Ukrainian history.

Notes

1. See Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (London, 1953), 6.
2. For recent studies of the Mazepist émigrés see Orest Subtelny, *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Eighteenth Century* (Boulder, 1981), and my "Mazepists and Stanisławists: The First Ukrainian and Polish Emigrés," in Peter Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980), 83-96. Older studies of the Mazepists include Nikolai Kostomarov, *Mazepa i Mazepintsy* (St. Petersburg, 1885); Borys Krupnytsky, *Hetman Pylyp Orlyk: Ohliad ioho politychnoi diialnosti*, vol. XLII of *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu* (Warsaw, 1938); and E. Borschak, *Hryhor Orlyk, France's Cossack General* (Toronto, 1956).
3. Another wave of anti-tsarist Ukrainian Cossack émigrés appeared in 1775, when the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed by Russian troops. About 5,000 Zaporozhians fled to the Ottoman empire, where the Ottoman Porte granted them refuge and allowed them to settle at the mouth of the Danube (present-day Dobrudja). There they built a new *sich* and continued their traditional lifestyle. In 1828, 1,500 of the Zaporozhians returned to the Russian Empire and were eventually resettled in the Kuban. Those Zaporozhians who remained under Ottoman rule were severely punished for the behaviour of their comrades, and their *sich* was destroyed. See Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History*, ed. and updated by Oleh W. Gerus (Winnipeg, 1975), 478-81.
4. Some examples of this tendency were the popular journal *Orlyk*, which was published in the Berchtesgaden DP camp; the dance group Orlyk, which was established by Ukrainian émigrés in Manchester, England, in 1949; and the Orlyk DP camp in Bavaria.
5. For an overview of Drahomanov's activities abroad see M. Hrushevsky, *Z pochatkiv ukrainskoho sotsialistychnoho rukhu: Drahomaniv i zhenevskiy sotsialistychniy hurtok* (Vienna, 1922); M. Vozniak, "Do istorii misii Drahomanova," *Ukraina* (January-February 1929); K. Studynsky, "Persha zustrich Drahomanova z halytskymy studentamy," *Ukraina*, nos. 2-3 (1926); and M. Pavlyk, *Mykhailo Petrovych Drahomanov 1841-1895: Ieho iubilei, smert, avtobiohrafia i spys tvoriv* (Lviv, 1896).

6. See M. Pavlyk, *Mykhailo Drahomanov i ioho rolia v rozvoiu Ukrainy* (Lviv, 1907); and Y. Bilinsky, "Mykhailo Drahomanov, Ivan Franko and the Relations between the Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences* 7, nos. 1-2 (1959): 1542-66.
7. A first-hand account of the SVU is O. Skoropys-Ioltukhovsky, "Moi 'zlochyny,'" *Khliborobska Ukraina*, nos. 2-4 (1920-1): 191-237. See also R. Rozdolsky, "Do istorii SVU," *Ukrainskyi samostiinyk*, nos. 137-42 (1969); and *Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy 1914-1918: Viden* (New York, 1979).
8. Austrian archival materials dealing with Vienna's policy in Eastern Galicia in 1914 may be found in T. Hornykiewicz, ed., *Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914-1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergrunde*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1966), 26-55. See also V. K. Osechynsky, "Avstriyskyi viiskovo-politseyskyi teror v Halychyni pid chas Pershoi svitovoi viiny," *Naukovi zapysky Lvivskoho derzhavnoho universytetu* 6 (1957): 65-81; V. Makovsky, *Talerhof: Spohady i dokumenty* (Lviv, 1934); and B. Svitlynsky, "Avstro-Uhorshchyna i Talerhof," in *Voennyi prestupleniia Gabsburgskoi monarchii, 1914-1917 gg.: Galitskaia golgofa* (Trumbull, Ct., 1964), which is a reprint of the rare four-volume Lviv edition that appeared in 1924-32.
9. For a description of conditions in Gmünd see V. Makovsky, *Gmünd: Tabir ukrainskykh zbihtsiv i vyhnantsiv u chasy svitovoi viiny 1914-1918 rr.* (Lviv, 1935).
10. For a discussion of the political activity of these émigrés in Vienna see K. Levytsky, *Istoriia vyzvolnykh zmahan halytskykh ukraintsiv z chasu svitovoi viiny, 1914-1918*, part III (Lviv, 1930), 518-40.
11. An informative account of the Russian occupation of Galicia is D. Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro nedavnie-mynule (1914-1920)*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1969). See also I. Petrovych [Krypiakievych], *Halychyna pidchas rosiiskoi okupatsii: Serpen 1914-cherven 1915* (Lviv, 1915). An Austrian evaluation of Ukrainian behaviour during the Russian occupation is "Verhalten der Ukrainer und Polen während der russ. Invasion," in Hornykiewicz, *Ereignisse in der Ukraine*, 56-72.
12. Secret Russian plans for the liquidation of the Greek Catholic church in Galicia are in S. Iefremov, "Do istorii 'Halytskoi Ruiny,' 1914-1915 rr.," *Ukraina*, no. 4 (1924): 127-44; and M. Kornylovych, "Plany 'vozsoiedyneniia halytskykh uniiativ' v 1914-1915 rr.," *Ukraina*, no. 3 (1925): 144-52. According to Austrian authorities, only about thirty of approximately 3,000 Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests went over to the Orthodox church. See Hornykiewicz, *Ereignisse in der Ukraine*, 79. Metropolitan Sheptytsky spent about two years in enforced seclusion in the Spaso-Efimov monastery in Suzdal. Other details of his exile may be found in Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro nedavnie-mynule*, 35.
13. For more information concerning the hostages see Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro nedavnie-mynule*, 96-146.
14. The SVU activity in the prisoner-of-war camps is discussed in *Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy 1914-1918: Viden* (New York, 1979). See also W. Bihl, "Österreich-Ungarn und der 'Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraina'," in *Österreich und Europa: Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag* (Graz-Vienna-Köln, 1965), 505-26; and his "Die Tätigkeit des ukrainischen Revolutionärs Mykola Zaliznjak in Österreich-Ungarn,"

- Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, N. F. XIII (Wiesbaden, 1965): 226-30. For the memoirs of one of the SVU leaders, see O. Skoropys-Ioltukhovsky, "Moi 'zlochyny'," *Khliborobska Ukraina*, nos. 2-4 (Vienna, 1920-1): 191-237.
15. In March 1918 the Germans trained and dispatched to Ukraine two divisions of *Syniozhupannyky* (blue coats). Because of the rapidly changing political situation in Ukraine, however, these units were disbanded. Another division—formed in Austria and popularly called the *Sirozhupannyky* (grey coats)—was also sent to Kiev and rendered valuable service to the Ukrainian state.
 16. The fullest treatment of this "Petliurist" emigration is S. Narizhny, *Ukrainska emigratsiia: Kulturna pratsia ukrainskoi emigratsii mizh dvoma svitovymy viinamy* (Prague, 1942). For information about the Ukrainian émigrés during the interwar period see also V. Kubijovyč, ed., *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1963), 859-69. Insights into the concerns and conditions of life of the émigrés may be found in I. Korovytsky, ed., *Lysty Dmytra Doroshenka do Viacheslava Lypynskoho* (Philadelphia, 1973); and in such memoirs as Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro nedavnie-mynule*; E. Onatsky, *U vichnomu misti: Zapysky ukrainskoho zhurnalista, 1931-1932* (Toronto, 1981); and M. Kovalevsky, *Pry dzhherelakh borotby: Spomyny, vrazhennia, refleksii* (Innsbruck, 1960). Information about the political activity of the interwar émigrés may be found in *Ievhen Konovalts ta ioho doba* (Munich, 1974), 619-849, 907-27. See also S. Mikulicz, *Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw, 1971).
 17. Narizhny, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 53-70.
 18. *Ibid.*, 33-52.
 19. In Łańcut, an excellent *gymnasium*, staffed by many noted émigré scholars, was established, and a "people's university" offered a wide variety of lectures.
 20. For a discussion of Hrushevsky's reasons for returning to Soviet Ukraine, see L. Wynar, ed., *Avtobiohrafia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho z 1926 roku* (New York-Munich-Toronto, 1981), 36-9. For a Soviet view of this episode, see F. P. Shevchenko, "Chomu Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi povernuvsia na Radiansku Ukrainu?," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (1966): 13-30. See also T. M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987).
 21. See V. Kubijovyč, *Ukrainci v Heneralnii Hubernii, 1939-1941: Istoriia Ukrainskoho tsentralnoho komitetu* (Chicago, 1975), 47. It should be noted that the Hungarian invasion of the short-lived Carpatho-Ukrainian state that occurred just prior to World War II, in March 1939, also produced a wave of émigrés. Seeking to avoid Hungarian occupation, several thousand Carpatho-Ukrainians sought refuge in Slovakia, Moravia, Bohemia and Germany. In 1939-40 an additional 15-20,000 Carpatho-Ukrainians fled to Soviet-occupied Galicia. But instead of finding refuge, most of these émigrés were incarcerated in Siberian labour camps. In 1943 several thousand survivors of the camps were allowed to join a Czechoslovak corps in the Soviet Army and fought their way back to their homeland. See Peter Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine, 1919-1939* (New York, 1971), 385-8; Vasyi Markus, *L'Incorporation de l'Ukraine subcarpathique à l'Ukraine soviétique, 1944-1945* (Louvain, 1956), 25; Ivan Vanat, "Zakarpatski

- ukraintsi v chekho-slovatskomu viisku v SSSR," *Naukovyi zbirnyk MUKS*, vol. 2 (Bratislava-Prešov-Svidník), 183-201.
22. The fullest treatment of the activity of the Ukrainian Central Committee is the work by its leader, Kubijovyč, *Ukraintsi v Heneralnii Hubernii*. See also the works of Kubijovyč's close associate, K. Pankivsky, *Vid derzhavy do komitetu* (New York-Toronto, 1957); *Roky nimetskoj okupatsii* (New York-Toronto, 1965); and *Vid komitetu do derzhavnohu tsentru* (New York-Toronto, 1968).
 23. The Ukrainske Natsionalne Obiednannia (Ukrainian National Alliance, UNO) was founded in Berlin in 1933. However, it did not grow in numbers until 1937, when it adopted a nationalist platform. During World War II, and especially after the influx of voluntary workers from Western Ukraine into Germany after 1939, the UNO became the largest Ukrainian organization in Germany. By 1942, it had over 42,000 members and 354 local chapters. In 1944 its membership reached 57,000. The main goal of the organization was to look after the welfare of the Ukrainian workers. It also addressed their educational and cultural needs. By 1942 the UNO had organized 230 vocational courses, 94 cultural groups, 97 libraries and reading rooms, and 1,107 concerts and lectures. Its newspaper, *Ukrainskyi visnyk*, had a press run of 15,000 copies. The leadership of the UNO consisted to a large extent of post-1920 émigrés. Another, and much smaller, Ukrainian organization in Germany was *Ukrainska Hromada* (roughly 6,000 members), which was dominated by the followers of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. For an informative discussion of the UNO see V. Maruniak, "Ukrainske hromadske zhyttia v Nimechchyni pid chas druhoi svitovoi viiny," in *Nepohasnyi ohon viry: Zbirnyk na poshanu polkovnyka Andriia Melnyka* (Paris, 1974), 309-51.
 24. For a discussion of Soviet policies in Western Ukraine in 1939-41 see the valuable collection of memoirs edited by M. Rudnytska, *Zakhidna Ukraina pid bolshevykamy* (New York, 1958). See also H. Vashchenko, "'Vyzvolennia' Zakhidnoi Ukrainy bolshevykamy," *Ukrainskyi zbirnyk* 1 (Munich, 1954): 67-77. Polish accounts of the Soviet occupation are also informative: W. Studnicki, *Das östliche Polen* (Kitzingen-Main, 1953), 78-100; and Z. Sobieski, "Reminiscences from Lwow, 1939-1945," *Journal of Central European Affairs* VI (1947): 350-74. For an unofficial Soviet view of these events see R. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York, 1971), 248-9.
 25. Prisoners were killed in Lviv, Zolochiv, Rivne, Dubno, Lutsk, and other towns. In several cases inmates were burned alive. An incomplete list of the most prominent Ukrainian victims of the NKVD may be found in Rudnytska, *Zakhidna Ukraina*, 477-92. For estimates of the total number of victims of the NKVD see V. Kubijovyč, ed., *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva*, vol. 1 (Munich-New York, 1949), 583. There are also German documentary reports about the NKVD massacres.
 26. See J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945* (New York, 1955), 84-98; Z. Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (Munich, 1952); and L. Shankovsky, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN: Prychynky do istorii pokhidnykh hrup OUN na tsentralnykh i skhidnykh zemliakh Ukrainy v 1941-1943 rr.* (Munich, 1958).

27. According to German statistics the total number of Soviet *Ostarbeiter* (workers from the east) in Germany in May 1945 was about 2.8 million, of whom about 2.2 million were from Soviet Ukraine. So many Soviet Ukrainians were transported to Germany because all of Ukraine was occupied by the Germans and Koch (*Reichskommissar* of Ukraine) was especially brutal and effective in meeting the quotas for labour. See A. Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo., 1981), 428-53. In addition to the Soviet Ukrainians, there were about 800,000 Western Ukrainians in Germany by 1943, according to K. Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoï okupatsii*, 209. Thus, Ukrainians made up the largest percentage of Germany's forced labourers.
28. Ukrainian labourers in Germany could be divided into three categories. Those who voluntarily arrived in Germany from the *Generalgouvernement* prior to June 1941 were treated the same as German workers. Those workers from the *Generalgouvernement* who were forcibly transported to Germany after June 1941 received wages and living conditions that were considerably inferior to those of German workers. *Ostarbeiter*, the third category, were treated little better than slaves. See Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoï okupatsii*, 202.
29. Soviet authors claim that the number of Soviet citizens forced to work in Germany was higher than the figures provided by the Germans. According to Soviet sources, 4,078,000 Soviet citizens were transported to work in Germany. Of these, 2.4 million were from Ukraine. The total number of forced labourers in Germany is estimated to have been between 13.3 and 14 million. See M. Pavlenko, "Bizhentsi" ta "perekishcheni osoby" v politytsii imperialistychnykh derzhav (1945-1949 rr.) (Kiev, 1979), 28.
30. For a history of the Galician Division see W. Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit: Die Geschichte der Ukrainischen Division, 1943-1945* (Dorheim, [1973]); and B. Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division 'Galicia'," *American Slavic and East European Review* 15, no. 1 (1956): 1-10. For the view of those who participated in the organization of the division see V. Kubijovyč, "Pochatky Ukrainiskoi Dyvizii Halychyna," *Visti Bratstva kol. voiakiv I-oi Ukrainiskoi Dyvizii UNA*, nos. 3-4 (41-2) (1954): 2-5; and Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoï okupatsii*, 216-53. The flight of the families of the division members from Galicia is described in R. Krokhamliuk, *Zahrava na skhodi: Spohady i dokumenty z pratsi u Viiskovii upravli "Halychyna" v 1943-1945 rokakh* (Toronto-New York, 1978). The experience of the division in British captivity is treated in V. Budny and O. Slupchynsky, eds., *Rimini 1945-1947* (New York, 1979). A study of numerous Ukrainian teenagers who were drafted into German anti-aircraft units is Z. Zeleny, *Ukrainske iunatstvo v vyri Druhoi svitovoi viiny* (Toronto, 1965).
31. There were approximately 550 Ukrainian students in German universities in 1944. About 200 of them studied in Vienna. There were also large groups of Ukrainian students in Prague, Graz, and Berlin.
32. In 1945-7 the émigré League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners registered about 1,200 members who had been prisoners in Nazi concentration camps. For the most part, these were people active in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Countless thousands of other Ukrainians perished in the camps. See P. Mirchuk, *In the Germans Mills of*

- Death* (New York, 1976); and M. Ilkiw, *German Concentration Camps: Memoirs* (New York, 1983). For an extensive bibliography of Ukrainians in Nazi concentration camps see Yury Boshyk, *Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath: A Symposium* (Edmonton, 1986).
33. According to German estimates, about 10,000 Ukrainians and their families had fled from the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* to Galicia as of February 1944. See W. Präg and W. Jacobmeyer, eds., *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen, 1939-1945* (Stuttgart, 1975), 792-3; and Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoj okupatsii*.
 34. The administration of the *Generalgouvernement* reported that as of July 1944 approximately 30,000 refugees from Galicia crossed over into Slovakia and 90,000 entered Hungary. Präg and Jacobmeyer, *Das Diensttagebuch*, 885. See also Krokh-maliuk, *Zahrava na skhodi*, 116.
 35. Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoj okupatsii*, 418.
 36. For a statistical analysis of the Ukrainian DPs see V. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emihratsiia," in *Ukrainci u vilnomu sviti: Iuvileina knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu 1894-1954* (Jersey City, [1954]), 115-36. Very useful is V. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhi svitovii viini* (Munich, 1985). An excellent bibliographic guide to this topic is Y. Boshyk and B. Balan, *Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons," 1945-1954: A Selected Bibliography and Guide to Research with Special Reference to Ukrainians* (Edmonton, 1982).

Ukrainian Population Migration after World War II

Ihor Stebelsky

One of the most intensive Ukrainian migrations was triggered by the events of World War II. The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and subsequent occupation of Ukraine caused the Soviet government to remove 25 million people from Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic republics, and the western oblasts of central Russia. Of that population, some 8-10 million remained in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union after the war,¹ a new migration that probably included 2-3 million Ukrainians. As well, the German army succeeded in taking vast numbers of prisoners of war as it advanced into the Soviet Union, served as an enforcing agent in the recruitment of forced civilian labour in Ukraine for the agricultural, industrial, and domestic needs of the Third Reich, and formed a division of Ukrainians to fight the advancing Red Army. Hence, toward the close of the war, 2.5-3 million Ukrainians were within the boundaries of the Third Reich.²

As the Allied armies occupied Germany, Soviet forces identified more than 5 million "citizens of the Soviet Union," including Balts, Belorussians, and Ukrainians from prewar Poland. The Soviets carried on a propaganda campaign among them and promptly repatriated them. The Western Allies (the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, SHAEF) identified more than 2 million citizens of the Soviet Union and nearly 1 million citizens of Poland. Almost all of the "Soviet" citizens were quickly delivered to Soviet authorities in the spring and summer of 1945.³ In many instances the unwilling were forced to return, and some even resorted to suicide to avoid repatriation.⁴ Of an estimated 2 million Ukrainians in the zones of Austria and Germany occupied by SHAEF,

0.25 million remained when mass repatriations ceased.⁵ It was this relatively small group of Ukrainians that found refuge in the West, and subsequently emigrated overseas.

The purpose of this article is to examine Ukrainian immigration to the West: the magnitude, the source areas of migrants, the routes taken, and the destinations.

Estimates of Ukrainians in Western Europe

After the collapse of the Third Reich the largest number of Ukrainian displaced persons found refuge in the zones of Austria and Germany occupied by American, British, and French troops. Their numbers cannot be easily determined, however, because the occupying forces used citizenship rather than ethnic origin to classify DPs and to expedite their repatriation to their home country, as agreed at the Yalta Conference on 11 February 1945. Since Ukrainian DPs came from the prewar territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, as well as the Soviet Union, their former citizenship varied.

The Soviets, however, attached more importance to ethnic origin. Having annexed the Baltic countries and the Belorussian and Ukrainian territories of prewar Poland, they automatically extended claims to all persons of Belorussian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian nationality who had lived in those territories. In order to recover these people, they participated in the screening of DPs in the western zones, deluged DPs with propaganda, and even employed secret agents who incited quarrels among the refugees.⁶ In some cases, blackmail or kidnapping was used to force certain individuals to return.⁷ In the United States, the Ukrainian communist organization appealed to the State Department to have all Ukrainian DPs in Europe repatriated or handed over to the Soviet government as war criminals.⁸

Ukrainian refugees who fled from the communist regime so feared repatriation that they were prepared to claim any citizenship or nationality. When they were screened by military authorities or by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) personnel, they were reluctant to reveal their identity, for the UNRRA had as its prime objective their repatriation to their lands of origin. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the early UNRRA statistical summaries Ukrainians were normally not reported as a separate category or were underrepresented when reported.

1. UNRRA Enumerations

Although UNRRA statistical data are by no means comprehensive, they are indicative of some patterns in the Ukrainian DP population (Table 1). By far the largest number of Ukrainian displaced persons resided in the American Zone of Germany. There was a shift westward during the first three postwar years, as the number of Ukrainians in Austria was slowly decreasing, whereas the number in

Germany was increasing. (Apparently some of the non-repatriable displaced persons in Austria were allowed to transfer to other camps in Germany and Italy.) Other countries harboured considerably fewer Ukrainian DPs. According to an official military report, in Italy in June 1945 there were 11,000 Ukrainian prisoners of war.⁹ In Czechoslovakia, the U.S. Army V Corps reported 982 Ukrainian DPs, mainly in towns.¹⁰ In other countries only a few individuals were reported (the Netherlands had seven),¹¹ or their existence was acknowledged within the “undetermined” category.¹²

In the last month of its existence the UNRRA began to report the number of Polish Ukrainians under its care. This was prompted by the request of the Polish government to segregate Polish Ukrainians from other persons displaced from Poland.¹³ The Polish government desired the return of Polish DPs, including Polish Jews, but did not want the Ukrainians. Poland had concluded an agreement with the Soviets (6 July 1946) to exchange Ukrainians in Poland for Poles in the Soviet Union and wished to rid itself of its Ukrainian minority once and for all.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the Western Allies abandoned forced repatriation and began to issue reassuring policy statements,¹⁵ thus encouraging Polish Ukrainians to declare themselves openly.

Within a year of the war's end it became clear that a large group of DPs was not going to be repatriated. In order to provide them with continued care and to assist them with resettlement the Western Allies, without the USSR, formed the International Refugee Organization (IRO).¹⁶ Like the UNRRA before it, the IRO provided for the care, maintenance, and repatriation of displaced persons. Moreover, it provided for legal and political protection, transportation, resettlement, and re-establishment of eligible DPs in countries able and willing to receive them. Thus the IRO supported not only assembly centres with shelter and food for eligible DPs, but also vocational and language training programs to prepare the DPs for resettlement. This environment allowed the Ukrainians from Western Ukraine, at least, to declare themselves openly. Statistical summaries began to list Polish Ukrainians. Later, Ukrainians from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were also included, and the UkSSR category was added.¹⁷

2. IRO Enumerations

After 1947 the number of refugees receiving PCIRO/IRO care was diminished by emigration—with the assistance of the IRO—to Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and overseas. The largest number of remaining Ukrainian DPs was in West Germany and Austria (Table 2). There were few Ukrainian refugees receiving IRO care or registered for IRO services in other European countries.¹⁸ By the end of December 1949, the number of Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia had diminished to 83, but in France it had increased to 4,630, in Belgium 453, in Luxembourg 65, in Denmark 17, and in Spain 6. Ukrainian refugees were even reported in Turkey (6), Lebanon (1), and Kenya (1). Ukrainian DPs in the Far East had diminished to 43, but in their place 98 appeared in the Philippines,

evacuated from China.¹⁹ Thus, between 1948 and 1949, there was considerable dispersion of Ukrainian displaced persons.

For Austria and Germany IRO statistics differentiated between DPs housed in IRO assembly centres and those who lived outside the camps. Moreover, those who did not receive IRO care and maintenance but were registered for IRO services were also enumerated. In some cases, in addition to Ukrainians, IRO statistics listed separately those claiming UkSSR origin. Although the UkSSR category was not consistently maintained and probably understated the actual number of Ukrainians who came from the pre-1939 UkSSR, their residential preference was apparent (Table 3). Because the fear of forced repatriation persisted, many Ukrainians from the pre-1939 UkSSR falsely gave Western Ukraine as their place of birth. Only a minority of those identified as originally from the UkSSR received IRO care and maintenance within IRO assembly centres. By contrast, Ukrainians originally from Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia resided predominantly in IRO assembly centres and, particularly in Germany, a few were registered for services only. Also, whereas the Ukrainian group declined in size rather rapidly, the UkSSR group remained fairly stable over the fifteen-month period. Two plausible hypotheses may explain this: 1) that as the Ukrainian group receiving IRO care emigrated, the UkSSR group was being replenished by individuals coming into the open in search of IRO assistance; or, perhaps less likely, 2) that members of the UkSSR group were not as readily accepted by the immigration authorities of potential host countries. Additional data are needed in order to prove either case.

3. Estimates by Ukrainian Organizations

Besides international relief organizations, the Western Allies allowed a number of Ukrainian volunteer relief organizations to provide assistance to their countrymen. The United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC, formed 22 January 1944) was accepted for membership by the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service on 7 March 1945. It was allowed to participate in relief work by the President's War Relief Control Board. Similarly, the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF, formed 4 May 1945) became the fund-raising and relief arm of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. It joined the Canadian Red Cross as an auxiliary, so that it could assist Ukrainian DPs in Europe. In order to expedite operations, on 28 July 1945 both the American and the Canadian organizations established the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB) with its head office in London.²⁰

Meanwhile, Ukrainian DPs began to organize themselves for mutual assistance, cultural enrichment, scholarly research, and political influence. On 17 March 1945, shortly before Nazi German capitulation, the Ukrainian National Committee, a short-lived political co-ordinating body, was formed in Germany under the leadership of P. Shandruk, V. Kubijovyč, and O. Semenko. By 1

November 1945 the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany, headed by V. Mudry, assumed the role of co-ordinating mutual assistance in the American Zone of Germany. Similar bodies were formed in the British Zone of Germany (the Ukrainian Central Consultative Committee) and in Austria (the Ukrainian Central Aid Alliance of Austria). Members of these committees could visit camps and residences of Ukrainian DPs within their own military zones of occupation, but it was impossible for them to cross from one zone to another. Only passport-carrying citizens from the West, especially military personnel, could move freely. The director of CURB, G. R. B. Panchuk, was one with such mobility. After his visit to Germany, he reported that all current statistics on Ukrainian DPs in Germany were underestimates; that thousands were hiding under every nationality and citizenship but Ukrainian; that Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine were at least as numerous as those from Western Ukraine, but the latter, knowing that their chances of repatriation were not great, were coming out of hiding; that Ukrainians were to be found in every camp regardless of the official "nationality" of the camp; and that this dispersion was caused, in part, by the fact that Ukrainian as a nationality was not recognized and that they tried to conceal themselves to avoid repatriation.²¹

Later, in a memorandum to the PCIRO in Geneva, Panchuk pointed out that prior to the war, Ukrainians had at least five different categories of citizenship: Soviet, Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and stateless (the Nansen passport). After the war, when large numbers of "Soviet citizens" were being repatriated, many declared citizenship that would offer them the greatest protection from forcible repatriation. Thousands of people completely changed their identity, including their name, religion, nationality, and place of birth. As a result, many Ukrainians were either counted with those other nationalities or included in the "undetermined nationality" category, depending on the personal preference of the military commandant or UNRRA director. The "nearest to the truth" statistics, asserted Panchuk, were those produced by Ukrainian DP organizations which collected information about the location, number, age, skills, and education of Ukrainian refugees. Their estimates indicated that in January 1947 in Western Europe there were 250,000 Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons.²² Of this total, only 150-200,000 were eligible for IRO assistance and thus officially recorded. There were 20,000 Ukrainian DPs in Austria, 25,000 in the British Zone of Germany, 10,000 in the French Zone of Germany, 70,000 in the American Zone of Germany, 1,500 in Italy, and 23-80,000 in Belgium, Denmark, France, Holland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.

More complete information compiled by Ukrainians themselves is available for the western zones of Austria and Germany (Table 4). As expected, it shows from 20-30 per cent more Ukrainians in the various zones of Germany and more than twice as many in Austria as UNRRA or IRO statistics had indicated. The data include those refugees who were not eligible for UNRRA or IRO care and maintenance or who remained out of the camps by their own choice. Since

nearly half of all IRO-registered refugees in Austria lived outside the camps, in contrast to about one-quarter in the American Zone, one-sixth in the French Zone, and one-eighth in the British Zone (Table 3), it is not surprising that the figures for Austria are so great. As a criterion, nationality rather than citizenship also played a role in the higher count obtained by the Ukrainian organizations.

As for Ukrainian DPs in Italy, on 14 January 1946 Captain Smylski reported a total of 13,000-14,000 to CURB.²³ Shortly thereafter, the Very Rev. Dr. Kushnir reported a similar number.²⁴ By August 1947, after the Galician Division had been removed to Britain, the Italian Relief Committee reported 921 Ukrainian DPs in various camps, 656 living privately, and 180 unspecified, for a total of 1,757. There were, in addition, some 200 Ukrainian prewar immigrants, mainly priests and theology students in Rome.²⁵

Ukrainians in Displaced Person Camps in Austria and Germany

The majority of Ukrainian DPs in Austria and Germany resided in camps known as assembly centres. These were to provide temporary housing for DPs until their repatriation. As it became clear that many Eastern Europeans resisted repatriation, separate camps were organized for those who would not return. Military and UNRRA officials, lacking familiarity with East European affairs, showed little concern for national differences and preferred multinational camps. Only through the persistent efforts of the Ukrainian committees were the Ukrainians separated into their own DP camps.²⁶

Later, the UNRRA and its successor, the IRO, allowed each camp to establish its own local government, or "camp republic."²⁷ Vested with such broad latitude of self-administration and provided with food, clothing, shelter, and health care, the Ukrainian camps became hearths of intense cultural vitality. The larger the camp and the more exclusively Ukrainian it was, the more Ukrainian activities it could generate in the diaspora. Within the span of four years (1946-9) the Ukrainian camps had passed through their formative stages, development, and maturity, when emigration substantially altered their character and reduced their numbers. This inherent instability was increased because populations were often relocated from one camp to another as first the UNRRA, and later the IRO, tried to match the populations to the available facilities. Consequently, a comprehensive list of Ukrainian DP camps, let alone a continuous run of statistical data, is impossible to obtain.

1. Ukrainian Camps in Austria

Little information is available on the Ukrainian camps in Austria (Table 5). A list of camps with significant Ukrainian communities in 1948 revealed the largest concentration in the American Zone, in and near Salzburg. That area contained some 3,000 Ukrainians²⁸ and had Ukrainian schools, a high school, an agricultural college, an adult education program, two theatres, seven Ukrainian community organizations, and both Catholic and Orthodox parishes.²⁹ In the French Zone the largest concentration was at Landeck, which had about 1,000 Ukrainians and boasted an elementary school, a high school, a vocational school, a handful of community organizations, and both Catholic and Orthodox parishes. Villach, the largest centre in the British Zone of Austria, had an elementary school, vocational schools, and a folk university.

2. Ukrainian Camps in the British Zone of Germany

In the British Zone of Germany (Table 6) Ukrainian DP camps were usually located in or near large industrial towns, especially along the east-west route through the Niedersachsen region and near the Soviet Zone. The largest and most active community was the centrally located camp "Lysenko" in Hanover, which also had an impact on the nearby camp at Burgdorf. In the north, Hamburg had a large concentration of Ukrainians, but even more were housed at Heidenau to the south. The few camps in northern Schleswig-Holstein were small. In the western region of North Rhine-Westphalia, Ukrainian camps followed the east-west trail of refuge or clustered near the industrial cities of the Ruhr.³⁰

3. Ukrainian Camps in the French Zone of Germany

The French Zone of Germany had the smallest number of Ukrainian communities, but there were at least twenty camps with more than fifty Ukrainians. The largest were at Gneisenau in Koblenz (more than 1,000), Bad Kreuznach (more than 600), Landstuhl (more than 600), Trier (more than 500), Niederlahnstein (more than 300), Freiburg (more than 300), Kisslegg (more than 200), and Wangen (more than 200). Most camps shared facilities with predominantly Polish camps.

4. Ukrainians Camps in the American Zone of Germany

Most Ukrainian DPs and refugees resided in the American Zone of Germany (Table 7). That zone had both the largest number of camps housing Ukrainians (more than seventy in 1947-8) and the greatest number of camps that might have been considered almost exclusively Ukrainian. Many camps were very large, which provided a critical mass favourable to vigorous social interaction and the formation and support of cultural, educational, religious, and political institutions. Even some of the smaller camps were almost exclusively Ukrainian, although there was a policy to close down the smaller operations and concentrate DPs in larger camps.

The greatest concentration was in Bavaria (more than fifty communities in 1947-8). Of the camps in Hessen, only Cornberg and Mainz-Kastel at Wiesbaden possessed both very large and exclusively Ukrainian concentrations. Each had an elementary school, a high school and trade school, a handful of community organizations, and two parishes. The others only had public schools. In Württemberg-Baden, Ellwangen and Ettlingen had a wide array of organizations, including high schools. All the larger camps supported both Catholic and Orthodox parishes, elementary and high schools, trade schools, cultural groups, co-operatives, and other community organizations. Among these, Munich emerged as the centre for Ukrainian DPs and refugees. It boasted the Ukrainian Free University and the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute, and housed the offices of several Ukrainian émigré newspapers and organizations.

5. Other Camps

In addition to the assembly centres, which were organized according to nationalities, there were hospitals (especially for victims of tuberculosis) that served many assembly centres in the area and therefore had doctors and patients of a mixed ethnic background. The IRO also established special resettlement centres in various regions where refugees were brought for documentation, final medical examination, and an interview with the prospective host country's mission. Moreover, it organized staging centres near ports where the DPs were collected and prepared for embarkation. Since these resettlement and staging areas served all assembly centres, their ethnicity was also mixed. As emigration intensified, the resettlement and staging centres temporarily gained in the number of Ukrainians they held.

Emigration from Austria, Germany, and Italy

For many refugees and DPs who would not return to their country of origin, the only viable option was emigration. As soon as military action ceased the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR) started to assist refugees to emigrate and even financed transportation costs for individual refugees and family groups. Most Ukrainian DPs were not affected by this scheme, however, for they were viewed as displaced persons who were to be repatriated by UNRRA. By 1946 the number of DPs who would not return to their land of origin was substantial, so the IGCR signed an agreement with Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and the French General Residency in Tunisia for the recruitment of DP workers. The IGCR also sent missions to South America to explore resettlement possibilities and conclude agreements with a number of countries. The IGCR also negotiated an agreement with the government of Canada, which had received many representations from its citizens about the immigration of close relatives who were DPs.

Unfortunately, the IGCR did not possess an operational budget and thus could not, by itself, finance group migrations. It became imperative to create an organization (IRO) to take over the care of DPs from the UNRRA and to expedite their emigration overseas by subsidizing their journey.³¹ Movement of DPs and refugees, however, also depended on the will of the potential host countries to implement measures that would facilitate immigration. Some governments acted quickly, while others moved cautiously or hardly at all. Each government set its own guidelines for the number and kind of immigrants desired and the way in which visas would be issued.

The largest number of DPs could be moved via group schemes, but these were open only to those who possessed the qualifications for specified occupations. Individuals or conjugal families could migrate to join relatives who would sponsor them, but contacts for Ukrainians were hindered for a brief period by censorship in the UNRRA camps, which disallowed the use of Ukrainian in correspondence with relatives.³² The attainment of visas for Ukrainian DPs also was not easy, but assistance and intervention on their behalf was provided by CURB in Europe, UCRF in Canada, and UUARC in the United States.³³ Ukrainian DPs also tried to influence the course of immigration. The Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany took the initiative by forming a resettlement council. That council, with branches in all major camps, studied the possibilities of resettlement and even proposed schemes for compact settlement of Ukrainians in various countries, especially where Ukrainian colonies already existed. Such an approach, however, was in conflict with the needs of the potential host countries and so remained purely academic.

Before the mass migrations in which the IRO played a paramount role, there was movement of a smaller magnitude. Most of those migrants (the "Spanish Republican refugees" and "Jewish victims of persecution") were refugees eligible for IGCR support. After July 1946 other refugees became eligible for assistance to join their relatives in Canada, the United States or Argentina. Although the IGCR published no statistics on that early movement, authorities in the host countries kept records.³⁴ Another special group that was moved before the beginning of the mass migration period was the Galician Division. That group, consisting of "surrendered enemy personnel," unanimously opposed repatriation and was not repatriated by the British despite vigorous demands from the Soviet government. The British, having assumed responsibility for the Galician Division, feared that Italy, after the British withdrawal, would not be able to resist Soviet pressure and would forcibly repatriate the Ukrainians. The British, therefore, decided that most of them would be removed from Italy and brought to work camps in England in place of repatriated German prisoners of war.³⁵ An estimated 500 such prisoners, upon successful application and screening in Italy, were allowed to join their families in West Germany.³⁶ Those who needed institutional health care were moved to hospitals or sanatoriums in Switzerland, to the south of France (where there was a colony of Ukrainians), or to Spain

(where the Catholic Church was willing to help).³⁷ With those exceptions, in May 1947 the men were moved to Britain, where they retained their prisoner-of-war status until the end of 1948.³⁸

Massive immigration of DPs began in mid-1947, when the IRO took over the care of refugees and DPs from UNRRA. The peak migration period for IRO-assisted displaced persons was the first six months of 1949. The number dropped dramatically in 1950. The peak migration period for IRO-assisted Ukrainians, however, was the second half of 1949 and was followed by a gradual reduction in the first six months of 1950 (Table 8). This minor delay is indicative of the small disadvantage Ukrainians had in comparison with displaced persons of all nationalities being moved by the IRO. In 1947 and the first six months of 1948, by far the largest number of Ukrainian DPs migrated to other countries in Europe. In the second half of 1948 migration within Europe declined, and the two main destinations became North and South America. By 1949 migration to South America declined to third place, as North America and Australasia emerged as the leading destinations for Ukrainian refugees. Of all the IRO-supported Ukrainian refugees (1947-51), more than one-half migrated to North America, more than one-fifth to other European countries, more than one-sixth to Australasia, and about one-twelfth to South America.

1. Migration to Other European Countries

The earliest major movement of DPs out of Austria and West Germany was to adjacent countries that had negotiated agreements with the IGCR for DP labour to rebuild their devastated industries. Indigenous labour was insufficient not only because of war casualties but also because the “depression generation” had produced fewer children who would be entering the labour force in the forties. However, interest in DP workers varied widely.

France offered legal protection to the refugees, but strong communist influence in the country discouraged the French government from openly accepting Ukrainian DPs. It preferred that they enter “illegally,” and then pay a fee of 2,000 FF to seek employment in France. Even legal entrants were not tied to individual sponsors. For example, in the short-lived agricultural-worker scheme, when 2,000 Ukrainian DPs arrived late to assist with the harvest, the farmers would not take them, and they remained unemployed.³⁹ Thus early Ukrainian migration to France, while significant, did not live up to Panchuk’s optimistic projections.⁴⁰ It peaked in the second half of 1948 and sharply declined thereafter (Table 9). By the end of January 1952, there were 18,233 Ukrainian refugees in France registered with the IRO, of whom 5,000 carried Nansen passports.⁴¹

Belgium began to recruit DPs in 1947 for work in the coal mines. In the last six months of 1947, the IRO assisted more than 4,500 Ukrainians in this move (Table 9). When their two-year contracts expired—in 1949 for the first large

influx—the labour market deteriorated and they could not find lighter work elsewhere. Indeed, those who had work permits specifically for mining could not legally work elsewhere. By the end of 1949 about 25 per cent of the total returned to Germany, seeking immigration overseas. The IRO reacted by classifying the refugees in Belgium as resettled and hence no longer eligible for IRO assistance. After some incidents, the Belgian government abandoned compulsory mine work for those who no longer wished to work there and, after a year, aided the rest in their immigration to Canada.⁴²

By far the largest migration of Ukrainians in Europe was to Britain (Table 9). Altogether more than 17 per cent of the IRO-assisted immigrants to Britain were Ukrainians. The migration scheme known as “Westward Ho” provided a solution to two problems. First, it helped reduce the burden of maintaining large refugee populations, primarily in the British Zone of Austria and Germany. Second, it provided labour for undermanned British industries. For the Ukrainian refugees it was a chance to move away from the communist military frontier and to escape crowded camp life. From the DPs the British recruited “European Volunteer Workers” for specific manual labour. These workers were contracted to undertake only the employment chosen by the Ministry of Labour and Natural Service. By 1951 that restriction was lifted for those who had been in Britain for three years.

Because of the housing shortage, single, able-bodied persons were recruited. Only later were their dependants allowed to join them. This scheme produced a distorted demographic profile for DPs. Those who arrived in Britain were, for the most part, single, able-bodied males, whereas the population that remained in Austria and Germany tended to be sickly, old or with large families. Only a small proportion of the “European Volunteer Workers” returned to Germany and Austria, for the IRO regarded them as re-established and would not accept them for a further move overseas.⁴³ By the end of May 1951, nearly 30,000 Ukrainian refugees resided in Britain (Table 10). Two-thirds of that population came from Poland; the rest originated elsewhere, including the UkSSR.⁴⁴ More than one-quarter were former Galician Division personnel. One-fifth to one-quarter of the Ukrainian workers who came to Britain as part of the “Westward Ho” scheme were females. The dependants who came later made up less than 3 per cent of the Ukrainian population in 1951. This peculiar demographic structure facilitated their further immigration to Australia, Canada, and the United States when opportunities arose.

Migration of Ukrainian refugees to other European countries or their dependencies (with the help of the IRO, which took over the schemes negotiated by the IGCR) was minor (Table 9).

2. Immigration to South America

The main movement, beginning slowly in 1947 but growing rapidly in 1948, was immigration to Australasia and the Americas. Among the countries that

received significant numbers of Ukrainians for resettlement were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Venezuela. All these countries had agreements with the IGCR to accept numerous DPs.⁴⁵ Brazil accepted the largest number of Ukrainian DPs and the second-largest number of all IRO-sponsored refugees (Table 11). Brazil moved quickly in making agreements with the IGCR and the IRO (1947, 1948, and 1951), and worked closely with its national volunteer committees, which were responsible for meeting the refugees and helping them financially until they found work. Ukrainians were assisted by the *Comite Ucraino de Auxilio as Victimas de Guerra*, located in Curitiba, Parana.⁴⁶ That state housed 85 per cent of Brazilian Ukrainians.⁴⁷ More than 4,600 (16 per cent) of all IRO refugees who arrived in Brazil by the end of 1951 were Ukrainians, a clear indication of successful Ukrainian immigration to that country.

Argentina accepted the second-largest number of Ukrainian DPs and the largest number of IRO-sponsored refugees in South America. Like Brazil, it responded quickly and relied on volunteer committees such as CURB to provide lists of recommended groups of immigrants. Unfortunately, the committees in Argentina which "sponsored" the immigrants, such as the *Comite Ucraino de Ayuda a las Victimas de Guerra* that helped Ukrainians, lacked sufficient funds properly to assist the newly arrived refugees, especially the old or infirm who were incapable of looking after themselves. At the end of 1948 the Argentine government suddenly changed its immigration policy. It no longer accepted sponsorship by national committees; instead each prospective immigrant had to be sponsored by a first-degree relative. That policy sharply reduced the inflow of refugees from central and eastern Europe, including Ukrainians. By the end of 1951 approximately 2,300 Ukrainians (7 per cent of the IRO-sponsored immigrants) had joined the large Ukrainian communities in Argentina.⁴⁸

Third in importance among the South American host countries, both for all IRO-sponsored refugees and Ukrainians in particular, was Venezuela. Venezuela responded quickly and attained a peak period of immigration in 1948. In November of that year, however, a new government came to power and immigration virtually came to a standstill. Venezuela lacked an earlier Ukrainian community and thus had no national committee. The government was interested primarily in recruitment of skilled workers, so among the migrating families there were many single males. By the end of 1951 nearly 2,000 Ukrainians had arrived in Venezuela (11 per cent of all IRO-sponsored immigrants). The small size of that community, as well as its urban nature, dispersion among several cities, and imbalanced gender ratio among the immigrants, contributed to a high level of mixed marriages among these first-generation immigrants.⁴⁹

Small numbers of Ukrainian refugees immigrated to Chile, Paraguay, and Peru. Movement to Colombia and Uruguay was negligible. Chile was not a major receiving country for refugees inasmuch as its government, caught between two opposing viewpoints, followed a course of restricted, selective, planned, and

controlled immigration.⁵⁰ The few Ukrainian refugees settled in Santiago, Osorno, Temuco, and Concepción and, as in the case of Venezuela, lacked any previously established community to which they could turn for support. Paraguay, by contrast, had older Ukrainian communities as well as the *Comite Ucraino de Ayuda a las Victimas de la Guerra* that could support Ukrainian refugees. Yet its more restrictive immigration policy, followed by internal political unrest,⁵¹ resulted in a very small intake. Ukrainian refugees preferred not to remain in Paraguay. In pursuit of a more vigorous cultural life and economic advancement, most re-immigrated to Argentina, Canada, and the United States.⁵² Uruguay was even more restrictive and, despite a small older Ukrainian community (it formed no refugee aid committee), only five Ukrainian IRO-sponsored refugees went to that country. Peru's early agreement with the IGCR to accept refugees for a land settlement scheme attracted some Ukrainian DPs, but the scheme failed. The settlers, preferring urban occupations, gravitated to towns, especially Lima.⁵³

3. Immigration to North America and Australasia

The overwhelming majority (70 per cent) of Ukrainian DPs, with the aid of IRO, immigrated to the English-speaking countries of North America and Australasia. By far the largest share of this migration went to the United States (Table 12). Movement of Ukrainians to the U.S. ranked among the fourth to sixth largest in the 1947-8 period, but in 1949 it dramatically increased to become the largest movement to any country in the world. The sudden rise of the U.S. in 1949 as a primary destination was the same for most of the IRO-assisted refugees. However, the percentage of Ukrainian immigrants to the U.S., quite low in 1947, doubled and then redoubled in 1949.

The main obstacle to a massive Ukrainian refugee movement to the U.S. had been the Immigration Act of 1924, which stipulated rigid quotas on the basis of "national origins." The proportions favoured the British and northwest Europeans generally by providing very low quotas for Eastern Europeans.⁵⁴ The President's Directive of 22 December 1945 provided for a limited flow of refugees into the U.S. by giving a 90 per cent preference to DPs within the existing quota system, and by providing first consideration to orphaned children.⁵⁵ After considerable debate,⁵⁶ the U.S. Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act, which became effective on 1 July 1948.⁵⁷ It provided for "quota mortgaging," so that four times as many immigrants from Eastern Europe, including Ukrainians, entered the country as were authorized under the quota system.⁵⁸ Another obstacle, which may have been more severe in 1947, was the more restrictive political criteria that the U.S. immigration commissions employed.⁵⁹ Representations made by Ukrainian communist organizations to the State Department⁶⁰ may have had some effect on the screening process, but not on the final result. On the other hand, the existence of relatives and an already established sympathetic Ukrainian community helped Ukrainian immigration to the U.S.

By the end of 1951 more than 45,000 Ukrainian refugees immigrated to the U.S. with the assistance of the IRO. Almost 33,000 of those were assisted by the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee. Others were sponsored by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, as well as by relatives and friends living in the U.S. Not all Ukrainian refugees were assisted by the IRO, and many came later, indirectly, via Britain, Belgium, France, South America, and Australia. Some 85-100,000 Ukrainian refugees, or twice as many as the IRO registered, made their way into the U.S. after the war.⁶¹ Those refugees joined a substantial Ukrainian community in the U.S. Estimated at more than half a million, it provided the foundation to which the newcomers could contribute cultural and political activities and organizations. Most Ukrainian refugees settled in the industrial northeastern states, although some found employment in other large metropolitan areas.

Migration to Canada was sizeable from the start, reaching its peak in 1948 (Table 12). That year also had the highest percentage of IRO-assisted Ukrainian refugee immigrants. By 1949, however, migration of Ukrainian refugees to Canada slackened and continued to decline, as the main refugee flow turned to the U.S. Canada's quick response to the refugee problem in Europe explains the high level of immigration in 1948. First, an agreement with the IGCR was signed in 1946 that enabled refugees, including Ukrainians, to join their families in Canada. Then, an order-in-council (6 June 1947) provided for the "immediate admission to Canada of 5,000 individuals from the displaced persons' camps in Europe."⁶² Canada relaxed the required sponsorship of immigrants by close relatives and, following the lead of Britain, adopted a number of schemes involving the immigration of specific groups of labourers. Responsibility for the selection and transportation of immigrants rested with the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, and their reception and placement in Canada with the Department of Labour. Under the authority of this and subsequent orders-in-council, approval was granted for the admission of specified numbers of workers for the wood and lumber industry (to work in the bush), mines, the garment industry, farms, homes (as domestics) or other areas of labour shortage. Employment for each immigrant refugee was arranged before his departure from Europe, and the employer was required to sign an agreement to employ the worker for at least one year at prevailing wage rates and to arrange for suitable housing.

As in Britain, sponsorship of group movements of workers to Canada attracted predominantly unmarried people, usually males. The exacting medical requirements demanded by the Canadian immigration authorities, however, limited the number of Ukrainian refugees who could qualify.⁶³ Once established in Canada, however, these individuals could sponsor their relatives who remained in Europe. Indeed, the definition of "close relatives" was so broad that any Canadian resident, whether citizen or not, could apply to bring over his relatives,

provided that he supported them financially. As a result of the "close relatives" plan, practically all the refugee workers later brought their families to Canada.⁶⁴ Thanks to the large Ukrainian-Canadian community and its generous support through organizations and as individual permit-holding sponsors, about two-thirds of the Ukrainian refugees immigrated to Canada through the sponsorship plan.⁶⁵ Even so, the group movement of workers had a significant effect on the demography of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada. From 1947 to 1951, of the Ukrainian adults (eighteen or over) arriving in Canada, almost two-thirds were male.⁶⁶

According to IRO statistics, 14,877 Ukrainian refugees migrated to Canada between 1 July 1947 and 31 December 1951. Canadian immigration statistics for the same period reveal 29,201 Ukrainian immigrants from overseas,⁶⁷ or twice as many as the IRO data indicate. Of these, 25,772 were identified as refugees of Ukrainian origin.⁶⁸ Apparently more than 3,400 Ukrainians entered who were not recognized as refugees because they were not eligible for IRO assistance. Among such individuals—mostly re-immigrants from Western Europe—were former members of the Galician Division who had been resident in Britain.⁶⁹ If the "national origin" of refugees, as given by the IRO, is compared to "racial origin," as given by Canadian immigration statistics, it becomes clear that many Ukrainians in the IRO statistics were included with the Polish and, to a lesser extent, the Russian, Yugoslav, Czech, Slovak, and Romanian nationals. Among the refugees immigrating to Canada, IRO statistics underestimated the Ukrainians by 10,895 or 73 per cent. For Ukrainian immigration to other countries, IRO statistics would require comparable adjustments, but the precise magnitude of such adjustments is not known.

Ukrainian immigration to Canada continued well past December 1951, when the IRO ceased to exist. It consisted mainly of Ukrainian refugees who had immigrated previously to countries in Western Europe and Latin America, and who now wished to come to Canada. Many needed both counselling and financial assistance, which the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund continued to provide.⁷⁰ In any case, between 1945 and the end of 1955, Canadian immigration authorities registered the arrival of 34,339 Ukrainians.⁷¹ The Canadian destinations of these Ukrainian refugee immigrants reflected the job locations of their sponsors. Although a minority (29.6 per cent) was still destined for the prairie provinces, by far the largest proportion went to the industrial cities, mines, and bush country of Ontario (47.1 per cent) and Quebec (20.6 per cent). A few were sponsored in British Columbia (1.7 per cent) and in the maritime provinces (0.9 per cent).⁷² These Ukrainian immigrants thus accelerated the geographical shift of Ukrainian population in Canada to the country's industrial heartland.⁷³

Migration to Australia began slowly in 1947, gained momentum in 1948, reached a peak in 1949 and then tapered off, dropping quickly by 1951 (Table 12). In their respective peak years, the immigration of Ukrainian refugees to Australia was almost twice as high as to Canada. Total migration of Ukrainian refugees to Australia in the 1 July 1947-31 December 1951 period exceeded the

movement to Canada by 4,730 persons or 32 per cent. Yet the percentage of Ukrainians among all IRO refugees migrating to Australia was slightly lower than for Canada. The large number of people migrating to Australia, especially in proportion to its home population, reflected the vigorous immigration policy initiated by Australia after World War II. This policy was motivated by the declining rate of immigration during the prewar years and a perceived threat from the overpopulated countries of Asia. It involved the establishment of a special Department of Immigration and the recruitment of white population, primarily from English-speaking countries. Agreements were drawn up between Australia and Britain (31 March and 26 May 1947) and between Australia and the IRO (21 July 1947 and October 1948) for the reception of refugees and DPs. Agreements were also reached with Ireland, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands.⁷⁴ Inasmuch as the first step in refugee immigration was limited to individual nominations by relatives or friends in Australia⁷⁵—there was no Ukrainian community in Australia before World War II—the movement in 1947 was insignificant. After group labour recruitment became a common procedure, the number of Ukrainians and their percentage among refugees increased rapidly. Preference was given to young, single males, although young couples with children were also permitted to immigrate. Gradually the criteria were relaxed, so that toward the end of IRO operations, Australia was admitting even widows with young children, old people, and unmarried mothers. Medical criteria, however, remained exceedingly strict, and refugees were rejected for the slightest defects.⁷⁶ The Commonwealth Employment Service required immigrants to sign two-year work contracts.⁷⁷ Consequently, Ukrainian immigrants to Australia were mostly young people (twenty-five to thirty-five years of age), some only recently married. Many spent their first two years of contract labour at a work camp, and afterwards migrated to a larger city where they found more desirable employment.⁷⁸ Between 1948 and 1958 about 21,000 Ukrainians immigrated to Australia. They settled, primarily, in the states of New South Wales (34.8 per cent), Victoria (32.6 per cent), and South Australia (16.7 per cent), and formed dynamic communities in major urban centres.⁷⁹

The migration of Ukrainian refugees to New Zealand was small in scope (Table 12). The first shipment arrived in 1949, followed by a larger influx in 1950 and a smaller group in 1951. Altogether, according to IRO statistics, 179 Ukrainians immigrated to New Zealand, representing a mere 3.7 per cent of all the refugees. In fact, the immigration was somewhat larger, for it lasted until 1952 and ultimately produced about 250 Ukrainian newcomers.⁸⁰ New Zealand, unlike Australia, pursued no fixed plan of immigration after the war and followed a very cautious policy. It did not sign an agreement with the IRO until the end of 1948, thus delaying the arrival of refugees. Like Australia, however, it contracted the selected refugees for two years' work in agriculture or industry. Thereafter, the immigrants were free to choose whatever employment they

wished.⁸¹ After fulfilling those contracts, Ukrainian refugees settled in the scattered larger cities of the country: Auckland and Wellington on the North Island, and Christchurch and Dunedin on the South Island. Small, dispersed communities, remoteness from other centres of Ukrainian cultural life, and a friendly environment have been powerful operating factors in the assimilation of these refugees.

Conclusion

Out of some 2.5-3 million Ukrainians temporarily displaced in the West by the events of World War II, not more than 0.25 million remained as displaced persons or refugees, mostly in SHAEF-occupied Austria, Germany, and Italy. After mass repatriations ceased, there came a period of stability. Displaced persons were allowed to be grouped into camps according to nationality and, by the summer of 1947, UNRRA recognized the Ukrainian nationality as such. As prospects for immigration improved, the movement of Ukrainian DPs abroad (1948-50) drained the assembly camps of their most productive, younger population. By 1951 a residual population (some 10,800 elderly, invalids, widows, and unwed mothers with children) that no country wanted to admit was left behind. Including these residuals, some 25,000 Ukrainians were absorbed into the Austrian and West German economies.⁸²

The migration of Ukrainian DPs and refugees to their ultimate destination in the West involved one or more movements and, therefore, may have been accomplished within a period of months or might have required five or more years. The most desirable destinations were Canada and the United States, not only because of their attractive standards of living and political systems, but also because of their established and viable Ukrainian communities that could assist the immigrants in their difficult period of arrival, settlement, and adjustment. The countries that first opened their doors to mass migrations, however, were European. Desire on the part of Ukrainians to stay together and maintain viable communities explains the exceptionally small number who chose to migrate to New Zealand, Peru or other remote countries. It also explains, in part, the attempts of some to move on to an ultimate destination compatible with their aspirations. Thus many moved from Belgium, France, and Britain to Canada and the U.S. before they established roots. An even larger proportion attempted resettlement from the isolated countries of South America. These secondary movements, not recorded in IRO statistics, began almost as soon as possibilities for migration to Canada and the U.S. improved and continued well past the time when the IRO mandate expired.




Table 1
Ukrainians Receiving UNRRA Assistance in Austria and Germany

	1945		1946		1947	
	In Camps	Total	In Camps	Total	In Camps	Total
AUSTRIA	-	-	-	-	-	8,064 ^e
British Zone	3,942 ^a	5,634 ^a	-	4,316 ^c	-	-
French Zone	-	-	-	-	-	-
American Zone	-	4,196 ^a	-	3,047 ^d	-	-
GERMANY	-	-	-	-	-	101,836 ^e
British Zone	-	-	-	-	30,234 ^f	-
French Zone	983 ^b	-	-	-	-	-
American Zone	9,718 ^b	-	-	-	60,774 ^g	-

^a As of 31 December 1945. UNRRA, Austrian Mission, British Zone, *Semi-Monthly Statistical Reports*, United Nations Archives, New York (UNA), PAG-4/3.0.1.02.0.

^b As of 15 October 1945. UNRRA, Central Headquarters for Germany, *Displaced Persons Semi-Monthly Report No. 1*, National Archives, Washington (NARS), RG 59, 800.4016 DP/10-1545.

^c As of 15 April 1946. UNRRA, Austrian Mission, British Zone, *Semi-Monthly Statistical Reports*, UNA, PAG-4/3.0.1.02.0.

^d As of 28 February 1946. UNRRA, Austrian Mission, American Zone, *Semi-Monthly Statistical Reports*, UNA, PAG-4/3.0.1.02.0.

^e As of 31 May 1947. UNRRA, Central Committee, *Seventh (Final) Report on Displaced Persons Operations under Resolution 92*, UNA, PAG-4/3.0.1.02.0.

^f As of May 1947. PCIRO, *Refugees in PCIRO Assembly by Major Occupations, Nationality, Sex*, Public Archives of Canada, Microfilm C-10956, vol. 661.

^g As of 17 May 1947. UNRRA, Statistics and Reports Branch, American Zone, Heidelberg, *Summary of D.P. Population, UNRRA Assembly Centers United States Zone*, UNA, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.6:13.

Table 2
Ukrainian Refugees Receiving PCIRO/IRO Care and Maintenance

	30 November 1947 ^a	31 January 1948 ^b	30 September 1948 ^c	31 December 1949 ^d	30 June 1950 ^e
AUSTRIA	7,156	6,630	6,568	6,645	2,577
British Zone	1,867	1,789	-	-	881
French Zone	2,052	2,049	-	-	520
American Zone	3,237	2,792	-	-	1,176
GERMANY	-	-	73,621	46,087	-
British Zone	24,700	23,538	21,567	12,983	-
French Zone	-	-	4,596	552	-
American Zone	56,026	54,695	47,458	32,552	-
ITALY	319	313	44	155	-

^a International Refugee Organization, Office of Statistics and Operational Reports, *Statistical Report on PCIRO Operations, November 1947* (Geneva: PCIRO, 1947), 7.

^b IRO, Office of Statistics and Operational Reports, *Statistical Report on PCIRO Operations, January 1948* (Geneva: PCIRO, 1948), 4.

^c IRO, *Schedule of Refugees Receiving IRO Assistance, 30 September 1948*, Archives Nationales de France, Paris (ANF), AJ 43:1097.

^d IRO, *Schedule of Refugees Receiving IRO Assistance, 31 December 1949*, ANF, AJ 43:1097.

^e IRO, Field Service Office, Salzburg, *Totals Remaining in IRO Assembly Centres at End of June 1950*, ANF, AJ 43:1119.

Table 3
Ukrainians and UkSSR Categories Registered by IRO

	30 September 1948 ^a			31 December 1949 ^b		
	Receiving Care in camps	outside	Services only	Receiving Care in camps	outside	Services only
AUSTRIA	6,297	271	6,408	3,447	103	3,095
Ukrainians	5,909	105	5,726	3,093	73	2,619
UkSSR	388	166	682	354	30	476
GERMANY	72,870	751 ^c	1,698 ^c	35,580 ^c	181 ^c	10,387 ^c
Brit. Zone	21,567	-	1,698	11,270	61	1,613
Ukrainians	21,314	-	1,296	11,111	44	1,255
UkSSR	253	-	402	259	17	358
French Zone	3,845	751	-	386 ^c	1 ^c	165 ^c
Ukrainians	3,794	595	-	-	-	-
UkSSR	51	156	-	386	1	165
Am. Zone	47,458	-	-	23,824	119	8,609
Ukrainians	46,337	-	-	22,986	117	7,091
UkSSR	1,121	-	-	838	2	1,518
TOTAL	79,167	1,022 ^c	8,106 ^c	39,027 ^c	284 ^c	13,482 ^c

^a International Refugee Organization, *Schedule of Refugees Receiving IRO Assistance, 30 September 1948*, ANF, AJ 43:1097.

^b IRO, *Schedule of Refugees Receiving IRO Assistance, 31 December 1949*, ANF, AJ 43:1097.

^c These totals include numbers as reported in only some zones of Germany and may well understate the true numbers registered by IRO.

Table 4
Ukrainian Refugees and Displaced Persons in Austria and Germany

	March 1946	August 1947	February 1948	January 1949	January 1950
AUSTRIA					
All Western Zones	29,241 ^a [21,043] ^b	26,422 ^a [19,625] ^b	17,786 ^a [17,700] ^b	10,680 ^a [10,680] ^b	3,640 ^a [4,000] ^b
GERMANY					
British Zone	177,630 ^a	140,555 ^a	119,792 ^a	85,608 ^a	[55,183] ^b
French Zone	54,580 ^a	44,987 ^a	35,108 ^a	24,923 ^a	12,983 ^a
American Zone	19,026 ^a	9,922 ^a	6,130 ^a	4,074 ^a	2,841 ^a
TOTAL Austria and Germany	104,024 ^a [198,673] ^b	85,646 ^a [160,180] ^b	78,504 ^a [137,442] ^b	56,611 ^a [96,288] ^b	[39,359] ^b - [59,183] ^b

^a Compiled from data of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany, the Ukrainian Central Consultative Committee of the British Zone, and the Ukrainian Central Aid Alliance of Austria. Summarized in a table in CURB Report, PAC, MG28 V9, Vol. 17, CURB Reports, 1948-9.

^b Figures in brackets are additional data or data for Austria at variance with the above source, given in the doctoral dissertation of Volodymyr Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii v Nimechchyni ta Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini: 1943-1951-1967" (Munich, Ukrainian Free University, 1968), 46.

Table 5
Ukrainians in the PCIRO or IRO Camps of Austria

	30 September 1948 ^a	30 June 1950 ^b
British Zone	1,527 ^c	881 ^c
St. Martin	-	426
Spittal	-	114
Treffling	278	196
Trofaiach	378	145
Villach	871	-
French Zone	2,006 ^c	520 ^c
Hoetting	41	31
Kufstein	464	123
Landeck	1,161	339
Vorkloster	255	27
Waerogl "A"	85	-
American Zone	2,869 ^c	1,171 ^c
Asten	361	149
Beth Bialek	-	168
Enns	-	48
Glaserbach	188	189
Lehen	189	16
Parsch	104	288
Reid	164	64
Salzburg	1,863 ^c	58 ^c
Hellbrun	887	58
Lexenfeld	976	-
Wegscheid	-	191
Austria Total	6,402^c	2,572^c

^a Field Service Office, Salzburg, *Totals Remaining in IRO Assembly Centres by Nationality at the End of September 1948*, ANF, AJ 43, Box 1119.

^b Field Service Office, Salzburg, *Totals Remaining in IRO Assembly Centres by Principal Nationalities at the End of June 1950*, ANF, AJ 43, Box 1119.

^c These totals are simple summations of the numbers given for the camps listed and may well understate the true numbers of Ukrainians in PCIRO or IRO camps.

Table 6
Ukrainians in UNRRA or IRO Camps of the British Zone of Germany

	1946- 1947 ^a	May 1947 ^b	Dec. 1947 ^c	July 1949 ^d	Dec. 1950 ^e	Aug. 1951 ^e
LAND NIEDER- SACHSEN ^f	17,340	20,848	20,687	8,189	1,936	1,719
Altenhagen	179	-	-	163	-	-
Bad Minden	-	-	-	-	20	-
Barum	-	2,230	1,427	-	-	-
Bathorn	1,347	-	-	-	-	-
Braunschweig	902	1,007	906	1,083	346	295
Buchholz	-	172	100	174	-	-
Burgdorf	974	871	867	662	-	-
Cuxhaven	-	-	-	-	-	93
Delmenhorst	794	-	-	693	-	-
Dibroholtz	-	156	262	-	58	-
Friedrichsfeld	-	-	-	-	-	70
Gandersheim	-	362	-	-	-	-
Godenau	650	-	-	238	-	-
Göttingen	678	680	874	313	158	121
Goslar	1,200	1,043	993	256	-	43
Hallendorf	1,420	-	-	-	-	-
Hannover 1	3,426	3,258	3,203	2,180	-	-
Hannover 2	-	172	37	-	-	-
Hannover 3	-	477	335	-	-	-
Hameln	-	59	176	-	-	-
Haren	-	213	97	-	-	-
Heidenau	3,032	3,069	2,797	1,013	484	326
Hildesheim	-	793	42	-	193	147
Koringen	736	-	-	-	-	-
Lichtenberg	-	-	295	-	-	-
Lingen	-	1,489	1,352	-	-	-
Marx	-	-	-	-	48	35
Meppen	-	-	15	-	-	-
Münden	-	-	-	-	-	20
Münster-Lager	1,529	1,682	1,374	988	-	-
Neerbeek	-	-	18	-	-	-
Nordstemmen	-	-	670	-	-	-
Northeim	473	532	507	94	-	-
Oerel	-	-	-	-	374	245
Oldenburg	-	1,021	878	-	56	35

Osterbrüch	-	817	593	-	-	-
Osterode	-	301	43	-	-	-
Papenburg	-	324	-	-	-	-
Rehrden	-	85	-	-	-	-
Reine	-	35	-	-	-	-
Rhauderfehn	-	-	262	-	-	-
Salzgitter	-	-	409	-	-	-
Schulenburg	-	-	-	-	-	40
Seedorf	-	-	2,155	153	199	146
Unterluss	-	-	-	179	-	-
Varel	-	-	-	-	-	103
HAMBURG	1,113	1,991	1,367	1,583	688	522
Falkenberg	1,113	1,567	1,367	950	303	229
Other Camps	-	424	-	633	385	293
SCHLESWIG- HOLSTEIN^f	1,029	2,603	2,159	458	266	1,160
Eckernförde	-	-	51	-	-	-
Eutin	-	-	6	-	21	12
Flensburg	182	183	154	203	-	-
Geesthacht	-	50	11	-	-	-
Itzehoe	95	119	116	-	-	-
Kiel	-	1,330	215	130	-	-
Lübeck	530	590	503	-	111	102
Lübeck Resettlement Centre	-	-	79	-	-	125
Neustadt	222	280	229	125	118	72
Pinneberg	-	-	17	-	-	24
Preetz	-	-	647	-	-	-
Rendsburg	-	-	-	-	16	-
Schleswig	-	51	27	-	-	-
Wentorf Resettlement Centre	-	-	104	-	-	825
NORTH RHINE- WESTPHALIA	6,570	5,854	4,247	2,231	1,690	1,357
Augustdorf	-	-	15	98	86	96
Bedburg	-	4	3	-	-	29
Bielefeld	848	-	787	287	-	150

Bimben	-	-	-	-	32	-
Blomberg	-	-	52	40	-	-
Bocholt	-	-	165	174	103	124
Dorsten	450	434	-	-	-	-
Duisburg	-	-	-	-	-	70
Dusseldorf	-	11	18	-	-	40
Essen	-	-	-	-	104	90
Greven	-	38	141	-	-	-
Halle	302	-	-	-	182	-
Haltern	-	112	-	-	-	-
Henster	-	-	-	-	134	-
Hoxter	-	-	-	-	-	90
Lähden	-	35	425	-	-	-
Lintorf	1,321	857	382	342	174	170
Menden	320	62	81	-	-	-
Mülheim-Ruhr	1,438	2,234	-	-	-	-
Münster	-	120	-	-	259	38
Paderborn	-	-	284	-	36	-
Reckenfeld	-	38	13	-	-	-
Rheine	1,911	1,892	1,881	1,108	736	439
Solingen	-	17	-	-	-	-
Wipperfürth	-	-	-	-	26	21
TOTAL						
British Zone	26,072	31,296	28,460	12,461	4,580	4,758

^a Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii," 59-61, quoting questionnaire returns of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany, collected during 1946 and 1947. The questionnaires are housed in the archives of the Ukrainian Free University, Munich.

^b UNRRA, *Assembly Centre Reports - British Zone*, UNA, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.6:13.

^c IRO, *Monthly Assembly Centre Report as 31 December 1947 -- British Zone*, ANF, AJ 43, Box 1117.

^d According to a table compiled by the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau and appended to IRO, *Monthly Statistical Report on Refugees in the British Zone of Germany for July 1949*, PAC, MG28, V9, Vol. 17.

^e Materials for the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau Commemorative Book, 1945-52, PAC, MG28, V9, Vol. 17.

^f Totals for lands and zones are not reliable because not all camps may be listed.

Table 7
Ukrainians in UNRRA and IRO Camps of the American Zone of Germany

	1946-7 ^a	Aug. 1946 ^b	May 1947 ^c	Dec. 1947 ^d
LAND HESSEN ^c	6,528	3,972	5,340	4,941
Arolsen	-	-	6	26
Cornberg	2,338	2,481	1,999	2,098
Frankfurt (emig. a.c.)	-	-	90	-
Friedberg (emig. a.c.)	-	-	-	184
Fulda (hospital)	-	-	-	21
Fürstenwald	-	33	121	-
Giessen	500	-	-	-
Gudensberg	-	-	87	-
Hanau	246	146	186	220
Hanau (hospital)	-	-	3	10
Hersfeld (Kriegsschule)	430	217	246	41
Kassel (Mattenberg)	-	-	12	-
Kassel (Monchenhof)	-	15	107	106
Kassel (Wilhelmstahl)	-	4	2	32
Korbach (Conti)	477	-	77	976
Landau	460	427	357	-
Merxhausen (hospital)	-	-	36	-
Neukirchen	-	-	249	-
Offenbach	280	-	29	23
Waldeck (vocational school)	-	-	-	57
Wiesbaden (Mainz Kastel)	1,797	564	1,573	1,127
Wiesbaden (hospital)	-	-	-	20
Zierenberg (Fliegerlager)	-	85	160	-
WÜRTEMBERG-BADEN	10,622	306	8,424	6,883
Bissingen	-	-	212	-
Ellwangen (Muhlberg Kaserne)	2,330	-	2,329	2,177
Esslingen (Latvian Camp)	-	-	33	-
Ettlingen	2,147	-	1,694	-
Heidelberg (hospital)	-	-	-	55
Heilbronn	-	237	33	-
Herrenberg	-	-	24	-
Karlsruhe (Rheinlander K.)	1,300	-	1,344	1,633
Karlsruhe (Staging Centre)	-	-	-	123
Korntal	-	-	126	-
Ludwigsburg	797	-	773	-
Mannheim	560	-	576	-

Mosbach (Children's Centre)	-	-	-	44
Oberboihingen	320	-	178	-
Pforzheim	1,127	9	-	982
Stuttgart				
Zufenhausen (Grenadier K.)	1,583	-	740	1,509
Bad Connstadt	-	-	-	360
Unterlenningen	458	-	212	-
Weiblingen	-	60	-	-
Wolfschlugen	-	-	150	-
BAYERN (BAVARIA)	46,831	28,005	49,728	42,061
Altötting	136	92	169	-
Amberg	-	10	135	86
Ansbach	672	54	681	577
Aschaffenburg				
(Artillerie Kaserne)	1,449	417	1,294	1,254
(Bous Brule)	1,300	79	1,132	1,170
(Jäger)	-	-	24	-
(Lagerde)	1,298	1,398	1,081	918
(Pioneer Kaserne)	1,999	2,261	2,070	1,836
(DP Hospital)	-	-	122	129
Augsburg				
(Somme Kaserne)	2,643	-	2,528	2,344
(Other Units)	-	53	38	-
(Servatius Hospital)	-	-	69	72
Bad Kohlgrub (UNRRA hosp.)	-	-	140	-
Bad Wörishofen	491	679	576	528
Bamberg	1,382	1,094	1,426	-
Bayreuth				
(Leopold Kaserne)	2,170	1,301	1,432	2,610
(Other Units)	-	583	13	-
(St. Georgen Hospital)	-	7	82	68
Berchtesgaden (Orlyk)	2,112	2,191	2,154	1,953
Biesenhofen	125	-	54	58
Bodonwöhr	-	172	-	-
Coburg	-	-	15	-
Deggendorf (Winzer)	359	-	350	268
Dillingen				
(Luitpold Camp)	1,656	300	1,655	1,362
(DP Hospital)	-	-	36	-
Dingolfing	-	108	-	-
Dinkelsbühl	486	456	428	401
Ecksberg (Hospital)	-	-	25	-
Eichstätt	-	436	-	-

Emmering	-	57	-	-
Erasbach (Solheim Camp)	-	-	106	-
Ergolding	195	337	102	-
Erlangen	810	-	537	776
Flossenburg	-	19	10	-
Forchheim				
(Markville)	-	339	260	-
(Princeton)	-	399	250	-
Fraundorf	205	321	-	-
Fürstenwald	-	33	-	-
Fürth (Reitersach)	-	-	13	866
Ganacher	707	-	553	736
Gauting (DP Hospital)	-	29	66	74
Grafenaschau	-	-	273	213
Günzburg (DP Hospital)	-	-	17	-
Hof	99	-	-	-
Hohenfels	-	-	65	-
Ingolstadt	1,280	-	1,234	1,127
Kaufbeuren	407	766	694	433
Kempten (DP Hospital)	-	-	11	-
Kulmbach (Mainleus)	-	461	22	-
Lam (Children's Centre)	-	-	33	-
Landshut	895	628	839	893
Lauf	-	-	14	44
Lauingen (Latvian Camp)	-	14	-	-
Lohr (DP Hospital)	-	-	22	-
Markt	-	59	-	-
Memmingen	-	218	5	-
Mittenwald				
(Jäger Kaserne)	2,891	-	2,874	2,911
(Luitensee)	372	-	197	863
(Pioneer Kaserne)	1,192	-	464	65
(Hospital)	-	-	-	81
Mitterteich	-	-	223	-
Muhldorf (Pürten II)	-	-	-	731
Munich				
(Freiman/SS/Warner Kaserne)	2,575	-	2,337	3,250
(Funk Kaserne-Transit)	144	-	194	487
(Laim)	717	1,280	1,149	945
(Luitpold Kaserne)	-	-	91	27
(Schleissheim)	2,023	-	1,472	333
(Resettlement Centre)	-	-	34	472
(Labour Camp S.)	-	-	16	80
(Children's Division)	-	-	15	17

(Altersheim Hospital)	-	-	97	86
Natternberg	-	-	22	-
Neubeuren	254	419	345	-
Neuburg (DP Hospital)	-	-	56	30
Neudorf	58	-	-	-
Neumarkt (Nova Howerla)	1,067	1,406	1,001	929
Neu Ulm	1,931	2,051	1,985	1,714
Nurnberg				
(Congress Camp)	-	-	572	567
(Children's TB Sanatorium)	-	-	31	14
(Hospital, Fischbach)	-	-	-	7
Obernzen	486	464	437	-
Pasing	-	-	21	-
Passau	600	508	217	121
Pfarrkirchen	500	-	359	416
Prien	-	-	39	-
Reiterzeich	972	-	696	-
Regensburg	4,664	1,985	4,293	4,560
Rosenheim	473	240	268	177
Rothenburg	-	384	348	351
Schalldorf	-	373	66	-
Schongau	-	-	663	-
Schwabmünchen	207	-	-	-
Schwandorf	-	24	71	-
Stadtsteinach	-	-	338	-
Stefanskirchen	1,168	-	923	883
Straubing	-	90	29	-
Tirschenreuth	-	-	24	-
Türkheim	-	14	15	-
Velden	-	21	-	-
Vilsbiburg	-	354	-	-
Vilseck	-	428	-	-
Virnsberg	210	355	230	-
Wasserburg	168	-	160	-
Weiden	-	48	45	-
Weissenburg	618	695	572	542
Weyarn	253	269	208	225
Wildflecken	-	883	305	-
Wolkering	412	343	343	381
Wunsiedel	-	-	28	-
TOTAL, AMERICAN ZONE	63,981	32,283	63,492	53,885

- ^a Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii," 54-8, quoting questionnaire returns of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany, collected during 1946 and 1947. The questionnaires are housed in the archives of the Ukrainian Free University, Munich.
- ^b UNRRA, Statistics and Reports Branch, *Summary of D.P. Population UNRRA Assembly Centers in United States Zone, 24 August 1946* (Heidelberg: UNRRA Headquarters, American Zone, 24 August 1946).
- ^c UNRRA, Statistics and Reports Branch, *Summary of D.P. Population UNRRA Assembly Centers United States Zone* (Heidelberg: UNRRA Headquarters, American Zone, 31 May 1947), UNA, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.6:13.
- ^d PCIRO, Statistics and Reports Branch, *Summary of D.P. Population PCIRO Assembly Centers United States Zone* (Heidelberg: PCIRO Headquarters, American Zone, 2 January 1948), ANF, AJ 43, Box 1117.
- ^e Totals for lands and zones are not reliable because not all camps may be listed.*

Table 8
Immigration of Ukrainian Refugees Supported by IRO^a

DESTINATION	July- Dec. 1947	Jan.- June 1948	July- Dec. 1948	Jan.- June 1949	July- Dec. 1949	Jan.- June 1950	July- Dec. 1950	Jan.- Dec. 1951	July 1947- Dec. 1951
	Europe ^b	9,862	10,745	2,890	564	174	75	90	159
South America	797	1,274	3,793	2,125	956	105	93	195	9,338
North America	1,518	3,648	4,472	9,237	12,106	8,874	8,239	11,827	59,923
Australasia	14	639	1,743	6,091	6,036	3,206	1,693	364	19,788
World-wide	12,264	16,310	12,899	18,022	19,285	12,261	10,121	12,545	11,370
All Refugees	95,147	113,531	142,383	180,774	164,547	99,818	91,729	150,821	103,875
Ukrainians as % of refugees	12.9	14.4	9.1	10.0	11.7	12.3	11.0	8.3	11.0

^a Compiled from PCIRO and IRO *Monthly Statistical Reports* 1947 to 1951, and grouped into semi-annual intervals, where data permit, and by continents.

^b Includes North Africa and Middle East.

Sources for Tables 8, 9, 11, and 12: IRO, *Statistical Report on IRO Operations, June 1948* (Geneva: Office of Statistics and Operational Reports, n.d.), 32; *idem.*, *December 1948, 42; March 1949, 30; June 1949, 63; July 1949, 36; August 1949, 37; September 1949, 48; October 1949, 37; November 1949, 33; December 1949, 48; January 1950, 28; February 1950, 28; March 1950, 38; April 1950, 31; May 1950, 31; June 1950, 39; July-September 1950, 23; October-December 1950, 22*. See also *The Final Statistical Report of IRO with Summaries Covering the 54 Months of its Operations, July 1947 to December 1951* (Geneva: Office of Statistics and Operational Reports, n.d.), 13 and PCIRO, *Statistical Report on PCIRO Operations, December 1947* (Geneva: Office of Statistics and Operational Reports, n.d.), 18.

Table 9
Immigration of Ukrainian Refugees to Other European Countries^a
Number of Individuals

DESTINATION	July- Dec. 1947	Jan.- June 1948	July- Dec. 1948	Jan.- June 1949	July- Dec. 1949	Jan.- June 1950	July- Dec. 1950	Jan.- Dec. 1951	July 1947- Dec. 1951
	Belgium	4,519	726	338	38	11	6	5	7
Britain	4,822	8,803	1,220	119	33	19	11	-	15,027
France	429	1,071	1,302	299	113	42	72	14	3,342
The Netherlands	38	58	11	4	-	-	1	6	118
Tunisia	52	78	5	-	3	-	-	-	138
Fr. Morocco	1	-	14	34	7	-	1	-	57
Norway	-	-	-	-	1	4	-	53	58
Sweden	-	6	-	2	1	-	-	37	46
Italy	-	-	-	36	1	1	-	-	38
Switzerland	1	3	-	4	-	1	-	16	25
Other ^b	-	-	-	28	4	2	-	26	60
TOTAL	9,862	10,745	2,890	564	174	75	90	159	24,559

As Percentage of All the IRO Refugees

Belgium	28.4	22.3	12.9	13.0	8.5	5.4	6.7	6.5	25.1
Britain	16.4	22.0	11.2	8.9	4.4	3.9	5.0	0	17.4
France	5.0	14.1	15.4	2.9	6.1	7.8	10.3	4.0	8.7

^a Compiled from PCIRO and IRO *Monthly Statistical Reports*, 1947 to 1951 (see also sources, Table 8), and grouped into semi-annual intervals, where data permit.

^b Other equals Eire (16), Luxembourg (16), Turkey (12), Germany (7), Spain (7), and Denmark (2).

Table 10
European Volunteer Workers and Dependants in Britain
(until 31 May 1951)

	Polish-Ukrainian			Other Ukrainian			ex-POW Ukrainian			All Ukrainian		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M only	M	F	Total		
Arrived	10,131	2,762	12,893	6,063	1,956	8,019	8,128	24,322	4,718	29,040		
Returned	368	56	424	240	30	270	67	675	86	694		
Remaining	9,763	2,706	12,469	5,823	1,926	7,749	8,061	23,647	4,632	28,279		
Dependants arrived:												
Adults	23	202	225	13	173	186	-	36	375	411		
Children	134	114	248	126	77	203	-	260	191	451		
Total	157	316	473	139	250	389	-	296	566	862		
Total remaining	9,920	3,022	12,942	5,962	2,176	8,138	8,061	23,943	5,198	29,141		

According to Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (New Haven, 1953), 365.

Table 11
Immigration of Ukrainian Refugees to South America^a
Number of Individuals

DESTINATION	July- Dec. 1947	Jan.- June 1948	July- Dec. 1948	Jan.- June 1949	July- Dec. 1949	Jan.- June 1950	July- Dec. 1950	Jan.- Dec. 1951	July 1947- Dec. 1951
	Argentina	53	489	892	682	101	8	17	41
Brazil	325	227	1,938	1,424	593	2	12	88	4,609
Chile	-	193	2	-	100	5	12	7	319
Paraguay	9	11	98	-	-	24	-	4	146
Peru	-	72	10	-	4	-	-	-	86
Venezuela	410	282	852	18	158	63	50	54	1,887
Other ^b	-	-	1	1	-	3	2	1	8
Total	797	1,274	3,793	2,125	956	105	93	195	9,338

As Percentage of All the IRO Refugees

Argentina	15.9	5.5	9.5	12.8	9.2	0.6	1.1	2.4	7.0
Brazil	18.0	13.2	32.6	13.8	17.0	0.4	1.5	2.1	16.0
Chile	0	14.9	1.0	0	5.9	2.2	2.1	1.0	6.3
Paraguay	1.8	0.4	5.5	0	0	8.7	0	2.2	2.5
Peru	0	5.7	1.6	0	7.1	0	0	0	3.7
Venezuela	14.7	9.6	14.1	5.7	13.4	6.5	2.9	4.2	10.9
TOTAL	8.9	6.8	15.5	12.6	11.7	2.9	1.8	2.3	9.9

^a Compiled from PCIRO and IRO *Monthly Statistical Reports*, 1947 to 1951 (see also sources, Table 8), and grouped into semi-annual intervals, where data permit.

^b Other equals Colombia (3) and Uruguay (5).

Table 12
Immigration of Ukrainian Refugees to North America and Australasia^a
Number of Individuals

DESTINATION	July-1947		Jan.-1948		July-1948		Jan.-1949		July-1949		Jan.-1950		July-1950		Jan.-1951		July-1951	
	Dec.	1947	June	1948	Dec.	1948	June	1949	Dec.	1949	June	1950	Dec.	1950	June	1951	Dec.	1951
U.S.	231		520	272	11,163	6,945	11,163	7,416	7,648	10,849	45,044							
Canada	1,287		3,128	4,200	943	2,292	943	1,458	591	978	14,877							
Australia	14		639	1,743	6,036	6,049	6,036	3,205	1,596	325	19,607							
N.Zealand	-		-	-	-	42	-	1	97	39	179							
TOTAL	1,532		4,287	6,215	18,142	15,328	18,142	12,080	9,932	12,191	79,707							

As Percentage of All IRO Refugees

U.S.	2.5	6.6	6.2	14.9	13.7	17.3	17.0	12.0	13.7
Canada	16.7	17.8	18.1	13.1	8.5	16.4	8.4	3.2	12.1
Australia	1.1	14.6	17.5	15.5	11.9	8.0	6.4	2.8	10.8
N.Zealand	0	0	0	4.1	0	2.2	9.5	1.5	3.7
TOTAL	8.3	14.3	16.5	14.7	12.7	13.1	12.7	9.0	12.5

^a Compiled from PCIRO and IRO *Monthly Statistical Reports*, 1947 to 1951 (see also sources, Table 8), and grouped into semi-annual intervals, where data permit.

Notes

1. Andrzej Maryanski, *Sovremennye migratsii naseleniia*, trans. V. L. Kona, ed. Iu. L. Pivovarov (Moscow, 1969), 157.
2. Volodymyr Maruniak, "Ukrainci v Nimechchyni," in *Ukrainski poseleennia: Dovidnyk*, ed. A. M. Milianych, V. N. Bandera, I. M. Huryn, and W. W. Isajiw (New York, 1980), 149; Vasyl Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," in *Ukrainci u vilnomu sviti: Iuvileina knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1894-1954*, ed. L. Myshuha and A. Drahan (Jersey City, [1954]), 115. For more details on foreign labour in the Third Reich see Edward L. Homze, *Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany* (Princeton, 1967).
3. Malcolm J. Proudfoot, *European Refugees: 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movement* (Evanston, Ill., 1956), 159, 207-20.
4. *Plight of Ukrainian DP's* (New York, [1945]), National Archives, Washington (NARS), RG 59, 800.4016 DP/12-1745.
5. Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (New Haven, 1953), 86-7.
6. *Information on MGB Participation in Soviet Repatriation*, NARS, RG 59, 8000.4016 DP/3-447.
7. NARS, RG 59, 8000.4016 DP/9-2445; NARS, RG 59, 8000.4016 DP/2-1447; NARS, RG 59, 8000.4016 DP/7-2546.
8. *Summary of Memorandum of Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union of the International Workers Order, Addressed to the Secretary of State*, NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/11-2145.
9. SHAEF, *Displaced Persons Report No. 37*, 14, United Nations Archives, New York (UNA), PAG-4/2.0.6.2:15.
10. SHAEF, *Displaced Persons Report No. 35*, Appendix B, 2, UNA, PAG-4/2.0.6.2:15.
11. SHAEF, *Displaced Persons Report No. 39*, 17, UNA, PAG-4/2.0.6.2:15.
12. UNRRA Central Headquarters for Germany, *Displaced Persons Semi-Monthly Report No. 1*, NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/10-1545.
13. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 87.
14. UNA, PAG-4/3.0.1.3.2:3. The Polish ambassador blamed Polish Ukrainians residing in and repatriated to Poland for disorders and sabotage during the Soviet-Polish exchange of population and thus left the question of repatriation of Polish Ukrainians directly to the authorities of Germany and the USSR. See NARS, RG 59, 800.4106 DP/2-1447.
15. See, for example, the policy statement of the Survey Committee on Displaced Persons of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, *The Problem of the Displaced Persons (June 1946)*, 50-2, in NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/6-746. The standard replies to protests concerning forced repatriation also changed. In 1945 the State Department simply stated that "only Soviet citizens are repatriated to the Soviet Union." NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/9-2445. By 1946 the standard replies from the State Department offered assurance that the United States

government considered only those Ukrainians covered by the Yalta repatriation agreement “who were both citizens of and actually within the Soviet Union on September 1, 1939 and who come within the following categories:

- (1) those who were captured in German uniforms;
- (2) those who were members of the Soviet armed forces on or after June 22, 1941 and were not subsequently discharged therefrom;
- (3) those who on the basis of reasonable evidence have been found to be collaborators with the enemy, having voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy.

Other Ukrainians are not being repatriated unless they so desire.” NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/1-2346.

16. First, the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization was formed (1 July 1947). Later (20 August 1948), a sufficient number of countries joined to allow IRO to succeed PCIRO. The communist countries, however, insisted on repatriation, opposed the concept of resettlement and, while making every effort to influence the constitution and guidelines for IRO work, refused to join it in the end. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 402-6.
17. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 87.
18. At the end of September 1948, there were 98 Ukrainian DPs reported in Czechoslovakia, 551 in France, 1 in The Netherlands, and 2 in Spain. In addition, 80 Ukrainian refugees were reported in the Far East. International Refugee Organization, *Schedule of Refugees Receiving IRO Assistance, 30 September 1948*, Archives Nationales de France, Paris (ANF), AJ 43:1097.
19. International Refugee Organization, *Schedule of Refugees Receiving IRO Assistance, 31 December 1949*, ANF, AJ 43:1097.
20. One of the aims and purposes of the bureau was “to gather information and statistics with regard to the numbers, locations, and general moral and material conditions of all Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons wherever they may be.” *Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau*, National Archives of Canada, Ottawa (NAC), RG 76, Vol. 856 File 554-330.
21. CURB Reports, *Report of G. R. B. Panchuk to CURB, UARC, and UCRF, 20 February 1946*, NAC, MG 28, V9, Vol. 17.
22. G. R. B. Panchuk to PCIRO, 12 September 1947, NAC, RG 76, Vol. 856 File 554-3.
23. This enumeration included not only the 9,300 men of the Galician Division, but also 40 nursing sisters housed at the prisoner-of-war camps in Rimini, some 1,500 Ukrainian refugees at the Polish DP camps in Terni and Barletta, 1,500 Ukrainian refugees in various “stateless” camps for DPs, and 150 Ukrainian girls in a camp at Taranto. In addition he estimated that up to 3,000 Ukrainians might be found in camps with the Polish forces. *CURB Information Service, 1945-46*, NAC, MG 28, V9, Vol. 17.
24. He referred specifically to the 9,000 men of the Galician Division at Rimini, about 500 in the camp in Terni, and about 3-4,000 Ukrainian refugees scattered outside

- assembly centres. Ian Henderson to the Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London (PRO), WR 1040.
25. *Italian Relief Committees, 1947-50*, NAC, MG 28, V9, Vol. 16.
 26. Volodymyr Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii v Nimechchyni ta Avstirii po druhii svitovii viini: 1943-1951-1967," Ph. D. dissertation (Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1968), 47-51. For the UNRRA view of grouping dísplaced persons by nationality see UNRRA, *Report of the Director General to the Council for the Period 1 January 1947 to 31 March 1947* (Washington, 1947), 53.
 27. Kost Pankivsky, *Vid komitetu do derzhavnoho tsentru* (New York, 1968), 153.
 28. My estimate is based on statistical data of Ukrainians in camps and camp populations in: Top Secret. Headquarters US Forces in Austria. *Report on Displaced Persons*, November 1947. NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/P-1447.
 29. Maruniak, "Ukrainci v Nimechchyni," 63.
 30. Populations for these camps are according to Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii," 61, who used the questionnaire returns of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany collected during 1946-7. The questionnaires are housed in the archives of the Ukrainian Free University, Munich.
 31. International Refugee Organization, General Council, *Migration from Europe* (Geneva, n.d.).
 32. Olga Lozowchuk, Detroit, Michigan, to Hon. J. F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, 11 September 1946 and reply by his special assistant, E. A. Gross, 3 October 1946, NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/9-1146.
 33. Since not all Ukrainians had declared themselves as such, and not all could be assisted at once, many searched for alternate sources of support. Ukrainian Catholics, some of whom passed as Poles, sometimes were assisted by the National Catholic Welfare Conference. Ukrainian Orthodox or Baptists, on the other hand, often had support from the World Church Service. Some Ukrainians from the eastern regions were assisted by the Tolstoy Fund, a Russian non-communist foundation based in the United States. The lion's share of assistance to Ukrainian refugees came from UCRF, based in Winnipeg, and UUARC, based in Philadelphia.
 34. Thus, in the three consecutive years ending on 31 March 1947, respectively 14, 18, and 103 Ukrainians immigrated to Canada from overseas, nearly all of them (11, 16, and 99 respectively) children, probably war orphans. Department of Mines and Resources, *Annual Summary Tables of Immigrants Arriving from Ocean Ports*, NAC, RG 26, Vol. 53.
 35. Cipher telegram from Foreign Office to Moscow Embassy, March 1947, and subsequent communications, PRO, FO 371.66606, WR 920; Sir Clifford Heathcote-Smith to T. L. Rowan, Secretary to the P. M. of the U. K., 9 April 1947, PRO, WR 1386/18/48, FO 371-66610; Foreign Office to Mr. R. D. C. McAlpine, House of Commons, 25 April 1947, PRO, WR 1431/1/48, FO 371-66610.
 36. Cipher telegram from GHQ CMF to the War Office, 21 April 1947, PRO, WR 1519/77/48, FO 371-66711.

37. John Panchuk and the British Military Command in Italy to the War Office and Foreign Office, 17 April 1947, PRO, WR 1479/1/48, FO 371-66610.
38. Evstakhii Zahachevsky, *Beliariia - Rimini - Anhliia* (Munich, 1968), 292.
39. *Report of A. J. Yaremovich, Director, CURB to UCC, Winnipeg, 26 July 1948*, NAC, MG 28, V9, Vol. 16, CURB Correspondence with UCC and UCRF, January-July 1948.
40. *Report of G. R. B. Panchuk from the Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Victims of War to United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, 14 April 1947*, NAC, MG 28, V9, Vol. 16, CURB Correspondence with United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, January-June 1947.
41. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 259.
42. *Ibid.*, 298, 305-7.
43. *Ibid.*, 343, 350-2.
44. In principle, British policy opposed accepting former Soviet citizens, but Ukrainians were an exception. Ministry of Labour to the Home Office, 3 March 1948, PRO, WR 1000/1000/48, FO 371-72088.
45. Although those countries honoured the right of asylum, they viewed political refugees with reservation, for the latter, unlike ordinary immigrants, had hopes of some day returning to their native land and, in the meantime, were determined to maintain a cohesive, distinct community. Moreover, they perceived non-Romance language immigrants—such as Ukrainians—as more difficult to assimilate. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 581-9. See also “Mexican Immigration Requirements,” *International Labour Review* LV, no. 3-4 (March-April 1947): 306-7; “Immigration Policies of Countries of South America,” *International Labour Review* LV, no. 5 (May 1947): 436-44; “Immigration Board in Argentina,” *International Labour Review* LVIII, no. 3 (September 1948): 390-1.
46. *Organizations in Europe, North America, South America, Asia and Africa Extending Relief to Ukrainian Refugees, Displaced Persons and Victims of War*, NAC, RG 76, Vol. 856, File 554-33.
47. Oksana Borushenko, “Ukraiinsi v Brazyl'ii,” in *Ukrainski poselennia: Dovidnyk*, 298. She estimated that in 1970 there were some 150,000 Ukrainians in Brazil. If her estimate is accepted and adjusted for a natural increase of 1.0 per cent per annum over two decades, the Ukrainian population in Brazil may have numbered approximately 120,000 when the Ukrainian refugees from Europe arrived.
48. Mykhailo Vasylyk estimated the Ukrainian population in Argentina in 1970 at about 220,000. See his “Ukraiinsi v Argentyni,” in *Ukrainski poselennia: Dovidnyk*, 282. If his estimate is accepted and adjusted for a natural increase of 1.0 per cent per annum over two decades, the Ukrainian population in Argentina may have numbered approximately 180,000 when the Ukrainian refugees arrived from Europe.
49. For demographic characteristics of the Ukrainian population of Venezuela in the early 1970s, see Rev. Lev Lototsky, “Ukraiinsi v Venesueli,” in *Ukrainski poselennia: Dovidnyk*, 310-11.

50. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 630.
51. The unrest induced abrupt curtailment of immigration movement before the end of 1948. *Ibid.*, 666-9.
52. M. Danylyshyn, "Ukraintsi v Paragvaiu," in *Ukrainski poselennia: Dovidnyk*, 312-13.
53. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 674.
54. Helen F. Eckerson and Gertrude Krichefsky, "Immigration Restriction in the United States," *Monthly Review of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, vol. IV, no. 7 (January, 1947): 82-9.
55. "President Truman's Plan for Refugees," *Monthly Review of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, vol. III, no. 7 (January, 1946): 254-5.
56. Reported as "Feature of the Month," *The Congressional Digest*, vol. XXVII, no. 1 (January, 1948): 11-32.
57. Helen F. Eckerson and Gertrude Krichefsky, "Displaced Persons in the United States," *Monthly Review of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service*, vol. VI, no. 3 (September, 1948): 33-6.
58. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 482.
59. Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii," 189.
60. Those organizations denounced the Ukrainian refugees as war criminals and fascists who must not be admitted to the United States. Walter Riback, National Secretary, Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union, to Hon. James F. Byrnes, State Department, 21 November 1945, NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/11-2145; Walter Riback, National Secretary, Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union to Michael Rokocky, also of UAFU and Mr. Stevens of the State Department, 23 November 1945, NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/11-2145; Leon Tolopko, Secretary of Convention, Ukrainian-American League, Inc., to Hon. Mr. Acheson, Acting Secretary, State Department, 25 June 1946, NARS, RG 59, 800.4016 DP/6-2546.
61. Myron B. Kuropas, *The Ukrainians in America* (Minneapolis, 1972), 43; Volodymyr Bandera, "Ukraintsi v ZSA," in *Ukrainski poselennia: Dovidnyk*, 259.
62. "Immigration to Canada," *International Labour Review* LVI, no. 3 (September 1947): 330.
63. Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii," 189.
64. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 548-50. See also "Immigration into Canada," *International Labour Review* LV, no. 5 (May 1947): 449-50; and "Progress of Immigration into Canada," *International Labour Review* LVI, no. 5-6 (November-December 1947): 609-10.
65. Assuming the ratios are the same for Ukrainians as for all refugees. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 548, 550.
66. Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch, Statistical Unit, *Annual Summary Tables of Immigrants Arriving from Ocean Ports*, NAC, RG 26, Vol. 53.
67. Calculated from monthly summaries copied from Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch, Statistical Unit, NAC, RG 26, Vol. 21.

68. According to Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 562, the figure is 25,858. His time period, however, is longer by three months (April, May, and June 1947), in which there were eighty-six Ukrainian arrivals. Assuming all of these were refugees, the figure can be adjusted down to 25,772.
69. Their entry into Canada was opposed by the Canadian Jewish Congress, but no specific charges were laid against individuals, so they were eventually allowed to immigrate. Samuel S. Bronfman, President, Canadian Jewish Congress, to Hon. Walter Harris, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 25 September 1950, NAC, RG 26, Vol. 151, File 3-32-11.
70. Immigration from Chile, NAC, MG 28, V9, Vol. 12.
71. Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Statistics Section, *Immigration to Canada by Ethnic Origin from Overseas and Total from the United States by Province of Intended Destination. Calendar Years 1946 to 1955 inclusive* (Ottawa, 1956).
72. Department of Mines and Resources, Immigration Branch, Statistical Units, *Annual Summary Tables of Immigrants arriving from Ocean Ports*, NAC, RG 26, Vol. 53.
73. Ivan Teslia, "Ukrainci v Kanadi," in *Ukrainski poseleennia: Dovidnyk*, 209-12.
74. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 700-2.
75. "Australian Immigration Policy," *International Labour Review* LVI, no. 2 (August 1947): 184.
76. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 704, 706.
77. "Australian Immigration Policy," *International Labour Review* LV, no. 5 (May 1947): 451-2.
78. Oleh Volovyna, Ihor Hordiiv, and Liubov Hordiiv, "Ukrainci v Avstralii," in *Ukrainski poseleennia: Dovidnyk*, 332.
79. *Ibid.*, 329, 332-8.
80. V. Krekhovets, A. Martsiash, "Ukrainci v Novii Zeliandii," in *Ukrainski poseleennia: Dovidnyk*, 340.
81. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 724-5, 730; "Immigration Policy in New Zealand," *International Labour Review* LVI, no. 2 (August 1947): 186.
82. Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii," 183.

Economic and
Organizational
Structure
of the DP Camps

The Economic Aspects of Camp Life

Nicholas G. Bohatiuk

The economic life of Ukrainians in the camps was tied to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and later the International Refugee Organization (IRO), as well as to the organizational structure of the Ukrainian community itself. As soon as the war ended, Ukrainian refugees formed new organizations with cultural and political goals and for mutual aid and economic self-help. Thus, by the fall of 1945 an association of former Ukrainian inmates of Nazi concentration camps (League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners), and the Ukrainian Red Cross Bureau existed.

Many other associations sprang up just as quickly, a number of them as a continuation of associations in Ukraine. In November 1945 the Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigration (CRUE) was formed to co-ordinate the work of all Ukrainian refugees and to represent them in the outside world. The organizational structure of CRUE had five levels: refugee camp, district, region, province-land, and the central organization. The central level consisted of the Supreme Council, the Main Administration, and a number of various departments such as those concerned with organization, culture and education, employment and business, legal aid, social care, finances, information, youth, and women.¹ CRUE's constitution shows a strong emphasis on the economic aspects of refugee life:²

1. To provide Ukrainian DPs in Germany with general aid and assistance;
2. To preserve the achievements of the Ukrainian national culture and to secure the basis for its continuing development;
3. To involve and integrate the productive forces of the Ukrainian emigration into the economic and social life of the Western democracies;

4. To foster the physical and moral health of the Ukrainian emigration as well as its law and order.

One of CRUE's tasks was to gather and keep statistics on the social, cultural, organizational, and economic life of the refugees.³

The Postwar Economy of West Germany

Toward the end of World War II, Henry Morgenthau, American Secretary of the Treasury, recommended the partition of Germany into three states.⁴ However, the idea of the permanent transformation of part of Europe's industrial heartland into a secondary pastoral state was described by most of the experts as "fantastic, childish, and imbecilic."⁵ Nonetheless, Morgenthau's proposal was aimed at the creation of a new, peace-oriented Germany without heavy industry, but with well-developed agriculture. By implication, this policy aimed at building an economically-strong Europe with a weak Germany. However, the Americans slowly discovered that building a strong Europe through the economic destruction of Germany was a chimera. Since agriculture in West Germany would be unable to provide sufficient food for its inhabitants, a program had to be developed to feed the German people by importing food. German industry had to be revived so that the proceeds of its exports would pay for the necessary imports of food.

The political and economic conditions that prevailed in early postwar Germany were simply chaotic. Obstacles that had to be overcome to get German import-export programs started included the catastrophic situation in the German coal mines; the transportation problem (more than 60 per cent of all locomotives and more than 40 per cent of all freight cars were out of action); as well as a lack of hard currency. To further complicate matters, the German market was divided into two sectors. In one, entirely insufficient quantities of rationed goods were sold at official prices for payment in Reichsmarks (RM), while in the other most products were available provided that items of equal scarcity could be offered in exchange. In that sector, cigarettes frequently assumed the role of money, since they fulfilled the major currency prerequisites, namely, durability, divisibility, transportability, and wide acceptance.

Since barter was a matter of necessity in the business community, German industries began to supplement the monetary income of their employees with additional payments in kind. As a rule, these consisted of merchandise manufactured in the respective factories. On weekends the workers took off to the countryside where those wares were traded for eggs, butter, milk or whatever food items were available to supplement their inadequate official rations. Many of the workers maintained regular jobs only in order to be entitled to ration cards and social benefits. The story of a Ruhr miner exemplifies the situation.⁶ Conditions on German farms generally paralleled those in the factories. Since only minimal quantities of farm machinery and spare parts were made available through official channels in the first postwar years, farmers often were compelled

to divert some of their produce, which should have met official delivery quotas, to barter. Through this bartering they received commodities they needed either to operate their farms or to make future trading transactions. A barter economy between city and country thus came into being.

During the first three years of Allied occupation, the policy of deindustrialization of Germany was vigorously pursued by the American and British military governments, not so much by removing capital equipment as by deliberately neglecting the industrial economy and by placing an import embargo on raw materials. However, that policy worked at cross purposes with the policy of maximizing German agricultural production. The existence of barter reminded the occupation authorities, as well as economists, that when food rations fall below the subsistence level the will to survive results in a considerable withdrawal of effort from both industrial and agricultural activity. This economic helplessness of Germany, in turn, disrupted the intra-European trade that was essential to the prosperity of other European nations. As long as German industrial capacity was kept idle, the economic recovery of Europe was delayed. Therefore, to nurse Europe back to economic health, the Marshall Plan was introduced.

In order to increase available rolling stock, 25,000 railway cars brought into Germany by the American army were turned over to the German railway administration. In addition, in the spring of 1946 12,500 U.S. army trucks were made available to the German economy on a deferred payment basis.⁷ Delays in reconstruction of the transportation system complicated the distribution of coal in West Germany, as well as in the European countries dependent on German deliveries. The liberated countries of Europe often took the position that they were entitled to priority coal allocations. Since the output of English coal was far below normal, Western European requirements not satisfied by deliveries from the Ruhr had to be met by extensive imports from the United States.

In the period 1935-45 German currency in circulation had increased from 5 billion to 50 billion RM and bank deposits from 30 billion to 150 billion RM; the government debt, without war damages and other war-related claims of 350 billion RM, climbed from 15 billion to 400 billion RM. It was estimated that Germany's national real wealth had decreased by one-third by 1945, and that for the first postwar years its capacity to produce had been reduced to about 50 per cent of its prewar level. Monetary reform was considered essential if the economic recovery of the country was to take place at all. Anticipation of the currency reform, however, gave rise to widespread hoarding of goods by business, since it was accepted that the reform would treat monetary claims much more harshly than material assets. The greatest portion of goods produced went into inventory. Everybody wanted to buy and nobody wanted to sell. The inability to obtain, by legal means, the amounts of coal, raw materials, and semi-fabrics needed for continuous operations, and the desire to prevent dissipation of their

financial base forced German businessmen to circumvent existing economic controls.

For three years the Allies adhered to the policy of a price and wage freeze. As a result, average wages for all industries in West Germany were at the same level in June 1948 as in 1928. The postwar price freeze constituted an integral part of the Allied policy of German deindustrialization. Therefore, as long as the Western Allies persisted in deindustrialization, nowhere in Western Europe was the economic situation more desperate than in occupied Germany between 1945 and mid-1948. The Allies established some semblance of order, but there was no hope, no future; a relentless stream of refugees kept pouring into the Western occupation zones. Food rations were insufficient for survival; industrial production stagnated; and the transportation system operated under serious strains. The currency reform of 1948 changed the situation overnight. It removed the economic chains and, subsequently, West Germany launched its phenomenal economic upsurge. Similarly, by 1948 the political situation changed dramatically. When the alliance with the Soviet Union broke down, West Germany was readmitted to the family of Western nations.

Work and Business Initiatives

During the first two years of emigration, 1945-6, the economic life of Ukrainian refugees in DP camps in Germany and Austria did not differ much from the chaotic economic situation that existed in both countries as a whole. There were widespread black market activities, devalued currencies, severe scarcity of goods and raw materials, and a complete lack of work stimuli. In that period the UNRRA, and later the IRO, as well as the Allied military occupation authorities, provided the refugees with free food and lodging in the camps, but did not show much interest in raising the level of their economic activity. In this atmosphere of declining work morale, postwar economic hopelessness, the tyranny of the black market, and worthless currencies, wages were only equal to pocket money and work assumed almost derogatory characteristics.⁸

Only the worsening of living conditions in the DP camps (especially the bad food situation) and the far-reaching German monetary reform of 1948 restored work to its proper and honourable place. The percentage of the camp population which was employed increased considerably—from 30 per cent in 1946 to 60 per cent in 1947 of what can be estimated as the total labour force—as refugees found employment with camp services, schools, various educational programs, in UNRRA workshops, in co-operative shops in the camps, in outside establishments of the American army, in the UNRRA administration, and in the German work force.⁹

There was, however, little relationship between the occupational background of the refugees and the type of work they were able to find. The occupational

background of the Ukrainian emigration in West Germany, as of 1 August 1948, was as follows:¹⁰

University professors	259
Elementary, high school, special teachers	1,103
Writers	56
Artists	342
Journalists	136
Lawyers, judges	446
Engineers	887
Physicians	266
Veterinarians	92
Dentists	35
Midwives	11
Nurses	286
Officials and civil servants	262
Merchants and co-operators	1,043
Craftsmen and skilled workers	8,407
Car and truck drivers	2,912
Unskilled workers	7,038
Farmers and farm workers	18,957
Total	42,538

Out of this total, 27,475 resided in the American Zone of Germany; 11,792 in the British Zone; and 3,271 in the French Zone. Proportionally, the situation in Austria was similar. Thus, of the total refugee labour force in West Germany, 61 per cent or 25,995 were either farmers and farm labourers or unskilled workers; 26.5 per cent or 11,319 were skilled craftsmen and other skilled workers, 10 per cent or 4,181 were professionals, including a small proportion of civil servants, and 2.5 per cent or 1,043 persons were businessmen of the merchant type in Ukraine.

When hopes for imminent emigration faded, the Ukrainian DP community turned to economic activities along the lines of co-operative and private initiative, regardless of their previous occupation. Suddenly a whole network of commercial and manufacturing enterprises, numerous private vegetable gardens and orchards, and many private and co-operative workshops appeared.¹¹ The workshops employed exclusively Ukrainian refugees, and their activities were limited mainly to the territory of the camps. Only a few of them—those involved in the manufacturing of such things as Ukrainian applied art objects—slowly succeeded in breaking the camp barriers and reaching German and even international markets. The availability of production equipment (machines and raw materials) posed one of the most serious obstacles for the workshops.¹² Nevertheless, the manufacturers of Ukrainian embroidery, artistic carpets, and wood carvings (especially of the Carpatho-Hutsul style), enjoyed great success and recognition among foreign buyers. For a brief time, demand for their output seemed to be insatiable.¹³

The CRUE Department of Employment and Business dealt with employment and job placement, co-operative activities, professional associations, and job training and re-training throughout the entire Ukrainian DP camp system in Germany. In 1946-7 it had in its register 307 Ukrainian enterprises and workshops, of which 220 were located in the DP camps and 87 outside them. These were predominantly small workshops, most of them employing no more than 2-10 employees. Altogether, they employed over 3,000 Ukrainian refugees.¹⁴ These Ukrainian firms could be grouped into nine different categories:¹⁵

Mechanics, locksmiths, turners, tinsmiths, and electrotechnicians	22
Shoemakers	52
Tailors	44
Carpenters	18
Construction	5
Knitting workshops	32
Folk art manufacturing	116
Publishing and printing	8
Commercial (stores, kiosks, taverns etc.)	10

In 1947-8 the number of Ukrainian workshops in Germany apparently increased: 513 workshops with 3,347 employees, representing 7.9 per cent of the entire Ukrainian labour force in Germany (356 firms with 2,329 employees in the American Zone, 139 firms with 942 employees in the British Zone, and 18 firms with 76 employees in the French Zone).¹⁶ To co-ordinate the activities of all these Ukrainian enterprises, a trade association of merchants, industrialists, and craftsmen, the Ukrainian Commercial-Industrial Association, was founded in Stuttgart in 1946. Its professed goal was to secure a proper place in the German economy for the increased presence of Ukrainian firms and to help Ukrainian entrepreneurs enter into world trade. However, after publishing two issues of its journal, the association ceased to exist.¹⁷

An interesting report on the activities and problems of Ukrainian workshops for the period March-May 1948 was prepared by the Office of Employment and Business of the regional branch of CRUE in Munich. Its conclusions reflect the situation that existed in other parts of West Germany, as well. According to that report, in 1948 17,000 Ukrainians lived in the Munich region, of whom 13,000 were in DP camps and 4,000 in private dwellings (3,370 of these in Munich alone). Eighty-two per cent of them were able-bodied. Of these able-bodied, 68 per cent were employed: 18 per cent by Ukrainian business firms (21 registered Ukrainian enterprises and ten institutions), 6 per cent by German firms, 25 per cent by the Allied forces, and 51 per cent by camp administrations and the IRO. Owing to the lack of raw materials and skilled workers, some of the enterprises operated on a part-time basis only and many of them were short-lived.¹⁸ The following data illustrate this rapid decline:¹⁹

	Workshops	Employees
February 1948	356	2,329
December 1948	138	1,081
December 1949	65	299

Meanwhile, thousands of Ukrainians who lived outside the DP camps were satisfactorily integrated into the German economy. They found employment with various German business firms and within the German agricultural system. Similarly, among camp residents, workers' groups were organized for forest construction and other types of work. Such work detachments were even employed by American military companies and workshops. In this way, thousands of Ukrainian workers found promising employment.²⁰

Young Ukrainian refugees found employment in a unique engineering-construction work unit called Sotnia, which employed about one hundred persons, and operated in Gross Anheim, Hessen, in the American zone. This unit was dissolved in 1949. There also existed two workers' camps organized with the assistance of the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee at the beginning of 1948. In Giessen and Hanau, province of Hessen, more than 600 Ukrainians found employment with the U.S. Army installations and at relatively good wages.²¹

The workers at these camps were given better rations than those in the DP camps and were paid the same wages as the German employees. They enjoyed priority with respect to resettlement. Both work camps were closed at the end of 1949 owing to the beginning of active DP resettlement and the stepped-up hiring of Germans for work at the U.S. installations.

In the British zone, several hundred Ukrainian refugees were employed as watchmen and truck drivers in semi-military units at the British military facilities performing various auxiliary services.²² Also, in the British zone DP workers employed by German firms remained under the care of the British occupational authorities, and in addition to wages in factories and other enterprises, received "work supplements" that were twice as high as the rations of the non-working refugees.²³

Because of the general desire to emigrate, work morale of the labour force declined quite considerably after 1949. Planning production and increasing business productivity became very hard. Fictitious employment, mainly in camp administration institutions, and black-market activities were considered the worst enemies of the normal employment process. Because of this young people could not see much sense in vocational training and retraining. Black-market pricing demoralized the work process, while the UNRRA giveaway to the camp inmates had the most adverse effects on work organization.²⁴

The creation of a business and employment supervisory agency under the regional or central level of CRUE did not succeed, owing to the lack of suitable personnel, financial means, and incompatibility with German laws. The German

employment authorities refused to recognize such an agency. The regional organization of CRUE in Munich concerned itself with the care of Ukrainians who had been employed by German firms for three years. It had Ukrainian representatives working in the German employment agency in Munich who also were paid by CRUE. This arrangement greatly helped to settle job-action cases involving Ukrainian workers.²⁵ By 1949, however, the number of Ukrainians employed by German firms was on the decline, especially in agriculture. Ukrainian employees left their farm employment, even though they were considered good farmhands, for the material and living conditions of the Ukrainian workers were bad and getting worse. Wages were too low to cover the rising cost of living. As well, the uncertain future and total helplessness of the situation clearly had its demoralizing effects on Ukrainian workers.²⁶

Ukrainian Refugee Co-operatives

The Ukrainian community was first among all refugee groups in setting up its own system of commercial and manufacturing co-operatives on German soil. Five Ukrainian co-operatives were registered in the German courts. In Ukraine, besides its economic activities, the co-operative movement always played the role of great promoter of Ukrainian culture and learning. Ukrainian co-operatives always generously contributed a substantial share of their profits to the major national and cultural causes. Under Russian communist rule, the Ukrainian co-operative movement was cruelly suppressed and prohibited, while its leaders were persecuted and jailed. However, in Western Ukraine, the co-operative movement had been able to develop and follow its old traditions.

The ideological and organizational leadership of the Ukrainian co-operative movement in postwar West Germany was concentrated in Munich, where the main co-operative associations, as well as the leading professional and academic co-operators, were located. The old-country co-operative tradition was carried on in emigration, although seemingly insurmountable legal and economic difficulties forced the Ukrainian co-operatives to restrict considerably their scope of activities.²⁷ September 1945 marks the beginning of Ukrainian co-operative activity in West Germany. At that time, the co-operators gathered around the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Munich organized three large co-operative associations:²⁸

- 1) The Co-operative Association of Consumers—(Kooperatyvne Obiednannia Spozhyvachiv, CAC/KOS), which consisted of a wholesale business unit, a grocery store, a restaurant, and a bookstore; 2) The Women's Toil (Zhinocha Pratsia), which associated its activities with the traditions of the former Lviv-based Co-operative of Ukrainian Folk Art; and 3) Labor, which was active in construction, transportation, footwear, running shops (a tailor shop, barber shop, watch repair shop), publishing, as well as manufacturing folk art objects, chemicals, cosmetics, and much more.

At the first convention of the Ukrainian co-operatives in Munich, the Central Union of Ukrainian Co-operatives in Exile (CUUCE), Tsentrosoiuz, and the Association of Ukrainian Co-operators (OUK) were formed.²⁹ Tsentrosoiuz was initially designed to be a commercial centre for the procurement of supplies for the DP camps and other Ukrainian co-operatives and to be an intermediary for product distribution between the co-operative workshops and the overseas Ukrainian outlets. Later, however, it was compelled to transfer its commercial functions to the CAC/KOS and itself assume responsibility for organizational promotion, education, and professional supervision of the co-operatives. Ukrainian co-operative activities in Austria centred around the Landeck DP camp, where the Association of Ukrainian Co-operators (AUC) and the Agriculturist Society (Silskyi Hospodar) were formed in 1945.³⁰

There were co-operatives operating outside the thirty DP camps as well. They were, for the most part, members of the Tsentrosoiuz, but other co-operatives were run privately by some camp administrations or private groups. The co-operative associations outside the camps, located in Munich and registered with the German courts in 1947, included the Co-operative Association of Consumers (KOS/CAC), Labor, and the Women's Toil, as well as Unitas in Hannover and Zahrava in Blomberg. Together with the Plast co-operative of the Ukrainian Scouting organization in Bayreuth, these associations organized a central co-operative superstructure, UNIA, which was headed by renowned Ukrainian civic leader and co-operative ideologist, Iuliiian Pavlykovsky. UNIA was not only an umbrella association of member business co-operatives, but also a patron of the Ukrainian Co-operative Movement, providing it with general guidelines and direction. The report on the activities of the CAC/KOS co-operative in Munich for the period September 1945-June 1947 reveals the financial aspect of Ukrainian co-operatives in West Germany. During that period, the CAC/KOS co-operative had 922 members, 63 employees, and a turnover of 2.7 million RM.³¹

The peak year of the Ukrainian co-operative movement in West Germany was 1948, when the total number of co-operatives reached forty-three. The following table shows the number of co-operatives by year and occupation zone:³²

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
American Zone	7	24	29	30	15
British Zone	-	1	6	11	4
French Zone	-	-	2	2	-
Total	7	25	37	43	19

The economic co-operative life of the Ukrainian refugees in West Germany before 1950 could be summarized in four ways. 1) The deep-rooted Ukrainian co-operative idea flourished, at least for a while, among Ukrainian refugees. One of the basic practices to which it was making faithful was generous donations to

Ukrainian national and cultural causes. 2) The period of the existence of Ukrainian co-operatives, as well as of the handicraft and artisan industry abroad, could be divided into the pre-1948 period of growth and the post-1948 period of decline. 3) Manufacturing co-operatives did not find suitable ground for their growth during 1949-51 and, just like many other Ukrainian private firms located outside the DP camps, were forced to terminate their existence because they could not withstand the fierce German competition and because of the emigration of capable people. 4) After the transfer of refugees from the DP camps to German jurisdiction and economic administration, the camp activities of the DPs became quite limited; in the period 1949-51, the co-operative stores were liquidated and the growth of private stores left in the British Zone. Instead, eight private Ukrainian DP camp stores and three Ukrainian firms were relocated outside the DP camps and continued to operate there.³³

Professional and Charitable Associations

The economy of the camps provided no basis for the formation of labour unions. Rather, the civic organization of Ukrainian peasants and many semi-skilled or unskilled workers took place within the framework of Ukrainian political parties.³⁴ People with professional backgrounds and higher skills grouped themselves into professional associations. By June 1948 fourteen of these associations were registered with the CRUE Department of Labour (Viddil Orhanizatsii Pratsi TsPUE): physicians and medical personnel, engineers and technicians, silviculturists, private businessmen, teachers, lawyers, co-operators, journalists, musicians, research scholars (scientists), writers organized in MUR, artists, and stage performers.³⁵ The Central Association of Professional Unions (Tsentralne Obiednannania Profesiinykh Spilok, CAPU) was established to co-ordinate their activities. However, decentralizing tendencies and serious differences proved stronger than the need for work co-ordination. By mid-1948 this body ceased all its activities. At the beginning of 1949, when the resettlement process was reaching its highest point, the self-liquidation of the professional associations began, and in 1950 all the Ukrainian professional associations virtually ceased to exist, with the exception of the Association of Ukrainian Journalists (AUJ). Some of the associations, however, especially those for the artists, MDs, engineers, and foresters transferred their activities to the countries of resettlement, mainly North America.

In addition to professional associations, other organizations registered with CRUE, such as the associations of invalids, war veterans, and former political prisoners and inmates of concentration camps. Of special importance was the Ukrainian Medical-Charitable Association (Ukrainske Medychno-Kharytatyvne Obiednannania, UMCA), whose main task was to take care of the moral, material, and health-related problems of the hardest-hit war victims, such as invalids,

families of war victims, the unemployable, and the sick. This task was performed in full co-operation with the CRUE Department of Social Services.³⁶

The UMCS was organized in 1946 in Munich-Karlsfeld. Originally the Ukrainian Red Cross, it was first called the Ukrainian Medical-Charitable Association. It had a membership of 640, including 278 physicians, 40 pharmacists and 205 paramedical personnel.³⁷

Valuable information on the number of Ukrainian medical personnel employed by the UNRRA-IRO can be found in the IRO Report for 1950-1951. Among the IRO medical personnel of 3,373, there were about 484 Ukrainians recruited from among the Ukrainian refugees, or about 15 per cent of the total. In Austria, Ukrainian nationality was claimed by 51 physicians, 2 dentists and 1 pharmacist. In the U.S. zone of Germany, the Ukrainians were represented by 287 physicians, 21 dentists and 41 pharmacists; in the British zone—68 physicians, 15 dentists and 3 pharmacists; and in the French zone—3 physicians, 1 dentist and 1 pharmacist.³⁸ The UMCS published its journal, *Medychno-sanitarnyi visnyk* (Medical-Sanitary Herald).

The UMCS had field offices in three occupation zones of Germany and nearly 200 posts in the DP camps and in large concentrations of the Ukrainian emigration in Germany and Austria. The UMCS had its own dispensaries and took care of the Ukrainian World War II prisoners of war, former soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia), the sick, widows, orphans, and former political prisoners. The UMCS organized first-aid courses and published popular medical-scholarly literature. By 1947, its membership consisted of over 500 Ukrainian physicians and nearly 1,200 pharmacists, dentists, nurses, and medical students.³⁹

The Supportive and Charitable Work of CRUE

CRUE performed a significant role in the financial support of the cultural and scholarly life of the refugees and in charitable work among them. In 1948, for example, the best year of CRUE activity, it dispensed almost 1 million RM to various causes. Ukrainian community membership dues formed the financial foundation of CRUE. Annual membership dues were 20 RM and were to be paid by every employed adult Ukrainian refugee.⁴⁰ All Ukrainian co-operatives, as well as Ukrainian independent industrial and commercial business firms, were urged to contribute 1 per cent of their annual turnover. There was also a minor tax levied on all Ukrainian camp undertakings.⁴¹ The collected funds were then allotted for use: 60 per cent for the work of the Central Representation, 25 per cent for the work of the Regional Representations, and 15 per cent for the work of the Local Representations.

The financing of cultural activities was carried out by a special Cultural Fund.⁴² That fund received additional financial support from carolling, Easter activities, and various other collections: for the upkeep of the graves of Ukraini-

an soldiers who had died in Germany, for organizing art exhibits, for the financing of Ukrainian cultural enterprises, and for the support of Ukrainian students (even though responsibility for the students' support rested with the Commission for Aid to Ukrainian Students [CAUS/KODUS]).⁴³ The Cultural Fund was also supported by the admission fees charged for Ukrainian cultural events held in the camps and a tax levied on the gross receipts of various Ukrainian undertakings (10 per cent to the Cultural Fund head office and 5 per cent to the cultural needs of the refugee camps).⁴⁴

The CRUE budget for 1948 estimated a gross total of receipts in the amount of 938,000 RM. Of this, 438,000 RM⁴⁵ were to be collected as membership dues from all three occupation zones of West Germany. The rest was to come from carolling and all the other collections and fees. Total projected disbursement was estimated at 930,000 RM. Of this, 250,000 RM were to go to the Cultural and Educational Fund and 190,000 RM to social assistance. The rest was earmarked for other causes with a projected budgetary surplus of 8,000 RM.⁴⁶ However, many Ukrainian refugees were unable to pay their dues, even Ukrainian students, who were expected to pay only 5 RM. On average, only about 50 per cent of all Ukrainian DPs fulfilled this requirement. No outside aid was ever received by CRUE for the financing of its work.⁴⁷

During the first six months of 1948, CRUE received:⁴⁸

National membership dues	310,000 RM
1 per cent from business turnover	160,395 RM
Tax from various Ukrainian undertakings	30,175 RM
Christmas carolling for various causes	131,477 RM
Easter pysanka and other collections	258,858 RM
Total	890,905 RM

In the first six months of 1948, CRUE spent its total budget on:⁴⁹

Culture, education, science, promotion	36.6 per cent
Social aid and assistance	13.7 per cent
International committee and co-ordination	2.9 per cent
Communal judiciary of CRUE	3.0 per cent
Organizational activities	19.3 per cent
Office and business expenses	6.9 per cent
Overhead costs	17.0 per cent
Miscellaneous	.6 per cent
Total	100.0 per cent

CRUE extended financial support to a number of Ukrainian scholarly institutions: the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in Augsburg, the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Munich, the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI) in Regensburg, the Ukrainian College of Economics in Munich, the Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic

Theological Seminary in Hirschberg, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Seminary in Munich. No less important was the charitable work undertaken by CRUE's Department of Social Services, which co-operated with UMCA, the Organization of Ukrainian Women, and the United Ukrainian-American Relief Committee (UUARC). Aid was given both directly to individuals and to institutions. Individually, aid was given to the sick and to children, especially orphans, invalids, students, scientists, artists, community leaders and others.

During the period 1945-8, assistance was arriving from overseas through the Ukrainian relief committees from the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, Argentina, and other countries. With the creation of the UUARC in 1947 in the United States, more systematic care for the Ukrainian refugees in Germany and Austria was made possible. Now, Ukrainians with the greatest need were provided with clothing and food assistance. On 11 July 1948, the UUARC made available \$44,000 for distribution among the needy, together with 5,000 food packages purchased from the American Army in Germany, and an additional 3,160 food packages that were sent directly from the United States.⁵⁰

In the 1948-9 period, the regional and local branches of the CRUE Social Services Department distributed over 360,000 RM to institutions and individuals; of this amount 95,000 RM and over 14,000 DM went to former soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. There was also aid in food. During 1948-9, 62,000 kg or about 137,000 lbs of food, 33,000 packs of cigarettes, and over 130,000 free dinners at restaurants were given away by the CRUE Department of Social Services.

In co-operation with the UUARC, the UMCS and the OUW over 10,000 food packages were distributed. The CRUE Department of Social Services was not involved in direct aid in clothing, but only helped to distribute the clothing packages. Four hundred sixty-five bales of new and used clothing, as well as footwear were received during 1948-9 from the UUARC, OUW and Catholic Action.⁵¹

The German monetary reform of June 1948 caused loss of savings, dangerous unemployment rates, and a substantial reduction in the cultural life of Ukrainian DPs. The effects of monetary reform were especially painful to the families and individuals who earned their living in Ukrainian institutions and enterprises. Those who found themselves in a dire economic situation included invalids, cripples, senior citizens, the sick, all those incapable of working, and workers who in 1945-8 had earned a living from their cultural and intellectual contributions in the fields of scholarship, education, and culture.⁵²

Thus, after the monetary reform of June 1948, the financial circumstances of all Ukrainians in West Germany, as well as those of CRUE, worsened substantially. CRUE finances decreased by 92 per cent, even though it was allowed to exchange its balance of funds into the new currency at par. As the Ukrainian refugee population declined considerably because of emigration, so the financial revenues of CRUE also declined. While in 1949 8,700 DM were received from

community membership dues, in 1950 CRUE received only 761 DM. Deductions from wages collected by CRUE amounted to 31,300 DM in 1949; in 1950 they fell to less than 9,000 DM. Owing to those drastic changes, CRUE was forced to stop further payments to cultural and educational institutions, as well as all social-charitable assistance.⁵³

Vocational Training

The DP camps eventually began to function as transit points for their immigrating residents. The immediate postwar emigration proved beyond a doubt that in order to have a more successful life abroad, a practical profession was desirable. The military occupation authorities, the UNRRA, and later the IRO suggested that the refugees in Germany and Austria should be resettled in Western countries and that they should use their stay in the DP camps as preparation for resettlement.⁵⁴ The Ukrainian community and educational authorities took this matter of vocational education and re-training of refugees into their own hands. Some enterprises and workshops organized their own vocational training and re-training of workers. Some preparatory courses at larger DP camps were sponsored by the UNRRA and the IRO. More important, the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute resumed its operation in Regensburg, and in August 1945 it created a special commission to develop a program of mass re-training. Eventually, it was transformed into a UTHI division of middle and lower vocational schools and courses. In places of greater concentration of Ukrainian refugees, UTHI branches were set up.

At the end of the 1946-7 school year, a network of UTHI specialized vocational schools and courses, either short-term or one-year, was in operation.⁵⁵ As of July 1947, 24 UTHI vocational schools existed with 244 instructors and 876 students, and 52 vocational courses with 130 instructors and 1,587 students. In the 1946-7 school year such UTHI courses were successfully completed by 878 persons. Various UNRRA, and later IRO, vocational schools, programs, and courses for retraining were also underway in the camps. The most important UNRRA and IRO retraining centres were located in Arolsen and Hanau in the American Zone and in Hannover and Braunschweig in the British Zone of West Germany. There were also schools and courses set up by the camp administrations and community organizations. Frequently, the results of vocational retraining did not reflect the real needs or resettlement requirements of the emigrants. The most serious deficiency of the retraining process was lack of co-ordination. Attempts to create a single Ukrainian centre to co-ordinate vocational education and retraining did not produce any satisfactory results. Even in 1948, when mass resettlement was in full swing, the existence of the Office for Vocational Education and Courses, under the CRUE Department of Culture and Education, did not bring much improvement.⁵⁶

In 1947, 43 Ukrainian vocational schools with 2,250 students and 239 instructors were registered with the Office for Vocational Education and Courses. Thirty-nine schools with 217 instructors and 2,112 students operated in West Germany, while 4 schools with 22 instructors and 138 students were in Austria. However, much more popular was another form of vocational retraining of the general public, short- and long-term vocational courses. In 1947 there were 295 courses with 8,301 students in the American Zone of Germany, 107 courses with 2,994 students in the British Zone, 5 courses with 120 students in the French Zone, and 51 courses with 923 students in Austria. On average, there were twenty-five participants per course.⁵⁷

Attendance at these courses was motivated not only by the practical concerns of the students, but also by whichever resettlement expectations were popular at a particular time. When the idea of immigration to South America surfaced, Spanish-language and agricultural courses were in high demand. When the Anglo-Saxon world offered the chance for immigration, the demand for technical knowledge and English-language courses rose considerably. Artistic courses enjoyed high regard among the admirers of folk art, along with courses in technical drawing, geodesy, and others. These were intended for individuals who had no previous opportunity to complete their secondary school education.⁵⁸ However, during the course of resettlement, when host countries did not pay great attention to camp retraining, interest in vocational courses declined drastically among the refugees. In 1949 in the American Zone of Germany, the number of vocational courses fell sharply from 295 to 51, and the number of students from over 8,000 to 1,500. Despite the decline in popularity of these courses and the inadequate structure of the entire retraining process, a substantial percentage of the students enrolled in vocational schools found them very useful in their new countries of permanent settlement.⁵⁹

Refugee Resettlement

According to CRUE, by the end of March 1946 approximately 207,000 Ukrainians lived in Austria and the three western occupation zones of Germany. By mid-March 1948, this number fell by almost 50 per cent, owing to the immigration of many Ukrainians to other Western European and overseas countries. By 1 May 1948 CRUE reported that there were 101,130 Ukrainian refugees (67,255 in the American Zone; 27,745 in the British Zone; and 6,130 in the French Zone) still living in West Germany, with 17,786 in Austria. In search of economic betterment, after years of extreme hardship suffered during the period immediately following the end of World War II, Ukrainian refugees found homes and work in Belgium, the Netherlands, England, France, Canada, and the United States, as well as in such South American countries as Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Chile. Over 400 Ukrainians found employment in Tunisia. Some individuals immigrated to South Africa.⁶⁰ At first over 8,000 Ukrainians settled

in Belgium. They were the strongest physically and the best-suited to work in the Belgian mines. Their families were allowed to join them two or three months later, thus tripling the Ukrainian population there. England showed little interest in accepting too many families. However, over 20,000 former members of the Galician Division, which had fought on the German side against the Soviet Union, and who were all single, were transferred from their temporary place of confinement in Italy to England for permanent settlement. This trend created an unenviable situation; only individuals incapable of working, older people, invalids, and the sick were left behind in Germany, where they required special assistance and care.⁶¹

After 1947, resettlement became the principal means of solving the DP problem in Germany and Austria and constituted the main focus of IRO activities, as well as other welfare, civic, ethnic, religious, and international organizations. Out of twenty-two organizations, those that helped to resettle the largest number of refugees deserve special mention: UUARC, Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF), National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC, which helped mainly Ukrainian Catholics), and Church World Service (CWS, which provided aid to numerous Ukrainian Orthodox and Evangelical faithful). Some Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine were resettled through the Tolstoy Foundation, a Russian relief organization. Both the UUARC and the UCRF set up European offices, and the UUARC established a Main Resettlement Council with offices in various Ukrainian DP camps. It studied immigration possibilities and planned group resettlement.⁶²

Mass resettlement of Ukrainian refugees began in mid-1947, when the UNRRA was concluding its activities before the IRO took over. During 1946-7, only individual resettlement to relatives in Canada, the United States, and Argentina was taking place and, therefore, the number of emigrants was small.⁶³ The first country to open its gates to mass immigration of workers was Great Britain in May 1947. Earlier, a private but much more limited plan to resettle factory workers in Canada was devised. It was followed in June 1947 by a broader Canadian plan for the immigration of lumbermen. Later, seven additional Canadian plans followed. Ukrainian DPs could make very little use of these because of very demanding health requirements and strict selection terms set up by the Canadian mission. However, individual permit resettlement was used widely. Almost simultaneously with the British action, mass resettlement of the workers in Belgium began. In May-June 1947 Brazil opened its doors to European refugees thanks to the efforts of private Ukrainian and Brazilian organizations. In July 1947 the recruitment of workers to Venezuela was initiated. Beginning in March 1948 the possibility of mass immigration to Australia emerged. In the same year France began to recruit refugee workers.⁶⁴

Between March 1946 and August 1948, the number of Ukrainians residing in Western Europe changed considerably:

	March 1946	April 1948	August 1948
In the American Zone	104,024	67,255	60,263
In the British Zone	54,580	27,745	23,795
In the French Zone	19,026	6,130	4,207
In all zones of Austria	29,242	17,786	-
Total	206,872	118,916	88,265

Thus in August 1948, according to CRUE records, there were still 44,097 Ukrainians residing in 49 DP camps in the American Zone and 11,165 in private dwellings; in the British Zone, 23,342 Ukrainians resided in 44 camps and 453 privately; and in the French Zone, 2,556 resided in 7 camps and 1,651 in private homes: a total of 74,995 resided in 100 refugee camps and 13,269 privately. Thus, in August 1948, 88,264 Ukrainians still remained in West Germany: 34,887 adult males, 27,724 adult females, and 25,563 children under the age of twenty (52 per cent boys, 48 per cent girls). On 1 August 1948 the disabled, war invalids, the unemployable, and incurably sick Ukrainians accounted for 1,828 DPs (1,209 in the American Zone, 518 in the British Zone, and 101 in the French Zone). Out of a total of 4,909 adults over fifty-five, 3,873 lived in the American Zone, 969 in the British Zone, and 67 in the French Zone of Germany. Altogether 1,828 invalids and disabled, and 4,909 adults over fifty-five, or a total of 6,737 individuals, made up the hard core of those who, by the fall of 1948, remained in Germany and required special care and assistance. By 1953 there were still some 20,000 Ukrainian refugees in Germany and 5,000 in Austria. In Germany only 1,500 of them had jobs and were fully integrated into the German economy. In Austria only 500 were working. In both countries, they earned the same income as their German and Austrian counterparts. Serious efforts were made to integrate the remaining able-bodied Ukrainian refugees into the German economy. However, this was not an easy task; the German labour market was not fully accessible to foreigners because of the high unemployment rate among the Germans in the early 1950s.

The Ukrainian refugees who remained were thinly spread over the entire territory of West Germany. Many of them lived in German refugee camps. The incurably sick were placed in German hospitals and sanatoriums: 188 tuberculosis patients resided in Gauting sanatoriums, 63 persons in the Catholic House for the Aged in Munich, 88 in the Dornstadt Orthodox Senior Citizens' House, 33 in Regensburg Hospital for the chronically ill, 51 in the Wislock Psychiatric Ward, and 35 in Har and Straubing psychiatric hospitals. The total was 458 persons. In 1953 continuous assistance was still required by 4,937 Ukrainians, mainly older people living in the American and French zones of Germany. These, plus the 458 individuals in sanatoriums, houses for the aged, hospitals for the chronically ill, and psychiatric hospitals, yield a total of 5,395 Ukrainians who were in extreme need. In the British occupation zone there were 2,250 such

persons, while in Austria, 1,620 Ukrainians were in desperate need of assistance. This yields a total of 9,265 individuals who desperately needed help.⁶⁵ In addition to the aged and the incurably sick residing in institutions, there were 236 invalids (431 with dependants), 228 work-disabled senior citizens (395 with dependants), 422 chronically ill (787 with dependants), 1,573 afflicted with tuberculosis (1,415 with dependants), 64 widows with children (157 with dependants), 63 nursing mothers (177 with dependants), 246 disabled professionals (259 with dependants), and 296 parents with children under fourteen years of age in German camps and living privately in German cities and towns who were being plagued by serious economic problems. This yields 3,917 Ukrainians with dependants who relied on outside help. Thus in 1954, the grand total of Ukrainian refugees in need of assistance was 9,265 plus 3,917 or 13,182 individuals.⁶⁶

This was the bleak picture of Ukrainian refugees left behind in Germany and Austria. In the early and mid-fifties, limited aid for them was still provided by CRUE and UMCA, but the greatest benefactors were still UUARC and the Canadian Aid Fund. Yet by 1954 only UUARC had an office in Germany which it still maintains.

Notes

1. O. Zelenetsky, ed., *Na hromadskii nyvi* (Munich, 1972), 15.
2. M. M., *Narodnii kalendar* (Paris, 1949), 184.
3. Much of this paper is based on those statistics, especially as they have been analyzed by Vasyl Mudry, one of the initiators of CRUE, by O. Zelenetsky, and in particular by Volodymyr Maruniak, a scholar of the DP era: Vasyl Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," in *Ukrainci u vilnomu sviti: Iuvileina knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1894-1954* (Jersey City, [1954]), 115-6; Zelenetsky, *Na hromadskii nyvi*; and Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini* (Munich, 1985).
4. They were: a south German state in a customs union with Austria, having the Main River as its northern boundary; a north German state, east of the Weser River; and an international zone reaching from the Danish border to the Main, including the Ruhr area, which was to become "second-rate agricultural land." The Saarland was to be annexed by France. Henry C. Wallich, *The Mainsprings of the German Revival* (New Haven, 1955), 347.
5. This comment by Philip E. Mosely is in the "Morgenthau Diary (Germany)," 90th Congress, First Session, vol. 1, November 20, 1967, 15.
6. The miner, whose weekly wages totalled 60 RM, also owned a hen that laid five eggs per week. He usually ate one egg and bartered the remaining four for twenty cigarettes; each of the cigarettes brought him 8 RM on the black market—for a total of 160 RM. In other words, the hen earned nearly three times as much as the miner

did for his six days of work in the coal mine. *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, First Session, November 1967.

7. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y., 1950), 188.
8. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 313.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 120. Zelenetsky's statistics are somewhat different. According to him: "On January 1, 1949, for the most part, the Ukrainian refugee community in Germany consisted of 21,500 peasants (14,000 in the U.S. zone, 6,500 in the British and over 1000 in the French zone). They were followed by 9,000 unskilled workers (6,500 in the U.S. zone, 2,200 in the British and 300 in the French zone of Germany). Owing to training programs we find 14,000 skilled workers and car/truck drivers in the statistical files of the CRUE Organizational Department (11,000 in the U.S. zone, 2,500 in the British and 500 in the French zone)." See Zelenetsky, *Na hromadskii nyvi*, 82.
11. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 314.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 123.
14. Vasyl Mudry, "Ukrainska emigratsiia v Evropi," *Iuvileinyi Kalendar Almanakh Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu na 1949 rik* (Jersey City, 1949), 120-1.

The main goal of the workshops was to do necessary repairs, mainly in the living quarters, and to provide the most needed goods for the camp population. They were organized and run with the utmost devotion and sacrifices of the artisans and craftsmen. The tools, as well as raw materials, had to be purchased or bartered for within the German economy. UNRRA storage houses also served as sources of tools, raw materials, and semi-finished goods. The workshops' output was purchased not only by in-camp refugees but also by the German population, employees of the nearby UNRRA/IRO centres, and members of the U.S. Army occupation authorities. With time the workshops gained high respect and admiration.
15. *Ibid.* Folk art manufacturing was broken down into embroidered goods-36, folk art carvings-26, folk games-16, national doll manufacturing-15, painting-8, knitting wares-6, sculpture-4, ceramics-3, and art needlework-2.
16. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 317.
17. Zelenetsky, *Na hromadskii nyvi*, 11-12; *Torhivlia i promysl* [Trade and Industry], no. 1 (October-November 1946), no. 2 (March-April 1947).
18. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 317.
19. *Ibid.*, 321.
20. Mudry, "Ukrainska emigratsiia v Evropi," 120.
21. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 320.
22. *Ibid.*, 320.
23. *Ibid.*, 319.

24. Ibid., 318.
25. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 318.
26. Ibid., 319.
27. Ibid., 314. For background material on the co-operative movement in Ukraine see Illia Vytanovych, *Istoriia ukrainskoho kooperatyvnoho rukhu* (New York, 1964); Oleksander Morhun, *Narys istorii promyslovoi kooperatsii Ukrainy* (Munich, 1966); Pavlo Dubrivny, ed., *Kraiove hospodarske tovarystvo "Silskyi hospodar" u Lvovi, 1899-1944* (New York, 1970); S. V. Borodaievsky, *Istoriia kooperatsii* (Prague, 1925); Ivan Martiuk, *Tsentrosoiuz: Soiuz kooperatyvnykh soiuziv u Lvovi v rokakh 1924-1944* (Jersey City, 1973).
28. Ibid., 315.
29. The first convention was held on 9 June 1946; the second on 27 January 1947; the third on 26 July 1947—all in Munich. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 316.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 321.
34. Ibid., 322.
35. Ibid., 322-5.
36. Mudry, *Ukrainci u vilnomu sviti*, 123.
37. Maruniak, 323.
38. *IRO: Professional Medical Register* (Geneva, 1950-51) in Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 323.
39. Zelenetsky, *Na hromadskii nyvi*, 21.
40. The second general convention of the Ukrainian Emigration in its constitution emphasized CRUE responsibility for material aid and care; approval of the budget by the CRUE Executive Council; and the significant role regular voluntary contributions from individual members, institutions, and organizations played in the finances of CRUE. National membership dues were so important that participation in CRUE elections was limited to those who regularly paid their CRUE community membership dues. (The CRUE Constitution and the Election Rules, Augsburg, 1948, 6-8, 15-7, 23.)
41. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 121.
42. Mudry, "Ukrainska emigratsiia v Evropi," 113-4.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Prior to the June 1948 West German monetary reform, the unit of currency was the Reichsmark (RM). Afterward it was the Deutsche Mark (DM).
46. Mudry, "Ukrainska emigratsiia v Evropi," 114.

47. Ibid.
48. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 121.
49. Ibid.
50. Dr. M. M., *Narodnii kalendar*, 184.
51. Zelenetsky, 33-34.
52. M. M., *Narodnii kalendar*, 176-7.
53. Zelenetsky, *Na hromadskii nyvi*, 38.
54. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 325.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 326.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 327.
59. Ibid., 328.
60. Mudry, "Ukrainska emigratsiia v Evropi," 108-9.
61. Ibid., 109-10.
62. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 329.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 330.
65. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 127.
66. Ibid.

Common Organizational Efforts, 1945-52: Structure and People

Theodore Bohdan Ciuciura

I

Many thousand Ukrainians found themselves on German territory (including Austria) in 1945. Citizenship for most was either Soviet (those from the UkSSR) or Polish (those from Western Ukrainian Galicia and Volhynia). However, Ukrainians from Bukovyna and Bessarabia had Romanian citizenship, while those from Transcarpathian Ruthenia had Czechoslovakian citizenship. As citizens of allied states who were “forcibly displaced” or “displaced as a consequence of war,” they were officially designated by the Allied occupation authorities as “Displaced Persons.” Still others were political refugees who feared persecution by the Soviet authorities and hoped to find shelter in the American, British, and French occupation zones.¹ There also were some prewar political refugees (Ukrainians with Nansen passports) in Germany, augmented by the exodus of Nansen refugees from Czechoslovakia (mainly Prague) and other Eastern European countries.

Under Nazi Germany these Ukrainian displaced persons and refugees were subject to numerous legal disabilities and severe economic exploitation. The Allied victory brought liberation for them, but they found themselves “in a legal and political vacuum.”² During the first months after the war, their situation was frequently determined more by the sympathetic attitudes of the Allied local military commanders than by the official, and often ambiguous, instructions. For example, the deputy commander of the American military government in the

region of Regensburg in Bavaria, Lt.-Colonel Pospisil (who was of Czech descent and whose wife was Ukrainian), issued a directive, dated 31 May 1945, which “saved tens of thousands of Ukrainians from deportation to Siberia through the transient camp in [České] Budějovice, Czechoslovakia in the years 1945-1949.” This document stipulated that, “the displaced person is one who wishes to return home. Any one [citizen] of the Allied Nations who does not want to be repatriated (in particular, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Poles) is not a displaced person and must not be regarded as such. Their forcible evacuation is contrary to the wish of the Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Army.”³

A number of Allied directives were issued, even before the end of the war, designed to provide maintenance and protection while aiming at repatriation or resettlement of the displaced persons. The DPs were in general unaware of those directives, which were implemented differently from zone to zone, and also within each zone itself. The rather ambiguous regulations concerning the forced repatriation of Soviet and Eastern European DPs were based on the identical agreements between the United States and the USSR, and Britain and the USSR, which were signed at Yalta on 11 February 1944. They covered the procedures to be followed for “Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians.”⁴ A similar French-Soviet agreement was signed later, on 29 June 1945. The Soviet practice of forcible repatriation presented a difficult problem for Western authorities who wanted to carry out the provisions of the agreements and yet wished to safeguard the individual’s freedom of choice.⁵

“The status of the refugees evolved *pari passu* with the changes in the political and administrative structure of Germany after 1945.”⁶ First, the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of race, religion, citizenship or political orientation had been imposed on Germany by Law No. 1 of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and later by the Allied Control Council Law No. 1. The provisions were carried out by the occupation authorities in each zone. Essentially it meant that in the American zone, non-discrimination clauses were added to all German legislation which covered the refugees. In the British Zone the directives and orders of the military authorities to the German administrative bodies served the same purpose. However, in the French Zone, the military government had taken direct care of the refugees’ rights and interests.⁷ Along with the postwar directives of the military authorities in the three Western occupation zones, both the UNRRA and the IRO issued a number of orders and guidelines affecting the lives of the refugees. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) Resolution No. 1 stated that among the functions of this international body was “assistance in caring for and maintaining records of persons found in any area under the control of any of the United Nations, who by reason of war have been displaced from their homes, and, in agreement with appropriate governments, military authorities or their agencies, in securing their repatriation or return.”⁸

Between 1945 and 1952 two international organizations were concerned with the maintenance and protection, repatriation or resettlement of displaced persons and refugees. First was the UNRRA, formally established in Washington on 9 November 1943.⁹ Next came the United Nations International Refugee Organization (IRO), which on 1 July 1947 took over the functions and activities hitherto exercised by the UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. The legal status and protection of DPs was also affected by the West German law on the Legal Status of Homeless Foreigners of 25 April 1951. All international protection duties of the IRO were transferred to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on 31 January 1952.

The main task, repatriation, soon proved to be more difficult than expected. Difficulty with transportation only delayed repatriation, "But there was a psychological reason, namely that a large number of displaced persons were unwilling or reluctant to be repatriated."¹⁰ There were the Jews who felt that their ties with their countries of origin were broken. There also were many citizens of Eastern European countries who feared persecution if they returned. As a result, many thousands of non-repatriable displaced persons became refugees in the proper sense of the word.

Most of these non-repatriable persons continued to live in camps maintained by the UNRRA and later the IRO, which were divided along nationality lines and co-ordinated by a number of separate national committees.¹¹ DPs, often subject to the whims and biases of military officials, were unaware, at first, that camp self-government was one of the objectives of the UNRRA. Yet, the SHAEF *Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons* (May 1945) advised that national groups should be maintained in separate centres. It also recommended self-government and formation of national committees. According to this *Guide*, "National group leaders should be selected and small national committees be formed to speak for their nationals, make suggestions and enquiries and to act as a channel for disseminating instructions and information from the central staff." Under the tutelage first of the UNRRA and then of the IRO, the method of selection was later changed to that of election. "By the end of June, 1947, when the UNRRA's mandate came to an end, most displaced persons in most camps and assembly centres were capable of governing themselves with little or no outside supervision."¹²

The postwar DPs in Germany were at first divided into national categories according to their citizenship (such as Soviet, Polish or Czechoslovak). Soon, however, other categories such as Jewish, Belorussian, and Ukrainian were recognized, although one of the American directives included a statement that "the Ukrainian nationality was not recognized."¹³ First the "Polish Ukrainian" designation came into being.¹⁴ This category was soon augmented by other Ukrainians:

Often their nationality was a source of controversy. Some were legally Soviet citizens, others were Polish citizens and many of the former tried to join the latter because they feared repatriation. Despite all this, the Ukrainians managed to remain a nationally coherent group because they always emphasized that they belong to a common race, with a common language, culture and religion. Whether they were of Galician, Ruthenian or Bessarabian origin, they clung together in the camps and kept separate from the Poles and Russians, showing a strong spirit of nationalism.¹⁵

II

In the state of social and political chaos that prevailed in Germany (and Austria) in the first postwar months, the beginnings of Ukrainian organizational efforts were spontaneous. They also were more difficult than those of other national groups, which could rely on guidance from representatives of their national governments.¹⁶ Still, the initially amorphous Ukrainian exile community soon developed into a veritable quasi-polity with both positive and negative traits. It had a well-defined structure, encompassing all aspects of social life, as well as a propensity to undo the frequent attempts at group supremacy, which caused constant political squabbles. Those representative and organizational efforts started at a local level and were aimed at the protection of DP interests vis-à-vis local Allied military commanders, the remaining German authorities, and UNRRA regional and camp officials.

“Self-selection” of representative leaders was the initial stage in forming a representative structure for the Ukrainian exile community. Ambitious and willing men were needed to lead and represent the people; so they “presented” themselves to the Allied and UNRRA authorities who already had been instructed to “select” some DPs to assist in running the DP camps. This role was later expanded to full-fledged camp self-administration. A number of “self-appointed” action groups, local or regional committees, were also established. The most important and active was the regional relief committee in Munich, headed by Professor Alexander M. Korsunsky (University of Kiev). It was composed of persons of diverse social background and political orientation, but actively supported by the adherents of the Colonel A. Melnyk faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-M). The members of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B) too were instrumental in the formation of many action groups and relief committees elsewhere. Some of these “self-appointed” leaders were men with previous experience in communal affairs; others had only ambition and ability to lead, occasionally helped with a little luck. Most of them were dedicated and honest men who worked diligently to the best of their ability and in the face of considerable difficulties. However, not a few of these UNRRA-appointed administrators became loathsome and ridiculous camp despots, “tsars” or “kings.”¹⁷ However, “social life developed spontaneously and from below, breaking with the tradition of the Western [Ukrainian] lands, where the initiative came from above.”¹⁸

Already in the autumn of 1945 the delegates of the spontaneously created camp, local, and regional Ukrainian committees created a four-level framework for the Ukrainian exile community, with central representative bodies in Augsburg (later transferred to Munich). In addition to the “self-appointed” leaders, a new category of “recruited” leaders—formerly prominent men in social life, law, politics, and scholarship—appeared. Both these categories of Ukrainian representatives, sometimes indistinct or overlapping, were legitimized by a thoroughly democratic, though sometimes shaky, electoral process.

A Ukrainian committee was organized in Augsburg. It later became the basis for the structure of the whole community. It was created by Ukrainians forcibly deported to Germany and by former political prisoners held in Nazi prisons and camps.¹⁹ A competing committee was formed in Munich at the same time. The initiative to convene the first congress of the Ukrainian emigration came from the Tymchasovyi Provid (Provisional Leadership), which was organized immediately after the war. It was headed by Vasyl Mudry (former vice-marshal of the Polish parliament) and actively supported by the OUN-B. That first congress took place with the verbal permission of American authorities in Aschaffenburg, Bavaria, from 30 October to 1 November 1945.

The formation of these Ukrainian representative institutions was beset with some problems: “From the moment the idea of the formation of a unified community [supreme] centre was born, a continual struggle developed for domination over it in the political backstage. This circumstance constituted a threat to the community’s central body from the day of its conception.”²⁰ That initial threat was the intransigent strife between the two factions of the OUN. At the same time, however, an attempt was made to consolidate Ukrainian political life—the political parties with the government-in-exile of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1946-51). Lack of success there continually and prohibitively influenced the organization of the non-political aspects of the Ukrainian exile community. One of the delegates to the congress reminisced rather negatively about that strife:

Clearly, a compact was concluded between the *Banderivtsi* and Mudry; Mudry resolved to cooperate with the *Banderivtsi* in exchange for their support, notwithstanding his formal position as chairman of his party, UNDO [Ukrainian National Democratic Organization].... Not all understand what is going on. Soon it was revealed that the whole congress was to give a stamp of approval, of the “people’s voice,” by casually assembled delegates, to previously decided and debated matters; persons more than matters.... A tendency is being felt to push Vasyl Mudry into the presidency of the new organization, and behind his back—the *Banderivtsi*.²¹

It is evident that inter-group distrust, misunderstandings, and political antagonisms were carried from the Ukrainian homeland into the exile community. It is true that the conciliatory attitude of Vasyl Mudry toward the prewar Polish

government was not very popular in Western Ukraine, yet his new supporters—his critics in the past—proved themselves rather politically astute.

Ten standing committees were organized at the congress session, including Organizational-Constitutional (headed by Roman Ilnytskyj); Legal Aid (Iulian Revai); Women (Iryna Pavlykovska); Finance (Atanas Milianych); and Culture and Education (Professor Dmytro Doroshenko). Also, the draft of the proposed *Statut* (constitution) was submitted for approval on behalf of the Organizational-Constitutional committee by Roman Ilnytskyj. He prepared the first draft himself, because it was not possible to “entrust the preparation of the constitution to professional jurists.”²² The main aim of the constitution was to create a single, non-political, central representative body for all the exiles. The draft was eventually approved. Only Dr. Pavlo Lysiak, one of the delegates from the British occupation zone, objected to the unitary structure of the new organization and proposed to create “independent representations of the Ukrainian emigration” in each of the three Western zones of occupation. In such a “confederal” design the presidents of the three representative bodies “would meet from time to time and would deliberate together on matters of common interest.” Another debater, Dr. Vasyl Vytvytsky, thought that a unified central body was necessary, but that a provision for the autonomy of the zonal central bodies should be included (a federal structure).²³

According to the *Statut*,²⁴ the name of the organization was to be the Ukrainian Central Relief Committee—the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany. It was to be:

A community organ which represents the will of the Ukrainian emigration in all matters of communal character, except matters that are exclusively political [sec. 1].

The aim of the Committee is to conduct as well as oversee legal, moral and material care and aid and provide the necessary information and guidelines; to lead and represent all relief and other communal non-political organizations and to coordinate their activity [sec. 3].

All Ukrainian non-political organizations must adjust their by-laws with the Committee before submitting them for approval to the governmental authorities [sec. 4].

The four-tiered structure of the Central Ukrainian Relief Committee includes the central land (or zone), provincial and county bodies, with their respective assemblies of delegates and executive organs [sec. 5, 13].

All Ukrainian emigrants have the right to participate in the election of all organs of the Committee and its subordinate levels, without any discrimination on grounds of territorial origin, religion, sex, political orientation, social position, education or profession [sec. 2].

The franchise is general, equal, proportional, and secret [sec. 5].

The central organs of the Ukrainian Central Relief Committee are: General Assembly (Congress) of delegates and the Executive, elected by the Assembly [sec. 14].

The General Assembly is composed of the elected delegates and also of representatives from the central non-political institutions linked with the Relief Committee (one delegate from each) [sec. 17].

The Executive is composed of the president, vice-presidents (including the presidents of zonal committees), chief secretary, and heads of departments [sec. 20].

The other organs of the Central body were an Advisory Council of the Central Representation (with its own *prezyditiia* [presiding officers]) composed of the former delegates of the General Assembly; an Auditing Committee; and a Higher Communal Court. The lower levels of the new organization were structured according to the same pattern. Finally, the new Executive was elected with V. Mudry as president and R. Ilyntzkyj as secretary general.²⁵ Almost all the members of the Temporary Leadership were elected to the new executive. Several well-known people were included, representing many social and political groups.

The American military headquarters in Frankfurt/Main:

did not issue any written document concerning recognition [of the Ukrainian Central Committee]...considering the existing relations among the Allied Powers. Dr. Volodymyr Galan, executive director of the United American-Ukrainian Relief Committee, during his first stay in Germany, succeeded in finding a form for the legalization [legal status] of the new body.... In February 1947 the chief of the 5th department, Headquarters of the American Army, Colonel Shikelsen...appointed...[Mudry] as a spokesman for the Ukrainians with the American Headquarters.²⁶

This first provisional *Statut*, although elaborated by necessity in some haste, regulated the life of the Ukrainian exile community in a satisfactory fashion for some time. The question of a new *Statut* was debated extensively on 8-11 May 1947 in Regensburg. A special commission composed of professional jurists was formed to prepare a draft of the new *Statut*. According to Dr. Baran, "from the codification aspect, this draft seems considerably better than the existing one, which was hastily elaborated." In his opinion the draft was based upon the intentions of the radical nationalist group (i.e., the *Banderivtsi*), which wanted not only to secure its position, but also to ensure for itself a "commanding position in the emigration." Complete centralization was to be continued. Baran also asserted that the Ukrainian central body was recognized only by the American occupation authorities. He felt that the Ukrainian communities in the other occupation zones lived under different circumstances, and that Dr. Lysiak was therefore right when he demanded a broad decentralization of the Ukrainian communal framework at the first congress. The new draft removed from the General Council (Assembly) the delegates "of our principal institutions—scholarly, cultural-educational, sports, cooperative." Baran also thought the attempt to build up a large bureaucratic apparatus was improper.²⁷

After prolonged debate, a number of corrections were accepted, and the new *Statut* was approved unanimously by the second session of the second congress in Dillingen on 16 November 1947. This new *Statut* was considerably more extensive and legalistically elaborated, but only slightly more impressive than the old one. The main provisions of the “*Statut* of the [Central] Representation of Ukrainian Emigration—Ukrainian Relief Committee in Germany” were:²⁸

The four-tier structure remains as before, but the principal body is now designated the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration-Ukrainian Relief Committee in Germany (TsPUE-UDK). This democratic self-government is based on the will of the whole Ukrainian emigration, which derives from the election of all its organs according to the principles of general, equal and secret franchise, and with a proportional system [art. 1].

An additional aim of the organization is to integrate the productive forces of the Ukrainian emigration into the economic and social life of Western democracies [art. 4, sec. d].

Instead of the congress (assembly), a Central Council was organized as a permanent body. All members of the council were elected. However, the president of the Executive invited, “as honorary participants,” representatives of the church, scholarly bodies, and other central institutions [art. 16]. One commentator asserted that the majority of the congress, while abolishing the seats of representatives of all principal community organizations, was still willing to accept full membership in the Central Council not only for the representatives of four principal central organizations—the Association of Scholars, Peasants’ Union, Central Teachers’ Union, and Plast—but also for both Ukrainian churches.²⁹

A semblance of federal character was introduced in the form of an inter-zonal presidium, composed of three representatives of the central executive (located in the American Zone), two from the British Zone, and one from the French Zone [art. 35-7]. The central *Uprava* (Executive) was composed of the presidium (the president, his four deputies and a secretary-general) and heads of the following ten departments: Organization, Legal Aid, Culture and Education, Social Welfare, Labour and Economy, Information, Resettlement, Women, Youth, and Finance [art. 30, 33]. A new provision gave the president the right to decide, in case of emergency, on matters within the jurisdiction of the whole executive, subject to the subsequent approval of the presidium. The Auditing Committee and community courts continued to exist as before. However, the Supreme Communal Court was entitled only to interpret the provisions of the *Statut* [art. 66]. It could no longer nullify the unconstitutional decisions of the central executive.

According to V. Mudry, who was re-elected as president, the headquarters of the IRO had registered the new *Statut* under No. 2525X, 17/19 on 28 June 1948. The American military headquarters recognized the *Statut* in a letter, no. 6425, 12 July 1948.³⁰ A few months later the Higher Communal Court of the

Ukrainian Emigrations, carrying out the decision of the Second Assembly of 16 November 1947, proclaimed an elaborate electoral ordinance for the Ukrainian exile community on 6 December 1948:³¹ “The elections to Local (County) and Provincial Council are general, equal, secret and direct, and to the Central Council [at least forty members and forty alternates]—equal, secret and indirect, with the distribution of seats in all elections in accordance with the proportional system [sec. 2].” Persons twenty-one years of age and over had the right to vote; those twenty-five and over, to be elected [sec. 6]. Detailed provisions dealt with the formation of local, provincial, and central electoral boards and their functions; criteria for representation; lists of candidates; electoral procedures; and the appeals and protests to be handled by the appropriate communal courts. The Electoral Ordinance for Camps, proclaimed by the central executive on 27 May 1947, remained valid. Of special significance was the provision that members of the central executive could not simultaneously be members of the Central Council [sec. 74].

Dr. Baran, who a few months before had harshly criticized the draft of the new *Statut*, confirmed that the adopted *Statut* brought about a “balance—harmony between life and law,” especially through the creation of the Inter-Zone Presidium, although “for the present only formally.” He thought that “one should not hide the existence in our exile community of two opposing *svitohliady*—world outlooks.” One was pluralistic, though he did not use the term; the other favoured the predominance of one group (i.e., the *Banderivtsi*). He called for

The political re-education of our youth...especially of Galicians, among whom are still visible in their mentality and practice remnants [*zalyshky*] of the recent totalitarian system.... This great socio-political nationalist illness—a kind of mass psychosis—must be cured speedily and radically.

Dr. Baran also noted “the mechanical parcelling-out of the leading positions (offices) among the diverse party groupings.” He noted that “the departments of organization, information and youth were turned over to the adherents of [splendid] isolation [Banderites].” Still, he asserted that “our exile community’s attitude toward the new Executive...is loyal, and only after observing the results of its work will it render its final judgment.”³²

III

As its original name indicates, the central body of the Ukrainian exile community was to be a non-political relief organization co-ordinating activities of its own agencies and other associated central organizations. Its other aim was to represent the Ukrainian exile community before the Allied occupation authorities and German administrative organs. Political activities were to be entrusted to such bodies as the Co-ordinating Ukrainian Committee (KUK), the National Council of the Government-in-exile of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and the Foreign

Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR). However, the people staffing the supposedly non-political organization of the Ukrainian exile community were mostly Ukrainian political activists, who brought political biases and objectives into their work.

Although Dr. Baran criticized “the mechanical distribution” of leading offices in the central Ukrainian communal body, it was based on the principle of coalition. The list of elected officials—headed by V. Mudry as president and N. Hirniak as secretary general—clearly reveals that the executive was the broad representation of many social components of the Ukrainian exile community.³³ Therefore the adjective “mechanical” used by Dr. Baran does not seem to be an appropriate one. “Coalition cabinets” (versus “majority governments”) are a formation of a broadly supported and representative body. The members of the coalition, however, are not always the best representatives of the political partners. Dr. Baran’s dictum about “the two opposing world-outlooks”—terms more appropriate to the realm of political philosophy—should rather be applied to the actual, but not always clearly defined, political camps.

The minutes of the first (Aschaffenburg) congress reveal that the “Provisional Leadership” was composed of leading adherents of the OUN-B, as well as other well-known individuals. The critics of that group called the latter *poptentachi* (fellow-travellers). Still, the list of members was quite impressive. Those minutes mention another “strong centre of the Ukrainian Emigration” (Munich), which also was a coalition of social activists headed by the adherents of Melnyk (OUN-M). The minutes indicate that this group “welcomed the initiative of Mr. Deputy [*pan posol*] Mudry, but later tactically and continuously negated the work of the Provisional Leadership.”³⁴ This was the result of a sort of sibling rivalry and antagonism between the two factions of the once-united Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Even in exile, occasional appalling outbursts of animosity surfaced. Somewhat later a new, or revived, camp broadly called “democratic” came into being. It was composed of adherents of both the older and several newly created liberal and socialist groups. While the OUN-M faction established a partnership with this group (in the National Council), the *Banderivtsi* opposed them vehemently. Eventually, this OUN faction struck an alliance with a small monarchist group of Hetman supporters. However, the Bandera movement split into two factions. One faction (OUN-Abroad) increasingly favoured co-operation with the other political groups and pluralism, while Bandera and the core of his OUN faction continued the old ways, relying on their significant popular acclaim.³⁵

The new central body of the Ukrainian exile community was very weak from the start. This was a result of the fact that

between the two communal centres—Augsburg and Munich—backed by the two nationalist wings—there existed fundamental differences of opinion concerning the community centre in general, centralization in the community, and the role

of political groupings in particular. The OUN-B supported the principle of complete subordination and strict centralization of community life; the OUN-M strived for the de-politicization of community life and for broad autonomy in the organizational structure. After the Aschaffenburg Congress, the Munich Relief Committee found itself in sharp opposition to Augsburg. The conflicts between Augsburg and Munich continued for years and affected the pulse of community life as a whole.... [This resulted in] the Balkanization of community life.³⁶

In fact, both co-operation and political strife continued until 1949, when the tendency toward hegemony increased considerably. Only then did "Balkanization" appear.

The adherents of Bandera took complete control of the central representative body (under I. Vovchuk as president and Z. Pelensky as secretary-general). All this was vividly reflected in the Ukrainian exile press.³⁷ In general, the adherents of Bandera claimed majority support and consequently—as in a state organization—leadership of the community. If one looks for evidence of a real popular majority, this claim is questionable. The Ukrainian exile masses were rather socially apathetic. Some Ukrainians were even completely unaware of the whole community framework and its problems. People were primarily interested in trying to emigrate from Germany as soon as possible. Still, there is no doubt that the OUN-B was the most active group in the community, led by dedicated and energetic men. Occasionally the task at hand, for example, winning the camp or local elections, was more important to them than the consolidation of Ukrainian community endeavours. Nonetheless, they often claimed that "the masses" were solidly behind them and implied that the Ukrainian professionals did not deserve to be spokesmen for the people. Once, elections were to be held with two opposing lists of candidates. The agitators for list number 1—"Of National Unity"—hastened maliciously to point out to the electorate that the "Democratic Coalition List" sported "titles before and after the names" (for example, Dr. or Lawyer or Senior Assistant). The first list won the majority, although proportional franchise insured the second list considerable representation.³⁸

One of the most able Ukrainian journalists of the time, Zenon Pelensky, described the situation in the Ukrainian community in a rather conciliatory and unassuming way:

On May 8-11 [1947] there took place the second congress of "collaborators" of Mr. Vasyl Mudry. Such is the official version of the social organization of the Ukrainian emigration in Germany.... The authorities do not have any connection with it. They only know Mr. V. Mudry as a well-known and worthy Ukrainian politician of the older generation. It is Mr. V. Mudry's purely personal privilege to voice his opinions to the authorities.... [Still] this congress of "Mr. Mudry's collaborators" has an exceptional intra-Ukrainian importance...[although it] has no formal binding force for the authorities or Mr. Mudry himself.³⁹

Pelensky asserted that the congress was not well prepared. Ten of the eleven departmental reports were delivered only in verbal form. The debates were on a low level. More interesting than the plenary session was the backstage activity, in which “the battle for leadership and influence took place.” Most disenchanting was the “degradation of the congress from the heights of a true Ukrainian exile parliament to the level of a backstage group quarrel for position and portfolios.”⁴⁰ By contrast, quite a positive evaluation of the same congress appeared in *Nedilia*. There, this congress was described as “a most significant event indeed in the life of our exile community.” Although the report of Secretary-General Ilnytzkij was somewhat too extensive and detailed, still it “demonstrates the immense work accomplished by the Central Representation in very difficult circumstances.”⁴¹

Of special interest are two reports published in *Ukrainski Visti*, a semi-weekly organ of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party. The first article, entitled “Our Self-government,” stated that:

Those who know at close range the life in our camps...would agree that the organs of self-government in the camps—councils and executives—often incorrectly reflect the needs...of the camp population.

A considerable number of camp dwellers do not make use of their active and passive franchise...often the most socially and politically prepared elements.

Our unusual internal relations brought forward a feverish struggle for power among individual party groupings in the camp, county and provincial representation, and later on in the central body.... Camp self-government, together with its superstructure...is a peculiar form of our general-state organization in diaspora, in exile. Therefore the organs of the camp administration should in no case be the agency of any political grouping.... There should be no concocted coalition, but removal of any group strife from communal self-government.⁴²

Another article in the same newspaper, commenting on the second congress, proposed that the central body of the Ukrainian exile community should be elected:

not through the parliamentary machinations of a questionable or even real majority, but in agreement with the leading political trends; and leading not now, under the conditions of the camp-police regime, but tomorrow, when 90% of the Ukrainian emigration joins the working masses of democratic countries. It is clear: in such conditions the present-day political groupings will change places in regard to “influence on the masses.”...Therefore any attempt to impose on the exiles the regime of one-party rule [*monopartiinist*]...would be fatal to the further existence of TsPUE.... The adherents of *monopartiinist* understood this all too well; and they had enough political wisdom not to force their way to power with a questionable majority.... The Ukrainian emigration must have such a proper leadership or none at all.⁴³

Interestingly enough, it seems that there was a basic agreement between the adherents of “monopartyism” and their opponents that resulted in the changed phrasing of the official name of the whole framework. “Representation” moved forward, while “relief” was relegated to second place. Co-ordination of the activities of service and professional groups linked with the centre also was weakened, because their representatives were excluded from membership in the Central Assembly. Both “camps” talked about exile “parliaments,” making the whole exile community, even more than previously, a statelike organization or quasi-polity.

No wonder Z. Pelensky argued that the Central Exile Council, “the future parliament of the Ukrainian emigration,” should be composed only of “directly elected deputies,” without representatives of service and professional organizations. He noted

a curious shift of the camps; the so-called democratic front (mainly the adherents of KUK) persistently defended the corporate principle, and, on the contrary, the camp of adherents of the UHVR, which is accused of extreme rightism and quasi-fascism, decidedly upheld the principle of unrestricted and direct franchise of mass democracy.⁴⁴

Labelling the representation of service and professional groups in the central deliberative body “corporate” was meant to characterize it as “undemocratic.” Yet interest-group representation is an important component of some modern democratic systems, for example, the bicameral French parliament.

Strengthening the statelike character of the Ukrainian exile community by both the radical-nationalist and democratic camps inevitably led to practices associated with modern state models—near-total control, pluralistic or polyarchic rule (with majority rule of coalition cabinets), and near-anarchic conditions. A changing combination of all these models was apparent within the Ukrainian exile community, with tendencies toward both near-total control and communal anarchy. The radical nationalist camp assumed complete control of the central body of the community, while the “opposition” seceded and formed an Association of Ukrainians in Germany: “The opposition...was a reflection of the political conflicts that have occurred between the newly organized Ukrainian National Council [of the Ukrainian People’s Republic] and the adherents of ZCh OUN [Banderivtsi] and *hetmantsi* [monarchists].”⁴⁵

The first Congress of the Association of Ukrainians in Germany (SUN) took place in Munich on 29-30 October 1949. The introductory report “illustrated the history of internal relations in the exile community and the conduct of individual political groupings, as well as the negative and destructive role of the OUN-B.... The speakers sharply criticized the one-party line of TsPUE.”⁴⁶ A resolution adopted by the SUN congress asserted that

the policy of the present-day TsPUE...reveals all the features of totalitarianism, [and] causes the break-up of integrative endeavours both in the political and

communal fields.... The present-day TsPUE does not represent the whole Ukrainian emigration in Germany; therefore, it has no right to call itself the Central Representation.

The congress acknowledged “the traditional Government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic as the supreme authority for all Ukrainians.”⁴⁷ One newspaper account asserted that the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration had been “finally transformed into a regional (i.e., Western Ukrainian) and one-party institution.”⁴⁸

The co-existence of two rival representative bodies was harmful to the whole Ukrainian exile community in Germany, which was shrinking. The majority of the exiles had left for the United States, Canada, and elsewhere. In the meantime a number of new people, with minor political connections or none at all, joined the older central body. An attempt was made at reconciliation at the third session of the Central Council on 16-18 December 1950. Among the resolutions proposed by R. Ilnytzyj—always a proponent of group co-operation—was an appeal to the dissenters to return to the Central Representation and there to strive for the realization of their views.⁴⁹

At first a Committee for Communal Accord was created. Later a Committee of Three was formed: Professor V. Pliushch (for the Central Representation), I. Popovych (SUN), and Dr. Ia. Makovetsky (Munich Relief Committee). The fourth extraordinary session of the Central Council of the Central Ukrainian Representation was attended by the delegates of the two dissenting organizations that joined the newly reunified community framework. But the Ukrainian community in Germany was by this time quite small, geographically dispersed, and apathetic. There were still about 25,000 Ukrainians in West Germany, and yet they paid only 1,350 DM in contributions in the second half of 1951, and 357 DM for the first half of 1952.⁵⁰ The situation was very dismal.

This was a consequence of frustrated hopes for real Ukrainian statehood that lingered on in the Ukrainian exile community. Some individuals and groups who strove for leadership and power in the Ukrainian homeland could not rid themselves of their dreams of political power. They tried to politicize the “non-political” framework of the exile community. Consequently, their quest for power, no matter how ridiculous and minimal its scope, became their primary aim. The Ukrainian exile community in Germany and elsewhere went through the convulsions of political strife instead of fostering, co-ordinating, and representing as many Ukrainian interest or pressure groups as possible, perhaps making them influential in their respective countries of settlement. This called for the broadest social coalition, with as many diverse components represented as possible, and without the hegemony or “majority rule” of any one group. Since 1952 a modicum of common sense and co-operation, though not without some undercurrents of antagonism and distrust, has been achieved in the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany.

Notes

1. "It is estimated that at the end of the war there were 2,000,000 persons of Ukrainian origin in the three Western occupation zones of Germany and Austria. This total was made up partly of ex-prisoners of war of the Germans and people who had been deported for forced labour or other reasons; partly of those who had fled before the Soviet advance or had taken up arms against the USSR," Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (London, 1953), 86. "A count made in November 1946 in Germany and Austria gives a total of 201,000 Ukrainian refugees from all countries: 104,000 in the American zone of Germany, 55,000 in the British zone, 19,000 in the French zone and 23,000 in Austria," *ibid.*, 87. For more details see Vasyl Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," in *Ukrainci u vilnomu sviti: Iuvileina knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1894-1954* (Jersey City, [1954]), 117-20.
2. Louise W. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United Nations. Its History and Work, 1945-1952* (London, 1956), 311. See also Atle Grahl-Madsen, *The Status of Refugees in International Law*, 2 vols. (Leyden, 1966, 1972).
3. Bohdan Hanushevsky, "Regensburg—prybizhyshe skytalsiv," *Svoboda* LXXXIX, no. 92 (19 May 1982): 2.
4. See Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization*, 179.
 Article 2 of the Yalta agreement contained several provisions of immense advantage to the Soviet Union: "repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into camps and points of concentration...and they have the right to appoint the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of [their] country." Malcolm J. Proudfoot, *European Refugees, 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movement* (London, 1957), 157. "Every reasonable effort had been made...to persuade the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia, and Ukraine to accept Western policy regarding voluntary repatriation and the alternative of resettlement for refugees. The Soviet bloc for its part used every argument to persuade the West to accept its policy of forcible repatriation," Proudfoot, 401.
5. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization*.
 Significantly, though the Yalta agreements were communicated to the Western Allied military authorities immediately, they were made public only in 1946.
6. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 148.
7. *Ibid.*
8. George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, 3 vols. (New York, 1950), III, 43 (adopted November 1943). Resolution 10 in particular deals with "Policies with Respect to Displaced Persons," *ibid.*, 50-2. See also Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 30.
9. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 98-106 and on IRO, 399-436; see also Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History*, esp. III, 23-32, "The Agreement for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration."
10. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 30-1.

11. See Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 162.
12. Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History*, II, 522-5 ("9. Self-Government").
Camp self-government included distribution of food, clothing, labour, administration, education, recreational activities, camp police, and even courts.
13. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 216 ("Persons claiming it will be dealt with according to their status as Soviet citizens, citizens of other countries, or stateless persons"). One British directive stated that "if a prisoner of war or displaced person is identified as a Soviet citizen, he will be repatriated regardless of his personal wishes."
14. These were Ukrainians from the territories of Western Ukraine detached from the Polish state on the basis of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of August 1939. Territorial transfer was formally proclaimed later by the Soviet-controlled Western Ukrainian national assembly. On 16 August 1945 the Soviet-Polish agreement ceded these territories to the USSR again. Subsequently, the Polish government requested UNRRA to segregate the "Polish Ukrainians" from other displaced persons of Polish origin. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 87. See also Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History*, II, 516.
A problem remained, however. "The legal status of the persons who come from the territories of Eastern Poland ceded to the Soviet Union under the Soviet-Polish Treaty of August 16, 1945 who were abroad when the Treaty entered into force remains uncertain. The opinion that prevails among international lawyers is that these persons lost their Polish nationality unless they indicated an express wish to do so, and, in the absence of any such indication, they must be classified as stateless." Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, 77.
15. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization*, 178.
16. According to Vasyl Mudry, the well-known Western Ukrainian politician who eventually became the officially recognized spokesman for Ukrainian DPs, "already in the spring of 1945 Ukrainian emigrants in Germany and Austria, under the condition of general chaos, started to organize themselves for self-protection, and later for mutual aid and common defence against forcible repatriation. Everywhere, in the major groupings of Ukrainian emigrants, committees were established....
"The first petitions in the Headquarters of the American Army in Frankfurt/Main were not very successful.... [It] decided to establish camps on the principle of state citizenship. Only a few memoranda and oral petitions resulted in permission to establish Ukrainian camps in which Ukrainians could be accommodated, without regard for their state citizenship." Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 116.
17. See Vasyl Sofroniv Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy (Zapysky skytaltsia)* (Toronto, 1983), 16, 49, 62, and about the camp police as an "insolent gang," 36.
18. Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini* (Munich, 1985), 122.
19. O. Zelenetsky, ed., *Na hromadskii nyvi (do 25-littia TsPUN)* (Munich, 1972), 9-10. On "Provisional Leadership of Ukrainian Emigration," see 13.
20. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 123.

21. *Ibid.*, from Zynovii Knysh, *Na porozi nevidomoho* (Paris, 1955).
22. *Minutes*, 8, Mudry Archive, Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York.
23. *Ibid.*, 8-9.
24. *Statut Ukrainskoho Tsentralnoho Dopomohovoho Komitetu—Tsentralnoho Predstavnytstva Ukrainskoi Emigratsii v Nimechchyni*, Mudry Archive.
25. *Minutes*, 15.
26. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 121.
27. Dr. S. Baran, "Dictate and Centralization of the TsPUE," *Ukrainski visti*, 130, no. 72 (October 1947): 5. Baran was a veteran Ukrainian jurist.
28. *Statut Predstavnytstva Ukrainskoi Emigratsii—Ukrainskoho Dopomohovoho Komitetu v Nimechchyni ta Vyborchyi Pravylnyk dlia vyboriv...* (Augsburg, 1948).

Note that the term "Relief Committee" was moved from first position to second in the official name. That transposition of the term "Central Representation" to the fore of the official name might have indicated the desire of the strongest group within the organization (i.e., the Banderites) to expand its influence even beyond the borders of West Germany and to counteract that of the government-in-exile of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Actually the "representative" character of the organization was in evidence more within than outside it. From 1947 until the complete takeover by the *Banderivtsi* in 1949, this institution was truly representative of the whole Ukrainian exile community in West Germany. However, its dealings with the Allied military authorities (SHAEF and others), UNRRA, and IRO were rather informal, verbal, and infrequent. In most instances, maintenance, protection, grievances, and emigration matters were handled by the local military and United Nations agencies, without any discernible uniform patterns.

29. Zenon Pelensky, "Druhyi zizd...", *Ukrainska trybuna* 115, no. 91 (30 November 1947): 2. *Ukrainska trybuna* was a semi-weekly of Bandera-nationalist orientation.
30. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 121.

According to another source, while "the [American] occupation authorities did not recognize the representation, but tolerated its existence," the Central Ukrainian Relief Committee in the British Zone "was given official recognition, as was the regional office of the Central Representation...in the French zone." A. Figol, "Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1984), 394. In fact, the status of these three civic institutions was similar in respect of their advisory and relief functions. It can be characterized as being somewhere between full-fledged "official" or de jure recognition and de facto recognition, which means more than mere toleration. After all, V. Mudry was duly appointed an official spokesman for the Ukrainians, and secondly, the constitution of the Central Representation was recognized by both UNRRA and the American military government.

31. See note 28 above.
32. Baran, "Zhyttia i pravo," *Nedilia* (14 December 1947): 3. *Nedilia* was "a weekly of democratic orientation," according to *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*.

33. For a complete list of elected officials see *Ukrainska trybuna* 112, no. 88 (20 November 1947)—thirty-seven persons.
34. *Minutes* (First Congress), 14.
35. For an outline of OUN history—the first split in 1940, the second in 1948-56—see M. Prokop, “Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv,” *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, vol. 2, pt. 7 (Paris-New York, 1973), 1863-7; and V. Yaniv, “Stepan Bandera,” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1984), 169.
36. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 125.
37. The author possesses a large collection of press reports on the tug-of-war between the political adversaries in the “non-political” framework of the Ukrainian exile community in postwar West Germany.
38. This election was in my IRO Camp, AC No. 93/347 in Landshut, Bavaria. I was on the Democratic Coalition List.
39. Pelensky, “Prohainovana nahoda,” *Ukrainska trybuna* 59, no. 35 (18 May 1947): 3.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Nedilia* 73 (11 May 1947): 10.
42. *Ukrainski visti* 61, no. 3 (19 January 1947): 4.
43. *Ibid.*, 79, no. 21 (1 June 1947): 3.
44. *Ukrainska trybuna* 115, no. 91 (30 November 1947): 2 (commentary on the second session of the second congress).
45. Zelenetsky, *Na hromadskii nyvi*, 34.
46. *Ukrainski visti* 347, no. 90 (10 November 1940): 4.
47. *Ibid.*, 348, no. 91 (13 November 1949): 4.
48. *Ibid.*, 353, no. 96 (1 December 1949): 4.
49. *Informatsiyni Biuleten Tsentralnoho Predstavnytstva Ukrainskoi Emigratsii v Nimechchyni*, no. 1 (January 1951): 18.
50. Zelenetsky, *Na hromadskii nyvi*, 43-4. On the newly elected Central Executive, headed by Professor Dr. Vasyl Pliushch and Dr. Kyrilo Hodovanets, see *Informatsiyni Biuleten Tsentralnoho Predstavnytstva Ukrainskoi Emigratsii v Nimechchyni*, no. 3 (March 1951): 1; that *Informatsiyni Biuleten* also has information about organizations and institutions linked with the Representation, 2, and the Committee for Communal Accord, 10-12, as well as minutes of the Committee of Three, 12-13. *Informatsiyni Biuleten*, no. 5 (May 1951): 1-9, has materials from the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Central Council, 2-3 June 1949 in Munich and a new edition of the *Statut*, 9-15.

Delegates from the Ukrainian churches, central communal organizations, scholarly institutions, and institutions of higher learning were to be included in the Central Council again (Article 19; and a special Section VII—Representation of Communal Organizations, Articles 47-50).

The minutes of the executive of the Central Representation reveal that its attention was turned more than before toward relations with the German government

authorities. One of the most pressing questions was recognition of the lack of citizenship for Ukrainians (statelessness). Z. Pelensky stated that “he visited Bonn again in the matter of state citizenship of Ukrainians.” He was told that objective facts, not personal wishes, would determine this matter: “They are not going to change international law for Ukrainians.” (*Minutes*, 26 January 1952 [Munich—Dachauerstrasse 9/II]). The question of whether to register “as a Relief Committee or Central Representation” in the German courts was considered on 14 July and 6 September 1952. It was possible to register as a Relief Committee but keep things as before (*po davniomu*).

Political Life

Political Parties in the DP Camps

Vasyl Markus

Maurice Duverger, a leading theorist of modern parties, has defined the nature of parties as political actors:

Present-day parties are much less distinguished by their programs or by the class origin of their supporters than by the nature of their organization; a party is a community of a particular structure. Modern parties are primarily characterized by their anatomy: the protozoans of past periods were succeeded by the complex and differentiated party organisms of the twentieth century.¹

The complexity of party structure, even in organizations which functioned in such a marginal setting as the post-World War II Ukrainian political émigré environment, can easily be demonstrated. The structure and functions of these “parties,” as well as the role they played in several processes, demand that they be analyzed in light of party theory and according to the requirements of comparative political science methodology.

When slightly modified, the definition of political parties proposed by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner accurately describes the parties in the DP camps. They suggest that political parties must display four defining characteristics: first, they should possess a continuity in organization; second, the organization should comprise a local network; third, it must display the will to exercise power; and finally, it should seek, for this purpose, the accumulation of popular support via elections.² Except for the “electoral process” provision, Ukrainian parties in exile have satisfied the postulated requirements, and in fact, they did partly function as the electoral mechanism in choosing local officers for the camp administration. By this action, Ukrainian political parties were attempting in-

directly to influence the composition of the camp administration and to use DP self-government for partisan purposes.

The Ukrainian political parties of 1945-55 cannot be viewed abstractly, divorced from the historical precedents and patterns established by parties in Ukraine in areas where party politics became possible in modern history. Also, the experience of party organizations in political exile between the two wars must be taken into consideration. Hence, a brief survey of the development of Ukrainian parties is in order,³ though Ukrainian party politics has a relatively short history.

The first party dates to 1890 in Galicia (Western Ukraine). Under the constitutional government of Austria, the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party took part in elections to provincial diets as well as to the Austrian parliament. Ten years later, a centrist Ukrainian National Democratic Party was founded. Soon afterwards, the left-wing Social Democratic Party and right-wing Christian-Social groupings formed. All the Ukrainian Galician parties were of parliamentary origin—they served as electoral instruments.

At the beginning of this century, all semi-legal and clandestine Ukrainian parties in Russian-ruled Ukraine were organizations with strong ideological foundations that promoted national-liberation objectives. They did not directly participate in elections to the short-lived Russian State Duma, and otherwise did not serve as electoral instruments, because pre-revolutionary Russia lacked a normal democratic electoral process. During the war of independence (1917-20), newly established or revived parties became the first Ukrainian parties in Russia to attract a mass following and develop competitive functions in a multi-party setting. Significantly, they participated in elections to the All-Russian and Ukrainian constituent assemblies.


After the defeat of the nationalist cause and the subsequent overpowering of Ukraine by the totalitarian Russian Communist Party with its local branch in Ukraine, the Ukrainian parties in exile (five or six in number, both left and right) continued their marginal existence. They also provided the new émigrés after 1945 with some party tradition and an organizational framework and human base. More than the exiled parties, the multi-party systems of Western Ukraine, mainly under Poland, continued to inspire new political life after 1945.

A new force, which became a decisive political factor, took shape in Galicia and in exile after 1920. This was the organized integral Ukrainian nationalist movement in the form of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN); its creation was a reaction against the democratic liberal parties, which allegedly were not capable of achieving the goal of national independence. OUN originally was a non- or anti-party group/movement, and among political groupings the only one that continued to voice Ukrainian political aspirations during the Nazi occupation. The OUN, though split into two feuding factions, was the sole viable and organized political force at the end of World War II. Following the Nazi

capitulation, it was the only nationalist organization which had the advantage of having clandestine networks on the territory of the Reich. Their leading cadres and many rank-and-file adherents arrived as refugees from Ukraine.

The Party Spectrum

Owing to conditions in defeated Germany and the DP camps, a dozen political parties emerged in 1945-55. They covered a wide spectrum of ideological orientations: right, centre, left. (See Figure 1.)



Based on a variety of criteria (including following, popularity, apparatus, funds, publications, front organizations, position in non-party organizations and in the Ukrainian National *Rada*, and power and influence in exile), the eleven listed parties are: 1) OUN (Bandera); 2) OUN (Melnyk); 3) URDP (Bahrianyi); 4) OUNz (Abroad; so-called democratic faction or “dviika”); 5) Hetmanites; 6) Ukrainian National State Union; 7) Ukrainian Socialist Party; 8) Ukrainian National-Democratic Alliance; 9) Alliance of United Ukraine, with the affiliated Peasant Party; 10) Revolutionary Democratic Party (Vpered); and 11) Constructive-Creative Forces.⁴

It should be clear that, at least theoretically, Ukrainian politics was a multi-party system. A one-party system appeared to be alien and hostile to the Ukrainian strivings for a liberated Ukraine. (The totalitarian Russian Communist Party and National-Socialist German Workers’ Party were deterrents to mono-partyism

among Ukrainians.) The fact that the strongest party, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, was from the outset highly critical of a multi-party system and hesitant to embrace democratic positions with freedom of election for many parties, made it a clumsy giant among a plethora of small, weak parties. The two factions of that organization, though bitterly feuding with each other, clearly overbalanced the Ukrainian democratic camp. The polarization of parties and the imbalance of groups and forces shaped an unusual and abnormal constellation in which the right overpowered the combined forces of the centre and left. This fact led to the consolidation of small centre and left parties around the Ukrainian National *Rada*. It was a defensive alliance against the dynamic power of an extremely strong party.

It is clear that, for a while, one political force dominated the rest of the political groupings in the Ukrainian exile community. Some additional characteristics of this party setting were: 1) proliferation of parties and formation of splinter groups; 2) except for the two OUNs and Revolutionary Democrats of Bahriany, all other parties should be labelled mini-parties with defective structure-function properties; 3) some parties owed their origin to purely opportunistic reasons, namely to gain representation in the newly established National *Rada*; 4) the inter-party blocs and coalitions were unstable, volatile, and dependent on the behaviour of one or another large party.

The *raison d'être* of mini-parties was motivated by the aspirations of the OUN Bandera group to dominate the social-civic life of the Ukrainian community. As a result, ideological and political preference had little to do with the pattern of alliances. For example, the right-wing Melnyk faction of the OUN joined with moderate and left-wing groups against the Bandera movement. That self-defensive anti-Banderite coalition was based on minimal political consensus and organized simply to confront what appeared to be a real and present danger to their very existence. This led to amplification of their political programs and vulgarization of their tactics, resulting in the degradation of political culture and the undermining of the national-liberation struggle.

Several political scientists (Frank J. Sarauf, W. D. Burnham, LaPalombara, Weiner, and Duverger) have stressed the importance of the environment as the determinant of party organization and party politics. David E. Apter expressed this idea in non-equivocal form: "An essential feature of political parties is that their form is determined by the socio-political ensemble of their society.... In this sense, political parties are dependent variables."⁵ Thus, there can be a formula of interdependence which can be applied to the analysis of Ukrainian parties. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2

Environment:	Political Parties	Political and
a) internal	their a) function	social system
b) external	b) structure	

A given environment determines the functions of political parties and, most of all, their structure. This, in turn, shapes the socio-political system of a given community. There is also a direct impact of the environment on the system. Similarly, the system influences the environment and the parties.

Environment

In 1945-55, the tradition and history of Ukrainian political parties was one internal element of the environment. Another element was the insular position of the émigré society, which was artificially, although temporarily, isolated from the mainstream of a larger society. This mini-society possessed a high degree of isolationist tendencies and rejected any idea of absorption into an alien society. In terms of social stratification, the Ukrainian mini-society was a diversified community exhibiting social, educational, regional, and religious diversity. For the first time, an idea of a united Ukrainian society (*soborne ukrainske suspilstvo*), in a limited space and time, materialized. Significantly, the percentage of secondary school and university graduates was relatively high (some 15-20 per cent instead of 5-10 per cent, as in Galicia or Eastern Ukraine). Of equal importance was the fact that those between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five vastly outnumbered those fifty and older. Clearly, two important elements of political socialization and action were readily available: education and age.⁶

This society displayed a high degree of social organization. Its primary objective was to present an organized opposition to the threat of repatriation. Moreover, it aimed at creating multiple organizational patterns (horizontal and vertical), which embraced religion, economy, the professions, youth, culture, the press, and last but not least, politics. Ukrainian mini-society in the period of the DP camps was a “state within a state.” The social conditions of collective life in the camps, along with the fact that people were unemployed or only semi-employed, increased the receptivity of potential party recruits to the appeal of political mobilization.

Demographically, there were about 220,000-250,000 Ukrainians in Western Europe in 1945-50, discounting those who, in the first two years after V-E Day, were repatriated from the territory of the Reich to Ukraine. Out of those, 60 per cent lived in the DP camps of West Germany and Austria. In 1948—the year when some Ukrainian refugees were moved to Belgium and England, but still prior to the major wave of emigration across the ocean—the distribution of Ukrainian refugees in Europe was: West Germany—120,000, Austria—20,000, Great Britain—20,000, Belgium—10,000, France—30,000, Italy and other

European countries—5,000. The bulk of them lived in Germany, more specifically in the American occupation zone of West Germany, which offered conditions favourable to the émigrés' social organization, including their organization into political parties. In general, United States policy toward the DPs was more liberal than that of the other occupying powers. Americans also showed more tolerance and a favourable attitude towards DP activities. So, for a while, Munich became the unofficial capital of the Ukrainian exile state.

Large centres (camps or clusters of camps) existed in the Ukrainian DP community—in Aschaffenburg three neighbouring camps had over 5,000 inhabitants; Regensburg about 5,000 also; Karlsfeld (near Munich) had 5,000 for a short period of time—with a disproportionately high percentage of intelligentsia. The high concentration of intelligentsia located in these large communities was conducive to political organization. At the same time, they offered a demographic base and physical setting for party activism.⁷

Of primary importance was the fact that the émigrés were able to witness the Allied-directed revival of the German economy and see first-hand the re-establishment of the German democratic process. Thus manifested, the attractiveness of the Western political alternative, in contrast to the previously rejected Soviet model and the previously defeated Nazi model, became evident. Undoubtedly, this German renaissance inspired the émigrés in their choice of political orientation. Many Ukrainians had never before had an opportunity to experience how democracy works.

Limited information from Ukraine about the continuous struggle against the Soviets and the repression of Ukrainian nationalism offered an essential impetus to the organized effort of the émigrés. As the Cold War heated up, it gave a new dimension to their political activism. In this environment, political parties increased their activism, tying their function to the immediate needs of the émigré masses. These needs included organizing resistance to repatriation, gaining recognition as a separate ethnic group, and achieving recognition of self-government in the DP camps. They also exercised other, more typical, party functions. They mobilized human masses with the intent of socializing them politically. The idea of Ukrainian independence became a foregone conclusion for all Ukrainians. The question arose of how that independence could be achieved, not whether it was desirable. Here parties had their options and were ready to popularize them among their constituents. The articulation of political programmes and formulation of ideas with the intent of gaining followers for them became another function.

There was a substitute for real political power. Parties competed for it in the camps' representative and deliberative bodies (which were elected), and in the camp administration. Some camp elections were heavily influenced by political parties.⁸ One party in particular (OUN-B) came to exercise a good deal of influence, since it was able to attract large numbers of voters and gain control

of many camp administrations and social organizations. Another substitute for power was influencing the Ukrainian National *Rada* politics and eventually party representation within it. That was extended to the non-political social structure, first in Western Europe, and later in the ethnic communities overseas.

As for external propaganda (or information) about Ukrainian affairs, political parties viewed this function as their crucial vocation. Ukrainians (as most émigrés do at one time or another) felt obliged to “seek some friends” for their cause in the world. Ukrainian political leaders took the initiative to set up international groupings: the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN, sponsored by the OUN-B), International of Freedom (sponsored by the OUN-M), and the Paris Bloc of Non-Russian Peoples (initiated by Ukrainian National Council). Publications intended to disseminate relevant information included *Ukrainian Press Service* (Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council), *Nabat* (ABN), and *Obvozhdenie* (URDP).

Party Structure and Function

Duverger used the term *armature generale* to describe party structure and all elements of party organization. The structure is conditioned by both the environment and previous party experience. Among the conventional attributes of party structure, which Ukrainian parties do not possess, or possess only in part, are parliamentary party organization and the electoral mechanism. Yet even these attributes were present in substitute or rudimentary form: 1) camp elections; 2) representation of parties in the Ukrainian National *Rada* and its organs. The mini-parties actually had little organizational structure besides that which was related to the functioning of the *Rada*. Four out of five larger parties did, however, develop some party structure, consisting of a central leadership and some local units. The nationalist organizations had an intermediate level, by countries or, in Germany, by zones. Moreover, the OUN-B established regional or district structures.

The three right-wing parties recruited their members on a selective basis (elitism), and each organization was ruled as an authoritarian, hierarchical group. Even the mass organizations, such as the OUN-B, which recruited many of its rank-and-file members from less-educated groups, referred to special qualities in the selection of members and required that individuals occupying particular positions display certain attributes. In the democratic mini-parties and the URDP admission was loose; it sufficed for an adherent to express a desire to join the party. Each of those parties had its own statute or constitution (*ustrii*, in the case of the two OUN parties). However, they were not fully observed in reality. The paper statutes often did not have much in common with actual procedures. The OUN-B, the most structured party and the one with the largest membership, experienced criticism from within the organization that the leadership did not honour the *ustrii*.

Membership in the two nationalist groups was conspiratorial. Members used pseudonyms internally and sometimes belonged only to small primary units (*zveno*), which had up to five members. Only in the OUN-M was there a functional division of members. The so-called No. 1 unit (*odynka*) was recruited for special purposes (contact with the organization behind the Iron Curtain and particularly difficult assignments that included intelligence work). They had their own lines of communication and command. The OUN-B also operated through special functional departments, for example, contacts with Ukraine (K3), security services (SB), and party militia (ad hoc *boivky*).

Right-wing parties (Nationalists and Hetmanites) had sophisticated admission procedures, including a membership oath. The Melnyk OUN faction had an exclusive corps of elite members who were required to take a special oath (*prysiazhni chleny*) along with the normal oath of allegiance (*zapryszazheni chleny*). Evidence of this sort supports D. Dontsov's idea that the organization constituted more of an elite order than a "party."

The structure of each Ukrainian political party can be understood if viewed as a series of concentric circles, with the leadership core in the nucleus of the circle and the sympathizers on the perimeter. Membership categories in descending order of rank were: leadership core; leading cadres; members and candidates; sympathizers, followers, and occasional contributors (among them the so-called fellow-travelers or *poplentachi*).

The number of people affiliated with each party is of utmost importance. To give exact figures for all the parties is hardly possible, since the party leadership was unwilling, in most cases, to reveal exact numbers. Some data on individual camps, retrieved from former party functionaries, are available, but the figures should be treated as approximations. At the height of political activity (at the end of 1948), the OUN-B had more than 5,000 members in Western Europe (85 per cent in Germany and Austria, including 70 per cent in DP camps). This figure includes about 1,500 members of the Youth Division (*Iunatstvo ZCh/OUN*).⁹ The second-largest party was the OUN-M which, together with its youth units, had about 1,200-1,500 members. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (Bahriany), which did not have a youth division (sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds belonged directly to the party), had about the same number of members. The URDP, however, did have a separate youth front organization known as the Association of Ukrainian Democratic Youth. The mini-parties—UNDS, UNDO, USP, and SHD (Hetmanites)—had about 150-200 members each. The alliance of United Ukraine, together with the Peasant Party, had about 100 members, while the Constructive Forces of Ukraine had only 50-80 members. In 1948 the first split in the OUN-B occurred and caused the formation of UHVR followers (around the Foreign Representation as the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council). This group had about 100 members. In total, some 8-10,000 people were actively involved in Ukrainian party politics. They, along with over 15,000

sympathizers, financial contributors, and party press readers, constituted a relatively high proportion of people (25,000, which equalled 12-15 per cent of the entire émigré population) who were politically active.

The scope of a party's activities may be illustrated by listing the executive departments in the central leadership. The two nationalist organizations possessed a highly developed apparatus with many departments or sections: secretariat, organization, finance, ideology, propaganda, press and publishing, information (foreign), external policy, internal politics, culture and education, military affairs, youth, civic organizations, and other specialized departments, including security services or intelligence and underground liaison with Ukraine. Altogether, there were some twelve to fifteen departments in the central leadership. In some national executives (*terenovi provody*), there were also a number of officers in charge of the same affairs. It should be noted that not all officers of the central administration were members of the leadership *provid* (ZCh/OUN or OUN); some did not belong to this decision-making central body although they handled important party business. An analogy can be drawn between *provid* and executive officials (*referenty*) and the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat. In addition, there was the party Supreme Court and as the Supreme Auditor.

The URDP did not have such an elaborate command structure; within the Central Committee (CC) it elected the secretary-general and three to five principal officers. Some members of the CC were charged with ad hoc functions. The total number of CC members was between ten and fifteen. Only the OUN-B and OUN-M had full-time officers employed in party work. The number of paid party workers (some fully and others only partially) was 75-100 people in the OUN-B, 20-25 people in the OUN-M, and 5-7 people in the URDP (mainly employed by the newspaper *Ukrainski visti*). The term *état* (salaried position) was used to describe paid party jobs in the nationalist organizations.

Some Ukrainian political and/or party leaders became charismatic figures and came to symbolize certain ideologies and movements. After 1945, A. Livytsky, A. Melnyk, S. Bandera, and D. Skoropadsky each represented a certain idea of the future Ukrainian state, and each had fervent followers and strong opponents. This array of leaders was later supplemented by I. Bahriany, who represented the new Ukrainian emigration from Eastern Ukraine. In Ukrainian political jargon, political parties or camps were commonly labelled with the names of their leader—*Banderivtsi* (Banderites), *Melnykivtsi* (Melnykites), *Skoropadchyky* (Skoropadskyites), *Bahrianyivtsi* (Bahrianyites). Because there is no nominal derivative from Livytsky, the followers were called *uenerivtsi* (followers of the Ukrainian People's Republic).

At this point, the problem of party leadership should be touched on.¹⁰ Along with the major figures just mentioned, there was a gallery of secondary leaders. Some of them worked exclusively within the party structure, while others worked in inter-party centres or even civic organizations. About a dozen leading

political figures prior to 1939 shunned political activity and partisanship after 1945, preferring to become more active in academic or civic life.

Elements of *nomenklatura* affected the appointment process in both nationalist parties. This was not begun in the post-World War II period; rather, it was a carry-over of the conspiratorial and authoritarian attitude of the OUN prior to 1945. The modus operandi of parties was quite different depending on whether the party was a mass organization or a political club-type grouping. It was also affected by whether the organization was imbued with an authoritarian or a liberal-democratic ideology. In the case of the former, centralism and personal leadership were stressed, along with the member's discipline and accountability. Information would flow from the bottom to the top, while assignments, orders, planning, and decision-making went from top to bottom. The top-to-bottom pattern applied to the nominating process, which excluded normal elections of leaders by larger assemblies. Also, delegates to party conferences were appointed, not elected. The lines and modes of communication followed the same pattern. They aimed at efficiency, performance, and unity of action. Discussion, opposition, and factionalism within the parties, to the extent that they presented opportunities for dissent, were suppressed by purging the dissenters. This is what led to the formation of splinter groups. In both modes of operation and communication techniques, a *sui generis* principle of democratic centralism was applied, although, for obvious reasons, the term was never used.

The party press served as a major avenue of communication between the party leadership and its members (as well as larger segments of society). Two kinds of party press existed: 1) internal periodicals, which were published illegally; and 2) open press, mostly weeklies, which were circulated openly to a broader readership. All three nationalist factions had a well-developed press apparatus. The OUN-B published five periodicals for internal consumption along with six weeklies distributed in Western Europe. The OUN-M produced two internal periodicals, two weeklies, and two monthlies. The OUNz, and before it the UHVR (in opposition to the OUN-B), published three newspapers and two monthlies. The URDP was also active in publishing, producing two party journals and an important semi-weekly for mass circulation. Altogether, in 1945-55 there were about twenty party-influenced newspapers. In addition, a dozen monthly or quarterly periodicals were produced.¹¹

Some of the parties disposed of relatively large sums of money, which came only partly from dues or individual donations. Most of the money came from party-controlled economic enterprises (co-operatives, publishing houses, DP camp workshops) as well as from black-market operations, to which some enterprising members were assigned. The financial apparatuses of the three OUNs, and later of the Ukrainian National *Rada*, were busy collecting funds from the public under various guises, for example, the Liberation Fund and support for the

Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Mini-parties did not dispose of any substantial funds: they were not even capable of collecting membership dues.

Political Structure

The political system created by the party process in Ukrainian émigré society after 1945 was pluralistic, but the multi-party system functioned deficiently. It was unbalanced and asymmetrical, giving excessively large weight and influence to one radical mass movement, the OUN-B. This preponderance of power manifested itself directly in the OUN-B's control and domination of civic, economic, student, trade union, and youth organizations. Some general émigré organizations were also largely controlled by the OUN-B—to a greater degree in England and Belgium and to a lesser degree in Germany and Austria. The stronger parties tried to establish their own legal mass organizations, known in most political systems as front organizations. Some examples were the Association of Ukrainian Youth and Association of Ukrainian Democratic Youth, two nationalist ideological student groups, worker trade unions in France and Belgium, and ephemeral peasant unions in camps. The OUN-B in particular pursued a policy of featuring mass front organizations; the OUN-M and the URDP were also active along these lines, but less successful.

Inter-party alliances, especially for control of some civic organizations, resulted in the creation of double organizations. A party or group of parties, which was not able to tolerate their domination by another group, moved to create a splinter group. This was done under some pretext, such as absence of democracy or alleged totalitarianism in the opposing group. The result of these squabbles manifested itself in the existence (temporarily) of two student central boards, two journalistic associations, and even two general civic representative organizations in Germany (the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration and the Union of Ukrainians in Germany).

Some parties succeeded in fostering regionalism by creating organizations with members from only Eastern or Western Ukraine (Galicia). This phenomenon was highly complicated and calls for more sociological and psychological investigation to be fully understood. Suffice it to note here that the URDP and SSZU became typical Eastern Ukrainian parties, and the OUN-B, after losing some of its Eastern Ukrainian membership, acquired from its opponents the distinction of being a "Galician" (*halychanska*) organization. UNDO remained, from the beginning, a regional (Galician) organization. Despite some positive effects (mobilization and socialization of the Eastern Ukrainian masses), this phenomenon of regional splits and feuds, which at times was demographically inspired, had generally negative results.

The formation of blocs and inter-party alliances was the by-product of intense party conflicts. The Ukrainian National *Rada*, which initially co-ordinated the political efforts of all parties, later became a virtual alliance opposing the

OUN-B. In 1949, four democratic parties of the *Rada* created a formal anti-OUN-B bloc—the so-called Democratic Bloc, comprising UNDO, UNDS, USP, and SSZU. The OUN-B and the Hetmanite organization, in their turn, forged an alliance of right-wing forces against the democratic and socialist camps. In the mid-fifties, a new alliance was in the offing between the URDP and a new splinter group, OUNz. This alliance eventually led to the creation of the Ukrainian Democratic Movement (UDR) in the 1960s.

In general, political parties contributed to the mass mobilization of Ukrainian DPs to the extent that they achieved a high degree of participation in the political process: attendance at meetings, reading of the party press, heated discussions, increased party membership, and participation in DP camp elections. One can see how parties in the late 1940s affected the politicization of Ukrainian community life. Owing to the waves of overseas emigration after 1948-9, the shrinking Western European community, as well as the strengthened overseas community, began to lose some of the intensity it had previously displayed by participation in the political process. From a high point of over 15,000 individuals in 1948, the number of people active in party life dwindled to 7-8,000 by the mid-fifties. Ten years later, the figure had shrunk to 5,000.

If we apply Robert Dahl's formula to the Ukrainian situation, we must conclude that the existing differentiated social and political situation of the Ukrainian community does not constitute a mature pluralism. The non-party social system might reflect the concept of polyarchy—the leadership of many elites—but in reality this is not the case. The prevailing position of one particular party elite prevents many elites and individuals from exercising their leadership potential.¹² The strongest Ukrainian political party, the OUN-B, has shown a tendency to entrust just one party elite with the function of leadership—this despite the fact that the community was formally pluralistic and, as such, was professing democratic principles.

Model of Ukrainian Party System

The search for a distinct and valid model of Ukrainian parties in comparative party theory is of more than theoretical interest. The fact that there is one dominant party with a large number of mini-parties (whose combined power does not exceed that of the ruling party) has led to a bogus pluralism and a fictitious democracy. The dominant party in this model must accomplish two other tasks. First, in order to improve the operation of the government for which the leading party is responsible, it must embrace a number of governmental functions, resulting in the duplication of offices and prerogatives, so that the party becomes a "state within a state." Second, the party, being disposed to perpetuate its power, must try to manipulate the whole system of political organization and, in particular, the electoral process.

This is the model of party politics which prevails today in many of the newly emerging states of the Third World. There, the parties involve themselves in diverse functions (multi-functional parties) that exceed traditional liberal party operations. In addition, they are nation-building agents as well as modernizing agents of the developing nations. As a result, they have less respect for classic party politics and such traditional values as democracy, human rights, constitutional guarantees, and fair play among parties. They emphasize instead national unity, solidarity, social transformation, development, prestige, and the power of the nation. The moving forces of such parties are nationalism and/or socialism.

Close scrutiny of the fragmentary system of post-World War II Ukrainian émigré parties demonstrates a number of features and trends similar to those which may be observed in developing nations. Party doctrine tends to lose its original rigidity and comes to be interpreted liberally so as to embrace pragmatic concerns. What counts is not ideological faithfulness but, rather, the continuity of the system. Democratic institutions and pretenses are used instrumentally, as a means of asserting legitimacy and acquiring a positive image. For this reason, the multi-party system is tolerated and opposition comes to be seen as a tolerable evil. Every effort is made to prevent the opposition from threatening the control and power of the dominating party. After the 1950s, this model was transferred from DP camps to Ukrainian communities in other countries of the diaspora (overseas). Some thirty years after the DP experience, the political parties of the described model are still present in our midst.

An expanded version of this article, with much illustrative material, is "Ukrainski politychni partii na emigratsii v 1945-1955 rokakh," *Suchasnist* (October and December 1984): 64-79 and 64-81. I interviewed a number of political activists and leaders of various political parties on the subject, both in Europe and the United States. The facts, data, and evaluations presented here are not identified with any individual interviewed. Except for direct quotations, all comments and opinions expressed are mine.

Notes

1. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, 3rd ed. (Methuen, 1964), ix-x.
2. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966), 5-7.
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6. V. Kubijovyč, "Z demohrafichnykh problem ukrainskoi emigratsii," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 14-27.
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8. *Ukrainska trybuna* (Munich), 13 February 1947, calls the 88 per cent victory of the OUN-B in one of the camp elections a "popular plebiscite."
9. All figures in this paper, as well as facts and information about party structure, are based on the author's first-hand knowledge of Ukrainian political life in West Germany and on interviews with a number of activists and leaders. Among those interviewed were I. Maistrenko, Ia. Makovetsky, V. Maruniak, H. Naniak, D. Rebet, H. Vaskovych, and A. Zhukovsky.
10. The anatomy of Ukrainian political leadership—analysis of the background and careers of all members of the OUN-B; the OUN-M leadership; the CC members of leading parties as well as of the Ukrainian National *Rada* and its executive organ; or, for the same purpose, analysis of the Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council—totalling over 100 profiles, could be the subject of a highly interesting study. What is presented here is not to be understood as an exhaustive treatment of all dimensions of this problem.
11. Major newspapers were published under party sponsorship in Western Europe. External Branches of the OUN (ZChOUN): *Chas* (Fürth, 1946-9); *Ukrainska trybuna* (Munich, 1946-8); *Ukrainets-Chas* (Paris, 1945-60); and *Ukrainska dumka* (London, 1949-, initially a non-party paper). OUN-M: *Promin* (Salzburg-Munich, 1948-9); *Ukrainske slovo* (Paris, 1949-). Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council/OUN abroad: *Ukrainska trybuna* (Munich, 1948-9); *Suchasna Ukraina* (Munich, 1951-60); *Ukrainskyi samostiinyk* (Munich, 1954-7). URDP (Bahriany): *Ukrainski visti* (Neu Ulm, 1945-78). URDP (Vpered faction): *Vpered* (Munich, 1949-?). Ukrainian Socialist Party: *Vilne slovo* (Augsburg-London, 1946-?). SZSU-Peasant Party: *Ukrainskyi selianyn* (Munich, 1945-78). SHD (Hetmanites): *Ranok* (Heidenau, 1946-8). See also R. Ilnytzkyj, "A Survey of Ukrainian Camp Periodicals, 1945-50," in this volume.
12. Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956), 150.

Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics, 1945-50

Myroslav Yurkevich

Among the Ukrainians who found themselves in the Western occupation zones of Germany and Austria after World War II, nationalism was the dominant political current. The majority of displaced Ukrainians who were not forcibly repatriated had come from Western Ukraine, where the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv, OUN) had transformed the political scene during the interwar period. The OUN's integral-nationalist ideology, which placed the attainment of independent statehood above all other goals, challenged the programmes of the established parties and won the allegiance of much of the younger generation. During World War II, the nationalist movement underwent internal division and programmatic change, arousing hopes that co-operation, if not consensus, might be established between nationalists and older political groupings in the postwar emigration. It is these two developments—the partial transformation of OUN and the resulting efforts at political realignment—that the present article seeks to analyze.

Established at a clandestine congress in Vienna in 1929, the OUN was the product of an alliance between two disparate groups.¹ The first was composed of former officers and soldiers of Ukrainian armies who had fought in the revolution of 1917-20 and subsequently established a revolutionary underground—the Ukrainian Military Organization—to carry on the struggle against Polish rule in Western Ukraine. The second group was made up of students belonging to clandestine nationalist youth organizations, many of whom were too young to have fought in the revolution. Tension developed rapidly between the two groups. The OUN leadership, headed by Colonel Ievhen Konovalets, was drawn almost entirely from the older ex-officers who resided in various cities of

Western and Central Europe in order to escape harassment by the Polish authorities. The risks of the OUN's terrorist activity in Western Ukraine were borne by the younger men, who came to feel that their elders were turning into coffee-house dilettantes. Their bitterness increased when the Polish police penetrated the OUN's conspiratorial network, arrested many of the younger leaders, and had them sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

The crisis in relations between the two groups occurred after the assassination of Konovalets—almost certainly the work of a Soviet agent—in Rotterdam in 1938. The older leaders convoked a second OUN congress in Rome in August 1939. There, acting on the authority of what was claimed to be the verbally expressed will of Konovalets, they swore in as his successor Andrii Melnyk, an associate of Konovalets since the revolution. According to the new OUN constitution, the leader (*vozhda*) was no longer responsible to the congress or the other members of the leadership, but only to “God, the Nation and his own conscience.”² The younger leaders, who escaped from prison at the outbreak of the war, refused to acknowledge Melnyk's authority and established a Revolutionary Leadership of the OUN in February 1940. It was headed by Stepan Bandera, who had briefly served as leader of the Western Ukrainian Territorial Executive of the OUN before his imprisonment. Most OUN members in Western Ukraine took Bandera's side in the dispute, and from this point there were two organizations claiming to be the authentic OUN.

In the 1930s the basis of the OUN's ideological appeal to young people had been its unequivocal rejection of the various democratic-socialist and populist currents dominant in the Ukrainian revolution. According to the OUN, the socialists' doctrine of internationalism had blinded them to the Bolshevik menace and made them incapable of defending Ukrainian sovereignty. The writer Dmytro Dontsov, who did not belong to the OUN but exercised considerable influence on its younger membership, developed this critique into an outright condemnation of socialists and liberals as traitors to the national cause.³ In the 1930s, Dontsov issued a series of pamphlets indiscriminately endorsing the corporatist, fascist, and Nazi movements in Europe as models for Ukrainian nationalism.⁴

The OUN's first political program (adopted at its founding congress) drew its inspiration from Italian fascism and was strongly corporatist.⁵ The nation was held to be the “highest type of organic human community,” which became a “full participant in world history” through the attainment of political sovereignty.⁶ In an independent Ukraine, the state would control all aspects of domestic and foreign policy. This program was elaborated on by a member of the OUN leadership, Mykola Stsiborsky. He called for a nation-state ruled by a dictator with the assistance of a state council to which the various occupational groups of the population, organized in corporate bodies, would send representatives.⁷

The OUN regarded itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Ukrainian people in its struggle for national liberation.⁸ The legal Ukrainian parties in

Poland, both Christian-democratic and socialist, were dismissed as exponents of outworn world-views; their efforts to obtain concessions from the Polish authorities were condemned as “truckling” (*uhodivstvo*).⁹ The OUN’s terrorist actions, which included the murder of government officials and Ukrainians accused of betraying the national cause,¹⁰ encouraged the younger cadres to think of politics as a struggle for power in which all means were legitimate and adherence to conventional morality a sign of weakness.¹¹ The structure of the OUN, in which power was concentrated at the top, placed a premium on unquestioning obedience to commands. There was no institutional provision for the debate of conflicting views, leaving dissidents no alternative but to break with the organization. For the members of the Melnyk and Bandera factions (henceforth OUN-M and OUN-B), both of which claimed a monopoly on political legitimacy, every question became a question of principle, and compromise was ruled out as dishonourable.

Both factions appear to have believed that the impending conflict between Germany and the USSR would allow them to come to power in an independent Ukrainian state. Although Nazi ideology had been rejected by Stsiborsky and by the OUN representative in Rome, Ievhen Onatsky,¹² the OUN leadership maintained clandestine links with German military intelligence throughout the 1930s. They provided information about Polish government activities and attempted to interest German government and party circles in the cause of Ukrainian independence.¹³ On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, both factions of the OUN formed expeditionary groups whose task was to follow German troops into Ukraine and seize power.

On 30 June 1941 the OUN-B proclaimed Ukrainian independence in Lviv, with an associate of Bandera, Iaroslav Stetsko, assuming the position of Head of Government. The OUN-M attempted to duplicate this manoeuvre in September 1941 by establishing itself in the civic administration of Kiev, where it planned the formation of a Ukrainian National Council. In both cases, well-known figures who did not belong to the OUN were brought into the provisional governments in order to endow them with an all-Ukrainian legitimacy, but these people were never in a position to challenge the nationalists’ dominance.

The strategy of achieving Ukrainian independence under German sponsorship proved an immediate failure, for the Nazis were not interested in a partnership with the Ukrainian nationalists. Bandera and Stetsko were arrested and imprisoned in concentration camps; Melnyk was kept under house arrest, then sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp in 1944. Nationalists of both factions were rounded up and shot.¹⁴ This policy of repression was also applied to the population at large. The Germans deported hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians as slave labourers and maintained the former Soviet collective farms in order to ensure sufficient foodstuffs for the war effort.¹⁵ In spite of German persecution, the nationalist expeditionary groups continued their work in clandestine fashion,

conducting political discussions and reviving Ukrainian cultural and educational activity. They found that Eastern Ukrainians, who had experienced the horrors of forced collectivization, the famine of 1932-3, and the political purges of the 1930s were hostile to the idea of a national dictatorship.¹⁶

Given these developments, many Ukrainian nationalists ceased to identify themselves with European fascism, which in the 1930s had appeared to be the wave of the future that would sweep aside both liberalism and communism. An ideological reorientation became necessary. In May 1942 the OUN-M held an underground congress at which it condemned German colonialism.¹⁷ In Polissia, an armed force under the command of Taras Borovets, who gave his allegiance to the government-in-exile of the Ukrainian People's Republic, took shape with the assistance of the OUN-M. The Polissian *Sich* was conceived as the nucleus of an insurgent army.

It was the OUN-B, commanding the allegiance of most nationalist cadres, which went farthest in organizing armed resistance and revising ideology. In the autumn of 1942 a Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska povstanska armiiia, UPA) was organized by the OUN-B in Volhynia. The force commanded by Borovets was captured and obliged to surrender its weapons under circumstances that remain controversial to this day.¹⁸ In order to maintain discipline and prevent infiltration by enemies, the OUN-B organized a security service which acquired a reputation for ruthlessness.¹⁹ The UPA waged guerrilla warfare against the Germans, then against Soviet and Polish forces until the early 1950s.

On 21-25 August 1943, the OUN-B held a conference in the Ternopil region which was designated the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN. In the congress resolutions, the OUN-B declared its opposition to German and Russian colonialism and put forward a "system of free peoples and independent states [as] the single best solution to the problem of world order."²⁰ Even before the congress, in May 1943, the OUN-B had decided to substitute collegial leadership for the practice of electing a single leader. A three-man "leadership bureau," with Roman Shukhevych as chairman and Zinovii Matla and Dmytro Maivsky as members, was elected. The congress ratified this change and added Rostyslav Voloshyn to the bureau.

Although the social program approved by the congress did not depart in essentials from the statist principles of the earlier OUN programs, it emphasized provision of a wide range of social services and called for worker participation in the management of factories, free choice of profession and workplace, and free trade unions. The OUN-B affirmed that it was fighting for "freedom of the press, speech, thought, convictions, faith and world-view. Against the official imposition of doctrines and dogmas on society."²¹ The slogan "Ukraine for Ukrainians," which the expeditionary groups had brought to Eastern Ukraine, was dropped in favour of an affirmation of the right of national minorities to develop their cultures.²²

Following the congress, the OUN-B leadership struck a committee to work toward the formation of an all-Ukrainian representative body that would lead the struggle for independence. The result of the committee's work was the formation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (Ukrainska holovna vyzvolna rada, UHVR) in July 1944. Most members of the UHVR presidium belonged to the OUN-B, but there were some who did not, such as Vasyl Mudry, the head of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation in the interwar Polish *Sejm*.

If the OUN-B had taken steps toward the recognition of pluralism in its political life, it nevertheless continued to think of itself as the leading force in the national-liberation struggle and maintained firm control over the UHVR. Roman Shukhevych concentrated great power in his own hands. He was head of the OUN-B in Ukraine, commander-in-chief of the UPA, and head of the UHVR General Secretariat. Furthermore, the defeat of Germany had led to the release from incarceration of Bandera, Stetsko, and other leading members of the OUN-B who had not undergone the evolution experienced by members of the expeditionary groups. It became apparent that many of these people were not prepared to accept the changes brought about by the Third Extraordinary Congress.

Divergences of opinion were registered at the first meetings between the newly released OUN-B leaders and representatives of the UHVR who were sent to the West in 1945.²³ The two groups created a Foreign Centre of the OUN. In February 1945, the OUN-B in Ukraine had elected Bandera and Stetsko to its leadership along with Shukhevych, and their legitimacy was unquestioned. Moreover, as political prisoners who had endured Nazi persecution, they enjoyed considerable prestige. There was, accordingly, no question of a break at this time.

For Bandera, the immediate problem was not to resolve the programmatic dispute but to establish his authority among the displaced Ukrainians in Germany and Austria (some 200,000)²⁴ and to put the case for Ukrainian independence to the Western Allies. In his efforts to accomplish these tasks, Bandera faced two major competitors—the revived government-in-exile of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the OUN-M.

The government-in-exile had been established by Symon Petliura in his capacity as head of the last independent government of Ukraine, the Directory. Following Petliura's assassination in 1926, the government-in-exile was headed by Andrii Livytsky, a former minister of the Ukrainian People's Republic, who took up residence in Warsaw. Toward the end of the war, he reached Germany with a number of his followers. With the support of the Ukrainian National Committee—a representative body recognized by the Germans in a last-ditch attempt to mobilize Ukrainian aid for the war effort—Livytsky reorganized the government-in-exile.²⁵ He settled in Weimar, and the American forces temporarily occupying the city were apprised of the government's existence with the request that they relay the news to Washington.²⁶

The OUN-M, as the weaker of the nationalist factions, strove to recover its influence by allying itself with other political groups in the hope of emerging as the senior partner. Melnyk and a close associate, Osyp Boidunyk, settled in Bad Kissingen. They made contact with Livytsky in May 1945 and suggested that he also move there, as Weimar was to be assigned to the Soviet occupation zone.²⁷ Once Livytsky had taken up residence, Boidunyk proposed the creation of an "All-Ukrainian Supreme Council" consisting of the OUN-M, the OUN-B, the monarchist camp of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, and the supporters of the government-in-exile. Livytsky agreed to a conference at which the proposal would be discussed, and invitations were sent out over Melnyk's signature in July 1945. The OUN-B made no response, however, and the initiative failed.²⁸

The OUN-M then moved to sponsor a broader coalition of political forces. With the assistance of the Rev. Vasyl Kushnir of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, who was attempting to mediate between the political parties in order to facilitate aid to Ukrainian refugees, a series of meetings was initiated in Offenbach in March 1946. These meetings, in which representatives of the OUN-B participated, led to the formation, on 14 July 1946, of the Co-ordinating Ukrainian Committee (Koodynatsiinyi ukrainskyi komitet, KUK), based in Munich. Participating in KUK were the OUN-M, two socialist parties of the revolutionary period (the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries), two Galician parties of the interwar period (the Ukrainian National Democratic Union and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party), the monarchists, a new pro-Livytsky group (the Ukrainian National-Statist Union), and the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (formed in the DP camps by Eastern Ukrainian refugees). In its first communiqué, KUK announced that the difficult international situation and the uncertain status of the Ukrainian émigrés required the consolidation of Ukrainian political forces on a democratic basis. Four common principles were accepted by the various parties: political life was to be based on the rule of law and Christian morality; the use of physical and moral terror was condemned; totalitarian and monocratic tendencies in Ukrainian life, whether inspired by fascism and national socialism or by Bolshevism, were to be combatted; and the principle of fair play was to be observed in political discussion and criticism.²⁹

At the first meeting of KUK on 4 September 1946, OUN-B representatives announced that they would no longer participate.³⁰ The reasons were made clear in the new press organs established in the emigration by the OUN-B and UHVR. The chief OUN-B organ was the journal *Vyzvolna polityka* (Liberation Policy), established in January 1946 in Munich, where it continued publication until 1949. In mid-1946, as the negotiations leading to the formation of KUK were taking place, *Vyzvolna polityka* published an article by Bandera explaining the attitude of the OUN-B to political consolidation. Bandera argued that two conditions were required for consolidation: the acceptance of Ukrainian state sovereignty as

a common political goal and the acceptance of revolutionary struggle against Moscow as the sole means of its attainment. These conditions existed in Ukraine, where the “revolutionary OUN” (OUN-B) was the only remaining organized force. Despite its power monopoly, OUN had concluded that “a one-party system...did not correspond to the requirements of full, healthy national development” and had created the UHVR, which included representatives of other parties.³¹ With the achievement of independence, a multi-party system would be instituted in Ukraine.

In the emigration, continued Bandera, the situation was different. Ignoring the OUN-M, he concentrated on the refusal of Livytsky’s government-in-exile to subordinate itself to the UHVR. This was a senseless position, maintained Bandera, for the government-in-exile had no base of support in Ukraine. Appealing to historical legitimacy (the republic of 1917-20), it ignored the formation of the UHVR, which was in fact co-ordinating the national-liberation struggle. The government-in-exile had undertaken no activity of its own during the struggle, and representing it to the world as the embodiment of Ukrainian political aspirations would in fact be harmful to the cause. Ukraine was a “volcano of liberating revolution” that would channel the forces of all the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism in order to bring down the artificial political structures imposed on Eastern Europe.³² The UHVR, which had developed “organically from living reality,” was the only formation capable of leading the struggle to a successful conclusion.³³ The government-in-exile and the other Ukrainian political parties, most of which were too small to act effectively on their own, could best serve the cause by taking advantage of the opportunity being offered them to “make good their misdeeds and join the united liberation front” under the leadership of the UHVR.³⁴

Similar arguments were advanced by the foreign representatives of the UHVR, who had established the semi-weekly newspaper *Ukrainska trybuna* in Munich in August 1946, initially under the editorship of the well-known nationalist journalist, Zenon Pelensky. As early as June 1945 the Rev. Ivan Hryniokh, second vice-president of the UHVR, had approached Livytsky with the proposal that the latter co-operate in uniting the “state tradition of the Ukrainian People’s Republic abroad” with the “actual organizational and political power of the UHVR at home.”³⁵ Predictably, he was rebuffed. A more serious incident, which led to much recrimination, occurred in October 1946, when the External Representation of the UHVR (Zakordonne predstavnytstvo UHVR, ZP UHVR), submitted a memorandum to the Paris peace conference.³⁶ This memorandum, which called on the Allies to support the Ukrainian struggle, was endorsed by a representative of the government-in-exile in Paris, Oleksander Shulhyn, but his action was subsequently disavowed. For the OUN-B and ZP UHVR, this about-face served as proof of the government-in-exile’s fundamental opportunism and unreliability.³⁷

Accordingly, the formation of KUK precipitated a torrent of protest from *Ukrainska trybuna*, with most of the attacks coming from the pen of Pelensky. In his article "Dead Souls" he argued that the eight parties making up KUK were "fictions" and "figments," virtually without membership, which had been inactive since the outbreak of the war and had shown no aptitude for serious political work.³⁸ Pelensky emphasized that he was no opponent of pluralism. It would be an excellent thing, he wrote, if Ukrainians had political parties representing the interests of peasants, workers, and other social groups,³⁹ but "fictions" were no substitute for these. Pelensky then wrote a major article, "Splendid Isolation," in order to reply to critics who had accused *Ukrainska trybuna* of opposing political consolidation. Those making the charge, who saw "fascism" behind every attempt to organize the Ukrainian people effectively for the liberation struggle, did not understand the nature of democracy. By criticizing the parties grouped in KUK, *Ukrainska trybuna* was simply pointing out the existence of two opposing camps in the Ukrainian emigration—"the world of Ukrainian opportunism and the world of direct militant activism."⁴⁰ In any democratic society, elections would decide which of the two camps enjoyed the favour of the majority. Pelensky was convinced that the "UHVR movement; some call it 'Banderite'... would gain at least 70% of the votes in a general plebiscite." This camp was, accordingly, democratic. Endorsing Bandera's argument in *Vyzvolna polityka*, Pelensky depicted the "opportunists" as do-nothings so corrupted by their materialist outlook that they would take no risks to achieve Ukraine's independence. In truth, they had no conception of how to attain this end. Their aim was to "possess" the Ukrainian émigré masses, creating as many political facades as possible in order to "represent" Ukraine to the world. The ZP UHVR/OUN-B camp, by contrast, was "isolated. But this is splendid isolation."

Pelensky's phrase immediately entered the political lexicon of the Ukrainian émigrés, and the OUN-M seized upon it as a shorthand expression for what it saw as the Banderites' attempt to establish a monopoly on Ukrainian patriotism.⁴¹ The major press organ of the OUN-M was the monthly journal, *Za samostiinist* (For Independence), published 1946-8 in Munich. The November 1946 issue included a reply to Bandera's article signed by Zynaida Koval, who argued that consolidation could proceed without the blessing of the UHVR and OUN-B. Before the war, when Ukraine had been divided among four occupying powers, the political parties had adopted various stances toward them, sometimes lapsing into opportunism, while the OUN had stood alone in opposing all Ukraine's enemies. Now all of Ukraine was occupied by a single power, Russia, to which all Ukrainian parties were opposed, so they would quite naturally coordinate their efforts. Koval maintained that Bandera's article falsified the origins of the UPA, which had been initiated by Taras Borovets, not by the OUN-B: "S. A. Siry, developing his grey [*siri*] thoughts" went so far as to offer the other parties absolution for their misdeeds—a gruesomely inappropriate notion, con-

sidering that the OUN-B had killed “hundreds and thousands” of Ukrainians who would not acknowledge its authority.⁴² Another OUN-M writer, Ia. Dedalevsky, spoke of the “extermination of Ukrainian partisans...in the forests of Volhynia and Galicia...[by] people afflicted with diseased ambition who wish to realize it over the blood and corpses of their sisters and brothers.”⁴³ Such accusations, directed against the OUN-B Security Service, became a staple of OUN-M polemical literature.⁴⁴ Another common charge was that Bandera and his followers were ambitious hotheads who had revolted against the legitimate authority of Melnyk in 1940.⁴⁵ Once aggressively opposed to all other Ukrainian political parties, the OUN-M was becoming conservative and inclined to compromise with groups that might help it oppose the OUN-B.

The most important ideological treatise produced by OUN-M in this period, Osyp Boidunyk’s *Natsionalnyi solidaryzm*, was essentially a restatement of Stsiborsky’s *Natsiokratiia*. For Boidunyk, democracy in its liberal and totalitarian variants was an outgrowth of modern philosophical naturalism. Both liberal capitalism and state capitalism (communism) were reprehensible, as they impoverished the mass of the population for the benefit of a minority. Boidunyk argued that a people—a community related by blood—was the highest form of society, and that the political and economic structure of any nation should reflect the interdependence of all members of the given ethnic community. To be sure, a people consisted of various corporate groups (*stany*), but a national-solidarist state would ensure that no group would be privileged and that each would bear its fair share of social responsibility. Self-governing corporate bodies would serve as mediators between state and individual, preventing the degeneration of the political system into tyranny or anarchy. In such a system, argued Boidunyk, the putative goals of the French Revolution would truly be realized. Man would regain his dignity, and individual freedom would be complemented by equality and fraternity among corporate groups.⁴⁶

The resolutions of the Third Congress of the OUN-M, held in August 1947, reflected the organization’s attempt to develop a corporatist ideology devoid of fascist trappings. The existence of non-nationalist political currents in Ukrainian society was accepted as a fact of political life, with the proviso that nationalism remain the most secure foundation of Ukrainian nationhood and that the OUN-M continue to strive toward a leading role in politics.⁴⁷ The constitution of the OUN-M was altered to limit the leader’s power. Henceforth he would be responsible to the congress, which he was obliged to convoke every three years.⁴⁸ The program introduced an emphasis on legality in the political order. The citizens of an independent Ukrainian state would be equal before the law; the judiciary would be independent; and freedom of conscience, speech, the press, and political opposition would be guaranteed “within the bounds of legality.”⁴⁹ These programmatic changes were not concessions to Western liberalism but reassertions of conservative political values. The OUN-M notions of social

organization remained populist and pre-industrial. National solidarism was written into the programme. The Ukrainian nation was conceived as an extended family united in co-operation and mutual responsibility. The OUN-M ideological conference, which took place in June and July 1948, asserted that both Marxism and liberalism were in the last stages of their existence.⁵⁰ The future Ukrainian state would be ruled by the people, but this would not mean the dictatorship of a single class or the prevalence of liberal individualism. The values of Ukrainian society would be traditional ones: "the sense of a hierarchy of values, the sense of heroic chivalry, respect for tradition, the depth of a complex of religious experience, renewal of the sanctity of the family circle, etc."⁵¹

If the OUN-M wanted nothing to do with democracy, the OUN-B and ZP UHVR embraced the concept in principle. The Third Extraordinary Congress, with its acceptance both of political pluralism and the existence of national minorities in Ukraine, its promotion of social-welfare policies, and its emphasis on the working class, had already marked a break with the prewar agrarian-populist variety of nationalism.⁵² The issue that now began to divide the OUN-B and ZP UHVR was the understanding of the term "democracy." For Bandera and his associates in the OUN-B, democracy meant competition among various political currents and the victory of one, representing the majority of the population. The OUN was conceived as a vanguard party which interpreted and executed the popular will. This was democracy on the totalitarian model, though Bandera would never have called it that. For members of the ZP UHVR, by contrast, Western-style social democracy was the desired model. This meant acceptance of such programmatic features as the separation of powers, institutionalized opposition, and legal guarantees of minority rights. In the immediate postwar period, this difference of opinion was embryonic. It was quite possible for a member of the ZP UHVR to hold views consonant with Bandera's. Zenon Pelensky's articles are a case in point. Similarly, Lev Rebet, a leading member of the ZP UHVR, wrote that "if the world respects only force, then we must also mobilize it to our full capacity."⁵³

Nevertheless, the ideological evolution of the UHVR cadres during the war was alienating them from the OUN-B. In January and February 1946, a conference of leading members of the OUN-B and ZP UHVR in Munich failed to resolve their programmatic differences.⁵⁴ This conference created the Foreign Sections (*Zakordonni chastyny*) of the OUN-B (henceforth ZCh OUN) to encompass the members of the OUN-B in the emigration. That year the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, headed by Iaroslav Stetsko, was formed in Munich. (This was a common front of anti-Soviet organizations of various peoples, which traced its origins to the First Conference of Captive Nations of Eastern Europe and Asia, held in Ukraine in 1943.) As these organizations began to function, Munich became a forum for debate between members of the ZCh OUN and ZP UHVR. The former was organized in groups of five which had no direct contact

with one another—a feature that Bandera exploited to limit the extent of debate.⁵⁵ The First Conference of the ZCh OUN, held in September 1947, noted that “the greatest attention [was to be devoted] to ideological and political uplift, the establishment of a firm line on all questions, political education, ideological and political unity and discipline of the membership.”⁵⁶ It devoted a section of its resolutions to the question of political education.⁵⁷

This proved insufficient to quell dissent, and a Second Extraordinary Conference was held on 28-31 August 1948 in Mittenwald, Bavaria, for the express purpose of “resolving urgent matters of an ideological, political and organizational nature.”⁵⁸ The conference, at which delegates loyal to Bandera were in the majority, condemned the “democratism of discussion clubs, which violates the fundamental character of the OUN.”⁵⁹ According to the conference resolutions, only one political line was permitted in the OUN during the period of revolutionary-liberation struggle—a line determined by the leadership. OUN-B members of the ZP UHVR were to follow the political line of the ZCh OUN.⁶⁰ The Banderite majority demanded that the dissidents resign their mandates in the ZP UHVR, which they agreed to do on condition that the resignations not take effect until they had been accepted by the OUN-UHVR leadership in Ukraine.⁶¹ The Bandera faction pressed the issue, however, electing a new OUN delegation to the ZP UHVR and demanding that the old members make way immediately. In the autumn of 1948 the ZCh OUN leadership expelled all the dissidents from the organization’s ranks and forbade them to represent the OUN in the ZP UHVR. Both sides made their positions known to the OUN-UHVR leadership in Ukraine, asking it to resolve the dispute.⁶²

A decision was not immediately forthcoming, and in the meantime there was much to occupy the ZCh OUN and ZP UHVR in the emigration. The dispute over general political consolidation, which had dragged on since 1946, appeared resolved in mid-1948 with the formation of a new co-ordinating centre, the Ukrainian National Council (*Ukrainska natsionalna rada*). In fact, tensions remained high. Since the arrival of Ukrainian refugees in the zones of Allied occupation, the OUN-B had made a concerted effort to dominate life in the DP camps and refugee institutions, with the OUN-M and other groups offering resistance. Thus, the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration (established in Aschaffenburg in 1945 with the participation of all political groupings) became a forum for inter-party strife. At the representation’s second congress, begun in Regensburg in May 1947 and concluded in Dillingen in November of that year, the statute became an object of contention. The presidium, which favoured the OUN-B, was accused of attempting to centralize power in its hands. The dissidents ultimately formed a rival organization, the Association of Ukrainians in Germany, in 1949.⁶³ The pattern was reversed in another dispute. The Association of Ukrainian Journalists (established in Ulm in June 1946), was too deficient in ideological correctness for the Banderites, who formed the National-Democratic Union of Ukrainian Journalists in August of that year under Pelen-

sky's chairmanship in Munich.⁶⁴ A similar situation prevailed with organizations for former concentration camp inmates. The League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners, formed under OUN-B auspices, and the "non-partisan" Association of Ukrainian Political Prisoners were both established in Munich in 1945. When the Ukrainian boy scouts revived their organization, Plast, in 1945, OUN-B responded in the following year with the formation of the Ukrainian Youth Organization.

Polemics on these matters were generally conducted with some regard for diplomatic niceties. Journalists, for example, would refer to the "ambitions of a certain grouping" which discretion prevented them from naming, and critical broadsides were invariably accompanied by protestations of concern for the general welfare. On other levels, however, these restraints were not observed. In 1947, in his article "Terror Must be Combated!" Pelensky reported that, on occasion, community activists had been threatened, beaten or stoned, offices ransacked, and newspapers stolen or burned.⁶⁵ Election to DP camp councils were frequently accompanied by political infighting;⁶⁶ control over camp supplies was used as a political weapon.⁶⁷ The Ukrainian flag also excited violent passions. OUN-M favoured the yellow-and-blue design dating from the revolution, while OUN-B believed that the order of colours should be reversed. Partisans of the competing designs would tear down or publicly dishonour their opponents' flags.⁶⁸

The infighting did not give either side a decisive advantage, and KUK continued its work despite the hostility of the ZCh OUN and ZP UHVR. In 1947, a commission was formed to work toward the establishment of a Ukrainian National Council in which all émigré political groups would participate. The OUN-M responded favourably in November 1947, while the ZCh OUN and ZP UHVR attacked the commission in their press.⁶⁹ Ultimately, however, Bandera decided that he could not afford to ignore an initiative which (as he acknowledged in a major statement to his organization's membership), had the support of most émigré political organizations.⁷⁰ In April 1948 the ZCh OUN declared its willingness to participate in the proposed council on condition that it recognize the UHVR as the supreme authority leading the struggle for independence in Ukraine. The ZCh OUN also served notice that it would strive to make its political views prevail within the council.⁷¹ Justifying this decision to the membership, Bandera argued that it was up to the ZCh OUN to turn the council into a positive force in the Ukrainian struggle. Without that participation, the council would waste its energy on senseless competition with the revolutionary movement, "operating with political fictions, pretending that there exist other revolutionary forces which acknowledge the principles [of the council]."⁷² Bandera criticized the council's constitution, which gave every party equal status regardless of size, and gave the greatest number of mandates to one of the socialist groupings. This meant that the "positions and opinions of the broad émigré

community can in no way be represented in the Ukrainian National Council," while small, inactive parties gained representation on the basis of their former existence in Ukraine.⁷³

While Bandera's major criticism was of the council's unrepresentative character, the ZP UHVR questioned its legitimacy. The council, whose first president was Livytsky, was considered a successor of the Ukrainian People's Republic and its government-in-exile (although it included other parties). In a declaration published shortly before the council's first session, the ZP UHVR challenged the record of the government-in-exile, maintaining that it had accomplished nothing of value in its twenty-seven years of existence and had turned into a clique.⁷⁴ Also, it had not denounced the treaty concluded with the Polish government in 1920, which had surrendered the Western Ukrainian lands to Poland. Nevertheless, the ZP UHVR conceded that the council could play a useful role in representing the Ukrainian national-liberation movement to the world at large, as long as it acknowledged the leading role of the UHVR in Ukraine and denounced the treaty of 1920.⁷⁵ The ZCh OUN issued a statement dissociating itself from the declaration of the ZP UHVR. According to Bandera, his organization's attitude to the UHVR remained unchanged,⁷⁶ but he was not about to assist its dissident foreign representation.

The first meeting of the Ukrainian National Council, which began on 16 July 1948, was attended by representatives of all émigré political parties except the monarchists. Livytsky, who had already asserted in 1945 that he considered the treaty of 1920 null and void,⁷⁷ issued a statement to this effect at the inaugural meeting.⁷⁸ The OUN-M declared its satisfaction at this result of efforts toward consolidation.⁷⁹ The ZCh OUN, for its part, noted that the council's inaugural declaration mentioned the UPA but not the OUN and UHVR, which were giving political leadership to the struggle in Ukraine.⁸⁰ For this reason, the ZCh OUN decided to withhold approval of the declaration and to postpone participation in the council's executive organ until it acknowledged the authority of the organized nationalist movement in Ukraine and reformed its structure to reflect the true balance of political forces in the emigration.⁸¹

The council managed to organize a government-in-exile and to resolve the dispute over the flag—the design favoured by the ZCh OUN was adopted—but made no move to recognize the OUN or UHVR as political equals. The émigré nationalist press soon began to express its dissatisfaction with the council's "dilettantism."⁸² In 1949, on the occasion of the council's second session, the ZCh OUN repeated its demands, but they were again ignored.⁸³ In April 1950 the ZCh OUN withdrew from the council. Similarly, the council's negotiations with the ZP UHVR led to no positive result. Thus, the largest and most influential nationalist faction was no longer involved in the attempt at political consolidation.

This faction was, of course, internally divided. Having expelled the opposition from the ZCh OUN (though a second opposition developed within its

ranks),⁸⁴ Bandera published a major article setting forth his views on the attempt to revise the nationalist political programme.⁸⁵ It was critically important, he argued, to distinguish between basic, immutable elements of the programme and tactical concessions made during the war to win over elements hostile to the regime—Red Army soldiers, government officials, and members of Soviet organizations. The dissidents had lost sight of this distinction and now proposed to turn the struggle for national liberation, which necessarily involved the destruction of Russian communism, into a mere reformist movement directed against the current Soviet regime. Thus, the acceptance or toleration of a materialist world-view; the commitment to strive toward a classless society; the contention that Soviet imperialism was a creation of the regime and not of the Russian people; the effort to outdo the Soviet regime in programmatic democracy—all that represented a capitulation to communism and a betrayal of the “Ukrainian world-view,” which was idealist, Christian, and hostile to every variety of foreign socialist ideology.

In the summer of 1950, couriers from Ukraine brought letters from the OUN-UHVR leadership and articles by UPA publicists intended to settle the dispute between the contending factions of the émigré nationalist movement. The ideological bent of this material clearly favoured the ZP UHVR. The OUN-UHVR leadership declared itself in favour of a democratic political order with free elections; freedom of political organization, speech, the press, religion and conscience; an independent judiciary; and protection of human rights.⁸⁶ An article by the UPA publicist Oryp Diakiv-Hornovy contended that the struggle for independence should be conducted against Russian imperialism, not against the Russian people.⁸⁷ The leadership asserted that religion and philosophical outlook were private matters and that both idealists and materialists could belong to the OUN.⁸⁸ As for the question of a classless society, the UPA publicist P. Poltava maintained that his position had little to do with Marxism, for the OUN-UPA rejected Marxist views of state and nation, class conflict, and historical materialism. The movement was striving toward a society without exploitation, an ideal which it happened to share with socialists of Marxist and non-Marxist varieties, but which had developed independently.⁸⁹ By the time this material reached the West, Roman Shukhevych had been killed and the UPA virtually wiped out by Soviet and Polish forces. Since there was no longer an ultimate authority capable of putting a stop to the ideological dispute, it continued, the object being to win the allegiance of the émigré membership. The final break occurred in 1954, when the dissidents constituted themselves as the OUN (abroad).

Political consolidation, acknowledged by all parties to be the most important task facing the emigration, was not achieved. The liberal and socialist groups that formed the Ukrainian National Council—aided by the OUN-M, which preferred this incongruous alliance to political oblivion—wrote a constitution that patently

failed to reflect political reality. They were understandably concerned about being overwhelmed by the ZCh OUN and ZP UHVR, and hoped that a united front would coerce these groups into joining the council as junior partners. This manoeuvre had the opposite effect. It allowed both groups to abandon the council for what they claimed were the most patriotic and democratic of reasons.

In retrospect, the council's failure to reach an agreement with the ZP UHVR appears to have been a major blunder. Unlike the conservative OUN-M and the totalitarian ZCh OUN, the ZP UHVR had formulated a democratic political programme that was compatible with the principles espoused by most of the council's members. This grouping possessed two further strengths in which the council was deficient: relatively youthful cadres and a direct link with the latest phase of the national-liberation struggle in Ukraine. Had the ZP UHVR remained within the council, the ZCh OUN might well have found it much more difficult to justify its withdrawal, but the initial attempts at compromise foundered on mutual distrust. The council, deprived of a much-needed infusion of political energy, faded into insignificance, while the three factions of the OUN continued to polemicize against one another. The prospect of a new political consensus embracing most of the Ukrainian political emigration remained unfulfilled.

Notes

1. No complete history of the OUN has yet appeared. For a useful brief survey, see M. Prokop, "Orhanizatsiia Ukrainykykh Natsionalistiv," *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, vol. 2, pt. 5 (Paris-New York, 1966), 1863-7.
2. *Politychna Prohrama i Ustarii Orhanizatsii Ukrainykykh Natsionalistiv* (n.p., 1940), 55.
3. On Dontsov, see Mykhailo Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov: politychnyi portret* (New York-Toronto, 1974).
4. *Ibid.*, 295-7.
5. Stepan Nyzhankivsky, assigned to give a paper on "Fascist Italy" at OUN's founding congress, also spoke on "The Problem of the Future State Order in Ukraine." Petro Mirchuk, *Narys istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrainykykh Natsionalistiv*, vol. 1 (Munich-London-New York, 1968), 91. For an enthusiastic assessment of Italian fascism by a leading member of the OUN, see Ievhen Onatsky, "Lysty z Italii," *Rozbudova natsii*, no. 3 (1928): 93-6; *idem.*, "Italiiska korporatyvna derzhava," *Rozbudova natsii*, nos. 3-4 (1929): 78-84.
6. "Postanovy Velykoho Zboru Orhanizatsii Ukrainykykh Natsionalistiv, shcho vidbuvsia v dniakh 28. 1. do 2. 2. 1929 r.," *OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955 r.* (n.p., 1955), 3-5.
7. Mykola Stsiborsky, *Natsiokratiia* (Paris, 1935), 111-17.

8. Volodymyr Martynets, "My i ukrains'ki politychni partii," *Rozbudova natsii*, no. 5 (1928): 235-41.
9. Volodymyr Martynets', "*Realna*" chy vyzvolna polityka? (*Rozmovy na chasi*) (n.p., 1933).
10. Mirchuk, *Narys istorii*, 277-85, 365-86.
11. One of the postulates of the OUN's "Decalogue" originally read: "You will not hesitate to commit the greatest crime if the good of the Cause requires it," Mirchuk, *Narys istorii*, 126.
12. Stsiborsky, *Natsiokratiia*, 49-60; Onatsky, "Kult uspihku," *Rozbudova natsii*, nos. 7-8 (1934): 162-9.
13. Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945)* (Warsaw, 1972), 128-9; Hans Roos, *Polen und Europa*, 2nd ed. (Tübingen, 1965), 147-55; Anatol Kaminsky, *Krai, emigratsiia i mizhnarodni zakulisy* (Manchester-Munich-New York, 1982), 80-2.
14. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1963), 104-17.
15. Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo., 1981), 320-75, 428-53.
16. On the expeditionary groups, see Lev Shankovsky, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN* (Munich, 1958).
17. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 128.
18. Otaman Taras Bulba-Borovets, *Armiia bez derzhavy: Slava i trahediia ukraïnskoho povstanskoho rukhu* (Winnipeg, 1981), 267. Compare with the account in "Zaiava ZP UHVR i Obiednannia kolyshnikh voiakiv UPA," *Suchasnist*, nos. 7-8 (1982): 165-8.
19. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 63, 158, 281.
20. "Postanovy Tretioho Nadzvychainoho Velykoho Zboru Orhanizatsii Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv, shcho vidbuvsia v dniakh 21-25 serpnia 1943 r.," *OUN v svitli postanov*, 99.
21. *Ibid.*, 112.
22. *Ibid.* See also Myroslav Prokop, "U sorokrichchia III Nadzvychainoho Velykoho Zboru OUN," *Suchasnist*, nos. 7-8 (1983): 113-14.
23. The question was whether Bandera and company would resume their old roles or whether Shukhevych et al. would be recognized as leaders of the OUN-B in Ukraine and abroad. As for the UHVR representatives (who were also, of course, OUN-B members), Roman Krychevsky (pseud. of Roman Ihnytkyj) notes that the UHVR delegation included Mykola Lebed, Vasyl Okrymovych, Myroslav Prokop, and Dariia Rebet. That delegation was authorized by the OUN-B leadership in Ukraine to make contact with the OUN-B leaders in exile. See Roman Krychevsky, *Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv v Ukraini—Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv zakordonom i ZCh OUN: Prychynok do istorii ukraïnskoho natsionalistychnoho rukhu* (New York-Toronto, 1962), 20, 29.

24. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1971), 1216.
25. Kost Pankivsky, *Vid Komitetu do Derzhavnoho Tsentru* (New York-Toronto, 1968), 72-5.
26. *Ibid.*, 106.
27. *Ibid.*, 118.
28. *Ibid.*, 135-40.
29. "Koordynatsiinyi Ukrainskyi Komitet," *Za iednist*, no. 1 (January 1947): 22-3.
30. *Komunikat Provodu Zakordonnykh Chastyn OUN* (n.p., March 1947), 6-7.
31. Stepan Bandera, "Do problemy politychnoi konsolidatsii," *Perspektyvy ukrainskoi revoliutsii*, ed. Danylo Chaikovsky and Stepan Lenkavsky (Munich, 1978), 27-8. The article originally appeared under the pseudonym S. A. Siry in *Vyzvolna polityka*, nos. 4-5 (1946).
32. *Ibid.*, 35.
33. *Ibid.*, 36.
34. *Ibid.*, 43.
35. Pankivsky, *Vid Komitetu*, 134.
36. *Ukraina v borotbi: Ed-memoar Heneralnoho Sekretaria Zakordonnykh Sprav Ukrainskoi Holovnoi Vyzvolnoi Rady na Myrovu Konferentsii v Paryzhi* (n.p., October 1946).
37. Dmytro A. Vershnyk, *Iak khto rozumiie konsolidatsiiu* (n.p., 1946), 1-2; Zenon Pelensky, "Ustiinyty mandat mas!" *Ukrainska trybuna*, 20 October 1946, 2.
38. Zenon Pelensky, "Mertvi dushi," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 13 October 1946, 2.
39. Pelensky, "Ustiinyty mandat mas!"
40. Zenon Pelensky, "Blyskuche vidokremlennia," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 27 October 1946, 2. Emphasis in original. All further quotations in this paragraph are from this article.
41. See, for example, Stepan Rosokha, "Chy pryide do zamyrennia?" *Nasha dumka*, no. 3 (4), (February 1948): 1-2.
42. Zynaida Koval (pseud.), "Chudernatski dumky zapiznenoho provansaltsia pro konsolidatsiiu," *Za samostiinist* (November 1946): 33-6.
43. Ia. Dydalevsky [sic], "Deiaki dumky z pryvodu konsolidatsii," *Za samostiinist* (November 1946): 22-8.
44. See O. Shuliak (pseud. of Oleh Shtul-Zhdanovych), *V imia pravdy: Do istorii povstanchoho rukhu v Ukraini* (Rotterdam, 1947), 24-32.
45. See Bohdan Mykhailiuk (pseud. of Zynovii Knysh), *Bunt Bandery*, 3rd ed. (n.p., 1950).
46. P. K. Boiarsky (pseud. of Osyp Boidunyk), *Natsionalnyi solidarizm* (n.p., 1946).
47. *Rezoliutsii III-ho Velykoho Zboru Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv* (n.p., 1947), 7.

48. *Ustarii Orhanizatsii Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv (zatverdzhenyi na III-mu Velykomu Zbori Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv 30-ho serpnia 1947 r.)*, (n.p., 1947), 3-4.
49. *Prohrama Orhanizatsii Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv (zatverdzhena na III-mu Velykomu Zbori Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv 30-ho serpnia 1947 roku)*, (n.p., 1947), 4-5.
50. *Tezy Ideolohichnoi Konferentsii Orhanizatsii Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv (cherventypen 1948)*, (n.p., 1948), 8-22.
51. *Ibid.*, 31.
52. In the 1930s Mykola Stsiborsky published two pamphlets on the peasant question: *OUN i selianstvo* (n.p., 1933) and *Zemelne pytannia* (Paris, 1939). He planned a pamphlet on OUN and the working class, but it does not appear to have been published.
53. Lev Rebet, "Mizh vyzvolenniam i ponevolenniam," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 1 November 1946, 2.
54. Krychevsky, *Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh*, 20.
55. *Ibid.*, 21-2.
56. "Rezoliutsii Pershoi Konferentsii Zakordonykh Chastyn OUN, shcho vidbulasia v veresni 1947 r.," *OUN v svitli postanov*, 180.
57. *Ibid.*, 215-8.
58. "Postanovy Druhoi (Nadzvychnoi) Konferentsii Zakordonykh Chastyn OUN (z 28-31. 8. 1948 roku)," *OUN v svitli postanov*, 219.
59. *Ibid.*, 222.
60. *Ibid.*, 232.
61. Krychevsky, *Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh*, 23-4. On the UHVR leadership, see *Litopys UPA*, vols. 8, 10.
62. Krychevsky, *Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh*, 23-4.
63. Pankivsky, *Vid Komitetu*, 197-8. For contemporary accounts, see A. D-yi, "Druhyi Zahalnyi Zizd TsPUE," *Chas*, 18 May 1947; Zenon Pelensky, "Prohainovana nahoda," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 18 May 1947; D-yi, "Pislia Druhoho Zizdu TsPUE," *Chas*, 25 May 1947; Z. P., "Druhyi Zizd Tsentralnoho Predstavnytstva Ukrainskoi Emigratsii," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 20 November 1947 and 4 December 1947.
64. Zenon Pelensky, "Neuporiadkovana sprava," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 8 September 1946, 2; Serhii Domazar, "Chy budemo maty SUZh?" *Chas*, 18 May 1947, 4.
65. Zenon Pelensky, "Teror treba poboriuvaty!" *Ukrainska trybuna*, 22 May 1947, 2.
66. Pankivsky, *Vid Komitetu*, 153; Zenon Pelensky, "Ashafenburg—69%," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 9 March 1947, 2; Vasyl Sofroniv Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy (Zapysky skytalsia)* (Toronto, 1983), 80-2, 87-90, 127-9, 132-3.
67. Pankivsky, *Vid Komitetu*, 186.
68. *Ibid.*, 189; Sofroniv Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy*, 71, 106.

69. See, for example, S. E. Osinsky, "Baza konsolidatsii," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 31 July 1947, 2.
70. Stepan Bandera, "Slovo do ukrainskykh natsionalistiv-revoliutsioneriv za kordonom," *Perspektyvy ukrainskoi revoliutsii*, 101.
71. *Ibid.*, 101-2.
72. *Ibid.*, 103.
73. *Ibid.*, 109.
74. "Do vsikh ukraintiv, shcho perebuvauiut poza mezhamy Batkivshchyny! Dekliaratsiia Zakordonnoho Predstavnytstva Ukrainkoi Holovnoi Vyzvolnoi Rady," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 30 May 1948, 3-4.
75. *Ibid.*
76. "Komunikat Provodu ZCh OUN," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 13 June 1948, 2.
77. Pankivsky, *Vid Komitetu*, 73.
78. "Ofitsiyni lyst v spravi Varshavskoho Dohovoru," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 25 July 1948, 2.
79. [Zynovii Knysh], *Ukrainska Natsionalna Rada ta Orhanizatsiia Ukrainkykh Natsionalistiv* (n.p., n.d.), 15-6.
80. "Zaiava Delegatsii OUN(R) v Natsionalnii Radi do Dekliaratsii Natsionalnoi Rady," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 25 July 1948, 2.
81. "Dekliaratsiia Orhanizatsii Ukrainkykh Natsionalistiv (Revoliutsioneriv) na pershii Sesii Ukrainkoi Natsionalnoi Rady," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 1 August 1948, 3.
82. I. V., "Hovorim iasno," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 3 October 1948, 2; "Aparat ne diie," *Chas*, 7 November 1948, 1-2.
83. "II-ha Sesiia UNRady," *Homin Ukrainy*, 1 August 1949, 2.
84. Krychevsky, *Orhanizatsiia Ukrainkykh*, 24.
85. Stepan Bandera, "Ukrainska natsionalna revoliutsiia, a ne tilky protyrezhymnyi rezystans," *Perspektyvy ukrainskoi revoliutsii*, 130-70. The article was originally serialized in *Ukrainskyi samostiinyk* in 1950.
86. Krychevsky, *Orhanizatsiia Ukrainkykh*, 51-4.
87. Osyp Diakiv-Hornovy, "Nashe stanovyshe do rosiiskoho narodu," *Ideia i chyn: Povna zbirka tvoriv* (New York-Toronto-Munich, 1968), 153-66.
88. Krychevsky, *Orhanizatsiia Ukrainkykh*, 73-7.
89. "Lyst P. M. Poltav," *Vpered* 13, no. 4 (1950): 3-5.

Religion in the DP Camps

The Ukrainian Catholic Church

Alexander Baran

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in postwar Germany had much greater significance for the Ukrainian refugees and for displaced persons generally than any ordinary spiritual organization that simply took care of the religious needs of its faithful. This church, for most of the Western Ukrainians, was an important national institution and a moral authority that constantly influenced their political, social, and cultural existence.

According to the ancient “orthodox” tradition, there was always some kind of interdependence and co-operation—“symphony”—between spiritual and secular powers in the Christian East. This interdependence excluded the possibility of a single, international authority for Eastern Christendom. Instead it created many particular state or national churches, which were absolutely autocephalous (independent) in their organization and area of jurisdiction. Unlike the West, where in the early Middle Ages a “one faith-one church” concept developed, the East had just one Orthodox faith, but many “orthodox” churches.¹ This national concept of the church remained in Belorussia and Ukraine even after the Union of Brest (1595). Consequently, the Uniate Metropolitanate of Kiev became a “Particular Catholic Church,” based on its traditional (Ruthenian) rite.² Later, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church under Austro-Hungarian rule (1772-1918) became not only a particular church, but a national institution of Western Ukraine.

That was why the Western Ukrainian refugees were so anxious to find their church in postwar Germany. The church they found in their DP camps was the same one they left in their homeland, which became for them not only a spiritual hope in their grief, but a traditional institution that represented their whole national, cultural, and religious heritage. An embryonic organization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church existed in Germany long before the arrival of the DPs

and postwar refugees from Ukraine. However, prior to World War II there were only two Ukrainian Catholic religious centres in the Third Reich. One was in Berlin, established in 1910 and constantly supported by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky.³ The other was the Viennese parish of St. Barbara, which had been instituted by the Holy Roman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century.⁴ These two centres had been sufficient, since 80 per cent of the Ukrainian émigrés lived in those two cities.⁵ This changed when the Soviet occupation of Western Ukrainian lands (17 September 1939) started a very intensive mass migration of Galicians and Volhynians to Germany. By 1940, in almost every large German city there were new Ukrainian emigrants, who needed spiritual guidance. Since the two separate centres in Berlin and Vienna could no longer provide adequate care for all the Ukrainian Catholic faithful, the Papal See created an Apostolic Visitature with special jurisdiction over all the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) Catholics on the territory of the Third Reich.

On 23 November 1940 the Eastern Congregation, on behalf of Pope Pius XII, appointed Father Petro Verhun (the Ukrainian Catholic pastor of Berlin) to the new office of Apostolic Visitor of the Catholics of the Ukrainian or Ruthenian Rite in Germany.⁶ By Catholic canon law the Apostolic Visitor was a temporary appointment of a territorial administrator with full power: he was exempt from the jurisdiction of the local Catholic hierarchy and was directly subject to the Apostolic See of Rome.⁷ So Father Verhun obtained, *hic et nunc*, complete jurisdiction over all Ukrainian Catholics in Germany. He was virtually responsible only to the Eastern Congregation in Rome.

The installation of the new Visitature and the official inauguration of its jurisdictional activity occurred on 8 June 1941.⁸ In the meantime, Father Verhun tried to locate all the Ukrainian Catholic priests who were scattered in German wartime territory and to create for them pastoral districts in every large city, where they could visit their faithful and organize Ukrainian church communities. Some of those priests were in Germany because they were studying in German universities, but 80 per cent of the Ukrainian clergy in Germany were refugees from the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine. The new visitor also organized a small group of young German priests who were willing to study the Ukrainian language and help the Ukrainian clergy in their pastoral duties. In 1942, the Visitature had twenty Ukrainian priests and five bi-ritual German assistants under its jurisdiction.⁹

In the same year the Visitature was divided into four large pastoral districts (later deaneries), in which the local Ukrainian pastors tried to visit all the cities and smaller industrial centres, to search for Ukrainians and take care of their spiritual needs.¹⁰ Their work was not easy. The Nazi government confirmed (in 1941) the jurisdiction of the Apostolic Visitature—according to the Concordat of 1933 between Germany and the Vatican—but instituted a few unpleasant restrictions on the pastoral activity of the Ukrainian Catholics in the Third Reich.

Ukrainian spiritual administration was limited to: a) official refugees, b) contractual labourers, and c) students. Ministering to deported workers from “Polish” territories (wearing the insignia “P”), or to labourers from Eastern Ukraine (wearing the insignia “OST”), was forbidden.¹¹ Nevertheless, the clergy of the Visitature tried to contact even those proscribed groups and through the Ukrainian Central Committee in many cases managed to acquire legal status for them in Germany.¹²

In 1942-3 the number of Ukrainians in Germany increased substantially because the government needed foreign manpower from occupied territories. Therefore, the Nazi administration in Ukraine drafted people and transported them to different locations in Germany. Every village or town in Western Ukraine had to send a “contingent” of people to the Reich.¹³ Also, in 1944, under pressure from Soviet forces, the German army withdrew from Ukraine, and many Ukrainians, who did not want to live under constant threat and persecution, left their homeland and found refuge in Germany. Among these refugees were many political activists, middle-class intellectuals, businessmen, small land-owners, and craftsmen, who constituted an important part of the Ukrainian community at home. Also among them were over 250 Ukrainian Catholic priests who, prior to their departure, had been active in the Galician Ukrainian community.¹⁴

Most of the priests immediately started to work among the refugees and Ukrainian labourers in Germany. They usually contacted the Apostolic Visitature, where they registered and asked for pastoral jurisdiction. Msgr. Verhun always accepted their registration and conceded their pastoral rights. Through this registration they obtained legal status and a work permit within the jurisdiction of the Third Reich. They could also celebrate the Eastern-rite liturgy for their Ukrainian Catholic faithful in every Roman Catholic parish in Germany. If the priest found it necessary he could also obtain some financial aid.¹⁵

This situation changed suddenly after the fall of the Third Reich. The exempt status and autonomous jurisdiction remained untouched, but most of the Ukrainian Catholics in the western sectors of occupied Germany were sent to the UNRRA camps, where some were in danger of repatriation.¹⁶ In the Soviet-occupied zone the authorities arrested refugees and started their repatriation at once. Even the Apostolic Visitor, Msgr. Verhun, was arrested on 22 June 1945.¹⁷ Before his arrest, Msgr. Verhun appointed his closest counsellor, the Rev. Nykola Voiakovsky, dean of the Middle German district (deanery), as his vicar and successor. Father Voiakovsky, seeing the tragic end of his predecessor, transferred the office of the Visitature to Munich, to the monastery of the Passionist Fathers in Pasing.¹⁸

At the beginning of 1946 the danger of forced repatriation disappeared and 177,630 Ukrainian refugees remained in Germany and 29,241 in Austria. Of these, 65 per cent were Catholic.¹⁹ With most of the Ukrainians in DP camps, the pastoral work of Ukrainian Catholic priests became much easier. In every

camp a parish was established, where the numerous refugee priests could dedicate themselves completely to the pastoral care of their flock.²⁰ Voiakovsky was a good organizer who distributed the clergy evenly throughout all the DP camps of the three zones of occupation (American, British, French) and kept them under reasonable control.²¹ His task was eased because the occupation authorities generally were sympathetic to all religious institutions, including the Ukrainian Catholic Visitature, which soon acquired a strong and respectable position in the Ukrainian community of Germany.

In 1946-7 the Ukrainian Catholic Visitature in Germany established a stable structure for its religious activities. The *Schematism* of 1947 shows that the Ukrainian Catholic Visitature was divided into three archpresbyteries (districts), which covered the American, British, and French zones of occupation. Each archpresbytery was subdivided into deaneries.²² These deaneries contained 120 parishes and smaller missions with 182 priests and 58,278 registered faithful.²³ In addition, seven monastic clergymen lived privately, twelve had already immigrated to the United States, and eleven had died in the postwar years. The clergy taught religion in seventy-six elementary schools and forty-four high or vocational schools. The parishes and smaller missions also contained seventy-one specific church organizations in the form of brotherhoods and sisterhoods, or in the form of "Apostleships of prayer" and "Sodalities of B.V.M." For higher religious education the Visitature established a theological seminary in the castle of Hirschberg, Bavaria, with fifty-two students (theologians) and fourteen professors. The Ukrainian Catholic scholars in Germany gathered around an Ecclesiastical Archeographical Commission, which was founded in March 1944 by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky in Lviv, and renewed in Munich on 13 August 1946 by a pastoral letter from the Rev. Voiakovsky. This renewed commission, in its first two years of activity, organized eight scholarly colloquia to discuss the most important topics in Ukrainian church history. To co-ordinate all these religious and administrative activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Germany, the chancery office of the Visitature constantly employed five priests and seven lay people for office work. To resolve difficult marriage cases the Visitature established an ecclesiastical marriage court, which usually met once a month in Munich.²⁴

The structure of the Visitature was well organized and firm, but needed some adaptation to the whole émigré Ukrainian church in Western Europe, for there were also refugee camps outside Germany. In Italy the occupation authorities established many camps for the refugees who did not want to return to their Eastern European homelands. In these Italian camps there were 20,000 Ukrainian refugees who needed assistance.²⁵ In addition, 10,000 soldiers of the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army were interned in a British camp near Rimini as "Surrendered Enemy Personnel." As well, many Ukrainian refugees, fearing forced repatriation, had left their camps in Germany and Italy and

established themselves temporarily in other Western European countries, such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. All these people needed spiritual care in their own traditional rite. Therefore, on 28 July 1945 Pope Pius XII personally appointed Ivan Buchko, the auxiliary bishop of Lviv, to minister to all Ukrainian (Ruthenian) Catholics in Italy.²⁶ Bishop Buchko established a special Ukrainian Relief Committee in Rome, intended to help all Ukrainian refugees in Europe. With the help of the Vatican he also intervened with the occupation authorities against the forced repatriation of Ukrainians to the Soviet Union. In recognition of his intensive work, the Papal See, on 21 November 1946 by decree of the Eastern Congregation, appointed Bishop Buchko General Apostolic Visitor of all Ukrainian Catholics in Western Europe. On 16 December 1947, the Eastern Congregation also subordinated to his jurisdiction the Visitature in Germany.²⁷

Buchko, the new Visitor, arrived in Munich on 15 April 1948 and started to visit all the camps and Ukrainian private communities in Germany. With Vatican authority, he asked the occupation and German governments to support his refugees and to facilitate their immigration overseas.²⁸ On 6-7 May he called a priests' conference, which adopted important restrictions in church discipline; agreed on general principles to solve disputed marriage cases; re-emphasized the value of religious instruction in schools; encouraged the distribution of the Catholic religious press; and renewed all the charitable activities of the church. Furthermore, the conference decided to support all the existing Ukrainian Catholic organizations and to revitalize the work of the Ukrainian Catholic Seminary.²⁹ On 28 May Bishop Buchko, in a meeting with Ukrainian scholars in Germany, tried to reactivate the work of the Ecclesiastical Archeographical Commission. At that meeting the members of the commission decided that with funds from Bishop Buchko they would publish a series of scholarly works on the topic of Moscow's "Third Rome" theory and its damaging effect on Ukrainian church history.³⁰ After the priests' conference the autonomous Visitature in Germany was transformed into a General Vicariate of the integral Western European Visitature of Bishop Buchko. He appointed the former German Visitor, the Rev. Voiakovsky, as his first vicar-general in Germany. The bishop also elected a second vicar-general, the Rev. Petro Holynsky, and ten counsellors, who became the first members of his Consistory.³¹

On 30 November 1948 Bishop Buchko published his first pastoral letter to Ukrainian refugees. This letter became an ideological, disciplinary, and teaching program for all the Ukrainian Catholic faithful under his jurisdiction. In it the bishop described the persecutions in Ukraine and expressed his hope that with God's help the church would be victorious again and religious freedom would be restored in his homeland. He emphasized the necessity for the refugees to remain faithful to the Roman Apostolic See, which helped the Ukrainian émigrés in many ways. It 1) united them in an "exempt" church under their own hierarchy; 2) protected them by diplomatic interventions from forced repatriation to

the USSR; 3) offered financial aid to Ukrainian scholars to continue their work during their life as émigrés; 4) provided scholarships for Ukrainian students in almost every country of Western Europe; and 5) assisted all Ukrainians, without religious differentiation, with charitable help. Furthermore, Bishop Buchko warned his flock against the damaging influence of the atheistic, anti-Catholic, and sectarian literature of the West, which could unnecessarily disturb the traditional Christian Ukrainian ideology. To preserve the Ukrainian religious heritage, the Visitature officially accepted the new liturgical books, free of any Muscovite or Latinizing influences, which were published after World War II. Finally, Bishop Buchko encouraged the clergy to lead the people in Christian love by organizing them in Catholic action groups or lay apostolates.³²

In 1948 the Visitature also established a special Ukrainian Catholic Benefit Association—Caritas—which was designed to take care of the old, the sick, invalids, and those who could not leave Germany.³³ To facilitate migration overseas, especially to the United States, Bishop Buchko contacted the American National Catholic Welfare Conference and provided thousands of affidavits for those Ukrainians who did not have any relatives in America.³⁴ On 24 April 1948 another important event occurred in Bishop Buchko's Visitature: the transfer of the seminary from Hirschberg to Culemborg, a little town in the Netherlands. There the seminarians could be isolated from the unstable DP mentality and could dedicate themselves entirely to the growth of their spiritual life. Also the seminary obtained a new benefactor, the Apostolate of Union, a Dutch Catholic organization created by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky in 1922.³⁵ In June 1948 Bishop Buchko was sent by the Eastern Congregation to visit Ukrainian refugees in Austria. However, he acted there only as a guest, because all the Byzantine-rite Catholics of that country (Hungarians, Croats, Romanians, and Ukrainians) were submitted entirely to the jurisdiction of Cardinal T. Innitzer, Archbishop of Vienna. Nevertheless, Bishop Buchko visited all the Ukrainian camps and private communities and sent a long report to the Congregation in Rome, describing the most important problems of the refugees in Austria.³⁶

Bishop Buchko was responsible for the organizational and pastoral success of the Visitature among the Ukrainian refugees and DPs. He was an enthusiastic and hard-working leader who sacrificed all his energies to promoting the spiritual and religious uplift of his faithful. He visited most of the camp parishes in Germany, Italy, and the other countries of Western Europe. He organized spiritual missions, pilgrimages, religious manifestations, and public prayers for the persecuted church in the homeland. He also enforced in his church the Catholic doctrine, the traditional Eastern Rite, and strict Christian education, extending from elementary schools to universities.³⁷ In addition Bishop Buchko tried to support all the segments of Ukrainian émigré society. He supported, both financially and morally, the Ukrainian scholarly institutions.³⁸ He provided

special assistance for older scholars, who were no longer able to work and were unable to emigrate. He cared even more for Ukrainian students, for whom he provided many scholarships to study at such universities as London, Paris, Rome, Munich, Dublin, Strasbourg, Florence, and Madrid. In Louvain he bought a large building for use as a student residence, filled it with Ukrainian students, and paid all their expenses during their studies.³⁹ Bishop Buchko also helped many elderly, sick, and disabled people in the Ukrainian community. However, his greatest achievement was saving the 10,000-man Galician Division, which the Soviet government tried to repatriate to the USSR as war criminals. For those charitable deeds Bishop Buchko never asked gratitude or repayment because, in his view, he was simply carrying out his duties toward his church and his nation.⁴⁰

In 1948 the mass migration of Ukrainian refugees overseas began. By the end of 1949 more than 12,000 Ukrainian Catholics and ninety priests had left Germany with the assistance of Catholic immigration agencies. In 1950 the number of Ukrainian Catholic emigrants exceeded 20,000, and only thirty-seven priests remained to minister to the rest of the camps. At the end of 1951 only twenty-one parishes, most of them just pastoral districts, and twenty-two priests remained in the whole of West Germany.⁴¹ Nonetheless, the camps were full of religious manifestations, commemorative services, and other church activities in which almost the whole camp participated.⁴² However, that participation did not manifest the real spiritual life of the camps. Ukrainian Catholics in their homeland considered the church a national organization or at least part of their national heritage. Therefore, all the political and national commemorations, manifestations, and demonstrations were always connected with some kind of religious service. As well, because of the Concordat between Poland and the Vatican, the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Galicia acquired some immunity and freedom and so could protest against the abuses of the Polish government. In fact, the church in Galicia, in the minds of the people, was a semi-political or national institution. For this reason, a person who participated in all the religious manifestations was not necessarily a practicing Catholic.

A proper evaluation of Ukrainian religiosity in the DP camps can be found only in the internal church reports and statistics. In Bishop Buchko's report to the Eastern Congregation,⁴³ there is a whole chapter about the spiritual life and moral status of the people living in the camps of Germany. The bishop praised the pastors of the camps who, through spiritual exercises, retreats, and missions renewed the religiosity of their faithful. Church organizations were helpful in evoking an active religious ideology among the local parishioners. Evidently, the religious statistics collected from the parishes indicated a high degree of spiritual activity. Buchko's report shows that in 1949 in the DP camps of Germany, 75 per cent of Ukrainian Catholics regularly attended mass on Sundays and holy days of obligation. Out of 36,000 registered parishioners, only 2,309 did not receive the sacraments at Easter. On the other hand, 3,271 faithful received the

sacraments every month. In the bishop's opinion most of the fervent Christians belonged to the lower classes of Ukrainian society, while the middle-class intelligentsia was more conventional than actual believers.

The report became more critical in explaining the moral status of the émigrés. The camp mentality and life without work demoralized many Ukrainian Christians in Germany. The effect of this demoralization was evident in the loosening of marital and family ties. The solution to all the moral problems of the Ukrainian Catholic community, in Bishop Buchko's opinion, was the creation of a general religious organization in the form of Catholic Action and a strong academic association, *Obnova*, for the Catholic intellectuals.⁴⁴ Lay people among the Ukrainian Catholic faithful always supported their church and their local camp parishes in Germany. In every DP camp the community transformed big halls into churches and chapels. In some places (for example, Oker, Hallendorf, Korigen, Windischbergerdorf, Oberplatz, Kornberg), the faithful built Ukrainian-style wooden churches.⁴⁵ All the churches and chapels were decorated with paintings, murals, and iconostases. Every church had vestments and embroidered cloths for covering the altar. The congregation liked their religious services long. Nothing could be changed or shortened in the liturgical texts. Everything had to be preserved as it was from the religious tradition of their homeland. Even Latinized ceremonies and practices for the feast day of the Holy Eucharist continued to be popular, because they served to remind the people of the traditional processions in Galicia.⁴⁶

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in postwar Germany was a strong and united institution. Its strength and unity came from the fact that it was not an émigré creation, but rather a continuation of the church in Galicia. The Ukrainian Catholics in Germany had an autonomous existence as a "Particular Church," which was exempt from the jurisdiction of the local Catholic bishops and was directly subject, with its own hierarchy, to the Roman See. With this status the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Germany could observe all the traditions of the Ukrainian rite, and could recreate a spiritual presence of the lost fatherland in the psyches of the émigrés. In addition, the church preserved strict discipline under the guidance of a strong hierarchy and an obedient clergy. The precepts of the hierarchy were never questioned, and there was no opposition to church authority. The Roman Catholic clergy of Germany was also very helpful and supportive of the Ukrainian Catholics and never created any jurisdictional controversies. Generally speaking, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was in a very fortunate and privileged position in Germany and had a stronger influence on the émigrés than any other DP church organization in Germany.

Notes

1. T. Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (Baltimore, 1964), 243-68.
2. The legal status of this "Particular Ukrainian Catholic Church" was confirmed after the Union of Brest by a papal bull, "Decret Romanum Pontificem" (1596), A. Welykyj, *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantia* (Rome, 1953), vol. I, 266-8; by "Motu proprio—Cleri Sanctitati," *Litterae Apostolicae Motu Proprio Datae, De ritibus Orientalibus—De Personis* (Vatican, 1957), 99-119; and by the decree of Vatican Council II on the Eastern Catholic churches, "Orientalium Ecclesiarum" (1964), V. Pospishil, "Orientalium Ecclesiarum," *The Decree on the Eastern Catholic Churches of the II Council of Vatican* (New York, [1965]), 10-20.
3. P. Romanyshyn, *Ukrainska Katolytska Tserkva Vizantiisko-Slovianskoho Obriadu v Nimechchyni do 1945 roku* (Munich, 1978), 10.
4. O. Ostheim-Dzerovych, "Ukrainska Katolytska Tsentralna Parokhiia na Avstriu Tserkvy sv. Varvary u Vidni," in *Almanakh Ukrainskoho Katolytskoho Bratstva sv. Varvary 1971-2* (Vienna, 1972), 4-5.
5. P. Romanyshyn, *Studii do istorii Ukrainskoi Katolytskoi Tservy v Nimechchyni* (Winnipeg, 1988), 22-9.
6. *Ibid.*, 30.
7. *Decretum Sacrae Congregationis pro Ecclesia Orientalia*, Prot. 685/39, 23 November 1940.
8. Romanyshyn, *Studii*, 31.
9. *Amtsblatt der Apostolischen Visitatur der Ukrainer* 5-7 (May-July 1942): 12-5.
10. Romanyshyn, *Studii*, 49-50.
11. D. Zlepko, "Die Ukrainische Griechisch-Katholische Visitatur in Berlin (1940-45)," in *Symbolae in honorem Volodymyri Janiw* (Munich, 1983), 435-6; Romanyshyn, *Ukrainska Katolytska*, 20.
12. Zlepko, "Die Ukrainische Visitatur," 435-6.
13. V. Kubijovyč, *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1971), 1216.
14. Relazione a Card. Tisserant, Segretario della Congr. Orientale, 26 Febbraio 1950, 58, Arkhiv Apostolskoho Vizytatora Ukrainsiv Katolykiv v Zakhidnii Evropi (AAV).
15. Monetary support for the Visitature came from German Catholic missionary societies, such as the *Sankt Bonifatius Verein* and *Baromeus Verein*. These organizations donated annually at least 60,000 RM to Msgr. Verhun to cover the expenses of the Visitature. Romanyshyn, *Studii*, 55-6.
16. In the Vatican Pope Pius XII and Cardinal E. Tisserant became staunch defenders of political refugees and displaced persons. It was largely because of their efforts that the Allies suspended forcible "repatriation." See W. Dushnyck, "Archbishop Buchko—Arch-Shepherd of Ukrainian Refugees," *Ukrainian Quarterly* XXXI, no. 1, 41.

17. He was condemned to eight years of forced labour and deported to a labour camp in Krasnoiarsk (Siberia). After serving his sentence, he was not allowed to leave the Krasnoiarsk district. He died there on 7 February 1957. Romanyshyn, *Studii*, 42-4.
18. *Ibid.*, 78-9.
19. V. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia ta orhanizatsiia taborovoho zhyttia," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 9-10.
20. E. Skorodynsky, "Relihiine zhyttia v taborakh," *Siohochasne i mynule*, 46-7.
21. *Ibid.*
22. In the American zone there were nine deaneries: Augsburg, Eistedt, Bamberg, Würzburg, Munich, Passau, Regensburg, Rottenburg, Frankfurt. In the British zone there were four: Hildesheim, Munster-Cologne, Osnabrück, and Schleswig-Holstein. In the French zone there were only two deaneries: Würtemmberg-Baden and Koblenz.
23. *Shematyzm Dukhovenstva Ukrainskoi Katolytskoi Tserkvy v Nimechchyni* (Munich: Zahrava, 1948), 1-113. There is some discrepancy between the statistics in *Shematyzm* and the statistics of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration (CPUE), which on 1 May 1948 showed 101,130 Ukrainian émigrés and 66,000 Catholics in Germany. It should be noted, however, that many Ukrainians were then already in transit camps, waiting to emigrate. Also, many Ukrainians, especially professionals, lived privately and did not register in the camp parishes at all.
24. *Shematyzm*, xxiv.
25. A. Welykyj, *Arkhyypastyr skytaltziv—Preosv. Kyr Ivan Buchko* (Rome-Paris, 1949), 56-8.
26. Buchko was trapped in Rome during World War II and lived privately in St. Josaphat's Pontifical Ukrainian College. Ep. Myroslav (Marusyn), "Apostolska Vizytatura Ukraintsiv v Evropi," ms., 5.
27. *Ibid.*, 7, 9; Welykyj, *Arkhyypastyr*, 43-4.
28. AAV, *Relazione*, 8-13.
29. *Ibid.*, 14-5.
30. *Ibid.*, 22.
31. *Uriadovyi visnyk Apostolskoho Vizytatora Ukraintsiv v Zakhidnii Evropi*, no. 1 (January 1949): 51-2.
32. *Ibid.*, 1-21.
33. This association later became an important welfare organization for Ukrainians in Europe. *Ibid.*, 33-44.
34. *Ibid.*, 30-3.
35. "Ukrainski vysoki shkoly," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 84-5; Welykyj, *Arkhyypastyr*, 48-50.
36. AAV, *Relazione*, 23-7.
37. Welykyj, *Arkhyypastyr*, 44-61.

38. For example, he supported the Ukrainian Free University, the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences. Myroslav, "Apostolska Vizytatura," 11.
39. Ibid., 12.
40. Dushnyck, "Archbishop Buchko," 41-2.
41. Ibid., 59-60; *Uriadovy visnyk* IV, no. 1 (1952): 49-51.
42. Skorodynsky, "Relihiine zhyttia," 46-9.
43. The report was dated 26 February 1950. AAV, Relazione, 80-3.
44. Ibid.
45. Skorodynsky, "Relihiine zhyttia," 46.
46. Ibid., 47.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in West Germany, 1945-50

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

Professor Ivan Vlasovsky's account of the postwar history of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC),¹ while coloured by strong emotions aroused by the internal strife within the church's ranks in the late 1940s, provides the Ukrainian reader with a rich source of facts, documentation, biographical detail, and extensive commentary on the activities of the episcopate and central organs of the UAOC. Given his intimate knowledge of the church derived from being a leading participant in the Ukrainian church movement in Volhynia before World War II, wartime secretary to Metropolitan Polikarp (Sikorsky) and postwar secretary of the UAOC Synod,² Professor Vlasovsky's history remains an indispensable source for the study of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church among Ukrainian refugees in postwar West Germany and other countries of Western Europe. While I have relied, to a considerable extent, on his account, I have attempted to place the postwar developments within the UAOC in a broader context of the church's conflicting strivings to maintain its canonicity and unity both within its own ranks and with the Ukrainian Orthodox churches in the United States and Canada. Thus I have drawn also on publications and documents of the "conciliarist" (*sobornopravni*) opponents of the UAOC leadership.³

Some 80-85 per cent of the new Ukrainian émigrés were in West Germany in 1945,⁴ but not all were accorded "displaced person" status or resided in DP camps. Hence I have applied the more general term "refugee" to all categories

of Ukrainian émigrés who resided in Western occupation zones of Germany during 1945-50. While some Ukrainians may have been or eventually became members of Orthodox churches other than the UAOC, the latter, at least until 1947, enjoyed a virtual monopoly on pastoral care to Orthodox Ukrainians from all parts of Ukraine. This paper examines the organization and activities of the UAOC among the postwar Ukrainian refugees; the inner tensions that erupted in 1947 in the so-called Aschaffenburg schism; the problems in relations between the UAOC and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in North America; and the impact of mass emigration of Orthodox Ukrainians from Europe to the United States and Canada.

The Legacy of the Past

The wartime German occupation of Ukraine made possible the revival of organized religious life that had been almost totally destroyed by the Stalin regime. The episcopal leadership reconstructing the Orthodox church organization in Central and Eastern Ukraine (east of the pre-1939 Soviet-Polish border) came from Volhynia, which was now incorporated into the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*. From Volhynia emerged the two competing Orthodox church organizations—the Moscow Patriarchate-oriented Autonomous Church (which easily absorbed the remnants of the Russian Orthodox Church in Central and Eastern Ukraine) and the Autocephalous Church (which accepted into its ranks the surviving clergy and lay activists of the banned Ukrainian Autocephalous Church dating from 1921).⁵ The unification of those two autocephalist currents encountered problems of a canonical and organizational nature which were only temporarily resolved by the Pinsk *sobor* of 1942. Then the episcopate decided to admit, without reordination, the clergy of the 1921 UAOC who had been consecrated by non-canonically ordained bishops.⁶ (The hierarchy of the UAOC, constituted in 1942 under the leadership of Archbishop Polikarp Sikorsky, had been consecrated in accordance with established Orthodox canons.)

The two autocephalist currents also differed over the role of clergy and laymen in church life. While the 1921 UAOC established the dominance of clergy and laymen over bishops in its hierarchy of governing church councils (*rady*), such “conciliarism” (*sobornopravnist*) was not acceptable to the predominantly Volhynia-based episcopate of the 1942 UAOC, who favoured the established tradition of episcopal authority in church administration. Wartime pressures—the *divide et impera* policy of the Nazi occupation authorities, the conflict with the Autonomous church, the sheer exhaustion of the bishops and priests in the face of immense tasks, and the spectre of the Bolshevik return—all combined to submerge temporarily the differences between the two autocephalist currents.

Before the Soviet armies recaptured Ukraine in 1943-4, all but one bishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church had left for the West along with numbers of their clergy and thousands of the most active believers.⁷ During

the first half of 1944, the autocephalist episcopate found refuge with Metropolitan Dionisii Valedinskii in Warsaw, where they held their first general *sobor* from 11 March to 4 April 1944.⁸ That gathering adopted a “Provisional Statute of Administration of the Holy Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” and vested the direction of the church in a synod of bishops presided over by Metropolitan Polikarp Sikorsky. Archbishop Hennadii Shyprykevych was elected deputy head of the synod, Archbishops Nikanor Abramovych and Ihor Huba as members, and Bishop Platon Artemiuk as secretary.⁹

By the end of July 1944 the lengthy and perilous westward migration of the UAOC episcopate, clergy, and their relatives had begun. At the end of the war the bishops were safe, but many of them were isolated from the mass of their faithful.¹⁰ In conditions of isolation and close confinement serious differences developed between Metropolitan Polikarp and the bishops sharing his Thuringian exile.¹¹

The Orthodox Among the Postwar Ukrainian Refugees

Throughout the war some 2.3 million residents of Ukraine, most of them Ukrainians, were shipped as forced labourers into the territory of the Third Reich.¹² Most of them were from the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* and were classified as *Ostarbeiter*. They were from the traditionally Orthodox parts of Ukraine but, unlike Greek Catholics and Transcarpathians from Galicia,¹³ they were denied any spiritual care by the Germans. Since on German territory the Nazi authorities only recognized the Russian Orthodox Church (under Metropolitan Serafim Lade of Berlin), it was difficult for Ukrainian Orthodox to establish their own parishes in Berlin, and later in Vienna and Prague.¹⁴

By the end of the war, most *Ostarbeiter* either were in the Soviet-occupied territories of Germany and Austria or were forcibly repatriated from the Western occupation zones. Under the wartime agreement between the USSR and its Western allies, forcible repatriation applied also to the last wave of political emigration from Central and Eastern Ukraine that sought refuge in West Germany from the returning Soviet armies.¹⁵ Some of them were swept away in a series of repatriation raids staged in DP camps in the initial postwar months. Others attempted to save themselves by hiding among Western Ukrainians, procuring false documents, and similar devices. The trauma created by the threat of forcible repatriation of Orthodox Ukrainians from pre-1939 Soviet territories adversely affected Orthodox church life by reinforcing the old tensions between the “Easterners” (*skhidniaky*) and Western Ukrainian Orthodox (primarily from Volhynia and Bukovyna) and between the “conciliar” and “canonic” currents within the church. It also contributed to the disproportionate domination by “Westerners” (*zakhidniaky*) (mostly Greek Catholic), of the Ukrainian DP camps and émigré institutions during the early years of postwar exile.

In the early spring of 1946, when forcible repatriation to the USSR had ceased, nearly 178,000 Ukrainians remained in the three Western occupation zones of Germany and over 29,000 in those of Austria.¹⁶ By September 1948, re-emigration to other Western European countries and overseas reduced the number of Ukrainian refugees in Germany and Austria to 104,000. Nearly 66 per cent of those were Greek Catholics (Uniates) and 33 per cent Orthodox. Among the Orthodox, natives of Central and Eastern Ukraine constituted over 90 per cent of the total.¹⁷ The greatest concentration of Ukrainians was in the American Zone, where, since June 1945, Ukrainians had been allowed to settle in some eighty separate Ukrainian DP camps. By contrast, in the British and French Zones, nationally mixed camps (by previous state citizenship) prevailed.¹⁸ In the French Zone most Ukrainians lived outside camps.¹⁹ The American Zone thus offered the best conditions for the development of organized Ukrainian religious, cultural, and political life.

As Ukrainians settled down in DP camps, Orthodox parishes were soon formed, often by groups of believers from the same region of Ukraine who had shared, over the previous year or two, the hardship and perils of westward flight from the advancing Soviet armies. However, there was, in the beginning, an acute shortage of Orthodox priests. To direct the newly established parishes, parish councils (*radny*) as well as Orthodox brotherhoods and sisterhoods were formed by believers.²⁰ For many Eastern Ukrainians—not otherwise integrated into political and public émigré organizations—the parish became a focus of their social and cultural activity.²¹

Organization of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in Germany

On 16 July 1945 Metropolitan Polikarp²² and four other members of the hierarchy—Archbishop Mykhail and Bishops Mstyslav, Platon, and Viacheslav—held a conference in Bad Kissingen, which set into motion the canonical organization of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church for Germany and Western Europe. The bishops resolved that “the episcopate of the UAOC...personified by all bishops headed by Metropolitan Polikarp and acting for the good of the UAOC...shall be guided in its work by resolutions of the Warsaw *Sobor* of Bishops of March-April 1944, and should strive toward unity, concord, and love.”²³ The conference also decided to convene a *sobor* of bishops to examine the new conditions of the church’s activities in exile and to adapt its organizational structure to the postwar situation of Ukrainian refugees. Provisionally, the pastoral care of the Ukrainian Orthodox in the British Zone of Germany was assigned to Metropolitan Polikarp, while Archbishop Mykhail was entrusted with responsibility for the church in the American Zone.²⁴

There were formidable barriers to the establishment of a unified and efficient UAOC ecclesiastical organization during the first postwar years. Transportation

and communication difficulties, complicated by the occupation zone boundaries, hampered contact with the bishops, and especially with Metropolitan Polikarp. Archbishops Nikanor and Hennadii and Bishops Sylvestr and Volodymyr initially did not participate in the activities of the UAOC hierarchy in Germany,²⁵ while Bishop Platon had to be rescued in the fall of 1945 from imminent forcible repatriation.²⁶ Without episcopal authorization, priests (including some from other jurisdictions) were moving from one DP camp to another, so some camp parishes were overstaffed while others lacked clergy. There was an obvious need for more priests. Different liturgical texts and practices were being followed by the clergy.²⁷ Also, in November 1945, the long-simmering “anti-synodal” opposition of the followers of conciliar government in the church came into the open when they set up their own Initiative Group to convoke an All-Church *Sobor* of the UAOC.²⁸

Finally, the Second *Sobor* of Bishops met on 14-17 March 1946 in Esslingen, with all but three bishops in attendance.²⁹ That gathering adapted the organizational structure of the UAOC to new conditions by changing the titles of the metropolitan and the episcopate. However, it left the 1944 Provisional Statute’s leadership structures essentially intact; supreme authority remained with an annual *sobor* of bishops, and between its sessions, with a synod of bishops. Headed by Metropolitan Polikarp, the synod elected at Esslingen included Archbishop Mykhail as deputy head, and Bishops Mstyslav and Platon (as secretary). At the same time, the bishops indefinitely postponed the convocation of a national *sobor* that would include representatives of the clergy and laymen, which had been demanded by the conciliar opposition.³⁰ The Esslingen *sobor* also redistributed jurisdiction among the bishops, assigning the British Zone to Metropolitan Polikarp (to be assisted by Bishop Hryhorii). The American Zone was divided into several episcopal regions: southern Bavaria (Archbishop Mykhail), northern Bavaria (Bishop Volodymyr Malets), Schwaben (Archbishop Ihor), Württemberg-Baden (Bishop Platon), and Gross Hessen (Bishop Mstyslav).³¹ Archbishop Sylvestr was assigned the Ellwangen DP camp and Archbishop Hennadii, Austria.³²

To meet the pressing need for new clergy, the *sobor* authorized the synod to organize a higher theological school and pastoral courses, to operate a periodical UAOC press, and to publish standard Ukrainian translations of liturgical and other service texts. The *sobor* also resolved to pursue unification with the Ukrainian Orthodox churches in North America. This idea, which held the key to the immigration prospects of the UAOC bishops and clergy, encountered formidable difficulties of a canonical, structural, and psychological nature.

At the centre of the UAOC’s unification efforts was Archbishop Ioann Teodorovych. Since 1924 he had headed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in North America, composed mostly of converts from Uniate Catholicism.³³ He was ordained in 1921 by Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky and Archbishop Nestor

Sharaiivsky in departure from the established Orthodox canons. As the only surviving active bishop of the 1921 UAOC hierarchy, Archbishop Ioann was the focus of special attention and reverence among the émigré supporters of conciliar government within the church. Archbishop Teodorovych's stated desire for recognition by the UAOC episcopate was interpreted by the latter, and not entirely without foundation,³⁴ as his wish to receive a canonic episcopal ordination by the properly consecrated bishops from Ukraine. Thus the way could be cleared for his merger with the émigré UAOC hierarchy and the unification of the two churches. From correspondence with Archbishop Teodorovych, the conciliar opponents of the UAOC episcopate interpreted his desire for unity as dependent on the émigré episcopate's recognition of the validity of Teodorovych's 1921 conciliar ordination; the adoption by the UAOC of the 1921 *sobor's* canonic reforms; and the vindication of the principle of church government by councils of elected representatives of bishops, clergy, and laymen. The ambiguity of Archbishop Teodorovych's stand on the issue dividing the Ukrainian Orthodox in postwar Germany helped to increase the differences within the UAOC. The canonic and conciliar currents also misunderstood the dilemmas faced by the archbishop within his own American diocese on the issue of the validity of his 1921 ordination.³⁵

The Conciliar Opposition and the Aschaffenburg Split

While the origins of the conciliar opposition to the episcopate within the UAOC date to the union of the surviving clergy and lay activists of 1921 in German-occupied Ukraine with the Volhynia-based bishops of the 1942 UAOC, it assumed organized form on 1 November 1945. On that day the conciliarists established the Commission for the Convocation of the All-Church *Sobor* of the UAOC Abroad, headed by I. S. Harashchenko.³⁶ Based largely in the Ukrainian DP camps in Aschaffenburg, this commission became a spokesman for the predominantly Eastern Ukrainian and increasingly vocal critics of the episcopate. The commission charged the episcopate with inactivity, autocracy, disregard for grassroots initiative in the church, and disrespect for the patriotic and democratic tradition of the 1921 UAOC of Metropolitan Lypkivsky.³⁷ With the exception of Bishop Hryhorii, UAOC bishops viewed the conciliar movement's All-Church *Sobor* program as an attempt to superimpose upon their synodal authority a lay-dominated council that, given the organizational and communication talents of the Harashchenko group, would destroy the canonic foundations of the 1942 UAOC and return it to the church radicalism of the 1920s.³⁸

The episcopate, strengthened by the return of Archbishop Nikanor to active participation in the UAOC leadership,³⁹ responded to the opposition's mounting challenges by enforcing church discipline and by transferring or dismissing the few parish priests who sided with the opposition. Also, it established, at the 1946 Esslingen *sobor*, a commission to "study" the question of the proposed All-

Church *Sobor* with participation of some opposition spokesmen.⁴⁰ The Hara-shchenko group countered with the reconstitution, in November 1946, of its Commission on an Action Group for the Reunification of UAOC Formations of 1921 and 1942.⁴¹ When the Third Sobor of Bishops met in Munich on 12-15 May 1947, the Action Group presented it with a memorandum from a Conference of the Ukrainian Orthodox Public, signed by 276 supporters of the Action Group. This document ascribed a number of negative phenomena among the Ukrainian Orthodox and within the church to the “present forms of [church] constitution, ideological orientation and leadership of the UAOC,” which, it alleged, had departed from the church’s “historical principles.” Accusing the episcopate of violating the principle of conciliarism (*sobornopravnist*), the memorandum placed an ultimatum before the bishops. Either they would authorize the establishment of an elected, lay-dominated preparatory *sobor* commission that would submit its proposal for a pre-*sobor* conference or “the Ukrainian Orthodox public—autocephalists, conciliarists [*sobornopravnyky*] will, with God’s help, themselves seek ways and possibilities to reconstruct the constitution and the leadership of the UAOC in line with its historical principles....”⁴²

The May 1947 *Sobor* of Bishops rejected the Action Group’s ultimatum. At the same time, it voted to accept Archbishop Ioann Teodorovych into its ranks through new, canonically valid ordination. The archbishop perceived this published decision as public humiliation,⁴³ while to the conciliarist opposition it represented a public repudiation of the validity of the 1921 All-Ukrainian Sobor. They interpreted it as a provocation to open secession from the UAOC and restoration of a “true” *sobornopravna* autocephalous church, which—they were convinced—would find its new leader in Archbishop Ioann Teodorovych.⁴⁴

On 25-6 August 1947 the Action Group convened an “extended conference of faithful and priests of the UAOC” in Aschaffenburg, where it promptly renamed itself the First Church Congress of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Emigration, with sixty-three participants, including seven priests.⁴⁵ The postulates of the conciliarist opposition that had been elaborated in earlier meetings of the Action Group were presented to the Aschaffenburg gathering by the group’s principal ideologist, Archpriest Demyd Burko. The congress then declared itself representative of the “maternal” 1921 UAOC of Metropolitan Lypkivsky and described the church’s episcopate as belonging either to the 1942 UAOC or to the 1924 Autocephalous Church of Poland (actually the wartime Generalgouvernement⁴⁶). By their repudiation, at the May 1947 *Sobor* of Bishops, of the canons of the 1921 *sobor*, as demonstrated by its insistence on the reordination of Archbishop Ioann Teodorovych, “the twelve bishops have seceded from the UAOC.... In view of the fact that the maternal UAOC...was left without bishops, [the Congress resolved] to ask His Grace Archbishop Ioann Teodorovych to extend his care over the Ukrainian Orthodox parishes in Europe which will express their will to submit to his jurisdiction.”⁴⁷

The congress then proceeded to elect a twenty-one member Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council of the UAOC in Emigration, headed by Ivan Harashchenko. Archbishop Ioann was, in absentia, elected the council's honorary chairman.⁴⁸

Designating itself the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Conciliarist), the splinter group initially expanded its following among the clergy to at least fifteen priests and one deacon and formed (by secession or takeover from the synodal UAOC) several parishes in the British and American zones. Above all, it attracted one bishop, its long-time sympathizer among the UAOC hierarchy, Hryhorii Ohiichuk, who, on 16 October 1947, formally assumed jurisdiction over the conciliar UAOC.⁴⁹ The group failed to force the hand of Archbishop Ioann, who, after a period of procrastination, turned down the conciliarists' appeal to accept them under his jurisdiction.⁵⁰

The Episcopate's Reaction to the Aschaffenburg Split

The Fourth *Sobor* of Bishops (which met on 23-4 October 1947 in Aschaffenburg, the stronghold of the conciliarists), took radical measures to limit the damage done by the secessionists and to isolate their main spokesmen from the church. The *sobor* explicitly condemned those 1921 canons which "were deviations from the Orthodox teachings about the church" (including the lay-dominated conciliarism), and defrocked Bishop Hryhorii and seven priests who had participated in the Aschaffenburg "congress." Together with the seven principal lay leaders of the split, they were excommunicated by the *sobor*.⁵¹ Four of the seven excommunicated clergymen (including the Rev. Demyd Burko) abandoned the conciliar UAOC.⁵² With Archbishop Hryhorii Ohiichuk and most of his activists moving to the United States, the conciliarists established a foothold in North America, but split into opposing factions, and remained on the periphery of Ukrainian Orthodox life.⁵³

Secession of the conciliarists may have been privately welcomed in some church quarters as a radical resolution of the problem. At the same time, it made it both more urgent and less risky for the episcopate to offer more scope for the participation of the rank-and-file clergy and laymen in the formulation of the church's policy. On 25-7 December 1947 the UAOC held its first Ukrainian Church Congress in Regensburg with the participation of elected delegates from the clergy and faithful, as well as invited representatives of Ukrainian émigré institutions and organizations in Germany. The Regensburg congress, which endorsed the hierarchy's position and condemned the organizers of the Aschaffenburg split, served the purpose of further isolating the conciliarists.⁵⁴ Of Ukrainian émigré political parties, only a small Eastern Ukrainian-based group, The New All-Ukrainian Organized Public (or Kharkiv Group), of Volodymyr Dolenko, had openly supported the Aschaffenburg group.⁵⁵

The Parishes and Clergy of the UAOC

The fluidity of DP camps and resettlement of Ukrainian refugees outside West Germany, as well as the effects of the 1947 Aschaffenburg split, make it very difficult to compile reliable statistical data about the institutional strength of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in West Germany during the late 1940s. Table 1 shows that the greatest concentration of Ukrainian Orthodox parishes was in the American Zone, in particular in southern Bavaria (Munich region). The worst situation prevailed in the French Zone, with its nationally mixed DP camps and greater exposure to forced repatriation to the USSR.

By the end of 1948 the UAOC had a total of 103 clergy, of whom 82 were active. Of the clergy, 23 had higher theological education, 18 had completed theological seminary study, 13 had secular university education, 15 had completed secondary schools, 9 had graduated from the old theological *uchilishcha*, and 4 had only elementary education. Most of the 103 priests served as parish pastors or their assistants and/or teachers of Orthodox religion in Ukrainian DP camp schools. Others were in “reserve” or retired.⁵⁶

Scholarship, Publications, and Theological Education

The church desired to raise the level of the clergy’s theological knowledge. It also needed to alleviate an extreme shortage of Ukrainian Orthodox texts and periodicals and to introduce uniformity into Ukrainian translations of liturgical and other service texts. This led the UAOC to establish, in the spring of 1946, the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological-Scientific Institute.⁵⁷ The institute made an important contribution to Ukrainian Orthodox scholarship and intellectual life.⁵⁸

In late 1946 the Theological-Pedagogical Academy of the UAOC was established in Munich, with two faculties and a four-year course of study. The academy, critically short of financial resources and inadequately housed, provided a temporary academic base for more than thirty faculty members, headed by Rector P. Kovaliv.⁵⁹ The core of the academy consisted of former professors of Warsaw University’s Faculty of Orthodox Theology, academics from interwar Ukrainian scholarly centres in Prague and Berlin, as well as scholars from pre-1941 Soviet Ukrainian academic institutions. The faculty outnumbered regular students at the academy. In 1948-9 there were only nineteen students, but there were an additional fifty correspondence students.⁶⁰ Only five students completed the regular four-year program of study in 1950, owing primarily to emigration and the general impoverishment of DPs brought about by the West German currency reform and the IRO’s shrinking assistance. The academy’s publications included textbooks for its students and lectures by individual professors, as well as six issues of the academy’s *Bulletin*.⁶¹

Mass emigration of Ukrainian DPs made the continuation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy impossible, but the hopes of the bishops and the

faculty for its transfer to North America failed to materialize. A number of elderly faculty members were not accepted by the American and Canadian immigration representatives, and only a few of the academy scholars were able to continue their pedagogical and scholarly activities at St. Andrew's College of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada.⁶²

Emigration Problems

Emigration of Ukrainian DPs from West Germany to Belgium, France, Great Britain, and especially overseas posed complex problems for the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. In the countries in which no Ukrainian Orthodox churches previously existed (Belgium, Great Britain, Venezuela, and Australia), or where no Orthodox priests survived (France), the immediate problem was to provide pastoral care and episcopal leadership to the new Ukrainian Orthodox immigrants. In the countries of earlier Ukrainian immigration (the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil), the principal difficulties were the competing Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdictions and the unresolved problems of canonicity and unity between the UAOC and the North American churches. As certain categories of Ukrainian refugees either were denied immigration permits and could not find private overseas sponsors, or chose to remain in Germany, this increasingly aged and impoverished group of *zalyshentsi* (those who remained) had to be provided with spiritual care and at least moral assistance while the UNRRA's successor, the IRO, was reducing and eventually dissolving the DP camps.

The questions of emigration and its consequences for the church dominated the last two sessions of the *Sobor* of Bishops in Augsburg (19-20 April 1948) and Dillingen (3-5 November 1949), as well as the more frequent meetings of the church's synod. Initial hopes, voiced by the episcopate in the summer of 1946, centred on a collective resettlement of the entire "Church and [its] pastors, together with [its] own teachers, cultural-educational institutions and other public institutions."⁶³ By 1948 this quite unrealistic plan had been abandoned by church leaders, as individual recruitment and screening of DPs to fill manual jobs in countries of immigration acquired mass proportions. The only way in which the Orthodox clergy could follow their emigrating flock was by signing on as physical labourers or by accompanying those labourers as dependants. Only a few priests were able to emigrate on affidavits supplied by Ukrainians already established in overseas countries. During 1948-9 nearly sixty Orthodox clergy were thus able to leave West Germany.⁶⁴ Table 2 shows the distribution of emigrating Orthodox bishops and clergy by 31 March 1950, according to the church's archives.

It was much more difficult to arrange for the emigration of the bishops. The first to leave was Bishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk. After having briefly ministered to the Orthodox flock in France and Great Britain, he arrived in Canada in September 1947, at the invitation of the Consistory of the local Ukrainian Greek Ortho-

dox Church (UGOC). In November 1947 the Extraordinary *Sobor* of the UGOC elected Bishop Mstyslav as its ruling hierarchy, conferring upon him the dignity of Archbishop of Winnipeg and All Canada. Contrary to the expectations of the UAOC, this act did not bring the Canadian diocese under its jurisdiction, as the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church at the same *sobor* reaffirmed its independence of any outside jurisdiction.⁶⁵

Archbishop Mykhail Khoroshy moved to Belgium in September 1948 to assume, together with four priests, the archpastoral care of Orthodox Ukrainian labourers recruited for the country's coal mines.⁶⁶ Like many of the miners who re-emigrated overseas, Archbishop Mykhail finally settled in Canada, in May 1951, to head the Eastern Canadian diocese of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church.⁶⁷ In June 1949, another bishop, Sylvestr Haievsky, immigrated to Australia, where he headed newly established Orthodox parishes.⁶⁸ Although the United States was attracting most of the emigrating UAOC clergy, the resettlement of bishops there encountered many problems, including the unresolved question of Archbishop Ioann Teodorovych's canonical status, as well as his anxiety that the appearance of more Ukrainian hierarchs in the United States would further divide the Ukrainian Orthodox flock there. Responding to Archbishop Ioann's letter of 22 November, Metropolitan Polikarp wrote on 8 December 1949:

Concerning the move of the UAOC bishops to America, I must say that I do not believe that the presence of these bishops there would introduce disorder and undermine the life of the Church, as you write about it....

I am getting very many letters from America, which inform me that many Orthodox Ukrainians who recently arrived in America cannot attend Ukrainian Orthodox churches because they are struck by too many remnants of the Greek Catholic style in divine services; they begin to attend other Orthodox churches—Greek, Assyrian, and even Russian. I think, therefore, that—to remove this evil—it would even be beneficial to our church if our bishops were to help found in America new parishes for their own people [former DPs], which would assure livelihood to bishops.

So many Orthodox Ukrainians have now resettled in the U.S.A. and Canada that I do not think that the arrival from Europe of the UAOC bishops will bring disturbance into the church life of America; [they] have suffered in emigration for so long that they will surely be satisfied with the post of a pastor in the new parishes they will create in America, because virtually all our bishops have already been forced by circumstances to serve as parish priests here in Germany for more than two years. So the fears of American Ukrainians with regard to episcopal 'competition' are grossly exaggerated.⁶⁹

The increasing efforts of Archbishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk to bring about unification of Ukrainian Orthodox churches in North America with a canonical hierarchy and clear episcopal authority were not entirely successful. In Canada his efforts led to a parting of the ways with the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church by 1950.⁷⁰ In the United States he helped bring a number of Ukrainian

parishes (hitherto under Bishop Bohdan Shpylka's jurisdiction) into the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and was instrumental in the reordination of Ioann Teodorovych, the church's head, according to established Orthodox canons, on 27 August 1949.⁷¹ In October 1950, at the Unification *Sobor*, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States acquired for the first time a complete hierarchy. Its primate—Metropolitan Ioann Teodorovych—was joined by Archbishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk as his deputy, and recently arrived Archbishop Hennadii Shyprykevych. Subsequently, they were joined by Bishop Volodymyr Malets, who arrived in the United States in 1951.⁷²

Developments in Canada were moving in a similar direction. By August 1951, through a compromise reached among the powerful consistory of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church, Archbishop Mykhail Khoroshy and Metropolitan Ilarion Ohienko (who hitherto had remained outside both the UAOC and UGOC), the Metropolitan assumed the spiritual leadership of the Canadian church, with Archbishop Mykhail of Toronto as his deputy.⁷³ Although both churches acquired a canonically ordained episcopate, this did not bring them much closer together, nor did it gain them recognition from major non-Ukrainian Orthodox churches.

The UAOC at the End of the DP Camp Era

The last *sobor* of UAOC bishops was held on 3-5 November 1949 in Dillingen. Eight hierarchs attended, most of them soon to depart overseas. That *sobor* revised the church's statute and reduced the size of the synod to Metropolitan Polikarp, his deputy (Archbishop Nikanor Abramovych), a secretary (priest), and a layman.⁷⁴ Bishop Serhii Okhotenko was released from the UAOC to head the Belorussian Autocephalous Orthodox Church—the revived sister-church—which took over the spiritual care of those Belorussians who had been attending Ukrainian churches. Jointly, the bishops ordained another hierarch for this new church, Vasyl'ii Tomashyk.⁷⁵ Archbishop Ihor Huba was entrusted with arch-pastoral care of the Orthodox Ukrainians in South America.⁷⁶ Bishop Platon Artemiuk, the long-time secretary of the synod, left in 1951 for Canada (where he died the same year).

In May 1951 Metropolitan Polikarp immigrated to France.⁷⁷ Nikanor Abramovych (archbishop and, from 1952, metropolitan) assumed the leadership of the UAOC in 1953. He remained the key bishop in Germany, ministering to a predominantly aged and impoverished Orthodox flock.⁷⁸ In his several letters to Metropolitan Polikarp written during 1950-1, Archbishop Nikanor complained about the difficult situation of the UAOC in West Germany after the mass exodus of DPs. "Unfortunately, the people are so dispersed in villages that there is as yet no concentration" sufficient to form parishes. The clergy received no aid either from IRO or from the German authorities. "All those who are active, all who are capable of leaving have already departed overseas." In all of Ger-

many, there were only 18 priests of the UAOC, 14 communities with a priest, 8 without clergy. "Our camps are constantly melting away. There are almost no IRO [camp] parishes left."⁷⁹ As contributions from the faithful declined sharply, the UAOC in West Germany had to depend increasingly on the limited assistance it could receive from the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada and from the World Council of Churches,⁸⁰ as well as individual support from friends and relatives overseas.

Conclusion

The postwar Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church supplied an essential canonic, hierarchical, spiritual, and human link between the Orthodox church in Ukraine and Orthodox churches formed under diverse conditions in the lands of Ukrainian immigration and settlement. Under extremely difficult circumstances it preserved important elements of the Ukrainian Orthodox legacy from destruction by the Soviet regime. It also provided some 60,000 or more Ukrainian Orthodox refugees in postwar West Germany with spiritual care and with a religious-ecclesiastical structure for their lives, which at the time were full of instability and alienation. In the Ukrainian DP camps, the existence of the UAOC contributed to greater harmony and social balance between the Galicians and other Ukrainians by strengthening pluralistic tendencies in DP camp politics. It also helped provide a social base and institutional framework for some leading representatives of the intellectual and cultural elite, from Eastern Ukraine in particular.

The principal contribution of the UAOC to Ukrainian Orthodox communities overseas has been the realization of their long-standing aspirations to have their own canonically ordained Ukrainian hierarchy. This process, despite setbacks, has facilitated the integration of the new wave of immigrants into the UOC of the United States and the UGOC of Canada (including traditionally Orthodox priests and lay churchmen from Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Eastern Ukraine). Despite some fresh tensions and a few transplanted divisions, the meeting of the two Orthodox generations has infused the North American churches with new talent and energy, enriched them in spiritual, theological, and cultural terms, and led them, if not to organizational unity, at least closer to the common tradition of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

I wish to express my appreciation to His Grace Metropolitan Mstyslav Skrypnyk for his permission to consult the archives of the UAOC (particularly his own and those of Metropolitans Polikarp Sikorsky and Nikanor Abramovych, and Professor Ivan Vlasovsky), at the Museum-Archives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, in South Bound Brook, New Jersey. I am grateful to the Carleton University Library for granting me access to the Ievhen Bachynsky Collection. I am also grateful to the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and the Ontario Multicultural History Society for supporting research for this paper.

Table 1
Selected Statistical Data on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
in the Western Occupation Zones of Germany, 1945-50

	Date	Bishops	Priests	Deacons	Parishes	Estimated Believers
American Zone						
Entire	May 47 ^a	12			54	
	Apr. 49 ^a	9			35	
Munich Region	Nov. 46 ^b	Mykhail				5,652
	May 47 ^a				20	
	May 48 ^b				13	2,320
	July 48 ^b		17		14	
	Dec. 48 ^b	Hennadii	16	3	16	
	Apr. 49 ^a				14	
Augsburg Region	July 46 ^b		10		6	3,387
	May 47 ^a	Ihor			6	
	Apr. 49 ^a				3	
Regensburg Region	May 47 ^a	Volodymyr		5		
	Apr. 49 ^a				7	
Northern Bavaria	May 47 ^a	Viacheslav			2	
	Apr. 49 ^c				6	
Württemberg-Baden	May 47 ^c	Platon, Sylvestr and Nikanor			8	
	Apr. 49 ^c				5	
Gross Hessen	May 47 ^c	Mstyslav			13	
	Aug. 47 ^b	Viacheslav	15	3	5	
	Nov. 47 ^b	Viacheslav	12	3		2,350
British Zone						
Entire	May 47 ^a	Polikarp, Hryhorii			16	
	Nov. 47 ^b	Polikarp	20		17	8,650
	Aug. 48 ^b	Polikarp	15	2	15	
	Apr. 49 ^a	Polikarp			16	

French Zone						
Entire	June 48 ^b	Serhii	7	1		
	Dec. 48 ^b	Serhii	6	2	8	
	Feb. 49 ^b	Serhii	5	3	7	
Entire						
West Germany	End 46 ^a				52	60,000
	End 48 ^a		103		18	
	Spr. 49 ^a				51	

Sources:

^a Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 279-88.

^b "Nimechchyna," Metropolitan Polikarp's Archive, M-Archives USA, C125.

^c Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 350-3.

See also E. P., "Ukrainska Avtokefalna."

Table 2
Distribution of Emigrating Bishops and Clergy of the UAOC
by Individual Countries as of 31 March 1950

Destination	Bishops	Priests	Deacons	Total
Australia	1	6	5	12
Belgium	1	4	2	7
Brazil	-	2	-	2
Canada	1	8	4	13
France	-	2	-	2
Great Britain	-	2	-	2
United States	-	21	3	24
Venezuela	-	2	-	2
Total	3	45	12	60

Source: "Nimechchyna," Metropolitan Polikarp's Archive, M-Archives USA, C125.

Appendix

Episcopate of the UAOC, 1945-50

- Metropolitan Polikarp (Sikorsky) (1875-1953), ord. bishop of Lutsk (22 April 1932); archbishop-administrator of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine (1941-4); Metropolitan (1942-53); head of the *Sobor* of Bishops and the synod of the UAOC (1944-53).
- Archbishop Nikanor (Abramovych) (1883-1969), ord. bishop (9 February 1942); archbishop of Kiev and Chyhyryn (1942-3); deputy of Metropolitan Polikarp (1947-53); Metropolitan (1952-69); headed UAOC (1953-69).
- Archbishop Ihor (Huba) (1885-1966), ord. bishop (10 February 1942); archbishop of Poltava and Kremenchuk; left UAOC to establish, with Archbishop Palladii, a separate "UAOC in Exile" in the United States (1951).
- Archbishop Mykhail (Khoroshy) (1883-1975), ord. bishop (12 May 1942); archbishop of Mykolaiv (1943); elected archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church for the Eastern Canadian eparchy in Toronto (1951).
- Bishop Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) (*1898), ord. bishop of Pereiaslav (14 May 1942); bishop of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada (1947-51); archbishop (1950); head of consistory of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States and deputy of Metropolitan Ioann Teodorovych; Metropolitan of UOC since 1971; head of the UAOC since 1969.
- Bishop Sylvestr (Haievsky) (1876-1975), ord. bishop of Lubni (16 May 1942); bishop, subsequently archbishop of UAOC in Australia (1949-54).
- Bishop Hryhorii (Ohiichuk) (*1898), ord. bishop of Zhytomyr (May 1942); left UAOC (October 1947); archbishop of the Conciliar UAOC in the United States (1950-?).
- Bishop Hennadii (Shyprykevych) (*1892), ord. bishop (14 May 1942); joined the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States (1950).
- Bishop Platon (Artemiuk) (1891-1951), ord. bishop of Rivne (1942); secretary of the *Sobor* of Bishops of the UAOC (1944-9).
- Bishop Volodymyr (Malets) (1890-1967), ord. bishop of Cherkasy (23 May 1942); joined the episcopate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States (1951).
- Bishop Viacheslav (Lisytsky), ord. bishop of Dubno (13 September 1942); abandoned UAOC for the Russian Orthodox Church, which reordained him bishop (1952); excluded from the church by *Sobor* of Bishops of the UAOC (September 1952).
- Bishop Serhii (Okhotenko), Zhytomyr oblast; released from UAOC to assume headship of the Belorussian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (1949).

Notes

1. Ivan Vlasovsky (Wlasowsky), *Narys istorii Ukrainkoï Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy* (New York-Bound Brook, 1966), vol. IV, part 2, 271-375.
2. For a brief biography, see Andrii Kholmsky, "Professor I. P. Vlasovsky," *Ukrainske Pravoslavne Slovo* III, no. 8 (August 1953): 10-11.
3. Apart from numerous brochures of the UAOC-S, as well as their periodicals (*Tserkva i zhyttia* and *Pravoslavnyi ukrainets*), I used extensive collections of conciliarist documents held in the Bachynsky Archives and the Museum-Archives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA (hereinafter M-Archives USA).
4. Vasyl Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia ta orhanizatsiia taborovoho zhyttia," *Siohochasne i mynule*, no. 1-2 (1949): 9-10.
5. For a treatment sympathetic to the UAOC in German-occupied Ukraine, see Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 199-271; for an account antagonistic to Ukrainian autocephalists, see Wassilij Alexeev and Theofanis G. Stavrou, *The Great Revival: The Russian Church Under German Occupation* (Minneapolis, 1976).
6. After Ukraine was occupied by the Germans in 1941, only 270 priests and 2 former bishops of the interwar UAOC could be located in Ukraine. Mytrofan Jawdas, *Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church* (Munich, 1956), 179.
7. Metropolitan Feofil Buldovsky of Kharkiv, deposed by the Moscow Patriarchate, died in Poltava before the end of the war.
8. Metropolitan Dionisii, head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the *General-gouvernement*, had been, on the strength of the 1924 Tomos of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the source of UAOC canonic authority and its de jure head. He appointed Archbishop Polikarp as administrator of UAOC in *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*.
9. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 273-4.
10. Metropolitan Polikarp, Archbishops Nikanor and Ihor, and Bishops Sylvestr Haievsky and Hryhorii Ohiichuk spent the last four months of the war in a Thuringian village, with eighteen priests and three deacons; Archbishop Mykhail Khoroshy, Bishops Mstyslav Skrypnyk, Platon, and Viacheslav Lisytsky were in or near Bad Kissingen, along with twenty-eight priests and six deacons; and Archbishop Hennadii and Bishop Serhii Okhotenko with five priests were in Constanza. "Vidomosty pro teperishnie mistse pobutu iepyskopiv i dukhovenstva Ukrainkoï Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy" [Spring 1945], Archive of Metropolitan Mstyslav Skrypnyk, Nimechchyna 1944-8, M-Archives USA, M6.
11. "Ukhvala narady ukrainskykh pravoslavnykh tserkovno-hromadskykh diiachiv 18 travnia 1945 roku v m. Vaimari/Tiurinhii," Bachynsky Archives. It is signed by thirteen prominent laymen.
12. There were 2,244,000 forced labourers from Ukraine in wartime Germany (not including the Crimea), plus another 85,400 from Carpatho-Ukraine. Institut Istorii Partii pri TsK Kompartii Ukrainy, Glavnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov Ukrainkoï SSR, *Sovetskaia Ukraina v gody Otechestvennoi Voiny 1941-*

1945. *Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh*, Tom 3: *Ukrainskaia SSR v zavershaiushchii period Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (1944-1945 gg.)* (Kiev, 1980), 529n.

13. Since 1927 Ukrainian Catholics in Germany had been under the spiritual care of Msgr. Petro Verhun. In November 1940 he was appointed Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainian Catholics in Germany by Pope Pius XII. During the war, Metropolitan Sheptytsky dispatched several additional priests to assist Msgr. Verhun. German Catholic churches were made available for Ukrainian Catholic services.
14. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 274-5. Prague was under the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Dionisii Valedinskii of Warsaw.
15. See order no. 3467, issued on 28 July 1945 by a *Landrat* in Bad Kissingen in northern Bavaria, demanding that "all Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians (not Poles), including men, women and children should be swiftly shipped from Muennerstadt to their Fatherland by Tuesday, June 31, 1945.... The people should be made to understand that...there is no question of their being mishandled upon their return. Reports to the contrary are not true.... The assistance of the gendarmerie can be requested." Archives of Metropolitan Mstyslav, M-Archives USA, M6. Bishop Platon Artemiuk from Volhynia was among the people detained on a similar occasion in Bad Kissingen. He was saved from forcible repatriation only by the timely intervention of Bishop Mstyslav with the American military authorities. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 361.
16. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska," 9-10; V. Kubijovyč, "Emihratsiia," *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva*, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Paris-New York, 1955-7), 636. An additional 12-13,000, nearly all of them Ukrainian Division POWs, were in Italy.
17. V. Kubijovyč, "Z demohrafichnykh problem ukrainskoi emigratsii," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 17. That percentage included the "old émigrés," who had left Ukraine after World War I.
18. *Ibid.*, 15-16.
19. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska," 9-10.
20. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 278; E. P., "Ukrainska Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva na emigratsii," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 49-51.
21. On the extent of "Easterner"- "Westerner" alienation in DP camps, see Kubijovyč, "Z demohrafichnykh problem," 25; and Matvii Stakhiv, "Do sotsiologicheskoho zhyttia," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 34-6.
22. He moved from Thuringia to Gronau, near Hannover, in the British Zone. The distance from the metropolitan's new residence to Munich—the centre of the emigration's political, religious, and cultural life—made it virtually impossible for him to exercise effectively his leadership of the UAOC in Germany, given the postwar difficulties of communication and transportation. See Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 278.
23. *Ibid.*, 278-9.
24. *Ibid.*, 279.

25. *Ibid.*, 280-1. Cf. A. Dubliansky, *Ternystym shliakhom. Zhyttia Mytropolyta Nikanora Abramovycha. Do 20-littia arkhypastyrskoho sluzhinnia (1942-1962)* (London, 1962), 55.
26. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 361.
27. *Ibid.*, 279-80.
28. *Ibid.*, 292-3; cf. a selection of documents compiled by one of the opposition priests, Mytrofan Iavdas, concerning conflicts within a Ukrainian Orthodox parish in the American Zone of Germany. "Dokumenty Sv. Mykolaivskoi Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy v emihratsiinii podorozhi Mannheim-Dornstadt-Beblingen-Karlsruhe," [1947], Bachynsky Archives. See especially documents 1-4, 6-7, 10, 13, 28, 32-3, 40-7, 53-4.
29. Archbishop Nikanor and Bishops Viacheslav and Serhii. It was the second *sobor* after Warsaw.
30. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 281-5.
31. Mstyslav's assignment was provisional, since his departure for another Western European country (Great Britain or Belgium) which was recruiting Ukrainian DPs as manual labourers was planned.
32. Archbishop Hennadii Shyprykevych never actually assumed his jurisdiction over the UAOC in Austria, which remained a direct responsibility of Metropolitan Polikarp. As many as twelve parishes were active at different times in the Western occupation zones of Austria. Salzburg was the main centre of Ukrainian Orthodox life. Archpriest Ananii Sahaidakivsky was appointed by the synod as administrator of the UAOC parishes in Austria. He was assisted by four priests. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 351-2.
33. Archbishop Ioann Teodorovych to Bishop Mstyslav Skrypnyk, 13 June 1947, in *Pravoslavnyi ukrainets*, no. 27 (October 1954): 6.
34. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 319-21.
35. See a discussion of Archbishop Ioann's letter to Ivan Harashchenko, 28 April 1947, as well as Archbishop Teodorovych to Bishop Mstyslav, 13 June 1947, at the 3-5 June meeting of the Conciliar Action Group, "Protokol ch. 7 Zasadnna Initsiatyvnoi Hrupy Iednannia Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, formatsii 1921-1942 rr.," M-Archives USA, no. 43. (The archbishop mailed a copy to Harashchenko.) See also Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 319-22. Cf. Ihor Hubarzhevsky, *Zakhody shchodo poiednannia Ukrainskykh Pravoslavnykh iurysdyksii i naslidky ikh* (New York, 1968).
36. "Protokol zasidannia Initsiatyvnoi hrupy pravoslavnykh ukraintsev v spravi Sklykannia Vsetserkovnoho Soboru Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy—I.XI.1945, m. Ashaffenburg," Bachynsky Archives.
37. "Narada Ukrainskoho Pravoslavnoho Hromadianstva 12 travnia 1947 r. Do Sviaschennoho Soboru Iepyskopiv U.A.P.Ts.," [memorandum 276], *Pravoslavnyi ukrainets*, no. 1 (1947): 3-7.
38. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 293-4, 297-300.

39. Since the Third *Sobor* of Bishops in May 1947. See Dubliansky, *Ternystym shliakhom*, 55.
40. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 294-301.
41. "Protokol ch. 6 zasidannia Komisii v spravi sklykannia Vsetserkovnoho Soboru Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy zakordonom, 11-12 lystopadu 1946 r. m. Frankfurt n. M.," 6-7, M-Archives USA, no. 43.
42. "Narada Ukrainskoho," 7.
43. Archbishop Ioann to Bishop Mstyslav, 13 June 1947, *Pravoslavnyi ukrainets*, no. 27 (October 1954): 6. In early August 1947, having learned of Archbishop Ioann's refusal to accept such terms of unification, the UAOC synod softened its stand and apparently voted for the archbishop to be accepted without a new episcopal ordination. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 322. By then, however, Archbishop Teodorovych had changed his position on this question.
44. "Protokol ch. 7 Zasedannia Initsiatyvnoi Hrupy Iednannia Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, formatsii 1921-1942 rr." (Hersfeld, 3-5 June 1947); "Protokol narady chleniv prezidii Initsiatyvnoi Hrupy Iednannia UAPTs, razom z hromadskymy diiachamy" (Aschaffenburg, 15 July 1947); and "Protokol vuzkoi narady predstavnykiv Komisii Iednannia UAPTs" (Aschaffenburg, 8 August 1947), M-Archives USA, no. 43/31-37.
45. "Protokol I-ho Tserkovnoho Zizdu Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy na emihratsii, 25-26 serpnia 1947 r. v Ashafenburzi (Bavariia)," 1-3, M-Archives USA, no. 43/33-40.
46. Neither Metropolitan Ilarion Ohienko nor Archbishop Palladii Vydybida-Rudenko participated in the UAOC administration in postwar Germany.
47. "Protokol I-ho Tserkovnoho," appended "Ukhvaly," M-Archives USA, no. 9, 43/55.
48. "Protokol I-ho Tserkovnoho," 12, M-Archives USA, 43/55.
49. "Protokol Narady Dukhivnytstva Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy (Sobornopravnoi) 16 zhovtnia 1947 roku v Ashafenburzi," 1, M-Archives USA, no. 43/71. See also "Protokol Pokrivskykh Zboriv UAPTs (Sobornopravnoi) na emihratsii 16 zhovtnia 1947 r. v m. Ashafenburzi," M-Archives USA, no. 43/65-67.
50. I. Harashchenko to Archbishop Teodorovych, 19 September 1947, and Teodorovych to Harashchenko, 16 October 1947, reproduced in *Tserkva i zhyttia XI*, no. 5 (September-October 1967): 13-4.
51. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 308-10.
52. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 314-5.
53. "Ukrainska Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva—Sobornopravna," in "Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka," *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, vol. 2, pt. 9 (Paris-New York, 1980), 3334.
54. *Ibid.*, 313-8.

55. "Pozytsiia Novoi Velykoukrainskoi Orhanizovanoi Hromadskosti u spravi ostannikh podii v Ukrainskii Avtokefalnii Pravoslavnii Tserkvi," 3-4 December 1947, Bachynsky Archives.
56. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 355. In comparison, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Germany had 186 clergymen on 1 May 1947. E. Skorodynsky, "Ukrainska Katolytska Tserkva," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 46.
57. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 329-30. The institute was initially headed by Professor Ivan Vlasovsky; in 1948 Archbishop Nikanor became head. With the subsequent establishment of the UAOC Theological-Pedagogical Academy, the institute's scope narrowed to an editorial-publication arm of the synod.
58. *Ibid.*, 331-3; Dubliansky, *Ternystym shliakhom*, 57-9. Given the postwar difficulties in securing paper allocations and publication licenses from the authorities, most of the Ukrainian Orthodox publications appeared in mimeographed form.
 Of particular significance were its publications, such as Vlasovsky's *Ukrainian Orthodox Church During the Second World War, 1939-1945* (1946), Vlasovsky's popular *Short History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*, and Archbishop Nikanor's *Dogmatic-Canonic Constitution of the Holy Orthodox Church* (1948). In co-operation with the institute, the UAOC synod published a *Concise Orthodox Catechism* by Archpriest S. Haiuk, *Extended Catechism* by Archbishop Mykhail, Archbishop Ihor's histories of the Old and New Testaments, a *Missal*, a *Book of Hours*, other service texts, *Ukrainian Orthodox Calendars* for the years 1947-50, as well as two issues of its official organ, *Bohoslovskiyi visnyk* (Theological Messenger). With the synod's blessing, the privately published *Molytovnyk* (1946) responded to an acute popular demand for Ukrainian Orthodox prayer books.
59. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 336-47; V. Doroshenko, "Kulturno-osvitnia pratsia v taborakh i dlia taboriv," *Siohochasne i mynule*, no. 1-2 (1949): 51-5.
60. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 343; Doroshenko, "Kulturno-osvitnia pratsia."
61. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 348.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*, 349-50, 353-5. This UOAC proposal was sent to the United Nations in a memorandum dated 23 September 1946.
64. *Ukrainskyi Pravoslavnyi Tserkovnyi Kalendar na 1950 rik* (Stuttgart, 1949), 70.
65. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 323.
66. *Ibid.*, 356.
67. *Ibid.*, 370-1.
68. *Ibid.*, 358-9.
69. Metropolitan Polikarp's Archive, M-Archives USA, C80.
70. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 368-9.
71. *Ibid.*, 365-6. Cf. Iu. S., "Akt 27 serpnia 1949 roku," *Tserkva i zhyttia* V-VI, no. 3 (30): 6-12.
72. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 366.

73. *Ibid.*, 370-2. After his evacuation from Kholm in mid-1944, Metropolitan Ilarion Ohiienko lived in Austria and Switzerland until September 1947. Invited to Canada by the independent Ukrainian Orthodox parish of St. Mary the Protectress in Winnipeg, he headed this parish for nearly four years, until his election as primate of the UGOC in August 1951 (*Vira i kultura*, no. 4 (1982): 168-9).
74. *Ibid.*, 287.
75. *Ibid.*, 359-60. In 1949, for example, Belorussians formed as much as 60 per cent of the Ukrainian Orthodox parish at Ettlingen. Archbishop Nikanor to Metropolitan Polikarp [late 1949 or early 1950], Metropolitan Polikarp's Archive, M-Archives USA, C80.
76. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 361-2, 373-5. Huba immigrated instead to the United States, as did Archbishop Hennadii and Bishops Volodymyr and Viacheslav. After his immigration to the United States, Bishop Viacheslav abandoned the UAOC and was reordained by the Russian Orthodox Church as Bishop of Pittsburgh. The *sobor* of UAOC bishops excluded him from the church in September 1952. Vlasovsky, *Narys istorii*, 367.
77. Metropolitan Polikarp settled near Paris. From there, until his death, on 22 October 1953, he exercised spiritual care over Ukrainian Orthodox communities in France and England and, less directly, over several other countries that accepted Ukrainian DPs.
78. Dubliansky, *Ternystym shliakhom*, 59-74.
79. Nikanor to Polikarp, 15 November 1950, 25 March 1951, and 1 June 1951. Metropolitan Polikarp's Archive, M-Archives USA, C82.
80. Metropolitan Polikarp was receiving monthly assistance of \$100 from the UGOC in Canada. Metropolitan Polikarp to Archbishop Mstyslav, 28 March 1951, Metropolitan Mstyslav's Archive, M-Archives USA. The World Council of Churches provided modest assistance to all émigré Orthodox priests in West Germany. Archpriest Mytrofan Iavdas to Ievhen Bachynsky, 29 October 1951, Bachynsky Archives.

Education and Women

Education in the DP Camps

Daria Markus

Organizational activities among Ukrainians started immediately after the end of the war. On the basis of a former Ukrainian aid association (Ukrainska Dopomohova Orhanizatsiia), which operated legally in the Third Reich, Ukrainian aid committees (Ukrainski Dopomohovi Komitety) were formed. They soon coalesced into the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration (TsPUE), which promoted the creation of almost exclusively Ukrainian DP camps. That facilitated the development of Ukrainian schools, for in the nationally mixed camps Ukrainian schools did not develop so well.¹

The organization of schools, however, began not as the result of a decision or decree of the Central Representation. Rather, it was a spontaneous, extensive, local initiative from teachers and parents that occurred as early as the summer of 1945. To conduct schools, permission from the military government was needed. The military government of Germany obviously was not preoccupied with the question of education for refugee children, although, with a typical American belief in democracy through education, a great deal of consideration was devoted to the question of educating German youth in the democratic spirit.² This is even reflected in the response from the military government to a letter from the Ukrainian Aid Committee in Regensburg which asked for permission to start a school:

Bohdan Hanushewskyj, Ukrainian priest and professor is authorized to continue the educational training of the Ukrainian people.

The educational program so conducted will be free of any teaching of Nazi or Fascist doctrine and will be devoid of any instruction aimed at the existing order in Soviet Russia.³

This permission to start a school was granted on 11 August, but registration took place from 1-15 August. The school year started on 23 August 1945.⁴ Thereafter, communication with the military government and the UNRRA concerning the schools was limited to practical matters, such as teachers' pay, extra food and cigarette rations, school facilities, and supplies. Curriculum was not considered.

American authorities—as well as British and French, but the emphasis in this paper is on the Americans, because most of the Ukrainians lived in the American Zone⁵—were aware of the hardships involved in conducting a school in a DP camp: "...the schools at the camps are often located in bombed-out buildings without benefit of blackboards, chalk, books, paper or writing materials."⁶ That is similar to a Ukrainian teacher's observations that in the classrooms, "there were no tables and no chairs, children had to learn while standing...writing on window sills or on the floor."⁷ The schools survived and prospered because "the displaced persons themselves, anxious to see their children in school, are enthusiastically co-operating in the program."⁸

However, the DPs did not perceive the UNRRA as equally enthusiastic about educational matters. The UNRRA's priority at the time was repatriation of refugees (as resettlement was for the IRO) and not normalization of DP camp life. The reaction of Ukrainians to such an attitude was aptly summed up by Doroshenko:

The cultural and educational achievements are due exclusively to Ukrainian immigrants themselves.... The only good thing that the UNRRA did at the very beginning was to reproduce two or three textbooks for elementary school (a reader and a work-book), but even that in a limited edition. Only lately has IRO established various vocational schools—tailors', radio-technical, and such, as well as English-language courses for refugees in the American zone. Otherwise, the above organizations have done very little to fulfill the cultural needs of Ukrainians.

In practice both the UNRRA and the IRO recognized only elementary education and in general provided for kindergartens and elementary schools, that is, for education of youth until the age of sixteen. They would not hear about secondary education. Neither have they done anything for adult education. But they did put a great deal of effort into disseminating among refugees, under the pretext of promoting repatriation, various newspapers and pamphlets published in the USSR and in Poland.⁹

Schools

The variety of educational institutions and activities conducted by Ukrainian refugees, considering postwar conditions, may be justly described as astounding. At the top were the institutions of higher learning: Ukrainian Free University, Ukrainian Higher School of Economics, Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy (all in Munich), Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (branches in Munich and Regensburg), and Ukrainian Catholic (Byzantine-Rite) Theological

Seminary (in Hirschberg, Bavaria).¹⁰ These institutions, together with the scholarly associations—UVAN, Ukrainian History and Philology Association, and Shevchenko Scientific Society—represented the scholarship of Ukrainian émigrés. They are dealt with elsewhere in this book.

At the primary level, there were kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools, music schools, and numerous courses aimed at education and occupational training for the adult population. The elementary and secondary school system was mainly a transplant of the prewar system of schools in Western Ukraine. It was a two-track system: one for the future elite and another for the rest of the population. Children started in kindergarten. The first four years of elementary education were common to all. At the end of the fourth year those pupils who passed the examination could enter an eight-year academically oriented secondary school—the *gymnasium*. (That was the only secondary school which led to university.) Those who did not take or did not pass the examination remained in the elementary schools where, at the end of grade seven, they could take another, more difficult, examination covered three years of *gymnasium* subject matter. If they passed, they entered the *gymnasium* at the grade four level. Students who did not attend the *gymnasium* could complete elementary school and then proceed to other types of secondary schools: the teachers' seminary (three-year course preparing teachers for elementary schools); commercial or trade schools (three-year programs); or a number of short-term vocational courses. The short-term courses were especially designed to find gainful employment for students in the countries of resettlement.

In addition to this school system, there was adult education. The so-called People's Universities had eleven branches in the American and two in the British Zone of Germany. This institution sponsored a number of popular lectures on Ukrainian subjects.¹¹ There were also a number of short-term courses for adults. These can be categorized as: a) courses for illiterates, b) language courses (English, French, Spanish), c) music courses, d) courses to acquire a skill useful for future employment (e.g., shoemaking, radio repair, driving). Some of these courses had apprenticeship programs at specialized workshops (*maisterni*). In 1948, in the camps of the American Zone of Germany, eighty-nine courses were being conducted, attended by 2,039 persons. English-language courses were by far the most popular. In several camps Prosvita—historically an important organization in Western Ukraine—had renewed its activity.¹²

Schools in the DP camps proliferated for several reasons. First, there were children of school age and there were many teachers. In the American Zone, for instance, there were 7,042 children between the ages of three and eighteen, and 1,581 teachers, yielding a ratio of one teacher for every 4.5 pupils. There are several reasons for the availability of teachers: 1) in the absence of industry, especially in Western Ukraine, one of the few professional opportunities was pedagogy; 2) to teach in elementary schools, a college degree was not required,

only a teachers' seminary certificate; 3) there was a greater tendency among educated Ukrainians to flee the Soviets than among the uneducated masses. An incentive to engage in teaching in the DP camps was the fact that teachers were paid workers and received extra rations of food and cigarettes. Above all, however, there was a patriotic commitment on the part of the teachers to educate Ukrainian youth. This was sustained by a belief that only through education could the nation regain its independence.

Altogether, as the tables indicate, in all the zones of Germany and Austria, there were 266 schools and courses attended by 13,949 students.¹³

School Organization and Administration

Initially schools were exclusively independent local enterprises. Soon it became apparent that a common pool of school resources, an exchange of ideas and information, and unification of educational programmes would be beneficial. There was, moreover, a strong feeling among teachers that some form of legalization and standardization of schools was needed. Since governing authority rested with the occupying powers and permission to operate the schools had been legally granted by those authorities to the Ukrainian representatives, the teachers turned to TsPUE, their own unofficial self-governing body, to provide guidelines and supervision of the day-to-day operations of the schools. Later, in 1948, TsPUE sought legal recognition of the Ukrainian schools from the German authorities as well.¹⁴ In Austria such recognition was accorded to the *gymnasium* in Salzburg as early as 1945.¹⁵

The hierarchical structure of the school administrative system was patterned on TsPUE. At the top was the TsPUE Department of Culture and Education. On the board of that department was a member in charge (*referent*) of elementary and secondary education and a member in charge of vocational education. Although the ultimate authority on educational matters rested with this body, responsibility for supervision and day-to-day operation was passed down to regional superintendents (also called *referent*) and to superintendents of culture and education in local camps, as well as to individual schools and communities. The Department of Culture and Education was headed by the well-known historian, Professor Dmytro Doroshenko. In 1948 the *referent* for elementary schools was Vasyl Danylyshyn and, for secondary schools, Mykhailo Semilovych. At one time Professor T. Palywoda was the elementary and secondary *referent*.

The initiative to start a school (after the initial organization in 1945) or a course rested with local communities and camp superintendents of culture and education. It was the responsibility of the camp superintendent to see that all children, until the age of fourteen, attended school. The superintendent also recommended candidates for principals and teachers for elementary school to the regional superintendent, who served as liaison between the local school and the

TsPUE department. He also served as school inspector until this function was transferred to members of a special commission (*Inspektorat*) in the Department of Culture and Education of TsPUE on 1 October 1947.¹⁶ Besides general school supervision, the regional superintendent, in consultation with the camp superintendent, recommended candidates for secondary school principals to the department. Similarly, in consultation with and on recommendation of the secondary school principal, the regional superintendent submitted candidates for secondary school teachers. Confirmation of elementary school principals and teachers rested with the regional superintendent.

The TsPUE Department of Culture and Education functioned primarily as a policy-making body, providing ideological, curricular, and administrative guidance. It had the authority to confirm the appointments of secondary school principals and teachers and to approve newly established secondary schools.¹⁷

School Finances

The main source of income was school tuition. Next to that was income derived from school events—sports, games, concerts, dances—as well as from events sponsored by parents' clubs (Batkivskyi Kruzhok), which included fund-raising drives among camp dwellers. The TsPUE Department of Culture and Education recommended that each school should have a parents' club which would assume responsibility for the welfare of children, especially orphans, in the after-school hours, and provide for the school's basic material needs.¹⁸

Teachers' salaries, the major expense in any school, came from the camp administration's allotment, first from UNRRA and later IRO. IRO limited the number of teachers to be put on its payroll: if a school needed to employ more teachers, it was the school's responsibility to find the money. Before currency reform in Germany in 1948, the average monthly pay of an elementary school teacher was about 200 RM. At first, teachers had to work forty-four hours per week (twenty-four in the classroom and the rest in supervisory or preparatory activities). Later this was reduced to forty hours. In addition to salaries, teachers were entitled, as were all working persons on IRO's payroll, to additional rations of food and cigarettes.

Income derived from school and parents' club activities covered such school expenses as salaries for additional teachers, office and classroom supplies, books, teaching equipment (maps, laboratory equipment, etc.), and expenses for teachers and principals to travel to professional conventions.¹⁹

Teaching Personnel

Because a high percentage of Ukrainian refugees were teachers from all school levels, there was competition, especially in larger camps, to obtain a teaching position. To teach in elementary school in Western Ukraine, one had to complete

elementary school and teachers' seminary. To teach in secondary schools, a university diploma, with a major in a specialized field of instruction, was required. Secondary school teachers were commonly called "professors," and they did have substantial knowledge of the subject matter they were teaching. That enabled them to discharge their teaching duties satisfactorily, even when there were no textbooks. Moreover, a number of university professors, especially from Eastern Ukraine, came to teach in the higher grades in some of the DP camps' *gymnasias*. The teacher supply changed when a massive resettlement movement began in 1948. In small camps, the choice of teachers was always limited, and teacher qualifications sometimes presented a problem.

Teachers spent more than twenty hours a week teaching in the classroom. It was about twenty-four hours for the elementary school. In high school it varied according to the subject taught. Language and mathematics teachers, because of the heavy load of homework corrections, taught twenty-one hours. Those teaching physics, natural sciences, chemistry, history, and geography taught twenty-two hours. Teachers in all other subjects taught twenty-three hours.²⁰ Besides classroom teaching, the school bureaucracy kept teachers busy with paperwork. No fewer than eleven different school files had to be kept by school personnel, ranging from a file for regulations coming from the school principal to a chronicle of school or class activities.²¹

Branches of the Ukrainian Teachers' Association (*Ukrainska uchytselska hromada*) were formed in local camps. Its central executive (*Tsentralia*) closely collaborated with the TsPUE Department of Culture and Education. The Ukrainian Teachers' Association, established in the fall of 1947, organized teachers' conventions and continuing teacher education. The Association also sponsored a Ukrainian pedagogical journal, *Ukrainska shkola na emigratsii*, which served both the Association and the TsPUE Department of Culture and Education. The executive of the Association was located in Augsburg under the leadership of V. Cheredarchuk.

Student Population

Certain generalizations apply to all school children in the DP camps. They were all children of war. They all had experienced frequent and sudden uprooting. They had broken ties with familiar places and faces, which necessitated constant readjustment to new and often dangerous situations. All missed, because of the war, one or more years of regular school attendance. Their perception of their condition, however, differed according to their age. The younger they were, the more ignorant they were of the political implications of war. They tended more to accept the acts of war—the bombing, the shelling—the way they accepted the natural phenomena of thunder and lightning, rain or snow. The older they were the more aware they were of the possible implications of the war's outcome for

their country's and their own future. Being young, they all viewed war more as an adventure than as a life-threatening situation, unlike their elders.

Excluding orphaned children, who under any circumstances are prone to develop psychological problems,²² the children did not exhibit difficulties that could easily be ascribed to their wartime experiences. The war was more traumatic for their elders, and the uncertain camp conditions had a more negative effect on adults than on children. In any case, the social organization of the camps gave a semblance of normalcy and contributed to the mental well-being of the population generally. In the classroom the teachers did not make, and did not have to make, any allowances for the possible after-effects of the war on children. If there was any continuity in the lives of children at that time, it was family and school. Even though, in the case of school, the buildings, the teachers, and the classmates would change, school was still the same. The students were expected to work seriously and hard, to behave well, and to achieve. School, more precisely the *gymnasium*, was presented as a privilege, not a right, and as a unique opportunity for future personal success. Students, knowing that expulsion from school was not an empty threat, by and large conformed to expectations.

The student body comprised children of lower or peasant classes—some of whom probably would not have attended *gymnasium* if it were not for the camp situation—and the children of the middle class and intelligentsia, a composition not much different from that in Ukraine. What was new, however, was that the same classroom contained students from different parts of Ukraine and different denominations—Catholics, Orthodox, even Protestants. Though there was a tendency among students to associate along regional and denominational lines, there also was a conscious attempt on the part of educators to eradicate these segregationist tendencies by developing mutual understanding and a feeling that “we are all of the same nation.”

Curriculum

The curricula in the first postwar school year were based on individual teachers' recollections of programmes in Ukraine. In time, a standardized programme for all school grades was promoted by the TsPUE Department of Culture and Education. Some of the smaller schools did not strictly adhere to the standardized programme, but larger schools were, for the most part, in conformity with it. These programmes were based on “basics”—core subjects with few frills and no electives. Tables 2 and 3 show, grade by grade, how much time was allotted to individual subjects in elementary school and in *gymnasium*.²³ The program for elementary school was projected over eight grades, although in reality only seven-year schools existed. Actually, after grade four, when transfer to a *gymnasium* could occur, the school population was drastically diminished, which worked against the school's continued operation.

The programme in a commercial school included: religion, business management, bookkeeping, accounting, mathematics, law, husbandry, co-operative movements, merchandising, commercial correspondence, Ukrainian language, English language, German language, French language, history, economic geography, shorthand, advertising, typing, hygiene, and physical education. The whole program spanned six years—three years of lower commercial school and three years of so-called Ukrainian Economic Lycée. The Ukrainian Economic Lycées were located in Augsburg, Berchtesgaden, and Mittenwald. In the American Zone of Germany there were three such full schools and two lower schools which were located in Aschaffenburg and Bayreuth.²⁴

Class periods lasted forty-five minutes and were held six days a week in all schools.

Textbooks

Textbooks, or more precisely, the lack of textbooks, was a crucial problem for both teachers and students. In the 1945/6 school year they were almost nonexistent:

Until May of 1946, the school did not possess one single primer [*bukvar*]; not even the teacher had one. Nor were there any textbooks for other subjects, such as natural sciences, geography, history, German language, and arithmetic. Teachers relied on their own memory and from time to time borrowed textbooks in the German or Polish languages.²⁵

A year later, in 1947, at least twenty-nine textbooks were published, most of them reprints of books published previously in Ukraine. (Textbooks in sciences and mathematics were usually reprints of books published in Soviet Ukraine; those in history, language, and literature, reprints of the books published in Western Ukraine.) Some books were mimeographed, but such reproductions still fell short of covering all subjects for all grades.²⁶

It was also difficult to equip the science laboratory. In some schools, and this depended on the inventiveness of the teacher, the problem was solved to some extent. In Kornberg *gymnasium*, for instance, a laboratory was furnished in part by the camp workshop under the guidance of the school's chemistry teacher, Oleh Kononenko, and in part by materials and chemicals obtained from German companies.²⁷ A few camp schools made occasional visits to German schools equipped with a laboratory, but most—except for some simple devices—had no science lab. Chemistry was taught orally (experiments were described, and formulas and outcomes memorized), without the benefit of actual involvement in the process of the experiment.

Methods of Teaching

Teaching methods heavily reflected the theories of Comenius and Herbart. The autocratic role of a teacher as stern disciplinarian and authority figure (what the students called a *belfer*) was a legacy of the Austrian schools in Western Ukraine at the turn of the century. There was no place and no time for experimentation in teaching methods, and certainly no pressure to do it, though there was a great deal of improvisation. Dewey's methods would have been unacceptable to the spirit of a community frantically seeking to restore some sense of order to a chaotic postwar situation.

Memorization was the key to the teaching-learning process. Homework was an indispensable part of the student's daily routine. Humiliating a negligent student in front of his peers was an acceptable practice on the assumption that it would serve as motivation to improve. Grading student performance was strict and demanding. Otherwise "the school will perform a disservice to the student who graduates with insufficient or fragmentary knowledge. A low standard of graduates could undermine their life chances and put us in an unfavourable position in the eyes of foreigners."²⁸ In other words, it was not easy to get an "A" grade. There was no inflation of grades. For instance, the semi-annual grades in 1946/7 in the elementary school in Regensburg were: excellent—13, very good—40, good—104, satisfactory—48, unsatisfactory—19. That produced a nearly normal curve of distribution.²⁹

Extracurricular Activities

Education in the DP school was not confined to learning subject matter in the classroom. No less important were extracurricular activities, most of which were mandatory. Each Sunday and religious feast day students had to attend church services together with their classmates under a teacher's supervision. For *gymnasium* students church attendance was preceded by religious instruction (*eksorta*). Three times a year all students had to go to confession and communion: at the beginning of the school year, Easter, and at the end of the school year. During the school year there were fifteen religious and nine national official holidays.³⁰ National holidays were commemorated with concerts, church services or other activities in which students' participation was obligatory. Students were given a choice in such matters as membership in school sports teams, drama groups or choirs.

In a way the activities of Plast, the Ukrainian scouting organization to which a majority of students belonged, were an extension of extracurricular school activities. There was very close co-operation between school and Plast. For instance, a student failing in school would be suspended from Plast activities until his or her grades improved. School and Plast synchronized their activities, and co-operation and collaboration between them significantly influenced the

education of Ukrainian youth. When another youth organization, SUM, was first formed in the DP camps, it was aimed at youth outside regular schools. Only in 1949, when resettlement was well under way, did SUM also try to organize school-age youth and to establish close co-operation with the schools.³¹

Evaluation

Given the difficulties of conducting a normal school in the abnormal environment of DP camps, the question arises: why were the children not sent to German schools, which historically had an excellent reputation? Their education could have been complemented in after-school hours with instruction in Ukrainian subjects, as in the ethnic schools (*shkoly ukrainoznavstva*) in the United States and Canada. There are several possible explanations—camp schools were more conveniently located; Germans were not overly enthusiastic about foreign children; there was a superfluity of Ukrainian teachers—but only one serious explanation. One must look historically at the aspirations and frustrations of Ukrainians. They were threatened with assimilation, and through assimilation, with extinction as a separate national or ethnic entity. Thus, for the Ukrainian refugees in the DP camps, educational enterprise was not for the sake of the individual. It was education of and for a future nation. The child may be socialized through education, but in the case of Ukrainian refugees, children were nationalized through education.

The DP camps gave Ukrainians a sense of self-sufficiency. Although it was not total self-government, Ukrainians, nevertheless, had an unprecedented opportunity for self-administration and a free hand in cultural and educational activities. For the first time Ukrainian history, religion, and literature could be taught without fear of political repercussions. (The initial restriction by the American military government that “the education program...will be devoid of any instructions aimed at the existing order in Soviet Russia” was soon conveniently ignored by all parties.) In a sense, the DP camps were reminiscent of Greek city-states. The camps were not exactly utopias, but, as in Plato’s *Republic*, education there became a crucial activity for attaining the ideal state. This faith in education echoes that of the ancient philosopher.

In Europe, next to university, the most prestigious school was the *gymnasium*. In the DP camps it became *the* school. Unabashedly the students were told that they were the future national elite. The nation had lost its hereditary leading class, so a new one could be created through a process of education based on merit. That these schools functioned successfully was due chiefly to an exceptionally high community consensus on the “what” and “why” of school functions, and a general acceptance of “how” these functions were to be carried out.

A school’s success is measured by the achievements of its graduates. In Germany and Austria, *gymnasium* graduates, with few exceptions, went on to

university. Resettlement, however, interrupted their studies. In their new countries there were other priorities, as well as obstacles to continuing their education. Those over sixteen years of age could and did go to work to support themselves and to contribute to the support of their families. Tuition fees and language also were serious obstacles to the pursuit of higher education. Those approaching sixteen, but still within compulsory school attendance age, found the language barrier difficult to overcome, and many became discouraged. On the other hand, boys in the United States who joined the army might have delayed their education, but they learned English in the service and the GI Bill took care of their tuition. The younger the students were, the more easily they learned the language. Most found that in subject matter they were more advanced than their American or Canadian peers.

The activism of Ukrainian student organizations in the United States and Canada in the 1950s was spurred mainly by the Ukrainian newcomers. The proliferation of new Ukrainian Saturday schools was also directly related to the Ukrainian schools in the DP camps. The teachers who emigrated from Germany and Austria came to their new countries with experience in school organization and a conviction that they had a moral responsibility to educate Ukrainian youth.

Table 1
Ukrainian Schools in Germany and Austria:
Their Number, Type, and School Population
Schools/Pupils

Region	Secondary	Elementary	Kindergarten	Commercial	Courses
Schools in American Zone of Germany					
Augsburg	4/418	5/411	4/256	3/84	10/80
Aschaffenburg	1/158	4/248	4/227	3/52	6/428
Württemberg-Baden	1/73	4/292	5/246	—	6/387
Gross Hessen	2/56	3/184	3/153	—	4/213
Munich	6/673	7/616	8/355	10/208	8/295
Regensburg	5/483	8/614	6/342	7/166	3/142
Rothenburg	1/52	7/272	6/184	—	7/265
Total	20/1913	38/2637	36/1763	23/510	44/1810
Schools in British Zone of Germany					
Schleswig-Holstein	—	7/323	5/134	3/74	—
Niedersachsen	8/565	17/1215	16/601	8/301	3/236
Westfalen	1/39	6/250	2/70	—	2/68
Total	9/604	30/1788	23/805	11/375	5/304
Schools in French Zone of Germany					
Total	1/42	7/120	3/61	—	1/47
Schools in Austria					
Total	4/493	14/677	—	1/—	—
Total for all Ukrainian schools	34/3052	89/5222	62/2629	35/885	50/2161

Table 2
Elementary School Program
Class Hours per Week

Subject	Grades								Weekly
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	
Religion	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Ukrainian language	6	6	6	5	5	5	4	4	41
English language	-	-	-	2	3	3	3	3	14
German language	-	-	2	2	3	3	3	3	16
Arithmetic and Geometry	4	6	6	5	-	-	-	-	21
History	-	-	1	2	2	2	3	3	13
Geography	-	-	1	2	2	2	2	2	11
Natural Sciences	-	-	1	2	3	3	-	-	9
Art	1	2	2	1	4	4	2	2	18
Crafts	1	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	7
Calligraphy	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	4
Physical Education	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Music	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	16
Latin	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	8
Chemistry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Physics	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	6
Mathematics	-	-	-	-	4	4	4	4	16
Geometric design	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	3
Total	18	22	28	30	33	33	36	36	236

Table 3
Gymnasium Program
Class Hours per Week

Subject	Grades								Weekly
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	
Religion	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Ukrainian language	6	5	4	4	5	4	4	4	36
Latin	6	4	4	4	6	4	4	4	36
English language	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	28
German language	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	20
History	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	19
Geography	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	17
Natural sciences	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Chemistry	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	-	5
Physics	-	-	2	2	-	2	2	3	11
Mathematics	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	32
Intro. philosophy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Physical education	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Music	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	12
Applied arts	-	-	2	2	2	2	-	-	8
Art	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Total	36	33	36	36	38	37	37	37	290

Note: Class Hour = 45 minutes

Source for tables: Vasyl Mudry Archives, Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York

Notes

1. Vasyl Mudry, "Ukrainska emigratsiia v Evropi," in *Iuvileinyi Kalendar-Almanakh Ukrainskoho Narodnogo Soiuzu na rik 1949* (Jersey City, 1949), 114-15.
2. Some articles in American educational journals reflected this concern: F. N. Pitt, "Educational Mission to Germany," *America* 76 (18 January 1947): 429, 433; R. Albrecht-Carrié, "German Problem can be Simple," *Social Education* 64 (December 1945): 355-8; H. Fraenkel, "Is Hitler Youth Curable?," *New Statesman and Nation* 28 (23 September 1944): 196; and "Educational Progress in the American Zone in Germany," *School and Society* 64 (20 July 1946): 36-7.
3. Letter in the private archives of Iurii Teodorovych, Chicago, Illinois (hereinafter Teodorovych Archive). He was principal of the elementary school in the Regensburg DP camp.
4. *Zvidomlennia Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Shkoly v Regensburzi za navchalnyi rik 1945/46* (Regensburg-Oselia, 1946).
5. In 1946 in Germany there were 104,024 Ukrainians living in the American Zone, 58,580 in the British, and 19,026 in the French. See Mudry, "Ukrainska emigratsiia," 108.
6. "Schools in the 'Displaced Persons Centers' in Germany," *School and Society* (15 December 1945): 384.
7. See *Zvidomlennia Ukrainskoi*. A detailed description of school needs is in the principal's information letter, 2 November 1945, Teodorovych Archive.
8. Walter Bergman, "Educational Progress," 384. Bergman, UNRRA's director of DP education in the American Zone, was a teacher from Detroit and a former vice-president of the American Federation of Teachers.
9. Volodymyr Doroshenko, "Kulturno-osvitnia pratsia v taborakh i dlia taboriv," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 53.
10. "Ukrainski vysoki shkoly," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 82-3.
11. M. M., "Suchasna ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni," *Kalendar-Almanakh na Iuvileinyi 1948 rik* (Augsburg-Munich, 1948), 186.
12. From the archives of Vasyl Mudry at the Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York (hereinafter Mudry Archives). Prosvita was a civic educational organization founded in Western Ukraine in the 1860s to promote literacy and national awareness among the masses. In 1939 Prosvita maintained over 3,000 reading rooms for that purpose. *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznovstva*, vol. 2, pt. 6 (Paris-New York, 1970), 2365-72.
13. Mudry Archives.
14. "Obizhnyk ch. 8/48," (Augsburg, TsPUE Viddil Kultury i Osvity), 21 July 1948.
15. "Persha matura," *Novi dni* (Salzburg), 30 June 1946, 3.
16. "Obizhnyk ch. 3," (Shkilnyi Inspektorat), 12 November 1946.

17. Circular letter 4/6-05 (Regensburg: Oblasne Predstavnytstvo Ukrainskoi emigratsii v Regensburgu, 8 October 1947), Teodorovych Archive.
18. *Statut Batkivskoho Kruzha*, Regensburg, 31 July 1946.
19. Teodorovych Archive.
20. "Obizhnyk ch. 3."
21. Letter to the school principals, no. 1703, Augsburg, 1 August 1947, Teodorovych Archive.
22. The number of orphaned children, even immediately after the war, was rather small. In the 3-18 age group, there were 118 or 1.5 per cent orphans and 968 or 12.7 per cent half-orphans. Mudry Archives.
23. "Obizhnyk," TsPUE, 3 March 1947.
24. Korol, "Torhovelni shkoly na emigratsii," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 3 July 1947, 5.
25. "Zvidomlennia Ukrainskoi," 18. Reported by Iurii Teodorovych, principal of an elementary school in Regensburg.
26. "Information Letter to Oblast and Camp Superintendents of Culture and Education," [Do Oblasnykh i Taborovykh Kulturno-Osvitnykh Referentiv i Dyrektoriv Ukrainskykh Narodnykh Shkil] (TsPUE Viddil Kultury i Osvity), 3 March 1947, Teodorovych Archive.
27. "Dbaimo za naochnist v shkoli," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 27 March 1947, 5.
28. M. P., "Shkilnyi rik rozpochavsia," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 18 September 1947, 2.
29. "Zvit Shkoly 1946/7," Teodorovych Archive.
30. Nine national holidays were commemorated: November First, Battle of Bazar, Independence Day, Kruty, Shevchenko, Independence of Carpathian Ukraine, Day of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, Symon Petliura, and Ivan Franko.
31. Letter from the central executive of SUM, 4 April 1949, Teodorovych Archive.

The Women's Movement in the DP Camps

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak

The story of Ukrainian women in the DP camps can be told on two levels. In terms of social history, the experiences of individual women varied greatly. Women of different social classes, indeed of different levels of home culture, were thrown into communal living, communal cooking, and communal washing. Women who had never done housework had to fend for themselves and their families, and vie for provisions and facilities with women who were used to communal living, shortages, and hard physical labour. Strangers shared living quarters—privacy was a blanket suspended around a bed—and camp life was conducive to military-style regimentation that was strange to women. Responsibility for day-to-day survival of the family often fell to women, since cooking, clothing, and cleaning had been their traditional lot. The insecurity of the war was continued through the threat of repatriation and the insecurity of camp life. Even after the war, fear remained a constant companion of women.

On a different level women, like men, tried to make use of the peace to establish organized political and social activity. The enforced communality of camp life made community activities easier and fostered the growth of civic organizations. Women's organizations were influenced by the same factors that determined the largely male community experiences: the specifics of time and place, the tradition of previous community efforts, and the personalities of the leaders who emerged. Here I will concentrate on the moves to organize Ukrainian women in DP camps.¹

Historically, the most popular organizations of Ukrainian women can best be characterized by the term “pragmatic feminism.” Without articulating or even

realizing fully the rationale of community-oriented women's self-help organizations, Ukrainian women foreshadowed the approach taken after World War II by women of the non-industrialized societies. Avoiding ideological issues and even the term feminism, Ukrainian women outside the Soviet Union developed, in the interwar years, an all-encompassing women's society that spanned political borders and formally included even Ukrainian women's organizations in the United States and Canada (the All-Ukrainian Union of Women). The Women's Union (*Soiuz ukrainok*), while pursuing an active community role and enabling women to emerge as a political force, avoided identification with a particular political group or manipulation by any one of them. It was a mass organization, initiated by urban and educated women but composed mainly of peasants. It owed its popularity to its grass-roots economic self-help programs. As a result, it was able to organize women into an effective political force.

The union combined the rhetoric of patriotism with democracy, and stressed the expanded community responsibility of a mother who recognized the importance and impact of the world outside her four walls. In that way it managed to maintain both independence of action and a sense of women's solidarity, despite mounting campaigns by all political parties and some activists and priests of the Ukrainian Catholic Church to control them. In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II, years marked by economic crises and political repression, serious chinks were made in the united women's front.

The most significant of these was the growing popularity among women—especially those in their twenties and thirties—of nationalist ideology. In its Ukrainian variant this ideology played on the spirit of self-sacrifice. It also exploited the growing interest in the immediate past by stressing that it had been anarchic Ukrainian individualism, combined with misguided idealistic democratic pacifism, that facilitated the armed takeover of Ukrainian lands by the Bolsheviks and the Poles. Parties on both the left and the right viewed women primarily as bearers and nurturers of children. Pragmatic feminism did not deny that role, nor did it challenge the need to serve the nation and the community, but it pointed out the right of women to define their own autonomy and the terms of their participation. Some Western Ukrainian women came to accept the label feminist, while others vehemently denied it, espousing nationalist ideology, which limited the function of women to childbearing. Tension between the two groups flared in heated debate, but the union avoided an open split in the organization.²

In Eastern Ukraine the founding of women's organizations was cut by the Soviets, who consciously avoided linking women to the national issue. Women's organizations of the Communist Party in Ukraine were directed from Moscow, and the party did not allow independent community organizations. Although the Soviets made great strides in equality for women, the economics of their system placed a double burden upon them—work outside the home as well as housework. Feminism, which democratically minded Ukrainians always suspected was

a luxury of the idle rich, did not gain any popularity among the women of Soviet Ukraine. Most Eastern Ukrainian women linked feminism with middle-class liberalism, which they detested as priggish, dated, and anti-Ukrainian. Ukrainian democratic activists accepted the equality of the sexes as a part of their democratic ideology, provided, of course, that women took care of the children and the housework. The Eastern Ukrainian women from the Soviet Union in the camps were also not interested in feminism, considering that they had already attained equality and exhausted the discussion of women's issues. While World War I contributed to the emancipation of women, Stalinist totalitarianism destroyed the autonomous bases of Eastern European women. The man-made famine in 1933 in Soviet Ukraine rocked the family structure and decimated the population. When war broke out in 1939, with Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany as allies in the dismemberment of Europe, the Western Ukrainian women's organization ceased to function.

Of the 250,000 Ukrainians who ended up in Austria and Germany, about one-third were women. Most of them were young women who had been sent to Germany as slave labourers for the Third Reich. These young peasant women—brutalized by slave labour and by the war, uprooted from their families—had little experience of community life and even less understanding of the complex postwar situation. Since they had been working in farms in southern Bavaria, they flooded into the UNRRA DP camps in Munich and Augsburg. There they strengthened the numbers of women refugees and former concentration camp inmates. Eventually these women were joined by the few women from the small bands of guerrilla fighters who made their way from Ukrainian territories.³ The camps provided a sense of community and cohesion for women. They also brought together people from different areas of Ukraine, as well as from different classes and levels of society. The charged atmosphere of postwar Europe, insecurity about the future, and limitations on travel and communication among the four occupation zones created conditions conducive to petty politicking in that the organic base of the mass women's organizations was lacking in the camps, while opportunities for charged debates were myriad, given the density of camp population and availability of time. Personality clashes were intertwined with substantive differences, as well as differing perceptions of reality. Even allocation of the aid received from Ukrainians in the United States and Canada created fertile ground for discord. The vagaries of camp life undercut the orderliness of the organizations established in the camps.

Daily life in the camps was a combination of routine and instability in which the quick-witted, the resourceful, and the enterprising did better than those who were used to settled patterns of behaviour. The realities of camp life, like the realities of war, broke down some sexual stereotype behaviour, but did not alter basic thinking on sexual roles. Men, for instance, were obliged to master basic cooking on primitive appliances. There was no difference in resourcefulness between men and women. Both did their best to ease the tribulations of their

existence, within the limits of their abilities and scruples. Men and women alike scrounged for scarce goods, engaged in black marketeering and aboveboard barter, and jockeyed for favourable positions in the camps. They stood in line to bring rations of food to their rooms or ate at the communal eating facilities. Women, however, were more likely to work in the kitchens, although men were often in charge of the provisions. It was up to women, however, to ensure that their families were somehow fed and clothed. Women generally did the cleaning and the laundry. Both men and women tried to take on tasks that would give their families either a separate room—that greatest of luxuries—or at least one shared by fewer than four families. Work in the kitchen and dispensing of clothes or other products was highly desirable.

Some regimentation was built into the camp structure: controlled access, allocation of space, distribution of food, internal security. The greatest sources of insecurity were the inability to plan for the immediate future; Soviet attempts to repatriate residents of the territories which had either been theirs or which had become Soviet; disciplinary action for black marketeering; and periodic screening for possible collaboration with the Nazis. Welfare committees and the local internal camp administration developed by the inmates provided some of the routine in camp life. That routine, however, was not always welcome. Many of the camp leaders, elected or appointed, instituted reveille with public prayer, the raising of the flags, and some para-military hoopla. In the evening a similar ceremony was held. Rallies, meetings, and the like were also accompanied by various formalities that soothed patriotic yearnings. Women, less used to regimentation, at times objected to it. Others, however, welcomed it for the salutary effect it was considered to have on the development of the moral fibre of the nation. Then, although most camp officials were civic-minded individuals, there were also those who turned out to be unscrupulous. It is, however, difficult to generalize about these matters, since we do not have, nor will we probably ever have, the necessary information.

Like much of DP politics, the story of the organization of women in the camps is not very pretty. What happened, essentially, was that the women's movement—which, despite signs of strain before World War II, had nevertheless remained united outside the Soviet Union—split. The most outspoken feminists, such as Milena Rudnytska, Olena Sheparovych, and Mariia Strutyńska, who also happened to be politically moderate and opposed to the rhetoric of the nationalists, were pointedly excluded from the new organization of women that was created in the camps.

The last legally elected president of the Women's Union, as well as the moving force of the All-Ukrainian Women's Union (created in 1934, but legally sanctioned only in 1937, owing to the vagaries of Polish legislation), was Milena Rudnytska. She was a woman of political stature and a spokesperson for the Ukrainian parliamentary group in Poland. She also was an opponent of the

rightist trend in Ukrainian politics. At the end of the war she was in Austria, cut off from all communication with women in other parts of Europe. Rudnytska, who had personal connections within the international feminist movement, as well as among European politicians, presumed that the Women's Union would reactivate itself, expand among the refugees from the Soviet Union, and choose a new president. She felt it her duty to convene a formal congress of women to reactivate the union. To that end, members of local women's organizations, which sprang up spontaneously in groupings of Ukrainian émigrés, met in the summer of 1945 to prepare for a larger convention. Representatives of Ukrainian women from the three zones of Austria occupied by the Western Allies and from the French Zone of Germany convened a congress from 30 September to 1 October 1945 in Feldkirch, Austria. Ukrainian women from other parts of Germany were not represented because Iryna Pavlykovska, whom Rudnytska contacted as the ranking union leader, did not share with them information about the congress, nor about any of the moves to reactivate the union. She also did not attend the gathering herself.

The Feldkirch Congress called for the "re-establishment of an independent women's organization as the only suitable form which could preserve the achievement of the pre-war Ukrainian women's movement and which could activate Ukrainian women's forces in the diaspora [*chuzhyna*]."⁴ The women announced that, "until the time of our return to the homeland, during our stay in Central and Western Europe, Ukrainian women are joining the Union of Ukrainian Women in Europe [SUE] with branches in the individual countries...." They also maintained that "in the changed conditions the All-Ukrainian Women's Union ought to unite all organized Ukrainian women outside the boundaries of the Fatherland." They did not claim to be representative of the entire DP community, but argued, rather, that until the convocation of a comprehensive gathering of women, the last elected board of the All-Ukrainian Women's Union should serve as a formal women's representative body. An Initiative Committee was formed to co-ordinate those moves.

Rudnytska and her followers wanted to maintain the continuity of the organization, although they disclaimed any ambition to continue running it. The Initiative Committee immediately (September 1945) began publishing, in mimeographed form, an "Information Leaflet." In the first issue they argued for the preservation of the tradition-laden name, Union of Ukrainian Women, as well as for a women's organization independent of existing parties and male community organizations. Information on attempts to contact international relief organizations, especially the Red Cross, was also provided. The second issue (October 1945) provided specific instructions on how to establish local branches of the Women's Union, within given legal parameters. It also provided a set of temporary by-laws to facilitate organized activity.

The union activists, especially the circle from Lviv who clustered around Milena Rudnytska, simply presumed the continued solidarity of Ukrainian women. Pavlykovska's failure to attend the Feldkirch Congress and to share the information about it with other women was generally assumed to have been caused by the physical difficulties of travel and communication among the occupation zones. Rudnytska took it for granted that Ukrainian women, especially the large group in Bavaria, would reactivate the union. Indeed, when it became obvious that not all of them would, Rudnytska not only accused Pavlykovska of sabotage, but of doing so for purely personal motives. Although not without some truth, this is a facile explanation that ignores deep-seated disagreements and differing attitudes among the women.

"Feminism," in the Western European sense of women's emancipation, had never been popular among Ukrainian women, although the involvement of women and women's organizations in community activities was. The Eastern Ukrainian tradition of radical democracy wrote off feminism as bourgeois liberalism, while Soviet-style women's emancipation rang hollow within the context of Stalinist totalitarianism. Western Ukrainian women developed a pragmatic feminism that enabled them to maintain their integrity, but since they had not been socialized into ideological thinking, they were not able to articulate, let alone define, the community-oriented feminism they had been practicing.

Camp life, which provided men with more leisure than was available for women, bred conditions conducive to rampant patriotic rhetoric that strengthened the popularity of the rightist nationalist camp. The so-called liberals—persons who did not show sufficient zeal for patriotic lore, symbolic action, and pseudo-military drill—were especially under fire. Views on feminism, never very sophisticated among Ukrainians, became even more simplistic in these conditions. Feminism in common discourse tended to be lumped with communism, and the function of women was viewed in conventional terms: care of the family, child-rearing, and service to the nation. Communal living, limited rations, and a shortage of items necessary for survival created pressures to engage in black marketeering and favouritism, at which some were more adept than others. This holds true for men and women, but independent women's organizations that did not fit into the patriotic mould were at a disadvantage within this context.

The devastating experience of war had undermined the confidence of Western Ukrainian women in their ability to function politically. In the camps there was even some feeling that there was really no need for a separate women's organization. The argument was that not only had Ukrainian women always enjoyed a separate but distinguished status in the Ukrainian community, but the community had taken care of women's real needs. At best, some people maintained, women's auxiliary organizations would be suitable vehicles for women performing their public roles.

Meanwhile, the need to defend Ukrainians against repatriation to Stalin's Ukraine, to represent them before the military authorities, and to plead their cause accelerated attempts to create a single organization for Ukrainians. Leadership in this effort was taken over by right-wing moderates, especially Vasyl Mudry, who opposed the Ukrainian People's Republic-in-exile group. Mudry, although he had belonged to the same political party as Rudnytska, had not seen eye to eye with her and readily dropped her from the party ticket. He worked well, however, with Pavlykovska. When Ukrainian DPs began preparing a congress which was to create a central organization, it was Pavlykovska who became the women's representative.

None of the women on the Initiative Committee for the Women's Union was invited to participate in the community congress, which was held in Aschaffenburg, Germany, on 1 November 1945.⁵ Rudnytska had asked Pavlykovska to represent the women's organization. Pavlykovska had refused and had skillfully blocked the formation of separate Women's Union branches in DP camps in Germany. She seemed to prefer the idea of women's auxiliaries of general and political organizations, which indeed mushroomed in the 1940s. Under such an arrangement, the women ended up running hospitality functions, while the men planned strategy. Sensing that this would happen, women's organizations, which engaged in some type of community-oriented activity, spontaneously began to emerge in the camps. They avoided political involvement and often had no name. Pavlykovska noticed this and spoke up in the name of Ukrainian women at the Aschaffenburg Congress, which established a Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration. In the documentation on the congress, there is no mention of the argument for a women's auxiliary, nor of the fact that initially the organization Pavlykovska sought to establish was known as Women's Work—Zhinocha Pratsia.

Pavlykovska (daughter of a populist politician, wife of a senator in interwar Poland) was a political figure in her own right. Very energetic and an effective public speaker, especially at mass rallies, she came to side with the nationalist faction in the Ukrainian political spectrum. She had had her differences with Rudnytska—both were strong, ambitious, and domineering political creatures—but publicly each had defended the other. The average Ukrainian woman in Europe had no reason to presume that Pavlykovska's efforts at organizing women would in any way undermine the women's movement.

Pavlykovska mustered the support of women well connected with the interwar Ukrainian women's movement—Dr. Sofiia Parfanovych, Blanka Bachynska, and a writer from Volhynia, Liudmyla Ivchenko—but her most effective support came from younger women who shared the nationalist ideology. They included Uliana Tselevych, Halyna Dvorianyn Krokhmaluk, Halyna Chernysh, Dora Rak, Mykhailyna Chaikivska, Olena Vanchynska, and Ivanna Huzar. These women, in tune with the nationalist rhetoric, were offended by the alleged egotism of the feminists and objected to all feminist rhetoric. They shared the

belief that when all else collapses—state, society, the Western World—the family remains, and at its heart is the woman—the mother, the saviour of the nation. Pavlykovska—strong, tenacious, and of a populist background—rose to the challenge. With Uliana Tselevych she travelled, on foot or hitching rides, to any camp in which Ukrainians resided. She advertised her courage and resourcefulness. These trips formed the basis for the women's organizations, as yet unnamed. Many women joined in good faith, not suspecting any personal or ideological struggles.

Pavlykovska and her supporters decided to hold a women's congress in Augsburg, which had convenient railway connections with German cities where the Women's Union had not yet revitalized its branches. Augsburg was, moreover, the temporary home of such eminent luminaries from Soviet Ukraine as Olena Chekhivska, Izydora Kosach Borysova, Olha Kosach Kryvyniuk, and the earlier émigré, Elysaveta Zhuk. The Augsburg Congress was held on 15-16 December, three months after the Feldkirch Congress. It coincided with the Soviet push for repatriation, which helped forge bonds of cohesiveness among the women. It also heightened tension and forced women to look to the grim future, not to ruminate on the past. Thus the mood at that congress aided the creation of a new women's society and not the reactivation of the Union of Ukrainian Women, which had been founded in Western Ukraine. The new organization was named the Alliance of Ukrainian Women in Emigration.⁶

The creation of a new women's organization, established with the participation of many of the activists of the Union of Ukrainian Women, immediately drew fire from supporters of the historically independent Women's Union. They met at a special rally on 18 January 1946 in Innsbruck and indignantly protested the formation of an alleged all-Ukrainian women's organization which disregarded the immediate past as well as the contemporary women's organizational structure. They particularly resented not being informed of, let alone invited to, the Aschaffenburg and Augsburg gatherings. At Innsbruck they repeated their reasons for re-establishing the women's union: to stress the tradition of women's organizations, to conform with Ukrainian women's organizations in Europe and America, and "to preserve its affiliation with the International Council of Women."⁷

Rudnytska exhibited dignified restraint, despite a whisper campaign against her character, morality, and politics. She did not interfere in the plans for the Augsburg Congress and, indeed, welcomed it. She and her group relied upon democratic spontaneity, which had been a striking characteristic of the Ukrainian women's movement, to reactivate the women. She presumed that the women, who had withstood earlier attempts at manipulating them, would remember the recent past and re-establish the Women's Union as it had developed in Western Ukraine.

Immediately after the war ended, in the summer of 1945, Rudnytska, after much deliberation, decided that it would be most advantageous to Ukrainians if some of them could go to Switzerland, which had been a neutral country with links to the outside world. It had been the seat of the League of Nations and its affiliates, and Rudnytska had frequently gone there on official business. It also remained the headquarters of the International Council of Women. Since Ukrainians had at one time been members, Rudnytska tried to re-establish her contacts and obtain information on what Ukrainian women in America were doing. She argued that, given the existing political situation in postwar Europe, the Ukrainian women's organization was in a good position to represent the Ukrainian cause before the various humanitarian organizations. While some of the men were compromised by alleged co-operation with the Germans, this accusation could not be levelled against any of the women's leaders. Rudnytska's point was borne out by the fact that while the International Red Cross had received numerous requests for aid from various Ukrainian organizations, it had replied only to the Women's Union (July 1945).

Not only did Rudnytska avoid easy rhetorical patriotism, but she openly criticized all who in any way had recognized Nazi authority during the war. She protested fund-raising for the veterans of the ill-fated, German-sponsored army divisions, and she argued that Ukrainian supporters of these divisions ought to withdraw from community life. Many women resented the fact that Rudnytska referred to her opponents as "fascists."⁸ She presumed that the nucleus of Ukrainian life would quickly shift from the camps to Geneva, but by moving to Switzerland she removed herself from the scene of Ukrainian émigré activity—the camps in Germany. Rudnytska went to Geneva, walking through Austrian territory, carting her typewriter and meagre belongings. By the spring of 1946 she had established the Central Office Abroad of the Ukrainian Women's Alliance. On the letterhead, printed in English and French, she translated *Soiuz* as "alliance" and included the information that it had been and continued to be a member of the International Alliance for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship and a member of the International Co-operative Women's Guild.⁹

Seeing first-hand the opportunity to get help for Ukrainians through the organized women's connection, Rudnytska tried again to heal the rift with Pavlykovska. Pavlykovska had finally written to Rudnytska on 18 January 1946, in reply to Rudnytska's initial letter of June 1945. In that letter Rudnytska had proposed plans for the re-establishment of the Women's Union. Although Rudnytska considered the reply both late and inadequate, and felt that Pavlykovska's actions belied her words, she, nevertheless, was anxious to reunite the women. She proposed—according to letters she wrote to Pavlykovska—that she and Pavlykovska meet to iron out the difficulties between themselves. Rudnytska declared that she did not have any ambition to lead the women and would gladly see Pavlykovska in that position. Apparently Pavlykovska did not respond,

despite Rudnytska's stress on the importance and usefulness of the Geneva connection. Instead, Pavlykovska went to America and persuaded the Ukrainian National Women's League to support her newly founded organization rather than the historic Women's Union, of which the American Ukrainian Women's League was part. Meanwhile Rudnytska, with the support of the Ukrainian Canadian women's organization, tried for almost a decade to keep her union group going, but it finally failed.

Systematically and thoroughly, but without any written public documentation, the new leadership prevented Rudnytska and her closest associates from appearing before any major women's assembly. In the process, the very achievements of the Women's Union in the interwar years were also glossed over, and its existence often barely mentioned, while other, less numerous and less visible organizations received attention. Rudnytska's supporters did not put up a fight, but withdrew from public life.

Women had not been articulate proponents of a systematic ideology. The charged atmosphere in the camps, the arrival from Ukraine of the guerrilla fighters, and the enforced idleness of the men contributed to a shallow politicization of Ukrainian émigrés, who had leisure time for public meetings and constituted an audience responsive to emotionally charged rhetoric. Anti-intellectualism, which in the interwar years had fed the ranks of the extremist patriotic movements and had lumped feminism, socialism, and atheism into one pro-communist camp, flourished in the primitive conditions of camp life. Most women in the camps were not even aware of the power play between the two groups of women. Faced, as usual, with the need to feed their families, protect their children from the dangers of camp life, and maintain their own human dignity, while running between food lines and bartering whatever they could on the fringes of the law, the women easily lumped all "politics" into one useless, even dangerous, category. They readily joined a women's organization which helped set up day-care, schools, supplementary allocation of food, and even sewing courses so that women could prepare themselves for their future in the "sweatshops" of North America.

The women meeting in Augsburg called themselves the First Congress of Ukrainian Women, although later they added "in Germany." They passed over in silence the existence of the renewed Women's Union in Austria. They established an Alliance of Ukrainian Women, which they also later qualified with "in Germany." They were supported by women in the British Zone, and eventually came to be called the Alliance of Ukrainian Women in Emigration. Its first leadership included Iryna Pavlykovska as president; Mariia Biliak and Olena Chekhivska as vice-presidents; Dora Rak as secretary; Liudmyla Ivchenko, Vira Shpakivska Drach, Uliana Tselevych, Stefaniia Nahirna, Oksana Burevii, Kekyliia Gardetska, and Anna Hankivska as members of the board. Dariia Rebet, Mariia Dontsova, and Olha Pavlovskva were co-opted into the leadership.

The alliance avoided the terminology of the union. Establishing a three-level organizational structure—local, regional, and central—it avoided the terms “branch” or “affiliate,” which had been traditional in Western Ukraine. Instead it called the local section *delegatura*—a neologism in Ukrainian terminology—which did connote, however, a delegation of power from above rather than the free affiliation of local autonomous groups. For region, the term *oblast* was used, a borrowing from Soviet usage. That terminology was used only in émigré groups in Europe. As soon as Ukrainian women immigrated to the United States or to Canada, they shifted back to the traditional name—Union.

Forty-eight women, delegates from twenty-six groups, took part in the gathering at Augsburg. They protested the occupation of Ukraine by the Soviets; called “on the women of the free world to come to the aid of the refugees; and demanded the right of asylum in their countries.” They also began, in the words of Pavlykovska, “to seek ways of contact with the free world: with the Ukrainian women's organizations in North America and with the international women's and charitable organizations.”¹⁰ Rudnytska's efforts of the previous year in both directions were simply overlooked. These women began with themselves. They promulgated five ideological theses: 1) They accepted the principle of a united and sovereign Ukraine and the need to serve her. 2) They supported close cooperation “with both Ukrainian churches, namely the Autocephalous Orthodox and the Greek Catholic,” since they “recognized that the bases of Christian ethics and morality constitute the foundation of the authentic healthy development of the nation and the individual.” (This was a plank the Women's Union considered superfluous in its by-laws during the inter-war years.) 3) The women drafted a ringing call for unity:

Believing that unity is the precondition of the attainment of the goals of the Ukrainian nation, the organized Ukrainian women in emigration direct their efforts toward the creation of a healthy, conciliatory atmosphere among our citizenry. Neither territorial, nor religious, nor social, nor party differences dare destroy the unity of the Ukrainian Community.

4) They dealt with the need for women to “preserve calm, perseverance and strength of character” under difficult conditions. 5) They declared that women, with the support of the family, were to act as “the fount of the future strength of the nation.”

In a later publication on the period, Pavlykovska referred to the congress as one of Ukrainian women in Germany, but in the mimeographed materials of the time, it was called the Congress of the Central Alliance of Ukrainian Women in Emigration. Its major goal:

must be to activate the Ukrainian women-citizens and to unite all Ukrainian women, creating for that purpose the Central Alliance of Ukrainian Women in Emigration as the organizational culmination of the women's centres which already exist. Proclaiming the principle of unity of Ukrainian community life

in emigration...the Central Alliance will function on a three-level structure, as well as through autonomous sections of existing community organizations.¹¹

This provision sanctioned the notion of the “women's auxiliaries” and facilitated intervention in women's organizations by various parties and interest groups.

The women who attended the congress encouraged the leadership to care for the health and welfare of women and children, to combat alcoholism and tuberculosis, to promote hygiene, to train women to face a hard economic future, and to establish contacts with Ukrainians abroad. In what seems to be a new plank (one which is not mentioned in literature about the women's organizations written later), the congress enjoined the leadership “to establish contacts [*zviatzysia*] with the appropriate organization of other captive nations for the purpose of getting together [*zblyzhennia*] and common action.” The congress also “welcomed the creation of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration as a natural and co-ordinating factor, and proclaimed its support and co-operation.”¹² Finally, the women thanked the Ukrainian women's organizations of Canada and the United States for their help. They did not say a word, however, to those closest to them, the Ukrainian DP women in Austria in the Women's Union.

The underlying rationale of the organization was to “unify all women for common action on behalf of the Fatherland, the Ukrainian family and—particularly—for the defence of the Ukrainian woman and child.” The women picked up on patriotic rhetoric and symbolism and stressed not women's rights, but the importance of the family, the sanctity of motherhood, and dedication to children. Choosing as their patron St. Olha,¹³ the women minted medals of achievement and published a patriotic set of twelve guidelines for Ukrainian women. All of them were directed at the woman in her family role and her preservation of Ukrainian customs and folk arts. The wearing and giving of medals in addition to the usual membership badge played an important role at this time of symbolic action. Beyond the patriotic rhetoric and preservation of folk art, the ideology was shallow and undeveloped. It fell within a corporatist, pre-industrial mould in which women were viewed as the heart of the family; keepers of the national spirit; pure and unspoiled by rational and political excesses.¹⁴

In the first issue of their journal, *Hromadianka* (Citizeness, which appeared in July 1946, probably in Augsburg), the women proclaimed their views in an editorial:

We see from examples of many countries and all humanity that many problems cannot be solved and, more importantly, the solutions cannot be implemented under the one-sided male influence and direction, which is based only on reason and its achievements. If women themselves continue to follow that same line, then hopes for the further development of mankind and of new, deeply moral and humane relations will be futile.

What was happening, therefore, was another example of women denying their adherence to feminism, overlooking the achievements of other women, and initiating a women's organization without recognizing the achievements of earlier organizations. The same editorial continued:

But the woman can correct morality and ethics only when she learns to adopt her own approach to each issue at hand. The woman's approach and understanding cannot materialize at once, like the eruption of a volcano. It has to be nurtured, cultivated, and grafted. With this journal we are initiating this gradual and patient work of rooting women in the understanding of their worth, their great importance and responsibility for developing their *own* view on all matters.¹⁵

The actual work of the individual *delegatory*, as envisaged in the by-laws, did not differ at all from the pragmatic feminist activities of the interwar union. The rhetoric placed greater stress upon the innate propensity of women for high standards of moral behaviour, but the reality was such that the third congress of the alliance, held in Zuffenhausen in 1948, passed a resolution demanding "better care of orphans, half-orphans, and illegitimate children." Repeatedly, the women, according to another resolution of this congress "Call[ed] for strengthening educational work among women, youth, and especially young women, basing themselves on Christian morality and ethics, in view of the detrimental impact of émigré life."¹⁶ The individual branches were to unify all women in the area; to care for their moral, intellectual, and cultural needs, as well as for their physical well-being; to organize aid for them; and to care for the young. The women were to work on their own and to co-operate with other appropriate agencies in order to implement their programs.¹⁷

In addition to publishing mimeographed materials the women initiated the Lesia Ukrainka Fund. Its original purpose was to subsidize quality translations of major Ukrainian literary works. The alliance joined the Ukrainian National Women's League of America in raising money to translate and publish a volume of verse by Lesia Ukrainka. For that purpose the DP women sold embroidery.¹⁸ Through the women who had been working in Narodne Mystetstvo—an independent and financially successful co-operative of Galician women which had marketed peasant handicrafts—the women of the alliance established close contact with the Ukrainian National Women's League of America. The Ukrainian-American women then spoke in the name of all Ukrainian women at international gatherings. The dropped most connections with liberal interwar women's and feminist groups, such as the International Council of Women, and new alliances with more openly rightist factions were established, especially with the newly established Captive Nations bloc. The fact that Emily Balch, a shining light in the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom, which had not expelled the Ukrainians in the interwar years, had been awarded the Stalin Peace

Prize, did not make renewal of these contacts particularly attractive to Ukrainians.

The oldest international women's organization, the International Council for Women (ICW), although it expelled all women's organizations which did not represent sovereign states, had, nevertheless, maintained some degree of formal contact with the Ukrainian Women's Union. Rudnytska had been invited to participate in the ICW congress in 1946, which was held in New York, as well as in an ICW conference held the following year in Philadelphia. For legal and monetary reasons she could not go. Instead, the Ukrainians were represented by Hanka Romanchych, a Canadian who had taken Pavlykovska's side. Since Romanchych had been active in the All-Ukrainian Women's Union, she undermined Rudnytska's position.¹⁹ Moreover, at the congress of Ukrainian women held in Philadelphia on 12-13 November 1948, representatives of women's groups in the United States and Europe created the World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations, which spoke in the name of Ukrainian women outside the Soviet Union. Contemporary accounts did not mention its predecessor, and Rudnytska and other members of the All-Ukrainian Women's Union had not been invited to the gathering.²⁰

In the camps, women combined the useful with the patriotic. As part of a campaign to make Ukraine better known in the West, the women organized exhibits of folk arts. The items exhibited were largely made by the women in the shops they had set up in the camps. The sale of embroidered items, as well as of boxes decorated with coloured straw, contributed to feeding their families. At times major exhibits outside the camps were held, especially after 1947. Their function was largely representational. The alliance made a tremendous push to popularize the folk arts and encouraged all women to become proficient at least in embroidery. In 1946 and 1947 the alliance held eighty-five exhibits. One of them was a major travelling display. Whenever any officials visited the camps, it was up to the women to provide decorations and gifts. While men delivered the speeches, women demonstrated the achievements of Ukrainian culture through their artifacts. As hopes for a quick return to their homeland grew dimmer, the artifacts became their surrogate homeland, and each Ukrainian family was considered to be "a piece of Ukrainian land." Each issue of *Hromadianka* included a sample of a regional Ukrainian peasant outfit, as well as suggestions on how folk motifs could be incorporated into contemporary clothes. There was a discussion on the need to preserve aesthetic authenticity of the folk arts. It became a patriotic duty for each mother to outfit her children in ceremonial "national costume."

Their homes were gone, their extended families scattered, and mothers needed to work outside the home in order to feed their families, but Ukrainian women stressed the importance of the home and domesticity. More than ever, the mother was considered the keeper of morality, the saviour of children, and the

transmitter of national values. As part of the stress on domesticity, the women's press provided recipes (usually geared to the available food supply), suggestions for more rational housekeeping, and sewing instructions. Great importance was placed on the proper upbringing of young children: day-care centres and training courses were developed for them. Supplementary mimeographed materials which included brief articles on a variety of historical and practical subjects were circulated for use by the women's groups. Many of the articles dealt with the basics of etiquette, reflecting the social and geographical mix of women in the camps. Naturally, articles on achievements in various parts of Europe, especially in Canada and the United States, were also included.

Women in the new émigré organization distanced themselves consciously from any type of feminism. Brief articles on the earlier women activists, such as Nataliia Kobrynska or Kharytia Kononenko, stressed their patriotic achievements and not their quest for sexual equality. Indeed, Kobrynska's socialism was simply overlooked. In a sense, the whole notion of sexual equality seemed extraneous at the time. As they prepared for emigrant life outside Europe, the women emphasized the need for strength—moral and physical—within the home and outside it. The more politically differentiated the Ukrainian community became, the louder the women called for supra-party unity.²¹ Denying any split within the women's movement, the alliance not only convened a second congress in Frankfurt in March 1947, but claimed “a great moral victory” in unifying Ukrainian women in the emigration. In this respect, Ukrainian women in the camps followed the male lead. They called for unity, but certain groups claimed that unity and patriotism for themselves, to the exclusion of their rivals.

Yet, while the women lauded elements of domesticity and glorified large families, they underwent the same process of feminist consciousness-raising as had their predecessors. Deploring party strife and empty politicking, they nevertheless had to conclude that women must take part in the political processes which affect them:

We create life, we bear children, but their death has for centuries been decided upon without the participation of women.

If women stand aside, aloof from community life, they do not fulfill one of the basic duties toward their family. It is precisely family life that forces us to make certain contributions to society. Our experience in housekeeping makes us more knowledgeable than men about certain economic issues. Don't forget that 80% of the [family] budget is spent by women.²²

Attacks in the DP press on Ukrainian women, which alleged that they lacked domestic and child-rearing skills, especially vis-à-vis German women, led the women to defend themselves in good feminist fashion.²³ The difficulties women encountered in getting their own journal published, and the instances of overt and covert discrimination they experienced, raised their awareness of the “women's question.”

Other issues, more pressing than sexual inequality, overshadowed this nascent debate. Foremost was the basic struggle for survival, which many Ukrainians identified with getting as far away from Soviet influence as possible. Women, and especially Pavlykovska after her trip to the United States in 1948, stressed the need for manual labour by both the wife and the husband to get an edge on their new life. Repeatedly Pavlykovska stated that the work available, especially in the United States, was for physical labourers and skilled craftsmen. The women's organization tried to provide that training, while at the same time stressing the moral responsibility of women to rear their young and to ennoble community life.

The united front of the women's organization was successfully broken, but the attempt to make women's organizations only auxiliaries to the men's organizations also failed. The women's movement in the camps demonstrated that Ukrainian women were socialized into the Ukrainian community and were subject to the same tensions and attractions that prevailed among the broader Ukrainian émigré community. Hence, while calling for unity and patriotism, the women's movement was permitted to splinter; while deploring politicking, the women established "women's sections" within the major political organizations; and while divorcing themselves from feminism, the women practiced the traditional pragmatic feminism of their predecessors. Domesticity as an ideal was stressed while it was lost as a viable possibility, and folk arts increasingly came to be identified with the lost Ukrainian homeland. Above all, in the camps, as in the war, women demonstrated an ability to adapt to difficult conditions and somehow to marry and establish families, bear and nurture their children and themselves.

Notes

1. I am indebted to many persons who provided me with the materials on which this article is based, especially Tonia Horokhovich, for sharing her important collection with me; Olha Kuzmovych, for making the Olena Fedak-Sheparovych papers available; and Ulana Starosolska-Liubovych, for retrieving the papers of Mariia Bachynska-Dontsov. As usual, Ivanna Rozhankovsky and the Ukrainian National Women's League of America (UNWLA) extended access to their archival collection of correspondence and press. A number of albums documenting the life and work of women in the DP camps, prepared as a token of gratitude to Ukrainian American women, are on deposit in the League's central office in New York. Lidia Bura-chynska, in addition to advice, encouragement, and reminiscences, allowed me to use her complete set of *Hromadianka*. Irena Knysh shared her recollections of the period, as well as her copy of her book, *Pershi kroky na emigratsii: Z nedavniho mynuloho* (Winnipeg, 1955). Ivan L. Rudnytsky, permitted me to use his mother's papers (deposited at the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in New York), and let me see additional materials in his possession.

2. Fuller discussion in my *Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life 1884-1939* (Edmonton, 1988), especially pp. 190-234.
3. Iryna Pavlykovska, "Obiednannia Ukrainskykh Zhinok u Nimechchyni," in Dariia Rebet et al., eds., *35 rokiv Obiednannia Ukrainskykh Zhinok u Nimechchyni* (Munich, 1980), 14-15.

Unfortunately, there are no statistics to enable us to refine information on women in the DP camps. The few memoirs available are very vague on the matter. See especially, Iryna Pavlykovska, "Obiednannia Ukrainskykh Zhinok na Emigratsii: Ioho pobudova i pratsia," *Svitovyi Kongres Ukrainskoho Zhinotstva: Pamiatkova knyzhka* (Philadelphia, 1948).

4. Text in the possession of Tonia Horokhovich; an account of the congress is in Knysh, *Pershi kroky*, 25-9. Ukrainian women outside the Soviet Union translated *Soiuz* as "union." Ukrainian-American women chose to use "league." It may, moreover, be translated as "alliance"; and sometimes the Women's Union in Western Ukraine was referred to by that name. *Obiednannia*—the term DP women in southern Germany chose—is best translated as "alliance," although "union" is also possible. In this article I will use "union" to refer to the Rudnytska group, "alliance" for the women of the Pavlykovska faction, and "league" for the Ukrainian-American women. My use of "Women's Union" refers to the Union of Ukrainian Women (*Soiuz Ukrainok*), which had its headquarters in Lviv in the interwar period.
5. Zynovii Knysh, whose wife, Irena, was a close colleague of Rudnytska, did attend it and reported on it.
6. "Obiednannia Ukrainskykh Zhinok na Emigratsii." Uliana Tselevych explained that, "we decided that the work and the direction [of the organization] is different...hence we should not confuse the former society of *Soiuz Ukrainok* in the Homeland with the work of women now, in these very unclear and difficult [*kepski*] conditions. We decided not to keep the name, which has its traditions." Tselevych to Olena Lototska, Ukrainian Women's League of America, 17 December 1945, UNWLA.
7. Text of the resolution of the meeting in the possession of Tonia Horokhovich. The women also circulated a two-page mimeographed memorandum. In it they stressed that the women's organization must function along democratic lines. They also accused Pavlykovska of co-operating "with those circles which earlier, in the prewar years, under the influence of fascist trends, were enemies of the Ukrainian women's movement and actively opposed the Women's Union."
8. See especially Rudnytska's letters to Canadian women dated 10 May 1946 and 15 May 1946. On the letterhead Rudnytska translated *Soiuz* as "alliance," perhaps to reflect her responsiveness to the changed political climate ("union" connoted something leftist and assertive), but more likely to stress her connection with the Ukrainian women's organization. Rudnytska maintained that Ukrainians had missed many opportunities to get support from humanitarian organizations represented in Geneva, especially the American Quakers, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Red Cross, the International Union to Aid Children, and the Swiss Gift to the Victims of the War. The Red Cross and the Swiss immediately donated \$3,000 worth of sewing

materials to the Ukrainian women as a result of Rudnytska's efforts, and the YWCA promised to equip two day-care centres.

Vasyl Sofroniv Levytsky twice commented on his "strange apathy" in his DP diary, *Respublika za drotamy (Zapysky skytaltsia)* (Toronto, 1983). I suspect that these women, particularly the intelligentsia, were afflicted with depression. See also Knysh, *Pershi kroky*, esp. 30-2, and Rudnytska correspondence in Sheparovych file.

9. Rudnytska to the Canadian Ukrainian Women's League, 4 August 1945. A copy of that letter is in the possession of Tonia Horokhovych, who was the secretary for the Initiative Group to re-establish the Union. She also has a copy of Rudnytska's letter to Pavlykovska, 2 February 1945, discussing the period.
- Red Cross to Rudnytska, 5 April 1946, Rudnytska file, Archives of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, New York.
10. Text in Rebet, *35 rokiv Obiednannia*, 20.
11. All quotations are from the mimeographed text in the files of Dontsova, "Rezoliutsii ukhvaleni na z'izdi tsentralnoho Obiednannia Ukrainskykh Zhinok na Emigratsii z dnia 15 i 16 hrudnia, 1945." These resolutions are slightly different from the version Pavlykovska cited in Rebet, *35 rokiv Obiednannia*. The resolutions also prominently expressed the gratitude of the women to the central Ukrainian Emigre Committee for its support of the OUZh.
12. "Rezoliutsii ukhvaleni," *Zavdannia*, II, point 11.
13. The Corps of St. Olha had been the name of a women's organization in Western Ukraine when the Women's Union was briefly suspended by the Polish authorities in 1938.
14. Text published in 1947, with addresses of Ukrainian Relief Committees in various countries.
15. *Hromadianka*, no. 1, 1.
16. Mimeographed text, no date, in Dontsova files.
17. *Pravylnyk Delegatur Obiednannia Ukrainskykh Zhinok na Emigratsii* (three-page mimeographed document), Dontsova files.
18. "Plenum Holovnoi Upravy OUZh," *Hromadianka*, no. 10 (1947): 8-9.
19. Olena Kysilevska, "Zizd Kanadiiskoi Zhinochoi Rady," *Hromadianka*, nos. 4-5 (1948): 3. "Svitova Zhinocha Orhanizatsiia," *ibid.*, 9 (1947): 2-3, reported the presence of Anna Syvuliak of UNWLA at the Philadelphia meeting of the ICW on 5-12 September 1947. The league's journal, *Nashe zhyttia* (Our Life), published in Philadelphia, gave the alliance wide coverage and equated it with the whole women's movement in the camps.
20. *Nashe zhyttia* (June 1948): 3, contained Olena Lototska's ringing call for the congress to be "the very first WORLD Congress of Ukrainian Women in the history of the Ukrainian nation." The women's congress, held in Stanyslaviv in 1934, had had representatives from America, and the UNWLA was a founding member of the All-Ukrainian Women's Union. Somehow, that fact was overlooked by some women and suppressed by others, while those who remembered were not actual participants in

the Philadelphia meeting. In a lengthy interview in *Nedilia* (14 November 1948, published in Aschaffenburg), Rudnytska, who had not been invited to Philadelphia, ruefully commented that the unity of Ukrainian women abroad had been broken. She also noted that Ukrainian-American women could convene whatever congress they wished, but calling the Philadelphia convention the first world gathering of Ukrainian women was grossly inaccurate.

21. For instance, Pavlykovska's speech at a women's congress, 29-30 March 1947, in *Hromadianka*, no. 5 (May 1947): 2-3. (At that time, *Hromadianka* appeared as a supplement to *Chas*.)
22. K. H., "Zhinka i polityka," *Hromadianka*, no. 5 (May 1947): 4.
23. See, for instance, A. K., "...A ukrainska zhinka," *Nedilia*, no. 38 (1947); and O. K., "Shche pro ukrainsku zhinku," *Hromadianka*, no. 9 (1947): 3-4, and "De ukrainska hromadianka," *Nedilia*, no. 149 (1948).

Literature and Literary Activity

Organizational Aspects of DP Literary Activity

Danylo Husar Struk

“George Bernard Shaw once remarked that authors are incorrigible individualists, addicted to solitude and generally without any capacity for business or organization. And at first glance, the whole idea of a *society of authors* might seem paradoxical.”¹ Yet writers were the first of the Ukrainian DPs to organize. Only four months and seventeen days after V.E. Day and before UNRRA took official control of the DP camps in partitioned Germany, the Union of Ukrainian Writers (Mystetskyi ukrainskyi rukh, MUR) came into existence.²

The establishment of MUR was not the only organizational activity among Ukrainian writers, yet it is the most substantive and interesting. There were many literary organizations, as yet uncounted, but even a cursory glance at the bibliography³ reveals more than ten literary magazines, most of which were organs of local literary organizations. That bibliography also reveals that most of those journals, magazines, and almanacs had a very brief existence. Many existed only for several issues or even just one.⁴ A contemporary stated that although:

in various camps there existed various literary associations, they were incapable of providing any meaningful manifestation of their existence, and when, for instance, they turned to the publication of journals, they would immediately go beyond the boundaries of their local camp and invite authors from other regions to participate. Such was the case with the journal of the Karlsfeld association, *Ridne slovo*, or with the journal of the Augsburg association, *Zahrava*, both of which had a comparatively longer existence than other more ephemeral publications of the local writers' associations.

In the organization of literature the local camp principle proved beneficial only for the inept and the graphomaniacs.... Somewhat more important were

attempts to organize around political groupings and especially the attempt to organize...MUR.⁵

One may, therefore, forego all other literary organizations and concentrate on MUR. The Chronological Table (pp. 233-4) shows the activities of MUR during its three-year existence (from 23 September 1945 to 2 November 1948). An attempt to transplant⁶ the organization overseas was planned, but despite the efforts of some of the members to revive the organization, it was impossible.⁷ Mere dates and facts, however, hardly reflect its real activity. They must be fleshed out in order to get some idea of how and why the organization came into being, what caused its demise, and the value of its contribution to Ukrainian literature.

The celerity with which Ukrainian writers began to organize is puzzling, given the history and background of the initiators. The organization was apparently created by a six-member group: I. Bahriany, V. Domontovych, Iu. Kosach, I. Kostetsky, I. Maistrenko, and Iu. Sherekh.⁸ The only information on this important event is in a sparse report given by Sherekh at the first MUR congress.⁹ According to that, the six met in Nürnberg on 25 September 1945 and formally launched MUR with the following "declaration":¹⁰

The times have placed and place before Ukrainian art that task to which it has been called: to serve its nation by its highly artistic and superb form and in such a way as to establish for itself a voice and an authority in the art of the world.

Discarding all that is artistically imperfect and ideologically hostile to the Ukrainian nation, Ukrainian artists are uniting in order to strive in friendly cooperation toward the summit of real and serious art. This union of Ukrainian artists in emigration is open to those masters of the word and brush who write on their flag the motto of an art that is superb, ideologically and formally mature, as well as in a state of constant, eternal quest.

The initiatory group of Ukrainian writers who are starting MUR considers as its first concrete tasks the consolidation of artistic resources, such resources which wish to and can unite under the above motto; the preparation of a charter and by-laws of the organization; the establishment of a publishing house; and the development of publishing activity. For the latter this group is taking over, in agreement with the owners, one of the printing houses. Through the publication of collections, newspapers, and books of individual authors the initiatory group is striving to make its idea popular in artistic circles as well as individual literary groupings and to call into being the Ukrainian artistic movement which, by its momentum, would serve the establishment of a new literary era.¹¹

The declaration is rather indicative, in its nationalistic and romantic terminology and ambitious goals, of the heady idealism of its founders. Even the name of the organization—MUR—is a curious phenomenon. Its formation lies in the Soviet tradition of the 1920s of forming such acronyms as MARS and VAPLITE, but what is more interesting is that the acronym has a very specific

meaning—wall. That certainly reflects the longing of the founders for stability and artistic firmness, which the time of great upheaval made even more precious and unattainable. Wall also implies something which will protect, embrace, and unify. At the same time, the individual words stand for Artistic Ukrainian Movement, and “movement” gives quite a different emphasis. It implies dynamism, something akin to the vitality (*vitaizm*) of the twenties. It recalls the *rukh* of Tychyna’s *Soniashni kliarnety*, with its “momentum [which] would serve the establishment of a new literary era.” It is also quite indicative that even though the organizers were all writers, the name refers to “artists” and the movement was to encompass more than literature. This was not incidental. MUR was meant to be an all-embracing, intellectual movement, as opposed to a singular grouping, and, like a wall, was meant to enfold and protect all these creative but displaced persons. Khvylovy’s VAPLITE—the Academy of Ukrainian Literature and Art—was being revived once again. The comparison to VAPLITE is especially relevant, because VAPLITE’s main objective¹² was “to aim at quality, not quantity, and to elevate the *cultural life of Ukraine*....”¹³

The initiatory MUR group compiled a list of thirty-eight authors¹⁴ they thought should belong to the organization as founding members.¹⁵ They also elected a temporary executive consisting of Bahriany, Kostetsky, and Sherekh. These three co-opted Domontovych and started to perform functions that they established as the first priorities of this executive: 1) Find the persons on the founders’ list and ask them to become members of MUR; 2) Work out a constitution (by-laws) for MUR; 3) Explore publication prospects, and, if possible, establish a system for the publication of books; 4) Establish contact with the umbrella organization of the Ukrainian emigration to gain recognition for MUR; 5) Prepare and hold a MUR conference.¹⁶

Despite difficulties in communication and general postwar confusion, the provisional executive managed to accomplish four of those five tasks quickly and amazingly well. According to the report given during the first congress of MUR (only three months after the initiative group was formed), a congress had been prepared and was being held (point 5). All but six of the thirty-eight “founding” members had been contacted (point 1).¹⁷ The constitution (by-laws) had been prepared, read, and approved at the congress (point 2). Contact with the central umbrella organization had been made, and MUR was proclaimed the “leading organization of writers” (point 4).¹⁸

The Aschaffenburg Congress elected Ulas Samchuk head of the organization. His letter-declaration to the Central Representation, addressed to Professor D. Doroshenko, proclaims:

We take this opportunity to announce to you that the organization MUR is the *only* representative unit of such type on the territory of Europe in which our fugitives find themselves. The organization embraces all the foremost [creative] forces of our contemporary literature. Among various clusters of our citizenry in various locations there also exist local unions and organizations, but

all of these serve only local interests and needs...but in the external sphere all matters which relate to the literary activity of our cultural sector are represented and cared for exclusively by the organization MUR.¹⁹

The only item on the priorities list of the temporary executive which proved difficult to accomplish was number three, publications. This most pressing item was an unattainable goal throughout the organization's existence. Although the provisional executive (as well as the elected executive) tried to acquire one of the several presses which operated in the various camps, they failed. The Regensburg attempt is a good example of this failure. Documents indeed suggest that the alacrity with which the initiators threw themselves into the idea of creating MUR was tied to the sudden availability of a Ukrainian printing press. It was in the possession of two writers, L. Poltava and L. Lyman, both in the Regensburg DP camp.²⁰ That printing press, though discovered and seized by Poltava and Lyman, was under the control of a local political organization in Regensburg, the Committee for Stateless Ukrainians (CSU). MUR was forced to negotiate with this committee, which was reluctant to release the press. MUR turned for help to the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration. On 14 October 1945 (almost two weeks before the organization officially existed), a letter from the general secretary of the Central Representation, Roman Ilnytzkyj, went to the CSU in Regensburg. Ilnytzkyj outlined the need of the Ukrainian community for a central newspaper, the scarcity of printing facilities, and the dangers of need-less duplication. Then he proposed:

In the opinion of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration it would be advisable to begin publishing a Ukrainian newspaper in Regensburg, employing the facilities of the editorial staff of the mimeographed newspaper, *Chas*, published in Fürth. This newspaper would be published under the control of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration and its literary pages under the control of the literary-artistic organization MUR and would thus become the leading organ of the Ukrainian émigré community.

[Therefore it would be necessary] to hand over to MUR the printing press used by the CSU and Messrs. L. Poltava and L. Lyman in Regensburg.²¹

The discussions and pleas led to an agreement between MUR and the Regensburg CSU, but just before the actual takeover, the CSU decided to establish its own publishing house and thus refused to hand over the press. Similar last-minute failures plagued MUR's other attempts to get its own press and publishing house throughout its existence.²² This had a significant influence on all the publishing activities of MUR, as Sherekh tersely observed:

This episode, by itself insignificant, is important in that from the very beginning it left the union of writers without its own publishing base and predetermined its publication policy. The cornerstone of this policy was to make use of all possible avenues of publication, controlled more and more by various political groupings, and to do this without any outright political co-operation, maintaining, if not a supra- then an inter-party stance.²³

Thus even the few organizational publications of MUR had various publishers: *Almanakh* was published by *Ukrainski visti* in Stuttgart; *Zbirnyk II* and *III* by *Ukrainske slovo* in Regensburg; and *Arka* by *Ukrainska trybuna* in Munich. The unifying feature of all the MUR publications and the mark of “quality control” was the symbol-imprint of the organization, *Zolota Brama*.²⁴

Despite those difficulties the organization did create a small series (*Mala Biblioteka MURu*) and proceeded to publish various well-edited editions of smaller works.²⁵ Moreover, right from the start the organization did everything in its power to plan and control literary output. The provisional executive issued a questionnaire to authors asking about works awaiting publication. The return of the questionnaire, however, was tardy and sporadic, so no publishing schedule for available works could be drawn up. As early as 10 December 1945 the executive also sent a form letter to prospective members, asking for lists of members’ and classical works to be approved for publication in books used for recitations at various public forums. Furthermore, it asked for names of authors who would be willing to travel to various camps to do readings at literary evenings.²⁶ Six months later another form letter was sent out to all the members, warning against uncontrolled and chaotic publication—the proliferation of similar journals—and cautioning against the irreparable harm done to literature when the reader was presented with good, indifferent, and bad literature in the same journal. That appeal was meant to encourage members actively to support the executive’s creation of one representative journal. To this end, they were to “give their best artistic work” to that journal and “refuse to scatter it over the innumerable and often sporadic publications.” It went on:

The executive of MUR asks you: a) To hand over your works first and foremost to the representative organs of MUR and, in conjunction with the development and growth of these organs, to refuse to participate or greatly reduce your participation in other journals; b) not to accept editorial duties from other journals, and if you are already editing some other journal to get it to merge with MUR.²⁷

This appeal had limited success. There are some letters from individual authors, promising not to write for other journals,²⁸ as well as another form letter from the publication sector of MUR informing the members that the Innsbruck-based journal *Zveno* had officially become an organ of MUR.²⁹ In general the executive could not enforce its publication policy either on its members or on the owners of the printing facilities.

They were more successful, however, in organization. Despite the short time for preparation and general confusion, when the first congress opened on 21 December, nineteen authors were present.³⁰ That congress had three segments: theoretical, organizational, and performance. There were five papers presented in the first segment.³¹ They dealt with general literary problems and endeavoured to establish some guidelines for future literary work.³² The second

segment (organizational) was devoted to the most essential business of the newly founded MUR. Sherekh presented his report on the activities of the initiating group and the temporary executive. Domontovych presented the projected by-laws³³ of the organization, which the congress approved and accepted. Membership dues were set at one Reichsmark per month plus one per cent of any honorarium received, either from publications or from public appearances.³⁴ The first congress also prepared a resolution of intent and purpose. Finally, a nominating committee was struck (composed of M. Bazhansky, O. Liaturynska, and M. Svarozhych), which in turn proposed a slate of seven names (I. Bahriany, V. Domontovych, Iu. Kosach, I. Kostetsky, B. Podoliak, U. Samchuk, and Iu. Sherekh) for the executive and three names (V. Barka, I. Maistrenko, and V. Porsky) for the audit commission, with Sofiia Nesych as the candidate to this commission. There was a secret ballot and the slate was elected as proposed.³⁵ Despite the fact that Samchuk did not receive the greatest number of votes, at the first executive meeting he was chosen head of the organization. Sherekh became his associate and head of the membership qualification committee; Kostetsky became secretary-treasurer; Domontovych became head of the editorial-publishing committee; and Kosach was chosen for organizational chairman.³⁶

As part of the third segment at the first congress (performance), there were two literary readings. During the first one, Sherekh led the proceedings. While introducing the various authors who were to read, he gave a concise outline of the development of Ukrainian literature and the role of the participating authors in this development.³⁷ During the second literary evening the stage belonged to the younger poets: Harasevych, Stepanenko, Chorny, Sytnyk, and Hanna Cherin.³⁸ They were introduced by Podoliak. The second half of the evening was devoted to the reading of works by Iu. Kosach. He read the prose and the actress, I. Lavrivska, recited his poetry.

This rather detailed presentation of the events at the first congress set the pattern for the next two congresses. As promised at the first congress, the first conference in Augsburg was basically a repetition of the first Aschaffenburg congress. Yet there were differences both in the composition of those attending (Samchuk, for example, was absent) and in the program. There were some additions, as well as papers which were repeated from the first congress.³⁹ Most of the time, however, was devoted to a discussion of Sherekh's paper on the styles of Ukrainian émigré literature. The literary evenings included works by O. Babii, Sofiia Nesych, L. Lyman, L. Poltava, M. Sytnyk, Iu. Buriakivets, I. Manylo, Hanna Cherin, some young prose writers, and the Belorussian poet M. Sednov.

At the following two congresses the executive underwent some changes. During the second congress in Neu-Ulm on 15-16 March 1947, Samchuk and Sherekh retained their positions, Kosach was re-elected to the executive, and Podoliak became a full member. The other members of the executive were

replaced by Dyvnych and Hordynsky. Derzhavyn and Slavutych became candidates for the executive.⁴⁰ The third and final congress of MUR, 11-12 April 1948 in Zuffenhausen near Stuttgart, again elected Samchuk and Sherekh to the top executive positions. Only Dyvnych remained from the second executive. All the others were replaced by new members: Kravtsiv, Liudmyla Kovalenko, Bazhansky. Slavutych moved from candidate to full member of the executive. Miiakovsky (Porsky) and Korovytsky became candidates for the executive.⁴¹

In September 1947 Samchuk left for Canada and MUR's activity diminished. Neither Samchuk nor Sherekh mentioned any organizational activity after that. Materials in the MUR archives, however, reveal that the executive did meet after Samchuk's departure and that Sherekh was elected co-head of MUR.⁴² Kravtsiv was elected associate head with Sherekh. Yet despite the fact that it was really Sherekh who was the heart and soul of MUR, his stewardship made little difference. The time of MUR was over. Sherekh gave three reasons for the demise of the organization: lack of funds, lack of people due to emigration, and finally, political harassment.⁴³ One cannot argue against those. They were valid reasons for its demise, but there are still some points which must be clarified, and some conclusions to be drawn.

MUR never really solved its publication problems. It failed to gain control of a press and to organize a publication programme, not only for lack of funds but also for lack of co-operation from publishing enterprises and from MUR members themselves. What seemed to annoy MUR most was the fact that unqualified publishers had control over publications—the writers' lifeline. When the Regensburg attempt at securing a printing press failed, MUR wrote a note of complaint to the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration voicing these fears:

The printing press is used by a publishing co-operative formed from persons who have no relation to literature and who base their venture exclusively on private and commercial aims.

In fact the control over literary publications is concentrated in the hands of unqualified people, thus evoking indignation among writers and threatening to create an atmosphere of conflict in which our foremost authors would be isolated from publishers or placed in dependence on commercial factors.⁴⁴

These complaints are very revealing of the basic misconception that motivated the founders and the executive of MUR. Clearly they were thinking in Marxist terms—worker control over the means of production. Therefore they feared that publishing would not be in the hands of the authors themselves, and that commercial considerations would not allow for the best in literary output. From this it followed that the general public was ready neither to judge nor choose its own path in literature. They felt the public was incapable of differentiating between good and bad literature.

In the Western world commercial success serves as one of the deciding operating principles for most publishers. Judging quality literature is left to the reader, with prompting from professional critics and qualified editors, if or when the prompting is sought or heeded. Every author considers himself excellent and worthy of being read and often considers his approach the only right one. However, rarely does a group of authors aspire to manage the cultural development of a society. This is a uniquely Eastern, or more precisely, Russian-Ukrainian, phenomenon, where so much social and political thought entered the consciousness of society through literature. In the case of MUR, the aim of the organization—to marshal, lead, and control the development of Ukrainian culture, to create an all-encompassing cultural movement—was a continuation of the attempts by M. Khvylioviy to create a new Ukrainian proletarian culture.⁴⁵ Khvylioviy's VAPLITE never finished its work. It was suddenly and brutally interrupted. The men and women who were witnesses to that, who understood its importance and who thought in those very specifically Eastern literary terms were the founders of MUR. It was to be an academy, an Olympus. It was to have hegemony and to represent Ukrainian literature to the rest of the world. MUR, unlike its predecessor VAPLITE, did not choose the style of art, but it did insist that it be the arbiter of quality. The first to protest, of course, were some of the authors themselves. Significantly, Osmachka accused MUR of "vaplitanism."⁴⁶ Others, such as Kosach and Derzhavyn, protested and left the organization as soon as the standard of quality did not coincide with their wishes.

Much of MUR's time⁴⁷ was devoted to the resolution of various unpleasantnesses precipitated by members and non-members, owing to personal jealousies, misunderstandings about the nature of the organization, and political differences. Although many of these intrigues were nothing more than idiosyncrasies of the malcontents,⁴⁸ there was a built-in component, the idea of elitism, which was bound to be a destructive element in the organization. Even the methods devised by MUR to insure some quality control often backfired. Writers published on the side and used the MUR mark of quality, not always with the permission of the executive. Others besieged the association with applications for membership, thinking that would give them status as writers.

Sherekh's second reason for the demise of MUR—the lack of people owing to emigration—also requires elaboration. V. Mudry listed 104,024 Ukrainians in the American Zone of Germany in 1946 and only 67,255 in 1948,⁴⁹ a decrease of more than 35 per cent. The same proportion may hold for the members of MUR, yet that is not the whole story. A membership list of 14 September 1946 (in preparation for the Bayreuth conference) has forty-five members and two candidates. More than thirty of those were from Eastern Ukraine. The entire first executive, with the exception of Samchuk, was from Eastern Ukraine. The fact that Samchuk, despite a smaller number of votes, was internally chosen as head of the organization, is also indicative of its contradictory nature. MUR's initiators

and prime movers were mainly Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine, but the majority of the émigrés came from Western Ukraine. To avoid inherent distrust and even hostility, and to cement the organization, the leader had to be acceptable to both the Eastern émigré minority (but majority of known and established writers) and the Western émigré majority (but minority of authors). The leader also had to be at least nominally acceptable to the strong nationalist political parties, which were growing progressively stronger. The Eastern Ukrainians were on the whole not members of the nationalist parties, suspicious of them and suspected by them. Samchuk, from Volhynia and not Eastern Ukraine, was also one of the few who, though basically apolitical, had sufficient connections with at least one nationalist faction to be above reproach and have sufficient stature to be accepted by both East and West. Naturally, when such a neutral and unifying figure left for Canada, Sherekh found it much more difficult to manage the organization. His “front” was gone and the influence of the parties had grown. The inevitable split—some members quit MUR; Derzhavyn’s group, Svitannia, withdrew—coupled with the exodus of immigrants overseas left only a shadow of the original organization.

The third reason given by Sherekh—that the political parties did everything to monopolize control of literary and even scholarly activity and thus undermine MUR’s efforts—cannot be dismissed lightly. However, MUR was destined to fail because it was a concept alien to the majority of the emigration. They were not accustomed to centralized planning in all spheres of life. Even its terminology and organizational structure must have seemed strange and foreign, because they were based on Soviet models. Its elitism also doomed it to failure, as it had VAPLITE. Even if MUR had managed to establish a publishing house, the eternal strife among the various authors clamouring to be published would have applied constant and disruptive stress to the organization. Sooner or later the commercial values of the West and private enterprise would have come into conflict with this centralized and communal publishing effort.

It was a great attempt to create a synthetic milieu, a society in which reader, writer, critic, and publisher were all provided. It worked at first because of the sudden wealth of talent which the upheaval of World War II had thrown together. The conditions of life in the DP camps also contributed. People had the time, if not always the money, to organize, plan, and create. It is quite obvious why, on crossing over to North America, MUR could not take root. People just did not have the time to meet and plan; and although communication was a problem in postwar Germany, the distances were nothing in comparison to those faced by authors living in North America. Yet, five years after MUR’s quiet death, SLOVO⁵⁰ was born—once again an abortive publishing venture. It seems, Shaw notwithstanding, that Ukrainian writers just cannot exist without an organization.

MUR was driven primarily by the energies of one man, Sherekh. Its highest achievement, *Arka*, is also the achievement of Sherekh, its editor. Yet MUR was a reflection of an intense period of social activity, harnessing all the available creative forces after the destructive interruption of the war. In this it was also akin to the twenties in Soviet Ukraine, when a sudden surge of literary activity followed the cataclysm of the revolution.

Chronological Table

25 Sept. 1945	Initiatory
21-3 Dec. 1945	1st Congress, Aschaffenburg
23 Dec. 1945	1st Exec. meeting, Aschaffenburg
27 Jan. 1946	2nd Exec., Augsburg
28-9 Jan. 1946	1st General meeting, Augsburg
April 1946	MUR <i>Zbirnyk</i> I
26 April 1946	3rd Exec., Ulm
10 May 1946	4th Exec., Füssen (Minutes in MUR Archives; Samchuk gives 14 May, <i>Plianeta</i>)
3 June 1946	5th Exec., Neu-Ulm
Sept. 1946	MUR <i>Zbirnyk</i> II
4-5 Oct. 1946	2nd Conf. on criticism, Bayreuth
End 1946	MUR <i>Almanakh</i> (Minutes in MUR Archives; Samchuk gives 15 Jan., <i>Plianeta</i>)
12 Jan. 1947	6th Exec., Augsburg
Early 1947	MUR <i>Zbirnyk</i> III
15-16 March 1947	2nd Congress, Neu-Ulm
17 March 1947	7th Exec., Neu-Ulm
9 May 1947	8th Exec., Korntal (Minutes in MUR Archives; Samchuk gives 10 May, <i>Plianeta</i> .)

- 12-13 July 1947 MUR joins OM
(Obiednani Mystetstva [The United Arts], an umbrella organization)
- July 1947 *Arka*
(Continued as a monthly until May 1948 (11 issues), Sherekh, "Ukrainian Émigré Literature," 245.)
- 5-6 Nov. 1947 3rd Conf. on drama, Mainz-Kastel
- 25 Jan. 1948 9th Exec., Munich(?)
(Not mentioned by Samchuk; Minutes do not list the place)
- 11-12 April 1948 3rd Congress, Zuffenhausen
- 23 Sept. 1948 Samchuk to Canada
- 2 Nov. 1948 10th Exec.
(Sherekh to Samchuk, 2 Nov. 1948; MUR Archives in UVAN.)

Sources: Ulas Samchuk, *Plianela Di-Pi* (Winnipeg, 1979); Sherekh, "Ukrainska emihratsiina literatura v Evropi 1945-1949," in *Ne dlia ditei* (Proloh, 1964), 245; MUR Archives in UVAN.

Notes

1. Neil Berry, "Groans from Grub Street," *Times Literary Supplement*, 23 November 1984, 1329. (A review of Richard Findlater, *Author, Author*—emphasis is mine.)
2. Ahor, "Khronika," *MUR, Zbirnyk I* (1946): 98.
 This early date (25 September 1945 in Nürnberg) is even more striking when compared with other organizational events. Thus it was only on 1 November 1945 that the Ukrainian umbrella organization, the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany [Tsentralne predstavnytstvo ukrainskoi emihratsii v Nimechyni] was formed in Aschaffenburg; on 16 November that the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN) was re-established in Augsburg; and 30 June 1947 that the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh) was reactivated in Munich. This chronology is based on Y. Boshyk and B. Balan, *Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons," 1945-1954: A Selected Bibliography and Guide to Research with Special Reference to Ukrainians* (Edmonton, 1982), xiv-xxxiii. One clarification, however, must be made immediately. The 25 September date marks the meeting of the initiative committee, while the first congress, held in Aschaffenburg, did not take place until 21-3 December. There a proper executive was elected.
3. Boshyk and Balan, *Political Refugees*, 221-46.
4. *Khors* in Regensburg, although quite impressive in its content and trilingual captions, had but one issue—October 1946.
5. Hr. Shevchuk, "Tabir u literaturi i literatura v tabori," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 55-64. All translations are mine.
6. Sherekh to Hordynsky, 7 May 1948: "In accordance with the new by-laws of MUR, one is advised to establish branches of MUR in all countries where there are five and more members...." MUR Archives in UVAN.
7. Samchuk (in Toronto) to Sherekh, 30 May 1949, referred to the difficulty of this task. The same sentiment is recorded by Hryhorii Kostiuk, *Z litopysu ukrainskoho zhyttia v diiaspori* (Munich, 1971), 7.
8. Ahor, "Khronika," 98; *Deklaratsiia Obiednannia Ukrainskykh Pysmennykiv ta Mysttsiv*, MUR Archives in UVAN.
 In his recollection of the initiatory meeting, Samchuk lists L. Poltava as one of the original six, and not Iu. Kosach. See Ulas Samchuk, *Plianela Di-Pi* (Winnipeg, 1979), 24. Sherekh, however, lists both Kosach and Poltava. See Iu. Sherekh, "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura v Evropi 1945-1949," in *Ne dlia ditei* (n.p., 1964), 230-1.
9. Reprinted in *Zbirnyk I*, in the "Khronika" section.
10. Both Sherekh, "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura," 230 and Samchuk, *Plianela*, give the place as Fürth, where both Sherekh and Kostetsky were living; Samchuk does not give a date.
11. *Deklaratsiia Obiednannia Ukrainskykh Pysmennykiv ta Mysttsiv*, MUR Archives in UVAN.

12. It is interesting to compare the manifesto of VAPLITE with the Declaration of MUR in order to note some of the similar concerns, especially the emphasis on quality and cultural development:

The [future] literary organization should unite qualified writers.... The management of the organization should be in the hands of a council elected from the representatives of various schools and tendencies.... The organization should consist of several literary schools, forming one organization with a [common] ideological basis, while retaining wide autonomy as far as their literary work is concerned as well as in purely formal matters of publishing, the recruitment of young literary forces, and the accomplishment of cultural work outside the organization.

The organization must be united, although consisting of separate units and schools which, however, should not have a separate legal existence.

As quoted by George S. N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine: 1917-1934* (New York, 1956), 60-1.

13. Luckyj, *Literary Politics*, 61.
14. Ahor, "Khronika," 98. Sherekh included among the "founding members" the 7 initiators plus another 25. Later, another 23 were added to this group for a total of 55, plus 6 candidates. Sherekh, "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura," 233-4.
15. A list of founding members (an addition to the by-laws of the organization) lists 32, including the 6 initiators. An undated list in the archives of "writers invited by the initiating group to join MUR" lists 35, without the initiators. Twelve authors on this list do not appear on the founders' list; and two (apart from the initiators) on the founders' list do not appear on the "to be invited list."
16. Ahor, "Khronika," 98.
17. So says the report in "Khronika." Sherekh divided this process into two stages (see above) and claimed that of all those contacted, only Leonyd Mosendz refused to join. Sherekh, "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura," 233. The most famous émigré author, V. Vynnychenko, was not asked to join, although there was a connection with France as early as 1946.
18. Ahor, "Khronika," 99.
19. Dated 26 December 1945, Offenbach, it also reports on the proceedings of the congress and the election of the executive. MUR Archives in UVAN.
Compare the insistence on being the *sole* representative body to the VAPLITE manifesto quoted above. Emphasis is mine.
20. Although officially (in archival documents), L. Poltava was not a member of the initiators, both Samchuk, in his memoirs, and Sherekh, in his article, included him in the list. The reason for this double error lies most probably in the fact that it was Poltava's possession of the press that sparked the idea of organized literary activity and, primarily, organized publication. Supporting this hypothesis of MUR's genesis is the statement in the declaration that the newly formed group "is taking over, in agreement with the owners, one of the printing houses," as well as an archival letter dated four days after the so-called initiatory meeting, namely 29 September 1945. It is from Bahriany, Kostetsky, and Shevelov in Fürth-Nürnberg to L. Poltava and

L. Lyman in Regensburg. The letter tells of the formation of MUR on the twenty-fifth of the month, disposes of the purposes of the organization by including a copy of the declaration, and then proceeds:

As its first task MUR considers the creation of a writers' co-operative publishing house—*Zolota Brama*.

In the belief that the scarce printing means which can be found in the American occupation zone of Germany should be used not for speculative ends nor for the wishes of individual persons but for the development of Ukrainian culture and literature, the initiatory group of MUR turns to you with the proposal to submit the activity of your printing press to the control of the public professional writers' organization.

MUR Archives in UVAN.

21. MUR Archives in UVAN.
22. The difficulties encountered by MUR because it did not have its own printing facilities are apparent in Sherekh to Samchuk, 26 September 1947. Samchuk, *Pliianeta*, 308-9.
23. Sherekh, "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura," 234-5.
24. For a listing of works with this imprint, see *ibid.*, 246.
25. For a listing see *ibid.*, 235.
26. Form letter from Shevelov, 10 December 1945. MUR Archives in UVAN. Note again the similarity in activity to that of members of VAPLITE, who also made field trips and brought culture to the masses. See notes taken at such a reading in Iurii Lutsky, ed., *Lehkosynia dal: Vaplitiianskyi zbirnyk* (New York, 1963), 43-8.
27. Form letter from Samchuk and Domontovych, 17 May 1946, Ulm, MUR Archives in UVAN.
28. L. Korowytzky to the executive of MUR, 7 June 1946, MUR Archives in UVAN.
29. Form letter from publication sector in Munich to members, 23 September 1946, MUR Archives in UVAN.
30. Bahriany, Barka, Bazhansky, Cherin, Chorny, Harasevych, Kosach, Kostetsky, Kostiuk, Liaturynska, Petrov [Domontovych], Poltava, Ryndyk, Samchuk, Shaian, Shevelov, Slavutych, Stepanenko, and Sytnyk. See Samchuk, *Pliianeta*, 24. The minutes of the congress, however, give the number as sixteen voting members.
31. They were Samchuk, "Velyka literatura" [A Great Literature]; Sherekh, "Styli suchasnoi ukrainskoi literatury na emihratsii" [The Styles of Contemporary Ukrainian Literature in Emigration]; Bahriany, "Pro zavdannia ukrainskoi poezii" [On the Tasks of Ukrainian Poetry]; Kosach, "Kryza suchasnoi ukrainskoi literatury" [The Crisis of Contemporary Ukrainian Literature], and Kostetsky, "Problema ukrainskoho realizmu XX storichchia" [The Problems of Ukrainian Realism of the Twentieth Century].
32. These presentations provided the participants at the congress with materials for discussion and the publication committee with ready-made content for the organization's *Zbirnyk*. Later the executive also tried to organize conferences around one

major problem or issue. For example, the second general conference in Bayreuth, 4-6 October 1946, concentrated on literary criticism, while the next conference, in Mainz-Kastel on 4-6 November, concentrated on drama. The one on criticism included Podoliak, "Problems of Contemporary Ukrainian Émigré Literary Criticism"; Biletsky, "The Writer and Criticism"; Hrytsai, "Literary Criticism: Its Artistic Aim and Pitfalls"; Kosach, "Historical Belles Lettres and the Position of Criticism"; Kostetsky, "Subjectivism in Literary Criticism"; Chaplenko, "Literature and the Reader"; and Derzhavyn, "Literary Criticism and Literary Genres." For the original titles, see Samchuk, *Plianeta*, 155. For the conference on drama see Samchuk, *Plianeta*, 256-7; and Sherekh, "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura," 243.

33. Two versions of the by-laws exist in the MUR Archives in UVAN. The subtle differences between them deserve a separate analysis.
34. Ahor, "Khronika," 99.
35. Of the 18 voting members, 2 abstained. The result of the vote was: 15 votes each for Domontovych, Sherekh, and Kosach; 14 for Samchuk, 13 for Kostetsky. That established the top five members of the executive. The remaining two (Podoliak received 12 and Bahrianyi 10) became candidates to the executive. Minutes of the Aschaffenburg Congress, MUR Archives in UVAN.
This is strikingly similar in pattern to the Soviet political system of presidium and candidates to the presidium.
36. Minutes of the first executive committee meeting, 23 December 1945, MUR Archives in UVAN.
37. The authors reading were Domontovych (a short story), Slavutych (a poem), Kostetsky (a novella), Samchuk (an excerpt from a novelette), Barka (poems), and Bahrianyi (poems and epigrams).
38. What is noteworthy, if only for the resemblance to events which still occur today, is the fact that one of the younger authors caused a small scandal. Hanna Cherin changed her mind and did not read poetry but a short piece of prose. The subject, prostitution in Paris, upset many in the audience. In a report on the event the justification reads: "Hanna Cherin—according to the later explanation of B. Podoliak—was not to have read this short story, and the organizers of the evening did not know this piece in advance. Too bad. The artistic level of the evening was undermined." Ahor, "Khronika," 103. This type of commentary is a depressing witness to the unchanging prudery and censorship of the Ukrainian literary community.
39. The new ones were M. Shlemkevych on "Searches for World Outlooks" and O. Hrytsai on "Small or Great Literature."
40. In the theoretical segment of the congress, Sherekh read his "Roku Bozhoho 1946" [The Year of Our Lord 1946] and Derzhavyn his "Nasha literaturna proza 1946 - pochatku 1947 roku" [Our Literary Prose 1946—beginning of 1947]. Kosach presented a talk on contemporary drama: "Obrii novoi dramy" [Horizons of New Drama].

41. Again in the theoretical section, Sherekh gave his survey "Roku Bozhoho 1947" [The Year of Our Lord 1947]; Kostetsky examined émigré poetry, "Dekilka prykyrykh pytan" [Several Unpleasant Questions]; and Boiko gave a survey of Soviet Ukrainian literature.
42. Sherekh to Samchuk, 2 November 1948, MUR Archives in UVAN. Zenon Kuzelia to Sherekh, 9 November 1948, confirms that Sherekh became head of MUR: "Having learned from the press that you have been elected head of MUR, I hasten on this account to send you my congratulations and to wish you the utmost success in your work." MUR Archives in UVAN.
43. "The monetary reform in Germany undermined the financial basis of the existing publishers. The massive emigration from Germany, along with the fluid state of all émigré centres, made almost all organized cultural activity impossible.... A disillusionment with work came over many authors because of the campaign of baiting, unscrupulous in its methods, instigated by the political parties against all those working in literature whose activity did not coincide with the norms acceptable to the party politicians. It is this circumstance which produced in many writers a desire to work alone, not sharing with anyone the results of their work; a desire to abstain from all activity in any civic or literary groups." Sherekh, "Ukrains'ka emigratsiina literatura," 248-9.
44. MUR to V. Mudry, MUR Archives in UVAN.
45. On the manifesto of VAPLITE see Luckyj, *Literary Politics*, 60-1.
46. See Samchuk, *Plianeta*, 47.
47. It is evident in numerous letters in the MUR Archives, and in the reprinted letters of Shevelov to Samchuk. See Samchuk, *Plianeta*, esp. 54-7, 58-9, 198-200, 225-6, 236-7, 278-80, 289-91, 302-3, 308-9.
48. The problems MUR had with Osmachka and Kosach, for example. See Samchuk, *Plianeta*, 47, 161 (Osmachka) and 58-9, 137-8, 271-4, 286-7 (Kosach).
49. Vasyl Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia ta orhanizatsiia taborovoho zhyttia," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 9.
50. Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile.

“A Great Literature”

George G. Grabowicz

Let us hew the rock! Let us strike and crush the remains of barbarism in our souls. Let us create a society of great style, strong souls, balanced, persevering character. And then, we, creators of our literature, will not feel abandoned to our fate, then our creativity will take root in life...then we will automatically partake of the great creative process of the other cultural realms of our planet, and they will know us not only through geography, not only from occasional memoranda, but also from our names, our language, our works....

Ulas Samchuk

I think that all the failures of our literary process in the emigration stemmed precisely from our inadequate performance of the roles that we had assumed, or from an improper choice of roles.

Ihor Kostetsky
(Eaghor Kostetzky)

In the bad time—there are the bad writers [sic].

Teok

Arguably, there are still now, and there certainly were in the period under discussion, two distinct Ukrainian literatures—the Soviet and the émigré. The relationship between them, their roles in the course of history, have hardly been symmetrical: all the passionate arguments of several generations of émigrés notwithstanding, the literature written in Ukraine remains the main current, but all the more so now, when émigré literary creativity seems to be visibly dwindling. But from the perspective of history, Ukrainian émigré literature, even though it is a minor tradition, is certainly not marginal. It provides an invaluable range

of data and experiences and a perspective essential for reconstructing the totality of Ukrainian life in the twentieth century, not only as reflected in the emigration, but particularly as reflecting Soviet Ukraine itself. For here, to supplement the sanctioned view, even a crooked or cracked mirror is far better than none at all. From our perspective, even more important than the light that émigré literature casts on the surface extension of literary life—for example, on writers and events that are now officially proscribed and forgotten, on the cultural and political background—is the special insight it gives into the workings of literature as a process, and in the way it reveals the innermost forces shaping literary creativity and literary values.

The history of Ukrainian émigré literature has not been charted, and, as with so many things Ukrainian, there is no scholarly consensus even as to when it began. (To date its beginnings with the period immediately following the Revolution and the civil war in Ukraine is problematic, since many writers, emigrating from what had become the Soviet Union, settled in Western Ukraine, which—while under Poland—was hardly a foreign land; and even those settling in Poland proper, or Czechoslovakia, maintained reasonably close contacts with their compatriots in Galicia.) But there is no doubt that the DP period of émigré literature—roughly the latter half of the 1940s—is a special and rather distinct period. Whether one accepts it—as I would argue—as the first true phase of émigré literature, or as a continuation of a process begun earlier, it surely constitutes a watershed in the non-Soviet Ukrainian literary activity in this century. Its intrinsic interest is augmented by its unique ability to serve as a vantage point for surveying what preceded and followed.

For all that, and despite the fact that it is temporally circumscribed and sufficiently distant in time, the DP period has also not received an adequate literary-historical overview. The most probable reason for this, paradoxically, is the superabundance of sources and commentaries and, in particular, the fact that in keeping with their heightened sense of mission and their intense literary self-consciousness, the participants—writers and critics—wrote their versions of this period while they were still very much players on the DP stage.¹ These accounts—most often simply eyewitness chronicles, end-of-year reviews and polemics—have, to this day, stood as the historiography for this literature. The first to speak have remained the authorities, and seem to have pre-empted revision or, indeed, clear vision. Sadly, too, their biases, limitations and partisan loyalties have continued to provide the conceptual matrix for later, purportedly more historical, accounts.²

Such an account, however, is not the goal of this study. The rather more modest goal here is to provide a prologue to a history of this period by examining its central issue, the much discussed and much debated notion of "a great literature" [*velyka literatura*]. "A great literature," of course, is not simply an issue or a notion; it is much more than a programmatic (or theoretical) construct

or a polemical slogan. It is, in fact, a *Gestalt* that combines values and praxis. The values range from the political and ideological to the social, aesthetic, and psychological. The praxis, the incarnation of concept and ideal in actual literary works, is, for obvious reasons, intrinsically more difficult to demonstrate and it is perhaps for this reason that, apart from polemical or panegyric excursions, no analytical study of how one or more literary works actually articulate “a great literature” has really been attempted. Yet given the way this concept served to focus the conscious thought of this literary period, it is certainly legitimate to pose the question in terms of literary practice.

Clearly, a concept, an ideal, a value so resonant with the thought and experiences of the collective would constitute not only a ramified, but a coded system, a text, so to speak, that would be inherently resistant to analysis. Again, the lack of any critical initiatives in this direction seems to support this conclusion. But if our task is more than simply to recount the polemics and describe the shifting alignments, it is essential to disassemble this conceptual edifice, to look behind the facade of *ad hoc* (and largely unconscious) strategies, the rhetorical and artistic fictions and (self-)deceptions, and thus perhaps see the as yet unaccepted and unsanctioned, but surely more interesting, underlying motivations, causes, and patterns.

The Period

The overall social, historical, and political parameters of the DP period are relatively well known. Even the manifest literary parameters, the statistical data about the quantity and diversity of publications, the chronicle of the activities of literary organizations, and so on, can readily be reconstructed and need not unduly occupy our attention. Throughout, and, especially at the beginning, there is unfettered activity. In so short a period—five or six years (1945-50/51) if one takes the historical or socio-political view, and only three years (1946-8) if one looks to the period of most intense creativity—the actual quantity of literary (belletristic and critical) and associated scholarly and journalistic activity is nothing if not impressive. Over 1,200 books and pamphlets were published in all the various fields, from art to religion and youth culture. Some 250 of these were publications of original literary works of poetry, prose, and drama, to which one must add dozens of reprints, translations and works of criticism and children’s literature. Scores of magazines, journals, and newspapers appeared, with every camp and organization having at least one and often more. Some were exclusively devoted to literature, many others dealt extensively with literary matters.³ To be sure, the lifespan of all but a handful of these periodicals was very brief; they appeared and disappeared like mushrooms after a rainfall. The monthly journal *Zahrava*, published by the “Literary Section of the Union of Ukrainian Writers in Augsburg,” had only four issues, all in 1946. *Vezhi*, a cultural monthly devoted almost exclusively to literature and published in

Munich, appeared in only two issues, one in 1947 and one in 1948. The *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (Regensburg, 1948-9) claimed to revive the traditions of both the longest running and most serious Ukrainian literary journal ever, *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (1898-1919; 1922-33), and the militantly right-wing and nationalist *Vistnyk* (1933-39) of Dmytro Dontsov.⁴ The new *LNV* only continued the legacy of the latter, with the major change being that the general editorial and party line shifted from the openly pro-fascist stance of Dontsov's prototype to merely authoritarian prescriptions for Ukrainian society and literature. It too managed to produce only two issues, as did the lavishly illustrated, well-written, and carefully edited *Ukrainske mystetstvo* (Munich, 1947). Some major, and very interesting periodicals managed only one issue. Such was the case with the "almanac" *MUR* (Stuttgart, 1946), and perhaps the single most exciting periodical of all, the literary quarterly *Khors* (Regensburg, 1946). The "collections" (*zbirnyky*) of *MUR*, the other official house organ of the Ukrainian Artistic Movement (*Mystetskyi Ukrainskyi Rukh*) numbered only three issues (nos. 1 and 2: Munich-Karlsfeld, 1946; no. 3: Regensburg, 1947). Even the most solid and well-established of literary journals, such as *Arka* (Munich, 1947-9), or *Orlyk* (Berchtesgaden, 1946-8), lasted at most two or three years.

The brevity of these enterprises, however, should not suggest that they were all straw fires, although a pattern of quick enthusiasm and quick disillusionment can certainly be discerned. Nor is the real issue the obvious fact that by 1947-8 further emigration west—primarily to the United States and Canada—had grown in a short time from a trickle to a torrent, removing great numbers, ultimately the majority, of readers and writers to another hemisphere. (Thus when Dontsov publishes, in the September 1947 issue of *Orlyk*, an open letter attacking *MUR* and its conception of Ukrainian literature, he is already writing from Canada. When *Arka* publishes in its January 1948 issue Sviatoslav Hordynsky's "Odynadtsiat dniv na okeani," the author of these diary entries is already a newly arrived emigrant in the United States.) The phenomena here point to something more fundamental than the effects of mass emigration and the general transitoriness of DP existence: they illustrate the remarkable extent to which this literature is bound to its social and cultural roots, to its concrete audience. As much as this applies to every literature, in every period, the tightness of these bonds, the reciprocity and resonance between the thought and the values of the group and those of its writers can vary greatly. As we see from the present state of Ukrainian émigré literature, these bonds can be loose indeed. In the DP years they were strong and close, so that when the audience began to disappear so did the literature. This reciprocity is a defining structure here.

The intensity and sheer productivity of this period allows us to speak of it as a kind of "small renaissance." But what are its broad historical, extrinsic features? These, too, after all, contribute to the uniqueness of the whole. The first and foremost is the fact that now, after the ordeal of World War II, scores of

Ukrainian writers and thousands of readers found themselves in the West, in a situation of political freedom and relative security.⁵ One should not discount, of course, the various privations of DP life, the general anxiety about the future, and the traumas and tragedies caused by such events as forceful repatriation to the Soviet Union or the relatively less destructive, but not insignificant, internal “political” conflicts, abuses of authority and even occasional violence.⁶ But while not a paradise, the DP camps were a welcome relief and a first step in the direction of normalcy. In the literary realm this was signalled by virtually unimpeded access to publishing. The result was an all too obvious absence of quality control—a small price to pay for variety and ferment. For this was a new and heady freedom not only for the refugees from Soviet Ukraine, but also those from Galicia, for whom life under Polish rule had been not entirely repressive, but also not entirely free. (The German occupation, of course, was also a period of repression and restriction—although at the same time some writers proscribed in the Soviet Union were republished by the Ukrainian Publishing House in Lviv and Cracow, and some literary activities, particularly anti-Soviet publications, were tolerated.)

The very size of the DP population contributed to making its literary life a qualitatively new phenomenon. There not only existed a large and concentrated readership (the total number of Ukrainian displaced persons has been estimated at over 200,000⁷), but also a seemingly full range of genres and literary activities. (In retrospect, as we shall see, this proved to be illusory, most clearly in literary criticism and “theory.”) Also contributing to the vitality of this life was the distribution of the writers and the audience, and in the microcosm of the DP camps, where all the regions of Ukraine were represented, the long-hoped-for goal of *sobornist*, of the ingathering of Ukrainian lands East and West, was briefly (if only symbolically) achieved. Finally, and not least of all, the economy of this life conditioned the literary climate. Thanks to international (largely American-funded) relief efforts, the basic needs of the refugees were adequately provided for; with no obligation to work for a living, there was ample time for, among other things, literary pursuits.⁸

As important as are the historical, social, and demographic parameters, the spiritual or psychological determinants are probably more important. Of these, the most central by far is that set of feelings, troublesome and partially repressed and disguised, that is generally called the survivor complex. The horrors and trauma of the recent past, the unavoidable sense of guilt for having survived and fled to safety while so many stayed behind or perished, the resultant—not intellectual or even moral, but profoundly inner—need to bear witness, to tell the world what had happened, were a dominant, incessant refrain. There are various modalities for articulating this need. At one end are the consciously moralizing and “historiosophic” meditations on the apocalyptic past—and future. The same evocation of the holocaust just experienced and the same stance of invoking

divine or transcendent retribution is encountered in otherwise disparate poets, for example, in Mykhailo Orest's poem "Povstannia mertvykh," with such elevated lines as "O zhertyv zla, zamucheni ubyti,/Oskverneni u hidnosti svoii,/Nastav vash chas! Nastav, shchob vidrodyty/Vse, shcho ruinnyi rozmetav prybii" (1944)⁹; in Iurii Klen's long epos *Popil imperii*; in Vasyl Barka's "Prokliattia imperatorovi krainy Soniachnoho Skhodu" (1945)¹⁰; or in Ivan Bahriany's "Huliai-pole" (1944).¹¹ A more focused and effective literary expression of these same feelings are the various homages to and remembrances of fellow writers who had recently fallen victim to either Hitlerite or Stalinist terror. The memory of those dying at the hands of the Nazis—especially Oleh Olzhych and Olena Teliha—was particularly vivid in the minds of colleagues and contemporaries. The virtual cult of these writers, as expressed in numerous articles, pamphlets, and convocations (*akademii*), especially on the anniversary of their deaths,¹² was also swelled by the fact that both were members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The much more numerous victims of Stalinist terror were also hardly forgotten. In either case, the most valuable and lasting products of this threnodic mode were editions of some of their works.¹³ This fusion of scholarship and commemoration is practised in the emigration to this day, and, in some instances, significantly contributed to Ukrainian literary history.¹⁴

The theme, or genre, of martyrology was most directly expressed in works dealing with first-hand experiences of concentration camps, prisons, forced labour and the rest of the gamut of totalitarian oppression. Most were unadorned memoirs, their testimony all the more powerful for their formal simplicity, for example, O. Dansky's *Khochu zhyty!*, subtitled "pictures of German concentration camps," or Oleksa Stepovy's *Iasyr*, a collection of letters, notes and even versified accounts of various Ukrainians taken to Germany as forced labourers, V. Martynets's *Brätz*, V. Koval's *My—Ukrainci*, or, depicting with a detached, almost scholarly objectivity the Soviet camps on the Solovetskii Islands, Semen Pidhainy's *Ukrainska intelihentsiia na Solovkakh*.¹⁵ Some, like Mykhailo Bazhansky's *Mozaika kvadriv viaznychkh*, attempted a more belletrized form, even while keeping the historical and memoiristic core intact.¹⁶ A few, most notably Bahriany in his *Sad Hetsymanskyi*, sought not only to turn the autobiographic into fiction, but to write an inspired, "national" literature, wherein the personal ordeal programmatically recapitulates the collective ordeal, and individual survival prophesies a common salvation.¹⁷

This correspondence between the personal and the national constitutes a fundamental, but only partially conscious structure in the poetics of this period. Clearly, not all the writers felt called upon to write of or for the whole nation, but the autobiographic principle receives a special, *thematic* validation. Whether in the lightweight lyrical effusions of a Mykhailo Sytnyk or a Leonid Poltava, or the much longer and more substantial epic efforts of Osmachka and Klen,¹⁸

whether in the huge *roman fleuve* of a Dokiia Humenna or the short, experimental prose pieces of the only recently collected and published Zinovii Berezhan,¹⁹ depicting and deliberating on personal experience becomes more widespread than ever before. In effect, this theme and mode assumes a hitherto unprecedented *de facto* legitimacy. Thus, in the implicit poetics of this period the genre whose principles and parameters most inform the literary system as a whole, which seems most “natural” and “organic” for this period, is the memoir, the personal view of self and history. And yet, a most curious reversal occurs here: for that very drive to bear witness to the age and all its suffering, a drive which really underlies and animates the group’s sense of self, is also inextricably linked with an explicit poetics—again, more a programmatic value than articulated poetics—that basically denies this genre or modality. This programmatic value is the notion of a “great literature.” It embodies a profound paradox. While animated by and indeed intellectually crowning the multifarious and often diffuse sense of mission that these émigrés, like all others, created for themselves, the only function it could ever have—apart from simply existing as an unattainable ideal—was to dam up the wellsprings of creativity precisely by delegitimizing the personal.

For the DP period as a *literary* period, the historical-political, economic, and psychological criteria do not, in fact, provide an entirely satisfactory paradigm. In particular, they do not really establish the termini of this literary period. In terms of these criteria, both with respect to the preceding war years and even more so with respect to the émigré period that followed, the boundaries seem more fluid than the literary historian would want to admit. In one sense, the period 1945-50 is a continuation of the war years in that certain crucial conditions remain in force: the broad and historically momentous and unprecedented contacts of Western Ukrainian authors with those Soviet Ukrainian writers who fled to the West; the intense examination and exposure of Stalinist depredations in general and in literature in particular; and the publishing of previously suppressed writers, such as Mykola Kulish,²⁰ or of accounts of Stalinist prisons and concentration camps.²¹ All of this constitutes a very real, generic continuum between 1941-45 and 1945-50). So, too, does the fact that under the German occupation, various writers who later became quite prominent in the DP period—Klen, Malaniuk, Bahriany, Bohdan Kravtsiv, Oksana Liaturynska and Sviatoslav Hordynsky—did succeed in publishing their work.²² Most generally, the sense of personal uncertainty and upheaval, of the *ad hoc* and transitory nature of literary enterprises and institutions, remains constant throughout the decade of the forties and differs markedly with the stabilization—for good or bad—of the fifties and beyond.²³ The continuities between 1945-50 and the years after are even more striking. First and foremost, while some prominent writers (Klen, Mosendz or Katria Hrynevych) and some lesser ones (Andrii Harasevych), did indeed die in this period, the vast majority continued to live

and to write well into the next two decades. In varying degrees their work continued to turn to the themes and concerns first raised in the DP setting. Just as significant are the examples of continuity in institutions, the most programmatic of which would appear to be the decision of the newly formed Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile, "Slovo," to cast itself as heir to the legacy of MUR (a stance all the more easy to take in view of the fact that key members of each organization were the same people).²⁴ More important, perhaps, is the continuity of various publications, especially journals. The longest continuous émigré journal, the monthly *Novi dni*, published in Toronto, begins its North American incarnation in February 1950, with an editorial linking it to the recent DP past.²⁵ The most substantial Ukrainian émigré journal, *Suchasnist*, while having its editorial offices in New York, is still published in Munich and can also trace its lineage back to the DP period.²⁶

Illustrations of this phenomenon can be multiplied at will. But the real issues, of course, are not the individuals as such or even the actual institutions, organizations or periodicals. The real heart of the matter is the literary climate—its emotional and intellectual parameters, its themes, concerns and values. And here the continuity appears to be absolutely seamless. The examples of writers newly arrived in North America writing for DP publications are only the tip of the iceberg. The huge concealed mass is that all the baggage, the entire literary marketplace, seems, in time, to have been transhumed to the New World. Articles written at the height of the DP period and slated to be published then, such as Ulas Samchuk's "ideological report" delivered at the Third General Congress of MUR, April 1948, or Sherekh's overview of DP literature for 1947, are published a few years later in *Novi dni*.²⁷ There, too, and in many other publications, one finds reviews on books currently appearing in Germany.²⁸ The same themes and topics continue to exercise the literary community. In fact the sense that there is *one* literary community that continues on from the camps in Germany and Austria to North and South America and even Australia is strongly reinforced by ongoing polemics. Positions are attacked, opponents are vilified with a fervour that belies distance in time and space. In some instances the continuation of these DP conflicts is merely a function of personal rancour,²⁹ in other cases polemics are continued because ideological and "political" positions are for all purposes cast in concrete.³⁰ But while such "dialogue" does die down in the course of the next decade and a half as the dispersed émigrés become atomized—not so much by the fact of settling in different countries as by political sects and groupings—some intrinsically literary phenomena first engendered on a substantial scale in the DP setting do continue on, and indeed their proportion in the overall literature grows in size. Such, in particular, is that fascinating subset of émigré writing—and, of course, émigré society and culture—that can be called "crazy literature."

Yet when all is said and done, and all the many threads of continuity are identified and traced, there is little doubt that the DP years, as a literary period, are, nonetheless, quite distinct from what precedes and what follows. The basis for this distinctness is not to be found in the circumstances discussed earlier (political freedom, the imperative to bear witness and so on), but in two moments that are indeed unique to this period. These are the organizational, or more precisely the social-organizational, setting and the notion of a “great literature.” The two are intertwined, they feed and determine each other. By “organizational” I mean not only MUR and the drive to create various large, all-encompassing—more symbolic and “political” than actually functioning—let alone corporate entities, but also the concrete societal setting that made it possible. In effect, even though many never joined MUR or quickly left it, even though many never subscribed to, and more later denounced its premises, the DP period of Ukrainian émigré literature can rightly be called the MUR period—not because that organization dominated this period, but because the thinking and the values from which it sprang did. Hence, too, this is a period of a “great literature”—not simply because this was the generally acknowledged goal and battle cry of MUR, but because this notion, this value, like MUR itself, was the unique product of the social and cultural totality of this period. Clearly, neither before nor after was Ukrainian literature defined in those terms.

The Theory

To speak of a “theory” for this notion is to stretch the usual meaning of the term. In fact, the great bulk of commentary and lucubration on *velyka literatura* as such was injunction and exhortation, pious or grandiose desiderata, and polemics. The occasional more integrally theoretical component, like Iurii Sherekh’s idea of an “organically national” style, was rather an addendum, and one that was basically elaborated *ex post facto*.³¹ For all that, the discussions around this term, the attendant issues raised, cast an extremely interesting light on mid-twentieth century Ukrainian literature as a whole, and indeed on Ukrainian intellectual history. In the way it illuminates the literary process, if not in terms of its political and historical resonance, this debate is of the same order of magnitude as the “Literary Discussion” in the latter half of the 1920s in Soviet Ukraine. In view of the fact that modern Ukrainian literary history has few broad-ranging, historiosophic debates on the general direction and the goals of Ukrainian literature (the incipient and very tentative debate about modernism, for example, was basically side-tracked by the populist and civic-duty arguments of such as Franko and Iefremov), this discussion assumes even greater importance. In one sense, it constitutes the culminating phase of the century-old debate about *narodnytstvo*, the presumably populist essence of Ukrainian literature.

The watchword of “a great literature,” or “for a great literature” (*za velyku literaturu*) was initially articulated in the first program of the Ukrainian Artistic

Movement, MUR. The first congress of MUR was held December 21-22, 1945 in Aschaffenburg, in the American zone of occupied Germany.³² The proceedings of that congress—specifically the programmatic papers of Ulas Samchuk, “A Great Literature” (Velyka literatura), Iurii Sherekh, “The Styles of Contemporary Ukrainian Émigré Literature” (Styli suchasnoi ukrainskoi literatury na emigratsii) and Ostap Hrytsai, “A Small or a Great Literature” (Mala chy velyka literatura)—were soon published in the first “collection” of MUR;³³ the very titles of two of the three show how directly the issue was to be addressed and hint at their essentially exhortatory mode.

In fact, the introductory editorial statement, “What We Want” (Choho my khochemo), sets the tone of sublime duty and solemn injunction:

The times have set and continue to set before Ukrainian art the tasks to which it is called: to serve its people in highly artistic and perfect forms and in so doing to win for itself a voice and authority in world art.

Rejecting an art that is weak and in its ideas alien [*ideino-vorozhe*] to the Ukrainian people, Ukrainian artists unite so that in comradely collaboration they may strive to the heights of true and serious art. This union of Ukrainian artists in the emigration is open to all activists [*diiachiv*] of the word, the brush and the stage who inscribe on their banner the watchword of an art that is perfect, mature in ideas and form, and eternally searching.³⁴

The basic desiderata of this program are further elaborated: “The contemporary tasks of Ukrainian art,” the statement continues, “are in principle the same as they were ten or twenty years ago—unqualifiedly, fully and with self-sacrifice to stand guard over the interests of the nation, which struggled, struggles and will struggle for establishing the rights that it undoubtedly deserves.” The vehicle for this, “the principal task of Ukrainian art,” is:

to create by artistic means a synthesizing picture of Ukraine, its spirituality in the past, now and tomorrow. The artists who join MUR know that heavy day-to-day labour will be demanded of them. They are ready for this, but they are even more aware of their immediate task—to be artists. Genuine, well-rounded, unique artists, artists of such stature that through their works they determine their readers’ general world view and direction of thought, [artists] who reveal cultural-historical and psychological horizons, who force one to think persistently and feel passionately, who desire to create a literature which can truly become the conscience and the expression of the ideals of the people, which will give us the right to enter, as equals among equals, those places where the problems of all the peoples of this planet are decided and resolved. Not the poster, the memorandum or the appeal, but a great art—full, manly, all-encompassing—is to be our irrevocable mandate for the right to exist on the land of our ancestors as an eternal, creative and historically conditioned necessity. It is precisely this that our difficult and unique times require and will long require from us, artists, and it is precisely these requirements that we are called upon to fulfill. Such is our goal, such is our ideal...³⁵

Among the various interesting and revealing formulations, the two fundamental premises that Ukrainian artists, specifically writers, have a moral duty to their nation, an obligation to bend all their efforts to the overarching national cause of Ukrainian independence and that their task is to be effected through art that is of the highest quality, are more than plain. Moreover, as much as the goal of artistic excellence and sophistication is emphasized, as much as this programme denies the right of any political party to dictate its line and proclaims a full openness to different styles and ideas (“Full freedom, great in its ideas and its expression, the full creative expression of the individual—that is the task of our association”³⁶), there is hardly any doubt that the task, the goal, the duty is the determining component and that the art, the means, the search for excellence is subordinate to it. There is, to be sure, a tension between the stated end and means; the commitment to artistic excellence is made very forcefully (“We will be merciless towards those who by cheap costs would try to gain the label of artists”³⁷). But the very fact that a final goal and imperative of art and literature is at all postulated (let alone explicitly stated as transcendent to and determining the means, the art), puts the whole program and the theory of literature that stands behind it uncomfortably close to the literary theory of the state, the evil empire, that was the declared mortal enemy. In effect, in its ontological principles, if not in its stated openness regarding form and style, in its theoretical validation of a teleology of literature, its belief in a guiding principle in and a managing approach to literature, this theory is remarkably close to Socialist Realism, indeed a kind of distorted (or, at best, humanistically ameliorated) version of it. The parallel phenomenon of a “national realism” does indeed emerge in the DP period, and as a “theory,” if not as an easily defined praxis, it does continue to flourish in the emigration; its roots are clearly traceable to the *Visnyk* writings and doctrines (*visnykivstvo*) of the interwar years—augmented, to be sure, by deeply ingrained Soviet habits of thought of various authors from that sphere.³⁸ MUR (in its spokesmen and representatives) certainly does not consciously see itself as proclaiming or demanding adherence to “nationalist realism.” In fact, it is soon violently attacked precisely for not doing so. The issue is rather that in its deep and, in all probability, quite unrecognized structures, the program of MUR parallels to some degree the abhorred Socialist Realism. This much on a theoretical level. On the functional level, as we will see, the deep contradictions in the program—its espousal of goal-oriented literature, one that derives its essential *raison d’être* from a specific extra-literary goal—the full political and cultural independence of the fatherland—on the one hand, and full artistic freedom and the search for artistic excellence, on the other—grew into the flaw that made the collapse of MUR inevitable.

Another way of describing the immanent tension in the MUR program is to see the above cited expression of faith and hope as a document consciously (and in retrospect, desperately) mediating between two irreconcilable polarities. A

sense of one of these—the militant doctrine that the future of Ukrainian émigré literature lies only in total commitment to the political struggle—is fully conveyed in Ivan Bahriany's "Thoughts on Literature" (*Dumky pro literaturu*). It, too, was included as a programmatic article in the first MUR collection, even though it was apparently not first read at the MUR congress.³⁹ The crudeness and reductiveness of Bahriany's thoughts on what literature can or should be is matched by the perfervid tone and demagogic style of his argument: literature that is not a "weapon" or the "path of struggle" is either "lemonade," in effect, poison in the body politic, or the aberration of "art for art's sake," which is but a "theory of desertion" (from the "nation, from all struggles, from difficult reality"), or a cold "objective mirror" that is the trade of uninvolved writers-turned-secretaries.⁴⁰

It goes without saying that for Ukrainian literature to be a great literature, which Bahriany passionately approves and desires, it must not only be militant, but entirely subordinate to the overall strategy of the war effort: "...in the whole complex of means available for the nation's struggle, literature should occupy one sector of the entire attacking front, and the Ukrainian writer should be in its first ranks."⁴¹ The manic fervour and unchecked brutality of Bahriany's convictions, with their obtrusive, undigested remnants of Soviet and Visnykite prescriptions (the writer as engineer of human souls; the writer as soldier bound by military discipline; literature as too important to be a private matter—it is a national matter; the sense that deviation from the dogmatically asserted literary priorities is tantamount to treason)—all this makes his article eminently quotable, but hardly enlightening. The point is clear: MUR not only contained, but at least at this initial juncture, was to a large extent obliged to reflect this radical, not to say anti-humanistic, version of a Ukrainian literary program. The antipode, however, the unquestionably enlightened and intrinsically more literary (and literate) views of such as Kostetsky and Iurii Kosach would soon also be expressed.

In terms of dramatic effect, the congress articles, coming as they do after the preceding editorial statement and the Bahriany harangue, are a let-down. This is particularly true of the first of these, Samchuk's "A Great Literature." Samchuk, already the author of several large prose works and throughout this period, until his immigration to Canada in 1948, president of MUR, is at pains to appear to be balanced, thoughtful and reasonable ("By my very nature I do not like extremes. I do not persecute them and I do not espouse them. I do not think in the categories of a revolutionary, but at the same time I do not understand the reaction to revolution"). His article is often interlarded with self-conscious metacommentary ("Here, too, I want to think clearly, directly and quite lucidly..." or "then again, I consciously want to repeat myself again and again").⁴² The intellectual effect is to make his talk diffuse, dull and virtually shapeless. If one can cite him at all, it is only in large, wordy units. His meandering thoughts are utterly conventional and well hedged: "great literature" is an immediate and

pressing issue, but also a complex one; it is a new and current phenomenon, but also one that has been with us a long time; literature is the speech of a nation and through literature nations assert their spirit; nation with great authors have themselves become great; Shakespeare and Goethe were great writers, but they also belong to all mankind. And, finally, to the point: contemporary Ukrainian literature should also strive to be great; we, the Ukrainian writers, are called by history to bring our nation to its rightful place in the sun.⁴³

For all the conceptual and stylistic fluffiness of this statement, there is also, it would seem, a hidden message. The verbiage itself, the muffling cloak of excess words, may also serve to desensitize the issue of a “great literature,” to make it less the polemical property of MUR, or indeed of any of its more or less conscious factions, and more an acceptable general truth—its potential sharp edges rounded off with the magical names of Homer, Shakespeare, Goethe and Shevchenko. There is, at any rate, no doubt that the final exhortation (echoing Franko) to hew the rock of backwardness and to break into the bright day of great, European literature is presented in so general and so uplifting and uncontroversial a way that no one would think of questioning it. And for a while, indeed, no one did.

While Sherekh’s article is much more analytical than exhortatory, and deals with the stylistic options of a “great literature,” rather than with apologetics for it, Hrytsai’s examination of the issues of “A Small or a Great Literature” fully bares both the exhortative mode and the various commonplaces that have accreted to the concept. Then already an elderly former gymnasium professor (born in 1881), Hrytsai apparently often demanded and received the respect due a person of that rank. This paper also fits the archetype of an Austro-Hungarian *belfer*—it is categorical, normative, not very imaginative and utterly humourless. Like those before him, Hrytsai believes that “we need, we desperately need a literature that is on a great, on a European level, the representatives of which, by virtue of their authority as creators and carriers of the spiritual culture of the nation, could perform on the arena of the world at large an important task, one that goes beyond their role as writers.”⁴⁴ He laments the fact that the Ukrainians did not have writers of the stature of Tolstoi or Hauptmann to argue their case in the court of world opinion, as well as the fact that in his history of Charles XII, Voltaire accuses the Zaporozhian Cossacks (“obviously on the basis of the tsarist sources that were given to him”) of stealing in the course of a banquet a silver platter—“and this insinuation of Voltaire’s, shameful for us, has remained in his work, unchallenged by anyone to this day.”⁴⁵

To compensate for this dual absence—of Ukrainians in European consciousness and Europe in Ukrainian consciousness—Hrytsai proposes that the MUR conference at which the paper was read address an appeal to Ukrainian writers, which, while urging them all to make every effort “to raise the level of Ukrainian literary creativity to the heights of the creative achievements of the best

literatures of the European and non-European world," would also call upon them to take four concrete steps to that end (all of them elaborating the quasi-Shevchenkian "uchitiesia-chytaite"). According to Hrytsai, Ukrainian writers need to: 1) learn English, French and German; 2) read up on the classics in those literatures as well as in Spanish, Italian and the literatures of Scandinavia; 3) inform the outside world about Ukrainian literature by scholarly and publicistic works, by translating Ukrainian works into these languages and by personal contacts; and 4) produce works, preferably in the genre of epos, the novel and theatre, which would have a universal content, and which would show "the whole world the philosophical-ideological side and the depth of the Ukrainian spirituality."⁴⁶

As humourless, didactic and pedantic as these injunctions may appear (one need only compare them with Ezra Pound's tongue-in-cheek advice to William Carlos Williams as to the books "that you *need to read for yr/mind's sake*"⁴⁷), they do accurately reflect both the grandiose aspirations to affect and impress the world and the gnawing, collective sense of inadequacy. While the latter, almost always, will appear only in various psychologically determined disguises, the former, unabashedly expressed as national duty, or even more, as a national mission, is not only conscious, but indeed programmatically stressed.

At its most sweeping (as seen in the articles of Bahriany and Samchuk), Ukrainian literature is simply defined as a literature that is ideological and nation-building. Such, for example, is the argument of V. Derzhavyn in his paper "National Literature as Art" (Natsionalna literatura iak mystetstvo) presented at the Conference of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN) in Mittenwald, 22-3 June 1947. According to this norm, simply being written in Ukrainian does not make a work part of Ukrainian literature: it must also form (and presumably conform with) national consciousness.⁴⁸ A militant and aggressive version of this argument, and one that specifically ties in the notion of "great literature" with national mission and duty, is found in the pronouncements of the resurrected *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*⁴⁹ and of various political commissars for literature.⁵⁰ It appears as an unquestioned given in contexts that are sober and critical. Thus, for example, the painter Edvard Kozak, who in his article "Wide Roads and the Logs on Them" (Shyroki shliakhy i kolody na nykh) is rather pessimistic about the future of Ukrainian émigré art and much dismayed by the flood of amateurishness, the lack of quality control and a self-imposed provincialism, still concluded with "We believe that despite all that we can break up with our work the ice floe of the community's indifference and that in the future the community will help us perform our cultural mission, one that is imposed upon us by the times and by history."⁵¹ The argument is most striking, however, when asserted not by critics (or writers speaking as critics, such as Bahriany and Samchuk) or by ideological watch-dogs, but by writers speaking as writers, in effect, professing their *artistic* faith. We hear it from various ends of the literary spectrum, for example, from the rather traditional *byt* (pobut)

oriented realist (or “augmented realist” as he styled himself) Vasyl Chaplenko (“We will publish as we can—by photoreproduction, by cyclostyle, or whatever, but we will not neglect the national duty that lies upon us. I, myself, have several large pieces which I have worked on for years and which I wrote precisely as a way of realizing the national obligation that I took upon myself....⁵²). But we also hear it from the “neo-classicist,” erudite and highly esteemed poet Iurii Klen, who in his introduction to *Popil imperii* uses virtually the same argument to explain his choice of the epic mode.

The intellectual and political origins of the concept of mission can hardly be examined within the confines of this study. Still, two possible antecedents can be noted. One, in all likelihood, is the Soviet, with its teleology, its doctrine of literature as the handmaiden of political progress, and the quasi-religious sense of proselytization, of the duty of the believers to enlighten and save the world. The other, in my opinion the more pronounced and more germane, is that of Polish messianic thinking. Polish political messianism, its premises and especially its rhetoric, could not but have a deep imprint on Galician Ukrainians, especially since in some of its aspects it was directed against their very political existence.

Rhetoric about an historic mission (and rhetoric it could only be—there was hardly any means for implementing this notion) became part of the general nationalist credo and influenced not just the thinking of the interwar period, but, with various modifications, of the war years and, as we now see, the immediate postwar period as well. Iuliiian Bachynsky’s bitter denunciation of this epigonic megalomania fell on deaf ears.⁵³ The “times demanded” (as the formula used by ideologues and non-ideologues alike would have it) faith, will and heroism,⁵⁴ and not reasoned analysis and sober assessments of means and ends.

While the sense of a sublime, national mission or historical calling clearly animates much of the rhetoric and thinking of this period and establishes the general ambience or horizon of *velyka literatura*, there is one particularly concrete moment that deserves attention. This is the extraordinary drive to create organizations. Like the periodicals we already noted, groups and associations sprang up rapidly and seemingly everywhere, but often just as quickly dissolved. Quantity, however, is not the issue here, but rather the drive to create overarching “superorganizations,” presumably to guide and manage the whole socio-cultural process. There were superorganizations for political activity, for student affairs, for art, for literature and for scholarship.⁵⁵ Some of these all-encompassing organizations were never fully realized: a “parliament” for the arts, i.e., a congress of the umbrella organizations for literature (MUR), for the performing arts (OMUS), for painting (USOM) and for music (OUM) was held, but the resulting United Arts (Obiednani Mystetstva), even while electing a president (Samchuk) and drawing up a constitution, never really got off the ground. Similarly, an all-encompassing organization for scholars managed only a constitutional convention. But the very real *intent* to form these entities is itself

sufficiently revealing. Even if the scholars did not really activate their Union of Ukrainian Scholars and Researchers (*Spilka ukrainskykh naukovykh robitnykiv*), the fact that the congress was held, and especially that its resolutions called for the establishment of such an umbrella organization for *all* scholars and researchers, having *one, unified* scholarly publishing house, etc., speaks volumes for the mind-set involved.⁵⁶

Again, one can see here the influence of the Soviet mentality, with that system's insatiable appetite for centralized control.⁵⁷ The aetiology of this mind-set, however, is far less interesting than the function it ultimately performs. In effect, taking MUR as a paradigm, such an organization constitutes a revolutionary attempt to supplant a gradual, organic and necessarily slow process with an act of will, a quasi-political *fait accompli*. Whereas literature, as a body of work, a set of attitudes and values, modes and vehicles of discourse, must develop gradually, a literary organization can spring up virtually overnight.⁵⁸ While allowances must, of course, be made for the difficult circumstances, especially economic strictures and transitoriness, one cannot but see from the record of its activity that MUR as an organization seems to have been primarily concerned with its large "national role," with its symbolic and "political" functions (congresses, elections and presidia, position papers and resolutions—the pattern is depressingly familiar for émigré organizations) and not with grass-roots work at actually establishing a literary market-place.

What Sherekh (who as founding member and chief spokesman is certainly competent to judge) considers MUR's failing—its inability to secure independent means for publication or to set up a genuine organizational network⁵⁹—is indeed more serious than that. It shows not simply a failing in performance, but a basic discrepancy in the very nature of the organization. For an organization that was to nurture literature and assure its high standards to be unable to provide for these functions suggests that its very purpose, its essence, is different from what it claims to be. In fact, the argument can be made that the basic "flaw" of the organization—its lack of actual (as opposed to symbolic) organizational features, its lack of *substance*—is not the reason for its decline and fall, but simply its defining feature. The difference, especially now from our perspective in time, between the stated and the actual goals, intentions and priorities is more than apparent.

The issue is not organizational (the performance of MUR, its success or failure at implementing this or that goal), but theoretical (the values and the mind-set generating and making the goals). To put it more directly, the issue is not how well the literary process was managed—the evidence shows that it was not managed well at all, and that is all to the good—but the very fact, with its literary implications, that managing and controlling the literary process was generally and enthusiastically accepted by what then qualified as the literary establishment as well as the majority of the rank and file. From our cultural and

historical vantage point, the proximity of this understanding of literature to the Soviet and generally totalitarian attitude may be quite deplorable. But, deplorable or not, it did underlie the general psychological, cultural and largely unconscious context of the idea of a “great literature.”

Two further aspects should be noted here, if only very briefly. The first is Europeanism, the sense that—Western—Europe has much to offer in experience and cultural and literary models, and that Ukrainian literature and culture should actively strive to absorb these. MUR clearly associated the goal of *velyka literatura* with such an orientation to the West. As a concern with contemporary and avant-garde artistic developments, Europeanism is evident in the work of individual writers (Kosach and Kostetsky) and even various collective efforts (the journal *Khors*).⁶⁰

But as an intellectual and theoretical subset of the imperative of a “great literature,” Europeanism is not without its complications. In effect, while *velyka literatura* was a platform that virtually all accepted, Europeanism was a plank in that platform that some took issue with. One basis for opposition was ideological. If Europeanism is to be understood (as it then largely was) as acceptance of and orientation toward the Western intellectual and artistic avant-garde, then it certainly was not favoured by the various shades of militant nationalism. Whether for the Dontsovite *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, or the Melnykite ideologue Zhdanovych in *Orlyk*,⁶¹ or the leader of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP), Ivan Bahriany, such things as Joyce, Kafka and Sartre, surrealism and existentialism, were basically incomprehensible, dangerous and polluting. (For Dontsov and the right-wing nationalists in particular, this hostile stance was rooted in their contempt, already well documented in the interwar period, for the Western democracies. Now, however, this had to be expressed more circumspectly.) For the editors of the *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, in their first issue, the meaning of a great literature lies in its national character, one which is unmistakably in contrast with Europe

In creativity, the road to the universal passes through the national. None of the truly great writers of the world sets for himself the prior goal of creating a great literature for the world as a whole; every single great work is, first of all, intended for that milieu from which he takes at least the bases of his characters, his local colour and all that which inspires him to write.

He creates, above all, for himself, for his milieu, for his nation and its feelings, its goals, its ideas and aspirations.

And if such a work is written with talent, with love for those about whom it is written, it is transformed into Great Literature and becomes a work not only for the nation, or for any one people, but for all the world.

This should be remembered by some Ukrainian writers who try to convince themselves that they have outgrown their nation by 50 or even a hundred

years, and are ready now, right away, to leap to the world-wide table of the Greats (*vsesvitniho stolu Velykykh*), but their nation, their people have grabbed with their "Kashchenkite" hands⁶² their European tailcoats and won't let them get that running start that would allow them to reach the top of the world and show themselves in their full European glitter.⁶³

It is somewhat ironic that a questioning of Europe becomes a common value shared by the *Literaturno-naukovi vistyky* and Iurii Sherekh, the leading critic of this period, and one who in all other respects could be counted on to take positions diametrically opposed to those of this journal and the milieu around it. Sherekh's position, however, is considerably more reasoned and sophisticated. And the real irony lies not so much in the superficial typological similarity of the two stances as in the fact that Sherekh—the theoretician and main spokesman for MUR, and its *de facto* head (Samchuk being by all indications merely a figure-head)—was throughout his career a critic and publicist who more than any other in this group was acquainted with and attuned to Western values, to "Europe." To be sure, in one of his earlier articles, "Styles of Contemporary Ukrainian Émigré Literature," Sherekh gratuitously maligns the concrete, real Europe and finds the positive only in an abstract one: "the Europe of the impotent French *rentier* and the German beer-belly shopkeeper was never seriously considered. The abstract Europe, the Europe of cultural treasures won by the Faustian man—yes, this was considered, but only so that having been accepted it be superseded."⁶⁴ This splenetic barb, however, while not untypical for Sherekh's opinionated and at times apodictic style, does not really reflect the crux of the argument. The point of the discussion here is Sherekh's principled (and cogently argued) opposition to those like V. Derzhavyn, who would claim that one style—neo-classicism—constitutes the only path to excellence and the only legitimate option for Ukrainian literature. This validation of only one style and its attendant exclusive orientation to "Europe" and its "classics" must lead, as Sherekh argues, to sheer epigonism and ultimate sterility. It is precisely to counter this that Sherekh, falling back on Soviet Ukrainian literature of the 1920s, postulates a "national" or a "national-organic" style which would be attuned to and would express the uniquely Ukrainian experience and spirit. Updating Zerov's well-known watchword of *ad fontes*, he argues that "the cry of today should be: to the sources of Ukrainian national culture." Thus, he continues:

let us not think about the world and about representing Ukraine when we create. Let us try to express ourselves, our truth, more deeply, more fully, more essentially. Let us think more deeply, let us breathe more broadly, let us cogitate and feel with the categories of the Ukrainian empire of the spirit and not that of a Little Russian or Little Polish province; let us think through our concept and let us find for it its form of expression. And when we attain this, when we create a great *Ukrainian* literature, then "by this very fact" we will win for ourselves "a voice and an authority in world art." Our literature which

wants to be great can only be a great *Ukrainian* literature—otherwise it will not be great. Let us ponder this....

Does this mean that we do not need to know other literatures and other languages, that we have to give up on informing foreigners about our literature? No, a thousand times no! We do not preach obscurantism or self-isolation. The person who does not know world literature does not have the right to write—for he or she will discover what has long ago been discovered, he or she will be a sower of provincialism, and a general laughing-stock....

A national style which is not ethnographically stylized cannot be created if one has not experienced and absorbed the achievements of world literature. It is a shame to have to repeat these ABC's....⁶⁵

These lines surely raise more questions than they provide answers. Apart from its *ad hoc* polemical and publicistic value, the notion of a “national” or a “national-organic” style, further developed by Sherekh in a later article,⁶⁶ is highly problematical, the root of its confusion being the amorphous and polysemous idea of “style.” The existence of a unique, national character in every national literature is tautologous. It rests, however, on a range of components: traditions, themes, values, modes of perception. It is a totality, not a style. It is to Sherekh-Shevelov’s credit that he subsequently disavowed it. The second, rather more important issue is the rhetorical tenor and the implicit social function of this passus and the whole article from which it is taken (and ultimately much of Sherekh’s corpus). This, as the final image of the ABC’s intimates (and the following paragraph insistently drives home⁶⁷), is the sense of the critic’s propaedeutic, indeed school-marmish, role. (While for many this role and robe seemed entirely natural, for Sherekh, it became the tunic of Nessus which, in the final analysis, led to his “suicide.”)

For the present, one can only defer various other expressions of the Europeanism/Great Literature connection, for example, Kosach’s impassioned but highly cogent denunciation of the obscurantist and anti-humanist, visnykite legacy and his identification of greatness in literature with freedom to think and openness to ideas, with pluralism and tolerance, and, above all, with “the sovereignty of the writer.”⁶⁸ In retrospect, the emphasis on the latter is by far the most fruitful and prescient idea raised in these debates. One can, however, comment on the immanent validity, or “organicity” of yoking “great literature” with Europeanism. Clearly, if one looks not to the flowery rhetoric but to the underlying values and premises, the pairing is artificial. For even if we do not insist that everyone who propounded *velyka literatura* believed in a controlled and managed literary process (although even the most liberal betrayed such tendencies), there is little doubt that all but an insignificant handful believed in a mission, in a calling for Ukrainian literature as a whole and the various writers individually. And this is quite different from a “Europe” which then, as now, was determined by cosmopolitanism, pluralism and predominance of the avant-garde. The two mind-sets—the émigré Ukrainian and the “European”—taken in terms

of openness of culture, pluralism, tolerance of heterodoxy, flexibility of values and secularism are still far apart. In one sense, as such contemporaries as Sherekh and Kosach seem to be suggesting in different ways, the very fact of striving to validate *velyka literatura* by way of "Europe" only indicates the great distance between the two. At that time, and for some time still to come, the émigrés were in Europe but not of it.

If Europeanism constitutes, at least formally, a program and thus a link to the future, the link to the past, the historical roots of the broad complex that was the goal and the value of *velyka literatura* are focused above all on the figure and legacy of Mykola Khvylioviy. There is little doubt that while the legacy of Dontsov, of "visnykism," was still a perceptible influence and presence, it was on the defensive, not least of all by virtue of having been only recently so enthusiastically supportive of fascism and national socialism. In contrast, not only for those like Sherekh, Hryhorii Kostiuk or Iurii Lavrinenko who had come from Soviet Ukraine, but for many other writers, critics and intellectuals from various regions and backgrounds, Khvylioviy exemplified an intellectual and emotional openness, an assertiveness of will, an optimism and commitment to quality and disdain of provincialism.

The controversy over Khvylioviy was fierce even by prevailing standards in the DP camps. For many, his only redeeming feature was his suicide; by some he was vilified not only as a communist, but also as a Chekist and a matricide (the latter qualities being inferred from a literal reading of his own fiction). And yet polemics aside,⁶⁹ it is plain that the central *stated* issues of *velyka literatura* ("Europe" vs. provincialism, quality vs. populism, a sense of "mission" and of optimism for the future of Ukrainian literature) and the more thoughtful programmatic statements of MUR (the articles of Sherekh and Kosach) had Khvylioviy as their touchstone. Beyond that, as a figure overlaid with the secondary elaboration afforded culture heroes, Khvylioviy became for some a paradigm: of the writer hounded but uncowed by bureaucrats and gendarmes, of the shaper of literary opinion living out his convictions not only in words but in deeds. It is hardly a coincidence that Sherekh, the prime shaper of such opinion at that time, titles his first collection of essays after a collection of Khvylioviy's,⁷⁰ and that he later orchestrates his symbolic demise in a manner very like that of the author he admired so much.

The Underlying Structure

The truest sense of the phenomenon of "a great literature" can only be found in what must always be the literary critic's ultimate evidence—the texts themselves. The proposition I raised earlier, that the idea of "a great literature" informs the very fabric (the tone, the intellectual horizon, various compositional and rhetorical devices, and so on) of individual literary works, should and, I believe, can be demonstrated. *Velyka literatura* is by no means merely the property of those

talking *about* literature—critics, impresarios and commissars. Every literary work is always a nexus of various external and internal “causes,” and singling any one out could tend to distort the whole. Moreover, in any historical overview an adequate sampling, or base, is essential. Nevertheless, in lieu of both an intensive and extensive investigation, we can still postulate, in a very preliminary fashion, to be sure, some characteristic tendencies, in effect, the *dominanta*, precisely as they reveal themselves in artistic terms.

One major effect is the special legitimization of some genres and the delegitimization of others. In a word, an implicit poetics has taken hold, conditioned in large measure by various critics’ distinctions between “great” and “small” literature in which “large” genres like the epos and the long novel are seen as intrinsically better, aesthetically more valid, than “small” genres like satire, parody, depictions of actual *pobut* and indeed the lyric. The latter, to use a much discredited nineteenth-century term, tend to be cast as “literature for home use”—the archetypical East European kitchen, where dirty dishes and drying socks vie for space and where the family members gather to eat and fight. The salons—the noble genres—are for being on one’s best behaviour and for impressing guests, especially foreigners. An essential result of this hierarchy is a distortion of voice and composition. It is impossible to “prove” that the dullness of the novels of Samchuk and Humenna is an instance of this; in effect an intended “great scope” becoming simply languid pace and plodding problematics. In the case of Klen’s *Popil imperii*, however, there is little doubt that on the one hand, the epic mode is consciously and purposefully chosen to fulfill the hierarchical value in question, and on the other, that it is precisely this extrinsically and artificially imposed modality that is the very source of the work’s weakness.

The point can be put more directly: the poem is a monumental failure, its intended “epic” and historiosophic effects invariably breaking down into unpersuasive, often shrill, posturing as a consequence of an emotional tone and a narrative and cognitive stance that have nothing in common with epos or history, but which are genuine and which simply cannot be willed away. Its strongest moments are invariably personal recollections (especially of childhood, where the need to judge empires and lucubrate on universal history has not yet asserted itself). It is both melancholy and instructive to compare *Popil imperii* with Klen’s *Prokliati roky* (1938) to see how much more effective the earlier and much shorter poem is in harmonizing feeling, experience, voice and form. Its concluding dirge for the dead and persecuted is truly moving, and it conveys more wisdom and compassion with a greater sense of that tragic period than any self-consciously historiosophic passage in the later opus.

Another prevalent tendency generated by the goal of a “great literature” and the task of speaking for the nation’s cause is to overload art with a “publicist” message of unassimilated political content. The work of Bahriyan in general, and

his drama (or dramatic novella as he styles it) *Morituri*, in particular, stands as a good example of this artistic self-betrayal, or simply falseness. Here, precisely as in literature written according to the recipes of socialist realism, it is never enough to depict experience: one must augment it with exhortation and heavy-handed symbolism. Personal experience in NKVD prisons cannot be allowed to speak for itself, a drop in the sea of suffering, unique yet typical. One must make the hero an eloquent spokesman for the entire suffering nation and indeed a direct descendant of Khvylioviy. One must make Karl Marx one of the prisoners so that through his humiliation and terror the bankruptcy of his theory can be made plain to even the slowest of readers.

The self-destructiveness of this goal of "greatness" is apparent even in good works—works that are innovative and sophisticated, such as Kosach's *Enei i zhyttia inshykh*. For the debilitating feature that this short novel shares with Klen's poem and Bahriany's drama is an intensive literary self-consciousness that almost palpably militates against the work's broader potential. This self-consciousness (as a specific form of *literaturshchyna*) is perhaps the most poisoned fruit of *velyka literatura*. The rhetoric of pedagogy, as we have seen, pervades the criticism of this period, and it seems that most writers compensated by emphasizing their literariness. Kosach's *Enei* exemplifies this defence mechanism: the work is not only honeycombed with literary allusions to, echoes of, or quotations from Shakespeare, Schiller, Baudelaire, Dante, Gogol, Cervantes, and others, but on the basic compositional levels of narrative and character development often seems incapable of finding its own voice, as it persistently and self-consciously tries on mask after mask. While ambivalence towards literary models need not be an aesthetic failing, it is here, not only because it is so pervasive, but because it tends to paralyze both the voice and the dynamism of the novel. At its worst, the novel's metathematics suspend it in a declarative and poeticizing fog: things, emotions, people, ideas are not shown but muffled in "literary" descriptions. The props, at times, overwhelm the players.

These are all, to repeat, more or less pronounced tendencies and unconscious patterns. They are not conscious positions, let alone programmatic stances. Once the critic is attuned to them, however, they cannot but be obvious. When worst comes to worst, writers find themselves, as Kostetsky observed,⁷¹ assuming entirely false roles, like tenors straining to be basso profundos—all because "the times demand it." At best, the falseness is more subtle as the writer, in order to satisfy some abstract norm of greatness, betrays the potential of his artistry by gilding the lily.⁷²

Underlying both the conscious and the unconscious needs and desires is a structure that does provide a unified definition of the role of *velyka literatura*. It is the deceptively simple fact that the literary activity of this period, in all its various ramifications, is in an unprecedented way oriented toward the reader. The reader, of course, is always a factor in the literary equation, but the emphasis

may vary, and in this period the bond between the writer and his audience—the validation of the audience at the expense of the writer and his text—is inordinately strong. This makes the DP period rather exceptional in the course of modern Ukrainian literary history. For seldom was the writer and his work more dominated by the implicit demands and the explicit claims of actual readers or their various (often self-appointed) spokesmen. (Ukrainian literature written under the aegis of Socialist Realism provides close competition in this. Its readership, however, is entirely mediated—in the accepted literature, that is—by official strictures and censorship. At the same time, writers who are part of the establishment attain privileges and status which are never afforded to émigré writers, no matter how loyal to their party they are.)

While the period as such and the program and value of *velyka literatura* are not entirely synonymous (there were works and writers that stood apart from it), the orientation towards the reader, with the rhetoric, poetics and *Weltanschauung* that devolves from it, provides the essential link between the two and allows us to see *velyka literatura* as the dominant mind-set of this period.

References to the reader, a concern for his comprehension and involvement, the more or less explicit belief that only the consensus of the collectivity, indeed its anonymity signifies new strength (“Kupā, kupā ku potēdze,” as Tuwim put it)—all this abounds in theoretical-programmatic articles, in reviews and polemics. “The mission,” “the nation’s call,” “the demands the age (or history) imposes,” the whole gamut of military imagery speak of the soap box and the political rally. The notion that Ukrainian émigré literature should be tied to and determined by political goals and concerns is, of course, always in the wings and is periodically being trundled out to centre stage by various commissars for literature or by critics moonlighting as commissars. (A fine example of the latter is found in Iurii Boiko’s “Open Letter to Iu. Sherekh,” where he attacks the MUR theorist for apoliticism and for tolerating apoliticism in others, such as Kosach. Boiko declares with impeccable circularity that “what Ukrainian politics and Ukrainian literature have in common is that both one and the other should stand at the fountain-heads of national life. Then they will have the strength of Antaeus. In this commonality of the source lies the natural precondition of their union.”⁷³) When a small group of disaffected authors, calling themselves “Svitannia,” splits off from MUR, their open letter to the leadership of MUR has all the earmarks of a broadside announcing a party schism. After stating that MUR has “compromised itself” by “a series of publications that are of low quality and above all false in their ideas (*ideino falshyvykh*) and deeply injurious to Ukrainian literature,” and listing by way of illustration the major works of Sherekh and Kosach, it makes the following key point: “the writers who have gone furthest in their published appearances toward compromising MUR in the eyes of the nationally conscious readers, i.e., Iu. Kosach and Iu. Sherekh, still

remain for the broad reading masses the main representatives, so to say, of the ideology (*ideinoi linii*) of MUR...."⁷⁴

The reader, however, does not only appear as the confused, duped or outraged object of the author's wiles.⁷⁵ He is not, in other words, only construed in terms of extrinsic, political or ideological considerations. He is also the undisguised addressee. This is most apparent in the pedagogic tone that is so often assumed by critics. It seems at times as though literary criticism has been identified with and reduced to primers and lessons of *bon ton*, to *Kinderstube*, *vykhovuvannia* and ultimately *upupienie*.⁷⁶

The flowering, one might even say hypertrophy of criticism in the DP period also reflects on reader orientation, for the majority of the criticism understandably deals not with formal or intrinsic analysis but with generally thematic and social moments. In the purely functional sense, apart from tone, content and level of discourse, the criticism of the period performs the more natural role of talking about literature *to an audience*. At the present stage of émigré literature, the critic talks only to a handful of other critics.

Finally, the question of the reader and how to deal with him, how and what to write for him, provided the ground on which *velyka literatura* was exploded and this phase of émigré writing brought to a close. The principal saboteurs, as everyone really suspected, especially those outside the walls of MUR, were Kostetsky and Kosach, both of them founding members of the organization. Their heresy, the explosive material, was not, as the wisdom then had it, their apolitical stance (or even Kosach's impassioned attack on *visnykism*), nor their "Europeanism," "left-wing" experimentation,⁷⁷ avant-garde poetics or presumed erotic thematics. The heresy was simply that they denied the primacy of the reader, indeed reduced him to the least important factor in the model of literary communication. Kosach did it directly and polemically in the course of arguing for liberal, humanist values. His watchword, "for the sovereignty of the writer," while standing as the title of one of the sections of his paper, is in fact its central issue.⁷⁸ Kostetsky's argument is more subtle, more oblique and ultimately more seminal. He proposes to reformulate the question: "not WHAT but WHO and HOW." The issue is to find one's own individuality, and for this, in principle, there can be no ready-made formulas. The writer and the critic both should pose questions and not preach answers.⁷⁹ Nothing could have so undercut the themes of *velyka literatura*. By its very nature as a program with a designated set of goals, it postulated answers. And it is not really surprising that while Kostetsky was attacked for many, often very trivial things, this heresy was never mentioned. It was never noticed: matter does not recognize anti-matter.

It is also not surprising that the aesthetic program of sovereign individualism, of genuine not rhetorical openness to new and "foreign" ideas and models, of intuitive rejection of shibboleths, missions and organizational control that was present in embryo in Kostetsky's oblique and tentative ruminations was picked

up and given substance by the next generation, the so-called New York Group. It may seem unkind, but perhaps the most lasting achievement of MUR was that it sheltered such subversives, and of *velyka literatura* that it so quickly generated its own antithesis.

Notes

1. Cf. especially Iurii Sherekh [George Y. Shevelov], "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura v Evropi 1945-1949," in *Ne dlia ditei* (New York, 1964), and Volodymyr Derzhavyn, "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura (1945-1947)," *Kalendar-Almanakh* (Augsburg-Munich, 1948).
2. Cf. Hryhorii Kostiuk's "Z litopysu literaturnoho zhyttia v diiaspori" [*Suchasnist*, nos. 9-10 (129-30)] (Munich, 1971); and Liubomyr Vynar, *Ostap Hrytsai* (Cleveland, 1960).
3. See Yuri Boshyk and Boris Balan, *Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons," 1945-1954: A Selected Bibliography and Guide to Research with Special Reference to Ukrainians* (Edmonton, 1982).
4. *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* XXXII (Regensburg, 1948), 1-5.
5. To my knowledge, there are no reliable statistics on this. In their introduction to *Koordynaty*, an anthology of Ukrainian poetry in the West, the editors, Bohdan Boychuk and Bohdan T. Rubchak, note that their original pool of poets (including duplication because of pseudonyms) was 368, which they subsequently pared down to 68 (*Suchasnist* [New York], 1969, vol. 1, vi). If only one-half or even one-third of the original number were active in the DP period, and considering that this refers only to poets, the total number of writers in this period must have been fairly substantial. In a somewhat more rigorous way (Boychuk and Rubchak, after all, deny any scholarly claims and speak of their efforts as a literary work, as a labour of love [*ibid.*, vii]), Bohdan Kravtsiv in his *Na bahrianomu koni revoliutsii* (New York, 1960) lists close to 100 authors who fled from the Soviet Union after World War II. To this one must still add the writers from Western Ukraine.
6. The newspapers for this period are most instructive. Cf. *Nashe zhyttia*, Augsburg, 1947.
7. V. Markus, "Displaced Persons," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1984), 676, and V. Kubijovyč and V. Markus, "Emigration," *ibid.*, 822-3.
8. The degree to which the realia of daily camp life could or could not serve as the subject matter of literature, or a "great literature," is a question to which we will return; cf. Hr. Shevchuk [Shevelov], "Tabir v literaturi i literatura v tabori," *Sioho-chasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 55-61.
9. Cf. MUR, *Almanakh*, no. 1 (1946): 123-5. Cf. also "Obolona, nezryme tilo...", *Arka*, no. 6 (1947): 34.
10. Vasyly Barka, *Apostoly* (Augsburg, 1946), 30-2.

11. Ivan Bahriany, *Zoloty bumerang* (Neu-Ulm, 1946), 152-68.
12. Cf. *Orlyk* (Berchtesgaden, February 1947), 1 and (Feb. 1948), 1-4.
13. Cf. Oleh Olzhych, *Pidzamche* (n.p., 1946) and Olena Teliha, *Prapory dukha* ("Na chuzhyni," 1947).
14. See especially Mykola Khvylioviy, *Tvory v piatiokh tomakh* (Baltimore, 1978-84).
15. O. Dansky, *Khochu zhyty!* (Munich, 1946); Oleksa Stepovy, *Iasyr* ("Na chuzhyni," 1947); V. Martynets, *Brätz* (Stuttgart, 1946); V. Koval, *My—Ukrainci* ("Nimechchyna," 1948); Semen Pidhainy, *Ukrainska inteligentsiia na Solovkakh* (n.p., 1947).
16. Myhailo Bazhansky, *Mozaika kvadriv viaznychkh* (Aschaffenburg, 1946).
17. Ivan Bahriany, *Sad hetsymanskyi* (n.p., 1950).
18. Mykh. Sytnyk, *Vidlitaiut pytsi* (Hamburg-Heidenau, 1946); Leonid Poltava, *Za muramy Berlinu* (n.p., n.d. [Augsburg, 1946]); Teodosii Osmachka, *Poet* (n.p., n.d. [Regensburg, 1947]); Iurii Klen, *Popil imperii*, in *Tvory*, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1957).
19. Dokiia Humenna, *Dity chumatskoho shliakhu* (Munich, 1948); Zinovii Berezhan, *Na okrainakh nochii* (Stuttgart-New York, 1977).
20. Mykola Kulish, "*Patetychna sonata*," *drama* (Cracow-Lviv, 1943).
21. Ivan Shkvarko, *Proklynaiu* (Cracow-Lviv, 1944).
22. Iurii Klen, *Karavely* (Prague, 1943); Evhen Malaniuk, *Vybrani poezii* (Lviv-Cracow, 1943); Ivan Bahriany, *Zvirolovy* (Lviv-Cracow, 1947); Bohdan Kravtsiv, *Ostannia osin* (Berlin, 1940) and *Pid chuzhymy zoriamy* (Berlin, 1941); Oksana Liaturynska, *Kniazha emal* (Prague, 1941); Sviatoslav Hordynsky [Iurii Burevii], *Surmy dniv* (Cracow, 1940), *Pershyy val* (Cracow, 1941) and *Vybrani poezii* (Cracow, 1944).
23. The question of continuity between the literary situation of the war years and that of the immediate postwar period is also discussed by Sherekh; cf. "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura v Evropi 1945-1949," especially 229-31.
24. Cf. Kostiuk, "Z litopysu literaturnoho zhyttia v diiaspori," 7-9.
25. "Slovo do chytachiv," *Novi dni*, no. 1 (Toronto, February 1950), inside cover. The founder and editor of *Novi dni*, Petro Volyniak [Wolyniak], had been the publisher of *Litavry* and *Nash shliakh* in the DP period.
26. I.e., through *Ukrainska literaturna hazeta* and *Suchasna Ukraina*.
27. Ulas Samchuk, "Sekty-partii chy suspilstvo-natsiia?" *Novi dni*, no. 12 (January 1951): 7-13, and Iurii Sherekh, "Roku Bozhoho 1947," *Novi dni*, no. 15 (April 1951): 14-20.
28. See, for example, the review of U.S. (Ulas Samchuk?) of Sherekh's *Dumky proty techii*, *Novi dni*, no. 5 (June 1950): 26, or Valentyna Korpova's review of Bahriany's *Sad hetsymanskyi*, in *Literaturno-naukovyi zbirnyk*, no. 1 (New York, 1952): 280-82.
29. Cf. the personal attacks—in verse—on Iurii Sherekh in the Buenos Aires-based journal *Porohy* (February 1950); cited in Vasyl Chaplenko, *Mii holos u pusteli* (New York, 1979), 58. Chaplenko's bitter and shrill attacks on Sherekh-Shevelov and

various other critics for real or imagined slights make for melancholy reading (and are shrugged off by the literary “establishment” as the ravings of a crackpot). Like much of muckraking and *samvydav*, however, his writings about the literary scene often dredge up the interesting details that “official” histories prefer to ignore. They also highlight an interesting structure of contemporary émigré literary life, i.e., its fragmentation into rather hermetic and self-sufficient groupings, with each imposing a kind of conspiracy of silence on the world outside its walls.

30. A prime example of this is the virulent polemics concerning Mykola Khvylioviy (cf. below). Cf. especially *Na sud ukrainskoi emigratsii “natsional-komunizm”—Kvylioviyzm ta ioho propagatoriv* (New York-Toronto, 1959), ed. V. Koval.
31. See Iurii Sherekh, “Etiudy pro natsionalne v literaturakh suchasnosti. Do teorii natsionalno-orhanichnykh styliv,” *Literaturno-naukovyi zbirnyk*, no. 1 (New York, 1952): 148-61.
32. See Iurii Sherekh, “Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura v Evropi 1945-1949,” 229-33 and *passim*.
33. *MUR (Zbirnyk I)* (Munich-Karlsfeld, 1946).
34. *Ibid.*, 3.
35. *Ibid.*, 4.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, 5.
38. Cf. Iurii Sherekh, *Ne dlia ditei* (New York, 1964), 27-9 and *passim*.
39. *MUR (Zbirnyk I)*, 25-38.
40. *Ibid.*, 26-7.
41. *Ibid.*, 29.
42. *Ibid.*, 38-9.
43. *Ibid.*, *passim*.
44. *Ibid.*, 82.
45. *Ibid.*, 85.
46. *Ibid.*, 85-6.
47. See William Carlos Williams, *Paterson* (New York, 1963), 165.
48. See *Nashe zhyttia*, no. 27 (122), 14 July 1947, 4.
49. Cf. *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, no. 1 (1948): 1-5.
50. See, for example, O. Zhdanovych, “MUR—v teorii i praktytsi,” *Orlyk*, no. 8 (1947): 26-9; cf. also Iurii Boiko’s articles, note 73, below.
51. *Arka*, no. 2-3 (1947): 30.
52. “Shche pro vydavnychi spravy,” *Nashe zhyttia*, no. 41 (136), 3 Nov. 1947, 6.
53. See his *Bolshevytska revoliutsiia i ukrainsi* (Berlin, 1928), especially 7-13.

54. Cf. N. Gerken-Rusova's "Heroichnyi teatr," in *Sviato Derzhavnosty* (Prague, 1936), 4-11.
55. See the relevant essays in this volume.
56. Cf. *Nashe zhyttia*, no. 27 (122), 14 July 1947, 4.
57. Sherekh-Shevelov admits this influence with respect to his thinking then—if not to the premises behind MUR—with a candour that is quite rare among his contemporaries; cf. note 38, above.
58. According to Shevelov, this is literally the way MUR came into being: see *Ne dlia ditei*, 18. Kostiuk, in turn (see "Z litopysu literaturnoho zhyttia v diiaspori," 7) is quite open, indeed jocular, about the fact that Slovo, the Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile, began its existence on paper and only gradually acquired some substance.
59. Cf. Sherekh, "Ukrainska emigratsiina literatura v Evropi 1945-1949," 239-47 and *passim*.
60. While a concern with contemporary Western art is pronounced in various publications, e.g. *Arka*, none is as open about it as *Khors*, where there is not only a large section of translations, where titles of various sections are given in English, but where there is even an appeal—in English, French and German, and summaries of individual articles also given in English and German—to "foreign"—Western—writers to contribute articles on designated topics.
61. Cf. note 50.
62. Andriian Kashchenko: late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century author of Cossack adventure novels intended for juveniles but often read for patriotic uplift. The term "kashchenkite" is part of Sherekh's terminology of debunking Ukrainian provincialism.
63. *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, op. cit., 4.
64. Op. cit., *MUR (Zbirnyk II)*: 56.
65. "V oboroni velykykh," *MUR (Zbirnyk III)*: 12.
66. Cf. note 31.
67. I.e.: "Everyone who wants to be a writer must know world literature and foreign languages. He is not a writer until he has this—this we stress categorically. The era of hacks and of apologists for hacks is over. People who have not experienced the school of world literature can write and be published—but they are not writers, and their writings have nothing in common with literature. This is a preliminary grade, one [which one attends] before entering literature. It is as necessary as the one before that: to learn the alphabet, the rules of grammar, and punctuation." Op. cit., 12.
68. "Vilna ukrainska literatura," *MUR (Zbirnyk II)*: 47-65.
69. Examples of enlightened discussions of Khvyliovy in this period are O. Han's *Trahediia Mykoly Khvyliovoho* (n.p., n.d.) and Petro Holubenko's "Mykola Khvyliovy i suchasnist," *Orlyk*, no. 5 (May 1947): 8-14. An example of one of the sillier

- (but typical) attacks on Khvylioviy is Fedir Dudko's "Hodi movchaty!" *Nashe zhyttia*, no. 18 (113), 12 May 1947, 4.
70. Cf. Hr. Shevchuk's [Sherekh's] "Tabir v literaturi i literatura v tabori," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 55-61.
 71. "Pro iednist riznomanitonoho i superechlyvoho," *Slovo (Zbirnyk I)* (New York, 1962), 325.
 72. In a later article Sherekh speaks of the "falseness" of a whole generation of poets; he uses the term in a different and narrower context. Cf. "Pokolinnia bere falshyvu notu," *Novi dni*, no. 36 (January 1953): 6-9.
 73. "Odvertiy lyst do Iu. Sherekha," *Orlyk*, no. 11 (November 1947): 20. An equally explicit political approach is found in Boiko's article on Barka, "Pro Vasylia Barku i pro deshcho pryntsyrove," *Orlyk*, no. 5 (May 1947): 21-3, in which he chides the poet for his lack of political clarity and commitment, and meaningfully advises him to shake off "abstract humanism" and to enter on the one and only right path—of militant nationalist struggle.
 74. "Odvertiy lyst do pravlinnia MUR," *Nedilia*, 7 December 1947, 5.
 75. Cf. especially the reviews of DVH, "Fosforyzuiuche boloto," *Orlyk*, no. 10 (October 1947): 32, and of Hrytsai's monograph-length denunciation of Kosach, Kostetsky and other such literary, moral and intellectual bankrupts: "Bankrot literary," *Orlyk*, nos. 9-12 (1947) and nos. 2-4 (1948). The dominant tone of high dudgeon also provides moments of (unintended) comic relief.
 76. Apart from Hrytsai, the critic who does this most energetically, and with a sense of mission, is Sherekh. Cf. the opening paragraphs of his "Etiudy pro 'nezrozumile' v literaturi," *Arka* no. 4 (1947): 1, and the introduction and various articles of *Ne dlia ditei*.
 77. Kostetsky's word-play with "kambribum" (a version of "cumberbund"?), in his short story "Bozhestvenna lzha" in *Khors* (pp. 49-68), came to symbolize for some critics his degenerate lack of seriousness.
 78. Iurii Kosach, "Vilna ukrainska literatura," *MUR (Zbirnyk II)*: 55.
 79. Ihor Kostetsky, "Ukrainskyi realizm XX storichchia," *MUR (Zbirnyk III)*: 34 and *passim*.

Scholarship and Culture

A Survey of Ukrainian Camp Periodicals, 1945-50

Roman Ilnytskyj

For the sake of historical justice, I must begin with praise for Volodymyr Miiakovsky, organizer of the Museum and Archives of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN), which was established in Augsburg in 1945. He was the first Ukrainian activist to realize the need for an émigré press centre:

The Ukrainian Museum and Archives has taken on the function of a book centre. By collecting six copies of each piece of printed material, it saves newspapers and other publications from total oblivion, for with the great demand at present for the printed word, newspapers, journals, and books sell out extraordinarily quickly, and are read to the point of disintegration.¹

Many publishers responded to Miiakovsky's initiative and sent their publications to the Museum and Archives. Thanks to that effort, today we have in the UVAN building in New York a large collection of periodicals and books produced from 1945 to 1950. Fortunately, similar collections of our periodical literature exist at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich and at the Symon Petliura Museum in Paris. In North America there are the rich collections of the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre in Winnipeg, the Immigration Archives of the University of Minnesota, and the libraries of such universities as Toronto, Alberta, and Illinois (at Urbana), which employ Ukrainian librarians.² Still, of all the known collections of periodical literature, that of UVAN is the most complete.

The First Post-World War II Periodicals

Determining which Ukrainian newspaper of the DP camp era was the first to appear is difficult. For a long time this honour was claimed by the weekly *Nashe zhyttia*, which was published in Augsburg and first appeared on 5 September 1945. Twenty-seven days later the first issue of the weekly *Chas* came out in Fürth, on 2 October 1945. The question of primacy becomes more complicated if we consider what, in fact, can and should be included in the Ukrainian periodical literature from that period. If it should encompass all systematically produced written information about Ukrainian and world events earmarked for general readership, then the beginning of the history of Ukrainian periodical publication must be moved from the previously accepted September-October 1945 to April-May of that year. At that time the first brief notices of international events began to appear in typewritten bulletins (two-four sheets of paper), passed from hand to hand by readers and tacked up by the publishers on walls of buildings where Ukrainians gathered. This occurred primarily in the first provisional Ukrainian camps that were organized, as well as in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) camps.

According to my research, the first Ukrainian periodical publication of the post-World War II era was *Korotki visti*,³ which was published by the Ukrainian Organized Community, headed by Volodymyr Dolenko, Mykhailo Vietukhov, and Vasyl Dubrovsky. The first issue of *Korotki visti* appeared in Weimar on 22 April 1945, before the war had formally ended. For its first four issues, the bulletin appeared in typed format. The editors asked their readers to retype copies and pass them on to others. By the fifth issue, with the war formally ended, *Korotki visti* went over to letterpress. By the ninth issue it moved to Hersfeld, in the American Zone, where it ceased publication. Weimar was also the home of the *Biuletyn Ukrainskoho dopomohovoho komitetu* (letterpress), which reprinted official appeals of the military occupation authorities and texts of military radio broadcasts. There are some indications that as far back as April 1945 the newspaper *Ukrainski visti* was being published as the organ of the Ukrainian National Committee, headed by Pavlo Shandruk and Volodymyr Semenenko. That committee was constituted toward the end of the war as a German initiative.

In all, I have managed to trace the titles of forty-two Ukrainian newspapers and bulletins published in 1945. In the first overview of the postwar or, as it is called, the “camp era,” twenty-eight publication titles are listed. The authors also conjectured that a total of 270 Ukrainian periodicals existed at that time.⁴ That was the extent of our knowledge on the subject until 1982.⁵ Then we were provided with 315 titles of publications, that is, eleven times as many as Zhyvotko and Kravtsiv mentioned. To Boshyk and Balan’s list I added another twelve titles, so today we know of 327 periodicals, of which 221 were published

in the American Zone, 51 in the British Zone, 23 in Austria, 7 in Italy, 25 in unspecified places, and not a single one in the French Zone.

Some of the categories of Ukrainian camp publications, according to subject or type, were: Plast—21 titles; students—20; camp councils and boards—19; churches—18; intercamp newspapers—17; literary newspapers and journals—14; bulletins of social, scholarly and other institutions—13; journals for women, humor, and satire—11 each; for children—7; Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM)—5; refugee affairs—5; URDP—4; OUNm—4; the Hetmanite Association, political prisoners, SKhS, sports—3 each; socialist parties, professional associations, all youth, pedagogy, bibliography, economics, culture, Esperanto—2 each; art, military affairs, engineering, political science, co-operative movement, theatre, language, press service—1 each. The question of Ukrainian camp publications is not exhausted with this list of categories. The complete picture will emerge only when a union list of Ukrainian serials abroad is published.

Legal Status of the Press

For almost two years the DPs and political refugees in Germany and Austria lived outside local laws. They were not mentioned in any international agreements and their press, too, had no legal status. Neither the military authorities nor UNRRA were given any indication how they should treat them. Something, however, had to be done, for DP publications were springing up like mushrooms after a rain and they sought inclusion under Allied jurisdiction. For both UNRRA and the military administration, the question of what to do with the DP press dragged on for a long time.

Impelled to do something about the press problem, each local UNRRA office found its own solution. Vasyl Chaplenko, the first editor of *Nashe zhyttia*, wrote:

A group of writers who happened to end up together in the camp began to make attempts to publish a newspaper or journal. It turned out that for publication one had to have permission, but nobody knew exactly from whom. After some consultation, representatives of the group turned for permission to the American duty officer; he forbade all publication, even of a wall bulletin. A few days later, however, permission was granted by P. Carpenter, the person in charge of the local UNRRA organization. The first issue of *Nashe zhyttia* came out on September 5, 1945. Technically it was of low quality and in content, too, not very abundant. As of the second issue, content became even more limited, for the censor forbade the inclusion of any political article, even something like M. Dolnytsky's "Democracy," which had been published in the first issue.⁶

Hennadii Kotorovych, editor-in-chief of *Nedilia*, also left his recollections of that period:

The weekly had its origin in the understanding attitude of the authorities [UNRRA] and the long-cherished desire of the contributors and supporters of our evening radio broadcasts.... *Nedilia* published in common with the press

organs of the two neighbouring camps for Displaced Persons in our city [Schweinfurt], the Polish and the Lithuanian. The first issue of *Nedilia* leaves the press with the following message from our present government: 'Write about all that goes on in your camp, write of what you like and what you do not like, criticize, entertain and teach, but stay away from all politics.'⁷

A third witness to the birth of the Ukrainian émigré press, M. Dolnytsky, Chaplenko's assistant editor at *Nashe zhyttia*, wrote: "The little newspaper *Radio-visti* came out semi-legally in the Gegingen camp, with the permission of the (Ukrainian) camp director."⁸

In some camps censorship was applied. In some, material assistance was provided. There were even some camps in which all publication was strictly forbidden. That was most common during the first months after the war. In 1946, in the case of the weekly *Slovo* (edited by Spyrydon Dovhal at the Regensburg camp), the director of a camp UNRRA office forbade its publication, although the newspaper had been coming out for almost a year. Periodicals that originated outside the camps were in a different legal position. In the minority, they included *Chas*, published in Fürth, and a few newspapers in Munich. The non-camp publications had no connection with UNRRA. They obtained permission to publish from the military government. The procedure in these cases was simple. For example, as the publisher of *Chas*, I started my newspaper and only two weeks later did I report to the military government to ask permission for my initiative, which I was granted without any formalities. The only requirement was that I send two copies of each issue to the officer in charge of DP affairs. From that time onward the last page of the newspaper carried the standard phrase: "Permitted by Military Government in Fürth." Nobody ever censored *Chas* or even threatened to do so.

In general, newspapers and journals published in the camps were much more tightly controlled than those published outside them. Camp councils and boards, even camp commanders, interfered in their affairs. In order to avoid this interference, many newspapers moved out of the camps and continued their work outside. Those that operated inside the camps, however, enjoyed a number of material advantages, such as free office space, letter presses, typewriters, and often (especially at the beginning) free paper supplies. Newspapers operating outside the camps had to pay for everything with their own money.

The first official document—a circular—that sought to introduce some order into the legal chaos was published by the Supreme Command of the American Armed Forces in Frankfurt on 11 February 1947. Signed by General C. R. Huebner, it was entitled, "Publications By and For United Nations Displaced Persons and Those Assimilated to Them in Status."⁹ This was, in fact, not an original document, but a duplication of the law issued by the American authorities regarding the German press on 30 September 1946. Only the names of those addressed were changed: where the original document had spoken of "Germans"

and the “German press,” this one spoke of “DPs” and the “DP press.” The clauses of the circular were severe, reflecting the political atmosphere not so much of 1947, but rather of 1945-6—showing at least a strong political loyalty to all the Allies of the anti-Hitler war. The main clauses of the circular were:

1. Publishers who are not given a license to continue publishing their newspapers and journals (as prescribed by this circular) must immediately suspend their activity.
2. Freedom of the press and of speech is guaranteed, so long as it not be used in any way that endangers military security or the interests of the Allied military government and the press not engage in any subversive activities or propaganda.
3. Dissemination of any type of news, informational or editorial, which constitutes a malicious attack upon the policies or personnel of military government or the Allied forces, aims to disrupt unity among the Allies or seeks to evoke the distrust and hostility of any displaced person against any occupying power, is prohibited.
4. Dissemination of any type of news, informational or editorial, which incites to riot or resistance to military government or the Allied forces, jeopardizes the occupying troops or otherwise endangers military security, is prohibited.
5. Publications printed in the countries of origin of displaced persons may be distributed in DP camps; thus, Russian publications printed in the USSR may be distributed in camps with Russian inhabitants; Polish publications printed in Poland may be distributed in camps with Polish inhabitants and so on.
6. Control over the press, that is, the task of ensuring that it adheres to the regulations set forth in this circular, rests with the military commanders of the cities where the newspapers are published.
7. Three copies of each issue published are to be sent to the Supreme Command of the American Armed Forces and to local commands; one copy of each, to the Reference Library of the Allied government in Berlin.

That was the content of the circular. The greatest threat lay in its first clause, which spoke of suspending publications that were not authorized by the military authorities to continue their existence. Fears on this account were heightened by the fact that in October 1946, UNRRA Headquarters gave notice that in future, each national immigrant group would be allowed to publish no more than four newspapers and two journals.¹⁰ Naturally, such a change would wreak havoc on the press of all national groups, for by that time they all had hundreds of newspapers, journals, and bulletins.

Fortunately, the alarm was sounded prematurely. It is true that only forty DP newspapers were granted licenses to publish. Of these, the greatest number were Latvian (11), with second place going to Ukrainians (10),¹¹ the others being

Lithuanians and Estonians (6 each), Poles (5), and Serbs (2). But other unlicensed newspapers still continued to appear. They managed to survive by placing themselves under the aegis of their licensed brethren. I recall that the journals *Arka* and *MUR* were published under the license of *Ukrainska trybuna*; *Chas* took under its wing the Shevchenko Scientific Society's journal *Siohochasne i mynule*.

Censorship was never introduced. As head at that time of the International Association of the DP Press (which was recognized by UNRRA and the military authorities) for the whole American Zone in Germany, I do not recall a single case of the American military government's censoring any newspaper or journal. Thus the meaning of the circular was never implemented, but was ignored by both the American authorities and the DP publishers and editors.

So the question remains: why did the government formulate a law it did not intend to enforce? There is, in my opinion, only one possible answer: for the same reason that the Soviet government proclaimed a constitution it has never respected. The circular concerning the DP press was a response to Soviet pressure applied at international forums and, in particular, at meetings of the General Assembly and special commissions of the United Nations. Having issued this circular, the Americans could refer to it in the event of complaints from Moscow about anti-Soviet attacks in the DP press. They would be able to say, "We have forbidden that! Here is the circular."

The Economic Position of the Press

The economic development of the Ukrainian press can be divided into two phases. The first began with the appearance of the first newspapers and journals and lasted until April 1947. This was a period of isolation from the German economy and from the American occupation administration. The second phase began in May 1947 and continued until mid-1953, that is, until the cessation of the International Refugee Organization's (IRO) activity in Germany. It was a time of economic rebirth.

During the first phase, the DP press was excluded from the German economy and was not tied in any way to the American military government or UNRRA. The Germans avoided any economic relations with the DP press (although they required that taxes be paid), claiming that foreigners fell under the jurisdiction of the occupying powers and were, in their view, in a better economic position than the German population. The occupation authorities did not at first see much value in the DP press and thus paid it little heed. As a result, the press had trouble meeting its most urgent needs. The German centralized economy was headed by the *Wirtschaftsamt*, the office that set German economic policy. No supplies could be obtained without the *Bezugschein*, permission to buy goods. Thus newspaper publishers had difficulty getting such basics as letter presses, wax plates, typing paper, not to mention typewriters, and lead type.

Under these circumstances, for a newspaper to begin publication and maintain its operation (generally outside the camps), three conditions had to be met: first, the publisher had to have at least some starting capital (1-2,000 Reichsmarks); second, he had to be capable of working in extremely difficult conditions; third, he had to have co-workers prepared to do tasks assigned to them for minimal pay over long periods of time (several months). *Chas* began with six persons working in its offices; this number eventually grew to twelve. All the workers put out a maximum effort to build up the newspaper. Thanks to them, after six months *Chas* was an economically stable business. Each copy of the newspaper sold for 50 pfennigs. With a press run of 10,000 the paper took in 5,000 Reichsmarks per week. This was a sum that made self-sufficiency possible. Some newspapers decided to increase their income by publishing books, in particular *Ukrainski visti* in Ulm and *Ukrainska trybuna* in Munich. Selling good newspapers and good books was easy to do at that time. Camp dwellers, thirsting for the written word in their own language, bought out even large press runs.

The event that separated the two phases of economic development for the DP press was the appearance of the aforementioned circular from the Headquarters of the American Armed Forces. One of its clauses stated that every newspaper recommended by the IRO for licensing would automatically obtain the right to a free paper ration from IRO. The document also said that a licensed periodical could not be published more than three times a week, and could not be more than twelve pages in length. Its allowable press run depended upon the size of the population in the region of its publication. Furthermore, a single copy of any newspaper was expected to be read by at least fifteen persons. That last stipulation was more theoretical than real, for although the IRO had statistical data about the number of persons of every nationality in the newspaper's circulation district, those figures did not take into account the fact that each paper was distributed not only within its own district, but throughout the entire American, British, and French Zones and even abroad in Austria, Belgium, Britain, and Italy—everywhere Ukrainians were living. Thus *Chas*, for example, received enough ration paper for 3,500 copies, but printed 10-15,000 depending on the demand. Distribution was primarily by bookstores and camp kiosks. Demand varied from one issue to another, depending on such factors as the shift in population (movement from one camp to another, emigration, screening, repatriation) and interest in specific topics being discussed at a particular time. For example, during my running debate with the Poles, which lasted several months, demand for *Chas* noticeably increased. After the arrival of the Galician Division in Britain, the demand for *Chas* there increased from several hundred copies to over 2,000.

Under such rules, the newspaper publishers had to buy extra paper on the black market at profiteering prices. Nevertheless, the paper donated by the IRO played a decisive role in keeping the press at a certain operating level and even

in keeping it alive. Without that paper ration, Ukrainian periodical literature would not have survived, especially after the German monetary reform of 1948. The annual rations of paper for the forty licensed DP newspapers were: in 1947 (half-year)—75 tonnes; 1948—243 tonnes; 1949—303 tonnes; 1950—370 tonnes.¹² Another privilege that the licensed DP press enjoyed was that its publishers could travel by rail, free of charge, throughout all three Western zones of occupation. They or their representatives also had the right to take part in all the press conferences organized by IRO Headquarters in Bad Kissingen, or other press conferences, on the same footing as American and European journalists. They obtained these privileges thanks to the efforts of the Association of the DP Press.

Printers and Printing

Printers constituted a separate element in the economic life of the press. Of all Slavic immigrants, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Serbs, and Russians experienced the greatest mechanical difficulties, since they used Cyrillic script. Poles, Croats, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians were in a much better position. The main printers in Germany who did Cyrillic composition were in Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden, but those cities were under Soviet occupation. During the first weeks after the end of the war, only one printer with Cyrillic type was operating in West Germany, in Regensburg. A few months later, two more establishments began operation, one in Munich and one in Ulm. The first came into being thanks to the S. Bandera OUN political faction, while the second was created by supporters of *Ukrainski visti*. About the same time, Sazhnyk's printing firm began to operate in Augsburg and S. Sliusarchuk's in Munich. In Austria there were two printing houses owned by Ukrainians: Ivan Tyktor's in Salzburg and M. Denysiuk's in Innsbruck. Of course these few linotype presses could not satisfy all the demands of the Ukrainian publishing market. For that reason, all Ukrainian newspapers began publication on letter press (except for *Ukrainska trybuna*, but it did not appear until the end of 1946), eventually switching to photomechanical reproduction. Only in the second half of 1946 did normal printing procedures become possible.

To illustrate how difficult a path newspaper publishing had to follow I will focus on two examples, *Nashe zhyttia* and *Chas*. The first sixteen issues of *Nashe zhyttia* (from September 1945 to January 1946) were printed on letter press. From January to August 1946 a photomechanical process was used. Only in August 1946 did the newspaper begin normal production. Composition was done at Sazhnyk's print-shop, while the printing itself was done first at Buchdruckerei Anton Hieber in Augsburg, then from March 1947 at Hans Holzmann in Wörschafen and, six months later, at Mayer und Söhne Druckerei in Ansbach. Thus, during the course of one year, it was necessary to use four different

printers. This was mainly because German businesses were not eager to enter into any long-term contracts with foreigners.

Chas worked under conditions that were no better. During its first several months of operation the office had at its disposal only one typewriter, an old Underwood. It was used to prepare wax plates from which copies were made, first on a hand-operated and later on a mechanical letter press. The first few issues of the newspaper consisted of ten letter-size pages. For the next ten months, every issue was four pages in length, regular newspaper size. In January 1946 another good typewriter was acquired and letter press was abandoned for photomechanical printing, which was done by a German company, Buchdruckerei Fritz Zeinlein, in Fürth. In the meantime, efforts were being made to switch the newspaper over to normal printing, and in September an agreement was struck with the Ukrainian printer in Regensburg. Only one issue was produced there, however, for printing the newspaper 100 kilometres from its editorial office was more trouble than it was worth. On 27 October 1946 a contract was signed with a German publisher in Zirndorf (5 kilometres from Fürth), Cyrillic type was acquired, and only then did *Chas* take on the appearance of a regular newspaper. This happened almost exactly on the newspaper's first anniversary.

Similar ordeals were undergone by almost all Ukrainian newspapers. The weekly *Nedilia* was unique in the fact that for over a year it was printed in Roman, or Ukrainian and Roman, script. Ukrainian journals and books had an easier fate. They generally began publication only after the technical production problems had been more or less straightened out.

Association of Ukrainian Journalists

Ukrainian journalists in Germany were grouped into two professional associations—the Union of Ukrainian Journalists (SUZh) and the National-Democratic Association of Ukrainian Journalists (NDOUZh). Each group reflected the political and ideological views of its members, with SUZh supporting the Ukrainian National Council (UNR) and NDOUZh supporting the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) and the OUN Foreign Units (ZCh OUN).

Initiated by Hennadii Kotorovych, the first Ukrainian journalists' convention took place on 2-4 March 1946 in Schweinfurt, Bavaria. That convention was social rather than official, but it was there that the idea of bringing journalists together on a professional basis first arose. The next step in that direction was taken by the publishers and editors of five newspapers—*Ukrainski visti*, *Nashe zhyttia*, *Nedilia*, *Slovo* (Regensburg), and *Ukrainskyi tyzhnevnyk* (Aschaffenburg). They gathered in Regensburg on 7 April 1946 and established the Association of the Ukrainian Democratic Press with the aim of “countering the attempts of some émigré groups [ZCh OUN and Foreign Representation of the UHVR (ZP UHVR)] to foster exclusivity and intolerance of other Ukrainian groupings that favour Ukrainian statehood.”¹³ The fact that the association set itself the task

of “combatting,” rather than embracing, journalists espousing a different point of view meant it could not evolve into an overall grouping of émigré journalists. Furthermore, the Information Division of the Central Representation of Ukrainians in the Emigration (TsPUE), headed by Iuliiian Revai, called the first general convention of Ukrainian émigré journalists in Ulm on 2-3 June 1945. This was done in co-operation with the association and with the aid of its resources and contacts. Naturally, this cast doubt upon the objectivity of the convention organizers and aroused suspicion that the political camp of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) was being favoured.

The convention was attended by ninety-five people who had worked with the press in the past in Ukraine and were continuing to do so in emigration. As might have been expected, political issues dominated, and little was said on professional matters. Supporters of the Ukrainian People’s Republic were in the majority, and they tried to advance their own political view. They suggested sending a greeting to Andrii Livytsky, president-in-exile of the UNR. This move met opposition from supporters of the UHVR, who argued that a professional association of journalists could not take political sides that would cause disharmony in the ranks. Thus, if a greeting was to be sent to a leader of one political camp, the leader of the other camp should be greeted as well—Father Ivan Hryniokh, head of the ZP UHVR. The majority resolution passed and only Livytsky was sent a greeting, which called him the “representative of the legitimate Ukrainian government.”

In spite of this, the convention ended successfully: SUZh was created with Stepan Baran, spokesman for the majority, as its head and Zenon Pelensky, representative of the minority, as assistant. However, by the fall of 1946, conflicts broke out between the two political camps and strong polemics began in the press, with Baran and Pelensky on opposite sides. As a result, Pelensky was ousted from SUZh,¹⁴ after which ZP UHVR supporters left the organization and founded their own group, NDOUZh. Its founding convention took place in Munich on 28 August 1946. According to its November 1946 figures, SUZh had 150 members, NDOUZh 87. The head of NDOUZh was Zenon Pelensky; its secretary was Roman Olynyk-Rakhmanny. The members of the organization came mainly from workers on fourteen periodicals: *Ukrainska trybuna*, *Ukrainske slovo*, *Chas*, *Ukrainska dumka*, *Nasha poshta*, *Litopys politviaznia*, *Pereselenets*, *Siohodni*, *Visnyk UAPT*s, *Visnyk SKhS*, *Novyny*, *Nash klych* (London), *Visti* (Brussels), *Ukrainets u Frantsii*.

International Association of Publishers of the DP Press

Neither SUZh nor NDOUZh concerned themselves with the professional affairs of Ukrainian journalists or publishers. Those issues were taken up by the Association of the DP Press in the American Zone of Germany. (In 1950 the association changed its name to Association of the Free Press of Eastern and Central

Europe, Balkan, and Baltic States.) As initiator and founder of the association, I based the organization on the German model.¹⁵ The German-licensed press within each province had a central organization authorized to represent it in dealings with the American occupation authorities. At the end of 1946 these provincial organizations united to form a zonal representation. I attended their founding convention as a guest and, while there, made the acquaintance of General MacClure, head of the Information Office of the Supreme Military Government in Frankfurt, and H. Nauman, director of the Association of the German-Licensed Press. These contacts helped me to establish the Association of the DP Press, the founding convention of which took place on 27 February 1947 in the Ukrainian camp Somme-Kaserne in Augsburg. Forty-five representatives of twenty-two Ukrainian, Polish, Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Serbian newspapers took part. Eventually, publishers of Russian, Belorussian, Romanian, and Hungarian periodicals also joined the association. In total, eighty-three newspapers and journals became members.¹⁶ The association was recognized by the American army and UNRRA and exercised some influence with the occupation authorities regarding the DP press.

I was elected first president of the Association of the DP Press. While in that office, I initiated the publication of a German-language weekly, *Im Ausland* (In a Foreign Land), which first appeared in July 1947. The objective was to inform the German population about the DPs and political refugees, particularly about their achievements in the area of culture, in order to counter the view held by many Germans that DPs were asocial or criminal elements who resisted returning to their homelands for fear of prosecution for past crimes. The press run of *Im Ausland* approached 100,000 copies. Money to start the paper was borrowed from TsPUE, and its first editors were Ukrainians—Iurii Studynsky and Iurii Kosach. Unfortunately, they were not well suited to the job, and the paper began to flourish only when taken over by Lithuanians.

The success of the Association of the DP Press encouraged journalists of different nationalities to seek out more opportunities for wider co-operation. Thus, in 1948 the Federation of Free Journalists of the Captive Nations was created. It was based in London and grouped together émigré journalists from all the countries of Western Europe—Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden.¹⁷ Ukrainian journalists in the organization included: B. Halaichuk, R. Ilnytzkyj, M. Koliankivsky, M. Kovalsky, M. Livytsky, P. Polishchuk, I. Popovych, M. Semchyshyn. Unfortunately the federation did not become active on a wide scale. It is worth noting that at the founding convention of the federation, the Ukrainian delegations made a political declaration (declarations were made by all the national delegations), in which both the UNR and the UHVR were mentioned for the first time at an international forum. As a result of that, M. Livytsky had some unpleasantness in Munich, for SUZh, headed by S. Dovhal, reprimanded him for having signed such a declaration.

The Press and Information Division of TsPUE

The executive of TsPUE established, in addition to other divisions, a Division of the Press and Information. Until the fall of 1947, it was headed by Iulian Revai (with Iurii Stefanyk as assistant); later, the post was held by Zenon Pelensky. The main purpose of the division was to inform both the Ukrainian and the foreign-language press about the daily life of the Ukrainian emigration. Because of the way relations between different Ukrainian press organs in Germany developed, most of its energies were not devoted to that issue. Newspapers favourable to the UNR not only engaged in strong polemics with the press of ZCh OUN, but also levelled accusations that ZCh OUN and ZP UHVR adherents were waging a campaign of terror against their political opponents in the DP camps. Local camp reporters were the source of this information. They were often prejudiced and attributed to their political opponents acts which were in fact committed by criminals. Naturally, this damaged relations between the political camps. To deal with the problem, the TsPUE presidium demanded that the press not publish notices about alleged politically motivated criminal acts until the incidents were verified by the local camp courts.

When the SUZh newspapers rejected these demands as limiting their freedom of publication, the presidium proposed that the press create some system of self-policing. The first attempt in this direction was made on 18-19 November 1946:

Having read all the correspondence which has come to TsPUE regarding the press polemics, the presidium, composed of V. Mudry, M. Vietukhov, L. Romaniuk, A. Milianych, and Vasyl Potishko drew attention to the particular tone of the polemics and resolved that at the next meeting of all the editors of the licensed press, which was to take place in Augsburg, the chief secretary, Roman Ilnytzyk, would be charged with formulating a plan to exert influence on the press to temper the tone and content of their articles so as not to discredit us in the eyes of the world and not provide ammunition to forces hostile to us.¹⁸

After a long discussion between the editors and TsPUE, the Information Division called a conference for 17 March 1947 in Frankfurt. The license holders and editors of *Nedilia*, *Chas*, *Ukrainski visti*, *Nashe zhyttia*, *Ukrainska trybuna*, and *Na chuzhyni* took part. The conference passed the following resolutions:

1. In view of the fact that TsPUE is the fruit of the social organization of our émigré community, the licensed press commits itself to working co-operatively with the Information Division of TsPUE.
2. Without renouncing their political convictions and the right to express and defend them, license holders and editors-in-chief commit themselves to consider the interests of the community at large when publishing political polemics and, in particular, to refrain in their publications

- from attacking private individuals or publishing materials which could give our enemies ammunition against us or harm the Ukrainian cause and efforts toward liberation, to show tolerance to their political opponents, and to keep the tone of political polemics at a high level.
3. The Ukrainian press will publish materials that underscore the unity of interests of Ukrainian refugees, regardless of their political or religious convictions.
 4. The Information Division of TsPUE will be responsible for overseeing that these commitments are honoured. Should they be breached, the Information Division will send a letter describing the breach to all license holders and editors-in-chief. If the breach is confirmed by the next conference of license holders and editors-in-chief, appropriate sanctions will be applied.

The next conference, which took place on 7 April 1947, passed these additional resolutions:

1. [Internal] resolutions set out the procedure for dealing with certain negative tendencies of the political writing activity of the Ukrainian press. The license holders and editors-in-chief who signed the resolutions agreed to take pains to ensure adherence to these resolutions.
2. The conference resolves to publish all these materials in licensed newspapers and journals.

After these resolutions were announced, the majority of the ZP—ZCh newspapers published editorials expressing the hope that Ukrainian journalists would do their jobs with a greater feeling of responsibility. In *Chas*, I wrote:

the content of the agreement is very significant for our present conditions of life. The communiqué states that while newspapers will continue to hold the political positions they have held up to now, they will defend those positions in an entirely different way. Mutual attacks are to cease and gentlemanly behaviour is to prevail. Should these principles be consistently applied in the press, and then, perhaps, in other spheres of public life, it would be no exaggeration to state that the understanding among the press organs could become the basis of a new chapter in the whole life of the community. This would raise the cultural level of our public life and calm the atmosphere within the community. Relations in both private and public life would improve and this, in turn, would free human energies and create a fresh desire to work. We understand gentlemanly behaviour not as a shiny external coat of armour that covers a person's internal shortcomings, but as a set of moral qualities that naturally express themselves in correct, civilized behaviour. When we speak of a gentleman, we think of a person who is master of his own feelings, who, even if provoked, will not lose control or allow himself to fall into hysteria. We think of a person who is decisive, who while pursuing a noble goal is stubborn, consistent, and unswerving, but remains, all the while, civilized. We think of a person who is polite and attentive, while at the same time true to his ideals and principles and ready to fight for them in every way except in ways that would offend the ideals of honour and dignity.¹⁹

Unfortunately, hopes such as these remained unfulfilled. As early as the beginning of May 1947 the editor of *Nedilia* wrote:

Unfortunately, we cannot fully share in the optimism we see in some of the articles written on the subject of the communiqué regarding inter-newspaper peace.... There will be no peace in our press until every political 'leadership' realizes that trickery and pre-election or pre-conference machinations will not shut up or push out inconvenient people from the press who have a sense of responsibility.²⁰

The final attempt to influence the Ukrainian press to publish only reliable, verified information took place at the third conference of the licensed press on 25 May 1947. Its participants included the TsPUE presidium, workers of the TsPUE Information Division (Iulian Revai and Iurii Stefanyk), and license holders and editors-in-chief of DP newspapers and journals in the American Zone. As a result of that conference, two disciplinary commissions were established within the Information Division: one of them included representatives of *Chas* and *Nedilia* and the other, representatives of *Ukrainska trybuna* and *Nashe zhyttia*. Thus each commission had journalists from each of the two rival camps. The task of the commissions was "to immediately intervene in all cases where the social, and our own internal, order is breached, to investigate these cases objectively and to inform the community about them by means of communiqués written in common."²¹ This resolution was never implemented. The DP press continued to publish correspondents' reports without verifying their reliability, and thus accusations and counter-accusations continued to rage in the pages of the newspapers.

Workers for the Ukrainian Press

Although the general position of the Ukrainian press at that time was precarious, in one sense at least, it was very good, for there were among the immigrants a large number of educated people who were eager to write. These included journalists, writers, poets, scholars, artists, literary critics, and community activists. It is true, however, that there were not many real journalists among them. Although SUZh had 150 members and NDOUZh 85, most of those people were novices who only occasionally took pen in hand. Some, however, having innate talent as well as a good education, eventually became genuine, even eminent journalists.

Far fewer were good political writers, able to take a broad view of Ukrainian and international problems. Thus, while almost every larger newspaper (with the exception of *Nedilia* and *Khrystyianskyi shliakh*) had special pages devoted to literature, scholarship, and art, good political articles were few. Also in short supply were literary critics, the most notable of whom were Iurii Sherekh, Ivan Koshelivets, Viktor Petrov-Domontovych, Volodymyr Derzhavyn, Iurii Lavri-

nenko-Dyvnych, Hryhorii Kostiuk, Bohdan Kravtsiv, Sviatoslav Hordynsky, Iurii Stefanyk, Iurii Boiko, and Neofit Kebaliuk. It is interesting to note that while political writers were most numerous among Western Ukrainians, in the literary genres Eastern Ukrainians dominated.

The political direction and tone of the leading Ukrainian newspapers were set by six political writers: Ivan Bahriany (*Ukrainski visti*, Neu-Ulm), Roman Ilnytzkyj (*Chas*, Fürth), Pavlo Kotovych (*Nashe zhyttia*, Augsburg), Hennadii Kotorovych (*Nedilia*, Aschaffenburg), Zenon Pelensky (*Ukrainska trybuna*, Munich), and Volodymyr Stakhiv (*Suchasna Ukraina*, Munich). *Nedilia* and *Ukrainski visti* published the greatest number of articles which were unsigned, or signed only with initials. There were many notable workers on the other papers.²² All those newspapers also published the works of writers, poets, and literary critics. These authors knew no political barriers.²³

Topics Covered in the Ukrainian Press

The most popular topics discussed on the pages of the Ukrainian émigré press in 1945-7 were those that related to Ukraine and her people. This was a period of expectation of political change in Eastern Europe. It was thought that the Western powers would impel Stalin to pull his armies out of East Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans, and that in this process, Ukraine would also free herself from Soviet domination. These expectations were more justified because in Ukraine the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was increasing its activity and, had it received assistance from the Western powers, would have been able to mobilize the whole nation to join it. The situation was similar in the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), as well as in the Caucasus.

On this topic, Ukrainian political writers carried on polemics with journalists from the West (unfortunately, always one-sided). Ukrainian writers thought Western journalists had little understanding of Eastern European questions; allowed themselves to be manipulated by Stalin; exaggerated his contribution to the war against Hitler; confused Ukraine with Russia; and paid too little attention to her struggle for liberation and statehood. For a short time, Winston Churchill became a hero of the Ukrainian press because of his plan to form a united front with the United States in order to counter Soviet aggression.

The pan-European movement—to unite the countries of Western Europe into a single federation with a common parliament—was much discussed in the Ukrainian press. (The first step taken in that direction was the foundation of Benelux, that is, the tariff and military union of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in 1947.) Particular attention was given to this question by the newspaper *Chas*. In a series of articles entitled, "Toward a New Conception of Ukrainian Foreign Policy," its author proposed that the nations of central and Eastern Europe, which for centuries had borne the brunt of Russian and German

imperialism, should form a regional union modelled on Benelux. The nucleus of this federation should be Ukraine and Poland, for they were the most strategically placed and enjoyed the richest economic and human resources. The first reaction to this proposal came from Klaudiusz Grabik, a political writer and editor at the Polish weekly *Kronika* (in Epstein, near Frankfurt am Main). Thus began a lengthy Ukrainian-Polish debate, which lasted for several months, about the future of not only those two nations, but the whole of central and Eastern Europe. More and more newspapers and writers joined in the discussion—not only those in Germany, but also those in France, Belgium, and Britain. Eventually, nine Ukrainian and Polish newspapers and twelve different writers took part in the debate.

The Ukrainian press of the day also discussed internal Ukrainian issues, especially events that took place during World War II. The greatest attention was given to the question of Ukrainian-German relations—co-operation with Germany and resistance to her. The co-operative approach had been taken in Ukraine by the Ukrainian Central Committee, while that of resistance had been championed by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council. Polemical articles on both viewpoints written by émigré activists, although emotional in tone and style, are an important research source for studies of the war period in Ukraine. Much attention was also given in the press to the polemics between the two Ukrainian émigré political centres: the UNR and the ZP UHVR. (UNR was a coalition of seven émigré political parties, while the ZP UHVR represented the UHVR.) The work of the TsPUE was reported on as well, especially the elections to its governing bodies. (TsPUE was the only Ukrainian institution whose leaders were democratically elected by all immigrants over the age of twenty-one on a secret ballot.)

Apart from political articles, the press carried information about the work of artists, sculptors, singers, writers, scholars, sportsmen, teachers, and priests. There were many reports about churches, schools (elementary, secondary, and post-secondary), theatres, concerts, and sports competitions. (In 1947 a successful DP Olympics was staged to protest the exclusion of immigrant competitors from the Olympic Games). In 1947 attention in the press was also centred on the countries of immigration that had agreed to accept DPs from camps in Germany and Austria.

One noticeable omission in the press coverage of that period was any substantial reporting on day-to-day life in the camps. A positive explanation could be that Ukrainian DPs put more emphasis on ideology and politics than on material concerns.

Decline of the Camp Press

The “golden age” of the DP press, which began in May 1947, did not last long. By the second half of 1948, newspapers and journals were becoming keenly aware of a catastrophic drop in the number of readers and subscribers, due in large part to the massive emigration overseas that was being energetically organized by IRO. Publishers, editors, authors, and printers realized that the only way to revive their position was to begin building up a market for their books and newspapers in America, Canada, Australia, and Britain—the countries of immigration. This market development had to be done in concert, through friendly co-operation.

To this end Viktor Domanytsky, economist and professor at the Ukrainian Free University and the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (UTHI), proposed the creation of a “Book Centre” that would bring together all Ukrainian publishers, editors, authors, printers, and booksellers to control and reduce the costs of book and newspaper production and, at the same time, try to interest the mass of overseas readers in Ukrainian publishing efforts.²⁴ Domanytsky thought that even after resettlement in America, Canada or Australia, Ukrainians would want to read Ukrainian books and newspapers published in Europe. His arguments were convincing, and thus the founding convention of the Book Centre, in Munich on 30 September 1948, had many participants.²⁵ The convention managed to group together forty institutions, companies, and individuals.

At the convention it was resolved that the month of October should be declared “the month of the Ukrainian printed word”; that exhibitions of books and newspapers should be organized; that branches of the Book Centre should be established in various cities and countries; and that a “Ukrainian Book Institute should be created, to study not only the subject matter, language and design of Ukrainian books, but also such matters as economic questions of the book market and demand for books.”²⁶ The flow of events proved stronger than the Book Centre. Many members of its executive and supervisory council soon emigrated overseas. At the end of 1949, *Chas*, *Nashe zhyttia*, and most of the other periodicals suspended publication. The only newspapers that continued to appear were those receiving subsidies from their sponsors.²⁷

While Domanytsky was making plans to save the press, I saw an opportunity to bind Ukrainian DPs together, especially their elite, who at that time were leaving Germany and being dispersed throughout the world:

It is impossible and would not even be proper to prevent people from leaving Germany. Here we will not be able to earn enough for a decent life nor bring up our children, nor lay down a strong foundation for our political and social life. We must face the fact that our people will be scattered in small groups around the globe. These small Ukrainian islands will be washed by foreign seas until the seas cover them and swallow them up. But will they really be swallowed up? Will we allow this to happen? Is there any hope of resisting that process without a country of our own, without the strength that comes to people

from participating in the political process of their own land? For we will not have those things. But one thing we can have that will preserve our people for our nation and its cause—the Ukrainian press and book. That is the only weapon which remains in our hands as we scatter around the globe. The book and the press will unite us over countries, seas, and continents. To achieve this unity we need not only a local press, but international Ukrainian publications that can be read by Ukrainians all around the world. We believe that the greatest chance of fulfilling that function lies with the Ukrainian press that already exists in Germany.

The task facing the press is so enormous, and so much depends on its fulfillment, that everyone who holds dear the Ukrainian émigré community and its mission should strive to make this goal a reality. The Ukrainian intelligentsia should take on the responsibility of ensuring that no Ukrainian leaves Germany without giving his address in the new country to one of the Ukrainian newspapers. Camp directors, resettlement commissions, educational institutions, and the like should see to this matter. There should be with each transport of immigrants at least one person whose responsibility will be to keep up ties with his fellow-immigrants in the new country and forward their addresses to Ukrainian editorial offices. The first piece of mail which any new immigrant receives from Germany should be a Ukrainian newspaper. The list of subscribers to Ukrainian press organs should become the most complete register of Ukrainian immigrants in the world. Only when we all, scattered as individuals or groups around the world, are united by means of the Ukrainian press, will we be able to think of fulfilling our future tasks, which we will discuss in future articles.²⁸

The first steps towards fulfilling my plan were taken in Fürth and Paris. The weeklies that were published in those cities (*Chas* and *Ukrainets u Frantsii*) were merged into a single newspaper, *Ukrainets-Chas*, in September 1949. I left Germany for Paris to develop both the editorial and economic base of the first (so I thought) Ukrainian press organ with ambitions to become a pan-Ukrainian publication both in content and distribution. The difficulties of the venture proved too great. My plan failed, just as Domanysky's had. *Ukrainets-Chas* continued to appear for several years, but without me. I returned to Fürth, eventually moved to Munich, where I briefly edited *Ukrainskyi samostiinyk*, then turned to scholarly work at the German Ost-Europa Institut. In 1957 I immigrated to the United States.

Notes

1. Volodymyr Miiakovsky, "Museum and Archives," *Nashe zhyttia*, no. 4 (36), 19 January 1946, 2.
2. See Yuri Boshyk and Boris Balan, *Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons," 1945-1954: A Selected Bibliography and Guide to Research with Special Reference to Ukrainians* (Edmonton, 1982).

3. This and subsequent information about the first appearance of various newspapers is taken from the supplement to *Nashe zhyttia*, no. 4 (26), 19 January 1945; the special anniversary supplement to *Nashe zhyttia*, 5 September 1946; and issues of *Chas*, *Nashe zhyttia*, and *Nedilia* from 1946.
4. This article, by Arkadii Zhyvotko and Bohdan Kravtsiv, appears in *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, vol. 1, pt. III (Munich-New York, 1949), 981-1003.
5. Boshyk and Balan, *Political Refugees*.
6. *Nashe zhyttia*, 5 September 1946, 4.
7. "In parting," *Nedilia*, no. 1, 1945, 1.
8. *Nashe zhyttia*, 5 September 1946, 7.
9. Roman Ilnytzyk, *The Free Press of the Suppressed Nations* (Augsburg, 1950), 71-5.
10. *Ibid.*, 69.
11. Licenses were obtained by the newspapers *Chas*, *Ukrainski visti*, *Nashe zhyttia*, *Khrystyianskyi holos*, *Nedilia*, *Ukrainska trybuna*, *Na chuzhyni*; and the journals *Molode zhyttia*, *Ku-Ku*, and *Hromadianka*.
12. Ilnytzyk, *The Free Press*, 68.
13. "A United Front of Editors," *Ukrainski visti*, no. 14, 21 April 1946.
14. "Meeting of the Executive of SUZh," *Ukrainski visti*, 19 November 1946.
15. Volodymyr Ianiv, "On the Wide Seas," *Chas*, 9 March 1947.
16. Ilnytzyk, *The Free Press*, 26.
17. Roman Ilnytzyk, "Journalists of the Captive Nations have Created a World Organization," *Chas*, 19 December 1947.
18. Minutes of the Meeting of the Presidium of TsPUE, 18 November 1946, Vasyl Mudry Archives.
19. Roman Ilnytzyk, "Another Step Forward," *Chas*, 27 April 1947.
20. Hennadii Kotorovych, "Keeping Quiet or Taking Responsibility," *Nedilia*, 4 May 1947.
21. Press conference of TsPUE, 25 May 1947; *Chas*, 8 June 1947.
22. *Ukrainski visti*: Stepan Baran, Mykhailo Voskobiinyk, Vasyl Hryshko, Martyn Zadeka, L. Kaolin, Hryhorii Kostiuk-Podoliak, Iurii Lavrinenko-Dyvnych, Borys Levytsky, Spyrydon Dovhal, Mykola Livytsky, Ivan Maistrenko, Pavlo Maliar, Isaak Mazepa, Semen Stariv, Ulas Samchuk, S. Rosokha.
Chas: Bohdan Halaichuk, M. Koliankivsky (editor), Ihor Kostetsky, Iurii Kosach, Bohdan Kravtsiv, Zenon Kuzelia, Volodymyr Ladyzhynsky, Iurii Linchevsky, Roman Olynyk-Rakhmanny, Lev Rebet, Mykhailo Sopuliak, Mykhailo Sosnovsky, Myroslav Styranka, Iaroslav Shaviak, Iurii Koshelniak, Fedir Odrach, Volodymyr Kubijovyč, Andrii Kachor, Ivan Krasnyk, Viktor Prykhodko, Evhen Pelensky, Vasyl Markus, Iaroslav Dzyndra, Volodymyr Doroshenko, Damian Horniatkevych, Borys Lysiatsky, Hryhorii Vashchenko, Dmytro Chub, Zenon Pelensky, Volodymyr Ianiv, Evhen Kraplyvy.

Nashe zhyttia: Sprydon Dovhal, Myron Dolnytsky, Svitozar Drahomanov, Neofit Kebaliuk, Panas Fedenko, Vasyl Chaplenko.

Ukrainska trybuna: Ivan Vovchuk, Iurii Hryhoriiv, Volodymyr Derzhavyn, Vasyl Kachmar, Petro Kovaliv, Kost Kononenko, Stanyslav Kravchyshyn, Oleh Lysiak, Stepan Lenkavsky, H. Myronenko, Petro Mirchuk, Bohdan Nyzhankivsky, N. Pavlovych, Orest Pytliar, Zenon Tarnavsky, Anatolii Riabyshenko, O. Chornohirsky, Rostyslav Iendyk, Lev Rebet, Lev Shankovsky.

Suchasna Ukraina: Ivan Butkovsky-Hutsul, Mykola Hlobenko, Ivan Hryniokh, Ievhen Glovinsky, Volodymyr Derzhavyn, Kost Kononenko, Volodymyr Kubijovyč, Ivan Koshelivets, Bohdan Kravtsiv, Iaroslav Martynets, Mykhailo Orest, Myroslav Prokop, Liubomyr Ortynsky, Ievhen Pyziur, Dariia Rebet, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, Lev Shankovsky, Iurii Shevelov.

Khrystyianskyi shliakh (later *Khrystyianskyi holos*: Stepan Baran, Roman Danylevych, Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobriansky, Myron Konovalets, Ivan Nimchuk (editor-in-chief).

23. The names that appeared most often on the pages of the leading Ukrainian periodicals were: Iurii Balko, Vasyl Barka, Vsevolod Bilenko, Iurii Boiko, Iurii Buriakivets, Oleksa Veretenchenko, Sviatoslav Hordynsky, Andrii Harasevych, S. Hordiienko, Ivan Kernytsky, Hnat Dediurenko, Dmytro Doroshenko, Oleh Zuievsky, Orest Ikarenko, Petro Kovaliv, Ihor Kostetsky, Petro Karpenko-Krynysia, Petro Kamin, Nina Kaliuzhna, Vsevolod Lystvych, Vadym Lesych, Iurii Kosach, Hryhorii Linchevsky, N. Shcherbyna, Hanna Cherin, V. Lod, Oksana Liaturynska, Ivan Manylo, Bohdan Kravtsiv, Katria Hrynevychyeva, P. Oksanencko, O. Nesych, Mykhailo Orest, Nina Pavlovska, Leonid Poltava, Leonid Lyman, Viktor Petrov-Domontovych, Volodymyr Rusalsky, Ulas Samchuk, Or. Smishko, Iar Slavutych, Mykhailo Sytnyk, Volodymyr Svidzinsky, Ivanna Savytska, Ostap Tarnavsky, Iurii Chorny, M. Khustynsky, V. Shaian, Iurii Shevelov, V. Shpakivska. Initials that appeared frequently were: D. Z., Ia. S., M. S., P. K., V. Ch., I. M., O. V., O. Ch., A. K-r., Ia. S., B. Iu.

24. "Ukrainian Book Centre," *Chas*, 12 September 1948.

25. Among them were representatives of TsPUE, NTSh, UVU, UTHI, the Greek-Catholic Seminary, the Association of Scholars, the Association of Writers of Children's Literature, eight publishers, four bookstores, and three printers; and eleven authors and editors. Four other bookstores and three individuals from outside the city sent declarations of their intention to join the Book Centre.

The following executive was elected for the Book Centre: president—V. Domanytsky, vice-president—S. Klymyshyn (*Ukrainska Knyharnia*, Munich), secretary—Iaroslav Pastushenko, members—L. Kokodynsky (*Ukrainske slovo*, Regensburg) and K. Kaplysty (UTHI). I was chairman of the supervisory council which was composed of eleven members: Viktor Petrov, Iaroslav Rudnytsky, Ivan Rozhin, Hryhorii Linchevsky, M. Hotsii, Atanas Figol, S. Sliusarchuk, M. Kurylo, Stepan Sprynsky, S. Bihus, and a representative of NTSh. The audit commission was composed of Iurii Kosach, Bohdan Hoshovsky, I. Ianovych, O. Boichuk, and Hryhorii Prokopchuk.

26. "Opening of the Book Centre," *Chas*, 11 October 1948.

27. *Ukrainski visti*, the press organ of the Ukrainian Revolutionary-Democratic party (URDP), continued into the 80s. *Ukrainska trybuna*, published by the ZCh OUN (it later became *Ukrainskyi samostiinyk*) was published until 1975. *Khrystyianskyi holos*, the newspaper of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, also continued into the 80s. *Nedilia* survived as long as its owner, Hennadii Kotorovych, did (1956).
28. Roman Ilnytzyk, "Emigration at the Crossroads," *Chas*, 19 October 1948. Those "future articles" talked of Canada as the future for Ukrainian settlers in the world.

Theatre in the Camps

Valerian Revutsky

Vasyl Sofroniv Levytsky's memoir of life in the DP camp in Ingolstadt, *Respublika za drotamy* (The Republic Behind Barbed Wire), tells us that from his earliest days in the camp, he worked on preparing special events. After only a month of preparation, a theatrical was staged. What impelled people to set to work so quickly putting on theatrical productions? For the DPs, times were stressful and uncertain. Inside the camps, living conditions were primitive. So people looked for a way to dispel tensions and forget, at least temporarily, about their uncertain future. Thus, the art of theatre became a collective means of escape. At the end of 1948, when the possibility of emigration became more real, the activity of camp theatres began to wind down, putting an end to an era that will be regarded as one of the best periods of Ukrainian theatrical art.

In the camps the creativity of Ukrainian theatre was able to develop to the fullest. The moral oppression, ceaseless terror, and harsh censorship it had known before had prevented any free thought or independent spiritual existence. In the camps, however, theatre flourished in every form from the most primitive farces to the most complex tragedies. Camp theatres were also able to accept influence from Western European drama. In addition to the freedom, another significant factor in this flowering of the camp theatres was the fact that amateurs made up an overwhelming majority of theatre troupe members. They were grouped around one or more professional actors found in the camps. Every play, even if only semi-professional, was regarded as an important event in the camps, so grateful audiences often overlooked flaws in the performances. The abundance of free time in the camps was another significant factor in the development of the theatres. An actor could devote himself totally to each production. This, nat-

urally, improved the quality of the performances and helped compensate for the meagreness of the costumes and makeshift sets, although there were talented amateur theatre designers who, while operating within minimal budgets, managed to create appropriate artistic illusions.

All the best theatre troupes travelled to camps with large numbers of Ukrainian DPs. These travelling troupes normally offered several different plays from their repertoire. Each troupe varied considerably in orientation, size, and acting ability, but most of them were politically conservative. Hence they emphasized ethnographic plays of the classical Ukrainian nineteenth-century repertoire, as well as one-act sketches depicting everyday problems, dances, revues, singing solos, short scenes, monologues and, much less frequently, patriotic scenes from the life of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, historical Ukrainian dramas or plays from the Western European repertoire. I saw most of the plays put on in the DP camps, in particular the plays of the Ensemble of Ukrainian Actors and Theatre-Studio. This allows me to consider them from a historical perspective.

Some theatre groups were exceptionally active. For example, the Ukrainian theatre, directed by Omelian Urbansky in Munich-Freimann, visited fifty-two different locales. Its repertoire included popular plays, such as *Natalka-Poltavka* (Natalka from Poltava) by Ivan Kotliarevsky, *Oi, ne khody, Hrytsiu* (Oh, Don't Go, Hryts) by Mykhailo Starytsky (presented in their original versions), and a variety of revues such as "Happy Evening," "Good Evening," and "Camp Gossip." The sketches in the revues were constructed as short situation comedies designed to entertain. Contemporary plays also dominated the repertoire of the Ukrainian theatre in Austria (Salzburg), which was directed by Hanna Sovacheva. They, too, presented the traditional *Natalka-Poltavka*, but the troupe began its performances with a comedy by Marko Kropyvnytsky, *Perekhytryly* (Out-smarted), and the opera *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem* (Kozak Beyond the Danube) by Semen Hulak-Artemovsky. Still within the ethnographic style were the historical dramas *Oi, Moroze, Morozenku* (Oh Moroz, Morozenko) by Hryhor Luzhnytsky, and *Korol striltsiv* (The King of Riflemen) by Ivan Kernytsky. This group did not limit its appearances to camp halls. It also performed in the city of Linz and for the American army.

The same type of repertoire was performed by the camp theatre Orlyk in Berchtesgaden. That troupe owed its existence to the enormous enthusiasm of the camp dwellers. In the spot where they wished to have a theatre "stood an empty garage, with broken windows and bare, peeling walls. There were no decorations, costumes or props; there was nothing, and from this 'nothing' a theatre had to be created."¹ Included in their repertoire was the opera *Kateryna* by Mykola Arkas, in which several professional opera singers performed. Perhaps their greatest achievement was the performance of *Mirandolina* by Carlo Goldoni (directed by Teodor Teodorovych).

Another notable conservative theatrical ensemble was the troupe in Schweinfurt, which was directed by Mykola Kryzhanivsky. The most notable, however, was Rozvaha from Neu-Ulm, which put on over 200 performances, including all those which took place outside the camp itself. In addition to the classic plays of everyday life, it performed Lesia Ukrainka's *Boiarynia* and *Lisova pisnia* (The Song of the Forest); Mykola Kulish's *Myna Mazailo*; *The River* by Max Halbe; and two plays by Iurii Kosach, *Obloha* (The Siege) and *Zozulyna dacha* (Zozulia's Country House). Iosyp Mandzenko-Siry, the founder of the Rozvaha theatre, had a predilection for the ethnographic style which was reflected in the troupe's presentations. The themes of Lesia Ukrainka's *Boiarynia*, in which the seventeenth-century setting serves only to emphasize the great differences between the life of women in Ukraine and in Muscovy, or Kulish's *Myna Mazailo*, in which the playwright condemns the pathetic Little Russian with his inferiority complex as the sidekick of the all-powerful Russifiers of the Communist Party, were readily interpreted by the director in an ethnographic manner.

Perhaps the most significant point about Rozvaha is that these difficult plays were put on successfully by amateurs. They found it somewhat more difficult to put on plays in the Symbolist and neo-Romantic style of European drama of the twentieth century, such as the above-mentioned works by Ukrainka and Kosach. Perhaps that was why the critics remarked that the actress Luba Bokhan, playing the role of the heroine in *Zozulyna dacha*, failed to find the correct tone and resorted to declamation.² That play contains its own myth, a certain symbol of life in Kiev under the tsarist empire until 1917 and under the Nazis at the beginning of the 1940s. Whether the Rozvaha ensemble was able to overcome the difficulties of Kosach's *Obloha*, is difficult to determine, but it gave them experience with a script written in verse. Among the plays performed by Rozvaha that went beyond the standard Ukrainian ethnographic drama was *The River* by Max Halbe. In this the ensemble strove to give a new face to its activity. Emigration overseas of the leading members of the troupe caused the end of the Rozvaha theatre, which was the most modern representative of the right-wing theatres, but the memory of this talented, cohesive amateur ensemble remains.

Primary among DP camp theatres was the Ensemble of Ukrainian Actors (AUA), directed by Volodymyr Blavatsky. In contrast to many of the right-wing groups, this troupe was made up mainly of professional actors. Only occasionally did it fill its ranks with talented amateurs. The core of the ensemble had been together since the days of the Zahrava Theatre (1933-8), and its later incarnations, the Kotliarevsky Theatre (1938-9), the Lesia Ukrainka State Theatre in Lviv (1939-41, under Soviet occupation), and the Lviv Opera Theatre (1941-4, under German occupation). The Lesia Ukrainka State Theatre escaped forced evacuation to the Soviet Union in 1941 because the ensemble happened to be on holiday. Its key members immigrated to Germany in 1944 and settled in the DP camp in Augsburg. During the summer of 1947, however, the American author-

ities expelled AUA from the camp because its members had already gone through screening. Living in tents outside the camp, the AUA members decided to fight for their existence as a professional theatrical troupe. Fortunately, the Ukrainian community proved willing to give them material support. For example, a group of actors in Aschaffenburg put on a benefit play and a sports association organized a meet and donated the proceeds to the AUA actors. AUA was saved, but still did not have a permanent home. It operated out of a railway wagon, where it revised some of its old plays and enthusiastically prepared new ones. After several months of wandering from one DP camp to another, AUA took up residence at the Regensburg camp and began the second phase of its activity, which lasted until its members emigrated overseas.³

AUA's first season (1945-6) reflected, to a large extent, the repertoire of the Lviv Opera Theatre, in particular its dramatic works. Certain individual plays went all the way back to Blavatsky's time as director of the Zahrava Theatre—for example, Arnold Ridney's *The Ghost Train*, and *Zemlia* (Land), which was based on Vasyl Stefanyk's short stories ("This Land," "Sons," "Maria," "Thief," "The Pious Woman," and "Morituri"). *Zemlia* was not performed in the normal manner, but rather "chanted like a mass!"⁴ As a prologue to *Zemlia*, Blavatsky used Stefanyk's *Moie slovo* (My Word). By having a choir declaim the poet's words he created a highly dramatic effect. The individual sets which moved before the viewers' eyes, as though in a kaleidoscope, were done in the Hutsul style.

Stepovyi hist (A Guest from the Steppes) by B. Hrinchenko, *Ukradene shchastia* (Stolen Happiness) by Ivan Franko, *Na poli krovy* (On a Bloody Field) by Lesia Ukrainka, *Myna Mazailo* by Kulish, Franz Lehar's operetta *The Land of Smiles*, and *Der keusche Lebemann* by Franz Arnold and Ernst Bach, all were from the Lviv Opera Theatre repertoire. New productions mounted by the AUA included another farce by Arnold and Bach, *Die spanische Fliege*, the tragedy *The People's Malakhii* by Kulish (first performed at the Berezil Theatre on 31 March 1928, premiered by AUA on 28 September 1946), and a new play by Iurii Kosach, *Voroh* (The Enemy). The director of AUA stated that his version of *The People's Malakhii*

is not at all patterned on Kurbas's interpretation at the Berezil. It could not be otherwise! The technical possibilities are different, we have a different troupe of actors, and so much has been experienced during the last twenty years that has left its mark on the psyche and outlook of the theatrical artist. Let us remember that the viewer, too, has changed.⁵

Blavatsky's situation differed partly because he did not have to work under enormous pressure from party censors. He could stage uncut the playwright's original work, which showed the tragic contrast between the loud slogans of the Revolution and its actual results through the story of the provincial letter-carrier Malakhii Stakanchyk, who, "having read a lot of Bolshevik books," decides to

try to reform the world and, at the end, finds himself in a bordello. Blavatsky was able to leave in Malakhii's tragic line, "Quiet, that's Ukraine singing," when a whore begins to sing the Russian street song, "I lost my ring."

The new drama by Kosach in the AUA repertoire, *Voroh* (stage design by Myroslav Radysh), won second prize in the literary competition sponsored by *Chas*. The theme of the competition was the armed struggle of the Ukrainian people against the German occupying forces. According to Iurii Sherekh, "most of the works submitted for the competition took the traditional view of the insurgent movement, but did not meet even the minimal artistic standards."⁶ *Voroh* was something different, because the struggle of the Ukrainian underground against the German occupiers was of only secondary importance. The critics pointed out that in writing this play, Kosach illustrated how Ukrainians also played a role in the world-wide resistance to Nazi tyranny. In the atmosphere of 1947, when the survival of the émigré community was threatened by slander against the Ukrainian resistance movement during the German occupation, Kosach's *Voroh* took on particular significance.⁷ As to its artistic qualities, it was noted that the scenes of the play fell into two categories. Some of them could be classed in the psychological genre, while others were embodiments of ideas and were motivated not by the psychology of the characters, but by something outside them. This was particularly true when it came to the members of the resistance. The play's greatest achievement was its realistic portrayal of Nazism. In his review, Shevchuk noted that Soviet playwrights always portrayed the Germans as caricatures, in order to show the superiority of communism, but in *Voroh* AUA did something totally different:

Only the representatives of a free Ukrainian literature, that is, of the émigré literature, who base themselves on the holy feelings of patriotism of the Ukrainian people and on its experiences of superhuman sufferings and uneven struggle, are able to oppose the bestial 'morality' of Nazism with a higher ideal that is ideologically and ethically superior and totally different in its direction.⁸

Although the AUA enjoyed some community moral support after its expulsion from the Augsburg camp, it was faced with new problems that were linked to the reform of the German monetary system. When asked what the troupe should do, the director, Blavatsky, replied: "In my time in the theatre I remember periods when we did not eat for three days at a time. So far we are not threatened with that. Audiences will find their way to the theatre. We must show them the way and teach them that money spent on the theatre is not money wasted."⁹ However, some changes had to be made, without sacrificing artistic standards, in order to continue. Thus, AUA temporarily performed plays of a lighter genre: the operetta *Die keusche Suzanne* by Jean Gilbert; the comedies *Meine Schwester und ich* by Georges Berr and Louis Verneuil (with music by Ralph Bernatzky), *Duet zu Dritt* by Leo Lenz; and a revue, *Na khvyliakh rytmu*

i melodii (On the Waves of Rhythm and Melody, directed by Volodymyr Shasharivsky).

The financial success of AUA (and later its permanent home in Regensburg) was due in large part to the high quality of its performances in the 1947-8 season. That season was its peak, with five very different plays: *Un calpo di vento*, a sentimental comedy by Giovacchino Forzano; *Parkstrasse 13*, a crime drama by Axel Ivers; *Antigone* by Jean Anouilh; *Domakha* by Liudmyla Kovalenko; and *Order* (The Order) by Iurii Kosach. The inclusion of *Domakha* in the repertoire is worth noting. This work vividly portrays the tragedy of the Ukrainian village, but the author does not show this tragedy from the political standpoint. Many writers explain the failures in Ukrainian history as due to unfavourable external circumstances or, conversely, view foreign intervention as an essential step along the way to independent existence. Kovalenko, as a principled artist, felt that Ukrainian failures were based on the psychological and moral qualities of individuals, and thus the play goes far beyond the theatre of everyday life.

The work depicts a group of opportunists who survive at the price of another's happiness, and who are prepared to eliminate those who fight to the bitter end. One person who fights this way is the heroine of the play, *Domakha*. She is fully conscious of the inevitability of defeat, but accepts it as only temporary. The author herself was very familiar with the soul of the Ukrainian peasant woman, who sought by every means to defend herself against the decrees of the central government in Moscow, which were destroying the institution of the Ukrainian family. The heroine believes to the last moment that her stock will never die out.

As the members of AUA pointed out, the difficulties of staging *Domakha* were enormous. As Shevchuk correctly stated, the troupe "made a particular effort not to rid the play of everyday elements, but to raise them to a higher level—that of tragedy. The troupe helped the author in many ways, but it lacked decisiveness and occasionally gave in to the temptation of interpreting the work in the most ethnographic manner."¹⁰ In this staging, the great achievement of AUA was that it showed the camp audiences, if not tragedy (the highest form of drama), then at least the social factors that led to tragedy.

The satirical comedy by Iurii Kosach, *Order*, took AUA a month to prepare. It bared the human soul to the audience and showed it to be ruled by such base qualities as tyranny, corruption, flattery, opportunism, and spinelessness. The play presented people for whom only one sacred value exists—their own lives:

In Kosach's play, the main characters want to be given an order to live—to live a life that is insignificant, cowardly, but a life nevertheless. They are not capable of building a life themselves, but are looking for someone who would order them to do so.... In Ukraine, life belongs to the Ukrainian people, to those who are fighting for the liberation of their land and people. The true order has not yet been issued.¹¹

To show representatives of a true order, Kosach created a few positive types—insurgents and soldiers of the Ukrainian resistance movement. These positive characters appear not only at the end of the play, but also, episodically, in earlier acts, where they express their anger at the behaviour of the faceless masses. The appearance of these positive characters in the middle of the play weakens the work's satirical effect. It does not matter who represents the true national order; what matters is that the best method be found to communicate the message to the audience.

In spite of suggestions from critics, actors in the play, and others, the director, Blavatsky, did not alter what the playwright had written. He only placed the positive characters at stage front, while relegating the faceless mass to the rear. However, in his version, the masks were all presented as though (symbolically) put on trial. Their placement in the final scene was in total contrast to their behaviour in earlier acts of *Order*. There they had been in constant motion, uncertain and unstable. They had a mechanical quality to them, rather like marionettes. In certain scenes one could observe a disparity between their movements and speech, which served to underscore the chaotic quality of their behaviour.

Order proved to be a successful production, and the director was rewarded for his courage. He foresaw that many members of the audience would be irritated by this satirical work. Indeed, *Order* generated many arguments and heated discussions, but it also showed that camp society did not fear self-criticism. It is not by chance that Blavatsky's AUA turned from *Order* to a production of Anouilh's *Antigone*. The conflict between two opposing impulses in society, vividly portrayed in *Order*, appears again in *Antigone*. By staging this play, AUA "tried again to renew the traditional tie, now severed, between Ukrainian culture and that of Europe and the world, by taking on one of the most current and notable works of that culture at its present time. By staging *Antigone*, the Ukrainian émigré theatre was offering up a Slavic version of that tragedy."¹²

The main difficulty of playing classical tragedy in our modern era is that the theatre no longer forms part of religious ritual, and belief in heavenly powers can no longer help to explain man's fate. Modern man needs to fight against the fragmentation and decay of the human spirit. Anouilh and many of his contemporaries understood the spiritual state of the alienated individual faced with the danger of destruction; they based their tragedies on the conflicts between individuals, or, as in the case of Anouilh's *Antigone*, the conflict between Antigone and Creon is the struggle of the individual for the right to live free of violence, conformity, and hypocrisy.

Critics writing about the production of *Antigone* found a Slavic quality in two of the characters, Creon and Antigone (played by Blavatsky and Elyzaveta Shasharivska). As director, Blavatsky made Creon more noble by having him search for compromise with Antigone in order to spare her pride. In *Antigone*,

he softened the sharpness, having her present her demands with a degree of lyricism and injecting a note of desperation into her defence of her personal freedom and her thoroughly existential understanding of life. The director chose to dispense with a big choir and to use only a single commentator, who played his role in an intimate manner, avoiding the pathos of declamation.

The AUA's second major excursion into the world of contemporary drama was its production, during its last season, of *The Rape of Lucrece* by André Obey, a French playwright. In his version the playwright wanted to show, against the background of ancient Roman myth, the soul of contemporary Paris, as seen through his ironic eye. Obey focussed his attention on Tarquinius rather than Lucrece, but such was not the case in the AUA production. Critics noted that "he [Obey] would perhaps not recognize his own play as presented on the Ukrainian stage."¹³ Under Blavatsky's direction, the focus of attention is not Tarquinius (whom he played himself) but Lucrece (played by Evdokiia Dychkivna). The strength of a people lies in its moral purity, its ethical behaviour. The dearest thing in a person's life is honour—dearer than life itself. Lucrece is a proud woman who expiates by death the dishonour that has fallen upon her. She is a proud Roman, and thus, for Blavatsky, Rome, not Paris, becomes the symbol of the state. Along with this accent on Rome came an interpretation of *Lucrece* as a play in the classical style. Thus the set, designed by Volodyslav Klekh, consisted of symmetrical painted columns. Also symmetrically placed were the two commentators, who made no ironic remarks about the events or characters in the play, but only commented, in a grave tone, on what was happening on the stage. The actors were dressed in ancient Roman style. Secondary characters were turned into a choir.

Blavatsky's last project as AUA director was the staging of *Provulok sviatoho dukha* (Holy Spirit Lane) by the young playwright Iliarion Cholhan (Alekseyvych). That play consisted of a prologue, seven scenes, and an epilogue, all set in Lviv. The scenes, linked together by the main characters, showed the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the takeover of Lviv by Ukrainians, the work of the Ukrainian secret university in Lviv, the constant harassment of its members by the Polish police, the underground struggle in Galicia, the first Soviet occupation, the German invasion, and the second Soviet occupation. The epilogue ends with the projection onto a black curtain of an image of St. George's Cathedral.

"Emigration fever" began to affect the creative activity of AUA. The departure of some members of the troupe affected the quality of the productions. New directors arrived. Among the plays performed were some old works of the ethnographic variety. The works of European playwrights were represented only by the one-act play, *Monsieur Lamberthier* by L. Verneuil. Nonetheless, AUA's legacy was an interesting and varied repertoire, which included the better works of Kulish and of the more modern playwright, Iurii Kosach. As far as staging

plays of international renown, AUA was fully in step with other European theatres of its time, and occasionally (for example, its production of Obey's *Lucrece*), even surpassed the professional theatres in Germany. This play was scheduled for production by the Munich State Theatre only in April 1949.

The left (experimental) wing of camp theatre troupes was represented by the Theatre-Studio (TS) of Iosyp Hirniak and Olimpiia Dobrovolska. These former artists of the Berezil Theatre decided to organize a troupe in Lviv, within the structure of the Ukrainian Central Committee (arts department). In Landeck, Austria, after the war, the troupe, composed of actors of different theatre schools and tendencies, was not in a position to explore or experiment in its work. For that reason, Hirniak and Dobrovolska left the troupe and on 25 December 1945, with a group of former students of the Lviv Theatrical Studio, put on a stage version of Shevchenko's *Haidamaky*, as interpreted by Les Kurbas. This was the beginning of Theatre-Studio.

In Hirniak's archives there is a copy of a lecture he gave entitled, "A Few Thoughts and Reflections About the Studio and About Theatrical and Related Matters." Although this lecture was given a year after the Theatre-Studio had moved to the United States, its content applies to the earlier work of the company. Hirniak stated:

The aim of all the work of our collective in emigration was to make the theatre an inextricable part of the spiritual and cultural life of our Ukrainian community. If that were to be so, then the troupe carried a great responsibility for every play it put on, for maintaining ideological purity, for ensuring the artistic growth of its members and the development of artistic taste of its audience. This 'responsibility' was the cornerstone of all the Theatre-Studio's activities over the whole period of its existence.¹⁴

Haidamaky was staged as it had been in the Berezil Theatre during the 1920s. It was not a creative exercise, but rather a recreation of a past production. There was no motion on the stage. The actors simply sat under a portrait of Shevchenko and read from the poem. The rest of the play consisted of readings from other works by Shevchenko—the long poems *Velykyi liokh* (The Great Crypt) and *Vidma* (The Witch) and the lyrics "Ne spalosia, a nich iak more," (I Did Not Sleep, and the Night was Endless), "U nedilenku ta ranesenko," (Early on Sunday Morning), "I shyrokuiu dolynu," (This Wide Valley), and "I nebo nevmyte" (The Unwashed Sky).

The next two plays put on by Theatre-Studio, *Zamotelychene telia* (The Dumb Calf) and *Blakytyna avantiura* (The Blue Adventure) (both by I. Alekseyevych-Cholhan), marked a return to the theatrical revue. Hirniak viewed these works as a very good training ground for actors, because they provided an opportunity to develop every style of acting, which was not the case with the standard narrow Ukrainian theatrical repertoire.¹⁵ If in *Haidamaky* all the focus was on the spoken word, in *Zamotelychene telia* the directors emphasized

movement, exaggerated gestures, irony, the grotesque, parody, and extensive use of improvisation. *Blakytyna avantiura* (performed 5 May 1946) was different in structure from *Zamotelychene telia*. All the separate scenes were linked together by two characters, Roman Ptakh and the Seer. The latter, in addition to his role as seer, also played the part of interpreter of events. The main character, Roman Ptakh, was, as Hirniak noted, very current and timely.¹⁶

In *Blakytyna avantiura*, Ptakh begins his career as a scientist and discovers a new "blue atom bomb"; he becomes Mr. Poker, the representative of American Ukrainians in London, and collects money to go and live in the United States; he takes the theatre's money; he flees to Salzburg, where he invents the idea of a state of Honolulu, in which every Ukrainian has several political parties. However, Ptakh is unmasked after making fools of everyone and is sentenced by a "tribunal" to enter the Theatre-Studio. *Blakytyna avantiura* met with great success and critics noted that "the revue is a form of theatre that allows the TS to combine theatrical exercise with depiction of the current life of the community."¹⁷

Between the production of *Blakytyna avantiura* and the staging of *Maty i ia* (Mother and I) on 3 September 1946 (based on a story by Mykola Khvylioviy, as revised for the stage by Iurii Dyvnych and Ivan Koshelivets), there was a lapse of four months. Given the conditions of life in the camp, which allowed members of TS large amounts of time for rehearsal, this was a considerable period. The directors of the TS used this period to prepare that complex work, which embodied such diverse themes as the effect of political propaganda, the psychological duality of man, Romantic pathos and inner depth, inhuman brutality, and devoted love.

When Mykola Khvylioviy had first read his novella in Kharkiv, the work formed the basis of a well-known literary discussion in 1925-6. Shortly afterward, in an official Kharkiv newspaper, an article was published accusing Khvylioviy of depicting the Bolshevik Revolution as an expression of sadism and of slandering Bolshevism in the narrative by showing that a Ukrainian who consistently follows the Bolshevik path must inevitably end up killing his own mother. Twenty-two years later, when TS presented the stage version in Bavaria, discussions again broke out in the press. The renowned Ukrainian writer Fedir Dudko said nothing about the production, except that it was very well received by the critics, but instead directed his complaints against the play itself, calling it a monstrous, unhealthy work that had nothing in common with the Ukrainian psyche.¹⁸ Pavlo Dubiv wrote an apt response to this critique, stating that in *Mother and I* Khvylioviy shows the Ukrainian psyche as it became under the influence of Russian Bolshevism.¹⁹ He affirmed the relevance of the play and stressed that "Hirniak's achievement as director of the play is that he has shown the actuality of the events depicted on the stage and their significance to us."²⁰

The third revue by I. Alekseyevych, *Son ukrainskoi nochi* (The Dream of the Ukrainian Night), staged by TS on 10 October 1946, followed the travels of the carter (*chumak*) Mamai around the world from 1917 to 1946 (the prologue shows Ukraine in 1830). Hirniak himself took the role of Mamai. The great success of this revue led the company to put on *Khozheniie Mamaia po druhomu sviti* (Mamai's Pilgrimage Through the Other World), which premiered on 3 May 1948. The prologue of the first Mamai revue depicts the protagonist as seriously ill because he is deprived of whiskey. The witch-barmaid from Bald Mountain turns into Ivha, his wife, and, for his sin of flirting with other women, she traps him forever in a bottle. The prologue is a sharp satire of plays of the Romantic, ethnographic type, with their vivid theatricality, inevitable singing, comic drunken antics, and melodramatic use of demonology.

During the Revolution of 1917, the bottle containing Mamai is broken, and representatives of the "Pashkivka Republic" send Mamai on a diplomatic mission to Vienna. There Mamai gives a speech that reveals his nihilism, anarchy, and narrow thinking. In Paris Mamai, who earlier denied he was a Little Russian, meets a former Russian minister and prepares to sign an agreement with him; however, the former minister turns out to be an enemy of the Pashkivka Republic. The only skill Mamai demonstrates is in dance, and he is invited to go to Hollywood. There he not only becomes a famous director but also judges a boxing match between Hryts and Khoma. (He is then called Memei.) Later he travels to India as part of a cultural mission, but ends up in a harem. A dialogue with a parrot at stage front serves as a symbolic condemnation of Mamai's previous activity, for while he wandered the whole world over to find truth, he merely pursued slogans. The "republic" shows itself to have been a mirage, and Mamai goes to do penance alone, like some Robinson Crusoe, on the island of San Domino. A shipload of Ukrainians arrives on the island. Mamai hears the voice of his wife and in fear, hides in a bottle, which Ivha corks and throws into the sea.

His story continues in the second revue, *Khozheniie Mamaia po druhomu sviti* (Mamai's Pilgrimage Through the Other World). In *Son ukrainskoi nochi* (The Dream of the Ukrainian Night), the disillusioned Mamai dies, but his spirit remains and goes to the bottom of the sea, where he meets such notable personages as Skovoroda, Socrates, and Dante. They had fled to the sea bottom from the Ukrainian heaven, for in that heaven there were "three academies and three scholarly associations."²¹ Dante advises Mamai to go through the purgatory, hell, and heaven of the Ukrainian people. Purgatory is the émigré "wax museum" of the camps: the gossip, newspaper battles, multiplicity of parties, and endless speeches about unity. Disillusioned, he is led out of purgatory by Hamlet. Mamai then goes to the Bolshevik "democracy" on Olympus. There he meets a dethroned Zeus and General Marksos from the "Little Russian city of Nikolaev." During an official ceremony, the new gods of the Bolshevik Olympus give their

American guests a figure of the Angel of Peace. Mamai pulls at the cloth that drapes the figure and the cloth falls off to reveal an armed Red Army soldier. Mamai is arrested as an enemy of the people and Death, who was ordered by the Politburo to take him to hell, pulls him there by a rope.

Solovetskii Island represents hell. The Angel of Peace reads to Mamai and the Cossacks the appeal from "Sultan" Vissarionovich that they return "to the motherland." The Cossacks address the "sultan" with a string of colourful epithets. Death arrives with the order to wipe out the Cossacks. During a dance, Mamai loops a rope around the neck of Death and strangles it. He also cuts off the head of his wife, Ivha, who was assisting Death, and frees the Cossacks. The last scene takes place in Kiev, where a monument to Mamai is being ceremoniously unveiled. Politicians from the "wax museum purgatory" give speeches and express their regret that Mamai cannot come down from the pedestal. When he does begin to come down, they stop him, telling him to remain in heaven, as a symbol in stone. When the whole wax museum begins to sing honour and glory to Mamai, the statue on the pedestal turns its back on them.

If *Son ukrainskoi nochi* gave only a superficial picture of Mamai, the Mamai of *Khozhdennie Mamaia* offers a deeper study. It examines the conflict between the ghost of Mamai and the Ukrainian émigré society of the day by putting the dead Mamai into the kingdom of living DPs. In fact, Mamai turns out to be the only live person among the living dead in the "wax museum" of the new emigration. Describing his place in the new émigré "wax museum," Mamai comes to the following conclusion:

I left Pashkivka to see the world and achieved nothing. If there is anyone among you, ladies and gentlemen, who has had more success in the diplomatic field, let him cast the first stone at me!... You are stewing in your own juice, just like me, and see no further than your own noses. I do not hold it against you, my dear Pashkivka, that you laugh at me. For I predict that your descendants will laugh at you in just the same way.²²

Courage was not the chief quality that the author and director of the play wanted to portray. Mamai is depicted at the beginning as a chronically drunk womanizer, rather like Gogol's Kalenyk in "A Night in May." Further in *Son ukrainskoi nochi*, Mamai is portrayed as a narrow-minded "otaman," the spokesman for the only correct political line in the Pashkivka Republic. In diplomacy he proves a primitive. He feels no need for languages, for knowledge of foreign languages is an anachronism. Mamai is a demagogue who believes in fine words, in the greatness of the spirit of the masses. He suffers from the "Little Russian" complex and sees a "kindred spirit" in everyone who speaks Russian. Naively accepting all the whispered directions of the "parrots," he is an opportunist, and stands as a satirical picture of the infallible administrator.

Critics praised Hirniak's directional innovations and spoke of his success in recreating in the Mamai plays a truly Ukrainian comedic spirit, a "multifaceted

Ukrainian satire, which can be traced back to folk theatre, the Hellenistic finesse of Kotliarevsky's work, and the repulsive metaphysical irony of M. Kulish."²³ Unfortunately, the critics gave few descriptions of the interesting scenes the director created in the two *Mamai* revues. In one scene in *Son ukrainskoi nochi*, the audience heard a radio newscast in San Domino. While the voice on the radio recounted the succession of historical events, on a screen could be seen shadows of Hitler or Mussolini or a Soviet general in epaulettes. In *Khozheniie Mamaia*, the audience was struck by the circus-like effect in the final scene on the Red Olympus and by the sculptural quality of the scene in which the Cossacks write their reply to "Sultan" Vissarionovich. The combination of music and visual effects with the action, for the purpose of parody, was particularly original. When, for example, the girl from Lubni leads Mamai to the Ukrainian heaven, we hear the prayer "Ruler of heaven and earth" from the opera *Zaporozhets za Dunaie*m. In another scene, seaweed at the bottom of the sea turns into the DPs' laundry hanging on a line.

Because Hirniak wanted to familiarize his young actors with the commedia dell'arte form, he staged a comedy by Carlo Goldoni, *The Servant of Two Masters* (premiered on 6 February 1947). That play preserves the main features of the genre. Four months of painstaking preparation meant the ensemble was exceptionally even. He directed the play "simply, as a quickly paced comedy in which the action developed with lightning speed; it was an exercise in comedic lightness for the actors."²⁴ The acting was striking for its natural quality.

It made sense that after acquainting TS with the commedia dell'arte form, Hirniak chose to put on the renowned comic operetta by Marko Kropyvnytsky, *Poshylys u durni* (Fools of Their Own Making). He decided to direct the work in the style of a clown show, for this would allow him to bring in a variety of styles and elements from different cultures. Stage design for the production was by Myron Cholhan, and was executed in a grotesque style. At Hirniak's request, it made no attempt to give an illusion of reality. Thus the sets consisted of specific details. For example, the house of the miller, Kuksa, had a little windmill attached to it and a sack on the side; the house of the blacksmith, Dranko, was in the shape of a horseshoe. The production was not intended to be a satire on ethnographic theatre. Hirniak merely peeled away the ethnographic wrapping, searching for the foundations of Ukrainian theatre. One reviewer felt that "a more difficult objective has been attempted: to show the Ukrainian mentality—not an embroidered shirt, not an authentic clay pot from Poltava, not folkloric ritual, not some detail of everyday life, but something internal and more valuable: the very essence of Ukrainian theatre."²⁵

Orhiia (The Orgy) by Lesia Ukrainka, gave Dobrovolska her first opportunity to work independently in the TS as director. For her, the most important element of the play was the spoken word. Everything else in the play (the sets, music, choreography) served merely to support or elucidate the dialogue. The

word created a variety of effects—heightened tension, moderation, raised and lowered intonation. Movement in the play was reduced to a minimum and kept strictly in check. The purity of its style and form approached perfection. In addition, resonating through the play was the theme of the destruction of Ukrainian art by the bureaucratic officials of the Soviet empire.

The troupe put on another work by M. Khvyliovy. In this case, I. Koshelivets created a stage work, *Zaivi liudy* (Superfluous People), based on Khvyliovy's *Povist pro sanatoriinu zonu* (Tale of the Sanatorium Zone). Koshelivets restricted the romantic reach of the original work to fit it into the framework of a realistic play and focussed attention mainly on ideological questions, which were put forward through long dialogues. The subject was people who had become mixed up with the Revolution, those who believed in it too much, and those who betrayed it. They were living out their years in a sanatorium, in the poisoned Soviet atmosphere of spying, deceit, and provocation. Hirniak considered the play a psychological chamber drama, a style new to the members of the TS. He made paramount ideas, as expressed through words, with the help of static gestures. He tried to rid the production of any mood-evoking elements. He found "a way to reach the audience intellectually, and not merely through emotional experience."²⁶

With emigration fever infecting some of the company, Hirniak and Dobrovolska decided to switch their attention to works that required only a small number of actors. In this respect, Dobrovolska's production of Ibsen's *Ghosts* was an ideal vehicle. As director of this last TS production (premiered 26 February 1949), Dobrovolska chose to present Ibsen's drama chiefly through rhythm and speech and put less stress on psychology. This proved rather difficult, for Ibsen's work has many purely naturalistic scenes, but Dobrovolska succeeded with her idea of presenting the play in a highly theatrical style, through speech and rhythm. She was helped by the simple stage design by Ievhen Blakytny. I. Korybut noted that her production constituted a triumph, for "everything from beginning to end is due to the director, but not to a director who rules the actors; rather, to one who assists them, a director-teacher."²⁷

In the summer of 1949 all camp theatres came to an end. The right-wing ensembles were all disbanded, even the most active ones, such as O. Urbansky's troupe in Munich. The professional AUA also ceased to function. Its last play (*Bez talanna* [Luckless], by I. Tobilevych) was not directed by Blavatsky. The activity of the Theatre-Studio, which had turned young students into professional theatrical artists, also came to an end. Operating conditions for the DP theatres had been exceptionally difficult. Problems existed finding locations, sets, and props. Also, there was continual movement of the theatre company from one place to another. However, one thing helped buoy the spirits of the actors—the enthusiasm of the audiences. Audiences were varied, but all were thirsting for theatrical entertainment. Some viewers were critical of certain productions

(particularly of the experimental plays of the TS) because they could not outgrow their preference for the classical, ethnographic, everyday-life repertoire. If some viewers were critical of certain productions (particularly of the experimental plays of the TS), they were acting on the provocation of elements which wanted to limit Ukrainian theatre exclusively to the older repertoire.

The members of the acting troupes worked in a liberal atmosphere, choosing their own repertoire. Those troupes, created in such difficult conditions, worked true miracles, especially AUA and TS. They not only put on productions of a type never before seen in Ukrainian theatre and opened themselves to the theatrical influence of Western Europe, but sometimes they even competed successfully with the leading professional European companies. *Orhiia* by Lesia Ukrainka was compared to the staging of Racine's *Phèdre* at the Munich State theatre or *Iphigenie in Aulis* by G. Hauptmann at the Vienna Burgtheater.²⁸ The repertoires of AUA and TS included revue, farce, lyrical comedy, situation comedy, operetta, satire, psychological drama, and tragedy. AUA fell in step with the theatres of Europe. TS created its own theatre of pure art, inspired by the genius of Kurbas. The history of camp theatres constituted a new chapter in the history of Ukrainian theatre: a time of high spiritual culture and morality, noble humanity, and tension of ideas.

Addendum

Omelian Urbansky gave the approximate figure of thirty theatres in the DP camps. It has been possible to ascertain the existence of the following eighteen camp theatres in 1945-49:

1. Ivan Kotliarevsky Theatre, Aschaffenburg, originally in Schweinfurt
2. Rozvaha Theatre, Neu-Ulm
3. O. Urbansky's Theatre, Munich-Freimann
4. Ukrainian Student Theatre, Munich
5. Sadovsky Drama Theatre, Füssen
6. Marionette Theatre Leleka (travelling, established in Ellwangen)
7. Ukrainian Drama Theatre, Orlyk, Berchtesgaden
8. Ukrainian Theatre, Salzburg
9. Bohema Theatrical Association, Ellwangen
10. Y. Kononiv Theatre, Landeck
11. Ensemble of Ukrainian Actors (AUA) Augsburg, later Regensburg
12. Theatre-Studio (TS) Landeck, later Mittenwald
13. Drama Theatre, Ansbach
14. Drama Theatre, Obernzen
15. Drama Theatre, Firnberg
16. Drama Theatre, Raitersaig
17. Drama Theatre, Ingolstadt
18. Drama Theatre, Heidenau

Some names of characters and actors in productions mentioned in the text:

Narodnyi Malakhii, M. Kulish

Malakhii Stakanchyk – V. Blavatsky

Voroh, Iu. Kosach

Orest Tuha – Ievhen Kurylo

Lena – Vira Levytska

Asmuth – V. Blavatsky

Domakha, L. Kovalenko

Domakha – Nina Horlenko

Maksym – Roman Tymchuk

Blakytna avantiura, I. Aleksevych

Roman Ptakh – Stepan Zalesky

Son ukrainskoi nochi, I. Aleksevych

Dr. Rutenets – Antin Kryvetsky

Ivha – Inna Poshyvailo, later Luba Sai

Poshylys u durni, M. Kropyvnytsky

Kuksa – Iosyp Hirniak

Dranko – Myron Cholhan

Khozhdeniie Mamaia po druhomu sviti, I. Aleksevych

Skovoroda – Antin Kryvetsky

Socrates – Borys Palchevsky

Dante – Volodymyr Lysniak

Hamlet – Volodymyr Lysniak

Zeus – Antin Kryvetsky

Markeos – Borys Palchevsky

Death – Myron Cholhan

Girl from Lubni – Nilia Bezkorovaina

Notes

1. I. K., "Z ukrainskoho zhyttia taboru Orlyk," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 20 October 1946.
2. I. K., "Zozulyna dacha," *Arka*, no. 6 (1947): 46.
3. O. Lysiak, "Ansambl ukrainskykh aktoriv u 1945-49 u Nimechchyni," *Nash teatr*, vol. 1 (New York, 1975), 389.
4. Programme for *Zemlia*, performed by Ensemble of Ukrainian Actors under the direction of V. Blavatsky, 1946-7 season.
5. Programme for *Narodnyi Malakhii*. Interview by O. Lysiak with V. Blavatsky, Ensemble of Ukrainian Actors, 1946-7 season.
6. Programme for *Voroh* by Iurii Kosach. Iu. Sherekh, "Z vstupnogo slova na literaturnomu vechori, prysviachenomu pidsumkam literaturnoho konkursu vydavnytstva Chas".
7. I. Korybut, "Demon v odnostroiu," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 16 December 1946.
8. H. Shevchuk, "'Voroh' Iurii Kosacha v teatri pid mystetskyim provodom Volodymyra Blavatskoho," *Chas*, 15 December 1946.
9. O[leh] L[yasiak], "Ia i moia sestra," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 31 October 1948.
10. H. Shevchuk, "Domakha L. Kovalenko v teatri V. Blavatskoho," *Chas*, 21 March 1948.
11. H. Shevchuk, "Son zhe son, na pryhud dyvnyi," *Chas*, 28 April 1947.
12. K. [I. Kostetsky], "Antigona Anouilh na ukrainskii stseni," *Ukrainska trybuna*, 23 May 1948.
13. H. Shevchuk, "Paryzh chy Rym?" *Chas*, 26 December 1948.
14. Archive of Iosyp Hirniak, "Kilka dumok i refleksii pro studiiu i pro nashi teatralni i bilia teatralni spravy."
15. B. Boichuk, ed., *Teatr-Studiia Iosypa Hirniaka i Olimpii Dobrovolskoi* (New York, 1975), 42.
16. I. Hirniak's letter to I. Steshenko, 20 April 1969.
17. Boichuk, *Teatr-Studiia*, 62.
18. *Ibid.*, 197.
19. *Ibid.*, 204.
20. *Ibid.*, 207.
21. I. Alekseyevych, "Khozhdeniie Mamaia po druhomu sviti," ms. 36a.

22. Ibid.
23. Iu. Kosach, "Osnova ukrainskoho komediinoho diistva," *Ukrainski visti*, 6 November 1948.
24. H. Shevchuk, "Molodist, shcho vmiie, starist shcho mozhe," *Chas*, February 1947; see also Boichuk, *Teatr-Studiia*, 110.
25. V. Hlushko [V. Haievsky], "Tsikavi shukannia," *Nedilia*, January 1948; see also Boichuk, *Teatr-Studiia*, 122.
26. Boichuk, *Teatr-Studiia*, 156.
27. Ibid., 185.
28. I. Holovatsky, "Premiera Orhii Lesi Ukrainky," *Chas*, 2 November 1947; see also Boichuk, *Teatr-Studiia*, 133.

Ukrainian Scholarship in Postwar Germany, 1945-52

Lubomyr R. Wynar

The brief DP period following World War II, encompassing only seven years (1945-52), occupies a unique and prominent place in Ukrainian cultural and intellectual history. It also serves as a bridge between Ukrainian scholarship of the interwar period and the development of Ukrainian scholarly institutions in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States and Canada. The first section of this article, devoted to a brief overview of the state of Ukrainian scholarly life between the two world wars, provides the background necessary to understand the development of postwar émigré Ukrainian scholarship in West Germany. The second part focusses on the origin and activities of major scholarly and higher educational institutions; the organizational structure of Ukrainian scholarly life; the relationship between research institutions and the Ukrainian DP community; and a brief analysis of the influences of the social and political conditions of the DP period upon research activities of Ukrainian scholars. For these purposes, Ukrainian émigré scholarship is defined as the activities of individual Ukrainian scholars, as well as various learned societies, research centres, and institutions of higher education. It includes scholarly publications produced by Ukrainian researchers and organizations during the DP period. DP is used as a synonym for the refugees who were uprooted by World War II and who resided in DP camps or outside those camps in West Germany and Austria from 1945 through 1952.

Part I

Ukrainian Scholarly Life Between the Two World Wars

The post-World War II period of Ukrainian scholarly life may be considered a continuation and extension of the activities of major Ukrainian research centres and institutions of higher learning that existed during the interwar years. Prior to World War I, research on Ukrainian topics was conducted by two societies, the Shevchenko Scientific Society (Naukove Tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka, NTSh) in Lviv¹ and the Ukrainian Scientific Society (Ukrainske Naukove Tovarystvo) in Kiev.² Until 1914 both of these major Ukrainian research centres were headed by Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934), the most outstanding Ukrainian historian and organizer of Ukrainian scholarly life. His role in organizing and structuring Ukrainian scholarly work was paramount to the establishment of a solid scientific foundation for Ukrainian studies in the first half of the twentieth century.³

Under Hrushevsky's leadership (1897-1913), the Shevchenko Scientific Society—the oldest Ukrainian learned society, founded in 1873 in Lviv—became the de facto Ukrainian National Academy. It had three sections: 1) Historical-Philosophical, 2) Philological, and 3) Mathematical and Natural Sciences. While the Ukrainian national movement in Eastern Ukraine was officially being restricted and persecuted by the Russian government,⁴ NTSh became the main research and cultural centre for the whole of Ukraine. The society's numerous academic serials and monographs gained recognition in Western Europe and the United States. *Zapysky NTSh* (NTSh Notes), first published in 1892, became the leading scholarly periodical devoted to Ukrainian studies. During Hrushevsky's presidency the society published over 100 volumes of *Zapysky* and over 300 volumes of other scholarly publications devoted to such disciplines as Ukrainian history, literature, philology, ethnography, and bibliography.⁵ Another solid accomplishment of NTSh was the establishment of a library in 1893.⁶ In spite of difficult economic conditions and repression by the Polish government during the interwar period, the Shevchenko Scientific Society continued its scholarly activities.⁷

During the 1920s, NTSh co-operated with the Kievan Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and other Ukrainian émigré scientific and educational institutions in Central Europe. Owing to the Soviet government's liquidation of independent scholarly work within the academy in the 1930s and the persecution of Ukrainian scholars in Soviet Ukraine, NTSh was forced to interrupt co-operative endeavours with the academy. NTSh again became the major centre of independent Ukrainian scholarship in Europe. In 1940 the Soviet government liquidated NTSh and merged the society with a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR in Lviv. During the German occupation of Ukraine in 1941, German authorities refused to allow the re-establishment of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

The most prominent Ukrainian centre of learning during the 1920s was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Ukrainska Akademiia Nauk),⁸ established by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky in Kiev in 1918. The former Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kiev (founded in 1907; headed by Hrushevsky), provided the basis for the establishment of that academy in the independent Ukrainian state. After the communist takeover, it was renamed the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Vseukrainska Akademiia Nauk, VUAN) and was considered by Ukrainian scholars in Galicia and abroad as the major centre of Ukrainian scholarship. At the beginning, the academy had three departments: 1) History and Philology, 2) Physics and Mathematics, and 3) Social and Economic Sciences. After M. Hrushevsky's return from political exile to Kiev in 1924, the academy's research accelerated. A number of scholarly serials and monographs were published⁹ and it established close contacts with the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv and other scholarly institutions. Hrushevsky also renewed publication of *Ukraina* (1924-30), which published works by Ukrainian scholars from Soviet Ukraine and abroad.

This rebirth of Ukrainian independent scholarship in Ukraine was suppressed and destroyed by the Soviet government during the 1930s and VUAN was placed under the direct control of the Communist Party. A large number of Ukrainian researchers and intellectuals were deported or killed,¹⁰ many of the academy's institutions were eliminated, and the name of the academy was changed to the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR (Akademiia Nauk Ukrainskoi RSR) in 1936: "The growth of Ukrainian scholarship under the Kievan Ukrainian Academy of Sciences frightened the foreign rulers of Ukraine, who were the propagators of the new Russian version of communist faith, and who treated scholarship in a dogmatic manner."¹¹ As a result of this major purge of the Ukrainian Academy and other research and educational institutions, independent research in Ukrainian history, literature, ethnography, language, the social sciences, and humanities was discontinued, and a new period of intensified Russification of Ukrainian scholarship began.

After World War I and the lost struggle for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, many Ukrainian scholars and intellectuals immigrated to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, and other European countries. They were instrumental in establishing new Ukrainian research centres and institutions of higher learning in Central and Western Europe that were not hampered by Polish government policies or Soviet political persecution. Prague became the major centre of Ukrainian émigré scholarship prior to 1939. The Ukrainian Free University (UFU, founded in Vienna in January 1921), was transferred in the autumn of 1921 to Prague, and soon it became the major Ukrainian educational and research institution in exile.¹² The Czechoslovak government, especially President Thomas Masaryk and Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš, provided both financial and moral support to the university's programs and publications. Within

this supportive climate, in 1922 Ukrainian educators and researchers established the Ukrainian Academy of Technology and Husbandry (reorganized as the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute, UTHI, in 1935).¹³ Other Prague-based Ukrainian institutions involved in research included the Ukrainian Higher Pedagogical Institute (founded in 1923), the Ukrainian Institute of Sociology (founded in 1924), the Museum of Ukraine's Struggle for Liberation (established in 1925), the Ukrainian Society of Bibliographers (established in 1926), the Ukrainian Historical Research Cabinet (organized in 1931), and a number of other professional Ukrainian organizations.¹⁴

Ukrainian scholars and institutions, especially the Ukrainian Free University, participated in various European international congresses and conferences. They established close contacts and co-operation with the International Commission for Intellectual Co-operation at the League of Nations and other European scholarly organizations. In 1924 UFU established the Ukrainian Academic Committee, which served as the umbrella academic organization co-ordinating the research activities of scholarly and higher educational institutions in exile and in Western Ukraine.¹⁵ This committee represented Ukrainian scholarship at the League of Nations and also sponsored two major Ukrainian academic congresses in Prague, in 1926 and 1932.¹⁶ Prior to the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939, Prague became the major centre of émigré Ukrainian scholarship and cultural activity. In 1945, following the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops, Ukrainian scholarly and educational institutions in Prague were liquidated.

Ukrainian scholars also established two other important research centres outside Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin, founded in 1926 by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, served as a major scholarly centre to disseminate information to German scholars and academic institutions.¹⁷ This institute ceased to exist in 1945. The Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw was founded in 1930 as an independent research centre devoted to research and the publication of monographs and source materials pertaining to Ukrainian subjects. During its relatively short existence (1930-9), the institute published over seventy volumes.¹⁸ The institute ceased to exist in 1939, following the German occupation of Poland.

During the interwar period, Ukrainian émigré scholars were able to establish a solid network of Ukrainian research centres, higher educational institutions, and research libraries in Western Europe, which revived Ukrainian studies and trained a new generation of Ukrainian researchers. After a short-lived renaissance of Ukrainian scholarly life in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, the Kievan Academy of Sciences and its institutions were destroyed by the Soviet government, and independent research in the humanities and the social sciences was terminated. In Western Ukraine, the Shevchenko Scientific Society continued its existence, although its activities were restricted by repressive Polish government policies.

Part II

Ukrainian Refugee Scholars and the Beginnings of Organized Academic and Research Activities

Ukrainian scholarly life in the DP period in West Germany may be divided into two periods. The first period (1945-7) constitutes the formative stage of Ukrainian scholarship, as a number of research centres and institutions of higher learning were established in West Germany. This period also represents a time of major adjustment by Ukrainian researchers and educators to the new conditions within the DP camps and in postwar Germany. The second period (1948-52) was marked by the systematic emigration of the majority of Ukrainian scholars overseas. This mass exodus weakened the activities of the previously established institutions.

In the first period, Ukrainian scholars gradually assumed a leading role in the cultural life of the DP camps and were instrumental in assisting the émigré community to organize schools, professional organizations, libraries, newspapers and periodicals, and art and library clubs. However, their major accomplishment was the establishment of learned societies, research centres, and Ukrainian institutions of higher learning. Their initiative resulted in a unique renaissance of Ukrainian scholarship during the DP period.

Demographic and Academic Characteristics

Since neither international nor Ukrainian organizations kept reliable statistical data on Ukrainian émigré scholars, within or outside the DP camps in Germany and Austria, it is difficult to determine their exact number. Statistical estimates can be made on the basis of membership within various organizations and data provided by the organizers of Ukrainian scholarly life. Thus, Kubijovyč estimated that approximately 200 Ukrainian scholars resided in West Germany, particularly in Bavaria, and Austria after World War II.¹⁹ This, however, is rather conservative. In July 1947, Ukrainian researchers held a special meeting in Munich to establish a professional union of Ukrainian scientists. The organizers estimated the number of Ukrainian researchers residing in West Germany at approximately 300 persons.²⁰ In 1947, Ivan Rakovsky, president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, conducted a special survey of Ukrainian scholars in the DP camps. This survey, based on membership in the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainian Free University, and the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute, recorded a total of 340 “refugee scholars” (*naukovtsiv-skytaltstv*) residing in West Germany and Austria during 1947.²¹ If one adds to that figure approximately sixty scholars who were not affiliated with those institutions owing to fear of repatriation, then in 1946-8 approximately 400

Ukrainian scholars resided in West Germany and Austria. This number represents approximately 0.2 per cent of the total Ukrainian DP population.

Ukrainian scholars came from all parts of Ukraine and included former professors from universities and other institutions of higher learning in Soviet Ukraine, members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, professors from the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, professors from the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute in Poděbrady, members of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, and members of other Ukrainian research institutions and learned societies in Prague, Berlin, Warsaw, and elsewhere. They represented various subject fields in the humanities, social sciences, and sciences and generally possessed solid academic backgrounds and research records. In spite of difficult political and economic conditions, they became the initiators and promoters of Ukrainian research and educational institutions in West Germany. These institutions were primarily located in Munich, Regensburg, and Augsburg, which also served as the major cultural and political centres for the Ukrainian DP community. In addition, a few Ukrainian scholars lectured in the so-called UNRRA University in Munich (1946-7), which was closed by the American military government because of financial problems. Ukrainian students attended UNRRA University, which also employed many Ukrainian professors.²²

Political and Social Conditions

UNRRA was created in order to provide assistance to displaced persons and to repatriate them to their countries of origin.²³ Based on the Yalta agreement, the Soviet government insisted that all Soviet citizens must be repatriated:

Russia hoped to regain control over its citizens abroad before they could voice any opposition, since dramatic instances of resistance to repatriation would damage Soviet prestige. Moscow anticipated this unpleasant and damaging publicity and hoped to neutralize it by labeling all nonreturnees fascists or indoctrinated Western stooges.²⁴

The Soviet government regarded Ukrainian DP camps as centres of anti-Soviet activity and labelled Ukrainian political refugees as war criminals and traitors.²⁵ Ukrainian scholars from the Soviet Union were directly threatened with forced repatriation. In 1945, the American and British Allied Forces acquiesced to forced repatriation and, in many instances, aided Soviet repatriation missions in their "manhunt of defenseless people."²⁶ This forced many Ukrainian scholars to avoid the DP camps, to conceal their Soviet citizenship and, in some instances, to claim to be from Galicia with Polish citizenship. The resultant fear had an adverse effect on Ukrainian political refugees, especially scholars from Soviet Ukraine. It limited their participation in the cultural life of the camps, as well as in the establishment of Ukrainian research institutions in 1945 and part of 1946.

Despite the unstable conditions, political pressures, constant fear of forced repatriation, uncertainty over the future, psycho-social factors associated with a postwar environment, displacement, and internment within crowded DP camps, Ukrainian refugees began to organize life both within and outside those transitory communities. The city of Munich became their major political and cultural centre in early 1945, when refugees organized the Provisional Ukrainian Representation, headed by Vasyl Mudry. Frankfurt and Augsburg also played an important role in organizing Ukrainian educational and cultural institutions. In the autumn of 1945, this organization was instrumental in organizing in Aschaffenburg the first congress of Ukrainian refugees, with the participation of representatives from various Ukrainian DP camps. That congress formed the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration (CRUE) under V. Mudry²⁷ and established a Department of Culture and Education (*Viddil kultury i osvity*) within CRUE, which was headed by the noted historian, Dmytro Doroshenko, the first president of UVAN.

Under the general guidance of CRUE, Ukrainians developed a comprehensive educational network within the DP camps, including numerous *gymnasias*, secondary professional schools, technical schools, and kindergartens.²⁸ The establishment of Ukrainian newspapers and periodicals, radio programs, and various cultural clubs and organizations further enriched cultural life within the camps. Publishing houses, various professional organizations, art and music groups, literary clubs, student unions, youth organizations, and Ukrainian co-operatives added further stimulus to the growth of Ukrainian social and cultural activities. Thus, in spite of very limited assistance from UNRRA and later IRO, Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions were revitalized.

Beginning of Organizational Development

It is rather difficult to pinpoint a date for the revival of Ukrainian organized scholarly life in West Germany in 1945, since there were several concurrent initiatives by Ukrainian scholars. One such attempt occurred in the spring of 1945, when Petro Kurinny called a meeting of several scholars at his residence in Hochstadt at Donau to advocate the establishment of a general Ukrainian scholarly association.²⁹ A similar proposal, calling for the formation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, was advocated by V. Miiakovsky, L. Biletsky, L. Chykalenko, and others who resided in the DP camps in Augsburg. These two early initiatives were combined and served as the basis for a conference of Ukrainian scholars which took place in Augsburg on 16 November 1945. There the participants decided to establish the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (*Ukrainska Vilna Akademiia Nauk*, UVAN) and to accept an official document entitled "A Provisional Regulation Concerning the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences."³⁰ They also elected the Provisional Executive Board (Dmytro Doro-

shenko, Vadym Shcherbakivsky, and Levko Chykalenko). This was the origin of the first principal Ukrainian scholarly institution established in a DP camp.

At the same time Ukrainian professors and researchers were interested in the revival of Ukrainian institutions of higher education, especially the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute and the Ukrainian Free University. Most of the faculty and students from those two schools had left Czechoslovakia in 1945 and resided in DP camps in Bavaria. Two meetings were instrumental in the development of Ukrainian higher educational institutions in postwar Germany. The first such meeting was held by the professors and administrators of UTHI in Plattling on 12 June 1945. All participants agreed to renew the "activities of UTHI under new circumstances...and to enlarge the faculty of this institution with new members."³¹ The institute's faculty moved from Plattling to Regensburg and, on 28 June 1945, obtained a permit from the American military government to resume teaching activities.

The second major meeting was organized by V. Shcherbakivsky, an advocate of the re-establishment of the Ukrainian Free University, and was held in Munich on 22 September 1945. Fifteen professors representing various academic institutions participated in this conference, including V. Kubijovyč, I. Mirchuk, B. Martos, V. Domanytsky, R. Dyminsky, and V. Doroshenko. During deliberations I. Mirchuk announced the decision to reopen the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. Kubijovyč presented a comprehensive overview of Ukrainian scholarship between the two world wars and commented on the task of Ukrainian émigré researchers in postwar Germany. He promoted the concept of a separate institute of Ukrainian studies. Despite the varying views on organizational formats for Ukrainian scholarly life in West Germany, all participants agreed to establish the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Munich. It was patterned after the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv and the Kiev Ukrainian Scientific Society. V. Shcherbakivsky was elected head of the new society.

The Munich conference was a major landmark in the formative period of postwar Ukrainian scholarship.³² It served as basis and blueprint for the further development of Ukrainian research and higher education institutions. In addition to the re-opening of UFU and UTHI, Ukrainian educators established several new higher schools: the Ukrainian Higher School of Economics in Munich (1945),³³ the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological and Pedagogical Academy in Munich (1946),³⁴ and the Ukrainian Catholic Theological Seminary at Hirschberg Castle.³⁵ Despite inadequate facilities, all of these institutions were able to develop their curricula and to become involved in research activity.

Finally, in Munich on 30 March 1947, the surviving members of the Lviv Shevchenko Scientific Society, at the initiative of Z. Kuzelia and V. Kubijovyč, held a meeting in order to renew the work of the society.³⁶ Ivan Rakovsky, the society's last president in Lviv, was elected head. The revitalization of this oldest Ukrainian learned society had a profound effect on the further development of

Ukrainian studies in Western Europe and accelerated the publication of basic reference works and monographs. During the same period, Ukrainian scholars and educators established a number of additional smaller research centres and organizations in various DP camps. The most important were the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in Augsburg and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Berchtesgaden, which established research libraries/archives headed by two noted scholars, V. Miiakovsky (UVAN) and V. Doroshenko (NTSh). Tables 1 and 2 show the early development of Ukrainian scholarly, educational, and research-oriented institutions during the DP period.

The development of Ukrainian research and educational institutions was supported by Ukrainian social and economic organizations within the DP camps and Ukrainian political refugees at large, as well as by the Ukrainian community in the United States and Canada. Despite difficult conditions in the camps, external political pressures, economic hardships, limited library resources, and lack of assistance from UNRRA and IRO, Ukrainian researchers were able to establish research and educational institutions, libraries and archives, thereby contributing to a major revival of Ukrainian scholarship in exile.

Research Activities and Organizational Structure

A series of factors contributed to the development of the research programs and activities of major Ukrainian academic societies and institutions of higher learning. In addition to the political and social variables, another major factor was the transitory character of the DP period which, beginning in 1948, was marked by a systematic exodus of Ukrainian scholars and students to various countries, especially the United States and Canada. Economics also had a major effect on the publication program and activities of individual research institutions. Financial support from the UNRRA and IRO was minimal or non-existent. Germany was economically ruined and was faced with its own refugee problem, which limited any financial support from German authorities. Consequently, Ukrainian researchers and institutions primarily depended on assistance from Ukrainian DP camps as well as from Ukrainians living abroad, especially in North America. Substantial financial aid was also provided by Ivan Buchko, the Ukrainian Catholic archbishop, who became a major benefactor of Ukrainian learned societies, the Ukrainian Free University, and other higher schools. In the United States, Ukrainian Americans founded the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee in 1944, and in 1945 Mykola Chubaty established the Committee for the Aid of Refugee Ukrainian Scholars. Both these organizations assisted Ukrainian scholars in the DP camps. Ukrainians in Canada organized the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund in 1944, which provided temporary aid to Ukrainian DPs. Aid from these sources was crucial to Ukrainian scholars in their daily struggle for economic survival.³⁷

Despite limited funds and the crippling effects of currency reform in Germany in 1948, Ukrainian scholarship in exile was revitalized owing, for the most part, to the determined efforts of Ukrainian researchers and educators. Research institutions emerged which were able to function within an environment free of restrictive governmental dictates.

The Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (UVAN)

This institution was the first major Ukrainian learned society. It was established in the DP camp "Somme-Kaserne" in Augsburg in 1945. The initiators, V. Miiakovsky and P. Kurinny, included "Free Academy" in its official title to distinguish it from the Soviet Ukrainian Academy in Kiev, which was under the direction of the Communist Party. Dmytro Doroshenko (1882-1951) and Volodymyr Miiakovsky (1887-1972)³⁸ were elected as the first president and general secretary of the academy. Research within UVAN was conducted by study groups organized by subject specialists (see Table 3). Each group had its own internal structure, research programme, and responsibility for arranging scholarly conferences.³⁹

UVAN's research units (groups and institutes) covered the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, thus forming a broad foundation for basic scientific research. The groups actively organized conferences and meetings that reflected the most visible scholarly work of the academy.⁴⁰ The Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany recognized UVAN as the central Ukrainian scholarly institution in exile on 4 June 1946.⁴¹

In 1947, when D. Doroshenko departed for Canada, the academy elected a *Prezidiialne biuro* (presidium's bureau), headed by Leonid Biletsky, which was in charge of all research activities. In the same year, UVAN adopted a new *statut*, which arranged the research activity of the academy into three major divisions: 1) History and Philology, 2) Law and Economics, 3) Natural Sciences and Mathematics. Each division had various subsections and commissions.⁴² Academy membership was divided into full-fledged members, ordinary members, and corresponding members. The structure of the academy and its scholarly units was modelled, in many instances, on the structure of the Kievan Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, as it was in 1918 and the 1920s. During the years 1946-50 UVAN sponsored over fifty conferences and meetings in various DP camps at which members of the academy presented over 500 papers.⁴³ Some major conferences were devoted to Taras Shevchenko (Shevchenkivski konferentsii), as well as many other topics which reflected the objectives of various UVAN research groups. For instance, in 1946 the academy sponsored thirty-four conferences, twenty of which were arranged by ten individual research sections:⁴⁴

Name of group	Number of conferences	Number of papers
Prehistory Section	2	35
History Section	2	20
Literature Section	2	17
Linguistics Section	4	26
Art History Section	2	22
Oriental Section	1	5
Economics Section	3	3
Zoology Section	2	4
Biology Section	2	2
Pedagogy Section	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	21	135

This impressive number of scientific gatherings indicates the dynamic nature and vitality of UVAN. Special mention should be made of the academy's Library-Archives, under the directorship of V. Miiakovsky, which served as a general depository for Ukrainian imprints of the DP period and other research materials.⁴⁵ According to the academy's 1947 annual report, the library had 1,948 volumes of Ukrainian periodicals and various serials in English, German, and French. Miiakovsky also initiated the union list of *Ucrainica* holdings in Ukrainian and German libraries and published M. Kostomarov's *Knyhy bytiii ukrainskoho narodu* (1947) as the first issue in the museum's "Pamiatky i Materiialy" series.⁴⁶ Mass immigration in the years 1948-50 caused the decentralization of UVAN's scientific activity and the creation of three independent institutions—UVAN in Canada (established in Winnipeg in 1949), UVAN in the United States (established in 1950 in New York), and UVAN in Europe (headquarters in Munich).⁴⁷ Consequently, during 1949-52 its activity was diminished, especially when compared to the previous dynamic years.

The academy's publications serve as another major indicator of its scholarly activity. The publishing program was aided by the Society of UVAN's Supporters (established in Augsburg in 1947 and headed by Vasyl Mudry). In 1946 the academy initiated two serials: *Litopys UVAN* (Chronicle of UVAN) and *Biuletyn UVAN* (Bulletin of UVAN). In 1948 UVAN started publication of *Ukrainski bibliolohichni visti* (Ukrainian Bibliographical News), an irregular serial devoted to bibliographic research. *Litopys* (1946-9, nine issues) contained information on the academy's activities, official announcements, and brief articles. *Biuletyn* (1946-8, twelve issues), included abstracts of papers presented at UVAN's conferences, articles about Ukrainian scholarly life, and chronicles of the academy's activities. Both publications appeared in mimeographed format. During 1950-1 UVAN published, in Germany, three issues of *Informatsiyni biuletyn* (*Nachrichtenblatt*) in both Ukrainian and German. In addition to serials,

UVAN published monographs and special reports. From 1946 to 1952 an estimated fifty titles were published by various sections of the academy.⁴⁸

Given the meagre financial resources during this period, the record of the academy's activities was quite impressive. In revitalizing Ukrainian scholarship UVAN served as an anchor for scientific work by Ukrainian scholars of all generations and from various regions of Ukraine and abroad.

The Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh)

On 30 March 1947 the surviving members of NTSh held a meeting in Munich during which they decided to re-establish this oldest Ukrainian learned society,⁴⁹ which in 1940 had been liquidated by the communist government. The chief initiators of this significant event were Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Zenon Kuzelia. Ivan Rakovsky, the last president of NTSh in Lviv, was elected as the new president, Z. Kuzelia as vice-president, and V. Kubijovyč as learned secretary. These three scholars were responsible for directing and developing the society's programs and activities in Germany and other countries.

NTSh reactivated its Historical-Philosophical Section, headed by I. Mirchuk; its Philological Section, headed by L. Biletsky; and its Mathematical-Natural Sciences Section, under Iu. Poliatsky. Each unit included a number of research committees responsible for organizing conferences and initiating research projects.⁵⁰ In addition, NTSh established several research institutes, including the Encyclopedia Institute (1947, headed by Z. Kuzelia and devoted to preparing a Ukrainian encyclopedia); the Institute of National Research (1947, headed by V. Kubijovyč and devoted to demographic studies); the Bibliographic Institute (headed by Ie. Iu. Pelensky); the Institute of the Ukrainian Language (Ia. Rudnytsky, director); and the Institute of Publicism (headed by M. Shlemkevych and devoted to studying the Ukrainian press). The society also established its own library in the DP camp Orlyk in Berchtesgaden under the directorship of Volodymyr Doroshenko.⁵¹

The restored society in Munich had the same structure and objectives as NTSh had had in Lviv. It vigorously promoted research on Ukraine and served as one of the major Ukrainian learned centres in exile.⁵² The first branch of the society was organized in 1947 by Mykola Chubaty in New York, and this had a significant effect on the activities of NTSh and the resettlement of the society's members in the United States.⁵³ In 1951 the headquarters of NTSh were moved from Munich to Sarcelles, France, where Archbishop Ivan Buchko and Cardinal Eugène Tisserant donated a separate building to the society. Because of the dispersal of its members after 1951, the society changed its structure to a federation of separate Shevchenko Scientific Societies in Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia.⁵⁴ The scholarly work of the society was conducted through conferences sponsored by its various sections and through publications. Both of these activities were supported by Ukrainians and their organizations in

the DP camps as well as by donations from Bishop Ivan Buchko, the American Branch of NTSh, and various Ukrainian organizations in the United States and Canada.

In 1949 the society launched a new series, *Biblioteka ukrainoznavstva* (The Library of Ukrainian Studies), devoted to Ukrainian history, language and other subjects. Two important works were published in this series: *Istoriia Ukrainy* (History of Ukraine) by I. Krypiakievych (under the pen-name I. Kholmsky) in 1949, and Iu. Shevelov's *Narys suchasnoi ukrainskoi literaturnoi movy* (1951).⁵⁵ However, the most important project initiated by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Munich was the publication of *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva* (Ukrainian Encyclopedia). Edited by V. Kubijovyč and Z. Kuzelia, it was published in three volumes between 1949 and 1952.⁵⁶ Over 120 Ukrainian researchers participated in this fundamental work, which may be considered the major accomplishment of the Shevchenko Scientific Society during the DP period. Overall, the renewed Shevchenko Scientific Society, despite its meagre financial base, was able to revitalize Ukrainian research in exile and to publish a number of significant works on Ukraine and its people.

The Ukrainian Free University and Other Institutions

The renewal of academic and research activities of the Ukrainian Free University (Ukrainskyi vilnyi universytet) in Munich constituted a major accomplishment for Ukrainian scholars and educators. During the 1947-8 academic year, approximately 500 students were enrolled in the university's Faculty of Philosophy and Faculty of Law and Economics, which had a teaching staff of seventy.⁵⁷ UFU's educational program was supported by the Bavarian Ministry of Education, which gave the university accreditation in 1950 and officially recognized its degrees.⁵⁸ All full and associate professors at UFU were proven researchers, and many of them headed the various sections within the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences and the Shevchenko Scientific Society. UFU, considered a major centre of Ukrainian studies in exile, emphasized research in the humanities and social sciences and was responsible for educating a generation of young Ukrainian scholars within those fields.⁵⁹

In 1948 UFU resumed the publication of its prestigious *Naukovyi zbirnyk UVU* (Scholarly Symposium of UFU). In order to satisfy student demand, approximately thirty lithographed textbooks (*skrypty*) were published.⁶⁰ Additional works by UFU professors were published by NTSh, UVAN, and other scientific organizations. After 1948 a number of UFU professors were invited to teach at German, American, and Canadian universities.⁶¹ Faculty members also participated in scientific conferences in Europe and were able to establish close contacts with their colleagues from other countries. When a large percentage of UFU's students immigrated to the United States and Canada in 1948-50, the university was forced to restrict its curricular activity. After 1952, the university

focussed primarily on research, sponsorship of scientific conferences, and publication.

The second institution of higher education, the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (Ukrainskyi tekhnichno-hospodarskyi instytut, UTHI), located in Regensburg, focussed its activity on the expansion of the curriculum, research, and publication. The faculty consisted of 140 professors and lecturers. In the period 1946-50 student enrollment reached 1,290. UTHI added to its existing departments—Agriculture and Forestry, Engineering, Economics—two new departments of Veterinary Medicine and Pharmacy. The institute had a separate unit, “Sektor naukovo-doslidnoi pratsi” (Section of Scientific-Scholarly Work), which was responsible for co-ordinating scientific work, organizing conferences, and expanding the publications programme of the institute.⁶² In 1948 UTHI published a serial, *Naukovi zapysky* (Scientific Notes), and later published the scientific contributions of its faculty in *Naukovyi biuletyn UTHI* (Scientific Bulletin, in 47 issues). However, the main thrust of its publications programme focussed on reissuing textbooks for student use.⁶³ The growth of the institute and its research programs can be attributed to the efforts of Viktor Domanytsky, the rector, and professors such as B. Ivanytsky, M. Vasyliiv, Ie. Khraplyvy, and A. Iakovliv.

The third institution of higher learning was the new Ukrainian Higher School of Economics (Ukrainska ekonomichna vysoka shkola, UVESH, 1946), which was located in Munich. That school offered doctoral degrees in economics and limited its publishing to mimeographed textbooks. The professors organized the Ukrainian Scientific Society of Economists, which joined the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in 1947, becoming a part of the Economic Section of the academy headed by UVESH professor M. Velychkiivsky.⁶⁴ The school was headed by B. Martos (1945-9). Two other educational institutions were Ukrainian theological schools. Both the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy (Bohoslovsko-pedahohichna Akademiia UAPT, 1946) and the Ukrainian Catholic Theological Seminary (Ukrainska katolytska dukhovna seminariia, 1946) concentrated on teaching and the development of theological curricula. The Orthodox academy organized several academic conferences and in 1947 published *Biuletyn Bohoslovskoi Pedahohichnoi Akademii*—scholarly theological and historical materials—and an irregular serial *Zbirnyk naukovo-bohoslovskykh ta tserkovno-istorychnykh prats* (Munich, 1946-8).⁶⁵ The academy ceased to exist in 1950.

In addition to the major Ukrainian learned societies (UVAN and NTSh), and the institutions of higher education (UFU, UTHI), several smaller societies and groups were also actively engaged in research. The Historical-Philological Society (Ukrainske istorychno-filolohichne tovarystvo) from Prague renewed its activities in 1945 and concentrated on sponsoring scholarly conferences in Munich. In the same year the Ukrainian Black Sea Institute (Ukrainskyi Chornomorskyi instytut) reactivated its publishing program under the directorship of

archaeologist M. Miller and bibliographer Lev Bykovsky, who was one of the founders of the institute (first established in Warsaw in 1940). The institute published an irregular serial, *Chornomorskyi zbirnyk* (Black Sea Symposium—four issues, 1946-8), and also over thirty shorter studies devoted to the Black Sea and its role in European and Asian history.⁶⁶ In 1947 the Institute of Genealogy and Heraldry, headed by Ie. Arkhymenko, produced *Rid ta znameno* (Lineage and Coat of Arms—four issues, 1947). In the same year, the Research Institute of Ukrainian Martyrology, headed by Oleksander Ohloblyn, began collecting materials for recent Ukrainian history.⁶⁷ The Ukrainian Scientific Society (Ukrainske Naukove Tovarystvo) was founded in Munich in 1945, and in Aschaffenburg in 1947. These short-lived societies were active in sponsoring various scholarly conferences. All of these institutions were directly affected by the resettlement of Ukrainian DPs in the United States, Canada, and Australia. In 1949 they ceased to exist or were forced to change their organizational structure, as had UVAN and NTSh. However, the years 1946-8 may be characterized as a golden age in the development of Ukrainian scholarly institutions within the DP camps and in postwar Germany.

Ukrainian scholarly societies and researchers interacted with the Ukrainian DP community through the Ukrainian DP press and various meetings sponsored within the camps. Official communications and informative materials pertaining to the activities of UVAN, NTSh, UFU, UTHI, and other institutions were published in popular weeklies such as *Chas* (Fürth, 1945-9), *Nashe zhyttia* (Munich, 1945-8), *Ukrainski visti* (Neu-Ulm, 1945-52), and *Ukrainska trybuna* (Munich 1946-9).⁶⁸ Most of the newspapers included special sections on scholarship, literature, and art written by Ukrainian scholars. In addition there were a number of other journals, sponsored by professional organizations or by individuals, which served as a forum to publicize research by Ukrainian scholars. *Ridne slovo* (Munich, 1945-6), *Arka* (Munich, 1947-8), *MUR (Mystetskyi Ukrainskyi Rukh*, Munich, 1946-7), and *Orlyk* (Berchtesgaden, 1946-8)⁶⁹ all contained scholarly articles covering such topics as history, literature, ethnography, language, and art. Other articles written by refugee scholars in West Germany were published outside Germany in *Ukraina* (1948-53) and *Zapysky Chyna sv. Vasyliia Velykoho*, published in Rome by the Order of St. Basil the Great.⁷⁰

Prior to the reactivation of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the principal scholarly institution was the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, which enjoyed the full support of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany and its Cultural and Educational Department (headed by D. Doroshenko, the newly elected president of the academy). During the September conference held in Munich in 1945, V. Shcherbakivsky and V. Domanytsky raised the question of reviving the former Ukrainian Academic Committee as a major coordinating body for all Ukrainian scholarly institutions in exile. Another proposal, advocated by V. Kubijovyč, called for reactivating the Mazepa-Mohyla Academy

(the short-lived institution created by the UNR government-in-exile in 1937) to function as the principal co-ordinating arm. Neither proposal was accepted and a co-ordinating committee was not formed. Members of the academy and the society shared the same view of the role of Ukrainian scholarship in exile. They supported independent and impartial research on Ukrainian history, literature, and other subjects, as well as the exposing of biased interpretations of the historical development of the Ukrainian nation and its culture by Soviet scholarly institutions and the communist government.⁷¹ They also supported the concept of merging UVAN and NTSh into one major Ukrainian research centre.⁷² This view was also supported by CRUE, which created a special mediation committee to facilitate the merger.

However, the plan did not work. Members of the executive board of NTSh, especially V. Kubijovyč, advocated incorporating the academy into NTSh, the oldest Ukrainian scholarly society with a solidly established reputation. The board proposed the name *Ukrainska Vilna Akademiia Nauk* (formerly *Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka*).⁷³ The academy's presidium (D. Doroshenko, V. Miiakovsky, and L. Biletsky) also supported the merger of the two institutions, but it considered the academy the highest Ukrainian scholarly institution in exile, representing the best traditions of the Kiev Academy of Sciences from the 1920s. They proposed the name *Ukrainska Vilna Akademiia Nauk, davnish Naukove Tvo im. Shevchenka* for both institutions.⁷⁴ This was not acceptable to NTSh, which resulted in the parallel existence of two separate scholarly institutions with similar objectives for the representation of Ukrainian scholarship in the Western world. This conflict, however, did not result in any serious hostilities between the rank-and-file members of UVAN and NTSh, since in many instances Ukrainian scholars were members of both institutions and continued to co-operate in major research projects, such as the *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*. Nevertheless, by failing to reconcile their conflicting positions, Ukrainian scholarly life lost the opportunity to form a major united Ukrainian learned society and a research centre for Ukrainian studies in exile.

Summary

This overview of the development of Ukrainian scholarship and scholarly institutions in the DP period should be considered a preliminary step in the reconstruction of Ukrainian cultural history. The organizers of Ukrainian scholarly life, over a period of seven years, began to rebuild their institutional structures in the shadow of social, psychological, economic, and political forces associated with the uprooting and displacement of a people within a destabilized postwar environment. Despite these obstacles, there was a rebirth of independent scholarship, free from the grasp of governmental dictates. From 1945 to 1952 Ukrainian scholars were able to renew the activities of well-established institutions existing prior to World War II (Shevchenko Scientific Society, Ukrainian Free Univer-

sity), as well as establish new major research centres, such as the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences. The scholars participating in this institutional development were from all generations of researchers and various geographic locales. They were able to exchange their scientific and organizational experiences, and despite the transitory nature of the DP period, they made a united effort toward reconstructing Ukrainian scholarly life. Thus the continuity of the traditions of free Ukrainian scholarship that were present in the Kievan Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, and the Ukrainian Free University in Prague is evident in the activities of individual research institutions and émigré scholars in postwar Germany. They were responsible for the preservation of the concept of impartial research and independent scholarship, following in the tradition of Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The nature of Ukrainian scholarship was national in character, emphasizing the study of Ukrainian subjects (history, literature, language, economics, etc.). At its core it was anti-Soviet, as a result of the Soviet government's liquidation of Ukrainian independent scholarship and the Russification of Ukrainian culture.

The continuation and expansion of Ukrainian scholarly life in the United States and Canada can also be credited to Ukrainian émigré scholars of the DP period. The Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences and the Shevchenko Scientific Society transferred a major part of their scholarly activities overseas and integrated their work into the American and Canadian academic settings. In this sense, the DP scholars played a major role in bridging the scholarly activities between the continents. This scholarly activity did not escape the inter- and intra-group conflicts which typify human institutional development. Specific examples include the internal discord which resulted from attempts to merge UVAN and NTSh into one major Ukrainian research institution and the failure to revive the Ukrainian Academic Committee of Prague as a major co-ordinating body for Ukrainian research and academic institutions. Furthermore, the creation of some of the higher schools (such as the Ukrainian School of Higher Economics) and smaller research centres tended to duplicate activities of other major institutions, as well as create greater competition for the meagre financial resources available. These developments can, in part, be related to the "hidden agendas" of individual scholars and educators who, motivated by personal ambitions, preferred to establish "their own" centres of learning and research. Nevertheless, the record shows that the accomplishments were indeed significant and the legacy left by the Ukrainian DP scholars directly influenced the later development of Ukrainian studies and research in the West.

Table 1
Ukrainian Institutions of Higher Learning

Founding date	Educational Institutions	Place	Initiators
12 June 1945	Husbandry Institute (Ukrainian Technical College)	Regensburg Munich	S. Komaretsky V. Domanysky B. Ivanytsky
26 Oct. 1945	Ukrainian Higher School of Economics	Munich B. Martos	M. Velychkivsky
22 Nov. 1945	Ukrainian Free University V. Shcherbakivsky I. Mirchuk	Munich	A. Iakovliv
Nov. 1945	Ukrainian Catholic (Byzantine-rite) Theological Seminary	Hirschberg	Mykola Voiakovsky Vasyl Laba
17 Nov. 1946	Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy	Munich P. Kurinny	Metropolitan Polikarp

Table 2
Ukrainian Scholarly Societies and Research Centres

Founding Date	Educational Institutions	Place	Initiators
June 1945	Historical-Philological Society	Transfelden	V. Miiakovsky
16 June 1945	Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences	Augsburg	D. Doroshenko P. Kurinny V. Miiakovsky
22 Nov. 1945	Ukrainian Scientific Society	Munich	V. Shcherbakivsky
June 1946	Ukrainian Black Sea Institute	Kastel	L. Bykovsky M. Miller
10 Aug. 1946	Institute of Ukrainian Martyrology	Munich	O. Ohloblyn
Aug. 1946	Ukrainian Genealogical Institute	Frankfurt	Ie. Arkhynenko
30 March 1947	Shevchenko Scientific Society	Munich	V. Kubijovyč Z. Kuzelia

Table 3
Academy Structure and Research Interests

Date of establishment	Name	Director	Members
5 Nov. 1945	Hrupa peredistorii ta rannoi istorii (prehistory & early history)	Vadym Shcherbakivsky	20
14 Jan. 1946	Hrupa istorii ta teorii literatury (history & theory of literature)	Leonid Biletsky	22
30 Jan. 1946	Hrupa movoznavstva (language)	Jaroslav Rudnytsky	22
1 Feb. 1946	Hrupa Orientalistyky (Oriental studies)	Volodymyr Shaian	6
26 Feb. 1946	Hrupa Sulsilno-ekonomichna (socio-economic studies)	Mykola Velychivsky	8
3 April 1946	Hrupa mystetstvoznavstva (arts)	Volodymyr Sichynsky	17
7 April 1946	Hrupa zoolohii (zoology)	S. Shostak	3
25 April 1946	Hrupa pedahohiky ta psykhologhii (pedagogy & psychology)	Hryhorii Vashchenko	10
6 July 1946	Hrupa istorii (history)	Dmytro Doroshenko	22
9 July 1946	Hrupa biolohii (biology)	Mykhailo Vetukhiv	19
16 July 1946	Hrupa knyhoznavstva (bibliography)	Lev Bykovsky	6
20 Sept. 1946	Hrupa matematychno-fizychnykh nauk (mathematics & physics)	V. Chudinov-Bohun	4

10 Nov. 1946	Hrupa etnografii ta folkloru (ethnography & folklore)	Victor Petrov	3
1 Dec. 1946	Hrupa filosofii (philosophy)	Dmytro Chyzhevsky	7
12 Dec. 1947	Hrupa heohrafii (geography)	Volodymyr Kubijovyč	3
12 Dec. 1947	Hrupa heolohii (geology)	Hanna Zakrevska	3
27 Dec. 1947	Hrupa medychna (medicine)	Borys Andriievsky	17
1947	Instytut Shevchenkoznavstva (Institute of Shevchenko Studies)	Pavlo Zaitsev	
1947	Archeografichnyi Instytut (Archeographical Institute)	Oleksander Ohloblyn	
1947	Instytut Rodoznavstva (Genealogical Institute)	Mykhailo Miller	
25 Jan. 1948	Hrupa botanichna (botany)	N. Osadsa-Ianata	3

This chart was constructed from the information provided by the academy's two official serials: *Litopys UVAN* and *Biuletyn* (1946-8). See also V. Pliushch, "Korotkyi narys istorii Ukrainskoi Akademii Nauk u Nimechchyni," *Ukrainski naukovi visti*, no. 1-2 (1970-1): 5-32.

Notes

1. See V. Doroshenko, *Ohnyshche ukrainskoi nauky. Naukove Tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka* (Philadelphia, 1951); *Istoriia Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (New York, 1949); Wasył Lew, *A Century of Dedicated Work for Scholarship and Nation* (New York, 1973). See also *Publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society* (New York, 1980).
2. See M. Hrushevsky, "Try Akademii," *Kyivski zbirnyky*, no. 1 (Kiev, 1930): 2-13. See also Hrushevsky's "Ukrainske naukove Tovarystvo v Kyievi i ioho naukove vydavnytstvo," *Zapysky UNT*, no. 1 (1908): 3-15.
3. See L. R. Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i Naukove Tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka* (Munich, 1970). On Hrushevsky's scholarly contributions and scholarly activity see Lubomyr Wynar, *Naivydarnishyi istoryk Ukrainy Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi (1866-1934)* (New York, 1985); see also Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987).
4. The Russification policies of the Russian government reached their culmination in the Valuev ukase of 1863 and the ukase of Ems of 1876. For a comprehensive analysis of Russification policies see F. Savchenko, *The Suppression of Ukrainian Activities in 1876* (Munich, 1970).
5. L. Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, 17-27.
6. It contained over 70,000 volumes in 1914 and over 200,000 volumes in 1939, thus becoming the major library on Ukrainian subjects in Western Ukraine. Lew, *A Century of Dedicated Work*, 20.
7. On the interwar period see *Istoriia Naukovoho*, 30-9.
8. See N. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Ukrainska Akademiia Nauk*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1955-8); *Istoriia Akademii Nauk Ukrainskoi RSR*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1967); M. P. Semenenko, ed., *Academy of Science of the Ukrainian SSR* (Kiev, 1980).
9. Polonska-Vasylenko, *Ukrainska Akademiia Nauk*, vol. 1, 99-101; D. Doroshenko, "Akademie der Wissenschaften in Kyiw," *Mitteilungen des Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institutes*, no. 2 (1927): 11-20.
10. See *In Memory of the Ukrainian Scholars Liquidated by Communist Moscow*, *Zapysky NTSh*, vol. 173 (1962); D. Solovei, *Ukrainska nauka v koloniiialnykh putakh* (New York, 1965); *Academic Freedom Under the Soviet Regime: A Symposium* (New York, 1954).
11. O. Pritsak, "The Present State of Ukrainian Studies," in O. Pritsak, *Chomu katedry ukrainoznavstva v Harvardi* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 126.
12. The chief promoters of the concept of a Ukrainian Free University were Oleksandr Kolessa (former dean of the philosophy faculty at Lviv University), Ivan Horbachevsky (former rector of Charles University in Prague), and Stanislav Dnistriansky. "The Ukrainian University has adopted all the statutes and degree regulations of the Caroline University, and organized itself on the similar basis," R. Smal-Stocky, "Centers of Ukrainian Learning," *Slavonic Review*, vol. 2 (1923/4): 561.

On UFU history see *Ukrainskyi Vilnyi Universytet v Prazi v rokakh 1921-1931*; Roman S. Holiat, *Short History of the Ukrainian Free University*, Shevchenko Scientific Society Papers, no. 21 (New York, 1964); W. Janiw, *Ukrainian Free University* (Munich, 1958).

13. See *Ukrainska Hospodarska Akademiia v ChSR 1922-1935* (New York, 1959); *Ukrainskyi Tekhnichno-Hospodarskyi Instytut 1932-1952* (New York, 1962); Bohdan Wynar, *Materiialy do istorii ekonomichnykh doslidiv na emihratsii, 1919-1964* (Munich, 1965), 21-35.
14. Other Ukrainian professional organizations in Czechoslovakia included the Union of Ukrainian Physicians, the Ukrainian Pedagogical Society in Prague, and the Association of Ukrainian Lawyers in Czechoslovakia. See Symon Narizhny, *Ukrainska emigratsiia* (Prague, 1942), 119-96, 220-34.
15. The membership in the Academic Committee consisted of all Ukrainian academic and professional organizations in Czechoslovakia, the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, and the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin. See Narizhny, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 193-5.
16. See Ukrainskyi Akademichnyi Komitet, *Ukrainskyi naukovi zizd u Prazi* (Prague, 1928), 3-4.
17. The institute, first headed by Dmytro Doroshenko (1926-31) and later by Ivan Mirchuk (1934-April 1945), published four serials: *Abhandlungen* (3 vols., 1927-31), *Mitteilungen* (1927-31), *Beiträge zur Ukrainekunde* (1932), and *Ukrainische Kulturberichte* (1933-8). See Ivan Mirchuk, "Ukrainskyi Naukovi Instytut v Berlini," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 87-90. Paul Magocsi incorrectly states that USI was founded "as part of the University of Berlin," *National Cultures and University Chairs* (Toronto, 1980), 16.
18. The institute was headed by Oleksander Lototsky and financially supported by the Polish government. See Dmytro Doroshenko, "Ukrainskyi Naukovi Instytut u Varshavi," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 90-1; B. Wynar, *Materiialy do istorii ekonomichnykh*, 51-62.
19. V. Kubijovyč, "Suchasni problemy ukrainskoi nauky," *Siohochasne i mynule*, no. 1 (1948): 8.
20. Volodymyr Ianiv, "Profesiina orhanizatsiia vchenykh," *Chas*, no. 31 (96), 3 August 1947. For a statistical analysis, see V. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini* (Munich, 1985), 181.
21. I. Rakovsky to Bishop Ivan Buchko, 26 December 1947, Archives of the Ukrainian Historical Association. Rakovsky presented statistical data based on professional affiliations:

Shevchenko Scientific Society	96
Ukrainian University (excluding members of above)	19
Ukrainian Academy (excluding members of above)	90
UTHI (excluding members of above)	<u>136</u>
Total number of persons	341

22. See V. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 166. According to Mark Wyman, UNRRA cited the "community's fuel conservation program" as its official reason for closing UNRRA University. See M. Wyman, *DP: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951* (Philadelphia, 1989), 125. However, other sources pointed "to official opposition to anything that encouraged the DPs to remain in Germany," *ibid.*
23. According to official policy, "UNRRA personnel discouraging repatriation are to be removed from displaced persons camps administered by UNRRA." George Woodbridge, *UNRRA*, vol. 3 (New York, 1950), 400.
24. Mark Elliott, "The United States and Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, 1944-47," *Political Science Quarterly*, no. 98 (1973): 265.
25. For Soviet views on political refugees see M. Pavlenko, "*Bizhentsi*" ta "*peremishcheni osoby*" v politytsi imperialistychnykh derzhav (1945-1949 rr.) (Kiev, 1979), 94-120. On political status of refugees in DP camps, see Rudolf Wierer, *Probleme der Heimatlosen Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Grafeling, 1960), 15-16.
26. Anthony Hlynka, "On Behalf of Ukrainian Displaced Persons," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (1946): 167. See also Walter Dushnyck and W. J. Gibbons, *Refugees are People* (New York, 1947), 50-3 and Mark R. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and the American Role in Their Repatriation* (Urbana, Ill., 1982), 156-7. Mark Wyman presents a clear analysis of repatriation policies in 1945-7. See his *DP: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951*, 61-85.
27. See Vasył Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia ta orhanizatsiia taborovoho zhyttia," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 9-13. The Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration served as the co-ordinating body for Ukrainian organized life in DP camps. Its headquarters were in Augsburg. In 1945 Ukrainian refugees in Austria organized the Ukrainian Central Relief Union.
28. See *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1971), 327.
29. Petro Kurinny, "Propamiatna zapyska dlia prezydii UVAN," *Ukrainski naukovi visti*, nos. 1-2 (1970/1): 32-3.
30. *Biuletyn Ukrainskoi Vilnoi Akademii Nauk*, no. 1 (1946): 5-7. For the early activities of Ukrainian scholarly institutions see *Naukovi ustanovy na emigratsii v 1945-1946 rokakh*, *Litopys UVAN*, no. 4 (Augsburg, 1947).
31. Participants in this meeting included S. Komaretsky, B. Ivanytsky, V. Domanytsky, L. Shramchenko, and A. Iakovliv. See *Ukrainskyi Tekhnichno-Hospodarskyi Instytut, 1932-1952*, vol. 2 (New York, 1962), 55-66. See also *Nauka na emigratsii v 1945-1946 rokakh* (Augsburg, 1947), 1.
32. See "Protokol narady ukrainskykh naukovtsiv, dnia 22 zhovtnia 1945 r. v. Miunkheni." I have a copy of these minutes in my archive. During this meeting V. Kubijovych also advocated the re-establishment of the Mazepa-Mohyla Academy of Sciences. See *Naukovi ustanovy na emigratsii*, 2-3; *Nauka na emigratsii*, 2-4.
33. See B. Wynar, *Materialy do istorii ekonomichnykh*, 66-8.

34. P. Kovaliv, "Bohoslovsko-Pedahohichna Akademiia UAPTs v Miunkheni," *Siohochasne i mynule*, no. 1 (1948): 66-8.
35. Vasyl Laba, "Ukrainska Hreko-katolytska Dukhovna Seminaria na chuzhyni," *Siohochasne i mynule*, no. 1 (1948): 63-6.
36. "Zahalni zbory Naukovoho T-va im. Shevchenka," *Khronika NTSh*, no. 75 (1949): 9-10; V. Kubijovyč, "Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka u 1939-1952 rr.," *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, no. 1-2 (1973): 5-16.
37. See *Brat-bratovi: Knyha pro ZUADK* (Philadelphia, 1971); M. Marunchak, *The Ukrainian Canadians: A History* (Winnipeg, 1970), 564-8.
38. M. Vetukhiv, "Dmytro Ivanovych Doroshenko—pershyi prezydent Ukrainskoi Vilnoi Akademii Nauk," *Naukovyi zbirnyk UVAN*, vol. 1 (1952): 7-8; M. Antonovych et al., "Volodymyr Mijakovskij," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US XII* (1969-72): 286-8.
39. See "Tymchasove polozhennia pro Ukrainku Vilnu Akademiiu Nauk," *Biuletyn UVAN*, no. 1 (1946): 5-6.
40. D. Doroshenko, *Rozvytok ukrainskoi nauky pid praporom Shevchenka* (Winnipeg, 1949), 9.
41. Pliushch, "Korotkyi narys istorii," 21-2.
42. "Statut Ukrainskoi Akademii Nauk," *Litopys UVAN*, no. 7 (1947): 8-11.
43. Pliushch, "Korotkyi narys istorii," 5-32.
44. "Spravozdannia UVAN za 1946 rik," *Litopys UVAN*, no. 3 (1948): 3-4.
45. V. Miiakovskiy et al., "Muzei-Arkhiv im. Dm. Antonovycha," *UVAN: Iuvileine vydannia* (New York, 1956), 50-1.
46. "Spravozdannia UVAN za 1947 rik," *Litopys UVAN*, no. 3 (1948): 13-14.
47. See O. Arkhimovych, "Ukrainska Vilna Akademiia nauk v ii istorychnomu rozvytku," *UVAN: Iuvileine vydannia*, 8-19.
48. V. Bezushko and J. B. Rudnytsky, *Vydannia UVAN u pershomu desiatylitti, 1945-1955* (Winnipeg, 1955), 20-2. More substantial publications included the scholarly symposium *Shevchenko ta ioho doba* (1947), *Hetman Danylo Apostol* (1948) by B. Krupnytsky, and *Istorychni pliany Kyieva* (1947) by P. Kurinny and O. Povstenko. Additional titles were Dmytro Chyzhevskiy, *Kulturno-istorychni epokhy* (1948), and Jaroslav Rudnytsky, *Naholos v poezii Shevchenka* (1947). Other works prepared by the academy's various sections in Germany were published later by UVAN in North America.
49. See "Zahalni zbory Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka v Miunkheni," *Khronika NTSh*, no. 75 (Munich, 1949), 9-10. This session was attended by twenty-nine full-fledged members and twenty-three ordinary members of NTSh.
50. The Historical-Philosophical Section had forty members and five committees: Historical (head B. Krupnytsky); Philosophical-Pedagogical (head I. Mirchuk); Law and Social Sciences (head Iu. Pavlykovskiy); Archaeological (head Shcherbakivskiy); and Museological (head Z. Kuzelia).

The Philosophical Section had six committees: Bibliographical (head V. Doroshenko); Ethnological (head Z. Kuzelia); Linguistic (head K. Kysilevsky); Literature (head L. Biletsky); Shevchenko Studies (head P. Zaitsev); and Classical Philology (head V. Radzykevych).

The Mathematical-Natural Sciences and Medical Section had two committees: Geographical (head V. Kubijovyč) and Physiological (head Iu. Polansky). See V. Kubijovyč, "Naukove Tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka." See also V. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 176-80; V. Kubijovyč, *Meni 85* (Munich, 1985), 201-7.

51. See "Biblioteka NTSh," *Khronika NTSh*, vol. 77 (1954): 20.
52. Lew, *A Century of Dedicated Work*, 38-45; Kubijovyč, "Naukove Tovarystvo im. T. Shevchenka," 28-9.
53. "Amerykanskyi Viddil," *Khronika NTSh*, vol. 77 (1954): 23-37. See also Matthew Stachiv, "Work and Activities of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the Diaspora," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (1973): 267-71.
54. Lew, *A Century of Dedicated Work*, 38-45.
55. See *Publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1945-80* (New York, 1980), 47 pp.
56. See V. Kubijovyč and V. Markus, *Dvi ukrainski entsyklopedii* (New York, 1961); "Redaktsiia E. U.," *Khronika NTSh*, vol. 77 (1954): 18; V. Kubijovyč, *Meni 80* (Munich, 1980), 246-73; *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1963).
57. I. Mirchuk, "Ukrainian Free University," *Naukovyi zbirnyk UVU*, vol. 5 (1948): xvii-xix. V. Maruniak presents chronological statistical tables of student enrollment and faculty at UFU: see *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 168.
58. Holiat, *Short History*, 18.
59. Statistical data on Ph.D. degrees at UFU is in the university's *Biuletyn* for 1948/9, 1949/50, and 1951. UFU had the following presidents: Vladym Shcherbakivsky (1946/7), Ivan Mirchuk (1947/8, 1950-52), and Iurii Paneiko (1948-50). All UFU's presidents were noted scholars.
60. *Skrypty* were published by such noted scholars as V. Shcherbakivsky, B. Krupnytsky, I. Mirchuk, George Shevelov, M. Chubaty, and L. Okinshevych. For a complete list of university publications during 1946-52 see *Index Lectionum* (Munich, 1980), 52-85.
61. Some UFU professors who taught at other universities: Roman Smal-Stocky at Marquette; George Shevelov at Columbia; Dmytro Chyzevsky at Heidelberg; J. Rudnytsky at Manitoba; E. Pyziur at St. Louis. For a complete list, see Holiat, *Short History*, 20-1.
62. See *Ukrainskyi Tekhnichno-Hospodarskyi Instytut*, vol. 2, 79-104. Statistical data on UTHI students and professors is presented by V. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 170-2.
63. Between 1945-52 it published forty-two titles, ranging from political economy, sociology, and history to chemistry and botany. A complete bibliography of UTHI publications is in Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 395-6. For evaluative comments

- on the institute's scientific activity, see B. Wynar, *Materiialy do istorii ekonomichnykh*, 68-70.
64. See *Shist rokiv Ukrainskoi Vysokoi Shkoly v Miunkheni* (Munich, 1951).
 65. See Petro Kovaliv, "Bohoslovsko-Pedahohichna Akademia UAPT's v Miunkheni," *Siohochasne i mynule*, no. 1 (1948): 66-8.
 66. See I. Shovheniv, "Zahalnyi plian prats Ukrainskoho Chornomorskoho Instytutu," *Ukrainskyi Chornomorskyi Instytut* (1941), 1-16; Lev Bykovsky, *Ukrainskyi Chornomorskyi Instytut* (Munich, 1970); Lev Bykovsky, "Ukrainski Naukovo-doslidchi instytuty (1940-1952)," *Novi dni* 4, no. 34 (1953): 15-18.
 67. O. Ohloblyn, "Instytut Ukrainskoi Martyrolohii," *Siohochasne i mynule*, no. 1 (1948): 69-70.
 68. In the years 1945-50 Ukrainians published 282 serials in West Germany, with a total circulation of about 15,000,000 copies. See V. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 226-7. See also Roman Ilnytzkyj's essay in this volume.
 69. On the Ukrainian DP press, see relevant essays in this volume and *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1971), 516-17. The émigré scholars' contributions to the Ukrainian DP press upgraded the cultural level of the general Ukrainian DP populace and also gave the readers a more sophisticated world outlook. On cultural life in DP camps, see several chapters in this volume and V. Doroshenko, "Kulturno-osvitna pratsia v taborakh i dla taboriv," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 51-4.
 70. *Ukraina* was edited by historian Elie Borschak and published in Paris. *Zapysky Chyna sv. Vasylia Velykoho* was published in Rome by the Order of St. Basil the Great.
 71. See V. Kubijovyč, "Suchasni problemy ukraïnskoï nauky," *Siohochasne i mynule*, no. 1 (1948): 5-16; D. Chyzhevsky, "Naukova pratsia na emihratsii," *Biuletyn UVAN*, no. 5 (1946); L. Chykalenko, "Obiedannia naukovoï roboty," *Biuletyn UVAN*, no. 1 (1946); M. Shlemkevych, "Zhyttia i nauka," *Problemy*, no. 2 (1947): 7-8.
 72. *V spravi iedynoho naukovoïho tsentru*, *Litopys UVAN*, no. 8 (Augsburg, 1948).
 73. The official position of NTSh on this matter is in "Stanovyshche Vydilu NTSh v spravi obiednannia z UVAN v odnu naukovu ustanovu," 31 December 1947. For valuable information on the merger see V. Kubijovyč to V. Mudry, 18 and 28 February 1947. Archives of American NTSh, V. Mudry folder.
 74. *V spravi iedynoho naukovoïho tsentru*, 7.

Soviet Efforts at
Repatriation and the
Allied Response

The Soviet Repatriation Campaign

Mark Elliott

Because of early Wehrmacht successes on the eastern front and German occupation of large portions of the European USSR during World War II, Hitler exercised direct control over some 8.35 million Soviet prisoners of war and forced labourers. Approximately 5.6 million of these survived the war and were scattered all over Europe. The advancing Red Army took custody of 3 million outright, while American and British forces liberated more than 2.5 million Soviet displaced persons. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union signed agreements at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that required the repatriation of all Allied nationals, by force if necessary. The language of the American-Soviet document did not specifically call for the use of coercion, but the precedent had been set, and each side recognized privately that the agreements did not provide Soviet citizens any other option.¹ Since the Soviet Union regained control of more than 5 million of its citizens displaced during World War II, more than 2 million of these with the active assistance of the United States and Great Britain, by any normal accounting Moscow was remarkably successful in its efforts at repatriation. However, the USSR came to view the few hundred thousand nonreturners in the West as an embarrassing defeat. Thus by Moscow's reckoning its repatriation campaign failed because it was not total.

Adamant Soviet demands for the return of all their citizens in Western Europe stemmed from a variety of motives. A vindictiveness seemingly endemic to the system certainly played a large part. In addition, psychological, propagandistic, and strategic considerations contributed to Soviet insistence on total repatriation. Soviet statutes defined treason broadly enough to include not

only military collaborators but also POWs and, in numerous instances, forced labourers. A deeply rooted desire for vengeance, a longing “to punish the guilty,” which had been inflamed by innumerable Nazi atrocities, meant that repatriation spelled retaliation.² Those associated with the Germans, rightly or wrongly, faced severe punishment.

Psychologically, too, Moscow felt it deserved to have its own way on the DP question because of the disproportionate cost of the war to the USSR. The Soviet Union faced the postwar era painfully conscious of its huge losses, proud of its herculean success in battle, and in no mood to brook opposition on repatriation from Allies it did not consider its equal in victory. Soviet fatalities in World War II ran to 20 million, compared to 300,000 for the United States and 330,000 for Britain, which Soviet authorities and ordinary citizens both resented.³ The 130,000 American fatalities from three and a half years of war in Europe “did not even equal the average number of civilian casualties Russia suffered each fortnight before 1943.” The Soviet Union inflicted and suffered 90 per cent of the total casualties in the European theatre.⁴ Besides the human losses, 60 per cent of transportation facilities and 70 per cent of industrial capacity in the invaded portions of the USSR had been destroyed. The government wrote off 1,700 cities and towns and 70,000 villages as total losses.⁵ The passage of time has not erased Soviet consciousness of the heavier price the East paid for Hitler’s defeat.⁶

The repeated postponements launching the second front probably contributed to Soviet bitterness. From the Russian perspective, Lend-Lease shipments simply could not compensate for the delays in the cross-channel invasion of occupied France. Soviet leaders likely would have been suspicious of their Allies’ ultimate intentions no matter where or when large-scale Western military action on the Continent commenced. The Kremlin seems to have interpreted Roosevelt’s ill-advised promise to Molotov of a second front in Europe in 1942 and its delay until 1944 as evidence that the West was content to see the Wehrmacht bleed the Soviet Union white. Ivan Maiskii, wartime Soviet ambassador to London, saw the postponement of Operation Overlord as a deliberate, “ruthless calculation” to let the USSR bear the brunt of the fighting.⁷

Paradoxically, American technical and material assistance to the Soviet war effort may have heightened suspicion of American motives. Moscow wondered whether the aid was payment for services rendered, much as England had bankrolled Continental armies in centuries past. It is easy to see why the Kremlin concluded that that was the effect. Obviously circumstances beyond the control of either the United States or the Soviet Union played an independent role in determining who would sacrifice what to defeat Hitler. Nevertheless, the contribution of the United States to victory is best calculated in organizational, technological, and economic terms; the Soviet Union’s, in casualties. As compensation for its great sufferings and in recognition of its equally great military accomplish-

ments, the USSR seemed to expect its Western Allies to bend over backwards to accommodate it in all outstanding disputes: "Convinced that they had won the war, the Russians showed little inclination to compromise."⁸ On repatriation the Kremlin was insistent and inflexible.

The Soviet Union also demanded total repatriation because nonreturners posed a threat to the credibility of propaganda that stressed the unqualified wartime devotion of all Soviet citizens. Upholding the international image of the world's first Marxist state necessitated the rapid, forcible return of all displaced nationals before dramatic instances of resistance could damage its reputation abroad. From Moscow, George Kennan cabled Washington that Soviet leaders feared their standing in the world community would suffer "if it becomes generally known that some Soviet citizens are not accepting with enthusiasm offers of repatriation." Similarly, State Department refugee specialist Robert S. McCollum observed, "Each refugee from the Soviet orbit represents a failure of the Communist system" and thereby "constitutes a challenge to the fundamental concepts of that system."⁹ Leonid Brezhnev contended that "the Great Patriotic War showed very well that any attempt 'to blast the Soviet Union from within' was bound to be thwarted by the monolithic solidarity of the Party and the people, the Soviet people's loyalty to socialist ideals, and the solid national unity of the USSR's nations, who stood firm in the face of the hard trials."¹⁰ World War II showed no such thing, but it would have been far more difficult for Moscow to have perpetuated this ideological fairy tale had 5.5 million instead of 500,000 of its charges remained abroad. A vote of no confidence of that proportion would have underscored widespread disaffection and grievously compromised the Soviet myth of an unwavering patriotic response to German aggression from all the peoples of the USSR.¹¹

The prospect of a concentration of anti-communist political expatriates in the West also unnerved Soviet authorities. Ambassador Averell Harriman noted "extreme touchiness" whenever the subject of reluctant repatriates came up.¹² Soviet authorities were frightened by the spectre of an anti-Stalinist movement in the West co-ordinated by the remnants of Andrei Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army and other collaborator units. Moscow took the impotent Vlasovites much more seriously than did the Germans or the Western Allies. The story told by captured Soviet agents parachuted behind Wehrmacht army lines convinced General Reinhard Gehlen that this was the case. Gehlen subsequently advocated that more effective use be made of the anti-Stalinist inclinations of many Soviet POWs. The racial bigotry of party zealots, however, prevented any higher officials from acting upon such advice. As long as Red Army captives were treated as *Untermenschen* (subhumans), massive support for an anti-Soviet movement was out of the question.¹³

The Nazi failure to capitalize upon Soviet disaffection no doubt lessened the Kremlin's concern, but Russia's leaders, fearing that the Western powers might

succeed where Germany had failed, could not relax until repatriation was complete. For example, Soviet Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Andrei Vyshinski told the United Nations General Assembly in early November 1946 that "it is no secret that refugee camps, situated in the western zones of Germany, Austria and certain other countries of Western Europe, are springboards and centers for the formation of military reserves of hirelings, which constitute an organized military force in the hands of this or that foreign power." Soviet sensitivity on this issue seemed to fulfill the prediction of American military intelligence that "since the majority of displaced persons and refugees are anti-Communist, the U.S.S.R. undoubtedly will view with suspicion Allied action to allow them to remain abroad free of supervision." It may be, as the *New York Times* contended, that the Kremlin feared postwar political expatriates had "the same potential for causing trouble for Russia as did the White Russians in western Europe after the first World War."¹⁴

In the early years of the Cold War no one in the West attempted to exploit the anti-Soviet attitudes of nonreturners, or even recognized them as potential partners in the struggle against world communism. By the early 1950s, when East-West hostility had gained a great deal of momentum, this notion finally did surface. A 1953 call to arms by Eugene Lyons bemoaned the past neglect of *Our Secret Allies, the Peoples of Russia*. To the author of this aggressively anti-communist piece, the Vlasov movement was a lost opportunity, and the forced repatriation of disaffected Soviet nationals was a "Betrayal of Natural Allies." A Cold War polemic by Boris Shub, a Western journalist, went even further: "the first step should be a solemn proclamation by the President...announcing that the United States will throw its full support behind all groups [Vlasovites included]...who will act to replace the present Politburo leadership with an interim government pledged to the reestablishment of legitimate and representative government in Russia."¹⁵ After World War II the American government did not contemplate overthrowing the Soviet regime by force. Nor did it use, or even consider using, disaffected Soviet émigrés as the nucleus for an army bent upon eradicating communism in Russia. Nevertheless, given the Kremlin's innate suspicion of the West, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union might have been anxious about this possibility.¹⁶

Soviet leaders thus were determined to demand that the United States and Britain repatriate all Allied nationals. Proper handling of the matter necessitated a campaign to gain full Western co-operation and total refugee participation. The Kremlin relied upon three devices: 1) repatriation agreements to pressure the West into returning all DPs by means of accusations of noncompliance; 2) aggressive utilization of Soviet repatriation missions in the West; and 3) direct appeals to persuade the hesitant to return home. In the first instance, Moscow's program for obtaining the West's unreserved assistance in repatriation relied heavily upon the American and British exchange accords signed at Yalta in

February 1945 and similar instruments negotiated with France, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, and the East European countries occupied by the Red Army.¹⁷ If interpreted as the Kremlin wished, those documents would have settled the question by requiring the return of all Soviet nationals abroad, regardless of their individual wishes.

Since Soviet authorities could not consider Western concurrence a foregone conclusion, they coupled demands for adherence to repatriation agreements with accusations of Allied mistreatment of Russian refugees. These complaints served not only to bolster Soviet repatriation efforts, but also to counteract Western dissatisfaction with Red Army handling of POWs. As one Western repatriation official noted, "it was soon apparent that these complaints were intended to serve Soviet purposes by silencing potential counter-claims concerning Soviet non-compliance with the Yalta Agreement pertaining to British and United States prisoners of war."¹⁸ One complaint of this type came from Colonel General Filip Golikov, head of the Soviet Repatriation Commission. Displaced Soviet nationals were being mistreated, he claimed in late April 1945, and the Western powers were deliberately slowing down the pace of repatriation. This public criticism surprised Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) officials in London, who had previously been accustomed to a show of appreciation from resident Soviet officers and DPs. George Kennan, United States chargé in Moscow, reacted sharply, dismissing Golikov's accusations as "shameless distortions."¹⁹ By early May disagreements over repatriation led to what historian William Hardy McNeill has called "a public exchange of incivilities." The charges and countercharges dragged on month after month and year after year. As late as 1949 Moscow alleged that the United States and Britain were detaining 247,000 Soviet citizens in Germany and Austria. Acrimony over repatriation led to an increase in mutual suspicion and mistrust, which certainly contributed to the postwar deterioration in East-West relations.²⁰

The Kremlin also depended upon the resourcefulness of its repatriation missions in Europe to secure the return of those hesitant to go back. These bodies, self-consciously although not officially autonomous, served a variety of functions. Covertly, they were intelligence outposts in the West and agents of coercive return. Overtly, they served as legitimate expeditors of repatriation and as conduits for positive appeals to reluctant returners. The Soviet government, in October 1944, established the Main Administration for Repatriation of Soviet Citizens, better known as the Soviet Repatriation Commission. Serving as the nominal head of the organization was General Golikov.²¹ He had a reputation as a "spit-and-polish professional officer," a hardened soldier, and a man on the rise in the military hierarchy.²² Golikov perfectly served Stalin's purpose as a repatriation figurehead, since Golikov was unrelated to the Soviet security organs yet had extensive experience in military intelligence as former chief of the Main Intelligence Administration of the General Staff. As head of the Soviet Repatriation Commission he lacked real authority, the responsibility being concentrated,

in reality, in the hands of the secret police: the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) within the USSR or Soviet-occupied territory, and SMERSH ("Death to Spies") abroad. The Soviet Repatriation Commission, working primarily in the West, received its directions and portions of its personnel from the Main Administration of Counter-intelligence of SMERSH.²³

After the war Soviet authorities had little trouble maintaining an extensive intelligence apparatus in the West because of the vast network of Soviet displaced persons' camps all over Europe, literally from Norway to Greece. Besides providing the rationale for the existence of the Soviet repatriation missions and their extracurricular activities, the camps themselves contained Soviet agents recruited and stationed there in a variety of ways. Some had purposefully fallen into Nazi hands with the aim of offering their services to collaborator groups, such as the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. A number of these agents simply maintained their cover after the German defeat, and, for purposes of later reckoning, continued keeping tallies on the behaviour of Soviet citizens abroad.²⁴ SMERSH also secured help from some DPs by means of bribery, blackmail, and threats. A defector, formerly employed by SMERSH in repatriation work, recited typical tactics: "Some agents were bought for money, others paid in service to us for their own ill-calculated drunkenness and moral depravity.... [Others] might be promised complete forgiveness for all past sins and an honourable homecoming to their Motherland. They might also be threatened with reprisals and of course threats would be made against their families, if they happened to be in Soviet hands." The task of tracking down relatives and even close friends of potential agents in the West was "vast" and "laborious"—but rewarding from the Kremlin's perspective.²⁵

Soviet repatriation operations served double duty: returning the maximum number of DPs to Russia and providing cover for Moscow's espionage activities in the West. The inextricable nature of the two assignments is symbolized in the biography of Major Shikin in Solzhenitsyn's *First Circle*. A Red Army general as much as told Isaiah Berlin in the British embassy in Moscow that the postwar homecoming of Soviet citizens was the responsibility of the secret police. One former SMERSH officer emphasized in his post-defection memoir that Soviet repatriation personnel "travelled freely about the western zone, at one time without even being accompanied by allied representatives, and collected a mass of useful information about the location and strength of allied troops, etc., in addition to doing their basic job of rooting out former Soviet citizens."²⁶

None of the handicaps imposed by the Yalta settlement upon American and British DP camp administrators proved as troublesome as the well-nigh impossible task of satisfying and keeping track of the sizeable Soviet Repatriation Mission. By the end of June 1945 its staff numbered 153 in Germany alone, and SHAEF refused a Soviet request to more than double it.²⁷ Difficulties arose at an early stage with these liaison officers over the limits of their authority, a

problem that persisted throughout their stay in the West. Incidents involving Soviet repatriation officers occurred in widely scattered locations. On 31 July 1945 General Sir Andrew Thorne, commander of Allied forces in Norway, asked General Ratov, head of the Red Army's military mission in that country, to reduce drastically his staff of 170 men. SHAEF objected to the dragnet-like activities of Ratov's men: besides, most of the 80,000 Soviet citizens found there had been repatriated. The Soviet general objected, claiming that at least 1,000 of 4,000 "disputed persons" had to be returned to Russia. SHAEF personnel came to detest Ratov, describing him variously as "uncooperative, rude, contentious, antagonistic, not to mention stupid." The State Department's Robert Murphy characterized him similarly as "quarrelsome, uncouth, contrary *and* stupid." Ratov even engaged in an unprecedented public fight with his own superior by claiming jurisdiction over Soviet DPs not only in Norway but in Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark as well. General V. M. Dragun in Paris made an apparently legitimate counterclaim that he, not Ratov, was charged with the task of repatriating Soviet nationals in those countries. SHAEF finally declared Ratov *persona non grata*. Possibly piqued by the unseemly, open-air squabbling, in August 1945 Moscow also replaced General Dragun with Major General Aleksandr N. Davidov, who became the chief Soviet repatriation official in Europe.²⁸

Repatriation did not hold as high a priority in Allied negotiations as the East European settlement, German reparations, zonal boundaries, or access to Berlin, but it could never be ignored either, partly because the problem was continent-wide. Top officials had to attend to the question, not only because Moscow would not let them forget it, but also because of the conspicuous presence of innumerable DPs all across liberated Europe. Members of Soviet repatriation teams in a score of countries continually clashed with SHAEF civil affairs officers and regular army commanders, who in turn passed the problem up the chain of command. Subordinate officers bombarded their superiors with requests for instructions on how to handle displaced Soviet citizens. They wanted to know how to treat nationals of an Allied power and simultaneously how to control the meddling members of the Kremlin's repatriation missions.

The answer that Allied Forces Headquarters-Italy (AFHQ) gave to the second question was to "take such steps as you may consider necessary" to keep Soviet officials out of prohibited zones. This British Foreign Office response went to General Harold Alexander, commander of Anglo-American forces in Italy. By September 1945 he had had his fill of troubles with the Soviet repatriation mission, including two Red Army lieutenants who were arrested twice without identification in the compound of General Anders' Polish Corps, and General Basilov, who had commandeered 300 DPs travelling by rail to a screening centre and demanded their immediate repatriation. Alexander called these actions "gross interference" with his command and determined to tolerate them no longer.²⁹ The Soviet mission in Italy, which at one point numbered 101, lost

its right to virtually unrestricted movement in Italy in September 1945 and could no longer "break all travel regulations and get away with it."³⁰

From the very start SHAEF commanders north of the Alps had their suspicions about the role of Soviet repatriation officials. General Mark Clark, commander of American forces in Austria, took great pains to keep under surveillance Moscow's representatives in his occupation zone. He had circumstantial evidence that certain members of the repatriation mission had engaged in espionage, and he made his objections known to General I. S. Konev, military governor of the Soviet Zone of Austria. Konev offered to recall the offending parties and replace them with new representatives who would be placed on a thirty-day trial. Clark agreed, but before that plan could be implemented he learned that the team leaving the American Zone planned to kidnap an American counter-espionage agent in conjunction with its departure. The general, to obtain proof to verify his long-standing suspicions, set a trap. On 23 January 1946, when several members of the Russian mission arrived at the intended victim's house, concealed lights were switched on to prevent the kidnappers' escape, and Clark's men quickly arrested the entire group. One Soviet repatriation officer was wearing the complete uniform of an American military policeman. Two others had on civilian coats over Red Army uniforms. All were armed. Enraged by their clandestine activities, Clark informed Konev that the offenders "would be shoved over the line into the Russian Zone" the next day.³¹ This incident did not end the general's troubles with the Soviet mission, because he had to accede to the War Department's orders. Despite Clark's contention on 25 January "that all members of this mission have been involved in intelligence activities since they have been in our Zone," Washington required him to admit a new Soviet repatriation team. The outspoken general continued his complaints. In mid-March 1946 he advised the War Department that Moscow was trying to extend the life of the mission indefinitely for intelligence reasons. Clark also let it be known that the British and French representatives in Vienna "are as anxious as I to get rid of these missions, feeling that their most important work is espionage." Again in late June 1946 he reiterated his conviction that "the main object behind Soviet insistence in establishing another mission in the United States zone is for intelligence purposes."³²

General Walter Bedell Smith, prior to his appointment as ambassador to Moscow in January 1946, had similar troubles with Soviet repatriation officers in Germany. Requiring members of one especially meddlesome Soviet team to eat at a central facility, in order to keep close check on their number, proved ineffective: as General Smith discovered, several Red Army officers often used the same meal ticket. This deception was part of a larger scheme designed to move unauthorized "transient Russians" about the Western zones undetected.³³ A new rationing system put a stop to that, but conflicts continued as long as Soviet repatriation teams operated in the West.

Evidence of illegal seizures of DPs by Soviet officials applied to Germany as well as Austria. At Bad Kreuznach, an American officer of Ukrainian descent saved thirty Ukrainians from unauthorized repatriation. Members of the Soviet mission had loaded the group onto trucks bound for the eastern zone of Germany and might have succeeded in their abduction but for the American officer, who understood the refugees' pleas for help and stopped the transfer. The saga of high-handedness on the part of Moscow's repatriation officials was the same all over Europe. In Brussels, Soviet representatives, searching for reluctant returners, broke into private homes without warrants. In Greece, Moscow's repatriation mission managed to spirit Bulgarian communists out of the country "unscathed" by the Greek police.³⁴ In France, the Soviet Union had perhaps its most pliant Western government. Moscow's prerogatives clearly included flagrant examples of disregard for the assigned tasks of repatriation. A large, effectively autonomous compound at Camp Beauregard, outside Paris, served as the major processing point for persons returning to Russia. The provisions of the Yalta repatriation accords and the French one, which permitted Soviet internal administration of refugee centres, greatly facilitated clandestine activities. In effect, Moscow was able to establish extraterritorial islands throughout Europe.³⁵ Yet Camp Beauregard represented but a fraction of Soviet repatriation activities in France. Witnesses even attested to abductions undertaken without interference from the French police. The meddling of the Kremlin's officials on French soil became so commonplace that Parisian wags declared that German occupation had been replaced by Russian. Nevertheless, the Red Army's repeated delays in repatriating hundreds of thousands of French POWs in the East most decidedly helped to insure that General De Gaulle would tolerate the excesses of the Soviet repatriation mission.³⁶

In Norway, Italy, Austria, Germany, France, and elsewhere, Soviet repatriation missions regularly engaged in a variety of intrigues. Still, their selective participation in strictly illegal repatriation—genuine kidnapping—had less effect than two other approaches: 1) Moscow's emphasis upon Western compliance with its interpretation of the Yalta exchange accords; and 2) an extensive effort to woo Soviet citizens back into the fold through an enormous barrage of verbal and printed appeals. After the transfer to the USSR of the majority of clearly identified Soviet nationals, SHAEF officials still permitted the Kremlin's representatives access to DP camps. In particular, "stateless" refugees—those from East European countries or provinces annexed by the Soviet Union—could be addressed by Moscow's repatriation workers. Far from convincing their captive audiences to return home, Moscow's speech makers more commonly provoked agitation and, on occasion, violence. By every means possible—speeches, personal interviews, films, pamphlets, and newspapers—they told the story of the happy life that awaited the refugees back home. Promises of improved living conditions, the right to return to their old homes and jobs, and pardon for delayed repatriation rarely moved sceptical DPs.³⁷ An ex-Vlasovite held at Fort

Dix, New Jersey, reminded Colonel Malkov that the Soviet government considered surrender to the enemy a treasonable offense. The Soviet repatriation officer replied that the law had been changed; those returning were “freely settling” and “nobody had said a word to them.” When Malkov added that no one would be held responsible for what the Germans had made him do, the POW was openly sceptical. Another prisoner asked this same officer for something more concrete than oral assurances or Soviet statements to the press, but Malkov had nothing else to offer.³⁸ The United States did repatriate the Wehrmacht’s ex-Red Army men held at Fort Dix, but certainly not of their own free will and not because they found the appeals and assurances of the Soviet mission convincing.

More than once the commotion provoked by Soviet visits to DP camps took a sinister turn. At a Leipzig refugee centre, a call for return to the homeland ended abruptly when “an old man with an ax in his hand mounted the speaker’s platform and extending to the Soviet officer the ax, said: ‘Here is my ax, and here is my head. Chop it off, but I won’t go back.’ An American officer witnessed this scene, and upon learning what the old man had said, promptly ordered the Soviet officials to leave.”³⁹ In July 1945 a disorder in one British camp resulted in a Red Army officer shooting a DP. The foolhardy assailant “was subsequently lynched by an infuriated mob.” Because of the repeated physical assaults upon Soviet officials, the United States ruled in May 1946 that the Kremlin’s repatriation personnel had to be accompanied by American guards when entering multinational compounds.⁴⁰ AFHQ informed the Soviet mission in Italy that it would do its best to “assure the bodily safety of...authorized visitors,” but that it could not “assume responsibility for any untoward incident.” Things got so bad that one Red Army general toured a refugee camp with an escort of two armoured cars.⁴¹

In one instance of candour a Soviet representative admitted to a United Nations refugee worker that the chances of persuading the “hard-core” DPs to leave the West were negligible, but to their own superiors repatriation teams from the USSR had to present a picture of energetic, ceaseless activity that, of course, was on the very brink of productivity. One intercepted Russian communication between repatriation officers and their headquarters provides a rare glimpse at the curious combination of obsequiousness and braggadocio seemingly endemic to the Soviet chain of command: “We are about to carry on to incredible measures the pilferage in the so-called ‘Ukrainian UNRRA camps.’ ...We are able to bring about a mass dissatisfaction, but we did not quite achieve total dependency.”⁴² Whether or not they convinced many wary DPs, Soviet officials had to appear successful to their superiors out of fear for their own safety in Stalin’s purge-prone empire.

After the repatriation of the great majority of displaced nationals in the summer of 1945 and the exclusion of civilians from forced repatriation in

December of that year, American military officials sought to limit the size and activity of the Soviet repatriation missions in Western zones of occupation. Efforts to curtail and finally terminate them had only begun with Generals Thorne, Alexander, and Clark. Conflict over this Soviet presence in the West provided a protracted test of wills that coincided with other superpower controversies that spelled the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s. On 5 August 1947 General Lucius Clay ordered a reduction in the Soviet repatriation mission in Germany from thirty-four to four. The number crept back up, however, so that by late March 1948 Moscow had seventeen men at least officially charged with DP work. On 17 February 1949, during the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the Western airlift of supplies to the beleaguered city, Clay further aggravated Moscow by finally ordering the remaining Soviet repatriation personnel to leave the Western occupation zones: "It is apparent that sufficient time has elapsed...for voluntary repatriation to be completed."⁴³ This incensed the Kremlin, which argued that the United States was not only detaining 247,000 Soviet citizens in violation of the Yalta accord, but was now adding to its misdeeds by forcing the termination of the repatriation mission's work. The Soviet Union considered this a flagrant "unilateral abrogation" of a signed agreement. Washington replied to the Russian charges by stating that the United States was not preventing anyone from repatriating; most remaining DPs simply did not want to return home. Besides, the majority of the nearly 250,000 refugees referred to were not citizens of the USSR but were former inhabitants of Russian-annexed territories. Finally, the United States did not consider the closing of the repatriation mission a violation of the Yalta agreement, since the Soviet attaché could easily handle the small number of persons desiring to return to the Soviet Union.⁴⁴

Unmoved by these explanations, Moscow ordered the Soviet Repatriation Mission in Frankfurt to stay put. When General Clay's deadline of 1 March had passed without compliance, Western occupation officials cut off the group's utilities. On 4 May Moscow finally capitulated and the mission was ordered home. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Soviet military governor in Germany, renewed the charge that the action of the United States was a violation of an international agreement. Moscow also retaliated by ordering a British-American graves registration team to leave the Soviet Zone of Germany.⁴⁵

Besides the POW and refugee exchange agreements and Soviet missions in the West, Moscow's campaign for total repatriation employed a massive propaganda blitz designed to reassure the reluctant of a cordial homecoming. Soviet spokesmen presented DPs with an elaborate variety of misleading or demonstrably false information about the prospects for repatriates. Normally appeals directed toward Soviet citizens abroad or persons from annexed territories did not risk a negative approach. One 1947 communication that did come from the government of the Soviet Latvian Republic. Nonreturners could hardly find comfort in the veiled censure of, "You...are more than two years serving strange masters in a

foreign country, eating strange masters' bread," or "every honest Latvian has to come home."⁴⁶ Ordinarily Moscow's propagandists avoided pronouncements so chillingly devoid of consolation. Rather they offered an array of positive psychological and material inducements. Playing the chord of the motherland's prolonged suffering proved a popular theme among the Kremlin's phrase makers. In 1945 the Soviet Repatriation Commission's *Domoi, na rodinu!* [Home to the Motherland!] returned again and again to this theme in the course of thirty pages: "The mother country remembers its children. Not for a minute did the Soviet people, our government, or the party of Lenin and Stalin forget about the fate of Soviet citizens who temporarily found themselves under the yoke of fascist oppressors.... Many times throughout the war Comrade Stalin called to mind you who languished in fascist camps and said that the freeing of Soviet people from the German yoke was an important objective of the Soviet people and the Red Army."⁴⁷ In a similar vein Robert Murphy learned from a Red Army colonel that "these poor unfortunates who were deported to Germany are looked upon at home as martyrs and will be received with open arms by the entire Russian people."

Feigned compassion figured as the common denominator in many appeals. *Vot kak eto bylo* (That's How It Was), Aleksei Briukhanov's memoir of repatriation work, illustrated this approach in its description of the ex-DP-staffed Committee for Return to the Homeland: "Like a beacon, the Committee pointed out to the displaced the path to their native shores."⁴⁸ A closely related approach involved heart-tugging sentimentality. *Vstrecha s rodinoi* (Encounter with the Homeland), a Soviet film designed specifically for Armenian émigrés, cultivated homesickness as a means of encouraging return to the motherland. This relatively sophisticated soft sell contained no direct appeal for repatriation. Still that message resounded as the narrator proclaimed, "Soviet Armenia is the last harbour for all our wandering ships." In appeals designed to lure émigrés, this inclination toward sentimentality figured prominently. The Soviet government issued a number of edicts concerning the "Restitution of Nationality to Former Subjects" especially for them. By means of these proclamations pre-World War II expatriates could reacquire citizenship. For many refugees of 1917-21 the second German invasion of their homeland in their lifetime reawakened dormant patriotic feelings that in some cases were translated into postwar repatriation.⁴⁹

Another of Moscow's psychological approaches to DPs consisted of reassurance of forgiveness for past sins, including capture alive by the enemy, delay in returning home, and even collaboration with the Germans. The success or failure of non-coercive attempts to retrieve displaced nationals depended upon this more than anything else. That the Kremlin's promises left the vast majority of hard-core DPs cold was not for want of trying. One Red Army colonel in Germany told Murphy that military personnel taken prisoner by the Germans had no cause

for uneasiness: "We understand perfectly well that under modern conditions of warfare, large bodies of troops may be cut off and forced to surrender. There is no more stigma connected with capture in the eyes of the Soviet Government than there is in the American Army."⁵⁰ This charitable sentiment contrasted sharply with Decree Number 270 of 1942, which declared surrendered Red Army soldiers ipso facto traitors. Sources confirming this point are as diverse as the wartime edition of *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, the Soviet Constitution, the criminal codes of the constituent republics, the Red Army field manual, the leading Soviet scholar on military criminal law, and Stalin himself.⁵¹

Moscow also tried to convince its refugees abroad that no stigma attached to delayed repatriation. A 1949 catechism for DPs asked the question, "Are Soviet citizens held to account for not returning home at once after the war was over?" The answer was: "their long sojourn in a foreign land will not be considered their fault," but rather the responsibility of "reactionary elements" in the West.⁵² Convincing ex-Red Army soldiers who had served in the Wehrmacht that repatriation entailed no dangers taxed the ingenuity of Soviet propagandists as few assignments could. The standard line ran that no retribution awaited collaborators, "provided they honestly fulfill their duties on their return." That innocent-sounding reservation could not have helped but raise the suspicions of wary refugees.⁵³ A section entitled "How Freed People Are Received in the Homeland" appeared in the same tract that carried Stalin's alleged, pained remembrance of those torn from the motherland. The pamphlet shouted in bold-faced type, "All freed Soviet people are received in their homeland not with contempt or distrust but with consideration, warm encouragement, and affectionate sympathy." A Soviet notice in the British army paper, *Union Jack*, emphasized to DP readers that this applied even to "Soviet citizens, who, under German opposition and terror, had acted contrarily to the interests of the Soviet Union."⁵⁴

Referring to Soviet nationals who had served in Wehrmacht ranks, Aleksandr Bogomolov, Moscow's ambassador to France, said: "Some of these are heroes, some of them have been less strong-minded. No nation consists exclusively of heroes. But the motherland would not be a mother if she did not love all her family, even the black sheep.... Every man will be given a chance to redeem himself at home—if he is of military age, in the army; otherwise, in a factory. We take into full account the special circumstances under which each man has lived, the mass psychology of camps and pressure by the Germans."⁵⁵ The American embassy staff in Moscow noted that even the regular Soviet press, prepared for domestic consumption, occasionally reflected this solicitous, forgive-and-forget attitude. These American officials, who caught glimpses of Soviet repatriation first-hand, knew that the reception afforded returners in all categories was anything but cordial.⁵⁶

Besides appeals constructed to work on the emotional level, Moscow's campaign to retrieve all of its nationals abroad included a variety of material incentives. In addition to promises of free transportation home, job security, work in one's native region, and even residence in one's former dwelling, Soviet literature offered repatriates agricultural and building loans, educational opportunities, the right to vote, and, for ex-POWs, veterans' benefits. Also, those coming home were told they could count on social services such as pensions for the elderly, workmen's compensation, and convalescent homes for the disabled. The detailed specifications of advantages to be afforded repatriates' physical security and well-being, no matter how remote from the true circumstances of their reception, were intended to allay their apprehension and to convince them that they would be "treated with the maximum of care and attention."⁵⁷ At first glance that crowded schedule of inducements might appear enticing. To be convinced of Stalin's good will, however, the Soviet diaspora, raised on a diet of Orwellian doublethink, required more than unverifiable pledges of a warm welcome home.

In the Kremlin's campaign for total repatriation, results based on the Soviet missions in the West were modest, but results based on Moscow's litany of promises and direct appeals fell between negligible and nonexistent. Its monumental dimensions notwithstanding, the Soviet campaign for total repatriation failed. The USSR did retrieve 3 million of its nationals from Eastern Europe and 2 million from Western occupation zones, but the remaining DPs, roughly 500,000 persons, could not be moved by any persuasion short of force.⁵⁸ The Soviet government distrusted persons captured alive by the enemy and declared them traitors, prepared a hostile reception for all repatriates, and construed a refusal or even reluctance to return home as most unpatriotic. Refugees with time to ponder sensed these attitudes through the veil of promises and solicitous attention. Although concern for effect more than accuracy determined what went into Soviet appeals to refugees abroad, few returned home as a result of Kremlin propaganda. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union's campaign to regain custody of every one of its displaced citizens failed because refugees with a choice detected the insincerity of Moscow's appeals. Half-hearted promises of a happy homecoming did not successfully disguise the regime's vindictive spirit.

Notes

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3. John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York, 1972), 80; Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva, 1946), 181; Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941-1945* (New York, 1964), 707; Gordon Wright, *The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945* (New York, 1968), 263; Georgii I. Zhukov, *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov* (New York, 1971), 643.
4. Ralph B. Levering, *American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939-1945* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1976), 96, 77.
5. Wright, *Ordeal*, 264.
6. John Erickson, "The Soviet Union at War (1941-1945): An Essay on Sources and Studies," *Soviet Studies* 14 (January 1963): 268; "History of the United States Military Mission Moscow," (hereinafter USMMM) 30 October 1945, National Archives (hereinafter NA), RG 165, War Department General and Special Staffs, Operations Division (hereinafter WDGSS OPD), 336, Case 233, Part II; N. Lebedev, "The Truth about the Second World War," *International Affairs*, no. 1 (January 1974): 101-2; V. A. Valkov, *SSSR i SShA. Ikh politicheskie i ekonomicheskie otnosheniia* (Moscow, 1965), 340; P. A. Zhilin, "O problemakh istorii vtoroi mirovoi voiny," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 2 (March-April 1973): 12.
7. Ivan Maiskii, *Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador. The War: 1939-43* (New York, 1967), 277. See also Gaddis, *Origins*, 80; Keith M. Heim, "Hope without Power: Truman and the Russians, 1945," Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1973, 42; Zhilin, "O problemakh," 12.
8. Gaddis, *Origins*, 80.
9. George Kennan to Cordell Hull, 10 Nov. 1944, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers* (hereinafter FR), 1944, IV (Washington, 1966), 1264. McCollum was quoted in Anthony J. Bouscaren, *International Migrations Since 1945* (New York, 1963), 15-16.
10. Leonid I. Brezhnev, *The Great Victory of the Soviet People* (Moscow, 1965), 29. See also Alexander Borisov, "Recent Anglo-U.S. Bourgeois Historiography of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War," in M. Goncharuk, ed., *Soviet Studies on the Second World War* (Moscow, 1976), 233.

11. A. I. Romanov, *Nights are Longest There: Smersh from the Inside* (Boston, 1972), 170; Pfc. Dmytro Staroschak to *Narodna volia* [weekly of the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association], Box 192, United Ukrainian American Relief Committee papers (hereinafter UUARTC), Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota; Boris Shub, *The Choice* (New York, 1950), 51.
12. W. Averell Harriman to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 10 Jan. 1945, *FR Yalta* (Washington, 1955), 455. See also Alexander Dallin and Ralph Mavrogordato, "The Soviet Reaction to Vlasov," *World Politics* 8 (April 1956): 322.
13. Reinhard Gehlen, *The Service: The Memoirs of Reinhard Gehlen* (New York, 1972), 90. See also John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany* (New York, 1975), 353.
14. Andrei Y. Vyshinskii, *Speech Delivered by A. Y. Vyshinskii ...in the General Assembly—November 6, 1946* (Washington, 1946), 12; "DP's Problem in Europe," 2 April 1946, NAS RG 165, WDGSS Military Intelligence Service Project File, no. 2996; *New York Times*, 19 October 1945.
15. Eugene Lyons, *Our Secret Allies, the Peoples of Russia* (New York, 1953), 271; Shub, *Choice*, 201-2. See also John Scott, "Interview with a Russian DP," *Fortune* 39 (April 1949): 81.
16. Speaking specifically of the Soviet campaign for the repatriation of Armenians abroad, Reuben Darbinian suggested that one of Moscow's goals was the destruction of the émigré Armenian Revolutionary Federation: "The Proposed Second Repatriation by the Government of Soviet Armenia: What Does Moscow Want from Its Armenian Collaborators of the Armenian Diaspora?," *Armenian Review* 15 (April 1962): 7.
17. George Ginsburgs, "Displaced Persons," in J. M. Feldbrugge, ed., *Encyclopedia of Soviet Law*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1973), 231-2.
18. Malcolm Proudfoot, *European Refugees, 1939-1952* (Evanston, Ill., 1956), 213.
19. *New York Times*, 1 May 1945; Lt. Col. Zapozin and Maj. Berzoeski to Eisenhower, 9 April 1945, in Alfred D. Chandler, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower; the War Years IV* (Baltimore, 1970), 2603; Kennan to Stettinius, 30 April 1945, NA RG 334 USMMM-POWs, 25 April-15 June 1945.
20. William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (London, 1953), 580; George Ginsburgs, "Soviet Union and the Problem of Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1917-1956," *American Journal of International Law* 51 (April 1957): 352.
21. Aleksei I. Briukhanov, *Vot kak eto bylo: O rabote missii po repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan: Vospominaniia sovetskogo ofitsera* (Moscow, 1958), 38; F. I. Golikov, *V Moskovskoi bitve: Zapiski komandarma* (Moscow, 1967), 5; A. Nemirov, *Dorogi i vstrechi* (Munich, 1947), 38; Romanov, *Nights*, 170; Albert Seaton, *The Russo-German War, 1941-45* (London, 1971), 15; Mikhail Semiriaga, *Sovetskie liudi v evropeiskom soprotivlenii* (Moscow, 1970), 326; Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, vol. 1 (New York, 1973), 240, 624; Nikolai Tolstoy, *The Secret Betrayal: 1944-1947* (New York, 1978), 399-400; Zhukov, *Memoirs*, 216.

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23. W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946* (New York, 1975), 416; Romanov, *Nights*, 170, 172; Tolstoy, *Secret*, 400.
24. Romanov, *Nights*, 124, 127; Juergen Thorwald, *The Illusion: Soviet Soldiers in Hitler's Army* (New York, 1975), 254; Tolstoy, *Secret*, 401-2.
25. Romanov, *Nights*, 127.
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29. Brig. Gen. H. Floyd, 8th Army, to AFHQ, 7 November 1944; Maj. Gen. F. G. Beaumont-Nesbitt to CS, AFHQ, 9 January 1945; Lt. Gen. R. L. McBreery, 8th Army, to 15th Army Group, 30 March 1945, NAS RG 331, AFHQ, Roll 227-B, SACS 400-7, "Russian Matters"; Gen. Alexander to Troopers, London, 12 September 1945, NAS RG 331, AFHQ, 383.7-14.4, Reel 17-L, G-5, DP Div., "Travel of Russian Repatriation Representatives."
30. Allied Control Commission, Bulgaria (British delegation) to AFHQ, 7 April 1945, NAS RG 331, AFHQ 383.7-14.4, Reel 17-L, G-5, DP Div., "Travel of Russian Repatriation Representatives"; Dudley Kirk to Secretary of State, 14 September and 8 October 1945, NA RG 59 (SD), 740.62114/8-2745 and 10-845.

31. Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York, 1950), 476-7.
32. Commanding General (Clark), U.S. Army Forces Europe (Vienna), to WD, 25 Jan., 13 Mar., and 29 June 1946, NA RG 218, CCS 383.6 (7-4-44) (2) Sec. 7 and 8. See also U.S. Political Adviser for Austria (Erhardt) to James F. Byrnes, 26 December 1946, *FR, 1946*, V (Washington, 1969), 197-8.
33. Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (Philadelphia, 1950), 256.
34. "Plight of Ukrainian DPs," reprint from the Ukrainian newspaper, *Ameryka* (n.d.), Box 192, UUARC; Jefferson Patterson, Chargé d'Affaires, to Secretary of State, 8 March 1946, NA RG 59, 840.4016/3-846; Supreme Allied Command, Mediterranean Theater (Greece) to CIGS, 2 September 1945, NAS RG 331, AFHQ, Roll 228-B, SACS 400-7, "Russian Matters."
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36. "Plight of Ukrainian DPs," *Ameryka*; cablegram received by UUARC, 8 October 1945, 6; letter by a former Ukrainian member of the prewar Polish Parliament, 16 July 1945, 7-8, Box 192, UUARC; Vasili Kotov, "Stalin Thinks I'm Dead," *Saturday Evening Post* 220 (31 Jan. 1948): 57; Lyons, *Allies*, 268; Tolstoy, *Secret*, 373, 377. See also First Plenary Conference, 12 September 1945, NA RG 43, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Meeting, London.
37. One refugee mentioned receiving a letter from his father stating that there was nothing to fear in returning home. The Soviet repatriation representative beamed at such a positive response—until the refugee added that his father had been dead for ten years.
Alec Dickson, "Displaced Persons," *National Review*, 129 (December 1947): 490-1; Jaroslaw Tomaszewski, "'Vozrozhdenie': A Russian Periodical Abroad and Its Contributors" (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1974), 18. For the text of a Soviet camp appeal, remarkable in its psychological ineptitude, see minutes of meeting with Soviet Liaison Officer, Mittenwald Camp, 28 August 1947, enclosure to dispatch 409, 14 October 1947, NA RG 59, 800.4016 DP/10-1447.
38. Fort Dix Report, 19 July 1945, NA RG 59, 711.62114/7-1945.
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40. F. S. V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government, North-West Europe, 1944-45* (London, 1961), 357; Murphy to Byrnes, 16 May 1946, *FR, 1946*, V, 163-4.
41. ACC to Col. P. G. Jakovlev, USSR repatriation delegate in Rome, 13 January 1947, NAS RG 331, AFHQ 383.7-14.4, Reel 17-L, G-5, DP Div., "Travel of Russian Repatriation Representatives"; Louise W. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of the United Nations. Its History and Work, 1946-1951* (London, 1956), 351.
42. Samuel Snipes, UNRRA Team 1062, to Dorothy Thompson, Refugee Defense Committee, 3 June 1947, folder 38, Panchuk Papers, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota; OCMH, EUCOM, *Survey*, 279. See also Maj. Gen. F. G. Beaumont-Nesbitt to AFHQ, 5 December 1944, NAS RG 331, AFHQ.

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52. *Otveti na volnuiushchie voprosy sovetskikh grazhdan nakhodiashchikhsia za granitsej na polozenii peremeshchennykh lits* (Moscow, 1949), 4.
53. "Repatriation of DPs from Germany and Austria," NAS RG 165, WDGSS, Military Intelligence Service Project File, no. 2897, 1 March 1946. See also *Otveti*, 25.
54. Brychev, *Domoi, na rodinu!*, 10; Kirk to Stettinius quoting the *Union Jack*, 2 March 1945, NA RG 59, 800.4016 DP/3-245. See also Ivushkina, *Rodina*, 34, 52.
55. Memorandum by Donald Lowrie, 20 October 1944, NA RG 59, 762.61114/14.344.
56. Harriman to Stettinius, 10 January 1945, *FR, Yalta*, 455; Kennan to SD, 15 November 1944, NA RG 59, 762.61114/15.44; Solzhenitsyn, *First Circle*, 463.
57. Walter Dushnyck and William J. Gibbons, *Refugees are People: The Plight of Europe's Displaced Persons* (New York, 1947), 89; *Otveti*, 5, 20, 30, 39, 40-2; Kirk to Stettinius quoting the *Union Jack*, 2 March 1945, NA RG 59, 800.4016 DP/3-245.
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Repatriation: Ukrainian DPs and Political Refugees in Germany and Austria, 1945-8

Yury Boshyk

Helping refugees, exiles, and displaced persons return to their homelands has often been seen as a humane response, but there have been moments in history when repatriation was not desired by the uprooted. One such moment was the period immediately following World War II, when more than a million people, mostly from Eastern Europe, refused to be repatriated. For the Western Allies and the United Nations their resistance created a dilemma that involved choosing between political expediency and humanitarian concern. Several years of steadfast, organized resistance by the refugees exacted a heavy toll on their identity and well-being. The focus here is on official repatriation policies and the methods used to resist repatriation by one of the largest groups of postwar refugees and DPs, the Ukrainians.¹

The greatest mass movement of civilians took place during and immediately after World War II. In Europe alone, 30 million people were displaced and, by 1945, 7 million non-German refugees were residing in Germany and Austria.² The Western Allies had foreseen difficulties in repatriating the non-Germans, and so had created the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) before Germany's surrender on 7-8 May 1945. One objective of these agencies was the repatriation of these DPs and refugees. Political agreements with governments-in-exile and others, such as the Soviet Union, were also signed to speed the process of repatriation.³ Thus between 1 March and 30 September 1945 just

over 10 million people in Europe were repatriated. This number included more than 2 million Soviet nationals from the Western-controlled (SHAEF) areas of occupied Germany and Austria.⁴ During May and June, the most active months, the daily rate of eastward repatriation of Soviet nationals amounted to more than 50,000 people.⁵ From the Soviet-controlled areas of Germany and Austria, about 3 million Soviet citizens were repatriated at this time.⁶

However, 1.5-2 million DPs and refugees, mostly from Eastern Europe, refused to be repatriated from the Western zones. Among them were at least 500,000 Soviet citizens, as well as Jews, Poles, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, and some Western Europeans.⁷ Because Ukrainians did not have an independent state before the war, they were not recognized as a separate nationality by either the Western military authorities or by UNRRA officials. Since eligibility for repatriation was based on citizenship rather than national origins, for official purposes, Ukrainians from outside the Soviet Union were considered citizens of their country of origin or residence in 1939. In some cases they were designated as stateless or as Nansen passport holders (post-World War I Russian refugees who held League of Nations passports). Those from the Soviet Union were classified as Russian or Soviet.⁸ Of the almost 200,000 Ukrainians in occupied Germany and Austria who refused to be repatriated, about one-third were from the Soviet Union, and the remaining two-thirds were from other Eastern European countries, mainly Poland. By the time Germany and Austria were divided officially into American, British, French, and Soviet occupation zones (13 July 1945), most of these Ukrainians were in the American Zone of Germany.⁹

The postwar repatriation of Ukrainians and some other Eastern Europeans took place in two distinct phases. The first phase occurred from the spring to the autumn of 1945. The second phase began in December 1945-January 1946, when new criteria for repatriation were announced. The new criteria excluded Soviet civilians and reaffirmed that no Baltic or Polish citizens would be repatriated, thus checking the large-scale, indiscriminate repatriation of the first phase. Nevertheless, those civilians still felt threatened by the continued screenings, UNRRA's encouragement of repatriation, harassment by Soviet repatriation officers, and increasing hostility from the German population and the American military. That second phase continued until mid-1948, when Ukrainians, especially those from the Soviet Union, were finally safe from repatriation.

The First Phase of Repatriation, Spring-Autumn 1945

The political agreements governing the repatriation of foreigners in Germany and Austria gave responsibility for the refugees to both the UNRRA and the respective armed forces of the occupation zones, but in the spring and throughout the occupation period, the primary responsibility was assumed by the latter. It was

not until the autumn of 1945 that the UNRRA took a more active part in the repatriation program.¹⁰ In the Western zones foreign nationals were arranged by citizenship in guarded assembly centres, interrogated by military authorities, issued special identity cards, housed, and prepared for repatriation. By August 1945 there were 750 centres in the Western zones of Germany: 450 in the British, 250 in the American, and 50 in the French Zone. There were several Soviet camps in the Western zones as well.¹¹

What distressed the refugees was that under the terms of the Yalta agreement, Soviet citizens were to be returned to the Soviet Union immediately, and when necessary, force was to be used. The problem was that the Soviet Union claimed authority over territories it had annexed in 1939-41, when the Nazi-Soviet pact divided the Baltic states and Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union. Although the Western Allies did not formally recognize Soviet dominion over these territories, their position was not made explicit in the Yalta agreement. This non-recognition was not, however, widely known among the Western military authorities overseeing the repatriation of Eastern Europeans.¹² The Soviet repatriation teams were a more immediate threat to the refugees.¹³ The main responsibility of these teams was to identify former Soviet citizens, but they also designated for repatriation individuals who, before 1939, had not resided in Soviet territory but rather came from countries that fell under the postwar control or political influence of the Soviet Union.

Thus, in the first phase repatriation was indiscriminate, affected masses of people, and fostered violent resistance. A dramatic example of this resistance took place in Kempton, Germany, in August 1945:

The soldiers entered and began to drag the people out forcibly. They dragged the women by their hair and twisted the men's arms up their backs, beating them with the butts of their rifles. One soldier took the cross from the priest and hit him with the butt of his rifle. Pandemonium broke loose. The people in a panic threw themselves from the second floor, for the church was in the second storey of the building, and they fell to their death or were crippled for life. In the church were also suicide attempts.¹⁴

Because of such incidents, Western military officials were forced to clarify the eligibility criteria for immediate repatriation. In essence, DPs and refugees who were residing outside the Soviet Union in September 1939 were considered ineligible for involuntary repatriation to the Soviet Union. This protected Baltic citizens, Poles, and Ukrainians who had lived outside the Soviet Union from repatriation, but still allowed the forced mass repatriation of Soviet Ukrainians.

Confusion was widespread and American officers held different conceptions of their responsibilities and orders. Even the orders from British and American central officials were sometimes contradictory.¹⁵ For example, on 31 July 1945 Suzanne Chalfour, a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army stationed in Passau, Germany, wrote a strong letter of protest to the U.S. Army commanding general,

102nd Artillery, about “the forced departure of Ukrainians for Budweis.” She insisted that the Ukrainians were being sent to the Soviet Zone of occupation “against their own free will,” that “force had been used, against all orders previously given,” and that a secret order had been issued stating that “Ukrainians as well as Lithuanians, Letons [sic] and Esthonians [sic] would *not* be forced back into the Russian zone.” The officer in charge of this repatriation action claimed ignorance of that secret order and another order from the (G-5) Third Army stating that “under U.S. protection *no* one could force these people to go into the Russian zone.” Chalfour also added that not only had the Ukrainians been promised they would not be repatriated, but that she had been unable to prevent their removal. Her letter went unanswered by the higher authorities.¹⁶ However, not all British and American officers carried out orders for forcible repatriation. Some, sickened by the sight of the refugees’ self-inflicted wounds, suicides, and resistance, simply refused to carry out orders. Other local officers gave DPs special passes or documents designed to protect them from arbitrary actions by military officials, but these humanitarian gestures were more the exception than the rule.¹⁷

Western officials seemed not to have been fully aware of the reasons Ukrainians and others did not want to go home, did not want to be “productive citizens” of their own homelands, and perhaps wanted to conceal information about their wartime activities. The officials were also concerned about the welfare of Western POWs and personnel held in Soviet-dominated territory and perhaps believed that by adhering to the Yalta agreement they would ensure the safety and speedy return of their people.¹⁸ Moreover, Western authorities were not informed about national and political repression in the Soviet Union—the main reason these Ukrainians refused to return. Perhaps reflecting generally accepted views and naivete, the head of the UNRRA, Fiorello La Guardia (the former mayor of New York City), stated that he did not understand why DPs did not want to return home just because they disagreed with their government: he often disagreed with his government’s policies, but this was no reason for him not to return to his country.¹⁹

On the local level, many soldiers were not very sympathetic to the plight of the DPs. Care and supervision of DPs and refugees was considered burdensome while the war with Japan was still on, and many soldiers also wanted to return home as soon as possible. The German population, charged with providing housing and clothing to the DPs and refugees, also resented them and influenced the soldiers’ negative views of the DPs:

[The displaced persons and refugees]...are held in the greatest contempt by the Germans, who lose no opportunity to discredit them in the eyes of the American Military authorities. The effect of this derogatory influence has been strong and widespread to the point where it has seeped up from the operating levels to even the highest military echelons. The DP problem has always been a nuisance to the Army. With deployment, and introduction of new, untrained and un-

oriented military personnel, there is almost complete lack of knowledge and understanding of the factors which created the DP situation in the first place; and the subjection of the Americans [sic] mind to German influence has been such that there is even less human sympathy and consideration than there is understanding. The DP are generally considered by military personnel as 'lousy Poles' and 'Goddamn DP' who should be sent back where they came from whether they like it or not.²⁰

Military officials were also more inclined to listen to the views of the Soviet Union, an official wartime ally, than to the refugees. Soviet propaganda was resolute and relentless. Non-returnees were labelled collaborators and idlers, who preferred the relative "comfort" of the camps.²¹ The Soviets also insisted that their citizens had to be returned at all costs to undermine any potential anti-Stalinist émigré resistance abroad and to protect their citizens from Western influences.²² All Soviet nationals were to make their way to Soviet repatriation camps by 10 November 1945 or be arrested.²³ The Western allies, therefore, did not appreciate the fate that awaited Soviet citizens and other Eastern Europeans. Considered traitors and class enemies for having left the Soviet Union (a treasonable offense under Soviet law), after repatriation most returnees were harshly punished, even though most had been the victims of Nazi forced-labour policies.²⁴ The refugees were well aware of the welcome they would receive from the secret police and even from their compatriots, who were led to believe that only collaborators and traitors remained in Germany after the war.²⁵

Resistance of Ukrainian Refugees to Repatriation

In the chaotic months of May and June 1945 Ukrainian DPs and refugees formed self-help committees to resist repatriation and to demand the formation of separate Ukrainian camps. Their demand had some success. At the end of May, an unofficial liaison with the Western authorities was created, thus ensuring at least a hearing for Ukrainian DP concerns.²⁶ The committees also tried to bring the matter of forcible repatriation to the attention of Western leaders. The Ukrainian committee in Neubeuern wrote several letters to President Truman, Herbert Lehman (head of the UNRRA in Washington), the president of the International Red Cross in Geneva, and General Eisenhower. Unfortunately, their letters were never received, because the UNRRA officials to whom the letters were directed for forwarding did not send them on.²⁷

Ukrainians in Western Europe and North America, however, were a great source of assistance. In September 1945, when the desperate situation of DPs became widely known, relief committees were organized in Belgium, France, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States to help DPs and refugees and to lobby for their welfare. They augmented the DPs' anti-repatriation literature and pressured their respective governments to resettle the refugees. Especially effective in this work were servicemen of Ukrainian background in the Canadian

and American armies. Religious leaders also helped convince the Vatican to intervene on the refugees' behalf.²⁸

At times expressions of protest against repatriation took an especially tragic form. Among the so-called Easterners, suicide was a common occurrence.²⁹ Sometimes the desperate situation led to threats of mass suicide: "Ukrainian DPs requested the Military Government in Mannheim that they be granted an extension of two weeks, in order to enable them to receive the Holy Sacrament in preparation for mass suicide, upon hearing the order published a day prior, that is, on December 5, 1945, by the Office of Military Government in the American zone (S.P.O. 758), about forcible deportation to the Soviets."³⁰ Another way Ukrainians tried to escape repatriation was to live outside the camps. In the American Zone more than one-fifth of the Ukrainians managed to stay out of the camps.³¹ Others roamed from camp to camp, but this was a more dangerous alternative, because they became easy prey for Soviet agents.³² For Soviet Ukrainians, the most common method of defence against repatriation was fabrication or falsification of documents. Overnight, they became citizens of Poland by claiming pre-1939 residence in that country. These false papers were produced on a massive scale by Catholic priests, political groups, and enterprising individuals, who most often used cut potatoes or warm eggs to affix authorization stamps. The scale of this effort is revealed by the figures: in June 1949, 106,549 Ukrainians claimed Polish citizenship, up from 9,190 in December 1945.³³ In addition to the fabrication of documents an eyewitness account tells of bolder methods used by Soviet Ukrainians:

Saved from the 'motherland' were only those lucky enough to be 'recoloured' in one way or another to a Polish or some other colour—even to a Turkish one.... I myself helped about ten people by advising them to leave their personal belongings in the barracks...[to] lose or leave behind their documents with the German factory owner; [to] move to the Polish camp and declare themselves as Poles. But to do this was, naturally, difficult and dangerous, because the camp literally teemed with Soviet officials and secret Soviet spies.³⁴

A price had to be paid for these attempts to create a new identity. During the screening of DPs, interviewees were often asked details about hometown landmarks, churches, street names, and, of course, the language of the country of claimed citizenship. Such questioning caused considerable alarm. DPs became distraught in their efforts to learn everything possible about their newly claimed personal identities.

In their attempts to protect themselves against and identify Soviet spies and collaborators in the camps, Soviet Ukrainians relied on their judgement and personal acquaintances, but very often they had to defend themselves from unsympathetic Ukrainian underground political groups—in particular the Bandera and Melnyk factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)—who

distrusted Soviet Ukrainians, considering them politically unreliable. These groups espoused a radical nationalism, the main goals of which were independence for Ukraine and the unification of Ukrainian ethnic territories. These factions had become influential among Ukrainians after the collapse of moderate Ukrainian parties during the war.³⁵ Part of the refugee OUN's larger scheme was control over the DP population in order to keep morale and commitment high for the anticipated return to Ukrainian territory and armed confrontation with the Soviet Union. They were convinced that their goal of independence for Ukraine was at hand, since an underground armed struggle, led by the OUN, was continuing in Western Ukraine. They also believed that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable and that the West would help liberate Ukraine from Soviet rule.³⁶

The Bandera faction of the OUN was the most influential political group in the camps.³⁷ Through its conspiratorial network its members were able to take over most of the important positions and functions within the camps—camp police forces, then the food supplies, and finally, camp administration. Since Western authorities allowed the camps to be self-governed, it was relatively easy for these political groups to assume control by enforcing party discipline or by intimidating opponents. The Bandera faction, on occasion, used force against alleged Soviet spies, Soviet officials, and its own perceived enemies, including members of rival political groups. Some DPs claimed that in the camps those who dared to speak out against the faction were murdered. Individuals were even “terrorized” by the Bandera faction for not giving enough money during the faction's fund-raising events and collections.³⁸

These tactics exacerbated relations between Polish and Soviet Ukrainians, but the seeds of that mistrust had been sown earlier. Members of the OUN, who were strongly anti-socialist and anti-Soviet, believed Soviet Ukrainians were both insufficiently nationalistic and tainted by communism. Although in the camps cooperation between the two groups was a matter of necessity, relations were often tense, leading Soviet Ukrainians to believe they were misunderstood and discriminated against.³⁹ In one camp a leaflet protesting their treatment by members of the OUN was circulated:

Ukrainians! Enough is enough! The Galicians [Western Ukrainians] have seized power in all our camps. They pretend to be our older brothers, they take to caring for us and teaching us.... We extricated ourselves from Stalin and Hitler, and we will not let anyone rule over us. In all other camps—Polish, Baltic, and Russian—people live in safety and peace. Only in Ukrainian camps our ‘older brothers’ have created a system of terror and suffocation. We too want to live under the guardianship of the democratic order. We have had enough of dictatorship. We demand the removal of the Galicians from the Ukrainian camps!⁴⁰

The OUN factions tried to control all Ukrainian organizations in the camps, but while the refugees were united in their resistance to repatriation, most did not

join the OUN or the other political groups. Indeed, the majority were less concerned with factional disputes than with personal matters. One observer, for example, noted a greater interest in religion and increased church attendance among the refugees.⁴¹ Another noted “DP apathy”—growing demoralization and hopelessness among the DPs that led to lack of concern with life outside the camps.⁴²

Second Phase of Repatriation

For various reasons—including unease with forcible repatriation, the intervention of political leaders such as Eleanor Roosevelt against repatriation, and the realization that the West was not gaining concessions from the Soviets—the American policy of forced repatriation of *all* former Soviet citizens was altered in late 1945 and early 1946 to exclude most displaced Soviet civilians.⁴³ Forcible repatriation still applied, however, to Soviet refugees and DPs who were (a) “captured in German uniforms; (b) members of the Soviet Armed Forces on and after 22 June 1941 and who were not subsequently discharged therefrom; and (c) those charged by the Soviet Union with having voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy.” Perhaps to placate the Soviet Union, the directive reiterated American determination to repatriate all those who were “citizens and actually present within the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939” and who did not fall within the three categories. However, U.S. military personnel were ordered in no uncertain terms not to use force to repatriate Soviet citizens other than those included in the three categories.⁴⁴

The U.S. military command also affirmed that Baltic nationals and Polish citizens were exempt from forcible repatriation.⁴⁵ This was of enormous importance to Polish Ukrainians, who became much more secure. What also saved Polish Ukrainians who refused to return to their homeland was the Polish government’s unwillingness to allow its former citizens of Ukrainian nationality back into the country. This was not only the legacy of bitter Polish-Ukrainian relations in the interwar years but also the result of an agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union, made on 9 September 1944, that Ukrainians from interwar Poland would be resettled in the Polish lands that became part of Soviet Ukraine after the war.⁴⁶

As a result of these changes in American policy, the number of repatriated Soviet nationals dropped dramatically.⁴⁷ Repatriations ceased entirely during November-December 1945, increased to 972 in February 1946, and then continued at a rate of 11 persons per day for the next eight months in the Western zones of Germany. The figures for Poles were higher, but they were at most half of what they had been in October 1945, and repatriation was strictly voluntary.⁴⁸ The new repatriation policy also meant that new strategies had to be initiated for Polish Ukrainian and Soviet Ukrainian political refugees and DPs. The goal was still repatriation of as many as possible, but the methods were to

be different. This change of policy did not mean that Soviet citizens would no longer be encouraged to return to the USSR or that co-operation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union would no longer take place. The new order in January 1946 gave Soviet repatriation teams "free access" to Soviet DPs "for the purpose of persuading" Soviet citizens to return. Soviet authorities were also permitted to "furnish lists and addresses of Soviet Nationals who are charged with collaboration with the enemy and who were subject to the provisions" (outlined in the directive of January 1946). On receipt of such lists, U.S. Army district commanders were to "take measures to collect the individuals listed therein and place them in camps, where they will be held pending screening and examination of charges against them." However, "if addresses given are erroneous, Military Authorities will not be required to conduct a search."⁴⁹

This order also instructed American officers to take whatever practical measures were necessary to minimize both resistance to repatriation and the dissemination of anti-repatriation propaganda. Among the specific measures mentioned were the "segregation of known leaders of resistance groups; [and] the separation of existing groups into smaller groups" (movement to other camps).⁵⁰ It was further suggested that the UNRRA's cultural and educational courses for the DPs should not be developed too well or allowed to become too popular, so as not to encourage DPs and Soviet citizens to remain in the West.⁵¹

To make matters worse for the refugees, President Truman's Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, announced in March 1946 that the U.S. government was considering closing the camps in August-September 1946. His statement was intended to pressure the DPs into choosing repatriation.⁵² In March 1946, as well, the UNRRA took measures to increase repatriation by stepping up its co-operation with Soviet and Eastern European authorities.⁵³ At the same time, the American authorities and the UNRRA attempted to ascertain more precisely how many of the remaining DPs and political refugees fit into the new categories, how many wanted to be repatriated, and the reasons so many refused to go home. Accordingly, in the first two weeks of May 1946 the UNRRA conducted a poll among the DPs in its assembly centres in Germany. Three questions were asked: "(1) What nationality do you claim? (2) Do you wish to be repatriated now? (3) If your answer to 3 is 'no,' explain your reasons in the space below." The results were overwhelmingly against repatriation. Although Ukrainians were not designated separately in the results, there is no question that Ukrainians (classified as Poles or Russians or Undetermined) voted against repatriation, as did the Balts, only 2 per cent of whom expressed a desire to return home.

What is of interest in the UNRRA's report on the poll is the analysis of the negative votes as well as the reasons given for not wanting to return: ". . . nationals of so-called Western countries give both personal and economic reasons for not going home now, while the Eastern Europeans generally fall back on political factors as their primary explanation. The Eastern Europeans seem to

show a real fear in their replies, the fear increasing the further east the home of the voter."⁵⁴ This report was one of the first and most comprehensive attempts to assess why Ukrainian DPs refused to go home:

Like the Poles, they give mainly political reasons for not wanting to return home but they are generally more violent in their attacks on Russia, and express fear of forced labor conditions, even 'deportation to Siberia,' should they dare to return. Some give supposed first hand accounts of previous persecution.... About 10% of the Ukrainians included in their reasons descriptions of the absence of political, cultural, religious and personal freedom at home, while others compared 'Bolshevik totalitarianism' with Nazism. They claim that their country is occupied and since they do not wish to become citizens of the U.S.S.R., they have in effect no fatherland to which to return.... [Ukrainians] seem much more concerned over the lack of religious freedom than do the Poles.... Others merely stated their dislike for a system where there is no private property.⁵⁵

Despite the nearly unanimous refusal by Eastern European refugees to return home, Western authorities and the UNRRA continued their efforts to repatriate. As part of this process, widespread screening of DPs was conducted.⁵⁶ For the U.S. Army, the main purpose of screening was to determine whether those in the camps and elsewhere were legitimate non-returnees, that is, they did not fall into one of the three categories for forcible repatriation. For the UNRRA, the screening process was designed to ensure that the DPs in its care were eligible for assistance.⁵⁷ Screening was intensified after a decision was reached by the United States not to close the camps. Instructions to the chief officers of the U.S. occupying forces, Generals Clark and McNarney, stated: "Indefinite postponement of closing of DP camps necessitates that screening of DPs remaining in centers be intensified rather than discontinued, and that those found ineligible for UN treatment be promptly discharged from assembly centers or placed under arrest or forcibly repatriated in accordance with existing directives."⁵⁸

Some aspects of these screenings caused great fear among Ukrainian DPs and refugees. The presence of Soviet officials was particularly intimidating. The U.S. military seems to have been inconsistent in allowing Soviet participation. For example, in the American Zone of Germany, Soviet liaison officers from the Soviet Repatriation Commissions were not part of the screening teams except as consultants. As one report noted: "DPs are generally suspicious and hostile to liaison officers and experience has demonstrated better results are obtained by excluding them from screening teams.... Soviet officers tend to denounce without evidence as collaborators any person who does not demand immediate repatriation."⁵⁹ In the American Zone in Austria, however, Soviet authorities were allowed to sit on the Soviet-U.S. Screening Board. The French also allowed the Soviet representatives to do the same. These rather flexible arrangements changed over time, but perhaps they explain why, in Austria, 730 DPs found to be Soviet citizens in May and June of 1946 were repatriated, while in Germany

those found to be Soviet citizens were evicted from the DP camps but not repatriated.⁶⁰

The American military was also aware that Soviet repatriation officers were using these screening operations to gather intelligence. The generals complained to headquarters that the shortage of American screening officers who knew foreign languages put the Americans at a distinct disadvantage during the screenings and did not allow for a thorough vetting of DPs: "U.S. officers who can speak [the] language must supervise [Soviet] liaison officers to avoid their screening and repatriation activity being used to cloak intelligence work. U.S. officers used to screen independently must have fluent command of languages as well as the ability to detect and evaluate discrepancies in testimony and documents."⁶¹ The shortage of qualified officers was so acute that sometimes committees of DPs were used on a limited scale to "certify others of their nationality," but U.S. authorities found that there were problems with this arrangement. These committees had to be used with "caution in view of the antagonistic political factions among DPs."⁶² Presumably, members of one political group betrayed individuals from other factions, causing them to lose their DP status and to be evicted from the camps. Nonetheless, the shortage of trained U.S. personnel and the sometimes casual screenings saved some DPs from losing their status.

The DPs being screened would never know what questions would be asked, nor were they told quickly whether they had passed the screening and were still bona fide DPs. As late as May 1947, Mariia Iurkevych (the wife of the pre-1917 political activist Lev Iurkevych), wrote to a friend that three months after her last screening she still did not know the outcome. For a sixty-four-year-old woman this was a very trying experience.⁶³ To lose DP status was a catastrophe, given the severe economic crisis in the occupied areas, and loss of DP status also made it very difficult to emigrate from Germany.⁶⁴ To avoid such a catastrophe, "Polish, Yugoslav, Russian [and Ukrainian] DPs tended to support each other in opposition to screening by liaison officers regardless of past differences."⁶⁵

For some refugees, the screening process seemed interminable. A January 1947 report from officials in the American Zone of Austria mentioned that the DPs had to go before three separate screening committees, which were conducted by the Soviet repatriation mission, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and a UNRRA official, Dr. Bedo. Many families were separated when the screenings determined that one member of the family was considered ineligible for UNRRA support, and hundreds lost their DP status in 1946-7. Black flags were hung in the camps and hunger strikes were started whenever the results of the screenings were announced. Thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated sympathy and solidarity with those who lost their status, such as the 230 people at Hindenburg Kaserne who were evicted from the camp simply because they were "Soviet citizens," even though they did not fall into the three categories for repatriation.

The ruling was clearly in violation of the new orders of January 1946, but when the error was rectified it was too late to locate the evictees. They had scattered to other camps or found other accommodations.⁶⁶

Other forms of assistance with repatriation were also given to Soviet and Eastern European officials by Western authorities. One tactic was the "60-day ration scheme." In October 1946 the UNRRA offered each DP willing to be repatriated food rations for sixty days, to be handed over at the frontiers of their country. This program, however, did not meet with much success despite the general decline in rations—a deliberate gesture intended to encourage repatriation.⁶⁷ It was also a matter of official U.S. Army policy to facilitate direct Soviet contact with DPs of Soviet, Baltic, and "Ukrainian" origin. Soviet liaison officers could visit the camps and request lists of DPs the American military authorities had determined were Soviet citizens. The officers could also interview these individuals or groups (including Baltic nationals) with the purpose of persuading them to repatriate. During these visitations, the Soviet officers were to be accompanied by American representatives, preferably military personnel and guards, and in no instance were threats or force to be used. For their part, the Americans were given full authority to control DPs who "deliberately wish to instigate hostile or riotous action calculated to interfere with the normal privileged functions of the Soviet liaison officer while visiting the camp." Moreover, American military personnel were to help Soviet officers distribute Soviet repatriation literature, posters, and films in the camps.⁶⁸

This co-operation resulted in considerable psychological pressure on Ukrainian and other Eastern European DPs:

During the visits of the Soviet representatives every effort was made to persuade the people to talk to the [Soviet] officers, to ask questions and to get information. Very little result. No active hostility was shown to the Soviet representatives, but a marked indifference. Soviet literature is available in the library and in addition distributed to each barrack. (The supply being ample.) The peasant class are repeatedly informed that they are wanted in their own country and have nothing to fear, the cultivator being the backbone of the country. The professional classes are told that their diplomas are of very little use in any country but their own. Every repatriation appeal is translated, distributed, and broadcasted over loudspeakers. English conversation classes are conducted by all [UNRRA] team members and repatriation is urged and recommended at these classes. The people are repeatedly informed that UNRRA in the camp ceases on June 30th of this year [1947], and that their future after this in Austria is full of doubts.

The UNRRA camp director interviewed personally all displaced persons in the camp who were professionals to try to persuade them to return. He reported, however, that his efforts to encourage the DP camp leaders to form a repatriation committee met with "passive resistance."⁶⁹

Soviet authorities were untiring in their efforts to ensure the return of even those DPs who were exempted from forcible repatriation by the policy of January 1946. One method was to discredit prominent individuals, usually Ukrainian leaders, by charging that they were Nazi collaborators. Through the press, public forums such as the United Nations, various international commissions, and formal submissions to Western military authorities, they tried to influence public opinion against the DPs and were successful in having several people investigated. In the end, however, all that these Soviet efforts and investigations accomplished was harassment of the individuals in question.⁷⁰ The Soviets also complained about anti-repatriation propaganda distributed in the camps by what they called fascist and nationalistic organizations (presumably the OUN and its factions). U.S. military intelligence replied that it could not find any evidence to support their charge.⁷¹ As for anti-repatriation literature produced by the DPs and by Ukrainians abroad, UNRRA and U.S. military authorities prohibited dissemination of such material.⁷² Another oft-repeated Soviet charge was that these organizations were forcibly preventing those who wanted to return home from doing so—a charge the Soviets still level against Western governments.⁷³

In their efforts to repatriate Ukrainian DPs and refugees, the Soviet officials resorted to elaborate methods. Soviet sympathizers and local Communist Party members in the West deprecated the reputation both of individuals and refugees as a group. For example, well-known pro-Soviet Ukrainians in Canada such as Vasylyl Svystun denounced the DPs as war criminals and Nazi collaborators.⁷⁴ In the United States, some Ukrainian front organizations, such as the Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union, tried to persuade U.S. authorities that many “Ukrainian war criminals, quislings and collaborators” were among the DPs and refugees.⁷⁵ Another Soviet method to repatriate Ukrainians was kidnapping. In addition to kidnapping DPs from the Western zones of occupied Germany, as early as 1945 Soviet secret policemen seized Ukrainian émigrés living in Czechoslovakia. That violated international law, because those kidnapped were Nansen passport holders. These individuals, among them Valentyn Sadovsky and Maksym Slavinsky, were taken to the Soviet Union and given severe sentences. Men in their late sixties and seventies, most died either in prison or in concentration camps.⁷⁶ Also, in Italy in 1948, Soviet agents persuaded the Italian police to arrest five Ukrainians who had already boarded a ship bound for Argentina, even though those DPs had been screened by Western authorities and were legitimate refugees.⁷⁷

The frustration of Ukrainian DPs with the screening process, the privileges granted to Soviet officials, and the Soviet repatriation teams’ tactics was sometimes expressed in violent ways. Numerous reports speak of physical attacks against Soviet repatriation officers who visited the camps. In Wiesbaden-Biebrich camp in the spring of 1946, for example,

. . . two Russian officers accompanied by two interpreters entered the Camp on the authority of a letter from 7th Army Headquarters, in order to attempt to ascertain if any of the camp residents were Soviet Nationals. The Russians were attacked and eventually had to run from the Camp to the safety of the nearest Military guard. All four Russians were injured, two received multiple cuts, lacerations and concussion and one was stabbed in the back and in the chest.⁷⁸

At the Mittenwald camp Soviet officers were stoned by an irate crowd.⁷⁹ There were many such outbreaks of frustration and anger which came to a head in mid-1948, when DPs refused to participate in any further screening by the UNRRA's successor, the International Refugee Organization (IRO).⁸⁰ Several months later, in March 1949, the U.S. occupation authorities closed down the offices of the Soviet Repatriation Commission in Germany.⁸¹

In the end, what saved the DPs and refugees from repatriation was the change in political relations between the two superpowers. That made the Western authorities think of resettling rather than repatriating the "last million," as they were called. The onset of the Cold War in mid-1946 created a climate in which the refugees' reasons for not returning were given a sympathetic public hearing, ensuring their resettlement in the West. Perhaps even more fortunate for the refugees was the growing realization in the West that the DPs and refugees were a readily available source of unskilled labour.⁸² Thus, political, humanitarian, and economic reasons intermeshed to provide a long-awaited respite from uncertainty for the refugees.

Conclusion

Several accounts of this period have stressed how the Western Allies, and particularly the UNRRA, successfully repatriated millions of people within a short period, but the repatriation process was less than considerate and successful for many hundreds of thousands of Eastern Europeans, especially those who either lost or never had their own nation-state. For that group, which included Ukrainians, the problem of repatriation was compounded by the lack of official recognition of their nationality and a lack of understanding of their reasons for refusing to return home. The remaining refugees and DPs, almost all of whom were from Eastern Europe, presented a major political problem for the Western Allies. Their presence also called into question the nature of East-West relations at a time when these relations were being reassessed: "Shall they [the United Nations] bend the residue of the world's homeless and stateless to the will of authoritarians who want them back, or shall they jointly create a new National Home, or shall each liberally offer a fair share of sanctuary?"⁸³

That question was posed at the height of the forcible and mass repatriation of millions of Eastern Europeans, but it was not resolved until two years later. Offers of resettlement were extended, but only when it was politically and

economically beneficial for the host countries to do so. For the refugees, resettlement was a welcome alternative to the psychological pressures of screening boards, resentment and harassment by the local German population, police, and American soldiers, and the steady but deliberate decline in food rations.⁸⁴

Ukrainian DPs from pre-war Polish territory were, after the initial phase of indiscriminate repatriation, much better off than Ukrainians from the Soviet Union. Not only were Polish Ukrainians exempted from forced repatriation, but Polish authorities did not want them back. What made matters worse for Soviet Ukrainians, however, was that their reasons for not returning—chief among them was the likelihood of imprisonment, deportation or death—were not generally appreciated or understood. Moreover, they found it difficult to understand why the West was eager to assist Soviet repatriation teams. In the end they believed that the West, and especially the United States, was politically naive about the true nature of Stalin's regime. In later years, their belief in the correctness of their political understanding of the Soviet system sometimes bordered on self-righteousness. Like some of the more recent Soviet exiles and political émigrés, postwar refugees criticized the moral and political "weakness" and "indifference" of the West. They saw the world in much the same way as they had in the DP camps—almost exclusively in terms of East-West competition and conflict.⁸⁵ What some of these refugees did not appreciate was the courage and compassion shown by many U.S. officers and UNRRA officials, who, in the face of pressures to do otherwise, took action that proved helpful to the DPs and refugees. Similarly, the efforts of Ukrainians living abroad were exceptionally effective in bringing the refugees' situation to the attention of Western governments.

Perhaps the most important source DPs drew upon to resist repatriation, however, was self-reliance and organization. This became the basis of their ability to survive and have hope for the future. Political activity was but one part of an extraordinarily diverse and rich social life in the camps. Hundreds of theatrical groups, newspapers, literary societies, schools, and other cultural organizations were formed in the camps, which helped restore to the DPs some of the self-respect they had lost under the difficult and humiliating circumstances they endured both during and after the war.⁸⁶ If Ukrainian refugees and DPs seemed to some UNRRA and Western officials to be overly concerned with their national identity, this too was understandable, for their concern helped to restore their sense of dignity. By 1952 most had been resettled in the West. They remained full of animosity for the system they had left behind, convinced of the correctness of their decision not to return, but grateful that their long ordeal had come to an end.

Notes

1. Western military officials distinguished between refugees and displaced persons: the latter had been displaced from their homeland, but the former were not outside the national boundaries of their country. For the official definitions, see Malcolm J. Proudfoot, *European Refugees, 1939-1952: A Study in Forced Population Movement* (London, 1957), 115. The United Nations used broader and more traditional definitions. See E. F. Penrose, "Negotiating on Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1946," in Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., *Negotiating with the Russians* (Boston, 1951), 146. This paper makes a distinction between refugees and displaced persons; the latter being similar to the United Nations', that is, refugees are viewed as those also beyond the borders of their homeland. At the same time, those who were displaced by the events of the war and refused to be repatriated were, in effect, and considered themselves, refugees by November 1945. Among the more recent works on Western repatriation policy after the war, see Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, *Von Zwangsarbeiter zum heimatlosen Ausländer* (Göttingen, 1985), 123-52; Mark R. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation* (Urbana, Ill., 1982); Krystyna Kersten, *Repatriacja ludności polskiej po II wojnie światowej* (Warsaw, 1974); Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York-Oxford, 1985); Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini* (Munich, 1985); M. I. Pavlenko, "Bizhentsi" ta "peremishcheni osoby" v politytsi imperialistychnykh derzhav (1945-1949 rr.) (Kiev, 1979); and Nikolai Tolstoy, *The Minister and the Massacres* (London, 1986), *Victims of Yalta* (London, 1978), and *Stalin's Secret War* (London, 1981).
2. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 243; Marrus, *The Unwanted*, 311, Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 169.
3. On the evolution of the repatriation policy and agreements with various governments, see Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 120-57. SHAEF was terminated on 13 July 1945 and replaced by UNRRA and later IRO.
4. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 212, 228, table 12; Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 37, states that the official Soviet figure was 2,229,552 to September 1946.
5. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 210, 211 table 11.
6. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 2. Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, 37, states that official sources reveal 2,886,157 Soviet citizens were repatriated from the end of the war to 1 September 1946 from the Soviet-controlled zones of Germany and Austria. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 212, states that 2,946,000 were repatriated from the Soviet areas of Germany, Austria, Poland, and elsewhere.
7. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 2. On the number of the other (non-Soviet) peoples see John George Stoessinger, *The Refugee and the World Community* (Minneapolis, 1956), 55-6; Marrus, *The Unwanted*, 320, 323. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 237, gives the number 1,888,000 by September 1946, including those in Italy.

8. See, for example, "Determination and Reporting of Nationalities," from Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 16 November 1945, in which Major General C. L. Adcock states: "This group [Ukrainians] is not recognized as a nationality and will be dealt with according to determined nationality status as Soviet, nationals of other countries of which they may be citizens, or as stateless persons, in accordance with U.S. Forces, European Theater Main S-16517 of 9 August 1945." UNRRA Archives, UNRRA Germany, U.S. Zone, Office of the Director, Displaced Persons Camps, 1-31 December 1945. A circular from the UNRRA director of the French Zone in Germany reiterated this position. See UNRRA Archives, Records of the Germany Mission, Central Headquarters Repatriation, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:03, "Repatriation Information," General Bulletin no. 9 (26 April 1946). See also Vasyl Sofroniv Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy (Zapysky skytalsia)* (Toronto, 1983), 40.

This citizenship criterion was very much a legacy of the prewar period, when Ukrainians were living in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania as well as in the Soviet Union. Although almost 23.5 million Ukrainians lived in Soviet Ukraine, another 5 million, commonly referred to as Western Ukrainians, resided outside the Soviet Union, mainly in those three countries. See Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London, 1985), 115; Raymond Pearson, *National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945* (London, 1983), 171.

9. On the division of Germany and Austria see Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945-46* (Washington, 1947); John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford, 1968); William B. Bader, *Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955* (Stanford, 1966).

The most respected Ukrainian demographer estimated that there were 150-210,000 Ukrainians left in Austria and Germany at the end of 1945. See Volodymyr Kubijovyč, "Z demografichnykh problem ukraïnskoï emigratsii (na pryklad taboriv u Mittenvaldi)," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 15. Another source, compiled by the Ukrainian umbrella organization for DPs, found 206,871 Ukrainians in Germany and Austria in March 1946: 104,024 in the American Zone of Germany, 54,580 in the British Zone of Germany, 19,026 in the French Zone of Germany, and 29,241 in the three Western zones of Austria. See Vasyl Mudry, "Nova ukraïnska emigratsiia," in L. Myshuha and A. Drahan, eds., *Ukrainci u vilnomu sviti: Iuvileina knyha Ukraïnskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1894-1954* (Jersey City, [1954]), 117. For more on the demographic and social composition of the DPs see Kubijovyč, "Z demografichnykh problem," and Mudry, "Nova ukraïnska emigratsiia."

The American Zone in Germany, as well as the Bremen enclave of the American sector of Berlin, was under the command of the U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET), with headquarters at Frankfurt. The functions of military government, at first exercised by USFET, were later undertaken by the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), a separate organization with headquarters in Berlin. USFET retained jurisdiction only in matters relating to disarmament and demilitarization, security, displaced persons, and matters unrelated to civil control in Germany. OMGUS exercised a general surveillance over all German internal

affairs, operating increasingly through approved German administrative agencies and personnel.

The main battles on the eastern front had taken place in areas heavily populated by Ukrainians, which helps account for the 2.5-3 million who found themselves in Germany and Austria at the end of the war. Most (about 2.3 million) were males less than thirty years old who had been taken as forced labourers. Others were post-1917 refugees (Nansen passport holders), concentration camp survivors, Polish and Soviet prisoners-of-war, former *Osttruppen* (members of Eastern European units in the German armed forces), functionaries in the German bureaucracy that administered Eastern-occupied territories, and refugees who fled with the retreating Germans from the Soviets, fearing a repetition of the treatment they received in 1939-41, when the Nazi-Soviet pact was in effect, and political repression, labour-camp deportations, and killings had been widespread. See Yury Boshyk, ed., *Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath: A Symposium* (Edmonton, 1986).

10. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 167-9, 236.
11. *Ibid.*, 162-91.
12. For discussions on the Yalta agreement see the sources in note 1, especially Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 102-4; Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 152-7; and Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta* and *The Minister*. The terms of the Yalta agreement were not made public by the State Department for a year (February 1946).
13. According to Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 139, the Soviet Repatriation Commission was under the control of SMERSH and the Soviet secret police and some of its personnel came from the Main Administration of Counter-Intelligence (GUKR) of SMERSH.
14. Oleksa Woropay, *On the Road to the West: Diary of a Ukrainian Refugee* (London, 1982), 33; Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 90-1; Iurii L[avrynenko], "'Rodina' i 'skryning': Damokliv mech taboriv," *Siohochasne i mynule*, nos. 1-2 (1949): 65.
15. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 214-7.
16. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.0:6, "Forcible Repatriation of the Ruthenians," 28 Nov. 1945.
17. See, for example, Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 104; Ivan Bolekhivsky Bilych, "Moia zustrich z Vasylem Sofronym Levvyskym," in Levvysky, *Respublika za drotamy*, 154-5, 159, and 15 of the memoir; Omelian Kushnir, ed., *Regensburg: Statti, spohady, dokumenty. Do istorii ukrainskoi emigratsii v Nimechchyni pislia Druhoi svitovoi viiny* (New York-Toronto, 1985), 26, 34, 37, 38, 40-1. I am grateful to the late Illia Horodecky for documentary materials about the intervention of U.S. Lt. Colonel Jaromir Pospisil, QMC, Deputy Military Government Officer, Regensburg.
18. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 155, mentions that there were 200,000 British and American soldiers in Soviet-controlled territories awaiting repatriation.
19. Vera M. Dean, "Tug of War over the DP's," *The Nation* (Nov. 1946), as cited in Michael Palij, "The Problem of Displaced Persons in Germany, 1939-1950," in *Almanac of the Ukrainian National Association for the Year 1985* (Jersey City, 1985), 32. See also Vasyl Ivanys, *Stezhkamy zhyttia (Spohady)*, vol. 5 (Neu-Ulm, 1962), 382.

20. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, U.S. Zone, Office of the Director, PAG-4/3.0.11.3.0:9, "Confidential Report on the General Situation of DPs to the Director General of UNRRA, September 1946." Republished in Boshyk, *Ukraine during World War II*, 224-32. See also Joseph A. Berger, "DPs are People Too," unpub. ms. (31 July 1946). I would like to thank Antony Berger (Ottawa) for permission to use this source. Joseph Berger served as a director in the Displaced Persons Operations in the Freising area of Germany from June 1945 until July 1946. The area he directed was the largest of any UNRRA team.
21. UNRRA Archives, "Confidential Report," cites an anti-refugee article that appeared in *The Go-Devil*, 60th Infantry weekly, Ingolstadt, 23 March 1946.
22. Boris Shub, *The Choice* (New York, 1950), 46-7, 49, 51, 69; *Ukrainski visti* (25 Nov. 1945), 7; L[avrynenko], "'Rodina' i 'skryning'." Shub was assigned by SHAEF to interview DPs and Soviet POWs.
23. In a Soviet radio broadcast to the DPs, the following appeal and warning was made: "The fascist animals drove you by force into German slavery, they treated you cruelly and with ridicule, starved you and tortured you. Your motherland awaits you, the Party of Lenin, Stalin, Marx and Engels.... Those who do not show up by 10 November 1945...will be arrested and sent on the road to the police." V. Ost, *Repatriatsiia* (Germany, 1945-6), 5.
24. See Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 190-216.
25. *Ibid.*, 171. Through those who had escaped during the Soviet repatriation process the DPs learned about the treatment of Soviet DPs. A few DPs also managed to travel between the zones, and some even made several trips to Ukraine and back to the Western zonal camps. See Berger, "DPs are People Too"; V. Martynets, *Shliakhom taboriv DP* (Winnipeg, 1950), 276-314; Shub, *The Choice*, 33-45, 163-5; Ost, *Repatriatsiia*, 89.
26. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 116; Zynovii Knysh, *Na porozi nevidomoho (Spohady z 1945 roku)* (Toronto, 1963), 95-107; Kushnir, *Regensburg*, 33-42; *Dokumenty. Memorandum* (n.p., [Dec. 1945]). Four requests were made to American authorities at that time: 1) to establish the legal status of Ukrainians as refugees of a distinct nationality and grant them political asylum; 2) to appoint a Ukrainian representative who would defend their interests; 3) to grant Ukrainian professionals permission to work in their fields; 4) to permit Ukrainian religious, cultural, and educational life to develop under the supervision of American authorities. On 1 November 1945 Ukrainian refugees and DPs formed the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany, headed by Vasyl Mudry.
27. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, U.S. Zone, Office of the Director, Displaced Persons Camp, General, July-Nov. 1945, PAG-4/3.0.11.3.0:10.
28. Swiss efforts are best described in the Ievhen Batchinsky Archive, Carleton University, Ottawa. Other examples of the Ukraino-Swiss Relief Committee's interventions can be found in UNRRA Archives, Austria, Chief of Mission, PAG-4/3.0.1.0.0:7. For the activities of Ukrainians in America see Ostap Tarnavsky, *Brat-bratovi: Knyha pro ZUADK* (Philadelphia, 1971); and for Canada, Gordon R. Bohdan Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day: The Reminiscences of Bohdan Panchuk* (Toronto, 1983).

Numerous interventions by the Vatican can be found in the National Archives, Civil Division-Diplomatic Branch, RG 59, U.S. Department of State, Decimal Card Index, "Displaced Persons."

29. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 92-6, 173.
30. Cablegram from the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Belgium to the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, in Mykhailo Mandryka, *Ukrainian Refugees* (Winnipeg, 1946), 39.
31. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 117; Pavlenko, "Bizhentsi," 70; Ivanys, *Stezhkamy zhyttia*, 384; Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 173; Berger, "DPs are People Too."
32. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 217.
33. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 172; Milda Danys, *DP: Lithuanian Immigration to Canada after the Second World War* (Toronto, 1986), 36; interview with Luba Dyka, Cambridge, Mass., 5 August 1983.
34. F. Pihido-Pravoberezhny, *Velyka vitchyzniana viina* (Winnipeg, 1954), 207; National Archives, RG 59, State Department, 860.20231, Berlin, on the infiltration of Soviet and satellite agents posing as DPs.
35. See John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New York, 1963) and articles in Boshyk, *Ukraine during World War II*.
36. Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy*, 21, 40, 46, 105. He recorded the views of Western military officials.
37. Ivanys, *Stezhkamy zhyttia*, 382; Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy*, 106.
38. The money collected was earmarked for the liberation of Ukraine, but a public accounting of how these funds were allocated was never made.
 Interview with Myroslav Labunka, former secretary to Stepan Bandera, 10 August 1983, Cambridge, Mass. See also Ivanys, *Stezhkamy zhyttia*, 378; Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy*, 107, 120.
39. Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy*, 88, 111.
40. Cited in Semen Izhyk, *Smikh kriz slozy* (Winnipeg, 1961), 184. Ironically, the differences in political outlook and this intolerant treatment stimulated Ukrainians from the Soviet Union to form their own political organizations in the camps.
41. Levytsky, *Respublika za drotamy*, 104, 120.
42. See, for example, Eduard Bakis, "'D.P. Apathy,'" in H. B. M. Murphy, ed., *Flight and Resettlement* (Paris, 1955), 76-88; Edward A. Shils, "Social and Psychological Aspects of Displacement," *Journal of Social Issues* (1946): 3-18.
43. On the evolution of the American policy see Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 108-14. On the United Nations' change in policy on 29 January 1946 see Penrose, "Negotiating on Refugees," 142-3. On the French government's dissatisfaction with the Soviets see Alfred J. Rieber, *Stalin and the French Communist Party, 1941-1947* (New York, 1962), 200-1.

44. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief, PAG-4/3.0.11.01.4:1, USFET Directive to Commanding Generals, 4 January 1946. See also Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 111.
45. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief, point 2.
46. Mykola Korolko, "Pereselennia ukrainsiv na radiansku Ukrainu," in *Ukrainskyi kalendar na 1985 rik* (Warsaw, 1985), 159-62. The pro-Soviet Polish government was "interested only in persons of true Polish nationality [sic] and not in Polish Ukrainians." It also requested that Poles and Polish Ukrainians be separated into different camps. See, for example, UNRRA Archives, Austria, Chief of the Mission, Repatriation: Conditions Affecting Poland, PAG-4/3.0.1.0.0:19, "Polish Mission for Repatriation in Austria," 4 April 1946.
47. British authorities adopted the American policy only several months later. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 115.
48. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 283-4, 290.
49. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, Office of the Chief and Deputy Chief, PAG-4/3.0.11.01.4:1, USFET to Commanding Generals, 4 January 1946.
50. *Ibid.*
51. UNRRA Archives, Austria, Chief of Mission, Repatriation Policy, PAG-4/3.0.1.0.0:19, "Repatriation Reports from Camp Kufstein and Landeck," 16 April 1946.
52. UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.01.4:1, "Paraphrase of Restricted Cable, 15 March 1946 received by USFET from U.S. War Department."
53. See, for example, Resolution 92 passed 29 March 1946, Atlantic City, 4th Session of UNRRA Council, UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, Central Headquarters, Repatriation, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2.
54. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, Central Headquarters, Repatriation, "Report on the Repatriation Poll of Displaced Persons in UNRRA Assembly Centres in Germany, Period 1-14 May 1946"; Ivanys, *Stezhkamy zhyttia*, 378; the full analysis of the poll is reproduced in Boshyk, *Ukraine during World War II*, 209-22.
55. *Ibid.*
56. The screening process was so infamous that it received a special place in the Ukrainian language: "skryning" and "vyskryninguvaty" (i.e., not to pass the screening process). See L[avrynenko], "'Rodina' i 'skryning,'" 66.
57. See Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 203-48, on the differences between UNRRA and military responsibilities for refugees.
58. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, Central Headquarters, Repatriation, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2, 27 April 1946.
59. *Ibid.*, 3 Jan. 1947.
60. *Ibid.*, 4 June 1946 and 3 Jan. 1947.
61. *Ibid.*, 4 June 1946.

62. Ibid.
63. Mariia Iurkevych to Ievhen Batchinsky, 23 Feb. 1947, Ievhen Batchinsky Archive, Carleton University, Ottawa.
64. L[avrynenko], "'Rodina' i 'skryning'," 67; H. B. M. Murphy, "The Camps," in Murphy, *Flight and Resettlement*, 58.
65. UNRRA Archive, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2, 3 Jan. 1946.
66. UNRRA Archive, J. H. Whiting, Zone Director to General Brown, Deputy Director German Operations, UNRRA Central Headquarters, Arolsen, 22 Aug. 1946. See also L[avrynenko], "'Rodina' i 'skryning'," 67; report from Ellwangen in M. Kushnir, ed., *One Year in Ukrainian DP Camp Ellwangen (Odyn rik v tabori Ellwangen)* (Ellwangen, 1947), 3.
67. Stoessinger, *The Refugee*, 52; Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 252, 284.
68. UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, U.S. Zone, Displaced Persons Camps, 1 Feb.-31 March 1946, "Privileges of Soviet Liaison Officers in Displaced Persons Camps Other Than Wholly Soviet," 8 March 1946.
69. UNRRA Archives, Austria, Chief of Mission, Repatriation Policy, PAG-4/3.0.1.0.0:19, "Repatriation Reports from Camp Kufstein and Landeck," 16 April 1947.
70. Ivanys, *Stezhkamy zhyttia*, 373.
71. Allied intelligence carefully followed Ukrainian refugee activities in the camps, because frequent Soviet accusations necessitated investigations and replies. See, for example, UNRRA Archives, Germany Mission, Central Headquarters, Repatriation, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:1, "Report on Charges by Delegates at Special Session of the Committee of the Council for Europe," 20 August 1946.
72. See, for example, *ibid.*, USFET Directive, 4 January 1946, 1 August 1946.
73. *Ibid.*, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:3, "C.C.E. 23rd July 1946"; Pavlenko, "*Bizhentsi*," 56-79.
74. Vasyl Svystun, *Ukraina i skytaltsi* (Toronto, 1946), 17; John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada* (Toronto, 1979), 88-107.
75. See, for example, National Archives, RG 59, State Department Decimal Card Index, 25 June 1946, from the Ukrainian-American League; 21 November 1945 from the Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union; introduction to D. Z. Manuilsky, *Ukrainsko-nimetski natsionalisty na sluzhbi u fashystskoi Nimechchyny* (New York, 1946).
76. Interview with Mrs. Timoshenko, née Sadovska, Toronto, November 1983.
77. *Ukrainian Bulletin* no. 3 [New York], 1 June 1948, 2.
78. UNRRA Archives, PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2, "Screening of DPs," 2 May 1946.
79. *Ukrainian Bulletin*, no. 4 (1948): 4.
80. L[avrynenko], "'Rodina' i 'skryning'," 67; on resistance to the last UNRRA screening, March 1947, see Levvysky, *Respublika za drotamy*, 120.
81. Pavlenko, "*Bizhentsi*," 48; Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 122.

82. See Danys, *Lithuanian Immigration*; Leonard Dinnerstein, *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust* (New York, 1982), 159-60. This economic argument is central to Pavlenko, "Bizhentsi."
83. *Economist*, 9 June 1945, 762.
84. Numerous raids and searches were carried out by armed German police and U.S. military police in the camps. This caused great resentment and fear among the refugees. See Berger, "DPs are People Too"; Boshyk, *Ukraine during World War II*, 227-8.
85. *Emigratsiia* (Ellwangen, 1948), 18-30. For a recent example of this criticism of the West by a former DP see S. Iu. Protsiuk, "Taborovi chasy v bezposerednomu nasvitlenni," *Narodnia volia* (Scranton, PA), 14 June 1984, 5.
86. On cultural and other organizations in the camps see Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*; Yury Boshyk and Włodimierz Kiebalo, comps., *Publications by Ukrainian "Displaced Persons" and Political Refugees, 1945-1954: A Bibliography* (Edmonton, 1988); and relevant chapters in this volume.

Resettlement of
Ukrainians
in the USA and Canada

Ukrainian-American Resettlement Efforts, 1944-54

Myron B. Kuropas

Of all the many triumphs of which Ukrainian Americans can be proud, none is more outstanding than the endeavour to provide moral and financial assistance for their less fortunate brethren in Ukraine. It is a tradition that began prior to World War I, was continued during and after that war, and reached its culmination with the post-World War II resettlement of Ukrainian displaced persons.

The first organization to create a formal vehicle to raise funds for the old country was the Central National Committee, organized in Yonkers, New York, in 1903. A Ruthenian National Fund was established by the committee, of which 15 per cent was allocated to Ukraine. In 1906, the Ukrainian National Association (UNA)—then called the Ruthenian National Union—established its own national fund, financed from monthly assessments added to the dues of UNA members. By 1913, a total of \$10,173.45 had been sent to Ukrainians in Galicia. A similar fund was established by the Ukrainian Workingman's Association, which sent \$3,148.12 to Galicia by 1913. Soon after the war began in Europe, the UNA created the Ukrainian Liberation Fund which, by the end of 1915, was able to raise \$27,785 for Ukrainians in Europe. An additional \$12,000 was collected by Bishop Soter Ortynsky, who sent the money directly to the Austro-Hungarian government in Vienna. The most spectacular fund-raising endeavour during this period occurred on 21 April 1917, which was designated "Ruthenian Day" in an official proclamation by President Woodrow Wilson. That meant Ukrainians were permitted to stand on American street corners and solicit donations from passers-by. More than \$85,000 was collected for Ukrainian war relief that way.

When World War I ended and Eastern Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine, and northern Bukovyna were incorporated into the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, Ukrainian Americans began to lobby on behalf of an independent Western Ukrainian republic in eastern Galicia. They established a Galician Liberation Fund in 1919 and over \$110,000 was collected by 1924. When representatives from Western Ukraine established a diplomatic mission in Washington, an additional \$140,000 was raised by the Ukrainian-American community to support the mission's work. A new national umbrella organization, the United Ukrainian Organizations of America (UUAO), was established between the two world wars, continuing the tradition of assisting Ukrainians in Europe. By 1939 the UUAO had raised a total of \$367,533.83, most of which was sent to assist such Western Ukrainian institutions as Ridna Shkola and the Ukrainian War Invalid Fund. In 1940 UUAO was replaced by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA).

All of the work of the UUAO and other Ukrainian organizations in the nationalist camp during the 1920s and 1930s was vehemently opposed by Ukrainian-American communists. The Ukrainian Communist Front was able to convince a segment of America's liberal community that the Ukrainian national movement was fascist and Nazi-inspired. Ukrainian organizations that opposed Soviet rule in Ukraine, the communists argued, were being funded by Berlin in order to establish a Nazi-directed espionage network in the United States. When the Soviet Union became an ally of the United States during World War II, communist credibility was greatly enhanced. Communist disinformation about the UCCA became so pervasive during the early 1940s that three Ukrainian fraternal organizations—the Ukrainian National Association, the Ukrainian Workingman's Association, and the Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics—became fearful that further involvement with the UCCA could stigmatize their good name in American government and financial circles. They decided to suspend their association with the UCCA, which, with only the Ukrainian National Aid Association (UNAA) to sustain it, then lapsed into a moribund state. Within three years, however, the UNA and Providence Association reconsidered. At the second UCCA convention, held in Philadelphia on 22 January 1944, they returned to active participation.

The Birth of the UUARC

At the second UCCA convention, the postwar future of Ukrainian refugees in Europe was addressed by the delegates, who passed a resolution stating that: "In view of the fact that Ukraine is one of the major victims of the war, it is absolutely essential that the UCCA organize...a purely humanitarian and apolitical Ukrainian war committee for war victims and refugees..."¹ At the first UCCA executive board meeting (held in New York City on 16 March), a commission consisting of *Svoboda* editor Luka Myshuha, Longhin Cehelsky, and Olena

Shtogryn was created to explore the Ukrainian refugee problem further. In April all three commission members travelled to Washington, where they met with representatives of the American Red Cross and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

At the next UCCA executive board meeting, commission members reported that while UNRRA had the best developed network to assist refugees, it only cooperated with organizations that were: 1) accredited members of the Council of American Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Services; and 2) recognized by the president's Relief Board. Since UNRRA aided refugees without regard for national or religious affiliation, however, it was not in a position to guarantee that assistance would be assigned exclusively to Ukrainians, even when donors specifically requested that. Furthermore, all food, clothing, and monies sent overseas by American voluntary agencies required the prior approval of the State Department.

A final problem they encountered was the resistance of the Soviet government to any aid for citizens of the USSR which was not under its direct jurisdiction. The American Red Cross had already sent some \$20 million to the USSR, designating much of it for Ukraine. Since the Soviets would not allow anyone from the United States to monitor how and where these funds were used, there was no way to determine whether the donated funds had actually benefitted the Ukrainian people. All relief funds had to be channelled through Russian War Relief, an organization which dutifully forwarded all of its monies directly to Moscow for distribution within the USSR.²

Given the nature of the existing war relief system, the UCCA commission concluded that only an accredited Ukrainian organization created by Ukrainians and for Ukrainians could guarantee that monies raised would be spent the way donors expected. On 20 June 1944 the UCCA established the Ukrainian American Relief Committee (URC) as an independent organization. Headed by Dr. Walter Gallan, the executive board included Dr. Neonilya Pelechowicz-Hayvoronsky, vice-chairman; Dr. Paul Dubas, secretary; and Evhen Rohach, treasurer. Roman Slobodian, UNA treasurer; Vasyi Shabatura, UNA president; Anastasia Wagner and Ivanna Bencal, controllers; and Andrew Melnyk, Anna Nastiuk, Eva Piddubcheshen, Maria Staleva, Platon Stasiuk, Irene Tarnowsky, and Semen Uhorchak, members, completed the board. While the URC was being formed in New York, a second Ukrainian relief committee was established in Michigan under the chairmanship of John Panchuk. Officially called Ukrainian War Relief, the executive of the new committee decided to join forces with the URC when they learned that all work would have to be co-ordinated with Russian War Relief. At a unity conference held in October, they agreed to a merger to create the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC). Walter Gallan became chairman of the reconstituted organization, while John Panchuk assumed the vice-chairmanship.

Ukrainian communists in America meanwhile continued their opposition to Ukrainian-American relief efforts organized by the nationalist camp. *Ukrainski shchodenni visty*, a Ukrainian-American communist periodical, argued that since the Soviet government was already taking care of Ukrainian needs in Europe, the UUARC was practicing "racketeerism." Members of Russian War Relief complained to the White House that Ukrainians in America were planning to raise funds to assist Nazi war criminals and collaborators who had fled with the Germans to escape Soviet justice.³

The Growth of the UUARC

When the UUARC executive approached the president's War Relief Board for permission to raise funds for Ukrainian relief efforts in Western Europe, they were informed in November 1944 that no permission was required, since there were many overseas relief organizations which would gladly accept Ukrainian funds. With the help of the board, the UUARC eventually established ties with the Unitarian Service Committee, UNRRA, and CARE (a non-profit organization established to send food and clothing parcels to the needy overseas). The UUARC was accepted as a full member of the Council of American Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Services on 7 March 1945. Formal recognition as an independent entity enabled UUARC to expand its ties to other relief organizations, including the Catholic Welfare Conference, the American Friends Committee, the International Students' Fund, the International Immigration Service, and the Swedish Red Cross. In response to a second request for accreditation, the President's War Relief Board finally recognized the UUARC on 22 September.

Once accreditation was assured, the UUARC began to broaden its organizational base by establishing branches in cities throughout the United States such as Detroit, Chicago, New York City, Minneapolis, Rochester, Buffalo, Baltimore, and Syracuse. Fund-raising was intensified with the help of the Ukrainian press, and by the end of 1945, some \$100,000 was collected for the purchase of food, medicine, and other supplies needed by Ukrainian refugees. An additional \$200,000 worth of clothing was also collected by the UUARC and sent to Europe. Most of the refugee relief provided by the UUARC during this period was in the form of CARE packages co-ordinated through the women's section of UUARC in New York City.⁴

The Tragedy of Forced Repatriation

On 11 February 1945 the United States, Great Britain, France, and the USSR signed a repatriation agreement at Yalta guaranteeing the return of all displaced Allied nationals on a reciprocal basis. Significantly, the agreement defined Soviet nationals as all those who had lived within the borders of the USSR prior to 1 September 1939. This excluded, obviously, all those Ukrainian refugees who had

resided in the prewar Polish-governed regions of Galicia and Volhynia. At Yalta the Soviets had insisted that the repatriation agreement obligated signatory nations to return all nationals without exception, by force if necessary, as soon after the war ended as possible. Although many American diplomats were opposed to forced repatriation, American military leaders were not so disposed. Great Britain had adopted a policy of mandatory repatriation as early as August 1944, prompting Admiral William Leahy, President Roosevelt's chief of staff, to declare that "it is not advisable for the United States government to do otherwise." Also, behind America's acquiescence at Yalta was the fear—reinforced by Soviet threats—that Moscow would refuse to repatriate American POWs found in German internment camps in Poland, Hungary, and eastern Germany.

The Soviets took the position that all Soviet citizens who found themselves in Germany and Austria at the end of the war were anxious to return to the motherland, except those who had collaborated with the Nazis. The *New York Times* argued on 24 January 1945 that most refugees who did not wish to return were "collaborationists who have no claim on the sympathies of Russia's western allies." The UNRRA director for the American Zone in Germany shared that view. He declared that "anti-repatriation groups are not the product of democratic processes but are rather the remnants of pre-war regimes that reflect Nazi and fascist concepts."⁵ While some DPs had undoubtedly collaborated with the Germans, the vast majority had not. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had been brought to Germany as *Ostarbeiter* (labourers from the East). Thousands more had fled with the retreating German armies to avoid life under the Bolsheviks. When the war ended, they sought refuge in the West.

Nonetheless, U.S. military authorities were determined to repatriate refugees as quickly and efficiently as possible. Concerned that they would be forced to care for millions of refugees during the winter months, the American military command commandeered every available means of transportation in order to move Soviet nationals into the Soviet occupation zones before the end of autumn. It was an incredibly efficient operation. By 19 November 1945, Western commands had repatriated 2,037,000 people, most of whom were Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine. However, for American soldiers, forced repatriation was a dirty business. Refugees were often dragged kicking and screaming to trucks and railroad cars. Others, preferring death to repatriation, hanged themselves, rammed their heads through windows to sever their necks, or bit each other's jugular veins. Appalled by such incidents, General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered a ban on the use of force on 4 September. On 6 September American authorities attempted to move 600 Ukrainians and 96 Americans from Mannheim to a DP centre in Stuttgart. The refugees believed they were headed for the Soviet Zone, so they rioted. That prompted Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce to later query the War and State Departments about the Yalta Agreement and "our common

understanding here of the kind of freedom for which our soldiers fought." On 20 December the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee exempted Soviet civilians from mandatory repatriation.⁶

For Ukrainians in the United States, forced repatriation was an abomination. They learned of the tragedy from refugee letters sent to relatives and friends in America as well as from Ukrainian-American soldiers stationed in Germany and Austria.⁷ The UCCA emphasized that Ukrainian refusal to return to the USSR was prompted by fears of Soviet repression: "they well know that on account of their patriotic Ukrainian sentiments and their anti-totalitarian and pro-free Ukraine actions, they face imprisonment, banishment to Siberian wastelands or execution." The UCCA appealed to "all Americans of good conscience" to intercede on behalf of Ukrainian refugees.⁸ They sent letters to the White House, the State Department, and various congressmen.⁹ The official response was always the same: "You may be assured that insofar as it is within the power of the United States Government, no persons of Russian origin who are not Soviet citizens are being repatriated to the Soviet Union."¹⁰

The UUARC was not satisfied with the American response. In a letter addressed to various government officials, UUARC president John Panchuk wrote:

In the ordinary course of events, the resettlement of all displaced persons into the country of their origin would not [sic] go unquestioned. President Roosevelt and Marshall Stalin anticipated the repatriation of war torn populations and made it a subject of agreement providing for mutual repatriation of Americans found in the Soviet zone of occupation and of Soviet citizens found in the American zone.

As subsequent events proved, however, the vast majority of Ukrainians, whose melancholy destiny was the subject of barter at Yalta without their knowledge and consent, did not welcome the 'agreement' for their repatriation into the Soviet Union. When one recalls that Russia's claim to them rests upon military occupation of their homeland, forceful annexation and confiscation of their lands and property and ruthless subjugation, their determined unwillingness to comply with repatriation is understandable.

To avoid future miscarriages of justice, Panchuk argued, Ukrainians should be recognized as a separate ethnic group, "segregated from all other nationals of like status and be placed in exclusively Ukrainian camps."¹¹

The War Department responded that it was the

policy of the United States Government...to deal with Ukrainian displaced persons according to their national status as Soviet citizens, Polish citizens, Czechoslovak citizens, nationals of other countries of which they may be citizens, or as stateless persons. In view of this policy, it has not been considered appropriate to segregate all Ukrainian stateless and displaced persons and to place them in exclusive Ukrainian camps.... Ukrainian displaced persons are not being repatriated to their countries of origin unless they so desire.

The only exceptions were “Ukrainians covered by the US-USSR Yalta Agreement...who were both citizens of and actually within the Soviet Union on 1 September 1939”; those who were “captured in German uniforms;” those “who were members of the Soviet Armed Forces on or before 22 June 1941 and were not subsequently discharged therefrom”; and “those who on the basis of reasonable evidence have been found to be collaborators with the enemy, having voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy.”¹²

Still determined to frustrate the Ukrainian relief effort, America’s Ukrainian communists continued to condemn the UUARC and its activities. On 21 November 1945 the Ukrainian American Fraternal Union, an affiliate of the International Workers’ Order, a communist front organization, sent a letter to the United States State Department requesting clarification of the official American position regarding relief activities among Ukrainian Americans in the nationalist camp. On 25 June 1946 the Ukrainian American League, Inc., another communist front organization, sent a letter to the State Department protesting all efforts to assist Ukrainian “war criminals,” “quislings,” and “collaborators posing as displaced persons and refugees.”¹³

In Europe, meanwhile, Soviet Repatriation Commission members continued to prowl the DP camps “claiming” various Ukrainians as their own, even those who had not resided within the borders of the USSR on 1 September 1939.¹⁴ The UUARC publicly condemned all such actions and at a UNRRA-sponsored conference in Atlantic City in March 1946, the UUARC delegation successfully lobbied in favour of a resolution against mandatory repatriation.¹⁵ The problem did not end there, however. UNRRA officials in Europe, many of whom looked favourably upon the Soviet system and saw no valid reason for East European DPs to refuse to go home, continued to push for repatriation. As late as the spring of 1947 Meyer Cohen, Acting Chief of UNRRA DP operations, was urging DPs to “go home this spring.... Go home to help your countrymen rebuild and to share the fruits of that rebuilding.... Do not be misled by false rumors. Seize this opportunity now. Your relatives, your friends, your country await you.”¹⁶

In the June 1947 issue of *Repatriation News*, M. K. Glasser was singled out for “repatriation orchids” for his successful work among Ukrainians and Balts. Glasser offered a list of suggestions for other repatriation officers that included appeals to the patriotism of the refugees, small international meetings to which the Soviet liaison officer was to be invited, song groups “to arouse national pride and longing for the homeland,” special farmers’ days, special workers’ days, farewell parties for repatriates, special children’s farewell parties, and even religious services for those who had decided to return. The same issue contained an emotional letter from “Hania” to her sister telling her that her family in Ukraine was well and urging her to “please return home. We are longing for

you.” Also included was an appeal from the Latvian Soviet Republic: “Think of your children who want to grow up in your homeland and be taught their home language.... The Soviet Government guarantees you freedom and invites you home.”¹⁷ Those who agreed to return were offered a two-month ration of free canned goods by the UNRRA, while those who refused often found their rations cut.¹⁸ Although relatively few Ukrainians were actually fooled by these UNRRA blandishments, they lived in constant fear that sooner or later the Allies would renege on their promises and return to a policy of forced repatriation.

From Relief to Resettlement

On 28 July 1945, the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau was established in London with the co-operation of the UUARC and the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund. The following summer UUARC president Walter Gallan travelled to Europe, where he met with representatives of Ukrainian relief organizations in England, France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland. In Paris, Gallan participated in the purchase of a building that became the centre of a co-ordinated Ukrainian relief effort for DPs who had fled Germany to avoid repatriation to the USSR. Gallan was unable to obtain permission to visit DP camps, so he returned to the United States to lobby American authorities for the necessary approval. While in America, Gallan was appointed executive director of the UUARC. John Panchuk succeeded Gallan as president.

Permission to visit DP camps in Germany and Austria was granted early in 1947, and Gallan returned to Europe, where he learned that repatriation was still a major concern among Ukrainian refugees. Ukrainians were still not recognized as a separate ethnic group by some authorities, and many UNRRA officials, committed as they were to repatriation, were screening Ukrainian refugees with an eye jaundiced by the Soviets. These fears were allayed somewhat when the UNRRA was replaced by another UN-sponsored agency, the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which was pledged to honour the wishes of DPs who refused to return to their homelands for political or religious reasons. From that moment, the primary focus of the UUARC shifted from relief to resettlement. Meanwhile, on 16 September 1947, UUARC credibility in the United States was further enhanced when it was accredited by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, a federal board organized in 1946 to “guide the public and agencies seeking the support of the public in the appropriate and productive use of voluntary contributions for foreign aid.” When IRO began its work in Europe, there were approximately 1.25 million refugees still remaining both in DP camps and outside them in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Some 210,000 of those were refugees from Ukraine. Working with other Ukrainian refugee organizations in Europe, UUARC representatives processed applications for other nations, most notably Argentina. At the same time, UUARC officials discouraged immigration to such Latin American countries as Brazil and Paraguay, where living

standards were low. Resettlement in the United States was still not a realistic option because of immigration quotas established in 1929. Those quotas discriminated against Ukrainians: 1) because quotas were purposely lower for immigrants from eastern and southern Europe; and 2) because they were allocated to countries in existence after World War I. Since Ukraine was not a recognized nation-state, Ukrainians who immigrated to the United States were forced to do so within the relatively low quotas assigned to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union.

The U.S. immigration door opened slightly in December 1945, when President Truman issued a directive granting preference to refugees, within the quota, who had an American sponsor willing to sign an affidavit pledging assistance to the new immigrant after his arrival in America. Some 42,000 displaced persons were admitted to the United States in 1946 as a result of that directive, including a small group of Ukrainians. The president's action was significant because it broadened the criteria for DP status. For the first time, the designation "displaced person" included not only victims of Nazi oppression such as forced labourers and concentration camp inmates, but victims of communist oppression as well. Truman's directive was not well received by the American public. Mail received at the White House was against admission of DPs (by a margin of seven to one), and the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) made public statements opposing resettlement in America. However, the president persevered. In his 1947 State of the Union message, Truman urged America's legislative branch "to turn its attention to this world problem in an effort to find ways whereby we can fulfill our responsibilities to those thousands of homeless and suffering refugees of all faiths."¹⁹

The Displaced Persons Act

Soon after the Eightieth Congress convened in 1947, a number of bills were introduced to ease immigration restrictions, including one by Congressman Emanuel Celler (Democrat, New York), which would have made available to DPs the immigration quota of any European nationality that was unused by 30 September of the fiscal years 1947 and 1948. The Celler bill was never reported out of committee. On 1 April a bill was introduced by Congressman William G. Stratton (Republican, Illinois), authorizing the admission of 100,000 DPs a year for a period of four years. In the Stratton bill, a DP was anyone living in Germany, Austria or Italy who: 1) was out of his country of former residence as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of World War II; and 2) was unable or unwilling to return to the country of his nationality or former residence because of persecution or his fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion.²⁰ Despite almost unanimously favourable press reaction to the bill, opposition was still voiced by the American Legion and VFW executives, who argued that admission of refugees would only exacerbate the shortage of

housing and lead to unemployment among veterans. Other opponents of the bill labelled DPs as degenerates, criminals, and subversives who would never adjust to American life. Urging a return to the national origins system of the 1920s, they proposed resettlement of refugees in Africa and Alaska. Still other opponents argued that many of the refugees were communist agents anxious to come to America in order to subvert the American way of life. The Stratton bill was also defeated in committee.

On 7 July President Truman sent a message to Congress re-emphasizing the need for legislation permitting DPs to enter the United States. He argued that they were hardy and resourceful or they would not have survived the war; they were opposed to totalitarianism; and "because of their burning faith in the principles of freedom and democracy," they had suffered privation and hardship. He also said many DPs already had "strong roots in this country—by kinship, religion or national origin." A source of America's strength, the president concluded, "was the varied national origins, races and religious beliefs of the American people." Given the anti-ethnic trend so prevalent in America during the previous three decades, it was a bold statement.²¹

During the fall congressional recess, a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee travelled to Europe "to gain a grasp of the problem of displaced persons through direct observation...." Subcommittee members visited over 150 DP camps in the American, British, and French zones of Germany and Austria, and met with various IRO representatives, government officials, military authorities, voluntary agency directors, and other interested parties. In their report, subcommittee members rejected forced repatriation of persons "who have a legitimate fear of political or religious persecution in their homelands" as morally unacceptable and urged all nations "capable of receiving these displaced persons into their economies and national life" to do so.²² A Senate judiciary subcommittee visited DP camps early in 1948 and the result was S. 2242, a controversial bill that adopted the IRO definition of a displaced person, but restricted it to persons who entered the American, French or British zones of occupation between 1 September 1938 and 22 December 1945. Preference would have been given to people with agricultural skills (some 50 per cent of those admitted were to be in this category), people with skills needed in their resettlement locale, and people from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and east of the Curzon line in Poland. Only 100,000 refugees would have been allowed entrance under the bill's provisions.

On the House side, Congressman Frank Fellows (Republican, Maine) introduced a bill on 7 April 1948 that defined DPs as people who were in the camps on 21 April 1948 and authorized the issuance of visas in proportion to the total number of DPs in each nationality. Preference would be given to professional/technical people as well as agricultural workers and persons with blood relatives in the United States. The bill provided for the admission of 200,000 DPs. The original bill never came out of committee, but on 29 April Congress-

man Fellows introduced a similar bill that passed the House on 11 June by a vote of 289 to 91. After acrimonious and bitter debate, an amendment to increase the number of DPs to 200,000 was accepted by the Senate, and S. 2242 was passed by a vote of 63 to 13 on 2 June. Senate and House conferees met, bridged their differences, and passed the legislation on to the president. The final version of the bill permitted a total of 205,000 refugees to enter the United States over a two-year period. Although unhappy with many provisions of the legislation, President Truman signed it into law on 25 June 1948. He expressed his hope that future amendments would rectify the defects. (At the time, there were approximately 835,000 DPs still living in Europe, of whom an estimated 138,622 were Ukrainians.)

The United States Displaced Persons Commission was created in August. From its inception it became apparent that two years was not enough time to organize a resettlement program; create an effective administrative apparatus; develop rules, regulations, and procedures; and physically transport 205,000 persons to the United States. In its first semi-annual report to the president and congress, the commission made twelve specific legislative recommendations, including expanding the program to authorize 400,000 visas over a four-year period; establishing a revolving fund for loans to voluntary agencies in order to meet the reception and transportation expenses for displaced persons from their ports of entry to their destinations; and, most significantly for Ukrainians, changing the eligibility date for DPs' presence in Germany, Austria, and Italy from 22 December 1945 to 21 April 1947. That provision removed discriminatory restrictions against worthy refugees who fled Iron Curtain countries subsequent to 1945.

On 13 January 1949, Congressman Cellar introduced another bill that embodied many commission recommendations, including a provision to extend the life of the commission to 30 June 1953. That bill died in committee, but Congressman Cellar introduced a similar bill (HR 4567) on 9 May, and after much heated debate, during which opponents argued that screening procedures were inadequate, the bill passed the House on 3 June. Senate debate over HR 4567 lasted for months. In the interim, several congressional committees investigated the DP program, including the Subcommittee on Relations with International Organizations of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department. In 1949 the subcommittee recommended nine basic changes to the law that closely followed commission recommendations. Also significant was the special subcommittee report of the House Committee on the Judiciary entitled "Displaced Persons in Europe and Their Resettlement in the United States," submitted on 20 January 1950. The subcommittee, supported by staff experts, visited various DP camps and stressed personal contact, unscheduled visits, hearings with a free exchange of questions and answers, and briefings by military and civilian personnel.

Investigating charges of widespread fraud, falsification and forging of documents by prospective DPs, the subcommittee reported that: "The number of screening agencies, screening sessions, interrogations and checks that a displaced person must pass before reaching the United States is so extensive that the chance of a fraudulent statement or a forged document to 'slip through' is practically nil."²³ Every applicant under the Displaced Persons Act was checked by:

- a. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
- b. The Counter-Intelligence Corps of the U.S. Army, which included twenty-one separate investigative steps before a report was submitted to the DP Commission
- c. The Central Intelligence Agency
- d. The Provost-Marshal General of the U.S. Army in Germany
- e. The fingerprint record centre in Heidelberg
- f. The Berlin Document Center
- g. A special check by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice through stationing of immigration inspectors overseas in the DP resettlement centres as well as at ports of entry
- h. A check by consular officers especially assigned for this program
- i. A special investigation in connection with displaced persons whose country of origin had been overrun by communists.²⁴

The subcommittee concluded that it was "strongly inclined to believe that the majority of allegations can be safely classified either as rumors or deliberate misrepresentations intended to serve a definite purpose."

The Senate passed HR 4567 on 5 April and on 16 June 1950 the bill was signed into law by President Truman. Amendments to the 1948 Displaced Persons Act extended the life of the DP Commission to 30 June 1951 and included a change in the eligibility deadline from 22 December 1945 to 1 January 1949; expansion of the admission quota to 341,000 persons; elimination of an agricultural workers' quota; a requirement that sponsors be American citizens; and a provision for loans to accredited public and private agencies involved with resettlement. Legislation enacted in 1951 extended the operation of the commission to 31 December 1951.²⁵ Subsequent legislation permitted the commission to terminate its activities on 31 August 1952.²⁶ By the time the last DP ship arrived on 21 July 1952, some 395,000 new immigrants had been admitted to the United States under the provisions of the amended act.²⁷

The UUARC Resettlement Program

The Displaced Persons Commission co-operated with various federal agencies during its four-year history, and established a close working relationship with various American voluntary agencies and thirty-six state DP commissions,

created by local governors and state legislatures. Of all the state commissions, Michigan enjoyed the greatest local support. State employees were assigned to assist in its operations and donations were received from such organizations as the Community Chest of Metropolitan Detroit.²⁸ The Michigan commission was headed for a time by John Panchuk, who remained UUARC president until 1951, when he was succeeded by Luka Myshuha.²⁹ In both voluntary agencies and state commissions the Ukrainian presence was evident.

During the initial months of its existence, the commission limited its accreditation to those agencies which had resettlement experience and were registered by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. On 21 October 1948, the commission recognized nine agencies, of which only one, UUARC, was a purely ethnic American organization. By the end of the program, ten more organizations were accredited, five of which were ethnic. All registrants worked under the supervision of a special American agency, established to assure reliability; were required to file fiscal and programme reports, and had to place their overseas operations under the directorship of an American citizen.³⁰ The Displaced Persons Act as amended, as well as the extraordinary relationship which the UUARC enjoyed within the Displaced Persons Commission framework, permitted the UUARC to create an organizational network that resulted in the resettlement to the United States of almost 33,000 Ukrainians by 30 June 1952.³¹

The first priority was to find thousands of qualified Ukrainian-American sponsors willing to sign housing and employment assurances for most of the Ukrainian displaced persons whom the UUARC sponsored. With the help of the Ukrainian-American press, which consistently emphasized the moral and national obligation of Ukrainian Americans to their needy brethren overseas, as well as through various meetings, speeches, and rallies throughout the United States, the UUARC was able to find sponsors in all of the states where Ukrainian communities existed.

A second priority was to expand the UUARC's European apparatus in order efficiently to process and prepare prospective immigrants for life in America and co-ordinate travel arrangements to the United States. To prepare immigrants, the UUARC sponsored English-language classes and provided copies of Ukrainian-American newspapers, among other things. Anticipating congressional passage of some type of DP legislation, the UUARC had established its main office in Munich on 1 December 1947, under the directorship of Roman Smook, a lawyer from Chicago. Branches also were established in other cities, including Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Bremen, and Salzburg. UUARC operations in Europe eventually included fifty-eight full-time employees and an additional thirty volunteers from IRO. Smook returned to the United States after two years and was succeeded by Michael Rodyk who, with the exception of a one-year period during which Myroslav Kalba was director, remained as director until 1953. By the end of

1950, when Dr. Gallan visited Europe for a third time, some 20,000 displaced Ukrainians had been processed through the Munich office.

A third important priority of resettlement was the creation of a UUARC organizational apparatus in the United States that could greet Ukrainian DPs at their port of entry, attend to all of the necessary immigration formalities, provide temporary room and board, and assist the new immigrants to reach their final destinations. Reception centres were established in New York City, New Orleans, and Boston where, on 30 October 1948, the first boatload of IRO-sponsored refugees arrived. Among them were some 200 Ukrainians. The first ship carrying UUARC-sponsored DPs arrived in Boston on 17 January 1949.

The fourth UUARC priority was the creation of inland processing centres where new immigrants could receive temporary lodging until their sponsors or others could tend to their more permanent needs. UUARC centres were created in seventy locales—mostly in UNA and UNAA halls and in Catholic and Orthodox parish halls, located primarily in Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, Rochester, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Hartford, Scranton, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, and Baltimore. In every one of the larger cities there were Ukrainian Americans who sponsored fifty or more families, many of which were not even related to the sponsor. The sponsors were willing to take time off from their own jobs to find housing and employment for all of them. Given the number of Ukrainians who eventually immigrated and the time span within which they needed to be resettled, it was a voluntary effort of significant proportions.

Despite the UUARC's best efforts, there were still a number of DPs in Europe for whom no Ukrainian-American sponsors could be found in the time allotted. So the UUARC pursued the fifth priority, agricultural work. UUARC representatives travelled to various states and were able to obtain commitments from DP commissions in North Dakota, Oklahoma, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. The most enthusiastic response came from Maryland where, on 8 March 1949, the governor signed a blanket assurance for some 200 Ukrainian families (771 individuals), all of whom were expected to arrive in time for the spring and summer crop season. Owing to travel delays and other problems, the UUARC was never able fully to honour its contract with the farmers, many of whom refused to accept DPs who came after the fall harvest. Among those who did arrive on time, moreover, there were some whose agricultural skills were either minimal or non-existent or who were too weak to take on the hard physical labour required of them. Although the majority completed the one year of work for which they were contracted, some Ukrainians fled to the cities at the first opportunity. Because of these problems, the UUARC was forced to curtail its Maryland project and to work only with those farmers who had had good experiences with Ukrainians and were anxious to sponsor more. The crisis which the UUARC experienced with farmers was not peculiar to Ukrainians. Other agencies had similar setbacks with resettlement in America's agricultural areas.

The UUARC, of course, was not the only American voluntary organization involved with Ukrainian resettlement in the United States. The War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the Church World Service of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America also participated, bringing the total number of resettled Ukrainians in the United States, under the Displaced Persons Act, to approximately 70,000 or 18 per cent of all DPs who came to America.³²

The Refugee Relief Act

Although the number of refugees in Europe had been substantially reduced, overpopulation was still a problem. On the initiative of the American government, an international conference was held to address the problem in December 1951. On 24 March 1952, President Truman sent a special message to congress, recommending the admission of 100,000 additional persons a year for three years from the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Greece. Refugees from communism were included in the president's recommendation.³³ Legislation was subsequently introduced, and on 31 July 1953, the Refugee Relief Act was signed into law, which permitted an additional 210,000 persons to immigrate to the United States. Of this number, 35,000 were to be refugees still living in Western Europe. Appealing once again to the Ukrainian-American community, the UUARC was able to collect the necessary assurances and to resettle an additional 5,000 Ukrainians from Germany as well as a few from France and Belgium. At about the same time, the UUARC succeeded in bringing over 774 Ukrainians who had completed their work contracts in Tunisia and were still eligible to resettle under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.³⁴

Thus ended the last mass resettlement efforts of America's Ukrainian community. The third immigration quickly adjusted to their new environment and today, more than forty years after the first few postwar Ukrainian refugees arrived in 1946, they are an integral part of the Ukrainian-American community. Most have prospered in the United States, and their children are enjoying a socio-economic level that would astound members of the first immigration and continues to amaze those few members of the second immigration who are still around to applaud their accomplishments.

Notes

1. Ostap Tarnavsky, *Brat-Bratovi: Knyha pro ZUADK* (Philadelphia: UUARC, 1971), 7-83.
2. *Ibid.*, 35-6.
3. *Ibid.*, 36-9.

4. *Ibid.*, 39-83.
5. Mark R. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation* (Urbana, Ill., 1982), 30-49. See also Nikolai Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta* (London, 1977), 77-99.
6. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 80-97, 172.
7. Many of those letters were subsequently published in *Svoboda, America, Narodna volia*, and the *Ukrainian Weekly*. The UCCA published a thirty-one page brochure entitled *Plight of Ukrainian DPs* (New York, 1945).
8. *Plight of Ukrainian DPs*.
9. See archives of John Panchuk and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, Immigration History Research Center (hereinafter IHRC), University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
10. Marshall M. Vance (Assistant to the Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, State Department) to Charles Wolch (United American Organizations, Philadelphia), 30 November 1945, UUARC Papers, Box 193, IHRC.
11. John Panchuk (UUARC president) to U.S. Secretary of War, 28 January 1946, Panchuk Papers, IHRC.
12. Edward F. Witsell (Adjutant General, U.S. War Department) to John Panchuk, 20 February 1946, Panchuk Papers, IHRC.
13. See Yuri Boshyk and Boris Balan, *Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons": A Selected Bibliography and Guide to Research with Special Reference to Ukrainians* (Edmonton, 1982), 100-2.
14. See *Plight of Ukrainian DPs*.
15. Tarnavsky, *Brat-Bratovi*, 186.
16. "UNRRA's Chief of Displaced Persons Operations Urges Repatriations," press release, 24 March 1947, Panchuk Papers, IHRC.
17. *Repatriation News*, 14 June 1947, Panchuk Papers, IHRC.
18. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta*, 156-7.
19. Tarnavsky, *Brat-Bratovi*, 44, 83-90, 184. See also *The DP Story: The Final Report of the United States Displaced Persons Commission* (Washington, 1952), 6-11.
20. *The DP Story*, 11-12.
21. *Ibid.*, 17.
22. *Ibid.*, 18.
23. *Ibid.*, 35.
24. *Ibid.*, 100.
25. *Ibid.*, 35-41, 100.
26. *Ibid.*, 120.
27. *Ibid.*, 242.

28. Ibid., 298.
29. Tarnavsky, *Brat-Bratovi*, 116.
30. Ibid., 269-70.
31. *The DP Story*, 292. Tarnavsky claims that more than 35,000 displaced persons were resettled in the United States by the UUARC, while Gallan claims 40,000. Tarnavsky, *Brat-Bratovi*, 140, 188.
32. Tarnavsky, *Brat-Bratovi*, 91-143.
33. *The DP Story*, 351.
34. Tarnavsky, *Brat-Bratovi*, 166-70.

The Canadian Government and DPs, 1945-8

Harold Troper

The war in Europe did not end in the searing heat of an atomic fireball as it did in the Pacific. In Europe the military crusade against the Nazis dragged on and on as Allied armies hammered away at the Axis on several fronts. In the spring of 1945 the Allies finally encircled and overwhelmed an exhausted German heartland. If Allied victory in Europe came slowly, a major human crisis emerged with unexpected rapidity. The retreating Nazi armies left in their wake tens of thousands of dispossessed and dislocated souls from across Europe. They included a tattered remnant of Nazi death camp survivors and hollow-eyed members of forced labour battalions. At war's end, as a new political order fixed itself over Eastern Europe, others who had willingly or unwillingly collaborated with the Nazis and those who preferred exile to rule by the new masters of Eastern Europe joined the mass of humanity of varied national and ethnic backgrounds known collectively as Displaced Persons. When the dust finally settled, more than one million persons needed new homes.¹

No matter the magnitude of the immediate refugee crisis, Canada, like its other Western Allies, initially saw the problem as a temporary one. These postwar refugees, Canada had agreed, would only be refugees as long as they did not have a place to go. In the first flush of victory, in the naive euphoria of Nazism's defeat, Canadian officials fully expected that everyone would have a place to go—home. Once land transportation was re-established and civil authority reconstituted, all refugees would be helped back to their country of citizenship. If the Norwegians went back to Norway, the French to France, the Poles to Poland, Russians to the Soviet Union, and Ukrainians to their country of legal

citizenship, the Canadians reasoned, then displaced persons would be displaced no more. Postwar refugee planning had been predicated on repatriation. As such it was an administrative problem. Once DPs refused to go home, the problem became a crisis.

As far as Canada was concerned, the sole job of Allied refugee personnel and international agencies such as UNRRA was to organize a temporary holding action. They had only to sort out this mass of humanity and, in accord with Allied planning, facilitate their orderly repatriation. If Canadian expectations were not matched by European realities, as more than a million DPs rejected repatriation, it did not lessen Canada's immediate postwar commitment to repatriation as the just and simple solution to the problem of DPs. Canada did not look with favour on forced repatriation, but neither did it hold out much sympathy for obdurate DPs who seemed intent on messing up the prospect of postwar harmony in Europe by refusing to go home. If some DPs chose to continue as refugees rather than go home, they did so on their own. Canada had no legal or moral obligation toward them. Above all, Canada had no obligation to offer them a new home.²

The failure of repatriation soon became a festering sore on the body of European stability and reconstruction, but for most Canadians it remained a distant problem. Except for contributions of money and relief personnel, Canada maintained a hands-off policy regarding the DP issue. There were enough immediate problems on the home front to occupy the government. It saw no reason to involve itself with refugee problems engaging the four major occupying powers in Europe. Sixty thousand Canadian troops and their dependants had to be brought home and systematically discharged. Jobs had to be found for them. The economy—for six years on a war footing—had to be weaned off its diet of massive public spending and reprogrammed for peacetime consumption.

This preoccupation with jobs and economic stability was understandable. Canadian economists and government planners were only too aware that the depression of the 1930s, with its crippling unemployment and consequent social disorder, had not been resolved by any Canadian-style New Deal. It was the war, with its accompanying orgy of public spending, that had ended the depression. What, planners worried, would prevent Canada from sliding back into a 1930s-like depression in the postwar era once the tap of public funds was shut off? What would thousands of young and battle-hardened Canadian servicemen do if joyful demobilization was followed by jobless demoralization? The prospect was frightening. There was no time for European refugees. All was geared to domestic reconstruction.

If Canadian officials misread the prospect for universal refugee repatriation in Europe, so they misread economic prospects for Canada. They failed to foresee a dramatic domestic economic upswing. Prosperity, fed by long pent-up consumer demand and seemingly insatiable international markets for Canadian raw materials needed in the reconstruction of Europe, confounded the planners.

After a sputtering start, the Canadian economy did not fall into a slump as expected. It surged forward. By early 1946 the problem was not a shortage of jobs but a shortage of labour. One might expect that with unanticipated prosperity and resulting labour shortages Canada would quickly throw its doors open to the pools of available labour in Europe and to DPs in particular. Canadian economic planners marvelled at the suddenness of recovery, but sincerely doubted its durability. They still saw darkness at the end of the tunnel. After planning for so long to cope with an anticipated postwar backslide into a depression, they stood by delighted but bewildered, seemingly unable to grasp the implications of surging economic prosperity, let alone believe it could last.³

Perhaps nowhere were government planners more cautious than when it came to wrestling with postwar labour shortages. Unemployment had been the scourge of the 1930s. Without some security that the postwar economic surge would not evaporate like morning dew, bringing with it the return of mass unemployment, few were ready to endorse any scheme to enlarge the labour pool, especially when immigration was offered as a method of doing so. Politicians and public servants, whose careers were built in the bleak days of the depression, found the very notion of peacetime labour shortages difficult enough to accept. The idea of opening the door to job-hungry immigration was a disconcerting prospect.

Yet the Canadian labour supply was not meeting the postwar demand. What is more, according to the government's own research, the labour deficiency was most acute in the primary rural economic sectors, such as farming and lumbering, where physically demanding labour was required. Efforts to recruit domestic labour to meet the shortfall in these and other areas were unsuccessful. A postwar study commissioned by the Department of Labour lamented that native-born Canadians continued to reject this type of employment. The report recommended that the Department of Labour press the cabinet to approve the importation of immigrant labour as a means of easing the critical shortage. The Department of Labour was plagued by domestic labour shortages, but the administration of an immigration policy was not within its organizational mandate.⁴ That rested with the federal Immigration Branch, which had its own agenda—unyielding defence of existing policy.⁵

Postwar Canadian immigration policy had been forged on the anvil of interwar restrictionist sentiment. A turn-of-the-century generation of Canadians had watched with a mixture of satisfaction and concern as active immigration solicitation by federal and provincial governments, working in conjunction with the railways and labour-hungry extractive industry, brought thousands of European immigrants—including many Ukrainians—to Canada. These Ukrainians and other immigrants, the legendary stalwart peasants in sheepskin coats, are today the stuff of community folklore. At the time, however, those immigrants were brought into Canada as the cutting edge of agro-development in marginal prairie

farmlands and to supply the cheap labour pool needed by burgeoning labour-intensive industries. Immigration policy was hardly a manifestation of humanitarian concern for the world's needy. It was constructed on the twin pillars of economic self-interest and ethnic selectivity. Admission of foreigners was desired or, at least, tolerated only so long as economic necessity outweighed racial fears. A decline in economic prospects and the door was shut—more tightly against some groups of would-be immigrants than others.

Such was the case following World War I. The economic expansion of the prewar and war years was not long sustained into the postwar period. Labour was no longer needed. Politicians favouring immigration restrictions, especially against those considered to be racially less desirable peoples, gained wide public support. Officials responded with restrictions. Unlike the United States, they did not change the existing Immigration Act. Rather, they tinkered with the regulations supporting the act. With little difficulty they selectively cut off the flow of immigration by establishing a rigid order of ethnic preference as racially biased as it was popularly endorsed. With little or no forewarning, draconian restrictions were written into immigration regulations in 1923. In that year cabinet approved regulatory adjustments by which all would-be immigrants would thereafter be ranked in a descending preferential scale by ethnicity and country of origin and, secondarily, by occupation.

British and American settlers were in a class of their own—allowed unrestricted admission. Following closely came most Western European immigrants, grouped together as Preferred Class immigrants. Their admission to Canada, except for documentation and health requirements, remained virtually unrestricted. Most central and Eastern Europeans, including Ukrainians and other Slavs, were designated as Undesirable Class Immigrants. Severe restrictions were placed in the way of their immigration. As a gesture to powerful railway interests anxious to keep the flow of settlers moving onto western lands, bona fide farmers of this class with independent means were still encouraged to come. Non-agriculturalists were severely restricted. Furthermore, impediments to family reunification and other regulations which previously allowed those in Canada to sponsor immigrants were tightened up so as to gradually choke off this flow. Only one class of would-be European immigrant was ranked below the Undesirable Class. A Permit Class, made up largely of those from southern Europe and all Jews, no matter what their country of origin, was prohibited entry into Canada except by special permit granted by cabinet. With the depression in 1930, these already severe restrictions, based on ethnicity and country of origin, were tightened still further. Canada became almost hermetically sealed to immigration.⁶

Immigration regulations in force at the end of World War II were those instituted in 1923 and 1930. What is more, high-ranking postwar immigration personnel were the same career civil servants who had dedicated their professional lives to immigration restriction. After years in the public service, they

knew no other duty except to defend Canadian shores against any influx of the Undesirable, let alone Permit, Class immigrant. No matter how much postwar Canadian economic recovery required labour, these officials found the very suggestion of reopening immigration—including Eastern European Displaced Persons—a policy heresy.

Nevertheless, as postwar prosperity continued, arguments favouring the immigration of DPs to satisfy the growing labour needs of the country grew more insistent. The chorus of immigration advocates included ethnic organizations interested in opening the door to their kith and kin and, far more important, influential spokesmen for labour-intensive industries and their public service allies. By early 1947 these voices could not be denied. They won over influential cabinet members, including C.D. Howe, Minister for Reconstruction, who was responsible for national economic growth and development.⁷ He pushed for and won agreement in cabinet that immigration to Canada would be reopened.

There was still one major hurdle standing in the way of the government immigration program. Apologists for government inaction on immigration persisted in arguing that demobilization of Canadian troops still took priority over immigration and that a shortage of transatlantic passenger space precluded positive action anyway. These were only half-truths. Demobilization had moved ahead more smoothly and quickly than originally expected and the lack of transatlantic shipping was a problem which immigration officials had knowingly exacerbated by carefully refusing to address it, lest its solution lead to increased demand for Continental immigration. The real problem was that many in cabinet, including some who conceded the economic advantage of importing immigrant labour, were still not convinced that the economic benefits of opening immigration would outweigh the potentially negative political consequences the government might face at the hands of the voters. If public opinion polls indicated an upswing in popular support for immigration generally, and economic arguments for renewed immigration were winning editorial support, cabinet still worried that a fickle public would not prove so accepting of immigrants once DPs from Eastern Europe disembarked on Canadian soil. Government officials had reason to be concerned. If allowing immigration of DP labour was desirable on economic grounds, the government pondered how to open Canada's doors to some groups of DPs while retaining barriers against others, particularly Jews. The Jewish question had to be resolved before the wholesale admission of immigrants, including DPs, could begin.⁸

Much of the organized Ukrainian community, like that of other groups, wanted nothing less than wholesale admissions, with priority given to those with immediate family in Canada. The war in Europe had barely come to an end when the director of immigration complained to External Affairs that his office was "being literally flooded with applications from former residents of Continental Europe now in Canada for the admission of relatives from Europe, the

majority of whom are [DPs] residing in Germany, Italy and countries recently liberated from enemy control.”⁹ A confidential External Affairs report of January 1946 reported that External Affairs was also under pressure from “foreign language organizations and residents of foreign origin who are seeking asylum for associates and relatives who for various reasons cannot return to their homelands.” Ukrainians posed a special problem. Reflecting the sentiment percolating through the diplomatic community of the day, he warned that much of this lobbying was on behalf of “the political agitator with the enemy during the war.... Representations have already been received in Ottawa on behalf of a group of Ukrainian refugees including such nationalist leaders as Skoropadsky and Melnyk, who operated from Germany and apparently under German auspices in the pre-war years. These men are regarded, with some justification, as traitors and war criminals by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.” The External Affairs official who wrote this report counselled his superiors and immigration authorities against any lowering of immigration barriers to “Nazi sympathizers,” since any “desire to continue their political activities [in] their new homes, might have highly undesirable consequences.”¹⁰

This warning about collaborators fell on uncaring ears, at least in the Immigration Branch. To the degree that most immigration authorities in early 1946 were concerned over Ukrainian and other DPs, it was not out of fear of admitting unrepentant Nazi sympathizers. Their concern was to hold the line against admitting anyone. Arguments in favour of admission of labourers and first-degree relatives of those in Canada left immigration personnel unmoved. For twenty-five years immigration authorities had politely but firmly dismissed appeals from Eastern European ethnic communities on behalf of their relatives in Europe. Postwar appeals were handled no differently.

Ethnic group representations to immigration authorities may have carried little weight, but others had political clout. In late 1946, immigration authorities faced the inevitable, or rather, had it imposed on them. Confronted by continuing labour shortages, an economic recovery that showed few signs of slowing, massive pressure from business interests, a growing voice from within cabinet for immediate reopening of immigration and humanitarian appeals from Canadian ethnic communities, cabinet finally took firm action. Immigration from Continental Europe was finally promised, if half-heartedly authorized. At first, the government moved reluctantly, as if testing public reaction. Once satisfied the public was amenable to reopening immigration, if somewhat concerned about the ethnic suitability of would-be immigrants, the government approved two programs—one for the reunification of first-degree relatives and one to admit to Canada 2,000 Allied Polish war veterans who refused repatriation.

To Canadian ethnic communities, the authorization of family reunification seemed, on the surface, a major breakthrough. The plan permitted Canadian citizens or residents to apply to bring first-degree family members from Europe to Canada. Unfortunately, when it came to implementing the program, there was

less there than met the eye. Canadians could indeed apply to bring family from Europe, including family from DP camps, but filling out an application guaranteed nothing. Immigration authorities accepted applications on behalf of family in DP camps, but for almost a year simply filed them away. Officials claimed they could not process those applications until Canadian immigration personnel were stationed in Germany, Austria, and Italy, which the Immigration Branch refused to do. Instead, as applications for DPs piled up in Ottawa, immigration authorities expedited the reunification applications for relatives from northern and Western Europe, especially the lowland countries. DPs would have to wait.¹¹

The Polish war veteran scheme was a different situation. There were no problems of processing. The Poles, or rather their muscle, were desperately needed in Canada and needed quickly. Approved applicants were quickly admitted on contract to work in the hard-pressed farm and lumbering sectors, where they replaced German prisoners of war recently repatriated to Germany.¹² The enormous success of that Polish scheme and the unremitting pressure from business interests for more and diversified DP labour importation finally broke the dam. As if to override the negativism of the Immigration Branch, cabinet, finally committed to the immigration of labour as an economic necessity, made the Department of Labour responsible for importing labour. Immigration personnel were ordered to process applicants with dispatch. Older Immigration Branch personnel were quietly retired and immediately replaced by new and more liberal appointees.¹³ A new era had opened. In the spring of 1947, a quota of 5,000 DP labourers for jobs in Canada was approved. Within a year the quota had notched steadily upwards to 40,000. The door was open—although only selectively so—and, for much of the public, reluctantly so.¹⁴

Using the Polish labour arrangement as a model, most of the quota assigned to DPs was designated for specialized labour projects. That is, an employer or consortium of employers within one industry could apply to the Department of Labour to bring a specified number of labourers and their families, if any, to Canada under employment contracts. Although Immigration and Labour Department personnel administered the processing of those selected in co-operation with the employers, those labour schemes were officially classed as special programs—exceptions to existing immigration legislation rather than part of any normal flow of immigration. Economic necessity may have pried open the Canadian door, but it did not eliminate the longstanding ethnic selectivity so characteristic of Canadian immigration. In an effort to ensure that the labour inflow to Canada encountered the least possible public resistance, the government again fell back on its experience with the Polish scheme. Jews were secretly and effectively barred from most labour programs.¹⁵

Ukrainians, on the other hand, fared much better than Jews, although they met with something less than universal enthusiasm from government officials.

As early as October 1946, when government was still weighing the merits of DP labour programs, Colonel S. M. Scott, a member of the Canadian Military Mission in Germany, wrote a lengthy assessment of DPs in Europe. His memorandum, widely distributed by External Affairs, raised concerns about Ukrainians. In the first place, Scott suggested, it was difficult to determine exactly who qualified as a Ukrainian. Like most national or ethnic labels in postwar Europe, that of Ukrainian was worn only so long as it was convenient: "Ukrainians were once apt to declare themselves Russians; when Russian liaison teams were set up they became Poles and as the Polish repatriation drive intensified they became Ukrainians."¹⁶ Scott was, nevertheless, warmly disposed toward Ukrainians by whatever label and underscored their potential value as settlers in Canada. Both his description of Ukrainians and his definition of the type of settlers needed by Canada, however, did not necessarily speak well of either the Ukrainian image or Colonel Scott's vision of Canadian society. He lauded Ukrainians as "unimaginative, industrious, conscientious peasants, very religious and without initiative." According to him, if Canada wanted hard workers with strong backs and weak minds, then Ukrainians fit the bill. Since Ukrainians were less "ingenious and inventive" than Balts, not given to the "haughty [sic], temperamental and visionary" nature of the Pole, and not nearly as aggressively self-assertive as Jews, Ukrainians would, he believed, labour long and without complaint. No need to worry that Ukrainians would ever rock the boat of their Anglo-Canadian superiors.¹⁷

Other Canadian observers were even less charitable toward Ukrainians whom, as often as not, they lumped together with Poles. Major M. C. Bordet, for instance, the Canadian second-in-command of DP operations for the Eighth Army Corps, warned Canadian immigration authorities: "They will be a charge to the state from the very date that they are let in. Our police force will have their work doubled."¹⁸ Wing Commander J. W. P. Thompson simply warned that Poles and Ukrainians alike "are difficult people to manage and that they have often caused local authorities many headaches."¹⁹ In another assessment of the relative merits of different DP groups—dispatched to the Canadian High Commission in London by a member of his staff—Baltic DPs were, as usual in such assessment reports, ranked at the top. Ukrainians were described as given to intra-communal bickering between Catholic and Orthodox groups. To their credit, however, Ukrainians were said to be "a fairly clean living, rather hard-working simple people, without much education, who are anxious to have a job, a home and security.... Most of the people described are the victims of circumstance but the fact remains that many, through no fault of their own, lack both a sense of morals and a desire to work."²⁰

Whatever the assessments, however, the government's bottom line was now set. DP labour was an undesirable but unavoidable necessity. The chairman of the Department of Labour's Prairie Regional Advisory Board did not mince his words. Commenting on plans to admit DP labourers to Canada, he explained:

"The only thing that I do not like about the plan...is the predominance of Central Europeans, and would hope that this would be balanced in some way by an equal number of men and women of Anglo-Saxon descent."²¹ He would have his wish. Nevertheless, the die had been cast. The government in 1947 committed itself to DP immigration. Recruiting refugees to fill Canadian labour shortages and, at long last, the processing of applications for the admission of first-degree relatives to Canada began. For DPs, including Ukrainians but excluding Jews, the door was now as open as it had ever been since World War I.

However, DPs made up only a small part of the larger flow of immigrants into Canada after 1947. For all the government's fears, DPs raised surprisingly little hostility in the larger established social setting. Perhaps because the government moved so cautiously and selectively, perhaps because DPs generally played the role assigned to them, perhaps because postwar Canada was undergoing such enormous social upheaval, DP immigration, including that of Ukrainians, did not stand out as a particular social irritant.

Ironically, once the door was opened, no matter how reluctantly or self-servingly, the government which had been so negative was not above making what political capital it could out of the situation. It courted favour with ethnic communities in Canada, including Ukrainians, as the saviour of their European kin. In selecting lumber workers for Canada, for instance, it was assumed that a large number of those selected would be Balts. Balts were preferred by immigration officials and many had previous lumbering experience, but the Deputy Minister of Labour demanded an adjustment. He cabled his London officer overseeing the program "to include this number of Ukrainians as rush action will be favourably received in some quarters here."²²

In 1948 Canada finally enacted a new Immigration Act officially revoking twenty-five years of discriminatory barriers to the immigration of Eastern Europeans, but, in some respects, this was after the fact. The door was already opening. In the five years following the Canadian approval of admission for DPs, nearly 165,000 entered Canada. While statistics by ethnic background are notoriously bad, government figures indicate that approximately 26,000, or 17 per cent, of those admitted were Ukrainians. The number of Ukrainians almost equals that of the ever desirable Balts and only falls behind the Poles, with whom Ukrainians were so often confused.²³

Myth-making still obscures historical debate on the Canadian postwar immigration era. The actual record is perhaps best summed up in the words of then Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King. In opening a parliamentary debate on immigration policy in the spring of 1947, a debate which justified the admission of DP labour, the Prime Minister was candid:

With regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not

a 'fundamental human right' of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy. Immigration is subject to the control of the parliament of Canada. This does not mean, however, that we should not seek to remove from our legislation discrimination which appears to be objectionable.... There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alternation in the character of our population.²⁴

Notes

1. For a discussion of the number of displaced persons and the initial problems of mass relief, see Malcolm Proudfoot, *European Refugees: 1939-1952* (Evanston, Ill., 1956), 158-88, 318-68.
2. National Archives of Canada (hereinafter NAC), Immigration Papers, File 673931, Wrong to Glen, 19 August 1946. The British government was especially interested in involving Canada and the other dominions in the resettlement of refugees from the British Zone, but the Canadians refused to be drawn into the British scheme. An official in the German Department of the British Foreign Office pointed out that approaches to the dominions, including Canada, "to help us out of our difficulties with refugees...have been almost completely barren." Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers 371, File 57778, German Department, Southern Department to PMO, 29 November 1946.
3. For an overview of this era of Canadian economic growth, see *Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report* (Ottawa, 1958), 75-90.
4. External Affairs Papers, File 939-EA-40, Study no. 8, Department of Labour. See also Gerald E. Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?* (Montreal, 1977), 146-7.
5. For a discussion of postwar Canadian immigration policy and administration see Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948* (Toronto, 1982), 190-279.
6. Canada, Senate, *Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour* (Ottawa, 1946), 171-5. For a complete airing of immigration regulations and procedures, see Canada, Agriculture and Colonization, *Select Standing Committee on Agriculture and Colonization Report 1928* (Ottawa, 1928).
7. Abella and Troper, *None Is Too Many*, 228-9, 239-41.
8. Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Public Opinion News Service Release, 30 October 1946.
9. NAC, Immigration Records, File 376333, Jolliffe to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 October 1945.
10. NAC, External Affairs Papers, File A12, Vol. 2112, Confidential Report, 3 January 1946.

11. Abella and Troper, *None Is Too Many*, 241-7.
12. Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy*, 140-1; NAC, King Papers (cabinet documents and minutes), Vol. 420, Heeney, Memorandum for cabinet re: wood and agricultural labour, 21 May 1946; Vol. 419, cabinet minutes, 29 May 1946; vol. 429, Heeney, Memorandum, 11 July 1946.
13. NAC, Immigration Papers, Vol. 443, File 673931, pt. 12, Pope to King, 6 November 1946; File 673931, Jolliffe to MacNamara, 18 December 1946.
14. NAC, King Papers (cabinet documents and minutes), Vol. 421, Howe, Memorandum for cabinet re: displaced persons, 2 June 1947; Vol. 419, cabinet conclusions, 10 July 1947, 1 October 1947, 21 April 1948.
15. Abella and Troper, *None Is Too Many*, 251-7.
16. Editors' note: that phenomenon is explained in the repatriation chapters in this volume.
17. NAC, External Affairs Papers, A12, Vol. 2113, Memorandum of Scott re: movement of displaced persons to Canada, 4 November 1946.
18. NAC, Immigration Papers, Vol. 443, File 673931, pt. 12, letter of Bordet, November 1946.
19. NAC, External Affairs Papers, A12, Vol. 2113, Thompson to Scott, 18 November 1946.
20. NAC, Immigration Papers, Vol. 433, File 673931, pt. 12, Molson to Massey, 3 December 1946.
21. NAC, Department of Labour Papers, Box 275, File 1-26-1-1, Crabb to MacNamara, 21 December 1946.
22. *Ibid.*, Box 227, File 1-26-2-1, Brown to Haythorne, 7 June 1947.
23. *Annual Report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration* (Ottawa, 1954), 38.
24. *House of Commons Debates*, 1 May 1947, 2644-7.

Ukrainian DP Immigration and Government Policy in Canada, 1946-52

Myron Momryk

In the late 1940s, several “realities” of the Canadian political and bureaucratic environment influenced the Canadian government’s perspective on the Displaced Persons (DP) immigration movement in general, and Ukrainian DPs in particular. These “realities” also helped to shape government policy and management of DP immigration. This process is particularly apparent in Canadian government policy and management of three movements of DPs to Canada: the Bulk Labour Scheme, the Galician Division immigration, and the Catholic Orphan Immigration Scheme. Those three immigration movements included most of the Ukrainians who arrived in Canada during the years 1946-52.

General Background to Postwar Canadian Immigration Policy

The immigration debate over the fate of refugees and DPs began before World War II with the arrival of a few Sudeten Germans and German Jews. The Canadian Jewish community and other interested groups debated this issue during the war with varying degrees of intensity.¹ As the war was coming to an end in Europe, the debate on immigration policy became more ardent. Should immigrants, especially refugees and DPs, be allowed entry into Canada? How many and what kind of immigrants? The growing debate involved government officials, business leaders, the press, and voluntary and ethnocultural organizations (includ-

ing the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, UCC), which were particularly concerned about Ukrainian refugees and DPs. The policy makers, however, were a very small group in Ottawa composed mainly of the Liberal Cabinet and senior officials in the Departments of Mines and Resources, Labour, External Affairs, and Health and Welfare.

In Europe, providing assistance to refugees and DPs was only one of the major operations resulting from the war. The Allied governments also had to deal with such issues as repatriating prisoners of war, governing Germany, and war crimes. In Canada, when the war ended in May 1945, there was an immediate need to arrange to transport Canadian servicemen and their dependants home.² Other factors also were introduced into the growing debate on refugees, DPs, and the larger question of general immigration. War industries had to be converted to a peacetime economy and international trade had to be stabilized. There was a genuine fear among politicians and the public that the postwar economy might falter as it had at the end of World War I and economic recession, with its accompanying social and political problems, would result. The Depression of the 1930s was still a relatively recent memory for many Canadians, in particular government immigration officials.

The general national and racial prejudices of the period influenced government policy with decisive yet mixed results. Ukrainians were not exempt from these prejudices. This attitude was perhaps best summarized by Alistair Stewart, M.P.:

There is wicked discrimination against those of Ukrainian descent. We have several hundred thousand Canadians...who contributed great wealth to Canada, who have given their sons and daughters in Canada's war, and who deserve well of Canada. Yet because of their name, because of their ethnology, they find it difficult indeed to compete with Anglo-Saxons. Just the other day a young boy whose parents are Ukrainians and who had served five years in our air force, came to me. He wanted to pursue a certain line of work and asked if I could help him. I did what I could but I am afraid I was unsuccessful because the first question I was asked was as to his nationality.... He has been asked by his friends, 'Why do you aspire to this vocation? Don't you realize that you have no chance? Don't you realize you had better go to the railway shops at Weston or Transcona and work there as a labourer?'³

Ukrainian Canadians during this period were perceived by the general Canadian population in stereotyped roles as farmers and labourers. This perception became an important factor when policy regarding Ukrainian immigration to Canada was debated.

The most important element in the formulation of Canada's immigration policy, however, was section 95 of the British North America Act, which gave concurrent responsibility for immigration to federal and provincial governments. The division of powers between the federal and provincial governments in the areas of finance, education, social security and welfare, municipal government,

community and cultural development also seriously inhibited the decisive action that was required in the years 1945-52 to assist the refugees and DPs. A particularly important factor in this political debate was the attitude of Quebec. The political, religious, and cultural institutions that articulated French-Canadian opinion almost unanimously opposed any immigration movement. Quebec feared that it would eventually be overwhelmed by a growing majority of anglophones, augmented by immigrants from Europe. Quebec became particularly sensitive to federal political decisions after the Conscriptio Crisis of 1944-5. Also, the federal government began to give added weight to potential Quebec political reaction when formulating policy decisions.

At the end of World War II, the Immigration Act of 1910 was still in effect. It established the general guidelines that regulated immigration until 1952. However, an order-in-council passed on 21 March 1931 made a major change to this act by severely restricting entry into Canada. That restriction, designed for the economic conditions of the Depression, continued to be applied by Canadian immigration officials in the postwar period. Skilled and unskilled labour and, with some exceptions, contract labour were excluded. However, there were a number of preferred occupations which allowed entry—farmers (especially those with funds), farm labourers, and domestics. During the war several thousand refugees entered Canada, including civilian internees from Britain, Polish engineers and technicians, and European refugees from Spain and Portugal. An interdepartmental committee, established to assess their integration and adaptation, recommended that those refugees become regular landed immigrants. On 26 October 1945 the cabinet passed an order-in-council authorizing citizenship for over 3,500 wartime refugees.⁴

Immigration policy, however, remained basically the same as it had been before 1939. No official action had been taken to assist refugees and DPs in Europe. Ukrainian-Canadian individuals and families with relatives in DP camps applied to have them admitted to Canada. Ukrainian-Canadian organizations and members of Parliament pleaded with the federal government to allow refugees into Canada.⁵ The government replied that transportation facilities were primarily reserved for military personnel and their dependants and, therefore, not available for any immigrant movement.⁶ Nevertheless, Ukrainian refugees in Europe continued to submit applications through their Canadian relatives, creating an enormous backlog.

The legislation of the period gave the Cabinet wide discretionary powers. Under the Immigration Act of 1910, the Cabinet could issue orders-in-council to regulate the volume, ethnic origin or occupational standards of the immigration movement. On 25 October 1945 cabinet approved the recommendation of a special Cabinet committee that immigration policy should remain unchanged.⁷ Since the Cabinet decided not to amend the Immigration Act or pass new legislation, it established a subcommittee early in 1946 to examine the entire question of postwar immigration to Canada.⁸ Eventually a whole series of

committees and subcommittees at Cabinet, parliamentary, and departmental levels was established to monitor and regulate immigration. On 4 March 1946 representatives from the Departments of Labour, Health, Immigration Branch, and External Affairs formed an interdepartmental committee to discuss the refugee problem.⁹ On 9 May 1946 the Cabinet approved that committee's report, which suggested broadening the categories for immigrant eligibility, recognizing international travel documents, and reviewing all Canadian immigration policy. The Cabinet passed two orders-in-council authorizing Canadian officials to accept internationally recognized travel documents as equivalent to regular passports and Canadians with first-degree relatives in Europe to apply for their admission.¹⁰ On 8 May 1946 the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour was authorized and directed to examine the Immigration Act, its operation, administration, and the immigration question in general. The committee called witnesses, held hearings, received briefs on policy reform from various ethnocultural and other organizations, and submitted annual reports to the Senate.¹¹ The committee hearings were followed closely by many interested groups, especially transportation companies, the media, and ethnocultural organizations.

The UCC and the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA) presented briefs to the Senate committee on 29 May 1946. UCC representatives—the Rev. Dr. W. Kushnir and the Rev. S. W. Sawchuk—were accompanied by A. Hlynka, M.P., J. R. Solomon, MLA, and Flt. Lt. Bohdan Panchuk. The UCC delegation made a moving presentation and asked that Canada accept Ukrainian DPs because Ukraine was occupied by the communists, and individual liberties were suppressed. The ULFTA—represented by John Boychuk and Stephan Macievich—urged the Canadian government to reject any proposal for the immigration of Ukrainian DPs to Canada because the majority were "...war criminals...collaborators...and people who were attempting to avoid the responsibility of rebuilding Ukraine after the war."¹² The Senate committee questioned the representatives about the reliability and accuracy of the two presentations. Stephan Macievich was a long-time resident of Canada who did not serve in World War II. Flt. Lt. Panchuk, on the other hand, appeared in his RCAF uniform with two rows of ribbons on his chest. Also, Panchuk, who had been overseas three weeks earlier, described the desperate condition of the Ukrainian refugees and DPs that he had seen in Europe, produced photographs, and offered detailed answers to committee questions. Dr. Kushnir, who had recently returned from Europe, also testified. After the hearing, the senators patted Flt. Lt. Panchuk on the back and thanked him for enlightening them on an important question.¹³

During this period, the government was debating a more immediate immigration problem. In 1946 the British government inquired whether Canada would accept 4,000 Polish veterans who had refused to be repatriated to Poland. At first the Canadian government refused, but after reconsideration felt that there could be some definite benefit since, despite initial fears, the postwar economy had

entered a long period of growth. With the expansion of industry, Canadian workers and returned veterans gravitated to well-paying jobs in industrial plants in large urban centres, so a particularly severe problem was the shortage of farm labour. Prairie farmers began to submit requests for foreign workers to assist in the planting and harvesting of crops. During the last years of the war, much of this farm work had been provided by German prisoners of war, but by 1946 the German POWs were being repatriated.¹⁴

On 23 July 1946 an order-in-council was passed permitting the entry of 4,000 Polish veterans as "qualified agricultural workers" to replace the German POWs.¹⁵ Canadian immigration officers and representatives of the Department of Labour travelled to Europe to process the Polish veterans. Britain arranged and paid for transportation. Arranging farm employment removed the traditional concern that the Polish veterans would become public charges or take work away from Canadians. Processing those Poles provided valuable experience and precedents that Canadian immigration officials could apply to later similar programs for DPs. For example, the discovery of tuberculosis among some Polish veterans resulted in the regulation that all persons seeking entry to Canada must submit to X-ray examination.¹⁶

One of the more important committees established to monitor DP immigration was the Security Panel. Cabinet approved the organization of the Security Panel in July 1946. Experience had indicated that the existence of a screening system tended to discourage the introduction of undesirables into the immigration system. This panel felt that the security screening of prospective immigrants was a matter of considerable importance, for once the DPs and refugees gained entrance to Canada, deportation on legal grounds was a practical impossibility. The panel recommended that Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers be included on Immigration Teams and in immigration offices in Europe to prevent the entry of undesirable persons at the source.¹⁷

Cabinet agreed that security screening was required and it also recommended increased co-operation with United Kingdom and United States security agencies.¹⁸ It also declared that if a security investigation showed that the prospective immigrant was a communist, admission should be refused by the Immigration Branch without any reason being given.¹⁹ Earlier, on 9 April 1946, the Cabinet passed an order-in-council prohibiting the admission of enemy aliens, with the exception of those who could satisfy the minister that they were opposed to the policies of the enemy government.²⁰ The Cabinet felt that the inclusion of an additional classification of prohibited persons, which would cover members of Nazi and fascist parties, and war criminals, in a proposed bill to amend the Immigration Act was not possible because of the difficulty of drafting a suitable clause.²¹ Later it approved a recommendation that once peace treaties with enemy countries had been ratified, nationals of those countries should not be considered enemy aliens for immigration purposes.²² Limiting political prohibitions to "communists" and "enemy aliens" simplified the work of the

RCMP and also facilitated the entry of those Ukrainian refugees and DPs who convinced Canadian immigration officials that they were not communists and had not served in enemy armed forces during the war.

Bulk Labour Scheme

The shortage of labour became more acute in 1946. The programme to allow Polish veterans to enter the country as agricultural labourers was only an interim measure. On 13 August 1946 the Senate committee recommended that the Canadian government announce a policy of selective immigration for both agricultural and industrial workers, but that immigration should be limited to the absorptive capacity of the country and subject to transit priorities of servicemen and their dependants. The committee also recommended that the Immigration Act and Regulations be revised to provide for the selection of the most desirable immigrants.²³ At the same time Ukrainian-Canadian individuals, organizations, and Members of Parliament campaigned on behalf of Ukrainian DPs. On 28 August 1946 F. S. Zaplitny, M.P., said in the House that "We should take as many of these people as it is possible for the country to absorb at this time in order that they may get away from the conditions which surround them."²⁴

On 7 November 1946 in Parliament, Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced emergency measures to bring refugees and DPs to Canada. He added that arrangements had been made with the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to facilitate their movement.²⁵ On 6 December 1946 the Deputy Minister of Labour reported that as of 1 December 1946 there was a shortage of approximately 45,000 workers, mostly in the lumber and mining industries. (This estimate did not include the shortage of domestic servants.) According to the available information, Canada could absorb 20,000 heavy labourers a year for five years.²⁶ Several projects to remedy this problem were discussed, including the entry of selected groups of workers from the DP camps in Europe.

On 30 January 1947 an order-in-council was passed further widening the base for admission of close relatives. That order-in-council also provided for the admission of farmers, farm labourers, miners, and lumbermen to take up assured employment. That month an immigration officer left for Germany to make the necessary preliminary arrangements for the processing of DPs, and by March 1947 two inspection teams were in operation.²⁷ An Interdepartmental Immigration-Labour Committee was established on 27 March 1947 to advise the Cabinet Committee on Immigration on group immigration of DPs and other group immigration projects.²⁸ The first refugees sailed for Canada on 4 April 1947. An order-in-council was passed on 19 April 1947 suspending the previous order-in-council, which prohibited contract labour.²⁹

On 1 May 1947 the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons:

The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by

legislation, regulation and vigorous administration to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can be advantageously absorbed by our national economy.... An alien has no fundamental human right to enter Canada. This is a privilege. The people of Canada do not wish to make a fundamental alteration in the character of their population through mass immigration.³⁰

Those recommendations were very similar to the proposals submitted by the Senate Committee on Immigration and Labour.

On 14 July 1947 the Canadian Metal Mining Association submitted a brief on immigrant labour. Each mining company agreed to provide immediate employment for the workers they requested on condition that the immigrants qualify for the miner's health certificate as required by the Mining Act of the province concerned, pass the mining company's medical examination, and that no strike action be in progress at that time. The association emphasized the serious shortage of labour. One mining company hired 725 new employees but lost 700 during the same period. Most left for higher wages in other industries. The brief concluded that "...it cannot be anticipated that the labour requirements of the mines can be met without resorting to labour from overseas sources."³¹ Earlier, on 6 June 1947, an order-in-council was passed granting authority for the immediate admission of 5,000 DPs.³² On 18 July 1947 an additional 5,000 DPs were given admission to Canada.³³

The Immigration-Labour Committee, established to monitor the entry of DPs under various labour programs, was responsible for approving in principle the admission of stated numbers of DPs, dependent on existing labour requirements. The committee established procedures for the selection of occupational groups. In the summer of 1947 employer organizations were invited to canvass their member companies for their DP labour requirements. Those companies submitted individual applications specifying the number required and giving a written undertaking to the Department of Mines and Resources to give ten months' employment at prevailing wages and working conditions and to pay transportation costs from port of entry to the work site. The committee also received reports from the Employment Service that Canadian labour would not be available to meet the needs of employers and that the applicants were reliable. Representatives of the companies were sent overseas at company expense to assist government teams select DPs to fill the quotas. The selected DPs gave a written undertaking to the Minister of Labour to take employment in the lumber industry at prevailing wages and to work for ten months following arrival in Canada. The IRO provided transatlantic passage. In Canada follow-up services were provided. This procedure was followed, with some variations, for the clothing industry, fur workers, metal miners, heavy labourers, construction workers, and smaller groups for other industries.³⁴

On 10 October 1947 representatives of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF) met with H. L. Keenleyside,

Deputy Minister in the Department of Mines and Resources, to discuss the Ukrainian immigration movement. As a result of this meeting, Keenleyside wrote a memorandum to A. L. Jolliffe, Director of Immigration in the Department of Mines and Resources, providing information and guidelines.³⁵ UCC representatives informed Keenleyside that some Ukrainian DPs had applied to work in the sugar beet industry in May and June 1947, but the scheme had expired. Keenleyside confirmed that steps would be taken to remedy that situation, and those responsible would be properly reprimanded. Keenleyside stated that Ukrainian refugees in France could easily obtain clearance through the Canadian embassy and they should be given the opportunity to apply if they met the normal requirements. Keenleyside also felt that forty-six music string manufacturers in Austria would be useful immigrants and suggested plans be made for their entry to Canada.

In reply to UCC comments about strict health standards, Keenleyside said that there was little he could do about them. However, underweight applicants would be considered if they were in generally good health. The UCC also claimed that a number of Ukrainians were removed from the immigration list because they were one or two months over the age limit. Keenleyside wrote: "This seems to me to be a fatuous example of bureaucracy at its worst (of course, it may never have occurred). I think that our people overseas should be told to use their heads in such circumstances." UCC informed Keenleyside that some immigration officers were accepting applications to admit Ukrainian relatives only from farmers. Cases were cited where Ukrainian dentists and businessmen were told that they could not apply to admit their relatives. Keenleyside wrote: "These cases seem pretty incredible.... This should of course be stopped."³⁶ He also encouraged Ukrainian refugees and DPs without relatives or sponsors in Canada to apply for entry through the various "bulk labour schemes."

The policy of the Canadian government toward Ukrainian and other DPs continued to be restrictive, except for the orders-in-council, which were often the result of pressures from various members of Parliament, transportation companies, religious groups, and ethnocultural organizations, including the UCC. Their influence was reflected in the complex collection of orders-in-council regarding security regulations, age, health, and other standards that controlled entry into Canada. Successive orders-in-council widened the definition of DPs, thus broadening the scope of selection. For example, the majority of DPs admitted in 1948 were authorized by various orders-in-council. Increasingly, heads of families and single wage earners were applying for admission for their families and close relatives. In Europe priority was given to processing those dependants.³⁷

As expected, opposition to DP immigration and labour movement was more vocal in Quebec. One of the spokesmen for this opposition was Réal Caouette,

M.P. for Pontiac in northwestern Quebec. On 10 March 1949 Caouette spoke on the question of DP miners in his riding:

I am not against DP's nor against immigrants. They probably are perfect gentlemen, good Catholics and I have met many of them. I must protest energetically and vehemently against the government allowing mining companies in Abitibi and the northwestern part of the province to instigate such irrational immigration which only serves to cause anxiety in our Canadian families in the district. We have unemployed men in Val D'Or, Malartic, Rouyn, Noranda and Duparquet. We have unemployed men in all cities of the district.

Caouette also gave one reason for the preference for immigrant labour:

Mr. Beauchemin [owner of East Sullivan Mines Ltd.] recently admitted to me...that French Canadians were not suited for mining work and that it was necessary to bring displaced persons from Europe for underground work in the mines. The mining companies that have applied for DP labour are letting our own people go without work.³⁸

Despite these and other difficulties, the DP bulk labour schemes continued, and it was through these programs that most Ukrainian DPs and refugees entered Canada after World War II.

On 9 June 1950 an order-in-council enlarged the admissible categories of European immigrants to include any immigrant who was "...a suitable immigrant having regard to the climatic, the social, educational, industrial, labour, or other conditions or requirements of Canada."³⁹ Although the categories for admission were greatly expanded beyond these established by the earlier orders-in-council, immigration policy was still in essence a restrictive policy geared to Canada's absorptive capacity:

DPs Arriving in Canada during the Years 1947-52⁴⁰

Fiscal Year	Total	Ukrainian DPs
1947-8	14,250	3,321
1948-9	50,610	10,277
1949-50	33,197	5,617
1950-1	24,911	3,132
1951-2	41,016	4,268

The Galician Division

One of the lesser known attempts to bring Ukrainians to Canada was the struggle to bring Ukrainian Surrendered Enemy Personnel, also known as the Galician Division, from England.⁴¹ The first concrete proposal was a memorandum, dated 8 October 1947, sent by Gordon R. B. Panchuk, director of the Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Victims of War in England.⁴² He explained to the

Canadian government that, at the request of the British Foreign Office and the British War Office, his organization had undertaken responsibility for the welfare of approximately 8,000 Ukrainians. After thorough screening the British authorities had no security or other objections to this group and were anxious to give every possible assistance for immigration and resettlement. His organization had assumed responsibility for preparing plans for the emigration of this group. He also claimed that some were close relatives or friends of Canadian citizens who were prepared to offer any necessary guarantee and assistance on their behalf.

The UCC asked Keenleyside at the same time about the possibility of allowing the Galician Division, "who had previously served in labour battalions under the Nazis," into Canada. He replied that it was not likely anything could be done then and emphasized that "we want to give a preference to those who did not take an active part in the war against us."⁴³ He also told Dr. Kushnir, president of the UCC, that the movement of DPs from occupied territory was of primary importance, therefore it was not possible to arrange the movement of a group of enemy personnel which would interfere with those having prior claim to consideration.⁴⁴

Panchuk's memorandum of 8 October 1947 was read at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Immigration on 7 November 1947. The committee noted that the UCC and UCRF would assist in the reception, placement, and social welfare of the potential immigrants and would provide every assistance to prevent them from becoming public charges. The committee also noted that those men had enlisted in the German army for service against the Russians and had surrendered to the Western Allies at the end of the war. After discussion, the committee agreed that the Department of External Affairs, in co-operation with the Immigration Branch, should make further inquiries and report to the committee.⁴⁵

On 23 January 1948 Jolliffe submitted a memorandum to the committee from the Department of External Affairs. He divided Ukrainians into two groups: (a) approximately 8,000 who were formerly in the German army and held in England, and (b) approximately 26,000 who were held on the Continent and were largely former forced labourers in Germany. The committee agreed that the Ukrainians in group (a) should not be granted permission to immigrate to Canada because they had served in the German armed forces.⁴⁶ Jolliffe wrote to Panchuk on 25 March 1948 that the Department could do nothing, because under existing regulations these men were considered inadmissible to Canada.⁴⁷ On 30 June 1948 Keenleyside wrote to F. S. Zaplitny, M.P., who had also inquired on behalf of the Galicia Division: "...they [the government] are doing a great deal for the direct victims of Nazi tyranny and that as Canada cannot accept everyone who wishes to enter the country and as a line must be drawn somewhere, it is appropriate to draw the margin dividing those who suffered from the enemy from those who whether wholeheartedly or not collaborated with him."⁴⁸

Panchuk and others continued to write to the Canadian government on behalf of the Division. Panchuk's case was aided when members of the Division became civilians on 31 December 1948 in England. In one letter Panchuk indicated that he felt his proposals had not been thoroughly and fully considered, or else there had been an error in judgment by some official in the Immigration Branch. He added that a grave injustice was done to Canadians, claiming these potential immigrants and this matter would affect the attitude of the entire Ukrainian community in Canada. Panchuk also mentioned that some of the Division members had already immigrated to Argentina and to the United States.⁴⁹ The Canadian government also received unofficial requests from the British government to allow some of the Ukrainians into Canada, since they would be taking work away from British veterans if they remained.⁵⁰

Panchuk received a reply on 14 February 1949 that confirmed the earlier decision of the Canadian government not to allow the Ukrainians entry. This decision was based on the principle that persons of Allied or neutral nationality who had voluntarily served in enemy forces should be excluded from immigration opportunities.⁵¹ On 1 March 1949 the Hon. James A. Mackinnon, Minister of Mines and Resources, received a letter of support for the restrictive immigration policy from the president of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC).⁵² The reply to an inquiry from the Canadian Council of Churches explained that: "We fear there would be a very great popular opposition to admitting persons who served in the enemy forces, excepting under unusual circumstances."⁵³ On 4 May 1949 another letter was received from the AUUC that condemned the Galician Division and supported the government's decision to deny its members entry into Canada.⁵⁴ The UCC attempted to explain that the Galician Division was purely a Ukrainian military unit similar to those organized by the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and others to combat the Russian communists.⁵⁵ In his reply to Dr. Kushnir, Jolliffe stated that if the principle of denying entry were abandoned for the Galician Division, it would be impossible to maintain it for other inadmissible persons.⁵⁶ This decision was confirmed in an internal memorandum of 12 August 1949. In a Cabinet document four days later the Minister of Mines and Resources recommended that entry to Division members be denied, and on 16 September 1949 the Cabinet confirmed that decision.⁵⁷

On 28 March 1950 immigration regulations were changed to permit the admission of Volksdeutsch DPs and refugees who acquired German nationality after 1 September 1939 and German nationals who were first-degree relatives of Canadian residents. In view of this change, it was recommended that the Division in England be admitted to Canada, despite their service in the German army, provided they complied with immigration regulations.⁵⁸ On 5 April 1950 the Cabinet agreed to defer the decision to allow the Division into Canada because there were reports that a "Ukrainian terrorist organization" existed in Berlin during the war, and it seemed appropriate to further investigate the Ukrainians

in England.⁵⁹ A report was submitted on 26 May 1950 that dismissed any connection between the Galician Division and Ukrainian nationalist groups in Canada. The report also stated that there was no indication that the Division was connected with any Ukrainian or terrorist organization that had collaborated with the German government in Berlin. The report regarded the members as "...strongly anti-Soviet and if admitted to Canada it is likely that they would be absorbed into the various politically passive Ukrainian nationalist organizations here who are regarded as loyal to Canada and opposed to communism."⁶⁰

At its meeting of 31 May 1950 the Cabinet decided that the members of the Division should be admitted to Canada despite service in the German army, provided they were otherwise admissible. Those Ukrainians would be subject to special security screening.⁶¹ In reply to a question from John Decore, M.P., in the House of Commons, the Hon. Walter Harris, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, stated on 15 June 1950 that: "We have investigated not individuals but the group as a whole and we are quite prepared to accept them provided they come within the ordinary rules with respect to immigrants, that is they might be agricultural workers, settlers and the like."⁶²

On 4 July 1950, Harris received a telegram from Samuel Bronfman stating that the executive committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) was dismayed by his speech in the House of Commons. Bronfman also stated that the CJC had information disclosing that the Division had enlisted as volunteers in the German SS and requested that a full investigation be launched of alleged Division association with the SS.⁶³ Harris replied on 5 July 1950 that the government would give most careful consideration to each applicant. There was no question of a mass movement of the group. He also stated that he was prepared to delay the approval of Division applications for a reasonable time so that the CJC could forward any pertinent information.⁶⁴ Instructions were sent to London on 7 July 1950 to hold off any action on the Division. Screening of applicants continued, but no approvals were to be granted until further instructions were received.⁶⁵ Bronfman thanked Harris for this delaying order and added that the CJC would produce a brief for the minister.⁶⁶

On 14 August 1950 the Secretary of State for External Affairs received a dispatch from L. D. Wilgress, the Canadian High Commissioner in London. It provided information on the record of the Division and included the statement that, "Although communist propaganda has constantly attempted to depict these like so many other refugees as quislings and war criminals it is interesting to note that no specific charges of war crimes have been made by the Soviet or any other government against any member of this group."⁶⁷ An order-in-council on 14 September 1950 revoked an earlier order prohibiting the entry of enemy aliens.⁶⁸ Harris wrote to Bronfman on 15 September 1950 that after further investigation into the background of the Division the government had arrived at the conclusion that the Canadian screening facilities were adequate. He stated

that he intended to give approval to applications on hand and to continue the screening process of any applications received in the future.⁶⁹ New directives were issued on 25 September 1950 to the London office to proceed with the applications, and the applicants would be subject to full security screening.⁷⁰

Bronfman replied that it was impossible to find documents on every single member or even a large proportion of the members of the Division. He added that the Division would be a corrupting influence among the respected and worthy Ukrainian Canadian community and suggested that a number of SS men had already been apprehended in Halifax among DPs arriving from Europe.⁷¹ Harris requested that these cases be verified, but there were no records of any SS men actually having been found among DPs or having been sent back to Germany.⁷² On 7 November 1950 the CJC submitted to the minister a list of ninety-four names of people they considered undesirable. These names, in many cases only surnames or common Ukrainian names, were checked against the names of applicants from the Division who wished to settle in Canada. Only three were checked in some detail, including the name of Dmytro Dontsov, who was already in Canada and had no previous military connection with the Division.⁷³ On 5 January 1951 approval was given to process the Ukrainian applicants from England.⁷⁴ On 13 June 1953 Canadian immigration authorities issued instructions to cancel the directive dated 18 January 1951 regarding the processing of Ukrainians in England, because it was obsolete.⁷⁵

The Catholic Orphan Immigration Scheme

The Canadian government studied the question of orphans and on 28 December 1946 submitted a report, "Desirability of Child Immigration Into Canada," which reviewed the history of child immigration to Canada.⁷⁶ The question of orphan immigration exemplified the complexity and difficulty of organized refugee immigration to Canada.

Through the persistent efforts of the CJC, Cabinet passed an order-in-council on 29 April 1947 approving a plan to bring 1,000 Jewish orphans to Canada.⁷⁷ Then the Mount Mary Immaculate Orphanage in Ancaster, Ontario, submitted an application to federal immigration authorities for thirty-six orphan children from an orphanage in Przemyśl, Poland. The Mount Mary Immaculate Orphanage was administered by the Sister Servants of Mary Immaculate, a Ukrainian Catholic religious order. This application was sponsored by the Ukrainian Catholic Council of Winnipeg. However, the orphanage did not qualify as a charitable institution according to Ontario legislation. On 15 December 1947 this was still under consideration by the provincial authorities, and, therefore, federal approval for the admission of the children was withheld.⁷⁸ During this period federal immigration authorities also received applications from the Serbian National Shield Society of Canada in Windsor for the admission of 250-300 Serbian

children from Germany and an application from the Ukrainian Canadian Committee for the admission of fifty Ukrainian orphans.⁷⁹

On 11 February 1948 Monsignor Basil Markle, Monsigneur J. L. Beaudoin, and Dorothy Sullivan visited Keenleyside in Ottawa and presented a brief from the Permanent Secretariat of the Canadian Episcopate entitled, "Immigration to Canada of Unaccompanied Orphan Children from Europe." The Catholic Immigrant Aid Society (CIAS) had been delegated by the Roman Catholic Church to care for orphaned children, and in this brief the church offered to provide whatever resources were necessary to supplement existing services. Keenleyside replied that their proposal would be considered if additional information was provided about the number of children, method of selection, and method of allocation to homes. He also requested that the church accept responsibility for the placement and support of the children, and obtain a clear statement of approval from the provincial welfare authorities in Ontario and Quebec. Keenleyside felt that the church's proposal was justified not only on the usual humanitarian grounds but also because the government had already allowed Jewish welfare organizations to bring in 1,000 children.⁸⁰ The Catholic authorities were so optimistic that their proposal would be accepted that they publicized it.⁸¹

On 6 May 1948 a draft recommendation was prepared for an order-in-council to allow the Catholic orphans into Canada. On 10 May 1948 immigration authorities received a letter from the Canadian Welfare Council emphasizing the need to provide the highest possible level of care for any orphan children. The council also expressed concern about some of the facilities in Quebec offered by the church for the reception of orphans.⁸² A meeting was held in Ottawa on 20 May 1948 to discuss the questions raised by the Canadian Welfare Council. However, the government realized that it could not refuse an application from CIAS, especially if they received the consent of the Quebec provincial welfare authorities.⁸³

On 19 June 1948 the Canadian Welfare Council wrote to Keenleyside and submitted a report on the revision of the CIAS plan:

- 1) CIAS would place all children in foster homes within a few weeks of arrival.
- 2) Suitable reception centres would be established in Quebec as well as Ontario.
- 3) Children would arrive in groups corresponding in number to the number of foster homes available to receive them.
- 4) CIAS would appoint at least one qualified social worker as supervisor of the entire project to ensure high standards of care.

The Canadian Welfare Council stated that it would support the scheme if the revised CIAS plan included all these points.⁸⁴ The CIAS submitted a revised plan on 5 July 1948 that incorporated the requested changes.⁸⁵ On 15 July 1948 the Minister of Mines and Resources submitted a request for the entry of the

Catholic orphans and on 3 August 1948 an order-in-council was passed. The only difference in it from the order-in-council for the Jewish orphans was the minimum age limits, which did not apply in the case of younger children accompanied by a brother or sister.⁸⁶

Jolliffe wrote to Monsignor Markle on 12 August 1948 to clarify some of the main points in the plan and inform him that the necessary authority had been received. Jolliffe emphasized that the children had to be in good mental and physical health. He also insisted that the CIAS was to be in contact with the child welfare authorities in Quebec and Ontario and that the federal government was to be advised of their agreement to the plan.⁸⁷ On 13 September 1948 Ontario passed an order-in-council authorizing the CIAS to bring orphans into that province. Instructions were sent to the Superintendent of European immigration in London about the movement of Catholic orphans. The children had to pass the same medical examination as other DP immigrants, which included chest X-rays. Transportation and other details were negotiated with the IRO. To maintain control of this movement and to keep within the quota of 1,000, visas were issued under a separate set of visa numbers with the prefix C, from 1 to 1,000.⁸⁸

On 8 October 1948 the CIAS informed Mount Mary that the orphans would be arriving soon.⁸⁹ Dorothy Sullivan had already arrived in Europe and begun selecting qualified children. Canadian immigration officials in Europe inquired whether illegitimate children should be included. In a memorandum Jolliffe suggested that illegitimate children should not be included, but Keenleyside replied that he was inclined to accept all children where there was a reasonable assumption that they were in fact orphans.⁹⁰ The first group of thirty children, ranging in age from two to fifteen, arrived at Mount Mary on 15 May 1949. Cardinal McGuigan, who was among those who greeted them, was credited with bringing them into Canada: "For months, he had patiently chipped away at official objections until all of the Department of Immigration's delaying tactics had been exhausted and Canada had opened its arms to embrace these children...."⁹¹

By 30 September 1949 fifty-two children had arrived in Ancaster. Of these, thirty-five were placed and seventeen remained at the orphanage.⁹² On 1 November 1949 Dorothy Sullivan complained of the difficulty of her work because the regulations and procedures for the selection of children were too restrictive.⁹³ Difficulties also developed in Montreal and Ancaster. Some of the orphans had not been placed, and it was necessary for the church to support them. The 1950 annual meeting of the Canadian Catholic Conference (CCC) decided that after March 1951 orphans from Europe would be received in Canada depending on funds available. Miss Sullivan was recalled and thanked for her services. She was not replaced.⁹⁴ At the 1951 annual meeting of CCC it was reported that the orphans remaining in the care of the church in Montreal and Ancaster presented serious problems and, as a result, the CCC decided to accept

no more orphans. Approximately 300 European orphans were settled in Ontario and Quebec and a significant percentage were Ukrainian. The Catholic Church felt that this effort was justified because it added "...300 good Catholic citizens to Church and country in the years to come."⁹⁵

Conclusion

By 1952 the European countries devastated by war were beginning to recover and the movement of refugees and DPs to Canada began to decline. However, demand to enter Canada was still high, so the Canadian government did not have to initiate any programs to attract immigrants. The postwar Canadian economic boom was continuing, and there was still a strong demand for heavy work labourers in the resource industries.

On 29 November 1949 the Prime Minister introduced measures in Parliament to establish three new departments, including the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, which began its operations on 18 January 1950. Canadian politicians and public servants also realized that it was important to consolidate the numerous orders-in-council that had been passed since 1945. The old restrictive Immigration Act of 1910 had to be revised and updated, therefore, a new Immigration Act was passed in 1952. That act became effective on 1 June 1953 and opened a new chapter in Canadian immigration history.

There are a number of "realities" of the immediate postwar government attitude and policy regarding DPs, and Ukrainian DPs in particular, that are especially significant. The Cabinet decision on 25 October 1945 not to pass any new legislation for immigration to Canada was among the more significant factors that influenced the course of events. That decision obliged the Cabinet to rely on orders-in-council to regulate the flow of immigration. That affected not only immigration but other government matters and produced charges in one Canadian newspaper that "government is just one damned Order-in-Council after another."⁹⁶ Regulating immigration through orders-in-council meant that the decision-making process was in the hands of a very small number of senior public servants. In that situation, the personalities and personal preferences of public servants acquired a disproportionate influence over the policy-making procedures. Some officials, such as Keenleyside, were liberal in their interpretation of regulations, while others, such as Jolliffe, were more restrictive. However, these public servants viewed themselves as efficient and conscientious in the performance of their duties.⁹⁷

Another "reality," the stereotyped view of Ukrainian Canadians as farmers and industrial workers, produced mixed results. In some cases, Ukrainians encouraged this view. In the UCC's brief to the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour in May 1946, they emphasized the pioneering work of the first Ukrainian settlers in clearing the land and farming on the prairies.⁹⁸ When the Canadian Metal Mining Association submitted their brief in July 1947

on immigrant labour, a number of mining companies specifically requested Ukrainian or other Slavic workers.⁹⁹ If Ukrainian DP applicants were not farmers or heavy labourers, the Canadian government was not very interested. For example, in the memorandum of 10 October 1947, Keenleyside mentioned that there were thirty Ukrainian families in Shanghai, China, who were requesting admittance to Canada. A Canadian immigration officer assigned to Hong Kong examined the applicants. He was not impressed because "...during the approximately 27 years since they left Ukraine a new generation has grown up which has not been engaged in agriculture. The older members also found it necessary to follow other occupations than agriculture and at present cannot be considered as bona fide agriculturalists."¹⁰⁰ The fact that these Ukrainian families were caught in the middle of the Chinese civil war did not seem to impress the immigration officials.

The UCC submitted proposals for entry into Canada of a number of Ukrainian intellectuals and cultural workers who did not qualify under any of the orders-in-council. Jolliffe replied that "...it is not possible to deal with any one such request without taking into consideration the whole situation.... It would not be practicable to make any special arrangements for displaced persons of any one nationality and it is regretted...."¹⁰¹ This situation became desperate, and during the first week of June 1949 W. Kossar and W. Hultay from the Ukrainian National Federation visited A. MacNamara, Deputy Minister of Labour, to plead on behalf of Ukrainian DP intellectuals in Europe. As a result of their intervention a number of Ukrainian "community workers" were allowed to enter Canada.¹⁰² That, however, was an exception to the strict interpretation by government officials of existing rules and regulations.

In the case of the Galician Division no exceptions were made. Despite numerous letters and appeals from the UCC, UCRF, and others between October 1947 and January 1951, government officials did not allow entry to any member of the Division. They were able to enter only when an order-in-council was passed allowing former German "enemy aliens" into the country. Protestations of the Division's Christian and anti-communist character were at best peripheral in influencing the decision. Objections by the Canadian Jewish Congress did not significantly restrict the immigration of former members of the Division after January 1951.

The case of the Catholic orphans illustrates the impact of provincial jurisdiction on the federal government's ability to make rapid decisions. The Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canadian Welfare Council were also important influences on government policy. The various provincial standards and regulations for orphans significantly reduced the number of children entering the country. The fears of the Canadian Welfare Council, however, were partly justified, because the Catholic church soon realized that it was unable to cope with the orphans who remained at its facilities.

These are some of the “realities” of the Canadian political and bureaucratic environment that shaped government policy and the management of Ukrainian DP immigration. The unusual set of circumstances and conditions regulating the flow of DPs to Canada in the postwar period significantly influenced the composition of the Ukrainian DP immigration and, as a result, had a definite effect on the historical evolution of the Ukrainian-Canadian community to the present day.

Notes

1. For a detailed account of the Canadian government’s attitude toward Jewish refugees and DPs see Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948* (Toronto, 1982).
2. *Report of the Department of Mines and Resources for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1946* (Ottawa, 1947), 236. The Canadian Passage Priority Committee was disbanded on 1 July 1946, but transportation companies honoured previous commitments.
3. *House of Commons Debates*, 13 September 1945.
4. *Report of Mines and Resources 1946*, 236-7.
5. *House of Commons Debates*, speeches by A. Hlynka and W. A. Tucker, 24 and 26 September 1945. See also National Archives of Canada (hereinafter NAC) RG 76, Vol. 856, File 554-33 (Ukrainian refugees).
6. *Report of Mines and Resources 1946*, 236.
7. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 82, Cabinet conclusions, 25 Oct. 1945.
8. *House of Commons Debates*, 14 December 1945; Freda Hawkins, *Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern* (Montreal-London, 1972), 90.
9. Gerald E. Dirks, *Canada’s Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?* (Montreal-London, 1977), 138.
10. *Report of the Department of Mines and Resources for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1947* (Ottawa, 1948), 241; Privy Council (hereinafter P.C.) 2071 and 2070.
11. Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, “Minutes of proceedings and evidence, 1946,” 8 May 1946.
12. *Ibid.*, 29 May 1946.
13. NAC, MG 30 E 350, Vol. 2, Letter of 7 March 1948.
14. Dirks, *Canada’s Refugee Policy*, 141-2.
15. *Report of Mines and Resources 1947*, 241 (P.C. 3112).
16. *Report of the Department of Mines and Resources for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1948* (Ottawa, 1949), 239 (P.C. 2951).
17. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 103, Security Panel, “Minutes of meetings,” 23 August 1946.

18. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 103, File S-100-1 (Vol. 2), "Minutes of meetings," 7 February 1947.
19. *Ibid.*, 6 March 1947.
20. *Report of Mines and Resources 1948*, 239 (P.C. 1373).
21. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 82, 5 August 1946.
22. *Ibid.*, 2 August 1947.
23. Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, "Minutes of proceedings and evidence, 1946," Recommendations, 13 August 1946.
24. *House of Commons Debates*, 28 August 1946; NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 82, File 1-50-m (Vol. 1), 1946-9.
25. *House of Commons Debates*, 7 November 1946.
26. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 82, File 1-50-m (Vol. 1), 1946-7.
27. *Report of Mines and Resources 1947*, 241-2, 244.
28. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 82, "Memorandum for the cabinet committee on immigration policy," 10 April 1948.
29. *Report of Mines and Resources 1948*, 239.
30. *House of Commons Debates*, 1 May 1947.
31. NAC, RG 26, Vol. 144, File 3-41-8, Canadian Metal Mining Association submission re: immigrant labour, 14 July 1947.
32. *Report of Mines and Resources 1948*, 239 (P.C. 2180).
33. *Ibid.*, Order-in-Council P.C. 2856.
34. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 82, "Memorandum for the cabinet committee on immigration policy," 10 April 1948.
35. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 856, File 554-33, "Memorandum to A. L. Jolliffe from H. L. Keenleyside," 10 October 1947.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Report of the Department of Mines and Resources for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1949* (Ottawa, 1950), 225-6.
38. *House of Commons Debates*, 10 March 1949.
39. *Report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1951* (Ottawa, 1951), 19 (P.C. 2856).
40. *Report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1952* (Ottawa, 1952), 40.
41. Here, members of the Galician Division will be referred to as the Division. For a brief history of it see Basil Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division 'Galicia'," *American Slavic and East European Review* 15, no. 1 (1956): 1-10; Pavlo Shandruk, *Arms of Valour* (New York, 1958); Wasyl Veryha, "The Galicia Ukrainian Division in Polish and Soviet Literature," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 36 (1980): no. 3; Roger James Bender and Hugh Page Taylor, *Uniforms, Organization and History of*

- the Waffen SS*, vol. 4 (San Jose, 1975), 7-57. For a Soviet interpretation see V. Styrkul, *The SS Werewolves* (Lviv, 1982).
42. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 82, File 1-50-m (Vol. 1), 1946-9.
 43. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 856, File 554-33, "Memorandum to A. L. Jolliffe from H. L. Keenleyside," 10 October 1947.
 44. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 656, File B53802, H. L. Keenleyside to Dr. Kushnir, 23 October 1947.
 45. *Ibid.*, Cabinet committee minutes, 7 November 1947.
 46. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 82, File 1-50-d (1946-9) IMP Doc. no. 20, 23 January 1948.
 47. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 656, File B53802, A. L. Jolliffe to G. R. B. Panchuk, 25 March 1948.
 48. *Ibid.*, H. L. Keenleyside to Mr. Zaplitny, 30 June 1948.
 49. *Ibid.*, G. R. B. Panchuk to Guy Sylvestre, 19 January 1949.
 50. *Ibid.*, Correspondence to H. L. Keenleyside, 1 November 1948 and 26 January 1949.
 51. *Ibid.*, Guy Sylvestre to G. R. B. Panchuk, 14 February 1949.
 52. *Ibid.*, President of AUUC to Hon. James A. MacKinnon. The AUUC was the successor organization to the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA).
 53. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 96, "Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs," 7 April 1949.
 54. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 656, File B53802, AUUC to Louis St. Laurent, 4 May 1949.
 55. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 656, File B53802.
 56. *Ibid.*, A. L. Jolliffe to Dr. Kushnir, 13 May 1949.
 57. *Ibid.*, Cabinet document, 16 August 1949.
 58. *Ibid.*, "Memorandum to Hon. Walter Harris;" *Report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1950* (Ottawa, 1951), 25 (P.C. 1608).
 59. NAC, RG 2, 516, Vol. 19, P.C.O., "Cabinet decisions," 5 April 1950.
 60. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 166, Report to Hon. Walter Harris, 26 May 1950.
 61. *Ibid.*, "Cabinet decisions," 31 May 1950.
 62. *House of Commons Debates*, 15 June 1950.
 63. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 656, File B53802, Samuel Bronfman to Hon. Walter Harris, 4 July 1950.
 64. *Ibid.*, Hon. Walter Harris to Samuel Bronfman, 5 July 1950.
 65. *Ibid.*, "Instructions," 7 July 1950.
 66. *Ibid.*, Samuel Bronfman to Hon. Walter Harris, 12 July 1950.
 67. *Ibid.*, Dispatch no. C229, 14 August 1950.

68. *Report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration for the Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 1951* (Ottawa, 1951), 19 (P.C. 4364). Germans were placed on the same basis as other Europeans, but the Japanese continued to be considered "enemy aliens" until July 1952.
69. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 656, File B53802, Hon. Walter Harris to Samuel Bronfman, 15 September 1950.
70. *Ibid.*, "Instructions," 25 September 1950.
71. *Ibid.*, Samuel Bronfman to Hon. Walter Harris, 25 September 1950.
72. *Ibid.*, "Memorandum," 18 October 1950.
73. *Ibid.*, 7 November 1950.
74. *Ibid.*, "Instructions," 5 January 1951.
75. *Ibid.*, "Instructions," 18 June 1953.
76. NAC, RG 2, 518, Vol. 83, "Report," 28 December 1946.
77. Abella and Troper, *None Is Too Many*, 270-4.
The first orphans arrived on 18 September 1947 and eventually the entire quota was filled.
78. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 660, "Memorandum to A. L. Jolliffe," 17 March 1948.
79. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 856, File 554-33 (Ukrainian refugees).
80. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 660, File B74072.
81. "Archbishop Outlines New Scheme to Settle Refugee Children Here," *Montreal Gazette*, 2 April 1948.
82. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 660, File B74072, Canadian Welfare Council to immigration authorities, 10 May 1948.
83. *Ibid.*, "Memorandum," 20 May 1948.
84. *Ibid.*, Canadian Welfare Council to Keenleyside, 19 June 1948.
85. *Ibid.*, "Proposal," 5 July 1948.
86. *Ibid.*, Order-In-Council, P.C. 3396, 3 August 1948.
87. *Ibid.*, A. L. Jolliffe to Monsignor Markle, 12 August 1948.
88. *Ibid.*, "Memorandum to file by A. L. Jolliffe," 13 August 1948; "Instructions sent to Superintendent of European Immigration, London."
89. Sister Claudia H. Popowich, *To Serve is to Love: The Canadian Story of the Sister Servants of Mary Immaculate* (Toronto, 1971), 208.
90. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 660, File B74072, "Memorandum to Deputy Minister," 23 March 1949.
91. Popowich, *To Serve is to Love*, 208.
92. Canadian Catholic Conference, Archives, Catholic Immigrant Services, "Extracts from minutes, 1943-Nov. 1963," Annual meeting, 1950.

93. NAC, RG 26, Vol. 120, Dorothy Sullivan to immigration authorities, 1 November 1949.
94. Canadian Catholic Conference, Archives, Catholic Immigrant Services, "Extracts from minutes, 1943-November 1963," Annual meeting 1950.
95. Ibid., "Report of Social Action Department," October 1951.
96. "Those Orders-in-Council," *Toronto Star*, 16 May 1949.
97. Hugh L. Keenleyside, *Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside*, vol. 2: *On the Bridge of Time* (Toronto, 1982), 299.
98. Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, "Minutes of proceedings and evidence 1946," 29 May 1946.
99. NAC, RG 26, Vol. 144, File 3-41-8, Canadian Metal Mining Association submission re: immigrant labour, 14 July 1947.
100. NAC, RG 76, Vol. 856, File 554-33, "Memorandum from A. L. Jolliffe to Deputy Minister," 31 May 1948.
101. Ibid., Jolliffe to Dr. Kushnir, 13 May 1949.
102. Ibid., W. Kossar to MacNamara, 12 September 1949.

A Troubled Venture: Ukrainian-Canadian Refugee Relief Efforts, 1945-51*

Lubomyr Y. Luciuk

For hundreds of thousands of displaced Ukrainians, scattered across Western Europe, the proclamation of V-E Day (8 May 1945) brought only temporary relief. While their immediate need for food, shelter, and clothing was taken care of by the Allied occupation authorities, the refugees found themselves desperately in need of reliable sources of advice and information. Most of all they required the services of a sympathetic agency, able to represent their interests before the governments of the West, most of which were disinclined even to acknowledge that "Ukrainian" denoted a distinct national group.

Almost by chance, Ukrainian Canadians became advocates and supporters of Ukrainian DPs. At first their efforts were ad hoc and centred on the distribution of relief supplies. Later they became more systematic, as the emphasis passed from welfare functions to lobbying and assisting refugees in the resettlement process. With this aid approximately 40,000 Ukrainian refugees were relocated to Canada.¹ Despite the scale of the efforts and the impact this "third wave" of immigrants was to have on the social and spatial patterning of Ukrainian-Canadian society, this entire episode has received scant attention in Ukrainian-

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Canadian history. What follows is an outline of Ukrainian-Canadian refugee relief and resettlement operations, viewed within the broader context of this ethnic group's relations with officials of the governments most directly involved.

In late October 1944 George Pifher, director of Voluntary and Auxiliary Services for the Department of National War Services, queried his Department of External Affairs counterparts about a request he had received from the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC). The UCC was anxious to begin collecting funds in support of planned welfare operations on behalf of Ukrainian refugees, under the auspices of the Canadian Red Cross. The question was whether such a relief organization should be permitted. That stirred up a flurry of interdepartmental memoranda strongly objecting to the proposal. While Norman Robertson of External Affairs insisted that the government was "absolutely certain of the loyalty of the UCC to Canada," the creation of any special fund for Ukrainian DPs could not be authorized, since it would likely be a source of "considerable embarrassment" to the government, anxious as it was to maintain a harmonious relationship with the Soviet Union.² He felt that the UCC should be persuaded to abandon the project. Other Canadian bureaucrats concurred. For example, Dana Wilgress (then serving in the Moscow embassy) reported on the anti-Soviet struggle of Ukrainian partisans in "liberated Poland" and warned that relief given to Ukrainian refugees would be misconstrued by the Russians as implying Canadian support for the nationalist partisans. In his opinion helping Ukrainian DPs was tantamount to providing aid and comfort to "enemy agents," which was to be strenuously avoided.³

To their credit, the UCC's representatives persisted in their lobbying efforts. Finally, in January 1945 General L. R. LaFleche, director of National War Services, agreed to sanction the proposed fund. However, certain restrictions were put into place to safeguard the Canadian government against the anticipated objections of foreign governments. First, "refugee" was to be strictly avoided in the fund's formal title. Second, all monies collected were to be administered by the Canadian Red Cross, which was instructed to distribute relief to *any* person of Ukrainian "race" regardless of citizenship, political beliefs or status. Ingeniously, the Canadian government thus imposed on the fund an operating principle that might be used to force its executors to provide monies to non-refugees or Ukrainians living in the USSR. The thrust of these official conditions was to ensure that no money was sent to any ostensibly "pro-German Ukrainians." Under these terms the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF) was born.

Thus limited, the fund still provoked strong opposition from Soviet spokesmen. On 30 April J. E. Read, acting undersecretary for External Affairs, had to endure Soviet ambassador Zarubin's bitter denunciations of the UCC as a "pro-fascist" organization. Zarubin noted that his government regarded the entire issue as a "political question" of "a particular importance"—strong diplomatic language that boded ill for the future of Soviet-Canadian relations.⁴ The govern-

ment reacted by reviewing its earlier approval. One official even suggested that it was still not too late to block the use of the fund's monies.⁵ The recommendation to freeze UCRF operations, however, was not acted upon. Still, the government remained suspicious of Ukrainian-Canadian intentions and activities, which in many respects was simply a continuation of the covert monitoring of their activities that had been part of federal policy throughout the interwar period.

Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association

In Europe a young RCAF volunteer, Bohdan Panchuk, had helped organize a Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association (UCSA) around the small Ukrainian colony located in Manchester, England.⁶ The UCSA later became the nucleus for the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB).⁷ Ukrainian-Canadian soldiers like Panchuk had started meeting Ukrainian refugees shortly after the D-Day landings in June 1944, although Panchuk's first diary entry about such an encounter was not made until 15 April 1945.⁸ By 10 June he was sufficiently alarmed by the destitute condition of the Ukrainian refugees and the uncertainty of their future to send a report to the UCC (one of the first to be sent to North America's Ukrainians by an on-the-scene observer), in which he urged that immediate steps be taken to ameliorate their condition.⁹

Panchuk estimated that there were approximately 4.5 million refugees in Western Europe at the war's end, most of them Ukrainians. He subdivided this displaced Ukrainian population: 100,000 were "Old Refugees," that is, Ukrainians who had been living in the West prior to the war's outbreak; 1,650,000 were people forcibly evacuated to Germany in the years 1939-43, mostly for use as slave labour; 2.5 million were Ukrainians who had suffered a similar fate between 1943 and 1945, as the Germans had retreated before the advancing Red Army; 250,000 were "political refugees," whom he rather ambiguously defined as people "who had sought refuge." All these Ukrainians, he maintained, were being treated as "scapegoats" in postwar Europe, being tossed around "like a football" at the whim of the occupation authorities. He felt only one thing could save them, and that was the concerted effort of North America's Ukrainians, who must intercede on humanitarian grounds and insist on a just solution to the Ukrainian refugee problem. For Panchuk this was a *duty* and one which North America's Ukrainians had to get on with in a hurry, since the refugees were in surroundings where even their sense of belonging to a Ukrainian people was being eroded. He felt that unless their compatriots in the West moved with some speed, many Ukrainian DPs would lose all sense of ethnic affiliation.¹⁰

Panchuk suggested that Ukrainian DPs could be saved if the UCSA's facilities and personnel were transformed immediately to serve as a relief agency. Its appointed staff would act as "missionaries" ready to lead Ukrainian refugees to Canada. While Panchuk's zeal and the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau's subsequent accomplishments were considerable, within the UCSA early opposi-

tion arose to the idea of Ukrainian-Canadian soldiers becoming involved in any way with Ukrainian refugees. The trouble started early in 1945, even before the bureau was formally constituted. Panchuk had become increasingly active on the Continent in aid of refugees, and he often reported on this in the UCSA's official newsletter and in his own voluminous correspondence. This prompted several of the UCSA's executive members to meet in London on 14 February 1945 to discuss what their organization's position toward his work should be. After their deliberations they dispatched a letter stating their concerns.

While the actual letter has not survived, its contents can be reconstructed from extracts cited in subsequent correspondence. Apparently prominent UCSA members, including the Rev. Michael Horoshko, L/Cpl. Helen Kozicky, the Rev. S. Sawchuk, Major Syrotiuk, and Captain Peter Worobetz, felt that Panchuk's involvement with DPs was "of a nature contrary to UCSA policy," since those contacts, with what were euphemistically referred to as "civilian personnel on the Continent," could place the Servicemen's Association in a "precarious" position insofar as "international politics" were concerned.¹¹ Their considered opinion was that he should extricate himself from what they perceived to be a potentially dangerous entanglement with issues and people beyond Ukrainian-Canadian control.

While they sought only to caution Panchuk, his reaction was pique:

...to come straight out of the blue sky with a statement that 'you are taking part in activities and associations beyond the purpose of this organization' as if I didn't know why we organized it or what we have continuously strived for, and making it appear as if *all* my activities and associations are detrimental to the organization—after electing me unanimously for the third term, after sending me off as you did when I visited last.... I am forced to realize that either the outfit I have been working with is a bunch of hypocrites or else that they are being made a catspaw for ulterior purposes by some other influence. Whatever the true reason is, I feel that I am not willing to be part and parcel of any organization like that, and that is *not* the code and principle that urged us to form the association.... I will be only too glad to take a back seat for a change.¹²

With that he tendered his resignation as president of the UCSA. Since the offer was not accepted, he carried on his work among Ukrainian DPs, which hurt the UCSA to the extent that certain of its members afterwards divorced themselves from its activities.

What is significant about the argument within the association's ranks is that it underscores the deep-seated concerns some Ukrainians had with respect to their relations with the Canadian government. Many felt that they had proven their loyalty through the high rate of Ukrainian-Canadian voluntary enlistment during World War II and refused to jeopardize that newly acquired status. Worobetz came closest to spelling out their fears. Attempting to rationalize why UCSA executive members had rebelled against Panchuk's pro-DP activities, he wrote:

“After all, Gordon, you realize that we are being watched by people not all of whom are sympathetic to our general viewpoint.”¹³ Panchuk did make one cryptic reference to the official attitude to the UCSA in a circular letter he sent to several people. In it he affirmed that the UCSA had been approved by the Canadian military authorities.¹⁴ Certainly, once the UCSA was reconstituted as CURB, Western governments began taking a far more concerted look at what the Ukrainian Canadians were planning and insisted that they undertake nothing of consequence without prior approval. Consequently, many of CURB’s efforts were nestled within a blanket of official surveillance. They were free to plan, but never entirely allowed to act without supervision.

Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau

Well before CURB was officially sanctioned, its aims had been articulated. The guiding principles of the new body were: 1. To co-ordinate the relief activities of Ukrainian relief committees and institutions; 2. To act on behalf of them for the material and moral support of all Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons; 3. To co-operate with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA); 4. To help reunite families; 5. To inform all interested and give advice.¹⁵ These laudable aims were to be sponsored jointly by the UCC and the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund with financial support from the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC).¹⁶ CURB’s staff would include Panchuk as director, Stanley W. Frolick as general secretary, and George Kluchevsky as treasurer.¹⁷

Back in Canada, the UCRF and UCC were vigorously campaigning to raise funds to meet CURB’s needs. Over 40,000 letters of appeal were sent out in the early spring of 1945, and by 19 March the first donations had begun to arrive in Winnipeg. By 5 January 1946, over \$106,000 had been raised, \$50,000 of which was turned over to the Canadian Red Cross, in partial fulfillment of the mandate imposed on the UCRF by the Canadian government.¹⁸ The Relief Fund’s call for financial support found a widespread and sympathetic audience among Ukrainian Canadians. For example, the first large contribution—just over \$900—came in from the Ukrainians of Krydor, Saskatchewan.¹⁹

These urgent appeals did not go unremarked by other Canadians. In some quarters, vociferous opposition to DP immigration was raised, much of it orchestrated by the pro-Soviet Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC).²⁰ Articles appeared in the press denouncing the refugees as Ukrainian “quislings.” Often those stories asserted that Ukrainian-Canadian nationalist organizations were behind a campaign aimed at persuading the government to allow the immigration of “pro-Nazi Ukrainians now stranded in Germany.... The admission of these Nazi zealots into Canada would be nothing less than a national disaster. They could no more be expected to be loyal citizens of this country than they were of their own native land.”²¹

Since the USSR's representatives were also keeping up their anti-UCC clamour, the Canadian government remained cautious in all of its dealings with Ukrainian Canadians, although it was well able to distinguish between nationalist and leftist components within the community, thanks to the work of a small but competent cadre of informers.²² Thus, when it became known that the Rev. Wasyl Kushnir, UCC's president, planned a "fact finding" tour of Europe, a meeting was arranged between him and government representatives, who made it clear that he must do nothing to antagonize the Russians. Kushnir's protestation that his trip was "entirely charitable" and had "no political objectives" was disbelieved. Canada's bureaucrats were well aware that Kushnir would make contact with various Ukrainian political refugees and that this would provoke an angry Soviet response.²³ Subsequently, when Kushnir, Sawchuk, Anthony Hlynka (Social Credit M.P. for Vegreville) or any others attempted to travel to Europe, they were first carefully screened by Canadian and British officials and instructed about what they could not do overseas. As one Canadian remarked: "Great care should be taken in forestalling visits...by members of the Ukrainian Canadian community who do not realize the need for tact and discretion."²⁴

Both the British and Canadian governments were apprehensive about the impact visits by Ukrainian Canadians might have on DPs. They believed such visits would instill a false sense of hope in the refugees about their situation and likely fate. Neither government had decided whether to admit Ukrainians as immigrants. The preferred solution was to encourage voluntary repatriation of DPs. Yet despite their ongoing exchange of opinion on how to deal with Ukrainian DPs, no uniform policy emerged between the Canadian and British governments. The reason might be traced to the simple fact that while Canada had long experience of Ukrainian immigration and deep-rooted concerns over the loyalty of this ethnic population (both the pro-communist and nationalist elements), British interest in Ukrainian affairs had almost entirely been a reflection of their diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the British saw the Ukrainians as a persistent source of East European instability. Consequently their concern was to prevent Ukrainian Canadians who visited DP camps from doing something that might further "encourage Ukrainian DPs in their impracticable nationalism."²⁵ Nothing would be allowed to disturb Anglo-Soviet relations. The British even assured the Russians that they would attempt to eliminate all anti-Soviet propaganda emanating from DP camps under their control.

Canadian anxieties were different. While supporting the British in their position, the Canadian authorities were far more worried about pressure on Canada to admit Ukrainian DPs. The government was unwilling to countenance any such large-scale immigration: "From our point of view...it is most desirable that DPs should not be given hopes of immigration to Canada which cannot be fulfilled. The unfortunate homeless persons in Germany grasp at any straw for re-settlement abroad, and to the Ukrainians in particular Canada is heaven. The

arrival of visitors can, in itself, be a source of endless, inaccurate and misleading rumours....²⁶

Kushnir's arrival in London, early in January 1946, was the beginning of an extensive tour of Western European camps, preceded by an inspection of CURB headquarters. Kushnir was able to familiarize himself with the British Zone of Germany, where Ukrainian-Canadian efforts were concentrated, and even managed (with the assistance of certain DPs) surreptitiously to visit the American Zone. During this period he first became directly acquainted with and alarmed over the political beliefs and programmes of the DPs, noting the preponderance of revolutionary nationalists, popularly known as the *Banderivtsi*, throughout the refugee camp system. Since this political movement did not exist in Canada, he felt that the immigration of Ukrainian DPs would introduce a disruptive force into organized Ukrainian-Canadian life. Given the fragile nature of the UCC, he desperately wanted to avoid any further divisiveness.

To harness those revolutionary nationalists before they could relocate to Canada, Kushnir proposed the formation of a UCC clone in Europe to be known as the Co-ordinating Ukrainian Committee (CUC), meant to unite all political parties and movements active among the Ukrainian DPs. While this move can be seen as an attempt to ensure a common front among Ukrainian refugees, it can also be portrayed as a thinly disguised attempt to limit the influence of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Revolutionaries (OUN-R). This group was allowed voting privileges not in proportion to its numerical strength, but only as one organization with one vote. Since they refused to be treated on an equal footing with smaller and less relevant groups, the *Banderivtsi* withdrew from CUC. That decision openly pitted them against the UCC, which continued to prop up the languishing CUC and its successor, the Ukrainian National Council. The stage was thus set for the divisive politics that fragmented Ukrainian-Canadian society in the immediate postwar period.²⁷

By mid-1946 Panchuk had been overseas for nearly five years. In February of that year he married a fellow UCSA member and CURB worker, Anne Cherniawsky. Shortly after that he was posted to the British Army of Occupation on the Rhine. Although he had recognized that there was still considerable work to be done on behalf of DPs, he also wanted to resume his interrupted course of study at the University of Saskatchewan and enjoy a settled married life. Therefore, in May 1946 he returned to Canada.²⁸ In his place CURB's former general secretary, S. W. Frolick, became director. This transfer of authority was quite in keeping with CURB's charter, so no one in the UCC or UCRF then protested Frolick becoming the bureau's director.²⁹

During Frolick's brief tenure a considerable amount of CURB-sponsored activity resulted in progress being made in influencing British opinion on Ukrainian issues. Even Canada's acting High Commissioner noted this development: "[t]he UCC representatives in London are understanding and sensible [and] the

pressure exerted by them has not been without influence on recent developments in U.K. policy towards Ukrainians in the British zone.”³⁰ Essentially, however, the British remained paternalistic in their treatment of Ukrainian Canadians (and, for that matter, Canadian officials). The Foreign Office addressed advice to its Canadian colleagues, which it expected would be transmitted to the Canadian Ukrainians: “[a]dvice the influential Ukrainians in Canada that the best way in which to help those Ukrainians who were left in Germany [is] to behave reasonably and not to force the British authorities into a position which would make it difficult for them to help.”³¹

Furthermore, no matter how helpful CURB might be, there was absolutely no question of official recognition being granted to the bureau. This point was made clear to Andriievsky and Frolick by Thomas Brimelow of the Foreign Office early in 1946. The message all Western governments directed to Ukrainian Canadians was at least consistent. They were free to engage in “non-political welfare work,” but any political efforts among the DPs were strongly criticized. If the Ukrainian Canadians fell into line with this official prescription and helped to guide the somewhat unruly Ukrainian DPs away from politics, then the West might become well disposed toward them. If the DPs continued with their anti-Soviet work, aided in any way by Ukrainian Canadians, they would be suppressed.³²

Frolick’s personal credibility within Ukrainian-Canadian circles was weak. Although he had been a prominent member of the Young Ukrainian Nationalists (the youth group of the UNF), his experiences in interwar Western Ukraine (Galicia) had oriented him toward support for the *Banderivtsi*. While this political allegiance did not impair his functioning as CURB’s director, there were those in Canada, such as the UNF’s Kossar, who refused to accept him because of that affiliation. They feared not only possible reprisals if an “underground” aspect to CURB’s work was discovered, but also the influence this young Ukrainian Canadian was accumulating in official circles. Accordingly, they decided to remove him from CURB. That was accomplished by devious means. Frolick was chastised for running the Ukrainian Information Service and told that he was not CURB’s director (despite the previous statement of the UUARC’s Dr. Gallan to the contrary). Denied any opportunity to retort, he was branded with allegations of financial misdealing. So he was forced out of CURB and returned to Toronto by Christmas 1946. Panchuk again became director of CURB.

The Canadian Relief Mission

When Panchuk left London in May 1946, he expressed no desire to return.³³ Yet by October he was on his way back. Panchuk claimed that it had been the UCC which was instrumental in his change of mind.³⁴ The national executive had pleaded with the veterans’ group to return to London and take over CURB’s management. To this request the veterans (organized in the Ukrainian Canadian

Veterans' Association, UCVA), had responded with a counter-offer. At a meeting in Winnipeg on 10 September 1946, the UCC was forced to accept a memorandum entitled the "Renaissance Plan," which the Veterans' Association insisted would lead to a "rebirth" of Ukrainian community life across the country.³⁵ In return for UCC acceptance of this plan the UCVA agreed to send a team of its people to Europe, there to continue CURB's work.

The UCC accepted these terms and a group of veterans contracted to form a Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Victims of War (CRM), with a mandate to remain abroad until at least 30 April 1947. The members of the team included the Panchuks, Ann Crapleve, and Anthony J. Yaremovich.³⁶ Panchuk informed a non-existent "Diplomatic Division" at the Department of External Affairs of the CRM's mission: "1. Bring immediate relief to Ukrainian refugees; 2. [Act as a] liaison body to various Red Cross Societies; 3. [Act as a] liaison with UUARC; 4. Co-operate and co-ordinate relief work teams with CURB; 5. Assist Canadian authorities in selection of the best possible and available from among the Ukrainian DPs [for immigration]."³⁷ The mission was to be headquartered at 218 Sussex Gardens, funded by the UCC and UCRF with UUARC assistance, and staffed largely by the same people who initiated CURB. It was indeed really little more than yet another extension of the Relief Bureau. What did distinguish it from its predecessor, however, was the inclusion of the clause concerning Ukrainian immigration to Canada—an important shift away from the welfare-oriented work that had been an early function of CURB.

Wresting control over CURB from Frolick was one thing, but being able to do much thereafter was quite another. The Canadian Relief Mission's members found that before they were even allowed onto the Continent, they had to undergo the process of being lectured by British and Canadian authorities on the norms and rules of proper behaviour. This vetting took up much of November and December 1946.³⁸ The nature of these meetings is indicated in the notes on an 11 December meeting between Messrs. Panchuk and Hlynka and Sir Herbert Emerson. Emerson proceeded to give them "fatherly advice" on what they should do:

[We must] use all influence at our disposal to stop the militant and hostile propaganda that is so prevalent in some of the Camps—it is doing more harm than good and the people concerned are not only cutting their own throats, but the throats of their kinsmen who are eligible for assistance. There is much more useful, positive work to be done such as good organization in the Camps, handicrafts, educational, cultural activities which would be perfectly legal and most beneficial that it is unfortunate that so much energy and effort is wasted in hostile propaganda and activities of a negative nature which does more harm than good for now and for the future.³⁹

Since most Ukrainian Canadians accepted and acted on the basis of such counsel, they soon found themselves locked in a complex political struggle with those Ukrainian nationalists who still pined for a return to the homeland, and, in the

meantime, supported the ongoing insurgency there. Both sides became progressively disillusioned as they came to understand, if never to appreciate, the contrasting world-views of a Ukrainian Canadian and a Ukrainian refugee.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the CRM's members were growing increasingly anxious about their situation:

We have not come or been sent to 'view conditions,' to 'visit camps,' or on a sight-seeing tour. Each member of our relief team has been over here during the war and had no particular desire to leave home again, to go on the mission.... I have had my fill of Europe.... It's not the love of travelling that persuaded me to interrupt my university studies a *second time*.... Nor was it because I wasn't acquainted with conditions of the refugees...of whom I saw enough from Normandy to Hamburg....⁴¹

The mission's job, Panchuk asserted, was "to deliver the goods," and if that were not permitted, then he was ready to lead his co-workers back to Canada. From there, he threatened, he would turn the whole story over to all concerned organizations, the people, and the press, leaving public opinion to force a just resolution of the Ukrainian refugee problem.⁴² While this posturing may not have endeared Panchuk to those at whom it was directed, the CRM was soon allowed to set out for Europe, a concession won.

What they found shocked them, for the once chaotic refugee camps had come largely under the control of the nationalists and been made over into well-disciplined centres of Ukrainian organizational life, which encompassed cultural, religious, and social aspects—precisely the sort of thing the British and Canadians were afraid would happen. Ukrainian-Canadian relations with Ukrainian DPs deteriorated rapidly thereafter. The friction emerging from this encounter between the two did not go unnoticed by the authorities.⁴³

Further Developments

While many Eastern Ukrainian refugees were forcibly deported to the USSR under the terms of the Yalta agreement, the scale of the Ukrainian DP problem in Europe, even as late as 1947, remained considerable. Panchuk's proposal was that Ukrainians in Canada and the United States operate a joint mission, whose unity in the field would ensure economical and efficient use of the monies gathered to help the DPs:

I cannot over-emphasize that the people for whom we must work are one people regardless of whether they are in the British, French, or American Zone. They are the Ukrainian people, all [of] them the same class and category, refugees, DPs, and victims of this war...unless we are sponsoring one agency to help rather than a series of agencies, I think we are on the wrong track and I, for one, wish to have little or nothing to do with such a programme.⁴⁴

To emphasize these points, Panchuk derided the UUARC's basic approach to the Ukrainian DP question as "unsound and impractical." He even suggested that, in the event of a fusion of the two teams, Gallan could be the chairman of the new organization's board of directors, assigning to himself the role of field director for Europe. Adding insult to injury, Panchuk reminded Gallan that it had been Ukrainian Canadians and they alone who had established the UCSA Club in London and later CURB, so it was only proper that Canadians continue serving as the vanguard of North American Ukrainian refugee relief operations overseas. The Americans could, of course, continue assisting in this effort through generous financial subsidies.⁴⁵

While Panchuk was right in noting the early involvement of Ukrainian Canadians in relief work and sensible in making a call for a united effort, his abrasive and derogatory articulation of those points was very counter-productive. More importantly, his ideas regarding a fusion of the relief teams did not enjoy the support of the UCRF or UCC. Panchuk's enthusiasm for the work he was doing blinded him to the fact that, as far as the Ukrainian-Canadian hierarchy in Winnipeg was concerned, he was a subordinate, not an equal. But first he had to weather Gallan's scolding:

My advice to you now is...less criticism, shorter letters but to the point and show more concrete work, as we are short of help (much more so than you are) and sincerely have no time to waste reading lengthy, worthless criticisms. If you accomplish in your time as much as I did during my short stay in Austria and Germany, then after our mission is completed, and our refugees are well taken care of and we have more leisure time, the Committees can get together and criticize and slander to their hearts' content. Lots of luck.⁴⁶

The matter was not left at that. Stung, Panchuk decided first to turn to a higher authority, so he addressed a letter to the UCC, in which he dismissed Gallan's achievements in a few paragraphs and then added that he would prefer to have no further relations with his American counterparts: "Our Mission has decided *definitely* that we do *not* and will not represent the American committee. So far as we are concerned we represent *only* the Ukrainian Canadian Committee and the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund. The Bureau in London is also strictly a *Canadian* bureau sponsored and operated by the Ukrainians of Canada *only*."⁴⁷ He also duly informed the UUARC of this fact, adding that they should send all future correspondence to the mission through the UCC in Winnipeg. He had not, he noted, meant to "hurt anyone's feelings," but his team was intending to return to Canada as of 30 June, officially concluding all its operations overseas by that date.⁴⁸

Gallan was not to be outdone. In late June, he attacked Panchuk for daring to offer him "favours," stating that he felt comfortable standing on his own feet and would never accept the help of those he considered to be "plain cheap politicians." He told Panchuk he should "try and be a soldier" and refrain from

always bickering. Prominently mentioned in this letter was the fact that Gallan had discussed this entire controversy with Kushnir in Ottawa on 11 June, so the UCC was fully aware of UUARC's dissatisfaction with Panchuk.⁴⁹ This threatening reprimand had the desired effect. A few weeks later Panchuk's apology arrived on Gallan's doorstep. Panchuk wrote that "too much ado" had been made over a "small, petty" matter, which had taken on a "completely unforeseen, undesirable and distasteful form."⁵⁰ On the same day he also wrote contrite letters to John Panchuk, a leading member of UUARC, and Kushnir. These acrimonious exchanges were not untypical of the conflicts which plagued all attempts at forming a truly united North American Ukrainian effort throughout the period of the refugee emergency.

On 19 January 1946 the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (AUGB) was formed. It was composed of former Ukrainian soldiers in the Polish armed forces, European Voluntary Workers then being brought to England as labourers, and eventually bolstered by members of the Galician Division who had been relocated to Britain in 1947 as POWs. The AUGB was largely the brainchild of Ukrainian Canadians. Their idea had been to establish "something like a UCC" in England, and to create similar bodies wherever Ukrainian DPs were resettled.⁵¹ In their own paternalistic fashion, the Ukrainian Canadians assumed that they would be able to "control closely" AUGB. Ironically, in this their attitude was not very different from the sense of superiority with which the British often treated Ukrainian Canadians. It eventually provoked a negative reaction among many AUGB members and resulted in Panchuk's removal as the organization's second president in March 1949.⁵² As the AUGB was being established, however, Ukrainian Canadians did shoulder much of the financial burden of the new organization, largely through generous donations of CURB monies. There was nothing dishonest in this, yet the use of CURB's funds in support of the AUGB later proved a critical point raised against Panchuk by his Ukrainian-Canadian controllers.

Before that arose, Panchuk paid a brief visit to Canada to meet UCC, UCRF, and UUARC representatives. The discussions turned on how best to make operational the agreement that the Canadian and American committees had reached in late June 1947. The UCRF's A. Zaharychuk had informed Panchuk of the general policy that was to govern UCRF-UUARC relations shortly thereafter. The main points were:

1. U.S. would send two or three representatives to co-operate with Canadian team, especially in the American Zone.
2. U.S. would maintain their own field man out of their funds.
3. London office would be maintained as a joint venture, directing the activities of all field men.

4. No funds would be available to those who had already settled, e.g., France, Belgium, U.S., Great Britain, Canada. "They have to rely on their own sources."
5. Maintenance of central office, London, would be shared in the following proportion—Canadian Committee 3, American Committee 5.
6. Assistance would be given through territorial committees only and not individually.⁵³

After these discussions in Canada, Panchuk returned to England, leaving both Crapleve and Yaremovich behind to lecture and conduct cross-country fund-raising tours in support of further CURB and CRM efforts. During one such tour in eastern Canada, Yaremovich observed what he saw as the main difference in approach taken by the two committees: "I am coming to the conclusion that it will be best if we operate separately. *Immigration* is the thing in which we are interested, especially [since] the U.S. is restricting itself to *relief*...they are just prolonging the evil which we hope to liquidate." He added that Ukrainian-American efforts were also marred by internal squabbles:

Unfortunately, Mr. [John] Panchuk spent most of the time running down Dr. Gallan. I feel they have their own differences but they should not be aired before us Canadians.... Smook wrote that the Americans do not want any Canadians in the Zone. I am taking this with a grain of salt.... My personal view is therefore if we have our separate zones we will see who does what along the lines of immigration. That is what the people want to see happen. Relief is not wanted by the people. They must have some but they feel that it is not solving the problem. Mr. Panchuk was proposing that Ann Crapleve go to work for them. She refused on the grounds that if she decides to go overseas again she will be working for the Canadians.⁵⁴

Once back in Europe, Panchuk arranged for his own meetings with the UUARC's Roman Smook. Apparently he entered into arrangements which were not entirely in keeping with Winnipeg's understanding of how co-operation with the UUARC was to be handled. Panchuk argued that the real need was for creating a:

...*joint* and *co-ordinated* action. This does not mean that we must unite our two missions in any way. On the contrary it is necessary that we maintain our individual and separate identity, but it is vital that our work and actions be co-ordinated so that we do not duplicate.... Neither of our committees is strong enough or rich enough to carry out the tremendous task before us. We must therefore distribute and decentralize our forces, resources and personnel in such a way so as to *get most results* with the least possible effort and expense.⁵⁵

Again Panchuk suggested to Ukrainian Americans that an American representative could take the leading role, while he would be content merely to oversee all field operations.⁵⁶

As Panchuk, against the express wishes of the UCC and UCRF, was forging a united relief effort in Western Europe, Yaremovich and Crapleve were deciding on a different course of action. On 1 November 1947 they individually signed contracts with the Relief Fund to return to Europe as UCRF's field representatives, but *independent* of Panchuk, who they assumed would remain in London, directing CURB's work there. Although John Karasevich, a leading UCVA member, informed Panchuk of this change, receiving this news from a friend did little to alleviate the slight.⁵⁷ By 28 November Panchuk had tendered his resignation yet again, explaining that having two independent field representatives would multiply the problems he already faced trying to co-ordinate relief work. Simultaneously, he resented being made "ambassador for all of Europe" while others were given more manageable tasks limited to one zone of Germany: "I feel I have been wasting my time overseas." A few days later he informed Karasevich that he was irrevocably committed to leaving his post, a decision he also communicated to the UCRF.⁵⁸

Panchuk's reasons for quitting were complex and varied in merit. His deep commitment to the development of stable Ukrainian organizational life in Great Britain was unquestionable—to achieve that he even disbursed Ukrainian-Canadian funds. Yet the UCC and UCRF refused to provide support for resettled Ukrainians, because there were many displaced persons still requiring help. Panchuk's retort was that England was a far more important "base" than Canada, in fact "much *more* so."⁵⁹ But his "elders" were not convinced. They kept as their first priority the care of DPs left in the camps. On this issue Panchuk's avowedly pro-British sentiments blinded him to a fundamental Ukrainian-Canadian expectation—that many of the refugees would migrate to Canada and would enhance community life there. Ukrainian Canadians were less interested in building up a Ukrainian population in the United Kingdom.

Winnipeg was also unimpressed with Panchuk's elaborately designed schemes, which envisioned a long-term presence in Europe at considerable cost. Ukrainian Canadians did not want a "fusion" of the American and Canadian committees, nor permanent representation overseas. When Panchuk persisted in arguing for such things he was strictly reminded of his place: "...it is rather surprising that you are asking now [what] your duties etc. are. You are our agent, subject to our instructions and in duty bound to act within the scope of your agency. Make no commitments without first referring to the Committee. Keep in touch with all possible channels of immigration and assist in movement of Displaced Persons directly or indirectly." No additional funds would be allowed for the AUGB, or "for persons who have already settled." While Yaremovich and Crapleve would co-operate with Panchuk, he was reminded that they were directly responsible to the UCRF in Winnipeg and not to him. If these conditions were unacceptable, they urged Panchuk to look for "better opportunities elsewhere."⁶⁰

Chastised, his agreement with the UUARC described as “fantastic,” Panchuk left the UCRF as of 5 December 1947. Anthony Yaremovich then took over CURB, one of his first acts being to ensure that any arrangements Panchuk had made outside his mandate were liquidated. While Kushnir noted that he deeply regretted Panchuk’s refusal to follow plans which he had helped develop while in Canada, the latter’s defiance of UCRF directives would no longer be tolerated. A long exchange of letters followed, as Panchuk attempted to justify his deeds.⁶¹ Even though he promised to aid Yaremovich in taking over the bureau, he did so reluctantly.⁶² And even after several of his closest advisors, such as John Panchuk, urged that he not resign, Panchuk would not be budged.⁶³

Panchuk largely ceased to have a direct link with Ukrainian-Canadian overseas operations thereafter, but he never entirely refrained from offering his advice. He remained in England until 1951. In retrospect, much of what he accomplished was impressive. Almost single-handedly, he inspired Ukrainian Canadians to get involved in defence of Ukrainian DPs. While his effectiveness can be debated, his role in those years was pivotal and should be recognized for what it was—the determined activism of a man who was both a Ukrainian and a Canadian patriot.

Yaremovich’s tenure as director of CURB and a UCRF representative overseas was brief. His attention focussed on the distribution of relief supplies and aiding Ukrainians in the emigration process. Of necessity, some time had to be given over to straightening out the tangled finances of CURB and AUGB, an irksome responsibility which was not without its controversial aspects.⁶⁴ Yaremovich was also in charge of attempting to co-ordinate his work with that of the American Ukrainians—a task he found no less difficult than had Panchuk. Frustrated by such pressures, he returned to Canada in September 1948.⁶⁵ After that, Ann Crapleve took over as the officially appointed director of CURB. Under instructions from Winnipeg she began the formal process of liquidating the bureau, which occurred in December of that year.⁶⁶ After seeing to the disposal of the London headquarters, Crapleve moved UCRF operations to Bielefeld in the British Zone of Germany. All Ukrainian-Canadian efforts were to be known under the name of the sponsor, the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund.⁶⁷ Essentially Crapleve’s work followed a well-established routine. She supervised the distribution of goods sent over from Canada; assisted DPs with immigration officials; interceded on their behalf whenever difficulties arose; and visited various DP camps. This work had none of the glamour attached to lobbying, but it was an essential task which she carried out capably.⁶⁸

On 1 April 1949, Crapleve was pleased to welcome Eustace and Anne Wasylyshen to Bielefeld. He had come to be director of the Relief Fund; his wife and Crapleve were to assist him.⁶⁹ The Wasylyshens remained at their post until 12 September 1950, when they returned to Winnipeg, after which Crapleve resumed her duties as UCRF director. The Wasylyshens’ final report, dated 2 October, revealed a great deal about their disappointments while overseas. Not

only had they arrived in England just in time to witness the coup in the AUGB against Panchuk, but they soon found themselves in Germany without the support and direction they had expected the UCRF to provide. Certainly Wasylyshen could be eloquent in articulating the Relief Fund's mission—"To save, for us, the future of Ukraine and the world, our brothers and sisters from death and dire circumstances and to preserve the ideals of the Ukrainian Nation...."⁷⁰—but it is clear that both Wasylyshens felt abandoned by their head office in Winnipeg. To make matters worse, they also ran into trouble with the UUARC. While Eustace gave the Ukrainian-American organization full credit for its work and achievements, he noted:

In spite of the fact that UUARC has no mandate for the British Zone...they had letterheads printed bearing the name UUARC and underneath UCRF, implying that they represented both organizations. In fact their officers and employees persisted in considering the UCRF Mission a branch office or subsidiary of UUARC. Mr. Gallan, writing to us for a favour, addressed his letter to UUARC, Bielefeld.... UUARC considered the Wentorff office their branch office.... Neither UUARC Director nor any of their staff had ever visited Wentorff or contributed so much as a scrap of paper.... We wish UUARC had been just as ready to grant the same credit to UCRF for their work in Europe, which, after all, began long before UUARC came on the scene.⁷¹

Although the British authorities were willing to help maintain the UCRF office and its complement, their operations were instead allowed to wind down. Financial reasons were not the cause. As Anne Wasylyshen bitterly reported, the fund still had over \$14,000 on deposit in late October 1950.⁷² Instead a major factor behind Winnipeg's lack of interest in keeping up the mission was the widespread disillusionment many Ukrainian Canadians had begun to feel about the usefulness of the "newcomers" they were directly encountering: "...[the DPs] have managed to get under everybody's skin...the break up into 'two camps' is deep and thorough and I am afraid unless things change radically, final and irrevocable. The people don't want it but certain leaders act only on the instructions they receive from Munich and it's hopeless to do anything. There is no rhyme or reason to anything they do. It's orders from above."⁷³ For Ukrainian Canadians, relief efforts for refugees were no longer in fashion.⁷⁴

Assessment

Ukrainian Canadians sincerely believed that an influx of Ukrainian refugees would invigorate their existing organizations, so they mobilized their resources to establish the UCRF and support CURB's work overseas. Precisely how many Ukrainian DPs were directly brought to Canada under these organizational auspices is unknown, although their combined lobbying efforts undoubtedly had some influence on the formulation of Canadian and even British government policies towards the DPs. Certainly these Ukrainian-Canadian efforts, for all their

disruptive internecine difficulties, did play a positive role through their distribution of relief supplies, their outspokenness in defence of the refugees' interests, and their service as conduits of information between Ukrainians in the refugee camps and their compatriots throughout the West.

However significant these Ukrainian Canadian efforts may have been, it was the Canadian government that ultimately decided on allowing the postwar immigration of Ukrainians. The archival record shows that it did so only after considerable in-house deliberation, and after taking into account not only the ardent petitioning of Ukrainian Canadians in favour of such an immigration, but also the equally pressing arguments raised against this inflow. Government officials agreed that while there were sound humanitarian principles in favour—Ukrainians had proven themselves to be good agriculturalists, labourers, and anti-communists—there was also a case against allowing them in. Not only were many DPs suffering from impaired physical and psychological health, but some were known to have taken up arms against the Soviet Union, an ally of Canada from 1941. Domestic opposition might, therefore, be expected from those indisposed to allowing such former “enemies” into Canada. Also to be feared was the distinct possibility that, planted among these refugees, there might be Soviet agents. Hence the Canadian government, in October 1947, hesitated to permit any large-scale immigration of Ukrainian DPs. Only after conducting its own further investigations into the wartime record of Ukrainians was the decision made to draw upon the Ukrainian refugee population for needed additional immigrants to Canada. Eventually some 40,000 Ukrainian DPs were resettled in Canada.⁷⁵

Whether it was their lobbying and relief efforts or the gate keepers' perceptions of the utility of Canada's Ukrainian citizens during the war which finally decided policy on the admission of Ukrainian DPs is an issue that needs to be more fully explored. What is indisputable is that the eventual immigration of thousands of Ukrainian refugees into Canada established new social and spatial patterns of community life among the Ukrainian-Canadian population. That was to be the most lasting impact of the postwar immigration of Ukrainians to Canada. It would prove to be a very mixed legacy.

Notes

1. An historical review of the Ukrainian experience in Canada is provided by Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan in *Creating A Landscape: A Geography of Ukrainians in Canada* (Toronto, 1989). See also their *A Delicate and Difficult Question: Documents in the History of Ukrainians in Canada, 1899-1962* (Kingston, 1986).

2. N. A. Robertson to George Pifher, 15 November 1944, Department of External Affairs (hereinafter DEA), 2514-40. On the history of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee see B. S. Kordan, "Disunity and Duality: Ukrainian Canadians and the Second World War," M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1981. Many of the themes addressed originally by Kordan have been elaborated in T. M. Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians during the Second World War* (Toronto, 1988). For another interpretation of the events treated in this paper see my "Unintended Consequences in Refugee Resettlement: Post-War Ukrainian Refugee Immigration to Canada," *International Migration Review* XX, no. 2 (1986): 467-82. On Canadian bureaucrats with whom Panchuk and other Ukrainian Canadians dealt see J. L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957* (Toronto, 1982) and Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-68* (Toronto, 1981).
3. Dana Wilgress to N. A. Robertson, 25 January 1945, DEA 2514-40.
4. See J. H. Cleveland to Mr. Chance, 9 October 1947, DEA 232-L-40C, for a reference to Zarubin's remarks.
5. See note to N. A. Robertson, 15 May 1945, DEA 2514-40C.
6. See *Heroes of their Day: The Reminiscences of Bohdan Panchuk*, ed. and intro. by L. Y. Luciuk (Toronto, 1983).
7. See "Statement Submitted by B. Panchuk in Connection with Administrative and Financial Statement of CURB," Gordon Richard Bohdan Panchuk Collection (hereinafter GRBPC), Archives of Ontario, Toronto. From its inception CURB used the same building, assets, and even many of the personnel of UCSA at 218 Sussex Gardens, London.
8. G. R. B. Panchuk diary, 15 April 1945, Panchuk personal collection. Regrettably, Panchuk did not consistently record his impressions of events in this diary. The first CURB meeting was held in London on 13-14 April 1946, "Resume of Bureau Meetings," GRBPC.
9. "The Situation with Regard to Ukrainian Refugees," National Archives of Canada (hereinafter NAC), MG 28, v. 9, vol. 15, 10 June 1945.
10. Ibid.
11. Peter Worobetz to G. R. B. Panchuk, 11 April 1945, GRBPC.
12. G. R. B. Panchuk to Peter Worobetz, 27 February 1945, GRBPC.
13. Peter Worobetz to G. R. B. Panchuk, 11 April 1945, GRBPC.

Why did the Allied military authorities allow an ethnic minority to rent premises in central London, organize various social, religious, and cultural events and even publish their own newsletter? The official view was that these activities contributed to the troops' morale. Yet, given the long-standing Canadian and British suspicions about the nature of Ukrainian organizations, it is worth speculating whether UCSA was a target of official surveillance. Although no documentary evidence suggests that this was the case, it would be out of character if the very same governments which had carefully watched Ukrainians before the war had suddenly stopped doing so.

14. G. R. B. Panchuk to UCC et al., 29 July 1944, GRBPC.
15. "Statement Submitted by B. Panchuk in Connection with Administrative and Financial Statement of CURB," GRBPC. For a British government statement on CURB see Public Record Office (hereinafter PRO), FO 371/66355, 5 May 1947.
16. CURB memorandum, 19 March 1945, GRBPC. The UUARC was incorporated as a charitable organization 24 June 1944. Its executive director, Dr. Walter Gallan, visited the Continent in June and October 1946, then again in November 1950. UUARC's first accredited representative, Roman I. Smook, was stationed in the American Zone of Germany from 29 July 1947. On 1 December 1947, UUARC established an office in Munich. Others were opened in Baden-Baden (French Zone of Germany) and Salzburg, Austria. See Ostap Tarnawsky, *Brat-Bratovi: Knyha pro ZUADK* (Philadelphia, 1971).
17. Intriguingly, Dmytro Andriievsky was given a part-time position with CURB, effective from 4 February 1946, reportedly on the insistence of the Ukrainian National Federation's president, Volodymyr Kossar. Andriievsky was a leading member of the executive council of the OUN-Solidarists, popularly called *Melnykivtsi*. His inclusion on CURB's staff would seem to indicate a willingness to give this nationalist faction support. The question remains open as to who sanctioned this appointment and why.
18. NAC, MG 28, v. 9, vol. 9, 1 June 1946.
19. "Report and Outline of Achievement of Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (period 15 February 1945 - 1 June 1946)," NAC, MG 28, v. 9, vol. 7, 1 June 1946.
20. The communist-oriented Ukrainian Labour and Farmer Temple Association was renamed AUUC just after the war. A useful account of its history is John Kolasky, *The Shattered Illusion: The History of Ukrainian Pro-Communist Organizations in Canada* (Toronto, 1979).
21. *Edmonton Journal*, 7 February 1945, 10.
22. Many pertinent RCMP files remain closed. However, the fact that informers did work among Ukrainians in Canada on behalf of the government is demonstrated by such files as NAC MG 30, E350, File 14, 25-31 August 1941, which contain Michael Petrowsky's reports on various aspects of Ukrainian-Canadian organizational life.
23. N. A. Robertson to W. F. A. Turgeon, K.C., Canadian ambassador to Belgium, 2 January 1946, DEA 6980-GR-40.
24. N. A. Robertson to Lester Pearson, ambassador to the U.S., 7 January 1946, DEA 6980-GR-40.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. Kushnir's fear of the relocation of divisiveness from within the DP camps was made clear in his speech in London on 7-8 February 1946. The attitude of the militant nationalists was also expressed. See "Minutes of the First Day of a Conference held

in London, CURB and Representatives of Ukrainian Relief Committees.” Document provided courtesy of Mr. S. W. Frolick, Q. C.

The Co-Ordinating Ukrainian Committee was formally established on 14 October 1946 after an agreement on its principles had been reached on 12 March. Kushnir was present at the March meeting. The OUN-R took part in the first meeting, 4 August 1946, but subsequently declined to participate.

28. Panchuk informed his colleagues that he was resigning as CURB’s director in a memorandum, 15 March 1946, addressed to his “Dear Fellow Workers,” GRBPC.

While in Canada he played an important role as lobbyist on behalf of Ukrainian DP immigration to Canada. See, for example, the proceedings of the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, Ottawa, 29 May 1946. For more, see chapter by Myron Momryk in this volume.

29. Frolick, “Saving the Displaced Persons: The Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau,” speech given to the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Toronto, 13 November 1978. Frolick’s memoirs have been published by the Multicultural History Society of Ontario in its Ethnocultural Voices series under the title *Between Two Worlds: The Memoirs of Stanley Frolick* (Toronto, 1990), ed. Lubomyr Luciuk and Marco Carynnyk.
30. Acting High Commissioner for Canada (London) to Secretary of State, Department of External Affairs, 9 August 1946, DEA 8296-40C.
31. Ibid.
32. For the meeting between Brimelow, Frolick, and Gallan and the message, see PRO, FO 371/56791, 25 February 1946.
33. G. R. B. Panchuk to Tracy Philipps, 17 August 1946 and 28 September 1946, GRBPC.
34. G. R. B. Panchuk to V. J. Kaye, 21 September 1946, GRBPC.
35. While no copy of this memorandum exists in personal communications, Panchuk suggested that one of its central proposals was the building of Ukrainian community halls wherever concentrations of Ukrainians were found. These centres would ensure a united front among Ukrainian Canadians while preserving the group’s identity and culture.
36. Panchuk wrote to both Dr. Kaye and S. Davidovich regarding the memorable meeting between the UCVA and UCC on 27 September 1946 and next day addressed a similar note to Anthony Hlynka. The nature of CRM is noted in a memorandum, October 1946. In fact Panchuk did consider returning earlier. He wrote at least two letters to Lt.Col. Frost, commissioner at the Canadian Red Cross in London, mentioning the possibility, G. R. B. Panchuk to Lt.Col. Frost, 26 May and 26 July 1946, GRBPC. Possibly his musings on this theme were sparked by the meeting he, Hlynka, J. R. Solomon, Kushnir, and Sawchuk had with the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour in Ottawa, 29 May 1946.
37. G. R. B. Panchuk to Diplomatic Division [sic], Department of External Affairs, 1 October 1946, DEA 6980-GR-40.

38. There was a seemingly endless round of meetings and discussions, confidential and otherwise, between the Ukrainian Canadians and the British. For example, on 22 November 1946 Panchuk and Danylo Skoropadsky's aide, Vladimir de Korostovetz, had a chat with Col. Anthony Cooke of MI5. On 27 November, Dr. Gallan and Skoropadsky dined with prominent Liberals at the Reform Club. On 13 December, Panchuk and Hlynka had an interview with Sir George Rendell at Canada House.
39. "Report on a Conference with Sir Herbert Emerson, Director of the Intergovernmental Committee," 11 December 1946, GRBPC.
40. Panchuk and his fellow workers seem to have accepted the British position that no aid would be given to leaders of movements "hostile to their countries of origin," a blanket condemnation that concerned members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), OUN, and Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. Supporters of the huge anti-communist front within the DP camps resented this apparent indifference on the part of Ukrainian Canadians to a commitment which was at the very core of their refugee experience.
41. G. R. B. Panchuk to Mr. Moore, a member of the Allied Control Commission for Germany, 6 December 1946, GRBPC.
42. *Ibid.*
43. G. R. B. Panchuk to John Karasevich, 21 December 1946, GRBPC.
44. G. R. B. Panchuk to John Panchuk, president of UUARC, March 1947, GRBPC.
45. [Panchuk] Canadian Relief Mission for Ukrainian Victims of War to [Gallan] UUARC, 14 April 1947, GRBPC.
46. W. Gallan to G. R. B. Panchuk, 25 April 1947, NAC, MG 28, v. 9, vol. 15.
47. G. R. B. Panchuk to UCC, 2 May 1947, NAC, MG 28, v. 9, vol. 15.
48. G. R. B. Panchuk to UUARC, 10 May 1947; G. R. B. Panchuk to Gallan, 12 May 1947, GRBPC.
49. W. Gallan to G. R. B. Panchuk, 23 June 1947, GRBPC.
50. G. R. B. Panchuk to W. Gallan, 24 July 1947, GRBPC.
51. G. R. B. Panchuk to Peter Smylski, 25 May 1947, GRBPC.
52. Panchuk lost his position after the 12-13 March 1949 meeting of the AUGB in London. The meeting was disrupted by opponents of his continued presidency of the AUGB—mainly supporters of the OUN-R and the Hetman movement. Since they formed a majority, they had little trouble replacing Panchuk, although the validity of the election was debated at the time and the entire issue remained controversial. Eustace Wasylyshen reported that he was afraid "a similar pattern of events...may eventually turn up in Canada," NAC, MG 28, v. 9, vol. 16, 23 March 1949.
53. Panchuk returned to Canada around 11 September 1947 to meet UCC and UCRF representatives. See G. R. B. Panchuk to Prof. George Simpson, 26 June 1947; Zaharychuk to Panchuk, 4 July 1947, GRBPC.

54. Panchuk indicated that Crapleve and Yaremovich left England for Canada on 4 September, G. R. B. Panchuk to UCRF's Mrs. Mandryka, 5 September 1947. Yaremovich to Panchuk, 15 October 1947, GRBPC.
55. G. R. B. Panchuk to R. Smook, 23 October 1947, GRBPC. Panchuk returned to London about 17 October.
56. See "Agenda for Meeting—Panchuk and Smook," held in Frankfurt on 7-8 November 1947, GRBPC.
57. "Agreement Between UCRF and Field Representatives, A. J. Yaremovich and Anne Crapleve," 1 November 1947; John Karasevich to G. R. B. Panchuk, 3 November 1947, GRBPC.
58. G. R. B. Panchuk to John Panchuk, 28 November 1947; G. R. B. Panchuk to John Karasevich, 5 December 1947, GRBPC. UCRF was told on 28 November 1947.
59. G. R. B. Panchuk to George Luckyj, 2 November 1947, GRBPC.
60. J. W. Arsenych and A. Mandryka to G. R. B. Panchuk, 18 November 1947, GRBPC.
61. See G. R. B. Panchuk to John Karasevich, 2 December 1947; Kushnir to G. R. B. Panchuk, 5 December 1947; G. R. B. Panchuk to John Panchuk, 5 December 1947; G. R. B. Panchuk to Tracy Philipps, 11 December 1947; and G. R. B. Panchuk to Kushnir, 12 December 1947, GRBPC. Yaremovich was told what action to take regarding Panchuk's commitments in a letter 5 December 1947, GRBPC.
62. Panchuk to Kushnir, 12 December 1947, GRBPC; interview with A. J. Yaremovich in Winnipeg, 1 December 1982.
63. John Panchuk to G. R. B. Panchuk, 9 December 1947, GRBPC.
64. Responsibility for CURB and UCRF was transferred to Yaremovich, effective 31 December 1947, PRO, FO 371/71630, 23 January 1948.
 On 15 December, Yaremovich cabled UCC to ask that they definitely instruct Panchuk about the changeover in directors, A. J. Yaremovich private collection, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
 Questions regarding CURB and AUGB finances precipitated a voluminous exchange of letters. For example, see UCRF to Bill Byblow of CURB, 3 November 1948, and Byblow to AUGB's George Salsky, 8 November 1948, GRBPC.
65. J. Karasevich to Panchuk, 18 September 1948, [GRBPC].
66. "Memorandum re: Liquidation of CURB," 9 November 1948; "Liquidation of and Commitments and Responsibilities of CURB," 16 November 1948; "Meeting of the Commission of the Liquidation of the CURB," 23 November 1948; "Minutes of the Second Meeting for the Liquidation of CURB," 26 November 1948; "Minutes of the Third Meeting," 28 November 1948, GRBPC.
67. B. L. Byblow to AUGB, 9 December 1948, [GRBPC].
68. CURB and the UCRF teams, aided by Ukrainian DPs added to their staffs, distributed relief supplies sent from Canada; interceded with the occupation authorities in difficult cases involving individuals' status or immigration; kept their parent organizations throughout the Western world informed of British, American, and French policies relevant to DP issues; represented Ukrainian refugee interests before the

authorities; and served as sources of information on Ukrainian issues. While ostensibly apolitical, these Ukrainian Canadians did represent a non-Soviet viewpoint on Ukrainian affairs, and their individual backgrounds tended to colour the way in which they related to DPs, both in terms of the latter's world view and how the "DP problem" should be resolved.

69. Anne Wasylyshen to an unidentified friend, 10 April 1949, private collection of E. and A. Wasylyshen, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
70. Eustace and Anne Wasylyshen, "Final Report of Activities of Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund Mission in Europe," 2 October 1950, Wasylyshen Collection.
71. *Ibid.*
72. Wasylyshen to Kushnir, 24 March 1950, lamented the lack of "definite and direct answers." Wasylyshen to UCRF's board of directors, 27 April 1950, argued the need to maintain the mission. He also mentioned that he had received notice of termination effective 30 June. Anne Wasylyshen to Crapleve, 23 October 1950, Wasylyshen Collection.
73. The Panchuks to the Wasylyshens and Crapleve, 3 March 1950, Wasylyshen Collection. This was written after the third UCC congress in Winnipeg in February 1950.
74. Dr. G. Roussow to P. Shteppa, February 1949, S. W. Frolick Collection.
75. The government was particularly concerned about the question of whether to admit veterans of the Galician Division. A final verdict was not reached until 1950, when it was clear that no evidence existed linking the Division to war crimes. See my "Ukraine's Wartime Unit Never Linked to War Crime," *Globe and Mail*, 28 March 1985, 7. This exculpatory verdict was confirmed by Canada's Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, headed by Mr. Justice Jules Deschênes in his final public report (Ottawa, 1986), 249-61. The Commission determined that sporadic reports suggesting that large numbers of war criminals could be found in Canada were specious and gross exaggerations.

The DP Experience as
a Social and
Psychological Reality

The DP Camp as a Social System

Ihor V. Zielyk

The DP experience as a whole must be viewed as a temporary but crucial transitional stage in the lives of the Ukrainian immigrants, which holds many clues both to their background and to their subsequent adjustment in the new homelands. So the social structure of the camp may be seen both as a reflection of the relational and organizational patterns of the Ukrainian society of origin and as a basis for the development of structural trends and adaptations which the immigrants carried overseas.

Unfortunately, there are no systematic sociological studies of life in the DP camps or of their social structure. Yet it is possible to reconstruct, from scattered and varied evidence, some aspects of the camp experience.¹ Such an attempt must be made, because many things happened during this period (as well as the war years immediately preceding it) which helped modify the perceptions, habits, and relationships of the camp residents and even affected some of the demographic characteristics of the group as a whole. In short, it can be said that the immigrants who entered the United States, Canada, and other Western countries in the late forties and early fifties were often not the "same" people who had left Ukraine prior to 1945.

In the first place, many of them had already spent several years in Germany or Austria by the time the war ended, notably those who had been taken there as forced labourers. These were mostly young, single people of peasant background, who came into contact with an urban, industrial society for the first time. Some had worked in factories, and there, not unlike the Polish village youth described earlier by Thomas and Znaniecki, slowly acquired the new attitudes

typical of the urban working class. These included a measure of individualistic self-orientedness (in contrast to traditional familism), a concern with money as a means of obtaining goods for immediate consumption, a time perspective which focussed on the present and devalued the past, and some familiarity with the workings of large impersonal organizations, which usually were a mystery to the old-type peasant. Others had been employed by farmers in the countryside. Their contact with the city was limited, but they, too, became secularized through exposure to the technological sophistication, rational organization, and profit-orientation of modernized agriculture.

Another large category, refugees, had arrived in Germany and Austria just as the war was coming to an end. They came mostly from the cities and towns of Galicia and knew at least some German, so to that extent they faced fewer acute problems of adjustment. The demographic and social composition of this group of emigrants was also quite different from that of the wartime workers. There were many complete family units, a much larger age range that included very young children as well as older people, a much higher average educational level, and virtually the whole range of occupations that one would find in a Ukrainian city. These people had considerable experience with formal organization and bureaucratic procedures, since they had participated in a well-developed associational network back home. Thus they were relatively well equipped for adjustment to urban society, and it was they who provided the leadership and the various skills needed to organize the camp into a functioning community.

The occupational distribution of the refugees was heavily skewed toward the professional and white-collar categories, so that even after the addition of the forced labourers, the entire Ukrainian DP population, say in Germany, still contained a much higher proportion of non-manual (and non-farm) workers than the parent population in Ukraine.² The following table shows the occupations of Ukrainians in the American Zone of Germany as of 1948:³

	Percentage
Professionals	13.1
Business	3.0
Skilled workers and craftspeople	23.4
Auto and truck drivers	6.2
Semiskilled and unskilled	16.9
Farmers and farm workers	37.4

The high proportion of skilled workers and the substantial size of the driver category may serve to indicate the extent of acquisition of mechanical and industrial skills by the former forced labourers, either during the war or in the DP camps.⁴

The novel and often confusing, if not directly disorganizing, experiences to which the immigrants—particularly the labourers—were subjected in the Ger-

man-dominated environment had at least one redeeming feature. It was still a more or less "normal" social situation in which the individual had both the need and the freedom to adapt as best he could to the surrounding world. As a common labourer and a foreigner he suffered the disadvantages of inferior, minority status. On the other hand, the work situation linked him with many other people (some like himself, others of different nationalities), occupying diverse social positions, with unfamiliar lifestyles. If all this was somewhat bewildering, at the same time it forced the immigrant to do some thinking in the constant effort to keep his head above water.

Things changed rather abruptly with the establishment of the DP camps. The camp constituted a sheltering environment in a number of ways. For a long initial period, everyone was guaranteed some food and a roof over his head, whether he "produced" or not. Thus many people were suddenly given an extended holiday from some of life's most pressing problems.⁵ Also, the Ukrainians were not only isolated from the German-speaking native population, but in many cases formed ethnically homogeneous camps segregated from DPs of other nationalities. The latter temporarily eliminated the problem of out-group relations, while the former removed the stigma of minority status. (Germany had lost the war, but the local Germans were still on their own soil and it was impossible for foreigners—or even German refugees—to forget that). Within the camp itself, the lack of differentiated employment opportunities and the standardized living conditions produced a semblance of social levelling, a sort of instant equality in which the lower socio-economic categories were, to a considerable extent, prevented from feeling the burden of material or social deprivation. Working in the same direction was the emotional impact of the situation that everyone shared, with its elements of dependency, fear of repatriation, and uncertainty about the future. These psychological pressures, along with very real material shortages, made the refugees' life something less than ideal.⁶ However, one can still describe the DP camp as a temporary, artificial, insulated, and protective social subsystem, only loosely related to two larger, encompassing systems—the trouble-ridden society of postwar Germany and the Allied administration network.⁷

To penetrate beyond such general characterization, I shall present five selected sociological aspects of camp life as they manifest either noteworthy continuities or new developments whose significance seems to me to transcend the spatial and temporal limits of the DP camp, since they ultimately made a distinct imprint on the structure and dynamics of organized Ukrainian life in the new countries of settlement. The first is the organization of communal activities and individual interests into a network of institutions and associations which included, beyond the official camp administration, churches, schools, and a host of voluntary groupings. The second concerns a shift in the whole area of interpersonal relationships and group structure away from *Gemeinschaft* and toward

Gesellschaft patterns of interaction and orientation. The third is stratification. The DP interlude meant a temporary suspension of the usual rules of the game, such as community contribution as a basis of differential evaluation, a graduated reward system, physical and social segregation of the different strata, stylized forms of interclass demeanour, etc. The fourth is the politicization of community life and of social relations in general, a tendency whose roots, in a sense, reach far back into Ukrainian history, but which had been intensified by various wartime events, in particular the vicissitudes of militant nationalism.⁸ The fifth is the unprecedented integration of Ukrainians of different social backgrounds, regions, and religious persuasions into one nationality-conscious community.⁹

The mushrooming of associations within the Ukrainian camps represents a carry-over from the parent society in two distinct ways. First, the emigrants recreated the various types of voluntary associations which they were used to back home—church and secular choirs, sports clubs, women's organizations, hobby groups, professional societies. A few of the larger camps even had theatre companies.¹⁰ Second, they were now free to set up many organized activities which, as a minority, they had had little chance to develop in Ukraine. Thus political parties and factions multiplied, each with its own program and at least one published newspaper. Some of them were strongly irredentist and even in Galicia would have had to remain underground.¹¹ Schools were organized, not only for the elementary and secondary levels, but also for vocational and professional training—craft and mechanical workshops, music and art studios, teachers' seminaries, nursing courses.¹² Ukrainians under Polish rule, for example, had had only limited access to such education. In Germany, there were even three university-level institutions under whose auspices academic as well as adult education courses were offered at some of the major camps.¹³

Initial enthusiasm and the availability of free time combined to yield a crop of formal groupings that an outsider might have diagnosed as over-organization. However, the associational network performed several important functions for the Ukrainian DPs. First, it provided a large proportion of camp residents with a structured, and often constructive, way of using their time. Second, it gave the younger professionals—especially teachers and lawyers—a chance to practice, often for the first time. Third, rural youth, already broken into urban occupational patterns by their wartime experiences, now also learned urban, as well as urbane, ways of social behaviour. Fourth, children could be socialized not only by and into their families, but also into participation in a well-organized larger community. Going to a school where the language of instruction was one's mother tongue, attending church services or patriotic observances, even marching in a funeral procession for a camp notable, were not just socializing experiences but expressions of ethnic solidarity that tied the young to the community and thus guaranteed the continuity of its strivings and aspirations.

Even outside their organizational involvement, relations between individuals showed some noteworthy tendencies toward the formation of what might be loosely termed associational (as distinct from primordial or communal) ties. What brought people together was a shared interest in the problems of the present and the uncertainties of the future rather than the common background of their past. People found friends not necessarily among those who came from the same village or region, but among those who had similar work experiences or were faced with the same problems of resettlement.

The style of interpersonal relations was also changing. Interaction became more egalitarian, as both the conditions of camp life and various external influences, including perhaps some of the ideas of Western democracy, combined to reduce, slowly but irreversibly, the traditional distances and inequalities between male and female, old and young, villager and urbanite. Little remained of the stylized asymmetry of relations between *pan* (lord) and *khlop* (peasant), once prevalent in Ukraine's Western regions, even though the imagery itself proved quite tenacious.

Perhaps the most important development in group structure was the emergence of the small nuclear family as the common unit of kinship. The process of whittling down the old-style extended family had, of course, been under way in Ukraine—even in rural areas—for some time, but there were specific new circumstances that accelerated its culmination. In the camp economy, the family could not function as a unit of production or fall back on its own resources, nor did the available housing and the frequent changes of residence favour large personal groups. Also, and perhaps the simplest reason of all, in many cases the given nuclear unit was all that was left, after the war, of a wider kin group, or it was the only part of the larger family that had left the homeland. The erosion of familistic attitudes among the young caused by the forced labour experience helped complete the transition toward an urban, more secularized, family type.

The internal stratification of a DP camp is as fascinating—and as complex—an object for sociological investigation as one could wish to find. The microcosm of the camp, usually squeezed into the limited space of a former military base or workingmen's barracks, reduced physical distances and privacy to a bare minimum. Under these conditions, social disparities were difficult to maintain. If one adds to this the economic levelling of the camp—with its effect on life-style—and the common psychological burdens that helped erode class differences in self-assurance, it is difficult to see how inequality managed to survive at all. Yet survive it did, although mainly in the subjective sense, with some of the traditional status (*Stand*) differences retaining largely symbolic significance.

Interestingly, the basic distinction between those who worked (performed some function within the camp division of labour), and those who did not, which might have been made much of in other circumstances, or perhaps in a more

achievement-oriented group, was hardly utilized as an indication of relative social worth.¹⁴ On the whole, the old ascriptive status groups still dominated people's thinking, if only as labels, and the basis for differentiating between them was still the same combination of education, manners, social background, and differential association that had set the intelligentsia, particularly in Western Ukraine, apart from the rest of the population.

As the objective, readily visible, socio-economic differences became attenuated, subjective, symbolic ones grew in importance.¹⁵ The use of honorific titles—occupational, academic, military—received new emphasis. Some poorly educated but ambitious individuals simply assumed such designations as “director,” “engineer,” or “magister” in an attempt to share in the ascriptive deference enjoyed by the intelligentsia. Needless to say, such practices eventually brought even the genuine, earned titles into danger of devaluation. One important consequence of this was that many honest, simple folk developed a generalized suspicion of their titled compatriots,¹⁶ which tended to eat away at the rigidity of the old dichotomous image of stratification. Other factors contributed to the same effect. Differences in social origin were obscured, or rather cut across, by those of region and religion. Good manners ceased to be a monopoly of the intelligentsia as they rubbed off on others in everyday personal contact.¹⁷ The availability of education presented the former peasant youth and his offspring with an unprecedented opportunity for upward movement in one sense or another. At the other end of the scale, quite a few of the educated were learning carpentry, tailoring, and other manual skills in preparation for a future in which they might not find employment in keeping with their qualifications.

Despite all this, it cannot be said that the traditional imagery of stratification into status groups was fundamentally changed by the camp experience. After all, the various factors that tended to modify it were in operation for five or six years at most. Much of the upward mobility that occurred was temporary and, in some cases, spurious. Thus it seems safe to assume that most Ukrainian DPs entered their new homelands accompanied by the social memory of their precamp status, as well as their old perceptions of the nature of social differences.¹⁸

The transitory character of the DP camp as a social system created the makings of an anomic situation for the individual.¹⁹ On the one hand, there was little opportunity for real achievement, whether occupational or economic. Moreover, since the camp, though in itself almost a total environment, was not anchored in any wider system of norms and relationships, there was little by way of achievement motivation in the strict sense of striving to satisfy some standard of excellence.²⁰ On the other hand, the democratic atmosphere of camp life furthered the awakening of new aspirations, especially among young men, who were safe from both the hopeless drudgery of slave labour and the threat of military service.

The only area where opportunities for advancement seemed to beckon to the ambitious individual was political activity. This term may be applied to one or both of two kinds, or levels, of politics. One emanated from the intense, largely ideological rivalries among the various Ukrainian exile parties and factions, extending far beyond the boundaries of any particular camp.²¹ The other involved control over the distribution of power (and other scarce but more tangible resources such as dwelling space, clothing, food, and cigarettes) within the camp itself. It might seem that the distinction between the two would be basic and therefore easy to maintain, but in fact they were usually closely intertwined. The larger issues of émigré politics were both abstract and academic in the sense that no one could do much about them then, but the quality of leadership of a political grouping, the efficiency and discipline of its organization, the size of its membership, and its skill at exploiting opportunities would give it a certain degree of advantage and influence at the camp level.

Although the top technical positions in the camp community had to be filled by professionals with the requisite training—physicians, teachers, priests, lawyers, accountants—and the administrative positions were also pre-empted by the intelligentsia, there were still some opportunities for someone short on qualifications but assured of the backing of a strong political party. This applies particularly to the two key types of jobs—those entrusted with the distribution of consumer goods and the camp security force.²² In the larger camps something like a patronage system developed, which extended even to filling some of the technical and administrative positions.

It is small wonder, then, that life in the DP camp attained an unprecedented level of politicization, both in terms of the degree to which situations and problems were ideologically defined or endowed with political salience and in terms of the prevalence and intensity of involvement by individuals. Viewed as a phenomenon in its own right, i.e., apart from its relation to daily specifics, this spread of political awareness and participation appeared as important as it was new. Youths of rural origin, who back home would have been extremely difficult to mobilize for any political venture, were now providing enthusiastic support for the various parties and factions active in their camp environment.

If camp conditions produced or promoted a peculiar style of internal politicking, with its attendant divisiveness, the DP experience also helped to carry on, even to strengthen, the tradition of Ukrainian patriotism, particularly in its irredentist form. The recency of exile, the events in Ukraine during and after the end of World War II, the erection of the Iron Curtain, the formation of a central body (CPUE) to represent the interests of all Ukrainian emigrants, and simple nostalgia all combined to create, within the camp, a heightened sense of national identity and unity. Ukrainians of diverse social backgrounds, from various regions and professing different religious faiths, were thrown together on a large scale. For many a Catholic this was the first close contact with his Orthodox compatriots. Lemkos and Galicians had to find a common language with their

Eastern counterparts from Volhynia or the Donetsk region. The university professor stood in the food line with the labourer. They discovered many unexpected, baffling differences among themselves but, as time passed, became more and more impressed that they shared the same basic language;²³ intense (and, for some, new-found) pride in their cultural heritage; and all the hopes, problems, and frustrations of a collectivity seeking self-determination. Thus the generation that received its basic socialization in the Ukrainian DP camps grew up intensely aware of both the problem of cultural identity and the problem of irredentism in its political aspects.

This consciousness, transmitted perhaps to varying degrees in different types families, was reinforced on all sides by the very organization, issues, and events of camp life. All the schools, youth organizations, and both the Catholic and Orthodox church made the inculcation of irredentist ideals part of their programme. National holidays and anniversaries were commemorated by special concerts, *akademii*, and other gatherings with camp-wide—and, for schoolchildren, mandatory—participation.²⁴ A network of organizations, from stamp collectors' clubs to veterans' associations, all carried more or less clear patriotic overtones. Athletic groups were even named after Ukrainian historical figures, rivers or mountains. The same is true a fortiori of the highest-level (supra-camp) organizations, such as central associations of writers or students.²⁵

How much of this was sheer nostalgia, and how much purposive nationalism, would be difficult to decide.²⁶ The important thing is that this whole process of social and attitudinal integration which unfolded in the camp constituted a perpetuation, dissemination, and probably intensification of the irredentist value system which had developed and matured on Ukrainian soil, and which the Ukrainian DPs subsequently carried to their new destinations. We can say now, from the perspective of almost two generations of Ukrainian communities in North America and elsewhere, that it is still going strong, functioning simultaneously on a number of levels as a motivating force, as perhaps the only reliable cement that can unite all those who share Ukrainian ancestry, and as the prime guarantee of the maintenance of Ukrainian ethnic identity. Viewed from this standpoint, the DP camp, with all its ephemeral little dramas, with all its sociological anomalies, may still one day be vindicated by historians as a crucial stage in the building and continuity of a genuinely free and self-aware Ukrainian society.

Notes

1. For a summary account see Andrii Kihichak, "Iak vyhliadaly v rokakh 1945-1949 tabory nashykh skytaltstv v Nimechchyni?" in *Kalendar "Prosvity"* (Buenos Aires, 1958), 125-8.
2. On the other hand, somewhat higher figures for farm workers and lower ones for skilled occupations than the total for DPs of all nationalities are reported by Malcolm Proudfoot, *European Refugees, 1939-1952* (Evanston, Ill., 1956), 421, Table 46.
3. Percentages computed from data in Vasyl Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," in Luka Myshuha and Antin Drahan, eds., *Ukrainci u vilnomu sviti: Iuvileina knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu, 1894-1954* (Jersey City, [1954]), 115-36.
4. The process of "industrializing" foreign workers in Germany is confirmed by the fact that in 1940, 58 per cent of them were employed in agriculture and forestry, but by early 1944, 64 per cent worked in industry, mining, and other areas. Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 86.
5. As late as the end of 1947, only slightly more than 33 per cent of all employable DPs had some job within the camp; another 17 per cent were employed elsewhere. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, one assumes that similar trends prevailed among Ukrainian DPs. Ulas Samchuk described the early DP camp as a "realm of idleness, climate of uncertainty and fear," *Plianela Di-Pi* (Winnipeg, 1979), 12.
6. Daria Iaroslavska, *Povin*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1964), 49, 207. From the vantage point of the Allied authorities who had to deal with the refugee problem in all its ramifications, the DP situation was a headache: Sidney B. Fay, "DP's in Europe," *Current History* (March 1946): 194-205; Fred K. Hoehler, "Displaced Persons," in George B. de Huszar, ed., *Persistent International Issues* (New York, 1947), 41-68. For a more sympathetic view see Walter Dushnyck and William Gibbons, *Refugees are People: The Plight of Europe's Displaced Persons* (New York, 1947).
7. There were, of course, also some links to other Ukrainian camps, mainly through cultural and political activities.
8. See John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New York, 1955), ch. III.
9. What I have called a nationality community as distinct from a folk community. See Ihor V. Zielyk, "Two Types of Ethnic Communities," in Paul M. Migus, ed., *Sounds Canadian* (Toronto, 1975), 147-57.
10. Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia," 122; Vyacheslav Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokov," in *Almanac of the Ukrainian National Association for 1971* (Jersey City, 1970), 141-55.
11. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1971), 515-19.
12. Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokov," 148; Mudry, "Nova ukrainska emigratsiia."
13. See *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1971), 387, and several essays in this book. These institutions of higher learning represent a distinct organizational level, not limited or tied to any one camp. Other examples of such "overarching" bodies are the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration, the Central

Union of Ukrainian Students, cultural groups (such as writers' and artists' associations), and, of course, the political parties and groupings.

14. One of the few instances in which ethical (if not exactly work ethic) criteria were still used for social evaluation is provided by the black-market trader (*paskar*), who seemed to be viewed with ambivalence—envied for his success but condemned, or at least suspect, for his methods.
15. Ivan Kernytsky, *Pereletni ptakhy* (New York, 1952), passim. Iaroslavska, *Povin*, 25, suggests that the use of professional and academic titles helped the intelligentsia to maintain a positive self-image as a substitute for real achievement, for which camp living offered few opportunities.
16. Traces of this have survived in the Ukrainian community abroad. Part of it, however, may be the same old ambivalence toward the intelligentsia mentioned by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, vol. 1 (New York, 1958), 1109, n. 1.
17. Iaroslavska, *Povin*, 31.
18. Ihor V. Zielyk, "Social Integration and Culture Maintenance in an Ethnic Community" (1968, unpublished).
19. In the sense used by Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," in Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949).
20. See David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (New York, 1967), 40-3.
21. On Ukrainian political organizations in exile see *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1963), 914f.
22. In the camp described by Iaroslavska, the police force was under the direct control of the camp leader and his party.
23. There was a good deal of mutual influence among the speakers of the various regional dialects, which should be of considerable interest to sociolinguists.
24. Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokiv," 152-4.
25. See Samchuk, *Plianeta Di-Pi*, for detailed statements of the ideological and philosophical assumptions guiding MUR.
26. "Understandably, some ethnic groups in exile regard themselves as trustees of precious national heritage and culture which they believe they have a sacred duty to preserve and foster, since in their former homeland it is being strangled and stamped out." Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (New Haven, 1953), 359.

Community, Class, and Social Mobility as Dynamic Factors in the DP Experience

Wsevolod W. Isajiw

The sociologist's main task is to interpret and explain the phenomenon being studied. Here, the phenomenon to be explained is the unusually high degree of organized social life in the Ukrainian DP camps. Considering the fact that most camps existed for only about five years, the degree of organizational activity is impressive. Thus, for some 98 camps which included 92,768 persons, in the 3 occupation zones of Germany studied by Maruniak, there were 89 elementary schools, 34 high schools, 38 vocational schools, 406 vocational courses, 444 vocational workshops, 60 choirs, and 53 theatres. In the same period there were something like 1,821 theatrical plays presented, 1,510 concerts, 638 *akademii*, 81 folk art exhibits, and 2,339 lectures.¹ Furthermore, in that short period at least 302 organizations were established, 120 Greek Catholic and 79 Orthodox church parishes, 83 church-related fraternities, and over 320 periodicals were published. On the economic level the numbers were smaller, but still significant. There were 37 co-operatives and 49 retail shops.²

The basic question hence is how does one explain this high degree of organizational activity, or more specifically, from what does this strong tendency for organizational activity derive? The question gains significance if we consider the context of the existence of the camps. The camps were transitional, and everybody knew this. Also, the economic base of the camps was rather low, so there was a low standard of living. It would be difficult to argue that the need to

organize derived from these conditions as a way to alleviate them since, by a wide margin, most organizations established in the camps did not relate to economics, nor did they have much relevance to the political and social life directly outside the camps. Because of the Iron Curtain, they had little direct relevance even to the social and political processes taking place in Ukraine at the time.

Rather, the need to organize and build institutions in the camps has to be understood in relation to the social structure and the social processes taking place in Galician Ukrainian society twenty years before the war and emigration. The explanation given here is not meant to provide a complete history of the nationalist movement in Western Ukraine. Rather, as a sociological study, it will focus on those aspects of social history which are deemed to be essential conditions for the emergence of radical nationalism.

The organizational activity in the camps was a result of the process of social mobility that began in Ukraine after World War I and continued in spite of the serious disruptions due to the war and subsequent large-scale emigration. My theory is that this process reached its peak in the camps. That is, it culminated in a certain social structure built out of a set of organizations and incipient institutions created in the camps. What happened after resettlement in the United States, Canada, and other countries was simply a transplantation of the camp structure and a gradual winding down of this process. This does not mean that the postwar Ukrainian immigrants to the United States, Canada, and elsewhere had no impact on the community life of those Ukrainians who were already settled in these countries. They did, although the full range of this impact has not been sociologically assessed yet. This impact, however, has to be seen in relation to the end stage of the social process begun in Ukraine rather than as an early stage of a new process begun in the places of settlement.

The process of social mobility has to be conceived in a broad sociological sense. In a latent manner it was closely related to the radical nationalist movement that emerged in Western Ukraine in the 1920s and 30s. My assumption is that social mobility underlies radical nationalist movements; it gives them their dynamics. Before examining this question more closely, I must define and characterize the type of nationalism which prevailed among Ukrainians at that time and dominated organized community life in the camps. Nationalism is only one type of ideological movement. Ideologies, programmes for collective action derived from some set of values, represent practical ways in which values are specified for collective action in relation to actual or potential social change with the aim of either bringing it about or forestalling it. Hence, ideologies inherently bifurcate into left and right.

Under certain conditions the same ideology can be liberal or radical; under other conditions, it may be conservative or reactionary.³ For an established, independent nation-state, nationalism will tend to be a conservative or reactionary

ideology, but for a minority group within an imperial, colonial or other plural state, it will be a liberal or radical ideology. In other words, if the collectivity that provides the social base for nationalism is the group in power, nationalism will tend to be a conservative or reactionary ideology. However, if the collectivity which provides the social base for nationalism is a minority group, that is, it has no dominant power in society, it will tend to be either liberal or radical. The distinctions between the liberal and radical ideology on the left and the conservative and reactionary ideology on the right are important not so much because they represent lower or higher degrees of ideological commitment, but because they represent qualitative differences in a group's relationship to power.

In the case of Ukrainians, because they have been a stateless people throughout most of their modern history, only liberal or radical forms of nationalism can be meaningfully discussed. By the liberal form of nationalist ideology I mean that ideology which is often known as cultural or linguistic nationalism. The main goals of this ideology involve either conscious use of the minority group's language in developing new literature, art, and scholarship or introduction of the language into public institutions; ethnic self-awareness efforts through the study of the group's past; promulgation of the language and the group's culture as equal to that of the majority group; establishment and development of new organizations and institutions such as schools, institutes, youth organizations, clubs, and the like within the existing political structure; and economic betterment of the population. The important factor here is that although liberal nationalism attempts to bring about change, it does not directly challenge the position of the dominant group in society. The ideology does not aim at the total control of society.

Radical nationalism, however, does aim at a complete power change in society. The aim of the ideology is not just a change in some social institutions, but a change in all institutions. This is why the radical nationalist ideology is often closely aligned with various forms of socialist ideologies. What is, however, of central importance about the radical nationalist ideology, and what makes it qualitatively different from the liberal nationalist ideology, is precisely its holistic or totalistic character, which often is reflected in a totalitarian character of the organization of the movement itself. That is, radical nationalist ideology is not just a vision of a politically independent state. It is that, of course, but in addition, it is a view of society in which all areas of life, activity, and thought are subordinated to one goal and one principle. This holistic view of society appears to be typical of all radical ideologies, be they nationalist, communist, socialist or other.

Independence is defined in two ways by radical nationalism. It is political independence in the sense of removal of the power of the dominant foreign group, but it also means control of all institutions in society so that their change and development can be achieved harmoniously in relation to each other. These two definitions of independence present a double aim for the movement, but in

practice the two aims do not necessarily go hand in hand. The members of the nationalist movements, especially their leaders, usually see themselves as those who will oversee change in social institutions and potentially be in control of them. The control over all institutions of society may thus become a goal in itself for the movement and be a source of internal conflict and splintering.

In Western Ukraine the period between the two wars is one of the emergence of radical nationalism. It gradually gained dominance in the community, first in Galicia and later in the DP camps. Thus to understand sociologically the ascendance of radical nationalism in the camps, one has to understand first the social roots of its emergence in the 1920s and 30s. This emergence cannot be adequately explained as a case of social borrowing from others, as some have alleged. Mykola Shlemkevych, a political writer, had suggested that in the thirties some of the youth in Galicia might have been attracted by the ideology or the style of the Italian fascists and the German National-Socialists, since both were filled with resentment over the social and historical conditions in their respective countries and propagated the need to revise the status quo.⁴ All this might have impressed some people in Galicia, but even Shlemkevych himself would not claim that it would completely explain the emergence of the radical nationalist movement. Certainly its roots go deeper.

Other theories of nationalism would explain it as a reaction of deprived classes of people—peasants—to exploitation by the dominant power, in this case, Poland. While such exploitation existed and played a significant role in Ukrainian-Polish relations, there is no reason why it should have produced a radical form of reaction between the wars rather than at any earlier period, say at the time of the peasant revolts in Galicia in 1901 and 1906, or even earlier in the nineteenth century.⁵ A number of historians and sociologists have drawn attention to the emergence of the middle class as the dynamic force in the various nationalisms of nineteenth-century Europe. Facts appear to support this association between nationalism and the new middle class, and particularly the connection between the new middle class and the radical form of nationalism.⁶

The theory applied here, however, relates radical nationalism not so much to class as to the process of social mobility. The process of social mobility should not be seen in its narrow sense as a random shift of individuals from one occupational position to another. Rather, it should be seen as a shift of groups of people, often involving disruption of entire sectors of society. In this sense, the most important type of mobility is generational rather than career mobility, that is, mobility from one generation to another, rather than mobility within the lifetime of one generation. To assess adequately the process of generational mobility, however, it is necessary to study at least three generations. Furthermore, to assess adequately the import of the new social groupings which this process creates, it is necessary to understand the implications of the disruption of the old groupings which it also creates in the lifespan of several generations.

My thesis is that it is the process of social mobility as conceived in this broader sense which can account for the emergence of the radical type of nationalism. That is, radical nationalism and the organizational structures which develop with it emerge after periods of larger-scale generational social mobility, specifically, out of the rural community.

In Ukraine this process was already taking place in the last decade of the nineteenth century. By the turn of the century the rural community in Western Ukraine was in the process of profound change and by the 1920s and 30s many of the second generation out of the villages were already in the urban areas. Some were employed, some were being educated, and some were looking for occupations or for institutional links. A significant function was performed by a system of economic co-operation which emerged at the turn of the century, but grew rapidly in the twenties and thirties.⁷ Significant sectors of previously rural populations were involved in this process of urbanization. Yet in the urban areas those institutions which would normally provide occupations for such newcomers were either closed to them or simply non-existent. This derived from the fact that non-Ukrainians predominated in most urban areas. Hence there was discrimination against Ukrainians by many non-Ukrainian institutions, and the number of Ukrainian-owned institutions that could absorb the newcomers was simply too small.

It is in this social context that Ukrainian radical nationalism emerged. Its emergence was indicated by the establishment of organizations which did include many of the second- or third-generation peasants. Indeed, the nationalist organizations mixed the Ukrainian urban intelligentsia with the second-generation peasants, but the intelligentsia itself, as a rule, was not removed from the village by much more than an additional generation. It should be understood that this is mobility in a society whose status evaluation was based on ascriptive rather than achievement criteria. In such a society "who you are" is more important than "what you can do." The value of a position is indicated more by the title than the income that it offers. Likewise, a higher value is placed on civil- or public-oriented institutions than on individualistic structures, such as private businesses.

In such a society building new institutions has critical significance and is often carefully scrutinized by those in power. Thus, for those already mobile from previously rural backgrounds, establishing new organizations against the policies of a hostile, non-Ukrainian state and moving into and up the prestige structure of these organizations meant not only finding a new identity, but was tantamount to becoming an elite in a specifically Ukrainian society. This, indeed, became a latent function, perhaps the main latent function, of these organizations.

Elite status has two aspects, subjective and objective. Subjectively it means having prestige, being important, "being somebody." The social context described above created an unusually strong need to be somebody. Objectively, however, elite status meant community leadership. Certainly, the members of the national-

ist organizations perceived themselves as actual or potential community leaders and in that period of Western Ukrainian history, new community leadership could be achieved only through new organizations. In a stable, well-established modern society, a socially mobile generational cohort would find a place in the existing institutions of society. If these were insufficient, new institutions would be established as a natural outgrowth of the old ones. This, however, was impossible in the existing structure of the Polish-dominated Ukrainian society. Discrimination against Ukrainians in many Polish-dominated institutions and the unavailability of places for newcomers in the underdeveloped or developing existing Ukrainian urban institutions presented a formidable block to the social mobility of the second and third ex-rural generations. Finally, the war, by destroying many existing institutions, made any normal pattern of mobility impossible.

Nevertheless, the need to gain and hold a place of prestige and importance in a community remained and finally had a chance to express itself more freely in the DP camps. The move to the camps did not change the situation for normal social mobility. The conditions of the camps made any such mobility impossible. Once again organizations, like those established between the wars, proved to be well-suited to fulfill the need for prestige and importance. Many of these organizations were indeed transplanted to the camps. They could perform this function easily because of the simplicity of their organizational principle. It rested not on material rewards or occupational security, but on moral commitment and personal loyalty. For this reason such organizations became portable, and it was relatively easy to re-establish many of them in the camps or later in other countries of resettlement.

The camps, inadequate as they were for solid institution-building, provided an ideal environment for building organizations manifestly based on moral commitment. For one thing, life in the camps, although originally fraught with fear of repatriation, eventually was eased by the removal of any external threat and the growth of an atmosphere of psychological security derived from the relative political stability in international relations after the war. After at least six years of constant insecurity and fear, this atmosphere was particularly important for the Ukrainian refugees. Furthermore, although the economic conditions in the camps were primitive, there was at least an economic floor under the refugees' feet. Shelter, crowded as it was, and basic meals were provided by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the International Relief Organization (IRO). The standard of living was low, but subsistence was assured without the struggle to keep a job. (Few jobs were available anyway.) This released a lot of time for people to engage in cultural and organizational activities.

The camps provided a ready-made community as the necessary context for this type of social mobility. Mobility within an ascriptive social structure requires

an "audience." In such social structures "who one is" is the predominant issue. The position into which one moves is expected to provide the occupant with a "bigger" identity than the one he previously had, especially that derived from his father's status. We can call this type of social mobility identity mobility. There is a need, however, to "present" identity mobility to others, and the closer or the smaller the community, the easier it is to have the new identity appreciated. Inversely, community breakdown signals the end of ascriptive mobility and a shift to mobility based on achievement criteria. In many ways the camp community replicated the small town or the village type of community from which the refugees came. Indeed, the relative isolation of the camps even enhanced these features.

The system of organizations in the camps was established by people who were already socially mobile (up from rural origins). In the first decade of the twentieth century the Ukrainian labour force in Galicia was almost completely agricultural—90.5 per cent (1,191,000 persons) of the total Ukrainian labour force were engaged in agriculture. Only 4.4 per cent (58,000 persons) were civil servants and independent professionals; 3 per cent (39,000 persons) were in manufacturing; and about 2 per cent (35,000 persons) were in trade and commerce.⁸ The occupational distribution in the camps in Austria presented a clear contrast to those percentages (see Table 1). Likewise, rather high percentages had high-school and university education (see Table 2). This indicates not only that the refugees were made up of a self-selected group of people. It also reflects the shift in the occupational and educational structure in Galicia after the turn of the century. This shift is a basic factor behind the prevalence among the Ukrainian DPs of a low middle class of people who made up much of the membership and leadership of the camp organizations.

What the camp organizations lacked was something which is characteristic of the organizational structure of a stable, established society and something which transforms organizations into institutions. Among other things they lacked a solid material base, a legitimized use of power, persistence over the lifespan of one generation (particularly over the lifespan of the organizations' founders), limited and circumscribed terms of office-holding, and reasonable compensation for work. Of course, these things were impossible to attain in the context of the transitional nature of the camps.

In summary, vigorous organizational life in Ukrainian DP camps can be explained as a function of the generational upward mobility from rural society. The social, economic, and political circumstances in Western Ukraine in the first part of the twentieth century, produced a need among mobile individuals for a new status identity articulated by the ideology of radical nationalism. That acted as a dynamic factor for the establishment of new organizations and for organizational activity in general. Not all direct data are now available to substantiate this theory completely. More research in both social history and statistical documents is needed. Nevertheless, the indirect data adduced here and the social

history of the period already known make it a plausible explanation of an important phenomenon in Ukrainian emigration history.

Table 1
Occupational Distribution of Ukrainians in DP Camps
in Vorarlberg Region, Austria, 1945

Occupation	Frequency	Per cent
Labourers	99	16.3
Peasants (farmers and farm workers)	90	14.8
Teachers, elementary	90	14.8
Students	83	13.6
Government workers	72	11.9
Merchants	54	8.9
Lawyers	31	5.1
Musicians, singers	19	3.1
Agronomists	12	2.0
Physicians	7	1.2
Engineers	7	1.2
Priests	6	1.0
Painters	5	.8
Other	<u>32</u>	<u>5.3</u>
Total	607	100.0

Source: Iwan Bodrewycz, "Istoriia druhoi ukrainskoi politychnoi emihratsii v Avstrii (oblast Vorarlberg)," 1948 report in Archives of the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre [Oseredok], Winnipeg.

Table 2
School Attendance of Post-World War II Ukrainian Immigrants
in Philadelphia, 1955. Heads of Households and Spouses

Highest Level Attained	Frequency	Per cent
No formal education	5	2.5
Elementary: 1-8 years	93	46.4
High school or equiv.: 9-12 years	49	24.4
University or equiv.: 13+ years	<u>54</u>	<u>26.7</u>
Total	201	100.0

Source: Wsevolod W. Isajiw, "Social Status of Recent Ukrainian Immigrants in Philadelphia: A Study in Assimilation," (research report submitted to Dept. of Sociology, LaSalle College, under sponsorship of Social Science Research Council, 1955), 25.

Notes

1. Volodymyr Maruniak, "V 25-littia ukrainskoi emihratsii v Nimechchyni ta Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini: 1943-1951-1967," Ph. D. diss. (Munich, Ukrainian Free University, 1972) 114-36.
2. Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukrainska emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstrii po druhii svitovii viini* (Munich, 1985), 146-328, 411-9; Maruniak, "V 25-littia," 129-30; Yuri Boshyk and Boris Balan, *Political Refugees and "Displaced Persons," 1945-1954: A Selected Bibliography and Guide to Research with Special Reference to Ukrainians* (Edmonton: 1982), 221-50.
3. The distinctions presented here and the theory of the emergence of radical nationalism are taken from Wsevolod W. Isajiw, "Towards a Theory of Ideological Movements: Nationalism and Community Change in Quebec and Flanders," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* XII, no. 1 (1985): 141-60.
4. Mykola Shlemkevych, *Halychanstvo* (New York-Toronto, 1956), 78-81.
5. Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (Berkeley, 1975); Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobriansky, *Ukrainsko-polski stosunki u XIX storichchi* (Munich, 1969), 90-100.
6. Isajiw, "Towards a Theory," 150-5.
7. Franciszek Bujak, *Wybór Pism, t. II: Z dziejów społecznych i gospodarczych Polski X-XX w.* (Warsaw, 1976), 384; Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Zenon Kuzelia, eds., *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, vol. 1, pt. 3 (Munich-New York, 1949), 1118-22; Illia Vytanovych, *Istoriia ukrainskoho kooperatyvnoho rukhu* (New York, 1964), 328-30; M. M. Kravets, *Narysy robitnychoho rukhu v Zakhidnii Ukraini v 1921-1939 rr.* (Kiev, 1959).
8. Bujak, *Wybór Pism*, 387.

DP Experience, Personality Structure, and Ego Defence Mechanisms: A Psychodynamic Interpretation

Ivan Z. Holowinsky

Significant social upheavals such as wars and revolutions undoubtedly create major emotional trauma and leave lasting personality changes. My purpose here is to describe the influence of the experience as a displaced person¹ upon personality structure and ego defence mechanisms. More specifically I wish to discuss Ukrainian DPs in Germany and Austria between May 1945, when the agreement on East-West exchange of nationals in Germany was signed, and the end of July 1952, when the last ship of refugees admitted under the Displaced Persons Act reached the United States.

The issue of psychological experiences is extremely complex. Every individual as a bio-psycho-social unit reacts in a unique way to common group experiences. His reactions depend upon such factors as age, sex, socio-economic level, religious and ethnic background, political views, the reasons for his presence in the common situation, and his own ego strengths. There is no such thing as a uniform DP personality pattern. There were many DP groups that only had one thing in common, namely, being displaced from their native land.

Research Questions and Sources

Three main research questions can be raised about the DPs. What fears, phobias, and anxieties were most prevalent among them? What ego defence mechanisms did they employ to deal with their existential reality? In what way did their experiences contribute to psychological adjustment upon resettlement in other countries such as Canada or the United States? However, there are serious methodological difficulties with research that attempts to clarify distant events. It is simply impossible to use a direct empirical approach to answer those three questions. One possible method might have been the use of questionnaires, but memory of feelings and attitudes of forty years ago would be highly unreliable. The best approximations of questionnaires are sources focussing upon the affective domain of the DPs which were written and published between 1945 and 1955. This includes memoirs and diaries of former DPs.

Considering the cataclysmic emotional events of World War II, it is surprising that very few empirical psychological studies were done between 1945 and 1950 that specifically focussed upon emotional experiences of refugees and DPs. Weinberg's classic study, like some other studies, deals essentially with concentration camp survival.² In some respects, however, these studies can be useful here, since many DPs, including Ukrainians, were inmates of concentration camps before they became DPs. One book, published by UNESCO, lists among its sources 9 references on DP camp psychology, 26 devoted to adult refugee psychology, and 24 on refugee child psychology.³ Many of those publications were brief, descriptive, non-empirical articles that reflected the authors' Freudian psycho-analytical orientation. There is not a single reference, let alone an empirical study, specifically related to psychological problems of Ukrainian DPs.

To analyze the psychological adjustment of Ukrainians, I used some reports of UNRRA, but relied mainly on several autobiographical publications, particularly those by M. Kuzmovych-Holowinska, P. Mirchuk, and U. Samchuk. While few in number, they do provide some valuable psychological insights. There is a historical precedent for such research methodology, since psychologists and psychoanalysts have long acknowledged that the intuitive knowledge of writers and poets is a source for the psychodynamic interpretation of behaviour. There is some evidence that the writings of Goethe, Schiller, Shakespeare, and Dostoevsky provided rich material for Freud in the formulation of his psychoanalytical position. Freud himself acknowledged his debt to Goethe in 1930, when he received the Goethe prize for literature. Psychological interpretation of profound emotions in selected writings of Taras Shevchenko has also been discussed. For the purpose of this brief study, I selected Mirchuk for his description of life in concentration camps, and Kuzmovych-Holowinska and Samchuk for their descriptions of the life of DPs outside the concentration camps.⁴

Traumatic Psychological Environment

The war, emigration, and camp life gave the refugees a traumatic psychological environment. Psychological environment, from an individual perspective, can be defined as a totality of experiences at any given time, interpreted affectively and cognitively by the individual. The cognitive and affective interpretation depends not only upon personality variables and ego strength of the individual, but also upon the given situation.

Following the end of World War II, millions of individuals found themselves in Germany and Austria, uprooted from their homeland, culture, and traditional values. Some researchers estimated that as many as 30 million persons were displaced in Europe during the war.⁵ This phenomenon was of such magnitude that it was very difficult for Canadian or American public opinion to understand what really took place. Canadians and Americans had had experience with immigrants and had some understanding of their psychological problems. Yet, there was a very significant difference between an immigrant, who voluntarily left his country, and a DP, who left the country involuntarily for political, religious or other reasons. (Those who were transported to be slave labourers for the German war machine are an example of involuntary departure.) Psychologically speaking, with immigrants there was a positive movement *toward* a desirable goal. With refugees and DPs, there was a negative movement *away* from sources of persecution.

Since they did not know what to expect, some American psychologists projected outright negative pictures of DPs. One such expert, in his presentation to future UNRRA administrators, actually said:

It is important to realize that the personalities of people who have lived in camps have been impaired. They have been broken by isolation, social degradation, indeterminate sentence, and uncertainty about the future. [There are] masses of people reduced almost to the animal level, wayward youth who are used to being hailed as heroes when they kill, suppressed people suffering complete personality breakdowns and persons who have lost all connection with the past and hope for the future.⁶

Severity of psychological trauma prior to the cessation of hostilities in 1945 did play a very significant role in psychological adjustment once the DP camps were established. Those who were inmates of German concentration camps prior to 1945, in general, were expected to manifest more acute psychological problems than slave labourers or refugees who became DP camp residents between 1945 and 1950. Shils reported that fear and uncertainty about the future were common to refugees and DPs in Germany. Not only was their survival threatened by Germans, but also by American air raids. There was evidence of regression to earlier stages of personality manifested by loss of self-esteem, resentment, hostility, and hypersensitivity. In some instances changes in speech, behaviour, and attitude were noted. In his work, Weinberg pointed to evidence of

suspiciousness, paranoid tendencies, anxiety, and depression found among resettled former DPs.

Personality patterns of DP children were analyzed in the writings of Sterba and Althoff.⁷ Sterba reported on the examination of twenty-five adolescents whose parents were killed during Nazi rule. As a result of their negative experiences, the youngsters developed strong, almost desperate dependence upon each other. Toward those who were not members of their group, they manifested suspiciousness and aggressive tendencies. Althoff studied fifty adolescent survivors of concentration camps who manifested serious personality disturbances. Their symptoms included enuresis, night terror, depression, moodiness, feelings of loneliness and isolation, lack of response to others, secretiveness, and suspicion. They also manifested hostility and negativism toward any discipline.

The Terror of Repatriation

In anticipation of the tremendous logistical problems that would be created by millions of DPs and refugees in Germany and Austria, the UNRRA agreement was signed on 9 November 1943. Three years later, in November 1946, the United Nations proposed the establishment of IRO to replace UNRRA. From IRO's inception, political issues were injected into its operation by the Soviet Union: "The countries of origin maintained that the only practical solution of the refugee problem was repatriation. The constitution of IRO should provide only for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and should not make any provision for resettlement of refugees outside their countries of origin."⁸

In this context it should be pointed out that the concept of repatriation presented categorically opposed psychological issues for DPs from Western and Eastern Europe. For DPs from the West such as the French and Belgians, repatriation was a happy, positive event, a fulfillment of dreams. For Ukrainians, Latvians, Estonians, and other East Europeans, repatriation was a terror-producing concept, synonymous with exile, denial of national identity, loss of personal freedom, new trials, and executions.

An American Zone government order, issued on 5 December 1945, reads in part: "It is hereby announced that from 08.00 hr. December 8, all food, shelter, etc. for those displaced persons who are Soviet citizens are to cease forthwith. [They] are instructed to report to the Soviet camp at Stuttgart...those who do not report will be seized and brought to Stuttgart under armed escort."⁹ A British Zone military order of 29 December 1945 denied Ukrainians their national identity and basic human rights:

1. H. M. G. do not recognize Ukrainian as a nationality, and persons coming from the Ukraine are classed as citizens of the country in which they had their residence 1st September, 1939. No recognition can be given to any Ukrainian organization or representation as such.

2. All such persons who lived in Soviet territory are compulsory [sic] returned to the U.S.S.R. under the terms of the Yalta agreement as soon as they are proved to be such.
3. Ukrainians of other than Soviet citizenship receive education and welfare facilities in the language appropriate to their citizenship, and for the time being it is impracticable for a variety of reasons to publish books or other literature in Ukrainian.
4. All Ukrainian organizations will be disbanded forthwith, and where they are established outside camps, the representatives will be brought into camps as normal D.P.'s. All stationery pertaining to these organizations will be confiscated.
5. Continuation of such activities is punishable under articles 26 and/or 34 of ordinance 1.¹⁰

Other researchers of that period pointed out that former Soviet citizens who were unwilling to be repatriated to the USSR were ineligible for UNRRA services and protection.¹¹ They were not allowed to be employed by the occupation armies or the Germans. Often American, British, and Canadian soldiers permitted Soviet authorities to search for defenceless Ukrainian refugees, and in many instances themselves conducted such operations. Forced repatriation lasted approximately six months, although there were instances of forced repatriation as late as May 1947: "Decent British and American officers who took part in those 'voluntary repatriations' have told heart-rending stories of how men committed suicide before they could be put aboard the trains, and of the terror in the eyes of those who did not have the strength to commit suicide."¹² Especially notorious was the forcible repatriation of Ukrainians ordered by American General McMarney in DP camps at Dachau¹³ and Mannheim. There a number of people were killed, committed suicide or were taken to hospitals with serious injuries.

In addition to forced repatriation, Ukrainian refugees were subjected to psychological pressure and intimidation. For example, UNRRA officials attempted to bribe the refugees into accepting repatriation by offering them sixty days' rations, and Soviet repatriation missions utilized unlimited propaganda material.¹⁴ Usually, Ukrainian DPs did not succumb to those pressures, but rather fought back by organizing successful resistance to repatriation efforts through hunger strikes, manifestations, and disruption of Soviet propaganda efforts. The impact of this resistance was noted by UNRRA officials: "Anti-repatriation leadership has time and again proved sufficiently strong to prevent displaced persons from having access to information supplied by their home countries."¹⁵ Various efforts to stop repatriation, which originated in Canada, the United States, and the Vatican, were also important as moral and psychological support for the refugees.

A Psychodynamic Interpretation

While there are many theories of personality and interpretations of ego defence mechanisms, here personality is defined as a concept that describes long-lasting attributes of human behaviour unique to a given individual. An ego defence mechanism, in psychodynamic interpretation, is an unconscious adjustment process that enables the ego to maintain its integrity in the face of emotionally threatening situations. It has been recognized by psychologists that strong frustration emerges in those situations when an individual is confronted with a goal which simultaneously evokes positive and negative feelings.

The existential reality of Ukrainian DPs reflected the influence of a profoundly emotional conflict between homesickness and concurrent fear of repatriation. That conflict was responsible for nostalgia, anxiety, depression, and, in some cases, psychosomatic disorders among the DPs. Fear of repatriation was real and overpowering. The emotional impact of this fear cannot be described, nor can it be understood by those who did not experience it. It psychologically permeated the existence of Ukrainian DPs: "The apparition of *rodina* was constantly persecuting us, the feeling of fear was a dominant climate."¹⁶ "Just a mention of repatriation brought about panic."¹⁷ Fear and anxiety were associated with feelings of depression and hopelessness: "Autumn and autumn. On earth and in heaven, also in the soul."¹⁸ Psychological conflict was accentuated by strong feelings of homesickness and nostalgia: "Should we not return home, we will not have life on this planet."¹⁹ "Continuously my thoughts fly East. I grasp their total life, suffering, and pain."²⁰

In traditional psychodynamic interpretation, ego, governed by the reality principle, is viewed as being responsible for the resolution of psychological conflicts. At times, tensions and conflicts become so strong that they challenge the ego's ability to mediate. In psychologically traumatic situations anxieties and tensions can effectively impair the ego's ability to function, and in some instances can lead to personality dissociation and serious disorders. To prevent dissociative reactions from occurring, the ego employs an unconscious process known as a defence mechanism. Various ego defence mechanisms have been described in the psychological literature, with suppression and rationalization mentioned most frequently.

In the Ukrainian literature of the DP period it is possible to identify such ego defence mechanisms as a fixation on the past rather than the present, wish fulfillment, suppression of traumatic experience, preoccupation with basic needs, and catharsis. Fixation on the past has been so prevalent among Ukrainian DPs that it has become a universal trait, obvious to anyone who was a DP: "We live by memories. All our conversations are about the past."²¹ Dwelling upon the past became frequently associated with wish fulfillment: "If it could only happen that we would be able to return home freely."²² "In my dreams I am always returning home."²³ This tendency to be preoccupied with the past rather than

the future still remains an important trait of former DPs. While this impression has not yet been validated by empirical psychological studies, it can easily be detected in the Ukrainian press in Canada and the United States.

Strong, unpleasant, traumatic experiences are usually suppressed or considered semi-reality: "Everything with which one lived for four years became only memory. Memory only of something that is mentioned as at times a peculiar and unbelievable story."²⁴ "Most frequently I am as if in a trance, simply I do not realize that I am on foreign soil."²⁵ When reality presents a threat both to our physical and psychological well-being, as humans we tend to be preoccupied with basic needs. The end of the war and the defeat of Nazi Germany brought about the imminent dissolution of concentration camps. Any different future reality had not yet been perceived by the prisoners: "The prisoners enjoyed eating kasha and debated whether it is really possible that in the evenings we all will receive again a quart of good kasha."²⁶ Only with a concrete, visible object, for example an American tank, was there a sudden release of pent-up emotions: "The prisoners throw themselves upon the American soldiers, kiss them, kiss the tank, and sob with joy."²⁷

In spite of the emotional trauma experienced in the DP camps, tens of thousands of former Ukrainian DPs who came to the United States and Canada after the war, adjusted successfully to the new environment without manifesting any serious psychopathology. It is unfortunate, however, that we do not have any scholarly studies which compare the experience of DPs in Germany or Austria with their subsequent adjustment to life in North America. Ukrainian publications that describe Ukrainian communities in the United States and Canada do not discuss psychological issues at all.²⁸ Ukrainians are mentioned in a psychiatric study conducted in Montreal.²⁹ That study described psychiatric findings in a group of forty-eight DPs who were seen as patients at the Psychiatric Institute. The group included 10 Ukrainians (7 females and 3 males). The researchers commented that "...the future may be rejected often along with the present, and the individual concerned principally with the distant past and childhood, which are respectively idealized." Furthermore, "...returning to a 'happy past' is evident from the TAT [Thematic Apperception Test] stories of all patients. Patients refuse to talk about their immediate past experiences in the D.P. camps, saying that they like to forget them."³⁰ The two ego defence mechanisms described by Tyhurst—denial of the present and suppression of traumatic experiences—were also reported on earlier. While Tyhurst interviewed individuals with emotional problems, for her study Kushinka interviewed, at random, Ukrainians living in New Jersey. She found them to be "ambitious, hard working and independent."³¹

In summary, I wish to emphasize that the psychological experiences of Ukrainian DPs, while similar in general to experiences of other DPs, were also different in many important respects. The end of hostilities in Germany did not

mean the end suffering for Ukrainians. They were denied their national identity and subjected to the draconian measures of repatriation. It is remarkable that, as an ethnic group, Ukrainians have been able to make a successful adjustment to Canadian and American societies.

Notes

1. Here, displaced person is defined as a non-German national who was displaced from his native land as a direct result of the war and was living in Germany or Austria at the end of World War II.
2. A. A. Weinberg, *Migration and Belonging* (The Hague, 1961).
3. H. B. M. Murphy, ed., *Flight and Resettlement* (Paris, 1955). Of those articles, 35 were published in English, 19 in German, and 5 in French.
4. Petro Mirchuk, *V nimetskykh mlynakh smerty* (New York-London, 1957); Mariia Kuzmowych-Holowinska, *Chuzhynoiu* (Toronto, 1977); Ulas Samchuk, *Pliana D.P.* (Winnipeg, 1979).
5. E. A. Shiels, "Social and Psychological Aspects of Displacement and Repatriation," *Journal of Social Casework*, no. 2 (1946): 3-18.
6. "Psychological Aspects of Camp Administration," *UNRRA Review*, 9 Nov. 1943-9 Nov. 1944 (New York, 1944), 13.
This expert was an associate professor of sociology and psychology at the College of William and Mary.
7. E. Sterba, "Emotional Problems of Displaced Children," *Journal of Social Casework* 30, no. 5 (1949): 175-81; B. Althoff, "Observation on the Psychology of Children in a D.P. Camp," *Journal of Social Casework* 29, no. 1 (1948): 17-22.
8. United Nations, *Yearbook 1946-47* (New York, 1947), 164.
9. Anthony Hlynka, "On Behalf of Ukrainian Displaced Persons," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (1946): 174.
10. *Ibid.*, 167-8.
11. J. A. Berger, "Displaced Persons a Human Tragedy of World War II," *Social Research*, no. 14 (1946): 43-58.
12. D. Martin, "Not 'displaced person' but a Refugee," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (1948): 111.
13. Mykyta Mandryka, *Ukrainian Refugees* (Winnipeg, 1946).
14. Martin, "Not 'displaced person'," 109-14.
15. UNRRA, *Report of the Director General to the Council, April 1, 1947-June 30, 1947* (Washington, 1947), 34.

16. Samchuk, *Plianela D.P.*, 10.
 "Marevo rodiny peresliduvalo nevidstupno, pochuttia strakhu bulo dominiuchym klimatom." Note the use of the Russian *rodina* rather than the Ukrainian *batkivshchyna* to underline the negative and hostile meaning of repatriation.
17. *Ibid.*, 81. "Odyn tilky natiak na repatriatsiiu navodyv na nas paniku."
18. *Ibid.* "Osin i osin. Na zemli i na nebi, takozh u dushi."
19. *Ibid.*, 86. "Iak ne vernemosia do domu ne bude nam i zhyttia na tsii plianeti."
20. Kuzmowych-Holowinska, *Chuzhynoiu*, 98. "Lechu dumkamy na skhid. Lovliu vse domashne zhyttia, vsiu muku, vves bil."
21. Samchuk, *Plianela D.P.*, 86. "My zhyvemo zhadkamy. Vsi nashi rozmovy pro mynule."
22. *Ibid.*, 115. "Koly b tak stalosia shchoby my mohly svobodno vernutysia dodomu."
23. Kuzmowych-Holowinska, *Chuzhynoiu*, 98. "V sni vse povorot domiv."
24. Mirchuk, *V nimetskykh mlynakh smerty*, 193. "Vse te chym zhylosia chotyry roky stalo tilky spomynom. Spomynom pro shchos, pro shcho rozkazuiut iak pro dyvnu chasom i neimovirnu kazku."
25. Kuzmowych-Holowinska, *Chuzhynoiu*, 98. "Ia po bilshii chastyni nenache v sni, prosto ne zdaiu sobi spravy shcho ia na chuzhyni."
26. Mirchuk, *V nimetskykh mlynakh smerty*, 186.
27. *Ibid.*, 188.
28. Myron Kuropas, *The Ukrainians in America* (Minneapolis, 1972); Alexander Luzhnytsky, ed., *Ukrainians in Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1976); Olha Woycenko, *The Ukrainians in Canada*, 2nd ed. (Winnipeg, 1968); P. Yuzyk, *The Ukrainians in Manitoba* (Toronto, 1953).
29. Tyhurst, "Psychosomatic and Allied Disorders," in *Flight and Resettlement*.
30. *Ibid.*, 205, 211.
31. Joyce Kushinka, "A Study of Assimilation Experiences of Jewish, Latvian and Ukrainian Displaced Persons," Ed. D. diss., Rutgers University, 1979.

Appendix: Memoirs

Stanley W. Frolick

While I was associated with the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB), here I thought I would focus on the fight for what is today being called human rights. Foremost among these is the right of asylum, which in one form or another has always been recognized in every culture throughout human history. However, a secret accord, entered into at Yalta between the Soviets and the Western Allies, required the citizens of the respective countries to be “without delay separated from enemy prisoners of war and maintained separately . . . until they have been handed over.” (Art. 1) Mark Elliott wrote that “The last six words proved to be critical in subsequent debate over the treaty’s requirements.” (*Pawns of Yalta* [Evanston, Ill., 1982]).

Two disparate interpretations were possible: one, that the treaty did not sanction or require the use of force; the other, that it was a prescription for forced repatriation because, while semantically it is true that force is not mentioned, the provisions of the agreement were coercive in intent. The British government adopted the second interpretation, involving the use of force, and persuaded a somewhat reluctant United States to follow suit.

For seven crucial months, from 11 February to 4 September 1945, the Soviets were the beneficiaries of an indiscriminate repatriation of their civilians as well as military personnel. In the end, all but 500,000 of some 5.5 million Soviet citizens were sent to the East, many forcibly, others by the use of guile and trickery. No less ingenious were the means employed by many refugees to commit suicide in order to cheat the vengeful NKVD and SMERSH awaiting their arrival.

Lord Bethell, author of *The Last Secret*, an account of the role of the Allies in the forcible repatriation of Soviet citizens, described this practice as an

...episode that remains as a blot on the history of the English-speaking world, a fearful reminder that it is possible even for our own leaders—kindly men and women elected according to law—when caught between a Hitler and a Stalin, to sign a paper which secretly makes war criminals of us all...because the fact remains...that many American and British soldiers and diplomats are respon-

sible for sending groups of innocent people to their deaths. And this is what Klaus Barbie is accused of. And in each case the defence is the same: "we were the servants of a sovereign government and we were only obeying orders." ("How the Western Allies Shipped Victims to Stalin," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 September 1983).

As a British Foreign Office official, Patrick Dean, callously put it: "In due course all those with whom the Soviet authorities desire to deal must be handed over to them, and we are not concerned that they may be shot." (Ibid.)

For those not too conversant with the situation, I should have explained that "Soviet citizens," subject to repatriation in the Yalta Agreement, comprised two categories of military personnel: POWs and former Red Army troops who surrendered or were captured in German uniform, and two classes of civilians: *Ostarbeiter* (usually persons conscripted for work in Germany) and refugees from communist rule. Also, Soviet citizenship was not precisely defined in the treaty. In practice, the Western Allies excluded everyone from territories annexed by the Soviets after 1 September 1939 when determining Soviet citizenship. Thus, besides the Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians, Ukrainians from the former provinces of Bukovyna, Galicia, Volhynia, Pidliashshia, and Kholm were not considered to be Soviet citizens subject to repatriation. Prior to the Yalta Agreement, those categories of civilian and military personnel had never been subjected to involuntary repatriation. POWs traditionally were allowed to choose or refuse to return to their countries of origin. The 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention specifically protected Soviet citizens captured in *Wehrmacht* uniform, as it prohibited the capturing army from looking "behind the uniform" of the prisoner. That is, it forbade differentiation among captives according to nationality or race. To do so would have placed captured American or Canadian servicemen of German, Italian, Japanese, Hungarian, or other origin in jeopardy. After V-E Day, however, the danger of German retaliation vanished, so the Allies felt free to carry out the wishes of Stalin.

The first significant, albeit belated, blow against the policy of forcible repatriation was struck at the first session of the United Nations General Assembly held in London from 10 January-16 February 1946. I hoped that I could obtain access to that forum which, in turn, might provide an opportunity to do some good for the Ukrainian cause, so I solicited appointments from the North American Ukrainian press as their correspondent to enable me to do just that. One cablegram, 10 January 1946, read: "Ukrainian Voice Weekly in Winnipeg Manitoba Canada hereby appoints Captain S. W. Frolick its foreign correspondent in Europe. Ukrainian Publishing Company of Canada Limited Publishers of Ukrainian Voice."

However, this elaborate scheme to get me into the United Nations proved unnecessary. On the weekend preceding the commencement of the session, Peter Smylski and I went to look over the place where the delegates were to meet. We found the doors unlocked, the offices unattended except for a person here and

there, and no one paying any attention to us. Browsing around, we came across a stack of papers which proved to be a list of all the delegates to the meeting of the General Assembly, with their addresses in London and other information. It was a very simple matter to slip one of these lists under the tunic of the uniform and walk out into the street unchallenged. We realized the value of the information thus come upon so providentially and unexpectedly, so we hurriedly put together a memorandum, "The Ukrainian Displaced Person," by working well into the night. At the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau offices the next day, the memorandum was mimeographed, addressed, and dispatched to every delegate except those from communist countries. Shortly thereafter, much to our delight and satisfaction, the head of the United States' delegation, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, delivered a speech roundly condemning the policy of forcible repatriation and called for its abolition.

Her speech appeared to have made use of the material submitted in our memorandum. We picked up copies of her speech at Church House and CURB distributed them to all Ukrainian newspapers and organizations. I have in my possession a copy of our memorandum, obtained from the files of Mrs. Roosevelt, which bears a pencilled-in date of 13 January 1946. (Franklin Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York.) I have not been able to find a copy of Mrs. Roosevelt's speech.

There is an interesting epilogue to this affair. Some years later Watson Kirkconnell, then chancellor of McMaster University, repeated to Dr. Smylski a story told to him by the enigmatic Tracy Philipps. Apparently, at a reception for delegates to the General Assembly meeting, Eleanor Roosevelt told Philipps that she had received a memorandum on the plight of Ukrainian displaced persons which disturbed her, and she would like to do something about it if she were sure that its contents and its authors were bona fide and trustworthy. Philipps was in a position to reassure her on both counts from his personal knowledge. The speech was made. My career as a foreign correspondent ended before it began!

At the meeting of the UN General Assembly, a drafting subcommittee of Committee 3 was struck to formulate a resolution on the refugees. Representatives of the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, France, Panama, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, and Lebanon comprised the sub-committee. The Soviet delegate to this committee was Mr. Arutinian.* On

* Mr. Arutinian later surfaced in Canada as the Soviet Union's ambassador and was involved in a minor *cause célèbre*. On an official visit to Toronto he was received by then Mayor Nathan Phillips at City Hall and introduced as "Ambassador Rootin'-Tootin'" of the Soviet Union. The Soviets failed to appreciate the Mayor's wit and lodged an official protest with the Canadian government over what they perceived to be a deliberate insult to their diplomat.

5 February 1946, in a column called "My Day," Mrs. Roosevelt noted that: "The real cleavage between the thinking of ourselves and the Soviet republics as brought out in a resolution presented by the Russian delegate, Mr. Arutinian, is that they consider there are two categories of refugees: 1) those who wish to be repatriated and returned to their homeland, and 2) those who do not wish to return and who are therefore 'Quislings, traitors, war criminals and collaborators.'" The revised draft of the proposal on refugees, as approved by the majority of the subcommittee, reads in part:

Paragraph 3 (c): No refugee or displaced persons who have finally and definitely, in complete freedom . . . expressed valid objections to returning to their countries of origin and who do not come within the provisions of paragraph 4 below, shall be compelled to return to their country of origin. . . .

Paragraph 4: No action taken as a result of this resolution shall be of such a character as to interfere in any way with the surrender and punishment of war criminals, quislings and traitors, in conformity with present or future international arrangements or agreements. (USGA/1d/SHCom/39, 7 February 1946)

The Soviet and Yugoslav delegates introduced three amendments. The first had the effect of making the prohibition upon compulsion to return implicit rather than explicit. The second wanted the General Assembly to consider "Quislings, traitors and war criminals as persons dishonoured for collaboration with the enemies of the United Nations, and that Quislings, traitors and war criminals who are still hiding under the guise of refugees should be immediately returned to their countries." In the third, the communists demanded that the following clause be included in the committee's resolution: "No propaganda should be permitted in the refugee camps against the Organization of the United Nations or her members, nor propaganda against returning to their native countries. The Personnel of refugee camps should be comprised mainly of representatives of states concerned, whose citizens are the refugees."

That clause would have merely codified a policy adopted and pursued by the military authorities at the insistence of their Soviet counterparts ever since they entered the Third Reich. For example, as late as 26 February 1946 I was still complaining to a sympathetic British Member of Parliament, Rhys Davies, not only about a series of incidents of forcible repatriation of Ukrainians which had been reported to CURB, but that the Ukrainian relief committees and all cultural, social, welfare, religious, and other organizations and activities were still banned in the British Zone of Germany by an order issued by the commander of the 30th Corps District on 29 December 1945, as order no. 219/DP.

I also argued against the injustice of continuing to deny Ukrainians their identity. They were the largest single national group among all DPs and had suffered more than any other nationality at the hands of the communists and the Nazis. Yet they were required to register as Poles, Russians, Czechs, et al. After forcible repatriation, it is difficult to say whether the further denial of the basic

right to free speech, assembly, and pursuit of moral, aesthetic, and spiritual values and expression of same in publications is worse than the indignity of withholding or denying the right to be recognized as a separate and distinct nationality or, in contemporary parlance, a separate ethnocultural group.

In the matter of the “illicit activities” and the existence of proscribed forms of organization in the occupied zones of Germany and Austria, the Soviets were ever vigilant to denounce them and constantly demand their suppression through military commissions, diplomatic representatives, and spokesmen in international organizations. To illustrate I might cite Mrs. Roosevelt’s reply to the Soviet Union’s Vyshinsky, delivered at the UN on 6 December 1946:

Mr. Vyshinsky has made many charges against the administration of Displaced Persons camps in the western zones of Germany and Austria. These charges have been repeated time and time again in Committee 3 by the Soviet, Ukrainian and Byelorussian representatives. The charges are not new. They have been made before the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and at every level of military authority. I wish to point out, Mr. Chairman, that the endless repetition of these charges does not constitute evidence or proof of their validity. . . . The charges in summary are that quislings and traitors are harbored in the displaced persons camps, that these persons are the heads of organizations which carry on vicious propaganda against repatriation, that they threaten and attack potential repatriots who desire to return home, that they issue fraudulent documents and disseminate wild rumors of the conditions in the countries of origin. The argument runs further—that these conditions are responsible for the failure of over a million persons to return to their countries of origin. . . . Further in this connection, Mr. Vyshinsky in his speech on the subject, gave a list of individual names and organizations which appeared to bring us down to specific cases. . . . a similar list of charges was presented to the U.S. theater commander. . . . A complete and thorough examination was made and the Soviet commander in chief was advised as late as early October that in only a single instance could any of the committees or organizations listed in the charges be identified. In that investigation the charges could not be substantiated with respect to the following organizations: The Ukrainian Center at Augsburg, the Provincial Ukrainian Committee, the Regional Committee at Nürnberg, the Council for the Ukrainian Sector near Prince Leonard Barracks, the Ukrainian Provincial Committee in Regensburg. . . . The only organization identified in a similar long list presented to the military authorities in June was the Ukrainian Aid Committee which had been dissolved in September 1945. . . .

With respect to some of the individuals mentioned in Mr. Vyshinsky’s speech, the military authorities were recently requested to locate Stepan Bandera [leader of the OUN-R]; a zone-wide search is now proceeding. He has not been located and rumor has it that he is at present in the French Zone of Austria. The whereabouts of Borovets [Ukrainian guerrilla commander], alias Taras Bulba are unknown. In fact all other names listed in Mr. Vyshinsky’s speech are unknown in the U.S. Zone of Germany. . . . (National Archives and Records Service, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, E. R. Collection, Container no. 4587)

It would have been interesting to find Vyshinsky's list. Unfortunately, my efforts in that direction were unsuccessful. Incidentally, the name of Dmytro Donstov, political ideologue and writer whose works inspired the Ukrainian nationalist movement, was on one such "wanted" list which came to my attention back in 1945. The Ukrainian Aid Committee, referred to as having been banned in September 1945, was the predecessor of the Health and Welfare Service (Sanitarnokharytatyvna sluzhba) organized in Munich and headed by Dr. Voievodka, Dr. Borys Andrievsky, and other medical and para-medical personnel in an obvious attempt to circumvent the prohibition on relief committees and other organizations.

No one can stifle the Ukrainian drive to create organizations and then organizations of organizations in tall pyramids of creative zeal! One such umbrella organization, which attempted to embrace all Ukrainian DPs and their associations, was the Ukrainian Central Relief Committee in Germany, headed by Vasyl Mudry. Its English name did not quite correspond with the letter or spirit of its Ukrainian name, but did manage to conceal all traces of the political character of the organization hinted at in the Ukrainian name. Even the adoption of this innocuous terminology failed to get it past the occupation authorities. The situation was only rectified by appointing the said committee as a representative and agent of CURB in a document dated 7 February 1946, over the signatures of Bohdan Panchuk and myself. Mrs. Ewhenia Pasternak, now of Toronto, testified that our document was like a passport giving her and other personnel of Mr. Mudry's committee access to the military and civil authorities in charge of DPs and their camps.

An important initiative to win the right to publish and disseminate news and information was a joint memorandum by Dr. Walter Gallan, president of the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC) and me, as director of CURB, to the foreign secretary of the British government, Ernest Bevin, on 10 August 1946. In our preamble we stressed that Ukrainian refugees in the DP camps suffered most not from lack of material comforts, but from the uncertainty of what the future held for them; the constant fear of being forcibly abducted and deported; and the lack of reliable, accurate information on matters affecting their life and fate, such as requirements and decisions being made by UNRRA and other bodies, conditions prevailing in other countries, and resettlement possibilities. Therefore, we recommended to His Majesty's government that:

1. Permission be granted to establish in the British Zone of Germany a Ukrainian daily with a circulation of about 50,000 copies to answer the needs described, and that paper, facilities, and the means of distribution necessary to achieve the sought after objectives be provided;
2. Ukrainian relief organizations be allowed to send representatives to such organizations as UNRRA, to act as advisers and serve as liaison;

3. Assistance be given in posting field representatives of the Canadian and American relief committees in the British Zone for liaison, supervision over distribution of material aid, and as advisers and information officers.

A rather noncommittal letter acknowledging receipt of our communication was sent to CURB by Thomas Brimelow of the Foreign Office on behalf of the Foreign Secretary. On 27 September 1946, I wrote again. I suggested that the import of Ukrainian newspapers from Canada be permitted as a stopgap measure. On 14 October 1946 I pressed for a decision in this matter after being assured by the Foreign Office that the suggestions made by us on 10 August were receiving "sympathetic consideration."

Only with the recent access to government archives being granted to the public is it possible to learn what happens to communications sent to government officials. The Gallan-Frolick memorandum passed through a number of hands in the Foreign Office, each official adding his comment or suggestion, then referring it to the Central Control Office for Germany and Austria. This promoted interdepartmental correspondence and ultimately we learned that the Control Office decided to allow "factual-weeklies" for seven nationalities, including Ukrainians. They were to follow the BBC European Service in reporting news; to be under the supervision of the Information Services Control Board of the Control Committee for Germany and Austria; and to be guided, controlled, and censored by the Information Services, but not produced by that branch. All concerned were admonished not to say anything about this to the signatories of the memorandum, Gallan and Frolick. I left for Canada several months later without learning the disposition of this matter. Indeed, I do not know even today whether the Control Committee's decision was actually put into effect, and I assume that the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Mission and its field representatives, headed by Bohdan Panchuk, on their return to the United Kingdom late in 1946, may have benefitted from action taken by the British government on our recommendation.

I will conclude my reminiscences on this small segment of human rights work for Ukrainian DPs by telling you how inquiries directed to Canada House were treated. The Canadian High Commissioner wrote to the British Foreign Office concerning the idea of importing Ukrainian newspapers: "None of the Ukrainian language newspapers published in Canada is sufficiently unprejudiced to be used for the purpose which the Control Office has in mind."

Bohdan Panchuk

My role in this whole operation was very accidental. I certainly did not plan it and I know that if the Ukrainian Canadian Committee had had a choice, they would never have picked me to go overseas. It was just being the right person in the right place at the right time. That is about as much as I can take credit for. I also want to enlarge on the definition of displaced person. A displaced person was not only one of those persons who came from Ukraine and somehow ended up in Western Europe, but also the category of people with whom I was very much involved, who were away from home, who were sent to a place they did not voluntarily choose to go. They were people who served in Canada's armed forces.

We were recruited in Canada; we were put on the boat; we were shipped overseas. We were displaced by somebody else's intent. So we had problems. One of the problems was that we had no one to turn to for advice. We Ukrainian Canadians were very much alone. We were just as far from home, just as unattended, just as helpless as any refugee or displaced person from Ukraine. It was in that spirit that we created the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association (UCSA). In their wisdom or blindness they chose me as their president.

UCSA circular letter number 20 of 25 August 1945 shows how naive we were. (That is a point I want to make clear—all these things that occurred at that time happened to people who were in their twenties and thirties, young men and women for whom it was all a new experience.) World War II had just ended and we were at a loss what to do. The English Canadians had opportunities to visit England. The French Canadians could visit France or ski in Switzerland or all kinds of things, while waiting to return to Canada. We Ukrainian Canadians had nowhere to go. So a band of us got together and decided that since we had a very strong ally on our side, the Soviet Union, to whom Canada had given material supplies such as trucks and ships, we would ask for a trip to Ukraine!

We wrote to Canadian military headquarters and to the High Commissioner of Canada and said that we wanted to organize a trip to Ukraine. Our circular letter proclaimed, "This desire may become a reality in the near future." We were naive, but because of our enthusiasm our request had been approved by

Canadian military headquarters—that's how naive they were, too! So we awaited the necessary completion of arrangements. The number going would be restricted to approximately twenty-five. We did, however, want to know how many were interested in the project. The trip, if feasible, would take place in early spring, last approximately two weeks, and include such places as Lviv, Ternopil, Odessa, Chernivtsi, and Uzhhorod. We had a mountain of letters in reply. We sent copies of those letters and a list of names to Canadian military headquarters. The first reply we had to our letter, after about a month, was that there were some snags. The Soviets wanted to know what the purpose of our journey was. At that time we knew that it would be rather difficult to explain what our purpose was, so we said that we promised to keep quiet, not to speak to anybody, and to keep close to the airplane or whatever means of transportation we had. All we wanted was to see a little bit of our native land. To make a long story short, of course nothing ever came of this!

In that same circular letter we were also thinking of the displaced Canadians going back to Canada. So we wrote about the formation of the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Association (UCVA) and the preservation of UCVA's photographs and document archives for historical purposes. We also planned a gathering for 10-11 November 1945. By late 1945 the return of our servicemen to their respective homes in Canada was already in full swing, so the function of our Ukrainian Club in London was changing. This was a transition period from serviceman to civilian and from helping the displaced Ukrainian Canadians to helping displaced Ukrainians.

The efforts of our UCSA executive members who remained in England for some time—people like Bill Byblow and Steve Jaworsky—was useful long afterwards. We knew already that we had a job for them. Their work would consist of helping, in a worthwhile manner, with the problems and welfare of Ukrainian refugees. We could not permit the DPs' urgent appeals to go unanswered, and for that reason every effort had to be made to continue the support of the Ukrainian Club in London. A great deal of moral and material help, we argued, had to be immediately forthcoming from all Ukrainians in Canada in order to alleviate the critical situation.

The Ukrainian United Relief Committee was formed to handle these problems. (At that time we had not even named it CURB.) So we wrote to our soldiers to say that Ukrainian Canadians could assist the committee's work by forwarding all information on all the Ukrainian refugees they had met. This appeal went to Ukrainian-Canadian servicemen in the army who were stationed in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe. We asked that they send us names of those they contacted, as well as items such as clothes, food, cigarettes, and money, which were all urgently needed. So you see, we were already conducting a relief committee among our own servicemen in the forces.

That was 25 August 1945. The war had just ended. On 30 September, we issued another circular letter to say the trip to Ukraine was off and that the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Committee (UCVC) had been established in Winnipeg. We also said that the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, under the joint auspices of the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund (UCRF) and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee Incorporated, had been opened in the same building as our servicemen's club. The primary role of CURB was, in every moral and material way, to act on behalf of Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons on the Continent. We acknowledged that CURB wanted to work closely with UNRRA, the military government, and all other official bodies responsible for DPs. We appealed to all our members, to all Ukrainian servicemen, and particularly to those members who were still in Europe to send any information that they could possibly obtain with regard to the location, number, moral, physical, and material conditions of the Ukrainian refugees found anywhere on the Continent. We also appealed to members to pass this information on to anybody to whom it might be of value. Because there were those who were against us working for the Ukrainian DPs, we had to put in that CURB was a separate office entirely removed from our servicemen's organization. (They once asked for my resignation while I was still in uniform and on active service.) We also asked all our members to inform their friends and relatives back home in Canada about the formation of CURB and its cause. We estimated that there were still over one million Ukrainian refugees in the British and American Zones who required assistance and relief, and we argued that it was the social, Christian, and humanitarian duty of all of us to aid these countrymen.

Let me make it very clear publicly! Not the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, nor the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund, nor the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee had anything to do with organizing CURB, just as they had nothing to do with organizing the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemen's Association. These things happened spontaneously because the need was there. If anybody organized CURB, it was Stan Frolick and myself, and only because the need was there. We persuaded Stan to resign from his decent job with the Control Commission in Germany and join CURB as a civilian, working in the news office for the duration of his stay there.

Who were the members of CURB? In one sense, everybody who was in the Canadian Forces, who was in uniform, and who was on the Continent. For example, Professor Luckyj, who then was a sergeant in the British army, was posted in Europe, so we made him a representative of CURB. Everybody that we could possibly find were all members of CURB as far as we were concerned. We had no legal permission to help DPs. The only reason we were able to do anything was because we were in uniform. Who was going to stop me from sitting in my jeep and driving to Hamburg or Hannover once a month? Nobody was going to stop me. I was the authority, the jeep was mine! When Rev. Dr.

Kushnir came, he had no permission either. It took almost a month and a half to get him permission to travel to the Continent. The only reason that we were able to get him permission was that we were able to get the documents addressed to the United Nations. We were in uniform, we walked into the Foreign Office, and we said: Look, we fought for this country, the war is over, we want this and that and that's all and we got permission. In the British Zone I drove around in the jeep all the time, but I couldn't go into the American Zone. The DPs organized transport for Dr. Kushnir by trading lots of cigarettes on the black market, buying gasoline from the Germans.

Now the DPs, unfortunately, really thought that we were a powerhouse! They thought that we could do all kinds of things. As an example, after we landed in Normandy in June 1944, we began pushing towards Belgium. Paris was already liberated. Everybody in France and Belgium knew at that time that the war was over as far as they were concerned. In Prussia, there were a great many large German munitions factories. In these factories there were many Ukrainians who were forced to wear badges with either a "P" to indicate that they came from formerly Polish territories or "Ost" to indicate they were Eastern Ukrainians. Well, in the summer of 1944 a German major entered one of those factories where some 5,000 Ukrainians worked. He said, "you are mobilized as of now." Instantly they were "collaborators" who had to go to France to fight. These Ukrainians were needed because in France the Maquis (the French resistance) was a thorn in the side of the retreating Germans. So some 3,000 Ukrainians from Volhynia who were working there were unwillingly conscripted and sent to France. They were given six months' training and were posted to a place near Strasbourg to fight the Maquis. All those 3,000 Ukrainians in German uniform, within the week after they arrived, killed all the German officers, and as one Ukrainian force went to join the Maquis. Three thousand of them! Were they collaborators? When they found out that we were there, they got the impression that with the Canadian army there was a Ukrainian army, and that leading it was a General Panchuk! A delegation of them came to meet me in the Netherlands. They said: "We have 3,000 soldiers. We don't want to fight with the Maquis, we want to join the Ukrainian army from Canada!" Well, we couldn't accommodate them! That was the kind of problem we had then.

I would like to say that this was 1944, after the invasion. 1945 and 1946 were even more critical years for DPs. Those were the years when things happened very quickly, when people were repatriated, kidnapped, and such. Something had to be done. That is why we formed CURB; that is why we persuaded Stan [Frolick] to give up his career with the Control Commission in Germany. We did what we could.

The first problem we met was the status of the refugees. The Ukrainians were not recognized as Ukrainians. They were not treated as Ukrainians and they were not recognized as a distinct people. That was the first thing that we had to establish—to make sure that they were treated as Ukrainians, as an ethnic entity,

a national group. We received assistance from the Ukrainian Red Cross in Geneva, which was a relic of World War I. One of its organizers had stayed in Geneva. He was a DP as much as anybody else. He got the idea that it would be nice to print identity cards for the DPs who had nothing. So those identity cards were printed and shipped illegally across Germany. We had a whole organization distributing them. Jerry Buriannyk and I would take the jeep and a typewriter, and I would sign them "Panchuk," without indicating my rank or identity. We saved thousands of lives that way.

Our first objective was to save lives. Two other problems were to establish a nationality status for these people and to get them recognized as refugees. (Not all Ukrainians nor all DPs were recognized as refugees. The only way to get them any protection was to have them recognized as refugees.) When that was done, the final stage was to do something about resettling them. To solve these four major problems we had to lobby. We lobbied everywhere. To lobby simply meant making friends and influencing people. If you couldn't do that in one place you just kept knocking on the next door because those needs were urgent. Anybody we could recruit we tried to enlist in our cause.

We started in the beginning of 1944, as soon as the war was drawing to an end, and we used the Ukrainian-Canadian servicemen. (We had only a few Ukrainian-American servicemen.) As soon as UNRRA was organized we got the names and addresses of UNRRA officials. Some were helpful, some were not. We used them all as contacts. Also, we immediately recruited everybody who came from Canada or the United States, as they came through our office at 218 Sussex Gardens, and they became part of our Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau. For example, Rev. S. Sawchuk came on a mission from his church in Canada. We said to him, "You are now part of this establishment. It is going to pay us dividends if you help." Every single day we went to different embassies, to governments, to organizations, and everywhere we would say, "Look, there is a DP problem and we need your help." For every visit we made we wrote a report and sent it to the head offices in Winnipeg and Philadelphia and distributed it among all the committees that we had organized.

Rev. Kuzius from the Evangelical church was one supporter. Father Jean, from the Catholic church, a Basilian, we recruited as part of our mission. Rev. Stack from the American Catholic church and Mr. and Mrs. Hlynka got permission and they came and they stayed in the Bureau. Mr. and Mrs. Hlynka and I went knocking on the doors of different embassies during the day. Mr. and Mrs. Yanda went through London, so we recruited them. Dr. Yatskiw from Windsor, we recruited. Povoroznyk came on a holiday with a lot of money; we recruited him. Some of the boys who had come towards the end of the war and were not eligible for repatriation to Canada as soon as we were, because we had served since 1940, stayed to help. I had delayed my repatriation twice in order to stay longer. Bill Byblow, in fact, fell so much in love with relief work that he

stayed in London, I believe, until 1965 or 1970. The Sussex Gardens office became home for all other Ukrainians who happened to come to England. The Ukrainians, for instance, who served in the Polish forces started to come to Sussex Gardens and we organized them into an Association of Ukrainians in the Polish Forces, gave them an office in the building, and got them going. If there was a question of danger for people like Dontsov, and Andriievsky, who were political figures in the Ukrainian nationalist movement, we gave them a home. So our building became a central point for everyone looking for shelter. Fortunately, we were able to persuade the American Ukrainians to pay the cost of the CURB operation.

The point I want to make in conclusion is that the salvation of the Ukrainian refugees was predicated upon the joint efforts of old and new Ukrainian emigrants. From the newcomers we needed solidarity and unity of purpose to demonstrate their relevance and utility for the Ukrainians already settled in the West. The political factionalism of the DPs hurt their image before the authorities and other Ukrainians. From within our own ranks we had to exhibit unity as well, for in Canada there was also dissension, and even some Ukrainian communists travelled to Moscow as we went to Europe. Only they went to do all they could to impede the immigration of Ukrainian DPs to Canada, while we went to help. As our poet Shevchenko said, we must unite as brothers in the face of our common foes. That message is as relevant today as it was then.

Ostap Tarnawsky

The life of a displaced person—a refugee or escapee, any person expelled or impelled to flee his country—is always miserable and desperate. One big dilemma pursues him continuously—to return to his native land or to find a new and better place to settle. Wars result in the appearance of displaced persons and the last war raised this problem to a peak. At the end of World War II millions of DPs found themselves in Germany, without food, without lodging, without protection. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), organized by forty-three Allied countries in November 1943, was established to solve the economic and social problems of territories decimated by World War II. The presence of more than 6 million DPs in German and Austrian territory, however, diverted the activities of UNRRA to this refugee problem, to the task of feeding them, sheltering them, and helping them to return to their native lands. Repatriation did not solve the problem of DPs in Europe. In May 1946 the number of DPs still living in Western Europe, according to the International Refugee Organization (IRO), was 1,200,000, and out of this number more than 850,000 refused to return to their native countries.

IRO was established after it became known that hundreds of thousands of DPs refused to return to the Soviet Union for fear of political and religious persecution. It was organized despite opposition from the Soviet Union. At the United Nations Assembly meeting in June 1946, of the 43 Allied countries which had organized UNRRA, only 20 supported IRO, with 5 opposed and 18 abstaining. The most important paragraph of the IRO resolution was the solemn assurance that “nobody could be repatriated without his consent.” It was the first great modern victory for human rights. It was a declaration on the protection, care, and rehabilitation of human beings who had been deprived of their rights as the result of injustice and violence.

There were over 200,000 Ukrainian DPs among those listed by IRO as not wishing to return to their country of origin. About 90 per cent of them were under the protection of UNRRA and then of IRO in the refugee camps. Ukrainian DPs showed great vitality and organizational ability in the camps. This

thriving existence, however, flourished on a temporary basis while awaiting a final solution to their predicament, which for these displaced people was emigration. The homeless man has to be given a chance to rebuild his life, to become self-supporting, to regain his human dignity, independence, and self-respect. Ukrainian DPs wanted to emigrate even after spending four, in some cases even five or six, years in camps. Some immigrated to Belgium, France, and England as miners. The great majority of DPs, however, lived in hope of the possibility of going overseas to find a new life in America or Canada, where large Ukrainian settlements had been in existence since the turn of the century.

I learned about the nature of life in the camps from first-hand experience. I was one of those DPs myself. I stayed in Austria, a smaller and poorer country with less international attention and fewer possibilities for mobility and initiative. As a student at the Technical University in Graz, I was advised not to plan on staying in Austria after graduation to work at my profession. My own aspiration and hope was also to emigrate. I started to look for contacts in the Ukrainian community in America and at that time I began my association with the Ukrainian daily newspaper, *Svoboda*, in the United States. It was through *Svoboda* that I learned about the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC), which was organized in 1944, when UNRRA began its operations in Europe. UUARC's aim was to co-ordinate the efforts of the Ukrainian-American community to provide assistance to their brothers left behind in the Old Country devastated by the war. The presence of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian DPs in the camps in Western Europe turned the efforts of this Ukrainian humanitarian organization to a new purpose—to bring help to Ukrainian DPs while working in close co-operation with UNRRA and IRO.

When Dr. Walter Gallan, the president of UUARC, came to Europe in November 1946, he visited Austria, so I had a first-hand opportunity to learn about his organization. Gallan believed in the kind of social service that helps people achieve their own level of self-sufficiency and self-respect. His guiding aim was to bring all Ukrainian DPs to America, and to help them to begin a new life under new and better conditions. I respected this view of my future boss and mentor because I did not wish to return to my native country, where democracy and human dignity were denied under totalitarian rule. A year later I joined the staff of the Austrian branch of UUARC, which opened its offices in Salzburg in January 1948, and stayed with the organization for the next thirty years. First I worked in Austria and then in the United States, initially performing the duties of an immigration officer and then occupying the post of executive director for fifteen years.

Support of human rights and aid to refugees and others deprived of human rights became the basic task of UUARC, which was officially registered with the American State Department as one of the voluntary agencies assigned to operate in countries outside the United States. After the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights was proclaimed in December 1948, UUARC included similar principles in its constitution:

. . . to promote by all means and to respect the human rights and freedoms defined in the Universal Proclamation of Human Rights, as well as to promote the Declaration of the United Nations on the elimination of racial discrimination;

. . . to aid refugees, escapees and displaced persons deprived of their human rights and especially to help them obtain permanent asylum from persecution and help them establish new residences;

. . . to co-operate in the aim of promotion of Human Rights with the United Nations Economic and Social Council respectively and its commissions and sub-commissions according to the Charter.

I am proud to have had an opportunity to work with this very special Ukrainian organization. UUARC helped more than 100,000 Ukrainian DPs to immigrate to North America, especially to the United States, where they found a new independent life in a democratic society. I remember to this day the happy faces of all those, old and young, as they were leaving the grey barracks of the camps for the long journey to America under the auspices of their own Ukrainian organization. Dr. Walter Gallan, whom they called "Mr. ZUDAK" (the Ukrainian acronym for our relief committee in Austria), personified the organization he headed.

The task was not easy. A home and a job for the head of the family had to be found, and there were tens of thousands of DPs who did not have the skills for the available jobs. Also, most DPs had no viable knowledge of English. What a problem it was to find a sponsor and convince him to sign an affidavit in support of an unknown refugee family so many miles away. What patience and perseverance were needed to guide every immigrant through the long process of screenings and examinations to reach, finally, the consular office to get a visa and permission to go to America.

I remember one special case. One day an older man came to our office in Salzburg and I greeted him with joy. "Thanks to God, tomorrow you will go to Bremerhaven and then on the ship and away to America! Congratulations, Mr. Shkilny." He looked at me with sorrow and frustration and said, "If only I were Shkilny, but I am not Shkilny." I became speechless for a moment, and then I said: "Let's go outside!" There, in the corridor of our emigration office building, I started to talk to him bluntly: "How could you do something like this at the last moment? For your own sake and more, for the sake of your family, do not touch this subject and go tomorrow to Bremerhaven. You will have many opportunities to clear your documents and to explain the changes you have made in your biographical data for fear of forced repatriation." This emigrant was very special. We had many problems preparing his case for emigration. He could not even pass the medical examination, and only with the help of a local doctor did he get an X-ray to pass the screening. I was in sympathy with him. He was a veteran

of the Ukrainian Independence war with the rank of captain, and he wanted to go to America using his real name as a Ukrainian officer. Eventually he did change all the improper data in his documents at the time of his naturalization, and when he died both his names were printed in the obituary: the real one with his military rank and the adopted one that helped him to avoid repatriation and come to America.

Dedication to human rights and a humanitarian program of action outlined in the UUARC by-laws guided our activities in later years, when UUARC helped escapees from the Soviet Union residing in Iran; when it participated in bringing political refugees from Hungary after the uprising, with many Ukrainians among them; and when it organized aid to Ukrainian settlers in Yugoslavia after the earthquake. Violation of human rights is a constant problem in our world and through the UUARC's work to promote human rights we are co-operating in the building of a new and better world. I am very happy that through the difficult period of life in the DP camps, I had the opportunity to join a Ukrainian humanitarian organization responsible for promoting human rights in its social services activities, instead of engaging myself, as many others did, in political endeavours to build the so-called *taborovi respubliky* (camp republics). I was given the opportunity to work in a resettlement program that helped tens of thousands of Ukrainian DPs to abandon that abnormal existence in the DP camps.

George S. N. Luckyj

I was never a DP. Long before World War II, in 1937, I left Ukraine to study abroad. As an eighteen-year-old *matura* holder from the Ukrainian *gymnasium* in Lviv, I went to the University of Berlin to study German literature. My father had some misgivings about sending me to Nazi Germany. He would rather have sent me to England where, he claimed, I “would learn about order among a free people.” This presumably was a warning to me that the people I would meet in Germany were not free. After two years in Berlin, in the summer of 1939, when an opportunity arose for me to go to Cambridge to a summer school for foreign students, I travelled there with great eagerness to see England, even foregoing the chance of a holiday in the Carpathians. This move was perhaps the single most important stroke of fate in my life.

Soon after I arrived in England the so-called Danzig crisis began, which led to the German invasion of Poland in September of that year. By deliberately staying in England and not returning to the Continent, I inadvertently chose the victorious side in the coming conflict and cut my ties with Eastern Europe forever. There was more to this than fate. While still at home in Ukraine I had become deeply dissatisfied with life around me and longed, quite romantically perhaps, to get to know Western Europe. Often the target of this yearning was England but, in hindsight, the prime source of my dissatisfaction was the narrow and blinkered atmosphere of Ukrainian life in Lviv.

I was one of the few boys in our school who was not deeply stirred by Ukrainian nationalism. The nationalist rhetoric seemed to me full of clichés, and as for various nationalist youth groups (Plast, etc.), I refused to take part in them. Again and again we were told by our parents and teachers to serve Ukraine, but very little was said about general human values, and there was little encouragement to look beyond the Ukrainian cause. The eccentric streak in me prompted me to take a broader view of life. I took delight in foreign rather than Ukrainian literature. I read about and gave talks at school on foreign countries. I tried to

learn foreign languages (Italian) other than those taught in school (Polish, German, Greek and Latin).

My appetite for foreign ideas and lifestyles was partly satisfied in Berlin, but I found England a veritable feast. There I met people very different from my friends in Lviv. I grasped ideas that were not parochial. I saw a world confident in the preservation of humane values, instead of in pursuit of nationalist fantasies. To be sure, the war stirred British patriotism, but to me, safely enclosed among pacifist students in a Quaker college, what seemed paramount was not their national posture, but an attitude of free debate and cool rationality. My Slavic emotionalism stuck out like a sore thumb and I soon learned to control it.

The issues of war and peace seemed, for the first time, truly complex, intertwined with profound moral and religious questions. Solutions, if any, could be arrived at only by dispassionate quest, not through empty rhetoric. All this appealed to me enormously, and I came to understand my father's words about free men, reinforced by my study of English literature at the university. Slowly but surely my feeling for Shevchenko's and Franko's poetry was replaced by the beauty I found in Keats, Blake, and Coleridge. It also became clear to me that Ukrainian literature had to be studied with different tools than those we had used at home. New vistas opened before me, and I was young enough to reach out to them with hope and confidence.

This idealism was not dampened when I joined the British army in December 1943. True, army life was different from the sheltered existence of a university student but it, too, was permeated with the British qualities of quiet humour, fair play, and minding one's own business. I quickly rose to the dizzy rank of staff sergeant and found my niche in the big machine as an interpreter, attached to various intelligence units. It was in my job as an interpreter that I encountered problems which eventually found their solution in DP camps. Just after the end of the war I was posted to the British Army of the Rhine in Germany. Until 1947, when I was finally demobilized, I served as a Russian interpreter at the Fifth British Infantry Division Headquarters in Brunswick (Braunschweig), about 100 kilometres from the British-Soviet demarcation boundary in Germany. A Soviet military mission was stationed there which was to assist in the repatriation of Soviet citizens. Those repatriation efforts were not very successful, however, since most of the DPs did not want to return.

I had some dealings with DP camps, including a Ukrainian camp, but I was soon detailed to another task which proved much more fascinating. The units of the British army stationed on the Soviet demarcation line started to intercept deserters from the Red Army, who voluntarily crossed into the British Zone and asked for political asylum. The British Army, on orders from the War Office in London, detained these deserters and kept them in special barracks, code-named 'New York.' The deserters' code name was 'Friend.' There the deserters were kept under guard and interrogated by a British intelligence officer with my assistance. The entire operation was top secret and was conducted in a cloak-and-

dagger setting. After more than forty years I still vividly remember some of the interviews I helped to conduct. Within one year we processed approximately 100 Red Army deserters—from ordinary privates to captains and majors. Our greatest “catch” was the personal bodyguard to Stalin’s son, Vasilii. Various reasons motivated these men to desert. Some, as we discovered later, were what we called “plants”—KGB agents sent to conduct subversive activities in the British Zone. The overwhelming majority, in my opinion, were bona fide refugees from the Soviet regime. Their requests for political asylum were genuine.

For reasons which were unknown to us at the time, we could not grant their requests. So it was that this episode in my life began to assume a tragic aspect. As everybody knows, soldiers are duty-bound to carry out the orders of their superior officers. I soon discovered that carrying out orders, in this case, clashed with my conscience, and I found myself in a serious predicament. After the routine interrogation, which lasted several days and concentrated mostly on military details, the detained deserters were not released. They were kept under strict arrest until orders came to return them to the Soviet authorities. I remember the shock I felt when the first order for this callous move arrived. I tried to explain to my superior officer that this would endanger the deserter’s life, since I knew that the punishment for desertion in the Red Army was execution by firing squad. Later we heard that this was indeed what happened to most, though perhaps not all, of the deserters whom we returned. The actual transfer, usually at the Helmstedt checkpoint on the autobahn to Magdeburg, was a dastardly act which brought tears to my eyes. The detained deserter was not told where we were taking him. He sat inside a covered armoured carrier, so he realized where he was only when the Red Army guard, assisted by the British escort, opened the door of the vehicle. In this barbaric way we “repatriated” most of our “friends.” Only much later did I learn that this was done in accordance with a secret protocol of the Yalta Agreement, which required the Western Allies to repatriate all Soviet deserters.

Was I completely unable to stop this terrible traffic in human lives? At first it seemed so. My protests to my superiors were to no avail, though they were met with sympathy. Very few British officers grasped the tragedy of the situation, since for them a deserter was someone to be punished and the Soviet Union was, after all, our great ally. There were exceptions among the officers, one of them my immediate superior, the intelligence officer at headquarters. Slowly but surely he came to see my point, that this could not go on. Between ourselves we thought of a scheme whereby I would arrange for the “disappearance” of some of the deserters into DP camps, issue them with false papers, and make it possible for them to stay in Germany. Sometimes the stiffest opposition to the operation came from the deserters themselves, who did not want to be reduced to DP status. Only when I told them of the alternative did they agree.

To make a long story short, several deserters' lives were saved in this way. Some of them were Ukrainians.

There still remained not only my troubled conscience but my whole faith in the British way of life, which had been severely undermined. During one of my leaves then I tried to discuss the matter with my English friends and lobby some important acquaintances (for example, Wickham Steed, former editor of the *London Times*) on behalf of the deserters. I did not get very far. My contacts were very limited, and only an outstanding personality could have taken it upon himself to defy public opinion and expose the scandal, as thirty years later Lord Bethell and Nikolai Tolstoy did in books which shook the conscience of Britain. In 1946 times were different. The glow of victory eliminated many shadows, some of them peculiarly nasty and brutish.

Brutishness, I kept telling myself, was not a British characteristic. There had to be some other explanation for their behaviour during this episode, and there was. One can and perhaps should dismiss it simply as a wartime episode where the rules of normal morality do not apply, yet I was tempted to probe deeper. One curse of a Western liberal education is that it sometimes ignores political realities in the non-Western world. Rationality, detachment, and human decency are thought to be universal. To be sure, not all of the British thought the Soviet regime was the model of democracy, for at Yalta even Winston Churchill asked about the Russians: "Are we going to let these barbarians right into the heart of Europe?" Yet, such fears were not reflected in the Allied posture at Yalta. On the contrary, concessions were made to the Russians which ultimately led to their domination over half of Europe. In this atmosphere, one simply could not expect the British Foreign Office or the War Office to follow a more humanitarian policy towards Red Army deserters. In addition, there was also the Sovietophile outlook of many prominent British Russian and Soviet experts, such as Sir Bernard Pares, for whom Russia could do no wrong. Guided by them, British public opinion was badly misled and the media basked in the short-lived glory of the common victory over Nazi Germany.

During my posting in Germany I could see all that but I could not excuse it. Some of the DPs with whom I talked about this predicament had a wiser and more far-sighted view of Soviet policies than the finest British diplomats. One must not forget that it was the British foreign minister, Anthony Eden, who, when told of the forced repatriation of DPs to the USSR, said that "one cannot be sentimental about it." Assessing the entire tragic episode for myself, I could not ignore the short-sightedness and inhumanity of British behaviour. On the other hand, I had to admit that had their policy been completely inflexible I would not have been able to save some of the deserters. If human decency was blotted out with one hand it was, at least partially, restored with the other. Yet, as a result of this episode my Anglophilia remained badly shaken, for there must have been something very lacking in the British outlook on Europe and the

political realities of our era if I had to find a corrective for this outlook inside a DP camp.

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
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Continued from front flap

The essays in this volume are grouped in nine sections covering the most important facets of the displaced persons' lives. These include an assessment of the DP phenomenon in the context of Ukrainian history; its demographic dimensions; an examination of the economic and organizational structure of the DP camps; the role of political parties and nationalist ideology; the activities of the Catholic and Orthodox churches; the establishment of schools and women's organizations; the proliferation of literary, cultural and scholarly activity; Soviet efforts at repatriation and the Allied response; the resettlement of Ukrainians in the USA and Canada; and a sociological and psychological interpretation of the DP experience. Four contributions by eyewitnesses round out the volume.

Given the lack of scholarly work on this subject, it is hoped that this first systematic work on Ukrainian DPs will stimulate more interest and research on displaced persons, who have become such a prominent phenomenon in the history of the modern world.

Dust jacket painting:

"Skytalsi" (The Refugees, 1946)

by Jacques Hnizdovsky.

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