

Twentieth
Century
Ukraine



Twentieth-Century UKRAINE

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Foreword

THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE is spoken by over forty million people living in Europe, Asia and America. It has a large and flourishing literature, and its leading authors of the nineteenth century, such as Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrainka, rank with the best writers of the period.

Today the homeland of these people, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, is a member of the United Nations and its Russian Communist representatives vote consistently with the Soviet delegation in the solid bloc that stands opposed to the principles and ideals of the democracies of the world. The Soviet Union regards its representatives as on a par with those of Poland and Czechoslovakia as eligible for election to the Security Council. These representatives do not, however, speak for the Ukrainian people, for the Soviet authorities lose no opportunity to stamp out Ukrainian nationalism, one of the worst doctrinal heresies to affect the Soviet Union. Ukrainian national independence, if it were to be achieved, would strike at the heart of Russian imperialism, be it Red or White.

The strength of this Ukrainian nationalism is not appreciated abroad. The world still looks at it through the eyes of either the Russians or the Poles, both of whom repudiate it as a menace to their own plans for self-aggrandizement. Both are willing to point out how the Ukrainians differ from themselves

but both nevertheless persist in denying that the Ukrainian nationality now or in the past has ever existed.

It is the object of this book to give a picture of the Ukrainian struggle for independence during the twentieth century. It is a sad story of political failure after World War I and of oppression after World War II. With the exception of the *émigrés* and of the displaced persons, the bulk of the Ukrainians cannot speak for themselves. Yet they have a place in history which cannot be waved aside by calling their defenders propagandists or by stressing the fact that any discussion of their problem involves a criticism of their neighbors.

The Ukrainian question is today one of the most important in Europe, for it involves the largest group of people with a share of European traditions that is compelled to be silent. It enters into all plans for the future of Europe, for the securing and maintenance of peace, for the welfare of the United Nations and of humanity. If Ukraine is only a creature of propaganda, as its enemies assert, why was it admitted to the United Nations? If it is an independent nation of independent people, why should it be dominated by Moscow? This dilemma indicates the need for a deeper appreciation by the intelligent public of the situation that has developed in Kiev and Lviv and in the whole of Ukraine. It is an advanced stage of the same policy that is being applied in the satellite states, in China and Korea and explains Soviet aims and aspirations. If this book succeeds in throwing some light upon the matter, the author will be well satisfied.

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Note on Transliteration

In this work an attempt has been made to transliterate both Ukrainian and Russian names directly into English. This involves certain differences in spelling. Thus in the transliteration of Ukrainian y and h are often used where the transliteration of Russian shows i and g.

In regard to proper names, those as Kiev, Dnieper, etc. are given in their common English form. Lesser known names are given in direct transliteration.

A special note should be made for Lviv. This city of many names is called Lvov in Russian, Lwów in Polish, Lemberg in German and Léopol in French. The Ukrainian form is used consistently.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY UKRAINE

I

The Ukrainian Revival before 1914

THE PUBLICATION OF Ivan Kotlyarevsky's *Eneida* in 1798 is usually regarded as the beginning of the modern Ukrainian national movement. This travesty of the old Latin epic of Virgil attributed to Aeneas and his followers escaping from the sack of Troy the characteristic thoughts and actions of a band of Zaporozhian Kozaks escaping from the destruction of the Sich by Catherine the Great of Russia in 1775, the year of the opening of the American Revolution. It drew heavily upon the author's knowledge of Ukrainian life, customs and traditions and it revived a vein of patriotism and of pride in national heritage that had lain dormant for nearly a century.

It appeared twenty-three years after the final destruction of the Sich, the traditional center of Ukrainian political life, and thirty years after the Russian Empress had abolished the mechanism of the hetman state, the last formal Ukrainian organization. There was thus a definite political gap between the old and the new; and the Russian attitude was such that the new movement was forced to confine itself for some decades to struggle for a national culture.

The *Eneida* not only appealed to the traditions and instincts of the people, but introduced the vernacular Ukrainian into literature. Kotlyarevsky for the first time broke with that

artificial combination of Church Slavic, Polish and Russian that was the conventional written language among noble and intellectual Ukrainians. The discarding of this antiquated and rigid mode of expression brought the new literature near to the speech of the people, to their folk poetry, their *dumy*—the tales of adventure and heroism of the Kozaks of the Sich—and made them responsive to all the literary currents that were flowing from the West of Europe. It thus paved the way for the Ukrainians to develop a modern literature and take their place in the general stream of Western and European civilization and culture.

The *Eneida* was parallel to those works in the other languages of Eastern and Central Europe which marked the passing of the old order and initiated the modern national movements. All of these were at first literary rather than political. This was fortunate, for the movements were able to take root and gain strength under the very eyes of the authorities, whereas the slightest hint of political activity would have caused them to be tracked down and exterminated before they could have been fairly launched. As it was, Kotlyarevsky was able to call attention to much of the Ukrainian past and do it in what seemed to the watchful Russians a harmless way.

This is not the place to recount the ancient history of the Ukrainians.¹ In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Kiev, Christianized from Constantinople, was one of the great cities of Europe. Its grand princes, such as Yaroslav the Wise and Volodymyr Monomakh, ranked among the leading sovereigns of the day. The state soon fell upon evil times. In 1169 its capital was pillaged by Prince Andrey Bogolyubsky of Suzdal, the original capital of the Moscow princes, and later it was mercilessly ravaged by the Tatar and Mongol invasions. Finally all vestige of independence was lost and Ukraine came to form part of that heterogeneous state which passed into history as Poland. Then came the Kozaks, bold and fearless warriors, who in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries dared to raid

the outskirts of the Turkish capital of Constantinople and became a menace to the King of Poland.

In 1654 the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky made an alliance at Pereyaslav with Tsar Alexis of Moscow. The consequences were disastrous, for the tsars divided the country with Poland along the line of the Dnieper River and unilaterally abrogated one condition of the alliance after another. Finally in the latter part of the eighteenth century Catherine the Great not only wiped out the hetman regime and the Sich but she introduced the complete Russian system of administration and reduced the population to serfdom in the Russian manner. The richer landowners, many of whom had been Kozak officers, found it to their advantage to be completely Russianized, to accept the Russian language and the manners of the St. Petersburg court and to forget their Ukrainian past.

With all Ukrainian political institutions wiped out, the Russian government set to work to annihilate all distinctive elements in Ukrainian life. The name of Ukraine was abolished and there was only a grudging toleration of a somewhat confused region which passed under the name of Little Russia. The language of the Ukrainian people was blandly called a mere peasant idiom unworthy of serious consideration or development. The surviving Ukrainian customs were ridiculed as non-Russian and backward, while at the same time the government vehemently insisted that there was no recognizable difference between Ukrainians and Great Russians. When the incompatibility of these two views was pointed out, the government simply branded all interest in Ukrainian affairs an Austro-German intrigue which was to be repressed by severe measures.

This attitude of the Russian imperial government was shared to the full by the radical Russian intelligentsia. Belinsky, universally acclaimed for his liberal ideas, could not heap sufficient scorn upon the poems of Taras Shevchenko and used his pen to show that the peasant dialect spoken in "Little Russia" was not entitled to literary development.² His suc-

cessors followed his example, and during the entire century the government and the revolutionists joined forces against the Ukrainian revival.³

In 1905 the Russian Academy of Sciences at last admitted that Great Russian and Ukrainian were two distinct Slavic languages,⁴ but this advanced point of view was deprived of real meaning in the reaction that followed the unsuccessful revolution of that year.

It goes without saying that political action was altogether prohibited. Throughout the nineteenth century the whole empire was ruled by the bureaucracy. There were no popular elections, and the only rudimentary step toward elective government was taken with the organization of the zemstvos to handle certain local affairs. It is safe to say that up to the Revolution of 1905 there was no legal organ for the development of Ukrainian experience in public affairs and few or no means whereby the Ukrainians could secure such experience, unless they were content to serve as Russians in the Russian political machine. There were no schools where instruction was given publicly in the Ukrainian language; there were no newspapers printed in Ukrainian; and almost the only books available were those printed in Lviv and other cities of Western Ukraine and smuggled across the border in a steady stream.⁵

Of the younger and more radical Ukrainian intelligentsia, the vast majority joined the Russian revolutionary movements. On the one hand they thus gained a knowledge of Russian political techniques; on the other they were all too frequently drawn into the Russian orbit and suffered denationalization as surely as did the more conservative who bowed to the bureaucratic system.

The natural wealth of Ukraine was a significant factor in Russian plans; the coal and iron mines of the Donets basin played an important role in the industrialization of the empire. The commercial and industrial centers which were built during the nineteenth century on Ukrainian territory were settled

chiefly by Great Russians who were encouraged to emigrate there, while Ukrainians who obtained posts in government service were shifted to remote sections of the land where they would be isolated amid a non-Ukrainian population. This deliberate transfer of the population created in the country definite Russian and later Soviet centers which played an important role in the modern period.

There was a slight change after the Revolution of 1905, inasmuch as the first Duma contained a number of representatives of the Ukrainians and of minorities who sympathized with them.⁶ Permission was granted to publish newspapers in Ukrainian and for a while it seemed as if the Ukrainians might obtain the same rights as some of the other nationalities of the empire. But the first Duma was soon dissolved and in later elections the laws were so changed that the Ukrainians lost almost all representation.

Despite the attitude of the Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainians felt with especial rigor the force of the reaction that followed the collapse of the revolutionary wave. They were refused permission to open schools where Ukrainian would be the language of instruction and censorship was tightened over Ukrainian books and newspapers. However, for the first time in Russian history, there was a definite Ukrainian press. The *Literary and Historical Messenger* was moved from Lviv to Kiev. In a word, following this revolution, there did develop a distinct Ukrainian movement on a broader scale than had been possible earlier, even though it was hampered at every turn.

During the nineteenth century the revival spread to the Ukrainians living under Hapsburg rule in Western Ukraine.⁷ This area fell into three categories, depending on the provincial boundaries of the Hapsburg Empire: Galicia, Bukovina and the area of the Carpathian Mountains. Of these Galicia contained the largest part of the Western Ukrainian population, which had passed under Hapsburg rule after the dis-

memberment of Poland in the eighteenth century.

Conditions here were very different and there was a definite social pressure exerted to induce the Ukrainians (or Ruthenians, as they were called after the Latin name of the area) to declare themselves Poles. Serfdom was abolished in 1848 but the dominating class was Polish and in accordance with Hapsburg policy, the Poles were favored by the central government in Vienna.

Religiously and culturally there was another difference. Most of the Western Ukrainians were Catholics of the Eastern Rite and from the time when the Hapsburgs had taken over the province, they had provided much-needed opportunities for the education of the clergy. This gave the movement a far more clerical tinge than in Eastern Ukraine and it tended to perpetuate the artificial Church Slavic language. In fact, it was not until well along in the century that the clerical and conservative supporters of Church Slavic were defeated and the way was opened for the development of the vernacular tongue.

This came about when the nationalists were called upon to struggle with the Muscophiles who advocated the introduction of Great Russian and looked to Russia for protection. Very few of this group either knew any Great Russian or were aware of the linguistic complications involved in the ideas which they were so passionately advocating. It was in the time of Michael Drahomaniv and Ivan Franko, in the seventies and eighties, that the nationalist and vernacular cause definitely triumphed; but even later there were outbreaks of Muscophilism.

In Galicia the Ukrainians had far better opportunities to acquaint themselves with the problems of government and public service than in Russia. Though rarely considered for the higher administrative posts, they could look forward to minor positions in the Hapsburg service. They could enter the learned professions as Ruthenians. They could form their own

political parties and although the elections were often controlled, they succeeded in placing a goodly number of candidates even against Polish efforts.

In Galicia, then, there was no question of the existence of a Ruthenian group. It was treated by the Poles as inferior but its identity was undisputed. The people had at least a modicum of protection and of opportunity.⁸ In Russia, on the other hand, the autocratic government sternly denied the Ukrainians their identity and employed every means to deprive them of self-expression.

In Bukovina the Ukrainians were in much the same situation as in Galicia.

In the third section, the region of the Carpathians, conditions were less favorable, for this formed part of the kingdom of Hungary. Under the Hungarian system of administration the territory was divided into several counties, each of which was dependent directly upon Budapest. The Hungarian system made it much more difficult for minority groups to work together across county lines. Education was at a low level and what there was, was directed to turn the young men into patriotic Hungarians. The Russian invasion in 1848 had greatly strengthened those factions which were Muscophile in tendency and the nationalist movement was perhaps weaker here than in the other provinces. Yet the trend was definitely toward better living conditions and by the beginning of World War I the Ukrainian population of this mountain area was already becoming more self-confident and self-assured.

There was one outstanding hurdle that all Ukrainian leaders, whether in Russia or in Austria-Hungary, had to face, and it was something that confronted all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe. Any change in their political status was dependent upon forces outside of themselves. It was evident to all that the two empires in which they were enclosed could not be overthrown by popular revolt. They could improve their educational, social and economic conditions but the time

for armed uprisings was definitely past. Europe was on the surface more peaceful than it had been for centuries and although the coffee houses buzzed with gossip about the imminence of a great war, the fact remained that the rulers of Europe had been able to solve almost every crisis that had arisen since the time of the French Revolution without plunging the continent into a major struggle. It was only in such a major struggle that one could hope for the downfall of either of the two empires.

II

Ukraine and World War I

THE MURDER OF Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his wife at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, gave to the world its first open intimation that the long-expected test of strength in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Balkans was at hand. More specifically, it was a sign that on a world scale, a clash between the Triple Entente, composed of the British Empire, France and the Russian Empire, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy was to break out momentarily. This would be a struggle of giants.

Each of these great powers looked at the conflict in her own way. To Great Britain, the main enemy was Germany, with her aspirations for maritime supremacy and her efforts to push to the southeast and seize control of the wealth of Asia Minor and perhaps India. France thought in terms of the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. Italy was torn between her desires to profit at the expense of France and her hopes of recovering Trieste and adjacent territory from her rival and ally, Austria-Hungary, and securing the east shore of the Adriatic. Germany concentrated on her rivalry with Great Britain and her long-standing feud with France. Austria-Hungary wished to put a stop to the spreading of Slav nationalism

among the Southern Slavs from independent Serbia and she hoped to get rid of Russian agents working among her Slavic citizens. Russia saw an opportunity to advance toward the Straits and to win new subjects among the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

With these differences in the political line-up, it was only natural that the Western democracies thought of the war largely in terms of the Western front. The German invasion of Belgium and the overrunning of northern France seemed to both the British Empire and France the most *important* events. They knew relatively little of the complicated situation in Eastern Europe and they cared less. At the moment the might of the Russian Empire was to them the great factor in the East and though there might be criticism of Russian methods, there surged up a friendship for Russia and a belief in Russia that made them skeptical of any Eastern movement which was not sponsored by the tsars. This idea was fostered as always even by the Russian revolutionists abroad who were as ardently opposed to minority rights as were the bureaucrats themselves.

When the Western Powers thought at all of the future of Austria-Hungary, they were willing to divide it up. It was relatively easy to convince them of the right of the Czechs to independence, since they were familiar with the medieval kingdom of Bohemia. The problem of the Balkans was also relatively simple: the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 had publicized the desire of the Serbs to unite with them their long-separated brothers in the Southern Slav provinces of the Dual Monarchy. The case of Poland was more complex, for to the Poles the war was indeed a civil war. Relatives of all social ranks from peasants to aristocrats were called into the services of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia and were compelled to fight against their own cousins and even brothers. Russia promised freedom to the Poles of the Central Powers and demanded the direct annexation of the "Russians" in West

Ukraine. She confidently envisaged the establishment of a series of independent Slav countries and except in the case of the Serbs, who had already a native dynasty, she believed that she would be able to place on the thrones of the new governments Russian princes who would weld their states to the traditional Russian policy.

The Central Powers naturally saw things differently. They regarded the independence movement among the Czechs as the work of Russian propaganda and they aimed to bring all the Southern Slavs into Austria-Hungary. They were willing to liberate Russian Poland and place it under the control of a German or Austrian prince who would co-ordinate it with their own policy and who would perhaps have some influence in Austrian Poland but none in German Poland. This sharply divided the Poles at home and abroad—with a Polish National Committee operating in Paris, London and New York, and a Polish Council of the Regency working in Berlin and Vienna—and it was not until America entered the war and the Central Powers weakened that there was any agreement between the two factions.¹ The feud continued throughout the entire history of independent Poland in the hostility of the friends of Marshal Joseph Pilsudski and Ignace Jan Paderewski. The Central Powers were willing also to give at least idealistic support to all groups in the Russian Empire which might have separatist ambitions.

In all this the Ukrainians were under a special handicap. They had formed one of the latest waves of emigration to the West, and they had done so under the varied names of Galicians, Ruthenians, Russians, Little Russians and even Austrians or Hungarians. They had not yet developed a strong leadership abroad. They had no representatives with the broad popular appeal of the Czech Thomas G. Masaryk, a distinguished philosopher with an American wife, or of the musical genius Paderewski. The Russian authorities abroad redoubled their efforts to prove that there was no such people as the

Ukrainians and that the entire Ukrainian movement was of German origin. The Poles demanded the inclusion of a great part of Ukraine in a revived Polish state. The Central Powers would not promise to change their system whereby Polish influences were supreme in the Ukrainian parts of the Hapsburg Empire. Thus the Ukrainians could not look forward without misgiving to a victory of the Triple Entente nor could they be sure that a victory of the Central Powers would bring them any relief.

Despite the cheerless outlook, the Ukrainian leaders in Austria-Hungary established as early as August 5, 1914, a *Holovna Ukrainska Rada* to mobilize all Western Ukrainian forces against the Russian Empire. The next day a Ukrainian Military Organization was started to create a volunteer force of *Sichovi Striltsi* (Riflemen of the Sich).² This paralleled the Polish Legions of Pilsudski but it was distrusted by the authorities. The number of the *Striltsi* was severely limited and they were poorly supplied at the beginning. In 1918, a fully equipped regiment of them marched to the defence of Lviv.

The Ukrainians who had left Russia organized in Vienna a Society for the Liberation of Ukraine. This broadcast appeals for assistance to all enemies of Russia and hoped to find some sympathy among the Western democratic powers. At the moment it met with slight success.³

The wave of patriotic enthusiasm which swept over Russia demanded the suppression of all Ukrainian organizations as agents of the Central Powers.⁴ Ukrainian newspapers in Kiev and elsewhere which had survived the censorship of the last years were now suppressed. New regulations were added so that authors who desired to print books of any kind in Ukrainian were compelled to file three copies of the manuscript with the censor and then the government found excuses to hold up decisions and avoid publication. Prominent Ukrainians were moved into the interior of Russia. Separate Ukrainian relief organizations were forbidden as unnecessary on the familiar

pretext that the Ukrainians were not a separate people. Yet with open work barred, the Ukrainians were able to form unofficial groups within the Russian organizations and thus give some aid and encouragement to, and receive information about, the Western Ukrainians who were taken prisoners. Vainly the Eastern Ukrainians, especially those of socialist tendencies, argued that they were loyal and wished to see all Ukraine united within the Russian Empire. They were not believed and the government made it clear to them that the time had come to liquidate the Ukrainian problem for good and all.

In Western Ukraine the Hapsburg government arrested the Muscophile leaders as Russian agents. It was none too soon, for three days after the declaration of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, the Russian Army crossed the boundaries of Eastern Galicia and on September 3, 1914, entered Lviv, the capital of the province. Then it pushed on and finally it reached the summit of the Carpathian Mountains in the district of Carpatho-Ukraine, following much the same route as the Russians had taken in 1849, when they entered to aid the Hapsburgs against the Hungarians.

The Russians lost no time in putting into power the Muscophiles among the Western Ukrainians. They proceeded on the usual assumption that there was no such people as the Ukrainians; they appointed a Russian governor general of the "liberated" province and they deported prominent nationalist leaders to the interior. Thus they arrested Professor Hrushevsky at his summer home in the Carpathians and sent him to Nizhni Novgorod; but thanks to the intercession of the Russian Academy of Sciences, he was allowed to go to Moscow and work in the libraries there. Archbishop Count Andrew Sheptitsky, metropolitan of Lviv and head of the Catholics of the Eastern rite, was taken into Russia and kept there during the entire period of the war.⁵

The lesser clergy of the Uniat church who fell into Russian hands were either deported or compelled to join the Orthodox

church, on the adroit theory that the Uniat church had been forced upon the Russian Orthodox people in the sixteenth century by the papacy and the Poles⁶ and that the Russian armies had therefore liberated the people from a foreign yoke and brought them back to their original faith. Again it made no difference if the people preferred their own usages and customs. They were Russians and were to make the best of it. In the words of Shevchenko, be silent and happy.

All Ukrainian cultural and economic institutions were abolished. Reading rooms were closed, co-operative societies were shut down, and the printing of Ukrainian was subjected to the same rules as in Russia itself. Everything possible was done to give an air of permanence to the new regime.

In the spring of 1915 Tsar Nicholas II visited Lviv, where he congratulated the "Russian" population on their return to the homeland and assured them that the province would never again return to alien rule. All of the imperial and other official utterances stressed the fact that special rights would be given to the Poles but that the Russians of the province would receive the same treatment as did Russians everywhere.

This was a convenient principle for the Russians. In a region already devastated by war, it gave them the right to treat all conscious Ukrainians as traitors to the cause of Russia, their native land, to confiscate their property, and deport them to regions in the Russian Empire where they would be no longer subject to German influences—and this at a time when the activities of the Baltic Germans who held high rank at the Russian court, were beginning to awake suspicion of treason within the empire.

Naturally, this principle, when applied by renegade Ukrainians who had fled into Russia before the war and by certain favored Poles who were hostile to the growth of Ukrainian influence in Eastern Galicia, could excuse the most arbitrary actions. There resulted a reign of terror and destruction which did as much harm to the population as the actual fighting

around the various cities, even including the fortress of Pere-myshl, which held out against the invaders for several months.

At the end of April, 1915, the tide turned again. General von Mackensen smashed the Russian lines along the Dunajec River in the western part of the province and the Russians were compelled to retreat. Since "Russian" patriots must, of course, be kept from falling under German control, the army command ordered them to be evacuated. The Russians hoped to be able to move out of Western Ukraine all "Russian-speaking" persons, i.e., Ukrainians. Of course they did not succeed, yet they did gather up thousands of men, women and children who were compelled to retire eastward with the army and were then deposited as refugees throughout the eastern and northern provinces of European Russia and Siberia. The forced evacuation of the Ukrainian population was attended with severe hardships, especially since the military could ill spare any food, clothing or other supplies for the "liberated" and "rescued" civilians.

Once the refugees had reached their new homes, they were naturally forbidden to form any special Ukrainian associations. What was the use of a war of liberation if any evidence could be shown that the form of liberation was not too palatable to those liberated? The various other national groups that had been removed from the Western borders of Russia were allowed to form their own relief organizations, but the Ukrainians, since they were in theory Russian, were not given this privilege. Thus they were caught again on the two horns of the Russian dilemma. Their very existence was denied and they were refused the aid which they could expect as Russians while at the same time they were treated as an alien body which could expect no sympathy or support from the Russian population. Imperial fiat even tried to prevent help from the "non-existent" Ukrainians of the empire.

With the Russian retreat from Galicia, the Austrian authorities returned and they allowed Ukrainian life to resume in the

evacuated areas. Once more the old institutions, now devastated, were reopened. As the German armies advanced eastward and northward, Kholm, Pidlyashshya, Volyn and Podolia each became in turn the scene of the same kind of military activities, with the Russians evacuating Ukrainian inhabitants and forgetting about them afterwards. Later a Russian offensive under General Brusilov succeeded in penetrating Galicia again in the southwest and again the process was repeated.

The inability of the Ukrainians to win any active support abroad reacted against them. The activities of the Poles in all of the capitals of both groups of powers and in the United States made it advisable for the Austro-Hungarian government to proceed with caution and try to satisfy their demands. Both the Central Powers and the Triple Entente promised the Poles an independent state of some kind, the Germans and Austrians generously offering to include in their projected territory the land of the Western Ukrainians.

As a result of Polish influence, the Austrian government now became deaf when the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine pleaded for the establishment of an independent state in the Ukrainian territory taken by the German armies from Russia. The General Ukrainian Rada established in Vienna in 1915 had urged that the Ukrainian districts of Galicia and Bukovina should be included in this state. At this moment, with the Russian armies in retreat, the attitude of the Ukrainians was similar to that of the Austrian Poles: all groups within the Hapsburg lands were agreed that a reorganization of the government was necessary to satisfy the legitimate demands of the citizens and provide a proper and efficient setup. But the rigid ideas of the old Emperor Francis Joseph I prevented any action and the vigorous foreign propaganda of the Poles won them favored treatment. Undoubtedly Vienna hoped that the refusal of the Ukrainian request would leave the people a dissatisfied core in the Polish state projected by the Central Powers and so nullify its activity. The Ukrainians

became convinced that they could not look for justice to Vienna and they joined the nations ardently desiring the disintegration of the entire Hapsburg structure.

Meanwhile conditions in Russia for Ukrainians of even the noninvaded areas were going from bad to worse. The few Ukrainians in the Russian Duma again asked permission to use their own language in the schools and to implement the provisions of the Constitution of 1905 and the decrees of the Academy of Sciences. A new system of educational reforms was projected by the minister of education, Count Paul Ignatyev, but even this still preserved the old idea that Ukrainians were Russians and did not give them any of the relief granted to other nationalities in the empire. A few of the Russian Progressives utilized the scandal of the occupation in Galicia to make some interpellations but these were easily set aside by the ending of the session. The Russian liberals, as hostile as the government to the Ukrainian cause, refused to see anything extraordinary in the situation in the Ukrainian areas and the authorities continued to take every measure to suppress the Ukrainian movement and smear it both at home and abroad.

Thus the year 1916 passed. On both sides of the border there was a growing realization that the days of both Austria-Hungary and Russia were running out. No one could foresee what was going to happen but there was a growing war weariness and a sullen willingness to dream of what might happen that boded ill for the two regimes. Even the death of Francis Joseph and the accession of Charles could change nothing.



III

Ukraine and Russia in Dissolution

ON MARCH 8, 1917, began the riots in Petrograd that marked the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. These became intensified and spread rapidly until on March 15, Nicholas II abdicated the throne and the Russian Empire was no more. It was a sudden and dramatic end to the Romanov dynasty that had ruled for over three hundred years, so sudden indeed that the success of the long-expected revolution could hardly be believed, even by its foremost advocates, and days and even weeks were required after its immediate impact upon the peoples of the empire before its significance could be fully appreciated.

The Ukrainians in the capital welcomed the new movement which was taking shape as they prepared to celebrate the birthday of the national poet, Shevchenko, which occurred on March 9. This had always been a special time for tsarist persecution; now, in the midst of the rioting and disorder, the exercises were held on a scale and with a freedom that had never been possible.

When the first flush of enthusiasm was over, the serious work of the revolution began—the welding of a new organization to take the place of the old, discarded system. At this point the unanimity which had held together all classes, except the hard-shelled supporters of the old regime, broke down.

There were all kinds of questions to be decided. There was the problem of the participation of the new Russia in the World War which was still going on. There were the social problems involved in the distribution of land to the peasants, the rights of property and the position of the factory workers. There were the national problems presented by the various oppressed peoples that had been brought by force or by guile within the Russian Empire. It was soon evident that there was going to be no agreement about these or as to the ultimate form of a central government, if there was to be one.

In the capital itself a disagreement at once arose between the Provisional Government, formed largely out of the moderate parties of the old Duma, and the new Soviets of Soldiers and Workmen which had been called into existence by the more radical parties, among which the Bolshevik party was as yet almost negligible. The Provisional Government, which included only one Social Revolutionist, Kerensky, wanted to continue the war and adopt a form of government based generally upon the types of parliamentary democracy known in Western Europe. The Soviets argued for an immediate peace, the breaking up of the old army, and the organization of a government based upon soviets to be established throughout the country.

Outside of the capital the wealthier classes stood for principles fairly similar to those of the Provisional Government, while the peasants demanded the immediate distribution of the land of the great estates and were willing to use force to attain their goal. In the smaller cities or wherever there was a factory population, the revolutionary movement of the Soviets took hold.

Finally among all of the oppressed nationalities, there grew up with surprising speed an agitation for the recognition of special rights in their own territories, for permission to use their own languages, and for new relationships to the central government which usually involved either outright independence or reconstruction of the Russian Empire as a federal state.

At the same time these sections developed the same class bitterness and the same social demands that were appearing in purely Russian territory.

All this was repudiated by the Great Russians of both right and left. They could not conceive of a state which would be anything but the old monolithic unity. To win the support of the Allies they were willing to make some concessions in the cases of Poland and Finland, but that was about all. When they did grudgingly concede anything more, it was with the distinct proviso that all such questions could not receive a definitive answer until the meeting of a Constituent Convention, in which the Great Russians intended to have an absolute majority.¹

Of great importance in this connection was the relative isolation of the Russian Empire resulting from the war. Owing to the intervention of Turkey on the side of the Central Powers and the German advance into the Balkans, there was no access to the outside world through the Dardanelles. The Baltic sea routes were completely closed by the Germans. It was possible to reach Petrograd and Moscow from the West only by rail across Sweden or by the sea route to Murmansk and Archangel, the two ports on the Arctic Ocean. An alternative route was by way of Vladivostok on the Pacific and the long journey over the demoralized Trans-Siberian Railroad. The route from the Caucasus to the British positions in Mesopotamia and across Iran had indeed been traversed by a division of Russian Cossacks who had joined the British at Bagdad but it was not a practicable means of communication.

All of these routes led directly into Great Russian territory. This meant that the various non-Russian nationalities for the most part had no means of communicating with the Western Powers except across Great Russian territory. They were dependent, if war was to come, on their domestic manufacture of munitions and on captured materiel. Even if they were recognized by the Allies, these could extend them no direct help. That could come only from the Central Powers and to

accept such assistance would inevitably bring forth the charge in the West that the movements were German-inspired and would work against Allied recognition in the event of German defeat, which was already becoming evident.

There were few persons in authority in Great Britain, France or the United States (which had by now entered the war) who understood or cared to understand the real nature of the Russian Empire. The Allied representatives, often with the best intentions in the world, listened to the Great Russians of either the old regime, the Provisional Government or the revolutionary Soviets. They were only too willing to believe that all important questions would be settled in the Western manner at the Constituent Convention and when they did get into contact with the minorities, they did not have the authority to promise them anything or to carry out what they did feel inclined to offer.

The Allies, while welcoming the downfall of the tsar and of the supposed pro-German clique among his associates, still felt themselves bound by their agreements with the empire. They remembered the sacrifices that the Russians (and here they did not bother to distinguish among the various nations in the empire) had made in the common cause. They believed that Russia's internal problems would be solved without delay and that a new and democratic government would emerge from the growing chaos. They therefore again hesitated to take any action which might embarrass the Provisional Government in its efforts to maintain itself in power and they jumped at the suggestion that everything be left to the Constituent Assembly.

In this setting the Ukrainians were compelled to steer their course. They occupied an important geographical position, yet they were completely cut off from any direct contact with the West. They formed the largest group next to the Great Russians, yet for two centuries their very existence as a group had been denied by Russians of all categories and they had had no chance to present their case to the world. They had only their own abilities and their confidence in the righteousness

of their cause.

At the outbreak of the revolution, Professor Hrushevsky, the foremost Ukrainian historian, left Moscow, where he was under police supervision, and made his way to Kiev. Here he almost immediately became the mainspring of the Ukrainian movement. Hrushevsky was a liberal and a member of the underground Organization of Ukrainian Progressives, which had established contacts with all of the Ukrainian socialist parties.² The approach of the revolution allowed it to appear openly for the first time since its foundation in 1908 and take an active part in the spreading of Ukrainian agitation.

The ranks of Ukrainian patriots were swelled by the gradual return of many of the men and women who had been imprisoned or exiled during the last years of the imperial regime. They soon gave valuable support to the new movement.

In the beginning most of the leaders and the people undoubtedly thought that with the elimination of the tsar, the new regime at Petrograd would be eager to satisfy the legitimate demands of the various nationalities. The ardent separatist demands of the small Ukrainian Independence party seemed overwrought; its insistent calls for the declaration of Ukrainian independence went unheeded and its leaders took little part in the first deliberations.³

There is no reason to wonder at this. For about a half century, the opponents of tsarism and of imperial control of Ukraine had been in touch with Russian revolutionary leaders of the same general type and had accepted their ideology and methods. There were no political parties in the sense known to the democratic world, these having been forbidden before the Revolution of 1905. There were only secret revolutionary groups without political or administrative experience; the parties formed in 1905 had been largely broken up in the following period of reaction and driven underground.

As we have seen, the imperial regime had taken advantage of the war to suppress even the embryonic Ukrainian press.

It was therefore necessary, in the middle of the revolution, to create among a people with a high level of illiteracy a press which would voice Ukrainian desires. By the end of March there were at least three such papers, the *New Council*, the *Labor Gazette*, and the *Will of the People*,⁴ but with the breakdown of transportation it was almost impossible to circulate them among the villages where the Ukrainian sentiment was strongest.

From the beginning of the Ukrainian movement, emphasis had been laid upon its cultural aspects and little attention given to the restoration of the old Kievan state. Now in the days of the revolution, cultural rights became the chief plank in the national platform. To the masses and even to many of the intellectuals, the language question seemed to be the spearhead of their cause. They wanted to have their own language introduced into the schools and officially recognized. They had connected Russian opposition to this with tsarism and bureaucracy and it never entered their heads that a Provisional Government, which loudly proclaimed its belief in democracy, would question this right.

In common with most of the citizens of the Russian Empire, the Ukrainian leaders had almost ignored foreign affairs. Pre-occupied with their cultural rights and other internal matters, they had not planned any course of action in the international arena. They had devoted far more thought to the ideology of the revolution and of socialism. It was only natural that in the enthusiasm of the first days, the growing party organizations were similar to those organized elsewhere in the Russian Empire. Soon the Ukrainian Social Revolutionary party and the Ukrainian Social Democratic party under the leadership of the writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko came to the fore. Both stressed the need for autonomy but like the corresponding parties in all European countries, they thought of themselves as members of some sort of world-wide parties which would work together without too much attention to such questions as boundaries and national feelings. They had not yet

learned the full lesson of the situation in Germany in 1914, when the apparently international socialist parties had voted for the war credits in the Reichstag.

In a sense the position of most of the leaders was similar to that of the American colonists in 1775, who had taken up arms to defend their rights as Englishmen and had required more than a year to realize that their goal was independence. The Ukrainian leaders wanted social reform and a recognition of their cultural rights. This meant some form of local autonomy, the need for which was emphasized by the growing disorder throughout the country which had to be countered by local initiative.

With these objects in view Professor Hrushevsky organized at Kiev the Central Rada with the aid of the Organization of Ukrainian Progressives. In its early days this conceived itself as a committee representing the various elements of Ukrainian society rather than as the nucleus of a government. At its maiden session on March 17 its first act was to send a telegram of congratulations to the prime minister of the Provisional Government, Prince Lvov, expressing the hope that that government would recognize the autonomy of Ukraine and protect the rights of the Ukrainian people.⁵

The word autonomy was used in the same sense that it had had in Austria-Hungary. It meant the power to handle certain specific problems, especially local affairs, with the permission of the central administration. Autonomy was a gift and not a right. This distinction is at wide variance with the ideas of the Anglo-Saxon world as to the significance of local institutions. In the foundation of the United States, the rights of the states as self-governing bodies were fundamental and behind even the Articles of Confederation. Under the European understanding, autonomy could be given, extended, abridged or revoked, and in all matters outside of those specified, the power of the central regime was still supreme. It thus seemed to the nationalist leaders that the Provisional Government could confer autonomy without jeopardizing its

own position.

A Russia composed of autonomous districts could hardly be called a federal state, for the central authority derived its powers from itself. In a federal state the central authority would derive its powers from the component parts. The distinction was not clear at first to the Rada, and precious weeks and months were sacrificed in fruitless negotiations with the Provisional Government, which would not hear of any variation from the old monolithic system.

It was a period of meetings of all kinds. There were meetings of teachers, of co-operative societies, of peasants, of all classes, each of which demanded autonomy. When we consider that but a few weeks before, all of these groups had been organized on an imperial scale and were now talking of local needs, we can understand the effect of the upheaval and we can see why the few men who began from the definite idea of independence were scarcely heeded.

From the first moments of the revolution, the military element and those charged with maintaining public order had a deeper appreciation of what was coming. The Volynsky Guard Regiment,⁶ one of those regiments of the old Russian Army mobilized on a regional basis from Ukrainian lands, was the first to join the revolution. When its imperial insignia were discarded, the regiment demanded some local insignia and called for the use of Ukrainian in its orders. Its example was followed by others and by the volunteers who were recruited for the emergency. Many of these insisted that they be allowed to take up arms to restore order at home and wanted a local commander. Thus, almost against its own will, the Rada was forced to decide about these new and Ukrainianized organizations. Should they be sent to other sections of the empire to fight? Should they be retained as local forces? Who was to be their commander?

There was only one answer. The Rada could not act merely as a mouthpiece. It had to take over the definite task of administering the affairs of state for the Ukrainian population

of Kiev. Events were rapidly passing beyond the most ardent dreams.

On March 22 the Rada issued an appeal to the people to demand their rights and on the same day the Ukrainian military leaders in Kiev formed a Ukrainian Military Council to enroll troops to maintain order. This looked to the Rada as the only possible directing head.⁷

Each step in the assumption of responsibility by the Rada built up opposition among the Russians in Kiev. They felt strongly that the course of action on which the Rada had embarked was distinctly hostile to the attitude of the Provisional Government and was a threat to the unity of the state. Yet for their part they could receive no support from the Provisional Government, which was fully occupied with protecting itself against the demands of the Soviets of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates in Petrograd. They could only object to every action and set up their own institutions which were forced to act independently of the central government.

On April 1, when the Rada called for a public demonstration, over one hundred thousand persons appeared. These loudly demanded autonomy for Ukraine. Yet even such a mass demonstration and the previous telegrams to Petrograd brought no reply. Nor did the capital take any steps to assert its authority in Kiev.

The growing call for action in Kiev and the inaction of the Provisional Government convinced the Rada that it had to take over some of the functions of government. Ukrainian organizations were springing up throughout the country and were looking to Kiev for guidance. The influence of the metropolis was asserting itself. From the time of the old Kievan state, the city had been the capital. It was the spiritual, intellectual and economic center of Eastern Ukraine and now it was destined to become the political center. The pressure finally became overwhelming.

The Rada summoned an All-Ukrainian National Congress to meet in Kiev on April 19.⁸ This was attended by over

fifteen hundred delegates from all parts of the country and was the first large public gathering to represent more than the province of Kiev. It provided for a re-organization of the Rada to include delegates from all the Ukrainian provinces and a certain proportion to represent the various professional and co-operative societies. It adopted definite resolutions for Ukrainian autonomy within the Russian federation and declared itself the supreme authority in Ukraine, with a right to be consulted in the drawing up of plans for a federated Russia. There were the usual demands for Ukrainization of the schools and army forces and an insistence that Ukraine share in any Russian participation in international conferences. Again all these resolutions passed unnoticed by the Provisional Government.

The re-organization of the Rada with the appointment of a special executive committee, or Little Rada, marked a new stage in the process of the movement. It did not lead to any better relations with the Provisional Government; and even when a delegation, after a new series of congresses and petitions, went to Petrograd, the authorities refused all recognition to the Rada, still maintaining that it could make no change in the prerevolutionary setup before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

This blunt rejection poured oil on the fire. A Congress of Peasants' Delegates which met soon after in Kiev declared that the Rada should not have presented a request to the Provisional Government but instead a definite program for the federation of Russia. For the first time a large congress openly mentioned the possibility that if the Provisional Government refused to accept the conditions, there could only result a positive break between Ukraine and Great Russia.

The military units which had passed under Ukrainian control grew more and more restive and their feelings were not relieved when Kerensky as minister of war forbade the holding of a second military congress in June. The sole effect of Kerensky's orders was to popularize this congress, which was

held on June 18-23 and again stressed the need for Ukrainian autonomy.⁹

As the Russian elements in Kiev, both radical and reactionary, were becoming more aggressive, the Rada now decided to act and on June 23 it issued its First Universal.¹⁰ The mood of this was still conciliatory but it advanced Ukrainian thinking to a point nearer that of the nationalists. It named the Rada as the supreme government in Ukraine and the body which would speak for Ukraine in all matters concerning its relationship with the Russian Provisional Government and the Constituent Assembly.

The First Universal was of paramount importance in Ukrainian development, for while it proclaimed Ukraine as one of the federated states of the Russian republic, it laid responsibility for the development and protection of the country on the people themselves and on the Rada as their chosen vehicle of government. It did away with the old idea of autonomy as something to be granted by Petrograd and took its stand upon inherent rights.

It could not fail to widen the breach with the Provisional Government and with the Russians in Ukraine, no matter of what party they were, for all held to the unity of the country. Only the Russian Bolsheviks in Kiev welcomed its defiance of the central government but they repudiated it for assuming that Ukraine should have something more than local autonomy.

Upon the issuance of the First Universal, the Rada could now establish itself as a government. On June 28 it organized the Council of General Secretaries, with Vynnychenko as president. This was the first real executive body of the Ukrainian state. It had nine members, eight of whom belonged to the socialist groups, for the constant addition of deputies of workmen and soldiers had driven the Rada steadily to the left.

This new action finally aroused the Provisional Government. On the eve of a new offensive against the Germans, Kerensky, Tereshchenko and Tsereteli came to Kiev to consult the Rada.¹¹

They proposed among other things, that the Council of General Secretaries be subject to the Provisional Government as well as to the Rada. A compromise was finally reached under which Ukraine would be governed by the Rada but would not press its demand for autonomy until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, and the supreme command of the Ukrainized armed forces would still be in Russian hands. The results were embodied in a Second Universal, issued jointly with the Russian Commission on July 16.¹²

This clear retreat by the Rada was bitterly opposed by the military elements. The correctness of their judgment was amply confirmed by Kerensky's disastrous offensive against the Germans which commenced a few days later and which marked the final ending of the old Russian army, despite the efforts of the Ukrainian regiments. It weakened the Rada in its general position at home and benefited no one, including the Provisional Government.

Yet even this recognition of the Rada was enough to upset the Provisional Government. The Constitutional Democrats in the cabinet resigned and threw the control to the Socialists. Lenin and the Bolsheviks started another uprising in Petrograd which, though it was finally suppressed, harassed and weakened the government still further.

The Rada, continuing on its course, proceeded to draw up a constitution, or Statute of the Higher Administration of Ukraine, which it published on July 29. It was again a moderate document, avoiding any mention of the troublesome question of boundaries and carefully preserving the rights of a Russian government. Yet even this document was too strong for Petrograd, which sent down its own instructions to the Ukrainians and treated the Council of Secretaries as its own organ. Renewed protests and congresses followed and the Provisional Government was planning to arrest the members of the secretariat when it was itself overthrown by the Bolshevik revolution.

It is easy to criticize the actions of the Rada, the first Ukrain-

ian instrument of government since the Sich of a century and a half before. Its faults were those of all of the organizations set up by the nationalities of the old empire. They had been so long under the tyrannical and centralized rule of St. Petersburg that they could not grasp the fact that that rule had vanished and that the moment had come to disregard it. The Ukrainians did not want a civil war to be started while the German forces were occupying part of their country. They believed the Russians were sincerely working toward a democratic government. They had started from nothing, and from the vague desire for a cultural and economic autonomy they had progressed to the point of trying to help build a truly federal Russia. They had established contact with the various other nationalities of the empire in a congress of minority peoples held in Kiev on September 21-28 to make plans for a united front of non-Russians at the Russian Constituent Assembly. The Rada had grown steadily and almost consistently from the time of its inception despite the constant and unyielding opposition of the Provisional Government, which was bound to the old Russian tradition of unity and uniformity. Its chief fault was the same as that of the Provisional Government, for each was guilty of failure to devote its main energies in time of war and revolution to building up its armed forces and its means of self-defense.

The Rada had shown the Ukrainian people their possibilities. It had secured the controlling position in Kiev, but although it had brought into its membership the representatives of the minorities, it was still opposed by Russians of all types and schools of thought. It could not rely upon a single foreign friend. It had insisted that Ukraine have representatives on all Russian delegations but it was unable to take any steps to make this effective. The downfall of the Provisional Government turned the struggle from words to deeds. In the coming days the military and national aspects were to be of prime importance, aspects that were secondary so long as the conception of a federalized Russia held out hopes of peace.

IV

Ukraine, the Bolsheviks and the Germans

THE COLLAPSE OF the Provisional Government put an end to the question of whether Russia was to be a unified or a federal state and raised the more urgent and ominous question of whether Ukraine was to exist in its traditional mode of life or be swung within the Bolshevik orbit.

The new regime established in Petrograd, and soon to be moved to Moscow, was led by a man of a very different calibre from the men of the Provisional Government. Lenin was determined to carry through his ideas for the creation of a proletariat state to be entirely under the control of the Bolshevik party and to be administered through the soviets. On paper he was willing to be as liberal toward the minorities as the Provisional Government had been strict. But this was only on paper, for by insisting that the Communist soviets control everything, he provided for the continued rule of the Communist party leaders who were for the most part Russians.

The advent of the new regime thoroughly befuddled the Allied representatives in Petrograd who were trying to foster the Western form of democracy in Russia and keep Russia in the war against the Central Powers. They could not believe in the permanence of a government which preached internationalism, immediate peace and the overthrow of the social order in all of its manifestations. It seemed at best some

form of German intrigue, for it was known that Lenin had passed through Germany in a sealed car with the approval of the German General Staff. Yet they did not wish or feel themselves in a position to declare war on the new regime. So began a period of uncertainty and confusion, with one Allied mission disagreeing with another, while the old empire fell to pieces and part after part declared its independence.

If this was the state of mind of the trained representatives of the great powers, what could be said of the Rada and the Ukrainian people who were struggling to their feet after a century and a half of absolute political subjection?

The impact of Bolshevism upon Ukraine was in the form of arms and propaganda. The land hunger of the peasantry and the unrest among the city workmen grew daily and the Rada, following the mood of the people, swung toward the left, even against the better judgment of many who had up till now supported the revolution. The outstanding fact of the Ukrainian movement thus far had been its ability to include all classes and avoid much of the disorder that had come elsewhere. Now Bolshevik agents appeared with the frank object of stirring up discontent against the Rada, not so much on the ground of national separatism as by accusing it of reactionary tendencies which thwarted the will of the proletariat. The Rada was denounced as the agent of international capitalism, where but a few days before it had seemed to many dangerously radical.¹

The Russians in Ukraine who had fallen under Bolshevik influence no longer argued but fought. They gathered weapons and attacked each other's parties in the various cities. For a while it seemed possible that the Rada would be able to use this internecine warfare as a means of clearing its own territory and securing control, for the Bolshevik groups even with the aid of volunteers and bands from Great Russian territory were relatively weak. But their influence became threatening among some of the Ukrainian regiments, especially those which had not yet been properly trained.

The Rada strengthened its contacts with the non-Bolshevik

leftist parties and then issued the Third Universal on November 20.² This announced the formation of the Ukrainian National Republic (*Ukrainska Narodna Respublika*). The very name shows the strain and stress of the period, for it could be interpreted in all ways by all people. The word *Narodna* has two almost contradictory meanings. On the one hand it definitely and clearly means National. The new organization was that of the Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian people. On the other, it means Popular, with a strong emphasis on the masses, the workmen and the peasants, and especially the proletariat. In this sense the word had become almost a slogan of the extreme left, including the Bolsheviks, who had established at Petrograd their People's Commissariats. The word called attention to both salient problems of the Rada—the national Ukrainian movement and the social agitation which was rampant.

The Third Universal separated Ukraine from the Soviet administration of Russia. It provided for the distribution of land to the peasants, the introduction of an eight-hour day in the factories, the abolition of capital punishment, a political amnesty, personal minority rights for non-Ukrainians in the country, and the taking of steps to end the war. In this way the Rada tried to satisfy both of the great movements of the day. It realized that the old disputes had become merely academic and that it was time for Ukraine to handle her own affairs. Provision was also made to elect a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly on January 9 to meet on January 22.

The Third Universal was of course badly received by the Soviets. They demanded that the Red army be admitted into the country to follow the Don Cossacks who were retiring from the front across Ukrainian territory and that the Rada turn over its authority to the Bolshevik and Communist soviets of workers and peasants. These demands obviously were intended to bring the entire state under the control of Lenin, and when they were turned down, the Bolsheviks openly declared war on the Ukrainian Republic. The Rada accepted

the challenge and began to expel Bolshevik troops from Ukrainian territory.

The Kiev soviet, composed largely of Russian Bolsheviks, called a protest meeting on December 17. The Rada allowed this meeting of over two thousand deputies but saw to it that it was properly representative of the Ukrainian population. As a result there were fewer than one hundred and fifty Bolsheviks present and they withdrew when they proved unable to disrupt the proceedings. The meeting then took on a distinctively patriotic character, voted its support of the Rada, and added to its resolution the following passage: "On paper the Soviet of People's Commissars seemingly recognizes the right of a nation to self-determination and even to separation—but only in words. In fact the government of Commissars is brutally attempting to interfere in the activities of the Ukrainian government which executes the will of the legislative organ of the Ukrainian Central Rada. What sort of self-determination is this? It is certain that the Commissars will permit self-determination only to their own party; all other groups and peoples they, like the tsarist regime, desire to keep under their domination by force of arms. But the Ukrainian people did not cast off the tsarist yoke only to take upon themselves the yoke of the Commissars."³

This resolution aptly summarized in clear and unmistakable language the real meaning of the Soviet claims, doctrines and threats. It is as true today as it was then and is applicable to all relations between the Soviets and the rest of the world. The events of the next days showed clearly that the Bolsheviks had no intention of using persuasion or argument or any form of democracy to extend their power but that they relied entirely on force combined with disintegrating propaganda.

The frustrated Bolshevik representatives withdrew to Khar'kov and here they established a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It was headed by two Russians, Sergeyev of the Don basin and Ivanov of Kiev, and a Ukrainian Communist Horowitz. To add to the general confusion, the Soviets took over the

titles of the Rada, called their leaders secretaries instead of commissars and named their gathering the Rada; and they still use the term the Rada Republic to denote the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. To support this, they sent to Kharkov, to quote Professor Hrushevsky, "a band of soldiers, sailors, and various hired hooligans, stationed at Bilhorod, as if trying to force their way to the Don." These succeeded in overcoming the Ukrainian garrison in Kharkov, and the Bolsheviks made this city their capital. It was near the border of Great Russia and it was much easier to maintain contact with Petrograd and Moscow from there than from Kiev. To give color to their Ukrainian mask, they employed as one of the leaders of their armed forces George Kotsyubinsky, the son of a prominent Ukrainian writer, who had been a friend of Gorky and Lenin.⁴

The open warfare between the democratic Ukrainian government in Kiev and the Ukrainian Soviet regime in Kharkov was accompanied by effective Bolshevik propaganda in Kiev itself. This penetrated the Ukrainian army and some of the newly formed regiments either joined the Bolsheviks or went home, ostensibly for Christmas.

Up to this time the Rada had endeavored to remain in the war against the Central Powers. In this it was listening to the Western diplomatic representatives in Kiev. These promised all kinds of assistance to the hard-pressed government but found no way to deliver any supplies. And they refused to promise categorically any formal recognition of Ukrainian independence.

The situation became even more intolerable when the Germans and Bolsheviks met at Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace.⁵ The Rada was forced to send representatives to this gathering because Trotsky was presuming to speak for Ukraine as part of the old Russia. Everyone knew that it was Ukrainian grain for which the Germans and Austrians were bidding and a German-Bolshevik peace might easily force the country into a joint war against both the Bolsheviks and the Germans. The Western Allies stormed and threatened but could offer no

effective help. The Rada therefore sent to Brest on January 12, 1918, three young men, Michael Levytsky, Michael Lubinsky and Alexander Sevryuk, former students of Professor Hrushevsky. Their youth and inexperience surprised General Hoffmann, the German representative, and Count Czernin,⁶ the spokesman for Austria-Hungary. But they had been well instructed as to their policy and they put forward claims not only for the recognition of Ukrainian independence but for the inclusion in the new state of the Ukrainian territories under Austro-Hungarian rule. This last clause the Ukrainians soon found it necessary to waive, for it struck too deeply at the heart of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and imperiled all other negotiations.

The conference did not run smoothly. There was little friendship or confidence between the German and Austro-Hungarian representatives, for each of them was interested in advancing his own plans for Eastern Europe; and the Austrians, demoralized by the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph I,⁷ were even more desperately eager for peace and grain than were the Germans. The Ukrainian delegates were especially aware of the Austrian situation, for on their way to Brest, they had passed through Lviv and had established contacts with the Ukrainian leaders in that city.

Trotsky bitterly opposed the presence of the Ukrainian representatives. He advanced all the arguments in the Russian and Bolshevik arsenal, now asserting that there was no such country or region as Ukraine, now arguing that the Rada was not a revolutionary government of the workers and peasants, now insisting that the Bolsheviks had captured Kiev and wiped out the Ukrainian government, and then on January 30 introducing two representatives of the Kharkov Communist regime, Medvedyev and Shakray, as the real representatives of Ukraine.⁸

The young Ukrainian diplomats were in a particularly uncomfortable position, for during the conference the Bolsheviks renewed their efforts to capture Kiev and for a period at the end of the month were even able to isolate the delegation for

a few days by cutting all the telegraph wires out of Kiev. Yet they persevered and proved themselves far more reasonable and intelligent than the Bolsheviks, especially when Trotsky refused to sign the peace treaty in view of the Bolshevik theory that the Soviets as the spokesmen for the proletariat of the world could not sign an agreement with capitalistic and nationalistic governments like Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Germans then renewed their advance into Russian territory, whereupon Lenin compelled Trotsky to return and sign the treaty.

The treaty was finally signed on February 7, 1918. Under it the Central Powers formally recognized the independence of Ukraine, including the territory claimed by the Rada and that section which had fallen into German hands during the war. In return Ukraine promised the Central Powers a million tons of food. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians promised to return to Ukraine all of their prisoners of war and to arm and equip them for the struggle against the Bolsheviks. This was the most valuable item, for it insured a large number of trained men and of those military supplies that could not be manufactured in Ukraine under the stress of the revolution. There was also concluded a secret protocol, whereby the Austro-Hungarians would include Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian parts of Bukovina in a new crown land in which Ukrainian would be the official language.⁹

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was of the greatest significance to the young republic but it brought with it not only the expected compensations but many troubles. It secured for Ukraine international recognition by the only powers that were in a position to give her any tangible support. On the debit side it made Ukraine a German satellite state and rendered possible German interference in her internal administration. It drove a wedge between the new country and the Western Allies at a time when they were increasing in strength as a result of the active arrival of American troops. Yet it was the only possible course in view of the temporizing policy of

the Allies. Its unfortunate aspects were to appear only later.

Meanwhile the Rada had been making valiant efforts to maintain itself in Kiev against Bolshevik attacks and propaganda and against the opposition of Russians of every political party. A new government was formed under Volodymyr Holubovych, one of the Social Revolutionary leaders. But even in those critical days there was far too much argumentation in the Rada and too little effective action.

To strengthen the position of the delegates at Brest-Litovsk, the Rada had issued on January 22 a Fourth Universal which in direct and dignified language proclaimed the full independence of the Ukrainian National Republic—"From today the Ukrainian National Republic becomes the Independent, Free, Sovereign State of the Ukrainian People." It had taken ten months of endless talk and fighting to bring the Rada and the people to this clear-cut decision, so needful if the new government was to function smoothly and consistently.¹⁰

The pressure on Kiev continued and on February 7, the very day that the treaty was concluded, the government withdrew to save the city from civil war. The troops retired into the suburbs and the Rada moved to Zhytomyr. On February 9 the Bolsheviks entered the city and commenced a reign of terror which must have been as destructive as the scarcely averted storming. Over five thousand civilians fell victims in the massacre that followed of those suspected of being anti-Bolshevik.¹¹

The efforts of the Rada at Zhytomyr to solve the pressing problems of the country constantly evoked hostility from some element of the population. To many of the peasants, its attempts to divide up the big estates seemed halting and hesitant. These same attempts were too strenuous for the great landowners, many of whom were either Russian or Polish in sympathy, and these classes did everything to prevent land reform and restore the old order. Thus the Rada was assailed by both the right and the left.

All this disorder and chaos made it difficult to organize and

equip a regular army. The country was overrun by various armed bands under self-appointed atamans who plundered indiscriminately in the name of the revolution. Fortunately at this moment there arrived the Riflemen of the Sich and the other units which had been formed among the prisoners of war by the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine. These new units gave the republic a stability and a reliable military force that it had hitherto lacked.

By March 1 the Bolsheviks had been driven out of Kiev and the Rada was able to return. The process of clearing the country continued and by the end of April nearly all the Bolsheviks had been expelled from Ukraine by hard fighting. On March 9 the Soviets had promised the Germans to respect the territories of the Ukrainian Republic, but it goes without saying that they broke the agreement and that the Germans, busily transferring their troops to the Western front to meet the Americans, French and British, took no steps to compel them to respect it.

On the anniversary of Shevchenko's death, the Rada announced that it intended to continue the democratic policies outlined in the Third and Fourth Universals. The government of Holubovych got the support of most of the Ukrainian parties but it had continuous difficulties with the wealthy and conservative classes and in general with the non-Ukrainian population, especially the Russians and the Poles, who would have no part of it.¹²

The Germans acted as if they were the real masters of the country. In the spring, after a year of war and turmoil, with many harvests reduced or destroyed, it was hard to collect the promised grain from the peasants. The need for food was so acute in the Central Powers that they kept pressing the Rada and the government and even instituted their own methods of collection. Field Marshal von Eichhorn at Kiev became the most influential member of the German missions but he was constantly at odds with Baron Mumm, the representative of the Berlin Foreign Office. General Groner also arrived to take

an active part in the grain collection.

The major concern of the Rada was to prepare for the holding of a Constituent Assembly. This had been scheduled to meet in January but the elections had not been completed because of Bolshevik aggression and because of protests that those who had been elected in various areas no longer represented the wishes of their constituents. The Rada proposed new elections and announced that the convention would open on June 12, as soon as half of the delegates had been selected.

Nevertheless the Rada was still plagued by discord and inaction. The two great movements of nationalism and of social reform were not too closely coordinated. The parties differed widely from each other and almost every measure was stubbornly debated. There was in fact a tendency to postpone decisions until after the elections and this did not fit in with German plans for securing an immediate supply of grain.

The German authorities finally lost patience with the Rada. On April 28, 1918, they sent a force of troops to surround the Rada building. A small detachment entered and its commander ordered the Rada to disperse. Despite the protest of its president, Professor Hrushevsky, the order was carried out and the Rada, thus expelled from the seat of government, ceased to function.¹³

The next day the conservative elements of the state, especially the Society of the Agriculturists, the great landowners, held a congress and elected as a new hetman Paul Skoropadsky, who was installed at once. Skoropadsky was a member of that same family which had produced Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky, who had been selected by Peter the Great to take the place of Mazepa after his deposition in 1708. He had been educated in St. Petersburg as a Russian nobleman and despite his adherence to Ukraine, his opponents saw him still as a Russian. The new regime was as conservative as the Rada had been progressive. It repealed most of the land laws, even before they had been tried out, and it received German support to put down any dissatisfaction. The new leaders were able to

secure a considerable amount of grain but they met with increasing opposition and popular anger flared up against the Germans. Marshal von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev on July 30. He had no able successor and throughout the summer of 1918 German influence in Ukraine ebbed along with its power on the Western front.¹⁴

Throughout the summer there were present in Kiev Bolshevik diplomatic representatives; their leaders were Rakovsky and especially Dmytro Manuisky, a Ukrainian by birth who had spent most of his adult life among the Russians and was a close friend of Lenin. They were in Kiev ostensibly to draw up a peace treaty between the Ukrainian Republic and the Russian Soviet Republic but it was an open secret that they were carrying on disruptive propaganda. They had a great deal of money and they spent it lavishly. The Hetman and his officials vainly begged the Germans to allow them to limit or expel the offensive members of this group.¹⁵

The policy of the Germans during this period was most inconsistent. They were opposed to the extension of Bolshevism but they did not want to take an openly hostile attitude and risk the reopening of an Eastern front. Even when their ambassador, Count Mirbach, was murdered in Moscow, the Bolshevik capital, the Germans kept quiet and thus unwittingly allowed the concentration of resources and people for their own downfall.¹⁶

The Germans pushed on to the east. They gave aid to the Don Cossacks in their fight against Bolshevism, also to the Georgians and other peoples in the Caucasus, and under their protection a long series of more or less independent peoples sprang up along the north shore of the Black Sea. Farther to the east began that movement among the old Russian officers that was later to be led by General Denikin. This rallying of anti-Bolshevik Russians with the object of re-establishing a government for the entire country received the support of the Western Allies, who still had not adopted any concrete policy. They hampered the efforts of the anti-Bolshevik Russians by

banning all tsarist formulas, yet they would not support the democratic movements of those peoples who were trying to free themselves from both Russian and Bolshevik domination.

By autumn the defeat of the Central Powers was approaching and with each week the morale of their forces fell as Bolshevism made greater and greater inroads into them. At the end of October the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed. Turkey went out of the war on October 29. The Kaiser abdicated on November 9 and fled to Holland; and on November 11 came the armistice on the Western front. World War I was over.

It was a foregone conclusion that Skoropadsky could not retain his position without German support, for although he had tried to revive the traditions of the old hetmanate, he had won no popular approval except among the extreme conservatives. The final defeat of the Germans doomed him utterly. Rioting and disorders burst out anew as the people tried to rid themselves of the German "guests."

At this moment Vynnychenko tried to rally the forces of the Rada by forming a Directory of the various Ukrainian Socialist parties. He included Simon Petlyura, who had been one of the members of the original nationalist groups. Petlyura felt that action was needed even more than words. He went to Bila Tserkva, where the Riflemen of the Sich were camped, and with them he marched on Kiev.

Then came another one of those tangles that marked Allied policy toward Ukraine and the other states. Although the Germans had been defeated, the Allies in their fear of Bolshevism ordered them not to turn over their weapons or territory to the Ukrainians of any group but to maintain control pending Allied assumption of authority. It was a foolish order, for the defeated German forces were themselves heavily permeated with Bolshevism and even those who were not infected thought only of returning home with little emphasis on the order of their going. The Germans simply melted away and before long they were only too glad to make an arrangement

with Petlyura to take over. This was settled on December 11 at Kasatin; and three days later, on December 14, Colonel Evhen Konovalets entered Kiev at the head of a Ukrainian detachment. The same day Skoropadsky laid down his power and slipped out of Kiev to Berlin. Petlyura arrived on December 19 and re-established the Ukrainian Republic.

It was then almost two years since the establishment of the Rada and a year since the declaration of independence. It was necessary to begin work again in a country that was even more disorganized and devastated than it had been before. The Bolsheviks had had the opportunity of strengthening their position in Moscow and Great Russia, where they were relatively unchallenged, while to the southeast the anti-Bolshevik Russians were forming the White army to fight against Bolshevism and cement the unity of the country. The Allies still vacillated. The task of Petlyura, Vynnychenko and the Ukrainians was growing more difficult all the time.

V

The Republic of Western Ukraine

THE RUSSIAN INVASION of Eastern Galicia in 1914 had devastated the most developed portion of the Ukrainian lands, but after the Russian troops had been expelled in 1915, Ukrainian understanding of the issues of the war had definitely increased. Russian excesses had ended once and for all the old Muscophile faction, and its leaders had withdrawn with the Russian armies. Wherever these armies had penetrated, they had brought home to the population the differences that existed between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians. At the same time the presence of Eastern Ukrainian units in the Russian forces had revealed to the Western Ukrainian villagers their essential unity with their brothers under tsarist rule.

By 1917 it was clear to all the nationalities of the empire that Austria-Hungary would not emerge from the war as a unit. On December 3¹ the Ukrainian Student Organization in Vienna was even able to state that the future of their countrymen lay in union with the Ukrainian National Republic being formed in Kiev. The other Ukrainian organizations were perhaps less outspoken. Some of the older politicians still hoped for the creation of a Ukrainian section of the Hapsburg Empire but they were rapidly falling into a minority and when on July 22, 1918, the Austrian parliament repudiated the promise given to the Ukrainian delegates at Brest-Litovsk and

were sustained by the Germans, practically all hope for a peaceful solution was abandoned and action was begun on plans to set up a new regime.

President Wilson's address on January 8, 1918, setting forth his Fourteen Points, among them the self-determination of all nations, had given impetus to this development. Yet the leaders were aware of a new danger, that of falling under Polish control, for they realized that Polish propaganda at home and abroad regarded Eastern Galicia as Polish territory and that the Poles had been more successful than they in making friends among the Western Powers.

The summer of 1918 was a strange period. The Austro-Hungarian armies were still fighting on the various fronts but all of the nationalities were almost openly making their plans for an independent existence. By autumn representatives came and went, meetings were held to arrange for the formation of new governments, and the officials of the empire seemed not to notice.

By September 14, when the Allies rejected the idea of a separate peace for Austria-Hungary, even the officials of the empire lost hope. On October 16 Emperor Charles in a last attempt ordered a reconstitution of the empire on national lines but by this time no one paid attention. One and all were determined upon independence.

On October 18 a Ukrainian National Rada² was established at Lviv under the presidency of Dr. Evhen Petrushevych. It embraced all the Ukrainian representatives in the provincial diets and parliament and representatives of all political parties. It at once issued a call for the formation of a republic to include all the Ukrainians within the Hapsburg Empire, including those in Eastern Galicia, northwestern Bukovina and northeastern Hungary. It summoned the minorities to send their deputies to the new government and to aid in preparing a constitution providing for universal, equal, secret and direct suffrage on the basis of proportional representation, with the right of national cultural autonomy and the right of the minorities to participate

in the government. It very carefully, despite some protests, omitted the question of its relationship to the Ukrainian National Republic, which was still under the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky.

There will be noticed at once a striking difference between this movement and that of the previous year in Kiev. In Lviv there was no period of hesitation. From the moment when the Rada was established, its goal was absolute independence and the Rada applied all of its energies to determining how this was to be brought about.

The process of disintegration within the old empire gained momentum. On October 16 the Hungarians broke their bonds with the Austrians. On October 28 the Czechs declared their independence of Hapsburg rule. On October 31 the Poles raised their standard in Krakow and planned to take over the whole of Galicia.

On the same day, the Rada asked the governor general of Galicia, Count Huyn, to turn over Lviv to the Ukrainians. He declined but made it plain that he would take no counteraction, and that night the Ukrainian military raised their flag over the city. By morning the new government was in control.³

Yet if the break with the old order was peaceful—a mere recognition of changed conditions—the new state was faced immediately with difficulties with the revived Poland, which dreamed of restoring the position she had held in the Middle Ages in Eastern Europe. Poland's great asset was the experience which her leaders had gained during the years when they had been active in the affairs of the Dual Monarchy. The Western Ukrainian Republic, in contrast, was handicapped from the start by the dearth of men who had served in the more responsible posts in either the civil service or the army. There were a large number of lesser functionaries and officers; there were few men trained and experienced in the higher echelons. The military forces consisted of that part of the Riflemen of the Sich who had not gone to East Ukraine and some disorganized reserve units, whose ranking officers

had returned to their homes. The leaders of the new state soon saw that maintaining their independence was to be a greater task than winning it.⁴

They were not mistaken. On the same day that the Ukrainian flag was raised in Lviv, the Poles of the city rose in revolt. Lacking men trained in street fighting, the Ukrainians were unable to dislodge the Poles from their center of resistance and for three weeks the struggle went on. Neither side possessed any important supplies of heavy weapons. Both had only rifles, machine guns and grenades, but the contest was none the less intense.⁵

Meanwhile the Western Ukrainian Republic assumed control of one city after another throughout Eastern Galicia, as the news of the open establishment of the republic swept the country. Everywhere there was counteraction by the Poles. On November 11 a small Polish force, raised in Krakow, recovered Peremyshl and on the 19th a group of about one hundred and twenty officers with eight guns and twelve hundred men, set out by train for Lviv. They succeeded in running through the Ukrainian lines and the addition of even this small force turned the tide. They recovered the greater part of the city, and on November 22 the Western Ukrainian government left Lviv and moved to Ternopil and later to Stanyslaviv.

Throughout the winter the republic dominated most of Eastern Galicia with the exception of the railroad from Peremyshl to Lviv which the Poles succeeded in holding. The Ukrainians also maintained a more or less desultory siege of Lviv but they were confronted with steadily increasing Polish forces, as the Western Allies and especially France poured in more supplies and enabled the Polish army to grow along conventional lines. Finally in the spring, the Polish divisions which had been in France under General Joseph Haller arrived; despite the orders of the Allied missions they were thrown into the struggle and they finally forced the Western Ukrainian army to retire eastward.

The forces of the republic in Bukovina were little more fortunate. On November 3 the Ukrainians occupied Chernivtsy, the capital. It was not for long, for on Armistice Day, November 11, a detachment of the regular Romanian army entered the city and overthrew the Ukrainian Regional Committee which had been formed under Omelyan Popovych.⁶

In the third part of Western Ukraine, the region of the Carpathians, there was even more confusion. Under the old Hungarian system it had not been possible to establish a working agreement between the residents of the various counties and the disorder was abetted by the isolation of many of the mountain valleys in which the Ukrainian population lived. Meetings were held in the three centers of Preshov, Uzhorod and Hust but the great masses of the mountaineers were not as well organized as elsewhere. In addition to that, there was more Hungarian interference. Far too many of the semi-intellectuals of the region still sympathized with the Hungarians and the split between the nationalists and the Muscophiles was far deeper than in any other section. The Czechs also put in a bid for control of the territory on the basis of an understanding between President Masaryk as chairman of the Czechoslovak National Committee abroad and the American Ruska Narodna Rada, a gathering of Carpatho-Ruthenians in Scranton, Pennsylvania.⁷ This was similar to the famous Pittsburgh Agreement between Masaryk and the Slovaks in the United States and it was used in the same way to advance Czech claims.

The movement was slow in starting. There was a meeting in Hust on January 21, 1919, which voted to join Western Ukraine but this was already almost academic in view of the loss of Lviv to the Poles. Agitation continued, however, and finally, on May 5, with the republic almost in ruins, the Ukrainians of Carpatho-Ukraine voted to become an autonomous part of the new Czechoslovak Republic.

It is obvious from all this that the vital part of the Western Ukrainian Republic was the region of Eastern Galicia. It was the most developed section of the new state and it had the

most compact and organized Ukrainian population. Since it was only there that the state could hope to take root, the loss of Lviv was a crushing blow.

The Allied missions did their best to put a stop to the fighting but their efforts were fruitless. France stood solidly on the side of Poland; and Great Britain and the United States, convinced that the war was over, were already thinking of demobilizing their armies. Thus alone of the peoples of the old Hapsburg empire, the Ukrainians found it impossible to get a sympathetic hearing from the victorious Allies.

They went on, nevertheless, to carry out their real desire. The Republic of Western Ukraine formally voted to unite with the Ukrainian National Republic on January 3, and on January 22 the Ukrainian National Republic in imposing ceremonies accepted the union, declaring that "from today the Ukrainian people, liberated by the mighty effort of their own strength, is able to unite all the energies of her sons for the building of an undivided, independent Ukrainian State, for the good and happiness of the Ukrainian people."⁸

Once again the Ukrainian people were united as they had not been since the fall of the Kiev state in the thirteenth century. Yet this union was not consummated in a time of peace. It represented the spontaneous desire of the people but it was begotten under the shadows of two conflicts, that of the Western Ukrainians against the Poles, and that of the Eastern Ukrainians against the Bolsheviks and the White Russians, neither of whom would recognize the new state.

VI

The Decline of the Ukrainian National Republic

WITH THE RETURN of Petlyura and the directory to Kiev and the union of the two parts of Ukraine, there was again a momentary chance for the successful liberation of the country. The situation was not as favorable, however, as it had been a year earlier.

The signing of the armistice between the Western Powers and Germany had completely changed the situation and still more the temper of the times. From the very outbreak of hostilities, the Western Powers had always looked upon the Kaiser and the German general staff as the chief enemies. After the Kaiser had abdicated and the German army had been reduced to impotence, the object of the war seemed to be achieved. Austria-Hungary had disintegrated. Turkey had yielded. The old stories about an alliance between Germany and the Bolsheviks had lost all their point. The Allies were confident that Lenin and his associates could not maintain their power and they were no longer inclined to take an active part in the various conflicts raging in the east of Europe.

More than that, during the war they had worked with and recognized certain of the new governments of Eastern Europe through their national committees in Paris, London and Washington and on the whole they made little effort to ascertain

whether these bodies and the governments into which they turned were representative of the wishes of the people. They made no effort to maintain order in the new countries or to provide for a peaceful arrangement of boundaries by sending even token forces to the main centers to keep up transportation and similar services. They relied entirely upon the innate democracy of the new governments and seemed to believe that the boundaries would settle themselves automatically.

In their relations with the peoples of the former Russian empire, the Allied policy was even more irresolute. On the one hand, to oppose Bolshevism, they encouraged the German occupying forces to hold their positions.¹ As in Ukraine, the result was disastrous. Elsewhere it was little better, for the German armies melted away or were transformed into predatory bands under more or less able adventurers. These became a nuisance to the Allies as well as to the native peoples.

The opening of the Dardanelles made it possible to move supplies by sea into the long-closed ports of Ukraine, the Don Cossacks, Georgia and the other entities that were in open revolt. But the Allies continued to feel as a result of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that these uprisings were primarily the work of German agents and they declined to cooperate actively with the struggling regimes. They continued to believe that the future of Russia should be decided at some sort of general meeting after Bolshevism had been overcome, and this led them to give some support to the various Russian White armies which had been formed during the preceding year and were now trying to cut their way to the north and Moscow from the Caucasus and Siberia. At the same time they were afraid that these forces would prove to be reactionary or tsaristic and they opposed so many of their actions that they nullified any success which these might win.²

There was thus created a real vacuum. On December 12, 1918, just as Petlyura was entering Kiev, the French landed a force of French and Greeks at Odessa and tried to set up an anti-Communist regime under the command of a White Rus-

sian officer whom they appointed. The French soldiers, now that peace had come, had no will to serve and they soon became infected with Bolshevism. Disorders broke out among them and by early spring they had withdrawn, after turning over all supplies in the seaport town to a Bolshevik band of less than two thousand men.³

Such episodes gave strength to the French desire to erect a strong Poland as a bulwark against both Bolshevism and Germany. The Ukrainian leaders now saw themselves forced to fight in the west against a Polish army which was receiving reinforcements and supplies from the Western Powers and of course the Poles were never weary of arguing that the Ukrainian movement was only a product of Hapsburg and Bolshevik machinations, exactly as the Russians swore that it was of German derivation.

During the winter of 1918-19, the pressure of the Poles on the Western Ukrainian armies never slackened. The Poles were supposed to be fighting the Bolsheviks but in reality and on various pretexts, they turned against the Western Ukrainian armies and drove them steadily eastward, preferring to risk national extinction and the ill will of the victorious Allies than make any concessions to the Ukrainians.

The delegates to the Peace Conference and the leaders of the victorious Allies, Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, tried to check the warfare between the Poles and Ukrainians. Dmowski as the Polish representative in Paris played upon the Allied fear of a war of revenge by the Central Powers and charged that the Western Ukrainian Army was a hostile force because it had German or Austrian officers. In vain the Ukrainians offered to replace any such officers with persons nominated by the Allies. To every appeal the Poles made the answer that Galicia was an inalienable part of the Polish territory. Even at the very moment of receiving the Treaty of Saint-Germain, the Polish delegates in May and June refused to sign if any provision was made to recognize the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia.⁴

This put an end to the many proposals which had been drifting around as to the future of the province. Few of these had been truly realistic. Proposals had been submitted to set up an Eastern Galician state and every one recognized the folly of this. It was obvious that it would be dangerous to annex the territory to the Soviets and thus bring them to the Carpathian Mountains and make them a neighbor of Hungary which was just throwing off a Bolshevik experiment. It seemed the most practical move to make Eastern Galicia at least autonomous under Polish sovereignty; but this the Poles refused to admit.

The Allies, faced with the prospect of restraining Poland by force of arms and thereby weakening her stand against Bolshevism, finally yielded. On June 25 the Supreme Allied Council notified Poland that to check the Bolshevik bands, her army could advance to the river Zbruch, but that this did not affect the future political status of Eastern Galicia. This was a transparent fraud but it was enough for the Poles. Their new armies under General Haller rapidly pushed forward and by July, 1919, they had conquered the entire province.⁵ Then some seventy-five thousand men of the West Ukrainian army retreated to join Petlyura at Kamyanets-Podolsky.

These events in West Ukraine merely added to the difficulties of the directory in Kiev. Scarcely had the act of union between the two republics been proclaimed, when new troubles arose. The old differences between Petlyura and Vynnychenko were sharply accentuated. Vynnychenko as a leftist theorist was attacked, even by the Allies, as a Bolshevik. Petlyura, as a man of action, was assailed as a reactionary. A new attack by the Bolsheviks ended in Vynnychenko's resignation and Petlyura's accession to power as chief ataman of the army and chief of the cabinet.⁶

On February 4 Petlyura, with his government and army, was forced to evacuate Kiev under Bolshevik pressure. He wandered toward the northwest until he reached the city of Kamyanets-Podolsky, where he was joined in July by the

remains of the Western Ukrainian army. Under the conditions, it was futile to talk of plans for detailed legislation or even a unified military policy. All over Ukraine the way was open for ambitious leaders to raise their own private armies and operate in the name of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Bolsheviks or themselves.

The exactions of these men brought the Ukrainian forces into disrepute, for they often changed sides with amazing frequency. Thus Hryhoryev, the Bolshevik commander who took over Odessa from the French, had formerly been in the Ukrainian army and only a short time afterwards had assumed an independent position. The country was ravaged in a way that was strongly reminiscent of the ruin in the seventeenth century, when the various Kozak leaders were fighting for individual supremacy and seemed oblivious of the welfare of the state as a whole.

Even so, order began again to come out of chaos. The united Eastern and Western Ukrainian armies had so far recovered from the catastrophes of the spring that they were able to re-enter Kiev and re-establish their government. They decisively defeated the Bolsheviks, who were now posing as the army of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with its capital at Kharkov, the product of a new Soviet declaration of May 5, 1919. Whatever the Allies might think, the Ukrainian movement had become so widespread that even the Bolsheviks in Moscow tried to profit by it by recognizing the independence of their own Soviet republic and preaching an independent Ukrainian Communism.

Once more and almost immediately fortune turned against the new state. This time the threat came not from the Bolsheviks but from the White Russian armies under General Denikin which with Allied blessing were pushing across Ukraine from the southeast. Denikin was of course anti-Bolshevist but he was dedicated to the idea of Russian unity. Everywhere he went, he declined to compromise with any non-Russian anti-Bolshevist force and as he advanced in Ukraine, he expended

all his energies in trying to bring back the situation as it existed before the Revolution of 1917. Ukraine was to become again Little Russia. The Ukrainian language and Ukrainian newspapers were suppressed. Ukrainian officers and soldiers were punished as severely for their disloyalty to Russia as were the Bolsheviks. The large estates were returned to the former owners. The old Russian laws were reintroduced. The only concession made was the utterly meaningless statement that when Bolshevism was overthrown, there would be a Constituent Assembly which would then consider what changes needed to be made in the old Russian regime. It was the exact policy that had led the Provisional Government of 1917 to its doom at the hands of Lenin.

The White Russians, with their better-trained officers and the supplies furnished by the Allies, were able to win victory after victory. But these victories accomplished little or nothing. Behind their lines a continuous series of local revolts burst out among outraged populations which saw all their scanty gains of the last years completely nullified. Even after Denikin had taken Kiev, he was unable to hold it and before long the forces of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic reappeared in its streets and resumed their career of murder and devastation.⁷

An epidemic of typhus broke out in the Ukrainian army which decimated its ranks and wrought havoc among the civilians. It seemed to be the last straw, yet the struggle for independence did not end.

The epidemic, the shortage of supplies and the military defeats in both east and west opened a new period of friction between the two armies. Hemmed in between the Poles, the White Russians and the Bolsheviks, the Western Ukrainians saw their worst enemy in the Poles. Unwilling to end this struggle, Dr. Petrushevych and his followers crossed into Rumania and from there the *émigré* Western Ukrainian government went on to Vienna and continued its work.

The Eastern Ukrainians under Petlyura took advantage of

the new opportunities offered them and gradually retreated into Polish territory to prepare for a new onslaught against the Bolsheviks. These were offered by the policies of Marshal Pilsudski.

Pilsudski, the outstanding Polish military leader of the day, had been born near Wilno and differed in one respect from his fellow Poles. As a product of the old Polish-dominated Lithuania and a bitter enemy of Russia, Red or White, he conceived the idea not of forming a unified Polish state but of preparing around it a series of allies who as satellites would round out Polish influence and restore the country to its seventeenth-century position.

Petlyura, a man of eastern Ukraine, could not feel that deep personal antagonism to the Poles that was characteristic of the Western Ukrainians. Perhaps he sympathized with some of the broader aspects of Pilsudski's ideas. Perhaps he was merely impelled by the extreme straits to which the Ukrainian cause was reduced at the moment. At all events a *rapprochement* took place between Pilsudski and Petlyura and this involved a break with the Western Ukrainians.

On April 24, 1920, the Ukrainian National Republic, with Petlyura at its head, made a formal military alliance with the government of Poland. Under this the Ukrainians of the east omitted all references to Eastern Galicia. In return it secured Polish recognition, the first which it had received since the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the only formal recognition from one of the powers associated with the Allies.

Immediately after this the Polish and Ukrainian armies commenced to advance. On May 7 the first units entered Kiev and two days later they established a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. Many of the Ukrainian factions were angered at the appearance of the Poles and Petlyura was hotly denounced for abandoning Western Ukraine. The population in and around Kiev did not rally as expected.⁸

On May 14 the Soviets cut behind the Polish lines and severed their communications. The Polish army, still bound

to the tactics of the World War, was helpless against the unexpected attack and once again the Ukrainians saw their allies retire and had to leave with them. This was the last time that the troops of the Ukrainian National Republic penetrated their capital.⁹

The campaign of 1920 was one of rapid movement. In quick succession the Soviets pierced the Polish positions wherever they were established and by the early part of August they were in the neighborhood of Warsaw. Poland as well as Ukraine seemed doomed. The Allies again and again tried to bring about a peace. The Poles refused to listen to any propositions as to the future of Eastern Galicia or any other of the Ukrainian or Byelorussian lands. Yet despite this the French sent General Weygand to defend Warsaw. At the crucial moment Pilsudski, by a brilliant attack, placed his forces behind the Soviet lines and completely annihilated the Red army. It was then the turn of the Poles to advance and they reoccupied almost the same positions that they had had at the time of the alliance with Ukraine.

During the battle of Warsaw the southern Red armies with whom Joseph Stalin was acting as a leader and the cavalry forces of Budenny moved toward Lviv and tried to cut their way to the Carpathians to reach Hungary. The Ukrainian divisions played an important part in checking this movement and distinguished themselves in many battles in Eastern Galicia where they joined with the Poles in clearing the province of the last Red soldiers, who were forced again to the east.

Peace negotiations were opened at Riga, and on November 12 a treaty of peace was signed between Poland and the Russian Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. No mention was made of the Ukrainian National Republic.¹⁰ Despite the services of its troops to Poland during the war, it was as completely forgotten as if it had never existed. The Poles made no allusion to the alliance which they had signed only a few months before.⁹

This doomed the republic. The Ukrainian troops under

Petlyura continued to fight on but without hope of success. Deprived of their base in Poland, they had to face without supplies the entire force of the reorganized Red army. Peace was slowly coming to Eastern Europe. The White Russian movement had ended, except for the continuing resistance of Baron Wrangel; but this was not serious and on November 16 the White army was evacuated by sea from the Crimea. The Ukrainian forces lasted a few days longer; after a defeat at Bazar on November 21, they too were forced to give up and seek refuge in Poland.

Thus ended the military phase of the Ukrainian National Republic. It was a heroic struggle against overwhelming odds, a struggle of men with ideals but without supplies, without bases, without any of the necessities of modern warfare. It marked the end of one phase of the Ukrainian struggle for liberty. Not since the days of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the seventeenth century had the initial moment been so favorable. With the Russian empire and Austria-Hungary in dissolution and Poland not yet reborn, Ukraine had a golden opportunity to become master of her own destiny. The movement failed. The prejudices of the past were too strong. The Allies who had it in their power to recognize the new state and to carry out their ideals of a free, democratic Europe were still under the spell of the old Russian and the new Polish propaganda and they allowed Ukraine to be overwhelmed.

Yet in estimating the significance of the movement, we must not forget that the Russian Communists, in order to maintain the grasp of the old empire over the wealth of Ukraine, found it necessary to create a Ukrainian puppet state, which could sign treaties and arrange its own affairs, albeit under the dominating control of the party in Moscow.

The fate of Ukraine was shared almost immediately by the smaller states that had likewise struck for national independence. Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and many other groups in Europe and Asia had lashed out against the Russian tyranny. One and all failed. Only Finland and the three Baltic states of

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with their access to the sea survived the debacle.

The technique that was used against one was used against all. Ukraine was the model and the pattern by which the Russian Communists hoped to extend their control throughout the world. The system used in Ukraine was improved and standardized but it was never fundamentally changed. It called for the arousing of discontent, the encouraging of internal discord and confusion, the fomenting of disorder, the playing upon false idealism, and then the launching of an ostensibly independent Communist government which would call upon the Red army for support and assistance. There would be an immediate military response, and then would come massacres, the confiscation of property and the execution or deportation of the old leaders, while the country remained nominally free but in the chains of its masters.

For three years and more the Ukrainians had worked for their independence. For two years and a half they had fought for it, while the world had looked on with indifference. Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia had hoped to profit and so they did for a while but the same tactics were later to be applied to them. At the time it seemed a mere episode on the Continent but in 1950, in retrospect, the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic was but the first step in the creation of the modern Frankenstein that is threatening by the same policies to cause World War III and has forced an open struggle with the United Nations in Korea.

VII

Between the Wars

THE SERIES OF treaties that were drawn up at the Peace Conference in 1919 opened a new period in European history. It was confidently assumed that they had permanently limited the power of Germany as they had certainly wiped out the empire of the Hapsburgs by dismemberment. All of the important peoples of the Dual Monarchy except the Ukrainians received an independent position in the new Europe. Yet these treaties had completely sidestepped the problems offered by the dissolution of the Russian empire. The Treaty of Riga in 1920 had indeed given Poland for the first time an eastern boundary but this had been done at the expense of the Ukrainians at a moment when for the first time in centuries Poland and Ukraine had been fighting as allies. The "peace" that was thus made in Europe was destined to a precarious existence of only some twenty years.

Under the conditions of that peace there was little hope for the Ukrainians to advance far in the direction of their long-desired independence. The new situation presented even more ominous possibilities than they had faced in 1914. Western Ukraine was divided between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, largely according to the old provincial districts and regimes of Austria-Hungary. Eastern Ukraine, under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, was an unwilling victim

of the new form of Russian imperialism which was substantially the old system coated with the theories of Marx, Lenin and later Stalin.

The situation was a sharp letdown from the high hopes with which the Ukrainians and the whole of Eastern Europe had arisen at the moment of the Russian revolution and the collapse of Austria-Hungary. Then independence, peace and prosperity had seemed so near. Now all of these ideals had been relegated to the distant future.

Yet the years of struggle were not a total loss. The Ukrainians had acquired a certain self-confidence during the hard experiences of those eventful three years that was to stand them in good stead. They had learned to work together in a common cause. The masses were largely freed from their political apathy, had become conscious of their national identity and were willing to proclaim themselves for what they were. The two parts of Ukraine had learned to know each other better and to feel their kinship more strongly. Personal contacts had been formed in different areas and these were by no means confined to the outstanding scholars and writers; even ordinary citizens who had served in the armies had gotten to know their fellows from other sections of the country.

Some of these contacts were of short duration, for soon the paths of Eastern and Western Ukraine began again to diverge. In the early years there was a more or less brisk interchange of certain ideas between Lviv and Kiev but this soon dried up as the Iron Curtain erected by the Soviets across Europe became ever more impassable.

A large and active *émigré* group had developed abroad. The leaders of both east and west, after the failure of the political and military movement, made their way to Western Europe and spent the next years in the capitals of the democratic powers, endeavoring, as did Orlyk and his friends after the defeat of Mazepa in 1709, to arouse interest in the fate of the Ukrainian people and enlist public sentiment in their cause. Late in the nineteenth century Professor Michael

Drahomaniv had left Kiev to undertake work of this kind in Switzerland and then in Bulgaria, but that was about all. If Ukraine was known abroad before 1914, it was only through the laborers and peasants who had gone as seasonal workers across Europe or had settled down to build a new life in the lands across the Atlantic.

The struggle for independence had its effect on emigrant Ukrainians. Many had gone to the United States and Canada as simple laborers and had prospered. The World War woke them to a full consciousness of their feelings as Ukrainians. Made the targets of Russian, Polish and German propaganda, they commenced a counteraction. They were not able at the moment to sway American and Canadian public opinion as did some of the other groups but they went to work actively for the cause of a free Ukraine. They organized relief work for their relatives abroad and seriously undertook through their various societies and especially the Ukrainian National Association the difficult task of enlightening American and Canadian public opinion on the Ukrainian problem. They sent representatives to the Peace Conference in Paris and much to the annoyance of their enemies made sure that the voice of free Ukraine would not be silenced.¹

Even though the Ukrainian representatives failed, the Peace Conference served to introduce them to Western diplomats and statesmen. It gave them the opportunity to speak of their national cause and laid the foundation, even if only very sketchily, for future relationships.²

At the same time the leaders of the Ukrainian missions in Washington, Dr. Julian Bachynsky for the Ukrainian Republic and Dr. Longin Cehelsky and Dr. Luke Myshuha for the Republic of Western Ukraine worked steadily until 1923 to explain the situation. As the accredited diplomats of their state, they received broad powers and courtesies but not official recognition and their words far too often fell on deaf ears.

When all has been said, the period between the wars was disappointing for the Ukrainians but it was no less disappoint-

ing for all the other peoples of the world. The swing of public sentiment which had begun immediately after the signing of the armistice with Germany continued and resulted in an atmosphere in which all unconsciously the groundwork was laid for a new catastrophe.

The new world order was one of strange contradictions. In a physical sense the world had become united as never before. The discoveries and inventions of material science had seemingly annihilated space and time. The airplane and the radio had brought the nations nearer together. The spread of manufactures, the automobile and the motor bus had almost eliminated the self-contained life of the villages and the isolation of certain areas. The motion picture in all provincial centers and towns and in many villages had given even the most secluded individual some concept of the outside world.

Yet man had not risen to the level of these new inventions. The passport and the *carte d'identité*, regarded before 1914 as the signs of a backward government, now became almost universal. The free movement of populations was stopped. New political barriers were erected as a result of new political philosophies, while at the same time man was proclaiming as never before his belief in universality.

The treaties of 1919 had been amply provided with guarantees for the protection of minorities. They had visualized the application of the standards of civilized life to all communities. Suddenly it was discovered that these clauses either did not mean what they said or could be twisted to produce results entirely foreign to their intentions.

The statements of the Communists which had seemed alluring even to many people who did not fully sympathize with them were now revealed as little better than the brutal actions perpetrated in the height of the civil wars. The naked reality was even less palatable than the theoretical picture. The Ukrainians in the days of the conflict had realized this but they had done so unconsciously and often dimly. Now it was to be brought home to them at every moment.

The result was again a curious contradiction. During the twenty years from 1918 to 1939 not a single country on the borders of the Soviet paradise ever joined it by its own wish. It required intrigue and the intervention of the Red army. Yet abroad there were still well-meaning believers in human dignity and human rights who could somehow salve and deaden their consciences and in a kind of spiritual hypochondria place the minor mistakes of their own lands on a par with the terrors of the new system. Others were able to look upon the Soviet Union as a noble experiment and refused to condemn it. Still others believed or affected to believe that the government had been chosen democratically by its own people and insisted that the constant appeals of both the nationalities and the White Russians were mere propaganda of an undemocratic stripe. Finally some were so infatuated with the greatness and charm of Russia that they were willing to accept as perfect any government that was set up in Moscow.

War weariness became the dominant note of the new pacifism and the ideals of internationalism and the love of peace had a stronger influence on the minds and hearts of men than did justice and a secure social order. The intellectuals in their visions of a higher humanity forgot the dictates of common decency and their duty to protect their own countries, homes and firesides. In a word, it was a period when World War II was in the making and ambitious dictators could freely plot the downfall of disarmed and peaceful democratic powers.

It was a period when the old ideas of government were discarded, the old concert of European powers, the old codes under which mankind had advanced for centuries. New theories were spawned, concerned on paper with means of reforming democracy but in reality with the exaltation of the state over the individual. Idealism without a basis ran riot, and Communism, Fascism and Nazism were able to appeal to both the highest and the lowest instincts of man.

It was under such circumstances that the various Ukrainian *émigrés* abroad were compelled to live and carry on their work.

As they wandered from land to land, from capital to capital, they found different modes of thought, different ideas, different ideals, and different receptions. Now the more liberal went to one capital, the more conservative to another. They found it easy to build up groups of similar thinkers and to promote themselves to various offices in a multitude of parties and societies but there were few to follow and new divisions and new organizations sprang up like mushrooms, only to disintegrate or be dissolved in their turn.

For a while Czechoslovakia offered a safe refuge. Here the government helped to establish a free Ukrainian university, an agricultural school, a library. It was done largely because of the hostility between Czechoslovakia and Poland and had little or no connection with the development of the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine under Czechoslovak rule. Later, as Czech policy became more pro-Russian, this support for the Ukrainians tended to disappear.

Berlin and Vienna for a while after the defeat of Bolshevism in both lands welcomed the conservative *émigrés*. After his withdrawal from Kiev, Hetman Skoropadsky made his way to Berlin. The survivors of the Western Ukrainian government met regularly in Vienna. In both cases their presence in these cities was used to give color to the charges that the Ukrainian movement was a mere Austro-German phenomenon without any basis at home.

Later Paris became more hospitable and many who were disgusted with the rule of Hitler made their way to the French capital. They were only to move again when the French government turned to the left and sought the friendship of the Soviet Union.

Most of these *émigrés* remained aliens but there were others who went to the United States and Canada and the temperate countries of South America to settle down. They retained their Ukrainian feelings but many of them were swallowed up in the task of building their new homes in developing regions. They found themselves again as parts of a non-Ukrainian life

but one that welcomed them as individuals and gave them abundant opportunities to live and prosper.

It was a strange time between the wars. The world seemed to have forgotten all for which it had fought so stubbornly up to 1918. Yet those ideals did not die and by 1938 they were beginning to make themselves heard again. About that time, on the eve of World War II, all the old accusations against the Ukrainians were refurbished and recirculated, whether true or false. No one paid any attention to the strange and complicated developments in Europe which heralded the next stage of Ukrainian struggle. This had a different form in each country which had seized part of Ukraine but there was a tacit agreement everywhere that at all costs the essence of Ukrainian democracy must be wiped out in one way or another, by conversion or by extermination. It is to this situation that we must now turn.

VIII

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

I. Ukrainization

LENIN AND HIS associates had definite ideas as to the type of new world which they wished to produce. It was to be a world in which the proletariat would rule but their definition of the proletariat was peculiarly their own. It was to be a world of Communists, by Communists and for Communists. It was to be an international world in which the "proletariat" of all countries was to feel at home.

There was less agreement as to the cultural significance of this new creation. In the early days of Brest-Litovsk, when leaders like Trotsky had momentarily expected a world revolution, there had been some hesitation as to the position that the Russian variety was to hold in the Communist structure. A successful revolution, according to theory, in Germany, France or England would have been carried on by men who had come on a par with the Russian leaders.¹

It did not happen and Lenin quickly discovered that the Third International on which he had built such high hopes was not the gathering of the heads of dominant Communist parties meeting in Moscow as a world center. It was rather a group of more or less discredited failures coming to learn from him who alone had found the path to success. In view of the accepted infallibility of Marxian dialectics, it was strange that it was in the relatively undeveloped Russian em-

pire where the new regime saw light and gained strength and not in the industrialized areas where there was a strong proletariat. It was men trained in the Russian revolutionary technique who had been able to overthrow a government and it was only natural that from every ground these men came to accept their methods as the only correct ones.

They conveniently forgot and the world forgot with them that their victory was due to the indecision of their opponents. It was easy for them to overlook the fact that it was German policy, or lack of it, that had set Lenin up in Russia and allowed him to carry on his propaganda. It was easy to forget that it was American, British and French wavering between the independent republics which had liberated themselves from Russia and the White Russians that had facilitated the downfall of these lands. It was easy for them to gloss over and explain away the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic and to besmirch the reputations of its leaders. At first they remembered and acted with caution.

Lenin had the shrewd idea that it was going to be impossible to unify and standardize the world, or even Russia, as rapidly as he wished. More than any of the leaders of the former Russian Provisional Government or any of his Communist associates, he realized the possibilities in the cry for self-determination that was being raised on all sides. He appreciated to the full the extent to which the triumph of Bolshevism had been aided by the fighting between the White Russians and the struggling nationalities and he cleverly saw that he could use the conflicting claims of nationality and of government to further his cause in Poland and elsewhere. So he deliberately set about a policy of encouraging the growth of nationalist movements.²

There was another aspect to his policy. Bolshevism had not yet destroyed or exiled all of its "reactionary" enemies. The encouragement of the nationalities would develop and bring to light those men who possessed the natural gifts that might make them dangerous to him. Even a temporary catering to

the nationalities would bring these men into the open and put them within his power, whenever he was ready for the next step. In 1917 the meeting at Kiev had bluntly condemned the Communist policy. The defeat of the Ukrainian National Government had disheartened many of the leaders. They did not want to live in exile but they were suspicious of the power that had profited by their downfall. It was necessary to lull their suspicions and bring them into the net. Ukrainization might help.³

Lenin had no intention of allowing the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to slip out of his control. The Communist party would hold the reins but in the beginning it would be done behind a façade of nationalism. For this reason the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was called upon to play an independent role in the events of the day. The Russians emphasized its independence.⁴ They went through all the motions of treating it as a sovereign state. They allowed it to have its own foreign minister, its own army, its own school system, its own administration. But all these were to be under the thumb of the Kremlin. This was effected by insisting upon the unity of the Communist party and by demanding that the Communists should hold all the key positions, especially those that had to do with the maintenance of order.⁵

So it came about that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic signed a treaty of peace with Poland at Riga. It sent diplomatic representatives to all those capitals that had formerly recognized the Ukrainian National Republic. These persons were often either Russians or Ukrainians who had spent many years in Russian Communist circles but the farce continued. The democratic powers who did not believe in the existence of Ukraine and did not try to follow all the windings of Communist policy were completely deceived.

Meanwhile there was continuous activity by armed bands under men like Nestor Makhno who had played a role as more or less isolated guerilla leaders in the last days of the republic.⁶ They rallied liberty-loving peasants and malcontents and

proved a thorn in the side of the new regime which was based so largely upon the cities and their non-Ukrainian elements. However, their efforts were futile and merely added to the misery of the population without accomplishing any positive good.

In 1921-22 a new misfortune came upon the country. A long and severe drought completely destroyed the crops. Throughout the centuries this phenomenon has been spasmodically repeated. Due to climatic conditions, the spring and the autumn rains sometimes fail to appear. The results are serious for a land which is so uniformly fertile. Again and again these droughts have not only affected the material well-being of the population but their intensity has had a pronounced effect upon the grain markets of the entire world. In 1921 and 1922, the effects were catastrophic. War, revolution and turmoil had seriously curtailed production of food in earlier years. The dispossession of the great landowners who alone had the means to store up harvests and let them gradually pass upon the market and the demands of the organized and unorganized armies had reduced reserves to almost nothing. Famine broke out and large numbers of people perished.

The loss of the grain supply threatened not only the Soviet regime in Ukraine but even the masters in Moscow. It led to serious discontent which the authorities dreaded to quell. They appealed for world assistance. The American Relief Administration directed by Herbert Hoover came to the rescue and huge quantities of food were sent to the affected area. No attempt was made to exploit the revolt latent in the people and the relief workers brought aid to all without discrimination. There was no political upheaval and the Soviet government emerged more deeply entrenched than before.

Yet it was evident that something had to be done to remedy the persistent suffering and the lack of organized production. In 1921, therefore, the old period of militant Communism was ended and the New Economic Policy was proclaimed. Under this, while the fundamental principles of Communism were

retained, there was granted a considerable freedom for small, private trade. The peasant was allowed to raise and sell his grain on a relatively free market. The small shopkeeper was allowed to do business without fear of punitive actions by the authorities. Almost immediately the prosperity of Ukraine began to revive. The peasants worked harder and saved their money. The cities began to brighten and a freer air pervaded the countryside. The outside world looked on with approval, believing that the Soviets were now coming to see the advantages of capitalism and that a real *rapprochement* might be possible.⁷

There were of course dark sides to the picture. By one device or another the contributions that Ukraine was forced to make to the central regime became heavier and heavier, so that even some of the Ukrainian Communists who had the welfare of their homeland at heart began to complain that the country was being ruined and its wealth drained off. The entire life of the country was under the control of the OGPU, the secret police, which had succeeded the Cheka, and was later to be replaced by the NKVD (the forces of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). Yet all this was indirect and the average citizen was unaware of the general purpose and the methods that were being applied.

The wealthy landowners had already been dispossessed and driven into exile or liquidated. Attempts were made to form communal farms but the various cooperative organizations were allowed to flourish and the police rule was none too severe.

The first step toward limiting Ukrainian power and influence was undertaken with the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922. This was ostensibly a higher union to include the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian, the Georgian, and in fact all of the countries that Moscow dominated. But however it appeared on paper, it meant a legal justification for control by the Moscow regime of all the governments of the other Soviet republics and it soon became evident that the higher

administration was composed of exactly those persons who had sat in Moscow previously.

The whole field of foreign affairs and defense was handed over to the All-Union government, although for a while the custom continued of having a Ukrainian secretary in all the Soviet missions abroad. Yet even this was not too much of a blow, for there were a good many people in 1917 who would have been satisfied with the setting up of Ukraine as one of the federated states of a Russian republic and it seemed as if this ideal was now being realized under the rule of the Soviet Union.

Of course the real bond of union was the Communist party which itself was under the direction of Moscow. This made little appeal to the Ukrainians themselves and the bulk of its members in Ukraine were of non-Ukrainian origin. Even as late as 1927 there were at most only about one hundred and twenty-two thousand Ukrainian Communists, approximately thirty-nine for every ten thousand of the population—one of the smallest ratios of any of the Soviet republics.⁸

Yet during these years national sentiment was to a considerable degree appeased and canalized into nonpolitical paths by the emphasis that was laid upon the development of Ukrainian culture in all senses of the word. Before the outbreak of World War I, Ukrainian literature, art and music had been developing with great rapidity and broadening its scope and adapting the artistic methods of the West. National independence naturally lent zest to the movement but the stormy life of the republic made it impossible for the younger writers and artists to come to their mature status. The downfall of the republic hardly checked the flowering of the renaissance, for the Soviet regime was on the whole even more liberal than it was in the Russian Soviet Republic. Authors were compelled to pay a certain lip service to Communist ideals or at least not devote themselves to openly anti-Communist notions but within a broad range, they were free to express themselves and a little ingenuity in avoiding taboo subjects enabled them

to function with little fear of censorship. This was especially true during the period up to 1925 when in Moscow the "Fellow Travelers," who included all the leading authors, were gradually winning esteem at the expense of the more distinctively proletarian writers.⁹

This period saw not only the development of literature, art and music but the foundation and growth of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev. This had taken shape under the presidency of Professor Volodymyr Vernadsky during the hetmanate of Skoropadsky, but the rapid change of control in Kiev had precluded serious work. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic allowed the academy to reopen and granted it relative freedom, even though the bylaws were amended to turn it into a typical Communist institution. Still, these were disregarded and the academy was allowed to correspond freely with Ukrainian scholars abroad and elect members from Western Ukraine and elsewhere.¹⁰

To strengthen its staff, the academy was allowed to call back many of the outstanding figures of the republic. Professor Hrushevsky, the first head of the old Rada, returned to Kiev from an *émigré* life in Vienna, and became the head of the historical division. He resumed his researches as the dean of Ukrainian scholars. There was Serhey Efremiv, the literary historian and critic, who had played a part also in the various Ukrainian national governments. Then men who had been primarily politicians and statesmen, like Holubovych, prime minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, were induced to return.

We can well pardon and understand the point of view of optimists who saw in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic the fulfillment of many of their hopes and dreams. The Ukrainian language was introduced into the schools and the administration. It was the theoretical language of command in the Ukrainian army. Every official in the republic was supposed to be able to speak Ukrainian and use it in his office, even though exemptions were made for non-Ukrainian citizens. This was more than the Ukrainians had dared expect, even fifteen

years before.¹¹

The situation promised well for the future. The gradual improvement in living conditions brought about by recovery from the war, the flowering of the culture, the increasing prosperity of the peasants, the new opportunities all seemed to justify the inclusion of the country within the Soviet Union and the optimists—and these included all except the most bitter and fanatical opponents of Communism—were tolerably well satisfied with the progress that was being made.

The OGPU in the background, the attacks on religion, the other drawbacks, all seemed to be passing phases. They were little felt in the villages, although in the cities with a non-Ukrainian population they played a larger role.

The men selected to administer the state were also reassuring. The dominant figures in the Communist party were men like Rakovsky, a Romanian and an old Bolshevik, the prime minister; Gregory Petrovsky, the president; and above all Mykola Skrypnyk, the commissar of internal affairs. Rakovsky had passed through the usual routine of the professional international revolutionary but Skrypnyk was a more unusual character.

He had early enlisted in the Bolshevik party, when it was still but a struggling group largely in exile. He had become a friend of Lenin and had been prominent in the Cheka in Petrograd. He was a confirmed and ruthless Communist¹² but when he was transferred to the Ukrainian Republic, he showed at first a surprising kindness toward the new renaissance. For some years he allowed conditions to develop as they would but always with an eye to the future triumph of the general principles of Communism as he understood them and as he had learned them from Lenin. He proved himself to be a true Ukrainian Communist and during this golden age, despite his Communist ideas, he used his influence on the whole in beneficent ways.

Thus during the twenties, the Ukrainian urge for independence in the political sphere seemed to slumber. The cultural

autonomy which was given to the people, the opportunities that they had to shape Ukrainian culture along the lines of the Ukrainian tradition seemed to replace that fervor for independence which had been so marked in the earlier years.



IX

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

II. The New Standardization

MEANWHILE CHANGES WERE taking place in Moscow. Nikolai Lenin died on January 21, 1924. A bitter struggle to be his successor broke out among the leading Bolsheviks of the Soviet Union. The power finally passed into the hands of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin (Djugashvili). A Georgian by birth, he was a man of indomitable will and character, hence his pseudonym of Stalin (Steel). Unlike Lenin, he had scarcely been outside of Russia and he did not have that respect for foreign cultures and leaders that had been a marked characteristic of Lenin. He had risen to power as commissar of nationalities and as secretary of the Communist party and had thus created and developed its organizational framework. His accession meant the triumph of those elements that in the full sense regarded the party and the party only as the guarantee of the stability of the regime.

In the winter of 1926 at the 15th Congress of the party, Stalin made it clear that he regarded the moment as past for the encouragement and toleration of bourgeois elements and he emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union must become internally strong and developed. In due time followed the first Five-Year Plan, which aimed at the rapid industrialization of the country.

The essence of the new plan was the solidifying of the state

and the standardizing of its political and cultural life on the Moscow model. The new Communist culture that had been the dream of the state's original creators was destined to be all-embracing and it was now extended to cover far larger spheres of activity than many thoroughgoing Communists in the various republics had anticipated. The institutions of the Soviet Union were all to be modeled on those of the Russian Soviet Republic and it was the distinct understanding of the Stalinists that the Great Russians were to be the elder-brothers to guide all Soviet thinking.

The early stages of this new policy were hardly noticeable. Measures were taken to provide for proper instruction in Russian in all the schools of the union. The same was true of the various military services. As the central military schools were established and developed, ambitious young men from the armies of the various republics were sent to them. When they had finished their course of studies, they were available for service anywhere in the Soviet Union. Young Ukrainians who had received a state education and distinguished themselves were liable to be assigned to Russian units or units of the Caucasian or Central Asian republics. Similarly, Russians or non-Ukrainians were assigned to staff and command posts in the Ukrainian army. This process soon introduced a considerable measure of Russification and brought the situation back to what it had been prior to the revolution.

The same thing was done in the case of such scientific and educational institutions as the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Under one pretext or another, this now became a branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences and once that was done, there was no reason why Russian and other non-Ukrainian scholars should not be assigned to membership and to the administrative staff. The pressing demand for men in the natural sciences furnished a convenient excuse for the gradual suppression of those sections that dealt primarily with Ukrainian subjects. Thus slowly but surely Ukrainian institutions were transformed into branches of All-Union institutions and lost

their old contact with the native regions and populations.

During the height of the movement for Ukrainization which had served to call out the latent human resources of the Ukrainian intellectual world, the promotion of Communism had been relatively disregarded. When Kaganovich in 1928 came to Ukraine to speed up matters and put pressure upon the leaders of the party and of the republic, a series of investigations was begun to find out how far the various institutions were actively engaged in pushing Communism. The results were on the whole negative and new orders were issued.

In 1929 the Academy of Sciences was discovered to have no Communists in its membership. This was a glaring defect and under pressure from Skrypnyk, new members were elected by a "socialistic" method. Candidates were proposed by various Communist groups, societies, trades unions, and for the first time something else than scientific ability was adopted as a criterion for membership. On the whole Skrypnyk kept the situation within bounds in the beginning and the academy even with a few Communist members continued to function. It was only the first step. As increased Communization was demanded, these Communists formed a group to work against their colleagues and when the president of the academy died in 1929, a full-fledged Communist was elected to succeed him.

The final step was the purging of the old membership. Attacks were made in what is now the familiar fashion on the outstanding scholars for their ignorance of Communist truth. In 1930 Professor Hrushevsky was bitterly attacked for inculcating nationalism with his historical theories. In a short time, after a series of disorderly trials before the laboring masses of the city, he was condemned for doing harm to the proletariat by his obnoxious and un-Marxist notions. He was expelled from the academy and put under arrest in a place near Moscow where he could not read or study and where he finally became blind. Then, when he was near his end, he was allowed to go to a rest house in the Caucasus to die.¹

We have spoken at some length of Hrushevsky's case be-

cause he had played an important role in the history of the Ukrainian National Republic and was widely respected. His fate was shared by almost all of the men who had been persuaded in the period of Ukrainization to return home. In 1929 the Soviets discovered a secret Society for the Liberation of Ukraine and they arrested and sentenced to long prison terms the literary critic Efremiv and many others. The next year they found other traces of political opposition and of nationalism. This time it was the political men like Holubovych who were arrested and executed, imprisoned or exiled.²

It was soon the turn of the writers and artists. Those who declined to mold their thought into the accepted pattern were speedily silenced. A Ukrainian version of the Russian RAPP, whereby the writers were given specific assignments to cover the Five-Year Plan, was introduced and this provided an easy weapon for the coercion of the entire literary and artistic life of the state.

The Five-Year Plan introduced in 1929, with its emphasis on speedy industrialization, soon brought the laboring classes under the thumb of the authorities to an unprecedented degree while the outside world was regaled with stories of the triumph of Soviet construction. Furthermore these plans were so drawn as to exploit the natural resources of Ukraine and make its industry more and more dependent upon that of the Russian Soviet Republic. Certain plants for the use of the coal and iron resources were built and in most cases the half-finished materials were then transported to plants in the Russian republic for final manufacture. In this way a colonial regime was again implanted in the ostensibly independent republic. Even at this, the new factories, thanks to the laws permitting the definite assignment of labor, were filled with non-Ukrainians, and Ukrainians who heeded the government plea to go into the factories were transported away from their homes to other sectors where they could be severed from the life of the community.³

Yet the changes that were made in Ukrainian life by the

industrialization program were nothing compared with the results of the collectivization of agriculture which was begun in 1929. The Great Russians had always practiced a form of communal ownership of land and the change from this to working on collective farms was relatively minor. The situation in Ukraine was very different. Here, even in the old days of serfdom, the peasant had remained attached to his hut and his own plot of ground. They were his and his alone. Now he was abruptly ordered to turn over to a newly constituted authority everything that he possessed on pain of being expelled from his home. The order aroused instant opposition. The peasants—and they were not only the rich kulaks or the medium farmers—rose in opposition. More than in any other part of the union, they killed off their cattle and horses before they would turn them over. They burned the reserves of grain which the Soviet authorities had counted upon for their export trade and for the feeding of the cities. The situation speedily became serious but Stalin, pausing only to prosecute a few local authorities for excessive zeal in collectivization, pressed on.

Stern and serner methods were introduced to force grain from the unwilling peasants. Then in 1931 there came another drought and poor harvest. This was the opportunity for which the Kremlin had been waiting. Collecting parties ranged the countryside and compelled the peasants to hand over the specified amounts of grain and arrested, shot or exiled them if they did not do so. The result was the artificial famine of 1931-32, with the peasants being left at the approach of winter without food supplies and with no way of securing any, even though there was an abundance of grain in the hands of the government. The authorities refused to allow even the slightest amounts of food to be brought into the area from any source on the ground that the shortage had been caused by anti-governmental activity.⁴

When news of the famine began to reach the outside world, the Soviet government denied its existence and forbade the Soviet papers to publish any reports. Foreign correspondents

were denied permission to visit the stricken area and far too many of them, including some of the most respected names, meekly accepted the Soviet version of events. William Henry Chamberlin was almost the only man to report on the extent of the horror.

It is possible to estimate the number of deaths that occurred. It was apparently nearly 10 per cent of the rural population or in the neighborhood of five million. This figure is reached by at least two methods. Ten per cent was the approximate proportion in those villages about which detailed information was received through devious channels. If we compare the population of Ukraine according to the census of 1927 with that of 1939, which reported a net decrease of about two hundred thousand, and check against the average normal yearly increase of population, we reach the same estimate.

The world has seen cold-blooded massacres and mass starvation before but in almost every case these have been the result of war or plague or catastrophes of nature and the governments involved have done their best to alleviate the human suffering. In the case of the Ukrainian famine, the situation was different. The government deliberately profited by the shortage of crops to starve an unwanted portion of the population. This had not been its policy in 1921, just ten years before, when it was trying to cement its position. Now it was sure of itself and felt safe in resorting to any action necessary to curb a discontented population instead of meeting its demands even in part. There is no question that the Ukrainian famine was deliberately engineered to break opposition and disintegrate the population.

Starvation was supplemented by deportation in order to clear the land for the introduction of alien elements who would be more loyal to the central regime, while the Ukrainians were uprooted from their homes and scattered in heterogeneous groups throughout the country. Perhaps no act of the Soviet government has been more revealing of its essentially callous attitude toward human life than the satisfaction which it re-

ceived from this famine and its accompanying arrests and executions.

If we can possibly interpret the Soviet statements as even partially true, the net result of the increased pressure upon the Ukrainian people was merely to spread discontent and confirm the feeling that the future of Ukraine did not lie in affiliation with the Soviet Union. Year by year as an excuse for each new trial, each new act of oppression, there was discovered a new society, a new organization, a new tendency toward the strengthening of Ukrainian nationalism. The official Soviet reports during the thirties, in their apprehension of the spreading of nationalism, are comparable only to the reports of Tsar Nicholas I who was in constant fear that the "nonexistent" Little Russians who were consciously yearning for a union with their Great Russian brothers and only desirous of acquiring their superior culture were still planning an insurrection and dreaming of the days when they would be free from the Muscovite yoke.

Professor Hrushevsky's teachings as to the difference in origin and development between the Ukrainians of Kiev and the Great Russians of Moscow were found everywhere and were fiercely suppressed. Every manifestation of interest in any part of Western Europe was treated as a deliberate desire to separate from the Soviet Union and a deliberate insult to the elder brothers who had brought to all the true light of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist knowledge.

A few years before the general trend in Ukrainian Soviet thought had been to emphasize the unity of the Ukrainians in the republic with those under Polish rule. Now this was reversed. Even the Academy of Sciences which had had at least tacit Communist approval in electing to membership some of the outstanding men in Western Ukraine dropped them quietly and without fanfare.⁵ The academy refused to correspond with the scholars in the West and its members were brought to trial on the charge of corresponding with Ukrainians abroad. It was an unanswerable accusation, for the corres-

pendence had been inspired by the governmental organs themselves during the period when the country was permitted to develop its Ukrainian consciousness.

It was the same with all subjects that had to do with the Ukrainian past or culture. After the arrest of Professor Hrushevsky the Philological-Historical center of the Academy of Sciences was wiped out in order to put an end to his teachings. The publications of the academy "for greater usefulness" were now published chiefly in Russian and then they were rarely on Ukrainian subjects, except in the field of archaeology where they could be developed on a purely materialistic basis. The plan of the academy to create a dictionary was disapproved by the central authorities in Moscow for it demanded that emphasis should be laid on all phenomena that would tend to bring the Russian and Ukrainian languages closer together. Russian words were inserted in the dictionary at the expense of Ukrainian idioms and even then the dictionary could not escape the charge of Ukrainian nationalism and the tendency to separate the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.⁶

The most ardent supporters of the claims of the Ukrainian nationalists were hardly prepared to accept the evidences of the widespread success of nationalist ideas that were seriously exposed to public view by the Soviet regime. Even at the height of the Ukrainian National Republic, it is hard to find any more evidence of the desire for separation than was printed in the reports of the Soviet prosecutors of everything that the Kremlin could imagine as Ukrainian nationalism. The thought naturally comes to the mind that the efforts of the Communist regime to suppress it had fanned the movement to a greater intensity than even the struggle for independence had been able to do.

During the thirties technical changes in the administration of the laws rendered the position of the peasants on the collective farms somewhat more tolerable. The exactions which were made by the central government were standardized and were somewhat eased, so that the peasants could know what they

had to do. The old will to private property remained. The government was forced again and again to clamp down on the collective farms and even their Communist leadership because of the many efforts of the peasants to better their condition. Now the peasants were accused of giving too much care to the little individual plots which they were allowed to have for their own use, now they were accused of trying to add to these at the expense of the collective property, now they were attacked for stealing even a few handfuls of grain for their own use from the communal stores and were executed as dangerous conspirators. Village after village was uprooted and its inhabitants were scattered throughout the far north and Siberia and in the prison camps where they were destined to perish.⁷

Yet these casualties of the village population were as nothing in comparison with those of the Ukrainian Communists. After Kaganovich returned to Moscow, he was succeeded in 1933 by Postyshev as a trusted subordinate of Stalin. He called loudly upon the Ukrainian Communists to purge their ranks, recounted the discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, then of the Ukrainian Nationalist Center, then of the Ukrainian Military Organization. His reign was one of terror as he pushed on the work of ferreting out all opposition but by 1935 he too was on the verge of arrest for nationalism and committed suicide. Skrypnyk, who had starred in the beginning of the campaign for standardization and Communization, committed suicide under suspicion of nationalism in 1933.⁸ George Kotsyubinsky, who had led the Red army against the Ukrainian National Republic, was executed for nationalism in 1932. Kosyor, secretary of the Communist party for many years, was liquidated. So too were Prime Minister Chubar and President Petrovsky of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Another prime minister, Lubchenko, who had boasted that he had finally liquidated nationalist sentiment, was forced to end his life. Bondarenko, a successor, also disappeared. The controlling power then passed into the hands of Khrushchov, a Russian and a member of Stalin's inner circle, who retained

the confidence of the Russian authorities and has been promoted to work in Moscow.

There can be but one explanation. These people who vanished, were liquidated or committed suicide were fanatical Communists but they were Ukrainians who still had some regard for the essentials of Ukrainian life and tradition. That, to the Kremlin, was an unpardonable sin like that of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia. They had to be prepared not only to defend the doctrines of Communism but to prove that at every point where the ideas and customs of Ukraine differed from those of the Great Russians, they were nationalistic and treasonable. They had to be prepared to accept without murmur or hesitation the latest statements that were issued by the supreme authority.

Take an illustration. In 1935 Moscow issued the large Soviet Encyclopedia. In it⁹ Soviet scholars declared that Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who had won the independence of the country from the Poles in the great revolt of 1649, was a mere servant of the Polish nobles and an enemy of the Ukrainian people. That meant that all the songs that had been handed down in the villages praising his heroism and exploits were anti-Communist and anti-Moscow, even though Khmelnytsky had later brought Ukraine under Russian influence by signing the alliance of Pereyaslav. It casts a lurid light upon Stalin's dictum that there can be but one Communist culture and that the differentiation between the peoples of the Soviet Union can only be in non-essentials. But there are no non-essentials for a totalitarian regime, however it cloaks itself in pseudo-democratic dress.

Moscow and the Ukrainian Communists had done their best at the beginning of the revolution to eliminate the wealthier classes and the *bourgeoisie*. They had succeeded but that was not enough. Step by step they were led unhesitatingly to attack the fundamental forms of life, the teachings of the Socialist parties, the ideas of the poets and the writers, the historians and the retellers of the ancient legends, the advocates

of the popular poetry, the individuals who ventured to practice even the most harmless and unpolitical custom, lest in some way they conduce to a separation from the elder brothers of Moscow, the center of Russian and of Communist culture. Imperial Russia never forgave Mazepa for his attempt to join Charles XII of Sweden and the Communists share their view. By 1939 practically every Ukrainian was regarded by Stalin as a potential Mazepa, even if he only indulged in some local quirk of custom.

It brings into high relief the whole problem of the relations between international and national Communism, between the fundamentals of Communism with its class struggle, its collectivization and its regimentation and the additional demands of Moscow that the Russian version of Communism be followed in all details. Even the wildest advocates of Russification under the tsars never contemplated such an absolute and lifeless unification. The very men who had worked fanatically against the efforts of the Ukrainian to recover their independence and free themselves from the old Russian influence in broad outlines were unable to pass the new and more stringent tests and they had to choose between execution or suicide..

A mood and a temperament were developed that might prove fatal to the Soviet system if it were once aroused. Terror can succeed to a certain degree. It can silence and coerce but too much of terror will produce a revolt just as will an excess of weakness. The OGPU and the NKVD were able to prevent outbreaks. They were able to maintain the Soviet position but they were not able to win any inherent loyalty from a population that was already becoming aware that no matter what it did, it was still under suspicion. Such was the situation in 1939.

X

The Ukrainians in Eastern Asia

IN SPEAKING OF the general position of the Ukrainians within the Russian empire and later the Soviet Union, some mention must be made of that large number who for one reason or another during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had made their way to the east. In various places they had formed entire Ukrainian-speaking settlements and in these the Ukrainian spirit developed very much as it did on its native soil.

Eastern Asia had been used as a place of deportation for the various hetmans of the seventeenth and eighteenth century who had escaped execution at the hands of the tsars. The continuous procession of these men and their sympathizers to the desolate Far East led them to wild dreams of re-establishing the ruined hetmanate in those regions. These never assumed any serious form.

About the middle of the nineteenth century, however, there began a flow of emigration from Ukraine. The movement was inspired by the imperial authorities and despite the hardships of the journey across central Asia, many made it and added to the growing number of Siberians who looked for a freer regime than was possible in the more settled European parts of the empire. Later when the imperial government actively fostered the movement, it transported the emigrants from Odessa to Vladivostok by sea; after the completion of the

Trans-Siberian Railroad the largest number went by rail to Chita and from there by boat down the river Amur.

By the outbreak of World War I almost two million Ukrainians were scattered in the Kazakh areas of Siberia, and in two additional sections the Ukrainians far outnumbered the Great Russians. These were the so-called Gray and Green Wedges. The former lay between the territory of the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs, a land in which the Kazakhs still formed the largest single element of the population. In the Green Wedge, the area along the Amur and in the old region of Primorye, the Ukrainians formed an absolute majority, except in Vladivostok and a few other communities. In some regions they formed nearly 90 per cent of the population and throughout the entire area, they rarely fell below 50-60 per cent.

Ukrainian sentiment grew rapidly and even in Vladivostok there existed prior to 1914 illegal groups of Ukrainians who were pressing for more recognition of their specific national rights. Some of these groups were even more outspoken than were the groups in Kiev, which were more closely watched by the authorities, for with them the tsarist regime relied for its control on the great distance between settlements just as it relied on the expanses of wilderness which escaping political prisoners would be compelled to traverse. This was an old tradition; Dostoyevsky in *Memoirs from a Dead House*,¹ written in 1861, alludes to the fact that the authorities allowed many convicts to escape in the spring with the knowledge that they would be forced to return before the approach of winter or perish and meanwhile the officials could pocket the money appropriated for their support.

With the Revolution of 1917 Ukrainian fervor flared up as it did in Ukraine, and it followed a similar course. Representatives from the area took part in the great Ukrainian meetings which were held in Kiev during the spring of 1917 and on June 11 there was held in Mykolsko-Ussuriysky the First Ukrainian Far-Eastern Congress. This was attended by fifty-three delegates from the various Ukrainian Hromady (Com-

munities), representatives of Ukrainian co-operative societies, newly formed military units, etc.² It demanded the organization of a Ukrainian army with officers and men to be chosen from those units which were composed of Ukrainians; the organization of a permanent Ukrainian organization to be called the Secretariat of the Rada of the Green Wedge; and the drawing up of a constitution for a Far-Eastern Ukrainian Rada which was to be approved by a Second Congress.

The first actual military unit was formed in Harbin, Manchuria, by Lieutenant Theodore Tvardovsky. It was welcomed by the Chinese, who allowed it to cross the border into the Russian Empire at a time when the Chinese in Manchuria, in an effort to shake off the Russian yoke, were disarming all the old Russian military organizations.³

After the Ukrainian National Republic declared its independence, it sent in 1918 the same Lieutenant Tvardovsky as the first Ukrainian consul in the Green Wedge and as a result of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Ukrainian consuls were established in most of the important cities to open up relations between the Ukrainians in the Far East and those in the Ukrainian National Republic. This was one of the conditions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which had been signed in the early spring of 1918.

All of these measures for the organization of the Ukrainians of the Far East were opposed by the Russian Provisional Government exactly as they had been in the homeland. Russian remonstrations were, however, of no practical importance at the moment, for the various Allied armies and the Japanese moved into Vladivostok to protect the supplies of war materials which were awaiting transportation over the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Ukrainian hopes were thus entangled with the futile efforts of the Allied Expeditionary Forces to keep open the Trans-Siberian Railroad and stop the advance of the Bolsheviks without the formal recognition of the White Russian regime of Admiral Kolchak. It was the same policy that had proved so

costly to the Ukrainians and the Allies in European Russia. The Allies could not count upon the Provisional Government; they would not countenance a White military regime which sought to bring back a tsar or a conservative government; they would not cater to the Bolsheviks; and above all they would give the barest of promises to any group that was trying to help itself outside of the fixed Russian orbit.

The secretariat of the Far-Eastern Ukrainian Rada established contact with General Janin of the French army and with other leaders. At times some of the Allied officers seemed sympathetic to the movement but sooner or later a change of heart would come, the old question of the unity of Russia would again be raised and Ukrainian hopes would again be shattered.

Yet the Ukrainian population became more and more unified. More and more co-operatives and other institutions were founded; plans were made for Ukrainian schools and some of them were opened. Peter Ivanovich Horovy⁴ succeeded in uniting many of the co-operatives into one union, the Chumak (Teamster), with headquarters in Vladivostok and acting under the Ukrainian banner. He and Dmytro Vorovyk were the leading figures in this movement.

There was, as in the homeland, much hesitation as to the extent of autonomy which the Ukrainians should receive. For a long while the secretariat wavered as to a demand for complete control of the Ukrainian territories in the Far East. Some hoped to be a colony of the Ukrainian National Republic. Others had less drastic ideas and remained in the general position of the Ukrainian National Rada in 1917.

As the hour neared for the withdrawal of their forces, the Allies employed a new device. This was the formation of the Far-Eastern Republic, supposedly an anti-Bolshevik democratic state able to protect itself and prevent the eastward extension of Communism. Its capital was at Chita. The Ukrainians supported it and one of their number, Peter Marchyshyn, from Lviv, became its minister of Ukrainian affairs.⁵

It was again a disillusionment and its failure led the Ukrain-

ians to plan for a Fifth Ukrainian Far-Eastern Congress in 1923. This planned to proclaim the entire Far East, including the Primorye, the region of the Amur and the shore of the Pacific Ocean as far as Bering Strait, including Kamchatka, an independent republic, Green Ukraine. The movement was belated.

On the eve of the congress the Bolsheviks, who had recognized the independence of the Far-Eastern Republic, changed their policy and replaced it by a Communist government. Throughout the whole of the area, they arrested in December, 1922, all of the leading Ukrainian leaders, intellectuals and persons of prominence, even as they promised to open Ukrainian schools in the Ukrainian areas and did so in isolated cases.

The prisoners were held and examined for months. Then in January, 1924, a large state trial was held in Chita.⁶ The prisoners were accused of trying to tear away "the Russian Far East from Russia and to hand it over to international capitalists and bourgeois." Soviet practice had not been so finely developed then and the accused refused to make any confessions. The trial went on for some days and then the accused were convicted. The leaders were sentenced to death, although this was later commuted to a long term of imprisonment. Some of the defendants succeeded in escaping and making their way to Harbin.

In that city they continued their work. At first they were able to communicate with their compatriots across the Soviet border. This steadily became more difficult and almost impossible after 1929 when the friction between the Chinese and the Soviets developed into open warfare. During these years, however, the Ukrainian group kept its independence and did not co-operate with the Russian and Siberian groups working in Tokyo, although this course was urged upon them by some of their members.⁷

With the Japanese occupation of Manchuria new difficulties arose. Japanese policy wavered between encouraging the Ukrainian activities and discouraging them as hostile to a

single Russian monarchist movement which they might be able to create. The prolonged uncertainty barred active work and finally in 1940 the Japanese suppressed almost all the Ukrainian societies and stopped their newspapers.

The occupation of the city by the Soviets in 1945 put a decisive end to the movement. As in Great Ukraine proper, although the Ukrainian element of the population continued to grow because of new deportations, it was systematically suppressed. Those of the old leaders who had not succeeded in escaping from Manchuria disappeared and the Iron Curtain closed over another attempt of the Ukrainians to secure their rights. Some finally got to Shanghai and a fortunate part of these escaped from that city before its capture by the Chinese Communists. These are now in the Philippine Islands, where they share the lot of other displaced persons. The vast majority have, however, like so many of their compatriots, disappeared without a trace.

XI

Western Ukraine and Poland

AS WE HAVE seen, the Western Ukrainians took advantage of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October, 1918, to set up the Republic of Western Ukraine. This was at once attacked by the Poles, who demanded control of the whole province of Galicia. The officers of the republic were finally forced into exile and by the late summer of 1919, the Poles were able to extend their military control over the territory at stake.

Throughout the whole of 1919 the situation greatly disturbed the representatives of the Allied Powers and their confusion was reflected in the Treaty of Saint Germain which brought about peace between Austria and the victorious Allies. The latter, while anxious about the warfare that was still going on in Eastern Galicia, were in a way helpless in the face of circumstances. They were already deeply involved in the attempts of the White Russians to overthrow the Bolsheviks and they were not fully aware of the seriousness of the problem that was offered by the independence drive among the various nationalities in the old Russian Empire. So long as they were undecided about the future of Russia, it was hopeless for them to think of a final solution of the problem of Eastern Galicia.

It was obvious that if there were a Russia with a Ukraine

peacefully and willingly incorporated in it, Eastern Galicia should be added to it. Sober realism recognized that that condition was not going to prevail in the near future. On the other hand there were the Poles to be reckoned with. The wave of nationalism that had followed the independence of the Polish state led them to demand the restoration of the boundaries of 1772 before the first division of the country and they were not content with a Poland that comprised merely the Polish ethnographical territory where they formed a majority of the population. At times Pilsudski seems to have had a vision of a federation of the adjacent nations of Ukraine, Lithuania and Byelorussia under the aegis of Poland but the opposing groups headed by Dmowski and Paderewski demanded a unified state based on their interpretation of the Union of Lublin of 1569. Above all they demanded the inclusion in Poland of the two cities of Wilno, formerly the capital of Lithuania, and Lviv, the most important city in Western Ukraine. Furthermore, they wanted the whole of Eastern Galicia and were willing to fight for it.¹

The Allies vainly advanced one compromise after another. France, conscious of the danger from a reviving Germany, was an ardent and consistent supporter of a strong Poland and in all international gatherings could be relied upon to plead the Polish cause. Great Britain was inclined to be critical of the Polish claims, while President Wilson and the United States were more interested in securing support for the League of Nations. No Great Power understood or tried to understand the Ukrainian position or seriously defended the Ukrainian cause.

The Treaty of Saint Germain recognized the abnormal status of Eastern Galicia by leaving open its future disposition. On November 21, 1919, the Council of Ambassadors prepared a Statute for Eastern Galicia under which Poland would have control of the province for twenty-five years but the province would be fully autonomous with its own diet, school system and military units.² At the end of the period there was to be

a plebiscite in the area, for it was hoped that by that time the problem of Russia and of Bolshevism would have been solved. The Poles rejected the proposal on the ground that, having occupied the area to bar the spread of Bolshevism with the permission of the Allies, they were entitled to remain there. They rejected also the notion of the "Curzon line" as a boundary. This was a vague attempt to bound Polish territory at the time when the Allies were asking the Poles to occupy and organize territory farther east to bar Bolshevism.³

Under these circumstances the government of the Republic of Western Ukraine continued to flounder. In one sense its reason for existence had ended when it merged with the Ukrainian National Republic but this was so tenuous and so disturbed by the Bolsheviks that the regime of Petrushevych continued to speak for the Western Ukrainians. This was the more true when in the spring of 1920, in last efforts to secure Polish aid, Petlyura tacitly waived Ukrainian claims to Eastern Galicia at the time of his campaign against Kiev. Petrushevych and his followers moved to Vienna, where they remained as a government in exile, and later they went to Prague and finally to Berlin. Throughout they were the recognized leaders of their people and their influence on the life of the country was far greater than we might assume.

Ukrainian refusal to accept Polish rule and Allied indecision as to the future of Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia) had the inevitable consequence that the Ukrainians (and the other minorities) boycotted the Polish elections in the spring of 1919 and were not represented in the Constituent Assembly which drew up the Polish Constitution and remained the legislative body of the country until 1922.⁴ Thus at the critical period in the development of the Polish state, the advocates of a strong centralizing policy were put in absolute control.

It was very much the same in 1922, when again most Ukrainians stayed away from the polls.⁵ They had been promised by the Allies autonomy for Eastern Galicia and the creation of their own diet there and so they naturally stayed

outside of the Polish political arena. At the same time the Poles had no intention of granting them these privileges and the dispute over Eastern Galicia appeared constantly on the agenda of the diplomatic meetings, without any solution ever being reached.⁶

In the fall of 1922 another attempt was made to settle the long-smoldering question. The Polish Diet passed a resolution providing for the setting up of "Ruthenian" diets in the districts of Lviv, Ternopil and Stanyslaviv. The law was purposely vague as to the powers and functions of these diets but it was clear that it did not presuppose any possibility of co-operation between them on a provincial level and it did not extend any privileges to the Ukrainians living in Volyn and Pidlashshya, whom the Poles classed as a different people from the "Ruthenians." It was quite evident that there was no honest intention of granting this autonomy, such as it was. The measure was adopted to impress the Council of Ambassadors, which finally swallowed the bait and on Polish assurances that all would be well and that they would grant some sort of autonomy duly recognized Eastern Galicia as a part of Poland on March 15, 1923.⁷ The Ukrainian National Rada sent delegates to Paris to register its protests, but these were never heard and the decision was allowed to stand.⁸

From 1919 on, conditions in the Ukrainian areas were unsettled, to speak mildly. The Poles arrested large numbers of the more patriotic Ukrainians and sent them to jail for long periods. The turbulence and the Polish reprisals heightened the tension between the two nationalities and renewed the ancient clashes which had been so disastrous for medieval Ukraine and medieval Poland.

The final denial of all their hopes for international action brought about a change in the thinking of Ukrainians. They were forced to accept the fact that Western Ukraine would remain under Polish sovereignty until the next European upheaval and they began to take measures accordingly. Their attitude had been expressed by a Ukrainian delegate, Samuel

Pidhirsky, in the Diet of 1922, when he declared: "The creation of an independent Ukrainian nation is the goal of the Ukrainian people, but counting on the practical condition, the Ukrainians are ready to co-operate with the Polish people and all peoples who are within the Republic, if they will be assured full and free development in all fields of life."⁹ By 1928 most Ukrainians were electing members to the Polish Diet and exercising their duties as Polish citizens without giving up their hopes for independence.

Almost without exception the Ukrainian political parties formed a solid bloc of opposition to the government. They advocated measures of social reform which would benefit Ukrainians. At times they boycotted the parliament, but (what the Poles would never appreciate) they were still more bitterly opposed to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and had no desire to join it. Some of the conservative parties seemed to acquiesce more willingly in Polish domination and were regarded as collaborationists by their fellows.¹⁰

There was an irreconcilable core of Ukrainians who rejected all co-operation. These were represented first by the Ukrainian Military Organization and then after 1929 by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Evhen Konovalets. He was the officer who had led the Ukrainian troops into Kiev after the fall of Hetman Skoropadsky and he now became the head of a secret militant organization which was responsible for the murder of a number of Polish leaders noted for their anti-Ukrainian tendencies. This group naturally had the sympathy of much of the population and could count on their support, especially in moments of crisis. Konovalets was finally forced out of Poland and was murdered in Amsterdam in 1938 by a Bolshevik secret agent who handed him a disguised bomb.¹¹

The establishment of a *modus vivendi* between the Poles and the Ukrainians would have been delicate but the Poles completely misjudged the situation. They insisted that all the Ukrainians were eager to become Poles except a small

minority that had been bribed by the Germans. At the time when the followers of Pilsudski were planning for German support, they covered their actions by accusing the Ukrainians of being a German inspired party.

The Polish hope of eliminating the Ukrainians by assimilation was equally tactless. Count Grabski, minister of education and a statesman, declared that within twenty-five years there would not be a Ukrainian left in Poland and the government attempted a policy of forced assimilation and of disintegration of the Ukrainian communities and of pressure against outstanding Ukrainian leaders.¹²

The Polish land reform bills were applied in Ukrainian territory for the distribution of the estates of the large Polish land-owners there, but the land was not given to the Ukrainian villagers in the neighborhood but to groups of Polish veterans who were brought into the Ukrainian districts in order to alter the character of the population.

In the same way pressure was applied on the educational system. The government refused to allow the formation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv, a demand that had been put forward in the days of Austria-Hungary. They admitted only a negligible number of Ukrainian students to the Polish university in Lviv and to get an education, Ukrainians were obliged either to go abroad or to study informally in a secret Ukrainian university that was established in Lviv without the knowledge of the Polish authorities.¹³ While there were a few Ukrainian high schools in the area, the Polish language was the real medium of instruction and the work in Ukrainian in most of the so-called "Ukrainian" schools was usually confined to the most elementary grades and taught largely by Poles who had an inadequate knowledge of the Ukrainian language.

On a higher scale, the work of the Shevchenko Scientific Society was hampered in every way. Its funds were either confiscated or lost in the periods of inflation. Many of its collections were stolen and the institution was under constant

suspicion. In an effort to counterbalance its influence and remove Ukrainian influence from Lviv, the Poles in Warsaw agreed to allow the establishment of a Ukrainian Scientific Institute. The new institution did a great deal of valuable work but it shared the sentiments of the older organization and the two maintained the same point of view.¹⁴

In addition to these general policies, there came moments of especial attempts at suppression. Thus in 1929 and 1930 the government attacked Ukrainian Boy Scout troops, closed Ukrainian libraries and reading rooms, seized the property of various co-operative societies, and forced the situation to a point where there was something very close to an armed revolt. This was suppressed with cruelty by units of the Polish army.

These actions were of course contrary to and in violation of the minorities treaty which Poland had signed under protest in 1919 at the conclusion of the World War. The Ukrainians and their friends presented petition after petition to the League of Nations but to little or no effect. Even after the Pacification of 1930, when a specially strong protest was made not only by the Ukrainian representatives but by many leaders of world opinion, the League contented itself with a mild reprimand for the Polish government and a statement that some of its lesser officials were undoubtedly guilty of excessive zeal in maintaining order.¹⁵ It was merely another example of the helplessness of the League when it came to fulfill its functions against one of its members and only added to the growing weakness of the entire organization, on which the peace of Europe and of the world seemed to depend.

In 1934 the Polish government denounced the clauses of the treaties signed in Paris which guaranteed the protection of minority rights and it then opened concentration camps in which large numbers of Ukrainians were incarcerated without trial on the flimsiest pretexts.

By 1935 both sides were weary of the *impasse*. In that year the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, representing most of the Ukrainian parties, worked out a com-

promise with the government, especially Professor Koscialkowski, the minister of internal affairs. In return for ceasing their opposition, they were offered nineteen seats in the re-organized Polish parliament and promises were held out to them of the establishment of a Ukrainian university in Lviv. Yet this "normalization" meant little, for the government continued to make mass arrests of so-called members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, intern Ukrainians and close their institutions.¹⁶

Next the government turned against the Ukrainian Orthodox. In 1938 it seized over a hundred Orthodox churches on the ground that they had been Catholic at some time in the past, and demolished several. The measure was protested not only by the Orthodox but also by the Uniat Greek Catholics, especially Archbishop Sheptytsky. On the whole the move completely backfired, and served only to solidify all Ukrainians under Polish rule without regard to religious affiliation.¹⁷

Despite this sad picture of conflict with the government, the Ukrainian position constantly improved, especially in the economic and cultural spheres. The Ukrainian co-operative societies not only remained in existence but multiplied many times in memberships and in capital. They established a flourishing Ukrainian bank for which they were able to supply the funds. One Ukrainian agricultural society alone grew to have 160,000 members.¹⁸

Cultural work grew in the same proportions. Literature and journalism flourished. Institutions for the youth, like the Sokols, grew in number and various athletic groups such as the Luh (Meadow) came into being and increased rapidly despite Polish opposition. With each year the Ukrainians gained in wealth and power, despite the incoherent and brutal efforts of the government to check and undermine them.

It is easy to see the difference between the position of Ukrainians in Poland and of those in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. With all of their reactionary, unjust and brutal policies, the Poles made no attempt to wipe out the Ukrainian

population as a whole or to alter the fundamental characteristics of their life. The Ukrainian villagers were able to take advantage of the rise in living conditions and to adapt themselves to the modern European civilization. They were able to accept and assimilate the new ideas that were spreading throughout civilized Europe. They were able to vote and to elect their own people to the Polish Diet as they would, even though the authorities would frequently interfere on behalf of Polish candidates, break up election meetings and arrest anti-Polish candidates on trumped-up charges and employ every other means of stealing elections. In a word the repression of the Ukrainian cause was carried on by the methods of a traditionally reactionary and often unenlightened government machine.

Poland placed herself under a tremendous handicap by this all-absorbing effect to subdue and master a large minority. It was perhaps natural, for the sense of historical continuity between the independent Poland of the past and the present revived state was strong. During the last centuries of the old Polish Republic the Ukrainians had been forced into a subordinate position and subjected to a strong Polonizing influence. In the new state the average Pole could not imagine any change. The Poles were well aware of the harm which had been done to them in the seventeenth century by the Kozak revolts but they could not see their way clear to initiating a new policy of friendship and true co-operation.

As the most powerful of the revived states of Eastern Europe, Poland could have become the natural leader of those peoples between Germany and the Soviet Union. At times Pilsudski realized the possibilities of this but he was never able to formulate a working policy to bring it about. The trend toward a unified state was so strong that it swept the entire Polish population with it and gave the idea that their national existence depended upon their success in dominating the minorities. This unfortunate mode of thinking drove the Poles from one unhappy situation to another and cost them

abroad much of that wholehearted support which they had won during World War I, when the population almost with one accord was striving to recover its lost liberty.

The record of the Polish dealings with that part of Western Ukraine that was under its control contrasts sharply with its many positive achievements in other lines. It left behind it a hostility and a discontent which boded ill for the new state if it were to be involved in a major struggle with its neighbors. Yet it must be emphasized again that although almost all the Ukrainian parties were opposed to Poland, few were tempted to turn that opposition to the profit of Communism. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic had done its work so well that it proved to the Western Ukrainians that whatever was their hostility to Poland, their hatred for Russian Communists was still of necessity more intense and more fundamental.

XII

The Ukrainians and Romania

Those Western Ukrainians who had not passed under the control of Poland found themselves in either Romania or Czechoslovakia. In neither of these countries did they form as large or as concentrated a minority as in Eastern Galicia but their numbers were not unimportant.

There were nearly one million Ukrainians living in the provinces of Bukovina and Bessarabia who went to Romania. In the early days these had sought to join themselves to the Western Ukrainian Republic but in both provinces their hopes had been quickly dashed to the ground by the energetic action of the Romanian army in seizing Chernivtsy and other centers before the Ukrainians could mobilize their volunteer detachments and cement their regime. From that point on, they were denied all opportunities of organization.

As a Latin-speaking race, the Romanians were suspicious of all Eastern Slavs. In past centuries the Zaporozhian Kozaks had had close relations with the people of Moldavia and Wallachia. Vasil Lupul, the hospodar of Moldavia, had given his daughter in marriage to Timosh, the son of the hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The union of the two Danubian principalities in the kingdom of Romania in the nineteenth century and the growth of Latin ties had changed this old feeling and the Romanians were perhaps the most unreasonably anti-Ukrainian

of all the states which succeeded to their control.

Slowly but surely the Romanians liquidated practically the entire Ukrainian school system by introducing into it the Romanian language.¹ This was accelerated by a law in 1924 which declared the Ukrainians "Romanians who had forgotten their native language"—a highly original solution of the problem which flattered the Romanian argument that the entire population was descended from the ancient Roman settlers in Dacia.

The process was a little slower in Bessarabia, where there were conflicting political crises, arising from the fact that the United States did not fully recognize the Romanian occupation of the province, since it had formed part of the old Russian Empire.

After 1928 there came some small alleviation of the Ukrainian status. But Ukrainian political, journalistic and economic institutions were almost non-existent; in fact, during the entire period between the two world wars, it is hardly possible to speak of organized Ukrainian work in any field under Romanian rule. The Romanians, even more than the Poles, were firmly convinced that they had to repress all manifestations of Ukrainian activity, since it was motivated only by the desire to join the Soviet Union and might be regarded as indicating a lack of unity among the inhabitants of Greater Romania.

XIII

The Ukrainians and Czechoslovakia

WHILE OPEN CONFLICT marked the relations between the Ukrainians and the Poles and a creeping paralysis affected all Ukrainian work in Romania, the situation in Czechoslovakia was far more complicated. The Czechoslovak government followed a policy of not letting its right hand know what its left hand was doing. The situation in Prague and Bohemia was very different from that which prevailed in the Ukrainian section in the east of the republic, later to be known as Podkarpatska Rus, or Carpathian Ukraine, and this divergence was so sharp that it is necessary to consider separately the relations between the Ukrainians and the Czechoslovak government in the various parts of the country.

There was a scarcely hidden antipathy between Czechoslovakia and Poland which arose largely from the difference in the two national characters and partly from boundary disputes.¹ There was a theatrical and romantic side to the Polish character which made it naturally unsympathetic to the essentially sober and almost commonplace temper of the Czechs. There was a verve, a flash in the makeup of Warsaw and Krakow that was almost entirely lacking in Prague. On the other hand there was a sense of realism in the Czech capital that was not found among the Poles.

In addition the attitude of the Poles toward the Russians

differed widely from that of the Czechs. The Poles fought for supremacy for centuries with the Great Russians. They had had enough experience of Russian domination. They therefore were less responsive than other Slavs to the beauties and advantages of a mystical Pan-Slavism as devised for the benefit of the Russians. Even their experiences in the campaigns through 1920 had taught them an instinctive suspicion of all Russians whether White or Communist, and fear of the U. S. S. R. was one of the important factors in their policy.

The Czechs had no common border with the Russians but they did have a romantic faith in Pan-Slavism and a firm conviction that it was relatively simple for the Slavs to work together.² It was the Czechs who had developed and fostered Pan-Slavism as the Pan-Slavic brotherhood and they regarded Russia as one of the mainstays of this policy. Their chief enemies were the Germans and the Hungarians. Czech foreign policy after World War I was directed toward the neutralization of these two peoples. They had a fear and distrust of the Germans that the Poles did not share and a dislike for the Hungarians that was almost fantastic.

This was reflected in the policies of the Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, of which Dr. Benes was the chief architect.³ This was composed of the nations which surrounded Hungary and had been largely carved out of the Hapsburg Empire and its chief functions were to watch and thwart the irredentist dreams of Hungary and the efforts of the Hapsburgs to recover their power. It carefully avoided any stand on the subject of the Soviet Union and it failed to broaden into a general alliance of the post-Versailles states. Poland and Romania collaborated on the Soviet situation. Yugoslavia and Romania worked together with regard to Bulgarian claims, a subject from which Czechoslovakia stayed aloof, just as Yugoslavia and Romania did not interfere in the Czechoslovak attitude toward Germany. Poland and Czechoslovakia rarely came into close and friendly relations even on the question of Germany.

We may perhaps doubt the authenticity of the supposed letter of Jan Masaryk to Stalin before his suicide, when he stated that his father, Thomas G. Masaryk, had made it a principle that the Czechs and the Russians should never fight.⁴ Yet it was a fact that during the Soviet drive into Poland in 1920, the Czechs refused to help their neighbors; and this added to the bitter feelings between the two peoples. There were strong and well-founded suspicions that the Poles really desired friendship with the Hungarians. These two nations, and especially their upper classes, shared many of the same tastes. Poland was also accused of wanting to spread her influence among the Slovaks and intensify their disagreements with the Czechs.⁵

Whatever the exact motives and the political developments, it was President Masaryk's dream to make Prague the real Slav center after the war. From this city emanated all the calls for Pan-Slavic congresses, whether of law or philology or history or politics. In these meetings the Poles were the most critical and they often revealed their latent antagonism to Czechoslovakia.

During these years the Charles University of Prague was undoubtedly not only the oldest Slav university but the greatest. It rapidly built up an international reputation and it attracted young men and women from all parts of the Slavic world. Naturally the Ukrainians, particularly those from Poland, gathered here in large numbers. As brother Slavs, the Czechs received them kindly and were happy to help them, especially in ways that would annoy the Poles in the midst of their struggle for Eastern Galicia.⁶

Hence it came about that the Czechs and the Czech government showed themselves more than hospitable toward the Ukrainians who came within their borders. At Prague the government helped to set up a Free Ukrainian University staffed by scholars who had escaped from Poland and somewhat less often from Soviet Ukraine. With Czech approval and support, this institution embarked upon an extensive program of research and publication. Its student body was drawn

to a startling degree from Western Ukraine under Polish domination, and it proved itself in a few years not only the freest and best of the various Ukrainian institutions but a worthy companion of the Slav organizations that came into being around Prague.⁷

The Czechs also helped to establish a Ukrainian agricultural school at Podebrady. In Prague they allowed a Ukrainian museum and library. There were a Ukrainian Historical and Philological Society, a Union of Ukrainian Physicians of Czechoslovakia, and many other organizations. Prague became a center of *émigré* Ukrainian cultural life and the institutions there were liberally supported also by Ukrainians of the United States and Canada.

The policy of the Czechoslovak government toward these foundations fluctuated with the years. From the first, the Czechoslovaks had been against support of the more conservative groups of Slav *émigrés*, whether they were Ukrainians, White Russians or others. In the course of time, these rightists found themselves in a more congenial milieu in either Berlin or Paris, with the latter city growing in popularity after the rise of Hitler. On the other hand, the steadily growing *rapprochement* between the Czechoslovak government and the Soviet regime which coincided with the increasing age and lessening activity of President Masaryk led to some withdrawal of support from these institutions and it was widely believed that some restriction of their activity was a condition of the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance of 1935. Incidentally this was the first voluntary alliance between an independent Slav government and the Soviet Communists and it had serious repercussions on the European situation.

The relationship of these Ukrainian organizations and of the *émigrés* in and around Prague to the Czechs was handled apart from the relations between the Czechoslovak government and the population of Carpatho-Ukraine. This area offered the Prague regime some of its most troublesome questions.

We are poorly informed as to the early history of this part of

the Ukrainian population. We know that they existed in the later Middle Ages, but it is hard to decide whether they formed part of the pre-Magyar population of the area, whether they followed the Magyar hordes as they cut their way from the east through Ukraine and into the plains of Hungary before the Christianization of Kiev towards the end of the first millennium A. D., or whether they were fugitives from the fighting in Galicia that followed the collapse of the Kiev state. Perhaps they arrived in these isolated valleys in various waves of settlement. It was the only point where a Ukrainian population had crossed the summits of the Carpathians and was living on the southern slopes.⁸

The population was poor and backward and had little opportunity for large-scale joint action. Most of the educated or semi-educated classes were more or less pro-Hungarian in sympathy and in 1918, with the collapse of the Hungarian regime, had taken refuge in Budapest. Some steps had been taken to educate the Catholic clergy of the Byzantine Rite, and the Russians had sought to influence the Orthodox. All in all the population in these isolated mountain valleys was perhaps the least integrated of all the Ukrainians and represented the attitude which had generally prevailed a century earlier in Lviv and elsewhere before Ivan Franko and his associates had begun their work.

The slowness of the revolution in this area made it impracticable after the fall of Lviv for the Carpatho-Ukrainians to join the Western Ukrainian Republic. The dismemberment of Hungary made it impossible for them to remain in that state. By the late spring of 1919 public opinion, if we may speak of it at this time, inclined toward a union with Czechoslovakia and this was duly carried out. In return the region was promised local autonomy, that same elastic word that was heard so often in 1917 and 1918, and its own diet, although the Czechs carefully refrained from deciding whether the language of the people was Ukrainian or Russian.⁹

Possession of the area was important to the Czechs with their

fear of a revived Hapsburg empire and of Hungarian irredentism, for it gave them land connection with Romania and thus with the independent states of the Balkans. This was especially desirable in view of the clashes between the Czechs and the Poles, and the fact that their other neighbors, Germany, Austria and Hungary were their bitter enemies.

Relations between Prague and the province ran an uneasy course but there was not the train of uprisings and violence that marked Ukrainian-Polish contacts. The conflicts were largely confined to the political, educational and administrative spheres. The Czechoslovak government did an enormous work in establishing schools and other modern institutions but it staffed these largely with Czechs and Slovaks at the expense of the educated natives of the province, whom it suspected of being under Hungarian influence.

There can be little doubt that the Carpatho-Ukrainian leaders thought of the proposed union with Czechoslovakia in the same terms as those that had held prewar Hungary within the Hapsburg Empire. They regarded it as an independent state within the Czechoslovak Republic and predicated a Ruthenian or Ukrainian governor appointed by the president of the republic and choosing his own administration. The final agreement included in the Minority Treaty signed by Czechoslovakia spoke of "the widest autonomy compatible with the unity of the Republic," a separate diet, and the filling of "official positions so far as possible by natives."

In reality the Czechs placed the administrative power in the area in the hands of Czech officials. When they appointed a native governor, his powers were extremely limited. The local diet that had been promised was never introduced. It seems likely that the Czechs were waiting until they could train in Prague a new generation of men fit for high posts, while the return of many of the old semi-intellectuals from Budapest after the Hungarian financial reforms introduced by Jeremiah Smith in 1924 sharpened the demands for a rapid transfer of the province into the hands of its population. In 1928 there

was a reorganization of the government by Prague but the administrative institutions in Podkarpatska Rus were not acceptable to the population.¹⁰

The founding of new schools spread knowledge of the writings of the great figures of Ukrainian literature and strengthened the sense of Ukrainian nationality in large parts of the population. This was counterbalanced by a growth of Russianism reminiscent of the old Muscophile party in Eastern Galicia. The Czechs wavered between support of the two elements.¹¹

The Prague government could not decide whether the province was to be a link between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union, whether it was to be a Ukrainian center to give an example to the Ukrainians under Polish rule, or whether its chief value was to be as a link between Czechoslovakia and Romania. At various times it adopted each of these three policies. Communism of a sort was rife. Yet the general trend was distinctly upward, despite the increased hardships brought into the area by the depression of 1929. Yet, again, the growing *rapprochement* with the Soviets as a foil to Hitlerism and the unrest among the Sudeten Germans in the western part of the republic led the government to look with some disfavor on the Ukrainian tendencies. It is very possible that the future of the region was considered in the negotiations leading up to 1935 and the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance.

On the whole it must be concluded that the period between the wars was profitable to the population of this area. However galling Czech rule might have been, it undoubtedly brought educational and political training to a region that had been almost completely deprived of them. It developed a group of men who thought in terms of the province, men whose primary interests were with the people of the region. In this sense it prepared for the brief restoration of independence to the area which came for a few days amid the preparations for World War II.

XIV

Ukraine on the Eve of World War II:

The Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine

Early in the thirties the shadow of another world war began to fall over Europe. Just as the Italo-Turkish War and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 had heralded the cataclysm of 1914, so the disturbances in Manchuria, in Ethiopia and in Spain forecast a new struggle. Adolph Hitler was gaining strength almost daily, while the Stalinists were purging their ranks and preparing themselves for a new step in the development of world Communism.

Under these threats the United States, Great Britain and France seemed singularly asleep. The confidence in an uninterrupted peace that had emerged with the signing of the armistice in 1918 seemed unshaken by even the clearest intimations that all was not well. The great depression had destroyed the optimism of the twenties. Totalitarianism in its several forms, Fascism, Nazism and Communism, was raising its head and daring to question all of those postulates that had been accepted for centuries by civilized Europe. Yet no one took the threat seriously.

We have seen how Ukraine was faring under its new masters. It had no accepted spokesman. On the surface of events, it was growing apart. The Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Soviet

Republic, those living under Poland and those in Carpatho-Ukraine and Romania were being subjected to different influences, to different systems of law and administration and to different economic conditions. How was it possible to speak of a Ukraine?

Abroad the Ukrainian *émigrés* were divided. The old Ukrainian National Republic still maintained a shadowy existence. Petlyura was killed by a Soviet agent in 1926 and the head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, (Colonel Konovalets), was murdered by Soviet agents in 1938. The various political factions which had remained from the old organizations, the followers of Hetman Skoropadsky and new groups which had arisen under younger leaders continued abroad their verbal jousts. Each group was sure that it had the ear of the people and a program that would save the national spirit.

Yet, as events showed, there was a deepening of Ukrainian consciousness during these years. There was a steadily increasing consensus of opinion as to the significance of Ukraine, its importance to the world, and the essential nature of its possible contribution to humanity. Much of this was due to underground activity led by the Ukrainian nationalists, much of it was barely conscious to the people who shared it. But it existed and that was the main thing.

It would have been well for the democratic world, had it attempted to evaluate all of these new currents of thought. The Western mind still kept the same logical presuppositions that it had had twenty years earlier. Despite mounting evidence of the tyrannies and outrages of the Soviet system and of world Communism, liberal opinion still believed that the Soviet leaders did not mean what they said or were in their own way trying to introduce a new and better form of democracy. Western leaders strained to draw some line of distinction between the tyrannies of Hitler and those of Stalin, so as to condemn the one and condone the other. Some put their faith in the old thesis of the unity and contentment of all

peoples within the old Russian Empire. Some apologists for Kerensky and the Provisional Government turned to a glorification of the Communists as maintaining the old Russian idea. Others, anti-Communist, cherished the hope that the Provisional Government or something similar would return. Lovers of peace were afraid of annoying the Soviet government by uttering aloud what they privately believed. In fact public opinion was as averse to recognizing the facts of Soviet life as they were of suspecting Hitler of aggressive intentions and acting upon their feelings.

Yet the fear of a new war and the part Ukraine would play in it opened the way for the Communists and their allies of the popular fronts to revive all the old accusations against the Ukrainian independence movement. The mere fact that some of the leaders had taken refuge in Berlin (when all other capitals were closed to them) was enough to prove that the entire movement was Nazi-inspired, even though these leaders had appeared on the national stage long before Hitler had even begun to write his script. During the period just before the outbreak of World War II, when there were already hidden contacts between the two totalitarian systems, it became fashionable once again to damn the Ukrainians.

It was just at this moment that an enlightening episode occurred in Carpatho-Ukraine. Following the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia after the Munich meetings in 1938, that republic was reorganized on a federal basis and, on October 11, for the first time, Carpatho-Ukraine was able to organize the diet which it had been promised in 1919 and 1920. Almost immediately the regional Prime Minister Andrew Brody was arrested by the Czechs on the charge that he was trying to unite the entire area with Hungary. He was succeeded by Monsignor Voloshyn but the new regime was handicapped by the decision of Hitler and Mussolini to transfer to Hungary the area surrounding the two principal cities of the region, Uzhorod and Mukachevo. This left a truncated Carpatho-Ukraine and its government was forced to take up its abode in

the little town of Hust.¹

Disheartening as this was, the Ukrainians set to work with a will to construct even this small semi-independent state. For the first time since the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic, they might dream of something that they could call their own. Ukrainians of all groups made their way from the various countries to this new center. Trained veterans of the wars of 1918-20 came to prepare a new Ukrainian army, even though the possibilities of getting modern equipment were non-existent. Professional men of every kind gathered here and the little town during the winter was a hive of industry.²

Ukrainians in the United States sent aid to the new state, when they were allowed, and were prepared to establish formal contact with its leaders, but the representatives were prevented from arriving. The British refused to take any notice of the new state.

On February 12, 1939, elections were held for a diet. This held its first meeting on March 14, 1939, formally installing Monsignor Voloshyn as president.

In the early spring Slovakia was induced to declare its independence of the Czechs and was taken under the protection of the "Führer." This completely isolated Carpatho-Ukraine and rendered impossible any connection with Bohemia and Moravia. Voloshyn then declared the complete independence of the state.

His only hope of salvation was to receive at least beneficent support from the Germans, for the region was surrounded by enemies. There was little to be feared on the west, where Slovakia was already struggling with her own problems. Rumania too was relatively disinterested. Poland was, as we might expect, openly hostile. She had no desire to see an independent Ukrainian state, no matter how weak and helpless, lest it prove too great an attraction for the Ukrainians living under her own rule.³ Hungary was even more violent. That country had never been reconciled to her territorial losses of 1918 and the present moment seemed highly favorable for the

restoration of her own borders in the Carpathian region. Ever since the fall of Benes, the Hungarian government had been making plans for further action. It had been fairly well armed by the Germans and could expect to defeat the Carpatho-Ukrainians, with their rifles and antiquated weapons.

On March 14, the same day that the German troops set out for Prague, the Hungarian government ordered the withdrawal of all Czech troops from Carpatho-Ukraine and invaded the province with a demand that the new government submit. When Voloshyn, trusting to the indirect assurances he had already received from the German government, appealed for help, he was coldly informed that the Germans were no longer interested.

The tragedy soon followed. The little Carpatho-Ukrainian army composed of the Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich was attacked by the Hungarian army with modern weapons. Opposition was futile but it took several days before the resistance of the mountaineers, fighting on their own terrain for their homes and liberty, was crushed. There were numerous executions of officials who fell into the hands of the Hungarian army. Voloshyn and some officials escaped to Romania and safety.

There is much mystery about this episode. It seems fairly certain that for many years Hungary had maintained contact with certain Hungarian elements in Carpatho-Ukraine and had been engaged in fomenting discontent against the Czechs. They had followed the same policy in Slovakia. After the Munich appeasement, German influence had replaced the Hungarian and the German leaders had tried to get control of the Ukrainian movement in the province.

We know that Hitler had long cast covetous eyes at Ukraine, for he realized as the Allies had never done that it was the key to the Russian problem. He realized as the Allies had never done the strained relations between the Ukrainians under Polish rule and the Polish government. An independent Carpatho-Ukraine would serve as a magnet to draw first the other West-

ern Ukrainians and then the oppressed people in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Apparently he had made this clear even as late as the beginning of March, 1939, to Voloshyn and the leaders who were trying to find a way out of the *impasse* in which the Ukrainians had been placed by the collapse of Czechoslovakia. He gave Voloshyn to understand that he did not wish Poland and Hungary to have a common border, and he fostered the opposition between Carpatho-Ukraine and her neighbors.

Why, then, at the first moment of an attack by Hungary did he abandon the new state? One word would have held back the Hungarian army. He certainly did not do so in order to promote better relations with the Poles against whom he continued to intrigue. The only obvious answer is that already by March, 1939, the negotiations were under way between Hitler and Stalin which were to become public a few months later and under which Western Ukraine was to fall into the hands of the Communists. It adds a strange footnote to the negotiations between the Western Allies and Stalin, which were checked because none of the states between the two giants were willing to admit the Red army as saviors, for they well knew what the end would be.

There was another result of the collapse of Carpatho-Ukraine. Until this time it was confidently bruited about in many Polish and pro-Polish circles that the German attack on Poland would be preceded by an uprising in Western Ukraine. This was part of the Polish plan to present the Ukrainian movement as one made in Germany. The incident in Carpatho-Ukraine proved to the Ukrainians that they could not rely upon Germany. It emphasized again the same unfortunate truth that had been made so clear in 1918—i.e., that Germany was not interested in Ukrainian liberty, that the Allies refused to understand the situation, and that, fighting against overwhelming odds, the Ukrainians would have to solve their own problems or be overcome.

With the Hungarian conquest of the new state, conditions re-

verted to 1918. The region was reorganized as Ugro-Rus. The new institutions that had come into being between the wars were abolished. Ukrainian schools were closed. In short the region went back into Hungary as shorn of privileges as it had been during the preceding centuries.⁴

During the next months the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine was overshadowed by the better-understood events taking place in Prague, as the German armed forces wiped out the Second Republic and reshaped the area into the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Even the formation of the republic of Slovakia under German protection received little notice. Diplomats came and went, newspapers were filled with accounts of the conferences leading up to World War II, and there was little space or inclination to discuss the heroic struggle of these mountaineers and the part their fate was to play in the tragedy of the world and of the continent of Europe.

XV

World War II, 1939-41

On August 23, 1939, the Nazis and the Soviet Union signed a pact of friendship and nonaggression. It came as a bombshell to the Allied diplomats who were at the moment negotiating in Moscow for Soviet aid against Nazi aggression and it utterly confused those liberal American and Western authorities on the Soviet Union who regarded Moscow as the great bulwark against Nazism and Fascism. Yet it was no sudden development. Hitler's speech on April 28, 1939, had given good warning that something of the sort was in the air.¹ Besides, the speed with which events developed after the formal signing of the pact and the ease with which later agreements were made suggest that there was a thorough understanding between the two totalitarian powers as to many questions which were not openly included in the formal pact.²

The immediate result was the German attack on Poland on September 1. The campaign went as expected. The better armored and equipped Nazi forces speedily destroyed organized opposition and despite Polish valor in the defense of Warsaw and other cities, the Polish armies were forced to the south and east. By September 17 the Germans were besieging Lviv. Taught by the spring events in Carpatho-Ukraine and distrustful of the Nazi-Soviet alliance, the Ukrainian troops fought in the Polish ranks against the invaders.³

They certainly could have gained nothing had they taken an opposite course, for on September 17 the Soviet Union, which had a non-aggression pact with Poland, announced that the Polish government had fallen and the Red army invaded the country from the east "to take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia."⁴ As if matters were already arranged, the Germans on the approach of the Soviet troops withdrew from Lviv without a battle. On September 28 Ribbentrop and Molotov signed a new agreement in Moscow and on the next day at Brest-Litovsk the German and Soviet commanders signed an agreement for the delimitation of their holdings in Poland. The Soviets had already commenced their expansion in the Baltic republics. While the line was never publicly delimited,⁵ the Germans continued their retirement back of the San and Bug rivers and turned over the territory to the east to their Soviet allies.

This left in German hands four districts of Western Ukraine. The region along the San and Lemkivshchyna were added to the governor generalship of Krakow and the other two, Kholmshchyna and Pidlyashshya, were placed in the governor generalship of Lublin, for the Germans had determined to eliminate as many as possible of the old territorial divisions. All the areas became filled with refugees from the territories which had been handed over to the Soviets.⁶

In the first phase of occupation the Germans were apparently intent upon increasing the enmity between the Ukrainians and the Poles. Thus they allowed the Ukrainians to introduce Ukrainian schools in those areas where the Poles had forbidden them. They permitted quite liberally the publication of Ukrainian books. Finally they permitted the organization of a Ukrainian Central Committee in Krakow in March, 1940, to act as a general contact organ similar to those that they allowed to the Poles and the Jews. As a subsidiary of this, they approved the organization of relief organizations which would care for the needs of the local communities and of the

refugees who came in ever-increasing numbers with their stories of developments in Western Ukraine under Soviet rule. To some of these the Germans contributed funds apportioned from the enormous exactions that they made upon the population. Of course, no political activity was tolerated, even though for a while they looked with some kindness upon the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists as a body which had been prohibited by the Poles. Yet this favor was soon withdrawn as it became evident that the Ukrainians were not going to acquiesce peacefully in the new restricted life mapped out for them by the Nazis and were seeking their own style of secret organization.⁷

In the rest of Western Ukraine the Soviets were not slow in getting into action. All the lessons that they had learned in Eastern Ukraine in twenty years were at once applied. There were mass arrests of the intellectuals, the richer elements of the population, the Uniat priests, and all other persons who might be regarded with suspicion. Communist views of history and of atheism were applied in the schools. Bands of hoodlums murdered those persons whom the Soviets wished to eliminate but did not care to arrest. Deportations to the interior of the Soviet Union were common.

After a month of this procedure the Soviets judged that it was time to take the next step and proceed to the election of a People's Assembly of West Ukraine. The candidates were nominated by Communist labor groups and by peasant delegations which the Communists could control. The names of all the candidates were never published but they were largely Soviet officials and officers of the Red army. Among the names announced were the writer Korniychuk from Eastern Ukraine, Grechukha, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and many members of the NKVD. Then the Soviets took care to make it clear that anyone who voted against this new assembly or suggested other candidates was counter-revolutionary. When the elections were held on October 22, 91 per cent of the population was, to no one's

surprise, announced as voting for the new regime. The only act of the People's Assembly was to appoint Stalin and other members of the Soviet Politburo to the honorary presidium, to elect Stalin honorary president of the meeting, to congratulate the Soviet leaders, and to request admission to the U.S.S.R. and nationalization of banks and heavy industry.

The requests were kindly granted by the Soviet Union at Moscow and the hand-picked delegates were graciously received and welcomed into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in the Kremlin on November 21. During the entire performance there was no independent word from the Ukrainian Soviet Republic which was supposed to be the state which they were joining. It was a caricature of the symbolic act of union between the Republic of Western Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919.⁸

The next step was the introduction of the Soviet economic system. Nationalization of the land was commenced almost immediately, also of the factories and industrial plants, whether they belonged to Poles or Ukrainians. Soviet hours of labor, at least ten hours a day, and the Stakhanov piecework system were introduced. The upsetting of all of the channels of trade and commerce and the requisitioning of grain and other food-stuffs from the peasants increased the general misery. Mass massacres at Vynnytsya⁹ and elsewhere rivaled the massacre of the Polish officers at Katyn.

This first period of Soviet occupation, which extended from the entrance of the Red army until the German attack upon the Soviet Union, was a sort of preliminary period. We can compare it in many ways with the first period of the history of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and perhaps we can find details that are reminiscent of the period of Ukrainization.

The first act of the invaders was to build up a corps of natives on whom they could rely. Communism had made little inroad into the population that was under Polish rule. There were of course individuals who had accepted the idea that their brothers across the closed border were happy but

it did not take long to disillusion all who were honest enough to form an opinion. Ukrainian co-operative societies were closed or merged with those in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The independent educational institutions, such as the Shevchenko Scientific Society,¹⁰ that had existed under Polish rule were now standardized and their financial resources were confiscated and placed at the disposal of the new regime, with its representatives brought in from the east.

In this phase the task of separating the Poles and the Ukrainians was given the largest place. Lviv was declared a Ukrainian city and the University of Lviv was renamed in honor of Franko, the greatest intellectual leader of the Western Ukrainians. Its staff was purged both of the old Polish professors and of Ukrainians who did not seem responsive to the new ideas. The Soviets replaced them with trustworthy Russian Communists, as they had done in Kiev and elsewhere.¹¹

The masses were in a strange mood. They had heard for years of the opposition between Nazism and Communism and now the two dictatorships were working in apparently the best of relations. Supplies from the Soviet Union were going to Germany and likewise, in view of the blockade of the Atlantic coast of Germany, the Nazis were able to maintain contact with the world abroad across Siberia.

In the West the winter of 1939-40 was the period of the "phony war." The French armies were entrenched behind the Maginot Line and made few attempts to leave it and invade Germany. The Nazis were entrenching themselves in Poland and preparing to absorb the lands which they had already seized.

The dictators were not idle. Ribbentrop and Molotov had already come to an understanding as to the future of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were compelled to sign treaties of mutual assistance with the Soviets and admit Soviet garrisons to their important posts. During the winter the Soviets attacked Finland. World sentiment in the democracies was on the side of Finland and despite the efforts

of the Germans to secure information and turn it over to their Soviet allies the courageous Finns were able to give a good account of themselves and hold back the Red army during most of the winter.

The period also saw the formal expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations in Geneva.¹² The Soviet attack on Finland, even more unprovoked than Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, had shocked whatever was left of a world conscience. It was ironical that the League which had sidestepped every decisive action while there was time, should, past the eleventh hour, give a definite moral judgment and brand Moscow as an imperialistic aggressor.

Then Moscow turned her attention to the south. With the support of Hitler she requested Romania to turn over to her Bukovina and Bessarabia. That part of the two provinces which had a Ukrainian population was obligingly annexed to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The other sections were grouped with the Autonomous Moldavian Republic to form the Moldavian Soviet Republic, a small and unimportant district created for the sole purpose of annexing Romanian territory under the guise of self-determination.¹³ Again the same measures of Communization were introduced. There were the same nominations by Communist-dominated organizations, the same controlled elections, the same resolutions of gratitude to the great Stalin and the same massacres and deportations.

Then as Germany attacked in the West and her armies swept on to the Atlantic across the Netherlands, Belgium and France, Moscow repeated her tactics in the north and by the familiar devices accepted the submission of the three Baltic states, turned them into Soviet Republics and began to wipe out the people and nationalize all their possessions.

The Ukrainians could have little hope. The OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) indulged in acts of sabotage but there was little positive action. With Germany and the Soviet Union in alliance and with the Western powers evi-

dently losing the war, the future seemed dark indeed.

The only ray of light was the hope of a split between the two ruthless machines that held the country in their grip. The Ukrainian patriots sought eagerly for any sign of a disagreement, though they had few illusions as to the philanthropic motives of either party. The fate of Carpatho-Ukraine and the German surrender of Lviv and other Western Ukrainian territory to Stalin had shown them that Hitler was not interested in their problems. On the other hand their experiences with the Red army had shown them likewise that there was nothing to be expected in that direction. Renewed contact with the Eastern Ukrainians brought home to them in all of its horror the meaning of Communism and the sham of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

This gave the period a strange and unreal aspect. The Ukrainians realized perfectly that they could have no allies, even if they rose in revolt. Finland had been left to stand alone. The Byelorussians were in the same boat as themselves and the Baltic states still farther to the north were silenced. Waiting was the only course open. Meanwhile the patriotic leaders had to try to save their own lives, protect their followers, and prepare for whatever might come.



XVI

Ukraine between the Armies

On June 21, 1941, Nazi Germany denounced her treaty with the Soviets and her armies invaded the Soviet Union. They pushed ahead rapidly and soon the Communists were in full retreat from all the territories which they had acquired during their friendship with Hitler.

The next few days were to be decisive. As the Soviet forces withdrew, they indulged in another orgy of murder and deportation. As if doubting that they would ever return, they ruined or destroyed everything they could not carry away with them and in their haste did as much harm as possible to the local population, including the massacre of those political prisoners whom they could not remove.¹

On June 30, as the Germans were approaching Lviv, a Ukrainian National Assembly proclaimed a Ukrainian National Government in the West with Yaroslav Stetsko as prime minister; a few days later a Ukrainian National Rada was formed with Dr. K. Levytsky, a veteran of the old Republic, as prime minister.² The Ukrainians in Lviv called for the restoration of an independent Ukraine. They acted quickly to forestall any possible decisions by the Germans and set to work to prepare armed forces to join in the campaign against the Bolsheviks. Similar action was taken by the Lithuanians in Kaunas, the

Latvians in Riga, and the Estonians in Tallinn.³ The way was open for the resurrection of the governments which had been overthrown during the alliance of Hitler and Stalin.

The Germans at once made it clear that they had no intention of recognizing or co-operating with any of the newly formed governments. In accordance with Hitler's theories the lands which the German army was recovering from the Communists were not intended for use and development by their own population. They were intended to furnish supplies and men for the ruling and superior Germans. Thus in the very first weeks after the advance to the east started, it was certain that the Germans were not coming as liberators but as conquerors. All leaders of the new governments who fell into their hands were imprisoned in concentration camps.

The Nazis soon played another card. Under Soviet law the land and all industrial establishments had been confiscated from the original owners and possessed by the state. The Germans (and we must remember that in Western Ukraine and the Baltic states, Soviet control had lasted under two years, so that it might have been possible to find a considerable number of the original owners) calmly announced that since the property had belonged to the Soviet Union, it was legitimate spoils. The Soviet collective farms, etc. were maintained intact. The Soviet masters were replaced by Germans, who were ordered to extract from the helpless population the greatest possible returns at any cost. Corrupt, degenerate and brutal Nazis took the place of the old corrupt, degenerate and brutal commissars. This removed the last possibility of any active co-operation between the Germans and the citizens, who would have welcomed almost any government that would free them from Communist tyranny. The Germans acquired easy title to all the property in Ukraine and elsewhere, but they paid for it with the antagonism of the entire population, Communist and anti-Communist alike.⁴

The Nazis went much further than had the imperial German officials at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918.

Those, in their search for supplies, had granted favors to the landowning class. The current crop of war lords turned against this class as resolutely as had the Communists during their occupation. They made certain that in their war against Communism, they would have the open hostility of everybody and by their defiance of any form of self-determination, they made it clear that they intended to rule by terror exactly as the Communists had done. It may have been flattering to German self-esteem but it was to prove costly during the next four years, for it entirely changed the nature of the struggle and deprived the Nazis of any peaceful source of supply. The Gestapo was to be the pillar of German domination of Ukraine, and as the armies swept eastward, they extended this system wherever they went.

There seems little doubt that in the beginning the leaders who proclaimed at Lviv the independence of Ukraine were confident that they would receive the support of the Nazis as avowed anti-Communists. In the first stages there was apparently little more secrecy made about it than in the corresponding movement in 1917. The leaders acted in Western Ukraine before the Germans reached Kiev so as to prevent a gap in the administration of the country and give an excuse for some other solution of the problem than Ukrainian independence. They set to work to create a government and incidentally an army which could be thrown into the struggle against the Communists.

For this they already had some scattered forces. Among these were such groups as the Luh (Meadow) which had offered some military training to the Ukrainians during the Polish occupation of the country. There were the Kamenyary (Stone-Crushers), who had played a similar role but were under the control of the Socialist Radical Party. There were similar groups under the Ukrainian Nationalists, and it was these specifically that were led by Borovets, better known under his pseudonym of Taras Bulba, the Kozak hero of Gogol's novel of that name. Such groups could be used either

as the nucleus of an army or for police purposes, until an army could be formed.⁵

The Germans planned differently. They showed their hand on August 11, when they formally annexed Eastern Galicia to the Polish Government-General, the truncated body of the Polish state which was left after they had taken away the areas that they had decided to annex to Germany. Then they restored Bukovina and Bessarabia to Romania and they added to the Romanian share a large slice of Ukrainian territory on the left bank of the Dniester and the city of Odessa. The rest of Ukraine was formed into the Reichscommissariat of Ukraine under the supervision of Erich Koch and some of the eastern districts were placed under open military rule. This of course showed clearly that for Hitler, Ukraine did not exist in any form.⁶

Soon after, the Germans issued their first order for the transportation of physically fit Ukrainians to Germany for compulsory labor. They followed this up on September 15 with an order for the arrest of all officers of the new Ukrainian government and the internment of all known nationalists.⁷ This was not done until the Germans were sure that they were going to be the masters of all Ukraine and had taken not only Lviv but Kiev, which they reached early in September.

During the summer the new Ukrainian movement spread behind the German lines to include the old Ukrainian capital. In the first rush of the German forces the Ukrainian nationalists were able with relative immunity to spread their cause on the heels of the retreating Communists, who carried off with them everything that was movable. The Reds destroyed all available food supplies and seized as many prominent individuals as they could for transportation to Central Asia. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was moved to the east to Ufa with part of its scientific institutes. Other sections were wantonly destroyed. Old churches and other historical monuments were blown up and everything was done to ruin the city before the Nazi arrival. Later on the responsibility for all this

was placed on German shoulders despite the inconsistency with the Soviet boasts of the "scorched earth" policy.

This devastation by the retreating Communists proved fertile soil for the advancing representatives of the revived Ukrainian independence movement. They made such headway that it became obvious to the Germans that the call for an independent Ukraine was answering a popular demand. Hence the sudden swooping down upon the group and the mass arrests.

The German terror continued and soon the new masters were imprisoning or shooting well-known Ukrainian patriots. The writer Olena Teliha was executed in Kiev in 1942.

From this moment there could be no talk of any compromise with the Nazi invaders. The various groups that had been looking forward to a war on Communism saw their energies diverted to a struggle with the present enemy, the Hitler forces. It was obviously impossible to construct a regular Ukrainian army in the face of the German military control, but it was easy to organize a large number of small, independent bands of guerilla fighters.

These same tactics were adopted in all the countries that were overrun by the Nazis and the Fascists. Small bands numbering from fifty to one thousand men, largely from the same village, town or region, maintained themselves in the woods and swamps, and from these they would sally forth to harass German supply trains, cut off small columns of troops, and commit acts of sabotage on a consistent scale. Their tactics were those of the Greeks, of the Serbs under Mihaylovich, of the Norwegians, and of other peoples. There had been the rudiments of similar opposition in Western Ukraine to the Communist rule in 1940 and 1941.

These bands illustrate the difference between guerilla warfare of the present and of the not too distant past. Not many centuries ago, before the development of the modern rifle and machine gun, the bands came directly out of the village. The revolt of Khmelnytsky in 1648 and of the Haydamaki during the eighteenth century were outpourings of villagers armed

with their scythes and axes to assist some little nucleus of devoted lovers of liberty who were preying on the tyrants of the day. Then the crudely armed peasants were almost a match for even the heavy cavalry and on many a field of battle they were able to give a good account of themselves.

Under modern conditions, once guerilla bands were organized under men who preferably had had some military training, their first job was to secure an adequate supply of powerful weapons, build secret ammunition dumps and gird themselves with as many of the accoutrements of modern warfare as they could secure. This was not easy and in some areas for weeks at a time the guerilla forces were hardly able to operate.

German tactics during the winter of 1941-42 facilitated guerilla work. In their desire to push on and reach the oil fields of the Caucasus, the Germans trusted to their motorized equipment to force supplies through any given area with little trouble. They did not try to keep open their main supply routes but rather despatched flying columns to outlying regions while holding their grip upon the populated or strategic areas. This gave guerilla partisans a chance to dominate almost continuously large sections of the country away from the main arteries of communication and permitted them under terrible odds to take the first steps in perfecting their organizations on a large scale.

It was no easy task to bring together the scattered bands. Now and then two or more, operating in the same neighborhood, would combine for a joint enterprise, but more often the leaders were jealous of one another. Isolated detachments meeting unexpectedly would not recognize each other and would engage in bloody conflict.

The situation was made worse when the Communists, particularly after the checking of the German advance, and in Eastern Ukraine, outfitted similar detachments which were equally ready to fight both Germans and non-Communist groups. Many of the Ukrainian leaders lost their lives in these early attempts to create some form of liaison between the dif-

ferent groups, especially in the autumn and winter of 1941 and the summer of 1942.

Very little information about this movement reached the outside world. It was not to the German interest to let it be known that they were meeting with opposition. They much preferred to emphasize their successes and lay the blame for any partisan activities on the Communists.

For their part the Soviets were enjoying the sympathy of the entire anti-Nazi world, which was shipping all possible supplies to the Soviet Union. To encourage this, Stalin issued grandiose statements that the Soviets alone were not bothered with a fifth column but that all citizens of the Soviet Union were united against the Nazi invaders. He had expediently relaxed the vigorous fight against nationalism and even tolerated the appearance of stories and novels that stressed the heroism and devotion of non-Communists. It would never do for him to admit that he was confronted with an uprising of peoples who wished democratic and independent governments. Later he stated that the basis of the Soviet defense was the Great Russian population and the truth leaked out only when it was officially announced that several of the smaller autonomous republics had been liquidated because of their aid to the invaders. He might have said with more truth that it was because of their unwillingness to remain Soviet citizens, when they saw even a desperate chance to recover some of their human rights. According to Soviet theory all clashes of the Red army with hostile forces were exclusively with German-supported guerillas, exactly as the Germans admitted the existence of only Soviet-supported groups.

By the end of 1942 the more serious guerilla leaders had been brought together in a loose military organization called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). This possessed a general staff and, especially in the swamps of Polissya and the forests of Volyn, was able to develop a well-defined military base where it could gather supplies and train officers and men. The individual leaders still needed a considerable

amount of independence but they paid more than nominal respect to the central authority. Those who did not and who swung too far in concentration on one or the other of the enemies, i.e., the German occupying forces or the Soviet partisan bands which were sent into the area, were often disarmed or rendered powerless to do harm to the general cause.⁸

As an aid to their operations, the Ukrainians paid particular attention to the lower German administrative organs in the areas where they were in the greatest strength. The Nazis had retained the former administrative divisions of the country. They did not have the necessary men and equipment to maintain strong guards around these lesser centers and the Ukrainians were able to wipe them out in considerable numbers and install informal administrations which would meet the minimum needs of the population and incidentally collect supplies for the fighting men.⁹

The guerilla units were able in many cases to protect themselves against strong punitive expeditions which were sent to burn entire villages and massacre the local population. When these were too strong, the bands scattered or took refuge in the woods and swamps together with the villagers and reappeared when the invaders moved on.

We must not think of this movement as merely the spasms of some hopeless and feeble men. When need be, they were able to execute difficult assignments and even do away with high Nazi officials. Thus in May, 1943, they waylaid along the line of the Kovel-Brest Railroad no less a person than Victor Lutze, a chief of the Nazi SS forces and one of Himmler's most trusted aides. The official Nazi excuse was death in an automobile accident.¹⁰ A year later, when the Soviets were entering the same area, they surprised and mortally wounded Marshal Vatutin, perhaps one of the highest Red army officers to be killed during the war and this time the explanation was assault by bandits.¹¹ There was a long series of attacks on German trains deporting Ukrainians to Germany for slavery, when the guards were overpowered and the prisoners released to find

places in the ranks of the UPA or return to their families and continue activities in other fields.

In the spring of 1942 Marshal Timoshenko attempted to recover Kharkov by an attack from Great Russian territory and failed. The Germans did not renew their attacks on Moscow that year when the spring thaws made army movements possible but they pushed east through Ukraine to Stalingrad on the Volga in Great Russian territory and to the southeast into the Caucasus. Their defeat at Stalingrad, with the capture of their entire army, was fatal to their hopes and from then on the Soviet armies advanced westward.

This soon brought the Soviets back into Ukrainian territory. There were new and bitterer clashes with the UPA. The Red army advance was as ruthless toward the Ukrainians as toward the Germans.¹² To cover up, the army was now reorganized into Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies to give the impression that it was the natives of those Soviet republics who were doing the fighting for the Kremlin. The move was accompanied by a pseudo-reform of the Soviet constitution, granting to each Soviet republic its own commissar for foreign affairs and serving to make plausible the Soviet demand that each of the republics should be represented in the United Nations organization which was being planned to come into being after the ending of the war.

Thus in 1945 at Yalta, Stalin won the consent of both President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to the admission of Ukraine and Byelorussia into the United Nations. In the height of pro-Soviet enthusiasm no one bothered to ask whether the representatives of those countries would speak for Moscow or for the people. It is of interest that the Ukrainian representative hand-picked by the Russian Communists was the same Dmytro Manuilsky who had acted as the Russian Soviet agent in Kiev during the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky about twenty-five years before. He had improved his Communist techniques in the meantime by acting as co-ordinator for Communist interests in Germany. His appointment was a

guarantee that the spokesmen of Ukraine in the new organization would be men absolutely and exclusively loyal to the interests of Moscow. Apparently Stalin had won this concession from Churchill and Roosevelt by vague illusions to some sort of difficulties that the Soviet regime was facing. At Yalta he was not prepared to say that these difficulties were being caused by nationalist groups that would have none of the Kremlin but his companions apparently were too polite to pin him down on this question and allowed him to secure their approval of his farce by comparisons with the British Commonwealth of Nations, etc.

The Ukrainians were not alone in their struggle. The Soviet seizure of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and the German refusal to recognize the newly constituted democratic republics after their attack on the Soviets had made a common cause for the peoples extending between the two dictatorships. The Byelorussians, while they were less nationally conscious than the other groups, soon felt their kinship with the movement. They all developed the same type of guerilla warfare against the two invading armies and it was only natural that the various leaders established contact to carry on their operations along their ethnographical boundaries. It was then but a short step to a joint consideration of their general problems.

Furthermore, even during 1942, the UPA found that it could enroll as reliable members not only citizens of the countries that had been recently seized by the Soviet Union but many Red army deserters belonging to the other nationalities which had passed under Soviet domination at the same time as Ukraine, the period around 1920. The Stalinists were intent on destroying the essence not only of Ukrainian culture but that of the whole galaxy of nations within the Iron Curtain. The Germans tried to form units out of their prisoners of war from these same nationalities but in many cases the new recruits were susceptible to the propaganda of the UPA and passed over almost as units to the Ukrainian camp. There they

found leaflets on the efforts of their own nations to obtain liberty, prepared by men who had already joined the Ukrainian army. In a short time units were formed of Georgians, Tatars, Azerbaijanians and Uzbeks.¹³

So widespread were these reactions that in November, 1943, there was held in one of the UPA strongholds between Western Ukraine and the Dnieper a conference to set up the United Liberation Struggle of the Oppressed Nations. This was attended by thirty-nine delegates from thirteen peoples that had been caught in the Soviet net, including men from Ukraine and from Azerbaijan, Bashkirs, Kabardins, Kazakhs, Byelorussians, Armenians, Ossetes, Cherkassians and Chuvash. They issued an appeal to the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia to join in the creation of national democracies.¹⁴

It was similar in scope to the conference called in Kiev in 1917 to lay plans for the creation of a federalized Russian state. This had met just as the Bolsheviks were taking over power. It had aided in the disruptive movements within the Russian Empire and had served as an inspiration for the various national states which had developed on the imperial ruins and then been overthrown by Communist infiltration and military conquest.¹⁵ The tendency had been kept alive by the governments-in-exile of those republics and by other patriots through the Promethean League which published in Paris a journal devoted to the cause of the free peoples that had been overwhelmed by Communism. This movement had naturally been opposed by the Soviet Union but it had also incurred throughout its entire history the enmity of the Germans, who saw in it a weapon which might bar their expansion to the vital East.¹⁶

Although the UPA extended its activities throughout all Ukraine, its headquarters were in the West, where it was at first able to concentrate against the Nazis. Later as the Red army began to push westward, the Germans made strenuous efforts to enlist its members in the army of General Vlasov which they were forming out of prisoners of war and Red

army deserters. Few of the members yielded to the temptation and the UPA continued its fight against both aggressors.

It passed from Volyn and Polissya into the region of the Carpathians. It expanded its work in Galicia, where the Germans became more and more terroristic as they saw their hopes of victory evaporate. In these regions the advance of the Red army from the Balkans and Hungary again brought it up against the UPA, which in the meantime had had trouble with the Polish underground forces. The UPA had been able to establish contacts with these, especially during the Warsaw uprising of 1944, but many of the Polish bands were so strongly nationalistic that they declined to co-operate with other groups which might have a justifiable claim on territory that the Poles affected to own. Naturally the UPA could have no relations with the groups that were connected with the Communist-inspired center at Lublin.¹⁷

Finally in June, 1944, another important step was taken. This was the organization of the Supreme Ukrainian Council of Liberation, formed just before the Soviet troops entered West Ukraine. It aimed to consolidate politically all parties and it issued a Universal proclaiming its position as the supreme organ of the Ukrainian people in their fight for liberation. It adopted the following declaration of principles:

"It will fight to make you the sole master of your soil;
For a just social order without oppression and exploitation;
For the destruction of serfdom.
For free enterprise of the peasant on his own land;
For free enterprise for the worker;
For wide initiative of the working people in all branches of
the economic order;
For the widest possible development of the Ukrainian national culture."¹⁸

These were the goals that were outlined in the comparative quiet of 1917-18 and they are still held behind the Iron Curtain by all Ukrainians worthy of the name.

The UPA endeavored to create a definite military force

and a definite political body under the most adverse circumstances. It was unfortunate that the response was not unanimous because of a split in the leadership of the Ukrainian Nationalists. Nevertheless, the various groups of the UPA, north, east, south and west, have acquired a real military discipline.

Thus during the entire period of Nazi occupation and Soviet reoccupation the population strove to bring back those democratic principles and rights which the Ukrainian National Republic had proclaimed in 1918. It was a desperate struggle that offered little hope of final success but it showed that the Ukrainian national spirit was not dead, even after twenty years of Communist misrule, and it suggested the possibilities for Ukrainian assistance to the free nations of the world whenever they were ready to accept it.

XVII

Across the Iron Curtain

With the re-entrance of the Soviet army into Ukraine, rumors began to trickle out that not all of the partisan fighters who had helped disrupt German communications were devoted to the Communist cause. It was darkly hinted that at least part of these were organized into bands that were equally hostile to both Red and Nazi imperialism. Such rumors were not welcomed during the war—nor in the days when the West was seeking the co-operation of the Soviet Union in building the United Nations—for they seemed to indicate that all was not well and the public mood insisted upon the need for unity among the foes of Hitler.

The Communists knew how to capitalize on this mood of the moment to cement their power over Eastern and Central Europe. As the Soviet troops swept west in a wide arc, they used it to install their own governments in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Hungary and to dominate the regime in Czechoslovakia. Slowly but surely they made away with all of their opponents. On one excuse or another they virtually eliminated all other Allied representatives on the various control commissions and pursued their own policy of "liberation."

It was assumed by the Soviets and tacitly agreed by the other powers that the Soviets would recover that part of Western

Ukraine which they had occupied under their pact with Hitler in 1939. So they found themselves again in control of Lviv and the old Eastern Galicia and they were free to make such boundary settlements with a subservient Communist government of Poland as they might wish.¹

They fared just as well in Carpatho-Ukraine. When the Soviets recognized Dr. Benes as head of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile soon after they entered the war, they promised to respect the old boundaries of the republic.² But when the Red army entered upon its territory, they met at once in their usual manner enthusiastic appeals to include Carpatho-Ukraine in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. With their love for democracy, they could not fail to be moved; accordingly, on June 29, 1945, they annexed the area, while Dr. Benes yielded graciously in the name of Slav solidarity.³

In May, 1945, the Germans surrendered and the Red army formally met the Western troops in the middle of Germany to inaugurate the new era in human civilization. Up to this moment Soviet plans had proceeded without a hitch and the West had accepted the Soviet point of view on almost all disputed questions without protest or criticism.

After the first flush of jubilation over the joint victory and the first extensive contacts between soldiers of the West and those of the Soviet Union, the reservoir of good will began to empty rapidly. Soon the way was open for a new evaluation of all the reports that had been filtering across what was now commonly called the Iron Curtain.

There were three factors mainly responsible for this change. These were the unprecedented looting and plundering by the Red army, the problem of the displaced persons, and the open announcements of "banditry" by the Red command and the governments of the satellite states.

There is little need to dwell here upon the orgy of crime that was committed by the Red army. Even if a certain amount is almost inevitable in military occupation, the raping of the occupied lands reached a new high and was so reminiscent

of the excesses of the Reds in Ukraine in 1918 and in 1939 that it inevitably drew attention to this characteristic of the Soviet regime. The stories about Western Ukraine were so exceeded by the developments in Germany that their truth was easily rendered not only possible but probable. Contact with the Western armies threw a revealing light not only upon the cultural level of the masses of the Red army and their discipline or lack of it but upon the Soviet determination to shield their men from an accurate knowledge of what was going on in the rest of the world.⁴

The second factor was the problem of the displaced persons. In an evil hour at the Yalta conference in the spring of 1945, Roosevelt and Churchill accepted Stalin's idea that all displaced persons should be sent back to their own homes, by force if necessary. This seemed a senseless addition. The victims of German deportation from the Western countries were only too happy to receive governmental aid in returning to their homes. They literally swarmed back to pick up the threads of their old lives where they had been broken off by the Nazi invasion.

Not so, however, the persons who had been brought to Germany from the Eastern nations. It was to be expected that the refugees from the Baltic states which had been seized by Stalin in 1940 would refuse to go home. They were joined by millions of persons from states like Poland which had been placed under new Communist-dominated regimes including enormous numbers who had deserted from the Red army and had preferred even to starve with the Nazis under the command of the Russian General Vlasov in their zeal to combat the Communists. Of this group the Ukrainians formed perhaps the largest contingent and they had come not only from Western Ukraine, which had been seized in 1939, but even from the Ukrainian Soviet Republic where they had enjoyed the paradise of Communist rule for a quarter of a century.

In the first heat of enthusiasm for their Soviet allies, the Western nations obediently handed over the vast majority of

these people, who were immediately marched off to arrest and liquidation, for Soviet rules prescribed punishment not only for Red army deserters but for all persons who had fallen into enemy hands. The attempts to turn these people over led to disgraceful scenes and many preferred to commit suicide rather than return behind the Iron Curtain. Life under the most uncertain and trying conditions in the British and American zones of occupation in Germany still seemed better than life in the prison of nations that is the U.S.S.R. It was in vain that Soviet sympathizers in such organizations as the UNRRA tried to put pressure on the unwilling victims. Their minds were made up and gradually the Western Powers became convinced of this and began to try to find ways and means of balking the Soviet slave hunters. It is these implacable foes of the Soviet Union who form the overwhelming portion of the displaced persons and are able from their past experiences to supply hitherto unknown details about conditions of life in the Soviet Union and the opposition which exists against the Stalin regime.

The third factor was the announced outbreak of banditry behind the Soviet lines. This seemed strangely inconsistent with the boasted order and efficiency of the Red army. The Soviets made much of the so-called deserters and Fascists who were operating in parts of Poland and in Carpatho-Ukraine. The strength of the bands was shown by the fact that in May, 1945, they were even able to kill General Swierczewski, the Polish Communist vice minister of war.⁵ A little later these were identified to newspaper reporters as the Banderivtsy, the followers of one Bandera, who seemed to be everywhere preying on small isolated detachments of the Red army.⁶

Eventually the constant flow of official announcements combined with the rumors that seeped out made it known that the "bandits" were the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, part of which had been organized out of the branch of the Union of Ukrainian Nationalists headed in Western Ukraine by Stephen Bandera. It was soon evident that these foes of both

the Nazis and the Soviets at periods actually controlled relatively large sections of territory and proved a formidable enemy with which the Red army was not prepared to cope.

By the spring of 1947 the raids of these men had become so annoying that the Soviets actually made an agreement with both Poland and Czechoslovakia for joint military action against them.⁷ It was evident also that they enjoyed the sympathy and support of large sections of the population, especially in Slovakia, and cases were even known where they were aided by the Czechs. The prisoners taken from these bands were publicly tried in Poland and in Czechoslovakia and were usually sentenced to death.⁸

It is now becoming possible to trace out in general lines the later history of this force. After the retreat of the Nazis from Ukraine and the re-occupation by the Soviets, large detachments made their way to the Carpathian Mountains, fighting as they went. They were apparently part of the UPA-West forces and were under strict military discipline. In the fall of 1947 one of the detachments of this group even succeeded in cutting across Czechoslovakia to the American zone in Bavaria, where its members were disarmed and interned. At first the American authorities were suspicious of them but the soldiers were later given the status of prisoners of war and were added to the large number of displaced persons, despite the demands of the Soviets and their satellite states that they should be returned as deserters or war criminals. Since then, many other detachments have made the dangerous trip successfully.⁹

These detachments have small immediate hope of winning the independence of their country from the armies which the Reds have constructed to maintain the Communist regimes in power. Their primary object seems to be to maintain themselves in existence in expectation of the outbreak of World War III while carrying on propaganda work among the Red forces, especially the non-Russian troops coming from the other Soviet republics. Though they are thus much more of a potential than a present menace to the Soviet Union, they are

an outstanding example of the discontent that lurks at the core of Soviet power.

They are perhaps of even greater significance in keeping alive the ideals of liberty in the newly mastered states to the west of the Soviet Union. With the latent spirit of resistance still unextinguished in states like Czechoslovakia in which the governmental machinery has been seized by the Communists, these raiding detachments of disciplined and well-equipped men serve as a rallying point for all who prefer to die rather than live in slavery. They are of course pursued by vastly superior forces of both Soviet and satellite armies but they can be sure of support from sympathetic elements of the population.

Again and again the Communist press has issued appeals to the population not to assist them on pain of heavy reprisals but these have largely fallen upon deaf ears. The people of these countries, like the Ukrainians, are already learning that they will meet with the same reprisals and persecutions whatever action they take, and it is often safer for them to join these bands than to wait meekly for the inevitable.

The range of the UPA is gradually spreading. From the earliest days when it was chiefly occupied with the war against the Nazis, it has remained in close contact with kindred movements in the Baltic states. In fact it is rapidly becoming the center of armed resistance among all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe and taking the lead in building up an underground coalition of fighters against Communism and the Soviet Union.

This military activity is only one part of the story of modern Ukraine, even though it is perhaps the most spectacular. Discontent, scarcely more passive, reigns throughout the entire region.

Whatever hopes any part of the population may have had of better living conditions at the end of World War II were badly shattered almost at once. Any relaxations of Communist discipline which were tolerated during the war when the

Soviet leaders were in need of all possible support were soon revoked. The hostility of the Communists for the Western Powers which was scarcely veiled during the war flared up openly as soon as the war was over. Attacks on Anglo-American imperialism replaced the diatribes against the Poles and the Nazis of the prewar period. The new Five-Year Plan was openly described as a means of improving the military position of the Soviet Union and not of improving living conditions.

When the Soviet armies returned to Ukraine, Stalin made no bones of asserting that the Soviet victory had been won almost exclusively by the Great Russians. Several of the autonomous republics were liquidated and their populations scattered. The secret police, now renamed the MVD, continued to hound all of those people who had escaped deportation to Germany or the Soviet East. The innocent peasant who had remained on his own collective farm and who perhaps had on more than one occasion taken up arms against the Nazi invader now became a dread rebel or he would have retired with the Red army.

There came a new flood of deportations to Siberia and the Far North as the Soviet government set itself to wipe out the dangerous poison of Ukrainian nationalism and the independence movement. Again many of those Ukrainian authors were condemned and persecuted who had fancied themselves slavish followers of the new regime. They had, willingly or unwillingly, made mistakes in their ideology and in their choice of the settings of their works, which alone could be Ukrainian. Rylsky, a poet who had put himself entirely at the disposal of the Soviet government, was censured for giving way to nationalism and was thrown out of his political posts, even though in the last days of the war he had been sent from one satellite capital to another to praise Stalin's intelligence and kindness and break down anti-Communist feelings in the non-Russian Slav world.

The Communists themselves are today not immune to at-

tack. Exactly as in the period of the purges after 1928, the slightest sign of sympathy for or understanding of the fundamentals of Ukrainian life is sufficient for the accusation of disloyalty. Khrushchov, for years prime minister of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, has been promoted to service in Moscow, but before he left he had needed assistance and Kaganovich was sent down again as he was in 1928 to institute the reforms so much desired by the Kremlin.¹⁰ The Soviets themselves have announced that over sixty per cent of Ukrainian Communists have been found to be infected with the nationalistic ideas of Professor Hrushevsky and have been purged.

Hardly a week passes without some attack upon the ideas of Hrushevsky, who bids fair to rival in unpopularity in Moscow the hetman Ivan Mazepa who in the eighteenth century led Ukraine in her last great futile rebellion against Muscovite domination by joining Charles XII of Sweden against Peter the Great. The name of Hrushevsky is connected with all of the individuals purged and his teachings are running wild through the country, as the intellectual expression of the conscious and unconscious aspirations of the Ukrainian people. There can be little doubt that his serious studies have received a far more sympathetic hearing among the oppressed Ukrainians of the postwar period than they ever did during his working years.

To counterbalance these manifestations of Ukrainian spirit, the Kremlin has only the answer of force and this force produces a reaction which demands more force for its suppression. Shortly after the ending of hostilities against Germany, Marshal Zhukov, one of the leading Soviet generals, was transferred to the command of the Odessa Military District, apparently to cope with the discontented Ukrainians. There have been rumors of actual outbreaks against the hard conditions of life in both Odessa and Kharkov. It is perhaps fair to say that the entire Ukrainian Soviet Republic is in a state of potential revolt.

If this is true in Eastern Ukraine, which has been under Communist domination for a quarter of a century, it is even more true in Western Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine, which

are just undergoing the throes of collectivization. The collective farms being established to take the place of the old system of independent landholding are meeting with the same resistance that they did in the east during the years of the artificial famine created by Moscow.

Everywhere all that was Ukrainian in culture is being stifled. The great writers and leaders of the Ukrainians are being represented by the Russian Communists as the friends and supporters of their cause and their works and history are being shamelessly rewritten in order to vindicate the policies of the new masters. Russian theatrical troupes and musicians are appearing everywhere in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to advertise the duty of the people to have unlimited respect for their elder brothers who have liberated them from the foreign yoke. The Russian language, as the language of Lenin, Stalin and Moscow, is being forced into prominence either directly or by being touted as the Communist model for a Slav language. Old traditions and local customs are being treated as products of American imperialism and Moscow makes no scruples about asserting that Ukraine must have no connections with the West politically, economically or culturally.

No happier a fate awaited those Ukrainians who found themselves at the end of the war under the various satellite governments. The boundaries of these states were drawn in Moscow and the people were given the choice of moving to the countries to which they belonged racially or remaining where they were. Naturally very few in the districts formerly in Slovakia or in Poland preferred to move to the Soviet Union. The satellite governments immediately found excuses for uprooting the population. In the case of Poland the Ukrainians who remained under the control of the puppet regime were gathered up and forced to go to the western boundaries of the country, from which the native German population had been expelled. Here they were carefully scattered among the villages in the hope that they might be completely absorbed by the Polish population.

The immediate result was a widening of the area of Ukrainian resistance for the UPA now had increased opportunities to come into contact with the fighters for freedom among the oppressed peoples of the Baltic. This gave the satellite states further excuse for attacks on the luckless population and this again swelled the ranks of the UPA and its sympathizers.

While this persecution of the Ukrainian population continued, the Soviets were devoting a certain amount of energy to the restoration of the factories, mines and hydro-electric plants which they or the Nazis had destroyed during the war. The celebrated Dnieprostroy, the great electric plant on the Dnieper, the building of which had been highly publicized in earlier years, received early attention. It became clear that the primary object of Soviet restoration was to bind the economy of Ukraine still closer to that of Moscow, and the main efforts of the authorities were expended on the areas of Moscow, the Urals and Central Asia. Machinery which had been moved to the East was not returned.¹¹ So far as work was done in Ukraine, it became a pretext to bring in non-Ukrainians to populate the restored cities. Ukrainians going into industry were filtered off into other republics, while their places were taken by outsiders. The unparalleled destruction in the country left the Kremlin free to work even more openly and unhesitatingly in carrying out its plans but results were not always according to its desires. Again and again it found that its methods tended to infect Soviet citizens of non-Russian origin with the nationalistic heresy rather than persuade the local population of the advantages of the Soviet regime. But its decrees and policy are inexorable.

Flattery of Stalin must go on, even in the grimmest circumstances. In the very first days, before any reconstruction was even possible, the world was astonished to read of the most liberal donations by Ukrainian villages to their benefactor Stalin for the help of the Great Russians who had been injured by the Nazi advance. Villages which faced starvation could still find the grain to give thousands of tons to their elder brothers

and to the great Joseph Stalin as a small expression of their gratitude.¹⁷

Thus the ending of World War II has not eased the predicament of the Ukrainians. On the contrary the old processes that were applied during the preceding decade to break the spirit of the people have been intensified. The same men who came from Moscow to break Ukrainian resistance in 1928 are back at their work. The uprooting of Ukrainian ideas and ideals is being pushed more vigorously, the population is being decimated and dispersed ever more widely, and in their desperation the people are resorting to violence which is met with counter-measures. Amid all this the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is doing what it can and waiting for the hour when the world will awaken to the full significance of both the internal and external policies of the Soviet Union and come to their assistance.

XVIII

The Displaced Persons

During World War II the democracies became familiar with the work of the governments-in-exile from the nations that were overrun by the Nazis. They were composed of outstanding statesmen who had been able to escape the hurricane that swept over their countries and they not only enjoyed the general esteem of the democratic governments but were the truest guide to the ideas of the people who were compelled to remain at home. They included all parties save the Communists, for these found their spiritual and actual home in Moscow and worked at cross purposes with all of their fellows. It was a sad day for the world when the democratic powers, fired by the hope of appeasing Stalin and securing a lasting peace, withdrew their support from these groups of men and transferred it to the Communist-dominated regimes.

During the years when Hitler and Stalin were actively co-operating against democracy, these exiles and refugees had an important role not only in preserving to the world the ideals of their people but in voicing their hopes and aspirations. It is even truer today in the case of Ukraine, for it is only among the displaced persons that we can hear the voice of the true Ukraine; it cannot come from that Communist organization which has been admitted to the United Nations as the trusted mouthpiece of the Russian Communist party.

It has been a tremendous and heartbreaking task to create amid the hardships of the refugee camps in Germany and Austria the organs which can speak for the thousands of displaced persons who found themselves on the western side of the Iron Curtain. It has been even harder to prove to the Western Allies that the refugees speak not only for themselves but for their people and to secure the financial means to spread their message.

From the moment of Allied victory and the formation of the refugee camps a certain amount of relief work was undertaken by the refugees themselves. It was on a small and disconnected scale. In the autumn of 1945, however, there was held in the American zone of Germany at Aschaffenburg a meeting of representatives of the various Ukrainian camps and this formed a Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration, under the leadership of Vasyl Mudry, a prominent statesman among the Ukrainians previously under Poland. This committee was given the right to speak for their countrymen and their work was completed by the formation in 1947 in the British zone of a Ukrainian Central Relief Committee. In 1945 was also formed the Ukrainian Central Relief Union in Austria.¹

These committees exercised a general supervision and guidance over all cultural work done among the displaced persons. In a strikingly short time an energetic and well-edited Ukrainian press sprang to life. The publication not only of newspapers but of school textbooks and of serious works of science and literature proceeded as rapidly as the means of financing them could be found. Ukrainian schools were set up and religious organizations flourished.

In 1945, before the approach of the Communists, the Ukrainian Free University which had existed in Prague since 1921 was transferred to Munich and despite great difficulties it began to do good work in training the younger Ukrainians and in enabling the older scholars to continue their scientific work.²

This was by no means an isolated institution. In 1947 a

Ukrainian Technical-Agricultural Institute was organized in Regensburg and in 1945 a Ukrainian Higher Economic School in Munich. The Ukrainian Free Academy of Science was started in Augsburg in 1945 under the leadership of Professor Dmytro Doroshenko. Then in 1947 the members of the Shevchenko Scientific Society who had survived the Soviet and Nazi occupations of Lviv came together at Munich and renewed the work of the society. In addition there was started throughout the camps a network of Ukrainian lower educational institutions.³

We can add a large number of other organizations—a Society of Ukrainian Co-operatives, a Society of Ukrainian Journalists, a Central Society of Ukrainian Students. There was hardly a field in which some grouping was not formed—at first largely confined to one of the Western zones of Germany or Austria but gradually spreading through the entire area, as the Western Powers came closer together in their appreciation of the real problem offered by the displaced persons and Soviet opposition to anything Western.

Similarly the MUR, the Artistic Ukrainian Movement, brought into its membership writers, artists of all kinds, actors and musicians. Exhibitions of Ukrainian art produced under its inspiration, performances of Ukrainian plays and concerts of Ukrainian music all combined to reveal to the Western Powers the range and quality of Ukrainian cultural achievements, even under difficulties.⁴

All this organizational work together with the circumstances of their life has created a stronger sense of unity among Ukrainians of all areas and all walks of life. The displaced persons represent a good cross-section of Ukrainian culture and political life, all uprooted by the devastating tactics of two totalitarian powers. They have had the opportunity to compare their experiences, from the days of the Ukrainian National Republic, and to test their ideas against a background of military occupation and political oppression. Many have escaped from both German and Soviet concentration

camp and perhaps more than ever before they are coming to understand both the advantages and the defects of Western democracy and to understand also the similarity of their problems to those of persons from other occupied lands.

It was more difficult to organize political life and to co-ordinate the views of the various refugees. There had been an abundance of political parties in the area under Polish rule but none had been allowed in Eastern Ukraine. Finally in 1946, thanks to the efforts of the representatives of the Ukrainians in North America, a Co-ordinating Ukrainian Committee was organized to which most of the political parties, old and new, sent their delegates.

Once this was done, the trend toward unity was strengthened by the foundation in July, 1948, of an All-Ukrainian National Rada (Council) which is in a unique position to speak for Ukrainians of almost all political parties. At least eight of the leading Ukrainian groups took part in this meeting. They are the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, the Ukrainian National-Statehood Union, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workingmen's Party, the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, the Ukrainian Democratic Revolutionary Party, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Revolutionaries.⁵

These parties embrace the entire gamut of Ukrainian political life with the exception of a few of the more extreme factions on the right and left and it is likely that some of these will join ultimately. The Rada includes veterans of the Ukrainian cause who have survived from World War I and those who have come into the movement at various times since then. It occupies exactly the same position as the various national committees which were organized in Great Britain, France and the United States during World War I and the various governments-in-exile from World War II.

Through this body which have drawn their membership from all classes of patriotic Ukrainian citizens, Ukraine can for the first time in years express her real feeling for democracy,

her desire to take her place among the self-governing and independent nations of the world and her undying opposition to the totalitarian rule of the Soviet Union. It is these men and not the representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in the United Nations who are the real spokesmen of the Ukrainians as a definite factor in the life and organization of civilized Europe.

This concentration of Ukrainian life in Germany and Austria is obviously but a passing phase. It would be impossible to build up a normal life for the mass of displaced persons under the conditions of overcrowding and ruin in Germany and Austria. Adequate means of productive livelihood do not exist. The acute sufferings are relieved by such organizations as the United Ukrainian Relief Committee, in the American zone, and the Canadian Ukrainian Relief Fund working in the British zone, but more and more the efforts of these organizations are turning to the pressing task of moving the Ukrainians out of the devastated regions.

The dream of some of the refugees that they might be transported in a body to renew their active Ukrainian life somewhere in the New World soon proved unrealistic. There was no nation that would welcome an organized mass of several hundred thousand people carrying on their own life. The task is, then, to move the Ukrainians individually or in small groups to new homes, not only in North America but in South America, Australia, Great Britain, France and Belgium.

This new dispersal of Ukrainians throughout the world has broken up the unity of many of their organizations but it has also given them the opportunity to broaden the scope of their activity and to interest ever-widening circles of the Western world in their cause. For example, the Shevchenko Scientific Society is now represented by an American branch in New York. Many distinguished Ukrainian scholars have found posts and opportunities for work in various institutions in the United States and Canada, although unfortunately too many are still unable to utilize their distinctive skills and knowl-

edge. The best off are undoubtedly those who have been trained in scientific pursuits, for they have been able to fit themselves into the general reservoir of scientific men and have been hampered only by their lack of English. It has been far harder for men trained in the humanities and especially in Ukrainian subjects. Yet many of these in the course of time will be able to establish themselves satisfactorily.

It means a scattering of the already attenuated Ukrainian resources but the damage would be far greater except for the period of intense concentration that followed the World War. Men from all parts of Ukraine were able for the first time to get to know one another personally, compare notes, formulate their own ideas, and build up a real spirit of unity based on solid reality and not on the purely intellectual level. Whatever may be the future, Ukrainian society abroad is far more unified than it has ever been and we can confidently expect that the gains of the last years and the real renaissance of the Ukrainian spirit will not be lost.

XIX

Ukrainian Literature

With the nation thus torn apart and under a constant strain, it is no wonder that the literature constantly reflects the interplay of the dominating forces. The contrast between those authors who were imbued with the Ukrainian spirit and those who were loudly praised by the Communist masters is indeed striking, and the list of literary victims of the Soviet regime has steadily grown to include a large proportion of the outstanding artists of the written word.

From its origin with the *Eneida*, Ukrainian literature has sounded the note of democracy and freedom. Perhaps of no other literature can it be so truly said that it is a literature of the common man, his hopes and aspirations, his fears and difficulties.¹ The Ukrainian revival in its early stages was predominantly literary in character, for it was only in prose and poetry that there could be any national expression. During much of the nineteenth century all political work was impossible, but the writers at the risk of Siberia or prison dared to voice, sometimes openly and sometimes in guarded language, those ideals which otherwise would have been expressed in the political arena.

The literary revival started in Eastern Ukraine under Russian rule. The fate of Taras Shevchenko, the great poet who dared to lash out at the Moskals and their system and then

found himself in a Russian penal battalion in central Asia was a warning against too much plain speaking as to the people's suffering. As a result the ethnographical school gained in prominence. Here the difference in psychology, culture and modes of living between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians were stressed. The ideas of the authors were often cloaked in almost scientific descriptions of the life of the villages and they conveyed in the most diverse ways the real character and thoughts of the Ukrainians.

In 1863 the Russian minister of education denied and proscribed any separate Ukrainian language and an edict forbidding the publication in the language of books for popular use was interpreted by the censors to mean utter suppression of all literary work in Ukrainian. In 1876 these rules were made even more all-embracing and not until the revolution of 1905 were they at all relaxed. In the meantime most of the authors published their works at Lviv or elsewhere in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and thus undesignedly helped to knit together the two sections of the dismembered country.

The revival in Western Ukraine under the conditions of the Hapsburg system was slower but after it had taken firm root, it progressed somewhat more evenly. Its standard-bearer, Ivan Franko, a hard-working journalist of Lviv, showed himself not only a conscientious writer and critic but a man of keen insight. Through him and his associates Ukrainian literature was able to draw upon the literary development of Vienna and the West for broadening its outlook and its ideas.

By the first decade of the twentieth century Ukrainian literature was ready to break its original ethnographical bonds and stand out as a modern literature with its own aspirations and styles. It was able to express, despite unfavorable conditions, the Ukrainian version of all those tendencies which were dominant in the literatures of Western Europe as well as of Poland and Russia. The leading writers of the day, such as Lesya Ukrainka and Kotsyubinsky, shared in the literature of Western Europe. They sympathized with the developments

of the modern period; their literary techniques were modern; and although they were criticized by the more conservative and static elements of the day, they justified their ambitions to place Ukrainian on a par with the other Slav and European literatures.

By the beginning of World War I most of these giants of the past were no more. Franko had died in 1916 after the retreat of the Russians from Galicia. Lesya Ukrainka had passed away in 1913 and so had Kotsyubinsky. The new phase of the Ukrainian movement which began with the war needed new talents and new modes of expression.

The enthusiasm for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian National Republic called back into literature such a man as Ivan Stefanyk, who had become silent many years before, and gave him new hope and inspiration. He was not alone. New resources of Ukrainian energy were tapped by the enthusiasm of the days of liberty but it proved to be a false dawn when the continued succession of wars and the Soviet conquest carried down the newborn state. Still, the relative freedom of the years of Ukrainization brought forth many new writers.²

The most promising of these, like Pavlo Tychyna, were in the group of Ukrainian Symbolists. They developed the musical resources of the language and broadened its philosophical concepts more or less on the pattern of French poetry which had inspired the international Symbolist school.³ The common sense which had characterized Ukrainian literature kept the authors from imitating the more decadent and abnormal aspects of Symbolism. What they saw in the movement was not the desire to shock the manners and morals of the *bourgeoisie* but the opportunities to adapt to Ukrainian the ideals and techniques of Western Europe. The leading authors were men of education and culture, and following in the path of Lesya Ukrainka, they felt that the Ukrainians were heir to the poetic culture of Europe. Thus they became another link in the chain which connected Ukraine with the

whole of European civilization.

Another aspect of this longing of the Ukrainian people can be seen in the Neo-Classic group headed by Mykola Zerov, a lover of Greek and Roman literature. Zerov was tremendously impressed by the fact which had been so often overlooked by writers and scholars that the Black Sea coast of Ukraine had formed an integral part of the ancient Greek world. All along it were scattered the ruins of ancient Greek colonies and the region had been visited by classical writers, such as Herodotus and the exiled Ovid, who had died there. Zerov's imagination played on these scenes of the past and he sought to win for the literature of his country some part of that clarity and stateliness which had marked the ancient world. Among his followers were such men as Maksym Rylsky, with wide erudition and appreciation of the masters of world literature.⁴

The third tendency which developed in Ukraine, as in many other countries, was Futurism, whose leading exponent was Mikhaylo Semenko. The Futurists preached destruction for the sake of destruction. They broke with all the accepted canons of art, with the ideals and traditions of the past, the respect for the peasantry and the village, the poetic systems which had been developed for the language, the normal uses of meter, rhyme and even words. While they paid lip service to the fact that they were working to build something in line with the new proletarian culture, they reveled in the negative aspects of both the old and the new, sneered at everything, and went their own way.⁵

Both the Symbolists and the Neoclassicists sought support in the long history of civilization and culture. The Futurists denied and rejected the past and were vague about the future. They were all in a way apart from the writers who accepted in one form or another the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and tried to work in harmony with the new philosophy.

The outstanding feature of these early Communistic writers was their almost pathetic endeavor to organize groups and to announce platforms as to the precise ideological program for

which they stood. In the beginning there were many of these groups, each of which interpreted Communism in its own way. Thus, for example, the group of Muzahet through the pen of Yu. Ivaniv-Mezhenko concludes a long discussion of the functions of creative art with these words: "The creative individual can only create, when he considers himself as a being higher than the collective, and when, without submitting to the collective, he yet feels his national kinship with it."⁶ Other groups under the name of the Red Crown, the Vineyard, etc., brought forward other ideas, while the VUOPP (All-Ukrainian Federation of Proletarian Writers) followed in the same path as the Russian school of the same name and proclaimed that the only possible literature for the new day was that produced by definitely proletarian writers—most of whom were on a relatively low educational level.

The discussion over the rights of the fellow travelers, those persons who sympathized with at least part of the Communist program, though they were not Communists, lasted for some years, but about 1922 the groups and factions became more rigid; each had its own organs for publication and each indulged in lively polemics with all of its rivals.

In the course of time the groups tended to consolidate and the feuds became more bitter. There was first the Pluh (Plough) which rested its case on the theory that the basis of Ukrainian Communism must be the village and the peasant, since these had best preserved the fundamental Ukrainian characteristics and the new Communist culture was to be built by adapting these characteristics to Marxism and the teachings of Lenin. The Hart (Hardening) of the Lovers of the Workers' Theatres took its stand on a more purely proletarian and Communist basis and declined to recognize the peasant as superior to the factory worker. It denied the territorial basis of proletarian literature within Ukraine and had a generally broader foundation. Then there was the AsPanfut (Association of Pan-Futurists), later the AsKK (Association of Communist Culture), which stressed the international character of Communism and cared little or

nothing in its later developments for the purely Ukrainian, while the VUOPP (Pan-Ukrainian Society of Proletarian Writers) continued its original course.⁷

Soon out of the Pluh developed the Molodnyak (Young) which appealed for support to the more youthful classes of writers. The Hart after numerous dissensions developed into the VAPLITE (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) and this was to be for some years the leading organization.

The discussions between these groups were wordy and sterile but the issues which gradually emerged were clear and well-defined. These concerned the independence of Ukraine even within the Communist union of the USSR. On the one side were those writers who treasured the traditions of Ukraine and wanted to develop them through Communism. On the other were the men who were completely entranced by the visions of a great Communist Soviet Union with little variation between the Soviet republics and who accepted eagerly the slightest hint from the Kremlin, as it commenced its course of enforcing the ideas of the Russian Soviet Republic upon all of its satellite states.

In this feud Mikhaylo Khvylovy came to the front as a defender of a specific Ukrainian Communism. Undoubtedly the foremost prose writer of the day, Khvylovy was a strong supporter of Communism and of the proletarian literature that was to be but at the same time he rebelled against the narrow cultural outlook of too many of the Communists. He insisted that Ukraine had the right to a life and a Communism of its own. He called for the strengthening of Ukrainian bonds with Europe, for the continuation of an interchange of cultural ideas and methods, and he warned against the utter dependence upon the Russian Soviet Republic, which was in the throes of an Asiatic renaissance. More than that, he was disgusted by the uselessness of the orgies of murders that had been carried on during the Communist conquest of Ukraine.⁸

Such ideas were rank heresy to the powers of the Kremlin and even before the final acts of repression, he was continually

under attack both by fanatical Communists and the Russian sympathizers. In *The Woodsnipes* (1927) he clearly stated his ideas and indicated his lack of faith in the new paradise. He was compelled to apologize and burn the second part of the novel which was still unpublished, and it was a foregone conclusion that he was to be an outstanding victim of the purge that was to come.

In greater or lesser degree most of the capable poets and prose writers sympathized with Khvylovy. Whether Romanticism or Realism was their predominant style, whether they wrote about the present or the adventures of the past, whether they worked in poetry, prose or the drama, authors like Pidmohylny, Yanovsky, Slisarenko and Pylypenko tried to express something of the old Ukrainian spirit. They realized the difference between the ideals of Communism for which they had fought and the steadily growing power of the inhuman and cold-blooded bureaucracy and terror that they saw creeping over the country. Mykola Kulish in *The People's Malakhya* pictured an innocent and sincere Communist going up to Kiev to see the millennium which he could not find in his native village, only to be even more disillusioned. In the *Sonata Pathetique* he pictured all aspects of Ukrainian and Russian life and the entanglements of the revolution, when nationality and ideas were hopelessly confused.⁹ Borys Antonenko-Davydovych in *Death* showed a Communist coming to the realization that he has been but a tool for Moscow imperialism. The list could be increased almost indefinitely, as during the years 1925-29 old illusions began to pass away under persistent signs that the era of Ukrainization was nearing its end.

The Modernists and the Neo-Classicists remained apart from these disturbing questions as long as possible. In the first years men like Tychyna, Rylsky and Bazhan were able to maintain their point of view and to consider the changes that were taking place from a disinterested standpoint. Slowly but surely they found it advisable to take their part in the various political questions of the day. Tychyna, for example, could keep up his

old interest in the eighteenth-century Ukrainian philosopher Skovoroda but step by step he drifted away from the philosophical attitude that had inspired that remarkable figure. He came to introduce motifs that had a definite connection with modern life and to review his past works. It led him into the VAPLITE along with Khvylovy and made him a convert to the newer ideas.

Then came the end of Ukrainization. Special representatives of the Kremlin came down to Kiev and Kharkov to liquidate nationalist influences. The old liberties that had been accorded to the fellow travelers and nonparty writers were abridged. In Moscow this was done by placing the RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) in practical control.¹⁰ In Ukraine the same thing happened but here, besides the demand for proletarian control, there was a condemnation of everything connected with the name of Professor Hrushevsky.

It was quite to be expected that measures would be taken to put an end to such literary tendencies as the VAPLITE. Khvylovy was roundly denounced for speaking of the necessity of having relations with Europe and for his ideas of an Asiatic renaissance in Moscow. In return he established another organ, the *Literary Market*, which ostensibly published articles of all schools but added pungent introductions and comments which finally attracted the attention of the authorities.

During 1931 and 1932, as part of the general campaign for collectivization outlined by the Five-Year Plan, there came the artificial famine which proved that the Soviet leaders would stop at nothing to eliminate the old Ukrainian spirit, even when it was presented through a Communist prism. Henceforth there was to be no gainsaying the position of the Moscow-dominated Kremlin. The letters of Stalin and the arrests ordered by such leading agents as Postyshev and Kaganovich confirmed this truth.

In 1933 Skrypnyk, the Ukrainian Soviet commissar for education, was under fire and committed suicide. In the same year Khvylovy ended his life with a bullet. He was just in time to

escape the holocaust of writers, for some seventy-nine leading authors were liberated from their nationalist errors by execution or deportation. The list included most of the names that had already become famous in writing or the theatre—Zerov, Mykola Kulish, Kosynka, Les Kurbas, Antonenko-Davydovych and Pidmohyl'ny. The list accommodated with impartiality men who had been ardent Communists as well as those who had sought to remain apart from the struggle.¹¹ In many cases, as in that of Dmytro Falkivsky, their fault was that they had dared to say that they loved their village and its environs far better than Tibet, the Urals or the Caucasus, which was easily taken to be a hostile criticism of that greatest of all Russians, the Georgian Stalin.¹²

A few, like Tychyna and Rylsky, saw the light and were able to adapt themselves to the new conditions by abjuring all that they had formerly believed in. For example, Tychyna was not above emphasizing Skovoroda's weakness in maintaining an aloof attitude toward the affairs of men¹³ and he was able to go so far as to write of Kiev, "Although old Sofia stands within it, yet industry is all around" and to state that "we do not need the golden-domed, weakly dark, simple Kiev, stifled in its aged self but the new Kiev full of strength, with gold and silver, young of the young."¹⁴ He could turn from mystical themes to glorification of a tractor driver, and bring himself to flattering eulogies of Derzhinsky,¹⁴ the first leader of the Cheka, whose tortures and massacres had horrified the entire world. Rylsky was little better and the same was true of all the old writers who bought their personal safety with their personal integrity.

More and more the prime essential of poetry was unreserved adulation of Stalin and his associates, praise of the omniscience of the great master and of the devotion of Kirov and other Communists. Aspiring writers waxed lyrical over the great writers of Russia and the Soviets and passed over in silence their views on the development of Ukrainian literature. Some, like Yanovsky, who were more fortunate, wrote tales of the

civil wars and the fighting against the Poles and Petlyura.¹⁵ Abuse of the most scurrilous kind was heaped upon the men who had founded the Ukrainian National Republic and with each successive year Ukrainian history and literature became more unrecognizable.

Yet the most abject flattery of the powers in control did not satisfy the new master. Men like I. Kulyk could declare then that Tychyna and Rylsky were still only lukewarm in their devotion to the Communist fatherland. Praise was reserved for those young men like Mykytenko and others who had never been led astray and had consecrated themselves from the beginning of their literary careers to the building of socialism and the condemnation of the dregs of society, the old industrious peasants and workmen.

Yet even those men who had formed the nucleus of the VUAPP (Pan-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers) were soon themselves found guilty of the charge of Ukrainian nationalism. Their turn came as soon as the old literature was entirely broken or ended. They had not gone far enough in realizing that the new man must be built purely on the models set out by the Kremlin for the content of socialist realism and that anything specifically Ukrainian was to be restricted to the mildest form of scenic background.

The later thirties passed under this depressing picture, as the writers who wished to live and work vied with one another in adapting their language to Great Russian and their themes to the adulation of Stalin and his circle and to the glorification of the Soviet Union, with especial reference to the friendship and unanimity which Stalin had created between the Ukrainians, the Great Russians and the Soviet Georgians. At the same time Ukraine and her fighting against the Poles and Petlyura came to play a bigger role in Soviet Russian literature. But there was one significant factor in it—the Russian writers made no mention of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. We might overlook their acceptance of the Ukrainian National Republic as consisting solely of Fascists and White Guards but their failure

to pay any attention to the machinery of their own Ukrainian Soviet Republic in literature illustrates beautifully their rabid insistence on the unity of the Soviet Union and their denial of all semblance of independence to their subordinate Soviet republics. Even Nikolay Ostrovsky, held up by his compatriots as possessing the highest type of Communist conscience, does not feel it necessary in his novels to mention the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as part of the Communist machinery which he describes in detail, along with the fighting on Ukrainian territory.¹⁶

The new literature naturally developed that hardness and inhumanity which had been introduced by the Communists into Ukrainian life. The older writers had depicted a harsh and often a forbidding life. The lot of the Ukrainians in the days of serfdom and afterwards had not been pleasant but it had not deprived the people of a sense of sympathy or at most there was an unconscious brutality which enlightenment and better living conditions could mitigate. The new regime and the new literature boasted of brutality and Kulyk could condemn a novel written by the proletarian and Communist author Holovko, because in one of the characters "we distinctly sense the symbol sadly familiar to us of 'Mother Ukraine' whose heart aches 'equally' for all of her sons; for the workingman Artem, for the peasant Ostap and for the intellectual-nationalist Yurko."¹⁷ Here in one sentence we have the whole difference between Communist and non-Communist Ukrainian literature. The more honest and sincere Communists, like Khvylovy, could not bring themselves to this attitude and they perished under the wheels of the Moscow juggernaut. The Tychynas and the Rylskys did their best to stifle their senses and so in Rylsky's *Marina*, which was glorified as the equal of Shevchenko's *Haydamaki* and Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz*, we have a grotesque vulgarization of all human qualities which reduces even the possibly sympathetic characters to monsters and turns the unsympathetic into devils in human form. The slightest touch of human understanding was enough to bring charges of

Ukrainian nationalism against the most inveterate Communist. It was one of those things that so powerfully stirred up Ukrainian sentiment against the Soviet regime.

Meanwhile the literature of Western Ukraine continued the old Ukrainian traditions. Despite the difficulties with both Poland and Romania, the authors worked with relative intellectual freedom. There was no command for them to do more than to avoid too open seditious material. Thus, under the influence of Ivan Franko, the literature of Western Ukraine continued its bonds with the West. Some authors, such as Stefanyk, who very soon relapsed into silence, Marko Cheremshyna with his descriptions of the Hutsuls in the Carpathians and Les Martovych, continued the older ethnographic school.

The newer impulses were represented by Bohdan Lepky, who approximated Symbolism and showed a keen sensitivity for all the thoughts and aspirations of the individual. For a while he had withdrawn into exile but he later returned and became a professor of Ukrainian literature in the University of Krakow. A still younger group of Western Ukrainian authors flourished in the thirties in Galicia. Its leading representatives as Bohdan Ihor Antonych and Svyatoslav Hordynsky and Bohdan Kravtsiv, all show the influence of the West and also the results of the Ukrainian renaissance of the twenties, especially the work of the neo-classicists. During the same years a group of emigres in Prague headed by Oleksander Oles and embracing such varied names as Olena Teliha and Yury Lipa did good work in reviving the idea of the state in the Middle Ages in contradistinction to the purely ethnographical and popular treatments of the people.¹⁸

The hopes that had been kindled after the Revolution of 1905 that Kiev might become the center of the thought of a united Ukraine were gradually shattered. The center of Ukrainian progressive thought drifted back to Lviv, where it had been in the late nineteenth century, or to the Ukrainian circles of Prague. It was a severe disappointment, especially after the liquidation of Professor Hrushevsky and the other

intellectuals who had returned to Kiev during Ukrainization. Most of them disappeared or perished.

It was in Western Ukraine and especially in that part under Polish rule that progressive Ukrainian thought developed most strongly. Here the ideas and the emotions which worked around Europe in the twenties and the thirties could receive a Ukrainian coloring. Writers like Ulas Samchuk might follow ideas similar to those of Khvylovy and spread them in the *Scientific Literary Messenger*. It was in Western Ukraine and in Vienna that philosophers and sociologists like Lypynsky were able to work. Some of these naturally adapted the ideas of the twenties and thirties to Ukrainian thought in their dreams of a future Ukrainian state. They could not fail to be influenced by the ideas of the Polish intellectuals but they remained Ukrainian and there was none of that slavish adaptation of their own ideas to the will of an alien conqueror that was seen in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

Then in 1939 came World War II and the Communist rod was extended over Western Ukraine. Refugees fled to the West to escape the engulfing tide. For those who remained there was the choice of submission, death or deportation, the same choice which had confronted their Eastern brothers ten years before. There was the same necessity to pour out the grossest adulation of Stalin and his friends as the price of liberty. Those authors in the East who had made their peace with the Soviets heaped new compliments upon the dictator for his great generosity in "freeing" Western Ukraine and adding it to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Tychyna was especially perfervid in his praise of the great event.

To win popular support the Kremlin for a while carefully withdrew some of their restrictions but not those which had evoked laudation of the ruler. In fact more than ever it was made perfectly clear in the literature published under the Soviets that national defense was entirely the result of Stalin's inspiration. The war poems of Tychyna, of Rylsky, the prose and dramas of Korniychuk and of all other writers are one

long paean to Stalin as the head of the Red army, to the Kremlin as the wellspring of Ukrainian courage and patriotism, to the Great Russian brother as the protector and supporter of Ukraine, to the peoples of the Soviet Union as the direct and willing executors of the will of the master. There is not a word that can appeal to a Ukrainian nationalist, no matter how mild his sentiments. Of course there is not a mention of the desperate struggle of the Ukrainians to become masters in their own home. Such would be summarily dismissed as the work of Nazi and Fascist imperialists.

A striking commentary on this passing bid for support by the people of Russian policy is the changed attitude toward Khmelnytsky. A few years before he had been declared the enemy of the Ukrainian people; now he was restored to favor because it was he who at the Treaty of Pereyaslav had taken the first step toward connecting the Zaporozhian Kozaks with Tsar Alexis. For this act all else was forgotten and the once despised and rejected hetman now became the symbol of Russian and Ukrainian oneness. There was even a decoration founded in his honor but it is to be remembered that this was done by the Kremlin and not by the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which might as an independent entity be supposed to possess some power to confer its own honors.¹⁹

It cannot be denied that for certain types of war stories, the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet literatures possessed an adequate technique. Communist writers who had worked during the civil war and the fight against Ukrainian independence had built up a simple and direct type of writing in which the enemy were only black and the Communists white as the driven snow. They had an excellent supply of condemnatory epithets and knew how to use them and they never ceased to supply to their readers examples of this genre. They were able to turn out during the war a flood of forceful narratives exhibiting their hatred and disgust for the Nazis and their brutalities. Stories of the heroism of the individual soldier of the Red army and of the bravery of the civil popu-

lation in resisting the invaders and in enduring the tortures of the Nazis were supplied wholesale as much for propaganda as for literature. In most there was the same note that it was all done for Stalin.²⁰

With the ending of the war, Ukrainian Soviet literature continued in the same vein. In the first days of the new puppet governments, the old standbys were sent around to Prague, Warsaw and Belgrade, to meetings of the Slav Congress, to testify to Ukrainian gratitude for the beneficent works of Stalin and to inspire in the people of the other Slav states the same sentiments.

This era of good feeling did not last long. Almost at once there was a reversion to strict Communist doctrines. Once again the range of literature was narrowed and the political and authoritative critics began to criticize and suspect even Rylsky of going too far in lauding the services of the Ukrainians. He was at once accused of Ukrainian nationalism. The task was resumed of wiping out any vestiges of the old Ukrainian spirit in the name of the new Communist man as dictated by the Kremlin and the time-serving Korniychuk can deplore even in works with a national coloring, the overemphasis on the old mode of life.²¹

It was also the turn of many of the successful writers of war stories. They were accused of not practicing socialist realism, in that they had not sufficiently motivated the heroic actions of their leaders by linking them up with a conscious acceptance of the ideas of Stalin and the Great Russian masters of the Kremlin. It was not enough for an author to picture the heroic deed of a man defending his family and his village and his Ukrainian people. He had to do it purposefully because he was following the teachings of Stalin and acting on behalf of all the peoples of the great Soviet Union—or he risked the accusation of being a Ukrainian nationalist.²² Attacks were renewed on the vestiges of religion even while the subservient Orthodox church of Moscow with its hand-picked patriarch was thanking God for selecting Stalin to rescue

Russian religion.

It made the postwar Ukrainian Soviet literature even more schematic and sterile than it had been in the thirties and it made the Ukrainian elements even more obviously a mere background setting for the ordinary Communist tale. The process of denationalizing the literature and of eliminating the personal and the individual was carried even further, as the popular authors fell more and more under the ban.

It is small wonder then that it is only among the displaced persons and escaped authors that we can find any traces of literature imbued with a national spirit in its highest and best sense. Even under the hardships of life abroad there came a revival of Ukrainian literature which cannot be overestimated. These authors, often on the verge of starvation and in the most dire physical circumstances, are yet freer to write of their thoughts, feelings and experiences than they have been for nearly a quarter of a century. Men like Vasyl Barka are able to pick up once again the threads of contact with Western civilization and from the Ukrainian symbolism of the period of Ukrainian independence they can go on to describe their personal moods without reference to the directives of the Kremlin. There is a large number of novels and stories, like Dokia Humenna's *Children of the Chumak Path* and Ulas Samchuk's *East* which picture the forced introduction of Communism into the Ukrainian village and its devastating effects. Authors like Oleksy Zaporozhets describe, often with humor, the chaos and stupidity of the new bureaucracy which can see only rebellion and sedition in resistance to the mad whims of incompetent Communists who force their slaves to perform the most foolish and unprofitable actions in the attempt to make records for Communist efficiency. Others depict the tyranny and atrocities of the Soviet secret police. Others treat of the patriotic and personal motives that drove so many thousands to join the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Other young writers as Michael Orest and Ivan Bahryanny have made their appearance. These men also have the sad advantage that they

have become as intimately familiar with the works of the Western Ukrainian authors who have shared their fate in the camps.

Literary critics are able again to write honest and intelligent estimates of the great Ukrainian writers of the past and see them as they are and not as they must be in order to fit into the Communist ideology. They can discuss Shevchenko without feeling bound to point out that he was one in sympathy with the Russian radicals in his hatred of the tsar and was opposed to all of his high-placed friends because they were aristocrats. They can discuss Franko without shaping him to a Marxian sociology against which he was struggling for the sake of humanity. They can picture Lesya Ukrainka as a profound student of world literature without making her an adjunct of the Bolshevik party of 1905. They can bring back to Ukrainian literature and criticism the traditional meanings of liberty and freedom that have been buried in Soviet writings under the interpretations of Lenin and Stalin and have there lost all their original and normal sense.

It is still too early to know how permanent an effect this literature in exile will possess. It was the product of unusual circumstances. From 1945 for over three years the bulk of the free writers from all parts of the country were forced together. Now they are again scattering as they take up their new homes abroad.

We cannot overlook the few authors who have been writing abroad, especially in Canada, on the efforts of the Ukrainian immigrants before and after World War I to adapt themselves to the new life into which they have been plunged. In some cases these writers have been tempted to incorporate words and expressions which are not of the purest Ukrainian; they have translated English phrases; but their sins in this respect are no greater than those of Soviet authors who have edited and emended their writing into a Great Russian Ukrainian to please the Kremlin. They furnish valuable material for the student of Ukrainian character in its widest aspects and

with all their defects they are often more valuable and appealing than the machine-made literature that has been duly passed by the Communist censors.

A rich and valuable store of memoirs and reminiscences by refugees, is accumulating. The world is already familiar with the stories of certain ex-Communists who have succeeded in escaping to the outside world. It does not realize how many of these same tales have been written by victims of the Nazi and Soviet prisons, who are able to describe in horrible detail their own experiences in the dread past. We can confidently expect more such books as Ukrainian writers settle down in the New World and recount their experiences in acclimating themselves.

The history of Ukrainian literature during the last quarter of a century is a sorrowful tale. With World War I a new era opened which crowned the efforts of the past to make Ukrainian a truly modern and European literature. Then the Ukrainian National Republic suffered shipwreck before the growing pressure of Communist dictatorship. The list of literary martyrs who strove to express Ukrainian ideals was a long one. The republic has survived only in the truly amazing flowering of Ukrainian literature in exile. That literature can only be sad and depressing but it reflects the unquenchable spirit of liberty and democracy which has distinguished Ukrainian literature during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and which found earlier expression in the *dumas* and folksongs. We can only hope that that spirit may once again infuse the literature at home, that the fetters which bind it may be speedily broken and that the traditions of Shevchenko, Franko and Lesya Ukrainka may be restored in their native land.

The Religious Development of Ukraine

THE LAST THIRTY years have witnessed the same upheavals in the religious life of the Ukrainians as in all other fields. Each conqueror has tried to use religion as a means of breaking Ukrainian national consciousness.

At the outbreak of World War I, when Ukraine was divided between the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary, the people were divided between the Orthodox and the Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. This line did not exactly coincide with the boundaries of the two empires, for in Bukovina and to a lesser extent in the Carpathian region under Hungarian rule there were numbers of Orthodox. In Eastern Galicia the prevailing religion was Catholicism of the Eastern Rite and in Russia there was only Orthodoxy. As a result of this geographical division, there was the same difference in development that we have seen in other fields.

Let us look first at the situation on the ruins of the Russian Empire. The original Christian see was that of the metropolitanate of Kiev and of all Rus. It was in Kiev that Yaroslav the Wise had in the eleventh century founded the great Church of St. Sophia, one of the glories of Kiev architecture. Then at the time of the great sacking of Kiev in 1169 by Prince Andrew Bogolyubsky the person of the metropolitan was one of his greatest conquests. For all practical purposes the seat of the

ecclesiastical authority was moved to Suzdal and then to Moscow and the metropolitan became a creature of the Moscow princes and tsars. The manners of the Muscovite regime were impressed upon the church and long before the fall of Constantinople, all feeling of ecclesiastical dependence upon the patriarch of Constantinople was swallowed up in the pride of Muscovy.

In Kiev the metropolitanate was finally restored, after the region had passed under the control of Lithuania. The Orthodox of Kiev were not received favorably at Moscow and it was not until the revolt of Khmelnytsky in 1649 that the northern capital attempted to renew friendly relations with them. Then, after the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the patriarch of Moscow demanded that the Orthodox of Kiev submit to his jurisdiction and by political pressure the patriarch of Constantinople was forced to acknowledge this in 1685. Immediately all the rights of the Kiev metropolitan were abolished and the sterner system of Moscow was introduced, with strict censorship over all books that appeared in Kiev.

When the Ukrainian independence movement started in 1917, demands were immediately put forward for the separation of the Russian and the Ukrainian Orthodox churches and the resumption by the metropolitan of Kiev of his position as the head of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox church, exactly as the churches of Serbia and Greece had won their independence from the patriarch of Constantinople in the nineteenth century. It goes without saying that the liberal Russian Provisional Government and all the Russian ecclesiastics, including the Patriarch Tikhon, refused the request, if they deigned to notice it at all. This was naturally the case also after the triumph of the Communists. Patriarch Tikhon was not in a position to take any action and most of the Russian bishops in the Ukrainian dioceses in 1918 and 1919 sympathized with the efforts of the White armies to restore the unity of Russia.

This left the Ukrainians in a difficult position. They ap-

pealed to the patriarch of Constantinople but at this moment the Greeks in Constantinople were anxious about the attempts of the Turks under Mustapha Kemal to re-establish Turkish sovereignty and they had no desire to take any action which might involve them in a clash with the representatives of the Western or Eastern powers. The West had, as we have seen, tried to avoid action on the form of Russian governmental organization, and as a result the Ukrainian Orthodox found their hopes thwarted. They discussed possible solutions, some indeed rather fantastic, but the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic put an end to efforts to secure their own episcopate and the Ukrainians like the Great Russians were subjected to the fury of the Communist anti-religious persecutions.

Meanwhile in 1924 the patriarch of Constantinople did answer an appeal of the Polish government to set up an Orthodox church in their country and take it under his protection. This was for the Orthodox living within the boundaries of the Polish Republic as worked out after 1920—primarily Ukrainians and Byelorussians.¹ It was never recognized by any official or unofficial body of the Russians in the Soviet Union or by the *émigrés*.

On the other hand the legal establishment of this church did not relieve pressure upon the Ukrainians living under Polish rule. The civil government and a part at least of the Roman Catholic clergy were bitterly opposed to anything that might lead to a Ukrainian organization and found all kinds of excuses to annoy them and subject them to legal disabilities. In 1938 they went so far as to close a number of Orthodox churches on the ground that they had at one time or another been the property of Catholics of the Eastern Rite.² This led to disturbances and in some cases even the Polish courts refused to countenance the charges drawn against the Ukrainian Orthodox.

The chief result of these attempts was an improvement in the relations of the Orthodox and the Catholics of the Eastern Rite. The leader of the latter, Archbishop Andrew Sheptytsky,

openly protested on behalf of the Orthodox.

During nearly half a century the progress that was made by the Ukrainians of East Galicia was greatly aided by the work of Archbishop Sheptytsky, metropolitan of the Catholic church of the Eastern Rite. He was in every sense a great religious and cultural leader. His benefactions were limitless; he was a wise administrator of the church and he engaged in the most diverse religious and secular activities. There was hardly any aspect of Ukrainian life in which his influence was not felt. As a result he was bitterly hated by all the foes of his people. When the Russians entered Lviv in 1914, they at once deported him to Russia, from which he was not able to return until 1920, and even then the Poles did not allow him to return to his diocese. A little later, when he returned from a visit to the Ukrainians in the New World, he was interned for some months by the Polish government. This persecution by the two enemies of the Ukrainian movement only enhanced his prestige and his following and until his death in 1944 he was the very incarnation of Ukrainian hopes and aspirations.⁸

There is less to be said about the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina. In the case of the Orthodox under Czechoslovak rule, the patriarch of Constantinople exercised a nebulous control as in the past, despite efforts to establish an independent Czechoslovak Orthodox church. In Bukovina the Orthodox Ukrainians were brought under the control of the Romanian Orthodox church. In neither case were there any remarkable movements, although among the Ukrainian Orthodox of Carpatho-Ukraine the Russianizing tendency was very strong. In both cases the Catholics of the Eastern Rite led an uneventful existence without any strong leadership.

The equilibrium which had been attained in the religious life of Ukraine was rudely upset when Hitler and Stalin made their alliance in 1941 and the Red army invaded Poland and occupied Lviv. Almost at once there were signs that it would repeat the actions of the Russian army of 1914 and move against the Catholics of the Eastern Rite. Some of the clergy were

forced to join the Orthodox church and a number of Catholic churches were seized. No direct action was taken against Archbishop Sheptytsky. He was forced into practical retirement but he continued to serve his people and his church until the German advance on Lviv in 1941.⁴

Then he threw his energy into the attempts to reorganize a Ukrainian government. As we have seen, these were promptly blocked. In 1944 the Archbishop passed away and was succeeded by Archbishop Joseph Slipy, who was head of the Ukrainian Catholic church when the Soviet forces re-occupied the city and the area. This time they had come to stay and they acted accordingly.

On their arrival in both Carpatho-Ukraine and West Ukraine, the Communists demanded that the Catholic church of the Eastern Rite formally join the Russian church under Patriarch Alexis. When they found no support among either the clergy or the laity, they resorted to force and trickery. All of the bishops were arrested and disappeared, including the archbishop.⁵ Then the Soviets formed a "Committee of Initiative for the Transference of the Greek Catholic Church to Orthodoxy." This committee consisted of three priests, Rev. Dr. Havriil Kostelnik, Rev. M. Melnyk and Rev. A. Pelvetsky. These men shortly appealed to the other Greek Catholic priests for support on the ground that the Soviet government would recognize no other body as competent to speak for them. A favorable response was soon forthcoming from the representative of the Council of People's Commissars for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox church on the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Despite protests by most of the clergy, the Committee of Initiative arranged a synod in Lviv on March 8, 1946. It was attended by some 216 priests and was of course thoroughly uncanonical. The "synod" requested that it be admitted to the Russian Orthodox church; of course the request was granted and the three leaders were consecrated Orthodox bishops.⁶ The full resources of the Soviet machine were

applied to the task of deporting or executing any priests who refused to act in accordance with their orders.

The consequences have been appalling. Churches, including the Cathedral of St. George at Lviv, have been seized by the agents of the patriarch. There is yet no complete list of the priests and other clergy and laity who have died as martyrs to their faith. The entire property, printing houses, etc., of the church have been turned over to the Russian Orthodox. In a word the Soviets are carrying out the traditional policy of the Russian tsars and the Holy Synod which forbade the reading of the Liturgy in Russian-dominated territory in any other form than that ordered by the Russian church. Thus another dark chapter has been added to the bloody proceedings which went on as each new Ukrainian province was added to the Russian Empire and the people were forcibly converted from their centuries-old devotion to the Catholic church of the Byzantine Rite.

The Orthodox fared little better. At the first appearance of the Germans the Ukrainian Orthodox renewed their attempts to establish a Ukrainian Orthodox church. The Germans were, however, opposed to the development of any institutions to help the Ukrainians or any of the Slavs. Later some of the bishops who had served in the Polish Orthodox church consented to take part in the movement and consecrate Ukrainian bishops for the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church, and on the whole the church flourished in the regions which came under the control of the Ukrainian Revolutionary army. The Germans tried to prevent all these developments by encouraging the Autonomous Ukrainian church, which stood in some sort of relationship to the patriarch of Moscow. When successful attempts were made to unite these two groups, the German authorities interfered lest the movement be able to accomplish something for the Ukrainian national spirit. Under German pressure the Autonomous church soon withdrew from the union and then passed into insignificance because of its surrender to the enemy. After this flurry the Germans turned

against the church authorities and arrested or imprisoned many of the clergy.⁷

When the Soviets returned, they speedily turned against all the Orthodox clergy who had aided in the movement and they asserted their own control over the Ukrainian Orthodox. Deportation and liquidation followed and once again the hopes for the establishment of a Ukrainian Orthodox church were doomed.

At the present time the patriarch in Moscow in his reorganization of the church has remained true to the old Russian principle. The sees in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic are held by men who are loyal to Moscow and no concessions are made to the feelings of the Ukrainians. For religious purposes the Ukrainian Soviet Republic does not exist and the Orthodox church in Ukraine is as closely⁸ dependent upon the patriarch of Moscow as it had formerly been under the Holy Synod of St. Petersburg.⁹

All this is merely another sign of the fictitious quality which the Soviet Union attaches to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Just as in the economic, intellectual and political fields, Ukraine is felt by them as an integral part of Russia but without any of those possibly mitigating provisions which would come into effect if the republic were formally annexed. Moscow now claims precedence over all the Eastern Slavs and refuses them even those scanty privileges which are enjoyed by the citizens of the Russian Soviet Republic. At the same time it constantly harps upon the nationalistic desires of the Ukrainians and liquidates right and left.

XXI

The Economic Development of Ukraine

It is a truism for all students of Ukraine that the country is potentially one of the richest sections of Europe. It is equally obvious that the wealth of the region has never been employed for the benefit of the population. This was true under imperial rule and is just as true under the Soviets.

What are some of the resources which are available for development? They fall into the two great divisions of agriculture and mineral deposits. In both the area is unusually well endowed.

A large part of Ukrainian territory falls within the famous "black earth" region¹ which is admirably suited for the raising of grain. Even in classical times the importation into Greece and Rome of wheat from the area to the north of the Black Sea was of the greatest economic importance. After a temporary reduction of grain production in the Middle Ages because of the Tatar invasions, interest in the wheat fields of Ukraine freshened and since the annexation of the country by the Moscow tsars, Ukraine has been one of the chief sources for feeding not only Great Russia but the whole of Europe. Absence of Ukrainian grain from the world market has led to many of the difficulties in Western Europe.

Ukraine is the greatest beet sugar area of Europe. Fruits and other products of the temperate zone are also produced in large

quantities. In 1937 Ukraine produced 25 per cent of the total grain of the Soviet Union, 78 per cent of the sugar, 75 per cent of the canned goods, 15.2 per cent of the cattle and 30 per cent of the pigs.²

The yield per acre is far lower than in less favored countries of Europe. The methods of agriculture employed are primitive. Efforts to improve them were thwarted by the imperial bureaucracy and the methods of administration of the large estates. With the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic a drive was made toward efficiency and many agricultural stations were set up. These were for a while continued during the period of Ukrainization but their scope was gradually restricted.³

There have been few attempts to diversify crops. The soybean has been planted more widely but that has been the chief development. The area devoted to tobacco has remained almost constant. Cotton has not been successful owing to failure to introduce a proper system of rotation and to fertilize properly. Other crops, like rice, which might profitably be grown in certain areas have not been developed, in view of the necessity of fitting Ukrainian economy into the general pattern adopted by the central organs of Moscow.⁴ It is fair to say that less than one-third of the agricultural resources of the country are being systematically developed, and that in strict accordance with Soviet plans.⁵

The breeding of livestock has not progressed. The number of animals diminished sharply during World War I and the period of the revolution. Then it began to increase but it fell off sharply in 1929 when the peasants killed their animals rather than hand them over to the collective farms. The period from 1933 to 1937 witnessed an increase but World War II again ravaged the country, so that the industry is hardly yet on a par with what it was in 1912.⁶

It is a striking fact that the percentage of many of the products of Ukraine is shrinking when compared with other sections of the Soviet Union which are regarded as less suscept-

ible to national movements. This does not mean that conditions are improving for the population of the area. It only emphasizes the greater and greater exactions that are being demanded of the unfortunate people. Thus Ukraine produces 25 per cent of the total grain supply of the union but this is 2 per cent less than it was in 1913. On the other hand, despite the population increase, the Soviet Union expanded the export of Ukrainian grain from 41 per cent in 1913 to 71 per cent in 1937. The fixed policy of the Soviet Union has been to export the largest part of the Ukrainian grain crop without regard to the needs of the population. Total grain exports from the Soviet Union have paralleled the Ukrainian crop. As a result in 1937, despite the growth of the cities of Ukraine, nearly four million tons of grain less were available for the population than in 1913, after export. This contrasts with an increase of some twenty-one million tons for the population outside of Ukraine during the same period. Since the annexation of West Ukraine after World War II, the disparity is even greater.⁷

The mineral resources of Ukraine consist primarily of coal and iron. The coal deposits of the Donets basin are among the largest in Europe and were developed on a large scale long before World War I. It is estimated that some seventy billion tons of high quality are available—an almost inexhaustible supply.⁸

Near by are the iron mines of Kriviy Rih, which contain ore that is often 55 per cent pure. These furnished the nucleus for the imperial metal industry.⁹

The ease of bringing together the coal of the Donets basin and the iron of Kriviy Rih has long been recognized and has facilitated the development of the metallurgical industry in Russia. In imperial times the government encouraged the movement into the area of large numbers of non-Ukrainians and it was from these imported workers that the Soviets obtained many of the Communists who worked against the

Ukrainian National Republic. De-Ukrainization of the mines has long been a definite policy of the Soviet Union and has perhaps succeeded better than in any other enterprise.

In the neighborhood enormous plants were established for the production of pig iron. About eight million tons are produced each year and Ukrainian production has formed about 61 per cent of the total.¹⁰

The steel industry produces 47 per cent of all the country's steel. With this production we already find the first step in the diversion of industry. The production of steel is only a little over half of the total, while that of pig iron is three-quarters. When it comes to finished products, the proportion produced in the steel and iron area of Ukraine sinks still lower. Only 17 per cent of the machines produced in the Soviet Union come from Ukraine.¹¹

This is a continuation of the old imperial process which had concentrated around St. Petersburg and Moscow all the final manufacturing processes of the empire. Under that system Ukraine was to be only the source of raw material. The Soviets have sharpened and intensified this process with the idea of keeping the Ukrainian Soviet Republic completely dependent for all the necessities and conveniences of life.

The importance of Ukraine to the needs of the Soviet Union is being reduced by the development of Ural and Siberian centers of manufacture. Much money and energy are being expended to create these new plants and the German invasion gave the Kremlin a good pretext for moving a considerable number of the factories to the east. There are no plans for replacing these. The new Five-Year Plan adopted since the war provides for an increase of only 10 per cent in Ukrainian coal and iron production and of only 4 per cent in Ukrainian steel production. On the other hand, the energy with which this transfer of industry is being effected is shown by the fact that while in 1927 Ukraine produced 77 per cent of the coal, 75.9 per cent of the iron ore, and 72 per cent of

the pig iron, in 1937 these figures had dropped to 53.8, 61.9 and 61.5 per cent. At the completion of the new plan, these figures are to drop to 34.4 per cent of the coal and 49.7 per cent of the pig iron.¹²

This change is significant. Of course, part of it can be explained by the need of the Soviet Union for exploiting the rich mineral deposits to be found in the Asiatic regions. It is hardly to be expected that Moscow would work hard at enlarging the already existing facilities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic when other resources were available. In addition, however, the factories of Ukraine are far better known to foreigners than are the completely new developments in the east. The latter are regarded as in a safer position in time of war, since they are further removed from the frontiers. The creation of such facilities had been planned by the imperial regime but the revolution had prevented the carrying out of the process.¹³ The aid given to the Soviet Union in World War II during the period of appeasement of Stalin made it possible to proceed with this work and it has been pushed even more vigorously since the German-Communist clash. Now it is to be extended still further, so that under the Moscow yoke Ukraine can look forward to a static period of its industry. No one in authority is interested any longer in treating Ukraine, with its mineral supplies, as the manufacturing base of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin hopes that it will still play an important role but its widespread discoveries of the living character of Ukrainian nationalism and its hostility to the West have persuaded it to leave Ukraine as it was and to perform on its territory only the rough fabrication of raw materials which could be dispensed with in case of an outbreak of hostilities. All this bears out Khvylovy's statement that the Soviet Union was experiencing an Asiatic renaissance in which the Russian Soviet Republic and the western Asian regions were to profit.

Agriculture, coal and iron do not exhaust the natural

wealth of Ukraine. There are enormous deposits of peat in parts of the area. The Nikopil supply of manganese is perhaps the largest in the world and there is an unlimited quantity of potassium and other minerals. These of course must be worked until the authorities can find other sources of supply in the wide expanses of Siberia and elsewhere.¹⁴

We can understand now the relative indifference with which Moscow regarded the reduction of the population of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic even before World War II. It has given up any possible intention of making Ukraine an important source of supply. This explains too the relative lack of attention shown in many other ways.

Here in an industrial area which can surpass any European part of the Russian Soviet Republic, there is no development of any forms of light industry. Petitions to start textile plants or other necessary factories are uniformly turned down. The budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which comprises 18 per cent of the population of the country, formed 4 per cent of the total budget of the Soviet Union in 1927 and this later dropped to 3 per cent.¹⁵

Practically all of the projected plants are on the east bank of the Dnieper, rather than the west. While a few new plants are to be built in Lviv, we can be sure that West Ukraine will not benefit by its absorption and that her industries which were staggering along under Polish rule will not receive any substantial aid.

There may seem to be an exception in the production of hydroelectric power. Perhaps the best-known and best-advertised work in the U.S.S.R. is the Dnieprostroy. In the old days, when there was still the pretext of Ukrainization, American engineers were hired to construct this plant, largely destroyed during the Nazi-Soviet war. It is being rebuilt but its power will be conveyed mostly to Moscow and other points in the Russian Soviet Republic where the Kremlin wants to promote manufactures on a larger scale. As it is now,

the Dnieprostroy stands as one of the first great enterprises undertaken by the Soviet Union, and its outcome is regarded by the world as a measure of Soviet achievement. It has become more of a propaganda symbol than anything else, since the military preparations of the Union demand the strengthening and multiplication of plants which are less well known and less accessible.

Another important asset of Ukraine is its ports on the Black Sea. It is often forgotten that it was the securing of control over the Zaporozhian Kozaks in the seventeenth century that first seriously turned the thoughts of the Moscow tsars toward an interest in the problems of Constantinople and the Straits. Before that time what seaborne commerce was carried on by Moscow came through the White Sea and the port of Archangel, which was closed by ice for much of the year. Then came the interest in the Baltic through St. Petersburg. The eighteenth century saw Russian control extended along the shores of the Black Sea. In New Russia, as it was called, the imperial government concentrated upon the ports of Odessa and Mykolayiv.

Before the Revolution, Odessa ranked as the second port of the Russian Empire, surpassed in total commerce only by St. Petersburg, although as a center for exporting grain it was second to Mykolayiv and equalled by Rostov on the Don.¹⁶ Since the establishment of the Soviet regime, Odessa has been more or less superseded by Mykolayiv and Kherson, largely because it is located too near the border of Bessarabia, which was under Romanian control.

The Black Sea ports have always been closely connected with the export of Ukrainian grain and Caucasian oil. Neither during the imperial nor the Soviet regime have they been used extensively for the importation of manufactures and other articles from the West. This is only natural in view of the general purposes to which Ukraine has been put by her Russian neighbors. It was the two capitals and the Great Rus-

sian areas which were intended to receive the benefits of Western civilization which was being favored by the tsars. It was the Russian Soviet Republic which was to be the kernel and the heart of the Soviet Union; and for that Ukraine, even though it was declared a Soviet republic and admitted into the United Nations, was only an appendage to be exploited in whatever way was convenient.

It is easier to understand the imperial policy toward Ukraine than the Soviet policy, although they are one and the same. The imperial regime recognized the wealth of the area but obstinately refused to admit that it existed as an entity. To the bureaucrats of the old order, the rich mineral and agricultural resources of "Little Russia" were a godsend but it was largely the force of inertia that impelled them to work for the well-being of the capitals and they were as reluctant to develop ports on the White Sea as on the Black.¹⁷ The Baltic was their center of interest, for they viewed everything through the eyes of St. Petersburg, itself a Baltic port. The Soviets broadcast throughout the world their interest in all the peoples of the Soviet Union. They recognized, at least in the period of Ukrainization, the differences that existed between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians. But despite their international slogans they were as obstinate in insisting that progress should be Russian as had been the old regime. With their fear of the growth of Ukrainian nationalism, they naturally lost all desire to push the development of the area.

The wealth of Ukraine was for them a purely colonial possession. Throughout their entire history, they have expended less on the Ukrainian Soviet Republic than they have on the one region of Moscow, where they have concentrated their institutions and their progress. Now with the preparations for war and their appreciation of the potentialities of the Ural and Siberian areas, they are content to squeeze from the unfortunate republic whatever they can. They do not feel sure of their position there and they are trying to strengthen

it by famine, by deportation, by liquidation.

As early as 1927 the first Five-Year Plan announced that each one of the Soviet republics was to fit into a definite place in the whole. This was to be determined by the interests not of the people but of the Kremlin. From this point of view the position of Ukraine was clear and its function definite. It was to be an advanced storehouse in the economic sense. It was to be an accessible source of raw materials and foodstuffs and nothing else. The main base of the Soviet Union was to be in Asia, in the great expanses of the Russian Soviet Republic.

History hardly knows an example where a naturally rich area has been treated with such unconcern. From 1918 on, the interest of Moscow in the region was merely for the purposes of acquisition and exploitation. So it will continue to be and Ukraine has no more to expect from the economic development of the Soviet Union than it has from the political or the cultural.



XXII

Ukraine and the East-West Conflict

ON JUNE 24, 1950, the army of the North Korean Republic which had been established and dominated by the Soviet Union in defiance of the strict terms of the agreements made with the democratic nations during World War II, crossed into Southern Korea with the purpose of setting up a Communist government by force of arms. Of course the invasion was attended with the usual Communist outcry that North Korea had been attacked by the undemocratic and warmongering government of South Korea. It was the same story which has been repeated in varying forms for over thirty years.

Then came the surprising and unusual turn of events. The United Nations which the Soviet Union and its satellites had been boycotting declared North Korea the aggressor and the United States and the other United Nations began to give active military aid to Korea, while Stalin and his associates declared that it was undemocratic and warmongering to assist persons and nations on the bad books of the Soviet Union to defend themselves. The world is waiting now to see whether an aggressive Soviet Union directly or through its puppets feels itself ready to complete its task of communizing the world by force.

What is the fate of Ukraine in this struggle? With the exception of a few rather small areas Ukraine is united under

one government for the first time since the days of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the seventeenth century and a few months in 1919, but that government is not a government of Ukrainians, by Ukrainians and for Ukrainians. It is a government of Communist Russians, by Communist Russians and for Communist Russians; and even Communist Ukrainians cannot hope to find secure preferment in their Communist "Ukrainian" state.

Meanwhile there is a steady flow of Ukrainians to the Soviet paradise of Siberia and the frozen north, to the concentration camps, and to the grave. For those who were left under the satellite Polish government, there is exile and deportation to the new lands acquired by Poland in the West. For those who remain at home in both East and West Ukraine, there is only misery and persecution. In the words of Taras Shevchenko, "the people are happy, for they are silent," and they will remain so, in so far as the Kremlin can accomplish it.

Culture, language, traditions and institutions are being remodeled on the pattern of the Kremlin so that the Ukrainians may become worthy associates and followers of their Great Russian brothers. Their past is being rewritten for them, their present is being controlled, and their future is ultimate absorption or annihilation. The representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in the United Nations, Dmytro Manuilsky, speaks in the name of Ukraine but with the voice of Moscow.

Where, then, can we find the real Ukraine? First and loudest, it speaks today through the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which is carrying on its operations not only in Ukraine itself but within the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia and which has made itself the mouthpiece of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe. Now and then small groups of it appear, well-trained and well-disciplined, in the American zones of Germany and Austria. Now and then the satellite

governments release a few notes about its activities, chiefly notices of executions.

Abroad there are the displaced persons, living under the most terrible conditions but still free to live and write. There is the flowering of a new, old literature. There is the attempt to continue the old Ukrainian tradition of scholarship. There is the newly organized Ukrainian National Rada, which is composed of all parties and which is in effect the same form of organization as was adopted by the Czechs and the Poles during World War I.

What can they accomplish? They can speak and act clearly and distinctly but they cannot reach the world if the world is unconcerned.

It was the same situation in the days of the Ukrainian National Republic, when the great powers of the West declined to consider the Russian situation, supported halfheartedly the White movement, and then allowed the Communists to remain the masters of the territory. The world has seen the results of that error, and now the shadow of the Soviet Union is falling over Europe and Asia and the threat which it offers to humanity is exercising the minds and thoughts of intelligent men on every continent.

We can hope that history does not repeat itself. Already the anti-Communist Russian imperialists, the remains of the monarchists, and Kerensky and his followers, are raising their voices to demand that with the overthrow of Communism there shall be restored the one and indivisible Russia. They are using the same slogans as the tsars, the intelligensia, and Stalin, the same slogans that Taras Shevchenko and all the Ukrainians of the past cursed and opposed. They go still further and at a time when the British Commonwealth of Nations, the French Republic and the Dutch are working to extend liberty, they demand the inclusion in their Russia of all the territories that not only the tsars but Stalin has seized and dominated.

They advance the same arguments as before. Napoleon felt the weight of the power of holy Russia. Hitler tried to conquer the Communists and failed. All movements which refuse to recognize the power of Russia must fail. They overlook the fact that the White Armies in 1918, 1919 and 1920, by spurning the cooperation of the various nations which were struggling for independence and by insisting upon their indivisible Russian state and culture, doomed themselves to absolute and humiliating failure. They ignore the fact that Hitler in his insane racial theories deliberately spurned the help of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians, and set himself to reduce them to slavery. They forget conveniently that the greatest danger to the advance of Moscow was the campaign of Charles XII of Sweden, when mere chance determined that he and the Ukrainian Kozaks under Mazepa did not become the victors at Poltava.

As opposed to this Great Russian theory, the Ukrainians and with them all of the oppressed nationalities of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union appeal for a democratic solution of the problems of Eastern Europe. They believe that those great principles of respect for human dignity and human rights for which two world wars have been fought are more important to the world than the universalizing theories of a Belinsky or a Chernyshevsky, than the doctrines of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, or the mystic visions of a Third Rome and the universal dominance of Moscow, be it White or Red. They believe that the principle of self-determination enunciated by President Wilson, the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter outlined by President Roosevelt, can be made guides to a future warless world through the United Nations and that these doctrines have the same meaning to all peoples except Stalin and the imperialists of the Kremlin.

They understand today—and it is time for the democratic world to join them in this—that the steps which have been

taken to reduce the countries on their western border to the position of satellite states are nothing new. The world has seen with amazement mixed with unbelief the process whereby Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania have been brought under the power of an organized group of men, trained in the Russian Communist schools in Moscow and sent into those lands during the period of nominal alliance with the Allies, to worm their way into key positions of government and then take over. It is only in Yugoslavia that Communists like Tito who have some interest in their own country are carrying on a successful resistance to the demands of Stalin, while in the other satellite countries, the native Communists are being marched to prison or the gallows at the orders of the Kremlin, exactly as were Skrypnyk and his companions in Ukraine. The civilized nations are still scarcely able to credit the steps that were taken in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to reduce them to Soviet republics and admit them into the Soviet Union.

The Ukrainians understand all this, for they have seen how the process was worked among them in 1918, 1919 and 1920. They have seen how the way was prepared by appeals for assistance against the imperialists, how it was carried on slowly but methodically during the period of Ukrainization, and how it was accomplished during the period of collectivization. They have seen it and felt it for over a quarter of a century, and they have seen how it was applied when the Red armies invaded West Ukraine in 1939 and again in 1944 and 1945. They have seen the same process as it was developing in the other peoples of the Russian Empire, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

It is all the same process and Ukraine has been the great testing ground for the new methods of Soviet imperialism, not only under Stalin but under Lenin. The Russian Communists have made temporary truces with the capitalists, the Fascists, the peasants and the nationalistic workmen of each country which they wished to conquer and have continued them only

so long as it served their nefarious purposes. Western thought will do very wrong, unless it too learns that the process of 1950 is but a refined version of that which was worked out in 1918 and 1919 and improved in 1944 and 1945.

It was a bitter blow when democratic statesmen were forced to realize that their compromises with the Soviets and their abandonment of the governments in exile advanced Soviet power into the heart of Europe and put it in a position to threaten France and Italy. It was a sad blot upon their principles when they accepted the Soviet interpretation of the Yalta agreements and returned to deportation or death millions of wretched men and women who had succeeded in escaping outside the Iron Curtain.

Today the democratic powers have gone further. They are intent upon stopping the extension of Communism. They are trying desperately to keep it from conquering Greece and Turkey. They are hoping that it can be held in check in Italy and they are actively working to maintain some touch of freedom in Germany and Berlin. They are offering refuge to democratic leaders from the satellite states but as yet they have not ventured to form a plan to liberate their populations, while the Soviet colossus swallows China and advances throughout Asia.

Again and again in the patient discussions of the foreign ministers, the angry exchanges in the Security Council and the United Nations, the Western Powers have stressed the fact that they do not want to take from the Soviet Union what is rightfully her own. It is a noble sentiment. There is only one question more that should be asked: What is rightfully her own?

In view of the situation in St. Petersburg and Moscow in 1917, it might be held that the Great Russians have chosen Soviet rule. This cannot be said of any other people within the old Russian Empire and it can even less be said of any of the recent acquisitions. The world knows today the meaning of Soviet elections, where almost the entire population votes

in open ballot for the program dictated by their masters—or else. The world knows today how the Red army and the secret police, be it called Cheka, OGPU, NKVD or MVD, work to carry out that “or else.” The world knows today, as it never knew before, how the Red army and armed forces of various kinds can be called into action to support the Soviet Union. It knows the significance of the Soviet fifth columns in all the countries of the world.

All this is nothing new for Ukraine. The people there have seen the flowering of this system. They have seen it from the very beginning and it is their certainty that there is no hope of change that has led to the development of the Ukrainian insurgent army and the desperate struggle of the Ukrainian people. They prefer death as free men to death as slaves.

One leader after another who has awakened from the mirage of the past years is calling upon the democratic nations to take the lead in a positive message to the world, in formulating a program which can rally all men to their cause and arouse an echo even within the Iron Curtain. That program is simple. It is to offer true democratic liberty to the oppressed peoples of the Soviet Union, to the people of the satellite states as distinct from their puppet governments, even if they temporarily look askance at the Cominform. It is to offer just as certainly the same democratic liberty to the peoples of the oppressed republics of the Soviet Union, to demand that they be represented in the United Nations by people chosen by themselves in a democratic way and not picked by the Kremlin.

It is idle to put forward the plea that in the new democratic world Russia must exist in the boundaries of 1914 and of 1950. The very statistics put out by the Soviet Union emphasize that the Asiatic renaissance, the development of the eastern spaces of the Russian Soviet Republic, can supply satisfactorily all the needs of the Great Russians. They show conclusively that the satellite republics are doomed to a lower standard of living to furnish the Russian war potential in good measure. If Ukrainian grain is to be used solely for export by Moscow,

why should not that grain bring in returns for the Ukrainian people? Why should the Ukrainian peasant be expelled from his fields and subjected to famine, in order that the masters of the Kremlin should secure the means of spreading their propaganda?

Ukraine has always maintained close connections with the West. She has never voluntarily merged her fate with the East as has Moscow. Every attempt at the liberation of the country has approached the West and the West has not listened. Today the West is threatened as never before. It is but the part of prudence for it to open its ears and eyes and recognize the efforts of the Ukrainian people to shake off the yoke that has lain upon them for centuries, to assist them in their struggle, and to admit them to the new Europe and the union of free and democratic nations.

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Notes

CHAPTER ONE

1. For a brief history of Ukraine, see C. A. Manning, *The Story of the Ukraine* (New York, 1947), and M. Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941).
2. See V. G. Belinsky, "The Gaydamaki," *Polnoe Sobraniye Sochineniy* (St. Petersburg, 1904), VII, 214 ff.
3. See Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 496.
4. See Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 512.
5. See C. A. Manning, *Ukrainian Literature, Studies of the Leading Authors* (Jersey City, 1944), p. 69.
6. Seven Ukrainians were elected from the one guberniya of Volyn.
7. See Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, chap. XXI.
8. *Poland*, ed., Bernadotte E. Schmidt (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), pp. 68 ff.

CHAPTER TWO

1. R. L. Buell, *Poland, Key to Europe* (New York, 1939), pp. 65 ff.
2. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, ed. Ivan Tyktor (Lviv, Winnipeg, 1948), pp. 748 ff.
3. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 756 ff.
4. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 518 ff.
5. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 758 ff.
6. For earlier cases, see A. H. Hore, *Student's History of the Greek Church* (London, 1902), pp. 447 ff. Cf. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 516 ff.

CHAPTER THREE

1. Historians of all schools of thought agree as to the nature of the problems confronting the Revolution and vary only as to the emphasis which they place upon the different factors. However, most Russian historians and others trained under their influence pass over almost in silence the problem of the nationalities. Thus Bernard Pares, *Russia* (New York, 1943), hardly refers to it. Geroid Tanquaray Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1932), pp. 148-49, mentions the rise of nationalism in the border states prior to 1905 but pays no attention to its development between the Revolutions as affecting the rural population. On the other hand, C. Tcheidze in *Russia—U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1933), pp. 103 ff. notes the increasing tension between the Russians and the other nationalities and in the same volume, p. 65, Peter Malevsky-Malevitch mentions the important role of the separatist movements in the events of 1918. He emphasizes that by 1918 the opponents of the Communists were of "two very different groups: One comprising the property-owning classes (who had been deprived of their all by the Bolsheviks), the officers, the civil servants and all those devoted to the ideals of the Russian State as constituted before the October Revolution; the other, the national separatist groups, which desired complete separation from Russia. It is easy to see that, no matter how antagonistic these groups might be to Communism, their aims were absolutely dissociated. The unity of the Russian State could only be re-established in one of two ways: either by a restoration of the Monarchy or by federation. Neither alternative appealed to the anti-Bolshevik groups."
2. Nicholas D. Czubatyj, "National Revolution in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, I, 23.
3. Czubatyj, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
4. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 522.
5. See *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 763.
6. Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 86, does not mention that the bulk of the soldiers in this regiment were Ukrainian.

7. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 524.
8. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 763.
9. Czubytyj, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
10. See *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 766 ff.; Czubytyj, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 526 ff.
11. Chubytyj, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
12. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 527. This precipitated the downfall of the cabinet in Petrograd and was contemporary with the July uprising in that city.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 532.
2. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 532.
3. Czubytyj, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
4. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 768. Chubytyj, *op. cit.*, p. 33. This was in connection with the Russian Council of Soviets of the Donets and Kriviy Rih. D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy*, Uzhorod, 1930-2, Vol. I, pp. 222 ff.
5. The interpretation of the Conference of Brest-Litovsk is highly controversial. Russian and anti-German writers use it consistently to discredit the Ukrainian movement. Cf. Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 97; John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Forgotten Peace, Brest Litovsk, March, 1918* (New York, 1938), etc. *Russia—U.S.S.R.*, pp. 65-6. On the other hand Ukrainian historians as Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 536 ff. and D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (Uzhorod, 1930-32), p. 202 emphasize that the Rada had no other course open to it.
6. O. Czernin, *In the World War* (New York, 1920), p. 258.
7. Francis Joseph had died November 21, 1916, and the young emperor Charles was still floundering in his policies.
8. James Mavor, *The Russian Revolution* (London, 1928), pp. 202 ff.
9. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 779 f.
10. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 539 ff.
11. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 543.
12. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 546.
13. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 786.

14. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
15. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff.
16. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 790.
2. *op. cit.*, p. 791.
3. For the Polish explanation of this occupation as aided by the old government, see A. Przybylski, *Wojna Polska, 1918-1921* (Warszawa, 1930), p. 24.
4. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 792 f.
5. Przybylski, *op. cit.*, pp. 45 ff. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainym*, p. 798 ff.
6. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 832.
7. R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks* (London, New York, 1943), p. 324. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 833 f.
8. Czubytyj, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 ff.

CHAPTER SIX

1. For similar cases in the Baltic area, see E. W. Polson Newman, *Britain and the Baltic* (London, 1930), pp. 80 ff., in the cases of Von der Goltz and the still more complicated case of Bermond-Avalov.
2. All histories of the White Armies point this out.
3. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 555; W. H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine, A Submerged Nation* (New York, 1944), p. 48.
4. Buell, *op. cit.*, pp. 268 ff.
5. Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 270.
6. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 812.
7. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
8. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 825 ff.; Przybylski, *op. cit.*, pp. 130 ff.
9. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 827.
10. See extracts from the treaty printed in Stanislaw Skrzypek, *The Problem of Eastern Galicia* (London, 1948), pp. 72 ff.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Ukrainian-American Political Action in the Years 1914-1920, *Golden Jubilee Almanac of the Ukrainian National Association 1894-1944*. Jersey City, N. J. 1944, pp. 112ff.
2. Margolin, *From a Political Diary, Russia, the Ukraine and America*. New York, 1946.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. This is shown by the outline of the Communist International (the Comintern) published in *Russia-U.S.S.R.* (pp. 332 ff.) and resting on the declaration of 1924. The Comintern took definite shape in Moscow in 1919 before the ending of hostilities. Ruth Fischer in *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, 1948, p. 547) says: "Comintern life and Comintern policy should have been divorced from the Russian party." Still she notes that as early as 1920 Russian methods were already being applied in Germany. The failure of the Communists outside of Moscow had the inevitable result of emphasizing the success of Lenin and his followers but it is difficult to decide at exactly what date Russian domination became a matter of right and not of policy.
2. See the citations in *Russia-U.S.S.R.*, p. 171.
3. See Yuriy Sherekh, "Trends in Ukrainian Literature under the Soviets," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IV, 154.
4. The Constitution of the Uk.S.S.R. of March 14, 1919, definitely declares it to be a state completely independent of the R.S.F.S.R. (the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic) *Russia-U.S.S.R.*, p. 174.
5. Thanks to the statutes of the Communist International and its theories of class and not of geographical membership, there is no inconsistency on this point.
6. Makhno did not leave Ukraine until 1921. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 50. The guerilla movement died away of itself as the guerillas sank to mere bandits. Soviet literature of these years loves to reproduce this type. Compare the sequence in Boris Savinkov's *Black Horse* (London, 1924).

7. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 f.
8. *Russia-U.S.S.R.*, p. 115.
9. See Gleb Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature* (London, 1935), pp. 224 ff.
10. Nicholas D. Czubytyj, "Silver Jubilee of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 1918-1943," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, I, 236 ff.
11. See W. E. D. Allen, *Ukraine* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 280.
12. For an estimate of Skrypnyk in Moscow, see Reuben Darbinian, "A Mission to Moscow," in *The Armenian Review*, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 28 ff.

CHAPTER NINE

1. Nicholas D. Czubytyj, "The Silver Jubilee of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 1918-1943," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, I, 244 ff.
2. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 57 f.
3. Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 366.
4. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 59 ff.
5. Chubytyj, *op. cit.*, p. 248.
6. Chubytyj, *op. cit.*, p. 248.
7. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
8. The following paragraph can perhaps be cited here: "The Ukrainian Soviet literature arose, grew and developed in the throes of bitter class struggle. Its young and as yet frail forces had to blaze their path through the barriers that were raised by the Ukrainian nationalist bourgeoisie, by kulakdom and its ideologists in the domains of literary theory and literary policy, headed by the school of the 'academician' S. Yefremov. Preaching the 'united national front,' they withheld recognition from all forces which, opposing this front, sought to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship and to cement the brotherly alliance with the republics of the Soviet Union. These chauvinists further enjoyed active support of those elements which represented the nationalist deviation in the ranks of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Not without reason did

Skrypnyk (the head of the nationalist deviation in the Communist Party of the Ukraine who worked hand in hand with the imperial interventionists) even in 1929 write of the "diminished" role of literary work. His object was to make out a case for prerevolutionary Ukrainian literature (which, according to Skrypnyk and Yefremov, supposedly represented the "united front of the creative forces of our people"), as though it had been stronger, more influential and effective than the contemporary Soviet literature of the Ukraine. The reactionary roots of these arguments are quite apparent. The ideology of bourgeois nationalism reflected, after all is said and done, the aim of the Ukrainian kulak to fence off his farmyard from the proletarian revolution. It was a reflection of the hopes of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie for unhindered and "independent" exploitation of the workers and peasants of the Ukraine.

"Quite in accord with this kulak program was another slogan that was launched later by the Ukrainian nationalists (Khyylevy), that of "orientation psychology of Europe." This slogan, if carried out, would have meant the transformation of Soviet Ukraine into a colony of foreign imperialism." I. Kulik, in *Literature of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.* VOKS Illustrated Almanac, Nos. 7-8, Moscow, 1934, p. 53 f. It is to be noted that the author of these lines was himself later liquidated on the same charges, Cf. Yury Sherekh, in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IV, 166.

9. Bolshaya Sovyetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1935, Vol. LIX, p. 816.

CHAPTER TEN

1. F. M. Dostoyevsky, *Zapiski iz Mertvogo Doma*, Part II, Chap. V.
2. Ivan Svit, *Zelena Ukraina* (New York-Shanghai, 1949), pp. 11 f.
3. Svit, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
4. Petro Zeleny, *Petro Ivanovych Horovy* (New York-Shanghai, 1949), 11 pp.

5. Svit, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
6. Zeleny, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 f.
7. Svit, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 ff.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

1. See Malbone W. Graham, "Polish Politics, 1918-1939," in *Poland* (Berkeley and Los Angeles), pp. 81 ff.
2. See the summary of this statute in the article of Basil Paneyko, "Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia," *Slavonic and East European Review*, IX, 580 f.
3. See Buell, *op. cit.*, pp. 269 ff.; *Poland*, pp. 81 ff.; *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 820 ff. For the extreme Polish point of view, see A. Bruce Boswell, *Poland and the Poles* (New York, 1919), pp. 163-66.
4. See Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
5. See Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 272. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 562.
6. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 563. See also Paneyko, *op. cit.*, p. 581-82. It is to be noted that the Poles here drew a distinction between the Uniats (Catholics of the Byzantine Rite) and the Orthodox Ukrainians who were formerly in the Russian Empire. This can be seen in the article of Stanislas Srokowski, "The Ukrainian Problem in Poland," *Slavonic and East European Review*, IX, 588 ff., especially 593 f. This distinction is not made in the Treaty of Riga (see summary in Skrzypek, *The Problem of Eastern Galicia* [London, 1948], pp. 72 ff.). It is not made either in the *Polish Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, Nos. 3 and 5, Geneva, 1921, which uses the old terminology, regards Ukraine as the gubernia of Kiev and uses the term Ruthenia for the entire area, exactly the reverse of modern usage.
7. The Council of Ambassadors recognized the Polish boundaries as set by the Treaty of Riga. See Skrzypek, *op. cit.*, pp. 74 f. This decision, recognizing the legality of Polish control over regions to the east, made the question of Eastern Galicia as mentioned in the text academic and meaningless.
8. See Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 563.

9. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 853.
10. *Poland*, pp. 118 ff.
11. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
12. See Paneyko, *op. cit.*, p. 585.
13. See Czubytyj, "Silver Jubilee," p. 242.
14. See Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 504, 509, 562; C. A. Manning, "The Jubilem of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1873-1948)," in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 29-36.
15. See Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 568; Buell, *op. cit.*, pp. 276 ff.
16. See Buell, *op. cit.*, pp. 277 f.
17. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 856 f.
18. Roman Olesnicki, "The Ukrainian Cooperative Movement," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, II, 36-42.

CHAPTER TWELVE

1. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 859 f.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1. See *Poland*, pp. 381 ff.
2. The idealistic Pan-Slavism had been founded by the Lutheran Slovak, Jan Kollar, publishing in 1824 his collection of sonnets, *Slavy Dcera* (The Daughter of Slava). This inspired many of the Czech developments and indirectly had a great influence upon Taras Shevchenko and the Ukrainian movement as a whole. At the time of the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic, there was a sharp cleavage between the openly pro-Russian and anti-Bolshevik policies of Dr. Karel Kramar and the attitude of President Masaryk and Dr. Eduard Benes, who hoped for continued co-operation with Russia despite the Bolshevik government. See R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Czechs and Slovaks* (London, New York, 1943), p. 314.
3. See Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 339.
4. The authenticity of this was denied by Dr. Jan Papanek, *New York Times*, August 30, 1948.
5. See Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

6. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 867.
7. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 867 f.
8. See Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 427 ff.
9. The Treaty of Saint Germain (Articles 10-13) provided for the autonomy of the area (Podkarpatska Rus) and also stated, "Yet these deputies (to Prague) will not enjoy the right of voting in the Czechoslovak Diet in all legislative matters of the same type as those assigned to the Ruthenian Diet." (Article 13). Dr. Jiri Hoetzel in an article "The Definitive Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic" prefixed to a text of the Constitution, Prague, 1920, p. 12, stresses that by inserting the provisions of the Treaty as paragraph 3 of the Constitution, "the Republic clearly shows that she desires fully to guarantee the autonomic existence of the territory of Russia." This paragraph promises Carpathian Russia "the widest measure of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic." Other provisions specify that the laws passed by the Diet shall be approved by the President of the Republic and listed separately and that the Governor shall be appointed by the President and responsible also to the Diet and that "public officials shall be selected, in so far as possible, from the population of Russia" (*op. cit.*, p. 22). The question of language was handled in paragraph 6 of a law dated February 29, 1920, declaring the Czechoslovak language the official language of the State. "The Diet which shall be set up for Russia shall have the right reserved to it of settling the language question for this territory in a manner consonant with the unity of the Czechoslovak State. Until this settlement has been made, this law shall apply, due regard, however, being paid to the special circumstances of that territory in respect to language" (*op. cit.*, p. 49).
10. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 860 f.
11. Dr. Josef Gruber, *Czechoslovakia, A Study of Economic and Social Conditions* (New York, 1924), p. 9, shows this ambiguity by citing the census of 1921 which gives "Russians (Great Russians and Ukrainians) 461, 849."

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

1. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 374 f.
2. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 862 ff.
3. See Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 571.
4. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

1. *New York Times*, April 29, 1939.
2. Dallin, *Soviet Union's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942* (New Haven, 1943).
3. Skrzypek, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
4. See *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 873; Skrzypek, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
5. Skrzypek, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76. Note that the agreement in Moscow was apparently a fairly rough line, as shown by Article I.
6. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 873.
7. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 874 ff.
8. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 877; Skrzypek, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 ff., 82 f.; *Pravda*, October 29, 1939.
9. See M. Seleshko, "Vinnytsya—the Katyn of Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 238-48.
10. *Istoriya Naukovoho Tovaristwa im. Shevchenka* (New York-München, 1949), p. 45; Ya. Pasternak, "Naukove Tovaristvo im. Shevchenka v chas druhoi svitovoi viyny," *Syohochasne i Mynule*, Vol. I, München-New York, 1948, pp. 37 ff.
11. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 878.
12. *New York Times*, December 15, 1939.
13. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 879.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

1. *Ukrainian Resistance* (New York, 1949), pp. 43 f.
2. Mykola Lebed, *UPA, Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya* (Western Europe, 1946), p. 15.

3. For the situation in the Baltic, see Thomas G. Chase, *The Story of Lithuania* (New York, 1946), pp. 303 f.; Dr. Alfred Bilmanis, *Latvia and her Baltic Neighbors* (Washington, 1942), p. 114.
4. See Lebed, *op. cit.*, pp. 16 f. Compare Chase, *op. cit.*, pp. 304 f. *Deutsche Zeitung im Osland*, October 19, 1941 (quoted in Bilmanis, *op. cit.*, p. 115 f.
5. Lebed, *op. cit.*, Nicholas D. Chubatyj, "The Ukrainian Underground," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. II, p. 161 f.
6. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 880.
7. Nicholas D. Chubatyj, "The Ukrainian Underground," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. II, p. 157.
8. See *Ukrainian Resistance*, pp. 67 ff.; Lebed, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 ff.
9. *Ukrainian Resistance*, pp. 76ff.
10. *Ukrainian Resistance*, p. 79.
11. *Ukrainian Resistance*, pp. 88f.
12. *Ukrainian Resistance*, p. 109.
13. Lebed, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 ff.
14. *Ukrainian Resistance*, p. 84.
15. Roman Smal Stocky, "The Promethean Movement," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, III, 330.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 324 ff.
17. Lebed, *op. cit.*, 77ff.
18. Chubatyj, *op. cit.*, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, II, 162 f.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

1. Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*.
2. See Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 387. Jan Papanek, *Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1945, p. 103 f. "Now Carpatho-Russia and the other liberated parts of Czechoslovakia, outside the immediate military zone, are under the civil administration of the Czechoslovak Government, whose delegate from London took it over on October 28, 1944, from the Soviet military authorities, according to the Soviet-Czechoslovak administrative agreement of May 8, 1944."

3. *New York Times*, June 30, 1945. See P. Tychyna "Bud' zdorova, Zakarpatska Ukraina," *Vybrani Tvory*, Kiev, 1947, p. 281 f.
4. W. H. Chamberlin, "Stirrings of Ukrainian Unrest," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, III, 113.
5. Nicholas D. Chubatyj, "The UPA Fights the Kremlin," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, III, 359.
6. *New York Times*, May 4, 1946.
7. Chubatyj, *op. cit.*, p. 359.
8. *New York Times*, May 6, 1946, etc.
9. *New York Times*, September 19, 1947.
10. See Chamberlin, "Stirrings of Ukrainian Unrest," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, III, 109.
11. Stephen Protsiuk, "The Evacuation of Industry in 1941 and the Postwar Economy of Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 215 ff.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

1. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 888.
2. *U.F.U. Newsletter, Ukrainian Free University in Munich*, I year, April, 1948, No. I.
3. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 890 ff.
4. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 892 f.
5. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, p. 895 f.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

1. C. H. Andrusyshen, "Ukrainian Literature—A Mirror of the Common Man," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IV, 44 ff.; Clarence A. Manning, "The Democratic Trend of Ukrainian Literature," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, I, 40 ff.
2. Serhey Efremov, *Istoriya Ukrainskoho Pismenstva*, II, 337.
3. This does not prevent I. Kulyk (*Literature of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.*, Moscow, 1934, p. 58) from declaring, "His early works (1910) were saturated with symbolism, mysticism and abstract 'cosmic' ideals, which, in the long

- run, expressed the ideology of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie." Again, "Stronger organizational ties with the realities, emancipation from artificial, at times purely bookish culture, such are the conditions on which depends further progress by Tychina along the new road chosen by this great Ukrainian poet." Yuriy Sherekh, "Trends in Ukrainian Literature under the Soviets," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. IV, p. 151.
4. See Sviatoslav Hordynsky, "The Fivefold Cluster of Unvanquished Bards," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 249 ff. Also the introduction of Volodymyr Derzhavyn to Mykola Zerov, *Sonnetarium* (Berchtesgarden, 1948).
 5. See Efremov, *op. cit.*, II, 387. Sherekh, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
 6. Yuriy Sherekh, "Trends in Ukrainian Literature under the Soviets," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. IV, p. 163.
 7. Sherekh, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
 8. See note II, Chapter Nine. S. Mykolyshyn, *Natsionalism u literaturi na Shchidnykh Ukrainskykh Zemlyakh* (Paris, 1938), pp. 18 ff. Honore Evach, "Mykola Khvylovy—Communist and Patriot," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, I, 272 ff.; Sherekh, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
 9. Sviatoslav Hordynsky, "Ideas on the Scaffold, Mykola Kulish and his Sonata Pathetique," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 331 ff.
 10. Ernest J. Simmons, *An Outline of Modern Russian Literature (1880-1940)* (Ithaca, 1943), p. 49.
 11. See Sherekh, *op. cit.*, 165. Yar Slavutych, *Moderna Ukrain-ska Poeziya* (Philadelphia, 1950), pp. 62 f.
 12. See "Dmytro Falkivsky" *Samostiyna Dumka*, Chernivtsy, 1936, parts 3-5, p. 166 ff.
 13. Pavlo Tychyna, "Davyd Guramishivili chytae Hryhoriyu Skovorodi 'Vytyazya v Tigroviy Shkuri,'" *Vybrani Tvori*, Kiev, 1946, Vol. I, p. 248, ff.
 14. Tychyna, "Feliks Dzerzhinski," *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 242 f.
 15. Yanovsky, *Vsadniki*.
 16. Nikolay Ostrovsky, *Kak Zakalyalos Stal* (Moscow, 1936).
 17. Kulyk, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
 18. Yar Slavutych, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 ff.

19. Clarence A. Manning, "The Soviets and Khmelnytsky," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, III, 12 ff.
20. Clarence A. Manning, "Socialist Realism and the American Success Novel," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XLVIII, 213-19.
21. Yuriy Kobiletsky, "Shlyakhi Narisu," *Dnipro*, Year 3, No. 2, pp. 101 ff.

CHAPTER TWENTY

1. The number of Russian refugees in Poland was small. The Orthodox were chiefly centered in the so-called eastern provinces inhabited by the minorities and of this population again, few were Russian.
2. See Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 279.
3. Clarence A. Manning, Archbishop Andrey Sheptytsky, *Review of Religion*, IX, pp. 282 ff.
4. Walter Dushnyck, *Martyrdom in Ukraine* (New York, 1946), p. 15.
5. Dushnyck, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
6. Dushnyck, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 ff. It was reported in the *Ukrainska Pravda*, September 26, 1948, that Bishop Kostelnik had been murdered, Patriarch Alexis claimed that it was the work of Ukrainian agents but there is also a suspicion that he was liquidated for some reason by the MVD. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IV, 375.
7. *Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy*, pp. 881 ff.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

1. According to *Ukraine and Its People*, edited by I. Mirchuk, Munich, 1949, p. 131, three-quarters of Ukrainian territory consists of black earth.
2. Prof. T. S., "Ukraine in the Economy of the U.S.S.R.," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, III, 224 f.
3. Prof. Hryhory Makhiv, "Agricultural Science in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 53 ff.
4. Hryhory Makhiv, "New Cultivated Crops in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 319 ff.

5. Prof. Hryhory Makhiv, "Agricultural Science in Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 58.
6. Wasył Marchenko, "The Basic Features of the Development of Farming in Ukraine under the Soviets," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IV, 353 ff.
7. Prof. T. S., *op. cit.*, p. 225.
8. *Ukraine and Its People*, p. 150.
9. *Ukraine and Its People*, p. 155.
10. Prof. T. S., *op. cit.*, p. 225.
11. Prof. T. S., *op. cit.*, p. 228.
12. V. Marchenko, "The Role of Ukraine in the Present Five-Year Plan," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, V, 124 ff.
13. *Russia—U.S.S.R.*, p. 395.
14. *Ukraine and Its People*, pp. 153, 158 ff.
15. T. S., "Ukraine and the Budget of the U.S.S.R.," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IV, 26 ff.
16. *Russia—U.S.S.R.*, p. 454.
17. It was only during World War I that steps were taken to utilize the ice-free port of Murmansk in the north.

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