

ETHNIC REIDENTIFICATION IN UKRAINE

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 1989 census reports that 25 percent of the families in Ukraine had spouses of different nationalities. However, during the census enumeration, respondents were required to select only one nationality. A recent World Bank survey indicates that nearly one-sixth of the population is of Ukraine/Russian ancestry but most chose Russian nationality during the census. In the last several years, a number of surveys indicate a growing share of the population identifying itself as Ukrainian while the Russian portion is decreasing. At the same time, a growing percentage of women register their children as Ukrainian. The Russian share, again, is decreasing proportionately. These factors point to an ongoing reidentification, although there is no indication of overt Ukrainianization.

Political ramifications of these trends are not certain. Many Ukrainians in the east and south do not identify strongly with Ukraine. Other residents, people who until recently considered themselves Russian, would be in this category as well. There are, however, some unidentifiable undercurrents which make Ukrainian nationality preferable. Coupled with an increased use of Ukrainian in education, these trends should produce a population with a stronger attachment to Ukraine.

PREFACE

The International Program Center conducts economic and demographic studies, some of which are issued as Staff Papers. A complete list is included at the end of this report. The use of data not generated by the U.S. Bureau of the Census precludes performing the same statistical reviews the Census Bureau does on its own data.

We are grateful to the United States Information Agency and the World Bank for providing invaluable information. Within the International Programs Center, thanks are due to Lois Darmohray for secretarial support and to Andrea Miles for computer support. Any shortcomings in the report are the responsibility of the author.

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INTRODUCTION

Ukraine has been a part of neighboring foreign states throughout most of its history. The occupations precipitated migration of different nationalities, turning Ukraine into a multinational country. At the end of the 19th century, the growth of industry in eastern parts of Ukraine hastened migration of Russians in search of jobs, and of Ukrainians from villages to towns where they were rapidly assimilated. Essentially, these trends continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Recently published figures suggest that since independence the trend has been reversed--the share of Ukrainians is slowly increasing and Russians are proportionally decreasing. Two sets of data indicate this trend--published figures on births by nationality of the mother and surveys conducted by several western organizations. These figures will be presented and analyzed. The analysis will be supplemented by a discussion of migration and demographic characteristics of the two populations. Finally, the political implications of change will be examined.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Mongol invasion in the 13th century set in motion a series of events which are still evident in the population of Ukraine today. The invasion broke up the loosely-organized Kievan state, bringing some lands under direct Mongol control, while others continued precarious existence as vassals of the Mongols. One of the most important among them was the Galician-Volyhnia Principality in western Ukraine. The Principality suffered several punishing raids by the Mongols but retained its independence. By the middle of the 14th century, two events converged to end the independence. The male line of the local ruling dynasty died out, destabilizing the state. At the same time, Polish principalities were unified by Casimir III the Great.

Taking advantage of the chaos, Casimir, with the help of Hungary, conquered Galicia. The northern portion of the Principality, Volyhnia, was conquered by Lithuania. During the next several centuries, the Polish state continuously expanded eastward, especially after the establishment of the Commonwealth with Lithuania. The Polish version of *drang nach osten* eventually extended the Commonwealth's eastern boundaries to the Smolensk/Kyiv line. The Lithuanian component was largely Polonized and the Commonwealth became *de facto* a Polish state.

Polish occupation brought large numbers of Poles and Jews to Ukraine. The growth of the Polish population was the result of migration and assimilation. The assimilation was more rapid among the nobility and the urban population, as towns turned into Polish enclaves surrounded by Ukrainian countryside. Modern Jews (Ashkenazi) came to Ukraine through Poland. In the late Middle Ages, vicious pogroms and expulsion of Jews occurred in various parts of Western Europe. At the same time, the Polish Crown encouraged migration as a way of expanding commerce and industry. The two events brought large numbers of Jews to Poland, and as the Polish state expanded eastward, Jewish migrants followed.

During the partitions of Poland, most Ukrainian lands were absorbed by the Russian state, precipitating another cycle of migration and assimilation. Assimilation under the Russian rule was much more rapid than under Poland. Religion seems to have been a major factor in the process. Both Russians and Ukrainians are Orthodox, and assimilation did not entail conversion into another faith, as was the case with the Roman Catholic Poles.

Besides Russians, hosts of other people started settling in Ukraine at the end of the 18th century. The Russian state, after centuries of warfare, seized the Black Sea steppes from the Ottomans and subdued the Tatar tribes who had been attacking sedentary populations for centuries. The conquest opened large, fertile territory to farming, and Catherine II encouraged rapid settlement of the area by promoting migration from other parts of the Empire and from abroad. Several Orthodox groups migrated from the Balkans, and large numbers of Germans settled in the area, giving it a multiethnic coloration.

Russian migration within the current boundaries of Ukraine had several phases during the Tsarist period. In the northeast, Russians built and manned fortifications, mixing with Ukrainians coming from the west. In the Black Sea area, officials, both military and civilian, were given large tracts of land and the right to resettle serfs from Russia. The settlers were augmented by army veterans who, after their service, often chose to remain in the area. Members of various persecuted sects in Russia also moved to the region. Finally, the development of coal, steel, and related industries created the demand for labor, precipitating another wave of migrants from Russia at the end of the 19th century.

Development of industry in the east created jobs, bringing in not only Russians but also Ukrainians from the surrounding Ukrainian-speaking countryside. Since the Russian language predominated in towns, the new rural migrants quickly claimed Russian as their native language. This phenomenon can be most readily seen in the city of Kharkiv. The 1897 census reported that 63.3 percent of the inhabitants migrated from the surrounding and predominantly Ukrainian-speaking countryside (language but not nationality was asked in the census) but only 25 percent claimed Ukrainian as their national language. The migration took place largely after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, and the new Ukrainian migrants claimed Russian since Ukrainian was considered a crude peasant dialect. It is highly improbable that illiterate, or at best semiliterate, people from Ukrainian villages in a comparatively short period of time would forget Ukrainian and acquire proficiency in Russian, especially since they worked and socialized with people of similar backgrounds.

The rapid abandonment of the language becomes understandable when government policies of the time are examined. The Russian government and indeed the Russian establishment, in general, were advocating the thesis that Ukrainians (Little Russians in the parlance of the time) were a regional variant of Russians and that Ukrainian was a crude peasant dialect not fit for a cultured person. This view was widely accepted by Ukrainians and, to some extent, is still evident in eastern Ukraine today. The government did not rely solely on propaganda and took more direct measures. Some Ukrainian cultural figures were deported and Ukrainian schools and publications were closed. In 1876, Tsar Alexander II expanded these policies by signing a secret decree banning use of Ukrainian in print and public life and prohibiting importation of Ukrainian language literature from abroad. These attitudes and policies obscured the fact that cities, in large measure, consisted of Russified Ukrainians or people of Russian-Ukrainian ancestry.

At the turn of the century, Ukraine, within its current boundaries, had a population of just under 30 million. Ukrainians comprised about 72 percent, Jews 9 percent, Russians 8 percent, Poles over 4 percent, and the remaining groups almost 7 percent. Wars, revolutions, and famines inflicted heavy but uneven losses on all groups, and some barely survived. People living in western Ukraine suffered grievous losses during World War I because the war was fought there. Revolution, famine, and typhus inflicted heavy losses in the east. After the revolution, restrictions confining Jews to the Pale of Settlements, basically eastern boundaries of the Polish state in the 18th century, were lifted and many Jews moved to

large eastern cities while others migrated to Russia, especially Moscow and St. Petersburg. Famine in the 1930s was confined largely to the villages, and the losses were borne mostly by Ukrainians who were predominantly rural at the time.

World War II inflicted huge losses on everybody, but some groups were singled out for special treatment. Soviet occupation of western Ukraine in 1939, which was under Poland between the wars, precipitated extensive arrests and deportation. All groups were affected, but Poles suffered the most. Former Polish officials and community leaders were arrested, killed, or deported with their families. The Soviet government also signed a population exchange agreement with Germany. Some Germans migrated to Germany under this agreement, and a small number of Ukrainians in the German zone went to Ukraine. At the outbreak of the Soviet-German hostilities in 1941, Germans from the Black Sea steppes were deported to the interior, especially Kazakhstan. Many Jews fled before the advancing German army; those who remained were almost completely exterminated. Reconquest of Ukraine brought another wave of deportations for disloyalty, real and imagined, to the Soviet regime. In the east, Crimean Tatars, Greeks, and Armenians were deported, and insurrection in western Ukraine resulted in massive deportation of Ukrainians after the war. The so-called voluntary exchange of population between Poland and Ukraine began the expulsion of Poles from Ukraine, and a small number of Jews, who had been Polish citizens before the war, chose to go to Poland as well.

The first post-war census, in 1959, showed a substantially different ethnic composition than had been the case earlier in the century. Ukrainians now comprised 76.8 percent of the population of almost 42 million. Russians increased to 16.9 percent, Jews dropped to 2.0 percent, Poles to 0.9 percent, and other nationalities to 3.4 percent. Between 1959 and 1989, the population of Ukraine grew annually at 0.6 percent, Ukrainians at 0.5 percent, and Russians at 9.1 percent due to migration and assimilation. As the Soviet Union started disintegrating additional changes occurred; Crimean Tatars were permitted to return, and Jews were allowed to emigrate. The two trends have continued since independence. Figures for the two populations will have to await the results of the census scheduled for 1999, but President Kuchma reported in April 1996 that 250,000 Crimean Tatars returned to Ukraine.¹ The Ukrainian literature frequently reports that Ukraine is a multinational state with about one hundred different nationalities, and this is technically correct. However, the country consists mostly of Ukrainians and Russians, 94.8 percent in 1989, and the discussion will center on the two groups.

The census nationality data obscure mixed ancestry of a sizeable share of the population of Ukraine by requiring respondents to choose only one nationality. Many centuries of mixed marriages produced a heterogenous population. The 1989 census reported 14,057,000

¹FBIS-SOV-96-080, 24 April 1996, p. 60.

families, 25.3 percent of whom had spouses of different nationalities,² but for official purposes, children of these marriages had to choose the nationality of only one parent. Urbanization intensified this process as people from villages, usually populated by a single group, were drawn into multiethnic urban centers, increasing the number of mixed marriages. In 1989, for example, 31.7 percent of urban families were of mixed ancestry, but the rate dropped to 12.2 percent in rural areas. Table 1 presents mixed marriages for Ukrainians and Russians for the years 1991-1994. The Russian share has remained relatively stable, but the Ukrainian rate has been declining. The decline appears to be related to the larger share of Ukrainians living in villages where the population is more homogenous and marriages decreased less than in the cities. Members of smaller nationalities tend to intermarry more because the possibilities to socialize and marry within the group are limited. The 1994 figures

Table 1. Share Of Mixed Ethnic Marriages In Ukraine, 1991-1994

	1991	1992	1993	1994
Total	---	---	30.7	29.1
Ukrainians	21.3	20.0	19.3	17.9
Russians	58.1	58.0	59.1	58.9

--- Not Available

Sources: Percentages calculated from data in:

Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1992, Tekhnika, Kyiv, 1993; p. 122; and Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1994, Tekhnika, 1995, p. 131.

show that 17.9 percent of Ukrainians married outside their group, while the Russian share rose to 58.9 percent and the Jewish to 74.7 percent.

The varying percentages among nationalities reflect both the size of the group and the urban/rural factor. Ukrainians are not only the largest nationality in the country but a large share, 40 percent in 1989, are village dwellers. The Jewish group, on the other hand, is small and lives almost exclusively in the cities. These factors are readily apparent when the highly-urbanized and ethnically-mixed Donetsk Oblast is examined.³ Ukrainians comprise only 50 percent of the population, and the share marrying outside their group rises to 41 percent. The percentage for Russians drops to 54 percent, while in a small Jewish group, 78.6 percent chose non-Jewish spouses.


²Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrayiny u 1991 rotsi. Tekhnika, Kyiv, 1992, p. 80.

³ Percentages were calculated from the reported data in Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1994. Kyiv, 1995, pp. 131 and 136.

During the summer of 1995, a representative sample of the population of Ukraine was interviewed on a wide range of socioeconomic issues, including two questions on the national identity of respondents.⁴ The first question asked respondents to indicate their nationality. The second question asked to indicate the degree of mixed ancestry. The share of the population claiming Ukrainian nationality was several percentage points lower than the 72.7 percent reported in the 1989 census, and the Russian share dropped more than half from the 22.1 percent reported in the census. At the same time, almost one-sixth of the population considered itself to be of Ukrainian/Russian ancestry (Figure 1). There is, of course, some degree of error in the survey, but the share of mixed population is consistent with the official figures on mixed families and mixed marriages.

⁴I should like to thank Janine Braithwaite of the World Bank for providing me with the diskette of the survey and Loraine A. West of this office for processing some of the data.

Figure 1. Population of Ukraine by Nationality, 1995



Source: Table 5.

CURRENT ETHNIC TRENDS

Registration of births by nationality of the mother is the most explicit indicator available on reidentification. Caution must be exercised when interpreting the indicator since the trends are unfolding in the context of decreased birth rates and the differences in urban and rural rates. Ukraine, as other parts of the former Soviet Union, has been experiencing the type of population changes normally associated with a major war. Between 1989 and 1994, the number of marriages decreased by 18.5 percent and births by 24.5 percent. The drop in both is greater in urban than rural areas. A more refined measure, total fertility rate--number of children born per woman during child bearing years--shows a comparable decline. The 1989/90 rate of 1.9 decreased to 1.4 by 1994/95. A total fertility rate of 2.2 is generally needed to maintain the population at the current level.⁵ These changes are generally attributed to the economic deterioration in the region. The economic crisis undoubtedly is a factor but is not a complete explanation. Birth rates were decreasing even before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing economic decline; the number of births, for example, dropped 4.9 percent between 1989 and 1990.

In the last several years, figures have been published on births by nationality of the mother. The trend indicates a growing share of children born to Ukrainian women and a corresponding decrease of children born to Russian women. The share for other nationalities remains stable (Table 2). The 1989 census figures indicate that Ukrainians comprised 72.7 percent of the population and Russians 22.1 percent. The share of births in 1989 by Ukrainian women was higher than the Ukrainian share of the population because the total fertility rate for Ukrainian women was higher, 2.0 children per woman, compared to

Table 2. Share Of Births By Nationality In Ukraine, 1989-1994

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ukrainians	73.5	73.9	74.3	75.3	76.2	77.4
Russians	20.8	20.4	19.9	18.9	18.1	17.0
Others	5.7	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.7	5.6

Source: Figures in Table 3.

Russian women, 1.8 children per woman. The difference is due largely to more Ukrainians than Russians living in the rural areas where the birth rates are higher.

⁵Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayinskoyi RSR, Narodne gospodarstvo Ukrayinskoyi RSR u 1990 rotsi, Tekhnika, Kyiv, 1991, p. 44 and Ministerstvo staystyky Ukrayiny, Statystychnyy shchorichnyk Ukrayiny za 1995 rik. Tekhnika, Kyiv, 1996, p. 62.

Table 3 presents births by urban and rural area for 1989-94. The total Ukrainian decrease is 20.6 percent and Russian 38.1 percent. Nationality decreases are greater for the urban population, 26.2 percent and 39.6 percent, respectively (Figure 2). The lower urban rates reduced the Russian overall total more than Ukrainian because 87.5 percent of Russians lived in cities compared to 60.3 percent of Ukrainians in 1989. The trends for the remaining nationalities, "Others," are erratic. The urban/rural differential is greater than among the two major nationalities, and the number of rural births increased in the early 1990s. As the Soviet Union was collapsing, Jews were permitted to emigrate, and the emigration has continued since independence. The emigration decreased births by Jewish mothers from 2,919 in 1989 to 918 in 1994. During the same period, Crimean Tatars, who had been deported in 1944, were permitted to return, and 250,000 came back by 1996.

Table 3. Births by Nationality of Mother in Ukraine, 1989-1994

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Total	690,981	660,897	630,813	596,785	557,467	521,545
Urban	471,104	445,155	419,205	387,696	356,833	328,522
Rural	219,877	215,743	211,608	209,089	200,634	193,023
Ukrainians	507,837	488,161	468,485	449,387	424,716	403,441
Urban	324,637	308,814	292,991	274,893	256,531	239,726
Rural	183,200	179,347	175,494	174,494	168,185	163,715
Russians	143,553	134,591	125,629	112,961	100,782	88,872
Urban	123,448	115,143	106,838	95,311	84,554	74,610
Rural	20,105	19,448	18,791	17,650	16,228	14,262
Others	39,591	38,145	36,699	34,437	31,969	29,232
Urban	23,019	21,198	19,376	17,492	15,748	14,186
Rural	16,572	16,948	17,323	16,945	16,221	15,046
Percent, 1989 = 100.0						
Total	100.0	95.6	91.3	86.4	80.7	75.5
Urban	100.0	94.5	89.0	82.3	75.7	69.7
Rural	100.0	98.1	96.2	95.1	91.2	87.8
Ukrainians	100.0	96.1	92.3	88.5	83.6	79.4
Urban	100.0	95.1	90.3	84.7	79.0	73.8
Rural	100.0	97.9	95.8	95.2	91.8	89.4
Russians	100.0	93.8	87.5	78.7	70.2	61.9
Urban	100.0	93.3	86.5	77.2	68.5	60.4
Rural	100.0	96.7	93.5	87.8	80.7	70.9
Others	100.0	96.3	92.7	87.0	80.7	73.8
Urban	100.0	92.1	84.2	76.0	68.4	61.6
Rural	100.0	102.3	104.5	102.3	97.9	90.8

Sources:


1989: Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1993. Tekhnika, Kyiv, 1994, p.173.

1990: Interpolated linearly.

1991-92: Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1992, 1993, p. 1701993-94: Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1994, 1995, p.199.

2

**Figure 2. Births as a Percentage of 1989 Births
by Nationality of Mother, 1990-1994
(1989 = 100 percent)**



Data for the Crimean Tatars are very limited, but their impact on births can be detected. The 1989 census reports that of 86,875 Tatars, 86.9 percent were living in towns, and of the 46,807 Crimean Tatars, 66.6 percent were living in villages. Births are reported as a combined figure for all Tatar groups, but there is no indication of Tatars, other than Crimean Tatars, migrating to Ukraine. In 1989, 2,674 children were born to Tatar women, and the number of births peaked at 3,922 in 1992. The erratic changes for the smaller nationalities, therefore, have been caused by immigration of rural Crimean Tatars.

Births for five oblasts and the city of Kyiv are presented in appendix Table A-1. Oblasts are selected from different regions of the country to represent both urban and rural areas and varying ethnic mixes. The pattern observed earlier is replicated in all the regions, and the decrease is greater in urban than in rural areas. At the same time, the decline is steeper for Russians than Ukrainians in urban as well as in rural areas.⁶ The decline for all the groups was the greatest in Kyiv, the largest city in Ukraine, with 2.6 million population. The city rate is slightly lower than the urban rates for the oblasts, which include towns that are still partially rural. The lowest decline occurred in Vinnytsya, a largely rural oblast in central Ukraine.

There are several possible reasons for the diverging birth rates between the two ethnic groups: age/sex differences, educational attainment, migration, or ethnic reidentification. The Ukrainian population is slightly older than the Russian population, but Russian women of reproductive age (20-45 years) comprise 35.6 percent of the total compared to 31.2 percent for Ukrainians.⁷ A greater share of women in the reproductive ages should work to the advantage of Russians and cannot explain the decrease in birth rates. Educational attainment differs between the two groups, but narrows when only urban populations are compared.⁸ Furthermore, there is no indication of changes in the age distribution or educational attainment in the two groups during the last 6 years that would account for diverging birth rates. Income data by nationality are not available, but there has always been a strong correlation between income and education. Minor differences between Russians and Ukrainians, described above, cannot explain a sudden and substantial divergence in births.

A sudden large emigration of Russians could have reduced the number of Russian births. The migration data for most years are not reported by nationality, but the overall figures are low and Ukraine had a small positive migration balance until 1994. The population movement was mostly between Russia and Ukraine. In 1993, for example, of the 356,600 immigrants, 207,400 came from Russia, and of the 307,000 who emigrated, 204,800 went to

⁶The only exception is a slight increase in rural births for all the groups in Odesa. Data are not available in sufficient detail to determine the cause for the slight increase in the early 1990's. The increase, in any event, was minimal, 289 births in 1991, the peak year, compared to the 1989 level.

⁷Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Natsionalnyy sklad nasclennya Ukrayiny, chastyna I. Kyiv, 1991, pp. 33-35.

⁸Ibid., pp. 104-105.

Russia.⁹ The 1994 figures are disaggregated by country and major nationalities. During the year, 102,737 immigrated and 245,924 emigrated, giving Ukraine a negative migration balance of 143,187. When migration is examined by nationality, 93,374 more Russians left Ukraine than came in. The corresponding figure for Ukrainians is 20,102. The two groups account for 79.3 percent of the negative migration balance during the year.¹⁰ Thus, the relatively small decrease of Russians out of a total of 11.4 million reported in the 1989 census could hardly account for the reported drop in births.

Ethnic reidentification of mothers, women who earlier identified themselves as Russian and now consider themselves Ukrainian, is the most probable explanation. Russian births in Ukraine, between 1989 and 1994, declined 13.6 percent more than all the births in Ukraine. Similarly, Russian births in Ukraine declined 3.3 percent more than all the births in the Russian Federation. Based on these comparisons, we can assume that the 13.6 percent and 3.3 percent mark the outer limits of reidentification. But the change of nationality by mothers, as well as the general population, can be further inferred by comparing census nationality data with the change in births by nationality. Censuses provide the only official statistics on the nationality of the population. The census enumerators record the nationality indicated by the respondents, and the nationality data appear internally consistent. Nationality data may be obtained from the internal passport, but if these statistics had been compiled, the data were never made public. The passport, however, has had the most direct impact on the census figures.

At the age of 16, Soviet citizens were required to obtain an internal passport that, in addition to the usual biographic information, indicated the nationality of the holder. The applicant was required to present documents, usually birth certificates, indicating the nationality of both parents. If both parents were of the same nationality, that became the nationality of the applicant as well. But if the parents were of different nationalities, the individual could choose the nationality of either parent. Having made that decision at the age of 16, the person could not reverse it later. It is not clear how assiduously the regulations were followed. Through bribes and other machinations, some individuals may have been able to change their nationality later. Based on anecdotal information, the falsification, to whatever extent it existed, was confined mostly to Jews who found it desirable to mask their origin. Russians, as a dominant group, would have had no reason to claim a different nationality; those who were only partially Russian, as Ukrainian figures indicate, more often than not, declared themselves Russian. People who were completely Ukrainian and lived in Ukraine would have had little incentive to falsify their nationality, and to whatever extent it may have occurred, it does not appear to have been significant.

⁹Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny, Narodne Hospodarstvo Ukrayiny u 1993 rotsi. Kyiv, Tekhnika, 1994, p. 263.

¹⁰Ministerstvo statystyky-, Naselennya Ukrayiny, 1994. Kyiv, 1995, pp. 88 and 91-95.

The passport nationality would have a powerful influence on the nationality reported during the censal enumerations: census enumerators asked for the passport and used the information to fill out questionnaires. Even if the passport was not requested, there would have been little reason to claim different nationality during the census, since the authorities already knew the respondent's nationality. Nationality was a permanent feature of a person's identity and had to be indicated on various documents, such as an application to an institution of higher learning. The census data during the Soviet era, then, can be accepted as reasonably accurate and may be used as a benchmark against which survey figures or births by nationality can be compared.

Since independence, several western agencies, as well as individual scholars, have been conducting surveys in Ukraine on a wide range of social, political, and economic issues. The surveys normally include a question on nationality and occasionally a question on language preference. The survey data are presented in Table 4, with 1989 census figures added for comparison. The figures do not show consistent trends evident in the data on births by nationality of mother. Of eight surveys cited, six show a growing share of Ukrainians since 1989, while two report a decline. The surveys usually claim that the marginal error is within several percentage points, therefore, the two surveys showing a decline still fall inside that confidence limit. Survey figures and changes in births by nationality suggest that a perceptible reidentification has been occurring in the last several years.

There is no indication which segment of the population is undergoing change, but individuals of mixed ancestry are very likely candidates. Figures on mixed marriages indicate the potential size of this group, and the World Bank survey (Table 5) provides additional information. Individuals were asked to indicate their nationality, and in the case of Ukrainians and Russians, to specify their ancestry as well. The survey data differ considerably from the census figures, especially for Russians. In the census, an individual was allowed to choose a single nationality, but in the survey they were asked to indicate whether they were completely Russian or Ukrainian. The differences in definitions decreased the Russian rate from 22.1 percent in the census to 10.8 percent in the survey. The Ukrainian decrease is less dramatic but still significant--from 72.7 percent to 66.5 percent. These percentages imply that most self-declared Ukrainians have both parents of the same nationality, while many Russians are of Ukrainian-Russian ancestry. Apparently, some of these Russians are now claiming Ukrainian nationality.

Table 4. Distribution of the Population by Nationality, Survey Data

Survey and Nationality	1989	1992	1994	1995	1996
Census *	100.0	---	---	---	---
Ukrainian	72.7	---	---	---	---
Russian	22.1	---	---	---	---
Other	5.2	---	---	---	---
OMRI, January	---	100.0	---	---	---
Ukrainian	---	74.3	---	---	---
Russian	---	20.7	---	---	---
Other	---	5.0	---	---	---
OMRI, November	---	100.0	---	---	---
Ukrainian	---	73.3	---	---	---
Russian	---	22.5	---	---	---
Other	---	4.2	---	---	---
OMRI	---	---	---	---	100.0
Ukrainian	---	---	---	---	76.5
Russian	---	---	---	---	19.4
Other	---	---	---	---	4.1
Demo. Initiatives, May	---	---	---	100.0	---
Ukrainian	---	---	---	69.7	---
Russian	---	---	---	24.0	---
Other	---	---	---	6.3	---
World Bank	---	---	---	100.0	---
Ukrainian	---	---	---	77.7	---
Russian	---	---	---	18.4	---
Other	---	---	---	3.9	---
USIA	---	---	100.0	---	---
Ukrainian	---	---	69.9	---	---
Russian	---	---	25.9	---	---
Other	---	---	4.2	---	---
USIA, January	---	---	---	---	100.0
Ukrainian	---	---	---	---	73.8
Russian	---	---	---	---	21.7
Other	---	---	---	---	4.5
USIA, Fall	---	---	---	---	100.0
Ukrainian	---	---	---	---	73.1
Russian	---	---	---	---	21.8
Other	---	---	---	---	5.1

--- Not Available

Sources:

Census, Ministerstvo statystyky Ukrayiny Natsionalnyy sklad Ukrainy, chastyna 1. Kyiv, 1991, p. 5.

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USIA, Unpublished data from surveys conducted in Ukraine for the United States Information Agency.

Table 5. Self-Declared Ancestry of the Population of Ukraine, 1995

	Number of Respondents	Percent	1989 Census, Percent
Total	4,627	100.0	100.0
Ukrainian and Russian	4,339	93.8	94.8
Ukrainian, 100 Percent	3,078	66.5	72.7
Both Ukrainian and Russian, but mostly Ukrainian	203	4.4	---
Equally Ukrainian and Russian	370	8.0	---
Both Ukrainian and Russian, but mostly Russian	159	3.4	---
Russian, 100 Percent	500	10.8	22.1
Russian or Ukrainian with other nationalities	29	0.6	---
Remaining Nationalities	288	6.2	5.2

— Not Available

Source: World Bank diskette, the survey was conducted during the summer of 1995 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.

ETHNICITY AND POLITICS

Ukrainians and Russians have similar opinions on a wide range of socioeconomic problems; but there are significant differences between them on many political and foreign policy issues, especially those concerning relations with Russia. The differences can be discerned from the votes for independence, election results, and more directly from recent surveys. Since an increasing share of the population is claiming Ukrainian nationality, the implications of these trends will be analyzed.

The overwhelming vote for independence in the December 1, 1991, referendum came as a surprise to most observers. Even in Crimea, 54 percent of the people voted for independence. There were undoubtedly various motives and differing views of what independence actually meant. There is, however, a strong relationship between the share of Ukrainians and the share of votes for independence. Ternopil Oblast, with the highest share of Ukrainians, 96.8 percent, cast the most votes for independence, 98.7 percent. Ivano-Frankivsk cast 98.4 percent of the votes for independence, and Ukrainians comprised 95.0 percent of the population, the second highest after Ternopil.¹¹ Eastern oblasts with fewer Ukrainians also cast fewer votes for independence, although in all cases the share of votes for independence was much higher than the percentage of Ukrainians. In Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Ukrainians comprised barely a majority, but both oblasts cast 83.9 percent of their votes for independence.

The 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections show similar patterns. President Leonid Kravchuk was perceived during the campaign as an advocate of a strong Ukrainian state, while the challenger Leonid Kuchma, by favoring closer ties with Russia and advocating Russian as a second state language, was distrusted by the more patriotic Ukrainians. During the second round of voting, Kuchma garnered 52.1 percent of the votes compared to 45.1 percent for Kravchuk, but the differences by region were stark.¹² In the five eastern oblasts, Kuchma received 75.6 percent of the votes, compared to 21.9 percent for Kravchuk.¹³ On the other hand, Kravchuk received 87.4 percent of the votes in the seven oblasts that became a part of the Soviet Union after the war, compared to 10.4 percent for Kuchma. The idea of a strong Ukrainian statehood is obviously much greater among Ukrainians in the west than in the east. Nationalists and national democrats failed to attract much of a following in the east. Communists and leftists, who favored retaining much of the Soviet economic system and maintaining either strong ties with Russia or a restoration of the former Soviet Union in some form, swept the east.

¹¹Shares of the population by nationality came from the 1989 census; referendum results are reported by Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, no. 1, 1994, p. 48.

¹²RFE/RL Research Report, no. 32, August 19, 1994, p. 10.

¹³The five oblasts are: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya.

The most direct information on political view by ethnicity comes from surveys. Typically, individuals are asked to indicate their nationality, followed by specific questions on political and economic problems facing the country. Data presented here are derived from a survey sponsored by the United States Information Agency, conducted in the autumn of 1996.¹⁴

Ukrainians and Russians have similar views on many social and economic issues, but Ukrainians tend to be more optimistic about the future. For example, only about 1 percent of both groups thought that the economic situation would improve a lot for their family during the next 12 months; however, 18.1 percent of Ukrainians thought it would improve a little, compared to 8.9 percent for Russians. Similarly, 14.7 percent of Ukrainians had a great deal of confidence in the newly introduced currency, hryvna; but among Russians only 5.1 percent shared that view. In respect to the newly adopted constitutions, 21.6 percent of Ukrainians thought democracy would be strengthened, but only 11.7 percent of the Russians were of the same opinion.

Leading politicians received equally low approval ratings from both groups, with the exception of President Kuchma. Among Ukrainians, 41.8 percent had confidence in the President, while the share among Russians decreased to 22.2 percent. Vyachyslav Chornovil, Rukh leader and member of parliament, received a 19.8 percent approval rate among Ukrainians, and even 7.0 percent of Russians thought well of him. On the other hand, leftist politicians such as Oleksandr Moroz, head of parliament and the Socialist Party, and Petro Simonenko, a member of parliament and head of the Communist Party, received comparatively low approval ratings from both groups. Only 25.4 percent of Ukrainians had confidence in Moroz; among Russians the confidence level was 22 percent. Simonenko's approval ratings were 11.6 percent and 15.4 percent, respectively. These ratings are puzzling because there is a considerable amount of nostalgia for the former Soviet Union, and men like Simonenko, who are attempting to reestablish it in some fashion, still received little support.

The nostalgia for the old Soviet Union is stronger among Russians than among Ukrainians, and not surprisingly, few Russians identify with Ukraine. In the survey, 50.6 percent of Russians agreed that "it is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists," and another 18.7 percent agreed more than disagreed, for a total of 69.3 percent. The figures for Ukrainians are 34.9 percent and 16.6 percent, respectively, for a total of 51.5 percent. Nostalgia for the Soviet Union does not appear to represent a strong ideological commitment, but a yearning for a time when at least minimal human needs were met. The question whether Ukraine and Russia should unite drew a similar response. The share of Ukrainians who thought Ukraine should reunite with Russia amounted to 24.1 percent, and an

¹⁴A representative sample of 1,200 people was selected from different parts of Ukraine and each respondent was asked 66 questions, some questions had multiple parts. I should like to thank Steven Grant and Richard Dobson of the USIA for generously giving me the data derived from the survey.

additional 18.8 percent expressed partial support. Russian percentages were 50.2 percent and 32.7 percent, respectively. Therefore, 42.9 percent of Ukrainians and 82.9 percent of Russians are at least receptive to the idea of unification.

Opinion differs by region, but differences by ethnicity are not available because the data are not tabulated by both region and nationality. Nevertheless, desire for unification of some sort appears to be marginal among Ukrainians in the west but substantial in the east. Ukrainians comprise almost 90 percent of the population in the seven oblasts that joined the Soviet Union after the war.¹⁵ Only 10.7 percent of the people in the oblasts favored outright unification, and an additional 16.3 percent were lukewarm to the idea. In the east, where Ukrainians account for 54.4 percent and Russians for 41.0 percent, 45.9 percent of the respondents favored unification and 32.8 percent favored it advisedly.¹⁶ Clearly, a sizable share of Ukrainians had to be in that group.

Another question asked respondents to indicate their homeland, and again there was a considerable difference by nationality:

Table 6. Perceived Homeland by Nationality

Homeland	Ukrainians	Russians	Others
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ukraine	46.3	14.8	16.7
Russia	0.2	9.7	1.7
USSR	20.4	38.9	28.3
Region I live in	18.8	24.1	30.0
Region I grew up in	10.7	9.3	16.7
Not indicated	3.6	3.2	6.7

Source: USIA survey.

The responses are in sharp contrast to the 90 percent vote for independence in December 1991. Ukraine received the most votes among Ukrainians, but only 37.9 percent of all respondents in the survey considered Ukraine their homeland, and the former USSR was a second choice with 24.9 percent. Undoubtedly, a large share of people with regional affiliations would have voted for Ukraine if the regional options were not available in the survey, but the identification with Ukraine is clearly quite weak. Attachment to Ukraine follows well-established regional patterns; in the west the identification with Ukraine is comparatively strong and

¹⁵The west defined in the survey, consists of Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankinsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Volyn, and Zakarpattya oblasts.

¹⁶East consists of Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk oblasts.

diminishes as you move east. While preference for a Ukrainian state is marginal among all groups, it is the highest among Ukrainians. As the Ukrainian component grows and as the ever-larger share of young people are educated in the Ukrainian language schools, their identification is bound to grow. These changes, in time, will have impact on the politics of the country and especially the relations with Russia.

CONCLUSION

The ethnic situation in Ukraine is much more complex than the census figures indicate. Normally, both parents of the self-declared Ukrainians are Ukrainian, but about a half of the self-declared Russians are of Ukrainian-Russian ancestry. During the last several years, some portion of that population has been identifying itself as Ukrainian. The political implication of this trend in the near future is uncertain. There is considerable ambivalence about the Ukrainian state and the relations with Russia, even among Ukrainians. The uncertainty becomes especially strong in the east and the south, and these regions have a large share of Russians and Ukrainians of mixed ancestry. The territories were settled under the auspices of the Russian state, although Ukrainians comprised a majority by the end of the 19th century. Historical experience cannot be quantified, but the past influences the present. It is easier to accept Russian rule in the area where Russian domination spans generations than in the southwest, where the Russian influence was recent and brief.

There are undercurrents that motivate people to redefine their identity, even in the more Russified areas. However, individuals who yesterday considered themselves Russian and today Ukrainian can hardly be expected to have a strong commitment to Ukraine. But over time, these trends, coupled with the growing use of the Ukrainian language in education, will produce more people who identify with Ukraine.

APPENDIX

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Table A-1. Births by Oblast and Nationality of Mother in Ukraine, 1989-1994

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Donetsk	63,115	58,791	54,466	50,258	46,344	43,195
Urban	56,555	52,637	48,719	44,527	41,330	38,164
Rural	6,560	6,154	5,747	5,731	5,014	5,031
Ukrainians	31,869	29,766	27,662	26,113	24,382	23,472
Urban	27,700	25,846	23,992	22,371	21,083	20,106
Rural	4,169	3,920	3,670	3,742	3,299	3,366
Russians	27,410	25,459	23,507	21,252	19,370	17,334
Urban	25,576	23,736	21,896	19,723	18,024	16,046
Rural	1,834	1,723	1,611	1,529	1,346	1,288
Others	3,836	3,567	3,297	2,893	2,592	2,389
Urban	3,279	3,055	2,831	2,433	2,223	2,012
Rural	557	512	466	460	369	377
Kharkiv	38,638	36,657	34,675	31,277	28,270	26,069
Urban	31,100	29,262	27,424	24,411	21,686	19,737
Rural	7,538	7,400	7,261	6,866	6,584	6,332
Ukrainians	23,724	22,724	21,724	20,151	18,501	17,620
Urban	18,276	17,337	16,397	14,974	13,534	12,704
Rural	5,448	5,388	5,327	5,177	4,967	4,916
Russians	13,257	12,413	11,569	9,862	8,667	7,468
Urban	11,526	10,749	9,971	8,453	7,331	6,307
Rural	1,731	1,665	1,598	1,409	1,336	1,161
Others	1,657	1,520	1,382	1,264	1,102	981
Urban	1,298	1,177	1,056	984	821	726
Rural	359	348	336	280	281	255
Kyiv (city)	35,366	32,174	28,981	25,632	22,853	21,507
Ukrainians	27,188	24,955	22,721	20,436	18,338	17,385
Russians	6,606	5,906	5,205	4,328	3,765	3,431
Others	1,572	1,314	1,055	868	750	691
Lviv	40,200	38,943	37,685	36,612	34,717	32,444
Urban	23,469	22,711	21,952	21,139	19,734	18,391
Rural	16,731	16,232	15,733	15,473	14,983	14,086

Table A-1. Births by Oblast and Nationality of Mother in Ukraine, 1989-1994
(continued)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Ukrainians	37,623	36,637	35,650	34,741	33,065	31,107
Urban	21,189	20,678	20,167	19,463	18,292	17,188
Rural	16,434	15,959	15,483	15,278	14,773	13,919
Russians	1,869	1,683	1,497	1,379	1,194	1,021
Urban	1,741	1,570	1,399	1,302	1,117	956
Rural	128	113	98	74	77	65
Others	708	623	538	492	458	316
Urban	539	463	386	374	325	247
Rural	169	161	152	121	133	102
Odesa	35,014	33,567	32,119	30,155	28,185	26,197
Urban	22,421	20,829	19,237	17,474	15,652	14,607
Rural	12,593	12,738	12,882	12,681	12,533	11,590
Ukrainians	19,357	18,752	18,146	16,843	16,230	15,377
Urban	12,331	11,653	10,975	9,806	9,191	8,580
Rural	7,026	7,099	7,171	7,037	7,039	6,797
Russians	8,415	7,904	7,392	6,907	6,046	5,445
Urban	6,951	6,409	5,867	5,406	4,555	4,263
Rural	1,464	1,495	1,525	1,501	1,491	1,182
Others	7,242	6,912	6,581	6,405	5,909	5,375
Urban	3,139	2,767	2,395	2,262	1,906	1,764
Rural	4,103	4,145	4,186	4,143	4,003	3,611
Vinnytsya	24,645	24,145	23,644	22,674	21,355	20,356
Urban	12,957	12,511	12,065	11,238	10,416	9,746
Rural	11,688	11,634	11,579	11,436	10,939	10,610
Ukrainians	22,436	22,072	21,707	20,958	19,827	18,941
Urban	11,249	10,908	10,567	9,942	9,261	8,717
Rural	11,187	11,164	11,140	11,016	10,566	10,224
Russians	1,484	1,429	1,374	1,282	1,160	996
Urban	1,229	1,167	1,105	1,018	919	801
Rural	255	262	269	264	241	195
Others	725	644	563	434	368	419
Urban	479	436	393	278	236	228
Rural	246	208	170	156	132	191

Table A-1. Births by Oblast and Nationality of Mother in Ukraine, 1989-1994
(continued)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Percent, 1989 = 100.0						
Donetsk	100.0	93.1	86.3	79.6	73.4	68.4
Urban	100.0	93.1	86.1	78.7	73.1	67.5
Rural	100.0	93.8	87.6	87.4	76.4	76.7
Ukrainians	100.0	93.4	86.8	81.9	76.5	73.7
Urban	100.0	93.3	86.6	80.8	76.1	72.6
Rural	100.0	94.0	88.0	89.8	79.1	80.7
Russians	100.0	92.9	85.8	77.5	70.7	63.2
Urban	100.0	92.8	85.6	77.1	70.5	62.7
Rural	100.0	93.9	87.8	83.4	73.4	70.2
Others	100.0	93.0	85.9	75.4	67.6	62.3
Urban	100.0	93.2	86.3	74.2	67.8	61.4
Rural	100.0	91.8	83.7	82.6	66.2	67.7
Kharkiv	100.0	94.9	89.7	80.9	73.2	67.5
Urban	100.0	94.1	88.2	78.5	69.7	63.5
Rural	100.0	98.2	96.3	91.1	87.3	84.0
Ukrainians	100.0	95.8	91.6	84.9	78.0	74.3
Urban	100.0	94.9	89.7	81.9	74.1	69.5
Rural	100.0	98.9	97.8	95.0	91.2	90.2
Russians	100.0	93.6	87.3	74.4	65.4	56.3
Urban	100.0	93.3	86.5	73.3	63.6	54.7
Rural	100.0	96.2	92.3	81.4	77.2	67.1
Others	100.0	91.7	83.4	76.3	66.5	59.2
Urban	100.0	90.7	81.4	75.8	63.3	55.9
Rural	100.0	96.8	93.6	78.0	78.3	71.0
Kyiv (city)	100.0	91.0	81.9	72.5	64.6	60.8
Ukrainians	100.0	91.8	83.6	75.2	67.4	63.9
Russians	100.0	89.4	78.8	65.5	57.0	51.9
Others	100.0	83.6	67.1	55.2	47.7	44.0
Lviv	100.0	96.9	93.7	91.1	86.4	80.7
Urban	100.0	96.8	93.5	90.1	84.1	78.4
Rural	100.0	97.0	94.0	92.5	89.6	84.2

Table A-1. Births by Oblast and Nationality of Mother in Ukraine, 1989-1994
(continued)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Ukrainians	100.0	97.4	94.8	92.3	87.9	82.7
Urban	100.0	97.6	95.2	91.9	86.3	81.1
Rural	100.0	97.1	94.2	93.0	89.9	84.7
Russians	100.0	90.0	80.1	73.8	63.9	54.6
Urban	100.0	90.2	80.4	74.8	64.2	54.9
Rural	100.0	88.3	76.6	57.8	60.2	50.8
Others	100.0	88.0	76.0	69.5	64.7	44.6
Urban	100.0	85.8	71.6	69.4	60.3	45.8
Rural	100.0	95.0	89.9	71.6	78.7	60.4
Odesa	100.0	95.9	91.7	86.1	80.5	74.8
Urban	100.0	92.9	85.8	77.9	69.8	65.1
Rural	100.0	101.1	102.3	100.7	99.5	92.0
Ukrainians	100.0	96.9	93.7	87.0	83.8	79.4
Urban	100.0	94.5	89.0	79.5	74.5	69.6
Rural	100.0	101.0	102.1	100.2	100.2	96.7
Russians	100.0	93.9	87.8	82.1	71.8	64.7
Urban	100.0	92.2	84.4	77.8	65.5	61.3
Rural	100.0	102.1	104.2	102.5	101.8	80.7
Others	100.0	95.4	90.9	88.4	81.6	74.2
Urban	100.0	88.1	76.3	72.1	60.7	56.2
Rural	100.0	101.0	102.0	101.0	97.6	88.0
Vinnytsya	100.0	98.0	95.9	92.0	86.7	82.6
Urban	100.0	96.6	93.1	86.7	80.4	75.2
Rural	100.0	99.5	99.1	97.8	93.6	90.8
Ukrainians	100.0	98.4	96.8	93.4	88.4	84.4
Urban	100.0	97.0	93.9	88.4	82.3	77.5
Rural	100.0	99.8	99.6	98.5	94.4	91.4
Russians	100.0	96.3	92.6	86.4	78.2	67.1
Urban	100.0	95.0	89.9	82.8	74.8	65.2
Rural	100.0	102.7	105.5	103.5	94.5	76.5
Others	100.0	88.8	77.7	59.9	50.8	57.8
Urban	100.0	91.0	82.0	58.0	49.3	47.6
Rural	100.0	84.6	69.1	63.4	53.7	77.6

Sources: Same as in Table 3.

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