
THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

VOL. V—NUMBER 4



LOWER LIGHT: TERRITORY OF RUSSIA UPPER LIGHT: DISMEMBERMENT OF UKRAINE AFTER THE WORLD WAR

AUTUMN, 1949

\$1.25 A COPY

Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Edited by EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor-in-Chief NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY
Associate Editors—LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY
Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA
with support of Americans of Ukrainian Descent

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NUMBER

IVAN KEDRYN. Ukrainian journalist, until 1939 political editor of *Dilo*, the oldest Ukrainian daily in L'viv. Author of *Peace of Brest* and others.

MICHAEL MISHCHENKO. Doctor of medicine and professor of psychiatry at Kharkiv university, pupil of famed Russian physiologist Pavlov; member of *Psycho-Neurological Academy* as well as of Institute of Experimental Medicine in Kharkiv. Now in USA.

HRYHORY MAKHIV. Ukrainian soil scientist and agricultural expert. Member of Agricultural Scientific Committee of Ukraine and Agricultural Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences until 1941. Now in USA.

CLARENCE A. MANNING. Professor at Columbia University, department of Slavic and East European languages; author of *Story of Ukraine* and *Ukrainian Literature*.

SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY. Ukrainian poet and literary critic, now residing in the United States.

HALYNA SELEHEN. Former docent and member of Kharkiv Statistical Bureau until 1941. Expert in demography of Soviet Ukraine. Now in USA.

VOLODYMYR SICHYNSKY, PH.D. Professor of Arts at Ukrainian Free University of Munich. Author of *Monumenta Architecturae Ucrainae*.

ALEXANDER DOMBROVSKY, PH.D. Ukrainian Prehistorian of younger generation.

ROMAN SMAL-STOCKY. Professor and Director of Slav Department at Marquette University. Former Professor of Warsaw University.

TITO'S UKRAINIAN FORERUNNERS

(Editorial)

THE defection from Russian-dominated Communism of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia is a major setback to the Kremlin. For the Soviet Union it would be less painful had a change in that country resulted in the restoration of the monarchy of king Peter. Instead, Moscow-educated Joseph Broz-Tito has fallen into the serious heresy of announcing and applying the principle that there can exist Communist states that are guided by the interests and national character of their people and do not blindly execute the orders of Stalin.

This heresy has been promulgated in Yugoslavia by an individual whom the Kremlin had expected to act as a Russian proconsul, an obedient provincial governor subservient to the Red tsar in all vital matters. Yugoslavia was flooded with Russian agents and police, in much the same manner that Hungary, Rumania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have been inundated. Moscow tried to dictate policy to Tito in regard to the collectivization of agriculture, and the unionization of workers, and in general asked Tito to consent to the economic exploitation of his own country for the benefit of the Soviet Union. Despite his Moscow training, however, Tito was still a son of the Balkan world with its hot blood and strong individualism, and he revolted against Russian dictation.

Tito rebelled and expelled the pack of Russian Communists from his country. He went further, with an attack on the ideological front, and boldly proclaimed that Stalin and the Cominform, not he himself, are the real heretics, and that they have departed from orthodox Marxism. In the history of religions that is nothing new—all heretics have accused their spiritual fathers of corrupting the true faith. Every heresy is a rebellion against authority and is prone to spread like an epidemic. Tito's position has solidified into a system of thought known as "Titoism," which is often referred to as a movement capable of blowing up the entire structure of the Kremlin's international dictatorship.

Titoism spread quickly to other Russian satellites, and it has resulted, in Hungary, in the execution of Rajk, in Poland in the retirement of Gomulka, and in Bulgaria the trial of Kostov. It has spread to the Communist parties of Italy, France, and other countries of Western

Europe. Many American pro-Communists, such as the sculptor Jo Davidson, have declared themselves friends of Tito. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the eyes of Moscow Tito is a formidable enemy who must be destroyed, for he has shaken the foundations of Russian-based Communism, and cracks in the wall may appear in any part of the world.

For the Western world Titoism is a new phenomenon. In reality, however, the only novel aspect about it is that it has succeeded. Identical positions were taken in Eastern Europe in the past, but the Kremlin was able to destroy their representatives. Ukraine, for example, was rocked by a true Titoism twenty-five years ago, with all the elements exactly the same as those in Yugoslavia, save one—the Ukrainian Communists did not possess an army and police of their own.

Titoism is a natural development in any region where Russian Communism moves outside ethnic Russian territory and operates in non-Russian lands. For the Kremlin has managed to combine international Communism with Russian nationalism and great-state interests. Opposition, accordingly, can be expected from opponents of these two forces, that is, from non-Communists and enemies of Russian expansionism. When Russian Communists meet nationally motivated Communists of other countries collision is inevitable. There are too many non-Russian Communists who do not desire to be mere lackeys of Moscow or to throw their country to Russian economic exploitation.

It is historically true that during the Bolshevik Revolution the Russian Communists managed to gain control of Ukraine with the help of a small but significant number of Ukrainian Communists. With the help of these Ukrainians, whose numbers grew perforce as the Bolshevik occupation became entrenched, the armies of the Ukrainian democratic republic were defeated and a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic was proclaimed, which from the very beginning was controlled by Russian Communists. These Russian Communists were supported by Ukrainian Communists who organized themselves into what they called the Ukrainian Communist Party and were known as the *Ukapisty*. In 1920 these *Ukapisty* were amalgamated with the official "Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine" (KPbU), the membership of the latter being composed almost entirely of Russianized elements in Ukraine, less than 23 percent of its members being Ukrainians in 1922.

This Communist party in Ukraine, organized on the territorial principle, numbered among its leaders such Ukrainians as Chubar, premier of Soviet Ukraine, Hrynko and Shumsky, both of them ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet republic, the "old Bolshevik" and Lenin's close friend Mykola Skrypnyk, the proletarian writer Mykola Khvylovy, and the economist Volobuyev.

Shumskism—Ukrainian Titoism

Troubles on the economic front which led to the NEP in the early twenties and the later struggle between Stalin and Trotsky after Lenin's death allowed Ukraine a period of quiet, during which the Ukrainian nation, awakened in the flames of revolution, made remarkable progress in science, literature, and art under the protection of patriotic Ukrainian commissars of education—Hrynko, Shumsky, and later Skrypnyk. Ukrainian cultural growth was so great that the Russianized elements within the Ukrainian Communist party were forced to embark upon a policy of "Ukrainianization" of the party and state apparatus, although they did so with sorrowful reluctance and without enthusiasm. With encouragement from Moscow these Russifiers, although living in Ukraine and enjoying top privileges by lording over the Ukrainian masses, sabotaged the program of Ukrainianization. This reluctance was especially marked in the Donbas, where the Russifying Communists endeavored to keep the Ukrainian workers Russified, employing such arguments as the obvious advantage of retaining the "generally understood language" (*obshcheponiatnyi yazyk*). Stalin personally interceded in behalf of the opponents of the Ukrainianization and ordered the Politbureau of the Ukrainian republic "to suspend immediately the forced Ukrainianization of the workers in the Donbas".²

The renascent cultural movement immediately took on a traditional Ukrainian complexion which even more widely separated the Ukrainians from the Russians, a development not to Moscow's liking. A serious danger to the Russians was presented by the manifesto promulgated by the Ukrainian Communist writer Mykola Khvylovy, who called upon his followers "to orient themselves toward Western, psychological Europe and to turn their backs on Moscow." Khvylovy

¹ *Nashe Pravda*, official organ of Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1928, I, 65.

² *Nashe Pravda*, 1928, I, 64.

also declared that Moscow had betrayed Marxism and had become "the center of the all-Union bourgeoisie."³

Alexander Shumsky uttered similar ideas on the political level. In 1920 Shumsky had condemned the Red Army's invasion of Ukraine, maintaining that this act was tantamount to occupation by a power hostile to the Ukrainian people and injurious to Ukrainian Communism. At this moment, however, he strongly advocated the use of Ukrainian as the official language of the Ukrainian Soviet republic and the filling of the highest party positions with patriotic Ukrainians rather than by Russified, Moscow-worshipping "Little Russians" (*Malorosy*). Shumsky declared that the time had come for the Communist party of Ukraine to make it possible for a Ukrainian Communist to feel at home in the party. "Today," Shumsky wrote, "a Ukrainian feels like a stepchild of the party, for the party is dominated by the arrogant Russian (Rusotrap) along with the fawning *Maloros*."⁴

The Russian domination of what on the surface was supposed to be a Ukrainian Soviet republic was also attacked by the economist Volobuyev. In *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, the theoretical organ of the Communist party of Ukraine, Volobuyev criticized the economic politics of Moscow, and showed that the economic relation of Ukraine toward Moscow was identical with that of a colony toward an imperialist metropolis. He declared that Ukraine was a Russian colony undergoing economic exploitation.⁵

Criticism of Russian policy in Ukraine became general and found strong support among the masses. Moscow found it necessary to send to Ukraine the "Iron Commissar" Lazar Kaganovich, who as secretary of the Communist party of Ukraine was charged with uprooting the heretical notions entertained by Ukrainian Communists and with putting things in order.

The Kremlin's Struggle Against Ukrainian Communism

The Ukrainian Communists were subjected to strong control and criticism, which was summed up in the terse accusation of nationalism, direct connivance with Fascism and capitalist imperialism—accusations similar to those hurled at Tito. Just as all rebellion among Communists against Moscow is labeled Titoism today, in like manner twenty-five

³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

years ago all manifestations of national Communism were labeled Shumskisms.

In an article entitled *What is Shumskism?* the orthodox Communist Lovitsky analyzed the nature of the Ukrainian defection. "When we closely investigate the nature of the various groups of the nationalist opposition within the All-Union Communist Party (the deviationists in Georgia, the group of Shumsky in Ukraine, and others) ... it is readily apparent that they all have petty bourgeois roots... Especially in Ukraine within the past years we are faced with an undoubted growth of Ukrainian urban bourgeoisie and kulaks."

The writer continued: "Open orientation on the foreign bourgeoisie is usually hidden by general phrases about Western culture, a convenient cover for opposition to the centralist policy of Moscow, complaints against that policy for its supposed inadequate attention to the development of Ukrainian economy... Here we see an unbroken thread from Zerov, Mohylyansky and other neoclassicists through Khvylovy directly to Shumsky. If all these broad phrases about Western culture and the centralized policy of Moscow are translated into the language ordinarily used in our party, you will have *Shumskism*."⁶

Kaganovich set out to destroy Shumskism and the problem of Ukrainian oppositionism was made the principal topic at the next meeting of the executive committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The executive committee condemned Shumsky and Shumskism, but direct methods of liquidation were not employed immediately. Khvylovy and Volubuyev were publicly reprimanded. In addition to censure, Shumsky lost his post as commissar of education and was exiled to the far north of Russia.

The heresy of Ukrainian national-Communism was far from suppressed, however, and exhibited itself in a rebellion within the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, which was at that time under Polish rule.

Shumskism in Western Ukraine

At the session of the executive committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine which attacked Shumskism, one member of that committee refused to vote against Shumsky. That member was Comrade Maksymovych, who represented Western Ukraine. Communists in Western Ukraine followed the example of Maksymovych and the highest body

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1928, I, 59.

within that party in Western Ukraine, the Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution vigorously defending Shumsky. This defiance in Galicia, of course, was more easily expressed, since that part of Ukraine was beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.

Insubordination in Western Ukraine was discussed by the Executive Committee of the Comintern in Moscow. The Comintern declared "whoever comes out against the policy of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) objectively takes a position on that side of the barricade on which international imperialism is aligned."⁷

The Western Ukrainian Communist appealed to the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, which met in Moscow in 1928. The congress did not have time to discuss the matter and returned it to the Executive Committee for reconsideration. The result was easily foretold and the Western Ukrainians, led by Maksymovych, Vasylykiv, and Turyansky, withdrew from the Comintern. The Comintern ordered the Polish Communist Party to organize a new executive committee for the Western Ukrainian party, which as a result split into Shumkist and pro-Russian factions, the latter composed almost entirely of non-Ukrainians.

The Liquidation of Shumskism

In a speech before the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine in March, 1928, Kaganovich remarked that "it is necessary to state openly and firmly that the situation is difficult. It is clear to each of us Bolsheviks that the majority of the leaders of the Central Committee are traitorous... The task is difficult... In a time when we are saving the Communist Party of Western Ukraine from renegades and traitors, we must beat, beat and once more beat in Leninist fashion not only these traitors, but also those who hesitate." Kaganovich continued: "Within recent days there appeared in the press a shameful article by Volobuyev, which in my opinion was not only anti-party but anti-Soviet as well. Therefore in my opinion Shumsky does not possess solid support in our party and experience in the struggle with petty bourgeois deviations here in the Ukrainian SSR and Western Ukraine proves that Shumsky was and is a weapon in the hands of our enemies."⁸

⁷ *Nashe Pravo*, 1928, I, 36.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

On this occasion Kaganovich did not put into practice his intention to "beat, beat, and once more beat in a Leninist fashion" the Ukrainian national-Communists. The showdown came in the 1930's, after Stalin had succeeded in disposing of the Trotskyites in acquiring complete power. Shumsky and Volobuyev were exiled and never returned to Ukraine, but perished somewhere in concentration camps, as did Premier Chubar and others. Mykola Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, the latter a close friend of Lenin, committed suicide. The intelligentsia of Ukraine, from the members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science to thousands of school teachers, were physically liquidated.

What was the motive behind the Stalinist destruction of the leading groups of the Ukrainian people? The explanation lies in the observation that the Ukrainians had accommodated themselves to Russian occupation at the time of the introduction of Soviet rule. A temporary truce had been arranged, but matters had now come to a head. The situation had ripened, and the issue was solved by the argument of force. Thus far force has not been applied in the Yugoslav case. The Ukrainian Communists had entertained a naive faith in the "common interests of Russian and Ukrainian democracy." Those were the days of idealistic enthusiasm for social revolution in Eastern Europe, and the Ukrainian Communists had responded by opening the gates of their country to foreign troops. The axe fell a decade later.

Moscow-educated Tito was able to observe the liquidation of many a nationalist deviation in the Soviet Union, and it is probable that he is aware of Ukrainian Shumskism and its tragic end. The fact that he has his own army spared him a similar fate, and any future spreading of the Titoist heresy is impossible in lands where the Red Army holds undisputed sway.



UKRAINIAN POLITICAL SCENE TODAY

By IVAN KEDRYN

Historical source: Ukraine between Poland and Russia

THE political thinking of the Ukrainians, as of all other nations, has been largely determined by the geographical position of their country. Throughout Ukrainian history the relationship between Ukraine and her two Slav neighbors, Poland and Russia, both of whom showed a desire to expand into Ukrainian territory, is of paramount importance. The geographical position of Ukraine has also another great disadvantage: it placed Ukraine almost immediately in front of the gate through which all the hordes of nomadic invaders came from Asia in their attempt to overrun Europe. The Huns, and then the Avars, the Khazars, the Pechenegs, the Polovtsians and finally the last Mongol tribe, the Tartars, followed the same route. The "honorable" task of Ukraine was to act as a shield for Europe, to take the first blow from the invaders and thus to allow other nations in the west to develop and consolidate.

This task of "defending Europe" as well as the constant exploitation of Ukraine's weakness by her western and northern neighbors made the formation of a consolidated state quite impossible. Therefore, after the decline of Kiev in the twelfth century, the center of the weakened Ukrainian state moved from the east to the west, into Western Ukraine, where a Western Ukrainian State was established. In 1387 Western Ukraine came under Polish domination, while the east Ukrainian principalities passed under Lithuanian rule. Then in the definitive union of Poland and Lithuania in 1569 most Ukrainian territory became a part of Poland.

The tradition of the medieval Ukrainian state was later revived during the Kozak period, in which the Kozaks, a Ukrainian knightly order formed on the Dnieper in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, played a dominant part. The history of the Ukrainian Kozak movement and the Kozak state, established by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1648 on the Eastern part of Ukrainian ethnic territory is a history of the balancing of power between Muscovy and Poland, a history of wars and treaties between Ukraine on the one hand and

Muscovy and Poland on the other. During that period the policies adopted by Muscovy and Poland towards Ukraine were truly "imperialist"—based on exploitation of that rich country. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Ukrainian Hetmans turned for help to more distant allies, such as Sweden. The defeat of the Swedes under Charles XII and their Ukrainian ally by the armies of Peter I at Poltava in 1709 sealed the fate of the Kozak state. It was only after this battle that Muscovy assumed the name "Russia," and began a complete though gradual destruction of the Ukrainian autonomy. The policy of Moscow and Warsaw towards Ukraine from then on became even more ruthless and did not change under white or red regimes.

The partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century transferred most of Western Ukraine to Russian rule; only Galicia and Bukovina were taken by Austria. Galicia remained under Austrian rule until the collapse of the Austrian Empire in 1918. In November 1918 the Ukrainians proclaimed there an independent state, the West Ukrainian National Republic. However, in the subsequent war with the Poles the Ukrainians were defeated and their state absorbed into Poland. The Council of Ambassadors, as an organ of the Supreme Council formed at the Versailles Peace Treaty, on March 15th, 1923 assigned Eastern Galicia to Poland on condition that the Polish government grant autonomy to the Ukrainians. This condition was never fulfilled by Poland nor was an earlier promise of the Polish government made on September 22, 1922 ever put into practice. Polish policy towards the Ukrainians in the years 1919-1939 was a continuation of the old policy of exploitation and national oppression.

The great National Revolution in Eastern Ukraine in the years 1917-1920 which brought into being the independent Ukrainian National Republic ended equally tragically with the military occupation of Eastern Ukraine by the Bolsheviks.

This brief historical sketch helps us to understand not only the political but also the psychological background which conditions the political thinking of modern Ukrainians as we find it expressed in their political parties.

Two events in the nineteenth century helped to crystallize modern Ukrainian political thought: the foundation of the so-called *Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius* in Kiev and the *Holovna Ruska Rada* in Lviv, in the forties. The first organization was founded

by Prof. M. Kostomarov, the poet Taras Shevchenko and others, all of whom became later the victims of Tsarist persecution.

The atmosphere of these first stirrings of Ukrainian political ideas was saturated with nostalgia for their lost freedom and memories of the glorious, though unhappy struggle for national statehood and independence. The patriotic poetry of Taras Shevchenko is the finest expression of the feelings and ideas not only of his contemporaries but also of the following generations. In Shevchenko's poetry we find scorn for those Ukrainians who betrayed their nation and tradition in the interests of Warsaw or Moscow, and a passionate program for liberation in the lines of his *Testament*:

Rise up and break your chains...

This battle-cry has been adopted by all Ukrainian parties and organizations as a basic principle of their ideology. They may differ as to the system which they advocate for the future Ukrainian state and as to their approach to social problems, but all of them stand on the same platform which demands liberation of Ukraine from the Polish and Russian domination.

The structure of Ukrainian political parties

Two factors had a decisive influence on the structure of the Ukrainian political parties. The century-long subjugation and oppression have brought with them the polonization or russification of the Ukrainian gentry. Secondly, Ukraine has always been predominantly an agricultural country, a peasant land. Thus all Ukrainian political parties always had and always will have a wide peasant support. The long period of oppression also gave to the first political parties in Ukraine the character of a national movement in which details like official membership or party registration were unknown. "Belonging" to a party reflected not necessarily any interest in social and political life, but primarily the national consciousness of a citizen. Under such condition the first Ukrainian political parties were formed at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. In Western Ukraine there were three major parties, "the Radical Party," "the National-Democratic Party," and "the Social-Democratic Party." In Eastern Ukraine (under Russia) the most significant party was "the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party" (RUP) which by 1900 had

clearly formulated a policy aiming at the creation of an independent Ukraine.

Thus we can say that the Ukrainian political parties are only 50 years old. Although these early political parties sometimes changed their names, they did not change their ideologies and despite the two world wars they have preserved their old traditions. Apart from them, of course, new parties were formed, reflecting the new ideologies of modern times.

It should be borne in mind that today not a single political party exists in Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet one-party system is represented in the Soviet Ukraine by the Communist Party of Ukraine, which has never been a Ukrainian party, but a mere territorial branch of the Russian Communist Party. The political dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Russian Communist Party and the decisions of the Politburo in Moscow is as complete as that of Mr. Manuilsky, the Ukrainian representative to the United Nations, on Mr. Vishinsky.

It is obvious, therefore, that Ukrainian political parties can exist today only outside of Ukraine,—in the Ukrainian diaspora. The centre of Ukrainian political life today is still in Germany, although many political leaders have in the last two years left that country and are in the United States, Canada, the Argentine, Brazil, Paraguay, and also in certain Western European countries, especially France and England. This wide dispersal of the Ukrainians has disrupted the normal life of the political parties and therefore at the present moment we cannot speak of organized political activity among the Ukrainians, but rather of political trends and currents, groups and camps, often conducting bitter polemics with one another.

Among the pre-World War II political parties in Western Ukraine we must mention the *Ukrainian National-Democratic Union* (UNDO), which still exists and played an important part in the political life of Galicia during the past 50 years. A new party, very similar in its ideology to UNDO, was formed in the emigration and called the *Ukrainian National State Union* which has as its first aim the support of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic existing in exile since it was forced to leave Ukraine after losing the war against the Bolsheviks in 1921. Thus the preservation of tradition and of the legality of the national Ukrainian government is one of the fundamental principles of both these parties.

Among the Ukrainian Socialist parties the pre-World War II *Ukrainian Radical Socialist Party* a Western Ukrainian peasant party which belonged to the II International deserves to be mentioned first. Another Western Ukrainian Socialist party was the *Ukrainian Social-Democrat Party* organizing industrial workers. There are also two Socialist parties which were brought into the emigration by the Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine: the *Social-Democrats* and the *Social-Revolutionaries*. Actually there is little difference in ideology between any of these socialist parties. All of them are anti-Marxist and in their ideology are closest to the British Labor Party. Quite recently all the Ukrainian Socialist parties united into a *Union of Ukrainian Socialists* which co-ordinates the policies of all the separate parties.

An interesting new party, formed after World War II in the emigration, is the *Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party* (UR-DP) the members of which are almost exclusively Ukrainian refugees from the Soviet Ukraine. Among the chief tasks of this party is the problem of re-education of the Ukrainian youth born in the Soviet Ukraine. Its political program is moderately left.

The nationalist parties compose the third group. *The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists*, formed in 1929, has as its basic aim a national revolution. It tried to realize its revolutionary aims primarily in Poland (1930-1939) in a series of terrorist acts directed against the Polish regime. A split, which still continues, developed in this party in 1940/41. One group which retained the original name of the party moved away from terrorist activity and is now co-operating with other moderate democratic and socialist groups. The other group, much more numerous and more active, called *Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Revolutionalists* still prefers the use of revolutionary tactics. The Nationalist Movement in Ukraine before the second World War was especially strong in Western Ukraine.

In the fourth political camp we find the *Ukrainian Monarchists* who wish to see the future Ukraine not as a republic but as a monarchy, based on the Hetman-tradition in Ukrainian history and on the eight-month rule of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky in Ukraine in 1918.

In the political life of Ukrainians an important role is played by the Church which is very influential among the whole people. The Western Ukrainians are predominantly of the Greek Catholic faith (Ukrainian Catholics), the Eastern Ukrainians are Orthodox and belong mostly to the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church. All

Ukrainian political parties greatly respect the Church and the last mentioned moderate, nationalist, and monarchist groups actively support the Church, formulating their relationship to the Church in their political programs.

What unites and what divides Ukrainian political parties?

We are aware that to a stranger all the Ukrainian political parties are but names. It is important, therefore, to gain an insight into the contemporary political ideologies and party programs of these political groups.

All Ukrainian political parties take the same attitude toward Russia and Poland. All of them have as their ultimate goal the creation of a Ukrainian state, independent of Poland and Russia within the ethnic boundaries of Ukraine. There does not exist a single Ukrainian political party or group which would be content to accept autonomy for Ukraine from either Russia or Poland at the cost of renouncing the claim to independence. Neither is there any group which could be called pro-Soviet in the sense in which the policy of the late President Benes, or that of Mikolajczyk or Nagy was pro-Soviet. The Ukrainians have abandoned all pro-Soviet sympathies, even the idea that it is possible to co-operate with the Soviets. The last attempt at Soviet-Ukrainian co-operation was made during the period of NEP and the so-called "Ukrainization" in 1922-1929. The price in lives which those Ukrainians paid for their pro-Soviet policy was too high for any one to repeat the experiment.

This basic belief that it is impossible for any Ukrainian party to co-operate with either the Russians or the Poles stems from the conviction that both the Russians and the Poles do not genuinely desire co-operation on equal terms, but will always break all promises, and return to the old policies of exploitation and oppression of the Ukrainian nation.

All the Ukrainian political parties believe that a complete liberation of Ukraine and the formation of a Ukrainian state can only come after the collapse of the USSR, and that such a collapse will not be brought about by internal changes, but externally—by war which will at once bring out the revolutionary forces of the interior. All the political parties turn hopefully in their foreign policy to the West, especially to the United States and Great Britain.

The differences of opinion between the Ukrainian political parties are concerned with means, not ends. First of all, the political parties differ in their views as to what kind of political and social system they would like to see in a free Ukraine. Secondly, they differ as to who should represent the Ukrainians and their cause before the world. The unanimity in the basic aims of their policies is thus overshadowed by the personal ambitions of individuals and groups in their struggle for leadership.

However, in spite of all the internal strife, the political maturity of the Ukrainian parties was proved in 1948, when they all agreed to create the Ukrainian National Council, which acts in certain ways as a Ukrainian Parliament in emigration. The Ukrainian National Council in its declaration made it clear that the only legally representative body of the Ukrainian people in emigration and before the whole free world is the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic which preserves the actual tradition of a Ukrainian government legally elected in Ukraine before the Bolshevik occupation of the country. It alone symbolizes the historical continuation of the Ukrainian statehood.

In the Ukrainian National Council most of the above-mentioned parties are today united with the exception of the Monarchists who would not renounce their monarchist principles in favor of a republic. In the Executive Organ of the Ukrainian National Council we find representatives of all political parties with the exception of the Ukrainian-Nationalist-Revolutionist Party which, however, recognizes the authority of the Council and performs the function of an opposition. All parties which existed before World War II and all newly formed parties are assured equal representation in the Council. They are divided into three main groups: 1) the liberal group, 2) the socialists, 3) the nationalists. Each group contains an equal number of delegates sent by the separate parties.

Such a division of seats in the National Council is strongly criticized by the Nationalist-Revolutionists who feel that on the basis of proportionate representation they should as a larger party receive more seats. Secondly, the Nationalist-Revolutionists maintain that the Council should not be formed on the basis of party-representation, but on the basis of a free election in which all Ukrainians in emigration would cast their votes. Another section of the Nationalists opposes the National Council because, it claims, the "Supreme Ukrainian Liberation

Council" which is supposed to operate underground in the Soviet Ukraine is the only true representative of the Ukrainian liberation movement. The Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council regards itself as the political organ of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), an underground military organization which was active against the Germans and against the Soviets. In spite of some negotiations between the Ukrainian National Council and the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council as to their respective spheres of political action, no agreement between them has yet been reached and this fact is the cause of many internal conflicts in Ukrainian political life today.

The Ukrainian foreign policy

In May 1949 the Executive Organ of the Ukrainian National Council issued a declaration on the "principles of Ukrainian foreign policy." These principles are set down in eight main points, the first of which serves as a preamble. "The liberation of Ukraine can be brought about"—we read in this preamble—"by two decisive factors: the national forces in the country, and favorable international conditions. Therefore the Ukrainian movement for liberation is trying to consolidate its own forces as well as to gain sympathy and understanding abroad for the just cause of a free Ukraine." The political aspirations of the Ukrainians today are rooted in the long traditions of Ukrainian history. Further, the declaration mentions the ultimate goal of Ukrainian political thought—which is: "the creation of a fully independent Ukrainian state on its ethnic territory." It also stresses the solidarity of the Ukrainians with other nationalities subjugated by the Soviets and mentions that the Ukrainians believe in the self-determination of nations and accept the ideals of personal and national freedom expressed in the Atlantic Charter. The next point deals with the imperialist policy of Russia, in the Tsarist and Soviet periods, pointing out that during both periods Russia was attempting to dominate the world and expanded at the cost of neighboring nations. Further, the Ukrainian government in exile declares itself to be opposed to any form of federation with Russia in future, pointing to past history as a black record of Russia's part in governing other nations. "True federation"—it says—"is possible only between peoples which have preserved a tradition of self-respect and toleration for each other." It suggests that all oppressed nations in the Soviet Union after liberation should form

their own union on a voluntary basis of mutual participation, securing thus their common political, economic, and military interests. The frontiers of the future Ukraine, according to this declaration, should be based on the ethnographic principle. Those nations which will be neighbors of the new Ukrainian state and which are invited into a Federal Union of their own, are mentioned in the following point of the declaration. Among them are: Byelorussians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, the peoples of the Cossack lands in the territory between Ukraine and the Caucasus, and the various peoples of the Caucasus. Other European nations now oppressed by the Soviet Union would also be welcomed in the Federation, as "members with equal rights in a United Europe." The last point of the declaration emphasizes the belief that this Ukrainian plan for Eastern Europe could only be realized in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect.

This declaration is important not only as an official document on foreign policy issued by the Ukrainian National Council, but also because it expresses the views of most Ukrainians on an international order in a new Europe.

The most interesting point, of course, is the insistence, that under no condition will the Ukrainians co-operate with the Russians, while there is accepted the possibility of a free Poland entering into a federation of all the liberated peoples together with the Ukrainians. Thus the Ukrainian government in exile looks to the weakened Poland of today as a possible ally in a struggle against powerful Russia. The importance attached to a possible future federation of all oppressed peoples, except the Russians, is noteworthy especially in view of the fact that many emigre Russians regard Stalin as the greatest Russian statesman since Peter the Great, as the man who has led Russia to occupy a dominant position in the world. It is understandable, therefore, that while the Ukrainians have little trust in the political assurance of the Poles, after their experiences of Soviet rule in Ukraine they trust the Russians even less.

It is clear from the preamble of the declaration that the Ukrainians rest their hopes for a free Ukraine on the internal consolidation of their forces and on favorable external circumstances—in other words in a war that would bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the possibility of creating a new European order. The Ukrainians do not believe in the possibility of a violent change from within the

Soviet leaders, nor in the surrender of the Soviets as visualized by President Truman. It seems to them that they are better judges of Russia, its history, culture, collective psychology and Russian messianism (which constantly reappears in ever new forms but is still reducible to the one basic motive of expansion) than are other nations who have had less chance of observing and experiencing Russian influence from close quarters. Most Ukrainians are convinced, therefore, that only force can bring about the overthrow of the Soviet regime and thus create conditions for a true revolution and liberation.

Conclusions

In summing up, we would like to emphasize that it is incorrect to speak of great internal strife among the Ukrainians. The unanimity among all Ukrainians on the basic political questions is so great that all such quarrels will certainly disappear when the moment of liberation, the moment for action will come. Ukrainian political thinking is saturated today with democratic ideas not because it is opportunist, but because it is genuinely democratic in its foundations and because it believes that the true liberation of a nation is impossible without the voluntary support of the Ukrainian masses in the formation of a democratic government. The Ukrainians today are united in their fight against Soviet totalitarianism and autocracy. The Ukrainian people have suffered at the hands of both dictators Hitler and Stalin. They desire a true freedom within the framework of a democratic government, not anarchy or another type of totalitarianism. The Ukrainians, expressing their ideas through their political associations, believe that a free Ukraine is an essential prerequisite for a free Europe and for a free world which is not to be constantly threatened by that sword of Damocles the archenemy of Ukraine and of all civilization, the menace of Russia red or white.

MEDICAL SCIENCE IN UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS

By MICHAEL MISHCHENKO

THE Russification of all aspects of Ukrainian culture in Tsarist Russia was not allowed to make itself felt in the development of Ukrainian medicine which did not exist as a medical science of a separate nation. Under such circumstances the medical schools of the universities in Ukraine, though of a high standard, could not be regarded as centers of a distinct Ukrainian medical science. Most of the names prominent in the medical world of the 19th century in Ukraine were foreign. There were very few Ukrainian scientists; they were mostly Russified and their work did not leave any mark on the life of the Ukrainian people. All the most famous among them (e.g. Bets, Mechnikov a. o.) were always regarded by the world as Russian and were listed as Russian celebrities.

At the beginning of the 20th century and especially during the national revolution in Ukraine (1917-1921) Ukrainian medical scientists began to grow in number, and developed a definite Ukrainian character in their work and in their attitude towards the national life. Today, however, Ukrainian medical scientists in the Soviet Ukraine find themselves once more under an oppression similar to that of the pre-revolutionary days. The Soviet policy of russification, of terrorizing and destroying scientists who do not conform to the line accepted by the Communist Party, tends to force Ukrainian scientists once more into the general stream of Soviet, that is of Russian, life.

It is enough to mention that under the Soviets three presidents of the Medical Institute of Kiev were purged within a short period of time: Prof. Strelchuk was executed in 1929, Prof. Levytsky sent for 10 years to a forced labor camp, and Prof. Volkovsky was executed. Apart from them the following prominent Ukrainian medical scientists were severely punished: Professors Chernyakhivsky, Kudrytsky, Drapaluk, Udovychenko, Puchkivsky, and others. In Kharkiv among the victims of Soviet purges and repressions were Dr. Zhuravel of the Tuberculosis Institute, and two presidents of the First Ukrainian Medical Institute. Many medical scientists of the Kharkiv Medical Institute perished in forced labor camps.

It is interesting, therefore, to trace the work and achievements of Ukrainian scientists, and especially of the medical scientists, which has taken place in spite of Tsarist and Soviet restrictions and limitations. By the end of the 19th century some prominent scientists of Ukrainian origin were well known in Europe (e.g. Vvedensky, Zabolotny). Even before World War I Scientific Research Institutes such as the Psycho-Neurological Institute in Kharkiw, the Bacteriological Institute in Kharkiw, and the Pasteur Institute in Kharkiw and Odessa had attracted attention in Western Europe.

During the national revolution and the period of the Ukrainian National Republic these scientific institutions grew rapidly. The creation of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences at that time and scientific studies at the Ukrainian universities gave a new impetus to this movement for a Ukrainian national medical science.

At first, the Soviets based their policy towards the sciences on the theory that science "should be national in form and socialist in content." Later, however, they were forced by the emergence of independent scientific research among the various nationalities of the USSR, to resort to the policy of Russification and regimentation. The strategic considerations of Russian expansion make necessary an extensive system of medical research stations which are wholly devoted to the study of military medicine. Thus most scientific institutes have their secret medical, bacteriological, physiological, chemical, toxicological, and blood transfusion research branches. Large sums are needed for their maintenance.

At the same time much attention is given to the problem of methodology, the selection of scientific personnel, a means of fighting the idealistic and mechanistic ideology of "bourgeois medical science." It is demanded of all research scientists that they should respect the "Marxist-Leninist methods" and much time is devoted to the planning of scientific research based on these methods. All these efforts have not produced any startling successes. Marxian-Leninist methods in the field of medicine and other sciences have not been accepted as of any value in the world of science. In investigating some problems of biology (constitution, heredity), physiology, psychology, and pathology, the Soviet scientists have produced only some criticism of the mechanistic and idealist principles of the "bourgeois science." They have not put forward any original theories (with the exception of Lysenkoism).

The Communist Party is established today not only as a political

force, but also as the highest authority in all matters of science. By a party decree some sciences are encouraged, others are liquidated. The development and achievement of a particular science are determined not by scientific methods or objective considerations, but by changes in ideology or the requirements of the "party line." Strict adherence to the Marxian-Leninist method, as demanded by the party, becomes the highest purpose of science. The party is ever ready to detect any deviations in the work of a medical scientist which may contradict the needs of "social reconstruction," Soviet sociology and philosophy. The internal complexities of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy demand a very elastic strategy in accordance with Lenin's dictum "one step forward—two back." Science, too, is required to change its course and turn glibly in the direction indicated by the party. This is called a "turning point" in Marxian philosophy, and a "liberation" from bourgeois, nationalist influences.

The scientists feel therefore, that they must make "confessions" of their errors. They often try to detect "ideological deviations" in the work of their colleagues, and at all times they attempt "to annihilate the remnants of capitalist ideology" and alien and foreign conspiracies. Those pronouncements of Marx and Engels which contradict the present policy of the party are ignored or twisted into a "new interpretation." This, of course, is called "supplementing the classics by practical revolutionary Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism." Engels' sympathetic view of Lamarck, for instance, which is evident in his "The Dialectics of Nature" is ignored.

Medicine, like all other sciences, is regarded as a sociological science, as the object of it is Man—according to Marxism—a social being. Therefore mechanistic or idealistic views in medical science are regarded as the greatest sins. They aim, in the opinion of the Soviets, at the destruction of Marxian and Leninist principles, which alone are true.

Thus the party rejects the theories of Lamarck, Weismann, Morgan, and Kretschmer in the field of development and heredity, branding them as mechanistic and harmful, and basing this judgement on the unfounded theories of Michurin and Lysenko which are accepted as being true to Marxian Leninist philosophy. This "party line" as far as science is concerned, has undergone several changes. In the early period of the so-called "war-communism" and later in the period of the NEP—objective scientific research was encouraged. The works of

Pavlov, Bekhterov, and Kornilov, in the field of physiology and psychology date from this period. Great interest was then awakened in pediatrics, and considerable research was carried on in anthropology and anthropogenetics as well as the natural sciences. Subjective psychology in Ukraine was then replaced by Pavlov's physiology, Bekhterov's reflexology, and Watson's behaviorism. Freud's theories were severely criticised.

This flowering of the natural sciences was regarded by some Marxists (Lenin, Bukharin, Bogdanov) as a tribute to the Communist Revolution. The central committee of the party assigned large sums for the building of Pavlov's laboratories. Trotsky in one of his articles gave a brilliant comparison of the methods of Pavlov and Freud. In it he writes that these scientists remind him of two sages beside a deep well. One of them, Freud, tries to discover what is at the bottom by peering through a dark mass of water. The other, Pavlov, gets down to the very bottom and tries to recognize its nature by testing its qualities directly. Pavlov's ideas were made at the time a part of the general communist dialectics.

In the next period, that of "socialist reconstruction" when the Soviet Union was in the throes of a most serious economic and spiritual crisis, when there was a wide spread famine in Ukraine and a general pauperization with a high deathrate among the whole population, the party sought support in new scientific methods and theories. The development of the natural sciences, it was felt, became dangerous. The objective methods of the natural sciences and of psychology in so far as the picture of man given by those sciences was concerned, could not reflect the new methods of "socialist construction." They came to be regarded as either remnants of the "right-mechanistic theories of Bukharin" or the "left-idealistic theories of Trotsky." On the party's command hitherto accepted theories were attacked and destroyed and what was described as an "ideological turning point" was achieved by the party. The philosophy of Deborin was accepted as conforming to the new party line.

After this "turnabout" in Marxian philosophy (1932-1933) reflexology (as propounded by Bekhterov) and reactology (as taught by Kornilov) were banned. Pavlov's physiology, however, was spared. At the same time the departments of research in anthropology and anthropogenetics at various universities were closed. Later, in accord-

ance with a special decree of the Politbureau, pediatrics as a science was liquidated.

Severe repressive measures were taken against philosophers, biologists, anthropologists, pedologists, and psychologists. So, for instance, Professor Zaluzhny, a pioneer in the field of Ukrainian pedology was sent to a forced labor camp for life; Prof. Popov was tortured in prison; Prof. Sokolansky, a specialist in remedial work with deaf-mutes, etc., was imprisoned and finally exiled; Prof. Nikolajyv, the most prominent Ukrainian anthropologist, was deprived of his chair and imprisoned; Prof. Semkovsky, an eminent philosopher and director of the Marxian Leninist Institute of Philosophy in Kharkiw, politically active and a former member of the 2nd International, was sent to Siberia. Soon afterwards, Prof. Semkovsky's successor, Prof. Yury nec, was also arrested. An especially painful loss for all Ukrainian science was the deportation of the Academician, Stepan Rudnytsky, a famous Ukrainian geographer and director of the Geographical Research Institute. All this happened in the one Ukrainian city of Kharkiw. Many thousands of other scientists perished at the same time in other cities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

At the same time the party extolled the psychological theories of Vyhodsky, Leontiev, Lurie, and Rubinstein. In a new attempt to distort the original teachings of Marx, it stressed the importance of consciousness. A decree, issued by the Politbureau, declared that "in principle the construction of socialism, the creation of a classless society has been achieved in the Soviet Union." Further development, which would lead to a communist society, must be built on "the high degree of self-consciousness of the working class, in spite of all the difficulties of the present moment."

The "difficulties of the moment" were those involving the very existence of man: food and fuel shortages, inadequate clothing, fear of imprisonment or deportation, extreme exploitation of labor, and, in addition, the resistance of the masses to all the new socialist plans. No learned Marxist philosopher had the courage to expose the departure by the party from the original Marxist teaching, especially in view of the final note in the party's decree about "eradication of hostile ideologies and the necessity of continuous watchfulness."

Material insecurity, the impossibility of establishing contact with the outside world, lack of freedom of thought and creation, regimentation of scientific research according to a plan—all this created a situa-

tion in which real scientific work and objective research became impossible. Therefore the departments of natural sciences of all the universities and institutes still rely to a very great extent on the achievements of pre-revolutionary science (Pavlov, Zabolotny, Protopopov, Bohomolets) and also on the discoveries of Western European science, especially in the field of medicine.

It is no wonder, therefore, that in spite of constant encouragement from the party, often coupled with accusations of "narrow empiricism"—scientists in Soviet Russia have not achieved anything spectacular. After the last war, we can see the intensification of the struggle against Western Science in the attempt to prove to the world that Soviet Science alone can remain "pure" (Lysenko).

Medical research in Ukraine is being conducted in the following medical institutes of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: Pathophysiological, created by the Academician Bohomolets; Biochemical, created by the Academician Palladin, Ophthalmological, created by the Academicians Levytsky and Filatov, and others. In the years preceding World War II many new research institutes were created independently of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Among them the most important were:

1. The Ukrainian Psycho-Neurological Academy in which all branches of the natural sciences and medicine co-operate in the study of pathology and the norms of human personality. This Academy consists of the following four institutes: clinical (psychiatric, neurological, neuro-surgical), child psycho-neurology, experimental psychoneurology, social psychoneurology. Separate laboratories (for biochemistry, physiology, histology, patho-anatomy, and psychology) are at the disposal of these institutes and provide an opportunity for studying human personality in its totality.

2. The Institute of Experimental Medicine. As in the previous case, this institute provides facilities for the study of the human personality through laboratory work in all branches of medicine.

3. The Institute of Roentgenology and Oncology in Kharkiw and Kiev.

4. The Institute of Pathology and Industrial Hygiene in Kharkiw and Kiev. This is a center of research in the occupational diseases. There were more such institutes in the earlier period.

Among the founders of Ukrainian medical science the following scientists may be noted:

1. Prof. Bets; anatomist, professor of Kiev University (middle of the 19th century) who is famous for his discovery of the cells of pyramidal structure of the brain which are named after him. His name which can be found in all medical encyclopaedias, has been under the Soviets somewhat forgotten in Ukraine.

2. Academician Zabolotny, the second president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, known as a bacteriologist as well as for his work on Bubonic plague. Prof. Zabolotny led an expedition to the Far East, India, and China to study the effective means of fighting this disease.

3. Academician Yushchenko, psychiatrist; formulated a new historical principle for determining the constitutional characteristics of the personality.

4. Academician Vorobiov, anatomist, founder of the great anatomical museum in Kharkiw. Famous for his new method for macroscological study of the nerves; known for his physiological contributions to anatomy. A specialist in embalming, Prof. Vorobiov helped to embalm Lenin's body and was its constant guardian until his own death. Author of a standard work on anatomy in four volumes.

5. Academician Melnikov-Rozvedenko, an eminent pathologist and anatomist, and histo-pathologist. Also a specialist in embalming and preserving, interested in the preservation of the brains of eminent Ukrainians. After his death the latter practice was discontinued, partly perhaps because most eminent Ukrainians did not die a natural death in Ukraine.

6. Academician Bohomolets, the third president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, patho-physiologist, known for his contributions to the study of the reticulo-endothelial system and for his work on old age.

7. Prof. Protopopov, corresponding member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, a pupil of Pavlov and Bekhterov. Introduced Pavlov's principles into the study of the natural sciences in Ukraine. After Pavlov's death. Protopopov was the most prominent specialist in his field. In Ukraine he also represented the latest achievements in reflexology. Editor of "Reflexology and Experimental Pedagogy."

8. Prof. Sokolansky, educationalist, a pupil of Bekhterov, a follower of Potebnia in linguistics, and a pioneer in the field of remedial treatment. Exponent of a new method for the education of physically defective children. On the basis of Pavlov's theories he developed a method of teaching a language as well as of inculcating principles of

social conduct to blind-deaf mutes. Achieved remarkable successes in educating such handicapped children. One of his patients, Olha, became similar to Helen Keller and Louise Bridgman. She not only learned how to write and read, but studied literature at a university and conducted correspondence with writers. Prof. Sokolansky was very actively engaged in social work in Ukraine. Later imprisoned and exiled.

9. Prof. Zaluzhny, the most eminent Ukrainian pedologist. Conducted experiments in the field of children's collectives. Left a monumental work on his experiments, which has since been banned by the Soviets. Imprisoned and deported.

10. Prof. Nikolaiyv, prominent anthropologist, and a graduate of French universities. Russian in origin, but a very fervent Ukrainian patriot. Refused to lecture in Russian at a Ukrainian university. For his work in the field of anthropology he was accused of nationalism and later deprived of his academic posts. After a long imprisonment, he was given an opportunity to work in a shoe factory. Here he wrote a book on the anatomy of the foot. Imprisoned again.

11. Prof. Popov, educationist, director of the First Ukrainian Experimental Research Institute in Education and Pedology. Professor and Dean of the Kharkiw University. Created an original system of workers' education in Ukraine, different from the Russian system. Very active in social and political life of Ukraine. Compromised for a time with the Communist Party in order to retain Ukrainian influences in the field of education in the 1920-ies. Later imprisoned and tortured severely. After his release, completely ruined physically, Prof. Popov became a priest and continued his work in the emigration.

12. Prof. Platonov, psychiatrist and neuro-pathologist, a pupil of Bekhterov, professor in the Kharkiw Medical Institute. First to use the method of conditioned reflexes for the study of the higher nervous system. Used hypnosis for the investigation of the cortical vegetative function of the brain and for the study of the psychic ontogenesis of the personality. Explored the influence of language on vegetative functions. Author of a standard work "The Word as a Physiological Factor." Hanged in 1943 in Myrhorod on orders of the NKVD.

This list contains only the most prominent specialists in their field. We must not forget the other scientific workers and doctors in Ukraine who fell victims of the Soviet regime. Many of them suffered and are suffering today for their belief that science should be freed from the fetters which the Communist Party imposed on it in the Ukraine.

NEW CULTIVATED CROPS IN UKRAINE

By HRYHORY MAKHIV

ALTHOUGH the climate and soil of Ukraine are suited to a great variety of agricultural crops, very few new cultures have been or are being introduced. The chief reason for this is to be found in the backward state of agriculture during the Tsarist regime when peasant farming was based on the use of fallow-land as pasture for cattle and on the harvesting of winter rye and barley, though spring wheat and, in damp districts, oats and buckwheat were sometimes substituted.

In moist forest-steppe regions the cultivation of the sugar-beet was well developed, especially on the large estates. Ukraine, therefore, was the main sugar-producer of Tsarist Russia (70%) as well as, later, of the Soviet Union.

In the twenties a more valuable winter wheat was substituted for winter rye. The spring wheat acreage was then further reduced since the yield of spring wheat in dry regions with inadequate and unscientific methods of farming is 1.5 times lower than that of winter wheat.

The development from 1920-1927 by Ukrainian scientists of new drought-frost-resistant types of winter wheat of high yield has made winter wheat the main grain crop. The introduction of new grain crops in Soviet Ukraine was hindered by the exhausting crop-rotation maintained to meet the high demands made on agriculture by governmental policy. The role of "bread basket" of the Soviet Union which Ukraine still fills makes the proper utilization of the agricultural potential of the country impossible. An attempt to break up crop-rotation by the introduction of tobacco-cultivation (4-5% of nicotine) is foiled by the very character of the Soviet agricultural policy, since this is based on the exploitation of the naturally high fertility of the land without compensation of organic or mineral elements. This continuous exploitation of the soil is one reason for the decline in yields despite the favorable climate of the forest steppe regions.

New crops in Ukraine may be divided into three categories:

1. Crops which have already been introduced into Ukraine and already cover a considerable acreage.
2. Crops which have been proved useful experimentally by re-

search institutes, but are not raised because of the special economic policy of the Soviet government.

3. Crops which could certainly be introduced with beneficial effects into Ukrainian agriculture, but which because of the Soviet economic policy have not passed small-scale experimental tests.

The *soy-bean* belongs to the first group. The cultivation of this crop dates back to 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, but the acreage increased significantly only in the twenties. The slaughter of livestock which occurred in Ukraine on a vast scale, first during the years of "war communism" and later during the forced collectivization made it essential to cultivate the *soy-bean*, which is rich in protein and fats, and for a time acted as a meat-substitute. However, the high hopes of the benefits of *soy-bean* cultivation have not been realized; this crop is now less valued and is used mostly in the production of chocolates and pastries. The nutritive value of the *soy-bean* is far less than that of the Ukrainian bean or pea. The moist and warm regions of the southern forest-steppe are particularly suited to *soy-bean* cultivation and there the acreage under cultivation in both state and collective farms is considerable.

Another crop which has a large acreage in Ukraine (over 500,000 hectares) is *cotton*. It is not entirely new to Ukraine. At the end of the nineteenth century cotton was cultivated in small quantities on some farms in the Southern steppe region, and was used mainly to supply material for cotton-wool.

The isolation of the USSR from other countries forced the Soviet Union to be self-sufficient in raw materials, and so in 1930 the cultivation of cotton was forcibly introduced in southern areas with a long grain tradition. Apart from that large state farms (8,000-12,000 hectares each) were organized in Ukraine, and in these the cultivation of cotton played a leading part.

Ukraine is in the most northerly area of cultivation of cotton since this crop requires a maximum amount of warmth and a long growing period. Even the introduction of new kinds which ripen 5-10 days sooner than the ordinary variety, cannot be regarded as having made its cultivation more practicable. Thus the prospects of an increased cotton acreage are small. An increase in the yield is, however, quite possible. Cotton is drought resistant, impervious to large concentration of salts in the soil and its osmotic pressure and thus, in the southern farming areas of Ukraine it is possible to apply, around the

cotton plants, large amounts of organic and mineral fertilizers, mostly in the form of physiological acids.

The average yield of raw cotton on state farms in the warm southern areas is about 8-12 centners* and on the peasant collective farms 5-8 centners per hectare. The low yields of raw cotton are due to the following reasons:

1. The lack of a planned crop-rotation in which a high cotton yield could be assured by the use of a suitable predecessor (e.g. alfalfa).
2. An insufficient quantity of organic and mineral fertilizers used directly on the cotton and also on the winter-crop which usually precedes it.

It is important to remember that the most southerly area of the Ukrainian steppe (the coast of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov) is rich in saline soils. Such soils make the early ripening of cotton possible (100% pre-frost harvest), but they also hinder its growth and thus the cotton harvest in very saline soils is not over 5 centners.

The liberal application of chemical melioration in such areas, especially the use of gypsum and also the introduction into the crop-rotation of legumes (*Medicago falcata*, *Melilotus*) make it possible to reach yields of 20-30 centners. The harvest may be further increased up to 35-50 centners through irrigation in periods of drought. The effectiveness of these measures was proved experimentally in the thirties, but they have never been applied in practice and therefore the average yield of raw cotton in Ukraine (the coast of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, the steppes of the lower Don and its tributaries Manych and Sal) does not exceed 5-8 centners per hectare.

A well-developed cotton crop could supply all the needs of the textile industry in Ukraine. However, cotton is not processed and manufactured in Ukraine, but in the factories of central Russia, where, because of its high quality, it is mixed with cotton from Central Asia.

The second group of crops in Ukraine comprises those proven beneficial experimentally, but difficult to introduce into the cycle of crop-rotation.

Here we must, first of all, mention *rice*. There are good prospects for the cultivation of rice in Southern Ukraine. In the southern farming areas there are large strips of land which are not being used (waste-lands). They are for the most part lands with saline soils in the river

* 1 centner=1 quintal (50 kg).

valleys, large steppe depressions, and the coastal areas of river-estuaries.

The saline soils in the Southern Ukraine belong to the so-called salinized soils, the creation of which is conditioned by their proximity (1-1.5 m) to subterranean waters rich in minerals. While rising upwards along the capillaries of the soil these waters evaporate and leave layers of salt in the upper strata of the soil. In some salinized soils soda predominates; others are full of chlorite and sodium sulphate. Usually only saline vegetation of inedible plants grows on such lands. These areas, therefore, cannot even be used as pasture land for sheep.

Rice is not a saline-resistant plant, but its cultivation causes loss of salt from saline soils. The flooding of the ricefields with fresh water almost throughout the entire vegetation period (May-September) makes it impossible for the underground waters to rise up the capillaries of the soil and evaporate on the surface. On the contrary, small streams formed by fresh water help to wash the salt out of the upper layer of the soil. According to our observations, the quantity of salts in the soil after only one crop of rice, decreased from 1% of the soil weight to 0.1%. Thus the saline soil was transformed into good soil suitable for agricultural use.

In the Southern Ukrainian steppe regions there are large areas, so-called steppe depressions which form shallow hollows in the flat surface of the steppes. The area of the base of such a depression may vary from 1 to 20 or 30 square kilometres. In the spring these hollows are often flooded and are therefore useless for ordinary agricultural purposes. It is possible, however, to utilize these areas for rice cultivation by means of the so-called "seashore-estuary irrigation," or else by watering rice with the help of artesian wells. To put about 2,000,000 hectares of the Southern Ukraine under rice cultivation would be of very great advantage for the whole economy of the country since cheap water supply and suitable soil, otherwise unused, are available. By the introduction of rice it is possible to create a new crop acreage of very high productivity.

The rice acreage in 1941 was only 10,000 hectares; the average yield of rice was about 35 centners per hectare. Special farms which had rice plantations along the banks of the Dnieper had a yield of 50-70 centners, and those on the river Kuban 90-100 centners per hectare.

Why is it that such a useful crop as rice has only been allotted a small acreage in the Soviet Ukraine? The reasons are to be found, first, in the lack of gasoline for waterpumps, and also in the lack of man-

power on collective farms for work on rice plantations. In future, however, Ukraine is bound to become one of the chief rice-growing countries in Europe along with Italy and Spain.

Ukraine has only one oil-seed crop—the *sunflower*. Rape can be found in small quantities only in Western Ukraine. The sunflower is the source of a high quality oil, but the yields from it are very low. This can be explained by the facts that there are no drought-resistant types of sunflower-seed, and that there are many weeds which destroy the plants.

The introduction of other oil-seed crops into Ukraine would be most advantageous. Experiments have shown that many crops of high oil quality which could also be used in the confectionary trade could give high average yields under proper conditions. The *sesame* and *peanut* are the chief crops in this category. They could be introduced into the crop-rotations of the southern farming areas, as they are good preceding crops in crop-rotation. The *castor* plant, rich in oil of great industrial value, can also be grown. In the driest regions of Ukraine it is possible to cultivate *saffron* in rotation with the sunflower.

The absence of these crops in the crop-rotation of the Southern Ukrainian regions must be explained by the overcultivation of grain crops and by the insignificant development of industry which requires vegetable oils as raw material.

The Ukrainian steppe could produce many types of sugar. It has been experimentally proved that the American sugar cane finds good growth conditions in the Southern Ukraine. For feeding purposes the introduction of *sorghum* and *fodder grass* is of great importance.

Viniculture has long been practised in Ukraine, especially in the sandy regions of the south, but always on a small scale. However, it could have great importance in the economic life of that region. **Grapes** can be grown not only on sandy lands, but also on those slopes which otherwise are of no productive use. The grapes in the Southern Ukraine have a high percentage of sugar and a good flavor, and ripen earlier than the grapes on the southern coast of the Crimea. The grape-seeds can be used for the manufacture of highly important aviation oils. It is possible, therefore, to plan grape cultivation for a large area of wasteland.

As *fibre* crops, apart from *flax* and *hemp*, it is possible to cultivate *marsh-mallow*, and, on the floodplains—*Indian hemp*. Conditions in the Ukrainian steppe are very favorable for the growth of *Italian hemp*.

The present acreage of Italian hemp is very small, while marsh-mallow and Indian hems are not being used at all. The introduction of these crops is hindered by the lack of space for them within the crop-rotations, and by the absence of a major textile industry.

Rubber plantations, especially the cultivation of *cock-sagiz* have great possibilities in Ukraine. This rubber-bearing plant likes moisture and is also saline-resistant. It could be cultivated in the forest-steppe regions as well as in the south. *Cock-sagiz* and *Krym-sagiz* have in their roots 20% of rubber and, planted on a large scale, they could provide with raw material a rubber industry, now non-existent, but which could be developed in Ukraine.

The acreage of *cock-sagiz* in Ukraine is very small at present, especially as the cultivation of this plant requires much attention and is also hindered by many pests. *Tou-sagiz* has an even larger percentage of rubber (40%) in its roots. The cultivation of this type, however, has not produced satisfactory results.

A third type of new crop which could well be introduced into Ukraine is the *sweet potato* which could be substituted for potatoes in those regions of Ukraine where the potatoes give a very low yield.

In Ukraine there are also several plants growing in the steppes, the introduction of which into the crop-rotation system would benefit all crop harvests. Among them are *yellow (erecta) alfalfa* and *yellow sweet clover (Melilotus)*. These plants improve the southern saline soil areas.

In conclusion we can say, therefore, that the only new crop with considerable acreage in Ukraine is cotton. The cultivation of rice, rubber-bearing plants and oil-seed crops has been undertaken experimentally, but not utilized in practice to any great extent.

The main reason for this is to be found in the system of Soviet agriculture which is based on exploitation of the soil and which does not allow for a conservation program. The absence of well-balanced crop-rotations, and lack of systematic use of organic and mineral fertilizers create conditions under which the yields of the main grain crops steadily decline and the introduction of new intensive crops becomes impossible. Only a free, independent and democratic economy in Ukraine can assure a planned agricultural policy and the introduction of a great variety of new crops which would provide industry with raw materials and thus help to bring about a higher standard of living among the population.

TOTAL WAR AND UKRAINE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

THE explosion of the first atom bomb was an event that stirred the imagination of the world. The potentialities of this mode of warfare were evident to everyone and from the time when the problem of atomic energy was offered to the United Nations, discussion has been lively and continuous. It has been speeded up by the attitude of the Soviet Union and by the announcement that now the Soviets are able to produce also atomic explosions. Public attention is riveted upon it and has widened its range to include all those instruments of mass destruction which have been rendered possible by modern science.

It is only natural that these new methods should make a particularly strong appeal in the United States. The American people with their use of labor-saving devices and their dislike for the conventional forms of military training have eagerly grasped at the idea of a push-button war, in which a relatively small number of highly trained experts are able to manipulate almost fabulous machines to bring a certain victory. The possibilities of the airplane, of long-range bombing, as revealed in World War II have strengthened these feelings and the hopes and theories of at least part of the Air Force have added new justification and credibility to these desires.

The new warfare theories have been opposed on humanitarian grounds. Again and again the Pope has protested against their adoption as fundamentally anti-Christian and barbarous. They stand also in sharp contradiction to all those attempts which were made at an earlier period by the Hague Conferences and the International Red Cross for mitigating the horrors of war as well as of all measures advocated by various groups which are in favor of human reconciliation.

These opposing forces are supported also by a large number of military thinkers who realize that it is often easier to win a war than the peace which must follow it. Yet peace must be made, if the territory of the defeated power is not to be reduced to a desolate and uninhabited waste removed equally from the economic life of the world and from the channels of communication which formerly passed across the territory.

World War II has been a case at point. The concentration upon victory and the neglect of detailed plans for the future speeded up the end of the armed conflict but led also to the Conferences at Yalta and Potsdam which resulted only in the advance of Communist power into Central Europe and confronted the peace-loving democracies with a new and graver menace on a worldwide scale.

The tension between the democratic powers and the Soviet Union adds to the urgency of a careful consideration of the methods that can be profitably adopted in another clash, if one occurs, and stresses again the methods that must be used to secure a real victory and peace.

There is something striking and awe-inspiring in the destruction of entire cities either by high explosives or by the atom bomb. There is a demonstration of power which can serve to win a temporary advantage but which only results in a growing bitterness which can be exploited. The Soviets left all that in World War II to the west with the firm conviction that they could themselves profit by the reaction of the population. It is therefore the more imperative that the West should not again fall into the same trap and unwittingly play the game of their enemies in destroying what has survived of the centers of Western culture.

This is one of those truths which the Western world is very apt to overlook. Fascinated and absorbed by the growing power of atomic and other modern weapons, the Western man is all too ready to overlook the results that have been secured by the slower methods of mass extermination which have been known for centuries and millennia. Duly impressed by the achievements of modern science, he has tended to draw a line of distinction between the results of this and the injuries that can be done to humanity by a deliberate and long-continued policy of annihilation carried on by individual assassination and murder, by deliberate starvation and by the slaughter of large masses of the population.

The tactics employed by Peter the Great after his capture of the Ukrainian city of Baturyn in the days of the revolt of Mazeppa, when he gave orders for the torturing and slaying of the entire population of men, women and children, do not differ fundamentally or in their results from the methods employed by Hitler in his extermination of the Jews or of Stalin in his treatment of the Ukrainians and other groups. There is involved purely a question of technique and the

crocodile tears that the Soviets have shed over the destruction of cities by the Western nations in the last war have covered their own annihilation of the helpless population of many sections of their own empire.

With each day's news it becomes clearer that the goal of Moscow is not only to wipe out and disintegrate completely the culture of those peoples as the Ukrainians who fell into their hands at the end of the Civil War in the early twenties and to whom for a while they promised cultural but not economic rights. They are applying the same methods to the peoples of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whom they seized with Nazi permission during World War II. They are extending it now to the other nations which they have taken since the close of hostilities in one guise or another. The intentions, the methods, and the results are identical.

More than that it will be safe to assume as a matter of principle and as a guide to action that the enslaved populations will be and in fact are largely already in such a position within Soviet occupied territory that any large scale bombing or atomic attack will inflict heavier losses upon the unwilling victims of Soviet aggression than upon the master Russians themselves.

These problems must be viewed against the geographical background of the Soviet Union. The kernel of Russian Soviet might lies in an area which is relatively inaccessible from the regions still under the control and within the reach of the free nations of the world. Democratic neglect which has allowed for thirty years the building up of the Communist colossus from its low point in 1918 has brought about a situation where the heart of the Soviet Union is almost as secure as Russia proper was two centuries ago. The centres that are easily reached are those which will be needed in building a new and peaceful world and the population in them, even if not native to the area, are still largely people who have been uprooted from their own homes for their opposition to the new dictatorship. This is as true of the newly developed uranium mines in Czechoslovakia as of the mines in central Asia or the Caucasus.

It easily shows the folly of any assumption that indiscriminate bombing to wipe out the known centres of Soviet power on the periphery or even in the interior offers the solution of the problem. Even if that solution brought a speedy victory, it would only create at the end a complicated situation which would be as unsatisfactory as that

which was left by World War II. It is far and away too simple, too schematized for it blandly assumes that almost the entire Eurasian landmass must be stripped of its resources and population.



The recognition of this fact does not involve a confession of hopelessness. It does not rule out the use of Western potential destructive power but it indicates that this must be applied with a view not only to winning the victory in the war but to making secure the peace and the participation of the enslaved nations of the Soviet Union in a peaceful and democratic world. It calls for a broader outlook upon the problem, for a proper coordination of the use of military power with an understanding of the fundamental nature of the tasks which the democratic powers have to carry out.

Also involved is a careful weighing of all the aspects of the problem in its worldwide connections. It involves an accurate determination of what centres, what factories, what mines will need destruction regardless of the cost and also of what places and what sections of the population must be favored so far as it is possible. It means also the consideration of what movements are already taking place, of what can be reasonably expected, in view of the present conditions, in the immediate future.

In the early years of World War II, plans were made by the governments in exile for the development of sabotage behind the Nazi lines without the evoking of a general revolt that would give the Nazis the opportunity to declare open war against a considerable part of the population of the lands which they had occupied. That was changed by the intervention of the Soviets which relied upon the fact that an open appeal to a revolt would bring out into the open that patriotic part of the population which was most hostile to its own interest and cause it to be decimated. The outstanding example of this was the revolt in Warsaw which the Soviets encouraged and then declined to support.

The same technique which was used against the Germans in 1940 and the early part of 1941 is still available. This is clear not only from the reports of the emigrés of various national groups but it is still more strikingly verified by the statements of the Soviets and their satellite governments issued under such conditions that it is clear that they are not solely devised to trick the outside world. The Western powers have

nothing to fear by sympathizing with these movements. The Soviets in the United Nations and elsewhere will continue to denounce them as warmongers, even if they carefully abstain from any act which might seem to favor any of these hidden patriots, for by hypothesis the Communist leaders reject any possibility of permanent peace with the non-Communist world. They are creating as rapidly as they can their own fifth columns everywhere and concealing them with all the means at their disposal until the time comes for them to show their hand.

It is easier for democratic thought to recognize this truth in the case of those countries that have fallen under Communist control since the ending of the War. There are abroad to-day a substantial number of non-Communist leaders who have filled important posts in the border states since their establishment in 1918. It seems only natural for these men to resume informally those contacts which they had both before World War II and during the days of the governments in exile. They will be able to do much in the areas where they have had influence before. Yet they do not present the whole story.

Beyond them there is still another group, those who have come from the enslaved classes of the Soviet Union as it was in 1939. These offer a more difficult proposition for they represent those spontaneous movements which dared to raise their heads during World War II and the Nazi and Soviet occupations of their lands. They are the last survivors of that steady stream which began to flow abroad as the independent republics that won their liberty on the ruins of the Russian Empire in 1917 were overthrown. Most of these men are not as well known and many have even been avoided by the democratic governments. They represent and are the spokesmen for groups that are scarcely known in the West. Many of them, as Ukrainians, come from sections which were looked upon askance by the succession states of 1919.

Behind them again are the underground fighters in the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army which is still maintaining itself in the areas under Soviet control, especially in regions that are more or less remote that are mountainous or marshy, where the movements of Soviet and satellite troops are attended with difficulties. It is hard to make an accurate estimate of their numbers, but few as they are, they cannot be disregarded in the total picture.

All these groups each in their own way are vitally concerned in the democratic victory in the cold war that is now going on. They are

directly interested that the democratic powers in the name of a false peace do not abandon those whom they represent to the tender mercies of the Soviets with its views on total warfare. All are actively involved in the plans that are being made to check the onward rush of Communism and all can supply details that will be necessary, so that the mechanical and technical strength of the West can be expended in the most profitable and advantageous manner.

Among them all the Ukrainians occupy a key position. As the largest group next to the Russians, they have suffered more proportionately during more years than any other people and they also possess the invaluable asset of a foothold on the Black Sea, so that in case of a clash between the Soviets and the democratic powers, they would be in a position before almost any other group to welcome outside assistance and to utilize it profitably.

They have one other great advantage. They are already through their Soviet connections members of the United Nations. No one believes to-day that the Communist Czechoslovakia of 1949 as at present represented is the real Czechoslovakia. The same is true of Poland and of other countries. Why should not the world be equally wise and realize that the delegates of the Ukrainian people who speak with the voice of Moscow are equally not the spokesmen for their own people, especially when Moscow proclaims week after week, month after month, year after year that they are at last eliminating the Ukrainian national spirit?

Yet this involves a shift of attitude on the part of the people and the governments of the West. For three decades statesmen have contentedly gone on their way, assuming the unity and indivisibility of the old Russia. They have done it despite all the evidence that has been presented by the emigrés, by the wishes of the people as expressed in the governments set up in 1917 and 1918, by the denunciations of the Moscow Communists by the thirty years old struggle against Russian domination.

Now when the shadow of a conflict between Communism and democracy is looming larger and larger, it is high time that democratic thought reconsider all the problems of the present situation. The spectacular outbursts of the Soviets at the United Nations and at all other meetings are sufficient to put the world on their guard. The announcement that now the Soviets have the atom bomb is perhaps another danger signal, if it does not lead to some sober attempt on

the part of the Soviets to effect a truly peaceful solution of the problems at issue. No one expects this, even though the democratic powers feel themselves obliged to continue to try to work out a satisfactory solution of the cold war.

Now is the time to realize the fundamentals of the situation and to lay the foundation for that world which is to exist after Communism has been crushed. It involves a study of all these relations between the Russians and their neighbors and of the possibilities that will exist, if the worst comes to the worst.

Such a study of the human and material resources available in case of need are as vital as is the detailed knowledge of the location of Soviet industry as a whole and of the Soviet military plants in particular. It is a vital supplement to the simple theories that all that is needed to prevent a Soviet attack upon Western Europe is merely the power to smash Soviet war potential in the quickest possible time.

The combination of the two ideas, the knowledge of the forces within the Iron Curtain and the mechanical power to pierce it in case of necessity, may put a damper upon Soviet ambitions and claims. It can set a goal for democratic thinking which will promise more abundant and permanent results than blind concentration upon the shattering power of the atomic bomb and can utilize the human ideals and aspirations for a better life. In short it can put the Western world into a position where it will regard the attainment of peace as the object of a war and not the mere winning of a military victory. In two World Wars, the latter has been the ultimate goal. To-day it is high time that a victory that would produce a peace should be the object. It may mean the slighting of certain outmoded conventions which the Soviets have long rejected but it will give to democratic thought on international relations a vision that has been too often forgotten. It means an intellectual preparedness that is as vital for the future of humanity and democracy as the military preparedness that is now going on throughout the Atlantic community of nations and it will clarify the goal of military thinking which in some quarters tends to neglect in its pursuit of victory the attainment of peace which will follow inevitably after any struggle. Finally it represents a union of the idealistic and the practical goals for the building of that future which is the hope and the support of all peace-loving human beings throughout the world.

IDEAS ON THE SCAFFOLD

Mykola Kulish and his *Sonata Pathetique*

By SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY

AS I write these words I have in front of me two interesting original documents. One is the official record of the minutes of the meeting "for the Purge of the Party Organization of Writers" held on June 14th, 1934, where, in a declaration signed by Secretary Livshits we read the following:

"Mykola Kulish, born in 1892, clerk, Party member. Was not a member of other parties. Has received the following punishment from the Party: 1) a reprimand for unethical behavior in a co-operative settlement;¹ 2) a reprimand for a refusal to pay a visit to the country;² 3) a reprimand for his passive attitude in the work of the Party. For his nationalist deviations which are clearly visible in his historical dramas directed against the ideology of the Party (*Narodny Malakbiv, Myna Mazaylo, Zakus, Maklena Grass, and Sonata Pathetique*) as well as for his active support of and close contact with the nationalist counter-revolutionary elements (Kurbas, Yalovy), for his activity as a leader of the "Free Academy of Proletarian Literature" (VAPLITE) and All-Ukrainian Comedy Association in so far as he helped to direct the policies of those organizations against the Party, and for his own nationalist convictions of which there is no doubt,—it has been decided to exclude him from the Party."

The other document is the record of the search of Kulish's home, written in pencil in Russian on a Ukrainian form—on December 8th, 1934. As we learn from the document, the search was conducted under the supervision of the authorized representative of the NKVD—Comrade Gnoyeva. Further on the same blank we find a list of articles confiscated during the search, 15 items in all. Among them are: manuscript of the play "Such" (missing), 9 letters and 5 postcards from

¹ The "unethical behavior" of Kulish consisted in his using the word "zhyd" in a conversation which was subsequently reported to the party. "Zhyd" is the only word for "Jew" in the Ukrainian as well as in the Polish languages, yet it has an offensive meaning in Russian. Because of this the word "zhyd" was forbidden by the Soviets and the Russian word for "Jew"—"yevrey" was introduced instead. Curiously enough, the word "yevrey" in its Russian pronunciation has a slightly offensive meaning in Ukrainian, so the Ukrainians came to use the word "yevrey" in official language, but kept the word "zhyd" in private conversation.

² In 1933, during the famine in Ukraine, Kulish refused to engage in a propaganda campaign in the country.

abroad, 34 letters from various other persons, 8 books, passport No •A 125312, and the party membership card.

Both documents irrevocably sealed the fate of Mykola Kulish. The mere fact that he was deprived of his passport meant in fact that he was outlawed. In spite of his weak physical condition due to tuberculosis, Kulish was soon deported to the Solovki Islands in the White Sea. Here he was kept in the so-called II Isolation camp, and since 1937 all traces of him have been lost.

What can be said about the literary works of Mykola Kulish?



MYKOLA KULISH

In order to answer this question we must first of all consider the circumstances which conditioned his work. In the twenties the Ukrainian writers in the Soviet Ukraine, among them Kulish, were already aware of what the representatives of Western culture are only now beginning to be conscious. They realized that the acceptance of Soviet values as applied to spiritual and literary creation and expression must mean a denial of all those values that are the core of human civilization. Having realized this, the Ukrainian writers of that time dared to engage in a deep ideological struggle and were in the end

crushed by force. It is not too much to say that in the lonely but daring resistance which the Ukrainian writers put up against the ever-increasing Soviet regimentation of spiritual activities, they bore witness to the high values of human freedom, dignity, morality, and objective truth in our civilization which they tried so passionately to defend.

The Soviet occupation of Ukraine was virtually complete by 1920, although guerilla warfare against the Bolsheviks continued for some time. This was an occupation in the true sense of the word, especially as the communist regime had practically no support among the Ukrainians. Thus, in the elections to the legislative assemblies early in 1918—only 3% of the votes were cast for the communist ballot in the Kiev province, 4% in Volhynia, and 4% in Poltava, whereas in Moscow

and Smolensk the communists secured in the same elections 56%, and in the Tver province 54% of all votes. The whole power of the Soviets in Ukraine was based primarily on the occupation forces and the puppet Ukrainian Communist Government in which there were a few Ukrainian communists trained in St. Petersburg. How precarious and ambiguous was the position even of the heads of the Ukrainian Communist Government in those days may be seen from such episodes as the one narrated by V. Zatonsky, one of the commissars (ministers) of Soviet Ukraine. When Zatonsky and Skrypnyk (another commissar who in 1933 committed suicide) were talking in Ukrainian in a street in Kiev on their way home from a meeting, they were stopped and detained by a group of Russian sailors who at once suspected counter-revolution at the sound of the Ukrainian language. It was only after some time that both commissars managed to explain their "mistake," to the enraged Red sailors who were ready to execute them then and there. Characteristically enough we find in Zatonsky's account of the incident a truly dialectical touch. "Objectively speaking" he writes, "those who were then prepared to shoot down people who spoke Ukrainian, have managed to build a new Ukraine".³
Sapienti sat!

However, many of those Ukrainian communists who supported Moscow's policy played a prominent part in the government of the country in the twenties, especially as the communist slogan of the time was "to put the Ukrainian element in the saddle." The occupational authorities were thus forced to enroll the support of those few Ukrainians who were willing to collaborate with them, and furthermore in the twenties Moscow embarked on the so-called "Ukrainization policy." This was a well organized attempt to make the Ukrainians believe that the Soviet Ukraine was really a Ukrainian state. The Ukrainians for their part, naturally exploited this "Ukrainization" (what irony: Ukrainization of Ukraine!) for their own national and cultural purposes. During this period when all alien officials of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic were forced, in spite of vigorous personal protests, to learn Ukrainian, the Ukrainian intelligentsia which suffered wholesale destruction later in the thirties, for a while took the initiative in the cultural life of Ukraine. During this period therefore there was a new flowering of Ukrainian literature.

³ V. Leites and Yashek, *Ten Years of Ukrainian Literature*, Kharkiv, 1928.

The literary activity of Mykola Kulish began in the late twenties and lasted till the early thirties. His work is closely connected with the activities of the theatre group "Berezil" under the direction of Les' Kurbas. The productions by Kurbas were regarded as truly revolutionary. His style which could be called "expressive realism" demanded that the "theatre should first of all stir, unsettle, and intrigue the audience." For this reason Kurbas introduced into his repertory plays with deep ideological and philosophical problems, and months or even years were spent on the preparation of their production. It took Kurbas two years to prepare his production of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* and nine months for Kulish's *Narodny Malakhiiy*. Kurbas and his theatre were famous throughout the USSR, and such eminent Russian producers as Meyergold and Tairov used to come to Kiev to see the first night at "Berezil" and to speak to Les' Kurbas. This famous and very able Ukrainian theatrical producer was to share not very much later the fate of the other intellectuals deported to the Solovki Islands.

Kurbas found in Kulish an ideal playwright for his theatre. The first plays of Kulish, such as "97," were realistic. Later Kulish became interested in comedy and this led him to utilize the tradition of the Ukrainian "intermedia" plays of the 17th and 18th centuries. It may be said that Kulish created a new type of Ukrainian comedy with an original form which, as he himself said "does not fit into the frame of the drama of the Greeks, Shakespeare, or Molière, for our Ukrainian life is such that it does not recognize the established forms of the classic drama, and will not be forced in it."

The themes for the comedies by Kulish were drawn from the new Soviet reality in Ukraine. He was especially interested in a presentation of the Ukrainian middle class. His criticism was directed not only against the old "bourgeois" way of life of the middle classes, but also against their Russian imperialistic sympathies which during both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes were hindering the growth of Ukrainian culture.

The work of Mykola Kulish culminates in three plays: *Narodny Malakhiiy*, *Myna Mazaylo*, and *Sonata Pathetique*. The first of them, *Narodny Malakhiiy*, roused great discussions. *Malakhiiy*, the hero of the play, is an idealist and a dreamer, who is greatly attracted by the revolutionary slogans about a new life, and who unsuccessfully attempts as "a great reformer" to realize these slogans. Kulish himself defined this "malakhiianism" as Ukrainian neo-idealism, an ideology

which will live until the struggle between idealism and materialism ends. The Soviet critics soon discovered other dangerous ideas in this play. "The ridicule of Malakhii"—declared the Marxian literary magazine *Krytyka* (No. 5, 1928) "is directed not toward the reform of life but against the builders of socialism." Malakhii, it was pointed out, sees in Kharkiw, then the capital of Ukraine, only prisons, mental homes, taverns, and brothels, and in his speech rhymes the "Soviet Ukraine" with "prostitute." Instead of positive criticism, *Krytyka* maintained, we have here negative criticism which becomes transparent in such a passage of the play as the following:

"I ask: why do they 'Ukrainize' the foreigners? Is it done only in order that the driver should appear like a Ukrainian, that the fact that they consume twice as many calories as we do, should be concealed."

Kulish's second comedy was *Myna Mazaylo* described by a Marxist critic as a "political pamphlet." Unlike the dreamer Malakhii, Myna Mazaylo is ideologically mature, a man who knows what is good. He is in love with his own country—Ukraine—and worships everything Ukrainian. In one leading scene he even produces a tape measure to measure his girl-friend in order to prove that this Ukrainian girl's body has all the requirements of the classical ideal. It was for this reason that Myna was accused by Soviet critics of being a "Fascist race ideologist" and the whole play was condemned as "chauvinist." One may agree with the latter criticism, though this play exposes very well the failure of the Soviet so-called "nationality policy" which brought no solution, for the Russian-Ukrainian struggle went on as before.

The contrast between Myna, the Ukrainian, and his aunt Motya from Kursk, a Russian, is based on their different national backgrounds and is almost biological. In his reply to *Krytyka* (in 1929 it was still possible to reply to official criticism in the Soviet Union) Kulish declared that *Krytyka* criticised his play "from a pro-Russian point of view" and "had to reject my play simply because the *Krytyka* itself is like aunt Motya."

Sonata Pathetique marks the peak of Kulish's artistic achievement. The setting of the play is the revolution of 1917. The Russian Empire, in its last days, is weakened by the struggle between those who desire freedom and those who desire power. In Ukraine three main forces are portrayed as taking part in this struggle: Ukrainian nationalism, which sees in the revolution complete liberation from

oppression, White Russian Tsarism, to which revolution means a catastrophe, and communism directed from St. Petersburg and without roots in Ukraine. By an ingenious dramatic device Kulish manages to show us all three groups simultaneously through characters who live on three different floors of the same house, connected with each other by a staircase. This device Kulish borrowed from the Ukrainian *Vertep*—the school theatre in the 17th and 18th centuries. On this scene Kulish creates highly dramatic situations developing conflicts of ideas and life with an extraordinary power not previously found in the Ukrainian, and possibly even in the modern European drama. The great dramatic effect of the play is also increased by the use of music—Beethoven's *Sonata Pathetique*—as a background for revolution. Music is also a wonderful help to the revolutionaries as it inspires them in their struggle for a national revolution and carries their emotions like a wave from rebellious depths to the utmost heights of human endeavor.

The house in which the action of the play takes place belongs to the Tsarist general Perotsky. Although the Empire is crumbling the general clings desperately to the old way of life, and is quite unable to understand what is happening. His most dreadful experience is his stay in the Bolshevik prison where he shared a cell with a Ukrainian monk, who prayed all night long—"in Ukrainian, of all things, gentlemen!" When finally the Reds come to arrest him, he is advised to flee. "Where to?" he asks. "To Russia," they tell him. "To Russia—from Russia?" is his answer,—"that means there is no more Russia!"

This general has two sons: Andre, with all the qualities of the Tsarist officer, and Georgie, who constantly borrows money and promises to return it on his word of honor as a future officer.

Downstairs, in the basement, live the workers. One of them, Ovrarn, has just returned from the front where he had lost his legs. He is "half a man" with the order of St. George on his breast. To this group belongs also the model Zinka, a prostitute, often visited by George who is trying in this way "to collect the rent." On the second floor, above the general, lives Stupay—a teacher, with his daughter Maryna. Stupay represents the old Ukrainian intelligentsia with a rather naive and narrow patriotism which is more a matter of sentiment than a political conception. He is proud to hear Ukrainian spoken, even by the Reds who tell him, in Ukrainian, "be prepared to die." This is better, he says, than to hear people like Perotsky "who would sooner die than say a word in Ukrainian." Stupay's daughter, Maryna, how-

ever, represents the new Ukrainian youth. She is completely taken up with the idea of "national liberation," and she is aware that "only those who are prepared to go to the scaffold for their ideals, will be victorious."

The plot of the play (which could also be called a dramatic poem) is as follows:

Yuha, a young student, who stands close to the Reds, is in love with Maryna. He is an idealist and a dreamer and writes Maryna long, poetical letters. At the same time from the front comes Andre, the General's son, who was also in love with Maryna. In one scene Maryna plays Beethoven's *Sonata Pathetique* and her playing has a great effect on her father, on Yuha, and on Andre. Andre proposes to her, but she rejects him, saying that "only a hero who loves the Ukrainian stars and who will liberate her Ukraine from its enemies" will be her husband. This scene is observed through the half-closed door by Yuha, who, as he sees Andre kissing the hem of Maryna's dress, loses all his idealism and becomes a realist. In the meantime, the Reds, who have their headquarters in the cellar of the legless Ovrarn, prepare to occupy the whole town. Soon after moonrise one group of them goes to seize Perotsky. The general, however, flees to the apartment of his ideological adversary—the teacher. Andre is arrested, and Maryna resolves to help him to escape. She asks Yuha to help her in her plan. Yuha is persuaded, goes to the Red headquarters where Andre is awaiting execution by a firing squad and tells them that he himself had sent Andre in the uniform of a Tsarist officer to spy on the Whites. Andre is freed, but Georgie is seized at the same time for putting out a Tsarist flag and for shooting a Red. The communists occupy the whole town. Maryna now hopes to use Andre as a courier between herself and the insurgents in the country. She sends him across with a letter containing an order from a member of the insurgent Committee—*Chayka*. Chayka is her own pseudonym.

There is great confusion among the Reds when they are attacked from the rear by the insurgents. The Ukrainian insurgents, under the leadership of Andre, recapture the town from the Reds. Andre, however, does not remain faithful to Maryna, and soon begins to talk "not of Ukrainian stars, but of the Northern Star." Maryna sees the Ukrainian flag replaced by the old Tsarist standard. Her father is shot in a street battle. General Perotsky revives the old White Russian government and institutes a court where both Ovrarn and Zinka are

punished. However, the White Russian triumph is short lived; the Reds, with some reinforcements, recapture the city. Yuha, now with the Reds, finds on a dead insurgent a letter signed "Chayka" and he goes to see Maryna to find out if it was she who signed it. He reminds her of her own words about "the ideas on the scaffold" and she proudly affirms this. The Reds appear to arrest her.

All artistic and literary works created in Ukraine under the Soviet rule have been injured by the ideology imposed from outside. There are very few exceptions—as for example, Zerov's *Sonnetarium*, but this was never published in the USSR. Against this ideological and artistic crippling Kulish fought a cruel battle with himself, and he did not emerge a victor in all parts of his drama. He was not free to express his ideas, and was compelled to conceal them. The author was forced to diminish the moral quality of that which he desired most to raise to the heroic. It may be argued, therefore, that the real hero of the play is Yuha, not Maryna, and that the main idea of the play is Yuha's transformation into a true communist. However, for those who can guess what the author could not say, there is obviously another interpretation of the drama.

At the same time, the high quality of the play, as measured by the effect which it has on the reader, leaves no doubt that it is a truly great drama. It is dangerous to make literary comparisons, but there is an element in the *Sonata Pathetique* that raises this romantic drama to the heights of great moral ideals reached by the Greek tragedians. There is an unmistakable affinity between the tragedy of Antigone who dies because she loves and cannot hate, and that of Maryna who is completely dedicated to her idea of national liberation, and therefore inevitably perishes. In both cases there is evident a supreme moral law for which it is worth while to die.



The Sonta Pathetique was never performed on a Ukrainian stage. The Soviets banned the play, and abroad it remained entirely unknown. In 1942, Kulish's son brought his father's manuscripts to Lwiw, and it was in that city in 1943 that the play was published by the author of this article. Some scenes (e.g. the scene of the communist meeting) had to be deleted for reasons of censorship. It seemed at first quite impossible that the Germans, who did not allow any mention of an independent Ukraine, would permit the publication of this play.

The final permit was secured by bribing the German censors with six pounds of lard—this was in the fifth year of the war.

It is difficult to know whether it is at all possible, to prepare another complete edition of the play, as the original typescript was lost in the war, during one of the raids on Germany.

The Sonata Pathetique was performed, curiously enough, for a short while in the Kamerny Theatre in Moscow in 1931, in the Russian translation of Zinkevich, under the direction of the famous producer Tairov. The play was withdrawn after a short run on the demand of Kaganovich who was then the virtual ruler of Ukraine.

Thousands of plays have been created in the Soviet Union, but very few are worthy of mention today. Certainly, not one has reached the dramatic and poetic heights of the *Sonata Pathetique*. There is little doubt that this superb drama will be rediscovered and destined still to make history in the world of the theatre—not only Ukrainian but international as well.



SOVIET FAMILY LIFE

By HALYNA SELEHEN

THE grand experiment of building up a classless communistic society on the huge territory of the "Sixth part of the Globe" is coming to its unavoidable end.

Noisy slogans of the omnipresent Soviet propaganda still ring in many ears but the ideological allure of the Bolsheviks is broken, and the bases of their ideas are hopelessly shaken. The ideological bankruptcy of the Marx-Lenin doctrines shows itself especially clearly in Soviet marriage and family life.

It is our purpose here to evaluate the "Rebuilding of Family Life" in the Soviets and its consequences.

It is sufficient to read the Soviet press, to remember the decrees of the government, to fathom their meaning and to look with open, unprejudiced eyes at the statistical data published in their own official reports, to arrive at this unavoidable deduction.

A few short dry lines from a newspaper article but what a deep hidden meaning! Information from N., one of the largest industrial cities of Ukraine, two or three years before the beginning of World War II. Memory pictures an old provincial town, as it was 30-40 years ago. Avenues, steep side-streets, blind alleys, an old-fashioned diligence, drawn by five thin horses along a dusty street. Now this has been replaced by speedy street cars.

On the square with some trees in the middle, in front of the schoolhouse stands a dense mob: workers, women, Soviet employees with shiny knees and mended elbows and obligatory old portfolios—and lots of children and youth.

The mob peers with cowardly greediness through the windows and devours with their eyes the few "lucky ones" who pass in and out. Admission to the courtroom is strictly limited and possible only with special cards; the doors are guarded by well-groomed militia and NKVD men grimly control the documents of the persons who enter the court hall. No outsiders are permitted, only witnesses and defense. But the mob is well informed about the court proceedings. Judgment being passed on a gang of dangerous criminals, for systematic thefts, impudent raids, robberies and murder.

The witnesses for the prosecution give the details: cocaine, drunkenness, immorality.

In the prisoners' dock are sitting pupils of one of the local schools. The head of the gang is Rose X, a beautiful, slender girl with a fine childlike figure. She behaves provocatively and replies to the questions with impudence and cynicism.

Rose is the daughter of well known parents, party members, communists of the so-called "responsible" category. Her mother and father are busy from morning till late in the night working and actively participating in the life of the party. Rose, an only child, beloved and spoiled, is left to the care of fate, her caprices and the influence of her temporary school-mates. The parents know nothing about the second life of their daughter and do not dream of her adventures until the moment when the detectives find the track of the gang, and arrest its members, among them Rose.

Another case. The father is also a "responsible." The mother, a teacher. The only son, a boy aged 12 often leaves his home and returns very late at night and sometimes stays away for several days at a time. Questions, persuasions and punishments give no result. He keeps an obstinate silence concerning the cause of his departures and the persons with whom he associates. One day the boy is brought home by a member of the militia. It turns out that for a long time he has been a member of a gang of minor thieves and has been caught today by the police.

A third case: The father is a bookkeeper; the mother a Soviet employee. The eldest son, a boy aged 8, also leaves home and often stays away for long periods. The eternally busy parents pay no attention and do not care. The life of this child passes, as in the two previous cases, outside of the circle of interest of the parents. One day an object is missing and this happens again and again. Soon not only small objects are missed, but rather large sums of money and other valuables. The child is caught in the act of stealing; after long obstinate silence and denials, he finally breaks down, weeps bitterly and confesses that he is guilty of all the small and large thefts in the house. But for a long time he refuses to tell the reasons and circumstances that made him commit the crimes. As the result of long persuasion he at last tells how he became acquainted with a young man who employed many other boys as "Roots" (a slang expression of thieves; meaning helpers, aids). The detective force proved later that the head of the gang re-

cruited chiefly boys from well situated families and taught them to steal from their parents and relatives, and forced them by threats to keep silence.

Such cases of children's criminality and of smaller offenses against law and order are innumerable, and these give a clear picture of the joyless conditions of the Soviet family due to the "social rebuilding" of life.

The family, as the first institution that is called upon to bring up the young generation, is being systematically shattered: First—by open declarations about the necessity of the "rebirth" of the middle-class, the obsolete character and the amorality of the existing institution of marriage. Later—by indirect measures, by the diversion of the interests of women from the sphere of domestic life into that of social activities.

The responsibility of bringing up obedient and pliant citizens of the Soviet state could not be entrusted to the family, to the influence of the mother, since the state desired to monopolize it and to keep the young generation entirely in its own hands.

After destroying marriage and the authority of the family, the police state did not create any new means of influencing the youth, other than stopping the transgressions by isolating the young criminals, for the homes and working colonies that exist for this purpose are isolators which scarcely differ from the similar institutions for grown-up criminals—prisons and concentration camps.

In any case the system of bringing up in these institutions is so effective that the small *bezprizorny* tremble at the mere mention of such a "home." And when they are placed in one, they use all the wit and "genius" of the children of the street to escape from this terrible place. Soviet literature and film have created an unforgettable type of small "loafers" and surrounded with romance their life and desperate fight for "freedom" for a life under the open sky somewhere under a bridge, a canal tunnel or in a warm asphalt kettle, a highly valued lodging of these "knights of the street." Soviet children instinctively craving for freedom, love to read about the adventures of the *bezprizorny*, imitate their slang and sing their songs.

The homes and working colonies may be bad, but at least they could serve as a refuge for the less enterprising part of the small tramps if there were enough of them. But the building of hostels for children cannot keep pace with the growth of the number of the *bezprizorny*. This is the terrible result of the shattering of marriage, the destroying

of family life. The children left to the care of fate have become a plague of Soviet society and a menace to public order. After robbing the mothers of their natural function,—the bringing up of their children,—the state proved helpless to manage this enormous task and to stop the growth of the number of neglected children. Panic stricken at the growing menace of new millions of uncared-for children, the Soviet state tried to make the families, that have been destroyed by it, responsible for the situation. In the middle of the thirties a decree was issued to "Fight against leaving children to the care of fate." This decree threatens a fine and imprisonment for parents whose children would be found loitering on the streets.

Is not this decree the best proof of the complete breakdown of the "experiments" with the social rebuilding of the family? Life has bitterly revenged itself on the political jugglers for their attacks on the family morale. But even now the unfortunate experimenters have not come to the only correct solution—the return to the family of its natural right to bring up its own children, but even that alone is not enough, for they must create a secure financial base for existence and free the "freed" woman by giving her the possibility to perform her natural functions. They have not arrived at this conclusion for "it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle..." because that would mean openly to admit their own bankruptcy, because it would mean ceasing to be what they are, that is "the most democratic state in the world." Instead the decree threatens the parents with punishment, parents who have already been cruelly robbed, for crimes which they never committed and for which they cannot be made responsible.

The police state takes refuge in its beloved trick: it finds and publicly condemns imaginary criminals for the crimes that it itself has committed against society and humanity. At the same time it continues to produce in schools and children's hostel-prisons new series of "Builders" of socialism according to the formerly prepared pattern. Schools and children's hostels remain under the strict supervision of the police.

Family morale is something different! A mother is seldom able or willing to teach her child to hate the church and to deny God, to love slavery instead of freedom, to be treacherous and to consider as virtues denunciation and such "civil accomplishments" as are the basis of communistic morals. Therefore the bringing up of the young citizens remains completely in the hands of the state as its unlimited monopoly

and only the responsibility for its defects and failures continues to be the "privilege" of the parents.

In the family, the mother retains the function of child-bearing for up to now the brilliant Soviet scientists have not succeeded in finding other means for increasing the population. The women must bear children, but this must not divert the "freed" woman from her social duties. Her working-power must be fully used. Four months after the birth of her child she is again standing behind her machine, sitting in her office or flying an airplane while she thinks with anxiety and sometimes with vexation of the child given to a foster-home or left to the care of neighbors or without any care at all, as there is not sufficient room for everyone in the asylums. Like everyone else, after work, the young mother, her heart full of longing and trouble, sits for hours at a meeting, listening to tedious lectures, while she pines for the deserted child. As if the earth were burning under her feet she runs home in a breathless hurry to find her baby in wet diapers, screaming at the top of its lungs, calling for its mother who cannot hear. And the woman refuses motherhood, which gives her such constant heavy trouble and so little joy.

The statistics of the population in Ukraine show that with every year the curve of births is falling and at the same time the curve of abortions is rising, rising to the giddy height of one million cases. A million abortions to a million births under normal circumstances! This is the cruel revenge taken by the degraded instinct of the woman for the deprivation of her natural right—motherhood. But the state needs soldiers and working slaves for the "most democratic state of the world," and it intends to exist not less than "1000 years" as Hitler once planned. Workers are needed for the creation of the material base of communism and soldiers to "persuade" the neighboring nations to join the happy union of the communistic society.

Here as in the first case, the Bolshevists do not make the only right conclusion, that the securing of the family foundations is the first condition for increasing the number of births. They cannot come to it because in such a case they would plainly show their bankruptcy.

Instead they issue a new decree on the "prohibition of abortions," in the middle of 1936, shortly before the beginning of the World War II. The law threatens women, who get rid of pregnancy, with heavy punishment, and prosecutes them as criminals. The decree says very little about the removal of those reasons which force the women to

give up motherhood, about improving the material situation of the family, about the protection of the health of mother and child, and the measures planned are far from being sufficient to accomplish this.

The Soviet press and art receive a new "social order" and start cautiously and within certain limits to speak about the role of the woman as wife and mother. Stalin arranges a special reception for a carefully selected number of wives of the Red Army officers, the so-called "combat lady-loves" and gives them valuable presents.

The well-known military woman-pilot Polina Osipenko is featured in a film. She is shown in elegant teagown with knitting in her hands in the cosy flat of her husband, a commander of the Red Army. In spite of this the curve of abortions rises, obstinately, rises all the time to a giddy height and somewhere deep down at the foot of this terrible curve the number of births is to be seen.

But perhaps the Bolsheviks solved another problem? Perhaps they have really freed the woman as a personality from the chains of narrow domesticity, freed her from the close atmosphere of the kitchen and sleeping room for a wide, useful social activity? Perhaps the "freed" woman is glad to have this freedom, is proud of her acquired civil rights and her high position in society? Is it much finer to sit behind the director's table of a big factory, to accomplish ten norms during a working day or even to drive a tractor than to wash a baby's diapers or mend a husband's old socks?

Alas! Polina Osipenko, Maria Raskova, Dusya Vinogradova and Maria Demchenko are only rare cases in the vast number of workers, typists, saleswomen, nurses and simple farm-hands. Millions of working women who have been freed from the "chains of domesticity" are not freed from washing, cooking and mending of socks. These nameless workers have no cosy flats as Polina Osipenko and no cars and dazzling toilets as Maria Demchenko. They live with their families: husband, wife, children, grandparents, usually in one small room, where they cook, wash, sleep, love and quarrel. They go in shabby shoes and bleached, mended dresses. After eight hours behind a typewriter, a counter or a loom, weary to death, they go to meetings; otherwise, help us the Almighty, somebody might suspect them of being disloyal. That would mean their miserable wages, for the husband's wages are scarcely sufficient to cover his own needs. Oh no! they are not freed from the duty of washing or of mending, but nobody must see how the "happy" Soviet woman returns from work, washes and feeds her

children, cooks dinner for the family, cleans the room and stays up late in the night for washing, ironing and mending. No one must see the weariness in the morning, the terrible fatigue of this desolate life. The Soviet citizen must be happy. Therefore all have to smile even when the eyes are swollen from sleepless nights, when the heart is full of anxiety about the fate of the arrested husband, of the child left in one of the asylums. Can it then be a surprise that there are so many women among the political refugees, single women and mothers with children? By their own free decision they have left their native country and homes and have not merely followed their husbands.

"I will bring up my son to be a good American, but never, never will I go back, not even to Europe!" A woman wrote this before her departure for America. These words are not a simple condemnation; they are the death sentence for the Bolsheviks and the reign of violence and terror they have created.



SHEVCHENKO AS AN ETCHER AND PAINTER

By VOLODYMYR SICHYNSKY

ALTHOUGH the poetic genius of Taras Shevchenko is known to the Western world, his achievements in the realm of painting and etching are little appreciated, even among his own countrymen. Undoubtedly Shevchenko's chief claim to fame is based upon his poetic creations, which have unfortunately tended to obscure his activity in the plastic arts. However, it is noteworthy that Shevchenko himself considered painting to be his true vocation, and he worked steadily throughout his life in that field.

Shevchenko inaugurated a new period in Ukrainian painting and etching. He was a founder of that modern synthetic realism, which in the art of Eastern Europe of his day was a significant innovation and made a real contribution to the expression of form and content. More than his predecessors, Shevchenko, identified himself with the art of Western Europe and represented the progressive tendencies which concerned themselves with social themes and utilitarian objectives in reproductive art. On studying the esthetic ideas of Shevchenko, we cannot but be surprised at the extent to which they are in accord with the progressive theories of Western Europe of the day, when they are not even in advance of them.

Upon reading Libelt's *Aesthetics*, Shevchenko wrote that the author, like the Russian writer Zhukovsky, thought in a German manner. "They believe in the lifeless fascination of the emaciated, long-bodied ideal," he wrote. "Despite a sincere love of the beautiful in nature," he further remarked, "I feel an insurmountable, irrepressible dislike for philosophy and esthetics." Shevchenko rejected the formula of "art for art's sake," and the once popular theory of the existence of an absolute, permanent and unchanging "ideal of beauty." According to the new school of thought to which Shevchenko was inclined to adhere, the artist's objective was not only to gratify his own "esthetic needs" or to serve an ideal beauty, but above all to serve society.

In his theoretical views Shevchenko started from the principle that art exists not only to provide empty enjoyment and pleasure but to be an educational and directive force for the whole of society. Possessing a high social conscience and aware of the needs of his time,

Shevchenko specialized in those technical and manufacturing processes that facilitated the spreading of art. In painting he understood the value of reproductions, and he accordingly showed great interest in the techniques of engraving and other methods of reproduction to which he assigned greater significance than to painting. In 1857, prior



TARAS SHEVCHENKO: PORTRAIT OF PRINCESS KEYKUATOVA, 1847

to his liberation from exile, Shevchenko wrote: "Of all the fine arts, I am at the present time attracted to engraving. And not without reason. Being an expert in engraving is like spreading the light of truth; it means to be useful to humanity and pleasing to God." So the last years of the artist's life were devoted almost exclusively to the graphic arts.

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A study of Shevchenko's biography reveals that he received his first artistic training in Ukraine, at a time when there were still alive the traditions of Ukrainian painting and engraving, which had flowered in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a twelve-year-old boy he loved to study books with engravings and lithographs, and is known to have made a collection of sacred pictures and to have copied them diligently. Some scholars believe that he studied painting in Vilna and Warsaw in 1830 in the studio of the French painter F. Lampi, Jr. So that by the time when he arrived in St. Petersburg he had had a basic training in painting. In St. Petersburg he fortunately made the acquaintance of I. Soshenko (1807-1876), a Ukrainian painter, with whom he studied drawing and painting techniques and he became acquainted with the engravings of Raphael, Volpato, Poussin, Rembrandt, and Audran.

It is then not surprising that before his enrollment in the Imperial Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg Shevchenko not only possessed latent talent but also was a recognized painter. This is proved by recent study of his portraits done in water color in 1837,—that is prior to his academic training. Previously the artist had studied engraving, by copying the works of the world masters in private and museum collections. At the time of Shevchenko's association with the Academy engraving was not taught except in the old-fashioned method of the use of a small graving tool (a burin). The teaching of etching and aquatint techniques at the Academy was instituted by Prof. F. Jordan years later, when Shevchenko was in exile. It was only in 1858, after Jordan had returned from a trip to London, where he had become acquainted with the latest developments in engraving and especially in aquatint, that Shevchenko worked with him as a pupil.

Shevchenko progressed rapidly in painting at the Academy, and during his first three years as a student (1838-1841) he won four awards and in 1845 he received a diploma for finishing the course. His highest award, however, came in 1859, when the Academy presented him with the title, "academician of engraving."

Shevchenko's paintings and engravings are noted for their independence, precision of method, originality in form and the technique of their execution. As a man deeply interested in and influenced by reality he expressed in a realistic manner his deeply-felt life experiences. In addition, his thorough knowledge of world art made it possible for him to be influenced by contemporary artists and masters of the past.

K. Shyrotsky, an authority on Shevchenko's painting, wrote that "Shevchenko continued the Ukrainian tradition of contact with the West, thus completing in his person the cycle of a historico-artistic



TARAS SHEVCHENKO: SELF-PORTRAIT IN SIBERIAN EXILE, 1848

process." He brings to mind the names of the Western European masters, such as the English painter of folk life William Hogarth, the Flemish masters Wildens, Rubens and N. Uerkolie and especially the great Rembrandt.

When we compare the artistic tendencies of Shevchenko with those of his Russian contemporaries, vital differences are strikingly

apparent. The St. Petersburg Academy of Arts was dominated by a stagnant pseudo-classicism headed by Karl Bryullov, the idol of the Academy. Outside the academy Muscovite nationalism expressed itself in unhealthy and chauvinistic forms. This trend to super-patriotism gave rise to the so-called "Suzdal style," which Shevchenko sharply rejected. This Muscovite tendency struggled against Westernism (Western Europe) because of its "corruption of thought and shamelessness of knowledge," as the Moscow journal *Moskvityanin* wrote in 1841. This point of view even percolated into "progressive" circles and was evident in the so-called "peripatetic exhibitions" in which Russian artists ignored Western art, both new and old—a phenomenon repeated in our day.

Much has been written concerning the influence of Bryullov on Shevchenko, based for the most part not on an analysis of the work of the two artists as on the fact that Shevchenko was a pupil of Bryullov. Within recent years the "modern" but outmoded Russian critics have seized upon this as the final argument for returning Shevchenko within the "Suzdal-Moscow" school. As a matter of fact Shevchenko did hold his teacher in high esteem and admired his drawing, especially of human beings, but he did not share either the thematic approach or the artistic tendencies of Bryullov. Russian artistic criticism has greatly overestimated the significance of Bryullov.

In the progress of world art, Bryullov was a representative of antiquated and discarded art trends which had flourished in Western Europe several decades before. This was the cause of his failure at the Paris Exhibition of 1834, where he was not only not acclaimed, but was sharply criticized. His influence on Shevchenko is evident only in the early work of Shevchenko at the Academy (*The Dying Gladiator* in 1840, and *Diogenes* in 1842) and soon vanishes. As an experimentalist Shevchenko could not be satisfied with Bryullov's "classical" tendency and with its pretentious, artificial and theatrical compositions. Shevchenko stood far higher than such Russian "realists" of the period as Venetsiyanov with his cupped artists playing the role of "peasants" and the weak caricatures of merchant life by Fedotov. Yet here with his genre works, Shevchenko was significantly more advanced than the Russian artists. Even in comparison with the contemporary Western European art Shevchenko's work attained new heights in true realism, marked by an absence of naturalistic detail but with synthetic

form and strong delineation of psychological moods and inner dramatic impulses.

Shevchenko's talent was great and many-sided and was expressed in portraiture, landscape, historical and ordinary life themes, architectural drawings and engravings. Expert in the use of oil techniques.



TARAS SHEVCHENKO: IN A SIBERIAN GALLEY, 1856

water-colors, sepia, and the pen, he was a master in the graphic arts. He employed all known techniques of working on wood, copper, steel, lithography and especially in the complicated techniques of etching and aquatint. He followed also the newest developments in the graphic industry and was the first in Russia to employ the zinc hot-dip process, in the year 1843, the sixth after its invention.

In the selection of subject-matter and its interpretation Shevchenko was creatively original. His first independent compositions in the Academy, with their deeply humanistic and unusual themes, were

revolutionary in the Russian School. These early works include such titles as *Boy Sharing Bread with his Dog*, *Little Orphan Boy*, and *Housewife at Home Alone*. These works give a genuinely realistic interpretation of life in the luxurious Russian capital with its extreme social contradictions and its human suffering. In such matters Shevchenko was uncompromisingly outspoken and criticised severely the Russian tyranny, backwardness, hypocrisy and pretensions to culture. A series of productions entitled *The Prodigal Son* was a terrible indictment of Russian society.

A keen psychologist and a sympathetic observer who keenly felt within his own heart the suffering of others, Shevchenko excelled in reproducing human figures. He concentrated in detail on human character, creating a combination of his own thoughts and the personality of the person whose portrait he was preparing. He created a rich gallery of varied types, dispositions, and moods.

Shevchenko was the first of his contemporaries to resort unhesitatingly to themes from his own national history and from rural tradition. Since he considered art an educational medium, he specialized in etching, a technique ideal for reproductions. A series of six sheets entitled *Picturesque Ukraine*, produced in 1844, belongs to this group. It is interesting that this revival of etching in Eastern Europe was begun by a Ukrainian, just as the first etchings in that part of the world were the work of a Ukrainian, for Alexander Anthony-Tarasevych, an etcher active in the years 1672-1720, had launched a Ukrainian school of etching in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Shevchenko planned a series of historical themes as *The Death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, *Mazepa and Voinarovsky*, and *The Death of Ivan Mazepa* as continuations of the series *Picturesque Ukraine*, but his death prevented their completion. He died at the age of forty-seven, after having spent ten years in exile.

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The color schemes of the oil paintings of Shevchenko mark also a great advance. We observe his great individuality in his rich tonality and color range, in sharp contrast to the dark and earth-brown tones of the Bryullov school. Shevchenko's water-colors exhibit even greater richness of color, and he takes excellent advantage of his material, with a rich interplay of light and shade and with quiet, subdued nuances of color in perspective. Shevchenko was a master in distilling the transparency of the outdoors, the setting of the sun, in utilizing the most

delicate shades of color in horizon, but at the same time he preserved the overall dominant tone and harmony of color. (Landscapes from Ukraine, Aral Sea, etc.)



TARAS SHEVCHENKO: RUNNING THE GAUNTLET

He also spent considerable time in illustrating books, although the fruits of this activity are obviously of less significance. His best works in this line were the illustrations for the works of Kvitka-Osnovyanenko and for some of his poems, such as *Kateryna* and *The Haidamaky*.

As an interesting sidelight, it might be recalled that Shevchenko turned to sculpture, and when he was in exile in the Novopetrovsk fortress, and forbidden to paint, he occupied himself with sculpture. Architectural sketches by Shevchenko are also known. Thus his interests embraced all branches of the pictorial arts.

In the last years of his life in St. Petersburg Shevchenko devoted himself almost exclusively to engraving, especially to etching. His achievements in this field have been admired by specialists from home and abroad and show an original etching technique. He also introduced new methods in technique, inventing new instruments and applying new ideas. These innovations were later employed to good advantage by such Russian artists as I. Shishkin (1831-1898) and V. Mate (1856-1917). And although Russian literature has represented V. Mate as the founder of the modern Russian etching, it was due to Shevchenko that modern etching appeared in Russia.

In his first etchings Shevchenko made designs, spots showing a great graduation in half-tones, but later he made greater use of line drawing and shading. The drawing became brilliant and light, the line more lively and dynamic, but most important, he approached that special "Rembrandt method" of shading, which brings out superbly the contrast between light and shadow. In later etchings he employed a new method of shading, which brought him closer to the French graphic artists of the second half of the nineteenth century. Among these works belong the portraits of Fedor Tolstoy, president of the St. Petersburg Academy of Arts, and of Prof. F. Bruni of the same institution, as well as *The Sleeping Woman, Virsavia* (1859) etching of a work of Bryullov.

This new technique of French origin differed radically from the Rembrandt method. It gave Shevchenko's drawings a greater definition and a monumentality of form and emphasized the softness and variety of the shaded area. Thus the interest in the artistic work of Shevchenko is not caused only by the fact that he was a distinguished painter and engraver as well as a great poet. The significance of Shevchenko poetry is far wider than his role in Ukrainian art. He was in his time a great innovator in the art of all Eastern Europe—the founder of a new realism, especially in genre painting, of a new engraving and also one of the greatest etchers of the time.

PREHISTORY OF UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

By ALEXANDER DOMBROVSKY

RUSSIAN historiography almost without exception has at its base the denial of the existence of the Ukrainian nation. Hence Russian historians have included the history of the old Kievan State, that is the ancient history of Ukraine, together with the ancient name of Ukraine—Rus', as a part of Muscovite history. In this way the representatives of Russian historiography have endeavored to enlarge their own Russian historical tradition, by transferring its beginnings to the IX century, when in reality one should look for these beginnings far later, actually in the XII century, when the principality of Suzdal was founded.

Here we wish to call attention to another aspect of the imperialism of Russian historians, the appropriation of Ukrainian prehistory. Along with the ancient Ukrainian historical traditions, Russian historians have annexed the entire era of Ukrainian prehistory, from approximately the era of Homer until the dawn of the Kievan State, a period of almost fifteen centuries. The author of the excellent description of Scythia, Herodotus, is termed the father of Russian history and ethnography. However Herodotus did not mention any ethnographically Russian lands, for he treated only the northern coast of the Black Sea, the ancient territory of Ukraine, which by the period of Homer, was covered with a net of Greek colonies. These settlers had brought with them from their mother country, Hellas, poor in natural wealth, rich in spiritual culture, not only the fires from their home altars, but also the treasures of Greek culture. Transplanted into the fertile spiritual soil of the ancient territory of Ukraine, this creative Hellenistic genius produced in a long historical process a remarkable cultural achievement: nomadic Scythia slowly changed into the "Hellas of the Steppe."

This region altered its spiritual structure and acquired the stamp of the Hellenistic and later the Byzantine spirit. The so-called Pontic Culture in the history of Ukraine spread out in a wide circle, geographically, and continued over long centuries. Its political aspect developed parallel with its cultural. Greek historians were greatly

interested in the campaign of Darius against the Scythians. The State of Bosphorus in the Crimea was formed by a union of Greek colonies. Their relations with Asia Minor, the cradle of the ancient cultures, and the various treaties, among others those with the Caucasian Gate, left a highly positive mark on the prehistory of Ukraine, while they greatly affected the history of the motherland of Greece.

Herodotus is as important for the history of Scythia and ancient Ukraine as Tacitus is for the prehistory of Germany and Caesar of France. The Ukrainian lands had more or less the same significance in the history of Greece as the coasts of Asia Minor or Southern Italy, which, not without reason, was called *Magna Graecia*. Ukrainian wheat and other products fed the sons of the mountainous and not fertile Greek land. Beginning with Homer, throughout the whole of ancient Greek and Byzantine literature, there are frequent mentions of the Black Sea Greece, or in other words, ancient Ukraine. As we have said before, Greek colonisation enlivened culturally and politically ancient Ukraine, and made its prehistory a prologue, so to speak, to the later history of the Kiev State, which grew out of the superb prehistoric traditions in the middle of the XI century, during the reign of prince Yaroslav the Wise into a great power in Eastern Europe.

Ukraine in its spiritual, anthropological, and finally psychological aspects reflects the influence of Greece. On the other hand the spiritual and physical structure of the Russians, beginning with medieval Moscow, show a marked Finnish-Slav mixture.

According to Shcherbakivsky,¹ in the prehistory of the Ukrainian nation there were two main ethnic elements: the agricultural New Eastern substratum, which reached back to the Neolithic Trypillian era, and the ruling Indo-European classes, that is the Iranian Scythians, Sarmatians, etc., who settled for a time on the ancient territory of Ukraine, and passed leaving behind their anthropological and cultural influences. The Ukrainian nation is the ethnic result, and was developed out of the oldest branches of the Slavonic family, in which the Near Eastern influences, including the Dinaric racial element, played a large role. In contrast, the composition of the Russian nation is entirely different, for it represents a recent Slavonised Finnic-Uralic conglomerate, and the remains of the Finnic element in the Russian nation are still evident in the geographical names. The difference in the

¹ V. Shcherbakivsky: *Formation of the Ukrainian Nation*. Prague, 1941. (In Ukrainian.)

geographical and anthropological development of both territories, the Ukrainian and the Russian, created two separate anthropological types, unlike both in their physical and mental structure. The two different types are easily discernible: the Finnic-Uralic with the predominant mentality of the Eurasian nomad, and the Slavonic, that is the Indo-European, with the ancient prehistoric traditions of the settled tiller of the soil.

There is a corresponding difference in the culture of the two nations, a result of the different prehistoric bases. The ancient Greek element was to a very large degree the source of ancient Ukrainian culture. This is emphasized by the Hellenic account of the origin of the Scythians, which made them the descendants of Hercules and the serpent-woman (Herodotus IV, 8-10). According to Varnecke's interpretation, "this mythological symbolism represents the victory of culture, brought here by the Greeks in the person of Hercules, over primitive barbarism," and he adds that "this legend reconciled the natives with the newcomers, and leveled out antagonisms" between the nation of the north coast of the Black Sea and the Greek colonists.² But Greek influence was felt not only in the Black Sea region; it radiated far into the interior of the country. In his description of the Budini, Herodotus (IV-108) mentions that in their city of Gelon there were temples of Greek deities, decorated in the Greek manner with images of the gods and altars made from wood. The people celebrated the feast of Dionysus, and fell into a Dionysiac trance. The ancient Geloni, he writes, were Greeks who settled the coastal regions in the land of Budini. Kiessling thinks it very possible that Greek merchants lived in Gelon.³ Taking into consideration the fact that Gelon was situated far from the coast of the Black Sea, (Shcherbakivsky identifies it with the site of the town of Bilsky in the region of Poltava), we can see how far inland the influence of the Greeks really penetrated.⁴

We can understand this phenomenon the more readily, when we remember that the ancient territory of Ukraine on the boundary of the two worlds of the immense Eurasian continent was of great importance in trade and other relations between the East and the West.

² B. Varnecke: *Legends of the Descent of the Scythians*, in the Jubilee Almanac dedicated to M. S. Hrushevsky, vol. 1, Kiev, 1928. (In Ukrainian.)

³ Kiessling R. E.: *Peuly Vissova*, vol. VII, 1014. (In German.)

⁴ V. Shcherbakivsky: *La situation géographique de la ville de Gelone, d'Herodote. Memorial book in honor of Dr. Demetrykiewicz. Poznan, 1930.*

Through this region passed the most important trading routes, leading from the Baltic through ancient Ukraine, south in the direction of the Caucasian Gate and on into the highly civilized cultural centers of Asia Minor, and from the west to the east, along the northern coasts of the Black Sea, to the Maeotic and Caspian Seas. Ebert calls attention to the fact that the great Central Asian trade route ran through the ancient territory of Ukraine.⁵ The V-IV centuries B.C. mark the height of the Greek interest in Ukrainian lands.⁶ It is also interesting to note that from this contact with the ancient territory of Ukraine certain local influences crept into Greek art.⁷ Roman influences followed the Greek. The natives of ancient Ukraine were employed both in influential colonial Greek, and later Roman homes as guards and in municipal militias.⁸ Therefore to the culture of the Near Eastern agricultural class were added Hellenistic and later partly Roman elements. Although the political map of ancient Ukraine changed from time to time, the anthropological elements and cultural influences remained more or less constant and determined the synthesis of the original Ukrainian physical and spiritual structure. In the era of Slavonization all these elements melted into a single ethnical and crystallized unity, with its own original culture.

In comparison with Ukrainian lands, Muscovite territory in this prehistoric era was still lost in the haze of mythological geography and hyperboreology. Never reaching the territory of Muscovia, the antique Greeks thought of these regions only in terms of mythology, and believed that far away in these unknown northern wastes were the entrance to the underworld and the country of the idealized Hyperboreans. Being far removed from all the cultural centers of the Hellenistic world, this territory together with its inhabitants developed only a very primitive civilization, and remained on this level up to historical times. Since they held no interest for the ancient cultured nations, with small exceptions these lands had no place in ancient literature. Those highly cultured elements that formed the nucleus of Ukrainian civilization were unknown in the Russian territory.

⁵ Max Ebert: *Suedrussland in Altertum*. Leipzig, 1921.

⁶ Rostowtzev M.: *Scythien und der Bosphorus*.

⁷ Minne E. H.: *Scythians and Greeks*. Cambridge, 1913.

⁸ Rostowtzev M.: *Römische Besetzungen in der Krim und des Kostell Chateau*. Leipzig, 1902.

THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION

By ROMAN SMAL-STOCKY

A POLITICAL DOCUMENT OF OUR TIMES

[EDITOR'S NOTE: On December 31, 1948, *The Commonwealth* published an appeal drawn up by the "American Committee for a Free Russia." Dr. Roman Smal-Stocky, an outstanding expert on the national problem in the Soviet Union and president of the Promethean League, which champions equality and self-determination for all national groups now under Russian domination, challenged certain perversions of democratic principles that were imbedded in the declaration published in *The Commonwealth*. We regret that for reasons of brevity we are unable to print the entire exchange, and are limited to presenting Professor Stocky's basic thesis.]

The Commonwealth of December 31, 1948, printed the program of the "American Committee for Free Russia", created to bring spiritual help not only to the Russian people but also to "all the nationalities of Russia in their fight for the establishment of human rights and democratic freedoms in their fatherland, so that the great moral and social values that gave inspiration to the Russian Revolution may be revindicated and preserved, as the American and French peoples perceive the heritage of their Revolutions."

Because this program includes also the nationalities of "Russia", it is asked that you let the voice of these nationalities be heard concerning this program. This plea is made on behalf of the Promethean League of nationalities oppressed by Soviet Moscow. For more than a quarter of a century this League has defended the right of self-determination of Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Buriats, Cossacks of the Don and Kuban, Georgians, Ingrians, Karelians, Komi, North Caucasians, Tartars of Crimea and Idel-Ural, of the Turkestanian nations, of the Ukrainians, and White Ruthenians. It has sympathized also with the Siberian movement. The League now is defending the Baltic nations, also, and all nations behind the Iron Curtain.

Wholehearted support is given the program's economic points (2, 3) regarding heavy industry, the agrarian question and (4, 7) concerning interior and foreign policy. Although the goodwill of the persons who have signed the program is genuine, the other points indicate that they have not grasped clearly the true meaning of the "Russian Revolution" and the double-edged character of Russian Communism today, that it is simultaneously an international movement and a continuation of the chauvinism and imperialism of old Tsaristic Russia.

The following remarks are confined to six basic problems raised in the program of the Committee: (1) The "Russian Federation" plan and the questions it raises in regard to the non-Russian peoples of the present Soviet Union, (2) the principle of the "integrity of the frontiers of Russia", (3) discrimination against the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union, and (4) the meaning of the terms: "Russia and Russians", (5) revindication and preservation of the "heritage of the Russian Revolution" and (6) the aims of the non-Russian nationalities.

1. *Russian Federation.* Frankly, it appears that point 5 ("Real political and cultural autonomy within the framework of the Russian Federation will be granted to the nationalities of the border regions of Russia") represents morally and politically an injustice in its plan to force, without consulting their will, a "Russian Federation" upon non-Russian nationalities now within the boundaries of the Soviet Union.

(1) Let us recall and evaluate the historical facts as a background for this point. After 1919, the majority of these non-Russian peoples established independent Democratic National Republics with socialist governments and applied immediately for membership in the League of Nations. The Russian Communist Republic recognized their independence, and later by military aggression, overthrew these legally established governments and replaced them with fictitiously independent states (like the present Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia) and enforced on them since 1924, the so-called "Soviet Union". Occupied after bloody war with the Red Army, these nations, believing in international justice and morality, sent their democratic governments and representatives of all democratic parties to Western Europe, into exile. These subjugated nations manifested by repeated rebellions their will to independence, their fidelity to democratic ideals and the League of Nations. Their legal governments in exile, their national committees and their emigrants collaborated actively in the Congress of the League of Nations and in all international democratic organizations in Western Europe, until World War II. After its outbreak and during the Stalin-Hitler alliance, they adhered immediately to the cause of the Western Allies by the public declarations in Paris, 1939, by the Ukrainian Prime Minister, A. Shulgin, and the venerable Socialist leader, N. Jerdania, legal president of Georgia. The role these nationalities played through their underground and through partisans behind the German front line after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, is well-known. It forced Stalin later to sign the Atlantic Charter and even to make "concessions" to the national feeling of the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union.

After nearly one-third of a century of constant struggle against Communist and Nazi dictatorship, after this long fight for democracy and self-determination—a fight which they felt gave them claim to American aid and sympathy—American citizens have in point five presented these non-Russian nationalities with a program which includes:

- (a) A denial to all these peoples of the right to self-determination.
- (b) Discrimination regarding equality of sovereign rights between Russians and the non-Russian nationalities. The Russians are the "master race"; the non-Russians, the "under-dogs", are to be content with "political and cultural autonomy".
- (c) A denial of basic American ideas expressed in the Declaration of Independence, in the principles of Wilson, in the Atlantic Charter, and in the Statutes of the United Nations.
- (d) A moral recognition of the "Russian Lebensraum" created by aggression, international crimes and complete disregard for treaty obligations-methods

similar to those which have caused the makers of the German and Japanese "Lebensraum" to be tried by international tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo.

(1) It is astonishing that, though there is some Communist influence in the Indonesian movement, their right to self-determination against Dutch aggression is usually defended in American public opinion. This right is denied non-Russians within the Soviet Union, in spite of their century-old adherence to democratic principles.

(2) Point 5 of the program of the "American Committee for Free Russia"—which seems to have become the "American Committee for Discrimination against the non-Russian nationalities"—is even less just than the present Constitution of the Soviet Union the fictitious principles of which one is suddenly compelled to defend against American democrats.

It was the "political necessity" in the eyes of the Russian Communist dictatorship to preserve decorum before world opinion by including in the Soviet Constitution article 13, which states that the "Soviet Union is a federal state formed on the basis of voluntary association", and article 17, according to which "to every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to secede from the Soviet Union". Thus even the Russian Communists granted, theoretically, rights of full self-determination to non-Russian nationalities, but American democrats have not found it necessary to consult these peoples about their will or their wishes. They have denied them the right of full self-determination, and limited it to "real political and cultural autonomy" within an arbitrarily instituted "Russian Federation".

(3) *The Commonwealth* is a Catholic organ, and it is well to recall that this point contradicts the position of the Church, as expressed October 15, 1918, by Pope Benedict XV, who, welcoming the restoration of Poland to full independence, said: "It is our fond hope that at the same time all other nations, non-Catholic nations included, that have hitherto been subject to Russia, may be allowed to decide their own lot and develop and prosper according to their native genius and their own individual rescue." There has to be taken into consideration also the Peace Plan of Pope Pius XI, wherein it is stated that "a fundamental postulate of any just and honorable peace is an assurance for all nations, great and small, powerful and weak, of their right to life and independence".

II. *Integrity of Frontiers.* (1) It is difficult to understand how the Committee could rationally include in its program the principle of integrity for "Russia's" frontiers against the background of contemporary events: the dissolution of the British Empire (India, Pakistan, Burma, Egypt, etc.), the transformation of its remnants into a voluntary Commonwealth, the case of the Philippines, and the restoration of independent Israel. All of these not only demonstrate the creative power of the national idea in today's world, but also puts into proper focus the "demand" for Russian integrity.

(2) Again we drop somewhat below the level of the present legal status of the non-Russian nationalities. The Soviet Constitution, less touchy about the integrity of her frontiers, reserves, however theoretical it may be, the right to secede.

(3) This point of integrity is the more deplorable because by it the American Committee silently recognizes even the annexation of the Baltic states into "free

Russia"—an international crime the fruits of which have not yet been recognized by the United States.

(4) If such principles of integrity, introduced into political programs, provide silent sanction of international crimes, there soon will appear "integrity demands" for the German, Italian, and Japanese Lebensraum, all created with methods well-utilized by Stalin and his predecessor, Ivan the Terrible.

III. *Discrimination against non-Russian Nationalities.* Opposition is voiced against discrimination against non-Russian peoples living within the Soviet Union, which point six of the program implies.

(1) The point demands immediate abandonment by the future "Russia" of all policies of entanglement and intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary Czechoslovakia and Finland—regarding such policy apparently as political crime, though the same methods if applied against the non-Russian nationalities are considered lawful. The authors of the program do not realize that this "abandonment" can be achieved only if the right to full self-determination is secured for the non-Russian nationalities, too.

Why are Poles, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Czechoslovakians, and Finns granted complete self-determination when non-Russians within the Soviet borders may have only "political and cultural autonomy?" Why this double discrimination? Why are the rights of the non-Russian nationalities defined not only as less than those of the Russians, but as less than those of other people now behind the Iron Curtain?

(2) Both double discrimination and the "integrity" principle must be considered against the background of historical fact. And the fact is that only since 1854 with the capitulation of Shamil has Russia controlled the Caucasus; Catherine II divided the Ukrainian Hetman State into Russian *Governments* and the last Hetman, Razumovsky, lived until 1892; and Lithuania, now within the "unchangeable" boundaries of the Soviet Union, has been there only since the partition of Poland—and so forth for the rest of these peoples. That their past has not been forgotten nor their rights resigned is demonstrated (a) in the Soviet Constitution, which theoretically dismembers Russia, (b) by the legal national governments which still function in exile, and (c) by partisan warfare in the Soviet Union under the leadership of the Ukrainian partisan army (UPA).

(3) The points mentioned show an underestimation, perhaps a misunderstanding of the national idea among non-Russian peoples in old Russia and in the Soviet Union. In old Russia as in the Soviet Union not only classes, but also nations have been oppressed and exploited. These nations have defended their dignity against Russian oppression and exploitation through their aspirations for national self-determination. The national idea expresses not only their will for political freedom, but also is merged with ideas of social justice and religious revival.

IV. *Meaning of the terms: "Russia" and "Russians"* Objection is made to the Committee's use of the terms "Russia" and "Russians," a use misleading for Americans who are rather unfamiliar with Eastern European history. After 1920 the term "Russia" was limited to the "Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic", now one of the 16 Republics in the Soviet Union. It is then at least

inexact to include the other supposedly free republics in the modern term "Russia", giving to it the territorial meaning of old pre-World War I, Tsarist Russia. This misuse, with "integrity of frontiers" and discrimination against the non-Russian nationalities, is part of a new variation on the old songs of Russian imperialism, "unity and indivisibility", cloaking an old principle: might over right.

Such antiquated terminology is excusable in popular use, but a political program, necessitating knowledge of history and politics, should at least be worded accurately. Do Irish, or Americans, like to be called Britishers?

Russian imperialists, of course, will appreciate this terminology, which, by including non-Russian nationalities in "Russia", negates their right to self-determination. But does this terminology bring spiritual aid and comfort to democrats—non-Russian and Russian alike?

V. *The Heritage of the Russian Revolution.* When will Americans at last understand that in non-Russian countries of the old Russian Empire revolutionary ideals differed from "the great moral and social values that gave inspiration to the Russian Revolution"? That in reality the "Russian Revolution" happened only on territory ethnographically Russian? That in non-Russian territories, the revolution was primarily an "Anti-Russian Revolution"? When will Americans finally see that these non-Russian nationalities regard as the "heritage" of their anti-Russian Revolution their right to self-determination and to human freedom? For these moral and social values the non-Russian peoples are fighting now: "That they may be revindicated and preserved as the Americans and French have preserved the heritage of their Revolutions."

VI. *The Aims of the non-Russian Nationalities.* To avoid misunderstanding about the ultimate aims of the non-Russian nationalities, let it be stated clearly that these nations (represented in exile by Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Christian and Radical Democrats), are not chauvinistic nationalists—they are not isolationists, and they are well aware of national interdependence in modern life. They have considered for the future, possible unions of their nations into higher forms in keeping with their economic, cultural and political interest, without forgetting the UN or the future world government, which someday, let us hope, will rule our small United Nations planet with just and equal laws for all nations. "Balkanization" is not their aim, but rather an organic construction in which the non-Russian nationalities can participate voluntarily in Unions—the United States of Europe, or the Intermarium, or the Black Sea Federation, or the Islam Union, or the Siberian Federation, or a federative union with the Russian nation.

But underlying these plans is the realization that only the free will and decision of these nations can build lasting Unions. Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo give witness to the fate of unions based upon coercion, violence, and brutal oppression. Therefore, the Committee's proposed "shotgun wedding" of the Russian and non-Russian nationalities in a Russian federation" will surely fail.

It is further to be understood that non-Russian nationalities, when they have achieved their full rights will assist through all possible means (free ports, facilities, etc.) to assure the economic recovery of what it is hoped will be a friendly Russia. For, although our opinion about the "heritage" of "Russia" differs from those of the authors of the program, we are sincere friends of the

Russian people. We pray the Lord that they may learn of the fate of empires from those of the past, especially those built by Turkey, Austria, and England; that they may develop toward us the attitude proper for a Christian nation in its relations to its neighbors. The sooner the Russians frankly and honestly recognize the rights of the non-Russian nations they now oppress, the sooner they will find a common language with their neighbors.

The determined and persistent national revolution behind the Soviet frontiers and behind the Iron Curtain, the struggle for self-determination, is one of the great international problems, a problem, which can be approached only on the basis of the Soviet Constitution and solved only through honest fulfilment of the principles granting the right of full-self-determination to the non-Russian nationalities.

We thank sincerely these distinguished American citizens for their interest in the Soviet Union, but the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, having received no spiritual help, have been reduced to a sad reflection:

Are American principles as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, in Wilson's ideals, the Atlantic Charter, really only lip service, and must we despair that they will honestly be applied to us?

Are we, the non-Russian nations, to suffer the discrimination which afflicts the Jew and the Negro in some southern states? Has "Jim Crowism" extended into American foreign policy to deny self-determination to non-Russian nations, even to those—the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian—which the United Nations has recognized?



CURRENT UKRAINIAN CHRONICLE

● **CONGRESS OF AMERICAN-UKRAINIANS IN WASHINGTON.**—Americans of Ukrainian descent, organized in the Ukrainian Congress Committee, held their fourth convention in Washington, D. C., on November 5 and 6, 1949. With 500 delegates and guests attending, the Congress received greetings from prominent officials in the government, including President Truman. Among those speaking was Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey. The keynote of the gathering was Ukrainian unity, and representatives from the various parts of Ukraine spoke on behalf of the independence of their common homeland. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University was elected president of the organization, whose officers include American-born individuals older Ukrainian immigrants as well as even former members of the Red Army recently arrived in the United States.

● **PRESIDENT TRUMAN CONGRATULATES UKRAINIAN CONGRESS MEETING IN CAPITAL.**—On the occasion of the Fourth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent, holding its sessions at Hotel Statler, President Truman sent the following message:

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

November 2, 1949

Fourth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent
Hotel Statler, Washington, D. C.

Dear Friends:

The fourth national gathering of leaders of various groups from all parts of America of citizens of Ukrainian origin offers a suitable occasion to congratulate you and the men and women you represent upon your fine contributions to American life.

You are to be commended for your interest and participation in our democracy and also for your interest in and efforts to aid your kinsmen overseas who are not able to enjoy the benefits of a free society which we in the United States are fortunate to enjoy.

I hope that more and more the story of our American democracy will reach your kinsmen and others overseas who are not able to listen to a free radio or read an uncensored press and that as the

true story of democracy is heard more widely the desire of all peoples for freedom and peace and justice will increase correspondingly.

My best wishes to your meeting.

Very sincerely yours

HARRY S. TRUMAN (Signed)

● **“VOICE” TO BROADCAST IN UKRAINIAN.**—After preparations extending over a year, the Voice of America inaugurated a Ukrainian-language program in December, 1949. This decision is vital in the struggle between totalitarianism and democracy, since the Ukrainian people, long a pawn in the hands of imperialists and bedeviled by neglect and misrepresentation, will be enabled to play a positive role in the reconstruction of Eastern Europe on terms of mutual respect and equality.

● **RUSSIANS DISTORT “VOICE OF AMERICA” NEWSCAST FOR IMPERIALISTIC ENDS.**—On September 17, 1949, eleven organizations representing as many non-Russian nationalities within the Soviet Union sent a collective memorandum to the United Nations, asking that body, in accordance with article 56 of its charter, to investigate conditions within their countries under Communist Russian misrule. Among the signatories were representatives of the Ukrainian National Council and of the White Ruthenian Council. The State Department considered this move important enough to beam it to the subjugated nations themselves through “the Voice of America.”

In conformity with their imperialist theory of the “unity and indivisibility of the Russian people,” hammered into a state concept and into textbooks by such diverse interpreters of the Russian soul as Peter the Great, Karamzin, Catherine, Nicholas I, Joseph Stalin, and Alexander Kerensky, the Russians controlling the Russian-language broadcasts considered it fitting to “rectify” current events by omitting the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian signatories, thereby reducing the petitioners to nine.

Once again we ask: Do these Russians owe allegiance to Russia or to the United States? And is it fitting that they abuse the confidence and treasury of the American people in order to further their own imperialist ends?

● **UKRAINIAN ARTISTS IN WASHINGTON.**—During the IV Congress of Americans of Ukrainian descent in Washington, D. C., November 5-6, 1949 a preview of contemporary Ukrainian art was organized. Almost 50 paintings and sculptures were shown in two rooms of Hotel Statler. As was said in the Catalogue:

"After the last war many Ukrainian artists were compelled to leave their country. Not only the young artists emigrated, but many representatives of the older generation were forced to do so, among them Vasyl Krychevsky, the 78 year old rector of the Academy of Fine Arts in Kiev. In the years 1945-48 Munich became the center of Ukrainian art, much more creative than Kiev or Lwiw (Lwow), where only propagandive art in a purely realistic style is tolerated. Now for the most part the Ukrainian artists have left the DP camps in Germany, dispersing throughout the Western world. A great number of them came to the United States and Canada, some emigrated to Argentine, Venezuela and Australia, others to Paris, where a group of prominent Ukrainian artists resided before the war.

"This exhibit serves to make the American public acquainted with the works of some of the contemporary Ukrainian artists whose works are not yet known in this hemisphere. Of the American artists of Ukrainian descent, the sculptures of Archipenko are shown. Numerous artistic trends are represented in this exhibition, but the majority of the artists follow the trend of modern art. From its very beginnings the destiny of Ukrainian art was to synthesize Oriental and Occidental artistic elements and the same is true to this day. Expressive and joyous, full of contrast, the modern Ukrainian art is one of the most interesting creations that originated in Eastern Europe."

The following artists were represented: P. Andrusiw, A. A. Archipenko, S. Borachok, N. Butovich, M. Dmytrenko, A. Gritchenko, Y. Hnizdovsky, S. Hordynsky, M. Hotsiy, M. Kmit, V. Krychevsky (Sen.), V. Lasovsky, H. Mazepa, N. Nedilko, M. Stefanovych, J. Wynnykiw. The exhibition was visited by many distinguished persons—artists, scientists, journalists and members of the Convention.

● **CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN BOOK ART IN THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY.**—An exhibition of contemporary Ukrainian book art was opened November 2, 1949 in the New York Public Library, 5th Avenue and 42nd Street. There were exhibited illustra-

tions, book covers and book plates by twelve Ukrainian graphic artists, a majority of whom are now living in the new world.

Beside the original works there was shown a series of important books that were published in Ukraine and abroad. Similar exhibitions were organized before the war in Prague, Berlin, Rome, Naples and recently in Munich. Ukrainian graphic art, represented by such artists as Narbut, Kovzhun, Butovich, Mazepa, Dmyterko and others acquired an honorable place in this kind of art. The works for the exhibition were assembled by S. Hordynsky; it is worth while to see it.

● **CATACOMBS IN UKRAINE.**—A dwindling number of priests, without a single Bishop, are keeping the faith alive in the Soviet Ukraine, which once boasted many Bishops, thousands of priests, and millions of the faithful, reports a dispatch from Vienna by Dr. Friedrich Funder. Twentieth century "catacombs" in old barns and Carpathian mountain recesses are the mountain retreats of the few secret priests, according to reports of refugees.

Some people walk 50 miles to attend Mass. Only a few can leave any single village at the same time and never more than one member of any household so that suspicions will not be aroused. Priests are unable to be present at marriages and funerals, but they send their blessings to these ceremonies by blessing the wedding ring or a handful of soil to be thrown upon the grave. Parents usually baptize their own children, and use water blessed beforehand by a priest.

● **MORE UKRAINIAN PARTISANS REACH GERMANY.**—Early in November a new group of Ukrainian partisans, consisting of three men and one woman, entered the American zone of Germany. Recently arrived from Ukraine, they provided American military authorities with information on Soviet military preparations in Ukraine, Poland, and Eastern Germany.

● **SCOTTISH LEAGUE SPEAKS FOR UKRAINE.**—John F. Stuart, president of the Scottish League, has directed an appeal to H. Spaak, president of the European Council in Strasbourg, asking him to invite Ukrainian representatives to participate in the European Council.

BOOK REVIEWS

LEAP TO FREEDOM, by Oksana Kasenkina. J. B. Lippincott Co., New York, 1949.

To the majority of people who read in the newspapers about Mrs. Kasenkina's amazing leap from a window of the Soviet Consulate in New York the incident seemed the culmination of a thriller-like episode. At that time the facts behind the leap could only be guessed at. In her autobiographical sketch Mrs. Kasenkina rightly spends most of her time on an account of life in the Soviet Consulate here and the accumulations of bickering, spite, and downright persecution which led to her desperate escape.

This second section of the book is the most interesting. The first deals with life in the Soviet Union—the idyllic childhood in Ukraine, when the Tsar was still on his throne, later the dismal days (apart, perhaps, from the NEP period) following the revolution, complicated in her case as in that of many others, by personal tragedy—the deportation of her husband, the death from starvation of her young daughter, and finally the loss of her son, who was reported missing during the battle of Leningrad. We also get brief glimpses of life in Ukraine during the two great famines. We would be more grateful for just a little more detail about the methods used in Soviet education. Mrs. Kasenkina is obviously a good teacher, devoted to her work.

The second half of the book is completely satisfying in its behind-the-scenes account of the squalid existence of those living in the Soviet Consulate. There is here the germ of a satirical novel—the spying, the back-biting, the intense vanity sketched against a background of country houses in the last stages of decay and town mansions condemned by the City Board of Health as unfit for human habitation. One of the most revealing episodes in the book is Mrs. Kasenkina's interview with Mrs. Gromyko who wanted the author's assistance in destroying the romance between Anatole Gromyko and the daughter of the man who was, after all, only the Consulate chauffeur. Even in the Soviet brotherhood, one has apparently to draw the line somewhere.

The climax of the book is truly dramatic. Kasenkina's growing revulsion from all the spite and spying turns towards action when she is ordered to leave the United States. Her main difficulty was that in

spite of the time she had spent in New York she had very little contact with the outside world. Her Soviet experience had made her suspicious of everyone and unable to evaluate life in a different milieu. Thus the later part of the story—the flight to the Tolstoy settlement and the return to the Consulate read like descriptions of a nightmare when the chase is on, but the feet are rooted to the spot. Mrs. Kasenkina's leap from the window was the only step, given this atmosphere, which she could possibly take.

This is what an American or an English reviewer might have written about Mrs. Kasenkina's book, adding, no doubt, that this whole personal account is permeated with great sincerity, honesty and, most of all, with courage. To a Ukrainian reader, however, the book has yet another value.

It is, above all, the first true and genuine life story of a Ukrainian from the Soviet Ukraine. It reveals the Soviet reality in Ukraine as no other book in English. It is, therefore, more than a stirring personal record; it is documentary. For those who may fear that the Soviets have uprooted the national consciousness as well as the love of freedom from among Ukrainians, this book is a reminder that this cannot be so as long as there are Kasenkinas in Ukraine. The free spirit and the courage of the author must silence, though they may not convince the cynic who claims that such personal stories are not typical of the mentality of the Soviet people. It shows once more that given a stimulus from and a knowledge of the free life in the democracies, a person from Soviet Russia can recognize its true value. It also shows to the world that no power, not even that of Soviet tyranny, can imprison the human soul and mind, even though it may still imprison the body.

The translation of a book such as this, emotional and exciting as it is, must have made great demands on the translator. The book, however, has an authentic personal ring while remaining clear and dramatic in the narrative.

G. LUCKYJ

SLAVIC CIVILIZATION THROUGH THE AGES, by Samuel Hazzard Cross. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, vi+195 pp.

This book of the late Dr. Samuel Hazzard Cross, Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard University, has been published in 1948 by Leonid I. Strakhovsky, Lecturer in Slavic in the

same University. The book describes the rise, fall and re-emergence of the Eastern, the Western, and the Southern Slavs.

Curiously enough the author deals with all the Slavic peoples with the sole exceptions of the Ukrainians and the White Ruthenians because he considers them as Russians. He says on page 51: "In general, the Russian tribes formed three groups distinguishable by their speech, which are reflected in our day by the tripartite division of the Russian language into three basic dialects... But these three groups are none the less parts of the same nation, so that either a White Russian or a Ukrainian is precisely as much a Russian as the purest Great Russian born in the shadow of the Kremlin."

Such a statement is, of course, false and must have been based on Russian authors who, because of the Russian imperialistic politics, deny the existence of the separate Ukrainian and the White-Ruthenian peoples. The truth is that Kievan Rus was an ancient Ukrainian State and not a Russian. Russia did not yet exist at that time for it took its shape as such in the times of Peter I (18th century) as an evolution from the Muscovite principate of the 14th century.

It is obvious that if the premises are false—all the consequences and results must be false likewise. That is true in this case. As the author knows only the Russians, the Ukrainian people and its culture do not exist for him as something completely different and separate from all which is Russian. He does not care about the State of Galicia and Volynia, he does not know the Ukrainian Kozak State, and he does not mention the modern Ukrainian movement. There is not one word about the ecclesiastical reunion of the Ukrainians with Rome in 1596.

The author knows that the Russian-Moscovite "princes of Vladimir had always tended to be more absolutist than their Kievan forebears" (p. 103), i.e. the Ukrainians. He knows "how much interest the early Christian Kievan princes took in education" (p. 104) and that the Moscovite princes of the the 15th century and the higher clergy were frequently illiterate and that "the introduction of new intellectual concepts encountered serious barriers" (p. 105) in Muscovy. But he does not know how to draw the necessary conclusions from these statements. Yet they are clear: we have to do with two different peoples, with different characters, histories, cultures and Churches. Nobody today confuses the Ukrainians and the Russians with the exception

of people for whom political tendencies and violence have more worth than objective and historic truth.

In general, one reads this book with interest but the elimination of the Ukrainian and the White Ruthenian peoples from the book as separate and independent factors in Slavic history diminishes enormously its value. In addition the lack of bibliography, of footnotes and references, and of the appropriate geographical map gives the book no scholarly importance.

B. LONCZYNA

ALEXIS GRITCHENKO. *Sa vie, son oeuvre. Textes by René-Jean and Paul Fierens. English translation by Barnett D. Conlan. 42 plates, 10 in color. Editions "Quatre Vents," Paris, 1948.*

Alexis Gritchenko is one of the most distinguished Ukrainian artists in France, and his works are already a part of French art. After the First World War he went as a refugee to Constantinople, and here his water colors were discovered by the noted American scholar Thomas Whittemore. His purchase of some of Gritchenko's works enabled the artist to go to Athens and later to Paris. His first exhibition there was a success. In 1926 the French art critic Louis Vauxcelles wrote: "The young Ukrainian colorist has conquered Paris." Paul Fierens, the Director of the Royal Museum of Brussels (Belgium), writes in his article in this book about the first years of Gritchenko in Paris:

"Two of the leaders of modern art, Zborovsky and Paul Guillaume, became interested in the young Ukrainian. They organized the first exhibition of his work and 17 of his paintings were sold to the well known American collector Barnes. Gritchenko rapidly took a prominent place in what is known as the Paris School..."

"He has travelled all over Europe, visiting Greece, Portugal, Corsica, Brittany, England, Spain, the Balearic islands, and, recently, Sweden. From each of these voyages he has brought back canvases which are sumptuous and sincere, which are paintings in the real sense of the world, but which are also remarkable poetry."

Gritchenko is above all a colorist. Here his art is certainly an expression of the rich and colorful Eastern world, but these Eastern features are masterfully united with the most modern form. In his youth the artist studied and published some books on the Byzantine

icons, and the traces of this great art are unmistakably present in his own work. To the static Post-Cezanne painting he introduced with some other artists, as Vlaminck, Friesz, Segonzac, the elementary dynamic force. He sees all things as if they were in their primeval state on the first day of Creation, still unorganized and chaotic, and it is the artist who gives them order, form and sense. His world is one of cosmic forces, and it is there where the critic sees Gritchenko's affinity with Van Gogh. His art is best expressed in marines, in the representation of the turbulent forces of the Sea, and there are very few contemporary marine painters in the world who can be compared with him.

The works of Gritchenko are to be found in the Museums of L'viv, Paris, Brussels, Madrid, Moscow, Copenhagen, and in America in the Barnes Foundation in Philadelphia, the Collection of J. J. Ker-rigan in New York, and of Thomas Whittemore in Boston, etc.

This book, superbly printed in only 300 numbered copies, will certainly soon be a rarity. The reproductions in color are excellent. In all, this edition is a tribute to a great artist who profited richly from the French art, and in his turn was able to enrich it.

S. HORDYNSKY

THE HABSBURG MONARCHY, 1809-1918, by A. J. P. Taylor.
Hamish Hamilton, new edition. London 1947, 279 pp.

First published in 1941, this book has acquired the reputation of being good interpretative history in the Anglo-Saxon world. In a sense it is, despite an overdose of pedantic wit and conclusions based on hindsight. The author, a fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, is likewise noted for his account of the history of Germany and Italy and rates as an outstanding contemporary English historian. It is noteworthy, therefore, to investigate his acquaintance with the Ukrainian problem, especially since several million Ukrainians passed under Habsburg rule following the partitions of Poland in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

It is gratifying to note that in a study which tries to show how national struggles buried the Habsburg empire the Ukrainians have not been ignored. This at least is a departure from the usual treatment in English works, which by and large have tended to omit reference

to the Ukrainian contribution, for good or ill, to that downfall. The Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia receives its proper stress, but unfortunately the author does not cover familiar ground when he discusses Slavic Europe. A good job is done in upsetting the view, often voiced by Polish writers, that Vienna favored the Ukrainians. The facts, as elaborated by Taylor, speak otherwise. Count Goluchowski and his successors succeeded in winning Polish supremacy in an autonomous Galicia, while "electoral geometry" perpetuated Polish control. In 1871, a ministry of Galicia affairs, a special concession to the Poles and always filled by a Pole, was created in Vienna. Ukrainian demands for the division of Galicia along ethnographic lines, with the inclusion of Bukovina in the Ukrainian unit, were never granted. Poles monopolized the bureaucracy, courts, and Lwiv university.

Taylor always refers to the Ukrainians as "Little Russians," and indicates that he considers them a bizarre museum-piece. The word *Ukraine* is held to be derived from the Russian word for "frontier" (never mind what it means in Ukrainian), something "equivalent to the Welsh and Border Marches." This idea happens to be one of several theories, and even if it should be correct, what does it prove? Perhaps a species of "etymological monism" which seeks to reduce complex national problems to word origins. The author, however, does not seek to found a new science—he merely repeats an irrelevant Great-Russian argument which should never have been raised in the first place.

Equally unsatisfactory is his translation of *Rusin* into "Little Russian." There is no diminutive quality in the original, *in* (or more accurately, *yn*) being a common substantive suffix in Ukrainian (*Bulharyn*, *Tataryn*, *Moskvyn*). The translation *Ruthenia* is as much "dog Latin" as Austria (*Oesterreich*), Spain (*Espana*), and Norway (*Norge*) are "dog English."

There are other revelations. Such as the announcement that the tsarist government "could never decide whether to encourage the Little Russian feeling as a weapon against the Habsburg monarchy or to suppress it as a danger to Tsardom." Without documentation complete disposal is made of the troubles of Shevchenko, Drahomaniv, Kulish, and the *Khlopomany*, the "laws of Iusefovich," the Valuev decrees, and best of all, the subsidization of Muscophile individuals, organizations and journals in Galicia, which expressly dedicated themselves to eradicate "the Little Russian feeling."

Amusing and pardonable, perhaps, is the assertion that Slovaks

and Little Russians in America "transformed even the American political outlook" by "adding the new ideal of promoting national self-determination." He refers to the "Little Russians" growing rich in this country, a slip probably borrowed from Allen, who made a similar statement, although in reality the Ukrainians happen to be well-nigh the bottom of the economic scale in the United States and possess no wealthy patrons.

It may not be without significance that this book is dedicated to L. B. Namier, a really great English historian, but who has put himself on record as an avowed "Ukrainian-eater," and defender of "Russian unity."

JOHN BASARAB

ECCLESIA RUTHENA SEDE METROPOLITANO VACANTE, 1655-65 (The Ruthenian Catholic Church during the Vacancy of the Metropolitanate), by Ioannes Praszko. Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies, Rome, 1944, xvi + 320 pp.

The Ukrainian revolution against Poland in 1648, which was led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, was so thorough and far-reaching that its influence extended even to those Ukrainian areas that were not the scene of revolutionary action. Historians have failed to pay attention to other aspects of the life of the Ukrainian people at that time, such as the vicissitudes of both the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches. While glorifying Khmelnytsky, historians of his period have overlooked the partisan position of the Ukrainian leader in religious affairs. Khmelnytsky's religious policy deepened division of the Ukrainian nation into two hostile religious camps, it should be borne in mind, a turn of events which wrought serious misfortune upon the nation as a whole.

Demanding in his negotiations with Poland the extermination of the Church Union, the Ukrainian leader did not realize that Ukrainian Catholicism was already a strong moral force and that the tumult of religious persecution, first by the Ukrainian Kozaks and after 1654 by their Muscovite allies, served only to strengthen that camp. Khmelnytsky's religious blindness, as a matter of fact, not only strengthened the Union, but had the additional unfortunate result of pressing a part of the Ukrainians into the Polish camp. This whole development is treated at length by Praszko, formerly of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lwiv, and now in Rome.

Antin Selava, the metropolitan of the Greek Catholics in Ukraine, and White Ruthenia, died during the Khmelnytsky uprising—at a time when Poland was invaded from all sides. From the east came the Ukrainian Kozaks with their Russian allies; from the south, Rakoczy, the ruler of Transylvania; and from the north, the Swedes. Poland was deluged by foreign armies all hostile to Catholicism and in particular to the Church Union. To install a new metropolitan was impossible under such conditions, and the see was vacant for ten years (1655-65). The Polish government, caught in the great "Deluge," refused to nominate a new candidate to the Ruthenian see in order to avoid antagonizing the Ukrainian Kozaks and Muscovy.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church survived this ordeal largely through the work of two episcopal personalities, Methodius Terlecky and Iakiv Susha, both from the Kholm area. It was to Terlecky that Pope Urban VIII addressed the memorable message, *Per vos, mei Rutheni, Orientem convertendum esse spero*, which became the slogan of Ukrainian Catholics. Susha also achieved fame as the first Ukrainian archeologist, having excavated the ruins of the Kholm castle built by King Danylo (1200-64).

This neglected aspect of the tumultuous period has been ably investigated by the author, who has found interesting new material in the Vatican archives. And although pressed into the Polish camp by the Kozaks, the Ukrainian Catholics managed to shake off Polish domination and continued to work toward a general union of all Ukrainians with Rome, among other things endeavoring to bring Carpatho-Ukraine (the diocese of Mukachevo) into communion with the Kiev Greek-Catholic metropolitan see.

NICHOLAS CHUBATY

OUT OF THE CROCODILE'S MOUTH, by William Nelson. Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1949.

Since the days of the French Revolution, political satire has been a successful means of propaganda, often surpassing serious political literature in efficacy. To be effective, however, such satire should have a grain of truth as a base. Soviet satire of the United States, however, seems to lack that essential ingredient. It is impossible to relate these caricatures from *Krokodil*, the Soviet satirical magazine published in

Moscow, with reality in the United States. The value of such attempts lies at the opposite pole, for the book reveals to the Western world the sentiments, practically official when one considers the nature of the Soviet press, of our former ally toward this country.

Perhaps more than any other book, this work will convince the American reader of the impossibility of settling the differences between the USSR and the USA. *May First in Moscow and New York, Wall Street Conference, American Doctor, and American Puppets* should be called to the attention of those Americans hoping to do business with Stalin.

N. C.



UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"Ukraine's Rebels to Hear 'Voice' Broadcasts," by Ansel E. Talbert.
New York Herald Tribune, Sunday edition, November 13, 1949.

This story announcing the opening of a Ukrainian section in the Voice of America, toward which the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America contributed heavily, is an excellent summary for any uninitiated American reader of the highlights of the Ukrainian situation, past and present. Featuring some of the propaganda cartoons circulated by the Ukrainian underground forces in the Soviet Union and photographs of scattered members of that partisan army, the article covers with succinct comprehensiveness the historical background of Ukraine, the distribution of Ukrainian immigration into various parts of the world, the role of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the recent Presidential message to its fourth convention, and the operations of the leading underground resistance group in Eastern Europe, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

The beaming of the Voice of America to Ukraine in the language of that country will prove of immeasurable worth from many obvious angles. The avid inspiration it will generate for continued resistance will be far-reaching. But this step, vitally important in itself, can be viewed only as an initial one toward the undermining of the Soviet threat to world peace. The material conservation of the insurgent forces, a form of reciprocal action to Soviet practice in various parts of the world, is the next really important advance.

"My Three Years in Moscow," by Lieut. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.
The New York Times, November 16, 1949.

The account being run serially on the experiences and reflections of our former ambassador to Moscow is most illuminating in numerous respects. Of particular note is the General's endeavor to view some of the basic aspects of the functional structure of the Soviet Union in sound perspective. Treating for example, of the agricultural organization in that police state, the writer asserts, "Under Stalinism, the doom

of the independent farmer is sealed. From the beginning of forced collectivization in the Ukraine to the present date, this has been so unmistakably evident that it cannot be questioned." The stubborn fact is that in his consideration of other formerly independent spheres of non-Russian national activity—the political, the scholarly and cultural, the religious, and the industrial—the well-spoken General would find, perhaps to his amazement, Ukraine as the historic¹ point of departure for his generalizations.

"The American Tradition and the Catholic Graduate," by Clare Booth Luce. *Keryx*, St. Basil's College, Summer, 1949, Stamford, Conn.

This concise and brilliant essay by the Honorable Clare Booth Luce is a veritable contribution to the instructive content of thought characteristically embodied by this publication of the well-known Ukrainian Catholic institution of learning at Stamford. Neatly documented, convincing and direct throughout, it strikes at the very core of the modern problem, briefly, the indifference of the Western peoples toward basic religious truths and the spiritual decomposition represented by God-hating communism. The life-springs of human civilization are centered in the philosophical and religious truths actively practiced by man, and, as Mrs. Luce accurately emphasizes, the fundamental target of the world communist attack is the degree of institutional strength generated by these practiced beliefs. It is because of this reality that she witnesses an unprecedented responsibility being placed on Catholic college graduates to furnish the world Christian leadership.

"Land Socialization in Soviet Agriculture, 1917-1949," by Will Lissner. *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, October, 1949, New York.

In a number dedicated to the public service of Lawson Purdy on his eighty-sixth birthday, this article, written by the editor of the publication and a frequent contributor to the *New York Times* with an extensive and sound knowledge of the Soviet Union and Ukraine, traces the course of land socialization in the Union from its origins to the present. Naturally the manmade famine in Ukraine during

the early 30-s receives emphatic attention, although its political significance is passed over. The writer relies on the authority of Walter Duranty for the estimation of four to five million deaths from starvation in the execution of this genocidal Soviet policy. His source for the poverty of the Soviet economy, as partially evidenced by its "dependence upon grain and potatoes for well over 70% of calories of the Russian diet, by use of only a 1/3 or less of all grain milled for animal feed, and by the feeding of straw and chaff," is the material developed by the well-known Ukrainian-American food experts V. P. Timoshenko and Pasny, both at Stanford University.

"Poland at Home and Abroad," the editor. *Poland of Today*, October, 1949, New York, N. Y.

"Even the devil possesses some truth" is a fitting adage to guide one's recognition of the scattered bits of truth strewn about the distorting verbiage of this publication that spares no effort in its adulations of the current regime in puppet Poland. Rebuking the past chauvinist regimes of pre-war Poland for their flagrant defects, the writer of this article rightly recalls that police pressure "weighed heavily on national minorities (Ukrainians, Byelo-russians), and anti-Semitism was openly tolerated . . ." In another section he emphasizes that it "was the obvious reflection of Polish bourgeois class policies, combined with the interests of the large landowners who never ceased casting covetous glances in the direction of the fertile fields of the Ukraine" that accounted for Poland's incapacity to develop its "natural ally in the East."

The extent to which these truths are being processed through the Polish propaganda machine by the Kremlin to satisfy its own interests is scarcely debatable. In time, by sheer habituation if anything, native Poles may in the vast majority come to accept them axiomatically. It is here in the United States, however, that Polish-American leadership must begin with democratic responsibility to educate its many backward and chauvinist elements in the pertinency of these truths and that a free and independent Ukraine, including in part territory formerly under Poland but electing to be in historical and national union with the rest of Ukraine, is a "natural ally" of a free Poland. It would still be the height of characteristic Polish political ineptitude, as Churchill often calls it, indeed of idiocy, to think that by simply

impressing upon our Administrations the existence of six million Polish-American voters, their antiquated notions will be realized to the detriment of American, Ukrainian, and even Polish interests.

"Frontiers Between East and West in Europe," by Werner J. Cahnman. *Geographical Review*, October, 1949, The American Geographical Society of New York.

This writer's delineation of the shifting frontiers that have characterized the dynamic movements of Germanic and Slavic historical forces over the centuries is of considerable interest and worth. But the author's sudden and arbitrary bounding of a "truly united Europe by the Pripet Marshes and the mouths of the Danube, is curious and somewhat puzzling. One can only infer from this that the author possesses little understanding of the national populations constituting Eastern Europe and, still less, of the intimate cultural ties between Ukraine and Western Europe. In setting the boundary of a "truly united Europe" at the Pripet Marshes, what of the irrational political division between the Ukrainians of Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine, Bukovina, and Bessarabia and those of Eastern Ukraine? This absurd conception is a variant form of the current fallacious notion entertained by many who should know better than to propagate their illusory wish of establishing a united Europe just short of the Soviet borders—a notion without historical rhyme and political reason.

"Russia's Triple Crisis," by Ellsworth Raymond. *The Saturday Evening Post*, November 5, 1949, Philadelphia, Pa.

Professor Raymond of New York University and formerly of the American embassy in Moscow is an exceedingly astute student of Soviet affairs, and in this article reduces Soviet difficulties to a triple crisis, involving internal political rupture, a low mass morale, and economic privation. With the extensive purge going on, a growing food problem accentuated by the heavy material support of the unproductive $3\frac{1}{2}$ million armed force, and sustained high prices on absolute necessities, the Soviet Union in its external relations is viewed as necessarily pursuing a less intransigent course.

It is somewhat unfortunate that Mr. Raymond, with whom this commentator is acquainted, is not sufficiently versed in the restive

Ukrainian aspects of the Soviet situation. Oblique observations, such as that on the construction of capital investments rather "beyond and in the Urals than rebuilding the stupendous war damage in Ukraine and Byelorussia," have some significance, but by how much more would the author's theme be bolstered had he directly described the many episodes of seething unrest in Ukraine these past few years.

"The Altai Is Being Covered with Orchards," by O. Myatkovsky. *Soviet Press Translations*, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Nov., 15, 1949, Seattle, Wash.

The institute at the University of Washington performs an invaluable service for American readers interested in Soviet affairs by translating all the important articles and reports appearing in the Soviet press. This article, written by the assistant director of the Altai Experimental Fruit and Berry Station in Siberia and which appeared in the *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledelie* on June 21, 1949, is an interesting account of horticultural pursuit and experiment under both calm and severe weather conditions in this Siberian region. Of considerable interest, too, are the many Ukrainian names associated with the kolkhozi, the one lauded most being L. V. Ukrainsky for his skillful system of windbreaks around the orchards. The number of Ukrainians in Siberia runs into several millions.

"The 'Hard Core' DP's," by Edward B. Marks, Jr. *The Survey*, Sept., 1949, New York, N. Y.

As a member of the Geneva Staff of the International Refugee Organization, Mr. Marks exhibits a sure understanding of this shocking problem. Elaborating on the 174,300 DP's that nobody wants because of health handicaps, age liabilities, and occupational and professional obstacles, he cites the case 432, where a Ukrainian farmer of 39 years of age and his young wife were originally accepted for a Brazilian farm scheme in January, 1949, only to be later rejected due to the discovery of the fact that their only child of 10 lost an arm under Nazi aerial bombardment. Dr. Mykola Terlecky, a physician of Western Ukraine, is pictured as studying English, yet knowing that as a foreign doctor he is unwelcome in most English-speaking lands.

These are representative of the tragic cases that are likely to go

unheeded by June, 1950, when I.R.O. is scheduled to close its unfinished business. Only practical resettlement is the humane solution of this problem, not deathlike repatriation or harrassed local residence in Germany. A resounding expression of Christian charity was never more urgent than now.

"Trade with USSR and Other Eastern European Countries," *Bureau of the Census*. Department of Commerce, August-September, 1949, Washington, D. C.

Careful attention must be given to any change in trend of trade between the United States and Eastern Europe that may reflect a strategic softening-up on the part of the latter and a naive reciprocity in kind by the former. With the monthly average trade dropping from July to August in both exports and imports, the change that transpired in general imports by U. S. from Eastern Europe from August to September to the tune of \$3.2 million is noteworthy. Much of this increase is attributable to furs and manufactures sent here, but the slight rise in manganese and chrome ore that the United States needs may prove indicative of a more underlying purpose to obtain for the U.S.S.R. badly needed mechanical equipment. It is hoped that we exercise more mature prudence in such matters than we have previously.

"Eastern Rites in the West," by Frank H. Sampson. *America*, A Catholic Review of the Week, October 1, 1949, New York.

This former theological student in the Episcopal Church and now a convert to Roman Catholicism manifests a sure grasp of the problem confronting the Eastern Rite Catholics today. Recognizing the thoroughness with which the "official liquidation of the largest group of Eastern Catholics" has been carried out "first in the Ukraine, now in Roumania," he calls upon Western Catholics to support in every possible way the entrenchment of Eastern Rite Catholicism on the American continent.

L.E.D.

