### WALTER DUSHNYCK

## IN QUEST OF FREEDOM

1918 - 1958

# In Quest of Freedom 1918 - 1958

IN COMMEMORATION OF THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY
OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

By
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#### INTRODUCTION

January 22, 1958 will mark the 40th anniversary of the Ukrainian independent state which came into being on January 22, 1918 in Kiev. This anniversary, commemorating the most important event in modern Ukrainian history, will be celebrated by Ukrainian people everywhere, including those now enslaved in the Soviet Union who outwardly will not be able to manifest their patriotic feelings but who nonetheless will observe and cherish this memorable date in their unfettered hearts.

For on the day of January 22, 1918 the most oppressive and most hated Russian domination over the Ukrainian people came to an end. After the Battle of Poltava in 1709, at which Hetman Ivan Mazepa of Ukraine shared the bitter defeat of King Charles XII of Sweden, Russia had embarked upon a course whose goal was the total liquidation of Ukraine as an independent nation. Ukraine was forced to pay heavy indemnities to Czar Peter the Great for Mazepa's alliance with Sweden; housands of her people were sent north to build St. Petersburg, the new capital of the Russian Czars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion and starvation while working as slaves for the strengthening of Russian despotism. At the same time Moscow deprived Ukraine of its intelligentsia — scholars, artists, professors, educators, legislators, engineers and others — using them in the "Westernization" of Russia.

The Ukrainian hetmanite state was reduced to a shadowy structure with no real power and without influence upon the affairs of the Ukrainian people, but even this weak autonomous government was abolished by Catherine II and by 1781 all vestiges of Ukrainian autonomy were completely destroyed.

The only independent and true Ukrainian body remaining was the Zaporozhian Sich, which embodied the ideals and aspirations of the Kozaks. As such the Sich maintained the memories and traditions of the days when Ukraine was under the Kozaks, free and independent. Typifying the spirit of individual freedom and individual resource, it could not long live alongside Russian despotism.

On June 5, 1775 Catherine II ordered Russian troops to raze the Zaporozhian Sich, the last bastion of Ukrainian freedom, and Ukraine, as a whole, declined to the level of the other conquered provinces of the Russian empire. The surviving Zaporozhian Kozaks found shelter at the mouth of the Danube in an area under the protection of the Turkish Sultan, while the lands of the Zaporozhian Sich, a unique form of democracy in Eastern Europe at that time, were parcelled out among the favorites of Catherine II.

Thus, the remnants of Ukrainian freedom were brutally eradicated by the Russians at the very same time the United States was undergoing its creation as a free and independent nation. Freedom blazed up at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill; on the other side of the earth it was extinguished by the Russians in the waters of the Dnieper. Ironically, only three years after the final subjugation of Ukraine the French Revolution broke out, ushering into Western Europe a new political era.

But by liquidating Ukrainian independence the Russians did not destroy the Ukrainian national ideal and the desire for freedom. True, for all intents and purposes the entire Ukrainian nobility was lost. A great number of Ukrainian nobles adopted Polish culture and left the Ukrainian fold; the newer nobles and landowners who had risen from the ranks of the Kozak officers almost all became Russianized. They felt that it was "unfashionable" to use the Ukrainian language, the language of their peasants and serfs; and although they enjoyed hearing Ukrainian folksongs sung by the peasants, even this was regarded as an inferior form of entertainment.

In like fashion the townsmen, who had played a prominent role in the Ukrainian cultural revival of the XVIth century, no longer were influential. The Ukrainian cities lost much of their previous importance; their leading classes, like the landowners, fell under the spell of the conquering cultures.

Thus exercise of the Ukrainian language and traditions became largely limited to the peasantry, and it was this class which maintained the Ukrainian national ideals during the times of national oppression.

Ukrainian folk songs, and especially the historical dumy, sung to the accompaniment of the kobza and bandura by ambulant Ukrainian kobzars or folk bards, played an important part in the Ukrainian national rebirth at the end of the XVIIIth and the beginning of the XIXth centuries. These kobzars, many of whom

had lost their sight, knew a large number of Ukrainian historical songs and dumy, which they sang at village and town bazaars, church and social gatherings. They glorified and idealized the past, especially the heroic struggles for independence against the Poles, Russians and Tatars. They not only preserved for posterity the heroic historical record, but, more important, paved the way for the powerful Ukrainian literary and political revival of the XIXth century.

In 1798 in St. Petersburg appeared an epochal work entitled, Eneida, written in Ukrainian by Ivan Kotlarevsky. It was a travesty of Virgil's Aeneid, in which the Trojans were depicted as the wandering Kozaks who had been expelled from the Sich less than twenty-five years before. This book marked the beginning of the revival of Ukrainian literature, and of a new national movement. A number of talented writers and poets sprang up in Ukraine, who not only wrote in the Ukrainian language, but in their writings and works exalted the Ukrainian past, thus awakening the Ukrainian national consciousness. Among them were Hryhory Kvitka-Osnovyanenko, Panteleimon Kulish, Mykola Kostomariv, Mykhailo Maksymovych, Vasil Bilozersky, Mykola Hulak-Artemovsky, and finally the incomparable Taras Shevchenko.

With the publication of Shevchenko's Kobzar in 1840 and Haydamaki in 1841, Ukraine saw the culmination of a huge, momentous and romantic literary revival inspired by the ideals of freedom, independence and brotherhood of nations. Shevchenko is acknowledged not only as the greatest Ukrainian poet, but is given the unique distinction of being the national prophet of the enslaved Ukrainian nation. In common with the works of other writers, his political and historical poems dealt with the heroic deeds of the Ukrainian past, especially the wars of liberation against the Poles and Tatars. In addition, however, he strongly indicted the Russian Czars for their enslavement of the Ukrainian and other non-Russian peoples. For example, in his powerful poem, "The Dream," Shevchenko offered a bitter dedication: "To Peter I and Catherine II—the first crucified our Ukraine, and the second finished off his victim."

In 1847 he was arrested by the Russian police, forcibly drafted into the Russian army and sent to serve indefinitely in Asia. Czar Nikolai I wrote in his own hand: "Under the strictest supervision with the prohibition of writing and drawing." In 1857 the new Czar, Alexander II, pardoned Shevchenko and allowed him to return to Russia. In 1859 Shevchenko secured per-

mission to visit Ukraine for the first time in twelve years. He died on February 26, 1861, on the eve of the liberation of the serfs.

Shevchenko's influence upon the modern Ukrainian political rebirth was broad and deep. Voicing the thoughts and aspirations of his people, he became their champion for freedom and independence. A son of a serf, with an overriding faith in the ultimate victory of democratic ideals, and despite persecution and deportation, Shevchenko became one of the greatest poets in the Slavonic world and is still regarded as the greatest son of Ukraine.

The massive revival of the XIXth century was not limited to literary expression. Such fields as Ukrainian ethnography and folklore were explored and the findings widely propagated, which in turn stimulated the ever-growing concept of the separateness and individuality of the nation.

In the political field, the ideals of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, the Polish revolt in 1831 and the Revolution of 1848 which swept Central Europe — all had a great impact upon Ukrainian political thought. As far back as 1793 a group of patriots, in an effort to throw off the Russian chains shackling Ukraine, sent their leader, Count Vasyl Kapnist, to the Prussian court to seek political aid from Prussian Minister Hertzberg. During the French Revolution Ukrainian patriots rejoiced at the fall of the French tyranny, and when Napoleon marched against Russia they hoped for a swift liberation upon the fall of Russia. Unlike Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon had no understanding of the real problem of Ukraine, planning vaguely to establish two states, called "Napoleonides," in Ukraine under his protectorate. In any event, the vastness of the Russian land mass defeated Napoleon.

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organization, "The Society of St. Cyril and Methodius," was founded in Kiev, its members including several prominent poets and writers, among them Shevchenko, Kostomariv, Kulish and Hulak-Artemovsky. The organization stood for a united federative state of all Slavs, in which each Slavic nation would form a free and independent republic. In the declaration of the Society the idea of an independent Ukrainian state was clearly given:

"And Ukraine will be resurrected from her grave... And Ukraine will be an independent republic..." (The Book of the Genesis of the Ukrainian Nation).

The Ukrainian leaders of the Society were familiar with the conditions existing in Ukraine, and especially with the oppressive hand of the Russian government. They demanded the abolition of serfdom and called for the freedoms of conscience, of the press, and of thought and speech. They envisioned an independent state within the larger framework of a Slavic federation to be dominated by no one country, a genuine federation responding to the ideas and needs of free and independent citizens. It is evident that these leaders were inspired by the little they knew about the United States. It was Shevchenko who asked in one of his poems: "When will we receive our Washington, with a new and righteous law?"

Upon discovery of the Society by the Czarist police, all its prominent members were arrested and punished by prison terms and deportation to Siberia. Political oppression blacker than ever before descended upon Ukraine.

In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Czar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books and periodicals in the Russian empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was proscribed, while Ukrainian could not be taught in the schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian empire was outlawed until the revolution of 1905.

This general persecution of the language and culture by the Czarist Russian government considerably hindered the cultural development of the Ukrainian nation. On the one hand, Russia kept the people in illiteracy and reduced Ukraine to an area of economic exploitation. On the other, she bribed to her side the outstanding Ukrainian talents through titles of nobility and special privileges. In addition, scores of prominent Ukrainians were conscripted for service at the courts of Peter the Great and Catherine II, or to help build and develop Russian universities and academies. Some of the greatest Russian literary figures, among them Nicholas Gogol (Hohol in Ukrainian; his father was a patriotic Ukrainian), were of Ukrainian origin. The Ukrainian contribution to Russian literature, arts, music and science has been a weighty one.

In the meantime the Ukrainian territories which had gone over to Poland on the basis of the Treaty of Andrusiv (1667), concluded between the latter country and Russia, subsequently were taken over by Austria during the partitions of Poland.

These provinces — Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine — later to be known as Western Ukraine, experienced a political and cultural development totally different from that of their mother country, Ukraine under Russia. First of all, the people were, in the great majority, Catholics of Eastern Rite, or Uniates. In the course of history the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church had become inseparably connected with the Ukrainian national rebirth in the West. Especially during the reign of Empress Maria Theresa of Austria, the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Catholics found a strong protector in this devout Catholic monarch. She trained Ukrainian Catholic priests and tried to win over the Ukrainian masses in order to make use of them in her internal dealings with rebellious Polish and Hungarian nobles, the latter then also being under the rule of the Hapsburgs.

But the Catholic Ukrainians in Western Ukraine had to overcome the same linguistic difficulties as their Orthodox brothers in Great Ukraine; they had to adopt the Ukrainian language, thus far only spoken by the peasants, as their literary language. This task was boldly undertaken by a young Catholic priest, Markian Shashkevych. By writing in pure Ukrainian vernacular, Shashkevych galvanized the Ukrainian literary rebirth in Western Ukraine.

During the revolutionary "Spring of the Nations" in 1848 the Ukrainians in Western Ukraine began their political life on an organized basis. In that year a Supreme Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Council was elected in Lviv by the various Ukrainian groups and the intelligentsia, a body which was to serve as a political representation of the Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian empire. In the elections for the Austrian Parliament in Vienna the Ukrainians secured a considerable number of mandates. They also had their representatives in the Galician Diet in Lviv. At the same time a new Ukrainian literary trend was growing in strength and a series of demands was presented to the Vienna government, such as the introduction of the Ukrainian language at Lviv University, establishment of Ukrainian schools throughout the whole province, participation of Ukrainians in municipal and provincial administration, and the like.

But the suppresson of the Hungarian revolt of 1848 was followed by a strong reaction. As a consequence, very few of the promises of the Vienna government were fulfilled.

Only at the end of the XIXth century, despite obstacles put up by the Poles, did a rich cultural and political life develop in Western Ukraine. With the establishment of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv and of *Prosvita* (Enlightenment) Societies throughout the whole country the Ukrainian literary life now became concentrated in Western Ukraine. Ukrainian science and literature found their home in Lviv. Finding their way to Lviv were figures from Great Ukraine, among them the most outstanding Ukrainian historian, Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and such Ukrainian authors and scholars as V. Antonovych, P. Kulish, A. Konysky, I. Nechuy-Levytsky, and later on Mykhailo Drahomaniv, noted intellectual, and his niece, Lesya Ukrainka, prominent poetess.

In view of the upsurge of literature and intellectual interests under Austrian rule, which was mild and tolerant by comparison with the Russian, it was only natural that the second greatest figure in Ukrainian letters, Ivan Franko, should be a son of Western Ukraine. His great literary heritage and his passionate devotion to the interests of the poor and exploited peasants and workers, stirringly expressed in his writings, greatly enhanced the Ukrainian national development and the general cause of liberation.

The development of the Ukrainian political and cultural life in Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians under Russia, condemned to ruthless Russification. A steady social, political and cultural intercourse took place between the Ukrainians of Austria and those in Great Ukraine, and when in 1900 the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party (RUP) was founded in Great Ukraine, its first publication, *Independent Ukraine*, written by Mykola Mikhnovsky, was published in Bukovina, Austro-Hungary, and smuggled into Great Ukraine in large quantities.

The patriots in Great Ukraine morally and materially aided the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights. Western Ukraine became a national Ukrainian Piedmont, the focal point of the movement for freedom and independence.

The Russian government viewed with open alarm the speedy Ukrainian national rebirth in Austria, considering it as an overt threat to "one and indivisible Russia." Russian agents streamed into Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine to foster Russophile movements among the less literate folk, especially among the Orthodox Ukrainians in Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine. Long before the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the St. Petersburg government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina and to wipe

out *Mazepism* (movement for Ukrainian independence). When in 1914 a Ukrainian delegation visited Foreign Minister Sazanov to protest against the new wartime restrictions imposed upon the press, the Minister openly replied:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once and for all..."

Yet despite the national renaissance which occurred in Ukraine during the XIXth century, the Russian imperialists failed to see the handwriting on the wall. They continued to persecute the Ukrainians, banning their language and even their name. Ukraine was given an official Russian appellation, *Malorossiya* (Little Russia), and the Ukrainian movement for independence was dismissed as "Austrian" or "Polish" intrigue and adventure.

On the eve of World War I both Russia and Austro-Hungary, still nominally at peace, tried to play the "Ukrainian card," but neither was willing to take any action which would benefit the Ukrainians themselves. Austria, while supporting the Ukrainians in their national development, would not grant autonomy to the provinces of Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine. Russia not only denied them minimal rights in her own empire, but would severely persecute those looking across the border to Western Ukraine.

The Ukrainians themselves were so absorbed in the struggle for their survival and rebirth that they had no opportunity to prepare and present their case before the world court of justice. Their great writers and thinkers were known abroad far less than comparable figures of other nations. Equally, they had no prominent leaders in foreign countries, to champion their cause. Above all, they did not realize that their just claims to freedom would be evaluated in foreign countries in accordance with the national prejudices of those countries toward Russia and Austro-Hungary.

The Ukrainians had to trust in the inherent justice and legitimacy of their cause, hoping that somehow and sometime they would succeed in attracting attention to their plight. On the eve of World War I Ukraine was a forgotten nation, whose significance and potentiality for the cause of world peace were to be wholly and tragically overlooked.

# PART ONE: THE UKRAINIAN NATION BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR I

## 1. THE UKRAINIANS: THEIR NUMBER AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

At the outbreak of World War I the Ukrainians lived in two great empires, the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian. In the Russian empire, according to the official census of 1910, the Ukrainians were concentrated in the nine administrative provinces (gubernias) of Ukraine: Volhynia, Podilya, Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerinoslav, Kherson and Tauria (excluding the Crimea). These nine provinces, embracing a total area of 487,000 square kilometers, contained a population of 22,025,000, and collectively were officially designated as Malorossiya ("Little Russia") by the Russian Czarist government.

In addition, about 7,426,982 Ukrainians lived in the neighboring provinces: Grodno, Kursk, Bessarabia, Voronezh, Kuban, Stavropol, the Don Territory, Astrakhan, Caucasus, Lublin, Siedletz, Saratov, Samara, Orenburg and Minsk. (The Ukrainian poulation of the provinces of Kuban and Caucasus was as high as 47 per cent of the total.) In addition, more than 650,000 Ukrainians had settled in Central Asia and the Far East.

In the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Ukrainians lived in a compact mass in Eastern Galicia, which had been annexed by the Hapsburg dynasty in the first partition of Poland in 1772. Many Ukrainians were also to be found in Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Rus).

The official Austrian census of 1910 distributed them as follows:

Eastern Galicia — 3,380,000 Ukrainians or 62 per cent of the total population;

Bukovina (Northern) — 300,000 Ukrainians, and Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Rus) — 470,000 Ukrainians. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Ukraine, Handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the British Foreign Office, No. 52, Vol. IX, London H. M. Stationery, 1920, Appendix I, p. 103.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ukraine, the Land and Its People. Stephen Rudnitsky. An Introduction to Its Geography. New York. 1918, pp. 130-132.

The total number of Ukrainians in Austro-Hungary was estimated at 4,150,000.

Thus, the number of Ukrainians in both the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, as given by Rudnitsky, was 33,601,000, although the handbook, *The Ukraine*, puts the pre-war Ukrainian population at 34,415,000, as does Dr. Paul Ostwald, the German ethnologist.

Other sources differed in their estimate substantially, the Russian estimate being much lower than those of Ukrainian and non-Russian authorities. Dr. Rudnitsky maintained that there were about 32,700,000 Ukrainians on "solid Ukrainian national territory" on the eve of World War I, and that about two more million lived in Asia and in both the Americas. He estimated that the national territory inhabited by the Ukrainians totalled 850,000 square kilometers, or slightly less than the areas of France and Germany combined.

#### 2. POLITICAL STATUS OF UKRAINIANS IN RUSSIA

The political status of the Ukrainians under the regime of the Russian Czars had attained its most critical aspect prior to the revolution of 1905. With all Ukrainian political institutions wiped out, the Russian government had set upon annihilating all distinctive traces of Ukrainian life. The name of Ukraine was abolished, and there was only a grudging toleration of a somewhat confused region which came to be known as "Little Russia." The Ukrainian language was scornfully deemed a peasant idiom unworthy of serious consideration or development. The surviving Ukrainian national customs and folklore were derided as backward, while at the same time the Russian government vigorously propagated the notion that there was no recognizable difference between Ukrainians and Russians. At its worst, the Russian government resorted to crass propaganda: all interest in Ukrainian affairs stemmed from "Austrian-German" intrigue and as such was subject to severe punishment.

Significantly, this attitude of the Russian imperial government was fully shared by the radical and the chauvinistic Russian intelligentsia. Russian intellectuals of the most liberal cast could not heap enough scorn upon Taras Shevchenko's poems, as well as upon the work of many other Ukrainian writers and poets who followed the great bard. They dismissed the Ukrainian language as a "dialect" unworthy of being raised to a literary language.

In 1905 the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences at last officially admitted that Russian and Ukrainian were two disparate and independent Slavic languages; Ukrainian was not a mere dialect of the Russian. This signified a resounding victory for the Ukrainian national idea, constituting as it did a complete reversal of the position taken for a century by Russian scholars, journalists, critics and the Czarist government itself.

This restoration of the language, on paper at least, was accomplished in the first *Duma*, the Russian parliament, through the efforts of the Ukrainian representatives and of other nationalities sympathetic to the Ukrainians. Permission was granted to publish newspapers in Ukrainian. Indeed, for a while it seemed as if the Ukrainians might obtain rights on a par with those possessed by other nationalities of the Russian empire. But the reaction which followed the revolution of 1905 prevented a promising development of the Ukrainian culture.

Despite the ruling of the Russian Academy of Sciences as to the equality of the Russian and Ukrainian languages, the Russian government continued to oppress the Ukrainians and to hamper their cultural and literary development. Although their books and newspapers were published, they were subjected to a heavy and unrelenting censorship. Ukrainian-language schools were never allowed to open at all.

Yet despite the censorship, a definite Ukrainian press existed for the first time in the history of the Russian empire. In 1907 in Kiev a Shevchenko Scientific Society was established which worked very closely with the older foundation in Lviv. The Literary and Scientific Review, of which Ivan Franko was one of the chief editors and contributors, started a second edition in Kiev. It was even possible for Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Ukraine's foremost historian and a staunch anti-Russian, to move from Lviv to Kiev and to carry on his historical researches in this old center of Ukrainian political and cultural life. Professor Hrushevsky quickly became a symbol of the new unification of the two branches of the Ukrainian nation. His arrival in Kiev foretold that the revival of the nation would take place where it originated, in Ukraine under Russia.

#### 3. THE UKRAINIANS IN AUSTRO-HUNGARY

In Western Ukraine, i. e. Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine, the Ukrainians enjoyed far more favorable conditions to pursue their national development than in Russia. From 1860 on, at which time Eastern Galicia was granted autonomy, the Ukrainians maintained a steady progress and development.

For some time an internal struggle was waged between the Ukrainian-oriented progressive Ukrainian intelligentsia and the old Moscophile faction. The latter, to be found especially among the isolated mountaineers of Carpatho-Ukraine, believed in an eventual and fruitful union with Russia and were oblivious to the fate of their brothers under Russia.

The Ukrainian side in Galicia was helped immensely by the new ban imposed on Ukrainian writings in Russia. The news of the persecution of the culture was confirmed by the arrival of several prominent Ukrainian refugee scholars, such as P. Kulish, and later Mykhailo Drahomaniv, who came to work in Lviv. For the next decade the bulk of Ukrainian literature, created in Eastern Ukraine, was published in Lviv. Thus the community of interests of the two divided and separated parts of the Ukrainian people was progressively strengthened with the passage of the years

In Austria as well, the Ukrainians had far better opportunities to obtain training in government administration and public service. Though they were not eligible in great numbers for the higher administrative posts, they could look forward to minor positions in the empire. In each election to the Galician Diet the Ukrainians won a larger and larger number of seats and their leaders became more and more skillful in the intricacies of Austrian politics. This in turn led to increased disturbances with the Poles in Galicia, even to the assassination in 1908 of Count Andrew Potocki, Governor of Galicia, as every advance made by the Ukrainians was bitterly contested by the Poles.

There was no discrimination against the Ukrainian language; it was acknowledged as one of several official languages of the empire. Its use in schools, courts and administration in Galicia and Bukovina was wholly unrestricted. Political parties, farmers' cooperatives, cultural and sport organizations, banks and other organizations—all were allowed to flourish with the utmost freedom.

In this general progress the Ukrainian Catholic Church played an important part, especially under the able leadership of Archbishop Andrey Sheptytsky (1900-1944).

Thus at the outbreak of World War I conditions in Galicia had undergone a transformation. The people were no longer

satisfied with the nondescript appellation of Ruthenians. They visualized a future free Ukrainian state with Kiev as its capital. In this patriotic movement *Prosvita* (Enlightenment), *Sokil* and *Sich* organizations played an undeniably vital part, indoctrinating with patriotism thousands of the youth, who were soon to be called upon to fight for the freedom and independence of Ukraine.

#### 4. THE UKRAINIANS IN WORLD WAR I

The outbreak of the First World War aroused the hopes of all the submerged nations of Europe, and not least of all the Ukrainians. The very magnitude of the conflict made it clear to everyone that there would be definite and far-reaching changes in the political situation in Eastern Europe.

If the Western Powers thought at all of the future of Austro-Hungary, it was with no objection to having it divided up. It was relatively easy for them to appreciate why the Czechs and the peoples of the Balkans had a right to independence. The case of the Poles and Ukrainians, however, was more complex; there were millions of Poles and Ukrainians on both sides of the front line. Russia was willing to "liberate" the Poles under Germany and Austro-Hungary, and served notice that she would "annex" the "Russians" in Western Ukraine, i. e. Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine.

The Central Powers, on the other hand, regarded the independence movement among the Czechs as a Russian intrigue. They were willing to liberate Russian-held Poland and create some sort of a principality under Austro-German protection. This policy sharply divided the Poles at home and abroad and resulted in the establishment of two Polish camps: one, pro-Central Powers under Josef Pilsudski, the other pro-Entente with Roman Dmowski.

The Ukrainians found themselves confronted by special political handicaps and adversity. Their cause was little known abroad. The Russians exerted every effort to prove that as a people the Ukrainians were a fiction and that the entire Ukrainian movement was of German fabrication. At the same time the Poles, as allies of the Central Powers, demanded a great part of Ukraine to be included in a revived Poland. The Central Powers, on the other hand, would not commit themselves in any way regarding the future status of the Ukrainians. Thus the Ukrainians could not look without misgivings to a victory of the Triple *Entente*,

nor could they hope to receive any relief with a victory of Germany and Austro-Hungary.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war the authorities in Austria arrested and interned all Ukrainian leaders known for Russophile tendencies, and suspended or abolished their organizations and institutions.

In Russia, the Czarist government, encouraged by Russian chauvinist organizations, embarked upon a total suppression of all Ukrainian institutions and of the Ukrainian press, in particular, for alleged pro-Central Powers sympathy. Scores of prominent Ukrainians were deported to the interior of Russia. Even Ukrainian relief organizations were barred for fear they might influence the Ukrainian prisoners of war taken from the Austrian armies.

The Ukrainian leaders in Lviv greeted the outbreak of the war as a long-awaited moment for the liberation of the whole of Ukraine from Russian enslavement. As early as August 5, 1914, the Supreme Ukrainian Council (Rada) was established to mobilize all Western Ukrainian forces in the war against the Russian empire. A few days later a Ukrainian volunteer legion known as the Sich Riflemen (Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi) was organized with the approval of the Vienna government. Although there was great enthusiasm among the thousands of young Ukrainians, the legion never received the wholehearted support of the Austrian authorities and generally remained poorly armed and equipped. But it did become a nucleus of the Ukrainian military force which a few years later played a vital role in the rebirth of the Ukrainian independent state.

In Vienna and in Geneva gathered many Ukrainians who had escaped from Kiev, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities. They organized a "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," which propagated the cause of liberation not only on the terrain of the Central Powers but among the neutral states as well.

Galicia became a bloody battlefield contested by some of the greatest powers on earth: the Austro-Hungarian and German on the one side, and the Russian on the other. Several thousand Ukrainians were arrested by the Austrian authorities, especially by the Hungarian army *gendarmerie*, on suspicion of sympathy for Russia.

The Russian armies drove into Galicia. On September 3, 1914, they occupied Lviv, and then pushed ahead to the summit of the Carpathian Mountains and to the borders of Carpatho-Ukraine



Prof. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, President of the Ukrainian Central Rada, addresses Ukrainian soldiers attending the Third Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev on November 20, 1917.

along the same path they had taken in 1848, when they had come to the aid of the Austrians against the Hungarians.

With the occupation of Galicia the Russians lost no time in instituting their traditional policy of persecution and oppression. Thousands upon thousands of Ukrainians—students, teachers, lawyers, professors, Catholic priests, active peasants and workers—were summarily arrested and deported to Siberia. Among them was Prof. Hrushevsky, exiled to Nizhny Novgorod.

The Prosvita organizations throughout the entire province were closed down, which was also the fate of the well-established

Ukrainian press and other institutions. The newly-appointed Russian Governor-General, Count A. G. Bobrinsky, did all he could to wipe out Ukrainian nationalism once and for all. In his zeal, however, Bobrinsky went too far. He instigated the arrest and deportation to Siberia of Archbishop Andrey Sheptytsky, along with hundreds of Ukrainian Catholic priests. Through his Orthodox Bishop, Eulogius, he sought to subordinate, by force, the Ukrainian Catholic Church to the Russian Orthodox, all in line with the traditional Russian maxim of cuius regio, eius religio. He thus provoked bitter resentment and lasting opposition on the part of the Ukrainian people as a whole.

Czar Nicholas II himself visited Lviv. In an address the Czar stated that Galicia had already become an integral part of an "indivisible Russia" and would remain such forever.

But at the end of April, 1915, the German armies under the command of General Mackensen broke the Russian line on the Dunajec River, forcing a general Russian retreat from Galicia. As they drew back, the Russians sent thousands of Ukrainian families into exile in the depths of Russia, where they suffered mistreatment, starvation and persecution to such an appalling degree that even a Russian leader (Milyukov) appealed in the Duma for a "more humane treatment of the Ukrainians" in the exile and prison camps. He aroused no compassion, unfortunately. The Russians, both the liberals and the conservatives, insisted that the Ukrainians were an "invention" of the Germans and had to be destroyed one way or another. In 1916, upon recovery of some districts of Galicia after a partially-successful offensive mounted by Brusilov, the Russians reintroduced the same policy of oppression that they practiced in Greater Ukraine.

The return of the Austro-German armies to Galicia restored the political status quo of the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians redoubled their efforts to keep the Ukrainian question before the eyes of the Central Powers, hoping that eventually they would support the creation of an independent Ukraine. Numerous Ukrainian refugees from Greater Ukraine joined in the cause.

Although large portions of the Ukrainian territories of Kholm, Pidlasya, Volhynia and Podilya had already been cleared of Russian troops, the Central Powers stood pat on the Ukrainian question. Despite the pleas and efforts of the Ukrainian General Rada, established in Vienna in 1915, and of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," the Ukrainians were not given any hope for a recognition of their legitimate rights. Disappointment turned

to despair when they learned that Emperor Franz Josef was planning to incorporate Galicia into a future Polish state envisioned by the Central Powers. It seemed that Vienna, seriously perturbed by the activities of the Polish group in the camp of the Triple *Entente*, was inclined to appeare them at the expense of the Ukrainians and their lands.

As the war front became stabilized at the end of 1916, Emperor Franz Josef died, and Emperor Karl I took over the helm of the weakened empire.

It had become progressively plain to the Ukrainians that the Vienna government had not abandoned its traditional divide et impera policy with respect to them and the Poles. Accordingly, they began looking toward new developments which could only be generated through the inner strength of the Ukrainian nation itself.

# PART TWO: THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION

1. THE RISE OF THE UKRAINIANS TO FREEDOM: ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES — UKRAINIANS IN ST. PETERSBURG AND MOSCOW

By February, 1917, the position of the Russian empire had become extremely difficult. A series of economic and military disasters; the corruption of the Czarist court, as exemplified by the assassination of Rasputin, and the increased agitation of the Bolsheviks—all served to precipitate the fall of Czar Nicholas II, who by his abdication on March 15, 1917, brought the rule of the Romanov dynasty to a sudden and dramatic end.

The Ukrainian people, as did all the other enslaved nationalities of the empire, acclaimed the fall of Czardom in the belief that the time had come for the start of a new and hopeful era in their so glorious and yet tragic history. There were many questions to be decided at once; the war was still going on, and social and economic problems demanded a swift and radical solution.

The question of autonomy immediately divided the various nationalities and the Russians. The non-Russians met hostility from the Russian Provisional Government, first under the premiership of Prince Lvov and then of Alexander Kerensky. The Russian parties, too, opposed the idea of the decentralization of the empire, although some of the liberal leaders wanted that such be decided by the all-Russian Constitutional Assembly which was to meet later on. The Ukrainians were not alone in their demands, being supported by the Lithuanians, Finns, Poles, Latvians, Estonians, Byelorussians, and others.

While the Provisional Government was granting some concessions to the Finns (their constitution was approved on March 6, 1917) and issued a vague proclamation to the Poles, it was stubbornly reluctant to say or do anything for the Ukrainians.

Although the Ukrainians had hopefully awaited the fall of the despicable and oppressive Russian tyranny, they were not prepared to cope with the ensuing and urgent problems. They had suffered such extensive repressions that it took some time before they could muster political momentum. The Czarist regime had not only wiped out all Ukrainian political parties, but had dealt a cruel blow to Ukrainian cultural and social institutions in 1914. If there did exist some underground political parties, such as the RUP (Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, subsequently the Ukrainian Progressive Party), their scope and activities were necessarily very limited.

Thus the Ukrainian National Revolution began as a cultural and social transformation rather than a political one. It was initiated by newly-established cultural and educational societies, economic associations (cooperatives) and revolutionary committees of workers, peasants, teachers and students and Ukrainian soldiers from the Russian armies.

The cooperatives which existed legally throughout Ukraine provided a solid reservoir of Ukrainian cadres for the national revolution. So did the zemstvos (self-governing institutions) which, although not purely Ukrainian, brought together the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the town bourgeoisie and the nobility with strong Ukrainian sympathies and inclinations. The Ukrainian peasantry, the backbone of the Ukrainian nation, had never been Russified; as a class, it provided innumerable thousands of active patriots, joining Ukrainian soldiers from the Russian armies. The teachers and students, although numbering less than the Ukrainian peasants, were extremely active from the very beginning of the revolution and also provided cadres of leadership.

The industrial workers in Ukraine were largely ethnic Russians, but the proportion of the Ukrainian element in the working class steadily increased as the revolution progressed.

By early March, 1917, the Ukrainian political parties began emerging from the underground and new ones appeared. Among them was the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party (RUP), which had existed illegally and which now stimulated others. Its program was expounded in a brochure, Independent Ukraine, written by Mykola Mikhnovsky, Ukrainian lawyer and organizer of the RUP. The party stood for a complete and total separation of Ukraine from Russia. During 1917 the party broke up into various other political parties and factions, but nonetheless it produced such outstanding figures of the Ukrainian Revolution as Simon Petlüra, Dmytro Antonovych, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Andrey Livytsky, V. Sadovsky, V. Chekhovsky, M. Porsh and others. 3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ukrainsky hromadsky rukh 20-ho viku. Panas Fedenko. Podiebrady, 1934. p. 14 (The Ukrainian Social Movement of the 20th Century).

Another party that sprang up shortly after the fall of Czardom was the Ukrainian Progressive Party (TUP), which subsequently became the Union of Ukrainian Autonomists and Federalists, advocating autonomy for Ukraine, distribution of land among the peasants and the nationalization of industry. Yet another, the Ukrainian Social-Revolutionary Party (USRP), had existed illegally since 1913 and published an underground organ, Borotba (The Struggle), propagating a program envisioning the political autonomy of Ukraine, unrestricted cultural and educational freedom for the Ukrainians and the distribution of land among the resources.

The Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP), led by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, brilliant Ukrainian author who later became premier of the Secretariat General of Ukraine, also advocated the autonomy of Ukraine as well as a series of social and economic reforms. The Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party (URDP) stood for the political autonomy of Ukraine within a federated Russia.

With the course of the revolutionary events, these parties gradually aligned themselves and crystallized into distinct political groups that propagated clearly defined political programs.

The Communist Party in Ukraine, staffed mostly by Russian Bolsheviks, represented the extreme political left. The Ukrainian Nationalist Party was at the extreme right of this political spectrum, advocating the complete independence of Ukraine under a hetman or other executive. It did not support equal distribution of land, but upheld the principle of private property and favored the nationalization of heavy industry and national resources.4

These parties, as well as representatives of the various Ukrainian organizations and social groups, led the Ukrainian National Revolution.

But an equally great contribution was provided by the Ukrainian leaders and intelligentsia who lived in St. Petersburg and Moscow at the time of the fall of the Romanov dynasty. These Ukrainian patriots in great numbers had served as Russian officials (chinovniks), and as soon as Czardom fell, they proceeded to set up Ukrainian organizations. Thus to be found in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Ukrainska Revolutsia. Zamitky i Materialy do istoriyi ukrainskoyi revolutsiy. Pavlo Khrystiuk. Prague, 1921-22 (4 Vols.) Vol. I, p. 38. (The Ukrainian Revolution: Notes and Material on the Ukrainian Revolution).

St. Petersburg were many members of various Ukrainian political parties or reopened branches of their respective groups from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian soldiers garrisoned in St. Petersburg participated in the street demonstrations of the workers. The Volynsky and Guard Regiments, composed chiefly of Ukrainians, refused to shoot down Russian workers when ordered into the streets to put down the outbreaks, and thus set the greatest revolution in the world in motion. <sup>5</sup>

These patriotic Ukrainians not only demanded rights for the Ukrainians—political autonomy, freedom of the language, Ukrainization of the army stationed in Ukraine—but also called for an end of the persecution of Ukrainians deported from Western Ukraine and demanded their immediate release. On Sunday, March 12, 1917, some 30,000 Ukrainians gathered in the streets of St. Petersburg in commemoration of the 56th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's death. They sang patriotic Ukrainian songs and the Ukrainian national anthem, "Ukraine Has Not Died," for the first time in history. Through their newly established newspaper in St. Petersburg, Nashe Zhyttia, (Our Life), they constantly demanded more freedom and political rights for Ukraine, the release of Archbishop Andrey Sheptytsky, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, from exile in Siberia, and the like. They also sent a special delegation to Prince Lvov with a series of demands, and finally they established contact with the Ukrainian Central Rada in Kiev when the latter body had become established.

As in St. Petersburg, there were thousands of Ukrainians in Moscow serving as functionaries of the empire. They, too, were strongly nationalistic and supported the Ukrainian autonomous movement when the opportunity presented itself in March, 1917. The leadership of these Ukrainians in Moscow was in the hands of Simon Petlura, who was editor of Ukrainskaya Zhizn (Ukrainian Life), a Ukrainian review in Russian, and who later became head of the Ukrainian national government. Like the Ukrainians in St. Petersburg, they also demanded Ukrainian autonomy, freedom of Ukrainian culture and language, Ukrainization of the army and the establishment of a general federation in which Ukraine would be on an equal basis with Russia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Storinky z mynuloho. Alexander Lototsky. Warsaw, 1934, Vol. III, (Pages from the Past), pp. 318-326.

## 2. FORMATION AND EARLY ACTIVITIES OF THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA

The fall of Russian Czardom was the signal for bursting enthusiasm not only in Kiev and Kharkiv, but throughout the whole of Ukraine. Despite the systematic attempts of the Russian government to suppress Ukrainian ideals and aspirations, the dream of freedom and independence had survived.


At the beginning of the Ukrainian National Revolution, uppermost in the minds of the Ukrainian leaders was a federation in which Ukraine would be an equal partner of Russia and other nations. The great masses of the Ukrainian people above all wanted the freedom of their own language and their own schools, and land on which to toil and by which to live.

With the return from exile of Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky, old Ukrainian Kiev again became a center of political activity. On March 17, 1917, the principal Ukrainian organizations and parties, banding together for the common cause, established the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council), which set itself the task of crystallizing the Ukrainian national interests and assuming the leadership of the fast-growing Ukrainian movement for freedom. The Rada included representatives of various Ukrainian societies and groups, and Professor M. Hrushevsky was elected its first president. Significantly, the Rada's platform was rather modest, aiming at the "establishment of the territorial autonomy of Ukraine and a guarantee of the rights of the national minorities" of Ukraine.

On March 22, the Rada issued its first proclamation, "To the Ukrainian People," in which it stressed that the moment of true liberation had arrived. It called on the Ukrainian people to fight for their rights and to "carve out with a strong hand a new and free existence."

The proclamation made a tremendous impression not only in Kiev but among the people throughout all Ukraine. For the first time in more than a century and a half a Ukrainian political body had arisen to speak to the Ukrainian people in their behalf.

This first political step of the Rada intensified the activities of Ukrainian organizations in the country. Ukrainian soldiers from the Russian army began organizing into separate Ukrainian military organizations and demanded the Ukrainization of the army; Ukrainian farmers and cooperative workers called their own congresses, at which political resolutions were adopted de-





First President of the Ukrainian National Republic and President of the Ukrainian Central Rada in 1917-1918.



Simon Petlura,

Head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and Supreme Commander of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919.

manding an immediate autonomy for Ukraine. Ukrainian organizations mushroomed throughout the country and looked to Kiev for guidance and sustenance.

Popular support for the Rada was attested to by a huge Ukrainian demonstration which took place on April 1, 1917, in Kiev, with 110,000 persons participating. Armed Ukrainian troops, bearing the names of such historical Ukrainian heroes as Khmelnytsky and Polubotok, marched alongside Ukrainian students, farmers, bourgeoisie and representatives of organizations and clergy. Some 320 Ukrainian national blue and yellow flags were counted in the parade. Professor Hrushevsky addressed the cheering multitude, and a series of resolutions were adopted and presented to the Russian Provisional Government which in essence demanded the establishment of a national autonomy of Ukraine, Ukrainization of all the administrative institutions, courts and army and the introduction of Ukrainian schools.

The influence of the Ukrainian Central Rada grew by leaps and bounds, asserting itself everywhere. The time approached to call an all-Ukrainian National Congress in order to outline the general policies to be followed by Ukraine as a whole. Persistent demands for such a congress came from practically all the Ukrainian political groups and organizations, which were holding congresses almost every day.

By this time some opposition developed among the national minorities against the radical course of the Rada regarding Ukrainian autonomy. The Russian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party called a special meeting to warn the Rada against the convocation of a Ukrainian Constitutonal Assembly. Russian leader Georgy Piatakov, later to be a famous Bolshevik leader and who was executed in the purges, said that the Russians in Ukraine should counteract the "separatist movement" of the Rada. Even a more violent attitude toward the Rada was taken by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' deputies. Finally, an intra-party meeting was held in Kiev, at which Russian, Jewish and Ukrainian party leaders participated and at which Professor Hrushevsky, as President of the Ukrainian Central Rada, assured all present that the forthcoming Ukrainian National Congress was being called only to approve the Central Rada, and that it would not become a Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly.

#### 3. THE ALL-UKRAINIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IN KIEV

But events were moving rapidly in Ukraine and the Rada had to act at once in order to cope with the great developments enveloping the Ukrainian nation.

The purpose of the Ukrainian National Congress, which met on April 18-21, 1917, was to centralize Ukrainian political activity in one body: the Central Rada. In its attempt to gain Russian recognition of Ukrainian autonomy, this central Ukrainian body had to have the support of every group in Ukraine.

Some 1,500 Ukrainian delegates, according to Khrystiuk, came to Kiev to attend the All-Ukrainian National Congress. They represented all the Ukrainian organizations, societies and parties to be found in Ukraine and beyond its borders. Some came from Russian centers and the far-flung fronts. There also were delegates from Western Ukraine, an extremely important circumstance which subsequently facilitated the final reunion of all Ukrainian lands as one nation.

The congress met amid such nationalist fervor that when Commissar Sukovkin, representative of the Russian Provisional Government in Kiev, endeavored to speak in Russian, he was shouted down. The delegates refused to listen until he began to speak in Ukrainian, which he did not know well.

After several addresses, reports and vigorous debates, all centering around the problem of Ukrainian autonomy, the congress adopted a definite resolution for Ukrainian autonomy within the Russian federation and declared itself the supreme authority in Ukraine, with a right to be consulted in the final drawing up of plans for a federated Russian state. 6

The congress also firmly expressed its adherence to the principle of self-determination, and provided for the expression of the popular will in areas to be disputed between various states in the future federation. The congress insisted that Ukraine be admitted to the future peace negotiations between the belligerent nations on the ground that the war had been waged on Ukrainian territory with the Ukrainian people suffering great losses, thereby earning for them the right to be consulted in the peace negotiations.

A series of other important demands were adopted by the congress relating to the Ukrainization of the army, schools and administration in Ukraine and to pressing economic and social problems of the Ukrainian people. Another task of the congress was to speed up the reorganization of the Central *Rada* to include delegates from all the Ukrainian provinces as well as a certain number of representatives from the various professional and cooperative Ukrainian societies.

The All-Ukrainian National Congress marked the end of the first period of the Ukrainian National Revolution and ushered in an intensification of the struggle between the Ukrainians and the Russian Provisional Government for the autonomy of Ukraine. From this time on, the Ukrainian Central Rada became the most powerful force on Ukrainian soil, supported by the great majority of the Ukrainian people and by certain organizations of the Jewish, Polish, Russian and German minorities. In dispersing to their home cities, the 1,500 delegates spread the news of the new Ukrainian authority in Kiev to every nook and cranny of Ukraine.

A new period in Ukrainian political life opened with widespread and intense activity throughout the whole of Ukraine. Ukrainian congresses and conventions of peasants, teachers, sol-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Khrystiuk, op. cit. I, pp. 39-40.

diers, students and other groups were held in Odessa, Kharkiv, Poltava, Katerinoslav, Chernihiv, and in all sectors of the war front. All these congresses, in their official resolutions and platforms, supported the Ukrainian Central Rada, recognizing it as the sole authority of Ukraine.

These activities were carried on in smaller communities despite incessant Bolshevik agitation and propaganda, the backdrop of the World War and the intense struggle between the Russian Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks on the one hand, and the Ukrainian autonomists and nationalists on the other.


## 4. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE CENTRAL RADA AND THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The amazingly rapid progress and evolution of the Ukrainian political organization in the first two months after the fall of Czardom stunned the Russian Provisional Government. It simply refused to acknowledge the voice of Ukraine, so long suppressed, and continued to ignore the existence of the Ukrainian Central Rada. This "silent treatment" of the Ukrainian authority by the Russian Provisional Government was largely responsible for the increasing Bolshevik propaganda and agitation not only in Ukraine, but in Russia itself as well. The feelings of the Ukrainian people, now at liberty to express them, were running high.

This was especially in evidence during the First Ukrainian Military Congress, which gathered in Kiev on May 18-21, 1917. Throwing its support behind the Central Rada, the Congress demanded a swift implementation of Ukrainian autonomy. A similar course was followed by large peasant gatherings.

The Ukrainian element in the Russian army was extremely strong. Immediately after the establishment of the Central Rada, a Ukrainian Military Committee was set up which began organizing purely Ukrainian army units. One such Ukrainian regiment of 3,000 men was vetoed by the Provisional Government, despite the fact that the Rada promised to send it to the front. The Ukrainians nevertheless proceeded to organize the regiment, which the Russian military command was compelled to recognize.

The First Ukrainian Military Congress was attended by 700 delegates claiming representation of 900,000 Ukrainians in the army, navy, air force and the reserves. The Congress passed several resolutions and fully supported the Central Rada. It demanded the appointment of a special minister for Ukraine, full



Simon Petlura, Secretary for Military Affairs of the Secretariat General of the Ukrainian Ukrainian Rada, and Prof. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, President of the Ukrainian Central Rada, among Ukrainian soldiers attending the Third Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev during the proclamation of the Third Universal, establishing the Ukrainian National Republic on November 20, 1917.

autonomy for Ukraine, the Ukrainization of the army, and a "peace without annexations and indemnities."

Such prominent Ukrainian political figures as Simon Petlura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Mykola Mikhnovsky were elected to the presidium of the congress.

The First Ukrainian Military Congress had a great impact upon the masses of Ukrainian soldiery on all the fronts. Khrystiuk writes that there was no doubt of the depth and extent of the people's feelings. On the other hand, the Ukrainian leaders, including such outstanding ones as Petlura and Vynnychenko, were moderate in their demands, fearing that they would be accused by the Provisional Government of "separatism." Hence they tried to soften the tone of the movement. They also were cautious not to incur unnecessarily Russian brutality and persecution, bitterly experienced by the Ukrainians in the past.

A special Ukrainian Military Committee proceeded to recruit Ukrainian regiments with the aid and approval of the Central Rada, and also to Ukrainize mixed regiments already on Ukrainian soil.

The reaction of the Provisional Government was wholly negative, holding that neither the Ukrainization of the army nor the creation of Ukrainian regiments was feasible at that time. As for the demand of autonomy, Kerensky replied that "the wise Ukrainian people will find a good solution with the Russian people, and the Constitutional Assembly will decide the question."

Finally, on May 26, 1917, a special delegation chosen by the Central Rada and headed by V. Vynnychenko went to St. Petersburg to present demands concerning the autonomy of Ukraine to the Provisional Government. The Ukrainian Military Committee was also represented in the delegation. Presented was a nine-point memorandum, ranging from the demand for Ukrainian autonomy through the demands for Ukrainian cultural rights to that of the release of all Ukrainian political prisoners, including the deportees from Western Ukraine.

On May 31, the Ukrainian delegation was granted an official audience for the first time by the Provisional Government, and a special commission was created to discuss the Ukrainian demands and to devise a solution.

When the Ukrainian delegation arrived in St. Petersburg the Provisional Government was passing through a crisis. Foreign Minister Paul Milyukov resigned and was replaced by Tereshchenko. Kerensky became war and navy minister, while Prince Lvov remained Prime Minister. Thus, the Russian attitude was softer than it might otherwise have been. The Provisional Government agreed to some "local autonomy," but not a full national autonomy. It insisted that only the Constitutional Assembly should eventually decide the matter of Ukrainian autonomy. It consented to the Ukrainization of the army within certain limits. Although it was in accord with the use of Ukrainian in the lower schools, it insisted that the official language in Ukraine must remain Russian.

Most important, the Provisional Government refused to recognize the Ukrainian Central Rada on the ground it was an "illegal organization." Yet the Provisional Government itself was supported only by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies—a large majority of the Duma opposed it.

## 5. UKRAINIAN REACTION: THE UNIVERSALS OF THE RADA AND THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL

The refusal, by and large, of the Provisional Government to accede to the demands of the *Rada* evoked deep indignation, resentment and protest throughout Ukraine. The Ukrainian people began to feel disillusioned with the "democratic mission" of Russia; from this point on they doubted the sincerity of Russian actions.

On June 1, 1917, Alexander Kerensky, War Minister, came to Kiev and reiterated the stand of the Provisional Government regarding Ukrainian autonomy. Professor M. Hrushevsky said in reply:

"The Ukrainians want only national territorial autonomy within the Russian Federative Republic. We have not requested independence. We did have our own independent state, but the documentary proofs were taken away from us by the Romanovs. It is our desire that the Provisional Government proclaim that it agrees with our right to national autonomy, and that the Constitutional Assembly sanction this right..."

Alexander Shulhyn, prominent Ukrainian leader who later became Foreign Minister, said:

"We think that only the decentralization of Russia will save her; otherwise she will perish."

This reaction of the Ukrainian people was strongly registered at the First National Ukrainian Peasant Congress, held in Kiev on June 10-15, 1917, with some 2,500 delegates attending. Discussions centered not only on concrete and specific questions regarding the land-hungry peasantry, but dealt severely with the attitude

of the Provisional Government toward the Central Rada. The mildness of the Rada was criticized and denounced. The temper of the congress rose considerably when the news spread that Minister Kerensky had forbidden convocation of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress, scheduled for June 18-23, 1917. This was the Russian Provisional Government's first prohibition of any congress of this size and importance. Angry telegrams went back to Kerensky, accusing him of "transgressing the law guaranteeing the freedom of assembly..."

In a series of resolutions the First Ukrainian Peasant Congress gave unqualified support to the *Rada* and called for immediate establishment of autonomy. It also called for the right of Ukraine to participate in the future conference as well as speedy Ukrainization of the administrative institutions and apparatus of Ukraine.

In the meantime the Rada sent a sharp answer to the Provisional Government, stating that it had exhausted all opportunities "to reach an understanding" with the Russians, and that it would appeal in a Universal to the Ukrainian people and would prepare to establish an autonomous regime of Ukraine.

Despite Kerensky's ban the Second Ukrainian Military Congress met on June 18, 1917, in Kiev, again with 2,500 delegates, who represented 1,600,000 Ukrainian soldiers from all the armed services. In opening the congress, Professor Hrushevsky stated:

"The government has refused us autonomy . . . and now it is our task to see that Ukraine passes through this black period toward the establishment of autonomy within the Federative Russian State."

V. Vynnychenko spoke in a similar vein, insisting that the right to establish national autonomy was inherent and natural to the Ukrainian nation.

But the Second Ukrainian Military Congress was much farther ahead than the *Rada* in demanding rights for Ukraine, as shown in its resolutions:

"The Provisional Government completely misunderstands the national aspirations of Ukraine and underestimates the organized and spontaneous revolutionary strength of Ukrainian democracy.

"Through misunderstandings of and systematic resistance to Ukrainian democracy, the Provisional Government is heightening national conflicts in Ukraine, harming the great organizational work of the Ukrainian people and arousing anarchistic feeling among the various nationalities in Ukraine."

Moreover, the congress demanded the immediate recognition of the Central Rada by the Provisional Government. It also proposed for the first time that Ukraine was "not to refer any longer to the Provisional Government, but to initiate at once vigorous organization of the country in conjunction with the national minorities..."

Meanwhile the Russians in Ukraine were organizing their own forces as well. The Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks) in Kiev followed elastic tactics, dictated by Lenin. On the one hand, they supported the Ukrainians in their protest against the Provisional Government's ban of the Ukrainian Military Congress. On the other, they were against the Ukrainian movement for autonomy, that is, if that movement were led by any other group than the Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks, too, called upon their party members for "an energetic struggle against the bourgeois and nationalist movement in Ukraine." Although the Mensheviks supported the movement for Ukrainian national and cultural autonomy, such support was given only "on condition that the statehood and economic unity of Russia be safeguarded."

On the last day of the assembly of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress, June 23, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued its First Universal. The historical name of this document dated back to the times of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's proclamations, called Universals, which he issued during the Ukrainian war of liberation against Poland, 1648-1649.

Although the tenor of the *Universal* was still conciliatory, it advanced Ukrainian political thinking nearer that of the nationalists. In the main, it said the following:

(1) Declared the Central Rada to be representative of the Ukrainian nation;

2. Declared that Ukraine should be free, and that although separation from Russia was not advocated, the status of Ukraine should be established on a constitutional basis by the Ukrainian National Territorial Assembly;

3. Denounced the negative and uncompromising attitude of the Russian Provisional Government;

4. Declared that "from today on we will organize our own life."

Enthusiasm flamed up anew as a result of the *Universal*. It was printed from one end of the country to the other and distributed among the Ukrainian soldiers on all fronts. Although vague and highflown, it was hailed as the first definite pronouncement of the Central *Rada*, placing the responsibility of achieving autonomy

squarely on that body. In reading the *Universal* to the delegates of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress, Professor Hrushevsky said:

"'From today on we will organize our own life.' You will carry these words to your homes. In proclaiming these words the Central Rada is counting on your solidarity and support. Together with your representatives we will carry on the work which should be supported by all the people, and especially by their army..."

Simon Petlura, speaking in behalf of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress, assured the *Rada* that the *Universal* would be carried out.


Five days later the Rada took another step forward by creating the General Secretariat at its secret session (June 28, 1917). V. Vynnychenko (Social Democrat) became Prime Minister and Interior Minister as well; Simon Petlura was appointed Defense Minister. Other prominent Ukrainian leaders took over the posts of finance, agriculture, commerce, education, national minorities, justice, and so forth.

Thus the establishment of the Secretariat General marked the completion of the Ukrainian government. Ukraine now had a legislative body, the Central *Rada*, and an executive one, the Secretariat General.

These momentous steps dismayed the Russians. Russian revolutionaries as well as reactionaries were shocked that the Ukrainians, after long and oppressive Russian rule, could act on their own initiative. The Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine came up with a denunciation of the Rada as an "undemocratic organization." In other great cities of Russia the Russians fumed and sputtered at the daring of the Ukrainians. In brief, it was incomprehensible to the Messianic Russian mentality that the Ukrainians should want to break away from the Russian empire and to establish their own free and unfettered state.

The Russian Provisional Government at last became aroused by the First *Universal*, particularly because of the overwhelming support it received in Ukraine, and decided to act. But its acts were myopic and timid. In this time of decision it could not overcome its unwillingness to sacrifice any part of the Russian imperial domain.

On June 29 the Russian Provisional Government issued a proclamation, entitled, "From the Provisional Government to the Ukrainian People," in reply to the First *Universal* of the *Rada*.



Volodymyr Vynnychenko,

First head of the Secretariat General of the Ukrainian Central Rada and head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919.

It appeared in *Viestnik*, the official organ of the Provisional Government in St. Petersburg, and was signed by Prime Minister Lvov.

But the proclamation only promised what the stirred and long discontented Ukrainian nation had already seized for itself. Accustomed to wordy and watery pronouncements on the part of both the Provisional Government and the Czarist regime, the Ukrainians saw this lengthy appeal as wholly worthless, inasmuch as it had not dealt with specific Ukrainian demads, but had merely referred all decisions to the Russian Constitutional Assembly.

In a way, however, it was a victory for the Ukrainians. For the first time proud and arrogant Russia had humbled her-

self by appealing to the Ukrainians, who in the past were answered only by bayonets, prisons and deportations to Siberia.

A subsequent step of the Rada was the agreement reached with representatives of the national minorities on July 2, 1917. The agreement provided for a guarantee by the Central Rada of the right of language, schools and religion of every minority. The latter included the Jewish, Polish, Russian and other nationalities. In most cases these minorities supported the Rada in general in the conviction that more concessions could be obtained from a Ukrainian government than a Russian one. These minorities sent their representatives to the Rada, who in turn served on the various committees of that body.

In the course of the four months following the fall of the Romanov dynasty the Ukrainians swung firmly on the road toward full autonomy and freedom. The Russian Provisional Government was faced with two alternatives: to fight or give in. Some of the more reactionary Russian leaders favored the first course. Another group, more liberal, consisting of Prince Lvov, Kerensky, Tseretelli and Tereshchenko (the latter was of Ukrainian birth), insisted on a compromise. As a result, a group of three ministers of the Provisional Government—Kerensky, Tseretelli and Tereshchenko—arrived in Kiev in the middle of July, 1917, to negotiate with the Ukrainians. The Russians presented a compromise proposal which called for the General Secretariat being responsible both to the Rada and the Provisional Government, the abeyance of demands for Ukrainian autonomy until convocation of the Russian Constitutional Assembly, and dropping the demand for a Ukrainian territorial army.

The Ukrainians promptly rejected this proposal, and negotiations went on. Finally an agreement was reached under which both the Rada and the Secretariat General were recognized by the Provisional Government as the organs of the Ukrainian people. The Rada, furthermore, was to withhold its demand for autonomy until the Constitutional Assembly met, while the armed forces on Ukrainian soil and at the front were permitted to be Ukrainized, the high command, however, remaining in Russian hands. This agreement, bitterly protested by the Ukrainian Military Committee, was a manifest retreat of the Rada before the Russians.

On July 16, the Provisional Government issued a declaration signed by the three ministers who negotiated with the *Rada*. It may be summarized as follows:

- 1. The Provisional Government to appoint a Secretariat General, its composition to be approved by both the *Rada* and itself;
- 2. Agreement to recognize the national and political status of Ukraine "in a manner which the Central Rada itself will deem adequate for the interests of the country...";
- 3. Agreement to the Ukrainization of the army, permitting Ukrainian representation in the Russian War Ministry, the General Staff and the High Command.

In other words, the Provisional Government recognized the General Secretariat, although it attempted to maintain a hand in its selection; agreed in general to the political status of Ukraine as might be proposed by the *Rada*, and went further than the Kiev agreement in permitting Ukrainians, at least theoretically, to participate in the direction of military affairs.

On the same day, July 16, the Rada issued its Second Universal. This proclamation is still criticized today by Ukrainian nationalists as being too weak, in that it did not call for the



THE FIRST SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA. Sitting from left to right: Simon Petlura, Sergiy Yefremov, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Christopher Baranovsky, I. Steshenko; Standing from left to right: Boris Martos, M. Stasiuk and Pavlo Khrystiuk.

separation of Ukraine from Russia. The general tone of the Second *Universal* was rather conciliatory; it simply supported the agreement of the *Rada* with the Provisional Government.

In fact, there was much criticism both of the Second Universal (notably by the Ukrainian military and nationalist elements) and the declaration of the Provisional Government. There was nothing in these two documents that defined the territorial boundaries of Ukraine nor the authority of the Rada and the Secretariat General. Nothing was said of Eastern Galicia, as old and historic a land as the rest of Ukraine, nor of Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine, which all Ukrainian patriots wanted to see united with Ukraine. The reference to the Ukrainian autonomy was very vague and without any indication of the implementation of this status, nor was there any binding agreement to which the Rada could hold the Provisional Government.

In reality, the agreement served only to restrain the rising tide of Ukrainian nationalism.

# 6. THE UKRAINIAN CONSTITUTION AND UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

On July 29, 1917, the Constitution of Ukraine was drafted by the constitutional commission of the Central Rada. A special

delegation of the Secretariat General, headed again by V. Vynnychenko, went to St. Petersburg to have it approved by the Provisional Government.

The latter was then undergoing a crisis more profound than the previous one. The Russian Constitutional Democrats ("Ka-Dets") in the cabinet resigned, throwing control over to the Socialists. Lenin and the Bolsheviks started another uprising in Petrograd which, although finally suppressed, considerably weakened the government. Moreover, the Russian armies suffered an overwhelming defeat in Eastern Galicia and Bessarabia. (Ukrainian historian Doroshenko writes that a prominent part in the ill-fated Russian offensive in Eastern Galicia was played by Ukrainian forces, notably the VIth, XVIIth and XLIth Ukrainized Corps.)

The proposed Ukrainian Constitution, consisting of 21 Articles, was named the "Statute of the Higher Administration of Ukraine." It was a carefully drafted and moderate document which defined the authority of the Central Rada and its Secretariat General. It also established the relationship of these Ukrainian organs with the Provisional Government. It did not go so far as to destroy Russian authority in Ukraine, nor did it delineate the frontiers of Ukraine. In addition, the Constitution also limited the authority of the Secretariat General by providing that only non-elective posts would be filled by appointees of the Secretariat, which in effect prevented the Secretariat from controlling the provincial and district governors.

From the viewpoint of nationalistic and conservative Ukrainians the Constitution was much too moderate and conciliatory. Many Ukrainians now argue that had the Central Rada then declared Ukraine's independence, it is doubful whether the Provisional Government would have effectively resisted. With the subsequent Bolshevik overthrow of the Kerensky regime, the Ukrainian government would have been in a much stronger position.

At the time of the arrival of the Ukrainian delegation at Petrograd Prince Lvov resigned as Prime Minister and Alexander Kerensky assumed the post. On August 7, 1917, the delegation was received by the new government. The two parties failed to reach an understanding. The Provisional Government accused the Ukrainians of not living up to the Kiev agreement, a charge which the Ukrainians denied, contending that the Constitution was in full harmony with that agreement. After a few days, the delega-

tion returned to Kiev without receiving an official reply, although the Provisional Government did reject the Constitution orally.

Finally, on August 17, the Provisional Government issued a new instruction to the Central Rada and the Secretariat General, flatly rejecting the Ukrainian Constitution. In a long declaration, entitled, "Temporary Instruction for the General Secretariat of the Provisional Government in Ukraine," signed by Premier Kerensky and Justice Minister Zarudny, the Provisional Government completely disregarded the authority of the Rada and violated the Kiev agreement. In a sweeping manner it proclaimed the Secretariat General as "its organ" in Ukraine, although it was the creation of the Rada itself. The Provisional Government reserved the right to issue orders directly to provincial and district governments. It failed to grant important Ukrainian ministries, such as war, transport, post and telegraph, justice and food. The decree also limited the authority of the Secretariat General to but five of the eleven Ukrainian provinces.

The situation was aggravated by the shooting of Ukrainian soldiers by Russian troops in Kiev, as the Ukrainian Khmelnytsky Regiment was moving up to the front. The incident almost touched off a general anti-Russian uprising in Kiev but again the General Secretariat, trying to avoid an open break with Petrograd, agreed by a slight majority to accept the "instruction." V. Vynnychenko insisted that in principle it recognized the autonomy of Ukraine. But the Rada passed a strong resolution denouncing the "instruction" as imperialistic and anti-democratic and demanded full recognition of the Secretariat General, as it had been created by the Rada. It also called for a speedy convocation of Ukrainian and Russian constitutional assemblies.

Soon after, the attempt of Russian General Kornilov to establish a military dictatorship provoked a violent reaction on the part of the Bolshevik groups in Russia and Ukraine.

In Ukraine, meanwhile, the systematic introduction of Ukrainian autonomy was in full progress despite interdictions from Petrograd, the Bolshevik agitation and the collapsing Russian front in the West. Congresses of the Ukrainian peasants (September 15-18, 1917) and the All-Ukrainian Council of Soldiers' Deputies (September 9, 1917) fully supported the Rada and its Secretariat General and demanded that these two organs assume full control and authority in Ukraine.

On September 21-28, 1917, the First Congress of the Peoples of Eastern Europe convened in Kiev under the auspices of the

Rada, in which Ukrainian, Tatar, Georgian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Jewish, Byelorussian, Estonian, Moldavian, Don Cossack, Buriat, and Mongolian representatives participated. The congress debated on the creation of a Russian federation, although some of the nationalities demanded outright independence; the delegates fully endorsed the position of the Ukrainian Central Rada in its struggle against the Russian government for autonomy.

On October 10, the Secretariat General again issued a proclamation which reaffirmed the principles on which it was organized and which warned the Ukrainian people to remain calm and firm in the face of grave events that seemed to be drawing the Russian empire toward disaster.

Also on October 16-19, the Secretariat General called a conference of all the commissars of Ukrainian provinces and districts. They reported on the demoralized state of their territories; demobilized bands of uncontrolled soldiers and deserters were wandering about terrorizing the inhabitants. It was decided to organize a Ukrainian militia, called the "Free Kozaks."

The Ukrainian armed forces were only in an embryonic state in the late summer of 1917, despite the fact that the Russian government agreed to the formation of Ukrainian military units. After the collapse of the last Russian offensive in Eastern Galicia, demoralization swept the ranks of the Russian armies. Officers and men alike deserted their units, en masse. Actually, Ukrainian units alone remained at the front. With the fall of the Provisional Government the great majority of the Russian units went over to the Bolsheviks, while the Ukrainian units endeavored to enter Ukraine in military formations. Many were intercepted and disarmed by the Bolsheviks, with but a few units reaching Ukraine.

Before the outbreak of the Bolshevik (October) revolution, the Ukrainian armed forces comprised the following:

One Ukrainian Corps under the command of General Paul Skoropadsky consisting of two divisions;

Two infantry divisions consisting of eight regiments, which were formed in Kiev;

One cavalry regiment in Kiev;

One officers' candidate school in Kiev;

A few artillery batteries;

An auto-mechanized division in Kiev, and cadres of several units in process of being established in all parts of Ukraine.

The total Ukrainian armed strength amounted to some 60,000 men. In addition, comprehensive plans were being developed to organize an army of 500,000 men with combat experience, supported by auxiliary and reserve troops.

Now with the Russian front against the German and Austrian troops almost non-existent and the Provisional Government in Petrograd on the verge of collapse, the Ukrainian Central Rada began to move faster toward the realization of autonomy and assumption of political control of the country. On October 23, 1917, a discussion took place in the Rada on the vital necessity of calling a Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly. A week later, on October 30, the Provisional Government received a report from the Russian prosecutor in Kiev on the "high treason" of the Ukrainian leaders, and rumors began circulating to the effect that the Petrograd government was planning to arrest all the members of the Secretariat General and to disperse the Rada.

The Rada felt that it had committed no treasonable act, having merely acted in accordance with the will of the Ukrainian people. It dispatched a group of ministers with V. Vynnychenko as their head, but before they could reach Petrograd, the Bolsheviks supplanted the Kerensky regime, and a new era had begun.

# 7. THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION — THE THIRD UNIVERSAL — BOLSHEVIK AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

On November 7, 1917, the rule of the Provisional Government was brought to an end and a communist regime assumed the power and authority in Russia. The new regime was established through a violent seizure of power by the Bolshevik group whose leader, Lenin, was determined to have his proletarian state under the control of a single party.

The advent of the Bolsheviks to power in Russia did not occasion surprise in Kiev; nonetheless, it confronted the *Rada* and the Secretariat General with a novel situation.

While these epochal events were taking place in Petrograd, the Third Ukrainian Military Congress convened, November 2-12, 1917, in Kiev, with some 3,000 delegates attending. The congress deliberated in an atmosphere of unbounded enthusiasm. It had now become certain that Ukraine was heading for a definite break with Russia. Proposals and discussions on the forthcoming Ukrain-


ian Constitutional Assembly and the inevitable proclamation of Ukrainian sovereignty were commonplace. Professor Hrushevsky, speaking at the congress, clearly outlined the future Ukrainian policy. He said that the Central Rada was aiming at the creation of a Ukrainian National Republic and counted on the firm support of the Ukrainian military forces. Amid wild acclaim the congress voted full endorsement of and support to the Rada. The voice of the Ukrainian people was full-throated and vibrant: a dream was coming true.

After the establishment of the communist regime in Petrograd, some Russian military units, loyal to the Kerensky regime, tried to defend the Provisional Government in Kiev as well, with resulting disturbances in the Ukrainian capital. On November 7, 1917, the Rada in a secret session organized a "Revolutionary Committee to Safeguard the Revolution in Ukraine," which comprised not only members of the Rada but representatives of Russian and Jewish Socialist parties as well. The committee also created a military staff to prepare a reliable military force for the defense of the revolution. The Rada, especially its smaller working body known as the "Little Rada," assailed the Petrograd uprising, declaring that the authority should be placed in the hands of an "all revolutionary democracy," and not in the hands of "soldiers' and workers' deputies" exclusively. This precipitated the break-up of the revolutionary committee, with representatives of the Russian Bolsheviks seceding. Although the Ukrainian forces had to wage street fights in Kiev against the remnants of the Russian troops loyal to the Provisional Government, in the end the Rada and the Secretariat General emerged victorious.

The Third Ukrainian Military Congress, which continued to deliberate in Kiev, now issued a resolution stating that "on the basis of full and unlimited right to self-determination of nations, the Congress demands from its highest revolutionary organ, the Central Rada, the immediate proclamation of the Ukrainian democratic republic within the ethnographic boundaries of Ukraine..."

With the Provisional Government's fall and with fighting raging in Petrograd and other Russian cities, Ukraine in reality was already separated from the general political system of Russia. The Secretariat General swiftly proceeded to fill the vacancies in the ministries of war, food, railroad, post and telegraph and justice. The factual government of Ukraine was established.

Finally, on November 20, 1917, the Central Rada issued its Third Universal, which formally and officially proclaimed the



Patriotic Ukrainian manifestation on the occasion of the proclamation of the Third *Universal* of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in Kiev on November 20, 1917.

Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). It declared that "from this day on, Ukraine becomes the Ukrainian National Republic."

The term narodna in Ukrainian means both "people's" and "national"; it expresses both the idea of a government of the Ukrainian people as a separate nation and also the idea of a government emanating from the masses of common people.

Significantly, the Third Universal only separated Ukraine from the newly-established communist administration of Russia, inasmuch as it declared Ukraine would remain in the Russian Federative state as a free and equal republic. It asserted that until the convocation of the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly, scheduled to be held on December 27, 1917, all power and authority in Ukraine rested in the hands of the Rada and the Secretariat General. It provided for the confiscation of great private properties and for the distribution of the land among the peasants, the abolition of capital punishment, for political amnesty, and personal and national freedom. It said, among other things:

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties won by the all-Russian revolution must be safeguarded: freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, strikes, the inviolability of the individual and domicile, the right to use the local language in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation has fought for long years for its national freedom, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all national minorities dwelling in Ukraine; therefore, we proclaim to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal

autonomy to secure their rights and liberty of self-government in matters of their own national life..."

The Ukrainian Central Rada did not want to conclude a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers, toward which the new Russian communist government under Lenin was aiming. The Third Universal stated:

"Until peace is achieved every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, together with the citizens of all nations of the Russian Republic, shall stand firmly at their posts at the front and in the hinterland..."

The effect of the Third *Universal* was overwhelming. The disappearance of a strong central government in Russia galvanized the growth of Ukrainian nationalism up to the point of separatism. There was a political vacuum, which the *Rada* of necessity tried to fill, but the task of building up a strong and stable Ukrainian government, amid the unbelievable chaos, hunger, Bolshevik agitation and economic collapse, was extremely difficult, if not impossible.

The Ukrainian Central Rada, confronted with the fact of Bolshevism, either had to recognize the Lenin government or oppose it. It is clear from the Third Universal that the Rada still believed in a Russian federation, and that it did not consider the Bolshevik party as being representative of "all democratic and revolutionary forces." In a note (Dec. 6, 1917) to the People's Commissars in Petrograd, the Secretariat General suggested a conference on the matter of a proposed federation. The Bolshevik government not only refused to answer but continued to issue instructions regarding the forthcoming peace negotiations with the Central Powers to all former constituent elements of the Russian empire, including Ukraine. This compelled Simon Petlura, War Minister (Secretary for Military Affairs) of the Secretariat General, to issue special orders to all Ukrainian units at the front and elsewhere to disregard henceforth all such instructions and orders emanating from the Bolshevik authorities.

The establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic was naturally dimly viewed by Lenin and Trotsky. The Bolshevik organization in Ukraine was small but extremely efficient, and it consisted entirely of non-Ukrainians. Paul Khrystiuk, a chronicler of the Ukrainian revolution, states that in December, 1917, there was no Bolshevik or communist Ukrainian party as such in Ukraine. When the Bolshevik group in Kiev demanded a new Rada election, the All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants' Deputies,

which held its congress in Kiev (Dec. 2-16, 1917) representing the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian peasantry, attacked these maneuvers. In a resolution, the congress stated:

"Regarding the agitation of the Russian Bolsheviks for new elections for the Ukrainian Central Rada as their maneuver to seize the power in Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants' Deputies protests against it most categorically and declares that such an election at this moment cannot but be detrimental to the Ukrainian working people, and that the question of a Rada election is not a prerogative of Russian Bolsheviks, but of the toiling Ukrainian people..."

Identical sentiments were entertained by all the existing Ukrainian parties and revolutionary committees.

But the local Russian Bolsheviks, believing that they could achieve control in Ukraine as they had done in Russia, agitated for the convocation of an All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants', Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, groups which constituted the bulk of the Ukrainian democratic and revolutionary forces. The Rada and the Ukrainian parties had nothing against such a congress, and it was scheduled for December 17, 1917.

Some 2,500 delegates came to Kiev, but to the consternation of the Bolsheviks, the congress proved to be a devastating defeat for them. Despite violent agitation they barely mustered 60 delegates out of the 2,500. Among them were only two who could speak Ukrainian (Zatonsky and Shakhray).

Meanwhile an "ultimatum" had been sent by Lenin to the Central Rada. It concerned the matter of the disarming of Bolshevik troops by units of the Ukrainian government in Ukraine. The "ultimatum" stated:

"If after forty-eight hours no satisfactory reply is received, the Council of People's Commissars will consider the Ukrainian Central Rada to be at war with the Government of the Soviets in Russia and Ukraine."

The All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants', Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies unanimously condemned the "ultimatum" of Lenin as a bald attempt to restore the old great Russian centralist government and to subvert the creation of a new federative structure. It then voted confidence in the Ukrainian Central Rada. Only two delegates voted against the resolution of confidence, 19 others abstaining, out of 2,500 delegates!

The congress issued a proclamation to the "peoples of Russia" denouncing the Bolshevik government and its attempt to invade Ukraine for the sole purpose of establishing a Bolshevik regime.

The Bolshevik delegates escaped to communist-occupied Khar-kiv, where they 'declared themselves a "true Ukrainian Council of Peasants', Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies," and appealed to Lenin for military assistance against the "bourgeois and nationalist Central Rada."

The duplicity of the Bolshevik leaders was best typified by their "ultimatum." In fact, the Council of People's Commissars had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic, as stated in the "ultimatum":

"Therefore the Council of People's Commissars recognizes the Ukrainian National Republic and its right to full separation from Russia, and that it may enter into negotiations with the Russian Republic in the matter of federal and other relations. The demand of Ukraine regarding her rights and independence of the Ukrainian people the Council of People's Commissars recognizes without limitations and unconditionally..."

This "ultimatum" of December 17, 1917, was only a Bolshevik pretext for an armed attack against Ukraine. They failed to win in the All-Ukrainian Council of Peasants', Soldiers', and Workers' Deputies. They failed in their attempt to organize an armed uprising in Kiev. Now they had finally found an excuse for open war against Ukraine.

The Bolsheviks hastily organized a "Ukrainian Soviet Government" in Kharkiv and launched their campaign against Ukraine.

The prototype of Soviet armed aggression was now to be developed.

At the beginning of January, 1918, the Russian communist armies directed their principal spearheads toward Kiev and Kharkiv. At least 50,000 fanatical communist troops were thrown against the Ukrainian forces, which were smaller in number and without proper equipment.

The Ukrainian militia known as the "Free Kozaks" went into action. The Bolsheviks, however, received considerable support from the Russian troops returning from the German-Austrian front and which had been almost totally communized. This was especially true in the case of the Second Russian Guard Corps, under the command of Eugenia Bosch, a dedicated communist who joined the Bolsheviks in order to "fight against the bourgeois Ukrainian Central Rada." So when large contingents of Soviet troops, already in possession of Kharkiv, progressed toward the rich Donets Basin, Kiev was threatened not only from the north, but by ever-growing anarchy caused by Bolshevik agitation in Kiev itself. Moreover, the open war be-

tween Communist Russia and Ukraine favored Bolshevik agitation even in the Ukrainian army, and weakened its fighting capacity.

Up to this time the Rada tried to remain in the war against the Germans and Austrians, despite the fact that the Bolshevik regime under Lenin had already made substantial overtures for a separate peace with the Central Powers. The representatives of the Triple Entente in Kiev instigated the Rada to continue the war and promised all sorts of assistance to the hard-pressed Ukrainian government, but never did find any way of delivering the much-needed supplies. They also refused to recognize formally the independence of Ukraine. At any rate, the Secretariat General was compelled to send its representatives to Brest-Litovsk to take part in the peace negotiations, for Trotsky had begun the parleys with the Germans and the Austrians not only in the name of the Soviet government but in that of Ukraine as well. He employed two puppet emissaries from the fictitious "Ukrainian Soviet government" in Kharkiv, organized by the Russians.

But before the peace was concluded Ukraine had to formalize its independence and sovereignty.

## 8. PROCLAMATION OF UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE: THE FOURTH UNIVERSAL

By proclaiming the Ukrainian National Republic in the Third *Universal* on November 20, 1917, the *Rada* actually laid the foundations for the political and national independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian state. All the efforts of the *Rada* to help create the federation were of no avail, as the Bolshevik coup established a new form of government unforeseen either by the Provisional Government or the *Rada*.

Circumstances thus led the Ukrainian National Republic toward full independence, a process which was hastened by the willful and unprovoked aggression on the part of the Bolshevik regime. Moreover, the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and a sudden interest on the part of Great Britain and France in the Ukrainian movement were additional factors dictating a new line to be followed by Ukraine.

In January, 1918, France sent its representative, General Tabouis, and Great Britain its own Minister Picton Bagge, both of whom became de facto representatives of these countries in Ukraine. France and Britain promised the Ukrainian government

full support and assistance as long as Ukraine remained in the war against the Central Powers, the "enemies of democracy and humanity."

Thus, on January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued its Fourth Universal, by which it proclaimed the full and unqualified independence of Ukraine. The Ukrainian National Republic was described as "an independent and sovereign power of the Ukrainian people, subject to no other authority."

The Fourth *Universal* covered the four major aspects of the Ukrainian policies of the *Rada*:

(1) It proclaimed the full independence of Ukraine;

2) It empowered the Secretariat General, which now became the Council of Ministers, to conclude a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers;

3. It called on the Ukrainian people to rise in a defensive war against Communist Russia;

(4.) It adopted a series of social and economic decisions involving the land question and other problems of Ukraine.

"From today on the Ukrainian National Republic becomes an independent, subject-to-no-one, free and sovereign State of the Ukrainian People..." said the Universal.

The date of this proclamation has become the most important one in modern Ukrainian history as it saw the formal and official restoration of the independence of the Ukrainian nation, an independence lost to Russia some two-hundred and fifty years before.

Unhappily, the atmosphere in which the independence of Ukraine was declared was by no means bright or hopeful. The Russian communist forces at Bakhmach were threatening Kiev. All Ukrainian reserves available in Kiev had been thrown against the Russians. They comprised one regiment of the *Haydamakis*, the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment, one cavalry regiment, a detachment of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, and an officers' candidate school (one battalion in strength). The latter group suffered a total defeat at the railroad station of Kruty, north of Kiev, on January 29, 1918. Of the entire battalion of untrained youngsters but a few escaped with their lives.

The defense of Kiev was in the hands of Simon Petlura, now War Minister. Not a military man himself, Petlura nonetheless coordinated the efforts of a number of able Ukrainian generals from the Russian armies, such as General Yunakiv, former commanding officer of the IXth Russian Army, and Generals

Delvig, Kirey, Bobrovsky, Yanushevsky and Drozdovsky. This group came to include Colonels Salsky, Kapustiansky, Zmienko and others who subsequently became generals and played a major role in the Ukrainian war of liberation.

Soviet troops under the command of Colonel Muraviev finally took Kiev after ten days of bloody street fighting. With the fall of Kiev the Bolsheviks fell upon it in fury, slaying civilians, raping women, destroying Ukrainian libraries, institutions and the like. The Ukrainian government and the Rada were evacuated to the cities of Zhytomyr and Sarny.

It is worthwhile, as a matter of historical record, to underscore the fact that the war between Ukraine and Communist Russia was brought about by Lenin and Trotsky. Contrary to communist propaganda (very often aired by anti-communist Russians in the United States), the Soviet power in Ukraine was not installed by the "Ukrainian Communists," but by Russian communist troops on their bayonets.

One of the Russian Bolshevik commanders who waged the war against Ukraine, Antonov-Ovsienko, candidly admitted that the "Soviets" in Ukraine did not want to support him and his army. Writing about Ukraine (Comments on the Civil War, Vol. I, p. 55), Ovsienko said:

"The local Communists are very irresolute, are looking for coalition with opportunists, do not want and do not try to give our troops any assistance..."

Col. Muraviev, captor and butcher of Kiev, in his order No. 14 of February, 1918, wrote:

"We bring this government from the far North on the blades of our bayonets, and where we set up our rule, we support it with all means by the force of these bayonets..."

Still another Communist, a Ukrainian, Vasyl Shakhray, who became a war commissar in the "Ukrainian Soviet government" in Kharkiv, wrote ten years later:

"What kind of a 'Ukrainian government' is this that its members should not properly know and do not wish to know Ukrainian?...What kind of a Ukrainian war minister am I, that I should have to disarm all Ukrainian troops since they do not want to go with me to defend the Soviet government? We have but one military support in our fight with the Central Rada—the army that was brought into Ukraine by Antonov, which regards all that is Ukrainian as hostile, counter-revolutionary..."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Annals of the Revolution, No. I, p. 162, Kharkiv, 1928.

Such a great Ukrainian liberal and humanitarian as Professor M. Hrushevsky, President of the Central *Rada*, wrote thus of the Soviet invasion of Ukraine:

"The first matter I must stress is that, in our relations with Moscow, a radical change has taken place. It is useless to look for any possibility of living with the Russians in the boundaries of one state. We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the requisite conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have become convinced that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia. With the unprecedented barbaric atrocities of the Russian Bolsheviks with respect to the Ukrainian people, after the cruel shelling of the Ukrainian capital by the Soviet Russian troops, a new period has begun in our relations with Russia. Ukraine has to continue her struggle for liberation in order to create an independent state. Our social and political ideals must be based not on the precepts of Oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilized Europe, where human dignity is valued above all. Ukraine has always stood in her history, culturally and politically, nearer to Western Europe. If we wish to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we must conform to the civilized West..." 8

<sup>8</sup> M. Hrushevsky: On the Threshold of New Ukraine, Kiev, 1918.

# PART THREE: THE INDEPENDENT UKRAINIAN STATE

#### 1. THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK AND NEW ALLIES

Even before the proclamation of the Fourth *Universal* and the declaration of the full independence of Ukraine, the Central *Rada* had dispatched a delegation to Brest-Litovsk to negotiate a peace treaty with representatives of Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria. The Soviet government had begun peace parleys on December 22, 1917; the Ukrainian delegation arrived early in January of 1918.

There was much criticism in the Western nations regarding a separate peace treaty of Ukraine with the Central Powers. Yet as a matter of fact it was the Russians who first left the Allied fold by appealing to the Central Powers for an armistice, as was done by Soviet War Commissar Krylenko. At the outset, the Ukrainians merely tried to prevent Trotsky from representing Ukraine or having Russian puppets from Kharkiv representing Ukraine. They changed their minds quickly, however, when they saw what peace could mean to the newly-established and harassed Ukrainian state.

Leon Trotsky, who headed the Soviet delegation, tried to transform the peace negotiations into an international spring-board for revolutionary propaganda among the German and Austrian workers. He believed that the Bolshevik revolution could spread to Central Europe. The Kaiser's armies, as well as the Austrian, he thought, could be as easily disintegrated by propaganda as was the Russian. But the German and Austrian empires were too solid to be crumbled by Trotsky's propaganda speeches.

The Ukrainian delegation, consisting of three youthful diplomats — Alexander Sevriuk, Mykola Lubynsky and Mykola Levytsky — came there for business and showed it. Their deportment earned the admiration even of the German delegates. Major General Max Hoffmann, in his memoirs, Der Krieg der Versaeumten Gelegenheiten (The War of the Lost Opportunities), said:

"From the very first conversations with the Ukrainian delegation, the debate was placed on a concrete basis and was not lost in a sphere of fantastic plans."

During the negotiations, January 13-14, 1918, the Ukrainian delegation raised the following demands:

- ① De facto and de jure recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Central Powers;
- 2) Incorporation of the Ukrainian provinces of Kholm and Pidlasya (then under the occupation of the German-Austrian troops and which the Poles also coveted) into the Ukrainian republic;
  - 3. A plebiscite in Eastern Galicia.


While the Germans immediately accepted the Ukrainian conditions, Austrian Foreign Minister Ottokar von Czernin made a reservation regarding Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, stating that an autonomous regime would be granted to these Ukrainian provinces. As the negotiations proceeded, Trotsky tried to scuttle the authority of the Ukrainian delegation by bringing in his communist stooges from Kharkiv. The Central Powers refused to recognize Trotsky's "Ukrainian delegation"; on February 1, Count Czernin annonced on behalf of the delegations of the Central Powers that the Ukrainian National Republic was recognized as "a free sovereign state, fully authorized to enter into international relations."

Eight days later, Ukraine and the Central Powers concluded a separate treaty on February 9, 1918. The terms of the treaty in essence were:

Termination of the war between Ukraine and the Central Powers; incorporation of the Kholm province into Ukraine; agreement to withdraw all the troops from Ukraine; establishment of diplomatic and consular relations so soon as the treaty was ratified; renunciation of all indemnities; liberation of all war prisoners and resumption of agricultural and industrial trade (separate commercial treaties were to be concluded between Ukraine and each of the four Central Powers).

In addition, in a secret clause Austro-Hungary agreed to unite Eastern Galicia and Bukovina into a separate autonomous crown province, granting them the use of the Ukrainian language and other rights.

The signing of the treaty by Ukraine caused Trotsky to break off negotiations for a few days. He resumed them on February 18, but it was not until March 3 that the Soviet govern-



THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY AT BREST-LITOVSK: Ukrainian Delegates, Alexander Sevriuk, Mykola Levytsky and Mykola Lubynsky, representing the Ukrainian Central Rada, affix their signatures to the peace treaty document on February 9, 1918 at Brest-Litovsk. The Ukrainian delegates are surrounded by representatives of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.

ment finally signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers. One of its provisions was their agreement to negotiate a peace treaty with Ukraine. The Russians, of course, never abided by this clause. The Soviet offensive against Ukraine continued unabated.

The overall impact of the treaty, which has become known as the "Ukrainian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk," was naturally a weighty one. In the first place, it secured for the young Ukrainian republic recognition from the only powers that were willing and in a position to give Ukraine tangible and meaningful assistance. The provisions of the secret clause on Eastern Galicia and Bukovina were never put into effect. Nonetheless, the treaty enhanced the chances of realizing the ideal of independence for all the Ukrainian territories and paved the way for the Act of Union, which took place on January 22, 1919.

On the other hand, the treaty made Ukraine dependent on German support and rendered possible German interference in Ukraine's internal affairs, a development whose detrimental effects were to appear later. The treaty provided for a large shipment of Ukrainian foodstuffs to Germany and Austria, which enabled these powers to sustain themselves longer in the war against the Western powers. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty ("The Bread Treaty") also drove a wedge between Ukraine and the *Entente* at the time when the latter gained decisively in strength as a result of the entry of the United States into the war against the Central Powers.

But the Ukrainians only hoped against hope that the Germans and Austrians would provide military support to help them drive the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine. This and only this was paramount in their minds when they sought to conclude a peace treaty with the Central Powers.

In retrospect, it is a pity for Western civilization that Ukraine was too weak to crush Bolshevism at least within the confines of its own lands.

#### 2. THE RULE OF HETMAN PAUL SKOROPADSKY

After the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the Rada directed its efforts from Zhytomyr as a base. The country was now overrun by a multitude of armed bands under self-styled atamans who plundered indiscriminately in the name of the revolution. The Ukrainian forces were strengthened by the expansion of units of Sichovi Striltsi, organized previously by Colonel Eugene Konovalets, and by other units composed of former Ukrainian prisoners of war in Austria and Germany. Although these gave the Ukrainian Republic more stability and reliable military support, they proved insufficient to drive the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine. In desperation, the Rada then appealed to Germany for military assistance. By March 1, 1918, Ukrainian and German troops had entered the Ukrainian capital, and soon the Rada also returned to Kiev. The fighting against the Bolsheviks was hard, but during March and April the whole of Ukraine, as far as the Don Cossacks territory, was cleared of Russian communist troops. Militarily, the situation was eased.

But the Ukrainian national cause suffered again, because the allies who came to help drive off one hated enemy abused their privileges and quickly aroused the hatred of the population anew.

The Rada and its new government under the premiership of Vsevolod Holubovych announced that it intended to pursue the same policies as were outlined in the Third and Fourth Universals. Although the government received the overwhelming

support of all the Ukrainian political parties, it continually encountered difficulties with the wealthy and conservative classes and, in general, with the non-Ukrainian population, especially the Russians and the Poles. The Rada, with its radical program of agrarian reform, was singled out for bitter criticism by the landowners, who, in the majority, were either Russian or Polish. Their voice was not unimportant. Large numbers of the Russian aristocracy had fled to Ukraine from turbulent Russia. These dreamed only of the restoration of the Czarist regime, and so not only did they not support the young Ukrainian republic, they were totally hostile to it. As for the Poles, the Polish landowners on the right bank of the Dnieper River began organizing Polish legions and ap-



Paul Skoropadsky,

Hetman of the Ukrainian State from
April to November 1918.

pealed to the Austrian government to occupy Volhynia and Podilya and to repeal the agrarian reforms introduced by the Rada.

Finally, the presence of the alien German army in Ukraine also made for agitation against the *Rada*, as it was the organ which had appealed to the Germans for aid.

Seeking broad popular support again, the *Rada* set June 12, 1918, as the date for convocation of the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly.

Meantime the great landowners, among them Ukrainians who had never abandoned the Ukrainian traditions or their Ukrainian conscience, had organized themselves into a "Party of Farmers-Democrats" (Khliboroby). This body presented the Central Rada with a series of demands concerning the restitution of private property, the completion of the Rada with representatives of their groups, postponement of the elections to the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly, and the like.

The Germans, who had come as an "allied" army, were by nature conservative and bound to be critical of the socialist and radical policies of the Rada. Thus they gravitated to the landowners' groups, which in the German eyes, represented "order," always preferable to "chaos."

So we find the German authorities committing an unfortunate act, fraught with consequences. On April 28, 1918, they sent troops into the building where the Rada deliberated and dispersed the assembly, despite the impassioned protests of President Prof. M. Hrushevsky. The democratic spirit of Ukraine had received a mortal blow.


At the same time the "Party of Farmers-Democrats" held its congress and elected General Paul Skoropadsky as new hetman of Ukraine, who was immediately installed as head of the new government in Kiev with the instant approval of the Germans.

Paul Skoropadsky was of the family of <u>Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky</u>, who had been chosen by Peter the Great to take the place of <u>Hetman Mazepa in 1708</u>. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been educated in St. Petersburg as a Russian nobleman. His opponents still saw him as a Russian aristocrat, despite the fact that he, a high Russian military commander, had Ukrainized his corps immediately after the establishment of the *Rada*.

The new rule in Ukraine was as conservative as the Rada's was progressive. For a short time order was established in Ukraine. But the new regime repealed most of the land reforms of the Rada and the landowners were reestablished in their own estates. Strikes were forbidden and the German troops began wholesale requisitioning of foodstuffs by force throughout the country.

Adding to Skoropadsky's unpopularity was his policy of relying on former Russian officials and army men who had found shelter in Ukraine and who thought that by serving Hetman Skoropadsky they would rebuild the former Russian empire, a Russia in which Ukraine again would become a Malorossiya.

As discontent spread rapidly throughout the country, the Germans had increasing difficulties in their requisitioning raids. Large-scale reprisals against Ukrainian peasants began, with which Skoropadsky's government was closely identified. The opposition against the Germans and his government became so widespread that a series of underground resistance movements and groups sprang up in opposition.



UKRAINIAN PEASANTS' DEMONSTRATION: A patriotic Ukrainian Peasant Demonstration in Kiev in April 1918.

The Ukrainian partisans and sympathizers of the Hetmanite movement provide another interpretation of the advent of General Paul Skoropadsky to power in Ukraine in April 1918. For example, the late Professor Dmytro Doroshenko, eminent Ukrainian historian and himself a Ukrainian monarchist, writes about this phase of Ukrainian history:

"On April 29, that is, after the departure of the Germans from the assembly room, the Central Rada continued to deliberate; it passed a land reform, voted in a Provisional Constitution of the Ukrainian National Republic and elected Professor M. Hrushevsky as President of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Hetmanite coup took place in the night of April 29-30. The Central Rada was still in session when a solemn Mass was being celebrated at the St. Sophia Square, after the election of Hetman P. Skoropadsky. Only then when the news about the election of the Hetman became known, the Central Rada dispersed on its own, without being dispersed by anyone. No one stood in defense of the Central Rada and its Government, and Prof. Hrushevsky stayed quietly at his villa outside Kiev." 9

In another work on Ukrainian history, Prof. Doroshenko states:

"The regime of Paul Skoropadsky was recognized by the Party of Ukrainian Farmers-Democrats and industrial and financial circles of Ukraine. In opposition to his regime were the Ukrainian Socialists, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Dmytro Doroshenko: Istoriya Ukrainy, 1917-1923 (History of Ukraine 1917-23) Vol. II, Ukrainska Hetmanska Derzhava (The Ukrainian Hemanite State), Uzhorod, 1930, pp. 34-35.

a considerable majority of the Ukrainian democratic intelligentsia and workers. Against his regime were arrayed also the Russian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks, because the *Hetmanite* regime was a form of the Ukrainian monarchy, one which relied principally upon the conservative strata of the population of Ukraine. *Hetman* Skoropadsky proclaimed a new governmental order, taking upon himself *en toto* law making and administrative authority, until the time of the convening of a Ukrainian Parliament, based upon democratic principles.

"The Hetman abrogated the laws concerning the socialization of land, and proclaimed that private property of land is the basis of the economic order. The Government of the Hetman, relying on landowners, the wealthier Kozaks and upon moderate and conservative circles, which, in a great measure, were Russified, was moderate and cautious in its social policies. By doing so, it in a great measure arrayed against itself the radically disposed masses.

"Nonetheless, during his rule, (which lasted seven and a half months), he succeeded in restoring order in the state, which was disrupted by the Bolshevik invader and Bolshevik chaos; he introduced hard Ukrainian currency, and restored social self-government, transportation, and finally did a great deal for the benefit of Ukrainian culture." 10

Hetman Skoropadsky, indeed, founded two Ukrainian universities in Kiev and Kamianets-Podilsky, as well as the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev.

But this situation, of course, favored the Bolshevik agitation in Ukraine. Throughout the summer of 1918 a Bolshevik delegation stayed in Kiev. It was led by Christian Rakovsky and Dmytro Z. Manuilsky, the latter a Ukrainian by birth, but a close friend of Lenin and a fanatical Communist. The delegation ostensibly had come to draw up a peace treaty between Ukraine and the Soviet Russian Republic; actually, it was mounting a secret Bolshevik underground in Ukraine.

But the German policy, too, was inconsistent and ended up catastrophically. Although the Germans opposed the spread of Bolshevism, in Ukraine they played directly into the hands of the Bolsheviks by virtue of their harsh policies with respect to the Ukrainian people.

As the power and influence of the Central Powers ebbed and the collapse of the German front in France drew nearer, the Ukrainian nationalist and anti-German forces began preparing to reestablish the *Rada* and to restore the Ukrainian National Republic.

A secret Directorate under the presidency of V. Vynnychenko was formed in Bila Tserkva and together with the Ukrainian

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Dmytro Doroshenko: *Istoriya Ukrainy (History of Ukraine*) Cracow-Lviv, 1942, pp. 238-40.

National Union, a plan was devised to overthrow the Skoropadsky regime and to expel the Germans.

The final act of *Hetman* Skoropadsky in proclaiming a federation with Russia on November 14, 1918, precipitated the overthrow of his government.

Part of this plan was automatically met with the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm on November 9, 1918, and the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918. The German authority in Ukraine collapsed and its forces retreated posthaste. The victorious Allies, however, forbade them to turn their arms over to the Ukrainians for fear of offending the Russians. On December 14, 1918, the Ukrainian troops of the Directorate, spearheaded by the Sichovi Striltsi, under the command of Col. Eugene Konovalets, entered Kiev.

Throughout this period the Bolshevik forces had had ample time and opportunity to organize in Russia, where they were relatively unchallenged. In the southeast the remnants of the Czarist armies under Denikin and Wrangel were forming to fight not only against the Bolsheviks but against the Ukrainians as well.

At this critical stage Simon Petlura emerged as the dominant figure in the Ukrainian movement. A man of simple origin, he had acquired an education through force of will and developed a considerable talent for leadership, especially marked in military affairs. He assumed his role at a time when a novel Ukrainian political situation was created with the establishment of the Western Ukrainian National Republic.

### 3. THE RISE OF THE WESTERN UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC

While the Ukrainians on the Dnieper had been fighting in defense of their newly regained independence, their brothers under the Austrian rule were attempting to wrest from the Vienna government as much freedom as possible. As to be expected, the Ukrainian National Revolution had a profound effect upon the peoples of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine. Moreover, the Ukrainian legions (the Sich Riflemen), which served with the Austrian armies, were stationed in Ukraine in 1918; they had witnessed the rebirth of the Ukrainian state and openly sympathized with the movement. It did not take long for their strong sentiments to have repercussions back home.

Enthusiasm for a united Ukrainian state, which would include the Western Ukrainian territories, swept these lands when it became increasingly clear that the Hapsburg empire was doomed to fall. There still were, of course, some older Ukrainian politicians who believed in a Ukrainian autonomous section of the empire. But even these were disillusioned when on July 22, 1918, the Austrian parliament repudiated the promise given to the Ukrainian delegation at Brest-Litovsk regarding the Ukrainians in Austria. The movement for the decentralization of the Hapsburg empire received additional impetus with President Woodrow Wilson's proclamation of his Fourteen Points, among them the self-determination of all nations.

On October 18, 1918, a Ukrainian National Rada was established in Lviv under the presidency of Dr. Eugene Petrushevych. It embraced all the Ukrainian representatives in the provincial diets and central parliament as well as representatives of all political parties. It issued an appeal for the formation of a republic which would include all the Ukrainians living in the empire, i. e. in Eastern Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine. In doing so, the National Rada only followed what already had been done by the Hungarians, the Czechs and the Poles. The latter had set up their government on October 31, 1918, in Cracow and were planning to take over the whole of Galicia. The Rada, on the same day, asked the governor-general of Galicia, Count Huyn, to turn the administration over to the Ukrainians. When he refused, Ukrainian military units raised the national flag of Ukraine on the towers of the City Hall building of ancient Lviv on November 1, 1918.

But the Poles, who comprised a majority in the city at that time, rose in revolt, and bitter street fighting ensued which lasted for almost three weeks. The fighting ended when the Poles, helped by fresh detachments of their troops arriving from Cracow, succeeded in breaking the Ukrainian lines and taking over the city.

During the struggle for Lviv the entire province of Eastern Galicia went under the authority of the National Rada. On November 9 a new Western Ukrainian government was created under the premiership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, a veteran Ukrainian parliamentarian with many years of service in the Vienna Parliament. A Ukrainian force, known as the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), was organized under the command of Col. Dmytro Vitovsky and sent to the front against the Poles at the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad line.

The other two Ukrainian provinces followed suit. On November 3 the Ukrainians in Bukovina occupied the city of Chernivtsi and placed it under the authority of the Ukrainian Regional Committee under the presidency of Omelian Popovych. On November 11, however, units of the regular Rumanian army entered the city and overthrew the Ukrainian autonomous rule.

In Carpatho-Ukraine the Ukrainian movement was slow in gathering momentum for various reasons. Both the Hungarians and the Czechs put forth a claim to Carpatho-Ukraine. Ukrainian representatives held meetings in Presov, Uzhorod and Hust. It was on January 21, 1919, that these representatives voted to join Western Ukraine, a move which could not be implemented because of the Polish-Ukrainian war in Eastern Galicia.

#### 4. POLISH ASSAULT ON EASTERN GALICIA

With the fall of Lviv the seat of the Western Ukrainian National Republic was transferred to the city of Stanislaviv.



Dr. Eugene Petrushevych,

President of the Western Ukrainian National Republic in 1919.



Col. Dmytro Vitovsky,

War Minister of the Western Ukrainian National Republic. From here the much-harassed government ably administered the country. Its primary task was to organize an army which could effectively resist the Polish invasion. It appealed for help to the Ukrainian government in Kiev, which promptly responded by sending one infantry division, a cavalry brigade and some artillery units to the Lviv front.

On January 22, 1919, the Western Ukrainian Republic. by the Act of Union, was united with the Ukrainian National Republic. This seemed to be, for the time being, at least, a salutary move for the successful termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war, as the Western Ukrainians hoped to receive substantial military assistance from Kiev. But it was far more difficult to implement such policies in practice than to devise them in theory. The Directorate in Ukraine was itself beleaguered by new thrusts of the Bolshevik armies and by the resurgent White Russian (Czarist) troops.

In the spring the situation of the Poles had considerably improved. Pilsudski, on the side of the Central Powers, had reached a final agreement with the group of Paderewski and Dmowski, who were supported by the *Entente*, and, in fact, recognized by them. In May of 1919 the Polish troops who were fighting the Ukrainians were reinforced with six new divisions under the command of General Josef Haller, organized, trained and equipped by the Allies in France. Originally, these troops were supposed to resist Bolshevik attempts to invade Poland and not to fight the Ukrainians. However, they were thrown against the Ukrainians, and decisively swayed the fortunes of war to the Polish side.

The Polish-Ukrainian war continued until July 16, 1919, at which time the Ukrainian Galician Army, ill-equipped, lacking guns, ammunition, medical and other supplies, was forced to abandon Western Ukraine. To the last, however, its morale was unflagging under the brilliant leadership of Generals M. Omelanovych-Pavlenko, A. Hrekiv and Myron Tarnavsky, its commanders-in-chief.

At the Paris Peace Conference the two Ukrainian delegations (one from Petlura's Directorate, the other from President Eugene Petrushevych) vainly endeavored to seek support and recognition from the victorious Allied powers. The "Big Four" — Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando — tried to mediate the Polish-Ukrainian war, but an ambitious Pilsudski paid no heed to them.



Lt. Gen. M. Omelanovych-Pavlenko, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army in 1919 and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic.

Lt. General Myron Tarnavsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) in 1919.

Back in February, 1919, an allied military mission headed by French General Barthelemy had arrived in Eastern Galicia to try to mediate the Polish-Ukrainian war. It proposed a division of Eastern Galicia along the Bug and Striy Rivers. The Eastern part was to be under Ukrainian administration and recognized de facto by the Big Four powers as a sovereign state. This proposal was rejected by the Petrushevych government as unfair and injurious to the Ukrainians. In May, 1919, another Allied Mission under General Botha (South Africa) presented a revised armistice proposal, but the Poles, confident in their new-found military prowess, dismissed it and continued their offensive against the Ukrainians. Even then the Ukrainian army, under the command of General Alexander Hrekiv, was conducting a large-scale offensive against the Polish troops and succeeded in repulsing them several dozen miles along a large sector. The General Haller divisions, however, then entered the fray, and by the middle of July, 1919, the Ukrainian Galician Army was pushed back across the Zbruch River into Great Ukraine.

Raymond Leslie Buell writes of this phase of Ukraine's struggle for freedom: 11

"Attacked fiercely by Poles and Russians, the Ukrainians strove in vain for recognition at the Paris Peace Conference. The Allies might have been successful in their anti-Russian policy had they supported these claims. But they listened to the Czarist Russians, who demanded the maintenance of the old Empire; they listened to the Poles, who contended that the Ukrainians were under the domination of both the Bolsheviks and the Germans, and that Galicia had formed part of the old Polish kingdom and could not possibly maintain an independent government. When the Polish troops began to move against the Ukrainians, the Peace Conference endeavored to arrange an armistice, but Poland declined to accept it unless its territorial demands were recognized...

"Meanwhile, the Allies decided to supply arms not to the Ukrainians but to Admiral Kolchak, who insisted on being recognized as the head of the whole pre-war Russia except ethnic Poland. Crushed between the Poles, the Bolsheviks, the Czarist Russians and the Allies, the Ukrainian governments gave way, not only in Eastern Galicia, but in Russia as well, and the peasants in the Soviet Ukraine grudgingly accepted Communism..."

#### 5. THE UNITED UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC

The return of the Directorate to Kiev and the resumption of authority by the Ukrainian government was accompanied by extreme difficulties. But one of the most constructive initial steps of the Directorate was the implementation of the Act of Union, which took place on January 22, 1919, by which Western Ukraine was united with the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Act of Union was solemnly proclaimed in Kiev. A special proclamation was read in St. Sophia Square, thronged with hundreds of thousands of people. It was signed by V. Vynnychenko, the head of the Directorate, and four other members: Petlura, Andrievsky, Shvets and Makarenko. It read in part:

"...From today on there shall be united in one Great Ukraine the centuries-separated parts of Ukraine—Galicia, Bukovina, Hungarian and Dnieper Ukraine. The eternal dreams, for which the finest sons of Ukraine lived and died, have been fulfilled. From today on there shall be only one independent Ukrainian National Republic. From today on the Ukrainian people, freed by the mighty upsurge of their own strength, have the opportunity to unite all the endeavors of their sons for the creation of an indivisible, independent Ukrainian state for the good and the welfare of the working people..."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Poland: Key to Europe. Raymond Leslie Buell. Alfred A. Knopf New York-London, 1939, pp. 269 et seq.



The Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic welcomes the delegation of the Western Ukrainian National Republic at the railroad station in Kiev in January, 1919. From right to left: Volodymyr Vynnychenko, head of the Directorate, Simon Petlura (white armband) and Dr. Lev Bachynsky, delegate of the Western Ukrainian National Republic.

At the momentous Labor Congress the next day the Act of Union was read again and acclaimed by 257 delegates from all over Ukraine. Among them were 65 delegates representing Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine, all of whom unanimously endorsed the declaration.

With the collapse of Turkey the Dardanelles were open for moving of supplies by sea into the long sealed-off territories of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia and the Don Cossacks. But no supplies came for these newly-liberated countries. The Allies continued to believe that these countries obtained their liberation through German instigation. Instead, the Allies threw all their support behind White Russian Generals Denikin, Wrangel and Kolchak, whom they wanted to see as the future rulers of an anti-communist Russia. French troops landed in Odessa in December, 1918, at the same time the French and the British were training the Polish army of General Haller to be hurled against Western Ukraine. The French troops expelled the Ukrainian forces and installed a Czarist Russian general as governor. But the French soldiers themselves could not withstand Bolshevik agitation and soon lost their discipline and efficiency, which precipitated their withdrawal in April of 1919.

In February, 1919, a crisis shattered the Directorate. Petlura replaced Vynnychenko as head of the five-man body; he also became commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces. Soon the Directorate was compelled to abandon Kiev again, and the seat of the Ukrainian government was moved to Kamianets-Podilsky, closer to the hard-pressed Western Ukrainian government, which despite the Union with Kiev, continued to resist the Polish forces almost exclusively with its own resources, as the Directorate now could not spare any reinforcements at all.

Attempts to secure consideration for the claims of Ukrainian independence at the Paris Peace Conference met with complete lack of success. The Ukrainian delegation, composed of Prof. Alexander Shulhyn, Foreign Minister of the Directorate, and a staff of able Ukrainian statesmen from both Kiev and Western Ukraine, strove in vain to secure recognition of the Ukrainians' right to self-determination. Ironically, multi-national states were to be created; but Ukraine, of unsullied origin and with one language, culture and people, was to be ignored.

France at the time was obsessed by the possible resurgence of German militarism and therefore committed itself to the idea of a "strong Poland" as a counterpoise to Germany in Eastern Europe. She greeted the Ukrainian claims to Eastern Galicia with distinct disfavor, supporting instead the White Russian generals against the Ukrainian government in Kiev.

Great Britain wavered between the aggressive anti-Bolshevik policies of Winston Churchill, then Secretary of War, who aided Generals Denikin, Wrangel and Kolchak with arms and ammunition, and the more moderate policy of Lloyd George; but neither of these policies favored the Ukrainian aspirations to independence.

The United States) was relatively little interested in Eastern Europe. Its official attitude was one of waiting and doing nothing to prejudice the eventual rebirth of an anti-communist Russia, or even the emergence of a moderate Soviet regime. But all three great allied powers eventually threw their support behind the White Russian reactionary elements, apparently in the belief that they were the only forces that could thwart the Bolsheviks. They regarded with approval what General Denikin accomplished in those portions of the Ukrainian territories which he occupied in the summer of 1919. Everywhere Denikin went, he restored the old despicable Czarist regime, banning the Ukrainian language, closing the Ukrainian schools, confiscat-



ACT OF UNION: Proclamation of the Act of Union of the Western Ukrainian Republic with the Ukrainian National Republic on January 22, 1919 in Kiev.

ing Ukrainian books and newspapers, and restoring former estates to their owners.

By the end of August, 1919, the united Ukrainian armies, i. e. the Ukrainian Galician Army, which was pushed out from Galicia, and the army of the Directorate, together mounted a large-scale offensive and expelled the Bolsheviks from Kiev, reinstating the Ukrainian government, on August 31, 1919. This was a clear-cut defeat for the Bolshevik armies, which now posed as the "army of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," with its capital in Kharkiv) Where the Allies failed, the Bolsheviks profited: they recognized the Ukrainian movement, but they dressed it in their favorite Red color.


The Ukrainian peasants gave sympathy and support to the Directorate. They hated the Bolsheviks because of their anti-religious policies, their attempts to communize the villages, and their wholesale executions and murders. They despised the White Russians, inasmuch as they attempted to resurrect the old Czarist regime, with the hateful and oppressive features of alien rule.

The Red and White Russians, on the other hand, had a great number of experienced officers, trained in the Czarist armies; and the Whites received fresh supplies from the Allies. For the balance of 1919 the Ukrainian armies continued their struggle, until finally they found themselves in a "triangle of death," hemmed in between the Poles, the White Russians and the Bolsheviks. The Petrushevych government and one corps of the Ukrainian Galician Army commanded by General Krauss, seeing in the Poles their worst enemies, crossed into Rumania and Czechoslovakia, where they were given political asylum. The greater part of the Ukrainian troops, however, succumbed to an epidemic of typhus.

The Petlura government, taking opportunistic advantage, entered into a military agreement with Pilsudski's regime. Like Petlura, Pilsudski was a bitter anti-Russian, and he thought perhaps a Ukrainian government, without Western Ukraine and friendly to Poland, might weaken Russia, whether it was White or Red. Petlura, on the other hand, was driven by an extremely perilous position. Eventually a rapprochement took place between Petlura and Pilsudski, which provoked a break with the Western Ukrainians.

On April 24, 1920, the Ukrainian National Republic and the Polish government of Pilsudski concluded a military alliance. Eastern Galicia was not mentioned in the treaty, but in exchange the Ukrainian government secured Polish recognition. The Ukrainian army under the command of Petlura was reorganized and equipped with Allied equipment. In May of 1920 the combined Polish-Ukrainian armies cleared Ukraine west of the Dnieper, took Kiev, and even established a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

But this alliance with Poland elicited little enthusiasm and support among the Ukrainian people. Many patriotic Ukrainians could not forgive Petlura his abandonment of Western Ukraine, and still less could they countenance Polish influence and the return of Polish landowners in Ukraine. The subsequent successful and decisive counter-offensive of the Soviet armies against the Polish-Ukrainian forces was greatly abetted by the anti-Polish attitude of the Ukrainian population. By the end of July the whole of Ukraine again was in the hands of the Soviet troops, and Poland itself was saved only by the Battle of Warsaw in August directed by French General Weygand. The Soviet forces were pushed to the east, and Polish-Soviet peace treaty negotiations began. On March 21, 1921, a peace treaty between Poland, on the one hand, and the Soviet Russian Republic and the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," on the other, was signed, in Riga, Latvia.



THE DIRECTORATE OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC in 1919. From left to right: Fedir Shvets, Andriy Makarenko and Simon Petlura, head of the Directorate.

In this treaty no mention was made of the Ukrainian National Republic nor of the Directorate and the Ukrainian army which had fought alongside the Polish troops against the Red armies.

For all practical purposes, Ukraine was now again divided between Soviet Russia and Poland, as she had been by the Treaty of Andrusiv in 1667. History, tragically, had repeated itself.

The Petlura army was interned by the Poles. For several years thereafter in Ukraine, anti-Soviet uprisings occurred. One such upheaval took place in November, 1921, when a raiding group of 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers under the command of General Yuri Tiutiunnyk, Petlura's aide, crossed the Polish-Soviet border and penetrated deep into Ukraine to 40 klms. from Kiev, wreaking havoc and devastation. The Soviet command had to throw several divisions into the area to clear it of the Ukrainian insurgents. (Some 357 of them were caught and summarily executed in the town of Bazar, in Ukraine.) Such uprisings eventually subsided.

Thus for almost four years—from March, 1917, until the final occupation of Ukraine by the Russian Bolsheviks — the Ukrainian people fought for their freedom and independence under the most difficult and adverse conditions. Freedom was in their hands, only to be wrenched away. If fate was kind to

them, the world was unkind, for when they fought for their independence, the world at large displayed either indifference or complete hostility. We can well wonder now what would have happened had Ukraine survived as an independent state, thereby depriving the Soviet regime of its natural resources and, too, eliminating that alleged vacuum which Ukraine and other non-Russian countries apparently constituted for Hitler, enticing him toward their "easy" conquest.

Today, the memorable fortieth anniversary of Ukrainian independence, is a fitting occasion to think of what did happen. For the forces that raised the Ukrainian nation to freedom forty years ago are by no means gone. The yearning for freedom was not and never will be extinguished in the hearts of this valiant people.

# EPILOGUE

By the spring of 1921, when the dust of war had settled in Eastern Europe, Ukraine found itself in an entirely new political situation. Eastern Ukraine, now formalized in the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," was an unwilling victim of the new form of Russian imperialism, which in essence was the same old system, merely covered over with the theoretical trappings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Western Ukraine was divided between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, principally along the old provincial boundaries of the Hapsburg empire. The Ukrainians were thrown into depression; independence, peace and eventual prosperity had been in their grasp. Now these cherished ideals again had to be relegated to a future, distant day.

But in the decades that followed the fall of Ukrainian independence the Ukrainian nation learned a great deal, and eventually demonstrated that the years of struggle for independence had not been and would never be a total loss.

### BETWEEN THE WARS

1. Ukrainians in the Soviet Union: Over 30,000,000 Ukrainians lived in what was officially known as the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" and which in 1923 was made a part of the Sovet Union as a "free and equal member Republic." More than 8,000,000 other Ukrainians were dispersed throughout Asia. Although the Soviet Ukrainian government was established, it was in no wise a government of the Ukrainian people. It was ruled by the Politburo of the Communist Party through its puppets in Ukraine, organized in the Communist Party of Ukraine. But even this party was not run or controlled by Ukrainians, but by Russians or other aliens: Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, Melnikov and others who, more often than not, could not speak the Ukrainian language. Genuine Ukrainian Communists, such as Zatonsky, Petrovsky, Skrypnyk, Porayko, Shumsky, Khvylovy, Lubchenko, and others, were either "liquidated" or exiled, or forced to commit suicide.

Moscow ruled the Ukrainians with unrelenting severity and harshness. It did allow the use of the Ukrainian language and even introduced an official Ukrainization program in the middle 20's, but only to pretend that a "true freedom and independence" existed in Ukraine. But at the same time it pursued its policies of oppressive Russification and Sovietization, deportations and outright genocide. The periodical man-made famines, such as the one in 1932-33 which evoked worldwide protests and indignation, including official condemnation by the League of Nations, served Moscow as a heinous instrument to compel the Ukrainians to submit to forceful collectivization. In their unflagging drives against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," the Russian Communists sought to destroy Ukrainian culture by arresting, deporting or executing Ukrainian writers and poets; they suppressed Ukrainian science, although science was developed within the existing Soviet system. In their anti-religious policies the Russians obliterated the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalic Church by liquidating Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky and some 32 Ukrainian Orthodox bishops.

In the perennial purges which in Ukraine have always had the taint of genocide, the Russians decimated the Ukrainian intelligentsia and leadership. The apparatuses of the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD and MVD were especially busy in Ukraine in the 30's; thousands of patriotic Ukrainians were executed or exiled for participating in secret anti-communist organizations, such as the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," the "Union of Ukrainian Youth," the "Ukrainian Military Organization," the "Ukrainian National Center," the "Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Center," and many others. The overall terror against the Ukrainian people continued all through World War II, especially directed at that time against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR), and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), even though these groups were fighting against the Nazis.

The Russian Communists were not merely content with persecuting the Ukrainians inside the USSR; they stretched their hands out across the world trying to communize or to eradicate Ukrainians living in other countries. Liquidated, as examples, were three important Ukrainian leaders who symbolized the ideals of Ukrainian independence and who had been known in Ukraine as staunch anti-Russian giants in the Ukrainian movement:

On May 26, 1926, in a street in Paris, a Soviet communist agent named Schwartzbard shot to death Simon Petlura, actual head of the Ukrainian government-in-exile. The reason for the assassination was Petlura's alleged anti-Jewish pogroms conducted in Ukraine during his tenure as leader of the Ukrainian government. (As a matter of historical record, Petlura fought against pogroms. His Order No. 131 of August 26, 1919, to the troops of the Ukrainian National Republic was reprinted in the June 20, 1926 issue of *The New York Times*.)

Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky, former president of the Ukrainian Central Rada, who returned to Ukraine from Vienna on March 7, 1924, perished as a result of Russian persecution. In 1930 he was implicated in the political process of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" and exiled from Ukraine; he became blind from malnutrition and died in penury in the Caucasus in 1934.

On May 23, 1938, Soviet agent Valukh slipped a time bomb in the coat pocket of Col. Eugene Konovalets, head of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) and of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, which killed him instantly upon detonation.

With their seizure of Western Ukraine in the fall of 1939 on the basis of the Hitler-Stalin "friendship" pact, the Russians instituted a mass terrorization. Like their predecessors, the Czarist Russians, in 1914-15, they liquidated Ukrainian organizations, cooperatives, the press, *Prosvita* societies and schools. They also deported thousands of Ukrainians, members of the OUN and of such organizations as UNDO, Socialist and Radical parties, Catholic societies and others, as "fascists" and "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists." Among them were many Ukrainian Catholic priests.

2. Ukrainians Under Poland: When the Soviet Russian regime finally crushed the attempts to set up an independent Ukrainian state, Poland took over Eastern Galicia and a good portion of Volhynia, Polisya and Pidlasya, territories which had belonged to Russia prior to 1914. Some 7,500,000 Ukrainians were subjugated to the rule of reborn Poland. Originally, the Allied Supreme Council allowed the Poles to occupy Eastern Galicia with the proviso that political and religious freedom be granted to the inhabitants. But on March 14, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors assigned this Ukrainian land permanently to Poland under a provision that local autonomy be given to the Ukrainians. This decision provoked resentment and strong protests on the part of

Ukrainians everywhere, including those living in the United States and Canada.

The reborn Poland, supported by France, intended to become a "great power." Toward this end she embarked on a policy of persecution and intolerance toward the millions of non-Poles who were incorporated within the Polish borders. In addition to the Ukrainians, other oppressed nationalities included the Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Germans, and Jews. The Polish authorities set up a severe police regime and also planted colonies of Polish ex-soldiers in the Ukrainian territories. They pursued a policy of denationalizing the Ukrainians by closing Ukrainian schools and imposing the Polish language on these territories where few Poles resided. Although Catholics themselves, the Poles ruthlessly hounded the Ukrainian Catholic Church, inasmuch as this church was a bastion of Ukrainian national and cultural life. Finally, they introduced an infamous institution, a concentration camp in Bereza Kartuska, where they incarcerated rebellious Ukrainians, and sometimes even their own Polish oppositionists.

Reaction to this rule assumed two principal forms. The overt form was represented by the largest Ukrainian political party, UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Union), headed initially by Dr. Dmytro Levytsky and later by Vasyl Mudry. It advocated a policy of obtaining maximum rights for the Ukrainians in the Polish state, and at the same time stressed the right of all Ukrainians to unite themselves in a sovereign and democratic Ukrainian state within Ukrainian ethnographic borders. In 1928 the Ukrainians elected a considerable number of their deputies and senators to the Polish Sejm, thereby becoming an important political factor in Poland. Through newspapers, village libraries of Prosvita and the extremely well-organized cooperative system, the Ukrainians tried to keep alive the national and political consciousness of the people. They formed a virtual Ukrainian state within Poland.

A covert form of Ukrainian reaction to Polish harsh rule was the Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary front, represented by the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which adopted a position of intransigent and uncompromising assertion of the Ukrainian people to be expressed in an independent and united state. It was bitterly anti-Polish, its leaders in the majority being former Ukrainian officers who had fought in the war against Poland in 1918-19. The movement spawned a number of

clandestine groups, which organized attacks on individual Polish officials deemed responsible for oppressive acts of the government.

In retaliation the Polish regime was as indiscriminate as it was brutal and harsh. In 1930, for instance, Polish cavalry and police troops raided, plundered and burned Ukrainian villages, destroyed Ukrainian clubs, libraries, cooperatives, Boy Scout organizations, and closed Ukrainian private schools. They arrested and beat to death scores of Ukrainian patriots. This action, known as "pacification," became a subject for bitter debate in the League of Nations in Geneva, with Poland being given a severe reprimand for committing the barbarities.

Nevertheless, this anti-Ukrainian policy continued up to the very eve of World War II. In fact, Polish prisons were full of Ukrainian political prisoners when the Poland of 1919 ceased to exist in the fall of 1939.

3. Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia: Subjected to harsh political repressions and persecution in the USSR and Poland, the leaders

of the Ukrainian independence movement dispersed to various European countries. A number of them found refuge in Prague. Several Ukrainian cultural organizations were established there: the Free Ukrainian University, the Historical and Philosophical Society, the Museum of Ukraine's Liberation Struggle, and others.

But while the Prague government was favorably disposed to the political emigres from Soviet and Western Ukraine, it was quite antagonistic to some 550,-000 Ukrainians in Carpatho-Ukraine. This section of Ukraine, despite its attempts to unite with Ukraine in 1919, found itself incorporated into a new Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of St. Germain. The Prague government gave it the of-



Rt. Rev. Msgr. Augustine Voloshyn,
President of Carpatho-Ukraine in
March 1939.

ficial name of *Podkarpatska Rus* and promised it autonomy, a promise which was never kept.

But in general, Czechoslovakia being a democratic state, the conditions of the Ukrainians were better and they enjoyed more freedom there. At times the Czechoslovak government pursued a policy of playing off Russian against Ukrainian influence. Several hundred thousand Ukrainian mountaineers preserved patterns of Ukrainian culture and folklore, despite the domination of the Hungarians before World War I. The traditional pro-Russian tendencies of the Czechs were manifested in their policy of favoring the Russophile elements in Carpatho-Ukraine, despite the fact that these were in the minority.

In 1938 the rise to power of aggressive Nazi Germany threw Eastern Europe into a turmoil, and Carpatho-Ukraine acquired a sudden political importance. It was granted autonomy within a diminished Czechoslovakia, after the Munich pact. Although the Prague government appointed a pro-Hungarian man, Andrew Brody, he was quickly suspended because of his overt sympathies for the Hungarians, who coveted the country. A true national Ukrainian government then was entrusted to Monsignor Augustine Voloshyn, a very popular Ukrainian Catholic priest. On November 2, 1938, however, a substantial part of Carpatho-Ukraine with the cities of Mukachevo, Berehovo and Uzhorod was handed over to Hungary by Hitler and Mussolini. A few weeks later Carpatho-Ukraine became one of the states within the federation, and Hust became the new capital. On February 11, 1939, a general election took place in Carpatho-Ukraine to elect the 32 members of its first parliament. In this vote the Ukrainian National Union received 29 mandates, while three others went to the Czech, Rumanian and German minorities.

Within a short period Carpatho-Ukraine became a focal point of Ukrainian and international politics. Ukrainian became the official language. A Ukrainian army known as the Carpathian Sich was swiftly organized. Hungary repeatedly demanded the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine, a demand supported by Poland, which was afraid that the rise of Carpatho-Ukraine might inflame the 7,500,000 restless and rebellious Ukrainians who then lived under Poland. Even Stalin deemed Carpatho-Ukraine important enough to attack it in his address before the XVIIIth congress of the Communist Party.

Finally, on March 14, 1939, the Hungarian troops were given the go-ahead by Hitler to attack Carpatho-Ukraine. The Parliament in Hust proclaimed the independence and elected Monsignor Voloshyn its first President, Julian Revay becoming Prime Minister. The Sich sharpshooters put up a gallant resistance against the Hungarian divisions, but were soon subdued. In defense of their country some 5,000 Ukrainian patriotic youth died at the hands of the Hungarians, and Carpatho-Ukraine was taken over by Hungary.

Thus Carpatho-Ukraine was used as a pawn on the large chessboard of Nazi power politics, to which both Poland and Hungary were parties. It was only a few months later that Poland became a victim of the same game she played with Hungary in the case of Carpatho-Ukraine.

4. Ukrainians in Rumania: Some 1,000,000 Ukrainians lived between the two World Wars in Rumania. Predominantly a Latin race, the Rumanians were suspicious of Eastern Slavs, that is, Ukrainians, despite the fact that the Zaporozhian Kozaks and the peoples of Moldavia and Wallachia, the predecessors of the present-day Rumanians, had lived in close proximity.

Rumania acquired two provinces with Ukrainian populations: Bukovina, which was part of Austria, and Bessarabia, which belonged to Russia. For almost ten years the Rumanian government maintained an actual siege in these provinces, suppressing all Ukrainian schools, organizations and economic societies. In 1924 a law was enacted whereby the Ukrainians were declared "Rumanians who had forgotten their native language." In 1927, finally, the Ukrainian National Party in Bukovina elected 2 Ukrainian deputies and one senator to the Rumanian Parliament in Bucharest. In Bessarabia, however, the Rumanians would not even permit Ukrainian newspapers to be brought into the country for fear of stirring up a Ukrainian nationalist movement.

In 1940 Rumania ceded both Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Soviet Union; the Ukrainian parts of these provinces went to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, while the remainder was made part of the Moldavian SSR. In 1941 Hitler forced Rumania into war against the USSR, and for two years Bukovina and Bessarabia were again under Rumanian administration. Moreover, Hitler allotted Marshal Antonescu a portion of the Ukrainian land along the Dniester River, which the Rumanians saw as contributing to their dream of a "Great Rumania."

In 1945 Bukovina and Bessarabia were reinvaded by the Soviet troops and again were subjugated by the ruthless rule of the Soviet regime, as were the rest of the Ukrainian lands.

### UKRAINE IN WORLD WAR II

On June 21, 1941, the German-Soviet war broke out, the vast Nazi armies attacking the Soviet Union on a front extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In their precipitous retreat, the Russians massacred Ukrainian political prisoners in a number of larger cities, such as Lviv, Striy, Drohobych, Tarnopil, Dubno and Lutsk, and in many other smaller cities of Western Ukraine. The NKVD and its agents ruthlessly machine-gunned or bayoneted indiscriminately hundreds of them, with only a mere handful escaping to tell the morbid story to the world. This bestial process continued as the German armies advanced into Eastern (Soviet) Ukraine. Here the Russians had more time and did a thorough job of killing thousands of Ukrainian political prisoners. Thus, for instance, in Vynnytsia alone 700 bodies were found near the railroad station. (It is to be recalled that during the Yezhov NKVD terror in 1936-37 over 10,000 Ukrainians were executed in the same city; their mass graves were uncovered by the Germans in 1943.) Hundreds of executed Ukrainians were found in prisons in Kiev, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Odessa and Dniepropetrovsk.

It is small wonder, then, that in the early days of the German advance in Ukraine many of the Ukrainians welcomed them as liberators rather than as invaders. They hoped for a restoration of a free Ukraine, even under German protection. On the very day the German troops entered Lviv, the surviving Ukrainian political leaders formed a provisional government under Yaroslav Stetsko, a leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). This government was subsequently broadened by a "National Committee," consisting of representatives of various Ukrainian institutions and political groups. This movement spread rapidly eastward with the German advance during the summer of 1941.

These Ukrainian dreams, however, did not fit in with the plans of power-mad Hitler. A short time later, even as the German army high command looked approvingly upon the Ukrainian movement, the Gestapo moved in and arrested all the Ukrainian leaders and deported them to concentration camps in Germany. The Nazi policy in Ukraine, myopic and insane, played into the hands of the Russian Bolsheviks. The Nazis even claimed as war booty all the collectivized property of the Soviet state and thus perpetuated the slave system which the Bolshevik regime had introduced.

The hopes of the Ukrainians were completely shattered when in August, 1941, the Germans had Western Ukraine annexed to the General Government of Poland. True, they allowed the Ukrainians certain rights, such as publications, relief and cultural activities. The rest of Ukraine was organized in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, which was placed under the administration of Gauleiter Erich Koch, a thoroughgoing sadist. It was not long before the Nazis began to deport able-bodied men and women for slave work in Germany. The overall pattern of Nazi policies was to depopulate Ukraine, as well as other non-Russian countries of the USSR, to the greatest extent possible, in order to break the resistance of the Ukrainian people and to pave the way for German colonization schemes as dictated by Lebensraum requirements.

Naturally, the Ukrainian resistance to the new invaders began to develop rapidly. At the end of 1941 and in 1942 large segments of the northeastern Ukrainian territories seethed with discontent and unrest. Then early in 1943 the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was formed under General Taras Chuprynka (Roman Shukhevych), who soon displayed extremely remarkable powers and talents as a leader and organizer. The UPA succeeded in gaining control over a considerable amount of territory, especially areas remote from the main arteries of communication and travel. The Ukrainian population supported the UPA to an astonishing degree, providing foodstuffs, shelter and all forms of aid. The people, in fact, constituted the backbone of the resistance movement. In 1944 the UPA created the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR), which, by coordinating the political and civilian affairs of the lands under the UPA control, in a sense became the government of the resistance movement in Ukraine.

At the same time the Soviet government, in order to win the allegiance of the Ukrainian people, began to play the Ukrainian "card" as it had in 1918. Thousands of Red partisans were sent into Ukraine ostensibly to fight the Germans; but in reality they fought the UPA forces. General Sydir Kovpak, their leader and a Ukrainian who was a descendant of the Zaporozhian Kozaks, was propagandized by Moscow as a "Ukrainian patriot" fighting for a "free and independent Ukraine."

During the war the Soviet government somewhat relaxed the pressure against the Ukrainian population. Writers of Ukraine were allowed to sing the glory of Ukraine and express Ukrainian

patriotic feeling, such as Volodymyr Sosiura's poem, "Love Ukraine," which actually received a "Stalin prize." Vague promises were made about forthcoming "concessions" (in the national and social-economic field only). Stalin "restored" the Orthodox Church, thereby earning for himself "acclaim" in the West. In Kiev, a new Ukrainian communist government was formed with the retreat of the Nazis, and Dmytro Z. Manuilsky, who in 1918 had been an emissary of Moscow negotiating a peace treaty with the Ukrainian government, was made Foreign Minister of Ukraine. As the German tide continued to ebb, the Soviet armies reoccupied all the Ukrainian territories. They were renamed "Ukrainian armies," and in most cases were commanded by Ukrainian marshals and generals — Malinovsky, Konev, Grechko, Dibrova, Derevyanko, Timoshenko, and the like — to give the world "proof" that the Ukrainians were on the side of Moscow. At the Yalta conference both Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to Ukraine and Byelorussia becoming charter members of the United Nations in San Francisco.

By the end of World War II, peace seemingly had come to the world. In Ukraine, however, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army began its gallant underground struggle against the Russian communist giant.

### POSTWAR UKRAINE

The postwar Russian communist domination of Ukraine can be broadly subdivided into two distinct periods: a) the Stalinist and b) the Khrushchev.

a) The Stalinist Period: The return to Ukraine of the victorious Soviet troops in 1945 was characterized by inhuman terror and persecution of the population as a whole. First of all, Moscow ordered large scale requisitions of all foodstuffs in Ukraine. Then it ordered a general mobilization of all men from 16 to 60 without any regard to their ability to bear arms. Untrained thousands of them perished under the fire of German guns or under the tracks of German tanks. When the population resisted, the Russians carried out wholesale "liquidation" drives, tantamount to genocide. They executed "Banderites" (the name deriving from Stepan Bandera, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), burned villages, and deported hapless civilians. They raped women without regard to age or health. The merest suspicion of assistance rendered to the UPA fighters, or an anony-

mous denunciation by seksots (secret informers), sufficed to send one before the firing squad or to a slave labor camp.

The UPA underground warfare embraced Carpatho-Ukraine and extended as well to the western confines of the Ukrainian territories on both sides of the Curzon Line. The fighting raged despite constant appeals by Khrushchev and Manuilsky to Ukrainian freedom fighters to surrender. Since none surrendered, the Soviet high command mounted large-scale offensives with as many as 30,000 troops, as was the case in December, 1944. Through the spring and summer of 1945 entire Soviet divisions combatted the UPA unsuccessfully, no unimportant reason being the support given the nationalist partisans by the entire population of Western Ukraine. In 1946 the Minister of Interior of Ukraine, Lt. Gen. Vasyl Ryasny, sent General Moskalenko into the area with heavy forces to liquidate the underground. Moskalenko was ambushed and killed, just as was Marshal Vatutin on March 20, 1944, by the UPA. Stalin then sent Kaganovich to Ukraine to buttress the communist rule. In 1947 UPA raiding parties harassed the Polish communist forces west of the Curzon Line and killed Gen. Walter Swierszczewski, the Polish Vice Minister of Defense, who had acquired some notoriety as a result of his participation in the Spanish Civil war as a communist leader.

A tripartite agreement was then signed between the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia on May 12, 1947, directed against the UPA. In 1947 several hundred UPA resisters succeeded in penetrating the Iron Curtain into Western Germany still armed, after spectacular raids through Poland and Czechoslovakia. The fighting continued unabated until 1950, when the Soviet security troops ambushed and killed in battle General Taras Chuprynka, brilliant commander-in-chief of the UPA, on March 5, 1950.

By 1951 some 36,000 officers and men of the Soviet security troops had fallen at the hands of the UPA freedom fighters. Although large-scale armed raids of the UPA have since subsided, underground resistance and propaganda activity continue to this day. As recently as February 11, 1956, the Moscow radio appealed to Ukrainian insurgents in Volhynia, promising them full pardon in return for surrender; and on October 23, 1957, the Soviet authorities announced the execution of four "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists" in the city of Rivne, Volhynia, for allegedly killing "400 communists between 1944 and 1949." Now the Ukrainian underground partisans are denounced as "American stooges and spies" and "lackeys of the Vatican."

In this Stalinist period the Russians brutally liquidated the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine by arresting Metropolitan Joseph Slipy and Bishops Khomyshyn, Latyshevsky, Budka, Charnetsky and Kotsylovsky (the latter was arrested by Polish Communists in Peremyshl). A spurious Russian Orthodox Church was imposed upon the Catholic Ukrainians as hundreds of Ukrainian Catholic priests were arrested and deported, a fortunate few escaping underground. For fear of death some even accepted Orthodoxy. In Carpatho-Ukraine the Russians saw to it that Ukrainian Catholic Bishop Theodore Romzha got killed in an "accident," using a Soviet tank unit, and another Bishop, Pavlo Goydich, was sent to prison.

In its agricultural policy Moscow revived and tightened the collective farm regime, making life on them still more unbearable. It could not improve living conditions, despite propaganda boasting at the communist congresses. Western Ukraine was also collectivized, recalcitrant peasants being sent to slave labor camps in Siberia and Kazakhstan.

On the industrial level in Ukraine no greater progress was made, despite the ballyhooed Soviet "five-year plans." Factories and plants were rebuilt at a snail's pace owing to the lack of technicians and building materials.

A new wave of Russification swept all of Ukraine. The language was discriminated against, the fact that it is the official language of Ukraine notwithstanding. The linguistic theory of Stalin sought to make Russian a world language because it was the "language of communism" and because of its "correct standards." Russian books, art, plays and films flooded Ukraine in unprecedented fashion. Ukrainian history and literature were revised to show their dependence in the past, present and future on the "elder brothers," the benign Russians.

b) The Khrushchev Period: With the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, a new period in the history of the Ukrainian people under Soviet Russian domination began. The immediate repercussion of the intra-party struggle for power in the Kremlin was the sudden dismissal of Leonid Melnikov as secretary general of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He was publicly charged with forcing Russification upon Western Ukraine, a charge brought to the fore for the first time. Melnikov was replaced by Alexander Kirichenko, the first native Ukrainian ever to hold the post of secretary general of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

(Kirichenko was Khrushchev's "muscle man" in Ukraine in the late 30's).

After the execution of Lavrenti Beria the power in the Kremlin was vested in a "collective leadership," specifically in the hands of Khrushchev and Bulganin, who embarked upon a policy of "peaceful coexistence" abroad and of "peace" with their own population at home.

In 1954 the "collective leadership" began to woo the Ukrainians by granting some nominal concessions and by following certain pro-Ukrainian courses designed to please or appease the ever-recalcitrant Ukrainians.

In the spring of 1954 Moscow ordered the celebration with the greatest fanfare possible — through the whole of the USSR and the satellite countries of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, which had brought Ukraine into alliance with Moscow in 1654. On that occasion the Communist Party issued new "theses" on the relations between Russia and Ukraine. These propounded a theory of an "original linguistic political and racial union." They contended that "Russia" (Rus) was responsible for the origination of three Eastern Slavic nations: Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia. Hence the Russians could call Kiev "the oldest Russian" city, while Lviv is the oldest Ukrainian city because it was founded by the Ukrainians after the division of languages. Furthermore, the "theses" stressed the great help provided to Ukraine, i. e. to Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the way of food and arms in his struggle against Poland. They emphasized the contacts between Shevchenko and the Russian radical thinkers and writers, through whom, they claimed, Ukraine came to know the great treasures of Russian literature.

The Soviet press began acknowledging the Ukrainians as "equal" to the Russians; for some time now the appellation of "elder brother" has vanished from the pages of the Soviet press. To emphasize still further the "brotherhood" of the two peoples, the Council of Ministers made the Crimea part of Ukraine. (It was from the Crimea that Stalin had forcibly deported all the Tatars for disloyalty and collaboration with the Germans.) These two gestures were intended to placate the Ukrainians and to induce them to labor for the Soviet state. Khrushchev concected a scheme whereby the "virgin lands" of Kazakhstan would be cultivated and made productive with some 800,000 young Ukrainian men and women scheduled to "volunteer" for the task. The

undertaking, naturally, failed, as have many other such Soviet ventures, but thousands of Ukrainians were rooted up from their land.

The resistance of the Ukrainian people has shifted from armed struggle to other levels: sabotage on collective farms and in factories, absenteeism, agitation for higher wages, and the like.

Even in the Soviet slave labor camps the Ukrainians have not been silenced, erupting with bloody strikes and insurrections. As early as 1952, while Stalin was still alive, the first open strike of prisoners flamed up in the Karaganda concentration camp system. It was organized by former members of the UPA. The upheaval soon spread to other camps in Vorkuta, Mordovia, Kingir, Tayshet, and elsewhere. Moscow responded characteristically with mass executions and brutal killing, for instance, mowing down 500 Ukrainian women in Kingir with Russian tanks. But for the desperate inmates of those living hells, death was no longer a threat. Finally, Moscow announced amnesty for prisoners sentenced to less than ten years.

At the XXth congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, Khrushchev denounced "Stalinism," disclosing that Stalin had wished to liquidate the Ukrainians as he had liquidated the Crimean Tatars, Chechens and Ingushes. Unfortunately for the Georgian, there were simply too many Ukrainians to eradicate.

During the Hungarian revolution in the fall of 1956 the Khrushchev-Bulganin-Zhukov team proved that they wore the old Soviet mantle, after all. The Soviet troops stationed in Hungary were commanded by General Hrebennyk, a Ukrainian, and in the majority consisted of Ukrainians. When the Hungarian people rose in heroic rebellion, these troops not only refused to fight the Hungarians, but in many instances turned their arms over to the Hungarians and joined them in the freedom struggle. Some 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers in all left the ranks of the Soviet army. Some escaped to Austria and Yugoslavia, but most were recaptured and either executed summarily or exiled to Siberia.

In 1957 the Kremlin was confronted with a dilemma. Was it to pursue a thorough Stalinist course, thereby risking other insurrections, or was it to initiate a "liberal" policy, which, while it would favorably impress the Afro-Asian nations, would stimulate the enslaved peoples into demanding more and more freedom?

Khrushchev has devised a series of measures which tend to give the appearance of "liberalization" in reality. the unity and

indivisibilty of the Soviet empire is never lost sight of. Among these measures are: decentralization of planning and management of agriculture, salted with some concessions to the peasants; decentralization of management of industry and extension of the powers of the non-Russian republics; amnesty to slave laborers and "progressive" abolition of slave labor camps; "liberalization" of literature, that is, a limited criticism permitted to party writers and artists, and, finally, the elevation of a number of Ukrainians and other non-Russian communist leaders to the highest echelon of the Communist Party leadership, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. A number of Ukrainian Communists (although some had, unfortunately, already been executed) were "rehabilitated" by Khrushchev, while Ukrainian writers were allowed to attack Lazar M. Kaganovich for his attempt to liquidate the Ukrainian intelligentsia and leadership.

Parallel with this "liberalization" of policies in Ukraine, Moscow rigorously pursues a systematic Russification course in Ukraine. The latest Khrushchev tactic is to ensnare the Ukrainians, notably members of the Communist Party and the military leaders, into assuming a larger share in the administration of the Soviet empire. This is to make them "junior partners," and hence subject to responsibility with its attendant criticism, at home and abroad.

But the Ukrainian people are continuing their struggle by any and all means. At present they are fighting for the emancipation of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine, and, above all, are trying to have the Ukrainian SSR become truly Ukrainian and governed only by Ukrainians.

### UKRAINIANS IN DIASPORA

There are well over 2,000,000 Ukrainians and their immediate descendants in the free countries outside enslaved Ukraine. They constitute a formidable force which constantly champions the cause of freedom. Among them are some 250,000 recent Ukrainian political refugees from all corners of the Ukrainian land, whose experience with tyranny is fresh and who work and strive for a common ideal: liberation of their native country.

Whatever the future of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people may be, the Ukrainian community abroad is far more unified

and consolidated than it has ever been before. It can be counted upon to play a major part in the undying movement to restore the freedom and independence of Ukraine, as a vital and indispensable element in a free Europe and in a free world.

Meanwhile we salute those stalwart men and women who in 1918 made an independent Ukraine possible; and all those legions of heroes who have fought against hopeless odds these past forty years.

The heroes are dead or imprisoned; but the Ukrainian nation lives on.

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