

The

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Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

The Kerensky Provisional Government
And the Ukrainian Central 'Rada'

By Walter Dushnyck

The Guerrillas Behind the Iron Curtain:
Past and Future

By Enrique Martinez Codo

UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

PRIME ANTITHESIS TO FRAUDULENT RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

49TH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINE'S INDEPENDENCE

Speeches of

Hon. DANIEL J. FLOOD
of Pennsylvania

and

Hon. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
of Illinois

et al.

in the

House of Representatives and in the Senate of the United States

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE:

ENRIQUE MARTINEZ CODO is an Argentine engineer living in Buenos Aires; he is editor of *Manual de Informaciones*, official publication of the Intelligence Service of the Argentine Army; his articles have appeared in *Military Review*, *The Marine Corps Gazette*, in this review in the U.S., and in the military reviews of Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and France; his book, *Guerrillas tras la Cortina de Hierro*, dealing with the Ukrainian underground resistance (UPA), was published in 1966 in Buenos Aires.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Professor of Economics at Georgetown University; in October, 1966 was re-elected President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America for the sixth consecutive term; Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington, D.C.; former faculty member of the National War College; author and lecturer; his new book, *The Vulnerable Russians*, is scheduled to be published by the Pagean Press, Inc. in the fall of 1967.

WALTER DUSHNYCK, holds B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Louvain, Columbia University and the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, respectively; is editor of this review; author of articles, pamphlets and books on Ukraine and the USSR; his new book, *The Ukrainian-Rite Catholic Church at the Ecumenical Council, 1962-1965*, will be published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society this fall; is Research Associate at Fordham University.

BOHDAN P. PROCKO, Associate Professor of History at Villanova University; also taught at Rosemont College, St. Joseph's College, and the University of Ottawa; received his B.S. degree at Albert College, his M.A. at Columbia, and his Ph.D. at the University of Ottawa; his general study on the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the U.S. is soon to be published.

NEEDED: REASSERTION OF THE AMERICAN GENIUS

While in June, 1967, the U.N. General Assembly was debating the Arab-Israeli crisis, at a time when the world was very close to the brink of a major war, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a major pronouncement of its ideological beliefs and its political course. This public statement was issued in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution which the Soviet leaders are preparing to observe this coming October.

While American strategists and Sovietologists were assessing the impact of the "Summit" meeting in Glassboro, N. J. and were guessing at what effect, if any, it would have on U.S.-Soviet relations, the Kremlin did not waste a moment in making the world know where it stood. Not that there was any particular need for such edification. Premier Kosygin's rigid and unbending utterances surprised only those who had believed — as too many still do — that a mere meeting of President Johnson with the Soviet top leader would bring about a *detente*, a relaxation of international tensions, in short, political bliss.

The Communist document issued in Moscow harshly spelled out:

There can be no question of neutrality in the struggle against bourgeois ideology or anti-Communism. The struggle against bourgeois ideology and anti-Communism is one of the most acute aspects of the class struggle; it is a struggle for man, and for the triumph of freedom and progress of mankind.

The experience of the 50 postrevolution years has borne out the conclusion of revolutionary theory that capitalism is doomed.

Local wars and punitive expeditions against the national liberation movement (the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, the Israeli invasion of Arab countries), the militarization of the economy, the onslaught on democracy and the striving to establish terroristic fascist regimes (the most recent example being the reactionary coup in Greece) are the most obvious expressions of the reactionary nature of imperialism. . .¹

¹ Cf. "Excerpts from the Soviet Document," *The New York Times*, June 26, 1967.

These are some excerpts from a lengthy 25,000-word document summarizing the gains of the Bolshevik revolution and reiterating Moscow's unwavering position on international issues: a continued struggle against capitalism and imperialism. The document emphasized:

Imperialism, notably U.S. imperialism, was and continues to be the main enemy of the national liberation movement.²

Mr. Kosygin, before leaving New York for Havana, echoed the basic policy of the Soviet Union, lending support and assistance to the "wars of national liberation," which in the Soviet lexicon means any revolutionary movement led by Moscow.

The liberation movement of the Ukrainian people, indeed, the liberation struggles of so many non-Russian nations in the USSR, are scornfully described as "fascist subversions" or, at best, as "foreign espionage and intelligence" adventures.

This Soviet Russian line is steady, consecutive and unchanging, no matter how much and how ardently Messrs. Kosygin, Podgorny, Brezhnev and Gromyko talk about "peaceful coexistence" and *de-tente*.

VOICE OF EUROPE'S COMMUNIST PARTIES

The Western world, as demonstrated by its statesmen and diplomats in their desire to achieve a measure of relaxation with the Soviet Union, is, for all intents and purposes, totally oblivious to these basic objectives of Russian Communism, no matter how often they are reiterated. Yet Russian Communism remains all-important. Despite the Russian-Chinese (Mao Tse-tung) rift, the overwhelming majority of the world's communist parties actively support the Moscow policies.

This was shown once again as recently as April of this year. The top leadership of some 24 Communist Parties of the world gathered at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. Despite the absence of some parties, as, for instance, those from Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Norway, Iceland and the Netherlands, and notwithstanding the fact that one of the meeting's objectives was to patch up the somewhat shaky structure of the world-wide Communist movement under the direction of Moscow,³ it would be a grave mistake to as-

² *Ibid.*

³ "Red Nations Agree on One Thing: Hate U.S.," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 15, 1967.

sume, and act upon, the assumption that the communist movement has suddenly become powerless or even that it has lost its driving force.

Above all, the United States was the principal topic in the discussion dealing with the international issues confronting the Communists. All agreed that North Vietnam should be given all-out military and financial help to crush the "American aggression."

Significantly, and somewhat embarrassing to the United States, was the fact that the Communist chieftains completely by-passed American overtures toward a *detente*. President Johnson's much-publicized "building bridges of understanding" with Communist-bloc countries, and all other hopeful attempts, such as East-West trade, "cultural exchange" programs and so forth, were wholly ignored. Far from making any move to persuade the North Vietnamese government to negotiate peace with the United States, Leonid Brezhnev, No. 1 Soviet Communist leader, proposed a resolution calling for a close Soviet-Chinese cooperation to "oust" the United States armed forces from South Vietnam.

COMMUNIST FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA

Premier Kosygin's visit to Havana, after his two much-publicized chats with President Johnson in Glassboro, N. J., was optimistically interpreted here as an attempt on the part of the "older brother," the Russian Kosygin, to admonish the incorrigible Fidel Castro for his adventurous games in Latin America.

But these optimists all too easily overlook that in the document issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Russian Communist leaders condemned the "unceasing provocation against Cuba" by the United States.

Moreover, the alarming news from Latin America on the mushrooming Communist-led guerrilla groups in Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia no longer can be shrugged off or decried as a "warmongering device" to prevent the implementation of "peaceful coexistence" between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Appearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 25, 1967, Gen. Robert W. Porter, Jr., head of the U.S. Southern Command headquartered in the Canal Zone, stated:

Latin America's social, economic, and political problems make it a prime target for Communism. The problem is magnified by very rapid population growth. This projected demographic explosion will impose rapidly growing

demands on governments and underdeveloped economies, and will make Latin America even more ripe for internal disorders and Communist exploitation. . .

In my opinion, the main Communist campaign in Latin America is still ahead of us; and we can expect an intensification of Communist subversion and insurgency efforts.⁴

And yet the Communist build-up is neither new nor unknown.

Back in January, 1966, a conclave called the Tri-Continental Conference was held in Havana, sponsored and financed by the Kremlin. There it was decided to launch a series of guerrilla movements against "neo-colonialism," which is synonymous with "Yankee imperialism," at least in Castro's dictionary. The order of the day was to "liberate" Latin America from the "enslaving clutches of American imperialism."

The first target of Communist-led "revolutionary forces" are the national armies and police of Latin American countries. In order to succeed, the guerrilla must gain some point of attachment, some bases of operation. At present there are Communist guerrilla forces of significance in Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia and Bolivia. Maj. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, whose whereabouts have long been a matter of speculation, not excluding the possibility that he was "liquidated" by Castro himself, has now been located in Bolivia. According to *The New York Times* (July 21, 1967), Regis Debray, a French leftist writer awaiting trial for subversive activities in Bolivia, has stated that "Che" Guevara is alive, very much alive. That he was seen in Bolivia is incidental; his mission is undoubtedly continental. Debray writes that his historic mission, in accordance with Fidel Castro's instructions, "is to say 'no' to the oppression and humiliation which confront the people because of the power of the United States."

As a result of the landing in Venezuela of 12 Cuban saboteurs on May 8, 1967, the Organization of American States (OAS) held a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington to consider the "serious situation confronting member states." (Secretary of State Dean Rusk has long urged strong and concerted action against these budding Communist "armies of liberation" in Latin America.) Cuba, the OAS commission ascertained, is the principal base from which these guerrillas sally forth. The seriousness of the danger was confirmed by the government of Bolivia when its President, Rene Barrientos Ortuno, officially asked Argentina to send ground troops to help combat the Communist guerrillas.

⁴ *Communist Activities in Latin America: 1967*. Report of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, H. Res. 179, July 3, 1967, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1967.

Cuba and its importance as the center of agitation and subversion for the whole Latin American sub-continent, was evident in Nikita S. Khrushchev's comment in an N.B.C. film (cf. *The New York Times*, June 27, 1967) that he, and not President Kennedy, won in Cuba in 1962: "We agreed to withdraw our missiles from Cuba, and President Kennedy promised *not to invade Cuba*."

In the meantime, any number of our "friends and allies" still do business with Cuba:

Cuba is still receiving considerable assistance from our "friends and allies." Such assistance results in improving Cuba's economy as well as furnishing Castro with additional resources to expand his revolution.

The British are trading with Cuba and recently completed a credit guarantee for a large fertilizer plant, despite our protests. At least nine members of the OAS have remonstrated with the British Government, but to no avail.

A number of other countries have granted credits to Cuba, including Spain, Japan, France, the Benelux countries, Morocco, the U.A.R., Italy and Canada. Canadian wheat, purchased by the Soviet Union and shipped to Cuba, amounted to \$208 million in 1965, according to the latest figures available.

*The United States should urge other members of the Organization of American States to join with it in taking the most forceful measures practicable toward terminating entirely all significant trade between the free world and Cuba.*⁵

OPPOSITION OF HOME-GROWN "MANCHURIAN CANDIDATES"

The Arab-Israeli war in June, 1967, has resulted in some redressing of the ranks of the American "New Left." A great number of those vociferous "Manchurian Candidates" who have frequently espoused the enemy's cause as against that of the United States, overnight became tamer or grew completely silent with respect to the U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam.

But as soon as the Middle East conflict was brought to an end by the swift military victory of Israel these "Manchurian Candidates" began to raise their heads and voices again. They have derived considerable satisfaction from the Soviet Union's resounding defeat at the U.N. General Assembly's fifth emergency session. But their elation is, at the least, premature. It is foolish to assume that, with the defeat of the Arabs, the Soviet Union has suffered irretrievable losses in prestige and political influence in the Middle East. In its long-range efforts Moscow tends to gain substantially in that area both politically and militarily. Indeed, the Arabs' defeat has brought them much closer to Moscow. It has long been the dream of Rus-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

sian foreign policy, both Czarist and Soviet, to play a major role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Now, it appears, the opportunity has come. It is quite conceivable that the Arab states may soon become members of the Communist bloc, thus opening the way for Moscow into the Middle East and perhaps even North Africa. Western Europe would then be encircled from both the East and the South, thereby bringing the eventual U.S.-Soviet confrontation that much closer.

Regardless of the course of the Soviet Union, American "liberals" are doing everything they can to prevail upon the Johnson Administration to pursue a "soft" policy with respect to the Soviet Russian empire. They persist in their deluded belief that the Soviet government has "changed" and that it has nothing in mind but "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. Hence we must do everything in our power not to offend the sensitivities of the Russian Communist leadership.

It is not surprising then that these "Manchurian Candidates" should be systematically opposing the observance of Captive Nations Week throughout the United States. Typical in this field of misguided effort is *The Washington Post*, a self-styled liberal newspaper in Washington, D. C., which has gained some notoriety for its irrational opposition to the concept of the captive nations. Comes the third week of July in any given year, its editors promptly fall into a towering rage. The American people are beseeched, warned and threatened not to honor or attach any significance to Captive Nations Week. In an editorial this year appeared this nonsense:

This fanciful cold-war rhetoric was issued by Congress in 1959 in a surge of hysterical anti-Communism. Or rather, it was issued by ethnic manipulator Lev Dobriansky, father of the Captive Nations idea, and foisted by him upon a Congress sensitive to the presumed sentiments of Americans from now-Communist lands. Actually, many of these Americans, if not most of them, are insulted by being treated as hyphenated citizens. The annual Captive Nations charade might better be called Captive Congressmen Week.

Its aspect of ethnic discrimination is particularly offensive. For it turns out, Russia is not among the Captive Nations. The reason for this strange omission is that Mr. Dobriansky's heart belongs to his ancestors' native Ukraine, and Ukrainian nationalism is nothing if not anti-Russian. This is, in our view, precisely the kind of old country ethnic backbiting that has no place in a gambit designed to influence American policy...⁶

Yet we did not read such pontifications in *The Post* on "hyphenated" Americans when Hitler was ravaging Europe twenty-five

⁶ "Captive Congressmen," editorial, *The Washington Post*, July 10, 1967.

years ago, at which time the paper called for universal opposition to the Nazi aggression and support of the fighters for freedom in the occupied countries, nor recently, during the Arab-Israeli war, when it unqualifiedly supported the Americans of Jewish descent ("hyphenated" Americans) in their effort to help Israel and to prevail upon the U.S. government to "stand by its commitments" given to Israel. Fortunately for Israel and for all of us, the United States had no need to intervene in the Arab-Israeli war. We should like to have seen, however, the reaction of *The Washington Post* had the Arabs and not the Israelis won the war. Would it have counselled the "hyphenated" American Jews to keep quiet? Would it have given us the ludicrous picture of a mesmerized U.S. Congress cowering under the exhortations of a Jewish-American Svengali? We doubt it. *The Post* observes a double standard of liberalism as concerns the captive nations enslaved by Russian Communist imperialism, despite the fact that Communist Russia is fostering anti-Semitism in the USSR and the satellite countries, and is actively supporting the Arab countries against Israel.

Lastly, although Prof. Dobriansky has often spoken of the plight of the Russian people, we might add here that no Ukrainian-American would not welcome the creation of a free and democratic Russia. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no Russian-American group comparable to the other "hyphenated" groups concerned with the fate of their brethren in the USSR seems to be active here, or even in existence.

WEAKNESSES IN RUSSIAN SLAVE STRUCTURE

No matter how wishfully our leftists and "Manchurian Candidates" think about Communist Russia, its basic objectives remain rigidly fixed, as can be expected from a totalitarian state. A few weeks ago former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, undoubtedly alarmed by the drift into unreality, warned the American people that the Russians have never backed away from the goal of world domination. . . "None of us should forget their basic position. . ."

It is high time that the cloak of liberalism be stripped off those who don it only to counsel retreat and, ultimately, abdication of the traditions and beliefs that have, in this country, raised the individual to a dignity and sense of worth that is unmatched throughout history. It is the American genius to weld idealism and pragmatism

⁷ "Soviet Smiles Cover Sharp Fangs: Ike," *N. Y. Daily News*, July 11, 1967.

in a meaningful and productive way, and we must capitalize on this genius not only domestically but abroad.

The United Nations is, of course, the most obvious example of the tapping of this peculiarly American gift; this body, born at San Francisco, saw America as its midwife. But if the United Nations has often proved weak and inadequate, it nevertheless has served as an effective safety valve. That we have not exploited it as a world forum as has the Kremlin is, after all, our fault and not that of the body.

For some time now Soviet Russia has been misusing the United Nations podium, to pose as a "champion of liberation of the colonial peoples." Here we are presented with the opportunity and the place to beat the Russian totalitarians at their own game. According to our lights, we are perforce for the liberation of *all* peoples, including those within the confines of the Soviet Union, 22 non-Russian nations languishing from Berlin to the Mongolian border.

These captive nations, numbering over 200-million people, are a *fact*, and are not to be reduced to "ethnic backbiting," despite the craven outlook of the *Post*. That these nations compose the weakest link of the Kremlin's imperial structure was graphically demonstrated by Khrushchev's ire, springing from guilt and fear, at the very same Captive Nations Week the *Post* myopically dismisses.

When, then, the Kremlin mounthpieces clamor for the "liberation" of Bolivia, we should counter with a demand for an examination of Communist Russia's imperio-colonialistic composition. The results would be most gratifying, we predict, for an old Yankee trader. Such a demand, rather than lead to war (which even the *Post* would not contend) would probably bring about the very climate that the so-called liberals bleat about. For the Soviet Russian leaders are nothing if they are not realists; confronted by a rising Chinese menace on their eastern flank, they would not risk losing face with the non-committed nations, a loss of face which is foregone were we simply to train the searchlight of truth upon the unchanging genocidal makeup of the Soviet Union.

The mounting of this offensive of truth is long overdue, not only in our own interest but for the sake of the enslaved peoples themselves. If indeed there be any possibility of change in the Soviet Union, such external pressure would only enhance it. But if Kremlin control remains as rigid and oppressive as ever, in speaking up for freedom everywhere we could not but strengthen ourselves not only vis-a-vis the Kremlin tyrants but in the eyes of mankind as well. For freedom, as a fundamental truth, is close to the hearts of all.

THE KERENSKY PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA

By WALTER DUSHNYCK

Within recent decades the history of the Ukrainian people has become increasingly known in both Europe and the Americas, as Ukrainian and other scholars dig into the Slavic past and in effective writing relate their findings to events of the 20th century. Although not all such writing is unbiased and although the quality of scholarship has varied, the net result has been to focus international attention on Ukraine as an ethnographic, cultural and political entity within the Slavic lands of Eastern Europe.¹

This year of 1967 marks the 50th anniversary of the fall of the Russian Czarist empire. It also marks the inception of the Soviet power and hegemony in Russia and in a greater part of Central and Eastern Europe and Asia.

Significantly, there is no scholarly or intellectual agreement as to which event was more important to humanity as such. The Soviet historical school disparages the March 1917 revolution, insisting that the new era for humanity began with the Bolshevik revolution in October, 1917; the March 1917 revolution, the Soviet official line would have it, was but the prelude to the great communist event. Anti-communist Russian scholars outside the USSR, especially those oriented toward Russian Socialism, maintain that it was the Provisional Government under Alexander Kerensky which ushered in democracy and liberty in Russia.

Both scholars tend to ignore the overriding fact that both the March and October 1917 revolutions brought to the fore the nationalist forces of the non-Russian nations, and as a result these revolutions in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Turkestan and in other parts of the former Czarist empire assumed almost immediately a *nationalist* character. For instance, Richard Pipes, in his recent book, writes:

¹ *Efforts Toward Russian-Ukrainian Understanding and Failures, March to November, 1917.* By Walter Dushnyck. Doctoral Dissertation. Free Ukrainian University, Munich, November 1965, p. 4.

Soon, however, more radically inclined Ukrainian political figures, returning from the front and from the Czarist exile, began arriving in Kiev — men who before the war had been associated with socialist and nationalist movements. They at once assumed effective leadership over the *Rada* and steered it away from reliance on the Provisional Government toward an independent pursuit of national aspirations. . .²

During the frantic days following the March (February) revolution of 1917, relations between the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and the Russian Provisional Government were of utmost importance as regards the successful functioning and stability of these bodies. Had failures in these relations been fewer and the efforts at achieving Russian-Ukrainian understanding and agreement more successful, the governments of Prince Lvov and/or Kerensky might never have collapsed, or at the least a subsequent regime might have pursued policies leading to the successful survival of a democratic Russia and a free and independent Ukraine.

Historians writing on the March-November (February-October) 1917 events tend to concentrate on what transpired in St. Petersburg and at the war fronts. Yet, a deeper and fuller understanding of the flow of events in Russia, and of Eastern Europe as well, is inconceivable without proper attention to the decisions taken in Kiev.

UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION

There is no question that the revolution which engulfed Ukraine in March, 1917 was a national rebirth, a national and political renaissance of the captive people of Ukraine. The overthrow of the oppressive Czarist regime was the signal for the powerful and dormant forces of Ukrainian nationalism to sweep away the chains of oppression and establish, at first, an autonomous Ukraine, and then a full-fledged independent state. Professor Michael Hrushevsky, Ukraine's foremost historian and the first president of the Ukrainian National Republic, stressed this fact most emphatically:

Nothing is more erroneous than to dig out old Ukrainian petitions and again hand them over to the government as a statement of our demands. . . If our demands of five, four, three, and even one year ago had been granted then, they would have been accepted by Ukrainian society with deep gratitude. . . but they can in no way be considered a satisfaction of Ukrainian needs, "a

² *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*. Richard Pipes. Revised Edition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964, p. 54.

solution of the Ukrainian question" at the present moment! There is no Ukrainian problem any more. There is a free, great Ukrainian people, who attend to their lot under new conditions of freedom... The needs and claims of Ukraine are being advanced in all their breadth.³

KIEV AND ST. PETERSBURG—TWO REVOLUTIONARY CENTERS

With the formation of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* on March 17, 1917 the Ukrainians started a new and dynamic process of restoration of their national statehood. Although the tenor of the *Rada*'s first appeal to the Ukrainian people on March 22, 1917 was mild and conciliatory — "the establishment of the territorial autonomy of Ukraine and guarantee of the rights of the national minorities" ⁴— there was no doubt as to where the new Ukrainian movement was headed.

The appearance and initial activities of the *Rada* lent impetus to the resurgent Ukrainian spirit throughout the whole country. Scores of congresses and meetings of various Ukrainian organizations were held—some old, like the *zemstvos* which were tolerated by the Czarist regime, and many new, which had mushroomed throughout Ukraine almost overnight. All enthusiastically supported the *Rada* and demanded full autonomy for Ukraine.

An important endorsement of the *Rada* early in its existence came from the All-Ukrainian National Congress which met in Kiev in April 18-21, 1917, and in which 1,500 delegates took part. The latter represented Ukrainian organizations and societies and parties in Ukraine within and without Ukraine's frontiers. For instance, there were representatives from the Ukrainians in Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Caucasus, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, the army, and the Ukrainians from Eastern Galicia. The Congress issued a 5-point resolution calling for a Ukrainian autonomous state without waiting for the convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.⁵

Subsequently, regional congresses were held in Odessa, Kharkiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav (now Dniepropetrovsk) and other cities of Ukraine.

³ *Istoria Ukrainy, 1917-1923 rr.* (History of Ukraine, 1917-1923 Years), Dmytro Doroshenko I, (Uzhorod), 1932, pp. 179-81, cited in Pipes, *Ibid.* p. 54.

⁴ *Visti Ukrainiskoyi Tsentralnoyi Rady* (News of the Ukrainian Central Rada), No. 1, cited in Doroshenko, *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵ *Ukrainska Revoliutsia: Zamitky i Materialy do istorii ukrainskoyi revoliutsiyi* (The Ukrainian Revolution: Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution). Pavlo Khrystiuk, Prague, 1921-22 (4 vols.), Vol. 1, pp. 39-40; also Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

During May and June, 1917, a series of Ukrainian congresses of various strata of Ukrainian society were held, such as the Ukrainian Peasant Congress, Ukrainian Workers' Congress and, above all, the Ukrainian Military Congress. All publicly and spiritedly supported the *Rada* and its demands for Ukrainian autonomy.

Ukrainian peasants were neither reactionary nor radical. For them the revolution meant the freedom of Ukraine, freedom of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian schools. In this evaluation some Russian authors concur as well. One of them, A. Zolotarev of the Jewish Social Democratic Bund, wrote:

The typical characteristic of the social structure of the population of Ukraine, the nationalist stamp of the struggle for "liberty and land," the geographical situation of Ukraine as the *place d'armes* on the crossroads of world revolution, to the markets of the east and to the shores of the Black Sea—all of these factors contributed to the various characteristics of the Ukrainian revolution.⁶

Zolotarev further emphasized that "contrary to the Russian, the Ukrainian policy had a distinctive nationalistic stamp. It relied exclusively on the classes of its nation to destroy the class struggle within the national organism."⁷

One of the most powerful elements of the Ukrainian National Revolution were the Ukrainian soldiers in the Russian armies who hitherto had their own independent groups, spoke the Ukrainian language and possessed their own territorial societies. As soon as the news of the establishment of the *Rada* in Kiev reached the Ukrainian soldiers at the various fronts, many Ukrainian officers and soldiers looked to it for leadership. This pro-Ukrainian sentiment expanded rapidly when the *Rada* formed a Ukrainian Bohdan Khmelnytsky volunteer regiment in Kiev. Besides, Ukrainian soldiers were influenced by the example of the Polish units which had begun to form at that time with the approval of the Provisional Government.

These Ukrainian independence sentiments and, indeed, anti-Russian ones erupted in full force during the First Ukrainian Military Congress, which met in Kiev from May 18 to 21, 1917, and which was attended by several hundred delegates representing some 900,000 organized Ukrainian soldiers in the Russian armies. During the congress the speakers attacked the Provisional Government for its fail-

⁶ *Iz istoreye Tsentralnoy Ukrainskoy Rady (1917)* (From the History of the Ukrainian Central Rada [1917]). A. Zolotarev, Kharkiv, 1922, p. 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

ure to treat Ukraine on equal terms with Poland and Finland,⁸ to both of which St. Petersburg had promised independence, and for ignoring the demands of the Ukrainians for separate Ukrainian military formations under a Ukrainian command. Voices were heard in favor of Ukrainian independence and a separate Ukrainian delegation to the future peace conference. Elected at the close of the Congress was a Ukrainian General Military Committee (UGVK) of 18 members, including such leaders of the Ukrainian revolution as Simon Petlura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Mykola Mikhnovsky, A. Pylkevycz, S. Pysmenny and others. A number of resolutions adopted at the Congress demanded that the Provisional Government recognize the autonomy of Ukraine and the *Rada* as the legitimate organ of the Ukrainian people.

ATTITUDE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The record of the Russian Provisional Government was one of total inaction in the first two months of the Ukrainian National Revolution. Preoccupied with its perennial crises and badgered by the ever-growing Bolshevik agitation, it paid scant attention to the Ukrainian movement. Most of its members undoubtedly thought that the Ukrainian movement was a local cultural phenomenon, although the Czarist government had thought quite differently about Ukraine.

Encouraged by both the All-Ukrainian National Congress and the First Ukrainian Military Congress, and through the office of Michael A. Sukovkin, the Provisional Government's resident commissar in Kiev, the *Rada* sent, on May 26, 1917, a special delegation to St. Petersburg to negotiate the matter of Ukrainian autonomy with the Provisional Government. It was headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and included four members of the Ukrainian General Military Committee.⁹ In a 9-point memorandum the *Rada* presented such demands as autonomy for Ukraine, participation of Ukraine in peace negotiations, formation of Ukrainian military units, appointment of Ukrainians to the state administration, courts and churches in Ukraine, Ukrainization of all schools in Ukraine, inclusion of the *Rada* in the budget of the Provisional Government, and liberation of all Ukrainian political prisoners, especially those from Eastern Galicia, including Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Galicia.

⁸ Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁹ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, p. 59 (Vol. I).

On May 31, the *Rada* delegation met with the members of the Provisional Government, and a special commission was appointed under Interior Minister Shchepkin to discuss the matter and to draw up a plan for solution.¹⁰

At the time of the negotiations, the Provisional Government was being progressively weakened by reverses on the fronts and by internal disorders and intra-party strife. Nevertheless, it made only some concessions to the Ukrainians, and promised to grant local autonomy for the non-Russian peoples, but not full national autonomy. It insisted that the All-Russian Constituent Assembly be the body to decide on the question of autonomy for Ukraine. It consented to the Ukrainization of the army but only within certain limits. And it maintained that the official language in Ukraine would remain Russian, although Ukrainian might be used in the lower schools.

Above all, the Provisional Government refused to recognize the Ukrainian Central *Rada* on the grounds that it was an "illegal organization."

This argument was devoid of all logic. The Provisional Government had itself come into existence as a consequence of the support of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Its own claim to legitimacy was grounded only in a revolution which had yet to be proven successful. On the whole, the Provisional Government held to the old Czarist precept of "One and Indivisible Russia."

As soon as the attitude of the Provisional Government was made known, widespread discontent and dissatisfaction engulfed Ukraine. Many leaders, especially the Socialists, were disillusioned with the promises of "democratic" Russia. The negative attitude of the Provisional Government contributed significantly to the stirring up of aspirations for a final and complete separation from Russia.¹¹

The growing anti-Russian feeling was heightened when Alexander Kerensky, then the Russian War Minister, came to Kiev on June 1, 1917, conferred with such Ukrainian leaders as Prof. Hrushevsky and Alexander Shulhyn, and insisted that the All-Russian Constituent Assembly alone could deal with the matter of autonomy for Ukraine.

The Ukrainian mood was clearly shown during the First National Ukrainian Peasant Congress (June 10 to 15, 1917, in Kiev) which was attended by over 2,000 delegates, hailing from almost

¹⁰ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Annex 18, I, p. 127.

¹¹ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, I, p. 65.

every province of Ukraine. At the congress the Provisional Government was assailed for refusing to grant autonomy, while the *Rada* in turn was severely criticized for its hesitancy in forcing a showdown with St. Petersburg. The tension mounted when the news reached the congress that the Provisional Government had banned the Second Ukrainian Military Congress. Extraordinary sessions of the *Rada* and the Ukrainian Military Committee were called, at which protests to the Provisional Government were formulated. In its protest telegram the *Rada* stated:

We call your attention to the first case of transgression of the law guaranteeing the freedom of assembly, which was committed by War Minister Kerensky in banning the Ukrainian Military Congress. We strongly protest against such measures. We do not take any responsibility for any subsequent consequences growing out of this violation of the law as far as Ukrainians are concerned.¹²

In a series of resolutions the congress supported the *Rada* and demanded an immediate implementation of autonomy for Ukraine. It also called for a Ukrainian Territorial Assembly and for the transformation of the Russian empire into a federation with Ukraine as an equal member.

Hurt and inflamed by the refusal of the Provisional Government to accede to its demands, and encouraged and supported by the nationwide reaction of Ukrainians, the *Rada* dispatched on June 16, 1917, a strong telegram to the Provisional Government, stating that a) it would appeal to the whole Ukrainian nation to prepare to establish an autonomous government; b) it would issue a *Universal* and c) it would henceforth consider that all opportunities to reach an understanding with the Provisional Government had been exhausted.¹³

Back came an answer from the Provisional Government:

The Provisional Government does not consider it possible to satisfy the demands of the Central *Rada* because it feels that all questions concerning the autonomy of Ukraine and other nationalities must be decided by the Constituent Assembly.¹⁴

Despite Kerensky's ban of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress, the gathering took place in Kiev on June 18-23, 1917 with 2,500 delegates representing close to 2 million Ukrainian soldiers

¹² 1917 god na Kievshchynie. *Kronika sobytiy*. (1917 Year in the Kiev Province. Chronicle of Events). Kharkov, Goizdat Ukrainy, 1928, p. 94.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 102; Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, I, p. 69.

¹⁴ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, I, p. 87.

in the Russian armed forces. Among the resolutions supporting the *Rada* and the swift organization of Ukrainian military units, there was one calling on the *Rada* "*not to refer any longer to the Provisional Government, and immediately to initiate a vigorous organization of the country in cooperation with the national minorities, i. e., to build the foundation of an autonomous order as the only means of saving Ukraine and all Russia from disorder and destruction.*"¹⁵

THE FIRST UNIVERSAL OF THE CENTRAL RADA

There is no question that the demands of the *Rada* placed the Provisional Government in a difficult position. From its viewpoint these demands were directed at the very core of Russian imperialism. To assign Ukraine an autonomous status (although in 1654 Ukraine had concluded a treaty in Pereyaslav with Muscovy as one equal state with another) and to grant the formation of a Ukrainian army was tantamount to the dismemberment of "Holy Mother Russia." The Provisional Government proved to be far more Russian than democratic.

Prof. Hrushevsky, upon reading the telegram from the Provisional Government, sadly declared:

We have finished celebrating the holiday of the Revolution, and now we have entered upon its most dangerous period, one which threatens major destruction and disorder. We must prepare to resist effectively any hostile attack. . . I greet you, brothers, and repeat that, come what may, there shall be a free autonomous Ukraine.¹⁶

On June 23, 1917 the Central *Rada* issued its First *Universal* which in essence stated the following:

- a) The *Rada* is representative of the Ukrainian people;
- b) Although a separation from Russia is not advocated, the status of Ukraine should be determined by the Ukrainian National Territorial Assembly;
- c) The uncompromising attitude of the Provisional Government is denounced; and
- d) "From today on we will organize our own life."¹⁷ (cf. text of the First *Universal* in the Appendix to this article, p. 122).

Although not too specific in its language, the First *Universal* was hailed as the first definite pronouncement of the *Rada*, evoking

¹⁵ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, I, p. 70; 1917 *na Kievshchynie*, p. 115.

¹⁶ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 88; Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

¹⁷ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, I, p. 72.

nationwide support and enthusiasm. Funds for its work poured in from every corner of the country.

Furthermore, another step was taken: the transformation of the "Little *Rada*" into the Secretariat General to act as a cabinet or Council of Ministers of the *Rada*. It numbered among its members leading figures of the Ukrainian revolution: Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Simon Petlura, Serhiy Yefremov, C.A. Baranovsky, Borys Martos, Valentin Sadovsky, M. Stasiuk, I. Steshenko and Paul Khrystiuk.

The Russian reaction was one of shocked surprise: they could not believe that the Ukrainians, after two centuries of passive endurance, could organize and act on their own political initiative.

On June 29, the Provisional Government was compelled to answer with its own proclamation, appropriately entitled, "From the Provisional Government to the Ukrainian People."¹⁸ (cf. text of the Proclamation in the Appendix of this article, p. 124).

The content and tenor of the proclamation was not such as to evoke any favorable reaction. It furnished no concrete answers to the Ukrainians. Worse, it committed the political mistake of disregarding the popular Ukrainian Central *Rada* entirely and appealing directly to the Ukrainian people.

The *Rada* now gained further strength. In accordance with its promise it moved rapidly toward an agreement with the national minorities, particularly Russian, Polish and Jewish minorities. A meeting was held with representatives of these groups on July 2, 1917. An agreement was reached by which the *Rada* guaranteed the rights of national minorities as regards language, schools and religion. In return, support was pledged the *Rada* in its struggle for Ukrainian autonomy.¹⁹

AGREEMENT OF THE RADA WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

In view of the solidification of the Ukrainian national movement by July of 1917, the Russian Provisional Government was now faced with simple alternatives: to fight or to give in.

One of its factions was Russian traditionalists and chauvinists who advocated "stern measures" in dealing with the Ukrainians. Another group, including Prince Lvov, Nekrasov, Kerensky, Tsere-telli and Tereshchenko (who was of Ukrainian descent), favored a compromise. The Provisional Government finally dispatched a dele-

¹⁸ *Viestnik Vremennogo Pravitelstva* (Herald of the Provisional Government), June 15 (28), 1917.

¹⁹ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

gation (Alexander Kerensky, Irakly Tseretelli and M. I. Tereshchenko) which came to Kiev to negotiate a workable agreement with the *Rada*. This was on July 12, 1917.

After three days of long and often acrimonious debates an agreement was reached. Its essential points were:

1) The Provisional Government recognized the *Rada* and its executive body, the Secretariat General, as the official organs of the Ukrainian people;

2) The Central *Rada* was to withhold its demands for autonomy until the Convocation of the Constituent Assembly;

3) The armed forces on Ukrainian soil and at the front were to be Ukrainized, but the high command was to remain in Russian hands.²⁰

On July 13, 1917 the Central *Rada* approved the agreement in principle by a majority of 100 to 70, with a large number not voting. Members of the Ukrainian General Military Committee bitterly opposed the agreement.

In St. Petersburg the Provisional Government met to discuss the agreement, during the course of which meeting the Cadet Party members resigned from the cabinet in protest against the agreement.

We may note here that Alexander Kerensky, now an octogenarian in California, recently wrote a book, *Russia and History's Turning Point*, in which he made the following reference to our subject:

I was forced to interrupt my tour almost immediately after it began. Prince Lvov wanted me to go to Kiev without delay and settle the problem of the Ukrainian Army. Tereshchenko and Tseretelli were at that moment rounding off some tricky talks with the *Rada*, which was demanding the impossible. From there I planned to return to Petrograd to report to the Cabinet on the agreement with the Ukrainians... By July 1, Tereshchenko, Tseretelli, and I were back in Petrograd. The text of the agreement with the Central Ukrainian *Rada* had already been communicated to Prince Lvov by direct wire, and he had informed the rest of the ministers of its contents. At a meeting of the government that evening the agreement was ratified by the majority, whereupon the ministers from the Cadet Party announced their immediate resignation from the Cabinet.²¹

It is not a little surprising that Mr. Kerensky, one of the leading Russian figures who were involved in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in the March-October 1917 period, should have said so little

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²¹ *Russia and History's Turning Point*. By Alexander Kerensky. Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1965, pp. 288-289.

in his book on this very important subject. Virtually ignored are the liberation movements of the other non-Russian peoples which were equally involved during his premiership of the Provisional Government. Such gross omissions imply extreme bias and indicate his unreliability as an historian.

To return to the historical record, on July 16, 1917, a few days after the agreement between the *Rada* and the Provisional Government was reached, the Petrograd government issued a statement, entitled, the "Provisional Government on the Ukrainian Question," which in essence confirmed the agreement with the Ukrainians (cf. text of the "Provisional Government on the Ukrainian Question" in the Appendix of this article, p. 125).

The same day, July 16, 1917 the Central *Rada* issued its Second *Universal*, which dealt primarily with the same agreement (cf. text of the Second *Universal* in the Appendix, p. 126).

The Second *Universal* was the weakest document ever issued by the *Rada*, evoking considerable criticism both in the *Rada* and throughout Ukraine at that time. It is still being criticized by Ukrainian historians of today who contend that it set back the progress of the Ukrainian people toward independence.

Nonetheless, while these negotiations went on the *Rada* was able to establish a *de facto* government which exercised extensive authority over the country. The general administration of Ukraine was being Ukrainized, and a start at forming new Ukrainian military units was made.

On July 19, 1917, the *Rada's* Constitutional Commission prepared a draft of the Constitution of Ukraine. Called the "Statute of the Higher Administration of Ukraine" it was handed over to a special delegation of the *Rada* to take to St. Petersburg for the purpose of having it approved by the Provisional Government. On August 7 the *Rada* delegation was received by the Provisional Government, and the draft of the constitution was thoroughly discussed by both parties. The Russian government harshly criticized the draft as a departure from the original Kiev agreement, while the Ukrainians maintained that it was only the logical implementation of the same. (see text of the "Statute" in the Appendix, p. 127). Subsequently (August 17, 1917), the Provisional Government issued its own document, called a "Temporary Instruction for the Secretariat General of the Provisional Government in Ukraine."²² This reply to the draft of the Ukrainian Constitution again ignored the *Rada* and its consti-

²² Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 114-115; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 128-129.

tutional proposal. The Ukrainians charged that the Provisional Government negated the Kiev agreement by reducing the Secretariat General to a mere administrative organ of the Russian government, and by depriving the *Rada* of the broad powers and prerogatives it had acquired in the first three months of the Ukrainian Revolution (cf. text of the "Instruction" in the Appendix, p. 129).

While the Central *Rada* was persistently striving to attain a working compromise with the Provisional Government, the Ukrainian masses had now begun to press not only for autonomy, but for a complete break with the Provisional Government and the establishment of Ukrainian independence. Bloody clashes between the Russian and Ukrainian troops began to take place in various parts of Ukraine, contributing substantially to the rise of nationalist feelings in Ukraine.

To be noted here is that the Bolshevik movement in Ukraine, at least in the first months of the revolution, was neither strong nor popular. True, the Bolsheviks paid lip service to the principle of national self-determination, often "condemning" the Provisional Government for refusing to grant autonomy to Ukraine. In fact, however, they pursued their own policy, exploiting the Ukrainian national movement wherever possible for their own objectives. Their role in Ukraine became all too clear after their successful *coup d'état* in St. Petersburg and the seizure of power by Lenin and Trotsky.

On September, 1917 a Congress of the Peoples of Eastern Europe was held in Kiev under the auspices of the Central *Rada*. Ukrainians, Poles, Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Turkestanis, Byelorussians and Cossacks took part. All supported the *Rada* and advocated the dissolution of the Russian empire and the establishment of a federative state.

As late as October, 1917, the *Rada* tried to reach a new understanding with the Provisional Government. Again it dispatched a delegation to the north. But when the delegation, headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, arrived in St. Petersburg, the Bolsheviks had already taken over the government and dispersed forever the ineffective and myopic Provisional Government.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, there can be no doubt that St. Petersburg was wholly responsible for the collapse of a budding relationship between two great Slavic nations. Although democratic on paper, the Provisional Government proved in reality to be as reactionary as its predecessor in the matter of the preservation of "Holy Mother Russia."

Kerensky and his associates did not begin to understand the basic strength of the Ukrainian people, whom they saw as "part" of the Russian people. They were willing to allow the use of the Ukrainian language and a limited administrative autonomy of some — not all — Ukrainian provinces. But they opposed a separate Ukrainian army and, above all a Ukrainian government. In this respect, the Bolsheviks, at least in theory, surpassed them by propagating slogans of "self-determination, including complete separation" of the non-Russian nations. In trying to maintain the empire the Provisional Government rejected the rights of the non-Russian nations to freedom and self-determination. In so doing the Provisional Government managed its inevitable fall without accomplishing anything.

The Ukrainian leadership, too, is not entirely faultless. The Ukrainian National Revolution in its initial stages was led by Ukrainian Socialists and Social-Democrats who believed in internationalism and in a "new democratic Russia." They also opposed the swift organization of a Ukrainian army in the belief that the Russian leaders would keep their word and would allow Ukraine to become a member of a new Russian federation. The events that followed the collapse of the Provisional Government proved how disastrously wrong they were. The Kerensky government, incapable of organizing a stable regime, prevented Ukraine from establishing an army and government which could have withstood the Bolshevik onslaught.

Ukraine was subsequently proclaimed a republic (Third *Universal* of November 20, 1917) and declared its full independence (Fourth *Universal* on January 22, 1918). Also, a Ukrainian army was finally formed.

But these measures proved to have come too late. The chaotic Kerensky period made for the Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd and, aided by the indifference and ignorance of the Western World, the Bolsheviks went on to crush the Ukrainian State, whose origins date back to the tenth century.

APPENDICES

THE FIRST UNIVERSAL OF THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA¹

TO THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE IN UKRAINE AND OUTSIDE UKRAINE:

Ukrainian People! People of peasants, workers and laborers!

Through your will you placed us, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, as guardian of the rights and liberties of the Ukrainian land.

Your best sons, people elected from villages, factories, soldiers' barracks, from all communities and Ukrainian societies—these have elected us, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, and ordered us to stand and fight for these rights and liberties.

People, your elected representatives have declared as follows:

Let Ukraine be free. Not separating from all of Russia, not breaking away from the Russian state, but letting the Ukrainian people have the right to organize their own life in their land. Let the All-National Ukrainian Assembly (*Soym*), elected by an equal, direct and secret ballot, take care of law and order in Ukraine. The right to issue all the laws establishing this order in Ukraine should reside with the Ukrainian Assembly.

The laws providing for order in the entire Russian state should be issued by the All-Russian Parliament.

No one knows better than we ourselves what we need and what laws are best for us.

No one knows better than our peasants how to manage their land. Therefore, we demand that the land, in all of Russia, belonging to landlords, the government, the Czars, monasteries and others, be taken and turned over to the people as their properties and that when the special law on this is passed by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly—we demand a law concerning our own Ukrainian lands giving the right of utilizing them to ourselves alone, to our own Ukrainian Assembly (*Soym*).

So state the people, elected from the entire Ukrainian Land.

Having so stated, from among themselves they have elected us, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, and empowered us to lead the Ukrainian people, to stand for their rights and to establish a new order of a free, autonomous Ukraine.

And we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, obeying the will of our people, have taken upon ourselves the great responsibility of building a new life, and have already commenced this great task.

We believed that the Central Russian Government would extend a helping hand to us in this work and that, in concord with it, we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, would be able to establish order in our land.

¹ *Vestnik Vremennogo Pravitelstva*, June 15 (28th), 1917.

But the Russian Provisional Government has rejected all our demands and refused to accept the extended hand of the Ukrainian people.

We sent to Petrograd our own delegates to present our demands directly to the Russian Provisional Government.

In the main, these demands were as follows:

That the Russian Government declare, by a special public act, that it is not against the national freedom of Ukraine and against the right of our people to autonomy;

That the Central Russian Government, in all matters concerning Ukraine, should have our Commissar for Ukrainian matters;

That the local authority in Ukraine should be united with a representative in the Central Russian Government, namely, a Commissar elected in Ukraine;

That a certain part of the moneys collected from our people for the Central Treasury, should be turned over to us, representatives of this people, for the people's national and cultural needs.

All these demands of ours were rejected by the Central Russian Government.

It failed to state whether it recognizes the right of autonomy for our people, and the right to manage our own lives. It declined to give us a reply, but referred us to the future All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

The Central Russian Government did not want to have our Commissar within it; it did not want to create a new order with us.

Likewise, it refused to appoint a commissar for the whole of Ukraine, so that we, together with him, could lead our country to law and order.

Also, the taxes which are being collected from our land were denied us for the needs of our schools, education and organizations.

And so now, Ukrainian People, we are compelled to forge our own destiny. We cannot allow our land to fall into anarchy and decline. If the Russian Provisional Government cannot establish order for us and refuses to stand together with us in this great task, then we ourselves must undertake it. It is our duty toward our land and those peoples who live in our land.

Therefore, we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, hereby issue this *Universal* to all our people, and announce: from now on we ourselves will build our life.

Consequently, let every member of our nation, every citizen of every town and village know from now on that the time for great work has arrived.

From now on every village, every community, every county and *zemstvo* board which supports the interests of the Ukrainian people should establish the closest organizational relationship with the Central *Rada*.

Wherever for some reason the administrative authority remains in the hands of people inimical to the Ukrainian cause, we recommend that our citizens undertake extensive and concentrated organizational work aimed at the enlightenment of the people, and then elect a new administration.

In cities and those localities where the Ukrainian population lives with other nationalities, we recommend that our citizens come immediately to an understanding and accord with the democratic representatives of these nationalities, and together with them begin a new and orderly life.

The Central *Rada* hopes that the non-Ukrainian peoples living in our land also will support law and order in our land and, in this difficult time of government chaos, stand with us as friends in the work of establishing the autonomy of Ukraine.

And once this preparatory organizational work is accomplished, we shall then call up representatives of all the peoples of the Ukrainian land and enact laws for the country. These laws, this order, which we shall prepare, is to be confirmed by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly through its own laws.

Ukrainian People! Confronting your elected organ—the Ukrainian Central *Rada*—is a great and high wall which must be brought down in order that we may lead our people on the road to freedom.

We need strength for this. We need strong and daring hands. We need a great national effort. And for the success of this effort we must have money. Heretofore, the Ukrainian people paid all their taxes to the All-Russian Treasury, without receiving from it any counterpart rightfully due them.

Therefore, we, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, recommend that all organized citizens of villages and towns, all Ukrainian social boards and institutions impose on July 31 a special tax upon the population for the benefit of our cause and immediately and regularly remit to the treasury of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*.

Ukrainian People! Your fate rests in your own hands. In this difficult time of worldwide anarchy and destruction, prove by your unity and state wisdom that you, people of workers and farmers, can proudly and with dignity stand side by side with any other organized nation-state as equal with equal.

Kiev, June 23, 1917.

FROM THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE!²

Citizens-Ukrainians! In these historic days the Provisional Government addresses you in the name of the whole free Russia.

Russia is now passing through great difficulties in achieving the liberty that will give the people of all nationalities prosperity and restore their rights.

The gains of the Revolution are endangered. If an external enemy should defeat Russia, it would mean the end of liberty for all peoples inhabiting Russia.

The duty of the Provisional Government is to guide the state through these difficulties and to convoke the Constitutional Assembly at which all the people of Russia, by general, secret and equal elections, may express their will.

This is also your duty, Citizens-Ukrainians! Are you part of free Russia? Is not the fate of Ukraine bound with the destiny of all liberated Russia?

Who can doubt that Russia, standing under the sign of full self-rule of the people, will not safeguard the rights of all nations?

All nationalities, through their representatives to the Constitutional Assembly, will be able to choose those forms of government and economy that are fully compatible with their national aspirations.

In regard to all nationalities in Russia, the Provisional Government has already begun to promote cultural self-determination and, inspired by sympathy and understanding, it wants to destroy all vestiges of oppression of the Ukrainian people.

The Provisional Government had and still has the duty to reach an agreement with the democratic organizations of Ukraine, regarding all these pressing

² Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, I, p. 92.

measures; this agreement being necessary for the protection of the rights of the Ukrainian people in local autonomy, in autonomous organizations and in schools and courts.

This agreement will set up a temporary system until the final status of Ukraine is determined by the Constitutional Assembly. The full reorganization of Russia and the All-Russian Army cannot be effected under fire of enemies and in view of the present obstacles within the country.

Brother Ukrainians! Do not follow the dangerous path of dismemberment of the forces of liberated Russia.

Do not separate from our fatherland and do not dismember the army in this difficult hour. Do not bring fratricidal antagonism into the national ranks at this moment when all efforts should be made to prevent an external defeat of the country.

Do not give a mortal blow to the whole Empire and to yourselves, because the death of Russia will be the termination of your endeavors, too.

We appeal to all people of Russia to close their ranks in the struggle with internal and external difficulties. They should present their demands for final decision to the Constitutional Assembly where all people will decide the future of all Russia and of their separate countries.

St. Petersburg, June 29, 1917

Prime Minister Prince Lvov

DECLARATION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT³

On July 16 the Provisional Government issued the following declaration:

After considering the reports of Ministers Kerensky, Tereshchenko and Tseretelli on the Ukrainian question, the Provisional Government has decided:

1. To appoint a General Secretariat as a higher organ for conducting Ukrainian national affairs, its composition to be decided by the Provisional Government in accord with the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, which has been completed on the just basis of representation for other nationalities living in Ukraine... Through this organ, all measures and efforts will be undertaken which are necessary to the life of the state.

2. Considering that the question of the national and political status of Ukraine and the land question (the transfer of land to the working masses) must be decided by the Constitutional Assembly, the Provisional Government will positively meet the demands of the Central *Rada* respecting the political and national status of Ukraine in a manner which the Central *Rada* itself will consider as adequate for the interests of the country, and also respecting the land question, which will be presented to the Constitutional Assembly.

3. The Provisional Government, considering it necessary during the war to preserve the fighting unity of the Army, does not think it possible to permit any proceeding that would destroy the unity of its organization and command, as for instance, changes at the present moment in the general mobilization plan for immediate transition to the territorial system for completion of the Army, or the granting of rights of command to any civil organization. Mean-

³ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, I, p. 114. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, I, p. 93.

while the Provisional Government considers it possible to support further closer national union of Ukrainians in the Army by forming separate divisions exclusively of Ukrainians, if such methods will be possible technically, according to the War Minister, and will not weaken the fighting capacity of the Army. To carry out these plans, the Provisional Government considers it possible to admit Ukrainian soldiers themselves... into the cabinet in the Russian Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Supreme Command of the forces.

Regarding the local Ukrainian Military Committees, they should conduct their activities on a general basis and in accord with other military and civil organizations.

Signed:

KERENSKY
TERESHCHENKO
TSERETELLI

SECOND UNIVERSAL OF THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA ⁴

Citizens of the Ukrainian Land:

The representatives of the Provisional Government have informed us of the steps that the Provisional Government should undertake in connection with the question of the administration of Ukraine until the Constitutional Assembly meets.

The Provisional Government, safeguarding the liberty won by the Revolution, recognizing the right of self-determination for every people, and postponing the final decision of the form of government until the Constitutional Assembly, extends its hand to the representatives of Ukrainian democracy—the Central *Rada*—and appeals to them to cooperate in forming a new life in Ukraine for the benefit of all revolutionary Russia.

We, the Central *Rada*, who have always opposed the separation of Ukraine from Russia, in order that together with it other peoples may follow the road of development of all Russia and unite with its democratic forces, accept with satisfaction the appeal of the Provisional Government for unity and proclaim to all citizens of Ukraine:

The Ukrainian Central *Rada*, elected by the Ukrainian people through their revolutionary organizations, will soon be completed on a just basis with representatives of other peoples living in Ukraine, through their revolutionary democracy of Ukraine, which will represent the interests of the whole population of our country.

The completed Central *Rada* will organize a new organ—the General Secretariat—which will be responsible to the *Rada* and will be presented to the Provisional Government for approval, representing the supreme authority of the Provisional Government in Ukraine.

In this organ will be concentrated all power to represent the democracy of all Ukraine, and as the highest organ of administration to carry out the work of the organized life of the whole country in accord with all revolutionary Russia.

⁴ Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, I, p. 124.

In accord with all the nationalities of Ukraine and cooperating with them in government affairs, the General Secretariat of the Central *Rada*, as the organ of the Provisional Government, will move firmly to strengthen the new regime created by the Revolution.

Aiming at an autonomous government in Ukraine, the Central *Rada*, in cooperation with the national minorities of Ukraine, will prepare the fundamental law for approval by the Constitutional Assembly.

Considering that the creation of a national organ of the Provisional Government in Ukraine will enable the administration to meet the needs of the people within the limits of the Constitutional Assembly, and recognizing that the fate of all peoples of Russia is bound indivisibly with the general gains of the Revolution, we are absolutely against the idea of arbitrary realization of the autonomy of Ukraine before the Constitutional Assembly meets.

As to the formation of Ukrainian forces, the Central *Rada* will have its representatives in the (Russian) War Ministry, on the General Staff and in the High Command, who will participate in the completion of separate divisions exclusively of Ukrainians, if such will not be technically incompatible with the efficiency of the fighting capacity of the Army, in the opinion of the War Minister.

Announcing this to the citizens of Ukraine, we firmly believe that Ukrainian democracy, which delegated to us its power, will enable us, together with the revolutionary democracy of Russia, to lead the whole empire, especially Ukraine, to the victory of the Revolution.

Kiev, July 16, 1917.

Ukrainian Central *Rada*

CONSTITUTION OR "STATUTE OF HIGHER ADMINISTRATION OF UKRAINE"⁵

On the basis of the agreement with the Provisional Government on July 16, 1917, the organ of Revolutionary Democracy of all the peoples of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*—which has to prepare Ukraine for the final realization of autonomy and to lead it to the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly—creates the General Secretariat as the highest organ of administration in Ukraine.

The authority of the General Secretariat is as follows:

1. The highest national organ of administration of Ukraine is the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, which is elected by the Central *Rada*, and is responsible to it and is approved by the Provisional Government.
2. The General Secretariat of the Central *Rada* is appointed by the Committee of the Central *Rada* (the "Little Rada").
3. The Central *Rada* approves the General Secretariat by vote of confidence.
4. The General Secretariat is composed of fourteen ministers: interior, finance, war, supplies (food), agriculture, justice, education, national minorities, commerce and industry, post and telegraph, labor, transport, general controller and general secretary. Annex: In the ministry of national minorities, there are

⁵ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 114-115; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 128-129.

appointed three associate ministers—Russian, Polish and Jewish. They shall have the right to be consulted and to vote on any question regarding their respective nationalities in the General Secretariat. They are approved by the Committee ("Little *Rada*") of the Central *Rada*.

5. The General Secretariat exercises its authority through all government organs in Ukraine.

6. All government institutions in Ukraine are subject to the authority of the General Secretariat. Annex: The General Secretariat decides which organs, within certain limits and in certain cases, may confer directly with the Provisional Government.

7. All government posts in Ukraine, if they are not elective, are filled by appointees of the General Secretariat.

8. Within the Provisional Government there shall be appointed a state secretary for Ukraine, nominated by the Provisional Government with the approval of the Central *Rada*.

9. The state secretary shall protect the interests of Ukraine in all activities of the Provisional Government and when necessary may submit projects to the Central *Rada* through the General Secretariat.

10. The General Secretariat submits to the Provisional Government for approval all projects of law discussed and voted by the Central *Rada*.

11. The General Secretariat submits to the Provisional Government for approval the temporary expenses of Ukraine that have been discussed and voted by the Central *Rada*.

12. Appropriations (voted by the Russian Provisional Government) for the Central *Rada* shall be spent by the General Secretariat, according to the budget voted by the Central *Rada*.

13. The General Secretariat submits all important questions to the Central *Rada* for discussion.

14. The activity of the General Secretariat — responsible to the Central *Rada*—is controlled by it by interpellations during sessions.

15. Between sessions of the Central *Rada*, the General Secretariat executes all the functions of the Central *Rada* with the exception of (that indicated in) Paragraph 3.

16. In case of disagreement between the General Secretariat and the Committee of the *Rada* ("Little *Rada*"), the question shall be decided immediately by an extraordinary session of the Central *Rada*.

17. Should the Central *Rada* vote non-confidence in the General Secretariat, the General Secretariat shall resign.

18. All acts of the Central *Rada* shall be countersigned by the General Secretariat.

19. All laws of the Provisional Government become effective in Ukraine on the day of their publication in the National Official *Herald* (*Vistnyk*) in the Ukrainian language.

Annex: In case of emergency, the General Secretariat announces these laws in other ways.

20. All laws, administrative orders and resolutions, proclaimed in the Ukrainian language, shall be published also in Russian, Polish and Jewish.

21. In internal matters concerning its own work, the General Secretariat issues its own orders.

**TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE⁶**

1. Until the final decision of the Constitutional Assembly respecting local government, the higher organ of the Provisional Government is appointed by the Central *Rada*.

2. The authority of the General Secretariat extends to the Provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava and Chernihiv, excluding the districts of Minsk, Surazh, Starodub and Novozybkiv. This authority may be extended into other provinces when local organizations express their desire for having such authority.

3. The General Secretariat is composed of secretaries (ministers) of (a) interior, (b) finance, (c) agriculture, (d) education, (e) commerce and industry, (f) labor, a general secretary for nationalities and a general secretary. Besides these there is a general controller who takes part in the sessions of the General Secretariat with the right to vote. Within the secretariat of nationalities there are three associate secretaries, so that all the greater minorities in Ukraine (Russian, Polish and Jewish) may be represented.

4. The General Secretariat discusses and submits to the Provisional Government for approval all projects regarding the life of the country and its government. These projects can also be discussed by the Central *Rada*.

5. The authority of the Provisional Government in the matter of local government is delegated to the General Secretariat (Paragraph 3). Further explanation will be given in a special annex.

6. In all questions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the local authorities of the country are referred to the General Secretariat, which after consulting with the Provisional Government issues ordinances and orders to the local authorities.

7. The General Secretariat presents a list of candidates for government positions (whose duties are determined by Paragraph 5), the candidates to take office after approval by the Provisional Government.

8. The relations of higher state institutions (Russian) and separate (Russian) civil bodies with the General Secretariat and Secretaries are regulated by the Commissar of Ukraine within the Provisional Government. In the same way are regulated the legislative plans referring to the local questions of Ukraine and also measures of general significance, which also may be discussed in commissions which must contain representatives of the Provisional Government.

9. In emergencies, the higher state institutions and departments (of the Provisional Government) submit their orders to the local authorities (of Ukraine) directly, simultaneously notifying the General Secretariat of these orders.

Signed:

Premier Kerensky

Minister of Justice Zarudny

St. Petersburg, August 17, 1917.

⁶ Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 128-129.

GUERRILLAS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN: PAST AND FUTURE

(On the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the UPA)

By ENRIQUE MARTINEZ CODO

Much has been written about the success of Communist guerrilla tactics in Europe, Asia, and Latin America—indeed, to such an extent that it would appear the Communists have a global monopoly on this form of warfare. Yet the falsity of that Soviet propaganda had already come to light with respect to the guerrilla movements that developed in the USSR during World War II, especially in Ukraine.¹

Today it is no secret that in the years 1942-1950 a violent guerrilla war took place in Ukraine—initially against Nazi occupation forces and later against Soviet occupation. This movement's primary goal was the restoration of that country's national liberty.

The struggle was carried out primarily by the UPA (*Ukrainska Povstancha Armia*: Ukrainian Insurgent Army), a force which gathered under the Ukrainian flag some 200,000 combatants who were to fight over the course of years fierce and successful battles against the occupation forces. Its fighting methods were called *partysanka*, and assumed the characteristics of a popular guerrilla-type struggle. Even though the struggle never attained its goals (national independence, winning of a favorable world reaction, and assistance to its cause), the UPA was able to contain an enemy that was overwhelmingly superior in men and equipment and which had just defeated an adversary's powerful regular army.

News of the UPA's successes was suppressed by strict Soviet press censorship. Nevertheless, stirring articles and stories started to leak out of other countries, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, on how the forces of these countries had launched counteractions against the Ukrainian guerrillas. In addition, various exiles and refugees from the Communist world, once safe in the Free World, began telling of their personal experiences in this warfare.

¹ See *Military Review*, November 1960. U.S. Army and U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 3.

Polish military newspapers, for example, reveal that, in addition to normal police forces, regular army troops (WP) and troops from the Internal Security Corps (KBW)—totaling five divisions—were employed against the UPA forces in the regions of southeast Poland. (Polish General Ignacio Blum makes reference, in an article appearing in the No. 1, 1959 issue of *Historical Military Review*, to the intervention of the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th WP divisions, as well as a division from the KBW.)

Other articles appearing in the same periodical are eloquent narrations of the fierce struggle which was carried out against the UPA. In one of them (*Historical Military Review* No. 4, 1959), Colonel Jan Gerhard describes the ingenuity of the Ukrainian guerrillas in constructing bunkers and other underground facilities as winter fortifications and also for concealment of their tactics. He states: "...in the summer-fall of 1946 bunkers began appearing in the mountain and wooded zones; they were really underground cities. These structures, characteristic of the ingenious UPA, would have one or two plants. Each bunker was well concealed... not only were bunkers found in the forests, but the villages themselves were undermined with them..." This fortification capability apparently has been adopted and developed by Communist guerrillas in all the areas in which they operate. Recently, large and small underground fortifications have been uncovered in Vietnam which are quite similar to the type built by the UPA. This undoubtedly explains the Viet Cong's "evaporation" during carefully prepared encircling operations carried out by American and South Vietnamese forces.

The Soviet press has always begrudged the UPA any recognition, referring to the guerrillas as "common criminals," "bandits" or "outlaws." In April of 1964, that is to say, 20 years later, for example, the review *Ogonyok* acknowledged the fact that General Nicholas F. Vatutin, a Hero of the Soviet Union, whose statue is being erected in a Kiev park, died as a consequence of wounds received in a battle against the "...cowardly traitors and lackeys of the Gestapo, the banderovtsy-nationalists..."²

² The Russians call the Ukrainian guerrillas "banderovtsy," after the followers of Stepan Bandera, renowned leader of Ukrainian independence who was assassinated in Munich on October 15, 1959 by a KGB agent (as established in a court of law in Karlsruhe); this is also confirmed in the book by Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers* (1965). On page 42, it reads: "On February 28 (1944), however, the jeep in which General Vatutin was riding was ambushed by Ukrainian nationalists who were operating in this area as guerrillas, and General Vatutin was mortally wounded. He soon died in one of the hospitals in Kiev..."

In addition, UPA ambush attacks caused the death of prominent Communist leaders. Among these were the Polish Undersecretary of War, Gen. Karol Swierszczewski and Soviet Gen. Ivan Sovetnikov. Seriously wounded was Marshal Kiril Moskalenko. This gives an indication of the striking daring of the UPA forces, especially when we bear in mind the strong escorts accompanying these leaders when traveling within the theater of operations.

Another indication of UPA effectiveness: the Triparty Pact that was signed on May 12, 1947, by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which pledged the combined employment of important multinational forces in repression of the guerrillas; a wider barbed-wire strip along the frontiers bordering the Western powers, and the intensification of the anti-guerrilla struggle with specially selected forces. The USSR, for example, preferred fanatically indoctrinated troops from the MVD (security police) over regular Red Army troops.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FAILURE

Initially, UPA engagements were highly successful. This was due primarily to the support received from all the Ukrainian people, who saw in the guerrillas the means of regaining their independence, lost back in 1920 after the 1918 invasion by the Reds.

Second, it was due to the morale and outstanding tactical ability of the troops and commands of the UPA, who supplemented their inferior supply of weapons and equipment with audacity and maneuverability.

It was here where the *partysanka* demonstrated all its courage. The *partysanka* tactics were based on:

Simplicity: Simplicity in the formulation of operational plans and in the transmission of orders, which, without becoming too informal, insured rapidity of maneuver and prompt execution.

Intelligence: Fundamental base of all conflicts launched by the guerrillas and a permanent activity on the part of all commands and troops. Intelligence was gained through their own resources and from popular support to such an extent that repression forces could not undertake any movement without the UPA command being promptly informed of the strength, weapons, disposition, and direction of march of these forces.

Speed: Speed in the execution of operational plans. This speed was the product of the simplicity with which these plans were developed, the great mobility of small guerrilla groups and detachments, the relative freedom of action possessed by the smaller commands,

the intimate knowledge of the terrain in the theater of operations, and the maximizing of utilization of available resources.

Secrecy: The high order of secrecy maintained in all their activities, thanks to the clandestine planning and to the extreme security measures employed in their recruiting of fighters and civilian agents.

Morale Factor: The high morale stemmed from the lofty patriotic ideals of the combatants and their just cause, which was clearly understood and supported by the men and the rest of the population which did not hesitate to take risks or to spare any efforts in rendering support.

Another fundamental characteristic of the UPA struggle was its total sovereignty. In contrast to other guerrilla movements during World War II that benefited from an abundant aerial resupply, the UPA received no assistance whatsoever from any other power. Only in one case (in 1944) by virtue of a local pact formed with the Hungarian VIth Army Corps, the guerrilla forces in the Carpathian sector received some weapons and ammunition. These were given in exchange for an UPA agreement to fight only against the Soviets. Outside of this occasion the UPA literally lived off the enemy and the terrain. All their weapons and equipment were wrested from the enemy, while a large part of their logistics was improvised from the scanty resources left behind by the occupying forces. Clandestine factories and establishments, operated by the people themselves, kept the guerrillas supplied with clothing and food.

With the end of the war and the start of the Cold War, the UPA continued to operate without receiving assistance, even lacking the moral and psychological support of radio audiences in the Free World. Nor did the emissaries and propaganda groups that were sent to the West have any success: groups, like those in Homer's poems, which were able to reach allied occupation zones in Germany and Austria. When the Western press did begin printing some details about the no-quarter bloody struggle, many international events took place which diverted world interest and public opinion from its direction: the fall of Prague (1948) to communism, Mao Tse-tung's conquest of China (1948), the Berlin Blockade (1948-49), the Korean War (1950), etc. In the midst of all these crucial international developments, the UPA's struggle passed virtually unnoticed and ignored.

The year of 1950 saw the death in combat of the UPA's commander-in-chief, Lt. General Roman Shukhevych ("Taras Chuprynka"), followed by an abrupt change in tactics. The more or less overt

actions and large scale operations of the UPA now gave way to a completely clandestine phase, featuring general passive resistance, sabotage, strikes of opportunity and psychological war in general, with rumor campaigns, painting of inscriptions and slogans on walls, etc.

This clandestine phase, if spirited and far-reaching, nevertheless marked the UPA's failure to reach its prime objective, the restoration of national independence. It was due, among other things, to the following circumstances:

During the eight years in which it carried on the military phase of the struggle, the UPA lost an enormous amount of personnel. Concurrently, however, the repression forces continued to grow in quantity and quality.

The Communist authorities cut off the popular support of the UPA by organizing the evacuation of the Ukrainian population from those zones in which the action was most marked. Untold thousands of inhabitants were moved to other territories in the USSR, creating actual deserts in certain zones of southeastern Poland and Western Ukraine. In other zones the Ukrainian population was replaced by groups brought in from various USSR regions; these people were warned against the UPA as "leftovers from the fascist bands."

Lack of outside help and international developments focusing elsewhere were the factors which convinced the UPA leaders to conserve their energies for a more opportune time. By secretly saving their arms and equipment, intensifying their subversive and propaganda net, developing passive resistance plans, and upsetting the economic efforts of the central government, the UPA resistance passed over effectively to a covert status.

At this point, the following questions are pertinent: What importance can UPA actions have in an eventual conflict between East and West? What are the possibilities for and what adaptations are indicated in the UPA's tactics in such conflict? ,

IMPORTANCE OF THE GUERRILLAS

To begin with, it should be postulated that no future guerrilla action can succeed behind the Iron Curtain unless it is coordinated and supported from the outside in a clear and effective manner, granting the guerrillas are an allied force. The alternatives are barren: the Western Powers to sit and wait for a popular armed uprising before moving on the Communist camp or the oppressed people to wait inactively for their liberation to come from outside.

These courses would result in either no action or the pointless sacrifice of resistance forces. Glaring examples: the Hungarian, Cuban, and Ukrainian cases.

Above all, the fundamental mistake made by Hitler must be avoided. When he invaded the USSR in 1941 he made all kinds of promises of liberation, yet when the Nazi administration took over, it quickly fastened on the people a yoke which was worse than the one just lifted. Clarity and consistency in promises are indispensable.

There is little doubt that a solution to the present world confrontations will be written in the pages of history within the next few years. Nor is there much doubt that these pages will contain a chapter on the subdued nations. The UPA can again be counted on to fill important pages with glory and sacrifice. It could not be otherwise: with its experience, seasoned troops and clandestine organization, it constitutes a first-class allied anti-Soviet force.

Now, in order to understand fully the importance represented by the eventual uprising of the UPA within the framework of an alliance with the rest of the Free World, we must first glance at the scope of Soviet military doctrine, which in an emphatic and continuous manner postulates a certain number of elements as "fundamental factors that operate permanently and which determine the outcome of wars."

Repeatedly cited by such outstanding military leaders as Marshals Zhukov, Malinovsky, Konev, Vasilevsky and Sokolovsky, these factors are:

Stability of the rearguard

Morale of the army

The quantity and quality of the divisions (troops)

The armament of the army

The ability and competence of command

Also recognized by Soviet military leaders and specialists are "temporary" factors. These factors can be very significant in some phase of the war (especially at the beginning) and could have an important bearing on the course or even the outcome of the war. In duration, however, they are short-lived. Among them, the most commonly cited is that of surprise.

Also to be taken into account, however, is the dual meaning characteristic of Soviet thinking, including the military. For example, this is seen in their assessment of the duration of a nuclear conflict between East and West. On the one hand, the troops are taught that

such a confrontation would be of short duration and would result in few casualties. On the other, there is the equally strong classical viewpoint that a future war would inevitably develop into a prolonged and severe conflict "... since victory in war is not realized by one, two or several battles, but rather through the execution of a series of campaigns and military operations" (Colonel A. Stokov).

Nevertheless, the "rearguard stability" factor—the first item in Stalin's military doctrine—continues to enjoy respect and is considered by Soviet military theorists to be one of the basic factors of Soviet strategy.

Wherefore this emphasis on "rearguard stability?" To answer this question let us first examine what the Soviet tacticians consider as "rearguard."

Their rearguard concept takes in not only the communications zone, logistical functions, training of reserve replacements, etc., but is broad enough to embrace the whole Communist society. According to Marshal Voroshilov's definition, "...the idea of rearguard stability includes all that is constituted by the life and activity in the whole system: the social state, the political and economic, the means of production, the degree of organization of the working class, ideology, science, art, morale of the people, etc." In a word, the whole culture, including the anti-Soviet nationalist movements with their guerrillas ("bourgeoisie secessionists"), which, in their judgment, menace the existence and stability of the Soviet Union.

That this is not a far-fetched view is evident once we weigh the economic-industrial importance which Ukraine possesses in relation to the USSR. Agriculturally and in minerals, the loss of Ukraine would be fatal; even its neutralization through large-scale action on the part of the guerrillas would be disastrous. According to official Soviet sources of information, the Ukrainian economy and industry presently represent, within the overall production of the USSR, 90% of the Diesel engines; 78% of the Diesel locomotives; 65% of the sugar output; 55% of the pig iron; 54% of the coke; 52% of the cast iron; 49% of the metallurgical equipment; 46% of the railroad cars; 41% of the laminated metals, and 40% of the steel. Of the two major uranium centers, one is to be found in Ukraine. Ukraine's contribution, on the average, lies between 35 to 40% of the total production in the USSR.

Such is the value of the Soviet "rearguard," encapsulated in the phrase, "the Ukrainian front." Here is the terrain for the UPA's battlefield; here are the potential and actual possibilities to be gained

by the Free World through alliance and coordination between the Ukrainian guerrillas and the liberation forces of the West.

If to the Ukrainian front is added the internal fronts of Azerbaijan, the Caucasus, Armenia, the Baltic countries, White Ruthenia, Georgia, etc., the importance of guerrilla action behind the Iron Curtain comes into sharp focus.

INDISPENSABLE ADAPTATION

The experiences accumulating from all previous wars indicate that one regrettable tendency has been to think of future conflicts as developing in the same manner as those in the past. Analyses of victories in the past are applied too vigorously and unimaginatively to military situations of present and future. Yet every war presents a new set of conditions, often unprecedented, and the ability of every capable leader consists in being able to employ lessons learned from the past without overlooking the possibilities opened up by new technological and scientific developments.

Thus, is it wise to assume that a possible guerrilla war behind the Iron Curtain would develop along the same lines as the *party-sanka* of 1942-1950? Would the guerrilla plans, which were so successful in 1945, be valid in 1970 or 1980? Categorically, they would not. New electronic observation and reconnaissance means, the helicopter, tactical nuclear weapons, even advances in applied psychology—all are creating new types of terrains.

For example, employment of tactical nuclear arms against guerrilla groups behind the Iron Curtain is a distinct possibility. Such use of nuclear tactical weapons probably would be limited to the guerrillas and not directed against the Western regular forces, thereby resulting in "internal use in a police-type mission" which could even be carried out covertly.

Of course, if the Russians feared reprisal by the guerrillas employing nuclear weapons supplied by the Western powers, the Soviet command could rule out even this use of their nuclear capability. In this case, the guerrilla forces could adapt the tactics of the old *partysanka* to the new methods of electronic surveillance, aerial combat transport (helicopters), in such manner as in Vietnam, and new equipment yet untested in wartime. Especially because these new capabilities would enhance the effectiveness of the guerrillas, it is our opinion that the Russians would not be able to resist the use of tactical nuclear arms.

In such case, the guerrilla forces must be used in units no larger than battalion size or, at the very most, group or brigade size, the latter being composed of three battalions. This curtailment of size would be required in order to retain mobility as well as to avoid presenting the enemy with lucrative targets. Regroupment of the various battalions to form brigades could be done "upon order," as was the practice of the UPA. However, we must bear in mind that currently even companies and platoons of infantry may be justifiable targets for tactical nuclear weapons of the American "Davy Crockett" type (range: 10 km.) or a similar Soviet type, that is to say, relatively light weapons which could be easily air-transported. In this case, there is no reason why the guerrillas in turn should not become familiar with such nuclear weapons used by their allies.

Another observation is in order. In World War II, when the Russians wished to prevent the enemy from regrouping his first line, the Soviet artillery would continue shelling the breakthrough zone for a certain period of time even over their own troops without any regard to the casualties inflicted on their own comrades. We cannot overlook the possibility, then, that in the future, however limited the contact that is established, the Soviet command might decide to employ its tactical nuclear weapons indiscriminately over the combat zone if it appeared that by sacrificing a few thousand men they could annihilate a dangerous subversive enemy. This may seem inhuman and unthinkable to the Western Christian. Not so for the Russians, however, whose deity, Lenin, himself affirmed that "...no matter that two-thirds of the world's population perish; what matters is that the remaining third be true Communists..."

With respect to movement, especially under nuclear threat, it is evident that night-time should be fully capitalized upon despite the fact that electronic devices (infrared, radar, laser, etc.) will substantially reduce the impunity once afforded by night operations. The employment of these same devices by the guerrillas will tend to restore the old balance, especially if marches and deployment of forces be made in small fragments at long intervals, thus employing the old Napoleonic concept of marching apart and reuniting in combat.

The possibility of the enemy intentionally radiating specific areas makes it necessary that the guerrillas detach reconnaissance patrols from their rearguard equipped with dosimeters and Geiger counters to check areas for radiation and thus to avoid falling into a death trap undetectable to the human eye. Thus where heretofore the ideal guerrilla was the bellicose type armed with hand grenade and sub-machine gun, a premium would now be placed on those of exceptional

courage charged with insuring the survival of all the troops. In any event, the guerrillas must possess adequate means for reconnaissance and radioactivity detection equipment, for the possibility always remains of a nuclear war between East and West. In such case, the guerrillas would be operating in mass land areas exposed to fallout resulting from raids on important strategic targets within Ukrainian territory now under Communist domination (The Dnieper Basin, the Donbas, the industrial zone of Kiev, etc.). The guerrillas also must be trained in security and decontamination procedures; in other words, trained in subjects which were completely unknown to the World War II guerrillas.

Some of the UPA modes of operations also must be revised. For example, the old tendency to seek refuge or concealment in wooded areas, which not only would no longer present any major obstacle to infrared detection, but would also be highly susceptible to mass fires, like giant match sticks, as a result of a nuclear detonation or even from the explosion of low-yield weapons.

With respect to mobility, the need for swift maneuverability would be greater than ever. With nuclear weapons employed by the enemy, encirclement by the enemy is tantamount to annihilation. More, a break-out must run the gauntlet of enemy use of troop-carrying helicopters, which, speedily deployed, could negate the break-out. Since the helicopter is vulnerable to well-directed anti-aircraft fire, however, such light weapons as the American "Redeye" in the hands of the guerrillas can neutralize the helicopter threat. One must also bear in mind that helicopters can be utilized as a means of air-to-ground support, firing rockets, bombs and automatic weapons at ground targets. Here guerrillas must learn to distinguish visually the difference between the assault and transport types in order to mount immediate and adequate countermeasures.

From the intelligence point of view, a fact that was vital even in World War II: guerrilla activities will be confronted with a new series of intelligence requirements that will be indispensable for the success of their aspirations. Thus, in addition to the conventional requirements of yesteryear, the following are to be added:

- * Availability and employment doctrine of enemy nuclear weapons against guerrilla forces.
- * Firing positions or routes of march of such weapons.
- * Radioactive detection of areas and constant vigilance for radioactivity in the area.
- * Electronic observation means employed by the enemy and detection of enemy electronic observation.

- * Helicopter heli-pads and maintenance areas.
- * Reconnaissance of enemy objectives and targets susceptible to attack by employment of proper nuclear weapons.

With regard to logistical problems, the new characteristics of guerrilla warfare will necessitate great effort and foresight. To begin with, nuclear contamination can deny the guerrilla the classical resources he has used for the last 20 years. In addition, there will inevitably be mass confusion in casualty treatment operations resulting from a nuclear detonation. Entailed is doubling or tripling the construction of underground hospitals similar to those used in 1942-1950. In addition, underground depots and bunkers must be increased in number to shelter and protect the guerrillas from fallout as well as for storage of food and equipment for long periods of time. This means that the specialized fortification capability of the UPA must be intensified—a capability that was to become respected even by enemy forces and which apparently has been copied and perfected by the Viet Cong guerrillas.

Even though these aspects that have been discussed do not cover all the variations or adaptations which will have to be made in the tactics of the possibly reorganized UPA and other guerrilla movements operating behind the Iron Curtain in an eventual world conflict, this admittedly incomplete inventory has been made so as to demonstrate the diversity and complexity that is inherent in the role of insurgency in a nuclearized world.

Thus, it is plain that the troops of the UPA cannot be battle ready unless they have the training possessed by, say U.S. Special Forces "De Oppresso Liber," whose training covers, among other things, squad tactics and instruction and development of guerrilla tactics behind enemy lines.

By upgrading the UPA's guerrillas capability with the modern tactical and scientific knowledge of "De Oppresso Liber," there is no doubt that Soviet rearguard stability, one of the principal factors assuring success in war, would be severely shaken, and with it the apparatus on which rests the security of the Soviet world.

Guerrillas behind the Iron Curtain properly recognized, assisted, and coordinated with other major scale actions, could mean the containment of the centrifugal forces of expansionist Soviet imperialism. More, they could signify a decisive step towards the liberation of millions of human beings presently under oppression of the dictatorial Soviet regime, thus repaying the enormous debt which humanity owes these forsaken nations.

TRADE WITH THE RED EMPIRE

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Although cold war evidence of Russian and Red Syndicate aggression against the Free World accumulates daily, the pressure for the swift buck in East-West trade remains unremitting. Moscow's material support of totalitarian Hanoi, its triggering of the Israeli-Arab war, and indirectly, through Cuba and the Communist Party in the U.S., its political warfare exploitation of the American civil rights movement, leading to organized insurrection in our cities, make little impression on those who would beef up the Red economies to commit even greater and more disastrous cold war aggressions. In short, the Cold War is not at an end; on the contrary, it is more intense and complex than ever before, and trade is a vital part of it. If they knew what is being shipped to the Red Empire as "non-strategic material" under the Administration's irrational policy, the American people would be both horrified and rebellious.

Developments since World War II in the area of Free World trade relations with the expanded totalitarian Red Empire can be intelligibly reduced to a few essential and determining points. These are: (1) a repetition of errors committed in the prewar trade with the totalitarian Axis powers; (2) an almost total indifference to our past economic contributions to the imperium in imperio, namely the Soviet Union; (3) a grave limitation in general understanding of Red economic strategy in the Cold War; (4) a consequent lack of appreciation concerning the discernible outlines and inroads of Red trade aggression; and (5) the absence of a rationally appropriate and effective Free World trade policy to cope with the implicit dangers and threats of Red economic strategy and aggression. A thorough examination of all outstanding literature on the subject discloses the presence of one or any combination of these basic, ultimate points.

A NEW GENERATION OF ERRORS

In our thinking on East-West trade the one conspicuous oversight is the lessons taught by our experiences with totalitarian

economies prior to World War II. Except for a few references here and there, it would appear from current discussion that no such experiential background existed. What in essence is transpiring is a new generation of errors, characterized by a basic repetition of self-legitimized mistakes which, with new actors and a different setting on an old stage of imperialist totalitarianism versus freedom, yield substantially the same lines and sounds.

"Trade for peace," "trade to change the attitudes of the people," trade to reduce the power of domination and influence by the totalitarian state over another, trade to re-orient a totalitarian economy from heavy capital goods production to more consumer goods activity and also toward multi-lateral world trade as against economic autarchy with bilateral trade sieves, trade because other democracies are profitably indulging in this with the totalitarian states, and an inability to define precisely the nature of a "strategic item" — these dominant rationalizations and aspects marked the period of the thirties as they do now. They were employed to justify Free World trade with the totalitarian Axis powers of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy as they are now in relation to the totalitarian economies in the extensive Red Empire.¹ Supposedly, there were "good and bad Fascists" then as there are now "good and bad Communists."

In the welter of discussion on East-West trade the striking similarities between the thirties and now deserve incessant re-emphasis. As will be shown below, the present Cold War context with all its subtleties, evasiveness, and calculated maneuvers makes the present situation an even far more perilous one. The awareness shown, for example, by the AFL-CIO Executive Council should be generalized. Referring to business deals with Communist governments, the Council has clearly stated, "It is not true that in such deals 'the only thing that matters is profit and competitive advantage.' This practice of doing 'business as usual' with the Nazi and Fascist dictators proved disastrous before World War II. 'Business as usual' with Communist dictators will certainly be no less disastrous." ²

Some of the ideas suggested here have received only minor emphasis in the current discussion. For example, a nationally known

¹ See Lev E. Dobriansky, "Historical Lessons in U.S.-Totalitarian Trade," *The Intercollegiate Review*, Philadelphia, Pa., November-December 1966.

² Statement on East-West Trade, AFL-CIO Executive Council, Bal Harbour, Florida, March 1, 1965.

columnist has observed, "But if, as in the 1930's, the private greed supersedes the interests of the people as a whole, the world may again see a global conflict. For it was the failure of the embargo on oil against Mussolini in 1935 and the flagrant indifference of the nations of Europe to the plea of President Roosevelt in 1937 for a 'quarantine' or economic embargo against Hitler that brought on the very conditions which made World War II inevitable."³ Quoting a *Chicago Tribune* editorial, he observes further, "Although grain is not usually classified as 'strategic material' in the sense of arms and ammunition, it certainly becomes strategic when our enemies are hungry and can't feed themselves."

That our experience before World War II must be recalled over and over again with a necessary dimension of thought conveying the new context of protracted cold warfare is further underscored by much limited thinking on liberalizing trade with Eastern Europe. For example, a commission established by the President to report on the subject well demonstrates this with its unrealistic and narrow conception of what constitutes "strategic trade" in the contemporary context. It states in its report to the President, "we rule out from these considerations any kind of strategic trade that could significantly enhance Soviet military capabilities and weaken our own position of comparative military strength."⁴ Although this represents an improvement over the difficulties of thought encountered in the thirties, when far more than just scrap iron was shipped to the Axis powers, to think that strategic trade is related solely to military capability sufficiently indicates a conceptual insularity concerning the psycho-political content of the Cold War. Red propaganda employed in programs of subverting governments in the Free World, notably in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, doesn't place stress on the military powers of the USSR or even Red China but rather, and almost entirely, on the rapid economic advances of "the socialist countries."

It is noteworthy, too, that the commission virtually disregards the interrelated complexity of modern industry and agriculture, which is even more so now than in the thirties. The shipment of oil facilities, chemical plant structures, transport means, plastic and

³ David Lawrence, "Trade With West Bolsters Reds," Syndicated Column, October 1965.

⁴ *Report to the President*, Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations With East European Countries and the Soviet Union. The White House, April 29, 1965, p. 1.

synthetic processes, high-grade fertilizers, various types of machines for even consumer goods production, and valuable intangibles of managerial organization and talent cannot but have either direct or indirect beneficial influence for Red military capabilities. In terms of waging a psycho-political cold war, i. e., paramilitary capability, such measure of aid is absolutely unquestionable. But this perhaps more important factor escapes the understanding of not only the President's commission but also most analysts of the subject.

Moreover, on the bases of developments over the past thirty years, an examination of all current output on East-West trade and the new cold war dimension, it is no exaggeration to conclude and argue that up to this point we have developed an outlook of military preparedness toward the Red challenge, which we did not have toward the Axis threat, but as of now we still are fully exposed to cold war Pearl Harbors because of our fundamental unpreparedness in cold warfare, which embraces economic weapons as well as all others. These cold war Pearl Harbors may occur in the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Sudan, Thailand, anywhere in the Middle East and numerous other areas in the Free World, and ironically the leading economic powers of the Free World would in some indirect way be contributing to these outbreaks by beefing up the Red totalitarian economies through liberalized trade. In this broader framework of understanding, wheat shipped to the USSR so that it could meet its cold war commitments to Egypt, Cuba, and several other states is itself clearly a strategic item.

When one recounts how much the Red Empire expanded since World War II with inferior resources, one dreads to think about the long-term prospects of the empire's cold war operations, equipped with superior resources supplied in part by the Free World. Strangely enough, most analysts ignore the cumulative long-run record and concentrate exclusively on separate annual statistics of either absolute or percentage amounts. Yet, in the case of grain for example, it requires little imaginative thought to contemplate what the possible consequences might have been had the Red Empire been deprived of 40 million metric tons which it obtained from the Free World in the short period of 1960-64. There is no end in sight on this yet. In the sphere of complicated industrial equipment the same perspective should apply on both the military and cold war scales. Over the years of the thirties, the Axis powers acquired sizeable amounts of economic aid for their war plans.

TRENDS IN HELPING THE RED EMPIRE

The past twenty years of developments surrounding the issue of trade with the Red Empire lend themselves to an intelligible patternization of dominant trends and phases, in terms of both volume and controls. Bearing in mind the experiences of the thirties, it is remarkable how easily the natural instinct to exchange, veritably the economic side of the instinct for peace, can be exploited to advance the strategic objectives of the Red economies. It is also startling to observe how few pay any heed to our substantial economic contributions in the past to the build-up of the USSR imperium in imperio.⁵

Some who do recognize this past record rationalize it away on the basis that selective trade now would not contribute nearly as much because it would constitute a small percentage of Red gross product, estimated about \$500 billion, and that in time the Red economies will develop their own respective economic capabilities. But, then, the basic question still remains, "Why are they so anxious to indulge in trade with the industrial Free World?" What in this rationalization is overlooked, too, is the fact that the global goals, commitments, and cold war operations of the USSR in particular and the entire Red Empire in general are more positive, expressive, and costly today than they were decades ago. In effect, the industrial Free World is being called in to expedite these for the far-flung empire.

Control policy over the period logically bears an inverse relationship to volume of trade; a hard policy with many extensive controls means less trade, a soft policy with fewer qualitative and quantitative controls conduces to more trade. Three distinct phases punctuate the post-World War II period. Immediately after the war, in 1945-47, Western trade with the USSR and the "satellites" was on the increase, this exclusive of residual lend-lease deliveries and UNRRA operations. By 1948 broad controls were instituted by the U.S. and its Western allies to curb the shipment of goods important to the empire's military strength.

This early control picture from 1948 to 1953 was reflected statistically in the decline of exports and imports concerning the empire, whether one views them on the basis of the OECD countries, the Free World, or the United States alone. OECD exports to the empire

⁵ See "Five Perspectives On East-West Trade," *East-West Trade, Part II, Hearings*, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 1965, pp. 94-104.

declined from \$1,161.7 million in 1948 to \$770.8 million in 1953, imports from \$1,263.8 million to \$934.1 respectively.⁶ In the same period total Free World exports decreased from \$1,969 million in 1948 to \$1,389 in 1953, imports from \$2,008 million to \$1,631 million. U.S. trade dropped in exports from \$269 million in 1947 to \$1.8 million in 1953; imports from \$154 million in 1947 to \$46 million in 1953.⁷

A new trend followed this early period, thus initiating the third phase. The year 1954 may rightly be accepted as the starting point of a period of liberalization or breakdown in controls which has continued to the very present, with forces and pressures seeking a marked relaxation particularly in the U.S. The end of the Korean War, the death of Stalin, the bilateral and multilateral control stings felt by the empire, and a deceptive policy of peaceful coexistence resurrected by Moscow account for this change. COCOM lists were successively subjected to review and scaled down markedly in 1954, 1958, 1963, and 1964. In conformity with COCOM rules on individual country privilege, the U.S., however, had maintained its extensive control lists until recently.

The consequences of the soft multilateral control policy are plainly evident in the statistical data. OECD exports to the empire jumped from \$770.8 million in 1953 to \$2,481.4 million in 1960, and \$2,972.4 million in 1963; for the given years its imports from the empire also rose from \$934.1 million to \$2,448.8 million and \$3,150 million. Total Free World exports to the empire increased from \$1,389 million in 1953 to \$4,425 million in 1960 to \$5,173 million in 1963; imports showed equally significant increases from \$1,631 million to \$4,462 million and \$5,389 million, respectively. By virtue of a discrepancy in controls U.S. exports to the empire rose only from \$1.8 million in 1953 to \$194 million in 1960 and \$167 million in 1963; imports also increased from \$46 million to \$84 million and \$85 million for those years.

Since 1962 powerful pressures have been generated in the U.S. for relaxed export controls. While the campaign progresses, numerous disquieting features of slipshod control administration have been emerging, as though to reinforce the campaign. In addition to renewed pressures for U.S. wheat sales to the USSR, clearances have been given for the sale of advanced technologies, specialized machin-

⁷ *Annual Trade Statistics*, Department of Commerce.

⁶ *Direction of International Trade*, United Nations, 1948; *Statistical Bulletins, Foreign Trade, Series A*, OECD, 1953.

ery and equipment, and industrial plants, products and data to the empire. Of the far too many examples that can be mentioned, a few should be observed here as being typical of the present trend, notably from the viewpoint of strategic materials.

In July 1965, for example, the Department of Commerce issued an export license for the shipment of over \$3 million of chemical woodpulp to the USSR. This good is ultimately used in the production of tires, both passenger cars and trucks for both military and economic build-up uses. Another license issued that month was for over \$2 million worth of grinding machines to the USSR, also important militarily and economically in the transport industry. A license for the export of polystyrene to the USSR was also issued, despite the fact that the item enters critically into the manufacture of explosives, demolition blocks, nonmagnetic mines and the like. In addition, much technical data and a broad assortment of advanced machineries are being released to Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria without certain knowledge as to their end use. Moreover, many of the clearances give every indication of prototype purchasing by the Red regimes.⁸ Through July 31, 1965, the Export-Import Bank has authorized 83 commercial credit guarantees to Red states, totaling some \$66 million. The 1966-67 clearances are abounding and incredible, including steel mill components, computers, missile guidance devices, industrial chemicals, converting machinery, magnetic tape units, Boron isotopes, aircraft equipment, and wide assortments of machineries.

To complete this picture in outline form, it should be emphasized that Red exports consist largely of raw materials, food, fuel, and finished natural products for imports that are chiefly of highly developed finished industrial products, whole plants, and new technologies, such as chemical processing plants, oil refineries, synthetic rubber plants, electronic computer parts, research laboratory equipment and so forth.

Given a long-run cold war viewpoint, in the 15 years of the 1950-1964 period Free World exports to the Red Empire have totaled some \$49 billion, and in 1965 they well exceeded the \$50 billion mark. Although total imports from the West make up only a little over 1 per cent of USSR's gross product and about 2 per cent of the combined gross product of the other East European Red states, and despite the even lower aggregate significance of this trade for West-

⁸ *Export Control*, 73rd Quarterly Report, 3rd Quarter, 1965, Department of Commerce, pp. 4-5, 19-20.

ern Europe and the United States, over time this trade is substantial for the build-up and cold war potential of the Red Empire. And in any given year it bears disproportionate significance for selected Red industrial targets; trade between the Red states of Eastern Europe and the Western industrial countries was about \$3.5 billion each way in 1964, or a total trade turnover of approximately \$6 billion. It grew over the past decade by nearly 10 per cent, exceeding the rate of growth in the overall trade of the Western industrial states. For Western European countries this trade has averaged about 3½ per cent of their total trade, for the United States scarcely 1 per cent.

Those overemphasizing these small proportions as justification for more liberalized trade demonstrate their insufficient grasp of Red economic strategy in the Cold War. Regardless of the facades of "increasingly independent" Yugoslavia, Poland, and Rumania, this strategy is substantially no different from the past totalitarian economic strategy of the Axis powers, with stress on overall self-sufficiency, accelerated build-up by overcoming current deficiencies, and controlled trade and foreign exchange operations. In essence, the errors of thirty years ago are being repeated again. Some 50 per cent of all trade between the empire and the Free World is accounted for by the COCOM countries, predominantly the West European ones (non-European are the U.S., Canada, and Japan). In relation to the Red Chinese sector of the empire, Free World trade has also increased over the past decade, rising from \$740 million in 1953 to \$1,505 million in 1963.⁹ West Germany, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Canada show up in the figures as the leading traders with the Red Empire, taking into account all sectors.¹⁰

When talking about "strategic items," one need exercise only a minimum of common cold war sense in assessing these day-to-day reports: (1) according to Moscow, USSR trade with developed capitalist nations rose 15 per cent in 1964, chiefly in industrial products (USSR foreign trade increased more than 75 per cent since 1958, to about \$15.3 billion, of which 75 per cent is with other parts of the empire);¹¹ (2) Swedish firms contracted to supply

⁹ *A Background Study On East-West Trade*, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 1965, p. 67.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.* *East-West Trade*, Part II, pp. 186-187.

¹¹ *Reuters*, Geneva, May 5, 1965.

¹² *The London Observer*, June 29, 1965.

Red China with heavy duty trucks valued at \$30 million, apparently the most important single industrial contract between Red China and a Western country.¹³ Similar items abound monthly and add up to sizeable absolute amounts yearly, at least in the light of their significance for Red economic strategy.

RED ECONOMIC STRATEGY

As stressed at the outset, there have been grave limitations in general understanding of Red economic strategy, which is part and parcel of overall Cold War strategy as directed mainly by Moscow, the chief power center of the Red Empire, and to a lesser degree by competitive Peking. Also as indicated above, this strategy is not new, though it enjoys a considerably broader framework than prevailed prior to World War II at the hands of the Axis powers which did not command the resources now at the disposal of the Red totalitarians.

The elements of Red economic strategy, which even lends itself to diagrammatic exposition, include accelerated economic growth, self-sufficiency, overcoming short supplies, selective bilateral trading, sustaining cold war commitments, inroads into the underdeveloped areas, East European industrial assistance for the USSR, increased productivity and fulfillment of plans, acquisition of latest technology, data, and managerial ability, Russian exploitation of the empire, concentrated deficit payments in gold, and a growing integration of the empire — all interrelated and oriented to serve the consummate goals of political subversion, takeover, and empire expansion. All of these fundamental elements fit into a working pattern of operation in which the industrial Free World countries are to play their vital, assisting role.

Many salient points in this deficient understanding, in not perceiving the situation as a whole, can be elaborated upon. For example, on past empire assistance, Secretary of State Dean Rusk has admitted, "Even before we recognized the USSR diplomatically, the Soviet Trading Company, Amtorg, operated widely in the United States, and American engineers and private corporations helped to build industrial plants and installations in the Soviet Union."¹⁴ This valuable assistance contributed heavily to the economic and

¹³ *Toronto Globe and Mail*, Peking, June 7, 1965.

¹⁴ *East-West Trade*, Part I. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 1964, p. 3.

military build-up of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the effects of which have been felt by the West since. Today, under the illusion of fostering the "independence" of East European "satellites," we are being pressed to strengthen the extended Soviet Russian Empire largely through trade with its outer integral parts. It is not generally recognized that an extraordinarily high percentage of USSR imports from its Red partners in Eastern Europe is made up of industrial equipment and machinery. Rising significantly over the recent period, this machinery component represented 39 per cent in 1958, but 45 per cent in 1963 and with greater overall trade.¹⁵ Thus, when one reads "Present trends toward decentralization of the economic systems of the Eastern countries deserve a positive response from the West," he cannot but wonder about the politico-economic vacuum such statements are conjured up in.¹⁶

Thirty years ago statements of intention and aims issuing from the Axis powers were virtually ignored and even scoffed at. It is quite evident that today similar Red statements are not read or understood. They well support the facts presented here. Just to cite a few examples, it is well to recall the Marx-oriented statement of Lenin, "When the time comes to hang the capitalist class, they will compete with each other to sell us the rope." Khrushchev clearly stated in 1959, "We will soon need a large amount of equipment which must be designed and produced anew. It would also be expedient to order a part of this equipment in capitalist countries, primarily the United States, West Germany, and Britain." In 1959, during his visit here, he spoke quite frankly, "Some thirty years ago when our country started building a large-scale industry, good economic contacts were established with leading United States firms. Ford helped us build the motor works in Gorky. Cooper, a prominent American specialist, acted as a consultant during the building of the hydroelectric power station on the Dnieper, which in those days was the biggest in the world. Your engineers helped us build the tractor works in Stalingrad and Kharkiv. Americans, along with the British, were consultants during the construction of the Moscow subway." He also stated he wants more, following this up to the end of his reign, "We need to study all the best achievements, the best foreign experience, and apply this ourselves in order to obtain higher labor productivity."¹⁷

¹⁵ *Op. cit.* *Current Economic Indicators for the USSR*, p. 154.

¹⁶ *East-West Trade*, Committee for Economic Development, 1965, p. 19.

¹⁷ *East Europe*, October 1964, p. 40.

One of Khrushchev's successors, Premier Kosygin continues this strain by indicating the USSR's desire to "link the long-term economic planning with foreign trade prospects to expand the Soviet market for western goods and the production of Soviet goods for export."¹⁸ In the Red trade campaign in the Middle East and South-east Asia, the Czechoslovak Statistical Institution observed ten years ago: "Czechoslovak participation in this expansion of trade is not guided by purely practical considerations. It follows a plan carefully drawn up in accordance with political considerations."¹⁹ The director of the Department of Circulation of Goods in the Rumanian State Planning Commission states plainly: "We put great emphasis on modern techniques. We do not purchase equipment from abroad unless we are convinced that it is at the top of the world in technology. We find that the United States, West Germany, France and Great Britain make the finest equipment and we want to procure it. This accounts for the increase in our trade with the West."²⁰

An East German economist sheds light on another dimension, eventual military and political concessions by the West: "The fact that not only the working people but a substantial section of the bourgeoisie in Western Europe want closer economic relations between the two systems opens up broad opportunities for supplementing the political struggle for peaceful coexistence with economic struggle. The creation of a nuclear-free zone in the centre of Europe, renunciation by Bonn of nuclear armaments and the policy of revenge, and peaceful settlement of all outstanding questions, could create a favorable climate for closer economic collaboration between all the European countries."²¹ Here a Communist writer gloats, "During 1964, big holes were torn in the remaining barriers against free trade between Socialist countries and U.S. Allies. The volume of such trade spurted forward at an accelerated rate. A further shift in domestic views put a majority of American business in favor of East-West trade."²²

These statements are sufficient to indicate the primary factors at work in this issue. Discussion about laws, patent rights, copyrights, outstanding indebtedness and the like is of secondary im-

¹⁸ *New York Times*, December 10, 1964.

¹⁹ *The Observer*, December 11, 1955.

²⁰ *Congressional Record*, November 12, 1965, p. A6427.

²¹ Karl-Heing Domdey, "Economic Contacts Between the Socialist and Capitalist Countries of Europe," *World Marxist Review*, November 9, 1965, pp. 9-14.

²² Victor Perlo, *New World Review*, December 1964.

portance and suggests a blind willingness to trade with the empire. If we believe, for example, that more liberalized trade would contribute to peace, the growing independence of the "satellites," and a fairer share for American business, then an easy resolution of these secondary problems should take effect, with the Red regimes doubtlessly accommodating it in no small degree. Prior to its recognition by us in 1933, the USSR repudiated debts to the U.S. valued about \$628 million. During World War II, the USSR received approximately \$11 billion in U.S. lend-lease aid. By pillage, reparation, and expropriation Moscow collected over \$30 billion worth of property in Germany and elsewhere. All this did not deter us in 1951-52 to offer a negotiating figure of \$800 million for Moscow to settle its debts. It balked with a counter-offer of \$300 million.²³

If we disregard the content of Red economic strategy and plunge into liberalized East-West trade, some nominal settlement of outstanding obligations may be expected or the Johnson Act may be repealed. Concerning patents and copyrights, the trade-eager Russians have already demonstrated their civility by becoming the 68th member of the Paris convention for the protection of industrial property. This "concession" is not without several subsidiary advantages to the Russians, such as buying the complex know-how along with the patent, obtaining foreign exchange from the sale of its own patents, and continued difficulties we would encounter in finding out how our patents are being used in the closed society of the USSR. Moreover, with the dubious argument of increasing their purchases here, the Russians will seek the elimination of what they consider a discrimination against their exports to us, namely withholding the most-favored-nation treatment from their exports.

Exclusive concern with these secondary problems cannot but abet the objectives of Red economic strategy for it reinforces the underlying assumption of liberalized trade. In 1955, Khrushchev illumined the essence of Red totalitarian trade when he said, "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political reasons." It appears rather naive for many Americans to believe that trade with the empire is a peace-contributing, normalizing agent. Trade has been and will continue to be an essential weapon in the arsenal of Red economic warfare. The outlines of Red economic strategy are clear for all to see: (1) acquisition of the best of Western technology in its broadest sense to augment productivity, accelerate

²³ "Special Study Mission to Europe, 1964," Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 1965, p. 8.

economic growth, and reap surpluses for intensified Cold War operations; (2) furtherance of the empire's integration on the bases of national division of labor and a heightened intra-empire trade facilitated by products from the Free World; (3) marginal penetration of the markets in the underdeveloped areas, also indirectly assisted by Free World industrial trade and leading to political involvements designed for eventual takeover, and (4) playing off one Free World industrial competitor against another with the aim of advancing political divisions among allied Free World nations.

Anastas Mikoyan, the skilled Armenian trader and former president of the USSR, confirmed the foundation of this strategy when in 1961 he indicated how the industrial part of the Free World was to assist: "It will be necessary to make wide use of foreign trade as a factor for economizing in current production expenditures and in capital investment, with the aim of accelerating the development of corresponding branches." In short, whether by direct trade with Moscow or indirectly through the parts of the CEMA network (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance) meaning Bucharest, Warsaw, or Prague and others, the West is to enable the empire to leap over years of research and development cost so that it may be strengthened to pursue more rapidly its global objectives.

A POSITIVE POLTRADE POLICY

What goods are strategic? From the analysis given here it becomes clear that virtually no good for export to the empire is non-strategic. Its cold war economies thrive on fertilizers, food, transport facilities, plastics, clothing, etc., as they do on imported technological data, heavy machinery, and military weapons. As a vital instrument of the Red states, trade covers deficiencies in the economy, influences policies of less powerful states, affords channels for acquiring useful information, permits industrial espionage, has wide propaganda uses, allows for psycho-political penetrations of countries and their dependence on the empire without having to go "Communist," and gradually leads to a displacement of Western influence in the areas, primarily through political agitation for socialism, nationalization, and the imitation of totalitarian economic plans. In sharp contrast to normal, standard Western practices, the Red trading mechanism embraces all of these factors — ingredients of economic warfare.

One of the striking aspects of East-West trade discussion is the confusion surrounding the definition of "strategic materials."

Either the discussant prattles the term with no precise definition offered or he defines it solely in terms of military weapons, disregarding the intermeshed military-political-economic mix in a totalitarian economy oriented fundamentally toward Cold War goals. It cannot be said that the Reds, like the Nazi and Fascist totalitarians, haven't time and time again specified their desires, methods, and aims. As another example, Eugin I. Cortemiev, deputy chairman of the USSR Committee for Inventions and Discoveries, frankly told a National Association of Manufacturers conference in New York that for the latest and best technology "We are prepared to conclude not only separate license contracts but also permanent agreements on the exchange of patent rights and technical information between your companies and us."²⁴ An examination of the reports by the recent U.S. business mission to Poland and Rumania, shows a hungry appetite by the Red regimes for American techniques. Concerning the Polish, "They are very much interested in any form of cooperation with U.S. computer manufacturers, peripheral equipment manufacturers, and U.S. producers of integrated circuits, measuring and testing instrumentation."²⁵ The same applies to the Rumanians. American businessmen are quite capable of meeting this demand, but they also make clear their inability to determine the politico-strategic importance of such trade.

Clearly, our failure to recognize the varying strategic character of all goods, consumer and capital, to the planned cold war economies of the Red Empire has bred a series of policy failures that render our posture irrational and self-defeating. Inadequate food, for instance, does not exactly bolster a Red regime's relations with the underlying populace in terms of exacted productivity, stoic acquiescence, and reduced frictions and resistance, all of which have their impact on the overall strength of the state. Our basic failure to face up to the broad strategicity of goods has accounted for the little pressure exerted on our allies to restrict their trade with the empire, the little discipline we've displayed with our own recent exports, our own violations of the Battle Act during the Korean War and since, and the rash of Free World trade with Red China while the U.S. defends the sovereignty of South Vietnam. The proliferating anomalies in the vital situation are logically traceable back to this basic failure.

²⁴ "U.S. Technology Sought in Soviet," *The New York Times*, June 12, 1965.

²⁵ Thomas P. Collier, "Poles Enter Electronic Age," *International Commerce*, November 15, 1965, p. 14.

The problem is not as complex as the confused thought on strategicity would make it appear. Chemical plants, for example, are a top priority item in Red import demand. Missilry, space technology, munitions, agriculture, and general industry depend heavily on such plants. Strategic? As a restricted study by the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University discloses, our Manufacturing Chemists Association knows they are and, despite naive State Department urgings on Rumanian trust as to use, the group has consistently shown a reluctance to support their export to the empire. The oil offensive of the empire is a story in itself, an excellent example of empire integration through the Friendship Oil Pipe Line and also economic aggression. Strategic? The American Petroleum Institute knows it is and has opposed exports of oil processing facilities to the empire. These cases can be multiplied along the entire spectrum of economic goods entering into a planned cold war economy.

What can we do? On the basis of given evidence, the first thing is to recognize soberly the absence of a rationally appropriate and effective Free World trade policy toward the Red Empire. Second, to urge a complete embargo, such as exists against Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba, or to advocate freer trade with Eastern Europe because our allies indulge in it or because of accidental gestures on the part of the "satellites," is in the present situation an extreme course disproportionate to our strategic cold war needs. It is obviously not entirely true, as the President's Commission maintains, that "The United States has three alternatives. It can leave things as they are. It can eliminate this disparity through action across the board that would bring U.S. trading practice into line with those of our allies. Or it can modify its practices selectively and on a country-by-country basis."²⁶ In reality, there are two other alternatives — a complete embargo and selective country-by-country trade on the basis of political concessions; in other words, the latter being a poltrade policy with the same approach as the commission's third alternative but with a different and realistic, cold war political basis.

The poltrade policy has these five dominant characteristics: Cold War realism, freedom instrumentation, a via media approach, a formula for maximum flexibility and consistency, and a structure for positive Free World action. The first characteristic has been reflected throughout this analysis. Its content constitutes the very

²⁶ *Op. cit.* *Report to the President*, p. 5.

foundation of this poltrade policy. It refutes as illusory the basic assumptions and major reasons given for liberalized trade with Eastern Europe and emphasizes the Red economic strategy, the aggressive nature of Red trade, the vital distinction between Red states and the underlying captive nations, Red empire antarchy and integration, and the self-defeating character of unconditional Free World trade with the empire.

Indeed, the more one contemplates the clear-cut benefits of unconditional trade to the Red totalitarians, the more concerned one becomes about the acute vulnerabilities of the Free World. The trade issue cannot be divorced from "wars of liberation" and a host of other interrelated phenomena. Even this would be indicatively pertinent, "We have evidence," disclosed the Venezuelan Minister of the Interior, Gonzalo Barrios, "that Venezuelan Communists have been getting money from the Soviet Union, using the Italian Communist party as a vehicle. The Venezuelan Communists recently asked for additional funds designed to organize a large-scale subversive plan." ²⁷

Freedom instrumentation is the second characteristic, meaning the full use of trade as a means of sustaining and expanding freedom. Liberal trade advocates argue in terms of freedom, too, but their false notions about the weaning process and evolution have already been noted. With cold war realism, we should scarcely hesitate or fear utilizing trade as a freedom weapon just as the Red regimes manipulate it as a weapon for conquest. Vague rhetoric about bridges of understanding, contacts with peoples, and exchanges of ideas could hardly forge such a weapon for freedom. In the present-day context only trade predicated on specific political concession values, involving even pecuniary subsidy, can guarantee such a weapon.

The Red regimes would not, of course, find this policy to their liking. Early in 1965 the Polish premier, Josef Cyrankiewicz, already "warned the West not to demand political or ideological concessions in exchange for increased trade." ²⁸ He seems to forget that the empire desperately needs this trade, not we. On the Free World side former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of West Germany issued another type of warning when at the 13th Congress of the Christian Democratic Union he bemoaned the fact that some Western nations are "competing with each other to give the Communist East

²⁷ *AP*, Caracas, Venezuela, April 12, 1965.

²⁸ *Reuters*, Leipzig, East Germany, March 1, 1965.

long-term credits without getting any political concessions in return." Short-term credits are also important, and on this basis West Germany has led the others in East-West trade. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the United States leads in overall technological development, and it is this fact which places it in a unique position to determine how far the Red regime can partake of it.

Another important characteristic of the poltrade policy is its *via media* approach, a general avenue between a complete embargo and free trade, yet participating in their negative and positive natures in unlimited possible combinations of bids and offers. The approach would be sharply differentiating, in breadth and depth even more so than that of the present policy. The reasons for this are an awareness of the general strategic character of all goods for the Red cold war economies and their varying degrees of strategic importance, and of the different political conditions existing in various parts of the empire in terms of oppression, persecution, special restrictions, and opportunities for internal pressure. These are the two broad bases for the operation of the poltrade formula, which would proportion trade bids to political concession bids.

Much is uncritically made of Yugoslavia as an example of wisdom in our present policy, for \$3.5 billion in U.S. assistance chalked up are its "independence" from Moscow, about 70 per cent of its trade being done with the West, and a cozy association with Free World economic organizations. Yet it's extremely difficult to perceive the political values of this pragmatic wisdom. From viewpoints of ultimate survival and ideological hue, Belgrade's interests are inextricably tied up with Moscow's and, just to mention one example, Tito's record of condemnations against U.S. action in the Congo, Vietnam and the Dominican Republic and concerning Cuba, constitutes ironic compensation of the most indescribable type. Belgrade trades with Havana and, despite its minor power on the global scale, has played for the empire a unique role of diplomatic broker. Also, the thought of Yugoslavia setting a pattern of profitable practice for others in the Red Empire, and to the net advantage of the empire, seems to elude many. This pattern was formed not by design but rather by necessity of response to internal and external problems. In any case, the wisdom of our policy toward Yugoslavia has worked against the freedom of the various nations in that totalitarian state, as its broadened application certainly will against those in Rumania, Poland, Hungary and others.

Turning to the poltrade formula, one can see that it would be practicable and adaptable for all changing circumstances. Scaled

to priorities of political consideration, the formula allows for long-term and short-run credits, as well as cash payments. It deals in producer, capital goods and consumer goods, as well as managerial ability, organization, and technological data. In sharp contrast to present U.S. policy, it advances a principle of consistency in that its application would be directed at the Asia sectors of the empire as well as the European and Latin American. The avid use of the formula would produce considerable politico-propaganda values, since all trade transactions would necessarily be tied to specified political items. Bids for specific political concessions would make the latter integral parts of the economic valuation process just as much as Red bids for machines, etc.

Moreover, application of the formula would unambiguously work in behalf of the captive nations; it would not accommodate without real cost the empire's economic plans; it would uphold the efficacy of our foreign aid program by relating Red subversive efforts in the underdeveloped areas to trade offers; and it would provide the U.S. with an effective leverage to solve the problem of unconditional West European trade with the empire and reorient much of this trade toward intensified intra-Free World trade. A vigorous and well-planned poltrade policy with alternative advantages for our allies and a consuming emphasis on trade for freedom would find few, if any, Free World nations seeking to help the empire unconditionally, particularly as concern savings in intangible values of time and costs of research and development.

Steps in applying the formula would in general be simple, methodical, and in graded order: (1) as in present policy, military weapons and space technology face complete embargo; (2) most advanced producer goods, technology, managerialism and data would be proportioned to poltrade bids of the highest value, entailing free elections, enforcement of the national self-determination principle, the opportunity for political party opposition, and the satisfaction of legal obligations in World War II treaties; (3) trade in less advanced producer goods, engendering the set-up of whole factories and organizational plans, would call for proportionate poltrade values in the order of dismantling the Berlin Wall, Russian, Czech, etc. exodus from Cuba, the withdrawal of USSR troops from Hungary and other captive areas, a vastly expanded cultural exchange program, proven Red support of subversion in Vietnam, etc.; (4) trade in consumer goods would also be differentiated on scales of recency, quality, and quantity and proportioned in terms of prevailing conditions and acts of religious oppression, slave labor employment, civil

suppression, unjust arrests and imprisonment of Free World citizens, atrocities, the need for rehabilitating political prisoners and so forth.

These are the four general categories of poltrade application into which further specific poltrade bids would be fitted as developments and circumstances demand. Another manifest advantage of such constant predication is that the real cause of our foremost problems today will be kept in the forefront of world attention and thought. Except for a complete embargo and its justifying reasons, this is not the case with the other alternatives; indeed, they submerge these causes into temporary oblivion. Again, the argument that the empire would refuse to trade under such poltrade conditions misses the whole, crucial point of trade as a weapon for real freedom and the tremendous leverage possessed by the West. Pursuit of the present course means endowing the Red economies with intangible values of shortened time and reduced real costs of development without, in this dimension, receiving anything in return except the spurious satisfaction of believing that dispersed contacts would lead to "greater understanding" and "evolution toward peace." Also, in the cold war context, to literally aid them to undermine us in time and everywhere is the height of folly. Rationally, a quid pro quo is demanded in these dimensions and can only be realized through advanced bargaining for counterpart, intangible freedom values. If the Red states are desperately in need of this trade, as they indicate to be, the best test of their determination is this quid pro quo approach.

As mentioned earlier, the formula's application would, of course, receive detailed treatment in relation to each Red state. If Hungary, for example, seeks Free World trade, in addition to the items stated above there are the genocidal abortion laws, the case of Cardinal Mindszenty, the reduction of the Iron Curtain, release of political prisoners, freedom of assembly for the Petofi Circle and others, and a reciprocal distribution of U.S. literary output in Hungary. The same detailed treatment can be applied to any other Red state. Doubtless, the totalitarian regimes will cry about "interferences in internal affairs," their "national sovereignties" and the like, but these protestations are thoroughly arid in the light of history, the empire network, the basic solidarity of the Communist Parties, and the international Red conspiracy.

Lastly, the structure of positive Free World poltrade would to a notable degree be erected by the initiative and leadership of the U.S. and its poltrade policy. Though the structure should be built concurrently with the adoption of the policy, unilateral U.S. action would

itself become a constructive, efficient cause for the moulding of the institution. The objective is, of course, a unity of action primarily with our West European allies. The present lack of such unity is to a great extent ascribable to our own failure in providing the necessary leadership in the Cold War, over and beyond the military umbrella and foreign aid. A new, concentrated initiative by us should aim at the formation of a NATO Council on Free World Trade. The move would undoubtedly infuse a new life of working partnership in the Atlantic community.

The Council's prime function would be a multi-lateralization of the poltrade policy. Free World countries, such as Japan, would be included as associates. Japan has been pushing its trade with the empire (Japan's trade with it increased 15 per cent over 1964 and amounts to less than 7 per cent; about \$400 million with Red China, jumping 60 per cent over 1964, \$30 million with North Korea, and small amounts with North Vietnam). With this economic power assembled, in the ratio of 3 to 1 to the entire Red Empire, the so-called Communist economic offensive would become a sterile exercise as the Free World market, particularly in the underdeveloped areas, becomes in every sense a true, free market. The new structural framework would, with qualification, accommodate the inclinations of our allies as expressed, for example, in a resolution by the six-nation Common Market Assembly stressing "the political and economic importance of trade relations with state-controlled trade, in particular with neighbor countries of East Europe, and the desirability of developing them" — yes, toward genuine freedom. Canadians selling \$403 million of wheat to Red China, Italians buying natural gas from the USSR, Greeks selling wheat to Bulgaria, and multiplying day-to-day reports on unconditional Free World trade with the empire would receive an entirely new assessment under the sway of a rational poltrade policy.

Only thirty years ago we substantially committed the same trade mistake with another breed of totalitarian powers. This time it is even worse because of the cold war subtleties involved and the trained capacity of the enemy to compound the use of his relatively inferior resources. In the final analysis, the requirements of the present situation are a firm understanding of Red economic strategy, the launching of a poltrade policy to counter this strategy, and a national will to see it through. Frequent comments on the current disunity, the alleged ambiguity of strategic materials, and "our allies are trading them" are only convenient rationalizations for less than firm action in behalf of expanded world freedom.

AMERICAN UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH: HUMANITARIAN AND PATRIOTIC ACTIVITIES, WORLD WAR I*

By BOHDAN P. PROCKO

With the outbreak of the First World War, for the first time the Ukrainians in the United States found themselves in a position of leadership in the affairs of their people as a whole. In the case of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Most Reverend Stephen Ortynsky, bishop for the Ukrainians originating from Austrian Galicia, as well as for the Rusyns from Hungary's Transcarpathia, felt that the immigrants must take the lead in the affairs of their kinsmen in Europe, at least until that time when those in their native land could act in their own behalf.

He activated, therefore, a general collection of funds to aid the victims of war, and he was primarily responsible for the organization of the Ruthenian National *Rada* (Council) at a gathering of delegates from Galician and Transcarpathian parishes held in Philadelphia on December 8, 1914. The Council was to coordinate the efforts of all the Ukrainian and Rusyn Catholic organizations in behalf of their suffering people in Europe.

The hard work, together with the endless difficulties and opposition he encountered, strained the Bishop's nerves and undermined his health to the extent that he died on March 24, 1916; not, however, before thousands of dollars, as well as considerable quantities of medical supplies and gift packages, were sent by the Bishop's Ordinariat to help relieve the plight of Ukrainian war victims.¹

Following the death of Bishop Ortynsky, the Papacy appointed two separate administrators, one for the Ukrainians, the other for the Rusyns. Because this article is limited to the humanitarian and patriotic efforts of the American Ukrainian Catholic Church, our attention will be focused exclusively on the administration of Very

* This article is based on a section of a general study on the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States soon to be published.

¹ See Bishop Ortynsky's official diocesan bulletin, *Eparchiialny Vistnyk*, II (May 24, 1915), 3; III (March 8, 1916), 9-10.

Reverend Peter Poniatishtin. Since his administration (1916-1924) encompassed the years during which the Ukrainian problem came to the fore, Father Poniatishtin did not shirk what he felt was his responsibility. Consequently, the Church played a leading role in this important national and humanitarian work during those critical years.

On Nov. 1, 1916, a committee of the Ukrainian clergy met with delegates from the Ukrainian National Assn. (*Soyuz*), Providence Assn., and "Zhoda Bratsv" and organized the Ukrainian National Alliance.² It must be noted here, that, upon becoming the administrator of the Ukrainian part of the diocese, Father Poniatishtin took practical steps to end successfully the misunderstanding that existed between the Church and the *Soyuz* since 1910.³ The renewed friendly relations between the Church and *Soyuz* had excellent results in the humanitarian and political work of the American Ukrainians during and after the war. The Ukrainian National Alliance (the Ukrainian National Committee from late 1918), was an organization of political and humanitarian character that became the unofficial intermediary between the Ukrainian aspirations and the government in Washington.⁴ At the Alliance's first general convention, held on December 25-26, 1916, in New York, the delegates representing the Ukrainian part of the exarchy, the *Soyuz*, the Providence Association, and "Zhoda Bratsv" elected Rev. Volodymyr Dovhovich the organization's first president.⁵ The role of the Alliance in publicizing the Ukrainian national aspirations and providing material aid to the victims of war should not be underestimated. A major part in this work was played by the exarchy through its administrator, Father Poniatishtin.

² The announcement of the organization of the Alliance was published in *Svoboda* (Jersey City, New Jersey), December 5, 1916, p. 1.

³ Poniatishtin, Peter, "Ukrainska Tserkva i U. N. Soyuz," *Propamiatna Knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soyuzu, 1894-1934* (Jersey City: Ukrainian National Association, 1936), p. 293. (Hereafter cited as *Knyha Soyuzu*.)

⁴ A letter from a Second Assistant Secretary in the State Department to Poniatishtin, chairman of the Ukrainian National Committee, dated December 16, 1918 (in reply to Father Poniatishtin's letter of November 18, 1918), indicates that the State Department was glad to utilize the committee as a medium through which to acquire information regarding Ukraine, but that it was not prepared to recognize it as an official spokesman of the Ukrainian people. Letter in the Archives of the Ukrainian Museum in Chicago.

⁵ Protocol from the first general convention, *America*, December 30, 1916, p. 3.

The greatest accomplishment of the Ukrainian Alliance was its work leading to the proclamation of a Ukrainian Day by President Wilson in 1917. Greatly influenced by the fact that the Jews, Lithuanians, and Armenians succeeded in obtaining a special proclamation from the President in 1916, naming a special day for the collection of funds in the United States for each of these peoples suffering as a result of the circumstances of the war, the Ukrainian Alliance decided in December of the same year to attempt a similar proclamation for the Ukrainians. The responsibility for obtaining such a proclamation was placed on the shoulders of the administrator, Rev. Poniatishin.⁶

Together with the attorney for the exarchy, William J. Kearns, Poniatishin discussed the problems with Congressman James A. Hamill of New Jersey,⁷ who joined them in discussing the matter with the president's secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, on January 4, 1917. The secretary made it clear that since similar requests were being made by endless individuals and groups, it would be impossible for the President to make such proclamations in the future. The only possibility for such a proclamation by the President, he suggested, would be an emergency resolution passed by both houses of Congress unanimously. In spite of such odds the officers of the Ukrainian Alliance went to work on effecting such a resolution.

It is interesting to note that in preparing such a resolution for Congress the question of terminology became a major problem. Rev. Poniatishin and the officers of the Committee involved in the preparation of the formal statement, held the opinion that the text of the resolution must contain the term "Ukrainian," the proper name for their people. On the other hand, Congressman Hamill, in whose Washington office the resolution was being prepared on the morning of January 24, called their attention to the fact that the term "Ruthenian" could not be omitted from the resolution, for he doubted if there were even a few Congressmen who ever heard of a people called

⁶ Rev. Poniatishin discussed in detail the steps leading to the proclamation of Ukrainian Day immediately after the events took place in "Istoria Ukrainskoho Dnia," *Svoboda*, March 31, April 3, 1917, p. 3. Many years later he again wrote about these events in "Ukrainska Sprava v Amerytsi," *Yuvileinyi Almanakh Svobody, 1893-1953* (Jersey City: Ukrainian National Association, 1953), pp. 66-71. (Hereafter cited as *Almanakh Svobody*.) Both accounts are alike in substance.

⁷ Congressman Hamill in his remarks in the House, on February 21, 1917, reviews the specific contacts with Father Poniatishin which brought to his attention the humanitarian objectives of the Ukrainians. See U.S., *Congressional Record*, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 1917, LIV, Part 6 (Appendix part 1-5), 522.

"Ukrainian." This fact had to be taken into consideration by the framers of the resolution, aware that it had to be passed unanimously. They finally decided to use both terms in the text by incorporating the word *Ukrainian* in parentheses after the word *Ruthenian*. After much work by Rev. Poniatishin, his Committee, Congressman Hamill, and others, to gain Congresssional support, the resolution was finally passed by the Senate on February 7, 1917,⁸ and by the House on February 22, 1917.⁹ President Wilson approved the Joint Resolution of Congress on March 2, 1917, and his proclamation designating April 21, 1917, as Ukrainian Day appeared on March 16, 1917.¹⁰ The proclamation of a Ukrainian Day by President Wilson was considered by Ukrainian leaders to be their greatest accomplishment since the beginning of Ukrainian immigration to America.¹¹ This was the first time that the name "Ukrainian" was used in a United States Government document,¹² and the President's proclamation represented an official public recognition by Congress and the President that there was such a people as "Ukrainians" in the world. From this time on the old name "Ruthenian" began to pass rapidly out of use in the United States and the national name of "Ukrainian" began to take its place in American usage.

At the same time that the Ukrainian Alliance was carrying on its work to obtain a Ukrainian Day, serious efforts were being made by Father Poniatishin and the Alliance to free Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky who was exiled to Russia at the beginning of the war. Poniatishin wrote to Congressman Hamill on December 27, 1916 requesting that the United States Government attempt to obtain Sheptytsky's release. In his letter Poniatishin emphasized his need of the Metropolitan's presence in the United States, and guaranteed to provide for his support as well as to bear the expense for Sheptytsky's passage to the United States by way of either Archangelsk or Norway.¹³

⁸ U.S., *Congressional Record*, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 1917, LIV, Part 3, 2751-2752.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Part 4, 3909.

¹⁰ U. S., *Statutes at Large*, XL, Part 2, 1645-1646.

¹¹ According to Father Poniatishin, American Ukrainians are indebted to Congressman Hamill, President Wilson's secretary Tumulty, attorney Kearns, and a half-dozen other Senators and Congressmen, who understood their aspirations and through whose influence the Ukrainian Day became a reality. See *Svoboda*, April 3, 1917, p. 3, and *Almanakh Svobody*, p. 76.

¹² *Almanakh Svobody*, p. 76.

¹³ Copy of Father Poniatishin's letter to Congressman James A. Hamill, dated December 27, 1916. Letter in the Archives of the Ukrainian Museum in Chicago.

Congressman Hamill thought it wise to start action and together they brought the matter to the attention of the State Department. As a result, several cablegrams were written to the American Ambassadors in Vienna and St. Petersburg. With no replies forthcoming, Poniatishin and Hamill visited Tumulty, who, after a visit to the President's office, informed them that if replies were not received in three weeks the President would write personally to the Czar.¹⁴ In the meantime the Russian Revolution broke out, the Metropolitan was released and thus American intervention in the matter ended.

After the armistice in November 1918, Rev. Poniatishin and his colleagues felt that their committees had an opportunity to aid their people in Europe by starting action in Washington towards United States recognition of the independent Ukrainian state. With the aid of Congressman Hamill, Poniatishin was given an audience with Secretary of State Robert Lansing regarding this matter. Obtaining little satisfaction, the committee prepared a memorandum to President Wilson, who headed the American Peace Delegation in Paris.¹⁵ After the American Delegation left for Paris, Congressman Hamill brought up a joint Resolution in Congress on December 13, 1918, which if passed would have recommended that the American Delegation apply Wilson's self-determination of nations principle to the Ukrainians.¹⁶ Although the resolution did not pass, it did inform Congress about the hopes of the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian Alliance (now reconstituted as the Ukrainian National Committee) also sent a delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris to aid the official Ukrainian delegation from Ukraine. The motive was to aid the Ukrainian cause by influencing the American Delegation headed by President Wilson. The failure of the Ukrainians to realize their political aspirations at the Paris Peace Conference also resulted in a loss of prestige for the Ukrainian Committee in America. Thus, the committee was finally dissolved after nearly five years of fruitful activity. Through its ties with similar organizations of other stateless peoples, its various deputations, memoranda, petitions, publications, and letters, the committee had publicized the Ukrainian aspirations before the American Government and public.¹⁷

¹⁴ *Almanakh Svobody*, p. 71.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁶ U.S., *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong. 3d Sess., 1918, LVII, Part I, 434.

¹⁷ The following examples illustrate the significant role of Father Poniatishin and of his committee in their attempts to bring aid to the Ukrainian people in Galicia. In a letter to the Executive Committee of the National Catholic War Council, in Washington, D.C., dated October 30, 1919, Poniatishin pointed

Writing in 1934, Father Poniatishin stated that never before or since had Americans of Ukrainian descent been so united and active in aiding the national aspirations of their people in Europe. Through its work the committee gained great respect and influence not only in the American press, educational circles, humanitarian and political organizations, but also among the political and military leaders in Washington who turned to it as the spokesman and representative of Americans of Ukrainian descent for information regarding Ukrainian matters.¹⁸ A major force behind this work was the Church. "The Church and the *Soyuz*," states Rev. Poniatishin, "actually created the Ukrainian national movement in America and educated the masses in it. Were it not for the Church and the *Soyuz*, the greatest portion of our immigrants would have been scattered among Polish, Russian, Hungarian, and other churches and organizations, and would have been lost to the Ukrainian nation. They are two great fortresses of Ukrainian national consciousness in America."¹⁹ In essence, Poniatishin felt it was the result of the united efforts of the Church and the *Soyuz* during the war years that Americans of Ukrainian descent began to understand that an appreciation of their national heritages was an important sign of cultural maturity.²⁰

In October 1922, within a year after the dissolution of the Ukrainian National Committee, the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States was founded under the inspiration of Dr. Luke Myshuha. Rev. Leo Levitsky became the new organization's first president. It continued the activities formerly carried on by the

out that Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the Primate of Galicia, was interned by the Polish authorities, that about 200 of his priests were held in the notorious Brigidky prison (Brigitta, the building of the former monastery of St. Brigitta) in Lviv, that relief work had not penetrated into Galicia, and again requested an investigation of conditions and aid for the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. In a five-page memorandum to the United States Secretary of State, dated September 7, 1920, Poniatishin vigorously complained about Polish atrocities against Ukrainian Catholics in Eastern Galicia, such as the closing of three theological seminaries, internment of bishops, and the shooting of eleven priests, and begged the United States to use its influence to put an end to these conditions. Finally a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Galician (Western Ukraine) Republic in exile, dated in Vienna, November 10, 1921, and signed by Gregory Myketey, officially thanked Poniatishin for taking the first politico-diplomatic action to inform the United States government and President Wilson about the Ukrainian viewpoint concerning Galicia. The above letters are in the Archives of the Ukrainian Museum in Chicago.

¹⁸ *Knyha Soyuz*, p. 294.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

Alliance and its successor, the National Committee. The Church continued to support the new organization's efforts to aid the afflicted in Europe.

The Ukrainians in Galicia faced grave hardships following the war. Metropolitan Count Andrew Sheptytsky of Galicia poignantly expressed the plight of his people in a letter of December 18, 1920 to Father Poniatishin when he wrote: "Our life is sorrow, gloom, silence, misery, grief,—blood and tears."²¹

Having received an invitation from Poniatishin to be a formal guest of the exarchy, the Metropolitan made his second visit to the United States in November of 1921 primarily to seek relief for his distressed people. The Metropolitan had two main objectives while in the United States. He wished to collect funds for the war orphans in Galicia, and he also hoped for an audience with President Warren G. Harding, Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. Hoover, and Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes, with whom he wished to discuss the plight of the Ukrainians in Galicia.²²

Father Poniatishin made a special request that collections be made in all the Ukrainian Churches for the war orphans and that they be mailed to the Metropolitan who was temporarily residing at the late Bishop's residence in Philadelphia. On January 30, 1922, the Metropolitan informed Poniatishin by letter that he had already received a total of \$2,534.83 from forty-two of the parishes.²³ Hardly a church failed to contribute to this collection, with St. Joseph's in Frankford, Pennsylvania (whose pastor was Rev. Volodymyr Petrivsky), contributing \$900.00, the highest amount on a percentage basis.²⁴ In addition, voluntary contributions were made by the clergy. The Metropolitan also attempted to get financial aid from the Latin Catholics during his visits to various members of the hierarchy in whose territory Ukrainian churches were located. However, due to postwar circumstances, aid from this quarter was hardly possible. The American bishops were deluged with requests for aid from various European nations devastated by war; consequently, they just could not handle the situation. For example, Monsignor Michael J. Lavelle, pastor of New York's St. Patrick's Cathedral and a great

²¹ Sheptytsky's letter, from Lviv, Galicia, in the Archives of the Ukrainian Museum in Chicago.

²² Poniatishin, "Z molikh Spomyniv," *Ukraintsi u Vilnomu Sviti: Yuvileina Knyha Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soyuzu, 1894-1954* (Jersey City: Ukrainian National Association, n.d.), pp. 21-22. Hereafter cited as *Ukraintsi u Sviti*.

²³ Metropolitan's letter in the Archives of the Ukrainian Museum in Chicago.

²⁴ *Ukraintsi u Sviti*, p. 28.

friend of the Ukrainians, told Rev. Poniatishin so many requests from Europe were received at the Chancery that to satisfy them it would be necessary to arrange collections for every Sunday for several years in advance.²⁵ If the Metropolitan had arrived during the war, or even a year earlier than he did, the entire matter of aid would have appeared in a different light. In his recollections, written many years after these events, Rev. Poniatishin hazarded the opinion that upon leaving the United States the Metropolitan could not have had more than \$15,000, from all sources, for the Galician orphans.²⁶

Shortly after his arrival, the Metropolitan inquired about the possibility of an audience with Washington officials. To arrange an audience with the President, Rev. Poniatishin turned to friends he had made in Washington during his work leading to the Ukrainian Day proclamation in 1917. Eventually, with the aid of Senator Frelinghuysen from New Jersey and of President Harding's Secretary, the Metropolitan, together with Rev. Poniatishin and the diocesan attorney Kearns, got to speak with the President for a few minutes prior to his weekly public reception. During the brief audience the Metropolitan attempted to inform the President about the harsh military occupation of Eastern Galicia by the Poles. Next, the Metropolitan wished to see Secretary Hoover, who had been in Lviv in the summer of that year as the American Relief Administrator. Again, Senator Frelinghuysen arranged an audience. In the presence of Poniatishin and attorney Kearns, the Metropolitan thanked Hoover, in the name of the Ukrainian people, for the American relief in Galicia. He then brought up the question of the unfair treatment of the Ukrainian needy in the distribution of American relief packages by the Polish occupational authorities as well as the general political misfortune of the Ukrainians. When the audience ended, the Metropolitan left Hoover's office in a dejected mood for he realized, according to Poniatishin, that his visit would not result in any substantial improvement of conditions for Ukrainians in Galicia.²⁷

In March of 1922 the Metropolitan left for an extended tour of Ukrainian colonies in Brazil and Argentina,²⁸ after which he returned to the United States in August.²⁹ In October, when the Metropolitan was convalescing from his serious illness in Chicago, he re-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁸ *America*, March 15 and 20, 1922, p. 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, August 11, 1922, p. 1.

quested Rev. Poniatishin to arrange an audience with the Secretary of State, Hughes.³⁰ Again with the help of Senator Frelinghuysen, a meeting was arranged for early November. Accompanying the Metropolitan to the audience were Dr. Luke Myshuha (the representative of the Western Ukrainian government in exile, who prepared a memorandum about the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia and its persecution of the Ukrainian Church, clergy, etc.), and attorney B. Pelekhovich. After thanking the Secretary for America's hospitality, the Metropolitan explained the reason for the visit. He then asked for America's influential intervention at least in the matter of the persecuted Ukrainian Church and clergy. The Secretary promised to study the prepared memorandum carefully.

The concerted postwar effort by Metropolitan Sheptytsky, assisted by Father Poniatishin and the Ukrainian National Committee, to obtain aid for the Ukrainians in Galicia through the intervention of the American government did not succeed. On March 15, 1923, the Allied Council of Ambassadors finally decided that Eastern Galicia be permanently attached to Poland. That decision was a bitter blow to Ukrainian patriotic hopes. It also marked an end to the war-phase efforts of the Ukrainian Church in America to provide moral and material aid to their less fortunate kinsmen in Europe.

³⁰ Sheptytsky's letter to Poniatishin, dated October 29, 1922, in the Archives of the Ukrainian Museum in Chicago.

BOOK REVIEWS

GUERRILLAS TRAS LA CORTINA DE HIERRO (Guerrillas behind the Iron Curtain). By Enrique Martínez Codo. Prologo del General D. Luis García Rollán. Instituto Informativo-Editorial Ucraino. Buenos Aires, 1966, p. 424.

In the preface of this book, Gen. D. Luis García Rollán, Professor of the Superior School of the Spanish Army, writes that in our times of atomic armament and possible nuclear war capable of destroying all humanity, the "underground armies," or the partisan movements, assume a special significance. They can assist the regular armies of their own countries and be an expression of the political aspirations of their nations in the struggle for national statehood. Not all have the atomic bomb, but all people aspire to a free life. General Rollán praises highly the work of Codo, which is dedicated to the history of one of these "underground armies" in Eastern Europe — the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which arose in 1942 at the height of the Nazi-Soviet warfare.

In his own Introduction, Author Codo states that as long ago as 1959 his attention had been drawn to a short item in a Buenos Aires newspaper about the arrest in the Soviet Union of 5 persons who were charged with belonging to the UPA. This was a stimulus for him to begin a thorough research and study of the Ukrainian underground movement, resulting in the publication of this valuable book, *Guerrillas behind the Iron Curtain*.

Mr. Codo, a native Argentine, is a well-known journalist and historian. His articles on military themes have appeared in *Military Review*, *Marine Corps Gazette* and *The Ukrainian Quarterly* in the United States, and in *Revista Militar del Peru*, *Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela*, *A Defensa Nacional* of Brazil, *Estudios Sobre el Comunismo* of Chile, *Revue des Forces Françaises de l'Est* and the *Revue Militaire General* of France, and *ABN Correspondence* of Munich. Mr. Codo also translated a part of Prof. Dmytro Doroshenko's *History of Ukraine* into Spanish and wrote a book, *La Resistencia en Ucrania*. At present, he is the editor of *Manual de Informaciones*, published by the Intelligence Department of the Argentine Army.

The author is not only a diligent gatherer of a mass of historical facts, but also a keen analyst, as seen by his account of the events which led to the establishment of the UPA in Ukraine during the German occupation. He also gives a variety of reasons why the UPA continued to wage an implacable resistance many years after the end of World War II on Polish and Ukrainian territories held by Communist Russia. He points out cogently how important is the role the resistance movement plays in ideology, how attractive are national slogans preaching and advocating national freedom and independence.

The creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army stemmed from the contempt of the Ukrainian people for their enemies, Communist Russia and Poland, and equally from an undying desire to establish a free and independent state of Ukraine. Ukraine, with its ethnographic territory of 567,000 sq. km. and 45 mil-

lion people, after a brief period of independence under the Ukrainian National Republic in 1917-20, was divided among the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. During World War II Ukraine found itself under German occupation; it was clear to everyone that the struggle between Berlin and Moscow was waged primarily for the possession of the rich Ukrainian territory.

In this situation the political leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), trying to beat the Germans to the punch, announced the restoration of the Ukrainian independent state in Lviv in June, 1941. This daring move, while tolerated by the *Wehrmacht* to some degree, provoked a savage reaction on the part of the Nazi party and the Gestapo. Ukrainian leaders were given short notice either to revoke the act of proclamation or to find themselves in a Nazi concentration camp. The leader of the OUN, Stepan Bandera, and many of his principal collaborators chose the second alternative, ending up in the notorious Nazi concentration camp in Sachsenhausen.

But the Ukrainians, on the one hand protecting themselves against Nazi economic pressures and political persecution, and against the Soviet paratroopers and partisans who terrorized the population, on the other, began organizing self-defensive units, which rapidly expanded in Galicia and Volhynia into companies and battalions of the UPA.

Mr. Codo gives a balanced and sober analysis of the UPA, from its organization to its numerous engagements in the field. Using the underground publications of the UPA as well as those of the Polish Home Army (AK), eyewitness reports of various nationals, memoirs of former UPA soldiers, official field reports of the German army commanders and staffs, and finally, Soviet documents, especially the appeals of 1945-1947 to UPA soldiers to lay down arms and seek pardon — Mr. Codo has succeeded superbly in depicting the epic struggle of the Ukrainian people for their national independence. He maintains that the UPA would not have been able to wage underground resistance effectively against both the Nazis and the Russians at the same time had it not been for the overwhelming support of the entire Ukrainian people from 1942 until 1950. The armed resistance of the UPA continued even past 1950, but on a reduced scale and in different forms. Example: the assassination of Gen. K. Swierczewski ("General Walter" of the Spanish Civil War), Polish Defense Minister.

Mr. Codo also provides a detailed picture of the entire structure of the UPA (pp. 193-203), its organization, training schools for officers and non-commissioned officers, the methods of building "bunkers," the supplies and logistics, the preservation of food, medical supplies and arms in the forests and marshes. He dwells on the fact that in the UPA ranks were other nationalities, including many Jews, most of whom served as doctors and in the medical corps (pp. 215-237). Another outstanding part of the book deals with the psychological warfare (propaganda) methods of the UPA which served as a powerful weapon against the enemies and as a means of keeping the Ukrainian people informed as to the aims, objectives and progress of the UPA.

The book is richly adorned with some 100 photo-documents dealing with the activities of the UPA, several maps and charts and portraits of UPA commanders, insignia and orders of the UPA, photo-reproductions of armaments, underground publications of the UPA, schemes and plans of military operations, and the like. Included are portraits of General Taras Chuprynka (Roman

Shukhevych), Commander-in-Chief of the UPA, who was killed in an ambush set up by Soviet MVD troops in 1950, and of Stepan Bandera, leader of the OUN and outstanding Ukrainian nationalist figure who was killed by a Soviet KGB agent, Bogdan Stashynsky, on October 15, 1959, in Munich.

This year Ukrainians in the free world are observing the 25th anniversary of the UPA. In Ukraine, the puppet communist regime continues to stage trials of former members of the UPA, denouncing them as "Nazi collaborators and hirelings." For instance, *Visti z Ukrainy* (News from Ukraine) of Kiev, in the March 1967 issue (No. 12) reported that Oleksa Gryga, who was once punished by exile in Siberia, after his return was tried again as a member of the UPA and condemned to be shot.

Guerrillas Behind the Iron Curtain, written by an internationally known author and specialist, is a much needed publication, for it not only reveals the history of the brave Ukrainian resistance, but also, in a way, serves to predict what the captive Ukrainian nation may do in the future, when and if a proper opportunity arrives.

Associate Editor of Svoboda, Jersey City, N.J.

LEONID POLTAVA

UKRAINSKA RADYANSKA SOTSIALISTYCHNA RESPUBLYKA (The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). Published by the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, pp. 876 (no date).

The book under review, *The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic*, was prepared in 1965 on the request of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. It was conceived as the 17th volume of the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia* and its publication was timed with the 50th anniversary of the "Great October Revolution," which "opened a new epoch in the history of mankind — an epoch of proletarian revolutions, the bankruptcy of capitalism and the triumph of socialism and communism."

To give the book its due, there can be no argument over its attractive appearance. It contains 123 inserted full pages of illustrations, including multi-colored ones; over 500 illustrations in the text, and many colored charts and maps. The editors claim that some 378 authors, literary critics, artists and specialists in the party, state and social institutions took part in the preparation of the volume.

The work contains several major sections dealing with the history, social and political life, development and present status of the economy, science, literature and the liberal arts of the Ukrainian SSR. There is also a thorough presentation of the geography and other physical features of Ukraine, as well as its natural wealth and resources. A special section is devoted to the population of Ukraine. There are also several sub-sections, such as "The Social and State Order," "Social Organizations of the Ukrainian SSR," "National Economy" and "The Ukrainian SSR in the International Arena," which deals with the international "legality of the sovereign Ukrainian SSR" and its activities in

various international organizations, and with the economic and cultural relations of Ukraine with other states.

As for the source materials, the editors assure us that "the materials in the volume are presented on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist methodology in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and the struggle against bourgeois ideology, according to the Leninist norms in the life of the party and state, and according to the new program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

Consequently, we are not surprised to find that the volume is nothing else but a propagandistic instrument, however attractively done, of the Communist Party. An early victim is the truth, which has been savagely trodden upon in order to conform to the requirements of the party.

Above all, the history of Ukraine has been completely rewritten. The period of Kievan Rus is treated according to the precepts of the Russian historiosophical school — namely, that Kievan Rus was the common cradle of the three "brotherly peoples"—the Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. This fantasy is rejected by the Ukrainian historical school which has established that Kievan Rus was the first political state of the Ukrainian people, and that Russia (Muscovy) and Byelorussia developed their own historical courses. The Pereyaslav Treaty of Bohdan Khmelnytsky is given similar treatment by the Russian imperialistic doctrine.

But the most crass and glaring perversion of Ukrainian history is reserved for the account of the restoration of Ukrainian statehood in 1917-1920. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* is depicted as "one of the principal hearths of the all-Russian counterrevolution" (p. 124). Hardly any reference is made to the great Ukrainian national revolutionary movement which inflamed Ukraine immediately after the fall of Czardom. There is no mention of the long and stubborn struggle of the Central *Rada* and its Secretariat General with the Russian Provisional Government of Alexander F. Kerensky, or of the Four *Universals* of the *Rada*. The Third had proclaimed Ukraine to be the Ukrainian National Republic (November 20, 1917) and the Fourth *Universal* (January 22, 1918) established the full independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. Nor is there any hint of the fact that on December 17, 1917, the Soviet government, under the signature of Lenin and Trotsky, recognized the independence of Ukraine, nor of the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Soviet troops under the command of General V. Antonov-Ovsienko. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk is criticized and the recognition by Trotsky of the Ukrainian delegation sent by the *Rada* is assailed as a "treasonable act of Trotsky." The period of *Hetman* Paul Skoropadsky receives all of one sentence.

The same treatment is meted out also to Western Ukraine which was then under Austria-Hungary. The proclamation of the Western Ukrainian National Republic on November 1, 1918, in Lviv is ascribed to a "plot of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists with foreign imperialists," and the Act of Union in January, 1919 between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Western Ukrainian National Republic as a "bloc of the bourgeois counterrevolution against the Soviet power in Ukraine" (p. 132).

The whole period of the Ukrainian national revolution is thus rewritten and given a communist interpretation. It was the Bolsheviks, we read, who established the "free and independent" government in Ukraine in 1917, while the wicked Ukrainian nationalists, assisted by "Russian reaction" and "foreign interventionists," tried to destroy this state. The reverse is true, of course,

as any serious student of Slavic history knows. The Bolshevik faction in Ukraine was an insignificant political force which could not muster a majority in any Ukrainian community, factory or plant. It was only when the Soviet government hurled Communist troops into Ukraine in great numbers that the Ukrainian national armies were defeated and the Ukrainian non-communist government replaced with Russian communist puppets.

World War II is also interpreted from the viewpoint of the Communist Party. No mention appears in the volume about the Hitler-Stalin pact which precipitated the outbreak of the war. Nor is there any reference to the Soviet-Finnish war. The fall of Poland and subsequent incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR is described very casually—the Soviet troops “liberated the Ukrainian and Byelorussian brothers from the oppressive yoke of landlord Poland.” The entire Ukrainian political and cultural life in Western Ukraine is reduced to the following sentences:

“In its colonizing policy regarding Western Ukraine, the Polish bourgeois-landlord government relied on the cruelest enemies of the Ukrainian people—the bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists. The bourgeois-nationalist parties and organizations in Western Ukraine, the ‘Ukrainian National Democratic Union’ (UNDO), the ‘Ukrainian Catholic Union’ (UKS), the ‘Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists’ (OUN) and the Uniate church conducted a bitter and slander-ing anti-Soviet propaganda and helped the Polish government to suppress the revolutionary movement” (p. 150).

The anti-Nazi resistance of the Ukrainian people, especially the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against both the Nazi and Soviet troops, is also dismissed with a sentence or two. The UPA is described as “helping the Hitlerite hangmen in the destruction of the Ukrainian people” (!)

These outright fabrications and calumnies against everything which is dear to every Ukrainian suffice to classify the book for what it is: unremitting Communist propaganda designed to brainwash the Ukrainian people in captive Ukraine.

To top it all, Nikita S. Khrushchev, who played a significant part in Ukraine in 1937-40, and then again during and after World War II, goes un-mentioned in the volume which pretends to be an “encyclopedia of knowledge and truth.”

Ukrainian free scholars outside Ukraine have an important task in keeping the record of Ukrainian history straight and unbiased. Perhaps some day in the not too distant future, the Ukrainian people will have the opportunity to learn in freedom about their true history.

Meanwhile, unfettered scholarship must preserve genuine sources and the spirit of free inquiry. If any incentive is needed, this book, a mockery of honest and intellectual writing, provides it.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

THE SOVIET INFERNO. By Louis Zoul. Public Opinion, Long Island City, New York, 1966, pp. 144.

In many respects this is an interesting and instructive work. The book is based on the author's examination and interpretations of contents in *The Communist Manual of Instructions in Psycho-political Warfare*. Now that

Americans are receiving a few lessons in organized riots and insurrection, which unquestionably are linked to Moscow's Cuba base of operations, a work of this type can have considerable educational, not to say survival, value. The author displays much insight and understanding in his analyses of the chief instructions excerpted from the quoted pamphlet, and his extensive use of documentary and authoritative material to support his analyses is both impressive and convincing.

However, and very unfortunately, the entire work reeks with language that is overcharged emotionally and, at times, almost irrationally. That the writer feels very strongly about his subject, there can be no doubt. He writes with deep conviction, passion, and certitude. But these qualities, however commendable, can never justify sharp, emotional exclamations and the continuous use of harsh language which actually militate against the author's good intentions, the validity of the material handled, and the favorable reception he seeks from his reading audience. Also, the organization of the data incorporated in this work leaves much to be desired. The excerpts presumably initiate the respective chapters, but one seems to overflow into another. Moreover, where one quote begins and another ends is too often mystifying to the reader.

Those Americans who detest the use of force would undoubtedly find the first excerpted instruction revolting, but such is the nature of political life in the totalitarian mould. "Obedience is the result of force," and in its elaboration one finds that "it is necessary for a psycho-politician to be an expert in the administration of forces," for "he can bring about implicit obedience, not only on the part of individual members of the population, but on the entire populace itself and its government" (p. 9). In substantiation of this first instruction the writer leans heavily on supporting excerpts from Granovsky's book *I Was An NKVD Agent* and Jozsef Kovago's *You Are All Alone*. No punches are pulled. For example, from the former work quotes such as these appear: "Many of the guards took special pleasure in forbidding the use of the toilet when it was needed... The condition of the toilet was unbelievable. Filth, human dirt, and foul odors were everywhere." A thing of the past? Scarcely.

Also unpalatable to the American appetite is the second selected instruction: "The body is less able to resist a stimulus if it has insufficient food and is weary. Therefore, it is necessary to administer all such stimuli to individuals when their ability to resist has been reduced by privation and exhaustion" (p. 14). In addition to the preceding, substantiating sources, Edith Bone's *7 Years Solitary* is introduced at this point to show what this instruction in the Communist manual means. Describing concrete experiences, she points out that the "methods by which they attempted to break down the resistance of their victims were quite simple: they deprived them of the possibility of satisfying the basic natural needs of their bodies and then left it to their own bodies to torture them" (p. 15). From the book *The Reds Take A City*, by John W. Riley, Jr. and Wilbur Schram, the witness attests, "all examinations took place in the night with beating and torture. When they beat or tortured anyone they did not do it themselves but made some one of their prisoners who had been in the police do it. If the prisoner-torturer showed any mercy, they half killed him!" (p. 16).

The rest of the book is cast in similar format and effectively illuminates

the numerous other psycho-political instructions contained in the Red manual. For supporting evidence, M. N. Borodin's *One Man In His Time*, Pasternak's novel *Dr. Zhivago*, Peter Deriabian's *The Secret World* and many other authoritative sources are quoted at length. The instructions cover a wide range of operational human behavior, from the scale of human loyalty to sex and tax. The fourth excerpt, for instance, deals with human loyalties and clearly states, "In rearranging loyalties we must have a command of their values." It then goes on to show how these loyalties may be destroyed, starting with animal loyalty to oneself, through those toward family, group, and to the capitalist state.

What mars the work somewhat is the bitter interjection at intermittent points of the author's evident frustrations and dislikes. At one point he infuses this comment, "you will truly appreciate the following remark by the brilliant Franklin who, like myself, did not have the misfortune of having been afflicted with the tremendous handicap of a 'higher education.'" The remark quoted is "The learned fool writes his nonsense in better language than the unlearned; but still 'tis nonsense" (p. 19). At another point the author interjects with this, "miseducation is far worse than ignorance. I had excellent proof of this in my younger days when, before I was thirty, I found myself debating economics with professors. Practically without exception, their ignorance and delusions were appalling." As indicated earlier, few pages in the work escape some sharp, though at times entertaining, phrases and nomers. For instance, speaking of "unprincipled venal wretches" in the pay of Communism, the writer unequivocally states that this "talent results from the fact that they are freaks whose bowels are in their skulls."

However, despite these and other defects, numerous keen insights appear in the work. One is revealed when the author clearly asserts "that civilization is confronted by a chauvinistic Russian barbarism that is intent on world conquest" (p. 101). Another is the role dupes play in the evolutionary realization of this conquest. As he puts it, "The tragic fact is that, without such dupes, the handful of Communist criminals could never enslave any nation." Still another is the vital function of patriotism in the body politic. Leaning on Mark Twain, the author rightly holds "that, without patriotism, there can be no such thing as a unity of feeling" (p. 35). One needn't look far on the American scene for evidence supporting this truth.

As for the author's understanding of the Soviet Union, which is, after all, the power center of the Red Empire, there are certain limitations. "Russia" and the USSR are used interchangeably, as though the two were identical. Moreover, there is little appreciation of the real force of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. When the writer comes across such content in the psycho-political manual — "No agent of Russia could be even remotely effective without a thorough grounding in psychopolitics, and so you carry forward with you a Russian trust to use well what you are learning here" (p. 33)—by parentheses he wonders why not "Communism," why not "a Soviet, not a Communist, not a Socialist" rather than "Russian"? A complete reading of the instruction exposes one also to "the tremendous advance of Russian culture," "an enlightened state such as Russia," "the stupidities of nations not blessed with Russian reasoning," and hypnotism "first invented in Russia." All this and more reveals the scope and depth of Russian chauvinism behind the facade of communism, a point that does not receive sufficient stress in this work.

Some quoted material should have indicated to the author that "Russia" and the USSR are not synonymous, but evidently the imprint was practically non-existent. In the quoted passages from *I Was An NKVD Agent* the author of that book relates his experiences in Czecho-Slovakia, pointing out that "the people, predominantly of Ruthenian and Ukrainian stock, had for generations been treated as natural inferiors by officialdom, first of the Austrian and later the Czechoslovak variety," but the distinction made little impression on the author of this book. Later, another quote deals with a "thin, thirty-year-old Ukrainian (who) has reported to us on his horrifying experiences in the USSR and his freedom bid, successfully made two years ago," but this, too, fails to lead the writer into a firm grasp of the multi-national realities in the USSR itself.

The main value of the book rests in the selected excerpts from the Red psycho-political manual and the substantiating evidence adduced by the author. If the reader focuses his attention on this dimension, he cannot but profit from the work and this illumination of a tragic and sad part of political reality today. On the other hand, if he becomes distracted by the mentioned defects of the work and a good deal of exaggerated and even extraneous interpretations supplied by the author, he cannot but profit less. In short, it depends on one's approach to the material furnished by an obviously impassioned writer.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE MAKING OF THE RUSSIAN NATION. By Henryk Paszkiewicz. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1963, p. 509.

This book, Paszkiewicz's sequel to his *The Origin of Russia* (1954), opens with polemics against the Russian historians Presniakov, Parkhomenko, B. Grekov, B. Rybakov and G. Vernadsky. The latter published studies on the same problem in 1959: *The Origin of Russia* (Oxford) and *Essai sur les origines russes* (Paris). Paszkiewicz also disputes with the Ukrainians G. Shevelov and R. Smal-Stocki. From the Polish historian Karolina Lanckoronska he accepts the term "Russian" as a translation of the Polish noun *Rusin*, and the adjective *ruski* (which means Ruthenian, that is, Ukrainian). The author declares that he has found "new sources" for this problem and that he "did not know that there had existed in this sphere first-class material which would allow" him "to advance new arguments and shed new light on the problem" he has to deal with.

In the second chapter he considers the problem of "Ethnos" in the meaning of people, race and nation (p. 28), and in the meaning of *iazyk* (tongue) (pp. 28-30). He states that after the Slavic Poles had accepted the Latin rite, they contrasted to "Slavs" (i.e., the Slavs of the Greek-Slavic rite, e.g., in the Polish chronicle of "Gallus": *Latini et Slavi*). In Paszkiewicz's opinion, however, when the terms "Graeci," "Rutheni," and "Slavi" are taken in an exclusively ethnic sense, as is usually the case, and coordinated with *iazyk*, people, nation — these new sources are deprived of sense (p. 31).

As in his *The Origin of Russia*, Paszkiewicz passes over Ihor's treaty with the Greeks in 944 in which the "Christian Ruthenians" and "non-Christian Ruthenians" were mentioned. According to his bent he attempts to show the

religious meaning of the word *iazyk* in the *Church Statute of Yaroslav the Wise* which contained the words: *ot nasheho iazyka nekreshchen budet* (who among our people will be unbaptized). Consequently, Paszkiewicz's assumption of an ecclesiastical-religious sense of *iazyk* (pp. 31-41) is not correct. His subsequent negation of the meaning of *iazykom* as peoples in the *Prayer of Hilarion* (pp. 41-43) is the consequence of his failure to understand the Old Ruthenian language. In the words he cites from the *Tacticon of Nikon Chernohorets* (pp. 43-44), we see a mention of the various heresies among the Vandalian people (*iazyk*).

Paszkiewicz attempts to prove that the word *iazyk* can be understood only as "faith" or "religious belief" in a citation from the trade agreement of Prince Mstyslav of Smolensk with the Hanseatic cities, Riga and Gotland (p. 44). Paszkiewicz interprets that in the Ruthenian text of this treaty in 1229 (*mezhu Rusiu i tozhiu latyneskym iazykom*) "Rus'" should mean "faith," because the Hanseatic cities, Riga and Gotland of the Roman Catholic faith, had been called "Latin *iazyk*." But in the text "Rus'" is mentioned, not "russkyi *iazyk*." G. Vernadsky and M. Cherniavsky interpreted correctly that the word "Latin" therein corresponded to the West European and did not connote "faith."

The Tale of Monk Simeon of Suzdal against the Union of Florence is addressed to the Pope as *Uchitel latinskago iazyka* — "teacher of the Latin people," indeed, as the head of the Roman Catholic Church (pp. 47-48). In the *Epistle of Spiridon-Sabbas* (1511-1521) the Latin *iazyk* has been interpreted by Paszkiewicz as faith (pp. 48-51). But these two examples cannot be used as proofs for the meaning of *iazyk* in the *Tale of Bygone Years*.

Then Paszkiewicz attempts to identify the conception of the Rus'ian *zemlia* with the Rus'ian Christianity, citing the poem *Zadonshchina* (Deeds beyond the Don River). Herein two sons of Algirdas, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, were fighting against the Tartars. Demetrius says to Andrew: "Brother Andrew, we shall not spare our lives for the Rus'ian *zemlia* and the Christian faith" (pp. 51-56). Here we see quite clearly that Rus'ian *zemlia* is used as a separate entity. The Lithuanian princes had become princes in Rus' (Rus'ian *Zemlia*) and consequently they fought for it. They became Ruthenians, but Paszkiewicz does not want to accept their adherence to the Ruthenian (Rus'ian) nation. Their brother Jagello later became the Polish King, and, therefore, he and his descendants, the Jagellons, are regarded by Paszkiewicz as Poles.

After these citations from his so-called "new sources" Paszkiewicz returns to the Old Ruthenian chronicle *Tale of Bygone Years*. And again he tries to prove that the meaning of *iazyk* and *zemlia* in this chronicle corresponds to the meaning of "faith." For example, the words: *Bi edyn iazyk slovenesk* he interprets thus: There was one Slavonic metropolitan province of the Cyrillo-Methodian rite (p. 64). The sentence in the same chronicle: "The Slavonic *iazyk* and the Rus'ian are one" — he sees again as "*Rus'ian iazyk*" — faith (pp. 70-72). This interpretation is correct if it concerns the territory of the former Cracovian metropolitan province where in the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Polish Roman Catholic zealots persecuted the believers of the Greek-Slavonic rite, calling them "Rus'ians," and where soon their remnants in the Lublin province regarded themselves as the Ruthenian (Rus'ian) people.

The term "*Rus'skaia zemlia*" in *Tale of Bygone Years* is interpreted by Paszkiewicz as the "Rus'ian metropolitan see of Kiev" (p. 72), while this term has meant in fact the Rus'ian state, kingdom. Consequently, altogether wrong is Paszkiewicz's conclusion that the expressions "the Rus'ian *iazyk*," "the

Rus'ian *zemlia*," "the Rus'ian *strana*," and "Rus,'" so often encountered in the sources of the tenth and eleventh centuries, signified "the metropolis of Kiev and the believers in the faith upheld by its metropolitans" (p. 109). The Rus'ian *iazzyk* means the Rus'ian people or nation, and the Rus'ian *zemlia* and *strana* and Rus' mean the Rus'ian state, kingdom and nation. Why didn't Paszkiewicz take examples from the former Cracovian Greek-Slavonic metropolitan province where the Greek-Slavonic believers soon became the Ruthenians, although they did not belong to the Kievan metropolitans and Rus'ian kings? Although they were persecuted since the 20's of the eleventh century, they resisted Latinization and Polonization for centuries. In the second half of the sixteenth century the Polish cannon Jan Krasinski wrote: *Roxolania, quae Carpathios montes non longe ab urbe attingit Cracovia*. In Lublin the Ruthenian population was strong as late as the second half of the seventeenth century.

In the chapter on the decline of Rus' (pp. 110-175) Paszkiewicz selects citations from sources and literature that had appeared after the publication of his work *The Origin of Russia* — but only that which he judges as useful for his viewpoint. His analysis of sources and his polemics with the reviewers of *The Origin of Russia* are tendentious. At the end of this chapter (p. 175) he repeats again his erroneous conclusion: "The word *iazzyk* has also a meaning of an ecclesiastical and religious character. This sense of the word must be applied in 'Nestor's' passage since it is in complete harmony with the whole text of the chronicle, while the other interpretations of the term are glaringly contradicted by the *Tale of Bygone Years* and by other sources; thus, the most important argument in favor of the anti-Normanists' case fails decisively." In our opinion, however, the sense of the word *iazzyk* applied by Paszkiewicz is contradictory to the whole text of the *Tale of Bygone Years* and its uses in other sources. Moreover, this false interpretation of the word *iazzyk* would have tended to support the anti-Normanists' case decisively, were it not wrong.

In the chapter on "Old Rus'ian or East Slavonic Nation" (pp. 176-244) the author writes that the East Slavic tribes (the Derevlians and others) were subjected to the Rus'ian rulers in Kiev, and that the Rus'ian nation was a copy of the Byzantine nation, since the Rus'ian state and church were copies of the Byzantine state and church (p. 243). By way of proof for this statement he cites *Outlines of the History of Russian-Byzantine Relations* (1956, p. 498), written by Soviet historian M. Levchenko, who has contended that the Byzantine Empire was an artificial conglomerate of many tribes and peoples. In Paszkiewicz's opinion: "These words likewise define precisely the content and meaning of the concept of Rus' during the epoch under discussion (p. 244)." Did the Polish state not consist of different tribes at the same time? The Polish princes in Gniezno, having accepted the Roman Catholic faith, were influenced by the fanatic German Roman Catholic clergymen and persecuted their subjects, the Mazovian pagans and the Vistulians who had accepted Christianity of the Byzantine-Slavonic rite from St. Methodius. The Orthodox remnants of the Vistulians in the Lublin region between the Vistula and Wieprz Rivers soon called themselves Rus'ians, although they had never been subjects of the Rus'ian rulers in Kiev.

In the fifth chapter Paszkiewicz considers three Rus'ian nations (p. 245). He describes the decay of the Old Rus'ian or East Slavic nation, then he considers the Slavic colonization of the northeastern lands of the Kievan Rus' and, finally, the genesis of the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian nations (pp. 247-302). He criticizes the Ukrainian reviewers of his *The Origin of Russia*,

namely M. Cherniavsky, P. Hrycak (*The Ukrainian Quarterly*) and S. Bodnar-chuk. The author is annoyed (p. 322) that they should "cite some facts and ignore others, correct or disqualify the texts of the period if these clash with their own concepts drawn up without recourse to the sources." Paszkiewicz might in this light profitably reexamine his own work.

In *Appendix I* (pp. 323-335) he disputes points raised by the reviewers of *The Origin of Russia*. In *Appendix II* he clashes with the German historian G. Rhode (*Die Ostgrenze Polens*, 1955, p. 389), who established Poland's eastern frontier on the Pilica and Middle Vistula Rivers at the time of Mieszko's I death in accordance with the document *Dagome Iudex* and the narration of Ibrahim-ibn-Jacub. Paszkiewicz writes here that "there was no 'East Slavonic' nation, just as there never was a 'West Slavonic' one" (p. 366). Yes, there was no "East Slavonic," only the Rus'ian nation. Quite incorrectly Paszkiewicz writes that "to call the Buzhians and the Croats of the ninth and tenth centuries Rus'ian tribes is quite misleading and in evident disagreement with the testimonies of the sources" (p. 389). In the *Tale of Bygone Years* these tribes are specifically named as Rus'ian ones. Paszkiewicz's interpretation of Ibrahim-ibn-Jacub (pp. 370-371) is likewise incorrect and tendentious. His statement that "Nestor regarded Buzhians as Lendzens — Liakhs" is simply not true. Moreover, Paszkiewicz deforms the name "Bug" in the falsified Prague document of 1086 to "Boh" and, consequently, he is able to write that the eastern boundaries of Mieszko's I state were upon the Styr and Boh Rivers (pp. 390-396).

In this distorted book of history we see the author's political tendency to prove the Polish "historical rights" to Western Volhynia, Galicia, Podolia and... Odessa. We can state factually that no traces of Polish Roman Catholic churches are to be found in these Western Ukrainian provinces. But Rus'ian churches of Byzantine style existed in the tenth and eleventh centuries in Cracow, Wislica, Sandomierz and Lublin. Paszkiewicz attempts to deny the existence of the Old Rus'ian nation in the tenth and eleventh centuries, following the lead of Polish politicians of 1918-1923, who attempted to deny the existence of the modern Ukrainian and Byelorussian nations, the true descendants of the Old Rus'ian nation. Both books of Paszkiewicz grind a political axe: to prove that in the period of Kievan Rus' no Rus'ian nation existed in this state, and, moreover, that in western Ukraine up to the Styr and Boh Rivers Polish tribes lived there, before her annexation by Volodymyr the Great in 981.

The Chinese edition of Paszkiewicz's *The Origin of Russia* in Taipei, capital of Formosa, in 1956, shows where the Polish politicians look for their allies. We are reminded of the Polish imperialist Jan Bobrzynski, the editor of the monthly *Nasza Przyszlosc* (Our Future) before the Second World War. In the last number of this magazine in the summer of 1939 Bobrzynski wrote that the Poles should occupy all Ukraine, cross the Don and Volga Rivers and clasp hands with the Japanese soldiers at the Ural River. But Mr. Paszkiewicz has more moderate political claims: only Western Ukraine up to the Styr and Boh Rivers.

Rio Grande College, Ohio.

NICHOLAS ANDRUSIAK

IRONIES OF HISTORY: ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY COMMUNISM. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 278. \$5.75.

The bulk of this curious volume consists of articles and essays analyzing

social and political trends in the USSR, Communist China, and Eastern Europe. A chapter on "Vietnam in Perspective" apparently was inserted in order to lend the book an appearance of being quite up-to-date on current international relations since, in general, most topics are treated in historical perspective, grouped in four parts.

Part One, "Revisionism and Divisions," deals with: Khrushchev on Stalin: The Meaning of de-Stalinization; Russia in Transition; Four Decades of the Revolution; Khrushchev at Home; Three Currents in Communism; Maoism — Its Origins and Outlook; and the Failure of Khrushchevism. Part Two gives "Twenty Years of Cold War." Part Three, "From a Biographer's Sketchbook," is even more historical in its treatment: The Moral Dilemmas of Lenin; Trotsky at his Nadir; An Obituary on Stalin; and Warsaw's Verdict on Rokossovsky. Part Four, "Historical and Literary Essays," covers: Between Past and Future: the Mensheviks; Russia and the West; The Irony of History on Stalinism; Steps to a New Russian Literature; Pasternak and the Calendar of the Revolution, and Two Autobiographies (dealing with Ilya Ehrenburg's *Memoirs* and E. Yevtushenko's *Premature Autobiography*).

Deutscher, who died recently, was a Polish-born journalist. Expelled from that country's Communist party in 1932, he went to England and became a British subject; he participated in the National Teach-In on the Vietnam War at the invitation of the Inter-University Committee for Public Debate on Vietnam. There is no question that he can write well. Yet the work will not make many specialists happy. It has no systematic framework and is, in a way, a hodge-podge of writings which give the impression of already having been published elsewhere and, indeed, there is nothing particularly new in them.

In fact, Deutscher's presentation becomes quite irritating, here and there. Although the author makes it clear that he dislikes Soviet Communism, what is one to make out of such a wild generalization as:

"I still believe that class struggle is the motive force of history and that only a socialist world — one socialist world — can cope with the problems of modern society. But in our time class struggle has sunk into a bloody morass of power politics. On both sides of the great divide a few ruthless and half-witted oligarchies, capitalist oligarchies here, bureaucratic oligarchies there, are not only holding in their hands all the power of their nations; they have also obfuscated the minds and throttled the wills of their nations, and usurped for themselves the roles of the chief protagonists in social and ideological conflicts. The class struggles of our time have degenerated into the unscrupulous contests of the ruling oligarchies" (pp. 162-3).

One does not have to be very keen about President Johnson's foreign policies, but must he be viewed as representing a "ruthless and half-witted" oligarchy, a "capitalist" oligarchy?

Deutscher's treatment is also weak in bringing, in several respects, his history up to date. When reading that "the Maoist challenge to Moscow's 'leadership' of the Communist movement is partly a result of the consolidation of the Chinese revolution" (p. 117), one wonders whether Deutscher was aware of the roots of Communist China's violent convulsion, which were certainly in evidence when this manuscript was completed (April, 1966).

All in all, Deutscher's presentation is only for the wholly uninitiated, for casual observers of some problems of international communism who like their

presentation in easy, journalistic doses and who are not bothered by misleading comments and strongly biased attitudes.

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARMS RACE. SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. 1954-1964. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clevemans, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 338. \$10.00.

One of the most dangerous aspects of the formulation of foreign policy by any democracy is the tendency of the average citizen to pass judgment on foreign problems in terms of simple solutions and by attributing the steps taken by an antagonistic power to a single event or a personality. That the formulation of decisions in foreign affairs derives from a quite complex, fluctuating and many-faceted set of factors is the outstanding lesson in this brilliant analysis of the interplay of forces that produced the changes taking place in Soviet policy during the "Khrushchev decade." The changes indicated a hitherto unknown flexibility in the Kremlin's dealings with the West, as shown by the test ban, the "hotline," the bombs-in-orbit resolution and other limited arms control agreements of the early 1960's. At the same time, Moscow continued some of the hardline policies and propaganda of the past, making still more elusive the prospects for serious arms control.

Under the sponsorship of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency a team of experts at M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies spent 18 months asking and seeking answers to such questions as: what factors were most important in shaping Moscow's outlook toward the arms race, disarmament, the West, China, and the "Third World"? Using a great range of sources, including many hitherto unresearched primary Soviet and Chinese materials, they elicited these chief factors influencing Soviet arms control policy—the military balance, the political posture of the West, pressures within the Communist world, the economic cost of the arms race, and the power struggle within the Kremlin.

Of importance is the stress that the authors put on the fact that the shaping of Soviet arms control interests (which arose primarily in relations with the West) cannot be separated from the Kremlin's difficulties with Peking and the role of the southern front—the "Third World."

The conclusions should come as quite a lesson to the policy-makers in Washington (and even to such "deviationists" as De Gaulle). In summary, we learn, for instance: Soviet policy toward the West from 1954 to 1964 tried to avoid the mistakes of Stalin's antagonistic line and to capitalize on the diversity within and between the NATO governments. A central Soviet objective was to strengthen moderate, "sober" forces in the West which would tend to move their governments away from an arms buildup and promote accommodation with the USSR. Proposals for disengagement helped foster anti-German sentiment in Britain and France. Advocacy of a nuclear test ban helped stir differences between Washington and London on the one hand and Paris on the other. The "permanently operating factor" in Moscow has been, since 1955, the premise that some kind of accommodation with moderate forces in the West is both desirable and possible, although this orientation was qualified by

the Kremlin's belief that the influence of international communism, guided by the "Socialist Fatherland," would gradually expand while the sphere of capitalism would contract. After the abortive "quick fix" attempt in Cuba, "Moscow's interest in stimulating Western and particularly American tendencies to moderate the East-West conflict took on increasingly an aspect of collaboration as well as 'struggle,' intensifying the Soviet political interest in partial measures of arms control and tacit agreements to preserve peace and slacken the arms race" p. 273). The net result of China's military and political threat was to push Moscow steadily westward. The influence of the "Third World" upon Soviet arms control policies was quite marginal and indirect during that decade; as of 1961 Soviet propaganda hoped to persuade the non-aligned nations that the Soviet policy of Soviet coexistence was more in their interest than either the bellicose ways favored by Peking or Western "neo-colonialism." But "to strengthen its revolutionary image the Soviet Union continued to qualify its support for a warless world and the renunciation of force by insisting on the unavailability and justness of wars of national liberation. In practice, however, Moscow sought to impose a broad-front policy on the Communist parties in the 'third world,' and has shown some restraint even in exploiting unstable situations in the new states, as in the Congo in 1960-1961, Laos in 1961-1962, and Vietnam as of mid-1965" (p. 276).

The study's conclusion is that "all of this has contributed to the image Moscow wishes to convey to the West, and specifically to the possibility of continued arms control agreements."

This being the case, is there not only one answer: beware of any kind of such agreement?

SOVIET SOCIOLOGY, HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND CURRENT APPRAISALS. Edited and with an Introduction by Alex Simirenko. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, pp. 384. \$7.95.

The aim of this anthology is to provide background material for "an understanding of the new Soviet sociology in perspective of its historical antecedents."

Despite some glaring weaknesses in its treatment, it is quite a useful compilation, which, according to Simirenko's introduction, can be divided into five broad stages: 1) the period of proto-sociology, 1782-1870; 2) the pioneering period, 1870-1885; 3) the classical period, 1885-1924; 4) the period of decline, 1924-1956; and 5) the period of revival, 1956. The beginning of sociology in Russia, according to Simirenko, took place in 1782, the year that Moscow saw the publication of both the French and Russian versions of Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws* (p.13). Section 2, "The Russian Empire," after the editor's introduction and Sorokin's brilliant "Russian Sociology in the 20th century" (pp. 45-55), presents articles studying Plekhanov and the origins of Russian Marxism, the sociology of N.K. Mikhailovsky, the sociological theories of Maksim W. Kovalevsky, and perspectives on Lenin's organizational theory. Then comes "The Stalin Era," where we find the studies of Soviet Marxism by Nikolai Bukharin and Leon Trotsky, and "Stalin on Revolution," followed by the "Post-Stalin Era," with coverage of the Soviet attitude to sociology, sociology as a vocation, Soviet social

science and "our own," the Soviet philosophers, and "The New Sociology in the Soviet Union." The last section, devoted to "Current Research and Problems," presents a Soviet view of some principles of theory, problems and methods of research in sociology in the USSR, the dilemmas of Soviet sociology, the concept of industrial society under criticism by Soviet sociologists, the empirical research of Soviet sociologists, an empirical study of the Soviet workers' attitude toward work, and "The Vitality of the Baptismal Ceremony under Modern Soviet Conditions: an Empirical Study."

There are some excellent selections here, worthy of being reprinted and adjudged as "classics"; this applies especially to Sorokin's "Russian Sociology in the Twentieth Century" (pp. 45-55), T.G. Masaryk's "The Sociology of N.K. Mikhailovsky" (pp. 69-82), George Fischer's "The New Sociology in the Soviet Union" (pp. 275-294), and also his "The Dilemmas of Soviet Sociology" (pp. 306-326). Many of the other selections are satisfactory, if not outstanding. But Simirenko's selections in general and the handling of his symposium also leave much to be desired.

In the first place, one would assume that this anthology should and could claim the distinction of being the first systematic and comprehensive survey of its topic. Actually, such is not the case, since the selections and introductions leave quite a confusing picture in the mind of the reader. The fuzziness is caused by a lack of a particular systematic presentation as to what sociology is and what it is not, at least from the Western point of view (although "hints" can be found in various chapters). It seems that Simirenko subsumes under sociology also philosophy, all the social sciences, and even education. An example of this tendency is the statement claiming that "the beginning of sociology in the Russian Empire" dates back to 1782, when not only Montesquieu's *The Spirit of Laws* appeared but "the date also represents the period when the Imperial Academy of Sciences, established by Peter the Great in 1724 and staffed primarily with scholars from abroad, began to produce prominent native scholars who eventually controlled its destiny and the destiny of Russian education in general" (p. 13).

A second weakness springs from the fact that most of the selected articles have only substantial arrays of footnotes and references. But Simirenko lacks also a systematic bibliography which would indicate that, in addition to these references, there have been quite a number of other studies published on "Soviet Sociology." Such a compilation would help the student of this field to pursue the numerous prime and related topics of Soviet sociology which are treated in other respectable academic sources.

And this applies especially to quite a series of contributions to our knowledge of Soviet sociology authored by numerous Russian, Ukrainian and other refugee scholars and by the descendants of foreign-born parents. It is true that this group is headed here by Sorokin and Timasheff, and perhaps some others of this group are included in Simirenko's selections; but the point is that other important works are missing.

In short, then, the anthology is to be criticized more for what it lacks than for what it contains. It is a useful book; but it is deficient as a clear and comprehensive survey.

DIMITRY, CALLED THE PRETENDER, TSAR AND GREAT PRINCE OF ALL RUSSIA, 1605-1606. Philip L. Barbour, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1966, pp. xxvii, 387.

The wildest dreams of the purveyors of fantastic tales grow pale in comparison with the actual facts of the career of Dimitry, so far as they can be ascertained. Neither at the time nor subsequently has it been possible to establish with certainty the identity of this man who appeared out of nowhere in the seventeenth century at the court of Prince Adam Vishnevetsky, one of that Ukrainian family which later was Polonized, even contributing a member to wear the crown of Poland.

He claimed to be the Grand Prince Dimitry, son of Ivan the Terrible by his eighth Czaritsa, Maria Nagaya. Yet on May 15, 1591, the boy Dimitry had died suddenly, either being deliberately murdered or having cut himself on a knife during a fit of epilepsy. The investigation which followed was apparently an honest one as far as it went: no questions were asked of the Czaritsa. When Fyodor, the weakling second son of Ivan, died in 1598, his brother-in-law Boris Goudunov was finally elected Czar, although Boris had no connection with the House of Rurik.

Then in June of 1603 a poised young man appeared for work at the estate of Prince Adam Vishnevetsky and soon announced that he was no mere valet but Dimitry, the son of Ivan. Prince Adam, impressed and convinced, eagerly spread the news, and the young man finally reached the Polish King. He managed to pass all tests of veracity, and, incidentally, became enamored of Marina Mniszeck, a Roman Catholic Polish girl of high family. He also speedily allowed himself to be baptized in the Catholic Church, and charmed the Poles with his skill as a rider. Next we find him at the head of a small force whose military target was Moscow. He was defeated, and more or less abandoned by the Poles. But this astonishing man now secured the support of all the armies sent against him, and with larger or smaller bands of Zaporozhians and Don Cossacks, he reached Moscow and, after the sudden death of Boris, was accepted as Czar. He violated all of the taboos surrounding the Czar but won great popularity, even despite the intrigues of many of the *boyars*, especially the shrewd Vasily Shuysky. Then Marina and a large wedding party arrived with her priests and relatives. The marriage and coronation went off successfully in 1606. Here, however, his good fortune evaporated. Within a week, at the instigation of Shuysky, whom he had pardoned for earlier intrigues, a group broke into the palace and brutally murdered him.

Was he the real Dimitry, as Prof. Barbour is inclined to believe, or was he Gregory Otrejev, as the Goudonovs claimed, a version used by Pushkin in his *Boris Goudunov*? We believe it must still be considered an open question, as in our day is that of the mysterious Anastasia, who claims to be a daughter of Nicholas II and pursued her claims through the courts of two continents.

On the whole, the author has treated the subject objectively. A marring note: he has not distinguished between the Zaporozhians and Don Cossacks, who rarely cooperated, nor does he explain the reasons for the Muscovite opposition to the Orthodox of Kiev and the differences in their attitude toward Constantinople. Yet the book affords pleasure as an adventure story, if not a solution to one of the fascinating mysteries of Russian and East European history.

THE COMINTERN—HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS. Milorad M. Drachkovitch and Branko Lazitch (Eds.). New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. (Auspices: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California). Pp. xvi + 430. \$10.00.

Although not so identified by the publishers, this is a "source book" rather than a linear, chronological elaboration of the forty years the so-called *Third International* darkened the horizon of potential amity among nations so lately subjected to the perils of World War I. Yet the editors—each of which is significantly represented in the materials of the book—do declare at the outset that they intend to write (and indeed are writing) the "history" identified in our first sentence. Certainly this is a much needed work—and one entailed by the many parallel volumes lately appearing through English presses. *viz.*, the numerous "lives" of Joseph Stalin, *rationales* of N. S. Khrushchev, and especially the memoirs of Alexander Kerensky, that "grand" old man (now with the Hoover Institution at Palo Alto) of the "first" Russian revolution. Tangentially, contemporary interest abounds likewise through the lachrymose flicker of *Doctor Zhivago*, and in the unexpected (providential) flight of Stalin's daughter, Svetlana.

The "documents" within Drachkovitch's and Lazitch's compilation comprise three categories: (1) essays by the editors and others (including Bertram D. Wolfe, Stefan Possony, and Boris Souvarine, among others); (2) *petit memoirs* from three "who were there," Henri Barbe, the Vassarts—Albert and Celie, and Eugenio Reale; and (3) actual Documents—difficult if not impossible of access to scholars in general—such as "The Controversy between Radek and Levi," Albert Treint's letter of resignation (from the French Communist Party), "The Report of Comrade Levi to the Executive Committee of the Third International on the Italian Party Congress," etc.

Profiles too, of the authors represented, are given and, in addition to a copious citation section, there is an excellent index. COMINTERN is one of a series (No. 45) published by the Hoover Institution and Frederick A. Praeger.

Perhaps the first section is the one that deserves a special comment. Possony's "Comintern's Claim to Marxist Legitimacy," should be must-reading even to the faithful; here, *mirable dictu*, Marx becomes a conservative, even "reactionary" figure—the means by which Lenin was able so to pervert "his master's voice" are analyzed in Wolfe's and Lazitch's sections. (Here, this reviewer says, one should also consult Kerensky, not as to matters of fact though, but for atmosphere and perspective.) For, through one simple act of disdain, as Lenin disembarked at the Finland station, one might have clearly seen the eclipse of the Red Napoleon's ideology.

Within further essays, Lazitch's reports of Stalin's massacres, Gross' description of the failure of Communism in Germany, and Drachkovitch's comment on the activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 1941-1942, reveal little that is new except the infinite horror of Leninism-Stalinism, a *précis* of which Arthur Koestler gave us in 1941 with *Darkness at Noon*.

To repeat, Lenin's brand of "democratic centralism" did not originate in Russia; on the way there, in 1917, when he put the key to the "W-C" in his own pocket, a true "dictatorship of the proletariat" came into being! But, for further details concerning the Comintern itself we await the publication of Drachkovitch's and Lazitch's specialized work.

University of Montana, Missoula

KENNETH V. LOTTICH

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"COMMUNIST ECONOMIC SYSTEMS," an article by Lev E. Dobriansky.
The New Catholic Encyclopaedia, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1967.

Unlike most articles on communist economic systems this lengthy presentation maintains at the very outset, "Strictly speaking, no Communist economic system with an industrial base exists anywhere in the world." The general theme of the analysis runs in terms of "the concept of economic totalitarianism with a primary orientation toward global imperiocolonialism in the more powerful states." Economies in the Soviet Union, Red China, the captive states of Central-East Europe, and satellite Yugoslavia are examined in dominant detail.

The sub-captions running through the article reveal to some extent the nature of the analysis. "Common Characteristics" of the so-called communist economic systems, "False Comparison with Free World Economies," "The Empire-State Economy of the USSR," "Role of Non-Russian Areas" in the USSR, "USSR GIP and U.S.-GNP," "USSR Product a Gross Imperial Product," "The Totalitarian Economy of Red China," "The Captive Economies of Central and Southern Europe," and "The Satellite Economy of Yugoslavia" are a few nominal indicators of the critical examination undertaken in this long essay. Aside from emphasizing the imperio-colonialist character of the USSR economy, the analysis interprets the various economic changes in the Red Empire as necessary adjustments for the realization of Red cold war commitments and involvements throughout the world.

"VIET ATTACKS PERIL U.S.-RED CONSULAR PACT," a report by Tom Lambert, *World Journal Tribune*, New York, May 4, 1967.

In this report a threat has been conveyed by Moscow's diplomats that continued U.S. bombing of North Vietnam may lead to no ratification by the Russian dictatorship of the U.S.-USSR Consular Convention. Although the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty last March, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow has yet to ratify the pact. It appears that the Russian totalitarians are now using the pact as a diplomatic lever in the Vietnamese situation.

Those who testified against ratification early this year, may still win their points. Representatives of organizations, like the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the National Captive Nations Committee, argued in part that because of Moscow's heavy involvement in the Vietnam war, the treaty should not be ratified. Ironically, Moscow now predicates its ratification on Vietnam and the reduction of our necessary military effort there. Should it ratify the treaty for whatever reason, the next stage of contention will be

in our cities, where groups are prepared to oppose the establishment of Russian consulates.

"MISINFORMATION ON UKRAINE," a letter bearing 22 signatures. *The Evening Bulletin*, Philadelphia, Pa., April 18, 1967.

How fragile some journalistic understanding is about the Soviet Union is well brought out in this letter, signed by twenty-two people. An article in the *Bulletin* described a tour that "will include both sections of Berlin as well as landmarks in Kiev and Moscow in Russia." The letter quickly points out that "Kiev is not in Russia, but in Ukraine."

The letter clearly supports its position by depicting Ukraine as "a politico-geographic nation and, as such, . . . a member of the United Nations" and by referring the writer of the article to both American and foreign atlases. It is obviously pitiful that at this late stage of our relations with the USSR such misinformation about Kiev should appear in a big-city organ. This reflects more on the paper than its readers, and no opportunity should be lost to make the necessary corrections. The educational process is unending.

"COMRADE SHAKHOV THROWS A ROCK," an editorial. *Los Angeles Times*, Los Angeles, California, April 19, 1967.

For some acute editorial writing on the Russian-Non-Russian complex in the USSR, this piece is of outstanding worth. Last spring, the USSR representative on the U.N.'s colonialism committee, Mr. Pavel F. Shakhov, urged that the committee declare Puerto Rico a "colonial" territory, presumably under the sway of "American imperialism." Whereupon, this editorial quickly responded, "If so, there are millions of people living under Soviet rule who would be happy to get in on the joke."

The editors of this renowned Far West organ make no bones about what they mean. "The fact is," they write, "that only about half of the Soviet people are ethnic Russians. All the rest are victims of blatant Russian colonialism, first under the czars and later under the Communists." They continue, "To this day, as perceptive travelers within the Soviet Union learn for themselves, many of the non-Russian peoples are not reconciled to Moscow's rule." Then they suggest a package deal: "The United States could agree to U.N. supervision of the Puerto Rican plebiscite in exchange for an agreement by Moscow to permit U.N.-run plebiscites in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenia, Kirghizia and all the other subject territories within Soviet boundaries."

The remarkable editorial also stresses, "There are more Ukrainians than Poles, Spaniards or Filipinos — and anti-Russian nationalism is still present." These are thoughts Ambassador Goldberg should be expressing.

"SOVIET EXPERT URGES U.S. MAINTAIN STRENGTH IN VIET," a report. *The Bayonne Times*, Bayonne, New Jersey, April 5, 1967.

A talk delivered by Dr. Walter Dushnyck, a Fordham University research associate and expert on the Soviet Union, is given wide coverage in this report.

The talk was before the Bayonne Kiwanis Club. It covered a broad range of subjects which, nevertheless, are interrelated. A strong offensive in Vietnam, a continued effort for the reunification of Germany, and support of the captive nations, particularly those in the USSR, are a few of the subjects reported on.

The speaker, who is also the editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, is reported as saying that "the Soviet Union is behind subversive activities all over the world, particularly in underdeveloped nations." He also stressed "that we cannot have peaceful co-existence until we are certain the Soviets have given up the idea of world Communist domination."

"COMMUNISM: KIWANIS HEARS TALK," a report. *The Jersey Journal*, Jersey City, N. J., April 5, 1967.

Other points in the Dushnyck talk, mentioned above, are emphasized in this report. "Dr. Dushnyck told his audience that the Russians had the same goal as the Chinese — world revolution, but the Russians only wanted to go more slowly than the Chinese." He is also reported to have "accused the Russian regime in practice as well as in theory of wanting to liberate you and me—the capitalist worker. . ."

"REDS COMPARE ZIONISM, MAFIA," a report. *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D. C., August 6, 1967.

According to this UPI report, a long article distributed by the Soviet Novosti news agency compares the Zionist movement with the Mafia and Cosa Nostra. Then the report stresses, "The article charged Zionist leaders have collaborated with Ukrainian organizers of anti-Jewish pogroms. . ." For those who are familiar with this whole question, it is obvious that the Russians are attempting to discredit the Zionists by associating them with a myth. Both in the Tsarist Russian Empire and in the present Soviet Russian one, pogroms have always had official, totalitarian sanction and encouragement. They have always been Russian-instigated, though in some cases Ukrainian dupes have been exploited.

"ST. DEMETRIUS UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OPENS LENTEN MISSION TONIGHT WITH PATRIARCH BLESSING," a report. *The Leader-Press*, Carteret, New Jersey, March 30, 1967.

What is pointedly significant about this news report is the impressive photo it carries of the Reverend John Hundiak, pastor of the St. Demetrius Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Carteret, New Jersey, and His Holiness Athenagoras I, Ecumenical Patriarch of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The two became good friends when, in the period of 1932-48, the Patriarch was in New York City as Archbishop of the Greek Archdiocese of North and South America. Recently, Father Hundiak visited Turkey and spent many days with his old friend. The Patriarch inaugurated the Lenten mission conducted by Father Hundiak with a letter expressing blessings and glad tidings.

The good Father was again publicized in the May 11 issue of this newspaper when, in a telegram to House Representative Edward J. Patten in Wash-

ington, he stated in part: "Anyone who in any way or manner desecrates the American flag does not deserve to live under its protection. I respectfully urge you to propose a most severe punishment for those who burn this sacred emblem of the Republic for which it stands with liberty and justice for all, even if it be life imprisonment."

"KENNAN'S VERSION OF WHY COMMUNIST WORLD IS SPLIT," a testimony by George F. Kennan. *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D. C., February 5, 1967.

For a man who has been wrong so often and so naively, it must be comforting to still be accommodated by a Senator who has the same reputation and journalists who wouldn't know the difference. In this reprinted testimony before Senator Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee, the Kennan fables continue to germinate. For one, the forced incorporation of the Baltic nations into the USSR at the beginning of World War II is viewed as "no major expansion of the geographic area to which Communist power extended."

Other fables include the "independence" of Yugoslavia, which is the Red Empire's prime diplomatic broker, the destruction of "the monolithic character of Moscow's control of the world communist movement," as though it was ever a genuine monolith even in the days of Trotsky, Mao before 1949, Browder and others, and the Soviet Union as "a nation." It wouldn't be difficult to explode his other fables, such as "International communism" being "in part what we make of it" and also his "temerity to urge publicly upon our Government and our people at that time (end of World War II) patience in the approach to Russian communism..." No writer has gotten away with more fuzzy thinking and garbled, vacuous language than this so-called Russian expert.

"WHO IS IMPERIALIST?," a commentary. *Life Line*, Dallas, Texas, April 1, 1967.

That the real force of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the real enemy of the Free World, is being understood more and more is evident from this commentary. *Life Line's* commentary reaches millions of American homes. In a methodical way, the commentator first points out that the "Russians and others of the communist world commonly refer to us as American imperialists"; then, relying on the dictionary, he accepts its definition of imperialism as the "policy or practice of seeking to extend the dominion or empire of a nation"; and finally he compares our record with the Russian, one of zero to a hundred per cent.

In tallying the Russian imperialist record the commentator doesn't go back just to World War II. "Or," as he puts it, "to go back to the days following World War I, what about the Ukraine? The Ukraine has 45 million people. It is larger than 43 of the 61 new nations which have gained independence since World War II. Its people have sought independence ever since it was brought under the Russian rule."

"INSIDE STORY OF TOP RED SPIES HERE," an article by William Federici. *Daily News*, New York, N. Y., May 17, 1967.

The New York *Daily News*, with the largest circulation in the metropolis,

exposed the presence in the United States of three top men in the KGB, Moscow's superspy agency. Vasili F. Sanko, the agency's top muscleman, Gen. Vasilii V. Mozschechkov, and his top assistant, Gen. Nikolay Vinogradov, are described arriving here under aliases and with diplomatic passports. The account covers this incident and also the threats frightening Ambassador Nikolai T. Fedorenko and his entire staff at the United Nations.

The threats were "reportedly from Ukrainian separatist groups." They allegedly began five months ago and "rattled" the diplomats to the degree that city police protection was involved. The Russians held they were targets of "wild Ukrainians." This is strange, coming from the proverbial wild Russians.

"THREAT ON RUSSIANS AT U.N. IS DISCLOSED," a report. *The New York Times*, New York, N. Y., May 17, 1967.

This New York paper also carried an account of the *News'* exposure. According to its lights, "guards were assigned after Mr. Fedorenko received threatening letters, reportedly from a Ukrainian separatist group." Fedorenko was kept under guard for several months late last year.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS GET SHORT SHRIFT FROM PRESIDENTS," a column by Ted Lewis. *Capitol Stuff*, *Daily News*, New York, N.Y., July 5, 1967.

An excellent review analysis of Captive Nations Week is furnished by this popular column. The writer traces the Presidential proclamations of the Week from 1959 to the present and concludes that annually "there is almost always an embarrassingly weak-worded Presidential proclamation of Captive Nations Week, as required by the distinctly tough resolution

One of the chief points elaborated on is the captive people of North Vietnam. "The case of North Vietnam itself," writes the Washington chief, "shows the twists and turns in White House and State Department policy compared with the liberation-aid pledge, fundamental to the 1959 resolution."

He points out further, "Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, who is chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, says one of the highlights in this month's observance of "the week" will be "the plight of the 17 million captive North Vietnamese." The writer quotes the professor as saying "It is strange indeed that few of our leaders even discuss this troublesome subject. Yet it is crucial to our winning the war in South Vietnam."

"ADDRESS TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY," by Mr. Alexei Kosygin. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., June 20, 1967.

The address of the Russian premier to the U.N. General Assembly is a masterpiece of human deceit and degeneracy. In it he stresses, "No nation wants war," and points to its nuclear inevitability; yet he fails to indicate that despite this possibility the Russian dictatorship in the USSR wages a world-wide Cold War that may very well lead to a world holocaust. His attack on the U.S. for "direct aggression against the Vietnamese people" is another gem of deceit, and his equating Israel with Hitlerite Germany reaches the peak of diplomatic degeneracy.

Equally degenerate is the premier's observation that in "the course of its 50-year history, the Soviet Union has regarded all peoples, large or small, with respect." First, the USSR, established in 1922-23, has still to attain a 50-year history. Kossygin would like to conceal the first wave of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism which victimized Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, etc. The long list of such early victims makes mockery of his lies. But the lies abound with no point-by-point rebuttal from Free World representatives, especially our American ones.

"1966, NINTH CONGRESS OF AMERICANS OF UKRAINIAN DESCENT," a report. *Ekran*, Chicago, Illinois, January-March, 1967.

A concise account is given in this magazine of the 9th Congress held by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America in New York last October. It covers the convention itself, the banquet, and the Shevchenko Freedom Award winners. Speakers included Senators Fannin of Arizona and Dodd of Connecticut, the Honorable Liu Chieh, Chinese ambassador at the U.N., and the Honorable Nguen Duy Lien, U.N. observer from the Republic of Vietnam.

Important resolutions passed by the Congress included the support of Captive Nations Week, the creation of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations in the House of Representatives, and the issuance of a Shevchenko Freedom stamp. The UCCA has implemented a number of resolutions dealing with the U.S.-USSR Consular Treaty, Captive Nations Week, and publications.

"A PREHISTORY OF SLAVIC," book review by Horace G. Lunt. *The Slavic and East European Journal*, New York, N. Y., Spring 1966.

A Harvard University professor reviews a book titled *A Prehistory of Slavic: The Historical Phonology of Common Slavic*, written by George Y. Shevelov of Columbia University. The very first paragraph indicates the devastating character of the review. Mr. Lunt says: "This is a difficult book. Each sentence parses nicely enough as typically turgid linguist's English, but there is a lack of movement, a disconnection between one notion and the next, that forces even the reader thoroughly familiar with the subject matter to ask constantly, 'just what is he saying?'"

After reading this scorching review one wonders what the literary criteria are now at Columbia U's press. Paragraph upon paragraph in the review embraces comments such as these — "Shevelov offers nothing of value which has not been better said elsewhere," this is "an inflated, contradictory, and often fanciful account couched in opaque language," "Shevelov's method . . . is merely the run-of-the-mill practice of the early 1930's," etc., etc.

L. E. D.

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