


THE VOL. XVIII — NO. 2
SUMMER, 1962

UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



T. Shepko

**THE PRESIDENT AND THE "CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK"
PROCLAMATION**

— Editorial

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**THE CAPTIVE NATIONS
NATIONALISM OF THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS
IN THE SOVIET UNION**

By

Roman Smal-Stocki

With a Preface by Lev E. Dobriansky

Institute of Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University

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**THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV
PART 2**

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Mr. Nicholas Prychodko, Mr. Constantine Kononenko, Mr. Mykola Lebed,
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COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session

(September 9-11, 1959)

Washington, D.C.

(Including Index)

**PERSECUTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE UKRAINIAN
CHURCH BY THE RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIKS**

By

Gregory Luznycky, Ph.D.

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
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COVER ILLUSTRATION: "CAPTIVE NATIONS": It was after much thought and discarding of many ideas that the artist, Thomas Shepko, chose to portray the subject in its present form. By far, the strongest motivation towards choosing Man as a symbol, was our love for our fellow Man. After all, what is more important than Man as an individual? Mr. Shepko's experiences with many captive nations people—strictly as a private observer owing allegiance only to his conscience—both, here and abroad, are the substance of this drawing. From lengthy discussions with Communists to the guarded and often frightened behavior of those who are not Communists, the artist's reaction can be "only that of pity and anger." Why must this Man appear unable to hear, see and speak? When will he be free?

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THE PRESIDENT AND THE "CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK" PROCLAMATION

E d i t o r i a l

"For complete and final victory without atomic war, let's use the best weapon in our arsenal—the hatred of the Captive Nations for their Communist slavemasters . . ."

Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky ("Captive Nations — Moscow's Achilles' Heel," *The Manion Forum*, November 12, 1961).

The closing of "Captive Nations Week" on July 21, 1962, dramatically demonstrated the slow but nonetheless certain decline of freedom in the world. The "Captive Nations Week Resolution" of July, 1959, which is now Public Law 86-90, is certainly one of the finest documents, in which our country can take pride, because it expressed the undying belief of the American people in the basic inevitability of freedom for every nation in the world. But despite the powerful and attractive words of the Resolution, the captive and enslaved nations behind the Iron Curtain are sinking deeper and deeper into bondage as time passes.

A few years ago, our leaders had at least the courage to speak of liberation and of the rising hopes that this middle twentieth century was about to bring freedom to mankind everywhere. The U.N. Charter and the Atlantic Charter had emblazoned the aspirations of all men for the basic freedoms for which we were led to believe we had fought the greatest war in history, the Second World War.

For the fourth consecutive year the United States of America has been observing "Captive Nations Week" with appropriate patriotic manifestations and activities. But while these observances are gaining in ever-increasing popularity and recognition among the American people in every walk of life, the strange thing is that our leaders have become exceedingly reluctant to talk about the captive nations, and it was almost on the eve of "Captive Nations Week" that President Kennedy issued his Proclamation to mark this signal and important event.

Last year, it is to be recalled, President Kennedy's proclamation (in 1959 and 1960 it was President Eisenhower who issued the proclamations) was made hastily and reluctantly before the Presi-

dent's departure for a weekend of relaxation at Hyannis Port, Mass. Fulfilling the bare minimum of Congressional request, the proclamation made no reference whatsoever to the Soviet Union as the tyrannical jailer of some 22 nations of Europe and Asia.

This year's Presidential Proclamation is similar in tone. Released from the White House late on July 13, 1962, the Proclamation read:

WHEREAS, by a joint Resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress authorized and requested the President of the United States to issue a proclamation designating the third week of July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world;

WHEREAS there exist many historical and cultural ties between the people of these captive nations and the American people; and

WHEREAS the principle of self-government and human freedom are universal ideas and the common heritage of mankind;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 15, 1962, as "Captive Nations Week."

I INVITE the people of the United States of America to observe this Week with appropriate ceremonies and activities and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

IN WITNESS whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE AT THE CITY of Washington this 13th Day of July in the Year of our Lord 1962, and of the Independence of the United States of America the 187th.

In contrast to the previous years, this year's Presidential Proclamation went virtually unnoticed in the press. In fact, in several sections of the country, specifically on the West Coast, people did not know that the Proclamation was issued, because of the apparent conspiracy of silence on the part of the American press which, one may be prone to believe, was "instructed" to play down the Proclamation in view of the reopening of the Disarmament Conference on July 16, 1962, in Geneva. Yet, practically every U.S. metropolitan center has established civic committees to promote the purposes and objectives of the "Captive Nations Week" Resolution.

SOVIET ORGAN FIRST TO ATTACK PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION

The White House and particularly the State Department will undoubtedly find little comfort in the fact that the Proclamation of "Captive Nations Week" by President Kennedy this year was assailed by *Izvestia*, official organ of the Soviet government in Moscow.

On July 17, 1962, only four days after President Kennedy issued the Proclamation, *Izvestia* cried:

Done at the City of Washington this 13th Day of July in the Year of our Lord 1962, and of the Independence of the United States of America the 187th. What was done?

The latest proclamation by the President of the United States of the so-called "Captive Nations Week." In this proclamation the President invites the people of the United States to observe this week with "appropriate ceremonies and activities." On the basis of the "weeks" held in the past, we already know what these appropriate ceremonies represent—unbridled anti-Soviet and anti-communist slander.

As far as the "appropriate activities" are concerned, they are quite eloquently presented by a map which we produce herewith and which appeared in the July 9 issue of *The New York Times*. It contains a display of American military bases on foreign territory and those places in which American armed forces are located. More than 700 thousand men—more than one-fourth of all the armed forces of the United States—find themselves outside the borders of their country.

What are they doing in the foreign countries? Are they observing "Captive Nations Week"? Not at all. Their task is to see that these countries remain in subjugation. It is a secret to no one that the aggressive blocs constructed by Washington in a large measure have assumed the functions of a gendarmerie. They are called the prisons of nations in Asia, Africa, Latin America and even in Western Europe. No wonder that in the captions accompanying the map in *The New York Times* it is said that the armed forces of the United States abroad "constitute a real guarantee of the American government to bring help to those countries linked with it by treaties in the event of war.

Yes, it is only thanks to American bayonets that oppressors of freedom and blood-thirsty dictators are sustained in power in a number of countries of the Latin American continent and Southeastern Asia . . . What was done in Washington, was done according to a shallow formula of throwing the blame from a sick head on a healthy one.

This was, at this writing, the first reaction of Moscow to the observances of "Captive Nations Week" and to the Presidential Proclamation. Undoubtedly, we may hear more, although perhaps thanks to the silent treatment that the Proclamation received this year, the Soviet propagandists may lay low, too.

FORCES AGAINST CAPTIVE NATIONS AT WORK

There is little doubt that the reluctance of President Kennedy to issue a proclamation of "Captive Nations Week" this year was due largely to the powerful forces around him which are determined to suppress, if not completely eliminate, the issue of the captive nations from U.S. foreign policy. Immediately after World War II the U.S. government and the President of the United States himself made public statements to the effect that they would not negotiate with the U.S.S.R. and the Communist bloc as a whole unless free

elections were allowed in the satellite states. In some cases, notably in postwar Poland, the Russians went through the motions of staging rigged elections. This, of course, allowed some of our policy-makers to pay lip-service to the principle of liberation. We still remember how in 1952 our Presidential elections were largely fought on the issues of foreign policy—specifically, on the issue of a liberation vs. a containment policy. During the second term of the Eisenhower Administration the term “liberation” almost completely disappeared from the pages of the American press, and it was considered heresy to utter this word within U.S. government circles. This lamentable state of affairs was inherited by the Kennedy Administration in January, 1961, and thus far no significant changes have occurred for the better. Indeed, if all the signs coming out of Washington are interpreted correctly by astute and seasoned American political observers, the situation has deteriorated from bad to worse, as far as the captive nations are concerned.

Ever since the new administration of President Kennedy took over in Washington the Department of State has become extremely solicitous and cautious for fear of offending the sensitivities of the Soviet leaders who are, in the eyes of our State Department’s Soviet “experts,” a *bona fide* government which wanted nothing but friendship and cooperation with the United States and the free world at large. As a result of this muddled and wishful thinking, our government began reacting to Soviet pressures and tricks. We no longer follow our own objectives, but react to whatever “tension” Moscow creates for us. While Moscow has a field day with instigating and making “tensions” in every corner of the globe in order to engage our resources and dissipate our unity of purpose, we are told by Washington to sit quietly. “Don’t rock the boat,” “Don’t create new tensions,” “Let’s keep the *status quo*,” or even worse, “Better Red than Dead,” and so forth.

We have solid and irrefutable evidence to substantiate our assumption that the White House has been under the complete control of the State Department in such vital and important matters, as that of the captive nations.

First, we have the so-called Rusk Letters,¹ whereby our Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, expressed his view to the effect that some of the captive nations were mere “integral parts of Russia.” This utterance of Mr. Rusk occurred in the summer of 1961, a few months after we shamefully lost Cuba to our enemy, and when the Commu-

¹ See, “The Rusk Letters,” Editorial, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, No. 4, Vol. XVII, Winter, 1961.

nist influence was beginning to penetrate the strategical countries of South Vietnam and Laos.

THE "ROSTOW MEMORANDUM"

The overall policy with respect to the communist world has been defined by one of the chief policy-makers in the State Department, Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Board, who is described as an ardent protagonist of a "soft policy" with regard to the Kremlin. Although very few people saw the draft of the Rostow memorandum, a substantial leakage to the press allows one to acquaint himself with the basic outline of this controversial paper.

According to Williard Edwards of *The Chicago Tribune*,² the Rostow memorandum is advocating a conciliation with Communist Russia. The new policy is based on the alleged theory that Russian domestic and foreign policies have "mellowed" during the post-Stalin era and the way has been opened for cooperation between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

"Since the evidence, in the form of deeds and words by Soviet leaders, runs directly contrary to this assumption," writes Mr. Edwards, the U.S. Congress and the American people, according to the Rostow paper, must be "educated" to the acceptance of a fresh approach to the Kremlin.

What are the ultimate objectives of U.S. foreign policy as outlined in the Rostow paper?

These can be summarized in a few sentences: The U.S. will never start an atomic war; continued communication with Communist Russia must be maintained in order to dispel fear of the United States; the U.S.S.R. must be granted the status of a great power, and be induced, by word and deed, to fuller participation in the community of free nations; both East Germany and Red China should be recognized; the Eastern European satellite countries should be treated gently, and Western Europe should be induced to closer economic, cultural and political cooperation with the Communist bloc.

Above all, no encouragement or support must be given to armed uprisings in Eastern Europe, or in any other parts of the Russian slave empire.

If these proposals are accepted, they will in effect recognize the satellites, East Germany and Red China as legitimate regimes of

² See, "Selling Americans On Soft Red Line," *The Tablet*, Brooklyn, N.Y., based on Mr. Edwards' articles in *The Chicago Tribune*.

the peoples concerned, which in turn would be a violation of the principle of self-determination, and cause the captive nations to lose all hope of freeing themselves from the despicable and abhorrent Communist enslavement.

It is true that Mr. Rostow was called before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee where he was questioned by Senator Dirksen of Illinois and others, but none of the Senators was able to see the original draft of the Rostow paper, it is authoritatively reported.

The views of Mr. Rostow, even before he joined the State Department, were broadly expanded in his book, *The United States in the World Arena* (published by Harper & Bros. in 1960). In it Mr. Rostow's thesis was that the United States was not the great and invincible power its people have long supposed it to be. This country, he wrote, "must be viewed essentially as a continental island off the great land mass of Eurasia," which could unite at any time and destroy us. As recently as May 3, 1962, Mr. Rostow, testifying before the Senate Armed Forces Preparedness Subcommittee, stated:

The victory we seek . . . will not be a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union . . . It will be a victory for those who recognize the profound interdependence of the nations on this planet . . .

What in essence Rostow proposes is: That we should not pursue a winning strategy in order to defeat a ruthless and merciless enemy, but we must base our foreign policy on the meek hope that we can woo and induce the Soviet Russian slave empire into a membership of a "community of free nations . . ."

THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

The importance to the American people and to the peoples of the free world at large is to know the position of President Kennedy in these all-important matters. Mr. Kennedy's record so far has been wholly in favor of the captive nations. For instance, in a statement of November 4, 1960, bearing on the captive nations, he stated:³

The "Captive Nations Week" Resolution was passed by unanimous vote in the Senate last year. As a member of that body I have continually spoken on behalf of the eventual freedom of the captive peoples. I'll state here that I have been declaring throughout this campaign: We must never—at any "Summit," in any treaty declaration, in our words, or even in our minds—recognize Soviet domination of Eastern Europe . . . I maintain that the next Administration must

³ See, "CACEED Offers Support to President Kennedy," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, March 1-15, 1961, p. 23.

devise a specific policy for Eastern Europe. Among other things, we must prove to the men in Moscow that colonialism is doomed everywhere in the world, including Eastern Europe; we must arm ourselves with more flexible economic tools; we must be willing to recognize the growing divisions in the Communist camp and be willing to encourage those divisions . . .

In the same period, President Kennedy, in a message to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America on the 20th anniversary of its existence, stated:⁴

Dear Professor Dobriansky:

I welcome this opportunity to express my congratulations through you to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America on the occasion of this 20th anniversary. Ukrainians in America today have a special reason to treasure freedom. Moreover, there is a striking parallel between the inspirational struggle for freedom by the 45 million Ukrainians now held captive in the Communist empire and the struggle for independence and freedom of the many other non-Russian nations.

This past summer I had the pleasure of meeting with your Executive Director, Stephen J. Jarema, at Hyannis Port. I stated to him at that time that I deplored the monolith term often used by the Republican Administration in Washington, "Soviet Nation" or "Soviet people." In essence, it is contrary to the captive nations week resolution enacted last year. Its use implies that we condone the status quo of the Communist takeover of all the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain. I stated then, and I do now, that I adhere to the statement as contained in the Democratic Platform: "we will never surrender positions which are essential to the defense of freedom nor will we abandon people who are now behind the Iron Curtain through any formal approval of the status quo."

We can be thankful for organizations such as yours, ever aware of the Communists' ways of propaganda so that our nation will ever be alert to the dangers of Communism, whatever form it may take.

In his speech honoring the late Dag Hammarskjold in the fall of 1961, President Kennedy stated:⁵

There is no ignoring the fact that the tide of self-determination has not yet reached the Communist empire where a population far larger than that officially termed "dependent" lives under governments installed by foreign troops instead of by free elections—under a system which knows only one party and one belief—which suppresses free debate, free elections, free newspapers, free books and free trade unions—and which built a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizens prisoners . . . Let us have debate on colonialism in full—and apply the principle of free choice and the practice of free plebiscite in every corner of the globe . . .

⁴ *Twenty Years Devotion to Freedom*, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, 1961.

⁵ See, "Ukraine: A Neglected New Frontier," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, October 1-15, 1961, p. 80, and "On The Kennedy-Khrushchev TV Exchange," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, March 1-15, 1962, p. 24.

In view of these statements, we doubt strongly, if President Kennedy has reversed his stand on these vital and all-important issues not only to our own security, but to the entire free world as well. But the American people must know, if the President is backing the policies advocated by Rostow.

The American people are the legitimate source of sovereignty in the United States. They do not have to accept the judgment of the Department of State policy planners, especially as these planners can be proven wrong. We already had such planners, who advocated the acceptance of the "finality of enslavement" of Eastern Europe just a few months before the Polish and Hungarian revolutions in 1956. As the authors of this misguided theory were proven wrong, so will Mr. Rostow, with his ill-founded assumption on the "mellowing" processes of Russian communist tyranny.

The captive nations in the Soviet colonial empire continue to pose as many difficulties for the Kremlin tyrants as they have in the past, as they demonstrate the amazingly indestructible stamina to resist not only Communist oppression, but continue to perpetuate their diverse racial, ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds, and refuse to become robot-like "new Soviet men."

If the United States is to follow the dangerous path advocated by Mr. Rostow and Co., it will considerably facilitate Khrushchev and his successor to attain the unchanged objective of the Kremlin: conquest of the entire world for Russian communism.

PROBLEMS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF UKRAINE IN 1961*

By BOHDAN W. CZAJKOWSKYJ

The national economy of Ukraine is an integral part of the economy of the Soviet Union, and as such it is dependent on all those processes which rule the latter's economy. But the specific characteristic of Ukraine's national economy lies in the fact that the national, centrifugal tendencies of the Ukrainian people are able to make themselves felt more in agriculture, manufacturing, and trade than in the other aspects of national life. As a result, all problems, which are manifold in the Soviet economy, are worsened and generate more and more new conflicts. In their endeavors to regain ever new rights from Moscow, the Ukrainian people are now enjoying an unusually favorable situation in the field of economy created by the circumstances in which the Soviet economy or the so-called "socialist economy" has to retreat permanently and ceaselessly before the exigencies of life.

We are of the opinion that in the present stage of its development, the economy of the U.S.S.R. cannot continue along the path of Marxism-Leninism in accordance with the official dogmas, but must constantly diverge from that path. The changes that have come about are not the work of Khrushchev. They would still have come to pass if Beria, Malenkov, or Molotov were at the helm of the U.S.S.R. We have seen the liquidation of Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) and the spontaneous growth in depth and breath of inter-*kolkhoz* organizations and enterprises—as examples of divergence from Marxism in the field of agriculture. Last year two conferences of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) approved the development of open markets, which constitute further divergences from Marxism in the field of manufacturing and trade.

At present the economy of Ukraine is being shaped under the influence of three factors: the demands of everyday life, the pressure

*) *EDITOR'S NOTE*: The following article was written in May 1961. We are publishing this article at the present time because the author's evaluation has not lost its timeliness.

from Moscow, and the Ukrainian surge toward sovereignty. Because all three are in opposition to one another, we have a whole series of problems, the solution of which depends on the interplay of these three factors.

All the departures that have been allowed by the CC are not manifestations of good will on the part of the rulers in the Kremlin, nor are they evidence of amity nor the desire to better the conditions of the masses. They are merely concessions on the part of the communist leaders, who find themselves pushed against the wall but at the same time struggle to insure themselves against any big surprises.

In order to counterbalance these concessions, Moscow is strengthening its political pressure so as to prevent an eruption of the nationalist tendencies in both the political and economic life of the Ukrainian people. Moscow's difficulties lie in the fact that whereas Ukrainian culture can be kept at a low level, a similar repression in the economic sphere is almost impossible, inasmuch as the whole economy of the Soviet Union hinges on the development of the economy of Ukraine. Yet the breaking apart of the system—the so-called socialist economy—continues despite all attempts by the Kremlin to prevent it.

All the principles of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, on which the whole development of Soviet economy had been based, no longer withstand the pressure put on it by the new environment.

The conflict between small enterprises—the private-cooperative type, managed by an enterprising individual—and the large state enterprises is being won nowadays by the former.

The planning of the economy, which is directed from a central point, proves inefficient in competition with the economic laws of the free market and private enterprise, and this in effect weakens Moscow's chances in its drive for total control of the national economy of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian man shows himself most successful in the struggle for his rights in the economic field, where today he is able to force Moscow to capitulate, without risking bitter political repercussions for himself.

In a hypothetical discussion, whether to preserve the old Stalinist course, or whether to follow the tide away from Marxism, the position for Ukraine to take is a clear one. The official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CC CPU) *Komunist Ukrainy* in its October, 1960 issue states this as follows:

Dogmatism and sectarianism impede the development of Marxist-Leninist theory and its creative application in concrete conditions, which are changing and

are substituting the study of concrete situations with quotations, and are leading to the separation between the party and the masses.

As the result of the breakdown of the Soviet economic system, there came about a movement to get away from the socialist forms of production. Thus in agriculture, following the liquidation of the MTSs, there was the elimination of the RTSs. This process continues, quietly yet successfully, as may be seen from the following statistics on the Kharkiv *oblast*:

	1958	1959
<i>Kolkhoz</i> automobile repair shops	145	265
<i>Kolkhoz</i> other shops	381	509
<i>Kolkhoz</i> electric and gas welders	275	440

During 1959 over 100 *kolkhozes* in the Ukrainian S.S.R. bought out the RTS shops. The RTS did not fulfill their quotas in 1959 in the maintenance of combines (82.7%); in the maintenance of corn combines and silos (65.3%); beet-gathering combines (95.3%), or in tractors (98.4%), because the *kolkhozes* preferred to conduct maintenance operations on their own, even the most primitive types of shops rather than in the RTSs.

In a number of *oblasts* of the Ukrainian S.S.R. there is now in operation a new process of dividing up large *kolkhozes* into smaller ones. The attitude of the local party executive is not identical in all cases. For example, the secretary of the Odessa party committee, Kytaysky, writes in *Radyanska Ukraina* of March 27, 1961, that "the mistakes made in the consolidation of *kolkhozes* in Bereza, Velyky Mykhaylo and other districts by party committees are being corrected. It has been decided to break up the large *kolkhozes* quietly, especially in the Bereza district."

But the attitude of the party executive in the Cherkassy district is entirely different. We read in *Radyanska Ukraina* of March 5, 1961: "Some artels, which had been consolidated, express a desire to be broken up. But consolidation in general has had a significant economic effect on *kolkhozes*, in that it has helped to raise their living standards. There are, however, active evil-doers, who are interested in managing positions, and are misleading the *kolhospnyks* by pointing out the weaknesses and mistakes of consolidated collective farms.

"Party organizations do not fight back sufficiently against these ambitious climbers. What is more, among the latter there have even been persons with party membership cards. And in the Terletsy manufacturing section of the '*Zapovit Lenina*' *kolkhoz* these people are being led by the secretary of the party organization, Comrade I. Savchuk. The district committee of the party is looking the other way meanwhile."

The development of inter-*kolkhoz* organizations in further evidence of the divergence from the socialist forms of production. In his discussion last year, one of the leading economists in Kiev characterized the problem of inter-*kolkhoz* organizations in this way: "They are an existing factor in the national economy which cannot be liquidated now. The government of the Republic is attempting to consolidate inter-*kolkhoz* organizations on a lower level, for example, the district and eventually the *oblast* level. But it is against consolidation on the higher, republican level, because this would complicate the Soviet economy to a great degree, which has already been placed in a chaotic state by inter-*kolkhoz* organizations. The problem lies in the fact that there still are no legal bases for their existence and they are ruled by local initiative."

Inter-*kolkhoz* organizations are built along the lines of capitalist methods of production, and resemble limited companies and corporations. General meetings of *kolkhozes* (shareholders) elect the inter-*kolkhoz* board. All questions of the organization and accounting of inter-*kolkhoz* industries are resolved by the board, which is ruled by the decisions approved by the meeting of all member-*kolkhozes*. The board is responsible to that meeting. The board appoints individual managers, who are responsible only to the board. Profit sharing at the end of the year is on the basis of the decisions of the board. Usually a part is left for future development (reserve fund) of the enterprise, and the rest of the profits are divided among the member-*kolkhozes* in accordance with their share of capital invested.

Here are two examples: In the Cherkassy *oblast*, at the end of the fiscal operations of the Maydanetsky inter-*kolkhoz* cattle centre, *kolkhozes* received amounts equal in value to the cattle they handed over (253,700 rubles) plus 50 per cent of the net profits. The other 50 per cent was kept for expansion of operations.

In the Poltava *oblast*, the Lubensky inter-*kolkhoz* centre keeps 20 per cent of the net profits, returning the rest of the money to member-*kolkhozes* in proportion to their investment.

Inter-*kolkhoz* organizations take over state enterprises, buy their own incubator stations, and establish packing plants and factories to process agricultural raw material. They compete successfully with state-owned establishments with better quality and shorter production periods, as well as lower costs. There is no indication in the Soviet Ukrainian press that state enterprises, which enjoy the benefits of a planned economy and a guaranteed labor force, are able at any time to compete successfully with inter-*kolkhoz* organizations in the field of construction.

Among the other problems which in general hamper the national economy of the Soviet Union, and one which is particularly felt in Ukraine, is that of the lack of capital both in manufacturing and in agriculture. Just how difficult it must be to obtain the necessary capital for local manufacturing may be assessed when one realizes that there is not enough capital for the metallurgical industries, the oil industry, and other important branches of Soviet industry. The lack of capital lately has hit Ukrainian agriculture the most. When the majority of *kolkhozes* converted from payment in kind to payment in wages, a catastrophic lack of operating capital arose.

For example, in a number of *kolkhozes* in the Ternopil *oblast* the people have not been paid for over a year and a half. In the Cherkassy *oblast*, out of 11 *kolkhozes* in the Baban district seven have refused for over a year to give payment in currency, because of a tight financial condition.

While in 1957 in Ukraine one *kolkhoz* converted to payment in wages, in 1958 — eight, and in 1959 — approximately 1,000, in 1960 there was a return to payment in kind. A number of *kolkhozes* which earlier had converted to payment in wages were faced with a shortage of currency. The state was unable to extend the necessary credit even to those *kolkhozes* that had abandoned payment in kind during the previous year. All this shook the *kolkhoz* system in the Ukrainian S.S.R. and strengthened the negative attitude of the populace to *kolkhozes*.

Disregarding this state of affairs, the Ukrainian economists still support the introduction of wages in all *kolkhozes* of the Ukrainian S.S.R., including those which are economically weak, as a means of rectification of the mistakes which had been allowed in the payments to the *kolkhoz* members in the past. While we are on this question, it might be useful to point out that Ukrainian economists such as O. Onyshchenko and I. Romanenko do not hold with the official line that the introduction of wages for work done in the *kolkhoz* leads to removal of the difference between the *kolkhozes* and the state sector of agriculture. They explain clearly that even with the wage scheme *kolkhozes* remain co-operative establishments and should keep the system of sharing of net profits among members.

Lately the development of state manufacturing is meeting with a series of new difficulties. While the factories are being built by the *kolkhozes* in record time (according to Soviet standards), state construction has slackened its pace in comparison with previous years. The Kherson cotton complex was started in 1951. In eight years not even the first phase of the construction has been completed. A similar situation exists in the Pervomay diesel factory, in the Novo-

kakhovsky electric motor factory, and in other plants of heavy industry. Things are not different in the light and food industry: for seven years the Berezov Mineral Water Plant, near Kharkiv, has been under construction and there is no end in view. In 1954, of the budgeted 7.2 million rubles only 4 million were used. The completed walls of the main plant, the generator plant and other buildings are beginning to crumble. In 1960 the situation worsened. Of the 2,221,000 rubles, only 360,000 were used (15%).

A new factor which is slowing down the realization of the plans to develop the state industry is the recent spontaneous—for Soviet conditions—development of housing, which is concurrent with the breakdown of plans for the construction of building materials plants. In 1959, over 14 million square meters of living area were constructed, and put into use. This amounts to an increase of 130% over the 1958 figure. In 1960, there was a further increase of 12% in the first half of the year. All this at the expense of the state building materials industry in Ukraine. The consumption of building materials goes primarily for: 1) in the state sector—construction of mass dwellings, so poorly finished that their continual repairs and maintenance eat up additional money and materials; 2) in the private sector—construction of dwellings by individuals and by collective farms, which is being done to a large degree at the expense of materials earmarked for the development of state industry (in 1960 in Ukrainian villages, 151,000 buildings were built privately); 3) Development of the nation's light, food, and local industry, which is being conducted by local management at a faster pace, more effectively, and partly at the expense of heavy industry. A prevailing phenomenon is the exploitation of building materials for so-called "unlawful construction," for example, sports stadiums in Chernyiv and other cities of the Donbas.

The futility of the system is best demonstrated in the breakdown of planned economy which came about as the result of *strengthening of the role of the market*. More and more often the established plans are being modified, so that in effect the whole system of planning begins to be questioned. In the case of Ukraine's heavy industry, the planning for production of agricultural machinery has become a problem, since today the deciding voice comes not from the state, but from the buyer—the collective farm. Overproduction in light industry not only of Ukraine but of the entire U.S.S.R. reached such proportions that a special session of the CC CPSU in July 1960 had to be devoted to it. The market, which is regulated by the law of supply and demand, is a welcome development for the managers of local in-

dustry, which being more elastic, is able to adapt itself quickly to the market's demands. Along the same line of development rises the growth of collective farm markets, where the *kolkhozes* and their members are able to sell their products, and where the law of value is the only regulating factor; the level of prices depends on the supply and demand. Currently *kolkhozes* in Ukraine are selling on a free market more than $\frac{1}{3}$ of their fruit and produce, $\frac{2}{3}$ of watermelons and cucumbers, 35.5% of sunflower seed, 19.1% of potatoes, and 89.2% of honey. The importance of this market will seem even greater when we add that *kolkhozes* are not the only ones which are trading on it. Members of collective farms also sell there part of the products received in kind as well as some produce grown in private gardens. In the fall of 1960 state collective farms made their first appearance on these free markets.

The downfall of planned production in manufacturing continues with the concurrent downfall of planned marketing which resulted in surpluses both in wholesale houses and in retail stores. This should produce in the near future the growth of bankruptcies in individual manufacturing and in commercial systems.

Prices of some goods which were not marketable in the commercial network of the Ukrainian S.S.R. have been lowered three times, with little success. As a result, the Ministry of Trade and Commerce in Ukraine proposed the creation of specialized stores of so-called fixed-price goods.

The existence of the market, and its influence on the economic processes in Ukraine is not shrouded in secrecy, but is accepted as a positive development for the national economy of the country. As an example of the open attitude to this matter, we quote from V. Zadorozhny and V. Shpyluk, *Relationship of Goods and Money between the City and the Village at the Present Time*:

Ignoring the role played by goods and money in the relationship between the city and the village, negation of the manufacturing character of collective farm production, and ignoring the demands of the law of value were some of the reasons why the collective farm budgeting was poorly implemented and why the principle of material interest was broken in agriculture, all of which resulted in the first place from manipulation and errors allowed in the price policy.

Prices on agricultural products which existed during the last period before 1953, were set in a number of cases without taking into consideration the action of the law of value, and were so low that they did not cover the material and labor costs, and did not insure conditions for the development of collective farm production. This caused losses throughout the entire national economy of the country.

Practice of communist development indicates that in our economy there is no naturalization of economic processes, but rather the development of goods

and money relationship. In economic circumstances between the city and the village, as well as inside the agricultural production it manifests itself in such processes as the liquidation of the MTSs and the sale of machines to *kolkhozes*, in other words strengthening of the manufacturing side between the village and the city, liquidation of payment in kind for labor and the introduction of one form of producing and selling agricultural products, development in *kolkhozes* of payment in wages and progressive disappearance of payment in kind as measures of work and consumption.

Chaos in the conditions of manufacturing was most remarkable in the wage levels. Adjustment differences in wages between those made by industrial workers and those earned in agriculture are a sore problem.

In manufacturing, various RNGs attempt all means to attract and keep the labor force. As a result different wage levels and social benefits are created. But the variations in wages between manufacturing and mining do not equal those paid to collective farm workers. One step towards its partial liquidation was the introduction of money wages. Shortage of funds for the continuation or even maintenance of this policy, created a reaction in the villages, and a return to the years 1953-55, when the collective farmers were completely disinterested in the work of the *kolkhoz*.

Here are some examples:

On September 27, 1960, in the Makariv county of the Kiev *oblast* there were no collective farm workers in the field. Some 2,260 students were engaged for the task.

On October 15, 1960, in the Lviv *oblast* 130,000 tons of beets were lying on the fields, while in the Khmelnytsky *oblast* 400,000 tons of beets rotted.

On October 10, 1960, in the Vynnytsia *oblast* 160,000 hectares of corn and 84,000 hectares of beets were unharvested.

On October 22, 1960, in the Chernyiv *oblast* half of the potato crop was still in the field as frost began to appear. A similar situation with potatoes was noted in the Lviv *oblast*.

Meanwhile, the picture is pretty much the same everywhere: no people can be seen in the fields.

But the collective farmers are not alone in their lack of interest in work. A similar situation could be observed last fall on a number of state farms of Ukraine, where the workers first of all paid attention to their own allotted plots of land, and used the least amount of energy for the work on state farms.

Khrushchev's advance in the past in animal husbandry to raise the output of meat resulted in a situation where Ukraine does not fulfill its norm in the production of meat or milk. The pressure

on the private sector to submit the animals to collective farms resulted in a failure. While in the years 1953-58 the annual increase in the number of cows was 450,000, in 1959 it was only 2,000 in the whole of Ukraine (this averages out to not quite three cows per rural district of the Ukrainian S.S.R.). The number of cows in 1959 in the private sector decreased by 604,000 (14%); during 1960 this decrease amounted to 21%; while in the same period the decrease in pigs was 24%; lambs and goats—24%. The increase in the number of cows in 1960 in Ukraine reached 225,000 head, which is only 2/5 of the increase in 1957 (544,000 head).

At the same time it must be remembered that in 1959 in the Ukrainian S.S.R. the contribution in the meat output by collective farms was 11% and state farms 34%, a total of 45% from the so-called state-social sector. The private sector provided the remaining 55%. It becomes clear that liquidation of part of the private animal husbandry must have seriously disrupted the production of meat and milk in 1960 and 1961. In the three quarters of 1960 the Ukrainian S.S.R. produced only 95% of the 1959 total, and in the first half of 1961 only 80% of butter in comparison with 1959. In general, the output of meat in Ukraine decreased by 115,000 tons in 1960 as compared with 1959.

Just how catastrophic appeared the situation in animal husbandry last year may be seen from such drastic measures as the decree of the Rivne *oblast* production committee, reported in the newspaper *Chervony Prapor* (*The Red Banner*) of March 24, 1960, which forbade the people of this *oblast* to slaughter any calves, even those owned privately. This is in conflict with the constitution of the U.S.S.R. which says that the right of citizens to some private property is protected by law.

But the biggest problem facing Moscow is the growth of individual initiative on the part of Ukrainian peasants in the lower strata and in the center—Kiev. This growth of initiative follows along the lines of individual interest, the interests of an enterprise, community, *oblast*, and the republic.

With their growth, the RNGs (RNG—*Radnarkhosp* in Ukrainian or *Sovnarkhoz* in Russian—which are state-owned farms) have taken the initiative in production and marketing. Exchanges among individual RNGs within the republic, as well as outside it have proceeded without taking into account the interests of the state, but rather are based on the criterium of whether the given exchange is in the interests of the local community or not. This initiative, concentrated mainly in securing food products and general consumer goods, hit

the heavy industry, primarily defense production, in which the RNGs showed little interest. This resulted in the formation of Republican Councils. The Republican Council, established in August 1960 in Ukraine, had as its goal the regulation of any initiative along the lines of self-rule, as well as direction of planned production especially in heavy industry, and seeing to it that the Ukrainian S.S.R. fulfilled its contracts with other republics, primarily the RSFSR.

Following the example of the Leningrad RNG, which established direct trade contacts with Finland, the Ukrainian S.S.R. established direct trade agreements with French firms at the September, 1960 exhibition in Marseilles, by buying goods to the amount of the agreed value of exports to France. All transactions were handled by the commercial bureau of the Ukrainian S.S.R. pavilion, which was fulfilling the functions of the non-existent Ukrainian ministry of foreign trade.

Specialization and concentration of industry, securing of semi-processed materials within the borders of its Economic Region (ER)—that is the goal of practically every Ukrainian RNG. What is most interesting to us is that pressure from the Kremlin has been unable to overcome the opposition against the so-called co-operation forced from above, and to minimize the tendencies to self-rule by the republic and individual RNGs.

The following cases may serve as examples. The Lviv armature factory refuses to supply its steel scrap to the Leningrad and Tulskey RNGs, which demand it. The state plan of the Ukrainian S.S.R. for 1960 even raised the number of proposed shipments from Lviv, but the Lviv RNG protested this decision as uneconomical, and damaging to the Lviv Economic Region.

In the Dnepropetrovsk RNG the exchanges within the region increased from 12.5% to 38.3% in 1958; exchanges within the republic increased from 27.5% to 48.3%, while inter-republic exchange fell from 60% to 13.4%.

The Kharkiv RNG went against the decisions of both the CP USSR and CC CPU when it stated that it would not supply stampings for 74,000 parts for a crane for the Vladimir Tractor Factory (as part of the inter-republic plan for cooperative supply) in 1961, because its own tractor factory was too busy.

The RNGs are making their own policies, trying to increase to the utmost the profits of their enterprises and the Economic Regions. This they do, disregarding the fact that the rights given to RNGs and OVKS in price setting are very limited. The individual RNGs from Lviv to Kharkiv have taken over the rights to set prices on products which are supposed to have fixed prices. Usually these prices set by

RNGs and OVKS are much higher than the state prices, and carry revenue up to 183%, where only 5% is allowed. The so-called temporary prices, put on new production and which are supposed to last a maximum of one year, are in use three to four years.

At the same time the provincial bodies feel that planning rights allotted to local councils are insufficient. (They have no right to reassign capital from one branch to another.) Demands are being made that the time has come to concentrate all planning of the local economy into one system—in the hands of production committees.

The struggle of primary economic units for greater freedom in economic activity extends to the republican government. This was manifested in the speech of M. V. Pidhorny at the January, 1961 session of CC CPSU in Moscow, who in the debate with Khrushchev said, "... and what we ought to get, should be given to us . . ." Pidhorny was speaking against the new growth toward centralization in the state plan of the U.S.S.R., and this part of his speech throws an interesting light on the relationship between Kiev and Moscow.

Here is an excerpt from *Robitnycha Hazeta* of January 13, 1961:

... U.S.S.R. state plan and central distribution centers in practice are striving for over-centralization, which to a certain extent limits the initiative of the republics. Thus, for example, plans for production and distribution of all sorts of industrial products, which are manufactured by enterprises of the republican ministries, used to be approved by the Councils of Ministers of the Union republics. This allowed us to give much aid to agriculture in securing for it certain kinds of manufactured goods, equipment and smaller items. Now, all production which is manufactured in local enterprises, including such items as nails, spades and other small items, is distributed according to the state plan of the U.S.S.R. in a centralized order. At the same time the resources which are allotted for the release of these goods have seriously decreased as compared with those which were earlier governed by the republics.

Aside from that, the republics used to have the right to keep 50% of agricultural machinery and implements manufactured over the quarterly quota and additional orders. However, beginning in 1960, these rights were cancelled. We have the right to keep in the republic one-half of the metals which were overproduced, but, once we use them to manufacture agricultural machines, we cannot touch them, because they are to be distributed centrally.

We feel that it would be useful to bring back the former method of distributing production, put out by the local enterprises, as well as production which was manufactured over and above the planned quota. This would allow the republic to give additional aid to agriculture for the development of initiative in producing over the norm, and in searching for local resources. Along with this it would be useful to study the question of expansion of the rights of the Union republics in the field of redistribution of capital investments . . .

Private initiative acts most effectively in agriculture. It is the source of development for inter-*kolkhoz* organizations, which have assumed an important place in the development of Ukraine's national economy. For example, capital investments in one seven-year plan of collective farms in just one *oblast* — Odessa — are to reach eight billion rubles. In order to understand the activity and many-sidedness of this movement, let us take a close look at one region, namely, the Oleksandriv district of the Kirovohrad *oblast*.

All the 25 *kolkhozes* here joined the inter-*kolkhoz* council, and subordinated all their enterprises to its management (capital investment 15 million rubles). The council's jurisdiction includes all electric utilities for the district, all construction, a canning factory, a feeding station for cattle, and similar enterprises. There is also a rest home for the collective farmers, a music school with dormitories, and on account of expected profits (in 1960 it was 15 million rubles) a pension fund has been set up for older *kolkhoz* members in the district.

Although state supply prices have increased 461% on meat products, 643% on grain and 734% on potatoes between 1952 and 1959, they still do not cover the costs of production of the *kolkhozes*. For example, the price of potatoes in 1959, averaged among all collective farms of the Ukrainian S.S.R., was 33.4 rubles (37.7 rubles in the Lviv *oblast*, 38.9 rubles in Poltava). The state was paying 37 rubles in Lviv (while on the *kolkhoz* market the going price was 90 rubles), and 33 rubles in Vynnytsia (101 rubles on the free market). In order to cover the losses incurred on their sales to the state, the *kolkhozes* in the first instance tried to sell their potatoes on the open market, and as a result the average price was higher than the state price by 14% in the Lviv *oblast*, 17% in the Chernyhiiv, 44% in the Odessa, and 63% in the Kirovohrad. In *oblasts* where the *kolkhoz* market is of lesser significance the profit to collective farms was automatically lower, standing at 9% in Stanyslaviv, 5% in Volhynia, and only 2% in Chernyhiiv.

Just how greatly the role of *kolkhoz* management has grown and how it opposes the interests of the state, may be seen from the following examples:

Dnipropetrovsk *oblast*, fall of 1960:

Kolkhozes do not sell fruit and vegetables locally but ship them to far northern places, where they can obtain higher prices for them.

The interests of the *kolkhoz* are generally placed above those of the state.

Kolkhozes deliberately withhold deliveries to the state in order to create a shortage in the area, then sell the goods at a better price on the *kolkhoz* market.

Advertisements by *kolkhozes* promoting their products appear in the *oblast* newspaper *Zorya* and are broadcast over the radio. Emphasized are lower prices and better quality than state goods.

State farms also have sent their products to the free markets, although fulfilling only 52.4% of their state quota.

And here is a picture of one district, Petrivsky, in the case of vegetable supply: part of the crop was sold on the *kolkhoz* market, part was spoiled and lost in the field. The state plan was realized only 50%.

In the Chernyshiv *oblast*: Buying of apples and pears is proceeding at a very slow pace. The *oblast* achieved only 35.6% of its supply quota (Malodivysky district, for example, out of its 500-ton quota, supplied only 8 tons). This state of affairs is explained by the fact that individual *kolkhozes* do not submit their apple crop to fulfill the state quota, but either are selling it on local markets or shipping it beyond the borders of the *oblast*.

The Sumy, Kherson, Mykolayiv and Odessa *oblasts* failed to supply their share of tomatoes to Moscow and Leningrad. The Mykolayiv *Oblast* Supply Company shipped only 27% of its quota, Sumy only 10%.

Finally, to conclude these illustrations of conflict between the interests of the state and the collective farms, here is another picture from the western regions. It shows how initiative at the grassroot level throws Soviet planning into chaos and paralyzes the activity of state enterprises.

Last year the flax harvest in Volhynia was exceptionally good. *Kolkhozes* in the Rivne district alone had profits nearing the 120 million ruble mark. But by the end of September, 1960, the state had received only 12.5% of the estimated supply of flax. The linen mill in Kovel—the only plant of its kind in the whole of Volhynia—switched to one shift a day in the fall of 1960 because of the lack of raw materials. But this did not come about because less flax was being harvested than in previous years. Rather, it was because *kolkhozes* were reluctant to submit their quota of flax, preferring to process it themselves and to submit the finished linen fiber. They are buying up in quantities machines for the processing of flax, the so-called “LT-40” (in Kovel alone there are 40 such machines in *kolkhozes*). As a result, a million-ruble state enterprise is unable to run efficiently, because there is a lack of raw materials. From July 1 to September, 1960, the Kovel district submitted only 20 tons of flax, while such dis-

tricts as Kamin-Koshyrsky, Lubomelsky, Manevychsky, Ratnovsky, and Staroryzhevsky had not submitted a single ton of flax by September 10.

The dimensions of the growth of private initiative are best illustrated in the housing industry of the Ukrainian S.S.R., where, to be sure, the figures for 1959 are varied and controversial, but where it may be assumed that 2/3 of the dwellings in the republic were built by individual inhabitants of cities and villages. The rate of growth in housing for 1959 as compared with 1958 highlights the dynamics of the private sector.

State and co-op projects increased by -----	106.3%
Individual inhabitants of city housing increased by -----	126.5%
Individual inhabitants of village housing increased by -----	121.8%

The rate of growth in 1960 followed a similar pattern.

Private initiative is also developing artisanship, which is slowly emerging from underground and is utilizing, virtually in the open, legal forms of cooperation for its activity. In Kiev, for example, there is a shop for "Repair of Fine Leather Goods" on Shevchenko Boulevard. According to the Kiev press, this is a private craftsmanship enterprise, operated by two persons, which does good and fast repair work and which competes favorably with state or cooperative enterprises.

In Kherson it is possible to buy candy, made by a private factory; neither the state nor any co-op industry makes such a thing.

In Ciurupynsk, Kherson *oblast*, private individuals sell wine and even supply an accompanying snack right on the market. In various homes, it was also discovered, there are small bars where wine can be drunk or bought for home consumption, for cash or on credit. The local press says that this is done with the tacit approval of the police, who play a neutral part in the whole affair.

The Soviet economic system plus private initiative have led to such a growth of the black market that it has become a private sector of Soviet trade which not only complements but even competes with the state apparatus. In Kherson, for example, Odessa-made fly-catchers can only be obtained on the black market; in Mykolayiv, yeast from outside the *oblast* only on the market; while in Lviv, sugar in larger quantities can be bought at a price 30% lower than that of the state. Gasoline in Kiev costs 50 kopeks per liter on the black market, but one ruble 30 kopeks in state service stations.

The black market is supplied with goods and by and large stolen state resources, in an organized fashion, using ships and

trucks. In October 1960 the prosecuting attorney of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Panasiuk, stated that so-called "motorized" thefts from collective and state farms were reaching alarming proportions. Participants in the black market trade are not outcasts of society, but people from all walks of life, from members of university professors' families to highly placed party members, as well as high ranking officers of the militia and civil administration. Also, a good percentage of black marketeers is made up of young persons. For example, in the Kiev market, of the 36 persons who specialize in the radio parts trade, 10 are Comsomol members.

In the light of all these complicated problems in which the economy of the Ukrainian S.S.R. is so rich, and in the light of ever increasing difficulties which Moscow finds in trying to control them, we feel that every new retreat on the part of CC CPSU before the demands of everyday life in the field of economics will:

1. Increase departure from the Marxist-Leninist economic system;

2. Develop further the ideological discussion and mark more deeply the internal rift between orthodox Communists and the progressives, behind whom, in the shadows, lurks Khrushchev;

3. Make it possible for elements who are dissatisfied with the system to exploit the situation in making further gains in their struggle with the totalitarian regime.

4. Strengthen the tendencies of self-determination on the part of the Ukrainians and other enslaved nations, and broaden the basis for a successful struggle for economic independence from Russia.

LYSENKO'S GENETICS UNDER KHRUSHCHEV'S DETERMINISM

By PETER A. TOMA

The aim of every science is to understand and explain its phenomena in order to formulate laws about them. In order to achieve this aim it is necessary to follow the methods of scientific observation, experimentation, abstraction, and generalization. The last two, however, may often be dangerous ventures. For example, to make absolute generalizations in physics is a precarious undertaking; to do so in biology, where a tremendous heterogeneity of living nature prevails, is even more risky.

In the past there were at least four scientists who dared to formulate rules and laws about hereditary phenomena. They were Charles Naudin, Johann Gregor Mendel, Charles Darwin, and Sir Francis Galton. Of these, the most significant was Mendel, whose work, published in 1865, was the greatest contribution ever made in the field of genetics. Mendel was the first known scientist to observe that inherited characteristics are produced by "factors" which exist in pairs in the parents, which then separate in the germ cell and combine again at random in the next generation (one of each pair coming from each parent), and so continue unchanged from one generation to another.¹ In 1936, in the Soviet Union, the Mendelian laws led to a controversy which resulted in the "outlawing" of Mendelism in 1948.² The leader of the opposition, Trofim Denisovich Lysenko, charged Mendelism with failure in Soviet agriculture,³ and maintained that hereditary characteristics can be changed by human interven-

¹ For a more specific explanation of the Mendelian laws, see E. B. Babcock et al., *Genetics in Relation to Agriculture*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1918); J. S. Huxley, *Heredity, East and West* (New York: H. Schuman, 1949); John Langdon-Davies, *Russia Puts the Clock Back* (London: V. Gollancz, 1949); and Conway Zirkle, ed., *Death of a Science in Russia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949).

² See *O polozhenii v biologicheskoi nauke: stenograficheskii otchet sessii vsesoiuznoi akademii sel'skokhoziaistvennykh nauk imeni Lenina, 31 iuli—7 avgusta 1948 goda* (The Situation in Biological Science: Stenographic Reports of the Session of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science, from July 31 to August 7, 1948), Moscow: Ogiz-Sel'khozgiz, 1948.

tion, through the organism's response to a changed environment, and that these changes will be passed on to succeeding generations.⁴ In December, 1952, a group of Soviet botanists launched a discussion of Lysenko's theories of species and species formation which after Stalin's death spread into a controversy similar to the one waged in 1936-1948.⁵ The discussion, lasting six years,⁶ was brought to an end in December, 1958, when Khrushchev, *Pravda*, the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and *Izvestia* assailed the editors of the *Botanical Journal* for criticizing Lysenko. Subsequently, the twenty-one-member editorial board⁷ (the bulk of Lysenko's critics) was replaced by a thirteen-member group of "neutrals" and loyal Lysenkoites.⁸

I. KHRUSHCHEV — "CHAMPION OF FREE DISCUSSION"

Although the Lysenko controversy began shortly after Stalin's death, we do not know whether he initiated it, directly or indirectly, or whether it was inaugurated by his heirs, especially N. S. Khrushchev. Indications are that the latter is the case.

³ Since science in the U.S.S.R. is not regarded in isolation (as is the case in "Western" science at the present time), but as a social and political activity which must be concerned with the key problems of socialist development, the gene constancy hypothesis (Mendelism) was considered wrong and "metaphysical," tending to slow up the advance of agriculture, and therefore of the great change from Socialism to Communism on which Soviet aspirations were set. That is why Mendelism was regarded as a socially reactionary theory, representing a residuary influence of capitalism holding up the progress of the new society.

⁴ For Lysenko's theories and his criticism of Mendelism, see his *Agrobiology* (tr. from Russian by n.a.; 4th Russian ed., Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954).

⁵ The criticism of Lysenko's theories covered the following problems: (1) the scope and content of the term "species" and its criteria, (2) the intra- and interspecific struggle for life, (3) natural selection and the contemporary meaning of classical Darwinism, (4) the process of phylogeny, the theory of divergency and of the so-called birth of the new organism in the womb of the old one. Details of the discussions can be found in Peter A. Toma, "Sowjetische Diskussionen um die Theorien Lysenkos (Soviet Discussions of Lysenko's Theories). *Osteuropa—Naturwissenschaft* (Eastern Europa—Natural Science), I, 2 (1958), pp. 128-138.

⁶ Documentary material providing the substance of the debate is found in Soviet magazines and periodicals, such as *Botanicheskii zhurnal* (Botanical Journal), *Bulleten' Moskovskogo Obshchestva Ispytatelei Prirody* (Bulletin of the Moscow Naturalists' Society), *Uspekhy sovremennoi biologii* (Achievements in Contemporary Biology), *Zhurnal obshchei biologii* (Journal of General Biology), *Voprosy filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy), *Kommunist* (Communist), *Agrobiologiya* (Agrobiology), and many others.

On February 23, 1954, Khrushchev in his report to the plenary session of the Party Central Committee sharply criticized Lysenko for giving patronage to V. S. Dmitriev, a former chief of the GOSPLAN's Agricultural Planning Administration and a candidate for a doctorate at the Genetics Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, "Who caused much harm to the development of agriculture."⁹ Following Khrushchev's criticism, the Higher Diploma Commission, which had approved the dissertation three days earlier, quickly reversed its decision and rejected Lysenko's request that Dmitriev be confirmed in the degree of Doctor of Biological Sciences.¹⁰ Of course, it is probable that the outburst of criticism against Lysenko was dictated primarily by Khrushchev's need of suitable scapegoats. As boss of Soviet agriculture, Khrushchev had to begin shifting the blame for shortcomings in agricultural production on others lest ultimately he himself should be held responsible. Khrushchev's criticism of Lysenko occurred in the same speech in which the First Secretary took sharply to task the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister and the First Deputy Minister of State Farms, and the Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Committee. Thus the guns of the Party, under Khrushchev's command, were turned on Lysenko whose background revealed that he was G. M. Malenkov's protege.¹¹ Simultaneously with Khrushchev's criticism of T. D. Lysenko, *Kommunist*, the main organ

⁷ P. A. Baranov, A. A. Fedorov, M. M. Ilyin, V. F. Kuprevich, E. M. Lavrenko (associate editor), D. V. Lebedev, S. Iu. Lipshitz, S. D. Lvov, V. I. Polyan-sky, V. P. Savich, B. K. Shishkin, S. Ia. Sokolov, V. B. Sochava, E. I. Shteinberg, V. N. Sukachev (editor-in-chief), A. L. Takhtadzhian, B. A. Tikhomirov, N. V. Turbin, A. A. Iunatov (secretary), O. V. Zalensky, P. M. Zhukovsky. With the exception of Lebedev and Turbin, all of the editors were highranking officers in the All-Union Botanical Association.

⁸ A. A. Avakian, N. A. Avronin, P. A. Henckel (associate editor), L. V. Kydriashov, M. V. Kultiasov (associate editor), V. F. Kuprevich (editor-in-chief), S. S. Prozorov, V. I. Razumov, K. A. Sobolevskaia, A. A. Shakhov, B. K. Shishkin, P. A. Vlasiuk, M. S. Iakovlev. Only two, Kuprevich and Shishkin, are carry-overs from the ousted editorial board and only four members of the new editorial board (Kuprevich, Razumov, Sobolevskaia and Shishkin) are officers of the All-Union Association.

⁹ *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, March 21, 1954. Excerpts of Khrushchev's speech in English are available in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VI, 12 (1954), pp. 3-13.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, March 26, 1954.

¹¹ Lysenko's coming to power and the official endorsement of his theories by the CPSU coincided with the ascendancy of Georgii Malenkov—Khrushchev's most dangerous rival in the post-Stalinist struggle for power. For a brief account of the Malenkov-Khrushchev struggle for power, see Edward Taborsky, "The Rise of Nikita S. Khrushchev," *World Affairs Interpreter* (now *Quarterly*), XXVI, 2 (1955), pp. 186-200.

of the Party Central Committee, attacked "dogmatism in agricultural science" and demanded that Lysenko's theories be subjected to examination and discussion in a "free struggle of opinion."¹² Since then the criticism was waged not only on scientific but also on ideological grounds; quotations from Lenin, Marx, and Engels were used to plaster Lysenko with labels of bourgeois-idealism.¹³

Although both groups claimed to be followers of I. V. Michurin, they differed in tone and interpretation. For instance, on June 7, 1955, commemorating the hundredth anniversary of the birth of I. V. Michurin, Lysenko published a special issue of *Agrobiologiya*, elevating Michurin to canonical status.¹⁴ The opponents, on the other hand, writing in the Bulletin of the Moscow Naturalists' Society, published only a brief editorial on the practical aspects of Michurin's teaching.¹⁵ In the same issue there was also an article describing the great friendship between N. I. Vavilov (Lysenko's chief rival in the 1930's) and I. V. Michurin (Lysenko's saint).¹⁶ Nonetheless at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, it was Lysenko and not the opposition who spoke for Soviet agricultural science. There Lysenko blamed "biology theoreticians" for misinterpreting Michurinism, that is, for the "unspecific knowledge of biological objects—plants, ani-

¹² See "Nauka i zhizn" (Science and Life), an editorial in *Kommunist* (Comunist), No. 5 (1954), pp. 3-13.

¹³ See, for example, N. P. Dubinin, "Ob oshibkakh v voprose proiskhozhdeniia vidov" (Errors in the Problem of the Origin of Species), *Biulletin' Moskovskogo Obshchestva Ispytatelei Prirody, otдел biologicheskii*, LX, 1 (1955), pp. 97-107. Cf. also I. I. Novinsky, "O filosofskikh osnovakh biologicheskoi teorii vida" (The Philosophical Bases of the Biological Theory of Species), *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 4 (1955), pp. 160-173 and the reply by I. I. Prezent and I. A. Khalifman, "Nekotore voprosy teorii biologicheskogo vida i vidoobrazovaniia" (Some Problems of the Theory of Biological Species and Species Formation), op. cit., No. 5 (1955), pp. 157-169.

¹⁴ Included in this issue is Lysenko's article, "Za dal'neishie razvitie Michurinskogo uchenia" (For the Continued Progress of Michurinist Science), *Agrobiologiya*, No. 4 (1955), pp. 3-6.

¹⁵ See "Ivan Vladimirovich Michurin, 1855-1955," *Biulletin' Moskovskogo Obshchestva Ispytatelei Prirody, otдел biologicheskii*, LX, 5 (1955), pp. 17-18. According to this editorial, Michurin's achievements were particularly great in the field of hybridization and selection, but he was not a major foe of the Mendelian law.

¹⁶ See P. A. Baranov and S. Iu. Lipshitz, "N. I. Vavilov o I. V. Michurine" (N. I. Vavilov about I. V. Michurin), op. cit., pp. 19-20. Vavilov, Lysenko's predecessor in the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, was imprisoned in August, 1940, and died probably in 1942. Vavilov's fate is described by T. Dobzhansky, "N. I. Vavilov, A Martyr of Genetics, 1887-1942," published in Zirkle, *Death of a Science in Russia*, pp. 80-89.

mals, and microorganisms—utilized in agriculture.”¹⁷ “Lenin,” Lysenko stated, “discovered Michurin for the people and for biological science. The Communist Party, the Soviet government, and socialist agriculture have produced materialist, Michurin biology.”¹⁸

Whether Lysenko’s interpretation of Michurin biology was right or wrong, on April 9, 1956, Lysenko was released from the duties of President of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences and replaced by P. P. Lobanov, former First Vice-Chairman of the Russian Republic’s Council of Ministers and the Russian Republic’s Minister of Agriculture.¹⁹ After that the opposition launched a new offensive against Lysenko. V. V. Skripchinsky, for example, accused Lysenko and his followers of falsification of biological science by presenting their own hypotheses under cover of Michurin’s teaching, which were then popularized in the press and adopted in schools as Michurinist theory.²⁰ The same issue of the Bulletin also carried a book review depicting the author of the book,²¹ N. I. Feigenson, as a falsifier of biological science for having presented Lysenko’s ideas under the guise of Michurin’s teaching.²²

Perhaps these and similar taunts, published by the critics of Lysenkoism in 1955 and after, were biting enough to shatter Lysenko’s long silence²³ and to provoke him to retaliate. In the summer of 1956,

¹⁷ *Pravda*, February 26, 1956.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, April 10, 1956. Two months later, however, the General Assembly of the Lenin Academy elected Lysenko a member of the Presidium of the Academy (*Pravda*, July 12, 1956). However, he was not reelected to the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences on February 23, 1957 (*Vestnik Akademii Nauk S.S.S.R.* (Messenger of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R.), XXVII, 3 (1957), pp. 3-4.

²⁰ V. V. Skripchinsky, “Osnovnye problemy ontogeneza rasteniy v svete ucheniya I. V. Michurina” (Main Problems of Plant Ontogenesis in the Light of I. V. Michurin’s Teachings), *Biulleten’ Moskovskogo Obshchestva Ispytatelei Prirody, otdel biologicheskii*, LXI (1956), pp. 53-66.

²¹ *Osnovy michurinskoy genetiki* (Fundamentals of Michurin Genetics), 2nd ed., Moscow: Izd. “Sovetskaya nauka,” 1953.

²² B. N. Vasin, T. K. Lepin, V. P. Iefroimson, “N. I. Feigenson, *Osnovnye voprosy michurinskoy genetiki*” (N. I. Feigenson “Basic Problems of Michurinist Genetics”), op. cit., pp. 95-105. The same kind of criticism was also waged against A. I. Vorobyev in another book review published earlier by M. Belgovsky. See his *Falsifikatsiya nauki pod flagom michurinskogo uchenia* (Falsification of Science under the Cover of Michurin’s Teaching), op. cit., LXI, 2 (1956), pp. 100-106.

²³ Until the second half of 1956, Lysenko took no part in the controversy. Lysenko’s theories were defended by his colleagues from the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, The Genetic Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the *kolkhozes*, *sovkhoses* and experimental stations.

Lysenko made his first (mild) counterattack on the opposition.²⁴ He stated that the discussion of his evolutionary theory by his critics in the *Botanical Journal* had created confusion. Therefore Lysenko considered it necessary to restate his views on the biological species and species formation which were first published in 1950.²⁵ This included Lysenko's concept of "creative Darwinism,"²⁶ which, according to K. M. Zavadsky,²⁷ for more than ten years had been used by Lysenko as a cover-up for his own views.²⁸ Another opponent, A. L. Takhtadzhian, carried the criticism a step further. He identified Lysenko's "creative Darwinism" as a "vitalist" expression.²⁹

It seems, however, that Zavadsky's and Takhtadzhian's criticisms had very little effect on Lysenko's formulation of new theories for in July, 1957, two months after *Botanicheskii zhurnal* carried his opponents' articles, Lysenko applied his disputed theory to the raising of milk productivity.³⁰ When asked in an interview with M. K. Rubtsov, staff correspondent of the Party newspaper *Pravda*, what should be done about this theory, Lysenko said he wished the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Agriculture would put the results of his discoveries into practice on state farms.³¹ The implication of this statement was that Lysenko's theory could be the answer to Khrushchev's earlier

²⁴ See his *O biologicheskoi vide i vidobrazovaniyi* (About the Biological Species and Species Formation), *Agrobiologiya*, No. 4 (1956), pp. 3-30.

²⁵ See his "New Developments in Science of Biological Species," published in *Agrobology*, pp. 570-581.

²⁶ Identified with Michurin's teaching, which allegedly gave expression to a radically new step in the development of the theory of evolution.

²⁷ K. M. Zavadsky, *Predmet i zadachi sovremennogo darvinizma* (Subjects and Tasks of Contemporary Darwinism), *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XLII, 4 (1957), pp. 583-595.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 584.

²⁹ "The vitalism of Lysenko has been noted by none other than the vitalists themselves! The celebrated British playwright Bernard Shaw, well-known as an opponent of materialism and a supporter of vitalism, even praised Lysenko for his vitalism. (See George Bernard Shaw, "The Lysenko Muddle," *Labor Monthly*, XXIX, 1 [1949], pp. 18-20). And one must credit Shaw with insight when immediately following this he writes that 'Lysenko has to pretend to be a materialist, when in fact he is a vitalist.'" Takhtadzhian, *Priamoye, prisposobleniye ili estesvennyy otbor?* (Direct Adaption or Natural Selection?), *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XLII, 4 (1957), pp. 596-609. For a reply to Takhtadzhian's article, see I. T. Frolov, *O dialektiko-materialisticheskoi determinizme v biologii* (On the Dialectical-Materialistic Concept of Determinism in Biology), op. cit., XLII, 6 (1958), pp. 799-813.

³⁰ See *Pravda*, July 17, 1957.

³¹ Ibid. English text in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, IX, 29 (1957), pp. 8-10.

call to catch up with and pass the United States in per capita production of meat, milk, and butter.³²

II. KHRUSHCHEV'S VARIABILITY IN GENETICS

It appears that after Malenkov's "resignation" as Premier in February, 1955, and his confessed inability to solve agricultural problems,³³ Khrushchev no longer considered it necessary to use Lysenko as a scapegoat to undermine his rival's position,³⁴ and thus he made an effort to rehabilitate Lysenko. The first opportunity to restore Lysenko to favor came on March 30, 1957, at the conference of farm personnel of the provinces of the Central Non-Black Earth Zone. Speaking on the question of liming the soil, Khrushchev declared: "There are scientists who still argue with Lysenko on this question. If I were asked which scientist I agree with, I would unhesitatingly say Lysenko . . . I consider that few scientists know the soil as well as Comrade Lysenko does."³⁵ Khrushchev actually criticized A. Avdonin, Director of the Institute of Fertilization and Agro-Soil-Science of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and his colleagues for rejecting Lysenko's use of organic-mineral fertilization mixtures as scientifically unfounded.

One week later, Khrushchev gave an explicit view of the genetic controversy. Speaking about the harvest increase in the Diveyevko district through the use of organic-mineral fertilizer mixtures advocated by T. D. Lysenko, Khrushchev offered the following solution:

I believe theoretical and scientific arguments should be settled in the fields. Suppose a scientist says, 'Comrades, your method is no good; mine is better—it is scientifically substantiated.' All right, let's take a certain number of hectares and sow them according to your method and sow another plot according to our method, and let the collective farms and collective farmers decide.³⁶

On the criticism of Lysenko's theories, presented by the opposition since 1952, Khrushchev had this to say:

Some scientists invented all kinds of accusations to hurl at Comrade Lysenko during the whole time he was President of the All-Union Lenin Academy

³² *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, May 24, 1957. English translation in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, IX, 21 (1957), pp. 7-12.

³³ For Malenkov's statement concerning his resignation as Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, see *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, February 9, 1955, English text in *The New York Times*, February 9, 1955.

³⁴ See the Dmitriev case, *supra*, pp. 2-3, especially note No. 11.

³⁵ See *Pravda*, April 1, 1957.

³⁶ See *Pravda*, April 10, 1957.

of Agricultural Sciences. That is why we acquiesced when Comrade Lysenko asked to be relieved of the post. They said that Lysenko's character is one that does not permit contradictions, does not take other people's opinions into account. I know Comrade Lysenko. He knows how to defend his point of view, and this is all to the good.³⁷

Khrushchev said that he was astonished at the calm that was maintained by V. V. Matskevich, U.S.S.R. Minister of Agriculture and A. I. Benediktov, U.S.S.R. Minister of State Farms. "They have folded their hands like saints, and have not interfered in the arguments. The Ministers should not hold themselves aloof. Why a deaf ear on what the people say and recognize?"³⁸

Actually Khrushchev was wrong. Matskevich did not hold himself aloof and he did not turn a deaf ear on what the "people" said and recognized. In June, 1956, at an All-Union Conference of Agricultural Scientists, Matskevich, in an oblique reference to the genetic controversy, defended Lysenko by saying that "it is essential to struggle with determination against the anti-materialistic and mechanistic distortions which have recently occurred. The struggle against the infusion of various bourgeois theories into science is an essential condition for the successful development of Soviet biological and agricultural science."³⁹

Declarations such as the one by Khrushchev and Matskevich appear to have been the green light for Lysenko to defend his theory anew. In an article in *Izvestia*,⁴⁰ Lysenko said that his theories about inheritance of acquired characteristics have been vindicated by experiments reported recently by French findings that certain physical characteristics of Peking ducks were altered and the alterations inherited by subsequent generations after injections of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) from another breed of ducks. DNA is believed to be a constituent of the genes. Lysenko said that the French results proved his theory,⁴¹ but he added that he had been able to produce

³⁷ Ibid. Apparently Khrushchev was too short-memoryed to recall his own accusations against Lysenko in 1954.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ *Izvestia*, June 20, 1956.

⁴⁰ See *Izvestia*, December 8, 1957.

⁴¹ According to Dr. Lang, Professor Benoit's experiment does not support Lysenko's theory, but the notions of the "Western" geneticists, for DNA is the material of which all genetical structures we know of (cistrons, recones, or mutons) are made. If one succeeds in extracting this material, or if, as in certain microorganisms, it is released by the cells and then incorporated into other organisms, it is conceivable that one can change them genetically. But that does not at all mean that Lysenko and his followers have anything of this sort in their grafts or in their attempts at changing species by environmental influence. Letter to the author dated December 28, 1957.

similar hereditary changes without the use of DNA.⁴² At the same time Lysenko attacked V. N. Sukachev, chief editor of the *Botanical Journal*, for waging "under the guise of materialist biology, a highly unscientific criticism" of Lysenko's theories and of the scientists who agreed with him. Quoting Khrushchev as the supreme authority, Lysenko suggested that the best way of determining whether he or his opponents were right was by testing their alternative suggestions on the collective farms and letting the collective farmers decide.⁴³

III. LYSENKO'S IMPACT ON SOVIET AGRICULTURE

One of the principal reasons for the rejection of Mendelism by Lysenkoites in 1948 was its "failure" in practical agriculture. Because of its theoretical defects, they argued, Mendelism proved in practice to be incapable of solving the most pressing problems of socialist agriculture, those connected with seed production and the raising of new varieties, and was becoming an actual barrier to their solution.⁴⁴ While Mendelism had shown itself sterile in relation to the practical problems of agriculture, Michurinism, they said, had given us a new direction in seed production, breeding and research, which was bearing fruit in increased yields and efficiency.

The term Michurinism was actually coined by T. D. Lysenko, who took a personal part in developing new methods in plant and animal breeding on Michurinist theory. Lysenko was given credit for his achievements in the breeding of varieties through hybridization, for his method of "soil-root feeding of plants" (fertilization), for his reproduction by grafting and for his method of raising milk yields. But Lysenko was criticized for his failure in corn yields (through his method of intra-varietal crossing which had replaced hybrid corn in 1935), for his method of vernalization (*iarovizatsia*) for his summer planting of potatoes, and for his grass-field crop rotation.

A Western critic, Professor Anton Lang, estimated that the total loss in corn yields which the country suffered by following Ly-

⁴² In August, 1958, in Montreal, during the Tenth International Genetics Conference, geneticists pictured DNA as a complex compound supporting not Lysenko's theory, but the traditional explanation of heredity (through "genes") which are arranged in a linear order along the chromosomes of the cell nucleus. See A. McLaren, "Montreal's Congress of Genetics," *Discovery*, XIX, 11 (1958), pp. 460-462.

⁴³ See Khrushchev's speech of April 8, 1957, *supra*, p. 6, note No. 36.

⁴⁴ For the attack on Mendelism, see the reports of the "historic session" of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences in *O polozhenyi v biologicheskoy nauke: stenografichesky otchet*. Cf. also note No. 2, *supra*, p. 1,

senko's prescriptions amounted to at least six million tons.⁴⁵ This may not seem much by American standards, but the present corn acreage of the U.S.S.R. is only slightly more than ten per cent of that of the United States. Therefore at its January, 1955, meeting the Party Central Committee ordered a seven-fold increase in the corn acreage of the country, to be accomplished within six years and reaching 70,000,000 acres in 1960, and the exclusive use of hybrid corn within two or three years.⁴⁶

Potato growing in the Soviet Union and the satellites suffered considerably under Lysenko. The method of planting potatoes in the southern steppe regions in the beginning of July (instead of the spring) which Lysenko recommended for the purpose of avoiding excessive degeneration (*stolbur*) had proved a total fiasco and had resulted in the near extinction of certain early varieties which used to be widely grown in the country.⁴⁷ Similar findings were reported by scientists at a conference of geneticists held on October 24, 1956, in Prague.⁴⁸ According to their report, Lysenko's method of planting potatoes caused millions of dollars worth of damage in Czechoslovakia. Before the Communists took power in 1948, Czechoslovak agriculturists used seed potatoes only from mountainous regions. Their seed potatoes were famous all over Europe and also abroad. In 1949 this method of planting was abandoned and replaced by Lysenko's method, based on Michurinist theory; every economic unit now used its own seed potatoes taken from local crops. A few years later the quality of negative selection declined considerably, the extent of virus diseases in seed potatoes went up, and the yields went down. Experimental studies conducted in Czechoslovakia after Stalin's death proved that the virus diseases resulting in the degeneration of the potatoes had not been caused by the high temperature of the hot southern districts, as Lysenko claimed, but by other factors.⁴⁹

Other information in Soviet literature indicates that the practical application of Lysenko's teachings has caused great losses to Soviet agriculture not only in corn and potato production, but also in

⁴⁵ See his "Genetics, Corn and Potato in the U.S.S.R.," *Plant Science Bulletin*, III, 3 (1957), p. 1.

⁴⁶ See Lysenko's pledge to implement the Party's resolution in *Pravda*, April 27, 1955, and in *Zemledelie* (Agriculture), III, 6 (1955), pp. 9-16. Cf. also *O nekotorykh problemakh Sovetskoy biologiyi* (Concerning Some Problems of Soviet Biology), *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XLIII, 8 (1958), p. 1137.

⁴⁷ See G. N. Linnik, "O prichinakh vyrozhdeniia kartofelia" ("Causes of Degeneration of Potatoes), *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XL, 4 (1955), pp. 528-541.

⁴⁸ See *Konferentsiya o současnem stanov v genetice* (Conference on the Contemporary State of Genetics), *Preslia*, XXIX, (1957), pp. 106-112.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

forestation and grain and cotton production. In 1954, members of the All-Union Conference on Erosion-Control Forestation held in Moscow refuted Lysenko's policy of planting trees in clusters as erroneous in its very basis.⁵⁰ As a result Lysenko's method of planting and sowing in clusters was replaced by a square-cluster method based on recognition of intraspecific competition. Thus, if today in the Soviet Union we find farmers using the square-cluster method of sowing and planting, it is not because of Lysenko's contention that intraspecific competition does not exist in the organic world, but rather because of its agrotechnical advantage based on recognition of intraspecific competition.⁵¹ The material losses from the application of Lysenko's method of planting shelter belts amounted to at least one billion rubles.⁵²

In the spring of 1954 Khrushchev blamed T. D. Lysenko for the wrong distribution of grain and grass cultivation which caused a shortage of grain production in the Soviet Union.⁵³ Khrushchev stated that V. R. Viliams, father of the grass-field crop rotation system in the U.S.S.R., was a great scientist but that his followers, meaning Lysenko and company,⁵⁴ failed to appreciate the fact that he had studied the conditions in central Russia and that his work was therefore not applicable to the South.⁵⁵ Khrushchev announced (for

⁵⁰ See V. Ia. Koldanov, *Nekotoriye itogi i vyvody po polezashchitnomu lesorazvedeniyu za istekshiyie piat let* (Some Results and Conclusions with Regard to Shelterbelt Forestry in the Last Five Years), *Lesnoye khoziastvo* (Forestry), VII, 3 (1954), pp. 10-18.

⁵¹ V. I. Svinarev, *K voprosu o vzaimootnosheniyakh u rasteniyi pri razlichnykh sposobakh posadki* (On the Problem of Plant Interrelations Depending on the Method of Planting), *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XLIII, 10 (1958), pp. 1434-1444. Cf. also V. I. Koldanov, *Gnezдовиye posevy drevesnykh porod i srastaniye ikh kornevykh sistem* (The Cluster Method of Direct Seeding in Silviculture and the Fusion of Root-Systems of Trees), *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XLIII, 5 (1959), pp. 713-720.

⁵² Koldanov, *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XLIII, 5 (1958), p. 715.

⁵³ See *Pravda*, March 6, 1954; op. cit., March 21, 1954; and op. cit., March 28, 1954.

⁵⁴ In 1950 Viliams' teachings on the grass-field system were criticized by Lysenko as erroneous and outmoded. (See *Pravda*, July 15, 1950) Thus Lysenko introduced his own "correct" ideas on the grass-field system of agriculture, which were distributed among agricultural scientists and administrators of state and collective farms in the entire U.S.S.R. (*Pravda* Publishing House has issued 500,000 copies of Lysenko's article "On V. R. Viliams' Agronomic Teachings" in pamphlet form. *Pravda*, July 18, 1950). It is therefore logical to assume that since July, 1950, agricultural scientists and planners in the Soviet Union have known about the inadequacies of V. R. Viliams' and the improvements of Lysenko's teachings on the grass-field system of agriculture.

⁵⁵ *Pravda*, March 21, 1954.

the U.S.S.R. as a whole) a decrease in the grain area of 3.8 million hectares between 1940 and 1953, in spite of an increase in the total cultivated area of 6.8 million hectares.⁵⁶ In order to improve the situation the commander-in-chief of Soviet agriculture directed that scientists "study this question profoundly and, after *creative discussion*, give collective and state farms scientifically grounded recommendations on the correct agricultural methods to be used in accordance with the soil and climate conditions of every zone."⁵⁷

IV. PARTY ORTHODOXY VERSUS GENETIC HETERODOXY

Ever since Khrushchev reversed his policy on Lysenkoism the dispute waged in the Soviet press was focused on orthodoxy versus heterodoxy. The correctness or wrongness of any given viewpoint was judged not by available facts but by agreement or disagreement with an authority.

Who were the particular authorities on whom the Lysenkoites based themselves? Naturally the fountainheads were Marx, Engels, and Lenin⁵⁸ (Stalin for obvious reasons was omitted). The secondary authorities were canonized by association. Thus Darwin received his accolade from Marx;⁵⁹ Timiriazev and Michurin from Lenin. Finally, elevation was accorded to Lysenko himself (for the second time⁶⁰), when *Pravda* recently declared that T. D. Lysenko is the leading Soviet Michurinist scientist who "made a particularly great contribution to the development and enrichment of this teaching, which is cherished by the entire Soviet system."⁶¹ His theories, according to

⁵⁶ To appreciate Khrushchev's criticism of the one-sided emphasis on fodder it should be kept in mind that livestock failed to increase substantially above the 1940 level. (One hectare is equivalent to 2.471 acres).

⁵⁷ *Pravda*, March 19, 1955, emphasis mine.

⁵⁸ Lang, op. cit., p. 2.

⁵⁹ Regarding the *Origin of Species* in 1860, Marx reported to Engels and later declared to Lassalle that "Darwin's book is very important and serves me as a basis in natural science for the class struggle in history." *The Correspondence of Marx and Engels* (New York: International Publishers, 1935), pp. 125-126. Cf. also Jacques Barzun, *Darwin, Marx, Wagner* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941).

⁶⁰ First in August 1948, when the official ideologist under Stalin, M. B. Mitin, announced in the course of the discussion: "Lysenko (is) the Michurin of today." See *O polozhenii v biologicheskoy nauke: stenograficheskiy otchet*, p. 234; cf. also Zirkle, *Death of a Science in Russia*, p. 159.

⁶¹ *Pravda*, December 14, 1958. English translation in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, X, 50 (1958), pp. 37-39. It is interesting to note that after the purge of the editorial board of the *Botanical Journal* on January 20, 1959 (see note 73, *infra*, p. 12), the new editors adhering to the Party line reprinted the *Pravda* article in *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XLIV, 1 (1959), pp. 3-8.

the official Party organ, represent the materialist (as opposed to "bourgeois") science which "is developing as the science of control of heredity and its variability, as the science of control of the processes of evolution in the interest of society."⁶² Therefore those opposing Lysenko's views were automatically branded as heretics. This was clearly demonstrated by the editors of *Pravda*. They accused Lysenko's critics of "badgering Michurinist scientists and completely denying for a number of years the importance of many valuable works."⁶³ Specifically, the opponents were charged with furnishing ammunition to those "who are interested in weakening the materialist positions of Soviet biology;" with creating a negative effect on the "rearing of young people in the spirit of materialist understanding" of the development of the organic world; and with obstructing the "mobilization of all the forces of Soviet scientists" for the solution of the "highly important tasks posed by the Party" in the field of a further upsurge in the national economy. It was for these reasons that *Pravda* raised the following question: "Is the editorial board (of the *Botanical Journal*), as presently constituted,⁶⁴ capable of placing the work of the journal on solid foundations of materialist agro-biology?"⁶⁵

The problem was resolved the following day by the head of the Communist order, N. S. Khrushchev himself. Speaking before the December, 1958, plenary session of the Party Central Committee Khrushchev announced that the members of the editorial board of *Botanicheskii zhurnal* "must be replaced by real Michurinists."⁶⁶ Thus the long awaited decision had finally been reached; now it was only a matter of implementation.

In order to make things look more legitimate, an explanation of the state of affairs in the Biology Division of the Soviet Academy of Sciences was presented by a "real Michurinist and non-Party" academician, T. D. Lysenko. Addressing this group of Party workers Lysenko alleged that "some journals of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences have virtually begun to reject completely all materialist propositions of Michurinist biology, including the principle of the in-

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ See note 7, *supra*, p. 2.

⁶⁵ *Pravda*, Decemeber 14, 1958.

⁶⁶ *Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partiyi Sovetskogo Soyuza 15-19 dekabrya, Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Held from December 15 to 19, 1958. Stenographic Report), Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1958, p. 233.

heritance of acquired characteristics."⁶⁷ He assailed the Biology Division of the Academy for having "more doctors, professors and candidates of biology concentrated in this division than the entire system of agriculture."⁶⁸ Therefore he offered "to subject the work of biology institutions to the criterion of practice," because Lysenko continued, "our goal is practice and theory the means."⁶⁹ To prove that things were really so, Lysenko summoned witnesses from the fields and collective farms to give testimony about his contributions to agriculture. The speech by S. K. Korotkova, Chairman of the Lenin Collective Farm, is a case in point:

We are developing agricultural production on the basis of Michurinist science. Comrades, in 30 years I have not met another scientist who has helped production so much as Trofim Denisovich Lysenko. Yet certain unscrupulous people are beginning to defame our Michurinist science. I ask that it be defended. (Voices: Right!)⁷⁰

And defended it was, indeed.

On January 2, 1959, a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Collegium of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Higher Education condemned the editors of the *Botanical Journal* for "the incorrect methods of discussing theoretical problems" in biological sciences.⁷¹ When this proved insufficient to the Lysenkoites, an augmented meeting of the Presidium of the Academy, its department of biological sciences, and the Party *aktiv* was called to inflict the final blow. Following Academician V. A. Engelhardt's self-criticism,⁷² "the decision of the Presidium recognized as justified *Pravda's* criticism of the erroneous attitude adopted during the past few years by the editorial staff of *Botanicheskii zhurnal* and therefore appointed "a new editorial board of the magazine, headed by V. F. Kuprevich, President of the Byelorussian Academy of Sciences."⁷³

Quoting Khrushchev, *Pravda* and Michurin as high authorities, the new editorial board glorified Lysenko as the greatest living

⁶⁷ *Pravda*, December 18, 1958, English translation in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, X, 50 (1958), pp. 19-21.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* It is quite probable that the improvement in crop and stock production by Lysenkoites was quite genuine, but it had nothing to do with genetics.

⁷¹ *Pravda*, January 3, 1959. Cf. also the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XI, 1 (1959), p. 34.

⁷² *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January 21, 1959; English translation in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XI, 3 (1959), pp. 31-32.

⁷³ *Ibid.* For the names of the new editorial board see note 8, *supra*, p. 2.

Michurinist and repudiated his critics as enemies of Soviet science. It rejected K. M. Zavadsky's idea that "Michurin was a partisan of formal-genetics conceptions;" it questioned A. R. Zhebrak's and U. M. Olenov's refutation of Lysenko's theory of species and speciation; it ridiculed V. V. Skripchinsky's article disproving Lysenko's theory of transforming winter wheat into spring wheat and vice versa; and it condemned P. A. Baranov's method of criticism. Moreover, it considered the estimated losses inflicted to the state by Lysenkoites "absolutely incorrect and unrealistic" and "the assertion that inheritance does not depend on environmental conditions unfounded."⁷⁴

The new editorial board declared that in the future "it will base its work on the foundation of the original path drawn by the genial Russian scientist I. V. Michurin"⁷⁵ and therefore its attention will be applied to the publication of "original" articles "connected with practical problems, that is, with the development of our agriculture, industry and medicine."⁷⁶

CONCLUSIONS

In assessing the second Lysenko controversy, we should be careful not to repeat the mistakes committed by some Western observers during the Stalin era. Details of the Lysenko affair were often presented as a projection to characterize the entire Soviet science. Thus, there has been a tendency in this country to believe that because the U.S.S.R. is a totalitarian state, it cannot measure up to the scientific achievements of the United States. This proved to be a dangerous fallacy.

Science in the U.S.S.R. is (and always has been) a cult. As an integral part of Marxism-Leninism, it is professed to be a significant pillar of the Soviet state. Ever since the October (1917) Revolution, one of the chief concerns of the Soviet leadership has been to make science the workshop for changing backward Russia into an advanced socialist society. The quality of Soviet science, however, seems to vary from one field to another. According to Professor Nesmeianov (President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences) "Soviet science is strong in physics, theoretical mechanics, and mathematics; weaker in astronomy and chemistry; and weak or deficient in biology,

⁷⁴ "O nepravilnykh pozitsiyakh 'Botanicheskogo zhurnala' i dalneyshey ego rabote" (About the Incorrect Positions of the "Botanical Journal" and its Future Work), *Botanicheskii zhurnal*, XLIV, 2 (1959), pp. 1-6.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

geology, and certain technical disciplines."⁷⁷ The reason why biology is deficient and physics strong can be explained by possible conflicts between science and ideology. As a rule, the closer the subject is to sensitive ideological points, the smaller its chance of unfettered development.⁷⁸ In this respect physics appears to be situated fairly far from the dangerous magnetic pole, while genetics is very close to it. Yet political interference with scientific theories does not appear to have been consistent throughout Soviet history.

Under Stalin, for example, the relationship between the dialectical *Weltanschauung* and scientific theories were well established: ideology tended to overshadow technology. After Stalin's death, however, this relationship became more complex. The cult of T. D. Lysenko, which was "withering away" shortly after Stalin's departure, gained new momentum after Malenkov's demotion in 1955. Before Malenkov's removal from power, Khrushchev was a chief contributor to Lysenko's debacle. After 1955, however, Khrushchev incorporated Lysenko's theories into his new agricultural policy and defended Lysenko as a practical Michurinist who helped expand Soviet agriculture. But he did not encroach upon scientific freedom of inquiry or upon the exchange of criticism in Soviet biological science until his position in the Party and Government had been well established.

Why did Khrushchev change his attitude towards Lysenko? Was it perhaps because he sought to imitate Stalin; or was it because he felt that the criticism against Lysenkoism was incompatible with dogma? Evidence does not support either one of these propositions. The explanation rests elsewhere. First, it should be noted that unlike Stalin the new leader of Soviet Russia is more of a practical man than a theoretician. He is not absolutely dependent on the logic of ideology. If a policy is compatible with practical gains but not necessarily with political theory, Khrushchev will not hesitate to use this policy and then by a "creative development" of Leninism reinterpret it so that the policy will become compatible with "the most progressive scientific ideology." A good example of this is Khrushchev's decision to end the long term battle in the U.S.S.R. between the "two bosses on the land" with the collective farms swallowing the machine-tractor stations (MTS). As a practical politician Khrushchev seems to be primarily interested in the successful implementation of his program,

⁷⁷ See his *Ob osnovnykh napravleniakh v rabote Akademii Nauk S.S.S.R.* (Basic Trends in the Work of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.), *Vestnik Akademii Nauk S.S.S.R.* (Messenger of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.), XXVII, 2 (1957), pp. 3-42.

⁷⁸ Further explanation of this rule is provided by Leopold Labedz in "How Free is Soviet Science," *Commentary*, XXV, 6 (1958), pp. 472-481.

in which agriculture plays a significant role, and whoever, according to his judgment, can render valuable support will be accepted into the circle of true disciples enjoying the privileges and immunities of the Soviet society. In the struggle between the critics (working mostly with polyploidy, x-ray mutations, cistrons, mutons and recons) and Lysenkoites (practical agriculturists) Khrushchev found greater use and understanding for the latter group and therefore gave it the official *imprimatur* to consider Lysenkoism compatible with dialectical materialism. Next, it could be asked why did Khrushchev tolerate the critics for so many years? Perhaps because he lacked absolute power? More plausible than that is the explanation concerning the alignment of scientists in Russia. After Stalin's death the Lysenko controversy was used by the Kremlin as a tool to rally Soviet scientists behind the new regime; physicists, mathematicians, biologists and other type of Soviet scientists, who visited the United States, proudly referred to the Lysenko controversy as a sign of new freedom in Soviet Russia. It is conceivable that the controversy would still continue if the scope of the discussion during the past few years had not infringed upon the realm of ideology. It appears that those Lysenkoites who occupied important positions in the collective and state farms and experimental stations were numerically and potentially stronger than the critics who lacked the folksy touch of a true Michurinist hero.⁷⁹ In that lay their ultimate defeat.

As far as the future of the critics is concerned it is reasonable to believe that the type of purges practiced under Stalin will not be used again. Instead, the defeated scientists will probably be demoted to lesser positions where they may have the chance to practice Mendelism while probably giving lip service to Lysenkoism.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ A representative sample of Lysenko's role in Soviet agriculture is the decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of September 28, 1958, "awarding the Order of Lenin to Academician Trofim Denisovich Lysenko on his 60th birthday for his great services to the development of agricultural science and his practical assistance to production." *Pravda*, September 29, 1958.

⁸⁰ It is interesting to note that out of the ten members of the old editorial board of the *Botanicheskii zhurnal* who were scheduled to participate in the Ninth International Botanical Congress, held from August 19 to 29 in Montreal, only three (P. A. Baranov, V. B. Sochava and B. A. Tikhomirov) attended the meeting. The rest of the Soviet delegation included 21 scientists who may be considered as Lysenkoites rather than anti-Lysenkoites. Thus, it appears that most of Lysenko's opponents were barred from attending the Botanical Congress just as they were restrained from participation in the Tenth International Congress of Genetics held in the summer of 1958 in Montreal, Canada.

SERFDOM AND SOVIET LABOR

By L. JAY OLIVA

Revolutionary governments, as instruments of abrupt and violent change in political, economic and social structures, seem to share a common aspiration: to divorce themselves completely from their past, to discount entirely the system they have replaced. This revolutionary notion of new order, however, leads many to an over-emphasis on the differences between old and new regimes. While revolutionaries may avow that their system begins anew, one would be foolish to believe them. No system, strive as it may, can operate without a past, as no individual can operate without a memory. Nor can a new system change the basic logic of certain problems, or the basic gamut of human reactions.

The Soviet Union has undergone a revolution. It would be foolish to underestimate the deep and sweeping changes which that revolution has effected. It would be equally as foolish to conclude that the Russians had thus completely altered the nature of their problems or their subjects. This article is concerned with one Soviet problem in particular, the enslavement of the industrial working class for the needs of the state. Much can be learned from a consideration of Soviet labor policy in the light of the growth of serfdom, the development of the old regime whereby the peasantry slowly found itself bound uncompromisingly to the land. In many of their processes these two movements show an amazing similarity. They are both concerned with the relations of the state with the laborers of the dominant economic activity: in one case the land, and in the other, the factory. Because the Soviet Union has shifted its economic attention does not mean it has shifted the essence of its economic problems. The examination of the binding of the industrial laborer to the factory in terms of the binding of the agricultural serf to the land has much to tell us concerning economic systems and autocratic power.

The Soviet regime and the Czarist State were born and nurtured in war and chaos. The Muscovite state struggled through centuries of wars with both eastern and western neighbors, and complicated its growth with violent civil strife. The Soviet regime was born in a

world war, matured in civil war, and was likewise conditioned by its warlike existence. The obvious difference in the birth and childhood of the two is the time span involved. The foundations of the Russian Empire extended over centuries of step and misstep, while the development of the Soviet state was accelerated almost incredibly. But, time difference or not, both lived in infancy among the scourges of the four-horsemen.

War, hunger, pestilence, and death mean migrations, they mean labor shortage, they mean coercion of labor. Culminating in the era of Tartar invasions, the Muscovite lands had been desolated by internal strife and external attack. The landowners looked about for men to help the agricultural system survive. So also the Soviet state of World War I and the Civil War and the period of War Communism, sought workers to keep industrial production moving in the critical time. The simplest method of getting and keeping workers is force. The landowners of Muscovy put pressure on the peasantry to remain in their places; loans to peasants were fine instruments, and debtors were tied to the land for the duration of their debt. Similarly, the new Soviet government immediately betook itself to forcibly freezing its labor forces. This wartime coercion was the first taste which the Soviet Union had of labor discipline.¹ In other words, coercion of labor for the needs of the system was inherent in the birth of both systems.

During the 1920's, under the New Economic Policy, some of these wartime expedients were temporarily suspended. A similar suspension occurred in the period of recovery in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when Muscovy began to spread its influence into the comparatively peaceful vacuum of Tartar power. Both eras witnessed the girding of the new state structure for organization, direction, and purpose. Both eras were basically gestation periods for serious problems which emerging institutions were to present. The NEP, for instance, posed a partly free economic system which was tolerated as long as its goal remained the raising of industrial production to pre-World War I levels. But when, in the late 1920's, the rate of increase of production began to slip, the government reverted to heavy industrialization techniques. These techniques ultimately involved the subjugation of industrial labor. Similarly, in the period culminating with the reign of Ivan Grozny (1533-1584), institutions such as the *pomestie* and the *oprichina* were developed by the Czars to insure themselves of economic and political support against the

¹ G. R. Barker, *Some Problems of Incentives and Labour Productivity in the Soviet Union* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950), p. 28.

powerful aristocracy. These consisted essentially of grants of land to friends of the autocracy in return for support. These land grants, to be valuable, would require aid in getting and keeping farm workers. In short, both periods, representing the development of state policy, were incubators for problems which would directly affect the dominant working classes of their particular era. Both regimes were rising to a crisis.

In the late 1920's, the crisis was reached in Soviet industrial production: the rate of increase grew smaller and smaller. Stalin, firmly in power, unfolded his plans for rapidly expanding heavy industry. Labor would have to be whipped into line. Similarly, from the reign of Ivan III onward, the Czarist state increasingly committed itself to the service gentry system and therefore to all things needed for its support. The Czarist state, sponsoring the service gentry as the bulwark of that state, caused a struggle for the labor supply and ultimately its enserfment. The elements: the growing power of the gentry, and the dependence on an agricultural labor supply to support them. In the Soviet regime of the 1930's the elements were similar: the growing power of the industrial bureaucracy and a new dependence on the industrial labor force.

The Soviet problems really began when full employment was announced in 1930 to the sound of proud declarations.² Unemployment was hardly an unmixed blessing, for when jobs were plentiful, the demand for workers was great. Consequently workers sought the best possible wages and conditions for themselves. Thousands migrated from factory to factory in search of better pay and surroundings. In fact, the annual number of workers "hired and fired" greatly exceeded in certain industries the annual number of those regularly employed.³ The search for greener grass lessened worker incentive and productivity.⁴ Conditions culminating in the Time of Troubles (1584-1613) were not far different. Peasants, their numbers decreased by war and flight, taking advantage of labor need and the reduction of discipline to chaos, were migrating in search of easier conditions. The resulting labor loss on the land aroused the landed gentry to a defense of their system. They demanded state intervention to bolster the economy. In other words, neither system, given its political and supporting economic aims, could allow the work force,

² V. M. Molotov, *The Success of the Five-Year Plan* (New York: International Publishers, 1931), p. 18.

³ M. T. Florinsky, "Stalin's New Deal for Labor," *Political Science Quarterly* (March 1941), p. 39.

⁴ Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1950), pp. 445-446.

be it composed of farmers or industrial laborers, to endanger the system by freedom of movement and choice.

The first step of the Soviet rulers against workers' freedom came with the attack on trade unions. The independence of the trade unions was an obstacle to Soviet plans. The Soviet ideal was a trade union movement which would be an instrument for the execution of government schemes in industry. In 1927, strikes, the major weapon of the labor union, were prohibited, and by 1930 the trade unions subjugated.⁵ The State, while not yet directly attacking worker's freedoms themselves, had effectively narrowed the field of resistance. Once the worker's union "interceded and fought for him with the government; now it intercedes and fights for the government. Its function is no longer to represent the material interest of its members, but to keep them docile under any new decree from the state."⁶ Stalin and his henchmen then proceeded to undermine their original concepts of labor rights. Soviet plans obviously conflicted with the *Labor Code* of 1922 which guaranteed the laborer freedom of movement. The government had to be rid of such rude reminders. On July 1, 1932, the *Labor Code* was abolished.⁷

There was never any Muscovite organization from which the peasant could expect protection, so that the regime did not have to occupy itself with any such struggle as that between the Soviets and the trade unions. However, up to the time of Ivan Grozny, custom and tradition had been on the side of free peasant movement. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the peasant was being effectively separated from that tradition. Debt serfdom already prevented a peasant from leaving his employer's land until his obligations were settled. The *Sudebnik* of 1497 kept the peasant on the land during the harvest season, allowing him to shift only during the week following the Feast of Saint George (November 26).⁸ In other words, the government was beginning to separate the peasants from the traditions of unhampered movement by legal methods, following years of informal attacks by the landowners. It took centuries to separate the peasant from these ancient traditions. It took only a few years to separate Soviet workers from the independent labor movement. Both

⁵ Manya Gordon, *Workers Before and After Lenin* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1941), p. 102.

⁶ Will Durant, *The Tragedy of Russia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1933), p. 144.

⁷ Tony Cliff, *Stalinist Russia: A Marxist Analysis* (London: Michael Kirdon, 1955), p. 15.

⁸ M. Kovalevsky, *Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia* (London, 1891), p. 218.

systems, however, had destroyed the resistance of the workers to future limitations planned against them.

Turnover, absenteeism and truancy in the Soviet system raised difficulties for production plans which the mere subjection of the trade unions and labor rights could not solve. "To combat these consequences . . . it proved necessary to resort to controlling the movement of labor . . ."⁹ Stalin was forced to act, especially when his own enterprise managers retained idlers and absentees for fear of lowering production and even bid surreptitiously to win workers away from their fellow managers.¹⁰ This is another example of continuity in change. Throughout the long period of the laying-on of serfdom, especially in the chaos of the late sixteenth century, landowners consistently tried to entice peasants to their own needy plots. Landowners on the frontiers were especially guilty of tempting peasants away from the harsh conditions of older estates. They, too, preferred to ignore ineffective official measures in favor of more practical and profitable solutions.¹¹

The Soviet government began its move against mobility circumspectly. Workers who changed jobs too frequently were denied transfer to other jobs for six months. In May 1930, engineers receiving over 250 rubles a month forfeited their salary increases if they moved to another job without permission. At the same time, industrial enterprises were forbidden to employ people who had left jobs without permission.¹² By 1931, no worker could leave Leningrad without special permission, and by 1932 this applied to the whole Empire.¹³ The Czarist regime also found migration to be one of its most difficult problems, since the various Cossack communities beyond the frontier provided havens for runaway workers. The continuing attacks on the independence of Ukraine and the attack of Peter on the prerogatives of the Don Cossacks were designed to end this drain on labor resources. In 1930, too, the Soviet government attacked the problem from the opposite tack by strenuously prosecuting managers guilty of luring away workers.¹⁴ Long ago the landowning *dvorianstvo* had campaigned to prevent the newer landowners of the frontier from luring peasants away.

⁹ Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (Cambridge: University Press, 1947), p. 361.

¹⁰ Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, p. 447.

¹¹ Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), p. 151.

¹² *Izvestia*, December 17, 1930.

¹³ *Collection of Laws* (Moscow, 1932), No. 84, Article 516.

¹⁴ P. Haensel, "Labor under the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1931), p. 394.

By the end of 1932 the program of industrialization and labor compulsion was in high gear. In November, new laws provided dismissal for workers absent without good reason and made them liable to loss of their homes, now attached to their place of employment. In December food supplies and rationing authority were placed under the control of factory directors.¹⁵ The workers of the Soviet Union found themselves increasingly subjected to the industrial bureaucracy. Similarly, during the eighteenth century, the serfs of the Russian Empire had been increasingly abandoned to the power of the land-owning nobility. Resistance to service on the lands, attempts to migrate or to flee, were punished by the local landowner with the knout, army conscription, or exile. The same motive stimulated both accumulations of authority: the state relied for its power on the gentry in the first case and on the industrial managers in the second. The system must not falter.

Stalin's next step in the late 1930's was the introduction of the Labor Book. The idea was assuredly not new: its history stems back to the Second French Empire, Germany of the 1860's and 1880's, and the Russian Empire itself in the post-emancipation period.¹⁶ Wholesale introduction of the labor book came in 1938. According to the regulation, administrators "could see in these books the labor biography of a person as in a mirror."¹⁷ The books included the worker's name, his trade, full personal record, and changes of employment with reasons for such changes. Naturally no employer could hire a worker without this book. The labor book further concentrated control of labor in the hands of the industrial bureaucracy. Any Soviet director might now punish a worker by withholding his labor book and depriving him of his livelihood. True, the institution of serfdom never had such a reliable passport system to freeze movement, but it had substitutes serving the same purpose. The landlord was invested with police powers to return his own runaways. In addition, the serf was attached to his community because the tax burden was collected and duties paid by the *mir*; if he left, the *mir* (and therefore his family) suffered. The *mir* served as an effective check on migrations.

The new and crushing Soviet discipline was not received without violent popular reactions. Opposition to Soviet restrictions came notably from Ukraine and the Don basin.¹⁸ During the seventeenth

¹⁵ *Decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 127-130.

¹⁶ M. T. Florinsky, *History of Russia*, Volume II (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 931.

¹⁷ Gordon, *Workers*, p. 120.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

and eighteenth centuries revolts against oppression and denials of the peasants' traditional beliefs were numerous each year. The Soviet government overrode the active opposition of Soviet labor quite as cruelly and effectively as the Czarist regime had overcome Razin, Pugachev, and their like.

The Labor Book, however, was only the first of the hardhitting decrees. The Soviets wanted complete control of the labor force, and so a popular campaign began in the press against the obstinate. Attempting to show that "popular demand" forced the government to take harsher measures, reports of tardiness were published in great quantity. From every part of the Soviet Union, supposedly, came letters from laborers to *Pravda* protesting against lazy workmen, and demanding that the government enforce discipline. The Czarist regime never needed such pretense of popular support to justify enslavement of the peasantry. As a matter of fact, the Soviets did not need it either, but methods had changed. To his "popular" demand, the Soviets added defense against foreign threats. As early as 1931 Molotov was preaching that the Soviet Union would never be safe until the capitalist nations were defeated. Thus, those who interfered with Socialist production were playing into the hands of the enemy.¹⁹

The culmination and summation of these years of labor legislation came on June 26, 1940—the Soviet equivalent of the Russian Imperial laws from 1649 to 1785 which bound serfs forever to their employers, creating a static class system. The Decree of 1940 prohibited workers from leaving their jobs without permission of their employers. Violators were liable to four months imprisonment. Since workers might deliberately absent themselves in order to be dismissed, the wily lawmakers changed the penalty for absenteeism from dismissal to compulsory work at the same enterprise for six months with a 25% cut in salary. This was followed by a law against loafing: "No one who does not use all 480 minutes for production work is observing labor discipline."²⁰

Now that labor was subjugated, the government had to insure itself of a continued labor supply. On October 2, 1940, the government authorized the annual draft of between 800,000 to 1,000,000 boys between the ages of 14 and 17. Those from 14 to 15 were sent to trade schools for two years, while those 16 to 17 were trained for six months in factory schools for less skilled forms of work. All these boys owed four years work at places designated by the state.²¹ This

¹⁹ Molotov, *The Success of the Five-Year Plan*, p. 25.

²⁰ *Collection of Laws* (Moscow, 1952), No. 4, p. 41.

²¹ Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, p. 448.

creation was, of course, as much a closed class system as ever existed in the Russian Empire. If a boy was sent four years to a job, and there was a law forbidding his transfer without government approval, what freedom of choice did he have even within his own class of industrial laborer? From age 14 his position in life was set. The class system of serf economy did no more.

Once stability and continuity had been arranged in the Soviet system, there was a new problem. If workers were so stable, they could not satisfy demands in rising industries. The next step was to move workers about at government will. Since 1931 moves had been made in this direction. A decree of October 19, 1940, allowed the government to carry out the "compulsory transfer of plant engineers, technicians, foremen, employees and skilled workmen from one enterprise to another."²² Serfdom at its peak contained provisions for such movements. After Peter's decrees permitting industrial enterprises to buy serfs, the serf could no longer be sure of working his family's land for the rest of his life. Even that small security of serfdom was removed. During the eighteenth century, when aristocratic power was absolute over the serfs, serfs were able to be sold without land. Further, Catherine II and Paul gave away and moved hundreds of thousands of state peasants to populate the lands of aristocrats in the expanding frontier conquests.

The Russian Empire and the Soviet Empire had challenged and overcome the rights of the workers to freedom, mobility, and choice. The Soviet system had evolved a class structure no less rigid and unfair than the serfdom of the old Empire. The government had in both cases succeeded in binding the dominant labor force to its tools, in one case on the land, and in the other in the factory. One called it for the good of the state and the other for the good of the proletariat; either way, the dead fish smelled the same to the cooks.

To meet the demands of the Second World War, the Soviet government at first succeeded in reinforcing stern military discipline on industrial labor. Imperial conflicts from the Great Northern War to World War I laid the same heavy burdens and reinforced restrictions on the peasantry. The ravages and confusion of World War II, however, ultimately created complete disregard for existing labor laws. As a result, there was a great resurgence of labor laws and discipline in the postwar years. In an attempt to restore its totalitarian control between 1945 and 1950, the Soviet government reinstituted the whole spectrum of labor coercion.²³

²² *U.S.S.R. Gazette* (Moscow, 1940), No. 42.

²³ See Harry Schwartz, "Soviet Labor Policy 1945-1949," *Annals of the*

In 1861, five years after a war which revealed amazing weakness in the Russian Empire, serfdom was legally abolished. The story of the enserfment of Soviet labor also has its supposed feast of Emancipation. In 1956, eleven years after the costly victory of World War II, the Soviets announced the removal of many harsh laws against labor:

Labor discipline at enterprises and institutions has been strengthened as a result of the growth in the working people's consciousness and the rise in their living standards and cultural level. Under these conditions there is no longer need for the presently effective legal liability of workers and employees for leaving the employ of enterprises and institutions without permission and for repeated and prolonged absences from work without valid reasons, and their legal liability can be replaced by disciplinary measures and public influences.²⁴

On July 15, the Supreme Soviet repealed all the 1940 and supporting decrees.²⁵ True, the labor schools still remained, and heavy penalties still attached to truancy and absenteeism, but much of the penal aspect of labor law seemed to have disappeared.²⁶ The reasons for this seemingly abrupt reversal of policy were undoubtedly bound up with the political necessities engendered by the end of the Stalin era. Exorcising the ghost of Stalin meant, unfortunately, exorcising also some of his works. The new rulers were equally concerned with the end of the policy's usefulness for the system. The Czar's government, fresh from an unsuccessful war in the Crimea and faced with a rising new world economy, had taken the step of emancipating the serfs in the hope of catching up with a fast moving world.

Both emancipations were quick, especially in view of the long and cruel history before them. Both came as integral parts of an attempted answer to a new aspect of national and international affairs. Because of their speed, their breadth, and the immense problems of which they were a part, we do well to suspect the efficacy of such emancipations. In 1861 the job of emancipation was badly done, and the evils of the old system were continued under new names or replaced by newer and more unaccustomed evils. No doubt the Soviet emancipation of industrial labor in 1956 has had and will have

American Academy of Political Science, May 1949, p. 83; and P. R. Heller, "Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo: A Review of the Work of Professor Aleksandrov," *Soviet Studies*, II, No. 4 (April 1951), p. 378.

²⁴ "Decree of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VIII, No. 16 (May 30, 1956), p. 3.

²⁵ "Laws Adopted by the Supreme Soviet," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VIII, No. 29 (August 29, 1956), p. 14.

²⁶ "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (May 30, 1956), p. 3.

ramifications, too, far beyond the expectations and planning of its originators. The Soviet leaders of the 1960's, as did the Imperial leaders of the 1860's, obviously hope for the best from their manipulations.

History, however, is a trickster. Every change introduces new forces unknown in the original problem. In the years after the emancipation of the serfs, there emerged among the peasantry a compelling conviction that a second and true emancipation would give them all the land and fulfill the empty promise of 1861 with long dreamed prosperity. This conviction has been called by Baron Nolde, "latent socialism without a doctrine," and played a dominant role in the increasing agitation and revolutionary programs rising to 1917.²⁷ So, too, the emancipation of labor in the Soviet Union seems to have implanted in the working classes another latent and doctrineless expectation: that now steps must be taken to follow paper emancipation with the reality of individual prosperity, plentiful consumer goods, and a new freedom. The Program of the 22nd Party Congress seems fearful of this expectation. After admitting the terrible sacrifices squeezed from the workers by Soviet industrialization, the Program then promises:

In the current decade (1961-1970) . . . the people's standard of living and their technical and cultural standards will improve . . . the demand of the Soviet people for well-appointed housing will, in the main, be satisfied, hard physical work will disappear, the U.S.S.R. will become the country with the shortest working day.²⁸

It remains to be seen whether or not the Soviet Union, after admitting the sad lot of the working class, can live up to its shining promises and thus fulfill the latent and doctrineless desire of its working class for recompense. It remains to be seen as well what will occur if they do not. We may say, however, that there are forces generated by twenty-five years of labor coercion, as there were forces generated by centuries of serfdom, which cannot be disintegrated by a mere decree or satisfied by mere promises. It is more likely, as the newest movements seem to indicate, that the emancipation of labor is but the first sentence of a new chapter in government — worker struggles in the Soviet state.

²⁷ Baron B. E. Nolde, *L'ancien regime et la revolution russe* (Paris 1928). translated by TASS, reprinted in *New York Times*, Tuesday, August 1, 1961, I. 16.

²⁸ "Program of the Soviet Communist Party for the 22nd Party Congress,"

DISARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The Disarmament Conference organized under the auspices of the United Nations has now after several months work taken a recess amid some pious words from some of the non-committed nations that the leading representatives on both sides, the free world and the slave world, revise their thinking during the recess and try to return with some method of bridging the gap between the two camps. It has been a curious conference, for there has been hanging over it a strange contradiction — there has been a sense of urgency that the time is short during which the nuclear powers can arrange for the control of nuclear weapons and at the same time there has been a constantly increasing sense of futility and of the realization of a fact that no one wishes to speak aloud — that disarmament means something very different to the peoples of the different countries and that there can be no real disarmament until there has been established a definite chart for the progress of humanity and a definition of all the important terms used in drawing up that chart. Yet it is abundantly clear that neither of those two prerequisites exists or is likely to do so in the foreseeable future.

As a result, the dilemma which has confronted all similar movements in the past exists at the present time in a still more aggravated form, for the nations that are at the moment the best armed do not agree in the slightest on anything except the necessity for avoiding a full-scale nuclear war, which would certainly mean the destruction of civilization as it has developed for nearly three thousand years and more of human progress and might well end in the almost complete annihilation of the human race, because of the tremendous destructive power of modern atomic and nuclear weapons. Where formerly areas were ravaged and cities destroyed, the menace now hangs over continents with the possible contamination of all means of livelihood and nourishment.

The time has long since passed when the goal of the human race can be expressed by that phrase which Xenophon employed in regard to the domains of Cyrus the Younger in the *Anabasis*:

"Through his territory Greek or barbarian, doing no wrong, could travel freely, carrying with him whatever was convenient." If for centuries, the world seemed to be growing toward that ideal, its course has been abruptly changed and since the rise of Communism, the aspirations of the Communist world to dominate all humanity and the Communist denial of the validity of law as previously understood and the right claimed by the Russian Communists to infiltrate, disintegrate and occupy in the name of Marxo-Leninism all other countries have produced the cold war which threatens at every moment to bring about the final catastrophe.

As a result, disarmament and the Disarmament Conference have now taken a new dimension. No less an authority than Nikita Khrushchev claims that the Communists will bury the West and that peaceful coexistence is the highest form of hostility among peoples. In passing around the satellite states, he never ceases to belabor the West and the free world and claims that he will finally triumph with his ideas of rooting out all such bourgeois notions as liberty, religion, property and individuality and he iterates and reiterates his assertion that he does not believe in war but that he believes in "wars of liberation" to bring countries under Communism and class wars to allow the Communists in the supposedly oppressed stratum of the population to attack and overthrow all other classes and bring their country into that benign and ideal form of government represented by the Kremlin.

Thus to Khrushchev and the Communists the goal of the Disarmament Conference is clear. It is to bring about complete disarmament of his opponents and at the same time to do it in a way that favors their overthrow with the minimum use of force and the maximum of intrigue. This is inherent in all of his utterances and especially in the speech that he made at the Twenty-Second Congress in which he promised the Russian Communists the ideal life within twenty years, if the imperialists did not attempt to resort to war. It explains also the Soviet action in attacking colonialism of all sorts except that practiced by the Kremlin which is based on the principle that once a Communist regime is established by hook or by crook in a given area, that territory is to be forever in the Communist camp because only the Communists in the population know what are the real desires of the mass of the population which has the task only of obeying the masters.

Opposed to this is the object of the Western, free powers which have advanced the thesis that there shall be inspection of the various steps taken and a constant supervision by disinterested persons of

the keeping of the pact. It has been the goal of the American Secretary of State to provide for the reduction of armaments in such a way that the relative military power of the two main camps will not be seriously altered to the benefit of either side. The West predicates the development of a world law with appropriate instruments of enforcement, with due means for developing the traditional concept of justice and obedience to law and the maintenance of a real coexistence without hostility and without aggression but with the opportunity for nations whether in or outside of the Communist orbit to win back liberty and enter the world organization as free and equal partners. The concept of the West is that which animated the United States in liberating the Philippines and Great Britain in steadily loosening the bonds of empire and setting up free nations, even though they were in an early stage of development.

Under this concept, all of Khrushchev's justified "wars of liberation" and of "class wars" become for all intents and purposes wars of aggression and rebellions. His excuse that only a minority of Communists can accurately gauge the needs of the population is shown to be nothing but an extension of the policy of Stalin who made an alliance with Hitler to annex the Baltic republics and then with the Western Allies to obtain the chance to set up Communist governments on the territory in the East occupied by Hitler and legitimize them by rigged elections under the guns of the Soviet army.

Thus as far as the two great forces are concerned, the real argument does not concern disarmament but something far deeper—the shape of the future world and the goal of humanity, not merely the goal of the Western powers but all mankind everywhere.

It was this ideal that was present when the United Nations was organized. President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and the French representatives sincerely believed that Stalin was going to keep his word, despite the many examples of his duplicity, and make the world organization effective for peace. Yet to Stalin the situation seemed far different. He saw in the United Nations a chance for sabotaging this hope of a peaceful world order and as a result those conditions that were inserted to provide for a working agreement between the victorious allies now became a means whereby nothing could be accomplished.

It was perfectly evident that he was willing to fight for this and so after a glorious example of action in Korea, thanks to the boycotting of the Security Council by the Russians, the United Nations has bogged down. Then with the entrance of the new nations which have almost consistently declined to fulfill the obligations which they assumed upon entering the organization, there has come a gen-

eral agreement that they are free to intrigue as they will, act as they will, so long as they do not openly side with either freedom or the Communists. It has rendered their influence as fatal to the course of a healthy development as have the machinations and vetoes of the Soviet government.

Thus the Disarmament Conference has before it the two completely different plans of the Soviet Union and of the United States. Both plans as if by agreement do not touch upon the main dilemma of the Conference and such is the situation that the non-committed and neutralist nations which are represented have so far produced no blueprint of their hopes and expectations. We can easily see what these are. These states are at present not militarily powerful. Their strength lies in the assumption that they represent the conscience of mankind in their desire for peace. Some of them, such as India, have gigantic populations. Others are small with less than a million citizens. But not all of them are as peaceful or as free from ambition as they pretend. The most peaceful and uncommitted of all, India, has found it perfectly proper to resort to force in Goa, to flout the United Nations and its resolutions in Kashmir, and to become embroiled with Communist China which has clearly been the aggressor in Tibet and Ladakh. We hear constantly of nations in Africa which on one ground or another are not satisfied with their boundaries and influence and are hoping to gain new territory or new esteem by fishing in muddy waters. They are chiefly interested in limiting or eliminating atomic bombs and nuclear weapons and seem to pay little attention to any of the other factors involved. Yet we can confidently say that if the disarmament conference is to succeed, their course of action will be likewise circumscribed in their ambitions on their own scale. Thus if there is ever a draft produced for signature, we shall find that they will insist upon clauses which favor their own aspirations despite their optimistic talk that they are non-committed in other parts of the world problem.

The complications are well seen in the Declaration against War Propaganda which was jointly adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union on May 25, 1962, and almost immediately rejected afterwards by the Soviet side because it was not sufficiently far-reaching. Under the lax American reading of the resolution the United States government could not speak out in favor of war but the Russians had provided in their conception that any expression of condemnation of Communism inside or outside the Iron Curtain was itself "war propaganda." The United States government realized that it could

not introduce a general censorship of the press for all articles and books on Communism, a statement that was at once used on second thought by Zorin to denounce the treachery of the American government and to reveal its imperialistic tendencies. As Prof. Dobriensky pointed out, the American representatives had fallen into a carefully laid trap in seeming to approve even for the government those principles for which Stalin and, now, Khrushchev have been striving—the formal recognition by the West that Russian Soviet control in the name of Communism is legal and correct wherever it can be imposed, for Communism is the wave of the future which is to see the gradual overthrow of all personal liberty as the West knows it today. Without realizing fully this demand, the West agreed to stop “war propaganda” but Moscow insisted that anything which assaulted Communism or cast discredit on the ideas of “wars for liberation” from capitalism and “class wars” was a shameless attack and deserved to be condemned before the United Nations and all peace-loving people. Later still it tried unsuccessfully to have the fact deleted from the minutes of the Conference that this resolution, even in its totally incomplete and unfair form, had even for a couple of days been accepted as satisfactory by the Soviet Union, and Zorin ended the first phase of the Conference with a sweeping denunciation of the West and all that the West stood for,—obviously in an attempt to impress the non-committed delegates at the Conference and the non-committed nations of the world.

Thus the net result of the first months of the Disarmament Conference is a new flow of Soviet propaganda and an outline of the plans of the West and East, but we must note that in this Conference France under President De Gaulle refused to take part. Originally there had been planned a conference composed of the five free countries and five Communist together with eight so-called non-committed countries. De Gaulle saw clearly that there was no possible hope for any positive result and as he has consistently opposed random and poorly prepared talks with the Russians which might lead to unconsidered concessions, he declined to take part in this chaotic conference, which was really activated after the Russians withdrew from a discussion of the control of nuclear weapons with the United States and Britain, to end an informal moratorium on testing and to begin its own new series. The crux there was inspection, for Moscow stubbornly maintains that any visit by foreign officials to Soviet installations can only be for the purpose of espionage. It takes the firm stand that any inspection can only be of material to be destroyed and not of any of the same variety that is to be kept,

a condition that is naturally completely unacceptable to any nation that believes and even pays the merest lip service to the cause of honesty.

At the same time the entire subject of disarmament is far more complex than it is often regarded, especially by the advocates of the peace movements or the enthusiastic partisans of unilateral disarmament or of banning the bomb. In essence the disarmament movement is aimed at limiting or eliminating the most costly and destructive weapons, those instruments of mass destruction that menace the life of cities, nations and even continents. These are the product of modern industry and the industrial revolution. They are therefore closely connected with the development of industry and the availability of modern methods of developing power and production.

There are thus two aspects of disarmament—the suppression of power and also the results of that suppression. If civilization is to continue and progress, it can only do so by increasing still more its control of power and making it more available in greater and greater supply. Yet there is always the danger that the mere presence of this power will facilitate its transfer to warlike purposes. It is an old truism that a modern reaper rudely covered with heavy steel plating could well serve the purposes of an ancient Scythe-bearing chariot which again and again proved its usefulness in dealing with various armies. The mere structure of a Molotov cocktail, gasoline in a breakable jar which could be hurled at certain targets, is one that is of wide application. Thus if the world is to preserve the advantages of modern industry without war it must be able to control the possibility of such misuses through some form of world organization.

On the other hand, the old fallacy of the man who urged that rear-end collisions of trains could be prevented by leaving off the rear cars of trains comes into effect in the field of disarmament. Once the most powerful weapons are banned, the next most powerful resume automatically their former position as the most powerful and this process will continue until in the state of disarmament preached by Khrushchev to the free world the power of human numbers and of the brute physical force of the individual becomes the decisive factor in placing the more numerous and the more physically efficient people, whatever its culture, in the position of leadership. Of course, this doctrine which was well understood in the propositions put forward by Litvinov in the 1920's was immediately rejected by all the diplomats at Geneva who realized that Litvinov's

proposals gave the world control to the Russian masses. It becomes an even more forceful argument, now that Red China is desirous of playing the dominant role in Asia and other countries and this becomes in turn a menace to the Soviet advance in Central Asia and Outer Mongolia. It may be one reason for Khrushchev's efforts to populate the so-called "virgin lands" of Kazakhstan so as to offer a barrier to Chinese expansion to the west.

We have reason to believe that this line of reasoning which is contrary to that of the West may have a strong influence on Soviet thinking. Moscow has long made it a rule to accuse its opponents of planning to do what it intends to do itself. This was equally true under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev. In line with this we have Khrushchev's repeated refusals to allow any system of inspection until the entire world has been "liberated," i.e., communized, when a Communist United Nations will cheerfully set up a system of inspection to maintain its own control. In line with this we have Moscow's evident propaganda campaign to attack West Germany for desiring nuclear weapons and for being under Nazi leadership. It implies that West Germany cannot be trusted and, of course, this applies to certain elements in the West who have not forgotten the two World Wars but it does not excuse or explain away Stalin's willingness to embrace Nazi Germany, when he saw in that the possibility of extending Moscow's control over the Baltic Republics, Finland and the non-Polish lands of Eastern Poland. The world must be on its guard against similar pleas for neutrality elsewhere in East Central Europe and Asia.

This fact is often overlooked by American students of disarmament or at least perhaps for certain reasons, they do not care to discuss it as a possibility. For example, this use of disarmament is scarcely mentioned by Arthur I. Waskow, senior staff member of the Peace Research Institute in Washington, in an article published in the *Johns Hopkins Magazine*, Vol. XIII, No. 8, pp. 45-50. "A Strategy for Survival." He begins with the words, "When Isaiah spoke of beating swords into plowshares, he spoke as a prophet, a critic, a moralist out of power. When John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev spoke before the United Nations of 'general and complete disarmament' they spoke as statesmen, politicians and rulers. We have moved from the vision of future disarmament as the moral and ethical hope of man to the demand for present disarmament as a key element in national strategies."

He then discusses various plans to obviate total wars and he summarizes American policy in this field as advocating "counter-force strategy," perhaps some comparatively controlled war, or

"deterrence." To the former he advances the argument that "An America that regards as feasible the death of one of every six and calls this a controlled war is not an America seriously concerned with the protection of individual liberty." Yet he might add that Lenin was convinced that it was better that seventy-five per cent of the people die, if only Communism triumphs, and that Red China seems to be building its strategy on the possibility that the Chinese are so numerous and fertile that they can stand any percentage of human losses and still emerge the victor in a world conflict even if nuclear weapons are used and that this is the possible ground for conflict between Moscow and Peiping.

He recognizes the difficulties in the way of inducing the nations to disarm and then the difficulties of maintaining that disarmament, if achieved, and of convincing other nations that it is being kept. He points out the ignorance that we have of the value of neutrals and neutrality but the experience of the last years with neutral commissions in the cases of Korea, Southeastern Asia, etc., are so obvious that he must seem to be avoiding experience in the sacred name of research.

Finally he discusses how under conditions of disarmament the normal clashes of nations can be handled. The resolution is "world order under law" and this really was the one implied in the organization of the United Nations. But he recognizes that "the consensus necessary to underlie agreed legal codes or political assemblies does not exist. The provisions of present 'international law', for example, were developed mostly by Western experience and owe little to Communist notions of law or to the developing codes and interests of the undeveloped nations." Thus by denying the possibilities of establishing order either by arms or by law, we fall back on a "disarmed disorder" in which nations can intrigue to their heart's content and create as much trouble as possible by interfering politically and economically in other states without resort to violence. This idea comes very close to the idea of "peaceful coexistence" as outlined by Khrushchev but with the sole proviso that its benefits are not extended to the nations that have been forced behind the Iron Curtain who are now presumed to be Communist forever.

In a word the choice is put "between so much emphasis on preserving order in a disarmed world that no nation agrees to disarm, and having so little machinery to keep order that the world cannot be kept disarmed." He then summarizes the various organizations created to study disarmament scientifically and he concludes: "That disarmament is being born as a strategy and as a science does not

mean disarmament as a moral and ethical vision has died out in the western world. The moral and ethical dilemmas faced by scientists have been hotly debated during the last twenty years, but there can be no little doubt that some of the new community of peace researchers are drawn at least partly by Isaiah's vision of that time when 'a nation shall not lift up sword against nation.' "

This is a disturbing article for it assumes that the Western world must to preserve itself consent to the erosion of all of its ideals and principles. It suggests the main weakness of the United States and Great Britain—the desire to reconcile opposing elements as an ideal. The growth of the movements of national independence from the time of the beginning of the modern period was marked by many inconsistencies but it still had the same goal as was set by Cyrus the Younger. It has only been since the rise of Communism that the West has given up its demand for liberty for all as the cornerstone of human aspiration and progress.

That cornerstone must be restored, if freedom is to live and flourish. It must be put on the agenda of all international conferences, especially on disarmament, even at the risk of a total holocaust or it will be forgotten under the new totalitarian tyranny, even if that is pushed by Asian and African dictators who do not realize the full significance of what they are doing. There is little hope now that the present Disarmament Conference will produce a real disarmament which will guarantee human liberties to all men and peoples and will satisfy the aspirations of mankind not only in Western Europe but in the other continents. The Berlin wall is a witness to this with its almost nightly shooting of escapees. The episode of the attempted ban on "war propaganda" is another. Sooner or later the Conference must face the one question which is fundamental—Is the world to be slave or free? That cannot be avoided in the discussion and all questions of stages in disarmament, of methods and of tactics must be subordinated to that. Only President De Gaulle in refusing to get involved in pointless discussion has retained his intellectual balance. The United States must regain its balance and not seek a temporary and untrustworthy disarmament as the price for sacrificing the principles on which this country was founded. If that involves the ending of the Conference, the sooner it occurs the better.

CLASSES IN THE "CLASSLESS" SOVIET SOCIETY

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Marxist ideology holds that all members of society are equal workers in the task of building a "socialist society." The Russians place a great value upon the worth of work as a social activity, a value that has many sources and is perhaps implicit in the essential character of modern industrial society (whether socialist or capitalist). But this emphasis upon the value of work and the value of equality produces an ideological distortion of the actual stratification system of the Soviet controlled society. It is true that official Soviet ideology plays down and even dismisses the existence of any class structure at all. Yet, reports Moore, "In the U.S.S.R. the official categories that are used in all Communist discussions of the subject are workers, peasants, and the 'toiling intelligentsia.' To these terms is occasionally added, in the more technical discussions, a fourth category, the *shuzhashchie*, which roughly approximates our notion of white-collar workers and is usually translated as employees. It is obvious that many nuances of social behavior would escape through so crude a mesh¹."

Whereas classical Marxism defines the class line legalistically, congruent with the property lines, Soviet Marxism faces a real

¹ Moore, Barrington, Jr., *Terror and Progress, U.S.S.R.*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1954, 195. See also: Bauer, Raymond A., Inkeles, Alex & Kluckhohn, Clyde, *How the Soviet System Works*, Vintage Books, New York, 1960, 29-30, 55, 254, 281; Rostow, W. W., *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*, A Mentor Book, New American Library, 1954, 15-18, 20-22, 23, 54, 61, 80; Inkeles, Alex, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950," *American Sociological Review*, XV, 1950, 465-479; Feldmesser, Robert A., "Equality and Inequality under Khrushchev," *Problems of Communism*, IX, 1960, 31-39; Granick, David, *The Red Executive*, Doubleday, Garden City, 1960; Kubat, Daniel, "Soviet Theory of Classes," *Social Forces*, XL, 1, October, 1961, 4-8; Dahrendorf, Ralf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Stanford, 1959, Chapter 1, "Karl Marx's Model of the Class Society," 3-35, III, "Some Recent Theories of Class Conflict in Modern Societies," 72-117, IV, "A Sociological Critique of Marx," 117-156, and bibliography, 319-328; Black, Cyril Ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960; van der Kroef, Justus M., "Class Structure and Communist Theory," *American Behavioral Scientist*, IV, 9, May, 19-23.

difficulty in solving the class problem; Soviet demography tends to omit the class concept altogether; the party ideology requires that the postulates of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" remain unchanged. Since the satellite regimes are always forced to imitate to some degree the ideological as well as the practical goals of the Soviet claims and experiments, we must survey, very briefly, the Soviet experiences in this area of human behavior.

SOVIET CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

When the Dictatorship of the Proletariat was established in November, 1917, the goal of the "Workers' and Peasants' Government" was the foundation of a socialist economic system. The expropriation of the means of production to eliminate the exploiting class was promoted, and the workers, previously grossly exploited, became the dominant members of the new society. All sections of the population, excluding only the former exploiters, belonged to the worker or proletarian group. But in some cases even the former "exploiters" were given proletarian privileges if they demonstrated their acceptance of the Party program. Educated people rather than bench workers provided the leadership for the Party, although the Marxists do not divide society into upper, middle and lower classes, nor do they recognize the intelligentsia as a separate class.

Until 1936, the three officially recognized classes were the workers, peasants, and former exploiters. By 1936 the former capitalistic employers had been completely replaced by the state, and hence the exploiter class had disappeared. Since the peasants worked on collective farms where all property (excluding land) belongs to the collective, while all other workers, including state farm workers, were employed in state-owned enterprises, Stalin declared in 1936 that there were still two classes, the working class and the peasant class. Stalin contended that Soviet society was proceeding toward a classless society, since the antagonistic or capitalistic class had been eliminated, and the remaining classes, the workers and the peasants, were "friendly classes." Should collective farms be transformed into state farms, then in the sense that almost the entire population would be state employees, perhaps it could be claimed that a classless society had been founded.

Stalin considered the intelligentsia, although members of the working class, to be a special group or "stratum." The intelligentsia was informed as early as 1917 that it had been exploited by the capitalists, that it had been demeaned by working for unscrupulous businessmen, and that greater dignity was associated with working

for the state, for the entire society, and therefore for one's own benefit. But such appeals were not eminently successful. Many intellectuals in Soviet Russia, including the refugees, were skeptical about the Soviet experiment, and hesitated or passively resisted it; many had to be removed from important positions because of active opposition. But a minority did give invaluable support to the new regime, since the supporting minority provided almost all of the Party leaders.

The stabilization of the regime and the introduction of the planned economy caused many of the old intellectuals to revise their opinion, especially since most had no other choice. Concurrently, a new Soviet intelligentsia was being developed; this group, mostly derived from the worker and peasant classes, has seldom been suspected by the Soviet leaders, and this group was granted social equality with the two "friendly classes."

Article I in Chapter I of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. states: "The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialistic state of workers and peasants." How does this group fit into Marxist theory, then? Traditional Marxism demands complete economic equality, since under capitalism economic inequality is the cause of class antagonism, and maintains that equality and democracy could be introduced only after a proletarian revolution which removes the economically dominant class. But equality could not be achieved immediately after the overthrow of the bourgeois regime. Only under communism, the final stage of socialism, could complete equality, based on the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need," be established. Marx did not specify the approximate length of the transitory socialist period necessary prior to the establishment of the final stage of communism; during the transitory period, Marxism did not call for equality of income.

The difficulties of the Marxist doctrine with reference to equality became glaringly apparent immediately following the 1917 revolution. In 1917 Lenin, in his *State and Revolution*, claimed, "the whole society will have become a single office and a single factory with equality of labor and equality of pay." But the post-revolutionary period soon showed that much time would intervene before equalitarianism of that type could be realized. Thus Lenin and his group initially made "tactical retreats" with reference to equality. During the wartime period, equal pay for all, excluding only technical experts, was introduced; but this lasted only until the New Economic Policy in 1921. Some rewards had to be given immediately to the starving

² Lenin, V. I., *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1947, Vol. II, p. 210.

population fighting against the White Armies and "foreign intervention"; the Soviet leadership had little to offer in exchange for the great sacrifices demanded of the population. Everything that had been "Czarist" was changed; for instance, all former ranks, titles and distinctions were abolished; ministers were renamed "Peoples' Commissars," and military ranks were replaced by the title "comrade-commander." The most tangible reward was the abolition of differential incomes, which was, however, counter-balanced by a differential system of food rationing, with soldiers, factory workers, children, "responsible workers" and certain others being given additional rations. At the end of the Civil War, piece-work wages and bonuses were introduced, followed by even larger differences between the lowest and highest incomes in the industrialization after the NEP period; higher salaries were paid to skilled workers, technical experts and factory managers, a practice which is still in effect. In addition, such people and others—including engineers, inventors, composers and artists—receive privileged housing.

Thus, today, differential incomes and prestige act as effective incentives. Prestige is promoted by publishing the names of outstanding workers, medals are often connected with economic privileges, titles such as "Hero of Socialist Labor" are awarded. In 1935, the party leaders officially professionalized the Soviet officer corps, referring to the military profession as a lifetime and honored "calling"; from 1928 to 1939 educational requirements for officers were markedly raised; pay rates and other material benefits, relatively good at the start of this period, became much better, making the military profession one of the best paid. Incentives for attending in-service military schools were increased; criteria and procedures governing promotions were standardized, with provision for both seniority and merit promotions. In all these steps, efforts were made to enhance and augment the prestige, authority, and well-being of the military personnel.

The great expansion in the size of the Soviet military establishment during this period—a ten-fold increase between 1934 and 1941—opened up a vast career opportunity for energetic and talented youth. The military purge of 1937-1938—an open war against the middle-aged and older men who had fought in the revolution and then created the Red Army—opened up the higher ranks to younger Soviet military products. From these ranks came the replacements for the 90% of the Generals who were purged; for the 80% of the Colonels; and for 50% of the officer corps as a whole.³

³ Gleicher, David B., "Marshals, Commissars, and Other Ranks," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 22, 1958.

After World War I, the Russians retained in service the bulk of their combat veterans, choosing from among them those thought to be the best professional military prospects and offering them many career opportunities and incentives. Also the Communist leaders have exploited the benefits of competition to the full in their military administration, as elsewhere.

Political considerations are not very important in the passage from lieutenant to colonel. In the first place, 90% of the Soviet officer corps belong to the Party or Comsomol (Young Communist) organizations; with almost everyone on the "in," no special premiums are attached to Communist Party membership per se. In the second place, Stalin killed the opportunity for effective political differentiation among military (and other) personnel when he decreed any sign of political nonconformity a grave offense. Third, despite the official stress on political criteria in military honors and promotion, the party leaders have been primarily concerned with the military ability of the rank and file officer—given, of course, his political conformity. Apparently, at least on the surface, it is military rather than political criteria which dominate the careers of Soviet military men, although promotion to general rank is somewhat different; here political and military connections become supreme, for there are no standardized promotion procedures or criteria. (But in this regard there is nothing particularly unique about Soviet practice.)

The result is that Soviet military officers are generally serious and committed privileged professionals. Furthermore, from 1942 on, Soviet military professionals have been winning increasing freedom from political interference in military operations, developing a down-the-line division of labor between the political workers who conduct political educational work and the military professionals who concentrate on military affairs.

The over-all picture of the Soviet social structure thus shows that Soviet society is one of the most competitive societies in the world. Differential incomes and prestige act as effective incentives. According to Articles 122 and 123 of the Constitution, no one is to be discriminated against because of nationality, race, or sex. But there are discriminations against nationalities and races (including periodic explosions of anti-Semitism⁴. In the field of economics, it is

⁴ See, for instance, A Correspondent, "Growth of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe," *The Times* (London), December 22, 1951; Simmons, Ernest J., Ed., *Through the Class of Soviet Literature: Views of Russian Society*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1954; Choseed, Bernard J., "Jews in Soviet Literature," 110-158; Goldberg, B. Z., *The Jewish Problem in the Soviet Union: Analysis and Solution*, Crown, New York, 1961; Conquest, R., *Soviet Deportation of Nationalists*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1960; etc.

true, little prevents a competent individual from achieving a position of responsibility, *if he is politically reliable*.

Today the term "workers" in Soviet Russia is defined very broadly. Soviet publications refer not only to factory workers, but also to others, such as agricultural, musical, medical, scientific, and transportation workers; broadly, workers are recognized as the main class and are fully represented in all political institutions; in actuality, however, high government positions are held by "educated workers" only. Involved in the case of manual work is an important element: a worker able to increase production norms is called a shock worker (*udarnik*) and is accorded great prestige; his wages are greatly increased and he is granted better living accommodations, food, consumer goods, and preferential treatment in preventive medicine. His work is considered to equal outstanding work in science, art or medicine. In the case of the peasantry, this group was placed, prior to 1936, under the leadership or guidance of workers who were considered to be more advanced politically. Peasants were discriminated against with respect to voting power, admission to the Party, and social prestige. Currently, the collective farm workers, as the peasants are now called, have the same political rights, social status, and opportunities for distinction, study and promotion as do the factory workers; many have become agricultural specialists, "Heroes of Socialist Labor" and shock workers. The prestige associated with manual work in agriculture nearly equals that in industry.

Soviet professional people, almost all of whom work for the state, a *kolkhoz*, a trade union or some other socialist agency, are most adequately described as professional workers. While the intelligentsia of the Czarist era had been greatly mistrusted by the Soviet leaders, with the rise of a new intelligentsia, the mistrust has subsided. The competitive Soviet society is willing to pay for the skill and training of the professional worker.

Above the whole social structure in the U.S.S.R. is the elite, composed of the Soviet leaders; ranking right below them is the professional or intellectual elite, who are also the leaders of the Party. The individuals here must be proficient in their field, diligent party workers, thoroughly trained in Marxism-Leninism, and active in Party work; they must select carefully their friends within the Party. Once successful, their tenure as members of the political elite is extremely uncertain and shaky, and many soon are classified as "opportunists" or "enemies of the Party."

The professional elite is composed of individuals of extreme competence, regardless of field—successful artists, scientists, generals, shock workers, industrial managers and engineers. Because of

the divergences of interest, this group does not constitute a cohesive group. In general, the Party promotes and supports the professional elite, and, in turn, finds among this elite group its strongest supporters. But their position is also uncertain, especially in the field of ideological reasoning or in the field of the "arts." But executions are here less frequent; confession and self-criticism are usually sufficient remedies or atonements.

In general, one observer claims, "the quality of the professional elite is such that its members would get the same or higher rewards in any other country."⁵

At the same time it must be noted that the government discourages the rise of any special or privileged "class," antagonistic to any development of class consciousness or ingroup membership (apart, of course, from membership in the Party). The handling of the Army is, for instance, a good example. As a whole group, this profession pays highly. But among the officers are the so-called political generals, attached not to an "officers' class," but rather to the Party; the professional officers are themselves Party members and their allegiance is to the Party rather than to any military "class" of their own. No professional organizations are allowed to exist among the army which is a melting pot of all types of professional, religious and national groups.

⁵ Hulicka, Karel, "Social Change in Soviet Society," *The Social Studies*, LII, 5, October, 1961, 173-181.

FROM MUSCOVY TO RUSSIA

(THE BATTLE OF POLTAVA, 1709)

By NICHOLAS ANDRUSIAK

The Battle of Poltava of 1709, in which the Swedes were completely routed by the Muscovites, decided the political course of North and Eastern Europe. Muscovy, under its new name of Russia, became the prime North and Eastern European power, while Sweden lost its supremacy in the Baltic. Hence the Battle of Poltava was ranked by English historian Sir Edward Shepherd Creasy¹ as one of his *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*.² Again, English historian and military specialist, General John Frederick Charles Fuller³ discusses the Battle of Poltava in his *The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History*.⁴

Sir Creasy inserts a motto about "Dread Poltava's Day" from Byron's *Mazeppa* and recalls the prophecy of Napoleon I at St. Helena that all Europe would soon be either Cossack or republican. The fulfilment of the latter alternative appeared most probable in 1848, but the democratic movements were sternly repressed in 1849. Creasy has underlined the conspicuous role of Russia in the repressions of the revolutionary movements around the middle of the XIXth century, especially the crushing of the Hungarian revolt against the Austrian emperor by the Russian army. Afterwards he stated that Russia became a power thanks to its victory over the Swedes at Poltava.

However, Creasy did not look far into the sources dealing with the Swedish-Muscovite war in 1700-1709; he was satisfied with the epitomizing of the operations of Charles XII by Napoleon I. Moreover, his knowledge of the former history of Muscovy can be com-

¹ Born in 1812; from 1840 professor of Ancient and Modern History in University College, London, later Fellow in King's College, Cambridge; died in 1878.

² This work has been published in many editions since 1851.

³ Born in 1878, participant in the South African War in 1899-1902, as well as the First World War in 1914-18; he planned the attack at Cambrai in 1917.

⁴ Vol. II, London 1955, pp. 156-186.

pared to that of one of the West European politicians of the XVIth and XVIIth centuries about the contemporary state of Muscovy.⁵ But his statement on Muscovite growth since Poltava and its danger for the Western world remains valid indeed.

General Fuller prefaces his account of the Battle of Poltava with a sketch, "The Rise of the Muscovite Empire."⁶ To it some corrections are in order. Namely: Moscow, founded by the Suzdalian Prince Yuriy Dolgoruky in 1147, was not the center of the Suzdalian state at first. The capital then was Suzdal, and after his reign and until the beginning of the XIVth century, it was Vladimir on the Klazma River. The name of the state remained "Suzdalia."

Yuri's son, Andrey Bogolubsky, in 1169 had plundered and ravaged the "Mother of the Rus' Cities," Kiev. This act did not cause any gravitation on the part of the separate princes of the House of Rurik to Suzdal-Moscow. On the contrary, they hated the rising Slavonic-Finnish half-breeds. They were more attracted by the principalities of Galicia and Volhynia, which were joined together as one state at the end of the XIIth century by Prince Roman Mstyslavych, who took the title, "King of Rus'," previously belonging to the rulers of Kiev. Roman and his son Danylo were regarded as the kings of Rus' by Western powers,⁷ while the contemporary princes of Suzdalia were called only Suzdalian ones.⁸

After the extinction of the Galician-Volhynian branch of the House of Rurik, the Rus' princes and nobility preferred to swear allegiance to the Lithuanian grand dukes rather than to the Muscovite ones. But the Lithuanian grand dukes were capable of defending the Rus' countries only in the basins of the Dnieper and Western Dvina Rivers; they were not powerful enough to help the two republics of Novgorod and Pskov as well as the principalities in the basin of the Oka River in their wars against the Muscovite Czars at the end of the XVth and the beginning of the XVIth centuries. They were conquered by the Muscovites, and their population was displaced mostly into the midland part of Muscovy, with Muscovites then being resettled in those boundary territories.

The Muscovite Czar Ivan III (the Great—1462-1505) called himself the heir of the Byzantine emperors, but he could not call

⁵ *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, p. 326; *The Decisive Battles of the World*, p. 282.

⁶ Pp. 156-60.

⁷ P. A. G. Welykyj, OSBM: *Documenta Pontificorum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia*, Vol. I, Roma 1953, pp. 27-51; M. Andrusiak: "Kings of Kiev and Galicia," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, London, June 1955, Vol. XXXIII, No. 81, pp. 347-8

⁸ Welykyj, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

himself the heir of the Rus' kings of Kiev. In 1605-12 the Poles, supported by the Ukrainian Kozaks, occupied Moscow, and afterwards (1618-1634) they dictated the peace terms demanding that the title of the Muscovite Czars should not mention "all Russia," since this was carried in the titles of the metropolitans of Kiev and Moscow.

This humiliation of Muscovy by Poland did not last. The *hetman* of the Ukrainian Kozaks, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, revolted against the Polish king in 1648 and in 1654 swore fealty to the Muscovite Czar, Alexis Romanov. Soon afterwards this *hetman* and the Kozak nobility realized their mistake, and in allying themselves with Swedish King Charles X Gustavus they sought to re-establish their independence of Moscow and to deliver the Ukrainian and Byelorussian countries from Poland. But through promises the Polish nobility managed to influence the Swedish king and the Muscovite czar into electing for the Polish kings. Afterwards the Poles succeeded in influencing the three Ukrainian *hetmans* who followed Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and consequently Ukraine was divided between Poland and Muscovy by the treaty of Andrusiv in 1667. The following Ukrainian *hetmans* tended to be independent of the Muscovite czars and the Polish kings. This tendency towards independence impressed *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa during the Northern War, and made him hope for the moment Muscovy would be conquered by Sweden.

In his short sketch General Fuller did not cover all the causes of the defeat at Poltava of Charles XII, "one of the most remarkable soldiers in history."⁹ This question has been taken up by the German biographer of Charles XII, Otto Haintz.¹⁰ Haintz discusses the efforts of French King Louis XIV to reconcile Charles XII with August II. They failed because the Swedish King wanted to revenge himself upon the Saxonian and Polish King for his incursion into the Swedish province of Livonia. Charles XII fancied it would be easy for him to relieve August II of the Polish crown and to persuade the Polish noblemen to elect a king from among themselves. He thereby ignored the last warning of the dying Swedish chancellor, Count Bengt Oxenstjerna, who advised his king to make peace with Saxony-Poland and concentrate on the defense of the Baltic provinces from Muscovite invasion.¹¹

⁹ Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

¹⁰ O. Haintz: *Koenig Karl XII von Schweden*, I. Bd., 2-e Auflage, Berlin 1958, XII+307 pp.+8 tables.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-54.

Also there was the experience from history of the invasion of Swedish King Charles X Gustavus, whom the Polish noblemen at first acknowledged as their king (August 18, 1655), but subsequently renounced. This proved to be the cause of his later misfortunes in war. Charles XII repeated the mistake of Charles X Gustavus, although he did not intend to become the Polish king himself. When he brought about the election of Polish nobleman Stanislaw Leszczynski to kingship on July 2, 1704, the Swedish army had to defend this election, as well as the coronation of Leszczynski on September 24, 1705, from the assaults of August's partisans. The peace and alliance between Sweden and the Poland of Leszczynski on November 18, 1705, directed against Saxony and Muscovy, was not successful for Charles XII.

While King Charles stayed with his army in Poland, the Muscovites occupied the Swedish Baltic provinces of Ingermanland, Estonia, and Livonia. August's partisans proved unmanageable: they declared themselves as partisans of Leszczynski when the Swedish soldiers threatened them with devastation of their properties, but plumped for August II when his or the Muscovite troops were near.¹²

The accord between Charles XII and August II on September 14, 1706, in Altranstadt, whereby the Saxonian king gave up all his pretensions to the Polish crown, did not change the situation. With the battle on October 19, 1706, upon the Prosna River near Kalisz, where the Swedish troops of Mardefeld were defeated by Menshikov's Muscovite troops, the Polish partisans of August II joined the Muscovite troops. Then all Poland fell into the hands of the Muscovites, while Charles XII stayed in Saxony (August 1706—August 1707).¹³

Haintz¹⁴ does not agree with the opinion of Swedish historian Ernst Carlson that Charles lost one year in Saxony for defeating the Muscovites. He underlines that Charles' army had a great opportunity to rest and to drill in Saxony. However, Haintz¹⁵ overrates the Swedish ability in combat including the Battle of Poltava. In his opinion, "the strategic genius, the tactical preponderance, the higher moral strength in the Battle of Poltava were fully on

¹² E. V. Tarie: *Severnaia voina*, Moscow, pp. 73-89; V. E. Shutoi: *Borba narodnykh mass protiv nashestviia armii Karla XII*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 111-123; Haintz, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-76.

¹³ Tarie, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-20; 125-140; Shutoi: *op. cit.*, pp. 204-6; Haintz, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-58, 159.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 158-61, 173-9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-292.

the Swedish side. The uncountable casualties and the stronger hand of fate, directing all, finally wrested the deciding victory from the Swedish army. . ."

Haintz does not hold that the Swedish army never had any success east of the Dnieper River. As the Muscovites withdrew before the Swedes, they burnt all fields. Therefore Charles XII decided, on September 25, 1708, to turn toward Ukraine.¹⁶

The then commanding *hetman* of the Ukrainian Kozaks, Ivan Mazepa, 76 years old, decided that the time had come to strike for the deliverance of his country and people from the Czarist yoke. He secretly took the side of Charles XII through the mediation of Stanislaw Leszczynski. He then waited for the decisive battle between the Swedes and the Muscovites, although in his secret agreement with Charles XII and Stanislaw Leszczynski he had promised to support them with his Kozaks, ammunition and food, when they would engage the Muscovites near the borders of Ukraine.¹⁷

Mazepa acted in the belief that Charles XII would unfailingly execute his plan of march against Moscow. Hence he was nonplussed when he was apprised of Charles' march toward Ukraine. He cried out to his secretary, Philip Orlyk: "The devil carries him here! He will thwart all my plans and the Muscovite troops pursuing him will enter Ukraine for its ruin and perdition."¹⁸

Mazepa became fearful that the Czar and his retinue might have learned of his clandestine relations with Charles XII and Leszczynski. On November 4, 1708, therefore, Mazepa left his capital, Baturyn, ordering Colonel Dmytro Chechel and his command of 10,000 Kozaks to defend it against the Muscovite troops. He himself, along with seven general officers, seven colonels and Kozaks whose number is variously estimated from 3 to 12 thousand, rode to seek Charles XII.¹⁹

The very next day Mazepa met with the Swedish vanguard near the village of Orlivka.²⁰ Had Mazepa then taken the Swedish troops in a forced march back to his capital, he would have been able to outrace the Muscovites to Baturyn before November 11. Instead, Mazepa proceeded to the main military headquarters of Charles XII

¹⁶ Tarle, *op. cit.*, pp. 147, 149, 159-93, 196-218, 227-31, 238-41, 250-274, 276-86, 289-308, 310-21; Shutoi, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-51.

¹⁷ N. Andrusiak: *Die Beziehungen Mazepas zu Stan. Leszczynski und Karl XII*, *Mitteilungen der Schewtschenko-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften in Lemberg*, 1933, Vol. CLII, p. 47.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-4.

¹⁹ N. Andrusiak: *Istoria Kozachchyny*, Munich 1946, pp. 146-47.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

in Horny, where on November 8-9 he held discussions with the King, Chancellor Count Piper and commander-in-chief General Rehn-sköld, advising them to attack the Muscovite troops in Novgorod-Siversky, in the hope that the Swedish troops would defeat the Muscovites in Novgorod-Siversky and then go on to Muscovy. General Lewenhaupt advanced toward Novgorod-Seversky, but decided that the forces of the enemy outweighed his own. Whereupon he turned toward Baturyn.²¹

Muscovite General Menshikov outran Lewenhaupt. On November 13 Menshikov attacked and destroyed Baturyn, aided by the high treason of Lieut. Colonel Nis, commandant of the Pryluky regiment.

The Swedish troops located their winter quarters at first in the region of Romny; later Hadiach. They were not able to occupy Poltava, although Colonel Levenets awaited them. The Muscovites seized the opportunity to occupy Poltava, and arrested Col. Levenets.

After the failure of the plan to march on Moscow, Charles and Mazepa decided to occupy the center of the southern *hetman's* country, Poltava, recently fortified by the Muscovites. Their hope for helping forces from the Poland of King Stanislaw and General Krassow were not realized.²²

Fate now ceased to smile on Mazepa altogether. In the spring of 1704 he had arrested his colleague, the Colonel of Fastiv, Semen Paliy, and sent him to Moscow.

During the ensuing fight of Mazepa against the Czar, Paliy was freed by the Muscovite government and turned up at the Czar's side at the Battle of Poltava. Later, however, he corresponded with Turkish dignitaries seeking their support against the Muscovite and Polish policy in Ukraine.²³

Tarle²⁴ and Haintz²⁵ unjustly suspect Mazepa of proposing to the Czar to deliver up Charles XII in return for an amnesty for himself. We have analyzed the contradictory evidence in this matter collected by Tarle²⁶ and Shutoi.²⁷

Colonel Danylo Apostol of Myrhorod deserted Mazepa and in fear of being tortured contrived this proposition as emanating from his *hetman* to the Czar. The reason appears that he thought

²¹ *Ibid.*; Tarle, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

²² Tarle, *op. cit.*, p. 276; Haintz, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-6.

²³ Andrusiak, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 170.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 287-9.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 306.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 287-9, 327.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 289-92, 356-8.

he would be freed once the Czar got Mazepa in his grasp. Apostol did not produce any letter from Mazepa, delivering his information only verbally. He was detained in Lebedyn, where the Muscovites tortured the partisans of Mazepa. His friend, Colonel Shydlovsky of Kharkiv, who enjoyed some influence among the Muscovite dignitaries, asked for his release from prison. Subsequently, another deserter from Mazepa's forces, Colonel Hnat Galagan, appeared and confirmed Apostol's message. Galagan, however, contradicted himself. He also said that he had sworn to Mazepa that he was leaving only to seek feed for his regiments' horses.

It is unbelievable that Mazepa, who had been afraid of being apprehended by the Muscovites even before joining with Charles XII, should have hoped for an amnesty from the Czar. The Czar already had gone so far as to have ordered the torture of all captured partisans of Mazepa. But thanks to their machinations Apostol and Galagan were pardoned and they eagerly obliged the Muscovites: Apostol tried to persuade the Zaporozhians to take the Muscovite side. Galagan helped Muscovite Colonel Yakovlev to destroy the Zaporozhian *Sich*, after the *Sich Koshovy* (commander-in-chief) Constantine Hordienko had joined forces with Charles XII and Mazepa.²⁸

The enlistment of the Zaporozhians was for Charles and Mazepa their last success (April 6, 1709). They neglected, however, to use the Zaporozhian territory as a connection with the Crimea. On the contrary, they used the Zaporozhians for the siege of Poltava and allowed the Muscovites to sail in May, 1709 along the Dnieper River toward the *Sich*.²⁹ The Swedish army, as well as Mazepa's Kozaks and the Zaporozhians, should have withdrawn from the siege of Poltava and defended access to the Zaporozhian country in the region of Perevolochna. There they could have awaited the coming of the Tatars. But Charles XII and Mazepa were head-strong doctrinaires in strategy and policy.

The words of Fuller³⁰ can then be cited as the basic truth:

The Battle of Poltava was more than the usual tussle between two neighboring people, for it was a trial of strength between two civilizations, that of Europe and of Asia, and because this was so, though little noticed at the time, the Muscovite victory on the Vorskla was destined to be one of the most portentous events in the modern history of the Western world. By wresting the hegemony of the north from Sweden, by putting an end to Ukrainian independence and by ruining the cause of Stanislaus in Poland,

²⁸ Tarle, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-45; Shutoi, *op. cit.*, pp. 358, 363, 378, 384-97.

²⁹ Tarle, *op. cit.*, pp. 344-5; Haintz, *op. cit.*, p. 260; Alexander Ohloblyn: *Hetman Ivan Mazepa and His Era*, New York - Paris - Toronto 1960, pp. 350-52.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 184-5.

Muscovy, an essentially Asiatic power, gained a foothold on the counterscarp of eastern Europe, . . . the importance of Poltava lay more in what it established than in what it overthrew. . . . In shadowy form Poltava was Marathon in reverse.

Fuller also wrote that Czar "Peter married this (Muscovite) brutality to European efficiency, and out of their union emerged Russia, not only as an empire, but also as a pseudo-Western power, and the official birthday was October 22, 1721. On that day, after a solemn thanksgiving service in the Trinity Cathedral in St. Petersburg in celebration of the Peace of Nystadt, Peter was proclaimed —Emperor of all Russia. Such was the harvest which followed Poltava."³¹

After the Battle of Poltava Muscovy took the name of Russia in the form *Rossiya*. In *Pacta et Constitutiones legum libertatumque Exercitus Zaporoviensis*, enacted by the exile government of Mazepa's partisans in Bendery, on April 7, 1710, the Ukrainians were yet called *gens Rossiaca*.³² Czar Peter I, oppressor of the Ukrainians, deprived them of this name held by the true successors of Kievan Rus' and appropriated it for Muscovy. In the anonymous *History of Rus'* of the XVIIIth century, the author cited Mazepa's speech to the Kozaks after crossing the Desna River in November of 1708, and inserted these words: "It is well known that we first had what the Muscovites now have: government and seniority, while the very name *Rus'* has passed from us to them. . . ."³³

Peter I took the name "Russia" for his state in order to assimilate nationally the Ukrainians, at this time called *gens Rossiaca* —*Rusyny* in the meaning of citizens of the *Rus'* country. The Muscovites called themselves *Russkiye*, the adjectival form of *Rus'* and meaning people subjected by the *Rus'* princes. Authoritative evidence that the Moscow-Suzdal population did not consider itself a *Rus'* people in the twelfth century is furnished by the *Chronicle of Suzdal*. According to the *Chronicle*, the Suzdalians of Rostov complained of their princes that they had filled state position with "*Rus'* squires."³⁴

But this plan of assimilation has yet to succeed. The fight of the former *gens Rossiaca*, now known as the Ukrainians, against the Muscovites, now the Soviet Russians, still continues.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

³² Ohloblyn, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

³³ Dmytro Doroshenko: *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, New York 1957, p. 87.

³⁴ N. Andrusiak: "Genesis and Development of East Slavic Nations," *East European Problems*, New York, Autumn 1956, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 9.

BOOK REVIEWS

SOVIET SOCIETY. A Book of Readings edited by Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961. \$10.50.

In this book two American sociologists with a long interest in Soviet affairs, Professors Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger of the Russian Research Center of Harvard, have given us the best collection of interpretative articles on the Soviet Union, to which a few Soviet documents have been added. Seventy-three selections are included, making the book a truly outstanding reader, indispensable to any students who do not have access to the numerous specialized periodicals dealing with Soviet matters.

The reviewer's first impression concerns the technical excellence of the work. The inside covers contain two clear maps of the European part of the U.S.S.R. and of the Soviet Union as a whole. A welcome feature of the second map is a list of all Union Republics with population figures from the 1959 census. The material is arranged in six big chapters, each with a brief introduction and selected bibliography. Each selection in turn has been prefaced by short editorial remarks. At the end of the book there are biographical notes on contributors, a useful glossary of Russian words, and an index. The editors and the publisher deserve high praise for not skimping on the standard scholarly apparatus. One is pleasantly surprised to see the original footnotes reproduced (in so many readers they are unceremoniously suppressed) and, moreover, to find them at the foot of the pages, where they properly belong (an increasingly rare occurrence in American books). Each selection is conspicuously dated so as to alert even the cursory reader who may ignore the full source reference in fine print. The index is a great help to the specialist who wants to look something up in a hurry. Efforts have not been spared to aid the advanced student to use the reader as a starting point for research, while a beginner will appreciate the clear and attractive layout of the material.

The objective of the editors has been, above all, "to convey an impression of the Soviet Union as a complete society, a social system, and not merely a modern political state, or a planned economy, or a totalitarian dictatorship" (p. vi). Their second goal was to stress the development of Soviet policy. Lastly, they aimed "to convey a vivid sense of the concrete" experiences of Soviet citizens in all walks of life (p. vii). In my opinion, they have succeeded fully.

The scope of their selections is truly comprehensive and the choice of articles is, on the whole, very felicitous. The material is grouped around six major themes: Backgrounds, Ideology and Power, Economic Life, The Mind and the Spirit, Everyday Living, and A Forward Look. The reviewer particularly liked the inclusion of several authentic Soviet documents (Khrushchev's "anti-Stalin" speech, excerpts from Soviet newspapers, etc.). They lend to the collection a deservedly "true ring," blending surprisingly well with the interpretative articles by Western scholars.

One of the freshest and most revealing articles is "Recreation and Social Life at Moscow University," by Rex V. Brown. It is based on diaries that were

kept by British exchange students in Moscow. Penetrating as usual are the economic analyses by Alec Nove.

Readers of this journal will be particularly interested in the treatment of the nationalities problem. It is dealt with in two good selections: the intensive case study on "Assimilation and the Muslims" by Richard Pipes, reprinted from the *Middle East Journal* (1955) and Hugh Seton-Watson's analytical survey article "The Regime's Nationality Policy" from the *Russian Review* of 1956. Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson, the eminent British historian with a gift for the comparative sociological approach and the courage to speak clearly and plainly on very controversial matters, has provided us with one of the most stimulating pieces in the book. He points out that all Soviet protestations to the contrary Russification does exist, especially in the Central Asian republics, but also in Ukraine (systematic falsification of Ukrainian history, an influence of the Russian resident element out of proportion to its numbers). But in his judgment, it is not Russification that is the driving force, the motive of Soviet nationality policy, but "a special distrust . . . for any association derived from some principle that is independent of, and older than, the regime" (p. 586). In his opinion, the Russians, being "the most numerous, culturally and economically the most advanced" people of the U.S.S.R., are consciously used by the regime as tools for its consolidation of totalitarian power; they are the victims of Bolshevik tyranny as well as the other nations of the Soviet Union (pp. 585, 587). This may be so, but as the author implies in the phrase "Russians, as Russians, are less likely to be disloyal to the regime" (p. 585), they tend to be compensated for their services to the regime more than the non-Russian peoples, at the expense of those peoples. That this is not a desirable phenomenon for the long-range development of a democratic Russian state no objective student of Russian history can deny.

Prof. Seton-Watson brilliantly describes the failure of historic empires (Austria-Hungary, Great Britain and France) to win the allegiance of the new colonial intelligentsia whom they had educated themselves, predicts that the Soviet Union will similarly fail in obtaining the support of the new non-Russian elite, except by force. In the concluding section of the article Prof. Watson issues an unvarnished and very timely warning to some Western statesmen.

" . . . Strong arguments can be found in favor of preserving a single great state, reorganized on a genuinely federal principle. But there is no iron law of history that states must be big.

"The Nazis loved to declaim about the merits of a "*Grossraum*," within which the Germans should rule over dozens of smaller client peoples. To adopt their doctrines on behalf of the Russian people would be perilous. Let us put aside all rhetorical phrases and metaphysical dogmas. The economies of the Ukraine and Russia are complementary. They must trade with each other on a massive scale. *But this does not prove that there cannot be an independent Ukrainian State.* (Italics added. — Y.B.) National independence does not need to bring with it tariff barriers and economic boycotts.

" . . . Neither the United States, which has granted independence to the twenty million people of the Philippines, nor Britain, which has granted independence to the four hundred and fifty million of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon, can undertake to support a free Russia of the future in preventing Ukrainians or Uzbeks or Georgians or Letts from seeking their own independence. The future of the nationalities of the Soviet Union must depend on their own wishes, freely expressed in a clear manner" (pp. 587-588).

In summary, the collection by Inkeles and Geiger is an outstanding work. The reviewer has only one small reservation about the book: its price. All excellence has, of course, to be paid for; but the reviewer still nostalgically thinks back to the times when textbooks and readers in social sciences did not break the \$10 barrier. Given the costs of book publishing in the United States, this attractive volume may be fully worth the sum that is asked for it. But it is a prohibitive amount should the publishers consider exporting the book to the so-called non-committed nations (this is a work which should be given the widest possible circulation this side of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains). The price is even high for American college students. Would not the publisher consider a less expensive edition in the future?

Meanwhile, public and university libraries in the country ought to help out. For this is a truly comprehensive collection of solid, searching and often very lively articles on the U.S.S.R. A demanding but not a discouraging book, Inkeles' and Geiger's meticulously edited reader is highly recommended to all serious students of the Soviet type of totalitarian society.

University of Delaware

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961. Edited by Franklin Mark Osanka. Introduced by Samuel P. Huntington. The Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962. P. 750, \$7.50.

This is the first comprehensive manual on guerrilla warfare, dealing with its uses and purposes in modern warfare. The book presents a solid symposium of dissertations of some thirty-seven noted authors and contributors, from Lenin of Communist Russia to "Ché" Guevara of Castro's Cuba. There is also an article by Walt W. Rostow, the controversial adviser to President Kennedy, who outlines U.S. views on Communism and its over-all objective to conquer the entire world.

This timely and important work shows how a tiny Communist minority can operate effectively in a given society in order to subvert it and subordinate it to the master plan of Communism. It demonstrates that the West has begun to profit from the communist tactics of guerrilla warfare, that slowly but surely this type of warfare is being understood in the West and that many successful counter-guerrilla measures have been devised and put into effect in many countries, especially in the United States.

The study under review comprises nine compact parts. Part I deals with the history of guerrilla activity in modern times, while Parts II through VII provide detailed accounts of guerrilla warfare as a facet of Communist strategy in several geographical areas, such as the U.S.S.R., China, the Philippines, Malaya, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Greece. Part VIII offers an analysis of the "nationalist" guerrilla movements in Cuba and Algeria, and Part IX explores counter-guerrilla tactics and measures and suggests some principles to guide the policy of the free world toward the Communist threat on a global scale.

Guerrilla warfare has assumed a special and new importance in American military policy since the last war. We now often hear such new terms as "paramilitary operations," "unconventional war," "irregular warfare," "internal war," "guerrilla warfare," "underground resistance movements," and so forth. These terms designate new strategical concepts which are now being applied in all-out military planning by both the Communist bloc and the free world. As one of

the authors of *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* states, "Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places." Thus guerrilla warfare is the weapon of the weaker side. This type of weapon is decisive only where the anti-guerrilla side does not appreciate fully its value and importance.

The vast array of prominent military writers who have contributed to this book gives the volume an impressive weight and authority. Among them are a great number of United States Army, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force guerrilla warfare specialists, as well as a number of foreign military experts and writers. Among the latter are such well-known names as Field Marshal Alexander Papagos of Greece, Lt. Col. Tomas C. Tirona of the Philippines, Lt. Col. Marc E. Geneste of the French Army, V. I. Lenin, Stefan T. Possony, Maj. Anthony Crockett of the British Royal Marines, "Ché" Guevara of Cuba, James Burham, Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, and Walt W. Rostow of our State Department's Policy Planning Council.

The book of Prof. Osanka also contains an excellent article on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army by Enrique Martinez Codo entitled "Guerrilla Warfare in the Ukraine," which originally appeared in the November 1960 issue of *Military Review*, and which was subsequently reprinted in the Summer 1961 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

A research bibliography contains more than 600 references, among them such books on Ukraine as *Ukrainian Nationalism* — J. A. Armstrong; *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* — W. H. Chamberlin; *Our Partisan Course* — S. A. Kovpak; *Ukrainian Communism and the Soviet Russian Policy toward the Ukraine* — J. Lawrynenko; *Twentieth Century Ukraine* — C. A. Manning; *Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times* — O. Martovych; *Ukrainian Resistance* — Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, and *Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight for Freedom* — United Committee of the Ukrainian American Organizations. Also referred to are a number of articles pertaining to guerrilla warfare operations in the Soviet Union written by Soviet and non-Soviet authors.

The book is a long-overdue contribution to an understanding of an extremely important phase of modern war operations. It is also a well-balanced presentation of new tactics and strategy on which the United States is putting a great deal of weight in planning its military strategy. Not so long ago, especially after our disaster in Cuba, President Kennedy appointed General Maxwell Taylor as his chief military adviser with the purpose of revising U.S. guerrilla warfare techniques. (Gen. Taylor has been recently appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by President Kennedy).

There is no doubt that in the future the United States will find itself forced to act militarily without bringing its overwhelming military machine into overt action. Such is the case presently in South Vietnam. Guerrilla warfare can enable us to avoid the holocaust of a thermonuclear war while safeguarding our interests and insuring our survival.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

SIX CRISES. By Richard M. Nixon. Doubleday & Company, Garden City, New York, 1962, pp. 460, \$5.95.

Richard Nixon, our former Vice-President, didn't know what hit him when he arrived in Moscow for the American Cultural Exhibition in July, 1959. As his book attests, he still doesn't understand what struck him.

The six crises are turning points in Nixon's political life. The Hiss Case, the fund issue in the 1952 campaign, Eisenhower's heart attack and others down to the 1960 presidential campaign are set forth as crises in an interesting and highly readable fashion. The reader will find each of these chapters absorbing and at times quite instructive. In combination they give a moving portrayal of contemporary history, albeit from the viewpoint of one man. But by all odds the chapter or crisis which will have continuing and sustained interest is the one on Khrushchev.

This chapter on the Khrushchev crisis certainly deserves a critical article for it demonstrates the limitations and flaws in the understanding of too many of our leaders with regard to the Soviet Union and the nature of the threat. The concepts and conceptions shown by Nixon reveal only too clearly some of the reasons why the United States has been losing the cold war since World War II. Throughout the chapter and the book the author is under the illusion that the Soviet Union is populated only by the Russian people. He seems to gloat over the fact that he was given the opportunity to speak directly to the "Russian people," although he is thoroughly unaware of the fact that several things he had to say couldn't have but an adverse effect on the majority of non-Russian nationals in the U.S.S.R. Adding impression of thought to factual inaccuracy, if Nixon is not talking about the "Russian people," then he uses the equally misleading term "the Soviets."

As to ideology and reality, Nixon exudes similar confusions. He says, "I believed the most important single purpose of my talks with him would be to convince him that he could not hope to convert the United States to Communism . . ." (p. 244). This is a rather primitive conception of the problem. The Russian totalitarians haven't converted any nation to Communism, including the total Russian nation, so why place the United States as a lamb-like object of mythical conversion? If, instead of concentrating on the myths of communism and conversion, Nixon had viewed the problem in its true light, he would then have regarded as his most important single purpose the conveyance of our knowledge to Khrushchev about Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and our determination to beat it in its tracks. This could have been said diplomatically and with resolution. And Khrushchev would have respected our representative for it. Respect is not obtained by falling prey to his disseminated myths.

For one who had extensive briefings before his departure and an entourage of "experts" on Communism and the Soviet Union, Nixon fared rather poorly when he was confronted by Khrushchev's explosion over the Captive Nations Week Resolution. A careful reading of this chapter shows him inadvertently admitting this and, at the same time, casting a bleak reflection on the type of briefing and advice he received.

Let's consider a few observations and rationalizations made by the former Vice-President. He writes, "when I was being greeted at the airport, Khrushchev was lambasting the United States generally and me personally for the Captive Nations Resolution passed by Congress a week before. The resolution called for prayers for those behind the Iron Curtain. It was difficult for me to imagine that the resolution truly disturbed the Soviet Premier because it was simply the expression of a well-known opinion in the United States, and not a call to action" (p. 247). After reading this one wonders whether Nixon himself had ever read the Resolution. No wonder it was difficult for him to understand Khrushchev's reaction. Just reflect on these facts: (1) Nixon had nothing whatever to do with the passage of the Resolution and if he was lambasted, it

wasn't personal but rather official; (2) the resolution does not explicitly call for prayers, though on the basis of the resolution prayers, in addition to many other activities, are called for during the annual observance; (3) as concerns the captive non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union—the one new, unique and basic element in the Resolution that struck Khrushchev between the eyes—the conspicuous fact is that the liberation of these nations is not “a well-known opinion in the United States”; and (4) the whereas clauses leading up to the Resolution, including the resolve itself, unquestionably and explicitly constitute a call to action—action for a cold war strategy to be effected until all the enumerated captive nations and others are free and independent, an action that Nixon himself called for in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention but never concretely spelled out. This is obviously a poor score for the unwary Vice-President.

Let's take another instance, one among many during this historic tour. Narrating his “pure protocol courtesy visit” with Khrushchev, Nixon recounts, “Just as soon as we sat down at the conference table, he started in on a bone of contention that was to be the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour. It was the Captive Nations Resolution, passed by Congress on July 6, calling on the President to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July as Captive Nations Week, during which free people would rededicate themselves and pray for the liberation of ‘enslaved’ peoples behind the Iron Curtain. President Eisenhower had issued the proclamation on July 17, five days before my departure for Russia” (pp. 250-51). First note that Nixon considered his departure being for “Russia” not the Soviet Union. Second, the fact is that Congress passed the Resolution into Public Law 86-90 on July 9; only the Senate first passed it on July 6.

It is noteworthy that Nixon recognizes that the Resolution was the “major Soviet irritant” throughout his tour, but nowhere in this book, nor while he was in the Soviet Union, can one find any indication that he understood what this was all about. His belief that Khrushchev would have seized upon something else to berate him if there had been no resolution is baseless. Intent upon visiting the United States, Khrushchev would have soaped up the Vice-President in typical Czarist fashion. But this is another indication of Nixon's unfamiliarity with totalitarian Russian behavior.

One could go on and on showing the really pitiful situation in which the Vice-President found himself. The reader cannot but feel hurt for him. However, the Khrushchev crisis in Nixon's political life is a concrete lesson on the poverty of the official briefings he received. It is a solid lesson on the reasons why we continue to lose in the cold war. Pitiful, indeed.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

POLAND AND HER NATIONAL MINORITIES, 1919-1939: A case study. By Stephan Horak, Ph.D. New York; Vantage Press, c. 1961. 259 p. \$5.00. Includes tables, maps, appendices, notes, bibliographies, and index.

This book has become the target of rather concentrated criticism from the Polish side for its “overall negative picture of pre-war Poland,” whereas from the minorities' standpoint it deserves our special consideration for its “many things left unsaid.” To point out at least some of its definite and significant merits is the intent of this review.

The author's assertion that very little research has been done on the question of the ethnographical structure of Poland in the years 1919-1939 appears to

be true inasmuch as the bulk of coherent literature so far in existence either confines itself to generalities or, for the most part, is limited to one or another facet and reflects usually a more or less subjective if not a partisan point of view. A considerable number of titles of this sort could be added to the author's already generous list of selected bibliography on the subject matter. To mention a few: R. L. Buell's *Poland: Key to Europe* (Knopf, 1939), R. Machray's *Polish-German Problem* (Allen, 1941), L. Gerson's *Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1920* (Yale University, 1953). However, they would contribute little to Mr. Horak's exact documentary approach, in detail or *en masse*. His scholarly work differs from others on the subject in that it represents a serious and frontal effort to collect all available data of any importance on each facet of this perplexing problem, to weigh pertinent information in the light of conflicting statements, to group the findings together, and to let all forcibly speak for itself.

Mr. Horak begins his book with a short account of Poland's past and arrives at the point when the country, incapable of consolidating its conquered territories, disappeared, following its partition, from the map of Europe "without any mentionable resistance." As far as Rousseau could judge at that time, the main malady from which Poland suffered consisted of the indigestibility of the vast surrounding areas held in Poland's possession. Here, we agree with the author, lies the very core of the problem. The truth is that what later developed into Poland's national minorities problem has overshadowed its destiny ever since. Yet no hard blows inflicted upon the Polish ruling classes in the course of history could ever teach them a lesson. For two hundred years Poland had had no independence. Its incapability of healthy statehood, under prevailing conditions, had been clearly demonstrated by the partitions. Nevertheless, the first thing Poland did upon regaining independence was to claim the same foreign territories that had once caused its doom. The spokesmen of the new-born Poland—Dmowski, Paderewski, and others—called instantly for a re-creation of the Polish Empire which had collapsed in the eighteenth century. Denying freedom and statehood to the neighboring nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Lithuanians, in order to reinstate Poland's grandeur had become the *raison d'état* ("*racja stanu*") and a matter of principle. President Wilson's ethnographic principle apparently had no influence upon Polish thinking.

Subsequently, the fatal decision by the Conference of Ambassadors as of March 15, 1923, which authorized Poland to hold territories inhabited by compact millions of non-Polish autogenous populations, made for an endless victimization of the latter. They suffered denial of national minority rights, enforced Polonization, religious and political persecution, pacification, and, in due course, war and the present Russian state of captivity.

To this troubled sequence Mr. Horak has given forceful expression in his critical yet unprejudiced work, a work which consistently follows every phase of cultural, social, and political development of the various minority groups, including Jews and Germans, as affected by Polish aggressive interferences.

Himself a native historian of Western Ukraine (his published works include *Russia's Historical Way to Bolshevism*, *Ukraine in International Politics*), Mr. Horak has revealed some basic truths imperative for the understanding of East European interrelations, the East of Europe unfortunately being even now something like a *terra incognita* to many a Western mind.

Dr. Horak has succeeded in his aim:

"... This book is an attempt to outline a guide to the problem of co-existence of numerous national groups in the East Central European territory . . . to indicate how to understand the nationalities and how to incorporate them on a fair basis into national-state territories . . . We must bear in mind that Germans and Poles, Lithuanians and Poles, Ukrainians and Poles, etc., will have to live as neighbors in the future and for this reason alone a political campaign against the Polish people could make no real contribution to the cause of national understanding. Analyzing mistakes of the past is, after all, a foundation for a better future."

Deserving of special mention are the book's numerous and valuable statistical tables, maps, documents, appendices, notes, a list of bibliographies, an index, etc. Another commendable feature is that the author holds faithfully to original terminology, as in the case of geographic names, etc., known locally, which is a refreshing and justified innovation on the international scene.

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ROMAN V. KUCHAR

INDEPENDENT EASTERN EUROPE; a history, by C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer. London, Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's Press, c. 1962. 499p. Includes maps and bibliographies.

It was disappointing to read in the preface that, for the purpose of this book, Eastern Europe is that part of the continent which lies between Germany and Italy in the west and the U.S.S.R. in the east. In every high school in Europe it is taught that Europe as a geographical concept has its boundary at the Ural Mountains, which divide the Eurasian continent into two parts, Europe and Asia. Excluding Russia from Eastern Europe has some justification, inasmuch as the Soviet Russian colonial power is expended over Asia. But not to include Ukraine and Byelorussia in the concept of Eastern Europe is a grievous blunder.

It might be well to point out to the authors of the present book that, starting in October, 1951, in Stuttgart, Germany, the "Deutsche Gesellschaft for Osteuropakunde" has published a special periodical on that subject called *Osteuropa*, which had a predecessor of the same name published by the "Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Studium Osteuropas" (1925-1939). Also, we have another publication on that subject called *Ost Archiv*, published in the German language. In these periodicals and others they could find the exact meaning, the scholarly meaning of the concept of Eastern Europe, which unhesitatingly includes Ukraine and Byelorussia. That concept is also to be found in John Reed's *The War in Eastern Europe*, published in New York by Scribner's in 1918. One more edifying reference is Dr. Wilhelm Schlusser's *Russland, Reich und Europa*, published in 1943 in Munster by Coppenrath Verlag. On p. 41 is stated the following: "Ukraine . . . is an old country (*Heimat*) of the Eastern European world; it is the bridge for the future cooperation of Western civilization and Eastern Europe . . . Ukraine would prove that for a united Europe it would also be economically of primary importance."

However, the authors are not alone in their blunder. In 1951 Hugh Seton-Watson's *The East European Revolution* appeared in New York (Praeger). Re-edited for the 3rd time in 1961, this work lists the East European nations as follows: the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Greeks, Turks, Albanians, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. The Ukrainians and Byelorussians are omitted. Such scholars follow the practice of the satellite countries, organized in New York in the Assembly of Captive Eu-

ropean Nations, of seeking to eliminate Ukraine from their programs of political action. This practice is based on the status quo of the 1939 political state borders, an artificial concept which is contrary to the Ukrainian and the general concept of liberation and to the political concept of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) which unites all the non-Russian nations in the sense of the United States President's proclamation of Captive Nations Week and of Hon. Daniel J. Flood's Resolution (H. Res. 211) calling for the establishment of a House Committee on the Captive Nations. Any review of this book and of similar publications ought have this main political aim in mind. This work is supposed to be a history, and history to be worth anything must be objective.

The material of this book is carefully divided into ten chapters describing the challenge of the great powers, war diplomacy and national movements, 1914-1918, with mention in several places of the Ukrainian government's Central *Rada*, which on March 3, 1918, was recognized by Russia as an independent state. A detailed analysis is given of the peace settlement of 1919 which created a new Central Europe, with references to Ukraine and its struggle for freedom and independence against the Russians and the Poles. Carpatho-Ukraine is still mentioned by its historical name, Ruthenia.

Chapter Four deals with the anatomy of the new Europe, the states which emerged after the First World War, with mention of the Ukrainian struggle against Poland's domination of Western Ukraine. Missing is the main issue of that concept, namely, that the principle of self-determination as proclaimed by Wilson was applied only to Austro-Hungary, but not to the Czarist Russian colonial power. In consequence the Ukrainian nation was divided between four powers: Soviet Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, against the Ukrainian will to be independent and united as was stated in the All-Union Act of Ukraine of January 22, 1919.

Chapter Five deals with national and social consolidation and Chapter Six with international relations in the period 1919-1929. The last four chapters describe the depression and its consequences, the primacy of Germany and the end of independence, 1939-1941, with Soviet Russian advancement toward the west.

In conclusion, the authors are proposing the creation of multi-national states, none of which should "invite the hostility of its neighbors by extending its frontiers at the expense of their humanly legitimate claims." In other words, they should not be based upon aggression, which would produce another case like Ukraine overrun by the Muscovite Red Soviet colonial empire, Poland and Rumania. And in this way we can hope with our authors that ". . . the new day of Eastern European independence will be longer and happier than the old."

Brooklyn Public Library

ALEKSANDER SOKOLYSHYN

READINGS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Arthur E. Adams, Ed. Boston: D. C. Heath, 1961. Pp. xvi, 420.

Although the publisher of this book warns, "No part of the material covered by this copyright may be reproduced for commercial purposes without written permission of the publisher," it must be noted that this is only a collection of readings and selections from other copyrighted publications.

The editor (but not listed as the editor on the front page, thus giving the impression that he is the author) claims that "this book represents an effort to provide the college student or intelligent laymen with a coherent introduction to

Soviet foreign policy since late 1917," and "the readings included are roughly of three types—narrative, documentary, and analytical" (p. v).

The framework is provided by 15 chapters, covering: The Peace with Germany: 1917-1918; The West and the Comintern: 1917-1920; Dualism in Peacetime: 1921-1928; Problems of Tactics; The Search for Security: 1928-1928; Dualism in Distress: 1935-1939; The Great Reversal: 1939-1941; The Wartime Alliance: 1941-1943; Yalta, Potsdam, and the New Bipolar World: 1954; Expansion in Europe: 1945-1953; The United Nations, and Stalin's Death: 1945-1953; Developments in the Far East: 1945-1953; Improved Manners and A Balance of Terror.

The second purpose of the work is "to furnish some of the best evidence available concerning the motives and principles that appear to govern Soviet foreign policy; and still another is to acquaint the reader with the chief theories or hypotheses by which the world's most authoritative students of these matters explain Soviet policy" (p. xi).

The editor then says, "Many theories have been propounded as explanation of Soviet foreign policy, and a somewhat confusing number of the more important ones are presented in this book," and then proceeds, "for the sake of clarity and convenience," to classify them into four categories: the balance of power; ideology; internal organization; and personality and character (pp. xi-xiv). Then, all of sudden, he proclaims that "it must be admitted frankly that our knowledge of the principles and processes of Soviet foreign policy is inadequate" (p. xiv).

The reviewer is frankly most unhappy with this approach of the editor, who (like many American "experts" on Soviet Russia) is propounding the illusion derived from Churchill's most unfortunate statement that the Soviet Union is "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." Maybe the U.S.S.R. was "an enigma" to most Americans when Churchill said this; but, as a matter of fact, it has never been "an enigma" to those specializing in Soviet affairs, and to the many scholars who have escaped from Soviet terror and who have been trying for decades to inform the Western world of the declared and undeclared aims of world communism as directed from Moscow.

In this respect the editor but adds to the confusion which seems to be plaguing the policy-makers of Washington and London. While it is true that there are many theories on Soviet foreign policy, all these theories basically add up to the simple formula: a search for power whose main feature has been, especially since 1944 or so, aggressive imperialism and colonialism.

This inability or unwillingness of the author to derive the basic formula of Soviet foreign policy has prevented him from producing a very good book and is mirrored in his selection of material; some of it is good, and some of it is woefully inadequate. While we welcome the selections from the writings of Lenin, William Henry Chamberlin, Edward Hallett Carr, Barrington Moore, Jr., Stalin, Franz Borkenau, Max Beloff, Walter Z. Laquerr, and a few others (including the concluding chapter by Khrushchev: "Peaceful Competition or Destruction"), one wonders about the value of paying attention to such "experts" as Cordell Hull, James F. Byrnes, and a few such others. The same sort of weakness is reflected in "Bibliography" (pp. 409-420), which does not contain a single reference to the group of publications headed by *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and which have been exposing Soviet Russia's *realpolitik* for several years.

The editor would have strengthened his approach also had he introduced the concept of "geopolitics" into his framework.

All in all, this is not a too valuable addition to the growing number of studies and collections of readings on Soviet foreign policy. Adams does not supplement other available collections covering this area (headed by "Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, edited by Robert A. Goldwin, Gerald Stourzh & Marvin Zetterbaum, Oxford University Press, 1959). In many respects, in spite of its earnestness, the product leaves a confused and uneasy impression in the reader's mind.

University of Bridgeport

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

RUSSIAN CLASSICS IN SOVIET JACKETS. By Maurice Friedberg. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. xviii+228.

This is an interesting and careful study from all available evidence of the way in which the classics of the old Russian literature before 1917 have been fumigated, annotated and interpreted by various devious and often dubious methods to adapt them to the new conditions in which the old Russian Empire has become the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the same dominant Russian culture. The editors whether of multi-volume scientific editions or of popular editions with commentaries and introductions have followed the party line throughout the various periods whether of internationalism or of strict nationalism.

The author omits the question as to whether there has been any direct falsification of the text. This is hard to establish in view of the extensive censorship of Czarist times, when whole passages were arbitrarily omitted or altered to suit the whims of the censors. It can therefore only be considered by a study of the original manuscripts, a study that is difficult or impossible for persons abroad to undertake under present conditions.

It is to be noted that there is little direct reference to the publications of literature in the so-called minority languages. Thus Shevchenko is only mentioned once when Khrushchev states that thanks to Lenin and Stalin, the "lot of the peasant, the lot of the *muzhik*, truthfully described by the poets Nekrasov and Shevchenko, had faded away into eternity" (p. 112, footnote). A very significant passage is this: "Since the Soviet constitution provides that all ethnic cultures are to be 'national in form and socialist in essence,' the non-Russian readers in the U.S.S.R. get a literary fare basically similar to that offered to the Great Russians. Thus, in addition to works by native authors, the non-Russians get translations of all of the better-known Soviet Russian writers as well as foreign and Russian classics. Most Western authorities accept the Soviet claim that printing in non-Russian languages is a manifestation of the Soviet policy of linguistic pluralism as contrasted with Imperial Russia's suppression of the cultures of the national minorities. Actually as can be seen from Table 2 in Appendix A, the ratio of non-Russian books to Russian ones is constantly decreasing. In fact, at present it is smaller than it was under the old regime. In 1893 non-Russian books constituted approximately 25 percent of the total number of titles and 20 percent of the copies. In 1957 the corresponding figures were 24 per cent and 15 per cent" (p. 73 f.). Unfortunately there is no attempt to break down these per cents by languages and in view of the ban on Ukrainian in 1893, we are quite at a loss to draw any conclusions. The

author also does not go into details about the percentages or amount of the books printed for the other Slavic peoples but he seems to imply that the bulk of the Russian translations for non-Russian peoples were in non-Slavic tongues, for before 1941 most Russian works for non-Russians were published in Tashkent and in the postwar years in Riga, Tallinn and Petrozavodsk in Karelia and now also in Lviv. "All of these areas, it appears, were singled out for more rapid Russification and general assimilation into Soviet culture" (p. 76-77).

It is obvious from studies already made by Ukrainian scholars that the same tactics and even more so are being used in explaining the works of such men as Shevchenko and other pre-1917 writers to make them friends of Russia or at least of the "revolutionary democrats" of the mid-century and that no means are spared to prove their case. That is why it is necessary to use with caution not only the Soviet texts but also their introductions and notes and this is why the Russians in all areas under their control have ceaselessly blasted all foreign and non-Communist scholars who have tried honestly to present the true sense of the writings not only of the Great Russians but of the non-Russian writers.

This volume shows conclusively how far the Russians are going in perverting the Great Russian authors. As such it gives a real guide to the process on Soviet territory among the non-Russians. As a result we can welcome the book and hope that a similar concise treatment may be made of the fate of the various non-Russian and especially Ukrainian authors of the 19th century.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"MENTAL GAPS IN OUR THINKING ABOUT RUSSIA," article by Lev E. Dobriansky. *The Freeman*, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, May 1962.

Seven mental gaps in our thinking about Russia are described in this article. The author deals essentially with myths that continue to circulate about Russia and the Soviet Union in our various American institutions. The myths of federal union, Marxism, the "great" Russian brother and others are analyzed in systematic order.

One of the major points stressed is the rudimentary foolishness of equating the Russians with the non-Russian nationals in the U.S.S.R. As the writer states it, "When they are misidentified as Russian, it serves Moscow's purposes because the term Russia by-passes the fact of a Soviet empire, and obscures that empire's internal problems and inherent weaknesses."

The justification for his thesis that the world's enemy is totalitarian Russian imperialism is spelled out concisely. The myth of Marxist ideology simply blinds us to the real factors and forces at work in the Soviet Russian Empire. To quote the writer's concluding sentence, "When the world realizes—as it must for its salvation—the colossal hypocrisy that shields Moscow's malevolent ambitions, then we may hope for an end of the terror that bestrides this little star on which we live."

"DANCERS FROM THE UKRAINE," article by Ralph Parker. *Saturday Review*, New York, N.Y., April 28, 1962.

Anyone familiar with the paramount and real problems confronting the large Ukrainian nation will enjoy this exceptionally well written article. It was apparently prepared in Moscow. The piece deals with the Ukrainian Dance Company under the direction of Pavlo Virsky. The troupe recently completed a tour in the United States.

The writer possesses an unusual perception into the issues of the burning Ukrainian soul. His analysis of the dances performed by Virsky's group is preceded by an all too necessary historical background of Ukraine itself. And this he presents with a pungent report. "The history of the Ukraine," he begins, "is one of national self-assertion . . ." Then he continues to explain this: "Divided under the rule of rival powers, they have been known as Little Russians, Ruthenes, Galicians, while the Austrians, the Poles, and the Russians each had their own derogatory term for the Ukrainian peasant."

Actually, the so-called "claim to nationhood" is not as urgent and primary as the writer makes out. This was true a century ago. The actual claim is to independent statehood. However, the dance company performs, among its other functions, the one of informing Americans and others the basic truth that a Ukrainian is not a Russian.

"APOSTLE OF RUSSIA," article by Father Philip J. Sternig. *Hi-time*, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 13, 1962.

The Roman Catholic Church has made tremendous strides in the last ten years in disseminating accurate knowledge about Ukraine and other captive non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. Several parts and agencies of the Church have actually pioneered in this area for the general American reader. It is in the light of this major development that this article appears more like a badly battered thumb.

Amateurish is about the best adjective to characterize properly this essay about a savage warrior who became an apostle of "Russia." Doubtless, without any critical understanding the writer merely culled his few facts from some direct or indirect Russian source. Vladimir, who is venerated by Ukrainians generally, is erroneously depicted here as "the first Russian emperor to embrace Christianity." He is cast as the "Apostle of Russia," though there was no Russia in existence in the 10th century.

This article serves as a measure of the work still to be done. It makes as much sense as St. Patrick being described as the "Apostle of England."

"THE INSIDIOUS CAMPAIGN TO SILENCE ANTI-COMMUNISTS," article by William R. Kintner, *Reader's Digest*, Pleasantville, New York, May 1962.

With concrete facts and selective documentation the writer of this highly readable article explains to the American reader the type of campaign Moscow wages to silence anti-communists in the United States. The campaign is, of course, not restricted to this country. But few will deny its level of priority as viewed by Moscow.

A forest ranger who wrote anti-communist articles for a local newspaper, is fired from service because "his writings were controversial." However, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas can continue his ranting about the admission of Red China to the United Nations without censure or dismissal. The author goes beyond this example to cite the increasing censure of military men, the slander incited against reputable and responsible anti-communists as "Birchites," and the growing misrepresentations made of the *National Review* and *U.S. News and World Report*.

Colonel Kintner points out how on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev summoned his top psychological warfare experts together and stressed the need for destroying the rising anti-Communist movement. Khrushchev also emphasized the "necessity of establishing contacts with those circles of the bourgeoisie which gravitate toward pacifism." An important part of this operation which the writer failed to mention is Moscow's appeal to Americans of East European background.

"DO NOT BE PROVOCATIVE IS STATE DEPT. WORD," column of the managing editor. *The Tablet*, Brooklyn, New York, May 26, 1962.

Willard Edwards, a noted correspondent of *The Chicago Tribune*, is quoted at length in this column on the dominant philosophy among State Department censors. The report, signed by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, is most revealing. In essence, nothing should be done or said in any way to irritate the Russians. For we're supposed to be in the process of delicate negotiations with them on arriving at an agreement of functional coexistence.

Aside from the rampant naivete shown here and in Geneva, it is noteworthy that any talk about captive nations and slave labor is held to be taboo. There is much substance to this column in view of the fact that the President was most reluctant in 1961 to issue a Captive Nations Week Proclamation. Under considerable pressure he finally acceded. The war over this issue is still being waged, and the events of 1962, with regard to the captive nations, should prove to be most revealing.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS POLICY CLEAVAGES ARE DETAILED," excerpts.
World, Washington, D.C., April 17, 1962.

This compact international weekly carries a red headline of "U.S. Foreign Policy: Do We Have One?" Under it the views of Senator John Tower of Texas and Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University are considered. As the explanation about this report states, "Two men who demand drastic revision of the design are Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University and Sen. John Tower (R. Tex.)."

On the detailed policy cleavages, excerpts are presented from a paper submitted by the Georgetown professor. It is shown that the President's understanding of the Soviet Union, its composition, nature and forces, is quite wanting. The President's adverse attitude toward the Captive Nations Week Resolution is also indicated.

"A Win Policy of Emancipation" is offered for the reader's consideration. One of the major elements in this policy is wrapped up in this statement: "Both the expression and implementation of the policy would place Moscow under the constant pressure of its own theoretic affirmations regarding the status of the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R.; they would on this basis provide political leverage to the nationalist forces in the U.S.S.R. and deepen the insecurities of colonial Moscow within its own immediate camp."

"THE CHANGE IN RUSSIA: WILL IT BE BIG ENOUGH?" editorial. *Freedom's Facts*, All-American Conference To Combat Communism, Washington, D.C., May 1962.

The editor of this widely circulated monthly is a keen student and analyst of the Soviet Union. And this lead editorial reflects all the marks of his thoughtful analyses. It presents circumstantial evidence of growing individualism, bourgeois taste, emphasized incentive and stressed productivity in the U.S.S.R., and then raises the pertinent question as to whether this change is big enough to overcome the totalitarian controls exercised by the Communist Party.

Having shown the essentials of the current situation in the U.S.S.R.—and for that matter elsewhere in the empire—the writer proceeds to spell out the real alternative to war. "The real alternative for the West is a more aggressive non-military campaign to win the peoples on both sides of the Iron and Bamboo curtains . . ."

In the section "Among the Organizations," notice is given of Captive Nations Week, July 15-21. "National Captive Nations Week Committee Chairman is Dr. Lev Dobriansky, Chairman, *Ukrainian Congress Committee of America*." In perfect line with the alternative to war, it states "A major aim of Captive Nations Week is to keep alive resistance to Soviet tyranny behind the Iron Curtain and express our continuing support for captive peoples' just aspirations for freedom and national independence."

"DANCE: FROM THE UKRAINE," article by John Martin. *The New York Times*, New York, May 6, 1962.

The performance of the Ukrainian Dance Company at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York caused quite a cultural stir not only for New Yorkers but also others in the country. Reviews appeared in all major papers.

Here are a few examples: "Ukrainian Dancers Dazzling," by Robert Coleman, *New York Mirror*, April 25, 1962; "Dance: Lively Group of Young People," by John Martin, *The New York Times*, April 25; "Ukrainians Open Season at the Met," by Frances Herridge, *New York Post*, April 25; "Ukraine Troupe Is Full of Vitality," by Miles Kastendieck, *N.Y. Journal American*, April 25; "Ukrainian Dancers," by Walter Terry, *New York Herald Tribune*, April 25; "Just What Is Culture?", by John Chapman, *Sunday News*, April 29; "Ukrainian Dance Co. Takes Over the Met," by Louis Biancolli, *New York World-Telegram and The Sun*, April 26; "Ukrainians Are Zestful Hoofers . . .", by John Chapman, *Daily News*, April 25.

Almost all of the reviews were completely favorable. One or two, as expected, were confusing. A remarkable example of contradiction is offered by Frances Herridge of *The New York Post*. Under the very bold-type caption, "Ukrainians Open Season at the Met," she starts, "What incredible energy these Russian dancers have!" This is equivalent to witnessing a Chinese opera and then commenting "What a wonderful Japanese performance." If anything else, the troupe tried well to straighten out confused American minds which seem to find it so hard to draw intellectual distinctions.

The review by John Martin is substantial and quite accurate. His first sentence reveals his reaction: "It would be hard to find a more joyous evening of dancing than that being provided at the moment by the Ukrainian Dance Company at the Met." He then says, "These Ukrainians are a proud and self-aware people, accustomed to the necessity of maintaining their national self-respect under a succession of alien occupations, from the Lithuanians of old to the Nazis of yesterday." He could have been more current by saying "the Soviet Russians of today."

"SONG OF GOVERNMENT, NOT OF THE PEOPLE," letter to editor by Vera A. Dowhan. *The Washington Daily News*, Washington, D.C., May 22, 1962.

In Washington, D.C., the popular reaction to the Ukrainian Dance Company was similar to that of New York and elsewhere. The same wonderment and high praise, the same bits of misunderstanding and confusion. A bit of good example was Milton Berliner's column in *The Washington Daily News*.

Berliner saw the show, liked it immensely, and then wrote about "Another Russian Spectacular." At the start, this should indicate his level of understanding on this. But Berliner went further, to say that "the evening was marred by the rudeness of, fortunately, very few patrons who stood up during the playing of the Star Spangled Banner but sat down when the Russian and Ukrainian national anthems were played." According to Berliner's understating, "These are the songs of the people, not the government, and democracy is not served by bad manners."

A proper and pungent reply to this was given in this letter to the editor. The writer is a Washingtonian and well familiar with the issues at hand. As she puts it in her lengthy letter, "It is evident Mr. Berliner is very much in the dark. The Ukrainian 'national anthem' which was played is one Khrushchev

favors, not the Ukrainian people." The letter then spells out the genuine Ukrainian national anthem, "*Shche Ne Vmerla Ukraina*" and cogently explains the fraudulent anthem that was played. Who respects fraud?

"THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1960's," address by Hon. Michael A. Feighan. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C., May 23, 1962.

Congressman Feighan has long been known for his incisive analyses of U.S. foreign policy. In this address, delivered to the Rotary Club of Parma, Ohio, the legislator presents one of his finest examinations of our current policy directions. This presentation is comprehensive, challenging and lucid.

Against a background of isolationism and non-involvement the urgency of a sound long-range foreign policy is sounded. As the Congressman puts it, there is a "need for a long-range foreign policy based upon those realities together with the strategic planning necessary to implement that policy." He describes the realities that face us, continent by continent, and in connection with the most important reality, he states, "Looking to the Eurasian Empire of the Russians, a discerning observer will see the cross-fire effect of two aspects of the revolutionary age—the political and the social. The tidal wave of self-determination has not yet struck that empire but the powerful currents of the national independence movement run strongly beneath the imperial surface of that empire."

This scholarly address methodically examines the myths we live by as concerns the Russians. The enemy is not "the Soviets," holds Congressman Feighan. He avers, "The Soviets have long since drowned in a great Russian sea of chauvinist riffraff. The real, live enemy is Russian imperialism and all who support it are real, live enemies of the United States." The Congressman does not mince words for he has the facts and a body of truths that do not require any cover of tailored language.

"LENIN," article by Richard Harrity and Ralph G. Martin. *Look*, New York, May 22, 1962.

This is supposed to be "A new pictorial history" of Lenin, the assassin, the creator of the "world communist movement." Actually, neither the pictorial history is new nor the school-boy type of narrative presented is new. *Look* decided to plunge into the spectacular and, in effect, produced a rehash of many inaccurate notions and generalizations regarding the role and significance of Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov.

As a travesty to historical documentation, Lenin is depicted as some revolutionist from Mars who built an enterprise designed for world domination all his own. Because he once uttered "I spit on Russia . . .," he is revealed as one who possessed no interest or regard for the Russian Empire. There are quotes galore, both from his lips and his wife's, to prove quite easily that Lenin, more than anyone else, was a well versed Russian chauvinist and a skillful practitioner of the techniques of traditional Russian imperialism. For such data it would profit the reader to scan through the recent work on *Russian Bolshevism*, published by the Independent Ukrainian Association for Research of National Problems in Soviet Theory and Practice, Munich, Germany.

The map shown in this melodramatic presentation alone indicates the acutely limited knowledge and perspectives of the writers. All in the Russian

Empire is simply "Russia." One would think that after all these years of popular education on Eastern Europe, a greater show of responsibility for accurate knowledge would be displayed in the public interest. But the market, regardless of quality and truth, seems to be ruling.

"RADIO LIBERTY," a booklet. *Radio Liberty*, New York, N.Y., 1962.

"The Most Important Job In The World" is the remainder of the title under which this compact booklet is being circulated. And indeed it is such a job. The background, tasks, functions and achievements of "Radio Liberty" are lucidly described in this booklet. Its progress since March 1, 1953, when it commenced broadcasting as "Radio Liberation," is concretely shown.

There is no question of the progress that has been made in the past nine years. This is not only in terms of transmitters and other quantitative factors but also, and basically more important, in terms of qualitative political considerations. The non-Russian nations, which this booklet erroneously refers to as "national minority republics," have at least received a better deal than what was originally the case. On basis of fact as well as prudent use, there is no reason why the authors of this booklet had to restrict their terminology to these non-Russian nations to such less meaningful phrases as "the peoples of the Soviet Union," "captive peoples," "Soviet citizens" and the like.

As a further item of record, it is also undeniable that "Radio Liberty" far surpasses the "Voice of America" in broadcasts to the Soviet Union. The "Radio's" reporting has been considerably less circumscribed by government policy and its programming has been more imaginative and versatile. This piece gives the reader fairly good examples of the work being done. However, a close analyst of this project can easily take issue with the range of independence implied by the authors. The fact that the name was changed from "Radio Liberation" to the more passive "Radio Liberty" in the declining years of the Eisenhower Administration cannot be ascribed to mere coincidence of time. Nevertheless, this is the best project we have, though there is much room for improvement, and this booklet tells the story with vivid appeal.

"TRUE" AND GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION," a report. *The East of Today*, CIAS, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, March 20, 1962.

Edited by H. R. Alscher, this series of reports on Eastern Europe is pungent, well-documented, and remarkably precise. It offers regular reports and comments on "Political, Economic and Technological Affairs in the U.S.S.R. and its Satellite Countries." Judging by the contents of the reports, a subtitle on "Political, Economic and Technological Affairs in Soviet Russia and the Captive Nations" would be far more accurate.

The significance of this report is found in the current application of Russian distortions of the principle of self-determination to East Germany. In short, the false Russian applications to the once independent non-Russian nations now in the U.S.S.R. are witnessed in East Germany. The polluted dialectics are essentially the same. Referring to the earliest of periods, the editor states: "The national and colonial-revolutionary aspects of the struggle waged in those years are often overlooked and almost invariably underrated. Actually, the Revolution of 1917-22 was only in part a social revolution of the Russian people; in a large measure it was also a Polish, Ukrainian, Turko-Tartar, Finnish, Latvian, Estonian, Georgian, and Armenian rebellion against Muscovite rule." It would be truer to say that it was a war of independence.

L. E. D.

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