RUSSIAN CENTRALISM AND UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate

1760s - 1830s

ZENON E. KOHUT
Russia's expansion into a large multinational empire was accompanied by a drive towards centralism and administrative uniformity. Yet, particularly in the Western borderlands, Russia did accommodate itself to the reality of privileged self-governing areas. The Ukrainian Hetmanate, which came under the tsar's suzerainty in 1654, preserved for over a century its own military, administrative, fiscal, and judicial system. A basic but not well-researched theme of Russian history has been the tension between the centripetal forces favoring uniformity in administration, social structure, and even culture and centrifugal forces demanding the adherence to the rights of such special privileged territories as the Ukrainian Hetmanate, the Baltic areas, the Congress Kingdom, and the Grand Duchy of Finland.

Zenon E. Kohut examines the struggle between Russian centralism and Ukrainian autonomy. He concentrates on the period from the reign of Catherine II, during which Ukrainian institutions were abolished, to the 1830s, when Ukrainian society had been integrated into the imperial system. The study focuses on three principal problems. First, it shows how cameralist thought, Enlightenment ideas, and theories of a well-ordered police state reinforced Russia's drive towards centralism and uniformity and how these theoretical considerations were applied in the formulation of policy. Second, the work determines the extent to which Ukrainian society both resisted and accommodated itself to imperial integration. Social integration proved to be particularly difficult because of the dissimilarities in social structure between Russia and the Ukraine and because of the autonomist outlook of the Ukrainian gentry. Third, the study concludes that the very success of the integration process resulted in the

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Zenon E. Kohut

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The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute was established in 1973 as an integral part of Harvard University. It supports research associates and visiting scholars who are engaged in projects concerned with all aspects of Ukrainian studies. The Institute also works in close cooperation with the Committee on Ukrainian Studies, which supervises and coordinates the teaching of Ukrainian history, language, and literature at Harvard University.
In memory of my father
and in dedication to my mother
and all those who have shared the vision.
Acknowledgments

This book is based on my doctoral dissertation which I wrote between 1971 and 1975. Although my degree is from the University of Pennsylvania, most of the research and writing of the doctoral dissertation was done at Harvard University’s Ukrainian Research Institute. Subsequently, my professional career has taken me away from the thesis and it was only in the mid-1980s that I was able to revise, update, and expand the work for publication.

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A Note on Transcription

In transcribing Ukrainian and Russian personal names and terms a modified Library of Congress System is used.

A Note on Geographic Terms

Placenames are transliterated according to the country in which they are presently located except when standard English forms exist such as Kiev, Moscow, Lviv, Odessa, and Dnieper.
The Hetmanate as Part of Imperial Russia, 1809

[Map showing the Hetmanate and nearby regions, including Chernihiv and Poltava.]
Introduction

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the concept of Russia as a unitary state was so deeply rooted in the ruling elite that a policy of compromise with its awakening nationalities was never seriously attempted. This failure to come to grips with the nationalities problem contributed to the eventual fall of the empire. Such a predilection for centralism and administrative uniformity can be attributed, in part, to centuries of historical conditioning. Muscovy had already established a pattern of incorporating recently annexed borderlands into a Russian administrative framework. As long as Russia’s expansion was limited to sparsely settled areas inhabited by nomads or small Cossack formations, direct administrative incorporation encountered little resistance. In its Western expansion, however, Russia acquired territories and peoples who had a well-developed concept of juridical separateness, regional prerogatives, and corporate rights, and, as a result, Russia’s drive for uniformity had to accommodate itself to the reality of separate privileged areas. A basic but not very well-researched theme of Russian history has been the tension between centripetal forces favoring uniformity in administration, social structure, and even culture and centrifugal forces demanding the adherence to the rights of such special privileged territories as the Ukraine, the Baltic areas, the Congress Kingdom, and the Grand Duchy of Finland.

To a large extent, Russia’s experience with the Western type of self-governing areas began with the Ukrainian Hetmanate, which came under the protection of the Russian tsar in 1654, but nevertheless preserved its own administrative, fiscal, and judicial systems for over a century. The clash between Russian centralism and Ukrainian autonomy is the subject of this book. Chronologically it covers the period from the reign of Catherine II, during which the Ukrainian institutions of the Hetmanate were abolished, to the 1830s, when Ukrainian society had finally been integrated into the imperial system.
The study focuses on three principal questions. First, what were the nature, theoretical justification, and execution of Russian policies toward the Hetmanate and other autonomous regions? Second, what was the Ukrainian reaction to imperial integration, as evidenced by the Hetmanate’s institutions and Ukrainian society? Third, how successful was the integration process and what impact did it have on the empire and on Ukrainian society?

In addition, the study touches on broader issues. To general European history it offers an analysis of the development of the Russian version of the well-regulated absolutist state and its challenge to and transformation of corporate and regional privilege. To Russian history it presents both a case study in the formation of the Russian Empire and an introduction to its nationality policy. The abolition of Ukrainian and Baltic autonomy occurred at a crucial time, when the empire was expanding dramatically. The incorporation of its newly acquired Polish and Turkish territories was undoubtedly conditioned by Catherine’s experience with Ukrainian autonomy. By abolishing the administrative structure of territories that had been self-governing, Catherine helped shape both the multinational yet unitary character of the empire and the nationality policies pursued by her heirs.

Finally, this study has clear implications for Ukrainian history. The more success the imperial authorities had in homogenizing the Hetmanate in the imperial mold, the less likely it was that Ukrainians could retain their distinct historical identity. The cooption and partial assimilation of their elite left the Ukrainians a “sociologically incomplete” or “unhistorical” nationality and thus set them on a different road to nation-building than nationalities that retained their traditional elites. The establishment of a link between traditional Ukrainian autonomy and modern Ukrainian nationalism goes well beyond this work’s chronology and theme. I do, however, provide background material that could prove to be useful to scholars of nationalism.

Catherine abolished the autonomy of three Ukrainian regions—Sloboda Ukraine, Zaporizhzhia, and the Hetmanate. This work, however, deals only with the Hetmanate. By the time Catherine took the throne, the autonomy of Sloboda Ukraine, the institutions of which had never been well developed, was already limited. Zaporizhzhia was a Cossack republic with great symbolic importance for Ukrainian traditions, but its destruction was part of the empire’s larger policy
vis-à-vis all the Cossack hosts on its territories. As the largest unassimilated border area of the empire, the Hetmanate is uniquely well suited for a case study of imperial integration.

Although the recasting of the Hetmanate’s institutions and social structure into the imperial pattern is a major concern, the study does not attempt to deal with the complex process of cultural assimilation and “Russification.” Study of the latter would entail extensive research on Ukrainian-Russian linguistic and literary relations, as well as on the education, social life, and careers of the Ukrainian gentry and clergy. Therefore, acculturation and “Russification” are mentioned here only as they relate to an understanding of institutional integration and imperial policy.

This is the first comprehensive study of the Hetmanate’s integration into the empire. Most Ukrainian historians who have dealt with the Hetmanate studied other periods and other problems. This is hardly surprising, for the dissolution of native institutions is rarely a popular topic in a national historiography. Nevertheless, the various nineteenth- and twentieth-century historical schools have made major contributions in research and interpretation that justly merit attention here.

One problem to which historians have devoted considerable attention is the juridical nature of the Hetmanate’s union with Muscovy. Controversy has centered around the precise nature of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, by which Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nits’kyi and the Ukrainian elite recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar. The interpretations advanced to date include personal union, real union, protectorate, vassalage, military alliance, autonomy, incorporation, or reunion.¹ The continuing controversy over this issue is heightened by political considerations. In the Soviet Union, for example, the Central Committee of the Communist Party has defined the Pereiaslav Agreement as a permanent, voluntary “reunion” of two

¹ The most comprehensive and recent summary of the varied interpretations is John Basarab’s Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton, 1982); see also Andrii Jakovliv (Jakovlyv), Dohovir Het’mana Bohdana Khmel’nyts’koho z maskovs’kyiem Oleksiiem Mykhailovychem 1654 r. (New York, 1954), and Nikolai Andreev (Andreyev), “Pereiaslavskii dogovor,” in Studies in Muscovy (London, 1970), pp. 65–112.
While the arguments over the nature of the Hetmanate’s juridical relationship with Russia have added much to our knowledge of the Hetmanate’s early stages, they have contributed little to an understanding of its subsequent demise.

The struggles within the Hetmanate’s society have been thoroughly studied by the populist historians who dominated Ukrainian historiography from the mid-nineteenth to the twentieth century. They viewed the Cossack era as a time when the masses struggled for freedom and social justice against the exploitation of Ukrainian landowners. The populists collected and published some basic archival materials and produced several monographs on the Hetmanate’s social structure and institutions. Oleksander Lazarevskyi, who wrote more than four hundred works on virtually every aspect of the Hetmanate’s society, is the most notable of the populist historians. In dealing with the abolition of autonomy, the populists naturally concentrated on social issues. For instance, Mykola Storozhenko described the Cossacks’ fate, Dmytro Miller traced the transformation of the Cossack officer class into the Russian nobility, and O. Lazarevskyi and V. Miakotin studied the ensnarement of the peasantry.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a new generation of Ukrainian historians revolted against populism and developed a new “statist” orientation. They viewed the Hetmanate as a virtually independent state and concentrated their research on such indicators of independence as foreign relations, internal administration, and judicial

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2 Tezy pro 300-richchia voz’iednannya Ukrainy z Rosiyu (1648–1654 rr), sikhvaleni Tsentral’nym komitetom Komunistichnoi partii Radians’kooho soiuzu (Kiev, 1954).
3 Mykola Tkachenko compiled a definitive bibliography of Lazarevskyi’s works. See “Spysok prats’ O. M. Lazarevskyho i prats’ pro n’oho,” Ukrains’kyi arkhеohrafichnyi zbirnyk 2 (1927): 61–133.
procedures. For the most part, these historians were preoccupied with
the early period of the Hetmanate's history, when it was indeed virtu-
ally independent. Their main contribution to knowledge about the
abolition lies in their study of instances of opposition to imperial
integration. In fact, the greatest debate of the statist school pertinent
to this work was over the authorship of Istoriia Rusov, an anti-
integrationist and even anti-Russian political tract that had an impor-
tant impact on the development of modern Ukrainian national con-
sciousness.\(^7\) Oleksander Ohloblyn, in particular, has done much to
identify oppositionist circles at the time of the abolition.\(^8\)

Soviet historians consider the abolition of the Hetmanate's auton-
omy to be a politically sensitive topic that is best ignored.\(^9\) Their con-
tributions have been limited to two topics: the class struggle and the
"friendship" of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. Soviet historians
have investigated some manifestations of social discontent, thereby
expanding our knowledge of Cossack and peasant uprisings (espe-
cially in the village of Turbav).\(^10\) Under the rubric of the friendship
of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, they have produced many works

\(^7\) Historians' arguments about the authorship and philosophy of Istoriia Rusov
have been discussed by O. Ohloblyn in the introduction to a new Ukrainian transla-
tion; see Istoriia Rusiv (New York, 1956), pp. v–xxix.

\(^8\) O. Ohloblyn, Liudy staroi Ukrainy (Munich, 1959): "Ukrainian Autonomists of
the 1780s and 1790s and Count P. A. Rumiantsev-Zadunaysky," *Annals of the
Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* (henceforth *Annals
UAASS*), no. 3–4 (1958): 1313–26; Opanas Lobysevych (1732–1805) (Munich,
1966). For an exhaustive bibliography of Ohloblyn's works, see Liubomyr Wynar,
"Bibliohrafia prats' prof. d-ra Oleksandra Ohlobylina (1920–1975)," in Zbirnyk na
poshanu prof. d-ra Oleksandra Ohlobylina, ed. by Vasyl' Omel'chenko (New York,
1977), pp. 93–123.

\(^9\) I do not consider historians who published in the Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s as
"Soviet" but as representatives of various schools. Only after the establishment of an
official historical interpretation in the 1930s can the term "Soviet" accurately be used
to define a historical orientation.

\(^10\) I. O. Hurzhii, Borot'ba selian i robiynykiv Ukrainy proty feudal'no-
kryposnyts' koho hnutu (z 80-ku rokiv XVIII-st. do 1861 r.) (Kiev, 1958); Istoriia selia-
nstva Ukrainy'koi RSR, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1967); K. Huslysty, Turbav'ske povstannya
(Kiev, 1947); I. Hurzhii, Povstannya selian v Turbavakh (1789–1793) (Kiev, 1950).
on their common struggle against Napoleon (when several traditional Cossack units were reestablished).\footnote{G. Gerbil'skii, Ukrainskie kozachie pol'ki i ukrainskoe opolchenie v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda (Kiev, 1943); V. I. Strel'skii, Uchastie ukrainskogo naroda v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda (Kiev, 1953); B. S. Aboliikhin, "Ukrainskoe opolchenie 1812 g.," Istoriicheskie zapiski, no. 72 (1962): 87–118.}

Denial of access to Soviet archives has limited my study to published sources. Fortunately, however, most of the basic sources dealing with the abolition have been published. Catherine's correspondence, the petitions to the Legislative Commission of 1767, and the papers of Oleksander Bezborod'ko appear in the Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obschestva (St. Petersburg, 1867–1916). Governor-General Rumiantsev's military archives, Catherine's papers, the Cossack chronicles, and official documents dealing with the Hetmanate are found in the Chteniia v Imperatorskom obschestve istorii i drevnosti Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitiete (Moscow, 1846–1918). Virtually all laws bearing upon the abolition have been published in the Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 1st series (St. Petersburg, 1830), and in the Senatskii arkhiv (St. Petersburg, 1888–1913). During the nineteenth century, journals such as Kiev'skaia starina (Kiev, 1882–1906) and newspapers such as Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti (Chernihiv, 1838–1917) contained pertinent documentation in virtually every issue.

Much of this extensive published material about the abolition has never been incorporated into the general body of historical knowledge. I seek to remedy this situation. Undoubtedly, some lacunae will remain. I hope, however, that my work will stimulate further study, especially that based on archival research.

A few words about terminology are in order. During its history, Ukraine has been called by a number of names: "'Rus'," "'Little Russia'" (Mala Rus', Mala Rossia, Malorossia) and "'Ukraine.'" In the eighteenth century, the territory of the Hetmanate was known as "'Little Russia,'" but the term is imprecise because, in other periods, "'Little Russia'" referred to other territories outside the Hetmanate. Moreover, the term is now considered derogatory by many Ukrainians. In the nineteenth century, historians coined the term "'Hetmanate,'" and in the twentieth century Soviet historians have introduced the term "'Left-Bank Ukraine'" (the left or eastern bank of the Dnieper River).
“Left-Bank Ukraine” is unsatisfactory because, as a geographic term, it implies a larger territory than that encompassed by the Hetmanate, and it is not used consistently by the Soviets. Thus, in this work, I utilize the term “Hetmanate” for the specific polity governed by the hetman and also use the current designations of “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians.” “Little Russia” and “Little Russians” appear only in direct quotations or official titles (e.g., the Little Russian College).

A major difficulty arises in finding a suitable collective term for the Ukrainian elite governing the Hetmanate. The fusion of Cossack and Polish-Lithuanian elites and traditions resulted in a number of designations for the elite, including “starshyna,” “znachne viis’kove tovarystvo,” and “szlachta,” with its English equivalent of “nobility.” None of these is fully satisfactory. “Starshyna” simply means Cossack officers or elders, while the “znachne viis’kove tovarystvo” (Society of Notable Military Fellows) refers to the social grouping out of which all officers were recruited. Thus, upon becoming an officer, a member of the elite would become part of the starshyna but upon retirement would revert back to a Notable Military Fellow. The Ukrainian elite cannot be equated merely with a group of Cossack officers and notables, however. By the eighteenth century, this elite evolved into a cohesive landed aristocracy, which began claiming the status of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility, the szlachta. While such szlachta pretensions were not recognized by the Russian government, in the Hetmanate the elite did exercise some szlachta legal privileges. The lack of recognition of the elite as a nobility, however, renders both the terms “szlachta” and “nobility” inappropriate. As a result, I have decided to use the term “gentry,” because as landed proprie tors claiming noble status, the Ukrainian elite approximated the social position and life-style of a gentry. For stylistic variety, I have used the term “gentry” interchangeably with “notables” or “notable.” Equating the two terms is justified by the fact that virtually all who were considered gentry were at some point in their lives also members of the Notable Military Fellows. Whenever appropriate, I will also refer to the “szlachta,” “starshyna,” and “nobles” and describe further the various groups and subgroups that made up the Ukrainian gentry.

Ukrainian and Russian names have been transliterated according to the Library of Congress system. Ukrainian names are given in Ukrainian orthography, and Russian names are rendered in Russian
orthography. When Ukrainians whose names are well known in their Russian form are introduced, the Russian variant appears in parentheses. In citations, authors’ names are given exactly as they appear on the publications cited. This occasionally creates inconsistencies, since an author’s name can appear in one form within the text and in another in a footnote. Moreover, a number of historians wrote in several languages and their names may have several variants. The bibliography and index list all names in alphabetical order, with cross-references when more than one version of a name appeared.

All dates are given according to the Julian calendar that was in use in the Hetmanate and in Russia (in the eighteenth century, the Julian calendar was eleven days behind the Gregorian one followed in most countries of Europe). The single exception is the citation of dates from the reports of Western diplomats, which are designated “N.S.” (new style).
CHAPTER ONE

Russian Centralism
and the Borderlands

Russian centralism can be traced to the political system of early modern Muscovy. Its most salient feature was the theoretically unlimited authority of the ruler. By the fifteenth century, the principle of an all-powerful, divinely anointed ruler became the center of Muscovite politics. Struggles over power, prestige, or wealth were conducted within a framework of gaining proximity to and influence over the ruler rather than establishing an independent base. Such was the role of the boyar duma and the zemskii sobory (as they were labelled by nineteenth-century historians), which, in the end, enhanced the authority of the ruler rather than limiting it. The Orthodox church, which potentially could have evolved into a formidable independent institution, ultimately opted for support of tsarist autocracy and submitted to tsarist control. Even when the throne was occupied by weak or incompetent rulers or during periods of interregnum, the land was governed in the name of the absolute ruler. The concept of an unlimited all-powerful tsar was the mechanism for legitimacy and unity in Moscow, and, to some extent, served as a substitute for institutional development.\(^1\)

The absolutism, power, and majesty of the Muscovite ruler were expressed through concepts of patrimony, tsardom, and autocracy. Patrimony simply meant that the Muscovite ruler considered himself as owner of his domain. Some historians believe that the shift in terminology from gospodar to gosudar in the fifteenth century indicated

the widening of the concept of owner to that of ruler or sovereign. But the two concepts were never clearly differentiated, however, and when the Muscovite princes added territory, they were not simply extending their authority or sovereignty but gaining new possessions. According to Richard Pipes, the patrimonial mentality continued with the later tsars, who viewed their empire from Poland to China as a family estate to be passed on intact to their heirs.

The authority of the Muscovite ruler was further bolstered by the concepts of tsar and autocrat. Both were introduced by Ivan III in the late fifteenth century. The title "tsar" derived from "caesar" and implied a claim to universal rule. The first "tsar" to be recognized as such by the Eastern Orthodox churches, Ivan IV, was probably more concerned with proclaiming his rule over the newly conquered "tsardoms" of Kazan and Astrakhan than with asserting a role of universal emperor. Nevertheless, he did claim equality with the Holy Roman emperor.

Autocracy was a Byzantine concept denoting a sovereign who held his authority directly from God. Ivan III's application of the term was to underscore Muscovy's political independence, the final break from Mongol rule (1480). To Ivan III, autocracy meant primarily that he was not dependent on other rulers. His successor, Ivan IV, enlarged this concept to include unlimited rule both externally and internally. By the sixteenth century, Muscovite autocracy meant an independent ruler, who was not limited by any institutions, who was the sole lawgiver, and who was responsible only to God.

The image of the Muscovite tsar as a supreme ruler was further enhanced by historical and political literature. The tsar was presented as the legitimate inheritor of the Kievan realm, the gatherer of the "Russian lands." Through a legendary genealogy he was linked with the Roman emperors. After the fall of Constantinople to the Turks

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3 Pipes, _Russia_, p. 54.

4 Szeftel, "The Title of the Muscovite Monarch," pp. 70–76.

(1453), the Muscovite tsar was looked upon by some Orthodox clergy as the only legitimate Orthodox ruler, and Moscow was presented as the Third Rome, the final successor to the Roman and Byzantine empires.  

Royal claims to patrimonial and unrestricted absolutist rule were hardly unique to Muscovy. In this respect, at various times during the seventeenth century, France, Denmark, and Sweden resembled Muscovite absolutism. There were also important differences, however. In the West, there was a gradual emergence of the concept of the state as separate from the monarch and a differentiation between the authority of the monarch as the ruler of the state and as owner of a territory. Even in Louis XIV’s France, the king had to swear that he would not separate parts of his domain—i.e., truncate the state (irrespective of Louis XIV’s alleged famous dictum, “L’État, c’est moi”). De facto, the king did give up proprietary rights over his “possessions.” Similarly, while the Western absolutist rulers claimed to be totally independent and unrestricted monarchs responsible only to God, in fact they were limited by the existence of independent corporate and regional bodies. In late Muscovy, the restrictions on autocracy were practical—e.g., available resources, overcoming great distances—rather than institutional.

The tsar’s theoretically unlimited formal authority was transmitted through an increasingly larger number of servitors and government structures. The central administration evolved out of the tsar’s household. Its backbone was the diaki or secretaries, who once were probably household slaves but later included sons of clergy, townspeople, and even aristocrats or boyars. From the end of the fifteenth through the sixteenth centuries the diaki helped create a central chancellery or prikaz system. Each chancellery had primary competence over either a territory or a function. A series of reforms in the 1550s eliminated some of the overlapping jurisdictions in the prikazy and created a genuine centralized administrative apparatus. It was the tsar’s

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7 Pipes, Russia, pp. 65–66.

On the local level, the tsar was represented by a voevoda, who combined military, administrative, and judicial functions. His principal duty was to obtain taxes for the tsar’s treasury and recruits for his army. Although the voevoda and his staff were given sufficient opportunity for self-aggrandisement, they exercised little independent authority. Judicial decisions, questions concerning landholding, and even local military battle tactics were made within the prikaz system and then communicated with the voevoda. In order to avoid any strong regional attachments, voevody were frequently transferred. While such a system deprived the voevody of initiative or flexibility, it did assure control over the most minute details in the most distant territory.\footnote{Pipes, Russia, pp. 96, 108; A. V. Chernov, “Reorganizatsii tsentral’nykh mestnykh organov vlasti i upravleniia,” Ocherki istorii SSR. Period feudalismu konets XV v.–nachalo XVII v., ed. A. N. Nasonov and L. V. Cherepnin, (Moscow, 1955), pp. 321–328; Peter B. Brown, “Muscovite Generals and Military Amateurism: Unravelling the Tactical Blunders and Human Costs of Seventeenth-Century Russian Warfare,” Paper presented to the American Historical Association Convention, December 1984, Chicago.}

The emergence of tsarist authority, its political and theoretical articulation, and the creation of the Muscovite centralized state structure occurred simultaneously with rapid expansion. From the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century, Muscovy enlarged its territory from 430,000 to 5,100,000 square kilometers.\footnote{Pipes, Russia, p. 83.} At first, the expansion was confined to the “gathering” of Russian lands, but in the second half of the sixteenth century, Ivan IV conquered Kazan and Astrakhan, opening the whole mid-Volga area and going well beyond the ethnically Russian core area. With Ivan’s blessings, the Stroganov merchant family, together with Cossacks and mercenaries, went beyond the Urals, penetrating Siberia for the Russian fur and salt trade. By
the middle of the seventeenth century, Siberia had been crossed and the Russians reached the Pacific Ocean. In 1654 the tsar's rule was extended over Ukraine, and at the beginning of the eighteenth century Peter I conquered the Baltic area.11

As Muscovy expanded, it extended its political system to the new territories. Special characteristics of the newly acquired areas were wiped out. This pattern was already established while "gathering the Russian lands." In Pskov (1510) and in Smolensk (1515), the symbol of independent political life—the bell used for summoning town meetings—was destroyed. In Novgorod not only was the meeting bell torn down, but the very streets were changed to follow the Muscovite pattern. Scribes came to the newly acquired territories and took inventory of property so that it would be registered "in the Muscovite manner."12

A similar pattern was followed when Muscovy went beyond the ethnically Russian areas. Tsarist authority was proclaimed, and Muscovite administration was established through the military voevoda, who was expected to collect taxes, provide recruits for the military, and supervise judicial matters. Yet, the peculiar conditions of the borderlands had to be taken into account. Both in the Volga region and in Siberia, Muscovy encountered a variety of sparsely settled Finno-Ugric, Turkic, and Siberian peoples. Time and distance made it somewhat more difficult to coordinate everything from the center, and the resources of the Muscovite administration were stretched thin. As a result, taxes were collected in the form of tribute. In the mid-Volga region they were collected by the military governor, while in Siberia this function was entrusted to tribal chiefs, who also retained authority over minor judicial matters. Such accommodation was local and tactical, however, and was supervised by the military governor, who had actual local authority over all matters concerning taxes, recruitment, land, and justice. The voevoda, in turn,

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12 Raba, "'The Authority of the Muscovite Ruler,'" p. 311.
was responsible to the Kazan (1565) and Siberian (1637) prikazy specifically created by the Muscovite centralized state.  

The Muscovite authorities were willing to accommodate themselves more to the Cossack formations than to the native peoples. Initially, the Cossacks served as mercenaries and freebooters, each host resembling a small but independent military republic. Located in the vast borderlands between the settled agriculturalists and the nomads, the Cossack hosts served as a buffer zone for Muscovy and, later, the empire. The Don Cossacks, who accepted Muscovite suzerainty in the sixteenth century but retained considerable autonomy, were the largest formation. Smaller Cossack hosts existed from the Iaik River (now the Ural River) as far as Siberia but were under much greater control by the Muscovite military governors. In dealing with the Cossacks, the Muscovite and subsequently the imperial authorities balanced two opposing sets of considerations. On the one hand, the Cossacks protected the Russian hinterland and provided auxiliary troops for Russia’s wars. On the other hand, they harbored runaway serfs, sparked peasant uprisings, and precipitated international crises by conducting unauthorized raids. Consequently, the tsars pursued a dual policy. They granted charters recognizing self-rule and issued subsidies to each host. At the same time, however, the Muscovite authorities began to exercise greater control over the hosts’ activities.

Despite some accommodation with natives and Cossacks, the extent to which the central Muscovite state was able to assert administrative uniformity was remarkable. One reason for this was that government functions were relatively simple—the collection of taxes and the drafting of recruits—and, at first, were not particularly disruptive to native ways. The various native clans and tribes were used to paying tribute either to the Mongols or to another more powerful tribe.

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In the Volga region, the Muscovite authorities simply took over the Mongol tribute payment system. While paying tribute to the new Muscovite overlord, the tribe or clan continued its previous way of life. Similarly, the smaller Cossack formations continued their traditional life—hunting, fishing, farming, and occasionally fighting and looting—but enjoying these privileges as servitors of Muscovy rather than as independent hosts.

The relatively benign beginnings of Muscovite rule over natives belied its profound long-term effects. With Russian colonization, Christianization of the natives, and cooptation of elites, Muscovite rule meant not only administrative uniformity but also greater uniformity of social structure, ways of life, and even the beginnings of cultural Russification. Such an outcome could hardly have been foreseen by the natives, however. Moreover, once disaffected the natives did not have an adequate institutional framework to channel their discontent. Although at times the nomadic peoples and Cossacks could become extremely belligerent—as shown by the revolts of Stenka Razin, Bulavin, the uprising of the Bashkirs, and the rebellion led by Pugachev—these uprisings merely stimulated Moscow to assume greater control over the borderlands and impose a more effective administration. The huge eastern and southern areas annexed by Muscovy simply lacked the Western traditions of political autonomy, regionalism, estate rights, and legal prerogatives that would have allowed the retention of extensive self-rule. Almost imperceptibly, Muscovy became a large, multiethnic yet centrally administered empire.

Before considering Muscovy’s expansion into the Ukraine, it is necessary to describe, if only briefly, the various Ukrainian Cossack formations. The Ukrainian Cossacks emerged in the borderlands between the Tatars and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where

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15 Brown, "Muscovite Administration and the Peoples of the North," pp. 6–12.
16 Ibid., pp. 11–30; Raeff, "Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy," pp. 31–40.
they hunted, fished, and conducted raids against the Tatars and the
Ottoman Empire. Their stronghold was on an island fortress or Sich,
located beyond the cataracts in the Dnieper River. Hence, these Cos-
sacks were referred to as Zaporozhians, or Cossacks beyond the
cataracts. As their military power increased, the Polish government
would enlist the Cossacks for specific campaigns. Gradually, the
Zaporozhian Cossacks began identifying themselves as privileged
warriors, equal to the Polish nobility. While the Zaporozhian Cos-
sacks did, at times, greatly augment the fighting capabilities of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they also caused considerable in-
stability. If unsatisfied, the Zaporozhians would also revolt against
the Poles.  

In 1648, the Zaporozhian Cossacks provided the military support
for a massive uprising against the Poles. In 1654, the leader of the
Cossacks, Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, broke away completely
from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and, under the terms of
the Pereiaslav Agreement, placed Cossack Ukraine under the suze-
renalty of the Muscovite tsar. After a series of prolonged wars, the
Right-Bank Ukraine (west of the Dnieper River) was reincorporated
into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but the Left Bank (east of
the Dnieper) remained a separate political entity under the protection
of the tsar. It is this truncated Left-Bank successor to the polity estab-
lished by Khmel’nyts’kyi that is usually referred to as the Hetmanate.
The Zaporozhian Cossacks, who had provided the military base for
the revolt, gradually returned to their stronghold, the Sich, and contin-
ued to function as an independent Cossack host.

In addition to the Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Cossacks, there
was another Cossack formation in southeastern or Sloboda Ukraine.
This territory had been under Muscovite control but was sparsely
inhabited. Thus, in the seventeenth century, Muscovy encouraged
Ukrainian Cossacks to settle and defend the territory. Enticed by free
land and fleeing war in the Ukraine, settlers came in large numbers.

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18 For the Zaporozhian Cossacks, see V. A. Golobutskii (Holobuts’kyi), Zaporozh-
skoe kazachestvo (Kiev, 1957); idem, Zaporiz’ka sich v ostanny chasy svoego isnuvan-
nia (Kiev, 1961); and Natalia Polons’ka-Vasilenko, Zaporizhzhia XVIII stolit’ia ta
The colonizers recreated in Sloboda Ukraine the military structure of their former homeland—regiments led by a colonel.  

Moscow’s policy toward Ukrainian Cossacks varied depending on the type of formation. The Sloboda-Ukrainian Cossacks, located on Muscovite territory, were treated somewhat like some of the tribal groups. Although the tsarist authorities granted the Cossacks certain privileges, each regiment dealt separately with and was controlled by a Muscovite military governor. The autonomy of these Cossacks was limited, and there was little possibility for the regiments to consolidate into a separate host. The Zaporozhians, on the other hand, were a famous host on the borderlands between the Islamic and Slavic worlds. Toward the Zaporozhian Cossacks, therefore, the Muscovites followed the same policies as toward other Cossack hosts: maximum utilization of Cossack military prowess while at the same time curbing their independence.

When dealing with the Hetmanate, Moscow could, to some extent, treat it as the incorporation of yet another borderland or Cossack formation, but the Pereiaslav agreement between Muscovy and Cossack Ukraine also made it very different. The Ukrainian Cossacks were used to negotiating with the Polish king and held concepts of a negotiated contractual relationship between a monarch and the Cossack estate. Such an outlook was contrary and offensive to the Muscovite view of tsarist authority. Moreover, in the 1648 revolution, Khmelnyts’kyi had freed most of Ukraine from Polish rule. The victorious Zaporozhian Cossacks took over a large hinterland inhabited by non-Cossacks—gentry, burghers, clergy, and peasants. This resulted in a fusion of the new Cossack administration with the remnants of the old order. At Pereiaslav, the hetman and his administration represented not only the Cossack host, but also all of “Little Russia” (Malorossia) or the Hetmanate. Soon the Hetmanate developed a social hierarchy that more closely resembled a corporate society than a military republic. As a result, Muscovy came into contact with a complex society, with various groups—Cossacks, gentry, townsfolk, and clerics—claiming special “rights and liberties.” It was

19 The most noted historian of Sloboda Ukraine was D. Bahalii (Bagalei) who published numerous works on the subject. For general information, see his Istoriia Slobids’koj Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1918).
Moscow's first encounter with a type of society that included at least elements of a corporate order and a strong sense of regionalism.\textsuperscript{20}

Russia's incorporation of the Baltic littoral brought territories with even more entrenched regional prerogatives. When Peter I conquered the area in the early eighteenth century, he immediately issued charters recognizing the traditional rights of Estland and Livland, as well as the municipal rights of Riga, Reval, and Vyborg.\textsuperscript{21} The German nobility governed these territories through their diets, and the German-speaking urban patriciate and artisans ruled in the cities. The Latvian and Estonian peasantry had no voice in government. In continuing the traditional order, the imperial government may have viewed it as a temporary expedient, but the groups enjoying these privileges believed them to be corporate rights enjoyed by them from time immemorial.\textsuperscript{22} Nevertheless, irrespective of the tenuous nature of the arrangements, in its Western borderlands Russia did accommodate itself to corporate rights and regionalism, and its drive towards uniformity had been slowed if not necessarily halted.

As it turned westward, Muscovy not only encountered concepts of corporate and regional rights but also became exposed to new political and philosophical ideas and more advanced military and administrative practices. With the annexation of the Ukraine, Kiev became a transmitter of certain Western intellectual and political views and neo-Byzantine church practices. In their struggle with Catholic Poland, the Ukrainian clergy were able to use some of the intellectual tools of the Catholic Counter-reformation for the defense of traditional Orthodoxy. This reinvigorated Orthodox cultural milieu had a profound impact on Muscovy, resulting in church reforms that sparked a schism. Although Ukrainian neo-scholasticism was hardly the most advanced form of Western philosophical thought, its emphasis on

\textsuperscript{20} The particulars of the Ukrainian situation with full citations will be provided in the following two chapters.


logic and rhetoric provided a foundation for the introduction of Western rationalism, science, and the concepts of natural law.\textsuperscript{23}

The Ukraine was not the only channel for Western ideas. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, new political and economic theories emanating from the Germanies reached Russia. The new theories, subsumed under such terms as "cameralism" and the "well-ordered police state," advocated a reshaping of society in order to increase the power and wealth of the state and improve the moral and material welfare of the individual. The instrument for guiding and policing society was the absolutist state, which issued detailed regulations based on natural law or reason.\textsuperscript{24} The German cameralists believed that just as rational principles reveal the functioning of God's universe, so natural law—deduced by reason rather than revelation—reflects God's purpose for society. It was man's duty to discover these rules, and the sovereign was to introduce them into society.

Cameralist thought had a strong moral imperative derived from a religious sense of duty. It was the duty of the monarch to promote the spiritual, political, and economic welfare of society as revealed by God through natural law. He was thus obliged to introduce legislation that both adhered to natural law and fulfilled the spiritual and secular goals of society. The practical results of the cameralist outlook were the regulatory ordinances, or Landes und Polizeiordnungen, that regulated all aspects of German spiritual, political, and economic life in

\textsuperscript{23} Marc Raeff in \textit{Understanding Imperial Russia} (New York, 1984): 18–24 claims that the impact of the Ukraine weakened and undermined Moscow's traditional political culture. The exhaustive study on the Ukrainian impact on late Muscovy and imperial Russia is by K. Khitarov, \textit{Malorossiiskoe viianie na velikorusskuu tserkovniu zhizn'} (Kazan, 1914).

\textsuperscript{24} Marc Raeff believes that Muscovy's Ukrainian exposure laid the groundwork for concepts of cameralism and the well-ordered police state. See, "Seventeenth-Century Europe in Eighteenth-Century Russia," \textit{Slavic Review} 41, no. 4 (Winter, 1982): 613–14. This is contested by Isabel de Madariaga who states that nothing in Ukraine's political culture could have foreshadowed the police state. According to her, the Ukrainian ideal of sovereignty was diffused rather than centralized, corporate rather than absolutist. See, "Sisters under the Skin," \textit{Slavic Review} 41, no. 4 (Winter, 1982): 626. On the whole, I agree with de Madariaga. At most, the Ukraine introduced Muscovy to concepts of natural law which, subsequently, could have been utilized to buttress arguments for the well-ordered police state. Yet, the evidence is somewhat contradictory, for Feofan Prokopovich, a clear product of the Ukrainian political tradition, did become an eloquent apologist for Petrine absolutism.
the seventeenth century. According to Marc Raeff, these regulations ultimately inculcated the political attitudes associated with modernity—dynamism, goal orientation, and production orientation.25

The extent to which Peter I looked at the well-ordered state as a model when he transformed Muscovy into the Russian Empire is not clear. Most likely, the needs of the military drove Peter to introduce many of his reforms, and he undoubtedly did not adhere to any comprehensive philosophical system but relied on ad hoc solutions. Nevertheless, he did establish a large European-style standing army and laid the foundation for a modern bureaucracy. Borrowing unabashedly from his principal adversary, Sweden, Peter gradually abolished the prikaz system and established a new central administration, the colleges, based on functional rather than geographic lines. The General Regulations defined precisely the jurisdiction of each college, while the Table of Ranks set up an orderly system of recruitment and promotion for the newly proclaimed empire’s civilian and military officials. The state attempted to regulate the activities of its subjects and encouraged trade and manufacturing. Although these were only initial steps that hardly touched the provinces, Peter did set Russia on the road to becoming a goal-oriented, centrally regulated absolutist monarchy.26


While the Petrine revolution resulted in a profound transformation of the Muscovite state, it did not significantly alter the nature of authority. The all-powerful ruler was still the center of politics. Cameralist thought, moreover, recognized few rights of subjects against the absolutist ruler, only duties. It is true that the ruler also had a duty to promote the welfare of his subjects, but the subjects were treated as children who had to be guided and disciplined. In Russia, cameralist thought provided an added secularized justification—the common good—for autocratic rule. In the new imperial Russia, just as in Muscovy, there simply was even less legal basis for the rights of subjects, corporations, or special regions.

In central Europe, however, the corporate bodies played an important yet somewhat contradictory role in promoting the modern ethos. These constituted bodies—estates, guilds, municipalities, were, in many instances, the instruments through which the state was able to reach the larger public and inculcate modern behavior, which involved disciplining and guiding these bodies without destroying them. Therefore, the state was not the sole instrument of modernization but acted as a guide, encouraging the activity of corporate institutions and private individuals. Yet the corporate bodies were also preservers of traditional customs, groupings, and ways of life. In many instances, these constituted bodies were locked in mortal combat with the central authorities and faced possible elimination. As the foremost representatives of tradition, these bodies could also present formidable opposition to the new activism and emphasis on development fostered by the state. Since, according to the cameralists, the rules of good governance could be discovered and applied for the benefit of the entire population, corporate rights and regional rights could be viewed as a hindrance to the application of rational principles.

In Russia, the lack of genuine corporate bodies in the core area meant that the state had no partner through which it could reach and instruct society. The state itself became the major modernizer and carried out its activities through the newly reorganized bureaucracy. But in its western borderlands Russia did have some genuine corporate institutions and autonomous areas. Would imperial Russia choose to co-opt these or simply to replace them with the imperial

bureaucracy? Would the cameralist ideas filtering into Russia help to preserve borderland autonomy or accelerate the drive towards centralism?

Considering Russia's concept of autocratic tsarist authority, the history of Muscovite centralization, and the new emphasis on rational administration and development, prospects for regional autonomy did not seem auspicious. At least some of the autonomous institutions of the borderlands, particularly those structured on German and Swedish lines, however, conformed to cameralist thought and were considered worthy of imitation. Thus, at the beginning of the eighteenth century the concept of a unitary Russian state was seriously challenged by the special prerogatives of the Hetmanate and the Baltic area.

Both the Baltic region and the Hetmanate had certain advantages and drawbacks in the confrontation with Russian centralism. The political and corporate institutions of the Baltic region were well entrenched, more so than those of the Hetmanate. The German language and the Lutheran religion that predominated among the Baltic elite were entirely different from the Russian language and religion. Most important, the Baltic Germans and the Russians agreed that German culture was superior to that of Russia; indeed, the Baltic area was considered an enclave of Europe within the Russian Empire. The very entrenchment of its institutions, stemming from feudal times, however, prevented any consolidation of Baltic autonomy. The region actually comprised three autonomous areas (Estland, Livland, and Oesel) with three separate diets. By dealing separately with each corporation of the nobility and each town, the Russian imperial authorities could easily manipulate and, on occasion, subvert the functioning of autonomy. Finally, the Baltic region, although of great

29 Both the tension and the cooperation between the imperial authorities and the various representatives of Baltic autonomy are described in detail in Zutis, Ostzeiskii vopros, pp. 49–183.
strategic and economic importance, was smaller than the Hetmanate; in 1762 the population of the region was 386,915 males.\textsuperscript{30}

The institutions of the Hetmanate were less entrenched than those of the Baltic region, and many were of fairly recent origin. There were considerable similarities in language, culture, and religion between its inhabitants and the Russians. Yet, the institutions of the Hetmanate were quite different from those of Russia proper. The Cossack revolution of 1648 had provided the Hetmanate with its own unified central administration and even its own symbolic head of state, the hetman. Moreover, the Hetmanate was by far the largest and most populous autonomous region, inhabited in the 1760s by over one million males.\textsuperscript{31} At the time, the total population of the empire—including all military formations—was only just above eleven million males.\textsuperscript{32}

As the foremost representative of regionalism, the Hetmanate clashed more and more frequently with Russian centralism. The struggle began in earnest under Peter I and was to culminate during the reign of Catherine II. Before examining the nature of this conflict, however, let us look at the formation of the Hetmanate, its social structure, and the institutions of Ukrainian self-government.

\textsuperscript{30} V. M. Kabuzan, \textit{Izmeneniiia v rasmeshchenii naseleniiia Rossii v XVIII-pervoi poloviny XIX v.} (Moscow, 1971), p. 87.

\textsuperscript{31} Kabuzan in \textit{Izmeneniiia . . . naseleniiia} lists 1,027,928 males in 1762. The number was arrived at by totaling the male population of the Chernihiv (438,897), Poltava (565,964), and Kiev (23,052) areas. A. Shatonskii lists the total male population of the Hetmanate in 1764 as 1,024,023; see his \textit{Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoie opisanie} (Kiev, 1851), p. 85.

\textsuperscript{32} Kabuzan, \textit{Izmeneniiia . . . naseleniiia}, p. 91.
CHAPTER TWO

The Nature of Ukrainian Autonomy

The Origins and Development of the Hetmanate

The origins of the Hetmanate go back to the 1648 Cossack revolution, one of the most cataclysmic events in Ukrainian history. During that time, the Polish administration and ruling elites were swept from the Ukraine and entire segments of the population—magnates, Poles, Catholics, Uniates (adherents of Eastern Christianity who recognize papal supremacy), and Jews—were slaughtered or driven from the territory. The ferocity of the revolution arose from the convergence of social, religious, and—to some extent—national grievances that briefly united the greater part of the Ukraine’s Orthodox population, including the petty nobility, clergy, Cossacks, and peasants. It was the Cossacks, however, who provided the military strength that made the uprising possible and who replaced the Polish administration with their own institutions.

The Cossacks formed a military society living in the no-man’s-land between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They were free men recruited from various strata of the population; most, however, were runaway serfs. The borderland, with its freedom and wealth, attracted bold men who risked the constant danger of Tatar attacks while venturing into the steppe to hunt, fish, and farm. For self-protection the Cossacks began organizing themselves into armed bands, which, by the sixteenth century, were consolidated into a Cossack host. Located in an area beyond the Dnieper cataract, the Zaporozhian Cossacks became an army of mercenaries and freebooters.¹

¹ The history of the Cossacks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is summarized well in Golobutskii, Zaporozhskoe katachestvo, pp. 1–108; and Stöckl, Die Entstehung des Kosakentums. The topic is treated in much greater detail in volumes 6
The Polish government soon began enlisting the Cossacks in the defense of the southern frontier against the Tatars and Turks and as auxiliary troops in its numerous wars. As a reward for their services to the Polish crown, the Cossacks demanded the recognition of certain "Cossack rights and privileges." These included self-government; the right to own land; to hunt, fish, and trade; to produce alcoholic beverages; and to be exempt from taxation. But Poland's ruling class, the szlachta, who claimed these prerogatives as their sole preserve, refused to recognize the pretensions of the Cossacks, viewing them simply as rebellious peasants. In a society divided into lord, serf, and burgher, no special place could be made for the Cossacks, despite their military services.

As long as the Cossacks lived on the frontier between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tatars, these social tensions remained under control. In the sixteenth century, however, Polish and Polonized Ukrainian magnates began an intensive colonization of the Ukraine. They established latifundia for the large-scale production and exportation of grain. Sometimes, when they received title to lands containing Cossack homesteads, the nobles attempted to force the Cossacks to perform labor obligations and to evict them if they refused. The Cossacks resisted, leading to altercations and lawsuits, which, in the eyes of the nobility, set a poor example for the landlord's serfs. Attracted by temporary exemptions from labor obligations, the peasants flocked to the newly colonized lands. When the exemption period elapsed, however, the peasants frequently fled, revolted, or joined the Cossacks. Thus, the existence of the Cossack alternative became a constant source of social friction.

In dealing with the Cossacks, the Polish government found itself in a dilemma. As long as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was involved in a war against Tatars, Turks, or Muscovy, the government needed a large number of Cossacks, but when hostilities ended, this large number was a hazard to the Commonwealth and to the nobility. The government attempted to limit and control the number of Cossacks by establishing a register of officially recognized Cossacks who were paid by the crown. During peacetime, the government tried to keep the register as small as possible, while the Cossacks constantly

and 7 of M. Hrushevskyi's Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols. (Lviv and Kiev, 1898–1937).
strove to enlarge it. The register fluctuated according to political circumstances—there were one thousand three hundred Cossacks in 1568, six thousand in 1625, and eight thousand in 1630.\textsuperscript{2} This represented a mere fraction of their actual number, for the vast majority were unregistered or "self-governing" Cossacks. Circumstances sometimes forced the Poles to employ their military skill as well. For example, the great victory at Khotyn (1621) was won with the participation of 41,250 Cossacks.\textsuperscript{3} Once the danger to the Commonwealth had passed, however, the authorities eliminated all the recent entries from the register. In 1625 they agreed to register only six thousand out of forty-five thousand men who claimed Cossack status.\textsuperscript{4} The unregistered Cossacks lost their rights and were faced with the choice of either becoming serfs or fleeing. Many of these men went further into the steppe to regions beyond Polish control; others remained and somehow managed to evade enslavement. Nonetheless, the threat of serfdom, the limited register, and the Poles’ refusal to recognize fully Cossack "rights and privileges" caused intense dissatisfaction.

The Orthodox faith served as a common bond between the Cossacks and Ukrainian peasants, burghers, and some segments of the nobility. In the sixteenth century, the Orthodox church in the Ukraine was in crisis. Unable to compete successfully with Roman Catholicism, which enjoyed Polish state support, Orthodoxy was being abandoned by much of the nobility. In order to minimize the pressures of Catholicism, a number of Orthodox bishops and faithful agreed to the Union of Brest (1596), which created the Uniate church. This church retained Eastern ritual and the Slavonic liturgical language but was in union with Rome. While the church hierarchy, in general, favored the union, it was bitterly opposed by the lay brotherhoods, composed mostly of burghers, and by many nobles who remained Orthodox.\textsuperscript{5} Intense religious strife developed. Although unpopular with the

\textsuperscript{2} Ivan Kholms’kyi (Ivan Kryp’tiakivych), Istoriiia Ukrainy (New York, 1949), pp. 184–94.

\textsuperscript{3} Hrushevskyi, Istoriiia Ukrainy-Rusy, 7: 473.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., vol. 7: 482–83.

\textsuperscript{5} The church union, the religious strife, and the Cossack intervention are best treated in volumes 5 and 6 of Hrushevskyi’s Istoriiia Ukrainy-Rusy. They are described briefly in Dmytro Doroshenko’s Narys istorii Ukrainy, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1933), 1: 178–94.
Orthodox masses, the Uniate church, backed by the Polish government, was for a time the only legal Eastern church in the Commonwealth.

Until the 1620s the Cossacks strove only for the recognition of their corporate rights. Then, under the particularly skillful military leader, or hetman, Petro Sahaidachnyi (1614–22), the Cossack army intervened on behalf of the Orthodox in their struggle against the Uniates and Roman Catholics. An Orthodox hierarchy was reestablished under Cossack protection in 1620, and the entire Zaporozhian Host joined the Kiev Orthodox Brotherhood. From 1621 onward, Cossack demands consistently included the official recognition of the Orthodox church and the repeal of the Union of Brest.

The religious issue was closely related to the rebirth of interest in the history of Rus' and the Church-Slavonic and Ruthenian (middle Ukrainian) languages. Through their involvement in the religious question, the Cossacks became the protectors of "national" traditions and supporters of the Ukrainian cultural revival. The fusion of the Cossack corporate issue with religious, national, and social questions sparked a wide-scale national uprising led by the Cossacks. Beginning with an attempt by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi to rectify personal and corporate grievances, the uprising escalated into a Ukrainian-Polish war. Suddenly, Khmel'nyts'kyi and his Cossacks found themselves at the head of a coalition of Cossacks, Orthodox nobles, burghers, churchmen, and peasants. With the collapse of Polish authority, the Zaporozhian Army assumed the functions of a civilian administration, and, in fact, a new political entity emerged.6

When a compromise with the Commonwealth (the Zborov Treaty of 1649) failed and the struggle had become protracted, Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Ukrainian elite (i.e., the Cossack officers and a number of nobles who had joined the uprising) decided to seek assistance from Muscovy. In 1654 at Pereiaslav, Khmel'nyts'kyi and the representatives of the Zaporozhian Army recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar. In return, the tsar promised to assure the con-

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6 For the Khmel'nyts'kyi period, see Hrushev's'kyi, Istoryia Ukrainy-Rusyi, vols. 8 and 9; W. Lipiński (Lypyns'kyi), ed., Z dziejów Ukrainy (Cracow, 1912); V. Lypyns'kyi, Ukraina na perelom, 1657–59 (Vienna, 1920); I. Krypyiakevych, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi (Kiev, 1954).
tinuance of Ukrainian autonomy and proposed a military alliance against Poland.

Initially, the joint Cossack-Muscovite campaign enjoyed some success, but, because of mutual mistrust and lack of coordination, the military operations were soon bogged down. The rising tensions between the Ukrainian and Muscovite cultural milieus and systems of government led Khmelnits'kyi's successor, Ivan Vyshys'kyi, to break with Muscovy and attempt an accommodation with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The resulting Treaty of Hadiach (1658) brought the Cossack polity, as the Prizedom of Rus', into an equal tripartite federation with Poland and Lithuania. Neither Muscovy nor part of the Cossack rank-and-file accepted this solution, and hostilities were resumed.\(^7\)

While the war over the Ukrainian lands continued, factions within the Zaporozhian army vacillated between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania. The struggle so polarized the Ukraine that two separate hetmans, administrations, and armies emerged. Those on the Right Bank were pro-Polish, whereas those on the Left Bank were pro-Muscovite. Each hetman with his allies attempted to eliminate his counterpart and obtain sole control of the Ukraine, but neither side had sufficient strength to achieve supremacy. Exhausted by nearly a decade of war, Poland and Muscovy finally agreed to a thirteen-year armistice at Andrusovo (1667).\(^8\) By its terms Muscovy retained control over the Left-Bank Ukraine and the city of Kiev, and Poland kept the Right Bank. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were to have been under joint Muscovite-Polish suzerainty.

The Cossacks refused to accept this partition of the Ukraine. The hetman of the Right Bank, Petro Doroshenko (ruled 1665–76), attempted a third alternative—uniting the Ukraine by means of a Cossack-Ottoman-Tatar alliance. After scoring some initial victories, Doroshenko succeeded only in plunging the Ukraine into further warfare involving Poland, Crimea, the Ottoman Empire, and Muscovy. Foreign troops, several warring Cossack armies, and the class antagonisms of the peasants and the Cossack rank-and-file against the elite

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\(^8\) The complicated web of events from 1658 until the "eternal peace" of 1681 are best summarized in Doroshenko, *Narys*, 2: 51–93.
reduced the Ukraine to anarchy. The period came to be known in Ukrainian historiography as "The Ruin." The Ukrainian elite was slaughtered; the Right Bank, the arena for most of the military operations, was devastated and depopulated; even the Right-Bank Cossack formations dissolved or crossed the Dnieper.9 Their energies and resources spent, all the participants sought peace. By 1686 a series of agreements had stabilized the situation. A treaty of "eternal peace" between Poland and Muscovy finally granted Moscow international recognition of her control over the Left-Bank Ukraine and the city of Kiev.

In the three decades of conflict, the polity established by Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi had shrunk considerably in territory. Not only had the Right Bank been lost, but the Zaporozhian Cossacks, so instrumental in the 1648 uprising, had broken away and continued to maintain their own semi-independent republic centered on the Sich. This truncated Left-Bank successor to Khmel’nyts’kyi’s polity became known as the Hetmanate. Despite the losses incurred during the Ruin, it retained substantial territory (including all of the present day Chernihiv and Poltava oblasts, as well as parts of the Kiev, Sumy, and Cherkasy oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR and several towns now located in the Russian Republic) and a population which by the mid-eighteenth century numbered more than one million males. From the Hetmanate’s turbulent origins, a new social structure and system of government had emerged that differentiated it from both Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy. Ukrainian "rights and liberties" rested upon the peculiar social structure, institutions, and administration of the Hetmanate, as well as on the myths and political outlook of its elite.

Social Structure

Continual warfare and social strife prevented the crystallization of the Hetmanate’s social structure until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Legal corporate estates never actually developed there. Nevertheless, the Hetmanate’s social structure was a reflection of European corporate society, insofar as it had a vertical hierarchy in which an individual’s political, legal, and social status were determined by membership in a particular social group.

9 Doroshenko, Narys, 2: 73–93.
At the apex of the Hetmanate’s society stood the Ukrainian elite, which combined elements of the old nobility or szlachta of Polish times with a new group of Cossack officers and notables. Many szlachta members who had joined the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising insisted on recognition of their previous political and social positions. During the Pereiaslav negotiations the szlachta demanded and obtained special guarantees of their rights from the tsar. Their old position had been shaken by the social revolution of 1648, however. Many szlachta were killed or driven out of the Ukraine. Even those who were able to retain their estates lost the free labor of the peasantry. In some areas least touched by the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising, the szlachta held on to most of their former prerogatives. For example, in the Starodub area, the northernmost part of the Hetmanate, the local szlachta recognized the new Cossack administration, served it as they had once served Poland, and continued to benefit from peasant labor.

Yet even the recognition of some of its prerogatives failed to preserve the szlachta estate’s traditional leadership of society. The new polity was the creation of the Cossack army and the Cossack estate. Only by becoming Cossacks could the szlachta exercise its former authority. Within the Cossack army, however, there already existed a new non-szlachta elite as well as elements antithetical to this estate. Moreover, the szlachta loyal to Khmel’nyts’kyi was not numerous enough to man the new military and administrative apparatus. If unable to control the political levers of society, it could hardly continue to be an exclusive elite. At best, the old szlachta could hope only to fuse with the social group performing these functions; that is, with the Cossack officers (starshyna) and notables.

The formation of a new unified elite proved to be a slow and painful process. Continual warfare and civil strife resulted in the virtual annihilation of the elite—szlachta and non-szlachta alike—that had first emerged during the Khmel’nyts’kyi era. The next generation of Cossack officers, who had risen through the ranks during those turbulent years, laid the foundation for a more stable elite. During the rule of hetmans Ivan Samoïlovych (1672–87) and Ivan Mazepa (1687–1709) a fairly cohesive landed elite emerged and in social

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10 The szlachta who joined Khmel’nyts’kyi has been studied by Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi in his Ukraine na perelomi, 1657–1659 and in (W. Lipiński) Z dziejów Ukrajiny.
position and life-style, approximated a gentry. This new gentry included descendants of the szlachta, descendants of Cossack officers registered during Polish times, and deserving new recruits. The gentry had a formal organization known as the Society of Notable Military Fellows (znachne viis’kove tovarystvo), which, by the mid-eighteenth century, was divided into three social categories. The first and most influential was the Fellows of the Standard (bunchukovi tovarysh), who were under the standard or direct authority of the hetman. Next came the Military Fellows (viis’kovi tovarysh), who were designated by the General Military Chancellery (heneral’no viis’kova kantseliaria) or the Hetmanate’s central administration. Last were the Fellows of the Banner (znachkovi tovarysh), who were responsible to the regimental commander or the colonel (polkovnyk).

Although the gradations in the Society of Notable Military Fellows constituted not military or administrative positions but social ranks, virtually all offices came through them, so that the higher officials were recruited from the upper two categories. Even when not serving in the Ukrainian administration, the gentry remained on call to perform specific services for the Ukrainian authorities—to investigate a crime, for example, or to join a military levy in face of a Tatar raid. In return, the gentry received the right to own estates, to demand labor obligations from the peasants, and to participate in affairs of state by being present at councils that advised the hetman. The gentry was also under special judicial jurisdiction: Fellows of the Standard could be tried only by the hetman; Military Fellows could be tried only by the General Military Chancellery; and Fellows of the Banner could be tried only by the colonel.

11 The formation of the new elite has been described by Lev Okinshevych (Okynshevych), Znachne viis’kove tovarystvo v Ukraini-Het’manshchyni XVII–XVIII st., Zapsysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka, vol. 157 (Munich, 1948); and in Zenon E. Kohut, “The Ukrainian Elite in the Eighteenth Century and Its Integration into the Russian Nobility,” in The Role of the Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe, ed. by Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkovitch (New Haven, 1983), pp. 65–97; V. A. Miakotin argues that the new elite consisted only of the wealthiest and most prominent Cossacks and was not clearly differentiated into a separate social category; see Ocherki sotsial’noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv. 1 vol., 4 pts. (Prague, 1926), pt. 2, p. 14. Miakotin examined the landholding patterns but failed to see the developing organizational structure and legal prerogatives of the new gentry.
During the eighteenth century the Society of Notable Military Fellows was becoming a closed estate. At its apogee in the 1760s, the Ukrainian gentry numbered between two thousand one hundred and two thousand four hundred adult males: approximately three hundred formed the highest aristocracy; another five hundred formed the middle group, while an additional one thousand three hundred to one thousand five hundred constituted the petty gentry. The gentry began calling itself szlachta and demanded—but did not receive—recognition from the Russian authorities of the rights the szlachta had possessed under Polish rule. Ukrainians were denied admittance to cadet schools and, consequently, pursuit of imperial military and civilian careers, because in the opinion of Russian officialdom, in “Little Russia there are no nobles.” In the view of these officials, the charters granted by the tsar during Khmel’nyts’kyi’s time confirming szlacha status applied only to those who could prove noble lineage prior to 1654. Most distressing to the Ukrainian gentry was the fact that, as of 1722, Russians received automatic ennoblement upon reaching a certain rank in the Table of Ranks. By contrast, even the highest Ukrainian offices did not bring about automatic imperial ennoblement. Thus, the Ukrainian gentry struggled for the equalization of Ukrainian with Russian offices and ranks and for imperial recognition and confirmation of their noble status. Within the Hetmanate, however, the Ukrainian gentry’s power, wealth, and special legal and social status remained unquestioned.

12 Kohut, “The Ukrainian Elite,” p. 67; Okinshevych, Zhachne vois’kove tovarystvo, pp. 91—94. The figures are derived by adding the number of notables in each of the three categories to the number of officials who were most likely drawn from each category. The result is a fair approximation of the elite’s size and internal structure. These figures include only male adults (eighteen and above) who were either formally registered in the Notable Military Fellows or had an official position. Since the estimate does not include the notables’ younger sons or retired officials, it is on the conservative side.

Sandwiched between the gentry and the peasantry, the Cossacks were required to provide military service in exchange for special privileges. Since they had a common origin, Cossack privileges were similar to those enjoyed by the elite: self-government, exemption from taxation, the right to own land, the right to produce alcoholic beverages, and the right to trade in certain commodities. The only privilege of the gentry that was denied to the Cossacks was the right to exact peasant labor. Despite their privileges, however, from the end of the seventeenth century the position of the Cossacks steadily deteriorated. Under pressure from their officers and notables, the Cossacks steadily lost all their political prerogatives. They no longer elected their officers or participated in the various state councils. Most crucial was their economic decline. While juridically the Cossacks continued to approximate the gentry, economically they began to resemble the peasantry.14

Undercutting the Cossacks’ economic position was their dual role as soldiers and free farmers. Under Poland, the Cossacks were either paid or allowed to obtain booty. Now, while still expected to be fully equipped for battle, they usually received nothing. Occasionally, on long campaigns, the Cossacks received some remuneration, but each lengthy absence from their farms had a dire effect on their economic standing. Impoverished and seeking to avoid future campaigns, a Cossack would often sell his land and hire himself out to a landlord. This process was accelerated and heightened by the rapacity of the officers and notables, who frequently used illegal means to obtain the Cossacks’ land and services. Yet, some Cossacks were able to amass sufficient wealth to eventually enter the Notable Military Fellows, thus becoming part of the Ukrainian gentry. A trickle of upward mobility and a steady stream downward reduced the Cossack army of

the Hetmanate from sixty thousand in 1650, to thirty thousand in 1669, to twenty thousand in 1730.\textsuperscript{15}

Alarmed by the dwindling numbers, the Russian authorities attempted to arrest the downward mobility of the Cossacks. The attempt was spurred by the empire’s need for a maximum number of Cossacks to conduct a series of wars against the Ottoman Empire. As a result, a decree issued in 1723 and again in 1728 prohibited the Cossacks from becoming peasants, and an \textit{ukaz} of 1739 limited the Ukrainian officers’ purchase of Cossack farms,\textsuperscript{16} but these measures failed to tackle the basic problem—the Cossacks’ dependence on land. The gentry was able to serve because it had sufficient land and the free labor of the peasantry. Logically, for the Cossacks to do the same, they needed the economic support of either the state or some other social group.

To some extent, the latter course was attempted by a major tsarist reform of 1735. All the Cossacks were divided into two groups—rank-and-file (\textit{vyborni}) and helpers (\textit{pidpomichnyky}). The rank-and-file Cossacks were liable for military service, whereas the poorer helpers were responsible for auxiliary duties such as gathering and delivering supplies, horses, and cattle; carrying messages; and even tilling the soil in the long absence of rank-and-file Cossacks.\textsuperscript{17} Because they were unable to perform the traditional military obligations, the helpers were liable for taxes, but at only half the rate of the Hetmanate’s normally taxed populace of townsfolk and peasants.

In the eighteenth century, another category of Cossack appeared—the hired laborers (\textit{pidsustidky}). Whereas the Cossack helpers still owned some land, the Cossack laborers were propertyless. Their only recourse was to hire themselves out to a landlord, a rank-and-file Cossack, or a merchant. The category of hired laborer was not limited to Cossacks but included burghers and even peasants. Yet Cossacks forced into becoming hired laborers did not lose their Cossack status. In fact, up to the mid-eighteenth century, Cossack laborers were able to use their legal status to evade taxation. Then all hired laborers—

\textsuperscript{15} Apanovych, \textit{Zbroini suly}, pp. 21–22.
\textsuperscript{16} Miakotin, \textit{Ocherki}, 1, no. 3: 128–32, 162.
\textsuperscript{17} The reform of 1735 has been treated by Apanovych, \textit{Zbroini suly}, pp. 20–29.
including Cossacks—were assessed at the full tax rate. The Cossack laborer was still distinct from a peasant in his legal status and his unrestricted mobility. The laborer was free to terminate his employment at any time and to seek a better opportunity elsewhere. Moreover, a Cossack laborer could, through good fortune, gain sufficient wealth to buy land and to become a helper or even a rank-and-file Cossack.

By the 1760s, there were approximately 176,000 rank-and-file Cossacks, 198,000 Cossack helpers, and 80,000 Cossack laborers. These figures indicate that a majority of Cossacks exercised less than full Cossack rights and liberties, although they maintained legal membership in the Cossack estate. Most were either partially or fully taxed, and many were becoming dependent on landlords who, in turn, pressed them into assuming a socioeconomic position that made them virtually indistinguishable from peasants.

The artisans and merchants living in the towns and the numerous peasantry had a lower social position than the gentry and the Cossacks. Nonetheless, it was they who provided the economic foundation for both Ukrainian and Russian authority in the Hetmanate. Although bothburghers and peasants were equally liable for state taxes, the burghers as a matter of course possessed greater rights, wealth, and status. Residents of towns enjoying Magdeburg Law were entitled to self-government, whereas those living elsewhere had more limited autonomy. Under dual leveling by the Ukrainian and Russian administrations, municipal autonomy suffered serious cutbacks. Because they did not recognize the economic importance of the towns,

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19 These figures are based on the census of 1764. One problem with the census is that the entire Poltava regiment and part of the Myrhorod regiment were included in the newly formed Novorossiia gubernia, thus severing approximately 10 percent of the Hetmanate’s population from the whole. In reporting the number of rank-and-file Cossacks and Cossack helpers, Shafotskii (Chernigovskogo namestnichestva, p. 85) covers the entire Hetmanate, including the severed territories; unfortunately, he does not do the same for the other categories of population. In estimating the number of Cossack laborers, I have taken the 72,477 figure for the nine regiments and added 10 percent to represent those on the severed territories. The total is approximately 80,000 Cossack laborers. For the 1764 census figures, see M. G. Astriab, “Naselenie Malorossiia po reviziiam 1729 i 1764 gg.,” Trudy Poltavskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii, 9 (1912): 63–64.
the Cossack authorities—with the exception of hetmans Samoilovych and Mazepa—excluded burghers from any political role in the Hetmanate. Municipal offices were progressively taken over by the Cossack administration, and some smaller towns became the property of the Ukrainian gentry.  

The burghers were threatened economically as well as politically. Ukrainian towns were small; some virtually blended into the countryside. Because the manorial economy was largely self-sufficient, the need for the specialized services the burghers could provide was limited. Many burghers’ livelihoods depended as much on the cultivation of fields and meadows as on the production of goods or on trade. Nevertheless, artisans’ guilds and a prosperous merchant patriciate evolved in most towns, but they were undercut by nonburgher competitors—gentry, Cossacks, and even clergy who produced various goods and traded without paying any municipal or state taxes. The better-financed Russian and Greek merchants were able to conduct business more efficiently and on a larger scale than their Ukrainian counterparts. A poorly developed money economy, heavy taxes, the hostility of the Cossack authorities, and domestic and foreign competition combined to prevent the maturation of the burghers as a separate social group and brought about their gradual decline. In the 1760s, those possessing legal “burgher” status numbered merely thirty-four thousand.  

At the base of the social pyramid were the peasants. For the most part, they had been liberated from serfdom by the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising. The majority of villages formerly owned by Polish landlords or by the Crown now became “free military villages.” The peasants were now under the sole authority of the Cossack administration, by whom they were both governed and taxed.

Not all of the peasants’ villages had been freed, however. Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi had issued charters permitting monasteries to exact labor from the peasantry. In the northern part of the Hetmanate,

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21 Kabuzan, Izmeneniiia . . . naseleniiia, pp. 90, 94; Kabuzan’s statistics are for the entire Hetmanate. The number of burghers in the nine regiments was 23,021; Astriab, “Naselenie Malorossii,” p. 64.
the szlachta from Polish times, now serving the Cossack polity, had retained both their estates and their peasants. Also, some of the municipalities continued to obtain peasant services. These landlords received charters from the Cossack administration confirming the peasants' "normal submission" to them.

The villages that had been liberated did not stay free for long. In return for their services, the free villages were distributed, albeit temporarily, to the elite. Although these land grants were to revert to the treasury at the holder's completion of service, they soon became part of the hereditary landholdings of the elite. The "temporary" land charters also ordered the peasants' "submission." At first, this formula required the peasant to perform occasional specific duties for the landlord. Gradually these duties increased and the peasant found himself virtually enserfed. By the 1760s, only 25,000 peasants lived on "rank lands" still administered by the Ukrainian authorities, whereas approximately 465,000 peasants—virtually half the male population of the Hetmanate—resided on private estates held by the gentry and by the monasteries.

The peasant, however, was not yet a serf. He could still exchange one landlord for another or move from an oppressive estate to one of the few remaining free villages or into the steppe beyond the

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22 On the gradual enserfment of the peasantry see the following works: A. Lazarevskii, Malorossiiskie pospolitye krest'iane (1648–1783 gg.) (Kiev, 1908); V. Mikolenin in his Ocherki, nos. 1–3, and in his Prikreplenie krest'ianstva Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv. (the French translation of the latter is "La fixation des paysans ukrainiens à la glèbe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles," Le Monde Slave, 1932, nos. 11-12; V. Barvinskii, Krest'iane v Levoberezhnoi Ukraine v XVII–XVIII vv., Zapiski Kharkovskogo universiteta, vol. 1 (Kharkov, 1909). An outstanding economic study is Mykola Tkachenko's "Narysy z istorii selian na Livoberezhniii Ukraini v XVII–XVIII vv." Zapskyi istorychno-filohiichnogo viddilu Vsesukrain's'koi [or Ukrains'koi] akademii nauk (hereafter ZIFV [V]UAN), 26 (1931): 33–179. Unfortunately, Tkachenko's account goes only up to the eighteenth century, but he provides an excellent historiographical essay on the peasant question, pp. 33–74.

23 The 1764 census for nine regiments listed 23,021 peasants living on rank lands and 423,590 living on private domains (Astriab, "Naselenie Malorossii," p. 64). By increasing these figures by 10 percent to represent the two severed regiments, my estimate for the Hetmanate comes to 25,000 and 465,000 respectively. Kabuzan lists 570,000 peasants on private estates (Imenienia... naselenia, p. 89, 93), but since he does not distinguish between Cossacks and peasants, his statistics on peasants are highly inflated.
Hetmanate. In fact, Ukrainian landlords colonizing empty lands enticed peasants to settle there by giving them special exemptions for a limited time. Juridically, however, the peasants’ rights to mobility and land were gradually being curtailed. In 1727, the Ukrainian central authorities decreed that in moving to another landlord, the peasant lost all rights to his former property and could retain only his personal belongings.\(^{24}\) In 1738, peasant mobility between Sloboda Ukraine, the Hetmanate, and Russia was forbidden by an order of the Russian cabinet of ministers.\(^{25}\) In 1760, after numerous complaints about the number of peasants fleeing, Hetman Rozumov’s’kyi, too, issued a special decree regulating their mobility.\(^{26}\) According to its provisions, peasants exchanging landlords were permitted to take only their personal property; no landlord was to accept a peasant without a written receipt from his former landlord; and landlords were to issue such receipts on request. Rozumov’s’kyi’s regulation almost completely restricted the peasants’ opportunities to move. A landlord could simply refuse to issue a receipt, whereupon the peasants only real recourse was illegal flight. Thus, a century after liberation, the Ukrainian peasant once again found himself legally and economically dependent on his landlord.

The clergy stood outside the social pyramid, because they did not form an estate or a closed group. As a group, the clergy were rather heterogeneous in social origin, wealth, and political influence. They were legally separated from the rest of the populace by an autonomous administration and judiciary and enjoyed exemption from taxation, from military duty, and from labor obligations.

Monks were of particular importance in the economic and cultural life of the Hetmanate. Their ranks were constantly replenished by gentry, Cossacks, burghers, and even peasants. Monasteries owned huge estates supported by obligatory peasant labor. In the mid-eighteenth century they owned ten thousand estates, or 17 percent of

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\(^{24}\) Miakotin, Prikreplenie, p. 18. For a general account on the limitations placed on peasant mobility, see Lazarevskii, Malorossiiskie pospolitey krest’iane, pp. 75–83.

\(^{25}\) V. Miakotin, Prikreplenie, pp. 46–56.

\(^{26}\) The decree was published in KS, 1885, no. 7, pp. 477–83; for an analysis see Miakotin, Prikreplenie, pp. 71–80.
all landholdings in the Hetmanate. Monks also virtually monopolized Ukrainian higher culture, since they controlled institutions of higher learning and publishing.

The nonmonastic clergy were married, and parishes frequently passed from father to son. Because priests were selected by the community and enjoyed the right to own private property, however, their ranks were also constantly supplemented by Cossacks, burghers, and, on occasion, gentry. Mobility occurred in both directions, since children of clergymen also took civilian posts. The most notable instance was Ivan Samoilovych, the priest's son who became hetman.

The clergy also claimed szlachta status. Although the Ukrainian authorities were reluctant to recognize the claim, they did grant the clergy the basic right of the szlachta to exact peasant labor. Monasteries, but not individual monks, had had peasants attached to their estates from pre-Khmel'nyts'kyi times. In the eighteenth century, priests succeeded in obtaining individual authority over peasants. Concurrently, as the number of priests' sons not joining religious orders increased, it became necessary to clarify their social position. In 1757 Hetman Rozumovsky designated specific civilian ranks for sons of the clergy. Sons of protopopy—priests who administered the protopopiiia, a subdivision of a diocese—were to enter the lowest level of the Notable Military Fellows, and sons of ordinary priests were to become Cossacks. By this law the Ukrainian administration admitted that a connection existed between some clergymen and the lowest echelons of the gentry, yet denied gentry status to the clergy as a whole. The reason for this was straightforward. Because each parish selected its own priest—frequently from among the local populace—automatic szlachta status for the clergy would have allowed easy access into the gentry by Cossacks or even peasants, a situation that the authorities could not encourage.


28 Insight into the life of the nonmonastic or "white" clergy can be gleaned from V. Parhomenko, Ocherk istorii Pereiaslav'sko-Borispol'skoj eparkhii (1733–1785) v sviazis s obshchim khodom malorossiiskoi zhizni togo vremeni (Poltava, 1910).

29 L. Okinshevych (Okynshevykh), Lektsii z istorii ukrajns'koho prava (Munich, 1947), pp. 75–82.
TABLE 2.1

UKRAINIAN SOCIETY: APPROXIMATE MALE POPULATION OF THE HETMANATE IN THE 1760s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gentry (officers and notables)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy, Russian and Foreign Nobles, and Other Untaxed People</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossacks</td>
<td>455,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Rank-and-File</td>
<td>176,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Helpers</td>
<td>198,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Laborers</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Other</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burghers</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>515,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) On private estates</td>
<td>465,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) On &quot;rank lands&quot;</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Others (servants, hired hands, etc.)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,017,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The approximate figures on male population were derived as follows:

1. Gentry—the number of notables and the number of officials were totalled (see n. 12).

2. Clergy, Russian and foreign nobles and officers, and other untaxed people—Kabuzan gives a total of 13,643 in the untaxed category (Izmeneniiia . . . naseleniiia, pp. 91, 94). If one subtracts 2,400 elite from his total, the remainder in this category is 11,000; unfortunately, it is impossible to tell how many are clergy.

3. Cossacks—the rank-and-file Cossacks and Cossack helpers are listed by Shafonskii, Chernigovskogo namestnichestva, p. 85. The estimates of Cossack helpers were derived by adding 10 percent to the 1764 census figure. The categories of "other peasants" and "other Cossacks" appears in the 1764 census; see Astriab, "Naselenie Malorossii," p. 63.


5. Peasants—all estimates regarding peasants were derived by adding 10 percent to the 1764 census figure given by Astriab ("Naselenie Malorossii," p. 64).

6. Total figures are the following: Shafonskii—1,024,000 (Chernigovskogo namestnichestva, p. 85); Kabuzan—1,028,000 (Izmeneniiia . . . naseleniiia, pp. 87, 91); and mine, which includes the two regiments that came under the Novorossiia guberniiia—1,017,000.
In the century following the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, Ukrainian society underwent major transformations. The old szlachta disappeared as their descendants were obliged to merge with the new elite. This new gentry accumulated estates, obtained labor obligations from the peasantry, and, later, even assumed the old term for the nobility, szlachta. Conversely the peasantry, which had been freed from serfdom by the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, was once again tied to the landlord. A portion of the Cossacks, although retaining some of their legal privileges, was being squeezed into the virtually enserfed peasantry. Since the peasants and the impoverished Cossacks made up more than half of the population, the Hetmanate was indeed becoming a land of "lord and peasant," thus conforming to the basic social relationship in Eastern Europe, particularly Russia.

Despite this evolution, the structure of Ukrainian society was still quite different from that of Russian society. While in Russia over 95 percent of the population was peasant—either state peasant or serf—in the Hetmanate virtually half the population was legally in another social category. Most of these non-peasants were Cossacks, nearly all of whom tilled the soil, and many of whom were hardly distinguishable from peasants. Yet, the legal distinction between Cossack and peasant was real and definite. A large number of rank-and-file Cossacks exercised their Cossack rights and liberties fully, while the Cossack helpers and laborers retained them at least in theory. Similarly, the burghers, although in decline as a group, continued to enjoy at least limited self-government and, in some instances, the privileges of Magdeburg Law. Unlike the Russian clergy, the clergy of the Hetmanate claimed noble status, which was at times partially recognized. Finally, even though the peasants' mobility had been severely curtailed and they were again under the authority of the landlords, they were nevertheless still regarded as dependent peasants rather than as serfs.

31 For the number of peasants in Russia proper, see V. I. Semenovskii, Krest'ianе v tsaristovanie Imperatsritsy Ekateriny II. 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1901–1903), 1: vii--viii.
Government and Church

The Hetmanate’s governmental system evolved from the military structure of the Zaporozhian Army. Khmel’nyts’kyi’s victories swept away the Polish administration, leaving the Zaporozhian Army as the sole civil authority. The army was divided into regiments (polky) and companies (sotni). In time these divisions were applied to the land, in the form of regimental and company districts. Each of the ten regiments of the Hetmanate was thus both a military formation and a territorial administrative unit.

By the mid-eighteenth century the central institutions of the Hetmanate included the hetman, the General Staff (heneral’na starshyna), several councils (rady), and the Cossack colonels (palkov-nyky). The hetman and his staff conducted everyday affairs, while the councils made important decisions. At the apex of the administrative pyramid was the hetman. In addition to being the chief military commander of the Zaporozhian Army, the hetman was also a chief executive and an important legislator. He not only commanded the army but conducted foreign relations, issued decrees (universal’ny), appointed officials, rewarded service with grants and land, and, occasionally, served as a final court of appeals. The hetman’s authority was not constitutionally defined, and so it varied with his skill, fortune, and daring. Some hetmans ruled as virtual monarchs, while others governed as elected chieftains. In fact, the monarchical and republican tendencies of the office were in conflict throughout the Hetmanate’s existence. Bohdan Khmel’nyc’kyi (1648–57), Ivan Samoilovych (1672–87), and Ivan Mazepa (1687–1709) not only viewed themselves as elected monarchs, but groomed their relatives for succession in attempts to establish a precedent for hereditary monarchy. On the other hand, Pavlo Teteria (hetman of the Right Bank, 1663–65) and Petro Doroshenko (1665–76) represented the republican tradition. They ruled in conjunction with the General Council (heneral’na rada), whose superiority they were obliged to recognize. Every hetman was elected for life by a General Council. He could, however, resign voluntarily or be removed by the council. Hetmans who stepped down from the office either voluntarily or under

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32 The office of hetman is discussed in Okinshevych, Lektsii, pp. 85–92; and Diadychenko, Narysy, pp. 126–73.
duress were Iurii Khmel’nyts’kyi (1659–63), Ivan Vyhovs’kyi (1657–59), P. Teteria (1663–65), and P. Doroshenko (1665–76).

Once the main decision-making body of the Zaporozhian Host, which convened Cossacks, officers, and, upon occasion, townsmen and clergy, the General Council (heneral’na rada) began to decline in importance soon after the Khmel’nyts’kyi era. By the eighteenth century, it retained only the ceremonial function of formally electing the hetman. 33 During its existence the General Council never established clear procedures for its convocation or for the selection of participants, or criteria for dismissing the hetman.

A much more cohesive central body was the Council of Officers (rada starshyn). 34 It included the hetman, his central staff (heneral’na starshyna), the regimental commanders (polkovnyky, or colonels) and other regimental officers, the company commanders (smyky or captains), and, beginning in 1672, representatives from the Notable Military Fellows (znachne viis’kove tovarystvo). Up to the eighteenth century, town mayors and, on occasion, the higher clergy also participated. The Council of Officers then included all officials and notables, or virtually everyone with a political stake in Ukrainian society. Meeting between Christmas and Epiphany and during the Easter holidays, it debated all important matters, especially foreign affairs, finances, taxation, and judicial reforms. It also formed a vital link between the central administration and the provincial and local governments. The council’s competence was vague, however. Because it could not initiate legislation or negate the will of the hetman in any way, it constituted only a semiformal advisory body. Since their participants were exclusively members of the gentry, the councils developed into meetings of a self-declared Ukrainian szlachta. This was especially true during the rule of Hetman Rozumovs’kyi (1750–1764).

33 The General Council has been the subject of a special study by L. Okinshevych (Okynshevych), ‘‘Tsentral’ni ustanovy Ukrainy-Het’manshchyny XVII–XVIII vy. ch. 1: Heneral’na rada,’’ Pratsi Komisii dlia vykhuvannia istoryi zakhidn’o-rus’ko ta ukrains’koho prava 6 (1929): 253–425 (also published separately: Kiev, 1929). The council is also described briefly in Okinshevych, Lektsii, pp. 92–99.

34 This institution is treated in a detailed monograph by L. Okinshevych (Okynshevych), ‘‘Tsentral’ni ustanovy Ukrainy-Het’manshchyny XVII–XVIII st. ch. 2: Rada starshyn,’’ Pratsi Komisii dlia vykhuvannia istoryi zakhidn’o-rus’ko ta ukrains’koho prava 8 (1930): 1–352.
The actual management of the central administration was handled by the General Staff (heneral'na starshyna), a body combining the features of a military staff and a cabinet. Its administrators’ functions and the method of selection of its members varied. At times members of the General Staff were elected at either a General or Officer Council. Sometimes they were appointed by the hetman. At other times, especially in the eighteenth century, the Russian government selected members from a list of candidates submitted by the hetman. The General Staff performed a great variety of duties assigned by the hetman, but individual members had a definite hierarchy and degree of specialization. Second in command after the hetman was the quartermaster-general (heneral’nyi oboznyi), who was in charge of artillery. After him came the general chancellor (heneral’nyi pysar), two chief justices (heneral’ni suddi), and, after 1728, two chief treasurers (heneral’ni pidskarbi). A group of lower officials—two general aides-de-camp (heneral’ni osauly), a general standard bearer (heneral’nyi bunchuzhnyi), and a general flag bearer (heneral’nyi khorunzhyi)—had the largely ceremonial function of carrying the hetman’s standards and insignia. They also performed a variety of administrative and judicial tasks assigned to them by the hetman, however.

The hetman and the General Staff acted through several central administrative institutions, the most important of which was the General Military Chancellery (heneral’na viis’kova kantselariia). As reorganized by Tsar Peter I, the chancellery, headed by the general chancellor, had the following structure and functions. It recorded and promulgated all decrees of the tsar and of the hetman, oversaw


36 The late Petrine and post-Petrine administrative and financial reorganization in the Hetmanate is analyzed in Ivan Dzhydzhora, Ukraina v pershii polovyni XVIII viku (Kiev, 1930), and in Borys Krynits’kyi, Het’man Danylo Apostol i ioho doba (Augsburg, 1948). See also P. Nechyporenko, “Storinka z diial’nosti heneral’noi viis’kovo kantseliariii seredyny XVIII-stolit’ia,” Ukraina, 1927, nos. 1–2, pp. 130–33.
### Table 2.2

**Central Administration of the Hetmanate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elected Advisory Bodies</th>
<th>Hetman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. General Council</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(heneral’na rada)</td>
<td>(heneral’na starshyna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) All Cossacks (in disuse by eighteenth century)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Council of Officers</td>
<td>1. General Quartermaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rada starshyn)</td>
<td>(heneral’nyi oboznyi —second in command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Officers</td>
<td>2. General Chancellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(heneral’nyi pysar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. General Treasurer (heneral’nyi pidskarbnyi—two treasurers after 1728)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. General Judges—two</td>
<td>(heneral’ni suddi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Lower General Staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. General Aides-de-Camp—two (heneral’ni osauly)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. General Standard-Bearer (heneral’nyi bunchuzhnyi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. General Flag-Bearer (heneral’nyi khorunnzhyi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Military Chancellery</strong> (heneral’na viis’ kova kantseliariia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. General Chancellor</td>
<td><strong>General Military Treasury</strong> (heneral’na skarbova kantseliariia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>General Military Court</strong> (heneral’ni viis’ kovy sud)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>General Accounting Office</strong> (heneral’na shchetna komisiia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Two General Treasurers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Two General Judges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their execution, and investigated all complaints against officials. Subordinated to the chancellery were the General Military Court (general'nyi viis'kovyi sud) and, on occasion, the General Military Treasury (general'na skarbova kantselariia). Gradually these institutions required more and more administrators and secretaries. As a result, by the middle of the eighteenth century a rudimentary Ukrainian bureaucracy had emerged.

The provincial and local governments reproduced the central administration on a lesser scale. The basic provincial unit, the regiment (polk), comprised both a military division and a territorial-administrative unit. The regiment was led by a colonel (polkovnyk), who was its military commander, chief administrator, and judge. In effect, the colonel was a miniature hetman. At one time he was elected by the regiment’s Cossacks, but by the eighteenth century he was appointed by the hetman and, on occasion, by Russian authorities, usually from lists submitted by the hetman. Frequently independent of the hetman, the colonel wielded considerable power and held substantial wealth.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, several councils that had once aided the colonel had virtually disappeared. A Cossack Regimental Council (polkova rada) reflected the earlier period of direct democracy when the regiment’s members met to elect their leaders and to decide common problems. Another type of council—the Regimental Officer Council (rada polkovoi starshyny)—was limited to the colonel, his staff (polkova starshyna), the captains (sornyky) and the notables of the regiment. In the eighteenth century, the actual administration was managed by the colonel and the regimental staff (polkova starshyna). It included a quartermaster (polkovyi oboznyi), who was second in command, a judge (polkovyi suddia), a chancellor (polkovyi pysar), the lower ranks of the aide-de-camp

(polkovyi osaul) and a flag bearer (polkovyi khorunzhyyi). These officials met periodically with the colonel to decide administrative and judicial matters, to investigate landholders’ disputes, to collect taxes, and to conduct censuses. With the formation of regimental chancelleries in the eighteenth century, the whole regimental administration became part of a permanent bureaucracy.

**TABLE 2.3**

**REGIMENTAL ADMINISTRATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory Elective Bodies</th>
<th>COLONEL (polkovnyk)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cossack Regimental Council (polkova rada—in disuse by the eighteenth century)</td>
<td>REGIMENTAL STAFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regimental Officer Council (rada polkovoi starshyny—all officers of the regiment)</td>
<td>1. Regimental quartermaster (polkovyi oboznyi—second in command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Regimental judge (polkovyi sudda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Regimental chancellor (polkovyi pysar)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOWER REGIMENTAL STAFF</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Regimental aide-de-camp (polkovyi osaul)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regimental flag bearer (polkovyi khorunzhyyi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REGIMENTAL CHANCELLERY**

At the bottom of the Hetmanate’s three-tiered territorial and administrative structure was the company (sotnia). The number of com-

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38 The best general description of the company can be found in Diadychenko, Narary, pp. 249–80. Since the company was the major subdivision of the regiment, all the literature cited for the regiment is also pertinent. The Kiev company has been studied in specific by S. Shamrai in “Borot’ba kozakiv kyivs’koi sotni z kyivs’kymy monastyriamy ta mahistratom v XVII–XVIII v.” Ukraina, 1930, nos. 1–2, pp. 32–63, and in “Do istorii Kyivs’koi sotni Kyivs’koho polku,” Istorichno- 
panies in a regiment varied from eleven to twenty-three. The company commander, or captain (sotnyk), also performed military, administrative, and judicial functions, but his competence was much more restricted than that of the colonel. With his staff, the captain made initial investigations and arrests, kept order, and adjudicated minor disputes. He was aided by an assistant (otaman), who was second in command, a secretary (pysar), and an aide-de-camp (osaul). Initially, captains were elected at company councils, but as these gradually disappeared they came to be appointed by the colonel. By the eighteenth century, regular company chancellories coordinated the local administration’s activities.

**TABLE 2.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY ADMINISTRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advisory Body</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Company Council (in disuse by eighteenth century)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMPANY CHANCELLERY**

The Hetmanate’s fiscal system was poorly developed. There was no comprehensive tax system; rather, a number of institutions collected revenue for specific purposes: the hetman’s office, the hetman’s larder, the hiring of mercenary troops (the hetman’s guard), support for regimental and company officials, and the maintenance of churches and monasteries. In most instances revenue was derived

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39 Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo nainesnichesva*, pp. 73–85; for a listing of individual companies see G. Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*.

40 One of the most neglected areas of study is the Hetmanate’s financial system. The only general description can be found in M. Stabchenko, *Khosaistvo Getmanshchyny v XVII–XVIII st.*, vol. 4 (Odessa, 1925). See also Ivan Telichenko, “K istorii finansov v Malorossii i Slobodskoi Ukraini,” KS, 1888, no. 4, pp. 10–15 in the document section. A more specialized study is V. Barvins’kyi’s “Do pytannia pro induktu ta evektu v Het’manshchyni,” *Naukovyi zapsyky Naukovo-doslidchoi katedry istorii ukraïns’koi kultury*, 6 (Kharkiv, 1927), pp. 241–44; V. Barvinskii, “Zametki po istorii finansового upravleniia v Getmanshchine,” *Sbornik statei v cheš’ prof. V.*
from land. A specific plot of "rank land"—former crown land now in
the army's land fund—would be assigned for the upkeep of a particu-
lar office (e.g., the colonel of the Chernihiv regiment). Towns owned
estates outside the town, the profit from which was designated as pay-
ment to a mayor or other official. The towns, of course, also taxed
manufacturing and trade within the towns. "Free villagers"—
peasants who were on neither rank lands nor private estates—were
assessed a tax (either in money or in kind) by various local authorities
(regimental or company officials, a bishop, or a monastery). There
were also many tariffs on the movement of products (bridge crossings,
use of roads, ferries, etc.). The latter were collected by either the local
Cossack authority, a monastery, a town, or even a private individual
depending on who had jurisdiction over and maintained a particular
facility.

In addition to such local arrangements, there were a number of
taxes and licensed monopolies that were applicable to the Hetmanate
as a whole. While even these were, for the most part, collected and
dispensed locally, they did require some coordination and oversight
by the hetman's treasury. One such tax levied on all peasants and
hired laborers was in support of the Cossack army (statsii). The
amount assessed varied depending on particular needs, the state of the
harvest, and negotiations between the local Cossack official and the
peasants. The most universal tax levied on the entire taxable popula-
tion (peasants, merchants, craftsmen, laborers, and Cossack helpers
[half-rate]) was to support the Russian troops stationed in the Het-
manate (portsii and ratsii). The tax rate varied depending on the
number of troops and the state of the harvest. The tax, either in
money or in kind, was collected by the local Cossack official and then
passed on to the Russian military commander. The burghers and
peasants were also required to provide living quarters for the Russian
troops and officials.

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*Buzeskula* (Kharkiv, 1914), pp. 816–31; V. A. Diadychenko, *Naryky*, pp. 81–87 and

41 The financial support of the Russian army and officials in the Hetmanate is
described by Prokip Nechyporenko in "Pro 'portsii' ta 'ratsii' na Het'mans'khe yni
1725–1750 r.," *ZIFV/VJUAN*, vol. 20 (1928), pp. 175–98 and in "Do kharkivs'koks
podatkovoi polityky uriadu Elisavety," *Zapysky Ukrains'koho naukovo ho tova-
rysna v Kyevi*, vol. 26 (1927), pp. 44–47.
The hetman’s treasury gained considerable income from granting monopoly rights for the retail sale of spirits, tobacco, and tar. While virtually everyone except peasants had the right to distill alcohol and to produce other monopoly products, they could not sell such products on a retail basis but had to sell them wholesale to a licensed retailer. The hetman would issue yearly licenses to individuals and institutions permitting them to sell alcoholic beverages locally. In return, the retailer would advance a fixed sum to the hetman’s treasury. In essence, retailers would try to outbid each other in order to obtain a lucrative monopoly. Such monopolies were granted not only to private individuals but also to towns and monasteries. In fact, monasteries were frequently owners of taverns. Although these monopolies were a source of great income, they were also the cause for large-scale corruption and popular dissatisfaction. In the eighteenth century, the practice of granting such monopolies was gradually abandoned.

The hetman also levied an excise tax (indukty and eveykty) on all products entering and leaving the Hetmanate. In the early eighteenth century the rate was approximately 2 percent of the value of the product. In 1754 Empress Elizabeth abolished internal tariffs in the Russian Empire, a decree that was applied to the Hetmanate. It had a dire effect on many local sources of revenue, since the local Cossack administration, towns, and even monasteries levied local tariffs. The tariff levied on the Hetmanate’s border with Russia was also abolished, but the hetman was given fifty thousand rubles a year in compensation from the imperial treasury.

The various taxes and tariffs were collected by a fiscal apparatus that was rudimentary at best. Much of the revenue was collected directly by the receiving institution (local official, town, or

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42 The complex rights for distilling and selling alcoholic beverages are reviewed by M. Tyshchenko, in “Hural’ne pravo ta pravo shynkuvaty horilku na Livoberezhni Ukraini do kiusia XVIII st.,” Prasi Komisii diia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhid’o-rus’koho ta ukraïns’koho prava, 3 (1927): 150–202.
43 V. A. Diadychenko, Narysy, pp. 83–84; for the excise tax see also V. Barvins’kyi, ‘Pytyannia pro induktya ta eveyktu,’ pp. 241–44.
44 The abolition of the Russian-Ukrainian border tariff is discussed in V. O. Romanovs’kyi, ‘Do istorii buidzhetovoho prava Het’manshchyny za Kyryla Rozumovs’koho,’ Jubileinyi zbiryk na poshanu akadennika Dmytra Ivanovycha Bahaliia, 1 (Kiev, 1927), pp. 779–85.
monastery). Even some of the taxes for the Cossack army or Russian troops were collected and dispensed locally, with the Hetmanate’s treasury playing only a supervisory role. This slowed the development of a central fiscal system and treasury. The major problem was that the Hetmanate’s treasury was indistinguishable from the hetman’s personal wealth and from income connected with his office. The position of general military treasurer, which existed at various times during the seventeenth century, resembled more that of a private accountant or steward than that of a state minister. Any revenues that came into the central administration were controlled by the hetman.

A reform of the financial system was attempted by Hetman Danylo Apostol in 1727. He planned to renew the position of general treasurer, to clarify the question of a state treasury, and to streamline the tax system. The reforms were included in the Ukrainian treaty proposition to the tsar in 1728, but the Russian administration insisted that two general treasurers be appointed, a Ukrainian and a Russian. The Hetmanate’s treasury was separated from the office and person of hetman and put under the auspices of the two treasurers. They supervised a whole bureaucratic machine including a General Treasury Chancellery (general’na skarbova kantseliariia) and an accounting office (general’naia shtetnaia komissiia). This fiscal apparatus was responsible directly to the College of Foreign Affairs, bypassing the hetman. In manipulating a needed reform, the Russian administration obtained complete supervision and considerable control over the Hetmanate’s financial system.

Viewing the Hetmanate as a possible source of revenue, the Russian administration sought to tax its inhabitants directly. Because of Ukrainian opposition and constant warfare, this goal was not achieved in the seventeenth century. Peter I, however, initiated many imperial taxes that were also applied to the Hetmanate. For a brief period, the Little Russian College actually took over the Hetmanate’s taxes and directed them into the imperial treasury. This policy resulted in a sharp drop in revenues and was abandoned. The Hetmanate’s finances continued to be kept separate from those of the empire, and little revenue went directly into the imperial treasury. By stationing an increas-

ing number of Russian troops in the Hetmanate and placing the burden of their support on the Ukrainian populace, however, the Russian authorities were able to gain a substantial indirect fiscal contribution. In order to determine better the fiscal possibilities of the Hetmanate, the Russian authorities undertook a comprehensive census in 1730–31. Yet, the imperial administration greatly overestimated the revenue realizable in the Hetmanate. From 1729 until 1740, the Ukrainian administration was not once able to meet the tax goals necessary to support all of the Russian troops and officials in the Hetmanate, and more than 256,000 rubles in arrears were finally cancelled by Elizabeth.  

The subordination of the General Treasury to the College of Foreign Affairs caused a continued struggle over the control of Ukrainian finances between the college and the hetman. The General Treasury Chancellery was not entirely independent of the hetman. Ordinary expenses were met routinely, but extraordinary ones were decided by the hetman and the Ukrainian administration. The hetman ordered the issuance of money for various tasks, and the treasury either complied or waited for a decision from the college.

Although closely supervised by the College of Foreign Affairs, the Hetmanate was able to maintain a separate fiscal system. No Russian taxes were levied on its territory. Even the tax in support of Russian troops was collected by the Ukrainian administration. This sharply differentiated the Hetmanate from Russia proper, where after 1724 all taxable subjects had to pay a capitation or poll tax—a tax that tied much of the population to the state.

Such was the basic military and administrative, as well as judicial and fiscal, structure of the Hetmanate. The same officers who led the Cossacks into battle also registered decrees, adjudicated criminal and civil court cases, and collected taxes. Only in the central administration did greater specialization exist, including separate administrative bodies for finance (General Military Treasury and General Accounting Office) and a central tribunal (General Military Court).

47 Even the tax-exempt nobles were responsible for the tax of their serfs and, therefore, were liable if a serf escaped or died until the time such a person was stricken from the tax rolls.
The Nature of Ukrainian Autonomy

Connected with the Cossack administration was the older, theoretically self-governing, unit of the town. Two types of towns had come into being in the Hetmanate: one enjoyed considerable autonomy under Magdeburg Law, and the other existed under statutes that granted less autonomy.\(^{48}\)

Towns under Magdeburg Law were entitled to a complete independent judicial system and administration. Only twelve towns in the Hetmanate were granted Magdeburg Law, whether by Polish kings, Russian tsars, or Ukrainian hetmans. With the exception of Poltava, these towns were located in the more settled, traditionally urban north.\(^{49}\) Their trade was highly developed, and their craftsmen were organized into guilds. Town officials had jurisdiction over all town inhabitants, including visitors and nonburgers, and supervised craft and trade guilds, collected taxes, provided police and fire protection, and adjudicated civil and criminal cases. Towns without Magdeburg Law were generally smaller, less complex, and lacking in broad legal autonomy. There, Cossack officials supervised municipal court proceedings and administration. Over time, even the privileged Magdeburg towns lost some of their autonomy to the regimental and company chancelleries, which were located in the towns. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the degree of a town’s municipal self-rule depended on the extent to which it could resist or circumvent Cossack authority. Gradually, most of the towns became subordinated to the Cossack administration.


Another institution operating somewhat outside the Cossack administrative structure was the landlord’s court, or Court of Domain. After the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising, most of the Polish landlords were evicted. Those who remained lost much of their authority over the peasants. Later, with the development of a Ukrainian gentry and the increasing enserfment of the peasantry, the landlord’s court was reconstituted.

During the eighteenth century, Ukrainian landlords received greater and greater judicial authority over the inhabitants of their estates in all civil and in minor criminal matters. The landlords’ decisions could be reviewed and reversed by the regimental or any central court, however. The towns and the church maintained their own Courts of Domain. Many municipalities owned surrounding estates and villages. In such instances the town was considered the landlord, and the peasants were under the jurisdiction of town officials. The Orthodox church was the largest single proprietor in the Hetmanate. During the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising it came under the hetman’s protection and, consequently, retained its huge estates and privileges, including peasant labor. Various monasteries and dioceses maintained special courts for their subjects; persons accused of major crimes, however, were usually turned over to the secular courts. At times the secular authorities curbed the clerical courts, especially when the Cossack landlords were competing with the church for land and peasant services.

The church also maintained a system of ecclesiastical courts. Their jurisdiction extended not only to clerics but also to monastery helpers, church servants, cantors, and others directly associated with the church. Proceedings were conducted in accordance with Orthodox ecclesiastical law. Ecclesiastical courts exerted some influence on the general populace by deciding the legality of marriages and divorces and matters dealing with faith and morals.

The Hetmanate’s fairly elaborate judicial structure relied on a variety of laws. The decrees of the Ukrainian and Russian administration, legal codes, and common law were the most fundamental of

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these.\textsuperscript{51} Russian legal sources consisted of charters (\textit{gramoty}) and decrees (\textit{ukazy}) issued by the tsar and the occasional judicial decisions of the Senate. On the whole, these confirmed existing Ukrainian norms. The agreements (\textit{statti}) reached between the tsar and the hetman constituted another basic source.

Proclamations (\textit{universally}) and orders issued by the hetman and the General Military Chancellery formed the basic legislation of the Ukrainian administration. In addition, the Hetmanate used such older, pre-Khmel'nyts’kyi codes as the Lithuanian Statute of 1566 and 1588 and the Chelmo variant of Magdeburg Law. The most important and widespread source, however, was customary law. Many features of the written codes became inapplicable after the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising; consequently, Cossack and other customary practices were substituted. Customary practices and written codes existed side by side, although frequently in conflict. The overlapping and contradictory laws and customs resulted in lengthy and confusing judicial proceedings.

The lack of a unified legal code and the obsolescence of codes written in Middle Ukrainian, Polish, or Latin made the translation and codification of Ukrainian laws imperative. From 1728 to 1743 a Ukrainian juridical commission intermittently compiled a comprehensive new legal code. The resulting "Laws by Which the Little Russian People are Judged" (\textit{Prava, po kotorym suditsia malorossiiskii narod}) was never approved by the Senate or the tsar and so never became an official code.\textsuperscript{52} Nevertheless, it was used extensively by Ukrainian courts during the second half of the eighteenth century.

One of the most important institutions of the Hetmanate was the Orthodox church. Although the Ukrainians of the Hetmanate and the Russians professed the Orthodox faith, they did not always come

\textsuperscript{51} The types of law operative in the Hetmanate are well summarized by A. I. Pashuk, \textit{Sud i sudochynstvo na Livoberezhni Ukraini v XVII–XVIII st.} (Lviv, 1967), pp. 63–97.

under the same ecclesiastical jurisdiction. When the Ukraine was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, its faithful were served by a separate Orthodox church in no way connected with Muscovy. Symbolizing the unity of the Orthodox church in the Ukraine and Belorussia was its head, the metropolitan of "Kiev, Halych and all Rus'," who, in turn, was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople. Perhaps the most eminent metropolitan was Petro Mohyla (1632–47), who founded the Kiev Academy, wrote scores of sermons, and commissioned the compilation and publication of the first Orthodox catechism.\(^{53}\) Mohyla's successor, Syl'vester Kosiv (1647–57), continued his program while gaining political importance during the turbulent Khmel'nyts'kyi era.

As the political situation deteriorated and the Ukraine was partitioned among several powers, the Kiev metropolitan had great difficulty maintaining the unity of the Orthodox church. Kosiv's successor, Dionysii Balaban (1657–63), a supporter of Hetman Vyhovs'kyi's break with Muscovy, was unable to assert his authority not only on the Left Bank, but even in the city of Kiev—both were controlled by Muscovy. The next metropolitan, Iosyf Tukal's'kyi (1666–75), a supporter of Hetman Doroshenko's alliance with Turkey, exercised jurisdiction over an even more limited territory. Meanwhile, the Muscovite authorities appointed various "administrators" for the Kiev eparchy on the Left Bank, but they lacked the canonical authority to replace the duly elected metropolitan of Kiev.\(^{54}\)

The Muscovite authorities soon realized that to gain a firm foothold in the Ukraine they must control the Kiev metropolitan, but Metropol-

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\(^{53}\) For definitive works on the Mohyla and Khmel'nyts'kyi periods, see G. Golubev's \textit{Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i ego spodvizhniki}, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1883–98); V. Eingorn, \textit{O snosheniakh malorossiiskago duxhovenstva s maskovskim pravitel'stvom v isarsnovanie Aleksei Mikhailovicha} (Moscow, 1894); \textit{The Kiev Mohyla Academy}, special issue of \textit{Harvard Ukrainian Studies} 8, nos. 1–2 (June 1984).

ian Kosiv firmly rebuffed all attempts to subordinate him to the Moscow patriarch.55

Muscovite attempts to influence the election of the metropolitan in 1657 and 1665 misfired. Only in 1684, under relentless pressure from Muscovite envoys and Hetman Samoilovych, did a church synod in Kiev elect a pro-Muscovite candidate—Prince Gedeon Sviatopolk-Chetvertyns’kyi, a descendent of Rurik. Despite this electoral victory, the pro-Muscovite party at the synod faced strong opposition against the subordination of the Kiev metropolitan.56 The opposition capitulated only after the tsar issued a special charter affirming the following privileges to the Kiev metropolitan: free election (the patriarch’s role was limited to bestowing his blessing); maintenance of an independent ecclesiastical judicial system, not subject to review by the patriarch; continued jurisdiction over all eparchies, bishops, hegumens, and monasteries; maintenance of an independent educational system and press; preservation of local ecclesiastical practices; possession of all wealth and property held by the Orthodox hierarchy and clergy; superiority over all other hierarchs under the jurisdiction of the patriarch. With the Muscovite subordination, the metropolitan’s title was changed from metropolitan of “Kiev, Halych and all Rus” to metropolitan of “Kiev, Halych, and all of Little Russia.” Consent from the patriarch of Constantinople to the transfer of the Kiev metropolitan see to the Moscow patriarch was obtained in 1686 through intimidation and bribery.

At the time of the subordination, the Kiev metropolitan had six eparchies under his jurisdiction: two in the Hetmanate (Kiev and Chemihiv) and four in Poland-Lithuania (Lviv, Luts’k, Przemysł, Mahilieū-Mstyslau). By the 1720s the Kiev metropolitan had lost all the dioceses except his own Kiev eparchy. The first to bolt was the bishop of Chemihiv, Lazar Baranovych, who in 1688 successfully

55 For the views of Metropolitan Kosiv see Metropolitan Makarii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, 12: 55–90; K. Kharlampovich, Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuuiu zhizn (Kazan, 1914), p. 228; Metropolitan Kosiv’s opposition to the Pereiaslav agreement is also dealt with in Ivan Kryp’tiakovych, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (Kiev, 1954), p. 469.

56 The subordination of the Kiev metropolitan to the Moscow patriarch has been exhaustively treated by S. A. Temovskii, Issledovanie o podchinennii Kievskoi metropolii Moskovskomu patriarkhau (Kiev, 1912), and by Kharlampovich, Malorossiiskoe vliianie, pp. 149–233.
petitioned the tsar for exclusion from the Kiev metropolitan's jurisdiction and for direct subordination to the Moscow patriarch. In the early eighteenth century, the Lviv, Luts'k, and Przemyśl sees became Uniate. The Mahilieus-Mstyslau diocese in Belorusussia remained Orthodox but fell under the direct jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarch. The Kiev metropolitan also failed to place the newly established Pereiaslav eparchy (1700) of the Hetmanate under his jurisdiction. While he continued to include "Kiev, Halych, and all of Little Russia" in his title, the metropolitan's jurisdiction was in fact limited to the Kiev eparchy and the remaining Orthodox parishes on the Right Bank.  

The rapid demise of a separate Ukrainian-Belorussian Orthodox church can be viewed as the result of a twofold process: external political pressure and a voluntary internal movement. The loss of their traditional eparchies to the Uniate church propelled the Ukrainian Orthodox to merge with the Russian church. While pressure for the merger was undoubtedly resented, Muscovy did at least provide the church faithful with protection under a powerful Orthodox tsar.

A pro-Moscow faction had existed within the church even before the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, and the beginning of the eighteenth century it became dominant. Many Ukrainian prelates, clergy, hegumen, and monks identified with an imperial Orthodox church. Any strong particularist feelings they may have had were subordinated to the good of universal Orthodoxy and their own careers. It was at this time that Ukrainians were most influential in the Russian Orthodox church. The first Ukrainian to make a brilliant career was Stefan Iavors'kyi, who became metropolitan of Riazan and ""administrator of the patriarchal throne."" Feofan Prokopovych, rector of the Kievian academy, became an adviser and strong supporter of Peter I. In addition to those two outstanding Ukrainian clergymen, many others emigrated to Russia, where they played a prominent and, at times, dominant role in the Russian church.  

57 The church in the eighteenth century is treated in I. Chistovich, Ocherki istorii zapadnoi-russkoi tserkvi, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1882–84), vol. 2; Kharlampovich, Malorossiiskoe vliianie: Vlasov's'kyi, Narja, 3: 5–30.

58 This flow is the subject of Kharlampovich's monumental work, Malorossiiskoe vliianie.
Although a separate Ukrainian-Belorussian Orthodox church ceased to exist by the 1720s, it was still remembered by the Kiev metropolitans. Although after 1721 they were mere appointees of the Synod rather than elected representatives of the clergy, such Kiev metropolitans as Timofii Shcherbats'kyi (1747–57) and Arsenii Mohylians'kyi (1757–70) continued to demand the restoration of the metropolitan’s former prerogatives.  

The church in the Hetmanate, moreover, continued to retain its local peculiarities in language and liturgical practices, as well as to exercise a whole complex of personal property and customary rights deeply ingrained into the Ukrainian legal and social systems. Structurally, however, it had already merged with the larger imperial Russian Orthodox church.

The church, however, was the only important Ukrainian institution that was at least partially incorporated into the imperial structure. On the whole, the administrative practices, laws, system of taxation (the poll tax in particular), and military conscription of Russia remained unknown in the Hetmanate. The fusion of the Cossack military structure with the institutions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had created a unique administrative system that sharply differentiated the Hetmanate from Russia proper. Linking the Hetmanate to Russia was the authority of the tsar, who ruled the region through the Malorossiiskii prikaz, later the College of Foreign Affairs and, on occasion, through the Senate. Imperial interference with Ukrainian autonomy was limited to tampering with the Hetmanate’s central administration, leaving the basic legal, administrative, and fiscal apparatus intact.

**Ukrainian Political Concepts and Historical Literature**

The blending of Ukrainian Cossack traditions with the traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was also reflected in the gentry’s political outlook. Inherent in both the Cossack and Polish szlachta orientations was the notion of a contractual relationship. The

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59 I. G. Graevskii, ‘‘Kievskii mitropolit Timofei Shcherbatskii,’’ *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, 1910, no. 1, pp. 97–126; no. 2, pp. 147–63; no. 5, pp. 64–106; nos. 7–8, pp. 432–74; no. 10, pp. 203–34; 1911, no. 4, pp. 548–85; 1912, no. 2, 210–27; N. Shpachinskii, *Kievskii mitropolit Arsenii Mogilianskii* (Kiev, 1907). The efforts of Metropolitan Arsenii Mohylians'kyi to restore the rights of the ‘‘Little Russian’’ Church will be discussed in Chapter 5.
estate rights of the szlachta were based on its political, territorial, and regional rights. The constitutional theory of the time held that as the sole component of the political nation, the szlachta of the Commonwealth was fully responsible for maintaining its territorial integrity and constitutional basis. Prior to the election of a new king, the szlachta of each district met in a local diet to draw up lists of the region’s rights, privileges, and current needs. Their delegates to the Election Diet usually had instructions to vote for a candidate who guaranteed that the list would be honored. Upon election the king acquired a new contractual relation to the political nation. He solemnly pledged to respect all the rights and privileges of the whole nation, represented by the szlachta delegates from all regions of the Commonwealth.

At first, the relationship between the Commonwealth’s king and the Cossacks was essentially only a contract between a monarch and a mercenary army. The Zaporozhian Army or Host, represented by the hetman and Cossack officers, agreed to serve the king in return for cash payments and special privileges (exemption from taxation, self-government, the right to bear arms, the right to distill alcohol, and so on). Later, however, the Cossacks’ defense of Orthodoxy tied these payments and privileges to religious and political issues. Moreover, Khmel’nyts’kyi’s victories added a territorial dimension to the contract: after the conclusion of the Zboriv treaty of 1649, the sovereign was allied with an army that controlled a good part of the Ukraine. The Cossacks believed that in 1654 they replaced the Polish king with the Russian tsar in the same kind of relationship. In fact, the Pereiaslav agreement was largely modelled on the Treaty of Zboriv.

60 The ever-expanding contractual relationship between the Cossacks and the king is very well traced in volumes 7 and 8 of Hrushevs’kyi’s Istoria Ukrainy-Rusy; the Treaty of Zboriv is discussed in vol. 8, pt. 3, pp. 193–288.

61 Even a cursory comparison of the Treaties of Zboriv and Pereiaslav shows the consistency of Cossack demands: (1) political, social, and economic guarantees to the Zaporozhian army and Cossack estate; (2) actual control of a certain territory; and (3) protection for the Orthodox faith and culture. Not only did the Cossack officers make similar demands of both the Poles and Muscovites, but they wanted to maintain the same contractual relationship with the Russian tsar as with the Polish king. This was underscored during the submission ceremonies. Khmel’nyts’kyi and his staff demanded that the Muscovite envoys swear an oath on behalf of the tsar, just as the Polish envoy used to do on behalf of the king. The Muscovite envoy’s report of this
As the Zaporozhians withdrew to the Sich, as the Right Bank was lost to Poland, and as szlachta tendencies grew among the officers, the Cossacks’ concept of a contractual relationship declined. One attempt to return to the szlachta orientation, the Union of Hadiach concluded with Poland, proved to be disastrous. In its wake a new concept of “Little Russia” emerged that fused the szlachta and Cossack traditions into one political outlook.

By the eighteenth century, the hetman and the Cossack elite no longer claimed to represent the Zaporozhian Army or the territory it controlled. They now considered themselves the representatives of “Little Russia” or the Hetmanate. This newly formed gentry assumed the role of protector of the Hetmanate and its constitutional arrangement, thus approximating a szlachta political nation of the Commonwealth’s type.

Such an approximation, however, could be only partial. Aside from the improbability that a gentry democracy could exist within an autocracy, the formation of a full szlachta political nation would have imperiled the Ukrainian claim to a contractual relationship with the tsar. If the Pereiaslav agreement was interpreted as a contract, then the contracting parties were Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi and Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. The agreement’s main provisions were officially referred to as “the articles of Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi.” In the seventeenth century these “articles” were reaffirmed and renegotiated every time a new hetman assumed office. Thus the hetman and the Cossack tradition were a linchpin in the contractual theory, one that could hardly be replaced by a szlachta

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63 These agreements were analyzed in A. Lakoviv, Українсько-московські доховіри в XVII–XVIII століттях, Pratsi Ukrains’koho naukovoho instytutu, vol. 19 (Warsaw, 1934).
political nation. Whatever the social and political developments within the Hetmanate vis-à-vis the tsar, the Ukrainian elite had to share—willingly or unwillingly—the roles of political representative of the land and defender of “Little Russian rights and liberties” with the Ukrainian hetman.

Despite their increasing szlachta orientation, the Ukrainian gentry continued to show reverence for Cossack tradition. The need to relate to a heroic Cossack past and to establish a unifying myth was expressed in a new literary genre—the Cossack chronicle. At a time when most literature in the Hetmanate was produced by churchmen, the Cossack chronicles were written by clerks and officers of the Ukrainian administration. In fact, it was their bitter disappointment with the writings of the clergy, which ignored the history of Cossack Ukraine, that sparked the creativity of the new secular authors. For instance, Stefan Savyts’kyi, a clerk in the Lubny regiment, explained his reasons for writing *Povesti o kozatskoi voine s poliakami* (1718) as follows. Oral accounts that he had heard of the Khmel’nysts’kyi uprising did not satisfy his curiosity, and he had read Samuil Twardowski’s *Wojna domowa* (1681), which described the events from the Polish viewpoint. Savyts’kyi was surprised and disappointed that none of his countrymen, “particularly from the spiritual ranks, who, since the time of emancipation from Poland, lacked neither people capable of the task nor the necessary typographical means,” had written a work about the more immediate past. His thus became one work in the continuous stream of chronicles and histories—including such famous works as that by Hryborii Hrabianka (1710) and Samuil Velychko (1720)—that attempted to fill this gap and which, in fact, created a Cossack historical mythology.

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66 Hrabianka was published under the title *Deisvila prezel’noi i ot’ nachala poliakov kravashoi nebuvaloi brani Bogdana Khmel’nytskogo ... Roku 1710* (Kiev, 1854); Velychko, under the title, *Letopis’ sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossi v XVII-m veke. Sostavit Samoil Velichko byvshii kantseliarist kantseliarst Voiska Zaporo-
Reverence for the Cossack past, the social and political outlook *szlachta*, and a vigorous defense of the Hetmanate’s contractual relationship with the tsar were all present in the political poem “A Dialogue Between Great Russia and Little Russia.” Written in 1762 Semen Divovych, a translator in the General Military Chancellery, poem reflects the thinking of the Hetmanate’s gentry. Dedicated the “honor, glory, and defense of all Little Russia,” it includes panegyric to the Hetmanate’s founder, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. The poem ascribes the paramount role in liberating the Hetmanate from the Polish yoke to the Ukrainian gentry, and it laments the fact that Ukrainian noble and military ranks have not been recognized by imperial authorities. Most important, the poem flatly rejects the concept of the Hetmanate’s being a part of a uniform Russian Empire. The personified Little Russia bluntly tells Great Russia that it swore allegiance to the tsar, not to it. It goes on to state that, in fact, Little Russia and Great Russia are separate lands bound only by a common monarch, and that Little Russia has its own rights guaranteed by the tsars.

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Ukrainian Rights and Liberties—Conclusion

The Hetmanate’s autonomous political position, self-governing institutions, social arrangements, and administrative practices were all regarded as “Little Russian rights and liberties.” What these rights meant to an individual Ukrainian depended greatly on his social and political position. The gentry was concerned about the Hetmanate’s political prerogatives—a concern that was reinforced by a proud historical tradition and distinct political orientation. In the gentry’s eyes, the rights of the Hetmanate as a whole were indistinguishable from their rights as a social order. At the bare minimum, these included recognition of szlachta status and ownership of landed estates farmed by dependent peasants.

For the Cossacks, Ukrainian rights and liberties meant, above all, personal freedom. Next came exemption from taxation and the right to land ownership. These prerogatives became imperiled, primarily because of the Cossacks’ economic impoverishment, but also because of their exploitation by Ukrainian officials and notables. As a result, the Cossacks looked for protection not only to the Ukrainian administration, but also to the Russian authorities. Similarly, the burghers—whose autonomy in the towns was in theory assured but was in actuality being levelled by the Ukrainian administration—frequently sought redress from the central Russian administration.

Some of the clergy still dreamed of a separate church structure in the Hetmanate, but most believed that Ukrainian rights and liberties referred to their economic privileges and social status, which the clergy in the rest of the empire did not enjoy. If the peasants had any notion of Ukrainian rights and liberties, they probably thought that they entailed personal and legal freedom and the right to choose one’s landlord—rights which by the mid-eighteenth century they knew to be more theoretical than real.

Despite the internal contradictions and the multiplicity of definitions, Ukrainians recognized their rights and liberties as a collective symbol for certain political, social, and administrative norms legitimized by law and historical tradition. As such, these rights and privileges had formed a considerably cohesive system, which had become deeply ingrained into the society’s collective identity. No major political or social innovations could be undertaken without their violation. Any attempt by the empire to integrate the Hetmanate further would confront it with “Little Russian rights and liberties.”
CHAPTER THREE

Catherine II’s Clash with Ukrainian Autonomy: The Removal of Hetman Rozumovs’kyi

Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy Prior to 1762

In the seventeenth century the tsar confirmed "Ukrainian rights and liberties" every time a new hetman assumed office, but the Muscovite authorities held a restricted view of what these privileges were. Their nature and scope were poorly defined by the Pereiaslav agreement, because both sides misunderstood the other's intentions and institutions. The Cossacks wanted a binding bilateral treaty and military alliance that would form a quasi protectorate. The tsar was to guarantee the area’s security, but the Cossack army was to maintain virtual independence, obtain legitimate recognition of its role in the Ukraine, and secure an outside source of funds. In essence, the Cossacks believed that they were merely replacing the Polish king with the Muscovite tsar. But Muscovite intentions and traditions were quite different. The Muscovite sense of authority recognized no contractual relationships between the tsar and his subjects, but only unilateral submission. This concept was at work when the Muscovite envoy refused to swear an oath on behalf of the tsar, for it was unthinkable that a subject demand an oath from the autocrat. Dumbfounded and enraged by the envoy’s refusal, Khmel’nyts’kyi and his staff walked out during the submission ceremony. They did return later, but only after being entreated and reassured by the Muscovite envoy.¹

From the outset, the Pereiaslav agreement contained ambiguities and contradictions. Political expediency had only temporarily muted the clash of two antagonistic political systems. The Muscovites were eager to assert political control over the Ukraine, to weaken Poland, and to gain the services of the Zaporozhian Army, whereas the Zaporozhian Army sought military support in its protracted struggle against Poland. Rather than jeopardize an understanding that each desired, both sides "did not say what they thought and did what they did not wish to do." Thus the tsar regarded the articles of Bohdan Khmel'nits'kyi as a favor bestowed on the Cossacks, while the latter viewed them as a specific agreement between the tsar and his new subjects. Without understanding or considering the legal implications of their act, the Cossacks agreed to exchange theoretical pledges for military assistance. In practice, the Cossack polity did continue to function as a virtually independent political unit. For example, Khmel'nits'kyi apparently saw no contradiction between his oath to the Muscovite tsar and his negotiation with the Swedish king in order to accept the latter's protection, although at the time Muscovy and Sweden were in conflict. In fact, the Cossack polity was simultaneously under the protection of Muscovy, Sweden, and the Ottoman Porte. The internal administration of the Cossack entity, when established, permitted no interference by Muscovy, not even in instances allowed by the Pereiaslav agreement, such as the collection of municipal taxes by the tsar. Tariffs were levied at clearly demarcated borders between Muscovy and the new Cossack polity, and Muscovite troops stationed on Ukrainian territory were treated as foreign allied forces.

The existence of an autonomous Cossack Ukraine was an anomaly in the Muscovite political system. In a patrimonial state in which the tsar's authority was theoretically unlimited and everyone was his servant, if not his slave, there was no place for territorial privilege,
corporate rights of social groups, Magdeburg Law, or the Lithuanian Statute—all elements essential to Ukrainian rights and liberties. Therefore, from the Muscovite viewpoint, Cossack Ukraine had to be treated either as a completely foreign land or as a special domain of the tsar. To some extent both approaches were applied. Since all matters concerning the Ukraine were handled by the Malorossiiskii prikaz, a branch of the Posol’skii prikaz, which dealt exclusively with foreign affairs, Muscovite authorities clearly recognized the Ukraine as a foreign land. Moreover, in changing his title, the tsar called himself autocrat of Great and Little Russia. The new title may have been no more than an announcement of the tsar’s possessions, but it did imply that Little Russia was a distinct domain or tsardom, which the tsar ruled.5

In their dealing with Cossack Ukraine, the Muscovite authorities were guided not so much by theoretical or constitutional considerations as by pragmatic politics. The Muscovites’ first step after signing the Pereiaslav agreement was to secure a firm foothold in the Ukraine. They set about doing this by seeking to control the two major sources of authority: the office of hetman and the office of metropolitan of Kiev. Initially, the Muscovite authorities attempted to curb the hetman’s conduct of foreign relations. The Pereiaslav agreement permitted the hetman to receive and to dispatch foreign ambassadors and to conclude agreements with foreign powers. The implication of this was that in 1654 Muscovy did not see the Ukraine as falling totally under its authority or sovereignty. The hetman was required, however, to notify the tsar about the content of all discussions and agreements, and he was prohibited from negotiating independently with the Polish Commonwealth, the Crimea, or the Ottoman Porte. When their efforts to control the foreign policy of hetmans Khmel’nyts’kyi and Vyhovs’kyi failed, the Muscovites used Vyhovs’kyi’s abrogation of the Pereiaslav agreement and his union of Cossack Ukraine with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Union of Hadiach of 1658) as a pretext to falsify the original articles of

5 Not’dë discusses the Muscovite view of Ukrainian autonomy in his “Essays in Russian State Law”; the institutional arrangements are studied by K. A. Sofronenko, Deiatel’nost’ Malorossiiskogo prikaza Russkogo gosudarstva vo vtoroi polovine XVII-nachale XVIII veka [=Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, no. 2] (Moscow, 1957).
agreement. In 1659, at the election of Iurii Khmel’nyts’kyi, the Muscovite authorities presented a text which they alleged to be an exact duplicate of the articles signed in 1654. In fact, it was a substitute that contained many changes and additions, including the prohibition against any conduct of foreign relations by the hetman without the expressed consent of the tsar. Subsequently, any independent Ukrainian diplomacy was equated with treason, although controlled foreign relations were permitted until 1708.

The Muscovite authorities followed a similar policy in dealing with the Kiev metropolitan, who was head of the Orthodox church in the Ukraine and in Belorussia. After applying extreme pressure on the Ukrainian clergy and conducting lengthy negotiations with the patriarch of Constantinople and the Ottoman Porte, they succeeded in subordinating the Kievan metropolitan to the Moscow patriarch in 1686. This victory gave Muscovy control over both of the two major centers of authority in the Ukraine.

While battling to control the hetmancy and the metropolitanate, the Muscovite authorities also strove to influence Ukrainian affairs directly by stationing military governors (voevody) in the major Ukrainian towns. The agreement of 1654 stipulated that military governors were to be appointed for Kiev and Chernihiv, although Khmel’nyts’kyi actually allowed one only in Kiev. In spite of repeated protestations from Moscow, neither Khmel’nyts’kyi nor his successor, Vyhovs’kyi, admitted other military governors. The articles of 1659, however, allowed for their placement in five cities.

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6 Since no original text of the 1654 agreement has been found, the forgery charge is difficult to prove. However, a detailed textual study of the pertinent documents by A. Iakovliv convincingly reconstructs the original agreement and identifies the additions and deletions made in 1659; see his Dohovir. Moreover, one need not rely solely on Iakovliv’s study to prove the restriction of the hetman’s original right to conduct foreign relations: a simple comparison between the 1654 and 1659 charters issued by the tsar confirms the change. The former permits foreign relations while the latter prohibits them. See PSZ, 1, no. 119 (March 27, 1654), pp. 322–37, and ibid., 1, no. 262 (October 17, 1659), pp. 491–95. The controversy over the original text is well summarized by John Basarab in Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 25–44. Basarab also provides an English translation of the most pertinent documents, pp. 230–58.

7 The question of Russian military governors in the Ukraine is discussed by I. Rozenfel’d, Prisoedinenie Malorossii k Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1915), pp. 100–105, and by A. Iakovliv in Ukraïns’ko-moskov’s’ki dohovory, pp. 75–77, 81–92.
During the hetmancy of Briukhovets’kyi, the Muscovites managed to obtain the unrestricted stationing of military governors (1665). A general uprising in 1668 forced the new governors to flee from all Ukrainian towns. Afterward they were again limited to five cities—Kiev, Pereiaslav, Nizhyn, Chernihiv, and Oster. Subsequently, however, Moscow’s right to maintain military governors in major Ukrainian towns went unchallenged.

The Muscovites’ initial rationale for stationing military governors in the Ukraine was to provide protection against foreign invasion. Each governor commanded a garrison of Russian troops and was forbidden to interfere in local municipal affairs. Gradually, however, the governors began to shield the burghers from the abuses of the Cossack administration, encouraging them to submit grievances directly to Russian officials. The Muscovite authorities not only maintained a military presence in the Ukraine, but also became frequent arbiters of Ukrainians’ internal disputes.

Despite these inroads, the time of “the Ruin” (1659–79) prevented the consolidation of Muscovite gains in the Ukraine. On the one hand, the pro-Muscovite hetman of the Left Bank was more dependent on Muscovy than any hetman of a united Zaporozhian Host would have been. On the other hand, the mere existence of pro-Polish or even pro-Turkish hetmans and Cossack armies threatened Muscovy with the loss of the entire Ukraine. The pro-Muscovite hetman had to be given sufficient authority to appear as an attractive alternative to his pro-Polish counterpart. Moreover, the ever-changing fortunes of war did at times sweep Muscovite authority out of the Ukraine.

If the anarchy of “the Ruin” prevented the Muscovites from achieving control of the Ukraine, it also inhibited the consolidation of power by any Ukrainian authority. Only with the final sanctioning of the Ukraine’s partition (the “Eternal Peace” Agreement of 1686), the elimination of the pro-Polish Right-Bank hetmans, and the creation of the Left-Bank Hetmanate did stability return. Subsequently, the Hetmanate experienced a renascence. The rule of Hetman Ivan Samoïlovych (1672–82) and, especially, of Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1686–1709) effected the consolidation of the Ukrainian elite into a gentry and created a more effective administration and a vigorous cultural life, which, in turn, gave rise to distinctive political thought, independent economic ties, and renewed interest in reuniting the
Right-Bank Ukraine. These developments attested to the viability and vitality of the Hetmanate.

The renewed Hetmanate ran counter to Peter I's attempt to establish a regulated state, however. Among Hetman Mazepa's complex motives for his break with Muscovy, one theme seems to predominate: his fear, which he shared with the Ukrainian gentry, that Peter's drive for administrative reform would violate Ukrainian "rights and liberties." Peter's policy towards the Hetmanate's army had already shocked the Ukrainian gentry. In 1701–1703, Ukrainian Cossack units were, for the first time, fighting an imperial war far from home and under the command of Russian imperial officers. Rumors of even more dramatic changes pushed Mazepa steadily away from Peter and toward the tsar's enemies. A federation with the Poland of Stanislaw Leszczyński (the Swedish-backed candidate for the Polish throne) or a protectorate directly under Sweden seemed an attractive alternative to the eventual abolition of Ukrainian autonomy under Russian rule. Peter's defeat of Charles XII together with Mazepa at Poltava (1709), however, dashed any hope that the Hetmanate's autonomy could be increased—indeed, it soon had the opposite result.

After his victory at Poltava, Peter acted promptly to end "Ukrainian separatism." He appointed a Russian minister to the hetman's court, empowering him to read all of the hetman's correspondence and to review his appointments. The tsar appointed colonels directly for the first time. Candidates for the highest

8 Ukrainian society and politics during the Mazepa period have been well described in the following works: F. Umanets, Geiman Mazepa (St. Petersburg, 1897); B. Krupnitsky (Krupnyts'kyi), Hetman Mazepa und seine Zeit (Leipzig, 1942); O. Ohloblyn, Hetman Ivan Mazepa i ioho doba (New York, 1960); Diadychenko, Narysy.

9 The motivation of Mazepa and the Ukrainian elite in breaking with Muscovy has been analyzed by O. Subtelny, "Mazepa, Peter I, and the Question of Treason," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 2 no. 2 (1978): 158–83 and more recently in The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century (Boulder, 1981). An interesting contemporary justification for the break was written by Pylyp Orlyk, Mazepa's chancellor and subsequently émigré hetman to his former mentor, Stefan Iavors'kyi: see Orlyk to Stefan Iavors'kyi, June 1, 1721, Osnova (St. Petersburg), 1862, no. 11, pp. 1–29.

10 The best summary of the rule of Hetman Ivan Skoropads'kyi and the immediate post-Mazepa period can be found in Doroshenko, Narys, 2: 136–82.
offices—that is, within the general staff—were selected by the Malorossiiskii prikaz and later by the College of Foreign Affairs and were appointed by the tsar himself. The hetman’s chancelleries, the general staff, and the general military court were all placed under the review of Russian officials. Peter so desired Ukrainian loyalty that he ordered Hetman Skoropads’kyi to marry his daughter to a Russian as a symbol of trust and friendship between Russians and Ukrainians.11

Accompanying Peter’s campaign to weed out Ukrainian separatism was a policy of extracting the maximum in economic and human resources from the Hetmanate. Regulations on trade routes, state monopolies, tariffs on foreign goods, and import-export taxes were introduced for the first time. While the new regulations probably increased imperial revenues, they seriously weakened the Hetmanate’s economy because established trade routes and economic practices were disrupted.12 Peter also began a massive conscription of Cossacks, not for war but for imperial public works—the building of canals, fortifications, and, especially, Peter’s favorite project, the new capital of St. Petersburg.

Preoccupied as he was with the Northern War, Peter, during most of his reign, supervised the Hetmanate’s main administrative and judicial positions closely, but he did not attempt to take them over directly. Only after the Nystad peace (1721) did he really “take Little Russia in hand.”13 At that time he created a Little Russian College, composed of six Russian officers, and made it responsible for adjudicating all complaints against the Ukrainian administration. Simultaneously, he transferred the imperial administration of the Hetmanate’s affairs from the College of Foreign Affairs to the Senate, symbolizing his desire to treat the Hetmanate as an integral part of the empire. Upon the death of Hetman Skoropads’kyi, the Russian authorities forbade the election of a successor. Moreover, they encouraged the Ukrainian populace to deal directly with the Little Russian College, particularly in exposing alleged abuses by the

12 The Hetmanate’s economy during Peter’s reign was studied by Ivan Dzhydzhora, Ukraina v pervyi polovini XVIII viku (Kiev, 1930).
13 The phrase of Count P. Tolstoi when reporting on Peter I’s policies towards the Hetmanate, cited in Doroshenko’s Narys, 2: 179.
Ukrainian administration. But the General Military Chancellery, headed by acting hetman Pavlo Polubotok, resisted this attempt to take over the Ukrainian judicial and financial apparatus. In the ensuing power struggle with Russian officials, most of the top Ukrainian political figures were imprisoned, and acting hetman Pavlo Polubotok actually died in prison. In the end, the Little Russian College did wrest control of the Hetmanate’s finances and judicial system from the resisting General Military Chancellery.

The Little Russian College soon found, however, that it lacked the support needed among the lower echelons of the Ukrainian administration to govern the area directly. Chaos reigned throughout the court system, and the collection of revenues was disrupted. Like other Petrine reforms, the incorporation of the Hetmanate into the “regulated” state was first attempted without sufficient planning or preparation. Although the College was represented to the Ukrainian populace as its protector from an abusive Ukrainian administration, chaos and high cost—in both human and economic terms—of direct Russian rule generated popular discontent. Shortly after Peter’s death, when war with the Turks was imminent, the Supreme Privy Council decided to abandon his policy toward the Hetmanate. In 1727 Peter II issued a decree providing that “there be a hetman and officers in Little Russia and that they be maintained in accordance with the treaty of Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyst’kyi.”

From 1727 to the 1760s the local administration and judicial organs of the Hetmanate functioned without interference from St. Petersburg. During that period the imperial authorities vacillated in their dealings with the Hetmanate’s central administration. Sometimes they merely supervised the Hetmanate’s central organs; at other times they created imperial offices to assume some of the Ukrainian administration’s functions. During the rule of Hetman Danylo Apostol (1728–34), one Russian was assigned to supervise all Ukrainian affairs, and three others were appointed to the General Military Court. The hetman was again denied the authority to select the General Military Staff and his colonels; the latter were to be chosen by the Ukrainian officers, sub-

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14 _PSZ_, 7, no. 5127 (July 22, 1727): 828–29. It is interesting that the decree consistently refers to the “treaty” (traktat) of Bohdan Khmel’nyst’kyi.
ject to approval by St. Petersburg. The most significant instance of imperial centralization, however, was the assumption of control over the Hetmanate’s finances. Although the Hetmanate retained a separate system of taxation and treasury, its finances were closely supervised by the College of Foreign Affairs. After Hetman Apostol’s death (1734), the imperial government once more forbade the election of a hetman and created another collective body—“Rule of the Hetman’s Office”—to administer the Hetmanate. The new office nominally comprised six persons—three Ukrainians and three Russians—but was, in fact, presided over and dominated by a Russian general. For over ten years, this collective ruled the Hetmanate while acquiring a reputation for caprice and brutality.

The leveling of Ukrainian rights and liberties was partially and briefly halted during Elizabeth’s reign. It was then that the Hetmanate enjoyed the “Indian summer” of its autonomy. Elizabeth’s morganatic marriage to the Ukrainian Cossack, Oleksii Rozumovs’kyi, made her favorably disposed toward the reestablishment of the hetmancy. While carefully grooming Oleksii’s brother Kyrylo for the post of hetman, Elizabeth waited to announce her decision. In 1750, Kyrylo Rozumovs’kyi, then twenty-two years old, was duly elected hetman in the Hetmanate’s capital, Hlukhiv.

In contrast to his predecessors, Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovs’kyi originated from the Cossack rank-and-file, rather than from an aristocratic officer family. His formative years were spent at the St. Petersburg court and in Western Europe. He was the first hetman to hold an imperial office simultaneously with the hetmancy—he served as president of the Academy of Sciences and commander of the Izmailovskii Guards. Rozumovs’kyi’s close ties to the imperial family and the Russian aristocracy came not only through his brother, but also by his marriage to Ekaterina Ivanovna Naryshkina, Elizabeth’s third cousin. These ties embroiled the hetman in court intrigues and,

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15 The rule of Hetman Apostol is treated by Borys Krupnyts’kyi. Het’m’an Danylo Apostol i toho doba (Augsburg, 1948).
16 The fiscal reforms are discussed later in this chapter.
17 Doroshenka, Narys, 2: 191.
18 Hetman Rozumovs’kyi’s rule is discussed in the first volume of A. A. Vasil’chikov’s Semeistvo Rozumovskikh (hereafter Vasil’chikov), 4 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1880–87).
as a consequence, he was frequently absent from the Hetmanate, thus leaving its overall administration to his general staff and to the Ukrainian elite.

Despite Kyril Rozumovskyi's influence at court, he, too, had difficulty maintaining the Hetmanate's autonomy. In 1754 he was personally reprimanded by the empress for appointing officers and distributing land without her approval. Subsequently, he took part in a protracted and bitter struggle over finances. The abolition of imperial internal tariffs in 1754 and of the border tariff between the Hetmanate and Russia in 1755 deprived the hetman of revenue. Because of Rozumovskyi's vigorous protests, the empress allowed the hetman fifty thousand rubles a year in compensation from the imperial treasury. When the College of Foreign Affairs, headed by Rozumovskyi's enemy, A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin, demanded an accounting of the use of these funds, the hetman refused to comply. The refusal touched off a bitter struggle at the conclusion of which the imperial authorities accepted the hetman's proposal for the administrative subordination of the Hetmanate to the Senate. This was a moot victory for Rozumovskyi, however, for in the wake of the struggle the Hetmanate's position deteriorated radically: its border with Russia was eliminated, and the territory was placed under the jurisdiction of a body supervising internal affairs.

These setbacks notwithstanding, the role of Kyrilo Rozumovskyi infused the Hetmanate with the spirit of independence and vigor. Hetman Rozumovskyi restored the authority of his office to at least the level exercised by Hetman Skoropadskyi in 1709. He succeeded in again extending the jurisdiction of the Hetmanate to include the city of Kiev and the Zaporozhian Sich. In the late 1750s and early 1760s, Hetman Rozumovskyi and the Ukrainian administration also attempted to reform and revitalize the institutions of the Hetmanate. Standard arms and uniforms were issued to Cossack regiments, and training programs were begun. Hlukhiv and Mazepa's old capital of Baturyn were renovated. Baturyn was again designated the future capital of the Hetmanate, and plans were made for a university to be

19 Vasil'chikov, i: 158, 187.
built there. The preparation of a major reform of the Hetmanate’s judicial system was also begun. The Ukrainian elite’s new confidence in the future of the Hetmanate was shown by the resurgence of Ukrainian autonomist sentiments, particularly as expressed in the famous contemporary poem, “A Dialogue Between Great Russia and Little Russia.”

During the hetmancy of Rozumovs’kyi, the Hetmanate entered another era of rebirth and reform. The fate of this latest attempt at independent development was largely dependent on the caprice of the tsar and on Ukrainian influence at court. In such circumstances Hetman Rozumovs’kyi was well placed to defend the Hetmanate’s position in the empire. In 1762, however, the destiny of the Hetmanate came to hinge primarily on the new empress, Catherine II.

**Catherine II and the Well-Regulated State**

If Peter I laid the foundation for the modern regulated state, then Catherine II constructed it. During her reign Russia’s administration and society were reorganized, and, as a result, Ukrainian autonomy was nullified. Catherine promulgated her reforms according to certain philosophical principles, and these must be examined to understand her motivations.

Much has been written about Catherine’s espousal of “enlightened ideas” and her role as an “enlightened despot.” She certainly read the works of the major philosophers, corresponded with them, and even became their patron. Some nineteenth-century historians, disappointed by Catherine’s failure to abolish serfdom, charged that much of Catherine’s activity on this front was self-promotion, an advertising technique meant for foreign and limited domestic consumption. Privately, especially in the latter period of her reign, Catherine quipped about the philosophers’ impracticality. It would be erroneous, however, to assume that all of her theoretical interests were a sham, or mere intellectual windowdressing intended to satisfy her vanity. During her reign, theories of “enlightened governance” became

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so pervasive at court that they did form a theoretical base for Catherine’s actions.22

Catherine's exposure to enlightened theories of government came from three sources. First, her father and the milieu of petty German principalities in which she grew up provided Catherine with a practical acquaintance with concepts of the regulated or well-ordered state. Second, her own extensive readings of both the German and French thinkers gave her firsthand exposure to Enlightenment ideas. Third, her experience at the Russian court reinforced her attitudes. The need for a more rational system of government had been recognized since the time of Peter I, and, with some reverses and vacillations, that goal was pursued throughout the eighteenth century. Even if the tsars themselves knew little about the latest theoretical literature on the subject, members of various political factions were often quite well read. By the time of Elizabeth, the ideas of cameralism, the well-ordered police state, and early French and German Enlightenment had penetrated Russian court circles.23

Catherine herself said that she had accepted her father's republican ideals.24 By this she meant to show her willingness to serve the public good, or the res publica. This implied that she had a sense of duty toward her country and its citizens that was combined with her concept of absolutism. Catherine believed it to be her duty to correct the actions of her citizens so as to direct them toward the attainment of the

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supreme good. In this she echoed the German theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, Catherine herself expressed a preference for the ‘police state’ or, rather, the ‘well-ordered state.’ That particularly German attitude combining duty, absolutism, and regulation, which Catherine first absorbed in Stettin, Zerbst, and Berlin formed the basic principle for her rule of the Russian Empire.

Added to Catherine’s concept of the well-ordered police state were selected elements of the French and West European Enlightenment. In matters of government Catherine was particularly impressed by Montesquieu, from whom she cribbed whole passages, incorporating them into her Instructions. She also read and corresponded with Voltaire, Grimm, Diderot, d’Alembert, and Mercier de la Rivière, among others. The extent, if any, to which these thinkers influenced Catherine’s legislation is hard to determine. At the very least,

25 For Catherine’s expressed views on the form and function of government, see articles 9 through 14 of her Nakas, published in Documents of Catherine the Great, edited by W. F. Reddaway (Cambridge, 1931), pp. 216–17.


27 F. Taranovskii has claimed that Catherine had not only admired Montesquieu, but deliberately misrepresented his ideas: see his “Politicheskia doktrina v Nakaze imperatritsy Ekateriny II,” Shornik statei po istorii prava, posviashchennyykh Vladimirskomu-Budanovu (Kiev, 1904), pp. 44–86. Taranovskii’s thesis has been refuted by de Madariaga in “Catherine II and Montesquieu,” pp. 612–632. De Madariaga shows conclusively that Catherine took Montesquieu seriously and did try to apply his political theories to Russia. De Madariaga believes that Montesquieu and the French Enlightenment had a much greater impact on Catherine than German Cameralism, thus disputing Raeff’s thesis. For the purpose of this book, it is not as important to establish which current predominated as it is to show the impact that the intellectual climate may have had on the question of autonomous areas.

28 Although many studies about Catherine’s correspondence with various Western thinkers have been written, there is still no comprehensive study of their effect on Catherine’s political and social thought and policies. Before such a synthesis is possible, much more research must be done on the influence of individual theorists on Catherine. For a relatively recent example of such scholarship, see Marc Raeff, “The
Catherine's constant interaction with these philosophers created an intellectual atmosphere, which, when applied to politics, favored the program of "enlightened rule."

Catherine's general political outlook—although not a comprehensive program of reform—was already formed when she assumed the throne, and it was reflected in her earliest legislation. In actually planning governmental reform, however, Catherine first studied various programs for the replacement of the provincial military administration with a professional bureaucracy, the reduction of the size of administrative units, and the participation of the local nobility in provincial government. On December 15, 1763, she issued staff regulations that doubled the number of officials, created new posts, and standardized salaries. Her instructions of April 21, 1764, to the governors-general further defined the functioning of the provincial administration and recommended a variety of "enlightened programs," which each governor-general, as her personal representative, was to introduce into his province.

The pursuit of enlightened rule and a well-ordered state and society continued throughout Catherine's reign. At first, she proceeded cautiously and slowly. As the Pugachev rebellion demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the imperial government, particularly on the provincial level, Catherine most likely accelerated her reform program by issuing the Statute on the Provinces (1775), which greatly increased the number and functions of local government officials and, at the same time, forced the elected representatives of the major segments of society into the role of government regulators. A series of laws

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regulated—or at least supervised the self-regulation—of the nobles and the burghers. This was accompanied by a comprehensive police ordinance that regulated all aspects of urban life.\(^32\) During the early period of Catherine’s reign, administrative reform was closely connected with the introduction of the rule of law. Catherine professed that laws form “the foundation of the state ... through which the power of the government is poured out and diffused,” and that “the equality of citizens consisted in that they should all be subject to the same laws.”\(^33\) Catherine wished to introduce a new uniform law code, which would not only assure more rational and humane legal procedure, but would also define and restrict the competence of each government body. Subsequently, Catherine summoned the Legislative Commission of 1767–74 (including the work of subcommissions), which was to establish such “fundamental laws” and guide administrative reform.

Administrative bodies were also charged with exploiting the empire’s natural resources. In its efforts to erase economic barriers, to stimulate trade and agriculture, and to increase state revenues, the government initiated a variety of programs, some of which were patterned on those of other “enlightened monarchs.” In order to prevent property disputes and to better assess the country’s resources, the government initiated an extensive land survey. It encouraged the introduction of new crops and better agricultural methods, the colonization of new lands, immigration from abroad, and a return of emigrants living outside the empire. Secularization of church lands brought the state additional revenue and at the same time made the church economically dependent on the state.\(^34\) In sum, the measures were intended to mobilize the empire’s human and economic potential efficiently, and thus to enhance the wealth and power of the state while increasing the welfare of its people.

\(^{32}\) The role of police regulation in Catherine’s governmental system is discussed by Griffiths, “Catherine II,” pp. 331–32, and by Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State, pp. 140–244. Le Donne has made a detailed study of the police structure, see Ruling Russia (Princeton, 1984), pp. 83–141.

\(^{33}\) Reddaway, Documents of Catherine the Great, pp. 215–17.

\(^{34}\) Catherine’s initial policies are summarized in volume 2 of V. A. Bil’basov, Istoriia Ekateriny Vtoroi, vols. 1, 2, 12 (Berlin, 1900); Solovev, vols. 13–14; Aleksandr Kizeveter, “The Legislator in Her Debut,” in Catherine the Great: A Profile, pp. 247–66; and, most recently, de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, pp. 19–75.
Underlying Catherine's program was the goal of a unitary state. Since government was to be based on reason or on universal precepts, its laws and institutions should serve equally well for all the empire's subjects, regardless of whether they lived in Moscow, Siberia, or the Hetmanate. National differences, although recognized, were not considered significant and were thought to reflect differences in levels of development. Catherine believed that with administrative integration and more uniform development regional differences would recede. The ultimate goal was what Marc Raeff terms "institutional russification"—an integration that "was to lead to uniformity, first administrative and economic, then institutional and social, and finally cultural." In pursuing such uniformity, Catherine—like her younger contemporary, Joseph II of Austria—pitted the new rational order against the ancient "feudal" privileges of separate historical regions. To Catherine, the latter were antediluvian relics that could only block the implementation of her major goal—the creation of a unitary well-regulated state.

Hetman Rozumovs'kyi's Position at Catherine's Court

If contemporary Ukrainian officers and notables were at all aware of Catherine's outlook on the well-regulated state and governmental reform, they certainly failed to realize its threat to Ukrainian rights and liberties. On the contrary, for the Ukrainian gentry few events seemed to bode as well for the continuation and revitalization of the Hetmanate as Catherine's 1762 seizure of power. The reason for such optimism was the close personal relationship of the new autocrat with Hetman Rozumovs'kyi. Even during Elizabeth's reign, Rozumovs'kyi maintained a long-standing personal friendship with Catherine; perhaps he was even infatuated with her. When she feared the total collapse of her position upon Elizabeth's death, Catherine received secret assurances of support from Rozumovs'kyi. Although he was unable to be of any real assistance to her during the


36 Memoirs of Catherine the Great, p. 180; Solov'ev, 13: 184; Vasil'chikov, 1: 292; de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, p. 9.

37 Solov'ev, 12: 353; Bil'basov, Istoriiia, 1: 263.
months that her husband, Peter III, reigned, he subsequently played an important role in the coup that placed her on the imperial throne. It was Hetman Rozumovs’kyi who commanded the Izmailovskii Regiment, which provided the military strength for the successful coup. It was the hetman who remained at Catherine’s side during the actual revolt. And it was the hetman who, as president of the Academy of Sciences, used its press for the immediate publication of her manifesto, itself drafted by the hetman’s aide, Grigorii Nikolaevich Teplov.

Not only personal friendship, but also pique, fear, and ambition prompted the usually cautious hetman into this dangerous undertaking. Like most of Elizabeth’s commanders, he was constantly humiliated by Peter III, who forced him to publically conduct the new Prussian drills for which Rozumovs’kyi had little enthusiasm. Yet during Peter’s short reign the hetman’s power and position were undiminished. He remained general-field marshal, commander of the Izmailovskii Regiment, and president of the Academy of Sciences. He was even able to extend his authority in the Hetmanate by again bringing the city of Kiev under his jurisdiction and by directly appointing colonels. All of the hetman’s recommendations regarding promotions, retirements, and pensions for Ukrainian officials were routinely approved in St. Petersburg. The spectacular rise of another Ukrainian, Andrii Hudovych (Andrei Gudovich) had made the hetman apprehensive, however. Hudovych, who had served Peter III when he

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38 The Izmailovskii Regiment played a crucial role, initiating the revolt and providing headquarters for Catherine and her advisers. See Bil’basov, Istoriia, 2: 22–37; Solov’ev, 13: 79–102; Vasil’chikov, 1: 291–300. Vasil’chikov claimed that Kyrylo Rozumovs’kyi prepared the coup by removing from the Izmailovskii Regiment German officers favorably disposed to Peter III. A check of the officer register by Bil’basov revealed that Vasil’chikov was incorrect. See Bil’basov, Istoriia, 2: 11–12.


41 Vasil’chikov, 1: 290.

was heir-apparent, now became his adjutant-general, and was even sent to Prussia with offers of peace and alliance. With Hudovych clearly emerging as the emperor’s favorite, the court was rife with rumors that Hudovych would replace Rozumovs’kyi as hetman. Apprehension, combined with visions of a great imperial role in the event of a successful coup, drew the ambitious hetman further and further into the conspiratorial camp.

As an engineer of victory, Rozumovs’kyi reaped rewards in status, wealth, and power. On the day of the coup, June 28, 1762, Catherine appointed him senator. A few days later, on July 3, he was named Catherine’s adjutant-general. In that capacity the hetman took command of all the infantry troops in the vicinity of the imperial capital of St. Petersburg. Catherine went out of her way to express special consideration and favor for the hetman. On July 25, at a dinner in honor of the Rozumovs’kyi family, the empress presented the hetman’s wife with the Order of St. Elizabeth. Prior to her coronation, Catherine stayed at the hetman’s village of Petrovsk outside Moscow, and he assisted her during the coronation ceremonies. Catherine granted him large estates in the Hetmanate, and an additional lifetime pension of five thousand rubles annually, and permitted him frequent drafts on the state treasury. Moreover, Rozumovs’kyi began to participate on the highest levels in affairs of state. In addition to his position as senator, he was also appointed a member of a

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43 A brief biographical sketch of Andrii Hudovych may be found in Ohloblyn, *Liudy staroi Ukrainy*, pp. 7–13.
46 SA, 11 (July 3, 1762): 196.
47 Vasil’echikov, 1:299.
48 Solov’ev, 13:127.
50 Catherine divided the people to be rewarded into four categories, with the hetman, N. I. Panin, and Prince M. N. Volkonskii making up the most important category. See Bil’basov, *Istoriiia*, 2:93. Rozumovs’kyi’s frequent drafts on the state treasury are mentioned in Catherine’s notes to A. V. Otsuľev, “Bumagi Imperatrity Ekateriny,” *SIRIO*, 7 (1871): 109, 121, 125, 176. For information about the land granted to Rozumovs’kyi, see SA, 11 (August 8, 1762): 217–20.
commission dealing with the status of the nobility and chairman of a
commission charged with reorganizing the Russian military struc-
ture. Catherine even entrusted the hetman with a secret investigation
of the Khrushchev and Gur’ev affair, allegedly a plot against the
empress. Clearly, the hetman was emerging as one of the leading
figures in the empire.

Courtiers, however, always risk the appearance of a competitor
from among powerful rivals. Soon after the coup, Catherine pardoned
and reinstated into the inner circles of government the hetman’s most
inveterate enemy, Count A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin. Rozumovs’kyi’s
position at court was jeopardized by his repeated clashes with Grigorii
Grigorovich Orlov, Catherine’s lover at that time. Gradually two
major court factions emerged: one led by Rozumovs’kyi’s friend Nik-
ita Ivanovich Panin, and the other by his enemy A. P. Bestuzhev-
Riumin. Rozumovs’kyi’s support for Panin was reinforced, on the
one hand, by Orlov’s alliance with Bestuzhev-Riumin, and, on the
other, by the close relationship between Panin and Teplov, the
hetman’s former tutor, client, and friend.

At the height of the factional struggle, the hetman asked Catherine
for permission to leave Moscow and return to the Hetmanate. His

51 PSZ, 17, no. 11, 751 (February 11, 1673): 157. The workings of the commission
are described in Bil’basov, Istorii, 2: 242–47.

52 Vas’chikov, 1: 301–302.

53 The plot is described in Solov’ev, 13: 132–36; and Bil’basov, Istorii, 2: 189–203. Catherine’s appointment of Rozumovs’kyi was published in SIRIO, 7
(1871): 172.

54 In the 1750s, when A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin presided over the College of Foreign
Affairs, he had a bitter fight with Rozumovs’kyi over the hetman’s finances. But he
fell into disfavor with Elizabeth and, in 1758, was removed from office and banished
to a small estate until his recall by Catherine in 1762. For a brief biography, see A.
Presniakov, “Bestuzhev-Riumin, graf Aleksei Petrovich,” Russkii biograficheskii slo-

55 Vas’chikov, 1: 304–305.

56 For an account of the court factions, see David L. Ransel, The Politics of Cather-
iman Russia: The Panin Party (New Haven, 1975), pp. 99–117; Ransel had previ-
ously summarized his book in “Nikita Panin’s Imperial Council Project and the
Struggle of Hierarchy Groups at the Court of Catherine II,” Canadian Slavic Studies

57 The court was in Moscow from the time of Catherine’s coronation in September
1762 to June 1763.
reasons were twofold: Rozumovs'kyi was greatly annoyed by the presence of his two enemies at court and he was eager to resume a number of reforms in the Hetmanate that had been interrupted by the death of Elizabeth. Catherine readily granted Rozumovs'kyi a two-year leave from the court, beginning with the summer of 1763.58

Before he could depart, however, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi became entangled in another episode in the factional conflict at court. In May 1763, a plan for Grigorii Orlov to marry Catherine was advanced by the Orlov brothers and Bestuzhev-Riumin. Greatly alarmed, Panin and Rozumovs'kyi began rallying opposition to the marriage scheme.59 As it turned out, this was unnecessary, for Catherine had no intention of marrying Orlov. The anti-Orlov campaign, however, had unpleasant consequences. A young officer, Fedor Khitrovo, concocted a plot to prevent the marriage at any cost, including, if need be, the assassination of the Orlov brothers. The plot was uncovered, and although the investigation failed to prove that either Panin or the hetman was involved directly, the incident considerably weakened the Panin faction. By June, Panin's influence at court was at a low ebb,60 and Rozumovs'kyi's reputation had been tarnished. In a dispatch to England, the Earl of Buckingham aptly described Rozumovs'kyi's position:

I cannot find that the Empress suspects the Hetman's having any concern in the late tumult, though some of the persons, who were leaders in it, used to be almost constantly with him; I know, however, that he is extremely dissatisfied at the distinction paid to the favorite [G. G. Orlov] . . . 61

When Hetman Rozumovs'kyi left Moscow in June of 1763, he had good reason to be unhappy. His enemies stood high in the empress's favor, and he himself no longer enjoyed her confidence. Under such circumstances, the hetman was content to abandon court politics for

58 Solms to Frederick II, 17 [28 o.s.] March 1764, SIRIO, 22 (1878): 42–44.
59 The marriage scheme and the Khitrovo plot are best described in Bilibasov, Istorija, 2: 275–96.
60 Ransel, Politics of Catherinian Russia, p. 127.
61 Buckingham to Halifax, August 22, 1763, SIRIO, 12 (1873): 126; and in The Despatches and Correspondence of John, Second Earl of Buckinghamshire, Ambassador to the Court of Catherine II of Russia, 1762–1765, 2 vols., edited by A. Collyer (London, 1900–1902), 2: 57.
the time being and to devote himself entirely to the implementation of much-needed reforms in the Hetmanate.

**Political Plans and Reforms in the Hetmanate**

During his extended stay in St. Petersburg and Moscow, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi had used his position at court to obtain certain concessions for the Hetmanate. He and his staff, headed by General Chancellor Vasyl’ Tumans'kyi and General Aide-de-Camp Ivan Skoropads'kyi, had been in constant touch with the other members of the Hetmanate’s General Chancellery. Whether in St. Petersburg or Moscow, Rozumovs'kyi was well informed about the needs of the Ukrainian lands, and he carried out, in absentia, all the functions of hetman.

While still in Moscow, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi ordered a new census for the Hetmanate, and he showed increased interest in restoring, at least partially, the judicial system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that had been in use in the Hetmanate prior to its recognition of Muscovite authority. As early as 1760, when he enlarged and strengthened the General Military Court, the hetman advocated thorough judicial reform. On February 17, 1763, Rozumovs'kyi issued a decree eliminating the judicial functions of the General Military Chancellery, thereby reducing the number of appellate courts.

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62 The hetman was able to win various economic concessions for the Ukrainian populace. See PSZ, 16, no. 11,650 (August 21, 1762): 57–58; no. 11,736 (January 20, 1763): 137–38; no. 11,695 (January 25, 1762): 93; no. 11,685 (October 16, 1762): 82.


64 Pylyp Klymenko, "Kompyuty ta reviziі XVII stol.," Ukrains'kyi arkheografichnyi zbirnyk, 3 (1930): 184.

65 Hetman Rozumovs'kyi’s order was published by M. F. Vladimirs'kii-Budanov, "Akry po upravleniiu Malorossiia Gr. P. A. Rumiantseva za 1767 g.,” Chleniia v Istoriecheskom obishestve Nestora Letopisca, 5, pt. 3 (1891): 121–26. In the order the hetman indicated his wish to reform the court system further, e.g., to reinstate the chamberlain, land court, and castle courts (p. 122).

An opportunity for judicial reorganization presented itself during the complex and drawn-out court case of St. Michael's Monastery in Pereiaslav regarding the boundaries of its property. After a series of appeals, the case was finally heard by the Senate, which only obfuscated it even further. During the proceedings, however, it was discovered that, according to the Lithuanian Statute, the case should have been tried before a chamberlain court (*pidkomors'kyi sud*), whose sole function was to adjudicate property boundary disputes. In a letter to the Senate, the hetman explained that these courts had ceased to exist during Khmel'nyts'kyi's time; he recommended, however, that they be reinstated.\(^67\) After some deliberation, the recommendation was approved by both the Senate and the empress.\(^68\)

The *ukaz* that promulgated the reconstituted chamberlain court also stated that the Hetmanate's government was "to be conducted in accordance with Little Russian rights."\(^69\) To the hetman and the Ukrainian gentry, this constituted approval for reorganizing Ukrainian institutions to conform with the Lithuanian Statute. In September 1763, Rozumovs'kyi called an officers' general council at Hlukhiv to discuss a wide range of reforms. In attendance were two high-ranking officers from the regimental command, as well as two captains from each regiment. The rest of the council, in imitation of the Polish-Lithuanian *Sejm*, was drawn from the gentry, the Notable Military Fellows (fifty-six Fellows of the Standard and thirty-eight Military Fellows).\(^70\) The council first considered the problem of the judiciary. The very creation of the chamberlain courts necessitated further change of the judicial system. The Lithuanian Statute required that the chamberlain court function in conjunction with a land court (*zem's'kyi sud*) that no longer existed in the Hetmanate. The council decided to restore in full the court system as outlined in the Lithuanian Statute and as guaranteed by the tsar in the "Statutes of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi," although the system had never before really functioned in the Hetmanate.

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\(^{67}\) Cherkas'kyi, "Sudovi reformy," p. 773.

\(^{68}\) *PSZ*, 16, no. 11, 812 (May 10, 1763): 237-46.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 246.

\(^{70}\) D. Miller, "Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossii. Sudy zemskie, grodskie i podkomorskie v XVIII stoletii," *Shornik Khar'kovskogo istoriko-filologicheskogo obshestva* 8 (1896): 103.
Formally established by the hetman's decree of November 19, 1763, the restored court system comprised three types of courts: a land court (zem's'kyi sud), a chamberlain court (pidkomors'kyi sud), and a castle court (grods'kyi sud). The land court had jurisdiction over civil cases that primarily involved questions of property ownership, inheritance, or debt. The chamberlain court dealt exclusively with boundary disputes. The castle courts adjudicated criminal cases involving murder, rape, or theft. Cases originating in any of the three courts could be appealed to the General Military Court, and the hetman retained his right of pardon.

The restoration of the Polish-Lithuanian court structure did improve court procedures. It enabled the courts to follow more closely the Lithuanian Statute, the law code used in modified form throughout the Hetmanate. It streamlined the court system, simplified appeals, and differentiated civil from criminal proceedings. Because trial of Notable Military Fellows was no longer permitted by the General Military Court as the court of first instance, the reform made rank-and-file Cossacks, Cossack officers, and the aristocracy subject to the same judicial proceedings.

In practice the reconstituted courts relied in part on the previously existing judicial structure. The old regimental courts were merely renamed castle courts, and the officers who administered the regiment and led it in battle still adjudicated criminal cases. But in civil cases, there was separation of justice from administration, for the land and chamberlain courts were presided over not by administrators but by specially elected judges. The reform did not affect the judicial functions of the church, municipalities, and landlords.

In addition to judicial matters, the council discussed the problem of Ukrainian autonomy. This was somewhat surprising, for, according to the hetman's order, the council was summoned only to consider

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71 The decree was published by Miller, "Ocherki... Sudy zemskie," pp. 236–43. Miller's monograph (pp. 63–244) remains the definitive study on the judicial reforms of 1763–64.

72 Scholars who claim that the reform differentiated military and administrative functions or separated administrative and judicial functions are only partially correct. For such views, see Vasil'chikov, 1:312; P. Maikov, "Razumovskii, graf Kirill Grigor'evich," Russkii biograficheskii slovar', 15 (n.d.): 460; J. Padoch, "The Judicial System," in Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1963–71), 2:43.
judicial reforms.73 Because the agenda of the council sessions was prepared by Rozumovs’kyi’s staff, it is likely that the hetman himself decided to extend the scope of its deliberations.74 Once the council convened, both the hetman and the gentry recognized that the assembly was an opportunity to enact wide-ranging reforms.

The council considered the extent of the Hetmanate’s decline and debated measures for its revitalization. One orator lamented that from the time the Hetmanate came under Russian protection, Ukrainian rights and privileges had been curtailed.75 Painting a bleak picture of the current situation, he lamented the passing of the age of the famous Cossack warriors who had once struck fear in so many enemies. He blamed the loss of their freedoms on the Ukrainians’ placing of personal interests above civic responsibility and, especially, on their abandonment of the prerogatives that they had had in 1654. To rectify this situation the speaker urged the following reforms: in order to guarantee freedom and proper legislation, the Hetmanate must reinstitute general councils or sejms; in order to maintain proper judicial proceedings, it must establish land, chamberlain, and castle courts, with a tribunal for appeals; in order to improve the status of the Cossacks, it must guarantee their property rights and grant them exemption from taxes levied to support Russian troops. Other requests were the reinstatement of unspecified rights of the clergy, compensation for losses suffered by the populace in the last Turkish War, and establishment of secular schools and universities. The speaker also complained sharply that peasant mobility caused the impoverishment of the elite and the nonpayment of taxes.

73 The hetman’s decree was published in Miller’s “Ocherki . . . Sudy zemskie,” p. 235.


75 The speech was published under the title, “Rech’ o popravlenii sostoiania Malorossii,” KS, 1882, no. 10, pp. 119–25. In the introduction, an editor claims that the unknown orator spoke in the 1750s. This, however, is impossible, for the ukaz renewing the chamberlain court is cited in the speech. Since the speaker recommends the reinstatement of the other courts which were actually promulgated by the hetman’s decree of November 19, 1763, the speech must have been delivered before that date but after May 10, 1763, the date of Catherine’s ukaz approving the establishment of the chamberlain court. It could have been made only at the Hlukhiv council.
The general thrust of these views was that the Hetmanate’s decline could be reversed by renewing its political autonomy and reinstituting the traditional prerogatives of the gentry, clergy, and Cossacks. Concerned as it was with the recognition of broad political, civic, and economic rights for the szlachta, the speech represented the views of the new Ukrainian elite.

The program outlined by the anonymous orator became the basis for a petition drafted as the council neared adjournment. Originating from the “Hetman, szlachta, Little Russian army and people,” the petition contained the most particularistic views expressed publicly since the time of Mazepa.76 At its outset Hetman Rozumovs’kyi gave the official Ukrainian interpretation of the Pereiaslav agreement. The hetman stated that his predecessor, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, accepted the protection of the Russian tsar because of their common Orthodox faith. This protection, however, was based on treaties which were reaffirmed whenever a new tsar or hetman assumed office. The petitioners (including the hetman) proposed to renew the custom that the tsar confirm the Statutes of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi upon the election of a new hetman. The petitioners also sought a guarantee for the immediate election of another hetman in the event of Rozumovs’kyi’s death. They claimed that past interregnums were detrimental to the Hetmanate’s welfare and were a violation of Ukrainian rights. They also requested approval to establish a council or sejm as the Hetmanate’s permanent legislative body without, however, specifying its functions or its constitutional relationship to the office of hetman.

Presumably, these problems were to be worked out in subsequent meetings. The petition’s only other article dealing with the Hetmanate’s governmental structure was a routine request for the confirmation of the newly reinstated court system.

76 The petition was published under the title “Proshenie malorossiiskogo shliakhets’tva i starshin, vmesite s getmanom, o vozstanovlenii raznykh starinnykh prav Malorossii, podannoe Ekaterine II-i v 1764 godu,” KS, 1883, no. 6, pp. 317-45. Some points are listed as having come from the hetman and others as having originated in the council, which resulted in some duplication. Also, the numbering of the petition’s points is not always in order. It is possible that the publication was based not on the final copy, but on a preliminary draft. Thus far, however, it is the only copy extant.
The economic program of the Hlukhiv council was also autonomist. The petitioners sought the abolition of imperially licensed monopolies and the repeal of a Petrine decree which required that trade with foreign countries go through Russian ports. The decree had forced many Ukrainian merchants who had traditionally used direct land routes to redirect their trade to Baltic ports. Since this proved to be quite costly, Ukrainian commercial interests backed the reestablishment of direct land trade routes from the Hetmanate to Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, they called for the abolition of the imperial border tariffs and the reintroduction of the Hetmanate’s excise tax, abolished in 1754. Internal tariffs were not to be restored, but institutions that once derived their income from them were to be compensated from the Hetmanate’s import-export tax revenues. Finally, Jews—although not permitted to cross the frontier into Russia—were to be allowed to trade in the Hetmanate. If this economic program had been implemented, the same tariffs would have applied for trade between the Hetmanate and Russia as between the Hetmanate and foreign countries such as Poland-Lithuania, the Crimea, and the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Ukrainian merchants would have had the right to trade anywhere in the world without regard to imperial monopolies, official trade routes, or tariffs.

Turning to social issues, the petition requested for the Ukrainian szlachta the same privileges that the Russian nobility enjoyed, a guarantee of landholdings, and payments from the Ukrainian treasury to those officers who owned small, unprofitable estates. Conversely, the petition sought to curtail peasant mobility, to prohibit peasants from becoming Cossacks, and to secure repatriation of peasants who had escaped from the Hetmanate. The petition, like the council as a whole, paid little attention to the status of the clergy and the towns- men. In accordance with Ukrainian church traditions, the clergy were to possess all the privileges of the szlachta and were to elect their own hierarchy. The petition contained only the standard clichés about the townsman’s rights and privileges, including Magdeburg Law, without discussing them. Apparently, the demand for tariff-free foreign trade was made more on behalf of the gentry who controlled the council than of the merchants themselves. (There is no indication that any merchants were present at the council.)
Of particular concern to the Hlukhiv council was the steady decline in the number of battle-ready Cossacks. Estimating that only about 10,000 men were prepared for war, the petitioners recommended that the following measures be taken to bolster the Cossack estate: strict adherence to Cossack rights and privileges; exemption of Cossacks from any but military duties; exemption from all taxes, including the tax to support Russian troops; guarantee of Cossack property rights; imperial payment for and delivery of supplies during foreign campaigns; combining of several Cossack households to financially support one fully equipped Cossack; and establishment of a special registry so that Cossacks could not change units.

The petition clearly reflected an anti-Russian bias. Pointing to the Petrine guarantee that “not a penny would be collected” from the Hetmanate, the petitioners asked that the taxes supporting Russian troops be abolished. They proposed the creation of a joint Ukrainian-Russian commission to investigate and adjudicate complaints against Russians stationed in the Hetmanate. They maintained, therefore, that Russian soldiers were allied but foreign troops. Overall, the Ukrainian gentry so feared Russian penetration that it requested a limitation of the rights of non-Ukrainians to own estates in the Hetmanate unless especially rewarded by the empress or approved by the hetman and elite.

In sum, the Hlukhiv council considered the Hetmanate to be a separate land having its own borders, head of state, government, and economic system. It was connected to the Russian Empire in a special way, through a common sovereign, the Russian empress. But even this “submission” was to be predicated on treaties periodically renewed between the Ukrainian hetman and the Russian tsar.\(^{77}\)

The Hlukhiv petition showed that an accommodation had been reached between the hetman and the Ukrainian gentry. In addition to its powerful emotional attachment to the Hetmanate, each side had an interest in increasing its own power. The Hlukhiv council gave the new szlachta the opportunity to entrench themselves further as the Hetmanate’s political, social, and economic elite. As for the hetman, any broadening of autonomy made his position a little less dependent

\(^{77}\) The same view was expressed in the political poem “A Discussion Between Great Russia and Little Russia,” written by Semen Divovych in 1761, a year prior to the meeting of the Hlukhiv council.
on the capriciousness of court politics. Rozumovs’kyi was quite willing to accede to the gentry’s socioeconomic demands in return for their support of him at court. The hetman thus attempted to use the council to establish a firm regional power base.

While the hetman and the gentry agreed on most issues, differences did emerge on the question of the hetmancy. The Hlukhiv orator who represented the views of the gentry failed to mention two important points in the petition: the request that the tsar confirm the Statutes of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi at the election of each hetman, and the demand that upon the hetman’s death a successor be elected immediately. Rozumovs’kyi’s later attempt to make the hetmancy hereditary makes it probable that he himself initiated these requests. At the Hlukhiv council, however, conflict was avoided, and the hetman succeeded in establishing an amicable relationship with the officers and notables.

Suddenly, in late October 1763, just after the council had been concluded and the members were departing, the hetman received news of a dramatic change at the imperial court. His foe A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin had been defeated and his friend Nikita Panin had emerged as the chief architect of foreign affairs. Confident of some support at court and at home, the hetman launched the most daring project of his career. His staff began agitating among the officers still in Hlukhiv for a hetmancy hereditary within the Rozumovs’kyi family. A new petition drafted by some of the hetman’s closest supporters argued that the elected hetmancy caused confusion, disorder, and civil strife, and proposed that the office remain permanently within one family. Citing the case of Iurii Khmel’nyts’kyi as a precedent, the memorandum requested that a son of Hetman Rozumovs’kyi be selected heir to the hetmancy. Osyp Tumans’kyi, the brother of the General Chancellor, secretly took the petition to Kiev to discuss it with the ranking Ukrainian prelates—the archimandrite of the Monastery of the Caves

78 Ransel, Politics of Catherinian Russia, pp. 132–33; A. A. Viazemskii was emerging as a main figure in Russia’s internal affairs.
79 Most of the petition, which was never published in full, can be found in Vasil’chikov, 1: 313–17; Bil’basov, Istoriia, 2: 455; and, in a more condensed form, in Solov’ev, 13: 241–42.
80 This was not the best precedent to cite. For although Khmel’nyts’kyi designated Iurii as his successor and he was elected hetman, the position proved to be too taxing for the sixteen-year-old lad and he resigned.
(Pechers'ka lavra), Zosima Val'kevych (a relative of the hetman), and the metropolitan, Arsenii Mohylians'kyi (an old enemy of the Rozumovs'kyi family). Neither prelate signed the petition.\textsuperscript{81} Undaunted by this initial failure, Hetman Rozumovs'kyi called a meeting of the General Staff and all the colonels, who were presented with the petition. With the exception of General Chancellor Vasyl' Tumans'kyi (a client of the hetman), General Treasurer Vasyl' Hudovykh, and General Judge Oleksander Dublians'kyi, most of the General Staff opposed the petition and refused to sign it.\textsuperscript{82} The colonels (except for Petro Myloradovych of the Chernihiv regiment) and most of the regimental officers signed under some pressure.\textsuperscript{83}

Although the concept of a hereditary hetmancy found its strongest support among relatives and clients of the hetman and its greatest opposition among aristocrats (e.g., Apostol, Skoropads'kyi) who themselves had claims to the hetmancy, the debate was not limited to personal or family considerations but also dealt with matters of principle. The idea of a hereditary monarchy, although frequently expressed, was, in reality, only a weak undercurrent in Ukrainian thought. The whole Cossack tradition, bolstered by the Polish experience, was based on an elective hetmancy. Also, the gentry was striving for greater political control of the Hetmanate and was wary of any changes that might strengthen the position of the hetman. Consequently, not only potential candidates for the hetmancy, but also the less aristocratic families (e.g., Bezborod'ko, Myloradovych, Sulyma, Poletyka) and even close relatives and friends of the hetman (e.g., General Judge II'ia Zhurman, Quartermaster-General Semen Kochubai) refused to sign the petition.\textsuperscript{84} More than a century after Bohdan Khmel'nyc'skyi first attempted to introduce monarchical practice by requesting that his son be appointed hetman, the Ukrainian ruling elite was still bitterly divided over the issue of a hereditary hetmancy.

Catherine became alarmed about the events at Hlukhiv when she received the reports of the Russian governor-general in Kiev, F. M. Vocikov, and of the Hlukhiv army commander, de la Tour, and the

\textsuperscript{81} Vasil'chikov, 1: 315; Solov'ev, 13: 242.
\textsuperscript{82} Vasil'chikov, 1: 315. Solov'ev mentions only Tumans'kyi and not the others (13: 242). There are no other major discrepancies between the two accounts.
\textsuperscript{83} Vasil'chikov, 1: 315; Solov'ev, 13: 242.
\textsuperscript{84} Vasil'chikov, 1: 315.
denunciation by a Ukrainian participant, Military Fellow Pavlovskyi and the Ukrainian prelates.\textsuperscript{85} She immediately recalled the hetman to St. Petersburg. Entrusting the affairs of state to three members of the General Staff (Semen Kochubei, Vasyl’ Tumans’kyi, and Danylo Apostol), the hetman, unaware of any royal displeasure, left Hlukhiv on January 9, 1764.\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{The Abolition of the Hetmancy}

In his bold attempt to secure an autonomous position, Rozumovs’kyi had badly miscalculated the mood of the imperial government and his position at court. While the hetman and the Hlukhiv council were advancing a program of expanded autonomy for the Hetmanate, the imperial government was contemplating a tightening of control over it. The architect of this attitude was Grigorii Teplov, Rozumovs’kyi’s former tutor, estate manager and assistant, and a member of the Panin faction. Through his association with the hetman, Teplov had come into frequent contact with Catherine and became one of her most fervent supporters. After the coup, Teplov left the hetman’s service for a position as one of the empress’s secretaries.\textsuperscript{87} Soon after Rozumovs’kyi departed for the Hetmanate in June 1763, Teplov turned against his former benefactor and penned the famous memorandum “A Note on the Disorders in Little Russia.”\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 1:317; Bantyskh-Kamenskii, \textit{Istoryia Maloi Rossii}, 3:209.

\textsuperscript{86} Markovich, \textit{Dnevnye zapiski}, 2:388–89.


\textsuperscript{88} The memorandum itself is not dated. When P. Kulish published it in \textit{Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rossi}, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1857), 2:169–96, he ascribed it to the reign of Elizabeth. M. Vasylenko, in the article mentioned in fn. 87, argued persuasively that the note was composed during Catherine’s reign. It was certainly known by Catherine in September of 1763. Since Hetman Rozumovs’kyi was present at court continu-
While the memorandum reflects Teplov's views on the need for "enlightened rule" and economic development, its timing was undoubtedly connected with court politics. By exposing Rozumov's'kyi, Teplov could assert his independence and show his concern for the empire's welfare. More important, the memorandum would have served Teplov well in any changes at court: while supporting Panin, Teplov probably used the note as a hedge in case of Bestuzhev's victory.

Whatever Teplov's motivation, he voiced views directly opposed to those expressed at the Hlukhiv council and in Ukrainian political literature. For Teplov, the Hetmanate was not a separate land that recognized the suzerainty of the tsar on the basis of special treaties. Rather, it was an ancient Russian land lost to Poland-Lithuania. Teplov believed that "Little Russia, not only the land but the very people, are Russian from ancient times, and consequently belong under Your Majesty's suzerainty as the possessor of the All-Russian state." Discounting any claim that a contractual relationship existed between the Hetmanate and the tsar, Teplov repeated Peter I's allegation that between 1657 and 1708 all hetmans had been traitors or had

89 Teplov had his own views on economic development and enlightened rule and was an expert on commercial policies, see Wallace Daniel, "Grigorii Teplov and the Conception of Order: The Commission on Commerce and the Role of the Merchants in Russia," Canadian-American Slavic Studies 16, nos. 3–4 (Fall-Winter, 1982): 410–31 and in Jones, Provincial Development, pp. 28–30; S. M. Troitskii, "Dokument o krest'ianskoj torgovle v XVIII v.," Rossija v XVIII veke (Moscow, 1982): 239–51.

90 Ransel identifies Teplov as a prime ally of Nikita Panin: see Politics of Catherinean Russia, pp. 70–73. One indication of possible contacts between Teplov and Bestuzhev is that the Teplov note was found among Bestuzhev's papers (see fn. 91).

91 Vasylenko, "H. N. Teplov," p. 32. Three variants of the memorandum have been published. The first, by P. Kulish (see fn. 88), for some unexplained reason deleted the whole first section, which was a historical introduction. A fuller edition was appended to the writings of Count A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin in Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova, 40 vols. (Moscow, 1870–95), 25 (1882): 350–79. It differs only in several minor phrases from the version published by M. Vasylenko in the appendix to his article (pp. 29–54). I have followed Vasylenko's version as the most scholarly and authoritative.
inclined toward treason. He admitted that, due to long periods of Polish rule, the Hetmanate's populace had acquired specific customs and liberties. To Teplov, however, these "liberties" resulted only in exploitation and confusion; more significantly, some even contradicted the principle of autocracy.

Teplov declared that the declining number of Cossacks, the reduction of crown lands, and the confused Ukrainian legal system were detrimental to the empire's interests. He blamed the officers for expropriating the Cossacks' lands and bluntly accused the Ukrainian authorities of cheating on census-taking so as not to be liable for the required taxes and manpower. Teplov claimed that the only reliable census was conducted by Russian officers during the rule of the first Little Russian College (1723). Moreover, crown lands and estates had gradually passed into private ownership without the knowledge or consent of the tsar. Ukrainian legal procedures, according to Teplov, were in complete disarray, since they lacked any rational system and depended on a hodge-podge of the Lithuanian Statute and customary practices. This confusion caused numerous delays and endless appeals, giving the gentry ample opportunity to manipulate the legal system for private gain. Most important, in Teplov's view, was the fact that the republican Polish-Lithuanian laws and customs practiced in the Hetmanate clashed with the principle of autocracy. They were, therefore, totally unsuited for the "Little Russian" nation, which was, after all, under autocratic rule.

Although he described the gentry's exploitation of the peasantry and Cossacks at some length, Teplov nevertheless considered the chief economic problem of the Hetmanate to be a decline in productivity, attributable to peasant mobility. He claimed that richer landlords enticed peasants to their estates by offering favorable conditions, while the abandoned, more marginal landlords were forced into bankruptcy. Teplov's alleged concern for the peasants was accompanied by a recommendation that they be bound to their present location. On this issue, at least, he was in accord with sentiments expressed at the Hlukhiv council.

The impact of the Teplov memorandum on governmental policy first became evident in a decree issued on September 10, 1763. Catherine, undoubtedly reacting in alarm to Teplov's revelations of massive Ukrainian usurpation of crownlands, strictly prohibited their pass-
ing into private ownership. Then, in November 1763, the government advised the Senate to prepare legislation for a new census in the Hetmanate; the main proponent of the census was Teplov, who attended the Senate hearings and helped write the final decree. It entrusted the actual census-taking to Russian officers, subordinating even the hetman to them. At this very time, the Ukrainian authorities were conducting a census ordered by the hetman in March of 1763. Consequently, the new orders showed that Teplov’s deep mistrust of Ukrainian censuses, the hetman, and the Ukrainian administration had become the empire’s official policy.

It was at this time that news about the Hlukhiv council and the subsequent project for a hereditary hetmanate reached St. Petersburg and provoked the immediate recall of the hetman. When Rozumov’s’kyi arrived in the capital, he was received very coolly. Catherine barred the hetman from the court while squelching rumors that this was because of the intrigue of Rozumov’s’kyi’s enemy, Grigorii Orlov. She stated that her displeasure was entirely due to the hetman’s “behavior in Little Russia.” According to the dispatch of the Prussian envoy, Victor Friedrich von Solms, the two Ukrainian petitions so incensed Catherine that she wanted to try the hetman for disloyalty. Nikita Panin tried to protect his friend and former political ally by arguing before Catherine that the hetman had never entertained any treasonous intentions and had “sinned against reason and not against the heart.” In response, Catherine called a special meeting attended by I. I. Nepliuev, Prince Io. P. Shakhovskoi, Prince A. M. Golitsyn, Count P. I. Panin, and A. V. Olsuf’ev, at which it was decided that Peter Panin and Golitsyn were to go to the hetman, make him aware of his misconduct, and advise him that the only honorable course of action was to resign from the hetmanate.

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92 P.SZ, 16, no. 11,915 (September 10, 1763): 368.
94 Buckingham to Sandwich, February 14, 1764, SIRIO, 12 (1873): 160. Also in Despatches, 2: 142.
95 Catherine to Olsuf’ev, February 17, 1764, Russkii arkhiv (henceforth RA), 2 (1863): 427.
97 Catherine to Olsuf’ev, February 17, 1764, RA, 2 (1863): 427.
At first, Rozumovs’kyi refused. This led to further talks and even to a personal audience with Catherine, at which the hetman finally requested that he be relieved of his difficult post. In accepting the resignation, Catherine told Rozumovs’kyi that she no longer doubted his faithfulness. She instructed Nikita Panin to obtain the hetman’s resignation in writing.\textsuperscript{98} Nevertheless, Catherine found it necessary to send Panin many reminders to settle the affair.\textsuperscript{99} Panin was stalling with the resignation procedures, most likely for personal reasons. The hetman had been his friend and political ally, and Panin might have been embarrassed by Teplov’s role in the affair. Moreover, Panin probably did not want Orlov, whom he detested, to have the pleasure of seeing Rozumovs’kyi vanquished. If one believes that Panin was attempting to place limits on the autocracy, his defense of the hetman can be seen as opposition to the arbitrary abolition of a century-long constitutional arrangement. Whatever his motivation, Panin delayed the resignation procedures from week to week in the hope that tempers would cool.

While it is unlikely that Panin’s delaying tactics could or were even intended to reverse Catherine’s decision to abolish the hetmancy, they did allow the hetman to reemerge gradually at the court. By mid-March (1764), as a Senator he attended some meetings of the Senate.\textsuperscript{100} His return to favor was not complete, however, until he was permitted to accompany Catherine on her tour through the Baltic provinces.\textsuperscript{101} Welcomed again at Catherine’s table, Rozumovs’kyi, and especially his sons, became frequent visitors at court.\textsuperscript{102} Catherine

\textsuperscript{100} The first signature of Rozumovs’kyi in Senate documents appeared on March 1, 1764. SA, vol. 15, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{101} Petr Kolotov, Deianitii Ekateriny II, Imperatritsy i samoderzhitsy vserossiiskii (St. Petersburg, 1811), p. 127.
\textsuperscript{102} Semen A. Poroshin, Zapiski sluzhashchikh k istorii Ego Imperatorskogo Vysoshestva, Blagovernogo Kniazia Pavla Petrovicha, naslednika prestola Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1844), pp. 52, 81, 121, 148, 154–155.
also confirmed Rozumovs’kyi’s title to all Ukrainian state property granted to him by Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{103}

But Rozumovs’kyi’s position was further weakened by new intrigues that involved him, if only indirectly. In July, Vasyl’ Myrovyts’kyi (Vasilii Mirovich), son of the General Aide-de-Camp in the administration of the émigré hetman, Pylyp Orlyk, attempted a coup intended to depose Catherine and place the imprisoned Ivan VI on the throne.\textsuperscript{104} The attempt failed, Ivan VI was killed by his guards, and Myrovyts’kyi was tried and executed. The affair unwittingly involved Kyrylo Rozumovs’kyi. The aristocratic Myrovyts’kyi family had backed Hetman Mazepa in his break with Muscovy. After Mazepa’s defeat the Myrovyts’kyi wealth was confiscated and those family members who failed to escape the Hetmanate were deported to Russia and Siberia. Constant petitions for a return of the family wealth and permission to live in the Hetmanate were denied.\textsuperscript{105} Consequently, the Myrovyts’kyi eked out a livelihood by holding petty Russian military posts. It was in the capacity of a minor officer stationed at the Schlüsselfburg fortress—where Ivan was being held—that Vasyl’ Myrovyts’kyi attempted his coup. At the trial, Myrovyts’kyi claimed that the hetman gave him the idea for the coup. When Myrovyts’kyi had previously appealed to the hetman for support at court, Rozumovs’kyi told him that this was beyond his power and advised the young Myrovyts’kyi to find his own way to position and fortune. Myrovyts’kyi simply acted upon the hetman’s advice.\textsuperscript{106}

More important than just an embarrassment to Rozumovs’kyi, the affair sheds light on Catherine’s attitudes on the Hetmanate and on Ukrainians. In her manifesto on Myrovyts’kyi, Catherine specifically mentioned that the culprit was a Ukrainian, the son of a close collab-

\textsuperscript{103} Senate ukaz confirmed by Catherine, \textit{SA} (June 16, 1764), vol. 15, pp. 355–59.

\textsuperscript{104} Ivan VI succeeded Anna Ivanovna to the throne in 1740 at the age of two months. A year later Elizabeth deposed Ivan, who then spent his entire life as a prisoner. The Myrovyts’kyi affair is described in great detail by Bil’basov, \textit{Istoriiia}, vol. 2, pp. 349–405, and Solov’ev, vol. 13, pp. 315–25, and more recently by de Madariaga, \textit{Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great}, pp. 35–37.

\textsuperscript{105} As late as April 13, 1764, the Senate denied a petition to the Myrovyts’kyi family to have their property returned. \textit{SA}, vol. 14, pp. 187–91.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{RA}, 2 (1863): 478.
orator of the "traitor" Mazepa. Teplov's note, the Hlukhiv council, the hereditary hetmancy project, and now the Myrovykh affair produced a virulent anti-Ukrainian atmosphere at court.

But Catherine's move against Ukrainian autonomy was not due merely to court intrigues or the result of an anti-Ukrainian atmosphere. The clash came because the petitions of the Hlukhiv council and of Hetman Rozumovs'kyi ran counter to Catherine's fundamental outlook and goals, particularly her desire to rationalize imperial law and government and to fully tap the empire's human and economic potential. For instance, an autonomous Hetmanate would have obstructed the implementation of one of her favorite "enlightened" programs—the fostering of foreign immigration. Like many of Catherine's programs, the immigration policy had been initiated by her predecessor Elizabeth. As a result, Serbian military colonists had settled in the Southern Ukraine and had appropriated some of the Hetmanate's territory. In 1762 the hetman demanded its return; he was seconded a year later by the Hlukhiv council. The imperial administration, on the other hand, was planning to unite the foreign colonies with an extensive part of the Hetmanate into a new province, called Novorossiia (New Russia).

Predictably, the imperial policy prevailed. Some of the Hetmanate's territory was included in Novorossiia. The transfer of authority in the region, supposedly done voluntarily, was far from smooth, however. The officer in charge, Mel'gunov, collected signatures of those Cossacks willing to accept the new authority and to join the newly formed Lancer (Pikineritka) regiments. Those who did not wish to comply had the right to emigrate to the territories that remained under the Hetmanate, but this meant that they lost land. The transfer's implementation through a combination of threats and promised rewards stirred great dissatisfaction. Since neither the local nor the central Ukrainian government was even notified of the administrative changes, clashes of authority occurred. The hetman was

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107 PSZ, 16, no. 12, 228 (August 17, 1764): 890–92.
inundated with queries and complaints; in the late summer of 1764 Rozumovs'kyi passed these on to the Senate and no further action was taken. The border between Novorossiia and the Hetmanate remained vague until 1766, when the majority of the disputed territory was assigned to Novorossiia.\footnote{The transfer is described briefly by N. D. Polons'ka-Vasyleiko, Settlement, pp. 181–86; and in greater detail by D. P. Miller, "Pikineria," K3, 1899, no. 12, pp. 301–22.}

This is just one example of Ukrainian autonomist sentiments and the continued existence of an autonomous Hetmanate conflicting with Catherine's general views and plans. Whereas Catherine aspired to eliminate separate historical regions, the Ukrainians wanted to reconstruct an autonomous state. Whereas Catherine wished to break down economic barriers, the Hlukhiv council sought to reconstitute the Hetmanate's import and export tariffs. Whereas Catherine encouraged foreign immigration, the Hlukhiv council attempted to have foreigners excluded. And whereas Catherine sought new revenues, the Hlukhiv council objected to providing any funds to the imperial treasury, including the taxes traditionally paid to support Russian troops stationed in the Hetmanate. It was this diametric opposition in views and aims that sparked the clash between Catherine II and the representatives of Ukrainian rights and liberties.

As a bold first step in curbing these rights and liberties, Catherine decided to abolish the hetmancy and to appoint a governor-general to administer the area. In October 1764 she told her secretary Olsuf'ev to draw up instructions, based on her own notes, to the future governor-general of the Hetmanate.\footnote{Catherine to Olsuf'ev, n.d., RA, 2 (1863): 189.} On November 10, 1764, Catherine issued four decrees. The first announced the hetman's resignation, confirmed his right to all property acquired during Elizabeth's reign, and compensated him for the loss of income by a pension of ten thousand rubles annually and various properties previously attached to the office of hetman, including the city of Hadiach and the whole Bykovs'kyi area.\footnote{SA, 14, no. 401 (November 10, 1764): 323–34.} The second proclaimed the abolition of the hetmancy; the formation of an imperial administrative body, the Little Russian College, to govern the Hetmanate (enumerating its personnel); and, ironically, approval of the court reforms of the Hlukhiv
council.\textsuperscript{113} Apparently Catherine believed that the reformed courts were at least an improvement over the previous system, while the imperial judicial system was also in dire need of reform. Finally, Catherine issued a manifesto to the Ukrainian people and an order that all ukases pertaining to the changes in the Hetmanate be published.\textsuperscript{114} At this time Rozumovs’kyi asked to be relieved of all his official duties so he could settle his private affairs.\textsuperscript{115} Then, in the spring of 1765, he left the empire for an extended tour of Western Europe. After his return in late summer of 1767, he resumed positions of imperial importance, but he no longer played an active role in Ukrainian political life.\textsuperscript{116} Politics in the Hetmanate would no longer be dominated by the hetman but by Catherine’s new viceroy, the new governor-general.

\textsuperscript{113} PSZ, 16, no. 12,277 (November 10, 1764): 961–62.
\textsuperscript{114} SA, 14, nos. 403 and 404 (November 10, 1764): 324–25.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., no. 453 (December 10, 1764): 577.
\textsuperscript{116} Kyrylo Rozumovs’kyi continued his imperial career as senator, general-fieldmarshal, and president of the Academy of Sciences (in name only). From 1768 he was a member of the newly formed Imperial Council, a group of Catherine’s closest advisers. His later career is described in Vasyl’chikov, vol. 1. Some interesting details of Rozumovs’kyi’s stay in France and the French reaction to his resignation as hetman can be found in I’ko Borschak, \textit{Slidomy Het’mana Rozumovs’koho v Frantsii} (Munich, 1957).
CHAPTER FOUR

Catherine's Viceroy in the Hetmanate:
The Rule of Governor-General Rumiantsev (1765–1769)

Catherine's clash with Ukrainian autonomy precipitated a clear policy decision on the fate of the Western borderlands. At the very time Catherine forced Kyrylo Rozumovs'kyi to resign as hetman of the Ukraine, she instructed the newly appointed procurator-general, Prince A. A. Viazemskii, to be guided by the principles of gradual administrative centralization and Russification in dealing with the western self-governing areas:

Little Russia, Livonia, and Finland [Karelia] are provinces which are governed by confirmed privileges and it would be improper to violate them by abolishing them all at once. However, to call them foreign and to deal with them on that basis is more than a mistake; it would be sheer stupidity. These provinces as well as Smolensk should be Russified in the easiest way possible, so that they should cease looking like wolves to the forest. The approach is easy if wise men are chosen as governors of the provinces. When the hetmans are gone from Little Russia every effort should be made to eradicate from memory the period and the hetmans, let alone promote anyone to that office.

"This is a partial paraphrase of the Russian proverb "No matter how much you feed a [captured] wolf he still looks to the forest [to escape].

Gradual incorporation of the Hetmanate into the imperial structure had become Catherine's long-range goal. More immediately, she wanted to prevent the forced resignation of Hetman Rozumovs'kyi from causing discontent among the Ukrainian gentry. To quell any such anger, Catherine divided membership in the Little Russian College equally, between four Russians—Major-General Jakov Brant (Jacob von Brandt), Colonel Prince Platon Meshcherskii, Colonel Osip Khvostov, and College Advisor Dmitrii Natal'iu—and four Ukrainians—Quartermaster-General Semen Kochubei, General Chancellor Vasyl' Tumans'kyi, General Aide-de-Camp Ivan Zhoravka, and General Flag Bearer Danylo Apostol. The president of the college was, of course, a Russian—the newly named governor-general of the Ukraine, Count Petr Rumiantsev. By appointing officials from Rozumovs'kyi's administration, including the main proponent of the hereditary hetmancy, General-Chancellor Vasyl' Tumans'kyi, Catherine stressed a policy of administrative continuity without reprisals. As the former general-chancellor, Tumans'kyi, in particular, had a very detailed knowledge of the Hetmanate and thus would be invaluable to the new administration. To forestall tension between the Ukrainian and Russian members of the college, Catherine gave them equal rank, promoting General-Chancellor Tumans'kyi to major-general and the others to colonel in the Russian army. Her decrees pleaded for mutual cooperation among the members.\(^2\) Catherine wanted to avoid the errors of the first Little Russian College instituted under Peter I, which was still infamous for its brutal power struggle with local Ukrainian authorities.

While Catherine made conciliatory gestures to some of the Hetmanate's administrators, she did not abandon her general policy of integrating the Hetmanate into the empire. In fact, she issued a set of secret directives on how this could be accomplished.\(^3\) Written after her receipt of the Teplov memorandum, Catherine's instructions to Governor-General Rumiantsev repeat many of Teplov's criticisms of Ukrainian practices. For instance, Catherine attacked the confusion between military and civilian rule, the cumbersome legal system with

\(^2\) The functions of the Little Russian College and its membership were announced in the following decrees: PSZ, 16, no. 12,277 (November 10, 1764): 961 – 62; 54, 14, no. 445 (December 16, 1764): 566; 54, 14, no. 449 (December 20, 1764): 576.

\(^3\) The instructions were published in SIRIO 7 (1871): 376 – 91.
its endless litigations, and the peasants’ mobility. Her prime concern, however, was that the Hetmanate belonged to the empire "in name only." She deplored the Ukrainians’ "self-willed" appropriation of special rights and privileges and the "Polonized" liturgical and customary practices of the Hetmanate’s church.

The empress was especially disturbed by the local population’s hatred of Russians—a hatred which, she believed, was fomented by Ukrainian officers and notables who feared losing the secure positions from which they practiced graft and corruption. She gave an indignant account of how the Ukrainian administration and treasury were acting in an arbitrary fashion, providing no income for the empire, squandering the Hetmanate’s resources, and, at the same time, exploiting the populace. The new governor-general was entrusted with finding out the Hetmanate’s exact financial status, so that in the future the tax burden could be distributed equitably and thus provide the empire with an adequate and steady income. Catherine assured Rumiantsev that the populace would gain confidence in the new administration and would acknowledge the defects of the old, once it was treated with justice, selflessness, humility, and good will. Then, once "the best of all orders will be established," the Ukrainian populace, relieved from the officers’ oppression, would express gratitude to Catherine and the imperial authorities.

The remainder of Catherine’s program read like a catalog of enlightened rhetoric and suggestions. Most of its points concerned the development of economic resources. Catherine advocated a complete statistical survey of the Hetmanate, which would enumerate its people, measure its crops, and assess the extent and nature of its trade, natural resources, and available capital. This would enable the government to better allocate the resources at its disposal while stimulating economic growth.

For the most part, Catherine’s instructions consisted of a long list of exhortations, without any specifics about how to achieve the government’s goals. Thus, Catherine called for the construction of stone bridges, the improvement of roads, the draining of swamps into farmland, the construction of machinery and mills, the introduction of new crops and plants (particularly tobacco), the improvement of animal husbandry (particularly sheep), the training of veterinarians, the forestation of the steppe, and—probably her most fanciful
proposal—the leveling of the Dnieper cataracts to improve river commerce.

Catherine also suggested a number of public welfare programs. Towns were to have *magistraty*, just as they did in Europe. Municipal officials were to perform a variety of police and regulatory functions, such as maintaining proper order, regulating the upkeep of dwellings, and serving the welfare of the town’s inhabitants. Each region was to have an adequate number of doctors and apothecaries, and measures were to be taken to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. While some of the programs were obviously wishful dreams, far beyond the imperial authorities’ capabilities to achieve, they do reflect the empress’s optimistic belief that proper regulation and enlightened rule could greatly stimulate her state’s economic growth and increase her people’s welfare.

In sum, Catherine’s program for the Hetmanate called for its gradual integration into the empire, maximized contribution to the imperial treasury, stimulation of economic growth, and, at the same time, the reduction of friction between Ukrainians and Russians. The last would occur, Catherine was sure, when the Ukrainian populace became aware of the benefits of imperial rule in contrast to the misgovernment of the previous administration. The task of bringing this “best of all orders” to the Hetmanate was entrusted to the highly gifted imperial officer and newly appointed governor-general, Petr Rumiantsev.

In administering the Ukraine, Governor-General Rumiantsev was continuing a family tradition of service in the empire’s central government. His father, Count Aleksandr Rumiantsev, was the Russian military administrator of the Hetmanate between 1738 and 1740, a period when there was no hetman. During that time Petr lived in the Hetmanate and was tutored by a Ukrainian, Tymofii Seniutovych.4 He

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continued his education abroad and on his return began a military career. At the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, Rumiantsev, then a major in charge of a regiment, proved to be an ambitious, brave, capable, and at times even brilliant military commander. With the death of Elizabeth and the subsequent reversal of alliances, the new emperor, Peter III, showered Rumiantsev with favors and called upon him to execute the tsar’s pet military effort—an attack on Denmark on behalf of his native Holstein. Rumiantsev had already assembled an army of fifty thousand men and begun the campaign when Catherine’s coup brought another reversal in foreign policy. On the day of the coup Rumiantsev was relieved of his command and ordered back to St. Petersburg. Instead of complying, he submitted his resignation and remained in Western Europe. Catherine dissuaded him from resigning, however, and gave him a minor appointment in Estland. But Rumiantsev, still dissatisfied, soon requested and received a year’s leave of absence.

The recall of Count Petr Rumiantsev in 1763 caused puzzlement at court. Still not quite secure on the throne, Catherine was suspicious not only of Rumiantsev’s former association with Peter III and of his expressed hostility toward her, but also of his extensive military, personal, and family connections. It was believed in court circles that Count Petr Rumiantsev was, in fact, the illegitimate son of Peter I. The rumored connection endowed him with special appeal, so that Rumiantsev could readily have become a focal point in any plot to depose the empress in favor of her son, Paul. This, combined with Rumiantsev’s military and unquestioned family ties—his wife was the


5 Solms to King [Frederick], 1 June 12, 1764, SIRIO, 22 (1878): 259.

Princess Ekaterina Golitsyna—made the ambitious man’s continued stay at court a possible threat to Catherine.

Catherine solved the problem brilliantly, however. By giving Rumiantsev a major appointment as the Ukrainian governor-general, she removed him from court and, at the same time, channeled his considerable abilities into solving a delicate and serious state problem. Should Rumiantsev succeed at his task, Catherine would have made excellent use of a potential political rival. If he failed, which was a distinct possibility considering the mood of the Ukrainian gentry, Rumiantsev would be discredited. In any case, Catherine would emerge victorious.

On the other hand, to Rumiantsev, who had been out of favor since the coup, the appointment was an opportunity to further his military career. The Ukrainian situation involved risks, but, as in the past, Rumiantsev accepted the challenge enthusiastically. Barring another coup, the only possibility for advancing lay in pleasing Catherine, and the Ukrainian governorship-general provided the circumstances for passing that crucial test.

On April 8, 1765, Governor-General Rumiantsev arrived in the Hetmanate and settled in Hlukhiv. His assumption of command entailed only a few changes in the Hetmanate’s administrative and judicial structure. At the top, the governor-general and the president of the Little Russian College together replaced the hetman. Like Hetman Rozumovskyi, Governor-General Rumiantsev commanded the Zaporozhian Sich, but, unlike the hetman, the governor-general also commanded all the Russian troops stationed in the Hetmanate. The Little Russian College now became the chief central administrative institution, assuming the functions of the former General Military Chancellery. Special departments within the college were made responsible for military, judicial, and fiscal affairs. The college took orders from Rumiantsev and the Senate, while the governor-general reported directly to Catherine and dealt with the Senate only on occasion.7 The lower administration—on the regiment and company levels—remained intact.

7 Shafonkii, Chernigovskogo namestnichestva, p. 99.
Forty days after his arrival, on May 18, 1765, Rumiantsev presented Catherine with a comprehensive program of reform which, after an exchange of letters, Catherine approved in part. A program formulated so soon must have been conceived prior to Rumiantsev's arrival. Its provisions drew on three major elements—Catherine's instructions, the ideas of Teplov, and Rumiantsev's own concepts. As the imperial court's expert on the Hetmanate, Teplov gave Rumiantsev a briefing immediately after the court's appointment as governor-general, and, undoubtedly, passed along his critique of conditions in the Hetmanate. In his initial memorandum on reform and in his subsequent reply to Catherine, Rumiantsev reiterated Teplov's charges of administrative incompetence, abuse by officers, and corruption, particularly in the amassing of state lands and even towns. Rumiantsev proposed the verification of landholdings and the restitution of all former crown lands to the state. In her reply, Catherine, urging caution, ordered the governor-general not to tamper with any land grant approved by a tsar.

Many points in Rumiantsev's program were taken verbatim from Catherine's own instructions. Consequently his call for urban reconstruction, the development of crafts and industry, the establishment of town police, the encouragement of trade, the improvement of agriculture and forestry, and the rationalization and increase of state revenues were, of course, approved by the monarch. But Rumiantsev also added a list of his own suggestions: the organization of a postal service; the reorganization of the Ukrainian artillery; the resumption of gunpowder production; the payment of salaries to officials in lieu of land grants; the establishment of a military academy, a school for noble girls, and two universities; the founding of a state hospital; the reorganization of the judicial system; and the secularization of Ukrainian church property. All in all, his was a program that was certainly attuned to the principle of enlightened rule. Of these original propositions, however, Catherine approved only the organization of a

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8 Rumiantsev's initial program, Catherine's response, and Rumiantsev's subsequent reply were published together in SIRIO, 10 (1872): 9–21. Catherine's letter of reply was published in Smirdin, ed., Sochinenia Imperatritsii Ekateriny II, 3: 188.

9 Catherine to Rumiantsev, November 15, 1764, in Smirdin, ed., Sochinenia ... Ekateriny II, 3: 187. In this letter Catherine informed Rumiantsev that she was sending Teplov to him for an "extended conversation on Little Russia."
postal service; the others were passed on to special commissions for consideration or dropped entirely. Clearly, Catherine opposed any sudden or drastic changes. Furthermore, she wanted to be sure that any new program could be financed locally, without draining the imperial treasury. Still, the points Catherine did approve, combined with her instructions, gave Rumiantsev a mandate to initiate a number of long-range reforms.

Since Catherine’s original instructions, Rumiantsev’s program, and Catherine’s reply to Rumiantsev all called for the improvement of agriculture and commerce, it may seem somewhat surprising that the governor-general made few efforts to stimulate economic growth. Even these were inspired by the central authorities. To implement Catherine’s favorite project, Rumiantsev settled approximately one hundred German families in Bila Vezha and a small number of Wallachian and Bulgarian colonists in the Pereiaslav regiment. The Senate initiated an unsuccessful experiment to introduce the new crop of potatoes into the Hetmanate; most of the imported potato plants froze in storage and only a small number were eventually distributed to cultivators. Despite all the rhetoric to the contrary, neither the central authorities nor Rumiantsev was prepared to pursue economic development on a large scale. The problem was not only lack of planning, personnel, and funds; in the Hetmanate, political issues now overshadowed all others.

Rumiantsev therefore concentrated on such traditional areas of reform as the administration, the military, the judiciary, and, partially, the educational system. In judicial matters the governor-general could introduce only minor modifications, since Catherine disapproved of major changes. The General Military Court, the highest court in the Hetmanate, was staffed by twelve judges elected annually (one from each regiment and two general justices who served as supervisors). Rumiantsev changed the composition of the court, making it a permanent, paid body including the two general justices and three to five additional members. To facilitate the functioning of the central court,

Rumiantsev appointed state lawyers charged with assisting the plaintiffs. Also, the implementation of the 1763 judicial reforms brought about unforeseen problems, which the governor-general strove to resolve.12

The greatest change in governmental structure approved by Catherine was Rumiantsev’s proposal for a regular postal service. Previously, the Hetmanate’s mail had been carried by several municipal postal agencies and some official couriers. For instance, an ukaz of the empress would be delivered by messenger to the General Military Chancellery, which would distribute it, again by courier, down the chain of command. Rumiantsev’s proposition had been based on the need of both government and private individuals for systematic and regular service. The new system, established in 1765, comprised 9 postal routes extending over 2,358 versts, with 72 postal stations, 15 regional postmasters, 165 postmen, and 300 horses.13 Mail was to be picked up and delivered at a prescribed time twice weekly in each locality. The postal service became a sub-branch of the Ukrainian administration under the supervision of a postal director. The Hetmanate’s treasury paid all salaries and expenses of the postal service and received all its revenues. In 1768, 1770, and 1774 the postal service was expanded to facilitate communication with the Crimea and the new province of Novorossiia. With minor adjustments, it was incorporated into the Russian administration after the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy.

Rumiantsev’s main priority, however, was to increase state revenues. Catherine’s instructions, Rumiantsev’s reply, and a subsequent secret directive by Catherine all emphasized this aim.14 While maintaining the old sources of revenue—the liquor and mill taxes and a percentage of the border tariff—the governor-general introduced several new sources. He consolidated the various types of crown

14 Catherine’s secret directives; SA 13 (July 13 and 14, 1765), p. 81.
lands used by Cossacks who had once hunted for the hetman (bobrovnyky, stri'i'si, ptashnyky) into one category of state lands. Eleven supervisors were chosen to supervise the state lands, and all their inhabitants were taxed. This measure brought an additional annual income of ten thousand rubles, and applying the tax to servants of the former hetman netted another one thousand two hundred.

The largest revenue-producing reform, however, was the introduction of the ruble tax, levied to support Russian troops stationed in the Hetmanate. Up to this time the Ukrainian authorities had collected a combination of taxes, mostly in kind. Since the revenue was frequently inadequate and the delivery of supplies belated, the Russian troops took whatever they needed by force from the local populace. Thus the tax burden was borne unevenly, falling heavily on regions where troops were stationed. Having witnessed these problems during his tour of the Hetmanate, Rumiantsev decided on a new tax base, namely, one ruble annually from each household, collected quarterly. All peasants, townsmen, Cossack helpers (pidpomichnyky), and hired hands (pidusidky) were liable for the new tax. In 1767, the governor-general divided the Hetmanate into twenty equal tax districts and appointed a district commission responsible for gathering the levy in each. The estimated income came to approximately 250,000 rubles annually. Despite major arrears in payment, the Ukrainian treasury received a surplus, which, at times, reached 150,000 rubles. When the tax income exceeded the amount needed to support imperial troops, the extra funds were used for government expenses, including the salaries of Ukrainian officials and the subsidizing of the Kiev Academy. The ruble tax, originally instituted as a substitute for an existing military tax, was, in fact, becoming a general levy.

In addition to paying the ruble tax, the Ukrainian populace was obliged to quarter Russian troops, because no army bases or barracks existed at the time. Because of the unsettled international situation

15 Shafonskii, Chernigovskogo namestnichesiva, pp. 101 – 102.
17 Maksimovich, Detatelnost', pp. 88–119, provides a detailed account of the introduction of the ruble tax.
18 Vassiliy Ruban, Kratkaia istoria Mal'’ia Rossii s 1506 po 1776 god (St. Petersburg, 1777), p. 233.
19 Slabchenko, Khoziaistvo, 4: 269.
and, especially, the empire’s problems with Poland and the Ottoman Empire, the obligation increased during Rumiantsev’s tenure, when an additional regiment was stationed in the Hetmanate. According to the governor-general’s account, in 1763 there were in the Hetmanate six rifle, one dragoon, and eight infantry regiments, totaling 19,981 men and requiring 902 officers’ and 10,556 soldiers’ quarters. Although Rumiantsev attempted to distribute these troops as widely as possible, they still posed a serious hardship on local communities. Considering that there were only 29,025 town and village households where they could be stationed, the distribution would be two Russian soldiers for every three households or two official quarters for every five households.20 This system provided further savings to the government because the troops were able on more than one occasion to obtain food and firewood from the host household.

The Ukrainian treasury, greatly enlarged by the additional income, was further subordinated to imperial needs. In 1771, the imperial procurator-general ordered the Little Russian College to provide an exact accounting of all incomes and expenditures. This was done retroactively for 1768–70 and then continued on an annual basis.21 The Ukrainian treasury was still a separate entity, but it now came to be treated as a provincial branch of the imperial treasury.

Another consistent aim of the governor-general was to improve the Hetmanate’s military capabilities. This entailed the rejuvenation of the Cossack estate (soslovie). Since many Cossacks lost their land and either voluntarily or from necessity became landlords’ subjects, the number of Cossacks capable of real military service was constantly shrinking. In a report to Catherine, Rumiantsev blamed both the landlords and the Cossacks for this condition: the former for pressing the Cossacks into submission and the latter for surrendering their status to avoid military obligations.22 Adding his prohibition to the decrees already issued by the tsars and the Senate, the governor-general forbade the Cossacks from becoming either peasants or burghe rs. Quoting a Senate ukaz of 1746 ordering landlords to free any Cossack subjects, Rumiantsev permitted these former Cossacks to


21 Slabchenko, Khortaisivo, 4: 268–71.

appeal directly to the General Court for reinstatement. The state lawyers he appointed also helped in the suits brought by Cossacks andburghers. At the time, however, the governor-general was unwilling to tackle the complex social and economic problem of Cossacks directly under landlords' authority. He postponed such action until after the general census, when he hoped the social groups would be precisely differentiated and permanently fixed. Then, recognized Cossacks would be organized into a permanent military estate, retaining some of the Cossacks' traditional privileges, such as personal freedom, right to property, trade, and the production of alcohol.

At the same time that Rumiantsev wanted to protect the Cossacks from the abuses and pressures of their officers, he abrogated their most ancient right, that of electing their own leaders. This only strengthened the officers' control over the Cossacks. By the 1760s, the Cossacks elected only the officers on the company level; all higher officers were appointed by the Ukrainian administration. In 1767 the position of captain in the Korybutiv company of the Pryluky regiment became vacant and the Cossacks, in accordance with tradition, elected a new captain. Rumiantsev learned, however, that the successful candidate had dispensed liquor abundantly to every Cossack in the company before the election took place. Furious, Rumiantsev nullified the election and, instead of correcting the abuse, simply ordered that from that time on all company officials be appointed by the colonel and his staff. The order, based on Rumiantsev's deep mistrust of the Cossacks' ability to make any responsible decision, placed them completely at the mercy of the Ukrainian administration.

The governor-general restricted traditional Cossack rights even further. Himself a professional soldier, Rumiantsev attempted to transform the Cossacks into a more disciplined, better trained, and more efficient fighting force. Using the Russian army as his model, the governor-general demanded equal performance from the Cossacks. He formed a special unit, appropriately armed and uniformed, to guard the Little Russian College archive, the General Court, and the Treasury. When some Cossacks objected to performing such regular service, Rumiantsev ordered them beaten "without mercy." Similarly, in 1768, he decreed that Cossacks who did not obey their

23 Miakotin, Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy, 1, no. 3: 200 – 201.
24 The incident is described in Lazarevskii, "Po povodu sta let," pp. 380–81.
commanders should be whipped and that the most obstinate should be deprived of their Cossack status and registered as peasants.25 The most drastic change, however, occurred in December 1768, at the beginning of the Turkish War. At Rumiantsev’s request, the Senate placed the mobilized Cossack units under the jurisdiction of Russian military law.26 This virtually gave the governor-general a free hand with military discipline, but it deprived the Cossacks of another ancient right—the right to be judged by peers in accordance with their own laws. In 1775 the three hired Cossack units that had once formed the hetman’s guard were reorganized into regular army regiments. This constituted another step in the introduction of Russian military practices into the Hetmanate.27

A key precondition for further military and fiscal reforms was an accurate census. Since the Teplov memorandum had completely discredited all Ukrainian data, the Russian authorities were determined to conduct their own census. The one planned by the Senate was not implemented because of Hetman Rozumovs’kyi’s removal from office. Catherine, in her instructions, pointed again to the need for a new census, and by September 1765 conditions were sufficiently settled in the Hetmanate to undertake the task. Unlike the Senate plan, which was concerned primarily with the number of peasants, Cossacks, and their domiciles, Rumiantsev had a much more ambitious goal. He wished to register the age, social position, occupation, marital status, state of health, income, and tax payment of each person in the Hetmanate. Moreover, Rumiantsev’s census called for detailed description of all movable and immovable property, except personal belongings.28

25 These orders were published in “Dva dokumenta o sostojanii malorossiiskogo kozachestva v polovine XVIII st.,” KS, 1882, no. 10, pp. 126–33.
26 PSZ, 18, no. 13,217 (December 20, 1768): 786.
28 There has been a plethora of works on the Rumiantsev census. For a fairly thorough treatment of the census as a historical source, and for a listing of the major works based on the census, see M. Tkachenko, “Naukove rozproblematiz Rumiantsevs’koj reviziji,” Ukraina, 1924, no. 3, pp. 39–52; and M. A. Lytvynchko, Dzerella istorii Ukrainy XVIII st. (Kharkiv, 1970), pp. 95–114. For an account of the census-taking, see D. Bagalei, General’naia opis’ Malorossii (Kiev, 1883). For the most detailed analysis, see Maksimovich, Detal’nosti’, pp. 190–357.
Separate census forms were prepared for Cossacks and for inhabitants of towns, of crown and monastery lands, and of private estates. In addition to the information mentioned above, Rumiantsev inquired into the state of local trade, industry and municipal buildings, into the condition and income of crown lands, and, most important, the landholdings of both private individuals and officials using state lands. Peasants' work obligations were noted on crown and monastery lands, but not on private estates—a concession to the sensibilities of the landowners. The Rumiantsev census was unquestionably the most comprehensive ever attempted in the Hetmanate up to that time.

The official purpose of the census was to gather information so as to institute better order and justice. In reality, Rumiantsev aimed to resolve many specific problems. He hoped to assign the population to the official categories of landlord, Cossack, clergy, and peasant. Registering everyone and recording every household would help reduce peasant mobility and would determine the exact number of Cossacks. Better knowledge of the overall Cossack economic condition would facilitate the forging of a permanent, self-supporting military force and indicate the feasibility of the projected 30 percent Cossack property tax. The census would ascertain which lands were genuinely owned privately and which actually belonged to the state. Rumiantsev was especially interested in the crown and monastery lands. He wished to repossess the crown lands and compensate the owner-officials with regular salaries. Finally, he hoped that the census would provide the information on the extent and intensity of trade and on the vitality of guilds, industry, and handicrafts that was needed to plan for their improvement.

In each regiment a special commission was created to conduct the census. Headed by a Russian officer, the commission had a staff of lower-ranking Russian officers and local Ukrainian officials. Because of the immensity of the task and the Russians' unfamiliarity with local conditions, the work proceeded slowly. The passive resistance of the populace was another hindrance. With the possible exception of the burghers, all segments of the population feared the census. The

29 Maksimovich published Rumiantsev's official aims in *Deiatel'nost'* (pp. 200–201), and proved that he had other, less openly expressed goals (pp. 201–17).

30 This was proposed by Rumiantsev in the original project he submitted to Catherine.
peasants dreaded being bound to their current place of domicile and receiving a tax increase. The Cossacks were apprehensive about fulfilling their military and tax obligations, and the landlords were worried that their property rights would be questioned. Many landowners refused to give the required information, claiming that they were unfamiliar with surveying and geometry. Ukrainian members of the various commissions feigned illness and refused to participate. The head of the Poltava commission complained that in 1767 hardly any Ukrainian members were actually present and working.

The census-taking continued until 1769, when it was suspended due to the outbreak of the Russian-Turkish war. It is difficult to assess what part of the census was completed, since many of the documents have not survived. It is certain that extensive work was accomplished, however, for today completed census forms for over three thousand five hundred settlements can be found in Ukrainian archives.

As a viceroy of enlightened rule, Governor-General Rumiantsev was particularly concerned with combatting alcoholism and superstition. In his report to the Little Russian College, Rumiantsev had shown indignation at the large number of people who produced and sold alcoholic beverages. As an example he cited the relatively small town of Hlukhiv, which had 166 taverns. Rumiantsev suggested that the production of and trade in liquor be supervised by the government and that the volume of alcohol in the Hetmanate be reduced by strict enforcement of the Lithuanian Statute. These measures would, the governor-general hoped, reduce drunkenness among the populace.

Similarly, Rumiantsev wanted to diminish the widespread belief in witchcraft, the casting of spells, and other superstitions. He ordered strict enforcement of the Lithuanian Statute’s prohibition against divinations and magic; two women were even tried publicly for the practice. Concurrently, Rumiantsev launched an educational campaign against superstitious beliefs and requested all parish priests to preach against such practices.

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31 Lytvynenko, Dzherela, p. 98.
33 Lytvynenko, Dzherela, p. 100.
Governor-General Rumiantsev was genuinely interested in fostering enlightenment through educational reform. The establishment of new schools would have been one imperial program that the Ukrainian gentry would have greeted with enthusiasm. For years the Ukrainian gentry had sought the establishment of a university in the Hetmanate. The Kiev Academy and the Chernihiv collegium, with their antiquated curriculum, had ceased to meet the educational needs of the gentry, who were now sending their sons to study in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Western Europe. Prior to his dismissal, Hetman Rozumovs’kyi had completed plans for the establishment of a university in Baturyn. Moreover, the Hlukhiv council had requested the establishment of two universities and secondary schools—a request later repeated in the program that Governor-General Rumiantsev had submitted to Catherine. Catherine tied the project to secularization of church property, probably because she feared the financial cost. Meantime, she simply wished Rumiantsev good luck with improving educational facilities. No university or secondary school was established in the Hetmanate at this time.

Rumiantsev had more success in promoting primary education, because here he could rely on the rudimentary system that already existed in the Hetmanate. Primary education for the common people (Cossacks,burghers, and—at times—even peasants) was offered by the church parish. It would hire the local priest or cantor (diak) or a student of the Kiev Academy to teach reading of sacred texts and of church music. This was hardly an educational system, since it depended entirely on local parish initiative. Yet these schools apparently numbered into the hundreds, and “wandering cantors” were able to make a livelihood teaching in the parish schools.

In the 1750s, Rozumovs’kyi’s administration showed some interest in expanding the parish schools so that the children of Cossacks could be taught the martial arts and basic literacy. In 1758 Colonel Ivan Kulibaka of the Lubny regiment began an experimental program that made each company (or, actually, its officers) responsible for the

36 The Baturyn project was published in ChOIDS, 1863, bk. 2, pp. 67–85.
38 A. Lazarevskii, “Statisticheskie svedeniia ob ukrainskikh narodnykh shkolakh i gospodarakh v XVIII v.,” Osnova, 1862, no. 5 (May), pp. 82–99.
education of every male Cossack between the ages of twelve and fifteen. The program's curriculum had two parts—basic literacy, and the military craft (swordsmanship, musket firing, and so on). By 1760, these parish-company schools had enrolled 1,624 children of the Lubny regiment. Hetman Rozumovs'kyi considered the program so successful that he ordered its introduction into all ten regiments of the Hetmanate, but his dismissal prevented the full implementation of the order. Soon after he took charge, Governor-General Rumiantsev ordered that the company school program be continued and expanded. Thus Rumiantsev implemented a major reform of the previous administration, which must have pleased many Ukrainian officials.

The adoption of the discredited Ukrainian administration's education program was, perhaps, one way for Rumiantsev to accomplish a key task that Catherine had assigned him—the easing of tensions between Ukrainians and Russians. In evaluating the governor-general's effect on Ukrainian-Russian relations, one must consider not only his policies, but also his temperament and style of government. Rumiantsev was a strict military man who would not tolerate even the slightest hint of disobedience. When the Hlukhiv Cossacks objected to more regular duty, he had them beaten; when seventy-seven Cossacks who were tired of the indecision and inaction of their commander went home for the harvest without permission, Rumiantsev had them arrested and punished. He was especially strict in stamping out any expression of autonomist spirit. When, during the elections for the Legislative Commission, a group of Nizhyn gentry insisted on writing a petition demanding the election of a hetman, Rumiantsev had them arrested; although these notables were subsequently pardoned by the empress, he sentenced thirty-three to death and condemned eighteen to perpetual banishment. Rumiantsev made it clear to the Ukrainian gentry that his rule had certain limits of propriety and that to step outside them would result in swift and severe punishment.

39 The program for teaching Cossack children is discussed in Maksimovich, Deiatel'nost', pp. 136–89.
41 This incident will be discussed in the next chapter.
On the other hand, Rumiantsev attempted to win over the Ukrainian gentry by drawing them into imperial service. In a report to Catherine he recommended that rank (chin) and governmental service (dela) be granted to those “who have not been infected by the disease of self-willfulness and independence.” In setting such an example, Rumiantsev believed that even those who held strong autonomist sentiments would eventually change their opinions and become governmental employees. Catherine fully approved Rumiantsev’s proposals and requested to be informed of “those worthy of favor” who deserved promotion.

The governor-general placed special emphasis on properly influencing the young. He recommended the creation of an imperial cadet school in the Hetmanate, believing that it could inculcate in the Ukrainian gentry a love for regular military service that would erase “outdated and idle thoughts of self-willed Cossackdom.” While opening an imperial cadet school in the Hetmanate proved to be unfeasible, Rumiantsev did gain the right of admittance to the Imperial Cadet School and the Imperial School for Noble Girls in St. Petersburg for the children of the gentry. The governor-general’s motives for this were clear. The Ukrainian gentry would be trained together with Russian nobles, develop friendships and connections, thus becoming loyal imperial servitors. The gentry, on the other hand, was quite pleased with Rumiantsev’s intervention, since Ukrainians had long been denied admission into the imperial academies because of an official position that “there are no nobles in Little Russia.”

The governor-general also defended the Ukrainian claims to nobility based on governmental service. In a note to the Little Russian College, Rumiantsev suggested that all Ukrainian officials automatically receive ranks equal to Russian ones; nonofficials, however, would

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42 Rumiantsev to Catherine, February 5, 1768, in Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 331.
43 Catherine to Rumiantsev, April 16, 1768, in Smirdin, ed., Sochinenia ... Ekateriny II, 3: 196.
44 In Rumiantsev’s initial project submitted to Catherine, SIRIO, 10 (1872): 19.
have to prove noble ancestry. In 1774 Rumiantsev again wrote to the procurator-general, A. A. Viazemskii, on behalf of the Ukrainian officers and szlachta, requesting that appropriate ranks be granted to Ukrainian officials. Finally, as the supreme military commander, Rumiantsev could make appointments to the rank of kornet (ensign), the lowest commissioned rank carrying Russian noble privileges, and he granted the rank freely to Ukrainian landlords unable to obtain any other.

Rumiantsev and the Ukrainian gentry found that they stood on common ground in their attitude toward the peasants. Despite Catherine’s frequent admonitions to Rumiantsev to protect the populace from exploitation by the officers and notables, she considered peasant mobility to be an economic liability and a cause for social unrest. Hetman Rozumovsky had already limited the mobility of the peasants by requiring them to obtain a written release from their landlords prior to any move. With the introduction of the ruble tax, peasant mobility became an even greater problem. The mounting tax arrears—79,703 rubles, 52 3/4 kopeks in 1768; 135,658 rubles, 14 kopeks in 1769; and 177,142 rubles, 25 1/2 kopeks in 1770—were blamed primarily on the peasants’ mobility. Although a part of the arrears were eventually paid, the Little Russian College decided to act. In 1770 it ordered that “runaway peasants” be brought back to their former masters and be forced to pay back taxes. The official category of “runaway peasant” appeared for the first time, and the Ukrainian landowners realized that the Russian government might accomplish what they could not, namely, the total ensnarement of the peasantry.

49 O. Obiobly, “Ukrainian Autonomists of the 1780’s and 1790’s and Count P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky,” Armals of UAAS, 6, nos. 3–4 [21–22] (1958): 315. Le Donne argues that the very presence of a noble as illustrious as Rumiantsev in Little Russia raised the social standing of the Cossack aristocracy and drew it closer to the all-imperial elite. Le Donne, Ruling Russia, p. 309.
50 The tax arrears and the return of “runaway peasants” to the landlords is discussed by V. Miakotin in Prikreplenie krest’iansva, pp. 125–26.
The commonality of the socioeconomic interests of the imperial government and the Ukrainian gentry was dramatically demonstrated when an uprising occurred in the village of Klishchynshi. Having registered the Cossacks living in the village as peasants, the local landowning family, the Lysenkos, attempted to exact corresponding labor obligations. The Cossacks appealed to the courts and the central imperial administration, but their efforts were foiled through the intercession of General Chancellor Vasyli Tumans’kyi, who was Lysenko’s brother-in-law. Enraged by these unfair tactics, the villagers destroyed the Lysenko estate (1767). The pillage drew the imperial authorities into the dispute. Neither expeditions of Cossack troops nor the entreaties of various Cossack and Russian officers subdued the village. The villagers maintained an armed camp and refused to recognize any authority. Finally, in 1774, imperial troops crushed the uprising by force, killing seven rebels and capturing fifty-three. Subsequently, 176 insurgents were brought to trial. The leaders of the uprising were banished to Siberia, while the rank-and-file Cossacks were deprived of their Cossack status and enserfed.\footnote{The Klishchynshi uprising is described in detail by A. Lazarevskii, “Istoricheskie ocherki poltavskoi lubenshchiny XVII–XVIII vv.,” ChIONL, 1 (1896): 158–93.}

At about the same time, a major uprising of peasants took place on the Polish-ruled Right Bank (the Koliivshchyna) and a revolt occurred in the Zaporozhian Sich. In view of these disturbances and their proximity, the Ukrainian gentry must certainly have felt more secure knowing that imperial forces would provide military assistance should the necessity arise.

The rule of Governor-General Rumiantsev was interrupted by international tension and war. In 1768 all military forces in the Hetmanate were placed on alert because of the Polish civil strife and the bloody Ukrainian uprising on the Right Bank. Afterward, from 1769 to 1774, Rumiantsev achieved fame as the commander-in-chief of the forces that defeated the Ottoman Empire and as the negotiator of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. The Cossacks of the Hetmanate took part in the war. One regiment of three thousand men formed part of the forces under Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Golitsyn, while a larger army of six thousand men and the three hired units of the former hetman’s
guard were commanded by Rumiantsev. Because the majority of Ukrainian officers were participating in the campaign, only a caretaker government remained in the Hetmanate. All military affairs were under the supervision of Prince Platon Meshcherskii, and the civilian administration was directed by General Justice Iliia Vasylovych Zhurman, a Ukrainian. Few changes were initiated during their tenure, and the Hetmanate passed through a rather somnolent five-year period.

Four years were hardly sufficient time for Governor-General Rumiantsev to establish Catherine's "best of all orders" in the Hetmanate. He did succeed, however, in initiating several reforms that brought the Ukrainian government closer to imperial practice. At the expense of their traditional rights, Rumiantsev molded the Cossacks into a more efficient fighting force. By introducing, surreptitiously, an imperial general levy and totally subordinating the Ukrainian treasury to an imperial agency, he greatly increased the Hetmanate's fiscal contribution to the empire. Since the new regulations applied to all taxed individuals, the majority of Ukrainians were made aware of how imperial practices had penetrated their homeland. At the same time, Rumiantsev acted to stamp out any overt opposition to the imperial program and to direct the energies of the Ukrainian gentry toward socioeconomic concerns and imperial careers. Nonetheless, these initial steps in integrating the Hetmanate into the empire did spark a reaction, which Ukrainian society took the opportunity to express at the Legislative Commission of 1767–68.

52 Ruban, Kratkaia letopis', p. 237; Rigel'man, Letopisne povestovanie, pt. 4, pp. 26–27.
53 Rigel'man, Letopisne povestovanie, pt. 4, p. 27; Maikov, "Rumiantsev," pp. 534–35.
CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainian Reactions and Aspirations: The Legislative Commission of 1767–1768

The Issue of Ukrainian Participation

While Rumiantsev was implementing his program in the Hetmanate, Catherine summoned the Legislative Commission of 1767. The tasks before it were to prepare a new imperial law code and to consider administrative and other reforms.

Legislative commissions were not new in the Russian Empire. The commission of 1767, however, was unique in two important respects. First, its representation was broadly based, including nobles, burghers, Cossacks, and free peasants from all areas of the empire. Second, Catherine’s Instruction, or nаказ, to this commission paraphrased the ideas of Western thinkers, particularly Montesquieu and Beccaria. By issuing the nаказ, Catherine had hoped to guide the delegates toward enlightened reform.1

The commission gave Ukrainians an unexpected forum for responding to Governor-General Rumiantsev’s policies and for proposing their own resolutions. Before they could make use of that forum, however, the issue of participation had to be decided. The Hetmanate had its own laws and administration. Why then should Ukrainians take part in codifying Russian laws or in reforming the imperial

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1 Catherine’s Instruction has been the subject of extensive study and debate. For a recent balanced account see de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, pp. 151–63.
administration? Moreover, there was no precedent for Ukrainian participation.  

Catherine herself vacillated on the issue, after initially ignoring it. The first two drafts of the manifesto calling the Legislative Commission into being made no mention of the autonomous regions. The third draft gave the Hetmanate, Livonia, and Estland the option to participate in it or to retain native laws until such time as they might petition for the adoption of the resulting imperial code. Even after a member of the draft committee raised objections, Catherine offered the border areas the option of sending delegates, but she limited the duration of regional laws to ten years. The final manifesto, however, says nothing about a special status for the autonomous regions but presumes that the commission's participants would come from all parts of the empire, including the border areas.

Whatever her initial considerations, Catherine must have recognized that it would be a mistake to allow the populace of the autonomous regions to choose whether to participate. Not only could such a step be interpreted as another guarantee of autonomy, but it took a crucial decision away from the autocrat. At best, they, the regions had ten years to adjust to the imperial norm. Since the new law was soon to apply to all parts of the empire, the participation of all regions became imperative. Consequently, Catherine's final version of the manifesto permitted no exemptions.

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2 Although several representatives had been summoned to the commission called by Elizabeth (1761), there is no evidence that they actually attended. In 1761 the commission requested that delegates be sent from border areas including the Hetmanate and Baltic regions. See PSZ, 15, no. 11,378 (December 8, 1761): 862–63. V. N. Latkin recorded all the sessions of Elizabeth's commission and does not mention the presence of any Ukrainian or Baltic delegates; see his Zakonodatel'nye komissii v Rossii, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1887). 1:80–184. Also, Zutis in Ostreiskii vopros, p. 361, states that no Baltic representatives participated in this commission.

3 The first two drafts are discussed in detail in A. V. Florovskii, Sostav zakonodatel'noi komissii (Odessa, 1915), pp. 8–15, and touched upon in Paul Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 57–58.

4 Florovskii, Sostav, p. 29.


6 PSZ, 17, no. 12,801 (December 14, 1766): 1092–1110.
To forestall the opposition he expected in the Hetmanate, Governor-General Rumiantsev issued an appeal to Ukrainian civic-mindedness, emphasizing the great need for reform. Nonetheless, Catherine’s manifesto met with hostility. The need for reform was disbelieved, since a recodification of Ukrainian laws begun in 1728 had been completed in 1743, and the court reforms of 1763 were just beginning to be implemented. The Ukrainians had no reason and no wish to participate in the commission. The recodification awaited only confirmation from the sovereign to take effect. In a report to Catherine, Rumiantsev summarized the Ukrainian reaction to the manifesto thus:

Many began acting willfully, claiming that any law or ukaz of the sovereign is a violation of their rights and liberties. They all have the same attitudes. Why do we have to be there [i.e., at the commission]? Our laws are all good. If it becomes necessary to be deputies, however, then only in order to obtain a confirmation of our rights and privileges.

Dismissing the Ukrainian complaints, Rumiantsev scheduled elections for March 1767. Separate local gatherings of the nobility, townsmen, and Cossacks were to elect deputies and to compose the nakazy that these deputies would then present to the general assembly meeting in Moscow. The Little Russian College, as a central

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7 The circular was published in Nakazy malorossiiskim deputatam 1767 g. i akty o vyborakh deputatov v Komissii sochinenii ulozheniia (Kiev, 1890), p. 186, and is quoted extensively in G. A. Maksimovich, Vybyry i nakazy v Malorossii v Zakonodatel’nuui komissii 1767 g., pt. 1: Vybyry i sostavlenie nakazov (Nizhnuy, 1917), pp. 6–8.

8 I. Telichenko, “Soslovnye muzhdy i zhelaniia malorossiian v epokhu Ekaterinskoii komissii,” KS, 1890, no. 7, pp. 166–67; Florovskii, Sostav, p. 494. Only V. G. Avseenko maintained that Catherine’s manifesto was greeted “by all segments of society with genuine joy,” in Malorossiia v 1767 g. (Kiev, 1864), pp. 3–4. Avseenko did not provide any evidence for his statement, and this view was discarded by later scholars.

9 See Yakovlev, Ukrainskii kodeks 1743 roku. The code, although used, was never confirmed by the sovereign.

10 Rumiantsev to Catherine, March 2, 1767, Solov’ev, 14: 39.

11 The schedule was published in Nakazy, pp. 187–88, as well as in Maksimovich, Vybyry, pp. 8–9; it is misleading, for many of the elections were not held on schedule.
governmental institution, was also to send a deputy with a nakaz. The Ukrainian dioceses were to submit statements of the church’s needs to the Holy Synod, which, as a governmental agency, would then represent the church at the assembly. Russian Old Believers living in the Hetmanate were to send one deputy with a nakaz. Thus, most of the free, nonpeasant population of the Hetmanate was required to participate in some way in the Legislative Commission of 1767.

The Elections and Nakazy of the Gentry

The extent to which the elections to the Legislative Commission and the drafting of the nakazy reflected the “enlightened” spirit of Catherine’s Instruction depended on the attitudes of the gentry. As the most politicized segment of the populace and as the bearers of the historical traditions, the gentry could denounce Rumiantsev’s reforms, demand their traditional rights, and repudiate the convocation of the commission. On the other hand, if the gentry cooperated with the government, Rumiantsev would take a significant step forward in fitting the Hetmanate into the imperial mold. Moreover, the gentry’s influence on the Legislative Commission grew through participation in selecting other estates’ delegates. Besides voting in elections of their own estate, notables who lived in towns took part in municipal elections, and, as Cossack officers, frequently directed the elections by Cossacks.

Although the imperial government questioned the validity of Ukrainian ranks overall, it recognized the Ukrainian gentry’s noble status in full for the purposes of the Legislative Commission. All Ukrainian notables and officers were to convene, draft a nakaz, and elect a deputy. The “Little Russian szlachta” was accorded ten deputies—one for each regiment—and was obliged to draft ten nakazy.

The election procedures outlined in Catherine’s manifesto appeared to be designed to protect the gentry from bureaucratic interference. First, a marshal of the elections was to be chosen in the presence of a government supervisor. The supervisor was then to delegate all responsibility for the elections to the marshal, who would set a date and place for the election of a deputy within a week. The elected

12 The electoral procedures are discussed in Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 103–104.
deputy, who could be from any electoral district, need not have been present. The nakazy were to be composed by a committee of no more than five members, following the dictates of the assembly. Then all assembled gentry were to sign the document.

Rumiantsev could hardly allow such a potentially dangerous group as the Ukrainian gentry a free hand, however. Government pressure was applied in every phase of the proceedings. The governor-general led the process by intervening in the drafting of the nakaz of the Chernihiv gentry, in blatant violation of the mandated electoral procedures. As he reported to Catherine, "I did not restrain myself from telling them the full truth, which certainly was not pleasant for them." After a blistering attack against the proposals raised by the gentry—the guarantee of all Ukrainian rights and privileges, the abolition of taxes supporting Russian troops stationed in the Ukraine, and the right of tax-free trade for the gentry—Rumiantsev accused the gentry of coveting the complete enserfment of the peasants.13

Rumiantsev's tactics prevailed. His close adviser, Oleksander Bezborod'ko (Aleksandr Bezborodko), son of the election marshal, General Judge Andrii Bezborod'ko, was mainly responsible for the final draft of the nakaz and, together with his father, rammed it through the assembly. According to Rumiantsev, the effort earned them the enmity of their peers: "Bezborod'ko and his son became hated because of this nakaz, and they [the gentry] ... called him names to his face and complained that he wished ill for the Fatherland."14

Catherine informed Rumiantsev that "the tone of authority which you had to take was completely appropriate"15 and that the Chernihiv nakaz "contained many parts which honored its compilers."16 The empress undoubtedly found the most satisfactory portion to be the

13 Rumiantsev to Catherine, April 13, 1767, report 1, in Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 319; for the full report, see pp. 317–24. Excerpts from the letter appear in Solov'ev, 15:47.


16 Solov'ev, 14:44. Apparently this is an excerpt from the same letter of May 3, 1767, but the phrase does not appear in the published version of the letter.
criticism that "current circumstances require improvement in all areas." The entire first section discussed abuses and disorders in the Ukrainian judicial system. Still, the nakaz made a mild plea for autonomy:

Permit us to retain forever all the distinct advantages and freedoms which we inviolably held and still hold up to now, in accordance with our former laws and privileges. Include them in the proper place in the newly formulated laws for exact observance and execution.\(^{18}\)

The struggle between Rumiantsev and the Ukrainian gentry continued in Starodub. There the gentry elected as marshal the local judicial official (zems'kyi sudder), Petro Istryts'kyi. Rumiantsev reported to Catherine that the assembly's debate had taken a hostile turn:

All started screaming loudly and began with the rights, freedoms, and property that they obtained and which should not be changed but ratified, and all requisitions should be eliminated, troops withdrawn, and the szlachta freed from taxation. Some, especially those who had been in the administration of the Hetmanate, spoke up insistently and persistently to petition for a hetman as before.\(^{19}\)

The governor-general, however, had sufficient confidence in Marshal Istryts'kyi to leave Starodub to initiate elections elsewhere. Istryts'kyi proved loyal, indeed. Dissatisfied with the course of the assembly's discussions, he tried to alter the already written Starodub nakaz after the "model" Chernihiv nakaz. The marshal was intent on "correcting the former nakaz as much as possible and cleansing it at least from those requests which in our time no longer concur with the needs of society."\(^{20}\)

The "cleansing" required putting additional pressure on the gentry. This was duly exerted by the Starodub colonel, Prince Iuri Khovan-

\(^{17}\) *SIRIO*, 68 (1899): 248.  
\(^{18}\) *SIRIO*, 68 (1899): 235.  
\(^{19}\) Rumiantsev to Catherine, April 13, 1767, report 1, in Maksimovich, *Vybory*, p. 318. Rumiantsev describes this scene in both Chernihiv and Starodub.  
\(^{20}\) Istryts'kyi to Rumiantsev, April 6, 1767, *Nakazy*, p. 214.
skii, who insisted that the gentry accede to a new nakaz.\textsuperscript{21} Khovanskii must have failed in the effort, because the revised nakaz lacks the signatures of thirty-six of the eighty-seven notables who participated in the Starodub assembly.\textsuperscript{22}

Deleted in the revision were the sections dealing with Ukrainian autonomy, namely, the demand for a guarantee of the Ukrainian legal system and the Lithuanian Statute, the request that all local administrative positions be filled by the local gentry, and the abolition of the ruble tax. The sections asking for the establishing of higher schools, land surveys to end boundary disputes, the unhampered production and distribution of alcoholic beverages, and the establishment of a bank were copied verbatim from the Chernihiv nakaz.\textsuperscript{23}

At Chernihiv and Starodub, Rumiantsev's tactics had resulted in pro-government nakazy, while maintaining the fiction that the wishes of the local gentry were voiced. At the next election, however, by an assembly of the Nizhyn and Baturyn gentry, the governor-general provoked an open clash. Rumiantsev himself presided at the meeting that elected Colonel Ternaviot as marshal and the local judicial official (zems'kyi suddia), Lavrentii Selets'kyi, as deputy. After the Easter holidays, the reconvened assembly produced a nakaz, which Deputy Selets'kyi refused to accept. Instead, he submitted a draft that closely followed the Chernihiv nakaz. Rumiantsev's close collaborators Oleksander Bezborod'ko and Petro Zavadovs'kyi (Petr Zavadovskii) arrived in Nizhyn to garner support for the progovernment nakaz. Nevertheless, only six notables voted for Selets'kyi's version, with fifty-five opposed.\textsuperscript{24} Faced with Selets'kyi's refusal to accept the nakaz they had passed, the Nizhyn gentry prevailed upon Marshal Ternaviot to allow the election of another deputy. The new deputy, Hryhorii Dolyns'kyi, accepted the original nakaz, which called for the confirmation of all rights and privileges: (1) the administration of justice according to the Lithuanian Statute, (2) the election of a hetman for Little Russia and the Zaporozhian Sich, (3) the equalization of

\textsuperscript{21} Nakazy, pp. 215 – 16.
\textsuperscript{22} Maksimovich, Vyborb, p. 110; those notables living at some distance might have departed for their estates, but it seems more likely that the failure to sign indicated a lack of support for the ideas expressed in the nakaz.
\textsuperscript{23} SIRIO, 68 (1899): 233 – 50; Maksimovich, Vyborb, pp. 116 – 18.
\textsuperscript{24} Maksimovich, Vyborb, p. 164.
Ukrainian offices and ranks with Russian ones, (4) a reduction in the ruble tax and the cancellation of tax arrears, (5) the alleviation of hardships caused by Russian garrisons, (6) the creation of a commission to settle disputes between Russians and Ukrainians, and (7) permission to purchase Cossack lands.25

Infuriated by the fiasco, Rumiantsev abrogated Dolyns’kyi’s election and fined every participant at the assembly ten rubles for violation of procedure. He then ordered the gentry to reconvene on May 15 and to sign the “legal” nakaz, that is, the one drafted by Selets’kyi. Of the fifty-five notables only sixteen met and not one signed. His patience at an end, Rumiantsev ordered all the participants arrested.26

What Rumiantsev found especially alarming in the nullified nakaz was the call for a hetman to be elected with the participation of the Zaporozhian Sich. He reported to Catherine:

I abrogated the election of the deputy [Dolyns’kyi] and demanded a report from the marshal [Ternaviot] about who was first guilty of bringing forth the stupid suggestion concerning the election of a hetman with the participation of the Sich, and if there was any correspondence about this with the Sich. As to the latter, they appear to me as simply disobedient, and as to the former, they always answer that they thought it up together.27

Marshal Ternaviot denied that “under my marshalship anyone offered to write to the Zaporozhian Sich or that there was even a thought about this.”28 Rumiantsev, however, having authorization from the Senate, nevertheless proceeded to try the arrested gentry.29

The Nizhyn gentry holding military offices were tried in a military court, and the rest went before a civilian court. Marshal Ternaviot

25 A synopsis of this nakaz was published in Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 168.
27 Rumiantsev to Catherine, July 7, 1767, report 3, in Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 326 – 27; also cited in Solov’ev, 14: 44.
was exempted because of his "naivete." The Ukrainians showed little enthusiasm for the proceedings. Some appointed judges claimed to be ill; five others resigned or failed to appear at the court sessions. The military tribunal that finally assembled tried thirty-six Ukrainian officers and notables under Article 27 of the Military Code and Article 9 of the Naval Code. All were found guilty of willfully disobeying an order. Thirty-three were sentenced to death, and three to loss of rank. In reviewing the cases, the Little Russian College upheld the death sentences of twenty officers and condemned the rest to loss of rank, with the proviso that they be registered as common Cossacks.

The eighteen persons tried under civil law by the Ukrainian General Court fared better. Unlike the military men, they were not jailed during the proceedings. Their trial focused on two questions: (1) whether the defendants had participated in the second "illegal" election; and (2) whether they had refused to recognize the annulment of that election and to sign the official Selets'kyi nakaz. Essentially, of course, the notables were being tried for disobeying government authorities. Fourteen were sentenced to perpetual banishment, and four to loss of rank; the Little Russian College subsequently changed the sentences to only ten banishments, four losses of rank, and the rest undecided. All cases went to the Senate for final adjudication.

The central authorities proved to be much more lenient. In July 1768 the Senate changed all the sentences to loss of rank and of the right to hold any office. Two years later, four of the convicted gentry petitioned the empress directly for reinstatement, and Catherine decided for pardon. On January 25, 1770, the Senate reinstated all the participants in the Nizhyn incident to their former ranks.

Immediately after the arrest of the Nizhyn gentry, Rumiantsev officially recognized the Selets'kyi draft as the legal nakaz for Nizhyn, and submitted it to the Legislative Commission. The Selets'kyi nakaz

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31 Maksimovich, Vybori, p. 177.
32 Miakotin, Ochet, p. 63.
33 Maksimovich, Vybori, p. 185.
34 Ibid., p. 191.
35 Miakotin, Ochet, p. 62; Maksimovich, Vybori, pp. 193-97, cites the decision in detail.
36 Miakotin, Ochet, pp. 62-63.
differed from the Chernihiv model only in the deletion of a section pertaining to the quartering of Russian troops and in the addition of two other sections, one concerning the equalization of Ukrainian and Russian ranks, the other proposing the establishment of grain magazines.37 Sixteen notables eventually signed the official version, but only after the arrest of the recalcitrants. Apparently, ten of the signatories had not even participated in the elections.38 In contrast, fifty-five had signed the original Dolyns’kyi nakaz. Clearly it was that version that had expressed the wishes of the Nizhyn and Baturyn gentry.39

Autonomist views were also expressed at the Lubny elections. Although not as radical as the Nizhyn, the Lubny nakaz so firmly advocated the Hetmanate’s autonomy that the elected deputy, Colonel Antin Kryzhanovs’kyi, declined his post rather than present the nakaz before the commission in Moscow. In his place the Lubny gentry elected, in absentia, Hryhorii Poletyka as a replacement.40 Although Poletyka had extensive estates in the Hetmanate, he had lived most of his adult life in St. Petersburg, where he served in the imperial government. Naturally enough, then, his election caused no concern to the imperial authorities. Governor-General Rumiantsev did not even mention it in his otherwise very detailed election reports to Catherine. But the Lubny gentry must have known Poletyka’s views on Ukrainian autonomy and have expected him at least to accept their nakaz.41

At other elections opposition was muted, particularly after the news of the Nizhyn arrests. At Hlukhiv, the administrative center of the Hetmanate, the highest-ranking Ukrainian officers directly under Rumiantsev might have been expected to carry out the government’s

37 SIRIO, 68 (1899): 133–46 (Nizhyn nakaz); 233–50 (Chernihiv nakaz). The nakazy do list all signatories.
38 Maksimovich, Vybori, p. 171.
39 Ibid., p. 167.
40 For the Lubny elections see Ibid., pp. 135–44.
41 In his letter of acceptance, Poletyka does hint about his position on autonomy. He promises to work on behalf of “his beloved Fatherland” and mentions “the righteousness of our requests.” See S. D. Nos, “Biagodarsvennoe pis’mo Gr. Andrei Poletik svoim vyborshchikam za izbranie v zvanie deputata v Komissiu dla sochinenia proekta novogo ulozhenii,” KS, 1890, no. 11, pp. 334–35.
program, but, as Rumiantsev reported to Catherine, they feigned illness in order to avoid taking a stand:

At both assemblies [of the gentry and of the townsmen] from the officials only Kochubei and one simple old man, General Justice Dublians'kyi, were present. Because some of their rights and customs were defamed . . . General Justice Zhurman, General Chancellor Tumans’kyi, and General Aide-de-Camp Skoropads’kyi . . . were absent. In order to show the populace that they are not responsible for anything, they pleaded illness and asked permission to leave the town for better air.\(^{42}\)

Nonetheless, the Hlukhiv assembly displayed its independence by electing, in absentia, General Aide-de-Camp Skoropads’kyi. The new deputy was known for his autonomist views and was even rumored to be a candidate for hetman.\(^{43}\) At the same time an anonymous circular asserted that because of the completely satisfactory conditions of Ukrainian laws, privileges, and freedom, the need for Ukrainian participation in the Legislative Commission was doubtful. The circular repeated a previous argument:

Concerning Your Imperial Majesty’s decree of December 14, 1766 about one law, published in all our counties (povety): We do not understand why for some reason or other this decree is applied to the Little Russian country . . . for the Little Russian nation according to confirmed charters is judged not by imperial statutes (ulozheniia) but by their own laws.\(^{44}\)

The elections in Pohar, Pereiaslav, and Kiev took place without incident, but a minor protest erupted in Pryluky. Three officers from the Russian regiments stationed in the area refused to sign the nakaz because it was not in the spirit of Catherine’s manifesto; they did not specify their objections, however.\(^{45}\)

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\(^{42}\) Rumiantsev to Catherine, July 7, 1767, report 3: Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 327.

\(^{43}\) P. Efimenko, “Odin iz protestovavshikh,” KS, 1882, no. 3, pp. 602–603; Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 214–16. Skoropads’kyi was also elected deputy from two other gentry assemblies (Chernihiv and Pryluky) and from the Hlukhiv municipality.

\(^{44}\) Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 131–32.

\(^{45}\) Avseenko, Malorossiia, p. 10; Nakazy, pp. 229–30.
The resistance to government pressure among the nearly one thousand gentry in the Hetmanate involved in the elections to the commission and in the nakazy testified to a widespread support for autonomy among the Ukrainian elite.\(^{46}\) To define the political aspirations of the Ukrainian gentry, we must examine the nakazy themselves, which, despite government interference, are still the best source of contemporary public opinion.

In seven of the ten nakazy coming from the Hetmanate, the first point expressed the desire that the Ukrainian gentry maintain its rights, citing the privileges granted by Sigismund Augustus when annexing the Ukrainian lands to Poland (1569) and the treaty of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (1654). Of the remaining three, only the Starodub nakaz lacked such a request, while the Chernihiv and Nizhyn gentry petitioned that these rights be included in an all-imperial law.\(^{47}\) At Nizhyn and Starodub, the original nakazy stressing Ukrainian autonomy had much more support than the subsequent official ones, and at Chernihiv only Rumiantsev’s “tone of authority” softened the autonomist demands. Clearly, the Ukrainian gentry had closed ranks on the issue of preserving Ukrainian autonomy.

The gentry also stood firmly behind their property rights: only the Lubny and the suppressed Nizhyn nakazy did not request their confirmation. The demand for the right to purchase Cossack lands was also found in seven of the ten petitions (excluding Poltava, Hlukhiv, and Pohar, and including both the abrogated and official nakazy of Nizhyn and Starodub).

All the nakazy—official and suppressed—contained some criticism of the stationing of Russian troops in the Ukraine. Eight nakazy requested either a repeal or a reduction of the ruble tax, which was supposed to pay for Russian garrisons in the Ukraine. The abrogated nakaz of Starodub sharply criticized the tax. The Hlukhiv, Kiev, Lubny, and suppressed Nizhyn nakazy also petitioned for the cancellation of tax arrears.

\(^{46}\) The figure of one thousand has been approximated by totaling the signatories of all the official nakazy and of the second Nizhyn nakaz, together with the thirty-six notables who failed to sign the official Starodub nakaz.

\(^{47}\) See Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for the specific points of the nakazy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ukrainian autonomy: confirmation of all rights and privileges</th>
<th>Equalization of ranks with Russian ones—noble registers</th>
<th>Confirmation of all current landholdings</th>
<th>Right to purchase land from Cossacks</th>
<th>Surveys to settle boundary disputes</th>
<th>Criticism of rubic tax</th>
<th>Limitations on the stationing of Russian troops and quartering of Russian officers</th>
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Notes:  

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<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Abrogated</th>
<th>As part of Imperial Law</th>
<th>Indirect—High Cost</th>
<th>Election of Hetman</th>
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The Legislative Commission of 1767–1768

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The nakazy also sought protection for the gentry’s commercial interests. Seven wanted a guarantee of unlimited production and sale of alcoholic beverages; six requested the right to export livestock and other products; and four called for the tariff-free importation of salt, especially from the Crimea. None of these commercial concerns was mentioned in the two abrogated nakazy, however.

Seven nakazy requested the establishment of a university, a cadet academy and a women’s lyceum in the Ukraine. Three called for the discontinuation of the census being taken at the time. Taking examples from the official Chernihiv nakazy, three others discussed the rights of the gentry and the desirability of a nobles’ bank. Three petitioned for permanent marshals of the nobility and for surveys to settle boundary disputes. Others expressed local concerns.48

The nakazy document the oppositionist frame of mind of the Ukrainian gentry. The Hetmanate’s elite recorded its resistance to the policy of imperial integration and standardization. It reminded the imperial government of the Hetmanate’s voluntary union with Muscovy, of the “confirmed privileges” this union entailed, and of the obligation to maintain the Ukrainian legal and administrative system. The gentry’s consistent complaints about the quartering of Russian troops and their persistent requests for the equalization of Ukrainian with Russian ranks denote dissatisfaction in these matters. Finally, they expressed strong opposition to the rouble tax and the census of 1764—key reforms initiated by Rumiantsev.

Opposition was based not only on the intangibles of tradition or sentiment, but also on specific issues of power, status, and wealth. Because Ukrainian offices were not recognized as equal to the corresponding Russian ones, mistreatment often occurred in dealings between Ukrainian and Russian officials.49 Whereas Russians were ennobled automatically after reaching a certain grade in the Table of Ranks, even the highest Ukrainian offices did not carry Russian ranks. Moreover, although the Ukrainian gentry called itself “szlachta,” for the most part it was not recognized as such by the imperial authorities.50

48 For a summary of all the requests, see the Appendix.
49 The Poltava nakaz proposed establishing a special commission of Russian and Ukrainian officers to arbitrate disputes. SIRIO, 68 (1899): 221.
50 The official Starodub nakaz complained of this, SIRIO, 68 (1899): 191 – 92.
### TABLE 5.2: GENTRY NAKAZY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Production and sale of alcoholic beverages</th>
<th>Tariff-free importation of salt</th>
<th>Exportation of livestock and other products</th>
<th>Nobles' banks</th>
<th>University and other schools</th>
<th>Criticism of census</th>
<th>Right to travel, education, and service abroad</th>
<th>Elections of marshals to continue after commissions</th>
<th>Abolition of tax arrears</th>
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**Notes:**
- X: Present
- (): Official
- (): Abrogated
The gentry’s titles to estates were equally tenuous. Frequently these notables occupied “rank lands,” which their ancestors had held in connection with some office and which should have reverted to the Ukrainian treasury. Even possession of property or of a title granted by a hetman was not beyond dispute, because after 1709 the hetman could no longer make land grants without the tsar’s approval. Similarly, an ukaz of 1739 had forbidden the sale of Cossack lands and homesteads. In practice, however, the decrees of 1709 and of 1739 had both been ignored; consequently, many titles could be legally challenged. This situation, coupled with fear of taxation, brought about the gentry’s fear of the Rumiantsev census.

Although the gentry was exempt from the ruble tax, the peasants living on their estates were not. In some areas landlords were forced to pay the taxes of the impoverished peasants. Some peasants fled to avoid the tax or moved to the estates of landlords who would pay it for them. To a portion of the Ukrainian gentry, the tax meant economic dislocation and ever-increasing demands on their peasants by the Russian state. Hence the Ukrainian gentry reminded the Russian authorities that, according to the privileges of Sigismund Augustus, various treaties with Muscovy, and, especially, ukazes given by Peter I in 1708 and 1709, “not a penny was to be taken from the Little Russian people.”

A more critical issue was the continual abuses in the stationing of Russian troops. These should have been alleviated at least in part by the ruble tax, but were not. The gentry’s official exemption from troop quarterings was frequently ignored by soldiers and officials who demanded food, firewood, candles, and forage. Troops quartered in peasant homes on gentry estates placed a dual hardship on the peasants, who were not only required to house and, in fact, supply the soldiers assigned to their homes, but also to pay the ruble tax. Thus the imperial authorities and the Ukrainian landlords were in competition for the goods and services of the peasantry. It was with good

51 Iakovliv, Ukrain’sko-moskov’ski dohovory, p. 142.
52 See the Frylucky ukaz, SIRIO, 68 (1899): 226.
55 SIRIO, 68 (1899): Starodub ukaz, 197; Pohar ukaz, 108; Poltava ukaz, 220; et al.
reason then that the Ukrainian gentry tried not only to make good their own exemption from quartering, but to exempt peasants under their jurisdiction, even suggesting that troops be garrisoned only in towns.\textsuperscript{56}

The most striking element underlying the nakazy was insecurity. The Ukrainian notables performed all the functions of imperial nobility but had no imperial rank, held estates without having their ownership legally acknowledged, competed with the imperial treasury and military for the services of their own peasants, and, occasionally, had to house imperial troops in their own homes. Consequently, the gentry asked specifically for equalization of offices, titles of nobility, recognition of all land holdings, reduction of the ruble tax, and exemption from quartering troops. Until these requests were granted, however, the gentry’s legal basis for power, status, and wealth lay solely in the special rights and privileges of the Hetmanate. Confirmation of these rights, then, was paramount, and any threat to them had, of course, to be vigorously opposed.

Apart from these tangible reasons to defend autonomy, the Ukrainian gentry had an emotional attachment to their native land, to native ways, to native history. Despite the imperial government’s encouragement and open pressure, they were loath to admit any fault in the Hetmanate’s existing government.\textsuperscript{57} While Catherine and her advisers were formulating a more rational organization of government and some Russian nobles were defining their roles in a new age,\textsuperscript{58} the Ukrainian gentry saw the solution to all problems in the reconfirmation of the privileges of Sigismund Augustus (1569) and the treaty concluded by Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (1654).

\textit{Cossack Elections and Nakazy}

Since Catherine’s manifesto did not provide any guidelines for the holding of Cossack elections, Rumiantsev decided to apply the regulations of a social group in Russia that he considered to be analogous, the odvodory. They were military servitors who owned a single homestead and were regarded as special state peasants. Applying

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., Chernihiv \textit{nakaz}, 241–43; official Nizhyn \textit{nakaz}, 142.

\textsuperscript{57} Only the government-controlled \textit{nakazy} of Chernihiv, Nizhyn, and Starodub contain a relatively mild form of criticism.

\textsuperscript{58} See Dukes, \textit{Catherine}, pp. 145–53.
these electoral procedures meant that only rank-and-file Cossacks would participate, because the Cossack officers would never permit themselves to be equated with the lowly odnodvortsy. Rumiantsev’s decision also antagonized some Cossacks who considered themselves to be much higher on the social scale than the odnodvortsy—in fact, as being equal to the nobility.\textsuperscript{59}

As adapted to Ukrainian conditions, the electoral procedures called for the election of a Cossack delegate from a cluster of villages, most likely a kurin’ (a subdivision of a company). These delegates were to be sent to the company headquarters for the election of a company representative and the drafting of a company nakaz. Finally, representatives from all the companies in the regiment were to elect a deputy to the commission, and all the company nakazy were to be combined into one nakaz for the entire regiment. Since the Poltava regiment, having lost some territory to the new formed Novorossiia province, was rather small, it was combined with the Hadiach regiment. Hence, the Cossacks were to produce nine final nakazy and send nine deputies to the assembly in Moscow.\textsuperscript{60}

The regulations were too complex to be carried out flawlessly in every case. Rumiantsev himself confused the second stage with the first in one of his election orders.\textsuperscript{61} Hardly any elections were held on the first level, and most began at the company level. In some regiments no effort was made to amalgamate the company nakazy into one common nakaz for the entire regiment. In other regiments summaries were made of the company nakazy. In still others, no nakazy were written at the company level and only one nakaz was written at the regimental level. As a result, each of the ten regiments of the Hetmanate prepared anywhere from one to twenty-seven nakazy.

The electoral procedures failed to achieve Rumiantsev’s original goal, that is, that the Cossack nakazy reflect the views of the rank and file rather than those of the officers. Since the second and third stages in the elections were held at administrative centers, the Cossack officers could easily alter the final versions. So successful were they that virtually all complaints against superiors were eliminated. Only the Chernihiv nakaz and two Pereiaslav company nakazy discuss

\textsuperscript{59} Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 269.

\textsuperscript{60} The electoral procedures are outlined in Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 227 – 30.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 229.
misconduct or abusive treatment by the Cossack officers or the szlachta. In the Chernihiv regiment, the nakaz escaped the officers’ censorship because of an irregularity in the procedures. Representatives from the Cossack villages went directly to Chernihiv, elected one deputy, and drafted a single regimental nakaz, thus bypassing the second, company stage and officer scrutiny entirely. When the officers discovered what had occurred, they tried to force the Cossacks to draft another nakaz under their supervision. Despite the procedural violations, however, Rumiantsev refused to negate the original Cossack nakaz.62 In the Pereiaslav regiment, eighteen company nakazy were written, fourteen of them virtually identical. Of the four nakazy that apparently escaped the regimental-level censor, two broached the problem of extensive expropriation of Cossack property by large landowners.63

The sequence of events in the Starodub regiment best illustrates how the officers manipulated the outcomes of the elections. Colonel Iurii Khovanskii, the government supervisor, indicated in his report to Rumiantsev that the Cossacks had strongly resisted any suggestions for changing the company nakazy.64 The amalgamation of eleven company nakazy into one regimental nakaz, however, resulted in the deletion of complaints about the seizure of Cossack properties by the officers and about the landlords’ attempts to force Cossacks to perform peasant labor.65 The final version was undoubtedly changed without the knowledge of the rank and file.

Despite the incomplete documentary evidence,66 there are indica-

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62 Ibid., pp. 231–34.
63 Ibid., pp. 251–54.
64 Khovanskii to Rumiantsev, Nakazy, p. 217.
65 These complaints, deleted from the regimental nakaz, occurred in seven out of eleven company nakazy. Other deletions included a complaint of heavy taxation by the clergy (one nakaz), an accusation of abuse by Russian soldiers (one nakaz), and a request for reimbursement for horses and forage taken in previous campaigns. Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 237.
66 Not only is there a scarcity of documents about the electoral procedures, but even the nakazy are not all available. While all the nakazy of the gentry and townsmen were published, only four Cossack nakazy were published in full—Chernihiv, Starodub, Pryluky, and Myrhorod. On the basis of the materials provided by Maksimovich, it is possible to reconstruct fully the contents, if not the wording, of the nakazy of three more regiments—Pereiaslav, Poltava, and Lubny. Finally, certain points in the Kiev, Nizhyn, and Hadiach regimental nakazy are mentioned by Maksimovich, a full
tions of similar officer pressures in other regiments. In the Poltava regiment, Rumiantsev himself put the nakazy into the hands of the officers by ordering the regimental colonel to review the elections for possible irregularities. The final Poltava nakaz was written in Pryluky by Chancellor Petro Piatyhors’kyi under the supervision of the gentry. In the Mykhorod regiment the officers attempted to dismiss the elected deputy of the Sorochyntsi company, which resulted in the company’s boycott of the regimental elections. In the Kiev, Nizhyn, and Hadiach regiments the influence of the officers was also evident. Officer control was greatest in Lubny—its Cossack nakaz was nearly an exact copy of the one submitted to the Lubny gentry. All the Cossack nakazy, however, have to be viewed with caution by historians, because with the exception of Chernihiv and, partly, the Pereiaslav regiments, they probably reflect the wishes of the rank-and-file Cossacks only to the extent that these did not conflict with interests of the gentry.

The Cossack nakazy strongly upheld and defended the autonomy of the Hetmanate. The nakazy from nine of the ten regiments requested the confirmation of all Little Russian rights and privileges, and three called for the election of a hetman. Eight regiments supported the traditional election of officers, and five regiments reminded the authorities that, as privileged warriors, the Cossack should be honored equally with the nobility.

Elucidation of them is impossible, however, without the original nakazy, probably located in Soviet archives. Since the Revolution no one has worked with this material. The Soviet historian O. I. Putro, in a recent article dealing specifically with the Cossack nakazy, utilized only published materials. See O. I. Putro, “Do pytannia pro antifeodal’nu borot’bu ukrains’koho kozatstva v druhi polovini XVIII st.,” Ukrain’s’kyi istorichnyi zhurnal, 1971, no. 8, pp. 99–103. Putro’s more recent, “Deiaki pytannia sotsial’no-ekonomichnoi i politychnoi istorii Livoberezhnoi Ukrainy v druhi polovini XVIII st.,” Ukrain’s’kyi istorichnyi zhurnal, 1985, no. 7, pp. 71–77 is also based on published sources and breaks no new ground in either interpretation or factual information.

67 Nakazy, p. 291.
68 Maksimovich, Vybyory, p. 244.
69 Nakazy, p. 285.
71 For a comparison of the two, see Maksimovich, Vybyory, p. 258.
72 For the most frequent Cossack requests, see table 5.3. All the demands made by the Cossacks are listed in the Appendix.
The Legislative Commission of 1767–1768

To distinguish the wishes of the Cossacks from those of their officers, we must consult the Chernihiv *nakaz*, because it escaped the scrutiny of the gentry. It relates that the Cossacks were being abused by their officers:

Many Cossacks, because of the above mentioned purchases and seizures of Cossack lands by all sorts of landlords, captains, and officers, and other Cossacks, because of great pressure and fear, leave their Cossack lands to the landlords, unwillingly become Cossack laborers [*pidsusidky*] or go abroad or to other places.\(^73\)

Although the Chernihiv *nakaz* diverges sharply from the others, it does concur with them in the espousal of autonomy. This would indicate that the call for continued Ukrainian autonomy was not just an insertion into the Cossack *nakazy* by the gentry. Most probably, the officers censored rather than composed the *nakazy* for the Cossacks. It is possible that outright political demands, such as the election of a hetman, were strongly encouraged by the gentry, who were unable to include them in their own *nakazy*. There is no indication, however, that the defense of Ukrainian autonomy was antithetical to Cossack wishes or interests. On the contrary, the rights and privileges that the rank-and-file Cossacks wanted to secure have the same bases—that is, the privileges of Sigismund Augustus and the treaty points of Bohdan Khmel’nyc’kyi—as those of the officers. The Ukrainian ‘‘*szlachta*’’ was, in fact, no more than the upper stratum of Cossacks.

Because the Cossacks and the newly formed gentry were little differentiated juridically, they had similar rights—exemption from taxation, rights to ownership of land, various commercial privileges—as well as a similar obligation—to provide military service. This close connection was not forgotten by the Cossacks. In Pryluky they claimed that Cossack status was ‘‘from ancient times based on the same laws legislated for the *szlachta* and . . . therefore they utilized *szlachta* privileges,’’\(^74\) and in Chernihiv they stated that they ‘‘ought to utilize Cossack freedoms and *dvorianin* honor.’’\(^75\) To many Cossacks, Ukrainian autonomy meant theoretical equality with the gentry.

\(^73\) *Nakazy*, p. 145.
\(^74\) Pryluky *nakaz*, in *Nakazy*, p. 153.
\(^75\) *Nakazy*, p. 142.
Another Cossack request—the free election of officers—would not only give them greater influence in regulating the Cossack army and in administering the region but would also provide for upward social mobility. The election of Cossack officers, when practiced at all, had now become a mere formality. A return to the elections would again allow some rank-and-file Cossacks to enter the lower rank of the Military Fellows and, thus, the Ukrainian gentry. Even so, upward mobility was not altogether impossible: a wealthy Cossack serving in the administration with connections to the hetman or to the Little Russian College could still enter the Ukrainian gentry. Very few such possibilities remained, however, for the Ukrainian gentry was becoming a closed estate limited to members of outstanding families.

While the Cossacks were juridically close to the gentry, economically and socially they resembled the peasantry. Economic decline among the Cossacks continued, and previous attempts to reverse the trend by prohibiting the sale of Cossack lands had apparently been ineffectual. Nevertheless, the uncensored Chernihiv and two Pereiaslav nakazy pleaded that the prohibition stand, whereas the others petitioned for the unrestricted sale and purchase of Cossack lands, no doubt because of the intervention of the gentry, who wanted to purchase those lands.

As the Cossacks became less able to fight, they assumed more and more auxiliary functions, such as the construction of fortresses, the patrolling of borders, and even the building of roads and canals. The Cossacks objected to such "common," nonmilitary labor as not befitting their rank and as denigrating their rights. These duties also contributed to Cossack economic decline, because they frequently entailed long absences from their homes, resulting in the neglect of crops and other domestic duties. Like the gentry, the Cossacks resented quartering troops, which frequently meant absorbing the cost of their keep or even providing them with horses.

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76 Diadychenko, Narisy, pp. 252–56, describes how fictitious these elections were by the beginning of the eighteenth century.
77 Okinshevych, Znachne, pp. 120–71.
78 Chernihiv nakazy in Nakazy, p. 147.
79 Nakazy: Chernihiv, p. 147; Starodub, p. 155; Myrhorod, p. 164.
80 Myrhorod nakazy, in Nakazy, p. 164.
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<th>Election of a hetman</th>
<th>Confirmation of all rights and privileges</th>
<th>Free election of Cossack officers</th>
<th>Cossacks to be equal in honor to nobility</th>
<th>Abolition or reduction of ruble tax</th>
<th>No quartering of Russian troops or officials by Cossacks</th>
<th>Cossacks not to be used for public works</th>
<th>Termination of the census</th>
<th>Right to purchase and sell land</th>
<th>Tariff-free salt trade</th>
<th>Freedom to trade for Cossacks generally</th>
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1 nakazy    b  2 nakazy    c  3 nakazy    d  4 nakazy    e  5 nakazy    f  5 nakazy, 4 no tax arrears    g  No tax arrears
Incomplete  1 Composite of 18 nakazy    2 5 company nakazy composite
The Cossacks' greatest resentment, however, was against the ruble tax, introduced just that year (1767). Until that time, Cossack helpers (pidpomichnyky) were assessed half the tax required of peasants and burghers, but now they became liable for the tax in full. The new tax affected half the Cossack population (198,295). As evidenced by the Cossack nakazy, it had several severe repercussions. First, it substantially increased the tax burden of the Cossack helpers. Second, since these Cossacks lived with and assisted the officers or rank-and-file Cossacks, some of the tax burden devolved on other Cossacks. Third, it produced a large group of Cossacks who were indistinguishable from the peasants in matters of taxation. In fact, many of these Cossacks were already forced to perform peasant obligations to the landlords, and there was a real danger that they would merge completely with the peasantry. Hence the Cossacks' anxiety to regain their ancient status—guaranteed by custom and treaties—as honored warriors exempt from all taxation.

Another innovation by Rumiantsev that caused great concern among the Cossacks was the census. Eight nakazy asked that the census then under way be terminated because it did not follow Ukrainian census-taking procedures and thus violated their rights and privileges. The real reason for the opposition may well have been that many of the rank-and-file Cossacks were hardly in a better position than the Cossack helpers, and they feared a similar loss of tax exemption and social status.

Thus the fate of the Cossacks depended on the continuation of the Ukrainian rights and privileges. The unattractive alternatives were either merger with the peasantry or entry into Russian military units. To the Cossacks, Ukrainian autonomy meant social and economic survival, a way of regaining lost rights and status, and even the possibility of obtaining a foothold into the gentry.

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81 According to the 1764 census, Shafonskii, Chernigovskogo namestnichestva, p. 85.
82 Pryluki nakazy, in Nakazy, pp. 159-60.
83 According to the 1764 census, there were 174,886 rank-and-file Cossacks. Shafonskii, Chernigovskogo namestnichestva, p. 85.
84 D. Miller in "Pikineria," KS, 1899, no. 12, pp. 301-22, describes the recruitment of Ukrainian Cossacks for Russian units and the unpopularity of this kind of service among Cossacks.
The extent of Cossack attachment to native ways is best demonstrated by the Cossacks who were excluded from the Hetmanate just prior to the Legislative Commission. The Kremenchuk and Ulasiv companies were part of the Myrhorod regiment until 1764, when they were transferred to the newly formed Novorossiia province. These Cossacks refused to participate in the provincial elections and, in violation of government prohibitions, wrote a nakaz, elected a deputy, and sent him to the commission in Moscow. The petition—signed by many Cossacks, some officers, and even five peasants—lamented that:

... customs sacredly and perpetually guaranteed by the laws of your Imperial Majesty's ancestors have been greatly altered by newly-introduced practices; for example, the reorganization of our company towns, calling them rota or pikineriia regiments; the naming of our former captains and company officers as ratmistry and other rota officers; the naming and describing of our company chancellery as a rota government. We, signed below, do not wish at all to be excluded from Little Russia and do not want to register for pikineriia service...  

Town Elections and Nakazy

Town elections probably generated the greatest confusion. Catherine had decided that residency in the town would be the primary qualification for participation in town elections. The gentry, Cossacks, merchants, and craftsmen inhabiting a town had few common interests, however. Thus, town elections would frequently turn into a struggle over which social group was to represent the town.

Another problem was determining which towns were to send deputies. Unlike Russia, the Hetmanate did not have officially recognized and supernumerary towns. In theory, all towns qualified.

Catherine's manifesto also specified that the sending of deputies to the Legislative Commission from qualified towns with fewer than fifty urban homesteads (dvory) was optional. The implication was that qualified towns with more than fifty urban homesteads would participate automatically. In the Hetmanate there were more than one hun-

85 Maksimovich, Vybar, p. 287.
86 PSZ, 17, no. 12,801 (December 14, 1766): 101.
dred such towns. The literal application of Catherine’s guidelines would have resulted in a greater number of deputies from towns than of all other deputies combined (i.e., over one hundred town deputies to nineteen for the Cossacks and noblemen). Supervision of so many elections would have been a formidable problem. Also, some of the towns in question were populated primarily by Cossacks and peasants, with very few burghers. Hence, Rumiantsev decided that only fourteen towns could elect deputies to the commission: Novhorod-Sivers’kyi, Starodub, Chernihiv, Lubny, Nizhyn, Pohar, Kozelets’, Pereiaslav, Oster, Hlukhiv, Hadiach, Sorochyntsi, Poltava, and Pryluky. The disenfranchised towns, however, were permitted to send petitions about municipal needs directly to Rumiantsev. We do not know how many towns took advantage of the right, because, although several references to such petitions can be found, the actual texts are unavailable.

The fourteen towns selected by Rumiantsev shared the distinction of being historic, administrative, and economic centers where elections could be conveniently supervised. Apparently, population was not the deciding factor, because town size varied from 1,113 dvory in Nizhyn to 231 dvory in Pohar, and many excluded towns were larger.

87 According to Maksimovich there were 113; Vybor, p. 94.
88 According to Georg Sacke, Catherine may have intentionally provided for the over-representation of urban groups: see “Adel und Bürgertum in der Gesetzgebenden Kommission Katharinens II von Russland,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 1938, no. 3, pp. 408–17. Isabel de Madariaga has demonstrated that there is no evidence to support Sacke’s contention that Catherine deliberately contrived to obtain a bourgeois majority at the Legislative Commission in order to curb the nobility: see Russia in the Age of Catherine, pp. 168–69.
89 Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 94; some of these elections were subsequently cancelled and apparently only ten towns were allowed to send a delegate to the assembly.
91 Ivan Telychenko (Telichenko) in “Soslovnye, nuzhdy i zhelaniia . . .” KS, 1890, no. 8, p. 182, mentions such small towns as Min, Boryspil”, Hoholiiv, Olyshivka, Nosivka, Kobysyche, Bobrovytsia, Murovs’k, and Krolovets”. G. Maksimovich was unable to locate these petitions either in the files cited by Telychenko or anywhere else in the Kharkiv archive (Vybor, p. 19). A. A. Vasilevich had access to the Boryspil’ petition, which he quoted in Semestvo Rozumovskikh, 1: 157, fn.
than those included. The disenfranchisement of such important towns as Baturyn, Pochepe, and Berezna points to some arbitrariness in selection on the part of Rumiantsev.

The election procedures were of two kinds. In the larger cities and towns, all eligible townsmen were to elect an assembly of one hundred men, who, in turn, in the presence of a government representative, would elect a chairman. The chairman would then supervise the assembly in the election of a deputy and the writing of its nakaz. In the smaller towns, the election of the chairman and deputy was to be direct, without any intermediary assembly.

According to Catherine's manifesto, the main criterion for the participation in town elections was ownership of a house. The Hetmanate's town householders included not only burghers, but also gentry, Cossacks, and clergymen. Though the clergy technically qualified, only in Lubny did clergymen take part in the municipal elections.

In the town elections social strife overshadowed the issue of the Hetmanate's autonomy. Although virtually all the elections and nakazy reflect keen interest in the rights and prerogatives of each municipality, they show little concern for the autonomy of the Hetmanate as a whole. The only nakaz that defended autonomy came from Lubny, but it was drafted not by burghers but by gentry, and so Rumiantsev voided it.

The only other town where autonomist views were sufficiently strong to cause official concern was Hlukhiv. Rumiantsev reported to Catherine:

The nakazy from Hlukhiv [both from the gentry and the townsmen] were concluded with difficulty . . . they did not want any municipal, district, or any other new establishments, but at all times were substantiating their former rights and freedoms and no matter how hard the municipal chairman, Land

92 Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 12–14.
93 Point five of the city election rules, PSZ, 17, no. 12,801 (December 14, 1766): 1101.
94 Nakazy, p. 138.
Judge Derhun, tried [to change their opinion], many living in the city maintained their former ideas.\textsuperscript{95}

Such staunch autonomist views were probably because of Hlukhiv’s position as the administrative capital of the Hetmanate. It was inhabited by gentry, Cossacks, and various clerks and officials—many of whom participated in the municipal elections.\textsuperscript{96} Having been in the administration of Hetman Rozumovs’kyi, these officials were no doubt firm advocates of Ukrainian autonomy. At the same time, however, as government employees they were very susceptible to official pressure. In the end Rumiantsev prevailed. The Hlukhiv municipal nakaz made no mention of Ukrainian autonomy, but the townspeople did elect, in absentia, a well-known autonomist, Ivan Skoropads’kyi, as their deputy.

Confusion over eligibility and procedure resulted in the cancellation of several elections. Hadiach and Sorochyntsi, according to the government representative, Quartermaster-General Kochubei, had no burgher inhabitants, but only Cossacks, gentry, and peasants; also, the towns were under the jurisdiction of the Cossack administration and had no self-government.\textsuperscript{97} Since the Cossacks and gentry had already participated in their own elections, Rumiantsev decided that the town elections would be merely duplicates and cancelled them.\textsuperscript{98} At the time, the elections in Hadiach were in the initial stage of registering town inhabitants, whereas in Sorochyntsi a chairman and deputy had already been elected; in neither case was a nakaz written.\textsuperscript{99}

Kochubei’s report on the lack of burghers in these two towns may well have been inaccurate. According to Shafons’kyi’s calculations, in 1785–86 there were 846 burghers in Hadiach and 30 Ukrainian merchants,\textsuperscript{100} and it is unlikely that all the burghers arrived after 1767. Hadiach had formerly been attached to the office of hetman. With the abolition of that office in 1764, the town was granted to Kyrylo

\textsuperscript{95} Rumiantsev to Catherine, July 7, 1767, report 3. in Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 327.

\textsuperscript{96} Out of the fifty signatories of the nakaz, only eleven were burghers; the others were predominantly petty officials. SIRIO, 68 (1899): 128–19.

\textsuperscript{97} Nakaz, p. 283.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 288.

\textsuperscript{99} Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 283.

\textsuperscript{100} Shafonskii, Chornigovskogo namestnichestva, p. 629.
Rozumov's'kyi. Consequently, its burghe rs were probably counted as servitors of a landlord, rather than as burghe rs per se.

The elections of Pryluky and Lubny were also nullified. In Pryluky the pre-election register of citizens contained only burghe rs. In spite of Rumiantsev's coaxing, the higher gentry did not participate. On the other hand, the elected chairman and deputy were members of the gentry. Rumiantsev decided to nullify the election for two conflicting reasons: first, because all the town householders (i.e., the higher gentry) did not participate; second, because the election of a gentry chairman and deputy deprived the burghe rs of their rights. Catherine and the Senate eventually accepted the nullification. No nakaz was ever written in Pryluky, and the town did not send a deputy to the commission.

The extent of the confusion over the elections is best exemplified by Lubny. First, an election took place there under the supervision of a government official. Almost all the participants were burghe rs, and the town's mayor—a member of the gentry—was elected chairman. Then, acting on orders from Rumiantsev, the government representative annull ed the election. At a new election, with fewer burghe rs participating, the gentry and Cossacks controlled the choices for chairman and deputy and dictated the contents of the nakaz. Noting that so few of the nakaz's signatories were burghe rs—39 out of 191—Rumiantsev decided to abrogate the election. He then asked the inhabitants to forward a petition, instead of the normal nakaz, to him. We do not know whether such a petition was ever drawn up, for none has been found. What has remained is the voided Lubny nakaz representing the interests of the gentry and Cossacks with some burghe r points appended.

101 Ibid., p. 630.
102 Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 86–87.
103 Nakazy, p. 231.
104 Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 89–91.
106 The elections are described in Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 45–55.
107 Published in Nakazy, pp. 124–41.
The most balanced election results came from Nizhyn, the largest city of the Hetmanate. Here the various segments of the town population wrote separate nakazy, signed them, and then combined them into one nakaz. Consequently the Nizhyn nakaz has separate points from the nobles and Cossacks, the burghers, the Greek brotherhood, and the Russian merchants. The electoral procedures resulted in inconsistencies and contradictions in the nakaz, however, inasmuch as the requests of the interest groups conflicted.

Elsewhere, either the gentry and Cossacks or the burghers controlled the elections and the nakazy. From Poltava the government supervisor, Semen Kochubei, reported to Rumiantsev on the difficulties in bringing the two groups together to write a nakaz.

I have noticed that the interests of the burghers are completely in opposition to the interests of people in the military realm [Cossacks and their officers], and because of this, it is difficult to hope that they can forward identical nakazy to the deputy.

Apparently a real struggle developed, because two nakazy were written—one, unsigned, representing the burghers, and the other the signed, official nakaz. The latter omits burgher complaints about the Cossack administration, the szlachta, and starshyna.

At Kozelets', Oster, Pereiaslav, Hlukhiv, and Lubny, the gentry and Cossacks expurgated the nakazy. The burghers' influence in the composition of these nakazy probably depended upon their number and vehement. Two of the nakazy—Pereiaslav and Poltava—placate

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108 Kiev was larger but, in this period, lay outside the administrative jurisdiction of the Hetmanate. Nizhyn in 1765 had 1,113 dvory, or urban homesteads. Maksimovich, Deiatel'nosti', pp. 95-98, and Vybor, pp. 12-14.

109 The Greek brotherhood was a privileged, long-established trading company that controlled the activities of Greek merchants not only in the Hetmanate but throughout the empire. Since only eleven Russian merchants were registered in Nizhyn, it was somewhat unusual that they were permitted to have their own separate nakaz. Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 62.

110 See Table 5.4 and the Appendix for details.

111 Kochubei to Rumiantsev, Nakazy, p. 286.

112 Published in Nakazy, pp. 113-23.

113 Published in SIRIO, 144 (1914): 13-21.

114 See Table 5.4, for comparison.

115 Shown by Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 45-51, 64-79.
the burghers somewhat, but none can be regarded as truly expressive of their wishes.

The burghers, on the other hand, took the upper hand in Pohar, Novhorod-Sivers’kyi, Starodub, and Chernihiv. At Pohar, the mayor, ten notables, four Cossacks, and two merchants denounced the elected chairman and the nakaz.116 The chairman, in turn, wrote to Rumiantsev, accusing the mayor of corruption and the gentry of abusing the burghers and obstructing the election.117 The subsequent investigation vindicated the chairman: the mayor, in order to cover up his own illegal activities, had joined the gentry in an attempt to disenfranchise the burghers.118 The final result was complete victory for the burghers: of the 117 signatures on the Pohar nakaz, not one is that of a notable or a Cossack.119 In the remaining towns burgher victory was not as complete, but in all of them the interests of the gentry and Cossacks were represented only to the extent that the burghers permitted.120

Striking differences were evident between the two groups of municipal nakazy. All the burgher-controlled nakazy asked that foreigners, visitors, Cossacks, and gentry living in the towns be subject to municipal authorities. None of the gentry-controlled nakazy, naturally enough, made such a request for the gentry or Cossacks. One nakaz reflecting the gentry’s views, that of Ihukhiv, agreed that foreigners should be under municipal control. In Nizhyn, the Greeks and Russians, of course, wanted to maintain their own judicial procedures.

Another subject of conflict was the right to trade and manufacture. Six nakazy—five burgher-controlled and one gentry-controlled—objected to gentry, Cossacks, foreigners, or raznochintsy (people not belonging to any of the recognized social groups) trading or manufacturing without performing municipal duties or paying municipal taxes. Two of the gentry-controlled nakazy requested the confirmation of the rights of all townsmen to engage in manufacturing and trade, but three others allowed that the right should be curbed for foreigners and Russians. The Greeks and Russians in Nizhyn, however, protected their privileged position. Finally, the Oster nakaz contained a request for

116 Published in Nakazy, pp. 222–23.
118 Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 68–71.
119 SIRIO, 144 (1914): 75.
120 This was shown by Maksimovich, Vybor, pp. 23–38.
### TABLE 5.4: TOWNSMEN NAZAZY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>burgher controlled</th>
<th>Guarantee of previous municipal rights and privileges</th>
<th>Freedom from interference by the Cossack administration</th>
<th>Foreigners, visitors, Cossacks, gentry and Russians living in the city to be under city judicial authority</th>
<th>Gentry and Cossacks to remain under current authority</th>
<th>Land, villages, mills, once belonging to town and now under private or Cossack administration or ownership, to be returned</th>
<th>Townsman to produce alcoholic beverages</th>
<th>Curb gentry's, Cossacks', and foreigners' right to trade and manufacture without paying city taxes and duties</th>
<th>Maintain all rights and privileges of Cossacks and gentry incl. manufacturing and trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</table>

**CENTRALIC/ Cossack controlled**

| Zhytomyr         | h                                                   | X                                                       | X                                                        | X                                                    | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                |
| Rechitsa         | X                                                   | X                                                      | X                                                        | X                                                    | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                |
| Lemberg          | x                                                   | X                                                      | X                                                        | X                                                    | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                |
| Nizhyn           | X                                                   | X                                                      | X                                                        | X                                                    | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                |
| Cossack          | X                                                   | X                                                      | X                                                        | X                                                    | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                |
| Poltava           | X                                                   | X                                                      | X                                                        | X                                                    | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                | X                                                                |

1. Burgher points
2. First burgher nazazy
3. Outcome of burgher wishes
4. Cossack and gentry points
5. Voided nazazy
6. Official nazazy
7. Russians only
8. Foreigners only
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All, including gentry and Cossacks, to quarter Russian troops and officials</th>
<th>All except gentry and Cossacks to quarter Russian troops and officials</th>
<th>Burghers not to be responsible for cost of wood, candles, and forage for quartered offices</th>
<th>Remove part of stationed Russians</th>
<th>For noble tax</th>
<th>Want some relief from noble tax</th>
<th>Tax annexes cancelled</th>
<th>Lower tariffs, esp. salt to Crimea</th>
<th>Not to use burghers or city peasants for state workers without compensation</th>
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both the confirmation and the curtailment of gentry rights to manufac-
ture.

Both groups of nakazy asked for guarantees of various previous
municipal rights and privileges, including Magdeburg Law. The
burghers, however, showed a much keener interest in the restoration
of town autonomy, and the reversion to it of land, villages, and mills
once under the town’s jurisdiction but now controlled by the Cossack
administration or by private individuals.

The stationing of Russian troops and the quartering of various
officers and officials was a serious problem for Ukrainian towns.
Many of the nakazy called for a more equitable quartering system:
three nakazy asked that Cossack officers—exempt by law—also pro-
vide quarters for troops and officials. The nakazy also registered com-
plaints against having to provide the quartered officials with candles,
firewood, and forage. Finally, five nakazy requested the removal of at
least some of the military personnel stationed in their towns.

Taxation was another vital concern. A split developed over the
ruble tax: three burgher-controlled nakazy asked for a slight reduction
in the tax, whereas the gentry- and Cossack-controlled nakazy strongly
opposed the ruble tax altogether. Both groups favored the cancella-
tion of tax arrears, and the gentry requested the reduction of tariffs on
salt imported from Crimea.

The townspeople also asked for the right to produce alcoholic bev-
erages and for payment if drafted to work on state projects. Other
requests were either of a local nature or were not repeated in several
nakazy. 121

Although Kiev was technically outside the Hetmanate’s jurisdic-
tion, the city was so closely linked with it that any consideration of the
municipal nakazy would be incomplete without mention of the Kiev
nakaz. As the major western border point, Kiev had, throughout the
eighteenth century, been under the jurisdiction of a special imperial
official—the Kievian governor-general—who dealt with any interna-
tional and border problems and commanded the Russian troops gar-
risoned in Kiev and in the Hetmanate. The Kiev burghers enjoyed
extensive town autonomy, including Magdeburg Law. Periodically,
the hetman and the Cossack administration established their authority

121 For all the town requests see the Appendix.
over the Cossacks and officers residing in the city. Moreover, the hetman levied and collected an international import-export tax at the city’s border crossing. In most other matters, Kiev’s burghers dealt directly with the tsarist administration. With the abolition of the Hetmanate’s import-export tax (1754) and the resignation of Hetman Rozumovs’kyi, however, the tenuous administrative links between the Hetmanate and Kiev were again broken.

Hence the municipal election in Kiev was supervised by Kiev’s governor-general, Fedor Volkov. Apparently only burghers were permitted to participate. The five-point \textit{nakaz} that resulted showed that the Kiev burghers had some of the same concerns as did burghers in the Hetmanate: the high taxes in support of Russian troops; the cost of quartering Russian officials and officers; foreigners, particularly Greeks and Vlachs, trading in the city without payment of municipal taxes; and the all too familiar problem of Cossacks and their officers competing with the burghers in trade.\footnote{For the Kiev \textit{nakaz}, see \textit{SIRIO}, 107 (1900): 183–204.} Kievans complained that although the city was no longer the Kiev company’s headquarters, its captain and some staff still lived in the city—and sold alcoholic beverages without paying any municipal taxes. The burghers recommended that the Cossacks either be removed from the city or be registered as burghers liable for taxes. They also proposed the reintroduction of a municipal excise tax and made an extensive and elaborate defense of town autonomy, particularly Magdeburg Law.

Finally, a small group of Russian Old Believers living in the Hetmanate were also permitted to hold an election and draft a \textit{nakaz}. In the seventeenth century, Old Believers had settled in the Chernihiv and Starodub regiments to escape religious persecution. During the reign of Peter I, they were registered as special state peasants and taxed by the imperial authorities. As special Russian residents, they had been subject to Russian authority—that is, to the Kiev governor-general—rather than to the Hetmanate. Hence their election was supervised by Volkov rather than Rumiantsev. The \textit{nakaz} of the Old Believers expressed concerns limited to their own community (primarily the right to maintain their religious rituals). It did, however,
request the right to trade in "Little Russia" and a change in the Old Believers' status, from state peasants to Russian merchants. ¹²³

The nakaz of the towns clearly indicate the inability of the Ukrainian municipalities to maintain their autonomy. The Cossacks and their administration had penetrated even those towns having Magdeburg Law.¹²⁴ This is hardly surprising, since the towns were administrative centers for regiments and companies. For instance, Chernihiv, Starodub, Poltava, and Lubny were regimental administrative centers. The Cossack administration dominated the municipal government and in some cases assumed its functions.¹²⁵ Consequently the surrounding villages, meadows, and mills—which once helped to support the towns—were easily appropriated by Cossack officers or even by private individuals.

The administrative penetration increased the influx of nonburghers, especially officers and Cossacks, into the towns. Liable only to the Cossack administration, the newcomers were beyond the jurisdiction of the municipality and its courts. This gave them distinct legal as well as financial advantages over the burghers: the officers and Cossacks paid no municipal taxes and performed no municipal duties, though they engaged in trade and industry. Burghers soon decided to become Cossacks or servitors of noblemen in order to escape town taxes and responsibilities. This development, as well as trade and manufacturing by peasants, created disarray in the municipal guilds and contributed to the decline of the burghers.¹²⁶ Even Kiev, an autonomous city with only a tenuous link to the Hetmanate, did not entirely escape the Cossack onslaught. Since the clergy and foreigners were also exempt from town obligations, the town housed an increasing number of people who took advantage of its facilities but contributed nothing to its governance or upkeep. Elsewhere, in their own towns, the burghers found themselves at a distinct legal, economic, and administrative disadvantage.

¹²³ The nakaz of the Old Believers is published in SIRIO, 107 (1900): 204–10.
¹²⁴ This is discussed in P. Klymenko, "Misto i terytoria na Ukraini za Het'manshchynu (1654–1767 rr.)," ZIFV IV JUAN, 7–8 (1926): 309–57.
¹²⁵ See Table 5.4 and Appendix for examples.
¹²⁶ Pohar nakaz, SIRIO, 144 (1914): 81–82.
The remedy for the situation, the burghers believed, was to obtain new recognition of their ancient rights and privileges, including Magdeburg Law, which was to be translated from Polish into Russian. Not only would this directly help the burghers (most of whom no longer knew Polish), but it would also facilitate appeals to the Russian government. Recognition of Ukrainian town rights by the Russian authorities was the only way to offset the authority of the Cossack administration. Yet the burghers themselves were not clear what was entailed in town autonomy and Magdeburg Law. Apparently, they thought that it would free them from the Cossack administration, put all town dwellers under municipal jurisdiction, permit only burghers to engage in trade and industry, and restore former municipal property to the town. In any case, the burghers specifically requested that these points be granted by the empress. The burghers of Pohar even quoted an ukaz issued by Empress Elizabeth in 1752, forbidding trade in towns to nonnative merchants and nonburghers.\(^{127}\) The ukaz had nothing to do with the ancient rights of Ukrainian towns, but the reference to it indicates that at least some burghers were willing not only to rely on special rights, but also to obtain redress directly from the sovereign.

Reliance on Russian authority to offset the encroachment of the gentry and Cossacks proved illusory. In reality, the Russian administration was equally disruptive for Ukrainian towns, because the vast majority of Russian troops in the Hetmanate were stationed there.\(^{128}\) While the officers and Cossacks frequently avoided the much resented obligation of quartering imperial troops by claiming special rights, the burghers were constrained to accept the burden. All the nakazy request the equalization of this burden, protection against appropriation by Russian soldiers and officials, and establishment of special commissions for the adjudication of disputes (see Table 5.4). Housing Russian troops did not relieve the burghers of the ruble tax nor of frequent recruitment for various state labors, especially during wars. Thus, the burghers were obliged to assume a heavy financial burden in support of the military needs of the empire.

\(^{127}\) SIRIO, 144 (1914): 82.

\(^{128}\) Maksimovich, Deiatel’nosti, pp. 45–101, contains the official list of places where troops were stationed.
Municipal income declined seriously after 1755, when a decree issued by Empress Elizabeth prohibited internal tariffs, thereby eliminating taxes on produce bought by merchants and sold within the municipality. The Cossack administration was compensated for the loss of revenue by the abolition of the frontier tariff between the Hetmanate and Russia, but the towns received no such compensation. The financial loss can be measured by the request of the Nizhynburghers for 1,638 rubles and 40 kopeks per year in compensation.\textsuperscript{129} Moreover, the reduction and simplification of tariffs resulted in greater competition from Russian, Greek, and other foreign merchants, as shown in the request of virtually all the town nakazy to curb the trading privileges of nonnative merchants.

Caught between the steady levelling of their rights by the Cossack administration and the fiscal demands of the imperial authorities, theburghers sought some measure of autonomy as protection and as a means for survival. Consequently they enumerated half-forgotten rights and privileges stemming from Polish times. More concretely, they asked for control over their own towns, autonomy for their estate, relief from fiscal exploitation, and special rights and monopolies in trade and manufacture. They showed little interest in other issues and seemed hardly aware of the political crises before the Hetmanate.

\textit{The Petitions of the Clergy}

Although the clergy did not participate in the Legislative Commission, the Holy Synod, as a government institution, presented a nakaz summarizing the needs of the church. To assess the contemporary situation, the Synod turned to bishops for written reports on the problems of their eparchies. Instructions were sent back to the Synod by the bishops of all three eparchies in the Hetmanate—Kiev, Chernihiv, and Pereiaslav—as well as by the Kiev Monastery of the Caves (Pechers’ka lavra) and the Kiev Mezhyhir’s’kyi monastery. The latter two institutions were stavropigial, independent from the local bishop and under the direct jurisdiction of the Synod.

Little is known about the procedure that produced these clerical nakazy. There is some evidence that local councils discussed what

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{SIRIO}, 144 (1914), 30–31.
was to be included. The signatures affixed to the nakazy and the requests made in them indicate that many local clergy participated. The extant documents give no indication of any government pressure or interference.

The nakazy differ considerably in length, organization, and scope. The Kiev nakaz, comprising seventy-four points in 127 pages of small print, contains a detailed history, a political program, and a myriad of practical complaints and requests. It is representative of all the clergy of the eparchy and does not separate the needs of the parish clergy from those of the monastic communities. On the other hand, the nakazy from the Chernihiv and Pereiaslav eparchies are shorter, less historical, and contain separate sections for the parish clergy and for the monks. Finally, the nakazy of the two independent monasteries are strictly limited to their own activities and conditions.

The clerical nakazy reveal several strongly autonomist orientations. The Kiev metropolitan, Arsenii Mohylians'kyi, sought to establish an autonomous Orthodox church for the Hetmanate centered in Kiev. Consequently the Kiev nakaz contains a complete program for church autonomy: recognition of the metropolitan’s title as “Metropolitan of Kiev, Halych and all Little Russia”; renewal of the custom of electing the Kiev metropolitan from among native Ukrainians only; transfer of jurisdiction over the Kiev metropolitan from the Holy Synod to the College of Foreign Affairs; a reminder that Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and other eparchies were once under the jurisdiction of the Kiev metropolitan; a reminder that the independent monasteries also were once under the jurisdiction of the Kiev metropolitan; and, finally, a stipulation that hegumen be confirmed by the Kiev metropolitan or eparchial bishop, rather than being appointed directly by the Holy Synod.

The tradition of an autonomous Ukrainian church had remained in some clerical circles despite the church’s virtual merger into an imperial Orthodox church. There is no indication, however, that the bishops of Pereiaslav or Chernihiv or the independent monasteries had any desire to return to the jurisdiction of the Kiev metropolitan. In

131 SIRIO, 43 (1885): 504 – 508; articles 36, 37; 550, article 66; 508 – 10, articles 38, 39, 40; 510 – 11, articles 41, 42; 513, article 44.
fact, the requests of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves and the Mezhyhirs'kyi monastery to guarantee their independence clearly show opposition to any such consolidation of Ukrainian church authority. The desire to resurrect an autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox church must have been limited to the Kiev metropolitan and his followers.

The clergy, for its part, sought to secure a whole complex of personal, property, and customary rights deeply ingrained in the Ukrainian legal and social structure (see Table 5.5).

The parish clergy regarded their status as equal to that of the nobility. In actuality, this claim was fictitious since the lower clergy were never considered szlachta in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the clergy insisted on their szlachta status, citing the Lithuanian Statute and various charters as evidence for the claim, and they complained against Cossacks, gentry, Russian officers, and others who did not show them the proper respect. Property rights were of particular concern to the Ukrainian monasteries, since Russian monasteries had recently lost much of their wealth through state secularization. All the instructions sent to the synod from the Hetmanate pressed for the reaffirmation of the monasteries’ unrestricted right under Ukrainian law to own, sell, buy, and inherit property. They called for the eviction of those who had illegally seized monastery lands. The parish clergy also petitioned for the abolition of a 1728 decree that prohibited them from buying Cossack property and for the reestablishment of their traditional right to produce and sell alcoholic beverages, which had been abrogated by Hetman Rozumovs'kyi in 1761.

All the nakazy protested against any interference with the church’s judicial system and demanded the presence of a cleric at civilian court cases involving anyone under church jurisdiction. Also, they maintained that the clergy and those under their jurisdiction should be exempt from quartering troops and officials and from paying the ruble tax. The nakazy of the Kiev eparchy and the Kiev Mezhyhirs'kyi monastery asked for exemption from all taxes.

132 SIRIO, 43 (1885): 583, article 7; 589–91.
133 Although the clergy themselves were exempt, all those working and living on church lands were required to pay this tax.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Confirmation of rights and Privileges</th>
<th>Priest equal to nobility</th>
<th>No interference in church's judicial system and cleric present at any civilian proceeding involving church subject</th>
<th>Confirmation of monasteries' right to property</th>
<th>Right to buy and sell land esp. from Cossacks</th>
<th>Right to produce and sell alcoholic beverages esp. by parish priests</th>
<th>Church subjects freed from quartering troops and other officials</th>
<th>Financial support and academic upgrading of Kiev Academy and Chernihiv Collegium</th>
<th>Priests to make individual contracts with their communities rather than charging fixed prices for spiritual</th>
<th>Church subjects to be freed from nobles' tax</th>
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a And all taxes  b And other industries
Other issues were financial support for and academic upgrading of the Kiev Academy and the Chernihiv Collegium, and a provision of a separate publishing house for the Kiev metropolitan. Finally, the clergy urged that financial support for the church be based upon individual contracts between the priest and the community rather than on an official price list for spiritual services.\(^{134}\)

The clerical nakazy from the Hetmanate provoked some consternation in the Synod and much confusion about which points should be incorporated into the Synodal nakaz. By December 8, 1768, after several meetings devoted to the issue, the Synod had divided the articles of the nakaz from Kiev into three groups: those to be included in the Synodal nakaz, those to be excluded, and those to be forwarded separately to the Synodal deputy, Bishop Gavrili of Tver.\(^{135}\) None of the articles urging the reestablishment of an autonomous church were included in the Synodal nakaz,\(^{136}\) and the problem of the metropolitan’s title was to be passed on to the deputy.\(^{137}\) Many questions not concerned with church autonomy were also dropped not only from the Kiev nakaz, but from all the others as well. The protocol of the Synod says nothing about the criteria applied to exclude requests from the Hetmanate.\(^{138}\) All this became irrelevant, however, since the position of the church was not discussed at the legislative assembly.

**Nakaz of the Little Russian College**

Besides the nakazy from the Ukrainian populace, the Little Russian College, as the chief administrative body of the Hetmanate, elected a deputy, D. Natal’inn, and compiled a nakaz. Governor-General Rumiantsev presented the College with a memorandum of twenty articles as a guide for drawing up the nakaz. The memorandum closely followed the program Rumiantsev had submitted to Catherine upon taking office in 1765.\(^{139}\) The nakaz subsequently written by the Little

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\(^{134}\) For other requests, see the Appendix.

\(^{135}\) *SIRIO*, 43 (1885): 111.


\(^{137}\) *SIRIO*, 43 (1885): iii.

\(^{138}\) *SIRIO*, 43 (1885): v.

\(^{139}\) The memorandum was published by Vladimirskii-Budanov, “Akty . . . Ru-
Russian College virtually duplicated, in wording and even in sequence, the articles of Rumiantsev’s memorandum. Since the memorandum had incorporated Teplov’s criticisms and Catherine’s views, the nakaz, too, echoed the imperial government’s continuous and consistent policy toward the Hetmanate.

According to the nakaz, the Hetmanate’s fundamental problem was that its laws and customs stemmed from Polish times and were unsuitable under an autocracy. New conditions necessitated reforms in administration, social organization, economics, and education. Therefore administration was to be improved by the division of the Little Russian College into three departments—military affairs, taxation, finance, and justice (article 1), by the establishment of provinces based on population (article 2), and by a staff of paid officials following Russian practices (article 3). Taxes were to be collected systematically and in full, and the soul tax might be introduced (article 4). Furthermore, the Cossacks should be reorganized into standard units with a regular army command and proper equipment, manned only by able-bodied soldiers (article 14). Cossacks who did not qualify for the new units were to be integrated with the townsmen and peasants, and subsequently no one would be admitted into the Cossack estate (article 16).

Very significantly, the nakaz did not recognize the claims to nobility status of all officers. Instead, two categories of landowners were proposed: dvoriane and zemstvo. Officers who could prove noble descent or who held sufficiently high positions in the Ukrainian administration were to receive patents for the Russian dvorianstvo. All other landlords were to belong to a special category of zemstvo, and they would not be entitled to ennoblement on the basis of property (article 10). The nakaz contained a reminder of the appropriation of state lands by Cossack officers, the confirmation of which still awaited the decision of the sovereign (article 18). It did approve, however, the purchase of Cossack lands by the gentry (article 20).

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140 Compare the memorandum with the nakaz of the Little Russian College published in SIRIO, 43 (1885): 218–37.
The *nakaz* outlined the following programs for the rest of the population—clergy, townspeople, and peasants: monastery lands were to be secularized by the state, and some monasteries were to be converted into schools for the gentry (article 2); the clergy, however, were to be exempt from troop quarterings (article 18). Towns should be divided into two types—first and second class: in the former, town citizenship would be restricted to town officials, merchants, and craftsmen; in the latter, it would be extended to landowners, Cossacks, and other nonburghers (article 5). The Greeks of Nizhyn were to be under municipal jurisdiction (article 17). Finally, the common people, peasants and hired laborers, were to be restricted further in moving from one estate to another, and new lands were to be colonized only under governmental supervision (article 18).

Otherwise, the *nakaz* merely repeated points contained in Rumiantsev’s program: the necessity for legal counsel at higher judicial proceedings (article 3), the establishment of state industries, the diversification of crops with the aid of state agriculturalists (article 6), the need for a state forestry service (article 7), the regulation of trade in alcoholic beverages by the state (article 8), and the transfer of command over the Ukrainian artillery to the imperial general of ordnance, or *fel’dsekhmeister* (article 15).¹⁴¹

This document could hardly have received plaudits from the Ukrainian gentry. Well aware of this, Governor-General Rumiantsev was on guard for any signs of opposition. Clearly, the most acutely nationalist issues were the election of a hetman and the preservation of Ukrainian legal and administrative self-rule. The elections to the Legislative Commission had revealed a strong pro-hetman group who wanted a return—with some modifications—to the Cossack administrative system in existence at the time of Catherine’s coup. Although Rumiantsev was able to expunge such demands from the gentry’s *nakazy*, he was unable to win the Ukrainian gentry over to the government program. With the completion of the elections, the arena of the struggle between the Russian authorities and Ukrainian autonomists shifted from the Hetmanate to Russia and the meetings of the Legislative Commission’s general assembly.

¹⁴¹ The only additional request was the prohibition of all tariffs and tolls collected on roads and at mills by private individuals (article 9).
The Question of Ukrainian Autonomy
at the General Assembly of the Legislative Commission

On July 30, 1767 Catherine opened the first meeting of the Legislative Commission in Moscow with great pomp. After the inaugural ceremonies were concluded, the empress, in consultation with the assembly, appointed a military man, A. I. Bibikov, as marshal of the assembly, responsible to the imperial procurator-general, A. A. Viazemskii. Then the deputies selected a five-man committee, which was to supervise the work of numerous subcommittees and coordinate it with that of the general assembly (bol'shoe sobranie). As envisioned in Catherine's rules of procedure, the general assembly was to review Russia's laws and suggest reforms to the proper subcommittee. That subcommittee was then to draft new legislation, which, when completed, was to go back to the general assembly for examination. If approved, the proposed legislation was then to be forwarded to the Senate, the colleges, and finally to the empress for approbation.¹⁴²

The procedures were hardly precise, and the lack of a parliamentary tradition contributed to the confusion. At first, no one knew exactly what the deputies were to do with the nakazy they had brought to the Commission. Subsequently they were passed to appropriate subcommittees for processing, but until an agenda could be worked out, they were simply read at the meeting of the general assembly.¹⁴³ Speeches before the general assembly frequently rambled in content from one topic to another without specific purpose or guidance from the marshal. No formal vote was ever taken on any question. If any delegates felt very strongly about an issue being presented on the floor, they could show agreement or disagreement with the speaker only by taking the floor. According to V. I. Sergeevich, "the sessions of the general assembly had transformed it [the Legislative Commission] into a completely aimless reading room and parlor."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² The opening ceremonies and the procedures guiding the Legislative Commission have been succinctly summarized by Dukes, Catherine, pp. 76–80 and more recently by Isabel de Madariaga, Russa in the Age of Catherine the Great, pp. 164–66.
¹⁴³ de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, p. 166.
¹⁴⁴ V. I. Sergeevich, "Otkuda neudachi ekaterinskoi zakonodatel'noi komissii?," Vestnik Evropy, 1878, no. 1, p. 233.
Sergeevich’s judgment notwithstanding, the general assembly and the various subcommittees did attempt to produce legislation that would have reformed and regulated Russia’s government and society. The assembly was frequently the scene of heated debates on the future of the Russian Empire, including the rights and liberties of autonomous areas. In fact, that was the first issue brought up by the government before the five-man steering committee. After reading Catherine’s Instructions, Procurator-General Viazemskii posed the following question: “Since the Russian state, as far as its laws are concerned, is divided into three parts: Great Russia, Little Russia, and Livonia, and each governed according to its own laws, will these be necessary in the future?” To the chagrin of Viazemskii and the government, the steering committee answered that they would be. As a result the general assembly and the subcommittees began at first to consider only Russian laws.

This turn of events could only have pleased the twenty-nine deputies from the Hetmanate—ten gentry, ten townsmen, and nine Cossacks. On the whole, the Ukrainian deputies did not participate in the discussions of the general assembly and answered only direct challenges to their rights and prerogatives. Such self-restricted participation was consistent with the attitude expressed by the elite prior to the elections to the Legislative Commission—that representatives from the Hetmanate would go to the assembly only to protect “Little Russian rights and liberties.”

According to Rumiantsev, the major opposition leader in the Hetmanate was Ivan Mykhailovych Skoropads’kyi. A member of one of the most distinguished Ukrainian families, Skoropads’kyi was connected with the highest offices in the Hetmanate. His great-uncle, Ivan Skoropads’kyi, had been hetman (1708–22); his mother was the daughter of Hetman Danylo Apostol (1727–34); and his father was

146 The only deputy from the Hetmanate who spoke of general imperial problems without any reference to “Little Russian prerogatives” was Mykola Motonis, representing the Hadiach, Myrhorod, and Poltava szlachta. SIRIO, 8 (1871): 167–69; and SIRIO, 36 (1882): 61–67. Motonis did, however, support the Ukrainian delegation when the issue of autonomy was discussed.
the colonel of the Chernihiv regiment. Ivan Mykhailovych Skoropads'kyi was educated at the Kiev Academy and then at Breslau University. After returning from Western Europe, Skoropads'kyi became the Hetmanate's general aide-de-camp and took an active interest in civil affairs.

The governor-general became alarmed about Ivan Skoropads'kyi when he was elected, in absentia, as deputy from four different constituencies. In his second report on the elections, Rumiantsev expressed doubt as to whether Skoropads'kyi, as the elected deputy from Chernihiv, would accept the model progovernment nakaz:

I now doubt only that the deputy from the Chernihiv regiment, General Aide-de-Camp Skoropads'kyi, will accept this nakaz and will agree to act according to it, considering his sentiments, which are known to me; for with all his learning and travels in foreign lands the Cossack has remained in him in his true nature.

Rumiantsev's next report described how the elite of Hlukhiv feigned illness so as not to participate in the drafting of the progovernment nakaz. Again Rumiantsev singled out Skoropads'kyi as "an acknowledged patriot and lover of freedom and ancient rights," stating that Skoropads'kyi described the expurgated Chernihiv nakaz as "so obscure for him that it can barely be understood."

Yet if Skoropads'kyi was indeed the leader of the Ukrainian deputies at Moscow, he must have limited himself to behind-the-scenes activities. Even before his arrival, Skoropads'kyi had passed over three of his mandates to others, retaining only the deputyship from the Hlukhiv gentry. Not once did he speak before the general assembly,
nor was he elected to any subcommittee. The absence of overt participation could well have been deliberate. Skoropadsky probably wanted to underscore that the commission was to consider only Russian laws, and therefore its proceedings were of no concern to the Hetmanate’s delegation.

Discussions in the general assembly soon revealed, however, that the formulation of a new law code, even one limited to Russia proper, involved social and economic questions and regional interests that inevitably touched upon "Little Russian prerogatives." In October 1767, the deputy from the College of Commerce, Sergei Mezheninov, proposed that all international trade be conducted through the port of St. Petersburg. Mezheninov argued that in order to maintain adequate control over tariffs and state monopolies, international trade must be centralized.¹⁵²

The proposal provoked a vigorous response by deputies from the southwestern region. First to speak was the deputy from Kharkiv, who objected that the trade route through the Baltic was insufficient for the whole empire and proposed a new southern route from the Crimea.¹⁵³ Next came the major opposition speech, by Ivan Kostevych, town deputy from Nizhyn. Any prohibition of trade through the Hetmanate’s border, Kostevych argued, would be a violation of the privileges and liberties granted to the "whole Little Russian people," and specifically to the "Little Russian merchants." He claimed that Ukrainian merchants did not have sufficient capital to redirect their trade through St. Petersburg, and, moreover, that they had established trade routes and markets in Breslau, Gdańsk, and Königsberg. As far as tariffs were concerned, Kostevych pointed out that they were being paid at the imperial border crossing in Kiev.¹⁵⁴

When Kostevych finished his speech, many deputies took the floor in support of his views. Supporters from the Hetmanate included four of the ten gentry deputies, six of the ten town deputies, and eight of the nine Cossack deputies. In addition, eleven deputies from Sloboda

¹⁵³ Ibid.: 52–53.
and southern Ukraine, including the Zaporozhian Cossacks, seconded Kostevych's defense of the Hetmanate's trading rights.155

The attack on Mezheninov's proposal was taken up by the town deputy from Kiev, Iosyf Hudyma, who charged that it violated solemn charters granted to the Kiev townsmen by the tsars.156 Finally, the deputy of the Russian Old Believers in the Hetmanate, Ivan Shchapov, voiced support for the direct "Little Russian trade route" and firmly opposed St. Petersburg as the sole trading outlet. Shchapov's speech implied that the Russian Old Believers living in the Hetmanate should make use of the "Little Russian trading rights."157 The contention was immediately challenged by Danylo Rohyns'kyi, town deputy from Starodub, who pointed out that Old Believers living in the Hetmanate were merely Russian peasants and hence had no trading privileges. His speech was seconded by the town deputies from Pereiaslav, Nizhyn, Hlukhiv, Novhorod-Sivers'kyi, and Pohar and by the Cossack delegates from the Starodub regiment.158

As soon as the furor over the Mezheninov proposal subsided, the deputies from the Hetmanate were unexpectedly challenged by Andrei Aleinikov, a Cossack from Sloboda Ukraine and a staunch supporter of Ukrainian trading rights. Aleinikov decried the gradual enserfment of peasants in the Hetmanate and in Sloboda Ukraine, and he proposed that the officers and "Little Russian people" be prohibited from buying land with peasants and from settling land with peasants. The existing practice, he argued, ultimately harmed the Cossacks, for it displaced them from the land, thereby forcing them to emigrate to Russia, where they frequently lost Cossack status. Aleinikov also charged that Russian nobles who received or purchased land in the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine brought serfs from Russia with them or tried to enserf the local population. Aleinikov called for Russians to be prohibited from purchasing estates in territories inhabited by Ukrainians (that is, in the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine), and at the

155 Ibid.: 54.
156 Ibid.: 54–55.
157 Ibid.: 87.
158 Ibid.: 122.
same time, for Ukrainians to be forbidden from purchasing land or estates with peasants in Russia.\textsuperscript{159}

Part of Aleinikov's speech may have pleased the delegates from the Hetmanate, but his suggestion that all Ukrainians be prohibited from buying land with peasants in the Hetmanate, Sloboda Ukraine, or Russia conflicted with the vital interests of the Ukrainian gentry. On November 5, 1767, the deputy from the Nizhyn gentry, Havrylo Bozhych, answered Aleinikov on the floor of the assembly. He attempted to explain to the Cossack from the southeast that "Little Russia" had its own peculiar establishments and laws. As in Europe, society in the Hetmanate was divided into estates—szlachta, clergy, military men or Cossacks, burghers, and peasants—and each estate had its own rights to landownership (except for peasants who lived on szlachta lands). Bozhych cited the Lithuanian Statute, which gave the szlachta the right to colonize new lands and settle them with peasants and to purchase estates with peasants. He did admit that the statute limited the right of foreigners and that an ukaz of 1727 forbade foreigners to settle in Little Russia. In 1728, however, when Danylo Apostol assumed the hetmancy, a special ukaz had been issued permitting Russians to buy property in the Hetmanate and Ukrainians to buy estates in Russia. Though Bozhych conceded that more Russians than Ukrainians took advantage of the law, he vehemently denied that Russian serfs were imported into the Hetmanate. The Cossacks could not have been harmed by the gentry's land purchases because the Cossacks were independent landholders who had guaranteed property rights. Aleinikov simply did not understand the conditions in the Hetmanate, Bozhych concluded. His speech received immediate support from all the deputies from the Hetmanate, so its main points must have been previously agreed upon by the entire delegation.\textsuperscript{160}

Aleinikov did not accept Bozhych's line of argument. On December 17, 1767, he again defended the rights of all Cossacks and Ukrainians. The "Little Russian people," whether in the Hetmanate or Sloboda Ukraine, and the Cossacks, whether in the Ukraine, along the Don, or elsewhere, had greater freedoms than the Russians. These freedoms were constantly being eroded, however, and measures to secure them were imperative. In Sloboda Ukraine, for instance, Rus-

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.: 170.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.: 214–16.
sians had obtained land and settled it with Russian serfs, and Ukrainian landlords were busily colonizing new lands and trying to enserf the peasants. According to Aleinikov, this social process was displacing thousands of Cossacks from their homesteads. Russians in the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine must return to Russia, the Ukrainian Cossacks who had gone to Russia must return to the Ukraine, and Ukrainian landlords (whether in the Hetmanate or Sloboda Ukraine) must be prohibited from purchasing or colonizing lands with dependent peasants.\footnote{Ibid.: 369–75.}

Again Bozhych answered Aleinikov. He simply stated that Aleinikov had confused the Hetmanate with other military formations. It was obvious that Aleinikov was unfamiliar with the treaties guaranteeing certain freedoms that united the Hetmanate to the empire. Bozhych volunteered to gather information about them and to pass it on to Aleinikov.\footnote{Ibid.: 378.}

While Bozhych, supported by the entire delegation from the Hetmanate, was trying to explain the Hetmanate’s constitutional structure to Aleinikov, the general assembly began to debate in earnest the whole question of regional autonomy. The debate had been sparked in part by the many requests from the Baltic delegates for the confirmation of their traditional rights and privileges. On November 22, 1767, a deputy from the Russian dvorianstvo, Nikifor Tolmachov, lashed into the Baltic requests. If the Balts’ laws were perfect, he scoffed, they would not have been called to the Legislative Commission. What was really needed was one, uniform law for all the peoples of the empire.\footnote{Ibid.: 330.} Tolmachov was joined by other delegates. One said that, as a conquered people, the Balts had no privileges.\footnote{Ibid.: 335–36.} Another deputy questioned the patriotism of anyone who preferred the laws of foreign kings over those granted by their own sovereign.\footnote{Ibid.: 350.} Finally, Artemii Shishkov, representing the imperial office for Liefland, Est-
land, and Finland, reiterated that these areas should have the same laws as the rest of the empire.\textsuperscript{166}

During eight consecutive sessions, the privileges of the Baltic provinces were the assembly’s primary topic of debate. At every session deputies from a particular area, one estate, or even a privileged city in the Baltic read into the record their constituencies’ particular prerogatives. No cooperation existed among the Baltic regions or social groups. In fact, there was bitter animosity between the two elites—the registered nobility and the nonnoble landlords (Landsassen). All the Baltic delegates agreed on only one issue: the old prerogatives must remain.

The deputies from the Hetmanate stayed out of the fray, although the implication of the debate was obvious. Perhaps the Ukrainians wanted to avoid the tactical error of the Balts, who had brought up the question of Baltic rights themselves and now faced a barrage of criticism. The Kiev deputy, however, could not remain silent. Hudyma attacked Tolmachov directly, pointing out that Magdeburg Law had been given to Kiev by King Sigismund in 1544 and confirmed by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich in 1654. The Kievans had solemn charters protecting their municipal rights, and the general assembly had no authority to interfere in the sovereign’s will.\textsuperscript{167}

Hudyma’s argument was adopted by the Balts. The deputy from the Liefland landlords, Wilhelm von Blumen, claimed that existing laws and privileges were completely adequate and needed no revisions. He reprimanded the assembly for even discussing autonomous areas—although the topic had been repeatedly brought up by the Balts themselves—because that questioned the wisdom and authority of the sovereign who had granted these privileges.\textsuperscript{168}

As the debate over Baltic privileges was coming to a head, Marshal Bibikov suddenly announced that the assembly would be adjourned in four days—on December 18, 1767—and would reconvene on February 18, 1768, but in St. Petersburg rather than Moscow. Whether the heated debates over Baltic privileges prompted Catherine to suspend the discussions at this time is unknown. It is far more likely that Catherine transferred the proceedings to St. Petersburg because she

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.: 337.  
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.: 337–38.  
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.: 250–51.
herself wanted to return to the imperial capital. Also, the adjournment allowed the delegates to go home for the Christmas holidays.

When the second session opened in St. Petersburg, the delegation from the Hetmanate continued to respond only to questions that touched upon "Little Russian" privileges. They refused to participate in the discussions of general imperial problems. For example, Iakiv Kozel's'kyi, from the gentry of southern Ukraine (Novorossiia), addressed the assembly on the peasant question. While he proposed an interesting series of reforms, including hereditary use of the land, he did agree that the peasants' right to move from landlord to landlord in the Hetmanate and southern Ukraine made the collection of taxes difficult and ruined the nobility. Kozel's'kyi recommended that the peasants' mobility be curtailed. He was immediately rebuked by the deputy of the Pereiaslav gentry, Zakharii Zabyla, who stated that the delegation from the Hetmanate requested only the confirmation of all "Little Russian rights and liberties," including those of the common people. The Hetmanate's laws were entirely adequate and needed no changes.

The refusal of the Ukrainian delegation—controlled by Ukrainian landlords—to consider further limitations on peasant mobility or the introduction of a Russian type of servitude into the Hetmanate reflected a fear that any tampering with local practices—even if beneficial to the ruling gentry—would lead to the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. The experience of the assembly's first session in Moscow had only united the deputies in the determination to defend their special prerogatives. Governor-General Rumiantsev wrote to Catherine about the mood of the Ukrainian deputies after meeting with them during the Christmas recess. He indicated that the delegation was preparing a systematic defense of Ukrainian rights and again singled out Ivan Skoropads'kyi as its unquestioned leader:

I had the opportunity of seeing the deputies who had been home on leave for a while but have since departed [for St. Petersburg]. Regrettably, I found them holding even more firmly and stubbornly to all their previous inappropriate thinking, and all the advice given by Your Imperial Majesty... has made no impact on them.... Skoropads'kyi, the leader of all the others...

169 Ibid.: 87–89.
170 Ibid.: 100; for the full text of the speech, see pp. 519–20.
after his manifold elections as deputy and because of his marked abilities, dreams of being elected hetman, and, of course, he strives more than before to defend and have confirmed their Cossack freedoms and rights. . . . They [the Ukrainians] did much boasting that at the reading of the nakaz they voted with the Livonians, who seemingly were the only ones with the same intentions as they, to maintain their rights and freedoms, and they [the Ukrainians] expect from them [the Livonians] mutual co-operation. . . . He, Skoropads’kyi, is now preparing (as he himself announced) the presentation of a protest nullifying all the articles of the Little Russian college nakaz. The consequence of this will justify my report about him made to Your Imperial Majesty, and will reveal those who are supporting him in this. . . .

In replying to Rumiantsev’s letter, Catherine confirmed his charges: “What you have written about Skoropads’kyi is completely justified; here he behaves like a wolf and does not want to have anything to do with our people.”

Another incident indicates that Skoropads’kyi was indeed regarded by the populace as the likely candidate for hetman. In June 1768, a Cossack from the Hetmanate, Matvi Novyk, reportedly said:

Little Russia is deprived of its former freedoms and the Zaporozhians are under duress. And if Lord Skoropads’kyi becomes hetman, but the former freedoms are not renewed, then the Little Russian Cossacks with the Zaporozhians—and perhaps they will call upon the Tatars for assistance—will attack the Russians (mосkali) and first take the head of Rumiantsev.

During the investigation of the incident by the Little Russian College, Novyk claimed that a woman told him and many other people that everyone in Hlukhiv was “awaiting the arrival of Skoropads’kyi—who will come as hetman.”

Skoropads’kyi was indeed returning to the Hetmanate, but not as hetman. Without explanation, on June 7, 1768, he had passed his

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mandate as deputy to Pavlo Rymsha. He left St. Petersburg without delivering the promised attack on the nakaž of the Little Russian College, and leadership of the Ukrainian delegation at the general assembly was taken over by Hryhorii Poletyka, who held views different from those of Skoropads’kyi and his followers.

Skoropads’kyi’s realization of his untenable political position probably explained his sudden departure. The authorities were looking with disfavor and alarm at any suggestion of electing a hetman. Many of the Nizhyn gentry who had spoken out for such an election were under sentences of death, then being appealed to the Senate (its decision came on July 7, 1768). Skoropads’kyi must have known that he was under surveillance and that any political move would have been very dangerous for him and his followers. Finally, his private inquiries in Moscow had probably convinced him of the hopelessness of the situation. Hence he had resigned his mandate and left the assembly.

The emergence of Hryhorii Poletyka as the leader of the Ukrainian delegation was surprising. Until the Legislative Commission, he had not taken an active part in Ukrainian civic affairs. A graduate of the Kiev Academy who traced his ancestry back to the szlachta of Poland-Lithuania prior to Khmel’nyts’kyi’s time, Poletyka had continued his education at the academic gymnasium of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences. After securing a position as translator from Latin and German at the Academy of Sciences and at the Holy Synod, he had received the title of college assessor (kollezhskii assesor) in 1757. Upon retirement, in 1761, he had become a court councilor (nadvornii sovetnik). Poletyka’s first scholarly works, published in 1757, were Russian translations of Aristotle and an article on the

175 Longinov, “Materialy.” p. 42.
176 Maksimovich, Vybory, p. 197.
177 For biographical information on H. Poletyka, see V. Modzalevskii, “Poletika, Grigorii Andreieich,” Russkii biograficheski slovar’, vol. 14 (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 321–34; Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ Brokauza i Efora, 34:277–78. The genealogy of H. Poletyka may be found in Modzalevskii, Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik, 4:115–21; G. A. Miloradovich, Rodoslovnaia kniga chernigovskogo dverianskia, 6 pts. in 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1901), 2, pt. 4: 161–64; Vasyl’ Omel’chenko, “Rid Poletyk,” Ukrains’kyi istoryk, 1967, no. 1–2, pp. 59–63. These genealogies express some doubt as to whether H. Poletyka’s ancestor was indeed a member of the Polish szlachta.
origins of Russian education. The latter brought him into conflict with Lomonosov and probably contributed to his decision to retire as translator. In 1764, Poletyka reentered state service as the chief inspector of the naval cadet school. Many of his ancestors had held positions in the Hetmanate’s administration, but Poletyka himself never held a Ukrainian office. His only connections with the Hetmanate were the estates that he owned there and his self-identification as a member of the Little Russian szlachta. Small wonder, then, that Poletyka’s adamant defense of Ukrainian autonomy came as a surprise to the Russian imperial authorities.

Poletyka’s first act as the Ukrainian delegation’s leader was to answer the nakaz of the Little Russian College point by point. In a memorandum presented before the general assembly and entitled “Objections of Deputy Hryhorii Poletyka to Directives Given to Deputy Dmitri Natal’in by the Little Russian College,” Poletyka described the treaties by which the Ukraine came under the protectorship of the tsar. He enumerated ten benefits to Russia that resulted from this union. In return for these benefits, the tsar always guaranteed Ukrainian rights and privileges. Now, the nakaz of the Little Russian College attempted “to introduce into Little Russia such establishments as are in complete opposition to its rights and freedoms, and in this manner violate the sanctity of treaties.” Poletyka asserted that the experience of 130 years had proven that Ukrainian practices were compatible with autocracy. Admittedly, some laws might be imperfect and some abuses, especially by hetmans, might have occurred, but any reforms must originate with the Ukrainian people, not from the supervisory college.

Poletyka not only attacked the nakaz of the Little Russian College for violating local rights, but also attempted to prove that its proposals were unnecessary. Why introduce some foreign model for Ukrainian cities when they could be revitalized by reinstating Magdeburg law and town autonomy? The separation of military and civilian offices could also be achieved in this way. And why replace Cossack officers with regular army officers? It would be better to select worthy Cossack officers with military experience. Thus Poletyka emerged as an

179 Ibid., p. 73.
adamant opponent of the introduction of Russian imperial practices into the Hetmanate. A strong defender of historical legitimacy, he advocated only such changes as could be justified by former native traditions, and he systematically presented that position in all his speeches and writings at the assembly.

When the general assembly began to consider the proposal on "The Rights of the Nobility," it became only a question of time before a full-fledged debate over the issue of privileged areas was generated. Article 43 of the proposed project stated that "no one but Russian nobles can enjoy these rights in Russia."\(^{180}\) The implications were ambiguous. Did the statement pertain to the empire as a whole or only to the core area? Were Russian nobles to be defined as imperial subjects or ethnic Russians? Were all foreign nobles to be excluded from the Russian nobility? Obviously, such an ambiguous and dangerous article had to be challenged by nobles from the autonomous areas.

While waiting for the formal presentation of article 43, Poletyka began preparing a systematic defense of Ukrainian rights and liberties. He drafted a memorandum containing excerpts from the Lithuanian Statute that specified the rights of the nobility. It also contained summaries of treaties concluded between the hetmans and the tsars, tsarist charters, and any other documents confirming "Little Russian rights and liberties." When article 43 was finally introduced, Poletyka had the memorandum ready for presentation to the assembly.\(^{181}\)

On August 21, 1768, the general assembly began to discuss article 43. Immediately, the problem of defining a "Russian nobleman" emerged. The szlachta of southern Ukraine wanted to secure for themselves the full rights of the Russian nobility, but a deputy from the Hetmanate, Volodymyr Zolotyns'kyi, spoke out in opposition. Reminding the assembly of the charters issued to the "Little Russian szlachta" by kings and tsars, he asked the deputies to consider the memorandum distributed by Poletyka. Zolotyns'kyi moved that article 43 be amended as follows: "these privileges are utilized by the Great Russian nobility, but the szlachta of Little Russia, Liefland, and

\(^{180}\) *SIRIO*, 32 (1881): 585; the entire project appears on pp. 571–85.

\(^{181}\) Poletyka's memorandum was published in *Nakazy*, pp. 167–76.
Estland retain their former rights and privileges.’’ His motion was
seconded by most of the Ukrainian deputies.182

A similar but much more detailed argument came from Hryhorii
Poletyka. Speaking after Zolotyns’kyi, Poletyka first presented a
thorough critique of the proposed project as a whole and then turned
to Ukrainian autonomy in particular. According to Poletyka, if the
project did not pertain to the Hetmanate, then it need only confirm
traditional Ukrainian autonomy, but if it was applicable to the Het-
manate, then the following rights of the Ukrainian szlachta must be
incorporated:

(1) except for the emperor’s direct authority, all government func-
tions in the Hetmanate are determined by the szlachta;
(2) the szlachta alone had the right to legislate, subject only to the
emperor’s confirmation;
(3) all internal management, including taxation and requisitions,
was to be directed by the szlachta;
(4) Ukrainian civil and military officials were to be elected freely
from “native Little Russian szlachta”;
(5) a nobleman could not be imprisoned except for the most severe
violations, and if accused of a crime he was to be summoned to court
in accordance with prescribed laws and procedures;
(6) the szlachta had full judicial authority over all subjects on its
estates;
(7) nobles could travel to foreign lands without requesting permiss-
ion;
(8) a nobleman could freely dispose of his movable and immovable
property;
(9) nobles could fully exploit their estates, for example, mine
mineral and ore deposits;
(10) the szlachta was exempted from all taxes, except a small land
tax;
(11) nobles had the right to trade in domestic and foreign markets
without paying any tariffs or taxes;
(12) in case of the death of a foreigner who had been living on a
szlachta estate and who left no heirs, all his wealth was inherited by
the landlord, not by the state treasury;

182 SIRIO, 32 (1881): 304–307; Zolotyns’kyi’s speech was published in full in
(13) no troops were to be quartered on the szlachta’s estates;

(14) the homes of the szlachta were protected from all searches and seizures, and even criminals could not be removed from a nobleman’s estate without the owner’s permission;

(15) the szlachta could collect wood, hunt, and fish on all state property.

The speech received overwhelming support from the Hetmanate’s delegates: twenty-four of potential twenty-nine deputies seconded the speech.183

At the next session of the general assembly, on August 28, 1768, Maksym Tymöfeyev gave the only speech by a rank-and-file Cossack from the Hetmanate. Tymöfeyev agreed that nobles from border areas should retain their native rights and privileges, but he reminded the assembly that Ukrainian rights were guaranteed by the tsars not only to the gentry, but also to “all of Little Russian society and the Cossacks, and that all Little Russian inhabitants want to retain their rights and privileges.” His speech was hailed by virtually every delegate from the Hetmanate and by many delegates from Sloboda and southern Ukraine.184

The requests of the Ukrainian deputies encouraged similar demands from other privileged areas. The Smolensk nobility claimed the special rights guaranteed to them upon incorporation into the Muscovite state and asked for their retention.185 It was the Baltic nobility—still smarting from the earlier attacks upon their autonomous rights—that took up the question in earnest, however. At the next three sessions—held on September 4, 8, and 9, 1768—the nobility from Livonia, Estland, and Finland (Karelia) detailed their cases. Then, on September 9, after five sessions devoted almost exclusively to the status of the nobility in autonomous regions, General Bibikov, marshal of the assembly, read a single terse statement. The deputies from Livonia, Estland, Finland, Little Russia, and Smolensk had gone beyond their competence in requesting a confirmation of autonomous

183 Ibid.: 310–14; Poleyska’s speech appears in full in SIRIO, 36 (1882): 346–56. Seconding the speech were eight deputies from the szlachta, nine from the towns, and seven from the Cossacks: SIRIO, 32 (1881): 314–15. It is not known whether the remaining five deputies from the Hetmanate were present at this session.
185 Ibid.: 319.
rights rather than a formulation of the general project for the dvorianstvo. According to Bibikov, the deputies "could not enter into any discussion dealing with government, and even less on matters dependent solely on the authority of the monarch."\(^{186}\) Consequently the marshal was rejecting all the requests submitted by these deputies. Quite probably, Bibikov was acting on direct orders from Catherine, who was angered by the delegates' continuous demands for the retention of local privileges.\(^{187}\)

Since the rights of the Hetmanate could no longer be discussed at the assembly, the Ukrainian deputies decided to petition the empress directly. The result, a petition from "nobles, Cossacks, and towns- men" was apparently composed by Poletyka.\(^{188}\) It listed the benefits derived by the Russian Empire from the Hetmanate's voluntary union with Muscovy, requested the confirmation "forever" of all Ukrainian rights and prerogatives, and enumerated some of the wishes expressed in the nakazy.\(^{189}\) Although the assembly was soon disbanded, it is very likely that Catherine did see the petition.

It was probably also at this time that Poletyka wrote a treatise entitled "Historical Information: On What Basis Little Russia Was Under the Polish Republic and by What Treaties It Came Under Russian Rulers and a Patriotic Opinion as to How It Could Be Ordered, so that It Would Be Useful to the Russian State Without Violations of Its Rights and Freedoms."\(^{190}\) Here, as in his speeches and other writings, Poletyka insisted that Little Russia had always possessed certain rights

\(^{186}\) Ibid.: 346.

\(^{187}\) Dukes, Catherine, p. 157.

\(^{188}\) The petition is unsigned and does not indicate the author, but since whole passages are taken from Poletyka's challenge to the Little Russian College, it is probable that Poletyka himself wrote it. Even if someone else did, the ideas and even the wording were Poletyka's.

\(^{189}\) "Proshenie Malorossiiskikh deputatov vo vremia sostavleniia Ulozheniia," Nakazy, pp. 177–84.

\(^{190}\) "Istoricheskoie izvestie na kakom osnovanii Malaiia Rossia byla pod respublikou Pol'skoiu, i na kakikh dogovorakh oddalas' Rossiiiskim Gdram [sic.]. i patrioticheskoie rassuzhdenie, kakim obrazom mozhno by onu nuyne uchredit' chtob ona polezna mogla byt' Rossiiskomu Gosudarstvu bez naruseniia prav ee i volnosti," Ukrain's'kyi arkheografichnyi zbirnyk 1 (1926): 147–61.
guaranteed by the Muscovite tsar. To Poletyka these rights were virtually identical with the Polish nobility’s “golden liberties.” Unlike Skoropads’kyi, who wanted to reinstitute the administrative system prior to 1764 (with some modification), Poletyka wanted to resurrect the administrative, judicial, and social systems of the Ukraine under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising. At that time, according to Poletyka, regular diets of the szlachta acted as legislative bodies, consulting with other estates on important matters, while courts of the nobility and town magistrates adjudicated civilian cases. Most of these functions were later taken over by the hetman and the Cossack administration. All the misfortunes of the Hetmanate arose, Poletyka believed, from this usurpation of power by the military, that is, the Cossack administration.

Poletyka did not reject the Cossack experience totally. On the contrary, he advocated the recognition of Cossack officers as Ukrainian szlachta and the preservation of the traditional rights of rank-and-file Cossacks. In his view, however, a precarious balance had been upset after the Khmel’nyts’kyi uprising, when the Cossack system was imposed on all other estates. Instead of any new legislation or the introduction of Russian imperial laws, Poletyka espoused the faithful execution of ancient rights. This would lead to a differentiation between the military, administrative, and judicial systems, and thus correct what Catherine viewed as the most serious shortcomings in the Hetmanate’s government. In the end Poletyka envisioned the Hetmanate as a gentry republic, with no hetman and with virtually all executive, legislative, and judicial authority vested in the hands of the gentry. His only concession to autocracy was that legislation enacted

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194 Catherine to Olsuf’ev, no date, RA 2 (1863): 189.
at the radas or sejms of the nobility be forwarded to the Russian emperor for final approval.

Poletyka’s ideas directly opposed the concept of the hereditary hetmancy presented by Hetman Rozumovs’kyi, a scheme that had failed to obtain the support of the Hetmanate’s major families five years before. Poletyka’s gentry republicanism had certain features attractive to the Ukrainian elite. The Hlukhiv council had clearly demonstrated the gentry’s predilection for the old Polish-Lithuanian court system, for a parliament with exclusive participation by the gentry, and for the “golden liberties” still enjoyed by the szlachta just across the border in Poland. Yet, the same council had also shown a strong attachment to the traditional Cossack system of administration, with some notables even advocating a hereditary hetmancy. On some points—Ukrainian autonomy and the recognition of the Ukrainian szlachta—they agreed. On others—the authority of the hetman and the need for the traditional Cossack administration—they conflicted.

Despite these differences in political outlook, the Ukrainian gentry at the Legislative Commission rallied to Poletyka’s program. The primary reason for their support was that Catherine had eliminated, de facto, all viable alternatives. Her harsh rebuke to Hetman Rozumovs’kyi made the concept of a hereditary hetmancy virtually synonymous with treason. Government suppression of the gentry who called for the election of a new hetman, and the close surveillance of Ivan Skoropads’kyi clearly showed Catherine’s disapproval of the traditional elected hetmancy and Cossack administration. Poletyka’s gentry republicanism was the only option left. Moreover, it included two elements that Catherine seemed to favor.

First, Poletyka’s attitude toward the hetmancy did not differ greatly from Catherine’s wish that “when the hetmans are gone from Little Russia, every effort should be made to eradicate from memory the period and the hetmans.” Second, Catherine and her advisers believed that the most pressing reform for the Hetmanate was to differentiate “military from civilian administration.”¹⁹⁵ Poletyka also insisted on such separation, by a return to native practices abandoned after the Khmel’nits’kyi uprising. At a time when the Nizhyn gentry had been punished for demanding a hetman, Poletyka offered the

¹⁹⁵ Catherine to Olsuf’ev, no date, RA 2 (1863): 189.
Ukrainian elite an attractive alternative—a program that was clearly for autonomy and that took fully into account the gentry’s political, social, and economic interests, but which avoided an open rift with the Russian administration. His program, then, made Poletyka the chief spokesman for Ukrainian rights.

Catherine, however, was uninterested in any form of autonomy, whether of the gentry republican or more traditional Cossack type. If implemented, Poletyka’s program would have severely circumscribed the Russian imperial bureaucracy, and it would have given the Ukrainian gentry much greater privileges than those enjoyed by the Russian dvorianstvo. Moreover, despite Poletyka’s repeated assertions to the contrary, his program was incongruous with the very principles of autocracy. It would certainly have obstructed Catherine’s goal of a well-regulated, uniformly structured state.

The outbreak of the Turkish war ended the sessions of the general assembly, although some committees continued to function. The nakazy and the debates revealed the necessity for reform and the obstacles such reforms would encounter. The Legislative Commission provided Catherine with useful information when, during more peaceful times, she would again take up internal reforms. For the time being, however, the autonomous regions had succeeded in retaining their previous status.

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The Legislative Commission had revealed a close tie between support for Ukrainian autonomy and social structure. In the Hetmanate the gentry, Cossacks, clergy, and burghers formed separate social groups comparable to estates. Each of these groups possessed distinct autonomous rights and privileges, which it sought to protect from the encroachment of both the central imperial authorities and the other estates. The Hetmanate did not have a diet or any representative body that could unite the various segments of Ukrainian society on a regional basis vis-à-vis Russia. To be sure, the hetman and the central Cossack institutions did, at times, play a unifying role, but these offices were closely connected with the gentry and Cossacks and were frequently in conflict with the burghers and higher clergy. Lack of a central integrating body and social antagonisms were perennial
weaknesses that made a common struggle for autonomy difficult. This was evident in the elections of deputies to the Legislative Commission, where each estate had presented its own defense of autonomy.

It is hardly surprising that the gentry had emerged as the most politically conscious estate. Despite the leveling of authority by the Russian imperial government, they still maintained political control over the Hetmanate. The gentry regarded the Hetmanate as a separate political entity with an ancient history and "confirmed privileges." Interlaced with this political tradition were specific problems of the gentry's power, status, and wealth. The elections had proven that the Ukrainian officers were determined to maintain their position. Before any successful integration of the Hetmanate into the empire was possible, the imperial government would have to consider the interests of the Ukrainian gentry.

The Ukrainian gentry had to be reassured that at least their wealth and status in the Hetmanate would be recognized and that they would have access to positions in the central imperial bureaucracy. This approach would erode the tradition of Ukrainian political distinctness, especially if all the gentry's honors and offices were dependent solely upon the center. Until Catherine took some measures along this line, however, the Ukrainian gentry remained the most vocal and articulate defender of the Hetmanate's political separateness, together with their own political, social, and economic prerogatives.

Some of the higher clergy, especially the Kiev metropolitan, viewed the church in the Hetmanate as a separate autonomous entity. Corresponding to the hetman in the secular realm, the metropolitan of "Kiev, Halych and all Little Russia" was the religious primate for the Hetmanate. Yet, while the secular hetman ruling an autonomous principality had until recently been a reality, a metropolitan governing a separate church in the Hetmanate was only a seventeenth-century memory.

Autonomy had a more limited meaning for the rest of the Ukrainian clergy. For the monks, it signified the retention of large monastic landholdings, which in Russia had been secularized, and the return of properties seized by the Cossack administration. For the two independent monasteries, Ukrainian autonomy denoted continued exemption from the local church hierarchy. For the parish clergy, it meant equal status with the gentry, which in practical terms included such preroga-
tives as brewing alcohol and farming estates with the help of peasant labor. The clergy attempted to prove that all these privileges were rooted in Ukrainian traditions, various guarantees, and the Lithuanian Statute.

Despite the abuse the regular Cossacks received from officers and the gentry, they, too, had specific interests in maintaining Ukrainian autonomy. The only alternatives were service in the regular Russian army or peasant status, neither of which was palatable. In the existing system, at least in theory, the regular Cossacks were equal to the gentry and could elect their officers. But this nominal equality conflicted with the desires of the gentry, who wanted exclusive rights to all offices and separate courts for the nobility.

The burghers also wanted to maintain ancient rights and privileges, including Magdeburg Law, but to them this meant regaining political and administrative control of the towns from the Cossack administration and subordinating all town dwellers to town authority. The burghers also wanted exclusive control of trade and manufacture, which conflicted with prerogatives claimed by the gentry, Cossacks, and clergy.

In sum, Ukrainian rights and privileges had a multiplicity of meanings for the segments of Ukrainian society. At times the rights of various groups complemented and reinforced each other; at other times, they conflicted with and occasionally even negated each other. Each social group, however, had some tangible stake in autonomy.

It was in Moscow and in St. Petersburg that Ukrainians realized to what extent the privileges of each estate were interrelated and equally threatened. During both long and arduous sessions of the general assembly, the delegation from the Hetmanate acted in complete harmony and unity. Not once did a Cossack or a burgher speak against a member of the szlachta. The Ukrainian gentry, in turn, opposed the introduction of full serfdom, in order to preserve the Hetmanate's current legal institutions and social arrangements.

The unanimity was probably due in large measure to the gentry's control of the delegation, but the Cossack and burgher deputies were not mere stooges of the gentry—some had even been elected in opposition to them. Moreover, on most issues the Hetmanate’s delegation had the consistent support of the representatives from Sloboda Ukraine, southern Ukraine, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and the city of Kiev. Clearly, a regional interest group had formed. The deputies
from the Hetmanate itself had closed ranks because they had perceived that the major threat to their particular estate rights was coming from the outside—namely, from the imperial government and from social groups within the Russian core. In these circumstances autonomy was something familiar and valuable to all the Ukrainian deputies. Yet change was imminent, because the imperial government was advocating thorough reforms.

In their anxiety about the future, the Ukrainians looked back to an idealized, largely mythical past, when noble officers had been the unquestioned highest authority in a virtually independent polity, when Cossacks had been an elite of privileged warriors, when burghers had controlled bustling towns and cities, and when the clergy had administered their own branch of the Orthodox church.
CHAPTER SIX

The Triumph of Russian Centralism: Imperial Reforms and the Integration of the Hetmanate

Russian Centralism and Borderland Unrest

While the Legislative Commission revealed opposition to Russian centralism from the elites of well-established privileged areas, a series of revolts dramatically underscored the even greater discontent of tribal peoples, nomads, and Cossacks. At a time when the Russian Empire was engaged in a war against the Ottoman Empire, it was shaken by rebellions all along its southern and eastern frontiers, from Poland to Dzungaria. For some of the Cossack hosts and tribal peoples this was a last stand against the increasing impingement on their way of life by the "regulated" Russian state.

On this long frontier, the imperial administration was faced with two interconnected problems: the vigorous assertion of traditional rights by various Cossack hosts and ethnic groups against the steady incursion by Russian imperial authority, and the social discontent of the rank-and-file Cossacks and peasants against their own officers and landowners. The latter problem was much more acute on the borderlands, because the discontented were both frequently armed and relatively free and could voice their dissatisfaction by recourse to violence. Such outbursts contained the danger of spreading to the more central provinces of the empire and thus challenging its basic social relationship—that of lord and serf.

Social unrest was rampant throughout much of the Ukraine. On the Right Bank—under Polish rule—a bloody jacquerie led by Zaporozhian Cossacks was finally put down in 1768–69 with the aid of Rus-
sian troops.\textsuperscript{1} This uprising had repercussions in the Hetmanate, as some of the rebels crossed the border and sparked a series of Cossack and peasant revolts.\textsuperscript{2} These were usually minor incidents, but a major uprising did occur in the village of Klischchyns\textsuperscript{3}. Having registered the Cossacks living in this village as peasants, the local landowning family—the Lysenkos—attempted to exact corresponding labor obligations. The Cossacks appealed this matter to the courts and the central imperial administration, but their efforts were negated through the intercessions of General Chancellor Vasy\textsuperscript{3}l' Tumans'\textsuperscript{3}kyi—Lysenko's brother-in-law. Enraged by this maneuver, the villagers destroyed the Lysenko estate (1767). By this action, governmental authorities were drawn into the dispute. Neither expeditions of Cossack troops nor the entreaties of various Cossack and Russian officers succeeded in subduing the town's inhabitants. Finally, in 1769, government troops crushed the uprising by force, killing seven rebels and capturing fifty-three. Subsequently, 176 insurgents were brought to trial. The leaders of the uprising were banished to Siberia, while the rank-and-file Cossacks were deprived of their Cossack status and enserfed.

South of the Hetmanate, in the Zaporozhian Sich itself, some of the most impoverished Cossacks mutinied. The koshovyi (commander), Petro Kal'nyshchev's\textsuperscript{3}kyi, and the starshyna were forced to seek the protection of a Russian garrison. After the uprising had been suppressed by Russian troops, an inquiry revealed that the rebels wanted to elect a

\textsuperscript{1} The three principal leaders—Maksym Zalizniak, Myktya Shvachka, and Semen Nezhyvyi—came from Zaporizhia. For the connection of this uprising (Koliuvshchyna) with the Zaporozhians see V. Hrekov, "Zaporozhes'kyi Kish ta Koliuvshchyna," \textit{Ukraina}, 1928, no. 4, pp. 14–20; and V. O. Holobut's'kyi, \textit{Zaporiz'ka Sich v ostanni chasy svoho isuvannia} (Kiev, 1961), pp. 365–411. The more important works dealing with the Koliuvshchyna are: Ia. Shul'gin, \textit{Ocherk Koliuvshchiny po neizdannym i izdannym dokumentam 1768 i blyzhaishikh godov} (Kiev: 1890); Kost' Huslystyi, \textit{Koliuvshchyna} (Kiev: 1947); Koliuvshchyna 1768; Materi\textit{aly inviklinoi naukovoii sesii pryshchenoi 200-richchiu povstannia} (Kiev: 1970). For recent literature on the topic see Zenon E. Kohut, "Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the Koliuvshchyna in Recent Historiography," \textit{Harvard Ukrainian Studies} 1, no. 3 (September 1977): 359–78.

\textsuperscript{2} V. A. Golobutskii (Holobut's'kyi), \textit{Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo} (Kiev, 1957), pp. 398–412.

\textsuperscript{3} The Klischchyns\textsuperscript{3} uprising is described in detail by A. Lazarevskii, "Istoricheskie ocherki poluvskoi lubenschchiny XVII–XVIII vv.," \textit{ChIONL}, bk. 11 (1896), pp. 158–93.
new starshyna; appropriate all funds, arms, and ammunition; and then seek Turkish protection.\(^4\) Sporadic outbreaks against the starshyna occurred in various Zaporozhian units between 1770 and 1774.\(^5\)

In 1769 the revolt spread to several Lancer army units in the recently created Novorossia guberniia.\(^6\) Recruited from the Cossacks of the Hetmanate and the general populace, the Lancers did not wish to submit to regular military discipline. Many of the Zaporozhian Cossacks sent to quell the Lancers joined the rebellion. Finally, in 1770, regular Russian army troops and Don Cossacks succeeded in suppressing the uprising.

Dependent upon Russian authority and military strength to suppress social conflict, the Zaporozhian elite nevertheless vehemently opposed any Russian limitation of their autonomy. Petro Kal’nyshchevs’kyi, the same koshovyi who was forced to seek Russian protection from his own subordinates, attempted to regain Zaporozhian territories absorbed by the Russian administration.\(^7\) While various imperial commissions studied the Zaporozhians’ territorial claims, the Host began a policy of harassing those colonists imported by the imperial government and simultaneously accepting other settlers under Cossack protection.\(^8\) In his exasperation at the lack of progress in settling Zaporozhian grievances, Kal’nyshchevs’kyi even threatened to seek Turkish protection for the Host\(^9\)—the same political alternative advocated by

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\(^6\) Kosti Huslystyi in Z istorii kliaasovoi borot’by v stepovoi Ukraini (Kharkiv: 1933), pp. 41–59.


the Cossacks who had revolted against the starshyna. Suspicion of Zaporozhian separatism was heightened by rumors of secret negotiations with Polish confederates.\textsuperscript{10}

The imperial government viewed the Zaporozhians as fomentors of social unrest, as a serious impediment to imperial colonization of the South, and as dangerous potential separatists. While the Zaporozhians were part of the imperial forces fighting the Turks, however, no action against them was possible. On the contrary, the Zaporozhians received imperial honors, decorations, and assurances that their territorial grievances would soon be rectified.\textsuperscript{11}

Separatist tendencies were also in evidence among the Zaporozhians' eastern neighbors, the Don Cossacks. In 1771 the ataman of the Don host, Stepan Efremov, was accused of secret dealings with Tatar and Caucasian rulers—namely, the Kabardinian princes and the Kumyk prince Temir.\textsuperscript{12} Supposedly, the ataman did not pursue the military campaign against the Tatars because of this "conspiracy." In any case, Efremov discharged his forces in 1769 and did not move against the Crimean Tatars. Nor did he and the Don Cossacks join the Second Army as ordered by the Military College in 1770–71. In brief, Efremov refused to allow the Russian military to command the Don Cossacks at will. When summoned to St. Petersburg for an explanation of his actions, Efremov refused to comply and, with

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Cossack aid, evaded capture until October 1772. Once captured, Efremov’s original sentence of death for treason was commuted to life imprisonment in 1773. A special imperial commission was created to investigate the affair and proceeded to question fifty of Efremov’s closest supporters.

Cossack unrest was not confined to Zaporizhzhia or the Don. Indeed, it was much stronger in the Ural region, where the Iaik Cossacks, like other Cossack hosts, endeavored to prevent the constant erosion of their autonomy. The Cossacks were directly subject to the governor-general of Orenburg, and even the ataman was appointed by the imperial government. The Iaik starshina was dependent on Russian imperial authority for the maintenance and improvement of its socioeconomic position to a much greater extent than was the Zaporozhian. Rank-and-file Cossacks, therefore, began viewing the Russian administration as both the suppressor of their Cossack rights and as their class enemy. This hatred was reinforced by religious antagonism: the Iaik Cossacks were nearly all Old Believers, while the imperial administration consisted of adherents to the official Orthodox church. Bypassing their immediate superiors—the governor-general of Orenburg and the War College—the Iaik Cossacks repeatedly petitioned the empress for a redress of grievances against the imperial administration and starshina.

In 1772, frustrated by their lack of success, the Iaik Cossacks revolted. They slaughtered the local Russian garrison, killing its commander, General Traubenberg; pillaged the homes of the pro-Russian starshina; and, in accordance with ancient custom, attempted to elect new officers. In June 1772 a punitive expedition led by General Freiman crushed the rebellion. Even prior to this revolt, St. Petersburg planned to abolish the remnants of Iaik self-government and to subordinate these Cossacks to regular Russian military authority. This plan

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was not implemented. Moreover, eighty-six Cossacks were arrested, and all others were required to pay a sum total of 36,756 rubles in penalties.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition to the Iaik Cossacks, the Volga region was inhabited by two other groups that resisted assimilation—the Bashkirs and Kalmyks. The Bashkirs were a nomadic Turkic people of Islamic faith who gradually drifted under vague Russian protection in the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{16} From this time, Russian settlers began penetrating into their pastoral lands. This process was accelerated by the development of the Ural mining industry in the eighteenth century. Hemmed in on all sides by the Russian authorities, the Bashkirs responded with a series of revolts—1646, 1662, 1680, 1705–20, 1735–40 and 1755. As late as 1772, Governor Reinsdorp reported the existence of a Bashkir conspiracy to the War College, but no action was taken.\textsuperscript{17}

The Kalmyks were Buddhist Oirat Mongols who wandered from Dzungaria to the Volga area at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. The authority of the Kalmyk khan was severely limited after their acceptance of Russian protection:\textsuperscript{18} officials were no longer appointed by the khan but were elected by the various clans and confirmed by the Russian administration. Russian colonization of pasture lands, increased interference in Kalmyk affairs, and particularly attempts to extract greater military service contributed to the decision of Khan Ubasha and the Kalmyk notables to return to Mongolia.

In January 1771, the Kalmyks (30,969 families) left “Russian protection” \textit{en masse} and began the journey to their ancestral homeland.\textsuperscript{19} Alarmed at the loss of such a large populace, Catherine and the Imperial Council determined to use all possible means to prevent their exodus. Following the failure of regular Russian troops to overtake the Kalmyks, the Russians resorted to the old policy of divide and

\textsuperscript{15} John T. Alexander, \textit{Autocratic Politics . . .}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{16} For general information on the Bashkirs see \textit{Ocherki po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR} (Ufa: 1956), vol. 1, pt. 1.
\textsuperscript{17} John T. Alexander, \textit{Autocratic Politics . . .}, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{18} Reliable general studies about the Kalmyks are M. Novoletov’s \textit{Kalmyki. Istoricheskii ocherk} (St. Petersburg: 1884), and \textit{Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR. dookhtab’skii period} (Moscow: 1967).
\textsuperscript{19} M. Novoletov, \textit{Kalmyki . . .}, pp. 45–46; \textit{Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR . . .}, p. 216.
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rule, persuading the Kalmyks’ long-term enemy, the Kazakhs, to attack and harass the Kalmyks. Despite the mounting death toll wrought by fighting, hunger, and the loss of much of their livestock, the Kalmyks reached Dzungaria and pledged allegiance to the Chinese emperor.

Enraged by these events, Catherine ordered the Kalmyk khanate liquidated and the position of khan abolished. The various clan leaders of the 4,706 Kalmyk families who remained in the Volga were now forced to deal directly with the Russian administration through a separate Department of Kalmyk Affairs established at the chancellery of the Astrakhan governor.20

With the suppression of the Iaik Cossacks and the government’s assertion of greater control over the Bashkirs and remaining Kalmyks, the Volga region was outwardly quiet and subdued. The imperial government’s ascendancy over this region was more apparent than real, however. Soon the area was inflamed by the greatest uprising of eighteenth-century Russia—the Pugachev rebellion. Far from being simply a jacquerie, the uprising actually resulted from the interplay of three factors: the Cossack problem, ethnic heterogeneity, and intense social discontent. Pugachev himself was a Don Cossack and the Iaik Cossacks were among his most ardent supporters. In the initial stages of the revolt, the Orenburg road was guarded by a small detachment of Ukrainian Cossacks who surrendered the Iletsk fortress to Pugachev.21 Other Cossack formations proved equally unreliable. In response to Pugachev’s “decrees” restoring Cossack privileges, the Volga Host went over to the rebels.22 Catherine’s attempt to stem the revolt by making use of inter-Cossack rivalries also failed. In January 1774, she ordered Cossacks from the Hetmanate to join military operations against Pugachev because “they [the Ukrainian Cossacks] have shown a long-standing hatred towards the Iaik Cossacks.”23 This detach-

20 Ocherki istorii Kalmyskoi ASSR . . . , p. 221.
ment, however, "disappeared" by July without having engaged the enemy.²⁴

Posing as Peter III, Pugachev issued manifestos not only to the Cossacks but also to the Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Tatars, and Kazakhs (called Kirghiz in the eighteenth century), promising them "all their lands and pastures, money payments, lead, powder and provisions."²⁵ Many responded by joining Pugachev. Without the military expertise provided by the various Cossack formations, the Bashkirs, and the Kalmyks, Pugachev would not have been able to sustain his revolt as long as he did. The complexity of this so-called "peasant war" is indicated by the fact that aristocratic Bashkirs joined the rebellion, while Bashkir raiding parties attacked all Russian settlers, including those supporting Pugachev.²⁶

A thorough governmental investigation followed the suppression of the Pugachev rebellion.²⁷ At the outset, the possibility of foreign conspiracy—including French intrigue and connections with Polish confederates—was examined. Failing to substantiate this theory, the investigators attempted to link the Old Believers with the rebellion. There was, however, no basis for such supposition. Although the Iaik Cossacks were Old Believers, Pugachev and many of his followers adhered to Orthodoxy, while other rebels were of Islamic or Buddhist faith. Finally, in their report to Catherine, P. S. Potemkin and Prince Mikhail Nikitich Volkonskii concluded that "if this miscreant had not stumbled upon the aforementioned Iaik Cossacks, whose rebellious souls were living in disarray, he could nowise have brought about such evil by his base fabrications in any part of your Imperial Majesty's empire."²⁸ Thus, Cossack unrest was assessed as a prime factor in making such a large-scale uprising possible.

As a result, the central government decided to make all Cossack formations completely subordinate to imperial needs. In June 1774, Grigori A. Potemkin, the vice president of the War College and

²⁵ John T. Alexander, Autocratic Politics . . . , pp. 59–60. Alexander provides a very useful overview of the Pugachev revolt and the voluminous scholarly literature dealing with it.
²⁶ Ocherki po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR . . . , vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 228.
²⁸ Ibid., p. 203; P8Z, no. 14,235 (January 15, 1775), 20: 15–16.
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governor-general of Novorossiia, assumed command over all irregular troops and Cossack formations. Acting on Potemkin's suggestion, Catherine summarily renamed the Iaik territory the Ural and the Iaik Cossacks the Ural Cossacks. Their capital, Iaitsk, became Ural'sk. An increased number of Russian garrisons were to assure order in the Urals, and the commanders and chancellery of the renamed Cossacks were to be directly appointed by the Russian administration. The Volga Cossack Host was disbanded and its members—many of whom also aided Pugachev—were forcibly transferred to the Caucasus.

Even the Don Cossacks, who remained loyal throughout the Pugachev revolt, did not escape the new regulations. On the recommendation of Potemkin, Catherine issued an ukaz regulating the appointment of Cossack officers on a par with Russian military ranks and, in the nonmilitary realm, imposing imperial norms on judicial procedures and trade. With these restrictions, the Don Cossacks were reduced from a self-governing Cossack host to a privileged, but controlled, body of imperial soldiers. In advising this action, Potemkin reminded the empress that Cossack autonomy had enabled the Don's former ataman, Stepan Efremov, to carry out his treacherous activities.

Hardest hit by Catherine's anti-Cossack policy were the Zaporozhians. Despite their restlessness, separatist tendencies, and possibly a few pro-Pugachev connections, the Zaporozhians had fought valiantly against the Turks in the recently concluded Russian-Ottoman War. The Russian victory over the Ottoman Empire and the annexation of Crimea, however, ended the historic role of the Zaporozhians as a buffer between the empire and Turkey. The Russian government now viewed the Zaporozhian lands as an unnecessarily autonomous

29 S. G. Svatikov, Rossiiia i Don, p. 225.
31 PSZ, no. 14,464 (May 5, 1776), 20: 374–75.
32 PSZ, no. 14,251 (February 14, 1775), 20: 53–55.
33 S. G. Svatikov, Rossiiia i Don, pp. 231–32.
34 Ukrainian Soviet historians have attempted to connect the Zaporozhians with the Pugachev rebellion. Until recently, however, they have succeeded only in establishing that a few individual Zaporozhians joined Pugachev. See V. O. Holubots'kyi, Zaporiz'ka Sich . . ., pp. 396–407. I. G. Rozner, "Omelian Puhachov i Ukraina," UIZh, no. 9 (1973), pp. 63–74, claims that Pugachev was present in the Right Bank Ukraine at the time of the Kolivshchyna uprising (1768), in Zaporozhia, and in the Hetmanate.
enclave that impeded imperial colonization and as a center for rebellion and even sedition. Thus on June 4, 1775, during the Pentecost holidays, Russian armies en route from the Turkish wars launched a surprise attack on the Zaporozhian Sich.35 The Sich itself was sacked and the Zaporozhians dispersed. Some Cossacks escaped to the protection of the Turkish sultan, others were impressed into Russian military service, still others remained as free farmers. On August 3, 1775, Catherine herself issued a manifesto denouncing the Zaporozhians and justifying her actions.36

According to Catherine, however, Cossack unrest was only one of two primary causes for the spread and ferocity of the Pugachev rebellion. Equally to blame was the inability of the Russian civil administration to maintain control over vast areas of the empire. As Catherine wrote to Panin: "I must say in answer to you that I consider the weak conduct of civilian and military government in the various localities to be as injurious to the public welfare as Pugachev and his motley rabble."37 In the unpublished version of her manifesto on Pugachev, Catherine scorned local administration for its weakness, negligence, and laziness and asserted that "everywhere that the scoundrels encountered firmness and resistance, there they obtained no success."38

Thus, Catherine blamed the local administration for permitting the unrest to reach such massive proportions. She hardly realized that it was precisely the impingement of the Russian administration on the traditional life of the Cossacks and natives that had generated the

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38 SIRIO, 27 (1880), pp. 162–64, as quoted in Robert E. Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775," p. 507. These words were deleted from the official manifesto: PSZ, no. 14,230 (December 19, 1774), 19: 1064–1067.
conflict. To Catherine, the Cossacks and tribal peoples were on a lower level of development and had to be brought up to the same way of life and institutions as the core of the empire. The means for such a transformation was enlightened government, particularly on the local level. Catherine firmly believed that once the Cossacks and natives tasted the fruits of enlightened rule they would lose their unruly ways and ultimately would become civilized and grateful subjects. But the introduction of enlightened rule in the borderlands was hardly possible without restructuring Russia’s government and institutions.

Reorganizing Russia

The borderland unrest had shown that, far from bringing enlightenment and fostering provincial development, Russia’s local administration was not even able to maintain order. Proposals for administrative reforms had been under review from virtually the time Catherine assumed the throne. For a while, she placed her hopes on the Legislative Commission. A special subcommittee, “On the Structure of the State in Matters of Public Law,” considered administrative reforms from 1768 to 1771. Although this subcommittee did not produce a comprehensive plan for reform, its deliberations did help to establish the following basic principles for reorganizing provincial Russia: restructuring local administration in a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal way; reorganizing Russia into approximately equal-sized administrative units; separating judicial, administrative, and financial functions; setting up a new structure for “policing” society; and having elected members of social groups—primarily the nobility—perform some local government functions.

The Turkish war, the borderland unrest, and the first partition of Poland so preoccupied Catherine and her advisers that any application of these principles had to be postponed. By 1775, however, the

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41 de Madanaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, pp. 277–82. Robert E. Jones, Provincial Development in Russia: Catherine II and Jacob Sievers (New Brunswick: 1984): 82.
imperial authorities were finally free to concentrate on the long-awaited reform. Having just witnessed the empire’s fragility, Catherine no longer considered provincial reform as a long-term goal, but accorded it top priority. The Basic Statute for the Administration of the Provinces of the Russian Empire was prepared in less than ten months and promulgated on November 7, 1775.\footnote{Jones, \textit{Provincial Development in Russia}, p. 87. Catherine wrote Voltaire that she completed this legislation in just five months; \textit{SIRIO}, 27 (1880), p. 57. Perhaps this referred to the period of her most intensive effort, for she actually began work in late January and the law was not ready until November. Thus, about nine months elapsed between the law’s initial conception and its promulgation.}

The Statute on the Provinces provided for the most comprehensive administrative reorganization since the time of Peter I. It standardized imperial provinces and districts. Each province was to contain three hundred thousand to four hundred thousand souls and to be subdivided into districts not exceeding thirty thousand souls.\footnote{\textit{PSZ}, no. 14,392 (November 7, 1775), 20: 229–304. In the official document, the term \textit{dusha} (soul) is used to designate the population of provinces and districts (see pp. 231–32). Only male peasants were considered souls. Thus the total population would be somewhat larger: up to 700,000 for each province and 70,000 for each district. Most textbooks, however, give the number of souls as the total population.} The governor-general, or \textit{namestnik}, was the imperial vicegerent in one or several provinces. He represented the autocrat on the provincial level and was empowered with extraordinary executive authority. A governor, vice governor, procurator, surveyor, treasurer, and director of economy presided over several provincial agencies—Treasury Board, Board of Civil Affairs, Board of Criminal Affairs, and Department of Public Welfare. These agencies corresponded to the central institutions of the empire and were designed to assume much of the responsibility and workload of the central bodies, while simultaneously coordinating the functions of the district officials.

Finances were of primary concern. The Treasury Board (\textit{kazennata palata}) of each province—consisting of a vice governor, director of economy, three assessors, three counselors, and a provincial treasurer—directed all state incomes and expenditures, conducted censuses, audited the financial records of all governmental institutions,
and oversaw the construction of all public buildings. For State revenues were collected by a subsidiary agency of the Board—the Expedition for State Incomes (Ekspeditsia o gosudarstvenykh dokhodakh). For this purpose, the Expedition maintained a treasurer (kaznachei) in each provincial district.

The backbone of the provincial reform was a fairly well developed public order and judicial system. It was designed not only to foster public tranquillity, but also had the positive function of bringing the government program to the town and village level. On the provincial level, public order was administered by a committee consisting of the governor and two councillors. This committee acted as an intermediary between the central government and local institutions. It announced all decrees issued by the autocrat, the Senate, and other central institutions and saw to their application in the provinces. It was responsible for local adherence to all government regulations and for peace and tranquility in the province. Finally, it supervised the selection of local police personnel and directed their activities.

The organization of the local police force was quite simple. It was divided into two basic units—urban and rural. Each district maintained a lower land court (nizhnii zemskii sud) consisting of land chief or captain (zemskii kapitan or zemskii ispravnik) and four assessors. The land chief and two assessors were elected by the nobility, while the other two officers were chosen by Cossacks or state peasants. Estate stewards and village elders assisted these officials in performing their duties.

Urban regulatory functions were defined further by the Police Ordinance of 1782, a measure epitomizing seventeenth-century cameralist thought on the well-ordered society. The Police Ordinance not only provided for maintaining public order in towns but attempted to regulate all aspects of town life. The urban police were to oversee build-

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ing codes, maintain sanitary conditions, and prevent fire hazards. They were also to control drunkenness, prostitution, loitering, and all forms of misconduct.\textsuperscript{46}

The Police Ordinance divided towns into sections (\textit{chasti}) and subdivided them further into blocks (\textit{kvarialy}). Each block was to have a policeman and a deputy policeman. In each town, a police board (\textit{uprava blagochinii}) was instituted, composed of a town provost (\textit{gorodnichii}), two commissioners—one for criminal and one for civil affairs (\textit{pristav ugodovnykh del, pristav grazhdanskih del})—and two counselors (\textit{ratmany}) from the town magistry. The town provost was appointed by the Senate on the recommendation of the governor, while the commissioners rose through the ranks of the provincial administration. Only the two counselors were elected by townsmen, and even they were subject to confirmation by the town provost. Other minor police officials—ward inspectors, assistant commissioners, fire inspectors, and even chimney sweeps—assisted the police board. In towns where troops were garrisoned, however, the town provost and the police board were either replaced by the military command or subordinated to it. In fact, the police apparatus was reinforced by special military units (\textit{shtatnye kommandy}) stationed in provincial and district capitals. In case of serious disorders, the police could always depend on the support of regular troops dispatched on request by the governor.

Backing the regulatory apparatus established by the Statute on the Provinces and the Police Ordinance was a well-defined judiciary. The Statute on the Provinces provided for separate but parallel court systems for the nobility, townsmen, and rural inhabitants (\textit{poseliane}).\textsuperscript{47} At the local level, the law introduced a district court (\textit{uezdnyi sud}) for the nobility and peasants under their jurisdiction, a town magistracy (\textit{gorodovyi magistrat}) for the townsmen, and a lower rural court

\textsuperscript{46} Jones, \textit{Provincial Development in Russia}, pp. 94–99.

(nizhniaia rasprava) for rural inhabitants, that is, state peasants and Cossacks. Members of the district court were elected by the nobility; joined by the nobility’s district marshal, they formed a Court of Wards, which protected the property rights of widows and orphans. Similarly, the members of the Town Magistracy were chosen by the townsman; together with the town’s mayor (glava) and its elder (starosta) they constituted the town’s orphans’ court. In each district capital an informal, verbal court (slovesnyi sud) settled minor disputes of merchants and craftsmen. Lastly, a judge appointed by the provincial administration presided over the lower rural court, whose other officials were selected by the state peasants and Cossacks who fell under its jurisdiction.

Decisions made at the district level could be appealed to the provincial courts: the superior land court for cases involving the nobility, their peasants, and raznochintsy; the provincial magistracy for town inhabitants; and the superior rural court for state peasants and Cossacks. In some cases, all of these could serve as a court of first instance. The superior land court was divided into two separate departments—criminal and civil—and the provincial magistracy maintained separate court divisions—one for merchants, the other for craftsmen. The verdict of these provincial courts could be reviewed by the board of criminal affairs (Palata ugolovnogo suda) or the board of civil affairs (Palata grazhdanskogo suda). The boards were the highest provincial judicial authority—their decisions could be appealed only to the imperial Senate. Chairmen of both the provincial courts and their separate departments were designated by the Senate, while other presiding judges were elected. All board officials—chairmen, judges, procurators, assessors, and advisers—were appointed by the Senate.

In addition to this judicial hierarchy, there was one more court, the conscience court (sovesnyi sud), which adjudicated cases for which normal procedures and penalties were inapplicable, particularly those involving minors and the insane. Its members were elected by all segments of society—nobility, townspeople, state peasants—subject to approval by the governor-general. The conscience court was entrusted with cases of witchcraft and sorcery, as well as investigation of instances of false arrest or imprisonment without issuance of charges—a weak echo of the principle of habeas corpus. In civil cases, the conscience court arbitrated disputes; that is, the two contest-
ing parties agreed in advance to abide by the decision of an imperial judge. 48

The Statute on the Provinces also established rudimentary social welfare agencies. Each province's Department of Public Welfare (Prikaz obschestvennogo prizrenia), chaired by the governor, was entrusted with the establishment and financial support of schools, orphanages, hospitals, and homes for the aged and the insane. Governmental, educational, and social welfare services were still quite rare, and, if available at all, they were provided by the church and private benefactors. 49

Having assigned specific functions in the provincial administration to elected representatives of Russia's major social groups, Catherine now attempted to regulate, stimulate, and, to some extent, create a social order patterned on European estates. On her birthday on April 21, 1785, Catherine issued charters to both the nobility and the towns. The Charter to the Nobility confirmed a number of personal and property rights and exempted the nobles from taxation. It established provincial nobles' associations as legal entities having rights and duties. Each provincial association elected its own officials, maintained its headquarters, recorded information on its membership, and performed a number of cultural and charitable activities. The nobles on the district level also elected their own officials and performed many similar functions. 50

In giving the nobles a role in provincial administration and in organizing corporate activities of the nobles on a provincial basis, Catherine hoped to bring initiative, development, and civilization into the provinces. In this task the nobles were to assist the government rather than compete with it. In enlisting the aid of the nobles, Catherine recognized how limited the government had been in even reaching the countryside.


49 de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, p. 283.

50 The provisions of the charter are discussed at length in Robert E. Jones, The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762–1785 (Princeton: 1973), pp. 272–99; see also de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, pp. 296–99.
The Charter to the Towns had a similar purpose in stimulating urban development. The town was made a corporate entity with a complicated scheme for organizing its society, but the merchants and artisans received few special privileges and had to share authority with nobles and other town residents. Moreover, the elected town council, which selected the mayor, municipal judges, and town representatives on the police board, was overshadowed by the bureaucratic apparatus outlined in the Statute on the Provinces and the Statute on Police. Perhaps Catherine did not believe that the town residents could be readily channeled toward independent productive activity and needed greater guidance and control than the nobles. Moreover, the government exerted greater control in the towns because they were centers for various provincial and district administrative agencies.

In theory, the governmental system introduced by these reforms was that of an absolutist state administered through a bureaucratic machinery, aided and supplemented by the self-regulation of three social groups: the nobility, the townsmen, and the rural inhabitants (Cossacks and state peasants). The fact that these social groups elected a variety of administrative, judicial, and police officials would seem to bear out this supposition. A closer examination of the functioning of provincial administration indicates that, at least in the rural areas, the state shared the task of local government with the nobility.

On the whole, local rural administration was controlled by the nobility, checked in turn by the state. Nobles enjoyed complete mastery over their own district courts and elected the rural land chiefs and the majority of the police board. Since Cossacks and peasants were not obligated to vote for members of their own social groups, the officials they elected to the police board and Lower Rural Court were also frequently nobles. Thus, by utilizing the state's judicial and

51 The charter is treated in detail by I. Ditiatin, Ustroistvo i upravlenie gorodov Rossii, 1:415–96; A. A. Kizevetter, Gorodovoe polozhenie Ekateriny II 1785 g.; opyi istoricheskogo kommentariia (Moscow: 1909) is, of course, the classic monograph on the subject. A good brief description of the charter is contained in "Gorod i gorodskaiia reforma," Ocherki istorii SSSR: Period feudalizma; Rossii v vtoroi polovine XVIII v. (Moscow: 1956), pp. 151–63; Iu. P. Klokman, Sotsial’noekonomicheskaiia istoriia russkogo goroda; vtoraiia polovina XVIII veka (Moscow: 1967), also includes much valuable information in the introduction of the 1785 charter. For more recent treatment, see de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, pp. 299–304.
police powers, the nobles—absolute lords on their own estates—achieved some influence over those rural inhabitants technically outside their jurisdiction—Cossacks and state peasants.

The towns became the focal point for state control. They were the centers for various provincial and district administrative agencies and their numerous officials, supported by military garrisons. In some towns, military commanders fulfilled police functions. In others, the police force (except for a few minor posts) was part of an appointive system ultimately regulated by the Senate.

Catherine considered other reforms but did not enact them. A Charter to the State Peasantry would have given the state peasants more defined rights and have regulated at least some of the activities in the countryside. It is not clear why Catherine did not proceed. The Second Turkish war (1787–91), the second and third partitions of Poland (1793, 1795), and foreign affairs in general kept Catherine preoccupied. Moreover, the French Revolution may have brought fear of further reform, or perhaps the whole peasant question was considered too volatile to tackle. Catherine also began work on restructuring the central administration in order to make it interact more effectively with the new provincial bodies. But her thoughts in these matters were never even transformed into preliminary legislative drafts.52

While Catherine’s profound reorganization of Russia’s government and society did not follow a rigidly prescribed master plan, it did adhere to certain beliefs and goals. Catherine sought not only to increase the power of the state and the monarch, to obtain greater control over the provinces, and to rationalize and increase revenues, but she also wanted to bring development, enlightenment, and well-being to every corner of her empire. She thought that the best way to achieve this was through active, rational, and enlightened government aided by the more dynamic elements of society. In reorganizing Russia, Catherine attempted to create such a government machinery and lay the foundation for a more active civilized society.

52 For reforms considered but not enacted see de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine, pp. 299–307; and on the peasant question see her “Catherine II and the Serfs: A Reconsideration of Some Problems,” Slavonic and East European Review, 52, no. 126 (January 1974): 34–62.
The Integration of the Hetmanate

The Introduction of the Statute on the Provinces into the Hetmanate

Catherine's intention of eliminating self-governing areas had been clearly stated in 1764. At that time, however, Catherine lacked the model provincial administration to replace the autonomous institutions of those areas, and she favored a cautious, gradual approach to integrating privileged borderlands into the empire. The promulgation of the Statute on the Provinces again raised the question of the status of self-governing areas. Since Catherine believed that the new administration was the principal means of bringing enlightenment into the provinces, she certainly would have favored its introduction into all parts of the empire. Moreover, the borderland unrest could have only intensified her desire to obtain full administrative control in all areas. Indeed, while the Statute on the Provinces was still in preparation, the Imperial Council strongly urged that it be implemented immediately in all parts of the empire.\(^{53}\)

But Catherine proved to be more cautious than the Council. The first draft of the Statute on the Provinces exempted all regions whose rights had been confirmed by previous tsars. Not wishing to be circumscribed by her own law, however, Catherine deleted this passage from the final text.\(^{54}\) Instead, in her presentation of the Statute on the Provinces to the Senate, Catherine included a separate covering letter excluding the Hetmanate and Livonia from its provisions.\(^{55}\)

Most likely, Catherine wanted to first test the new administration in the Russian core area, because only four years later she decided to extend its provisions to the Hetmanate. On May 24, 1779, she instructed Governor-General Rumiantsev to make preparations for the new administration of the Hetmanate.\(^{56}\)

Rumiantsev came to this task with prior experience. He had recently directed the opening of the Kursk province and was in the midst of organizing the Kharkiv province.\(^{57}\) Rumiantsev, however,

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53 Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775," p. 508.
54 V. Grigor'ev, Reforma mestnogo upravlenia pri Ekaterine II, p. 208.
55 Published in ibid., pp. 382–84.
57 Rumiantsev's role in establishing the Kursk province is described in A. Tankov's "K biografii grafa P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiaskogo," Istoričeskiy vestnik, vol. 89 (1902), pp. 930–38. Rumiantsev's reports on the inauguration of both provinces can
could, at best, act only as overall supervisor. As other governors-general of this time, Rumiantsev was heavily burdened by the multiplicity of his duties. In addition to being the Little Russian governor-general, he also commanded all imperial cavalry troops, was responsible for guarding the Polish border, was actively involved in the constant squabbling between Russia and the Crimea, and was directed to assume a variety of state functions outside the Hetmanate.\footnote{This included accompanying the grand duke on his trip to Berlin in 1776. For a summary of Rumiantsev’s varied activities see P. Mal’tov’s “Rumiantsev, graf Petr Aleksandrovich,” pp. 549–64.} Naturally, this left the governor-general with little time for the day-to-day details of administering the Hetmanate. To aid him in this capacity, on his own recommendation, Catherine appointed Andrii Stepanovych Myloradovskyh as subordinate governor of Little Russia.\footnote{The appointment was published in “Raspisazhenie grafu P. A. Rumiantseva po upravleniiu Malorossii,” ChOV, no. 19 (1888), p. 4.}

Myloradovskyh’s appointment was another example of imperial cooptation, the use of the Ukrainian gentry to dismantle Ukrainian institutions. As a member of a highly respected Ukrainian family, Andrii Myloradovskyh’s connections with much of the Ukrainian gentry were well based in kinship, social status, and friendship. His father served as a captain in the Hadiach regiment and his brother was the Chernihiv colonel.\footnote{For general information concerning the Myloradovskyh family see V. L. Modzalevskii, Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik, vol. 3 (L-O), pp. 515–22.} Andrii Myloradovskyh, however, entered Russian military service, quickly rose to the rank of major general, and distinguished himself in two campaigns of the Russo-Turkish War.\footnote{Count Grigorii Aleksandrovich Miloradovich gives a brief biography of his ancestor, Andrii Stepanovych, in Skazaniia o rode dvorian i grafov Miloradovichei (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1873), 1:71–75; and a much more detailed account in Miloradovich Andrii Stepanovych, pokoritel’ Machina v 1771 g., gubernator Chernihivskogo namaestnichestva (1791 g.) s prilozheniem 57 pism k nemu (Chernihiv: 1887).}

Returning to the Hetmanate a much-decorated war hero, Myloradovskyh continued to serve in the military staff of Governor-General Rumiantsev until his appointment as governor.
Governor Myloradovych's first assignment was to conduct a thorough survey and census in the Hetmanate. This was necessitated by the requirement of the Statute on the Provinces that new provinces (námostnichestva) and districts (uezdy) be formed according to the number of inhabitants. For this purpose, Governor Myloradovych called a special commission composed of army officers, notables, and clerks. Working in several units, the commissions systematically surveyed the entire Hetmanate, completing their task by 1781.\textsuperscript{62} Through 1781, Governor Myloradovych and five clerks collated and systematized the data collected, on the basis of which new administrative boundaries were then delineated. On November 24, 1781, Governor Myloradovych finally forwarded the completed description of the "three projected Little Russian provinces" to the Little Russian College.\textsuperscript{63}

In its total disregard for historical and economic considerations, the new territorial distribution was a tribute to mathematical rationality. The Hetmanate was divided into three provinces (námostnichestva)—Kiev, Novgorod-Sivers'k, and Chernihiv—named after the provincial capital of each.\textsuperscript{64} The three provinces were each subdivided into eleven districts named after ten district capitals, with the respective provincial capital also doubling as the eleventh district capital. The boundaries between districts were not, as yet, precisely delineated; this work was continued by the district nobility and state surveyors throughout all of 1782.\textsuperscript{65}

The establishment of new territorial boundaries was only one aspect of the preparations preceding the provincial reform. Before new institutions could be established, Governor-General Rumiantsev was faced with a series of problems stemming from the autonomous tradition of

\textsuperscript{62} The workings of the commission are discussed by P. Fedorenko in the introduction to the Opys Novhorod-sivers'koho namisnytstva (1779–1781 rr.) (Kiev: 1931), pp. 4–21.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{64} A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskogo ..., p. 128.

\textsuperscript{65} Some of the official reports establishing the district boundaries have been published in ChGV, 1886; no. 22, pp. 3–4; no. 24, p. 4; no. 26, p. 4; no. 28, p. 4; no. 29, p. 5; no. 30, p. 5.
the Hetmanate. In an extensive memorandum to Catherine, he outlined these questions and suggested some resolutions.\textsuperscript{66}

He first concentrated on the Ukrainian gentry and its service in the new administration. The Statute on the Provinces restricted participation in elections to many governmental offices exclusively to the nobility. According to Ukrainian tradition, however, the clergy, Cossacks, and burghers were entitled to elect many of these officials. Rumiantsev inquired as to whether the imperial norm would nevertheless be applicable in the Hetmanate. He reminded Catherine that the composition of the Ukrainian nobility was not as yet fully determined and again petitioned for the equalization of Ukrainian and Russian offices and ranks, which would facilitate its delineation. Because of the Hetmanate’s peculiar system of government, Rumiantsev stated, virtually all the gentry possessed a military rank and, consequently, there were hardly any nonserving provincial gentry to fill the new civilian positions. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Ukrainian administration would also necessitate the complete reorganization of the Ukrainian military.

Rumiantsev then discussed the impact of the provincial reforms on the traditional privileges of Cossacks, townsmen, and foreigners. In addition to reiterating the perennial problem of Cossack land ownership and requesting the reinstatement of the Cossack right to sell property, Rumiantsev brought to Catherine’s attention the fact that the Statute on the Provinces failed to indicate which administrative and judicial organs had jurisdiction over the Cossacks. He pointed out that Cossacks in the Hetmanate were always tried in the same courts as the nobility. Similarly, Rumiantsev wanted Catherine to clarify the juridical status of foreign colonists and Russian Old Believers.

Furthermore, the memorandum indicated that the new provincial regulations violated Ukrainian municipal rights. By the provisions of the Magdeburg Law, towns maintained lands outside their territorial limits, and their proceeds were considered a normal source of income for the town treasury. The new imperial regulations forbade such land ownership. Therefore, Rumiantsev requested Catherine’s verdict as to the applicability of this imperial rule to the Hetmanate and the possible disposition of such municipally owned estates. Among the matters

\textsuperscript{66} The memorandum was published as “Doklad grafa P. A. Rumiantseva Imperatritse Ekaterine II 1781 goda,” KS, no. 12 (1884), pp. 693–703.
discussed were the Hetmanate’s postal system and the allocation of
the Ukrainian artillery, especially in regard to the crown lands that
provided its financial support. Rumiantsev recommended that a
special military unit of retired and invalid soldiers be maintained to guard
public buildings in Hlukhiv and that those buildings housing the cen-
tral institutions of the Hetmanate be converted into schools.

In an ukaz issued on October 26, 1781, Catherine answered
Rumiantsev point by point.\textsuperscript{57} The question of military reforms, the
designation of the nobility, and the integration of the Ukrainian postal
system were postponed for future consideration. The problem of Cossack
lands and the equalization of Ukrainian offices and ranks with
their Russian counterparts were ignored. Moreover, Catherine denied
permission for the continuation of the special Hlukhiv military unit
and the conversion of the public buildings in Hlukhiv into schools.
Instead, retired and invalid soldiers were consigned to charity care
while the Hlukhiv public buildings were to continue serving as such
for the Novhorod-Sivers’k province in the future.

On the whole, Catherine adhered to the Statute on the Provinces
rather rigidly. In disregard of Ukrainian tradition, the Cossacks were
placed under the jurisdiction of the higher and lower rural courts—that
is, institutions primarily designated for state peasants. Although Cath-
erine permitted those holding military rank to accept civilian posts,
she insisted that all governmental elections be held in accordance with
imperial norms. Also, she rescinded the right of towns to own prop-
erty outside their limits; all such possessions were to be appropriated
by the state and placed under the director of economy. In fact, all
lands formerly attached to Ukrainian offices and institutions (includ-
ing those of the Ukrainian artillery) were designated as imperial state
lands. Foreign colonists lost their special rights, with only the Nizhyn
Greeks maintaining their privileges.\textsuperscript{68} Finally, Catherine appointed a
special agent, subordinate to the Treasury Board of the Kiev province,
to control the border tariff with Poland.

\textsuperscript{57} PSZ, no. 15,265 (October 26, 1781), 21:295–97; also found in A. Shafonskii,
Chernigovskogo . . . , pp. 130–33.

\textsuperscript{68} At the request of the Greek community, Catherine issued a decree exempting the
Nizhyn Greeks from the provincial reform and again confirmed their special commer-
cial and judicial privileges. See K. Kharlampovych, “Narysy z istorii hrets’koi
This exchange of memoranda and the ukaz clearly indicate that Catherine and Rumiantsev disagreed on the policy to be pursued in the Hetmanate. Not only did Catherine disregard or reject some of Rumiantsev's specific recommendations, but she also diverged on the basic issue of Ukrainian autonomy. Catherine was committed to a quick implementation of provincial reform and strict adherence to the Statute on the Provinces, which precluded the consideration of any regional peculiarities. Rumiantsev, on the other hand, favored a more gradual approach—one that would adapt some norms to local conditions. This was the first indication of a rift between Rumiantsev and Catherine on the policy to be followed in the Hetmanate.

Catherine's policies prevailed and three new provinces—Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Sivers'k—were officially proclaimed on September 16, 1781, and inaugurated in January 1782.\(^\text{69}\) The inauguration ceremony—virtually identical in all three provinces—extended over seven days and included numerous church services, military parades, banquets, balls, masquerades, and firework displays. Set at intervals between the ceremonial functions and festivities were the elections for various governmental posts and the inauguration of most new institutions.\(^\text{70}\)

As the new provincial and district administration was introduced, the old Ukrainian central institutions were dismantled. The first to be abolished was the Ukrainian treasury. Since it functioned as a regional imperial treasury, it had already lost any justification for separate existence. In fact, Governor-General Rumiantsev readily

\(^\text{69}\) For the proclamation establishing the Novhorod-Sivers'k province see PSZ, no. 15,227 (September 16, 1781), 21:246–47, and for the confirmation of the province's administrative posts see PSZ, no. 15,234 (September 18, 1781), 21:271, and Kniga shtatov; for the proclamation establishing Kiev province see PSZ, no. 15,228 (September 16, 1781), 21:246–47, and for the confirmation of the province's administrative posts, PSZ, no. 15,233 (September 18, 1781), 21:271 and Kniga shtatov; for the proclamation establishing the Chernihiv province see PSZ, no. 15,229 (September 16, 1781), 21:247, and for the confirmation of the province's administrative posts, PSZ, no. 15,232 (September 18, 1781), 21:271 and Kniga shtatov.

\(^\text{70}\) These festivities are described in A. Rigel'man, Letopisnoe povestovanie, pt. 4, pp. 38–49; Fedor Kitchenko, "Otkrytie Novgorodseverskogo namiestnichestva 1782 g. ianvaria 8–17 dnia," ChGV, 1848; no. 1, p. 4; no. 2, p. 4; no. 3, pp. 4–5; and in Rumiantsev's report on the inauguration of Kiev province in "Vsepodannieshiye doneeniia i pis'ma grafa P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskogo," pp. 263–64.
drew upon it for imperial expenditures in no way connected with the Hetmanate.\(^{71}\) Thus, the treasury, its chancellery (skarbovaia kantseliaria) and the General Accounting Commission (general'naia shchetnaia komissia) were abolished and all financial matters were transferred to the Treasury Boards of the three provinces.\(^{72}\)

A similar fate befell the Ukrainian postal service. Founded in 1765 by Governor-General Rumiantsev himself, the postal service was hardly a deep-rooted Ukrainian institution. Nevertheless, this one system encompassed the entire Hetmanate—thus serving as a reminder of the country's unity—and its officials held Ukrainian ranks and offices. Once the Hetmanate was divided into three imperial provinces, its postal service had to be integrated into the imperial postal system. This was accomplished in 1782. All postal appointments were entrusted to the newly created Little Russian branch of the imperial Post Office Department. This department was responsible for all postal salaries and collected all postal fees and revenues in the provinces of the former Hetmanate.\(^{73}\)

The Little Russian College, however, could not be so readily dismantled because it served as the highest appeals tribunal in the Hetmanate and its decisions could be overturned only by the imperial Senate in St. Petersburg. Moreover, the General Military Court was, at this time, a subdepartment of the College. When the provincial reform was implemented, both judicial bodies had a large backlog of cases. Upon Governor-General Rumiantsev's request, the Senate granted the College a one-year period of grace to complete its judicial work, although all its administrative functions were abolished.\(^{74}\) Since some College members and many of its clerks entered the new administration, the Senate even made provisions for the College's restaffing. Despite these measures, the College was unable to complete its work in the allotted time. In 1784, Governor-General Rumiantsev reported that 449 cases had been reviewed in the College and


\(^{72}\) A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskogo... p. 134.

\(^{73}\) PSZ, no. 15,419 (June 3, 1782), 21: 575; PSZ, no. 15,420 (June 3, 1782), 21: 575.

\(^{74}\) PSZ, no. 15,284 (November 22, 1781), 21: 311–12.
886 had been adjudicated in the General Court. Still pending were 520 cases in the College and 1,285 in the General Court. Consequently, the Senate was forced once again to prolong the College’s existence. Only in August 1786, when all its affairs had finally been settled and all judicial records had been forwarded to the archives of the new courts, was the Little Russian College abolished.

On the local level, Cossack administrators lost all civil authority, but, for the time being, Cossack structure and ranks were retained, though strictly in a military capacity. Governmental institutions dealing with nonmilitary affairs were abolished; their records were turned over to the new provincial and district administration, and any further dispensing of Ukrainian civilian offices or ranks was strictly forbidden. Thus the criminal court (groids’kyi sud), the land court (zems’kyi sud), and the chamberlain court (pidkomors’kyi sud) were dissolved and pending cases were assigned, respectively, to the district courts (uezdnye sudy), the lower rural court (nizhniaia rasprava), and the district surveyor. Police duties were transferred from the sotnia chancelleries to the town police chiefs (gorodnichie) and the rural land court (nizhnii zemskii sud). District treasurers (uezdnyi kaznachei) and the Treasury Board (kazennaia palata) assumed tax functions previously performed by the Commissariats, while the director of economy (direktor domovodstva) assumed control over all rank and crown lands formerly governed by Crown Land Overseers (smotriteli koronnykh imenii).

The new provincial administration combined the personal rule of the governor-general with a rationalistic bureaucratic system. As the absolute monarch’s local representative, or namestnik, Governor-General Rumiantsev could deal directly with Catherine, bypassing the Senate or any other central Russian institution. Likewise, he could

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75 PSZ, no. 15,893 (December 13, 1784), 21: 1071 – 72.
76 PSZ, no. 16,430 (August 20, 1786), 22: 677.
77 PSZ, no. 15,478 (July 27, 1782), 21: 645.
78 The abolition of Ukrainian institutions, the transfer of their records, and the assumption of their functions by the new administration is briefly outlined in A. Shafonskii, Chernigovskogo . . . ., pp. 134 – 36.
79 Governor-General Rumiantsev had established a special office, the Commissariat, responsible for local collection of taxes.
countermand any decision made by the local administration and could issue mandatory orders to all governmental institutions in the provinces under his authority, with the single exception that his interference in judicial decisions was specifically prohibited. Catherine had recently made Rumiantsev governor-general of Little Russia for life, and together with his position as commander-in-chief of all troops in the province this made the territory of the former Hetmanate his virtual satrapy.\textsuperscript{81}

Directly subordinate to the governor-general was the governor of the province. As chief administrator of a province, the governor provided a vital link between the governor-general and the provincial institutions. Appointed to this post were: Andrii S. Myloradovych for Chernihiv province, the former Ukrainian General Judge, Iliia V. Zhurman, for Novhorod-Sivers'k province; and Major-General Semen Shirkov for Kiev province.\textsuperscript{82}

As the new administration was being introduced, it was staffed by former Cossack officials, clerks, and local Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{83} Not only elective positions but many appointive ones were filled by members of the Ukrainian gentry. Moreover, each new institution was provided with a bureaucratic apparatus—clerks, bookkeepers, minor officials—greatly enhancing the career opportunities of former regimental and company clerks, young graduates of the Kievian Academy, and even literate rank-and-file Cossacks. Due to the presence of this officialdom, the provincial capitals—Kiev and Novhorod-Sivers'k in particular—became the social and intellectual centers for the Ukrainian elite.\textsuperscript{84}

discusses the position of namestnik during Catherine's reign, Marc Raeff's "In the Imperial Manner," *Catherine the Great* ..., pp. 197–246, gives an interesting portrait of a contemporary satrap, Prince G. A. Potemkin, ruler of southern Ukraine. Potemkin combined on a grandiose scale his personal authority with imperial bureaucratic procedures.


\textsuperscript{82} The appointments were made on October 2, 1781, and published by A. Rigel'man, *Letopisnoe povestovanie* ..., pt. 4, pp. 43–44.

\textsuperscript{83} A. Andrievskii lists the number of such officials in Kiev province in "Arkhivnaia spravka o sostave Kievskogo 'obschestva' v 1782–1798 godakh," *KS*, no. 2 (1894), pp. 192–203.

\textsuperscript{84} For the cultural and political atmosphere of these two provincial capitals see A. Andrievskii, "Arkhivnaia spravka ...," pp. 192–203, and O. Ohloblyn, *Liudy Staroi Ukrainy* (Munich, 1959), pp. 1 – 327.
In the span of only four years (1782–86), Ukrainian self-government—rooted in historical tradition stemming from the Polish-Lithuanian period and bolstered by more than a century of practice in the Hetmanate—was summarily replaced by an imperial provincial administration. With no apparent resistance, the former functionaries of the Hetmanate exchanged their heavy swords and colorful Cossack garb for the rapier, the powdered wig, and the provincial imperial uniform (each province had a uniform). Such a metamorphosis was hardly surprising. The choice faced by the Ukrainian gentry was service or retirement. The concept of loyalty to the tsar and service, moreover, was deeply rooted in the Cossack tradition. By meekly accepting the provincial reform, however, the Ukrainian gentry lost their autonomous position, based on historical rights and privileges, and assumed the role of mere servitors for the imperial bureaucracy. This was the crucial transformation in the demise of Ukrainian autonomy.

**Imperial Integration of the Ukrainian Military**

The provincial reform greatly accelerated the pace of the Hetmanate’s integration into the imperial system by forcing changes in the Hetmanate’s military organization, church administration, and the social structure. The most immediate problem facing Rumiantsev and his subordinate governors was the confusion of the provincial reform introduced in the Ukrainian military. Drained by losses of personnel to the civilian administration and fragmented by newly instituted territorial divisions, the Ukrainian units were ill-prepared for any kind of military operation. Governor-General Rumiantsev had foreseen this situation and had discussed it with Catherine even prior to the introduction of the Statute on the Provinces. The hectic preparations for the provincial reform precluded the tackling of the military

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85 One account of such a transformation is Illia Tymkovs’kyi’s description of how his father, a Cossack official, assumed an imperial post: “Zapiski II’i Fedorovicha Timkovskogo,” *RA*, bk. 1 (1874), p. 1396.

86 For this discussion and Catherine’s instructions on preparing a plan for the future reorganization of the Ukrainian military, see “Doklad grafa P. A. Rumiantseva Imperatritse Ekaterine II, 1781 goda,” *KS*, no. 12 (1884), pp. 693–703; *PSZ*, no. 15,265 (October 26, 1781), 21:295–97.
problem at this time, and Catherine instructed Rumiantsev to prepare a plan for the future reorganization of the Ukrainian military.

Within the short space of ten years the traditional Cossack military organization was replaced by a system of regular imperial regiments. This was done in stages. Initially, Rumiantsev recommended the creation of ten regular military regiments, which would retain the names of Ukrainian Cossack regiments. They were to be staffed by experienced Cossacks and Ukrainian officers, who were to be granted appropriate military rank. Catherine accepted these suggestions but ignored Rumiantsev's copious recommendations as to organization, dress, and discipline.

The new carabinier (karabinerni) regiments were designed to have a rapid turnover of personnel and thus break down loyalties to the ancient Cossack regiments. Each regiment, numbering 828 men, comprised of six units of 138 soldiers. Annually, 48 of each regiment’s best soldiers were transferred to another detachment, while 120 were discharged as reservists. Since the term of service was set at six years, a complete changeover in the rank and file would occur every seven years. At the same time, the forty-eight outstanding Cossacks from each regiment would systematically enter elite imperial units.

The reorganization of the military proceeded slowly, accompanied by much confusion. The problems encountered prompted Rumiantsev to issue lengthy instructions to the two military commanders, Major General Karl von Kaulbars and Lieutenant General V. Nashchokin, and to provincial governors Shirkov and Myloradovych as to specific procedures to be followed. He defined each unit’s boundaries, headquarters, and recruitment area. In addition, he directed that only

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87 The memorandum was published by M. Sudienko, ed., "Bumagi po upravleniiu Malorossiei gr. P. A. Rumiantseva-Zadunaiskogo oynoschiachesia," pp. 153–61. The memorandum is dated August 9, without specification as to year. Since Catherine’s request for the proposal came on October 26, 1781, and her ukaz creating the new Ukrainian regiments was issued by July 28, 1783, Rumiantsev’s recommendation could have been made only on August 9 of 1782.

88 Catherine’s July 28, 1783, ukaz to the War College was published by A. Rigel’man, Letopisnoe povestvovanie, pt. 4, pp. 52–53; the February 9, 1784, ukaz is included in PSZ, no. 15,928, 22:21.

89 N. V. Storozhenko analyzes these instructions in “Reformy v Malorossii pri gr. Rumiantseve,” KS, no. 3 (1891), pp. 483–92.
reliable Cossacks be chosen for military service and that they live near unit headquarters in order to reduce the cost of upkeep. Officers were to be chosen from among the Distinguished Military Fellows (znachne viis'kove tovarystvo), with participants in the 1769–74 Turkish Wars given preference. Uniforms were to be issued for each soldier, but recruit and officer alike had to provide himself with a horse, arms, and ammunition until imperial supplies became available.

The new units were manned at a gradual but steady pace and were virtually at full strength when the Russo-Turkish War erupted in 1787. Although now a part of the regular Russian military, the carabineer regiments continued to retain numerous links with their Cossack origins: the very names of half the carabineer regiments—Starodub, Kiev, Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, and Nizhyn—were a reminder of famous Cossack regiments; the current units still maintained close affiliation with a specific territory, as did the previous companies; and virtually all of the officers were drawn from the Cossack officers. Most important, the carabineers could be recruited only from among the Cossacks, thus perpetuating the exclusively Cossack character of the Hetmanate’s military.

The uniquely Cossack make-up of the military was short-lived, however. The first blow came as early as 1786 with the creation of a new dragoon regiment.90 Conscripted from peasants living on recently secularized monastery lands, this unit also included a thousand Cossacks transferred from the carabineer regiments.91 This action was intended to provide the new regiment with experienced soldiers who could serve as examples for the raw peasant recruits. Cossacks and peasants were now serving in the same regiment under the same military discipline and thus, the clear distinction between the two estates was becoming blurred.

More drastic measures were to follow during the Ottoman (1787–91) and Swedish (1788–90) wars. Strained by wars on two fronts, the War College began conscripting at an increasing rate—4 new recruits per 500 taxable persons in 1787; 5 per 500 in 1788; and 2

90 PSZ, no. 16,374 (April 10, 1786), 22: 574—75.
per 500 in 1790. The manpower shortage continued, however, and in July 1789, Catherine resorted to another measure—the extension of the regular imperial recruit levy to the previously exempt Hetmanate.

The conscription decrees of 1789, reaffirmed and expanded in 1795, had a profound impact on the character of the military. They gradually reduced and then eradicated any regional peculiarities in the regular military forces. All taxable subjects—Cossacks, burghers, and peasants—became liable to conscription, thus putting an end to the exclusively Cossack composition of the Hetmanate’s armed forces. Recruits were drafted on an imperial basis and then assigned to various units according to need. This not only severed territorial loyalties and the regional tradition of various units but also prevented non-Russian ethnic homogeneity in any imperial formation. Furthermore, the imperial conscript served for twenty-five years, not the six designated for the Hetmanate’s carabineer units. The imperial army and the system of recruitment, which had created a stratum of professional soldiers drawn from several social groups and various regions of the empire, was now extended to the Hetmanate. Living apart from society, the imperial soldiers’ only loyalty was to the military unit in which they spent most of their lives.

Despite depletions in ranks due to the war and the accompanying influx of non-Cossack and non-Ukrainian replacements, the carabineer regiments still retained some Ukrainian characteristics. They continued to include a core of Ukrainian officers and Cossacks who still remembered soldiering in the Hetmanate. During the reign of Paul I, however, all imperial carabineer regiments were abolished as part of the military’s shift from light to heavy cavalry. Thus, the

92 G. Beskrovnya, Russkaia armia i flot v XVIII veke (Moscow, 1958), pp. 296–97.
93 PSZ, no. 16,784 (July 6, 1789), 23:46–47; no. 16,785 (July 7, 1789), 23:47; no. 17,393 (October 6, 1795), 23:804.
94 By the 1795 decree, however, military service required of recruits from the territory of the Hetmanate and southern Ukraine was limited to fifteen years. This was a temporary concession made to a populace not accustomed to lifelong inductions; see PSZ, no. 17,393 (October 6, 1795), 23:804.
95 The wartime operations of the carabineers can be gleaned from A. N. Petrov, Vtoraya turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie Imperatritsy Ekateriny II, 1787–1791 g. (2 vols., St. Petersburg: 1880), 1:133–70; 2:1–42, and passim.
96 Vooruzhennye sily Rossii do tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Aleksandra I (4, Intro-
carabineer’s role as an intermediate step in the integration of the Hetmanate’s military into the imperial system came to an end. The new military formations that followed were organized in strict accordance with standard imperial norms.

A number of attempts were later made to reconstitute special Cossack units on Hetmanate territory. The development of a tense situation in Poland in 1794 prompted the establishment of a regiment of Cossack riflemen, which was then summarily disbanded in 1796. This pattern continued in the nineteenth century: Cossack units were created in times of emergency (1812 and 1831) and served briefly as irregular military forces. Once the crises subsided, the units were quickly dissolved. The ephemeral efforts were, at best, mere echoes of the Hetmanate’s military past. By the end of the eighteenth century, the system of military recruitment and organization in the former Hetmanate differed in no way from that in the rest of the empire, and units stationed there no longer retained any connections with the traditions of Cossack Ukraine.

Church Reorganization, Secularization, and Russification

As the Ukrainian military was losing its distinct character, the Hetmanate’s church was also losing the last vestiges of autonomy. Despite their subordination to the Russian Orthodox church and the Holy Synod in St. Petersburg, Ukrainian eparchies still differed from those of the central provinces in organization and ritual. The empire’s civil and church authorities continually strove to reduce these differences, while some of the Ukrainian clergy treasured their peculiar rights and even sought to expand them, as shown during the 1767 Legislative Commission.

During the early part of Catherine’s reign a bitter dispute developed between the Kiev metropolitan, Arsenii Mohylans’kyi, and the Synod. Mohylans’kyi wished to retain the title “Metropolitan of Kiev and all Little Russia” and espoused the concept of a separate “Little Russian Church,” subordinate to the Synod but under the

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97 PSZ, no. 17,200 (April 24, 1794), 23: 511; PSZ, no. 17,566 (November 18, 1796), 23: 8–9.
direct authority of the Kievan metropolitan.98 These claims were challenged by the Synod, which subsequently excluded “Little Russia” from the metropolitan’s title. Ironically, the antagonism generated by this conflict succeeded in temporarily precluding any other imperial encroachment on Ukrainian church organization or religious practices.

With the implementation of the provincial reform, however, the question of Ukrainian church organization arose once again. The new provincial boundaries completely disregarded the traditional territorial divisions of church eparchies. As a result, some provinces contained several eparchies and others none; some eparchies were themselves divided by provincial boundaries. The situation was particularly serious in the Hetmanate, because Kiev province incorporated the sees of two eparchies, Kiev and Pereiaslav, while Novhorod-Sivers’k contained none. The subdivisions of the eparchies, the protopopiiia, were equally confusing. The Pryluki protopopiiia, for example, had jurisdiction over parishes located in the Pryluki, Hlyns’k, and Romen districts of Chernihiv province, as well as the Pryiatyn district of Kiev province.99 Each protopopiiia, therefore, necessarily contended with a great many new and frequently overlapping state agencies.

Catherine decided that the best solution to these territorial discrepancies lay in readjusting eparchial boundaries to provincial ones: in May 1784 she instructed the Holy Synod and the Senate to provide for such reform.100 The project then initiated by the Synod was intended to apply to all eparchies in the empire; planning proceeded very slowly, however, and on completion, the reform was only

98 The conflict over the Kiev metropolitan’s title is described by P. Orlovskii, “Isklučenien iz titula mitropolitov kievskikh slov, ‘mitropolit vseia Malyia Rossii,’” Kievskie eparkhial’nye vedomosti, no. 18 (1894), pp. 546–52. Arsenii Mohylians’kyi’s concept of a “Little Russian Church” is discussed in the previous chapter, dealing with the Legislative Commission.
100 The orders were published in Polnoe sobranie postanovenii i rasporyazhenii po vedomstvu pravoslavnego ispovedaniai (henceforth PSP)—Tsarskoye Gosudarstvennoe Imperatorskii Ekateriny Vtoroi (3 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1910–15), 2: 494; for Catherine’s treatment of the church in the Hetmanate see also de Madariaga, Russia, pp. 111–22.
partially implemented.\textsuperscript{101} The section dealing with the Ukrainian eparchies was prepared with singular speed, being proclaimed by Catherine on March 27, 1785.\textsuperscript{102}

According to this decree and its subsequent revisions, each province was to contain one eparchy, the boundaries of which were to correspond exactly to those of the province.\textsuperscript{103} The implementation of the decree caused some difficulties. For example, the Pereiaslav-Boryspil' eparchy was abolished and its bishop transferred to the newly created Novhorod-Sivers'k eparchy, but the preparation of the new residency of the bishop, the Savior (Spas'kyi) monastery, was considerably delayed because its monks continued to send reports to, and expect replies from, the Chernihiv consistory, not the one in Novhorod-Sivers'k.\textsuperscript{104} Such problems were soon surmounted, and the borders of the Ukrainian eparchies became coterminous with the Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Sivers'k provinces.\textsuperscript{105} Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over church monasteries now also corresponded to the new eparchial boundaries, with the single exception of the Caves Monastery in Kiev, which continued to deal directly with the Synod.\textsuperscript{106}

In addition to this restructuring, the imperial and church authorities decided to create an episcopate see for Poland. Because of Roman Catholic and Uniate pressure, the Orthodox population of the Polish Commonwealth—Right Bank Ukraine and Belorussia—were without a hierarch. Existing parishes and monasteries were administered through those eparchies in the Russian Empire that were closest—Kiev, Pereiaslav, or Mahilieú (Mogilev). Increased Russian influence in Polish affairs following the first partition forced Polish

\textsuperscript{101} Ivan M. Pokrovskii, \textit{Russkie eparkhii} ... 2: 719.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{PSZ}, no. 16,174 (March 27, 1785); 22: 329–30; \textit{PSP, Tsarstvovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi}, no. 1210 (March 21, 1785), 3: 2.

\textsuperscript{103} In addition to the March 27, 1785 decree, see the following ukazy and directives: \textit{PSP, Tsarstvovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi}, no. 1213 (March 31, 1785), 3: 15–16; no. 1215 (April 10, 1785), 3: 17; no. 1223 (May 16, 1785), 3: 26–27.

\textsuperscript{104} I. Pokrovskii, \textit{Russkie eparkhii} ... 2: 719.

\textsuperscript{105} Details of the territorial changes are given in I. Pokrovskii, \textit{Russkie eparkhii} ... 2: 719–22.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{PSP, Tsarstvovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi}, no. 1213 (March 31, 1785), 3: 15–16.
The Integration of the Hetmanate

authorities to accept an Orthodox bishop, however. Since the Kiev metropolitanate had a long tradition of legitimate Orthodoxy within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it was imperative that the new bishop be in some way connected with Kiev—a requirement filled by naming Viktor Sadovs’kyi as bishop of Pereiaslav and coadjutor of the Kiev metropolitan. The Orthodox population in Polish Ukraine was thus under the jurisdiction of the Kiev metropolitanate but administered by a specially appointed bishop, residing not in Pereiaslav—as his title would indicate—but in Poland. When Bishop Viktor assumed his pastoral duties, Catherine even permitted him to take an oath of allegiance to the Polish king, thus attempting to minimize friction with the Polish authorities.

The territorial reform was only the first step in a renewed effort to integrate Ukrainian eparchies into the imperial system. Conditions for the successful implementation of such a policy were more favorable than in previous times. The abolition of the Hetmanate’s native administration and military structure made the continued existence of even a limited autonomy of the Ukrainian eparchies seem an undesirable anomaly. Moreover, the ground for a policy of integration had been well prepared by the appointment of a prointegrationist prelate, Samuil Myslavskii, as Kiev metropolitan.

107 For the official decrees creating the new eparchy, outlining its administrative structure, and appointing its first bishop, see: PSZ, no. 16, 173 (March 27, 1785), 22:329 and no. 16, 202 (May 15, 1785), 22:306; PSP, Tsarstvovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 1209 (March 27, 1785), 3:12; no. 1212 (March 31, 1785), 3:13–14; no. 1214 (April 1, 1785), 3:16–17; no. 1217 (May 2, 1785), 3:18; no. 1220 (May 15, 1785), 3:25; no. 1221 (May 15, 1785), 3:25; no. 1230 (July 4, 1785), 3:35–38; no. 1240 (October 3, 1785), 3:65–66; no. 1241 (October 20, 1785), 3:66–67; no. 1248 (December 15, 1785), 3:72–73; no. 1262 (March 5, 1786), 3:83–84.


109 I. Pokrovskii, Russkie eparkhii ... , 2:729.

110 The appointment was made on September 22, 1783. See A. Cherkas, “Samuil (v mire Simeon Grigorievich Mislavskii),” Russkii biograficheskii slovar’, vol. Sabaneev-Smyslov (St. Petersburg: 1904), p. 179.
Metropolitan Samuil’s appointment, similar to that of Governor Mylорadovych, was another example of imperial cooptation. Again a Ukrainian was to introduce imperial norms into the Hetmanate. A graduate of the Kiev Academy and subsequently its rector, Myslavs’kyi pursued a highly successful ecclesiastical career outside of the Hetmanate.\textsuperscript{111} He held successive episcopal appointments in several Russian eparchies—Kursk, Moscow, and Rostov—and became a member of the Holy Synod in 1775. Metropolitan Samuil maintained connections with the court and became a close friend of the grand duke. In imperial circles he had a reputation as a scholar, an able administrator, and a progressive cleric open to suggestions for reform. At the promulgation of the provincial reforms, the then Archbishop Samuil welcomed them by delivering a special homily, “An Oration on the Great Institutions Established by Catherine” (Slovo o velikikh predmetakh uchrezhdenii Ekateriny), which was subsequently published in several languages.

With the help of an accommodating metropolitan, the imperial authorities proceeded with the next stage in the dismantlement of Ukrainian church autonomy—the secularization of church wealth. Because of their privileged position in the then autonomous Hetmanate, the Ukrainian dioceses and monasteries had escaped imperial church secularization in 1764. Catherine now wished to rectify this situation. In a decree issued on April 10, 1786, she stated: “Now with the creation of the three Little Russian provinces—Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Sivers’k—on an equal basis with other provinces in Our Empire, We deem it appropriate to also introduce the necessary conformity in regard to the upkeep of the bishops’ residences and monasteries.”\textsuperscript{112}

While conformity might have been the foremost reason for Catherine’s espousal of secularization, she must also have been quite aware of the benefits it would bring to the state. In this instance,


conformity meant that the provincial directors of economy appropriated the property, industries, and other incomes of all monasteries and bishops’ residences, while the state financially supported some of these monasteries, schools, churches, and bishops’ residences in accordance with a scale established in 1764.\textsuperscript{113} Peasants living on church and monastery lands became state peasants, liable to all state taxes and the military draft. In fact, a special grenadier unit was recruited from these former monastery peasants.\textsuperscript{114} A census conducted in the 1780s—just prior to secularization—gives a good indication of the extent of the state’s new acquisitions. Of the fifty-four propertied monasteries mentioned, eighteen were only marginal (fifty households or less), twenty-four were self-sufficient (between fifty and four hundred households), eleven were wealthy (four hundred to two thousand households), and the Caves Monastery was deemed immensely wealthy (four thousand to five thousand households).\textsuperscript{115}

The main secularization decree listed the amounts designated for the upkeep of each school, episcopal residence, and approved monastery, as well as for the salaries of the Ukrainian bishops.\textsuperscript{116} Of the three hierarchs, the Kiev metropolitan fared best. He was allotted the same stipend as the archbishop of Moscow (3,744 rubles, 40 kopeks annually) and was given an additional allowance for the maintenance of his episcopal residence, staff, and episcopal administration (2,954 rubles, 65 kopeks annually). Moreover, the Kievan metropolitan also held the position of archimandrite of the Caves Monastery, resided there, and, as a consequence, received another salary plus the funds marked for the Caves Monastery (10,570 rubles a year). The metropolitan’s mansion, however, was appropriated by the

\textsuperscript{113} These provisions were outlined in PSZ, no. 16,374 (April 10, 1786), 22: 574–75; and in PSP, Tsarstvovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 1270 (April 10, 1786), 3: 92–93.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{115} Pavlo Fedorenko, "Z istorii monastyrskoho hospodarstva na Livoberezhzhii XVII–XVIII vv.," ZIFV /VJ UAN, bk. 11 (1927), pp. 167–68.

\textsuperscript{116} PSZ, no. 16,375 (April 10, 1786), 12: 575–76; and in PSP, Tsarstvovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 1270 (April 10, 1786), 3: 93–95, and Kniga shitatov. In addition to these official versions, several other publications contain this decree copied from contemporary documents. See KS, no. 6 (1882), pp. 329–32; A. Rigel’man, Letopisnoe povedovanie, pt. 4, pp. 56–62; the latter is especially helpful, for Rigel’man gives the most detailed itemization of sums (rospisanie) appended to the actual decree (pp. 59–62).
state and was to house a provincial school and a part of the Kievian Academy. The rest of the academy was to be moved to the Caves Monastery, and the academy building was to be converted into a hospital. Fairly large sums were designated for the Kievian Academy (8,400 rubles), Chernihiv Collegium (2,000 rubles), and a new Novhorod-Sivers'k Seminary (2,000 rubles), but these institutions were to function primarily as seminaries. The bishops of Novhorod-Sivers'k and Chernihiv were allocated annual salaries of 5,900 rubles each, from which they were also to maintain episcopal residences and the eparchial administration. Finally, each monastery scheduled for continued operation was allotted funds according to its official status and number of members.

The implementation of these decrees raised new problems. Catherine was willing, however, to make concessions on minor issues as long as the substance of the reform remained intact. For instance, the secularization decree was promulgated in the spring, after the fields had already been sown, but it did not specify whether the new harvest was to be collected by the monasteries or by the new landowner—the state. As a result of repeated requests from Metropolitan Samuil Myslavs'kyi, all monasteries—even those scheduled to be closed—received Catherine's permission to gather the last harvest. In addition, the Kievian metropolitan protested to Governor-General Rumiantsev that the Lavra and his episcopal residence were quite inadequate to house the Kievian Academy, because of Rumiantsev's efforts, these directives were later rescinded. The Kievian Academy remained at its previous location, and although the metropolitan obtained new quarters at the Caves Monastery, he also kept his old episcopal residence.

Another problem, however, was not so readily soluble—that is, the fate of the monks and nuns displaced by the reform. According to the April decree, the three eparchies were to maintain the following religious institutions: three first-class monasteries (each housing thirty-three monks); six second-class monasteries (each housing seventeen

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118 Metropolitan Myslavs'kyi's complaints to Rumiantsev were published in "Kiev'skaia perturbatsiia 1786 g.," KS, no. 4 (1883), pp. 895–98.
monks); four third-class monasteries (each housing twelve monks); one first-class convent (housing seventy-two nuns); one second-class convent (housing seventeen nuns); and four third-class convents (each housing seventeen nuns). Discounting the monks of the Caves Monastery—who were recipients of a special subsidy—and several monks and nuns serving at episcopal residences, legal provision was made for the livelihood of 249 monks and 157 nuns residing in thirteen monasteries and six convents. All other convents and monasteries were to be abolished. This entailed the closing of forty-two institutions, dispossessioning 466 monks, 510 nuns, and twenty-nine monastic superiors.

As soon as Catherine realized the magnitude of this dislocation, she outlined several measures designed to alleviate the situation. A July 13, 1786, ukaz granted the dislodged monks and nuns minimal state pensions, while permitting the continued existence of several monasteries originally scheduled to be closed. In addition, it forbade the officially recognized monasteries to accept any novices until all displaced nuns and monks found new residences, and strongly recommended that many monks and nuns be transferred outside of the Ukraine. The state even subsidized several monasteries that had previously been scheduled to be abolished.

Catherine’s concessions gave Ukrainian monastics a brief reprieve in their struggle for existence and greatly reduced chances of overt resistance. The displaced monks and nuns lived either in officially designated monasteries—which therefore exceeded the number of permitted residents—or in the monasteries not receiving state subsidies but supported by voluntary contributions and those made by the bishop. An October 17, 1788, decree gave all unsubsidized monasteries third-

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120 PSZ, no. 16,375 (April 10, 1786), 12: 575—76; and in PSP, Tsarstvovanie... Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 1270 (April 10, 1786), 3: 93—95 and Kniga shurow.


122 See note 119 above.

123 PSP, Tsarstvovanie... Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 1289 (July 13, 1786), 3: 112; no. 1290 (July 15, 1786), 3: 112—14.

124 The crowded condition of the subsidized monasteries and Metropolitan Myslav’kyi’s efforts to finance the other monasteries are described in F. Rozhdestvenskii, “Samuil Mislavskii...,” Trudy KDA, no. 4 (1877), pp. 10—16.
class status and forbade parish collections for monastery upkeep, but the temporary nature of such additional state financing was emphasized by the ordering of another census of monasteries. The 1789 census revealed that there were still 264 monks and 390 nuns in excess of the officially approved number. In response to this, on August 3, 1789, an ukaz pointed out the many vacancies that existed in other parts of the empire and ordered what was previously only recommended—the placement of Ukrainian monks and nuns outside the Ukrainian eparchies. As a result, Ukrainian monks were sent to the eparchies of Moscow, Tobol’sk, Riazan’, Suzdal’, and Vologda. As a result of such transfers and new vacancies, the displaced Ukrainian monks and nuns were gradually absorbed by the numerous officially approved monasteries and convents of the empire.

Because of Catherine’s concessions, secularization evoked little overt opposition on the part of the Ukrainian monastics. The most drastic incident of protest occurred during Catherine’s scheduled visit to the Mezhhyhirs’kyi monastery in 1787. On the morning of the visit, a courier informed Catherine that the monastery had been ravaged by fire: the monks themselves had apparently set it ablaze rather than receive the autocrat who had caused them such distress. This was an isolated incident, however; for the most part, the Ukrainian monks accepted their fate passively—an attitude fostered by the Ukrainian hierarchy. Metropolitan Samuil Myslavs’kyi, in particular, traveled widely, preaching obedience to the law and the proper authorities and

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125 PSZ, no. 16,721 (October 17, 1788), 22: 1120; PSP, Tsarsnovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 1414 (October 17, 1788), 3: 263–64, and more detailed instructions in no. 1415 (October 25, 1788), 3: 264–65.
126 PSP, Tsarsnovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 1417 (November 29, 1788), 3: 265–70.
127 PSP, Tsarsnovanie ... Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 1442 (August 3, 1789), 3: 295.
129 F. Rozhdestvenskii, “Samuil Myslavs’kyi . . . .”, Trudy KDA no. 4 (1877), pp. 11–12.
130 A well-known monks’ lament on facing secularization is in reality a biting anticlerical satire, see “Plach kyvš’kykh monakhiv,” and “Pryhavok k plachu kys’kykh monakhiv,” Ukrain’ska literatura XVIII st., I. O. Dzeverin and O. V. Myshanych eds., pp. 216–24. Kiev, 1983.
131 F. Rozhdestvenskii, “Samuil Myslavs’kyi . . . .”, Trudy KDA, no. 4 (1877), p. 17; there may have been an additional reason for the dislike of Catherine on the part of the Mezhhyhirs’kyi monks. Their traditional and most generous patron had been the Zaporozhian Sich, which Catherine, of course, had destroyed.
praised the reforms as both useful and necessary. At the same time, the metropolitan did much to improve the conditions of the dispossessed monks and nuns—providing housing, contributing money, and intervening on their behalf in the Senate. Once the gradual absorption of the displaced monks and nuns by various monasteries of the empire had begun, monastic life returned to normal, although greatly reduced in number. Yet the change effected was indeed profound, for the Ukrainian monks and nuns who remained were, in reality, virtual state employees.

Increased state control and more rigid ecclesiastical regulations were not limited to monastic life but were also applied to the parish clergy. According to a long-standing Ukrainian tradition, local parishes elected their own priests. At the death or dismissal of the parish priest, the community would select the local cantor or a student from the Kievian Academy, who was then ordained by the bishop. In addition to local aspirants, there were a great number of priests and students of the Kievian or Chernihiv Academy, or Kharkiv Collegium, who traveled from place to place in search of a vacant parish. The various candidates pleaded with local parishes for acceptance and, once chosen, were totally dependent upon the communities they served.

This situation changed in the latter part of the eighteenth century. A 1778 edict allocated a fixed amount of land, meadows, orchards, and other sources of income to each parish. Another decree regulated the number of priests, deacons, diaxy, and other church servitors to be maintained by each parish and required that all clerical appointees be approved by the local bishop. These ukazy shifted some of

132 Ibid., p. 17.
133 Ibid., pp. 10–20.
136 PSZ, no. 14,807 (October 8, 1778), 20:752–53, and in PSP, Tsarstvovanie . . Ekateriny Vtoroi, no. 889 (October 8, 1778), 2:211–12.
the control over the local clergy from the community to the bishops. Up to this time, the community or the local landlord provided the local priest’s upkeep and could alter, virtually at will, the conditions of his service. Although the priest still depended on parish generosity, he was assured a minimum income, and it was equally important to the priest that he obtain confirmation of his post from the local bishop. The community still retained the right to suggest an appointee, but its candidate had to have the appropriate educational level, be exempt from the poll tax (thus be a recognized nobleman or cleric), and had to have a good moral character. On occasion, bishops appointed priests directly. Metropolitan Samuil, in particular, was quite successful in filling parish posts directly with graduates of the Kievan Academy and thus created a precedent for direct episcopal appointments of all clerics.

A series of educational reforms further weakened local customs. Metropolitan Samuil wished to introduce uniform education for parish priests. He was particularly determined to limit the great number of poorly educated and frequently unemployed wandering priests who virtually purchased their ordination from Moldavian and Greek bishops. Myslavs’kyi aimed at supplanting such aspirants with a stable, well-educated, and self-perpetuating local clergy. He therefore encouraged the sons of priests to enter the Academy and prepare for the priesthood. Also, the curriculum of the Academy—which up to this time provided a general education for members of all social groups—was revamped in favor of theological studies. Although as an academy its curriculum and status was still higher than a seminary, the primary function of the once famous Kievan Academy was to train clerics.

In addition to improving the Academy’s theological studies, Metropolitan Myslavs’kyi launched a campaign to maintain the purity of the Russian language. He was particularly dismayed that the students and faculty of the Academy used a mixture of Ukrainian, Polish, and Latin in both their spoken and written language, thus deviating from the

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139 For a detailed account of these changes see N. Petrov, Kievskiiia akademiiia v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II (Kiev: 1906).
recently standardized literary Russian. He prescribed that instruction be held "in accordance to poetic books published in Moscow and books of oratory adhering to the rules of Master Lomonosov." Myslivs'kyi even sent two of his best students to the university in Moscow, ordering them to learn Great Russian speech and pronunciation. One of these students, Mykyta Sokolos'kyi, subsequently became instructor of Russian at the Academy. Despite these efforts, some of the Academy staff confessed to the metropolitan that they were "unable to rid themselves of their Little Russian manner of speech."

Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Orthodox church in the Hetmanate lost its autonomy and became administratively integrated into Russian state Orthodoxy. Its eparchies were adjusted by the Synod and secular authorities at will. The church's wealth was confiscated, and its bishops, hegumens, and monasteries became virtual state employees. Although priests were outside the state salary system, they were becoming as dependent on episcopal favor as on local support. Moreover, the number of priests, deacons, and other church personnel was determined by the state, as were all church finances. The Ukrainian clergy was required to follow the "Spiritual Regulations" issued by Peter I for the church, and the elite of the clergy, educated at the Kievan Academy, were trained to be proficient in Russian. By the turn of the century, the church in the provinces of the former Hetmanate had become a pliable servant of the empire.

The Partial Restitution and the Ultimate Demise of Ukrainian Autonomy

By the 1790s little remained of the Hetmanate's autonomy. The civilian administration, the military, and the church were the same as in the rest of the empire. Ukrainian society still needed considerable adjustment before it could conform fully to the imperial pattern, however. Other surviving remnants of a distinct and individual past were the law codes still in use in the Left Bank Ukraine—Ukrainian com-

140 F. Rozhdestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii . . .," Trudy KDA, no. 5 (1877), pp. 303–304.
141 F. Rozhdestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii . . .," Trudy KDA, no. 5 (1877), p. 304.
142 Ibid., p. 304.
mon law, the Lithuanian Statute, and a modified version of Magde-
burg Law.

Nevertheless, Russian centralism hardly proceeded in a steady
linear pattern. Periods of advance were, at times, followed by retreats.
Catherine II went further than any previous monarch in establishing a
uniformly administered empire. The new emperor, Paul I, however,
strongly disapproved of most of Catherine’s policies, which gave
those who favored regional autonomy renewed hope for the restora-
tion of traditional rights.\textsuperscript{143} Indeed, Catherine’s death and Paul I’s
ascension to the throne sparked rumors in the Hetmanate that Paul
himself would become hetman and appoint his father’s favorite
adviser, Andrii Hudovych, as regent of a reconstituted Hetmanate.\textsuperscript{144}

While rumors of a reconstituted Hetmanate proved to be
unfounded, Paul did revive some of its former prerogatives. He abol-
ished the Kiev, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Sivers’k provinces (\textit{namest-
nichesvta}) and created a single Little Russian province (\textit{gubernia}).\textsuperscript{145}
The city of Kiev was excluded from the Little Russian province. It
became the capital of a new Kiev province carved out of the territory
taken from Poland in the second partition. With the sole exception of
the city of Kiev, which even in the best of times was only tenuously
connected with the Hetmanate, the new Little Russian province
encompassed all the territories of the former Hetmanate, even the area
severed in 1764 to form the province of Novorossiia.

Paul also approved the election of the nobility’s district marshals
(\textit{povetovye marshaly}) in accordance with Polish-Lithuanian practice,
rather than the \textit{uezdnye predvoditeli} provided for by the Charter to the
Nobility,\textsuperscript{146} and restored a major part of the court system that existed
in the Hetmanate in 1763 (incorporating Hetman Rozumovs’kyi’s

\textsuperscript{143} For a general history of Paul’s reign, see M. V. Klochkov, \textit{Ocherki
pravitel’stvennoi dejatel’nosti vremeni Pavla I} (Petrograd: 1916).


\textsuperscript{145} \textit{PSZ}, no. 17,634 (December 12, 1796), 26: 229–30; Aleksandr Kovalevskii,
“Nekotorye podrobnosti, kasatushchiesia uchrezhdeniia Malorossiiskoi (Chern-

\textsuperscript{146} Aleksandr Kovalevskii, “Nekotorye podrobnosti . . . ,” pp. 2–3; the \textit{povetovye
marshaly} are also discussed in “Zamechniia do Maloi Rossi pridnadzhashchii,”
pp. 7 – 8.
judicial reforms). A reinstituted General Court again acted as the highest tribunal for both civil and criminal cases. Only the Senate and the autocrat could overrule its decisions. The court consisted of two general judges, four advisers, and ten representatives elected by the nobility. Two erudite Ukrainian nobles, Akym Semenovych Sulyma and Hryhorii Petrovych Myloradovych, filled the posts of general judges. The lower civil courts—the land court (zems'kyi sud) and chamberlain court (pidkomors'kyi sud)—were reestablished, but the imperial court system was retained for criminal cases.

This restoration was, however, only a brief epilogue, and gradually the remnants of autonomous Ukraine were eliminated. When Alexander I came to the throne in 1801, the Little Russian guberniia was divided into two provinces: Chernihiv and Poltava. This was soon followed by the abolition of the court system. Only the chamberlain court was retained, so as to not further complicate property disputes. The leveling of Ukrainian institutions and traditions continued under Nicholas I. The imperial government viewed such institutions as unwarranted reminders of Polish influence in the Hetmanate. Thus, after the Polish uprising of 1830, the remnants of Magdeburg Law, until then still in use in Ukrainian towns, were abrogated. The imperial authorities, furthermore, ordered that all governmental institutions in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces adhere strictly to the

147 PSZ, no. 17.594 (November 30, 1796), 26:212–13; Aleksandr Kovalevskii, "Vozobnovlenie general'nogo suda v Malorossiiskoi gubernii v 1797 godu," ChGV, no. 178 (1894), pp. 3–4.


149 PSZ, no. 20,162 (February 27, 1802), 27:59–60.

150 Described in "Dnevnik Akima Semenovicha Sulmy," p. 163.

Statute on the Provinces. In 1834, the chamberlain court and various Ukrainian traditional offices connected with property and surveying were abolished. Finally, the Lithuanian Statute was abolished, and in 1843, the Russian Law Code (Svod zakonov) was made applicable in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces, but it was amended to take into account some local legal practices. These legal peculiarities, which survived until the Russian Revolution, were the only vestige of the Hetmanate's former autonomous status.

152 PSZ, 2d ed., no. 4992 (December 6, 1831), 6: 276.
153 PSZ, 2d ed., no. 6718 (January 16, 1834), 9: 42.
154 PSZ, 2d ed., no. 16,585 (March 4, 1843), 18: 115–16; Vasylento enumerates the local legal practices retained with the introduction of the imperial code, "Iak skasovano Lytov's'koho statuta," pp. 288–316.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Ukrainian Society Adjusts to the Imperial Order

The Cooptation of the Ukrainian Gentry

The abolition of the Hetmanate's institutions and the introduction of an imperial administration were accompanied by a gradual fusion of the Ukrainian and Russian social structures. This process was greatly accelerated by the introduction of the provincial reforms and the implementation of the new imperial charters granted the nobility and townsmen. In the brief period between 1782 and 1786, the changes in social organization were dramatic: the Ukrainian gentry became part of the imperial dvorianstvo; town dwellers in the Hetmanate became subject to the same legal, economic, and social regulations as townsmen in the rest of the empire; the Cossacks became regarded as special state peasants; and the peasants on private estates became legally enserfed. These were only the legal steps for integrating Ukrainian society, however; it took several more decades for Ukrainian society actually to correspond to the imperial social order.

Successful imperial integration of the Hetmanate depended largely on the cooperation of the Ukrainian gentry. As the Hetmanate's ruling class and the main exponent of autonomy, the Ukrainian gentry represented the major force capable of expressing opposition or attempting to subvert the rapid implementation of the provincial reforms. Indeed, when the subject was first broached at a 1781 meeting of the gentry, the participants showed considerable apprehension and reservation toward the projected reforms. Their disapproval was so pronounced that the newly appointed governor, Andrii Myloradovych, issued a warning to the leader of the autonomists, Hryhorii Poletyka. In a secret, unofficial letter Myloradovych advised his personal friend, Poletyka, to consider his "family, wealth, and advanced years
and to soften his patriotic fervor," and "let events take their course."  

The major part of the Ukrainian gentry was willing "to let events take their course" and the actual implementation of the reform elicited little response. This inertia can be ascribed to a variety of factors. First of all, the death of Hryhori Poletyka (1784) deprived Ukrainian autonomists of a bold leader and skilled polemicist. More important, as the gentry obtained titles of dvoriane, corporate self-government, and the legalization of serfdom, they became aware of the many benefits that would accrue from the new order. Opposition, in any event, involved considerable risk. Not only was there a possibility of prosecution, as had been hinted by Myloradovych, but any indiscretion at this crucial time could jeopardize the recognition of a rank or the attainment of an official post.

It was the implementation of the provincial reform that finally forced the imperial authorities to recognize the Ukrainian gentry as dvoriane. The Statute on the Provinces called for exclusive dvorianstvo control of many governmental offices, a separate court system for the nobility, district and provincial organizations for the dvorianstvo, and local assemblies of the nobility which elected marshals and dealt with local problems. These functions could hardly be carried out without the Ukrainian gentry. As a consequence, the view that there were "no dvoriane in Little Russia" was dropped, and a major part of the Ukrainian gentry was quickly brought into the dvorianstvo. As in the rest of the empire, "nobility" was derived primarily from rank in state service. Administrators of the Hetmanate

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1 Letter of April 13, 1781 in "Chastnaia peremipka Grigoria Andreievicha Poletiki," KS, no. 10 (1894), pp. 123–24. The postscript also instructs Poletyka to tear up the letter immediately without taking any notes. Poletyka, obviously, did not do this. The material presented in these two sections has been partially covered by me in "Problems in Studying the Post-Khmelnitsky Ukrainian Elite (1650s to 1830s)," Rethinking Ukrainian History, ed. Ivan L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton, 1981): 103–119 and in "The Ukrainian Elite in the Eighteenth Century and Its Integration into the Russian Nobility," The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe, eds. Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkowitz (New Haven, 1983): 65–97.

2 As late as 1761 sons of the gentry were denied admission into the Imperial Cadet Corps because of this attitude. See D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie moloruszkoi starshiny v dvorianstvo," KS, no. 1 (1897), pp. 18, 26; A. V. Romanovich-Slavatinskii, Dvorianstvo v Rossii ot nachala XVIII veka do otmeny krepostnogo prava (St. Petersburg, 1870), pp. 103–104.
who continued in service received imperial ranks that provided for automatic ennoblement.\(^3\) Nonserving members of the gentry were, however, required to produce evidence of nobility.

In the absence of any imperial regulations governing the entrance of the non-serving Ukrainian gentry into the dvorianstvo, Governor-General Rumiantsev requested guidance from Catherine, who responded by sending him a preliminary draft of what later became the 1785 Charter of the Nobility.\(^4\) The charter, which was intended to apply to the whole empire, specified that deputies of each district, together with the marshal of the nobility, verify the credentials of an applicant for dvorianstvo.\(^5\) Designed as a procedure for incorporating new members into a recognized body of dvoriane, it was quite inadequate for an area where the composition of the dvorianstvo had not as yet been established. Governor-General Rumiantsev, however, did not seek any further clarifications. Being very favorably disposed toward the Ukrainian gentry, he interpreted Catherine’s response as a blanket authorization to the gentry for determining membership in the dvorianstvo.

Under Rumiantsev’s permissive supervision, the Ukrainian gentry carried out its own transformation. Three to four delegates were elected in each district, and they, assisted by the provincial marshal, were to register all nobles in residence.\(^6\) These functionaries were, of course, soon inundated with thousands of genealogies, charters, documents, and sworn affidavits. Even in the best of circumstances the verification of this material would have been time-consuming and

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3 For the official list of Ukrainian positions and their imperial equivalents, see "Zapiska iz dela, proizvedannogo v Komitete vysochaishe utverzhdennom pri Pravitel’stvuiushchem Senate; kasatel’no prav na dvorianstva byvshikh malorossiiskikh chinov," ChODR, bk. 2, pt. 5 (1861), pp. 103 and 107.

4 Rumiantsev’s request is contained in "Doklad grafy P. A. Rumiantseva Imperiatrisce Ekaterine II 1781 goda," KS, no. 12 (1884), pp. 693–703; for Catherine’s answer, see PSZ, no. 15,265 (October 26, 1781), 21: 295–96; D. Miller indicates that Catherine did, indeed, in 1781 forward a preliminary draft of the 1785 Charter to the Nobility; "Prevrashchenie malorusskoj starshiny v dvorianstvo," KS, no. 1 (1897), p. 204.


difficult. In fact, there is considerable evidence that widespread corruption occurred in the form of bribery, fake genealogies, and forged documents. Regular "diploma mills" in Polish Ukraine sold hundreds of fake genealogies and charters to candidates for Russian dvorianstvo. The number of new dvoriane swelled rapidly, reaching twenty-three thousand to twenty-five thousand by the 1790s.8


8 It is very difficult to determine with any accuracy the number of nobles in the provinces of the former Hetmanate. A. Romanovich-Slavatinskii lists one hundred thousand, Dvorianstvo v Rossii, p. 108. He obviously is following the estimate of the anonymous early nineteenth-century author of Zamechanii, do Maloi Rossi pri nadeshashchie (probably written in 1803, and published in ChODR 1, pt. 2 (1848): 1–55; the number is given on p. 20). This number, however, must be discounted. In the first place, it is not based on any official source; second, the author includes petty functionaries who had no claim to hereditary nobility and would at best receive only a personal rank for life. Finally the number has probably been inflated as a literary device. The author is, after all, ridiculing all the petty claimants to nobility. Since nobles were not taxed, they were not included in the census. Therefore, statistics concerning nobles are usually based on governors' reports and topographical descriptions. The first topographical descriptions that accurately list the number of nobles in the Hetmanate were conducted in the late 1790s. On the basis of these topographical descriptions and governors' reports, V. M. Kabuzan and S. M. Troitskii conclude that in 1800 there were 18,599 male nobles in the territories of the former Hetmanate. "Izmeneniiia v chislennosti, udelen'nom vese i razmesthenii dvorianstva v Rossii v 1782–1855 gg.," Istoriiia SSSR 4 (1971): 167–68. From two other sources it is known that there were 22,702 individuals (both male and female) listed as taxable in the 1782 census who were admitted later in the 1780s to the dvorianstvo. The claims of 10,105 were eventually rejected. The remaining 12,597 were recognized, all but 2,616 were dropped from the tax registers. However, there is no information as to whether these 2,616 nobles kept on the tax registers were counted in the sources used by Kabuzan and Troitskii. The above-cited figures are taken from A. Markovich, "Istoricheskaia i statisticheskaia zapiska o dvorianioskom sostavei i dvorianiiskikh imostinostvakh v Chernigovskoi gubernii," Materialy dlia statistiki imperii Rossiskoi, 4 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1841), vol. 2, pt. 4: 8–9, and D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie ...," no. 3, pp. 367–68. Thus, my estimate of 23,000–25,000 male members of the dvorianstvo in the 1780s takes the 18,599 males given in the topographical descriptions as a base; to this figure it adds 5,052 males (one half of the 10,105 excluded from the dvorianstvo in the early 1790s). The total of these two figures is 23,651 males. If the 1,908 males (one half of 2,616) recognized as nobles but included in the Chernihiv tax register were counted as nobles in the topographical descriptions, then the figure of approximately 23,651 males stands. If the topographical descriptions did
Ukrainian Society Adjusts to the Imperial Order

Up to 1784, when the preliminary draft of the Charter of the Nobility had become generally known, the Ukrainian gentry preferred to claim the rights of the old Commonwealth szlachta rather than join the Russian dvorianstvo, because the szlachta enjoyed various privileges denied the Russian dvorianstvo. According to the Lithuanian Statute, a nobleman could participate in sejms and local diets and was exempt from any state service or troop quarterings (the latter right was also granted in part to the Russian dvorianstvo). It was virtually impossible for a noble to lose his rank, and his estate was protected from confiscation. He could be arrested only if a court so ordered; even then, he was to be tried by his peers, but not tortured or put to death. Finally, the szlachta possessed wide-ranging economic rights: full exploitation of property, including farming and mining; the ownership and establishment of towns and villages; and license to conduct tariff-free trade. Although many of these liberties were, of course, only theoretical, the Ukrainian gentry did not want to surrender their claims.

With the gradual emancipation of the Russian dvorianstvo from compulsory state service, and its evolution into a semicorporate entity, the gap between the rights of the szlachta and those of the dvorianstvo narrowed considerably. The culmination of this process came with the Charter to the Nobility granted by Catherine in 1785. The charter specified that a Russian dvorianin could not be deprived of life, status, or property by the arbitrary action of the state. If accused of a crime, he was to be tried by his peers: no corporal punishment was permitted. If tried for a capital offense, the case had to be reviewed by the Senate and empress. The nobleman was freed from compulsory state service, except in national emergency. He was exempted from all taxes and from the quartering of troops on his property. He could travel abroad and even enter foreign service, but not in a state unfriendly to the empire. The noble's economic rights included

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9 For a good summary of these, see D. Miller, “Pervrashcheni...,” KS, no. 2 (1897), pp. 194–96. A detailed listing is contained in the 1786 law code, N. Vasilenko, ed., Ekstrakts iz ukazov... , pp. 216–31.

10 Discussed in Robert Jones, The Emancipation... , pp. 272–99. The Charter articles were known already in 1784 when the Ukrainian gentry began its transformation into the dvorianstvo.
complete legal ownership of his estate and the full exploitation of all natural resources on his estate, including the labor of his serfs. He could sell his produce and own property in town. Nobles who possessed estates could also enroll in cooperative associations: the Association of Nobles (sobranie dvorianstva) elected the various officials as stipulated by the Statute on the Provinces, provided for orphans and widows, collected monies for various local projects, and, in effect, acted as an auxiliary to the local government.

Catherine's 1785 Charter to the Nobility provided a powerful stimulus for the final merger of the Ukrainian and Russian elites. By becoming part of the Russian dvorianstvo, the Ukrainian gentry would receive many of the prerogatives that it claimed as szlachta. The political rights of the Lithuanian Statute—control of governmental policy by participation in the sejms—were certainly beyond the reach and even the expectations of the Ukrainian gentry. Therefore, they enthusiastically accepted the 1785 charter. No longer did the gentry petition for the recognition of a separate Ukrainian szlachta. Instead, they eagerly sought entry into the Russian dvorianstvo.

Even before the Ukrainian gentry was accepted into the imperial dvorianstvo, their peasants had become enserfed. A May 3, 1783, decree forbade peasant mobility and extended the poll tax to the Ukraine. The landlord became responsible for the poll tax of his peasants, which, in effect, increased his authority over the peasants. Since the peasants could no longer leave legally, there were few constraints on the landlord in increasing the peasants' labor obligations.

Integration into the Russian nobility provided the Ukrainian gentry with unprecedented opportunities for imperial careers. Although some of the gentry possessed immense wealth, the vast majority owned small estates barely able to provide the necessities of life.

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11 PSZ, no. 15,724 (May 3, 1783), 21:908.
12 Unfortunately there is no study of the Ukrainian gentry's landholdings. An approximation can be made from several sources. V. M. Kabuzan and S. M. Troitskii in their pioneer work "Izmenenia v chislennosti," pp. 153-69 provide an estimate of the number of serfs per nobleman in a given territory. For the Left-Bank Ukraine (the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine) the proportion for 1782 was 43.32 serfs for every 1.20 noblemen and for 1795 it was 42.68 serfs for every 1.33 noblemen. This converts to 34.66 serfs per nobleman in 1782, and 32.01 serfs per nobleman in 1795. In comparison, the central Russian regions had 66.07 serfs for every 0.70 nobleman in 1782 and 66.64 serfs for every 0.63 nobleman in 1795. This converts to 103.39 serfs
Economic conditions forced the sons of the gentry to seek careers in government service. The existence of the Kievan Academy, and Chernihiv and Pereiaslav Collegia offered the Ukrainian petty gentry better opportunities to obtain an education than its Russian counterpart and, therefore, more ready access to bureaucratic positions. There is some evidence to suggest that while most of the newly recognized nobles remained in the Hetmanate, more and more Ukrainians were moving to other provinces, with the more ambitious seeking fame and fortune in the capital. There was already an established tradition of Ukrainians reaching the highest imperial posts, beginning with Feofan Prokopovych and Stefan Iavors'kyi in Peter I’s time, then Oleksii and Kyrilo Rozumovs’kyi during Elizabeth’s reign. Also in the 1770s and 1780s, Oleksander Bezborod’ko, Petro Zavadovs’kyi, and the Kochubei and Troshehyns’kyi families all had outstanding imperial positions and maintained magnificent houses in St. Petersburg. They were not only examples for others but also provided the necessary connections for employment. The more prominent Ukrainians secured positions for their relatives, friends, and acquaintances, who in turn attempted to find employment for their own relatives and friends. Thus, by the 1790s a fairly large group of Ukrainians from the Hetmanate was domiciled in St. Petersburg. They knew each other both on the professional and social levels and formed their own cultural subgroup in the imperial capital.\footnote{For Ukrainian chinovniki and Ukrainian life in St. Petersburg, the memoirs of V. N. Getun are the best single source. “Zapiski V. N. Getuna,” Istoriitcheski vestnik, vol. 1, no. 1 (1880), pp. 26–67. V. N. Getun, as a minor functionary, described how}
In addition to the steady stream of nobles going to St. Petersburg, Ukrainians from the former Hetmanate also made careers in the neighboring provinces. Southern Ukraine, particularly Novorossiia, was for a long time considered an El Dorado where one could easily make a fortune. Although only a small percentage of nobles emigrated to the South, some did join the administration or become landowners in this still virgin territory. It was, however, the enlargement of government resulting from the provincial reforms that provided the Ukrainian gentry with their greatest opportunity. As early as 1779 Governor-General Rumiantsev, who organized the administration of the Kursk province, summoned Ukrainians from the Hetmanate to staff the new positions. This movement accelerated by the turn of the century. Many functionaries of the Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, and Sloboda Ukraine provinces were originally from the former Hetmanate. With the annexation of new provinces, particularly the Right-Bank Ukraine, the nobility from the Hetmanate was again tapped as a source of per-

most positions were obtained through a chain of protection culminating with Oleksander Bezborod'ko or Petro Zavadovs'kyi. His account also mentions the close social contacts maintained by the Ukrainian bureaucrats. This is confirmed in the memoirs of H. Vyns'kyi, "Moie vremia; Zapiski Vinskogo," RA, bk. 1 (1877), pp. 90–104. Many examples of assistance to Ukrainian office seekers can be found in the biographies of the two principal benefactors, Zavadovskiyi and Bezborod'ko. See "Graf Petr Vasilyevich Zavadovskii," RA, vol. 21, no. 2 (1883), pp. 81–174, and N. I. Grigorovich, Kantsler kniaz' Aleksandr Andreevich Bezborodko (2 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1879–1881), 1: 1–62 and passim, and 2: 377–416 and passim. Most recently that subject is treated by D. B. Saunders, The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850 (Edmonton, 1985).

14 Polons'ka-Vasylenko in "Pivdenna Ukraina roku 1787," Zaporizhzhia XVIII stolit'ia ta ioho spadshchyna, vol. 2, indicates that the Ukrainian gentry from the Hetmanate formed only 10.5 percent of the nobility, and most of them resided in those areas of Novorossiia that had once been part of the Hetmanate (pp. 135–36). Several prominent Ukrainian figures in imperial politics, e.g., O. Bezborod'ko and K. Rozumovs'kyi, however, managed to obtain immense estates (pp. 137–38).

15 Document no. 73; "Rasporyazhenie grafa P. A. Rumiantseva po upravleniiu Malorossiie (1779 g.)," ChGV, no. 25 (1888), p. 4.

16 The service patterns of the Ukrainian gentry outside of the Hetmanate have not been studied. A good indication can be obtained by gleaning V. Modzalevskii's Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik, however. When in civilian, rather than military service, the Ukrainian gentry tended to go either to St. Petersburg or to nearby provinces of Kursk, Orel, or Sloboda Ukraine.
sonnet for the imperial administration. Similarly, with the conquest of Georgia, nobles from the Left-Bank Ukraine were recruited as experienced administrators. Thus the abolition of Ukrainian institutions did not mean a loss of offices for the Ukrainian gentry. On the contrary, Catherine’s provincial reforms offered the Ukrainian petty gentry an unprecedented opportunity for imperial careers, first of all in the new administration in the territory of the former Hetmanate, in the bordering provinces, in the military ranks, and in St. Petersburg itself.

The Ukrainian gentry’s increasingly more cordial relationship with Governor-General Petr Rumiantsev—who introduced the provincial reforms—blunted overt opposition to the new imperial administration. The Ukrainian gentry was very reluctant to create difficulties for the man who permitted them a free hand in determining the composition of the local dvorianstvo and who liberally dispensed the lowest hereditary noble rank, the kornet. The majority of Rumiantsev’s military as well as civilian staff were Ukrainians, and during the twenty years of his rule a genuine friendship, even camaraderie, developed between the governor-general and the leading Ukrainian aristocratic families. Rumiantsev cemented these relationships by serving as godfather to the children of various nobles—a role usually reserved in Ukrainian society for family and very close friends.

As Rumiantsev’s contacts with the Ukrainian gentry grew increasingly more cordial, his relationship with Catherine and the central authorities became more strained. From the outset, when he was first

17 I. Smolens’kyi, “Biurokratychna verkhivka na Ukraini na prykintsii XVIII i na pochatku XIX st.,” *Ukraina*, 1930, nos. 7–8, pp. 70–80. Smolens’kyi lists the first seven classes of administrators for 1798 and 1800 for the Ukrainian provinces of the empire. Many of the administrators on the Right-Bank can be identified as having originated from the territory of the Hetmanate.


19 The majority of the Ukrainian gentry, of course, remained in the territory of the former Hetmanate and joined the local administration. Between the 1780s and 1802 the local administration was largely Ukrainian. See A. Andrievskii, “Archivnaia spravka o sostave Kievskogo ’obschestva’ v 1782–1797 godakh,” *KS*, no. 2 (1894), pp. 192–203 and I. Smolens’kyi, “Biurokratychna verkhivka na Ukraini na prykintsii XVIII i na pochatku XIX st.,” pp. 70–80.

appointed governor-general, Rumiantsev’s support of Peter III and the Grand Duke Paul made him suspect at court, but his successful service as governor-general of the Ukraine, his brilliant victories in the 1769–74 Ottoman War, and his personal role in negotiating the very favorable Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji brought him closer to the empress and the court. He was highly decorated, awarded the addition of Zadunaiskii (Beyond the Danube) to his name, and richly rewarded (with jeweled swords, money, and estates). In fact, Rumiantsev emerged as the empire’s leading military figure. Soon, however, he was eclipsed by the spectacular rise of the empress’ favorite, G. A. Potemkin, who became field marshal and received substantial material resources for the development of the territories under his control. Rumiantsev detested Potemkin as a less able and experienced military commander, a flatterer, and an upstart. The strain between the two was particularly intense in 1787, when Catherine traveled through the Hetmanate on her way south to meet Emperor Joseph II of Austria. The well-informed French envoy, Count Louis-Philippe de Ségur, who traveled in Catherine’s entourage, left a rather subjective but telling account of the Potemkin-Rumiantsev rivalry.

Field Marshal Rumiantsev received the Empress on the border of the governorship. The face of this venerable and distinguished hero was an expression of his soul; but it showed a shade of sadness and dissatisfaction evoked by the preference for and immense power of Potemkin. Competition for power disunited those two military leaders; they went along, fighting for glory and favor and, as usually happens, it was the Empress’ favorite who won out. The Field Marshal [Rumiantsev] did not receive any wherewithal for governing his dependency; his work proceeded slowly; his soldiers wore old clothes and his officers persistently demanded promotions. All favors, all encouragement went to the army which the First Minister [Potemkin] commanded.


The conflict between Rumiantsev and Potemkin reached the breaking point during the second Russo-Turkish War. The command was equally divided between the two, and Rumiantsev, the hero of the previous Ottoman War, considered this an insult. The two commanders could not agree on a joint policy, and in March 1789 Catherine recalled Rumiantsev to St. Petersburg, making Potemkin the commander-in-chief.23 Rumiantsev was ordered to organize another army for a possible war with Prussia. In light of his pro-Prussian sympathies, this appointment served only to further humiliate the venerated military commander and, as expected, he resigned his commission and asked permission to travel abroad. Although Catherine readily granted this, Rumiantsev remained in his military headquarters at Jassy. Repeated demands by Catherine that he leave his military unit in Moldavia were ignored. A year after his resignation he was still living in Jassy, and Catherine wrote Potemkin in blunt terms that “it would be best if you would send for Rumiantsev and tell him that it might easily happen that the Turks will take him away unless he gets away himself first, and if even this does not help, then send him a convoy which would accompany him and take him out.”24 Finally, in late 1790, he left Moldavia and settled on one of his Ukrainian estates.

Rumiantsev returned to the Hetmanate not as governor-general but as a private citizen. Although Catherine had granted him the Ukrainian governorship for life, in 1789 she dismissed him from this office, which was then entrusted to the governor-general of Tula and Kaluga, General M. N. Krechetnikov.25 Rumiantsev’s removal was undoubtedly connected with his recall as co-commander of the Turkish front, although this was only a pretext. It was no secret that in the late 1780s Catherine had become disenchanted with his performance as governor-general, especially when she compared it with Potemkin’s. During her 1787 trip through the Hetmanate, Catherine complained that, “in the three Little Russian governorships, because

23 Documents relating to Rumiantsev’s recall to St. Petersburg, his resignation, and subsequent refusal to leave Moldavia because of “illness” are published in Fel’dmarshal Rumiantsev. Sbornik dokumentov . . ., pp. 304–15.
nothing had been set in motion, the deficit reaches a million, the cities are drab and nothing is done.\footnote{26}

The Ukrainian gentry sympathized with their governor-general during Rumiantsev's dispute with Potemkin and the central administration.\footnote{27} Not only was he their benefactor in terms of offices and ranks of dvorianin, but he also had attempted to adjust the provincial reform to local conditions. These efforts were unsuccessful and served only to increase Catherine's impatience with him. To the Ukrainian nobles, however, Rumiantsev was the defender of their estate's and their homeland's interests before the central authorities. Moreover, he was regarded as a venerable military figure who led them to glory in battle. The Ukrainian gentry resented the preferential treatment accorded Potemkin and his command. Besides, criticism of Rumiantsev's civil administration also reflected on them, since the local gentry held the majority of offices. Consequently, an atmosphere of opposition to the central authorities developed among the gentry of the former Hetmanate.

Oppositionist tendencies did not necessarily strengthen the gentry's pro-autonomist sentiments, however. While Ukrainian autonomy was the primary issue at the 1768 Legislative Commission, by the late 1780s—though still an issue—it was becoming secondary to problems of regional discrimination and the unfair treatment of Rumiantsev. On the whole, the members of the gentry seemed to have accepted the fact that they were no longer in a separate country but, rather, in a region that played a part within an imperial political system. In order to protect their own interests and those of their region, they sought an appropriate share in this system.

\textit{The Struggle for the Ennoblement of Former Ukrainian Office Holders}

The Ukrainian gentry soon discovered not only the rewards but also the dangers of being part of an imperial political system, particularly in being associated with a disgraced military leader. Rumiantsev's successor as governor-general, M. N. Krechetnikov, who did every-

\footnote{26 G. V. Esipov, "Puteshestvie imper. Ekateriny II v Iuzhnuiu Rossiiu v 1787 godu," \textit{Kv}, no. 7 (1891), p. 31.}

\footnote{27 This is the main thrust of Ohloblyn's article "Ukrainian Autonomists . . ."}
thing possible to discredit his predecessor, took a particularly hostile attitude toward the gentry. He reported to the Senate on massive irregularities in determining the local dvorianstvo, claiming that 22,702 formerly taxed persons—who could not have been nobles—were now included in the register of nobility. Krechetnikov’s report alarmed the Senate. As a result, a decree was issued stating that not a single person was to enter the dvorianstvo without sufficient proof of nobility; furthermore, it was necessary to diminish the number of pretenders to dvorianstvo from taxed groups.

Armed with such an authorization, Krechetnikov began a vigorous investigation of the nobles registered in the tax rolls. By 1795, only 12,597 individuals were recognized as “nobles without any doubt.” The claims of the remaining 10,105 taxed nobles were either totally rejected or additional proof of nobility was required, whereby most of them were never recognized. The 12,597 “nobles without any doubt” also had difficulties. In the Novhorod-Sivers’k and Kiev provinces they were dropped from the tax registers (1795 census), but they were not dropped in the Chernihiv province, and 2,616 proven nobles were still taxed. In 1803 many of the nobles previously excluded from the tax registers were again included due to the Senate’s ruling that the local administration was not authorized to change tax registers. Thus, in the early nineteenth century 12,000 “nobles without any doubt” were still engaged in litigation in order to be exempted from the imperial tax rolls and the imperial levy and to enjoy the full rights of nobility. Although most of these nobles finally obtained recognition, the imperial bureaucracy made the process a protracted and excruciating one.

29 The ukaz was quoted in “Zapiska iz dela, proizvedennogo v komitete vysochaishe utverzhdennom pri pravitel’stvuiushchem Senate kasatel’no prav dvorianstva byvshikh chinov malorossiiskikh,” ChODR, bk. 2, pt. 5 (1861), pp. 128–31.
32 The fate of these nobles is described by D. Miller, “Prevrashchenie . . .,” pt. 3, p. 368–374.
In addition to substantially reducing the number of taxed individuals who had been admitted into the dvorianstvo, the imperial authorities devised an exceedingly difficult procedure for new candidates to obtain the status of dvorianin. In a decree issued on January 9, 1792, Krechetnikov imposed fines on unsuccessful candidates for the dvorianstvo as well as on the local Commission of the Nobility that honored dubious claims.33 Those individuals who risked the consequences of an unsuccessful claim to prove their nobility were also penalized. Krechetnikov argued that, as nobles, such individuals were not allowed to hold Cossack lands, and if they possessed any, they were to be confiscated by the state. The latter ruling was of such dubious legality that Krechetnikov was forced to rescind it.34 But the governor-general's message to the Ukrainian gentry was clear. New seekers of imperial titles faced considerable risks.

Krechetnikov's removal in 1795 and the accession of Paul I to the throne gave the Ukrainian nobles renewed hope that their claims would be honored. In January 1797 a decree ordered the compilation of a new Imperial Heraldry Book and all dvorianstvo families were to submit evidence of ennoblement.35 This decree greatly centralized control over the granting of rank. Both new candidates for the dvorianstvo and recognized nobles had to deal with the Office of Heraldry, which was the final arbiter in all cases. In effect, local commissions of the dvorianstvo could now only recommend or support candidates for the dvorianstvo.36 At first, the Ukrainian gentry benefited, since its members could again attempt to obtain ranks of dvorianstvo without any risk. The Heraldry Office recognized all Polish ranks and coats-of-arms. Service in Ukrainian institutions was sufficient evidence to obtain dvorianstvo, but no coat-of-arms was permitted.37 It seemed that the only impediment to obtaining titles for most of the Ukrainian gentry was the excruciatingly slow procedure of the Heraldry Office.

33 Krechetnikov's stern measures are treated by D. Miller, "Prevrashchenie . . . ," no. 3, pp. 363–368.
34 Ibid., p. 366.
By the turn of the century, however, there was a basic shift in the policy of the Heraldry Office, and claims to dvorianstvo based solely on service in the abolished Ukrainian institutions were no longer recognized. Since each case was decided individually, the new policy became apparent only after several Ukrainian candidates had already lost their cases. The Ukrainian gentry thus discovered that the Heraldry Office had taken a strict constructionist interpretation of the Ukrainian offices. Neither the Table of Ranks nor the Charter of Nobility recognized that service in Ukrainian institutions gave an automatic right to dvorianstvo. Since there was no official table equating Ukrainian offices with corresponding ones in the Table of Ranks, the Heraldry Office had no legal basis for honoring Ukrainian claims.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 4–5, 8.}

Had it been fully implemented, the ruling of the Heraldry Office would have had a catastrophic effect on many Ukrainian gentry families. It meant that those who had joined the imperial civilian administration were eligible for dvorianstvo if their position were sufficiently high in the Table of Ranks. All those who had retired without ever holding any imperial office were in jeopardy, however. They themselves could be taxed, and their children were barred from cadet schools, subjected to the military levy, and disqualified from many military and administrative positions. It was quite possible for a Ukrainian official of superior rank to become ineligible for dvorianstvo, while one of much lower rank, having transferred to the imperial administration at the time of the abolition of Ukrainian institutions, was readily recognized as a dvorianin.

The ruling of the Heraldry Office caused a storm of protest and indignation among the Ukrainian gentry. It violated a twenty-year local practice that recognized Ukrainian service as indisputable evidence for dvorianstvo. The incensed gentry began a struggle to obtain full recognition of Ukrainian ranks. They were led by a smaller group of nobles, who called themselves “patriots.”\footnote{The correspondence of some such nobles, collected in the “Books of the Nobility,” was entitled “Correspondence Between Patriots of this Land for the Common Good” (Perepiska mezhdu patriotami sego kraia dla obshchei pol’zy); see D. Miller, “Prevrashchenie . . . ,” no. 4, p. 15.} These patriots began collecting charters of Polish kings, all the treaties concluded between

\footnote{Ibid., pp. 4–5, 8.}

\footnote{The correspondence of some such nobles, collected in the “Books of the Nobility,” was entitled “Correspondence Between Patriots of this Land for the Common Good” (Perepiska mezhdu patriotami sego kraia dla obshchei pol’zy); see D. Miller, “Prevrashchenie . . . ,” no. 4, p. 15.}
the tsars and hetmans, tsarist ukazy and land grants, the decrees of hetmans, and documents issued by the College of Foreign Affairs and the Senate. On the basis of this material, they prepared various petitions, position papers, and memoranda to defend their right to nobility. Vague historical memories were now reinforced with historical documentation.

The first polemical works on the issue of the Ukrainian nobility appeared in Chernihiv province. The general judge in the reconstructed Ukrainian court system (1796–1801), Roman Markovych, wrote a Commentary on the Rights of the Little Russian Nobility ("Zamechania o pravakh malorossiiskogo dvorianstva"). He argued that Ukrainian ranks were always accepted by the Russian authorities and cited as proof the following documents: the "articles of 1728" (Hetman Danylo Apostol's election), a 1735 opinion of the Foreign College indicating Russian equivalents for Ukrainian ranks, and most important, the imperial ranks given to those who transferred in 1782 from the abolished Ukrainian institutions to the new imperial administration.

Writing at virtually the same time as Markovych was another, more erudite polemicist, Timofii Kalyns'kyi. His work was entitled Thoughts About Little Russian Ranks, Their Advantages, the Evidence Necessary for Proving Nobility on the Basis of Service and in What Sections of the Nobility's Book of Heraldry These Ranks Should be Recorded ("Mnenie o malorossiiskikh chinakh i o ikh preimushchestve, a rave i o razbore ikh dokazatel'stv o dvorianstve po sluzhbe i chinam ikh dla vnesenii v Rodoslovnuii dvorianskuui knigu i v kakuiu imenno onoi chast"). Kalyns'kyi claimed that the Ukrainian starshyna was already recognized as szlachta at the end of the sixteenth century. As szlachta, they had greater rights than the Russian dvorianstvo, since not only the officers, but the whole Cossack estate was "a knightly order with szlachta status" and thus readily qualified as Russian dvorianstvo. He equated the Ukrainian captains (a rather low rank) with the Russian voevoda, the General


42 The work was never published, but there is a detailed summary of its contents, D. Miller, "Prevrashchienie . . .," no. 4, pp. 17–22.
Staff with dumnye boky. The hetman, in Kalyns’kyi’s opinion, could hardly be equated to a general field marshal (the rank held by Rozumovs’kyi) but was a virtual sovereign.

Both works were discussed at an 1805 meeting of the Chernihiv dvorianstvo and resulted in a petition to the imperial authorities, followed by at least two other petitions. All of these were shelved in the office of Governor-General Prince Kurakin, and only in 1809 were these petitions passed on to the Council of Ministers.

Simultaneously, the gentry of Poltava, the other province that had once been part of the Hetmanate, were also preparing to counter the ruling of the Heraldry Office. The Poltava nobles were familiar with petitions presented by the Chernihiv nobility but felt that these omitted the most important and fundamental points. They decided to draw up new petitions, but in consultation with their counterparts in Chernihiv. Mykhailo Myloradovych, the Poltava provincial marshal, discussed the matter with R. I. Markovych, who in turn recommended Timofii Kalyns’kyi as the most knowledgeable person on the subject. Subsequently, Myloradovych entered into a lively correspondence that served to define the issues clearly and to coordinate the activities of the nobility in both provinces. With this correspondence between the patriots of the country for the common good, the gentry’s struggle became an organized movement.

On commission by the Poltava nobility, in 1808 Kalyns’kyi produced a new polemical work, Notes on the Little Russian Nobility (“Primechania o malorossiiskom dvorianstve”). It was indeed the fundamental apologia of the rights of the Ukrainian nobility desired by the Poltava gentry. It enumerated all the grants given by monarchs from the time of Sigismund Augustus to Catherine II and cited all the pertinent articles of the Lithuanian Statute as well as treaties of various hetmans. Departing from his previous stance, Kalyns’kyi no longer proposed that each Ukrainian rank be equated with a specific Russian one, but rather that all Ukrainian rank-bearers simply be

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43 For the 1805 meeting and the petitions see D. Miller, “Prevrashchenie . . .” no. 4, p. 30.
44 D. Miller, “Prevrashchenie . . .” no. 4, p. 31.
45 For Kalyns’kyi’s activities see Ohloblyn, Ludy . . ., pp. 33–48.
46 This work also was never published but again D. Miller provides a detailed summary, “Prevrashchenie . . .,” no. 4, pp. 34–36.
ennobled, with the general staff and colonels entered into the sixth part of the Heraldry Book, the regimental officers into the third, and the company officers into the second.

When in 1809 the Poltava nobles elected a new provincial marshal, V. I. Charnysh, they specifically instructed him to obtain recognition for the Ukrainian nobility. On the basis of all previous works Charnysh prepared a draft of a new petition, which was circulated locally. It was amended by Adriian Chepa and V. H. Poletyka, son of Hryhorii, who in addition wrote an independent work, A Note on the Little Russian Nobility (“Zapiska o malorossiiskom dvorianstve”) (1809). Vasyl’ Poletyka argued that during Polish times all szlachta were legally equal in status and rights, and this equality had been guaranteed when the Hetmanate came under the protection of the tsar. It was unthinkable, therefore, that some nobles were to be recognized as dvoriane and others not.47

The polemics on the Ukrainian nobility continued throughout 1809. Adriian Chepa wrote his A Note on Little Russian Ranks (“Zapiska o malorossiiskikh chinakh”), in which he gave a detailed historical explanation of all Ukrainian offices and attempted to prove that these ranks were always recognized by the Russian authorities.48 Adriian Chepa and V. H. Poletyka coordinated their activities by mutual exchange of historical materials and advice.49 Finally, Fedir Tuman’s’kyi wrote his Note in defense of the rights of the nobility,50 and his accession to the “patriotic” camp gave it a great stimulus. He was a leading intellectual of the Hetmanate and the planner of an

47 V. H. Poletyka’s notes were published in “Zapiska o malorossiiskom dvorianstve (1809),” KS, no. 1 (1893), Appendix, pp. 1–8.
50 Unfortunately Tuman’s’kyi’s Note was never published. The manuscript has been seen by O. Ohloblyn (cf. Ludy . . . , p. 258) and A. Lazarevskii (cf. Zamechaniiia na istoricheskii monografi D. Milleria o malorusskom dvorianstve i statutovkh sudakh [Kharkiv: 1898], p. 26).
academic library in Hlukhiv.\textsuperscript{51} More important, as a literary figure and
the former editor of St. Petersburg's \textit{Rossiiskii magazin}, Tumans'kyi
enjoyed an imperial literary reputation.\textsuperscript{52} This was a further indication
to the imperial authorities that the movement was not limited to a few
malcontents but included some of the most illustrious figures of the
Hetmanate.

By the end of 1809 the discussion had terminated, and the Poltava
nobility presented its petition, which the local and central authorities
considered in conjunction with those received from Chernihiv prov-
ince. The Council of Ministers decided that "in the case of the Little
Russian \textit{dvorianstvo} the same rules should be utilized as were made
by General-Fieldmarshal Count Rumiantsev-Zadunaiskii."\textsuperscript{53} The
Napoleonic Wars, however, prevented the implementation of this rul-
ing, and subsequently the Ukrainian nobles were forced again and
again to petition the central authorities. In 1819 and again in 1827
these petitions were vigorously supported by the governor-general,
Prince Repnin.\textsuperscript{54} While the Council of Ministers acted favorably, the
measures were usually blocked or tabled in some special commission of the
Senate.

The reason for the senatorial opposition was that the Senate sup-
ported bureaucratic rank (\textit{chin}) and opposed an entirely hereditary
castle nobility. In a meticulous study of every imperial decree on
Ukrainian ranks, the Senate commission attempted to prove that only
the higher ranks brought hereditary nobility while the lower ones
qualified for personal nobility.\textsuperscript{55} The descendants of those in the lower
ranks, therefore, were not to be considered as nobles, but could

\textsuperscript{51} O. Ohloblyn, "Fedir Tumans'kyi i ioho proiekt akademichnoi knyhami v Hlu-
khovi kintsisia 1770-kh rr.," \textit{Naukovyi zbirnyk; Ukrain's'ka vil'na akademia nauk u

\textsuperscript{52} For a bibliography of Tumans'kyi's works see M. N. Longinov, "Ruskie pisat-
teli v XVIII stoletie," Chapter 19, "Fedor Osipovich Tumanski," \textit{Russkaia starina,
248–58 and in "Fedir Tumans'kyi i ioho proiekt . . . ."

\textsuperscript{53} V. Gorlenko, "K istorii izuzhno-russkogo obschestva . . . .", pp. 46–49.

\textsuperscript{54} D. Miller, "Pervarshchene . . . .", no. 4, \textit{KS}, no. 4 (1897), pp. 40–44.

\textsuperscript{55} The reports of the Senate commission dealing with Ukrainian ranks has been
published, "Zapiska iz dela, proizvedennogo v komitete vysochaishe utverzhdennom
pri pravitel'svuiushchem Senate, kasat's'no prav na dvorianstvo byvshikh chinov
become nobles, even hereditary ones, by achieving the appropriate level in the Table of Ranks. The Senate did not want to exclude the non-Russian dvoriane, it merely wanted them to enter the dvorianstvo through appropriate advancement in imperial service rather than by claiming illustrious ancestors.

The issue was finally brought up at the Imperial Council and settled by imperial decree in 1835. All Ukrainian military and civilian ranks except for the lowest—Comrade of the Standard and voynyi—were recognized as automatically bestowing hereditary dvorianstvo on their holders and their descendants.\footnote{PSZ. 2d ed., no. 7976 (March 20, 1835), 10, pt. 1, pp. 154–55. Those whose Ukrainian ranks were not recognized were listed as odvodvortsi.} This decision finally settled what was for the gentry the last remaining issue stemming from the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy.

While the movement to obtain imperial recognition of Ukrainian ranks was, without doubt, motivated by class interest, it had broader implications for the rise of a Little Russian patriotism. Not all members of the gentry would realize gains from the success of the movement. In fact, many already possessed ranks in the imperial dvorianstvo. All the leaders of the movement—Roman Markovych, Tymofii Kalyns'kyi, Mykhailo Myloradovych, Vasyl' Poletyka, Adrian Chepa, Vasyl' Charnysh, and Fedir Tumans'kyi—were recognized as dvoriane without any question, and all except Kalyns'kyi and Markovych were prosperous and held a rank in the Table of Ranks.\footnote{V. Modzalevs'kyi provides information as to rank and wealth for the following individuals: Roman Markovych reached rank 6 (koleshskii sovetnik); Malorossiiskii rodoslovnik, 3:430; Mykhailo Myloradovych, rank 3 (rainyi sovetnik), ibid., 3:490–91. Vasyl' H. Poletyka, rank 5 (shatskii sovetnik), ibid., 4:126–27. Tymofii Kalyns'kyi only reached rank 9 (tiuliarnyi sovetnik); see O. Ohloblyn, "Lituy . . .", pp. 33–48. Fedir Tumans'kyi had rank 5 (shatskii sovetnik); see Count Grigorii Miloradovich, Rodostlovnaia kniga chernigovskogo dvorianstva (2 vols.; St. Petersburg: 1901), 2, pt. 6, p. 203 and O. Ohloblyn, "Lituy . . .", pp. 248–58 and "Fedir Tumans'kyi . . .", pp. 106–114. I have been unable to establish the precise rank held by A. Chepa and Vasyl' Charnysh, but since Charnysh was also the Marshal of the Nobility for the whole Poltava province, he must have held an appropriate rank.} As the struggle became protracted, many of the descendants of the unrecognized nobles had already gained dvorianstvo on the basis of imperial service, which occurred on a large scale during the Napoleonic Wars. The best evidence for this is that the recognition of
most Ukrainian ranks in 1835 brought no increase in the number of nobles in Poltava and Chernihiv provinces; in fact, the number continued to decline. In purely socioeconomic terms, the lack of recognition of Ukrainian ranks had dire consequences for only a part of the nobility, and the problems had diminished considerably by the 1820s.

Beyond the bread-and-butter issue, the movement for the recognition of Ukrainian ranks was reinforced by the nobility’s strong local patriotism, which reflected two main concepts: the nation and the Fatherland. A long-standing tradition stemming from Polish times had equated the nation with the nobility. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the nobles made up the nation that ruled the state. Thus, in defending the nobility, “the patriots” were also defending the rights of the nation and their Fatherland—the Hetmanate. Their writings contain a telling gradation of loyalty and identification. The first loyalty was to the tsar, then to the imperial state, but they still reserved the term “fatherland” for the territory of the Hetmanate.

Such concepts, typical for the large multinational empires of the eighteenth century, had already been challenged by the nation-state of revolutionary France. In the territory of the Hetmanate, however, the old views were still firmly entrenched. Although the Hetmanate no longer existed, the values it embodied remained strong. The ruling of the Heraldry Office infuriated the Ukrainian “patriots” because it questioned the status of their heroic ancestors and the traditions of their Fatherland, and this was the reason for a highly emotional patriotic outcry. For example, T. Kalyns’kyi wrote to M. Myloradovych, “A passionless concern for the Fatherland, and, moreover, the degradation of our native [uiecehestvennye] ranks, would cause even the dumb to become vocal and with an apocalyptic and prophetic voice speak out the truth.” Kalyns’kyi added that, “I am ready to die in defense of our common advantages and freedoms.” R. Markovych wrote his work out of “a zeal for my countrymen,” and A. Chepa pur-

58 In Chernihiv province the number of nobles dropped from 12,006 in 1834 to 10,551 in 1850. In Poltava province there is a slight decrease from 10,988 in 1834 to 10,875 in 1850; V. M. Kabuzan and S. M. Troitskii, “Izmeneniia v chistennosti, udel’nom vese i razmeshchenii dvorianstva v Rossii v 1782–1858 gg.,” Istoriia SSSR, no. 4 (1971), p. 164.
59 D. Miller, “Prevrashchenie . . .” pt. 4, p. 44.
sued the struggle because of his "zeal and love for the nation." When in 1809–10 it seemed that the Ukrainian nobility had triumphed, V. H. Poletyka wrote to A. Chepa, "How pleasant it is to work for the glory and utility of the Fatherland. Our own feelings, the realization that in troubled times, we, nevertheless, did not live in vain, rewards us and comforts us in death and gives us the right to call ourselves 'sons of the Fatherland.'"

The sudden decision of the Heraldry Office not to recognize Ukrainian ranks somewhat slowed the full integration of the gentry into the dvorianstvo. Although only part of the Ukrainian gentry was faced with the possible loss of position, wealth, and way of life, the gentry as a whole, at least in official petitions, closed ranks and fought the Heraldry Office. While, for the most part, the gentry was ultimately successful, the long and sometimes bitter struggle produced an outburst of local patriotism, generated a keen interest in the past, and kept alive a sense of dissatisfaction with and opposition to the imperial center.

The Attitudes of the Ukrainian Gentry
Toward Imperial Integration

In questioning the validity of Ukrainian ranks, the imperial government would not let the Ukrainian gentry forget its autonomous past. The protracted struggle spurred the gentry to consider its role within the imperial system and reflect on the value of the abolished institutions. In these ruminations, the Ukrainian gentry expressed two basic attitudes that I will call assimilationist and traditionalist. These were not systematic political ideologies but contrasting views as to the value of the Hetmanate’s heritage. The assimilators came to believe that clinging to autonomist traditions was outmoded, since the future of the Hetmanate was inevitably intertwined with the fate of the empire as a whole. They began to view the empire as their country—an empire that so many "Little Russians," beginning with Feofan Prokopovych, had helped to develop. The assimilators were proud to be part of an empire that had vanquished the Hetmanate’s worst enemies (Poland, the Crimean Khanate, and the Ottoman Empire) and

60 Ibid., p. 14.
61 V. Gorlenko, "K istorii iuzhno-russkogo obschestva . . .," p. 56.
that had given them access to court society and opportunities for imperial careers. The proponents of this view included some of the most illustrious names of the Hetmanate and the empire: Oleksander Bezborod’ko (Aleksandr Bezborodko), Petro Zavadov’s’kyi (Petr Zavadovskii), Count Ivan Hudovych (Gudovitch), Dmytro Troschyns’kyi (Dmitrii Troschenskii), Count (later Prince) Viktor Kochubei, Hryhorii Myloradovych (Grigorii Miloradovich) as well as countless less distinguished individuals.62

Prince Bezborod’ko illustrates well the attitudes of the assimilators. He began his career in the Hetmanate and rose to the rank of Kiev colonel; later he was an assistant to Governor-General Rumiantsev and participated in the Turkish War. In 1774 he became secretary to Catherine II and from that time his career continued in St. Petersburg.63 Bezborod’ko’s outstanding abilities and his willingness to serve the imperial cause were soon recognized. While still in the Hetmanate, Bezborod’ko rammed through the government nakaz in Chernihiv, thereby earning, according to Rumiantsev, the enmity of his countrymen.64 In recommending Bezborod’ko to Catherine for a promotion, Rumiantsev stressed that Bezborod’ko “is devoid of local sentiments.”65

Bezborod’ko’s views on the empire and the Hetmanate emerge most clearly in his correspondence with his father, his mother, and his relatives, the Kochubei family.66 In his letters, Bezborod’ko stresses the importance of having Ukrainian youth attend the cadet schools and

62 Ohloblyn identifies this group of Ukrainian gentry as centered around Prince O. Bezborod’ko and favoring close cooperation with Russia. **Ludy Staroi Ukrainy** (Munich, 1959), p. 155.
63 Bezborod’ko’s career is traced by Grigorovich, **Kantsler . . .**, 2 vols.; Bezborod’ko himself traced his various positions in his resignation given to Paul I in 1799, published in Grigorovich, 2: 640–42.
64 G. Maksimovich, **Vybor i nakazy . . .**, pp. 119–25; Rumiantsev’s report on pp. 326–28.
65 Ibid., p. 328.
66 O. Bezborod’ko’s letters to his father have been published by Grigorovich, **Kantsler . . .**, 1: 235–87; a brief report on these letters was made by Pavlo Klepats’kyi, “Lystuvannia Oleksandra Andriievycha Bezborod’ka z svoim bat’kom, iak istorychne dzherelo,” **Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu akademiya M. S. Hrushevs’koho** (2 vols.; Kiev: 1928), 1: 280–85. Grigorovich also published the letters to Bezborod’ko’s mother (1: 470–502), and the Kochubei family (1: 480–502).
the School for Noble Girls; he gives advice for advancement in service and describes the honor of achieving an imperial rank or decoration. He was always quick to acquire or buy estates and often hinted to his Ukrainian colleagues that imperial service could also bring wealth. On the whole, Bezborod'ko’s letters indicate that he was an enthusiastic supporter of the imperial system, that he was very proud to have achieved a high position, and that he would like his countrymen to emulate his success.

This does not mean that Bezborod’ko lacked all sentiment toward the Hetmanate. On the contrary, he loved his native land and particularly encouraged the study of its history. Due to Bezborod’ko’s patronage, V. Ruban was able to publish *A Short Chronicle of Little Russia* in 1777. Bezborod’ko was directly involved in the project, bringing the chronicle up to date and compiling the appendices. Sending the work to his father, Bezborod’ko wrote,

I present it to you, in all fairness it belongs to you, for you have proven in many instances your love for that country, Our Beloved Fatherland, on behalf of which sincere efforts will always be made so as to preserve from oblivion the events and circumstances that indicate the fame and glory of our ancestors. . . . This little work is a guide to a more detailed history of Little Russia, which has been planned. . . . My satisfaction will be complete when I finish this work and particularly when its completion is followed by other instances which allow me to express my sincere feelings towards my fellow citizens.67

This reverence, however, was for the Hetmanate’s past. At no time did Bezborod’ko express a desire for the renewal of the Hetmanate’s autonomous institutions.68 In fact, he either hampered or opposed projects for organizing traditional Cossack units, and his commentary in

68 Bezborod’ko has been credited for the renewal of Ukrainian judicial institutions in 1797. This claim was made in a contemporary (ca. 1802) polemical work, *Zamechanitia do Maloi Rossii prinadelzhashchiei*, p. 7 and p. 12, and then repeated in many textbooks. Indeed, in 1797 Paul I restored the civil court system not only for the Hetmanate but also for the Baltic region. It is true that Bezborod’ko was able to place his relatives and cronies as administrators of the renewed court system, but this does not prove that he played any role in its establishment.
Ruban's chronicle fully approved the abolition of the hetmancy. For Bezborod'ko the Hetmanate was an entity of the past that could be cherished and written about in history books. His present loyalties were not to a moribund entity, but to its former citizens. He showed a genuine concern for his fellow Ukrainians, but rather than trying to regain traditional rights and privileges for them, Bezborod'ko wanted to integrate them into imperial society. He became their main protector in St. Petersburg. Despite his preoccupation with governmental affairs, Bezborod'ko usually found time to meet his Ukrainian petitioners and attempted to obtain positions for them. He considered this a duty to his homeland and his countrymen. In 1779, before the final abolition of autonomy, Bezborod'ko proudly reported to his father that he had been able to obtain Russian ranks for approximately twenty Ukrainian officials.

Bezborod'ko apparently considered the Hetmanate to be his homeland, although he saw it as part of a larger country, Imperial Russia. Implicit in his works is the idea that Ukrainians were but a subgroup of an all-Russian nation and that imperial integration was, therefore, merely part of a reunification process. In Bezborod'ko's view, the benefits of such a reunification were considerably more than just imperial positions, titles, land, and wealth, for, as part of the empire, the Hetmanate would be able to cope with its traditional enemies. The constancy and intensity of his anti-Polish, anti-Tatar, and anti-Turkish policies were an outgrowth of his Ukrainian heritage. In his 1776 memorandum and historical tract on the Tatar problem, he listed every raid and deplored the immeasurable harm done to "Russia, particularly Little Russia." He recommended the same course of action that Ivan IV took at Kazan and Astrakhan—conquest and incorporation

69 V. Ruban, Kraikaia letopis' Mal'ya Rossii s 1506 po 1776 god. (St. Petersburg, 1777), pp. 231–38.

70 N. Grigorovich, Kantsiar., 1:342.

71 Ibid., pp. 270–72; D. Saunders describes the many favors he bestowed on his fellow Ukrainians and his deep involvement in the affairs of the Ukrainian gentry; see The Ukrainian Impact, pp. 69–81.

72 This view is particularly evident in a long memorandum-history that Bezborod'ko wrote: "Karina ili kratkoe izvestie o Rossiskikh s Tatarskimi vozniakh i delakh, nachenshikhia v polovine desiatogo veka i pochti bezpreryvno chrez vesennye let prodolzhiashchikhsia," published by Grigorovich, Kantsiar., 1:339–69.
into the empire. Similarly, he argued that Poland had for centuries persecuted the Orthodox and "Russian" population of the Right-Bank Ukraine and Belorussia. With the destruction of the Crimea and the partition of Poland, the two oldest enemies of Cossack Ukraine were finally vanquished. For Bezborod'ko and his followers this was yet another justification for close cooperation with Russia and for imperial integration. Bezborod'ko, along with many other Ukrainian nobles, was simultaneously able, on the one hand, to love the Hetmanate of the past and to identify with his Ukrainian countrymen and, on the other hand, to assimilate eagerly into an imperial, mainly Russian, society.

The strongest expression of the assimilators' point of view can be found in a pamphlet written in 1802 or 1803, the Zamechaniia do Maloi Rossii prinadlezhashchie. Little is known about its author, but one could surmise from the text that he was a Ukrainian nobleman, probably from the Chernihiv province, who apparently spent most of his life in Russian service. His detailed description of the status of Little Russia in 1802, frequently interjected with Russian comparisons, included a sharp criticism of the reestablishment of the General Court (1797), the more outlandish Ukrainian claims for ennoblements, and the haughty attitude in some Ukrainian circles towards Russians. He found incomprehensible the Ukrainian penchant for clinging to outdated institutions stemming from Polish times:

The views of many people . . . filled with the Cossack Zaporozhian spirit . . . have become so ossified that they don't think about their own benefits nor of the common good and keep repeating only that we do not want to be Russians [Muscovites, moskali]. It is quite obvious that among those holding such a view are those who had received their upbringing, good manners, enlightenment, wealth, and honors from the Russians [Muscovites], and they are so ungrateful for all of this that they want to force Polish customs and maintain Polish courts. . . . Can one wish [to emulate] the laws and

73 Ibid., pp. 369–70.
74 N. Grigorovich, Kantister . . ., 2: 633.
75 These are the hypotheses of A. Bodianskii (O. Bodians'kyi), who published the work. It is also possible that the author was a Russian who had lived for a long time in the Hetmanate, but one would then have to discount the author's frequent use of "we" which could refer only to "Little Russians." For Bodianskii's preface and the work itself see "Zamechaniia do Maloi Rossii prinadlezhashchie," ChOISR, bk. 1, pt. 2 (1848), pp. 1 – 55.
arrangements of a people—having 16 million inhabitants—but who because of their own willfulness have lost their Kingdom? Whoever wishes such a rule betrays his Tsar and himself, and as it is said, emits the spirit of Mazepa. (p. 3)

According to the author, the tenacity of the Polish institutions is even more puzzling in light of the shabby treatment received by the Little Russians from the Poles. While the Russians recognized the Cossacks and the Ukrainian nobles, “the Poles had said that the Little Russian officials and the Little Russian szlachta are all our peasants.” (p. 21)

The author clearly identified Ukrainians with Russians and believed that the Ukrainians were to be governed by the all-Russian imperial administration and laws. According to him: “We are not Poles, but Russian people, and should have the same arrangement as the whole state, even more so, since it is clearly to our benefit and convenience.” (p. 12) He attacked a traditionalist who wanted to restore some aspects of Ukrainian autonomy in the following way:

This self-imagined patriot, following the French example, gave an oration. He demanded that Little Russia and her former army be renewed just as it was under the hetmans, and that the whole Novorossiia province be abolished and the bordering lands be united to Little Russia. It is obvious that following Mazepa’s example he wanted to have an Appanage [udel’noe] Little Russian Kingdom; in a word, he wanted such things for which one is sent—and that is with mercy—to the Maksakiv monastery. (p. 16)

The assimilators, therefore, readily integrated into imperial society. Some, like Prince O. Bezborod’t’ko, had genuine affection for the Hetmanate’s past and its traditions and for their own fellow Ukrainians. Others, like Prince Viktor Kochubei, even expressed contempt for their ethnic origins. Kochubei, as chairman of the Imperial Council in the 1830s, blocked all efforts at reestablishing Cossack military formations. He explained his opposition to the Ukrainian governor-general, Prince N. G. Repnin:

Although I was born a khokhol [derogatory term for Ukrainian], I am more Russian than anybody else ... My calling and the position I hold put me above all sorts of petty considerations. I look at the affairs of your province from the point of view of the common interest of our country. Microscopic views are not my concern.76

76 N. Storozhenko, “K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale
All the assimilators, however, enthusiastically supported the new imperial administration and showed no interest in maintaining or reestablishing any aspect of Ukrainian autonomy.

While the assimilators were willing to reject the Hetmanate's traditions, they could not be simply transformed into Russian functionaries. When the Ukrainian aristocrats went to the imperial capital, they brought with them a Ukrainian outlook. According to David Saunders, the search for an appropriate imperial role caused these Ukrainians first to raise the question of a Russian national identity. In an attempt at broadening such an identity, the Ukrainians introduced the Russians to a wider Slavic world, and, to some extent, prepared the ground for Slavophilism. Thus, in Saunders' view, some of the Ukrainian assimilators had an important impact on the development of Russian political thought and, ultimately, Russian nationalism.77

Yet only a part of the Ukrainian gentry broke with the traditions of the Hetmanate and eagerly assimilated into a Russian imperial nobility. There were many others who, although they had accepted being part of the empire, nevertheless wanted the imperial order in the Ukraine to reflect local legal and administrative practices. These were the traditionalists. They were not organized into any movement and, therefore, reflected various opinions and heterogeneous goals. What they had in common was an attachment to the past that was, at the same time, an explicit or implicit criticism of the present. Such criticism ranged from a vague sense of dissatisfaction to a virulent opposition to the imperial order.

The most extreme opposition came from a group that was willing to appeal to a foreign power for aid in resolving the plight of the Hetmanate. On April 24, 1791, (N.S.), Vasyly Kapnist (Vasili Kapnist), a well-known literary figure in imperial Russia, held secret talks in Berlin with the Prussian cabinet minister, Count Ewald Friedrich Hertzberg. Hertzberg reported to King Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia that Kapnist claimed that he was sent by his compatriots to inquire whether, in the event of a Russian-Prussian war, the Ukrainians could...

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77 Saunders, The Ukrainian Impact, pp. 202–53. Saunders presents a convincing picture of the Ukrainian search for a broader imperial identity. He has not demonstrated, to my satisfaction, the impact this search had on the development of Russian political thought, Slavophilism, and Russian nationalism.
count on Prussian protection if they attempted to throw off the imperial yoke. The king’s reaction was negative, and he approved Hertzberg’s polite refusal. Although the parties agreed to keep in touch, it was obvious to all that the Kapnist mission had ended in failure.


Some scholars cannot accept the possibility that Vasyl’ Kapnist, the “loyal” Russian writer, would ever have been involved in such an undertaking. Since Hertzberg’s memorandum never indicated the full name of the Kapnist who visited Berlin, it is certainly possible that some other family member visited Berlin. The candidacy of Vasyl’s brother Petro was first advanced in V. Modzalevskii, Malarossiiskii rodoslovnik, 4 vols. (Kiev, 1908–14) 2: 284–85. It has since become the official Soviet interpretation; see Lu. G. Oksman and S. N. Chernov, eds., Vospominaniia i rasskazy deiatel’i tainykh obschestev 1820-kh godov, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1931–33), 1: 407–408; A. Matsai, "Iabeda” V. V. Kapnista (Kiev, 1958), p. 78; L. A. Kovalenko, Velyka francuz’ka burzhuazna revolutsiia i hromads’ko-politychni rukhy na Ukraini v kini s XVIII st. (Kiev, 1973), pp. 101–102. Despite the numerous adherents of the view that it was Petro who went to Prussia, the theory is unconvincing. It is based largely on Petro’s reputed liberalism—calling his estate a “republic” and changing the form of peasant obligations on his estate to a small money payment. While these actions may have been examples of “free thinking,” they were probably more connected with the French Revolution and had nothing specifically to do with Ukrainian autonomy. Moreover, while Hertzberg’s memorandum does not give the full name of Kapnist, it does specify his rank (court counselor) and position (state factory manager), both of which correspond to Vasyl’ and neither of which can be attributed to Petro. Recently, William B. Edgerton in "Laying a Legend to Rest. The Poet Kapnist and Ukraine-German Intrigue," Slavic Review 30 (1971): 551–60, advanced another hypothesis that Vasyl’s other brother, Mykola, went to Prussia. Edgerton’s evidence is that Mykola was the only Kapnist other than Vasyl’ to hold the rank specified in Hertzberg’s memorandum (court counselor), and that in 1812 he stated that he would welcome Napoleon. One may counter this argument by the fact that Mykola did not have a position in the state factories—at least there is no evidence for this—and again, while a statement favorable to Napoleon in 1812 may have been considered an act bordering on disloyalty, it has no connection with Cossack rights. Edgerton’s methodology, to say the least, is questionable. He sets himself the goal of defending the Russian poet Vasili Kapnist from “the charge of high treason” and then proceeds to discredit those historians who had held that Vasyl’ Kapnist had
Kapnist’s appeal to Prussia and several hints of conspiracies were only isolated incidents. The vast majority of traditionalists were completely loyal to tsar and empire and only wanted to retain the few remnants of the Hetmanate’s administration or to restore its institutions through legal means. During the latter part of Catherine’s reign, the traditionalists placed their hopes on her son, Grand Duke Paul, whose opposition to Catherine’s policy was well known. Indeed, upon ascension to the throne, Paul did restore some of the Hetmanate’s former prerogatives.

One goal of the traditionalists was to preserve as much as possible the native judicial system. When Alexander I came to the throne, the Ukrainian nobles met in Chernihiv and, with their letter of gratitude for the reconfirmation of the 1785 Charter of Nobility, they also forwarded a petition requesting that the local judicial system be retained.\(^{80}\) Alexander evidently was not favorably disposed, because he divided the Little Russian guberniiia into two provinces and partially dismantled its judicial system.\(^{81}\) Nevertheless, the local legal codes (a peculiar mixture of the Lithuanian Statute, common law, and elements of the Magdeburg Law for towns) were not only retained, but even recodified (1807).\(^{82}\) By the 1840s, however, these law codes

\(^{80}\) The petition has been published, “Zapiska 1801 g. o nuzhdakh malorossiiskogo dvorianstva,” KS, 1890, no. 8, pp. 310–16.

\(^{81}\) PSZ, no. 20,162 (February 27, 1802), 27:59–60. The abolition of the General Court is described briefly by its last general judge, Akim Sulyma; see “Dnevnik Akima Semenovicha Sulimy, 1772–1817,” in Sulimovskii arkhiv (Kiev, 1884), p. 163.

had been abrogated, although the imperial code was amended to account for some local peculiarities.\textsuperscript{83}

Another traditionalist goal, which was achieved from time to time, was the restoration of one of the most important elements of Cossack Ukraine—the Cossack army. The first project for the renewal of Cossack military formations was presented in 1788 by the leading exponent of traditionalism, Vasyl’ Kapnist.\textsuperscript{84} Both as Kiev’s provincial marshal of the nobility and as a fervent Little Russian patriot, Kapnist took a very active part in Ukrainian political affairs and had already gained a reputation as a defender of Ukrainians against abuse by the imperial administration.\textsuperscript{85} Kapnist realized that this was the appropriate time for such a project. The empire was engaged in a two-front war with Turkey and Sweden and was in desperate need of additional troops. Only six years had elapsed since the abolition of the traditional Cossack regiments, and Kapnist believed that it would be possible to organize a rather large fighting force quickly. Taking the initiative, he formulated a modest project, which he, given the advantage of his court connections, presented directly to Catherine. The project called for the formation of a separate Cossack army, commanded by the Cossack officers elected at the lowest levels. Catherine forwarded the project to O. A. Bezborod’ko, who approved it with some reservations. Bezborod’ko wanted to be certain that the new units would not resemble “the structure of the former Hetmanate.”\textsuperscript{86} The project was then passed on to Prince Potemkin, the commander of all Cossack and irregular forces.

\textsuperscript{83} The abrogation of these law codes has been described in the previous chapter.

\textsuperscript{84} The project has been discussed by M. Antonovych, “Kozats’kyi proiekt Vasylia Kapnista,” \textit{S’ohochasne i mynule}, no. 2 (1939), pp. 16–22, and by O. Ohloblyn, \textit{Liudy Staroi Ukrayini}, pp. 85–90.


\textsuperscript{86} For Bezborod’ko’s memorandum on the Kapnist project see “Mnienie grafa A. A. Bezborodkii na proiekt Kapnista: Polozhenie na kakom mozhet byt’ nabrano i soderzhano voisko okhochikh kazakov, v nachale 1788 goda,” Grigorovich, \textit{Kanstler...}, 2:516–17.
Meanwhile, Catherine had adopted a policy of increasing the number of Cossack troops, to which were admitted escapees from Poland who could in the future be useful in dealing with the Orthodox population beyond the empire’s borders.\textsuperscript{87} At this propitious moment for the Ukrainian autonomists, Potemkin recruited two Cossack corps from among former Zaporozhian Cossacks and assumed the title of ‘Great Hetman of the Ekaterinoslav and Black Sea Cossacks.’\textsuperscript{88} These units were carefully regulated by the government and settled in rather remote areas. They did not possess the traditional rights and privileges of the Hetmanate’s Cossacks, nor those of Zaporizhzhia. The Kapnist project, however, was never implemented, because Potemkin’s province became the center for Cossack recruitment and the central authorities feared any renewal of traditional Cossack formations.

The imperial policy toward the Cossacks was strictly one of expediency. Whenever the empire was in need of irregular troops, the imperial government was willing to consider reestablishing traditional Cossack units, but once the danger had passed, the fear emerged that this might lead to other concessions. In rejecting a 1794 project for organizing Cossacks in the newly acquired Right-Bank Ukraine, Prince Bezborod’ko—without doubt the leading expert on the Hetmanate’s Cossacks—succinctly summarized the imperial position:

If in 1790 we favored similar extreme measures [the reinstitution of traditional Cossack troops—Z.K.] it was because of the extreme precariousness of our position. We were at war with Sweden and Turkey and on the verge of war with England and Prussia. The Poles at that time were quite strong and preparing to move against us. It was necessary, therefore, to seek a way to deal with this independently from our operations . . . . Now we are no longer in such a dire position. Ukraine, Podillia, Volhynia [the Right Bank—Z.K.] are ours. It would be possible to reawaken our separate people, who remember the time of Khmel’nyts’kyi and are inclined towards Cossackdom. A military nation would be readily formed and this is even more dangerous for Little Russia, and his guberniia [Potemkin’s, i.e., Southern Ukraine] would be infected with this spirit. The result would be a new type of revolution, and, as an extreme measure, we would be forced to reestablish the

\textsuperscript{87} PSZ, no. 16,605 (June 14, 1788), 22:1009–1010; Theresia Adamczyk, Prolegomena zur Geschichte Potemkins (Berlin: 1936), pp. 76–78.

\textsuperscript{88} Theresia Adamczyk, Prolegomena . . . , p. 75.
hetmancy, and permit many unfortunate freedoms and, in a word, destroy what we could peacefully and quietly rule forever.\textsuperscript{89}

The same sequence of events was repeated several times. When the empire was strained by war or revolution (1812 and 1830) the Ukrainian nobles offered various Cossack projects. In their eagerness to increase the empire’s military potential, the imperial authorities gave the project a hearing, but they were wary of relinquishing any special prerogatives and rescinded any concessions as soon as the danger was over.\textsuperscript{90}

While some traditionalists openly attempted to bring back one of the most important elements of Cossack Ukraine—the Cossack army—most of the others eschewed any active role. Only in private would they criticize imperial assimilation and decry the loss of autonomous privileges. The political orientation and mood of this segment of traditionalists were best captured in several, mostly anonymous, political tracts that were secretly circulated among the Ukrainian nobles. One work, a history of the Hetmanate by Arkhyp Khudhory, which, according to the Decembrist A. F. von der Briggen, was written “very freely and against our government,” has not survived.\textsuperscript{91}

Two other works, however, became widely known at the end of the eighteenth century and remained popular during the first half of the nineteenth. Both were in the form of apocryphal speeches by Ukrainian hetmans, subsequently reworked and incorporated into \textit{Istoriia Rusov}, the most comprehensive autonomist tract.

\textsuperscript{89} N. Grigorovich, \textit{Kantsier} . . . , 2: 261.


\textsuperscript{91} O. Ohloblyn, \textit{Ludy} . . . , p. 288.
The first speech was attributed to Acting Hetman Pavlo Polubotok. After the death of Hetman Skoropads'kyi, Peter I had greatly curtailed the Hetmanate’s autonomy and had forbidden the election of a new hetman. Polubotok was then appointed acting hetman. Polubotok and his staff demanded the restitution of full autonomy. Peter had Polubotok arrested and he died in a St. Petersburg prison. In the apocryphal story, Polubotok’s final words to Peter were:

To enslave nations and to rule over serfs and slaves is the role of Asiatic tyrants and not of a Christian monarch. . . . I know that shackles and bleak dungeons await us where we will be subjected to hunger and oppression as is the Russian [Muscovite] custom, but as long as I am still alive, I will tell you the truth, O sovereign [Gosudar’], that without fail, you will have to account before the King of Kings, Almighty God, for our demise and that of our entire people.92

Unlike Polubotok’s speech with its sharpness and emphasis on righteousness, the other apocryphal oration, by Hetman Mazepa, focused more on historical and legal arguments. It treated the Hetmanate as an independent state and accused the Muscovites of having usurped the name Rus’. In this speech, Mazepa explains the treaty with Sweden as an exercise of the Hetmanate’s right to foreign relations, as the continuation of the policies of Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, and as a necessity in order to maintain “all the privileges of a free nation” (pp. 272–75).

Little is known about the authors and the milieu from which these works originated. They were apparently circulated in secret among a small group of nobles, most likely centered at Novhorod-Sivers’k. A Ukrainian version of the Mazepa speech existed prior to the early nineteenth century Russian version found in Istoriia Rusov. The existence of three versions of Polubotok’s oration has been established.93 The first was published in J. B. Scherer’s Annales de la Petite Russie (1788). This led O. Ohloblyn to speculate that Ukrainian autonomists (those espousing the restitution of Ukrainian autonomy) stationed in St. Petersburg passed materials to Scherer so that the plight

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92 Istoriia Rusiv, ed. O. Ohloblyn (New York: 1956), p. 309. Henceforth, Istoriia Rusiv will be cited by page number in the body of the text.

of the Hetmanate would become known outside the Russian Empire. While there is no direct evidence to substantiate this claim, Ohloblyn has proved that Scherer, both in his *Annales* and a subsequent six-volume work, *Anecdotes particulières aux differans peuples de cet empire* (1792), had at his disposal copies of authentic Ukrainian sources, including some especially patriotic toward the Hetmanate.94

Both orations were included in the most comprehensive, the most important, and the last political tract of Cossack Ukraine, *Istoriia Rusov*. This early nineteenth-century work presents a long, elaborate, and, to a great extent, fictitious history, dealing with the period from Kievan times until the 1769 Turkish war. While recognizing Ukrainian history as a special branch of a greater "all-Russian" entity, the work at the same time stresses Ukrainian separateness and is the last eloquent apology for the Hetmanate and Cossack rights and privileges. It describes in a romanticized fashion the heroic struggle for the preservation of Cossack liberties against the Poles, Tatars, and Muscovites. *Istoriia Rusov* is vituperatively anti-Polish and, at times, quite anti-Russian.

*Istoriia Rusov*, however, departs from previous political works by fusing traditional sentiments—pride in the Hetmanate and emphasis on the rights and privileges of estates—with new concepts emanating from the American and French revolutions. The fundamental principles underlying this work are truth and justice.95 All the positive characters strive for justice, while the negative ones subvert such principles. The anonymous author of *Istoriia Rusov* believes that, "every creature has the right to defend his right to life, freedom, and property" (p. 88). The author is against all tyranny of any kind and places the monarch within the law, for "laws are the exact mirrors for the position and behavior of tsars and monarchs, and they should be their first enforcers and defenders" (p. 308).

The thinking of the author is clear. The Hetmanate and the Ukrainian nobility have both rights and privileges guaranteed by the tsar and certain inalienable rights. The tsar's duty is to recognize and uphold these rights, while the Ukrainians have an obligation to defend them. Respect for both inalienable and guaranteed rights results in

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94 Ibid., pp. 90–94.

harmony and good order, while their abrogation produces tyranny. The author warns that Ukrainians have always resisted tyranny and that they were "ever ready to give their lives to the last man for the sake of freedom. This is their inborn trait and they do not bear enslavement willingly." (p. 121).

The author of Istoriia Rusov has never been identified. The book appeared under the alleged authorship of Archbishop Heorhii Konys'kyi, but the work's rationalism, anticlericalism, and differences in style from Konys'kyi's known writings have led scholars to reject his authorship. Recently, Ohloblyn has shown that Istoriia Rusov was written after Konys'kyi's death (1795), sometime between 1801 and 1804.66 Undoubtedly the name of Konys'kyi was used to give the appearance of clerical approval and to create a smokescreen that would hide the actual author and the milieu in which the book originated. For over a century scholars have attempted to identify the author, but the many hypotheses and debates have proved fruitless.67 This scholarly spade work, however, has produced some results. There is strong evidence that the author originated from Novhorod-Sivers'k,68 and was, perhaps, strangely enough, in the services of Prince Bezborod'ko in St. Petersburg.69

Istoriia Rusov was enormously popular among the nobility of the former Hetmanate. In the 1820s it was circulated widely in

66 Introduction to Istoriia Rusov, p. viii.
The German traveler Johann Georg Kohl, passing through “Little Russia” in 1841, noted the popularity of the work. He reported that *Istoriiia Rusov* was written in such a virulent anti-Russian and oppositionist tone that it could never be published. There were, nevertheless, whole districts where it could be found in almost every estate. In 1846, *Istoriiia Rusov* finally passed censorship and was published. Thus it became available not only to the Left-Bank nobility but also to the modern Ukrainian national movement.

Although anonymous political works were frequently strident in tone and sometimes attacked the tsar and the imperial administration, they never questioned the tsar’s claim to sovereignty over the Hetmanate. The anonymous authors pointed, at times rather bitterly, to the tsar’s failure to uphold the privileges guaranteed to the Hetmanate in perpetuity. The implication of this argument was that the tsar should rectify the injustice suffered by the Hetmanate by restoring these rights. Thus, the political literature, written anonymously and presumably without fear of reprisals, came to the same conclusion as the petitioners for the continuation of the Lithuanian Statute or of the reestablishment of Cossack formations. For virtually all the traditionalists, the only conceivable action was continued loyal service to the tsar in the hope that he would maintain the last remnants of autonomy, or even restore their traditional rights.

In sum, the traditionalists, first and foremost, disapproved of total imperial assimilation and wanted to maintain various aspects of their traditional life and institutions. Some pursued active goals of reestablishing Cossack units, others only wanted to retain the Lithuanian Statute, while still others wrote and circulated patriotic literature. The traditionalists’ dissatisfaction grew out of their historical memories of the Hetmanate and their lost privileges. They compared their bleak present with a largely idealized free and glorious past. Although Russians and foreign travelers perceived this dissatisfaction, they also exaggerated it. General Aleksandr Mikhailovskii-Danilevski reported on his visit of 1824:

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100 O. Ohloblyn, *Introduction to Istoriiia Rusiv*, pp. x—xxv.
101 J. G. Kohl, *Russia: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkoff, Riga, Odessa, the German Provinces of the Baltic, the Steppes, the Crimea, and the Interior of the Empire* (London: 1844), p. 528.
I did not find one person in Little Russia with whom I was able to talk in a manner friendly towards Russia; there reigned an open spirit of opposition in all of them. Such a hatred is caused by the violation of Little Russia’s rights, by the decline of credit and industry, by the increase of taxes, which have reduced all of Little Russia to poverty, and by a poor arrangement of the judicial system, where conscience is for sale.\footnote{102 "Iz vospominanii Mikhailovskogo-Danilevskogo," \textit{Russkaia starina}, no. 10 (1900), p. 212.}

In his travels through the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine in 1841, Johann Georg Kohl wrote in the same vein:

Such is the aversion of the people of Little Russia to those of Great Russia that it may fairly be described as a national hatred, and the feeling has rather strengthened than diminished since the seventeenth century, when the country was annexed to the Moscovite empire. The Malorossian, to this day, sympathizes more with the Pole than he does with the Moscovite.

Before their subjection, all Malorossians were freemen, and serfdom, they maintain, had never been known among them. It was the Russians, they say, that reduced one-half of the people to slavery. During the first century after the union, Little Russia continued to have her own hetmans, and retained much of her ancient constitution and privileges, but all these have been swept away by the retrograde reforms of the last and present century. Even the name of Malo-Rossiya has, since 1837, been abolished, and occurs no longer in any official document. Till that year, there had been a governor-general of Little Russia but the office has been done away with, and the former inscription over the government building at Poltava has been effaced. This has given great offense to the nobles of the land, and a stranger will not be long among them without hearing bitter complaints on the subject. . . .

Little Russia was formerly a republic under the protection of Poland and the nobles preserve still many tokens of their golden age of independence. In many houses will be found portraits of all the Khmelnitzkis [sic], Mazeppas [sic], Skoropatskis [sic], and Rasumoffskis [sic], who, at various times have held the dignity of hetman, and manuscripts relating to those days are carefully treasured up . . .

Should the colossal empire of Russia one day fall to pieces, there is little doubt but the Malorossians will form a separate state. They have their own language, their own historical recollections, seldom mingle or intermarry with the Moscovite rulers, and are in number already more than 10,000,000.
Their national sinews may be said to lie among the rural nobility living in the villages, from among whom every great political movement has hitherto emanated.\footnote{I. G. Kohl, Russia: St. Petersburg ..., pp. 527–29.}

The traditionalists did not have visions about a future separate state as Kohl speculated, however. While they were unable to restore institutions of the Hetmanate, they sought at least to preserve the memory of it. As a result, from the time of the abolition until the 1840s, the Ukrainian nobles compiled and published topographical descriptions, genealogies, local histories, family archives, and several works of synthesis.\footnote{Dmytro Doroshenko, A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography. Special Issue of the Annals of the UAAS, vols. 5–6 (New York, 1957), pp. 92–116.} This surge in historical consciousness, however, did not reflect a new form of “Little Russian” patriotism but a belief in the ultimate demise of “Little Russia.” The Ukrainian nobles felt that they were epigones, the last remnant of a society and country that would soon disappear. This attitude was captured by one of the Hetmanate’s historians, Oleksa Martos, who, while visiting Mazepa’s\footnote{“Zapisky inzhennernofo ofitsera Martosa o Turetskoj voine v tsarstvovanie Aleksandra Pavlovicha 1806–1812,” RA, 7 (1893), p. 345, as quoted in D. Doroshenko, A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography (Special Issue of the Annals of the UAAS), p. 112.} gravesite in Moldavia in 1811, jotted the following in his diary:

Mazepa died far away from his country whose independence he defended. He was a friend of liberty and therefore deserves to be honored by posterity. After his expulsion from Little Russia, its inhabitants lost their sacred rights which Mazepa had defended for so long with great enthusiasm and patriotic ardor. He is no more, and the names of Little Russia and its brave Cossacks have disappeared from the list of peoples who, although small in numbers, are yet famous for their way of life and constitution. . . . Now rich Little Russia is reduced to two or three provinces. That such is the common destiny of states and republics, we can see from the history of other nations . . .

For the traditionalists, only the memories of the Hetmanate remained. Nostalgia for the past without any hopes for the future was the dominant mood of the traditionalists well into the 1840s.
Traditionalist tendencies slowed but could not stop the integration and gradual assimilation of the Ukrainian gentry into an imperial Russian nobility. Despite the tenacity of certain native traditions, in the end the factors favoring integration proved too strong. Foremost among these was the incomplete development of the Ukrainian gentry. Although the internal organization, the constitutional arrangement, and the political outlook of the Ukrainian gentry was fairly well defined, they were not sanctioned by centuries of tradition and, therefore, lacked the legitimacy of the Polish or Hungarian nobility. Second, those traditions that had become firmly established were subsequently weakened through the adoption of Russian practices, through their abandonment by the assimilationists, and through the influx of new members at the time of incorporation into the dvorianstvo. In spite of the removal of many outright frauds, the ranks of the nobility had become swelled by individuals who had little knowledge or concern for the old political ideals of the Ukrainian gentry.

Another factor that greatly facilitated the integration of the Ukrainian gentry into imperial society was the cultural and linguistic similarity between the Ukrainians and Russians. The identities of the German Baltic barons or the Polish szlachta, similar to those of the Ukrainian gentry, were based on historical “rights and privileges.” They were also reinforced by radical differences between the Balts or Poles and the Russians in language, religion, and culture, however. While contemporaries perceived the differences between Ukrainians and Russians, they did not consider such differences great. The Ukrainian gentry could and did readily adapt to the newly emerging Russian imperial culture. Finally, an important element in the Ukrainian gentry’s collective myth was the tradition of loyal service to the tsar. With the exception of the Kapatist mission and a few hints of conspiracies, even the anonymous oppositionist literature hoped that the tsar’s sense of justice would restore lost “rights and privileges.” Since the Ukrainian gentry could not envision any alternative to continued service to the tsar, even the most outspoken malcontents could do little more than accept the imperial system.
The Absorption of the Cossacks into the Imperial Social Fabric

In bringing the Ukrainian social structure into conformity with the imperial pattern, the Cossacks' position was the most ambiguous. No comparable group existed in the core of the empire, and, therefore, at least in the short run, the imperial authorities were forced to make some allowances for local peculiarities, but even determining who belonged to the Cossack estate was difficult. Those who had some claim to Cossack status but were registered in 1782 as peasants on private estates were automatically enserfed. Those on crown lands became state peasants. Many Cossacks, especially those in the category of Cossack-helpers, were economically and for tax purposes indistinguishable from peasants, and their claims to Cossack status were highly dubious. Landowners, moreover, would, at times, treat even recognized Cossacks as their subjects. The boundary between peasant and Cossack was murky yet vital, for now it could mark the difference between a free man and a serf.

Imperial legalization of serfdom resulted in a sharp increase in the number of "seekers of Cossackdom." In dealing with this problem, the imperial authorities had to consider the demands of the landlords, while at the same time forestalling any large-scale social unrest. On the whole, the authorities attempted to register the number of Cossacks accurately, and dubious cases, when not contested by a landlord, were generally decided in favor of the applicants. The best evidence for this is the census of 1782, which lists 428,442 male Cossacks. Since in 1764 there were 176,886 rank-and-file Cossacks and 198,296 Cossack helpers, it is obvious that most of the Cossack helpers—whose claims did not necessarily have to be recognized—were included in the "Cossack" category. Yet many whose claims were questionable and whose landlords were powerful were registered as peasants.


107 Shafonskii, p. 85.
The registration of Cossack claimants as peasants led to a major civil disturbance in the village of Turbaiv. The status of the villagers was disputed from the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1783 all the villagers were registered as serfs of the local owner, the Bazylevs’kyi family. The villagers, however, refused to perform any serf obligations and continued to petition the Senate through intermediaries for a reclassification of their status. These efforts proved to be successful, and in 1788 the Senate decided that seventy-six individuals registered as Cossacks in 1738 and their descendants could not be considered as serfs. The local authorities, under the influence of the Bazylevs’kyis, were slow in implementing the order and demanded that the villagers provide additional evidence of their 1738 Cossack registration. By 1789 the procedures bogged down and the villagers, unable to obtain their freedom, revolted. The rebels stormed the landlord’s mansion and killed three members of the Bazylevs’kyi family. They expelled all local authorities and took over Turbaiv and several nearby villages.

The imperial authorities immediately surrounded the rebels but did not have sufficient strength to attack them. The international situation was rather uncertain, and the imperial authorities did not want to provoke a major uprising. Instead of dispatching additional troops to Turbaiv, the government sent a representative who worked out a compromise that proved to be short-lived. The villagers refused to surrender any additional suspects involved in the Bazylevs’kyi murders or to give up the Bazylevs’kyis’ valuables and records. In 1793 regular troops and Don Cossacks were brought to Turbaiv, and the villagers were forced to surrender. Turbaiv had defied the government for four years, and the imperial authorities decided to make it an example. Stiff penalties were meted out to the villagers. Fifteen were tortured to death in prison; 13 were physically mutilated and sentenced to a lifetime of hard labor in Tobolsk; 155 were subjected to

108 The Turbaiv revolt has been the subject of several studies: A. Efimenko, “Turbaivskaiia katastrofa,” KS, no. 3 (1891), pp. 373–401; K. Husliystyi, ed., Povstannia setian v seli Turbaivakh 1789–1793 rr. (Kharkiv: 1932); K. Husliystyi, Turbaiv’ske povstannia (Kiev: 1950). Soviet studies rarely differentiate between Cossacks and peasants and treat the Turbaiv revolt as part of general peasant unrest. Undoubtedly, peasants participated in the revolt, but it was sparked by the issue of Cossack status.
beatings; and 2,300 villagers were resettled in Tauridia and beyond the Dniester River.  

After the suppression of the Turbaiv uprising, the government treated the "seekers of Cossackdom" with more circumspection. It wanted neither to spark more unrest by denying just claims nor, on the other hand, to encourage any petitions en masse. This delicate balance was broken at the beginning of the nineteenth century. During the reign of Paul, the Ukrainian judicial system was partially restored, thereby strengthening claims based on the Lithuanian Statute (not abolished as an acting code until the 1840s). In accordance with imperial law there was a statute of limitation on initiating such cases as the recognition of Cossack status; the Lithuanian Statute, however, contained no such provision. In July 1803, the Senate confirmed that in accordance with local law "seekers of Cossackdom" were not subject to the statute of limitation. Alarmed by this decision, Governor A. B. Kurakin reported that "whole villages have petitioned for the restitution of their Cossack status and many have expressed the opinion that having petitioned the government, they no longer have to obey the landlord."

The Senate acted immediately and issued clear instructions about the "seekers of Cossackdom." According to a December 1803 decree, eligibility for registration was limited to those who could prove that in 1782 they were rank-and-file Cossacks (Cossack-helpers were now considered as peasants). Thus, only those who for some reason lost their Cossack status after the abolition of autonomy could attempt to regain it. This simplified the procedure and greatly reduced the number of possible applicants. Now only a limited number of individuals could become Cossacks, and for all practical purposes, the Cossack estate was closed.

Although the imperial authorities had settled the question of who belonged to the Cossack estate, they had much greater difficulty in determining the Cossacks' role in the imperial order. Traditionally, the Cossacks functioned as irregular troops who protected border-

110 N. Storozhenko, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov...", KS, no. 6 (1897), p. 462.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., pp. 463–64.
lands. The Hetmanate, however, was no longer a borderland, but part of the settled interior of the empire. Thus, large numbers of irregular troops had little military value and posed the danger of social upheaval. Integration of the Cossacks into a non-military imperial structure was impeded by the lack of a corresponding imperial social group. In most of the empire, rural society consisted of lord, serf, or state peasant. Deviations from this pattern only created difficulties and confusion and were to be avoided whenever possible.

One step that the government did take toward alleviating the Cossack problem was to encourage emigration to border areas where the Cossacks could still fulfill their traditional role. A June 28, 1803, decree permitted the Cossacks to resettle in the South and other sparsely populated regions.\(^{113}\) Spurred by the promise of land and the “Cossack way of life,” a steady stream of settlers left the Hetmanate and joined the Black Sea Cossack Host in the Kuban. In 1803 and 1809, the total number of males who migrated to the Kuban was 22,206; between 1820 and 1825, it had risen to 25,627; and between 1845 and 1850, it was 8,500.\(^ {114}\) Taking into account that only adult males were included in these statistics, emigration in the first half of the nineteenth century was probably much greater—well in excess of one hundred thousand persons. This was, however, a mere palliative at best. While emigration probably succeeded in relocating some of the more adventurous, dissatisfied, and land-hungry Cossacks, it failed to deal with the majority who had remained in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces.

From the time of the abolition of autonomy until the 1830s, the imperial government vacillated in its aims and policies toward the Cossacks of the Hetmanate. On the one hand, the government wanted to reduce the number of Cossacks and convert them into docile state peasants. On the other hand, there was an attitude that any further weakening of the Cossack estate was premature because the Cossacks’ “martial spirit” could still be of use to the empire. Furthermore, there were frequent clashes between the central and local administrations as to Cossack policy. The local authorities usually defended the remaining Cossack rights and advanced or supported various schemes

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\(^{113}\) PSZ, no. 20,823 (28 June 1803), 27: 714.

\(^{114}\) F. Shcherbyna, “Kolonizatsiia Kubanskoi oblasti,” KS, no. 7 (1883), pp. 529–45.
to reestablish Cossack military units. The central administration, on the other hand, often strove to curtail Cossack rights and was cautious about the formation of Cossack military units.

The Cossacks retained their right to own land and to the unrestricted sale of alcoholic beverages.\textsuperscript{115} With the Napoleonic invasion and the reestablishment of fifteen Cossack regiments, the position of the Cossacks improved considerably. Since they supplied the manpower and provided for the upkeep of the fifteen regiments, they were exempted from the draft and from various taxes.\textsuperscript{116} But in August 1818, the Cossacks were again subjected to the regular army levy, and in December 1819, their tax exemption was terminated.\textsuperscript{117} By the 1820s the Cossacks’ position deteriorated even further, for even their right to own land was questioned.

Despite a Senate confirmation of 1803, in the 1820s the Ministry of Finance challenged the Cossacks’ full ownership of their land. The matter was submitted to the State Council, which ruled on April 14, 1823, that the Cossacks’ land was owned personally, as was the land of the nobility, and that Cossack landownership had nothing in common with the land tenure of the state peasants.\textsuperscript{118} This decision was disputed by the finance minister, Count Dimitrii Aleksandrovich Gur’ev, who argued that the Cossack lands were originally common or state lands. As evidence, Gur’ev pointed to past laws prohibiting Cossacks from selling lands and to the fact that Cossacks, like state peasants, had to make a cash payment, or obrok, to the state. Thus, argued Gur’ev, the Finance Ministry should assume full control over Cossack lands.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{115} The right to produce and sell alcoholic beverages was reconfirmed in 1791 and in 1811. \textit{PSZ}, no. 16,981 (August 7, 1791), 23: 246–47; no. 24,832 (October 26, 1811), 31: 880–81.

\textsuperscript{116} N. Storozhenko, “K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov . . .”, \textit{KS}, no. 6 (1897), pp. 470–80.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{PSZ}, no. 27,505 (August 25, 1818), 35: 544; no. 28,021 (December 10, 1819), 36: 410.

\textsuperscript{118} “Kratkaia zapiska o malorossiiskikh kozakakh,” \textit{ChOIDR}, bk. 2 (1864), p. 114.

\textsuperscript{119} Gur’ev’s views were summarized and refuted in Governor-General Repnin’s official memorandum to the Senate, “Kratkaia zapiska o malorossiiskikh kozakakh,” pp. 85–135.
Gur'ev's efforts were blocked by the champion of Cossack rights, the Little Russian governor-general, Prince Nikolai Grigorevich Repnin.\footnote{Repnin was noted as a liberal governor-general sympathetic to Ukrainian autonomy and was even charged with advocating "Ukrainian separatism." See Doroshenko, Narysy, 2: 283.} In a memorandum to the Senate, Repnin presented a comprehensive history of Cossack rights and refuted all of Gur'ev's charges. The governor-general indicated that the Cossacks had always owned their land and that the obrok they paid were state taxes, not rent for the use of state lands. Repnin explained further that past prohibitions against the sale of Cossack land had been enacted in order to prevent Cossack impoverishment, especially from sales forced by the officers. While arguing that a class of free farmers would greatly benefit the empire, Repnin pleaded that all restrictions on Cossack landholdings, mobility, and rights to trade and industry be lifted.

The Polish uprising of 1830 gave Governor-General Repnin the opportunity to demonstrate the Cossacks' continued military utility to the empire. As the campaign against the Poles faltered, Repnin suggested that Ukrainian Cossack units be reactivated as they had been in 1812. In a memorandum to Tsar Nicholas, the governor-general cited the Cossacks' antipathy toward the Poles, their loyalty to tsar and empire, and their ability to mobilize quickly as chief considerations for such a move.\footnote{Governor-General Repnin's 1831 memorandum to Tsar Nicholas was published in ChOdRR, bk. 1 (1863), pp. 176–77.} Nicholas, annoyed by the incompetence of his military staff, authorized the Cossack mobilization. Eight Cossack cavalry regiments of 1,200 men each were organized,\footnote{I. Pavlovskii, "Malorossiiskie kozachi'i polki v bor'be s poljakami v 1831 g.," Trudy Poltavskoi gubernskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii, vol. 7 (1910), pp. 108–14.} and the Ukrainian nobles again contributed toward the arming of the regiments. By the time the Cossacks were ready for the campaign, however, the Polish uprising was crushed and the Cossack units, no longer needed, were disbanded.

Having proved the Cossacks' loyalty and continued utility, Governor-General Repnin now pressed for some fundamental review of the Cossacks' status. He proposed to Tsar Nicholas that Cossacks
should return to their "former military status." He prepared a project that would not only reestablish Cossack military formations but permit a limited form of Cossack self-government. In subsequent letters to the tsar, Repnin attempted to gain support for his project by extolling the Cossacks' service over centuries for "the faith, tsar and Rus'." Tsar Nicholas forwarded Repnin's plans to a special committee, which was to study the Cossack problem. On April 13, 1832, the committee reported that "the division of the Empire into independent parts, or more correctly stated, into a federal union of provinces which have their own rights, cannot be reconciled with the preservation of the unity and might of the Empire, under the benevolent rule of autocracy." After the Polish disaster, the imperial authorities were again committed to a unitary Russia.

While the reinstatement of Cossack autonomy was unfeasible, Tsar Nicholas, pleased with the performance of the Cossacks, was willing to grant them some privileges. On June 25, 1832, he issued a decree dealing with Cossack lands, taxes, and recruits. The Cossack lands were to be held in perpetuity by the Cossacks and their descendants. This meant that Cossacks could sell their property only to other Cossacks. They were, however, permitted to buy estates from nobles and raznochintsy, and this land could be sold to whomever they pleased. The ukaz also guaranteed a number of local judicial practices and the Cossack right to sell spirits. The tax it imposed on the Cossacks was approximately equal to that on the state peasants (except for land rents), whereas the draft quota was set at five per thousand, with service limited to a period of fifteen years.

Prince Repnin, however, believed that these measures were insufficient, and he repeatedly petitioned for the creation of a separate department for Cossack affairs. His efforts were successful: on January 17, 1834, a Chief Economic Department for Little Russian Cossacks (Glavnaia khoziaistvennaia kontora dla malorossiiskikh kozak...)}

123 This memorandum was published in ChODR, bk 1 (1863), pp. 182–91.
125 Ibid., p. 128.
kov) was created.\textsuperscript{127} It regulated the disposition of all Cossack landholdings, taxation, recruiting, and emigration. At the local level, the Cossacks could even elect some of the department’s officials. Thus, a special bureaucracy was to have protected the Cossacks from abuse by landlords and the local administration controlled by the nobility, but the department survived for only a short time. Soon after the establishment of the Ministry of State Properties (Ministerstvo gosudarstvennykh imushchestv) in 1837, the Cossacks were placed under its jurisdiction and remained under its authority until the 1860s.\textsuperscript{128}

Neither the meager concessions granted by Nicholas nor the administrative reshuffling could slow the economic decline being experienced by the Cossacks. The decline was caused by two interlocking problems: an increase in population and shrinking Cossack landholdings. Despite constant emigration, the Cossack population of Chernihiv and Poltava provinces was steadily increasing. Census figures record 428,442 males in 1782; 450,365 in 1819; 533,778 in 1837–39; 549,198 in 1851; and 595,989 in 1860.\textsuperscript{129} Landholdings, however, did not increase, so the Cossacks were forced to subdivide their land into smaller and smaller plots. Many Cossacks were left with no land whatsoever: in 1839, when the Cossacks came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry, 39,000 families (105,000 male Cossacks) were landless.\textsuperscript{130} The latter went to work on the estates of nobles or other Cossacks and many emigrated to Novorossiia, the Don, the Caucasus, and the Crimea.

\textsuperscript{127} PSZ, 2d ed., no. 6,727 (January 17, 1834), 9: 46–52.
\textsuperscript{128} Istoriisheskoe obozrenie piatidesiatlekoi deiatel’nosti Ministersva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv 1837–1887, pt. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1888), p. 18.
\textsuperscript{129} The 1782 figure appears in N. Storozenko, “K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov ...,” KS, no. 4 (1897), p. 155. The 1819 figure comes from Governor-General Repnin’s report, “Kratkaia zapiska o malorossiiskikh kozakakh,” p. 128. The 1837–39 figure is from Istoriisheskoe obozrenie piatidesiatlekei deiatel’nosti Ministersva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv 1837–1887, pt. 2, p. 18. Finally, both the 1851 and 1860 figures are taken from Materialy dlia statistiki Rossii, sobrannye po vedomstvu Ministersva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1861), pp. 188–89.
\textsuperscript{130} V. P. Teplyts’kyi, Reforma 1861 roku i ahrarni vid nosyni na Ukraini (Kiev, 1959), p. 25.
The transfer of jurisdiction over the Cossacks to the Ministry of State Properties did, however, have one lasting effect. It ended all questions as to Cossack status. Although the Cossacks retained all the privileges obtained in 1832 and 1834, they were still under the jurisdiction of an agency intended primarily for state peasants. To the imperial authorities the Cossacks were nothing more than a special group of state peasants. This attitude was not new, for it had been pronounced in a Senate ukaz as early as 1802.\textsuperscript{131} But the formation of Cossack regiments in 1812 and in 1831, as well as Governor-General Repnin’s espousal of the Cossacks’ cause, put their status in doubt. Any plan to revitalize the Cossacks as free warriors of old-Ukraine was forestalled by imperial opposition (except in temporary military emergencies) and the Cossacks’ economic decline. Although they still considered themselves as Cossacks, they hardly differed from the state peasants either in administrative supervision or in wealth. With emancipation—which resulted in state peasants’ receiving some land—this distinction was blurred even further. Thus, it took sixty to eighty years after the abolition of the Hetmanate to transform the Cossacks into special state peasants and integrate them into the imperial social structure.

\textit{Imperial Integration of the Rest of Ukrainian Society}

Imperial integration of the other strata of Ukrainian society proceeded quietly, with relatively few polemics and little opposition. This was to be expected, since the burghers, clergy, and peasantry constituted more politically passive elements of Ukrainian society. They identified less with the traditions of an autonomous Hetmanate and were unable to exert any significant political influence. To be sure, some clerics and burghers still remembered their guaranteed privileges, but these, if mentioned at all, were used primarily to buttress their group’s social position, rather than to voice displeasure with the abolition of autonomy.

The assimilation of the burghers proceeded much more quickly than that of the Cossacks, and with fewer legal and administrative complications. First, there was no ambiguity in the legal and social status of the Ukrainian burghers. Unlike the gentry or Cossacks, the

\textsuperscript{131} PSZ, no. 20,823 (June 28, 1803), 27: 712–15.
burghers obtained immediate imperial recognition of their status. Their position was clearly defined by the 1785 Municipal Regulations and was similar to that of burghers in all other parts of the empire.

Second, the autonomous traditions of the burghers had become so weak that imperial norms were introduced without encountering opposition. The symbol of town autonomy had been Magdeburg Law, which guaranteed town self-government and prevented the intrusion of any outside authority into town affairs. In reality, Magdeburg Law and independent city administration had never been in full force in the Hetmanate. Nevertheless, it retained great symbolic importance to the cities of the eighteenth-century Hetmanate, as evidenced by the burgher requests at the 1767 Legislative Commission. By the 1780s, however, even this symbolic role had been lost, except in Kiev. All other cities were governed by a combination of Russian urban law and the Lithuanian Statute.¹³²

While the 1785 Town Charter did not abolish Magdeburg Law nor any other code, it did carefully redefine the structure of town administration and justice. It created new administrative positions and procedures that were clearly in violation of those required by the Magdeburg code. The burghers' memory of Magdeburg Law was so weak, however, that, except in Kiev, this contradiction was not even perceived. It was, in fact, the imperial government that was to remind the burghers of Magdeburg Law. In 1824 the Senate overruled a case dealing with trade in Poltava because it had been decided on the basis of the Lithuanian Statute rather than of Magdeburg Law. The Senate instructed the municipal courts to continue using Magdeburg Law whenever it was applicable. The directive could not be followed, because the courts did not even have copies of the Magdeburg code. In consequence, the Committee of Ministers suggested that a new edition and a Russian translation be prepared (the Magdeburg code was available only in German, Latin, and Polish). The matter was passed on to Speranskii, who, in a special memorandum, indicated that the Magdeburg Law had long since been supplanted by the Lithuanian Statute and Russian Law and recommended the continuation of

current practices. In 1831, Magdeburg Law was officially abolished in the Left-Bank Ukraine. It was retained and used in Kiev until 1834.

The third factor facilitating imperial integration was the weak political and financial position of the Ukrainian merchants. In the 1780s Shafons’kyi noted that international trade was conducted primarily by Greeks and other foreigners, while internal trade, particularly at fairs, was increasingly being controlled by Russians. In 1782, out of 1,483 merchants registered in the Chernihiv province (exclusive of Greeks and other foreigners), 896 were Russians and 587 were Ukrainians. Shafons’kyi attributed the small percentage of Ukrainian merchants to the lack of capital in the Hetmanate. “In all of Little Russia there is not one merchant of Little Russian stock who has capital of 1,030 rubles.” Even if they had wished to oppose the Town Charter, the Ukrainian merchants possessed neither the wealth nor the power to do so.

In sharp contrast to the Ukrainians, the Greek merchants of the Hetmanate were successful in gaining exemptions from the Town Charter provisions. In response to requests from the Nizhyn Greek Brotherhood, Catherine issued an ukaz continuing the Greeks’ economic privileges, exempting them from taxation and troop quarterings, and providing for a separate Greek magistracy and judicial system in Nizhyn. These concessions were made to the fewer than five hundred Greek families who controlled trade with the Ottoman Empire. The Greek case demonstrates that the Town Charter could have been successfully circumvented.

Finally, the 1785 Town Charter was widely accepted because it hardly affected the largest group of town inhabitants, the burghers (meshchane). Unlike the merchants, the burghers were overwhelm-

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133 The 1824 Senate ruling, the proposal for a Russian translation of the Magdeburg Law, and Speranskii’s opinion are summarized in N. Vasilenko, “Pravo magdeburgskoe,” pp. 894–96.


136 A. Shafonskii, p. 187.

137 Ibid., p. 22.

138 PSZ, no. 16,250 (October 1, 1785), 22: 447.

139 A. Shafonskii, pp. 468–76.
ingly Ukrainian. In Chernihiv province, for instance, out of 19,139 registered meshchane only 654 were Russians, the rest were Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{140} The Town Charter left the hub of town life—the artisan guild structure—essentially intact, regulating only the term of apprenticeship and placing some restrictions on prices. Several studies have shown that even after the introduction of the more elaborate Guild Regulations of 1799, the Ukrainian guild structure changed only gradually.\textsuperscript{141} By the 1820s, however, the artisan guilds became organs of state administration and thus lost the major characteristic of the old-Ukrainian guilds: corporate self-regulation of production, quality, and prices and control over the selection and training of future guild members.\textsuperscript{142}

Although there was no overt opposition to the Town Charter, it was not universally accepted. In Kiev, with its strong autonomist traditions, the charter’s provisions were skillfully blended with local traditions. Magdeburg Law remained in force, and the Kievan patriciate maintained control over government and finances, even reinstituting a traditional part of Kievan administration, the militia.\textsuperscript{143} In 1796 Kiev’s administrative connection with the Hetmanate was severed, and it became the capital of the newly created Right-Bank province of Kiev. Since the Right-Bank Ukraine was incorporated into the empire by the second partition of Poland, the imperial authorities were somewhat more tolerant in regard to regional differences. It was probably for this reason that Kiev was permitted to retain peculiarities in its administration longer than any of the Left-Bank cities. In fact, in

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 187.


\textsuperscript{142} Pylyp Klymenko, Tsekhi na Ukraini, pp. 160–66.

1797 and 1802 Kiev received a reconfirmation of its ancient privileges.\textsuperscript{144}

Citing their ancient rights, the Kievanus attempted to restrict trade and manufacturing by foreigners, especially Russians and Jews. Although the city's inhabitants did everything possible to prevent Jewish settlement, by 1797 there were already 1,411 Jews from the Right Bank in the city, and their number kept increasing.\textsuperscript{145} Often, participation in Kiev's fairs served as a pretext for entry into the city; after a stay of several months, many Jews were able to purchase a house and become permanent residents. The Kievan burghers repeatedly requested the imperial authorities to remove these illegal settlers.\textsuperscript{146} Finally, in the 1830s, action was taken and the city's Jews were forced to move outside the city limits.\textsuperscript{147}

The Jews' departure was a Pyrrhic victory, because it was accompanied by the final abolition of municipal autonomy and the loss of the Kievan patriciate's privileged position to other competitors—the Russians. Until the mid-eighteenth century, the Russians, like the Jews, were restricted from settling permanently in Kiev. By that time, however, the Russians had succeeded in penetrating the clannish Kievan burgher class by becoming assistants or even partners in established Kievan firms. Gradually, more and more Russians came to

\textsuperscript{144} 
\textit{PSZ}, no. 18,142 (October 16, 1797), 24: 736. The September 15, 1802 \textit{ukaz} confirming all privileges was not included in the \textit{Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov}. L. Matseevich in "Iz zhizni Kiev v nachale iskhodiaschego stoletiya," \textit{KS}, no. 11 (1896), pp. 65–67 described the ceremonies in Kiev associated with the reception and official pronouncement of the decree.

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I. Semenov, ed., \textit{Geografichesko-statisticheskii slovar' Rossiiskoi imperii} (St. Petersburg: 1863–85), 2:622. Officially, there had been a policy of excluding Jews from Muscovy and, subsequently, from the Russian Empire. With the partitions of Poland, Russia obtained a large Jewish population. Even then, the imperial authorities attempted to keep Jews out of Russian proper by restricting them to the former Polish territories and the Ukraine (the Pale of Settlement). Prior to the partitions there were relatively few Jews in the Hetmanate.

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One such petition has been published. "Melochi iz arkhivov iugo-zapadnego kraia; khodatoistvo kievskikh grazhdan o vyselenii iz Kiev evreev (1830 g.)," \textit{KS}, no. 10 (1901), pp. 12–13.

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I. I. Funduklei, \textit{Statisticheskoe opisanie Kievskoi gubernii} (3 vols. in 4; St. Petersburg: 1853), pt. 1, p. 261. The decree was issued on December 2, 1827, but it provided up to two years for Jews to sell their property and leave the city. Thus, many Jews did not leave the city until the early 1830s.
Kiev, and by the 1830s they were in the city in sufficient numbers to challenge the control of municipal administration. The struggle between the city’s Ukrainian and Russian factions was ultimately decided by the imperial authorities. In 1821, the Senate discovered that Kiev’s Ukrainian administration had embezzled millions of rubles from the city. Investigation of the scandal continued until October 1834, when the implicated officials were dismissed. A month later, all vestiges of autonomy, including Magdeburg Law, were abolished.

The scandal was merely a convenient pretext for a change in imperial policy. Faced with the Polish uprising, which had a substantial following in the Right-Bank Ukraine, Nicholas I decided to abolish all remnants of self-governing institutions and local peculiarities. Governor-General Bibikov pursued a policy of “assimilating this land [Right-Bank Ukraine including Kiev, Z.K.] ... to Great Russia.”

Thus, the Russian faction won control of the city’s administration; the next four mayors were Russian merchants. Nicholas was so determined to break Kievan burgher exclusiveness that he granted a special three-year tax exemption for any merchant or artisan of the empire who settled in Kiev. As expected, newcomers flocked to the city, and, by 1845, out of 6,048 masters registered in the artisan guilds, only 3,959 were natives, while 2,089 had come from other cities.

Most of the newcomers were Russians, who assumed complete control of the building trades (2,648 masters, journeymen, and helpers). Having lost their autonomy, the merchants and artisans became part of an ethnically heterogeneous social estate of the empire.

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149 The scandal is discussed in detail by I. Kamanin, “Poslednie gody samoupravleniia Kiev po magdeburskomu pravu,” KS, 1888, no. 5, pp. 140–68; no. 8, pp. 157–95; no. 9, pp. 597–622.
151 PSh, 2d ed., no. 7931 (March 8, 1835), 10:211.
153 Ibid. Since census figures from 1782 to 1897 did not differentiate between Ukrainians and Russians, it is necessary to rely on such impressionistic information as a whole guild or profession being controlled by one nationality.
The Kievan struggle elicited the only known protest literature emanating from the burgher class of the former Hetmanate, "The Lament of the Kievans on the Loss of Magdeburg Law."154 This protest was a long poem written in Ukrainian with a virulently anti-Russian tone. It decries that the "bearded ones," the katsapy (here: tsapy), are coming from Tula, Kaluga, Briansk, and other cities and have taken over Kiev. The anonymous author ponders whether the native Kievan's only recourse is to leave his wife and house and flee the city. He condemns the previous city administration for having lost Ukrainian rights through corruption and gambling, and concludes that now "the Muscovite will rule."

Elsewhere in the former Hetmanate, imperial integration of the cities occurred much more quickly and without local resistance. Strong traditions of self-government did not exist in the cities of the Left Bank nor were the authorities as tolerant as in the Right-Bank Ukraine. In Chernihiv, for instance, the introduction of the Town Charter evoked no protest. The consequences of imperial integration, however, were similar to those in Kiev. First came a large influx of Jews: while in 1786 there was only one Jew living outside the city limits, by 1796 Jews made an unsuccessful bid to obtain the municipal monopoly in spirits, and by 1802 Jews in Chernihiv were numerous enough to have a synagogue, school, and cemetery.155 At mid-century Jewish burghers outnumbered Christians: 2,741 Jews, 2,012 Orthodox, and 7 Old Believers.156

Concurrently, the Chernihiv burghers had to face a much smaller but steady influx of Russians. In 1787 and 1797 the Chernihiv duma dealt with complaints that Russians were illegally trading within the city.157 The conflict between Ukrainian and Russian burghers reached a climax in 1815, when Russian burghers (mostly in the building industry) attempted to form their own guild. In a petition to the

155 V. Khizhniakov, "Chernigovskaja starina (1765–1810); po arkhivnym bumagam gorodskoi dumy," KS, no. 6 (1899), pp. 373–75.
156 N. Markevich, "Chernigov; istoricheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie Chernigova," ChGV, no. 10 (1852), p. 4.
provincial government, 151 Russianburghers complained that they were disproportionately taxed and that too many Russians were being selected as conscripts to the army. The Chernihiv duma replied that the Russians were not fulfilling their financial obligations toward the city and that many Russians being drafted were vagrants. The Chernihiv duma, however, had no objections to the Russian guild as long as the guild members fulfilled all their municipal obligations. As soon as Governor-General Repnin discovered the existence of an exclusively Russian guild, however, he ordered its immediate dissolution (1818) and the registering of members into guilds according to profession, not nationality. Apparently, this was not an isolated incident, since the governor-general sent a circular abolishing all ethnic guilds in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces. Thus, once again imperial authorities fostered the creation of a united, but ethnically heterogeneous, burgher class.

The same pattern prevailed throughout all the towns of the Hetmanate, with the exception of Nizhyn. Largely because of the presence of the Greek Brotherhood, Nizhyn was a more cosmopolitan city than others in the Hetmanate. At the time of the abolition, there were 163 Ukrainian, 90 Russian, and approximately 700 Greek, Bulgarian, and Wallachian merchants. The artisans were still overwhelmingly Ukrainian—4,817 Ukrainians to 88 Russians. Then Jews began arriving in the city. In 1797, the Nizhyn burghers petitioned the imperial authorities to prevent Jews from settling in Nizhyn. The petitions were not successful, and by mid-century the city was even more cosmopolitan with the addition of more than two thousand Jewish merchants and artisans.

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158 The whole incident is recounted in Governor-General Repnin’s circular abolishing all ethnic guilds in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces. The circular was published by I. F. Pavlovskii, “Ob uniichozhenii plotitskogo tseka russkoi porody,” Trudy Poltavskoi arkhiivnoi komissii, vol. 6 (1909), pp. 317–18.

159 A. Shafonskii, pp. 475–76.


Since the Greek Brotherhood retained its privileges, Nizhyn, as under Ukrainian administration, had two governments and two judicial systems. During the first half of the nineteenth century the two administrations were at odds over taxation, fire-fighting, passports, and numerous other municipal problems. This struggle overshadowed any Ukrainian-Russian friction in the merchant and artisan guilds.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian merchants had become a minority in the territory of the former Hetmanate. According to the 1851 census, in Poltava province there were 1,381 Jewish merchants (6 in the first guild, 22 in the second, 1,353 in the third) and 1,229 Orthodox Christians (4 in the first guild, 30 in the second, 1,095 in the third). In the Chernihiv province, Christian merchants outnumbered the Jews 2,848 to 767, but even in this case, large-scale trade was controlled by Jews. No Christians had sufficient capital for the first guild, while 59 Jewish merchants were so registered (second guild, 82 Christians to 15 Jews; third guild, 2,766 Christians to 693 Jews). To these figures one must add the 900 Greeks, Wallachians, Persians, and Moldavians belonging to the Greek Brotherhood who were not required to join Russian merchant guilds. Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate the number of Russian merchants in the Hetmanate. Contemporary literature and some scholarly works indicate that Russians and Jews dominated internal trade, especially at fairs. M. Domontovich, who gathered statistical information for the military, estimated that two-thirds of the merchants of Chernihiv province were Russians and Jews and only one-third “is made up of the native poulation, the Little Russians.”

164 Ibid.
167 M. Domontovich, Materialy dla geografii i statistikiRossii; Chernigovskaiaguberniiia (St. Petersburg: 1865), p. 156.
Ukrainian artisans fared only somewhat better under the dual pressure of incoming Russians and Jews. In Poltava province, Jews numbered about one-third of all artisans registered in the guilds (9,448 Jews to 18,358 Christians), while in Chernihiv province the ratio was approximately one-fifth (12,378 Jews to 47,955 Christians). Unfortunately, since the statistics did not differentiate between Ukrainians and Russians, it is impossible to even estimate the extent of Russian penetration into artisan guilds. Judging by the struggle in Kiev and Chernihiv, the number must have been substantial, especially in the building trades.

The long-term effect of the introduction of the Town Charter was to integrate the Ukrainian merchants and artisans into an ethnically mixed imperial burgher class. This, more than any other factor, broke the burghers' ties with the Hetmanate's past. The Ukrainian town assumed a more and more ethnically heterogeneous and linguistically Russian character. Russian was not only the language of trade and industry but also of government. The numerous imperial officials who flocked to the provincial and district capitals added to the towns' Russification.

Imperial integration of the Hetmanate brought about the partial Russification of another social group, the clergy. In the nineteenth century, the clergy became a separate closed social group numbering 8,073 in Poltava province and 7,097 in Chernihiv province. Up to this time, it had been possible for a member of the gentry, a Cossack, or even a peasant to become a priest or monk for the clerical status had been considered a vocation, a profession, and not a separate social category or estate. The introduction of the poll tax, state regulation of the number of clerics, and compulsory seminary education contributed to the clergy's becoming a closed estate, however. Since persons liable to the poll tax and the draft could not be accepted into the

169 Ibid., p. 209.
clergy, the candidates for the priesthood had to belong to the two estates exempted from the poll tax: the nobility and the clergy. Church service carried little social prestige or financial reward, and, therefore, was unattractive to the nobility. Compulsory seminary training further narrowed the possibility of any outsider entering the priesthood, since the seminaries in practice accepted only sons of priests. Finally, the state strictly regulated the number of priests and monks for each parish. Competition was keen, for only those who held officially recognized positions were exempted from the poll tax. Clerical families made certain that no vacancy in the eparchy would go to a stranger if there were any applicant from among the sons of the local clergy.

By the nineteenth century, therefore, it had become impossible for the community to elect as priest a local resident, who would then receive some theological training and be ordained. Nor could a community invite a foreign priest, ordained in Moldavia or the Ottoman Empire, or even one from another part of the Russian Empire. Those few communities that attempted to continue the tradition of elections were in practice limited in choice to one of the sons of the former local priest.

Surprisingly, the strong local roots of the clergy did not prevent their Russification. Having become a class apart, they studied in Russian, wrote to each other in Russian, spoke Russian in the home, and even preached village sermons in Russian. Hrushevsky provides a

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171 In the 1770s and 1780s, the Senate and the Synod demanded the exclusion from the clergy of anyone listed on the poll tax. See Gregory L. Freeze, "Social Mobility and the Russian Parish Clergy in the Eighteenth Century," *Slavic Review*, vol. 33, no. 4 (1974), pp. 655—56.

172 In the former Hetmanate this policy had been initiated by Metropolitan Samuil Myslavs'kyi—see F. Rozhdestvenskii, "Samuil Mislavskii...," *Trudy KDA*, no. 4 (1877), p. 31—and was continued by Metropolitan Gavrili Banulesko-Bondoni. See "Kievskii mitropolit Gavrili Banulesko-Bondoni (1799—1803)." *Trudy KDA*, no. 10 (1904), p. 274. The restriction of seminary applicants to sons of clergy had apparently become common throughout the empire. See G. Freeze, p. 653.

173 Metropolitan Bondoni made an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the process of priestly families controlling appointments to certain parishes. See "Kievskii mitropolit Gavrili Banulesko-Bondoni," *Trudy KDA*, no. 8 (1904), pp. 105—108.

174 A. Fedor Kistliakovskii, "'Vospominiiaiia (1807—185? g.)," *KS*, 1895, no. 1, pp. 44—63; no. 2, pp. 218—33; no. 4, pp. 114—30; no. 7—8, pp. 185—210; no. 9, pp. 346—66; no. 10, pp. 113—18; no. 11, pp. 244—58; no. 12, pp. 380—96; I.
perceptive capsule description of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian parish clergy:

The right of the village communities to elect their clergy had been abolished. More educated people were assigned to the parishes but were foreign to the community and were unwilling to have much to do with it. Having gone through a Russified school system, the candidates for the priesthood, even those whose origins were from the Ukrainian village, rejected the language of their own people and viewed the culture, language, and traditions of their people with derision. . . . The Ukrainian language was banished from the pulpit and school. . . . In social relations the clergy was friendly with the petty gentry, the police officials, and various merchants. From the village community they only demanded payments. . . .

Finally, the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy meant the enserfment of the peasants on private estates, the culmination of a process that had begun in the late seventeenth century. The peasant, bound to the land and registered for the poll tax, was now more than ever at the mercy of the landlord. While there seemed to be no immediate change in the peasants' labor obligations to the landlord, the abolition of autonomy did close most legal avenues of redress. Unlike the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was lamented in folk songs, there is no indication that the peasants had any sentimental attachment to the Hetmanate and its institutions. One response to the abolition of autonomy and their complete enserfment was flight from their masters. Between 1782 and 1791 approximately thirty-five thousand peasants from the Kiev and Chernihiv provinces escaped their masters and, for the most part, went to the southern Ukraine and the Don. Considering that the total peasant population of these provinces was approximately seven hundred thousand, this meant that in the short

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Vlasovskiy, Narvy istorii ukraiins'koi pravoslavnoi tserkvi, 3: 251–62. The best description of the contrast between the old-fashioned clergy and the more educated but Russified younger generation can be found in a work of fiction by Ivan Nekhui-Levyts'kyi, Starovit's'ki batiushky ta matushky (many editions). Levyts'kyi himself was of clerical origins and graduated from the Kievan seminary.

duration of nine years, five percent of all peasants had fled. With the settling of the south and vigorous imperial prosecution of runaways, peasant escapes became more difficult. Nevertheless, they continued. Between 1822 and 1833, for instance, 1,349 peasants from Poltava and 1,827 peasants from Chernihiv were sent to Siberia because of repeated escapes from their masters.

Petitions to the government and violence were the only other means for the peasant to indicate his dissatisfaction. Hundreds of petitions were presented by the peasants to the local and, at times, the central authorities. Many who were registered as peasants wanted to prove that they were, in reality, Cossacks. Peasants who were enserfed by the landlord wanted to have their status changed to state peasants. When petitions failed, the peasants occasionally resorted to violence. In the village of Morozivka the peasants protested their registration in the 1782 census as privately owned serfs instead of state peasants. They "arrested" the landlord, expelled the local authorities, and sent a delegation to the Kiev provincial administration. The investigation proved the charges of Morozivka peasants to be accurate and they were registered as state peasants. While there were many individual instances of violence perpetrated by the peasants, there were few massive uprisings involving villages. In those cases where uprisings did occur, they usually involved Cossacks, who had lost their land, meadow, or forest.

177 I. O. Hurzhii, Borot'ba selian i robiinykiv Ukrainy proty feodal'no-kripsyus't'koho hnutu (z 80-kh rokiv XVIII st. do 1861 r.) (Kiev: 1958), p. 79. Hurzhii devotes a whole section of his book to peasant flights, pp. 69–82.
178 Ibid., pp. 53–59.
179 Ibid., pp. 83–84.
181 While Hurzhii lists a number of larger uprisings in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a closer examination reveals that in virtually all cases Cossacks were involved. See Hurzhii, Borot'ba selian . . ., pp. 83–105. Soviet historians treat Cossacks as part of the peasantry and thus can talk about the growing peasant movement from the end of the eighteenth century until emancipation.
While Catherine was able to abolish Ukrainian institutions and quickly introduce a Russian imperial administration, it took more than half a century for Ukrainian society to fully reflect the imperial social structure. During this time, the Ukrainian gentry, with some vacillation, was assimilated into a Russian dvorianstvo, the Cossacks were gradually reduced to virtual state peasants, the merchants and artisans were absorbed into an ethnically heterogeneous but linguistically Russian imperial estate, the clergy became a partially Russified closed caste, and the peasants on private estates were fully enserfed.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Russian Centralism
and Ukrainian Autonomy:
Conclusions

Russian centralism has deep roots in early modern Muscovy, and the idea of an all-powerful, divinely anointed monarch provided a mechanism for legitimacy and unity. Such a concentration of power impeded the emergence of any independent centers of authority. As Muscovy expanded, it imposed its sense of authority on the newly acquired territories, abolishing local peculiarities. Gradually, Muscovy evolved into a large multiethnic yet centrally administered empire.

Although the trend toward a unitary state had been firmly established, it hardly proceeded in a simple linear or deterministic fashion. There were retreats as well as advances on Russia's road to uniformity. In gathering the 'Russian lands,' Muscovy encountered considerable opposition to centralism. As Muscovy grew, considerations of distance and capacity to rule forced it to make concessions to native and nomadic peoples as well as to borderland Cossack formations. Moreover, in its Western expansion, Russia acquired territories and peoples who had well-developed concepts of regional and corporate rights and who possessed elaborate institutions of self-government. Such entrenched regionalism challenged the concept of a centrally controlled and uniformly administered Russian Empire. To a large extent, the Ukrainian Hetmanate was Russia's first experience with this Western type of regionalism and self-government.

The tension between centrifugal forces favoring uniformity in administration, social structure, and way of life and the centrifugal forces demanding the retention of autonomous organs of government, native society, and customs came to a climax during the reign of Catherine II. New Western concepts and beliefs reinforced Russia's drive
toward centralism and uniformity. Under the influence of carnisalism thought, the Enlightenment, and concepts of a well-ordered police state, Catherine sought to obtain greater control over the provinces, rationalize and increase revenues, and bring development, enlightenment, and well-being to her empire. The agency for development was a more rational and active government. Autonomous areas, regional rights, and special social and economic prerogatives were thought of as mere hindrances to the establishment of a new, more enlightened order. Thus, in reorganizing Russia, Catherine introduced the new administration into all parts of the empire, including privileged areas.

As a result, the autonomous institutions of the Hetmanate were abolished, and the region was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire. The abolition occurred in two stages: an initial one, followed by the actual introduction of imperial administration and institutions. The first stage began in 1764 with the forced resignation of Hetman Rozumovs'kyi and Catherine's formulation of a clear policy aimed at gradually integrating all autonomous areas. From 1764 until 1782, the major Ukrainian institutions remained intact, but Governor-General Rumiantsev successfully intermeshed them with the imperial bureaucracy and made them dependent upon imperial institutions. By the time this process was completed, the Hetmanate was well prepared for the final abolition. The consternation caused by the abolition of the office of hetman had subsided, and the hostility between the Ukrainian gentry and Governor-General Rumiantsev had been superseded by cooperation and even friendship. When Catherine, spurred by social and political unrest, developed plans for reorganizing Russia, the fate of the Hetmanate was sealed. The introduction of Catherine's provincial reforms into the Hetmanate in 1782 initiated the second, decisive stage of the abolition. The Ukrainian administrative, fiscal, and judicial systems were abolished, the church lost its wealth and was divested of any remaining local peculiarities, and, finally, the Cossack military formations were phased out and the populace subjected to the empire's military levy. By the end of Catherine's reign the Hetmanate was, with only a few exceptions, governed by an imperial bureaucracy according to imperial norms.

The Ukrainian social structure, however, did not correspond to the imperial order so readily. While the burghers soon became part of an ethnically heterogeneous Russified estate and the clergy were transformed into a partially Russified closed social group, the
Conclusions

Ukrainian gentry and the Cossacks proved more difficult to integrate. The imperial authorities, moreover, wavered in their policies toward the latter two groups. Initially, in 1783–1785, virtually the entire Ukrainian gentry was admitted into the dvorianstvo. Then, at the turn of the century, the Office of Heraldry rescinded thousands of patents and advanced strict regulations for those who claimed rights to imperial dvorianstvo on the basis of Ukrainian ranks. This resulted in twenty-five years of struggle by the Ukrainian gentry against the Office of Heraldry and the Senate. Although most Ukrainian ranks were eventually recognized (except for the two lowest ranks) this long, drawn-out battle slowed the assimilation of the Ukrainian gentry.

Similarly, the imperial authorities vacillated in dealing with the Cossacks—a group that did not readily fit any standard category of imperial society. On the one hand, there was a strong tendency to reduce the Cossacks’ status to that of state peasants; on the other, in times of military emergency, the imperial authorities sought to mobilize them as irregular troops, thus reviving their Cossack status. Finally, in the 1830s the Cossacks were definitively accorded the status of special state peasants. It was only at the end of the 1830s, therefore, that Ukrainian society at last approximated the imperial social structure.

The initial reaction of Ukrainian society to imperial integration and assimilation was an entirely negative one. Rumiantsev was forced to use repression and arrests to counter the autonomist demands made by the Ukrainian gentry. Despite these measures, fiery leaders such as Hryhorii Poletyka from the gentry and Arsenii Mohylians’kyi, the Kiev metropolitan, called not only for the continuation of autonomy, but also for the restitution of rights long lost. The Legislative Commission of 1767–69 had shown that all segments of Ukrainian society—with the exception of the peasantry who did not participate—cherished their autonomous rights. But the commission had also revealed a fragmented society, with politics controlled entirely by the gentry and higher clergy. The other segments of society (Cossacks, burghers, lower clergy) were concerned only with their estate rights and were hardly aware of the political crisis that threatened to end the existence of the Hetmanate.
All Ukrainian institutions were abolished only two decades later, yet the reaction of the Ukrainians was nothing more than mild. Had there been an opportunity to register an opinion, such as in the 1767 Legislative Commission, much of Ukrainian society would still, perhaps, have preferred the continuation of local institutions. Even with the lack of a public forum, the gentry, the chief proponents of Ukrainian autonomy in the past, might have expressed greater dissatisfaction. Their placidity stemmed from Rumiantsev's well-planned policy of drawing the Ukrainian gentry into imperial service. Imperial cooption of the Ukrainian gentry proved so successful that Governor A. Myloradovych, a Ukrainian, and his largely Ukrainian staff actually prepared the introduction of imperial institutions into the Hetmanate. Another Ukrainian, the Kiev metropolitan Samuil Myslavsky, supervised the imperial secularization of church wealth and attempted to obliterate any remaining peculiarities that still differentiated the church in the Hetmanate from the rest of the empire.

Yet the cooperation obtained by the imperial government from the Ukrainian elite cannot be interpreted as universal acceptance of imperial integration. A portion of the Ukrainian gentry openly espoused assimilation, and a much larger number probably became Russified and were assimilated without ever being conscious of the process. Some of the assimilators who went into imperial service and left the Hetmanate subsequently raised the question of what roles the Little and Great Russian traditions played in forming a "Russian" national identity. Through their attempts to reconcile Little- and All-Russian loyalties, they may have prepared the ground for Slavophilism. Another part of the gentry strove to retain or even renew various aspects of the Hetmanate's heritage. The latter group, the traditionalists, were not united in any cohesive movement but were heterogeneous in make-up and goals. Some merely espoused the continuation of the Lithuanian Statute and the Ukrainian judicial system; others utilized propitious political moments to propose the reestablishment of Cossack military formations; still others clandestinely wrote and distributed antiassimilationist and anti-Russian political literature (Istoryia Rusov); and a daring few even plotted against the imperial government. Oppositionist tendencies were further reinforced by the long struggle to gain recognition of Ukrainian ranks as bestowing automatic membership in the imperial dvorianstvo. In sum, while most of the Ukrainian gentry had become assimilated and at least
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partially Russified, the process was not as automatic as hitherto presumed and encountered pockets of resistance throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.

The only protest against imperial assimilation not made by the gentry was "The Lament of the Kievan on the Loss of the Magdeburg Law," a passionately anti-Russian poem. Kiev, with its strong traditions of self-rule and an articulate burgher class, was the exception to the rule. For the most part, the burghers, the Cossacks, the lower clergy, and the peasants were the politically passive elements of Ukrainian society. If they were dissatisfied, they simply lacked the forum and the artificulateness to express their opinions.

Catherine and her heirs seemed successful in integrating the Hetmanate into the Russian Empire. Not only were the institutions of the Hetmanate replaced by imperial ones, but a part of Ukrainian society was assimilated and Russified. A basic polarization resulted; the town, with its ethnically mixed population and numerous officials, became Russified, while the countryside, inhabited by Cossacks, peasants, and nobles, remained, on the whole, Ukrainian. Later, even many of the provincial nobles became Russified and the Cossacks were merged into the peasantry. Being Ukrainian was virtually synonymous with being a peasant.

In addition to reducing Ukrainians to primarily a peasant nation, the successful integration of the Hetmanate into the empire meant that the Ukraine was no longer considered a borderland, but a core area of Russia. With Russia's expansion further westward, the struggle between Russian centralism and regional autonomy also moved westward, to Poland, the Baltic area, and Finland. Catherine's successors did not have her singularity of purpose and their policies toward autonomous areas were shaped by new political circumstances, court favorites, and even personal whim. Paul restored many of the prerogatives of the Baltic area and even the judicial system of the Hetmanate. The remaining and restored institutions of the Hetmanate were subsequently abolished, however, not so much because they represented the last vestiges of an autonomous Ukraine, but rather to rid the area of perceived Polish influences. The complete absorption of the Hetmanate into the empire gave credence to the idea that Ukrainians and Russians were really the same people who had been separated because of "perfidious" Polish institutions and practices. In that respect, the concept of Russia as a unitary state had been
considerably strengthened even as it was being again challenged by the autonomous institutions of Russia's more recent acquisitions. Moreover, the view that the Ukraine was an integral part of a unitary Russian state made any subsequent forms of Ukrainian particularism—irrespective of how apolitical or innocuous—seem treachery if not treason.

The absorption of the Hetmanate into the empire had other important consequences for further Ukrainian developments. In a traditional society, where political leadership was the exclusive province of the upper classes, the assimilation of the native elite to another culture also meant the loss of national political representation. For Ukrainians, the whole course of "nation-building" would have to be different from those nations that, although stateless, had fully retained their traditional elites. Unlike the Poles, whose national movement in its initial stages could be based on the historical legitimacy of the nobility and expanded to include ethnic Poles of various strata, the Ukrainians first had to develop a new stratum capable of leadership—the intelligentsia—and the subsequent national movement was based not on historical legitimacy but primarily on ethnic and linguistic considerations.

Although the assimilation of a significant portion of the Ukrainian gentry into Russian imperial society deprived Ukrainians of the leadership of a traditional elite in the initial stages of "nation-building," the heritage of the gentry did have an important impact on the development of a modern Ukrainian national consciousness. Because of their antiquarian interests and nostalgia, the Ukrainian nobles preserved the Hetmanate's heritage well into the 1830s and 1840s. At the same time, under the influence of Herder and Romanticism, a new generation discovered the Ukrainian folk with its vernacular language. The young students identified themselves with the term "Ukrainian" rather than "Little Russian" and espoused cultural work rather than a political struggle.

For a while, the nostalgic descendants of the "Little Russian" gentry and the apolitical enthusiasts of Ukrainian folk language and customs could pursue their activities without much interaction, but eventually they also clashed. To some extent, it was a clash of generations (fathers versus sons) and social groups (gentry versus gentry-intelligentsia) over language (Russian versus Ukrainian) and orientation (restoration of some of the Hetmanate's institutions versus
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apolitical Ukrainian cultural work). This clash helped spark modern Ukrainian nation-building because the intelligentsia of the 1840s combined Ukrainian cultural activities with the political outlook and historical consciousness that had been part of the Hetmanate’s heritage. Ukrainian poets and writers took the civic and patriotic political writings of the gentry and infused them with a new romantic and national message. The Cossack Chronicles and historical works of the gentry formed the basis for the development of a national history and national myth. The new Ukrainian movement quickly gave rise to calls for at least cultural autonomy. Neither Catherine nor her heirs could have foreseen that the unitary, well-governed state that they so assiduously pursued would soon be confronted by what Marc Raeff calls “the revolution of national consciousness.” Thus, at the very time that the Hetmanate had become fully absorbed into imperial Russia, new forces at work revived, in a different context, the struggle between Russian centralism and Ukrainian autonomy.
Appendix

Supplementary Information on the Nakazy

1. Nakazy of the Gentry

CHERNIHIV NAKAZ

Comments:
1. government-controlled;
2. 135 signatures.

Additional points (not on chart):
1. criticism of the Ukrainian administration;
2. petition for creation of nobility courts;
3. request for stationing of Russian troops in towns only;
4. demand for exemption of peasants under gentry jurisdiction from performance of public works.

Published in: SIRIO, 67 (1889): 233 – 50

HLUKHIV NAKAZ

Comments:
1. 48 signatures.

Additional points:
none

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899): 127 – 32

KIEV NAKAZ

Comments:
1. 111 signatures.
Appendix

Additional points:
1. request reimbursement for various border obligations (maintenance of fortifications, border buildings, bridges, etc.);
2. demand for registration of all Cossacks and the prohibition for peasants to enter Cossack ranks;
3. proposal for a reform of the Ukrainian General Court.

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899): 173 – 88

LUBNY NAKAZ

Comments:
1. 117 signatures.

Additional points:
1. petition for free elections of all military and civilian officials and for the confirmation of the gentry’s rights to manufacture goods and products;
2. request the prohibition of a Russian military unit to have its quarters in Lubny.

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899): 158 – 72

NIZHYN: OFFICIAL NAKAZ

Comments:
1. government-dictated;
2. 16 signatures.

Additional points:
1. criticism of Ukrainian administration;
2. demand for creation of nobility courts;
3. request for exemption from state services of peasants under the jurisdiction of the gentry;
4. proposal for the construction of storage bins for grain.

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899): 33 – 146

NIZHYN: SUPPRESSED NAKAZ

Comments:
1. suppressed by Rumiantsev;
2. 55 signatures;  
3. not published in full.

Additional points:
none

Synopsis published in: Maksimovich, Vybor, p. 168

PEREIASLAV NAKAZ
Comments:
1. 116 signatures

Additional points:
none

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899): 147–57

POHAR NAKAZ
Comments:
1. 39 signatures.

Additional points:
1. request that raskolniki living in the territory of the Pohar regiment either be removed or subjected to local jurisdiction.

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899), 203–10.

PRYLUKY NAKAZ
Comments:
1. 100 signatures.

Additional points:
1. petition for the confirmation of the Ukrainian legal system.

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899): 223–32

STARODUB: OFFICIAL NAKAZ
Comments:
1. 118 signatures.
Appendix

Additional points:

none

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899): 211–22

STARODUB: SUPPRESSED NAKAZ

Comments:

1. suppressed by Rumiantsev;
2. no signatures, but 87 gentry were present;
3. not published in full.

Additional points:

1. petition for a guarantee of the Ukrainian legal system and that government posts be held by the local gentry.

Synopsis published in: Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 111–17

II. Cossack Nakazy

CHERNIHIV NAKAZ

Comments:

1. first page of manuscript missing, first point unknown;
2. 90 signatures, all Cossacks, no gentry.

Additional points:

none

Published in: Nakazy, pp. 142–50

HADIACH NAKAZY

Comments:

1. 27 nakazy written;
2. not published and information incomplete.

Additional points:

not known

Discussed in: Maksimovich, Vybory, pp. 266–70
KIEV NAKAZ

Comments:
1. nakaz not published and information incomplete.

Additional points:
not known

Discussed in: Maksimovich, Vyborg, pp. 246–50

LUBNY NAKAZ

Comments:
1. virtually identical with Lubny gentry nakaz;
2. no signatures.

Additional points:
none

Published in: SIRIO, 68 (1899): 158–72 (Lubny gentry nakaz) with all differences in the Cossack version pointed out in Maksimovich, Vyborg, p. 258.

MYRHROROD NAKAZ

Comments:
1. a synopsis of various company nakazy;
2. no signatures available.

Additional points:
1. petition for the confirmation of title to Cossack lands and exemption from taxation of Cossacks and Cossack widows;
2. demand payment for livestock taken from the Cossacks during the Prussian campaign;
3. request the return of property in New Serbia and repayment for supplies appropriated by the Moldavian Hussar regiment;
4. proposal for rotating stationed Russian troops among various localities.
Appendix

NIZHYN NAKAZ

Comments:
1. *nakaz* not published and information incomplete.

Additional points:
not known


PEREIASLAV NAKAZ

Comments:
1. composite of 18 *nakazy*;
2. no signatures available.

Additional points:
1. general praise of the sovereign for the manifesto;
2. proposal for abolition of tariffs in Little Russia;
3. complaint against requirement to provision passing Russian officials;
4. request for retention of own company court system.

Published in: Maksimovich, *Vybory*, pp. 251–54

POLTAVA NAKAZY

Comments:
1. five separate company *nakazy*;
2. no signatures.

Additional points:
1. request for the return of land appropriated by the land militia (2 *nakazy*), return of land beyond the Vorskia River incorporated into Novorossiia (1 *nakaz*), and the return of land once belonging to the town of Reshitelivka (1 *nakaz*);
2. demand payment for livestock taken during the Turkish and Prussian campaigns (4 *nakazy*);
3. plea for Cossacks living in towns to be allowed to trade.

Published in: Maksimovich, *Vybory*, p. 265
PRYLUKY NAKAZ
Comments:
1. 22 signatures.
Additional points:
   none
Published in Nakazy, pp. 157–63

STARODUB NAKAZ
Comments:
1. no signatures.
Additional points:
   none
Published in: Nakazy, pp. 151–52

III. Town Nakazy

CHERNIHIV NAKAZ
Comments:
1. 83 signatures (36 burghers, 13 nobles, and 14 Cossacks).
Additional points:
   none
Published in: SIRIO, 144 (1914): 117–27

HLUKHIV NAKAZ
Comments:
1. 50 signatures (11 burghers, 35 officers, 4 gentry).
Additional points:
   1. proposal for the establishment of a town police force.
Published in: SIRIO, 144 (1914): 128–33
KOZELETS' NAKAZ

Comments:
1. 64 signatures (20 gentry, 13 Cossacks, 31 burghers).

Additional points:
1. petition for a state subsidy in lieu of revenue lost by the abolition of internal tariffs, the creation of a commission to settle disputes between Ukrainians and Russians, and to return to the status of burghers those who had become Cossacks.

Published in: SIRIO, 144 (1914): 109–17

LUBNY: SUPPRESSED NAKAZ

Comments:
1. 191 signatures (39 burghers, 130 Cossacks, 11 gentry, and 11 clergymen);
2. the burgher wishes are appended to the nakaz.

Additional points:
1. petition for the preservation and confirmation of all Little Russian rights and privileges, permission for clergy to buy and sell land, and the acceptance of clergy's children for military service;
2. complaint against requisitioning of livestock without compensation;
3. request that the census be terminated and that hired hands not be counted for census and tax purposes;
4. appeal for the right to fish in the Sula River and the reactivation of guilds (separate burgher points).

Published in: Nakazy, pp. 124–37

NIZHYN NAKAZ

Comments:
1. four separate nakazy combined into one.

Additional points:
A. Burghers (32 signatures)
1. petition for state subsidy in lieu of cancelled internal tariffs (1756);
2. proposal for translation of the Magdeburg Law code from Polish into Russian;
3. request for three taverns run as concessions by Russians to be returned to municipal jurisdiction;
4. demand that all inhabitants except the Cossacks contribute wood for the rebuilding of the city.

B. Gentry and Cossacks (20 signatures)
no additional points.

C. Greek Brotherhood (15–20 signatures, some indistinct)
1. petition for confirmation of traditional rights and privileges including adjudication by own brotherhood and exemption from taxes in Nizhyn and elsewhere;
2. request for right of tariff-free trade with foreign countries;
3. demand right to purchase new homes in Nizhyn;
4. plea for the sole right to settle claims after the death of any Greek in Little Russia and Russia;
5. proposal for a bank in Nizhyn due to the short supply of cash;
6. complaint against the 8 percent state tax on credit as too high.

D. Russian Merchants (unsigned, written down by Ukrainian chancellery officials from the testimony of two Russian merchants)
1. request for own courts, exemption from Little Russian taxes and duties (since liable to Russian taxes), and the equal distribution of quartered Russian troops and officials among all town inhabitants;
2. proposal for the public sale of property for nonpayment of debt, better collection of credit, and the transfer of debts to relatives in the case of a debtor's death;
3. appeal for the cessation of merchant abuse, the construction of housing for visitors and merchants, and the right to purchase serfs;
4. demand that peasants and raznochintsy be prohibited from engaging in trade, that those engaged in foreign trade have sufficient capital, and that foreigners sell their products at the border;
5. complaint against the 8 percent state tax on credit as too high.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 144 (1914): 21–63

NOVHOROD-SIVERS’K NAKAZ

Comments:
   1. 96 signatures (83 burghers, 13 city officials).

Additional points:
   1. request for permission to cross the Desna River;
   2. proposal for municipally owned breweries, the profits from which were to be utilized for town upkeep.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 144 (1914): 63–72

OSTER NAKAZ

Comments:
   1. 54 signatures (8 nobles, 26 Cossacks, 20 burghers).

Additional points:
   1. demand that Russians, Greeks, and Vlachs be prohibited from dispensing alcoholic beverages and that the census be terminated.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 144 (1914): 99–109

PEREIASLAV NAKAZ

Comments:
   1. 317 signatures (20 nobles, 201 Cossacks, 86 burghers).

Additional points:
   1. request for compensation for loss of revenue due to the abolition of internal tariffs and exemption from all taxes and troop quarterings for city officials;
2. demand that only inhabitants under municipal jurisdiction be allowed to trade and produce alcoholic beverages, that non-townsmen be prohibited from trading outside the city gates and that the townsmen be permitted to fish in the Dnieper River.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 144 (1914): 3–13

**Poltava: Official Nakaz**

Comments:

1. 117 signatures, all burghers or city officials.

Additional points:

1. petition for the right to sell immovable property to Cossack officers, *raznochintsy*, and Cossacks, the right to wear swords and appeal directly to the empress, and the right to move from place to place;
2. proposal for the translation of the Magdeburg Law code from Polish into Russian, the placing of peasants under municipal jurisdiction, and the protection of peasants from the claims of landlords;
3. demand that the populace living outside the town limits contribute to the town’s upkeep and reconstruction.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 144 (1914): 73–86

**Poltava Nakaz: First Burgher Nakaz, Unofficial**

Comments:

1. no signatures available.

Additional points:

1. proposal to equate city officials with the gentry and to establish a bank.

Published in: *Nakazy*, pp. 113–23

**Starodub Nakaz**

Comments:

1. 142 signatures (87 burghers and 55 of all other groups).
Additional points:

1. proposal for the translation of the Magdeburg Law code from Polish into Russian and the curtailment of fairs held by the raskolniki living in the Starodub regiment; 
2. request for money to pay city officials, exemptions from paying the regimental doctor, and the right to collect a tariff and maintain a weighing station for passing merchants.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 144 (1914): 86–99

IV. Other Requests of the Church

CHERNIHIV EPARCHY

Additional points:

1. petition for maintenance of own consistory personnel equal to Russian eparchies, exemption from the rouble tax, conversion of the Piatnyts'kyi men's monastery into a women's convent, the curtailment of drafting church personnel for civilian state functions, confirmation of property rights for priests' clerical widows and children providing them protection from landlords, and financial contribution by the guilds to the church; 
2. complaint against requiring the liturgy to be said at unusual hours; 
3. request for salaries for employees of the Synod and other church institutions, and equalization in rank of church employees with similar positions in government.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 43 (1885): 561–73

KIEV EPARCHY

Comments:

1. impossible to list 74 points (127 pages).

Published in: *SIRIO*, 43 (1885): 433–560

KIEV MEZHYHIRS'KYI MONASTERY

Additional points:

1. request for funds for essential repairs;
2. appeal for boats for crossing the Dnieper;
3. complaint about the yearly destruction of forests by Russian soldiers erecting fortifications washed away by spring floods, resulting in peasants fleeing to Poland.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 43 (1885): 588–97

KIEV PECHERS’KA LAVRA

Additional points:

1. request for funds for general renovation and state subsidies;
2. plea for the right to cross the Dnieper River without paying tariffs and the right to tariff-free importation of grain;
3. complaint against destruction of forests by Russian troops resulting in flight of peasants;
4. appeal for exemption of priests’ children from taxes and provisions for their education.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 43 (1885): 578–88

PEREIASLAV EPARCHY

Comments:

1. two separate sections written, one coming from monks and the other from the parish clergy.

Additional points:

A. monks—none;
B. parish clergy

1. plea for exemption of widows and children of clergy from various taxes.

Published in: *SIRIO*, 43 (1885): 573–78
Abbreviations

ChGV  Chernigovskie gubernskie vedomosti
ChIONL  Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora Letopista
ChOIDR  Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i
drevnosti rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom
universitete
KDA  Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii
KS  Kievskaiia starina
PSP  Polnoe sobranie postanovlenii i rasporiazhenii
po vedomstvu pravoslavnogo ispovedanii
PSZ  Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii
RA  Russkii arkhiv
RS  Russkaia starina
SA  Senatskii arkhiv
SIRIO  Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istorichesko-
obshchestva
UAAS  Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the
United States
UIZh  Ukrain's'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal
ZIFV [V]UAN  Zapysky istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu Vse-
ukrains'koi [or Ukrain's'koi] akademii nauk
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Russification of the Ukrainian towns and in reducing Ukrainians to a peasant nation. Imperial absorption of the Hetmanate also strengthened the concept of Russia as a unitary state even as the empire was again challenged by the autonomous institutions of its more recent Western acquisitions.

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Zenon E. Kohut, who holds his doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania, has taught there and at Michigan State University. A longtime associate of Harvard University's Ukrainian Research Institute, he has written articles on eighteenth-century Ukraine as well as on East European and Russian history. Between 1980 and 1984, he had been the compiler and editor of the American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies. Currently, he is Senior Research Specialist for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at the Library of Congress.

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