

PETRO MIRCHUK, Ph.D., J.D.

AGAINST THE INVADERS

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Commander-in-Chief of the UPA

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Translated from Ukrainian
by **IHOR MIRCHUK, Ph.D.**

Edited
by **MARIA KICIUK, Ph.D.**

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
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A sculpture of Roman Shukhevych by Mykhailo Cheresniovsky, a former fighter of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

I. EARLY LIFE

Roman Shukhevych, nom de guerre Taras Chuprynka, the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent (Partisan) Army (UPA), was born on June 30, 1907, in Krakovets, a small Western Ukrainian town about 70 km. west of Lviv. Roman's father, Osyp Zinovii Shukhevych, was the local magistrate. His mother, Evhenia, was the daughter of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic village pastor, Reverend Stotskyi. When Roman was six years of age, his father was transferred with his family to the town of Kaminka-Strumylova, situated on the river Buh, about 35 km. northeast of Lviv.

The ranks of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Halychyna (Galicia), to which Shukhevych's father, Osyp, and grandfather, a high school teacher, belonged were very small in number. During the period of Polish rule in Halychyna a severe blow was inflicted upon the Ukrainian people: the peasants were subjected to the bonds of serfdom and denied access to education, while the Ukrainian upper classes, enduring decades of persecution, were driven to forsake their Ukrainian nationality and become Poles. When Halychyna was annexed by Austria in 1772, only "the priest and peasant" (*pop i khlop*) remained Ukrainian, as the Poles used to say scornfully. Under Austrian rule the conditions of life improved somewhat for Western Ukrainians, and in 1848 serfdom was abolished. But the oppression of Polish landlords and administrators continued and was directed especially against the new Ukrainian intelligentsia, whose ranks began to increase in the early nineteenth century from the families of clergymen, among whom were Roman's great-grandfather, Rev. Yosyp Shukhevych, and great-great-grandfather, Rev. Mykola Shukhevych. With the abolition of serfdom, a new intelligentsia began to emerge from families of other social groups, primarily from the few urban Ukrainian families. The Poles continued to exert great efforts to draw this new Ukrainian intelligentsia into their own ranks. There were some who were unable to resist Polonization, abandoning their Ukrainian nationality for the sake of a better career and an easier life. But Roman's

father was not among them, nor was his grandfather or great-grandfather. They remained staunch Ukrainians and passed on to Roman a strong attachment to the Ukrainian people and a firm determination to preserve the Ukrainian identity.

In Roman's family, there were frequent discussions about the difficult conditions of life for Ukrainians under foreign oppression, and of the duty of Ukrainian priests and the intelligentsia to spearhead a struggle for the achievement of freedom and a better life for their people. Roman's grandfather, Volodymyr, the author of a five-volume ethnographical study of the Hutsul tribesmen of Ukraine, traveled every year to the Hutsul region in the Carpathian Mountains over a period of twenty years to gather ethnographical material and to study the spiritual culture of this unique group. Roman's grandfather would often retell the legends of the Ukrainian Hutsuls, particularly about the real-life hero Oleksa Dovbush, who in the middle of the eighteenth century, together with a small group of freedom fighters, bravely defended the Ukrainian peasants inhabiting the Carpathian valleys of the Hutsul region against Polish landlords. Young Roman found Dovbush a compelling symbol of Ukraine's struggle against its oppressors. Roman's life-long dedication of the cause of attaining freedom and social justice for the Ukrainian people may be traced to these early images of chivalry and romantic heroism.

As a young boy, Roman already demonstrated his willingness to be helpful to others, even at the risk of his own life. One winter day, while skating on the frozen waters of the Buh River, he saw another boy racing over an area of thin ice, which suddenly gave way. The boy disappeared under the sheet of ice. Roman immediately jumped into the water and saved him. Although afterwards Roman had to spend several months recovering from what was probably pneumonia, he never regretted saving the young boy's life.

In September 1917, Roman was enrolled at the Ukrainian Academic Gymnasium in Lviv. While studying there, he lived with his grandmother, the widow of Volodymyr Shukhevych. This was a time when Ukrainians living under Austria were under the impression of important revolutionary events taking place in Eastern Ukraine, which until then had been under Czarist Russian rule. On January 22, 1918, an official declaration of Ukraine's independence was issued in Kyiv (after the abdication of the Czar in 1917 the Ukrainians of Eastern Ukraine had been gradually moving toward independence). The Ukrainians of Halychyna were overjoyed at the news of the proclamation and were anxiously anticipating similar developments in Western Ukraine. Roman Shukhevych, at the time a young high school student, was similarly overcome with anxious anticipation of Western Ukraine's liberation.

The great moment came unexpectedly when Roman was in Kaminka-Strumylova on a three-day school vacation in November 1918. On November 1, a large crowd of Ukrainians from Kaminka-Strumylova and the surrounding villages assembled before the town hall. Roman was also among them and for the first time in his life he saw the blue and golden flag of Ukraine waving over the town hall. A delegation of councilmen and military officers, led by Roman's father, came out of the town hall to the assembled crowd to announce the joyous news. Roman's father read the proclamation, issued that day in the capital city of Western Ukraine, Lviv, announcing the establishment of an independent Western Ukrainian Republic. The proclamation was received with tremendous enthusiasm by all those present, including the young Roman Shukhevych.

Western Ukrainian independence, however, was soon smothered by Polish invasion. In Lviv, the Poles staged a revolt against the Ukrainian government, while Polish troops, armed with French weapons and ammunition, were sent to their assistance. The subsequent outbreak of fighting cut communications between Kaminka-Strumylova and Lviv. Roman remained in Kaminka, where his father became the mayor. Ukrainian volunteers from the entire region massively enlisted in the newly-formed Ukrainian Army of Halychyna (UHA), eager to defend the freedom of their country.

Kaminka-Strumylova became the headquarters of the first corps of the UHA. The house of the Shukhevych family was frequently the site of meetings between commissioned officers of the Ukrainian army and prominent Ukrainian politicians who gathered to discuss the current military and political situation. Probably few of those participating in these discussions noted the presence of the young student Roman Shukhevych, who would be eagerly and attentively following the discussions. One who did notice was Dr. Stephan Shakh, who later related this in his memoirs on Roman Shukhevych:

One day, a group of leading local citizens along with their priest, Rev. Hnat Tschelskyi, and Capt. Bohdan Hnatevych gathered in the small three-room dwelling of the Shukhevyches. I talked about military life, about the situation of the front, about our skirmishes with Polish detachments, about our successful operation in Volia Dobrostan-ska. Everyone was visibly pleased by these reports... Only one listener remained silent, staring at me intently, as if he were trying to catch every word; his ears reddened, while his eyes glowed. This attentive listener was the son of the Shukhevyches, Romko, a second-year student of the Academic Gymnasium in Lviv, a twelve-year-old, blond, curly-haired and slender youth. He sat motionless at the table,

next to Reverend Kazanivskyi. At the end, he braved to ask me, "Why don't you try to disrupt the railroad connection between Horodok and Lviv?" I must admit, his question startled me and I couldn't find a good answer to it...

After dinner and our exhaustive discussions, as I was getting ready to leave, Romko was waiting for me with my helmet in hand, examining it with great interest. I went over to him, smilingly placed the helmet on his head, and everyone present agreed that "Romko could already be a full-fledged Ukrainian soldier". Inspired by this, he snapped to attention and saluted me, placing his fingers to the helmet. I then said to him, "Romko, may you become an outstanding warrior of Ukraine!" His eyes beamed, his face became very serious, and he answered briefly, "I shall try to be worthy of your wish, Lieutenant!" Silently I shook Roman's hand. Captain Hnatevych, according to a medieval custom, placed his hand (in place of a sabre) on each of Roman's shoulders, while the elderly Reverend Tselhelskyi recited a passage from the twelfth century Ukrainian heroic epic, *The Tale of Ihor's Campaign*, in praise of the brave Prince Buy-Tur Vsevolod...

This was a brief but very solemn moment when Roman Shukhevych was "knighted."¹

The armed struggle in defense of Ukraine's reborn independence, however, ended in failure. The Western Ukrainian lands were occupied by the Polish aggressor. Roman's father, together with thousands of other Ukrainians, was arrested and sent to the Polish prison Brygidky in Lviv, where he was held until December 1919. Those events, the glorious rebirth of Ukraine's independence and the tragic occupation of Ukrainian territory, left a deep impression on the young Roman Shukhevych.

When the situation in Halychyna returned to normality, Roman returned to Lviv to continue his education at the Ukrainian Academic Gymnasium. Here he not only excelled in academic studies, but was also a very good athlete. He became a leading member of the Ukrainian scouting organization *Plast*, and an active member of the gymnastic and soccer club *Rusalka*. Roman also liked to play basketball, volleyball, and other sports. At the age of sixteen, he set a record at the 1923 Zaporizhian Games in the 400-meter hurdle race and came in first in the 100-meter swim, also setting a record. His involvement in sports continued long after high school. At the Zaporizhian Games of 1933, he was selected to lead the parade of contestants and took first place in the senior skiing competition. It should be pointed out



Roman Shukhevych (kneeling in the center of the second row) at a Scout Conference in the Carpathian Mountains, 1926.

that Shukhevych's active participation in athletic activities in no way interfered with his schoolwork.

Having become a member of *Plast*, Roman Shukhevych tried to impart a distinctly national character to this organization. His first act as a scoutmaster in 1922 was to give his patrol not the customary name of an animal or plant, but instead the name *Yasnyi Tryzub* (Bright Trident), the national symbol of Ukraine. He led his group on numerous hikes into the wooded environs of Lviv, viewing these excursions not as recreational outings to explore nature, but as opportunities to become better familiarized with this region's terrain and as vigorous exercises preparing its participants to fight Ukraine's battles in the future.

Roman's activities and interests soon expanded beyond his studies and involvement in scouting and sports clubs. Very early in life, he became a member of the clandestine Organization of Students of the Upper Classes of High Schools. The members of this group met secretly to study the history of

Ukraine and the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism as expressed in the writings of the Eastern Ukrainian writer and political leader Mykola Mikhnovskiy. The group also collected financial contributions for the Underground Ukrainian University in Lviv, a clandestine institution of higher learning organized by Ukrainian students and university professors, and for the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO).

In 1923, when the Allied Conference of Ambassadors, charged with redrawing Europe's post-war boundaries, recognized the Polish annexation of Western Ukraine, sixteen-year-old Roman Shukhevych decided to join the Ukrainian Military Organization in order to participate in the revolutionary struggle against Western-sanctioned Polish occupation. Roman had the unusual opportunity of becoming acquainted with the new organization's objectives and strategy from the UVO Supreme Commander, Colonel Evhen Konovalets. Before his permanent departure abroad, Colonel Konovalets occasionally stayed in the house of Roman's grandmother in Lviv.²


Aside from all these activities, Roman still found time to continue his studies on the piano, which he loved to play very much. In his relations with others, Roman was consistently friendly, good-natured, and always maintained a good sense of humor. It was in this way that he won good will and respect. One of the participants of the Zaporizhian Games later recollected:

He would always find a kind word for all of us, boys and girls alike, and he would always say something to keep our spirits high in the competitions. We knew that he was the best among us, the most deserving and most able to lead, and had he given us a command, we would have followed him, even under gunfire. He was a true leader and a genuine commander. When we heard his voice, we all felt as one.³

Roman Shukhevych completed his high school education in June 1925 with excellent grades. He intended to study engineering at the Polytechnical Institute in Lviv, but although he passed the entrance examination with a very high score, he was prevented from studying in Lviv by Polish authorities on political grounds. Under the so-called *numerus clausus*, the Polish government admitted only a small number of Ukrainian students for technical and medical studies at the higher schools of Lviv, and these students had to be free of political suspicion. Usually, the only Ukrainian students admitted were those whose parents had connections among Poles. Therefore, Shukhevych enrolled at the Polytechnical Institute in Danzig, and there he completed his first year of studies. It was only in 1926 that Roman's

father succeeded in obtaining the "patronage" of Professor Anton Lomnitski of the Polytechnical Institute in Lviv,⁴ through whose intercession Roman was admitted to the institute in the summer of 1926 for his second year of study in the department of architectural engineering.

However, due to his intense involvement in the UVO and later in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and his two years of service in the Polish army from 1928-1929, Roman was not able to complete his studies in Lviv until June 1934.



Roman Shukhevych as a young student.

II. AGAINST POLISH OCCUPATION

Baptism By Fire

When Roman Shukhevych was nineteen and in his second year of studies at the Lviv Polytechnical Institute, he underwent a "baptism by fire." As a member of the UVO, he was ordered to plan and execute the assassination of the Polish Superintendent of Schools, Stanislaw Sobinski.

This revolutionary act was intended as a response to the increasingly severe repression of Ukrainian education by the Polish authorities. When Halychyna was transferred to Poland by the Conference of Ambassadors on March 14, 1923, the Polish government agreed to reorganize the former Austrian university in Lviv into a Ukrainian university. Poland violated this agreement, however, and transformed the university into an exclusively Polish institution. In 1925, the Polish police suppressed the Underground Ukrainian University in Lviv.

Stanislaw Sobinski, known for his chauvinistic views, held the special position of Curator of Schools for Halychyna from 1923. Through this office he proceeded to implement a program aimed at Polonizing Ukrainian education. In accordance with this program, Western Ukrainians were to be referred to as "Ruthenians" or "Russians" and Halychyna was to be renamed "Little Poland." The appellations Ukraine and Ukrainian were permitted only in reference to Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainian gymnasia (high schools) were transformed into State gymnasia, and Polish was made the language of instruction, except for classes of Ukrainian. Official stamps and documents were required to be printed with Polish at the top and Ukrainian below. History and geography were to be taught in Polish and using Polish textbooks, which referred to Halychyna as "Eastern Little Poland." Gradually the language of instruction for all other subjects was to become Polish, so that in the end Ukrainian would be taught only as a secondary language course. All Ukrainian students were required to participate in Polish nationalistic

functions, and the Polish national emblem and portraits of President Pilsudski had to be displayed in all classrooms. A similar program for Polonizing elementary schools was also being developed.

The UVO decided to protest these policies of denationalization by carrying out a revolutionary act that would be heard throughout the world. Sobinski was targeted by the UVO for assassination since he had been appointed to oversee the implementation of this program aimed at "the destruction of Rus'." The awesome task of liquidating the Polish Curator of schools was assigned to the young Roman Shukhevych. Bohdan Pidhainyi, also a student, was directed to assist Shukhevych in carrying out the assignment.

Roman carefully laid out the groundwork for this important task. He first investigated the presence of patterns in Sobinski's behavior and daily routine. He determined the precise time and route of Sobinski's daily evening strolls. Roman selected the most appropriate point along the route in which to carry out the assassination and familiarized himself meticulously with the layout of this section of Lviv.

Curator Sobinski met his death at the hands of Ukrainian revolutionaries on the evening of October 19, 1926. The Polish police made sweeping arrests and conducted an exhaustive investigation, but were unable to uncover the identity of the real assassins. The Procurator investigating the case erroneously focused his suspicions on the older veterans of the UVO. Roman Shukhevych was not only young, but also had an excellent alibi. On the evening of the assassination, he had been attending activities at his athletic club with friends. No one noticed his brief disappearance, and all the members of the club testified that Roman had been there the entire evening. Bohdan Pidhainyi, who was studying in Danzig, had come secretly to Lviv and returned to Danzig without being noticed by anybody.

After a one-year investigation, seventeen Ukrainians were arrested and tried, two of whom, Vasyl Atamanchuk and Ivan Verbytskyi, were sentenced to death. The sentence was later commuted to ten years in prison for Atamanchuk and fifteen years for Verbytskyi.

After the sentence was passed, Roman Shukhevych reported to the UVO Command that he intended to surrender voluntarily to the police in order to spare the lives of Atamanchuk and Verbytskyi. But the UVO Command asked Roman's uncle, Dr. Stepan Shukhevych, a prominent lawyer, to first investigate whether the Polish courts would free the two innocent men if the real assassin proved to be someone else. Dr. Stepan Shukhevych learned from his sources in the Polish administration that if the real killer became known, he would be executed, but the sentences of Atamanchuk, Verbytskyi and others would not be revoked or commuted. As a result, the UVO Command forbade Roman Shukhevych to disclose that he was the real assassin.

Service in the Polish Army

In the summer of 1928, Roman Shukhevych was conscripted into the Polish Army. The UVO was not opposed to Ukrainians serving in the Polish Army, viewing this as an opportunity for its members to receive military training, and even encouraged members to voluntarily report to schools for commissioned officers. Accordingly, Roman volunteered for military training and was accepted, having graduated with honors from high school. Shukhevych received training as an artillery officer in the Officers' School in Volodymyr-Volynskyi. Before the final examination, however, Shukhevych was declared politically unreliable and was transferred to Polissia to complete his military service as a regular gunner at one of the Polish military garrisons stationed there.



Roman Shukhevych (left) during his furlough from the Polish Army (approx. 1928).

Roman Shukhevych upgraded his military training later through special officer courses in Danzig, Berlin, and Czecho-Slovakia.

In the Military Leadership of the OUN

Shortly after Shukhevych returned from service in the Polish Army, he was called to serve as an officer in the underground army of the UVO-OUN. In June 1930, he was placed in charge of military affairs in the OUN Regional Executive for Western Ukraine by the Regional Leader of the OUN, Yulijan Holovynskyi, who concomitantly was the Regional Commander of the UVO, having been appointed to the posts by Colonel Evhen Konovalets, the Supreme Leader of the OUN and Supreme Commander of the UVO. As UVO Regional Commander in 1926, Holovynskyi had given Shukhevych the order to assassinate Sobinski, and Holovynskyi was impressed with the manner in which Shukhevych had carried out this assignment.

Shukhevych's deputy was Zenon Kossak, who like Shukhevych was then 23 years old and similarly had been a member of the UVO since high school. Kossak was the previous officer for military affairs in the OUN Regional Executive, but voluntarily stepped down from this position in deference to Shukhevych's military experience and expertise. Their relationship was never that of a superior to a subordinate, however. In fact, Kossak was Shukhevych's closest associate and friend.

Like Holovynskyi, Roman Shukhevych never flaunted his authority; rather, he maintained his rank in the OUN in strict conspiracy from the other members of the OUN, meeting with others to discuss matters relating to the work of his sector only in cases of great urgency. Consequently, most of the leading members had the impression that the officer for military affairs in the Regional Executive was still Zenon Kossak, whom Shukhevych would ordinarily request to continue representing the military sector at meetings of the Regional Executive. Roman Shukhevych adhered very closely to the strict OUN regulations concerning secrecy, particularly to the commandment of the "OUN Decalogue" which stated: "Talk not to everyone whom you have the opportunity to talk with (about the affairs of the OUN), but only with whom you must talk!"

Mass Sabotage

When Capt. Yulijan Holovynskyi took over the combined leadership of the UVO and OUN in Western Ukraine, he decided to launch a campaign of extensive revolutionary operations, a campaign of mass sabotage. This

campaign was to serve as a mass protest of the Ukrainian people against the Polish political and economic oppression of Western Ukraine: the allocation of land in Halychyna to Poles brought in from the heartland of Poland at a time when the native Ukrainian farmers were extremely hard-pressed for land. Furthermore, Polish landlords, who owned most of the land in Halychyna, denied landless Ukrainian peasants employment by bringing in Polish workers from western Poland for seasonal labor, thus depriving Ukrainian peasants of the opportunity to supplement their meager incomes from tiny farm plots. By strengthening the economic position of Polish landlords, the Polish government hoped to restore the old feudal relationship between Ukrainian peasants and Polish landlords, while the immigration of Polish colonists was aimed at boosting the Polish proportion of the population of Halychyna, transforming this region, which at the time had an overwhelming Ukrainian population, into one with a mixed ethnic composition. Finally, it was hoped that Ukrainian farmers, displaced and impoverished through these measures, would massively emigrate to the United States and Canada, abandoning Western Ukraine to the Poles.

The mass sabotage campaign, which consisted of burning down the holdings of Polish landlords and houses of immigrant Polish colonizers, had as its objective the mobilization of the Ukrainian population for active resistance to Polish colonialist policies and the mobilization of world public opinion on behalf of the oppressed Ukrainian population of Polish-occupied Western Ukraine. At the same time it was aimed at discouraging Polish colonists from settling on Ukrainian lands.

The organization and execution of this campaign was entrusted by Captain Holovynskyi to Roman Shukhevych. Shukhevych, however, had to rely entirely on the young activists of the OUN because the older members of the UVO opposed the integration of the UVO into the new united nationalist structure and disapproved of Holovynskyi's campaign of sabotage. The OUN had been formed in 1929 to unite the Ukrainian nationalist movement. It was then decided that the UVO should merge into the OUN by becoming its military wing. The name UVO was to be preserved only for external propagandistic purposes as the executor of OUN's military operations. But most of the older veterans of the UVO were reluctant to integrate into the OUN, whose ranks were primarily filled by young university and high school students. For the first year and a half after the founding of the OUN, the Regional Command of the UVO stubbornly continued to resist UVO's dissolution. When Captain Holovynskyi assumed the post of UVO Regional Commander, one of his first tasks was to complete the merger of the UVO with the OUN. However, his efforts and plans were often openly challenged by the officer for military affairs within the UVO Regional Command, Zynovii Knysh, who also opposed Holovynskyi's plan for a mass sabotage campaign.

Thus, although the campaign was to be credited to the UVO, which was better equipped to conduct a campaign of mass sabotage, Shukhevych was forced to forgo involving the military sector of the UVO in this operation and rely on the young members of the OUN to carry it out.

After careful planning by Shukhevych, the campaign began almost simultaneously throughout Halychyna in the summer of 1930, with the farms of Polish landlords and colonists being set ablaze. Polish police stations and telephone/telegraph lines were destroyed. Retaliatory actions against members of Polish paramilitary groups and chauvinist youth organizations were also carried out, and punishment was meted out to Ukrainians who collaborated with the Polish police. The police proved impotent in the face of this campaign of mass sabotage, which continued to spread and increase in intensity.

The campaign was given considerable coverage by the foreign press. The November 5, 1930 issue of the American magazine *The Nation*, informing its readers about the wave of sabotage in Western Ukraine, explained the motives for the campaign thus:

The long simmering hostility of the Ukrainians over being cheated of their independence is now erupting in the form of open rebellion against Polish rule... The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia have no one who would intercede on their behalf in the League of Nations. American press correspondents report that Ukrainian petitions of grievance are simply always thrown away into waste disposals, because there is nobody in the Secretariat of the League of Nations interested in the tragic situation of these people. Thus, one can hardly wonder why Ukrainians in Galicia have chosen other, more direct methods to speak out about their suffering.

The New York *Herald Tribune* in its edition from October 16, 1930, also made an attempt to throw some light on this campaign:

The campaign is directed by a terroristic military organization which aspires to liberate Eastern Galicia from Polish occupation and to establish an independent Ukrainian state. These acts of arson are very reminiscent of the activities of Irish terrorists in the eighties of the last century.

In his article, which appeared November 5, 1930, in the Czech newspaper *Przhitomnost*, Dr. Frank called attention to the economic-political reasons for the campaign:

The agrarian reform, which is being carried out exclusively in the Ukrainian and Lithuanian territories occupied by Poland, has transferred 90% of the confiscated land to Polish colonists and legionnaires, regardless of the fact that 27% of the local peasant population is landless, 70% with very little land, and only 3% with enough land to be self-sufficient. Between the Polish colonists and the Ukrainian population there exists a state of war. On one side there are the armed Polish colonists with large estates, and on the other rebellious Ukrainian farmers. As a consequence of this clash, we have the burning of Polish landholdings and the liquidation of Polish colonists.

The campaign of mass sabotage thus brought the Ukrainian question to the attention of the entire world and placed it in its proper context. Gradually world opinion was beginning to understand that the waves of sabotage in Western Ukraine were the revolutionary expression of Ukrainian opposition to their Polish oppressors, and that the overall objective of the Ukrainians was the restoration of their country's independence. Yet, even though the situation in Western Ukraine became the focus of world attention, the Poles continued to act with disregard to world opinion. When it became apparent that the police could no longer handle the situation, units of the Polish army were also deployed against the Ukrainian population in brutal operations named the "pacification", which lasted from the fall of 1930 until the spring of 1931. But the methods of pacification, which included the torture of Ukrainian men, women, and children, and the destruction of Ukrainian libraries and the property of Ukrainian cooperatives and other organizations, only resulted in a condemnation of Polish behavior by the League of Nations as unbecoming of a civilized nation.

A particularly hard blow for the OUN during this period of Polish reaction was the murder of Captain Yulian Holovinskyi. Unable to assemble enough evidence proving the complicity of Holovinskyi in the sabotage campaign to bring him to trial, the police drove him out to a forest near Bibrka, where they murdered him on October 30, 1930. The OUN placed responsibility for this barbaric act on Bronislaw Pieracki, the deputy Minister of the Interior, who came to Lviv to direct the pacification campaign.

At the end of October 1930, the OUN and the UVO *Provid* (Supreme Command) ordered the mass sabotage to be stopped. A special

declaration of the UVO Supreme Command was subsequently issued in connection with this directive and published by Ukrainian newspapers in Halychyna and the United States. The declaration stated:

For the last several months a state of unrest has existed on the territories of Ukraine. In Eastern Ukraine, the Bolshevik occupation has been resisted by revolutionary activities against agents of Bolshevik rule, while in Western Ukraine, a mass sabotage campaign has spread against Polish landlords and colonialists.

The first mass action of the UVO in Western Ukraine took place in 1922, when the estates of large Polish landlords were burned, Polish colonial administrators were assassinated, collaborators and traitors were liquidated, and Polish government property was destroyed. The Ukrainian people were revolutionized and united into one front, refusing to vote in elections to the Polish *Sejm* (Parliament). Although this resulted in harsh persecutions, and many UVO activists fell in battle, this campaign remained in the memory of the Ukrainian people as a demonstration of its power. The campaign was also remembered by the Poles as a warning to them for the future.

And now the UVO has demonstrated its power for a second time. Our objective has been to create a state of unrest in Western Ukraine and a sense of insecurity among the Polish colonialists, to break the aggressive spirit of these elements, to alienate the Polish people from their chauvinistic government, and to impress the world with the tenacity of Ukrainian resistance to Polish rule.

The campaign began with individual acts of sabotage against the holdings of well-known Polish chauvinists: generals, former provincial officials, former ministers, etc. Soon the campaign was extended against all Polish landlords, including the immigrant colonists, as well as against government properties. Why did the campaign take the course of destroying the property of Polish landlords and colonists? Firstly, because the colonization of Western Ukraine by Polish immigrants, supported by the Polish government, and the resulting confiscation of Ukrainian farmland threatens the very livelihood of the Ukrainian people, and thus it has become necessary to frighten Poles from settling in Ukraine. Secondly, because such a mass

campaign has a particularly strong psychological impact on the peasant population. The burning of the huge estates of those who have taken land away from them is closer to the interests of the Ukrainian farmers than the distant assassination of some unknown official of the Polish government.

The desired objective of the sabotage campaign had been entirely achieved. True, the Polish government responded with massive arrests, but this not only did not halt the campaign but rather intensified it even further. Every day brought reports of new acts of sabotage. Polish authorities became increasingly anxious about the situation, especially because it had come to the attention of the outside world. The uneasiness of the Poles increased with every day, eventually turning into extreme hatred toward Ukrainians and frustration over the inability of the Polish government to suppress the campaign. Finally, calls went out for a concerted Polish retaliatory campaign against Ukrainians. But this only interfered with the state program of pacification, because such calls created confusion and each act of revenge served to further discredit the Polish state abroad. Desperate about this turn of events, Pilsudski sent Interior Minister Pieracki to Lviv to personally direct the program of pacification, with special attention to liquidating the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO).

But the subsequent wave of mass arrests did not give the results that were hoped for; instead, it only contributed to the further spread of the sabotage campaign. Chaos now came to reign as the Polish government lost control even of their own people. Civilian Poles now began resorting to individual acts of revenge, which inflamed the passions of both sides still further. All this was happening against a background of a tense internal political situation that was created by Pilsudski's power struggle with the *Sejm* and the pre-election campaign. The government became totally helpless. Its entire apparatus was tied up with mass house searches, arrests, investigations, and trials. The prisons were filled beyond capacity, but the sabotage campaign still continued. Not even punitive police and military expeditions, dispatched to Ukrainian villages, had an impact. And now, at a time of general peace, the Polish government is considering declaring martial law in the occupied Ukrainian lands.

Our campaign has thus reached its culmination. Our goal has been achieved. We have succeeded in making the necessary moral impact on the Ukrainian people, as well as on Poles and citizens of other countries. We have delivered a severe moral and material blow to our enemies. Lastly, our fighters have demonstrated their technical skills, which is best evidenced by the fact that not one of them was caught by the police in the act of sabotage.

Therefore, we are herewith terminating the campaign of mass sabotage.⁵

Roman Shukhevych came through brilliantly with his task of preparing and directing the campaign of mass sabotage. The OUN structure proved to be resilient beyond all expectations, and each act was prepared and executed masterfully. Despite the brutal methods of interrogation applied by the police, the Polish authorities were unable to penetrate the OUN cells and failed to identify the main organizer, Roman Shukhevych. In fact, Shukhevych-Dzvin concealed his role in the campaign so well that even the UVO officer in charge of military affairs, Zynovii Knysh, did not know the identity of the mysterious Dzvin, who had organized and directed the campaign of mass sabotage.

Internal Organizational Problems

The extensive activity of the OUN regional military sector for Western Ukraine was temporarily suspended in the fall of 1930. This suspension occurred not because of the order to halt the sabotage campaign, and not because of the death of Captain Holovynskyi, who had been simultaneously the OUN Regional Leader and UVO Regional Commander, but rather as a result of an internal conflict within the nationalist underground, which intensified after the death of Captain Holovynskyi.

After Holovynskyi's death, the OUN *Provid* named Stepan Okhrymovych, who until then had been the organizational officer of the OUN Regional Executive, to the posts of OUN Regional Leader and UVO Regional Commander. Okhrymovych was a spokesman of the "younger generation" of Ukrainian nationalists, who had organized themselves before the founding of the OUN into various ideological-political student organizations, such as the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth and the Ukrainian Statehood Youth Group. Okhrymovych had been a member of the UVO and of the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth since high school. But the "older members" of the UVO regarded Stepan Okhrymovych as too young to be the UVO Re-

gional Commander who would effect the UVO's integration into the OUN, and therefore resisted the dissolution of the UVO, favoring its continued existence as a separate organization with only an ideological affinity with the OUN.

A specially convened First Regional OUN Conference was held in Lviv in January 1931 to deal with the problems hindering the OUN-UVO merger. It was attended by members of the OUN Regional Executive and representatives of the UVO. The conference confirmed once again the urgency of integrating the UVO into the OUN and extended support to Stepan Okhrymowych in his post as OUN Regional Leader. Colonel Konovalets endorsed this decision, but its realization was temporarily postponed by the sudden arrest and death of Stepan Okhrymowych and then the illness and death of his successor, Dr. Stepan Nyzhankivskyi.

These developments halted the work of the military sector of the OUN Regional Executive because military operations had until then been the exclusive domain of the UVO. Only in July 1931, when Ivan Gabrushevych became OUN Regional Leader, completing the process of merging the UVO into the OUN, was Roman Shukhevych able once again to reactivate the military sector with its former intensity.

Military Expropriations

Military operations of the OUN Regional Executive resumed under the direction of Roman Shukhevych in July 1931 with a return to the "ex-es" or expropriation assaults on Polish post offices. The UVO had specialized in such raids in the past. They served several purposes: to terrorize the Polish colonial administration, to generate an atmosphere of insecurity among Poles, to be sharp reminders that the struggle of the Ukrainian people had not ceased on Polish-occupied Ukrainian lands, to rouse world opinion in support of the Ukrainian cause, to raise the morale of the Ukrainian people, and to hurt the Polish government financially through the seizure of government funds. Through the "ex-es", money that was to be used to finance the Polish occupation of Ukraine was instead used for the financing of the revolutionary struggle.

Three such expropriation operations, organized by Roman Shukhevych in close collaboration with Zenon Kossak, were successfully staged in July 1931.

In one of these operations a group of five OUN members stopped a postal truck loaded with money as it was passing through a forest from Pere-myshl (Przemysl) to Bircha. While the money was being confiscated from the truck, the police guard, Gibinski, reached for his gun, but was shot and

killed by the assailants, who also wounded the driver, a Pole. The police of Peremyshl and Dobromyl counties were alerted, but succeeded in capturing only one assailant, Vasyl Tsebyniak, who was subsequently sentenced to 18 years in prison. The other four assailants were neither captured nor identified. However, it was common knowledge that this had been a revolutionary operation of the OUN underground.

That same day, a second successful expropriational operation was carried out at the other end of Halychyna, in Pechenizhyn near Kolomyia. In this assault, an attack on a postal truck was also carried out, and similarly the police guard was killed and the driver injured. But none of the assailants in this raid were apprehended. The investigation only proved that the OUN was responsible and that the raiders traversed 110 km. in 40 hours to cross the border into Czecho-Slovakia.

The third operation was launched that same day in Boryslav (about halfway between the other two sites) on a branch of the Polish People's Bank. At 2:00 P.M., two OUN fighters, armed with guns, took positions at the entrance to the bank, while three others entered the building, terrorized the clerks, and took over 20,000 zlotys. The raiders disappeared before the police could arrive. A special police agent, Buksa, was given the task of investigating the OUN in the Drohobych area to discover the identity of the assailants, but he was shot on August 24, before he could do any damage to the OUN. The Polish police was thus never able to determine the identity of the assailants.

A week after the attacks near Bircha, Pechenizhyn and in Boryslav, another raid was carried out on the post office in Truskavets. Just as in the raid on Boryslav, two armed members posted themselves at the entrance, while three others made their way into the building. In addition to the staff, several Polish officers, who were there by chance, were also subjected to verbal harangues concerning Polish occupational policies towards Ukrainians. The assailants escaped with all the cash, never to be exposed.

The success of these revolutionary acts, and the inability of the police to find the organizers and activists involved, increased the prestige of the OUN and demonstrated that it could operate with impunity throughout the entire occupied territory of Western Ukraine.

The Assassination of Tadeusz Holówko

The military operation that created the most resonance was the assassination of the Polish parliamentarian Tadeusz Holówko (pronounced Holufka), which occurred on August 29, 1931, in the town of Truskavets near Drohobych. Because the police were unable to determine the identity of the

organizers and perpetrators of this assassination, the deed has been shrouded in mystery. Even years after the collapse of the Polish state in 1939, some Ukrainian writers maintained that the OUN-UVO had no connection with the assassination since Holówko was a "friend of the Ukrainians".

In reality, the assassination of Holówko was a military action of the OUN, executed under the guidance of Roman Shukhevych, who was the officer for military affairs in the current OUN Regional Executive. It was meant to be a revolutionary action directed against a very dangerous advocate for the destruction of the Ukrainian independence movement on Polish-occupied Ukrainians lands. Holówko's intentions were the same as that of Vice-Minister Pieracki, only his methods were different and more subtle. Whereas Pieracki advocated not only the liquidation of the OUN-UVO and the independence movement in general but also the eradication of the Ukrainian character of Polish-occupied Halychyna through the employment of full-scale brutal police terror, Holówko, in his plan "for the destruction of Rus'," favored the path of cleverly transforming Ukrainians into loyal citizens of Poland according to the slogan *gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus* (Ruthenian/Ukrainian in origin, belonging to the Polish nation). That such was his plan was confirmed by the Polish newspaper *Slowo Polske* from August 5, 1931:

Holówko was absolutely opposed to all plans for Ukrainian autonomy, regardless of who proposed them. Moreover, he opposed the establishment of a Ukrainian university anywhere in Poland. He correctly believed that in the current state of affairs, the granting of autonomy to the Ukrainians or even permitting the establishment of a university would only serve to perpetuate and further strengthen Ukrainian separatism, thus seriously hurting the success of his educational program... On the road to achieving his program of educating a new type of citizen, he proposed and proceeded to implement with marked consistency the following clear and necessary steps: the existence of one Polish-Ukrainian school system (throughout Halychyna), the equalization of Poles and Ukrainians in rights and responsibilities, the creation of one Polish-Ukrainian cooperative movement under strict state control, aimed at augmenting the wealth of all citizens, the exclusive existence of one organization for physical education, and finally the introduction into Eastern Galicia of the same administrative system that exists in the rest of Poland.

Thus, the policy which the slain Polish curator of schools Sobinski had initiated in the area of education was to have been implemented in all areas of life by Holówko. His was a program calling for the "peaceful" liquidation of all forms of Ukrainian education, of all Ukrainian cultural and economic institutions and organizations, including the popular educational societies *Prosvita* and *Ridna Shkola*, the agricultural society *Silskyi Hospodar*, the youth organizations *Sokil* and *Sich*, etc. Holówko became especially active during the period of pacification, making efforts to convince Ukrainian politicians inclined toward conciliation with the Polish state to halt their anti-Polish activities at international forums, withdraw their petitions and memoranda to the League of Nations concerning Ukrainian grievances, and instead make a public declaration of loyalty to the Polish state.

Such a subversive plan was all the more dangerous because "realpolitic politicians" already had begun to appear among Ukrainians welcoming Holówko's overture toward Ukrainians and willing to lend support to his policy of delusive conciliation between Poles and Ukrainians. The OUN, therefore, decided that Holówko had to be eliminated. The opportunity to implement this decision came surprisingly soon. In August 1931, Holówko was vacationing at Truskavets, the popular Western Ukrainian health spa. While staying at the pension of the Basilian nuns, he was noticed by the porter of the villa, Oleksa Bunii, a member of the OUN. Through underground channels, Bunii passed this information to Zenon Kossak in Drohobych, who was at the time the organizational officer of the OUN Regional Executive. Kossak in turn notified Roman Shukhevych and Ivan Gabrusevych, the current head of the OUN Regional Executive, and together the three of them made the decision to assassinate Holówko at the villa. Shukhevych began preparations at once with the assistance of Kossak and a group of OUN members from Drohobych and Truskavets.

The September 1, 1931 issue of the Ukrainian Lviv daily *Dilo* described what followed:

On August 29, at 7:30 P.M., Tadeusz Holówko, deputy head of the BB club within the Parliament, was assassinated. Holówko had been vacationing in Truskavets for two weeks at the villa of the Sisters of St. Basil. During this vacation he conferred with people involved in diplomatic and government work, and also, according to Polish sources, with Ukrainian politicians. On Saturday, sometime after 7:00 P.M., Holówko retired to his room. Outside there was a heavy downpour of rain. Holówko undressed and lay down in his bed to read a book. Five minutes later the door burst open and two young men entered the room.

They leaped toward him. One of them fired three shots at him with a revolver and the other stabbed Holówko with a dagger into his left chest. The men disappeared with the revolver, leaving the dagger planted in the body. Holówko died immediately. One bullet was launched into Holówko's head, and the other two into his back, which appears to suggest that Holówko started to rise up in the first seconds of the assault. The assassins escaped by the same route they had used to come in. The sound of the shots brought the servants and guests in neighboring rooms out into the hall. The assassins escaped virtually within their view, disappearing into the dark. The search was complicated by the rain, which washed away traces of the assassins. Witnesses have provided a description of the assassins, and the police of Truskavets, Drohobych and Boryslav are now searching for them.

The Polish police, as usual, conducted a very thorough investigation, but were unable to identify the persons responsible for the assassination. Of the many persons arrested on suspicion, only Oleksa Bunii, the porter at the villa where Holówko had been staying, was brought to trial. Bunii admitted that he belonged to the OUN and that he had informed the Organization of Holówko's stay at the villa, but he denied knowledge of the details of the assassination or the identity of the assassins. When a year and a half later two fighters of the OUN from Truskavets, Bilas and Danylyshyn, were apprehended and brought to trial for the raid on the Horodok post office, there was a general conviction among the police that these two OUN fighters were the two assassins of Holówko. But the police were never able to confirm this, since Bilas and Danylyshyn refused to answer any questions of the police interrogators and prosecutors, and even went to their execution without revealing whether or not they were the perpetrators of Holówko's assassination.

In OUN circles, it is generally accepted that Bilas and Danylyshyn carried out the assassination under the leadership of officer Roman Shukhevych-Dzvin. Nevertheless, it is very possible that only one of these individuals participated in carrying out the assassination, and that the other assassin was Roman Shukhevych himself.

The Assassination of Commissioner Emilian Czechowski

Another revolutionary act, carried out with exemplary precision under the leadership of Roman Shukhevych, was the assassination of the Polish police commissioner for Halychyna, Emilian Czechowski.

Commissioner Czechowski headed the "Ukrainian section" in the police administration as well as all major investigations of OUN activities. During these investigations, he personally participated in the torture of Ukrainian prisoners, and soon became notorious as a brutal sadist who derived pleasure from tormenting his victims. Thus, when Captain Holovynskyi became Regional Leader of the OUN/UVO in 1930, he issued an order for the assassination of Czechowski.

At that time, there still existed a sector for military affairs within the UVO Regional Command, headed by Zynovii Knysh. Consequently, Holovynskyi entrusted the assassination of Czechowski to Knysh, since all combat operations were still handled at that time by the UVO. The assassination preparations, however, were botched due to the incompetence on the part of Knysh and those assigned to carry out the assassination. The death of Captain Holovynskyi postponed further planning for a while. Had he continued to live, it is very probable that Holovynskyi would have reconsidered his decision to have the military sector of the UVO plan and carry out the assassination and would have reassigned this task to Roman Shukhevych, who was the officer in charge of military affairs in the OUN Regional Executive.

Eventually Roman Shukhevych was given the assignment. Two years later, at the end of 1931, the new head of the OUN Regional Executive, Ivan Gabrushevych, ordered Shukhevych to begin planning the assassination. Shukhevych set to this task with his characteristic seriousness and cautiousness, and it was not long thereafter that newspapers carried the sensational news that on the morning of March 22, 1932, police commissioner Czechowski had been shot with a revolver on the streets of Lviv. The assassin escaped before the eyes of several frightened witnesses, and all efforts by the police to track him down ended in failure. Only in 1940, after the fall of the interwar Polish state, did Roman Shukhevych himself, in a special article on the assassination published in the Ukrainian newspaper *Krakivski Visti*,⁶ reveal that the assassin was Yurko Berezhynskyi, who died later in the attack on the Horodok post office. But even then Shukhevych did not disclose that he was the mysterious officer Dzvin who had organized the operation.

Similarly to the manner in which he prepared the assassination of Sobinski in 1926, Shukhevych laid the groundwork for Czechowski's assassination by conducting a detailed analysis of Czechowski's habits, daily strolls, and the terrain where the killing was to take place. Yurko Berezhynskyi, a young student, fiercely loyal to the Organization and the brother of



(From left) Roman Shukhevych, his wife's brother Myroslav Yurko Berezynskyi and a friend of the Berezynskyi family who died from tuberculosis as a young man, 1932.

Shukhevych's fiancée, was selected by Shukhevych to carry out the assassination. The plan was sketched out to the minutest detail and so well-timed that Berezynskyi was able to carry out his assignment without even his absence being detected at home. Leaving his family with the impression that on the morning of March 22, 1932, he was sleeping longer after a lengthy choir rehearsal the preceding evening, Yurko slipped out of the house and took the train to Lviv, arriving at 6:45 A.M. He was met at the station by an OUN female courier who supplied him with two revolvers. Yurko then went by tram to Sapihy Street and by foot from there to Stryiskyi Street which ran along Stryiskyi Park, where Commissioner Czechowski was just approaching the corner, appearing at precisely the time that had been determined from earlier observations of his daily routines. At that moment shots were fired, and Czechowski fell dead on the sidewalk. Two witnesses, both of whom were railroad workers, failed to react in their state of confusion, while the assassin climbed onto the escarpment on the edge of the Stryiskyi cemetery where he vanished from view. On Pelchynski Street, Yurko met up again with the courier to whom he returned the two revolvers, and then proceeded to the train station to catch the 8:00 A.M. train back to his home village of Ohliadiiv, near Radekhiv. His absence, as well as his eleven kilometer hike

from home to the railroad depot in Radekhiv and back, went unnoticed. Only Yurko's sister knew because she was asked to awaken him on the day Czechowski was shot.

The Polish police commissioner was not able to defend himself although he always carried two revolvers at his side (in fact, he fell to the ground with one of his hands still clutching a revolver) and had a group of disguised police agents constantly around him for protection. Not even the planting of an agent-provocateur within the OUN, on whom Czechowski depended for information concerning OUN plans, proved to be of any use for Czechowski in the long run.

The Raid on the Horodok-Yahailonskyi Post Office

When Ivan Gabrusevych, OUN Regional Leader of Western Ukraine, was released from prison and went abroad, he was replaced by Bohdan Kordiuk-Dik. Shukhevych remained at his position in the Regional Executive as director of military affairs, and was ordered that autumn to prepare another expropriation operation. Kordiuk reserved the choice of the targeted post office to himself and designated Mykola Lebed-Marko, who until then had been the auxiliary officer for youth affairs and was now transferred to the military sector, as coordinator of the operation. Shukhevych was entrusted with working out the details of the plan and selecting the fighters to carry it out.

Eleven participants were selected by Shukhevych from among OUN volunteers from various parts of Halychyna. Kordiuk chose the post office in Horodok-Yahailonskyi (30 km. west of Lviv) as the most suitable target, and set November 29, 1932 as the date of the assault. The assailants were met by Lebed at a prearranged point in Lviv and then proceeded separately to Horodok where command of the raid was transferred over to Yurko Berezhynskyi. In Horodok the raid had to be postponed a day since not all of the ammunition had been delivered to Horodok on time.

The following day, Wednesday, November 30, 1932, the assailants arrived at the post office in two separate groups. Upon entering the building, they were greeted with a terrible surprise. According to the information that had previously been given them, the post office was not supposed to have had any armed guard nor were any police supposed to have been stationed in proximity of the post office. However, as soon as the assailants commanded the cashiers to produce the money, they were peppered with gunfire, and the doors to the safe were closed. The attackers succeeded in seizing some cash and then started to flee. Coming out onto the street they were sprayed with a fusillade of gunshots from an adjacent building. Yurko Berezhynskyi was

mortally wounded, as was Volodymyr Staryk. Vasyl Bilas and Dmytro Danylyshyn were captured after an intensive chase, and Marian Zhurakivskyi was later tracked down by the police. Bilas and Danylyshyn were sentenced to death and hanged at 6:39 A.M. on December 23, 1932. Zhurakivskyi was also sentenced to death, but the President of Poland commuted his sentence to life imprisonment.

The heroic behavior of Bilas and Danylyshyn at their trial and execution shook the entire Ukrainian community and increased the sympathy of all Ukrainians for the OUN. But the technical failures in the preparation of the raid made an OUN investigation necessary. In accordance with the trial verdict, Kordiuk was removed from his post as Regional Leader and Lebed was given another revolutionary operation to carry out so as to redeem himself before the OUN membership. Shukhevych was completely exonerated and his plan and selection of the operation's participants were judged to have been entirely appropriate.

Assassination in the Soviet Consulate

In the summer of 1933, the OUN *Provid* formally designated Stepan Bandera as the new OUN Regional Leader for Western Ukraine. Roman Shukhevych remained as director of military affairs and received an order to prepare an assassination of an official of the Soviet Consulate in Lviv.

Such an act was important as a demonstration of solidarity of Western Ukrainians with their Eastern Ukrainian brethren who at this time were suffering fierce persecution under Soviet Russian rule. The OUN felt that such an act was long overdue. News arriving from Soviet-occupied Ukraine during 1932-1933 told of a widespread famine, artificially induced by the Bolshevik state machine, with millions of victims.

An earlier attempt at the assassination of a Soviet official had ended in failure. It had been planned in retaliation for the Soviet purge of members of the underground Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) and of the Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM). The UVO Command had placed Zynovii Knysh, the officer for military affairs in the UVO Regional Command, in charge of such an operation. Knysh prepared a very elaborate operation, which he set for April 22, 1930; however, his efforts came to naught. As he states in his memoirs, he planned for a very ambitious attack:

The plan was for the consulate to be blasted with hand grenades from the side of a blind alley. All the offices were to be thoroughly demolished. The top part of the building was to be left alone because in the evening there

were always people there. Two fighters were selected to carry out the operation.⁷

But the men who were carrying a smoke bomb to be used in creating the diversion necessary for the operation to proceed were detained on the street by the police and taken into custody. This made the rest of the operation unworkable. "The operation was scrapped," Knysh wrote later, "and several weeks of preparation and effort went to naught." Why a second attack was not launched is left unexplained in Knysh's memoirs. The idea for such an operation was not revived until the summer of 1932, and then it was assigned to Roman Shukhevych-Dzvin. By organizing an assassination, the OUN hoped to awaken world attention to the artificial famine that was ravaging Soviet-occupied Ukraine.

Shukhevych supervised the preparatory intelligence work in his usual meticulous manner. With the help of a young female member of the OUN and a painter named Roman Senkiv, he prepared a floorplan of the consulate. A 19-year-old student, Mykola Lemyk, was selected for the assignment from a group of volunteers.

On October 22, 1933, Lemyk, using a forged document identifying him as Dubenko, entered the Soviet Consulate on Nabeliak Street, claiming that he wished to emigrate to the Ukrainian SSR. When requested by the Soviet diplomat who met with him to produce the letters from his family in Soviet Ukraine to which Lemyk had referred, Lemyk took out a gun and aimed it at the petrified diplomat. Lemyk proclaimed that he had come to avenge the extermination of Ukrainians under Soviet occupation and then killed the diplomat with one shot.

Lemyk thought that he had assassinated the Soviet consul stationed in Lviv. It turned out, however, that he had eliminated no ordinary diplomat, but rather a very important Soviet official, namely Alexei Mailov, whom Stalin had appointed to review the intelligence work of Soviet diplomatic missions throughout the world. Having carried out the assassination, Lemyk voluntarily surrendered to the Polish police so as to use his subsequent trial as a forum for the political motivations underlying the assassination. In the resulting interrogation and trial, Lemyk revealed that he had been commissioned to carry out the assassination by a leading member of the OUN, Xavier Brudas, who also furnished Lemyk with the necessary weapon and instructions. But who Xavier Brudas was, he did not know.

A Generous Reward for Secrecy

One of Shukhevych's most valuable qualities was his penchant for maintaining strict conspiratorial discipline and secrecy in all activities connected with his work in the underground. It was to this quality that Shukhevych attributed much of his military success. But no one in the OUN, not even Shukhevych himself, realized the far-reaching value of such secrecy and the rewards it would bring. One such reward was the exposure and destruction, ironically by the Poles themselves, of the most dangerous Polish provocateur in the OUN, Roman Baranovskyi.

Roman Baranovskyi, whose mother was Polish and father a Ukrainian priest, had joined the UVO in 1924 together with his younger brother, Yaroslav. Both brothers were sentenced to two and a half years in prison for their role in the attack on a postal truck near Kalush on May 30, 1926. After their release in 1928, Roman Baranovskyi-Rybak became the officer for military affairs in the UVO Regional Command, headed at the time by Col. Roman Sushko-Sych.

Suspicion arose, however, over Roman Baranovskyi's loyalty, and when Sushko was replaced in the spring of 1929 by Omelian Senyk-Hryb, Baranovskyi was also soon replaced by Zynovii Knysh-Rens. An explanation for this decision was provided by the UVO Supreme Command in the November-December 1933 issue of the nationalist organ *Vidrodzhennia Natsiiv* (Rebirth of the Nation):

By a decision of the UVO Regional Command made in June 1929, Roman Baranovskyi was expelled from the UVO because he had lost those moral qualities which are required of UVO members. In October 1929, further suspicion arose that Roman Baranovskyi had contacts with the Polish police. The case was reviewed, but there was insufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of an order calling for the highest penalty for such behavior.

In taking over the post of UVO's military officer, Knysh was fully aware of the reasons for Baranovskyi's dismissal and the fact that suspicions about Baranovskyi continued to linger. But Knysh did not disassociate himself from Baranovskyi; rather, as he admits in his memoirs, he met with him frequently. Their conversations often touched upon sensitive matters concerning the UVO and its personnel.

In fact, from June 1929 on, Roman Baranovskyi was a paid agent of the Polish police. Baranovskyi himself admitted to this at a court trial in October 1933, revealing that his task was to penetrate both the UVO and the

OUN, find out everything he could about the plans and activities of these underground organizations, and then report his findings back to the Polish police unit under Commissioner Czechowski. This helped explain why almost every operation organized by Knysh ended in failure, being paralyzed by the previously informed Polish police.

Baranovskyi was, however, less successful in penetrating the OUN. As a communiqué from the OUN *Provid* noted, he never even belonged to the OUN; nevertheless, in order to increase his salary from the Polish police, Baranovskyi bragged to Czechowski that he was not only a member of the OUN, but sat on its Regional Executive as well.

Roman Shukhevych was in the Polish army at the time when Roman Baranovskyi was the officer for military affairs in the UVO Regional Command. Thus, never having met Shukhevych personally, Baranovskyi did not suspect Shukhevych's involvement in the UVO. Shukhevych distrusted Baranovskyi and kept his appointment as officer for military affairs in the OUN Regional Executive secret not only from Baranovskyi, but also from Knysh, with whom Shukhevych should have been in close contact in light of Captain Holovinskyi's UVO-OUN merger plan which called for the temporary formation of a combat unit within the OUN structure headed by Knysh. In his memoirs Knysh admits to his ignorance of Shukhevych's real position in the OUN:

My conversations with Roman Shukhevych led to nothing. A year younger than I, a good fighter, and part of the underground's younger generation, becoming active in the UVO a short time before Holovinskyi's arrest in 1926, Roman Shukhevych disappeared from Lviv.⁸ I subsequently found out that he was somewhere in the district of Radekhiv, and later encountered him in Lviv, where he came to visit his parents who lived on Cadet Hill. There I had a long conversation with him. Although not categorically rejecting work in the military sector, he postponed making a decision about whether to join (the sector) until August because, he said, he still had to be away from Lviv for half a year. It is interesting that he was fairly critical of the OUN. He was not a member of the student nationalist group in Lviv, and he soon left the city. I heard nothing further about him until 1934, when he was arrested in connection with the murder of Pieracki in Warsaw.⁹

Due to Shukhevych's conspiratorial habits, Knysh got the impression that Shukhevych was not inclined to return to active work in the UVO

and had reservations about the OUN. These were probably the impressions that were transmitted by Knysh about Shukhevych to Baranovskyi, and as a result Shukhevych escaped Baranovskyi's attention. Zenon Kossak was less fortunate, however, and was unable to maintain his cover. Knysh continues:

The easiest matter was with Zenon Kossak. He was also one year younger than I, a student of law in Lviv, of gentle mien, a good-looking blond, but of very firm character, and one of the few to survive police torture without breaking. A seasoned leader, he was very good at supervising the OUN in the whole Boryslav-Drohobych basin, where he was a virtual god for the local boys who in succeeding years proved to be some of the best fighters in the OUN. It was from this area that Bilas and Danylyshyn came. Kossak agreed to join the military sector of the UVO; there was a great interest in him by the OUN and particularly Stepan Okhrymovych, who asked me several times not to take Kossak away from the OUN. The matter resolved itself when Kossak just simply disappeared one day, sitting out a month and a half in some village close to Drohobych, and returning shortly before the spring conference of the OUN.

Knysh saw Kossak at this conference, and concluded that Kossak was now a leading member of the OUN. Baranovskyi got the same impression and probably this was the reason that he was arrested several times in these years by the Polish police.

Shukhevych's escape from Baranovskyi's attention not only protected Shukhevych from imprisonment, but frustrated police efforts to uncover the leading organizer of the expropriational attacks on Bircha, Pechenizhyn, Truskavets and Boryslav. This eventually proved fatal to Baranovskyi, especially after the assassinations of Holówko and Czechowski.

As a way of tracking down the participants of UVO's operations, Baranovskyi obtained a special revolver from the police with marked bullets. Baranovskyi "lent" this revolver to a UVO member from Drohobych, Lev Krysko. A police investigation later confirmed that this was the revolver that was used in assassinating Holówko. Baranovskyi tried to win points with the police by convincing them this should serve as proof that Krysko was one of Holówko's assassins. However, Krysko had been arrested a week or two before the assassination along with Kossak, who was detained by the police in response to Baranovskyi's warning that Kossak's visit to Lviv should be construed as an indication that the OUN was probably preparing a major op-

eration. Since both men were in prison when the assassination took place, Baranovskyi's investigative work proved worthless. Baranovskyi's inability to furnish any further information concerning the organizers and perpetrators of the assassination led the police to suspect that Baranovskyi was in reality a double agent.

Baranovskyi's fate was finally sealed by the murder of his superior, Commissioner Czechowski. It was proved that Czechowski was killed by the same revolver that was used against Holówko.¹⁰ How could Baranovskyi, who claimed to be the director for military affairs in the UVO and the OUN, not have been privy to the organization of these assassinations?

Baranovskyi vouched to the police that he knew nothing about the plan to assassinate Czechowski and was not able to learn anything about who carried them out afterwards. He swore that he had served the police faithfully, as was demonstrated by his betrayal of Captain Holovinskyi in 1930 and by his exposure, for 1,500 zlotys, of Zenon Kossak after the raid on the post office in Horodok-Yahailonskyi. But the police were not convinced, and Baranovskyi was arrested and tried in Sambir in September-October 1933. Baranovskyi disclosed at this trial all the details of his treachery, but nevertheless was sentenced to ten years "for participation in the killing of Holówko." Registered in Polish prison under the pseudonym Zawadski, he died soon after starting his prison term.

Thus, through the maintenance of the strictest secrecy, Shukhevych succeeded not only in shielding his own cover, but also in drawing out the most dangerous Polish provocateur in the OUN, Roman Baranovskyi.

The Assassination of Pieracki

The last military operation prepared by Roman Shukhevych as officer for military affairs in the OUN Regional Executive was the assassination of the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, Bronislaw Pieracki. A death sentence was passed on Pieracki by the OUN for his role as head of the barbaric pacification of Halychyna in 1930, during which Captain Holovinskyi was murdered. In 1933-1934, Pieracki once again made his mark as the author of a plan to destroy through means of legislation and terror all Ukrainian political and cultural life in Western Ukraine. His plan called for the liquidation of all Ukrainian institutions and organizations, heavy prison sentences for all exposed participants of the Ukrainian nationalist underground, and even the establishment of a special concentration camp for them as well as for those Ukrainian activists who, though working through legal channels, were nonetheless considered a thorn for Polish assimilationist policy.

A UVO communiqué issued after Pieracki's assassination further explains the reasons which necessitated this act:

The act perpetrated by the UVO fighter was directed at Pieracki not only for his individual misdeeds, but for his role as the overseer of Polish occupational policy in Western Ukraine. After all, who was Pieracki? He was one of the fiercest liquidators of Ukrainian national life in Western Ukraine. Pieracki was a destroyer of Ukrainian schools, Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions, economic, cooperative, and sports societies, and a Polonizer of Ukrainian churches. Pieracki was the author and organizer of the Polish policy of economic exploitation in Western Ukraine, the policy to colonize Ukrainian lands with Polish intruders and to flood the industrial centers in Western Ukraine with imported Polish laborers. Pieracki was the organizer of pogroms against Ukrainians in Western Ukraine conducted with the help of gangs who were under police pay, punitive campaigns, barbaric pacifications (the southern areas of Western Ukraine in 1930, Volyn in 1931, the Uhniv, Rava Ruska, Sambir, Mosty and other regions in 1932). Pieracki was the creator of special trials which sentenced many Ukrainian revolutionaries to the gallows. Pieracki was the perpetrator of brutal police tortures of Ukrainian political prisoners. Pieracki was the author of the savage profanation of the heroes of Ukraine's liberation struggle, exhuming graves and destroying memorial crosses. Pieracki was one of the authors and most fervent executors of an ugly arsenal of brutal measures aimed at destroying Ukrainian life and Polonizing the Ukrainian people. Consequently, the UVO assassin liquidated one of the worst butchers of the Ukrainian people, who also happened to be the highest ranking member of the Polish police force.

According to documents from the so-called Senyk archive, the collection of OUN documents kept by Omelian Senyk and Yaroslav Baranovskyi, which fell into the hands of the Polish police, the decision to carry out the death sentence was reached at a special conference held in Berlin in April 1933. Among those attending the conference were Col. Evhen Konovalets, Richard Yaryi and Yaroslav Baranovskyi from the OUN and UVO su-

preme leaderships, and Stepan Bandera, who was at the time the acting head of the OUN Regional Executive for Western Ukraine.

The plan for the assassination was prepared by Roman Shukhevych-Dzvin. Mykola Lebed-Marko returned to Poland from abroad to redeem himself by this assassination for his mismanagement of the raid on the post office in Horodok Yahailonskyi. Lebed's task was to investigate Pieracki's daily routines, and at the chosen moment, point him out by a prearranged signal to the assassin. The assassin, Hryts Matseyko-Gonta was selected by Stepan Bandera from three recommended members. The technical details were worked out by Bohdan Pidhainyi, the deputy military officer of the OUN Regional Executive, who worked under Bandera's direct supervision.

On June 16, 1934, shortly after 3:00 P.M., Minister Pieracki was shot and died from two revolver bullets fired by an OUN member as he was stepping out of his car to dine in a restaurant in Warsaw. Pieracki's special police guards were unable to protect him. The assassin escaped before the eyes of many witnesses, firing at his pursuers, and was never caught by the Polish police. The Polish police succeeded in unraveling this case as well as other pages of OUN's activities only later when they got hold of the Senyk archive.

Concentration Camp and Prison

Shukhevych was incarcerated in Polish jails several times. For example, during the wave of mass arrests which followed the attack on Horodok-Yahailonskyi, Shukhevych was detained by the police for several months. But in this and every other investigation, Shukhevych was soon released for lack of incriminating evidence. The Polish police apparently continued to rely on the information provided by Baranovskyi that Shukhevych was disinclined to return to active work in the UVO and was critical of the OUN.

A year before Pieracki's assassination, Shukhevych decided to concentrate his energies on completing his university studies, and thus was on a "temporary leave of absence" from the OUN. His deputy, Bohdan Pidhainyi-Byk became the acting military officer in the OUN Regional Executive, and represented Shukhevych at all its meetings, talks abroad, and contacts with organizational cells. Consequently, Pieracki's assassination was prepared by Bohdan Pidhainyi. In the documents of the OUN *Provid* (PUN) that fell into the hands of the Polish police as part of the Senyk archive, there was mention only of Byk directing the activities of OUN's military sector in Western Ukraine, and nothing about Dzvin. Thus, Polish police investigations following the assassination focused on determining the identity of Byk, believing

him to be the military officer of the Regional Executive. Furthermore, Shukhevych's name did not surface when the police interrogators, relying on sensitive information gleaned from the Senyk archive, attempted to trick tortured prisoners into providing additional information by being misled that a prominent OUN member had been broken under police interrogations and was now incriminating fellow members.

Nevertheless, during the virtually indiscriminate wave of mass arrests at the end of June 1934 Shukhevych was also arrested, and at the beginning of July was sent with other Ukrainian political prisoners to the newly constructed concentration camp in Bereza Kartuzka, where he was incarcerated until January 1935.

As a result of the new arrests and newly obtained information, the Polish investigators finally discovered that Shukhevych was a member of the OUN Regional Executive. He was therefore transferred to prison in Lviv in January 1935, where he joined the ranks of those involved in the "Bandera Trials," which took place in May-June 1936.

Shukhevych was second on the list of those charged; his name appeared immediately following Bandera, because the Polish prosecutors suspected that Roman Shukhevych was Bandera's deputy. But the evidence against Shukhevych was unclear. Shukhevych claimed that despite his nationalist convictions, he was not a member of the OUN. His lawyer and uncle, Dr. Stepan Shukhevych, demonstrated the unreliability and confusion of the prosecution's evidence in order to support the contention that his clients, Roman Shukhevych, Dr. Bohdan Hnatevych, and Osyp Fenyk, were not members of the OUN. The court nevertheless declared Shukhevych guilty of membership in the OUN and sentenced him to four years in prison.

At this time, Roman Shukhevych was already married and had a son. In 1930 he had married Natalka Berezhynska, the daughter of a priest in Ohliadiv near Radekhiv and the sister of Yurko Berezhynskyi. Roman Shukhevych's son Yurko was born in 1933.¹¹



*Roman Shukhevych
with his son Yurko
(1938 or 1939)*

As a result of an amnesty proclaimed by the Polish government, prisoners sentenced to five years had their sentences reduced by half, and those sentenced from five to fifteen years had their sentences reduced by a third. Accordingly, Roman Shukhevych left prison in 1937, having served six months in a concentration camp and a full two years in prison.

After his release, Roman Shukhevych lived with his family in Lviv and worked for a Ukrainian advertising agency which he had founded with some friends.

Internal Problems of the OUN

Shukhevych emerged from prison in 1937 only to come up against an internal crisis within the OUN in Western Ukraine. The head of the OUN Regional Executive for Western Ukraine at this time was Lev Rebet, who candidly admits in his memoirs that he became head only through "a curious turn of events." After the mass arrests of OUN members following the death of Pieracki, a new Regional Executive had to be quickly formed, and thus Lev Rebet, the former OUN leader of the Stryi district, came to be appointed the new Regional Leader for Western Ukraine. However, there was strong opposition to Rebet among many leading OUN members because of his propensity to engage in intrigues and personal vendettas. Rebet's intrigues, for example, led to the departure of many OUN members in Stryi from the organization.

The *Provid* was requested by a group of these activists to court-martial and expel Lev Rebet from the OUN. But in the spring of 1935, Hanna Chemerynska, the fiancée of Yaroslav Baranovskyi, a member of the *Provid*, came to Lviv from Prague with an order from Baranovskyi designating Rebet as Regional Leader. The order was met with open opposition, which Rebet repressed with an "iron hand," ordering the expulsion of several members of the organization who were not in agreement with Rebet's appointment as head of the Regional Executive. Among those expelled were a large number of experienced members who enjoyed broad support among the new "younger generation" of the OUN.

Even worse, however, was the change in OUN policy in Western Ukraine effected by Rebet. Although iron-handed in dealing with his personal rivals, Rebet sought to terminate the military activities of the OUN and limit the work of the organization to "ideological-political instruction." For the longtime members of the OUN this was an unacceptable change which merely duplicated the legal activity already being carried out by such organizations as the educational society *Prosvita*, the syndicate of farmers *Silskyi Hospodar*, and the youth athletic association *Sokol*. Those released from

prison and from the Bereza Kartuzka concentration camp refused to return to active work in the OUN because of these changes in the nature of the organization. But in spirit they remained strongly attached to the OUN. Consequently, serious tensions arose within the underground. Though the number of arrests in Western Ukraine was increasing, Lev Rebet himself escaped arrest throughout his four years as head of the Regional Executive (1935-1939), even though he was tried twice for membership in the OUN before 1935. This circumstance helped amplify suspicion about Rebet's loyalty, as he himself admits in his memoirs.

At the same time, suspicions with regard to Yaroslav Baranovskiy also intensified. The treachery of his brother, Roman, had not aroused any suspicions about Yaroslav until the end of 1934, when through some mysterious turn of events the secret archives of the *Provid* fell into the hands of the Czecho-Slovakian police. These archives had been maintained by Omelian Senyk, but because of Senyk's frequent trips to America, custody of the archives was actually held by Yaroslav Baranovskiy. During the Pieracki trial, the prosecutor cited information provided by an unnamed "foreign informant." Members of the Regional Executive later established that Yaroslav Baranovskiy was the only *PUN* member privy to three of the items mentioned at the trial.

In light of these developments within the OUN leadership, Zenon Kossak, Dmytro Hrytsai, Oleksa Hasyn, and other former leaders of the OUN, upon release from prison, refused to participate in the underground while Lev Rebet was in charge. Shukhevych likewise decided not to work with Rebet after his discharge from prison. Yet, even now, when the unhealthy state of affairs in the underground would have justified a well-deserved respite, Shukhevych felt that he could not move entirely into the sidelines, occupying himself with only family matters and his advertising agency. Rather, he resolved to become actively involved in efforts to restore the organization's integrity.

At Shukhevych's initiative, Zenon Kossak and Oleksa Hasyn traveled abroad in order to apprise Colonel Konovalets of the situation within the OUN in Western Ukraine and to propose the immediate dismissal of Lev Rebet from the post of Regional Leader and the appointment of Dmytro Hrytsai in his place. Colonel Konovalets, although occupied at this time with building contacts with the revolutionary underground in Soviet Ukraine, listened to the representatives of OUN's "old guard" in Western Ukraine, checked the information with other sources, and ordered Yaroslav Baranovskiy, the coordinator for Western Ukraine in the *Provid*, to carry out the proposed changes.

Rebet reluctantly acceded to the order, but, by casting aspersions about Hrytsai, he simultaneously took steps to assure that Dmytro Hrytsai

would not succeed him. In order to preempt a lengthy investigation examining Hrytsai's record and suitability for the position, thus postponing Rebet's departure from the leadership, the older OUN members decided to ask Shukhevych to assume leadership of the Regional Executive, knowing that Rebet would not dare to raise any doubts about Shukhevych's record and qualifications. Recognizing the grave urgency of the situation, Roman Shukhevych agreed to accept the position, and in the spring of 1938 made a secret trip to the Netherlands to have the leadership changes confirmed by Colonel Konovalets. The assassination of Konovalets in May 1938, however, prevented matters from being resolved according to the wishes of the group lobbying for OUN's regeneration. These events are described by Stepan Bandera in his memoirs:

In the last years before World War II, the OUN in Western Ukraine underwent a new crisis. The nationalist movement had gained significant influence among Western Ukrainians and had mobilized the masses to an active struggle against the occupation through revolutionary means. But the incumbent OUN Regional Leader for Western Ukraine opposed such methods, and favored the cessation of all forms of revolutionary activity, be it military operations or political-propagandistic campaigns. A serious crisis ensued, undermining the trust of many members of the Organization in the Regional Executive. A change of leadership became necessary.

The leading activists in Western Ukraine expressed a concerted wish that leadership of the OUN Regional Executive be assumed by Roman Shukhevych, the officer for military affairs in the preceding Executive, who had just recently been released from prison... During his years of work in the UVO and OUN Shukhevych had demonstrated the qualities of a decisive leader and staunch nationalist, a talented and energetic organizer, and a resolute fighter, qualities which commanded the trust and loyalty of the OUN members and of those Ukrainians sympathetic to the OUN struggle. The nationalist cadres in Western Ukraine anticipated that Roman Shukhevych would redirect the OUN to the firm but correct road of revolutionary warfare, as the world political situation and the situation in Western Ukraine itself demanded. Besides, Roman Shukhevych was immensely popular. The Supreme Leader of the OUN, Col. Evhen Konovalets himself ardently wished

for Shukhevych to be the Regional Leader of Western Ukraine, declaring his complete confidence and support for Shukhevych.

Roman Shukhevych submitted to the general will of the Organization and agreed to assume this responsible and demanding post, although he was in a more precarious position than most other members because by then he had completely lost his cover and was fully known to the enemy. After his release from prison, he found himself under constant surveillance by the enemy police, and was forced to develop entirely new methods of underground work so that his revolutionary activity, to say nothing of his leadership, would not be detected... But these plans never came to fruition because Roman Shukhevych never assumed leadership of the Regional Executive... Nevertheless, the decision to appoint him as Regional Leader had a positive impact on the future course of the Organization's work and development. A break with the recent past was achieved. Along with the necessary personnel changes in the Executive, revisions were effected in the Organization's direction and style of work. The feebleness, stagnation, internal seclusiveness, and external inertia that had pervaded the Organization recently was finally replaced with a new course favored and personified by Shukhevych, a course characterized by decisiveness, dynamic activism, a combative spirit, widespread revolutionary activity, uncompromising resoluteness in politics, ideological purity and clarity, and above all, commitment to truth, to the consistency between word and deed, and to the purging of phraseological obfuscation. This was a break other leading OUN activists had hoped for but had not been successful in achieving which was finally effected by Roman Shukhevych with his decision to assume leadership of the Regional Executive.

The position of Regional Leader for Western Ukraine was assumed by other activists who shared Roman Shukhevych's ideas about what the direction and tactics of the liberation struggle should be. First, there was Myroslav Turash, who mysteriously perished while returning to Western Ukraine (at the time under Soviet occupation) from a conference abroad with the OUN *Provid*, and then his deputy, Volodymyr Tymchii-Lopatynskyi. In the course of a brief period they steered OUN's development and ac-

tivities in Western Ukraine in the direction that Shukhevych would have taken. Because of this, the Organization in Western Ukraine was able to enter the period of World War II as a strong and dynamic force, well-prepared to conduct a large-scale military-revolutionary struggle.¹²

From this brief account it is evident that Shukhevych played a major role in meliorating the state of affairs within the OUN Regional Executive on the eve of World War II. Bandera's point that personal ambitions played no role in these matters is worth noting, since some participants of these events, who were opposed to these changes, later claimed that to be the case. The internal conflict was basically an effort to redirect the OUN once again to a clearly revolutionary struggle and to restore the political and military character of the nationalist movement. Without the leadership changes, initiated by Roman Shukhevych, the OUN would hardly have been prepared to meet the crucial challenges of World War II and the years which followed.

Two salient traits of Roman Shukhevych are highlighted by this episode. The first was a boundless devotion to the cause in which he believed and a corresponding readiness to carry on the struggle under all circumstances and to assume even the most difficult and dangerous responsibilities for the good of the cause. The second of Shukhevych's traits that stands out is the complete absence of selfish personal ambition and of any covetousness for power or fame. Throughout the Rebet affair, Shukhevych never advanced himself for the position of Regional Leader; instead, he always proposed other prominent members. Shukhevych accepted the position only under strong pressure from leading activists, who were convinced that only he could succeed in overcoming the conflict that was paralyzing the work of the organization in Western Ukraine. When his candidacy was tied up by a new intrigue, spawned by Yaroslav Baranovskyi, Roman Shukhevych once again demonstrated the absence of personal ambition by withdrawing his candidacy, even though before his death Konovalets had expressed complete confidence in Shukhevych. In his place Shukhevych proposed Myroslav Turash, and when Turash perished while crossing the German-Soviet border on his return to Western Ukraine from a trip abroad, Shukhevych joined others in endorsing the candidacy of Volodymyr Tymchii. Shukhevych chose at this time to remain in Transcarpathian Ukraine in order to help organize the military forces of the new Carpathian Ukrainian state.

The Attempt to Free Stepan Bandera

Stepan Bandera was not released in 1937 with Roman Shukhevych and others. The death sentence passed on Bandera at the Pieracki trial had been commuted to life imprisonment. Shukhevych did not forget about the former Regional Leader, however, and at a meeting with Colonel Konovalets in the spring of 1938 in Prague, Shukhevych proposed a plan for Bandera's escape from prison. Konovalets approved the plan, and through Zenon Kosak ordered the current OUN Regional Leader, Lev Rebet, to carry out the plan.

Rebet, however, postponed the operation, claiming that it would endanger Bandera, who could be killed in the event of failure. Having received Konovalets' endorsement to head the Regional Executive, Shukhevych reactivated the plan himself, but Konovalets' tragic death on May 23, 1938, in Rotterdam again upset those plans since Rebet, supported by Baranovskyi, refused to hand his post over to Shukhevych.

The death of OUN's Supreme Leader made Bandera's escape all the more pressing. No current member of the *Provid* enjoyed sufficient stature among the OUN cadres to succeed Konovalets as the Supreme Leader. For most of the OUN cadres Stepan Bandera was unquestionably the best man for the post. Bandera had been a revolutionary activist from youth and had earned tremendous respect in the course of the Warsaw and Lviv trials not only among OUN members, but also among all Ukrainians, and even among some political enemies.

A description of the escape plan is provided in the memoirs of a certain Mykhailo Teren, an OUN member who had spent five years in a Lviv prison:

One day in June 1938, I was approached by my current OUN superior officer, Ivan Ravlyk, who gave me a password and told me that someone using this password would contact me on a very important matter. That man turned out to be none other than Roman Shukhevych, with whom I was well acquainted. We went to the pond Svitez, which in the early morning was virtually deserted, and we had a quiet conversation that lasted over two hours. He told me that Stepan Bandera, the former Regional Leader sentenced at the Warsaw trial to life imprisonment, had been transferred to the prison in Wronki. A group of OUN members wished to liberate him from prison. This was to be done in secret, independently of the Regional Executive, which I understood from his words was opposed to the op-

eration. The necessary funds for this operation were to be provided, or already were provided, by Ukrainians in America, and transported by Colonel Makohin to Danzig. Who this Makohin was I did not ask, but I wondered if it was not the same Makohin who was often mentioned in the Ukrainian press. The question of my involvement was then raised, whether I would be willing to renew my contacts with the jailers known to me in Wronki.¹³

The planning of Bandera's escape was undertaken by OUN member Kuspis, who was placed in contact with Shukhevych by Ivan Ravlyk. Kuspis contacted Sherley, a guard known to him in prison, who accepted a bribe of 50,000 zlotys (\$5,000) to be shared with another jailer in the escape. The prison was nine kilometers from the German border and the plan was for Bandera to cross the border. However, as the organizer of the escape wrote:

When everything was ready, and after I had traveled to the prison to check for the last time that everything was in place for the escape, leaving Sherley an extra 500 zlotys, I suddenly learned from Ravlyk that the operation was called off, that there would be no escape.

Plans for the escape were permanently scrapped. The plan was torpedoed by Yaroslav Baranovskyi and Lev Rebet. Unfamiliar with the contemporary internal problems of the OUN, Colonel Makohin turned the funds that had been raised in America to the *Provid*. Baranovskyi and Rebet "froze" this money. Shortly thereafter the jailers at the Wronki prison, while intoxicated, divulged the entire plan to other prison guards. Kuspis was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison. In his memoirs, Rebet blamed the deceased Baranovskyi for this fiasco, claiming provocation by the Polish police designed to provide a pretext for Bandera's murder.¹⁴

This was one of Shukhevych's few failures. And the failure was not a failure of planning or execution on Shukhevych's part, but a failure resulting from the actions and decisions of other members within the organization.

At the time, the entire episode seemed trivial, and was in fact little known to most members. But from the larger perspective of succeeding developments, the failure to free Bandera at that time proved to be a serious setback for the OUN in the future. Had Stepan Bandera been abroad in the summer of 1938, i.e. in the first months after Konoval's death, the catastrophic schism within the OUN might very well have been avoided or resolved before the onslaught of World War II. Had the confrontation of programs and personalities, with Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych on

one side and Yaroslav Baranovskyi and Andrii Melnyk on the other, been played out exclusively within the *Provid*, it is likely that a single program and a single, monolithic *Provid* would have emerged. The unity of the Ukrainian nationalist movement would most likely have been preserved, commanding the trust of the Ukrainian people in all parts of Ukraine. Consequently, the energies and attention of the movement would have been concentrated entirely on the enemies of Ukraine.

It is evident that Roman Shukhevych understood the importance and urgency of an immediate confrontation within the *Provid*, and thus at his own initiative, disregarding impediments placed by some members of the *Provid* as well as the current head of the Regional Executive, attempted to push ahead with the plan to free Bandera from Polish prison.

III. FOR THE FREEDOM OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE

For the Freedom of the Silver Land

Roman Shukhevych went abroad in the spring of 1938 to discuss with Colonel Konovalets the critical situation within the OUN arising from Rebet's and Baranovskyi's behavior. He intended to return to Lviv after these matters were addressed, but when it became apparent that he would have to remain abroad for a longer period, Shukhevych decided to take advantage of the opportunity to upgrade his military training. With the assistance of Colonel Richard Yaryi, a member of the OUN *Provid* with connections in the German officer corps, Shukhevych enrolled in and completed a condensed course for officers at the military academy in Munich and, in addition, passed the test for glider pilots. Afterward he joined a group of young military men of the OUN, who having made the estate of Colonel Yaryi near Saubersdorf (near Vienna) their center, engaged among other things in editing military textbooks for the training of Ukrainian officers of various ranks.

This work was interrupted, however, by the political storm gathering over Czecho-Slovakia in the summer of 1938 as a result of the threat of German aggression. The brewing developments resurrected the issue of the status of Transcarpathia, a region of Ukraine which belonged to the Czecho-Slovakian republic, popularly known as Ukraine's Silver Land.

Toward the Strengthening of National Forces

The inevitability of deep political changes in Czecho-Slovakia prompted Ukrainian patriots to turn their attention to the future of Transcarpathia. They recognized that the initiative had to be seized by the OUN. An

opportunity arose to realize at least partially the age-old national dream of establishing an independent Ukrainian state. Until now, however, the Ukrainian population of Transcarpathia was unable to form a strong organization to express its political aspirations. Transcarpathia needed Ukrainians from other parts of Ukraine to help strengthen its cadres.

Therefore, the leading members of the OUN from Halychyna, who at the time were abroad in Germany, Austria and Italy, hastened to Transcarpathia to volunteer their services to their Transcarpathian brothers. Leading OUN activists Mykhailo Kolodzynskyi, Roman Shukhevych, Zenon Kossak, Oleksa Hasyn, all former members of the OUN Regional Executive for Western Ukraine, and many others gathered in Uzhhorod, the capital of Transcarpathia. The four mentioned activists, all of whom had undergone military training, embarked on transforming the youth organizations of Transcarpathia into a military force for the emerging state. Other non-combatant OUN members directed their attention to organizing the political and civic life of Transcarpathia.

Conflict with the *Provid*

The group of OUN activists that came to work for the Ukrainian national cause in Transcarpathia naturally looked to the *Provid* for leadership in the coming events. But they were to be bitterly disillusioned. Under the leadership of Andrii Melnyk, the *Provid* maintained that the OUN should not become involved in the political affairs of Transcarpathia for the time being. The Nazi regime had promised Transcarpathia to the Hungarians in return for Hungarian participation in the Rome-Berlin Axis, and the *Provid* decided that it could not afford to oppose German plans at this time. Accordingly, the *Provid* officer for Transcarpathian affairs, Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, was sent to Uzhhorod with the order that all Galician members of the OUN depart from Transcarpathian Ukraine.

But the aforementioned group of OUN activists rejected this order and demanded an explanation from Melnyk's deputy, Yaroslav Baranovskyi. Baranovskyi's trip to Transcarpathia in this matter is described by one of the group's members:

Yaroslav Baranovsky arrived in Uzhhorod, Transcarpathia, at the end of October 1938. He demanded the immediate return "home" of the OUN members there; but when he was met with a firm refusal, he relented in the face of "insubordination." Elaborating on the policy of the *Provid* in this crisis, based on nonintervention in the events

transpiring in Transcarpathia, he stated, "We stand at the watershed of great and fundamental events which will engulf not only Central Europe, but also the entire world. In this situation, leading to a confrontation of superpowers; we must orient ourselves toward one of them. The *Provid* has made the only objectively possible decision. Our activity in Transcarpathia clearly goes against the course of German policy, and we cannot afford the luxury of a 'war' with German might. The *Provid* must consistently carry out a policy of 'noninvolvement' because such is in the interest of a higher rationale." So stated Baranovskyi.

We in turn explained that our position on this matter was determined by two principles, which guided our approach to all situations, namely to always lean first and foremost on our own native forces, and to strive to strengthen these forces. Although the policy of the *Provid* was perhaps logical, it was not feasible, because for ten years the OUN had instilled in its members the spirit of direct struggle. Our actions, undertaken in contradiction to the orders of the *Provid* were the consequence of our beliefs in the complete validity of our methods of political warfare. We were thus faced with a dilemma: either to betray our nation or disobey the *Provid*, and we chose the latter.¹⁵

Conversations with Baranovskyi came to an impasse, and efforts by the "rebels" to speak directly with Colonel Melnyk failed; both sides remained adamant in their positions. The group of *kraiovyky* (OUN activists from Halychyna) continued to provide assistance for Ukrainian forces in Transcarpathia not only without the approbation of the *Provid* but also in opposition of the *Provid's* instructions.

The current political situation made it essential that members of this group operate under cover, not revealing their identities outside their internal circle. The events of November 1938, when as a consequence of the Vienna arbitrage between the governments of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the government of Czecho-Slovakia was directed to hand a strip of Slovakia and Transcarpathia to Hungary, forced the group to show greater military initiative. Soon the Hungarian government began to send saboteurs into Transcarpathia. The partition created panic in the political circles of Transcarpathia. Because of these developments, the Galician group, which immediately after the formation of the Ukrainian Self-Defense (UNO) forces (September 4, 1938) organized itself into the first section of the UNO under the command of Col. Mykhailo Kolodzinskyi, felt compelled to take into its own hands the

initiative of an armed struggle with enemy forces. It was this section that repulsed the saboteurs and provided an armed escort in the evacuation of the Transcarpathian autonomous government with its property and assets from Uzhhorod to Khust (as Uzhhorod was transferred into Hungarian hands by the Vienna arbitrage). Immediately afterward, this militia was reorganized as a military force called the Carpathian *Sich* National Defense Organization, or simply the Carpathian *Sich*.

The General Command of the Carpathian *Sich* consisted solely of Transcarpathian Ukrainians, while members of the Galician group formed the Military Staff of the Transcarpathian armed forces. The Staff consisted of the following personnel, operating in Transcarpathia under the guise of pseudonyms to conceal the fact that they were from Halychyna (Czechoslovakia would not have permitted Polish citizens to operate on its territory): Col. Mykhailo Kolodzynskyi-Huzar, the chief of staff; Adjutant Roman Shukhevych-Borys Shchuka and Lt. Zenon Kossak-Tarnavskyi, deputies of the chief of staff; Adj. Osyp Karachevskyi-Svoboda, Adj. Hryts Barabash-Chorny; Adj. Yurii Lopatynskyi-Kalyna, and Lt. Evhen Vretsiona-Volianskyi, members.

Shukhevych was responsible for maintaining communications with Halychyna, recruiting volunteers from other Ukrainian regions, and obtaining financial assistance. During the First Congress of the Carpathian *Sich* on December 4, 1938, ten thousand *Sich* members paraded before the Transcarpathian government, headed by Rev. Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn. Most of these *Sich* members were young boys who had no military training, only the desire to serve their country. The lack of arms, uniforms, food, and especially officers with military training, was felt from the very first moment.

The Effects of Events in Transcarpathia on Halychyna

From mid October 1938 to March 1939 Roman Shukhevych made several illegal crossings over the Czechoslovak and Polish border into Transcarpathia. During this period he also spent some time in Lviv in order to organize a concerted campaign for aiding Transcarpathia. He contacted not only fellow members of the OUN but also leaders of the legal Ukrainian political parties and financial organizations. He initiated the convening of a special political meeting in Lviv for the defense of the rights of Transcarpathian Ukraine. Immediately after the meeting, an imposing Ukrainian demonstration took place in Lviv protesting the Hungarian annexation of southwestern Transcarpathia, during which the windows of the Hungarian consulate were smashed and the Polish police were assaulted. Similar demonstrations followed in almost all the cities and major towns of Halychyna.

In this manner Roman Shukhevych initiated the mobilization of Ukrainian support in Halychyna for the cause of Ukrainian Transcarpathia.

Soon after his return to Lviv in November 1938, Shukhevych was confronted with a peculiar problem: Polish chauvinist students, with the ill-concealed support of the Polish police, had planned a series of anti-Ukrainian pogroms in Lviv. The Ukrainian student leaders, knowing that Shukhevych was the organizer of the impressive meeting in defense of Transcarpathia and the subsequent mass demonstration in Lviv a few days earlier, turned to him for advice. Although burdened with other work, Shukhevych organized a successful repulse of the Polish student offensive, employing Ukrainian students and workers in this operation.

It appeared at that point that Shukhevych's effort to generate support in Halychyna for Transcarpathia was largely successful. Ukrainian financial organizations promised large contributions for the purchase of uniforms and weapons for the Carpathian *Sich*. Many former officers of Ukrainian military formations from the liberation struggle of 1917-1921 and Ukrainians with military training in the Polish army were recruited to join the Carpathian *Sich*.

But the effect of the *Provid*'s stance was also felt here. Rebet, who thanks to Baranovskyi's intrigues continued to head the OUN Regional Executive for Western Ukraine, threatened OUN members who enlisted in the Transcarpathian defense effort with organizational sanctions. Rebet informed the leaders of financial institutions and Ukrainian veterans' organizations that Galician aid to Carpathian Ukraine was "not urgent." Financial assistance received from Canada and the United States by the *Provid* was transmitted by Baranovskyi into Transcarpathia only in the form of food packages. Thus the Military Staff of the Carpathian *Sich* under the leadership of Kolodzynskyi, Shukhevych, and Kossak received a severe blow from the least expected quarter.

Ukrainian Nationalists Never Capitulate

Adverse external circumstances and the position of the *Provid* did not, however, deter the nationalists from Halychyna from their determination to oppose the Hungarian invasion. The training of *Sich* members was accelerated. The major problem now became one of military supplies. Negotiations with the Czech army for weapons got nowhere. So, on the night of March 13, 1939, Roman Shukhevych and twenty hand-picked volunteers disarmed a Czech gendarmerie station in Khust and captured a magazine of arms and ammunition. This was the first successful partisan operation carried out by Shukhevych.

On March 14, 1939, President Hacha of Czecho-Slovakia capitulated to the Germans under the pressure of Hitler's ultimatum. The Republic of Czecho-Slovakia ceased to exist. Expressing the will of its people, the Ukrainian government of Transcarpathia declared the independence of this region and the establishment of a separate sovereign state under the name of Carpatho-Ukraine.

The newly established state was invaded almost immediately by Hungary, which had been promised this territory by Hitler. The German consul in Khust summoned representatives of the Carpathian *Sich* and advised them to forfeit any thought of armed resistance to the Hungarians and surrender Transcarpathia to Hungary without a struggle because such is the will of the *Führer*. In the current situation, he added, the Carpatho-Ukrainians, like the Czechs, had no choice but to capitulate.

The meeting with the German consul was attended by Colonel Kolodzinskyi-Husar and both of his deputies, Shukhevych-Shchuka and Kossak-Tarnavskyi. Having listened to the German consul's "advice," which was but a disguised ultimatum coming from Hitler himself, Col. Mykhailo Kolodzinskyi responded by saying that "in the dictionary of Ukrainian nationalists there is no such word as 'capitulation'". The Ukrainian nationalists do not capitulate and they will engage in an armed struggle in defense of Transcarpathian Ukraine against the Hungarian aggressors."

The Hungarian army began its advance on Khust March 14, 1939, marching from Berehiv through Irshav, and on the following morning through Sevlush. The Hungarians used tanks, heavy artillery, and air strikes, as well as infantry, in an effort to take Khust in a single day. But they were able to reach the capital only after two days of heavy fighting.

On March 15, the Carpathian Minister of Defense, Stepan Klochurak, issued his "Order No. 1," in which Colonel Serhii Yefremov was placed in command of all National Defense forces of Carpatho-Ukraine, that is of all military and paramilitary groups, including the Military National Defense staff, headed by Colonel Kolodzinskyi and consisting of ten other members, among them Shukhevych-Shchuka. The burden of sustaining the war effort continued, however, to be shouldered by the same people as before. This order aimed at unifying the paramilitary groups with the units of the military defense. In practice, however, Kolodzinskyi and his deputies in the military *Sich* remained in command.

Colonel Kolodzinskyi personally assumed the defense of Khust. After two days of heavy fighting in the environs and one day of fighting in the city, Kolodzinskyi and the remaining *Sich* members retreated into the mountains. Shukhevych was ordered to break through to Velykyi-Bychov, where Colonel Yefremov was supposed to establish a center of resistance. Kolodzinskyi and Kossak perished in battle with overwhelming Hungarian

forces near Bushtyn. Shukhevych reached Velykyi-Bychov, but found it already occupied by the Hungarians. Attempts to make contact with any part of the Carpathian *Sich* were unsuccessful, so Shukhevych broke through the Hungarian encirclement on the Tys River and crossed into Rumania.

The heroic defense of the Carpathian *Sich* fighters against the Hungarian army from the south and Polish saboteurs from the north impressed even some Poles. The *Merkuryiush Polski*, in its No. 15 issue for that year, wrote:

Earlier, on the pages of the *Merkuryiush*, we had voiced strong opposition to the Transcarpathian Ukrainian state... Nevertheless, we must frankly admit that in view of recent events we now have more respect for the Ukrainians than for the Czechs or Slovaks. Whatever they may be, those *Sichovyky* did not wail or lay down their arms, but fought under the most difficult political and strategic conditions. Had I been in charge of a Hungarian unit, I would have commanded at my own responsibility that an honorary salvo be fired over the bodies of the fallen Ukrainians.

The courageous defense by the Carpathian *Sich* against the Hungarian invaders stands out as one of the most illustrious chapters in the history of Ukrainian Transcarpathia. In the fire and blood of military combat the Transcarpathian "Rusyns" were transformed into Carpathian Ukrainians.

A crucial role in this struggle was played by Roman Shukhevych, who left his wife and children to risk his life for the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia at a critical moment of their history. For Roman Shukhevych every part of Ukraine was Ukraine, while service for Ukraine was a supreme duty.

IV. ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II

Internal Problems of the OUN

The conflict between the *Provid* and the group of *kraiovyky* was strictly an internal problem: no one was aware of its existence outside the small group of members at the top. Credit for the impressive defense of Carpatho-Ukraine was therefore attributed to the whole OUN, and consequently to the *Provid*. This credit was exploited by the *Provid* when, on July 21, 1939, it signed an agreement with the exiled government of Carpatho-Ukraine in which the latter acknowledged "the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement to be the exclusive bearer of the struggle for the social liberation of the Ukrainian nation, and the *Provid* of Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN) under Andrii Melnyk as the leader of this struggle." In exchange, the *Provid* recognized "the government of Carpatho-Ukraine with its president, Rev. Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, as the lawfully authorized representative among Ukrainians and in foreign circles of the last legitimate Ukrainian government to have governed a part of the Ukrainian land." The fourth paragraph of the agreement stated, "It is affirmed that the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement, and specifically the Government of Carpathian Ukraine and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, had endeavored together with all their might to build and defend the Carpathian Ukrainian State."

Consequently, the *Provid* decided not to carry out its earlier threat "to hold responsible" those Western Ukrainian activists who, contrary to orders, had participated in the defense of Transcarpathia. The OUN members in question were simply reintegrated into the Organization's ranks. Shukhevych himself was assigned to the free city of Danzig to head Ukraine's liaison post. With war between Germany and Poland approaching, this appeared to be a position of special importance. Shukhevych remained at this post until the outbreak of World War II.

Formation of the Revolutionary *Provid*

The German invasion of Poland began on September 1, 1939. After three weeks, Poland ceased to exist as an independent state; Polish territory west of the Curzon line was occupied by Nazi Germany, while the Western Ukrainian lands east of the line were occupied by Soviet Russia.

The *Provid* had not anticipated Germany's relinquishment of Western Ukraine to the Soviets; it had expected that after the collapse of Poland the Germans would support the creation of an independent Western Ukrainian state. A few weeks before the war, in fact, *Provid* member Stsiborskyi was entrusted with the task of drafting a constitution for such a future Western Ukrainian state.¹⁶ Consequently, no directives were provided on what to do in the event of Soviet occupation. At their own initiative, the Regional Executive and the members of the OUN agreed that previously exposed members of the OUN, particularly leading activists, should cross over to German-occupied territory. As a result, a large group of OUN members, including such well-known leaders as Stepan Bandera, crossed into German-occupied Poland.

With Germany's rejection of the idea of establishing an independent Western Ukrainian state, it seemed that the internal conflict within the OUN might finally be overcome. The *Provid*, however, adamantly refused to discuss internal organizational issues with the leading activists from Western Ukraine. This led to a further worsening of internal conflict, which soon became aggravated by new revelations about Yaroslav Baranovskyi.

Following the German capture of the Western Ukrainian town of Sambir, members of the OUN discovered in the Polish police archive, a document incriminating Yaroslav Baranovskyi as a Polish police agent. To determine the authenticity of the document, a special commission was formed in Krakow consisting of three respected Ukrainian lawyers: Dr. Stepan Shukhevych, Dr. Lev Hankevych and Dr. Volodymyr Horbovyi. These three lawyers had in the past frequently defended OUN members at political trials, and were therefore familiar with the format and appearance of Polish police documents. The commission established the authenticity of the Baranovskyi document, and consequently a demand was put forth to Colonel Melnyk for an immediate suspension of Baranovskyi's membership in the *Provid* and a review of his case by an OUN tribunal.

Even more significant was the sharp disagreement over the future strategy of the OUN. As with the issue of defending Carpatho-Ukraine's independence, the *Provid* reaffirmed its orientation on Nazi Germany as the likely victor in the upcoming war with Soviet Russia. This allegiance to the interests of a foreign power was alien to the revolutionary spirit of the OUN, and the Western Ukrainian nationalist leadership therefore demanded that

the *Provid* commit itself to the pursuit of an independent political course guided only by the interests of the Ukrainian people. These interests were defined in three points:

1. The OUN must not commit itself to either side in the present war. The *Provid* and its head must relocate to a neutral country and carry on its work through two sub-leaderships: one for OUN members residing in German-occupied territory, and one for members in territories controlled by the opponents of Germany. The activities of both parts of the OUN were to be conducted along active and truly independent lines, and not as an arm of a secret service.

2. An organizational base must be developed on Ukrainian territory occupied by the USSR, so that in case of a Soviet-German war, a third force will exist for the immediate implementation of efforts on behalf of Ukraine's independence. Particular emphasis must be placed on organizational work in the central and eastern lands of Ukraine.

3. Advantage should be taken of the Soviet-Finnish War to organize Ukrainian army units on the side of Finland. These units should be recruited from among émigré military troops and Soviet Ukrainian troops taken captive by Finland.

But Colonel Melnyk refused to discuss any of these points, and furthermore, dismissed the special commission's indictment of Yaroslav Baranovskyi. Members of the Regional Executive were ordered to "maintain strict organizational discipline" and to refer all matters to the *Provid* through Baranovskyi. Efforts to hold three-way discussions between Colonel Melnyk, Stepan Bandera and Volodymyr Tymchii-Lopatynskyi, the current OUN Regional Leader for Western Ukraine came to nothing, even though Tymchii had specially come from Ukraine for such a meeting. Unfortunately, he perished while crossing the border on his return to Soviet-occupied Ukraine.

As a result of these events, a special meeting of the revolutionary membership of the OUN was convened on July 10, 1940. A Revolutionary *Provid* under the leadership of Stepan Bandera was elected in place of the *Provid* headed by Colonel Melnyk. The Melnyk *Provid* reacted to this by issuing a death sentence against nine of the ten members of the Revolutionary *Provid*. Comprising the new *Provid* were: Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, Ivan Gabrusevych, Stepan Lenkavskyi, Mykola Klymyshyn, Mykola

Lebed, Yaroslav Stetsko, Ivan Ravlyk, Dmytro Hrytsai, and Oleksa Hasyn. But the sentence was never carried out. The OUN members who were summoned to execute the members of the Revolutionary *Provid* responded to the order by refusing to carry it out.

Roman Shukhevych was at the time OUN's Regional Leader for the Ukrainian lands under German occupation. In the new conflict between PUN and the *kraiovyky*, he sided with the *kraiovyky* now headed by the former OUN Regional Leader for Western Ukraine, Stepan Bandera, since he viewed this conflict as but a continuation of a previous disagreement between PUN and the *kraiovyky* that arose in connection with events in Carpatho-Ukraine. During that disagreement the *kraiovyky* were headed by Colonel Kolodzynski. The above mentioned meeting of the young nationalist activists elected Roman Shukhevych to the Revolutionary *Provid*.

The Mobilization of German-Occupied Ukraine

After the partition of Poland in September 1939, Ukrainian lands west of the Curzon line, with a population of around one million Ukrainians, fell under German occupation. These lands (Lemkivshchyna, Zasiannia, Kholmshchyna, and Pidliashia), known as Transcarpathia, had been the target of intense Polonization before the war, and had been isolated by a special police cordon from the political, economic and cultural life of the rest of Western Ukraine. Ukrainian organizations and institutions were not permitted to exist here; the Ukrainian press was denied circulation among inhabitants of this region, and in the Lemko region the Polish government supported the propagation of an artificial "Rusyn" identity. These territories were consequently quite backward from the standpoint of national-political consciousness. Consequently, the OUN took upon itself the task of raising the national awareness of Transcarpathia up to the level of Halychyna. Roman Shukhevych was charged with heading these efforts, being appointed by the new Revolutionary *Provid* to the post of OUN Regional Leader for these western borderlands of Ukraine.

Roman Shukhevych encountered in Transcarpathia a situation quite similar to that of Transcarpathia in 1938, which until then had borne the name of *Karpatska Rus'*. On the basis of his experience in Transcarpathia, Shukhevych understood well that a national-political consciousness among the population of these regions could develop only gradually and organically. He thus decided against forming an OUN network by simply enlisting three to five youths from each village into the core structure of the OUN. Instead, he first concentrated on the development of a broader, non-political national consciousness through the creation of educational, youth, and cooperative or-

ganizations. Only with such preparations could a mature disciplined political movement arise; and indeed it did, sooner than Shukhevych expected. A few years later, the native populations of the Lemko and Kholm regions gave the Ukrainian Insurgent Army hundreds of fighters, fiercely dedicated to the Ukrainian cause.

The Mobilization of Soviet-Occupied Ukraine

In April 1941, the Revolutionary *Provid* convened the Second Great Assembly of the OUN. Members of the Melnyk *Provid* were also invited, and had they accepted, the conflict within the OUN might have been settled. Colonel Melnyk ignored the invitation. The Assembly elected Stepan Bandera head of the OUN and ordered Colonel Melnyk to cease his activity as OUN Supreme Leader. Melnyk rejected this order, claiming that his *Provid* was the only legitimate leadership of the OUN. Melnyk was joined by part of the OUN membership and, as a result, a definitive schism in the Ukrainian nationalist movement ensued, with the emergence of two organizations, both using the name Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

The Second Great Assembly of the OUN elected Roman Shukhevych to the *Provid*. In addition to serving as Regional Leader of the western borderlands of Ukraine, Shukhevych was appointed to supervise the *Provid's* liaison with the organizational network in Soviet-occupied Ukraine and to head the staff of the *Provid's* military sector, with Dmytro Hrytsai and Oleksa Hasyn as his deputies.

The new political situation required more intense contact between the *Provid* abroad and cells of the Organization in Ukraine than was necessary until now. However, the system of ruthless police terror and provocations, which were employed by organs of Russian communist rule against the population, had made such contact and the activity of the underground in Ukraine very difficult. For this reason, it was particularly desirable that the person in charge of maintaining liaison between units of the OUN in Ukraine and those abroad be a very astute and skillful revolutionary activist. Once again, Roman Shukhevych demonstrated that his selection for the position was a very appropriate choice. His success in carrying out this difficult yet critical function is manifest from the fact that in a short time he was able to establish a chain of liaison points along the entire German-Soviet border and across Slovakia, which continued to operate through the next two years of Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine.

Shukhevych also understood that contact with the Organization's cells under Soviet occupation needed to go beyond mere exchanges of information and include assistance from abroad in the full range of organizational

matters, since it was much more difficult to maintain the revolutionary movement under Soviet occupation than it had been under Polish rule. In particular, this involved replenishing the ranks of the Organization. It was soon apparent that under conditions of ubiquitous Soviet control, activists could not continue to live "legally" as they had under Polish occupation. Members living legally could only serve ancillary functions. Leading activists, on the other hand, had to live "illegally" on a continuous basis, so as to avoid surveillance and arrest by the NKVD (the Soviet secret police). Consequently, this required frequent changes of personnel so as to disorient Soviet counterintelligence. In February 1940, a group of OUN activists entered Soviet-occupied Ukraine, led by Volodymyr Hryniv who succeeded Volodymyr Tymchii as head of the Regional Executive for Western Ukraine. New groups followed under Dmytro Myron, Vasyl Sydor, Vasyl Chyzhevskiy and Ivan Klymiv. Dmytro Myron succeeded Hryniv as Regional Leader, and was later succeeded by Ivan Klymiv.

Shukhevych also placed special emphasis on expanding the OUN into Central and Eastern Ukraine. Such an expansion was facilitated by the elimination of the border between the western and eastern parts of Ukraine as a consequence of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine. Shukhevych directed many activists whom he sent into Ukraine to proceed as far as possible into the heartland and distant corners of Ukraine. As a result of these efforts, a separate regional leadership was organized by the early part of 1941 in the Dnipro region under Panko Sak-Mohyla from Kyiv and in the Kryvyi Rih region under Serhii Sherstiuk, a native of the Kharkiv region.

OUN Expeditionary Groups

The number of OUN members sent back to Ukraine during the first Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine represented only a small percentage of the total OUN membership. But the presence of the remaining members west of the Curzon line was viewed as only temporary. It was foreseen that in the event of a Nazi-Soviet war, these members would proceed to Halychyna, Volyn, the Dnipro region, Donbas, and Kuban. The possibility of such a war was apparent to all.

To prepare for this contingency, Shukhevych developed a project for the transfer and dispersal of the OUN membership throughout Ukraine in the form of Expeditionary Groups (*Pokhidni Hrupy*). The project was approved by the Revolutionary *Provid*, and supervision was assumed personally by Bandera, with Vasyl Kuk-Koval, the organizational officer of the *Provid*, appointed to assist Shukhevych in implementing this important project. A detailed plan giving individual assignments to 5,000 OUN members, according

to the needs of various regions and the personal qualifications of each member, was worked out by Vasyl Kuk, Zenon Matla and Roman Malashchuk. The plan called for the rapid dispersal of OUN members throughout Ukraine in three groups: a Northern, a Central, and a Southern Expeditionary Group. The leadership of each group was to be strictly hierarchical, with a group leader at the top.

As a result of this plan, thousands of OUN members dispersed throughout Ukraine following the German advance on the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the subsequent crackdown on the OUN by the Gestapo and the activity of a small group of Ukrainian collaborators in rounding up "Banderites" did not allow for a smooth implementation of the plan. Many OUN members were executed by the Gestapo, many were incarcerated in German prisons and concentration camps, and many contacts had to be suspended. Nevertheless, the plan, which was essentially Shukhevych's idea, had important results for the OUN, particularly in expanding its organizational network and revolutionary activity throughout Ukraine.

Legions of Ukrainian Nationalists

A parallel initiative was proposed by Roman Shukhevych in the military field: the formation of a Ukrainian legion to form the nucleus for a future Ukrainian national army. The initiative was realized through the assistance of Colonel Yaryi, who had been an officer of the Ukrainian Army of Halychyna in the 1918-1921 war of liberation, and later a member of the leadership of the UVO and the OUN *Provid*. After the split within the OUN he joined the Revolutionary OUN. Throughout the years, he had maintained ties with officers of the German Army, directed to do so by Col. Evhen Konovalets. When the Nazi Party gained ascendancy in Germany and began consolidating its power over the German armed forces, there began to emerge a group of officers within the German High Command critically disposed to the Party's plan of subduing Europe to German rule. Colonel Yaryi was instrumental in gaining support from this group for the idea of establishing Ukrainian legions within the German Army.

Two Ukrainian legions were formed, each of which was given a code name for conspiratorial purposes: a northern legion, code-named *Roland*, and a southern legion, code-named *Nachtigall*. The aforementioned group of officers were aware of the real purpose of the legions and of the plans of the OUN for its future transformation into the core of a Ukrainian National Army; however, these plans did not conflict with their position, since they believed that Hitler's plans were based on unrealistic fantasies, and would need to be overhauled in the course of the war in the East, with Hitler

himself becoming reconciled to the notion that it was in Germany's best interest that independent states be established in Ukraine, Belorussia and the Caucasus. In order to achieve this goal, national armies of these nations would need to be established. Consequently, with the assistance of the German Army the legions received arms and military training.

Thus were formed the Legions (*Druzhyny*) of Ukrainian Nationalists in April 1941. The agreement of the *Provid* with the German High Command stipulated that even though both of the Legions were formally to be part of the German Army, they were in reality to be under the jurisdiction of the OUN *Provid*, particularly in political matters.

The real commander of both Legions was Roman Shukhevych, who was authorized to make decisions about the fate of the Legions on behalf of the *Provid*. Formally, both Legions had separate commanders: Shukhevych was placed in command of the Northern Legion, and Major Evhen Pobihushchyi became the commander of the Southern. When the two legions eventually merged, Pobihushchyi, as the senior ranking officer, was made the overall commander, and Shukhevych became his deputy. Pobihushchyi described these events as followed:

In late autumn of 1940, the two men met in Frankfurt: Roman Shukhevych, the highest ranking military officer of the OUN, and Evhen Pobihushchyi, a major of the Ukrainian army during the first war of liberation in the years 1918-1920. Most of the legionnaires knew or surmised Shukhevych's stature in the Organization, but at this meeting Shukhevych displayed a quality exceedingly rare in Ukrainians -- a great degree of humility. He could have arranged things so that should Major Pobihushchyi "fall ill" Shukhevych would take command in an emergency... But Shukhevych knew that the Major had valuable experience in military training, which would be worthwhile to exploit in the training of the Legion. Therefore, Shukhevych politely requested that the Major take command of the Legion, while he himself would hold the post of Pobihushchyi's deputy and commander of the northern unit. Almost all of the legionnaires were members of the OUN, and anyone else in Shukhevych's position would have argued for and tried to become commander himself. This was the nature of his greatness. We all know the Ukrainian character: the pursuit of ranks and honors, the innate disposition to be in a position of command. But Shukhevych



Roman Shukhevyč's wife Natalka Berezyńska-Shukhevyč with their two children, 1941.

was indifferent to his formal status, and was willing to accept any post as long as he could work for the good of the cause.¹⁷

The Southern Legion underwent military training at Saubersdorf, near Vienna, while the Northern Legion trained at Neuhammer, near the town of Sagan.

On June 18, 1941, the Northern Legion was transported to Riashiv, and from there the unit marched to the vicinity of Peremyshl on the eve of the German advance on the Soviet Union. On June 24, the unit under Roman Shukhevyč crossed the Sian River and on June 29 marched into Lviv, engaging Soviet forces along the way. But the day of liberation from Soviet oppression was also the day of witness to the horrible aftermath of Soviet terror. The retreat of the Soviets and the appearance of Ukrainian military units with tridents on their hats and blue and yellow ribbons on their shoulders brought happiness to the Ukrainian population, but soon this joy was eclipsed by the discovery of mass graves of Ukrainian political prisoners horribly massacred in Lviv by the NKVD. The prison courtyard and the cells of Lviv prisons were filled with brutally mutilated corpses. Crowds of Ukrainians came to the prisons to search for relatives. Among the mutilated corpses Roman Shukhevyč discovered the body of his brother, Yurko.

On June 30, 1941, the restoration of Ukraine's independence was proclaimed. The two Ukrainian Legions took part in gatherings marking the proclamation. After two weeks in Lviv, the Legion under Shukhevych was moved into combat, and advanced through Zolochiv, Ternopil, Sataniv, Proskuriv and Vinnytsia. The bravery and courage of its officers and regular soldiers earned the respect of those German officers who were impartial.

Throughout the advance, Shukhevych maintained contact with the Expeditionary Groups of the OUN. The second in command of the Southern Group, Yaroslav Dzyndra-Chubai, described a meeting of his group with Shukhevych that summer:

Twenty kilometers before the city of Vinnytsia, we turned to the town of Yuzvyn. Here two other of our groups stopped to rest, wash their laundry in the pond, and meet with Roman Shukhevych. On the anti-Soviet front, there was no military unit braver than Roman Shukhevych's unit. They marched, it is true, in German uniforms, but from the beginning they pursued the ends established by the Organization. In the district of Vinnytsia, the unit distinguished itself with such a spirited assault on the enemy that the surprised German command had no choice but to recognize each individual soldier in Shukhevych's unit with medals of the Iron Cross of military merit. It was said even then about Roman Shukhevych that he was a first-rate military strategist. The victory occurred before our eyes in the town of Yuzvyn... We had an opportunity to speak candidly with the members of the unit, who were at the same time members of the OUN. During these conversations they threw off their German military tunics disdainfully and said, "If only we didn't have to wear these foreign uniforms much longer. We are beginning to prefer even a ragged uniform, that it only be our own native one..." Our meeting with Roman Shukhevych's unit ended with a religious service which was celebrated by the chaplain of the unit. This happened July 27, 1941.¹⁸

The Southern Legion under the command of Major Pobihushchyi left Saubersdorf on July 6, 1941, and proceeded through Hungary and Rumania toward Odesa. This unit fought not only with the Soviets, but also with "allied" Rumanian troops, who plundered Ukrainian peasants at every opportunity and accused those Ukrainians who defended themselves of being "dangerous communist agents."

The OUN *Provid* had originally planned that the Ukrainian Legions would enter Kyiv immediately after the Soviet retreat in order to proclaim the restoration of Ukrainian independence. A government was then to be formed under the current head of the Soviet Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Oleksander Bohomolets, and was to include representatives of Eastern Ukrainian regions, as well as of Western Ukraine. Among them were to be members of the Ukrainian National Committee, which had been established in Krakow on the eve of the war, consisting of OUN members and members of other Ukrainian political parties, such as Sak-Mohyla, Serhii Sherstiuk, Osyp Pozychaniuk, who were natives of Central Ukraine, Western Ukrainians Dmytro Myron-Orlyk, Roman Shukhevych, and others. The Ukrainian legionnaires were then to discard their German uniforms and don those of a new Ukrainian National Army. Afterward, a regional government was to be formed in Lviv for Western Ukraine, headed by Yaroslav Stetsko.

But the political situation took a different turn. Shortly before the German invasion, the Nazi regime ordered the arrest of Stepan Bandera, and soon afterward, the Gestapo summoned individual members of the Ukrainian National Committee in Krakow for interrogation in an attempt to terrorize them into assuming a passive stance in relation to developments in Ukraine. At the same time, the German advance toward Kyiv slowed down and so the establishment of an independent Ukrainian government in Kyiv had to be postponed. However, in light of the fact that leaders of the Nazi Party were beginning to reveal ever more clearly their hostility to the concept of an independent Ukrainian state, it became apparent to the OUN that the proclamation of the rebirth of Ukrainian independence could not be postponed. It was consequently decided that a declaration reestablishing Ukrainian statehood was to be immediately issued in Lviv and a Provisional Ukrainian Government formed, which would subordinate itself to the Ukrainian government to be established in Kyiv after its liberation.

In his memoirs Yaroslav Stetsko wrote thus about this development:

Originally we had taken the decision to proclaim the rebirth of Ukrainian statehood in Kyiv and not in Lviv. But because of developments, the proclamation was issued in Lviv as a result of my personal decision, when I realized that no other option existed for us after Hitler's declaration of June 22, 1941, on the occasion of the beginning of his campaign in the east, and in the face of the way the Germans were conducting themselves, declining at all governmental levels to establish contact with Ukrainians...

On the basis of a careful analysis of facts, it became clear that there were no indications that the Germans

were inclined to support our moves in establishing a Ukrainian state, or that they would even permit the proclamation of Ukraine's independence in Kyiv. Thus, we decided to act in Lviv and readjust our plans to the new situation. We concluded that the Germans may even attempt to prevent the realization of our plans in Kyiv.¹⁹

Thus, the proclamation of the rebirth of Ukrainian statehood was issued in Lviv on June 30, 1941. But on July 11, Yaroslav Stetsko was arrested by the Gestapo and transported to Berlin, as were several other members of the new Ukrainian government. On July 17, the Nazi regime annexed Halychyna to the so-called *Generalgouvernement* of Poland, which was a separate administrative unit established by the Germans on the territory of the former Polish state that had existed until 1939. The rest of Ukraine was organized as a colony, named the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*. The east bank of the Dnister River was transferred to Rumania and was renamed Transnistria. This was a clear negation of the concept of Ukraine's independence and unity of its territory.

In response to these open violations of Ukrainian independence, Roman Shukhevych notified the German High Command that after the arrests of members of the Ukrainian Government and of the head of the OUN, the Ukrainian Legions could no longer remain part of the German army. In August 1941, the Legions were therefore withdrawn from the front and sent back to Neuhammer and Saubersdorf "for additional training until the settlement of the problem," and in September were transferred to Frankfurt an der Oder.

In Frankfurt, both of the units, i.e. the Southern (*Roland*) and the Northern (*Nachtigall*), were formally united into one unit. Colonel Pobihushchyi was named commander of the Legion by the German Command, while Roman Shukhevych was named his adjutant and commander of the first company. Taking advantage of the circumstance that the legionnaires found themselves in a situation of being under possible arrest, the German Command attempted to replace the Ukrainian officers with Germans, but Shukhevych ordered each legionnaire to declare that he could not understand German well enough to carry out military orders delivered in German. As a result, the Ukrainian officers were left at their posts.

While the units were still in Neuhammer and Saubersdorf, a petition, drafted by Roman Shukhevych and signed by each legionnaire, was sent to the German High Command defining the conditions of further collaboration with Germany. The petition demanded that the Germans:

1. Respect the declaration of Ukrainian independence of June 30, 1941.

2. Immediately release from prison Stepan Bandera and other Ukrainian political prisoners.

3. Immediately release from prison Yaroslav Stetsko and other Ukrainian governmental leaders.

4. Use the reorganized Legions in military action on Ukrainian territory only.

5. Guarantee that the commanders of each unit of the Legion shall be Ukrainian.

6. Grant members of the Ukrainian Legion the same rights and obligations as troops of the regular German Army.

7. Provide immediate material aid to the families of the legionnaires.

8. Recognize the fact that members of the Legion had declared their allegiance to Ukraine and therefore could not declare allegiance to Germany.

On November 1, 1941, the combined units of the Legion received a reply from the German High Command, in which the authors explained that the High Command was not competent to decide political questions, but that in other matters the Ukrainian demands would be satisfied. The German High Command also responded that it would not demand an additional oath of loyalty to Germany from the legionnaires.

The units were then offered a military assignment in Belorussia to combat Soviet partisans. In view of the likelihood that Ukrainians would soon find themselves warring on two fronts, i.e. both with Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, it was decided that the opportunity to gain practical military experience overruled objections to continued collaboration with the Germans.²⁰ On November 25, 1941, every member of the Legion individually signed a one-year contract in which it was stipulated that no legionnaire would be employed for police actions against civilian population.

The units were transferred to Belorussia in March 1942. Needless to say, the Germans soon needed to be reminded of the proviso about not employing the legionnaires in any police action:

On June 20, 1942, the unit refused to carry out the command of the German captain to assist the members of *Wi-Ko* (*Wirtschaftskommando*) in expropriating food contingents from the starved population. Shukhevych declared that he would not send his troops to execute such an order because the legionnaires were sent here to fight and not to plunder.²¹

Both units of the Legion remained in Belorussia until the end of 1942, acquiring valuable military experience while fighting against Soviet partisans. This experience proved especially useful later, when most of the officers and soldiers of the Legion joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The Legion also won the sympathy of the local Belorussian population, as the above-mentioned member related:

The day of our departure was marked by an extremely pleasant experience. The entire population of the small town of O. came to bid farewell to our "Sich." This was truly a touching scene. They bade us farewell as if we were their own sons and brothers. I do not know if we would have received a more sincere farewell in Ukraine.²²

In December 1942, the one-year contract for military service ended, and despite German pressure the legionnaires to a man refused to renew the contract. The Legion was therefore disbanded on December 1, 1942. Beginning on December 5, small groups of Legion members were transported under police escort to Lontski prison in Lviv. Shukhevych's group was transported to Lviv at the end of December. Shukhevych, however, wore a German uniform and inconspicuously joined a group of German officers standing on the railroad platform. By the time the police escort realized what had happened, Shukhevych "vanished." A desperate hunt for Shukhevych by the Gestapo ended in failure, as did a conditional release of Ukrainian officers in the hope that they would lead the Gestapo to Shukhevych.

Roman Shukhevych left for the Polissia region to take command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. He was joined by most of the officers and soldiers of the Legion. Thus began in the spring of 1943 a new period in the life of Roman Shukhevych -- the period of service for Ukraine as Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

V. SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY

The Complex Political Situation

At the time of the Nazi crackdown on the OUN in July 1941 the *Provid* had at its disposal the following military cadres: two units of the Ukrainian Legion under the political supervision of Roman Shukhevych, with up to 1,000 officers and soldiers; members of the Ukrainian militia, police schools and police units in Halychyna, Volyn and Polissia, and units of the Ukrainian National Army, which had been mobilized upon the outbreak of the Soviet-German war by order of the head of the OUN Regional Executive for Western Ukraine, Ivan Klymiv-Evhen Legenda, with up to 10,000 fighters. It would therefore appear that there were over 10,000 Ukrainian revolutionaries under arms, reinforced by a network of 5,000 Expeditionary Group members of the OUN, to defend the Ukrainian nation against German occupation.

A cold, objective analysis of the political and military reality in Ukraine led to a quite different conclusion. The struggle in defense of Ukraine's freedom and honor, initiated by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, needed to have firm moral and political backing from the entire Ukrainian population. The Ukrainian people had to see that this struggle was inevitable, purposeful, and the only proper course of action. At the time when the German army marched into Ukraine, however, the general conviction among Ukrainians was that Germany was a natural, and therefore sincere, ally against Russia, since it was in the interest of Germany to support Ukrainian aspirations for statehood. This position was promoted by a widespread propaganda campaign by Ukrainian political circles opposed to the revolutionary OUN.

In this situation, when the Ukrainian liberation struggle still had to be waged against Moscow, immediate armed resistance to Nazi Germany by the revolutionary OUN would have been rejected by a majority of the Ukrainian people as a foolhardy challenge to Germany that would only provoke Germany to completely alter its attitude toward Ukrainians. It was thus apparent that before an armed insurgency could be mounted against Germany, the psychological mobilization of the entire Ukrainian population for a struggle against Germany as the new colonial occupant of Ukraine was necessary. The leadership of the OUN therefore decided to carry out a widescale political-educational campaign among the population and to strengthen the organizational base of the OUN, postponing an open armed struggle against Germany for a later and more favorable time.

The partisan forces under Klymiv-Legenda were therefore demobilized. However, the military sector of the OUN was preserved in order to have a foundation ready for a future Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The new armed underground was comprised of OUN members with military training and combatants of the Ukrainian National Defense (*Ukrainska Natsionalna Samooborona, UNS*) which consisted of OUN members and nonmembers with military training. Military schools which at first existed openly for the training of militia officers and NCOs went underground, and weapons were hidden in secret storage depots. Members of the OUN/UNS military underground lived as civilians, and only in case of need gathered together and took up arms to execute a specific mission. The OUN *Provid* placed this network under the command of a Supreme Military Staff, which also included military specialists who were not members of the OUN. All regional military staff reported to the Supreme Military Staff.

Polissia: The Birthplace of the UPA

During the period of preparation for a full-scale struggle against Nazi Germany, this network of OUN military cells and units of the Ukrainian National Defense were sufficiently strong to suppress rival Communist and Polish partisan activity in Halychyna, but proved inadequate for the situation in Volyn and Polissia. Polissia, in particular, had become the center of activity of Soviet and Polish partisan bands. Since German retaliatory operations were usually conducted against Ukrainian villages, it became necessary to organize an armed defense of the Ukrainian population of Polissia simultaneously against all the forces harassing the Ukrainian population: Soviet partisans, Polish terrorists and the Nazi police.

The military underground of the OUN/UNS did not suffice for such a task. It was necessary to organize regular Ukrainian military units pre-

pared both to repulse and assault the enemy at a moment's notice. Therefore, the OUN Provincial Leadership (*Oblastnyi Provid*) of Polissia urgently requested the OUN Regional *Provid* for Northwestern Ukraine to sanction the organization of a Ukrainian Insurgent Army, that is, of regular Ukrainian military units, which would defend the Ukrainian population of Volyn and Polissia against all three enemies: the Bolsheviks, Poles and Germans.

This request was resisted for a while by the OUN leadership, which feared that an open war between Ukrainian insurgents and German forces would provoke terrible repressive measures against the Ukrainian population as a whole. Although the true intentions of Nazi Germany toward Ukraine were brutally demonstrated during the first year by a rapacious colonial policy, the growing enmity of Ukrainians did not immediately translate into a general endorsement of the necessity of military resistance.

Roman Shukhevych, while on duty with the Ukrainian Legion in Belorussia, followed the developments in Ukraine closely and maintained active contact with the leadership of the OUN. When Shukhevych had joined the Legion, Dmytro Hrytsai replaced him as head of the OUN Supreme Military Staff, but Shukhevych continued to be a member of the OUN *Provid* and its Military Staff.

Concerned with the deteriorating situation in Polissia, Shukhevych requested an officer of the Legion, Ensign Vasyl Sydor, to journey around Polissia (taking advantage of a leave "to visit his family" in the Sokal region) to study the attitudes of the local population and of the local OUN membership. In 1937 Sydor had been the officer of military affairs in the OUN Regional Executive for the northwestern lands (Volyn and Polissia). It had been at Sydor's initiative that the first military group of the OUN was formed, whose objective it was to raid Polissia along the Prypiat River against organs of Polish occupation. In the summer and autumn of 1939 Sydor had been part of a group of OUN members who in the vicinity of the Polissian town of Yaniv had formed the *Poliska Sich*, as the main base for a partisan unit named Polissian Kozaks, numbering around 500 fighters. In 1940, during the first Soviet occupation of Polissia, this group made an attempt to initiate military operations against the forces of Soviet occupation. The group's activity was finally checked by the arrest and trial of Los-Adamskyi and colleagues. Sydor had thus been closely associated with developments in Polissia and personally knew the revolutionary activists of the region, to whom he now turned for assistance in becoming acquainted with the current political climate in Polissia.

Sydor carried out the mission assigned to him by Shukhevych very diligently. He conducted discussions with the OUN Supreme *Provid*, with the leadership of the Organization in Polissia, the lower echelons, the population, and transmitted all of this information to Shukhevych.

Having analyzed Sydor's report, Shukhevych endorsed the plan to immediately begin with the organization of regular UPA forces in Polissia. Such a plan had been proposed by the current OUN Regional Leader for Northwestern Ukraine, Serhii Kachynskiy-Ostap, the son of an Orthodox priest in Polissia. Acting on Shukhevych's recommendation and that of the Regional Executive for Northwestern Ukraine in October 1942, the supreme OUN *Provid* approved the plan to organize the first units of a Ukrainian army. The first company of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was formed that month in Polissia under the command of Kachynskiy-Ostap. Soon after, a second UPA company was formed in Volyn under the command of Perehiiniak-Dovbeshka-Korobka. By the end of 1942, three more platoons of the UPA were organized in Polissia and Volyn under commanders Kruk, Dorosh, and Gonta. By the summer of 1943 these platoons had grown into full brigades.

In the first days of 1943 Roman Shukhevych and Vasyl Sydor left for Polissia to help organize the UPA.

During the first months of its existence, the thrust of UPA's activity was directed against Polish bands and Soviet partisans who terrorized the Ukrainian population. Commander Serhii Kachynskiy-Ostap particularly distinguished himself in operations against these enemies, being mentioned in the memoirs of all the Soviet partisan leaders who operated in Polissia at the time.

With the arrival in Polissia of Roman Shukhevych, who because of his membership in the OUN *Provid* and its Supreme Military Staff was in a position to make decisions in regard to crucial matters, the actions of the UPA were redirected from the Soviets and Poles against the Germans. The first battle with the German occupational forces took place on February 7, 1943. In the Volyn region, the UPA unit under Perehiiniak seized the town of Volodymyrets in a bold assault, disarmed a group of German *Schutzmänner* and gendarmes, freed a group of political prisoners, and captured valuable arms and ammunition. The UPA platoon lost one soldier, while the Germans lost seven men, including the commander of the German gendarmes. Some consider this action to have been the actual beginning of the UPA warfare.

From this point onward, the number of UPA battles with the Germans rapidly increased, and soon exceeded the number of operations against Soviet partisans and Polish terrorists. On March 10, 1943, Serhii Kachynskiy-Ostap, the commander of the first UPA platoon, was killed during an assault on a German arms depot near the town of Orzhev, while a little earlier, on February 22, 1943, commander Perehiiniak-Dovbeshka-Korobka, commander of the first UPA Volyn platoon, fell in battle against the Germans near the town of Vysotska.

As in his work in the Ukrainian Legion, Roman Shukhevych displayed exemplary unpretentiousness in the UPA, spurning the lure of leadership and power. Roman Dmytro Kliachkovskiy-Klym Savur, Regional OUN Leader for Ukraine's northwestern lands, became the commander of the UPA units operating in Volyn and Polissia, which were eventually designated as the territory of UPA-North; Vasyl Sydor-Konrad Zov became chief of the UPA-North General Staff, while Shukhevych returned to Halychyna to head the Supreme Military Staff, which was entrusted with the task of guiding and coordinating the entire military sector of the revolutionary movement. It was then that Shukhevych began using the pseudonym Taras Chuprynka with the rank of Major.

In the spring of 1943, a former colonel of the armies of the Ukrainian National Republic, Leonid Stupnytskyi joined the UPA, adopting the pseudonym of Honcharenko, and was appointed chief of staff of UPA-North by Vasyl Sydor, who felt that Stupnytskyi was more qualified than he for this important position.

Territorial Expansion of the UPA

A conference of the OUN in February 1943 officially approved the initiative of Roman Shukhevych in forming regular units of the UPA in Polissia and Volyn. The conference also approved the transformation of the Ukrainian National Defense and the military units of the OUN into one Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Leadership of the UPA was officially entrusted to Roman Shukhevych.

Shukhevych assumed his new position with the energy, planning and thoroughness typical of him, and attracted the best military men of the OUN leadership to his side. Special emphasis was given to expanding UPA's activity into the eastern lands of Ukraine. The success of this effort was noted by the Third Great Assembly of the OUN in August 1943:

News about the UPA, i.e. about the armed resistance on the territory of Polissia and Volyn, inspired the admiration and stirred the military spirit of people in other areas of Ukraine. The operations of the UPA spread quickly from the provinces (*oblasts*) of Berest, Pinsk, Volodymyr Volynskiy and Rivne to the Kamianets-Podilskiy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr and Kyiv provinces.²³

The process of organizing the UPA into a military entity was completed in August 1943, when the Command of the UPA was made independent of the OUN *Provid* and the Supreme Military Staff of the OUN was transformed into the UPA Supreme Military Staff with a separate post of UPA Supreme Commander. The UPA was subdivided into four territorial commands: UPA-North, which included the Volyn, Polissia and Zhytomyr provinces; UPA-West, which comprised Halychyna, Bukovyna, Carpatho-Ukraine and Transcarpathian Ukraine; UPA-South, encompassing the Vinnytsia and Kamianets-Podilskyi provinces and the lands south of them; and UPA-East, covering the remaining central and eastern lands of Ukraine.

Colonel Roman Shukhevych-Taras Chuprynka assumed the post of Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, while Major Dmytro Hrytsai-Perebyinis became Chief of the UPA General Staff. Both Shukhevych and Hrytsai were promoted to the rank of general by the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council on February 9, 1946. Taking command of the regional groups were: Col. Roman Kliachkovskiy-Klym Savur as commander of UPA-North, with Gen. Leonid Stupnytskyi-Honcharenko as the chief of staff, Major Vasyl Sydor-Shelest (promoted on January 22, 1946 to the rank of Colonel) as commander of UPA-West, with Ensign Stepan Novytskyi-Vadym-Step as chief of staff, and Col. Omelian Hrabets-Batko as commander of UPA-South, with Ensign Kropyva as chief of staff. UPA-East never completed its formation, and only isolated battalions and platoons operated in the area. Next to Hrytsai, the closest colleagues of Shukhevych-Chuprynka were: a native of Volyn, Rostyslav Voloshyn-Pavlenko, commander of all UPA support personnel, and a native of Central Ukraine, Yosyp Pozychaniuk-Shabliuk-Shuhai, the chief political officer of the UPA.

The Loyalty of the Commander

At the beginning of 1943, when Roman Shukhevych and Vasyl Sydor were still in Polissia, the chief of the OUN Supreme Military Staff, Dmytro Hrytsai and his deputy, Oleksa Hasyn, fell into the hands of the Gestapo. Hrytsai landed in the Lviv police jail, while Hasyn was confined to the jail in Drohobych.

Upon hearing the news of Hasyn's and Hrytsai's capture, Shukhevych immediately went to Lviv with Vasyl Sydor and devised a plan for the liberation of the imprisoned men. The freeing of Hrytsai was entrusted to Sydor, while the liberation of Hasyn was entrusted to Kost Tsmots-Modest. The plan was identical for both operations, and proved successful because of its simplicity. The essence of the plan rested on the reckless courage of those carrying it out. With Sydor and Tsmots wearing the uniforms of Gestapo of-

ficers, and members of their respective teams dressed as Gestapo troopers, the two teams went to the two jails, and presented the prison commandants with forged documents from the Supreme Command of the Gestapo in Berlin, which instructed that each convict be handed over to the Gestapo *Sonderkommandos* for immediate transfer to Berlin. The cool-headed demeanor of the participants in executing the escape plots deluded the commandants of both the Lviv and Drohobych prisons, who unwittingly handed Hrytsai and Hasyn over into the hands of Ukrainian revolutionaries dressed in German uniforms.

Both of the liberated men resumed their work on the UPA Supreme Military Staff. When Shukhevych became the Supreme Commander of the UPA, Hrytsai became the chief of staff with Hasyn-Lytsar as his deputy; and when Hrytsai died in the fall of 1945, his deputy became the next chief of staff.

Against Otamanism

As Supreme Commander of the UPA, Shukhevych directed a great deal of attention to bringing uniformity to the military resistance. First of all, he united all the military units of the OUN, the Ukrainian National Self-Defense in Halychyna, and the Bukovynian Ukrainian National Self-Defense into a consolidated military formation, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Shukhevych also felt strongly that the UPA should be the sole Ukrainian military force, basing his reasons on Ukraine's recent tragic experience with military fragmentation. Historic consciousness likewise guided Shukhevych in his selection of the alias Chuprynka and of his endorsement of the name Ukrainian Insurgent Army for the emerging military formation.

The UPA was regarded by its organizers to be the direct successor of the last military formation of the independent Ukrainian National Republic, which continued Ukraine's struggle after the occupation of Ukraine by the Bolsheviks and the retreat of the main armies of the UNR. Organized in 1921, this earlier army was also called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and was led by a Central Insurgent Committee under the command of a young poet, Hrytsko Chuprynka. Shukhevych was particularly drawn to this phase of the Ukrainian liberation struggle as a youth, analyzing such questions as: What was the attitude of the Ukrainian people toward the national liberation struggle after the retreat of the UNR armies from Ukraine? Were there efforts to continue the military struggle? What kind of attempts were made? Why did they end in failure? Hrytsko Chuprynka's bold concept of organizing the entire Ukrainian population into one Ukrainian Insurgent Army impressed Roman Shukhevych so much that he took the surname Chuprynka as

his nom de guerre, adding the name Taras in honor of Ukraine's greatest poet, Taras Shevchenko.

Shukhevych's analysis of the military struggle of 1919-1921 also showed him the frightening consequences of the phenomenon that was named "otamanism." Most of the innumerable Ukrainian insurgent leaders (called otamans in the tradition of the Kozaks) and their followers were sincere Ukrainian patriots, who loved their people and were prepared to sacrifice their lives in battle against the enemies of Ukraine. But the inability of these otamans to unite into a centrally-directed and disciplined Ukrainian army made all of their patriotic fervor useless and caused a pointless loss of blood. How different the struggle would have been if the numerous Ukrainian partisan groups had all been part of a united Ukrainian army, and all the insurgent leaders had been strictly subordinate to a unified Ukrainian military command.

Therefore, Shukhevych set as one of his first priorities the unification of the entire Ukrainian national resistance under the command of the UPA, including those resistance groups which were not linked to the revolutionary OUN under Stepan Bandera.

The brutal conditions of German occupation did not permit the continued existence of numerous insurgent forces as in 1919-1921. In 1942-1943, there were, in addition to the UPA, only three other nationalist armed groups: the *Poliska Sich* under Otaman Taras Borovets-Bulba in the Liudvypil district (*raion*) of Polissia, and two military detachments linked to the organization of Col Andrii Melnyk: one operating in the district of Kremiannets-Rivne under Ensign Blakytnyi, and the other in the district of Volodymyr-Volynskiy under Ensign Bilyi (both in the Volyn region).

Borovets-Bulba, who had formerly served in the Polish army as a contract officer, crossed into Soviet-occupied Polissia from the *Generalgouvernement Polen* before the outbreak of the Soviet-German war through the underground connections of the OUN. He was smuggled over the border by the sister of Serhii Kachynskiy-Ostap, who was killed in the process. In Polissia, Borovets contacted the surviving members of the OUN group of Los-Adamskyi. After the June 30, 1941 Declaration of the rebirth of independent Ukrainian statehood, Borovets organized a unit of the Ukrainian militia in Olevska in Polissia, calling it the *Poliska Sich*.

When the Germans disclosed their real attitude toward the issue of Ukrainian independence and began to disband recently organized Ukrainian militia detachments or to convert them into auxiliary police units under German control, Borovets went underground with twenty *Sich* members, officially dissolving the *Sich* on February 16, 1942. In the course of 1942, Borovets' underground group grew to about 100 members. A young poet,

Oleh Shtul-Zhdanovych, a member of the Melnyk organization, was made chief of staff after negotiations between this organization and Borovets.

The separate activity of this group in time became very dangerous for the UPA not only because it was a manifestation of otamanism but also because Borovets began to engage in negotiations and at times collaborated with Soviet partisans against the Germans, and then with the Germans against the Soviets.²⁴ This often had dangerous consequences for the UPA, for example, when Bulba by his knowledge of the Polissian terrain helped Soviet partisans establish themselves in the rear of the UPA, not realizing that by helping them he inadvertently contributed to the severe losses which the UPA incurred fighting the partisans.

When negotiations between the UPA and Borovets failed to achieve a merger of the Bulba group with the UPA, a UPA platoon under the command of Dorosh simply took charge of the Bulba group without firing a single shot in August 1943. Sixty-three members of the Bulba force freely joined the UPA, while about forty under Bulba and Shtul-Zhdanovych refused to join the UPA and reorganized themselves into the Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army (UNRA). But after three months the UNRA was dissolved following Borovets' arrest during negotiations with the Germans, who consequently incarcerated him in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

The groups of Blakytyni and Bilyi, each with approximately 100 members, freely joined the UPA, the former almost entirely, the latter in the majority. Those who refused formed a separate force within the structure of German sponsored anti-partisan units, that functioned under the auspices of SS *Sturmabführer* Bieglmayer, with the name Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense.

By September 1943 there was only one Ukrainian Insurgent Army under the command of Col. Taras Chuprynka. The name Ukrainian National Defense continued to be applied to the insurgent units in Halychyna until the end of 1943, but in reality the UNS was an integral part of the UPA.

The UPA: An All-National Ukrainian Military Force

Together with the consolidation of all Ukrainian military formations into a single and unified Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Roman Shukhevych consistently endeavored to promote the UPA's role as an all-national political movement. In his declaration of September 25, 1947, General Taras Chuprynka noted:

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army arose from the military units of the OUN (under Stepan Bandera) in 1942, under conditions of total war between the Ukrainian people and the Hitlerite occupational force. During the course of 1942-1943, the population massively enlisted in the UPA. The UPA became clearly an all-national military force. It became the most complete expression of the liberation struggle of the entire Ukrainian nation.²⁵

And in his exhaustive article on the genesis of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych wrote the following:

In February 1943, as a result of the heightened brutality of German rule, the insurgent armed struggle against the Hitlerite occupation became a mass phenomenon in the Volyn and Polissia regions. Insurgent units which were formed after thousands of men, women and youths massively went underground could no longer continue to exist as military units of the OUN because now they had come to consist not only of OUN members, but also of supporters of other political groups and patriots of no particular political persuasion. Consequently, the OUN military forces had to be replaced by a national, superpartisan Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA.²⁶

The all-national character of the UPA was expressed in practice as well as in proclamations. When in 1943, Leonid Stupnytskyi, a former officer of the army of the Ukrainian National Republic, joined the UPA, Roman Shukhevych gave him the post of chief-of-staff of UPA-North, replacing in this critical position a member of the OUN, Ensign Sydor-Zov. Stupnytskyi remained at this post as General Honcharenko until his heroic death in a battle against the Soviets on July 30, 1944.

The military officers of the Bulba group who joined the UPA were also given officer ranks in the UPA. Shukhevych appointed Ensign Pol-Polovyi from the organization of Colonel Melnyk to the rank of Major and gave him command of the first UPA officer school in Volyn, while later he made him commander of the UPA officer training school, code-named *Oleni*, stationed in the Carpathian Mountains.

In 1944, Shukhevych made an effort to attract Colonel Melnyk's organization into the UPA. Through Major Pol-Polovyi, the UPA Supreme

Commander proposed to Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, the acting leader of Melnyk's group in Ukraine, that selected members of his organization be sent to the UPA officer school. Kandyba personally agreed with this proposal and at his own initiative sent several scores of Melnyk's adherents to become UPA officer candidates. But the Melnyk *Provid* (*PUN*) rejected such active cooperation with the UPA. The entire matter soon became known to the Gestapo, which consequently arrested nearly the entire *PUN*. All of the arrested, with the exception of Olzhych, were released after several months of interrogation. Olzhych subsequently met his untimely death in the Nazi concentration camp of Sachsenhausen, having sustained weeks of torture for his collaboration with the UPA. The officer candidates, whom he had sent for training in the UPA, however, remained in the UPA and eventually were commissioned as UPA officers.

Colonel Bartolomei Evtymovych, a prominent member of the Hetmanite (quasi-monarchist) movement, was also a member of the UPA Supreme Military Staff.

A Common Struggle

As Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, General Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka placed great emphasis on the clarity of the ideological-political principles under which the UPA fought. The objective of the UPA armed struggle was not only Ukraine's independence but also a new political order in the world, under the slogan "Freedom for all Nations! Freedom for all Individuals!" In accordance with Chuprynka's orders, an effort was made to include in this struggle the other peoples enslaved by Muscovite and German imperialisms. Large numbers of sons of these nations were found at that time in the ranks of the Red Army and in separate military formations of the German army. The UPA appealed to all of them to leave the Red Army and the *Wehrmacht*, the enslavers of their homelands, and to join the UPA in a common struggle against common enemies.

The nobleness of the ideals proclaimed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army inspired many to join in the great struggle led by the UPA. Although UPA's struggle against two great military giants seemed hopeless, large numbers of foreign nationals from the Soviet and German armies deserted to the UPA. By the summer of 1943, separate national units of Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks and Tatars became autonomous units of the UPA, and distinguished themselves with particular heroism.

At the initiative of the UPA Supreme Commander, the First Conference of the Enslaved Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia was convened on November 21-23, 1943, on territory controlled by the UPA and attended by

39 delegates representing thirteen captive nations. This conference established the ideological, political, programmatic and organizational groundwork for the common struggle. Roman Shukhevych personally attended the conference as an honorary guest.

The Ukrainian vision of a new political world order, based on a recognition of every nation's right to independence and each individual's right to freedom and security was thus realized.

The UPA and the Division Halychyna

In the spring of 1943, when the UPA was actively engaged in an open struggle against Nazi occupation and began to extend its activities into Halychyna, the *Provid* of the Melnyk organization delivered a memorandum to Hitler proposing the formation of separate Ukrainian combat units in the German army.²⁷ This memorandum went unanswered. But soon after, the Nazi governor of Halychyna, Otto Wächter, proposed to the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Professor Volodymyr Kubliovych, the organization of a separate Ukrainian division within the *Schutzstaffel* (SS). When the Ukrainian Central Committee agreed, Wächter announced on April 28, 1943, the formation of the Waffen-SS Division Galizien.

From a political standpoint, this Division was established on grounds completely contradictory to the UPA, which the organizers of the Division stressed on every occasion, directing especially harsh and exaggerated propaganda against the UPA in the Ukrainian press, in leaflets and at public meetings. Shukhevych, however, did not find it necessary to respond to these attacks. In fact, he demonstrated a remarkable degree of tolerance, distinguishing the political organizers of the Division from the Division's rank and file. He took a negative stand against the former, because it was one thing to have created Ukrainian units within the German Army in the spring of 1941, when there existed a strong possibility that Germany would react favorably to the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty and to the formation of a separate Ukrainian army, but it was another matter to collaborate with the Nazis in 1943, in the face of German colonialist policy toward Ukraine and in view of the fact that Germany was headed for defeat. Nevertheless, Roman Shukhevych did not accuse the political organizers of being national traitors, but only characterized them as opportunistic and politically naive individuals. In an article entitled "Concerning the Genesis of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council" Shukhevych wrote about these individuals among the leadership of the Melnyk organization and the Front of National Unity, headed by Dmytro Paliyiv, thus:

These people shared a more or less pro-German framework of the objectives and methods for furthering the Ukrainian liberation cause in the circumstances of German occupation. Utilizing the organizational apparatus of the Ukrainian Central Committee, they were able to propagandize their political views among the Ukrainian masses of the Halychyna region. This grouping, and particularly the veterans, led by Dmytro Paliyiv, became very active in conjunction with the German plan of forming the Division Halychyna consisting of Galician Ukrainians. The veterans of the former Ukrainian Army of Halychyna reckoned on recreating the experiment from World War I, hoping that as then through the military formation of the Ukrainian *Sich* Riflemen, so now through the creation of the Division Halychyna, a Ukrainian military force would be created, which would at the appropriate opportunity lead the struggle for an Independent Ukrainian State. All their hopes rested on the Germans.²⁸

Shukhevych regarded the soldiers of the Halychyna Division as sincere Ukrainian patriots, who believed that in the existing situation they could best serve Ukraine in the ranks of the Division. Upon Shukhevych's command, many members of the OUN joined the Division to acquire military skills and especially NCO and officer training. Following the German retreat, many of these members joined the UPA. It was the clear wish of General Shukhevych-Chuprynka that there be friendly relations between the members of the Division and the UPA.

Against Two Goliaths

If the struggle of the UPA under General Shukhevych is allegorically reminiscent of the Biblical story about David and Goliath, then this was the battle of the Ukrainian David against two Goliaths, the brown-shirt Germans and the red Russians. In the first three years of the war, Ukrainians had to struggle with both superpowers simultaneously.

The gravity of the situation was obvious to everyone. Hence, some OUN leaders believed that simultaneous resistance to both aggressors was unfeasible. Would the enslaved Ukrainian people display so much moral strength and titanic courage as to duel with these two military Goliaths? All the more serious was the presence among Ukrainians of a group of opportu-

ists who preached the necessity of appeasing the Germans in order to destroy the Soviet Russian empire, and denounced the struggle against Hitlerite Germany as a pointless and criminal waste of Ukrainian blood.

Roman Shukhevych, however, had limitless faith in the spiritual strength of the Ukrainian people, and it was for this reason that as early as the autumn of 1942 he decisively supported the immediate formation of a regular Ukrainian Insurgent Army to combat German colonialism. His faith in his people did not delude him. Thousands of volunteers from all parts of Ukraine swelled the ranks of the UPA, more than anyone could have expected. Thousands volunteered despite the fact that tens of thousands of young Ukrainian revolutionaries had been massacred in the cellars of the NKVD and more than a million Ukrainian deserters of the Red Army had starved to death in German POW camps, and despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainians were being forcibly mobilized into the Red Army or sent to labor camps in Germany. The above mentioned organizational structure of the UPA did not remain a purely theoretical plan, but came to reflect a reality, an efficiently functioning organization of mass proportions and great strength.

Within a few months of its formal creation by the *Provid* of the Revolutionary OUN, the UPA was successfully engaged in inflicting severe blows to Ukraine's enemies in Polissia, Volyn, the Carpathian Mountains and even on the great open terrains of the Dnipro region. If the activity of the UPA was weaker in the central regions of Ukraine than in Western Ukraine, the reason lay only in the lack of strategic qualities of the terrain there: in the Dnipro region there were neither swampy forests, such as in Polissia and Volyn, nor mountains as in Halychyna. But in the ranks of the UPA in Western Ukraine, there were, in addition to Polissians, Volynians, Galicians and Bukovynians, such natives of the Dnipro region as one of Shukhevych's closest associates in the UPA Supreme Command and UHVR, Yosyp Pozychaniuk-Shuhai, who was born in the Kherson region of southern Ukraine and grew up in various areas of Central and Eastern Ukraine. Pozychaniuk lost his life fighting the Bolsheviks on the Galician foothills of the Carpathian Mountains. The first officer of the UPA, who was awarded the Gold Cross of Military Service, First Class, was another native of the Dnipro region, Major Dmytro Karpenko-Yastrub, a former Red Army lieutenant and commander of the foreign national units of the UPA. He fell in battle on December 17, 1944, near Strilyska Novi. The commander of the Bukovynian battalion was Captain Lisovyi, who hailed from Central Ukraine. He died heroically fighting the Bolshevik aggressor on the crests of the Carpathian Mountains in Bukovyna.

Reality confirmed that Roman Shukhevych's faith in the moral strength and patriotic fervor among Ukrainians of all regions of Ukraine

rested on a firm basis. From the first day of its existence the Ukrainian Insurgent Army had become an all-national army of Ukraine's finest sons. For members of the UPA, Polissia, Volyn, Halychyna and Naddniprianshchyna (Central Ukraine) were but administrative and geographic designations of different parts of a single Ukraine.

The size of the UPA grew at a surprising pace. During the shifting of fronts in 1944, the number of UPA fighters approached 100,000, with another 100,000 men and women participating in the resistance in a supportive capacity. Cardinal Joseph Slipyi related that at the turn of 1944-1945 Soviet military circles were estimating the strength of the UPA at around half a million.²⁹

The difficult and complex problems of guerrilla warfare in such an exceptionally hostile environment were pointed out by Gen. Pavlo Shandruk, a military expert:

Having become UPA Supreme Commander, General Shukhevych had to overcome tremendous difficulties of an organizational nature at the same time as the UPA units were engaged in military operations. The UPA units operated on dissimilar terrain; there was a lack of arms, ammunition, food and sanitary supplies. Above all, there was in the very beginning a lack of experienced commanders and trained soldiers. This handicap was overcome in a short time through the experience of daily military operations and by the enthusiasm and superhuman efforts of Shukhevych, as well as of all the commanders and soldiers. Particularly serious difficulties existed in maintaining communications between Supreme Headquarters and groups operating over vast territories controlled by the UPA. These problems were overcome through what we call the "unity of common doctrine" under which the soldiers knew the intentions of their commanders as well as their respective assignments and had the tactical knowledge of how to execute these aims, while all the officers and soldiers were able to discern the intentions of their Supreme Commander, Roman Shukhevych, proclaimed in his instructions and directives. Every sector of the UPA was so well organized in those extremely difficult circumstances, including officer schools, that one cannot but have great admiration for its organizers and commanding staff. Everything that we call the tactical position of the UPA was in good order.

The most dangerous objective, shouldered by General Shukhevych and his staff, namely the urgency of fighting three enemies, and the consequent need to shift the military groups of the UPA to different segments of the front, was handled with incomparably efficient techniques of warfare.

How was the UPA able to oppose three enemies? Its greatest asset was the element most important in warfare: the tactic of unexpected assaults in the most appropriate terrains. When larger enemy forces were encountered, UPA units would retreat skillfully without incurring great losses. Naturally, such activity owed much to the patriotic support of the population, who saw the UPA as its unwavering and courageous defender.³⁰

Odd as it was, the first targets of the UPA, which was originally formed to fight against the Germans, had to be directed against communist partisans and their collaborators, Polish military bands. On the terrain where the UPA was born, these bands pillaged and terrorized the Ukrainian population even more than the Germans. When the advance of the Germans was halted, the Soviet command decided to strengthen its partisan bands operating behind enemy lines in Ukraine and also send groups into the Carpathian Mountains.

Thus, in the winter of 1942-1943, a special Soviet partisan group was formed in the Sumy region of northeastern Ukraine under the command of a seasoned Red Army general, Sydor Kovpak, numbering about 4,000-5,000 troops. This force was transferred to Belorussia, from which it proceeded through Polissia and Volyn to the Black Forest area of the Carpathian Mountains, where it was to establish its base. This force consisted of Ukrainian traitors, who acted not unlike the Ukrainian janissaries of the days of Turkish yoke, willing to sacrifice everything for the achievement of their goal. From the moment that they stepped into Ukraine from the Belorussian forests, the Kovpakists displayed a bestial hatred toward all Ukrainians who supported the struggle for an independent Ukraine. Disguising themselves as fearless partisan fighters against the Germans, the Kovpakists directed most of their activity to terrorizing Ukrainian inhabitants in an effort to dissuade them from supporting the Ukrainian independence movement and to induce them into believing that Moscow was Ukraine's only ally in its struggle against the Hitlerite *Übermenschen*.

The appearance of such a strong and well armed communist partisan force surprised the still weak Ukrainian resistance. The *Poliska Sich* of Otaman Borovets-Bulba began negotiations with this force. Even certain

units of the UPA tried to "coexist" with the Kovpakists. But Roman Shukhevych, upon becoming Supreme Commander of the UPA, insisted on pursuing an uncompromising war against the Red partisans.

Despite several battles with the Germans, Kovpak managed to reach the Carpathian Mountains. But here, in the Black Forest, his forces were decimated by the UPA and had to withdraw from the area. A similar fate befell the Red partisan groups of Colonels Medvedev, Mikhailov and others who in 1943-1944 tried to establish themselves in northwestern Ukraine, as well as General Shukaiev's "coalition of groups" based in the Carpathian Mountains.

The political leadership of Nazi Germany at first considered Ukrainian partisan warfare against the Germans as untenable. German "specialists" regarded the Ukrainian guerrilla offensive against the German *Übermenschen* as an act of conscious suicide, since they believed that German forces could destroy such resistance within a matter of days. But the first attacks by the UPA showed that this was not so. The UPA delivered great blows to the German administration, and the barbaric methods of Gestapo repression and random terror proved ineffective in crushing the UPA. The *Sturmabteilung* (SA) chief Viktor Lütze, a close collaborator of Hitler, was ambushed and killed in early May 1943 on the Kovel-Brest highway by the UPA group *Pomsta Polissia* (Revenge of Polissia). Instead of bringing in chains the commander of the UPA to Berlin, as Lütze had boasted he would succeed in doing, they brought back the corpse of Lütze himself.

The murder of Lütze forced the Nazi command to recognize how serious a threat the UPA anti-German resistance really was, politically and psychologically as well as militarily. When neither propaganda nor terror brought results under SS General von dem Bach-Zalewski and *Gebietskommissar* Müller, a special staff to combat the UPA (*Banden Bekämpfung*) was formed in June 1943 in Volodymyr Volynskyi under the command of SS *Sturmabführer* Platte and SS General Hinzler. In early May, combined military-police actions against the UPA were extended from the region of Horokhiv to all Volyn and Polissia. Tanks and airplanes were employed in these massive operations, aimed at "eradicating the bands" from the forests of the Lutsk, Kostopil and Volodymyr regions. "The insurgency has to be destroyed and the whole terrain mastered by the Germans administratively, propagandistically and economically," wrote General Hinzler in his order No. 41.

However, this widespread military-police action ended in a fiasco. Through clever maneuvers, the UPA partisans succeeded in evading the overwhelming German forces and attacking with greatest effect where they were least expected. For example, on the night of June 23-24, 1943, the UPA companies *Dorosh* and *Yarema* attacked a German train between the stations

of Nemovychi and Malynske, killed 150 Gestapo troops and seized substantial quantities of arms and ammunition. More such blows against the Germans followed.

The Germans launched another widespread military-police operation against the UPA in the Carpathians during November and December 1943. But their attack on the Black Forest ended in an embarrassing defeat: at the onset of the battle the Ukrainian insurgents captured the German military station and severed communications between the German command and its units. Losing sixty soldiers, the Germans retreated in panic, leaving in the confusion wagons loaded with arms and ammunition. German retaliatory operations in the Sambir, Dolyna and Skole regions also ended in failure.

Regardless of their awesome advantage in arms and manpower, the German generals and Gestapo cutthroats showed themselves to be helpless against the heroism and partisan skills of the Ukrainian insurgents, who operated under the knowledgeable and systematic leadership of the legendary UPA Supreme Commander, Taras Chuprynka. The myth about the untenability of Ukrainian armed resistance against the German aggressor was crushed.

In the area of propaganda, the Germans tried to portray the UPA as Bolshevik lackeys. Using Polish collaborators and *Volksdeutsche*, the Gestapo spread a fraudulent "Appeal of Marshal Vassilievsky," in which the government of the Ukrainian SSR promised to accept into its fold the leader of the anti-German resistance, Stepan Bandera. This was soon followed by an "Appeal of Leontii Markovsky," an allegedly "famous Ukrainian political leader," who assumed this pseudonym to protect himself from the Security Service (*Sluzhba Bezpeky*) of the OUN. This appeal pointed out the "Commands of Vassilievsky" as evidence that the "Banderite UPA" was led by Soviet generals and operated in the service of Stalin.

The Ukrainian people, however, scornfully rejected this primitive propaganda, for they could see that the UPA was just as opposed to Stalin as it was to Hitler. Such propaganda against the UPA and the OUN under the leadership of Stepan Bandera merely served to ridicule and compromise not only the Germans but also their collaborators.

Recognizing their failures in weakening support for the UPA, the Germans attempted still another approach: to enter into negotiations with the UPA command. But General Chuprynka decisively rejected any such negotiations as a matter of principle.

Instead of weakening under enemy assaults and terror, as the Nazis had expected, the UPA continued to grow in strength and expand its activities to other territories. In many areas of German-occupied Ukraine, "insurgent republics" arose, to which the German administration didn't dare to extend itself. These areas were under the control of independent Ukrain-

ian administrations which oversaw the functioning of services in all areas of life. Workshops and factories were established producing clothing, footwear, ammunition, medicines and even preparing food for the UPA. A "Directorate of Forests" of the Supreme UPA Command redistributed the land in the forested areas under UPA jurisdiction to the peasants.

A German survivor of the Eastern campaign had this to say about these vast areas under UPA's control:

These were districts (*raions*) with two faces: during the day they were under German administration, but at night the whole countryside beyond the towns, which were like islands, was dominated by the UPA. Military training proceeded in the forests, along with the construction of bunkers and hide-outs; ammunition was transported on the roads, and all along their route there were checkpoints and patrols; the villages lodged armed UPA units. The administration of the UPA increasingly frustrated the German administration. Any kind of German administrative act which contradicted the interests of the Ukrainian people, such as excessive food taxation, a larger recruitment of workers for Germany, was met with ferocious opposition from the populace, which now had become very politically active and at every stage made it widely felt that it was guided by a single central authority.³¹

The Germans knew that at the head of the underground stood the legendary Taras Chuprynyk, but the all-powerful Gestapo was never able to find out who Chuprynyk actually was. On many occasions, in fact, Roman Shukhevych walked through the streets of Lviv in the uniform of a German officer, using forged German documents, or rode from one town to another in a German staff car. Similarly, over the succeeding six years, he evaded capture by the NKVD and MGB (Ministry of State Security).

Additional Fronts: Against the Poles, Hungarians, and Rumanians

At the same time that they were engaged in a superhuman struggle against the brown and red Goliaths, the Ukrainian insurgents also had to repulse three smaller aggressors: the Poles, Hungarians, and Rumanians.

The most pernicious of the three were the Poles. Regardless of the fact that the Poles living on Polish territory were being slaughtered by the

Germans, the Polish chauvinists of Western Ukraine did not abandon their dream of continued domination over Western Ukraine. The German occupation of this territory was exploited by them as an opportunity to destroy the forces of Ukrainian independence. Many Poles from German-annexed Poland, declaring themselves to be *Reichsdeutsche* (i.e. true Germans), massively infiltrated the German police and civil administration of Halychyna, Volyn, and Polissia. They were reinforced by local Galician Poles who declared themselves *Volksdeutsche* for the same reason. In many cases, these Poles formed the foundation upon which Polish chauvinist bands in Volyn and Polissia as well as secret Polish organizations in Halychyna were organized.

The Polish chauvinists made it their objective to execute in the harshest manner the German policy of plunder and economic exploitation and to liquidate all leading Ukrainians, which for them included not only activists of the nationalist liberation movement but also administrators of cooperatives, teachers, and even Ukrainian priests and doctors. Dispatches from the Ukrainian underground overflowed with reports of Polish atrocities. Here are several examples:

February 28, 1944. Polish partisans, using axes, murdered two Ukrainian families in the village of Butyniv near Zbarazh.

March 2, 1944. Near the town of Maziarnia Hoholova, district of Kaminka-Strumylova, a Polish terrorist band murdered Ukrainian activists from the village of Yazyenysia Ruska. Captured by Ukrainian self-defense forces, the Polish terrorist Zbigniew Polsinski admitted that in the villages of Verbeky and Maziarnia Hoholova Poles murdered 19 Ukrainians.

March 2, 1944. In the town of Vyshniv, district of Rohatyn, a band of Polish partisans (about 200) attacked, kidnapped, or murdered several young Ukrainians from Vyshniv in addition to seven in the town of Zhurova. They also killed one woman. The bandits robbed and demolished the houses. They burned the village of Kozar.

March 26, 1944. Polish terrorists murdered the Ukrainian Catholic priest, Father Fedevych, and his coachman, when they were riding to the village of Krekhovych, in the county of Peremyshl, to serve Mass.³²

Roman Shukhevych, as UPA Supreme Commander, tried to negotiate with the leadership of the Polish underground in order to stop these atrocities, but his efforts came to naught. Nothing also came from printed warnings posted and distributed among Polish inhabitants by the Ukrainian underground. Therefore, Shukhevych ordered that the OUN and UPA carry out retaliatory raids. As a result, 5,000 Polish terrorists paid with their lives in the first half of 1944 for their campaign of terror against the Ukrainian population. In the majority they were either members of Polish terrorist bands, participants in the Polish underground, or Polish *Volksdeutsche*. Poles were advised by the Ukrainian underground to leave Western Ukraine and return immediately to Poland.

UPA's tough response to Polish terrorist activities frightened almost half a million Poles into leaving Western Ukraine in the last months of German occupation. The rest left in the years immediately following the war, during the forced Soviet repatriation. Consequently, there no longer remained in Western Ukraine a sizable Polish population, which in the past constantly engaged in subversive activities whenever Ukrainian rule was established on these lands.

Together with the German Army, which marched into Ukraine after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, came Hungarian military forces, as allies of Nazi Germany. The Hungarians occupied the southern sections of Halychyna. They were, of course, hostile to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, not only for reasons of loyalty to the Nazis, but also because they saw the incapacitation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as the best safeguard for ensuring their rule over Transcarpathian Ukraine. This hostility toward Ukrainians was further fostered by Poles who frequently reminded the Hungarians of the brotherly assistance of the Poles for the Hungarian campaign in Transcarpathian Ukraine. Hungarian troops plundered Ukrainian villages and executed captured members of the Ukrainian underground, as they had during World War I. The terrorized Ukrainian population turned to the UPA for help.

Once again the UPA did not tarry in coming to the defense of the Ukrainian population. UPA units were ordered by their Supreme Commander to strike at the Hungarian forces in Ukraine. On April 11, 1944, the UPA annihilated a Hungarian army unit which had plundered the village of Kopanky in the Kalush district. Several Poles, dressed in Hungarian uniform, were identified among the dead soldiers. The next day, the UPA destroyed a Hungarian punitive expedition, accompanied by two tanks, as it was approaching the village. Several blows were also inflicted upon the Hungarian military in the regions of Dolyna, Skole, Stanislaviv, Kholm, and also in Volyn. Among the victims in one such assault on a Hungarian unit that was

traveling along a main road in Halychyna was a Hungarian general with his entourage.

It did not take long for this kind of activity to make an impact on the Hungarians. The first to request a truce with the UPA was the Hungarian commander Dubna, who wrote a letter in the Transcarpathian dialect to the UPA Supreme Commander after one of the punitive expeditions, sent by him into the vicinity of the Hurben forests, had suffered heavy losses at the hands of the UPA. Dubna's example was followed by the Hungarian military command in the Carpathian Mountains, which signed a formal truce with the command of the UPA-West. Soon afterwards, a total armistice was signed between the UPA Supreme Command and the Hungarian army command in Budapest. "It should be said," writes Mykola Lebed in his book on the UPA, "that from this time the Hungarians behaved appropriately in the entire area (of UPA's activities). They allowed units of the UPA to cross through the areas guarded by their troops; they informed us of the daily password; they notified us of the coming danger from the Germans; they stopped pillaging, and they began to respect our struggle for independence. Such a state of affairs continued until the end of the German occupation."³³

Another ally of Nazi Germany was Rumania, which was rewarded with a large slice of Ukrainian territory between the Dnister and the Buh rivers. The Rumanians named this area Transnistria, and quickly set up their administrative apparatus, intending to make the region part of Rumania in the future. The Rumanians threw themselves upon the annexed area with an ugly vehemence, persecuting, arresting, and executing scores of Ukrainian nationalists.

Once again the Supreme Commander of the UPA, Taras Chuprynka, was intent on not leaving this section of Ukraine defenseless. At his command, the armed underground demonstrated to the Rumanians the might of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Consequently, the Rumanians, with surprising swiftness, suggested talks with the UPA Supreme Command. This was soon followed by a series of official meetings between the UPA Supreme Command and representatives of the Rumanian government. The negotiations, however, led only to a *de facto* armistice. No formal agreement was signed because the Rumanians would not concede that Transnistria, i.e. Bukovyna and Bessarabia, were inseparable parts of Ukraine. Nonetheless, the *de facto* armistice was observed faithfully by the Rumanians.

Maintaining Ideological Purity

It was clear to the Nazi leadership that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was equally opposed to the German Nazis and Russian Bolsheviks.

But as Germany faced the specter of defeat and the seemingly invincible German divisions retreated ever further west in panic, the Germans invited the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to collaborate with Germany "in battling a common enemy -- Moscow." The Germans realized that it would be very advantageous for them to have as allies Ukrainian partisan units which would harass the Soviet Army with its guerrilla operations. Military considerations appeared to make such collaboration an enticing proposition for the UPA, since it could thus obtain large quantities of German arms, ammunition, and other needed military equipment.

General Shukhevych-Chuprynka decisively rejected such speculations. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army dared not, for any price, tarnish the purity of its ideas with the shadow of collaboration with Nazi Germany. The UPA was ready to cooperate only with a Germany that officially recognized the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, declaring so officially and unequivocally. Without this declaration, no collaboration with Germany was possible. Throughout the war Shukhevych was unflinching in maintaining this principled position. When two UPA field officers who had attempted to negotiate with the Germans at their own initiative in violation of the UPA Supreme Command ban were sentenced to death by the UPA tribunal, General Chuprynka declined to grant them a pardon.³⁴

A Difficult Test

The second half of 1944 was an especially difficult period for the UPA. As the Bolshevik hordes increasingly flooded the Ukrainian lands, tens of thousands of Ukrainians fled into exile, particularly those who were in any way involved in political life. All of the leaders and personnel of the Ukrainian Central Committee went west, as did the Division Halychyna after the tragic battle of Brody. The organization of Colonel Melnyk viewed any struggle under conditions of Bolshevik occupation very pessimistically, and so its cadres departed west. Joining this great flight to the west were leaders and staff of cultural and economic institutions.

What was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to do in this situation? Retreat into foreign lands or remain in Ukraine to continue the difficult and unequal combat?

This question came to confront the UPA as a whole and each UPA fighter individually. Could the UPA possibly succeed where the Germans, armed with the most advanced weapons, had failed? Did not each UPA member have an obligation to save his own life, since to remain in Ukraine meant almost certain death? And as for Roman Shukhevych himself: had he not already fulfilled his obligation to Ukraine in the UVO, the OUN, the

Carpathian *Sich*, and the UPA? Did he not have the right to flee and live the comfortable life of an émigré politician with his family?

However, the Supreme Commander never had any hesitation or doubt. He had been willing to risk his life on his first assignment for the UVO in 1926, and now he was willing to risk his life again. He thus did not even for a moment entertain the thought of fleeing before the enemy, especially since he headed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. He knew his men to be fearless soldiers and commanders, and he did not doubt that they would fulfill every mission placed before them. Therefore, he decided that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army would continue its armed struggle against Soviet occupation.

This struggle was particularly necessary because the USSR was making an effort to portray itself as the liberator of the Ukrainian and other peoples from Nazi occupation. Through its heroic armed struggle the Ukrainian Insurgent Army hoped to open the eyes of the world to the fact that the Muscovite hordes were not liberating the captive nations, but merely replacing one yoke with another.

Roman Shukhevych tried to convince his wife that she and their small children should escape to the West, but she decisively rejected her husband's pleas. Why should she hide in a safe place while the Ukrainian people were burdened with oppression? She would carry the same burden as the wives, mothers, and sisters of soldiers in the UPA. Therefore, she remained in Ukraine, refusing to be intimidated by the terror of imprisonment in harsh Siberian concentration camps. Similarly, their son, Yurko Shukhevych, remained steadfast in his convictions, and even thirty years of torture in Soviet concentration camps did not weaken his spirit.

One senses great firmness and determination in each sentence of the Supreme Commander's address of May 1945 to the UPA:

Hitlerite Germany is finally defeated and crushed. No longer will the Ukrainian people have to fear annihilation in gas chambers or mass executions in scores of villages by the bestial Gestapo. The German will not freely slap the Ukrainian villager in the face, and will not take away his land and transform him into a slave of a German lord...

But with the collapse of Germany, there has returned to Ukraine an even worse aggressor: Russia. Having enslaved Ukraine for centuries, Russia will never surrender Ukraine, regardless of whether she (Russia) has a czarist regime or "the most democratic republic in the world."



*Roman Shukhevych's wife
Natalka Berezynska-Shukhe-
vych with their two children,
1941.*



*Roman Shukhevych's daughter
Maria with a liaison officer in
Stryiskyi Park, Lviv, 1943.*

At present, it is this "socialist republic" that has decided to definitively suppress the aspirations of Ukrainians toward national independence...

The Ukrainian people will not capitulate to the aggressor...

I am confident that you will not shame the weapons with which you have been entrusted by your nation, and that you will leave for future generations a memory enveloped in immortal glory...

Ukrainian Insurgents! The ranks of fighters against the eastern satrap are growing. This will enhance the conditions for continuing our struggle, and will advance the moment of collapse of the Soviet empire. Your sacred mission is to continue holding weapons in your hands until this moment and to lead the people in the struggle against Stalin. I believe that you will fulfill this task with the honor and strong dedication with which you have carried out all your previous missions. With new methods of struggle, applied to new conditions, we will let the enemy feel our response to its advance. With firm faith, let us move onward, to victory!³⁵

The continued armed struggle of the Ukrainian people under the UPA standards against Soviet Russia was a serious blow to the Soviet image. For this reason, Moscow threw all of its military and police forces against the UPA to liquidate the "Banderite renegades" as quickly as possible after the defeat of Germany. But these "renegades" continued to bite the Moscow bear painfully, and showed no indication of relenting in their struggle.

In his Appeal to the fighters and officers of the UPA, dated July 1946, the Supreme Commander declared:

Since the start of winter there has been a titanic and virtually uninterrupted assault by the enemy upon the Ukrainian revolutionary underground and its UPA military units. The enemy has resorted to every means at its disposal to crush this movement, upon which all oppressed people and nations of the USSR base their hopes...

The UPA has succeeded in withstanding these assaults throughout the winter...

May the memory of the heroes who have given up their lives for the freedom of Ukraine live in eternal glory! We will not retreat a single step from the goal for which

these heroes have laid down their lives. With honor we will fulfill the obligations entrusted to us by our people: Freedom or Death! By our further heroic actions we will help preserve the glory of the UPA! Under the command of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council we will continue to wage a relentless struggle against the aggressor until we have achieved ultimate victory!³⁶

This same spirit of determination and unswerving faith in victory was reflected in yet another document, dated October 14, 1947, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the UPA:

On this great day let us look proudly at the last five years and let us recall with respect all those who, by the supreme sacrifice of their lives, have forged a New Era. On this holy day, with its head held high, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army looks toward the future which will crown our liberation struggle with victory!³⁷

The Master of Partisan Warfare

Throughout 1944 waves of Red Army troops, numbering millions of men, swept through Ukraine, followed by brutal NKVD battalions. In response, Roman Shukhevych decided to implement the same tactical strategy against the new aggressor as he did against the Nazis: avoid armed confrontations with the Red Army, which through compulsory draft, encompassed millions of troops of various nationalities, most of whom were not communists, and direct the UPA's main thrust against the NKVD and the "security battalions," which were comprised of fanatical communist volunteers, intent on implementing the Red terror and tightening the shackles that had been placed on the captive nations.

Nevertheless, unavoidable encounters with the passing Red Army made it impossible to remain entirely within the bounds of this policy. With the shift of war fronts, some skirmishes with units of the Red Army were inevitable. Besides, from a political and propagandistic standpoint, a few successful blows against the Red Army were desirable to demonstrate to everyone the might of the UPA. For this reason, it was decided to jolt the Russians with an assassination comparable to the killing of SA chief Lütze. On March 29, 1944, a carefully prepared attack was carried out by Commander Enei's unit on the motorcade of Soviet Marshal Vatutin near the town of Hoshcha as it was driving on the Korets-Rivne road. The gravely wounded marshal soon

died in a Kyiv hospital. For a long time, the Soviets denied that Vatutin had been killed by the UPA, just as earlier the Nazis had denied that Hitler's close associate, Lütze, had died at the hands of the UPA fighters. In the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, however, published in Moscow in 1969, it is acknowledged that Vatutin died at the hands of the UPA.³⁸ We can see that the Soviet leaders, including Stalin himself, were aware of this as early as the end of March 1944.

News about the great battle that raged near the town of Hurby, in Volyn, from April 22-25, 1944, spread widely throughout Ukraine. Units of the UPA-South had taken refuge in the forests of Volyn near Kremianets to avoid the oncoming Red Army and to wait out the shifting of the front. They intended to return afterwards to their home territory in the Soviet rear. But their location was detected by the enemy, which surrounded the area with 30,000 Red Army troops equipped with tanks and planes. On the morning of April 23, the 4,000 troops of the UPA-South and a detachment of UPA-North under Commander Yasen, launched a desperate attempt to break out from the so-called "ring of death." The battles which followed lasted two days until the dawn of April 25, when the UPA fighters, having lost 80 men, broke out and retreated north, south and east. The Soviet army command officially admitted the loss of 120 Red troops, but it was clear that Soviet casualties were substantially higher. Thus, in this great battle, the UPA demonstrated that it could inflict heavy casualties upon the enemy ten times its size, equipped with the latest American weapons.

In general, however, the UPA avoided offensive operations against the Red Army, and instead distributed leaflets, appeals, and other pieces of propaganda to Soviet troops denouncing Soviet Russian imperialism. These leaflets provided information on how the Red partisans engaged extensively in criminal activities against the peaceful Ukrainian population:

These atrocities by the Red parachutists once again demonstrate that both the Hitlerite and Stalinist butchers shared the intention of destroying the Ukrainian and other peoples and of plundering their rich lands. Together with all other nations subjugated by the Soviets, Ukraine will continue its struggle against Hitlerite-Stalinist imperialism. Death to Hitler and Stalin! Away with imperialistic wars! Away with Hitlerite and Bolshevik atrocities and pillaging! May there be peace and friendship among peoples! May every nation have the opportunity to have its own independent state!³⁹

When in February 1944 a general of the Red Army and his entourage were captured by a UPA unit between Volodymyrets and Antonivka, in the Volyn region, and it was determined that the general was not a party member, he was released. But no mercy was shown toward members of the NKVD and the "security battalions," who engaged in savage hunts for "Banderites," brutally torturing and executing their victims.

Battles with the NKVD began in Volyn in January 1944, and gradually moved onto the territory of Halychyna. The UPA was successful in inflicting many serious blows upon the NKVD forces. On March 11, for example, the UPA unit under Laidaka annihilated the NKVD battalion of Captain Shmatov, capturing arms and ammunition; in a battle near the village of Mulchytsi, in the Rafaliv district, UPA fighters killed 60 NKVD members; more than 100 NKVD members died in a battle near the river Horyn on March 26; in a battle waged by the UPA groups of Enei and Dubovyi on April 15, near the town of Liudvypil, 147 NKVD personnel were killed and 22 captured; a week later, over 100 NKVD members died in a battle with the UPA group of Kvatyrenko-Polovyi. In Halychyna, where battles with the NKVD began in the summer of 1944, the UPA succeeded in destroying large numbers of NKVD and Soviet administrative personnel in numerous battles and assaults on regional centers.

News of such resistance spread widely, and in April 1944 the party organ *Bolshevik* warned that "without the complete and final annihilation of the Ukrainian-German nationalists and the liquidation of their influence, it is impossible to proceed with the reconstruction of the national economy and renewal of our cultural life." On the basis of discussions at the Yalta conference, U.S. Secretary of State E.R. Stettinius Jr. revealed that Stalin himself "recognized that his position in Ukraine was very difficult and precarious,"⁴⁰ and therefore demanded the acceptance of Soviet Ukraine into the United Nations.

Perhaps the most painful blows, which Moscow incurred as a result of the UPA's armed struggle against it, was in the political-propaganda field. Dependent upon the Americans for arms, ammunition, supplies, and food, Stalin feared that the Americans would not remain deaf and blind to the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. Stalin feared that soon after the capitulation of Germany, the Americans would demand that the Soviet Union demobilize its armed forces and withdraw from Ukraine and other occupied territories. The Soviet leaders were well aware of the sentiments of the population at large and of the soldiers of the Red Army and realized that it would take only a declaration of support for the captive nations by the United States and the United Kingdom and the approach of only a few American divisions onto Soviet-occupied territory to cause the collapse of the Russian Empire.

For this reason, Stalin pledged a new constitution that would guarantee the rights of all nationalities of the USSR, and demanded the admission of Ukraine and Belorussia into the United Nations as "independent socialist republics." Ukrainian poets and writers were directed to produce patriotic articles and poems in the style of Volodymyr Sosiura's poem "Love Ukraine," a passionate patriotic piece with an addendum about Ukraine's "eternal unity" with the "Russian Brother." In addition, a rabid campaign was conducted by Soviet propagandists against the OUN and UPA, depicting them as "Ukrainian-German hirelings."

Discerning Americans were, however, not so easily misled by Soviet lies about the OUN-UPA (the so-called *Banderivtsi*). When American army units marched through Germany, they encountered thousands of *Banderivtsi* in Nazi concentration camps, and found among the numerous documents in Nazi archives Gestapo reports about the widespread executions of *Banderivtsi* who had waged an uncompromising struggle against Nazi Germany. In an attempt to distort the significance of these reports, Soviet propaganda specialists advanced the notion that one should distinguish UPA's leaders, whom they accused of selling out to Hitler, from the mass of UPA fighters, who had been "misled" by their leaders. Accordingly, the government of the Ukrainian SSR issued an "amnesty" inviting the "confused masses" to defect from the UPA to the Soviets, promising that such deserters would receive a full pardon for all previous anti-Soviet activities. Those who did not accept this "great generosity of Father Stalin" were threatened with physical annihilation, as were also their families.

This "Appeal of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR" had some success, but for reasons altogether different from those assumed by the Soviets.

The UPA: Defender of Ukrainian Youth

With the return of Soviet occupation, all militarily capable men were drafted to fight at the German-Soviet front. To save themselves, Ukrainian youth fled en masse to the forests to seek refuge with the UPA.

Roman Shukhevych directed the UPA to accept all of these youths under its protection. As a result, the forests of Halychyna, Volyn, and Polissia swelled with tens of thousands of Ukrainian youth. Reports from the four provinces of Halychyna reveal that the Soviets succeeded in mobilizing a little more than half of those summoned, about 200,000. The other 200,000 Galician youths escaped "into the forest." In Volyn and Polissia the percentage of youths inducted into the Red Army was even smaller. Large numbers

of recruits from Bukovyna, Carpatho-Ukraine and the central provinces of Ukraine also fled to the forests.

Of the 200,000 Galician Ukrainians drafted into the Red Army, almost 50,000 perished at the front. Undoubtedly another 50,000 would have died, had the remaining 200,000 been conscripted as well. Thus, the UPA saved 50,000 lives from Halychyna and probably no smaller a number of youths from the other regions of Ukraine. It is on the basis of these great numbers of young men who took refuge in the forests that the Soviets estimated the strength of the UPA at half a million members.

But the additional mass number of men in the forest became a burden to the UPA after the German capitulation in May 1945. The Soviet fear of American support for the independence movements of Eastern Europe proved unjustified. The American political leadership gratuitously surrendered these peoples to the Soviets. General George Patton, who opposed the withdrawal of American divisions from Czecho-Slovakia and favored a further advance of American forces east, died, "by chance," in an "accident." Western victors declared imperialistic and bloodthirsty Moscow their ally in the liberation of peoples.

Under these circumstances, the UPA could continue the armed struggle only in the form of guerrilla warfare based on a deployment of small groups. Such a form of warfare could be waged by seasoned partisans of exceptional courage. Therefore, the Supreme Command of the UPA ordered the "demobilization" of all those who had joined the UPA to evade the mobilization into the Red Army and of those who were willing to take advantage of the offers of amnesty. Others were directed to return home with the mass of Ukrainian laborers who were being repatriated after the war from Germany. In this way, a large number of UPA activists were dispersed among the civilian population of Ukraine, subsequently enhancing the revolutionary underground throughout Ukraine.

This "demobilization" of the UPA was carried out at the command of General Chuprynka in the spring of 1945. The great number of those returning to civilian life from "the forest" deluded the Soviet leadership into believing that their amnesty was successful. But they soon realized that the hard-core of the UPA were not among those seeking amnesty. The core of the UPA continued their uncompromising struggle against the NKVD and the colonialist apparatus. Neither a second "Appeal of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR to the People of the Western Ukrainian Provinces," issued on November 27, 1944, nor a personal order to the Soviet armed forces from Stalin himself to liquidate the UPA at all costs by March 15, 1945, had any significant results in terminating UPA activities.

The capitulation of Germany on May 7, 1945 enabled the Soviets to concentrate on destroying the UPA. Large forces of the NKVD and security

battalions were reinforced by the most ideologically reliable elements of the Red Army, who named themselves "Stalin's Children." The resulting battles were incredibly fierce, with great losses on both sides. Commander Kruk's UPA group, for example, lost 140 men in battles in the Chortkiv district from June 7-13, 1945, among whom was Kruk himself. Strong Soviet units conducted blockades and combings of large forest areas, using tanks and infantry, encircling and bombing entire forest areas, after which massive units would fine comb the forests, searching for and liquidating all insurgents.

These measures, however, did not produce the desired results. An order of the UPA dated August 31, 1945, stated:

We have not surrendered; we have not betrayed ourselves; we have withstood all blows of the year-long offensive of the combined Red forces of tyranny. We stand today with clear consciences and proud heads, not as defeated and vanquished slaves, but as free and unbroken Freedom Fighters, loyal to death.⁴¹

The Soviets knew well that the UPA was not merely making wishful claims. Regardless of their superiority in manpower and arms, the Soviets had sustained enormous losses. Thus, for example, in the Rava Ruska region, in the vicinity of the villages of Richytsia, Kariv, Hrushky, and Yastrubychi the Soviets lost 500 men in the winter campaign of 1944-1945. Over 250 Soviet troops died in battle with the UPA platoon *Poltava*, near the town of Rohatyn in December 1944, including General Fyodorov, who was in charge of 20,000 Red troops in this district. Another 120 NKVD troops died in the village of Rypnytsia near Kalush, on June 1, 1945, battling the UPA platoon of commander Rizun. During the first half of 1945, over 200 smaller assaults were carried out by the UPA on NKVD stations, resulting in over 1,500 deaths in NKVD and Soviet administrative personnel.

Although in its fourth "Appeal" the Soviet government warned that the deadline for UPA soldiers to obtain amnesty was to be July 20, 1945, after which all "remnants of UPA bands" were to be "totally liquidated," yet another "Appeal of the NKVS Minister of the Ukrainian SSR" was issued on November 5 of that year. Still another appeal from the minister of the KGB, General Ryassny, announced an extension of the amnesty deadline because "many members of the UPA found themselves in circumstances in which a withdrawal from the bands was impossible." The same appeal also declared that "the remains of the crushed bands would be destroyed in a very short time."

Three months later, 500,000 NKVD troops, including tank units, were brought in from throughout the Soviet Union for a new campaign to

destroy these "remaining bands" in Western Ukraine. Thus began the "Great Blockade," which lasted throughout the first half of 1946. During this operation, which was led by Khrushchev himself, the Soviets resorted to all possible means of terror and provocation, not only against the UPA, but also against the Ukrainian civilian population, including the contamination of medicines with poison, sold on the black market and destined for UPA hospitals and the spread of infectious diseases through bacteriological warfare.⁴²

Retaliation came soon. In addition to the thousands of NKVD officers slain, the commander of the Great Blockade in the Stanislaviv region, NKVD General Moskalenko, was shot down with his retinue, among which were a major and two colonels, in an ambush by the UPA platoon *Mesnyky* near the railroad station of Tiaziv. Thus, the fierce offensive, which engaged more than half a million of NKVD servicemen during the period between January and June of 1946 did not succeed in liquidating UPA "remnants," as the Soviets had prematurely anticipated. One can only have great admiration for General Shukhevych-Chupryna, the Supreme Commander of the UPA, who showed enormous gallantry and strategic skill in conducting partisan warfare and leading the UPA through extremely difficult conditions.

There is no question that the two years of harsh and bloody combat with overwhelming Soviet forces were very costly for the UPA. Many commanders fell in battle alongside their men, for UPA commanders always fought in the front lines. On May 13, 1944, commander Kropyva, chief of staff of UPA-South, fell in battle; on June 10, 1944, Colonel Hrabets-Batko, commander of UPA-South and hero of the Vinnytsia battalion (*kurin*) was slain; on July 30, 1944, General Stupnytskyi-Honcharenko, chief of staff of UPA-North, died a heroic death; on December 12, 1944, Colonel Kliachkovskyi-Savur, commander of UPA-North, died in battle; on October 1, 1944, near Strilyska Novi, the famed commander Yastrub died in a three-day battle that cost the enemy 370 men; on October 15, 1944, the commander of the UPA Officer School, Major Pol-Polovyi, died in the Skole region; in October 1944, company commander Novytskyi-Vadym, inspector of the UPA-West military staff, was killed in the region of Rava Ruska; in November 1944, battalion commander Lynda-Yarema died near Kalush; on December 29, 1944, officer Kindzirskyi-Boievir died in the Chernivtsi region; in January 1945, battalion commanders Stepovyi, Blahyi and Maksym died in battle with special units of the NKVD; on April 7, 1945, officer Kolchak, commander of the Tactical Group of UPA-West died near Halych; on May 7, 1945, battalion leader Kruk died near Chortkiiv; in mid-April, battalion commander Blahyi and Lieutenant Vershnyk died in a bloody battle near Bohorodchany together with 50 insurgents; and on December 19, 1945, UPA chief of staff, General Hrytsai-Perebyinis was killed.

In the English language pamphlet of the Ukrainian underground entitled "Elections of the USSR," published in 1947, it was stated that during the period of the "Great Blockade" from January to June, 1946, the UPA engaged in over 1,500 battles and armed clashes, in which about 15,000 Soviets and 5,000 Ukrainian insurgents were killed.⁴³

Losses of this magnitude and the new political situation in Europe forced the UPA Supreme Command and particularly its Supreme Commander to reconsider UPA's political and military strategy. The expectation that the "freedom-loving" Americans would send forces against the moral-political twin of Hitler, "Marshal" Stalin, although based on completely logical assumptions, was not realized, just as the expectations of the East Germans in 1953, the Hungarians in 1956, and the Czechs and Slovaks in 1968 went unfulfilled.

In June 1946, a conference of the OUN *Provid* was convened by Roman Shukhevych-Tur, the head of the OUN in Ukraine, with the purpose of reexamining the situation in Ukraine and in the world and devising new methods of resistance. In a proclamation, issued in July 1946 to the soldiers and officers of the UPA, informing them about the decisions accepted at the conference, General Shukhevych-Chuprynka declared:

The UPA has withstood the entire period from winter to the present day with honor. At a difficult time for the Ukrainian people, when the Stalinist bandits compelled them to vote in "Elections to the Supreme Soviet," the UPA gave military protection to the people, although the whole region was saturated with NKVD forces. Finding themselves under extremely adverse conditions, some units even lost half of their forces; however, no unit of the UPA has capitulated to the enemy. In this incomparably difficult struggle, the UPA has surpassed all of the expectations placed upon it by the people and the revolutionary leadership, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. I am proud of the fact that I was given command of this army of heroes, the likes of whom the history of Ukraine has never known before...

Today's moment is a time for only revamping our forces, a moment of transition from one form of armed warfare to another. I am sure that you, who are unyielding fighters and heroes, will master the new forms of warfare with the enemy just as quickly and effectively as you mastered the art of guerrilla warfare. Hidden and elusive to the enemy, you will hit him with lightning-fast

blows where he least expects it. With your seasoned boldness and endurance, which have made you legendary throughout the world, you will continue the famous traditions of the UPA, educating through your heroic deeds a new generation of fighters in the revolutionary struggle...

Let us fulfill with honor the task with which we have been invested by our people: freedom or death! Through further heroic deeds we will continue bringing glory to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Under the leadership of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, we will continue an unrelenting struggle against all foreign aggressors until ultimate victory!⁴⁴

Subsequently, a large part of the UPA forces were transferred to the military sectors of the OUN underground, and all units of the UPA were broken down into smaller independent groups, which were to unite into regular units only in time of need. Open battles were to be replaced by ambushes and surprise attacks on NKVD outposts and offices of the colonial administration.

The statistical report of the UPA Supreme Command on UPA activities indicated that, from mid-1946 to mid-1947, 912 military operations were carried out on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR by units and sub-units of the UPA and the military underground, relying on new forms of warfare, in which 1,012 NKVD and administrative personnel died, along with 303 fighters of the UPA. From mid-1947 to mid-1948, there were 1,205 operations, with the Soviets losing 1,031 men with 411 wounded, compared to UPA losses of 407. During the following year, from mid-1948 to mid-1949, it was reported that in 1,073 actions, the enemy lost 565 men, while UPA losses were 255 dead.

In relation to scope and the number of participants, the battles after 1946 were smaller than in the period of 1944-1946, but the political impact of this continuing resistance was no less devastating to the Soviets. The third, fourth and fifth year after the close of World War II passed, and the "almighty" NKVD was still unable to destroy the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. It was not even able, in spite of the use of extreme brutality and terror, to compel a single unit of the UPA to capitulate. Fame about this continuous struggle spread throughout the world, and particularly among the captive nations within the Soviet Union and its satellites, raising the spirit of resistance to the Bolshevik tyrants.

In Defense of Transcurzonია

As a result of an agreement between Stalin and the communist government of Poland in 1944 regarding their mutual boundary, part of Western Ukraine, with about one million Ukrainians, remained under Polish jurisdiction. This territory was known as Transcurzonია, the land west of the Curzon line.

The Curzon line had been proposed by British Foreign Secretary Lord G. Curzon as the line of demarcation between Poland and Russia on December 8, 1919, in the aftermath of World War I. On July 11, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allies in Paris officially endorsed the line as the boundary between Soviet Russia and Poland. But, as a result of the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, Poland extended its eastern boundary to include Halychyna, Volyn and Polissia.

Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia resurrected the line in 1939, when Molotov and Ribbentrop agreed to use it in determining the new Soviet-German boundary. As a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Transcurzonია, namely the Lemko, Sian River basin and Kholm regions, were incorporated into the *Generalgouvernement* of Poland. In the territorial structure of the OUN, these lands came to be known as the Western Borderlands of Ukraine, and as it was noted earlier, Roman Shukhevych served as OUN Regional Leader for this territory during the years 1939-1940.

At the conference of the "Big Three" in Yalta on February 11, 1945, according to Churchill, "Stalin suggested using the Curzon line, noting that it had been proposed in 1918 at the world peace conference by the English representative Lord Curzon, and was at the time supported by the representative of the United States and by Clemenceau. President Roosevelt suggested that the line needed correction, and that Poland should be given Lviv and a section of Galicia... Stalin opposed this; after all, how could he, as the representative of Russia, demand less than was proposed in 1918 by the representatives of England, France and America?"⁴⁵

From the standpoint of Russian imperialism, the Western endorsement of Stalin's annexation of Halychyna was a great triumph. But in reality this was nothing more than a case of thieves haggling over stolen property. Furthermore, the Polish agreement with Moscow to deport the Ukrainians of Transcurzonია to the Ukrainian SSR was an act of criminal force against the Ukrainian people. The Soviets tried to explain that the transferred Ukrainians were being exchanged for Poles living in Halychyna and Volyn, but this argument had no rational or moral justification. The Poles in Western Ukraine were a foreign element who had settled in the area during the period of Polish occupation of Ukraine. It was thus logical that when Western Ukraine was reunited with Eastern Ukraine after World War II, many Poles

returned to Poland. The Ukrainians of Transcarpathia were, however, the indigenous, sole and rightful masters of the Transcarpathian lands of the Lemko, Kholm and Zasiannia regions from time immemorial. For them to be expelled was an act of criminal violence and gross injustice. Neither Poland nor Russia had any right to those lands.

The UHVR General Secretariat, headed by Roman Shukhevych-Lozovskiy, the sole legitimate and genuine Ukrainian government, decided to protest in word and action against this crime that was being perpetrated by Russia and Poland. A memorandum concerning this issue was forwarded to representatives of western nations, while an appeal was disseminated among the Polish population to shun their chauvinistic dreams in respect to Ukraine. Instead of wasting their energy in shamefully annihilating and rooting out Ukrainians of the Transcarpathia region, they should turn their energy to a common struggle with the Ukrainian people against the real enemy, the Russian imperialists. We read in the Appeal:

Fellow Poles, our western neighbor from time immemorial! Both of our nations have experienced in our respective histories a common misfortune: we have both been the target of Russian and German-Austrian expansionism. We have also encountered a common fate from the beginning of the last imperialist war when both German and Russian imperialism directed their advance against the Polish and Ukrainian peoples. And now, with bloodthirsty Muscovite imperialism ravaging our lands, our peoples are once again suffering greatly under the Communist yoke.

Fellow Poles! Look more closely at the activities of the present Polish militia and of some members in the Polish administration. Their cruelty towards the civilian Ukrainian population, their pillage of our villages, the mass arrests and cruel torture of those interned, their close cooperation with the enemy, the NKVD, is taking on very frightening forms. We appeal to you to make them realize the evil of what they are doing, since they appear to be unaware of the gravity of their crimes. Help bring an end to these anti-Ukrainian operations by encouraging all Poles to cease in serving the villainous NKVD. We hope that they will look in a more sober manner at the present situation. We hope that they will listen to the voice of the Polish masses, and that, in a short time, they will be able to decipher the disguised imperialistic designs of the Russian aggressors. May peace, understanding and cooperation live

between the Ukrainian and Polish peoples as our nations
both struggle against Russian imperialism!

May every captive nation succeed in establishing
its independent state!

Freedom to all nations and every individual!⁴⁶

At first the UPA Supreme Commander, General Shukhevych-Chuprynka directed the UPA units to engage only in defensive actions, shielding the Ukrainian population of Transcurzonian from persecution. But when his appeals to the Poles for prudence did not bring the desired results and Polish terrorism against Ukrainians simply continued to escalate, he approved the shift to retributive actions and a disruption of the campaign to deport all Ukrainians of Transcurzonian to the Soviet Union. Eleven units of the UPA were dispatched to the territory of Transcurzonian to help the UPA units already stationed there.

The campaign of retaliation frightened the Poles of Transcurzonian just as a similar campaign had frightened them in Halychyna and Volyn two years earlier. Polish terrorism soon subsided and the deportations were halted. In fact, from mid-May 1945, the Lemko area became an "insurgent republic" in which no representative of the Polish communist administration dared to appear without a large military escort. Commander Stepan Stebel-skyi-Khrin wrote in his memoirs:

An economic system was organized on the territory of the UPA republic. Small factories were established. The villagers decocted salt, cured leather, made oil grease for weapons, footwear and wagons. Sewing shops were set up to manufacture clothing, uniforms, sweaters, bandages, linen, etc. Everywhere the young and older male population was given military training. Nursing courses were held for girls. Blacksmith and locksmith shops were also established to repair weapons and produce needed parts. All weapons and ammunition left by fleeing enemy units were collected for the UPA. A census of the Ukrainian and Polish population was undertaken. All men capable of bearing arms were registered. In the villages there were concerts of theatrical and choral groups.⁴⁷

This was, however, only a temporary breathing spell in a continuous heavy duel. The Polish communist government had no intention of abandoning the Soviet-Polish plan of forced deportation of Ukrainians from Transcurzonian. The Supreme Command of the Polish Communist Army

prepared a separate war plan against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and sent strong military reinforcements into Transcarpathia. When the year-long campaign did not bring success, new divisions were thrown into battle. The Polish Deputy Minister of Defense, General Swierczewski, was sent to direct this campaign. Vauntingly Swierczewski promised that he would succeed in "destroying the UPA bands in several weeks." But within a few weeks he too went the way of Gestapo General Lütze, Marshal Vatutin of the Red Army, and NKVD Generals Fyodorov and Moskalenko. On March 28, 1947, on the road between Balyhorod and Tisno, an UPA unit under Commander Khrin annihilated the security escort of General Swierczewski along with the General himself.

On May 28, 1947, a separate treaty was signed in Warsaw between the Poles, Czechs and Soviets, calling for a common military campaign against the UPA. In accordance with this agreement, the USSR threw into the Sian River region a tank division along with special anti-partisan units, and strengthened the border forces in order to sever UPA connections between Transcarpathia and Halychyna. The Czechs sealed their border with a mountain brigade, and the Poles committed a motorized corps with three divisions and units of the KBP (the Polish NKVD). These forces engaged the UPA in large-scale battles, while Polish police units carried out the deportation of Ukrainians to the *Ziemie Odzyskane* (Restored Territories), annexed from Germany after World War II and virtually emptied of their German inhabitants. Formations of the UPA had no possibility or need to stay on the remaining collection of ashes, so the surviving UPA fighters crossed over into the Ukrainian SSR, while several units were ordered by the UPA Supreme Command to cross into Western Europe.

Throughout 1945, as was mentioned above, the UPA was engaged in heavy fighting with the overwhelming forces of the Red Army and the NKVD on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. Therefore, the defense of Transcarpathia had to be sustained by eleven existing companies (*sotni*) of the UPA (about 1,100 men), significantly strengthened by local volunteers. The volunteers proved that the seed of Ukrainian national consciousness sown by Roman Shukhevych in 1939-1940 had fallen on fertile soil. The Ukrainian youth of Transcarpathia, especially the Lemkos, volunteered en masse to the UPA, and the older citizenry assisted the UPA despite their age. As a result, the UPA was able for over three years to offer successful resistance not only to units of the Polish police, but also units of the regular army, forcing Poland to turn to Soviet and Czech troops for assistance. The heroic resistance carried on by the sons of Lemkivshchyna and Kholmshchyna forms an important chapter in the distinguished history of the UPA.

Political Mobilization of the Satellite Peoples

Notwithstanding the enormous difficulties of waging an armed struggle in Ukraine, Roman Shukhevych aspired to extend the perimeters of the struggle against Moscow by mobilizing the "satellite" nations that had recently been deprived by Moscow of real independence and saddled with puppet governments. From 1945 through 1949, at the Supreme Commander's order, UPA units carried out raids into Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, Poland and Hungary. The purpose of these raids was to demonstrate to the populations of these countries, which had recently fallen under Moscow's "protection," that resistance to Moscow was possible, that Moscow was not invincible, as the Ukrainian armed struggle of the UPA demonstrated. The fact that the satellite regimes were compelled to dispatch police and army units and that the press at all levels was reporting about UPA raids intrigued the inhabitants of these countries. They began to ask who these *Banderivtsi* were and what their struggle was all about. Thus were sown the seeds of discontent against Moscow among the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Poles.

Contact with the Western World

In the summer and fall of 1947, following the deportation of the Transcarpathian Ukrainians and the withdrawal of the UPA to Soviet Ukraine, Roman Shukhevych ordered several units of the UPA to cross through Czecho-Slovakia into West Germany in order to establish contact with the Western world. As Shukhevych himself stated:

The passage of several units of the UPA and groups of revolutionaries from the borderlands of Western Ukraine into the West German zone was carried out in accordance with the directives of the UHVR and the Supreme Commander of the UPA. Their task was to lodge a protest before the world about Bolshevik and Polish crimes against the Ukrainian people, and to transmit information to the outside world about the revolutionary liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Russian and Polish Communist aggressors and their oppressive policies...

While traversing in their raids through Czecho-Slovakia, often amid intense and heavy fighting with the Czecho-Slovakian army and Soviet-controlled police, the UPA units carried out significant political-propagandistic

work among the Czech and Slovak peoples. The population of Czecho-Slovakia was very receptive to these units. News about these raids was beamed throughout the world by many radio stations. The crossing of several UPA units and groups of revolutionaries into the West German occupational zones must be viewed as a genuine military-political triumph of these units and groups.⁴⁸

The command of the UPA expected that in addition to an interest in the Ukrainian armed struggle, generated by the appearance of armed UPA units in West Germany, the U.S. government would express an interest in extending assistance to the liberation struggles of the captive nations. Unfortunately, these hopes were not fulfilled, just as the hopes of Hungarian, Polish and Czech revolutionaries were unfulfilled in the succeeding decades. Nevertheless the arrival of UPA units in West Germany helped bring a change in Western and especially American public opinion regarding the true nature of the USSR as a Russian empire.

The Supreme Commander Speaks

The unyielding struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was being carried out at a time of continued internecine feuding within the Ukrainian emigration in West Germany. Blinded by factional hatred, opponents of the Revolutionary OUN received the news about the armed struggle of the UPA and the revolutionary underground in Ukraine with disbelief, and even open hostility and malice. Inaccurate and carefully concocted interpretations appeared in the press of several Ukrainian émigré parties. All this was known to the leaders of the UPA and revolutionary underground because they received the press and literature of Ukrainians abroad through the underground couriers.

Therefore, on September 25, 1947, the UPA Supreme Commander issued a special communiqué for publication in the West, in which he stated:

We in Ukraine have recently learned that some émigré Ukrainian political parties have been exploiting the nonpartisan character of the UPA, attempting to negate the great organizational role of the OUN under Stepan Bandera in the creation and growth of the UPA, a role which this organization continues to play to this day. In connection with this, the Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army declares the following:

1. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army evolved from military groups of the OUN led by Stepan Bandera in 1942 under conditions of a fierce struggle by the Ukrainian people against the Hitlerite aggressors. In 1942-1943, the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army swelled by volunteers from the broad popular masses. The UPA clearly became a national military force. It became the most consummate expression of the Ukrainian people's struggle for independence...

2. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army stands above all political parties. In its ranks are found all for whom the liberty of the Ukrainian nation is dear, regardless of political convictions and party affiliations. But simultaneously, the UPA acknowledges the great contribution which was made by the OUN under the leadership of Stepan Bandera in the formation, strengthening, and development of the UPA. The OUN laid the foundations of the UPA and strengthened the UPA with its highly-principled cadres (OUN members form over 50% of the UPA forces). The OUN defended the UPA politically from attacks by both the opportunistic camp and the national enemies of Ukraine. The OUN put forth the greatest efforts for the successful development of the UPA, and continues to do so to this day within the framework of the UHVR.

The Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army expects that this Statement will help clarify for the emigration the issues discussed, and believes that the Ukrainian emigration, both the old and the new, will rise above petty partisan squabbles to properly represent our Ukrainian nation before the world, that it will stand firmly behind the present underground movement in Ukraine, bloodied by a fierce struggle under the leadership of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, in its fight for our mutual dream: the establishment of an Independent and United Ukrainian State.⁴⁹

The Most Heroic Struggle in the History of Ukraine

In his Declaration on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the UPA's founding General Shukhevych-Chuprynka analyzed the incredibly difficult struggle, waged by the UPA, in the following manner:

The fearless officers and soldiers of the UPA have etched onto their army's standards a lengthy list of heroic exploits that will be inscribed in golden letters into the annals of Ukrainian military history. The avenging hand of the UPA fighter has reached even the highest ranking representatives of the occupying powers, as for example: German General Lütze, chief of the SA, the commander of the First Ukrainian Front of the Soviet Army, Marshal Vatutin, and Polish Deputy Minister of Defense, General Swierczewski. UPA units succeeded on many occasions in capturing the district centers of the enemy and penetrating provincial centers; they have traversed in extensive raids both native and foreign territories, and through ambushes and sudden attacks have harassed the enemy, denying him the opportunity to implement his plan of destroying the Ukrainian people. The names of Hrehit-Rizun, Yastrub, Yasen, Storchan, Prut, Konyk, Peremoha, and Khrin have carried the glory of Ukraine's military forces far beyond Ukraine.

Soldiers and officers of the UPA! You, who to-day are fighting the Bolsheviks and who have replenished the ranks of the revolutionary liberation underground, be aware that the struggle of the UPA, which is entering its sixth year, constitutes the most heroic epoch in the history of Ukraine. Be aware that a more heroic epoch is unknown in the history of mankind. It has even overshadowed the deeds of the glorious heroes of Thermopila. Future Ukrainian generations will be reared on the heroism of the UPA and the revolutionary liberation underground. The UPA warrior and the Ukrainian revolutionary will take the place of the courageous Spartan warrior in the history of mankind.

There is no exaggeration or self-praise in this statement. All previous national liberation struggles could depend on the support of either the population in the rear of the front lines (as, for example, the Greeks at Ther-

mopylac), or of foreign allies (as was the case with the Vietnamese Communists, who received arms from the Soviet Union and Red China). But the Ukrainian Insurgent Army never had a secure rear base, and never obtained any assistance from another country. In its struggle against two great military powers, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, the UPA depended entirely upon its own strength, counterbalancing the overwhelming material odds of the struggle with moral power. In such a situation each member of the UPA had to be a moral giant.

It is because the UPA fighters and commanders were characterized by moral might that their Supreme Commander had every right to state:

I am proud of the fact that I have been given the opportunity to lead a glorious army of heroes, the equal of which has never been known in the history of Ukraine.⁵⁰

And we may add, the equal of which has never been known in the history of mankind.

This last chapter of Roman Shukhevych's biography may appear to the reader as but a brief essay on the history of the UPA. This, however, would be a misguided observation based on an erroneous treatment of the UPA as if it were a regular army, where the Supreme Commander is only one of the players in a complex military apparatus, with his role being limited to that of strategic planning and general supervision. In a biography of a conventional army's commander the narration would be confined to those fragments in the history of the particular military force over which the officer had a clear impact. But the nature of partisan warfare, which is conducted under conditions of enemy prevalence, makes the role of the insurgent army's supreme commander much more crucial. This was especially true in the case of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which conducted its struggle without any external material or moral assistance. Here the Supreme Commander was not only a leader, but the actual nucleus of its existence.

In a regular army the incompetence of a supreme commander is the factor that necessitates his replacement; in a partisan army it is the spiritual downfall of the commanding officer that is the most lethal blow to its strength and discipline. In a conventional army the supreme commander only issues orders; in a partisan army he has to carry a lion's share of responsibilities arising in the implementation of his own commands. The Supreme Commander of the UPA, General Shukhevych-Chuprynka did not sit in an "eagle's nest," secure from enemy attack, nor did he remain aloof from the fighting. His headquarters were at various times in the vicinity of Lviv, in the Carpathian Mountains, and in the forests of Volyn, where he was often

faced with the danger of unexpected face-to-face encounters with enemy forces. He frequently participated in the exercises and battles of insurgent units, and often visited and interacted with the soldiers, who hardly suspected that the unknown "coordinator" talking with them and dressed in an old gray coat was their superior commander. In these moments Shukhevych preferred to disguise himself so as not to prejudice the thoughts, opinions and attitudes of his soldiers and officers. When necessary, he would don the uniform of a Nazi officer during the German occupation and of a Soviet officer during the Soviet occupation and drive through the streets of Lviv and other towns to inspect enemy defenses in person. Through the might of his spirit he strengthened the spirit of the UPA. As Supreme Commander he was involved in every facet of UPA's activities: planning and monitoring operations, effecting changes and improvements whenever necessary and making critical decisions concerning the course of action for the UPA.

The heights to which the UPA had risen was in a large measure the work of the Supreme Commander himself. His impact was visible in all its operations, major battles, and even minor skirmishes. The history of the UPA must for this reason constitute a chapter in the biography of General Shukhevych-Chuprynka during the years 1943-1950.

VI. AT THE POST OF SUPREME OUN LEADER IN UKRAINE

After the First Blows

Serious complications within the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists resulted from the Nazi blows to it in 1941. The arrest of Stepan Bandera on the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union and of hundreds of OUN members in the first months of occupation came at a critical moment, when the need for experienced and talented leaders at the helm of the organization was greater than ever before. The complications that arose involved not only replacing leaders that were incarcerated, but formulating an operative policy for the Organization as the political situation was evolving.

Mykola Lebed-Maksym Ruban, as Bandera's second deputy, became the temporary head of the OUN. Another leading activist who commanded enormous authority among the cadres was Ivan Klymiv-Evhen Legenda. At the outbreak of the Soviet-German war he was the OUN Regional Leader for Western Ukraine and an ex-officio member of the *Provid*. But between these two leaders there were profound differences in approach to basic issues confronting the Organization at this time. Klymiv favored an immediate show of political and military force against the Germans. As early as June 1941 he ordered a mobilization of volunteers for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which would simultaneously battle the Red and Brown aggressors. Lebed, on the other hand, believed that the OUN should exercise caution and not initiate a premature military struggle against the Germans. By virtue of his position, Lebed had the decisive word, and so the OUN proceeded to wait, postponing military action. But among the membership there arose the belief that this caution went too far and that the transitional stage lasted too long. As a re-

sult, dissatisfaction spread among the membership, eventually turning into a call for a change in leadership.

In the second half of 1941 and throughout 1942 Roman Shukhevych was still in Belorussia, bound by his responsibilities as an officer in the Legion, remaining only formally a member of the *Provid*. Nevertheless, even in Belorussia, Shukhevych closely followed the work of the *Provid* and attempted to communicate his views on various issues of importance. One of the first of Shukhevych's interventions with the *Provid* was his strong endorsement, in the autumn of 1942, for the idea of creating units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Polissia and Volyn.

At the beginning of 1943, after the dissolution of the Legion and after evading arrest by the Gestapo, Roman Shukhevych became once again actively engaged in the work of the *Provid*, both in organizational matters and in the formulation of its political policy. At his initiative, a Third Conference of the OUN was convened February 17-23, 1943, at which OUN policy toward the Germans was fully clarified. The fourth point of the Conference's resolutions stated:

We hold that for the sake of consolidating all political and national forces in Ukraine in a struggle against Muscovite-Bolshevik imperialism, as well as the inclusion of other captive nations into this struggle, it is essential that the struggle of the Ukrainian people be at this time directed also against German imperialism.

Only through armed struggle against German imperialism will it be possible to:

a) Free from Moscow's influence those segments of the Ukrainian people who look to Moscow for protection from German imperialism;

b) Unmask Russian Communism, which camouflages its imperialistic designs for enslaving Ukraine with slogans about defending the Ukrainian and other enslaved peoples against the German aggressor;

c) Secure a recognized position in the international arena for the Ukrainian people and their national liberation struggle.⁵¹

The Conference endorsed the inauguration of an open military struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army against the German invader, the formation of UPA units throughout Ukraine, and the expansion of UPA operations to all parts of Ukraine.

The Problem of Leadership in the OUN

The above-mentioned Conference did not, however, address the pressing issue of reconstituting the *Provid*, since it did not have the mandate to do so. This matter could only be handled by a Great Assembly of the OUN, and according to the OUN statute, the next Great Assembly was not scheduled to convene until 1945. Thus arose the idea of calling an Extraordinary Great Assembly.

However, the pressing need to resolve this matter made it impossible to wait for the convening of even an Extraordinary Great Assembly. So, on May 13, 1943, a meeting of the OUN *Provid* was convened at the direction of Mykola Lebed. The following members participated: Roman Shukhevych, Dmytro Maiivskyi, Zenon Matla, Mykhailo Stepaniak, and Myroslav Prokop. A sharp difference of opinion promptly arose between Mykola Lebed and the other members. Consequently, Lebed submitted his resignation as Acting Head of the OUN and placed the fate of the movement in the hands of the *Provid*. In further discussions, conducted without Lebed, it was proposed that the leadership should be assumed by Roman Shukhevych. Shukhevych did not decline this proposal, but suggested that until the convocation of a Great Assembly, a special Bureau of the OUN *Provid*, composed of three members, should take charge. Shukhevych agreed to head such a body. This suggestion was approved, and the provisional Bureau of the OUN *Provid* was formed, consisting of Roman Shukhevych, Zenon Matla and Dmytro Maiivskyi. Thus, Roman Shukhevych found himself at the helm of the OUN already in the middle of 1943, several months before the convening of the Great Assembly, at a time when the political situation was extremely difficult in Ukraine, and a mood of despair prevailed among Ukrainians, extending into the ranks of the OUN.

Shukhevych set himself immediately to preparing for the Extraordinary Great Assembly. Though burdened by responsibilities in the UPA, he participated actively in all areas of preparatory work for the Assembly. He even initiated talks with the organization of Colonel Melnyk and with Ivan Mitringa, leader of the so-called Left OUN, in an unsuccessful attempt to unite them all into a single OUN. This initiative demonstrated Shukhevych's concern about overcoming internal conflicts in the revolutionary underground in order to concentrate all energy on the external enemies of Ukraine.

The Third Extraordinary Great Assembly of the OUN took place in August 1943. The basic task of every OUN Great Assembly was to re-examine the ideological program, political policies and tactics of the Organization. These were the basic matters taken up by the Assembly. But the advanced convocation of this Assembly was precipitated by issues of an organizational nature which had to be resolved even before all other matters so as

to put an end to the temporary and makeshift state of affairs that characterized the Organization at the time.

The problem of leadership was complicated by the circumstances that the head of the OUN, Stepan Bandera, was currently interned in a Nazi concentration camp and thus was not in a position to provide direct leadership to the Organization. It was awkward to have him remain the official leader of the OUN when the OUN was progressing to a military confrontation with Nazi Germany, for this would only serve to further endanger his situation, as well as the status of all other leading OUN members who were in German prisons. Therefore, for tactical reasons, it was necessary to formally relieve those *Provid* members who were incarcerated by the Nazis of responsibility for the OUN's new political course, which meant the election of a new *Provid* from among those leading members who were still free. However, because Stepan Bandera was the symbol of Ukraine's uncompromising struggle for independence, no one had the slightest doubt that upon his release from prison, he would resume the post of leader of the OUN.

At the initiative of Roman Shukhevych, the Bureau of the *Provid* was transformed into a special supervisory committee, thus evading the need of identifying the head of the OUN and Bandera's role in the Organization. Shukhevych was named head of this Bureau, with Rostyslav Voloshyn-Pavlenko and Dmytro Malivskyi-Taras as members. By virtue of his position in the Bureau, Shukhevych became the official acting head of the OUN. Thus, alongside his responsibilities in directing the armed struggle of the UPA, in the summer of 1943, Shukhevych assumed leadership of the OUN, the political arm of the resistance movement.

The OUN as the Spearhead of the Revolutionary Struggle

The Third Extraordinary Great Assembly of the OUN affirmed the ideological position of the First and Second Great Assemblies which proclaimed that the nation is the foundation and final goal of all OUN activity. In the political realm it was emphasized that the only correct course for the OUN was an uncompromising military struggle against every aggressor, which at the time were Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. The political character of the OUN as standing above party partisanship was also affirmed:

The OUN, as the leader of the revolutionary liberation struggle, calls for the participation of all citizens in this great struggle. The OUN is not struggling to have Ukraine for itself nor to seize power in Ukraine, nor is it fighting for a specific type of political system. The type of

government will be decided by the people and their selected representatives. But today the OUN stands at the helm of the liberation struggle of our people, and therefore calls upon everyone to join the struggle. No one should remain aloof of the struggle!

Years of Superhuman Work

The years which followed the Third Great Assembly of August 1943, placed before the Ukrainian liberation movement tasks which required superhuman strength and determination. Realizing that they stood before an abyss of shameful defeat, the Nazis unleashed a reign of terror to destroy all opposition among Germany's captive nations. All of Ukraine was covered with one wave after another of unrestrained plunder and expropriations. From the east, Soviet Russians were moving into Ukraine to replace the Nazi aggressors with their own methods of terror, plunder and exploitation. The OUN had to defend not only itself and its members against Nazi and Soviet terror but also all the Ukrainian people. It was vital at this time that the OUN, despite its heavy losses, continue to exist as an operative and active force that would be able to inflict serious blows upon the enemy.

The OUN under the leadership of Roman Shukhevych-Tur, as head of the Bureau of the *Provid*, accepted this tremendous burden, readily exposing itself to very painful blows. The German *Reich*, which was "destined to last one thousand years," was on the verge of collapse, having survived barely four years in Ukraine. The hordes of Stalinist "warriors" were equally helpless in fighting the OUN. The OUN was successfully withstanding the blows of the enemy.

In his "Declaration on the Conclusion of War World II," dated May 1945, Shukhevych-Tur emphatically stated:

We, the *Provid* of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, will continue to be by our people's side on the battlefields of our war for liberation. Shoulder to shoulder with one another, nationalist revolutionaries and insurgent fighters will always be in the front lines of our continuing struggle for freedom.

We believe in the vitality and the coming resurrection of Ukraine, and we know that through our actions we are bringing nearer the day of national and social liberation. If we fall in battle, new fighters will rise up to

carry on the struggle, just as we are presently carrying on the struggle of our fathers.

Upon the blood of those who fell in battle in defense of their homes, families, and their people against the Gestapo and NKVD squads and units, in individual combat while performing conspiratorial work for the underground, and upon the blood of all those tortured to death in prisons and concentration camps, there grows an immortal legend of an embattled captive nation, a legend that burns as a flaming torch in the hearts and souls of our people, illuminating the way to a better future. Ukraine continues to live and fight and forcefully gain victory.

Loyalty to the Leader

At the end of 1944, the government of Nazi Germany unexpectedly freed Stepan Bandera and several dozen other OUN leaders, leaving them only under police surveillance. This was done to facilitate the creation of a National Committee, consisting of all Ukrainian political formations, which would represent the Ukrainian people as Germany's ally in its war against Soviet Russia. Bandera, however, stipulated in his conversations with German authorities that any joint military action of Ukraine with Germany required an official German declaration recognizing Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. The Nazi leaders were not willing to agree to this demand, still dreaming about planting German colonies throughout the east, even though they were faced with inevitable defeat. Thus, not surprisingly, their effort to pull the OUN into collaboration with Germany met with failure. Stepan Bandera was, nevertheless, free.

The Third Extraordinary Great Assembly of the OUN named Roman Shukhevych head of the Bureau of the OUN *Provid*, placing him formally at the helm of the OUN. Shukhevych could rightfully have regarded himself as the highest ranking OUN officer even after Bandera's release from prison, until the convening of a Fourth Great Assembly of the OUN. The enormous influence which Shukhevych had in the Ukrainian anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet underground as supreme leader of the OUN, the UPA, and the UHVR would have intoxicated lesser men, who would have jealously guarded their authority.

However, Roman Shukhevych was not that kind of man; he was a genuine nationalist revolutionary who sought to work and fight for Ukraine's liberation at the most dangerous posts, and never scrambled for positions of authority or honors of any kind. He accepted leadership positions in the

OUN, UPA and UHVR not because they would bring him rewards or prestige, but because these were the most difficult positions in the underground movement. This is best attested to by his refusal to leave Ukraine even when the underground was experiencing its most difficult period of existence, hounded by virtually ubiquitous enemy forces.

Respecting the moral authority of Stepan Bandera as a symbol of the entire revolutionary nationalist movement, Shukhevych put aside formal aspects of the leadership issue and immediately after Bandera's release established contact with him, reaffirming his recognition of Bandera as the real head of the OUN. In February 1945, Shukhevych convened a special conference of the OUN in Ukraine to formally resolve the matter of OUN leadership. The Conference reconstituted the Bureau of the *Provid*, unanimously electing Stepan Bandera, whom Shukhevych had nominated to head the Bureau, with Roman Shukhevych as his deputy and Yaroslav Stetsko as the third member. At the same time, it was decided that as leader of the OUN, Bandera should remain outside the area of Soviet occupation. Roman Shukhevych, as his deputy, would remain in Ukraine at the post of head of the OUN *Provid* for Ukraine. This decision, made unanimously at an OUN Conference in February 1945, restored Bandera to his role as supreme leader of the OUN and definitively settled the question of organizational leadership for the OUN members in Ukraine.

For the émigré OUN members, however, the question of leadership was not settled. Lev Rebet, who was released along with Stepan Bandera, initiated opposition to Bandera's leadership. Back in 1944, Daria Rebet, Lev's wife and member of the *Provid*, had been sent to Germany by Roman Shukhevych to take charge of the task of enlisting Ukrainian forced laborers working in "Greater Germany" into the OUN. Leaning on this technicality, Lev Rebet maintained that since Shukhevych had been elected head of the OUN at the Third Great Assembly of the OUN in 1943, and Daria Rebet had been given authority over OUN activists abroad, it followed that Daria Rebet had seniority over Bandera in Germany. Bandera therefore had the choice of either subordinating himself to Daria Rebet's commands, should he remain abroad, or of returning to Ukraine and subordinating himself to Shukhevych. The conditions of confusion in postwar Germany helped Lev Rebet find support for his incendiary position.

Learning of this conflict, Roman Shukhevych sent to the OUN *Provid* abroad two plenipotentiaries of the OUN *Provid* for Ukraine, namely Dmytro Maiivskyi-Taras and Gen. Dmytro Hrytsai, chief of the UPA General Staff, to help resolve the conflict. Both men successfully crossed the Soviet-Czech border, but were unexpectedly caught and killed crossing the Czech-Bavarian border by a special Soviet border guard on December 19, 1945.

When Shukhevych received news of their death, he dispatched once again to the OUN *Provid* abroad the official communiqué of the 1945 OUN Conference in Ukraine which declared Stepan Bandera head of the Bureau of the OUN *Provid* and Supreme Leader of the entire OUN. This time the female courier, Bystra, who carried the dispatch, succeeded in reaching West Germany, and a special commission of the *Provid* of the OUN Units Abroad, having examined the code of the dispatch, established the authenticity of Shukhevych's communication regarding this divisive issue for activists abroad.

An Additional Burden: Extraterritorial Conflicts

Shukhevych's formal reaffirmation of Bandera's leadership of the OUN, which he had transmitted to OUN members abroad, did not, however, put an end to the brewing conflict within the ranks of the nationalist movement abroad. Soon Lev Rebet began making claims that there had arisen "important differences" in ideological and policy matters between the OUN in Ukraine and OUN Units Abroad. This new provocation was aimed at creating the impression that Bandera's policy differed from that of the OUN in Ukraine, and therefore solidarity with the homeland required opposition to Bandera.

Rebet's claim was based on an intentionally misleading interpretation of the political writings of Osyp Diakiv-Hornovyi and Petro Poltava, OUN theoreticians in Ukraine. The authors were alleged to affirm that the nationalist movement in Ukraine had rejected the value of ideology and supported the tenets of socialism. Rebet's charges were based on phrases taken out of context, which referred to "classless society" and the "lack of clarity in OUN theories and doctrines." Members of the Rebet opposition were small in number, but claimed the loyalty of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, consequently disrupting even further the nationalist movement abroad. Both sides claimed the authority to speak on behalf of the underground in Ukraine and sent couriers to Shukhevych in an attempt to win his support for their position in the conflict.

All of this was an additional burden for Roman Shukhevych, who already had his hands tied with matters relating to the military struggle against the USSR. But Shukhevych did not evade this question, as he would have had every moral right to do. "Materials from the emigration (*re* the conflict) were twice the subject of several discussions with General Chuprynka," wrote Osyp Hornovyi to Yaroslav Stetsko-Zenon Karbovykh in Western Germany. "We carefully listened to the emissary from abroad, Ensign Yavir. We tried to approach this conflict within the OUN Units Abroad

as objectively as possible and to understand as much as possible the reasons underlying it." Shukhevych felt that if his word could stop the bickering and return the émigrés to a true path, then he would arbitrate the conflict. Despite his other difficulties, Shukhevych spent days and nights studying the reasons for the conflict in the Organization's ranks abroad, and searched for ways to resolve it.

First, Shukhevych supported Osyp Hornovyi and Petro Poltava. In a letter to the *Provid* of the OUN Units Abroad and to the Foreign Representation of the UHVR, Shukhevych declared that the views which Hornovyi and Poltava expressed in their writings were not their personal opinions, but the views of the OUN in Ukraine, because "all underground publications are subject to the approval of the head of the OUN in Ukraine. They would not be able to appear without this approbation. All the publications that have been sent abroad had the approbation of Chyprynka-Tur and the *Provid* in Ukraine. Consequently, they reflect the official views of the underground in Ukraine."

The essence of a solution was worked out by Roman Shukhevych in October 1949, and was sent to the *Provid* of the OUN Units Abroad and to the Foreign Representation of the UHVR as "An Explanation of the OUN *Provid* in Ukraine Concerning Several Ideological and Programmatic Questions:"

- 1) The basic aim of our struggle is the establishment of an Independent and United Ukrainian State.

- 2) We are fighting for the disintegration of the USSR into free and independent states of the nations under Soviet rule.

- 3) In our struggle for an Independent and United Ukrainian State, we ascribe a decisive role to the might of our own native forces.

- 4) We seek an alliance with all peoples of the world to join us in our struggle for the collapse of the USSR and of Russian Communist imperialism.

- 5) We hold that in the present situation the Ukrainian people, as all the captive nations of the USSR, can achieve their independence only through the path of revolutionary struggle, and solely through revolutionary methods.

- 6) Our struggle has as its objective the establishment of a Ukrainian State based on healthy democratic principles.

7) Concerning the internal order of the Ukrainian State, we stand for a classless society. By this we mean a society in which workers, peasants, and the productive intelligentsia will not be exploited.

8) We are against being firmly tied to any doctrines or theories. Our ideas flow not from doctrines, but from the actual and immediate needs and demands of the Ukrainian people. Our ideas are based on the evolving tendencies of the contemporary world.

9) While recognizing the enormous role of the OUN in the formation and the growth of the UPA, we reaffirm the non-partisan character of the UPA.

10) The OUN further reaffirms its full support for the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, just as it is widely supported by the Ukrainian masses.⁵²

Personally, Shukhevych advised the *Provid* of the OUN Units Abroad to be tolerant of all who supported the Ukrainian cause. Consequently, he suggested concrete proposals for resolving the conflict, adding that if his suggestions were not helpful in ending the conflict, then each side should send emissaries to Ukraine for arbitration by the OUN leadership in Ukraine. Shukhevych, however, did not live to see a resolution to this internal conflict.

Death of the Commander

Shukhevych attained the height of mastery in evading the enemy, in dodging ambushes, and in keeping the adversaries at bay, even while constantly battling them. For six years the Soviet NKVD failed to track the Commander down. But the years of life under the difficult conditions of insurgent warfare destroyed the health of Shukhevych. Heart disease weakened him further. He was also burdened with worry over his wife and small children, a son and daughter, who were arrested in August 1948, and deported to Siberia. Still, Shukhevych persevered in the struggle with the enemy and with his failing health. He refused to consider the option of leaving Ukraine. Nevertheless, his illness prevented him from changing his quarters as frequently as he used to.

In the winter of 1949-1950, Shukhevych quartered in a house in the village of Bilohorshcha, then a suburb of Lviv and presently a district of the city. The Soviet MVD (the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs) finally succeeded in detecting the location of the UPA commander, and at dawn of



An undated picture of Roman Shukhevych.



Roman Shukhevych, 1950.

March 5, 1950, a special MVD unit with police dogs surrounded his quarters. The sick commander defended himself to the last bullet, and with the last grenade covered himself with Ukrainian earth.

Although General Roman Shukhevych-Taras Chuprynka-Roman Lozovskyi was no longer alive, his immortal glory as the legendary commander of the "Army of the Immortals" has lived on. Of his 43 years of life, fully 27 were sacrificed for the achievement of freedom and a better life for the Ukrainian people.

VII. NOTES ON ROMAN SHUKHEVYCH AS A PERSON

Roman Shukhevych can be described in a number of ways:

He had enormous vitality and was very amicable. He loved athletics and music. Alongside an active involvement in athletic activities and physical training, he sharpened and strengthened his spirit by engaging in the work of clandestine ideological societies and from early youth, maintaining a deep interest in the study of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, and the military field.

He was a disciplined and very trustworthy member of the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). As the officer in charge of military affairs in the OUN Regional Executive for Western Ukraine, Shukhevych-Dzvin showed himself a true master in organizing and conducting underground operations, which inflicted heavy blows upon the enemy.

As Tur, the head of the OUN Regional *Provid* of Western Ukraine, he capably ended the internal disorder that encumbered the OUN in the years 1942-1943, and put the Organization once again upon a course of widespread revolutionary activities against Ukraine's aggressive enemies, preserving its effectiveness as long as he lived.

As General Taras Chuprynka, the legendary Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), he commanded an army of warriors, who through their heroic combat forged one of the most glorious chapters in Ukrainian history.

As Roman Lozovskyi, the General Secretary of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), he performed the functions of prime minister of the revolutionary underground Ukrainian government. Under his leadership the UHVR continued to function during a very difficult period as an active government for Ukraine, engaged in defending the Ukrainian peo-

ple and directing the struggle for liberation which was being conducted under the banners of the OUN, UPA, and UHVR.

Such is the person that emerges from the accounts of those who knew Roman Shukhevych.

Vivacity and Earnestness in Work

Those who had the opportunity to personally work or even briefly meet Roman Shukhevych note that they were struck by the harmonious coexistence in Roman's personality of two almost contradictory traits: an abundant vivacity, leaning toward carefree cheerfulness, and intense earnestness in work. He belonged to the small number of Ukrainians who have the ability to lighten up tense and unpleasant situations with humorous anecdotes, and at the same time display extreme seriousness and earnestness in all spheres of their life. His joviality won him the sympathy of everyone with whom he came into contact, but his extreme seriousness in work nevertheless kept others somewhat distanced from him.

This aspect of Shukhevych's personality was subtly noted by Zenon Matla in his article commemorating Roman Shukhevych:

My memories of meetings and conversations with the General will forever remain alive for me. Each time I recollect those encounters I experience them once more. Frequently there come to memory the villages of the Zolochiv and Pidhaitsi districts, in which we wrote appeals to the population, articles for our underground press, worked on plans for mobilizing armed UPA units to combat the bands of Soviet partisan leader Kovpak that roamed throughout Polissia and then moved south in an attempt to reach the Carpathian Mountains... Other times I remember a small peasant cottage with its windows tightly shut and a weak light flickering above a table around which sit the closest associates of the General. A chess board is set out on the table over which the General is leaning. He has a faint smile on his face and a tuft of golden hair stubbornly persists on falling over his forehead. I can hear his words to this day as if they were spoken here and now, "*Careful, druzhe* (comrade) Vyshnia, you have lost, checkmate!" And then began to flow a long series of humorous anecdotes and stories. The General related how he succeeded in wriggling out of the hands of the Gestapo at Lviv's train terminal,

hiding in a German police station near Lviv and using a false identity card, while the German police searched for him in vain throughout the area the entire day. After several minutes of rest he would proceed again to work, preparing a conference of leading underground activists, writing appeals to the people in Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and German about the aims of our struggle, analyzing various reports, such as on the work of the clandestine printing press in its hideout below the ground, examining how the construction of a clandestine radio station (which was given the code name "Aphrodite") was progressing and how the "boys" in the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donbas regions were holding... A conversation breaks in as furrows appear on the Commander's forehead...⁵³

Through his vivacity and earnestness Shukhevych gained the love and respect of all the revolutionary activists who worked with or under him. He knew how to implement projects so that they would be successful, investing maximum initiative and creativity into them, and maintaining in his associates the necessary intensity of work, never neglecting to interject a needed release of tension, humor and rest, which helped keep everyone's spirit high. He was disliked only by those who were more fruitful in words than in work. For them Roman Shukhevych was either "not serious enough," since he liked to tell jokes, or too much like a taskmaster, since he always placed high expectations for himself and others. There were, however, few "revolutionaries" of the latter type in the ranks of the UPA and OUN in Ukraine during the difficult days of Nazi and Soviet occupation, and thus there is little wonder that Shukhevych enjoyed such great esteem in the underground.

These character traits were also shared by another nationalist leader, Stepan Bandera, and probably for this reason the two leaders became very close and faithful friends from their first encounter. Their enormous respect and trust for each other was unbroken until death.

Shukhevych was also greatly admired for remaining highly principled, open and honest throughout his life. He disdained those who told others to act in one way, but themselves acted in another, not being true to their own exhortations. Shukhevych preached only what he strongly believed in; he gave only those commands that he himself was ready to execute and planned only those operations that he himself was ready to implement. This aspect was brought out in Bohdan Kravtsiv's⁵⁴ recollection about the time Shukhevych was sending the OUN member Mykola Leniuk off to assassinate the Soviet consul in Lviv as a protest against the Moscow-induced famine

that was ravaging Soviet-occupied Ukraine at that time. In parting with Lemyk, Shukhevych said in a saddened voice, "It would have been best for me to have gone myself." This is how Shukhevych was, always preferring to carry out the dangerous tasks himself rather than assigning them to others.

When in 1944 the UHVR was organized at his initiative to serve as the underground government of Ukraine, and it was decided that members of the UHVR were to remain in Ukraine, Roman Shukhevych-Lozovskyi faithfully abided by this decision as head of this government. He did not leave Soviet-occupied Ukraine even when his closest associates tried to persuade him to do so, at least for a brief period of rest and treatment, in light of the serious deterioration of his heart condition. "To head another 'Ukrainian government in exile?'" would be Shukhevych's customary sarcastic response to such suggestions. "How could the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the UPA be transferred to Paris or New York? When I directed others to remain in Ukraine to fight our struggle to the finish, that order was first of all directed at myself, and thus I can hardly defy this directive!" And he complied with this order until his death. He never sought any reasons to revoke or modify this command.

Underground courier Smereka, who successfully reached the underground headquarters of Shukhevych-Chuprynka shortly before the Supreme Commander's death, gives the following description of the General in his recollections of this meeting:

A group of people were awaiting us in the thick bushes, among them the Commander. Over his shoulders was a Soviet overcoat, drawn over his forehead was a military cap, and from under it there peered a pair of eyes whose glance frightened me somewhat at first. But only in the first few seconds. When one looked closer, one saw eyes that were kind, gentle and very cheerful... Slowly I stopped listening and looked closer at the Commander. With the aid of daylight I could better see how he had changed physically over the last period. Only his smile remained unchanged; it was the smile of a person who placed high expectations, but also was capable of being understanding. I will never forget that smile and those eyes.⁵⁵

One trait that particularly distinguished Shukhevych as a revolutionary nationalist and a noble individual was his exemplary modesty. Colonel Pobihushchyi-Ren focuses on this trait in his memoirs about Shukhevych when he was a member of the staff of the Legions of Ukrainian Nationalists:

Shukhevych wanted very much to have a work assignment (in the OUN). It didn't matter to him what function he would be given formally to perform; he was happy to take any kind of assignment as long as he could be engaged in some work for the national cause. He was willing to relinquish to anyone the distinctions he held in the organization in the interest of the cause.

These traits which Roman Shukhevych already possessed in his childhood remained unchanged until his death. When he joined the OUN, Shukhevych did not scramble to become OUN's Regional Leader for Western Ukraine although he had to his credit the reputation of an excellent UVO fighter. Rather, he was content to be appointed as officer in charge of military affairs in the Regional Executive in order to be directly involved in the organization of military operations. While he was in charge of the OUN's military sector, he never flaunted his rank in the OUN. On the contrary, he always acted in an unassuming manner so as to conceal even his membership in the OUN. Similarly, while being engaged in a military capacity in events that transpired in Carpatho-Ukraine during its struggle for independence, he was not known to covet praise and military citations. Having organized two units of the Legions of Ukrainian Nationalists, and while remaining the actual political commander, he readily yielded formal command of the new military formations to Colonel Pobihushchyi, who though a novice to revolutionary activities, was a seasoned specialist in military matters. Shukhevych yielded this post because he felt that this would best serve the cause. During the years he served as Supreme Commander of the UPA, Shukhevych did not appropriate any ostentatious titles or ranks in the style of "Marshals" Stalin, Voroshilov, Tito and others, but remained a simple Major and later Lieutenant-Colonel Chuprynka. Only in 1947 his associates persuaded Shukhevych, as UPA's Supreme Commander, to accept the rank of general since, at the proposal of the UPA, the UHVR had awarded the rank of general to Hrytsai-Perebyinis, chief of the UPA's military staff.

No one doubted that Roman Shukhevych deserved to be distinguished foremost among the UPA fighters for showing great heroism, courage and sacrifice. Shukhevych always dismissed proposals to award him with military honors but continually commended to the UHVR the names of other officers and soldiers for appropriate recognition. When Stepan Bandera was released from German prison at the end of 1944, he insisted that Roman Shukhevych remain as head of the entire OUN in recognition of his enormous service to the Organization, but Shukhevych refused. Shukhevych maintained that Bandera had become the symbol of Ukraine's revolutionary struggle for freedom, and thus must become once again the head of

the OUN, while Shukhevych would stay on as head of the OUN leadership in Ukraine. Shukhevych felt that in light of the current political situation it would be best for the head of the OUN to reside in the free world to conduct the liberation struggle regardless of how matters would develop in Ukraine where Shukhevych would continue the armed struggle until death.

A participant of the Conference of Captive Nations also gives special recognition to the Supreme Commander's extraordinary humility in his memoirs on the conference. He notes how Shukhevych had been the initiator of the idea of convening such a conference and how he followed with great interest the preparations for the assembly and later its proceedings:

On the third day of the conference, the Supreme Commander arrived with a small select personal guard in the force of one squad. Dressed in civilian garb, the Commander could hardly be distinguished from the men in his patrol. No one among the sentinels guarding the conference would have guessed that the unknown soldier-revolutionary for whom they provided lodging in their quarters was our Commander and Leader, who had been visiting punishment on Ukraine's fiercest enemies long before the war, and under whose leadership and command thousands of warriors of Ukraine's revolutionary army were marching into battles throughout the vast territory bounded by the Prypiat River and the Carpathian Mountains.

Probably everyone of Shukhevych's stature would have expected to be seated at the presidium dais and be given the opportunity to address the conference. But Shukhevych sat through the conference's sessions as an indistinguishable participant. Aside from a few individuals, the participants of the conference were not aware that among them sat the Supreme Commander of the UPA. Not even all the Ukrainian delegates attending were aware of this. However, everyone who came into contact with this "obscure" Ukrainian delegate found him to be very sympathetic. When on the second day after his arrival for the conference the Commander was compelled to attend to other duties and miss the day's sessions, those who had become acquainted with him on the preceding day noted his absence almost immediately and soon were asking for the whereabouts of the personable blond soldier or officer whose name they did not know.⁵⁶

A Rigorous Lifestyle

Roman Shukhevych always maintained a rigorous lifestyle in his private life. He was very fond of good company and liked various diversions, but abhorred excessive frivolity and revelry. In his youth he was a member of the Ukrainian scout organization *Plast* and of the temperance and anti-tobacco society *Rebirth*. All his life he refrained from drinking and smoking. He made every effort to give his family a secure existence, but did not pursue wealth. When after the fall of Poland in 1939 some of his friends hastened to accept employment overseeing estates formerly owned by Jewish landholders and confiscated by the Nazis, Shukhevych, who was fluent in German, contemptuously rejected this distasteful opportunity to enrich himself at someone else's expense, and dedicated himself entirely to work in the OUN. He believed that it sufficed for his family to have a modest dwelling and live in modest circumstances, while he himself maintained a Spartan-like lifestyle.

Courage and Composure

When as an 18-year old student at the Lviv Polytechnical Institute, Roman was asked by the UVO leadership if he would take the assignment of assassinating the Polish school superintendent Stanislaw Sobinski, by using a grenade that would also blow up the assassin, the young Shukhevych replied, "Yes, I am ready for such an assignment!"⁵⁷ The command to use a grenade was later revoked and Shukhevych shot Sobinski with a pistol. During the events in Carpatho-Ukraine, Roman Shukhevych frequently made illegal border crossings from Poland into Transcarpathian Ukraine even though many nationalists were being killed by Polish border patrol as they attempted to cross the border. Similarly, during the most difficult times of the partisan struggle against the Nazis and Soviets, Shukhevych always acted with enormous courage.

He maintained incredible composure at all times. When it was necessary, he would don the uniform of a Nazi, or Soviet officer, and calmly pass by groups of Gestapo, or NKVD officers.

Strong Faith and Tolerance for All

Roman Shukhevych remained profoundly religious from early youth to his last days. Neither a fanatic nor a pharisee, who proclaim religion in speech but live contrary to the requirements of Christian morality, Roman

never flaunted his strong religious convictions, while fulfilling its precepts in everyday life.

From youth Roman wore a medallion of the Blessed Virgin Mary over his chest and under his shirt. He had been given this medallion by his mother when, as a six-year-old boy, he had received his first Holy Communion. Before every sports event in which he was a participant, he would bless himself inconspicuously. While incarcerated in Polish prison, he made morning and evening prayer a mandatory practice for Ukrainian nationalist political prisoners. As UPA Supreme Commander and head of the underground Ukrainian government, he made it a point to have the UPA Supreme Command and the UHVR issue a proclamation solemnly placing the UPA under the care of the Holy Mother of God in the tradition of the Kozaks and designating the feast day of the Patronage of the Mother of God (October 14) as the official feast day of the UPA. He also instructed each unit of the UPA to have its own chaplain and was personally involved in implementing this directive. At Shukhevych's instruction, the administration of oath for new UPA members was preceded by the celebration of the Holy Liturgy. The signature of the head of the underground Ukrainian Catholic Church, Rev. Prof. M. Lavrivskiy, was placed first in the list of signatories of the "Appeal of Struggling Ukraine."

Nevertheless, alongside his strong religious convictions, Shukhevych was very tolerant. One of the members of the OUN *Provid* in Ukraine wrote about this in a letter, dated June 1950, to the *Provid* of the OUN Units Abroad:

In our Organization, the religiously pious, the theologically indifferent, and unbelievers all work side by side, and this issue has never given rise to conflicts among our members.

A deep religious tolerance was embodied, with Shukhevych's unequivocal support and possibly at his initiative, in the resolutions of the Third Great Assembly of the OUN, held in July 1943. This was, first of all, the practical implementation of one of the principles of Christ's teachings: "Give to God what is God's, and to Caesar what is Caesar's," i.e. since the Ukrainian liberation movement was a political movement, its attention had to be concentrated on political aims and political objectives. Such a deep tolerance was a necessity for the Ukrainian liberation movement if it aspired to mobilize into its ranks all Ukrainian patriots of Central and Eastern Ukraine. In Shukhevych, this tolerance sprung not so much from an awareness of its necessity in light of political-tactical considerations, as from his deep personal convictions. Such an attitude proved invaluable for the OUN, UPA,

and the UHVR, since it opened the door for participation in these organizations to many young and patriotic Ukrainians from Central and Eastern Ukraine, among them numerous UPA officers who were reared from childhood in the atheistic, anti-religious atmosphere of the *Komsomol* (Communist Youth Organization), and who became believers, or at least tolerant and understanding toward those with religious convictions, only as a result of their involvement in the Ukrainian liberation movement.

Strategist and Incomparable Politician

Roman Shukhevych was above all a revolutionary fighter and soldier, by nature and his circle of interests. However, in addition to this, he showed himself to be an incomparable politician, who was able to view every new situation comprehensively and from different perspectives.

Shukhevych, for example, held that a military struggle against the Nazis was necessary not only for the sake of defending members of the OUN revolutionary movement and the entire Ukrainian people, but as the best political-propagandistic weapon in warding off Soviet accusations that the OUN and the Ukrainian liberation movement were sponsored by the Nazis. This, by the way, is what distinguished the UPA led by Shukhevych-Chuprynka from the other three Ukrainian insurgent groups that existed when the UPA was being organized. The commanders of the other groups viewed their respective formations as modern-day *Sich*, which provided haven for individual political activists targeted by the Nazis for persecution, but did not pull the political organization, to which these activists belonged, into assuming an anti-Nazi posture. In contrast, the UPA, under the command of Shukhevych-Chuprynka, viewed itself from its inception as the military arm of the Revolutionary OUN which had declared itself an intransigent enemy of Nazi Germany. And so, while the leaders of those other small groups, Bulba-Borovets and *PUN*, saw no contradiction in addressing memoranda to leaders of Nazi Germany and engaging in negotiations with the Nazis even as their groups were involved in anti-Nazi resistance, the Supreme Commander of the UPA, General Shukhevych-Chuprynka, decisively rejected such contacts with the enemy. He persisted in maintaining this stance even when Russian Soviet forces were advancing on Ukraine from the east.

The political correctness and moral value of such a political position became apparent to everyone only after the collapse of Nazi Germany. Shukhevych was able to discern the imperativeness of such a stance when the Germans were still in complete control of Ukraine, and it is to his credit that he implemented this policy with ironclad determination.

Similarly, it is to Shukhevych's credit that he also continued the armed liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA-UHVR against the Russian aggressor for years after the conclusion of World War II, even though the supporters of "realpolitik" considered such resistance as a "political absurdity." Again, the significance of this position became more apparent with the passage of time.

Thus, there is little wonder that Roman Shukhevych came to be viewed as the legendary Commander of the "Army of Immortals," who through their unequalled heroism in the struggle against both Nazi Germany and Communist Russia etched into Ukrainian history one of its most glorious chapters, leaving a clear guide for future generations embarking on the road to liberation.

All-Encompassing Support for the Unity of Ukraine's Lands

Commitment to Ukraine's unity (*Sobornystvo*) is an important political principle among Ukrainians; however, its meaning is ordinarily tied to a territorial concept: the unity of all Ukrainian lands. Roman Shukhevych, on the other hand, interpreted this principle in a much wider context, implementing the idea into all aspects of the liberation struggle.

Roman Shukhevych first encountered the problem of territorial unity as a 14-year old youth, when a severe blow to this principle was lodged by Symon Petliura's alliance with Pilsudski's Poland in 1920-1921. The alliance entailed an agreement ceding Western Ukraine to Poland in return for Polish military support of Petliura's efforts to liberate the rest of Ukraine from Soviet occupation. The alliance deeply offended the Ukrainians of Halychyna who responded with great indignation against Petliura and all Eastern Ukrainians, attacking them as national traitors. Dr. Evhen Petrushevych, the dictator of the Western Ukrainian National Republic, severed ties with the government of the Ukrainian National Republic and began to conduct diplomatic activity abroad separately and independently of the representatives of the UNR. The patriotic Ukrainian youth of Halychyna tended to be more sympathetic to Petrushevych because with every new day they became witnesses to and often victims of ever increasing instances of violence by the Polish government directed against Ukrainians.

Several members of Shukhevych's family also became victims of Polish terror. Roman's father, for example, was imprisoned. Thus, there is little wonder that young Roman leaned toward the view that the policies of the Supreme Commander (*Otaman*) of the UNR, Symon Petliura, based on an alliance with Poland, narrowing the territory of the UNR to Ukraine's Central and Eastern lands, at the cost of Western Ukraine, were wrong and trai-

torous, while the activities of Western Ukrainian Dictator Dr. Evhen Petrushevych in defense of Western Ukraine against Polish aggression were politically correct and revolutionary.

At that time circumstances brought Shukhevych into contact with Col. Evhen Konovalets. Konovalets had returned to Lviv from abroad and took temporary residence in the house of Roman's grandmother with whom Roman was staying while he was studying at the Academic High School in Lviv. In his conversations with the inquiring and thoughtful youth, Colonel Konovalets, who was then the head of the UVO, convincingly justified Petliura's forced alliance with Poland, in spite of its unsavory concessions to Poland, as a temporary necessity. Konovalets, who knew Petliura personally, vouched for Petliura's sincere patriotism. The fact that Konovalets was a Western Ukrainian and was personally burned by Petliura's move, having at the time been the commander of the *Sichovi Striltsi*, a division of Western Ukrainians within the military structure of the UNR, gave more credence to Konovalets' defense of Petliura. Consequently, Roman Shukhevych became one of the first advocates of Konovalets' position among Western Ukrainians, raising Petliura to the pedestal of an all-Ukrainian national leader. Thus, at a time when even some of Petliura's former colleagues were defiling Petliura in an attempt to discredit him, the young Western Ukrainian student Roman Shukhevych was passionately defending Petliura as a national Ukrainian leader.

Roman Shukhevych was concerned with the fate of Central and Eastern Ukraine no less than with the fate of Western Ukraine, viewing both sections as inseparable parts of Ukraine. As a member of the UVO and OUN he had organized revolutionary protests against the trials, conducted by Moscow's agents, of leading members of the underground organizations: Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) and Union of Ukrainian Youth (SUM), and against the Moscow-planned artificial famine of 1933 that killed millions of Ukrainian farmers. As UPA Supreme Commander he placed particular emphasis on drawing into UPA's ranks as many Ukrainian patriots from Central and Eastern Ukraine as possible. As organizer of the UHVR he insisted that the new political body consist of as many Ukrainians from those regions as possible and that the president of the UHVR be from Ukraine's heartland.

Along with this, Shukhevych was always actively concerned for the fate of other parts of Ukraine, such as Transcarpathian Ukraine, Transcarpathia, the Kholm region, and at various junctures of his life he was closely associated with important developments in each of those regions.

As was mentioned earlier, Shukhevych's commitment to Ukraine's unity was not limited to a territorial aspect. From his first days in the OUN, he aspired to have this principle implemented in a social aspect. When many

OUN organizers and leaders held that the OUN should be an elitist organization consisting primarily of revolutionary student activists. Roman Shukhevych insisted that the OUN should seek to recruit members from among farmers, workers, and professionals. The mass sabotage campaign against Polish occupation, organized by Shukhevych while he was the officer for military matters in the OUN Regional Executive of Western Ukraine, brought Ukrainian students, farmers and workers together in a common struggle. "The Ukrainian State will be the common good and possession of all social strata, all economic classes, all groups of the Ukrainian people, and for this reason all social components of the Ukrainian nation must be involved in the struggle to build this state," Shukhevych repeated at every occasion.

As the Supreme Commander of the UPA and organizer of the UHVR, Roman Shukhevych implemented this principle in its political context. In his statements concerning the composition of the UPA Shukhevych emphasized that although the UPA evolved from the military units of the OUN lead by Stepan Bandera, and although members of the Revolutionary OUN formed the nucleus of the UPA, the UPA was a national, all-Ukrainian and non-partisan formation, since one could find in its ranks fighters from all Ukrainian political groupings. Roman Shukhevych conducted negotiations with the leaders of all existing and defunct Ukrainian political parties, organizations and groupings, including the organization of Col. Andrii Melnyk, the National Centre of Andrii Livytskyi, former members of the Ukrainian National-Democratic Union (the largest pre-war party in Polish-occupied Ukraine), the Front of National Unity (also a pre-war party), and the "hetmanites" (supporters of a Ukrainian variation of monarchism, favoring a system headed by a hetman). He sincerely hoped to unite all these groups in a common struggle against German and Russian occupation waged on a military front by the UPA and under the political leadership of the revolutionary all-Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR).

This commitment to the principle of national unity was also very evident in Shukhevych's attitude to the problem of *Krai* (the movement in Ukraine) and its section abroad. Even under harsh conditions in Ukraine, he never forgot about émigré Ukrainians. He remained consistently interested in the work of the OUN Units Abroad, as well as in the activities of the entire Ukrainian emigration. He was very concerned about dissension among Ukrainians abroad, and often appealed for unity with the struggling Ukraine both in word and action. In his seventh year of leadership of the Ukrainian liberation struggle in Ukraine, he sent an "Appeal of Struggling Ukraine" to Ukrainians abroad with a passionate plea for complete unity, not only on paper but in concerted action on behalf of Ukraine. In his appeal, he states, "Struggling Ukraine emphatically demands complete unity from the entire

Ukrainian emigration, unity not only in words, but also in deeds, an active and not a paper unity, based on the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people in Ukraine."

The revolutionary liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people after 1920 can be divided into several periods: the period of the UVO (1920-1929), the period of the OUN (1929-1939), and the period of the OUN-UPA-UHVR (the years during and after World War II). Roman Shukhevych can be viewed as the embodiment of the continuity of the struggle through all of these periods, since he participated in an active and leading capacity through each of these successive stages. As an 11-year old youth, he experienced the emotional upsurge of the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation culminating on November 1, 1918, when the Ukrainian blue and yellow flag was hoisted on all administrative buildings in Western Ukraine, just nine months after the Fourth Universal of January 22, 1918 was issued in Kyiv declaring Eastern and Central Ukraine an independent and sovereign state. This was soon followed by the Act of January 22, 1919, proclaiming the unification of all Ukrainian lands into one state. Although soon after that Roman experienced the tragedy and humiliation of renewed occupation, the extraordinary events of 1917-1919 left an indelible mark on young Roman, inclining him even from those early years to take an active interest in social and political developments. Those events also implanted into his soul an intense yearning for freedom and hatred toward foreign subjugation. As a young man he had listened intently to Col. Evhen Konovalets, who had been the commander of the military formation *Sichovi Striltsi*, which had defended the Fourth Universal, as he spoke with Roman about the necessity of continuing the liberation struggle. Under the influence of these words Roman joined the underground UVO while only sixteen years old.

Stormy years passed, the UVO was transformed into the OUN, the UPA was born against the background of World War II, and eventually the Ukrainian resistance movement completed its structural formation with the establishment of an underground Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. Throughout this entire period of the organizational maturation of the underground movement, Roman Shukhevych remained a leading participant of the military flank of the movement, not only steadfast in his commitment to the cause, but constantly growing in strength, courage, and qualities of leadership.

From a historical perspective, primary emphasis should probably be given to Roman Shukhevych's role as the organizer and commander of a popular national armed struggle, waged under the most unfavorable conditions, and as the creator of one of the most glorious periods in Ukrainian history. To better understand why emphasis is being placed on this aspect of Shukhevych's life, let us turn to the preceding period of the national libera-

tion struggle when Ukrainians were engaged in an armed struggle against aggressors, the period which began in the twilight of World War I. The February Revolution of 1917, which brought about the collapse of the Russian Czarist empire, provided a unique opportunity to secure the restoration of Ukrainian statehood. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian political leaders at the time, who were of socialist leanings, did not take full advantage of this exceptional opportunity. Their greater interest in effecting a "proletarian revolution" in concert with their Russian socialist "brothers," rather than pursuing the goal of national liberation, created political confusion among Ukrainians, when the moment called for an ironclad resolve to stave off all who had any territorial designs upon Ukraine. However, the fact that those events were, at least obliquely, set off by a world conflict gave rise to expectations among Ukrainians that the next great conflict would provide a similar opportunity for Ukrainians to pursue the realization of their national ideal.

History does not, however, have the tendency to repeat itself. World War II did not bring a repetition of the military-political situation that existed in Eastern Europe at the end of World War I. What emerged was almost the exact opposite: conditions that were probably the most unfavorable that war could have brought for the Ukrainian liberation struggle. Ukraine became the battleground and stage of one of the fiercest conflicts between imperialists in history. Millions of Nazi German and Soviet Russian troops incessantly trampled through Ukraine, spurred on by sinister leaders who were intent on turning the Ukrainian people into slaves within their evil empires. Neither the foreign aggressors nor the western powers envisioned support for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. Furthermore, the situation created in Ukraine by the military activities of the invaders left no room for such a possibility. The Provisional Ukrainian Government, established by the Proclamation of the Rebirth of Ukrainian Statehood on June 30, 1941, was brutally liquidated by the Germans in the first days of its existence. At Hitler's order, the Legions of Ukrainian Nationalists, which had been organized in agreement with the German High Command, were disbanded, and almost three million Ukrainian soldiers of the Red Army, who surrendered voluntarily to the Germans at the outset of the war, were starved to death in Nazi POW camps. In addition, the entire Ukrainian population was subjected to an extremely harsh terror, aimed at nipping in the bud any thought of resistance.

How could anyone have dared to propagate the concept of a national liberation struggle under such frightful and adverse conditions, let alone attempt to implement this concept into action?

Ukrainian patriots from the camp of so-called "opportunists" and "realists" argued that this was an absurdity. Consequently, their most prominent representative, who entered the Ukrainian government of 1941,

immediately repudiated his independist views once he saw that at the time conditions were not entirely favorable for the existence of an independent Ukrainian state, and quickly made a leap "from government to committee," i.e. from participation in the struggle for Ukrainian independence to the organization of a relief committee whose existence was approved by German occupational authorities. This group replaced the independent Ukrainian government with an apolitical Ukrainian Relief Committee. Even after the German defeat at Stalingrad, when the luster of "invincible" Germany began to wane, Melnyk's *PUN* and the Ukrainian Relief Committee continued to approach the Germans with the proposal to form a Ukrainian Division within the German military structure to be comprised of Ukrainian youth.

Let us imagine how Ukraine's political history would look had the UPA, UHVR, and the Revolutionary OUN not made their appearance. It is apparent that Ukraine would stand very bleakly in the world community had its political life during the war period been limited to the meek efforts of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Ukrainian Relief Committee, and *PUN* on behalf of the brutally victimized, but defenseless Ukrainian population. This would have been morally devastating for Ukrainians living at the time, spawning a sense of helplessness, despair and servile resignation. In the absence of resistance, the German aggressor would have proceeded to execute his nefarious designs for Ukraine with an arrogant brazenness. After all, the Nazis began arresting and executing scores of Ukrainians within the first months of their occupation of Ukraine, including members of Colonel Melnyk's organization, simply for organizing a massive commemorative observance for Ukrainian soldiers who were captured and executed by the Bolsheviks at Bazar in 1921. Later several Melnyk activists working on the staff of a Kyiv newspaper were executed at Babyn Yar, even though the Melnyk organization endeavored to maintain the appearance of loyal cooperation with the Germans.

It was only as a result of the menacing activities of the Revolutionary OUN underground and the UPA that the Germans eventually felt compelled to make some concessions to the camp of opportunist Ukrainian patriots. Without the resistance activities of the OUN-UPA, German terror would have undoubtedly struck at the ranks of obliging members of the apolitical relief agencies, who with time would have come to be viewed as bothersome and dispensable. Harvest contingents would have been increased, the villages would have been plundered far more extensively, and more young Ukrainians would have been conscripted for labor assignments in Germany. Neither higher nor middle level Ukrainian schools would have been allowed to function.

Foreign opinion would be even less generous to Ukrainians. Though the Ukrainians involved in opportunist groups were sincere patriots,

who wished to help their people by adjusting to existing conditions, they would have been viewed by the Western Allies as Ukrainian counterparts of people like the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling and Marshal Petain of France, whose patriotism meant little to the Allies in light of their collaboration with the Germans. Consequently, after the war, they and all Ukrainians fleeing from the communists would have been mercilessly handed over to the Soviets, just as tens of thousands of Don Cossacks were delivered to almost certain death in the Soviet Union, with not even women or children being spared. Stalin, in turn, having once again seized all Ukrainian lands, would have had a free hand, provided by the discreditation of Ukrainians as Nazi collaborators, to implement his plan for dealing with the "Ukrainian problem," which, by the way, he once shared with Khrushchev: to resettle all Ukrainians to Siberia just as he had deported the Tatars, Kalmyks and Volga Germans under the guise of punishment for their collaboration with the Germans.

This did not happen because that period of Ukrainian history was marked by the heroic armed struggle waged under the banners of the Revolutionary OUN and UPA, first against the German invader and then the Russian. This valiant and widescale struggle struck a response with both friend and foe. It compelled Ukraine's newest invaders to modify their terror, heartened the Ukrainian people with increased confidence in their ability to impact events around them, and delivered a serious blow to the slanderous propaganda about Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis. As a result of the anti-Nazi warfare of the OUN-UPA-UHVR, the activities of the opportunist camp came to be viewed in a different light, namely as a complement to the revolutionary underground in the spheres of cultural, economic and relief concerns.

The revolutionary struggle of the OUN-UPA-UHVR rendered a huge moral capital for the Ukrainian national cause which benefited Ukrainian patriots in Ukraine and émigré Ukrainians. It endowed with enormous courage all those who continued to offer resistance to Moscow's colonial rule in Soviet prisons and concentration camps, among them numerous intellectuals who perceived their mission as continuing the liberation struggle in modern forms. It compelled Ukrainian members of the communist youth organization *Komsomol* to reexamine more carefully the reasons why their brethren fought so heroically in the anti-Communist Ukrainian nationalist movement. In light of this struggle, Stalin decided to discard his plan for deporting all Ukrainians from Ukraine to Siberia, fearfully recognizing, as he later admitted to Khrushchev, that this would push all Ukrainians to join the UPA-OUN's armed struggle, which would then dangerously rock his empire.

It is important to remember that the great heroic struggle of the OUN-UPA-UHVR was organized and led for over seven long years by Ro-

man Shukhevych, who during this period was known to the world only as either Tur, Taras Chuprynka, or Roman Lozovskyi. It was he who at the critical moment for the OUN, when its leader and tens of its leading activists were apprehended by the Gestapo and incarcerated in prisons and concentration camps, took command of the OUN and guided it out of its momentary confusion onto the road of overt armed struggle against the German aggressor, disregarding the counsel of "veteran politicians" who viewed such a course as absurd and dangerous. It was he who initiated the organization of the UHVR, Ukraine's underground government, helped it to become a functioning body, exercising power over significant tracts of Ukrainian territory and the hearts of millions of Ukrainians. It was also he who remained on the battlefield to head the resistance movement up to his heroic death, when all the politicians subscribing to the "prescripts of realpolitik" fled Ukraine. At a time when émigré "presidents" and "premiers" were arguing in Displaced Persons (DP) camps over issues of power within the émigré structure and claiming "authoritatively" that the UPA was virtually nonexistent since no armed resistance was possible under conditions of Soviet rule, Roman Shukhevych was leading from his field headquarters in the Carpathian Mountains, the forests of Volyn and Polissia, and the hills near Lviv a very serious armed struggle against Moscow that lasted over a decade after the close of World War II and involved thousands of fearless warriors.

Herein lies the historic role of Roman Shukhevych, the organizer and Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the military arm of the Ukrainian people during the period of probably their greatest tribulations in recent history, the leader of the OUN, the revolutionary avant-guard of the Ukrainian nation, and head of the Secretariat of the UHVR, the real government of the steadfast Ukrainian nation. Under his leadership and command, the finest sons and daughters of Ukraine provided the period of World War II and the decade after it with a glorious content that will live on in Ukrainian history, reinvigorated the Ukrainian people with a renewed spirit of tenacity, and rekindled the intensity of the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people for the restoration of their Independent and United Ukrainian State.

NOTES

1. S. Shakh, "Roman Shukhevych -- symbol nezlamnosti," *Shliakh Peremohy*, November 14, 1965.
2. Ibid.
3. O-iak, "Komandyr, revoliutsioner, sportovets," *Ukrainskyi Samostiinyk*, November 12, 1950.
4. Information received by the author from relatives of Roman Shukhevych.
5. The declaration appeared in *Svoboda*, published in Jersey City, and in *America*, published in Philadelphia.
6. P. Mirchuk, *Narys Istorii OUN*, Vol. 1, pp. 291-295.
7. Z. Knysh, *Dryzhyt pidzemnyi huk*, Winnipeg, 1953, p. 85.
8. This referred to the military service in the Polish army.
9. Z. Knysh, *Dryzhyt pidzemnyi huk*, Winnipeg, 1953, p. 57.
10. This strengthens the view that Shukhevych himself was the second assassin who later gave the revolver to Yurko Berezhynskyi to kill Czechowski.
11. Stepan Shakh, in his memoirs appearing in *Shliakh Peremohy*, December 12, 1965, states that Shukhevych was married in 1935 and that Yurko was born in 1936. In 1935 and 1936, however, Shukhevych was in prison. Yurko gives 1933 as the date of his birth in a letter to the Soviet leadership in 1968.
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APPENDIX I

ADDRESS BY YURII SHUKHEVYCH ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF HIS FATHER, GENERAL TARAS CHUPRYNKA

The year was 1947. At that time our entire family was arrested and deported. My little sister and I were taken to an orphanage in Donbas. I managed to escape and establish contact with my father, and the two of us met near the city of Rohatyn in March of 1947.

I was led into the forest where we met and had a chance to talk. My father had not seen me for several years. He wanted to see what I looked like and how my stay in the orphanage had affected me. I found it very interesting and a great joy to speak with him.

We exchanged ideas about the present situation. I told him what I knew about our family, about my mother and about my grandfather, who had been deported and later died in Siberia. My father must have sensed the anger and hatred which I felt and that is perhaps why he told me:

You know quite well, Yurii, that practically our entire family has perished or is being imprisoned, but I want you to know that we are not fighting for the sake of avenging ourselves. If we did that, would we be any better than they? We are fighting, Yurii, to make sure that these things never happen again.

These words had a tremendous impact on me and served as a guiding light throughout my life.

It is especially appropriate to mention this incident now because they really fought so that these things do not happen again. People have be-

come aware of this fact not only here but throughout Ukraine and, in fact, throughout the world. They have realized that communist ideas are false and misleading and can lead nowhere but to the dead end to which they have brought our country today.

Forty years have gone by since my father perished, and I am filled with pride that his name has not been forgotten and that those who shared with him the thorny path of struggle remember him today. I am happy to see that not only they but also the younger generation have not forgotten him. This is why it is a special pleasure for me to address those who stood alongside my father for many years, shouldering the burden of the armed struggle, yet managing to survive and serve as witnesses to the horrible sufferings which our people were destined to endure. This is why I greet all of them and wish them happiness and many, many years of life.

MEETINGS WITH MY FATHER

I lived with my father for only a short time. These were mostly brief encounters. This is perhaps why I remember them so vividly.

The first one I remember was a meeting with my father in the prison of Brygidky. I remember that my mother and I entered the meeting room. It was a big room where several prisoners at a time met with their loved ones. The room was already filled with many people. Suddenly, I saw my father as he entered the room accompanied by a Polish policeman. I remember clearly that he was dressed in a gray garment and that he was smiling. My father embraced my mother. He wanted to pick me up, but for some reason I became fearful of the policeman, who tried to calm me down without success. Then my father took me in his arms and I calmed down.

Our next meeting was about a year later. It was in 1938. My father had just been released from prison. He came to Oliadiiv where we lived with Mother at that time. My father was an avid and skillful horseback rider. He loved horses. My grandfather Roman Berezynskyi had beautiful horses and saddles. After a few days, my father saddled a horse and went horseback riding. He then put me in the saddle. I, merely a child, did not hold the reins firmly and fell off. I was probably somewhat scared but it did not dampen my interest in horseback riding. In time, I developed as much enthusiasm for horseback riding as my father and my mother's brother Yurko Berezynskyi. We then spent the whole summer on the river Dnister, in the village of Rakhivets, where the pastor was Reverend Rudenskyi, a distant relative.

My next meeting with Father took place in Krakow in 1939, right after the fall of the Polish state. The Bolsheviks occupied Halychyna up to

the rivers Buh and Sian. The Germans were on the other side. My mother and I crossed the border near the town of Tomashiv and went to Krakow via Yaroslav. We arrived early in the morning and were passing by the university. Suddenly, I saw my father coming towards us. I was overjoyed and ran to embrace him. He took Mother and me to show us our new apartment which he had just found.

We lived there, on Uriadnychy Street, for nearly a year (I don't remember the number of the house, but I would find it blindfolded even today). I especially remember my life on Uriadnychy Street because of the fact that Mother went back to Halychyna. She wanted to bring her parents with her. They didn't want to leave, however, so she came back to Krakow.

She was away for more than a month. Then she left again to take some courses in Breslau (presently Wroclaw). She was there for three months. All that time I spent with my father. What a heavenly "bachelor's" life it was. We would get up early in the morning. Father would prepare breakfast, most of the time scrambled eggs and coffee, or tea. We would then be on our way -- I to school and he on his errands. We usually had lunch at the "Ukrainian Casino" which at that time was the center of the Ukrainian diaspora in Krakow. Then I would do my homework and play and he would do his work. We also had out supper at the casino, with the exception of those days when my father had late night meetings; then I had supper at home.

At that time, Father was the OUN leader on the territory of the *Generalgouvernement*. Such Western Ukrainian provinces as Lemkivshchyna, Zasiannia, Kholmshchyna, Pidliashia were under his jurisdiction. He went there on business quite often. In such cases, he would leave me with one of his friends for a few days. In those times of "bachelorhood", father taught me two things: punctuality and the use of weapons. When I went somewhere, he designated a time I had to be back and I could not be late even for a minute.

My father had a pistol. He would remove the bullets and show me how to use it. He also explained to me the differences among various systems. From that time on I became interested in weapons.

In 1940, we moved from Uriadnychy Street to 22 Green Street. Bandera's OUN Center was located next door at 20 Green Street and Melnyk's Ukrainian Central Committee was housed at 26 Green Street. The Krakow Branch of Melnyk's *Provid* of Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN) was located in the same building.

We had a big apartment on the fifth floor. Actually, we only had one room. Another room was occupied by Ivan Ravlyk, a member of the OUN *Provid*, whose wife Myroslava was my mother's cousin. Yaroslav Stetsko and Stefan Lenkavskyy also lived there. Lebed, Klymyshyn and other

prominent members of the *Provid* were frequent visitors at our house. Stepan Bandera also came occasionally. They usually met in the dining room and discussed various topics, mostly political issues.

These were the years of 1940 and 1941. France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway...then Yugoslavia and Greece. One could feel the approach of the war with the USSR. There were frequent discussions of the current and future problems. I was in the midst of those discussions and listened to what was being said. Even though I was only seven or eight, for the first time I began to think about these issues. For me it was an education of a special kind. When I was ten or eleven, I was already reading Machiavelli.

In the spring of 1941, the Ukrainian Legion was organized. My father became one of its commanders and after that I didn't see him for a long time, with the exception of two brief encounters when he had a short leave of absence. We didn't see each other again until the Christmas of 1943. At that time the Legion was disbanded. Privates and NCO's were demobilized. Officers of the Legion were transferred to Germany. Father realized that he would surely be arrested as a member of the *Provid*. Therefore, dressed in the uniform of a German officer, he got off the train at the Lviv station and, unnoticed by the German guards, he disappeared.

In a short time, he became the Supreme Commander of the newly organized Ukrainian Insurgent Army. At that time, in 1943, his headquarters were not far from Bibrka near Lviv, where he frequently spent time due to organizational matters.

I used to meet with him. Usually we met at Pohulianka and the Lychakiv Cemetery. These meetings were of great interest to me and had a tremendous impact on me. At the Lychakiv Cemetery there was a section, which now lies in ruins, known as the burial grounds for the (Polish) "defenders of Lviv". It contained the remains of those who fell in battle with the Ukrainians in November of 1918 as well as the remains of those who died in battle with Budionny's army in 1920.

In addition, Polish Scout members were buried there. These were mere children, 14 and 15 years of age, who died in those November days. My father took me to their graves and told me that this was a manifestation of the high degree of patriotism of the Poles and the Polish youth. Too bad we didn't have such patriotism in those days. Those trips to the cemetery forced me to think about the issue of patriotism and the events which took place at that time, especially since my father told me that in those days in November he had shed tears many a time because he, as an 11-year-old boy, was too young to bear arms.

What was characteristic in our relationship was the fact that in our discussion of serious issues he talked with me not as a father but as an older

and experienced friend. After giving some thought to the topic under discussion, I would come to the conclusion that he was, in fact, right.

The arrival of the Soviets in Halychyna interrupted my meetings with Father for a long time. Then came the imprisonment of our entire family, orphanages in Chornobyl and Stalino (presently Donetsk) and my escape from Donetsk. In Halychyna I managed to establish contact with my father through underground channels. We met once again in the forest near the village of Pidhoroddia near Rohatyn in the region of Ivano-Frankivsk. It was towards the end of September or the beginning of October of the year 1947. We talked almost the entire night about our family, the imprisonment of family members, the orphanage and my escape from it, my wanderings throughout Ukraine and other matters.

It was then that my father told me that the members of the underground were fighting not to avenge themselves but to make sure that such atrocities do not happen again. He also added that even though it was my dream to join the underground and its armed struggle, this was not the time for it -- I should be studying since the older generation was, in fact, destined to die and be physically annihilated in this armed struggle. Time would pass, however, and we, my generation, would have to raise the people to fight for our independence. Who would do it if we, the young ones, were killed? It would be different if the situation were such as to allow the possibility of an uprising against the invaders. In that case he would not oppose my joining the armed struggle. He would, in fact, bless me for such an undertaking, and even were I to perish in the struggle, he would accept my death as worthwhile, no matter how difficult it would be. It would be death for one's country. Once again, although unwillingly, I forsook the thought of joining the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. I had to agree that he was right.

Our next meeting took place in Lviv in the apartment of Yaroslav Davydovych. We spent several hours together. We spoke of the need to go to Stalino in order to take my seven-year old sister Maria away from the orphanage. We also spoke about my life and plans for the future. We parted as the evening approached. It was January 17, 1948. This was the last time I saw my father alive.

...I was already an "old" prisoner. In fact, I had spent two years in the MGB (the Soviet Ministry of State Security) interrogation prisons. I was in solitary confinement. At that time, they conducted the interrogations during the night. They usually interrogated prisoners until 2 or 3 A.M. At dawn the prison became quiet. The prisoners, tired from being interrogated, fell into a deep sleep.

That night I also slept. My sleep was uneasy, disturbed by nightmares. I woke up at dawn. I was tortured by some unknown apprehension which I couldn't explain. I sat up and lit a cigarette, but the anxiety contin-

ued. I lay down hoping to doze off for a while longer, but I couldn't fall asleep. Moreover, there was no time: it was six o'clock and we, the prisoners, had to get up. It was the start of everyday prison errands.

Breakfast was over, two or three additional hours passed, and around 11:00 A.M. they came for me. They took me for questioning to the interrogating office in the administration building. In the waiting room there was my interrogator, Major Guzeev, as well as other MGB officers dressed as civilians. One man, however, looked different since he was dressed in winter pants, a soldier's jacket and a cap. He also had boots on and a wide officer's belt with a pistol attached to it. One could see at once that he was not a private; the MGB officers participating in roundup operations and raids were dressed in similar fashion.

They handcuffed me, took me outside and put me in a car. The MGB officers sat down next to me and Guzeev gave me a cigarette. From the Lontsky prison they drove me to their headquarters on Pelchynskiy Street (presently Dzerzhynsky). We arrived at the courtyard and there we waited for about an hour. They all got out. One MGB officer, however, stayed with me. Then Guzeev came back with the others and they escorted me out of the car. At the present time, there are new buildings at that location but at that time this was the place where the MGB garages were located.

Other MGB members join us. The whole group, approximately 8 to 10 people, take me into the garage. I go straight. Suddenly, they turn me to the left. I make several steps and stop abruptly: at that moment I realize what has happened. Near the wall of the garage there is a pile of straw. Lying on the straw is a body covered with canvas. The whole body is covered, except the feet. One glance at the feet is enough to make me understand that I am not mistaken. In front of me lies my father with his characteristic high arches.

One of the MGB officers removes the canvas. My father lies dressed in an embroidered shirt and riding breeches. He is barefoot. Apparently, they took his shoes off because his feet are clean, not soiled. His shirt is unbuttoned. On his chest there is a medallion to the Blessed Mother, with its chain all twisted. His left hand is lying straight alongside his body. His right hand is on his chest. On his shirt, under the rib cage and over the waistline there are bloody reminders of the bullets. His face is calm, without the slightest trace of pain or fear. His gray eyes are open as if gazing into the distance.

I kneel down. Guzeev asks me if I recognize him. I respond with a slight nod. I hear the voices of the other MGB officers, "See, this is what it comes down to". I bend down in silence to kiss my father's hand. One of the MGB officers grabs my shoulder. I shake his hand off and they leave me alone. I kiss my father's hand. I feel spasms pressing on my throat, but I

restrain myself from bursting into tears, so that all those present would not see my tears. At this very moment, I sense a feeling of joy: he did not let them take him alive. I know fully well what it would have meant for him at that time. They grab me and take me away...

For years to come I would see my father in my dreams. Young and alive, all in smiles, with a trail of blood on his right temple...

Forty years have passed by. The village of Bilohorshcha. The house where my father had his hiding place, where it all happened. With me is my sister and my son. We place flowers by the house. I take my hat off and offer a prayer for the repose of his soul.



Roman Shukhevych's wife Natalka Berezynska-Shukhevych with their son Yurko, 1983.



(From left) Roman Shukhevych's younger sister Natalka, his children Maria and Yurko and his wife Natalka Berezynska-Shukhevych in the vicinity of Omsk where Yurko Shukhevych was incarcerated, 1983.

APPENDIX II

ROMAN SHUKHEVYCH - 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS DEATH

There are a number of different and, in fact, conflicting accounts relating to the circumstances of the death of General Roman Shukhevych. There are reports which claim that the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army killed himself with a grenade, that, surrounded by the enemy, he put a bullet into his head, or that escaping through a window from the MGB, he was struck with automatic fire. There are other versions as well.

The staff of the publication *The Young Ukraine* gathered three testimonials which, it appears, for the first time do not contradict each other, but in fact complement each other in their portrayal of the tragedy that happened in the early morning of March 5 in the village of Bilohorshcha near Lviv.

The following is a brief account of the memoirs by Halyna Dydyk who served as Supreme Commander's liaison officer:

The lady of the house where Roman Shukhevych and Halyna Dydyk were staying left the house early in the morning. This was the day of Stalin's "elections" and she, as a member of the polling committee, had to be there before the polls were open. There she was arrested. After some time, someone knocked on the front door claiming that since she hadn't arrived at the polling place yet, they came to pick her up. As soon as Halyna Dydyk opened the door, a group of MGB officers rushed into the house and handcuffed her. When she started to explain the situation and complain as loudly as she could, one of them told her, "Tell Roman not to try anything, the house is surrounded". Halyna Dydyk heard someone coming down the steps from the second floor where Shukhevych was sleeping. These steps led into a small dark hallway, separated from the porch, where an MGB captain had just gone

in. In a second a shot rang out. The MGB officers dashed into the hallway. On the floor lay their comrade, mortally wounded. They left him to die and darted to the back door. What happened next, Halyna Dydyk didn't remember since she managed to swallow poison in a moment of confusion. She survived, half-paralyzed, to endure many years of torture and imprisonment. The last thing she remembered but was not quite sure of, was the sound of an explosion of a grenade in the courtyard.

A second version, which helps shed light on the events of that bloody morning, was a report by Markian Shushanskyi. He got the information of Shukhevych's death from Savelev, a former member of the regional MGB who, in turn, got the news from an MGB officer who on that day was in command of the raid in Bilohorshcha.

From this source it is evident that the MGB officers knew of Shukhevych's whereabouts, the information having been leaked by a traitor. The house was completely surrounded; some raid members were stationed at the front door and another group aimed their weapons at the back door. Their commander stood near the dark hallway. In a short while, the door opened and Roman Shukhevych emerged and started walking straight towards the enemy. He was barefoot, dressed in an embroidered shirt. In his hands he held one or two grenades, their pins removed. Calmly, without stopping or glancing sideways, he walked straight towards the MGB commander, who gave an order to shoot, in spite of the fact that he was requested to take Shukhevych alive.

This version of the death of the legendary general is supported by the account of his son, Yurii Shukhevych, who was asked to identify the body of his father:

At that time I, merely a child, was imprisoned right here in Lviv. That day, March 5, I was taken to the headquarters of the MGB, presently the regional KGB. There were garages on the left side of the courtyard. I was led there handcuffed and told to turn sideways. There on a table, under bright lights, was a man's body covered with canvas. I knew immediately, even before they uncovered him, that it was my father. First of all, it was a time when such news was always expected. In addition, my father's feet had high arches, so that, in fact, he had to have boots specially made for him. They took the canvas off and there indeed lay my father. He was dressed in an embroidered shirt. I didn't notice any massive injuries to his body which one would expect from a self-inflicted explosion, as reported by some. On the shirt over his stomach one could

see bloody stains, evidently the result of automatic fire. On one side of his temple the hair was burnt and bloodied. I thought that a bullet grazed his temple, but it is also possible that a grenade fell out of his hand and landed at a distance.

This is the scenario that is portrayed of the tragic death of a great patriot, a wise leader of the OUN and a heroic commander, Roman Shukhevych, General Taras Chuprynka, who preferred to die rather than surrender to the enemy, at the same time causing the death of at least a few invaders.

The 40th anniversary of the tragic event is approaching. On March 5, 1950, Roman Shukhevych, an outstanding military leader, perished at the age of 43. It is impossible to overestimate his role in unifying the fragmented forces into a highly trained and disciplined army -- the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which fought against both the Nazi and the Soviet invaders under very difficult conditions. The army had to undergo especially difficult battles during the year when the Bolshevik forces were advancing into Halychyna. The forces were uneven, and the UPA was retreating westward. Later on, there was demobilization, the crossing of the front lines and the subsequent formation of the guerrilla forces. At the same time, there was a change in the methods used in the liberation struggle, fought under the leadership of the OUN (the formation of the UPA was also under the aegis of the OUN).

I became acquainted with Roman Shukhevych, who was the leader of the OUN under these difficult conditions. I know him not only as a military commander but also as an excellent organizer of the underground movement and above all as a human being. Such traits as modesty and compassion should be especially pointed out. Those who had close contacts with him called him simply *druhze* (comrade), without any title or even a pseudonym. This might have been done for conspiratorial purposes, but, in general, his relationship with people evidenced great modesty. As a result, I didn't know for a long time that I was speaking with the renowned General Chuprynka. Eventually another guerrilla fighter, with whom I had my first assignment, enlightened me on that point. I saw him in the company of his bodyguards and other guerrilla fighters of various ranks, but the Supreme Commander never flaunted his superior rank. Soldiers felt at ease in his presence. One had the impression they were all equal. He didn't set himself apart from the other guerrilla fighters, didn't wear any insignia and ate from the same kettle. He loved his soldiers and they were very attached to him as well. Despite the difficult conditions of underground life, the dangers at every step of the way and frequent health problems, one could often hear kidding and laughter. Shukhevych had a great sense of humor and would often joke around or laugh at somebody else's jokes.

I saw General Chuprynka for the first time in 1947 in the village of Hrimne, where a house had been set aside for him. Before that, the Supreme Commander lived in Kniahynychi, but because of an incident, namely the arrest of two guerrilla fighters who lived in the same house legally, he was forced to move with two soldiers to Hrimne near Komarno. I remember the Commander's talk with my mother. He knew where we were from and since he knew some OUN members from Truskavets, he started to talk about them. They reminisced about the times, so rich in various events in Truskavets in which, perhaps, he himself participated. He asked many questions about Yaroslav Bilas, one of the most active local OUN members, who was executed by the Poles together with Danylyshyn. I was amazed by this talk with an elderly woman he had just met for the first time. He also loved children and knew how to get along with them.

Shukhevych had to place a great deal of trust in people who were close to him in order to feel fairly safe living in a house, knowing that those who knew his whereabouts were free to come and go at will. It shows not only his courage but also his piety and faith in God, especially when the Commander walked around his native Lviv and lived for a while in a house where there was no hiding place. He lived in Lviv for some time in order to get treatment for his heart condition, and in 1949 he sometimes went to Lviv from Bilohorshcha to see a doctor. Some of his bodyguards, with fictitious documents, went by train, bus or even by an airplane.

Since the house arrangement in the village of Hrimne fell through and it was too risky for him to live in Lviv throughout the winter, it was necessary to organize new living quarters near Lviv. This time the head of the household had legal residence, and Halyna Dydik, with fictitious documents, served as the housewife. In this house there was a hiding place which could accommodate 4 to 5 people.

Occasionally the security officers would come. I could come and go even during the day, but most of the time I would go there under the cover of darkness. At that time, when he was part of the household, one could clearly perceive his diligence, fairness in his dealings with others, as well as kindness and spirituality. Frequently these traits would be accompanied by a sense of humor. When, for example, there were more people for the night than beds, we would cast lots to see who would sleep in a bed and who had to sleep on the floor. The Supreme Commander also occasionally had to sleep on the floor, but he took it in stride, with a sense of humor.

The Supreme Commander was always busy. He read and wrote a lot, but he also spent time talking with others. Having direct contact with people was very important to him. In his free time, he studied English and by the end of 1949 he listened almost exclusively to English broadcasts. He assumed responsibility for many household chores. For example, he would

get the wood ready and start the fire, peel potatoes, and so on. One time while I was polishing my shoes, I also polished the Commander's shoes; he was quite embarrassed and kept thanking me for a long time.

There was a special ambiance in the underground. I clearly remember the Easter in 1948. I don't quite recall if the table was set, but I know that we had eggs which had been blessed. The prayers were special (at least for me), and after the prayers the Commander greeted and embraced each one of us individually. I don't remember what we had for breakfast, but the day was so beautiful and festive that I have treasured it throughout my life.

The entire adult life of the late General Chuprynka was a continuous struggle for an independent Ukraine to which he allotted all of his energy and skills. He served his people with great devotion and patriotism. He witnessed the decline of the underground. Even though he was aware of the fact that the struggle for independence was a lost cause and that very few of those who stayed in Ukraine would survive (only a handful of individuals managed to stay alive), he was convinced that the struggle against the invaders and the resulting sacrifices were not in vain and that future generations would be brought up based on the heroic deeds of their predecessors. When the conditions became more favorable, they, in turn, would continue the struggle for liberation and would gain liberty for their nation.

Our freedom fighters have proved to the rest of the world that our people strive for freedom and are ready to fight for it. This means that our nation is alive and will not perish as long as we have such dedicated sons. With God's help we will live to see a successor worthy of the great leader, General Chuprynka, whose memory will live forever among the people.

Eternal memory to a true freedom fighter, General Roman Shukhevych!

Odarka Husiak
Former liaison officer of the Central Command

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Petro Mirchuk was born in 1913 in Western Ukraine, which was occupied by Poland between World War I and World War II. After receiving his high school diploma, he studied law and political science at a Polish university in Lviv, and at the German and Ukrainian Free Universities in Prague, Czecho-Slovakia. He received his J.D. degree in 1941 from the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. In 1959 he added an MSLS from Drexel University in Philadelphia, PA, and in 1969 a Ph.D. from the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Germany.

He was a member of the Ukrainian underground liberation movement, OUN, since he was seventeen, and as such was imprisoned six times by the Polish administration. In 1939, when Russia occupied Western Ukraine, he fled West. He returned in 1941 when the German army entered the USSR, but was caught by the Gestapo in September, 1941. As one of the leaders of the Ukrainian anti-Nazi movement, he was sent to and held in several concentration camps until May 6, 1945. Liberated by the American Army, in 1952 he immigrated to the United States and was naturalized as a citizen in 1957. He was married in 1946 and has three sons.

A member of many scientific and social organizations, he has authored over twenty books in Ukrainian, among them the first history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (1953, 320 pp.) and the first history of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement, OUN, (1968, 639 pp.).

In 1976, Petro Mirchuk published his memoirs about life in the Nazi concentration camps, which were published in English under the title *In the German Mills of Death*.

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