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THE FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic

УКРАЇНСЬКА РЕСПУБЛІКА ПІД ЧАС
ВЕЛИКОЇ СХІДНЬО-ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОЇ РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ
Том I.

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СТВОРЕННЯ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ РЕСПУБЛІКИ

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THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE GREAT EAST-EUROPEAN REVOLUTION
Volume I.

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THE FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

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TO MY FATHER

P R E F A C E

In general, it is not an easy task to write a preface for a historical work. And it is still more difficult to do so if the main research for the book was carried out under the direction of the very man who is asked to provide some introductory words for it. The basic danger is that, in his desire to remain impartial, the writer may be strongly influenced by the preparatory period of the thesis done under his guidance and thereby overlook his principal duty to introduce the author and his achievement to the public.

After having made this preliminary remark I may now say that O. S. Pidhainy did his investigations under my supervision, that this book represents a greatly changed version of his Ph.D. thesis, and that, in accordance with European tradition, he was free to express in it his own opinions which are not necessarily those of his tutor. This does not mean, however, that he has not done an excellent piece of research. Although there exists a rich literature dealing directly or indirectly with the emergence of the Ukrainian Republic, which came into being to stay in one form or another, I have not seen a better work that poses and analyses the problem in such an adequate way. In this respect, Pidhainy's study represents a real contribution to our knowledge of Ukrainian history.

Starting from the generally accepted standpoint that the state is the highest expression of mature nationhood, Pidhainy has undertaken the neglected task of illustrating how the Ukrainians made conscious and unremitting efforts to acquire three features essential for the existence of an independent state: establishment of a central authority with its administration on Ukrainian territory; de facto acceptance by other countries of this new authority as a factor to be reckoned with;

and de jure recognition by other powers allowing the new state to enter into the family of nations. With this aim in mind, Pidhainy has described and interpreted historical events and the struggle of the Ukrainian people for self-assertion as well as their international relations during the period which led to their final statehood.

On their road towards the formation of a fully recognized state the Ukrainians passed through three laborious stages in which they acquired the three fundamental traits characteristic of political independence. The first of these stages was certainly the most exacting and soul-searching period. The news of the Revolution in February 1917 was received with great joy, but there was no clear idea of what this change would mean in practice. Ukrainian leaders and intellectuals saw in it an opportunity to realize the old dream of internal autonomy and freedom for national and cultural development within a federation of equal nations on the territory of the Tsarist Empire. Without delay, they formed a Central Council in Kiev, a modest union of various organizations, which aimed at taking over the administration and proceeded to call a National Congress responsible for shaping the future of the Ukraine.

Simultaneously, Imperial Russia was rapidly slipping into disintegration. The post-revolutionary Provisional Government showed itself unable to secure the proper functioning of the administration and the Empire was increasingly transformed into a battle-field for all the currents and subdued undercurrents found in a country suffering from a weak government, tremendous strains of war and centrifugal tendencies among its various nationalities. All of the ethnic groups in the country were divided by conflicting political programmes and ideologies which often ran right through the Empire across the territorial boundaries of different nationalities, creating a perplexing picture of intersecting and intertwining fronts. In the Ukraine, there were also groups that represented all types of economic and social ideas and class interests, but for the majority of her leaders the national question seemed to be of

paramount importance. Although these various movements sometimes impinged directly upon each others' goals, the Central Council managed to mobilize the main groups for the common national cause by associating itself with them. It even succeeded in obtaining support from national minorities in the Ukraine.

In taking over the administration the Central Council did not meet with resistance by former imperial officials or with any other insurmountable obstacles because there was less disorder in the Ukraine than in some other parts of the Empire. Difficulties arose, however, in its relations with the Provisional Government, where some members of the Cabinet were set up to maintain the unitarian form of tsarist times. During the six months between the Revolution and the Bolshevik coup d'état Kiev and Petrograd negotiated continually to settle the question of federalism, but the Ukraine did not succeed in legalizing her political status until September when the Provisional Government officially recognized her autonomy.

After the coup d'état the situation again became confusing, especially when the Bolsheviks proclaimed a Federal Soviet Republic. The course of relations between the Bolshevik Government and the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic was determined by the Bolshevik design of re-unifying all the former imperial lands and of imposing the communist regime on them. The plan provoked strained relations between the two republics and led to a war-like conflict and the final occupation of the Ukraine by Bolshevik troops. Pidhainy has devoted special attention to this period, giving a sound interpretation of the events that caused the newly emerged Ukrainian state to lose its independence again and to be subjugated to communist dictatorship. For it was during this period that the Ukrainians abandoned—reluctantly, it seems to me—the idea of a federation with Russia and decided to make definite steps towards proclaiming complete independence in January 1918.

Pidhainy is on a much surer terrain in his investigation

of the second and third stages during which the Ukraine acquired international recognition. While in the first stage he had to investigate a confusion of post-revolutionary unrest, conflicting ideologies and contradicting class and personal interests, in the two last phases he had to deal with official negotiations and declarations. Here he had at his disposal a great number of previously unused documents which he collected with the self-sacrificing zeal of a young scholar. Having a wide knowledge of languages, Pidhainy was able to use all available official sources as well as secondary material, and he has given an excellent analysis of the way in which the Ukraine obtained not only de facto but also de jure recognition from the Central Powers and their allies. The major powers of the Entente extended de facto recognition with the important exception of the United States. The Americans did not recognize the Ukrainian Republic in spite of the fact that they opened their Consular Service in Kiev and in spite of the pressure made upon them by France.

In connection with the problem of recognition it is quite interesting to note that the existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of to-day is based on the recognition of the democratic Ukrainian state by the Bolsheviks. When they set up the "People's Secretariat" for the Ukraine as an instrument of their policy, they emphasized that it was simply a new government within the existing Ukrainian National Republic. The ramification of this event has been shown by Pidhainy for the first time.

Despite his eagerness as a young scholar and his patriotic enthusiasms, or perhaps because of it, Pidhainy has produced not only a study of great value, but a work that must be taken into consideration in the future historiography of the Ukraine and Eastern Europe in general.

M. Mladenovic

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I would like to thank those who helped me in my work. My foremost debt, in respect to scholarship, and in other respects is to my Father, from whom I endeavoured to learn the traditions of Kievan historical scholarship. I also owe a great debt to my scholarly adviser at McGill University, Professor M. Mladenovic, who in the time of my official stay at the university, and since, has been always ready to assist with wise counsel and frank criticism where such was warranted. My stay at McGill with its living tradition of free historical scholarship was one of the happiest periods in my life.

The technical editor of the book, David Aylward, and other technical assistants, are gratefully remembered.

The study appears in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the Ukrainian Republic.

O. S. PIDHAINY

WILLOW BEACH
June 29, 1966

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THE FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION

The Ukrainian Republic has often been an object of historical study, though usually not for its own sake, but rather incidentally, in the course of other research. It is for this reason that a study of the formation of the Ukrainian Republic has been undertaken here. The formation of the Ukrainian Republic is viewed from both the internal, constitutional, and the external, diplomatic viewpoint.

Still another reason for the study is the large amount of new primary material which has become available. In particular, there are the archival sources of Germany and of the United States and the printed sources published in connection with the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union.

The two major archives open are the American archives, and particularly the German archives. The former are on the whole disappointing. The most important documents in the American archives are those of the Department of State, which include the documents originated in Washington, as well as reports from the Embassy and Consulates within the Russian Empire. There is no classification under the name 'Ukraine' or any similar concept under another name. The documents are all classified under the various divisions for 'Russia' as a whole. To illustrate, the reports from the consulate in Odessa, are found close to reports from other cities of the former Russian Empire, without any consideration of the fact that Odessa was in the Ukraine, and could conceivably be grouped with reports from other cities in the Ukraine. It is of interest that as late as the end of 1919 and in 1920, there is a group of documents under the general title of 'Russia. South', describing events in Ukraine under Denikin. It would thus appear that the Department of State, and consequently much of American opinion,

influenced by the Department, was not overly conscious even of the concept of the 'Ukraine'. It must be noted, however, that the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, whose records have not been integrated with those of the general records of the Department of State, does provide a classification under 'Ukraine'. Its work is nonetheless outside the general range of this thesis. The lack of interest in the Ukraine makes the American archives a much less important source of information than it might have been in view of the large number of Americans present in the former Russian Empire at the time of the formation of the Ukrainian Republic. Many important events which, viewed through the disinterested eye of the American observers, would appear in a much clearer light today, are simply not recorded in the American official information. The reports of the then newly established American Consulate in Kiev, which could have been the beginning for a Ukrainian file, are included in the general files devoted to the former Russian Empire.

It must also be mentioned that there appears to have been no serious effort to systematize American records, either at the time of their accumulation or later on. Thus, the reports appear under only one classification and in the original, with very few cross-references.

The Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, open without any restriction, present a totally different picture. It must first be remarked that they appear to be extremely well organized. Various directives and reports from embassies, as well as memoranda by various German ministries, reports from espionage agencies, and the various army offices appear under various classifications with full cross-references. They consist, on the whole, of orders from the Foreign Ministry, through the State Secretary, to the embassies in Kiev (when it was established), Moscow, Stockholm, Bern and so on. The embassies in the 'neutral' countries were of considerable importance as the centres of German espionage and contact with various dissident groups, such as the members of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshe-

viks), as well as certain Ukrainians. The documents also embrace reports from these various centres. There is also the correspondence with the officers stationed at the locations of international conferences such as those at Brest-Litovsk, at Bucharest and so forth. The papers of the Army Commands at Brest-Litovsk and elsewhere are also present. The vast majority of the documents have been microfilmed and are available for consultation at either the National Archives in Washington, or the Public Record Office in London, or at the various universities. Oxford University, the University of California, McGill University and the University of Michigan have a considerable number of the files. It must be emphasized that the archives are of great importance, as they provide a multitude of contemporary reports of events in the Ukraine, as well as illustrating the policy of one of the major foreign powers in the Ukraine.

The first file bears the file code number Vorgaenge i.a. I.A.B.i. 54, deciphered as Vorgaenge Russland 54 (Events Russia 54). As the code system had been generally abandoned in 1879, while the new system of reference was to countries by name and the proper title of the file, it would appear that the file in question was established, in either the late seventies or early eighties, while the actual material began to be accumulated in January 1886. Thus, the first file on the Ukrainian problem bore the title 'Die Bestrebungen der Ukrainophilen und die kleinrussische (ruthenische) Frage.' (The Strivings of the Ukrainophiles and the Little-Russian (Ruthenian) Question). The observation of the movement at such an early date is remarkable. The other interesting aspect is the identification of the Ukrainophile movement of Russia with the movement of the Ukrainians within Austria-Hungary through the equating of the term 'kleinrussische' (Little-Russian), as a term characteristic of the Russian Empire, with the term 'ruthenische' (Ruthenians) a term characteristic of Ukrainians in Galicia, Bukovyna and Trans-Carpathia.

The affairs of Western Ukrainians are followed intermittently in the files entitled *Die Angelegenheiten Galiziens und*

der Bukowina' (Affairs of Galicia and of the Bukovyna), begun a year earlier in January 1885. It must be noted that in this case the subject was not the Ukrainian people as such, but the two entire provinces themselves, with primary attention given to the dominant Polish element, while the Ukrainian element becomes important only gradually. It appears to be this primarily utilitarian view (from the point of view of Germany) which resulted in the series of volumes on the Ukrainian problem in the German archives entitled 'Unternehmungen und Aufwiegungen gegen unsere Feinde in der Ukraine', (Projects and the Raising of Dissatisfaction against our Enemies in the Ukraine), in parallel to comparable files in regard to Rumania, Poland, Jewish people, Baltic countries, Bolsheviks, Cossacks and others. Special files are extant for the organization of the Ukrainian (and of Bolshevik) prisoners-of-war. Again further separate files, bearing the same distinguishing symbol (Aktenzeichen), were held by the German Embassy in Switzerland, entitled 'Stepankowski' and 'Stepankowski. Sonderband', with the title representing the name of the main informant of the German Ambassador, Romberg, and eventually, the former Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg.

It is of interest that the files 'Unternehmungen und Aufwiegungen' were primarily for accumulation of informational material on events in the Ukraine and of the formation of the Ukrainian political centre, the Rada, the predecessor of the Ukrainian Republic, the Ukrainian Autonomous Land, and finally the formation of the Ukrainian Republic itself. It is very significant that the file concludes with the *de facto* recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Central Powers (and the Entente powers), which occurred in late December with the invitation to the Ukrainian Republic to join the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. At the end of the file, the reader is referred to the general file on the Ukraine established in January 1918.

The Ukraine was introduced as a separate category in the entire structure of the archives, following alphabetically, after Turkey and preceding 'Orientalia generalis'. The file indicates

that it is either a continuation of the earlier Ukrainian archives or a complementary source. Thus, there are references to the 'Ukrainophilen' and to 'Unternehmungen und Aufwiegelungen', which were almost concluded by this time. There are also references to the file 'Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Galiziens und der Bukowina', which are continued in their own right, thus indicating the narrow identification between the two Ukraines. This was a result, no doubt, of the demands presented by the Ukraine for a special position for Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary. The files of the Ukraine proper consist of three sections, the first section entitled 'Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (der Ukraine)' (General Affairs of the Ukraine), consisting of 6 volumes, covering almost the entire period of the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic; the documents reach from January 1918 to March 1920. Of these, volumes 1 - 8 cover the period more narrowly associated with the formation of the Ukrainian Republic, January 1918 to April 1918. There are also files entitled 'Kirche' (Church), and 'Finanzen', but these do not appear to have a direct connection with the formation of the Ukrainian State.

Furthermore, there are several files dealing with various aspects of the peace-making between the Ukrainian Republic and the Central Powers, as well as various commercial negotiations, espionage reports from the embassy in Stockholm, documents of the Highest Command on Ukraine, documents of the Ober Ost (High Command of the Eastern Front), under the formal control of Prince Leopold and the direct control of General Hoffmann and others. Of these, the relatively small file (three volumes) entitled 'Friedensverhandlungen mit der Ukraine' (Peace Negotiations with the Ukraine) should be noted. Another interesting file, possibly indicating the full acceptance by Germany of the idea of the Ukrainian state, is the one entitled 'Beziehungen Russlands zum Ukrainischen Staat' (Relations of Russia to the Ukrainian State). This file of four volumes, begun in May 1918, consists largely of reports relating to the peace negotiations between the Ukrainian Republic, and of the later governments, with Russia. The title refers at

the same time to the Ukrainian State (Ukrains'ka Derzhava) proclaimed by Hetman. The main file, 'Allgemeine Angelegenheiten der Ukraine' is the basic file, and served also as a key to other files, as the German procedure of filing copies of documents into logically connected files enables us to find documents having an indirect relation to the Ukraine (as in those on the Crimea), the originals of which belong to the Turkish files, or the ones on Russo-Ukrainian relations, and so forth. The German Archives, therefore, constitute a very valuable source on the formation of the Ukrainian Republic, and indeed on the history of the Ukraine as such. At the same time, they demonstrate in their very organization that the idea of the Ukrainian Republic first dawned, though faintly, on German diplomats as early as the late eighties of the nineteenth century, and that the Republic used (without much success for German endeavours) in the World War, parallel with the use of Bolsheviks, Poles and others, and was finally accepted fully after the formation of the Ukrainian Republic, by January 1918, at which point the 'Unternehmungen und Aufwiegelingen' disappear, and are succeeded by a general file, 'Ukraine', in parallel with the files 'Russland', 'Frankreich', and others. It is of interest that neither Lithuania, nor Latvia and Estonia have been dealt with separately, but are discussed as part of Russia; Poland, too, appears only as part of Russia (as well as of other states), the file 'Polen', begun on March 1, 1867, being obviously the continuation of the earlier Prussian archives, and ending by February 1885, with a few documents extending to December 1915, and finishing there until several years later.

While the American and the German archives are open and constitute an all-embracing source for the study of the formation of the Ukrainian Republic, neither the Soviet nor British archives are open. The French archives are closed, and at any rate, the vast majority of papers appear to have been destroyed in the Second World War. As far as the British archives are concerned, a fifty-year secrecy rule prevails, according to which the archives relating to the period studies are closed and shall remain closed for several years. The new series of British foreign documents begins in mid-1919, and thus is outside

the period. An occasional paper relating to the events studied is found in printed form in Commonwealth archives.

Archives within the Ukraine, under Russian domination at the present time, are not open to free and conscientious scholarship, as archives within Russia and the Soviet Union as a whole also are not. Archives of the Ukrainian National Republic have either been left behind in the various evacuations and have fallen into Russian hands, or were lost during the Second World War. Scattered minor collections of archival documents appear in France, Canada and the United States of America. The archives in the Soviet Union have occasionally been opened to select historians, at various periods in the past. They were able to use them either in their work or for publication of documentary collections.

Thus, a great deal of material can be found in special collections as well as scattered through various journals. Still other sources are contemporary newspapers, pamphlets and books.

It should also be mentioned that memoirs and biographies contain a great deal of relevant material, and have been used extensively in this work.

It has been mentioned that scholarly studies have covered the field only incidentally, in the course of other research.

Several histories are available of either the Russian or the Ukrainian revolution. The former topic has been studied by Chamberlain, Carr and Vernadsky, to name only a few. The problem of the Ukrainian state is touched on in these works; however, we find no systematic outline dealing with the Ukraine of the events or the constitution. The topic of the Ukrainian revolution has been covered by Khrystiuk, Doroshenko, Reshetar and others. Although we do find a systematic presentation of events in these studies, the researchers' topics precluded study in particular detail, or systematization of the constitutional and diplomatic aspects of the events, that is, the formation of the Ukrainian Republic. It should also be men-

tioned that the new archival source material was not available to the historians mentioned above.

Turning to the more detailed aspects of the problem, we also find a dearth of secondary studies. In fact, only German-Ukrainian relations have been studied, in a recent work by Fedyshyn using the available material. The Ukrainian relations are investigated only incidentally in the work of Kennan on Russo-American relations, of Ullman on Anglo-Russian relations, of Warth on Russo-Entente relations, of Freund on Russo-German relations and others. Again, as expected, the Ukrainian aspect often lacks systematization in these studies.

On the other hand, Russo-Ukrainian relations have been studied in great detail in several important studies, such as those of Borys, Sullivant, Sadovsky and others. The studies published in the Soviet Union should also be mentioned. Those published in the nineteen-twenties, give a great deal of information on the events in the Ukraine, especially where a direct relation with the Bolshevik party could be established. There is no Soviet study on the formation of the Ukrainian National Republic. Studies on the formation of the Soviet Ukraine abound, but should be read critically in view of the state and theory of scholarship in the Soviet Union.

The coming of the revolution meant a very intensive political activity, and this, in its turn, meant the development of political parties. Political developments had to be so much more rapid since political parties in the Russian Empire had the disadvantage of Tsarist despotism and of the exigencies of the war, in 1914 and later. It is of interest to examine the earlier political history of the Ukraine.

Party-life in the pre-war Russian Empire left much to be desired under such circumstances. Party Congresses usually had to be held in exile, often clandestinely. Representation in such congresses very often depended upon accident. Party members were not well-acquainted with each other. It was only in the spring of 1917 that parties could associate freely and therefore develop. They also had to gain political responsibility in a short time. Furthermore, the revolution saw the rise of new

national and social demands; the parties had to accomodate these demands, or to part company with many people.

It is in the Society of Ukrainian Progressives that we find the general Ukrainian movement connecting with the revolutionary tradition with earlier generations. Traditions of political independence in the Ukraine as a Cossack State had survived into the eighteen-thirties but disappeared towards the end of the thirties, together with the Ukrainian squire, heir of the Cossack officers, who became russified. The new Ukrainian tradition was established by Kostomarov and Shevchenko on the basis of the surviving Ukrainian peasants, in the Society of Cyrilus and Methodius, where the goal of an all-Slav federation around Kiev was aspired to. This is closely associated with the aims of enlightening and freeing the Ukrainian peasant; in the Emancipation of 1861, this protected enlightenment acquires a predominant place, with some attention given to further social reform. It was as in the Hromada (Community) of Kiev that the new trend was expressed; it was the Hromada which sent Drahomanov to Europe on behalf of Ukrainian interests.

Drahomanov's influence was very important in the development of Ukrainian political life. He believed that the independence of the Ukraine was not a practical aim and that foreign intervention on behalf of Ukrainian interests was not to be expected, but held that the current task was to strengthen the Ukrainian nation within the existing states. One of the main tasks was to attempt to make the cities in the Ukraine, Ukrainian in population and in character.

Drahomanov spurred on the general enlightenment of the Ukrainian people, the organization of societies, reading rooms and co-operatives, and eventually, the organization of political powers through parliamentary institutions.

Eventually, the Hromada began to be called *Stara Hromada* (the old Hromada), interested primarily in ethnography. The new body, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, concluded the process which began in the late eighties and early nineties. It was founded by Konysky. The Society, known as

the All-Ukrainian Organization, was a non-party group which brought together the most varied political elements with only belief in democracy and Ukrainian nationality in common. The Society was organized in the summer of 1897. The Society formed an executive called the Rada (Council) harking back to the Cossack state terminology; it was from this that the Ukrainian Central Rada acquired its name. The Society acquired its more usually known name when it reorganized during the relative freedom of the 1905-1908 revolution. At the outbreak of war in 1914, the Society decided that the Ukrainian nation should be neutral in the struggle. In December 1916, the Society issued a declaration re-stating its neutrality, and calling for Ukrainian democratic autonomy and federalism in the whole state. But now the Society saw very quickly that after the Revolution, far from becoming the general intellectual leading group, it was courting the danger of being left behind altogether in the new currents.

The first truly political party among the Ukrainian people within the Russian Empire, was the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, established in 1900 by the Kharkiv group, consisting of D. Antonovych, M. Russov and B. Kaminsky joined by Mikhnovsky, Vynnychenko, Yurkevych, Stepankivsky, Huk, Petlura. The program of this party was outlined in a pamphlet by Mikhnovsky, *An Independent Ukraine*, advocating an independent Ukraine stretching 'from the Carpathian to the Caucasian mountains'. However, the first practical task of the party was to be a return to the 'Pereyaslav constitution', that is, the one between the Ukrainian State of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Muscovy of Alexius established in 1654. However, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party achieved immediate direct results which drew it from the gradual minimum goals first expressed. The peasant revolts of 1902-3 in the Poltava gubernia and elsewhere, appear to have been due to the activity of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party.

The desire to overthrow the Tsarist autocracy drew the party towards common action with other parties bent on the same aim. The influence of the rising social-democratic tide in

the Russian Empire as a whole also acted upon it. Thus, at the Second Party Congress, the party demonstrated three currents. One of them was headed by Porsh; this national group supported the independent existence of the party, and accepted the slogan of autonomy for the Ukraine. Another was headed by Melenevsky; this group supported the union of the party with the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, and only general democratization. Still another current, the smallest one, was that led by Mikhnovsky and Shemet, supporting the independence of the Ukraine.

The party split in the Congress in 1904. The main tradition of the party, and the most prominent members, remained with the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party. The party proclaimed that it was fighting against national oppression, for equal rights of all nations, and for such political institutions as would ensure a free cultural and social development. On the national question in particular, the party supported the creation of an autonomous Ukraine. The party also stated its goals to be those of a social-democratic movement.

The group which split off entered the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, under the name of *Spilka*. The group believed that national oppression would become a thing of the past in the general democratization of the Russian Empire, and therefore did not call for Ukrainian autonomy.

The U.S.D.W.P. became of primary importance for the formation of the Ukrainian Republic. The *Spilka* dissolved very quickly in the Russian organization. Only a few of these individuals became important in the Revolution; among these must be mentioned Melenevsky, Skoropys-Yoltukhivsky and Stepankivsky. It is characteristic that none of these retained their influence in the Ukraine itself, but became prominent outside the Ukraine.

The *Spilka* had a temporary success however. In the 1907 elections to the Duma, it succeeded in electing 14 deputies, while the Ukrainian Social-Democrats sent only one. One of the reasons was certainly the fact that the *Spilka* was protected by its association with the Russian Social-Democrats, while the

brunt of Tsarist pressure fell upon the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, who were socialists and stood for decentralization of the Russian Empire, with the concurrent danger of its dissolution. The *Spilka* disappeared by 1911-1912.

The U.S.D.W.P. became the preserve of younger Ukrainian intellectuals. It is through this that its influence spread over the next decade into the general levels of the Ukrainian society. Its reputation was firmly established in Ukrainian society, that although it was patently a minority party in the time of the Revolution (the majority lying with the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries), the party was allowed to form the government through most of the period of the formation of the state, right up to the proclamation of Ukrainian independence.

The very earliest Socialist party to be formed upon the territory of the Russian Empire, independently of the somewhat earlier formation in Switzerland of the Plekhanov group, seems to have been the Ukrainian Social-Revolutionary Party formed by Halan and some others in 1885, demanding 'Ukrainian autonomy in a federal Russia'. However, that group remained very limited and disappeared in a few years. The Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries went on developing in the atmosphere of *Khlopomany* (the educated being attracted by the peasants), along with their Russian counter-parts — the later Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Narodniks. Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries did not have the mystical revolutionary drive of the Russian peasant, nor did they believe in the common ownership of land practiced by Russian peasants, a belief prevalent among Russian Social-Revolutionaries. The *obshchina* (commonalty) was thought by Russian S.R.'s to be the fundamental element of their creed, and the one important principle given by Russia to the world. The Ukraine had never had common ownership of land.

Separate groups of Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries arose in 1905-1906, in Simferopol, Odessa and other cities — Kiev, Baryshpil, Novebask and elsewhere. An active group was dispersed in Radomyshl in the summer of 1907; on this oc-

casion, Mykola Zaliznyak was arrested. Here and there, Ukrainian organizations were rebuilt in the 1913-1915 period. The organization in Kiev was particularly active. It agitated among students and workers, as well as soldiers. It published *Borot'ba* (Struggle), edited by Kovalevsky, with Kovaliv and Polonsky. They enjoyed the support of such non-Party individuals as Yefremov, Oles', Nikovsky and others. The technical side of the publication was looked after by Senyuk, Ksendzyuk, M. Chyzhevsky and Zasuliv. The publication was helped financially by the Moscow organization of the U.P.S.R. The 'Ukrainian Political Red Cross' was formed to aid political prisoners. The Kiev Socialist-Revolutionaries held a conference, at which the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and its federative connection with Russia was put forward, as well as one for nationalization of the land. In 1915 they came to an agreement of mutual support with the Polish Socialist Party. In January 1915, in Moscow, a conference of Ukrainian socialist parties was convened with a view to forming a united Ukrainian Socialist party. The discussions failed. However, the Socialist-Revolutionaries held a separate meeting. No party was formed, however. Out in Austria-Hungary, M. Zaliznyak carried on anti-Russian activity, at the head of the Foreign Committee of the organization of Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, after leaving the S.V.U.

There were also other parties. It must be kept in mind that the main strength was concentrated in the two Socialist parties: the U.S.D.W.P. and the U.P.S.R. The future Socialist-Federalists had little direct influence in the country. However, their individual intellectual attainment and prestige were of great help to the other two parties, where either a business-like or a decorative effect was needed. Two other parties deserve attention. They are dealt with here for the sake of a more complete picture of the evolution of institutions in the revolution, although their founding dates belong to a somewhat later period. However, although not formally founded in the early period, there were groups and 'wings' who approached a certain well-defined position, and are thus of importance.

One of these, in particular, could be considered a survival of an earlier party. It will be remembered that the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party had published a pamphlet advocating independence, written in 1900 by Mikhnovsky, a Kharkiv lawyer, expressing its views. After its enthusiasm towards the national idea cooled, the 'Independents' (Samostiynyky) became somewhat cooler to the U.R.P. Two years later, the Ukrainian National Party (*Ukrainska Narodna Partiya*), under the spiritual leadership of Mikhnovsky was formed. The same year, the Ukrainian National Party published two pamphlets in Chernivtsi. One of them defined a task of Ukrainian workers to be: throw the foreigners out of the Ukraine and form an independent state. In 1905, the party published a book by Mikhnovsky, which formulated the party program, spelling out the steps towards independence, and perhaps in this way suggesting gradualism, though not necessarily so: 'Political autonomy with our own parliament, autonomous education, press and literature — the first stage of the struggle for national liberty'. Nationalization of the administration of courts and taxation would be the second stage, and finally the 'independent state — a democratic republican Ukraine' as the final stage of the struggle. Former members or sympathizers of this group (which had gradually dissolved) and the new element, consisting for the most part of the Ukrainian military after they had made their presence as an indefinite group felt for a long time, finally formed a party group in a Poltava Province Independents' Congress on November 6, 1917. The party finally constituted itself on December 30, 1917, in its first All-Ukrainian Congress. P. Makarenko was the Chairman of the Congress; his associates were I. Lutsenko and M. Andrievsky. The decisions of the Congress, upon which the program of the Party was based, recognized 'the Socialist ideal which alone can destroy the existing capitalist way of life'. Factories were to go to Ukrainian workers, soil to Ukrainian farmers. An immediate proclamation of the independence of the Ukraine was demanded. The other party of importance was the Ukrainian Democratic Agriculturalist Party, formed by some landowners

and others in the summer of 1917. The program of the party was drafted by Lypynsky in November, 1917. It was this party which was used by the Central Powers and others in the overthrow of the Republic.

Other late-comers on the Ukrainian political scene were the Ukrainian Toilers' Party and the Ukrainian Federal-Democratic Party. These two parties were quite moderate in their policies. It is, of course, a commonplace that there was no 'Ukrainian Bolshevik Party'. Nor did a single person in the Committee of the Kiev Bolshevik party organization speak Ukrainian; Zatonsky, a late-comer to the Committee, in his memoirs dealing with the period of the November coup, stated that he was chosen to join the Rada — because he was the only person on the Committee who could speak Ukrainian. We shall deal with the various minor groups which arose from time to time in the Ukraine, or were in conflict with her, at the proper time.*

* The writer has examined the archives of the Department of State of U.S.A. in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. and the archives of the Foreign Office of Germany on microfilm in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. and Redpath Library at McGill University. The bibliography for the introduction is incorporated with the general bibliography.

CHAPTER ONE

CRYSTALLIZATION OF UKRAINIAN CONSTITUTIONAL STRIVINGS IN THE RISE OF THE UKRAINIAN CENTRAL RADA

The news of the triumph of the Revolution in Petrograd on March 12, 1917, reached Kiev the following day through the telegram signed by the President of the State Duma, Rodzyanko, and countersigned by the Minister of Railroads, Bublikov.¹ The news quickly spread through the city.

On the next day, representatives of various organizations and the members of the Kiev City Duma began gathering in the City Hall to discuss events.² A meeting was under way by the early afternoon under the chairmanship of Vice-Mayor Stradomski. It was decided that there was a need for a body which through its influence could keep the order among the various layers and classes of the city population demanded by the Committee of the Duma, and that such a body should include representatives of those various groups. An extensive list of organizations was drawn up for a proposed Committee of United Civic Organizations. There were included representatives of the city government, of the province (gubernia) and zemstvo executives, the Committee of the South-Western Front, Committee of the Union of the Cities, the Military-Industrial Committee, the Workers' Group of the Military-Industrial Committee, employees of co-operatives, the stock-exchange, and representatives of national organizations. It is of interest that among the nationalities mentioned, Ukrainians occupy the second place after the Poles, and are followed by Jews. No representatives of the Russian minority were summoned. Other institutions too were to be represented.³

The first meeting of the Civic Committee met on the same day. The Chairman of the meeting, this time the Mayor, Bur-

chak, submitted to the meeting the text of a proclamation to the population. Earlier in the day, the Workers' Group of the Military Industrial Committee, joined by a few representatives of some factories and unions, had discussed and approved the appeal, the aim of which was mainly to call for law and order so as to save the country from disorganization. The Chairman of the Workers' Group, Socialist-Revolutionary P. I. Nezlobin, told the meeting of the approval.

The representative of the co-operatives, N. V. Porsh, a member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, pointed out when disagreements with the Bolsheviks arose in the meeting that 'the Committee has as its task the co-ordination of all civic groups on the basis of the support of the new government.'⁴

The representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks), announced to the meeting that the 'workers organized in unions' did not consider the representatives of the Military-Industrial Committee at the meeting to be representatives of the workers, in so far as the latter were 'betraying the interests of the workers in the war.' Then, he expressed what in his view were the 'demands of the revolutionary proletariat': 'organization of the Soviet of Workers Deputies, full democratization of the country and the calling of the Constituent Assembly.' After stating this, the Bolsheviks left the meeting.⁵ After some further discussion, the draft proclamation calling on the population for law and order was passed with overwhelming majority.

The Bolsheviks went off to make revolution. This is shown by subsequent developments, although the actions at this stage seem to have been extremely doctrinaire and much out of touch with reality. The meeting of the Bolshevik group took place in the early hours of the next day, March 15. There were also present 'representatives of unions and parties except for the Mensheviks.' It was decided to form the Provisional Soviet of Workers' Deputies.⁶ Later on in the day, the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. (B.) issued its Proclamation. Stating that a war to the death was proceeding between

the old and the new Russia, it said that the 'imperialist war, the war for dominion over the world has been transformed into civil war, the war of the working class against its oppressors.' While blood was being spilt, 'the treasonable counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie stole to the government.' The appeal of the Duma Committee and the Civic Committee for quiet is condemned as a 'call to gather all forces for the further continuation of the fratricidal war' (the world war is meant). Not quiet, 'but the most decided struggle to full victory, to the full destruction of the autocratic regime should be our cause.' The 'ruling clique and their bourgeois minions' are described as having destroyed millions in the war and now calling for 'quiet and suffering.' They will not feed the hungry or shoe the unshod. The proclamation shows that 'we know that inside their coat they are holding a stone instead of bread.' The conclusion is then reached, that the people themselves must now take into their hands the decision of the question of war and peace, of supplies and of the organization of the new life and form an all-national Constituent Assembly. 'Now is the time to act', continues the proclamation. The main task is defined: 'Not a war to the victorious issue, but a war against the present criminal war.... Only by reaching out the hands to our brethren—the proletarians of the belligerent states, going with them to one end—liberation of democracy of all countries, of all the world from any oppression and exploitation, can we stop the bourgeois imperialist bacchanalia, to put an end to the war.' The Proclamation included the calls, among other things, 'Long live the civil war,' and 'Long live socialism.'

The call to civil war and a general strike was completely ignored. The proclamation is not known to have produced any comment at all—definitely not in such material as has survived the civil war. The Kiev Committee kept its silence after the proclamation. Four days later it resigned, and a new Committee was formed.

The same day as the publication of the Proclamation, there was a meeting of representatives of some factories and machine shops. A total of some sixty people was present.

The meeting decided to form a Soviet (Council of Workers' Deputies). A greeting to the Duma Committee was sent. The meeting held that 'without renouncing the goals towards which the working class had always striven,' they recognized the authority of the Provisional Committee and would support it in the struggle with the old authority. They saw as 'the task of the day,' the strengthening of the new free way of life, with democratic freedom including national equality. It was only under such conditions that they saw the opportunity for the 'working man to become powerful as a class.'⁸

In the meantime, in Petrograd, the Duma Provisional Executive Committee formed, in the negotiations lasting throughout late March 14 and March 15, the Executive Council of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Provisional Government. The Provisional Government was announced on March 16. It was headed by Prince Lvov; its membership was largely Constitutional Democrat, but it did include Kerensky, a member of the Trudovik party, the right-wing fraction of the party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, as Minister of Justice. Kerensky resigned as Vice-President of the Soviet. The announcement was accompanied by a statement of tasks of the Government. Besides giving guarantees of democratic freedoms, the amnesty, election of militia (police) officers and assurance that the garrison would not be moved, it stated as its task 'the immediate preparation for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly . . . which will determine the form of government and the constitution of the country.' This then was the only actual undertaking attempted by the Government.⁹ Any serious reform was expected to be left for the Constituent Assembly. As problems mounted in the Empire, 'the immediate preparation' lengthened considerably. The procrastination of the calling of the Constituent Assembly was to be very significant in the problem of the emerging Ukraine, and of its autonomy through 1917.

The very first time that the revolution was finally mentioned in the Kiev press coincided with the formation of the Provisional Government. Thus, the news and the Proclamation

of the civic organizations appealing for law and order and peaceful labour appeared together. The civic organizations still did not coalesce into a single body. It was only on the evening of March 16, that an Organization committee for the creation of the 'Council of United Civic Organization,' met. A provisional Executive Committee of the Council was formed the same night.¹⁰

A further step towards the organization of the Council of Workers' Deputies was taken. We have seen the Bolsheviks forming, but not proclaiming, a 'Council' organized at a meeting of the group in the early hours of the previous day. Its function seems to have meant to be a governing body in a 'civil war' which failed to break out; we have also seen the meeting of workingman's representatives which decided that a Council ought to be formed. It seems to have been on the basis of the latter decision that a meeting of representatives of factories met on March 16; the meeting formed the Council of Workers' Deputies out of itself. A Provisional Executive Committee was chosen. The executive committee was equally divided between Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats (Mensheviks). Nezlobin and Morgunov, both Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Kovalevsky, a Ukrainian S.R., were elected as were also Palamarchuk, a Ukrainian Social-Democrat, and two other Social-Democrats, Dorotov and Tsederbaum. V. N. Bozhenko, a Bolshevik was also elected.¹¹ And so ended this memorable day, when three types of constitutional development formed themselves into three provisional institutions with their executives, shortly following the fall of absolutism. On the same day, the special meeting of the City Duma (Council) of Kiev recognized the existence of the Executive Committee by deciding to include it in the membership of the city administration and at the same time proclaimed its support for the new regime.¹² In this way, the Duma showed that it had pretensions towards power, independent of any other institution to be formed, except the highest ones in Petrograd. It must also be remembered that the Petrograd Council of Deputies in its appeal to the 'people of Petrograd and Russia'

had called upon the population of the capital to rally to the Council, to organize local committees and to take into 'their hands the management of local affairs.'¹³

Thus, the evolving Council of Workers' Deputies could exert some initiative in local administration. The Committee of the United Civic Organizations had already expressed a claim in issuing its appeal to the population. The meeting of the 'united Ukrainian organizations', by the decision of making representations to the government in Petrograd, seemed to consider itself spokesman for the Ukrainian people, although no further claims were laid. And so the situation rested. None of the three new institutions were recognized in any way by the new regime as yet.

It was on the next day, March 17, that the main lines of the new democratic regime were laid and free institutions (i.e. constitution) essentially formed. Out in Petrograd, the Provisional Government held its first meeting, in the persons of the Council of Ministers. Earlier in the day, Prince Lvov, the Minister-President, announced the new regime in a circular telegram sent to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, to all mayors, to 'gubernia and oblast capitals,' to the presidents of gubernial boards of zemstvos, and others. It is plain that by the indefinite phrase 'gubernia and oblast capitals' were meant the committees of united organizations. Prince Lvov announced that the Provisional Government was vested 'with full powers pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.'¹⁴ In the first meeting of the Government, it was decided to remove governors of the provincial zemstvos boards.¹⁵ However, this decision was announced only on the following day.¹⁶ The civic committees (and others) were as yet unrecognized.

In Kiev, the Executive Committee of the Council of United Civic Organizations was constituted. The Committee was led by the Presidium which consisted of Stradomsky, a Constitutional Democrat, as chairman, Grigorovich-Barsky, a Constitutional Democrat and Dorotov, a Social Democrat (Menshevik) as Vice-Chairmen; Frumin, a Socialist-Revo-

lutionary, and Nikovsky, a Ukrainian Socialist, seemed to have been meant, as Secretaries, to represent the Jewish and Ukrainian people, while Treasurer Zelinsky represented the Poles. Since this Committee became the governing body of Kiev province and the most influential governing group in most of the Ukraine, in the next few weeks, it is of interest to examine its constitution further. The Executive Committee consisted of sixteen members: Stradomsky and Grigorovich-Barsky were deputized by the city administration, Sukovkin represented the Kiev provincial zemstvo; Shlikevich was from the Union of Cities of the South-Western front; Chernysh, a Constitutional-Democrat again, came from the Oblast 'Military-Industrial Committee'; the Council of the Workers' Deputies was represented by Alekseev, a Menshevik, Tscoderbaum, the same, and Palamarchuk, a Ukrainian Social-Democrat; the cooperatives sent Koliukh; students (organized in the Coalition Committee of Higher Education Institutions) were represented by Gurevich, a Socialist-Revolutionary; Frumin was an appointee of the Jewish organization in Kiev, while Zelinsky had been sent by the Polish institutions; Oberuchev, a Socialist-Revolutionary, completed the Committee. The leading role of Constitutional Democrats is obvious; furthermore, although five members were Ukrainian by origin, politically they were represented only by Nikovsky, who was the official delegate on behalf of 'Ukrainian organizations'; in fact there was a conscious effort to have Ukrainians fill the role of minorities in common with the Polish and the Jewish minorities. Again, we see that the Kiev Committee was made comprehensive by including representatives of institutions which operated far out of the boundaries of Kiev province, the Zemstvo and the Union of Cities of the South-Western Front; this particular fact meant that the Kiev Committee claimed to be influential, and in fact was so, over a great part of the Ukraine. (Of course, its official jurisdiction was limited mostly to the Kiev province). The Executive Committee is thus seen to have made a very extensive claim of power.

In fact, the Executive Committee held its first meeting

the same day and first elected Oberuchev as the Kiev Commandant. Furthermore, it authorized its Presidium to consult with the chief of the Kiev Military District in connection with the 'appointment of the Commissars' (civil officers at military offices) and the transfer of the civil power to the hands of the Executive Committee. The Presidium reported that agreement was reached.¹⁷ The Executive Committee thus became the *de facto* authority in the Kiev Province and the most influential body in the Ukraine. Similar institutions arose in other provinces in the Ukraine, in common with the rest of the former Russian Empire.

The final formation of the Council of Workers' Deputies took place on March 17 as well. A meeting was arranged by the Provisional Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' Deputies formed on the previous day. That meeting had been called by the Workers' Group of the Military-Industrial Committee, which the Bolsheviks refused to recognize in the first civic meeting after the Revolution; although a Bolshevik was elected, the Bolshevik group as such dominated 'their' Council directly by their drawing also upon the professional unions in which Bolsheviks were dominant. Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries seemed to preponderate among the rank and file as shown by election of delegates. The final meeting consisted of delegates both from the factories and from the professional unions and the workers' cooperative *Zhyzn'* (Life). It is not clear how the understanding was reached, yet the meeting was opened by Nezlobin, the Socialist-Revolutionary and the leading member of the Provisional Executive Committee on behalf of *both* Councils of Deputies. A Provisional Presidium of the Council was elected, chaired by Nezlobin; the vice-chairman being Mayorov, a Bolshevik, and the Secretary, Petrov (Savel'ev), also a Bolshevik. The Executive Committee was elected. Out of 37 members of the Committee, at least 7 were Bolsheviks, 11, Mensheviks, 3, Socialist-Revolutionaries, 2, Ukrainian S.R.'s, 1, Ukrainian Social-Democrat, some Bundists, and others. A total of 230 delegates were present, those of 80 factories and other organi-

zations and bodies.¹⁸ The main changes in the Executive Committee consisted of a great weakening of the Socialist-Revolutionary fractions (though Nezlobin kept his leading position), and practically the elimination of the Ukrainians (in the Executive Committee, which was enlarged five-fold, they kept the same three seats). The permanent Presidium of the Executive Committee was formed two days later. Nezlobin became the Chairman, Dorotov, a Menshevik, the Vice-Chairman, Ermakov, a Bolshevik, shortly to be unmasked as agent-provocateur of the former secret police and imprisoned, was the other Vice-Chairman, and Secretaries Morgunov and Petrov were S.R. and Bolshevik, respectively.¹⁹ No Ukrainian was elected to the Presidium. As the result of all this, the Council of the Workers' Deputies became an overwhelmingly Russian institution. Corresponding institutions acquired many all-Ukrainian characteristics, although the Council of Workers' Deputies lacked such character altogether. Its lines of communication lead directly to Petrograd; the Kharkiv Council, and particularly the Katerynoslav Council, were even more Petrograd-oriented, for reasons which will emerge in the process of the thesis. This then was the background against which Ukrainian institutions were being formed.

From the very first days of the Revolution, the Ukrainian club *Rodyna*, in Kiev, became the centre of Ukrainian life. The club was quite insignificant physically. Most of its building was occupied by a soldiers' hospital, and meetings and talks took place in four small rooms. It was to this club that the oldest Ukrainian political organization, recognized generally to be the only all-Ukrainian body, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, moved its deliberations. The executive of the Society, called *Rada* (Council), held its meetings there.

The original plan of the Society was to make of its *rada* the body around which all Ukrainian life could be organized.²⁰ However, there was another body of Ukrainian opinion, the Ukrainian Socialists. Both these groups took active part in the first days of the revolution. Porsh, a member of the central committee of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party

took part in the organization of the Civic Committee, and was seen in polemics with the representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks) in the constitutive meeting of the Civic Committee, on March 14.²¹ The same day, a meeting of civic organizations of Kiev had decided that the Ukrainian 'national organization' should be represented in the Civic Committee. And so we find Nikovsky, a leading member of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, as one of the Secretaries of the Civic Committee as it was finally constituted on March 17.²² It was probably in this connection that there had taken place, on March 16, a meeting of local and provincial Ukrainian organizations.

Present at the meeting of March 16 were over one hundred representatives. The meeting unanimously greeted the newly-formed Provisional Government. Ten persons were elected to take part in committees organized either by the city or any other one wherever 'the representation of Ukrainian organizations should be required.' The meeting accepted the resolution on the sending of a delegation with a declaration to the new government of the 'pressing needs of the Ukrainian nation' and the permission to use the Ukrainian language in the press. They also decided to issue, on behalf of the 'united Ukrainian organizations' an appeal to the population of the city and the country-side, pointing out the necessity of the full support of law and order and cooperation towards the 'easing of the economic crisis.'²³ Absence of any socialist appeals in the meeting would mean the absence of Ukrainian socialists as a group.²⁴

The plan of the Society to transform its *rada* into a general body collapsed when their meeting was visited by representatives of Ukrainian Socialist organizations, T. Steshenko, D. Antonovych and O. Stepanenko. These demanded that representatives of Socialists be accepted in the same number as that of the existing *rada* of the Society. The Society of Ukrainian Progressives agreed to prevent forces from splitting and forming centres. This agreement was of great significance for the Ukrainian revolution. A general national front was created

by the Socialists and non-Socialists uniting in the name of national unity of Ukraine, a feat which the Russian revolution hardly ever accomplished. This union of the 'bourgeois' and the Socialist sections of the Ukrainian nation explains to a great extent the rise and survival of the Ukrainian republic.

The body which was organized was to bear the name of the Central Rada (Council), and formed by representatives of Ukrainian Socialist-Democrats, the Ukrainian military, workers' cooperatives, students and various societies, the Ukrainian Technical-Agronomical Society, the Ukrainian Pedagogical Society, the National Ukrainian Union, and others, as well as members of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives. The final union and elections took place on March 17. In absentia, the historian M. Hrushevsky was elected as President, V. P. Naumenko Vice-President, and D. Antonovych and D. Doroshenko, President's Associates.²⁵

The organizational meeting also sent a telegram to the Minister-President of the Provisional Government, Prince Lvov, and to the Minister of Justice, Kerensky. The Rada hailed in the person of Lvov the 'first ministry of free Russia.' They also expressed confidence that 'the just demands of the Ukrainian people and her democratic intelligentsia would be fully satisfied.' A much warmer telegram went to Kerensky. He was reminded that he 'proclaimed the slogan of the Ukrainian autonomy' from the tribune of the State Duma. Kerensky was entrusted with 'guarding the just interests' of the Ukrainian nation. They expressed assurance that the time was not too distant when the 'ancient aspiration for a free federation of free peoples' would be fulfilled.²⁶ However, the telegram, when sent, was signed by Yefremov, Matushevskii and Chykalenko, all members of the Society, in the name of the Society itself. This implies dissatisfaction among some members of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, as distinct from the Central Rada, in its losing control of the Ukrainian public policy. At the same time, the Central Rada agreed on a telegram to be sent to local organizations. These were to send delegations to the central government to demand the 'Ukrainianization'

(introduction of the Ukrainian language etc.) of education and governmental offices and the return of Ukrainians of Galicia interned in Siberia, in particular, of the Uniate Metropolitan Sheptytsky. The local organizations were further urged to form or to re-create the Ukrainian cultural institution *Prosvita* (Enlightenment), to initiate further proclamations with these demands and to organize the collection of money for the 'National Fund'.²⁷ The Ukrainian Central Rada kept the form that was created by the meeting of March 17 only for a short time. It was realized almost immediately that a more solidly based form would be desirable, and so it was decided about the same time that a 'Ukrainian National Congress' should be summoned which would work out and approve the main lines of Ukrainian policy and which give the Central Rada the 'rights of a directing body' on the basis of the power of the Congress.²⁸

Thus March 17 saw the final formation of the basic institutions, the Ukrainian Central Rada as well as the Council of United Civic Organizations, and the Council of Workers' Deputies.

Next day, March 18, being Sunday, was given to the expression of faith in the new way of life. The Provisional Government and the previous Provisional Committee of the Duma had co-operated sufficiently with the Councils of United Civic Organizations; the Councils themselves possessed sufficient authority among the population of the cities and other centres all over the Russian Empire, that they became the natural rallying points for the supporters of the new order.

The Council held its seat in the Duma building in Kiev. Large crowds gathered in front of the Duma and were greeted by the Executive Committee of the Council. Military forces in closed formations paraded before the Committee, and the troops of the Kiev Military District were presented by the newly appointed Commander of the District. The officers of the various units expressed faithfulness and loyalty to the new way of life to the Executive committee.²⁹ Similar events took

place all over the Ukraine and the Empire. The Provisional Government and other institutions of the Revolution were solidly established, commanding almost unanimous support.

The Rada leaders did not waste any time in building their base. Already on March 19, there took place a well-attended Ukrainian public meeting, led by Antonovych of U.S.D.W.P. A demand for autonomy of the Ukraine was presented at this meeting.³⁰ The Society of Ukrainian Progressives issued an appeal to the Ukrainian people calling for preparation towards the All-National Constituent Assembly at which the voice of the Ukrainian nation should insist on the autonomy of the Ukraine in a federal state. Again, demands familiar from the Rada telegram mentioned earlier were presented.³¹ A day later, the Rada issued an appeal 'To the Ukrainian Nation.' It said that the true voice of the Ukrainian people would be heard for the first time in the world, in the Constituent Assembly which was to be called by the Provisional Government. Until that time, however, Ukrainians were asked to demand in 'a quiet yet decisive manner' all the rights which belong 'by nature' to 'the Great Nation, its own master in the Ukrainian Land'; they were to unite in political societies, cultural and economic unions, to gather money for the Ukrainian National Fund, as well as to elect 'their own Ukrainian people' everywhere. The appeal described the nation as 'hammering out its own better lot in a comradely family of free nations'.³² Besides issuing the appeal, the Rada continued to strengthen itself. Thus, on March 22, the Ukrainian Central Rada decided to include some of the Orthodox clergy.³³ Shortly, a group of the local clergy delegated three representatives.³⁴

It was very probably as a result of the impressive Ukrainian participation in the demonstration of the Celebration of the Victory of the Revolution, in Petrograd, as well as that of Kiev, that the Minister-President Lvov received a Ukrainian delegation on March 30, which included representatives of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives in Petrograd, of the Ukrainian student organization and of 'organized Ukrainian soldiers and workers.' The Ukrainian demands included ap-

pointment to offices in the Ukraine of persons acquainted with the country; appointment of Ukrainians as Commissars in provinces; appointment of a special Commissar for Ukrainian affairs with the Provisional Government, and various measures in regard to the use of their own language in school and court.³⁵ The cause of the Western Ukrainians ('Galicians') held as hostages by Russian authorities was taken up. The Minister-President said that the government agreed in principle with these³⁶; but Lototsky, a member of the delegation describes him as non-committal.³⁷ These demands were put down in writing in the memorandum of the Society and presented to the Provisional Government.³⁸ The government reprinted the demands and circulated them to the ministries.

Still, the only real measure promulgated by the Provisional Government favoring Ukrainians as such was the authorization of the use of the Ukrainian language in national schools.³⁹ Chartered private associations, too, were authorized to use the language, but not public ones. The reticence in regard to Ukrainian desires is quite manifest. Kerensky, the most liberal of ministers, who at one time publicly supported Ukrainian autonomy, was silent, although he told the *Daily Chronicle* on March 22 that he favoured the 'independence of Poland,'⁴⁰ and told Knox, the British military attaché, that he favoured self-government for Poland, Finland and Armenia.⁴¹ The first Declaration of the Provisional Government made no reference to the various nations in Russia at all.⁴²

In Kiev, the Ukrainian Rada was much strengthened through the arrival on March 27 of Hrushevsky, who had been elected its head in absentia. This period saw a very fast development of Ukrainian institutions and life. Two days earlier, the first issue of the *Nova Rada* (New Council) since the war appeared on the newsstands, followed soon by the *Robitnycha Hazeta* (Workers' Newspaper) published by the U.S.D.W.P., as well as by many other newspapers.⁴³

The Rada rallied various societies to its cause. The Congress of Cooperatives of the Kiev Province opened on this day; Hrushevsky was elected the honorary chairman.

The Congress demanded national autonomy for the Ukraine, with a guarantee of 'rights of national minorities.'⁴¹ One speaker, well applauded, called for 'a free Ukraine, independence, native tongue and school'.⁴² The Ukrainian Central Rada presented greetings to the Kiev zemstvo congress.⁴³ This was the beginning of a profitable cooperation for both parties between zemstvos and the Rada. Khrystiuk, the historian of the Ukrainian Revolution, brings out the financial and moral aid given by zemstvos to the Rada.⁴⁷

The Rada had decided at the very beginning of its organization to gather its strength from the people of the country by calling the 'Ukrainian National Congress,' which would work out and approve the main aims of Ukrainian policies and to give the Central Rada the function of the leading body on its behalf. The Rada sent out the invitation to the Congress stating that all Ukrainian organizations, whether political, cultural, professional or territorial, were welcome who accepted the program of a large national-territorial autonomy.⁴⁸ For the meantime, the Rada called a demonstration in Kiev, a Ukrainian 'Celebration of Freedom.'

The Kiev Public Meeting, gathered on April 1, succeeding in showing the strength of the Ukrainian movement, just as the demonstration in Petrograd showed the same in that city. The number of people taking part was perhaps 100,000 by estimates of the Ukrainian press, or 'several tens of thousands'⁴⁹ by others, much more than in the 'general' meeting of victory of Revolution held earlier. The public meeting was seen to include particularly many soldiers, and university and other students. The gathering met under Ukrainian (yellow-blue) flags near the Volodymyr Cathedral where the clergy celebrated a requiem for Shevchenko. The throng, led by the Ukrainian Central Rada, the Ukrainian General Military Committee (a body associated with the Rada) and others went to the Duma building, with standards reading: 'A Free Ukraine to a Free Russia,' 'Autonomy of Ukraine,' 'Independent Ukraine with Hetman at its Head,' 'Long Live the Federal Republic' etc. At the Duma, Hrushevsky, asked those present 'to swear before the portrait of Shevchenko not to rest' till a

free autonomous Ukraine had been built. The demonstration went on to Sophia Place where they were again greeted by clergy; requiems were sung again, flags of a regiment of Ukrainian soldiers were blessed. In his speech, Hrushevsky declared that the time had come to 'create Ukrainian popular power and the Ukrainian constitutional right, in union with other nations of Eastern Europe in a federal Russian republic'.⁵⁰

The resolution approved by the Meeting stated that the Meeting supported the Central Government and expressed to it the expectation of an immediate summoning of the Constituent Assembly to 'approve the autonomous order which we are realizing in the Ukraine,' as well as to demand from the Provisional Government that it 'tie the issue of Ukrainian autonomy closely to the interests of the new order.' Furthermore, they asked for a declaration by the Government in favour of a wide autonomy for the Ukrainian land, as well as measures to lend a Ukrainian character to public offices. Most important, from the point of view of the development of authority, the Meeting authorized the Ukrainian Central Rada to come to an understanding with the Provisional Government 'in the realization of these decisions'.⁵¹

The early development of Ukrainian institutions was met at first with an expression of joy by the prevailing Russian democracy in Kiev. However, serious worries began to turn up even then. After the Manifestation, the worry 'turned into panic' in the words of Khrystiuk, a contemporary. The clauses regarding the autonomy of the Ukraine were the greatest difficulty.⁵² The fears of the Russian democracy were simple: Ukrainians meant to break off from Russia. The Russian policy found its most prominent expression in the Committee of United Civic organizations, the Council of Workers' and of Soldiers' Deputies.⁵³

The Ukrainian Central Rada was placed squarely in the political picture through the measures. The Civic Committee, recognized officially as a governing body, and the Council of Workers' Deputies, as well as that of Soldiers', could also be expected to be in opposition as rivals for power.

The attention of all Ukrainian parties and groups in the first month of the Revolution was directed to the one immediate task, the Ukrainian National Congress. Other political groups also directed their attention to the Ukrainian autonomous movement, scrutinizing it closely. On April 15, the non-Ukrainian Socialists, startled by the calling of the Ukrainian National Congress, decided to examine the situation. Jewish Socialist parties approached Russian Socialist parties and others, suggesting that a party conference be called of all socialist organizations in the Ukraine, Ukrainian ones included. The matter to be faced was the 'separatist strivings of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which is calling the Ukrainian congress shortly — the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.' The suggestion was taken up. The Bolshevik organization took great interest in the matter; they decided to send Pyatakov and others to the interparty Socialist conference, instructing them to initiate relations with representatives of the Ukrainian Social-Democracy for 'common moves against the Ukrainian bourgeoisie.' If the latter were to refuse, the delegates were to leave the conference while the party organ would open 'a campaign against Ukrainian separatism.' The Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party was expected, in the words of Pyatakov, to 'lead struggle against the secessional strivings of the Central Rada.'⁵⁴

At the conference held next day, the Ukrainian Social-Democrats expressed support for the Ukrainian Central Rada.⁵⁵ This support was interpreted, again by the Bolsheviks, as encouraging the Rada's desire for 'the formation of a federative Ukrainian Republic.' The reply of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik) committee was to 'authorize the presidium to establish relations with a 'Spilka' (non-national) organization, as if there were no Spilka meant yet, with 'Spilka-men' for the formation of one.'⁵⁶ The Bolsheviks evidently were not able to find even a few 'Spilka-leading' Ukrainians. (The 'Spilka' had been a split group of U.S.D.W.P. which entered R.S.D.W.P., and disappeared).

Immediately after the Socialist investigation of the Uk-

rainian movement, the Rada was called on the carpet by the non-Ukrainian governing authorities. The Kiev Committee of United Civic organizations called a united sitting of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Central Rada, of that Committee itself, the Presidium of the Council of Workers' Deputies, Council of Soldiers' Deputies and the Coalitionary Council of Students. Khrystiuk wrote that the Rada was subjected to a 'civic-political cross-examination.'³⁷ When questioned on the rumors that the Congress was to proclaim the immediate separation of the Ukraine from Russia, Hrushevsky answered to the contrary; he was obviously acting for Ukrainians at large when he put before them all the question: "With whom have we met here? With friends or enemies?"³⁸ He thus expressed the surprised realization by the Ukrainian parties and groups that the Revolution indeed meant various things to various people and especially that the Ukrainian and the Russian revolution were parting company. Although this particular conflict was solved immediately, and although the non-Ukrainian parties of the Ukraine accepted the Ukrainian policies a few months later, the break with the Russian revolutionary process became permanent and only more pronounced with the passage of time. At this point, the Ukrainian Central Rada, and the Ukrainian parties could keep in mind the declaration made at the conference by the Chairman of the Council of Workers' Deputies, a Russian Socialist-Revolutionary, Nezlobin, that demands for autonomy at the present time was a dagger in the back of the revolution, and that 'all attempts to realize this autonomy would be answered by the revolutionary democracy with bayonets.'³⁹ The date was April 17, exactly one month after the success of the Revolution. The 'Honey-moon of the Revolution' was indeed over. The Ukrainian Revolution and its institution, the Ukrainian Central Rada, took their independent course.

Shortly before the Congress, and in part, concurrently with the Congress, Ukrainian party congresses were convened. The Society of Ukrainian Progressives had been the only all-Ukrainian body before the revolution. In April, far from be-

coming the general leading group, the Society seemed to court the danger of being left behind altogether in the new currents. In early April, the Society held its Congress in Kiev, with delegates from its centres elsewhere. Altogether there were delegates from Poltava, Chernyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Zhytomir, Kamyanets-Podil'sk, Pereyaslav, Sosnytsi, Uman', Zolotonoshi, Vynnytsya, Lubny, Hadyach and Ekaterynodar, and from Petrograd and Moscow. The Society decided to accept a political form in renaming itself the Society of Ukrainian Autonomist-Federalists.⁶⁰ A further step was taken two weeks later, when members of the Society had decided to re-establish the former Ukrainian Radical-Democratic Party which had been formed in 1905-1907.⁶¹ Still later, the party accepted the name of Party of Socialist-Federalists, in the common fashion of the day.⁶² Hrushevsky did not enter the Provisional Executive of the party (society): he was leaning in the direction of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Yefremov, Doroshenko, Erastov, Shulhyn and others came to form the 'Rada' of the Society renamed later the Central Committee. Yefremov came to be the Chairman of the Central Committee.

The Society gave most of its attention to the question of Ukrainian autonomy. The resolution of the Congress decided to further with all means the immediate introduction of an autonomous constitution. We can also find, almost at the outset of the revolution, hints of a possible institution approaching the Constituent Assembly. The Society urged that the autonomous organization be given a basis as much as possible in the 'assemblies of all groups of population of the Ukraine' (by groups were meant primarily, no doubt, the national groups—Ukrainians, Russians, Jews and Poles, etc.). At the same time, the Society pointed out that rights of national minorities must be guaranteed. The General Constituent Assembly was to give the final sanction.⁶³ The Society also seconded the familiar demands of Ukrainians: safeguarding of the Provisional Government, rights of the Western Ukrainians and others.

At the Conference of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic

Workers' Party, in Kiev on April 17 and 18, there were representatives of the party branches of Kiev, Katerynoslav, Poltava, Kharkiv, Odessa, Cherkasy, Novohrad-Volynsky, Berdyansk, and Petrograd. Leading Social-Democrats were present (M. Porsh, V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura and M. Tukachenko, among others). The Congress was chaired by Vynnychenko. The main task of the conference was the revision of the national program of the 1905 party program. Somewhat apologetically, the resolution on the national question put forward *'the old demand of the Party—the autonomy of the Ukraine as the foremost, pressing, burning task of the present moment of the Ukrainian proletariat and of all the Ukraine,'* based upon the need of the Ukraine's widest economic and political self-determination. Furthermore, the Conference advocate the introduction of the principle of federalism for 'all Russia' and allowed its members to support 'struggles for autonomy by the democracies of other nations.' The demand for federalism was based on a desire, first, to further the development of the proletariat, in particular of the Ukrainian proletariat, and secondly, to prove a guarantee of the maintenance of democratic and national rights. However, the Conference also recognized that while Ukrainian self-government had been authorized by the 1905 congress, federalism as such was a new demand. Because the Conference felt that only a full-fledged Congress of the party could change the party program, the final decision was left for the time when this body was called.⁶⁴

As a practical means towards the creation of an autonomous Ukraine, the conference saw it as necessary to begin work toward the calling of an all-Ukrainian territorial assembly, in which the will of 'the Ukrainian democracy and the democracy of other nations' of the Ukraine should express itself. It was again a harbinger of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, in clearer form than that of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives. The conference further stated that the formation of the autonomous order in the new nation was to take place by a revolutionary development through local revolutionary na-

tional forces. The Provisional Government was asked to see in this a method of introduction of self-government in the Ukraine, or direct its own activity towards a democratization of Russia by realization of the national demands of the former nations of the empire which had possessed no state.⁶⁵

The Conference made also what must have been seen as half-hearted attempts to pay reverence to 'solidarity,' which was 'preserved' allowing into the party only members of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (the Mensheviks) as accepted the autonomy of the Ukraine.⁶⁶ The other traditional counsel of perfection was the discussion by the conference of the U.S.D.W.P.'s with the 'united Russian socialist-democratic party.' The lack of seriousness in the suggestion is seen firstly in the fact that no 'united Russian' party existed and also from the demand that 'the basis of the union must be the recognition by the united Russian socialist-democratic party of principles set forth by the old congresses of the Ukrainian S.D.W. Party and the principle of national organizations.' The party recognized that immediate union was impossible now. Hence it authorized the Bureau of the party to enter into relations with 'other fractions of the R.S.D.W.P.' in order to clarify their attitude to the matter of the national program and the union of parties.⁶⁷ No practical results were achieved from this clause.

The party of Socialist-Revolutionaries held their congress at the same time. While the U.S.D.W.P. was an independent party, the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries did not form an independent Ukrainian party before the revolution. Thus, the Congress of Ukrainian S.R.'s was at the same time the Constituent Congress of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries (U.P.S.R.).

The Constituent Congress contained representatives of the party organization of Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries from the Kiev, Poltava, Kharkiv, Chernyhiv and Katerynoslav provinces. That which was hinted at by the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, which was implied by the U.S.D.W.P., was demanded by Revolutionaries: the calling of the Constituent Assembly.

The greatest exigency of the Ukrainian people was recognized as being the realization of a 'wide national-territorial autonomy of the Ukraine, with the guarantee of rights of national minorities, and the immediate summoning of a territorial Ukrainian Constituent Rada for the working-out of the forms of autonomy and the preparation of elections for the 'general-Russian Constituent Assembly by the Ukrainian people and other peoples of Russia.' The best form for the Russian state was seen to be a federative-democratic republic.⁸⁸ Thus, by insisting that the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly be called earlier, and that even a *pro forma* statement of sanction by the Russian Constituent Assembly be omitted, the Socialist-Revolutionaries were essentially demanding the recognition of the sovereignty of the people of the Ukraine. The party also asked that the Provisional Government express its attitude towards the Ukrainian autonomy by a declaratory act. Any resistance on the part of the Russian government against the calling of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly would be regarded as a continuation of the imperialist policies of the tsars.⁸⁹ The party said in its agrarian policy statement that it would be difficult to realize the desired end—socialization of the soil—under present conditions of the country. For this reason, the Party would insist on the transfer of all state, cabinet (Tsar's allodial lands), and private lands in the Ukraine to the Ukrainian Land Fund, through which the land would be divided among the peasantry by civic organizations. The question of the cost, if any, of reform, was not faced. Expenses for the realization of the land reform had to be charged to the state, the program declared.⁹⁰ Because the main strength of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries was in the country-side, the main attention of the party was directed towards the organization and growth, of the Peasants' Spilkas (Unions), and keeping their influence in them. The Spilkas were elective institutions of the country-side, the executive being elected by the appropriate body of peasants. They represented the professional interests of the farmers. However, in the circumstance of the Revolution, their claims were con-

siderably wider, and so were their powers—thus they acquired a constitutional position.

At the conclusion of the Congress, the Central Committee of the U.P.S.R. was elected. Included were Kovalevsky, Korzh, Khrystyuk, Zaliznyak and others. Kovalevsky became later the Chairman of the Central Committee.

There were also other parties, but the main strength was concentrated in the two Socialist parties: primarily in the U.P.S.R. The future Socialist-Federalists had little direct influence in the country. However, their individual intellectual attainment and prestige were of great use to the other two parties, the U.P.S.R. and U.S.D.W.P., where either a businesslike or a decorative effect was needed. Two other parties deserve attention. They are dealt with here for the sake of a more complete picture of the evolution of institutions in the revolution. These were present as groups in the early days, although their founding dates belong to a somewhat later period.

Although not formally founded in the early period, there were groupings and 'wings' who approached a certain well-defined position, and thus are of importance. One of these, in particular, represented the survival of an earlier party, the Ukrainian National Party, organized in 1903. Former members or sympathizers of this group, and the new element consisting for the most part of the Ukrainian military, after making their presence felt as an indefinite group for a long time, formed a party group at the Poltava Province Independents' Congress, of November 6, 1917. The party of Independents finally constituted itself on December 30, 1917, in its first All-Ukrainian Congress. P. Makarenko was the Chairman of the Congress; his associates were I. Lutsenko and M. Andrievsky. The decisions of the Congress, upon which the program of the Party was based, recognized that 'the Socialist ideal alone can destroy the existing capitalist way of life.' Factories were to go to Ukrainian-workers, soil to Ukrainian-farmers. An immediate proclamation of independence was demanded.⁷¹

The other party of some importance was the Ukrainian Democratic Agriculturalist Party formed by some landowners

and others in the summer of 1917. The program of the party was drafted by Lypynsky in November 1917.⁷² This party was generally inimical to the Rada. Two other latecomers on the Ukrainian political scene with little influence were the Ukrainian Federal-Democratic Party. These parties were moderately liberal in their outlook.⁷³ There were no Ukrainian counterparts to the Russian Mensheviks or Bolsheviks. The group of the Spilka corresponding to Mensheviks disappeared: there was no 'Ukrainian Bolshevik party.'

The various congresses of Ukrainian parties immediately preceded the Ukrainian National Congress. Hrushevsky, in the meantime, had been attempting to obtain the complaisance of the Russian society while expressing his views on Ukrainian autonomy. In a pamphlet entitled *Where the Ukrainian Movement Came from and Where It is Going*, Hrushevsky repeated again and again that Ukrainians did not intend to 'tear the Ukraine from Russia.' All they wanted was to be in 'voluntary and free connection with her'.⁷⁴ However, it is obvious that the Rada leaders were considering the possibility of independence of the Ukraine. Hrushevsky wrote on April 12 that a 'wide autonomy of the Ukraine, with rights of state to the Ukrainian nation in a federal connection (*zvyazok*)' was the platform of the Ukrainian movement. However, if the 'all-Russian centralists' were to attempt to 'snatch from our hands the flag' of Ukrainian autonomy, the 'flag of the independent Ukraine,' which was upright now, it would be immediately unfurled.⁷⁵

The Ukrainian National Congress finally met on April 19. There were altogether about 900 delegates from various Ukrainian military, peasant, workers', cultural and economic organizations, and parties. The delegates came from all parts of the Ukraine, from larger Ukrainian communities in Russian territories, as well as from the front, and from the fleet of Baltic and Black seas.⁷⁶ The presidium of the Congress was elected; it was rather moderate; there were Erastov (as chairman), Vynnychenko, Shteyngel of the Union of Cities and others. Hrushevsky was named the honorary president of

the Congress. The Congress was addressed by the Kiev Commissar of the Provisional Government, Sukovkin. He told the meeting that the Provisional Government, in building the new way of life (*lad*) in the Ukraine, would consider the views of the 'organized Ukrainian citizenry of first importance'.⁷⁷ While making the declaration, Sukovkin apologized for his inability to speak Ukrainian.⁷⁸ In his report to the Provisional Government later on, Sukovkin stated the desires of the Congress, as requested by the latter.⁷⁹ His position was quite interesting. It must be remembered that one of the earliest Ukrainian demands had been the appointment of a Commissar for the Ukraine by the Petrograd government. Early in April Lototsky and Korchysky, on request of Prince Lvov, represented Sukovkin and others as candidates; Prince Lvov remained non-committal. The request was refused, however, by Shchepkin, who was in charge of internal affairs, on the ground that the appointment of a commissar for Ukrainian provinces would mean that the Government recognized the 'separateness of the entire country'.⁸⁰ Thus, Sukovkin's relative friendliness (as contrasted with the 'bayonets' of the Council of Workers' Deputies) is understandable. The Congress was also greeted by representatives of the Jewish community in the Ukraine. On behalf of the Council of United Jewish Organizations, Dr. Bychovsky especially hailed the 'glorious leader of the Ukrainian movement, Professor M. S. Hrushevsky' and finished, accompanied by applause, with '*Slava* (Glory) to the Ukrainian people, *Slava* to Hrushevsky its leader'.⁸¹ The Congress eventually returned the compliment by resolving that 'one of the more important principles of the Ukrainian autonomy' would be the 'full guarantee of rights of national minorities present in the Ukraine'.⁸² Greetings were also extended by letter by the 'Jewish Social-Democracy,' the Jewish Democratic Teachers' Union and other Jewish organizations.⁸³

The Congress was also saluted by the institution which came to represent more and more exclusively the Russian minority in Kiev and the Ukraine, the Executive Committee of United Civic Organizations, in the person of Chairman Stra-

domsky.⁸⁴ The Councils of Workers' and of Soldiers' Deputies seemed to have stayed out.

The Congress sat for three days. Its procedure was to have reports presented to it, followed by debate and finally the acceptance of the various resolutions in connection with the reports. D. Doroshenko presented a report on the constitutional law and strivings for federalism in the Ukraine. Shulhyn discussed federalism and the demand of 'a democratic Russian republic.' Matushevsky and Ponyatenko reported on guarantees of minority rights. V. Sadovsky discussed the territorial extent of an autonomous Ukraine, while autonomy as such was discussed in two other reports.⁸⁵ Hrushevsky had opened the Congress with an appropriate speech, describing the Congress as historic.⁸⁶

As we have seen, the Congress was primarily concerned with the problem of autonomy and the guarantees for national minorities, as well as the organization of the Rada. In its resolutions, the Congress concluded that 'only the national-territorial autonomy of the Ukraine could satisfy the demands of our nation and of all other nations present in the Ukrainian Land.'⁸⁷ A federative democratic republic was considered to be the proper constitution for the former Russian Empire. On the one hand, the Rada was called on to attempt to bring about a 'strong union' with other nations who, like the Ukrainian people, 'demand national and territorial autonomy.' On the other hand, stating that it desired 'to meet the wish of the Provisional Government in the matter of organization of all civic forces,' it decided that a Land Rada should be formed, consisting of representatives of provinces and cities, of nations in the Ukraine (i.e., national minorities), and of civic strata. The initiative in the formation of the Land Rada was to be taken by the Central Rada.⁸⁸ The Rada was also called upon to form a committee together with representatives of national minorities which would draft a statute on Ukrainian autonomy to be accepted by a future Congress representing the entire Ukraine, and which would be sanctioned by the Russian Constituent Assembly.⁸⁹ Pretensions of Poland for Ukrainian territory were rejected.

We see that it was the policy of the Congress (and the Rada) to attract to its support those concerned with the preservation of the new way of life. In particular, an attempt was made to associate the Rada with all those various elements which saw it desirable to press for Ukrainian autonomy, but which, as yet, did not associate their wishes directly with the institution of the Rada. National minorities were to be persuaded that their best interests lay with the Ukraine, and with the Rada.

Inasmuch as the Rada leaders were expecting resistance on the part of the Provisional Government, the attempt was also made to associate autonomous movements of other nations in the Empire with the Ukrainian movement. Obviously, an attempt was being made to revive the idea of the Union of Autonomists created by members of the First Duma in June 1906. At that time about eighty members united in that faction, and on the basis of a 'wide autonomy,' developed its policies in conjunction with the national groups of the Duma. The Union consisted of Poles, Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Jews, Georgians, Armenians, Caucasus mountaineers, the Azerbaijan, Volga Tartars, Kirguizes and others. The Russian policy could be guessed at from the presence of only one Russian in the Union, the Deputy from Kaluga, V. P. Obnysky.⁹⁰ The policy of association of non-Russian nationalities in April 1917 was a viable policy, but it was almost certain to provoke the resistance of Petrograd.

Most important, however, the Rada claimed to be the centre around which the general governing body of the entire territory of the Ukraine was forming. The Rada was as yet solely representative of those living in the Ukraine who considered themselves of Ukrainian origin. Although it was generally accepted by all groups that the Ukrainians did in fact constitute the Ukrainian nation as a whole, and other national groups were to 'govern themselves accordingly,' the depth and the sincerity of the Ukrainian national movement was doubted by some non-Ukrainian groups, and other observers. It could also be argued that even if the

Rada were to express the will of the Ukrainian majority, it would lack the character of a democratic state institution unless it represented every person living in the Ukraine. This view was generally accepted by the Rada leaders: hence came their insistence that the Rada is to become a 'territorial' rather than a 'national,' body. The Rada's emergence as a state body was thus connected with its re-formation as the Land Rada. Its formation would also serve to define the territory of the Ukraine. With the Land Rada, the problem would arise of Ukrainian minorities in the territory outside of the 'Autonomous Ukraine'; regarding this, the Congress decided to demand the same rights for the Ukrainian minority as were being enjoyed by non-Ukrainian minorities in the Ukraine.⁸¹

The Ukrainian movement, as expressed in the Ukrainian National Congress, did not want to wait for the Constituent Assembly to satisfy its demands. The Congress did recognize the rights of the Russian Constituent Assembly to sanction both Ukrainian autonomy and the transformation of the Empire into a federal state, but it considered that 'the adherents of the new way of life in the Ukraine could not remain passive.' They were enjoined to 'immediately lay the foundations of her autonomous life,' in agreement with the minor nationalities.⁸² This policy could result only in further conflicts with the Provisional Government, which had expressly stated on assuming office that any far-reaching changes would have to be made by the Constituent Assembly.⁸³ It was obvious that while in Russian eyes the Constituent Assembly would undertake and complete the entire reform,⁸⁴ the Ukrainians were attempting to build the Autonomous Ukraine themselves, leaving for the Assembly the 'sanction' of the constructed new way of life.

It was to the task of strengthening the Central Rada that the congress finally turned its attention. It was decided to entirely re-elect the Rada by the Ukrainian National Congress, which of course had been called by the Rada. The Rada was to consist of about 150 deputies elected according to the schedule of representation proposed to the Congress by Hrushevsky. Most of these were elected in the Congress, while the

Rada was given the right to co-opt 15 per cent of its membership, with the representatives of national minorities expected to be part of the 15 per cent.⁹⁵ The schedule also establishes the territorial claims of the Rada. Eleven provinces were to elect four or three representatives each; these provinces, obviously meant to be the 'home territory,' were the Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Kherson, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernyiv, Tauria, Kuban Cossack territory and the Kholm provinces. These covered most of Ukrainian ethnic territory in the Russian Empire with the exception of Polessia and Podlassie (the last exception probably with the wish to avoid offending the Belorussians) and some Ukrainian populated territory in the Don Cossack Voisko (Army) lands. The provinces with smaller Ukrainian population could have one delegate each. Furthermore, there were representatives from the main Ukrainian cities and the two Russian capitals, from Ukrainian political parties, and various Ukrainian civic and economic organizations.⁹⁶ The relationship of the Ukrainian National Congress to the re-formed Rada, and the view expressed on May 6 by the Rada of the nature of the Rada, was defined in the 'Order of the Ukrainian Central Rada' issued by the Congress. In it, the Rada has stated that the Central Rada was the 'representative body of the entire Ukrainian population'; its task was 'to fulfil the will of the population expressed in the Ukrainian National Congress, that is, realization of the autonomy of the Ukraine in a federative Democratic Russian Republic with the guarantee of rights of the national minorities who are in the Ukraine.'⁹⁷

In the elections, which at the insistence of Hrushevsky were held by secret ballot, Hrushevsky was elected the President of the Ukrainian Central Rada by 588 votes against several, showing his hold on the allegiance of the Ukrainian National movement and the bodies influenced by it. Yefremov, a Socialist-Federalist, and Vynnychenko, the Social-Democrat, were elected as Vice-Presidents.⁹⁸

It is of interest to examine the make-up of the Rada closer. Although elected by the Ukrainian National Congress, the Ra-

da is found to have consisted in essence of deputies of various organizations which accepted the principle of Ukrainian autonomy. This is understandable in view of the organization of the Ukrainian National Congress. In addition to these, we also see individuals of great influence in their respective communities. This is particularly true of territorial representatives. These were elected in the provinces for the congress.⁹⁹

Further, there were representatives of the U.S.D.W.P., the Ukrainian Democratic-Radical Party, the Autonomist-Federalists, the U.P.S.R., the Party of Independents, Peasants' Spilka, students', teachers', women's and educational organizations. Among the military representatives, there were those from Ukrainian military bodies in Kiev, Odessa, Kremynets, Viborg (Petrograd), the Kronstadt fleet. Ukrainian workers' organizations were represented too, in particular, workers at the Kiev Arsenal, Ukrainian railroad men, and others.¹⁰⁰

Thus, on the whole, the Rada provided representation of a nationally conscious, organized Ukrainian community.¹⁰¹ To be sure, this method of organizing a governing body by amalgamating all other bodies, whatever their strength might be, left such to be desired. It was, however the only method really practicable under the circumstances of the revolution. Finally, the Rada sought to include non-Ukrainian groups and political parties, after the Congress laid down the points of association: autonomy and minority guarantees.

The re-formed Rada met immediately upon the closing of the Congress on April 21. At that time 115 elected members were present there. The Rada elected an executive body, called 'Committee of the Central Rada.' Hrushevsky was its President, flanked by Yefremov and Vynnychenko, in the total Committee of 20.¹⁰² After the formation of the General Secretariat as an executive body of the committee, the Committee became the Small Rada (*Mala Rada*). The Rada turned, for the time being, to further strengthening of its own position.

The Rada saw the greatest possibility of growth among two groups of the Ukrainian population: the peasants and the soldiers. In some respects, this was but a single group. The Uk-

rainian army, due to the peculiarities of the social make-up, was solidly peasant.

The Organization of Ukrainian soldiers developed in parallel to the organization of the Council of Soldiers' Deputies, which had been undifferentiated as to nationality. On the day of the formation of the latter body on March 22, Ukrainian soldiers and officers joined in a separate meeting. The meeting decided to consider itself the Provisional Military Rada; it issued a greeting to the Provisional Government expressing the hope that the Provisional Government would issue a constitutional act, similar to that regarding Finland, in which it 'would return to the Ukraine her autonomous rights robbed by Tsarism.'¹⁰³ Two days later, there gathered over a thousand soldiers and officers in the Military Viche (Assembly), which approved the resolution of the previous meeting, and a new resolution was made, supporting the formation of a Ukrainian Volunteer Regiment.¹⁰⁴ On March 29, there was a meeting of the Ukrainian soldiers of Kiev, which voted to establish the Hetman Pavlo Polubotok Ukrainian Military Club, and also to organize the First Ukrainian Volunteer Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment.¹⁰⁵ The main activity in the Ukrainian military development was in the direction of the formation of Ukrainian regiments and larger groups, an action known at that time as 'nationalization' or 'Ukrainianization' of the army. The efforts at organizing separate Ukrainian military radas became unnecessary, as with the further progress of the revolution, in the early summer, most Councils of Soldiers' Deputies in the Ukraine threw out the first wave of Russian S. R.'s and Mensheviks which had been elected, and put in their place Ukrainian S.R.'s, for the most part; this occurred in Kiev. With this, the former Councils became known as Radas of Military Deputies. A parallel development occurred on the front, where Front Radas were formed. In other words, just as Ukrainian parties came to dominate peasant organizations in the Ukraine, they also came to dominate soldier's organizations at home and on the fronts with relatively large Ukrainian concentration; the South-

Western front, cutting through Ukrainian territory, was the main area with these characteristics.

The Ukrainian Central Rada came into direct contact with the military after a group of 3,000 Ukrainian soldiers concentrated in Kiev, in conjunction with the Polubotok Military Club, and drew up a plan of organization of the Ukrainian Khmelnytsky Regiment.¹⁰⁶ While all non-Ukrainian bodies protested, the Rada took the Regiment-to-be under its protection.¹⁰⁷ General Brussilov, Commander of the South-Western Front, ordered the recognition of the Regiment. It was in consequence of this that the Central Rada formed the Military Commission to further the 'Ukrainianization of the army',¹⁰⁸ claiming in a resolution that the recognition of the Khmelnytsky Regiment constituted recognition by the higher army command of the principle of Ukrainianization of the army. It obviously constituted no such thing. The army's attitude towards nationalization was divided. According to Denikin, a ranking officer at this time, the larger part of the command had a negative attitude towards nationalization; the smaller part supported it, hoping that in breaking with the Petrograd Council of Deputies through nationalization, the national groups would be a 'healthy kernel' for the army and its reconstruction.¹⁰⁹ General Brussilov, says Denikin, ordered the Ukrainianization of the Khmelnytsky Regiment on his own, and afterwards approached the Commander-in-Chief Alexeev with the request not to change the order, so that his authority would not be undercut. Alexeev, however, ordered the dissolution of the Khmelnytsky regiment; this order was then countermanded by the highest civil authority, Kerensky, as the War Minister.¹¹⁰

After the Ukrainianization of the first regiment, the operation proceeded very rapidly, the Highest Command assigning special divisions on all fronts for it, in particular the 34th Corps on the South-Western front.¹¹¹

Ukrainianization of a group meant that it broke off relations with the Petrograd Council and set up connections with the Rada through the Military Commission and its successors. The Front Rada, elected by soldiers, received directions from

the Kiev Rada through Kiev's emissaries.¹¹² Denikin complained bitterly that he had to suffer direct contact with soldiers in the form of a post near his headquarters with a yellow-blue flag.¹¹³

The Ukrainian movement in the army was advancing very rapidly. Already, on May 18, the First Ukrainian Military Congress opened in Kiev. There was a total of about 700 deputies which had been elected by 1,580,702 Ukrainian soldiers.¹¹⁴ The total number was verified by mandates presented by the delegates. The Congress elected Hrushevsky as its Honorary President, again testifying to his popularity among the soldiers organized in Ukrainian Front Radas and their Committees. After the opening of the Congress by Hrushevsky, Vynnychenko proposed his colleague in the U.S.D.W.P., Simon Petlura as the President of the Congress. Mikhnovsky objected to the argument that the president of the Congress must be a military and not a 'civil person', such as Petlura, hereby initiating the first important internal disagreement of the Ukrainian policy. Mikhnovsky himself was suggested by some delegates as President of the Congress.¹¹⁵

A Member of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the predecessor of U.S.D.W.P., since 1900, and a former editor of the Moscow journal *Ukrainskaya Zhyzn* (Ukrainian Life), Simon Petlura worked in the Union Zemstvos and Cities during the war, and was in Minsk at the outbreak of the Revolution. With the spread of Ukrainianization in the armies, he was elected President of the Ukrainian Military Committee of the Western Front. It was in the capacity of the representative of Ukrainians of this front, that Petlura arrived in Kiev.¹¹⁶

Mikhnovsky was the author of the R.U.P. program pamphlet *An Independent Ukraine* of 1900. The revolution found him in Kiev, where he immediately directed his efforts to the organization of Ukrainian military institutions, and in particular, the Polubotok Military Club.¹¹⁷

In these elections at the Congress there had been in fact a collision between the socialist current and the nationalist, current, represented by Petlura and Mikhnovsky, respectively.

Ukrainian Socialists, together with most socialists of the day, shared a general distrust of the 'army' as such. For most socialists the army was the very personification of the oppressive state. Late in April, Vynnychenko wrote in the Social-Democratic newspaper *Robitnych Hazeta* (Workers' Newspaper) that Ukrainian democrats or Social-Democrats did not need their own army, but rather the destruction of all standing armies. He further argued that the need lay not in the organization of the 'Ukrainian regular army,' but rather in the spreading the sense of being a Ukrainian among the soldiers, and in Ukrainianizing the all-Russian army units consisting of Ukrainians; these groups were to be separated and reorganized into a 'Ukrainian people's *viysko* (troops)'. This *viysko* (that is, militia) was to be conscious of people's and not of soldiers' interests, so it could never be a 'power in the hands of the governing classes, no matter to what nation they belonged.'¹¹⁸ In an earlier article, Vynnychenko, apparently on behalf of the U.S.D.W.P., warned that 'not only the red ribbons of freedom may wave at the points of bayonets but also the black hands of the reaction, violence and absolutism'.¹¹⁹

Although the armed force as such was not rejected in a show of pacifism, regular armed units, of a specifically 'militarist' character were rejected.

Their disagreement about the presidency was solved by the formation of the Presidium consisting of Petlura, Vynnychenko, Mikhnovsky, Pysmenny, and Kapkan (the last had just been appointed the Commandant of the First Ukrainian Khmelnytsky Regiment). With regard to the program of the Congress, the one submitted by Petlura on behalf of the Rada was accepted; the part of the program which had been drafted by the Polubotok Club was incorporated into it. Thus Congress, although called in common by the Rada (probably through its Military Commission), and the Ukrainian Military Committee (formed at the same time as the Polubotok Club), decided to follow the largely socialist oriented direction of the Rada, rather than the prevailing nationalist current in the military club.

On the whole, however, it seems that the majority underestimated the nationalist strain in the Congress. This is plain from the condemnation of certain actions of police and military authorities taken in connection with the Congress. On the night of April 18, Oberuchev, the Kiev Commissar, was told by Chief of Police Leparsky that the Congress had decided to capture the State Bank and the Provincial Treasury; Oberuchev issued an appeal to the population, and put guards in the city. The Congress members considered this a provocation, and it was only on the insistence of Petlura that Leparsky was not publicly condemned by the Congress. Leparsky's action, however, was not a provocation. Just before the Congress, the underground Fraternity of Independents, including also Mikhnovsky, had formed the Union of Ukrainian Statehood (*Soyus Ukrains'koi Derzhavnosti*). On the night of April 18, the Union held a common meeting with about a third of the Congress members. At the meeting it was decided to take power in the Ukraine by force, forming a Ukrainian state. A committee was appointed.¹²⁰ News of this meeting reached Leparsky, who seemed to think, however that it was the Congress itself which reached the decisions.

Thus the Social-Democrats had to contend with a very serious nationalist movement drawing its strength from the front-line soldiers.

The Russian liberal newspaper *Kievskaya mys'* (Kievan Thought) discerned this patriotic tendency. It reported a noticeable 'elevated nationalist feeling' leaning towards 'radical, militarist' positions. However, the newspaper felt that under the leadership of the 'well-experienced' chairman Petlura, the Congress would take 'a more moderate position.'¹²¹

The Congress broke with the Petersburg Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Council had addressed a telegram to the Congress requesting that it discourage immediate formation of separate national units by Ukrainian soldiers, and informing the Congress that such a formation should be postponed until the all-Russian Military Congress, in mid-June. At that time, a commission including 'representatives of na-

tional organizations' and the General Headquarters, were negotiating on the matter of national armies.¹²² This was a challenge of control and initiative to Ukrainian military groups and the Congress: the reference to undefined 'representatives of national organizations' showed plainly that the Executive Committee of the Council meant to pre-empt the entire field. The Congress received the telegram with disfavour. In the reply to the Petersburg Council, it stated its intention to ignore the undertakings of the Council.

The Petrograd Council was informed by the Congress that resolutions on military affairs and other matters would be given to a delegation to be sent to the Provisional Government and the Council of Deputies by the Rada and the Military Congress.¹²³ The Congress supported 'nationalization of the Ukrainian army' which was to consist of the separation of all Ukrainian officers and soldiers into national groups. A Ukrainian general 'military committee,' would be formed which would work in contact with the Russian General Headquarters.¹²⁴ The Congress stated that a 'Ukrainian national army was necessary'; after the war this was to become the 'army of the people (national militia)'.¹²⁵

The Military Congress accepted decisions bearing on the agrarian problem. The soil and mineral resources of the 'autonomous Ukraine' were to belong 'exclusively to all the people' of the Ukraine; this soil was to be partitioned by the Ukrainian Parliament on the basis of 'justice and equality among all the people inhabiting the Ukraine'.¹²⁶ Thus Russians and others outside the Ukraine were not entitled to it, nor should land or forests be sold.

The Congress decided to use the Rada as the main vehicle for its demands. It stated that it considered the Ukrainian Central Rada the only body competent enough to decide matters which have to do with the entire Ukraine and with her relation to the Provisional Government.¹²⁷ This, of course, gave new strength to the Ukrainian Central Rada. Ukrainian front-line soldiers, as represented in the Congress, had presented for deliberation and discussion by them, two points of

view about Ukrainian statehood in connection with war aims. Mikhnovsky, Lutsenko and others supported a United (that is, with Ukrainian-populated territories in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire) Ukraine with independence on the basis of Wilson's program, as the main war aim for them. Vynnychenko supported a peace 'without annexations and contributions' as stated in the Declaration of the Council of Deputies; to this he added the demand that the Ukrainian people be represented in it, without referring expressly to the 'united' Ukrainian people. The Congress largely accepted Vynnychenko's formulation with the express statement that the representatives should be from the 'Ukrainian nation in all its entirety'.¹²⁸

Concerning current problems, the Congress demanded that the Government and the Council of Deputies proclaim by a special act 'the principle of national-territorial autonomy of the Ukraine,' and also appoint, as the first measure, a Minister for the Ukraine, for the Provisional Government. The Congress also associated itself with the demand of the National Congress that an *oblast* body be formed in the Ukraine which would 'work together' with the Commissar appointed for all provinces inhabited by Ukrainians.¹²⁹ The slight difference from the National Congress demand that the Rada be the basis of this *oblast* (large subdivision of several provinces) body may be possibly explained from the distinction between the soldiers' representatives with their more national-minded program and the Rada as elected by the National Congress.

The Congress finally decided to form the Ukrainian Central Rada as the executive body in charge of the formation of Ukrainian regiments, and consequently, of all military affairs, and to have under it the Ukrainian General Military Committee. The Rada accepted the initiative, and authorized that body to act for it. The nationally radical sense of the Congress was expressed in the fact that Vynnychenko and Petlura on the one hand, and Mikhnovsky and Lutsenko on the other hand together with others, entered the Committee.¹³⁰ However, the Committee came to be essentially the responsibility of the

moderate Petlura. Vynnychenko was mainly involved in the work of the Central Rada; Lutsenko left Kiev, while Mikhnovsky became connected very soon with an almost dictatorial coup attempted by the independents, as will be seen later, for which he was sent to a headquarters on the Rumanian front, cutting short his political career.

By its answer to the Council of Deputies, by the election of a military delegation to join the Rada's expected delegation, and by the show of support to the Rada, the Military Congress forced the Rada's hand, emboldening it to send a delegation to the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee of the Council, with a memorandum on the wishes expressed by the Ukrainian National Congress which had remained unanswered.

At its first meeting on April 21, the Central Rada had elected the Executive Committee, also known as the Committee of the Central Rada. It was, then, this Committee which constituted the Delegation, consisting of Vynnychenko, I. Kovalevsky, Yefremov, Odinets, and others. Pysmenny, Rovynsky and Pylkevych, members of the General Military Committee, and delegates of the Congress, were also included.¹³¹ The Memorandum of the Rada included as its first demand that the Provisional Government announce its recognition and its favourable attitude, in principle, towards autonomy of the Ukraine. This was followed by the demand that the request for representation at the peace conference be answered, in view of the 'necessity of the preparation of practical steps towards the irredental Ukraine.' This was in fact an offer of support in the foreign policy of the Provisional Government.

The formation of bodies of Ukrainian troops on 'her' South-Western front meant largely the increase of the fighting strength of the troops who could consider themselves to be fighting for the liberation of the Western Ukraine and the formation of a great Ukraine from 'the Carpathians to the Caucasus.' Lenin, in particular, said again and again that the expected 'annexation' of 'Galicia' would not be countenanced.¹³² The practical proposals of Bolsheviks, and of those

near to them boiled down to the demand for a *status quo ante*, at best, but more generally to immediate peace negotiations which meant the establishment of an armistice line quite unfavourable to the Ukraine in the West. It was this point in the memorandum put before Russian institutions, which represented a serious conflict between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Ukrainians.

The memorandum also included the already familiar demands: a Commissar for the Ukraine, a Land Rada, the separation of the Ukrainians into their own armed groups, extension of the Ukrainian language to the secondary and higher schools, appointment of Civil Service officials in the Ukraine who were acquainted with the Ukraine, and enjoyed the confidence of the population, and the extension of these rights to Western Ukrainians. The Rada also demanded grants from the general treasury 'for the satisfaction of the national needs'.¹³³

While expressing the demands of Ukrainian soldiers, mostly 'peasants in greatcoats,' the Rada was able at the same time to become the spokesman of the peasants of the Ukraine.

After the revolution, the Ukrainian peasantry rediscovered the old Peasants' Spilkas of 1905-1907 as a form of political organization. The Ukrainian peasantry was quite used to this political form of struggle: there were wide-spread peasants' revolts in 1902-1903, probably called by the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the predecessor of U.S.D.W.P., and the peasantry had revolutionary tendencies even earlier. The Spilka form was rapidly resurrected, and was under the influence of the old 'Spilka' men such as Stasiuk, Osadchy, Stepanenko, Odynets and others. The old Spilka hands were joined by new men, mostly members of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries' groups.

Records show that some peasants attempted to draw the attention of the Kiev Executive Committee of the United Civic Organizations to their situation in mid-March.¹³⁴ Yet the Civic Committee did not follow up the initiative. A few days later, still in March, the Ukrainian Central Rada established a body concerned with the interests of the peasants.¹³⁵ Still later the so-called Congress of 'Active Persons of the Ukrainian Village,'

called by the former Spilka men,¹³⁴ was held in conjunction with the Ukrainian National Congress on April 19-20. Eighteen branches of Spilkas had already been represented. The Congress saw it as necessary to organize the Ukrainian peasantry in one all-Ukrainian Central Spilka.¹³⁷ The all-Ukrainian Peasants' Congress was to be called, and an elected organizational committee was to be formed for the purpose.¹³⁸ The Congress also decided on two resolutions which laid the foundation for all future activity. It demanded the realization of a national-territorial autonomy of the Ukraine, and also the solution of the agrarian question by a Ukrainian parliament.¹³⁹

It was shortly after these events that the Petrograd Soviet attempted to organize the peasants, along with workers and soldiers, in the Kiev gubernia and the 'oblast.' On its own, the Kiev Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies formed the South-Western Oblast, consisting of the Kiev, Poltava, Chernyhiv, and part of the Kharkiv gubernias, and also of the predominantly Russian Kursk and Voronezh provinces.¹⁴⁰ The region did not represent any historical province; rather, it incorporated large Russian territories into a Ukrainian region. It excluded the gubernias traditionally associated with Kiev, which also are Ukrainian-populated, that is, Volhynia and Podolia. Volhynia and Podolia border directly with the Kiev gubernia.

The schedule of representation gave a disproportionately small representation to the peasantry. The Congress was called without any consultation with either the Ukrainian Central Rada or with the Provisional Committee of the Ukrainian Peasants' Spilka elected by the April Congress.

The Provisional Committee suspected that the Congress was being called in order to create a body which would claim to represent workers, soldiers and peasants of the South-Western Oblast. The arbitrary delineation of the borders of the Oblast, not corresponding to the national or even economic make-up of the region, and the small representation offered to peasants, caused the Spilka to call upon the gubernia and povit organizations to send 'as many as possible delegates to it'.¹⁴¹

The Congress did not find favour in the South-Western Region. At any rate, only 80 delegates returned the call; the

vast majority of the region ignored it. It seems outlying Soviets, controlled by a non-Ukrainian element, preferred to hold direct contact with the centre in Petrograd. Most of those who appeared were from various soldiers' councils. The Spilka appeal brought 50 deputies from seven Ukrainian gubernias while the Zvenyhorodka povit of the Kiev province sent 150 people, who could hardly be considered deputies. It is indicative of the weakness of the Kiev Soviet and of their position with the peasantry, that all delegates, including the Zvenyhorodka 'delegates', were eventually admitted to the Congress: The Congress divided into sections; the peasants' section produced resolutions which could not be accepted by the rest. The result was further disagreement, expulsions, charges and counter-charges. The Congress ended in confusion without electing any executive body representative of the 'workers, soldiers and peasants of the South-Western Region.' The calling of the Congress demonstrated, however, that no body in any way representative of Ukrainian peasantry in general could be called without the cooperation of the peasant organizations, as they did not respond to any others' invitation.

The Congress was evaluated by the Bolshevik Kiev newspaper, *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of the Social-Democrat) as one which had shown how far the 'self-consciousness of the province is behind the capitals and the leading centres.'¹⁴² The meagreness of results is also seen in the fact that the Kiev Soviets were not enlarged, even if only in name, to include 'Peasants' Deputies.' The Congress seems to have left no trace at all. Thus, when another somewhat similar Congress was called for December 1917, it was called *ab ovo*.

The peasant institutions in the Ukraine developed gradually, which pointed to the genuineness of the movement. Many county and provincial peasant congresses of the Kiev, Kherson, Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernyhiiv, Katerynoslav and Podolia provinces were held in April and May. All these congresses, according to Khrystiuk, the historian of the Ukrainian revolution, demanded the introduction of autonomy in the Ukraine and the realization of agrarian reform through a Ukrainian parlia-

ment on the basis of expropriation and division of soil for use by peasants.¹⁴³

The Kiev Gubernia Peasant Congress, which consisted of about 250 deputies, was held in the capital early in May. The Kiev Provincial Spilka was sending recognized delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies. Co-incidental elections took place in various Provincial Peasant Congresses of the Ukraine; all these deputies joined into the faction of Ukrainian peasant deputies, nor would they divide into any other combination at the Congress. The Kiev Provincial Congress passed an Order for their Delegates as the views of the Congress; again other Congresses drafted similar resolutions. The Kievans decided that lands were not to be divided on individual initiative; the Ukrainian national parliament was to solve the problem. All lands, losing the status of private property, would pass into the Ukrainian Soil Fund, which was to be managed by the Ukrainian parliament, which again would partition them for those who worked the land. In the resolutions on the constitution, which would in fact have to be the *ultima ratio* for the above proceedings. The Congress demanded a 'democratic federative republic,' and autonomy for each nation of Russia. With regard to autonomy, it was decided that the Government should publicly recognize the rights of the Ukrainian people for national territorial autonomy. Also, there were the familiar demands on using the Ukrainian language in schools, and to the formation of Ukrainian armed groups. The similarity to the Congress's and the Rada's demands was certainly not accidental. Khrystiuk, of the Executive Committee of the Rada, was President of the Congress. However, the Rada as such is not mentioned. There is a statement of the necessity of organizing the Land Rada of Peasants' Deputies in Kiev for 'common work with the Councils of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies'.¹⁴⁴ This probably indicates that the peasants still considered themselves solely a social grouping. The Poltava gubernia Congress produced similar, though more extreme resolutions.¹⁴⁵

By this time Hrushevsky was among the Socialist-Revo-

lutionaries, who were a majority in all peasant organizations, so an absence of direct reference to the Rada is the more curious. More likely, however, since this particular congress took place before the Soldiers' Congress, the Rada did not seem to loom so large. On the other hand, it is also possible that the peasants were afraid to lose representation in an all-embracing body like the Rada unless suitable influence were to be exerted. There is definitely no hint of any rival organization, as the Peasants' Rada was not likely to consider itself as the proper base for an autonomous Ukraine, in association with the Soviets. If it had nourished such ambitions, these would surely have been indicated in demands to the Provisional Government like those of the Rada, of a practical nature (e.g. a Commissar for the Ukraine).

The Kiev Delegation joined others to form a faction of 170 men in the All-Russian Congress in early June. Its one achievement was to force the congress to add the amendment 'federative' as part of the slogan of the Russian Democratic Republic.¹⁴⁶ Most other demands were totally ignored; eventually, the All-Russian Council (initiated by the Congress) decided on one Soil Fund to be centrally controlled, with an expected smaller share of the soil, where he was settled, to the Ukrainian peasant, since immigrants from the more land-hungry Russia were to be brought into the Ukraine to be settled.¹⁴⁷ This issue brought the break, as we have mentioned before; no other delegates were ever sent by the peasants to Russia.

Thus, when the Ukrainian Central Rada spoke to the Provisional Government it did present the demands expressed by the soldiers' and peasants congresses in May. The Rada's Delegation had been in Petrograd since the end of May, trying to come to an understanding with the revolutionary institutions.

In deciding to send the Delegation both to the Government and the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, the Rada was making sure of an understanding with one or the other bodies. However, the Executive Committee of the

Soviet disappointed these expectations. Vynnychenko mentions that while the Government received them immediately, the Committee kept them waiting for three days and then told them to take it up with the Government, as being outside the Committee's jurisdiction, after an inconclusive interview.¹⁴⁸ The reticence of the Committee was quite unusual since it had issued a proclamation in regard to self-determination of Poland, feeling that issue within its jurisdiction. The Delegation was further disappointed when they found 'not a single' Russian Socialist newspaper wished to publish the Memorandum.¹⁴⁹ An interview with the Government was through the special Commission, headed by Shchepkin¹⁵⁰ who had earlier given negative views to Lototsky, as has been seen. While the Government had been reformed after the resignations of Miлюkov and Guchkov by the inclusion of more Socialists, the Commission was made largely Constitutional-Democrat; Octobrists served as experts.¹⁵¹ During the heated discussion in the Commission, the Russian side claimed that the autonomy of the Ukraine could not be realized by the Provisional Government, while Ukrainians insisted that they wished only the recognition of the principle of autonomy of Ukraine. It was also made clear that the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernyiv could be recognized as Ukrainian, but not Odessa, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Tauria and Kherson. Ukrainian territory claimed by the Rada, it was said, would cut Russia off from Black sea.¹⁵² Negotiations continued, but did not result in any reply to the Memorandum.

The main centre of interest shifted again to Kiev, where the First Ukrainian Peasants' Congress was about to meet. The immediate events in the Ukraine itself brought a further increase of tension in national relations. The conflict between the Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians was bound to increase the disagreement between the Radas of Peasants' Deputies or Spilkas and the Council (Soviet) of Workers Deputies. Thus, possible direct cooperation with the Councils, dominated by Russians, was not to arise in the future. The prestige of the Rada had risen immeasurably with the First Military Congress. This

Peasants' Congress was indeed the first truly representative congress of the Ukrainian peasantry. The schedule of representation was quite simple. Each *volost* (district) was a subdivision of a *povit* (county), which in its turn was a subdivision of a *gubernia* (province). A *volost* (district) might include several villages, but not less than one.

For the First All-Ukrainian Peasants Congress, the plan provided for one representative from each *volost spilka*, two from each *povit* (county) *spilka* and two from each *gubernia spilka*.¹⁵³ The total number of delegates was about 1,500. Altogether about a thousand districts were represented by actual delegates elected.¹⁵⁴ This compares quite well with the total number of districts in the Ukrainian populated area. The representatives were sometimes village school-teachers. The Congress as a whole considered itself the voice of the peasantry, and most of the nation. The Congress had considered itself peasantry in sitting; this view was shared by the public in Kiev. The Ukrainian peasantry had developed the *spilka*s as a political expression of their own interests embodied in permanent institutions. Behind the *Spilka* was the concept that peasantry should be directly represented in the organs of government, above and beyond the party organization. This was indeed what they achieved at this Congress. However, the further claim of the peasantry, as expressed in the Peasants' Constitution adopted at this Congress, that the *Radas* (Councils) of Peasants' Deputies and the Committees of Peasants' *Spilka* (as their executive bodies) have direct governmental authority, was not accepted by the Ukrainian Central Rada. At issue was point 16 of the Constitution, which stated that all administrative, civic and *zemstvo* institutions, agrarian, food-supply and other committees shall serve the peasantry as technical organizations; they were to be subordinate in their activity to the *Radas* and Committees.¹⁵⁵ This claim was not pressed later. An autonomous Ukraine was to be governed locally by the Provincial Commissars and the County Commissars (*povitovy komisar*) appointed by Rada bodies from Kiev supported by the corresponding Civic Committee (*zem-*

stvo) Committee elected on the universal basis,¹⁵⁶ or formed through the amalgamation of local organizations.

The Ukrainian peasants silently acquiesced to the shelving of point 16. The claim for exercising direct government was being withdrawn in the Ukraine in the same process, while the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies (and others) were gaining greater and greater power in Russia proper.

Dealing with the basic attitude of the peasantry of the country to the question whether general or local government was to be lodged in a modified form of Soviet, or of representative institutions like the emergent Ukrainian territorial Rada, we have mentioned that the Congress supported the demands put before the Provisional Government by the Rada. The Delegation of the Rada returned expressly for the opening of the Congress,¹⁵⁷ and reported to the Congress that the Provisional Government was procrastinating; it gave an account of the course of negotiations. The debates in the Congress were full of indignation with the Provisional Government; often the speakers blamed the Delegation for its humility and the Rada itself, for 'lowering' itself by asking from the Government that which they should demand. Vynnychenko (who, together with Khrystiuk, Martos and others, had been elected to the Presidium of the Congress, while Hrushevsky became the Honorary President of the Congress)¹⁵⁸ reported that the indignation of the Congress 'flowed over the brim': 'Why and wherefore did the (Central Rada) send a delegation to beg for grace from these enemies of our people from times immemorial? Not by request, by negotiation, or with a plea for justice are we to talk to them, but with the fist'.¹⁵⁹ Representative Bily of Cherkasy county said that in his opinion the Ukrainians of today ought to follow the example of their glorious forebears who knew how to defend their liberty, gun in hand.¹⁶⁰ The reporter of the *Kievskaya Mysl* probably had these scenes in mind in reporting 'nationalist boiling' in the Congress. However, the resolution to proclaim the Ukrainian republic immediately was rejected, fetching only under twenty votes.¹⁶¹

It was decided to continue negotiations with Petrograd; in extending its support to the Rada Memorandum, the Congress described the propositions in it as 'demands'; thus Congress 'demanded' in its turn that the Provisional Government satisfy them immediately. Congress also recognized that only 'a federative-democratic republic (of Russia) with the national-territorial autonomy of the Ukraine and guarantee of rights of national minorities' could safeguard the land from chaos (*bezladdya*). The Ukrainian Central Rada was told that it was to work out the draft of the legislation (*polozhennya*) on the autonomy of the nation and a federative-democratic constitution (*ustriy*) of the Russian republic. The Peasants' Rada was to be consulted in the matter of drafting. The Rada was to call a congress of representatives of other nations and areas which might demand the same kind of constitution and finally, it was to speed the organization of a Ukrainian land congress; to this, the Congress added that it called upon all 'military and civic (peasant, *zemstvo* and other) organizations and administrative institutions of the Ukraine' to help the Central Ukrainian Rada and the Rada of Peasants' Deputies in preparing the new order and the 'Ukrainianization of all governments and institutions.'¹⁰² The discussions with regard to the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations were influenced to some extent by the prohibition by Kerensky, as Minister of War, of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress; this called forth great indignation.¹⁰³

After debating Ukrainian-Russian relations, the Congress turned its attention to the matter of agrarian reform, as always closely connected with the problem of Ukrainian autonomy. The Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries advocated 'socialization' of the land, while the Social-Democrats attacked such programs. However, the 'socialization' of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries was quite moderate; the Congress finally agreed that while 'private property in land was to be abolished', all land would become part of the Ukrainian Soil Fund, managed by 'the nation herself' through the Ukrainian parliament (*soym*), and the *povit* and *volost* Soil

Committees, elected democratically. Then the land would be divided for use by those 'who work the land with their own hands.' The All-Russian Constituent Assembly 'has' to approve the arrangement, including the principle that the land would join the Fund 'without payment (*vykup*).' The socialist ideal, towards which the Congress claimed the Ukraine and all other nations was moving, was given homage in the decision that 'it was desirable' that large exemplary undertakings be given to 'agrarian-economic societies' as 'hearths of the future Socialist economy.' The Congress was more enthusiastic about socialism in regard to natural resources, including forests; all these were to be nationalized.¹⁶⁴

There can be no doubt that the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian peasantry, through actual representatives of the various *povits* (the *povits* had one or two representatives each) was indeed being voiced. Since the deputies in the Rada were residents of the various counties which they represented, the contact between Rada and county was maintained. The Rada of Peasants' Deputies was elected, consisting of representatives of counties in the Kiev, Poltava, Volhynia, Chernyhiw, Podolia, Kherson, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Tauria, Don, and Bessarabia provinces (of the last, the Ukrainian-populated Akerman county was represented).

The Congress completed the break with the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. Perhaps the greatest disagreement between the two agrarian communities lay in the fact that Ukrainian lands were of better quality and that there was more land. Thus while the All-Russian Soviet insisted on a generally uniform plan of land distribution, the Ukrainian Congress insisted on an independent Soil Fund controlled and distributed by and for the Ukrainian people. Two means were accepted by the Congress to control the threatened colonization of the Ukraine by landless Russian peasants. It was provided that the 'resettlement within the borders of the Ukraine shall be decided upon by the Ukrainian Parliament and Soil Committees.' The other measure was a pre-emption of foreign immigration by the provision for the return of Ukrainians

to their homeland outside the Ukraine. As large numbers of Ukrainian immigrants would want to return to the native land, the Congress decided that this question was to be within the purview of the Ukrainian national Parliament, in an understanding with Parliaments of 'other lands of Russia.'¹⁶⁵

Regarding the immediate tasks, it was decided that neither 'arbitrary occupation of the land nor arbitrary cutting of forests' was to be undertaken. It was evidently decided to avoid any conflict with soldiers who would have a claim on the soil, as well as to avoid serious internal conflicts between individuals and various government units. The Provisional Government was asked to form the Central Ukrainian Soil Committee, to consist of party representatives of various agrarian Ukrainian organizations and some others. Although the Ukrainian Central Rada was to be the territorial rada and consequently, the basis for any Ukrainian Parliament, the Soil (Fund) Committee included but a sprinkling of the Rada representatives; it was obvious that Ukrainian peasants wanted to reserve the management of the Fund for themselves.¹⁶⁶ The Independents and the Autonomist-Federalists, successors of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, were kept out of it by vote from the Committee.¹⁶⁷ Thus the number of enemies of 'socialization' of the soil was kept to the minimum. On the whole, the reform was not to be towards mass expropriation. It was vaguely hinted that the expenses of realization of the reform 'would be borne by the state'¹⁶⁸ without an indication of the resources which were to cover the expense, the scheme of recompensation, or even which 'state' was meant, the Ukraine or Russia.

Finally, the Congress elected the Rada of Peasants' Deputies, which together with the Central Committee of the Spilka (intended to be the executive of the Rada of Peasants' Deputies), were to enter the Ukrainian Central Rada.

On the last day of the Peasants' Congress, Hrushevsky announced the receipt of a telegram from the Provisional Government rejecting the demands of the Ukrainian Central Rada. In the telegram, the Provisional Government expressed

doubt whether the 'Central Ukrainian Rada could be regarded as the plenipotentiary,' that is, expressing the will of the entire population of the territory to be included in the 'territory of the future autonomous Ukraine.'

Furthermore, the Government refused to take action as the *de jure* and *de facto* competence in the matter being considered by the Constituent Assembly, or to appoint the Commissars as being prejudicial to eventual solution. The Government also refused to take an initiative in the matter of an 'independent Ukrainian army'; insofar as the Rada memorandum did not include a request for an 'independent army', the form of refusal is likely to have been meant as a slight to the Rada. In conclusion, the Provisional Government stated that it recognized the 'national peculiarities' of the Ukraine, again referring any solution to the Constituent Assembly.¹⁷⁰

In announcing the resolution of the Provisional Government, Hrushevsky said, "The Festival of the Revolution is over. A threatening time is upon us! The Ukraine must be organized! Only the Ukrainian nation shall decide its fate. No one else will decide for her. I am convinced that the free, autonomous, Ukraine shall live."¹⁷⁰ This meant a break with the Provisional Government, and a decision for a struggle with this institution. Vynnychenko described the tactics of the Rada leaders of the time: 'Neither rebellion, nor capitulation. Steady untiring organization of forces, the organizational, concerted, planned realization of autonomy... Without chancing open, physical struggle, to explain our position before the people and all Russia.'¹⁷¹

The Congress proceeded with its business at the request of Hrushevsky, who suggested that the Ukrainian Central Rada, including the Rada of Peasants' Deputies, should be charged with the *development* of further policy. On the same day, the Congress closed and its 2,200 delegates, including 1,500 voting delegates (the rest being alternates), went back to their thousand-odd *volosts* leaving behind 133 representatives of the Congress and peasantry.

The strange timing of the telegram assured that the

farthest corners of the country would hear that the associated demands of the Rada and the Congress were refused or ignored, and that the President of the Rada announced the coming of a time of stress.

In this conflict, the Provisional Government could brace itself on its own authority, as well as that of the Russian Soviets, and the all-Russian organizations in Kiev. *Izvestiya* (News) of Petrograd, in an editorial appearing on the morrow of the decision of the Government, stated the view of the Executive Committee of the Soviets.

'The All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress, convening currently in Kiev, has fallen under the control of forces (advocating) disunity and national separatism, which are pernicious to the revolution.' The editorial was directed primarily against the reaction of the Congress to the prohibition of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress. *Izvestiya* stated that in the prohibition, the Provisional Government was 'expressing the adamant will of the revolutionary and democratic masses of the population (and), in particular, the will of the army.' The reference to the army was probably a threat of violence. Concluding, the editorial dealt with the Peasants' Congress demand discussed above, supporting Ukrainian autonomy and other Rada requests, declaring that the plan of the Ukrainian Congress would lose their initiative in the calling of a non-Russian nations congress.' 'Prior to the Constituent Assembly we will not take any steps to seize national rights by way of a *fait accompli*, for every step would be against the interests of the revolution,' stated *Izvestiya*.¹⁷²

In Kiev, there took place a united meeting of the Executive Committee of Civic Organizations, the Council of Workers' Deputies, Council of Soldiers' Deputies, and the Coalition Council of Students. They accepted the resolution that they were ready with 'all the strength of their authority to support the point of view of (the Provisional Government)'.¹⁷³ Prominent Rada leader Khrystiuk, recalling that Nezlobin and Task, chairmen of the Council of Workers' and of Soldiers' Deputies had threatened the Rada with 'bayonets', included

in that term 'not just moral authority'.¹⁷⁴ The rejection of the Rada's demands was supported by all Committees of Russian parties, including the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. (Bolsheviks).¹⁷⁵

The prohibition of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress has already been referred to. This prohibition was sent in two orders to Oberuchev, the Commander of the Kiev Military District, on June 10,¹⁷⁶ and June 14,¹⁷⁷ pleading military necessity. It indicates the lack of authority of the Provisional Government and of its War Minister, Kerensky, that the Congress did take place, despite the prohibition. The Government, which could have prosecuted the members of the Congress on very serious charges, especially in view of the fact that many officers were among the members, ignored the matter of the flouting of its orders. The Congress altogether consisted of 1,976 delegates elected by 1,732,444 soldiers. The delegates continued arriving during the congress and in a few days grew to about 2,500.¹⁷⁸ We have already dealt with the demands of the Ukrainian soldiery in the discussion of the First Ukrainian Military congress. This Congress built upon the First Congress in its work.

It will not be necessary to enlarge upon the narrower aspects of the work, which dealt essentially with practical difficulties, development, and minor changes. Turning to the newer elements,¹⁷⁹ we find that the Congress approved the necessity of execution of orders of the Ukrainian General Military Committee for all Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainian institutions. In other words, the General Committee was acknowledged by the soldiers as their authority. The contact of the Committee with the soldiers was impeded, Petlura reported, by some officers of high rank.¹⁸⁰

The General Military Committee was re-elected by the Congress, and included Petlura, Lutsenko and Vynnychenko in it. Mikhnovsky was not re-elected.¹⁸¹ The Congress then demanded that the Headquarters recognize the Committee as an official Ukrainian military organization, and approved the organizational scheme of the Committee, drawn up by Pet-

Iura. This scheme indicated the extent of the interests of this body of the Central Rada, and of the Congress: agitation, information, inspection, mobilization, training, and forming a special services commission, a sanitary-medical, a secretarial and a juridical section.¹⁸² The Congress also declared that it would back the decisions of the All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress in agrarian matters 'with all the forces at (the Congress's) command'.¹⁸³ Ukrainianization of the army was furthered by the approval of a detailed plan.¹⁸⁴

However, the main problem under discussion was the crisis in the relations between the Rada and United Petrograd. Immediately after the opening of the Congress by Petlura,¹⁸⁵ the Congress turned to the issue of its own prohibition and declared that the right of meetings and congresses belonged to Ukrainians as to other free nations and, for this reason, the 'prohibition of the Congress by Minister of War Kerensky was unlawful'.¹⁸⁶ Beginning on this violent note, the Congress did not use quiet language in the debate. Khrystiuk, a participant, emphasizes that on the whole, the role of Ukrainian leadership was to use 'extraordinary force' to restrain the 'intuitive protest and wrath of the Ukrainian soldier,' so that these would not pass certain limits, and would not break the planned 'line of the regular organized struggle for national liberation and for the gains of the revolution'.¹⁸⁷

Finally the Congress accepted the resolution reconciling various currents. In it the Congress declared that it stood for '1,600,000 armed and organized Ukrainian people' and that having considered the stand of the Provisional Government it stated that the 'Provisional Russian Government' completely lacked an understanding of national relations in the Ukraine and did not estimate as highly as it should the 'great organized and elemental powers of the Ukrainian democracy, awakened by the revolution.' Thus the 'Russian Government' (this is probably the first time that the Petrograd government is called Russian, as contrasted with Ukrainian institutions), was reminded of the armed force, which seemed ready, in the person of their representatives, to support the Rada. The po-

licy of the Provisional Government, described by the Congress as 'systematic resistance to the demands of the Ukrainian democracy,' was seen as creating chaos in the Ukraine.

The Congress further decided to 'direct the attention' of the Government that if it valued the preservation of the gains of the revolution, and in particular, the peace and maintenance of order in the Ukraine, it should change its policy to suit the demands of the Rada. The Congress 'proposed to its higher representative body, the Ukrainian Central Rada' not to turn to the Government for directions any more but to attempt to form a 'solid partition of the land in agreement with national minorities'—that is, to the 'factual realization of the bases of an autonomous way of life' as the only method of saving the Ukraine and all Russia against anarchy and destruction.

On its own behalf, the Congress assured the Central Rada of its 'most active, determined support in all measures.' It called also upon the 'entire organized Ukrainian people,' in unbending unity, to realize all the decisions of the Rada. It asked the Rada to call the territorial congress as soon as possible, towards an understanding with the national minorities of the Ukraine and the discussion of the draft statute of the 'Autonomous Ukraine.'¹⁸⁹

The Congress elected from its members the All-Ukrainian Rada of Military Deputies by the basis of the schedule drawn up by Polozov,¹⁹⁰ 130 members were elected, including Tyutyunnyk, Avdienko, Balaban and Voropay.¹⁹⁰ This Rada of Military Deputies entered the Central Rada somewhat later.

Before the Congress of the Ukrainian military had met, the Rada, 'enlarged by the Ukrainian Rada of Peasants' Deputies and the Ukrainian General Military Committee' (the last entered the Rada after the First Ukrainian Military Congress), decided on June 16 that the Provisional Government had gone 'against the interests of the toiling people of the Ukraine and against the principle of self-determination of nations.' The Rada again appealed to the Ukrainian people to become organized and achieve their autonomy. To explain the essence of Ukrainian demands along with its tasks in com-

mon with other nationalities, the Rada decided to issue a Universal. Historically, Universals had been proclamations of the Ukrainian Cossack State. Finally, the Rada concluded that it had exhausted all means to reach agreement with the Provisional Government and hence must take action in order to give the elemental Ukrainian movement a desirable direction.¹⁹¹ Despite the brave words, the appeal being promised was at first planned as an explanation of events.

At this juncture, there was another attempt to break the impasse. The Kiev Gubernia Executive Committee attempted to mediate. It sent a telegram to the Provisional Government, signed by Sukovkin, the Commissar of the Provisional Government of the Kiev Gubernia. In the telegram, the Committee urged that 'decisive measures to pacify the population of Ukraine be taken'.

Considering that the evolving Ukrainian movement had assumed such great power that it was not possible to ignore it, the Executive Committee urged that a special conference be called to Kiev 'consisting of representatives of the Provisional Government, national and political organizations and parties,' all having a 'corresponding representation of Ukrainians'. This conference would prepare, for the use of the Constituent Assembly, the basic drafts on the autonomy of the Ukraine and the mutual relations of 'the Ukraine to the State as a whole.'¹⁹² Petrograd did not answer this suggestion.

An outline of the ideas of Vynnychenko, accepted as the most important Rada leader next to Hrushevsky, is of interest at this point. Speaking to the Military Congress, Vynnychenko claimed that there was no authority in the all-Russian state, in spite of the fact that 'Kerensky talks about it all the time.' The Russian revolution presented another challenge to the revolutionary government. 'They have nothing to create (all they need is to effect social revolution) but we still have something to create— (that is) ourselves.' Vynnychenko claimed that Ukrainians did not have any classes with which their democracy could not cooperate; the 'bourgeoisie' in the Ukraine was 'not ours' but "South-Russian." Vynnychenko

said that he would not exclude the possibility of independence, if conditions showed that 'there can be no brotherly coexistence with Russia.' For now, he saw no need of that. Even should a pro-Ukrainian revolution occur, the large cities would 'not follow us' while in two-three years they 'will be ours,' he thought. And so, he concluded, we must organize ourselves at once'. In the words of Vynnychenko: 'We shall present the Constituent Assembly with a completed autonomy and nothing will be left for it to do but to say, "Hail Autonomous Ukraine."' ¹⁰³

However, for the time being there was the fact of the impasse between Ukrainians and the Provisional Government. The Ukrainian Central Rada considered itself as speaking for the Ukrainian nation; behind the Central Rada were the representatives of Ukrainian peasants and soldiers, organized on the basis of individual congresses in corresponding Radas. The Ukrainian intelligentsia was present in force, by reason of its leadership in various educational and cultural associations and Ukrainian parties, represented in the Rada as created in March 1917, and as re-formed in the Ukrainian National Congress.

The Provisional Government questioned the entire structure of the Rada, rejecting the Rada's claim, at least for the time being, to speak for the Ukrainian nation. In fact, many leading Russian bodies, and individuals rejected the very existence of the Ukrainian nation. V. Shulgin, the noted Kiev monarchist and editor, had proclaimed in the motto of his newspaper, in earlier days: 'The Southern District — Russian, Russian, Russian.'¹⁰⁴ This attitude was by no means dead. Lapchinskiy, a future member of the Soviet government, thought Bolsheviks in the Ukraine had a very hazy view of the Ukraine in 1917 and, for the most part, considered it to be part of Russia;¹⁰⁵ this would make Kiev, for instance, simply a larger city, comparable to Tambov or 'Russian' Riga. Under these circumstances, the attitude of the Provisional Government simply reflected Russian opinion; Russia was not willing to compromise its territorial integrity and its interests.

Negotiations reached a dead end. The Ukrainian Central Rada had so far achieved very little through attempted bilateral action; there remained the possibility of unilateral action. It was this road that the Rada was to take. The difficulties must not be underestimated. The challenge to the Provisional Government was to be of such nature as to constitute a truly revolutionary action.

The plan of the 'revolutionary proclamation of autonomy of the Ukraine,' in the words of chairman Kovalevsky of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, had been bruited for a long time.¹⁹⁶ The month of June seemed to be the right time. On the one hand, the Ukrainian Central Rada had acquired an important armed force in Kiev, in particular the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment, the Galician Strilets' Regiment, and other units. The activity of Oberuchev, the Commander of the Kiev Military District, was thought provocative; accumulation by the Command of a significant armed force around the neighbourhood of Kiev was considered threatening. On the other hand, the demands of the Ukrainian people seemed to have crystallized. The telegram from Petrograd of the outright refusal to treat with the Rada had aroused general indignation in Ukrainian society; it was interpreted, as closing the way to any agreement between Ukrainians and Petrograd.¹⁹⁷

The initiative was taken by the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and the All-Ukrainian Peasants' Spilka, and they proposed in the Rada that state autonomy be proclaimed. The raising of the matter called forth much excitement in the Rada. The representatives of moderate parties, in particular the Socialist-Federalists, led by Yefremov, offered some objections to the proposition. On the whole they thought that the Ukrainian people were not ready as yet, in the political and the organizational sense, for the proclamation of the autonomy. The revolutionary character of the act would create great conflict with the Provisional Government; the latter was still enjoying much support and strength. Ukrainian Social-Democrats, too, counselled against any hurry in the matter.

The position of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and of the Spilka, was that the Revolution which began in March was not over yet and that it was the revolutionary right of the Ukrainian people to take into their hands their own national life and the forming of the autonomous constitution of Ukraine.¹⁹⁸ This autonomous form would be the basis for the final decision on the state form of the Ukraine by the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly was to be elected independently from the Russian Constituent Assembly on the basis of a general suffrage and a secret ballot.¹⁹⁹

The motion on the proclamation of Ukrainian autonomy gained an overwhelming majority. The (Executive) Committee of the Rada was charged with the drafting of the actual Universal.

Two drafts were then presented. The first one to be considered was presented by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. This text stated that the day of the full liberation of the Ukraine had arrived; the Ukrainian nation, and the organ of its will, the Ukrainian Central Rada, was taking the creation of a new national life into its hands, and proclaiming the Ukraine to be an autonomous state, with its own government, its own armed forces and its own legislative bodies. The Autonomous Ukrainian Government would realize all necessary political and social-economic reforms, and would call elections for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly which would be charged with determining the final state organization of Ukraine.

The text was objected to as being too revolutionary, and as failing to explain to the people all the problems encountered in the reformation of institutions in Ukraine. The draft was thus not accepted, although Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries possessed a majority in the Rada. In the Committee, each party had been represented by two members in the presidium of the Rada; the draft failed to gain approval by the majority.²⁰⁰

The accepted draft was very probably drawn up by Vynnychenko, the leader of Ukrainian Social-Democrats. It was this draft which was approved unanimously in the Committee. The text of the Universal was brought to the Ukrainian Central

Rada, and to the Second Military Congress, which greeted it with an ovation.²⁰¹ On the next day, the Universal was proclaimed to the population of Kiev in Sophia Place. A demonstration of Ukrainian regiments in honour of the Rada took place immediately after the proclamation. Ukrainian Military forces were led by the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment. In a show of solidarity, a battalion of Don Cossacks took part in the demonstration.²⁰² Kovalevsky, an eye-witness, comments on the enthusiasm of the Kiev throngs in the proclamation of autonomy. In this, he is joined by many other observers, including Khrystiuk, Tyutyunnyk, and Vynnychenko.²⁰³

The Universal embodying the demands of the society in the Ukraine, as they had been expressed in the country in the course of the revolution, followed the classical form of such documents. The introduction described the authority of the issuing agency, the Rada, followed by the statement of principle as realized by the Universal; demands of the Ukrainian nation were detailed, followed by an account of the various refusals by the Provisional Government; then practical measures to be undertaken were outlined, finished by an appeal to the Ukrainian people for greatness.

The statement of principle and the practical measures suggested are of particular interest to us. The Universal thus appealed on behalf of the Rada as by the 'elected people of the Nation, from the villages, factories, soldiers' barracks, and all communities and Ukrainian societies':

Let the Ukraine be free. Without separating from greater Russia, without breaking with the Russian state, let the Ukrainian nation have the right to order its life on its soil by itself. Let law and order (*lad i porядok*) in the Ukraine be administered by an All-National Ukrainian Parliament (*Soym*) elected by universal, equal, direct and secret vote. All the laws which must give us that way of life (*lad*) here in the Ukraine can be issued only by our Ukrainian Parliament (*Zbory*). Laws to keep order (*lad*) in the entire Russian state, must be issued in the All-Russian Parliament.

Above all, the universal provided for the solution of the agrarian problems on the Ukrainian model.

Nobody knows better than our farmers how to take care of their own land. And for this reason we wish that after the landlords, state, Tsarist, monastic and other lands should be taken into the property of the nations, when the law regarding this is issued in the Constituent Assembly, the right to dispense with our lands, the right to use them be lodged in us alone, in our Ukrainian Parliament (*Soym*).

The Universal went on to suggest practical undertakings, beginning with the statement, 'From now on we will be regulating our own lives.'

All villages, *volosts*, *povit* administrations, or *zemstvo* administrations were enjoined to keep the closest relations with the Central Rada. Wherever the administrative power had been retained in hands inimical to the Ukrainian way, the citizenry was asked to re-elect the administration. Where Ukrainians lived together with other nationalities, the citizenry was urged to come immediately to an 'understanding with their democracy' (with their democratic groups), and to work together with them to 'build a new and just life.'

Hope was then expressed that 'non-Ukrainian nations present in our land will also care for law and order' and together with the Rada would turn to work for the organization of the autonomy of the Ukraine. It is to be noted that the 'minorities' were assured that an understanding with them would be sought, but the usual guarantee of minority rights was absent, probably with the aim of underscoring the expected higher role of minorities as 'nations.' On the other hand, this may have been a means of pressure.

When all of the preparatory work was finished, the representatives of all nations of the Ukrainian land would be summoned and the laws of the autonomous Ukraine, would be worked out. The express mention of nations other than the Ukraine went further than the usual guarantees (which might still be desired). The non-Ukrainian nations were to be partners in the construction of the Autonomous Ukraine; the Rada turned its back on the concept of minorities. Finally the Universal provided that the 'All-Russian Constituent Assembly has to approve by its law' the entire new way, all the laws prepared

by the institutions referred to above. It was indeed a case of Constituent Assembly having nothing to do but say, 'Hail, Autonomous Ukraine,' as Vynnychenko had said.

The Universal exhorted the 'organized citizenry of villages and cities,' and all-Ukrainian 'administrations and institutions' to lay a special tax upon the population for national needs, and to send it to the treasury of the Rada.²⁰⁴ It was by means of this constitutional document that the foundation of Ukrainian autonomy was laid.

Together with the First Universal, according to Kovalovsky, the Central Rada issued a separate order to halt the payment of taxes to the Russian treasury. The payments were to reach the treasury of the autonomous Ukraine. The village communities sent payments by messengers, since as yet there were not any Ukrainian treasury offices in the provinces.²⁰⁵

Thus, the Ukrainian Autonomous Land was established in essence, with the Ukrainian Central Rada as the governing body. The form acquired real content in the process of time.

The telegrams and resolutions supporting the Universal filled the newspapers of the day, according to Khrystiuk and Vynnychenko; Khrystiuk quotes 22 random resolutions of support,²⁰⁶ Vynnychenko quotes 6.²⁰⁷ These included recognition of the Rada as the Government (Uryad) or similar institution, by the Kharkiv Provincial Rada, Kremenchuk Zemstvo, Zolotonoshi Zemstvo, Povit Zemstvo Administration, meeting of Administrations of Povit Zemstvos of Kiev province, Kaniv Povit Zemstvo Administration, Poltava Provincial Zemstvo, and others. Ukrainian Soldiers of Semeniv, Izmail and Yeger Regiments, decided to support 'with all their might the freedom of the Ukrainian people as expressed by the Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada'.²⁰⁸ Financial backing was pledged: Poltava Zemstvo assigned 200,000 roubles to the Rada, Kremenchuk, 15,000 roubles, Zolotonoshi, 15,000 roubles and Borzenks, 3,000 roubles.²⁰⁹ Kiev Povit Peasants' Congress decided that priests should read the Universal in the churches and serve masses for the Central Rada.²¹⁰ However we must emphasize that the incidents referred to are random; the

greetings and telegrams have not been systematized. Arriving in mass and printed in newspapers, they made their impression upon the public,²¹¹ as another observer, Doroshenko, stated.

On June 28, four days after the proclamation of the Universal, the Committee of the Central Rada, in closed session, decided to reorganize the first Government of the Ukraine, named *The General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada*. Secretaries were appointed at the same time. Vynnychenko, a member of U.S.D.W.P., was called President of the General Secretariat, and the Secretary for Internal Affairs Khrystiuk, an S.R., became the General Secretary (*pysar*), Baranovsky, the General Secretary for Finances, Yefremov, Secretary for Inter-National Affairs, Petlura, Secretary for Military Affairs, Martos, Agrarian Affairs, Sadovsky, General Secretary for Justice and Steshenko, Education. Five of the Secretaries were Social-Democrats, to were S.R.'s, one was an S.F., Baranovsky was non-party.²¹² Thus the Ukrainian autonomy was established.

The first steps towards administration of the land were taken. An executive was established. But the authority had to be maintained and accepted by Russia. The military power of the Rada to uphold the First Universal was two-fold. The Rada had the Khmelnytsky regiment of some 4,500 men under its direct orders. This force was not insignificant in terms of Kiev. The Rada was also united with the immense forces on the front through the General Ukrainian Military Congress. Therefore, any violent proceedings against the Rada could have had very serious consequences for the Empire as a whole. Besides, the provision of Greater Russia and its army depended to a large extent on its hold on the Ukraine, which was the prime supplier of food. Proceedings against the Rada would be interpreted by the peasantry as a refusal of all their demands. Nor was it too clear that an expedition against the Rada need be immediately effective even in Kiev alone.

NOTES

1. Manilov, Valentin (ed.), *1917 god v Kievshchine. Khronika sobytiy*, Kiev, 1928, p. 1.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
7. Tron'ko, P. T. (ed.), *Bor'ba za vlast' sovetov na Kievshchine (Mart 1917 g. — Fevral' 1918 g.). Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Kiev, 1957, pp. 4-6.
8. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
9. Browder, R. P. and Kerensky, A. F. (ed.), *The Russian Provisional Government 1917, Documents*, 3 Vols., Stanford, 1961, Vol. I, pp. 135-6.
10. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
13. Browder and Kerensky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 78.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
17. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 4. It should be noted that the Council of the United Civic Organizations and the Council of the Workers' Deputies were seen by Ukrainian observers as possessing 'Muscovite character' right from the start; see Khrystiuk, Pavlo, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrain-s'koi revoliutsii 1917-1920 rr.*, 4 Vols., Vienna, 1921-2, Vol. I, p. 15.
18. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
20. Doroshenko, Dmytro, *Istoriya Ukrainy 1917-1923 rr.*, 2 Vols., 2nd ed., New York, 1954, Vol. I, p. 42.
21. Manilov, Valentin (ed.), *1917 god v Kievshchine, Khronika sobytiy*, ("Oktjabr'skaya Revoliutsiya i Grazhdanskaya Voyna na Kievshchine v dokumentakh, statyakh i vospominaniyakh"), Vol. I, Kiev, 1928, p. 2.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
23. *Ibid.*
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CHAPTER TWO

THE AUTONOMOUS UKRAINIAN LAND IN THE RISING ANARCHY AND DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE

The Provisional Russian Government at this time was primarily Constitutional-Democrat. Although Guchkov and Mil-yukov had been forced to resign, the Constitutional-Democrat character of the Government was still plain. It is thus significant that the *Rech*, the Constitutional-Democrat newspaper, described 'the action of the Ukrainians' to be a direct crime, one which called for the 'application of stern penalties, in accordance with the law.' According to the *Rech*, this was 'still another link in the German plan to dismember Russia.'¹ *Birzhovye Vedomosti* (Stockmarket Reports), the voice of the commercial and industrial interests of the Empire, said there should be 'no hesitation in using extreme measures to destroy the power' of the Universal.² Particularly threatening for the Rada and the General Secretariat was the decision of the All-Russian Cossack Congress, led by the Don Cossacks, of Russian origin (The decision had been voted against by the Kuban and the Black Sea Cossacks, of Ukrainian origin). The Cossack Congress decided that they stood for the indivisibility of the 'Russian Republic' and, in particular, they would unswervingly 'support the Provisional Government in its orders against the Universal issued by the Ukrainian Rada.'³ The role of Cossack troops in suppression of public manifestations was notorious. The reality of the implied threat was the greater as the garrison of Kiev included the Seventeenth Don Cossack Regiment and other Cossack troops of Russian origin.⁴ Since the Cossack Congress was presided over by high-ranking officers of the Army, we may conclude that the Provisional Gov-

ernment was being prodded by some military circles towards a military solution of the conflict with the autonomous Ukraine.

The position of Russian conservatives on the Universal was straightforward. The position of the most extreme centralists among the Russian Socialists, the Bolsheviks, was more complicated. It is of interest to note that Lenin avoided the issue as long as possible; the *Rech*, in the editorial referred to above, taunted the Bolsheviks by saying that the haste of 'the Ukrainian gentlemen' would be unanimously condemned by all the civic organizations with, perhaps, the exception of the 'most extreme partisans of "disannexations"—the Bolsheviks.'⁵ Lenin wrote in *Pravda* next day, obviously in pique, as he mentions the newspaper *Rech* as the newspaper of the 'malevolent bourgeois counter-revolutionaries who have gone half-mad with anger.' Lenin declared that 'we are not supporters of small states.' He deduced from the Universal that the Ukrainian people, in demanding autonomy were 'not at all refusing the necessity of the supreme power of the "all-Russian" parliament.' The Universal was represented by Lenin as being the demand of the autonomy, not its realization. Lenin also repeated the old formula that the *right* of the Ukraine (the word 'right' underscored by Lenin) for self-determination cannot be rejected by 'any democrat.' The 'revolutionary democracy of Russia' was urged to recognize 'the *right* of free separation.' Lenin concluded with a call for 'the free union of the peasants and workers of the free Ukraine with the workers and peasants of revolutionary Russia.'⁶ In this way then, Lenin refused to take a stand, failing to clarify whether Socialist 'expediency' justified the realization of the 'right.' Two days later, on June 30, when the Rada had survived a week since the Universal, Lenin wrote again that the Government parties, S.R.'s and Mensheviks, had 'suffered defeat on the Ukrainian question' and 'the all-state scale and one of the most important questions.' It is obvious that Lenin considered that the battle was over already. Neither the Ukrainian Central Rada nor the General Secretariat were mentioned. The governing parties were urged to give in to 'these arch-lawful and arch-modest

demands of Ukrainians.' 'There is not a shadow of anarchy and chaos in the decisions and demands of Ukrainians,' he stated. Although there is a hint in the article that the Rada might have been a sort of a Council of Deputies, the demands mentioned by Lenin were detailed to be those for the recognition of the right of autonomy, and of the appointment of Commissars. In 'giving in to Ukrainians,' the way would open for 'confidence between the two nations, to the fraternal union of all equals.' On the whole, Lenin, while hinting at various things, was giving outright support to the very limited earlier propositions mentioned above.'

The views of the groups associated with the Petrograd Soviet may be seen from the *Izvestiya* editorial of June 29 on the Universal. The revolutionary democracy of Russia was described as standing 'for the indivisibility of the State.' The splitting of 'a great state created by a thousand years of historical development' into a series of small states 'each with their own peculiar laws' would be a step backward from the political and economic point of view. However, *Izvestiya* also stated that no objection in principle could be made towards the demands of autonomy. But the question 'whether it was timely . . . to act upon a unilateral decision on autonomy, as the Central Rada wants to do' was answered 'categorically in the negative.' It was not clear whether the Rada's opinion was that of the majority of the Ukrainian people; also, the foundation of revolutionary law and order had not been secured yet. Lenin's newspaper *Pravda*, as well as *Izvestiya* waited for almost a week to comment, leaving all the initiative to the Provisional Government, which under the circumstances could be expected to be disapproving. The articles in *Pravda* written by Lenin failed to give a direct opinion on the conflict. As is discussed in greater detail elsewhere, the Bolsheviks largely avoided the issue.

The Bolsheviks in Kiev showed less grace. Their representative did condemn the activity of the Provisional Government as 'mistaken' but directed the main attention to the 'chauvinist feelings of Ukrainian congresses' and showing up

'the bourgeois nature of the Central Rada, based on the prosperous peasantry.'⁸ In Kiev Party Committee meetings, Pyatkov said, "Ukrainians are not to be supported by us, as their movement is harmful to the proletariat."

The Russian peasants, represented in the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, expressed their view which also represented that of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Committee decided that the refusal of the Provisional Government to immediately ratify the autonomy of the Ukraine was justified, for it did not have the 'right to do so.' For this reason, the Rada's Universal, setting up as if it were the 'Supreme Government of the Ukraine' was 'unlawful and dangerous.' In particular, the Committee complained that the policies of the Central Rada would lead to an independent solution of the agrarian question in the Ukraine. The Peasants' Deputies 'considered it necessary that the Ukrainian Central Rada cancel the Universal issued by it.'⁹

In Kiev, the many common meetings of the Executive Committees of the Civic Organizations, Councils of Workers, Soldiers' Deputies and the Students' council roundly condemned the Universal. Nezlobin of the Workers' Soviet, claimed the Rada was motivated by 'middle-class bourgeois nationalism'.¹¹ His colleague Dorotov asked as to where the guarantee was that 'we would not be thrown out of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies tomorrow with bayonets?'¹² Others condemned the Rada for creating 'dual power'¹³ while the chief of police, Leparsky, commented that he considered the Ukrainian movement 'a sad manifestation.'¹⁴

Thus we see the whole Russian society, not excluding the frankly opportunist Bolsheviks, united in its resistance to the realization of autonomy by the Ukrainian Rada and the Secretariat. However, the Provisional Government, to which the various groups were satisfied to leave the responsibility of action in the first few days, refused to take it, and continued to refuse.

The Provisional Government would not recognize either the Rada or the Universal. Towards the end of June, the

Government issued an appeal directed at Ukrainians. In the appeal, signed by Minister-President Lvov, the Government stated that its aim was 'to lead the land through all dangers and to call the All-National Constituent Assembly in which all nations of Russia, in a universal and equal vote, should express their will directly and solidly.' The Government considered it to be its duty to come to an agreement with the 'civic democratic organizations' of the Ukraine on the matter of provisional measures, which were to ensure the rights of the Ukrainian people in local government, and in bodies of self-government, and in school and court. However, the 'full rebuilding of the state body of Russia' and of the army was described as impossible under the circumstances.' The Ukraine would receive the final 'free governmental organization' from the hands of the Constituent Assembly. The Ukrainians were warned 'not to bring into the nation' a quarrel 'where brother might kill brother.'¹⁵ This appeal 'to the Ukrainian people' deliberately ignored the existence of the Rada and implied that the united civic organizations were representative enough. Some undefined rights were offered to Ukrainians but it was made plain that these would be of very limited nature; autonomy, which certainly would involve 'full rebuilding of the state body' was thus ruled out. And so, all Russian groups, bodies and the Provisional Government were united in their opposition to Ukrainian autonomy, and to the body created in the course of its revolution, the Central Rada, and the General Secretariat, its organ. The Rada ignored the appeal, while the Peasants' Rada found it lacking in 'sincerity' in ignoring the Rada.¹⁶

They started looking for a solution of the impasse in the Ukraine. The interest of the Ukrainian Central Rada for the non-Ukrainian population of the country was of long standing. A direct attempt to court the minorities was made in the First Universal, as we have seen. The main minorities of the Ukraine were Russian, Jewish and Polish groups. The largest minority in numbers and influence, was Russian. This was, of course, because the Ukraine had been governed by the

Russians. The Jewish minority of the Ukraine considered itself a nationality; this was particularly true among the more socialist Jews, for whom the matter of religion was secondary, and paradoxically among the more religiously inclined groups, for whom Jewish nationalism, whether it was Zionist or non-Zionist, was a useful way of guaranteeing the right of his religion, religious schools and so on. The assimilated (Russian or Ukrainian) Jewish people were not prominent; the movement of assimilation was largely stopped and reversed with the state-inspired pogroms in the 1880s. The Russian-assimilated Jews were prominent in the Russian Social-Democrat group in this period, particularly those of Menshevik tendencies.

The association of the various minority nationalities with the Ukrainian Central Rada was particularly important in the case of the Jewish minority. The reason for this was that the Polish and other minorities were a great deal smaller in numbers. Also, the Polish people in the Ukraine were violently divided between the conservative and pro-Russian position of Dmowski's National Democratic Party and the socialist and somewhat pro-German position of Pilsudski's Polish Socialist Party (Pilsudski was not imprisoned as yet). The Poles, too, though often influential and possessing much landed property, were spread out in the Right-Bank Ukraine and had little influence in Kiev itself.

The Jewish group, on the other hand, was surpassed only by the Russians as a minority in the Ukraine. In wooing the Jews, the Rada could isolate the Russian minority, and hope to force it to associate itself with the Rada; after all, the Russian minority lived in the Ukraine and could hope to share in the progress of the country, assuming it could be consoled for the loss of privileges and reassured of rights in the future.

The demands of the Jewish nationality in the Ukraine were made early in the revolution. The tenth Conference of the Jewish Bund (Social-Democrats) was held in the spring. It demanded a Jewish 'national-cultural autonomy.' By this, the Conference meant 'nationalization', that is, control by in-

stitutions of national culture, including education and cultural institutions. The Conference of the Jewish Socialist Workers' Party at the end of March resolved that 'Jewish workers considered that national-political autonomy also applied to themselves.'¹⁷ A Jewish Parliament (*Seym*) was demanded; the Parliament would have within its competence 'cultural needs,' social welfare, the national budget, and the community as a whole.¹⁸ The Zionist Congress held shortly after the conference demanded the Jewish tongue as the language of instruction in schools (Yiddish was meant). The national nature of the Jewish community was recognized by the demand for a 'representative of the Jewish nation' at the Peace Conference.¹⁹

These were the demands to which the Ukrainian circle had shown great sympathy. However, the Jewish minority did not wish to be separated by state borders from their compatriots in the rest of the European part of the Russian Empire. Furthermore they were afraid to tie their fate to a new state whose policies could not be well foreseen. It was often held by the Jewish people that minority guarantees were a feature of 'all-Russian' state-forms which the 'national state' would fail to establish. Yet, the most over-riding consideration in all these events seemed to come closer and closer to the fore; that the Ukrainian political parties and institutions were the effect of a mighty reformation and renewal of society and that minorities ought to co-operate in the goal of building the new state. The demands of Jews were those of other minorities; it can be said, however, that the minority legislation of the Ukraine was the joint creation of the Jewish and Ukrainian nation. Goldelman, in his study of Ukrainian Jewry in the Revolution, underlines the parallel development of Ukrainians and Jews.²⁰

The Ukrainian Central Rada promised the various nationalities of the Ukraine, on the one hand, minority legislation; on the other hand, as was stated by Hrushevsky in early July, at the Jewish-Ukrainian-Russian meeting, Ukrainians asked the Jewish people to help the Rada in its task, safeguarding the land 'from dissolution, anarchy and economic exploita-

tion.' 'Circumstances made it necessary to change the Rada from a national body to a territorial body.'²¹ This meeting, at which it was decided by the leading organizations in Kiev and the Rada representatives that 'agreement after the calling of the territorial Congress and the land body was possible,'²² had been kept on the same course as that taken by the Executive Committees of the Civic Organizations, the Council of Workers and of Soldiers' Deputies on behalf of minorities, as well as the Committees of the Central Rada, the Presidium of the Ukrainian General Military Committee and the Presidium of the Rada of Peasants' Deputies.

The Central Rada met in full session on July 3. On July 6, Hrushevsky reported on the formation of the General Secretariat and on the former Committee of the Rada which now undertook the legislative functions of the Rada in the time between the sessions and was to be known as the Mala Rada (Small Rada). The General Secretariat and Mala Rada were approved; this was the first vote of confidence for the emergent Ukrainian government. Soon, the Rada also agreed that the General Secretariat had to immediately begin the task of reforming the Rada as the territorial land parliament, with representation of national minorities. The commission for the drafting of the statute of Ukrainian autonomy was to consist of representatives in proportion to the national make-up of the population of the Ukraine: 71 Ukrainians, 11 Russians, 8 Jews, 2 Germans and one each of Belorussians, Tartars, Moldavians, Czechs, Greeks and Bulgarians, were provided for the Commission a total of 98.²³ On the same day the General Secretariat presented a declaration regarding its program. The program stated that the Central Rada had been transformed from an 'executive body of party and civic groups' into a 'higher body, not only an executive one, but also a legislative one, of the entire organized Ukrainian nation.' The General Secretariat further declared that both in itself and in the person of the Ukrainian Central Rada, represented the formation of a government (*vlada*—power); yet the government was said to be an entirely new, modern type.

The Central Rada, in accepting the will and trust of the nation, 'has become the immediate, organically-united part of this great whole.' The process of transmutation of the 'moral government (*vlada*) into the public-juridical one' was not yet finished. It was to be the task of the Central Rada, and of the General Secretariat as its executive body, to further this process. Furthermore, the Declaration presented an immediate program in the field of internal affairs (local government and central administration organically united with the Rada), financial affairs (eventual taxation but voluntary collection for the moment), judicial affairs ('Ukrainianization and democratization of the courts'), supply and agrarian affairs (furtherance of the Radas of Peasants' Deputies and of the Soil Committees, and organization of the Ukrainian Land Soil Committee) and related matters, military (Ukrainianization of the army at the front as well as in the rear), inter-national affairs (the calling of a Congress to unite the work of all nationalities for autonomy, and furthering understanding with the Ukrainian minorities) and education (control of all schooling in the Ukraine), as well as in the fields of commerce and industry.²⁴

The Declaration was debated in the full Rada. Finally, an official vote of confidence was given. The formula included a statement that the General Secretariat was the democratic body of the Ukrainian people and its highest government, that the calling of the Constituent Assembly was 'in the interest of the Ukrainian toiling people', and took it for granted that the General Secretariat would present its report on the Constituent Assembly to the next session of the Rada.²⁵

The insistence on the Constituent Assembly reflected the more national-radical character of the Rada, as against the Secretariat. It will be remembered that the Secretariat was largely Social-Democrat, while the Rada was mainly Socialist-Revolutionary and conscious primarily of farmer interests. The reason for this curious arrangement was two-fold: on the one hand the U.S.D.W.P. had a tradition of service to the Ukrainian people, and a very high percentage of intellectuals

compared to the U.P.S.R. On the other hand, the leading member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, Hrushevsky, suggested to the Central Committee that the Socialist-Revolutionaries must hold themselves ready in the background to take over from the inevitable failure of the Social Democrats.

Hrushevsky expected that the policy of compromise with Russia would inevitably fail; Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, unencumbered by compromises, would take the government and consider purely Ukrainian interests.²⁵

The tension between the Ukraine and Russia rose. However, the united Russian front against the Ukraine was weakening. The support and relief was not to come, however, from the Bolshevik side, which was proclaiming the principle of self-determination. Leaving the problem of the measure of their real influence, we find Lenin treating the serious conflict as a bagatelle and referring to problems of an earlier era while pointedly ignoring the more timely one of the formation of the Ukrainian Land, as he did in his two articles on the conflict in June.²⁷ Lenin had also declared on behalf of the R.S.D.W.P. (Bolsheviks), at the First Congress of Soviets in mid-June, that his party wanted 'a single indivisible Russian republic, with a firm government,' while characterizing disagreement between Ukraine and Russia minor 'War Minister quarrels for no reason....'²⁸ Lenin failed to mention that the Ukrainian-Russian conflict had an influence on later events after June 1917.

The Peasants' Congress of Russia held firm to its anti-Ukrainian position. Nor were any parties ready to lend the Rada or the Ukraine any support. Industry and finance maintained their inimical stance.

Two non-belligerent voices were raised in Russia urging the Provisional Government to negotiate with the Rada. *Russkaya Volya* (on June 30, 1917) and *Den'*, in calling for this, were thus countenancing the autonomy as a *fait accompli*.²⁹

The serious push towards negotiations on the basis of the status quo was provided, it seems, by the needs of the war and the military, and by the fear of liberal elements of toppling

the unsteady state of Russian freedom through violence, which any prolonged controversy seemed to threaten.

The Ukrainian-Russian conflict foreshadowed prosecution of a war. The grand offensive planned for the near future was to take place primarily on the South-Western front, upon the Ukrainian territory where there were large numbers of Ukrainian troops, represented in the Rada directly by the Rada of Military Deputies, and indirectly as peasants of the Ukraine. The conflict also threatened provisions and supplies, provided by the countryside.

It was also becoming slowly clear that if the Rada was to be destroyed, the autocratic forces would be strengthened and, this success, might move on to other fields. The next possible goal could be the dispersal of the Finnish Sejm and the Executive Committee of the Councils of Deputies themselves.

It was most likely with this in view that the Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies acting 'in accordance with its general position on national independence,' offered the revolutionary democracy of the Ukraine its full support in the realization of autonomy and the rights of minorities. In this, the Congress used the phrase from former congresses and meetings. The Constituent Assembly, the Congress decided, had the final decision in the matter of autonomy; however, the Congress wished to see the formation of a 'provisional body representing the democracy of all nations of the Ukraine.' This body would direct the preparatory work towards the autonomy, and develop the 'autonomous order.'

The Provisional Government was requested to cooperate with the 'Ukrainian revolutionary democracy' in order to create such a body, towards an agreement on, and realization of concrete measures for the satisfaction of the national demands of the Ukrainian people.³⁰ Although the Central Rada was not mentioned as being the possible basis of a territorial body, the reference to the 'Ukrainian revolutionary democracy' seemed to refer particularly to the Rada, though the Peasants' Rada (its component) could have been meant, too. The Civic

Committee was bypassed, as was the Soviet of Workers in Kiev, because it could not qualify as Ukrainian.

The Bolshevik faction of the Congress did not support the resolution. In the words of its spokesman, it stated that the resolution was 'compromising,' and offered its own resolution, in which it moved that the policy of the Provisional Government against the Ukraine be condemned as counter-revolutionary and anti-democratic and offered to recognize the rights of the Ukraine for full autonomy and the formation of an independent state.³¹ The propaganda nature of this resolution was plain, and it could not be accepted—the old distinction of the Bolsheviks between the right and the expediency seemed to be indicated and the resolution did not seem to offer a practical guide to realization or the machinery of realization, and finally, did not refer to the existing Ukrainian institutions—such as the Rada or the General Secretariat. The main aim of the resolution seems to have been to compromise the Provisional Government rather than to further Ukrainian interest. This position seems to characterize the Russian Social-Democrat (Bolshevik) position, particularly as expressed by Lenin.

However, a phrase typical of the Bolsheviks vitiated the entire resolution as impractical and self-centred. It was provided that the 'right' of self-determination was not to be confused with the expediency of such in each separate case.³² This indeed would have the Congress adopt the mode of thinking peculiar to the Bolsheviks; acceptance would give the Ukraine only the verbal 'right', and no actual forms of self-government. Clearly this could not satisfy Ukrainian groups who wanted recognition and cooperation of the Provisional Government with an actual body of political Power, the Rada.

The Petrograd Government decided that it had no alternative but to come to an agreement with Kiev. At first it was decided to send a special Commission headed by the Vice-Minister for Internal Affairs, Count Urussov, and to include Krapotkin, Lopatinu, Vernadsky, Oldenburg, Avksentiev, Myakotiv and Korolenko, but this was given up by the Government

as only time-wasting.³³ Finally, it was decided to send members of the Government.

Ministers Tseretelli and Tereshchenko arrived on the 11th of July and were joined by Kerensky on the 12th. The result of negotiations between Petrograd and Kiev reflected the desire of both sides to come to an agreement. In the case of the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks were threatening insurrection, and in fact attempted a coup within a week; agreement with Ukrainians was all the more necessary in connection with the 'Kerensky offensive.' In the case of the Ukrainian Rada and the Secretariat, there was a realization of the weakness of their position in face of any *immediate* force of dispersal, a fear of autocratic currents, such as Bolsheviks, coming to the fore, and the desire to acquire a juridically well-defined position. The agreement as it emerged, was not received with any extraordinary enthusiasm by Ukrainian society. Tyutyunnyk, an outstanding Ukrainian military leader, reported that the reaction was a general disappointment; however, this might have been confined to military circles. The main part of the agreement, however, was not mere enthusiasm, but was a solid document providing for certain rights, and above all, the recognition by the Russian State of the Ukrainian Land. The agreement was imperfect (for instance, its Ukrainian section—the Universal—and the Russian section described the authority borne by the Secretariat as 'highest' and 'higher' respectively).

It was through the evolving cooperation of Ukrainians and Jews that the agreement had been made while the role of the Delegation had been that of the guarantor. Following the meeting at the beginning of July, on July 12, the South-Western Committee of the Jewish Social-Democratic party passed a resolution which was quite favourable to the Ukrainian position, though it would not quite overlap with the Ukrainian views.³⁴ Generally speaking, Rada and minorities agreed on the territorial principle of the Rada, with the only disagreement being the demand of the nationalities for 50 per cent of the seats, while the Rada only wanted to grant 30 per cent.³⁵

An agreement, except for the actual percentages, was finally reached in the meeting of July 11, 1917, with the acceptance by non-Ukrainian bodies of the Rada as the basic institution of the Ukraine.³³

The Delegation had a common meeting with the Secretariat and the Presidium of the Rada on July 12. Later on, there was a meeting of the Executive Committees of civic organizations, Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Next day, July 13, agreement was finally reached on the subject by the Delegation, the Secretariat and the Presidium. The agreement included the publication of two similar documents, the Second Universal on behalf of the Rada, and the Proclamation (*Postanovlenie*) on behalf of the Provisional Government. It was facilitated by the understanding already existing with the national minorities. On July 15, the Government of Prince Lvov fell through the resignation of Constitutional Democrats over the agreement with the Rada. Prince Lvov resigned shortly. A new government was formed by Kerensky on the basis of the agreement; the Constitutional Democrats were not included.

In Kiev, the Rada published the Second Universal. It stated that the Provisional Government extended its hand to the representatives of the Ukrainian democracy—the Central Rada—and appealed, in the agreement with it, for the creation of a new life of the Ukraine for the good of all of revolutionary Russia: 'We of the Central Rada, who have stood for non-separation of the Ukraine from Russia, so that we may proceed together with all her nations towards the development and welfare of Russia as a whole, and to the union of her democratic forces, receive the appeal of the Government to unite, and proclaim to all the citizens of the Ukraine: The Ukrainian Central Rada, elected by the Ukrainian people through their revolutionary organizations, will shortly be completed upon an equitable basis by the representatives of other nations of the Ukraine, elected from the revolutionary democracy, who would represent the interests of the entire population of our land.'

The Rada further declared that the enlarged Central Rada would provide from its membership a separate body responsible to her—the General Secretariat, which would be presented for recognition (*zatverdzhennya*) by the Provisional Government, as the bearer of the highest authority (*vlada*) of the Provisional Government in the Ukraine.

The Central Rada, in agreement with the national minorities of the Ukraine, will prepare drafts of the laws of the autonomous constitution of the Ukraine in order to submit them for approval to the Constituent Assembly.' Furthermore, regarding Ukrainian forces the Rada would have representatives at the Cabinet of the War Minister, at the General Headquarters, and with the Commander-in-Chief, who would cooperate in the formation of separate units composed exclusively of Ukrainians, in so far as such formation would be possible in the opinion of the War Minister without endangering (*narushuvaty*) the preparedness of the army.³⁷

The phraseology of the Universal had been purposely restrained. Thus the Universal proclaimed on July 16, contained the assurance that the Rada was 'decidedly against attempts for unpremeditated autonomy.' In return for this concession, though, the Rada persisted in its claim to be the governing body of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Government was proclaimed as being part of the Rada. The Universal was published in Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish, and Polish.³⁸

The Proclamation (*Postanovlenie*) of the Provisional Government was published on the same date. It was also published in four languages and stated that 'having listened to the Ministers Kerensky, Tereshchenko and Tseretelli on the Ukrainian matter', the Provisional Government had decided to appoint a higher body for the direction of "national affairs" in the Ukraine, a separate body to be called the General Secretariat. The membership would be determined by the Government in agreement with the Central Ukrainian Rada, and enlarged by the representatives of the other nationalities. All business connected with the affairs of the country and its government would be directed by this body. 'Considering that

the problem of the national-political constitution of the Ukraine... must be determined by the Constituent Assembly,' the proclamation stated, the Provisional Government would show a sympathetic attitude to the preparation by the Central Rada of a draft of the national-political state along those lines which the Rada herself shall think to be in the interests of the land.²⁹

It was by the Universal and the Proclamation that a body responsible primarily to the Rada was created, with virtually unlimited jurisdiction (all business connected with the country's affairs and government) qualified only by reference to the Constituent Assembly, yet to be held. The relationship of this body, the government of the Ukraine, to the Ukraine and the Provisional Government, had been defined by the Rada in the Universal and approved by the Provisional Government, as a matter of recognition (*zatverdzenyya*), or investment with powers by the Provisional Government. Furthermore, according to the Universal, the recognition was not absolutely necessary so far as the existence of the secretariat was concerned, but was the means by which the Secretariat was to become the agent of the Provisional Government; the Secretariat would in all events remain in control, being the executive body of the Rada. According to the Proclamation, the Secretariat, as an agent of the Provisional Government, was to be the joint creation of the Rada and the Provisional Government. The procedure by which this was to be effected was not defined, and since the Secretariat, which already existed along with the Delegation that had made the agreement, was a body of the Central Rada, and since the whole point of the agreement was that a *modus vivendi* of the Provisional Government and the Rada be developed, it would appear that the Government intended to see the existing procedure maintained and that the statement to that effect found in the Universal was acceptable.

This is also the interpretation of the documents by Baron Nolde, professor of constitutional (state) law in Petrograd University.

'What then is the new Ukrainian state power?' he asks.

At the head of the land there has been put, by agreement, the 'Central Ukrainian Rada'. The Rada creates from within itself a 'General Secretariat' responsible to it which would be recognized (approved) by the Provisional Government and which would be considered 'the representative (bearer) of the highest power of the Provisional Government.' Nolde concludes that the Declaration attempted to obscure the significance of the organization. It was quite clear that the power had been transferred to the Rada and her body the Secretariat, while for the Russian Government, there was kept only *nudum jus* of recognition of that Secretariat and the fiction that the Secretariat represented in the Ukraine the 'power of the Provisional Government'. In regard to the extent of the Secretariat's power, the agreement only recognized that the Rada and her Secretariat 'shall govern in the Ukraine as they see fit'. 'What juridical argument would the Provisional Government use against the Ukrainian government?' asked Nolde, 'If the latter, on the basis of the agreement, should demand the transfer of the mail, telegraph or taxation? The division of powers between Russia and the Ukraine was made on the completely unheard-of principle of full liquidation of the powers (*povnovlastiya*) of Russia',⁴⁰ concluded Nolde.

Nolde's interpretation of the agreement, although written in a largely partisan matter, attempting to show that the Ministers had been imposed upon by Hrushevsky, still seems a reasonable one. We have noted the different appellations of the General Secretariat, by the Universal, 'highest' and by the Declaration, 'higher' power. Even allowing for this, Nolde's discussion is valid.

We have mentioned that the Second Universal was greeted without enthusiasm comparable to that shown for the First Universal; still, this Universal seems to have been received with a feeling of relief and some satisfaction with the legality of the proceedings.

In the meeting of the Mala Rada in which the Second Universal had been read, Hrushevsky told the meeting, "You have heard the Second Universal of the Central Rada. We are at-

taining a higher level and achieving the actual autonomy of the Ukraine, with legislative and administrative bodies—the Rada and the Secretariat. We must remember, in obtaining these bodies, that everything should be united under their direction so that we may pass from a moral form of government (*vlast'*—power) to the government by law (*pravova vlast'*).⁴¹ The interpretation of Vynnychenko was similar: 'Truly we are passing the last outpost of our lawlessness... I salute you and the entire Ukraine along with the new way of life (*lad*)'.⁴²

Disappointment with the slow development of the power of the Ukrainian Land was rife among certain circles of Ukrainian society. We see from this, that far from attempting to aggravate conflicts and trying to ride the wave of popular trust, the Rada was attempting to embody all the main forces of Ukrainian life, as it saw them, not neglecting to capitalize on more violent manifestation, yet avoiding jeopardy of her position. This course of action was found defective by some groups.

The Fraternity of Independents, led by Mikhnovsky, established the Union of Ukrainian Statehood in common with the First Military Congress; their plans for a coup were developed in a secret meeting with the more independent-minded part of the Second Military Congress. At that time it was also decided that power must be taken in the Ukraine with the aid of the army. A special Committee was appointed whose task it was to prepare for such action, to choose the decisive moment and to realize the take-over.⁴³

The Committee decided that the time had arrived with the publication of the Universal. Three elements entered into their decision, according to its memoirist, Mlynovetsky: 'the disgraceful Second Universal,' the preparation of the offensive which tied up the main Russian forces, and the attempt at a coup by the Bolsheviks and Petrograd.⁴⁴

The Fraternity of Independents had developed their armed force by the detention in Kiev of the Doroshenko Regiment, formed in Chernyihiv and destined for the front; it was at their urging that these soldiers had proclaimed themselves the Polubotok Regiment when stationed in Kiev. With further

agitation among the garrison, the regiment grew to about 5,000 soldiers. In addition to this, there was an estimated 15,000 soldiers in Kiev who refused orders of the Command.⁴⁵

The matter of the Polubotok soldiers came up in the Rada, where the members of the Ukrainian General Military Committee reported that they, the Committee, had come to the conclusion that these 'people did not want to go to the front, using their Ukrainian nationality as an excuse.' A member of the Rada of Military Deputies, Vrotnovsky-Syvoshapka, added that he recommended that 'most decisive measures be taken against the Polubotok men.' He also stated that Independents had gone to Chernyhiiv and invited the men to come to Kiev where they would be armed and left there.⁴⁶ It was decided in the Rada to send a delegation of soldiers, including Vynnychenko. The Rada, upon hearing the report, asked the soldiers to become part of a designated Ukrainian regiment; the Polubotok soldiers did not budge.⁴⁷ The first Ukrainian Khmelnytsky Regiment decided 'that they did not consider the Polubotok men their brothers and would not lend them any aid.'⁴⁸ Further negotiations with Polubotok men gave no results.

At the time of the arrival of the Delegation from Petrograd, Vynnychenko visited these soldiers and asked the 'Regiment,' such as it was, to take part in the military parade organized by the Rada. According to Mlynovetsky, the Independents authorized the Regiment to agree; the Polubotok Regiment received 1,000 rifles from the Command, on Vynnychenko's initiative.⁴⁹

The Polubotok soldiers were not the only ones who found it conceivable that they could grasp power by coup. In Petrograd, the Bolsheviks moved against the Government. The move of the Polubotok men and the Bolsheviks may have been coordinated, though this is unlikely. On July 15, the Independents received news 'transmitted by the independent telephonists' that the Bolshevik uprising was to take place, according to Mlynovetsky.

Oberuchev, the Commissar of the Kiev Military District, wondered in his memoirs whether the Polubotok men raised a

rebellion in connection with the Bolshevik rebellion in Petrograd, or whether the coincidence in time was simply accidental. He mentioned that while the movements of many persons were restricted, Yuri Pyatakov, a leader of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, had full access everywhere.

Manilov, a Russian (Bolshevik) historian, and a contemporary, studied the question in great detail, and came to the conclusion that there could have been no connection between the two groups. Only the Independents had been involved with the Polubotok regiment. The Kiev organization of the R.S.D.W.P. had not directed any of the men's work nor did it seem to have had any direct contact with them. The Polubotok soldiers did try to get in touch with the Bolshevik Committee during the uprising, it is said, and in reply to the question on their aims put to them by the representative of the Bolsheviks, they said that they wanted 'food, weapons and . . . the power of the Soviets.' The Kiev Bolsheviks were not persuaded. They rejected all attempts of the Polubotok men to establish contact as they had considered them a very undependable, and even a 'plundering' element. Manilov stated emphatically that the Kiev Bolsheviks did not take any part in the preparation and organization of the uprising.

A part of the Polubotok regiment had also attempted to obtain the support of the Third Aviation Park. The Aviation Park was an enterprise manned by Russian workers under strong Bolshevik influence; the work had been evacuated to Kiev in the course of the war. The aid was not given. It is difficult to say how far this indicated any Bolshevik leanings. However, it may be concluded that in so far as Bolshevism was characterized by defeatism and by leaning towards anarchism under the influence of the Lenin group, this trend of Russian Social-Democracy attracted to itself certain elements of dissolution. Such elements were 'spontaneously Bolshevik' (though not truly Bolshevik) were certainly present among the Polubotok men; one of the factors in the decision for the uprising was certainly the demand by the Kiev Command, reinforced by the Rada, that the regiment leave for the front, as well as the

asserted shortage of food. The determining element was still the nationalist spirit of the soldiers; there can be no question of any Bolshevism, as such, among these troops.

The Polubotok Regiment immediately before the uprising, attempted to win the Ukrainian Central Rada to their side. The meeting between the military leadership of the Regiment, and (at first) the lower echelons of the Rada, began late on July 16, while the Bolshevik rebellion was at its height in Petrograd.

The representatives of the regiment spoke with the consciousness of military power behind them; they had under their command 5,000 troops. They protested at the presence of lesser officials representing the Rada at the meeting; as the result of their protests, both Vynnychenko and Petlura were summoned and spoke for the Rada.

The point of view of the regiment, as represented in particular by Kalnychenko, was that the authorities of the Provisional Government were attempting to deprive the Ukrainian Central Rada of any true military support. This was their reason in refusing to leave Kiev. They meant to defend the Rada in case of necessity against the Russian authorities. They did not urge the Rada to take power at this point, taking advantage of their military strength. From this, it appears that their professed aim to give power to the Rada was similar to that of the Petrograd Bolsheviks to give power to the 'Soviets.' Both these groups seemed to want to force a certain policy upon their respective institutions in 'transferring power' to them.

The point of view of the Rada, and of the General Military Committee was presented for the most part by Vynnychenko. Vynnychenko asked the soldiers for patience; he referred to his own persecutions by the Russian government before the revolution. The soldiers need not be afraid for the fate of the Rada. Its safety would be guaranteed by the Khmelnytsky Regiment in the absence of the Polubotok men. Vynnychenko urged the soldiers to entrain for the front.

It appears that while the Polubotok leadership overestimated the current danger to the Central Rada from the Russian

institutions, the Rada leadership underestimated it. In fact, it failed to foresee the possibility that it would be deprived of the Khmelnytsky Regiment as well, in the near future. Negotiations were broken off late in the night. No compromise had been reached.

Early in the morning of July 17, the centre of Independents held a meeting and decided that the time for an uprising was at hand.

The plan was drawn up for the coup; this plan was intercepted later by Russian counter-intelligence. The outline of the plan also gave the general demands of the Second Ukrainian Polubotok Regiment. Guiding themselves by the First Universal ('we do not recognize the Second Universal') they intended to 'establish order in the Ukraine.' Russians and 'renegades' who were holding up the Ukrainian plans would be thrown off by force. 'Recognizing the Central Rada as our highest government, we are driving the traitors from the Ukraine without the Rada's sanction. When we have prevailed, we shall put ourselves at the service of the Central Rada. Then it will govern in Kiev and the entire Ukraine as in her own home.'³⁰ The detailed plan of operation was itself worked out by a special Commission, developed (and so effected) in conjunction with the Command of the Regiment in the early hours of July 17. The plan of the Kiev action was drawn up in a professional way. The plan also provided for action in several other cities in Ukraine. The security of the uprising was to be assured by the movement of the Free Cossack Groups. Those of Zvenyhorodka County received orders by courier on the night of July 17 to take the railroad centres of Znamenka, to disarm the troops, which would be sent from their quarters in Darnytsya, Brovary and elsewhere, and to paralyze railroad connections. The Samostiyniks (Independents) in Zhytomir received orders to secure Korosten, those in Poltava, Romodan; those in Kremenchuk were to capture the railroad junction of Znamenka. The Tahanrih Independents seemed to have some troops under their influence which were to take action later; the Chernyhyv Doroshenko soldiers were to take action too. The

communications of the movement were maintained by the Samostiynyk telegraphists, present in all stations, according to Mlynovetsky, to the number of two or three.⁵¹

At first the situation was made easier for the Polubotok Regiment by the initial apparent cooperation of the Commander of the First Ukrainian Regiment. Together, these regiments would constitute the considerable force of 10,000 men, which might hope to enjoy the support of some other troops. With the possible break-down of authority in Petrograd, through the Bolshevik coup, the uprising was expected by its organizers to be backed by Ukrainian troops at the front. Mikhnovsky received promises of support from Kapkan, the Commander of the First Regiment, though that Commander was not told any details. The First Khmelnytsky regiment obtained the actual news in the middle of the night⁵² of July 17, when the uprising was in progress.

When the success of the uprising was evident, certain persons were to inform Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko of the overthrow and tell them that they could assume control of an independent Ukraine.⁵³

The uprising began in other centres besides Kiev; the Zvenyhorodka Free Cossacks in particular, took the station of Tsvitkovo, disarmed soldiers there, and advanced in four trains towards Kiev.⁵⁴ The Kiev uprising was a complete success. The Polubotok Regiment was met in the middle of the night by the Khmelnytsky Regiment (the latter was armed but had not been issued bullets, suggesting collusion). Part of the Regiment joined the rebels.⁵⁵

Kapkan, however, returned to the main body of his regiment to proclaim himself the Commandant of the City. According to Milyukov and the Commissar Oberuchev, Polubotok men took the Pechersk Fortress, the Arsenal, most police stations where they disarmed police, and arrested the Chief of Police, Leparsky.⁵⁶ They also overpowered the Headquarters of the Kiev Military District, arrested the Commandant of the Garrison of Kiev, and occupied the Bank. Furthermore, they disarmed the Russian military schools and the Russian units

of the garrison. The only resistance had been shown by the Second Ponton Regiment, who attacked the Fortress and were repulsed by machine-gun fire.⁵⁷

The Khmelnytsky Regiment Commandant, however, informed the Ukrainian General Military Committee and proceeded to substitute his sentries for the Polubotok sentries; the latter however, failed to cooperate. The Committee met and decided to take resolute measures to liquidate the uprising. Separate members of the Committee joined the Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment and persuaded the various Polubotok units to allow themselves to be disarmed. At two o'clock, the meeting of the Committee and the military authorities (showing the complete lack of tact of the latter) authorized General Kondratovych, a member of the Ukrainian Military Committee, to liquidate the uprising, which he succeeded in achieving almost completely.⁵⁸

The General Secretariat telegraphed the Provisional Government, which had just succeeded in containing the attempted Bolshevik coup, that the 'General Secretariat had used decisive measures in establishing order.'⁵⁹ Whether the Polubotok uprising was indeed organized in an understanding with Petrograd Bolsheviks (the Kiev Bolsheviks played no role), it demonstrated clearly that the Rada possessed a large unrealized and disorganized power in the city, and perhaps elsewhere, and in case of serious troubles could call on actual force.

On the other hand, the Independents seem to have had some support among the soldiers; a city was dominated without bloodshed, showing at least the 'neutrality' if not friendliness of a part of the garrison. The ease with which the Polubotok Regiment occupied the obvious strategic points during the time when the Kiev Military District had reason to be on guard (if only in connection with the expected Bolshevik troubles) only strengthened the power of the Rada, as was pointed out by Doroshenko.⁶⁰

The Rada leaders turned their attention to the systematic building of their power, at this stage, through association with

the Radas of the non-Ukrainian population. On July 14, the Central Rada increased the membership of the Mala Rada to 40 members, consisting of 8 members of the U.S.D.W.P. and of the U.P.S.R., 3 Socialist-Federalists, one National Revolutionary, 1 Ukrainian Trudovik, 1 'non-party socialist,' 9 representatives of the Presidium of the Rada, and 3 Presidium members of the Radas of the Military, Peasants', and Workers' Deputies.⁶¹

The Mala Rada was shortly reorganized again after agreement was reached with minorities; the agreement marked the end of the claim by the Civic Committee to represent the population as a whole, instead of the Russian minority only. All minorities were to have 18 members in the Mala Rada, and 30 per cent in the Large Rada. The Executive Committee of the Civic Organizations had the right to divide the seats given to minorities. The Committee kept a seat for itself, 2 seats went to the Council of the Soldiers' Deputies of the Kiev Military District, 3 seats to the Kiev Council of Workers' Deputies. Three seats went to Jewish Socialist parties, 2 seats went to the Polish organizations (one to the Polish Socialist Party, the other to the Polish Democratic Union); 2 further seats went to Jewish groups (making a total of 5 Jewish representatives), one to Zionists, one to the Jewish Democratic Union, and one seat went to the Kiev Committee of the Constitutional-Democrat Party; 2 seats went to the Russian Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) and one seat was for the Bolsheviks.⁶² The usual number sitting would be between 40 and 45 members out of a total of 58. The membership changed little, despite the existence of the Mala Rada. The most noteworthy change was the entrance of the Bolshevik representatives, Pyatak and Zatonsky, who had at first refused, but did accept on August 22, proclaiming that 'entering the Ukrainian Central Rada they would lead an intense struggle with the bourgeoisie and bourgeois nationalism, and would rally the workers and peasants of the Ukraine under the red flag of the International and lead them towards the victory of the proletarian revolution,' yet stating that 'the destiny of the Ukraine is to be

decided by its population,' urging the population to unite with the workers and poor peasants of all Russia.⁶³

Of all the major groups of the Ukraine, the Ukrainian workers were as yet unrepresented in the Rada. The slowness of development of Ukrainian working men's associations was a result of the small number of Ukrainians engaged in industry; however, Ukrainians did have some important positions in the food-processing industry, notably in the sugarbeet industry. The All-Ukrainian Congress had been called by the Ukrainian fraction of the Kiev Council of Workers' Deputies. They invited all Ukrainian workingmen's associations as well as Ukrainian factions in the common workingmen's associations. This meant, of course, the division of the workingmen's organizations on a national basis. The number of members was about 315; this contrasted greatly with the Peasants' or the Military Congresses. About half of the Congress were Ukrainian Social-Democrats; there were at least 57 Socialist-Revolutionaries (a surprisingly large number, showing the connection of workers with the peasantry); the rest were non-party. There were no Bolsheviks at all. The Presidium of the Congress included Vynnychenko, Porsh, Veselovsky, Palamarchuk and Yeremiyeu. The appearance of Antonovych, initiator of the R.U.P., in the Presidium, is of particular interest, showing the desire of the working people to establish a continuity in the development of the political life of the working class, of the 'robotnytstvo' or the 'proletariat,' in the phrase of the day.⁶⁴ Reports were heard by Sadovsky, Martos and Steshenko of the General Secretariat. Although the Congress was mainly under the influence of the moderate Social-Democrats mentioned above, the Congress did contain some radical currents.⁶⁵ Still, Doroshenko, the noted conservative Ukrainian memoirist and historian, was surely wrong in stating that 'there was a strong Bolshevik tint (*notky*) in the speeches.'⁶⁶ The Congress, which met between the 24th and 27th of July, heard speeches in which workers complained about the not entirely 'revolutionary-democratic' make-up of the Central Rada (the addition of the minorities added greatly to the conservative element of

the Rada, especially on the national question). The agreement with the Provisional Government was criticized.

The First All-Ukrainian Workers' Congress paid close attention to the political situation. It is to be noted that the Ukrainian working people considered the current disagreement between the Rada and the Provisional Government, the Declaration and the Second Universal, unimportant. The fact of Ukrainian statehood, expressed in an autonomous form, was taken for granted; the working class was more concerned with the actual problems to be solved in the re-established Ukraine.

The Congress thus decided that the 'strengthening of the gains of the revolution, of the deepening and of widening of its social-economic contents' was possible only through the organization and systematic 'formation of new kinds of civic-political and national life and the satisfaction of the social and economic needs of the working classes of the population.' It concluded that only a revolutionary government in the Ukraine and Russia, formed by a revolutionary democracy, could be equal to the demands of their tasks. The 'bourgeois classes in Russia' showed and would show later, ever more strongly, their anti-revolutionary character. We see that while the revolutionary government is mentioned only with regard to Russia; the Ukrainian worker's view did not include a middle class, or bourgeoisie. The Congress finished its resolution on political matters with pledge of support for the Ukrainian Central Rada and her General Secretariat, as bodies of the revolutionary power (*vlast'*) in the Ukraine which were 'founded upon the forces of the revolutionary democracy—the working class, peasantry and the army.' However, the workers attempted to maintain solidarity by deciding that the 'representatives of the Ukrainian proletariat in the Ukrainian Central Rada, in declaring as their goal the realization of the aims of the revolution'—in the Ukraine as in Russia—should move 'towards this in a close union with workers of other nations,' 'in agreement with the entire revolutionary democracy—Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian—(they should) hold an independent class position.' The working people thus gave the Rada

notice that they intended to support the 'interests of the working class' with the important limitation that agreement with the Ukrainian (and other) revolutionary democracy was necessary.⁶⁷

The attitude of the Ukrainian workers towards war and peace is of particular interest. We mentioned already the incompatibility of the position of the Bolsheviks and, to some extent of all Russian Socialist parties, on the Ukrainian position. The Congress proclaimed that the war had to be finished in the near future; for this reason, the Provisional Government ought to demand that England, France and other Allies begin peace negotiations, together with Russia, immediately; the Congress hinted at the bare possibility of some other solution, without daring, or perhaps even knowing, what to suggest: 'if the Allies were to refuse—other measures ought to be undertaken for the ending of the war.' The reason for such uncertainty and the failure to suggest the remedy of the Council of Workers' Deputies can be gathered from the same resolution. The enemy was now threatening the Ukrainian lands with partition of her territory into two parts, which would have unpleasant consequences for the 'development of the entire Ukrainian proletariat' and would destroy the new order in the captured area. Active resistance to the enemy was urged, as well as support of the army by labour in the rear.⁶⁸ Here was perhaps the strongest backing for the army by a popular workers' congress in the entire Empire, certainly in Russia proper. A strong desire to fight in the war, in the national interest, and hence to obtain a greater alliance with the Entente, was a further reason for the Ukraine to establish an independent state.

Concerning the emergent Ukrainian statehood, the Congress held that it was 'putting forward the old slogan of the Ukrainian proletariat' in supporting autonomy, which was finally to be established by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. Through absence of any reference to the Russian Constituent Assembly, the Congress could speak of the 'sovereign autonomous Ukraine,' recognizing that a 'federative con-

nection with Russia was necessary.' The proletariat was to take the 'most active part in the creation of an autonomous Ukraine (which had) already begun.' This was to be done in the interest of the proletariat, since in this way, full democracy (*demokratychnist'*) in this way of life would be guaranteed; this was also in the interest of the 'great mass of the population.' The concern with segments of the population than the 'proletariat,' appearing again and again, is seen as a particular feature of the 'national proletariat,' distinguishing the Ukrainian working class from the Russian. This, again, tended to dissociate the two lands further. The 'proletariat' of the Ukraine was very closely united with other groups in Ukrainian society—the worker very often worked in agricultural districts, in contact with farmers; often he was related to the peasantry through his family, or was a former peasant himself. His Ukrainian nationality gave him ties with other social groups of the same nationality. Thus, the Ukrainian worker was less characterized by the feeling of his proletarian superiority over others, distinguishable in his Russian counterpart. This, again, made cooperation with Russia and with Bolshevism quite difficult. The idea of the unity of the people could be seen in the resolution; the workers held that all government should be elected, and that the administration should govern in 'permanent agreement directly with the population which had elected them, or with their representatives,' as far as possible. They failed to show any desire to assign a special or leading role to any particular group in the population and so, implicitly rejected the theory of government by any proletarian-led 'soviets.'⁹⁹

The concern for the interests of the Ukraine showed up in the resolutions on the trade-unions, in one way through the demand that all unions unite into one bureau of trade unions of the Ukraine; also, various unions were to unite into all-Ukrainian Unions, and the rights of Ukrainians as to language were to be recognized. The trade union as such, however, was not to be organized by nationality; rather, a given union was to have a Ukrainian section in it.¹⁰⁰ On the

whole, then, Ukrainian distinctiveness appeared in the desire to centralize unions around Kiev, rather than Petrograd or Moscow.

The attention with which the Rada regarded the Workers' Congress is shown by the fact that the rather weak working class of the Ukraine was given the high number of 100 seats in the Rada—one half of the seats offered to the minorities, or to the peasants—and 3 seats in the Mala Rada.⁷¹ The reason for this concern lay in the desire to see Social-Democracy strengthened in the Rada, with a view towards the supposed historical importance of the working classes, and the role of Social-Democracy in building the Ukraine. The explanation may have been a preparation for the future, which, it was thought, would see the development of the Ukraine as a great industrial country, because of the Donets Basin coal and the Kryvyi Rih iron. The main task of Ukrainians in the development of her independence had been defined by Vynnychenko to be takeover of the cities; this could be done through the workers.

The First All-Ukrainian Workers' Congress elected the All-Ukrainian Rada of Workers' Deputies. This was to represent the working people, and was to be a part of the Rada, in order for it to represent the entire population. The incorporation of this body into the Rada completed creation of the representative body of the Ukraine. On July 27, it was announced in the Central Rada that it was being increased by delegates of the workers. The next day, this enlarged Central Rada approved the constitution of the Ukrainian Land bearing the title Statute of the Higher Governing of the Ukraine.

The Central Rada as it finally emerged had a total of 822 seats. The largest group was the Peasants' Deputies, which considered itself the voice of Ukrainian peasantry. As such, it had its own executive. While outside of the Central Rada, the Peasants' Rada was completely independent, as part of the Central Rada, its executive became simply the leading group of members of the peasants' faction. This group consisted of 212 deputies, a little over a quarter of Rada mem-

bership. The next in size was the All-Ukrainian Rada of Military Deputies. It too acted independently outside the Rada. The membership was 158, and included the Ukrainian General Military Committee, elected by the First Ukrainian Military Congress. The All-Ukrainian Workers' Rada consisted of 100 members. This, too, could and did act independently. The representatives of mostly non-Ukrainian Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies accounted for 50 seats. Ukrainian Socialist parties held 20 seats in their own right; Russian Socialists, including Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Social-Democrats, Menshevik and Bolshevik, held 40 seats, Jewish Socialists, 35 seats, and Polish Socialists, 15 seats. Representatives from cities and provinces who had been elected at various peasants', workers', and all-national congresses accounted for a further 84 members, 108 mandates were to have been issued to professional, educational, economic and civic organizations, as well as to national parties — Moldavian, German, Tartar, White-Russian and others.¹² The actual number never reached that mentioned here. It should also be remembered that a later change somewhat rearranged the representation of national minorities.

The Central Rada, at all levels, represented the varied make-up of the Ukrainian people. On the other hand, through its members' influence the Rada could act on the opinion and, as far as practicable, on the power of all the various nationalities and political groups, as well as the four main social groups of the country: peasants, workers, soldiers, and intellectuals.

The General Secretariat was changed somewhat, though not fundamentally. The President of the re-formed General Secretariat was again Vynnychenko. Martos, a Social-Democrat, was appointed the Secretary of Agrarian Affairs, Baranovsky took over the financial affairs. Sadovsky remained in charge of justice, Steshenko in charge of education, and Stasyuk, the Secretary for Food Supply. Petlura was again elected the Secretary for Military Affairs. The new position for transportation (roads) was filled by Holubovych, for post and

telegraph by A. Zarubin, for state control by M. Rafes. The inclusion of Zarubin, a Russian Socialist-Revolutionary and Rafes, a leader of the Jewish Bund, was part of the agreement with minor nationalities to allow them a voice in the government. The other advantages for the minorities was the establishment of Vice-Secretariats in Inter-National Affairs; I. Silberfarb, a member of the Jewish United Socialist Party was the Vice-Secretary for Jewish Affairs; V. Mickiewicz (the son of the poet Mickiewicz) accepted the position in charge of Polish Affairs.⁷³ The position of the Secretary for Inter-National Affairs was still held by Shulhyn. The position of the Vice-Secretary for Russian Affairs was as yet unfilled, and was eventually filled by Odynets. The minorities were also to choose candidates for two further Secretariats, of particular interest to them in view of the prevailing occupation distribution in the Ukraine. These were Secretariats of Labour and of Commerce and Industry.⁷⁴ The General Secretary (*pysar*) was P. Khrystiuk; Stebnytsky was elected as the State-Secretary of the Ukraine at the Provisional Government. It was the view of the Rada that Stebnytsky was to enter the Russian Provisional Government.⁷⁵ The Ukrainian Social-Democrats prevailed in the Secretariat; however, the representation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was quite strong, although in less responsible positions; influence of Socialist-Federalists and of Jewish Socialist parties was noticeable.

The Constitution of the Ukraine—as interpreted by the Rada—was embodied in the Statute of the Higher Governing of the Ukraine, drafted by a commission of the Rada, consisting of representatives of both Ukrainians and minorities. The Statute was based on the agreement of July 15, 1917. Thus both the declaration of the Provisional Government and the Second Universal were being made the basis of the constitution. The essence of the agreement was that the Ukrainian Central Rada was ‘the organ of the revolutionary democracy of all the nations of the Ukraine,’ whose task it was to prepare the Ukraine for the final realization of an autonomous way of life and to achieve a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, as well

as Ukrainian representation in the Assembly. The Rada established the General Secretariat, and was described in the Statute as the 'highest organ of governing in the Ukraine.'

The field of operation of the General Secretariat was not defined. A practical limitation was found in the list of various functions: internal, finance, military, food, agrarian, justice, education, national, commerce, industry, post and telegraph, labour transportation (roads), with controlling secretaries, and the secretary himself. The three minority vice-secretaries were also mentioned. The general Secretariat would realize its functions through all government bodies in the Ukraine, which in their turn were subordinate to the government of the General Secretaries. However, the limitation was that certain bodies might have a direct connection with the Provisional Government, but only upon the decision of the General Secretariat which bodies may have direct contact. All government positions were to be filled by the General Secretariat or by its agents. The functions of the Provisional Government were being made dependent upon the agreement of the Ukraine, in application to that country. This was secured by the statement that all laws of the Provisional Government would be valid in the Ukraine only on their ratification in the Land Government, in the Ukrainian language (*Krayevyi Uryadovyi Vistnyk*). The *Vistnyk*, as the official publication had been provided for in the Declaration of the General Secretariat of July the 9th, where it stated that 'information on the activity of the General Secretariat,' would be provided, among other ways, through a periodic publication of the General Secretariat.⁷⁸

Furthermore, the 'Provisional Government would have with it' (probably as a member of the Government) the State-Secretary for the Ukraine, who was to be appointed by the Provisional Government, in agreement with the Central Rada. The State Secretary would look to the interests of the Ukraine in the work of the Provisional Government, on the one hand, and on the other hand, would submit draft legislation to the Ukrainian Central Rada through the General Secretariat.

The functions of the General Secretariat and of its source,

the Ukrainian Central Rada were severely limited in the Statute through the necessity of having the bills which had approved by the Rada submitted to the Provisional Government for its 'sanction.' A more serious limitation lay in the obligation of the Secretariat to submit all 'provisional financial accounts of expenses for the purposes of the Ukraine discussed and approved by the Central Rada' for affirmation (*zatverdzhennya*—final approval). So, the Rada did not claim final disposition of funds in its sphere of action. The funds of the Central Rada would be spent by the Secretariat on the Rada's budget.

The Secretariat itself would be affirmed (*zatverdzeny*) as a body by the Central Rada when it expressed its confidence in the Secretariat. It would be formed in the Committee of the Rada (*Mala Rada*). The statute stated expressly '(The General Secretariat) is responsible to the (Rada).' When the General Secretariat should have the non-confidence of the Central Rada, it shall resign.⁷⁷

Thus, on the whole, the Constitution expressed the spirit of the agreement, as interpreted at the time by Nolde, in a reasonable manner. The basic elements of the agreement were present: that the General Secretariat appointed by the Rada and responsible to the Rada alone, shall govern the autonomous Land of Ukraine. The extent of the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Central Rada had not been defined at the time of the agreement. However, the Provisional Government was negotiating with an existing General Secretariat.

The Secretariat, at the time of the agreement, covered internal, financial, inter-national, military, judicial, educational, food and agrarian affairs. At that time, no limit had been placed on the activity of the Secretariat except that autonomy should not be realized 'spontaneously' (*samochnynno*). It would seem that these fields could be validly included within the framework of the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Land. The claim to the Secretariats of transportation, post and telegraph, trade and industry, and labour would be more difficult for the Ukrainian leaders to substantiate. Their inclusion was pro-

bably due to the introduction of national minorities into the Rada, of which the Jewish and Russian parties particularly, were interested in the trade, industry and labour, as well as post and telegraph. The Controlling Secretariat would seem to be non-controversial. However, the language and the spirit of the language of the two documents of mid-July pointing to the General Secretariat as the only governing body in the Ukraine ('the highest body of the direction of Land affairs in the Ukraine,' according to the Declaration, and possessed of 'all rights and means . . . to order the life of the entire country', according to the Universal), would indicate the general coincidence of the Statute with the agreements formed between the Rada and the Provisional Government.

The most notable lack in the document was the absence of any definition of the territory of the 'Ukrainian Land.' It was not through oversight that that question was omitted. As Hrushevsky stated, the representative of the Provisional Government had been of two minds about the territory of the Ukraine. On the one hand, they did not wish the Ukraine to extend further than the undoubtedly Ukrainian 'national oblast,' on the other hand, they wished to give the territory of the Ukraine 'a certain' rounded form, a geographical and economic unity, so as not to form separate autonomous oblasts. In particular, they would wish to include Bessarabia.⁷⁶ This may have been caused by the desire to have the non-Ukrainian element strengthened. According to Hrushevsky, the Rada leaders refused the latter kind of arrangement as 'they considered each addition of non-Ukrainian territory harmful (*nekorysny*) for the Ukrainian situation,' and would accept such an addition only as an expression of the 'will of the population in question.'⁷⁷ Earlier, Vynnychenko and his delegation had been told by the Petrograd commission that the Black Sea coast and other areas were not Ukrainian at all. There was resistance to both extremes; in the first case, the Ukrainian element was in danger of being submerged by the others; in the second case, considerable Ukrainian-populated territories would be left outside of the territory of Ukraine. The general territorial claims

of the Rada were plain from the constitution of its representation, established over the course of the Revolution. This would include the nine basic gubernias (e.g. in the representation of the National Congress). Concerning territorial extension, what were to be considered parts of other Lands of the Ukraine was not defined in the Statute.

The Ukrainian Land, established in the First Universal, and the Second Universal, recognized by the Provisional Government through its Declaration (*Postanovlenie*) of July 16, 1917, had acquired a provisional constitution in the Statute. Behind the Statute stood all Ukrainian parties, Socialist and Zionist Jewish, as well as Russian, except the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik). The Constitutional Democrats maintained their membership in the Rada.

It is evident that the Kiev Committee of the Bolshevik party was finding its total isolation from the major institution, from the Ukrainian Central Rada, and thus from the people, untenable. Pyatakov's position on the national question, consisting of the outright rejection of national manifestations, was rejected by the City Conference of the Kiev Bolsheviks in favour of the opportunist line of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. on August 5.⁸⁰ Although the Bolsheviks were not to enter the Ukrainian Central Rada for another fortnight, the last challenge to the constitutional position of the Ukrainian Land was crumbling.

While the Statute was accepted by all groups of the Ukraine, the Ukrainian majority held it to be a constitutional document, which was to be affirmed by the Provisional Government without any material changes; any such changes were to be effected only in agreement with the Mala Rada. This ultimatum was supported in the Mala Rada on August 8, by all Ukrainian votes against all these of the minorities,⁸¹ who had felt it inadvisable to present the Provisional Government with an ultimatum. However, the fundamental position of acceptance and support of the Statute was maintained by them. Rafes of the Jewish Bund, Zarubin of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Mickiewicz of the Polish Democratic

Centre, were negotiating in Petrograd on the Statute as the provisional constitution of the Ukrainian Land.

The Statute found practical recognition immediately, in the case of the administration of local government in the gubernias. On August 9, there was held in Kiev a Meeting of the Gubernia Commissars of the Ukraine. The meeting formally that the commissars were subordinate to the General Secretariat in all matters of the governing of the gubernias. Basing themselves upon the local organizations of the revolutionary democracy, they stated that they held 'all plenitude of revolutionary power within the limits of their gubernias.'⁸² With this, control of the Ukrainian Land was proclaimed over the local government, one which had been increased by the method of appointment of the commissars; they were expected to enjoy the support of the gubernia zemstvos. The zemstvo institutions, renamed about this time 'national administrations' (*narodnya uprava*) were elective institutions in which the peasantry predominated. In late spring and in early summer, most zemstvo bodies found themselves in the hands of Ukrainians, or under overwhelming Ukrainian influence. Thus, the decision of the Meeting of the Gubernia Commissars of Ukraine reflected the actual state of affairs.⁸³ The Commissars had originally been chairmen of the Zemstvo Board. Their successors were appointed by the Provisional Government, sometimes in cooperation with the Rada, for instance in the case of Doroshenko, and were to serve as Commissars of the new territories of Western Ukraine.⁸⁴

The Statute was taken for the sanction of the Provisional Government by the Delegation consisting of Vynnychenko, Baranovsky, and Rafes (the last representing the non-Ukrainian element of the Rada).⁸⁵ In the meantime, however, serious changes occurred in the Provisional Government. After the attempted coup by the R.S.D.W. Party (Bolsheviks) there arose a new crisis in the government. In the final result, a government was formed which included the Constitutional Democrats, still led by Kerensky. The Delegation was received only on August 7, but were not met by the Government, but

by Minister Nekrasov, as the Vice-President of the Cabinet, accompanied by jurists Nolde, Halperin and Bart.⁹³ Most of the discussion was led by the learned commission. The new, more conservative trend of the government was immediately noticeable. It was indicative that the main protagonist leading the fight against the agreement, Baron Nolde, was a member. In Vynnychenko's words: 'The views and aims of the (Government) were immediately plain . . . to cancel the agreement of July 16 and to limit Ukrainian gains to the barest minimum.' In the meeting, the Commission found the statute 'simply ridiculous' (according to Vynnychenko). Vynnychenko also claimed that the behaviour of the Commission was calculated to provoke the Ukrainians to break off negotiations, but they did not do so.⁹⁷ The delay in negotiations was found to be too long, however, and Vynnychenko left Petrograd before the decision was reached.

In its deliberations, the Provisional Government rejected the Statute altogether, and issued in its place the Provisional Instruction of the Provisional Government to the General Secretariat, on August 17.

The Instruction stated that until the Constituent Assembly settled the question of 'local governments,' the General Secretariat would be appointed by the Provisional Government on the recommendation of the Central Rada and would be the highest organ of the Provisional Government in matters of local affairs. While the Declaration of the Provisional Government, July 16, provided for the jurisdiction of the Secretariat over 'measures and means in the life of the land,' the Instruction referred specifically to 'local government' with a corresponding narrowing of function. Far from dealing with the Ukraine on the basis of the earlier agreement, it negotiated on the level of the gubernia legislation. This was also emphasized by the substitution of the phrase 'Land affairs' as the field of the Secretariat, and by the phrase 'local government affairs.' While the agreement in the Universal was that the Secretariat was responsible to the Rada, and the Declaration of the Provisional Government, negotiated with the Secretariat, stated

that the Secretariat would be appointed by the Government in agreement with the Ukrainian Central Rada, and had also provided for the independent role of the Rada in drafting legislation founded on the Ukrainian 'national-political statute' and the agrarian legislation, in the Instruction, the Rada and her independent role, as well as her control of the Secretariat, was completely ignored. The Secretariat became simply an extension of the Provisional Government.

The territory of the Ukraine was defined without mentioning the word 'Ukraine' itself ('the powers of the General Secretariat extend to the gubernias...' was the form used), as the provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava and part of the province of Chernyhyv (excluding Mhlyny, Surazh, Starodub, Novozybkiv povits). Thus the Kherson, Tauria, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv provinces and other smaller parts of Ukrainian populated territories were excluded, as well as all of the Southern Ukraine and its entire Black Sea coast. Also excluded were the main industrial complex of the Ukraine, the Donets Coal Basin and the Kryvyi Rih iron, forming the basic source of iron and coal in the Russian Empire, as well as the steppe and agricultural districts of Katerynoslav and Kharkiv. (Kharkiv was of course an important industrial center in its own right.) The instruction did, however, provide a way for other provinces to join the Ukraine. This would occur when zemstvos, formed on the basis of the legislation of the Provisional Government, would express themselves in favour of such jurisdiction. The zemstvos were to conduct business through the gubernia units, and in so far as the provincial borders of the Empire cut off larger or smaller parts of Ukrainian-populated territories, this meant that such territories would not be open for acquisition by the Ukraine. This was of particular importance for the Donets Basin complex, which was partly in the territory of the Don Voisko (Army), as well as to Polesie and Podlassie, and elsewhere. The very procedure providing no indications for the method of reaching decisions, suggested to the Rada leaders that the government's one aim was procrastination.

The General Secretariat was allowed to keep only four of the original eight Secretaries, for the positions of Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and Education. Of the Secretaries with whom the Provisional Government had reached the July agreements, the following were to be dismissed: Petlura for military affairs, Sadovsky for justice, Stasiuk for food supply. Of the newer secretariats, trade and commerce and labor were kept while the transport, and post and telegraph were to be discarded. The original Instruction also provided that no fewer than four of the eight Secretaries were to be non-Ukrainian in nationality.⁸⁸ It must be kept in mind that the Controller-General, who does not seem to have been thought Secretary from the wording of the Instruction ('the General Secretariat shall include a Controller-General . . . who shall participate in the meetings of the General Secretariat with the right of a deciding vote') was non-Ukrainian at the time. The General Secretariat was also to be the legislative body for the region; it was to work out bills pertaining to the region and submit it to the Provisional Government; in the only reference to the Rada, it was stated that such bills 'may be presented to the Central Rada for discussion prior to being presented to the Provisional Government.' The authority of local government would be exercised by the Provisional Government 'through General Secretaries.' With this, the General Secretariat was losing control of local government, as the direct non-collegiate relationship would tend to make the separate Secretaries simply agents of the Provisional Government. On the other hand, the local government bodies turning to the General Secretariat would receive the 'orders and instructions of (the Provisional Government)' relayed by the General Secretariat. The offices would be filled by the appointments of the Provisional Government. However, the Secretariat could 'recommend candidates.' The Commissar for the Ukraine would be appointed 'by the Provisional Government,' and was not stated to be a member of the government. Finally, the Provisional Government informed the General Secretariat that 'in pressing and urgent matters' the higher governmental institutions and de-

partments would communicate their decisions directly to the local authorities, informing the General Secretariat of such instructions at the same time.⁹⁰ This last clause meant that the General Secretariat could be circumvented in any important issue or dispute. It was the goal of Kohoshkin, the Constitutional Democrat Minister in the new government, Controller General, and one of the best authorities on the constitution, 'to weaken as much as possible the harm done to Russia by the agreement of July 15,' in the words of his party colleague Milyukov.⁹¹ Milyukov also held that the new government was much less willing to give in to the Central Rada as the previous one. From this we must conclude that the Instruction was meant to limit the agreement of mid-July.

The Instruction called forth much criticism in Ukraine. The situation in Kiev was further complicated by a shooting incident where the Khmelnytsky Regiment, which was sent to the front, was attacked while entrained by the Government troops (Don Cossack Regiment), and suffered 46 casualties, 16 dead and 30 wounded.⁹² The criticism of the Instruction was general and was voiced by non-Ukrainians, in particular by Jewish parties. The Bund representative, Rafes, who had criticized the First Universal, protested.⁹³ Mickiewicz and Zarubin, the non-Ukrainian members of the General Secretariat, declared to the Provisional Government in Petrograd that 'a spirit of distrust rises in the Ukrainian nation' from the Instruction, and obtained certain alleviations. The number of obligatory non-Ukrainian members of the Secretariat was lowered from four to three. The Instruction concerning the direct contact circumventing the General Secretariat was not changed but it was stated that this was due to the war-time conditions. The appointment of a Commissar of the Ukraine and the 'definite delimitation of competence of the General Secretariat' would be done in agreement with the General Secretariat after the approval of its membership by the Provisional Government.

They were also told that, although the Instruction provided for four representatives of minorities (including Ukrainian), the Government would only insist on three representa-

tives, in the present agreement. Finally, they would approve the Secretariat immediately upon the submission of the list of Secretaries.⁹³

In the course of debates, the delegates of the Central Rada from the Chernyhiv, Kharkiv and Kherson gubernias expressed a protest against the separation of 'parts' of these gubernias from the Ukraine.

After extremely long debates, the Rada accepted the resolution that the Instruction had been dictated by distrust of the strivings of the Ukraine for democracy and that it was 'soaked with the imperialist tendencies of the Russian bourgeoisie' towards the Ukraine, and that it broke the agreement of July 15. The actual Instruction was ignored in the decision of the Rada; there was no statement of acceptance or non-acceptance. However, they decided to submit, 'from the number of 14 Secretaries, the 9 Secretaries mentioned in the Instruction, for the approval of the Provisional Government.' This was also the sense of the suggestion made by Rudnicki, on behalf of the Polish Democratic Centre, that the entire Secretariat should be approved by the Rada, while the 9 secretaries mentioned were to be submitted to the Provisional Government.⁹⁴ The resolution furthermore described the General Secretariat as responsible to the Central Rada. The Mala Rada and the Secretariat were to draft a statute defining the relations between 'the Rada and her General Secretariat.' The Secretariat was moreover authorised to draw up bills regulating labour, agrarian, food and educational matters. The Central Rada also decided to put before the Provisional Government the matter of 'war and peace'; thus the Rada refused to stop at the jurisdiction defined for the Secretariat. It was also decided to begin the preparatory work for the calling of the Constituent Assembly of the Ukraine and the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. The Rada finally decided, 'pointing out to all the fault of the Provisional Instruction,' to call the 'toiling masses of the nations' to an 'organized struggle for their interests and their union around the Rada'.⁹⁵

When Yefremov, on behalf of the Socialist-Federalists, asked in the Rada how the attitude towards the Instruction was to be understood, as the resolution said nothing of the acceptance of the Instruction, Vynnychenko answered, "It has been".⁶⁶ Porsh, speaking for the Ukrainian Social-Democrats who had moved the accepted resolution, said that the Instruction, where not being accepted, was still to be used as the basis for further struggle.⁶⁷ In the view of Vynnychenko, the Instruction had as its favourable elements the fact that this was 'the first step of our 'lawful . . . juridical-legal statehood'. The Instruction had the effect of uniting all Ukrainians from the outlying regions around the Rada.⁶⁸

The vote on the plenum of the full Central Rada resolution on the Instruction had come in the selection of alternate drafts, one drafted by the Ukrainian Social-Democrats and amended by the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, the other presented by the National Revolutionaries, a group in which the national interest prevailed over the social one. The National Revolutionaries suggested that the Rada simply express a protest in administrative fashion against the desire of the Provisional Government to partition the territory of Ukraine, and to authorize the General Secretariat to be guided in future only by the orders of the Central Rada. This resolution received only 21 votes. The more popular resolution gathered 247 votes, mainly Ukrainian-Democrats and a considerable part of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries. Some Socialist-Revolutionaries abstained. Russian Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) abstained, as did the Constitutional Democrats. Nationalist-Revolutionaries and 'Non-Party Socialists' voted against the resolution.⁶⁹ It seems that the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Jewish Bund, the United Jewish Socialist Party, the Poale-Zion, and possibly others voted for the Social-Democrat resolution of the Rada. It is of significance, that it was on this day, after the vote, that the Bolshevik representatives entered the Rada. Thus all political groups in the Ukraine, except those too minute to be considered, or those local in character, recognized the existence and authority

of the Ukrainian Land, and were integrated in its basic institution and legislature, the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The full Meeting of the Ukrainian Central Rada, after the vote on the Instruction, opened a new period in the developing Ukrainian state in deciding to call the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. It was this new period which terminated in the establishment of the actually independent Ukrainian National Republic, three months later. The Central Rada proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination, and that only the population itself could decide the question of the political order of the Ukraine and its relation to Russia; it considered that 'the calling of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly is indispensable.' The Central Rada was to immediately elect the commission for the determining of norms of representation.¹⁰⁰

The Rada also decided that the initiative to call the Congress of Federalist Nations was to be assumed by the Ukrainian Central Rada. The Congress would be charged with effecting the federalization of the Russian Empire.¹⁰¹ While taking part in negotiations with the Rada on the occasion of the Second Universal, a member of the Russian delegation, Tseretelli, had particularly urged that the Ukrainian Central Rada not undertake this means.¹⁰² With the passing of Tseretelli from the Provisional Government, an event which had caused the Rada to express its regrets formally,¹⁰³ the hands of the Rada were untied in this matter. And so the Rada took the road of full sovereignty for the Ukrainian Land through the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and the unilateral reconstruction of the Russian empire by means of non-Russian constitutional units and states, while maintaining the gains achieved so far—the constitution of the Ukrainian Land.

Establishment of the General Secretariat as the legal government of the Ukrainian Land, with a Rada as a legislature upon which the General Secretariat could base its power, opened the new stage in the development of the Ukrainian statehood. With the progressive dissolution of the Petrograd authority, the General Secretariat and the Central Rada were

gaining ever greater power in the Ukraine, supported as they were by largely united Ukrainian popular institutions, those representing the peasantry, the soldiery and, to some extent, the workers.

As the result of the struggle over the Instruction, and other more general grounds, the first Secretariat lost the confidence of the Rada. It resigned thereupon. Doroshenko was to form the new government, but his program was found to be too considerate of the Provisional Government's Instruction and he could not.¹⁰⁴ Vynnychenko again attempted to form a government. It is to be noted that the Instruction was no longer the issue. A crisis was seen to arise in the entire former Empire, while the conflict between Petrograd and Kiev was going on. The conservative forces gained new strength with the fright occasioned by the Bolshevik uprising, by the Ukrainian crisis, and by the defeats at the front. The Moscow Conference called by the Provisional Government, which the Rada refused to attend, took place on August 23; the Rada described the Conference as 'incapable of strengthening and deepening the gains of the Revolution—can further the counter-revolution!'¹⁰⁵

If the final break between democratic Ukraine and the Provisional Government is to be pin-pointed, it would probably fall in the period of the Moscow Conference. In his speech to the Conference, Kerensky, the Minister-President, stated that there were signs of the weakening of the international and national life of our free, revolutionary and democratic Russia.' The Provisional Government saw the weakening not only in the appeal for Peace by the Poles but also 'in the aspirations observed within the Russian State itself among some of the peoples who seemed to be indissolubly, vitally and permanently bound with the free democracy.' Referring to the non-Russian nations of the Russian Empire, Kerensky called, 'Why do we fail to hear your voices casting your lot with us unconditionally with no bargaining, in the fight for common freedom from a great terrifying despotism,' Hard as it was for the Russian people 'to bear this test of friendship which

failed in time of misfortune,' Russia would not retract 'what it had given.' After reference to Finland, Kerensky turned to the case of Ukraine and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict:

I do not wish to touch upon an intimate and fraternal strife. I have faith that the many millions of peasants, workers and urban masses, of brothers bound by blood ties and common faith—the Ukrainians—in spite of many grievances and differences, due perhaps to misunderstanding, will never follow the course which would justify our saying, 'And why, my brother, dost thou kiss me? And who gave thee thirty pieces of silver?'¹⁰⁶

The conclusion of the suggestion of the possible treason of Ukrainians was met with the applause of the assembly.¹⁰⁷ Some Ukrainian delegates attempted to protest against the statement of the Minister-President, but were not recognized by the chair after they identified the topic of their comments.¹⁰⁸

The Conservative element and the Bolsheviks, were gaining strength again. It was with the desire to embark at once on the new order, rather than to continue fighting for further concessions when the main step had been in fact taken, that the new Secretariat was formed by Vynnychenko, with a membership of 8 Secretaries, and 2 Vice-Secretaries according to the Instruction. Vynnychenko was the President and the General Secretary for Internal Affairs, Steshenko for Education, Tuhan-Baranovsky for Finance, Shulhyn for International Affairs, with his Associates, Silberfarb and Mickiewicz, Zarubin as General-Controller, Lototsky, as General Secretary and Stebnytsky as Commissar of the Ukraine with the Provisional Government.¹⁰⁹ The Rada sent the list to Petrograd for approval, and finally, following an intervention by Doroshenko, and after the Kornilov rebellion when Ukrainian support may have seemed of greater interest, the Provisional Government approved the list and so on September 14, 1917 the fully legal Government of the Ukrainian Land was recognized by the Provisional Government. The first meeting of the Secretariat was on September 20.

Two days later, in its Sixth Session, the Rada decided that the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly must be called, and elected a Special Commission to work out the elections law for its summoning, in understanding with the General Secretary for Internal Affairs and the bodies of local self-government.¹¹⁰

The Rada had also called the Congress of Representatives of Nationalities, to which there came representatives of Georgians, Lithuanians, Tartars, Latvians, Estonians, Belorussians, Moldavians, Jews, Don Cossacks, and Buryats. They were greeted by a representative of the Provisional Government, Slavinsky. A federative republic was demanded. However, although the Congress decided to form the Rada of Nationalities at the Provisional Government and the Rada of Nations with its seat in Kiev, headed by Hrushevsky, the Congress had little practical importance. The crisis in the country was reaching the high point and these measures, which would be of immense significance in more normal times to the formation of the Ukrainian state and its national role, at this time passed off with little effect.¹¹¹

It was only on October 10 that the General Secretariat gave a plan of action. The President of the Secretariat, presenting the program, defined three main tasks before the nations. First there was the achievement of union of the entire Ukrainian land and nation in one autonomous unit. Then, to see that representatives of the Ukraine were among the delegations at the peace conference. Most important for Ukrainian statehood, Vynnychenko announced that 'for the most true expression of the will of the democracy of the Ukraine' there were to be held the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for which the General Secretariat would prepare a bill.¹¹² The Mala Rada accepted the program and voted full confidence in the General Secretariat. Two weeks later, the Mala Rada held a debate on the consequences of the earlier Rada decision and finally concluded that, considering that the will of nations in the Ukraine for self-determination might be expressed only through the Constituent Assembly of the Uk-

raine (while the Rada was again underscoring the 'necessity of the unity of the federative Russian Republic'), and that the will expressed would be reconciled with that of the nations of Russia, expressed in a Russian Constituent Assembly, they were certain that the rights of nations of the Ukraine would be satisfied in full measure in the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Despite all the complicated language, it was plain that the Rada was indeed calling, with the initiative taken by the General Secretariat, the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly as an independent and sovereign body.¹¹³ The Provisional Government, in its meeting of October 30, considered the official information of the Public Prosecutor of the Kiev Court, S. Chabakov, that the Central Rada and the General Secretariat were preparing the calling of their own Constituent Assembly, and decided to call on the General Secretaries Vynnychenko, Zarubin and Steshenko at Petersburg, for explanations. At the same time, the Minister of Justice, Malyantonovych, sent the order by telegraph to the Public Prosecutor of the Kiev Court to immediately begin an investigation, and if the General Secretaries had indeed broken the law, to make them responsible as officials.¹¹⁴ When the Ukraine's Commissar with the Provisional Government was asked about this conflict, he stated that such repressions of the Secretaries were indeed possible but not of the Central Rada, as the first had been appointed by the Government and the second was the creation of the Revolution. Stebnytsky said that repressions were hardly in the interest of the state.¹¹⁵ The General Secretariat decided, in its meeting of November 3, to send the three secretaries to Petrograd for explanation of the conflicts and misunderstandings.¹¹⁶ The Bolsheviks threatened rebellion in Petrograd at the same time; Petrograd's policy was incomprehensible.

However, the Third All-Ukrainian Military Congress opened in Kiev the day before, classes of the various nations—in this case, the peasants and the soldiers—pledged their support of the institutions of the revolution, the Central Rada, the General Secretariat and the Autonomous Ukrainian Land.

As a post-script to the Instruction, we mention that the

Senate of Russia, in its hearing of October 15, 1917, refused to 'publish' the Instruction to the General Secretariat 'as proposed by the Ministry' on the basis that the General Secretariat was not established in law.¹¹⁷ Vynnychenko, in his somewhat unrestrained way, said that 'homerical laughter'¹¹⁸ greeted this incident in the Ukraine, and 'even' Russia. It was ignored.

On November 2, the All-Russian All-Cossack Congress opened in the city. Unlike the Ukrainian Congress, this one was poorly attended. Although 1,200 delegates had been expected, only 600 showed up. The Cossack Congress welcomed foreign consular authorities: Douglas from the British Consulate and Masaryk for the Czechs. Chairman Ageyev defined the main program of the Cossacks, which was not very promising to the Ukrainians. The first principle was 'a healthy statehood consciousness (*gosudarstvennost*) free from aggressiveness and unyielding to rumour and anarchy. The second principle was 'genuine democratism.' The 'statehood consciousness' meant, of course, faithfulness to the Russian state. Shulhyn addressed the Congress on behalf of the Rada. They were assured that the Ukraine was not striving towards 'independence.' Rather, she was after the same goal as Cossackdom: the right to 'build an independent life.' After drawing this rather scholastic distinction, Shulhyn declared that 'we were going the same way as you.'¹¹⁹ Cossacks might well wonder.

The Third All-Ukrainian Military Congress had opened on November 2. At the time of the opening, 965 delegates had arrived. Of these, 630 were Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, 101 Ukrainian Social-Democrats, 3 non-party Socialists, 23 Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists, 13 National-Revolutionaries, 21 Independents, 3 Confederalists, 8 Bolsheviks, 1 Anarchist, 82 non-party and 82 undetermined.¹²⁰ Ukrainian S.R.'s were about two-thirds of the Congress. The number of Bolsheviks was insignificant. As the Congress proceeded, further delegates arrived. The next issue of the newspapers counted a membership of 1,140 delegates. The proportion remained largely the same. Thus, the Ukrainian S.R.'s were now 783, Ukrainian S.D., 111, 'non-party Socialists,' 11, S.R.'s,

24, National-Revolutionaries, 13, there was still 1 Anarchist, 3 more Bolsheviks arrived to make 11, Independents, 24, while the undetermined decreased to 80.¹²¹ The total number to arrive reached 3,000 people elected from the various units of the front and rear, and the fleet.¹²² These members of the Congress had been elected by about 3,000,000 Ukrainian soldiery.¹²³

The Congress was opened (after a mass in Sophia Place) by the Chairman of the Organizational Committee, Neronovych, who invited the Congress to divide into fractions to choose candidates for the Presidium. The Independents protested against this division into parties (on the general principle that the Ukraine was one and indivisible), thus showing autocratic and somewhat totalitarian tendencies, to the mind of the largely Socialist-Revolutionary mass. After Independents were removed from the hall of the Socialist-Revolutionary fraction, Kovalevsky, as their speaker, attacked these tendencies. The Ukrainian people, he said, who were fighting for national as well as social liberty, should group themselves around the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Hetmans (bearers of unified, undivided power) were not needed by the Ukrainian people, for they would not sacrifice soil or freedom; the people required those who gave them these things to 'lead them to Socialism.'¹²⁴ The Presidium as finally elected had the 4 Socialist-Revolutionaries, Lebedynets, Shaulko, Blonsky and Chernets, the 2 Social-Democrats Sknar and Taburynsky, an Independent, Makarenko, the non-party Lorchenko and a National-Revolutionary, Kovalenko.¹²⁵ Neronovych was not included in the Presidium and is not seen to have taken further part in the Congress. The Congress was welcomed on behalf of the Central Rada by Hrushevsky, and on behalf of the General Secretariat by Vynnychenko. Hrushevsky was elected Honorary President of the Congress. It is significant that the Secretariat members were not elected, reflecting radically the national composition of the Congress and perhaps the feeling that the General Secretariat was moving too slowly in the strong currents of the time. Representatives

of the French and Rumanian military missions, and the Polish Socialist Party addressed the Congress as well. Vynnychenko hailed the Congress as 'foundation and adornment of the Ukraine' gathering support for the position of the General Secretariat in its planned journey to Petrograd. "We are not civil servants of the Provisional Government," he declared. He further stated that the General Secretariat had not been created by the Petrograd Government but by the power which thrust them forward. The Ukrainian Constituent Assembly had to express its will. If this was to be real sovereignty, he added, to general applause, let it be called such. The General Secretariat required plenitude of power. The Provisional Government was said to have lost its head, feeling no firm ground under it, which existed under the General Secretariat. Vynnychenko added surprisingly prophetic words: "We can, therefore, tell the Provisional Government, 'If you are going under, remember that there is one Government which feels itself full of power; do not put difficulties in its path.'"

Vynnychenko increased the demands for other non-Ukrainian provinces to be joined to the Ukraine—the process of accretion was declared to be too slow. He also demanded that control over the military be lodged in these nations. This was described as necessary for life itself; troops were leaving the front, plundering and destroying, and illegal alcohol 'was wreaking havoc in the villages; however, to all demands for power to prevent this, the Secretariat only got 'polemics on the "nationalization of the bayonets."'

Petlura appealed to the Congress to work hand in glove with the Central Rada. The Congress gave a tumultuous reception to Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko (not Magarenko, who attempted without success to explain the Independent position in his speech). The disposition of the Congress was expressed after Vynnychenko said the Secretariat demanded to know whether the Secretariat was to be made responsible for recent events, whether its credit was in jeopardy, if it was to go to Petrograd only for matters of the constitution and why the Provisional Government offered dementis. A roar rose from the floor as members called out that the General Secretariat 'must not go'

to Petrograd, but they were quietened by Vynnychenko.¹²⁶ The Congress continued its work.

It is characteristic that the last discussion led by the Rada for the duration of the Provisional Government was marked by conflict and utter frustration. Matsiyevich, the Vice-Secretary for Agrarian Affairs, reported on his trip to Petrograd, where he sought to obtain the approval of bills drawn up by the Agrarian Secretariat regarding the 'transfer of land to the control of the Soil Committees.' He was not successful. After some discussion, it was decided to submit the bill for approval of the next session of the Central Rada 'independently of examination in the formally constituted Land Committee' (probably to be dependent upon the Provisional Government); Vynnychenko and other Secretaries were urged to call upon the Provisional Government to approve the Bill.¹²⁷

The Secretaries, however, were not to meet the Provisional Government. They arrived in Petrograd in the middle of the Bolshevik coup and returned safely to Kiev; Vynnychenko assures us that the Petrograd Government intended to imprison them 'as was discovered later'; however, there is no further evidence for this.¹²⁸ The Provisional Government was dispersed by the Bolsheviks. Kiev, instead of being a source of strength to it was totally estranged. This may explain the fact that Ukrainian troops in Petrograd, though ready later to proceed against the Bolsheviks when repatriated to Kiev, did not raise their arms in defence of the Government, which was widely believed at the time to be about to proceed with criminal charges against the Government of the Ukraine, as embodied in its Secretaries.

The first decrees of the new Russian government seemed to indicate that the conflict between the Ukraine and the Russian state would not be alleviated. The new government, represented by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, led by Trotsky, issued three declarations on the morning of November 7, in which it proclaimed itself the government of the entire former Russian Empire. This was

in a fundamental conflict with the position of the Ukrainian Land.

The Military Revolutionary Committee described the immediate tasks to be: the 'immediate offer of a democratic peace, the disestablishment of landlords' property in soil, the establishment of the workers' control over production' and the formation of the Soviet Government. Any reference to the right of national self-determination was missing.¹²⁹ The same aims, with the addition of the one of the calling of the Constituent Assembly appeared in the declaration 'Revolution has Triumphed.' This declaration also stated that local government had passed into the 'hands of the Soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies.¹³⁰ The same claim with regard to local power appeared also in the declaration 'To the Rear and the Front'.¹³¹ This position contradicted that of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which considered all institutions in the Ukraine to be responsible to the Revolutionary Committee.

While the Provisional Government had not formally challenged the control of the General Secretariat over the gubernia commissars and over other bodies of government such as the *zemstvos* and soil committees, except for the functional and territorial limitations of the Provisional Instruction, it did try to sever local government from the Secretariat's jurisdiction (a few hours later, the Second All-Russian Congress directed the Soviets to establish relations with it, a policy the Radas would certainly resist).¹³² If power passed into the hands of the Radas of Peasants' Deputies in the gubernias, the hold of the Central Rada over the countryside would not weaken, but if it went to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the cities, Ukrainian interests would be threatened. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies in the Ukraine were dominated by Russians or Russian sympathizers. The hold of the Rada over its territory would be quite compromised by any control by these bodies, since the cities were centres of military and governmental power. Particularly in Kiev, the application of the principles of the Bolshevik government would probably have resulted in the control of the city by the Russian Mensheviks who,

together with the Constitutional Democrats and parties farther to the right, were the groups most inimical to the Rada; these might be supported by the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries. The same result would have been obtained in the vast majority of large cities in the Ukraine.

Combined with the strategic influence of the cities and the presence of the command centres of the Russian army, the Bolshevik principles, had they been applied in the Ukraine, would have meant extreme danger to the Ukrainian Land, Menshevik and Constitutional Democratic power. This result would have meant extreme danger to the Ukrainian Land, and would probably have had as a consequence the creation of a *Vendée* based upon a Russian-dominated Ukraine, assuming the survival of the Bolshevik regime in Petrograd.

The gulf between the Ukraine and the Russian Republic was becoming ever wider. Although the Declaration of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, approved early on November 8, stated that the government would 'assure all nations of Russia a true right of self-determination,'¹³³ the promise was not followed either by any statement of the principles of the policy on nationalities, or by the realization of these principles. Decrees of the Soviet of People's Commissars, approved by the Congress of the Soviets, made the break almost final.

One of the main demands of the Ukrainian Central Rada and of its subordinate bodies was that the Central Government be made responsible to the totality of 'representative bodies of the revolutionary democracy'; this was presented by the Rada to the Democratic Conference discussed earlier. The Soviet of People's Commissars was essentially composed of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. (Bolsheviks); it was formally constituted by the Second All-Russian Congress, without any reference to the 'representative bodies' such as the Rada.¹³⁴

The Decree on Peace conflicted with the views of the Rada in several aspects. For one thing, it was issued in the name of the Russian Government only, and not of the nations

of Russia. The Decree called for immediate negotiations for peace. This obviously meant the preservation of the existing front lines. One of the reasons for the greater fighting spirit of Ukrainians was the fact that the front line divided Western Ukraine (as part of Austria-Hungary) from Eastern Ukraine. The Decree meant the sacrifice of the Ukrainian claims for Galicia and Bukovyna.¹³⁵

The Provisional Government had recognized these claims to the South-Western territories by appointing, with the approval of the Rada, a Ukrainian, Doroshenko, as commissar for those territories of Galicia and Bukovina. Doroshenko was allowed to take part in meetings of Commissars of the Ukraine called by the Rada through 1917. The Decree did not directly provide for representatives of the Ukrainian nation at the Congress, as had been consistently demanded by the Rada; still, the way for such representatives seemed to have been kept open by the proviso that representatives of all 'nationalities or nations drawn into the war, or forced to take part in it' were to participate in the talks on peace.

However, the Decree which seemed to be completely unacceptable to the Ukraine was the Decree on the soil.¹³⁶ That Decree incorporated the Peasants' Order drawn up by *Izvestiya*, the official newspaper of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies. The order was Russian Socialist-Revolutionary in nature. Everything contained in the Order, as the expression of the will of the immense 'majority of aware peasants of all Russia' was proclaimed as a provisional law. The Radas (Soviets) of Peasant Deputies of all Ukrainian gubernias had broken off, the Soviet of Chernyiv being the last one, from the 'majority' referred to, as they considered that their will differed from that of the All-Russian body.

The Soviet provisional law on the soil opened with the statement that 'the question of the soil, in all its volume, may be solved only by the all-national Constituent Assembly.' This basic proposition of the law was rejected by Ukrainian Peasants in numerous decisions of the Central Rada, and of the various Gubernia Radas of Peasants' Deputies, as well as by

the First All-Ukrainian Peasants' Congress. As has been indicated in previous pages, the demands of the Ukrainian peasantry pointed towards a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly which was to decide the disposition of lands in the Ukraine.

The law also provided that all natural resources, forests and waters of 'common-state importance', as well as the animals and tools of such confiscated lands, were to pass into the ownership of the (Russian) state. The peasantry demanded that such resources of the Ukraine pass to Ukrainian institutions.

The entire soil would become part of the common-national Soil Fund. Its division among the toilers was to be effected by local and by central bodies (on the gubernia level). The right to the use of the land was granted to all citizens of the Russian state. The control of Ukrainian land by the All-Russian Soil Fund was specifically rejected by Ukrainian Peasantry. The formation of the All-Ukrainian Soil Fund was supported.

Perhaps the single most objectionable provision of the law was that authorizing settlement of 'surplus of population' in territories better provided with arable land. The law stated that such 'surplus' was subject to resettlement, at the expense of the state. The resettlement was to take place from territories where the soil fund would be insufficient for the 'satisfaction of the entire local population'; persons to be resettled were to be in this order: those willing, then the criminal members of communes, deserters and others, and finally by lot or agreement. The Ukrainian peasantry felt itself threatened by the massive resettlement of landless Russian settlers. Peasant bodies provided that any immigration was to be controlled by Ukrainians.

On the whole, the Decree on the Soil showed complete disregard of the desires of the Ukrainian peasantry. Since the Central Rada, the majority of which was Socialist-Revolutionary, consisted primarily of the peasantry, the Decree on the Soil brought the peasantry and soldiers even closer to it, despite their suspicion of the Social-Democrats and other mi-

norities in it. On the other hand, it made any serious rapprochement between the Ukrainian Land and the Russian Republic impossible, unless it were in the form of a confederation, or some sort of indefinite association.

Kiev learned of the Bolshevik coup at two o'clock on November 7. The United meeting of the Executive Committees of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies met immediately. Bolsheviks were a minority; however, Ukrainian Social-Democrats would not support Kerensky's Government as unreservedly as were the Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks were said to be pressing for the formation of a 'revolutionary committee and an uprising of workers and soldiers, to gain power,'¹³⁷ as claimed by Dora Itkind, a member of the Kiev Committee, in her later memoirs. However, the actual resolution is not given in any detail, and in view of the later behaviour of the Bolsheviks and lack of any indication as to whether the uprising was to take place in Kiev, Petrograd, Moscow or wherever, we must tentatively conclude that the uprising was not to be in the Ukraine; the evasiveness of the statement demands caution. Indirect evidence on this conclusion is proved by the disagreement in later polemics on the role of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, and that Dora Itkind was not likely to use such a general phrase in view of all the elements involved which shall become clear in the sequel, if a revolution in the Ukraine was indeed projected. This point must be left unresolved, until new material becomes available. It is also plain that the role of the revolutionary committee would be to 'call' upon workers and soldiers to rise in revolt rather than 'direct' a revolt, through armed and determined units, or compact groups. Zatonsky, another member of the Kiev Bolshevik Committee, stated that 'the strength of Bolsheviks in Kiev was still insufficient for open struggle.' 'There was no registry of available men, or any method of directing them.' Making bolder statements, Zatonsky said that the nearest fronts were under the 'strong influence of 'compromisers' (non-Bolshevik Russians), or of Ukrainian nationalists.'¹³⁸ Gamarnik, another Kiev Committee

member, ignored the first meeting, as did Ivanov,¹³⁹ and Zatonsky himself. Hence we may further conclude that the 'call to arms' was considered by Bolsheviks as a counsel of perfection rather than a direct order to certain units through a known chain of command (as had been done in Petrograd).

Whatever the exact nature of the 'call for an uprising', if at all, it existed the Executive Committee refused to endorse the Bolshevik resolution; the Ukrainian Social-Democrats abstained from supporting either the Menshevik-S.R. or the Bolshevik positions. No revolutionary committee was formed, but a 'Group of Seven' was formed of four democrats (1 Ukrainian Social-Democrat, and 3 Russian non-Bolsheviks) and three Bolsheviks.¹⁴⁰

The Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' Deputies also met; the question of election of three representatives to the Revolutionary Committee at the Council of Workers' Deputies was raised. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries insisted that election of the Revolutionary Committee be on the basis of proportionality. This was countered by Pyatakov's motion that the 'principle of homogeneity' be accepted. Pyatakov's motion was accepted 17 to 13 with Ukrainian Social-Democrats voting with the Bolsheviks. As the result of elections, the Revolutionary Committee of the Council finally consisted of two Bolsheviks and one Ukrainian Social-Democrat (Pyatakov, Sivtso, and Shmatok).¹⁴¹ Other fractions refused to take part in the vote. Thus the main party forming the General Secretariat was in a position to control the activity of the Revolutionary Committee.

In the meantime, the forces loyal to the Provisional Government attempted to rally. Kwiecinski, the Commander of Troops of the Kiev Military District, issued the Order to the 'Kiev Military District in the Theatre of Action'. The Order as well as its Address reminded it specifically that Kiev lay in the zone of martial law. The Commander called on all peaceful citizenry to go about their tasks; the troops 'remain in full readiness to come forward at the demand of the powers established by the Provisional Revolutionary Government for

the defence of order and the gains of the revolution' against the attempts at them by a small group of irresponsible persons and demagogues leading 'the country to ruin.' Public meetings were prohibited.¹⁴² The Commander was joined by the City Administration. These decided that the tasks of 'defence of the city from excesses and the support of the Provisional Government' were to be fulfilled by a specially empowered organ of the local government, a Special Committee. The City Administration itself was to issue an appeal calling for peace and the execution of the orders of the 'local military and civil powers.'¹⁴³ The two left it unclear in whom the power was lodged as the agent of the Provisional Government; the possible contenders would be the Commander, the Commissar of the Military District, the Commissar of the City, or even the General Secretariat. It is plain, however, that the military authority, recognized by the Administration (in placing 'military' before 'civil' power), took the initiative on behalf of the Provisional Government.

NOTES

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30. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
32. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 18.
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34. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 86-7.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
37. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 115-6; also Browder and Kerensky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 392-3.
38. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 92 n.
39. Browder and Kerensky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 389-90.
40. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 97-8.
41. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 116.
42. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 95.
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61. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.
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CHAPTER THREE

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

The decisive meeting for the Ukraine took place in the evening of November 7 at the session of the Rada. Representatives of various parties and organizations took part. It is of interest to examine the make-up of the meetings, as the attendance at the meeting and the making of common decisions, constituted the *de facto* acceptance of the authority of the Rada. In addition to the basic membership of the Small Rada, same representatives of organizations dependent on or associated with the Rada were present. Among such were the Ukrainian General Military Committee, the all-Ukrainian Radas of Workers' and Military Deputies, the Kiev Council of Soldiers' Deputies (led since summer by Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had half of the votes and the chairmanship of its Executive Committee),¹ and the Main Railroad Committee, where Ukrainians were predominant. There were also representatives of 'revolutionary organizations' of the cities of Kharkiv, the main city of the Left-Bank Ukraine, Ekaterynoslav, an important centre of the steppe region, and of Odessa, the city controlling all of the South and the Rumanian front. Here again was the appearance of the all-Ukrainian principle which gave the Rada its original strength. As we shall see in the sequel, the out-of-town representation was not by any means false. The Council of Workers' Deputies was also represented (its Executive currently had a democratic majority with Russian S.D.'s possessing the controlling balance),² as were Ukrainian S.D.'s, and S.R.'s, S.F.'s, and Russian S.R.'s and S.D.'s (Bolsheviks). The Mensheviks, however, seem to have been absent. Of the Jewish parties, there were represented the Bund and the United Jewish Socialist party.³

In the meeting, the situation in the Ukraine and the entire former Empire was discussed.

The Central Rada decided unanimously to form the *Revolutionary Committee* for the Defence of the Revolution in the Ukraine. The Committee has to direct (*rozporядzaty-sya*) all forces of the revolutionary democracy, and all bodies of government of the stated territory are subordinate to it as far as the defence of the Revolution goes. The Committee is responsible to the Ukrainian Central Rada and begins its activity immediately.⁴

The government's claim was all-inclusive, extending to both the central power in Kiev, and to local power. This appears from the statement that 'all bodies of government of the stated territory' were to be subordinate to the Committee.

Thus, Rafes took it for granted that local government in the Ukraine was to be directed by the Rada. This is conceded in a guarded manner by Zatonsky in the same Rada discussion: 'I shall add that we called upon the Land government of the Central Rada not to refuse to let the power pass to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in all localities.'⁵ That such an important claim could be discussed in the form of an aside ('I shall add') and so not to be discussed thoroughly, implies that the speaker could hardly expect that he would be taken seriously with this interpretation. Furthermore, the statement does not present the 'calling upon' (*prizyvat*) as an agreement. Unlike the previous form, 'it was said', which did imply general agreement, the unilateral appeal expressed in 'called upon' does not constitute agreement, even in the claim of Zatonsky. The statement of Zatonsky was commented upon by Maevsky in the Rada meeting in a form definitely meant for history and so we will record it:

'Yesterday, it was definitely determined (*ukazyvalos'*) that the Central Rada cannot allow (*dopustit'*) local government in the Ukraine to be grasped by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.'⁶

Zatonsky's claim to limit the Rada to Land government as part of the agreement of entrance of the Bolsheviks into the Committee conflicts with the fact that in order to make such a

concession to any body, the Rada would in fact be obliged to submit to some sort of condominium. Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, and particularly in Kiev, possessed very little actual armed force and enjoyed little moral support. The lack of support was evident in various elections as well as in the fact that in Kiev proper, after leading a precarious existence for months, the Bolshevik newspaper *Sotsial-Demokrat* finally folded a few days before the meeting. If, however, the Bolsheviks had indeed possessed such powers, they would have been eligible for a much stronger representation in the Committee than they in fact possessed (3 of close to 30 members).

The policy of the Committee was laid down in the Proclamation the Committee issued to the population, in the name of its constituent parts and, primarily, itself. The Committee stated that there 'is a struggle in the streets of Petrograd between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.' Thus the Committee was mainly concerned with the maintenance of the status quo in the Ukraine and refused to comment upon the significance of events.

Most important, the Revolutionary Committee, responsible to the Ukrainian Central Rada, extended its power to the entire Ukraine, in the same Proclamation:

The power of the Committee which has united all organs of the revolutionary democracy, all revolutionary and Socialist parties of our land, Ukrainian as well as non-Ukrainian ones, is extended over the entire Ukraine, over all nine gubernias, those of Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia, Poltava, Chernyhiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Katerynoslav and Tauria.⁷

At the same time, the Committee issued the 'Obligatory Order,' in which it stated that all 'pogroms, riots and disorder will be suppressed unmercifully by all means at the disposal of the Committee,' including armed force. It also stated that it would suppress 'counter-revolutionary agitation,' agitation on national grounds, and calls for rioting on the pretext of food problems. Public meetings 'under the open skies' were prohibited until further notice.⁸

All the organizations which had taken part in the meeting were represented in the Committee. The fact must be underlined that no collegiate body was created, as the announcement stated that the Committee was formed by the Rada alone. Nine members were from the Rada directly; the rest from various parties and organizations. There were at least twelve members belonging to various Ukrainian parties (Tkachenko, Porsh, Sevriuk, Shapoval, Kovalevsky, Nikovsky, Matushevsky and Petlura—from the Ukrainian General Military Committee, Shumytsky, Telezhynsky, Kasyanenko and Pisotsky), three were from Jewish parties (Rafes, Silberfarb, Goldelman); a Russian Socialist-Revolutionary (Saradzhev), and three Bolsheviks (L. Pyatakov, on behalf of the Rada—Zatonsky and Kreyzberg) were also members.

Thus, the parties representing the vast majority of the population were represented in the Committee. All important Ukrainian parties, Ukrainian Social-Democrats, Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists, were represented. The Jewish Socialist parties were represented, as were also the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks).

The groups which were largely inimical to the establishment of Ukrainian power, as shown by their failure to rally to the united Committee, are seen to be on the whole of two kinds. On the one side were the Russian Social-Democrats (Mensheviks). They were quite important for they dominated, or were influential in, the main Council of Workers' Deputies in Ukraine, including Kiev, as well as Kharkiv, Katerynoslav and Odessa, as distinct from the Radas of Workers' Deputies, where such existed. Although Mensheviks were in a minority in the Kiev Soviet, the Chairman was a Menshevik. Their failure to cooperate, or to take responsibility for the Committee, may be explained by their radicalism in the devotion to the ideal of a proletariat without nationality (the Russian proletariat was considered to be such, while the Ukrainian proletariat was seen as national). In this, the Mensheviks broke with the Bolsheviks,

whose position in the national problem appeared to be much less doctrinaire or radical, although admittedly opportunist.

The socialist radicalism of the Mensheviks on the national question aligned them with the conservative Russian groups, and with Czecho-Slovak groups (of the former prisoners-of-war), and other Slav groups, who saw their future as connected with the survival of a unified Russian state. Conservative Ukrainian groups, such as Independent, were much too weak in the matter of party organization, but could be expected to support the Rada, while conservative Jewish groups were of very small number, on the national scene, and were hardly to be noticed. (The considerable number of Russian-assimilated Jewish people may be more conveniently regarded as Russians; such were quite numerous among the Mensheviks, as, for instance, the Kiev leader Balabanov.) The conservative Russian groups included Constitutional Democrats and the Bloc of Russian Electors, a group led by V. Shulgin, the editor of *Kievlyanin*, with Monarchist leanings. Even further to the right would be various Russian Monarchist, pietist or anti-Semitic bodies such as the Black Hundred Alliance, the Alliance of the Two-Headed Eagle, and the Alliance of Archangel Michael.⁹

The serious nature of the challenge to the Committee will become plainer with the examination of results in the municipal elections in the city of Kiev, the latest general election, held in August.

Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social-Democrats, and Socialist-Federalists had obtained only under 21 per cent of the vote. Jewish parties (without the Bund) brought in 6 per cent (10,964 votes), just a few votes more than the Bolsheviks, 6 per cent (9,520 votes). The Polish parties brought in about 6 per cent (10,515 votes), also more than Bolsheviks. It is impossible to determine exactly the Bund and Russian Socialist-Revolutionary vote as against the Mensheviks, since these three parties had formed a bloc which fetched a plurality of 37 per cent. If the vote can be assumed to have fallen more or less equally among the three groups, we would have

about 25 per cent going to the Jewish Bund and the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries. The total approximate vote of the parties which were to support the Revolutionary Committee three months later embraced approximately two-thirds of the voters.

On the other hand, the parties indifferent or hostile to the Revolutionary Committee included the Bloc of Russian Electors, fetching 15 per cent of the vote, the Constitutional Democrats with 9 per cent and the Mensheviks, whose vote was probably in the same range. (The Menshevik vote was substantial throughout this period, as witnessed by their continued control of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies). These groups, then, were controlling a probable one-third of this vote.¹¹ As the strength of these parties seems to have remained quite unchanged in the period after the July events, about one-third of the population of the city was not represented in the Committee. It is indicative that this one-third was not Bolshevik, but rather conservative and Socialist. Above all, their uniting characteristic was their Russian character and their support of a Russia one and indivisible. It was this group, represented in various degrees in the larger cities in Ukraine, that was seen by the Central Rada as the main danger to the Ukrainian Land at this time.

While the right was considered to be most dangerous, the threat from the left was also recognized. After all, it was the Russian Social-Democrats (Bolsheviks) who were attempting to take power in Petrograd. Bolsheviks were generally known as extreme centralizers; Bolsheviks in Kiev, in particular, being faced with the immanent establishment of Ukrainian identity, had taken positions opposed to it.

The ease with which Ukrainians dismissed the danger from the left, and the reason why the subsequent events seem to have justified their policy, is a result of the weakness of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine.

Their fundamental weakness, because of the national and social make-up of the Ukraine and of her classes, has been discussed in the previous chapters. It remains for us to examine

the actual situation and policy of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine on the eve of the rebellion in Petrograd, and in the first stages of the rebellion.

The Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik) was hardly conscious that it was in the Ukraine as such. Lapchinskiy, one of the leaders of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, wrote in his memoirs that the Bolsheviks, in 1917, were taught by their party experience that 'there were three *oblasts*' in the 'South of Russia', those of Kiev (South-Western), of Odessa (Southern Right-Bank Ukraine, Bessarabia and the Crimea) and of Kharkiv (Kharkiv gubernia, the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast and part of Don lands). Only those who had come from a Ukrainian Socialist party had 'some idea that the Ukraine was an entity' but of such there had been 'very few' among the Bolsheviks.¹¹

This situation was prevalent in the system of the Bolshevik party organizations in the Ukraine, finally recognized in the Sixth Congress of the Bolsheviks, held in August in Petrograd. The delegates from Ukraine were separated into two independent oblast organizations on the motion of Sverdlov, a member of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. Recognized were the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast, including 'Tahanroh, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Rostov-on-the-Don and other (centres)', and the Southern Oblast ('Odessa with district and Kiev with district'). The two oblasts were constituted with a disregard of national characteristics.¹²

It was this organization, then, which was to stand against the united and centralized bodies of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Each of the oblasts had its Oblast Committee entirely independent as to each other. The division, however, went much further. The Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Bolsheviks were concerned primarily with the workers, mostly of Russian nationality, in the coal basin of Donets-Kryvyi-Rih. The area of this oblast, organized on the basis of economic unity of the basin, included much of purely Russian or Russian Cossack element; the Russian influence was paramount, and the national problems of the Ukraine were correspondingly ignored.

The Southern Oblast, or the South-Western Oblast as it was to be called, was purely Ukrainian territory, with the pre-vaillingly agricultural character. It was somewhat conscious of the national problem, and thus somewhat better equipped to counter the appeal of the Ukrainian Central Rada. However, it was comparatively weak. As the centre of the South-Western Oblast lay in Kiev, it was this group which had to bear the main brunt of the Rada power.

Kulik, a leading member of the Kiev Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. (Bolshevik) said in his memoirs that neither the South-Western Oblast nor 'any other party organization of the Ukraine' had put the 'problem of Ukrainian proletarian statehood' on the order of the day.¹³

Nor was the organization of the South-Western Oblast able to establish Soviet power. The South-Western body was on the whole quite weak, nor was it able to command the respect of presumably the most important organization in it, the Kiev body. The Kiev organization, in their numbers, was greater than the rest of the entire Oblast. According to Kulik again, the Kiev organization thought of Kiev, not as a centre of the Ukraine, or even of the oblast, but primarily as another larger city in the Russian Republic. Hence the Kievans had little interest in the Oblast. The Kiev organization refused to give up its more effective workers for the Oblast. Usually, it held itself ambivalent to the decisions of the Oblast, for the most part abstaining from voting in the Oblast conferences. It had even abstained on the question of the desirability of an uprising supported by the South-Western Oblast (at the Fourth Conference). The Kiev Committee refused to cooperate with the Oblast in the publication of a newspaper, with the result that the Oblast did not have its newspaper, virtually a necessity for political influence. Not overly strong itself, the Kiev Committee saw its newspaper *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of the Social-Democrat) finally collapse, shortly before the Bolshevik rebellion, after a series of protracted crises.¹⁴

Failing to obtain support from the Kiev organization, the South-Western Oblast also found none in the province at large.

Its influence was limited, in particular, to the cities. As Ivanov, a member of the Kiev Committee, stated, 'villages were left completely at the disposition of the Central Rada' in 1917. His colleague Kulik, agreed that provincial organizations on the Right-Bank Ukraine were few in number and with rare exceptions, did not exert decisive influence upon the political life surrounding them. 'If their influence was felt in the cities, it failed completely to extend itself in the villages.'¹⁵

The situation in the cities themselves was not favorable. The larger cities in the Oblast had not had Bolshevik parties at all throughout 1917, right up to the Bolshevik rebellion. Thus Odessa, Nikolaev, Elisavethrad, Kherson, the most important cities of the South-Western Ukraine, had united Social-Democratic organizations through most of 1917. The same was true in Poltava (where the Bolshevik organization was formed only in October) and Chernyhiiv.

Thus, the South-Western Oblast, which, according to its leader, Bosh, was inclined to support an uprising, did not have any serious backing in the area. It could rest only upon one major armed unit, the 2nd Guard Corps, based at the railroad centre of Zhmerynka. (Even here, the support was not overly strong; the Corps was disarmed without much struggle by Ukrainian troops in Winter).

Most of the committees in the provinces were drawn, not from a settled working element, but from passing soldiers. Often, deserting soldiers accepted the Bolshevik party labels, according to Manilov, a Bolshevik historian of the Revolution. This element was very unpredictable. Organizations often had no continuity in policy, nor were its members steady in their persuasions.

Still, there was another influence greatly weakening the South-Western Oblast Committee: the apparent lack of confidence in it by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. (B.), which did not inform it of the planned uprising in Petrograd. (Nor did it tell the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Committee.) The only serious hint was contained in the letter of the Secretariat of the Central Committee to the South-Western Committee on

October 20 where the leader, Bosh, was told that 'we stood on the threshold of important events'. The possibility was not excluded of calling some detachments from the front, as had happened in the days of July 16-18th, the time of the Bolshevik uprising.¹⁶ However, in the next communication of November 3rd, the Secretariat completely ignored the question of the planned uprising. Instead, the Oblast was urged to organize a Military Bureau at the Oblast Committee. The Secretariat also expressed agreement with the proposition of Bosh to create a 'common newspaper for the entire front'.¹⁷ The reference to the newspaper implied, in particular, that no urgent activity was expected. The organization of the Military Bureau of Oblast was a long-range program. The total disorientation of the South-Western Oblast Committee is seen particularly in the fact that the Committee issued an appeal to the Bureau on the second day of the Bolshevik uprising, November 7, before the news of the uprising had come to Kiev. The appeal stated that the Military Bureau had been organized and was already at work; membership cards had been printed and were being sent out to all groups. All party members were called upon to organize military cells and to contact the Bureau. A conference of the Military Organizations of the South-Western Front was being projected for the near future. The appeal finished by asking for the 'creation of a strong oblast military organization'.¹⁸ It is evident that the Oblast Committee was not planning any uprising in the Ukraine.

The Central Committee also tried to weaken the South-Western Oblast Committee, in the period immediately preceding the Bolshevik rebellion. Thus the Secretariat of the Central Committee informed the Committee on October 15 that, in their opinion, it would be more to the point to include only the Kiev, Chernyhiv, Poltava, Volhynia and Podolia gubernias in the South-Western Oblast. This area was identical to the territory of the Autonomous Ukrainian Land created by the Instruction of the Provisional Government, testifying to the continuity of policy of Russian democracy and of the Russian Bolsheviks. The gubernias of Kherson and Tauria, with

Bessarabia, were to form a separate Southern oblast.¹⁹ The Oblast Committee ignored the direction and, in reply, asked what was to be done in regard to certain events on the Rumanian front (which was closely connected with the Kherson gubernia, and thus within the new Southern Oblast).²⁰ The Secretariat pointed out on November 3 that the contacts of the Rumanian front lay with Odessa (of the Kherson gubernia) and not with Kiev, and so the decisions about which Kiev inquired had been forwarded to Odessa.²¹ Thus, the South-Western Committee was cut off from the south of Ukraine, and limited to the territory proclaimed by the Instruction. This, however, meant an extraordinary weakening of the South-Western Oblast organization. The actual power of the Committee to organize any uprising against the Rada was gravely compromised.

The Central Committee did in fact write the Odessa Committee in regard to the Rumanian front, on November 5, the eve of the uprising, without any hint of expected events.²² On November 7, the Secretariat wrote to the Odessa Committee on an inconsequential matter (behaviour of a party member), without any reference to events.²³ The Southern Oblast Committee was not prepared nor did it undertake any violent action in the circumstances, joining the South-Western and Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Bolshevik bodies in this.

Nor was the Ukrainian Central Rada seriously threatened by the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast organization of Bolsheviks, based upon Kharkiv. The Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast body was quite moderate in its policy, and unwilling to take serious radical action against non-Bolsheviks, according to Antonov, a member of the Soviet of People's Commissars.²⁴ The Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast Committee was not interested in the events of Kiev, or in Central and Western Ukraine. Its interests were regional; It was in this area that the main strength of the Bolsheviks was based. Associated with this was the rather moderate attitude towards non-Bolshevik groups in Kharkiv and the surrounding regions, which acted in the Rada's favour. The Bolsheviks could conceivably have counted on the sup-

port of Russian Social-Democrats, (Mensheviks), who prevailed in the Workers' Soviets, and of Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, in the attempt to partition the Ukraine, and to strengthen in such fashion the bonds of the region with Russia proper. These latter had created the region as a separate unit in the first place (in April 1917), and caused the Provisional Government to appoint a Commissar (refused to the Ukraine) to this Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast.²⁵ The Bolshevik policy was in fact a continuation of that of the Provisional Government. The short-range effect of the policy of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Bolsheviks was lack of interest in Kiev events, and relative peace, in Kharkiv and elsewhere.

The position of the Kiev Committee itself remains to be examined. It was mentioned earlier that the Kiev Committee was not interested, on the whole, in events further than the city of Kiev. Was it concerned with the overthrow of the Rada and the taking of power in Kiev proper? This is a debatable question. Kulik, a member, stated unreservedly that there had been no detailed plan of the uprising either discussed or accepted in the Kiev Committee.²⁶ In the absence of definite indications by others and in view of the statement of Kulik, it must be concluded that no uprising in support of the one in Petrograd had been planned by the Bolsheviks.

The Ukrainian Land, having broken with the Provisional Instruction, and exerting its authority independently of any other source, had become a self-governing country.

The balance of forces behind the Revolutionary Committee of the Ukrainian Central Rada was threatened by the officials of the civil and military authorities of the Provisional Government. The conflict seems to have been spearheaded, or at least countenanced, by the Russian Mensheviks. Kirienko, who had succeeded Oberuchev as the Commissar of the Kiev Military District for the Provisional Government, and a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Menshevik), prevented Lototsky, a member of the General Secretariat, and in Vynnychenko's absence, the head of the General Secretariat,²⁷ from communicating with Petrograd.²⁸ (Three

General Secretaries, including the Head of the Secretariat, were in Petrograd at that time.)

The conflict was further fed by the arrests of the commissars of the Revolutionary Committee by Kirienko.²⁹ Kwiecinski, the Commander of the Kiev Military District, also 'took measures for the defence with armed force of all governmental and civic buildings of the city of Kiev'.³⁰ The conflict expressed itself in the establishment of rival sentries before the various buildings, by the Revolutionary Committee and by the Command of the Military District.³¹ The troops reputed to be Bolshevik took part in these events.

Petlura, a leading member of the Ukrainian General Military Committee, and of the Revolutionary Committee, as well as the unofficial General Secretary for Military Affairs (the post was abolished through the acceptance of the Provisional Instruction), attempted to solve the conflict. The delegation led by him was met by the representatives of the Provisional Government, consisting of Kirienko as the Command Commissar, Kwiecinski, the District Commander, and Vasilenko, the City Commander. These stated that they could not recognize the Land Revolutionary Committee in view of the presence of Bolsheviks in the Committee.³²

The meeting of the Mala Rada on November 8 was devoted to the discussion of the conflict. The meeting was a stormy one. It was interrupted at one point by the news that the Third All-Ukrainian Military Congress, all able-bodied soldiers and officers, in the number of some 3,000 well-armed men, had formed themselves into a regiment and was ready to carry out commands of the Rada. The Mala Rada accepted the offer, and appointed its own commissars to the Congress regiment.³³ Another interruption was of a different kind; representatives of the Cossack Congress, which had also formed a regiment came to the meeting presumably at the service of the Kiev Military Command, since the Congress included representatives of the various Cossack military units stationed in Kiev. The representative of the Cossacks said they did not intend to concern themselves with matters of local autonomy,

but asked that they be permitted to take the common-state matters into their hands, in order to save the country from complete anarchy.³¹ Echoing the demand of Ryabtsev, the City Mayor, a Menshevik, demanded that the Rada give 'a definite answer to the existing situation', in reference to the Bolsheviks.

The position of the Ukrainian parties was presented by Social-Democrats Tkachenko and Porsh, who told the Cossacks that there could not be any 'coalition with the bourgeoisie'; power was to pass into the hands of the revolutionary democracy, which did not mean at all to transfer it into the hands of the Radas of Workers' and Soldiers' and Deputies.³²

The representative of the Bund, Rafes, led the main move against the Bolsheviks. He considered that a resolution must be passed by the Rada which would state that it would consider the uprising harmful at the given moment. The Bolsheviks were in the Committee because they had declared that they would not undertake any uprisings in the Ukraine. Speaking on behalf of the Bolsheviks, Zatonsky said that the sympathies of the Bolsheviks were on the side of the Petrograd uprising; if the Rada was to merge with the Bund, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries (Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries were obviously meant), in that case the Bolsheviks had no business to be in the Rada.³³

The position of the Command can be gathered from Kwiecinski's telegram to the military authorities, where he stated that he was ready to coordinate his actions with Ukrainians, on the condition that they 'separate themselves from the Bolsheviks' and remove Ukrainian troops from the street, and not interfere with the command of troops. Ukrainians were in the process of transferring weapons from the artillery arsenal to Ukrainian troops and to 'workers'; a Don Cossack regiment which had been assigned to guard the arsenal refused obedience and left its position. As the Rada took the point of view, in the discussions, that the Provisional Government was no longer in existence, Kwiecinski felt that a conflict with Ukrainians was inevitable.³⁷

In the Mala Rada, two resolutions were presented for ap-

proval. The resolution moved by Tkachenko, a Ukrainian Social-Democrat, and obviously on behalf of the Ukrainian parties, was quite moderate in its condemnation of the Bolsheviks. The resolution moved by Saradzhiev, a Russian Socialist-Revolutionary, on behalf of government power three weeks before the Constituent Assembly, was unacceptable; the Rada expressed itself as decisively against the forcing of the will of the minority upon the majority of the revolutionary democracy. This resolution was rejected.

Tkachenko's resolution, strengthened by an amendment by Rafes (approved by Tkachenko) that any attempt in the Ukraine to support the uprising would be fought against, was finally accepted. Another amendment by Rafes, which described the uprising as 'Bolshevik' and which 'condemned' it, was rejected. Tkachenko had protested against the amendment as the 'coalition Provisional Government was responsible for the uprising in a greater degree (than the Bolsheviks) in their class bourgeois tactics and the imperialist drawing out of war'.²⁰

The resolution of the Rada on the Bolshevik coup, as finally accepted, stated that it recognized that the power in the entire state, as well as in each separate Land, was to pass into the hands of the entire revolutionary democracy, and considered the passing of this power into the hands of the Radas (Soviets) of workers and soldiers' deputies, who were only a part of the revolutionary democracy, unacceptable; the Rada further 'expressed itself against the uprising in Petrograd and would fight energetically against all attempts to support rebellion in the Ukraine'.

Despite the verbal distinctions drawn by some members of the Rada, the resolution constituted a clear condemnation of the Bolshevik rebellion. With this resolution, the conflict between the Rada and the Command, as well as between the Rada and some conservative groups, was settled. The Mala Rada voted to include into the Revolutionary Committee representatives of the Cossack Congress of the City Duma, dominated by Mensheviks and Constitutional Democrats of the

Poale-Zion, which had been represented only through the individual representation of the Jewish *Folkspartay*, and most important, a representative of the Command of the Kiev Military District.³⁹ An important source of support was obtained in the Kiev Committee of Mensheviks. The Duma was recognized as the power in Kiev, while the Mensheviks recognized the General Secretariat for the Land approved by the Provisional Government.⁴⁰

As the result of the condemnation, the Mala Rada and the Revolutionary Committee as well as the large Rada, lost their Bolshevik representation. Yuri Pyatakov announced the withdrawal from the Mala Rada in the meeting itself. There was a hint of disapproval of the Petrograd rebellion in his announcement, since he declared himself to have been against the uprising of the Paris proletariat, but as the Paris Commune had been established, he approved. This was apparently not the case here. In condemning the uprising, the Rada had struck against the proletariat and troops of Petrograd. Still, Pyatakov promised, when the Rada 'was perishing under the blows of Russian imperialism' (which was being strengthened now, presumably), they would find Bolsheviks on their side 'with weapons in arms'.⁴¹ The declaration was welcomed with 'loud applause'.⁴² Leaving the Rada meeting, Pyatakov stopped Kovalevsky, the leader of Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and told him in the way characteristic for the time, "Well, comrade Mykola, our ways part, but it may be that we shall meet yet in the struggle against imperialism on the same side of the barricades."⁴³ Both these declarations point to a genuine recognition of the fact that at this stage, both the Ukrainians and the Russian bolsheviks in the Ukraine were being threatened by the same enemy. While the Russian bolsheviks in Kiev may as opportunists have considered Ukrainians as allies; the same does not appear to hold for Ukrainians. We have no evidence of a declaration of friendly support to Bolsheviks by any leading Ukrainian personality.

The Revolutionary Committee, enlarged by representatives of the Cossacks, the Duma, the Command, and the Men-

sheviks, was held immediately after the meeting of the Mala Rada, in the early hours of November 9. The control of the actions of the Command was agreed on unanimously; the representative of the Command abstained. The control was to be effected by a special Commissariat, the majority of which was to consist of members of the Rada or bodies under Rada influence. No orders of the Command were to be issued without the sanction of the Commissariat, while the orders in regard to Ukrainian troops were to be realized through the Ukrainian General Military Committee. Kirienko was to surrender his functions to the Commissariat. As the Commissariat was formed by the Revolutionary Committee, which was itself responsible to the Ukrainian Central Rada, it appears that the Command was being placed under the control of the same body. The Command of the Kiev Military District refused to accept the decision of the Revolutionary Committee. Resistance to the authority of the Revolutionary Committee of the Ukrainian Central Rada became polarized around the Kiev Command as the conflict in Kiev continued; the Bolsheviks also appeared as enemies. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Land had succeeded in attracting to its support all significant Ukrainian forces, and most of the democratic Russian groups (including Mensheviks), as well as Jewish forces.

Some leaders of the General Secretariat, headed by Lototsky, attempted to reach a compromise with Kwiecinski. Shulhyn reported that Kwiecinski was wavering, but the arrival of Czecho-Slovak troops led by Grigoriev, the Commissar of the Provisional Government over the South-Western front, made agreement impossible.⁴⁴ The Czecho-Slovak troops were joined by a newly-summoned Cossack division.⁴⁵ With these, there arrived Battalions of Death, élite troops of the Provisional Government. In all, seventeen trains of loyal troops had been despatched from the South-Western front.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the Rada of the Ukrainian Military Congress sent their commissars to the 'Ukrainian corps on the front with the aim of transporting them to Kiev,' in the words of the Command Commissar of the Provisional Government.⁴⁷

The Highest Command of the Russian Army associated itself with the Kiev Command. Vyrubov, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, wired from the Stavka to Vynnychenko that the 'Bolshevik rebellion had been liquidated everywhere,' while no measures to realize the Rada resolution directed against the Bolsheviks had been taken in Kiev. Asking that order be re-established in Kiev through the authority and forces of 'Rada and Commissariat', the Command warned that in the case of 'insufficiency of local forces, troops would be sent'.⁴⁸

The Cossack Congress passed completely to the side of the Provisional Government. The Cossacks decided that the central governing (*rukovodyashchee*) body in Kiev and the Land was to be the Command of the Kiev District acting closely with the Commissar of the Provisional Government, Kirienko. It also held that it could 'not be indifferent to the situation in Ukraine as half of the Cossack troops were stationed there'. Therefore the Congress proclaimed that it took power in Kiev into its own hands so that the action of the Congress could be coordinated with the Command and Kirienko.⁴⁹ Thus, the most pro-Russian forces in Kiev and the Ukraine had become consolidated. The Command and the Commissar silently acquiesced in the decisions.

Although Ukrainian authority prevailed in Kiev and the Ukraine, the unclear situation was becoming intolerable, especially in view of the progressive dissolution of solid authority in the North. In Kiev too, the balance created by the Revolutionary Committee was upset, with consequent polarization of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

The situation in Kiev was described in the meeting of the Duma of that day by member Sinkovskiy:

The mood in the city has become crystallized. It has become clear by all external characteristics that military forces are not united in the city, but represent two hostile camps. It is sufficient to observe the picture superficially, of the Command and the Central Rada, in order to become persuaded in this. Both institutions represent armed camps,

surrounded by units of troops, machine-guns, armoured automobiles, etc.⁵⁰

In the vacuum of power which had arisen through the helplessness of the Revolutionary Committee and with the return of Vynnychenko, the General Secretariat came out from its comparative obscurity. It had been much weakened by the absence of Vynnychenko; and the rise of the Revolutionary Committee. In its meeting of November 8, the General Secretariat dealt with the question whether it could still be considered to exist after the fall of the Provisional Government, but no decisions were made then.⁵¹ Its declaration establishing the claim to govern was on the whole quite moderate; it repeated in essence the resolution of condemnation of the Bolsheviks, but referred to the Provisional Government as the body which had affirmed the General Secretariat as the higher power in the Land, created by the Central Rada.⁵²

The Rada, however, decided to maintain its authority in the land without any reference to the Provisional Government. Porsh reported on the breakdown of negotiations with the Kiev Command. The Command had been willing to establish unity of action in the defence of order in Kiev and the District, but it rejected the idea that its representative in the Revolutionary Committee should be bound by the decisions of the Committee, as well as the establishment of a controlling Commissariat over the Command in place of Kirienko.

The Cossack claims were discussed too. Hrushevsky commented that if the Cossack Congress was not to issue a public dementi, the Ukraine would break with the Cossacks. The Rada thereupon decided that the general direction of governmental branches should be concentrated in the hands of the General Secretariat. The direction of military affairs would be entrusted to the Command of the District under the control of the Commissariat. In such manner the Rada issued a challenge to the Kiev Military Command this time on its own behalf. The Ukrainian Central Rada was assuming all power. The Revolutionary Committee, on being rebuffed by the Command, had decided to stop its activity to call the meeting of the Mala

Rada, and to propose there that the Committee be dissolved. The decision was pushed through by votes of all Ukrainian parties, against the votes of the non-Ukrainian representatives.⁵³ The net result of the decisions was to strengthen the Ukrainian element, as the Mala Rada was closer identified with Ukrainian aims than the Revolutionary Committee, and as its membership was Ukrainian to a greater degree.

The policy of the Russian Social-Democrats (Bolsheviks) was largely non-committal at this point. The strain of conflicting influences was, however, showing a break-down in unity of policy. The Kiev Bolshevik Committee stated in its declaration that the workers and soldiers of Kiev should close their ranks for the support of workers and soldiers in Petrograd, and 'for the struggle against the counter-revolution.' Events in Kiev were not referred to specifically. This equivocal appeal could have been held to apply to the current crisis; in this case, the Bolsheviks might seem to be supporting the Central Rada against the Command of the Kiev Military District, that is, the 'forces of Russian imperialism' referred to earlier by Pyatakov. This is the later interpretation by him in his message to the Soviet of People's Commissars on November 15.⁵⁴

The appeal also stated that only workers and soldiers united around their revolutionary Soviets, having taken power in their hands could give the suffering masses peace, bread and freedom.⁵⁵ This declaratory principle was also presented equivocally; it is not clear where and to what degree it was to apply. The appeal did not refer to the Ukrainian Central Rada, nor did it identify the Rada as a body of 'counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie', against which the appeal was directed. Nor did it call for an uprising, or for the preparation for one. The policy of the Kiev Committee of Bolsheviks could be characterized at this point as 'wait and see'.⁵⁶

A somewhat different statement was issued by the 'Revolutionary Committee of the Kiev Committee of R.S.D.W.P. (B).' No record of the organization of such a committee by the party has survived. It is quite likely that this appeal was issued by a dissident faction of the Committee. It was drafted

by Kulik on behalf of the Kiev party Committee, according to him. This 'Revolutionary Committee' stated that the Ukrainian Central Rada had 'cheated both us and you, comrade workers and soldiers.' The Ukrainian Central Rada was said to 'wish the victory of the counter-revolution and the transfer of power to the bourgeoisie.' All those supporting the transfer of power to the hands of workers' and soldiers' deputies, of soil to the peasants, of 'bread, peace and freedom', were called upon to 'await the call of Social-Democrat Bolsheviks'. The appeal also stated 'Down with the Ukrainian Central Rada . . . down with counter-revolution'. It concluded with a call for self-determination of nations. Although appearing to be quite radical in comparison with the Kiev Committee appeal, it still did not call for any immediate uprising against either the Rada or the 'counter-revolution'; the Kiev Command was probably meant in the latter case.⁵⁷ In refraining from actual rebellion, both Bolshevik appeals had the same import in relation to the events of the time; the Rada was left alone in its conflict with the Command.

Whether appealing cautiously or more openly for support, the Bolsheviks attempted to obtain backing for their position among the population. It is indicative of the comparative weakness of the Bolsheviks that they did not present themselves to the bodies for whom they were ostensibly making a claim of power, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, or the Soviet (Rada) of Military Deputies, or a joint meeting of the two. The reason appears obvious; the Rada of Military Deputies was dominated by Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Council of Workers' Deputies had a Bolshevik minority.

The Bolsheviks chose instead to present their program to a gathering which described itself as the 'united meeting of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies, with Representatives of Military Units and Factory Committees, the Professional Unions taking part'.⁵⁸ The executive committees of professional unions were heavily Bolshevik, as were the executives of the Factory Committees. The additional representatives of military units may also be presumed to have been repre-

sented in the Rada of Soldiers' Deputies. The presence of these additional delegates was irregular in view of the rather strict standards of representation prevailing in the Soviets or Radas. The Revolutionary Committee, which was elected by the gathering, was called by the indefinite name 'Revolutionary Committee of the Soviet'. The election of the Committee were boycotted by the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Russian Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.⁵⁹ The regular meeting of the Executive Committee of the Military Rada described it as a purely Bolshevik body, not recognized by it.⁶⁰ The Revolutionary Committee consisted solely of Bolsheviks and representatives of units with strong Bolshevik leanings. The meeting appears to have been, on the whole, the result of an attempt by the Kiev Bolshevik Committee to create a semblance of support; it does not seem to have been properly constituted, nor did it, in all probability, represent the collective opinion of the groups whom the meeting purported to represent, that is, the workers and soldiers of Kiev.

The Chairman of the Council of Military Deputies, Hryhoryiv, a Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary, Porsh, a Social-Democrat, and Levin, a Menshevik, disputed the views of Pyatakof, elected as Chairman of the meeting. There were two resolutions submitted to the meeting: a Bolshevik resolution and a non-Bolshevik resolution; the source of the latter is not known. The Bolshevik resolution was accepted. The total number of delegates voting was unusually high: 683. The total of delegates in the Soviets (Radas), elected by their units or factories two weeks later was 589.⁶¹ There is no evidence on the mode of calling of the meeting.

The resolution expressed approval of the Petrograd uprising. It concluded that the 'Revolutionary Committee of the Soviets' must be organized; this Committee was to be given the complete power in Kiev. It was to realize the decisions of the Congress of the Soviets. The Committee was put under the control of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which were to have the right to re-elect it at any time. The claims

of the (Bolshevik) Revolutionary Committee were somewhat limited, in line with the thinking of the Kiev Bolshevik Committee on its role in the Ukraine. It consciously limited the claimed power to the city of Kiev. The Conflict with the Rada and the Provisional Government was hereby being limited only to the exercise of power in the city. The question of the military dispositions of the Kiev Military District, extending from the Dnieper to the front and covering several gubernias, were not affected. Although the wording appears rather equivocal, the claim of the fullness of power 'in Kiev' implied the control of the Kiev garrison. To this extent, the Bolshevik Committee was entering into conflict with the Command. Still, the resolution did not provide for the immediate realization of the claim of power; the authorization to the Committee was vague as far as *modus procedendi* was concerned. Since the Committee was subordinate to the Soviets, it would appear that any serious decision would be directed by the Soviets. Thus, any actual moves would be undertaken with the initiative, or at least immediate sanction, of the Soviets. To this extent, the resolution did not indicate an actual rebellion, only a general readiness to rebel. This was the way in which the resolution was understood by representatives of the Rada when they intervened on behalf of the Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee, after their arrest by the Command.⁶²

In the meantime, the Command had received the loyalist troops and the support of the Cossacks. Through the night of November 9, it received reports that 'the Bolsheviks and the Red Guard were preparing to undertake an open attack.' The Palace, occupied by the united Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, was reported to have received weapons and other supplies.⁶³ In his report on the evening of November 10, Kwiecinski stated that the 'command of the Bolsheviks was in the Palace', and that he was working in close cooperation with 'civic groups, representatives of civil authorities and the commissariat,' taking the position of a decisive struggle with 'Bolshevism'. The representatives of the Rada were not mentioned.⁶⁴

The troops of the Command were moved without further provocation. At the same time, the troops surrounded the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, the Rada of Peasants' Deputies of the Kiev garrison, representatives of Spilka, the Rada of Military Deputies, and the Committees of Ukrainian and Russian Socialist parties: these were all located in the Palace or the vicinity.⁶⁵ The decision to proceed had been taken at the Command with the votes of the military as against the votes of the civil authorities of the Provisional Government.⁶⁶

Hryhoryiv, the Chairman of the Military Rada, was allowed to meet Kwiecinski; after discussions, the Rada of Military Deputies, of Peasants' Deputies, and representatives of Spilka were freed from arrest.⁶⁷

The Kiev Red Guard which had been summoned to the Palace, decided to leave, in order to keep its 'non-partisanship', as was remarked bitterly by a member of the Revolutionary Committee.⁶⁸ Members of various Committees were allowed to leave; however, some Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) and Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries remained. In the interpretation of Tkachenko, they 'wanted to defend the Soviet against the counter-revolutionary attack to the last.'⁶⁹ In the end, the Mala Rada intervened in the conflict; under its pressure, Kwiecinski agreed to free all those surrounded on the condition that they surrender weapons.⁷⁰ In the meantime, the surrounded Revolutionary Committee sent word to the Bolshevik-inclined troops. With the exception of the purported order to occupy the post and telegraph, and the summoning of the Red Guard (which deserted), the orders called for readiness.⁷¹ The post and telegraph was not taken, nor is there any record that the Bolshevik troops made the attempt to take them at all. The entire defence establishment of the Palace consisted of a machine-gun and an armoured car in the yard.⁷² When the conditions of liberation had been given to the defenders, they agreed to them. However, the Kiev Command did arrest all soldiers found in the Palace and the entire Kiev Bolshevik Committee.

It seems that no uprising had been planned at that time. This is shown by the poor choice of the 'headquarters', and

the fact that no definite plan of troop movements had been made previous to the Command attack, as well as from the fact that no appeal had been prepared to explain the aims of the uprising to the population. An appeal announcing the existence of the Revolutionary Committee and its assumption of responsibility of 'directing here, in the city of Kiev... the struggle, for the right of workers, soldiers and peasants', had been printed and dated November 11 (the appeal must have been pre-dated, as the events of November 10 were not referred to). Still, the appeal warned that there were to be no attacks except on authorization of the Revolutionary Committee. No call for an uprising was contained in the appeal itself.⁷³ Thus it appears to have been largely similar to the resolution of the Bolshevik meeting setting up the Committee.

The Kiev Command followed up its initiative and attacked the three points where the Bolsheviks seemed to have actual power. One of these had been the Arsenal works, the other two were the Aviation Park and the Ponton Regiment. The troops resisted. There was no city-wide coordination of the actions of the Bolshevik troops, according to Bolshevik sources.⁷⁴ The new Revolutionary Committee was cut off from the rest of the city, being surrounded in the Arsenal. Members of the Bolshevik Kiev Committee, avoiding arrest, seem to have met with representatives of some units. In the meeting, mentioned only very generally by some Bolshevik memoirists,⁷⁵ and not at all by any other, there was said to have been formed a Revolutionary Committee headed by Ivanov, a Bolshevik.

The main centre of struggle was the Pechersk district, where the Aviation Park was located, cut off from the Revolutionary Committee. on the whole, the Bolshevik units were incapable of fulfilling any orders, because of faulty communication and lack of weapons, according to Bolshevik memoirists.⁷⁶

The defensive character of the operation appears clear in the light of the intervention of the Rada on behalf of the Bolshevik troops attacked by the Command. Tkachenko reported to the Rada that the Kiev District troops had initiated

the attack against the Ponton Battalion and the Artillery Park (lying in the neighbourhood of the Aviation Park, and taken over by the latter as their fortress). It was feared that the Bolshevik troops might bombard the Command and the City. In order to prevent this, the Central Rada had sent Tkachenko, a Social-Democrat and Tuhan-Baranovsky, a liberal close to Constitutional-Democrats, to intervene with the Command. There they demanded the immediate dismissal of Kirienko and General Tregubov (in charge of the military operation), as well as the withdrawal of troops sent against the two points. Command refused to do so on the grounds that it wanted to 'break the rebels, to subject them to a court-martial and send them to the front'.⁷⁷ The Command had also ignored a previous resolution of the Rada stating that the use of military forces by the Command without authorization of the Rada was inadmissible and demanding that all the troops summoned to Kiev by the Command were to be evacuated from the city.⁷⁸

The Rada troops began to take part in the struggle against the Command, including two battalions of the Khmelnytsky regiment,⁷⁹ while Ukrainian authorities called for re-establishment of peace in the city.

On November 13, Kwiecinski reported to the army authorities that the victory had passed to Ukrainians, summarizing the progress of events:

Because of the political situation, which has become extremely unfavorable, refusal of troops, not excluding the Cossack troops, to take part in the ... national struggle, the refusal of the Czechoslovak representatives (to allow their troops to participate in the rebellion), the moral support to Ukrainians by the Cossack Congress, I have found it necessary to use all troops that remain faithful to the Government from the city, to re-establish order, and then, together with newly arrived units and with the cooperation of the heavy artillery division, to regain power in the city. Again I request the sending of non-Ukrainian troops in exchange for those sympathetic to the Ukrainian movement.⁸⁰

The fighting was on the whole very light, and was hardly noticed by the peaceful population. Total casualties of those

resisting the Command were 20 (by the Bolshevik sources).⁸¹ Casualties of Command troops cannot be established.

Actually, on the previous day, November 12, the vast majority of troops in Kiev expressed fealty to the Ukrainian Central Rada, while the troops which were faithful to the Russian authorities or to the Bolsheviks who had withdrawn from the struggle proclaimed neutrality. Russian Bolshevik neutral troops were easily disarmed by the Ukrainian authorities.⁸² Russian non-Bolshevik troops do not seem to have been disarmed. Such Bolshevik troops which had not turned neutral, in particular those of the 3rd Aviation Park, were allowed to keep their weapons. Russian non-neutral troops were allowed to leave the city. The Command itself fled on the night of November 13. Officials of the Russian Provisional Government were imprisoned for a few days. Members of the Kiev Bolshevik Committee were released.

The entire settlement was formalized in the meeting of the representatives of the Ukrainian Central Rada, of the Russian Military and civil authorities, and of the Bolsheviks, held on November 13.

The formal take-over of all power, and the preliminary action towards the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic, had begun before the actual attack of the Kiev Military District against the various points and the arrest of all Radas and Soviets. The Seventh Session of the full Ukrainian Central Rada opened early on November 11. The meeting opened with the report of Hrushevsky on the activity of the Mala Rada. Thereupon Kovalevsky, on behalf of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, the majority party in the Rada, stated that the time had arrived to create the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and to call the sovereign Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, as chaos in 'centralized Russia' had brought the nation to the brink of ruin.⁸³ This position was supported by Chopovsky, who presented the decisions of the Congress of the Kiev Gubernia (consisting primarily of peasants' organizations) to the Rada. These demanded that the Rada take all power, and that the Ukraine be proclaimed a 'Democratic Re-

public' and that 'all Russian troops be withdrawn from the Ukraine immediately'. The Central Rada expressed full agreement with Mala Rada and with the (Social-Revolutionary) Presidium.⁸²

The attack by the Command interrupted the consideration of the general problems, while the Rada undertook intervention in immediate events. On the next day, during which most armed units had pledged allegiance to the Ukrainian Land, the Ukrainian Central Rada accepted the draft constitution of the Ukrainian Republic; this was to be confirmed by the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. By it, the supreme power (*vyssha vlast*) in the Ukrainian Republic belonged to the constituent assembly called under universal suffrage. The Ukrainian Republic was to be in a federative connection with other countries (republics of the present Russian state), and it was to give up part of its sovereignty to the 'federative All-Russian parliament'.⁸³

The Ukrainian Land also acted to extend its functions. The Rada approved the enlargement of the General Secretariat by Commissars on Military, Supply, Railroad, Post and Telegraph, and Juridical Affairs.⁸⁴ Although the functions were by the Provisional Instruction were continued. The apparent modesty of the claims of the Rada seems to have resulted in a forceful intervention of the Third All-Ukrainian Congress, which demanded, by a resolution presented to the Rada in the evening session, that it 'proclaim the Ukrainian Democratic Republic'.⁸⁵ There were also demands for a greater extent in the country's territory. As a result of an assumption of the powers of the Revolutionary Committee, the Ukrainian Central Rada claimed authority over nine gubernias. The extension, however, had not been specifically authorized by the Rada. In the meeting, speaking on behalf of the Rada of Slobozhanshchyna (a part of the Left-Bank Ukraine), Odoevsky stated that the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of Kharkiv and other localities had decided to unite the Slobozhanian Ukraine to the Autonomous Ukraine.⁸⁶ The resolution of the united Poltava Rada (Soviet) of Workers',

Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies was presented to the Central Rada. This resolution stated that the Soviet recognized the Ukrainian Central Rada as the highest power in the land.¹⁹

The struggle in the city culminated in the victory of the Rada at this point. Both the Command and the Bolsheviks were reduced to non-entities through desertion, neutrality of troops and the rising power of the Rada. Ivanov, the head of the new Bolshevik 'Revolutionary Committee' by the decision of the Committee, showed up in the Duma demanding the release of imprisoned Bolsheviks.²⁰ Zatonsky of the Kiev Bolshevik Committee, a self-styled Chief-of-Staff (there is no record of authorization by any group, including the Bolsheviks, for his title), presented the same demand to the Central Rada.²¹ Ivanov claimed that the demand was in the form of an ultimatum, with the threat to bombard the city if it was not accepted.²² This claim is not supported by other sources.

The transfer of all power in the city and in the Kiev Military District to the Ukrainian Central Rada took place by the surrender of the other two opposing parties, which was agreed on during a joint meeting of all combatants. The minutes of the meeting were actually signed by Ivanov on behalf of the Bolsheviks, and by Russian military and civil authorities, as well as by representatives of the Rada; in this manner, the minutes became to a certain extent the provisional constitution of the regime in Kiev and the Kiev Military District.

The meeting, which described itself as the Commission on Determination of Conditions of the Cessation of Military Activities in the City of Kiev, was chaired by Hryhoryiv, a Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary, and Chairman of the Rada of Military Deputies; hereby, the preponderant position of the Ukrainians was indicated. The composition of the Commission is of interest in so far as it indicates the parties taking part in the meeting, as well as approving the conditions.

The Ukrainian Central Rada appears under the name of 'All-Russian Central Rada', which was apparently meant to indicate its equal status to such bodies as the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, etc. All Ukrainian military bodies were

represented, such as the All-Ukrainian Rada, the General Committee, the Third Congress of Deputies, and the (Rada) Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies of Kiev. Also represented were the Ukrainian fraction of the Kiev Workers' Soviet, and the Ukrainian Social-Democrat and Socialist-Revolutionary fractions of the Kiev Soldiers' Rada. Ukrainian representatives had 14 members of the total of 32 in the Commission, again indicating their preponderance.

The Russian party was represented by delegates of the Executive Committee of the South-Western Front, of the Commander of Troops of the Kiev Military District (Dorzhanski attended), of the Commissariat of the Provisional Government, represented by Grigoriev, who had brought the Czechoslovak troops, Vasilenko and Tsuderbiler. The Cossack Congress was also represented, as was the Kiev City Duma (by a Russian Social-Democrat Menshevik, and a Russian Socialist-Revolutionary). Also represented were the Menshevik and Russian Socialist-Revolutionary fractions, of the Soviets (Radas) of Military and Workers' Deputies. One somewhat unexpected delegate represented the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists of the Rada of Military Deputies (the Maximalists were a minor offshoot of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, accepting terrorism, they must be distinguished from Left Socialist-Revolutionaries).

The attendance and concurrence of the Russian groups transferred the responsibilities of the Provisional Government, in their civil and military sphere over the territory of the City of Kiev, of the Kiev Military District, and over the South-Western Front. The entire Russian revolutionary democracy also subordinated itself to the groups further to the right, who were admittedly in a minority among the Russian national group in Ukraine.

The Russian Social-Democrats (Bolsheviks) should also be considered part of the Russian group; but because of the special role they took in the military events, they held a somewhat disproportionate number of delegates. The total number of Russian delegates was 18 to the Ukrainian 14. However, in

fact plurality rested with Ukrainians, as 12 of the Russian delegates were Democrats and 6 represented Bolshevik groups. In addition to the Bolshevik fractions of the Radas of Military and Workers' Deputies, there the Central Bureau of Professional Unions, dominated by Bolsheviks, was represented. The Revolutionary Committee was represented by the Chairman, Ivanov, Bolsheviks Koshelev and Druzyzhkin. In attending and concurring in the decisions, the Bolshevik groups were also subordinating themselves to the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The meeting was opened by Hryhoryiv, who proposed that clarification of conditions for peace be presented by various parties. The Rada considered that 'guaranteeing peace in the land and in the city,' all civic government must subordinate themselves to it. The military operative (technical) functions were to remain dependent upon the orders of the High Command. As far as 'defence of order and revolution was concerned, the Rada however demanded full control over the District Command by means of a special Commissariat. The Rada was in fact claiming supreme authority over the military as defence of 'order and revolution' was more important than operative orders, if the two were to conflict. There were also certain subsidiary demands: Bolsheviks were to be liberated, martial law in Kiev was to be rescinded, a commission of inquiry on events was to be set up, and all units brought into the city 'as a result of recent events' were to be withdrawn. The demands of the Rada were reinforced by those of the Rada of Military Deputies. These dealt with subsidiary matters, including the liberation of Bolsheviks and disbandment of the officer and volunteer units; the latter had been particularly loyal to Russia.

The conditions presented by the Bolsheviks are of particular interest, as these may be considered as the maximum responsible demands. These are found to be very modest. There was no demand for any governmental or military authority at all, whether effected even in control of information. The first demand concerned the 'liberation of the Bolsheviks', troops which had 'sacked the Palace' were to be disarmed, as were

the officers of the companies; troops guarding the city were to be placed under the control of the Commission; Kirienko was to be imprisoned. Since the demands of the Bolsheviks or of the Military Rada were strictly limited and did not concern actual government power, it appears that the serious contenders for power were the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Russian Provisional Government, as expressed through its Commissariat and other authorities.

The Commissariat of the Provisional Government presented its conditions as well. As a basic proposition, it stated that responsibility for the 'general state of affairs' (*obshchee polozhenie del*) and the safety of the population and both official and private property' was to be laid upon the General Secretariat. The Secretariat was described as the 'body of the Provisional Government in the Civic government of the land.' In this matter then, Russian authorities in the Ukraine gave their actual power into the hands of the Ukrainian Government. In other words, representatives of the democratic government of the Russian Republic, in the Ukraine, on the dissolution of the Central Government, relinquished their power in the Ukraine in favour of the Ukrainian Land, while attempting to preserve the forms of loyalty to the Provisional Government. Order in the city was to be the responsibility of the Kiev Duma. The Command of the Military District, the Military and Civil Commissars and troops loyal to the Provisional Government, as well as other military employees, were to be allowed to leave the city fully armed. Other clauses are of lesser importance, as well as largely impractical in view of the general abdication and the projected withdrawal. They seem to have been presented as purely declarative statements. The military forces of the district were to be under the control of the General Army Committee (a soldiers' body at the High Command), and of the Commissar of the Kiev Military District and the Assistant Commissar of the South-Western front. (In view of the projected withdrawal of the Commissars, the question of their replacement seems to have been left open). The last condition was the declara-

tion that 'all civic and military organizations of Kiev are obliged to render full cooperation to the Provisional Government.' This declaration was in fact empty of content in view of the transference of power, and the non-existence of the Provisional Government. The phrase may have been an attempt to maintain loyalty according to oath.

The meeting was stormy. The demands to liberate the Bolsheviks immediately were refused. However, all those arrested on both sides were to be brought to the Palace and held there. The commission of control over the Command was decided upon. It was to consist of four representatives of Ukrainian organizations, a representative of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies (a Menshevik was elected), and a representative of the Executive Committee of the South-Western front, with Ukrainians possessing an absolute majority. The city was made peaceful. The troops brought into the city were to be expelled immediately, depending upon the condition of railroads; if they so wished, they were to be shipped to the front. All officer and volunteer detachments were disbanded. Sentries from military academy schools (largely loyal to Russia) were to be replaced, as part of the general plan for transforming the city to the conditions of peace. The Command was to be reorganized in the sense of change of personnel; this reorganization was to be realized by the Commissar of the South-Western Front, in agreement with the Commission of control. Finally, the basic first proposition of the Commissariat was considered. The decision on the general exercise of power was reached in the agreement that the 'plenitude of defence of the city was laid upon the Ukrainian Central Rada' (not the General Secretariat). The Rada was to work 'together with the Duma and the Rada of Military and Workers' Deputies.' As the government of the Land was not otherwise decided upon, it may be concluded that the original proposition of the Commissariat held good, especially in view of the preponderance of the Rada in the Commission. It was decided, with regard to the transfer of the Command from the city of Kiev to another city, that such a transfer was impossible.

The general weakness and disorganization of the Bolsheviks was made plain in the course of negotiations. At one point, the 'Military-Revolutionary Committee' of the Soldiers' Committee of the Third Aviation Park presented an ultimatum that 'the Command surrender before one o'clock at night,' otherwise operations would be begun. The Commission refused to negotiate under the threat of an ultimatum. The Chairman of the 'Revolutionary Committee,' Ivanov, explained that the ultimatum had been accepted without his knowledge, while his colleague Druzyakin said that it was accepted against his wish. The Commission delegated Ivanov and Druzyakin for talks with the 'Revolutionary Committee.' Ivanov, after discussions, stated that the ultimatum had been issued as the result of misunderstanding and had been revoked; on the demand for a written revocation, Ivanov supplied the Commission with one.

The meeting was terminated with the 'emergency statement' of the representative of the Commissariat of the Provisional Government, Grigoriev. He informed the Commission that the 'troops which had been summoned by the Command had refused obedience'. Russian troops in the city rebelled against Russian authorities, and left the city. In connection with their departure, 'the Command left hurriedly in an unknown direction', according to the Commissar of the Provisional Government. In this fashion then, the power of the Russian Provisional Government dissolved in the Ukraine.

The Commission decided, on considering the announcement, the following: 'To pass to the Central Rada for the discussion of all questions arising from this statement.' Power passed to the Rada by decision of all parties, in view of the mutiny and flight of those who were to hold certain military powers. The meeting closed in the early hours of the morning of November 14. The minutes of the meeting were countersigned by the major participants. Among these we find the signatures of Hryhoryiv of the Rada of Military Deputies, Frumin, Chairman of the City Duma, the Menshevik Vice-Chairman of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The minutes had

been also signed by a 'representative of the command of the Kiev Military District, Major-General Dobrzhanskiy', while Commissar Grigoriev signed 'N. Grigoriev attended', as did the Chairman of the 'Revolutionary Committee', who signed 'Ivanov attended'.⁹³

The unlimited power of the Ukrainian Land was a reality, as was effective military power. It remained to express this in constitutional form. This was done through the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada, issued on November 20, 1917.

Previous to this, the Ukrainian Central Rada, on the evening of November 13, when the meeting of the Commission on Cessation of Military Activities was well under way and the authority of the Rada could hardly be questioned, proclaimed the union of Ukrainian lands. The Rada pointed out that the partition of the Ukraine had been the 'result of the imperialist policies of 'the Russian bourgeoisie'. It decided to extend 'in full measure the authority of the General Secretariat over all lands partitioned from the Ukraine, where the majority of the population is Ukrainian.' Gubernias so affected were Kherson Gubernia, Katerynoslav Gubernia, Kharkiv Gubernia, the continental part of the Tauria Gubernia, Kholm, and part of Kursk and Voronezh.⁹⁴

After the meeting of the Commission had closed, the Central Rada informed the population on November 14, that an agreement had been reached between representatives of the Rada, the Soviets, the Duma, and various other groups. The 'Revolutionary Committee' was not mentioned as a party to the agreement. This agreement was, to halt anarchy and to ensure law and order; despite the agreement, the military authorities of the Kiev Military District, and of the South-Western front had left their posts. The Rada thus found it necessary to enlarge the Secretariat by five Commissars, above all by the General Commissar of Military Affairs, who was to appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Kiev Military District. Lieutenant-Colonel Pavlenko was appointed acting Commander-in-Chief of the Kiev Military District. All civil and military offices were

ordered to execute the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. These military officers were to immediately undertake the supply of the armies on the front, and in the rear, with all that was required.⁹⁵ The Secretariat was enlarged and the names of the new Secretaries were announced.

The new Russian government was conscious from the very beginning of its existence that it would eventually be necessary to use armed force against the Ukraine. Thus it had raised the conflict to a different plateau than the one on which the earlier democratic Russian government had rested. Although there had been rumours that the democratic government was planning to undermine Ukrainian institutions, and although certain conservative circles had pressed at various times for such action, it remained for the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks) to take arms without provocation. The fact that provocation was lacking must be regarded as established; there is not a single piece of evidence of any hostile movement against Petrograd directed from the Ukraine.

The first military action was the organization and dispatch of the armoured train *Putilovets No. 2*, manned by Russian employees of the Putilov works in Petrograd. This took place under the direct supervision of Lenin, the head of the Russian government. The destination of the Putilov detachment must have been formulated on or before November 14, since the train left for its destination on November 15. In the words of a Bolshevik commentator, the decision was made 'at the meeting of the officers of the Red Guard taking place in Smolny, under the leadership of V. I. Lenin'. The commander of the armoured train, A. Zeitsev, and his aide, M. Londarskiy, also took part in the meeting. Londarskiy reported in his memoirs that their orders were to proceed to the Ukraine, and to form War-Revolutionary Committees and party units along the route of their journey, and generally 'to aid in the organization of local Soviet power'. Most ominously, they were also to form 'organs of the Cheka' (Extraordinary Commission).⁹⁶ This expedition was perhaps the first hostile action against the

Ukraine. This was followed by the dispatch of more Russian troops, primarily from Petrograd. In November and December (old style), after the train expedition, which contained only men of the First March Train of the Red Guard of the Vyborg district, about 900 men were sent, including: the Second Detachment of the Vyborg Red Guard—200 troops, the Second Combined Detachment of the Petrograd Red Guard—about 1,000 men, the Catchino Detachment—about 340 men.⁹⁷ In late December, the Council of People's Commissars ordered 'no less than a third' of the total number of the Red Guard of Petrograd to be sent to the Southern front.⁹⁸ Troops continued to be sent from Petrograd during January.⁹⁹ Altogether, employees from over forty Petrograd factories went into action.¹⁰⁰ The Petrograd nucleus was joined by troops from Moscow; for instance, the 'army' of Commander Yegorov consisted mainly of the Moscow Red Guard. The details of men and movements are discussed in greater detail elsewhere; it will suffice to establish the general trend of Russian aggression. It must be realized that the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by Russia was accompanied by more or less constant warfare. At first, Russian aggression constituted only a minor irritant to the Ukrainian armed forces. It became of serious consequence only in the later period, when the recognition was almost complete.

The motivation of at least the earliest forces does not appear to have had any basis in political theory. It was, rather, a national Russian struggle against the Ukraine. As reported in early 1918 by an early combatant, in a typical statement, the troops left Petrograd 'at the first approach of counter-revolution'. The 'bourgeois Rada' was said to be trying to 'cut off the Southern gubernias, rich with grain, from Northern Russia, in order to suppress the revolutionary proletariat and the poorest peasants with the bony hand of famine'. Thus, the Ukraine was contrasted against Northern Russia in the matter of food supply. Also, the Donets Basin had been captured, the coal mines had been closed, depriving their factories of a vital material. The above-mentioned soldier also referred in passing

to the struggle against Soviet elements in the Ukraine.¹⁰¹ National hostility between Russians and Ukrainians was steadily increasing with the progress of the war.

The morning after the departure of the first armed detachment against the Ukraine, the first statement appeared of the new Russian government on policy in regard to nationalities, dated November 15. The coincidence in time, which would be somewhat strange ordinarily, seems to have been rather typical for the new Bolshevik regime; as will be seen, the next major Bolshevik statement, expressed at the same time, was the recognition of the Republic and an ultimatum backed by a threat of war, followed by actual declaration of war.

The earlier conflict between Russia and the Ukrainian Land was not eased when the Soviet of People's Commissars somewhat belatedly issued a Declaration of Rights of Nations of Russia. This simply stated certain principles that would guide the activity of the Soviet of People's Commissars. The Declaration did not provide for any immediate action, nor for any reconstruction of the Russian state in accordance with the principles. It announced further that the former policy of sowing distrust among nations must be supplanted by the new one of a 'voluntary and honest union of nations of Russia'. As the result of the new policy there would arise a 'strong union of nations'. Only in such a way could the 'workers and peasants of the nations of Russia be united into one revolutionary power' against the bourgeoisie.¹⁰² However, the form of the union was not stated. It appears that a federal form of government was not considered, indicated by the reference to one revolutionary power, and the generally anti-federalist position of Lenin and the Bolshevik party referred to earlier. The principles upon which the decree would be based were to be the 'equality and sovereignty of nations of Russia', and their right of self-determination, including actual separation and formation of an independent state. Although a self-governing Ukrainian Land existed, as well as a self-governing Finland, and other territories, these principles were not stated to apply to them. In

view of the Bolshevik party's policy of distinction between right and principle on the one hand, and expediency of socialist interest on the other, the profession of these principles, in the absence of any application of them, was of no value in solving the question of tension between the two countries. By failing to provide a practical solution, or at least to take a concrete step towards one, the Declaration in fact only intensified the conflict, making it plain that the Russian government was not willing to take the opportunity created by the Declaration to clarify its attitude to Ukrainian self-government.

In this way, the first decrees of the new government of Russia, through their refusal to recognize the fact of the Ukrainian Land and Republic, and through their disregard of Ukrainian interests, were threatening to the Ukraine in every respect.

In the Ukraine on November 16, the General Secretariat issued another declaration, developing ideas expressed earlier, calling for the support of the army and stating that any rumours of separation of Ukrainians from Russia were not correct. Still, the 'Central Government of greater Russia' was described as not having the chance to direct the life of the state. Entire lands were left without governing centres. There was rising political, economic and social anarchy. It thus appeared that the Secretariat did not recognize the Bolshevik Soviet of People's Commissars as governing the entire state. The Ukraine was to remain in the 'constitution of the Federative Russian Republic as a co-eval state body.' This particular expressed the non-recognition of People's Commissars as the government of the entire former Russian Empire.

The declaration limited the claims of the Ukrainian Land upon the Kherson, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav gubernias and continental Tauria, in addition to the earlier five gubernias. The claim corresponded closely to the territory where Ukrainian authority actually prevailed. On the other hand, Kholm was under German occupation, while parts of Kursk and Voronezh gubernias were tightly tied to the rest of the gubernias.¹⁰³

The Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed four

days later in the Third Universal. In supporting the proclamation of the Republic, Hrushevsky declared in the *Mala Rada* on November 20 that, 'when no central power was left', decisive measures were required. The Ukraine must be saved from anarchy and civil war. There was a necessity to create a firm foundation which would help save the 'gains of the revolution, not only for the Ukraine but also for all of Russia.' Under such circumstances, the General Secretariat decided that the base to be laid under the Land power, to make it an actual power, would be the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic, which would be a 'fully empowered body in the mighty union of free nations of Russia.' "Circumstances were forcing us," stated Hrushevsky, "to realize that which, a short time ago, we had thought to be further removed from us." The Ukrainian fractions had agreed on the necessity of the act. The declaration was a surprise for the parties of the national minorities.

In the vote held on the proclamation, the Universal was supported by all Ukrainian and Jewish parties. There were no negative votes. Representatives of Russian Social-Democrats (Mensheviks), and of Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries abstained, as did the representative of the Polish Democratic Centre, a body under the influence of the Polish Socialist Party.¹⁰⁴ The Third Universal declared in its main clause that 'from now, the Ukraine has become the Ukrainian National Republic.'

The Soviet of People's Commissars in Petrograd was not recognized. It was stated that 'there is no Central Government and anarchy, disorder and ruin is spreading over the State'.

The Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed with the aim of establishing 'law and order (*ladu*) in the Ukraine, and in the name of the salvation of all Russia. 'Without separating from the Russian Republic, and maintaining its unity', the Ukrainian Republic would be 'firmly based upon its own land, in order to help all of Russia, that the entire Russian Republic may become a federation of equal and free nations.' The Rada thus again presented the view that a federation was yet to be cre-

ated; when it was, it would be on the basis of local power and the association of equals.

Power to establish order in the Ukraine, to issue laws and to govern was lodged in the Ukrainian Central Rada and in the Government, the General Secretariat of Ukraine, 'until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly'. Unlimited sovereign power was in fact proclaimed. Despite the references to the Russian Republic, it was plain that any federation was to be formed on the basis of a sovereign Ukraine. Until such a federation had in fact been created, by the will of the sovereign Republic of the Ukraine, the country was a self-governing independent state. Joining a 'Russian Federation' upon the terms outlined in the Universal would not endanger its sovereignty.

The Universal delimited the territory of the Republic as the following: the Kiev gubernia, Podolia, Volhynia, the Chernyhiv gubernia, the Poltava gubernia, Kharkiv gubernia the Kherson gubernia and the Tauria (without the Crimea) were proclaimed to be part of the Republic, reflecting earlier declarations, such as that of November 16 and of November 8 (except for the Crimea). Parts of Kursk, Kholm, Voronezh and bordering gubernias where the majority of population was Ukrainian would have to be included within the Ukrainian National Republic, whose final borders would be established in agreement with the 'organized will of nations.' Besides proclaiming the Republic, the Third Universal provided for reforms in the spirit of the revolution.

All rights of possession upon the lands of landlords and other lands of 'non-toiling' households of agricultural importance, as well as upon state (*udilni*), monastic, cabinet (belonging to monarch) and church land were abolished. The Rada recognized that these lands were the property of the entire producing population and were to pass to the people without payment. A law would be immediately prepared to guide the Soil Committees, elected by the people, in the disposition of the land before the meeting of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. Final disposition seems to have been left for the Assembly. It is obvious from the preceding that the

question of soil disposition was being followed in the spirit of the views of the peasantry, as expressed in the Peasant Congress and sessions of the Rada of Peasants' Deputies.

The Rada also declared upon the workers' interests. An eight-hour working day was proclaimed to be effective in Ukraine 'from this day on.' State control over production in the Ukraine was to be introduced 'from this day on' by the Secretariat of Labour in cooperation with representatives of the workers.

Turning to the problem of war, the Rada declared that its position was that peace be established as soon as possible. For this, the Rada promised to take 'decisive measures to force both allies and enemies, through the Central Government, to begin peace negotiations.' The rights of the Ukrainian nation whether 'within Russia or outside Russia' would not be threatened in the armistice. Thus, the Rada seemed to wish to use a 'Central Government' (which it said did not exist) to bring about peace. It would appear that either the initiative was to wait until the creation of a central government, or the Rada wished to exploit the initiative of the Soviet of People's Commissars, towards an armistice, without compromising its own position.

The Republic also described France, England, Belgium, Serbia, the United States and others as her 'allies' (and the Central Powers' enemies), thus establishing its relation in international affairs. The Rada repeated its claim for Ukrainian lands in Austria-Hungary, or at least proclaimed its role as a protector of those lands.

The Universal also introduced certain other liberal measures, such as abolition of the death penalty, reform of courts, and guarantees of freedoms, of speech, print, faith, assembly, association strikes, inviolability of person and habitation, and the right of use of local languages.

Russian, Jewish, Polish, and other non-Ukrainian nationalities in the Ukraine were guaranteed national-personal autonomy, as 'assurance to them of the right and freedom of self-

government in the matters of their national life'. An appropriate law was to be drafted.

The Republic was to exert all forces in order to supply the front and 'those parts of Russian Republic which would need our help.' An attempt was made to forestall the charges that the Ukraine refused to aid neighbouring nations and the soldiers. The guarantee of supply to the soldiers was in line of the general appeal in the Universal that until peace was achieved, 'each citizen of the Republic of Ukraine, in common with citizens of all nations of the Russian Republic, must firmly stand upon their positions, in the front as in the rear.' The demand for the maintenance of the front was in sharp contrast to the policy of the Soviet of People's Commissars, who at this time were encouraging fraternization on the front.

The Universal also called for the 'great building of new state forms' which would give the 'Russian Republic a new future.' These forms were to be created in the Ukrainian and All-Russian Constituent Assembly. The federation was to be created jointly.

In conclusion, the Universal gave the date of elections for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly as January 9, 1918 and the date of the summoning of the Assembly was to be January 22, 1918.¹⁰³

The sovereign character of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly was assured. It was called without any reference to any other institutions.

The establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Third Universal did indeed correspond to the wishes of the masses of the Ukraine, as became readily apparent in the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which after the many delays of the Provisional Government, had finally been called for November 25, 1917. In the Ukraine, and now in the Ukrainian Republic, the elections took place as scheduled, as they did in the rest of the former Russian Empire. With the liquidation of the authority of the Provisional Government in the Ukraine, the Ukrainian Republic became the

inheritor of all institutions in its territory, and in particular, of the elections to the All-Russian Assembly.

Thus, the reality of the Ukrainian National Republic was demonstrated by the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. These also underlined the break between the Ukraine and Russia. Elections began five days after the proclamation of the Republic. It is of interest to examine the election results in the centre, the gubernias, and the Ukraine as a whole.

A total of 1,627,727 electors voted in the Kiev gubernia. The majority of these, 1,256,271 persons or 77 per cent voted for the Ukrainian parties. All other parties received token numbers of votes ranging from the largest, of 86,943 votes or 5 per cent, for the Jewish National Bloc, to the smallest, of a few hundred or a few thousand.

Jewish and Polish parties received a total of 153,276 votes, or about 9.5 per cent. The four major Russian parties, Bolsheviks, Constitutional Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, received altogether 118,776 votes, or somewhat over 7 per cent, considerably less than the non-Russian minorities. The Russian Right-Wing Bloc, a body peculiar to the city of Kiev, brought in 36,602 votes, bringing the votes for the gubernia as a whole to 155,378, or 9.5 per cent, equal to the number of votes brought in by non-Russian minorities. The anti-Bolshevik Russian parties took in about two-thirds of the total vote of the major Russian parties, the remaining third going to the Bolsheviks, who got 59,413 votes, or 3.6 per cent of the total. The Russian anti-Bolshevik vote was about 6 per cent in all, the bulk going to the Right-Wing Bloc and the Constitutional Democrats, who shared about 4 per cent, while Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Russian Social-Democrats were practically wiped out, the former receiving 19,201 votes or about 1 per cent, the latter, 11,732 votes or 0.7 per cent.

The parties represented in the Rada, and supporting it, were the Ukrainian, Jewish and Polish parties, as well as the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. These parties received 1,441,280 votes, out of a total of 1,627,727

votes or 82.5 per cent. Those opposed were divided rather evenly—4 per cent to the conservatives (Right-Wing Bloc and Constitutional Democrats) and 3.7 per cent to the Bolsheviks. However when forced to choose between Bolsheviks and Ukrainians, conservatives certainly leaned towards Ukrainians. Thus, the only group opposing Ukrainians in any serious way at all in Kiev gubernia were the Bolsheviks, and, as has been discussed above, these were far from being united or completely disloyal to the Ukrainian state.¹⁰⁶

It is characteristic of the Ukraine as a whole that the territory of a gubernia, outside the city limits of its capital, was dominated by Ukrainian parties. Such territory would include all the smaller cities and towns, as well as rural districts. The gubernias, as against the gubernia capitals, had the overwhelming majority of the votes. The Kiev gubernia, through its central position, was of particular importance. The Kiev gubernia vote was 1,448,039, while the Kiev city vote was 179,688, giving the ratio of 7 to 1 in favour of the gubernia. The total anti-Bolshevik vote in the gubernia was 1,421,202, against 26,837 votes given to the Bolsheviks; thus the parties supporting the Republic received 98.1 per cent of the total vote, with 1.8 per cent of the vote going to the Bolsheviks. Ukrainian parties received 80.2 per cent; non-Ukrainian parties represented in the Rada received 15.1 per cent, while Constitutional Democrats and right-wing groups received under 2.8 per cent.¹⁰⁷ The Kiev gubernia elected 22 deputies, of whom 21 were Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Ukrainian Social-Democrats, led by Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko, while one deputy had been elected on behalf of the Jewish Socialist Bloc, Syrkin, the leader of the Zionist Party in the Ukraine.¹⁰⁸

The situation in the city proper was less favourable to the Ukrainian Parties, as most Russian conservative and Russian Social-Democrat (Bolshevik) votes had been given there, while the number of such votes was quite negligible outside of the city. Approximately one-tenth of the total Kiev gubernia vote was given in the city of Kiev, 179,688 out of 1,627,727. Those unfavourable to Ukrainians were divided among the

Right-Wing Bloc (36,602 votes), the Constitutional Democrats (18,742 votes) and the Bolsheviks (32,576 votes).¹⁰⁰ However, the Right-Wing Bloc and the Constitutional Democrats were loyal to the Republic when faced with Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik vote bears examination. A large part of it seems to have belonged to the Russian Bolshevik units which had taken part in the events of November 12-13. Of the total of 32.5 thousand Bolshevik votes in Kiev, fully 12.5 thousand had been given by soldiers, a transient element. The rest may be assumed to have been given by workers.¹⁰¹ Shortly after the elections, Bolshevik troops in Kiev were disarmed and deported to Russia from Kiev. Many Russian soldiers left Kiev in the demobilization of such troops by the Republic and 'went home'. The rest were forcibly expelled. Thus the role of the Bolshevik soldiers may be largely discounted after the middle of December, leaving some 20 thousand Bolshevik workers and other Bolsheviks as a more or less permanent burden, at least until the siege of Kiev.

The Bolshevik workers could only have a relatively small influence on the city. In the first place, the most active groups of Bolshevik workers were foreign to Kiev, with few local ties or contacts, having been sent to the city within the last two to three years in the course of mobilization and the progress of the World War. The two leading centres of Bolshevik workers in Kiev were the Arsenal, which despite its name was a military factory, and the Aviation Park, which was actually a large repair shop for airplanes.

Likholat, a Bolshevik historian, wrote that the 'strongest detachment of armed workers' was at the Arsenal, which contained some 4,000 workers 'of whom many were Muscovites and Peterburgians, sent from the army following the mobilization'.¹¹¹ The same is stated by Chaykovsky, a member of the Bolshevik Committee at the Arsenal, in his memoirs; at the Arsenal, there were a considerable number of workers who had passed through 'a serious school of revolutionary struggle in Piter (Petrograd) and Moscow. These people . . . were the organizing nucleus'.¹¹²

Kutuzov, a Bolshevik from the Aviation Park, wrote that the workers at the Park were 'for the most part qualified workers—metallurgists who had been called to the army from the largest industrial centres of Russia and who had a certain experience of revolutionary struggle'.¹¹³ It was for this reason, he stated, that the Bolshevik propaganda was successful. The Aviation Park gave 929 votes to Bolsheviks out of its 1,378.¹¹⁴

Although 18 per cent of the votes in the city of Kiev went to the Bolsheviks, within two or three weeks only the non-military vote had any meaning. This vote was 20,125 or 11 per cent of the total city vote. But even this group was relatively weak through the fact that the leading cadres and probably the bulk of supporters were not an element native to Kiev, or indeed to the Ukraine, but rather to Russia. The rising conflict between the Ukrainian and Russian Republics could but increase the tension between the Ukrainian mass and the largely Russian or Russian-led Bolsheviks. The influence of the Bolsheviks among soldiers and workers was also checked through the fact that 16,011 soldiers of the city voted for the Ukrainian bloc, as compared to 12,401 for Bolsheviks; probably a smaller number of votes went to other anti-Bolshevik parties.¹¹⁵ The units of Ukrainian-oriented soldiers were of course not subjected to evacuation or other signs of hostility, but rather, they were continually increased as a matter of policy. According to the information of the Russian commander Antonov, upwards of 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers were concentrated in Kiev through the winter.¹¹⁶ At any rate, in the vote for the Constituent Assembly, 147,112 voters of the total of 179,688, or 82 per cent of the votes of the city of Kiev, voted either for parties which actively supported the Republic, or for such as the Constitutional Democrats, and the Russian bloc chose to support it, as against the Bolsheviks. The parties taking part in the activity of the Republic brought in the bare majority of 91,424 votes (51 per cent), against 87,920 votes split between the Russian conservative groups (31 per cent) and the Russian Social-Democrats — Bolsheviks (18 per cent).¹¹⁷

The situation was duplicated in the city of Kharkiv, where some 72 per cent voted for anti-Bolshevik parties, while 28 per cent voted for the Bolshevik party.¹¹⁸ However, the Kharkiv gubernia as a whole, including the city, gave only 11 per cent to the Bolsheviks. The Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were running as a bloc, received 70.5 per cent of the total vote.¹¹⁹ In view of the Kiev experience of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the fact that the peasant population of the Kharkiv gubernia was Ukrainian, it may be concluded that the prevailing part of these were cast for Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries. On the whole then, the Kharkiv gubernia gave 89 per cent to non-Bolshevik parties.¹²⁰ Incidentally, the party of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries was not organized yet, certainly not in the Kharkiv gubernia. At any rate, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries were predominantly a Russian group, as no such Ukrainian group arose before May, 1918. In view of the sorry showing of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Ukraine as a whole, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries cannot be considered an important group.

The Kiev situation was characteristic for Bolshevik city groups all over the Ukraine. For instance, the role of the Kiev Arsenal and the Aviation Park was played by the General Electric Company (V.E.K.) in Kharkiv. It was here that the guns which had been delivered to the Bolsheviks from the Tula works were kept. This factory had been evacuated to Kharkiv from Riga (in Latvia) in the summer of 1915. There had been a strong Bolshevik group still at Riga. The number grew further by 'hundreds of workers', of 'Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Belorussians and Germans', while the 'underground group of Bolsheviks began active work after arrival in Kharkiv' according to a member of the Bolshevik party cell at this factory.¹²¹

The same situation prevailed at another large centre, Katerynoslav, where the spearhead for Bolshevik groups was in the Bryansk factory,¹²² manned primarily by non-Ukrain-

ian workers brought into the city in the course of the mobilization.

In two gubernias: Chernyhiiv, 28 per cent Bolshevik, and Katerynoslav, 17.9 per cent Bolshevik, an unusually high percentage of votes went to the Russian S.D.W.P. (Bolsheviks).

Turning to the case of the Chernyhiiv province in detail, we see that Doroshenko, according to contemporary reports, stated that Ukrainian Socialist parties received an overwhelming balance in the 'southern Chernyhiiv gubernia'.¹²³ Tabakov, a Bolshevik historian, discussing the events of November, 1917 and later in the Chernyhiiv gubernia, stated that the gubernia was sharply divided into two parts. According to him, the southern *uezds* (districts) of the gubernia, that is, those of Oster, Chernyhiiv itself, Borzen Kozelets and Nezhyhyn were 'overwhelmed by the wave of nationalism so characteristic of the socially non-differentiated Ukrainian village in the Right-Bank Ukraine of the period previous to the German occupation'. This 'nationalist-chauvinist movement' not only failed to receive any resistance in the cities, but according to Tabakov, 'because of the absence of the proletariat', it was 'fully supported by the city bureaucracy, teachers and clergy'. The village was represented by 'the so-called Peasants' Spilka'. The Peasants' Spilka was the organization in which, as was discussed earlier, the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries were paramount. Against this solidly Ukrainian-dominated region, Tabakov contrasted the northern *uezds*, where the proletarian influence of the centre was predominant and there was a direct connection with Moscow. Tabakov concluded that despite the formal connection (on the basis of the gubernia organization) Moscow enjoyed greater influence in the proletarian north than did Kiev.¹²⁴ Shcherbatov, another regional historian of the Bolshevik revolution, agreed with Tabakov's general evaluation. The border of the overwhelming influence of Ukrainian parties as given by Tabakov and Shcherbatov, largely corresponded to the ethnographic border of the Ukraine, which excluded the northern part of Chernyhiiv from Ukrainian territory, as drawn by Kubyiovych, among others. Thus, the apparent anomaly of

Chernyhiv is explained by the national make-up of the territory; the Ukrainian-populated part of Chernyhiv, allowing for the great concentration of Bolsheviks votes in the north, in accordance with the situation described by Tabakov and Shcherbatov, would give the Ukrainian territory a more solidly Ukrainian majority. In particular, we have a record of the southern centres of Nizhen, Hlukhiv, Novozybkiv, Starodub, Kozelets, Chernyhiv proper, and even Konotop, either asking for Ukrainian troops or accepting the Ukrainian Republic as their government. However, in the absence of election returns by the *uezds*, it is not possible to give the returns for the Ukrainian part of the Chernyhiv province.¹²⁵

The All-Russian Constituent Assembly elections gave the following returns for the eight provinces of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Tauria province is not included, as the division of votes in the continental (Ukrainian) and Crimean (non-Ukrainian) parts is not available. The returns for Chernyhiv should be treated critically, in view of the remarks above. By parties represented in institutions of the Republic are meant all parties with the exception of Constitutional Democrats, Bolsheviks and Russian non-Socialists. 'Loyal parties' are all parties except the Bolsheviks.

<i>Gubernia</i>	<i>Parties loyal to U.N.R.</i> <i>Per Cent</i>	<i>Bolsheviks</i> <i>Per Cent</i>
(Chernyhiv)	(72)	(28)
Katerynoslav	82.1	17.9
Kharkiv	89.0	11.0
Kherson	89.7	10.3
Poltava	94.4	5.6
Volhynia	95.6	4.4
Kiev	96.4	3.6
Podolia	96.7	3.3
Total for Eight Gubernias:	90.0	10.0

Popov, a Bolshevik historian of the R.S.D.W.P. (B.) in the Ukraine, generally agrees with these calculations. He sup-

plies the Bolshevik vote in the Ukraine, showing a 3 per cent Bolshevik vote for the Kiev gubernia, 4 per cent for Volhynia, 6 per cent for Poltava, 11 per cent for Kherson, 11 per cent for Kharkiv and 20 per cent for the Chernyhiv gubernia.¹²⁶

Thus, the Bolshevik vote in the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic was 10 per cent; the vote of parties loyal to the Republic was 90 per cent. The vote for the former Ukrainian Land, and the traditional area of the Ukraine (with Chernyhiv excluded) was 94.8 per cent for loyal parties, and 5.2 per cent for the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik). The fact that the Ukraine gave 10 per cent to the Bolshevik party was accepted by Lenin in his article, "The Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", written shortly after the elections. He uses the figure as an argument against the anti-national Luxemburgist position of a part of his party, pointing to the strength of the Ukrainian national movement.¹²⁷

The non-Bolshevik vote in the Ukraine was 90 per cent, shifting from as low as 72 per cent to as high as 96.7 per cent. Most of the vote, however, was concentrated in the range of 90 to 95 per cent non-Bolshevik. Showing this were six out of eight Ukrainian gubernias, with two of them showing a significant Bolshevik vote. It would not be correct to state, as Bolshevik historians often do, that there is no element common to all gubernias in the Ukraine, that the revolution must be studied rather in terms of gubernias, or at the most, oblasts. The common element, shown incidentally by Lenin, is just this cluster of votes in the 90 to 95 per cent range, rejecting the Russian and Bolshevik rule in the Ukraine, while the truly peculiar problems are the widely separated (geographically) gubernias of Chernyhiv and Katerynoslav, with the high Bolshevik vote.

Doroshenko states, on the evidence of the Kiev contemporary press, that the delegates assembled in Kiev on December 25. Kovalevsky is mentioned as having been in the presidium. Although various speakers doubted the value of the Assembly, the group decided to take the most active possible role

in the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.¹²⁸ The situation was reversed on January 12, 1918, when the Central Committee of the party of Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries forbade the Socialist-Revolutionaries to go to Petrograd because of the hostilities between the Ukraine and Russia.¹²⁹ This proved decisive, as Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries numbered 81 deputies, to 2 deputies among the Social-Democrats.¹³⁰ A deputation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries stated, in the only session of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, that the delegation of Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries was not coming, though they reserved their right to come.¹³¹ In this manner then, the elected members from the Ukraine (Socialist-Revolutionaries obtained an absolute majority of votes in the Ukraine) refused to recognize the sovereignty of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

Kovalevsky, the leader of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, stated in his memoirs that all the Ukrainian deputies to the All-Russian Assembly gathered in Kiev and issued a declaration that the Ukrainian nation, which had elected them by general and secret suffrage, demanded full independence of the Ukrainian state and that for this reason they did not go to Petrograd to join the Russian Constituent Assembly.¹³²

In this manner, the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, later dispersed by the Bolsheviks, ceased to be of consequence for the Ukrainian Republic.

The Ukrainian National Republic was established, and its central authority confirmed by elections, in November, 1917.

While the Third Universal had proclaimed the sovereign Ukrainian Republic, it had also stated that this Republic was in a federal relation with a Russian federation, which in fact did not exist and had first to be created. Before attaining complete independence, the Ukrainian republican authorities appear to have attempted to form such a federation. It is difficult to say how sincere the Ukrainians were in taking this initiative. It will be remembered that the most forthright supporters of a 'Federation' were the minorities represented in the Rada.

The Ukrainian Republic was born into an uncertain and dangerous world. The front line passed through Ukrainian territory; the might of the alliance of the Central powers certainly inspired fear for any policy of going it alone in a world at war. The fear provoking Russia further at this particular stage of international affairs also came into play. The influence of the Allied powers also favoured the maintenance of the status quo. It is probable that considerations of defence and of foreign policy were decisive in the idea of a federation, while hostility to the Bolshevism of Russia, implying an avoidance of a decisive break with the Russian revolutionary democracy, was also of great, if secondary importance. The question of a 'central government' was primarily one of war and peace.

The matter of such a government was raised in the meeting of the General Secretariat of November 23, 1917. At that time, the General Secretariat decided that an 'immediate peace was necessary', and as the peace negotiations had to be conducted by authorized representatives, and as the Soviet of People's Commissars was not representative of the people, a new federal government had to be created in agreement with the Republics and other influential and autonomous organizations.¹³³

The Secretariat established relations with the Highest Command of the Russian Army, at Mohyliv, and the government of the Don and of Kuban. The Highest Command was also contacted by Chernov, the leader of the Russian party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, and some other leaders of the Russian democrats, who were in the process of negotiations on the formation of a coalition Socialist Government, 'from Bolsheviks to the People's Socialists', in the phrase of the day. The Highest Command argued in particular that the federal government should be formed in Kiev. The Secretariat, on the other hand, considered the proposal 'inopportune'.¹³⁴ Although Vynnychenko's view was that it would not be right for the two governments to be in the same city, it would appear that the Ukrainian government was motivated primarily by fear of the

repetition of the events of November 12, and the renewal of Russo-Ukrainian hostilities.

The negotiations were discussed in the Rada on December 3, 1917. The report of Vynnychenko on the problem was discussed in a lively manner. Porsh in particular was insistent on the necessity of a central government. The Ukrainian Republic would otherwise perish in the universal anarchy, he held. Hence, a government had formed their governments already.¹²⁷

The Mala Rada thereupon approved the general trend of the Secretariat in the matter of federation, and authorized it to continue discussions.¹²⁸ The Secretariat did indeed issue two appeals to all *de facto* authorities in the former Russian Empire, including the Soviet of People's Commissars, but the matter was not taken up.¹²⁹

The Third Universal was welcomed by the Jewish people in the Ukraine. *Naie Tseit*, the newspaper of the United Jewish Socialist Party, wrote, 'The Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed by and for ALL the population of the Ukraine, Jewish as well as Ukrainian, Russian and Polish.... Long live the free Ukraine, the first member of the federative All-Russian Republic.' The representative of the Bund in the Small Rada, Zolotarev, stated, "When we see that the liberated Ukrainian nation gives freedom to our people too, we take part of the responsibility upon ourselves for this act and sign the Universal with all our hearts."¹³⁰ The Jewish parties expressed, however, some reservations about a virtual proclamation of independence of the Ukraine.

A different situation arose over the attitude of the Polish population of the Ukraine to the Universal. The Third Universal drew the Ukrainian-Polish border (if there was to be a Poland) as a line that would probably cut the Kholm province. On the other hand, the Third Universal authorized a wide-ranging agrarian reform. The Poles considered the reform to be very prejudicial to the interests of the Polish minority; historical circumstances had made much of the landed nobility of the Ukraine Polish. The conflict, however, did not persist.

The Ukrainian Central Rada proclaimed the Republic

against the continual warning of the small nationalities in the Ukraine against this. The Rada attempted to gain the support of the minorities for the Republic through the proclamation of national-personal autonomy. As it appears from the record of the vote on the Third Universal, it was largely successful. The decisive element in this was the vote of Jewish parties, for reasons discussed earlier in this study.

Through protection of law and order and national-personal autonomy, the Rada hoped to associate minorities with herself. The Third Universal, primarily the expression of the will of the Ukrainian population of the Ukraine, was to find a favourable reception on the part of the minority nationalities.

The Jewish political groups were attracted to the Rada by her conscious effort to give equal rights to all national groups in the Ukraine. Thus the Vice-Secretariat on Jewish Affairs was transformed into a full Secretariat, and the Secretary of Jewish Affairs, Doctor Silberfarb, took direct part in the governing of the country through the resulting membership in the Government, rather than through Shulhyn, the Secretary of Nationalities' Affairs, as earlier. On the other hand, the energetic way the government undertook the struggle against anti-semitism which threatened to harm national cooperation, could not but endear the government to the Jewish people.

In October, Shulhyn, the Secretary of Nationalities' Affairs, published an appeal. 'There are noticeable attempts at organization of anti-Jewish pogroms and robbery of Jewish wealth. Criminal agitators . . . attempt to create the feelings of national enmity. All conscientious Ukrainians should help the General Secretariat and the local administration with all their energy in their struggle against this curse, which we have inherited from the Tsarist regime.'³⁹ About the same time, Vynnychenko, the Secretary for Internal Affairs, sent a circular to the Commissars of the U.N.R. 'Dark elements are stirring up pogrom agitation,' he stated. The circular ordered the local government to undertake decisive measures against the pogrom agitation and lawlessness and to send an armed guard, if necessary.⁴⁰ Finally, the Secretary for Military Affairs, Simon

Petlura, published a declaration to the soldiers in regard to pogroms. 'Do not allow pogroms and disorders, for if you should allow them, you would cover with shame the bright name of the Ukrainian army. No pogrom should take place on our soil.'¹⁴¹ The Nationalrat expressed high confidence in the ability and the will of the Rada to keep the Jewish people safe from the excesses of war and revolution. The Natsionalrat published a Declaration to the Jews in mid-October.

In the Ukraine, the state is stable and firm. And it is this state which attempts here with all its forces to guarantee and assure order and peace for all the nationalities in the Ukraine. The General Secretariat had firmly decided not to allow any lawlessness.... Do not lose heart, citizen Jews.¹⁴²

The trust the Jewish people had in the Ukrainian Rada is seen to have been great. This trust expressed itself in the vote of Jewish parties in support of the Universal proclaiming the Republic.

The Vice-Secretary for Polish Affairs, who had to hold the conference of the Council, was directed to resign by the Council. After an impasse lasting days, the Government ceded to the demands of the Council and of the Committee. The agrarian law was to be modified and its execution postponed. At the same time, the status of Mickiewicz as Vice-Secretary was raised to that of the Secretary for Polish Affairs. The Secretariat now had in its jurisdiction education and welfare. It controlled approximately one thousand schools.¹⁴³ Thus we find that the Third Universal was at least passively accepted by the Polish minority, although it prejudged the question of the border and affected Polish property rights. However, the later explanation of the Universal softened the opposition. The Russian minority was also pacified by the guarantees of Russian schools, and also because of hostility to Bolsheviks.

Although the Republic was in fact independent, there was still need to proclaim an unlimited independence. Thus the Russian Federation, which was yet to be created, and of

which the Ukrainian Republic was the first and only member, was allowed to disappear as effortlessly as it was conjured.

The Republic thus moved in the direction of formal independence. When the Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed by the Third Universal, a way was left for an agreement to be reached with a 'democratic' Russia concerning the possible future participation of the Ukraine in a federal Republic. The Rada now decided to cut her ties with Russia completely. Accordingly, it proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine in the momentous Fourth Universal, published on January 22, 1918:

Nation of the Ukraine! By your power, will and word, there arose on the Ukrainian Land the free Ukrainian National Republic. The old dream of your fathers, the fighters for freedom, has now come true, and the toilers have been granted their rights. But the freedom of the Ukraine was born in a dark hour. Four years of bitter war have weakened our land and population. Factories are not producing goods, the machine shops are closing, the railways are decrepit, money is losing value, there is less bread—famine nears. Gangs of robbers and thieves have appeared in the land, especially since the time when the movement of the Russian army from the front line caused bloody murder, riots and ruin in our land. For this reason, we have not been able to hold the elections for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.... From now on, the Ukrainian National Republic will be a self-governing, totally independent, free sovereign state of the Ukrainian Nation. With all the neighbouring nations, such as the Russians, Poles, Austrians, Rumanians, Turks and others, we wish to live in concord and amity, but without any interference from them in the life of the independent Ukrainian Republic. The power in it shall belong only to the People of the Ukraine, in the name of whom, until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly gathers, we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, the representative of the toiling people, of the peasants, workers and soldiers, shall govern, we and our executive body, which shall bear the name of the Council of National Ministers.

The Rada enjoined the Government, 'the Council of National Ministers,' to carry on the peace negotiations already begun quite independently with the Central Powers, and to

bring them to an end regardless of any hindrance on the part of the former Russian Empire, and to establish peace. Regarding 'the so-called Bolsheviks and other aggressors who are destroying and ruining our land,' the Rada instructed the Government to take up the struggle with them in a forceful and decisive manner; it also summoned all the citizens of the Republic to defend the welfare and the freedom of the people. 'Our National Ukrainian State must be cleared of the aggressors sent from Petrograd who are violating the rights of the Ukrainian Republic.' The Rada proclaimed, for the minorities, that in the independent Ukrainian National Republic, all nations should enjoy the right of national-personal autonomy, accorded to them by the law of January 9.

The Rada further advised all citizens to have the elections for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly organized 'as thoroughly as possible', to take the necessary measures to see that the accounting of votes be concluded as fast as possible in order that in a few weeks' time, the Constituent Assembly—'the highest sovereign'—be empowered to ensure freedom, law and order and the welfare of all by the constitution of the independent Ukrainian National Republic.¹⁴⁴

The Fourth Universal came to a vote in the Small Rada on January 24. It was accepted by 39 votes against 4 votes, with 6 abstentions.¹⁴⁵ All members of the Ukrainian parties voted for it. Only the members of the Bund and the Russian Social Democrats voted against the Universal. Tcherikover wrote, 'Although being definite enemies of the break-down of the government union with Russia and hence of the act sanctioning the partition of Russia and cutting the Jewish nation (*yevreystvo*) in Russia into two parts . . . the Jewish parties did not decide to vote against the Universal, the manifesto of the independent Ukraine, but rather to abstain'.¹⁴⁶ The Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Polish Central Union also abstained. Tcherikover also pointed out that, 'the Jewish representatives took a sympathetic attitude to the new course', when Ukrainian independence was proclaimed.¹⁴⁷ *Naie Tseit of*

Kiev wrote of the Fourth Universal as '*a fait accompli*': 'The nation cannot be in opposition,' maintained the editorial.¹⁴⁸

The Fourth Universal proclaimed the absolute independence of the entire Ukraine within the borders previously defined by the Third Universal. The Universal also empowered the Ukrainian Delegation to conclude a treaty with the Central Powers. It called for war against the Bolsheviks who were threatening the Ukrainian National Republic from the North. The right of national-personal autonomy was incorporated into the very proclamation of independence, thus inducing other national groups, in particular those in the western regions, to support and enlarge the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Universal furthermore indirectly demonstrated the rather non-German orientation of Government policy, dominated by Vynnychenko, thorough as it was. In the list of nations with which the Ukraine wished to have relations, Germany was not even mentioned by name, while Russia, Poland, Austria, Rumania and Turkey were. However, although the Universal contained a statement to the effect that the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly might consider future participation in a Russian federation a possibility, this statement was probably made in deference to the non-Ukrainian national groups, and cannot, with the Assembly being sovereign, alter the fact that the Universal initiated an entirely new type of policy for the Ukraine.

The support or at least the silent acquiescence to Ukrainian independence on the part of the minorities was obtained by the acceptance of the Law on National Autonomy, of the same date, embodying the desires of national minorities.

The law on National Autonomy was submitted by the Jewish Secretariat, which was created as a body defending Jewish rights, in the agreements at the time of the Second Universal. The General Secretariats of Jewish Affairs, and affairs of other minorities, were made ministries in early January. The Law of National-Personal Autonomy was proclaimed shortly. It had been passed by the Rada unanimously, and thus had the full support of all Ukrainian parties, of the Jewish

parties, Polish parties and the Russian parties (except for the Bolshevik party which had left the Rada shortly after the Bolshevik coup d'etat in Petrograd). The law had been introduced by the Jewish General Secretariat, and of it, Tcherikover, the leading Jewish historian of the period, wrote: 'The immense importance of this law could have been judged by the enthusiasm with which it was greeted by the representatives of the Jews, to whom the law had actually the greatest relevance.'¹⁴⁹ Indeed, we must again stress the point that the law was the outcome of the general demands of different national groups in the Ukraine, first and foremost those of the Jewish nation. Its essential provision was for the formation of separate constitutional bodies of different nations in the Ukraine. A person who so wished might register into the competence of a particular national union; the influence of that Union was then extended upwards through the election of members thus registered to the National Legislative Assembly which formed the national autonomous authority of the country. This authority would then have control of schooling, health, welfare, religion, cemeteries and such other matters as should eventually be agreed on. From the general accounts to the Union would then be transferred funds proportional to the numbers of people in the Union and the extent of its jurisdiction, and each National Union would have the right to collect taxes voted by themselves for their own purposes.¹⁵⁰ Individuals could also decide to stay outside of the National Union and those belonging to the National Unions would, of course, keep their vote in the general bodies, just as the Jewish and Polish ministries in the Government would be maintained.

"The law passed by us may be compared only with the acts of the great French Revolution: there were then proclaimed the rights of men; today there have been proclaimed the rights of nations," stated the General Secretary of Jewish Affairs, M. Silberfarb. The representative of the Bund, Rafes, greeted the law as 'an act of the greatest importance, unknown as yet in any land in Europe.' The leader of the Zionists, N. Syrkin, wrote then of the law, '*an after cholem wert m'ku-*

jem'—'the old dream comes true'.¹⁵¹ Representatives of other Jewish parties also hailed the law, as did the Poles.

That the attitude of the government was representative of that of the people as a whole, towards Ukrainian independence, was expressed by Vynnychenko, the Head of the Council of National Ministers. The new name of the government itself was accepted in the creation of independence. Previous to the statement by Vynnychenko, Hrushevsky, as the President of the Ukrainian Central Rada, had announced the acceptance of the Fourth Universal, after the conclusion of the voting in the Rada, concluding, 'the Ukraine has been proclaimed a self-governing and independent National Republic'.¹⁵²

Vynnychenko expressed, on behalf of the Council of Ministers of the independent Ukrainian National Republic, the 'sincere satisfaction with the important historical act which had just taken place'. The General Secretariat had had this in mind for a long time. 'Several weeks ago,' according to Vynnychenko, the Secretariat had considered the independence of the Ukraine, but had decided to wait a while 'until the idea had become ripe.' He was particularly pleased with the Universal also for the reason that the Universal 'was proclaiming peace.' The Ukrainian people would be able to begin creative labour and the 'building of their way of life in their own state'. Vynnychenko expressed the wish that the 'Universal become a strong foundation for our building of Socialism', which he felt sure, was desired by all those present. In conclusion, Vynnychenko expressed his assurance that the bases of this Universal would lead them to a 'federation of Socialist Republics of the entire world'. In this manner Vynnychenko, as the foremost leader of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats and as the Head of the Council of Ministers, announced the end of the Russian orientation.¹⁵³ His statement was given an ovation by the Central Rada.¹⁵⁴

In the opinion of Hrushevsky, the president of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the culmination of the Ukrainian revolution in the proclamation of the independence of the Ukrain-

ian National Republic was a 'historical necessity'. It was as such that he described it in the article written three weeks after the proclamation of independence, entitled tellingly, 'The Ukrainian Independence and its Historical Necessity'. He wrote that without breaking with the 'traditional idea of federalism', the Central Rada had felt it necessary to underline 'for this moment the full and absolute independence.' The first motive for this step was the need to make peace. The Ukrainian National Republic had to draw a line between itself and the Soviet of People's Commissars in the matter of peace in view of the 'changeable and uncertain policies of the People's Commissars, who were not showing in this matter any concrete plan besides loud talking.' The independence had generally justified itself in this matter, as the 'Great-Russian People's Commissars, according to the latest news, had broken off peace negotiations and had at the same time proclaimed full demobilization, delivering Russia completely to the mercy of Germany.' The Ukrainian independence, according to Hrushevsky, had enabled the Ukraine to reach an 'honourable, worthy, democratic peace.' The other immediate motive was the need for a 'more decisive policy in the matter of Great-Russian's attack upon the Ukraine under the leadership of the People's Commissars.' The previous condition had made some regard the struggle of the Ukraine with the Bolshevik Government of Russia as a 'political, a party struggle,' thus encouraging neutralism, and the attitude of taking sides. After the proclamation of the independence of the Ukrainian Republic, 'no one can hide in the wilderness of neutrality' as now there was the struggle of the two states, Ukraine and Russia, in which 'all citizens of the Ukrainian Republic, all inhabitants, without distinction of views and beliefs were obliged to support the Ukrainian government . . . the one who avoids doing so shirks his responsibility to the state,' and the one who appears on the side of the enemies of the Ukrainian Republic while an inhabitant of the Republic is a 'traitor and a rebel to his lawful government.' The final motive, in the proclamation of independence was the necessity for full freedom in the settlement of the social, economic

and financial problems of the Republic. These then were the facts and motives which, according to Hrushevsky, made independence 'a necessary demand of the moment, a historical necessity to which the Ukraine must bow and draw its conclusion from the circumstances thereof'. After the difficulties of the Ukraine were passed, its economic and social life contained within proper channels, the gains of the revolution assured, the culture and national conditions of the Ukrainian life confirmed, together with those of other nationalities in Ukraine, there would be time for the Ukrainian Republic to look over the neighbours and form a federative connection with those who would be 'going the same way.' Hrushevsky thus concluded that the 'dangerous road towards the full triumph of our democratic and social tasks must be covered by the Ukrainian National Republic as a self-governing, as an independent state.'¹⁵⁵

The Fourth Universal and the statements of Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko were certainly a true expression of the views of the Ukrainian people as a whole.

The elections to the All-Ukrainian Constituent Assembly began within a few days of the publication of the Fourth Universal. Although the evidence from these elections is less clear, in view of the progress of Russo-Ukrainian hostilities, and allowing for all factors, essentially the same result is obtained as for the All-Russian elections. It is to be noted that the Bolshevik organizations in the Ukraine were taking part in these elections.

301 members were to be elected. As a result of the warfare, only 171 members were elected. The Kiev gubernia elected 45 deputies. Of these, 38 were Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries; a total of 42 non-Bolshevik members were elected. 3 Bolsheviks were elected. Since deputies were elected on a proportional basis, we find that 84.5 per cent of the electorate of the Kiev gubernia voted for the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, while about 93 per cent voted for non-Bolshevik parties. Only about 6.7 per cent voted for the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks). Although this

constituted a virtual doubling of the Bolshevik (from 3.6 to 6.7 per cent), the total Bolshevik influence was insignificant.¹⁵⁹

The elections in Poltava gubernia took place under a condition of occupation by Russian forces; the same is true of Chernykhiv. However, the democratic regime prevailed in Volhynia. The results of the earlier Assembly elections were largely a duplication; a total of 30 deputies was elected, of whom 19 were Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 1 was a Jewish Bundist. 26 non-Bolshevik and 4 Bolshevik deputies were elected. The vote was about 63.3 per cent for Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, about 86.7 per cent for all non-Bolshevik parties, and 13.3 per cent for the Bolsheviks. Again, this constituted a three-fold rise in the Bolshevik vote from 4.4 per cent, but the number of Bolsheviks was still small.¹⁶⁷ One of the reasons for the sharp rise in the Bolshevik vote was the fact that the front ran through the Volhynia gubernia, and thus an indeterminate number of the demobilized and demoralized soldiers, regardless of their place of residence, may have taken part in the elections.

In Podolia, 39 deputies were elected; of these, 30 Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries were elected. No Bolshevik at all was elected. Although we do not have the figures, it may be assumed that the balance of the (non-Bolshevik) deputies was made up of adherents of the Jewish and Polish parties.¹⁶⁸ On the whole, 9 Zionists and 5 Polish deputies were elected in the entire Ukraine; Podolia and Volhynia showed considerable concentration of these two groups. At any rate, about 72 per cent of the Podolia vote went to Socialist-Revolutionaries. As all Bolshevik deputies are accounted for in the other gubernias, it must be concluded that the Bolsheviks fetched a minimal number of votes. This would not be exceptional for this gubernia, as Podolia showed the smallest Bolshevik vote of all Ukrainian gubernias in the All-Russian elections (3.3 per cent).

The situation in the Poltava gubernia is more complicated. As pointed out in the memoirs of Andrievsky, the elections took place in conditions of Bolshevik occupation and open persecution of all Ukrainian elements.¹⁶⁹ It is significant,

therefore, that out of 30 deputies elected, 18 were Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, while all non-Bolshevik parties took in 20 deputies, 10 going to the Bolshevik party. Thus Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries had 60 per cent of the vote, all non-Bolsheviks, 67 per cent of the vote, while the Bolshevik party received about 33 per cent.¹⁰⁰

In the Chernyhyv gubernia, the situation of the Russian Constituent Assembly was largely repeated; this time however, the division between the Ukrainian and the Russian-populated sections was further complicated by the Russian occupation of the gubernia. The Chernyhyv province gave 28 deputies, 17 of whom were Bolshevik and 11 were non-Bolshevik (among the latter were 10 Socialist-Revolutionaries). This would give 61 per cent of the vote to Bolsheviks, and 39 per cent to non-Bolsheviks. It is not possible to establish the election results in the Ukrainian part of the gubernia, nor to estimate the significance of Russian occupation in the elections.

The elections took place upon the territory which could be described as the historical area of the Ukraine, consisting of five gubernias: Kiev, Poltava, Volhynia, Podolia and Chernyhyv.

The total vote gave 34 deputies out of 172 to the Bolsheviks. However, one-half (17) of these Bolshevik deputies were elected to the Chernyhyv gubernia alone; another 10 were elected in the Poltava gubernia. The former gubernia was sharply divided between the Russian and Ukrainian sections, and both gubernias were under Russian occupation. Only 7 Bolshevik deputies were elected in the three gubernias of Kiev, Podolia and Volhynia, which were by far the most populous of the region. Thus, it is difficult to reach incontrovertible conclusions. On the basis of all returns, it can be seen that the total number of non-Bolshevik deputies was 137, there being also 1 Left Socialist-Revolutionary and 34 Bolsheviks. This would give about 80 per cent to the parties which took part in the work of the Republic, and about 20 per cent to the Bolsheviks, and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries supporting them. Ukrainian parties held absolute majority with 68.5 per

cent of the vote. Finally included were 116 Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, 34 Bolsheviks, 9 Zionists, 5 Polish deputies, 1 Bundist, 1 Social-Democrat, 1 Left Socialist-Revolutionary, 1 Agriculturalist-Owner (a conservative group), and 4 deputies of other groups.

Because of the persecution of Ukrainian elements in the Russian-occupied territories of the Ukraine, the will of the free Ukrainian nation was probably better represented in the region where a democratic regime existed, where the freedom of meetings, information and political agitation, as well as the physical safety of the electorate, were assured. Only the Kiev, Podolia and Volhynia gubernias qualified as such.

Looking at the provinces alone, we see that a total of 114 deputies were elected, of whom 87 were Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries; 20 belonged to other non-Bolshevik parties (of whom no more than 2 belonged to Ukrainian parties), while 7 belonged to the Bolshevik party. In these provinces, parties supporting the Republic received 94 per cent of the vote, while the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party received 6 per cent of the vote.

Thus, the formation of the Ukrainian National Republic as a result of an internal constitutional process, was completed. The full maturation of the Ukrainian National Republic, such as was involved in its recognition by foreign states is discussed below.

NOTES

1. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 218; p. 380.
3. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 42.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
5. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 321.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
7. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 43.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
9. Onyschuk, Y., "A New Look at Simon Petlura." *The New Review*, Vol. II, Nos. 4-5, pp. 32-8, p. 35.
10. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
11. Lapchinskiy, Georg, "Z pershykh dniv vseukrains'koi radyans'koi vlady," *Letopis' Revolutsii*, Nos. 5-6, 1927, pp. 46-47, p. 48.
12. *Shestoy s'ezd RSDRP (bolshevikov). August 1917 goda Protokoly*, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1958, p. 286.
13. Kulik, Ivan, "Kievskaya organizatsia bol'shevikov v oktyabr'skie dni. (Opyt kratkoy kharakterizatsii)," *Letopis' revolyutsii*, Nos. 5-6, 1927, pp. 219-34, p. 226.
14. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. xv.
15. Ivanov, *op. cit.*, p. 72-3; Kulik, *op. cit.* p. 226.
16. Doniy, *op. cit.*, p. 686.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 689-90.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 690-1.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 684-5.
20. *Ibid.*, 687-9.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 689-90.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 833-4.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 845.
24. Antonov-Ovseyenko, V., *Zapiski o grazhdanskoj voyne*, 4 Vols., Moscow, 1924-1934, Vol. I, p. 171.
25. Koroliivskiy, S. M. (ed), *Velikaya oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya na Ukraine*, 3 Vols., Kiev, 1957, Vol. I, pp. 883-4.
26. Kulik, *op. cit.*, p.230.
27. Shulhyn (Choulguine), Alexandre, *L'Ukraine contre Moscou 1917*, Paris, 1935, p. 144.
28. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 317.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 316.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 320.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 322n.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 320.
37. Tron'ko, P. T. (ed.), *Bořba za vlast' sovetov na Kievshchine. (Mart 1917 g.—Fevral' 1918 g.), Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Kiev, 1957, pp. 358-9.
38. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 322.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
43. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 422.
44. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
45. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 329.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 329.
47. Tron'ko, *op. cit.*, p. 362.
48. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 330.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 329.
50. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 325.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 317.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 329-30.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 329.
54. Tron'ko, *op. cit.*, pp. 380-1.
55. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 327.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 327.
57. Kulik, I., "Oktyabr'skie dni v Kieve," *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, pp. 39-43, p. 39; Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 326-7.
58. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 326.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 324-5.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 370.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 379-80.
62. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
63. Tron'ko, *op. cit.*, p. 364.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 364.
65. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 333.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
68. Kulik, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
69. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
70. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 45.
71. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 335.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-9, p. 339n; also Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 31-2.
74. Ivanov, A., "Tsentral'naya Rada i Kievskiy Soviet v 1917-1918 g.g.," *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. I, 1922, pp. 9-15; p. 11; also, Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 340.
75. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.
76. Ivanov, *op. cit.*, p. 11; also Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 342; also, Kulik, I., "Kievskaya organizatsiya bol'shevikov v oktyabr'skie dni," *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, Nos. 5-6 1927, pp. 219-34, p. 225.
77. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
80. Tron'ko, *op. cit.*, p. 376.
81. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 346.
82. Kulik, I., "Kievskaya organizatsiya bol'shevikov v oktyabr'skie dni," *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, Nos. 5-6, 1927, pp. 219-34, p. 223.
83. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 342.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 347.
87. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 48.
88. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
89. *Ibid.*, pp. 347-8.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 349n.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
93. "Protokol Zasedaniya Komissii 'po vyrobotke usloviy prekrashcheniya voennykh deystviy v gor. Kieve,'" *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 4, 1924, pp. 187-194.
94. Manilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-9.
95. *Ibid.*, pp. 352-3.
96. Ezhov, V. A., "Rabochii Petrograda v bor'be za ustanovlenie vlasti na Ukraine", in Kornatovskiy, N. A. (ed.), *Iz istorii pervykh let sovetskoy vlasti*, Leningrad, 1959, pp. 59-77, p. 74.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-9.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
102. U. S. S. R. Ministry of External Affairs, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 14-5; also, R.S.F.S.R., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 39-41.

103. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 50-1.
104. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 363.
105. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 188-92.
106. The summary of election returns in the Ukraine by gubernias and military fronts is found in: Borys, J., *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of the Ukraine. A Study in the Communist Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations*, Stockholm, 1960, p. 161. All the figures on the Kiev gubernia returns have been taken from the table, with the exception of the figure for the Russian Right-Wing Bloc (also known as the Union of Russian Electors), which has been taken from Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 213.
107. The figures for the Kiev gubernia alone were obtained through the use of the results for the Kiev gubernia (including the city) given above and the results for the city of Kiev found in: Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 212-3.
108. Gol'denveyzer, A. A., "Iz Kievskikh vospominaniy (1917-1921 gg.)", *Arkhiv russkoy revolyutsii*, Vol. VI, Berlin, 1922, pp. 161-303, p. 201.
109. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 212-3.
110. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 375
111. Likholat, A. V., *Razgrom natsionalisticheskoy kontrrevolyutsii na Ukraine (1917-1922)*, Moscow, 1954, p. 51.
112. Chaykovsky, Yu. H., "Na Kyivs'kim Arsenali", in Alekseyev, L. D., et al. (eds.), *Borot'ba za peremohu radnyanskoi vlady na Ukraini*, Kiev, 1957, pp. 92-115, p. 92.
113. Kutuzov, S. J., and Bondarenko, S. S., "Aviaparkivtsi", in Alekseyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-44, p. 124.
114. Tron'ko, P. T. (ed.). *Bor'ba za vlast' sovetov na Kievshchine. (Mart 1917 g.—Fevral' 1918 g.). Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Kiev, 1957, p. 461.
115. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 375.
116. Antonov-Ovseyenko, V., *Zapiski o grazhdanskoy voyne*, 4 Vols., Moscow, 1924-33, Vol. I, p. 131.
117. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 212-3.
118. Figures for the election returns in the City of Kharkiv are found in: Korolivskiy, S. M. (ed.), *Velikaya oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya na Ukraine*, 3 vols., Kiev, 1957, Vol. II, p. 175.
119. The figures for the Kharkiv gubernia alone were obtained by the use of the results for Kharkiv gubernia with the City, and the results for the city alone, given above.

120. The figure is based on the summary of the election returns in: Borys, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
121. Zaryts'ky, N. M., "Na choli kolektyvu robotnykiv", in Alekseyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-15, p. 209. Thus, this factory employing 3,600 workers and 60 employees gave 2,849 Bolshevik votes; see Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 164. The total number of Bolshevik votes in Kharkiv was 27,336. If one-half of the vote is assumed to have belonged to soldiers, the single factory in question had about one-fifth of all Bolshevik voters in the city; for the Bolshevik vote in the city, see Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 175.
122. Gopner, a member of the Katerynoslav Committee of the Russian Bolshevik S.D.W.P., wrote in her memoirs of 'Bryansk factory, which had become the main arsenal and fortress of the Revolution'; see Gopner, S. I., "Vid berezhnya 1917 do berezhnya 1918 r.", in Alekseyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-52, p. 243. Potapov, the Chief-of-Staff of the Katerynoslav Red Guard, wrote of the 'Bryansk Military Detachment' that 'the make-up of the fighters of the detachment was truly international. Here, there were Russian, Ukrainians, Latvians, Belorussians and representatives of the Caucasian nations'; see Potapov, M. I. "Chervona hvardiya Katerynoslava", in Alekseyev, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-73, p. 269. It would appear, therefore, that the force was not Ukrainian in national make-up to any great degree. It is also significant that of the four Bolshevik military centres created in Katerynoslav, one was controlled by and consisted of, Latvians exclusively; see *Ibid.*, p. 258. It would appear that the Bolshevik force in Katerynoslav was largely non-Ukrainian, although no definite data are available.
123. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 212.
124. Tabakov, Z., "Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya na Chernigovshchine", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, pp. 143-70, p. 143, p. 144.
125. Shcherbatov, V., "Zhovtnevyy period na Chernyhyvshchyni", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, Nos. 5-6, 1927, pp. 299-317, p. 30. It is of interest that Popov, a Bolshevik historian, pointed out the connection between the Russian population and the Bolshevik vote; see Popov, N., *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi Partii (Bil'shovykiy) Ukrainy*, 3rd ed., Kharkiv, 1930, p. 125. In explaining the Chernyhyv vote (given by him as being 20 per cent Bolshevik), Popov stated, 'I remind (the reader) that the Great-Russian povits of

- Chernykhiv gubernia, which had been separated from the Ukraine, now belonged to the Chernykhiv gubernia'. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
126. Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
 127. Lenin, V. I., *Sochineniya*, 4th ed., Vol. XXX, p. 246.
 128. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 213.
 129. Radkey, O. H., *The Sickle under the Hammer. The Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*, New York, 1963, p. 388.
 130. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
 131. *Ibid.*, pp. 388-9.
 132. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 441.
 133. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 204.
 134. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-6.
 135. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
 136. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
 137. *Ibid.*, pp. 205ff.
 138. Tcherikover, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-1.
 139. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
 140. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-2.
 141. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
 142. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
 143. Jablonski, H., *Polska autonomia narodowa na Ukrainie 1917-18*, Warsaw, 1948, (University. Warsaw. Historical Institute, *Prace*, Vol. III), p. 153.
 144. League of Nations. Secretary General, *Application of the Ukrainian Republic for Admission to the League of Nations*, Paris, 1920, (League of Nations Assembly Doc. No. 88), pp. 9-12; Bunyan, James and Fisher, H. H. (eds.), *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918. Documents and Materials*, Stanford, 1934, pp. 444-8; also Mazepa, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 158-61 also Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 264-8; also Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 103-106.
 145. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 268.
 146. Tcherikover, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
 147. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
 148. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
 149. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
 150. Jablonski, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
 151. Tcherikover, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-3.
 152. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 268
 153. *Ibid.*, pp. 268-9.
 154. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

155. Hrushevsky, Mykhaylo, S., *Vybrani pratsi*, edited by Haliy, M., New York, 1960, pp. 37-9.
156. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 6.
157. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
158. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
159. Andriyevsky, Victor, *Z mynuloho (1917-yi rik na Poltavshchyni)*, 3 Vols., Vol. I (2 parts), 2nd ed., New York, 1963, Vol. I, (Part II), p. 138.
160. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 6.

CHAPTER FOUR

UKRAINIAN AUTHORITY AND ACTUAL TERRITORIAL AND MILITARY CONTROL IN THE PROVINCES

The establishment of the Ukrainian Republic took place in the lower levels of government, in particular on the gubernia level. The gubernias to consider are nine in number, the gubernias of the Third Universal. These are the Kievan gubernia, Kharkiv gubernia, Kherson gubernia, Katerynoslav gubernia, Poltava gubernia, Volhynia, Podolia, Chernyhiv gubernia and Tauria gubernia.

The Kievan gubernia was the gubernia of the capital, and as such, has been discussed in great detail in the general treatment of the establishment of the Republic on the all-Ukrainian level. It will not be discussed in this chapter.

A review of the establishment and consolidation of the Ukrainian Republican authority in the provinces demands a look at earlier events in the provinces. Local government in the Russian Empire was concentrated in the hands of gubernators (governors) appointed directly by Petrograd. The government in the povits (*uezd* in Russian) lay in the hands of officials named *ispravniks*, officials appointed by gubernators. Insofar as the gubernator represented the autocratic principle, his power was in fact unlimited. The gubernator was expected, however, to consult with quasi-representative bodies of the province, the *zemstvos*, and other bodies. As the possessor of executive authority, the gubernator had under his direct control the police, and could call upon the entire resources of the state. The gubernators had made frequent use of their powers of suppression of any disturbances. Among these were the

wide-scale rebellions in the Poltava gubernia, which appear to have been organized by the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, in 1902 to 1903.

In an earlier era, the gubernators in the Ukraine often carried with them the historical association of the disestablished Hetmanate state. Thus, Dragomirov, a gubernator of the Kiev gubernia, had affected a certain amount of Ukrainophilism, expressed by the wearing of Ukrainian national clothes, by Ukrainian songs and folklore.¹ However, in a later era, when Ukrainian language and political life was being suppressed as subversive, all such associations were studiously avoided by the gubernators or their officials.²

The coming of the Revolution in March 1917 had as a consequence a general suspicion of gubernators as representatives of the old autocratic power. When the Petrograd government was formed and had begun to establish itself, on March 17, 1917, the matter of local government came up in the discussions of the Provisional Government. Minister-President Lvov presented the question 'on the reorganization of the local administrative authorities'. It was resolved in the meeting that gubernators and vice-gubernators were to be 'temporarily' removed from office. In the gubernias where the *zemstvo* regulations were in force (which included all of the Ukraine, except for some outlying regions), it was decided to 'entrust the functions of the governor' to the Chairmen of these bodies, who were to be designated 'Gubernia Commissar of the Provisional Government'. The decentralization was further applied to the *uezd* level, where it was decided that the administration of the *povits* (*uezds*) was to be given to the chairmen of the *povit zemstvo* boards. These were to be known as 'Uezd Commissars of the Provisional Government'. The existing administrative apparatus was to be preserved as far as possible.³ The centralized police were disestablished as well, while the policing of the provinces was undertaken by the militia raised and controlled by local governments.⁴

The changes meant, in particular, that local government was essentially under the continual control of the Petrograd

government. The existing chairmen of zemstvos were appointed 'Commissars' who were 'fulfilling the functions of the governor'. However, no provision was made for any dependence of the Commissars upon the local bodies; rather, the Commissars were appointed and removed on the orders of Petrograd. One of the consequences of this was a developing impotence of the Commissars, in the rising conflicts in the Revolution. Denikin, a conservative observer, was probably right in concluding that the 'position of the governmental Commissars became an empty space from the earliest days'.⁵ The position of Sukovkin, Commissar of the Kiev Gubernia, studied in some detail above, appears to have indeed been weak, and to have gotten progressively weaker. It had been the intention of some groups in the Ukrainian Rada to attempt to concentrate the local Ukrainian forces around the person of the Kiev Commissar, but, primarily because of the intractability of the Petrograd government, which refused to consider appointing Sukovkin as Commissar for the Ukraine, the plan collapsed. Sukovkin resigned soon after.⁶

Still, the Provisional Government seems to have wished to cooperate with the Ukrainian Government on the appointment of the Commissars. Thus, Dmytro Doroshenko, a well-known Ukrainian, was appointed Commissar for the territory of Galicia and Bukovyna, insofar as they were free of enemy occupation. The appointment followed the intervention of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the Union of Cities of the South-Western Front, and the Union of Zemstvos.⁷ The uезд commissars appointed were also Ukrainian, or persons who had been friendly to the Ukrainian institutions.⁸ Doroshenko refused to be bound by the Russian military officers in the area (although the front was the actual border of the territory in question), and instead went to Kiev to coordinate his activity with Ukrainian circles.⁹

The Provisional Government, although not bound to do so, also attempted to follow the principle of appointing commissars who would be at least acceptable to the дума or zemstvo organizations, though in many cases, it tried to use the

Commissar as the agent of the Petrograd authority, in conflict with the Ukrainian population. As has been seen, the Provisional Government had insisted on the appointment of Vasilenko as the City Commissar of Kiev; this appointment was terminated only by the overthrow of Russian authority in the Ukraine. However, in less contentious places like the zemstvos, which had become almost completely dominated by Ukrainian parties,¹⁰ local Ukrainians were appointed, according to the principle universally applied in the former Russian Empire.¹¹ In such a manner, the local government passed slowly into the hands of Ukrainians.

However, contact between local bodies and the Ukrainian Central Rada was apparently intermittent only, through the summer of 1917. One of the reasons for this was the constant preoccupation of the Rada officials with the struggle with Petrograd. Doroshenko states that the General Secretariat, 'busy with high statesmanship all the time' produced a practical declaration only in the fall.¹² This was said to follow 'several months of general conversations'.¹³ Indeed, the general inexperience of the new men must have been at least a contributing factor, though the corresponding Russian leaders, Kerensky, Chernov, Lenin and others were not noted for administrative ability or experience. Perhaps a more solid reason lay in the resistance of the whole hierarchy of officials, primarily Russian or Russified, to the new administration. The resistance extended through various fields; for instance, the system of the administration of justice consisted of Russian officials. Goldenveyzer, one of these, related with gusto in his memoirs of the passive resistance of officials against the establishment of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian control over the system. On the other hand, some individuals came to support 'Ukrainianization' in the judiciary system. One of these was Margolin, who describes in his memoirs the developing Ukrainian control in the administration of Justice.¹⁴ Similar resistance was found in the system of public education (though not among the mass of teachers), the church and elsewhere.¹⁵

The authority of the Ukrainian Land, as proclaimed by

the First and Second Universals, and recognized by the Declaration of the Provisional Government of July 16, 1917, extended over local government in the Ukraine. However, the first official order of the General Secretariat does not appear to have been issued until October 7, 1917. The Order, entitled the 'Information of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada on the Entering of the Administration of the Land', referred to the Provisional Instruction by which the authority of the General Secretariat was limited to five provinces. The Order stated that the 'highest governmental body of the land', the General Secretariat, created by the Ukrainian Central Rada and confirmed by the law (*akt*) of the Provisional Government of August 17, concluding its internal organization and beginning the administration of the land, was 'proclaiming on this to the population of the Ukrainian and all civic offices, which are to direct themselves by it on the basis of Article 6 of the Instruction to the General Secretariat.' The detailed description of the sphere of activity of individual secretariats was to be issued later.¹⁶ Clause 6 stated that 'local governments direct themselves to the General Secretariat', which, after consultation with the Provisional Government would issue 'decisions and orders of the latter to the local governments.'¹⁷ The Order of the General Secretariat, while accepting the authorization of the Provisional Instruction, in underlining its dependence upon the Ukrainian Central Rada, established its own authority in local matters. The Order was published in the press on October 8, 1917.¹⁸

Immediately upon the issuance of the Order, Vynnychenko, the Head of the General Secretariat and the Secretary for Internal Affairs, held a conference with the gubernia and povit commissars of the Ukrainian Land, from the gubernias of Kiev, Chernyhyv, Poltava, Volhynia and Podolia. The Commissar of the territory of Galicia and Bukovyna also attended; about 80 gubernia and povit commissars were present.¹⁹ The Commissar made a formal request for information whether they were Commissars of the Provisional Government or of the General Secretariat,²⁰ and were presumably given an answer

in the spirit of the Order of October 7. The discussion presented a picture of the Ukrainian countryside in the throes of progressing military defeat and exhaustion. It appears plainly from the reports, however, that the greatest amount of disorder stemmed from activity of soldiers and deserters. These actions were referred to by the Commissars of Volhynia, Podolia, and the Kiev province. According to Doroshenko, a participant in the conference, Volhynia and Podolia, the gubernias adjoining the front, were hardest hit. There is also reference to the conflicts between peasants and owners of land-holdings, forests and sugar-factories. These, however, do not seem to have been mentioned too often. An interesting feature is the total absence of any reference to pogroms.²¹ The Commissars also approved, although the vote was 25 to 5 with 20 abstaining, the organization of the Free Cossacks, a military volunteer group composed mainly of peasantry,²² as a body of peasants self-organized to suppress disorders.

The internal administration of the Ukraine ran into further difficulties with the demise of the Provisional Government.

The situation was changed with the overthrow of Russian authority in the Ukraine. There was no longer any generally recognized central government. While the Bolsheviks were in control of Petrograd, and later Moscow, their control of the machinery of government was quite weak, and ran into a determined boycott on the part of the civil service, a situation which did not occur (despite the passive resistance) in the Ukraine. Some immediate problems, connected with the sudden liquidation of the central government, made for certain passing difficulties. As an instance of the many immediate problems, there was a shortage of bank-notes, which will be investigated later. Previous to the fall of the Provisional Government, the Ukraine had supplied Ukrainian produce to non-Ukrainian provinces, and obtained the financial papers to pay workers on the railroads, etc., from the central clearing-house of Petrograd, but in the new situation, the entire front and the territories were still being supplied in part with Ukrainian

produce, and there was no clearing and balancing of accounts in any way whatsoever. An attempt to tide over the dislocation was made in the negotiations between Porsh, the General Secretary of Labour, and Stalin, as the 'representative of the Soviet of People's Commissars,' which took place on November 30, 1917.²³ The negotiations did not produce any results. The sugar monopoly established in the entire former Russian Empire on September 14, 1917, became the basis of the Ukrainian financial system. The immediate shortage was relieved through the expedient of the use of the 5% bonds of the Russian Treasury, which were to be issued by the gubernia and povit administrations, by the circulation of cheques, and by the requirement that the businesses deposit in their accounts a certain part of their daily circulation, to be duly credited in their favour. Eventually, the problem was completely solved by the issuance of bank-notes of the Ukrainian National Republic, backed in particular by the sugar monopoly.²⁴

Much of the information on the conditions of the time can be gleaned from reports of foreign officials or visitors in the Ukraine. These include Tabouis, the French representative, Jenkins, the American consul, and others. The reports of Jenkins, which are of particular interest, can be consulted with profit. The reports deal mostly with the Kiev gubernia. Since the city of Kiev as the capital of the Ukraine and the Kiev gubernia has been studied in some considerable detail in an earlier chapter, they are not reviewed here in any further detail.

The Kharkiv province was second in importance to the Ukraine, only to the Kievan province. The city of Kharkiv itself was dominated by the non-Ukrainian element, but the city was enclosed by a much larger population of the solidly Ukrainian peasantry. The actual composition has been discussed in greater detail in an earlier chapter. At any rate, as Doroshenko pointed out, the Ukrainian institutions had to base themselves primarily upon the zemstvos and gubernia congresses.

As soon as the news of the March revolution had reached

Kharkiv, the local Ukrainian *Hromada* (Community) called a meeting in which a demand was put forward to introduce the Ukrainian language in courts and schools, and for the Ukraine, autonomy in a federated Russia. The Ukrainian community of Kharkiv also sent representatives to the Ukrainian National Congress, held in Kiev in mid-April. The Congress re-elected the Ukrainian Central Rada, electing as representatives of the Kharkiv gubernia and seven city representatives, among them Rubas, S. Tymoshenko and P. Zaytsov. A Gubernia Congress, called by the Ukrainian Hromada, was held a few days later. There were nationalist and socialist currents in the Congress, but in the end, the majority favoured a united national course. The Congress passed a resolution recognizing the Central Rada as the lawful representation of the Ukrainian nation, and endorsing all the resolutions accepted by the National Congress in Kiev.²⁵ The Congress also deliberated on the problem of further organizational work. The Kharkiv Gubernia Rada was elected, headed by a member of the Ukrainian Central Rada, Rubas.

An important demonstration of the Ukrainian power was provided by the First Ukrainian Peasants' Congress. The Kharkiv peasantry appears to have been widely represented since the Rada of Peasants' Deputies, elected by the Congress, included representatives on the povit level, covering the entire gubernia. The povits and towns of Lebedyn, Sumy, Zmiiv, Kup'yans'k, Valkiv, Izyum and Bohodukhiv were represented by fifteen men who were in the Peasants' Rada, and therefore the Ukrainian Central Rada.²⁶ The Kharkiv peasantry held the Kharkiv Gubernia Peasants' Congress on June 12; it decided that the general principles of the agrarian system were to be decided on by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, but the practical development of agrarian laws, in consideration of local conditions in the Ukraine, should belong to the Ukrainian Soym.²⁷ The local Ukrainian work in the gubernias throughout the summer was directed primarily towards the Ukrainianization of education.²⁸ The limitation of the Autonomous Ukrainian Land to the five gubernias had brought a

spirited protest from representatives of the Kharkiv gubernia in the Ukrainian Central Rada.²⁹

In the Kornilov rebellion, the Ukrainian groups in Kharkiv were able to establish themselves as the predominant party. A Revolutionary Committee was formed in which the Ukrainian organizations had to divide the remainder among themselves. Represented in the Rada of the Slobozhanian Ukraine were the Ukrainian Military Rada, Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats and others.³⁰ The principal reasoning of the Ukrainian groups was that they represented the Ukrainian masses; judging by the constitution of the Committee, it was accepted by all other democratic (and Bolshevik) organizations of Kharkiv.

The revolution against the Russian authorities in the Ukraine, in the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee in Kiev, on November 7, 1917, appears to have been supported by the Kharkivites. Thus the Rada of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies of Kharkiv was represented in the Revolutionary Committee also proclaimed the extension of its power into the Kharkiv gubernia, negating thereby the Provisional Instruction.³¹

The Russian government officials and groups formed a Committee for the Salvation of the Revolution, consisting of Russian Social-Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Commissars of the Provisional Government. On November 10, 1917, they issued an appeal for support of the Provisional Government,³² possibly in connection with the moves of the Kievan Command. The Committee attempted to persuade the Chuhui military school to support this, but the railroadmen refused to transport the detachment, while the school itself was not determined enough to force them to do so.³³

The authority of the Revolutionary Committee was recognized by the Ukrainian Gubernia Rada almost immediately.³⁴ A Military-Revolutionary Committee in which Ukrainian groups had a prevailing influence was also formed in the city.³⁵ They were supported by Russian Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, in the words of a Bolshevik

participant, although only two or three months earlier they could not decide whether the Kharkiv gubernia was part of the Ukraine, were now 'ready to become Independents just to avoid accepting the Soviet power.'³⁶ At the same time, the 'counter-revolutionary face of the Central Rada' was still not plain to many Bolsheviks, according to the same observers.³⁷

The Military-Revolutionary Committee was formed on November 8, with a plurality for Ukrainian parties, where a parity between Ukrainian parties, and all other parties including the Bolsheviks, was established. The Executive Committee was elected, consisting of 9 members, of whom 4 were Ukrainian Social-Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries, 2 were Bolsheviks, 2 were Left S.R.'s and 1 was Menshevik Internationalist. The Bolsheviks were immediately defeated in the Military-Revolutionary Committee when they moved that the Committee be made responsible only to the Soviets; instead, a plurality was established for Ukrainians.

The Military-Revolutionary Committee established its power in Kharkiv without bloodshed. The old Commissars were dismissed the same day, the authority of the Committee was proclaimed, and the still doubtful contingent of armoured cars was made to recognize the authority of the Committee.³⁸

Very quickly, the Military-Revolutionary Committee weakened the Bolshevik influence in itself, by establishing relations with the Committee of Salvation of the Revolution.³⁹ The Bolshevik newspaper *Donetskiy Proletariy* wrote in retrospect that in Kharkiv 'where the counter-revolution is completely powerless, the transfer of power (into the hands of the Soviets) did not take place.'⁴⁰

Since the Ukrainian parties had the relative majority in the Committee, and the opposition was hopelessly divided between the Bolsheviks and the non-Bolsheviks, power came to be in effect exercised by the Commissars of the Ukrainian Central Rada.

In the meantime, the struggle in Kiev had plainly resulted in the victory of the Ukrainian Land. In the absence of any other claimants, definite pronouncements, or protests, the

Kharkiv gubernia has clearly passing into the sphere of the Ukrainian authority. Thus, Odoevsky, in the meeting of the Ukrainian Central Rada on November 12, speaking on behalf of the Kharkiv Gubernia Rada (also known as the Rada of Slobozhanshchyna), stated that the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Soviets of Kharkiv and other localities had decided to unite the gubernia to the Autonomous Ukraine.⁴¹ The next day, the Ukrainian Central Rada, perhaps unnecessarily, in view of proclamations of the Revolutionary Committee, decided to 'spread in full measure the authority of the General Secretariat upon the shut-off territory of the Ukraine, where the majority of the population was Ukrainian', and specifically mentioned the Kharkiv gubernia.⁴²

In Kharkiv, the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies also dealt a rebuke to the Bolsheviks. In the meeting of November 12, 1917, the Soviet rejected the resolution of the Bolsheviks which had demanded that the Executive Committee of the Military-Revolutionary Committee be subordinated to the Soviets, but instead accepted an S.R. and Menshevik-Ukrainian resolution demanding the uniform Socialist ministry, unconditional recognition of the "Revolutionary Nine" as the right form of government. The reference to the uniform Socialist ministry concerned the demand, fought fiercely against by the Bolsheviks, for a central government composed of Socialists from 'Bolsheviks to People's Socialists'.⁴³

The population of the gubernia as a whole demanded a clearer pronouncement from local bodies. The peasantry of the gubernia, in a group outnumbering all other groups many times over, held a Gubernia Conference of Peasants' Deputies. The Conference recognized the Ukrainian Central Rada as the highest power in the Ukraine, as did the Kharkiv povit zemstvo.⁴⁴

The proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic in the Third Universal, declaring the Kharkiv gubernia to be an integral part of the Ukrainian Republic,⁴⁵ demanded a statement from all institutions in the gubernia. The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was finally obliged to issue

some sort of statement, although its role appears to have been strictly limited. Thus, on November 21, the Executive Committee of the Soviet was reduced to 'asking' the Revolutionary Nine to give reports on its activity. At the same time, it continued its disagreements with the Military Rada (the latter appears to have been dominated, as were most military Radas, by the Ukrainian parties).⁴⁶ Two days later, the Soviet held a plenary meeting in which the Bolshevik resolution, obviously of a compromise variety, was accepted by a vote of 120 to 75. The relatively small number of deputies may have meant that the meeting was either called suddenly, or was boycotted by some members of the Soviet, but data lacking on this point. By the resolution, the Soviet 'greeted the only valid all-Russian government of People's Commissars' and their decrees. However, passing to the truly operative sections, the Soviet stated that the 'organization of the land on federative principles was desirable' and, 'hailing the initiative (*pochin*) of the Ukrainian Central Rada which proclaimed the National Republic of the Ukraine' said that power should be held by the Congress of Soviets of the Ukrainian Republic, and that the Central Rada should be elected from it, and eventually the General Secretariat. At the same time, the resolution proclaimed that the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly should be held as soon as possible.⁴⁷ The resolution was also important because of the tacit assumption of the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic, or the fact that the Kharkiv gubernia was part of it. The recognition of the principle of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, with the date set by the Third Universal, made little sense of any demands of a traditional nature. The practical liquidation of any rebellious position against the Ukrainian Republic, in the Kharkiv gubernia, was supplied by Artem, the Chairman of the Conference, summed up the discussions on the 'Ukrainian question' by stating that 'in the struggle with counter-revolution we must use the revolutionary, national movement', and finishing with 'Let the counter-revolution meet a maximum of hindrance on its way.' It was also stated in the meeting by Raikhshtein, without protests,

that if the 'Rada of the Ukrainian organizations remained, it would be necessary to enter into a definite contact with it'.⁴⁸ In this manner, the only possible serious rivals for authority in the Kharkiv gubernia were slowly reconciled with the fact of the Ukrainian Republic, in the face of their own impotence. A Bolshevik memoirist describes the situation in Kharkiv.

One way or the other, when the Central Rada issued the Third Universal proclaiming the Ukrainian Republic over the territory of the nine gubernias, including the Kharkiv one, this universal was recognized by the Kharkiv Soviet under the active initiative of Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats, with the support of the Mensheviks and S.R.'s . . . and with the restrained neutral attitude of the Bolsheviks.⁴⁹

Buzdalin, a member of the Kharkiv Executive Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. (B.) subsumes the events simply:

If we are to speak of the October Revolution in the widest meaning of the word, in the sense of the immediate struggle, there was no such thing in Kharkiv. The fate of the revolution and its victory were being decided in Petrograd and Moscow....⁵⁰

The situation in one Kherson gubernia, with the major city of Odessa (gubernia centre being the city of Kherson) shows some variation from the history of the Kharkiv gubernia, due primarily to the extremely cosmopolitan character of the main centre of Odessa, and the proximity of the front and the fleet. The countryside of the Kherson province was solidly Ukrainian.

The centre of the Ukrainian community in Odessa was the organization called the Ukrainian Home (*Khata*). The society was secret before the Revolution, but the liberalization after March 1917, enabled the organization to hold meetings openly.

Three political groups were represented; the major groups were Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats. There was also a small group of Socialist-Independents.⁵¹ The Ukrainian community (*hromada*) of Odessa in a meeting

in mid-April passed a resolution demanding the 'territorial autonomy of the Ukraine within the borders of the ethnographic majority of the Ukrainian population', with guarantees to minorities. The Kherson gubernia was to be included in the autonomous Ukraine. The Provisional Government was urged to issue the declaration of territorial autonomy for the Ukraine without waiting for the Constituent Assembly, and to appoint a minister to the Ukraine.³²

The most solid backing came from the peasantry. A Peasants' Congress took place in Odessa shortly thereafter; it approved the demand for autonomy of the Ukraine with the rebuilding of the Russian state on a federal basis, while the agrarian problems were to be solved only by the Ukrainian soym.³³ While the education problems had been considered in the Kherson gubernia (the Teachers' Congress decided to introduce Ukrainian schools, and schools for minorities), unlike Kharkiv gubernia, much of the Ukrainian activity consisted of building up military power around the Odessa Ukrainian Military Rada, later renamed as the Odessa Ukrainian Military Unit (*Kish*). The governing body was known as the Odessa Military Rada, consisting of representatives of the army and navy in the Odessa Military District, the Rumanian front and the Black Sea Fleet.³⁴

The Kherson gubernia, with the city of Odessa were represented in the Ukrainian National Congress, where they gave five representatives to the newly elected Ukrainian Central Rada; among these was Lutsenko, the early Chairman of the Odessa Ukrainian Military Rada, Mazurenko, Shelukhin and others.³⁵ The Kherson gubernia was also represented in the First Ukrainian Peasants' Congress; representatives of four poviets were elected into the Peasants' Rada, and consequently the enlarged Ukrainian Central Rada.

By July, the Rada in Odessa was able to challenge successfully the orders of the command (being under Independents' influence) and, gathering a public meeting of some 10,000 soldiers, succeeded in having its strength recognized. In the end, permission was granted by the Russian military authority

to organize from Ukrainian soldiers two *kurin's*, already a respectable force in terms of city garrison. Generally, these units were able to recruit further soldiers, but not from other units. In the stable conditions, the Ukrainian units grew very quickly, and became two regiments, with another regiment in the process of formation.⁵⁶ These Ukrainian regiments became the instruments for the maintenance of the republican authority in the area.

In the events of early November, the Kherson gubernia was spoken for through the representation of the Rada of Odessa in the Revolutionary Committee.⁵⁷ The Committee had also proclaimed that its power extended over the Kherson gubernia.⁵⁸

The news of the November events had reached Odessa on November 7. In Odessa, the Ukrainian Rada, decided to form the Oblast Committee to take over power.⁵⁹ Besides that, the Rumcherod had also decided to form an oblast committee.⁶⁰ The Rumcherod was the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Rumanian front, the Black Sea fleet and the Odessa Oblast', formed at a congress of these bodies held in May 1917. The Rumcherod consisted largely of Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats. It was quite hostile to Bolsheviks.⁶¹ A Revolutionary Committee was also formed by Russian organizations of Odessa. These included representatives of the Odessa Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Sailors' Deputies, and other Russian organizations and Socialists parties, as well as General Marks, Chief of the Odessa Military Command, Kharito, the Military Commissar, and Shreyder, the Navy Commissar of the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks were represented, too.⁶² It should be noted that the name of the Soviet was a misnomer, as there was not a single peasants' representative in it.⁶³ The Soviet had issued a resolution of confidence in the Revolutionary Committee.⁶⁴

Faced with this situation, the three groups agreed 'on co-ordination of actions'. The basis of coordination was to be (a) that the old power was overthrown, (b) that the formation

of a uniform Socialist power was essential and that a contact or coalescence of organizations was to take place.⁶⁵ The arrangement had obvious advantages for all parties. The decision, however, moved directly against the Petrograd Bolshevik policy, which excluded any uniform government, on the grounds that it would be a government of compromise.

The next Odessa Rada sent in a declaration that, in view of the absence of governmental power, the Central Rada had proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of the Ukraine. As the Kherson gubernia, and Odessa, were in the territory of the Ukraine, all the local organizations would be subject to the Rada. The Odessa Rada would form a Committee which was to be joined by Socialist parties and the Soviets.⁶⁶

The Revolutionary Committee suggested, on the other hand, 'a separate Command for the Kherson gubernia, and the South, and in this fashion, to achieve the formation of a federative republic'.⁶⁷ Thus, the area was to be separated from the Ukraine and enter a Russian Federation as a separate unit. The three bodies were in the process of further debates.

While this was going on, the Odessa Soviet held a meeting, in which the position rejected two days earlier was endorsed. The Bolshevik resolution was passed, stating in defiance of the earlier compromise, that the Petrograd 'Revolutionary Committee was the only revolutionary-lawful power confirming the power of the Soviets.' Support for Petrograd was called for, and most importantly in the immediate context, the call was issued to 'all revolutionary organizations of the city and the oblast',⁶⁸ for the 'creation of a strong revolutionary power of the Soviets in localities'. The same day, the 'Military-Revolutionary Committee of the City of Odessa' as the Committee had renamed itself, appealed to the Odessa population, in reply to the 'appeal of the Petrograd Soviet', asking the true friends of the revolution to cry: 'Long live the revolutionary power.' Again, more importantly, it stated that 'all to whom revolution is dear, should rally to the close support of the new revolutionary power,' which was calling for submission to the 'organized will of the Soviets and the revolutionary democracy'.⁶⁹

The first result of the appeal was the resignation of the two Commissars from the Revolutionary Committee, who thought the latter had taken the 'road towards joining the uprising.'⁷⁰ General Marks of the Odessa Command chose to remain in the Committee.⁷¹

In the meantime, the Odessa Rada appears to have formed the City Revolutionary Committee, supporting the Ukrainian Central Rada.⁷² The Rumcherod, on the other hand, passed a resolution declaring that it 'took up a negative position towards recent events', and called for a 'determined struggle with any attempts for violent seizure of power from whatever direction it should come'.⁷³ This was a rebuff to the Revolutionary Committee of the Rada, and that of the Bolsheviks. Despite the proclamation, the Bolshevik-dominated Committee failed to take any immediate action. Ray, the American Consul at Odessa, wired a resumé of the situation to his government on November 14:

In view of the situation in Petrograd the revolutionary Committees of Odessa, representing conflicting national policies, have agreed to cooperate to maintain order locally with the result that normal life in the city continues undisturbed. Outlook uncertain.⁷⁴

Indeed the outlook was uncertain, and the situation could not persist. Matters were brought to a head by the Bolsheviks.

The Ukrainian Military Rada considered the Bolshevik preparations for the uprising. Earlier, it had considered the proposal of a member, Hryshko, to 'liquidate the Club of the Red Guard', the main centre of Bolshevik power. The Commissar of the Ukraine for the Kherson gubernia, Poplavko, moved that the matter be dropped, since the Club was a political organization. His motion was accepted. The position of the Commissar was strengthened in relation to the Command, which was in charge of the actual units.⁷⁵

Ukrainians were well-informed on the activity and plans of the Bolsheviks through the department of intelligence of the Ukrainian Military Rada, just as they were of the later events of December 1.⁷⁶ The Bolsheviks had attempted to

make an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada for a common uprising to establish a co-eval government of Ukrainians and Russian Social-Democrats (Bolshevik).⁷⁷ The Rada considered the proposition; the Social-Democrats waited and watched; Socialist-Revolutionaries supported common action, and government on a parity basis. The Independents moved that Ukrainians should take part in the uprising, and establish Ukrainian authority. A tactical plan covering the entire city was drawn up. Since the hour of the Bolshevik uprising was known to the Rada, all governmental buildings and important points were occupied in advance.⁷⁸ The Bolshevik plan was to occupy the city telephone, telegraph, radio-telegraph and railroad stations, as well as the post office, water works, the Command headquarters, the city administration, the arsenal, the treasury and the aviation park. When faced with Ukrainian sentries, (the city streets were patrolled by armoured cars), the Bolsheviks attacked only the post office, arsenal and the treasury. They were surrounded and disarmed by the Ukrainian troops.⁷⁹

About the time of the suppression of the Bolshevik move, Russian authorities of the Provisional Government were also rounded up. The order was received from Kiev, by Poplavko, the Commissar for the gubernia, to take over the Odessa Command, the only remaining effective institution of the Provisional Government. General Yelchansky, the newly named Chief of the Odessa Command, arrived with the XIIth Horse Division. The division was stationed in the immediate area, Voznesens'k and Anan'iv, while the command and a regiment was based on Odessa.⁸⁰ This force provided a background of strength for further moves. The detachments organized by the Ukrainian Military Rada provided the actual force for the establishment of the Ukrainian military authority in the gubernia. On the orders of Poplavko, the First Haydamak Kurin' occupied Odessa itself, the Second, the environs of the city, while the Third Kurin' occupied the Railroad Station and the area of the Command of the Odessa Military District. The take-over occurred without any opposition whatsoever.⁸¹ The Ukrainian power in the city and the gubernia was complete.

This is the impression of the Bolshevik observers of the time. Thus, we find a member of the Odessa Red Guard, writing in his memoirs the impressions of the time, that 'while the proletariat of Petrograd and Moscow was gaining strength in hot street battles, the yellow-blue Rada reigned in the South of the Ukraine'. Kirov, the Bolshevik historian of the Odessa events, explained them as follows:

Interrelation of forces was not in favour of the Soviets. The Ukrainian Rada, which was in Odessa, had succeeded . . . in organizing its haydamak kurin's. Soon after the overthrow of the Provisional Government, the Ukrainians seized the Command of the Military District, the arsenal and other institutions.⁸²

The take-over of Odessa, the city, the port and the entire coastal area was of immense significance for the Ukraine, and for the World War in general. The operation was described by Ray, the American Consul, in his wire to Washington of November 20.

The arrangement between revolutionary committees broken by Ukrainian troops who proclaimed the annexation of Odessa to Ukraina November 15. Movement unpopular among Jewish population but supported by the Black Sea Fleet and railroads. No serious disorders.⁸³

The reference to the Jewish population was probably because the city of Odessa, unlike the Kherson gubernia as a whole, had only a minority of Ukrainians.

The authority of the Ukraine was recognized by all groups in the Odessa gubernia in a unified meeting of all Socialist groups of Odessa including, of course, Ukrainian ones, together with the representatives of the Ukrainian Military Rada, the Soviets and other military organizations. The meeting recognized the Central Rada with its executive body, the General Secretariat, as the only authority in the Ukraine.⁸⁴

The proclamation of the Third Universal made the Kherson gubernia part of the Ukrainian Republic. The public proclamation of the Third Universal took place in Odessa on November 22. The proclamation was accompanied by a parade, which also was a show of force, where the Haydamak kurin's,

the infantry, cavalry, artillery, sailors' commands and machine-gunners' groups passed in front of the new Chief of the Odessa Military District, General Yelchaninov, and the Commissar Poplavko. The Third Universal was announced to each unit separately.⁸⁵

Apparently with a view to placating the cosmopolitan population of the city, the Ukrainian authorities, placed the local government in the hands of the Rada of Ten; a body in which Ukrainians had five representatives, while the Soviets (represented by Bolsheviks) and the anti-Bolshevik Russian represented in the Rumcherod, shared the other five seats.⁸⁶ The Ukrainian plurality gave Ukrainians complete control against the divided opposition.

Bolshevik rebelliousness against the Ukrainian Republic continued, however. Ukrainian counter-intelligence learned that another Bolshevik uprising being planned for the period of November 30 up to December 1,⁸⁷ and that a Revolutionary Command had been formed. All the important centres were invested by Ukrainian troops on the night of November 30.⁸⁸ The Bolsheviks succeeded in occupying the railroad station,⁸⁹ but were attacked there. The largest battleship of the Black Sea Fleet, the *Pamyat' Merkuriya*, was under the complete control of the Ukrainian forces (together with the battleship *Volya*), and took up a firing position in the port, flying a Ukrainian flag. Two armoured trains were also put in position.⁹⁰ However, the city itself was not bombarded. The added pressure of armoured cars, and the Haydamak kurin's, crushed the rebellion in one day. The Ukrainian losses were two soldiers killed and several wounded, while Bolshevik losses were not known.⁹¹ The disturbance continued, although with much decreased intensity, for another two days.⁹² Kirov, the Bolshevik historian, concludes that the result of the events of December 1 was the actual transfer of power into the hands of the Ukrainian Rada, both in Odessa and in the oblast' as a whole.⁹³ At the same time, the control of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies passed into Ukrainian hands,⁹⁴ as the Ukrainian Military Rada absorbed it through union.

While the essentially new Odessa Military Rada became the supporter and agent of the authority of the Ukrainian Republic, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies gave up its pretensions of being an independent power, and began negotiating the status of a 'free city' for Odessa with the Central Rada. Kirov concludes that through this, the Soviet had come to 'recognize the Ukrainian Rada as the bearer of the highest state authority in the Ukraine. In reports at a later time, the Bolshevik groups in Odessa denounced the uprising, terming it the 'fast-rising attempt of the Red Guard to overthrow the power of the Ukrainian Rada without convening leading bodies.'⁹⁵ The authority of the Republic was not to be challenged by any essentially local bodies; further events in late January were the outcome of outside forces, and are rather a feature of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

The events in Odessa largely determined the situation elsewhere in the area. Thus, in the Mykolaiv elections to the Duma in July, 65 members out of 101 were S.R. The Bolsheviks were not even represented as a separate group (the Social-Democratic organization being a united Menshevik-Bolshevik group). The Russian Social-Democrats gathered a total of 17 seats. In the Soviets, the group had about one-third of the seats. When, in expectation of the Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were re-elected, the Bolsheviks obtained 42 out of 120 seats. The Bolshevik formula of the passing of power to the Soviets, after the Bolshevik rebellion, was defeated in the Soviet.⁹⁶

Ukrainian troops, apparently from the Ukrainianized units of the garrison, had a skirmish with the Red Guard; a Red Guard was killed.⁹⁷ The Bolsheviks formed a Revolutionary Committee, despite their defeat in the Soviet, and established themselves on boats in the port. The Duma took the position of an intermediary in the solution of the conflict. The result was the Bolshevik acknowledgement of defeat by the dissolution of the Revolutionary Committee.⁹⁸

Ukrainian authority was established in Mykolaiv on the

same principles as in Odessa, with the Ukrainian groups holding a plurality on the basis of parity in the 'Rada of Ten' of Mykolaiv.⁹⁹ The takeover occurred without any resistance, it appears.¹⁰⁰ The Ukrainian republican authority was proclaimed in the local announcement of the Third Universal.¹⁰¹

The situation in other cities of the gubernia was similar.¹⁰² A Bolshevik memoirist, describing events in Elisavethrad, stated that only in the second half of December could the Bolshevik and the anti-Bolshevik forces be taken into account in Elisavethrad. The local povit Commissar, Mrachkovskiy, was a hold-over from the Provisional Government. Thus, when local authorities in late December, it was to the zemstvo, based upon the peasantry and dominated, apparently as elsewhere, by Ukrainian groups, and not to the Soviet of the city. The Bolsheviks took a loyal position towards the Ukrainian Republic, as they took part in the preparatory work for the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly as late as the end of January 1918.¹⁰³

The situation in the countryside and smaller cities of the Kherson gubernia in common with other gubernias seems to have been dominated by a strong and widely distributed group of Ukrainian military volunteers—the Free Cossack (*Vil'ne Kozatstvo*). This body originally arose to defend the countryside from the ravages of deserters, returning soldiers, and criminal elements. It was essentially a volunteer body of peasants' sons. By October 1917, the Free Cossacks amounted to 60,000 armed men, spread through the gubernias of Kiev, Chernyiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav, Kherson and Kuban. The organization of the Kherson gubernia was particularly well-developed and consisted of 8,000 men. All of these Free Cossacks were represented in the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Free Cossacks held at the old Cossack capital of Chyhyryn from October 16 to 20. The Congress consisted of some 2,000 deputies.¹⁰⁴ As had been mentioned before, the Conference of the Commissars of the gubernias and povits of the Ukraine cautiously endorsed the Free Cossacks as the safeguards of law and order in the countryside.¹⁰⁵ The Congress issued a proclamation 'to the ci-

tizens of the Ukraine', that it had decided to 'form a strong armed force for the struggle against robbery and for the defence of freedom and the rights gained by the revolution.' It said that the Free Cossacks were accepting any 'honest people who consider themselves Ukrainians' and who were willing to defend the entire toiling people of the Ukraine and to 'support the federative-democratic-republican order in Russia allowing full autonomy to the Ukraine under guarantees of the rights of minorities.' Each village was exhorted to form a hundred, the povit, a kurin', the gubernia, a kish', with various grades of officers. It finished: 'Let all Cossacks arm themselves and keep a military order.'¹⁰⁰

The General Secretariat of the Autonomous Ukrainian Land approved the Statutes of the Free Cossacks towards the end of October 1917. Thus lending an official aspect to a military organization, the General Secretariat in fact made the body a branch of its own military power in the Ukraine. The statutes approved by the General Secretariat stated that the aim of the group was the 'physical and spiritual development of their members, support of peace in the land, the struggle with deserters in the war and defence of peace, life and property of citizens, especially during the de-mobilization'. The Free Cossacks were authorized to form infantry and cavalry, and to unite in volost', povit and gubernia unions. The unit became the armed might of the local Ukrainian administration of the particular level. The Free Cossacks were placed under the authority of the local officials, the chief of militia (police), and the Commissar. The Free Cossacks had been given a completely official status in the matter of search and arrest; in this case, they could act only on the orders of the governmental and juridical bodies.¹⁰⁷ The General Secretariat saw in the Free Cossacks the means of struggle with anarchy; thus, Lototsky, a member of the Secretariat, in answer to an interpolation in the Central Rada as to what was being done to assure the maintenance of order, replied that the Free Cossacks were being organized for this task.¹⁰⁸

As an example of the activity of this institution (consider-

ing only its official appurtenances), the Free Cossacks of the Elisavethrad povit shall be considered. The povit centre of the Elisavethrad Free Cossacks was located in Hlodosy, a large village of 15,000 inhabitants, typical for the Southern Ukraine. The Free Cossacks arose in the summer of 1917. The Command of the kurin' was headed by Fotiy Meleshko; headquarters unit consisted of 250 cavalry, officered by Vasyl Nedaykasha, the Brothers Berezhnyak, Vasyl Skrypka and others. Associated with Hlodosy were hundreds (*sotni*) in other villages of the povit, for instance Dobrovelychkovka, Markovo and others. Hlodosy, together with the city of Elisavethrad, dominated the entire povit and it was apparently for this reason that the administration of the entire povit, including the city, passed into the hands of the zemstvo, dominated by the peasants¹⁰⁹ and the Ukrainian parties.

Even in the Kiev gubernia (discussed earlier), in the Kharkiv and Kherson gubernia, with their respective capitals the three largest Ukrainian cities, Kiev, Kharkiv and Odessa, have been discussed in some detail in view of their great importance for the actual control of the countryside and the smaller centres.

The triangle of these three cities dominated the Ukrainian territory. Thus, the Katerynoslav gubernia, although important in its own right, was largely enveloped by the Kharkiv and Kherson gubernias; it was cut off from any outside influence, and was overshadowed by these cities, which controlled its railroads, highways, lines of supply, trade, commerce and production. Poltava was squarely under the influence of Kharkiv and Kiev; while Chernyhyv, cut off from any serious concentration in the North, depended almost entirely upon Kiev, especially in its southern (Ukrainian) portion, as has been noted, among others by the Bolshevik historian Shcherbatov. Volhynia was cut off by the front and the Kievan gubernia, while Podolia looked to the Kherson province, and the city of Odessa. In fact, the term "Odessa oblast" is usually held to embrace the southern part of Podolia, being in the vicinity of the Rumanian front. Tauria, again, was under the influence of the Kherson

gubernia, especially in view of the common coast line with consequent ease of contact, and the common Black Sea Fleet.

This state of affairs had been recognized by the Russian Army, which divided the entire Ukraine into two military districts: the Kievan, the Odessa, and the Kharkiv Command of a Corps. The gubernias were subordinated to the Districts in military affairs, and thus, in the conditions of the Revolution, ultimately surrendered all control of the territory.¹¹⁰ The takeover of the two commands of the Military Districts, was in fact a takeover of the entire military structure of the Ukrainian territory, and was the assumption of the ultimate policing of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The situation of the other gubernias fell into a predictable pattern.

By now, the similarities of developments in the Ukrainian gubernias can be said to have emerged with a discussion of the events in the Kiev, Kharkiv and Kherson gubernias. The very notion of Ukrainian history implies that there are sufficient similarities in the development of the parts, so that the whole, the Ukraine, can be considered one nation. This does not mean, of course, that there are not interesting and important variations in the history of the provinces, once the general pattern of the common Ukrainian development has been established.

Further discussion of the provinces will be primarily on the specific characteristics of the development of the gubernias, while continually pointing out the elements common to all, or in the case of one of the three gubernias of special importance, those elements of a distinctive character.

The Poltava gubernia, and the city of Poltava had been the centre of Ukrainian national ambition for some generations before the Revolution. The Society of Ukrainian Progressives of Poltava, surviving from pre-revolutionary times, undertook the first Ukrainian appeals, and the elections to the Ukrainian National Congress.¹¹¹ An inter-party group was formed by all Ukrainian bodies in Poltava, one which included representatives of the Peasants' Spilka and others, and was known as the Common Committee of Ukrainian Progressive Parties and Or-

ganizations.¹¹² In the meantime, the Ukrainian National Congress elected Poltava representatives.¹¹³ The main task of the Common Committee was to call the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Poltava gubernia, which was to elect four representatives to the Ukrainian Central Rada.¹¹⁴ Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries were elected.¹¹⁵ The Poltava gubernia appears to have been very well represented in the First All-Ukrainian Peasants' Congress; the Poltava delegates elected to the Rada of Peasants' Deputies, and so to the Rada, represented fifteen povits.¹¹⁶ The overthrow of the Provisional Government found the city of Poltava relatively indifferent. The Duma, representing the population of the city itself, had been unable to agree on a resolution on the overthrow.¹¹⁷ The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies accepted a resolution that the decisions of the Petrograd Congress would be 'obligatory' to it. After this rather general statement, the Poltava Soviet found itself obliged to approve 'the Central Ukrainian Rada's decision; to take power together with other revolutionary bodies into its own hands', and to promise that it would 'work in Poltava, with the Land Committee for the Defence of the Revolution at the Central Rada.'¹¹⁸ Since the Committee had proclaimed its authority over all organizations in the Ukraine, this amounted to the recognition of the Land Committee as the only power in the country. The Poltava Soviet sent a telegram to the Central Rada stating that it recognized the Rada and asked it to take the highest land power into its hands.¹¹⁹ The immediate military power of the Ukrainian Rada in Poltava was the Poltava Military Academy, among others. The Academy took part in the only quasi-conflict with the potential rival for power, the Bolsheviks. These had formed a Revolutionary Committee, and in the words of its Chairman, the 'Revolutionary Committee was not taking power into its own hands, or organizing any departments, but strengthening the defence of the revolution from counter-revolutionary threats.'¹²⁰ He also admitted that the Revolutionary Committee had 'extraordinarily little military power' and that the 'several hundred military academy students' represented a 'consider-

able threat' to it.¹²¹ Although a Bolshevik battalion of one and a half to two thousands troops had supposedly been summoned from Myrhorod, it does not appear that the Revolutionary Committee gained any additional strength.¹²² The Bolshevik attempt to issue an ultimatum to the Military Academy was ignored by the latter, resulting in a loss of face for the Bolsheviks.¹²³ The Bolshevik leader who was particularly involved in the incident was Ausem, later member of the Bolshevik People's Secretariat of the Ukraine; this was probably his first exposure to Ukrainian politics.¹²⁴

The proclamation of the Ukrainian Republic was received in the Poltava gubernia with enthusiasm. Mazlakh, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, admitted somewhat grudgingly that the 'Ukrainian National Republic proclaimed by the Third Universal of the Central Rada had been received in general rather sympathetically, and among certain segments of workers and peasants with great enthusiasm'.¹²⁵ The Third Universal was proclaimed in Poltava on November 22. A display of the armed forces took place, along with a meeting and a public reading of the Universal by the head of the Rada of Poltava, Terletsky. Commissar Lewytsky, in the name of the administrative bodies of the Poltava gubernia, said he would submit only to the General Secretariat.¹²⁶ The Bolshevik speaker also hailed the proclamation of the Republic; however, they said that their support was conditional to the Republic's remaining faithful to the spirit of liberation of the Ukrainian and Russian proletariats.¹²⁷ The Bolshevik party in Poltava was hardly in a position to challenge the Republic, and appears to have accepted the Republic as a *fait accompli*; in its correspondence with the Petrograd Bolsheviks on November 25, they referred to the Bolshevik party groups in the Ukraine as 'all organizations of the party of the Ukrainian Republic'.¹²⁸ Thus, the authority of the Ukrainian Republic was consolidated in Poltava; the only other possible claimants to power had demonstrated their weakness in the conflict with the Military Academy.

The Katerynoslav gubernia followed the pattern of other

Ukrainian gubernias, with peculiarities arising from the presence of a large Russian minority and the newly developing iron industry at Kryvyi Rih and elsewhere. As has been pointed out by many, including the most recent historian of the Katerynoslav gubernia, Elwood, this gubernia experienced a 'flow of skilled workers from the north and the uprooted peasants of the Ukraine'.¹²⁹

The coming of the Revolution freed Ukrainian energies in the Katerynoslav gubernia. During the war, the Ukrainian movement was suppressed here as elsewhere. Thus, in 1915, members of the Katerynoslav branch of the U.S.D.W.P. were arrested.¹³⁰ The first Ukrainian meeting in Katerynoslav was called by employees of the Katerynoslav railroad centre for March 13.¹³¹ The Ukrainian political parties were quite weak; they had only one periodical, appearing irregularly.¹³² Leading Ukrainians of the gubernia took part in the Ukrainian National Congress, and were elected by the latter to the reorganized Rada; there were seven representatives from the city and the gubernia, including Bidnov and others.¹³³ The Ukrainian Gubernia Rada was formed after the Congress. In May, the Rada called the Ukrainian Gubernia Congress, which the main Ukrainian demands.¹³⁴ The bulk of the peasantry of the gubernia, however, was represented in the Katerynoslav Gubernia Peasants' Congress called by the Katerynoslav office of the All-Russian Peasants' Union, early in June. At that time, the Katerynoslav peasantry somewhat hesitantly endorsed autonomy of the Ukraine, but refused to break away from the All-Russian Peasants' Union (headquarters in Petrograd) to merge with the Ukrainian Peasants' Spilka.¹³⁵ In the course of the summer, the situation in the countryside changed decisively. The Katerynoslav povit zemstvo, in its re-elections, returned a completely Ukrainian administration headed by V. Stromenko, as had also occurred in the Novomoskovsk Zemstvo, Pavlohrad zemstvo and elsewhere.¹³⁶ The Second Katerynoslav Gubernia Peasants' Congress, called by the same Russian body, turned its back upon the Russian Peasants' Union, and voted to associate with the All-Ukrainian Peasants'

Spilka¹³⁷ and consequently to become represented in the Ukrainian Central Rada. The peasants' military formation, the Free Cossacks, developed in Katerynoslav as well.¹³⁸ It is of interest that the Katerynoslav workers also formed units of the Free Cossacks.¹³⁹

Under the pressure of events, the Duma of Katerynoslav, where Ukrainian representation was disappearingly small, shifted to the position of support of the Ukrainian Land. Although not formally part of the Autonomous Ukraine, the Katerynoslav Duma condemned the peremptory summons of the General Secretariat by the Provisional Government in late October, declaring that the Provisional Government was violating the rights of the Ukrainian nation for self-determination, which had been 'proclaimed clearly and unequivocally by the all-Russian revolution'. Only the Russian Constitutional-Democrats and a Jewish political group (probably the Bund) supported the position of the latter.¹⁴⁰

The Ukrainian groups in Katerynoslav formed the Gubernia Revolutionary Committee after receiving the news of November events. The Committee was represented in the Revolutionary Committee of the Ukrainian Central Rada.¹⁴¹ On the proclamation of the Ukrainian authority, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' deputies met, increased by representatives of parties. The surprise feature of the meeting was the joint motion of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats and the R.S.D.W.P. (Bolsheviks). The joint motion urged support to the 'insurgents' and transfer of power in the city and the district to the Soviet. The equivocal nature of the motion was apparent as the 'insurgents' were described as both the Bolshevik group in Petrograd and the Revolutionary Committee in Kiev. By providing only for local power, and failing to specify to whom it would be responsible, the motion could eventually be applied to either Ukrainian or Bolshevik authority.¹⁴² The aim of the motion at this stage was simply to block any support of the Provisional Government by Katerynoslav; the feint was successful, and the Soviet parted without

being able to agree on any motion,¹⁴³ while the question of authority was to be decided at yet another meeting.

The Soviet met again on November 9. As Gopner, a member of the Bolshevik Executive Committee of Katerynoslav, said in her memoirs, the Bolsheviks had 'known that our resolution on the establishment of the Soviet power would be defeated in the meeting of the Rada of November 9 by a majority of several votes.'¹⁴⁴ Thus, while the meeting was in progress, an agreement was reached on the initiative of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, that the resolution would contain a clause recognizing the 'Kiev Revolutionary Committee appointed by the Central Rada' as the 'highest Land government (*vlada*)'¹⁴⁵ After some debate, the Bolshevik Committee agreed.¹⁴⁶ A motion was then introduced in the Soviet by the Bolsheviks containing general slogans, to which the Ukrainian Social-Democrats suggested as an amendment the significant formula that Katerynoslav Soviet recognized the Rada Revolutionary Committee as the highest power in the Ukraine. This motion, with the amendment, was accepted.¹⁴⁷

Gopner, in her memoirs, noted that at that point the Katerynoslav Soviet 'did not want to be, nor could it be, a government'. She goes on to say that 'of course, at this stage, one could not even speak of any (Bolshevik) armed insurrection against the Rada'.¹⁴⁸ She also stated that the 'Red Guard was still not sufficiently prepared for the struggle with the troops of the Central Rada, blaming "lack of weapons" for the lack of preparedness'.¹⁴⁹

The takeover of power by Ukrainian authorities was furthered by the decision of the workers and employees of the Katerynoslav railroad that the passing of all authority in the Ukraine to the Central Rada and its General Secretariat was essential.¹⁵⁰

The Katerynoslav gubernia was joined to the Ukraine in the resolution of the Central Rada, of November 12, and again by the Third Universal of the Ukrainian Rada, as has been mentioned earlier. The reality of the Republican authority was demonstrated by the parade of the Katerynoslav

garrison, professing loyalty to the Republic, on November 23, 1917. The Free Cossacks and the Workers' Society, a Ukrainian organization, were invited to take part in the parade. The garrison, however, was represented by the Ukrainian soldiers of various regiments; also taking part were the Free Cossacks, the Haydamak kurin' (as the Free Cossacks of the city were called), the postal and the railroad armed units, as well as the Ukrainian gubernia Rada. The paraders carried rifles, while machine-guns and artillery were also included.¹⁵¹ The parade, taking the designated route, passed the Katerynoslav Soviet of Deputies. There, Epshtein, a member of the Bolshevik Executive Committee, formally greeted the Republic from the balcony of the Soviet calling 'Long live the Ukrainian National Republic.'¹⁵² The Third Universal was formally proclaimed in Katerynoslav on December 2, 1917.¹⁵³ In the smaller centres of the Katerynoslav gubernia, the republican authority was generally recognized, while the police power was provided by the Free Cossacks, of peasants and of workers. For instance, the important centre of Kryvyi Rih, the heartland of iron production, had as chairman of its Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Ternyuk, a Ukrainian Social-Democrat. Ternyuk was one of the leaders of the Kryvyi Rih unit of the Free Cossacks. There was a limited engagement between the Free Cossacks and the Red Guard of Kryvyi Rih, led by Valyavka and others. As a result the Red Guard was dispersed, while the Free Cossacks issued orders that all Russian workers who were enrolled in the Red Guard were to leave the territory and go back to Russia, while the Red Guard would provide security for themselves and their families. It is not known whether the order was actually executed.¹⁵⁴ In Luhans'ke, the Bolsheviks were the majority in the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet and a plurality in the Duma, but do not appear to have overtly challenged Ukrainian authority, though the city was in the easternmost part of the gubernia, near the Russo-Ukrainian frontier, and was thus under considerable Russian pressure. The report of the Luhans'ke organization of the Bolshevik party to a questionnaire from the Central Committee in Petrograd stated in reply to a

question whether there were 'counter-revolutionary troops' that as 'yet there weren't any.' It went on to say that 'there were, however, Ukrainian troops, which are of a very reactionary character'. To the question whether there were any special problems in the work there, the report replied:

We live in the Ukraine, where they are driving us out saying: 'Get out from our home.' Many troubles are to come.¹⁶⁵

It would appear from the report that the Bolshevik, although having the prevailing political influence in the city, did not challenge the Ukrainian authority. There is no record of proclamation of Soviet power in Luhans'ke.

The gubernias reviewed earlier, Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson, Poltava and Katerynoslav, form the central body of the Ukrainian territory. These illustrate the main pattern of developments. The remaining four gubernias, Chernyhiiv in the North, Tauria in the South, Volhynia in the North-West and Podolia in the South-West are actually the borderlands of the Ukraine. The developments were on the whole, slower in these territories, their contact with the centres weaker and less definite. Events in these provinces parallel the general development of the provinces reviewed above, in five different and perhaps weightier areas, and were particularly strongly influenced by the greater gubernias. This is especially true of the Chernyhiiv province, if it is recognized that the ethnographically Ukrainian part of Chernyhiiv, the southern povits, followed the general lines of development, while the northern part followed the Russian pattern. The peculiarities of the Chernyhiiv province have been discussed in some detail above.¹⁶⁶ The role of these gubernias in the formation of the Ukrainian Central Rada is found discussed from time to time in the general review of the development of the Rada in the previous chapters.¹⁶⁷

It will be consistent with the purposes of this study, however, to look upon the final establishment of the Ukrainian central authority in these minor gubernias.

The news of the November events reached the city of Chernyhiiv only on November 9. On the reception of the news of the Petrograd events, the Gubernia Commissar issued

an appeal for a struggle with the anarchy.¹⁵⁸ The Chernyhiw zemstvo newspaper of November 9 condemned the uprising in an article written by a certain Stepanenko.¹⁵⁹

It is only on November 16, that a Committee of Public Safety was formed on the initiative of the City Duma. Representatives of all democratic groups and of all military units joined the committee. The Committee called on the population for law and order, promising at the needed time to give a decisive answer to all who attempted to create anarchy in the city.¹⁶⁰ The Committee of Public Safety, the bearer of authority in the gubernia, recognized the Ukrainian Central Rada as the 'provisional parliament of the Ukraine', and the General Secretariat as the highest land power on November 21.¹⁶¹ The Chernyhiw Soviet ignored the events in Petrograd altogether, right up to late December.¹⁶²

The reception of the news of the proclamation of the Ukrainian Republic, in the Chernyhiw gubernia, is described by Shcherbatov, the Bolshevik historian of the Chernyhiw gubernia, as follows:

Majority of the zemstvo and city bodies of self-government... make an abrupt turn in the direction of the recognition of the complete independence of the Ukraine and the union with her. City Dumas and zemstvo meetings devote whole sittings to the question over the Ukraine and discussion of the Third Universal.¹⁶³

Thus, the city of Nizhen' sent a three-man delegation to Kiev asking that the Ukrainian troops be left in the city. Hlukhiw zemstvo meeting stated that the povit zemstvo 'welcomed with enthusiasm the Ukrainian National Republic.' The zemstvo of Novozybkiv stated that in view of the clearly expressed will of the population of the povit on the accession of the Ukraine, the povit zemstvo meetings sanctioned this will and authorized the publicising of it to various officials. The zemstvo meetings of the Starodub povit also voted to join the Ukraine. The Station of Konotop had a meeting of some two thousand railroad workers, and passed a resolution greeting the 'Ukrainian revolutionary Parliament, the Ukrainian Central Rada as the only

Land governmental body of the Ukraine', and also supported a sovereign Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.¹⁶⁴

Ukrainian republican authority in the gubernia was proclaimed formally on December 1 on the cathedral square of Chernyhyv after a liturgy, with a reading of the Third Universal. The day was proclaimed a holiday in the gubernia by order of the gubernia Commissar, and all state offices and schools were closed.¹⁶⁵ The garrison held a parade under Ukrainian flags; the salute was taken by gubernia Commissar Dmytro Doroshenko.¹⁶⁶

The events in Volhynia closely approximated those in other gubernias, already discussed, particularly the Kiev gubernia. The principal city of the gubernia, Zhytomir, saw the formal proclamation of the republican authority through the issuance of the Third Universal on November 30. The proclamation began with the holding of a *Te Deum* with the 'Many Years' sung to the 'God-fearing Ukraine, Central Rada and General Secretariat.' Gubernia Commissar Vyazlov, spoke to the populace, greeting it with the 'great festival'. The gubernia education commissar read the Third Universal. The reading was closed by the Ukrainian national anthem and the Marseillaise. There was a march-past of the garrison troops showing their loyalty by marching under Ukrainian flags; the garrison was followed by school children and various organizations.¹⁶⁷ A festive proclamation of the Republic also took place in the towns of Zvyahel' and Luts'k in Volhynia, and probably elsewhere.¹⁶⁸

In Podolia, establishment of Ukrainian authority seems to have occurred peacefully; however, Vynnytsya was a special case. There, the 15th reserve regiment had mutinied and refused to embark for the front, at the end of October.¹⁶⁹ Thus, the refusal was not connected in any way with the November events in Petrograd. The disturbance could not be put down by military authorities, in the sudden crisis in Petrograd. According to a Bolshevik of the Vynnytsya organization, Miller, a meeting was held 'in one of the back rooms in the night' of the Executive Committee of the Soviet with representatives

of the military units, at which a Revolutionary Committee was formed, with the prevailing influence of Bolsheviks. It was also decided to hold the regiment, to confirm the Revolutionary Committee at a full meeting, to strengthen the guards and to watch all incoming troops. On the night of November 10, the Revolutionary Committee decided not to start an uprising. The next day, the Soviet, which had refused to allow the passage of arms, to send the regiment to the front, or to let Eugenia Bosh organize an uprising, was attacked by military academy students, and the Revolutionary Committee was dispersed.¹⁷⁰ On the whole, this incident must be considered an isolated case of mutiny, by a transient military unit, having little to do with the life of gubernia.

The proclamation of the Ukrainian republican authority in Podolia took place through the local issuance of the Third Universal. The Universal was proclaimed in the meeting of the Vynnytsya City Duma, held publicly, in the presence of a large crowd. The Universal was read in the Ukrainian, Jewish (Yiddish), Polish and Russian languages. Commissar Markovych spoke in the name of the gubernia rada. The Duma passed a resolution recognizing the Central Rada and the General Secretariat as the highest power in the Ukraine, with 29 votes opposed by 6, and 11 abstentions.¹⁷¹ A more public proclamation of the Third Universal took place on December 4, with a *Te Deum* and a review of the garrison in the presence of a crowd of some 30,000 people, in Vynnytsya.¹⁷²

The Third Universal was also celebrated by Ukrainian sailors and troops in the principal city of the Tauria gubernia, Sevastopol.¹⁷³ The Ukrainian Republic had claimed, however, only the continental part of the gubernia, and not the Crimea. The Taurian gubernia was represented in the Rada of Peasants' Deputies, and so the Central Rada only by the Berdyans'k gubernia as late as June 1917.¹⁷⁴ However, the Ukrainian Central Rada is said to have become active in Tauria through the summer and fall of 1917.¹⁷⁵ Generally speaking, the truncated territory of continental Tauria was completely under the influence of the Kherson and Katerynoslav guber-

nias. The Second Congress of the Bolshevik Party of the Taurian gubernia, on December 7, showed the weakness of the Bolshevik party in continental Tauria. Thus, the city of Militopil had only 200 members; Berdyans'k had 200 as well; these 400 members were all the organized Bolshevik members in the entire continental Tauria.¹⁷⁶ The resolutions of the Congress spoke only of the 'strengthening of the Bolshevik influence among the workers, soldiers, sailors and in part, peasant masses', while the establishment of the Soviets' power was regarded only as a question of the 'nearest future'.¹⁷⁷ It is indicative of Bolshevik weakness in the Taurian gubernia, that they speak of growing influence upon peasantry, being only 'in part', especially when it is kept in mind that the continental Tauria was largely agricultural.

A short review of the events in the army will complement the review of the provinces. The Commander of the South-Western Front, Volodchenko, recognized the authority of the Ukrainian Land about the middle of November.¹⁷⁸ General Scherbachev, the Commander of the Rumanian front recognized the Ukrainian Land as his authority somewhat later.¹⁷⁹ In each case, the Commanders were to keep direct operative contact with the Commander-in-Chief, Dukhonin. The supreme command passed into Ukrainian hands through the destruction of the High Command by the Bolsheviks; this occurred shortly after the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic. General Scherbachev was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian forces.¹⁸⁰

The immediate war-capability of the front, and the fact that the German Army considered the Ukrainians to be a dangerous fighting force are both of importance. This is revealed by the late December communication of Lersner, the liaison officer of the German Foreign Ministry at the German Supreme Command. Lersner quite often reflected the views of the office to which he had been assigned; he was also the usual channel of communication for the highest German officers in the field, Hindenburg and Ludendorff.¹⁸¹ His report can reasonably be considered the evaluation of the German Supreme

Command, as the Command was the source of his information. The report presented a systematic representation of the front in late December seen through the presumably well-informed eyes of the enemy.

The report generally shows that the calculations of Clemenceau, Foch, and in a smaller way, of Bertholet and Tabouis, were based upon solid fact. Although the Ukrainian Front could not undertake any offensive, it was judged capable of maintaining its positions and of tying up a considerable number of enemy troops.

The report pointed out that, with the capture of the Supreme Command of the Special Army at Rivne by Ukrainian troops, all Bolshevik Army Commands and Committees from the River Prypyat to the Black Sea, had been imprisoned by Ukrainian authorities. The Commands themselves had been transformed into Ukrainian Commands. German authorities lacked information only on the Command of the Sixth Army, at the front of Sereth and the Danube. Isolated units had attempted to show resistance to the Rada, especially in the case of the Fourth Army, where the reinstatement of the imprisoned commander and of the Committee is said to have taken place, while the Eighth Army had expressed itself as being against the Rada. However, the report concluded that 'in view of the very unfavourable conditions, under which the troops, cut off and lacking any direction', had to wage the struggle against the Rada, victory was apparently 'doubtful'. The report also points out that the authority and direction of the superior officers was maintained upon the Ukrainian front, which also received reinforcements in officers 'who had fled from other fronts'. The reference appears to be to the Ukrainianization of the front, and the concentration of Ukrainian troops upon their own front.

The report also pointed out the abundance in the Ukrainian rear, and the ample maintenance and supply of the troops. It noted that the 'greater part of the industrial region' of the former Russian empire was under the control of the Ukrainian government. It held that the 'Ukrainian government could

hardly realize the order of Petrograd to de-mobilize the war industry in its area'. The region under the control of the Republic was stated to have 'extensive coal, iron ore and copper ore resources and 51 factories of war production material.'

Although the report did state that the 'expectations of peace among the Ukrainian soldiers and people are not less sure than that among the Russians', it concluded that the Ukrainian army did constitute a considerable power. The conclusion then, underlined in the original, by officials in Berlin, was as follows:

Thus, the Ukrainian Army could in the foreseeable future, in conjunction with the still well-disciplined Rumanian troops, represent militarily a considerable (*beachtenswerten*) enemy.¹⁸²

In this manner then the Ukrainian republican authority was established in the provinces of the Republic. The stability, however, was being threatened by the rising Russo-Ukrainian war.

NOTES

1. Memoirs of older Ukrainian leaders give a great deal of information, and reflect the spirit of the times; see for instance, Lotos'kyi, O., *Storinky mynuloho*, 3 Vols., Warsaw, 1932-4 (Ukrains'kyi naukovi institut. Warsaw, Pratsi, Vols. VI, XII, XXI), Vol. I.
2. The Ukrainian language had been suppressed officially ever since the issuance of the Decree of Ems of 1876, but the suppression was being applied stringently in the later times of social turmoil.
3. Browder and Kerensky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 163.
4. Denikin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 130.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
6. The circumstances surrounded these matters have been discussed in great detail in an earlier chapter.
7. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 414-5.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 415n.
9. Denikin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 130.
10. The zemstvos were actually almost solidly dominated by the Ukrainian S.R.'s.
11. The whole matter of local government in the former Russian Empire can be followed through the documents in Browder and Kerensky, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 243-99.
12. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
14. The memoirs of Gol'denveyzer and others give a wealth of detail on the juridical system, and civil administration in the Ukraine; see Gol'denveyzer, A. A., "Iz Kievskikh Vospomynaniy (1917-1921 gg.)", *Arkhiv russkoy revolyutsii*, Vol. VI, 1922, pp. 161-303; also, Margolin, A. D., *From a Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine and America, 1905-1945*, New York, 1946; also, Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 243-4.
15. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 386 ff., pp. 406 ff.
16. *Revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rosii v sentyabre 1917 g. Obshchenatsional'nyi krizis*, ed. by Chygaev, D. A. et al., Moscow, 1961, pp. 534-5.
17. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 129.
18. *Revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rosii v sentyabre 1917 g. Obshchenatsional'nyi krizis*, ed. by Chygaev, D. A. et al., Moscow, 1961, p. 534.
19. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 150-1.

20. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 14.
21. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 150-1.
22. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 14.
23. The transcript of the negotiations are found in Manilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 531-4.
24. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 251-2.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 65; p. 70. See the Bibliography for the reports of Jenkins
26. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 85.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-6.
29. The reception of the Provisional Instruction by the Rada and the Kharkiv representatives was discussed in further details in Chapter Two.
30. Popov, N., "Ocherki revolyutsionnykh sobytiy v Khar'kove ot iyunya 1917 g. po dekabr' 1918 g.", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, pp. 18-9.
31. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 161.
32. Dykov, I. G. et al. (ed.), *Bor'ba za ustanovlenie i uprochnenie Sovetskoj vlasti. Khronika sobytiy, 26 oktyabrya 1917 g. — 10 yanvarya 1918 g.*, Moscow, 1962, p. 44.
33. Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
34. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
35. Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
38. Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, *op. cit.*, p. 141.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
41. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
42. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-4.
43. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 124.
44. Dykov, *op. cit.*, p. 114; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
45. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 179.
46. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 141.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 150-1.
48. Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-8.
49. Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
50. Buzdalin, S. F., "Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya v Khar'kove," *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1. 1922, p. 35.
51. Hryshko, H., "1917 rik v Odesi. (Spomyny z chasyv vyzvol'-nykh zmahan')", *Rozbudova Natsii*, No. 5-6 (29-30), 1930, pp. 128-9.
52. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 63-4.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
54. Hryshko, *op. cit.*, No. 7-8 (31-32), 1930, pp. 178 ff.
55. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 70.
56. Hryshko, *op. cit.*, No. 9-10 (33-34), 1930, pp. 239-41.
57. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 161.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
59. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 358.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 369.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
63. Hryshko, *op. cit.*, No. 11-12 (35-36), 1930, p. 282
64. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 359n.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 358-9.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 359.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 360-1.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 361.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 363.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 363.
73. Kirov, A., "Rumcherod i Radnarkom Odesskoj oblasti v borot'bi za zhovten' ", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 5-6, 1927, p. 237.
74. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1918. Russia, 3 Vols., Washington, 1931-2, Vol. II, p. 648.
75. Hryshko, *op. cit.*, No. 11-12 (35-36), 1930, pp. 241-2.
76. *Ibid.*, No. 7-8 (31-32), 1930, p. 183.
77. *Ibid.*, No. 11-12 (35-36), 1930, p. 243.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
80. Yanishevs'kyi, Mykola, "Zi spomyniv", *Za Derzhavnist'*, Vol., II, 1932, p. 144.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
82. Bronevoy, A., "Oktyabr'skie dni v Odesse", No. 1. 1922, p. 158; also Kirov, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
83. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 648-9.
84. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
86. Kirov, *op. cit.*, p. 239.
87. Hryshko, *op. cit.*, No. 7-8 (31-32), 1930, p. 183.
88. Hryshko, *op. cit.*, No. 11-12 (35-36), 1930, p. 281.
89. Yanishevs'kyi, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

90. Hryshko, *op. cit.*, No. 11-12 (35-36), 1930, pp. 281-2.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
92. Yanishevs'kyi, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
93. Kirov, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
96. Ryappo, Ya., "Bor'ba sil v oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii v Nikolaev", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, p. 90-1.
97. Kagan, I., "Partorganizatsiya i oktyabr'skoy perevorot v g. Nikolaev", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, p. 105.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
99. Kirov, *op. cit.*, p. 238; also, Kagan, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
100. There is, at least, no record of any resistance in the available literature.
101. Ryappo, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
102. Kirov, *op. cit.*, p. 239.
103. Volkats, S., "K bor'be za oktyabr' v Zinov'evske (Elisavetgrad)", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1928, p. 213.
104. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 151.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
106. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-2.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
109. The data on the organization of the Free Cossacks in the Elisavethrad povit have been gathered in an interview with a contemporary observer of the Elisavethrad scene, on July 20, 1965.
110. Shankovs'kyi, L., *'Ukrains'ka armiya v borot'bi za derzhavnist'*, Munich, 1958, pp. 67 ff.
111. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 66.
112. Andriyevs'kyi, Viktor, *Z mynuloho (1917-yi rik na Poltavshchyni)*, Vol. I, Part 1, 2nd ed., New York 1963 p. 8.
113. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 70.
114. Andriyevs'kyi, *op. cit.*, Part 1, p. 8.
115. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-8.
116. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 84.
117. Andriyevs'kyi, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 39-40.
118. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 444.
119. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 173.
120. Mazlakh, S., "Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya na Poltavshchine", *Litopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, p. 135.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 135; Andriyevs'kyi, *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 22.

124. Andriyevs'kyi, *op. cit.*, Part 2, p. 22.
125. Mazlakh, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
126. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 192.
127. Andriyevs'kyi, *op. cit.*, Part 1, p. 147.
128. Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, *op. cit.*, p. 482.
129. Elwood, Ralph Carter, "The R.S.D.R.F. in Ekaterinoslav: Profile of an Underground Organization, 1907-14," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. VII, 1965, p. 204.
130. Fedenko, Panas, *Isaak Mazepa. Borets' za volyu Ukrainy*, London, 1954, p. 20.
131. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 61.
132. Mazepa, I., *Ukraina v ohni i buri revolyutsii, 1917-1921*, 3 Vols., Neu Ulm, Vol. I, p. 25.
133. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 61.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
135. Mazepa, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 27.
136. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 62.
137. Mazepa, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 27.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 29; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 151.
139. Fedenko, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
140. Mazepa, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 30.
141. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 175.
142. Dykov, *op. cit.*, p. 600.
143. *Ibid.*, p. 600.
144. Gopner, S. I., "Vid bereznya 1917. do bereznya 1918 r.", in Alekseyev, L. D. et al. (eds.), *Borot'va za peremohu radyans'koi vlady na Ukraini*, Kiev, 1957, p. 240.
145. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
147. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
148. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
150. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 175.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
152. Ravich-Cherkasskiy, M., "Fevral'-Dekabr' 1917 g. v Ekaterinoslave", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, p. 79.
153. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 193.
154. Fedenko, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
155. Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, *op. cit.*, pp. 336-9.
156. Peculiarities of the Chernyhiv gubernia are discussed in Chapter Three in connection with analysis of election returns to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.
157. The development of the Ukrainian Central Rada was discussed in great detail in Chapters One and Two.

158. Shcherbatov, V., "Zhovtnevyi period na Chernyhiivshchyni", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 5-6, 1927, p. 303.
159. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
160. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
162. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
163. *Ibid.*, p. 312.
164. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
165. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
166. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 194.
167. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
168. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
169. Miller (Bernshtein), I., "Iz istorii Vinnitskoy organizatsii bol'shevikov", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, p. 97.
170. Millre, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
171. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 194.
172. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
173. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
174. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
175. Sapronov, S. H., "Bil'shovyky Sevastopolya v borot'bi za zavoyuvannya mas", in Alekseyev, L. D. et al. (eds.), *Borot'ba za peremohu radyans'koi vlady na Ukraini*, Kiev, 1957, p. 542.
176. Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, *op. cit.*, p. 628.
177. *Ibid.*, pp. 629-30.
178. Tabouis, General, "Comment je devins Commissaire de la République Française en Ukraine," in *Spohady*, Warsaw, 1932, pp. 142-64, (Ukrains'kyi Naukovyi Institut. Warsaw, *Pratsi*, Vol. 8), p. 147; also Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 176.
179. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 198.
180. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1918. Russia, 3 Vols., Washington, 1931-1932, Vol. II, p. 663.
181. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin, "Akten Krieg 1914. Unternehmungen and Aufwiegelingen gegen unsere Feinde in der Ukraine", 1917, Doc. No. A 43554 dated December 27, 1917.
Calculations of the French statesmen, generals, and officials in the Ukraine (Tabouis), in regard to the Ukrainian Republic, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE

RECOGNITION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC BY THE ALLIED POWERS, AND THE WORLD WAR

The proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Third Universal, which followed the establishment of independent Ukrainian authority in the dissolution of that of Russia, meant that there existed no higher authority over the Republic than herself.

The Republic took over the responsibilities of the former democratic Russian Republic. In the Third Universal itself, the allies of Russia were described as allies of the Republic. The Universal also proclaimed the continuation of warfare. The Ukraine claimed France, the United Kingdom, Rumania, Serbia, and further, the United States of America and other nations as Allies. The enemies were necessarily, of course, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

The Ukrainian Republic was a commonwealth of considerable importance. Its importance was further heightened by the exigencies and shortages of the First World War. By November, 1917, both immense alliances, the Entente and the Central Powers were under conditions of economic and military exhaustion. The resources of the United States of America were not available, as yet, to the Alliance, which had also been robbed of the resources of the Russian Republic through the Bolshevik rebellion. They were in danger of losing Rumania as well; this country, after entering the war in late 1916, had been beaten. Its front was maintained only through the massive support of the Russian armies. The fear of the Alliance was that the Central Powers, replenished by resources of the former Russian Empire, would break resistance

before the American military and economic aid could be made effective.

The Central Powers, too, were in considerable difficulties. The Austro-Hungarian armies, and the Bulgarian army, had been doing rather poorly. After the early successes of the Austro-Hungarian Army on the Russian front, the Austrians faltered. The Russian advance was stemmed only by serious German aid. Austria-Hungary was also doing badly against the Italians; here a true disaster at Caporetto was avoided only through the German troops. As far as Germany was concerned, however, it shared with Austria the general scarcity of food and raw materials. For a serious and decisive battle against the Entente forces in France, Germany needed both men and, no less important, food and other supplies. Men would be available through the collapse of Russia occasioned by the Bolshevik rebellion. As far as food and supplies were concerned, the Russian Republic could not give any in the best of circumstances. These could be obtained in large quantities only from the Ukrainian Republic. Looking beyond the immediate needs, the Ukrainian Republic presented many possibilities to foreign powers, through its strategic position as the Black Sea bridge to Western Europe, towards Persia and the East.

The importance of the Ukraine to the Entente, the Central Powers, and indeed to Russia, will become clearer with the examination of its economic potential in 1917. The population of the Ukraine, in 1917, was about thirty million.¹ In 1913, the Ukraine produced 1,561,000,000 poods of coal, or 70.2% of the total production of the Russian Empire. In 1916, after the occupation of Polish coal fields at Dombrova by the German troops, Ukraine produced 1,752,200,000 poods of coal or 87.2% of the total. Production fell off somewhat in 1917. In 1913 the Ukraine was producing 420 million poods of iron ore, which constituted 72% of the total; 68% of the pig iron was melted in the Ukraine, which also produced 35% of the locomotives. One quarter of the manganese and 30.6% of the salt was produced by the Ukraine. Much of the railroad rolling stock was concen-

trated in the Ukraine because of the proximity of the front.

Besides these industrial products, the Ukraine was producing, in the period immediately before the war, 48% of the wheat, 30% of the rye and 72% of the barley in the whole Russian Empire. Of special importance was the production of sugar, which amounted to 82.0% of the total production of the Russian Empire (in 1914-1915).²

While for the Central Powers and the Entente, the Ukraine could mean the difference between victory and defeat, its value to the Russian Republic can be well appreciated. The loss to Russia was all the more painful as it was taking place under circumstances of anarchy, chaos and serious economic dislocations. Thus, the external situation was hardly favorable to the survival of the Ukrainian Republic. Born among warring states concerned with their own survival, the Ukrainian Republic wanted to gain status as a nation among nations and its recognition among the powers of the world.

The establishment of the international status of the Republic took place largely in four stages. In the first stage, the newly born Republic established relations with the powers of the Alliance in November, and after a decisive stage in December, was fully recognized in early January. The next stage was determined by the relations between the Ukrainian and Russian Republics, and recognition by Russia. The third stage was dominated by the recognition of the Republic by the Central Powers and the development of the status of the Ukrainian Republic in the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk which were to re-establish peace in the Republic. This stage roughly embraces the latter part of January 1918, culminating with the signing of various agreements between the Republic and the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk in the beginning of February. The final stage in the formation of the Republic occurs throughout February and early March, when the Republic achieved an equilibrium in her position between the pressures of the Russian Republic, the Central Powers and the Powers of the Entente. By mid-March of 1918, a year after the formation of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the Ukrainian National Republic was

an independent state fully recognized by the Central Powers and the Russian Republic, while keeping contact with certain neutral states. There were some leanings toward the Entente as well as mutual contractual relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The conclusion of the final stage may be delimited by the issuing of synopses by the German Foreign Office, expressing confidence in the stability of the situation; by the Republic's demand that the Central Powers withdraw their forces and agree in principle with the demand. By the ratification of the peace treaties by the Ukraine, Germany and Russia, by the establishment of peace in the Ukraine and finally, by the emergence of the new independent national policy expressed by Hrushevsky to make the Ukrainian Republic the basis of a Black Sea commonwealth of nations, independent of Russia.

Throughout the entire period, there were rising restorationist groups, furthered as much by a certain reaction to the excesses of the Bolshevik invasion as by the extremely conservative character of the states whose troops were present upon the territory of the Republic. Still, in this period the policy of the Central Powers was dominated by relatively moderate elements. A change which could hardly have been foreseen with any certainty occurred in the latter part of April. After the obvious insufficiency of the Spring offensive of the German Army in the West, the military party of Ludendorff and Hindenburg acquired the upper hand in the affairs of the German Empire. The result was the collapse of the relatively moderate policy developed by Kuehlman and Czernin, which had countenanced an indefinite coexistence of autocratic states with the peasant democracy of the Ukrainian Republic. However, in no case was this development the necessary and inevitable outcome of the policies culminating in the full formation of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Republic was born into a dangerous world. Its earliest move in the international world was characteristically towards the French Republic. The first public contact with French representatives occurred on November 20, with Russia on

November 30, with Great Britain on December 1, with United States on December 23 and with Germany and Austria-Hungary on January 2, 1918.

The Republic's interest lay in particular in France. On the one hand, French culture and French traditions, the French Revolution and democracy evoked a great admiration in the Ukraine. On a more practical plane, there was the fact that France was the major continental power who had the means and the interest to exert considerable impact in Eastern Europe. The Ukraine could also hope to receive support from France in its extension of power towards the West, because France was the state most interested in breaking or limiting the might of the coalition of the Two Emperors.

It is of interest that the Ukraine did not throw herself in the arms of Germany and Austria-Hungary through the proclamation of immediate peacemaking with them, as did the Bolsheviks. The immediate disadvantages of such a re-orientation were obvious. The Ukraine would have had to recognize the Bolsheviks as the government of the Russian Republic, limited of course to the territory outside Ukrainian borders, and establish friendly relations with former enemies. The gain could possibly have been territory at the cost of Rumania and possibly of Austria-Hungary, at least to the extent of occupied territory, as well as guarantees of existing borders. This was precisely the solution urged by some Ukrainian conservative elements. However, no such solution was accepted, principally because of Ukrainian sympathy with the Entente.

In the immediate circumstances of the First World War, this position expressed itself by sympathy towards Serbia. This is brought out in the memoirs of Shulhyn, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and a Ukrainian Socialist-Federalist who stated that Serbia's rights were violated.³ Ever since the days of Kostomarov and the young Shevchenko, and of their Society of Cyril and Methodius, there had existed a considerable Ukrainian Slavophile sentiment, largely hostile to Russia and anticipating a loose confederation of Slav states around Kiev.⁴ The basic element in the pro-Entente position was, however, the fear of

Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus, the liberal Ukrainian newspaper *Rada* had called for defence against the Central Powers,⁵ and characterized the attitude of what later became the Socialist-Federalist party.

The basic feeling of Ukrainian Social-Democrats was pro-Entente and was represented by the position of Petlura, the Secretary of War, although there had been an important minority led by Vynnychenko and Porsh in Ukraine and particularly by Yurkevych in Geneva. This latter group was friendly to the Entente as a democratic alliance, but considered the World War a struggle pursued by both sides for imperialist ends. Under these circumstances, their aims were a revolution against Tsarism and an autonomous Ukraine arising from this revolution, as shown by the declaration on the war by *Borot'ba* (Struggle)⁶ published by Yurkevych in Geneva, which received the support of Vynnychenko.⁷ There was also a minor group of Social-Democrats friendly to the Central Powers, who organized the Union of Liberation of Ukraine with Germanophile leanings.⁸

An inclination towards the Entente was expressed in a journal published in Moscow and edited by Petlura, called *Ukrainskaya zhyzn* (Ukrainian Life). The editorial "The War and Ukrainians" written by Petlura for the special issue on the war was, in the words of Shulhyn, a 'true manifesto supporting the Entente and placing Ukraine at its side.' In it, the hope was expressed that as Ukrainians and other nations within the Russia Empire should do their 'duty towards Russia', Russia and her leading circles shall give such nations corresponding rights. The possibility of a union with Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary was suggested. Petlura also pointed out that the current struggle between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente did possess 'world significance,' obviously in objection to 'internationalists' who considered the struggle meaningless in terms of the interests of the people. Since the struggle was meaningful, all were called on to develop a definite attitude to events. By implication, he chose the Entente as the side of the democracy. This sentiment was also revealed by a

condemnation of any 'Austrophile tendency' which was said to be strong among those in Austria,¹⁰ although non-existent among Ukrainians in the Russian Empire.

Replying to Nazaruk, who had written him on behalf of the Germanophile Union of Liberation of the Ukraine, Petlura stated, 'It may be difficult for us to live under the circumstances known to you, but to get into the chains of Germany—thank you kindly.' He also asked not to be contacted again.

The Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary party, on the other hand, was an extremely young movement, which could not be said to have existed in the period previous to the Revolution; thus they had not been faced with the problem of war and peace and of allies, in all its breadth. Their primary interest was the safeguarding of Ukrainian soil and territory. With these two assured, perhaps through peace, they were uninterested in other matters, including the allies.

The views of Hrushevsky, a Socialist-Revolutionary, were of particular importance. Hrushevsky's entire outlook as a politician and as a historian was populist. It was the people and their self-government which formed the main interest in history for him. In this instance Hrushevsky's sympathies lay primarily with the democratic Alliance, such as it was, and he demonstrated the strength of his convictions by leaving Austria-Hungary, where he had been caught by the War,¹¹ and going back to the Central Ukraine, despite considerable personal danger, via Italy and Rumania. In the Ukraine he was promptly arrested by Russian authorities.¹² As he had joined the Socialist-Revolutionaries only recently, and previous to that was leading member of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives (later Socialist-Federalists), his basic attitude to the parties in the Great War is also characteristic of the older Ukrainian intelligentsia united in the Society.

Immediately after his return from Austria-Hungary, and before the arrest, Hrushevsky reported to the Rada (Council) of the Society about the Germanophile Union of Liberation of Ukraine. The Society, on his report, condemned the activity of the Union and protested in advance against any declaration

of the Union in the name of the Ukraine.¹² Hrushevsky, as chairman of the Rada, declared in May and again in September 1917 that the Central Rada was not entering into any relations with the Union of Liberation.¹⁴ Volodymyr Doroshenko, his associate and biographer, wrote that Hrushevsky felt himself completely isolated in Austria-Hungary, as he was 'not a friend of the Austro-German orientation.'¹⁵

The position of Hrushevsky was doubly exposed, on one hand because the entire Ukrainian movement was thought by more extreme Russian elements to be the result of Austrian influence, and on the other because Hrushevsky was considered the founder of the Ukrainian movement. The Bolshevik Zatonsky, for instance, wrote of his colleagues in the Ukraine in 1918, 'Many comrades to this day are persuaded in the depth of their soul that the Ukraine was thought up by Hrushevsky.'¹⁶ Hrushevsky's avoidance of any foreign contact went to the extreme of requesting directions from the Central Rada as to what to do about 200,000 rubles sent to the Rada by Ukrainians in the United States.¹⁷

It may be concluded that on the whole neither important Ukrainian leaders nor Ukrainian institutions had been in contact with powers other than those of the Entente, and that they had a friendly policy towards it.

It was natural that the Ukrainian National Republic turned to France. Relations with France began on a rather inauspicious basis. As has been mentioned earlier, the Ukrainian movement had always been suspected by Russians of being Austrian-inspired, nor was it taken seriously. The Russian attitude was projected upon Russia's allies to a great extent. The Ukraine had passed out of European history with Mazepa's failure to separate from Muscovy. In France and Great Britain the memory of the Ukraine had been preserved only in the famous remark of Voltaire, in his history of Charles XII, that 'The Ukraine has always striven to be free,' and in reference to her natural riches.

General Tabouis, the future Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Republic, was typical of the edu-

cated European of his time. He related that he had a long conversation 'on the Ukraine, Mazepa, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the Hetmans, the peasants' songs, the richness of the country, wheat, sugar, iron.' This was all, he had to admit to his interlocutor 'to his shame' that he remembered from school.⁹

The earliest serious interest in the Ukraine as a potential new state was shown by a remarkable Frenchman, Jean Pélissier. A French correspondent in Vienna before the World War, he became interested in nationality problems. He founded a journal, *Annales des Nationalités*, which enjoyed the support of eminent French politicians; among its patrons there were Painlevé, Beranger, Leygues. The Ukraine was popularized in this journal; thus a 1913 issue of the *Annales des Nationalités* was devoted to the Ukraine. He was on the Eastern front during the revolution. From there he sent to a friend in Paris a memorandum on the revolution. In his opinion, the Revolution would result, in the near future, in a number of independent national states, while the common state would disintegrate.¹⁰

A similar view had been held by the French Ambassador in Petrograd, Paléologue. Back in 1915, Paléologue directed the attention of Goramykin, the Russian Minister-President at the time, at the Ukrainian question. The latter replied to the doubting Paléologue, 'But there is no Ukrainian question.'¹¹ Paléologue wrote in his diary, after the outbreak of the Bolshevik rebellion that the general character of the Russian revolution was the disintegration into national units.¹² Pélissier, however, had recognized this phenomenon early in the summer of 1917. He urged the French Government to recognize that the problem of the nations of the Russian Republic was not theoretical but rather practical and, in particular, military. The Government was urged that the new non-Russian nations be promised the recognition of the right of self-determination so that they would defend Russia against Germany. The military forces of the East would have to be reorganized upon the national principle.

As the result of the memorandum, Pélissier was summoned to Paris where he was received by the President of the

Council, Ribot, who told him, 'We cannot dismember Russia, our ally.' Pélissier protested that the Russian government recognized the right of self-determination, and that such a recognition would be beneficent to Russia.

At the same time, Pélissier urged publicly that France enter into relations with the Ukrainian Central Rada. Pélissier, supported by his powerful friends Painlevé and Brunhes, was attached to the embassy of the new ambassador, Noulens, with the mission to study the national movements in the Russian Empire. Pélissier, however, was not allowed by Noulens to go to Kiev after their arrival at Petrograd in early July.²² It was only in August that Pélissier was sent to Kiev by Noulens with the instruction, 'See if it exists,' referring to the Ukrainian movement, after receiving an order from Ribot in Paris to do so.²³

Pélissier met various leaders of the Rada—Hrushevsky, Vynnychenko, Shulhyn, Doroshenko, Rafes, Rudnicki, Yefremov. One of the important matters was the relation of the Ukrainian movement to the Central Powers. He received full disavowals of any relation with the latter, as well as with the Union of Liberation of Ukraine which operated within the Central Empire and worked for the Ukrainian State to be formed with the assistance of Central Powers. On the whole, Pélissier's impressions were very favourable. Certainly quite innocently, Pélissier managed to heighten the importance of the Ukraine in the eyes of Germany. He wrote a letter presenting the interviews and the essence of his recommendations to a certain Kaufer (possibly a cover-name); the letter was transmitted to Romberg, the German Ambassador to Bern; the letter was perused by the Berlin Foreign Office.²⁴

Various articles written by Pélissier in support of the Ukraine, later of the Ukrainian Republic also found their way to Bern in translation from the newspaper *L'Est Rêpublicain* where they had appeared.²⁵

Pélissier reported to his superiors that the time was near when the Rada would take all the power in the Ukraine. His opinions found no support or credence by Noulens.²⁶ Pélissier

also sent reports to Paris.²⁷ The contact was resumed, however, by Ukrainians. Among others in Kiev, Pélissier met Shulhyn, who was at the time the Secretary of Nationalities' Affairs, and who became his main informant. When Shulhyn went to Petrograd at the end of August, he met Pélissier, who offered to introduce Shulhyn to Noulens.

Noulens invited Shulhyn for talks, and it was thus that a Ukrainian minister had the first serious conversation with a representative of France, as Shulhyn reported. Noulens was quite familiar with the Ukrainian problem, but he stated now and again that he did not wish to involve himself in the 'internal affairs of Russia'. Shulhyn observed that the 'Ukrainian problem was not an internal problem.' If a federative constitution of the entire state was not accepted by Russia, Ukraine would separate itself from Russia; the result would be total anarchy if the present situation were to subsist. He directly suggested French assistance, saying that if France wanted to join with other allies to maintain order and to reorganize the Ukraine in a stable fashion, Europe would benefit. Although no engagements were made, Shulhyn considered that a more cordial atmosphere was established between the Allied Officers and Ukrainian officials.²⁸

Pélissier visited Kiev again in September, this time probably in the capacity of a correspondent. His articles warmly supporting the Ukraine and the Republic appeared in the French press, as mentioned above. About the same time, the French Military-Sanitary Mission had arrived in Kiev, and presented itself officially to the Secretariat, in the company of the French Consul Balachowski.²⁹

In an interview With Pélissier, held in French, Hrushevsky declared:

*La Rada restera toujours jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix sur le même terrain que la Russie démocratique et les Alliés.*³⁰

Petlura stated the notion in a sharper form referring to Germans in the term beloved of the French, 'les boches.'

Le tort de Kerensky, c'est de ne pas avoir confiance en nous et de prêter une oreille trop favorable aux calomnies de

certain gens... qui représentant le mouvement ukrainien comme un mouvement à la solde de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne. Nous repoussons ces insinuations avec mépris. Nous sommes de bons patriotes convaincus de la nécessité de défendre notre pays contre l'invasion boche.³¹

Vynnychenko, too, protested against the implication that the Ukrainian movement was Germanophile, as did the entire Rada. In August, he had been in Petrograd and gave an interview to the French newspaper *L'Intransigeant*. He had been quoted as saying that there was a strong group of Germanophiles in the Rada, and that the greater part of the Rada was Germanophile.³² Vynnychenko explained in the Rada, on July 23, that he had been misquoted. The Rada as a whole passed a resolution in which it declared that there were no Germanophile currents in it.³³ In his memoirs, Vynnychenko declared that he did not and 'could not have said that' despite frequent accusations to that effect. The French in particular had shown hostility by epithets like 'some madmen' (*fous*).³⁴

Franco-Ukrainian relations were proceeding also on the military level. General Niessel, Chief of the French Mission in Russia, and his attaché on the South-Western Front, Tabouis, visited Kiev in early October.³⁵ For him as for Noulens, the Ukraine did not exist: he told General Dukhonin that he considered the Ukrainianization of the army harmful to the interests of the Entente.³⁶ Actually, his opinion was divided. On the one hand, he had met Hrushevsky who, according to Niessel, 'was well-known for his Germanophilia.' On the other hand, he met Shulhyn, Vynnychenko and Lototsky, who declared to him 'formally, that they were opposed to the peace without annexations as they demanded the eastern part of Galicia and that they wanted to lead the struggle in order to defend their territory'. Niessel was not able to avoid completely the national problem, and engaged in polemics with Commissar Kirienko who had insisted on the legitimacy of the Ukrainian movement at the dinner given for Niessel. Niessel replied to all that the 'wishes of France were for the well-being of Russia and of all nationalities present'.³⁷

The one important consequence of the meetings with Niessel must have been the fact that Ukrainians put France on notice that they demanded Galicia, which was at the same time a guarantee to France that Ukrainians would not turn immediately to Germany and Austria-Hungary as friends. The demand for Eastern Galicia was also presented openly to the Russian Government. Thus, Vynnychenko had stated to Kerensky that as far as the incorporation of Galicia in the 'Russian Ukraine' was concerned, they thought that the Ukrainian population of Galicia, on the basis of free national self-determination would pronounce themselves, without any doubt, for the 're-union with democratic and republican Russia and for its complete incorporation in the Ukraine.' This Ukrainian demand was also known in Germany.³⁸

Niessel, on the whole, was not friendly to the Ukrainians; Tabouis, on the other hand, spent a great deal of time 'managing the Ukrainians', under the immediate orders of Niessel.³⁹

Tabouis, accompanied by Perlier, a subordinate officer, visited Petlura, the General Secretary of Military Affairs. The visit was reported in the press. Thus, the French army representatives had had a long talk on the Ukrainianization of the army, and on the conditions in which it took place. Tabouis showed interest in Ukrainian military affairs from the political as well as from the technical aspect. The presidium of the Ukrainian Military Committee was present. Towards the end of the talk, General Tabouis expressed the desire to have a closer contact with the Ukrainian military body, the General Committee, while Colonel Perlier requested that the official gazette of the General Committee, "Vistnyk General'noho Vy-s'kovoho Komitetu", publish news of the French and of the British troops, and as well as Allied affairs in general.⁴⁰ According to Shulhyn, the Secretariat had also been visited by representatives of the heads of the Military Missions of Italy, the United States of America, Serbia, Rumania and Japan, while relations with the French and the British had been of the closest.⁴¹

As far as the Japanese were concerned, the Central Rada

and Shulhyn had been visited by the attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Petrograd, Ashida, who gathered information on the Ukrainian situation.⁴⁹ It is of interest to discuss further the relations of Ukrainian authorities in Asia, anticipating events in the process. The main interest of the Ukraine in Asia lay in Manchuria, close to the Ukrainian colonies on the Amur River. On September 27, 1917, Zhukovsky, the Undersecretary for Military Affairs, sent a telegram to the Manchurian Ukrainian District Rada in Harbin, according to which the Ukrainians of Manchuria depended directly upon the Kiev General Secretariat. As the result of the telegram, the Rada sent couriers along the East Chinese Railroad, organizing separate Ukrainian units. The Russian General Pereverzev, commanding in Kharbin, authorized an independent Ukrainian formation. In the developing disintegration of the Russian army, the local Chinese authorities disarmed the Russian troops, on December 26, 1917, while Ukrainian troops maintained their neutrality. Friendly relations developed between the Ukrainians and the Chinese. Thus, for much of the revolutionary period, the Ukrainians were the only seriously organized troops, and were in charge of the security of the city of Kharbin, the railroad and governmental buildings and works. In early 1918 the Second All-Ukrainian Far Eastern Congress was organized in nearby Khabarovsk, centre of the Amur colonies and established as a governmental body, the Far-Eastern Provision Committee, later renamed the Ukrainian Far-Eastern Secretariat. All Ukrainian troops were to be under the control of this body, and deputies of the army were to be sent 'to Kiev, to the General Secretariat of Military Affairs, in order to obtain instructions for the organization of the military units.' A separate unit, the Rada of the Manchuria station, made an agreement with the Otaman Semenov, which was condemned by the District Rada. The Ukrainian troops were slowly being evacuated to the Ukraine. Other forces, the College of Consuls of Kharbin, Otaman Semenov, General Khrvat, and other groups came to dominate the Far-Eastern scene, and the Ukrainian Far-Eastern Secretariat was not able to exercise any power, while

the Ukrainian influence in Manchuria became ever weaker. One of the first leaders of the movement, Tvardovsky, was evacuated as one of the last, and returned later as the first 'representative of the Independent United Ukraine—the Ukrainian Consul for the Far East.'¹²

The Bolshevik rebellion upset the plans of France and the Entente. Under the circumstances there arose the idea to combine the forces of Rumania, Ukraine and the Don Cossacks in a new coalition against the Germans. The Ukrainian Secretariat of War considered that 300,000 men could be mobilized within three months. Tabouis promised the support of French officers, and General Berthelot of the French Military Mission in Rumania established contact with Kiev.

The General Secretariat demanded official recognition of the Ukrainian Republic and that diplomatic and military representatives be sent to it. They also asked for a French loan, according to Niessel.¹⁴

The idea of grouping the Ukrainian Republic, Rumania and the Don Republic towards the maintenance of a serious front against the Central Powers was thought plausible by Noulens and Niessel, as well as de Saint-Aulaire, the French Ambassador to Rumania, and General Berthelot, at one time or other. However, the French representatives in Rumania believed in the strength of the Ukrainian Republic and the Kaledin forces. Noulens and Niessel, on the other hand, considered it imprudent to engage France completely.

Five days after the proclamation of the Republic, the French Government decided to cooperate with the Republic. While establishing relations with Ukraine, Paris telegraphed to Niessel that it considered the power of 'Maximalists to be irregular' and prohibited the Military Mission to enter into contact with them. It was held that 'an immediate break should occur shortly between the Northern and Southern Russia.' The former would remain under the influence of the Bolsheviks, 'Germany's agents,' while the latter would fight against this influence, and would offer a basis for a 'national reconstitution.'

The French Mission was to offer support to such elements if the break were to occur. In this eventuality, however, the Allies would find the point of strength in the Rumanian Army; and with the aid of the French mission, the 'still healthy elements of Russia' would gather around it.

The French decision seemed to be due primarily to the new administration in France headed by Clemenceau, who had given his program in the words, 'My aim is victory.'⁴⁵ It was realized by the new Commander-in-Chief, General Foch. The Rumanian Mission was ordered to enter into close contact with the Rada.⁴⁶ Foch informed General Berthelot that the French Government appreciated the gravity of the situation which a 'total defection of Russia would entail for Rumania.' However, no thought was to be given to the disbanding of the Rumanian Army. If events were to necessitate the evacuation of Rumanian territory, the struggle was to be pursued in Bessarabia and in the Donetz region.⁴⁷ Foch persevered in his efforts to form resistance in 'Southern Russia.' According to his memoirs, these efforts were not calculated to overthrow the 'newly established Russian government'; what was sought was the 'continuation under any form of the struggle against the Central Empires' and 'the maintenance in the East of a war front against them'.⁴⁸ Thus, the proceedings were the result of the new policy of the struggle to the end.

The lengths to which France went to further the formation of a combined Ukrainian and Rumanian front can be gathered from the fact that one of the victims of the forceful policy was the current Rumanian Government. King Ferdinand of Rumania seems to have been the originator of the plan to keep Rumania in the war. About November 17, he promised the British and French ambassadors in Jassy that if their governments would continue to give support despite the collapse of Russia, he would try to force a passage through Russia with a portion of his troops to join the Cossacks of South Russia and possibly, with British forces in Mesopotamia. This plan would of course require the support of a friendly Ukraine. However, if he did not receive the necessary assurances, he would abdicate or even

come to terms with the Central Powers.⁴⁰ This former plan would of course require the support of a friendly Ukraine.

But it seems that Averescu, the Rumanian Prime-Minister, did not agree with the King. The Premier confided in early 1918 to the German official, Lersner, that there were conflicts between the Premier and Berthelot in December. Averescu had already seen that the Rumanian situation was hopeless. Berthelot, however, had turned to the opposition, and together with the Bratianu clique, hoped for the assistance of the Ukraine. Averescu however, declared that the Ukraine 'was an invention of Bismarck' and would never go with the Entente. As the consequence of the disagreements, Averescu was obliged to resign.⁴¹

With the development of the new French policy, all French officials in the Ukraine were eventually withdrawn from the command of Noulens and Niessel and placed under the orders of St. Aulaire and Berthelot, in Rumania.⁴² This serious reorientation of French policy in Eastern Europe, consisting of the attachment of Ukrainian interests to Rumanian interests, although due primarily to military exigencies, was the practical consequence of the realization by France that the united Russian republic did not exist: it only strengthened the actual independence of Ukraine.

The political justification for the French action was presented in an article of the semi-official newspaper *Le Temps* on November 20. The article, inspired no doubt by the Foreign Ministry, questioned the very existence of Russia, and recognized the reality of the Ukraine:

"Can one still speak of Russia? The Bolshevik secession can, it appears, having broken Russian unity.... It has been announced that the independence of the Ukraine has been proclaimed; is this break-off only for the time being? As long as it exists, it constitutes a fact and our policies can base themselves only upon facts.... It is natural that the autonomy of Ukraine has transformed itself into an independence. Since the time when Great Russia was dispersed, Little Russia has become a State again. It may even become a powerful state...."⁴³

It was apparently at this time that the French authorities made the first moves towards offering aid, especially financial, to the Republic. When Tuhan-Baranovsky, General Secretary for Finances, was spending time in Petrograd, in November, he was invited to Russia by the French Ambassador, Noulens. Noulens appears to have been acting on instructions from Paris, as he had shown himself to be quite uninterested in the affairs of the Ukrainian Republic. Noulens told Tuhan-Baranovsky on that occasion that there was 'deep sympathy with the Ukrainian movement in France.' A loan to the Ukrainian National Republic could be raised in France, he said, but through private, not government channels.⁵³ Tuhan-Baranovsky informed Vynnychenko of this intimation by letter.

Fears that the Republic would be Germanophile or would not offer guarantees were expressed by many, by Niessel among others, in a telegram to Paris drawn up with approval of Noulens. They held that while it was necessary to support the Ukrainian Government, its official recognition would be premature.⁵⁴ Their advice was dismissed and, as was mentioned earlier, they were relieved of their posts in the Ukraine. In this way, General Tabouis, under more favorable superiors, could develop his friendly relations with Ukrainians.

Beginning with relative ignorance of the Ukraine, Tabouis quickly developed genuine enthusiasm for the land. A month before the Bolshevik rebellion, he noted down in his diary: 'this old nation has felt the awakening within itself, the sentiment of independence and the taste for *grandeur*.' The map of the Ukraine in his possession represented the Ukraine as spreading from the 'Caucasus to the Wisla'. But he still did not know what was going to come from it, and he turned to further study and work⁵⁵ in Kiev. After the opening of the Third All-Ukrainian Military Congress, he was largely won for the Ukrainian movement. 'I still cannot form a definite judgement (*idée nette*), but I have a tendency to believe in the Ukraine', he wrote.⁵⁶

The establishment of Ukrainian authority found him in the headquarters of the South-Western Front. Despite 'contra-

dictory news from everywhere,' he continued to believe in the Ukraine, at the same time rendering a serious service to the country. On November 13, with the struggle in Kiev almost over, there arose the plan of a march from the South-Western Front. When told by the Commander-in-Chief and the Commissar of the Front of the project to bring the Ukraine and Rada to 'less independent ideas,' Tabouis 'easily persuaded them to the contrary,' by insisting that two parties in the civil war was enough without creating a third party.⁵⁷

Tabouis was very favorably impressed when the news arrived on November 16, that the Ukraine, 'continuing to organize its independence had constituted a complete government, with Petlura as Minister of War, and that the Commander of the Front had absolute authority in the army zone... no other master but the Minister and the General-in-Chief, not even Army Commissars. That would be too good to be true,' he thought. He was finding that the Ukrainian movement was a mass phenomenon: 'I felt that a powerful current agitated this mass, that this formidable boiling... was capable of overthrowing rocks of granite,' as he expressed it in the Gallic fashion. Finally, he was able to get in touch with the French mission at the Supreme Command. It had been cut off from the rest of the French world.⁵⁸ However, Tabouis received the order from Paris 'to keep complete neutrality in the internal struggles'.⁵⁹

With the establishment of the agreement between the Commander-in-Chief of the Front and Petlura, Tabouis' confidence rose. A representative of the Ukrainian government approached Tabouis and stated that the Ukraine did not want Bolsheviks but liberty. The Proclamation of the Republic appeared to Tabouis 'a unilateral contract whose value could be established only by the future'. Despite this generally hopeful interpretation, and against his instructions, Tabouis protested sharply at the mention of peace with the Central Powers. 'France would never recognize a Government', he stated, 'which perjured itself in the first manifestation of existence.' ⁶⁰ However, Lenin's order to the Commanders arrived the next

day, commanding them to conclude a truce immediately. The French Military Mission thereupon sent Commander Vaneux to Kiev asking whether this order and the orders of Lenin in general were accepted by Ukraine, and received a negative reply. Vagneux attended the ceremony of the Proclamation of the Republic and received a good impression.⁶¹

Tabouis' political mission began three days after the proclamation of the Republic. An officer, Dentz, was sent by General Berthelot and de Saint Aulaire to consult with Tabouis on the way to Kiev, where he was to serve as the liaison agent between the Republic and the French Mission in Rumania. He presented to Tabouis the 'vast projects of General Berthelot'. These plans were: to observe and to assist the evolution of Ukraine and to ally it to the Don and Rumania. In such a way 'all of Southern Russia would be held in good order'. The only aim of the Allies in this was to have them continue the war indefinitely, falling back if need be, to the Caucasus. Tabouis 'could but approve', but believed himself to be particularly suited to fill the role assigned to Dentz; Dentz agreed. Tabouis' views on cooperation with the Ukraine were confirmed by a telegram from Berthelot informing him of the essentially political decision that Paris was disposed to work for the national governments if they 'were for order, continuation of war and were anti-German' in persuasion. Tabouis went to work. His views at this point seem to characterize the French policy as a whole:

'...perhaps in the future the Ukraine will be considered an error ... it may become an undesirable child, but there is the fact: this child is born; in the general disarray, the total disintegration, the Ukraine seems bound to become a point of crystallization, and therefore let us help her.'⁶²

The appreciation of the situation by Tabouis is echoed by French officials and officers in the Ukraine. Pélissier commented on the strength of the Republic at this time, crediting it with 'perhaps saving European civilization' from the Bolsheviks.⁶³ Sers, a member of the French Mission in the Ukraine

said that in the general disintegration in Eastern Europe, there was a 'single cloud upon the horizon of the Central Empires and this was the regrouping of the Ukraine',⁶⁴ while the Germans were said to be using the Bolsheviks to threaten it. D'Auz, an officer connected with the South-Western front, wrote in his memoirs of this time that 'the Bolsheviks were victors in all of Russia.' Only the Ukraine had resisted. 'The yellow and blue cockades, the shield of Saint George triumphed.' The 'victory' of the Ukrainians had generated on the South-Western front great enthusiasm, he declared.⁶⁵ Niessel stated of this period that 'at the start the Rada seemed strong', and further, that 'in the face of general disintegration, it presented the appearance of a constituted power.'⁶⁶ Even Noulens wrote that the 'reorganization of the Ukraine presented for the development, be it intellectual or economic, of France, a prospect which I was not able to disregard.'⁶⁷

Three days after the assumption of authority by Tabouis, the Secretary for Military affairs, Petlura, was visited by the two officers of the French Mission, Perlier, mentioned earlier, and Gravier, and Colonel Charles of the British Military Mission. The meeting was publicised in the press. These officers inquired about the political situation in the Ukraine, the Ukrainian army, the situation on the front lines, and the plans of the Ukrainian military command. The French officers in particular, stated that the 'Ukrainian National Republic would stand fast if all classes of the population would understand that the interests of the Ukraine as a state unit should be common for all those classes.'⁶⁸ It can be assumed that their public visit had been authorized by Tabouis, who was due in Kiev in a few days.

It may have been in connection with decisions in Paris, acting either through General Bertholet, or independently, that the General Secretariat was visited on the same day by a delegation from the Yugo-Slav Executive Committee, which brought news that the Serbo-Croatian military units in the Military Districts of Kiev and Odessa wished to be included in the Ukrainian Army. According to the Kiev press, Petlura

approved the proposal, and gave orders to the Head of the Kiev Military District to take appropriate measures.⁶⁹ Czechs, too, appear to have been influenced. The relations between the Ukrainian Republic and the Czech troops in the capital and the country were strained. Czech troops sided with the Russian Command in the events between November 12 and 13, and had fought for at least a day. On November 12, the Czechs defected from the Command, professing that the 'Czechs and Slovaks had sincere sympathies with the Ukrainian nation',⁷⁰ but the damage was done. Thus, on November 25, Masaryk, the Head of the Czecho-Slovak National Rada, and later President of Czecho-Slovakia, explained the events as a misunderstanding, and issued a statement that the Czecho-Slovak National Rada held to a 'strict neutrality in questions of internal politics and the party struggle.' He concluded:

On the basis of the above mentioned principle, we have taken the most loyal position to the Ukrainian and the Ukrainian National Republic. The best proof of this is our friendly relations with the official representatives of the Republic.⁷¹

The following day, Masaryk made a further friendly gesture towards the Republic by taking part in the protest meeting called by the government against any award of Ukrainian lands to the Polish Kingdom, which had been granted a constitution by Germany and Austria-Hungary.⁷² The position of the Czech legion in the Ukraine was an important one for the Republic, as the legion had close to 50,000 troops quartered in Ukraine.⁷³ Masaryk had been generally distrusted on account of his Russophilism. The fear had serious justification. Czechs and Slovaks, much more than Serbs and Croats, had looked towards Russia for support. Masaryk's views on Russia, presented in the memorandum to Lord Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, March, 1915, projected the establishment of 'Bohemia' as a 'monarchical state.' The dynasty would be designated by the Allies, or there would be a personal union between Serbia and Bohemia. While using the general term 'Allies', Masaryk discussed the Russian dynasty thoroughly.

The Bohemian people, it must be emphasized once more, are thoroughly Russophile. A Russian dynasty in whatever form would be most popular. At any rate, Bohemian politicians wish the establishment of the kingdom of Bohemia in full agreement with Russia. Russia's wishes and plans will be of decisive influence.⁷⁴

Relations with the Polish troops in Ukraine, close to 100,000 men, were settled at the same time through the representation of the Polish minority in the Rada; minority relations have been discussed in an earlier chapter. The question of the Polish troops was of a somewhat different category from others, as these had been recruited from Poland (in the Russian Empire), the Ukraine and Belorussia, which the Czecho-Slovak and Croat troops were volunteers from former prisoners-of-war from Austria-Hungary, and the Serbs had belonged to the regular Serb army. By the end of November the Ukrainian Republic had regularized her relation to three extra-territorial armies in the country totalling from 150,000 to 200,000 men, while maintaining working relations with the Military Missions of the main states of the great Alliance, France and Great Britain.

While France was pursuing her interests in the Ukraine, Great Britain, her closest and most important ally, was also probing. However, her influence was secondary to that of France, which after all had a greater desire to further Allied and French policies.

Unlike France, Great Britain did not have a tradition of any particular friendship to the Ukraine in her appearance on the historical scene. British interests lay closer to the Caucasus and Central Asia. No British periodical seems to have been interested in the Ukraine for its own sake. However the Ukraine was discussed in connection with the war effort. One of the earliest British periodicals dealing primarily with Eastern Europe was *The New Europe*, edited by Seton-Watson. This weekly journal had been founded by Seton-Watson, Masaryk, Ronald Burrows, Principal of King's College, A. F. White and H. W. Steed. Steed states that Seton-Watson bore 'practically the whole cost' and did most of the work. The aim of the

periodical was to 'unmask the great design of German war policy' and to further reconstruction of Europe 'on the basis of nationality.' Masaryk, a Czech leader, with a main point of strength in the Ukraine where the Czech legion was located, contributed a fundamental article to the first issue where he declared that the aim of Germany was to become a great Asiatic power. In the German plan, the 'weakening of Russia and the Slavs must be the first step, but the final stage is to be the overthrow of British.' Part of the plan was the partition of the Russian Empire; Masaryk mentioned in particular the Baltic countries and Poland. All persons involved supported the liberation of subject Hapsburg peoples.⁷⁵ In this manner then, the only serious periodical devoted to Eastern Europe appeared to link the liberation of subject nations in the Russian Empire directly with the pan-German plan; this did not promise well for the Ukraine, which could emerge precisely out of weakening of the Russian Empire. Still, a few articles either friendly or at least neutral to the Ukraine appeared in it, most of them under pseudonyms. The main documents on the emergence of the Ukraine appeared in it too; the text of the Third Universal was published, although belatedly.⁷⁶ According to the German Embassy's information supplied to it by an informant interviewed in London, most of the contents of *The New Europe* was supplied by the Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office, which if true certainly detracted from the importance of the journal as an index of British interest in the Ukraine.⁷⁷ Nor was the lack of information offset in any serious way by émigrés. There seems to have been only one pamphlet on the Ukrainian problem, published by a stillborn Anglo-Ukrainian society in 1914, just before the war. It was the *Memorandum on the Ukrainian Question in Its National Aspect*, by a certain Fedorchuk.⁷⁸

The British position was well described by Arnold Toynbee, writing in 1915, in a short essay on the Ukraine, in a book on war aims, *The New Europe*:

Many neglected nationalities have won recognition through the war, but the case of the Ukrainians is surely the strangest

of all. A nation of thirty millions, and we had never heard its name!⁷⁹

In the essay, Toynbee presented an outline of the Ukrainian problem within the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires. The idea of 'an independent Ukrainian state' is dismissed, especially in view of the patronage of the Central Powers for such a state. The arguments are reminiscent of those offered to Vynnychenko in Petrograd.

Kieff and Odessa divorced from Russia! Russia excluded from the Black Sea! Of course the scheme is impracticable... The Ukraine and the rest of Russia are geographically inseparable, economically interdependent, racially and culturally interlaced. To part them is impossible, and would remain so even if the Allies were beaten to the earth.⁸⁰

While the 'Ukraine can never obtain entire political independence from Muscovy', on the other hand, the 'Muscovite can never entirely stamp out Ukrainian nationality'. A compromise is urged: 'Russia must have her geographical unity, the Ukraine her national rights.' while the latter's territories in Austria should be transferred to a reunited Ukraine, with all the rights enjoyed there extended over the entire Ukraine. In the view of Toynbee, this constituted a valid war aim and would 'profit the cause for which the Allies are at war.' It would deflect 'a nation of thirty millions from its present orientation towards the Teutonic powers', it would cure one of the 'worst disharmonies', retarding development of 'our partner Russia', and would fulfil the principles of Liberty and Nationality. If this were not done, Great Britain and the rest of Europe shall 'in like measure suffer'.⁸¹

While the work of Toynbee was sympathetic towards the Ukraine, much of the British literature of the time ignored it. Lewis B. Namier wrote a small book, *Germany and Eastern Europe*, in 1915, where Namier fails to refer to the Ukraine.⁸² R. W. Seton-Watson, in his study of Eastern Europe in the war entitled *German, Slav and Magyar: A Study of the Origins of the Great War* published in 1916, refers to the Ukraine

primarily in discussing the pan-German plans for expansion into Eastern Europe.⁸⁵

The situation does not appear to have been affected a great deal by local advice. The British Ambassador, Buchanan, unlike Paléologue or even Noulens, was hardly conscious of Ukrainian matters. There is no record of any interview with a Ukrainian held by him. He did inform London of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict at least once, on July 23, 1917, but only in connection with the fall of the first Russian Provisional Government.⁸⁴ The British Military Attaché, Knox, Buchanan's chief adviser on military affairs, had no particular interest or sympathy with the Ukraine, either. In a telegram from Buchanan to Balfour, he told his superiors that he had always thought the 'French were deluded in their hopes of having the Ukraine as a pro-Ally state.'⁸⁵ However, the British Embassy had sent an informant, Professor Piret, to Kiev shortly after the proclamation of the First Universal.⁸⁶ Piret met officials of the General Secretariat, putting business-like questions as to what the Central Rada would do when it gained autonomy and the Ukrainianization of the army. According to Khrystiuk, a Secretary at the time, the British wanted the Central Rada to pursue the goal of a 'victorious end' to the war and saw the Ukrainian problem exclusively from that point of view.⁸⁷

However, the British government appears to have been conscious of the Ukrainian emergence, though not to as high a degree as the French. Balfour was asked in the House of Commons about the recognition of the Ukrainian Land by the Provisional Government. Balfour stated that 'nothing would be gained by answering a question which deals with the internal arrangements of Allied countries.'⁸⁸ In this way, the government expressed its lack of interest in events in Ukraine.

The parliamentary question had come to a head in the Ukraine in the meetings of the Third All-Ukrainian Military Congress, and the ensuing take-over of power from Russian authorities in Kiev and the Ukraine.

In addition to the regular sources of information on the events in the former Russian Empire, the British Government

may have received some information on the current Ukrainian events from a member of the Germanophile Ukrainian Information Bureau in Lausanne, Stepankivsky. The haphazard character of information about the Ukraine was typical. Stepankivsky was in steady contact with Romberg, the German Ambassador in Bern; the German Ambassador was financing his Bureau.⁸⁸ Stepankivsky went across the front-line on a trip to the Ukraine shortly before the Bolshevik rebellion and talked with his former party colleague, Porsh, who promised to direct Hrushevsky towards Ukrainian independence and peace with Germany. Shortly after, Stepankivsky was arrested. Liberated by the Bolsheviks, he went to Great Britain by way of Stockholm, and rumors of this incident reached Bern in early December.⁸⁹ Proof of his presence in Great Britain was a postcard from him dated at London.⁹⁰ Further evidence of his presence in London was the report of another Ukrainian emigré, Svatkovsky, who had been invited by the French to Paris where the Russian Ambassador, Maklakov, representatives of the French Government, and Stepankivsky were to meet to discuss the 'Ukrainian problem'. Svatkovsky was told in Paris that Stepankivsky was not allowed to come to Paris from Great Britain despite the French guarantees.⁹²

After his return, in his meeting with Romberg, Stepankivsky claimed to have led the discussion with various British officials, including the men at the top, Lord Cecil, Balfour and Lloyd George. Since no other evidence exists, his testimony must be approached with reserve: still, it may be assumed that he did indeed inform some British officials of events in the Ukraine at a crucial period for the state, after arriving in Great Britain late in November. He was known throughout Europe as an activist, for instance by the journalist Wickham Steed,⁹³ who dabbled on the side in promoting revolution in Austria-Hungary.⁹⁴

Stepankivsky said that he arrived in Newcastle-on-Tyne on November 24. Apparently, the British were 'very happy to have a Ukrainian' just at the time when the Ukrainian problem 'had suddenly become of principle interest'. Lloyd

George is supposed to have remarked to Stepankivsky that he could have come in no more favourable moment. According to Stepankivsky, the 'English had at first been completely at a loss what position to take on the Ukraine.' Stepankivsky claimed to have given information to Balfour and Lord Cecil as well as to Lloyd George and to have emphasized to all these statesmen the popularity of the Ukrainian movement, and the trends towards neutrality. Stepankivsky mentioned to Romberg specifically that his exposition had a pro-German character. He left London on January 24, 1918.⁵⁵

In view of the uncertainty in supposed facts, further details of this matter need not be discussed: if Stepankivsky did indeed meet Balfour and Lloyd George, which is very doubtful, his pro-German (as he mentioned to Romberg) expositions, apparently could not advance the idea of recognition of the Ukrainian Republic, while his value as the witness of Rada's importance could have had the opposite effect.

The Ukrainian question was brought to the fore in Great Britain in connection with Rumania. The latter was discussed in the War Cabinet on November 21. Although Balfour supported the recognition of Kaledin, the leader of the Don Cossacks, no decision was reached. Although the question dealt with 'independent Russian forces in south-west Russia', which would include the Ukraine, it was not mentioned by name as yet. The Cabinet could reach no decision; the advice of Colonel House, the emissary of Woodrow Wilson, was taken next day. House favored the strategy of making Rumania the rallying point for 'all forces in South Russia willing to stay in the war', but did express the fear that any overt step to support 'one Russian fraction against the Bolsheviks' would strengthen the Soviet determination to seek peace, and might inflame anti-Allied feeling. Rumanians were to be advised to cooperate with whatever forces loyal to the Allies nearest to them. These "forces" were unspecified. This policy was accepted by the Cabinet on November 22. The decision was wired to the British Minister at Jassy.⁵⁶ The British had recognized the Bolshevik government *de facto* already; the importance of this for

the Ukrainian Republic was that *de facto* recognition of any part of the Russian Empire could refer to effective constituted authority, and if the Bolshevik authority were to be circumscribed, it would become immediately clear that this did not extend over the Ukrainian Republic. The Republic could therefore press for similar recognition for itself. The fact that Bolsheviks were so recognized is substantiated by the statement to that effect on November 23, from Bertie, British Ambassador in Paris, to Maklakov, the Russian Ambassador there.⁸⁷

The decision to give support to Rumania's neighbours ran against an undercurrent of pacifist feeling, which had come to the fore immediately prior to the opening of the Inter-Allied Conference, in the publication on November 28 of a letter advocating peace, by Lansdowne, a prominent conservative.⁸⁸ Among Socialists too, the pacifist currents had begun to rise.

The United States was the major allied power least interested in the Ukraine, a little-known country to Americans. Besides that, they had a tradition of support of the territorial integrity of Russia; support to the Ukraine in wartime when Russia was not interested in Ukraine on commercial grounds. Thus, although there was a consulate in Odessa, there was no consulate at Kiev through most of 1917. The information on events in the Ukraine were received from Allied sources, or through chance opportunities.

Some American officials did mention the Ukraine occasionally, in their reports to Washington. Summers, Consul-General at Moscow, reported in mid-May that there was a 'state of chaos in Russia' complicated further 'by the lack of national patriotism.' 'A Pole cares nothing for Russia.' Developing the idea, he states that the same applies to 'the small (Little) Russians.'⁸⁹ By this term, Summers meant Ukrainians, giving a hint that he understood the problems involved. Francis, the American Ambassador in Petrograd, made a single important reference to the Rada previous to the Bolshevik rebellion, again in connection with the fall of the Lvov government. Francis held that the 'real difficulty' was not that question, but rather that the 'Cadet Ministers wish relief from the

responsibility for the situation, which (is) becoming critical on account of food scarcity and workmen's refusal to work.'¹⁰⁰

The question of the Ukrainian state imposed itself upon the uninterested officials in connection with the prosecution of the war. Kennan, the American historian of U. S. diplomacy of the East-European revolution, states that British interest at this time was concentrated on the Cossack lands and the Caucasus, while French eyes were 'on Rumania and the Ukraine.'

The United States government, although lacking any direct interest in the areas concerned, also found itself pressed, on grounds of wartime necessity, to take some action on behalf of the nuclei of anti-Bolshevik opposition in southern Russia and the Caucasus. The first urgings in this direction did not come from the Petrograd Embassy, where Robins (Chief of the American Red Cross Mission) and Judson (Chief of the American Military Mission) were openly hostile to the idea and the Ambassador wisely passive, but from Consul-General Summers in Moscow and from Consul F. Willoughby Smith in Tiflis.¹⁰¹

There is no reason to disagree with this summary of the situation in the opening of the period. The most important officials in the Embassy, the centre of the American presence in the former Russian Empire, were quite unconcerned with the use of forces willing to carry on the struggle independently of the Bolsheviks. The position of Robins should be explained: his importance lay not in his actual office, but in the fact that he was the main unofficial channel of day to day contact between the Embassy and the Bolshevik officials.¹⁰²

Smith, Consul in Tiflis, pointed out in his communications, shortly after the Bolshevik rebellion, in particular in that of November 18, the advantages to be gained by the Allies in holding a line from the Ural Mountains to the Volga and thence north to the Don Basin and the Black Sea. In this manner, most of the resources would be in the Allied sphere,¹⁰³ while the Germans could not obtain any supplies in Russia. This was essentially the conception which governed the French and the British in their policies.

In Washington, however, President Wilson was not conscious of the character of the new Russian government. On November 11, he commented upon the Bolshevik government as a 'body of free men,' who were 'compounding for its own destruction.' The group was said to believe that 'any reforms planned in the interest of the people' could survive in the presence of an inimical Germany.¹⁰¹ In another connection, he described them as 'leaders of the Russian masses.'¹⁰²

The changes in Eastern Europe had an immediate consequence upon the course of the World War. Pershing, the American Commander in France, wired on November 15 to the Secretary of War that 'as long as Russia does not actually conclude a separate peace, Germany would have to keep a certain number of divisions there',¹⁰⁰ and some two weeks later he remarked on the 'apparent total collapse of Russia.'¹⁰⁷ House, Wilson's personal representative, and a highly trusted adviser, wrote to Wilson on November 18 that the 'situation in Rumania was serious and they may be compelled to make a separate peace because of inability to get food from Russia.'¹⁰⁸ This awareness would immediately necessitate an examination of the situation in the Ukraine as the main supply base of Rumania. Two days later, House wrote to Lloyd George that Rumania 'should be made a rallying point for Polish and Cossack troops that are willing to continue fighting.'¹⁰⁹ House does not seem to have been conscious of the Ukrainians at this point. It was this idea of House, backed up by other reports, that was accepted in the meeting of the Supreme War Council in Paris, as discussed below.

The report of Smith was forwarded by the Department of State to House in Paris. The Department sent Smith a telegram requesting him to explain how, 'under circumstances you describe, the financial support you propose will not tend to encourage sectionalism or disruption of Russia or civil war,' while insisting that the Department could not 'encourage tendencies in any of these directions.'¹¹⁰ It was thus restating a popular diplomatic leaning in American diplomacy, which favored a strong Russia to balance out Germany in Europe, and

Great Britain and Japan to do the same in Asia. House, however, seemed to countenance the policy suggested by Smith. He reported that England, France and Italy were inclined to 'give encouragement to the Transcaucasian movement'. Although he thought the proceeding 'dangerous', he still concluded that the movement for resistance might 'go to pieces', if they were not given money and encouragement.¹¹¹ At the same time, House wanted to suppress the demands in American newspapers that 'Russia should be treated as an enemy.'¹¹²

Summers, the Consul-General in Moscow, endorsed a report from Bullard with the request that it be submitted to Lansing. In this report we find first inkling that the American diplomatic service surmised the real character of the Bolshevik rebellion. Bullard believed that the Bolsheviks were a minority, and that their influence was limited; their power would be held only by terror. He urged that the United States refuse to recognize an undemocratic government of violence and terror.¹¹³ Lansing, the American Secretary of State, drafted a memorandum of the projected policy of the United States about December 2. In it, he held that the Bolshevik government was 'frankly avowed, to overthrow all existing governments and establish on the ruins a despotism of the proletariat in every country.' The Bolsheviks could not be recognized. He held that 'the Russian "Terror" will far surpass in brutality and destruction of life and property the Terror of the French Revolution', as the latter possessed the semblance of government and made a pretence of legality, while opposing 'group or faction.' The American policy should be 'do nothing' until the 'black period of terrorism' ends.¹¹⁴ President Wilson agreed that the Bolsheviks should not be recognized.¹¹⁵ In line with Lansing's recommendation, no decision was taken to aid the anti-Bolshevik groups.

The unsettled situation in the former Russian Empire was discussed at the Inter-Allied Conference in Paris, begun on November 30, in connection with the suggestion of House and others, of sending aid to Kaledin and elsewhere. It was decided to send an Anglo-French mission to the Cossacks; the

Ukraine was not mentioned directly.¹¹⁶ A declaration underlining the absence 'in Russia of a regular Government' submitted by Lloyd George was not approved due to the refusal of House to sign the declaration.¹¹⁷

In Kiev on December 1, Tabouis met Petlura, the Secretary of War, and Shulhyn in the temporary offices of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs. His impression of both was very favorable. We also became engaged in the practical task of attempting to re-organize the Ukrainian Army. He could be assisted with this by the numerous members of the French Military Mission.¹¹⁸ It was on the same occasion that General Tabouis, accompanied by Major Fitzwilliams of the British Mission, visited the Foreign Secretary, Shulhyn and said that the Entente, and France in particular, had 'great sympathy for the cultural and political rebirth of the Ukraine'. They further stated that they understood that the building of a new republic under the existing circumstances was not an easy task. Therefore, the Allied Government 'offered assistance and asked what the Ukraine required and how they could be useful.' All of this was eventually incorporated in a *note verbale*. Shulhyn, following the decision of the Cabinet, refused to answer these offers. He held that it would be necessary for the states with which the Ukraine were to discuss matters, to first recognize the Ukrainian National Republic through some official declaration, or at least establish diplomatic relations.¹¹⁹

The plan of assistance to the Ukrainian Republic by France and by other western states, as worked out by Tabouis, and subsequently developed further was very extensive. It was not limited to the extension of military assistance. This is evident from the various discussions held by Tabouis with Shulhyn, Petlura and Kovalevsky, the minister of supply. In a meeting with the last, minuted by him for his own use, Tabouis declared that France hoped that the Ukrainian state would become organized as fast as possible. The Russian giant had fallen, and the formation of the Ukrainian Republic was of vital significance. The aim of French policy was described by Tabouis to be not just to have the Ukraine simply shoulder

the Russian responsibilities to the Entente. They wanted her to help maintain the balance of power in East Europe, and to prove by her role in the world war that she was aligned with the western democratic powers. Kovalevsky concluded from this that the French did not want the Ukrainian Republic to fall under the influence of the Central Powers.

Consequently, the plan of assistance presented by Tabouis, offered the help of experienced French specialists who would reinforce Ukrainian ministries. In his view, the Ukraine required experts on railroad transport, which was failing badly and on financial administration. France was ready to give the Ukraine a first loan of ten million dollars, which was to be followed by further loans, according to the needs of the new Ukrainian state. The military policy was also developed in some detail.¹²⁰ The French suggested that a common army be formed consisting of Ukrainian, Czecho-Slovak and Polish troops. This army was to strengthen the South-Western and Southern (Rumanian) fronts, tying up a considerable number of German troops.¹²¹ Tabouis did not offer any arbitration of the rising Russo-Ukrainian conflict as the French were persuaded that the Lenin government would not continue the war, and was ready to sign a separate peace as fast as possible.¹²² From the various discussions, it appeared that aid to the Ukraine was to be inter-Allied, in particular Franco-British. The British offered supplies: they stated that they had stored large quantities of goods in Vladivostok, and were offered a guarantee that the goods would be delivered by them through Russia to the Ukraine, if the latter were to request these.¹²³

The first declaration of the sympathies of France and Great Britain, and the offer of actual assistance, preceded events which put Bolsheviks in a very poor light, in world opinion, especially with the Allies. Commander-in-Chief Dukhonin was ordered by Petrograd to remain at Headquarters in order to transfer his duties to the Bolshevik Krylenko; later he was murdered by Bolshevik troops. This outrage strengthened the position of the Ukraine, and when the allied delegations left headquarters, they accepted the invitation of the

Ukrainian Government to settle in Kiev. They were received with military honours by Petlura and Ukrainian troops.¹²⁴ The heads of the Allied Missions were General Baxter for Great Britain, Lavergne for France, Romelli for Italy, Tagainaki for Japan, while the smaller Allied powers were represented by Coanda for Rumania, de Riquel for Belgium, and Leontkiewitch for Serbia.¹²⁵ The presence of the generals increased the Ukraine's prestige. Another arrival was Pélissier sent by Noulens from Petrograd.¹²⁶ This late manoeuvre of Noulens to exert influence in the Ukraine had little consequence except the provocation of Tabouis, who remarked, 'C'est un Français, M.P., qui veut traiter avec le Gouvernement Ukrainien au nom de l'Ambassadeur de France à Petrograd en passant par dessus moi.'¹²⁷

In early December, Vynnychenko announced that the Allies had accredited official representatives to the government of the Ukraine. The numbers of the Missions issued *dementis* of the news.¹²⁸ The news spread into Petrograd, where *dementis* were issued as well.¹²⁹ Vynnychenko may well have tried to interpret the presence of the Missions as recognition, or had adopted the means as a measure to force the foreign powers to undertake action.

Vynnychenko also said that the Ukraine had named special officers for Allied liaison. In return, France named Colonel Denz as her liaison officer. Further diplomatic initiative was taken by the Ukraine in announcing that a Ukrainian diplomatic mission would be sent to Paris.¹³⁰

Despite the attempts to continue active warfare, such warfare was becoming impossible in view of the beginning of negotiations for a truce between the German command and the Bolsheviks, on November 28. The former South-Western and Rumanian fronts were united into one Ukrainian front based upon Kiev. Scherbachev, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Rumanian front was named the new Commander-in-Chief. On December 3, Scherbachev informed Kiev that he was being forced by events to begin negotiations for peace in conjunction with the Rumanian government and asked the

Rada to send its representative to take part in the negotiations. Hrushevsky informed the Rada, whereupon it was decided to authorize the negotiations.¹³¹ The Allies were thus faced with an actual cease fire on the Eastern Front.

The case of Rumania was quite sad. The Rumanian army had evacuated most of her territory and fall back, under German pressure, to Jassy. This and the occupation of Supreme Headquarters by Bolsheviks cut Rumania off from its supply bases, which meant a shortage of food for her army. Under these circumstances, supplying the army with Ukrainian food was a necessity for the Rumanian government.

General Coanda, the Rumanian Commander-in-Chief, arrived in Kiev from Mohilev, shortly after the fall of Headquarters and visited Minister of Supply, Kovalevsky, in the company of the French consul, Balachovsky. Coanda presented a statement of the quantity and kind of food asked for by the Rumanian Army from the Ukraine. Their political justification for the request was that Rumania as well as other states of the Entente had a special agreement with Russia, by which Russia was to supply a certain quantity of food to the Rumanian Army. Insofar as the Ukraine proclaimed its state autonomy, she had assumed certain obligations. The declaration concluded that the Entente, and Rumania herself, were following the Ukraine's struggle for liberty with great sympathy. The request of Coanda was considered by the government, which decided to comply with it for the most part. The fronts continued to be supplied by the Ukraine, and the Rumanian army held out for the time being.¹³² Coanda spoke with the authorization of Bratianu, the Prime Minister of Rumania at that time.

The proclamation of the Rumanian front to be a Ukrainian front was another gain for the Entente. This meant that Ukrainian troops were not being withdrawn from non-Ukrainian territory. Any immediate withdrawal and concentration upon Ukrainian borders would deliver the Rumanian Army and possibly the Government itself to the Central Powers.

Thus it would appear that the French policy justified itself for the time being.

Relations between Rumania and the Ukraine were complicated by the problem of Bessarabia (Moldavia). The Ukraine had not claimed any part of the territory of Bessarabia, although the coastal areas of the province, to the Danube, were populated by Ukrainians.¹³³ In Bessarabia, as elsewhere in the former Russian Empire, non-Russian bodies of administration had arisen. In Kishinev, the capital of the province, a Congress of Moldavian Soldiers representing some 250,000 troops was held on October 20. This congress decided that 'Russia is to be a federative democratic republic', and that Bessarabia was to have territorial and political autonomy, while a Provincial Diet, the *Sfat Tsarii*, was to be organized. The representation in the Diet was to be proportional. Although the Russian figures had given the population of Bessarabia as only some 50% Moldavians, it was decided to adopt the scheme of 70% of votes to Moldavians, with 14% going to Ukrainians. Eventually, Ukrainians received 10 votes in a *Sfat Tsarii* of 135 members, and later, of 150 members.¹³⁴ The *Sfat Tsarii* opened on the morrow of the proclamation of the Ukrainian Republic, and elected Ivan C. Inculetz as President. Inculetz, in his opening speech, insisted that the *Sfat Tsarii* must keep closely allied with the Russian Democratic Republic. "It is quite evident," he said, "that rumours of a so-called 'Rumania orientation' are misleading and without any foundation in fact... Separatism in Bessarabia is non-existent, particularly separatism towards Rumania. Here there is only a handful of men who look across the Pruth. The path of Bessarabia merges into the path of Russia, for Russia is a country much more free than Rumania." Some Moldavians, however were in favour of Rumania.¹³⁵ The Diet issued a Manifesto, on December 2, 1917, declaring that the 'Russian Republic is in great danger.' Echoing the sentiments of the Third Universal — that is of non-recognition of the Bolsheviks as a government — it stated that the 'absence of central authority, and disorder throughout the country, which is exhausted by its struggle with the foreign

enemy, is bringing the whole republic to destruction.' The Manifesto went on to say that Bessarabia proclaimed itself the 'Democratic Moldavian Republic, entering into the structure of the Federative Democratic Russian Republic, as a partner with equal rights,' while the highest authority was to be provisionally the National Diet, Sfat Tsarii.¹³⁶ The Republic exchanged salutations with the General Secretariat. There was an attempt made to hold a meeting at Kiev for the drafting of the federal constitution (it will be remembered that the Ukraine, too, was part of a non-existent Russian federation at this time), but the effort was unsuccessful.¹³⁷ The Democratic Moldavian Republic existed as an independent unit through the period of the formation of the Ukrainian state, and represented a constant issue in any friendly relations between the Ukraine and Rumania. Although the Ukraine had not presented any direct claim for Bessarabia, she was plainly interested. In August 1917, the General Secretariat invited the delegate of the Executive Committee the Soviet of Bessarabia, to take part in the conference of representatives of gubernias under the Secretariat. The Soviet protested to the Russian government.¹³⁸ Also, in a visit to Petrograd, Vynnychenko showed interest in Bessarabia in negotiations with the Provisional Government. At that time Cristi, an influential Moldavian, protested against this approach.¹³⁹

Bessarabia had a considerable importance at that time. In addition to the Ukrainian population of the area, the Ukrainian part would have meant direct access to the Danube for the New Republic, as well as a common border with Bulgaria. For Rumania, on the other hand, the possibility of acquisition of Bessarabia would have meant reunion with Rumanian-speaking Moldavians as well as additional outlet to the sea. Bessarabia would be particularly important to Rumania if the Dobrudja was to be sacrificed to the possibly victorious Central Powers; in that case, Bessarabia would be Rumania's only access to the sea. In view of the close association between France and Rumania, the issue extended also to Franco-Ukrainian relations.

On the other hand, Rumanian-Ukrainian relations were being furthered by another province, Bukovyna. By the secret Treaty of Bucharest of August 17, 1916, by means of which Rumania entered the war on the side of the Allies, Bukovyna was to be partitioned between Russia and Rumania, along the River Pruth, with the Ukrainian portion of Northern Bukovyna going to Russia.¹⁴⁰ Although the treaty was secret, its tenour was generally known; Bolsheviks published the treaties shortly. With the establishment of relations between the Ukraine and Rumania, on Russia's model, as underlined by General Coanda, the Ukraine might well look towards acquisition of Bukovyna in the case of victory of the Allies.¹⁴¹ Rumanians appear to have honoured their treaty. They complained to Tabouis of not being able to group together 'their nationals, so numerous in Bukovyna.'¹⁴² Rumanians were now completely dependent on Ukrainian supplies.

The difficulty of organizing a front in the Ukraine was connected with the developing conflict between Lloyd George, supported by General Henry Wilson and Lord French, and Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, supported by General Haig and the command in general.¹⁴³ The Government and generals of the Eastern fronts pressed for an 'Eastern strategy', 'knocking out the props' (i.e. the allies) of Germany, particularly Turkey, through action either in Greece (perhaps from Salonika), or the Middle East (through the push into Mesopotamia, based on the brilliant successes of General Allenby), or perhaps directly through the Dardanelles (reviving Gallipoli memories and perhaps refurbishing reputations.) The aim would be thus the capitulation of Turkey, fall of Bulgaria, and the collapse of the Central Powers themselves. The Imperial General Staff and the generals of the Western fronts, led by Robertson, pressed for a 'Western strategy', concentrating all forces on the Western front, which they saw as the principal theatre of war. The knock-out blow would be delivered directly to the German armies in France. British policy on the Ukrainian fronts and to the Ukrainian Republic was being formed closely in connection with the struggle of the strategists in

Great Britain. The support of the rebuilding of the Ukrainian front made sense obviously only in the case of the triumph of the Eastern Strategy, pressed by the British Government, but resisted by powerful forces.¹⁴⁴

The military arrangements expressed in the Memorandum and the Convention found military exemplification in the recommendations for policy in the Ukraine, Rumania, the Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire made by the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council. The Military Representatives were formed as a committee on the initiative of Lloyd George, to the displeasure of Robertson and some of the military who saw in this an attempt to circumvent their authority. The Representatives were members of the Council, and in their communications, styled themselves as military representatives of the respective national sections of the Council.¹⁴⁵ These were General Henry Wilson (Lloyd George's nominee), Weygand of France, and Cadorna of Italy. In early December, they had been directed by the Supreme War Council to survey the whole position 'in view of the new conditions which had arisen through the collapse of Russia, and to prepare plans for submission to the Governments and to the Staffs of the Allied Armies'; they had been assured of full and up-to-date information by the military and civil authorities.¹⁴⁶ The United States was informed of their decisions: their notes appear in the American Modern Army Archives.¹⁴⁷

The matter of the Ukraine came up as a separate subject in the War Cabinet meeting of December 3; the initiative was taken by Lloyd George in the absence of Balfour, the Foreign Secretary. The decisions reached were quite far-reaching and were probably due in part to the exasperation of Lloyd George at the repeated checking of his policy by the Allies, House in particular. Lord Cecil wired the decision to Buchanan, the Ambassador in Petrograd. The War Cabinet, he said, had considered the 'Russian situation' and decided that every effort should be made to keep Russia from making a separate peace. The support of a coalition of Bolsheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks was dismissed. On the

other hand, if a southern bloc could be formed consisting of the Caucasus, the Cossack regions, the Ukraine and the free parts of Rumania, it would probably set up a reasonably stable government and would, through its command of oil, coal and corn, effectively control the whole of Russia. Buchanan was authorized to take whatever steps he thought possible with a view to carrying through this policy either directly or through agents. He was ordered to furnish Cossacks or Ukrainians with any funds necessary by any means he thought desirable. A similar message was sent by General Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to the Military Attaché in Jassy.¹⁴⁸

Knox, the British Military Attaché in Petrograd, in a wire sent to the British Ambassador, protested rather violently against the policy. He minimized the strength of the Cossacks, and said that any alliance between them and Ukraine with the purpose of continuing the war was 'fantastically unlikely'. Buchanan also condemned the policy. He suggested that any dealings with the factions be handled through the Legation in Rumania. Both he and Knox referred to the danger to themselves; Buchanan thought also that the arrests of him or of the Military Attaché would 'cause His Majesty's Government grave embarrassments'.¹⁴⁹

Yet on the other hand, Wardrop, the Consul-General in Moscow, endorsed as trustworthy a report that 'Ukrainian forces would join (the Cossacks) in cooperation with Rumanian and Caucasian forces'. This forces would be more than sufficient to re-establish constitutional government.¹⁵⁰ General Shore, Chief of the British Military Mission with the Caucasus Army, also held that if Britain were to give financial support to the Ukrainian Rada and Transcaucasia on the condition that they join with the Cossacks, they would continue opposition to the enemy.¹⁵¹

The policy of Lloyd George and Balfour was concerned primarily with German military power, and only secondarily with the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were to be resisted only if their actions actually or potentially strengthened the forces of the Central Powers. This is the position of Lloyd George

described in his memoirs, and there does not appear to be any grounds for doubting his word.¹⁵²

'What we had to consider as a war problem was how best to prevent Germany from revictualling herself afresh from the corn lands (i.e. of the Ukraine), and oil fields which would be laid open to her if she succeeded in penetrating to the Don and the rich provinces of the Caucasus,' he stated.

The war would be prolonged 'perhaps by years', if the Central Powers obtained the wheat and oil; hence the War Cabinet had discussed the need of organizing the forces of resistance, and examined the measures to be adopted to assist the anti-German forces which still existed. 'The difficulty was to do so without appearing to wage war on the Bolshevik Government,' which was a problem indeed.¹⁵³ The views of Lloyd George were seconded by those of Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, while some members of the British government had strong anti-Bolshevik views. Balfour's position was presented in a memorandum (dated December 9) to the Cabinet on the request of Lloyd George. The main points of this memorandum were: the defence of Rumanian interests, the prevention of large German forces evacuating the front, and the safeguarding of supplies. The memorandum was pessimistic in regard to Rumania (an armistice having been proclaimed on that front), as well as to the maintainance of a front. The safeguarding of supplies from the Germans was particularly important; this was to be done without provoking the Bolsheviks.¹⁵⁴ Although endorsed by Lloyd George, the memorandum failed to sway the Cabinet as a whole. The acceptance of this plan, and its eventual imposition upon France, would have meant complete alienation of the Ukrainian Republic. The Cabinet decided instead upon the primary aims: 'Russia (was to be kept) in the War until our joint war aims were realized', or should that prove impossible, to ensure that the terms of peace closed by Russia gave a 'bias in the favour of the Allies'.¹⁵⁵ This attitude was already more helpful to Ukraine, as the possibility of resistance to Germany on the Eastern front was held out.

By December 14, the decision to aid anti-German forces upon the Ukrainian front was implemented. The rule was laid down that any sum of money required for the purpose of keeping resistance to the Central Powers alive in South-East Russia should be furnished.¹⁵⁶ Two advances of £10,000,000 each were authorized, one of them to be distributed by British representatives in Rumania to whatever Russian Forces could be persuaded to continue resistance on the Ukrainian and Rumanian fronts.¹⁵⁷ The plan for the formation of the new front and the policy towards the Ukraine was further developed later in December.

The British reserved most of their attention for the Cossacks, while the Ukraine was treated in conjunction with them. They were satisfied to allow France to represent the Allied interest in the Ukraine.

The decision of the British War Cabinet, presumed secret, apparently reached the German Foreign Office. In fact, according to the notation in the Archives, the report was to be submitted to the highest authority in the German Empire, Wilhelm II. The Imperial German Embassy in Copenhagen, in its report No. 176 of December 8, 1917, informed Berlin as follows.

Ein Kurier aus London, Professor Gardner (sic!), bestaetigte die Erwartung dass England saemtliche Organisationen finanzieren wird, die zur Unterdrueckung der Bolschewiki bis zur Wiederherrstellung der Ordnung und einer gesetzmaessigen Regierung in Russland notwendig wird...

The same report, incidentally, refers to the initiative of Russian ambassadors, presumably including Nobokoff, Russian Ambassador in London, and Maklakoff, his counterpart in Paris, to call for the Union of the Caucasus, the Cossacks, Siberia and the Ukraine to suppress anarchy and the Bolsheviks.¹⁵⁸ The earliest purely American contact in Kiev was a Y.M.C.A. Secretary, Heald, who came to Kiev to open a branch of his organization in early December. He had wide-ranging interests and sent a lengthy letter to his colleague Wheeler regarding 'the military and political situation'. The letter gave

a lengthy description of events in general, followed by a commentary upon Ukrainian events in particular. The writer's conclusion was that the Rada was of little consequence 'which had sacrificed its future by a damning misalliance with Bolsheviks and Austrians'. The Ukrainians were said to be weak 'because their movement was not a popular or national movement'.¹³⁹ The interest of this report lies primarily in the fact that it was considered by Consul-General Summers in Moscow to be worthy of being sent to Washington. It should also be mentioned that Heald's letter is referred to by Kennan, an American historian. Somewhat carelessly, Kennan represents the resumé of the letter by Summers, American Consul in Moscow, as the 'words of a private American observer', referring to the printed sources.¹⁴⁰

The United States sent Jenkins, the former consul at Riga, to Kiev on December 12, with instructions to consult Summers about establishing a consulate at Kiev. This project had been approved by the Department of State, but the Provisional Government was deposed before it gave approval. Jenkins was cautioned against recognizing any government but was given discretion for opening a consulate.¹⁴¹ The plan was occasioned by a note from Shulhyn to the Allies, received by Francis about December 12. Among these were accounted Great Britain, Belgium, United States, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Rumania, and Serbia. The note announced that 'in the absence in Russia of a central power recognized by all peoples of the Russian Federation,' the Secretariat of State of Ukraine had constituted itself into a 'complete and independent government', and the Central Rada had proclaimed a democratic republic. If the union should be reformed, the Republic would be an autonomous member of the Federative Republic. While maintaining close relations with Russia, the Republic always considered itself the 'ally of all the powers which were fighting with Russia against the Central Empire.' The Allies were informed, however, that the Rada had deemed it necessary to begin the armistice.¹⁴²

The Allies were also told of the unification and the take-

over of the command of the Ukrainian front, consisting of the South-Western and Rumanian fronts of early December. This was done in agreement with the 'Rumanian Government and that of autonomous Moldavia'; the Ukrainian front would be co-ordinated with the Russian one.¹⁰³

The American military authorities in Petrograd, through General Judson, the head of the American Military Mission, took a position much more favourable to the Bolsheviks in the rising Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Judson stated that no Americans were in the south with Kaledin, or other counter-revolutionaries or rebels, obviously meaning by the latter the Ukrainian government.¹⁰⁴ The same indifference to the Ukraine, in the conflict, was shown by the British. They had a strong detachment of armoured cars at Kiev. These were transferred to Kursk, where they were requisitioned by Russian authorities. This was done, according to Niessel, to forestall the accusation that the British delivered them to Ukrainians.¹⁰⁵ The British action characterized the unclear conditions and the general uncertainty.

The statements regarding military Allied personnel in the Ukraine and their relative strength were confirmed in the diplomatic report sent two weeks later by Douglas Jenkins, who was about to open an American Consulate in Kiev. 'There are no American officers here', he stated in emphatic support of the statement of Judson. There were a few British officers. The British and French missions from the highest Headquarters had left Kiev. However, General Tabouis remained in Kiev 'with a considerable staff'; there was also a French military hospital there. Most of Tabouis' officers seemed to have come from Rumania.

Jenkins had talked with General Baxter, Chief of the British Mission at the Headquarters, which had been in Kiev but was now in Petrograd; Baxter told him that his instructions were not to recognize the Ukrainian government or to take any part in politics.¹⁰⁶

The new situation made the course of negotiations somewhat more difficult. Circles in the Ukraine more favorable to

peace were gathering strength. Two or three days after the agreement for negotiations, an article appeared in the quasi-official newspaper *Nova Rada*, obviously inspired or written by Vynnychenko. The article discussed the initiative of Noulens to Tuhon-Baranovsky, regarding the French private loan to the Ukraine. The article explained that by circles in France 'sympathizing' with the Ukraine, were to be understood the capitalists who were trying to 'invest their money in the industrial establishments in the Ukraine.' The so-called 'sympathy' was thus shown as simply as material interest of capitalist France. The reason given for such an interpretation was that in the immediate past, 'France had not shown any sympathy for the Ukraine's destiny'. The article concluded by what may well have been the position of Vynnychenko, then Head of the General Secretariat:

In our present international relations, the new governing meetings and discussions should be that the Ukraine requires peace first and foremost, after which she will begin putting her economic life in order. The Ukrainian government then deciding, after the war, any economic questions should not stand upon this or that 'philism', but upon a sober calculation of political and economic¹⁴⁷ factors profitable first of all for the Ukraine itself.

This position could not be said to have characterized the policy of the government as a whole, nor was this position fully crystallized. In the rise of Russo-Ukrainian hostilities, such sentiments became less pronounced.

Generally speaking, with the publication of the secret treaties of the Allies, the Ukrainian Republic, assuming that her army was organized and had fought to victory, could hope to exercise her rights under the treaties. While the Republic had not shown any interest in non-Ukrainian populations, the guarantee for its Western border given to Russia by France must have been of importance. In this case, on March 11, 1917,¹⁴⁸ in reply to a similar note from Russia dated February 18, 1917,¹⁴⁹ France offered to waive the determination of the Western border in return for the corresponding liberty in es-

tablishing French borders in the East. This guarantee applied in particular to the Ukrainian-populated parts of Austria-Hungary, to the eastern part of the province of Galicia, the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine and again, Bukovyna. These considerations were present in the minds of Ukrainian officials. For instance, Lototsky had stated to French officials that the Ukraine was fighting for 'annexation' of Galicia, as mentioned elsewhere.

The moves of the Entente powers were generally highly appreciated by the Republic. They were reviewed in their entirety by an agent of the Central Rada, judging by its contents, in a telegram of December 12, which was intercepted by Russia, and which made Russo-Ukrainian relations more difficult. The telegram was published in late December in an article by Stalin as justification for the Russo-Ukrainian war. It constituted a useful summary of Ukrainian-Entente relations at the time.

The French Military Mission on the Rumanian Front had received urgent instructions from their Government to cooperate with, and to support by all means, the Ukrainian Rada. This followed the statement by the latter that it wished to secure order and 'the conclusion of the peace in conjunction with the Allies'. The French counted on maintaining the appearance of an All-Russian (*rossiyskiy*) front to February or March, and thus to put off the final conclusion of the armistice to the spring, in order to prevent the preparation of the German spring campaign on the Western Front. It was believed that in the spring a more favourable situation for the conclusion of a general peace would arise. In the French view, Ukrainians could maintain the Rumanian front and portions of the South-Western front. The French were also in contact with the Don Cossacks to see that the front was supplied with coal and wheat. Conversely, the British were liquidating their positions on the Ukrainian fronts and their hospital and medical detachments were being evacuated.¹⁷⁰

In the meantime, American policy shifted to support for anti-Bolshevik forces in the former Russian Empire. Lansing

had apparently changed his mind. In his memorandum of December 10, he shifted to the position of giving aid to the anti-Bolshevik groups. The only possible nucleus was Kaledin's group which would receive the support of the Constitutional Democrats, the middle class and land-owners.¹⁷¹ The policy suggested thus would definitely mean the extension of support to the more conservative groups, a minority in the former Russian Empire. In particular, as far as the Ukrainian Republic was concerned, the Constitutional Democrats were inimical to it. It has been mentioned that their representative, Krupnov, left the Rada in early September.

The question of the Ukraine and Kaledin was discussed by the chief aides of the State Department with Lansing. This is borne out by the title of the memorandum drafted by then for Lansing: "Ukrainians and cossacks."¹⁷² It probably became clear in the discussion that the support of both was self-defeating. Lansing met Wilson the same day, and decision was reached to give clandestine financial aid to the Cossacks.¹⁷³ The assistance was to take the form of American loans to the British and the French, who would actually provide the assistance. Crosby, representative on the Inter-Allied Council of War Purchases and Finance was advised that the 'movement in the south and southeast under the leadership of Kaledin and Korniloff offers at the present time the greatest hope for the re-establishment of a stable government and the continuance of a military force on the German and Austrian fronts.' Kaledin's regime could not be recognized, however. The memorandum opened the door to extension of the principle to other centres, it seems by the statement that any movement to keep Russia in the war should be encouraged.¹⁷⁴

In this manner, the policy of anti-Bolshevik resistance urged by Summers was accepted, paralleling the French and British policies. However, Summers was well-informed on the conflict between Kaledin and Ukraine. On December 15, he wrote to Washington that the 'relations of the Cossacks and Ukrainians do not seem to be as good as they were some time ago'. The Ukrainians were dissatisfied over the proclamation

of martial law in the coal basin, he reported. Then he concluded that the 'Ukrainians are bent on independence, and are more disposed to lean upon Austria-Hungary'. This made them unreliable allies of the Cossacks. But he also found it doubtful whether they would actively assist the Cossacks 'in their proposed march to the north'.¹⁷⁵ It was Summers to whom the American consuls in the anti-Bolshevik areas reported: Poole in the Don Army Region, and Jenkins in the Ukrainian Republic.

The consolidation of relations with the Allied powers ran into the opposition of the Bolshevik government. On December 16, Trotsky, the Foreign Affairs Commissar, insisted on seeing Noulens in Petrograd. He protested against the cooperation of French officers with the Ukrainian government which 'was disarming Soviet troops'. He pointed out that the Ukrainians were supporting the 'counter-revolutionary machinations of Kaledin', hardly a matter to distress Noulens. He also attempted to play on French fears by saying that Ukrainians were withdrawing troops from the Russian-Rumanian front. Noulens replied that all French officers attached to missions in Russia had received orders not to meddle in internal political strife. This was the truth, as was seen in the case of Tabouis.

The presence of officers previously attached to the South-Western and Rumanian fronts was explained to the commanders as being a result of requests by 'various Russian Governments' that they observe the formation of a national Ukrainian Army. Thus Trotsky was given to understand that his protest was being disregarded. However, he was assured that in the event of an armed struggle between the Ukrainian and Russian governments the role of these officers would be reduced to that of a military mission, they would not take any part in a struggle.¹⁷⁶

It was at this point that the actions of a certain American official touched on the question of the Ukrainian Republic. The official in question was Robins, head of the American Red Cross in Petrograd. Kennan, an American historian, supplies a sympathetic picture of Robins as a 'characteristic figure of the

liberal movement of the Middle West in the years before World War I,¹⁷⁷ a well-meaning, if somewhat muddle-headed, muck-raker from Chicago who had discovered in Soviet Russia something of value. Professor Charles E. Merriam of the University of Chicago described him in 1922 as a 'powerful and picturesque figure in Chicago',

...A flaming orator of marvelous power, commander of humor, satire, tenderness, emotional appeal in their finest forms, he has been a flaming sword in many a Chicago battle. With broad, democratic sympathies, incorruptible honesty and indomitable courage, his blade had been a ring of fire, and his voice a trumpet to a fray.¹⁷⁸

The picture must be balanced with the portrayal of Robins by Dzierzdzinsky, the chairman of the Extraordinary Commission—the Cheka. Dzierzdzinsky was quoted in the memoirs of Kalpaschnikoff. In view of the fact that Kalpaschnikoff believed himself betrayed by Robins, the quotation must be approached with caution, Dzierzdzinsky is supposed to have described Robins as follows:

But he was the only true and faithful friend we had among the foreigners and he was the only one who understood our aims and fully sympathized with us and was ready to support our government, and we valued him greatly. The complete contempt which the other Americans and foreigners showed us exasperated us and caused great complications which nearly brought a great crisis.¹⁷⁹

Robins was a 'worshipper of great men.' According to Lockhart, the British unofficial representative (similar to Robins in this respect), after the admiration for Roosevelt and Cecil Rhodes, now Lenin captured his imagination.¹⁸⁰ Kennan holds that 'no mention of Robins and his activities in Russia would be complete without a word about the alter ego who guided his steps in that country from the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, arranged his contacts with the Soviet authorities, translated for him, and served as secretary and general aid—Alexander Gumberg.'¹⁸¹ The relationship of Gumberg to the American Red Cross Mission is not clear. In the report from the Council Department of Personnel of the American Red Cross,

Gumberg was described as 'presumably... a personal attaché of Mr. Robins.'¹⁸² Whether he was paid by Robins at all, and if so, whether the money came from American funds, is not clear. According to Kennan, Gumberg 'enjoyed excellent and intimate relations with Trotsky, Radek, Peters (members of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission), and other high Bolshevik officials.'¹⁸³ The propriety of having the man as a 'personal attaché' is open to doubt in the case of an official of a foreign power, such as Robins was. The most serious error lay in the fact that Gumberg 'availed himself... of a Russian passport' in entering Russia in 1917,¹⁸⁴ and was thus a Russian citizen. As such, he could not at all be protected by any American intervention, and was expected to support Russian interests.

Robins became involved in Ukrainian-Russian relations, and in particular in the matter of the proclamation of war against the Ukrainian Republic by Soviet Russia. At stake were 72 Ford ambulances and 8 light Talbot trucks. These had been brought to Petrograd from the United States of America by a certain Kalpaschnikoff, who, as an official of the Russian Red Cross, had succeeded in raising a certain sum of money for the purpose in America.¹⁸⁵ These, along with a train of sanitary supplies, were requested by the American Red Cross Mission at Jassy. Major Roger Perkin of their staff attempted to arrange for the shipping of some of the ambulances to Jassy, but found that 'Robins opposed (it) on the grounds that in view of the likelihood of an immediate outbreak of civil war between the Bolsheviks and the Ukrainian Rada', 'he regarded it as impossible to ship with the other supplies any motor cars whatsoever.'¹⁸⁶ This interview appears to have taken place on December 16, one day before the Russian ultimatum to the Ukraine; and was probably informed there.¹⁸⁷ On the next day, December 17, further disagreement developed between Perkins and Robins, in which latter insisted 'that the other supplies could go forward, but that the motor cars must not be moved.' Next day, according to the Red Cross report cited by Kennan,

... Col. Robins had an interview with the representatives of the Russian *de facto* government as the result of which he received written instructions authorizing the dispatch of the train of cars containing clothing and other materials for civilian relief, but that no motor cars could be transported.¹⁰⁹

Perkins gave up the same day and left Petrograd, after complaining to his superior in Jassy.¹⁰⁹ The actual motives of the transfer of ambulances to Jassy are not clear.

In view of the fact that Robins was informed of the Russo-Ukrainian break before it became general knowledge, it must be concluded that he was acting on independent information by Soviet authorities. Thus the prevention of supply of motor cars to the Rumanian front, via Kiev (this being the only really practical way) was a solid gain to Russian authorities in the outbreak of open warfare between the two Republics. On December 18, after the ultimatum to the Ukraine by Russia, Robins had 'written instructions' prohibiting him from transporting any 'motor cars.' The importance of 'written instructions' becomes heightened when it is known that they had been written by Trotsky himself. It was this which was communicated to Perkins in final refusal.¹¹⁰ The impropriety of accepting, particularly using, the 'written instructions' from a representative of a foreign power which was not recognized by the United States, in a dispute within an American service does not appear to have occurred to the participants. At any rate, the net result was that American officials, participating without official American authorization, in discussions with unrecognized Russian authorities, did in fact prevent the passage of American property into the Ukrainian sphere of activities. It can be assumed that in the negotiations between Trotsky and Robins, the 'personal attaché' Gumberg, a Russian citizen, was a participant and interpreter. It should also be noted that the American Embassy did approve the dispatch of the motor cars to Jassy, and had issued a certificate to that effect.¹¹¹

Thus, the Ukrainian Republic had against it not only the relative indifference of the authorized representatives of the United States of America, in this case, the American Embassy

in Petrograd, but also the hostility of the head of the American Military Mission, Judson, and particularly of the head of the American Red Cross Mission, Robins.

The recognition of the Ukraine was making some progress among the French, and the new country was beginning to attract the attention of other powers, when recognition by Russia and the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War changed the situation greatly. These two events are treated in detail elsewhere; it will suffice to mention that the Ukrainian government received a note from the Russian government on December 17, which announced the recognition of the Republic by Russia, and at the same time presented certain peremptory demands in the form of an ultimatum, threatening war. The note was presented to the Congress of Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine on December 18, as discussed below, and met with general disfavour. The Russian demands were rejected, and measures of defence were taken.

The circumstances of the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War can be examined to see how valid the views, or illusions, of the powers about the Ukrainian Republic. The calculations of the Allies were determined primarily by their desire to preserve at least a part of the Eastern front. Especially in the case of the French, hostility to Bolshevism was quite secondary. The maintenance of the front itself consisted of two problems. On the one hand, the attempt was made to enable the Ukrainian Republic to keep the line of fortifications, and on the other hand, to save Rumania.

The other problem, the holding of the purely Ukrainian front, was a much more serious affair. The South-Western front held out reasonably well. Though it had been badly mangled in the July offensive, its morale, in comparison with the Western and Northern fronts, was high. The front was regularly supplied with food. In view of the general quietness of the Eastern front, due mostly to the preparations of the German Army for a planned knock-out blow at the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, as well as intermittent supply from the North, the front did not suffer a serious shortage of weapons.

The gradual reorganization of the front on national lines continued, not without difficulties, as was to be expected. The problem has been discussed at some length, above.

The fact that the German military authority, as was mentioned before, considered the Ukrainian forces an enemy not to be disregarded (*beachtenswert*), had an importance of its own. There is little reason to doubt the rightness of the evaluation of the seasoned German military observers. Yet, regardless of the correctness of the evaluation, the very fact of belief constitutes an important element in the strategy. This consideration may also have been present in the calculations of the military leaders of the democratic Alliance.

The one eventuality which had not been foreseen, or at least not been taken seriously, was the possibility of a Russo-Ukrainian War. Here again the French had some justification. Under the circumstances, the war meant that Russia was throwing herself completely on the mercy of Germany; the national struggle would disorganize all fronts, the Northern as well as others. The number of troops involved in actual warfare would of course have no bearing on the strength of the front, at least while it was still intact. But the fact was that the All-Russian Army was of mixed national composition: the war between nations internally meant war between national troops at the front, resulting in the break-down of all authority and of effectiveness in battle. The war was also a measure of very serious risk to the none-too-secure Bolshevik regime. It is not surprising therefore that the Foreign powers failed to consider the possibility of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Even allowing for the internal exigencies of the regime, the war was still a very risky adventure, which a serious regime would surely avoid.

It was at this juncture that General Tabouis asked for a meeting with the head of the government, which took place on December 18. General Tabouis arrived with his staff in the company of Major Fitzwilliam of the British Military Mission. He stated proposals of technical and financial aid. These were formulated in a *note verbale* which stated that the Allied powers had not yet taken an official decision about the Ukraine,

but that he had already been told to express to Shulhyn Allied sympathy with Ukrainian efforts to re-establish order and re-construct the forces of resistance. He went on to say that although he did not have an official mandate, he would like an eventual discussion about the financial and technical assistance which the Allies would give the Ukraine to aid her in her gigantic task of reorganization. Furthermore, he informed the Ukrainian government that he had received the order the previous day to invite the Ukraine 'in view of the financial and technical aid which France could give the Ukraine to define and to transmit to the French Embassy the program, the Ukrainian government wished to realize and the corresponding needs. In conclusion, Tabouis emphasized that he had made the *démarche* first. 'The sympathies of France... are real and active', he stated.¹⁹²

This was the first open approach by any foreign power to the Ukraine. A *note verbale* does not have to have a signature, or the name and title of the person addressed and there was no precedent created for either party. Still, the official interview and the offer on paper was a definite step towards recognition.

The inconsistencies in the Allied policies towards the Ukrainian Republic, and the desire to avoid duplication of effort, imposed upon the Allies the necessity of an agreement. In the meeting of the British War Cabinet on December 21, concern was expressed about the lack of co-ordination among the Allies in the work of the British and French Missions in the Ukraine, Rumania and among the Don Cossacks.¹⁹³ It was decided to send Lord Milner and Lord Robert Cecil to Paris to confer with the French Government. A memorandum was considered at the meeting, and was approved. It was submitted to the French. The memorandum broke with the earlier wave of pessimism and the refusal to intervene expressed in the Balfour Memorandum.¹⁹⁴ 'Bolsheviks', who were not described as the Russian government, were to be told that the Allies felt it necessary to keep in close touch with the Ukraine and others 'because these various semi-autonomous provinces represented

a very large proportion of the strength of Russia'. The British were finally coming around to the view that Ukraine was self-governing. As they said, 'In particular, we feel bound to befriend the Ukraine, since upon the Ukraine depends the feeding of the Rumanians, to whom we are bound by every obligation of honour.' The French policy of association of Ukrainian and Rumanian interests was being accepted.

The Bolsheviks were also to be urged to prevent, if they could, the 'wheat districts of Russia, such as the Ukraine' from falling into German hands; and thus, far from 'trying to coerce the Ukrainians', they were to be urged to enter into close co-operation with them. The saving of the wheat district was given as still another reason 'why we are anxious to support and strengthen the Ukraine.'

The general tasks in 'Southern Russia' were to be the rescue of Rumania and the prevention of supplies from reaching Germany. If the 'Southern Russian Armies (could be induced) to resume the fighting', that would be very desirable, but was considered to be improbable.

In the execution of the proposed policies, there were two means which could be used — money, and the agents of the Allies already on the spot.

The sums required were not considered to be very high. The financing of the reorganization of the Ukraine was to be undertaken by France, while others would be financially aided by Great Britain. It was also understood that the United States would assist.

There were also to be 'agents and officers to advise and support the provincial Governments and their armies', though this was to be done quietly, to avoid provoking the Bolsheviks. 'A general officer from each country', would be appointed to take charge of the activities; they would keep a close liaison. Dealing with Ukraine on behalf of the Allies were to be supervised by the French 'general officer'. The idea of limiting British interest to other territories, and leaving Ukrainian relations to France, arose from the general apathy towards the area. This idea had been endorsed by General Ballard, the

British Military Attaché in Rumania, who reported that the French mission in Rumania was hand-in-hand with the Rada. The French, with so many officers throughout the area, were in a much better position than the British to judge the course of Ukrainian events.¹⁹⁵

The British memorandum was considered in Paris and was agreed with.¹⁹⁶ The agreement was formalized on December 23, in Southern Russia. The importance of the convention was evident from the array of co-signers. Representing Britain was Lord Milner and Lord Cecil, as well as military officers. Appearing for France were Clemenceau, the President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pichon, General Foch, the Commander-in-Chief and immediate superior of General Berthelot, and others. The Convention provided that the French action against the enemy was to develop, in general, to the north of the Black Sea. The zone of influence of France was to extend over Bessarabia, the Ukraine and the Crimea. The expenses were to be shared, and regulated under a Central Inter-Allied body.¹⁹⁷

The Convention was drafted in very general terms, granting to France in the Ukraine wide discretion of action on behalf of the Entente as a whole. The only limitation, if it can be said to be a limitation at all, was that the action was to be 'against the enemy'. The 'enemy' was not defined; it seems to have applied primarily to Germany and Austria-Hungary, but the Bolsheviks were not excluded by the wording. In so far as the Memorandum itself was accepted by the Allies, the Convention was the expression of the Memorandum, and governed the inter-relations of the Allies in the fulfilment of that policy. To a certain extent, the Convention was a further step away from the somewhat pessimistic policy of Balfour.

The convention has been viewed by some as a part of the effort of Western powers to partition the territory of the former Russian Empire for exploitation. Considered in its proper connection with the Memorandum, such interpretation seems faulty. The main enemy was of course Germany. Rather than aiming at any exploitation, the Entente powers, fighting for

their very existence, seem to have been concerned for the welfare of the territories so that they could defend their borders, and their wealth in wheat, coal and oil, and the front against the Central Powers. No long-range plans of weakening the territory seem to have played any serious role in the decisions so far as can be established with the evidence available. These would seem to be precluded by the overwhelmingly strong position of the Central Powers; it will be also remembered that a peace allowing Germany to preserve its position was favoured. This movement was noticeable in Great Britain, where it was represented by some conservatives, such as Lord Lansdowne, and by the Independent Labour Party. Also, the fall of Russia seems to have made the Entente war-aims, as expressed in various treaties, a dead letter in the East; still, these treaties anticipated a strong Russian state to check the remaining power of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

It is obvious that the Entente powers were simply accepting the facts as they were — that there was no Russian Republic. The Convention, in mentioning the Ukraine separately, was only describing the actual state of affairs. In December 1918 when all danger was past, the Convention was considered in a meeting of the British War Cabinet, the idea that it might serve as justification for the extension of British authority into the Caucasus was specifically rejected. It was held that the convention had related only to wartime military arrangements.¹⁰⁸

An authoritative interpretation of the Convention by Selby of the British Foreign Office, in his memorandum on British policy, was drawn up in middle of 1919. The agreement between Britain and France was said to be an extension of 'French control . . . to Bessarabia, the Ukraine and the Crimea', while the British 'took responsibility' for other territories in the East. This agreement and various others arising from it in the future, were described as the 'division of spheres of activity'.¹⁰⁹ This was a somewhat wider claim than the decision referred to above, and certainly much wider than the original memorandum. The basic idea in the statements discussed in detail

above was the maintenance of these areas as self-governing and defensible units.

There was a problem over the participation of the United States in this convention and thus in France's authorization to be the Allied agent in Ukraine. The Memorandum stated that the United States was expected to contribute money to finance the Ukrainian organizations and the Ukrainian front among others. The Memorandum was transmitted by Balfour to the American Ambassador in London, Page, and retransmitted to Washington, on December 29, 1917.²⁰⁰ American officials were acquainted with the Convention. A later agreement between France and Great Britain in August 1918, provided that expenses in the area would be divided jointly with the United States contributing, if possible; the French government gave instructions to their Ambassador in Washington to press for agreement of the United States to pay a third. The Convention was described as concerning France and Great Britain; the United States was not mentioned.²⁰¹ Still, the inter-allied body which was to supervise financial affairs presumably included America, considering that it was to pay a part of the expenses. Such a body was, however, never set up.²⁰²

The evaluation of the convention by the historians in the West, and by historians in the U.S.S.R. is of interest. Thus, Ullman, the historian who wrote the most recent study of the Anglo-Russian relations holds that the convention was 'simply a strategic document intended to set forth spheres for military activities'.²⁰³ Ullman mentions that two recent Soviet histories describe the convention as a 'program for the exploitation of Russia', referring in particular to Naida, and to Volkov. It must be mentioned that Volkov considered that there existed 'imperialist contradictions within the Entente bloc'; thus 'in contradistinction to France, interested in the preservation of one and united Russia of the Tsarist type, which would be a counterweight in the case of the conflict between France and Germany, England and U.S.A. strove towards the weakening and dismemberment of Russia, towards its transformation into a colony of world imperialism'.²⁰⁴ A similar opinion is given by

Shtein.²⁰⁵ Both Shtein and Volkov cite the evaluation of the general situation by Lenin who wrote, 'The French needed a strong Poland and a strong Russia of Tsarist type. England, in view of its geographic position strives towards the other — the break-up of Russia, and the weakening of Poland so that there would be a balance between France and Germany'.²⁰⁶ These historians strive to prove in particular that it was the United States and Great Britain which were particularly interested in the 'dismemberment of Russia'. Berezkin, another Soviet historian, is quite insistent on the American desire to 'obtain Siberia' as part of the arrangement where Great Britain would get 'the Caucasus and the Cossack oblasts' and France the Ukraine, Crimea, Bessarabia and Rumania.²⁰⁷ The most thorough examination of the Convention in Soviet literature is found in the recently published study by Trukhanovskiy.²⁰⁸ The Memorandum of December 21, is described as containing an overt plan of intervention with the aim of destruction of the Soviet government and the partition of Russia into a series of states dependent on England and the allies. In so far as 'England could not count on destruction of the gains of October, the dismemberment and the enslavement of Russia, by her own forces', the cooperation of France and U.S.A. in the 'intervention' was expected; the Convention itself is presented in similar light.²⁰⁹ Trukhanovskiy does not distinguish as strongly as others between the Western powers, and brings out the supposed aim of 'destruction of Soviet power' harboured by the Western powers. It would appear on the whole that the Soviet historiography, appearing to follow the political demands of the time (which would most readily explain the variations in the evaluation from Lenin to Trukhanovskiy), does not offer much to the elucidation of the problem. Still, it would be an error to regard the Soviet position on the problem as unchangeable.

A view generally paralleling the views of the Bolshevik historians has been presented by Strakhovsky, a Russian historian. The agreements had been characterized by Strakhovsky as the 'Franco-British plot to dismember Russia'.²¹⁰ Kennan,

an American historian, in a recent study rejects Strakhovsky's interpretation; he considers that Strakhovsky depicted the agreement 'rather luridly', while the circumstances would not bear out 'so dramatic a view'.²¹¹ The Convention is seen to envisage the extension of aid to anti-Bolshevik forces in respective areas, and not the landing of troops.²¹² The policy was thus calculated to support the policy of re-establishment of a 'stable government' and the maintenance of the front.²¹³

The view of Strakhovsky in fact characterizes the general feeling of the more conservative Russian writers. Denikin, an active participant in the struggle of the Revolution, and its historian, held that 'that strange line' dividing zones 'had no meaning in the strategic sense'. It corresponded rather to 'interests of occupation and exploitation'.²¹⁴

Perhaps the most extreme evaluation of the problem should be referred to. Fisher, an American historian, in a new edition was a possibility of 'a secret Anglo-German agreement at Russia's expense' without presenting any evidence to the existence of an agreement.²¹⁵

The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, had met the same day that the Convention had been authorized on the request of the British Government to give their opinion on whether 'Southern Russia and Rumania' were 'effectively able to resist the Bolshevik forces assisted and controlled by the Germans'.²¹⁶ That the Russian Bolshevik government was an enemy cooperating with Germany was taken for granted. According to Lloyd George, such cooperation did not need to be overt in order to be significant to the British government. He stated that the Bolsheviks, although, not 'willing allies' of Germany, were 'in a military sense at her mercy'.²¹⁷ This view, which may well have been that of the other Allies, does not appear to be unreasonable. Accepting the idea of the helplessness of the Russian Bolshevik Government against Germany, the Allies saw the extension of that government's authority to the Ukraine and other areas of consequence to the Entente as a shield for infiltration of the Central Powers into Ukraine. If Russia was serving the interests of the Central

Powers, it was desirable that its service and tribute to the Powers, be as feeble as possible.

In their reply in the Joint Note No. 5 of December 24, the Military Representatives pointed out the danger of Germany getting food from the region and gaining a foothold in the Caucasus by securing command of the Black Sea. The Germans would then receive wheat through Odessa and oil through Batum. The Representatives were unable to guarantee that the 'troops of Southern Russia and Rumania were able to resist the Bolsheviks helped by the Germans'. The troops mentioned were referred to as 'national groups', that is Ukrainian, Cossack and Caucasian (Georgian and Armenian). Further, they 'were of the opinion that all national groups who were determined to continue the war must be supported by every means in our power'.²¹⁸ The Representatives were aware that this resistance could not be sustained for an indefinite time unless it proved possible to establish a more 'direct communication between the Allies and our friends in Russia'. The obvious difficulty was the route of supply. The Ukraine and other countries were cut off in the west by the front, in the north by an unfriendly Russia which had proclaimed war to the Republic only the previous week, in the south by the Turks blocking the Dardanelles, in the south-west by the Dardanelles, in the south-east by the Caucasian front. It was indicative of how serious the Military Representatives found the situation that they supported a major operation to make close contact with the Allies in Russia. The alternatives were either an attempt through the Siberian Railway, or an attack upon Turkey which would break through to Georgia, or would force Turkey to accept a separate peace and to open the Dardanelles.²¹⁹

The Military Representatives were proposing a very wide-ranging strategy which was necessarily based upon the maintenance of an anti-Bolshevik organized authority in the Ukraine, which by this time was the Ukrainian National Republic. The policy of an offensive against Turkey with the view of opening the Dardanelles remained constant. The action against

Turkey would be continued through the advance of General Allenby (who had recently taken Jerusalem) toward Damascus or even Aleppo.²²⁰ The aim was to force Turkish capitulation. General Henry Wilson apparently supported the Ukraine: he had drafted a report, which was approved, of steps which 'ought to be taken in regard to stemming the tide of Bolshevism in the Ukraine'.²²¹

The main direction of the Allied policy in the Ukraine had been left in the hands of France, as has been seen. France moved quickly. *Le Temps* stated in the issue following the Convention that everything was happening as if the Bolshevik authorities worked only for the profit of Germany. The 'forces of the South, on the contrary' deserved the sympathies of the Allies. 'What are the means of action possessed by the Allies to support their friends?' This was the way, concluded *Le Temps*, that the problem was imposing itself on the scene.

It is obvious that France was too hard pressed to change the Allied policy in Eastern Europe. On the morrow of the signing of the Convention, and of the provocative question by the British Government, General Berthelot informed Tabouis that he was asking at Paris that Tabouis be designated as 'Commissioner of the French Republic in Ukraine', (*Commissaire de la République Française en Ukraine*). It is of interest that the initiative in recognition had come from Berthelot; it is probable that the telegram had been requested by his immediate superior, Foch. Shortly before that, Tabouis was transferred from the authority of the French Mission in Russia, and of Ambassador Noulens, and placed under the Mission in Jassy and the political direction of Saint Aulaire, the French Ambassador to Rumania. This followed a series of conflicts where Tabouis was receiving contradictory orders from Rumania and from Petrograd. Tabouis seemed to have considered attachment to the Rumanian sphere expedient, seeing this to be the preliminary of the recognition of the Ukraine. Saint Aulaire 'saw only advantages' in the recognition that Noulens' influence was diminishing. Having also been the representative of France to the old Russia, he was attached to the idea of one

Russia and could hardly acquiesce easily in what Tabouis described as 'dismemberment of that Russia'.²²² On the other side, Tabouis was being pressed by Foreign Secretary Shulhyn, who had declared to him that since France refused to recognize the Ukraine, he was obliged to correspond with Noulens.²²³

Thus, Reshetar, an American historian, is not entirely correct in stating that Noulens 'disassociated himself and General Niessel' from the appointment of Tabouis, stating that neither of them was consulted in the matter. Noulens' and Niessel's judgement was found wanting by their government in the matter, and they were removed from the Ukrainian scene by an order from Paris. Noulens' statement on Tabouis' appointment as the result of 'several officers within the French military mission in Kiev', who received their advancement 'by personal influence' can well be expected of a disappointed diplomat.²²⁴

Berthelot's telegram encouraged Tabouis to urge the newly arrived American consul in Kiev, Jenkins, towards a friendly policy to the Republic.

Jenkins had arrived in Kiev on December 20. Soviet historians ascribe to him sinister motives. Belan has written in a recent study that the Government of the United States had sent its 'consul in Riga, Jenkins, to Kiev for the realization of their insidious designs'.²²⁵

Jenkins went on a parallel mission with Poole. Poole had been sent to the Rostov area, 'ostensibly to examine into the question of opening an American consulate in Rostov, but actually with a view to establishing contact with Kaledin and Alekseyev'.²²⁶ Jenkins was to establish a consulate in Kiev. It may be presumed that he was expected to contact the Ukrainian government. He had left Petrograd on December 12, to go to Moscow to consult with Summers on the way to Kiev. Both he and Poole left Moscow at the same time, the former arriving at Kiev on December 20,²²⁷ the latter arriving in Rostov before December 22.²²⁸ Poole proceeded to Novocherkask, from where he wired to Summers next day warily

recommending an immediate extension of financial aid, suggesting the channels for it.²²⁹ Poole had also indicated that it was a joint recommendation of General Hucher, of the French Military Mission in Rumania, and himself. General Hucher had just arrived from Jassy. In this, General Berthelot extended his influence into an additional area, with General Tabouis reporting to him from Kiev. Four days later, Hucher was informed by the French that they were ready to make the sum of 100,000,000 rubles available; Hucher and Poole jointly informed Alekseyev of the news.²³⁰ From this, it would appear that the machinery worked out in the Convention, and the authorization by Wilson of American credit through Crosby was indeed operative. It would be difficult to explain the coincidence in timing of the receipt and the common announcement except in such a fashion.

The mission of Poole throws some further light on the Jenkins Mission. It may well be that Jenkins was sent along, because, having been authorized by Francis to proceed to Kiev, he could not be held at Moscow indefinitely. In his first report, given two days after his arrival in Kiev, Jenkins showed a sympathetic though cautious attitude to the Ukraine. He felt that the Department of State, as well as the Embassies and the Consulate-General in Moscow, should be fully informed of events. A certain group in the Ukraine had been trying to organize a more or less independent state with Kiev as the center; their movement had been gathering considerable support, particularly since the Bolsheviks came to power in Petrograd. 'The Rada, or parliament' seems to have been gaining strength, and now there was 'a completely organized ministry with departments for foreign affairs, war, etc'. A small army was being formed whose endurance was yet to be tested. These troops were much scattered to meet pressing needs for police purposes in various parts of Ukraine. The forces were estimated to between 50,000 and 75,000 men, but the number was rising 'fairly rapidly', toward the goal of 100,000 men by the end of 1917. Despite the general reservations on the strength, Jenkins reported that there seemed 'to be a certain amount of

enthusiasm amongst the Ukrainian troops for the Ukraine', though it could hardly be called patriotism. Elite Ukrainian troops were being formed and they wore their uniforms 'with evident pride'. Although he could not find 'anything like real discipline and morale' amongst the Ukrainian troops, Jenkins considered that these 'may come in time'. He could observe no ill will between officers and men, though 'men showed little deference to the officers, at least on the surface'. Salutes were not exchanged between men and officers, and seldom between the officers themselves. The troops were reported to be well supplied with arms and ammunition. Russian military stores had been taken over 'wherever possible' including some artillery and machine guns. The various Bolshevik detachments around the city had been dispersed a few days ago and their arms seized. Jenkins thought it 'worthy of note that only one of the Bolsheviks detachment made any real show of resistance, an aviation section'. The reference is obviously to the Aviation Park. 'These men put on a brief fight, but were overcome and disarmed.' Jenkins appeared to be ignorant of the fact that it was this disarmament of December 12-13 which was primarily responsible for the declaration of war to the Republic by the Russian Republic, just as he ignored the very fact of the declaration of war.

The internal situation was described as reasonably secure. 'The spirit of the people, as far as a casual observer could see, was much better than in Petrograd or Moscow.' Everyone appeared to have a little more assurance and sense of security. People were going about their work with somewhat lighter hearts and life here was not so hard. Still, Jenkins observed, there were strikes occasionally: he had passed a shop which was closed while the notice proclaimed that 'the clerks were not getting sufficient wages and were holding out for more.' Thus, general labour-management peace seemed to prevail.

On the whole, he reported, while the 'Ukrainian Government was a young and tender thing whose roots have not had time to sink deep into the soil, it was undoubtedly a government with such support as the newly formed Ukrainian na-

tional sentiment was able to give behind it.' While it might die, on the other hand it 'may live and grow stronger.' If the government could keep the people fairly contented by improving living conditions from day to day, there would be 'little to fear from the Bolsheviks, or even other more dangerous outside interference.' 'Serious trouble' could be expected if the government failed to bring about improvement or took some stand that did not meet with 'widespread approval among the masses.' Much depended upon events outside the Ukraine. ;

Jenkins planned to meet with Shulhyn shortly and would be able to report as 'to the aims of the Ukrainian Government' in foreign affairs, and 'especially what it was hoping for in the way of assistance from the Allies'. Groups favourable to both the Entente and the Central Powers were mentioned as being present in Ukraine.

Jenkins remarked the 'interest the French are taking in the Ukrainian movement'. 'In fact it is said the French are doing more than merely observing development', he stated, but this was yet to be determined. There was also the secret but powerful influence of the Central powers. Jenkins enlarged upon the plans of the Allies. He had met Captain Fitzwilliam of the British Military Mission, who told him that the French and English officers 'hoped in the course of some months to have a sufficiently large organized Ukrainian Army to take the field against the Central Powers in a purely defensive campaign.' The French plan, to which the British agreed, was to use this army in conjunction with the Rumanian and Polish forces. The latter two were thought to be capable of mustering some 200,000 men, while the Czech troops numbered some 50,000 men. Fitzwilliam had also stated to Jenkins that the French had about a thousand officers in Rumania and the Ukraine, and that he thought they should be allowed to 'direct the interests of the Allies to as full an extent as possible', because they were in a better position than either the British or Americans to carry on the work without delay. Fitzwilliam 'did not impress (Jenkins) favourably' but he 'seemed to know, or at least to give the impression that he knew, a good

deal of what was going on here'. He thus presented the essence of the Franco-English policy in regard to the Republic.

Jenkins concluded that he did not feel that the Ukrainians could be relied upon to aid 'in actually carrying on the war', in the absence of force, 'even if they had the inclination'. But, with proper and speedy support from the Allies, the Ukraine could be used as a point from 'which the reorganization of Russia may be started... as a base to work against German penetration, commercial and otherwise'. They might be useful in stopping to some extent the flow of food supplies and other materials to Germany. Disregarding the 'advantages which may come after the war, from the military point of view alone, Jenkins thought it was the 'duty of the Allies to foster the Ukrainian movement'. He added the proviso that the aim would be not the development of an entirely independent state, but 'merely an autonomous state which should ultimately become a part of the Russian confederation'. A policy of non-interference was rejected. Theoretically it would be leaving the Ukraine to work out its own destiny, but practically it would, in the view of Jenkins, amounts to 'throwing these people into the arms of the Central Powers', and would disappoint the majority of Ukrainians, who were stated to be friendly to the Entente rather than the Central Powers. For the time being Jenkins recommended that besides propaganda 'liberal financial assistance' be extended to the groups friendly to the Allies. In anticipation of meeting Shulhyn, he felt that such an aid would be appreciated by the pro-Ally group. No direct loan to the government was advisable at the time.³⁵¹

Jenkins met Shulhyn the next day, and told him that he had come unofficially to remain in Kiev provided his government had no objection. To his question as to what the 'Ukrainian Government expected of the Allies' Shulhyn replied, rather surprisingly, along the lines of the earlier recommendations by Jenkins. He thought that it would probably not be advisable to offer financial assistance to the Government as a government, but he felt that the Allies should be prepared to spend money to 'counter-act Austrian influence'. The Austrians

were 'spending a great deal, and the Allies should be moving vigorously'. Surprisingly, he mentioned President Hrushevsky of the Rada among the 'pro-Austrian' leaders. This party was working towards complete independence, which would mean falling under Austria; Shulhyn himself favored an 'autonomous state' to be ultimately part of 'the Russian confederation'. He also advocated the name 'Russian Ukraine', since the country was 'really Russian'. He had no fears about the Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian army being sufficiently strong to repel these. Shulhyn did not discuss the Ukraine's continuation of the war; Jenkins gathered from this that he and the other leaders were anxious for peace, though they were trying to hold out until a general peace. It is difficult to discover how far Shulhyn was playing up to the generally well-known American desire to maintain the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire, and how he was expressing his actual views. Shulhyn's position, however, was defined primarily by the fact of his office, that of a member of the government of the Republic, and it was in this capacity that Jenkins had met him unofficially. But on the whole, the interests of the Republic were being furthered. Jenkins seems to have had a favorable impression of the meeting.

This feeling was reinforced by the confirmation of the news that the Ukrainian army had taken actual possession of the staff headquarters of the South-Western front. Bolsheviks who had attempted to form revolutionary committees on the Ukrainian front had been imprisoned and brought to Kiev. Jenkins seems to have been impressed also by the consolidation of authority of the Republic, because he reported that the courts in Katerynoslav had begun to render decisions in the name of the Republic.

Jenkins had also called Tabouis, thus completing his acquaintanceship with the main diplomatic elements in Kiev. He was received 'with evident pleasure' on the part of Tabouis, as 'there was much to be done and (the French) wanted the United States to take part.' He also said that no one in Petrograd seemed to have any idea how important the 'Ukraine

movement' was, and that he had been urging in every way in his power that the Allies increase their activity here. He intimated that financial assistance 'in certain quarters would prove advantageous,' and ended by saying, 'it might ultimately become advisable to recognize this government.' Jenkins became obviously interested as he stated to American authorities that he would arrange to see the General soon again, and would try to get more detailed ideas for carrying on the work here, 'should (it be decided) to go into it.'

He concluded from all he had been able to gather that the Ukrainian movement was of the greatest importance to the United States and that 'we should have more people here to study the situation and ultimately help in furthering our interests.' Jenkins had been bold enough to suggest in the previous report that the 'Government should take some sort of active part in affairs here.' Although he 'knew that ordinarily we are not supposed to interfere in such matters', he felt that he would not be doing his duty if he did not recommend it in this case. The same had been borne out by his interview with Shulhyn reported at this time.²³²

However, Jenkins received no reply to his reports. Summers, and other Americans in Eastern Europe and the United States, had apparently decided to back Kaledin. In view of the developing hostilities between the Ukrainian Republic and the Cossacks centred on possession of the coal-bearing Donetz Basin, the support of both contendants may well have appeared out of the question. The conflict was also centred on the land question. Francis reported to Washington on December 21 that reports were current of 'engagement between Ukraine troops and Cossacks concerning land differences, Rada confiscating lands owned by Cossacks.'²³³

George Kennan, an American historian, in his study of Soviet-American relations during the revolution, discusses the question of American-Ukrainian relations.²³⁴ Kennan apparently used the archives of the Department of State of the United States. He refers to three letters from Jenkins to Francis in the archives of the Petrograd Embassy. However,

he fails to refer to the reports of Jenkins to his immediate superior. Summers, Consul-General at Moscow. Jenkins had been sent to Kiev with instructions to consult with Summers on the establishment of the consulate in Kiev, as has been stated. In this manner then, a direct contact between Summers and Jenkins was established. The relatively voluminous reports, amounting to 42 typewritten pages with enclosures, throw a great deal of information on the relations.²³⁵ Hence, it is seen that Kennan's statement that Jenkins, in 'leaning over backward to be faithful' to Francis' injunction, had 'refrained from making even any courtesy visits on the Ukrainian officials after his arrival.'²³⁶ Far from waiting until the later part of January as asserted by Kennan, he sought out the Foreign Minister within three days of his arrival.²³⁷

Jenkins had actually proposed to the American government that 'no time should be lost in extending liberal financial assistance to those groups sympathizing with the cause of the Allies'.²³⁸ He was making this recommendation after only two days in Kiev, and the day before 'an appointment to see Mr. Shulgrin (Shulhyn), the minister for foreign affairs.'²³⁹ In the meeting with Shulhyn, Jenkins actually took the initiative by asking what the 'Ukrainian government expected of the Allies'.²⁴⁰ Shulhyn stated that it would probably be inadvisable to 'offer financial assistance to the Government as government' while leaving Jenkins free to counter-act Austrian influences. Shulhyn indicated his disinterest in the matter as Jenkins reported that 'naturally he did not offer any suggestions as to whom we should offer financial assistance or how the work should be carried on'.²⁴¹

In view of the above quotations from the reports of Jenkins to his superior, it is difficult to see how Kennan can write that 'Jenkins was also approached by the Ukrainians for financial aid, but wisely refused to have anything to do with the undertaking'.²⁴² The wisdom of the 'refusal' seems to have been that the 'Allied representatives were being left with the feeling of having been mercilessly doublecrossed'.²⁴³ While making these statements, Kennan fails to offer any direct support for

his assertion in regard to Jenkins. The matter discussed here is of considerable importance. It is not the political judgement of Jenkins which is at issue here, but rather the implication that the attitude of the Ukrainian government towards the United States of America was mercenary in one of the few cases of the Ukrainian-American contact, and also that the Ukrainian government was in some sort of client relation to both sides of the belligerents.

Thus, it is of interest to consider the question of money. The Ukrainian government, from its very inception in the early Committee of the Rada, was very careful in the matter of finances. When Ukrainian civic organizations in the United States had learnt of the establishment of the Rada, in the Spring of 1917, they sent a sum of 200,000 rubles for war relief. Hrushevsky announced the matter in the Rada and asked for directives. This was done, according to Khrystiuk, 'in view of those insinuations made all the time in the Black Guard press, that the Ukrainian movement and the Central Rada itself was working for foreign money.'²⁴⁴

France, through Tabouis and the American Consul in Kiev, had broached the matter of money but in neither case did the Ukrainian government take any action. The direct offer of France was made conditional upon the 'statement of needs' of the Ukrainian government, and as has been seen above, and is still to be discussed, the Ukrainian government refrained from doing this, and ignored the offer of money by France.

In many statements by various writers, including Kennan, as mentioned above, the receivers of any funds are described in a very hazy manner. Thus Kennan used the indefinite term 'Ukrainians', while the funds themselves are discussed in connection with the Republic, and are described as 'political subsidy'.²⁴⁵ The impression arises that the Ukrainian government had actually been receiving funds outright. Among the various references to the funds, there is not a single piece of evidence presented directly implicating the government.

The refusal by the Ukrainian government to accept foreign money is substantiated by its relations with the Central

Powers. There is no evidence at all in the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry that any money had changed hands between the Germans and the Ukrainian governments or the Secretariat and Committee of the Rada in the earlier period.²⁴⁶ The refusal was firm, and it was maintained in the darkest days of the Ukrainian Republic, in February 1918, when the Ukrainian government had evacuated Kiev and passed into the Right Ukraine. The Ukrainian delegation to the Brest-Litovsk Conference had on its own authority told an intermediary, Zaliznyak, to raise the matter of a loan to the Ukrainian government by Germany and Austria-Hungary. Kuelmann and Czernin, representing the two powers, were approached immediately after the signature of the peace treaty. According to Zaliznyak, the sum of one billion marks had been discussed. Both diplomats 'expressed their agreement in principle to the extension of a loan for the sum mentioned, with the usual interest, while the Ukrainian government could pay up this loan gradually or as a whole, in cash or in produce.'²⁴⁷ However, the Delegation did not wish to undertake responsibility for this step. When Holubovych, the Ukrainian Prime-Minister at the time, visited Brest-Litovsk, he was quite upset by the plan. His greatest fear was 'what would be said by the Russians and Jews when they found out that he had taken money from the Germans.'²⁴⁸

What does emerge from the sources is that some subsidies had been extended: just as had been stated by Shulhyn to Jenkins, these subsidies were given to various organizations in Ukraine, without involving the government. The evidence for this is quite flimsy but may be significant. The Soviet standard history of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (Bolsheviks), states that the 'French imperialists' supported the newspaper of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats *Robitnycha Hazeta*. The active members of the same party are said to have received 'imposing sums.'²⁴⁹ Khrystiuk, too, refers to subsidies given by the French. He claims in his memoirs that various Ententophiles had been receiving funds. In particular, he suggests that the French had given 10,000 rubles to the *Robitnycha Hazeta*,

through M. Porsh.²⁵⁰ It is surprising that Khrystiuk should have singled out Porsh, among all the Social-Democrats of consequence in Ukraine, Porsh had had the reputation of being least pro-Ally of all. Jenkins, the American Consul in Kiev, had an interview with Tabouis' chief-of-staff in Kiev, on January 5. The French official, referring to Porsh, observed to Jenkins that the French 'first impressions of the new war minister were not favorable from the point of view of the interests of the Allies, but that the conditions seemed to be changing and they had hopes of being able to work with Mr. Porsh.' Jenkins himself agreed, stating that in the resignation of Petlura (and the coming of Porsh) as war minister the 'position of the Allies has *not* been strengthened.'²⁵¹ It is highly unlikely that the Allies would have turned to Porsh, under the circumstances. It would seem that Khrystiuk, a member of the opposition party had allowed himself to be influenced by partisanship and gossip. Khrystiuk, and Kovalevsky also, claimed that Skoropadsky, the chief of the Free Cossacks, has also been given money by the Allies.²⁵² This may be gossip, as Khrystiuk and Kovalevsky were separated from Skoropadsky by politics, and distance as well. Khrystiuk concludes, however, that with Skoropadsky based at Zhmerynka, any Allied money or any German money had played 'no noticeable role in the mass Ukrainian movement.'²⁵³ Again, there had been a report in the German Embassy in Stockholm that the Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists were receiving Entente money.²⁵⁴ Kovalevsky states that the French did indeed support financially various organizations in Ukraine friendly to the Entente. Kovalevsky singles out in particular the Masonic Brotherhood of St. Andrew, which was formed in Kiev at the time; this society supported the accession of the Ukraine to the Entente alliance.²⁵⁵ Khrystiuk expresses the same supposition.

The Americans established the Kiev Branch of the Young Men's Christian Association. The Secretary of the Kiev Branch, Heald, was actively promoting the interests of democracy and of the Allies in Kiev, as is evidenced from his report, referred to above. It is significant that Heald did comment

on the military and political situation in Kiev, and that his letter had been forwarded to the American diplomatic service, and eventually wound up in Washington. Heald also kept in touch with various political circles in Kiev.

We have no evidence for any money of the Central Powers reaching the various organizations in the Ukraine. As mentioned above, Shulhyn had told Jenkins that the 'Austrians... were spending a great deal.'²⁵⁶ However, he failed to supply any details. Jenkins wrote in his first report that it had been 'reported but not confirmed, that the Rada was recently informed that Rs. 3,000,000 had been placed to its credit by Austria.'²⁵⁷ Another incredible rumour, especially in view of shortage of provisions in Austria-Hungary, was noted by Jenkins. Here 'one of the consuls, but a Russian subject' (probably Consul Balachowski of the French consulate in Kiev), had told Jenkins that 'he had heard from one of the employees of the General Secretariat that Austria had offered to help supply the people with food along the Ukrainian front,' while the Secretariat was reported to be rather 'embarrassed to know what to do about the offer.'²⁵⁸ Sometime later, again, Jenkins reported that the 'city was full of rumours of Austrian influence at work.' In fact, 'it is said that an Austrian General is stopping in this hotel, but I have not been able to see him.'²⁵⁹ To Jenkins' credit he did add to this story that 'it (was) probably untrue.' On the whole, it must be observed that neither Shulhyn nor Jenkins supplied any reasonable evidence on the rumours. However, it is easy to see how these two men, passionately devoted to the cause of democracy in the world war, could suspect Austrian money in the time when the decision was being reached in the Ukraine that it might have to make peace. This writer examined the German archives and failed to find any evidence that German money did in fact reach any organization in the Ukraine. The only proof bearing on the matter was the solitary request that the sum of 200,000 to 300,000 Marks be issued to the Ukrainian Social-Democrats in Kiev, who, according to the Soviet source, were also being financed by the 'French imperialists.' The request, as has been

mentioned above, had been presented by Zaliznyak, a Ukrainian emigré who had been acting on that of a member of the Austro-Hungarian delegation, Wassylko, the intermediary between the Ukrainian Delegation and the Central Powers. The request remained unanswered. Since all other money transactions are fully documented in the archives, it must be concluded that no money had in fact changed hands.'

As far as general estimates of the expenditures in the Ukraine were concerned, we find actual claims made for 50 million rubles, 7 million pounds and 180 million francs. All these sums are mentioned for the expenditures by France. There is no estimate at all given for the Central Powers, or for others. Kennan writes that the 'French agents actually turned over to the Ukrainians very sizeable sums of money, estimated to have amounted to something around 50 million rubles.'²⁰⁰ It is surprising that Kennan accepts the figure so uncritically. The source he supplies is the work by Sisson. Kennan definitely rejects the contention by Sisson that the Soviet of People's Commissars was in the pay of Germany, and implies that the documents used by Sisson in support of his view were forgeries planted on Sisson.²⁰¹ Sisson was in Petrograd in the period discussed, quite isolated from Kiev and the circumstances of Russo-Ukrainian hostilities. Franco-American relations were not overly close; in addition, Sisson's position on the outskirts of the diplomatic world could hardly allow him to receive any confidential information of a foreign power. It may well be that there is some truth in the contention of Sisson; but such must be taken with a grain of salt. The other two figures supplied refer to the same matter. The figure of 7 million pounds or 180 million francs appears in several Soviet sources, for instance in the Mayorov,²⁰² or Khvostov and Mints,²⁰³ and Belan.²⁰⁴ These simply state that France gave Ukraine that sum of money. Kennan, among non-Soviet historians, cites the figures from Khvostov and Mints without further comment.²⁰⁵ It was apparently lifted from a report of the *New York Times* which printed, from an 'authorized SOURCE' the news that France was immediately putting at the disposal of the

Ukraine the sum of 180 million francs' as the Allies considered that the restoration of the Russian State was impossible and that the Ukraine was an oasis in the revolution in Russia.²⁶⁶ This was perhaps the basis of a report in the *Manchester Guardian* which stated that France had loaned the Ukraine a sum of 7 million pounds.²⁶⁷ The loan referred to was a version of the offer of Tabouis of December 18, 1917 (the report appearing on December 20, in *The New York Times*).²⁶⁸ That particular matter had led nowhere, as on January 11, 1918, Tabouis repeated his proposal again; the matter was pending almost to the time of the conclusion of peace by the Ukraine, as is discussed below. It should also be pointed out that the original news report did not state that money had actually been given to the Ukraine, but that it was put at her disposal. The news report may have been the result of the eagerness of the Allied powers to court the Ukraine, and the genuine understanding of the position of the Ukraine in the matter. As the Ukraine did not reach an agreement on the loan at this time, the matter was allowed to fade away. There were no further 'authorized' announcements in the press on the matter of financial aid to the Ukraine. It must be concluded that no '180 million francs' or '7 million pounds' had been given to Ukraine. It is surprising to note that no other estimates had been supplied. The general conclusion is that while some money had indeed been spent in the Ukraine by foreign powers, some of it in legitimate undertakings such as possibly the Masonic Society, the Y.M.C.A. Branch, there is no definite evidence extant at this time that the sums were large, or that any of the money was spent in large-scale illegitimate fashion.

Sympathy with the Ukraine was not dampened by the despatch of the Note on Peace by the Ukrainian government of Brest-Litovsk expressing their readiness to take part in the peace settlement, though Shulhyn had stated on December 25, in the Rada that peace ought to be general, and that they could not welcome a peace prejudicial to the interests of the western democracies (French and other).²⁶⁹

In the meantime, Francis was under pressure to soften

the policy of non-recognition. On December 22, General Judson urged the establishment of 'helpful, friendly, sympathetic relations' with all existing *de facto* governments. This would presumably include the Ukrainian Republic. Judson also urged that the 'civil war' be discouraged and efforts to prolong war on the Eastern front be abandoned.²⁷⁰ While the recommendation for the recognition of governments other than the Bolshevik one was ignored, he thought that it was possible that in 'establishing relations with the Soviet Government' a less harsh peace would be obtained by Russia,²⁷¹ and inquired after the views of the Secretary on the manner. The suggestion was not taken up.

Despite the acceptance of the offer of participation by the Central Powers on December 26,²⁷² Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, declared on December 27 in the Chamber of Deputies that France's duty was to remain in contact with 'all ethnic groups with sentiments of independence and of loyalty, the instinct of legitimate defence, the need of order and of liberty'. Pichon's declaration was cheered in the Chamber.²⁷³ The same day, 'an official telegram confirmed by letter' informed Tabouis that France had decided to recognize the Ukraine. In the written notification Saint Aulaire stated that the Government of the Republic charged him to inform Tabouis that 'wishing to confirm its intentions in regard to the Ukraine', the Government was ready to name to the 'General Secretariat of that State', a Commissioner of the French Republic in the Ukraine, a function entrusted to Tabouis. In as much as this position, under the circumstances, must have an official character, Tabouis was to inform the General Secretariat that he was authorized to only begin diplomatic relations with the *de facto* representatives of authority ('les représentants actuels de l'autorité') in Kiev and that he was invested with the power to deal with French matter.²⁷⁴

It was probably a coincidence that Stalin, the Russian Nationalities' Commissar, protested against the Franco-Ukrainian cooperation in an article appearing in Pravda on December 28. However, Russia may have been consulted by France

in advance of the recognition, or it may have received the information through unofficial means. Commenting on this article, Noulens declared in a communiqué that France, in establishing relations with various nationalities making up part of the Russian State, was faithful to the principle of the right claimed by the Bolsheviks. Noulens was referring, of course, to the right of national self-determination proposed by the Russian government as the basis of peace and accepted by the Central Powers shortly before the invitation to the Ukrainian Republic. In further comment *Le Temps*, doubtlessly acting on instructions again, proclaimed that 'Russia was a diplomatic fiction'. The former (*ancien*) organization of the Russian State had foundered; the new one was still to be born. The French public was said to understand this truth and to be interested in the demands of the nationalities. In an effort to prepare public opinion, *Le Temps* stated that 'it would perhaps be well for Allied diplomacy to show officially that it too is interested in important problems,' which had been 'studied a great deal by the Germans and Austrians'.²⁷⁵

Instructions to Tabouis were to be issued by General Berthelot, his immediate superior in the military service. Tabouis received notification of this only three days after the original telegram of nomination was received; this points to a possible conflict between the French military and civil authorities regarding policy in Ukraine. The military seem to have kept the upper hand, though under a show of compromise.

Berthelot informed Tabouis that he had received a telegram from Paris that action in the Ukraine was placed under Berthelot's exclusive direction. General Tabouis would depend solely upon Berthelot's authority as Commissioner. The limitation on Berthelot was that all 'useful instructions' would be given after an understanding with Saint Aulaire as far as political questions were concerned.²⁷⁶

At the same time Saint Aulaire, Ambassador to Rumania, informed Tabouis of a telegram from Clemenceau, the President of the Council. The Allied Governments were in the process of examining the conditions upon which the Ukrainian

government was to be recognized by them officially. For the time being, Saint Aulaire was to tell the Ukrainian government that France, 'always faithful' to the rights which nations have to govern themselves, would whole-heartedly support the Ukrainian national movement and give it all the material help it could use, until the day that it should be officially recognized.²⁷⁷ On the same day, Saint Aulaire sent a letter of investiture to be presented to Ukrainian authorities by General Tabouis.²⁷⁸ The letter, dated December 29, 1917, and signed 'Saint Aulaire', read as follows:

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le gouvernement français vous a désigné comme Commissaire de la République française en Ukraine.

Je vous prie bien vouloir en informer le secrétaire général des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement Ukrainien, en remettant entre ses mains la présente lettre, qui vous accrédite en cette qualité.

Shulhyn, given the text of the telegram and later of the letter, had professed himself somewhat dissatisfied with the form of the recognition, and stated that he would have preferred an 'Ambassador to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic'. Tabouis held, on the other hand, that such a formula would imply that which France was not ready to accept. 'Ambassador' would imply an absolute independence, while the 'Government' and 'Republic' would constitute premature politics. Tabouis' interpretation of events was that 'the Ukraine existed, it was a fact', and that France, in placing there an Agent was recognizing it *de facto*. This would suffice for the time being.²⁷⁹

Vynnychenko, the Head of the Secretariat, announced the recognition of the Ukraine by France in the meeting of the Rada. He considered it a great event in Ukrainian history. He was too happy to see, he said, that 'France, the greatest power in the world, had recognized the right of self-determination of Russian nationalities.' For its part, the new country would make every effort to form in Russia a government capable of reaching a 'just and lasting peace in full agreement with her

Allies.¹²⁸⁰ Next day, *Le Temps* said that the declaration by Vynnychenko constituted 'a new hope for the Allies in the European East.'¹²⁸¹

Representatives of the Ukraine had gone in the meantime to Brest-Litovsk and had begun taking part in the Peace Conference. All this was disquieting to the Allies; thus when Tabouis saw Shulhyn on the first day of 1918, he asked, "Did we give in at Verdun in 1916? Or in 1917? Finally, Excellency, remember that the great future treaty will be to Brest-Litovsk what the treaty of Berlin was to San Stephano.... Further, when we have gathered together on a far-off day around the tragic green broadcloth, I would rather, because of the sympathy I bear your country, see you on my side of the table rather than the other." Shulhyn replied, "Que faire? Nous sommes épuisés."¹²⁸² However, he personally undertook not to conclude a separate peace while in office and in any case, to inform Tabouis before doing anything definite.¹²⁸³

France was obliged to yield, on January 3, 1918, to Ukrainian demands in the matter of recognition. Although Tabouis was still not styled 'Ambassador', the entity to which he was being accredited was described not as a rather indefinite 'Ukraine', but as the 'Ukrainian Republic'. The letter sent by Tabouis read:¹²⁸⁴

République Française

Le général commissaire de la République

Kiev, le 21 décembre 1917 / 3 janvier 1918

Le Général Tabouis, Commissaire de la République française auprès du Gouvernement de la République ukrainienne, à Monsieur le Secrétaire général des Affaires étrangères de la République ukrainienne.

Monsieur le Secrétaire général,

J'ai l'honneur, de vous prier de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement de la République ukrainienne que le Gouvernement de la République française m'a désigné comme commissaire de la République française auprès du Gouvernement de la République ukrainienne.

Je vous demanderai, en conséquence, de bien vouloir me faire savoir quel jour et à quelle heure je pourrai faire

au chef du Gouvernement ma visite solonelle de présentation officielle.

Veillez, Monsieur le Secrétaire général, agréer l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé) Tabouis.

Tabouis commented that he thus made the last *geste*, in declaring his status to Shulhyn and the various Consulates in Kiev. 'France had recognized the Ukraine first,' he wrote.²⁸⁵ The letter had been delivered by Colonel Denz, the French Military Attaché.²⁸⁶ Vynnychenko announced in the Rada to 'wild applause', according to him, that the French had accredited a representative to the Ukraine.²⁸⁷

The ceremony of recognition and establishment of relations took place the next day, in the office of the Presidency of the Rada. Tabouis was accompanied by Arquet, a vice-consul of France recently sent to Kiev, as well as by the military attachés. Representing the Ukraine were Vynnychenko, Shulhyn and others. Hrushevsky was not mentioned as being present. Tabouis stated to Vynnychenko that 'desiring to confirm its friendly intentions towards the Ukrainian Republic, the Government of the French Republic had informed him that it named him the representative of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Republic.' Tabouis then said that, having been over a year on Ukrainian territory, he had studied the history of the Ukraine, following the development of its national movement and the efforts to create the State. He was now proud to find that the Government of the French Republic approved his actions and authorized him to pursue officially the excellent relations which had already been established. He then gave 'the formal assurance that France, which was the first to undertake this decisive action (*geste*), would support with all its moral and material forces the Ukrainian Republic in its efforts to follow the example of the Allies. Vynnychenko replied that the Ukrainian people would fully appreciate the sympathy of France. Concerning the future, Vynnychenko stated quite coldly, in comparison to the statement of Tabouis, that 'the ideals for which French democracy has fought have

always been alive in the traditions of the Ukrainian people.' After the official ceremony, there was a conference between Tabouis, Vynnychenko and Shulhyn, on the 'question of peace'. It was agreed that both the Ukraine and France desired peace, but it must be 'a peace furnishing a guarantee of permanence'.²⁸⁸

Anglo-Ukrainian relations continued to grow stronger. A few days earlier, on December 27, the Rada hailed the publication of the Balfour Declaration,²⁸⁹ proclaiming that the establishment of a Jewish national state was a goal of war. The Ukraine thus gave moral support to the British policy, discomfiting Turkey. It must be pointed out however, that the main consideration appeared the expression of general Ukrainian sympathies to the Jewish national strivings. It was probably in the course of the continual debate on East-European policy in the Foreign Office, that a senior official, Sir G. R. Clark, drafted a memorandum on January 1 in which he asked how the British Government could support the governments in the South without provoking a rupture with the Petrograd government? How could they be certain that even if they did support those governments they would not be quickly swallowed up by Bolshevism? Lord Robert Cecil wrote in a minute to the memorandum, 'I think we must be prepared in the desperate position in South Russia to take risks.'²⁹⁰

Having recognized the Ukrainian Republic herself, France undertook a far-flung diplomatic campaign towards recognition of the Ukraine by the allies. She cabled London and Rome, 'suggesting or requesting concerted action,'²⁹¹ in the matter of recognition, as Noulens informed Francis on January 8. France also moved to urge the United States of America to recognize the Ukraine, on January 7.

Italy failed to take any action on Ukrainian statehood. It must be concluded that Great Britain, on the other hand, acting on the urging of France, did undertake decisive action. In view of close Anglo-French relations and the French initiative, any other course was unlikely. The British took the initiative, according to Shulhyn, 'two or three days' after the official visit of Tabouis.²⁹²

Picton Bagge, the former British Consul at Riga, was appointed as a representative by telegraphic communication from London. The exact date of the telegraph communication is not known.

The Consul General, Picton Bagge, described by Tabouis as a 'pleasant person with calm courage',²⁰³ representing Great Britain officially, presented his authorization to the post as Representative of Great Britain. The Foreign Office List mentioned that he was 'employed on special service at Kiev from January 17, 1918 to February 22, 1918' when ostensibly he 'left for England owing to the approach of the enemy forces'.²⁰⁴

Picton Bagge presented himself before the head of the Ukrainian Government 'two or three days after the reception of General Tabouis.' During the visit, Picton Bagge read a short statement; this statement, signed by him was presented to Shulhyn, the Foreign Secretary.²⁰⁵ The original language was French.

Représentant de la Grande-Bretagne Janvier 1918.

A Son Excellence le Président du Conseil des ministres de la République nationale ukrainienne

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique m'a nommé, par la voie télégraphique, a seule possible actuellement, représentant de la Grande-Bretagne en Ukraine.

Mon Gouvernement m'a chargé de vous donner l'assurance de sa bonne volonté. Il appuiera de toutes ses forces le Gouvernement ukrainien dans la tâche qu'il a entreprise de faire oeuvre de bon gouvernement, de maintenir l'ordre et de combattre les puissances centrales, ennemies de la démocratie et de l'humanité.

En ce qui me concerne en particulier, j'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Président, de vous donner l'assurance de mon entier concours pour la réalisation de notre idéal commun.

Picton Bagge,

Représentant de la Grande-Bretagne en Ukraine.²⁰⁶

In this manner *de facto* relations were established between Great Britain and the Ukrainian Republic. The British gov-

ernment promised to support the Ukrainian republic 'with all its forces'. It remained to be seen how the support would be made effective.

Picton Bagge had presented his accreditation in an audience with Vynnychenko, who greeted the representative in reply to the declaration. He professed himself pleased over the fact that Great Britain had appointed as its representative a diplomat who had spent many years in the Ukraine.²⁹⁷

Shulhyn wrote in his memoirs that relations with representatives of France and Great Britain 'se poursuivaient avec la plus grande cordialité'.²⁹⁸

As has been mentioned, France made a *démarche* with the U.S.A. over recognition of the Ukrainian Republic. Jusserand, the French Ambassador in Washington, sent a note to Lansing, the American Secretary of State, on January 7. He stated that his government had informed him that it was maintaining *de facto* relations with the Secretariat of the Rada of the Ukraine. These diplomatic relations were further accentuated by the appointment of General Tabouis as Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukraine. In view of the Austro-German activities at Kiev, the French Government saw that it could not defer taking a clearly defined attitude any longer. General Tabouis therefore, was instructed to notify the Ukraine that France was glad to actually recognize it as an independent government, and was inquiring whether the United States would be inclined to take a similar step.²⁹⁹ The American government made no immediate reply.

The wording of the note means the matter of the joint or individual recognition of the Ukrainian Republic was open. This was no doubt due to the fact that while France was 'allied' with Great Britain and Italy she was only 'associated' with the United States of America, according to the American thinking. The actual wording of the French notes to London and Rome is not known, unfortunately. At any rate, it must be concluded that it was French policy at this time to have the Ukrainian Republic recognized by the entire Entente, and thus to draw it conclusively into Allied relations.

The French exerted pressure not only on Washington, but also on the Embassy in Petrograd. Noulens mentioned the *démarche* to Great Britain and Italy, in speaking to Francis; in hinting at concerted action, the French were obviously provoking Francis to make up his own mind in regard to the Ukraine. Francis was quite impressed by the Ukrainian authority at this time; in reporting the Noulens' conversation, he said the 'Ukrainian delegation was admitted to a peace conference which (was) very significant.' Quite surprisingly, Francis shows an understanding uncommon among the Allied officials of the Ukrainian point of view vis-à-vis Russia. This indicated, he stated that the 'Soviet (was) abandoning the policy of all-Russian subjection.' Francis appears to have considered the Ukrainian-Russian conflict as the result of the Soviet policy of 'all-Russian subjection'. Reverting to the consideration of the military ends, Francis went on to say that he was 'beginning to think separate peace improbable, perhaps impossible.' Francis concluded by swinging over to approval of the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic.

...and inclined to recommend simultaneous recognition of Finland, Ukraine, Siberia, perhaps Don Cossacks Provinces and Soviets as *de facto* government of Petrograd, Moscow and vicinity.³⁰⁰

Jenkins had in the meantime felt quite isolated from it all, as he wrote the American Consul in Kiev, on January 2.³⁰¹ Summers did not reply to Jenkins or to any of his reports. It would appear that the Consul-General was not receptive to pro-Ukrainian overtures. Jenkins wrote in the seventh report a post-script for Summers, 'Up to this time I have not received any letters from you.'³⁰² This isolation would be felt by any experienced diplomat such as Jenkins to be a deliberate ignoring of the views expressed, and of policy suggested.

On January 2, Jenkins received a 'long code message' from the Embassy, at Petrograd; he could not 'do anything with it', and had to wire the Embassy in Petrograd that he had left the code with Summers. He also wrote to Summers that his code was on its way to Kiev.³⁰³ Actually, the code never ar-

rived in Kiev. The message had been a request for information, sent by Lansing on December 24.³⁰⁴

The recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by France had been made known to Jenkins by a letter from Tabouis, where the latter stated that the 'Government of France had designated me as commissioner of the French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic,' and that the Ukrainian Government had been informed of the appointment.³⁰⁵ Jenkins also indicated in his report to Summers that the 'general public regarded this appointment as recognition and the newspapers so declared'.³⁰⁶ He also concluded that the term 'Commissioner' instead of some more formal recognition was not intended.³⁰⁷

In his reports of January 5 and 9, Jenkins did not repeat his recommendation that the American government take some action in the Ukraine. This was no doubt due to the decision of the Ukrainian Republic to sue for peace and to take part in the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. Both Petlura, the Minister of the War, who shortly resigned, and Shulhyn were 'understood to be pro-Ally' and therefore opposed to complete independence of the Ukraine, which was favoured by the party with Austrian leanings. The Government, through the influence of Petlura and Shulhyn, was striving 'to do the good thing by the Ukraine, and the Allies, including all Russia', but a 'great mass of people are insisting on peace, independence, land confiscation, etc.' Jenkins concluded that if the Allies were to win the confidence of even the pro-Entente group, they 'would have to let it be known that no idea was entertained of forcing the Ukraine to continue fighting' after the Petrograd government concluded peace. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned 'the Ukrainians have little to fear', but it was feared that Germans would succeed in putting new life into them. The Ukrainian army was said to control the front.³⁰⁸

Jenkins' mission has been studied here in some detail as it throws a great deal of light on the Entente and, in particular, American policy in the Ukraine, as well as the Ukrainian attitude towards the Entente and the United States. In particular, the view that American policy was motivated by any desire to

"exploit" its natural resources cannot be supported by reference to the mission. It is significant that Jenkins was mainly interested in military and political affairs; economic matters were hardly mentioned. Only once were possible commercial advantages referred to, in connection with the need to counter German commercial penetration into Ukraine.

Jenkins wrote also to Francis, on January 8. Francis reported developments in Kiev to Lansing by telegraph. While describing the appointment of Tabouis as 'commissioner to the Ukrainian government', Francis disagreed with Jenkins' evaluation. 'Press generally considers such action recognition of Ukrainian republic,' he wrote, adding that the 'French Ambassador here concurs but said action was from Paris direct not through Petrograd.' According to Francis, although the British said that they 'had only a consular agent at Kiev,' Jenkins informed him that the British Consul General had been transferred there.

Lansing was also indirectly informed that Jenkins was in charge of the American consulate in Kiev. Francis said that together 'with other consuls Jenkins had received formal notice (of recognition) from the commissioner.'³⁰⁹

The American Consulate had actually been opened around January 5, 1918. Jenkins used the authorization given to him by Francis to open the consulate. The particular occasion was the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by France. This emerges from report No. 6 to Summers of January 5. The report is preceded by the heading 'American Consular Services' in the letterhead, followed by the address, 'Kiev', and the date.³¹⁰ Report No. 7 also has the heading 'American Consular Services'.³¹¹ Earlier reports did not have any letterheads but were described from Moscow as 'copy of a letter' or 'copy of a report' as the case might be.³¹² Under these circumstances, Jenkins reported (to Summers) that although he had not 'made any effort to meet Mr. Shulgin (Shulhyn), the minister of foreign affairs, 'it may become necessary to do so at any time.' Although the meeting would 'not be official' he feared 'it would get into newspapers' and might prove embarrassing

to American officials in their relations with the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, he might be able 'to arrange to meet (Shulhyn) quite privately at his home'.³¹³ Thus, the American Consulate in the Ukrainian Republic had in fact been opened; the Consulate remained operative from January 5 on, when the Republic had already proclaimed 'independence in international affairs' by the peace note of December 24, 1917. The American Consular Service had in fact been operative as an office, and not merely in the person of Jenkins. Jenkins reported, after closing the American Consular Service in Kiev, that in leaving Kiev, the 'American Consul burned all archives of any importance and turned over American interests to the Spanish Consul'.³¹⁴

Kennan ignores the establishment of the American Consular Services in Kiev at the time of its 'international independence' and of its full independence, a consulate with an official name, archives, protection and transfer of interests to a foreign power, Spain. Kennan commented on the status of Jenkins in this way:

(Jenkins) ... simply took up residence quietly in the city, as an unofficial American observer. It was his hope that he would soon receive some sort of instruction from Washington that would clarify his status. But none ever came. Fortunately, the strict instructions Jenkins had from Francis kept him from involving himself in that unhappy situation.³¹⁵

If it as Jenkins' hope that his status would be clarified from Washington, he fails to mention it. His status had been clearly defined for him by Francis: being excluded from recognizing any government, he was given 'discretion as to opening a consulate'.³¹⁶ While the opening of the consulate does not itself imply official relations, the act, under certain circumstances, such as recognition of the republic by other foreign powers, might well have been considered the opening gambit towards establishment of relations. In any case, the American presence in the Ukrainian Republic at least was hereby established. In conditions of revolution, the accumulation of precedents in such pedestrian matters as passports, permission to

stay, the matter of telephones, the use of the telegraph and so on, create serious problems which carry weight in the discussion of relations. This has been demonstrated very thoroughly by Kennan in a solid chapter in his study of Soviet-American relations on the 'First Problems of "Contact" with the Soviet Authorities', dealing basically with the secret meetings of Judson and Robins with Trotsky.³¹⁷ Shortly after opening the American Consular Service in Kiev, Jenkins was 'finally obliged to call on the Ukrainian Foreign Minister'. The object of the visit was to 'obtain permission to remain in the city.' The permission was granted.³¹⁸ Given the nature of the request, in view of Jenkins' position at the American Consulate, the visit demonstrated the existence of working relations between the Consulate and the Ukrainian Republic. The Consulate acquired a solid footing in its work of protecting its citizens, the transfer of information from Kiev to foreign powers and such like, while the Republic could also take advantage of the situation.

In this manner then, the Ukrainian Republic established consular relations with the United States of America, and gained the cautious approval of the American Ambassador in Petrograd, Francis, for its recognition of the United States. In Washington, the request of the great Associate Power of the United States of America, France, for Ukraine's recognition was pending, while President Wilson was drafting his program for the future. The situation was delicate but on the whole quite hopeful.

The French government, having sent the Allied and Associate Powers notification on January 7, marked time for three days, and on the evening of January 10, ordered Tabouis to get in touch with the Ukrainian authorities.³¹⁹

The next day, the French Commissioner-General sent a new note to the Ukrainian government. In it, Tabouis repeated the earlier offer of assistance of December 19. The Ukrainian Government was asked in a very friendly fashion ('j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir') to give its answer to the offer of assistance as soon as possible 'in view of the rapid

progress of events and to avoid all loss of time.' Most important, the note stated in a specially underlined passage.

Depuis cette date, la France est entrée en relations officielles avec l'Ukraine.³²⁰

Thus had France established relations with the Ukrainian Republic.

The recognition of the Ukraine was described by the British government as being *de facto*. On February 7, a month after the appointment of Picton Bagge, the British War Cabinet was considering instructions to Lockhart as the British representative to Petrograd. The Cabinet requested Balfour to prepare a draft of the instructions, which was approved by the Cabinet and sent to Petrograd. It stated that the British government was prepared to establish relations with the *de facto* Bolshevik Government at Petrograd, as 'we have done with the *de facto* Governments of the Ukraine, Finland and elsewhere.' The British Government could not be compelled to leave 'in the lurch our Allies and Friends in those parts of Russia where the *de facto* government' was not Bolshevik.³²¹ A similar instruction was sent to the British Minister at Jassy, to explain the British position to the Rumanian Government. The British Embassy in Washington was also told to inform the American government. In its memorandum to the Department of State issued on February 11, two days after the signature of the treaty of peace between Ukrainian Republic and the Central powers, the British Embassy announced that the British Government was beginning diplomatic relations with the Bolshevik government as it had done with the *de facto* Government of the Ukraine, Finland and elsewhere.³²²

Recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by the French Republic appears to have been *de facto* as well, although a higher level of relations is hinted at in the formulation of the note of January 11, 1918. Tabouis, the Commissioner, described the relations as being *de facto*, as mentioned above. The note of Jusserand, the French Ambassador in Washington, to the American Secretary of State, of January 7, 1918, al-

ready referred to, stated that the French Government was maintaining *de facto* relations, further accentuated by the appointment of Tabouis as 'Commissioner of the French Republic to that country', while it was now ready to recognize the Ukrainians' Government 'as independent government.'³²³ The American government interpreted the information as meaning that the French were 'pleased to recognize (the Ukrainian Government) in fact as an independent government.'³²⁴ *Le Temps*, as well referred to the recognition of 'Ukrainian power as *de facto* government and establishment of relations.'³²⁵

Thus, in view of the fact that the British and the French had described their recognition as being *de facto*, and were seconded in this by the American government, the evaluation of the matter by Reshetar, an American historian of the Ukrainian revolution, should be revised. Reshetar expressed a popular view on the matter. He wrote that:

Some of the leaders of the Rada, notably Vynnychenko and Shulgin, as well as Arnold Margolin, have insisted in their memoirs that 'Britain and France "recognized" the Ukrainian Republic and were morally as well as legally obligated to support it'. In claiming recognition, the Ukrainian spokesmen ignored the fact that in diplomatic practice the sending of a special representative to a newly established state 'does not necessarily imply even *de facto* recognition'. The British and French, as a result of their pre-World War I policy of rapprochement with Russia, found it difficult during the revolutionary period to 'conceive of a dismembered Russian state'.³²⁶

But the point is precisely that both the British and the French had come to believe, at this particular historical point, that Russia was a 'diplomatic fiction', in the words of the semi-official French newspaper. Reshetar also refers to certain more technical matters, such as a letter of credence. Here Reshetar appears to have overlooked the identical statements of both Picton Bagge and of Tabouis that their appointment had reached them by telegraph 'the only possible (means) at this time', as well as the fact that both representatives had presented themselves to the head of government. In any case, the

idea of a *de facto*, rather than full recognition, implies some imperfection in relations. Finally, it must be observed that in such a field as *de facto* relations and recognition, the disposition of the government granting it, and of associated governments will be decisive. In so far as the French, British and American governments considered the French and the British states to have given a *de facto* recognition to the Ukrainian state, their decision must be accepted as final.

Shulhyn agrees with this interpretation. Commenting on the official visit of Tabouis he wrote thus in his memoirs:

Des événements tragique suivrent en Ukraine, les gouvernements s'y succédèrent. La France a pu ne pas tenir compte de ces gouvernements successifs: la reconnaissance de l'Etat ukrainien demeurait un fait accompli. Et elle reste la preuve qu'aux yeux de Gouvernement français, l'Ukraine était en 1917 un Etat régulièrement organisé... L'exemple de la France fut suivi par l'Angleterre.³²⁷

Still in another study, Shulhyn states flatly that the Ukrainian government 'succeeded in being recognized by France... and by Great Britain.'³²⁸

Vynnychenko, too, concludes that 'Ukrainian statehood was officially and unequivocally recognized by these two most important states of the "Allies".' Indeed, he believed the fact that 'France, England and other states finally sent their official representatives to the Ukrainian National Republic',³²⁹ consummated, in the clearest possible manner, the independent statehood of the Ukraine.³³⁰ As pointed out by Reshetar, above, Margolin and other writers hold a similar opinion.

It is of interest to turn to the views of the foreign officials resident in the area at the time. Niessel, the former chief of Tabouis, in Petrograd at the time states that 'the autonomy of the Ukraine was recognized by us and General Tabouis was named Commissioner there.' Niessel also adds that his powers could not have had 'an official character since the Allies had not recognized' the autonomy. It would appear from this confused statement that France *did* recognize the Ukraine, but it lacked an 'official character' because of supposed lack of re-

cognition by other Allies.³³¹ The general appreciation of the situation by the French officials present in the Ukraine is evident from the memoirs of two officers in the French Military Mission. D'Aux, an officer in Kiev, held that the 'Ukraine had to constitute itself as a republic, and France sent a military attaché to Kiev, Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Republic.'³³² Sers, an officer of the French base in Lubny, near Kiev, present in Kiev in early 1918, expresses much the same thought:

Le gouvernement français n'hésite pas, il reconnut le gouvernement de la Rada et envoya auprès de lui un représentant, le général Tabouis.³³³

Borschak, still another historian, holds that it was in January 1918, that 'the official recognition of the Rada by France and England' took place.³³⁴ It is surprising to find that Komarnicki, a Polish historian who, in his study of the rebirth of Poland, thought that the Ukrainian government consisted of German 'puppets' agrees. He wrote that 'so far as the Ukraine was concerned the Allied Governments recognized the *de facto* Government of the Ukrainian Rada.'³³⁵

A similar view is expressed by Yakovliv, a constitutional historian. Yakovliv refers also to the recognition of the Ukraine by other powers, which is treated elsewhere in this study.

The actual existence of the sovereign, independent U. N. R. based on the constitution of III Universal and the exercise by the supreme power of its state functions, had led to acts of an international character which affirmed, in a *formal manner* full independence of the U. N. R. These were: recognition by the Soviet of People's Commissars of Russia of the independence of the U. N. R. and the proclamation of war against it, the official recognition of the U. N. R. by France and England and, finally, a similar recognition of the U. N. R. by the Central Powers and their associates: Bulgaria and Turkey.³³⁶

Reshetar's view is not uncommon today. Thus, Kennan ignores altogether the matter of recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by France and Great Britain, while he states that Tabouis was 'soon given the designation of "Commissioner of

French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic." '337 However, he thinks the real purpose for this was to enable 'French agents' to turn over 'to the Ukrainians very sizeable sums of money,' as Kennan observes that this was happening 'under the cover of this outward activity.'³³⁸ It is difficult to understand that it could seriously be held that France undertook the actions discussed above, actions which were to considerably embitter Russo-French relations for many years to come, simply to provide a cover for clandestine transference of funds.³³⁹ Ullman, the historian of British diplomacy in the Revolution unaccountably fails to mention the British recognition of the Ukraine. Carr, another British historian of the Revolution, mentions that the Ukraine was recognized by France, but dismisses the whole business with the observation that, when faced with the threat from Petrograd, the 'inherent tendency of the Ukrainian national movement, faced with superior Russian power, to place itself under foreign patronage was once more illustrated.'³⁴⁰ The case of the Ukraine is thus represented as a client-patron relationship and not the recognition of mutual rights and responsibilities, as is usual in inter-state relations.

A similarly careless discussion of the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic appears in a recent work devoted to the study of the diplomacy of the 'Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic' by Markus. In Markus' view, the relations of the Rada (Markus avoids the term 'Ukrainian Republic') with other nations 'did not have any international character', taking the truth of the statement for granted.³⁴¹ Markus' interpretation approaches that of the Soviet sources. The various documents referred to above are not discussed or even mentioned.

Soviet historians present a uniform picture of the evaluation of the relations of the Ukrainian Republic with the Allies and its recognition. Belan, a Soviet historian, discusses the relations as follows:

Imperialists of U. S. A., England and France had supported the Russian White Guards and the Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist counter-revolution from the first days of the

Great October Socialist revolution. The foreign imperialists saw as the power which they could use for the struggle with the Soviet power, the Central Rada, and with whose help they could count on making the Ukraine their colony. The Central Rada was given much financial aid, and the governments of France and the U. S. A. gave it diplomatic support and military advice.³¹²

The 'diplomatic support' was supposedly meant to make the Ukraine a colony and to use it against Soviet Russia and the Soviets. Suprunenko, a Soviet historian, agrees.

... Representatives of the government of England (Picton Bagge) and France (General Tabouis) declared that their governments recognized the Central Rada. For the establishment of contact with the counter-revolutionary Central Rada and for talks with it... Jenkins came to Kiev. The representative of France promised the Central Rada financial and military-technical "aid" which led to the serfdom of the Ukraine. The Central Rada in return, undertook to continue the war in the interests of the Entente.³¹³

A similar point of view is found in studies of Mayorov³¹⁴ and others, resulting in a uniformity of judgement. It should be noted that Soviet historians avoid the use of the term 'Ukrainian Republic', while granting the fact of recognition of the Ukraine by the Entente powers. Neither the French nor the British government rescinded the respective recognitions given to the Ukrainian Republic. The Ukraine was passing from the orbit of the powers of the Entente, which was of course the reason why their privileges were not exercised by the Allies. The fact of the Ukraine's existence could not be avoided in the succeeding months; however, re-established relations with the Ukraine through General Berthelot and his subordinates in the period of the weakening of the Central Powers took place rather easily. However, this is outside the period of formation of the Ukrainian Republic and cannot be considered here.

This time also saw the recognition by the Central Powers of the Ukrainian delegation at Brest-Litovsk as the representation of the 'independent Ukrainian National Republic'. Formal recognition of the Republic was to be given in the Treaty of

Peace. Trotsky, too, recognized the Ukrainian delegation as an independent representation, thus confirming the earlier declaration of the Russian Republic. These are treated in some detail elsewhere, and are mentioned here only in order to summarize the international status of the Ukrainian Republic.

It seems clear, therefore, that the Ukrainian Republic had been given a *de facto* recognition by both the French Republic and Great Britain. Recognition by the Government of People's Commissars was declared to be complete and unlimited, as is discussed elsewhere. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria had done the same. In other words, all Great Powers of Europe had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic by early January 1918. The United States had established consular relations, and the American Ambassador recommended American recognition of the Ukrainian Republic while Washington wavered.

NOTES

1. The data collected by the All-Russian Commission for the Preparation of the Elections to the Constituent Assembly gives the population of the nine Ukrainian gubernias, on April 1, 1917, as 29,337,700 persons, according to one set of figures, and 32,019,000 persons according to another; Sklyarenko, Ye. M., *Borot'ba trudyashchykhysya Ukrainy proty nimets'ko-avstriys'kykh okupantiv i het'manschyny v 1918 rotsi*, Kiev, 1960, p. 56n. It must be also realized that many persons had been mobilized; of these, probably the majority served outside the Ukrainian gubernias proper. Rubach concluded in his study that over 45% of male Ukrainians, of working age, had been mobilized. Thus, out of 791,964 working-age male Ukrainians in the Kiev gubernia, 337,285 had been mobilized; the corresponding figures for the Kharkiv gubernia were 705,343 and 337,285, of Chernyiv gubernia, 593,546 and 280,229, for 5 povits of Volhynia, 312,218 and 155,921; see Rubach, M. A., "Agrarnaya revolyutsiya na Ukraine v 1917 godu", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, Nos. 5-6, 1927, pp. 7-45, p. 18.
2. The data on the Ukrainian production may be consulted in: Dmytryshyn, Basil, *Moscow and the Ukraine 1918-1953. A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy*, New York, 1956, pp. 183-7, p. 192, and in: Borys, Jurij, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine. A Study in the Communist Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations*, Stockholm, 1960, pp. 53-5.
3. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
4. Luciani, Georges (ed.), *Le livre de la genèse du peuple ukrainien*, Paris, 1956; in particular, pp. 140-3.
5. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-50.
6. Further details on the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, which was hostile to the Central Powers, may be found in Doroshenko, Dmytro, *Z istorii ukrains'koj politychnoi dumky za chasyv suitovoi viyny*, Prague, 1936, pp. 49-87. The declaration of the Borot'ba was reprinted by the periodical of the Petrograd organization of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, *Nashe Zhyttya*, indicating thus the influence of the Yurkevych publication within the Russian Empire; for the text of the declaration see, Avdiyenko, M., "Lyutneva revo-

lyutsiya v Petrohradi i USDRP", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 1, pp. 226-234, p. 233.

7. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, p. 85-7. Vynnychenko wrote to Yurkevych on December 1, 1915, in part as follows: "We all (Ukrainian Social-Democrats) are on your side... In the Ukraine, the liberationists (Germanophile Union of Liberation of Ukraine) have absolutely no contacts... You have a somewhat incorrect view of the feelings of the middle-class Ukrainian groups. There is certainly no Russophilism... I have met only two Russian patriots from the great number of Ukrainians with whom I have had the opportunity to speak. Altogether, the mood is depression in Russia, and all dream of the end of the war. The word 'revolution' is on the lips of all."
8. The Germanophile Union of Liberation of Ukraine is further referred to below.
9. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
10. Petlura, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-7. For the letter to Nazaruk, see, *Ibid.*, pp. 188-9.
11. Doroshenko, Volodymyr, "Zhyttya i diyal'nist' Mykhayla Hrushevs'koho", in Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-30, pp. 17-18.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
13. Doroshenko, Dmytro, *Istoriya Ukrainy 1917 - 1923 rr.*, 2 Vols., 2nd ed., New York, 1954, Vol. I, p. 11.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 36n.
15. Doroshenko, Volodymyr, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
16. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 155.
17. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, u. 123.
18. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
19. Borschak, E., "La paix ukrainienne de Brest-Litovsk," *Le Monde Slave*, No. 4, 6th Year (Vol. II), pp. 48-9.
20. Paléologue, M., *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, 3 Vols., London, 1924, Vol. I, pp. 327-8.
21. Paléologue, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 276-8.
22. Romberg, the German Ambassador in Switzerland, stated on the basis of the reports of his informants in Paris, on August 1, 1917, that Pélissier had supported the 'nation' strongly. According to this information, Paris had been greatly worried about the strivings for 'separation'. Pélissier pointed out to the contrary that it was in order to gain influence upon these movements that one must look for contact with the Ukraine, so that the latter be not drawn into German arms. Romberg was further informed that Pélissier arrived together with Noulens in Petrograd,

- and that he would go on a special mission to Kiev. See, Auswaertiges Amt, Berlin, "Akta der Kaiserl. Deutschen Gesandtschaft zu Bern betreffend Stepankowski", Telegram from Romberg to Michaelis No. 2345 dated August 1, 1917, Frame No. L246675. See, also Borschak, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
 24. Auswaertiges Amt. Berlin, "Akta der Kaiserl. Deutschen Gesandtschaft zu Bern betreffend: Stepankowski", 1917, AS9474 dated November 3, 1917, (The report as micro-filmed bears the Frame Nos. L 247003-5).
 25. (Jean Pélissier), "La question Ukrainienne. De notre envoyé spécial. Kieff, 16 Aout 1917." *Ibid.*, Frame nos. L247121-5. J(ean) P(élissier), "En Russie. Interview de M. Vinnitchenko. Président du Secretariat - General de l'Ukraine. Kieff, le 1 Septembre 1917," in *Ibid.*, Frame Nos. L 247126-30.
 Jean Pélissier), "La question ukrainienne. De notre envoyé spécial Kieff, le 20 Aout 1917" Frame Nos. L 247219-2'. The report was published in *Est Républicain*, November 5, 1917.
 (Jean Pélissier), "L'IMBROGLIO UKRAINIEN. De notre envoyé spécial Kieff, 2 Septembre 1917," in *Ibid.*, Frame Nos. L 247226-9. The report was published in *Est Républicain*, November 7, 1917.
 (Jean Pélissier), "LE PATRIOTISME UKRAINIEN. De notre envoyé spécial. Kieff, Le 4 Septembre 1917," in *Ibid.*, Frame Nos. L 2472270-3. The report appeared in *Est Républicain*, November 22, 1917.
 (Jean Pélissier), "Toute l'Ukraine est autonomiste. De notre envoyé spécial. Kieff: Octobre 1917", in *Ibid.*, Frame Nos. L 247274-9. The report as published in *Est Républicain*, December 7, 1917.
 (Jean Pélissier), "A Travers la Russie. La Capitale de l'Ukraine. Comment on vit à Kiev pendant que la gêne alimentaire sévit à France Nos. L 247131-34.
 (Jean Pélissier), "Les affaires de Russie. CE QUE VEUT L'UKRAINE. Quelques illusions de l'Entente sur la Revolution russe. De notre envoyé spécial: Kieff... Octobre", in *Ibid.*, Frame Nos. L 247135-7. The report reached the German Embassy in Bern in November - December 1917. They show evidence of having been consulted by officials. There is no evidence, however, that they were forwarded to Berlin.
 26. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

27. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 157-8.
29. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 232.
30. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
31. Antonelli, Etienne, *La Russie bolchéviste*, Paris, 1919, p. 146.
32. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 321 Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 91-2.
33. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 133.
34. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 321.
35. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 158. Hrushevsky had also declared in the interview with *Le Journal de Russie* of October 19 that the Ukraine would be faithful to the Entente. See, Karpenko, O. Yu., *Imperialistychna interventsia na Ukraini 1918 - 1920*, Lviv, 1964, p. 60.
36. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
37. Niessel, Général, *Le Triomphe des Bolshéviki et la Paix de Brest-Litovsk. Souvenirs. 1917-1918*, Paris, 1940, pp. 18-9.
38. Part of the text of the letter is found in *Agence de Presse Russe (Berne)*, (*Service d'information*), October 1, 1917, p. 2, in *Auswaertiges Amt. Berlin*, "Akta der Kaiserl. Deutschen Gesandtschaft zu Bern betreffend: Stepankowski", 1917, Document dated October 1, 1917, Frame No. L 246922.
39. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
40. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 232.
41. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
42. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 232.
43. Svit, I., "Ukrain'ske viys'ko v Mandzurii," *Istorychnyi kalendar-almanakh Chervonoi Kalyny na 1937 rik*, 1936, pp. 115-22.
44. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
45. Noble, George Bernard, *Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919. Wilsonian Diplomacy, the Versailles Peace, and French Public Opinion*, New York, 1935, p. 37.
46. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 237.
47. Foch, F., *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la guerre*, 2 Vols., Paris, 1931, p. 225.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
49. Ullman, Richard. H., *Intervention and War (Anglo-Soviet Relations)*, Vol. I, Princeton, 1961, p. 42.
50. *Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin*, "Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (der Ukraine)", 1918, Document No. A 10024. The Rumanian policy expressed in the reply of the Rumanian Embassy to the Russian ultimatum in early Janu-

- ary was to initiate 'closer relations (with Ukraine and Caucasus)' in order to receive supplies due to them by earlier agreements with Russia see, *Ibid.*, 1918, Document No. zu A 8023, pp. 3-4.
51. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 238; also Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
 52. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
 53. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 238.
 54. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
 55. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
 56. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
 57. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
 58. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-8.
 59. *Ibid.*, p. 149; p. 150.
 60. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
 61. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-50. It should also be mentioned that it was stated in the meeting of the General Secretariat of November 17, 1917, that Tabouis showed considerable interest in the 'overthrow in the Ukraine, and greeted the federative Ukraine'; see Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
 63. Péliissier, J., *Ce que s'est passé en Ukraine — Justice au Garibaldi Ukrainien, Petlioura*, Lausanne, 1919, p. 4.
 64. Sers, Louis, "Un Parc d'aviation française en Russie bolcheviste, mars 1917 — mars 1918", *Revue des deux mondes*, Vol. XLVI, p. 790.
 65. d'Aux, R., "Un an en Ukraine", *Revue hebdomadaire, Nouvelle serie*, No. 37, Vol. XIV, p. 183.
 66. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
 67. Noulens, Joseph, *Mon Ambassade en Russie soviétique (1917-1919)*, 2 Vols., Paris, 1933, Vol. I, p. 239.
 68. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 233; Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
 69. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
 70. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
 71. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-3.
 72. *Ibid.*, pp. 243-4.
 73. Masaryk, T. G., *The Making of a State. Memoirs and Observations 1914-1918*, London. 1927, p. 182. See Za-vych. Iv., "Chuzhozemni viys'kovi formuvannya v ukrains'kiy derzhavi", *Istorychnyi kalyendar-almanakh Chervonoï Kalyny na 1939 rik*, v938, pp. 88-101. Also, see Karpenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-6.
 74. Nowak, Karl Friedrich, *Chaos*, Munich, 1923, p. 350.
 75. Steed, H. W., *Through Thirty Years 1892 - 1923*, 2 Vols., Garden City, 1924, Vol. II, pp. 125-6.

76. On editorship of *The New Europe*, see, Craig, C. A. and Gilbert, F., (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, Princeton, 1953, p. 26. For the text of the Third Universal see, *The New Europe. A Weekly Review of Foreign Politics*, Vol. V, 1918, pp. 309-312.
77. Stepankivsky, a Ukrainian in touch with Romberg, the German Ambassador in Switzerland, reported to the latter in reference to his stay in Great Britain between November 1917 and January 1918, that almost the entire contents of the magazine "The New Europe" was coming from the "Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office", Auswaertiges Amt, Abteilung A., Berlin, "Akten betreffend: Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (der Ukraine)", 1918, Document No. A 6597.
78. Fedorchuk, Ya., *Memorandum on the Ukrainian question*, London, 1914.
79. Toynbee, Arnold, *The New Europe. Some Essays in Reconstruction*, London, 1915, p. 75.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-4.
82. Namier states only that 'Ruthenians in the North-East (of Austria) would join their compatriots in the Russian Empire'; see, Namier, Lewis B., *Germany and Eastern Europe*, London, 1915, p. 126.
83. R. W. Seton-Watson mentions an anonymous Pan-German writer who, in 1895, suggested that 'a Kingdom of Ukraine' be formed; see Seton-Watson, R. W., *German, Slav and Magyar. A Study in the origins of the Great War*, London, 1916, p. 142. The Ukraine is referred to on the map of the Pan-German Plan as being part of the second state in the realization of the Plan; see *Ibid.*, p. 175. Seton-Watson states that the barrier to the *Drang nach Osten* had to include a Poland united with Russia, a strong Bohemia, a South Slav state, a small independent Hungary, a Greater Rumania, and Russia controlling Constantinople, while Ukrainians (or Ruthenians) in the Russian or the Austro-Hungarian Empire are not mentioned; see, *Ibid.*, pp. 173-6.
84. Lloyd George, D., *War Memoirs*, 6 Vols., London, 1928, Vol. V., p. 2552.
85. Ullman, Richard H., *Intervention and War*, Princeton, 1961, (*Anglo-Soviet Relations*, Vol. I), p. 50.
86. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 426.
87. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 92.
88. *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 98, col. 803, cited in Reshetar,

- John S., *The Ukrainian Revolution. A Study in Nationalism*, Princeton, 1952, 99n.
89. Berlin directed Romberg, on December 18, 1917, to continue to put at the disposition of the Swiss Ukrainian Bureau 5,000 Franks monthly; see, Auswaertiges Amt. Berlin, "Akta der Kaiserl. Deutschen Gesandtschaft zu Bern betreffend: Stepankowski", 1917, Frame No. L 247283.
 90. *Ibid.*, Frame No. L 247234.
 91. *Ibid.*, Frame No. L 247284.
 92. *Ibid.*, Frame No. L 247284.
 93. Steed, H. W. *Through Thirty Years, 1892-1923*, 2 Vols., Garden City, 1924, Vol. II, p. 115.
 94. Seymour wrote in regard to February 1918 that Wickham Steed was 'at this moment engaged in the vital work assisting the revolutionary movement among the Austrian Slavs'; see House, Col., E. M., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour*, 4 Vols., Bosts, (c. 1926) - 1928, Vol. III, p. 374.
 95. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A, Berlin, "Akten betreffend: Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (der Ukraine)," 1918, Document No. A6597.
 96. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
 97. Bertie, F. L. B., *The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame 1914-1918*, ed. by Lennox, A. G., 2 Vols., London, 1924, Vol. II, p. 227.
 98. Dickinson, G. L. (ed.) *Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims, December 1916 - November 1918*, New York, 1919, p. 84.
 99. United States of America, Department of State, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918. Russia*, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. I, p. 159. It should be noted that some support in the rise of the Republic was given by Ukrainians in the United States and in Canada. Thus, a Ukrainian Day was held in U.S.A. on April 24, 1917. Some funds were collected, see, Karpenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-2.
 100. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
 101. Kennan, G., *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920*, 2 Vols., Princeton, 1956-8, Vol. I, p. 170.
 102. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
 103. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
 104. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
 105. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
 106. Pershing, John J., *My Experiences in the World War*, London, 1931, p. 214.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
108. House, E. M., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour*, 4 Vols., Boston, (c. 1926). Vol. II, p. 234.
109. Kennan *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 168.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
114. Lansing, R., *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing*, London, (c. 1935), pp. 339-42.
115. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 158.
116. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
117. House, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 290.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 151. Reshetar discusses the meeting giving the incorrect date of 'mid-November', Reshetar, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
119. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 233-4.
120. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 430.
121. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 92.
122. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 430. The General Secretariat continued with the technical development of the plan, in case it was to be accepted. Thus, on December 14, it authorized the Secretary for Finances to 'develop the plan of financial operations between the Ukraine and France; see, Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
123. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 234.
124. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A, Berlin, "Akten betreffend Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Russlands", 1917, Document No. A 43082.
125. *L'Ukraine* (Lausanne), January 1, 1918, p. 4. See, Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin, Akten betreffend: "Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (der Ukraine)," 1918, Doc. No. A 6268. Also, Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
126. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
127. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
128. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A, Berlin, "Akten betreffend: Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Russlands", 1917, Doc. No. A 43397.
129. United States of America. Department of State, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 650.
130. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A, Berlin, *op. cit.*, Doc. No. 43397.
131. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

132. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 427-8; on Coanda's authorization see, Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 240.
133. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 174n.
134. Clark, Charles Upson, *Bessarabia. Russia and Rumania on the Black Sea*, New York, 1927, pp. 143-7.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
136. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-9.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
138. *Revolutsionnoye dvizheniye v Rossii v iyule 1917 g. Iyul'skiy krizis*, Moscow, 1959 (*Velikaya oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya. Dokumenty i materialy*), pp. 523-5.
139. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
140. Markus, V., *L'Ukraine Soviétique dans les Relations Internationales et son Statut en Droit International 1918-1923*, Paris, 1959, p. 158.
141. Further detail on Ukrainian-Rumanian relations is found in: Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A, Berlin, Akten betreffend: "Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (der Ukraine)", 1918, Doc. No. A 8028.
142. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
143. The conflict is discussed in great detail by Lloyd George in his war memoirs, cited above.
144. The conflict in policy is well covered in memoirs. See, Robertson, William, *Soldiers and Statesmen 1914-1918*, 2 Vols., London, 1928, Vol. II, 264ff.; Dewar, George A. B., *Sir Douglas Haig's Command December 19, 1915, to November 11, 1918*, 2 Vols., London, 1922, Vol. II, pp. 3-63; Lloyd George, D., *War Memoirs*, 6 Vols., London, 1938, Vol. IV, Vol. V; Callwell, S. E., *Field-Marshal Henry Wilson. Bart. G.C.B., F.S.O., His Life and Diaries*, 2 Vols., London, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 13ff.
145. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 2754.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 2706.
147. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 56n.
148. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
149. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-8.
150. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
152. Lloyd George, D., *War Memoirs*, 6 Vols., London 1933-6, Vol. V, p. 2572.
153. *Ibid.*, pp. 2572-3.
154. *Ibid.*, pp. 2573-8.
155. *Ibid.*, p. 2578. It should also be noted that a large British

- Economic Mission arrived to Kiev; its activity is unknown; see, Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
156. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
 157. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
 158. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A, Berlin, "Akten betreffend: Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Russlands", 1917, Doc. Nos. AS 4725, December 10, 1917.
 159. Department of State. United States of America, "Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1929", Document No. 861.00/1209. The report reached Washington on March 3, 1918.
 160. Kennan, George F., *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920*, 2 Vols., Princeton, 1956, Vol. I, p. 185. Kennan may have been misled by the fact that the official publication states that the report of E. T. Heald, Y.M.C.A. secretary at Kiev, was 'not found with the despatch where it had been referred to.' Department of State, United States of America, *Paper relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918. Russia*, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. II, p. 660n.
 161. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918. Russia*, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. II, pp. 649-50.
 162. *Ibid.*, pp. 650-1.
 163. *Ibid.*, pp. 651-2.
 164. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A, *op. cit.*, Document No. A 659/3094, p. 19.
 165. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
 166. Department of State. United States of America, Records of the Department of State relating to the internal affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1923, Document No. 861.00/1239, Report No. 4, dated December 30, 1917.
 167. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 238-9.
 168. Filasiewicz, S. (ed.), *La question polonaise pendant la guerre mondiale*, Paris, 1920 (*Recueil des Actes diplomatiques. Traités et Documents concernant la Pologne*, Vol. II), pp. 138-9.
 169. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-1.
 170. *Pravda*, December 15, 1917 (old style), Nr. 215 (146), p. 1. The telegram is quoted in the statement of the 'People's Commissar on Nationalities' Affairs I. Dzugashvili-Stalin' entitled 'Chto takoe Rada.'
 171. Lansing, R., *The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, 2 Vols., Wash-

- ington, 1938-40, (Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States.*), Vol. II, pp. 343-4.
172. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 176.
173. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
174. Lansing, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 345-6.
175. Department of State, United States of America, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 311-2.
176. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. "Akten betreffend: Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Russlands", 1918, Document No. A 659/3094, 'Funkspruch von Petersburg vom 19. 12. 1917', pp. 18-9; also see from Francis, 1917, Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 652-3.
177. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 64.
178. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
179. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
180. Lockhart, R. H. B., *Memoirs of a British Agent. Being an Account of the Author's Early Life in Many Lands and of his Official Mission to Moscow in 1918*, London, 1933, p. 222.
181. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 65.
182. *Ibid.*, p. 65n.
183. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
184. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
185. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
186. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
187. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
188. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
189. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
190. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
191. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
192. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 232-3. Also see, Tabouis, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-3; Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-2; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 234. The most complete text of the note appears in Vynnychenko and is given below.
- Mission Militaire Française en Russie. Front SO.
- Kiev, le 5/18 Décembre 1917.
- Texte des paroles adressées à Monsieur Vinnitchenko, Premier Secrétaire général de la République Ukrainienne, par le Général Tabouis de la Mission Militaire Française au front sud-ouest le 5/18 Décembre 1917.
- Les Puissances Alliés n'ont pas encore pris une décision officielle vis-à-vis de l'Ukraine, mais j'ai déjà été chargé de transmettre à M. Choulguine la sympathie des Alliés pour les efforts que fait le Gouvernement Ukrainien dans

le but de rétablir l'ordre, de reconstituer une force de résistance et rester fidèle aux Alliés. J'avais cru de mon devoir de ne pas attendre un Mandat officiel et de vous demander de m'entretenir avec vous, dans le but de ne pas perdre un temps précieux, de ne pas être pris au dépourvu si le moment venait d'agir, et par suite de préparer les matériaux d'une discussion éventuelle relativement au secours financiers et techniques que les Alliés pourraient fournir à l'Ukraine pour l'aider dans son oeuvre gigantesque d'organisation et de relèvement. Je suis heureux d'avoir pris cette initiative, car hier soir j'ai reçu ordre de de vous inviter, en vue d'une aide financière et technique que la France pourrait apporter à l'Ukraine, à préciser et à faire transmettre à l'ambassade de France au plus tôt, le programme que le Gouvernement Ukrainien pense réaliser et les besoins correspondants.

Par cette démarche que je fais, le premier, vous pouvez vous rendre compte que les sympathies de la France à votre endroit sont réelles et effectives.

TABOUIS.

It should be noted that the Secretariat had been discussing the offer of aid of the Entente powers the previous days; see, Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

193. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
194. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 2582-5. The memorandum is found in: Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1918. *Russia*, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. I, pp. 330-1.
195. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
196. Lloyd Georges, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 2585.
197. *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*. ed. by Woodward, E. L., and Butler, R., First Series, Vol. II, London, 1949, pp. 369-70. The text of the convention is given below.
Terms of the Convention agreed at Paris, dated the 23rd December, 1917.
 Present: M. Clemenceau, Président du Conseil; M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs; M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London; General Foch; M. de Margerie, Political Director, Foreign Office; Lord Milner; Lord Robert Cecil, Major-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh; Sir George Clerk; Lieutenant-Colonel Spears, Interpreter; Captain Kisch.

Convention entre la France et l'Angleterre au sujet de l'action dans la Russie méridionale.

1. L'action dirigée par la France se développe au nord de la mer Noire (contre l'ennemie).

L'action dirigée par l'Angleterre se développe au sud-est de la mer Noire (contre les Turcs).

2. Le Général Alexieff, à Novo-Tcherkask, ayant proposé l'exécution d'un programme visant l'organisation d'une armée destinée à tenir tête aux ennemis et ce programme ayant été adopté par la France, qui a loué à cet effet un crédit de cent millions et prescrit l'organisation d'un contrôle interallié, il y aura lieu de continuer l'exécution du dit programme jusqu'à ce que nouvelles dispositions soient arrêtées de concert avec l'Angleterre.

3. Cette réserve admise, les zones d'influence affectées à chacun des Gouvernements seront les suivantes:

Zone anglaise: territoires cosaque, territoire du Caucase, Arménie, Géorgie, Kurdistan.

Zone française: Bessarabie, Ukraine, Crimée.

4. Les dépenses seraient mises en commun et réglées par un organe centralisateur interallié.

It should also be mentioned that an English translation of the convention is found in: Fisher, Louis, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, 2 Vols., London, 1930, Vol. II, p. 836.

198. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 55n.

199. *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, Series I, Vol. III, p. 367.

200. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 330.

201. *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, Series I, Vol. III, pp. 372-3.

202. *Ibid.*, p. 367.

203. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

204. Volkov, F. D., *Krakh angliyskoy politiki interventsii i diplomaticheskoy izolyatsii sovetskogo gosudarstva* (1917-1924 g.), Moscow, 1954, pp. 30-2. The work by Nayda should also be mentioned. Nayda, S. F. et al., *Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1957.

205. Shtein, B. E., "Russkiy vopros" na parizhskoy konferentsii (1919-1920), Moscow, 1949, pp. 19-20.

206. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-22; Volkov, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-2.

207. Berezkin, A., *S.Sh.A. — aktivnyi organizator i uchastnik voennoy interventsii protiv sovetskoy Rossii* (1918-1920 gg.), 2nd ed., Moscow, 1952, p. 23.

208. Trukhanovskiy, V. G., *Vneshnyaya polityka Anglii na pervom etape obshchego krizisa kapitalizma*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 53-56.
209. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
210. Strakhovsky, L., "The Franco-British Plot to Dismember Russia," *Current History*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 539.
211. Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 180n.
212. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
213. Kennan holds that the agreement put the two signatories into a position similar to that of Wilson and Lansing towards Kaledin, see *Ibid.*, p. 179. The latter had been presented in the telegram from Washington to Crosby, as discussed above.
214. Denikin's conclusions are cited in Shtein, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
215. Fisher, L., *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Abridged ed., New York, 1960, p. 20. There is no evidence at all of any agreement between the Allies and the Central Powers on the convention. The parts of the archives of the German Foreign Office pertaining to the time and place, which were examined by the present writer contained no evidence, pointing to any agreement between the belligerents on this issue.
216. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
217. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 3168.
218. *Ibid.*, pp. 3170-1; Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
219. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 3171.
220. Callwell, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 47.
221. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
222. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 154; pp. 152-3. For the editorial of *Le Temps*, see: Borschak, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-1.
223. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
224. Noulens, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 241.
225. Belan, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
226. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 180.
227. Department of State. United States of America, "Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910 - 1929," Doc. No. 861.00/1239, Report No. 1, dated December 22, 1917.
228. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 180.
229. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
230. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
231. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Report No. 1, dated December 22, 1917.
232. *Ibid.*, Report No. 2, dated December 24, 1917.

233. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1918. Russia, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. I, p. 320.
234. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 183-6.
235. The reports contain personal impressions of Jenkins, as well as certain documentary material.
236. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 183.
237. Department of State. United States of America, "Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1929", Document No. 861.00/1239, Report No. 2, dated December 24, 1917.
238. *Ibid.*, Report No. 1, dated December 22, 1917.
239. *Ibid.*, Report No. 1, dated December 22, 1917.
240. *Ibid.*, Report No. 2, dated December 24, 1917.
241. *Ibid.*, Report No. 2, dated December 24, 1917.
242. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 185n.
243. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
244. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 123. Apparently a draft for 100,000 rubles had been issued by the Mechanic Metal Bank of New York, in August 1917 to Hrushevsky in connection with the matter; see, Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
245. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 184.
246. This point is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six.
247. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 333.
248. *Ibid.*, p. 333.
249. Nazarenko, I. D. (ed.), *Narysy istorii komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1961, p. 68.
250. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 92.
251. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Report No. 6, dated January 5, 1918.
252. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 92n; Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 427. It should be noted that Skoropadsky states in his memoirs that Tabouis and others were not willing to cooperate with him; see, Skoropads'kyi, Pavlo, "Uryvok zi "Spomyniv" Het'mana Pavla Skoropads'koho," *Khliborob-s'ka Ukraina*, Vol. V, 1924-1925, pp. 35ff.
253. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 92n.
254. Fedyshyn, O. S., "German Plans and Policies in the Ukraine and the Crimea 1917-1918," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1962, p. 35.
255. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 426; Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 92n.
256. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Report No. 2, dated December 24, 1917.

257. *Ibid.*, Report No. 1, dated December 22, 1917.
258. *Ibid.*, Report No. 4, dated January 4, 1918.
259. *Ibid.*, Report No. 5, dated January 2, 1918.
260. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 184.
261. *Ibid.*, pp. 441ff.
262. Mayorov, S. M., *Bor'ba Sovetskoy Rossii za vykhod iz imperialisticheskoy voyny*, Moscow, 1959, p. 138.
263. Cited in Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 184n.
264. Belan, Yu. Ya., *Otechestvennaya voyna ukrainskogo naroda protiv nemetskikh okkupantov v 1918 godu*, Kiev, 1960, p. 39.
265. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 184n.
266. Borschak, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.
267. Likholat, A. V., *Rozgrom natsionalisticheskoy kontrrevolyutsii na Ukraine (1917-1922)*, Moscow, 1954, p. 55.
268. Borschak, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.
269. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Report No. 3, dated December 28, 1917. The Note on Peace is discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
270. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 231.
271. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
272. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A, Berlin, "Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Russlands", 1918, Document No. A 659/3094, pp. 23-4.
273. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
274. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-3.
275. Borschak, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-2. The reference to the article by Stalin is found in note 86 above.
276. *Ibid.*, p. 74. The text of the telegram is given below.
Mission militaire française en Russie. Front Sud-Ouest. Kiev. Télégram no 85 expédié le 16/29 décembre 1917 de Jassy à 23 h. 30, reçu le 17/30 décembre 1917 à 20 heures. Général Berthelot à général Tabouis.
Je reçois du gouvernement française Paris télégramme suivant:
1) Action en Ukraine est placée sous votre direction exclusive. Général Tabouis relève seulement de votre autorité.
2) En conséquence cet officier général est désigné comme commissaire de la République en Ukraine.
3) Toutes instructions utiles seront données par vos soins après entente avec M. de Saint-Aulaire pur ce qui concerne la question politique. (Signé): Berthelot.
277. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-5.

278. League of Nations. Secretary General, *Application of the Ukrainian Republic for Admission to the League of Nations*, Annex VIII, (League of Nations Assembly Document 88), see also Margolin, A. D., *From a Political Diary*, New York, 1946, p. 182; also cited by Jenkins in his report, Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Report No. 6 of January 5, 1948; Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 171. It may be that French aid to the Ukraine was discussed in connection with this initiative. At any rate, it was mentioned in the meeting of the General Secretariat on December 29, that France was offering the Ukraine credits to the amount of 500 million Francs; see Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
279. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
280. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
281. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
282. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
283. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
284. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 235. See also, League of Nations. Secretary General, *op. cit.*, Annex VIII, pp. 19-20; Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 172; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 236.
285. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
286. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Report No. 6 of January 5, 1918.
287. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 200-1.
288. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-5; Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
289. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
290. Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
291. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1918. Russia. 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. I, pp. 335-6.
292. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
293. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
294. *The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and Consular Year Book for 1919*, London, p. 248, quoted in Reshetar, J. S., *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920. A Study in Nationalism*, Princeton, 1952, p. 99n.
295. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-6.
296. *Ibid.*, p. 176. Also see Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 241-2; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 235; League of Nations. Secretary General, *op. cit.*, Annex VIII, p. 20. There are minor variations. The text supplied by Shulhyn contains the date of 'Janvier 1918,' the League of Nations document reads only 'Janvier,' while other sources fail to give any date. The oral statement of Tabouis, and the text supplied

to Shulhyn appears to have been in French. However, there is a text in English. The more important variation in the text is in the definition of the office given in the letterhead 'Office of the British Representative', while the description of the Ukraine as 'National Ukrainian Republic' is noteworthy. The English text appears to be a translation made in 1920. The complete text reads as follows.

Office of the British Representative. January.
To His Excellency, the President of the Council of Ministers of the National Ukrainian Republic.
Your Excellency,

I have the honor to inform you that His Britannic Majesty's Government has appointed me by cable as the representative at present of Great Britain in Ukrainia. I am directed by my government to assure you of its goodwill. It will support the Ukrainian Government to the utmost of its ability, in the task which it has undertaken of establishing good government, maintaining order, and resisting the Central Powers, who are enemies of Democracy and Humanity.

As far, as I, personally, am concerned, I have the honour to assure Your excellency of my wholehearted support in the realization of our common ideal.

(Signed) PICTON BAGGE, British Representative in Ukrainia.

Certified True Copy. London, October 19th, 1920. NDISH-NITZ.

297. Bund (Bern), February 14, 1918. See, Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin, "Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (der Ukraine)", 1918, Document No. A 7656.
298. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 176. It should be noted that Bratianu, Premier of Rumania, had expressed willingness to recognize Ukraine; see, Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
299. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 665.
300. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 335-6
301. Department of State. United States of America, "Records of the Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1929", Document No. 861.00/1239. Report No. 5, dated January 2, 1918.
302. *Ibid.*, Report No. 7, dated January 9, 1918.
303. *Ibid.*, Report No. 5, dated January 2, 1918.
304. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers*

- relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918. Russia. 3 Vols., Vol. I, p. 324.
305. Department of State. United States of America, "Records of the Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1929", Document No. 861.00/1239, Report No. 6, dated January 5, 1918.
306. *Ibid.*, Report No. 6, dated January 5, 1918.
307. *Ibid.*, Report No. 6, dated January 5, 1918.
308. *Ibid.*, Report No. 5, dated January 2, 1918.
309. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1918. Russia. 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. II, pp. 656-7.
310. Department of State. United States of America, Records of the Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1929", Document No. 861.00/1239, Report No. 6, dated January 5, 1918.
311. *Ibid.*, Report No. 7, dated January 9, 1918.
312. *Ibid.*, Reports Nos. 3, 4.
313. *Ibid.*, Report No. 6, dated January 5, 1918.
314. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1918. Russia, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. II, p. 674.
315. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 184.
316. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 650.
317. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 99-130.
318. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
319. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
320. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 237-9. See also League of Nations. Secretary-General, *op. cit.*, *Annex VIII*, p. 83; Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 177. The most complete form of the not appears in Vynnychenko, is given below.
- Le Général Commissaire de la République.
Nr. 11. République Française
Kiev, le 29/11 Janvier 1918.
- Le Général Tabouis, Commissaire de la République Française auprès du Gouvernement de la République Ukrainienne, à Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères de Gouvernement de la République Ukrainienne.
- Le 5/19 décembre, dans une entrevue à laquelle assistaient M. Vinnitchenko, Président du Conseil, et les Secrétaires d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères, aux Finances, au Revitail-

lement, aux Voies et Communications, à la Justice, j'ai eu l'honneur de présenter la demande suivante:

"Monsieur le président du Conseil,

"Désirant confirmer ses intentions amicales envers la République de l'Ukraine, le gouvernement de la République française m'a fait savoir par télégraphe (le sur moyen de communication existant actuellement) qu'il me nommait représentant de la République française auprès du gouvernement de la République de l'Ukraine.

"Voici bientôt un an que je me trouve sur la territoire de l'Ukraine. Pendant ce temps, j'ai l'occasion d'étudier l'histoire de l'ancienne Ukraine, j'ai suivi avec attention le développement de son mouvement national et j'ai pu constater les efforts accomplis par la République de l'Ukraine dans le but de créer et d'établir les forces morales et physique nécessaires à l'organisation d'un Etat. Tout cela, je l'ai suivi avec un intérêt toujours croissant et je suis heureux et fier, Monsieur le président, de voir qu'aujourd'hui cet intérêt n'est pas seulement personnel, car en me nommant son représentant, le gouvernement de la République française approuve ma manière d'agir et m'autorise à poursuivre officiellement les excellentes relations qui se sont déjà établies entre nous. Je vous apporte l'assurance formelle que la France, qui est la première à faire ce geste décisif, soutiendra de toutes ses forces morales et matérielles la République de l'Ukraine dans les efforts qu'elle accomplira pour continuer à marcher dans la voie que se sont tracée les Alliés et qu'ils poursuivront sans hésitation à l'avenir en pleine connaissance de leurs droits et de leurs devoirs, devant la démocratie du monde entière et de l'humanité.

"Personnellement, je me consacrerai à cette tâche avec toute l'énergie d'un soldat et avec le coeur d'un Français."

Depuis cette date, la France est entrée en relations officielles avec l'Ukraine. Vu la marche rapide des événements et pour éviter toute perte de temps, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir me faire tenir cette réponse aussitôt que possible.

TABOUIS.

321. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 73.

322. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 379.

323. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 655.

324. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 655.

- 325. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
- 326. Reshetar, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
- 327. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
- 328. Shulhyn (Choulguine), Alexandre, *L'Ukraine et le cauchemar rouge: les massacres en Ukraine*, Paris, 1927, p. 28.
- 329. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 243.
- 330. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
- 331. Niessel, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
- 332. d'Aux, *op. cit.*, p. 184.
- 333. Sers. *op. cit.*, p. 788.
- 334. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
- 335. Komarnicki, Titus, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic. A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe. 1914-1920*, London, 1957, p. 198.
- 336. Yakovliv, Andriy, *Osnovy konstitutsii U.N.R.*, 2nd ed., New York, 1964, p. 16.
- 337. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 184.
- 338. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
- 339. Subsidies to dissident elements or to rival governments are common practice, and are usually unaccompanied by any 'recognition'.
- 341. Markus, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
- 342. Belan, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
- 343. Nazarenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-9.
- 344. Mayorov, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

CHAPTER SIX

RECOGNITION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC BY THE SOVIET RUSSIA, AND THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR

Relations between the Russian Bolshevik government and the government of the Ukrainian Republic were established in direct-wire negotiations between Porsh, Secretary of Labour, and Stalin, who said that he spoke 'on behalf of the government of the Soviet of People's Commissars'. The negotiations were held on November 30, 1917.

It appears to be the consequence of the elections and the succeeding demonstration of stability of the Ukrainian Republic, that the Russian government was obliged to break its silence towards the Ukrainian Republic on November 30, and to enter into discussions on matters concerning the entire Ukraine, thus giving implicit recognition to the fact that the Ukrainian Government could indeed be considered as being the effective government in the territory of the Ukraine.

The main significance of the discussion lay however, in the presentation by Petrograd of the demand for the calling of a Congress of Soviets in Ukraine. The initiative for this Congress had thus come primarily from Petrograd and in fact had constituted an external interference in the affairs of the Ukrainian Republic. The South-Western Oblast Committee of the Bolshevik Party had called for the Congress of the Oblast Soviets, as an immediate objective.¹ Still before the proclamation of the Ukrainian Republic, on November 16, the Bolshevik group had called for such a congress.² A meeting of deputies of Soviets of Kiev obviously packed with Bolshevik supporters (through representation of the Factory-Works Committees

and other familiar organizations), recognizing the Central Rada as the power in Ukraine, decided that the Rada should be reconstructed by an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets.³ The situation seems to have changed radically with the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic. The decisions of the meeting were silently ignored by all, while it was held that a decision on the power would be reached after the election of a new, and united, Executive Committee of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The elections of the Executive Committee, elected by deputies of the various soldiers and workers' soviets was decided on by the Soldiers' Rada and the Workers' Soviet, headed by Bolsheviks. The deputies, presumably under the instructions of their electorate, were told by the Soviets to vote for the united Executive Committee.

The elections gave the majority to anti-Bolshevik parties, 37 deputies of 60 belonging to parties loyal to the Republic, while 23 deputies were Bolsheviks.⁴ The new Executive Committee held a meeting in which Hryhoryiv, a Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary, and a forthright supporter of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly as the final unreconstructed body, was elected Chairman. In the contest, he received 30 votes, while the Bolshevik Ivanov got 21.⁵ The Committee rejected the Bolshevik motion that the Committee take power in the city. Thus it was plain on November 28, that the initiative for the calling of any Soviet Congress would not come from the United Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Thereupon, the Bolshevik deputies called for a general meeting of this combined body.⁶ The express purpose of the meeting was 'final decision of the question of the political position of the Soviets'; it was held three days later. The tone of the meeting was made immediately plain through the election of the same Hryhoryiv as Chairman. Ivanov then demanded that the meeting be proclaimed incapable of deciding the problem of the organization of the power as, in his view, 'very few workers' deputies had gathered for it'. All the non-Bolshevik fractions of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies announced that in their opinion the meeting was entirely capable of forming

decisions (*pravomochnoe*). The Bolshevik fraction of the Soldiers' Rada expressed their support for the Bolshevik motion, but it was rejected. The Bolsheviks then left the hall, never to return to a regularly constituted Soviet in this period. The united Soviet, in the absence of the Bolsheviks, proceeded to decisions on the power. On the question of the 'power in the Ukrainian National Republic', it was decided that the Central Rada and a General Secretariat possessed that power, until the calling of the 'All-Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, which will be the supreme agent of the will of nations of the Republic.' Thus, the calling of any Congress of Soviets was rejected, while the Kiev Soviets proclaimed their allegiance to the Republic and its institutions.

However, the Kiev Bolsheviks requested the support of the government of the Russian Republic; this profoundly transformed the question of the calling of the Congress. On the one hand, the pressure of the Russian Republic was brought to bear upon the Ukraine, on the other hand, the passing of the initiative to Petrograd made the Kiev Bolsheviks lose the control of proceedings and opened the way to direct interference by Russia in Ukrainian affairs.

Two days after the election of Hryhoryiv as chairman of the Executive Committee, Bakinskiy, on behalf of the South-Western Oblast Committee of Bolsheviks, and Porsh, Secretary of Labour of the government of Republic, held negotiations with Stalin, who stated that he was the 'representative of the Government of the Soviet of People's Commissars'. Bakinskiy stated that the Bolsheviks desired the calling of the Oblast Congress of Workers and Soldiers (not peasants) in the immediate future, as well as an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. While not rejecting outright the idea of calling the Oblast Congress, Stalin directed Bakinskiy to summon a Land Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. 'The supremacy of the Soviets must be accepted in all localities', he stated. This was a 'revolution commandment' which could not be attained.

Stalin underlined the fact that the Congress was to be of

an All-Ukrainian nature. 'Kievites, Odessites, Kharkivites, Katerynoslavites and others' were to take part in this Congress. This was directed against the particularist strivings of the three Oblast Committees, and was at variance with the sanction to the Kharkiv Bolsheviks, still probably valid, of the formation of the Republic of the Donets Basin and Kryvyi Rih."

Stalin stated to Porsh (whom he termed 'Comrade') on behalf of the Soviet Government that it recognized the right of full self-determination, including right of separation and formation of an independent state. Such aims could be expressed either through referendums or through 'Constituent Assemblies'. This in fact constituted the recognition of the authority of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly to decide on the final disposition of the Ukraine. If the will of the nation was to express itself for a federal republic, the (Soviet) government would not say anything against it. This constituted a certain defeat for the view of Lenin, who had held that a federal republic was not a desirable form.

While thus endorsing the Constituent Assembly, Stalin stated at the same time that the power 'in the Land' (meaning obviously the Ukraine of the Provisional Instruction), and 'in other oblasts' was to belong to the 'sum total of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies, including also the organizations of the Rada'. There was a wide area of agreement in this field 'between the Central Rada and the Soviet of People's Commissars'. Stalin stated to Porsh that a conference between the representatives of the Central Rada and the People's Commissars was expedient, on these matters, which after all affected the Ukraine as a whole. The Soviet Government was stating that it was ready to enter into negotiations with the Rada, which showed that it considered the Rada as representative of the Ukraine as such. In view of this position (on other matters discussed) Stalin inquired whether 'The Soviet of People's Commissars could count on the friendship (*sodruzhestvo*) of the Central Rada'. In the course of the discussions, Porsh stated that he could present his personal view, and emphasized that he was on the Central Committee of the

U.S.D.W.P. and was a member of the Secretariat. In the matter of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets', Porsh said that the institution of elections for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly made such a Congress superfluous; this congress would hinder the work of the General Secretariat and the task of a quick realization of the social-economic reforms indicated in the Universal. Porsh further stated that 'the Central Rada is the Soviet of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies' in its composition, which have been elected in the Congresses of peasants, workers and soldiers. This interpretation ignored the facts of development of the Rada, its membership of cultural groups, of national minorities, or political parties, and the very basis of the attempt to organize the Rada as the representative of all groups of the population of the Ukraine.

The discussions between Stalin and Porsh also dealt with the formation of the central power; Ukrainian wishes were ignored entirely in this matter. Stalin simply informed him that a new government consisting of Bolsheviks and (Russian) Left Socialist-Revolutionaries had been formed.

Still another matter of consequence to the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic was raised by Stalin. Porsh was told that the 'Petrograd section of the Central Rada' had been given 'national Ukrainian reliquiae—flags and others, taken from Ukrainians in the epoch of Catherine II'. There were to be returned to the Ukraine. The transfer of reliquiae took place 'in agreement with the Soviet of People's Commissars'. This was a rather significant statement, indicating that the Russian Government was willing to treat with the Ukrainian Republic, and with the Rada as the representative of the Ukrainian nation. The symbolic act of the return of national insignia by the Russian Government to the Ukrainian Central Rada (which, incidentally, did not take place despite the statement by Stalin) pointed again towards recognition.

The matter of the transference of the insignia into the hands of the representatives of the Ukrainian government was being drawn out, however, thus procrastinating further the practical contact between the Ukrainian Republic and the

Bolshevik Government. The matter was finally dealt with on December 7, in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, on the proposition of the People's Commissar of Education. The Committee decided to realize the transfer of insignia in the 'solemn form of a national holiday in front of the Preobrazhenskiy Cathedral with armed units taking part'. The insignia would be transferred with a declaration signed by the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Sverdlov, and the Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars. The recipients were described by the indefinite name 'Ukrainians'. The declaration addressed to 'brother-Ukrainians' was to state that the flags, cannons and the *bulava* (symbol of hetman authority) held in Petrograd were testifying to the oppression of the Ukrainians in the name of Great-Russians. There were no longer oppressed nations in the free Russia. 'The Great-Russian people and revolutionary Petersburg sent the holy gift to free Kiev, with a greeting in the name of fraternity of nations. . . . Let the fraternal union of the free nations of Russia and the whole world be glorified and be strengthened.'⁹

On the same day that the Committee reached this decision, Trotsky, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued the order to the Commander-in-Chief, Krylenko, on behalf of the Soviet of People's Commissars, stating, among other things that, 'we approve fully' the policy of Krylenko for allowing Ukrainian soldiers to the southern part of the front. Toiling 'Ukrainian masses must understand,' stated Trotsky, through the deeds of the Soviet that the 'Common-Russian' Soviet power shall not raise any difficulty with the self-determination of Ukraine, in whatever form this self-determination would take. 'The recognition of the national Ukrainian Republic on the part of the Russian power is fully complete.'¹⁰ This then was the first outright statement of recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic, though it took such a roundabout way.

The Kiev Bolsheviks, strengthened by Russian interventions, turned to the calling of the Congress for December 16.¹¹ An Organizational Bureau was formed by the Bolshevik party itself; the Bolsheviks had obviously not been able to find a

responsible body to sponsor the Congress. The Kharkiv Bolsheviks called their own independent Congress of Soviets of the Donets Kryvyi-Rih Basin, despite Stalin's direction that a common congress be held.¹² The Kiev Bolsheviks acquiesced in this state of affairs; in the norms of representation they provided representatives for the 'Oblast Committee of Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies of the South-Western Land' without providing for its counterpart of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast. Still, the Odessa region was claimed, as representatives of the Rumanian front were invited.¹³

The idea of the calling of the Congress of the Radas, furthered by the Bolsheviks and the Petrograd regime, found some support in the extreme left of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries. There was no Ukrainian Socialist party of the extreme left; such Ukrainians as were persuaded of the extreme left-wing view had no place to go; Maximalists, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks were purely Russian parties. On the other hand, the two great Ukrainian Socialist parties were extremely anxious to prevent any 'split' or even any serious polarization of their parties; they could and did draw attention to the danger such a split or polarization would be to the Ukrainian national movement. Through careful managing, the split was avoided, through the entire period of the formation of the Ukrainian National Republic. This was generally recognized in the Bolshevik historical literature of the period previous to the consolidation of despotism in the thirties. For instance, M. Rubach, a contemporary Bolshevik historian and member of the (Bolshevik) Academy of Sciences wrote in the twenties, referring to the period studied: 'The fact that the national front uniting Ukrainians, starting with Constitutional Democrats and Liberals and finishing with the genuine representatives of the national-revolutionary elements of the peasantry, had not been split (*razorvan*) was certainly our (that is, the Bolsheviks') main failure in that period'.¹⁴

The views of some lesser figures among the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries brought serious concern to the lead-

ing persons of the party. Among such oppositionists were Kovaliv, Bochkovsky, Shumsky, Poloz, Shrah and Kedrovsky,¹⁵ and Zarudny. It is of interest that Bochkovsky and Zarudny were murdered in the reign of terror after the occupation of Kiev by Russian forces.¹⁶ The leftists were threatening a serious split of the party.

The solution was found by Kovalevsky, a leading member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and of the Peasants' Spilka. Counsel was taken with the peasant leaders and the conclusion was arrived at, that the plan for the calling of the All-Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Congress be accepted, and that it be held as fast as possible. As the peasant organizations would be in the majority at that Congress, its favorable result would be, that it would become a measure of power, and would be a moral defeat to the Bolsheviks who had initiated this matter.

Kovalevsky presented this proposition in the meeting of the Central Committee, and it was accepted.¹⁷ The agreement of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was decisive; as they dominated the country-side, their influence was decisive in the Spilka. At any rate, on December 11, the Central Committee of the Peasants' Spilka published a circular in the press with the demand that the peasants' bodies (the Spilkas) send representatives from gubernias according to the number of povits, and from the povits, according to the number of volosts. At the same time, they asked for resolutions of protest against the separate holding of the Congress of workers.¹⁸ A similar egalitarian resolution was sent by the All-Ukrainian Military Rada to the military of all Ukrainianized units, by sending one deputy to a regiment.

The Organizational Bureau in its turn sent out the circular on the norms of representation. The Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies were not to be represented by themselves. Only united Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies had been provided 7 deputies on the gubernia city level, 5 deputies on the povit town level, and 2 deputies on the small town level. (Where a united workers', soldiers' and peasants' soviets ex-

isted, a very rare occurrence in the Ukraine, somewhat higher numbers were to be sent). The United Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets were also quite rare in Ukraine. The Kiev Soviet, for instance, was unable to function as a united body. Also, Ukrainian soldiers were mostly organized in separate Military Soviets (and thus had no representation). Nothing, however, prevented Workers' Soviets from claiming to be united.

The scheme also provided for peasant representation. First, the representation was provided for the gubernia, povit and small town Soviets' of Peasants' Deputies. This was an empty grant, as such bodies did not exist in Ukraine, distinguished from Peasants' Spilkas. The scheme also provided representation for the Peasant Spilkas. The recognition of these bodies as valid organizations representing the peasantry was unprecedented in the Bolshevik practice. The gubernia Spilkas were to send 4 deputies the povit Spilka was to send 2 deputies. The smaller towns were not allowed any Spilka representatives.

One of the obvious disadvantages of this scheme was the extreme under-representation of the peasantry. This may be gathered from the case of the Kiev gubernia. If the voting of the city as against gubernia in the Russian Constituent Assembly be accepted as a yardstick, the relationship of the Kiev city to gubernia vote was 179,688 to 1,627,727, or approximately 1 to 8. The Kiev gubernia had 12 povits. Thus its total representation would be 43 deputies for the Workers' Soviets and 28 deputies for the peasants, based on the representation of the gubernias and povits. Thus, according to the representation scheme, the Workers' Soviets were being favoured over the peasants' organization at the rate of close to 12 to 1. The scheme also provided for the representation of the soldiers at the front and for the various central Ukrainian organizations, including the All-Ukrainian Radas of Workers' Deputies, of Military Deputies and Peasants' Deputies, and the District Rada of the Kiev Military District; all these were to send 3 members each. Some other organizations were also represented. The recognition that these bodies represented some-

body was rather unusual for the Bolshevik practice. However, this could not make up for the over-representation of the Workers' Soviets.

Under these circumstances, the leaders of the Organizational Committee were forced to recognize the reality of the representation of the peasantry of the Ukraine. The election of peasants by volosts was silently acquiesced in; there is no record of any Bolshevik protest of the representational scheme of the Spilka and the Military Rada. In protest against the separate holding of the 'workers' congress', the Spilka had called for a coalescence of the three congresses. The Bolsheviks were given notice to either cancel their meeting, to send it to another city or to take part in the Congress of the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine.

The Bolsheviks summoned delegates and took their seats in the Congress hall with the rest. A member of the Organizational Committee, Bolshevik Zatonsky, opened the Congress. The Congress was overwhelmingly anti-Bolshevik; a Ukrainian presidium was immediately constituted.

The number of delegates in the Congress represented a problem. The latest Bolshevik historian of the Congress states that about 500 delegates had been expected by the Organizational Committee (of course, by the formula of the Committee).¹⁰ This seems to be a low estimate.

The representation of the Congress as called by the Spilka was identical to that of the First Peasants' Congress. At that time, about a thousand volosts had been represented. The members of the Military Rada (invitees) were relatively less numerous than at the corresponding Military Congresses. The Congress of all deputies, workers', peasants' (spilka) and soldiers', consisted of approximately 2,500 deputies. The Congress elected the presidium, which showed the relative strength of parties; there were nine Socialist-Revolutionaries, three Ukrainian Social-Democrats, and one Menshevik elected. Bolsheviks and other Socialists were to determine their representatives next day.

Immediately after the elections of the presidium, a break

was held, after which Zatonsky said that they had come about 'a misunderstanding'. Delegates who did not have the right even to be present had a deciding voice. In order to 'settle the misunderstanding which had arisen as a result of the incorrect representation', all fractions had agreed to put off the business of the Congress to the next day and to authorize the mandates commission to check the mandates of all delegates. Stasiuk, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Spilka, declared that the Congress had been called on the basis of improper representation, giving overwhelming preference to workers and soldiers, badly falsifying the will of the Ukrainian people. Hence, the Central Committee did everything in its power to strengthen the representation of the peasantry in the Congress. Porsh called upon 'the entire revolutionary democracy of the Ukraine to move towards union', and spoke of the necessity for various fractions to reach agreement on norms of representation. The Congress, with all voting, accepted the Bolshevik motion of the interruption of work, 'in order to give the fractions the possibility of agreeing on the question of the representation at the Congress'.²⁰

The Bolshevik fractional meeting held the same evening was attended by Porsh, who argued for agreement on the formula of representation. The fact that Porsh, a Ukrainian Social-Democrat, was allowed to address the Bolshevik fraction implied that it had not been able, as yet, to reach a decision. It can be gathered from the memoirs of Lapchinskiy, a leading Bolshevik, that no formal decision on leaving the Congress had actually been taken. According to Lapchinskiy 'we had a plan' to leave the Congress after joining it the next day, but the reference is rather unclear. The Bolshevik historian writing under initials. S.Sh. concluded that the Bolsheviks had acquiesced in the actual situation and intended to stay.²¹

Their actual number in the Congress appears to have been about 60. Kovalevsky, in his memoirs, gave the figure of 60 out of 2,500 delegates with mandates.²² This was also the figure given by the historian of the Ukrainian Revolution (and a witness), Khrystiuk.²³ Tcherikover, a Jewish historian, gave

the figure of 60 men.²⁴ The maximum figure for Bolsheviks could not have been greater than 100. Lapchinskiy stated that the Bolsheviks and those who left the hall with them eventually held a meeting after the Congress, where 'over one hundred persons' took part. He also said that the Bolsheviks took part in that meeting with the Left Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Russian 'Borbists' group, the Russian Social-Democrat Internationalists, and 'Ukrainian Left Social-Democrats'²⁵ (of these, only a Medvedev is mentioned, probably the only one). The interest of many of these delegates in the Bolsheviks was not long-lasting, or at least not serious enough to induce them to follow them. Thus, this group, when reaching Kharkiv a few days later, had dwindled to about 50 persons.²⁶

One of the reasons for the number of the Bolshevik deputies was the fact that the Bolshevik soviets of the Donets-Basin Oblast, including the organizations of the Donets-Basin itself, of the Kharkiv and the Katerynoslav gubernias, where Bolsheviks were numerous, and 'separatist-minded' refused to come to Kiev, but held at this time, first the Bolshevik Party Conference of the Oblast, and then the Third Oblast Congress of Donets-Basin and Kryvyi Rih.²⁷

If the strength of the element loyal to the Republic, as against the Bolsheviks in the Congress, is estimated, certain difficulties have to be faced. Assuming the figure of total mandates given by Korolivskiy as correct, the number of Bolsheviks does not appear to be higher than 12 per cent of the figure (60 out of 500). The number said to have taken part in the Bolshevik meeting after the walk-out could not be more than 25 per cent, while no more than 10 per cent of the theoretical 500 left Kiev with the Bolsheviks. However, the representational scheme giving the 12 to 1 advantage to the largely non-Ukrainian working groups in the Ukraine makes the Bolshevik gathering definitely unrepresentative of the Ukraine.

No definite percentage can be drawn on the basis of the Congress with any degree of certainty, except to say that in

the middle of December, faced with the ultimatum of Russia, the Bolsheviks were a group small to the point of disappearing. It is a fact that the Bolsheviks had gathered other dissatisfied deputies and passed a resolution which was signed by individuals and by various Soviets. Not a single Peasants' Soviet (nor Rada, nor Spilka, of course) appears among the forty-nine Soviets represented there. In other words, the Ukrainian peasantry, constituting the overwhelming mass of the population of Ukraine, had rejected the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik) completely. It will be realized that the Organizational Bureau had authorized the election from at least nine gubernias, about 100 povits, and an undetermined number of Peasants' Soviets of the smaller units. That not a single body supporting Bolsheviks was found among this mass of authorized representatives, or at least among the thousand-odd volost organizations, is surprising, and it does point to the complete isolation of Russian Social-Democrats (Bolsheviks) in the Ukraine.

Relations with Russia suddenly and somewhat unexpectedly worsened a great deal in December. The events which explain this were certainly the declaration of truce between Russia and the Central Powers proclaimed on December 5, to begin on December 7. On the same December 5, Lenin gave a speech to the First All-Russian Congress of the Military Fleet, held in a manner hostile to Finland and the Ukraine. He declared, 'We are—I will use a bad word—"conquering" Finland, but not in the way it is being done by the international predator-capitalists.' The difference lay in that full support was being given by 'toilers of all nationalities against bourgeoisie of all lands.... At this time, we observe the national movement in Ukraine and we say: we are, without reservation, for the full and unlimited freedom of the Ukrainian people.... We shall tell the Ukrainians: as Ukrainians you may build your life as you wish. But we will extend a fraternal hand to Ukrainian workers and we shall tell them: together with you we will fight against your bourgeoisie and ours'.²⁸ The hostile intent is rather plain: even ignoring the fact that work-

ers in Ukraine were a small minority, the working people did not show any desire to fight against the Republic. On the contrary, the working people formed quite often the Free Cossacks detachments in Katerynoslav, discussed above.

On December 8, the decree was proclaimed in which the Russian Government stated that it had sent troops against the Cossacks on the Don, while the 'bourgeois Rada of the Ukrainian Republic, leading the struggle against the Ukrainian Soviets, was . . . hindering the Soviet power in sending the necessary military forces over the territory of the fraternal Ukrainian people for the suppression of the rebellion.'²⁹ The reference to the 'Ukrainian Republic' was the one hopeful element in this declaration. The same day, the Soviet of Commissars issued a decree constituting a definite intervention in Ukrainian affairs. It offered a certain sum of money, on its own authority, to an *uezd* administration in the Kiev gubernia, in connection with flood losses.³⁰

Thus, when the representatives of the Central Rada 'requested that the transfer of the insignia' be made into their hands, they were told that in view of the fact that there was no way of 'addressing the Soviet of People's Commissars as the lawful supreme power in Russia', as well as in view of the sharper tone of negotiations, it was decided to have further discussions with the 'Ukrainian fraction of the Central Executive Committee', a purely theoretical body. The rejection was announced on December 12.³¹

At about the same time, the Revolutionary Staff, was formed, headed by Ter-Arutyunyants, operating as part of the Highest Command, in Mohilev, in Belorussia. The Russian (non-Bolshevik) press stated that the Staff was to direct the struggle against the Ukraine.³² Two days after the closing of the insignia negotiations, the troops of the Staff were given the order to attack the Ukraine. The attack was to be in a giant pincer movement; some Russian Bolshevik troops were to advance from the South-Western Front, under the Command of a certain Feyerabend. The main blow was to come from the North, by troops ordered by Berzin. These were divided into

three groups, one to advance against Kiev, one against Khar-kiv, and one somewhat further east towards the Cossacks. Other Bolshevik units were to advance against points in Eastern Ukraine and against the Cossacks.³³

In the meantime, Krylenko, the Commander-in-Chief, received a document from the Soviet of People's Commissars, to be sent to the Ukrainian Central Rada in Kiev.

The document in question had been drafted in part by Lenin and in part by either Trotsky or Stalin; sources are contradictory on this.³⁴ It was the result of discussions of December 15 and 16. The whole document was entitled 'The Manifesto to the Ukrainian people with Ultimative Demands to the Central Rada.'

The Manifesto stated that the Russian government recognized the Ukrainian Republic:

... The Socialist government of Russia, the Soviet of People's Commissars, once again reaffirms the right of self-determination of all nations which had been oppressed by Tsarism and the Great-Russian bourgeoisie, up to the right of these nations to separate from Russia.

Therefore, we, the Soviet of People's Commissars, recognize the National Ukrainian Republic, its right to secede completely from Russia or to enter into agreement with the Russian Republic on federal or any other suchlike relations between them.

In such manner then was the Ukrainian National Republic recognized by Russia.

At the same time, the Rada was accused that 'covering itself by nationalist phrases, it was holding an equivocal bourgeois policy which expressed itself in non-recognition of Soviets and of the Soviet power in Ukraine'. This equivocal politics, which had deprived the Soviet of the possibility of recognizing the Rada as a plenipotential representative of the exploited toiling masses of the Ukrainian Republic, had lately brought the Rada to steps meaning the destruction of any possibility of agreement. These steps were said to have been the disorganization of the front, the disarmament of Soviet

troops in Ukraine, and allowing of troops to go to Kaledin (to the Don), while refusing to let through troops against Kaledin; this was 'the path of unheard-of treason to the revolution'. This policy would force a declaration of war on the Rada even if it had already been formally recognized as the undoubted highest body of the state power of the independent bourgeois republic of the Ukraine. While the Ukrainian Republic was being recognized, the Rada was stated to be lacking in full government character.

'Before the nations of the Ukrainian and Russian Republic', the Soviet was putting four questions to the Rada: would it stop disorganization, would it prevent troops from passing to the Don, the Urals and elsewhere, would it cooperate in the struggle with the 'counter-revolutionary Cadet-Kaledin uprising', and finally, would the Rada stop its attempts to disarm Soviet regiments and the workers' Red Guard in Ukraine and immediately return arms to those from whom they were taken?' The Soviet of People's Commissars gave the Rada 48 hours to 'reply in a satisfactory manner' to the demands; in the contrary case, the Soviet of People's Commissars would consider the Rada in a 'state of open war against the Soviet power in Russia and the Ukraine'.³³

It is difficult to evaluate the document. Generally it would appear that the ultimatum was not meant to have been considered seriously as a basis for agreement. Two demands in particular show this; the first was the demand that troops be allowed to go to the Don and the Urals. The front was beginning to disintegrate; the attempts of Bolsheviks to take over the South-Western Front in early December, and the counteraction of Ukrainians, who arrested all the Bolshevik Revolutionary Committees on their front about December 12, as well as other measures, such as the call for fraternization, meaning that troops began 'to go home'. One of the reasons for it was the relatively poor supply of the front in the rising chaos. The Cossack troops were returning arms in hand, passing through the Ukraine; the Russian troops were mostly bypassing Central Ukraine, in their return. The stopping of the

troops would mean on the one hand very serious armed struggle, and on the other hand, if successful, would simply put the men in conditions of famine, and thus was hardly practicable. The other demand that seemed to lack a serious intent was the demand to return arms to the Russian troops which had been disarmed in Kiev and elsewhere, in the night of December 12 to 13. Among these had been, for instance, the Aviation Park, the Ponton Park, and other units which had taken part in the events of November 12 to 13, as the backbone of Bolshevik troops. Many of these troops had been already shipped to Russia. How the Republic could stop disarming disloyal troops, and return arms which had been taken is very difficult to see.

Historians differ in the evaluation of the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by the Manifesto. Sullivant, an American historian, wrote recently that the Manifesto was on the whole an attempt to find a formula which would justify intervention within the framework of self-determination.³⁶ We must reject this interpretation. An intervention could be justified simply on the basis of the contention that there was no such thing as the Ukrainian nation at all, while "Ukrainians" were simply a few fanatics supporting something unreal, the approach often adopted by conservative Russians in their approach to the Ukrainian problem. The recognition of the Republic meant a serious sacrifice for the largely centralist Bolsheviks in any case. It was the price the Petrograd Bolsheviks were to pay to regain the Ukrainian people for Russia, offering peace, recognition and fictitious self-government in return for the actual self-government the Ukrainian people enjoyed in the Ukrainian National Republic. The manifesto, at any rate, underestimated the desire for true self-government and democratic freedom on the part of the Ukrainian people.

Bolshevik historians treat the Manifesto as an outright recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic. Thus, Jenkins, in a serious study of the formation of the Soviet Union, wrote that on December 17, that the Soviet of People's Commissars recognized by decree the 'state independence of Ukraine'.³⁷

Much the same interpretation has been provided by Starushenko, in a recent study. He stated that as the result 'of the Great Power policy followed by the Provisional Government, a number of nationalities seceded from Russia'.³⁸ Among those which seceded was the Ukraine. 'Power in the Ukraine was seized by the bourgeois Central Rada.'³⁹ The question of 'establishing federal relations' between Russian and the 'other republics which had seceded from the former Russian empire' was first raised in practice in the Manifesto, according to Starushenko. Thus he is obviously admitting that the Ukrainian Republic had in fact seceded, and was being recognized by the wording of the Manifesto which he quoted. Elsewhere, Starushenko again states that the Soviet Government set out to implement the principle of national self-determination. 'It recognized the Ukraine's right to self-determination on December 17, 1917.'⁴⁰

Still other historians hold that the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic was indeed a valid act, but that the concurrent conditions presented in the ultimatum made the recognition practically valueless. Thus, Sadovsky, in his study of the national policies of the Soviets in the Ukraine, held that the Manifesto, although containing the recognition of 'national rights and national independence of the Ukrainian people, in principle', through its refusal to recognize the Central Rada as the authorized representative of the 'toiling and exploited masses of the Ukrainian republic, destroyed the value of the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian nation by the Soviet of People's Commissars'.⁴¹ A rather less friendly evaluation is supplied by Khrystiuk, the Socialist-Revolutionary historian of the Ukrainian revolution. He held that it was clear, 'in the light of the ultimative demands put in the document', that the recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Soviet was rather a 'diplomatic manoeuvre than true recognition'. The Soviet of People's Commissars 'did not even have the recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic in mind, and used the corresponding phrase with the aim of agitation'. Thus, the recognition of the 'Ukrainian National

Republic by Soviet Russia in principle' actually 'contained the opposite significance'. It constituted the 'overt rejection of the fact of the existence of Ukrainian democracy in any form'.⁴² It was also in this way, that the Manifesto was evaluated by the 'entire Ukrainian revolutionary democracy', according to Khrystiuk.⁴³

The Manifesto, with the ultimatum, was presented to the Congress of Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the second day of their session, by Shulhyn. The meeting was then addressed by Petlura, the War Secretary, who declared that the General Secretariat had definite news that the Bolsheviks were preparing a 'stab in the back for the Ukrainian National Republic', and that the first Bolshevik troops had reached the border town of Bakhmach. 'The ultimatum given to us by the People's Commissars . . . is an attaint of our rights, which must be defended by you steadfastly and decisively,' he declared, thus indicating the course of the policy of the Government. He also announced that volunteer detachments of the 'Free Cossacks' (a military patriotic society), had been mobilized; this announcement was greeted with applause.

It appears that the indignation of the Congress was shared by Bolshevik delegates though, it seems, for reasons somewhat different from those of the majority. The Kiev Bolsheviks had not been consulted on the ultimatum by the Soviet of People's Commissars. There was 'dissatisfaction and indignation' at the action of the 'Peterburg comrades' who, according to Lapchinskiy, 'without asking our advice, without receiving our consent, completed this move which had utterly confused our plans'. Without it, there would not have been such a 'united front against (the Bolsheviks)', he stated.⁴⁴ For the time being, the Bolsheviks did not decide on any course of action. Various announcements by members of the Government was followed by the statement of Vynnychenko, the Head of the Secretariat. Vynnychenko declared that the coming struggle was in its nature only a national struggle.⁴⁵ The reply of the General Secretariat, which had been drawn on the lines of the

statements of Vynnychenko and Petlura, and thus rejecting the ultimatum, was approved by the Congress.⁴⁷

In the reply, the Rada accused the Soviet of People's Commissars of intervention in 'the construction of the constitutional and political life of the national Ukrainian Republic'.⁴⁷ The various accusations in the Soviet ultimatum were rejected. It was also declared that the Rada was acting on the basis of the 'right of self-determination of every national element'. The Secretariat also demanded that the Soviet 'call back Bolshevik regiments from the Ukraine', and promised in no way to hinder their leaving.⁴⁸ It did not wish a fratricidal war, but if the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Great Russia would force the General Secretariat to accept their challenge, it did not doubt in the slightest that 'Ukrainian soldiers, workers and peasants would defend their rights and the land, and would give a worthy answer to the Soviet of People's Commissars'.⁴⁹

There were further negotiations between the General Secretariat and the Soviet of People's Commissars, but they were fruitless. Their only serious importance lay in the repeated statement of recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by the Soviet, which was stated again on December 20 to the Ukrainian Revolutionary Command of the Petrograd Ukrainian Land Military Rada. The latter was acting as an intermediary between the Ukraine and Russia. As far as conditions put forward by the Rada were concerned, 'those which have the character of principle (the right of self-determination) did not, and do not constitute the issue at hand, as the Soviet of People's Commissars recognize and realize these principles in full.' The Soviet addressed the Command as acting with the approval of the 'Authorities of the Ukrainian National Republic'.⁵⁰

The presentation of the Manifesto, with the ultimatum to the Congress, produced much turmoil among the delegates. The members of the Congress protested against the Bolsheviks present in the hall. There was a threat to order in the meeting with apparent danger of physical violence to the Bolsheviks.

When Kovalevsky accused the Bolsheviks of 'Russian imperialism', Pyatakov called to him, "Do you really believe what you say?" Kovalevsky repeated his accusations, whereupon a general call rose in the Congress 'away with imperialists' and similar.⁵¹ Bolsheviks left the hall on the order of Pyatakov. Bolshevik Kulik declared on their behalf that the meeting did not possess the proper authority, and had become in fact simply a rally.

Some Bolsheviks, however, had been left in the hall, and took part in polemics; among these was Shakh-ray, a leading Bolshevik and the future 'Secretary for Military Affairs' of the Bolshevik puppet government in the Ukraine.

Speaking on behalf of the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, he declared that the ultimatum was misunderstanding which would be cleared up without 'shedding of blood'. 'Our party is no more frightening than other parties of the Russian Federative Republic,' he declared. That part of it which lives in the Ukraine has the 'same right to call itself Ukrainian as any of the local parties'. Shakh-ray continued, 'So I, as its representative, state: there occurred a misunderstanding with the ultimatum.' Shakh-ray then pointed out that the Soviet of People's Commissars recognized the Ukrainian National Republic in the ultimatum. While he proclaimed that the Bolsheviks would struggle against the bourgeois policies of the Central Rada 'for the complete success of the revolution', he attempted to persuade the Congress that 'that part of the Russian Social-Democratic Party of Bolsheviks which lives in the Ukraine would use all possible means to end this misunderstanding peacefully.' 'There can be no hostility between the Russian and Ukrainian democracies,' he concluded.⁵²

Shakh-ray's speech was generally met with extreme hostility, and in the end, rising protests of the audience in the Congress made it impossible for him to continue. Zatonsky, another leading Bolshevik, who unlike Shakh-ray, had the disadvantage of being a member of the local Kiev Committee, was hardly allowed to speak before there were vocal protests and calls 'out with him'.⁵³

Shakhrai also intervened in the debate on the third day of the Congress, December 19.⁵⁴ The same day, Hrushevsky declared to the Congress that if it was to decide to re-elect the Central Rada, the latter would not resist the decision nor would it attempt to keep on holding power.⁵⁵

By all votes except 2 against, with 19 abstentions, and in the absence of some 60 Bolshevik delegates out of the total of some 2,500 deputies, the Congress approved a resolution on the Manifesto and the Ultimatum.⁵⁶ The recognition of the Republic expressed in the Manifesto was taken for granted in the resolution. The ultimatum itself was regarded as 'an attempt against the Ukrainian National Republic'. The demands presented in the ultimatum were considered as breaking the right of the Ukrainian nation for self-determination and the 'free formation of the forms of existence as a state'. The centralist motives of the Russian government, leading to a 'war between Muscovy and the Ukraine' threatened to tear completely apart the 'federative relations' towards which the Ukrainian democracy had been moving. The threat of a 'new fratricidal war proclaimed by the Soviet of People's Commissars on the Ukraine', especially in view of the 'struggle for democracy of the whole world... for the reaching of general peace', was said to be destroying the fraternity of the toiling classes of all nations, and awakening the manifestations of national hostility, and so generally furthering the growth of counter-revolution. The reply of the General Secretariat to the ultimatum of December 17, rejecting Russian allegations, was proclaimed to be a 'correct answer against the attempt of the People's Commissars against the rights of Ukrainian peasants, workers and soldiers'. The All-Ukrainian Congress of Peasants', Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies considered it necessary to undertake all measures to prevent the shedding of fraternal blood, and turned with a passionate plea to the nations of Russia to forestall 'by all measures the possibility of a new disgraceful war.'⁵⁷

In this special appeal issued to the 'nations of Russia,' the Congress stated that the Ukrainian Nation had used its

right of national self-determination when it proclaimed the Republic. It was to this National Republic that the Soviet of People's Commissars proclaimed war while 'negotiating peace with Hindenburg'. The Rada was said to be supported by the 'democracy of Ukraine'. 'Workers, peasants and soldiers' were asked whether it was they who proclaimed war to the 'revolutionary democracy of Ukraine', and whether they considered the 'democracy of Ukraine a more fearful enemy than the legions of Hindenburg?' They were urged to tell the Soviet of People's Commissars that the latter had begun a 'criminal action'; the appeal closed with the familiar phrase of the day, 'enough of blood'.⁴⁸

The Congress also considered the question of the authority of the Ukrainian Central Rada. This body was considered representative of the people, and was continually renewing itself. It consisted of the All-Ukrainian Radas of the Peasants', Workers', and Soldiers' Deputies and of 'representatives of the democracy of national minorities'. Thus it constituted a 'lawful provisional legislative body of the revolutionary democracy of Ukraine'. The Congress considered any re-election of the Central Rada to be 'inopportune and unnecessary', also in view of the fact that the Rada put itself on the road of 'wide social and political reform, by the Third Universal', and had begun the process of the fastest possible calling of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly' which alone could be entrusted with 'full power in Ukraine'. The Congress expressed to the Rada its 'complete confidence and promised to it its decisive support'. The resolution was accepted by all except 2 against 2 who abstained (with the 60 Bolsheviks absent, of course).⁴⁹

The reply of the General Secretariat to the Manifesto, given on December 17, received a negative evaluation in Petrograd. On December 18, the Soviet of People's Commissars stated that having considered the reply, it found 'the reply of the Rada unsatisfactory and considered the Rada in a state of war with us.' Thus was the Russo-Ukrainian War proclaimed by Russia. It also decided 'to entrust the Commission consist-

ing of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin to take necessary measures for contacts with the Highest Commands and to issue in the name of the Soviet of People's Commissars two appeals—to the Ukrainian nation and to the soldiers'.

The same intransigent position was taken by Stalin in the statement to the protest delegation of the Socialist-Revolutionary fraction of the Extraordinary Peasants' Congress, which had attempted to mitigate the crisis. Stalin stated that it must have been well-known to the deputies that the Soviet of People's Commissars was striving towards revolution on an international scale. Therefore, if circumstances demanded, he said, 'We shall sweep everything from our path, without considering the interests of individual nationalities.'⁶⁰

The disposition of the Russian troops has been discussed already. The result of the ultimatum was a complete military debacle for Russia. The detachment of Feyerabend from the South-Western Front was disarmed by Ukrainian troops. Chudnovskiy and Roshal, heads of the Revolutionary Committee, sent to gather further Bolshevik troops on the Ukrainian front, were taken prisoners and brought to Kiev.⁶¹ The situation of the main body of troops under the command of Berzin was equally bad. The group directed to enter the Ukraine met Ukrainian troops at Bakhmach. A part of them (37th regiment), at their own speed, left the disposition against orders and went in the opposite direction. The group itself refused to fight against Ukrainian troops. Berzin demanded decisive action from the Commander of the troops, Volobuev, on the direct demand of the Highest Command. Volobuev was forced to negotiate with the Ukrainian army. The latter had torn down the railway, and said that they would not allow the Russian troops to pass, and 'would shoot'.⁶²

The regiments of the group, the so-called 19th column, gathered together and held a meeting; they decided against attacking Bakhmach, and said they would fight only against Kaledin. The Highest Command ordered them again, this time no doubt with reference to the Lenin-Stalin-Trotsky Committee, as it stated that the Rada had refused to answer the ulti-

matum. However, this again was to no avail. The renewed demands of the Commander of the Western Front, Kamenchikov, and of the Revolutionary Staff urging 'most decisive actions against the Rada', forced Berzin, the Commander, to talk with the commanding officer of the group. However, after the talks, Berzin had to agree to keep the group in Russian territory (Homel), where it went on its own stem, again against orders. There the group disintegrated completely, 'went home', in the phrase of the day, with only a few men remaining.⁶³ The whole ultimatum, despite the array of names behind it, intending to use the force of the Russian Army against the Ukraine, appeared to be but an adventurous document. The recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic by Russia remained as a solid gain of the resistance of the new country of Russia.

One of the reasons for the success of the Ukrainian army against the Russians was the fact that the membership of the Russian army was nationally mixed. This feature is reported by People's Commissar Antonov and Commander Lykin. Antonov wrote that the 19th Column, in particular, had 'not a few soldiers who considered themselves Ukrainians, and that there were 'very few revolutionary-conscious elements who understood the counter-revolutionism of the Rada'.⁶⁴ On the other hand, Lykov, the Bolshevik Commissar over the 2nd Guard Corps, had wired Commander-in-Chief Krylenko of his inability to advance against Kiev, which was to have been the target for the Corps. He wired that the Second Guard Corps was in his command, and that he was attempting to disarm the Ukrainians, but the soldiers refused, as there were up to 1,000 Ukrainians in each regiment. He had attempted to disarm two trains of soldiers of the Ukrainian army, but did not succeed due to their 'steadfastness'. On the other hand a train of Bolsheviks had been disarmed by the Cossacks; other (Russian) trains refused to 'liberate their brothers'. He concluded that in order 'to advance against Ukrainians, it was indispensable to separate out all Ukrainians and to send them to

the front'; with the rest, that is the Russian troops, one could advance against Kiev. He saw no other way out.⁶⁵

One of the lessons learned by the Soviet of People's Commissars from this adventure seems to have been that only purely Russian units, formed not from soldiers, but from workers, could gain military success in the proclaimed Russo-Ukrainian War. At least, there did not appear any other wide-scale effort in this period to operate with regular army troops. Thus, on December 24, 1917, the Soviet of People's Commissars ordered that one-third of the Red Guard of Petrograd be directed to the war on the 'Southern Front'.⁶⁶

The news of the ultimatum and the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war spread quickly in the Ukraine. The ultimatum, and the Soviet which had issued it, appears to have been generally condemned, with the sole exception of the meetings of the Bolshevik organizations. It was denounced not only by the Congress of Workers and Peasants, but also by the *Rumcherod*. The *Rumcherod* was a democratic body created in the process of the revolution in the South-Eastern Ukraine, and uniting the soldiers', workers', sailors' and peasants' deputies of the Rumanian front, of the Black Sea Fleet and of the Odessa district. It was actually the only well-based local body of government in the territories covered in addition to Ukrainian commissars. The *Rumcherod* had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic, and had thus become a subordinate body. Its Executive Committee issued a wireless protest directed 'to all', including 'People's Commissars'. The protest itself was drafted by the 'Ukrainian fraction of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats' of the front congress. The appeal is rather typical of many other local appeals issued about the same time, for instance by the Sevastopol Rada,⁶⁷ and by the Odessa Rada,⁶⁸ by what appears to have been the Free Cossack societies⁶⁹ and by the Kherson Gubernia Rada. For this reason, this typical local appeal shall be examined in greater detail.

It was signed by the bodies incorporated in the aforesaid *Rumcherod*; it also appears to have been broadcasted by

wireless from army installations, and thus under the direct control of the same *Rumcherod*. The Ukrainian fraction was said to have considered the ultimatum of 'the so-called People's Commissars' to contain 'the proclamation of war to the Ukrainian people, through its Central Rada and General Secretariat'. As the result of this, it was decided to put the following, extremely provocative and obviously rhetorical questions, which may be quoted verbatim to indicate the temper of the time.

1. Socialist Lenin, who gave you the right to declare war against the Ukrainian people?
2. What kind of Socialist teaching made you dare to rise against the right of self-determination of the Ukrainian people?
3. Are the sacrifices given at the front still too little for you? Do you wish to have such sacrifices also internally? Where are you leading the tortured, ragged Russia overflowing with blood?

The soldiers, peasants and workers of 'all nationalities of Russia' were asked in rather heavy-handed humour whether 'Lenin, Trotsky, Krylenko and their comrades' would fight against the Ukrainian people themselves, or would they send others, while pointing out that they wrote their decrees in ink, while others were to 'sign them with blood'. In conclusion, a resolve to fight 'with weapons in hand' was proclaimed. 'The ray of liberty, equality and fraternity has still not gone out of the hearts of some in the Ukraine,' the appeal concluded.¹⁰

As was shown earlier, declarations of this nature, and a relatively mild military action by Ukrainian troops sufficed to bring the Russian offensive to nought. It is of interest that the few pro-Bolshevik proclamations stemmed from Russian troops in the Ukraine, and by their scarcity served to underline the Bolshevik unpopularity.¹¹

However, the ultimatum had serious consequences in international affairs. The ultimatum itself, and the various Ukrainian protests, were picked up by the enemy front. The Germans estimated the Ukrainian ability to fight on the front quite highly, as was seen above. In addition, they followed

closely the development of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict; references to it appeared continually in the various diplomatic reports of that time.⁷² The news of the conflict obviously strengthened the German hand on the Eastern front at that time.

The other serious consequence of the Russo-Ukrainian war, was the extremely high pressure upon the Ukrainian Republic to conclude peace with the Central Powers on its own, in order to be able to remove the necessity of waging war on two fronts, the German and the Russian. Thus, on December 18, Ukrainian delegates were sent to Brest-Litovsk; they met the returning Russian delegation at Smolensk. The Ukrainian delegation declared that they alone were authorized to speak for the Ukraine, and rejected any right of the Russian delegation to do the same.⁷³ The Ukrainian Republic also formally proclaimed the validity of the armistice for the Ukrainian front.⁷⁴

Still another consequence was the passing of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks) as a political force in Ukraine. With the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the Congress, and their voluntary departure to Kharkiv, the role of the Bolshevik party in the Ukraine was virtually ended. Lapchinskiy, a leading Bolshevik, described the transition as follows, in describing the journey of Bolshevik deputies from Kiev to Kharkiv. It is characteristic that Ukrainians did not attempt to stop the Bolsheviks.

We talked little to each other. When the train reached Kharkiv the first thing that we saw when leaving the car, was the train of revolutionary troops which had arrived from Petersburg under the command of Comrade Sivers as a vanguard to the expeditionary detachment which was being led against the reactionary Don by Comrade Ovsyenko-Antonov.... This immediately improved our mood, gave us to feel the renewed connection with the Petersburg proletariat from which we had felt completely cut off in the counter-revolutionary atmosphere created by the Central Rada in Kiev.⁷⁵

The party had thus become simply an adjunct to the mil-

itary forces of Russia, moving in the train of the Russian armies.

The main interest in the recognition of the Republic and the consolidation of its international situation thus passed to Brest-Litovsk, while the Central Powers became the most important figures.

However, the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, which must be definitely credited to the adventurist policy of the Lenin government, seriously weakened the Ukrainian Republic, and its international position. The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war may well be considered the greatest single failure of the Russian regime, which had as the consequence the rise of the hegemony of the Central Powers in Eastern Europe so characteristic of 1918. It appears that the adventure was engineered primarily by Lenin, but this cannot be precisely established in the absence of any serious evidence. It would seem however, that the Lenin government thought it possible to wipe out the Ukrainian Republic by a huge and fast offensive, aided by the political impact of the recognition of the Republic. If this was the case, then the Russian government would find it easier to justify its likely sacrifices to the Germans in the North. The result of the failure of the policy was a veritable collapse of the East-European system of defence, and the guarantee of almost full freedom of manoeuvre to the Central Powers in their Eastern policy.

The policy and success of the Ukrainian Republic in gaining the recognition of the Central Powers, and therefore, international status, forms the next important aspect of the formation of the Republic, and is treated in the next chapter. The new nation entered that stage as a state recognized by the Russian Republic.

The conflict between the Russian and the Ukrainian Republics had continued in the meantime. After the fiasco of the offensive against the Ukraine in mid-December, a more serious campaign was organized. The campaign was to be commanded by Antonov, a member of the Soviet of People's Commissars. In mid-December, he received the proposal from Lenin 'to

indicate, in agreement with Comrades Krylenko and Podvoyskiy, the person for the immediate command against Kaledin and his accomplices.' Antonov wrote that the term 'accomplices' meant the 'Kaledin-supporting counter-revolutionary Ukrainians'.⁷⁶ Antonov suggested himself for the position. Although Lenin had insisted upon his immediate departure, Antonov insisted on going to the Highest Command first to locate the forces for his campaign.

Antonov's appointment was made official on December 12. Lenin, as Chairman of the People's Commissars, issued to him a certificate stating that he, with the acquiescence of Commander-in-Chief Krylenko, Commissar Podvoyskiy and the entire Collegium for Military Affairs, was empowered to direct operations against the 'Kaledin troops and their accomplices'.⁷⁷ The direct control of the operations by Lenin and the Soviet of People's Commissars was maintained through the order to Antonov to inform the Soviet every day by direct wire, whom he or any other military authorities appointed for the direction of separate operations, especially the displacement, gathering and commanding of troops.⁷⁸ In the disorganized state of warfare, where the operations could be organized only *ad hoc*, this indeed constituted a sufficient check upon military authorities, and guaranteed control and direction to the Soviet.

Antonov selected a certain Muravyov as his chief-of-staff, and thus in fact, the second-in-command. Muravyov had reputation of being a ruthless officer. However, Lenin approved his appointment, with some dissension when Antonov, in accordance with Lenin's order, presented the candidacy for Lenin's approval. "As you see fit. . . . On your own responsibility", warned Lenin, agreeing.⁷⁹

The military operations against the Ukrainian Republic were not being realized not by the Army, but by units composed completely of Russian workers from Petrograd, Moscow and other cities of Russia proper. Thus, as mentioned previously, the Petrograd Red Guard was ordered to send one-third of all its troops to the 'Southern Front'.⁸⁰

A more serious plan of attack against the Ukraine was

followed this time. All Russian forces were directed, in the first stage, at just one objective, the establishment of Russian power in one major centre of the Ukraine, the city of Kharkiv. It has been already mentioned that the Bolshevik deputies of the Congress of Workers and Peasants went to Kharkiv, where they came under the protection of the Russian troops there.

The Russian troops brought from Petrograd were under the orders of Sivers and of Khovrin. The detachment of Khovrin had dissolved almost completely, in the words of Antonov, after 'requisitions, searches and arrests'.⁸¹ This process, pointing to very lax discipline of the troops, seem to have been quite general among Bolshevik troops and is referred to by Antonov again and again. The detachment of Sivers, on the other hand, was still disciplined.

The Petrograd Russian troops met with the resistance of the Kharkiv Bolsheviks. The policy of the Kharkiv Bolsheviks has been discussed earlier. Thus, the members of the Kharkiv Committee, led by the leader Artem, came to the railroad station where the Petrograd detachment was, immediately after its arrival on December 21. There they demanded from the commanders of the detachment that there be no hostile action against Ukrainian authorities in Kharkiv. The local Bolsheviks were working in common with the Ukrainian and Russian non-Bolshevik parties in the so-called Revolutionary Committee of Kharkiv, and did not find it possible to enter into a conflict with the Central Rada. The nature of the Central Rada still appeared to them as 'not yet defined'.⁸²

It is not entirely clear how Sivers' detachments could have arrived in Kharkiv in the first place; it appears to have happened in the general chaos on the railroads, where large numbers of trains of soldiers were routed though the Ukraine on the way to the front or from the front. It also appears, that the Republic was not overly anxious to stop Russian troops moving against the Don Cossacks, and thus may have attempted to seek a *détente* in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Its own authority was not overly threatened, in the peculiar circumstances of Kharkiv.

However, Sivers, going against the protest of the Bolsheviks, decided to proceed against the Rada authorities. The next night, an attempt was made to disarm the armoured division which formed the main strength of the local authorities. After the operation began, the Bolshevik Committee was informed, and Martyanov demanded on its behalf that the attack cease, not to antagonize the authorities and embitter their attitude towards the Soviet of People's Commissars. However, the attack proceeded. The Ukrainian Commandant and other officials of the city were arrested; the armoured division, surprised in the darkness by artillery, was disarmed. During the operation, Volynsky, Sivers' chief-of-staff, was summoned by Artem, the Kharkiv Bolshevik leader, to the meeting of the associated democratic organizations of the city of Kharkiv, where the Bolshevik Kharkiv representatives were also present. The meeting demanded that the detachment be withdrawn from the city. The demand, formulated by the Chairman of the Kharkiv City Duma (Council), was reiterated by the Bolsheviks. The altercations between Sivers and the Bolsheviks went on right up to the conclusion of the operation.⁶³

Still, the demands of the Kharkiv Bolsheviks had some practical results. Even after the disarmament of the armoured division, Artem and others, pointing to the 'special situation in the Ukraine on the national question', demanded the cessation of all action against the Rada by the detachment, and its subordination to the City Revolutionary Command, a branch of the Revolutionary Committee. Finally, it was decided that Sivers' detachment, while not going under the orders of the Kharkiv groups, would 'keep close contact' with a new Revolutionary Committee. The Committee was to consist of Russian Social-Democrat Bolsheviks and Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, while Ukrainian parties would be kept out. On the other hand, the Ukrainian authorities, who do not appear to have been displaced, agreed to allow free traffic in grain between the Ukraine and Russia.⁶⁴ The rest of the Ukrainian garrison was not attacked. The situation in Kharkiv was uneasy, where the Ukrainian authorities apparently main-

tained their sovereignty; however, Russian troops in the city were being continually reinforced, ostensibly on their way to fight Cossacks. While a dual power existed in Kharkiv itself, the province was solidly dominated by Ukrainians. The towns of Sumy, Chuhuiv, and Kup'yans'k maintained exclusively Ukrainian garrisons. The way from Kharkiv to the South was cut off for the Russians by Ukrainian troops in the towns of Izyum and Balakleya, dominating the railroads. Control of the southern part of the Kharkiv gubernia was also kept and further south; the cities of Pavlohrad, Konstantinohrad and Aleksandrovsk were also secure.⁸⁵ The important industrial centre of the Southern Ukraine, Katerynoslav, was of course controlled by Ukrainians, as was the rest of the country.

In the meantime, the Russian government attempted to undercut the authority of the Republic by various appeals to the 'Ukrainian people' bypassing any Ukrainian institutions much in the manner of Prince Lvov during the June Crisis. On December 21, the Soviet of People's Commissars issued such an appeal, signed by various Russian organizations ordinarily in conflict with the Bolsheviks, but now joined hands because of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Of course, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Deputies signed, as did the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks). Others were: the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Central Factory-Works Committee and Central Professional Union. It is somewhat surprising to find the Second All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies among the signers, considering that the Congress was in conflict with the Russian Government. The Petrograd Soviet added its voice, but the most surprising signer was the Petrograd City Duma, a body which had shown a consistent hostility to the new regime. The appeal accused the Central Rada of joining the enemies of Soviet power in Russia.⁸⁶ While the Rada was depicted as having gone to the 'counter-revolutionary rulers' cap in hand, it was supposed to have failed to take a single step toward an agreement with the 'government of workers and peasants, which

opened the road to freedom and happiness of all nations of Russia.' The Rada was accused of supporting the Don Cossacks, of having 'attacked the Kievan revolutionary troops, disarmed them, and sent them out of Kiev'. This was described as a 'challenge to the working class of all Russia'. The Ukrainian people were urged to 'support the Workers' and Peasants government of Russia'; this would even be in 'the national interests of the Ukraine, if only properly understood'. 'Where is that class capable of ensuring the liberty of all nations, including Ukrainians?' This class was obviously in Russia. According to the appeal, all counter-revolutionary forces were gathered in Kiev rested their hopes upon the Rada. Still, the Rada itself was not described as counter-revolutionary; but a re-election was demanded, while the Russian government urged that all power in the Ukraine pass to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' deputies. A slight modification in the policy was adopted; 'Let Ukrainians prevail in the Soviets,' stated the appeal. Finally, the Russians insisted that Ukrainian workers and peasants were 'true brothers' of their Russian counterparts, while Ukrainian landlords were their 'enemies to the death'. The view of the Ukrainian parties that the 'Ukrainian landlord' simply did not exist except in isolated cases, the majority of which were Russian or Polish, was simply ignored, as was the fact that there was no struggle between peasants and landlords in the Ukraine at this time, since the demoralized and isolated non-Ukrainian landlords had hurriedly left their homesteads in 1917.

The appeal of the Russian government was followed by the statement of Stalin, People's Commissar for Nationalities' Affairs. In an article 'The Answer to the Comrades Ukrainian in the Rear and at the Front', Stalin wrote that he had received a 'multitude of resolutions and letters from Ukrainian comrades' on the question of the conflict with the Rada. The questions presented in these were essentially the following: how did the conflict arise, on what points did it arise, what means would be necessary for the solution of the conflict peacefully and finally, 'would the blood of fraternal nations

indeed flow?' According to Stalin, there was a 'certain confusion of concepts among our Ukrainian comrades'. Now and then they represented the conflict as one between the Ukrainian and Russian nations, which was not correct, as it was only between the Soviet of People's Commissars and the General Secretariat of the Rada. The idea that the difficulty arose on the problem of centralism and self-determination was also rejected. The Soviet was fighting for a 'people's power', while the General Secretariat was fighting against it. Referring to the Rada's support of Kaledin, he wrote, 'We believe in the self-determination of nations but we are against the "autocracy of Kaledin" masquerading under the "flag of self-determination"'. Nor was the conflict over the formation of the Ukrainian Republic, and any presumed reason that the Soviet did not recognize the Ukrainian Republic. The idea that it hadn't was stated to be incorrect. 'The Soviet of People's Commissars', stated Stalin, 'officially recognized the Ukrainian Republic in the "Ultimatum" and in the "Answer" to the Petrograd Ukrainian Command.' Finally, Stalin concluded that the Rada had the alternative of either breaking with Kaledin and opening the way to the Revolutionary troops towards the counter-revolutionary nest on the Don, or not opening the road, which would have as consequence the 'shedding of fraternal blood.' Ukrainian workers and soldiers (ignoring the peasantry) were urged 'to call their General Secretariat to order, or to re-elect it in the interests of a peaceful solution of a dangerous conflict.'⁸⁷ Thus, the policy of the Russian government was proclaimed to be limited in aim, although it was plainly interference in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian Republic, particularly by the pressure for re-election of the government on threat of war. The Russian policy aimed at the formation of a pretended rival government in the Ukraine, to serve as a contender for power.

This policy was definitely of non-Ukrainian origin. It was foreshadowed in the calling of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, as was discussed above, as well as in the issuance of the Ultimatum to the Congress without any warning to the

local Bolshevik Committee, obviously making the Bolsheviks' position in Kiev untenable now, with the coming of the Bolshevik deputies from Kiev to Kharkiv, the stage was set for a surrogate organization supposedly expressing public opinion in the Ukraine.

The Third Congress of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Basin held its sessions in Kharkiv. It consisted of 77 representatives with deciding voice and 5 with consultative voice, 83 persons in all. Not a single peasants' organization of the region was represented, and only 46 out of the 140 soldiers' and workers' soviets. The first problem, therefore, faced by the Congress was whether it was indeed qualified to describe itself as such, as the Second Oblast Congress had provided that at least half of the Soviets, that is 70, had to be represented for a Congress to be legal. Against the votes of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Russian United Social-Democrat fraction, the Bolshevik majority voted the provision of the Second Congress down and declared itself properly constituted. The vote was 46 against 18 with 5 abstentions. The Social-Democrats stated that they would not take part in the work of the Congress, while Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries held that, while they considered the Congress illegal, they would take part in it.⁸⁸

The Congress, then, only represented about one-third of workers' and soldiers' soviets in the region. However, in the debate, Bolshevik Kamensky stated that the 'greater part of the workers of the oblast' were represented, failing to mention the soldiers' soviets. It would appear that the representation spoke primarily for the workers, an overwhelming minority in the region. The representative of the group of Bolshevik deputies from Kiev addressed the Congress and explained the reasons why the 'majority of representatives of workers and soldiers had been forced' to leave the Congress. A part of these had come to Kharkiv, and suggested to the Oblast Congress that they unite for the common discussion of political questions.⁸⁹

The proposition met spirited debate. The delegates from

Kiev who had come to Kharkiv had not had a 'particularly friendly reception,'⁶⁰ previously. In the discussions, the telling argument for union was the fact that the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks), 'had given its sanction for the organization of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with the inclusion into it of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Basin,' according to the memoirs of Myshkis, a participant in the Congress.⁶¹ Against this, the embarrassed part of the Congress could point to another sanction given for the formation of a separate Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Republic,⁶² by the same Central Committee, but the new sanction was obviously the expression of current thought in Petrograd. These ideas prevailed, and the Congress decided by a vote 43 to 11 to unite with the Kiev deputies and to call itself the 'Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Ukraine with the Attendance of part of the Peasants' Deputies.' Myshkis concluded that the number of Kiev deputies (which were to represent the rest of the Ukraine) was 50 to 60, evidenced by the increase in the vote of the meeting.⁶³ He also said that the total number of deputies was about 120, the Soviet parties with over 100 deputies, while the Socialist-Revolutionaries and United Mensheviks were under 20. Actually, the highest vote recorded in the Congress was 123, while the maximum possible votes of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Republic were 83.

The original Kharkiv congress had been limited to workers and soldiers' organizations. The Kiev deputies, who joined the walk-out with the Bolsheviks, were altogether 112 men, representing 41 workers' and 8 soldiers' soviets.⁶⁴ Only 50 to 60 of these joined the body rivalling the Rada. The number of the Soviets represented cannot be established on the basis of the available documents. However, the fact emerges that the peasants were totally absent. The official name of the Congress adopted did not correspond to truth; there were no peasants' deputies at all. The 'Congress' which resulted was quite unrepresentative to the Ukraine.

The discussions leading to the constitution of the First

All-Ukrainian Congress are of some interest. The Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast party organization, and with it most of the former Kharkiv Congress, felt that with the coming of the October Revolution, 'when Russia began the direct transformation of economic relations to a socialist basis', the principle of self-determination had lost its timely revolutionary meaning, as there was left 'no one after the revolution to suppress other nationalities'. As far as the Ukraine was concerned, they allowed the possibility of self-determination, but they did not consider it at all possible to allow the entrance of the 'proletarian oblast' of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih basin into Ukrainian territory. The deputies from Kiev thought that the separation of the region from the Ukraine would mean the artificial creation of a purely agricultural region on the one hand, and a purely industrial region on the other, which would be harmful to the 'further development of the Socialist revolution', and that the formation of a separate republic would lead to the weakening of the 'spreading struggle against the petit-bourgeois and other counter-revolutionaries in the Ukraine.'

Shreiberg, a Bolshevik historian, states that the 'mix-up was becoming greater' through the fact that the 'Kharkivites had been given the sanction of the Central Committee of R.S.D.W.P. for the formation of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Republic', and there was at the same time one for the formation of an 'all-Ukrainian union in the interests of the common centralized struggle with the Central Rada'.⁹⁵

Myshkis again stated that, despite many common sessions of the Kiev and Kharkiv oblast committees of the Bolsheviks, and despite the common meetings of the deputies of both the Kiev Congress and of the Kharkiv Congress of Soviets of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast, the left-bank (Kharkiv) party organization remained adamant on the question of the 'independence (*vydeleniya*) of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Republic'. It was only in view of the 'immediate danger of attack by the Central Rada' that the organization refrained from realization of the measure for the time and decided to unite the Congress of Soviets of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast with

the delegates of the Kiev Congress. The United congress was called the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. The Khar-kiv and Donets Bolsheviks agreed to enter the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine elected by the Congress but 'did not take a great part in its work considering that this body had no immediate relationship to the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih region',⁹⁶ in the words of Myshkis. Ravich-Cherkasskiy, the earliest historian of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, also commented on the elections of the Committee. According to him, representatives of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Basin, connected primarily with the Katerynoslav gubernia with its Russian character of the workers, refused to take any part in the elections, or in the work of the Committee.⁹⁷

The united Congress elected its Central Executive Committee, which in its turn formed a 'government', the 'People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Republic'.⁹⁸ The Central Executive Committee consisted of 41 members, of whom 35 were members of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik), 4 Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, and 1 Russian Menshevik-Internationalist; there was only one member of a Ukrainian party which actually did not exist, a Ukrainian Left-Social-Democrat. There was in fact no Left Social-Democratic Party; at least there was not a single local organization of such a party, nor was there a central committee. The person involved was a Medvedev, who had been a member of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers Party, and had appeared as such in Kiev.⁹⁹ He does not seem to have had any serious influence in the party. Obviously, there was nothing to prevent him from describing himself as a Left Social-Democrat.

The Central Executive Committee was planned to consist of 61 members, with 20 members chosen by peasantry. The real difficulty of the Congress was the absence of any peasant deputies at all. This problem was solved by the reservation of 20 seats to be filled by peasants at a later All-Ukrainian Peasants' Congress,¹⁰⁰ comprising the present Peasants' Congress and the Rada of Peasants' Deputies which the

former had elected back in June. Anticipating events somewhat, we find that the Central Executive Committee announced in January 9 that the Peasants' Congress was appointed for January 28. The representational formula provided for the election of 3 deputies from each *povit*; these were to be elected at the *Povit* Peasants' Congresses. The latter were to take place under the 'direct leadership of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies,' and were to express the 'true will of the peasant poor'. This scheme was applied in the absence of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies; when it was present, a comparable elaborate formula was drawn up allowing representation to these bodies on the *povit* and gubernia level. Thus, Soviets of Peasants' Deputies uniting 25 to 50 thousand of peasants were entitled to one deputy, those of 50 to 75 thousand, 2 deputies, and 100 thousand, 1 deputy more.¹⁰¹

The entire scheme was vitiated by the absence of representation of the only mass organization of the Ukrainian peasantry existing at the time, the *Spilka*, which had been given limited recognition by the Bolsheviks as representative of the Ukrainian peasantry in the Kiev Congress. Soviets of Peasants' Deputies simply did not exist in the Ukraine, at this time, as was made plain when not a single peasants' organization in the Kiev Congress, to which the 'Soviets of Peasants' Deputies' had been summoned, followed the Bolshevik deputies out of the Congress. While some Soviets could have been formed for the occasion, the main mass of the peasantry, if only because of lack of time, would have had to be represented through the *povit* elections. Here too, the free will of the peasantry was circumscribed, as these were to be held under the 'leadership of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies'.

According to Fuks, a Bolshevik historian of the Soviet constitution, a total of 300 deputies was to have been provided by the scheme of representation. However, the total number of delegates who gathered for the Congress which opened on February 2 was only 78. Of these, 44 were Bolsheviks or professed to be sympathizing Bolsheviks; the rest leaned to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries.¹⁰² In view of the small number

of delegates, on the suggestion of the People's Secretariat the Congress decided to conduct itself not as a Congress but as the All-Ukrainian Peasants' Conference,¹⁰³ in the practice of the day, implying that its decisions were not obligatory for the peasantry but rather constituted the expression of a point of view.

The Conference passes two resolutions; one of these expressed gratitude to the People's Secretariat for their 'fearlessness in the struggle with the Kaledin-Ukrainian counter-revolution and approved their measures in political as well as economic fields. The other largely repeated the resolutions of the Kharkiv Congress, and declared, rather paradoxically for a peasants' conference, that the aim was not 'equality of all social classes', but 'equality of all toilers and a dictatorship of the proletariat, including the poorest peasants'.¹⁰⁴

Although the Conference was unrepresentative of the Ukrainian peasantry, the 78 members elected among themselves 20 members of a Central Executive Committee. It was unusual for a gathering calling itself a 'conference' rather than a 'congress' to take such decisive action on representation, but does not appear to have provoked any comment. However, the Conference provided, in obvious reference to its own irregularity and that of the Kharkiv Congress, that the 'lawful body of government' shall be the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies', which would be called soon.¹⁰⁵ The 20 members elected to the Central Executive Committee consisted of 10 Bolsheviks and 4 persons 'sympathizing with them', 2 persons whose party affiliations were unknown and 3 Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and their sympathizers.¹⁰⁶ It must be concluded that the Central Executive Committee was absolutely dominated by Russian parties, first and foremost by the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks), in the absence of Ukrainian parties. It was still meant to be the new legislative body of the Ukrainian National Republic. Returning to further consideration of the Kharkiv Congress, one finds that the official name of the Ukrainian National Republic as the description

of the regime was maintained.¹⁰⁷ The official gazette of the regime was the 'Herald of the Ukrainian National Republic', published in the Russian and in the Ukrainian editions.¹⁰⁸ Thus Fuks is surely wrong in stating that the decisions of the Khar'kiv Congress constituted the 'proclamation of the creation of the sovereign Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Republic',¹⁰⁹ expressing thereby the common ground of most Bolshevik historians. What was actually to be created was not a new state but a rival government; this is the implication of the Manifesto of the Congress and of the actions of the Russian Government.

In its resolution 'On the Organization of Power in Ukraine', the Congress proclaimed that 'power in the territory of the Ukrainian Republic belongs from now on exclusively to the Soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies, and in the centre to the All-Ukrainian Congress'. While the Ukraine was proclaimed to be the Republic of Soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies, the Congress 'authorized the Provisional Central Executive Committee of Ukraine to extend over the territory of the Ukrainian Republic all decrees and orders of the Workers'-Peasants' Government of the Federation having a common significance for the entire Federation—those on the soil, on the workers' control over production, on the full democratization of the army' and to proclaim as invalid orders of the Rada. The Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Bolsheviks were courted by a special resolution where the separatedness of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih was proclaimed as policy. Any partition of this territory, as attempted by the leaders of the Cossacks and the bourgeois Ukrainian republic was condemned, as leading to a weakening of both its productive forces, and 'of the union and might of the proletarian struggle'. The Congress would fight for the inclusion of the 'Donets basin within the limits of the Soviet republic'. By this, the principle of national self-determination was proclaimed as in fact inoperative upon the territory of the basin,¹¹⁰ while the Donets basin was put on a special footing in Ukrainian territory.

The Central Executive Committee issued a Manifesto

on December 27, condemning the policies of the Ukrainian Central Rada, stating that it had not been elected by the 'Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies', The Central Rada was trying to turn the Ukraine 'into a bourgeois republic'.

The Rada had refused to extend to the 'territory of the Ukrainian Republic' the decree on the land. It appears from the Manifesto that the Committee recognized that the Ukrainian Republic existed previous to their proclamations. The attempt to connect their own authority with the authority of the Ukrainian National Republic to appear as heirs of the Rada is particularly clear in the claim to government stated in the Manifesto.

In order to cut at the root the criminal policies of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which had the daring to act in the name of the toiling masses of Ukraine, the Congress of Soviets thought it necessary to take upon itself all fullness of state power in the Ukrainian National Republic.¹¹¹

The Executive Committee also sent a wireless message largely reiterating the arguments of the Manifesto. Again it emphasized that it was a new 'people's government (*vlast*) of the National Ukrainian Republic'. The wire also assured that the conflict between the Rada and the Soviet of People's Commissars would not come to the 'shedding of blood', and that the chauvinist and nationalist poison created by the Rada would cease and that Ukrainian soldiers would understand who defended their interests in reality, and 'would stop supporting the adventure of the petit-bourgeois Rada.'¹¹²

In reply to a telegram of greetings from the Committee, the Soviet of People's Commissars welcomed the 'formation in Kharkiv of the true people's Soviet power in the Ukraine'. The Soviet saw in this 'workers' and peasants' Rada' a true 'government of the National Ukrainian Republic'. It promised the new government of the 'fraternal republic' its support.¹¹³

Shreiberg, a Bolshevik historian, writing in *Letopis' Revoliutsii*, the historical journal of the Bolshevik party in the Ukraine, characterized the position of the People's Secretariat in this period as being 'contradictory and indefinite'. In this pe-

riod, he states, 'all-Ukrainian government constituted a centre without a periphery, a headquarters without an army, when it had neither the territory nor the population subjected to it, nor any armed force.' The weakness of the Ukrainian Central Committee was primarily a result of its lack of support by the population, and in some measure, to the continual and systematic resistance of the non-Kievan Bolsheviks to the Committee. The party workers of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih region ignored the Central Executive Committee and the People's Secretariat. Thus, Artem, who had entered the Committee on behalf of the group, was seldom present at meetings.¹¹⁴ According to Antonov 'hardly a day passed without a sharp conflict between the Committee and the Kharkiv members'. The Kharkivites refused to 'recognize the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih basin to be part of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.'¹¹⁵ The organization also refused to cooperate with the Central Executive Committee in everyday affairs; they would not even assign any office space to the Secretariat. In reply, the Central Executive Committee 'nationalized', on its own authority, some rooms and the printing shop of the newspaper *Yuzhnyi Kray* for its purposes. The Kharkiv Revolutionary Committee refused to recognize this nationalization and decided to resist it. This could be realized only with the armed forces of the Red Guard detachment from outside, under Antonov, acting against the orders of the Revolutionary Committee.¹¹⁶ The power of the Central Executive Committee did not extend, of course, over the city of Kharkiv, because control in the cities was lodged in the united Soviet of the city. This Soviet was largely under the sway of the Kharkiv Bolshevik party organization. The policy of excluding the Central Executive Committee from the exercise of power in Kharkiv was eventually expressed in a special resolution of the All-City Kharkiv Conference, stating that the Committee was the central Soviet power in Ukraine; their tasks were: 'state labours, political direction of all local Soviets, as well as realization of necessary revolutionary means in the localities where the Soviets were as yet weak.' The local power was to be the Soviets, which would direct the local work

in accordance with the general directions and directives of the Committee and the Secretariat. In particular, in Kharkiv, where the Central Executive Committee was described as remaining 'temporarily', all local matters were also to be solved by the local Soviet, while the task of the Bolsheviks would be to guarantee 'truly revolutionary activity' by the Soviets. Although 'all local matters' were reserved for the jurisdiction of the local Soviet under the leadership of the non-Kievan Bolsheviks, the Central Executive Committee still had 'the right to undertake measures of national significance, as well as acting for the Committee and the Secretariat'.¹⁷ Since the influence of the Committee hardly reached outside the city of Kharkiv for most of this period, where even the surrounding provincial centres had hostile garrisons, the limitation of the Committee to matters of 'state significance' in fact meant extreme restriction of its authority.

The situation of the Committee was not strengthened with the extension of occupation of the Ukraine by the troops commanded by Antonov. The local Bolshevik party units acting through the local Soviets pre-empted the government of the occupied territory.

On the other hand, Antonov's troops remained under his direct control, and by order of Lenin, under that of the Soviet of People's Commissars, and not under the Committee or the Secretariat. The helplessness of the Committee with regard to armed force was demonstrated early; as mentioned before, they were reduced to employ the armed help supplied by Antonov in occupying their own quarters.

The People's Secretariat was unable to recruit Ukrainian troops in their cause. They recruited only one unit in all, the detachment of 'Red Cossacks' formed after the disarming of the armoured division. It appears to have been the only unit in the army under Antonov's command which was formed upon Ukrainian territory. These were the two or three hundred soldiers formed out of part of two detachments of the armoured division, the Second Ukrainianized regiment in Kharkiv. The non-national character of these two units seemed

to arise from the manner of the recruitment. These two detachments were quartered separately from the main body of troops. They had cooperated with the armoured-train detachment commanded by Sivers and sent from Petrograd:¹¹⁸ in the middle of the night, some soldiers of these detachments, in agreement with the Russian troops, opened machine-gun fire on the windows of their sleeping regimental confreres: Sivers' detachment surrounded the regiment and disarmed it, as was discussed earlier. Some soldiers of the two detachments chose to remain under the orders of Antonov and Sivers. They were described by the then 'Secretary of Military Affairs', Shakhrai, as 'Red Cossacks' (*Chervone Kozatstvo*); however, they were still further mixed with Russian troops under Antonov, and were put under the command of Petrograd commander Primakov, who integrated them with his Petrograd detachment. To these, Antonov added more soldiers. The original group was already in a minority at the time when their advance against Kiev was ordered; the total of the mixed group was about 500 men when they left.¹¹⁹ These two or three hundred troops were of course numerically insignificant among the troops proceeding against Ukrainian authorities. The origin of the 'Red Cossacks' has certain unclear elements. The strangest of all is the concentration of troops with Bolshevik leanings in two separate detachments, and their attack on their confreres. A more sensible course for the 'Bolshevization' of the units would be a *general* disintegration of the regiment, followed by the formation of a group which would proclaim its *neutrality*, eventual proclamation of neutrality by the whole regiment, and finally, the regiments' *dissolution*. With the loss of all regimental loyalty and of a common ground, actual enmity could develop. This process occurred in a sufficiently great number of regiments in Russia and elsewhere to describe it as typical. Thus it is likely that the detachments in question were fatigue brigades, or may have been incorporated comparatively late. As it may be, the 'People's Secretariat' did not have the 'Red Cossacks' under its orders. Officially, the 'Red Cossacks' were founded shortly before the fall of Kiev on Feb-

ruary 2, as a volunteer group, by a decree of the 'People's Commissariat for Military Affairs'.¹²⁰ Before the decree, the unit was simply under the command of Muravyov and Antonov; five weeks after the decree, the 1st Red Ukrainian regiment renamed itself by vote of soldiers "First Workers' Peasants' Socialist Regiment of the Red Army," cutting off the umbilical cord tying it in any manner to the Ukraine.¹²¹

The Central Executive Committee and the People's Secretariat thus had no power of their own. Their existence and attributes were pervaded by a sort of unreality, according to Lapchinskiy, a leading member of both these institutions.¹²² This was expressed particularly clearly by Shakhrai, the People's Secretary for Military Affairs, in conversation with the sympathizing Lapchinskiy, his colleague in the Secretariat as a whole. Shakhrai expressed his view as follows:

What sort of Ukrainian government is that whose members do not know nor do not want to know the Ukrainian language? Who do not only lack any influence among the Ukrainian community, but whose very names were not even heard by it earlier? What sort of 'Ukrainian Military Minister' am I when all Ukrainianized units in Kharkiv have to be disarmed by me as they do not want to go with me for the defence of the Soviet power? For the entire military support for our struggle against the Central Rada, we have only the army brought to the Ukraine from Russia by Antonov, which look upon everything Ukrainian as inimical, counter-revolutionary?¹²³

Skiyarenko, a Bolshevik historian of the East-European Revolution, agrees with the conclusion that the People's Secretariat did not have an army of its own, in the period studied, and indeed through the rest of the life of the People's Secretariat did not in fact have a new army at its disposition; the latter had only begun to form.' Skiyaenko mentions that the decree on the organization of the 'Workers'-Peasants' Socialist Army in Ukraine' was issued on February 2. It appears, from Skiyaenko's presentation, that the People's Secretariat was either not particularly interested in a force of its own or saw itself as incapable of organizing one. According to him,

the 'complicated . . . work on the formation of the detachments had been entrusted to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, and to Committees of the armed units of the old army, which did not have sufficient experience in this matter.' It would seem that those who were entrusted with the organization of a military force for the Central Executive Committee and the People's Secretariat was not efficient either. The difficulty for the People's Secretariat had been further confounded, according to Sklyarenko, by the fact that certain Party and Soviet workers were 'taking the course of maintaining the Red Guard instead of the regular army'.¹²⁴ One may conclude that the actual fighting force to establish Soviet authority in the territory of the Ukrainian Republic was the Russian Army under the direct order of the Russian Government, while the Central Executive Committee and the People's Secretariat of the Ukraine did not possess any significant force of its own for the period of the Republic's formation.

The Soviet of People's Commissars ignored the Central Executive Committee and the People's Secretariat, failing to even keep up appearances of regard for their 'sovereignty' in holding direct relations, and negotiating with the Ukrainian authorities of the Republic.

The negotiations whose consequence was a renewed statement of recognition for the Ukrainian Republic, were held in Kiev, through Proshyan, a member of a peasants' congress in Petrograd.

In the resolution of the Soviet of People's Commissars reached on January 1, 1918, and published on January 3, it was stated that it had been taken into consideration that 'official representatives of the Rada' had expressed their willingness to begin negotiations with the Soviet of People's Commissars, on the basis, among other things, of 'recognition by the Soviet of People's Commissars of the independence of the National Ukrainian Republic'; that the Soviet of People's Commissars had 'always and unequivocally recognized the right of each nation, including the Ukrainian one, for an independent state existence'. The Soviet also pointed out its belief

that only the power of the Soviets in the Ukraine would make 'conflicts between brotherly nations impossible'. The Soviet of People's Commissars held, 'at the same time', that it would be opportune to 'open business-like negotiations with the Rada' with the 'aim of removing the conflicts'. The Soviet thus reached the decision to offer the Rada negotiations 'on the basis of the mentioned principles'.¹²³

Thus, the Soviet of People's Commissars, on behalf of Soviet Russia, expressed again its 'recognition of the independence of the National Ukrainian Republic', in early January 1918, inexplicably appointing at the same time a 'Commissar' for the Ukraine, a certain Ordzhonikidze,¹²⁴ a native of Georgia, whose knowledge of the Ukraine, and whose contacts with the Ukraine were minimal, while his influence and popularity could be described as being nil. Nevertheless, Soviet Russia had again recognized the Ukraine on the eve of the peace conference of Brest-Litovsk, in early January 1918.

NOTES

1. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 533.
2. Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-8.
3. Manilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 359-60.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 386.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 386-8.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 393.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 393.
8. Sh(reiberg), S. (ed.), "Iz istorii Sovvlasti na Ukraine. (O pervom Vseukrainskom s'yezde Sovetov i pervom Sovetskom pravitel'stve Ukrainy)", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 4, 1924, pp. 166-85, p. 172. The transcript of negotiations is found in: Manilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 531-4. For the same text in English see, "Stalin's Negotiation on Behalf of the Soviet Government with the Ukraine, November 30, 1917 and Conversation with Bakinskiy: Suppressed Text," *The New Review*, No. 6, 1963, pp. 4-12.
9. R.S.F.S.R., *Dekrety Sovetskoy Vlasti*, 2. Vols., Moscow, 1957-9, Vol. I, p. 169.
10. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 47.
11. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 550.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 543.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 550-2.
14. Rubach, M. A., "K istorii ukrainsky revolyutsii. (Zametki i dokumenty; dekabir' 1917 — yanvar' 1918 g.), *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 6, 1926, pp. 7-35, p. 7. The recognition that the Ukraine as a whole was united, that there was no social split, is common in the Bolshevik historiography during the relatively free period of the twenties. Thus, Popov, the historian of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, characterized this period as one 'when our (Bolshevik) party had almost no support in the Ukrainian masses,' see, Popov, N., *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii (Bil'shovykiu) Ukrainy*, 3rd ed., Kharkiv, 1930, p. 132. This view was also general among the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine at the time. Zatonsky, a leading member of the Bolshevik party, stated without any contradiction, in the session of the Congress of the Russian S.D.W.P. (Bolsheviks) of the South-Western Oblast, held in mid-December 1917, "For the time being there is no split among Ukrainians, nor does one appear likely, and for this reason,

- (we have) to lead the struggle against the Ukrainian nation, while of the Bolsheviks there is but a tiny (*nevelychka*) smattering (*kupka*)", see, *Ibid.*, p. 138.
15. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 436.
 16. Lapchinskiy, G., "Borot'ba za Kyiv — Sichen' 1918 r.", *Letopys Revolyutsii*, No. 2, 1928, pp. 209-219, p. 218.
 17. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 437.
 18. Korolivsky, S., *Pershyi z'izd rad Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1957, p. 49.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 52. The same estimate is reached in the study by Fuks; see Fuks, S. L., "Velyka Zhovtneva sotsialistychna revolyutsiya i stvorennya ukrains'koj derzhavy", in Korots'ky, V. M. et al. (eds.), *Istoriya derzhavy i prava Ukrain'skoi RSR (1917-1960)*, Kiev, 1961, pp. 5-155, p. 63.
 20. "Otchety o vseukrainskom s'ezde sovetov", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1928, pp. 257-92, p. 267.
 21. The anonymous Bolshevik writer, signing his name Sh.S (Shreiberg. S?), wrote: "The question of leaving the Congress . . . arose only after the receipt of the Ultimatum"; see, "Otchety o vseukrainskom s'ezde sovetov", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1928, pp. 257-92, p. 264.
 22. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 438.
 23. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 69.
 24. Tcherikover, I., *Antisemitizm i pogromy na Ukraine 1917-1918-1919*, Berlin, 1923, p. 45.
 25. Lapchinskiy, G., "Z pershykh dniv vseukrains'koi radyan's'koi vlady", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, Nos. 5-6, 1927, pp. 45-67, p. 64.
 26. For this, see the discussion of the Congress in Kharkiv below.
 27. It is of interest that the simultaneous calling of a Congress in Kharkiv is usually passed off without a comment by the newer Bolshevik historians; for instance, see Likhohol, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
 28. Lenin, V. I., *Polnoe sobraniy sochineniy*, 5th ed., Vol. 35, Moscow, 1962, pp. 115-6.
 29. R.S.F.S.R., *op. cit.*, pp. 154-5.
 30. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-4.
 31. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-70.
 32. *Novyi Luch*, December 23, 1917 (January 5, 1918, in Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin, "Akten betreffend: Allgemeine Angelegenheiten (der Ukraine)", 1918, Document No. A 8103. This file is cited as *Ukraine* below.
 33. The orders were issued on December 14, by Berzin, stationed at Gomel, north of the Ukrainian border; general orders for the attack were given in Order No. 9 by the

- War-Revolution Committee (Revolutionary Staff) at the Highest Command of the Russian Army, in Mohilev; see, Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.
34. It appears from the latest publication of the document in the fifth edition of Lenin's works, that the text of the Manifesto itself was written by Lenin, while the ultimative demands had been drafted by Trotsky; these ultimative demands had been revised in draft by Lenin and Stalin; see, Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 35, p. 468. For a short discussion of the question of authorship of the document see, Borys, *op. cit.*, p. 165 n.
 35. R.S.F.S.R., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 178-9; also, Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 35, pp. 143-5.
 36. Sullivant, R. S., *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957*, New York, 1962 p. 26, pp. 27-9.
 37. Genkina, E. B., *Obrazovanie SSSR*, Moscow, 1927, p. 31.
 38. Starushenko, G., *The Principle of National Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1963, p. 95.
 39. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
 40. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
 41. Sadovsky, V., *Natsional'na polityka Sovitiv na Ukraini*, Warsaw, 1937, (Ukrainian Scientific Institute, Warsaw, Pratsi, Vol. XXXIX), p. 80.
 42. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 85-6.
 43. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
 44. Lapchinskiy, G., "Z pershykh dnyv vseukrains'koi radyans'koi vlady", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, Nos. 5-6, pp. 46-77, p. 64.
 45. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 71.
 46. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 438.
 47. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 216; Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 122-3.
 48. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 122-3.
 49. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 216.
 50. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 124.
 51. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 439. The statement of Kulik is found in: "Otchety of vseukrainskom s'ezde sovetov", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1928, pp. 257-92, p. 271.
 52. *Ibid.*, pp. 274-5; also Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 70-1.
 53. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 70.
 54. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 440.
 55. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol II, p. 72.
 56. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
 57. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-3.
 58. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-4.
 59. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

60. Radkey, O. U., *The Sickle under the Hammer. The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*, New York, 1963, p. 310
61. For the sending of various commanders for the offensive, see, Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 29. The defeats of the Russian troops attempting to advance against Ukrainian forces from the South-Western Front are discussed in some detail by Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 130-1. Antonov concluded in his memoirs: 'The Highest Command apparently was not able to manage the front, and it dissolved almost unused, left to itself.... One could not count on the pressure towards Kiev from the West', see *Ibid.*, p. 131. The arrest of the Bolshevik leader of the South-Western Front, Chudnovskiy, has been referred to by Jenkins in his reports, above.
62. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 32.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
65. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 197.
66. Ezhov, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
67. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin, "Akten Krieg 1914. Unternehmungen und Aufwiegelingen gegen unsere Feinde in ther Ukraine", 1918, Doc. No. A 147. This file is cited as *Unternehmungen* below. Also, *Idem.*, "Akten betreffend: Allgemeine Angelegenheiten Russlands", 1918, Doc. No. A 659, pp. 33-4. This file is cited as *Russland* below.
68. The statement of the Odessa Rada is incorporated in the text referred to in Note 70.
69. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 43627; also *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43790; also, 1918, Doc. No. A 900; also *Ibid.*, Doc. A 659, pp. 26-7.
70. For the appeal of the Central Executive Committee at Odessa see *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. 43659; also *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659, pp. 26-7; also *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 900; also (in English), "Capture of the Ukrainian Capital by Russian Troops", *The New Review*, No. 1, 1964, pp. 40-1. For the protest by the Kherson Gubernia Rada, and associated organizations see, *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 147; also, *Russland*, Doc. No. A 659, pp. 32-3.
71. The pro-Bolshevik appeals have been gathered by Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. *in passim.* ..
72. The matter is discussed in some detail in Chapter VII.
73. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 441.
74. See below.

75. Lapchinskiy, G., "Z pershykh dnyv vseukrains'koi radyan-s'koi vlyady", *Letopis Revolyutsii*, Nos. 5-6, 1927, pp. 46-67, p. 67.
76. Antonov, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 46.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 51. This text is absent from the editions of Lenin's works.
78. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 50, pp. 17-8.
79. Antonov, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 85.
80. This fact is discussed elsewhere.
81. Antonov, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 53. The detachment of Khovrin bore the name 'First Petrograd Union Detachment'; see, *Ibid.*, p. 53.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-5.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-8.
86. Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, op. cit., pp. 7-9.
87. Stalin, I. V., *Sochineniya*, 13 Vols., Moscow, 1946-53, Vol. IV, pp. 6-14.
88. Korolivskiy, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 468-70.
89. *Ibid.*, pp. 569-70.
90. Sh(reiberg), S. (ed.), "Iz istorii Sovvlasti na Ukraine. (O pervom Vseukrainskom s'ezde Sovetov i pervom Sovetskomy pravitel'stve Ukrainy)", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 4, pp. 166-85, p. 173.
91. Myshkis, op. cit., p. 247.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 292n.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 283.
95. Sh(reiberg), S., op. cit., p. 172. The matter of sanctions is discussed in greater detail below.
96. Myshkis, op. cit., p. 248.
97. Ravich-Cherkasskiy, M., *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy Partii (bol'shevikov) Ukrainy*, Kharkiv, 1923, p. 48.
98. Georgadze, M. P. et al. (eds.), *S'ezdy Sovetov Soyuza SSR, soyuznykh i avtonomnykh sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh republik*, Vol. I-II, Moscow, 1959-60, Vol. II, p. 13. The Soviet government described itself as the 'provisional Workers'-Peasants' Government in the persons of the People's Secretaries of the Ukrainian National Republic' in their appeal of January 6, 1918; see Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, op. cit., p. 279.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 13. On the role of Medvedev in Kiev, see his reminiscences, Medvedev, Ye. H., "Z Kharkova do Kyieva i nazad (Epizod)," *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1928, pp.

241-4. It appears that Medvedev took part in the meeting of the Kiev organization of the Ukrainian S.D.W.P. in mid-December 1917, but his identity as a Bolshevik had been established by Vynnychenko on that occasion.

100. Fuks, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
101. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 284-5.
102. Fuks, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
104. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 300-1.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
106. Fuks, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
107. Georgadze, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 12n.
108. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 583.
109. Fuks, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
110. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 575-8; also Georgadze, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 15-6; p. 18.
111. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 584-7.
112. *Ibid.*, pp. 589-90.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 594.
114. Sh(reiberg), S., *op. cit.*, p. 175.
115. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 172.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
117. Pavlyuk and Ryadnyna, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
118. Sh(reiberg), S., *op. cit.*, p. 184.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
120. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 51-2.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
122. Lapchinskiy describes the stay of the People's Secretariat in Kharkiv as 'to a certain extent, an emigré situation,' see Lapchinskiy, G., "Pershyi period radyans'koi vlady na Ukraini VTsKu ta Narodniy Sekretariyat (spohady)", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1928, pp. 159-75, p. 160.
123. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-2.
124. Sklyarenko, Ye. M., *Borot'ba trudyashchykh Ukrainy proty nimets'ko-avstriys'kykh okupantiv i het'manshchyny v 1918 rotsi*, Kiev, 1960, p. 27.
126. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 9.
125. R.S.F.S.R., *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 263-5.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RECOGNITION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC BY THE CENTRAL POWERS, AND THE BREST-LITOVSK CONFERENCE

German-Ukrainian relations, of one form or another, appear to be a constant and an important element in East-European history, as has been demonstrated convincingly by Doroshenko.¹ Austria-Hungary and Turkey had also been quite conscious of the existence of the Ukraine, all the more since the former was dominating a part of Ukrainian territory, while the latter had done so in the past; Bulgaria too had a long history of relations with the Ukraine and had been reminded of them quite recently by Drahomanov and his students.

In the actual circumstances of the war and, later, revolution, the more important the Ukraine might loom on the international horizon, the more adventuresome any policy of the Central Powers to force Russia to disgorge it would appear. While Russia might be willing *in extremis* to let Poland go, the sacrifice of the Ukraine might mean the end of Russia as a great power, hardly a policy to be seriously considered unless Russia was to be completely defeated.

Fritz Fischer has demonstrated in a recent study that Germany and her allies did attempt, though secretly and somewhat erratically, to further the liberation movements of the non-Russian nationalities,² as well as to support the Bolsheviks; thought was given to sabotage, as well. However, after the first flush of the expected easy victories, which did not materialize, had passed, first Austria-Hungary, and then Germany, largely curtailed their interest in non-Russian nations (except for Poland under German occupation). Gener-

ally speaking, German interest in the Ukraine continued on a slight level in the financing of a Ukrainian Bureau in Lausanne, under Stepankivsky, contributions to the Ukrainian Bureau in Vienna, again under Stepankivsky, and eventually, a Ukrainian Bureau in Stockholm, under Mykola Zaliznyak, a Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary, in exile. These bureaus gathered information, mostly from the Russian and Ukrainian papers available in the neutral countries, as well as from the world press. Occasionally, the bureaus had been able to receive direct reports from the Ukraine or Russia; none of the reports had come from any governmental source. The Lausanne bureau had published a small newspaper, *L'Ukraine*, appearing rather irregularly. Germans had also supported, at first jointly with Austria-Hungary, a small group of individuals associated as the Union of Liberation of the Ukraine, formed mostly by Ukrainian Social-Democrats, with Skoropys-Yoltukhivsky and Melevsky, formerly members of the *Spilka*, and V. Doroshenko carrying between them the bulk of the work. The Union was engaged in national propaganda among Ukrainian prisoners-of-war as well as occasional attempts at diplomacy with indifferent results; despite statements to the contrary, the examination of German archives of the Foreign Office shows that the Union definitely did not engage in espionage. In the progress of the revolution, the Union announced that it considered its international tasks completed and stopped issuing pronouncements on behalf of Ukrainian nation.¹

The consequence of these German activities was that Berlin was extremely well acquainted with the internal events in the Ukraine, and Russia; during the early stages of the revolution the knowledge could be said to be on a week-to-week basis, later day-to-day, with a delay, if any, of a few days. It must be stressed that a very close examination of the archives fails to indicate any contact whatsoever between the Central Powers and responsible officials in the Ukraine before the actual peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. This fact is noted and condemned by Mykola Zaliznyak, in a good posi-

tion to know who had tried to establish contact; he succeeded in obtaining only the views of his brother, Volodymyr Zaliznyak. The latter, a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, had met on his own initiative, in late September 1917, Vasylo, a Ukrainian politician in Austria-Hungary, the leader of the group of the Reichsrat deputies from Bukovyna. Volodymyr Zaliznyak suggested to Vasylo, in reports subsequently given by the latter to Berlin, and presumably to Vienna, that 'now any attempt for an understanding with the Central Rada would be pointless (*zwecklos*).'³ Zaliznyak had also given the report on the 'Suggestions on the Strivings for Separation of Russian Ukrainians', which included further support of the bureau run by his brother, further publication of pamphlets, and money for support of the 'newspapers, and the printing shop of the party in Kiev'.⁴ Germans followed the advice of avoiding contact with the Ukrainian emergent government, but ignored the advice to send money to Mykola Zaliznyak; there is no record of any money paid, although full records of other money expended appears in the archives. The internal evidence suggests that the reports themselves had been drafted by Vasylo. Zaliznyak's brother-in-law, Okhrymovych, appears to have been his other contact in the Ukraine. The Union appears to have had a few contacts in the Ukraine, but not with any Ukrainian official. The archives contain only one suggestion by a German official, Steinwachs, to subsidize a Ukrainian party, in a late reference of January 1918, where he asks that '100 or even 200,000 rubles be sent over our safe way to the Social-Democratic party in Kiev', in a letter to Minister Bergen.⁵ No funds had in fact been authorized by the Foreign Office for any Social-Democratic party in Kiev, while of course references to the subventions to the Bolsheviks in the Foreign Office archives suggest very strongly that this was the ministry through which subventions of the sort would be made. In fact, the Ukrainian government refused to accept a loan from the Central Powers even after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.⁶ This

matter has been discussed in such detail in order to see that the policy of Germany, and other Central powers, was limited through choice or necessity to gathering of information and influencing, to a certain degree, public opinion in neutral countries.⁷

It was on the eve of the establishment of the Ukrainian Republic, in early November 1917, that the policy of Germany, and her allies, underwent a transformation and moved towards the recognition of the Ukrainian state.

The eve of the establishment of the Ukrainian Republic brought a large number of important reports to Berlin whereby the leading German officials were informed on the gravity of events. On November 4, Berlin received the news of October 29, from Sevastopol via the Ukrainian Bureau in Bern, that after the Provisional Government had given the cruiser *Svetlana* of the Baltic Fleet permission for 'Ukrainianization', immediately 'all war-ships of the Black Sea Fleet' raised the Ukrainian flag.⁸ The news was corroborated from Stockholm, citing the Russian newspaper *Russkaya Volya*; it was also stated that the 'Black Sea Committee had decided to recruit only Ukrainian seamen for the future'.⁹ Further reports, arriving in Berlin on November 8 (and read by Bussche, among others), stated that Kerensky had authorized in mid-October the Ukrainianization of fifteen more divisions.¹⁰ The news was also received of complaints of Ukrainian delegates against Russians in the Democratic Assembly,¹¹ while the Declaration of Vynnychenko in the Small Rada, given on October 12, was studied in Berlin as well. German officials underlined the passage stating that the General Secretariat . . . would direct itself in its activity by the principles and directives worked out by the Ukrainian democracy.¹² The news of the formation of the committee for the drafting and examining of the draft law on the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly had also reached Berlin by November 8,¹³ as well as the view of the Russian newspaper *Utro Rossii* that the demand of separation of the Ukraine from Russia had been clearly expressed in the meeting of October 23.¹⁴ Berlin also noted that the French

Military Sanitary Mission had 'made an official visit to the Ukrainian General Secretariat', while the calling of the all-Ukrainian Military Congress was noted as well.¹⁵ On November 2, the Foreign Office had a report from Orenshtayn, a Jewish bookseller from Kolomyia, who had spent most of the year in Kiev, and claimed to have as his acquaintances some leading Ukrainians in Kiev, Nikovsky, Doroshenko, Matushkevsky, Chebeko and others. Orenshtayn was attempting to win the German Foreign Office over to his plan to publish works of Shevchenko and other Ukrainian writers, as well as post-cards, in the interest of Ukrainian national-cultural propaganda, with German money; thus his report could well have been influenced by these considerations. He stated that 'as I have seen, the Ukrainian leaders were for the most part friends and admirers of Germany', and that Vynnychenko, in particular, was attacked as a Germanophile by the Russian press. He had also gained the fullest persuasion that the Ukraine would become independent for certain. He held that Ukrainians thus stood on the standpoint of independence and that 'all decisions on the association of the Ukraine to the federative Russian Republic were but decisions for appearances and expressed for tactical reasons.' Orenshtayn had also described himself as an admirer of the Ukrainian movement, stating that he had been sent to Siberia for pro-Ukrainian activity. He concluded that Germany had no enemies in the 'peoples of Russia' with exception of the Poles who 'were the bitterest enemies of Germans'.¹⁶ It should be noted that this report, coming at a crucial period, had been closely studied by Kuehlmann; at any rate, the decision to subsidize Orenshtayn by 500,000 Marks was reached by Kuehlmann in the time that the vastly more important question of German attitude towards the *de facto* independent Ukraine was being decided.¹⁷

Important changes had occurred in Germany. Hertling came in as the new Chancellor, replacing Michaelis on November 1. A crown council was held on November 2 and 3 at which the agenda was planned for the meeting with Austro-

Hungarians. The Ukraine was not discussed; but it was decided that autonomous Lithuania was to be enlarged by the regions of Vilna and Grodno as well as the territory between Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk.¹⁸ That the Ukrainian interests were being ignored at this point is clearly shown by the provisional decision taken at the meeting in Vienna, where Germany and Austria-Hungary appeared to agree on the transfer of Galicia to Poland, if the 'Austro-Hungarian solution of the Polish question was to prevail.'¹⁹

The situation had changed with the outbreak of the Bolshevik coup at Petrograd, at the height of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The Bolsheviks appear to have established immediate direct contact with the German government, potentially undermining the Ukrainians, who had no such contact. The Russians had informed Germans 'via Stockholm, immediately after their assumption of power', according to Czernin's informant in Stockholm, Des Fours, that if Germans were to make overly heavy conditions, they would be overthrown by the bourgeois reaction which would attempt, in union with Japan, to rebuild the front against Germany.²⁰ These Russian demands would check, it would appear, the immediate support of the Central Powers for the Ukraine. Germans did not believe in the permanence of the new Russian regime: Kuehlmann, writing from Stockholm to Lersner, the representative of the Foreign Office at the Command, said that he doubted that the new government could maintain itself longer than a few weeks, while asking for 15 million Marks in support of the Bolsheviks, on November 9, the money being authorized the next day.²¹

Czernin took the initiative in the peace-making with Russia, while attempting to ignore the Ukraine. Thus, he sent a memorandum to Hertling, approved by the latter, that the Central Powers must accept the proposal of Lenin for a general peace without annexations and contributions; with the Entente refusing to go along, the Central Powers could reach separate peace negotiations with Russia. He also pointed out

that the proclamation of the right of self-determination for 'non-Russian nations in Russia', would allow them to decide the future of 'Courland, Livonia and of Finland in the peace negotiations.'²²

Under these circumstances, Kuehlmann took decisive action towards Germany's ally, in favor of the Ukraine. The German government had thus reached a decision, by November 11 or 12, that the Ukrainian state was a reality, achieved by the gradual strengthening of the Ukrainian autonomous state, of the rising Ukrainian army and fleet, and the anarchy prevailing in Russia proper. Germany's action was taken at the time when the German press (*Koelnische Zeitung*, among others) reported on November 8 that the conditions in the Ukraine were 'very unstable (*Im Fluss sind*)'.²³ Thus, Kuehlmann wired Wedel, German Ambassador in Vienna, directions based on Czernin's views on the 'answer to the Soviet'. He observed that Czernin thought it was very important that Russia had given 'all its nationalities the right of free self-determination' and that under such circumstances 'I would have to negotiate, apparently, no longer with Russia but with the "liberated nations".' In the German view, the 'emancipation of the nationalities of Russia' was extraordinarily important; this was to be encouraged, especially 'at the present time, to the full extent of our capabilities.' These nationalities 'must be won for us if possible'. Ignoring at this point the nations mentioned by Czernin, Kuehlmann stated that 'Ukrainians were not to be left out of the view' (originally, he had put down the stronger phrase, 'the Ukraine takes here the first place'). Kuehlmann pointed out Ukrainian objections to Austro-Hungarian policy; these objections might be in the way of Ukrainian friendship. It was known that Ukrainians had been dissatisfied till then that 'no distinction was made on the Austrian part between the Polish and the Ruthenian Galicia, in the treatment of Galicia regarding the Polish question.' Thus, Wedel was instructed to ask Czernin 'whether special treatment of Eastern Galicia in the sense of satisfaction of Ruthenian wishes' was not in the Austrian-German

interest. (Again, the original was stronger: Wedel was told that 'it would be extraordinarily advantageous' if Count Czernin could obtain a government decree or at least an agreement towards it, presumably satisfying Ukrainian wishes.) Hertling observed in a note to the wire that 'Ukrainians had a certain influence, especially upon our leftist parties' which could make trouble in a solution of the Polish question.²⁴ Thus, an agreement with the Ukraine was seen to involve not only the internal affairs of Austro-Hungary, but of Germany as well.

Reports began to come in to Berlin on the situation in the former Russian empire, after the Bolshevik coup. Riezler wrote from Stockholm on November 12, in a report arriving on November 15, that there was confusion in the country, and foretold the establishment of dictatorship. If the Bolsheviks were to hold power even a few days, the report concluded, the country would 'leave the World War militarily and economically.' The Ukraine was not mentioned.²⁵ Rosen wrote from the embassy at The Hague that Petrograd was at peace, while fighting was in progress in Moscow. He also referred to the beginnings of national resistance. The Cossacks were said to be organizing themselves.²⁶

In Vienna, Wedel saw Czernin and wired back to Hertling, on November 16 that Czernin did not misunderstand the importance of supporting the 'Ukrainian movement', and that he agreed 'in principle with the standpoint of your Excellency.' For the present moment however, he had declared that he was obliged to be 'cautious in promises' since he urgently required the support of the Poles of the Delegation, the main committee of the Reichsrat. There were 12 Polish deputies to 2 Ukrainian, he pointed out. However, Wedel reported in an underlined passage that the opportunity would offer itself to 'show consideration for Ukrainians and to assure them of as satisfying a special position as possible in the regulation of the Galician matter.' For the time being, Ukrainians rejected belonging to the Polish state altogether. Czernin believed that he could satisfy both the Poles and Ukrainians.²⁷ In this manner Czernin resisted German pressure for the time being, but

was given notice on the German policy in the matter. The ground was being prepared for friendly relations with the Ukraine and for an eventual recognition and a new relationship with the Ukrainian state.

On the same day, Wedel wrote to Berlin another report describing the complete break between the Ukrainian representation in Austria-Hungary and the government, on the question of union of all of Galicia with Poland: an agreement which had in fact lapsed in the new situation. On November 14 and 15, the meeting of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation had taken place, in which it was decided to fight any attempt to join Galicia to the Polish state formation with all possible means, within Parliament as well as without.²⁸ Vasylo, the leader of the representation of Ukrainians of Bukovyna, close to Czernin, had also declared that if the published reports were true, there was 'no other way for Ukrainians in Austria than the hope for assistance by the Entente in the peace conference.'²⁹

On November 16, Berlin had also received from Wedel the text of Declaration of the General Secretariat, again; the passage was particularly noted where the General Secretariat stated that it would 'make all efforts in order to ensure the participation of the representatives of the Ukrainian people in the peace conference', as well as the passage on the Ukrainian troops. The Declaration was consulted widely, by Busche, Stumm and the chancery, while copies of it were sent to the Command.³⁰ A further report was evidence of a solid organization of the lower levels of government, in the description of the meeting of the gubernia and povit commissars under the chairmanship of Vynnychenko.³¹

Further belated news on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict of late October arrived from the German embassy at Stockholm on November 18. More important, the report referred to the mass of Ukrainian soldiers, which were said to be 3,000,000 strong. The actual number of Ukrainian divisions was not known; however, the 24th Corps was supposed to consist of

110,000 men, all Ukrainians. The report also mentioned that Military Commissars of the Provisional Government, on the South-Western front, had been dismissed by the Ukrainian military. The report also stated that an 'anarchical and revolutionary Russia would not be able to hold the Ukraine, or the rest of non-Russian nations'. This condition, however, was described as being temporary.³²

The warnings not to take the Bolshevik regime in Russia too seriously, or the Bolshevik domination as permanent, continued to come in. Hans Eckardt, a steady informant of the foreign Office on the nationality affairs of the former Russian Empire, wrote on November that the 'domination of the Bolsheviks was rather uncertain.' The Bolsheviks were only a phase, he said. Eckardt mentioned resistance to the Bolsheviks outside the 'northern centres'; he wrote that their 'government was not recognized in the provinces'.³³

The Third Universal, proclaiming the Ukrainian Republic was picked up by the German military wireless facilities, when sent by the Kiev wireless station on November 21 as an order to the Army and Fleet units, countersigned by Petlura as the General Commissar of the Ukrainian Republic for Military Affairs.³⁴ A separate order was issued to the Black Sea Fleet to greet the Republic by a gun salute.³⁵ The Third Universal stated that the allies and the enemies were to be urged towards peace.

The Third Universal appeared in a view of the 'propaganda situation of the Eastern front' of November 22. The Foreign Office, however, received the text of the Third Universal badly mangled on November 24. That text stated incorrectly that the General Secretariat believed the 'Government of People's Commissars in Petrograd had the majority of the population behind it', and that the General Secretariat would 'negotiate with the allies and the enemies concerning peace', while having some reservations on the *modus procedendi* in the negotiations for armistice and the peace.³⁶ The correct summary of the Third Universal from army sources was received by the Foreign Office on November 25.³⁷

Three days later, the news of the Republic was corroborated by a press reports of November 25 in the world press.³⁸

Ukrainian demands in the expected peace negotiations were learned by Germany (and other powers) on November 26. According to the Ukrainian Bureau in Bern, citing sources in Kiev, the Ukrainian political parties declared their task to be to unite 'all Ukrainian territories of Russia, Austria and Hungary' within the borders of an 'independent, indivisible Ukraine.'³⁹ In the meantime, German officials, apparently in expectation of a firmly defined policy, adopted an expectantly friendly attitude towards Ukrainian demands. Thus, when member Kolessa of the Austrian Reichsrat, presented complaints of the Ukrainian population in Eastern Galicia against Austro-Hungarian and German troops, which ordinarily would have been brushed off, German Ambassador Wedel, immediately transmitted the complaints to Berlin, and asked that 'in view of the political situation, it was particularly important at this time to avoid any friction' between German troops and Ukrainians. Berlin requested the military offices to show 'greatest possible consideration to the wishes of the Ukrainian population.' Berlin forwarded Wedel's report to the Command.⁴⁰

Further information arrived in Berlin on the events of early November in Kiev, with a report on the order of the All-Ukrainian Rada of Military Deputies to the soldiers of the Kievan District, to refuse to carry out the orders of the newly appointed General Kwiecinski. Vynnychenko's report to the Third all-Ukrainian Military Congress was also carried. There was also a report that some ministers of the Provisional Government intended to dissolve the General Secretariat if the report of Vynnychenko should prove unsatisfactory.⁴¹ German officials could appreciate the crisis in Russo-Ukrainian relations pointing to a possible Ukrainian independence.

In the meantime, the new Russian government stated by wireless its readiness for peace. On November 23, all army units had been invited by Petrograd to begin any armistice negotiations on their own initiative. Shortly after, Russian delegates had crossed German lines and agreed with the Ger-

man Northern Army command to have negotiations on an armistice. Czernin for Austria-Hungary, and Hertling for German expressed their willingness for discussions on the basis indicated by Russia, on November 29. This had been expressed in the Russian declaration of November 28 as follows: 'A just and democratic peace should be an immediate peace without annexations and contributions'.⁴² On December 2, Russians and Germans met again to discuss an armistice. The armistice was in fact agreed upon December 5, to start on December 7 and to last for ten days.

The armistice applied only to the Russian part of the front. According to Hoffmann, troops on the southern part of the front 'would recognize the right of the Petrograd Bolshevik delegation to conclude the armistice'. Thus, the armistice commission appointed for the southern section of the front 'was not able to cross the front'.⁴³

The Central Powers further understood that the Bolshevik authority did not extend over the army in the Ukraine, which meant the southern half of the Eastern front, from about the River Prypyat to the Danube. This was shown by an order of Krylenko, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, who ordered a change in commanders on November 27, but not in the region to the south. That military affairs were somewhat misunderstood became evident when the Foreign Office was informed by Haparanda on November 30, that 360,000 Ukrainians had received an order from the new Ukrainian government to leave the front.⁴⁴ This reference was most likely to the policy of the Ukrainian government of concentrating Ukrainian troops on the Ukrainian front. By this time, Riezler in Stockholm had come to the conclusion that the Bolsheviks were friendly to the 'foreign nations' (*Fremdvoelker*) referring to the Ukraine and others.⁴⁵ On December 5 arrived the report by a German observer, a certain Ziese, forwarded to Kuehlmann, stating, that a number of independent Republics had formed 'inside Russia'.⁴⁶

At the same time, a report was received describing the general position of the Ukrainian government from Russian

sources. This report appeared originally in the Petrograd newspaper *Den*, on November 28, stating that 'power had passed to the General Secretariat in the Ukraine', and that this development had received the 'recognition of the Army of the South-Western Front, and of the Kiev City Duma'. The Secretariat was in fact a 'coalition ministry' (without Bolsheviks), a national Ukrainian party bloc which, although very 'radical' in the national point of view, stood 'far from socialism'.⁴⁷

In the meantime, Ludendorff gained support from the Emperor for the preparation of the knock-out blow in a great offensive in the coming March;⁴⁸ the events on the Eastern front were to be subordinated to this strategy. The Emperor had also suggested to Kuehlmann that if peace negotiation were to come in the reasonably near future, Germany should attempt to enter with Russia into a kind of an alliance of friendship relationship,⁴⁹ with provision of aid for reconstruction. Kuehlmann held that the Russian regime was not stable; the 'Russian ring' had seemed to be the weakest link in the enemy chain, to be sprung by 'destructive work', in the first place by the furtherance of separatist tendencies and the support of the Bolsheviks. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, Kuehlmann stated that it was in their 'interest that their possibly short government be used to reach an armistice next, then, if possible, to reach a peace.' The letter had been drafted by Bergen;⁵⁰ there appears to be a tendency in the letter to project the current potentialities to the passed situation, by hindsight as it were. At any rate, Kuehlmann, a newcomer to the post of State Secretary, could not claim any place for himself in the 'destructive work' in the past.

The Ukraine had been discussed in the meeting between the representatives of the German government and the Command, on December 6 and 7; the place for the peace negotiation had been agreed on to be Brest-Litovsk.⁵¹ Further information on the Ukrainian situation arrived at Berlin on December 7, from Stockholm officials, presenting an essentially correct picture of the actual takeover of power from the

Kievan Military District, the takeover of the mails, telegraph and railroads, and the submission of the front to the Ukrainian government; the dates had been indicated incorrectly, though, and the chronological sequence of various events was not given correctly. The Stockholm embassy concluded that the 'separation of the foreign nations had made further progress since the uprising of the Bolsheviks.' The current leaders in the Ukraine were determined to carry through the independence. However, the parties had not been able to agree yet on the extent of the independence; whether the Ukraine would be an independent sovereign state or an autonomous member of a Russian federal state.⁵² The tendency of various reports reaching Berlin, whether from official or non-official sources, was exemplified in the report of the Ukrainian Bureau of Switzerland, forwarded by the German embassy in Bern on December 9, and reaching Berlin on November 12:

The power of the Ukrainian government grows day by day in importance and extent. In the unintelligible chaos in Russia, the Rada and the Ukrainian government appears to be the only well-organized authority.⁵³

This view of the Ukraine as an 'oasis of order' had prevailed in the Entente circles and the Ukrainian governmental circles as well. Berlin had acquired a clear picture of the situation in the Ukraine, and the events of the Ukrainian assumption of full authority reaching to the current situation; it must be underlined again that Ukrainian authorities had not been in any contact whatsoever with the Central Powers in the period before December 1917.

In the meantime the Ukrainian government was moving towards peace. Soon after the proclamation of the Republic, the meeting of the Government on November 23 decided that an 'immediate peace' was imperative; peace negotiations could be started only by a government authorized to act by the majority of population, which the Soviet of People's Commissars were not. The Secretariat believed that a new federal government should be formed.⁵⁴

On December 4, the peace question was discussed again in the Rada. Hrushevsky announced that on the previous day, the Commander-in-Chief of the Rumanian front, Shcherbachev, had sent a telegram to the Ukrainian Central Rada informing it that he, in agreement with the Rumanian government, was being forced to begin peace negotiations with the enemy and asked the Rada to send a representative to take part in these negotiations. In this manner then, Rumania joined Russia in forcing negotiations with the Central Powers, putting the Ukraine into an isolated position

An extensive debate took place in the Rada. In the end the Rada decided that it had found it necessary 'in the name of the Ukrainian National Republic' to begin an armistice immediately, informing allied powers at the same time. The Ukrainian Central Rada approached the 'active realization of peace'. To that end, the Rada decided to 'send representatives from the General Secretariat to the Rumanian and the South-Western Fronts' for negotiations for peace.' The Rada had also decided to immediately approach both allied and enemy powers on behalf of the Ukrainian National Republic with a proposal to begin peace negotiations, notifying the neutral states, and informing the Soviet of People's Commissars and governments of other republics of Russia, for coordinated action. At the same time, the Rada was to begin the immediate drafting of the program of peace for its presentation to the peoples of Russia on behalf of the Republic, as well as to the allied and enemy nations, as a basis for negotiations.⁵⁵ In the meeting of December 5, the General Secretariat sent, as representatives to the South-Western Front, Vice-General Secretaries for Internal Affairs Kraskovsky and Udovychenko; Lyubynsky, a member of the Small Rada and Lewytsky, a member of the General Military Committee, were sent to the Rumanian front. Their mandates stated that the armistice was meant to be the basis not of a separate peace, but of a general democratic world peace.⁵⁶ On the next day, the government reached the decision to constitute the former South-Western

and Rumanian fronts as the Ukrainian front. A Commission under Akimov was formed for the Black Sea fleet.⁴⁷

The Russian government was forced by the circumstances of the time to refrain from resistance to Ukrainian decisions. On December 7, Trotsky, on behalf of the government, instructed the Bolshevik 'Commander-in-Chief' to allow the representative of the Ukrainian Central Rada to enter the joint Russian peace delegation, as well as to make no difficulties in the transfer of Ukrainian troops to the southern fronts. The recognition of the National Ukrainian Republic by the Russian government was 'as full as possible,' it was stated.⁴⁸

Germans had received the decision of the Ukrainian government on negotiations for peace and the representatives to the front. The wireless message intercepted by the Germans was that of War Secretary Petlura to the army, ordering the decision to be read by the commanders to their respective units, and to be spread through the Military Radas. At the same time, disturbances were prohibited, and exemplary order was to be kept, both at the front and to the rear. Military Commissars and representatives of the Republic at the front were ordered to report on the condition of the units during the armistice.⁴⁹

The business-like tone of the communication and the obvious order implied in it, combined with reports on events in the Ukraine, as well as the actual condition at the front, showed the German government the strength of the Ukrainian Republic. However, the situation was complicated for the Republic, as the German government was negotiating with the Bolshevik Government, while the latter had sent a message of condemnation of the Ukrainian Government. The Germans had picked up Lenin's message of December 9, accusing the Republic of helping Kaledin, and taking other allegedly unfriendly actions against Soviet Russia.⁵⁰ Nevertheless the Ukrainian government had formed a delegation for the Brest-Litovsk talks where the Germans and Russians were meeting, consisting of Lyubynsky, Hasenko and others. The delegation entered the Russian delegation for 'control over negotiations'.⁵¹

In the meantime, Berlin had received reports that the Entente was attempting to attach the Ukraine closely to itself. On December 9, Rantzau, ambassador at Copenhagen, wired that the 'Russian (non-Bolshevik) diplomacy with the support of the Allies' had attempted to initiate a 'national gathering under the leadership of the Ukraine' to form a front against Petrograd and Moscow.⁶² On December 12, Berlin had also received a report from Bern that the 'diplomats of the Entente had declared to the Ukrainian Central Rada that their government were ready to recognize the Ukraine consisting of all its national territories, if the Ukraine would obligate itself to continue the war on the side of the allies.' In reply, Ukrainians were said to have stated that the Ukraine wished to maintain a 'strict neutrality to obtain the friendship of both belligerent parties.' The report was consulted by Bussche.⁶³

The German Foreign Office undertook a review of the entire situation on December 12, 1917. The result was a memorandum: 'Review of the Russian movements of Foreign Nations.' The writers distinguish three main currents among the 'Russian Foreign Nations'. The first group, including the Finns, Poles, Lithuanians, Balts (Latvians?), Germans and Trans-Caucasian Tartars, as well as the 'leaders of the Ukrainians', strove for complete separation from Russia and the formation of fully independent national states. The second group was said to want a Russian confederation, and within it, federated states. Ukrainians were thought to have accepted this viewpoint 'in their official declarations'. The Ukraine is discussed further on, where its program was described as including the proclamation of a democratic Republic within Russia, the formation of a Central Rada and a Ukrainian Army, and a take-over of the greater part of the Black Sea fleet. The Ukraine was said to be 'against the Russian Bolsheviks.' The space provided for the German position on the Ukrainian stand was left blank.⁶⁴

Further news reached Berlin on the morning of December 14 with a report from the Stockholm embassy clarifying the earlier one about the 360,000 troops by pointing out that

these were the troops whose transport from the Northern Front to the Ukrainian front was being demanded by the Rada. The report added details on the takeover of power in Kiev.⁶⁵ Berlin had also received an article from *The New Europe*, a London journal, by which they learned that there was an 'Austro-German Intrigue in the Ukraine' which was exploiting a genuine national movement; the Union of Liberation of the Ukraine was accused of participating.⁶⁶

It was on December 14 or 15 that the decision to establish relations with the Ukrainian Republic was reached in Berlin. At that time, Bussche wrote to a subordinate in Brest-Litovsk that it would not be a good idea to ignore the Ukrainians, in view of the apparently strong forces behind them, but rather, if it was all possible, 'to enter into an immediate contact with them. Perhaps it would be possible to make it clear to the Bolshevik representatives that 'their position in the south, where they have had little support till now' would be strengthened through the 'admittance of the Ukrainians'. The official in question was cautioned however, that 'of course, any antagonizing of the Bolsheviks had to be avoided.'⁶⁷ The German government had thus authorized negotiations with the Ukrainian Republic.

The German military had a great interest in the matter of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. General Hoffmann had been authorized to represent the German Command in the negotiations. Ludendorff gave him directions in mid-December on the policy to be followed. Thus, the Command supported the 'non-intervention in Russian affairs', provided for German interests in the Baltic region, and elsewhere. The Ukraine was not mentioned except for a reference to Western Ukraine: Russia was to leave that land: this was done probably in the Austro-Hungarian interest.⁶⁸

Ukrainian delegates arrived at Brest-Litovsk on December 16. The delegates were late, as they had gone to Dvinsk, where the negotiations had been expected to take place, and only then went to Brest-Litovsk. The delegates spoke with the Bolshevik delegates, to whom they declared that they did not

recognize the Soviet of People's Commissars as all-Russian government, but only as a Great Russian government. Kameney, a member of the Russian delegation, declared to that, 'Overthrow us first; then you would be able to say that.' The Ukrainian delegation had also met Hoffmann, and his titular chief, Leopold of Bavaria.⁶⁹ According to the report of Ludendorff, forwarded to the Foreign Office on December 17, the Ukrainian delegates declared that they were 'enemies of the Russians and did not want to have anything to do with Russia.' Ludendorff asked for directions on the treatment of the Ukraine. Lersner, the representative of the Foreign Office at the Command, informed him that the Chancellor would give instructions to Rosenberg, an official of the Foreign Office.⁷⁰ The Foreign Office thus insisted on its independence from the German Command on the question of the Ukraine.

Rosenberg attempted at this point to gain the Ukrainians' favour. He wired Berlin that the Ukrainian knew strikingly little of the 'good treatment which their prisoners-of-war enjoyed in Germany'; he asked for some material in the matter to be sent to Brest-Litovsk.⁷¹ Berlin took the initiative, and even arranged to send to Brest-Litovsk some Ukrainians from Biala and other Ukrainian areas under German control engaged in the local development of schools and so on. These were to meet Ukrainian delegates as if by chance.⁷²

It was at this time that the news of the Russian ultimatum to the Ukraine was received in Berlin. Lersner informed the Foreign Office of the ultimatum in the early afternoon of December 17.

According to a wireless message Trotsky had given the Ukraine a 48 hours' ultimatum for the declaration of their submission to Petrograd.⁷³

The basis for this information appears to have been the wireless message consisting in part of the ultimatum, and in part of Trotsky's appeal to the nations, of December 17.⁷⁴ An essentially complete ultimatum signed by both Lenin and Trotsky, somewhat incorrectly translated, was received a little later.⁷⁵

The ultimatum may well have surprised the officials as about the same time they received the news from their Stockholm embassy that Ukrainian troops were cooperating with Russia in the struggle with Kaledin. In fact, Antonov had issued an order that the Ukrainian troops which were being sent to the Ukraine as a result of the demand of the Ukrainian government were to be supplied with all military gear.⁷⁶ At the same time, the German ministry had learned of the rising conflict between the Ukraine and Russia; the former was accused by Russia of following a pro-bourgeois policy.⁷⁷

The matter of the Ukraine was discussed in the Crown Council, held at Kreuznach, on December 10. At this meeting, attended by Wilhelm and the military and civil officials of the German Empire, it was decided that peace with the Ukraine was to be striven for.⁷⁸ Two days later, Kuehlmann declared to the main committee of the German Reichstag, in the discussion of the conditions of peace, that the separation of the Ukraine would be recognized only if it was recognized by Russia.⁷⁹

Although the Ukrainian National Republic was in relations with France and Great Britain, and addressed as an ally in the continuing war against the Central Powers, she found herself increasingly alone in the field. The Northern Front, utterly disorganized in the Bolshevik coup and the systematic destruction of the army, as well as in the general war-weariness, was disintegrating fast. Rumania was weakening. Although the Ukrainians held their front better, still the problem in reorganizing the entire system seemed very great. Nor was it known what would be done if the Germans, taking advantage of the disruption of the Russian front, would move forward in the North. On the other hand, Ukrainians were favoured by a time of year which of necessity made any German advance highly unlikely; furthermore, the desire of the Germans for a victory in the West could conceivably enable the Ukrainian National Republic to dig in and present an extremely difficult problem for any attacking armies; it must also be realized that the position of the Austro-Hungarian

armies was critical; their front had had to be reinforced by German troops. Since the border of the Ukraine would face Western Ukraine, then Austria, the comparatively weak Austria-Hungary would have an irredentist problem in the South. While inducing Western Ukrainians to fight against the All-Russian army, presumably in liberation of their kin, was one matter, getting the same people to fight the Ukrainian National Republic would be another. In the north, the Ukraine did not border Germany, of course, but a very weak Kingdom of Poland. Thus the position of certain Ukrainian leaders, such as Petlura, that the Ukraine could stay a belligerent and continue the more or less active defensive struggle, was not unreasonable. Petlura's plan, in short, was to retrieve all Ukrainian troops, and to rebuild the army to some 300,000 men with the aid of the Entente. Nor was Petlura alone in this; the long drawn out negotiations with the Entente had shown that this view was important in Ukrainian political thought.

However, the way to receive the Entente's aid seemed blocked; Rumania was not to be depended on. Hence, the yearning for peace became stronger in the land. It was, of course, aided by the breakdown in the north, discussed above. Negotiations for peace had begun at Brest-Litovsk between the Russian peace delegation and those of the Central Powers. The Russian delegation was led by Joffe, and included also Kamenev, Bitsenko, Pokrovsky and others. The German delegation was led by Kuehlmann, seconded by Hoffmann, and others. Hoffmann had been authorized to speak and even to protest in the name of the Command. The Austro-Hungarian delegation was led by Czernin; there were also Turkish and Bulgarian delegates, who had little to say.

In the meantime, the Rada had heard the report of one of the delegates to Brest-Litovsk, Lewytsky, and of an officer, Hasenko, who had been attached to him. Lyubynsky had remained in Brest-Litovsk, and arrived later.⁸⁰ On the next day, December 21, Shulhyn presented the text of the peace note to the Small Rada. The debate in the Rada was inconclusive at this point. The Rada passed a resolution that 'having heard

the Note of the General Secretariat to begin immediately a statement of the concrete conditions of the general democratic peace.¹ ⁸¹

The Note of the General Secretariat was sent by wireless on December 24, to 'all belligerent and neutral states.' The Note was received by the German authorities. The wireless message intercepted was addressed to Lyubynsky, the representative at Brest-Litovsk, to Petrograd and to 'all belligerent and neutral states'. In it, the Secretariat stated that the Ukrainian National Republic had been proclaimed on November 20, 1917 and that the Republic thereby gained international status'. While striving for the formation of a federative union of all republics arising from the territory of the former Russian Empire, until such a federative Republic would be formed and the 'international representation be divided between the government of the Federative Republic and the Government of the Ukraine', the Republic would take the path of 'independent international relations.' The General Secretariat sent representatives to Brest-Litovsk for 'control and information', but the Soviet of People's Commissars formed 'an independent general armistice without any understanding with the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic.'

The Government proclaimed its peace program. The task of the entire democracy of the Ukrainian state was stated to be world peace. The peace should give to all nations in each state the freedom of international self-determination. Neither annexations, nor contributions were acceptable. The Government declared that the 'power of the Soviet of People's Commissars did not extend over all of Russia, and specifically, did not extend over the Ukrainian Republic. Hence, any peace that Russia signed would be valid for the Ukrainian Republic only if the conditions were accepted and signed by the government of the Ukraine. Peace 'in the name of all of Russia' could be concluded only by a federal government created by all republics and other 'districts of Russia'. If no such government could be created, peace would be concluded by the joint governments. The Peace Note concluded as follows.

The Ukrainian General Secretariat holds firmly to the principle of a general democratic peace and aspires to the earliest possible realization of it. Recognizing the great importance of all attempts directed towards the realization of such a peace, the General Secretariat deems it indispensable that its representatives take part in negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, wishing at the same time that the cause of peace be settled at an international congress to which the Ukrainian government invites all belligerent powers.⁶²

In Berlin, Ukrainian affairs continued to be the subject of close attention. On December 18, Berlin ordered Romberg, its Swiss ambassador, to continue paying the full 5,000 francs monthly subsidy to the Ukrainian Bureau in Lausanne, instead of drastically reducing it, as suggested by the ambassador.⁶³ The activity of the Entente powers in Kiev appears to have been of particular interest. On December 17, Lucius von Stuedten, ambassador in Stockholm, wired the Foreign Office, that Volodymyr Zaliznyak, brother of Mykola Zaliznyak, had reported from Kiev (probably to his brother who had no doubt passed the information to the German embassy either directly or through Vasylo) that French and English Military Commissions and the French journalists had been hard at work at Kiev and that the press opinion was changing strongly in the favour of the Entente. The ambassador also added that 'other news strengthened the impression that the Entente was working strongly, especially in the Ukraine.'⁶⁴ A similar observation came from Romberg in Bern apparently on the basis of reports of Svatkovsky, a Russian journalist in Lausanne who had gone to Paris, on the 'demand of the French government' to consult with Maklakov, the Russian ambassador there, and Stepankivsky (the latter was not allowed to join them). Thus, Romberg reported that there was 'great bitterness against Russia in the Entente', while on the other hand, there was an 'ever-growing interest in the problem of the Russian foreign nations'. He reported as still another symptom of it, the request by Huguenin, head of the French Bureaus in Switzerland, to the Ukrainian Bureau to send him all the news on the Ukraine.⁶⁵

The Stockholm Embassy wired on December 18 that the 'Ukraine Bureau (of Stockholm) had received news from Kiev' on December 10, that diplomatic representatives of France and England had arrived there on that date and had presented their credentials to the Rada.⁸⁶ On the same day, Mykola Zaliznyak appears to have wired the German military authorities that his brother-in-law, Julian Okhrymovych, had arrived to Stockholm from Kiev and told him that 'France and England had recognized the Ukraine' and had appointed their representatives, while the influence of the Entente had become very much stronger. The General Secretariat had declared officially that the return of Kholm and Volhynia would be demanded in a separate peace.⁸⁷ From the reference to the published demands of the General Secretariat, it is plain that Okhrymovych was definitely not authorized by the General Secretariat or any governmental body of the Ukrainian Republic for his statement; otherwise, the German report would have referred to concrete propositions. Concrete evidence on the cooperation of the Ukraine and Entente was received on December 21, in Berlin. Berlin forwarded the report to Rosenberg at Brest-Litovsk and the German Command. The report referred to the meeting of Petlura, General Secretary for Military Affairs with the representatives of the French, British and Serbian Missions, as well as representatives of the Polish Army, on November 26 (discussed earlier). Germans may well have noted that the British representative, Colonel Charles, had been interested in the 'political situation, especially the operative condition of the Ukrainian Army, in the situation at the front and in the organization of supply', while the French inquired on the 'international policy of the Ukraine.' They also learned that the Serbian corps in the Ukraine, 24,000 men strong, had placed itself at the disposal of the Ukrainian government.⁸⁸ Further important news from Stockholm, was the report from Eckardt, who commented on the conflict and concluded that an eventual war of the Ukraine with the Bolshevik Government would conclusively overthrow the latter.⁸⁹ The Foreign Office discovered that the Secretariat

had decided to send its representatives to all states and to ask the Foreign Powers to send their representatives to Kiev. Most important, the report added that the French government had named its representatives already.⁹⁰ The Central Powers were thus in danger of being left behind.

A note of caution arrived from Lersner, the representative of the Foreign Office at the Command when he pointed out on December 23 that 'a division had declared in a unanimously accepted resolution against the Rada, and for the Ukrainian Soviets Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies who in their turn were 'for the Soviet of People's Commissars.' The report was stated to be a 'new proof of a split in the Ukraine itself'; the report referred to the refusal of a Siberian division to obey the orders of the Ukrainian government, as well. The reference to the 'Siberian division' appears to be of little importance; the troops, being obviously Russian, can hardly be blamed for refusing the orders of the Ukrainian government in the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The first reference to 'a division' makes it virtually impossible to ascertain whether the troops in question were Russian, Ukrainian, or what. The resolution of the sort mentioned could well have been taken by a Russian division; considering the Ukraine part of Russia, the soldiers could well have called for authorities recognizing effective subordination of the Ukraine to Russia, in this case, the 'Ukrainian Soviets.' The matter must remain unresolved; it should be noted that this was the only anti-Ukrainian declaration picked up by German wireless installations in the Ukraine, up to that time. The report added that the 'atrocities (*Gewalttaetigkeiten*) of the Russians in Moldavia were indescribable.' An official of the Foreign Office wrote a note on the report that it 'appeared that the Entente was driving Russia to a fratricidal war'.⁹¹

The position of the Ukrainian Republic was probably strengthened a great deal when the Central Powers picked up a wireless message from the government of Russia signed by Lenin and Trotsky, sent on December 25. The Russian government announced that it had decided to 'strengthen with

every possible means, including money', the international left wing of the labour movement in all lands, regardless of whether the state was at war with Russia, allied with her, or neutral. In pursuance of this, the Soviet had assigned two million roubles to the 'international representatives of the commissariat of Foreign Affairs'.⁹² This document was widely consulted in the Foreign Office; there is evidence that it was read by Bussche, Stumm and Nadolny, all high officials.

The Central Powers did not tarry with their reply to the Ukraine. In a wireless message on December 26, the representatives gathered at Brest-Litovsk explained the reply could not be issued to the Ukrainian representative, Lyubynsky, as the latter had already left Brest-Litovsk. Referring to the statement in the note that the Ukrainian Republic thought it 'absolutely necessary that the representatives of the Ukrainian National Republic take part in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk', they declared:

Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungarn, Bulgarien und die Tuerkei legen Wert darauf, zu betonen, dass sie bereit sind, bevollmaechtigte Vertreter der Ukrainischen Volksrepublik zur Teilnahme an den Friedensverhandlungen in Brest-Litovsk zu begruessen.⁹³

Thus in declaring that they were ready to welcome the representatives of the Ukrainian Republic to Brest-Litovsk, the Central Powers appeared to have taken the first step towards the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic. They also said that the Ukrainian Representatives would have been welcome at the armistice negotiations; this tended to put the Ukrainian Republic in a position of equality vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, who was thus prevented from claiming that the Ukraine should leave the armistice to Russia. The message was signed by Kuehlmann, Czernin, Popov and Nessimy Bey, for Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey respectively.

In Kiev the question of Ukrainian participation in the peace negotiations was being discussed further. On December 28, Lyubynsky reported on the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk; he urged that the Ukrainian delegation should take official

part in negotiations and be present not only for information and control.⁶⁴ Shortly after, the Rada decided to 'take part in peace negotiations as an equal to other states' and confirmed the decision of the General Secretariat on the immediate sending of a delegation for participation in peace negotiations. The Rada had also called for participation by all nations in the negotiations, 'whether those who had their state or those who had not.'⁶⁵ A delegation was made up, consisting of Holubovych, a member of the government, as chairman, and Lyubynsky, Lewytsky, Sevryuk and Polozov;⁶⁶ it left Kiev shortly to go to Brest-Litovsk.

In the meantime, the Foreign Office continued to receive highly encouraging reports on the strength and consolidation of the Ukrainian army and of the Republic. After the momentary wavering induced apparently by the anti-Ukrainian declaration of 'a division', and the action of the 'Siberian division', Lersner, sent a new report on December 27, it appears on the basis of the information of the German army. This report had been referred to earlier. Lersner had reached the conclusion that the 'Ukrainian army, in conjunction with as yet well-disciplined Rumanian troops, could be still a considerable (*beachtenswert*) enemy'. Lersner also stated that the expectation of peace was no less strong among the Ukrainian soldiers and nation than among the Great Russians. He also reported the wireless message of the Ukrainian government on the peace negotiations, replied to by the Central Powers already.⁶⁷ On the same day, Ludendorff insisted on a quick conclusion of negotiations with the Ukrainian peace delegation expected at Brest-Litovsk, and urged that the agreement be achieved on the basis of the award of the region of Kholm (necessitating the evacuation of Western Volhynia by Germany as well), to the Ukrainian Republic.⁶⁸

It was at this time that a great number of wireless messages of support for the Ukrainian government had begun to come in. Germans intercepted a number of messages of support from various ships of the Black Sea fleet, in particular from the battle-cruiser *Volya*,⁶⁹ dominating other smaller ves-

sels. On December 26, the protest against the Russian ultimatum by the Central Executive Committee of the Soldiers', Workers', Sailors' and Peasants' Deputies of the Rumanian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the Odessa District was intercepted, reaching Berlin on December 27 or 28.¹⁰⁰ The protest has been referred to above. The message of mobilization of the Free Cossacks against the Russian Bolshevik troops, and protests against the Russian war were received at the same time.¹⁰¹ The declaration of the Central Committee of the Ukraine, of December 27, was picked up as well.¹⁰² No message of support was intercepted, while protests continued to come in, from Odessa¹⁰³ and from Sevastopol.¹⁰⁴

Lersner reported to Berlin, on December 28, that the situation was developing in the Ukraine in a manner unfavorable to the Bolsheviks, while the influence of the Entente had continued to grow. There were many battles between the Russians on one side, and Ukrainians and Rumanians on the other, in which the Ukrainians had carried off the victory. Thus, the city of Luts'k was taken by Ukrainians; 8,000 Ukrainians were said to be concentrated there. The Committee and Command of a corps in the area south-east from Chernivtsi was arrested by the Rada. The railroad from Kiev to Sarny was occupied by Ukrainians. Battles were in progress in the Trotus Valley, between Ukrainians and Russians, while Rumanians were fighting in the Bystrych Valley. In a very important railroad junction of Zhmerynka the Guard Corps had been disarmed by Ukrainians. According to Lersner, Committees of many corps were attempting to organize active resistance against the exercise of power by the Rada. In spite of many appeals, cries of encouragement and discussions by wireless, no common decision had been reached. Lersner also pointed out that there were 'numerous Entente agitators at the Ukrainian front,' while a report arrived that many British and French officers had been seen in Kiev. Lersner also mentioned that reports were heard at the front of the alliance of the Rada with Kaledin and Kornilov; in view of the Ukrainian conflicts with Kaledin, the reports may presumably be Russian in ori-

gin. Reports also stated that 'the Ukraine wanted to destroy the revolution and to re-establish monarchy in Russia and Ukraine;' Prince Dolgoruky was given as the candidate for the throne.¹⁰⁵ The fact that the latter nonsense was sent seriously to Berlin testified to the genuine character of the reports, gathered obviously in the confusion of the front-line war. The very clear references to the Russo-Ukrainian hostilities appear to be the result of intercepted wireless messages and possible first hand information.

Further news on Ukrainian relations with the Entente continued to come in; under the circumstances, these could but strengthen the desire of the Central Powers to come to an agreement with the Ukraine, even with certain sacrifices. On December 30, Berlin received word that Vynnychenko had declared on December 21 that the Allies had been informed of the beginning of peace negotiations; the latter were said to have decided already to send 'their ambassadors to the Ukraine to have their interests represented'.¹⁰⁶ On December 30, a report appeared in the world press that 'French and English delegates in Kiev had made the recognition of the independence of the Ukraine conditional upon the proclamation of war by the latter' against the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks. The Stockholm embassy reported to Berlin in connection with the report that 'France had recognized the Ukraine as independent' a few days ago, and had named an ambassador to the General Secretariat, named as 'Denis' (The same report had also indicated that the Ukrainian Republic had given an ultimatum to Russia on December 24, demanding the dissolution of the Soviet of People's Commissars, which was rejected).¹⁰⁷

Stockholm again reported, on December 31, that Prince Janusz Radziwill, a conservative Pole arriving from Petrograd, stated that in his view the Entente 'despite all the money spent would not be able to bring the Ukraine to continue the war'; the money would be taken 'gladly', but there would be no returns. In further elucidation, he stated that the Rada was 'very well led and conscious of its goals'. The Rada was said

to want peace as much as the Bolsheviks, and knew that the 'Entente had nothing to offer it besides money'; it would desire the money but would not bind itself. Radziwill stated that an agreement was reached between the Rada and the Poles represented in it on the question of 'Kholm and Volhynia'.¹⁰⁸

The Stockholm embassy had also reported that 'insofar as can be judged here, the political centre of gravity lay still in Petrograd as the seat of the old centre, while the economic might and the prospect of greater stability (rested) in the Ukraine.' While coming to this conclusion, the embassy spoke approvingly of the report from the Ukrainian Bureau that the Central Powers would be building on sand if they should chose the Petrograd option in the matter of peace negotiations. After the Bolsheviks broke with the Ukraine, the latter was said to consider that any peace reached only with the Bolsheviks would be null and void for the Ukraine; a pro-Ukrainian policy by 'Germany and Austria in the question of Volhynia and Kholm' with the earliest possible direct negotiations would draw the Ukraine on the side of the Central Powers. The embassy reported that Orlovsky, the Russian representative, was extremely upset by the latest events in the Ukraine, and very bitter against the Entente on account of its Ukrainian policy.¹⁰⁹ Orlovsky also stated, apparently to the German ambassador, that the 'Constitutional Democratic elements in the Central Government of the Rada and the Don Cossacks were attempting to form a bloc against the Bolsheviks under the influence of the Entente.' Peace negotiations with the Ukraine, in view of the powerful influence of the Entente, were described as being 'hardly possible'. Bolsheviks were said to have sent troops from the Northern Front and had a great influence in the Northern Ukraine; they also were attempting to destroy from below the influence of the Rada though the 'formation of an anti-Rada (*Gegenrada*)'.¹¹⁰

German policy to the Ukrainian Republic was formulated finally by Kuehlmann in the reports to representatives of parties of the Reichstag on January 1, 1918. He attempted to overcome the difficulties with the Russians through separate

peace agreements with the 'more or less autonomous bodies', above all with 'the Ukraine, by far the largest and more important of those'.

The meeting appropriate German ministries had reached the decision on January 1, that the renewal of the Commercial Treaty of 1904, and if possible its widening,¹¹¹ should be the economic condition of peace with 'Russia'.

The policy of Kuehlmann was approved in principle in the Crown Council held on January 2; Kuehlmann was authorized to proceed with negotiations.¹¹²

The military had protested against what they considered lenience to the Poles, bringing on a constitutional crisis which in the final analysis strengthened the hand of Hertling, and of course Kuehlmann. Hindenburg had urged Wilhelm not to underestimate the 'Polish danger'. 'Creation of a Ukrainian State is certainly conducive to the diminution of the Polish danger, yet events in Russia were so uncertain that one could not base the security of the German Empire upon the above'.¹¹³ The military had in fact supported a policy of caution towards the Ukraine, although for their own opportunistic reasons.

Kuehlmann was able to return to Brest-Litovsk with his policy vindicated. The Ukrainian delegation had arrived there on January 1, 1918 and was joined there shortly by other delegations.

The coming of the Ukrainian delegation was appreciated by Kuehlmann and Hoffmann on the German side, and by Czernin on the Austrian. As Hoffmann saw it, the possibility arose of playing the Ukrainian delegation members against the Bolsheviks, although he saw too that their presence might prove embarrassing to Czernin should a demand in support of the Ukrainian in Austria-Hungary be made.¹¹⁴ Czernin, however, was favourably impressed by the delegation, as they were 'less revolutionary' and were 'cultured (*intelligent*)'. He saw them attempt to use the Central Powers in their attack against the Bolsheviks.¹¹⁵

Under the circumstances, however, the presence of the delegation was already useful to the Central Powers in the current crisis. Czernin saw the Bolshevik manoeuvre in suggesting Stockholm, on January 2, as a bluff; in case they really didn't come back, he foresaw negotiations with the Ukrainians.¹¹⁶ Hertling announced to the Reichstag Main Delegation and the world that in case the Bolsheviks were to renege, Germany would 'continue to negotiate with representatives of the Ukraine for peace.'¹¹⁷

The Ukrainian delegation met with the German and Austro-Hungarian delegates shortly after the arrival. The delegation demanded its own recognition, and the recognition of the Ukraine. They stated that they would not be able to take part in discussions without such recognition. The territorial demands included the annexation of Kholm, Podlassie and Polessia. The future fate of the Ukrainian territories within Austria and Hungary was to be decided by a plebiscite; this demand was to affect Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovyna and Transcarpathian Ukraine.¹¹⁸ Germans learned from their own intelligence, on January 5, that Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna were desired.¹¹⁹

The depth of feeling for the Western Ukraine among the members of the delegation must be appreciated. Sevryuk, a member who was to lead the delegation, had visited Galicia as a member of a delegation of Ukrainian students, in 1911; the visit had left in him personally the lasting, deepest and best impression of his youth'. He wrote much later,

Galicia! How much power, how much love, how many filial emotions had been called forth by this word in us, Ukrainian delegates in Brest, especially the younger ones. . . . For us all, Ukrainians of the Dniipro, it was the Ukrainian Piedmont. . . .¹²⁰

The position of Austria-Hungary and Germany was expressed at the meeting of January 6 by Czernin. The Central Powers were willing to recognize the independence of the Ukraine if the latter (1) cooperated in the conclusion of negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, (2) recognized the old state borders

between Austria-Hungary and the Ukraine, (3) agreed with the 'non-interference of one state in the internal affairs of the other'.¹²¹ He appeared, however, willing to discuss the matter of Kholm, Polessia and Podlassie; the Ukrainian delegation continued discussions on these without replying to the basic demands of Czernin on non-interference, or insisting on an immediate recognition. Lyubynsky had supported a rejection of talks on the existing basis.¹²² The sacrifice was real for both sides. The fact that the policy of compromise was adopted by the Ukrainian delegation for the time being can be gleaned from Sevryuk's statement that the aim was to 'show that we can be useful to them'.¹²³

The Russian delegation returned to Brest-Litovsk on January 7, headed by Trotsky. Before the Conference convened, the Bolsheviks and the Rada delegation met. The Ukrainians had the idea that they, being the 'defeated', together with the Petrograd delegation, were to be on one side, while the 'victors'¹²⁴ were on the other side. It was agreed in the meeting that Trotsky would announce in the plenary meeting of the Peace Conference that the Russian delegation agreed to 'extend the right of self-determination to the Ukrainian people as well' and would propose that the Ukrainian Delegation be regarded as the fully empowered representation of the Ukrainian National Republic.¹²⁵ The Russian delegation recognized the Ukrainian one as being independent; it also recognized the Ukrainian Central Rada and the General Secretariat.¹²⁶ Unanimity in all declarations was agreed to; hence all questions were to be previously discussed in joint meetings. Ukrainians stated that they indeed wished to escape any economic pressure from Germany and Austria-Hungary; they also appeared to agree to support the transfer of negotiations to a neutral territory.¹²⁷

The meetings of the two delegations took the form of joint meetings chaired by Holubovych, and, more often, by Trotsky. There were very serious disagreements between the two delegations, besides the fact of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Trotsky stated that he did not believe that the Germans were

capable of mounting an offensive; he believed that conditions were 'ripe' for a German revolution. The Ukrainian delegation had also gathered the impression, over the several meetings which had been in fact held, that the fate of Ukrainian territories, of Galicia, Kholm and Podlassie were of 'secondary interest for the Russian delegation', in the words of Sevryuk. It would appear that Sevryuk's characterization of the Russian position was overly charitable: except for a flamboyant and patently futile gesture of February 1, discussed below, the Russian delegation failed to show any interest in serious negotiations either in public or in private about Western Ukrainian territories. Although the Ukrainian delegation stood firm and united in discussions with the Russians, one member, Polozov, showed particular interest in patching up differences between the delegations. The Russo-Ukrainian war was responsible, however, for an eventual complete break between the delegations. The Ukrainian government issued directions to the delegation that the agreement with the Russian delegation could continue on the condition of the halting of the Russian troops. This condition was not being met, and the break between the delegations became formal. Relations between the delegations, while they lasted, were full of mistrust and conflict. Thus, the original declaration of the recognition of the Ukrainian delegation was altered unilaterally by the Russians shortly before the first plenary meeting.¹²⁹ The Russian delegation was also attempting, it appears, to supervise the activity of the Ukrainian delegation.¹³⁰

The first plenary meeting of the conference was to be held on January 8; it was put off, however, as the Ukrainian delegation was not finished with their preparations.¹³⁰

The Ukrainian delegation did take part in the first meeting on January 10, with the disposal of the Stockholm ultimatum between the Russians and the Central Powers.

The conference opened with a speech by Holubovych, the latter was conciliatory towards Russia. The Soviet government was described as 'representatives of the democracy of Great Russia' who despite the 'attacks of a certain part of

Russian citizenry and press' had acted to gain a 'general peace, desired by the entire world.' He further stated that the Ukrainian National Republic was beginning an international existence lost more than 250 years ago, and was entering 'international relations to the entire extent of its rights in this field.' He emphasized that the Republic was taking an 'independent position at the present peace negotiations', and read the Peace Note of December 24 to the conference.¹³¹

In reply, Kuehlmann stated that the declaration of the Ukrainian delegation had been listened to with great interest, and that the Central Powers welcomed the arrival of the Ukrainian delegation.¹³² Then, turning to Trotsky, he asked whether the Russian delegation intended to continue to represent the 'entirety of Russia', as until that time all problems of interest to the Russian State had been dealt with through the Petrograd government. He received the following reply:

Having heard the note of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian National Republic, announced by the Ukrainian delegation, the Russian delegation, fully recognizing her responsibility to allow every nation the right of self-determination even to the limits of outright separation, declares that on her part, she has no protest against the Ukrainian delegation taking part in the peace negotiations.¹³³

When, however, Kuehlmann went on to state that the Ukrainian delegation was therefore to be considered as speaking for the land whose borders had been approximately indicated, Trotsky protested against the idea that the question of borders could be considered to be resolved and so appeared to claim the right to discuss the Ukrainian borders. Kuehlmann then countered with a direct question as to whether the Ukrainian Delegation was to be part of the Russian delegation, or whether, regarding diplomacy, it was to be considered as representative of an independent state, and Trotsky speaking on behalf of the Russian Delegation, again recognized the Delegation in the latter sense, with the words, "As the Ukrainian delegation has appeared here as a completely independent delegation, and as in our Declaration we have recognized

her right to partake in the negotiations without any limitations, and as there have been no suggestion on anybody's part about the transformation of the Ukrainian delegation into a part of the Russian delegation—then this question, I think, fails of itself." ¹³⁴

After Trotsky's declaration Holubovych pronounced himself satisfied. He thanked Trotsky for his answer and for the manner in which the 'independent Ukrainian delegation was received by the Russian delegation.' ¹³⁵ The meeting was closed with a declaration by Kuehlmann, with the agreement of the conference, that the preliminary question of the Ukrainian delegation taking part in the peace negotiations as an independent one had first to be discussed by the delegates of the Allied Powers, and then brought before the entire conference. ¹³⁶

The Ukrainians attempted to follow up their success by raising anew their demand of recognition in their meeting with Austro-Hungarian and German delegates, on the same day. They refused to take part in further negotiations unless they were recognized. ¹³⁷ Czernin was willing, but Kuehlmann wavered. Hoffmann intervened on the Ukrainian side, according to Sevryuk. Faced with the firm position of the Ukrainian delegation, Germany and Austria-Hungary had finally backed down, and agreed to recognize the Ukrainian bodies, to a certain extent. ¹³⁸

The intervention on behalf of the Ukraine by some German officials certainly contributed to the recognition. On January 9, Minister von Bergen wrote a letter to Kuehlmann; the letter won the approval of Nadolny, the Chief of Section Politics in the General Staff, a person close to the Emperor. ¹³⁹ Bergen pointed out that Austrians bore little love for the Ukraine, and would do anything to prevent a 'more intimate acquaintanceship' with Germany. The Ukrainians were said to have been the only one of all the Russian groups who had shown determination and energy and had followed through to independence. Bergen pointed out that the Ukrainians constituted 30 to 35 million people, and controlled the 'economi-

cally strongest part of Russia'. If the Ukrainians were to stay in the federation, they might take over the leadership from the Russians. On the contrary, should they leave the federation, 'Great Russia would be heavily dependent upon them.' The Ukraine would be of great economic advantage to Germany in the present circumstance. For the future, the 'well-to-do Ukrainian population' would be a good market for export, as well as supplier of produce and raw materials, while the trade routes to the Caucasus and to the Volga region would lead through the Ukraine. Hence, Bergen recommended that it would be desirable to 'bring the Ukraine as close as possible to us politically' and that without any particular attention to the Great Russians, nor the Austrians, nor the Poles, and 'come to a quick agreement with them (*Abschluss*)'. The 'opening of diplomatic relations' with the Ukraine, and further contact with the Cossacks and the Caucasus was to follow.¹⁴⁰

On January 11, the Territorial and Political Commission set up by the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian delegations, met; the Ukrainian delegation, maintaining its independent position, did not attend it.¹⁴¹ In the meeting, the Russians called for representatives of Poland and some other lands; hardly a measure to endear them to Ukrainians. Czernin thought that it would be a good thing to have Poles at Brest-Litovsk: they would serve to exert pressure against the Ukrainians and the Germans. No agreement was reached as the powers could not agree on the rightful representatives of those lands. Czernin, however, raised the question of Polish representation in negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation. These countered by asking for the representations of Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary. Czernin refused and dropped the question of the Polish representation. Nevertheless, he said somewhat later, in a private conversation with Sevryuk, that he would willingly invite Vasyenko to Brest-Litovsk. Sevryuk said that was his business, but the lawful Austro-Ukrainian delegation could be only the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation led by Petrushevych. Czernin dropped the matter altogether.¹⁴²

The Russian government had been forced by the chain of events to recognize the Ukrainian delegation at Brest-Litovsk; the military successes of the Soviet of People's Commissars were few and far between. The equivocal policy followed appeared to anticipate two mutually exclusive possibilities: if the armed forces of the Ukraine succeeded in overcoming the Russian troops, the way was kept open for an eventual peace with the Ukraine, but if on the contrary, the terrorist warfare in the Ukraine was a permanent success, the claims were set up for the eventual liquidation of Ukrainian gains.

Trotsky demanded from the Soviet of People's Commissars in Petrograd 'military action against the Ukrainian Rada with the aim of presenting the German delegations with the naked fact of the end of the independent Ukraine', in the words of Fokke, a member of the Russian delegation.¹⁴³

On January 11, the day after the recognition of the Ukrainian delegation, the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine passed the decision to send to Brest-Litovsk a delegation consisting of Medvedev, the Chairman of the Committee, Shakhrai and Zatonsky. The delegation was told to 'act as part of the Peace Delegation of the Russian Federation' and to declare that no obligations with which the 'bourgeois Ukrainian Central Rada would bind the Ukraine in the name of the Ukrainian nation' would be recognized by the 'Workers'-Peasants' government of the Ukraine or its toiling masses'.¹⁴⁴ The delegation went to Petrograd. In view of the formal and factual subordination of the Central Executive Committee to the Russian government, it is probably that the declaration was produced on the initiative of the Soviet of People's Commissars.

The recognition of the Ukrainian Republic agreed to by the Central Powers was given in the next plenary meeting of the conference on January 12.

Czernin, in reply to the note of the U.N.R. Secretariat, announced on behalf of the delegation of the Quadruple Alliance:

We recognize the Ukrainian delegation as an independent delegation and as a plenipotentiary representation of the independent Ukrainian National Republic. Formal recognition on the part of the Quadruple Alliance of the Ukrainian National Republic as an independent state shall find expression in the peace treaty.¹⁴⁵

After the recognition was expressed, Trotsky stated that the 'conflicts which arose between the Russian Government and the General Secretariat' had no connection with the matter of 'self-determination of the Ukrainian nation.' As regards the self-determination of the Ukraine which 'in fact is taking place in the form of the National Republic', that matter could not be the cause of conflict between the 'fraternal republics'.¹⁴⁶ Trotsky, on behalf of the Russian delegation, testified to the free conditions and the free choice in the Ukrainian Republic.

Taking into consideration that there was no occupation of troops in the Ukraine, that political life there runs in conditions of full liberty, that there are no administrative organs which would pretend to represent it, nor fictitious ministers named by right of force, that in the Ukraine, freely chosen soviet councils function, there cannot be any doubt that the process of self-determination in the Ukraine is taking place within those geographic limits and in the administrative forms which truly correspond to the will of the Ukrainian people.¹⁴⁷

News of what had been decided was then given to the government in Petrograd. Lipsky, the consultant of the Soviet Delegation, informed the Soviet of People's Commissars, that in the plenary meeting, the States recognized the delegation of the Ukrainian republic as separate. The States of the Central Alliance reserved the right to postpone recognizing the republic as a self-governing independent state until the conclusion of peace. 'People's Commissar Trotsky, considering the presence in the Ukraine of all conditions necessary, in the view of the Russian government, for the free expression of the will, has also recognized this decision.'¹⁴⁸

Discussions continued in the Territorial and Political Commission. Spirited debates on the rights of existing bodies

in the occupied territories of the north-western part of the former Russian Empire, and on the question of the occupation troops, moved Hoffmann to a sharp protest, with the acquiescence of Kuehlmann. He referred to the Russian policy towards the Ukraine, in an attempt to justify German policies: in so far as his accusations were true they probably had the result of strengthening the German hand generally. He said, "When the Ukrainians realized their right of self-determination, the Petrograd government put an ultimatum to them and attempted to achieve its will by force of arms."¹⁴⁹

In the meantime, a new military adventure of Russia against the Ukraine was being mounted. On January 7, the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Russian Republic authorized the Military-Revolutionary Committee in Petrograd to begin the 'organization of the Red Guard for operations in the all-Ukrainian scale under the leadership of the Workers'-Peasants' government of the Ukraine.'¹⁵⁰ The initiative of organization was thus with the Russian bodies; the place of effective operation of the Military-Revolutionary Committee meant that recruiting would be carried out primarily in Russia, presumably of Russian nationals in the absence of any indication to the contrary.

On January 12, the Soviet of People's Commissars approved an order drafted by Lenin in which the Soviet applauded the 'decisive measures of Comrade Antonov in the struggle against the Kaledinites and their accomplices', and at the same time, certain measures taken by Antonov in the prosecution of the struggle.¹⁵¹ While the wording of the decree is somewhat inconclusive, in view of the fact that the phrase 'his accomplices' referred, in the words of Antonov, to the 'counter-revolutionary Kaledin-supporting Ukrainians', Antonov was apparently being encouraged to carry on the struggle with Kaledin and the Ukrainian National Republic. Antonov also wrote in his memoirs that the struggle against Kaledin quietened down at this juncture.¹⁵² On the other hand, he stated that a vast new offensive was being planned against the Ukraine, to start about January 18,¹⁵³ and that the appropriate

orders were being given. Thus Russia was undertaking another attack upon the Ukraine, with the expectation of victory at home, and dominance of the international scene.

The Soviet of People's Commissars had issued a new decree in regard to negotiations with the Republic, on January 12, as well. In it, the Soviet discussed the Ukrainian position and described the 'reply by the Rada' as so indefinite and equivocal that 'it bordered on torment (*izdevatel'stvo*)'. The decree, drafted by Lenin, further stated that the 'direct or indirect support of the Kaledinites by the Rada was the undoubted basis of military actions against the Rada'. The responsibility for the 'continuation of the civil war' was laid upon the Ukrainian government in view of the claimed equivocality of the Rada in reply whether it would 'stop the direct or indirect support of the Kaledinites.' The decree also stated that 'in the Ukraine itself the revolutionary movement of Ukrainian toiling classes for the full transfer of power to the Soviets takes ever greater strength and promises victory over the Ukrainian bourgeoisie in the nearest future'. Although the reference to this as support for the 'continuation of the civil war' would appear to be interference in Ukrainian affairs, the decree finished as follows,

As far as the national demands of Ukrainians are concerned, the independence of their National Republic, its right to demand federative relations, these are recognized by the Soviet of People's Commissars in the fullest and do not occasion any disagreement.¹⁵⁴

In the meantime, the Russian government was preparing further claims on the Ukraine, this time in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Russian Constituent Assembly. As has been discussed before, the Ukrainian delegates to the Assembly, Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary for the most part, had refused to take part in the Assembly. Thus, the Ukraine was not represented in this body.

Nevertheless, on January 17, the press published a Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, written by Lenin, to be presented on behalf of the Russian government

for approval by the Constituent Assembly. By it, the 'Soviet Russian Republic' was being instituted on the basis of a 'free union of free nations as the federation of Soviet national (*natsional'nykh*) republics'. The claim was made for the Ukraine indirectly: the decree greeted the policy of the Soviet of People's Commissars in regard to the recognition or rights of certain nations, where the Ukraine was not mentioned.¹⁵⁵ The draft decree was submitted to the meeting of the Constituent Assembly on January 18, and was rejected.¹⁵⁶ The All-Russian Constituent Assembly was dispersed shortly.

The Ukrainian Republic still continued to be an important factor in relations of the Entente. The reply of Acting Secretary of State Polk to Jusserand's *démarche*, given several days after the latter, stated that, while giving careful consideration to the whole situation, the American Government had 'no determination to acknowledge separate government in Russia'.¹⁵⁷ Thus French policy encountered a check.

President Wilson had proclaimed the Fourteen Points as the basis for peace on January 8. Although self-determination was the leading principle in the Fourteen Points, it was ignored for nations of the former Russian Empire, except in the case of Poland. The Fourteen Points had declared that 'Russia' must be allowed to solve its own difficulties, while the attitude of the democracies¹⁵⁸ towards Russia would be the 'acid test' for intentions. This was hardly surprising as the Point dealing with Russia had been based upon a draft by Bakhmetieff, the Russian Ambassador in Washington.¹⁵⁹ The Ukrainian Republic was completely ignored; a week later the provisional decision on recognition was made and Lansing notified the American Ambassador in Petrograd, Francis, that France considered the Ukraine 'as in fact an independent government'. The words 'in fact' did not appear in the French *démarche*. Francis was told that the American Government would not 'recognize any independent governments until the will of Russian people has been more definitely expressed on this general subject'. On the other hand, the President had defined clearly, according to Lansing, the sympathy of the United States for

democracy and self-government.¹⁶⁰ Thus the door on recognition of the Ukraine by the United States was closed for the time being.

Ukrainian statesmen attempted to maintain relations with the Entente. On January 12, Hrushevsky met Tabouis, the French Representative, and complained to him that Wilson's Points spoke neither of Russia nor of the Ukraine, and so on. The Ukraine, according to Hrushevsky, was an independent state in fact; a federation might be possible, but only in the future. In developing the idea of his complaint, he stated that he was the chairman of a committee made up of Ukraine, Crimea, White Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, while neither the Poles, nor Muscovy, nor Siberia were represented.¹⁶¹ Tabouis also met the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the same time. Shulhyn said to him that the Ukraine wanted to put off peace, as Germans wanted to impose upon the Ukraine an unacceptable commercial treaty; thus the Ukraine was going to ask a loan from France and proclaim herself in armed neutrality. The suggestion of neutrality for the Ukraine was rejected by Tabouis. He remarked that it was too late; armed neutrality would entail disarmament of foreigners; this would affect the French, and would be an act of hostility, useless if not harmful.¹⁶²

Tabouis claimed that the liaison between the Allies in Kiev was close. Almost every day Consul-General Bagge, and Captain Fitzwilliams for Great Britain, Colonel Pentimalli for Italy, General Coanda for Rumania and Dimitrievitch for Serbia met together, and these were joined by Masaryk for the Czecho-Slovaks and Bartoszewicz for the Poles (the Pilsudski party, cooperating with the Rada, did not belong to the group).¹⁶³ It was then that an agreement was concluded between Masaryk and the Republic on January 15. By this agreement, Czechs would be supplied by the Ukraine, and could leave the Ukraine offer 'giving up their arms as the property of the Ukrainian state'.¹⁶⁴

Further negotiations between the Ukraine and Entente ensued. The meeting took place on January 16, between the

representatives of the Ukrainian Republic, Halip, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Holitsynsky, Chobotarenko, Kovzhun and others,¹⁴⁵ and the representatives of France, Great Britain, the United States and Italy, at Jassy in Rumania. The demands of the Great Powers of the Entente and the nomination of Allied diplomatic representatives at Kiev, financial support to the Ukrainian Government, and the establishment of facilities for supplying the Ukraine with manufactured products. Halip added that the military situation would change completely if there were Allied forces in Russia, if the Allied powers were masters of the communications with Vladivostok, and if agreements could be concluded with Turkey and Bulgaria. According to Halip, these two powers had made advances to the Ukrainian delegates and had 'shown a certain resentment against Germany and Austria-Hungary'. In their reply, the Allied representatives stated that 'in the first place, the Allied powers must ask the Ukraine even if it could not carry on the war financially, to give at least an assurance that it would conclude no separate peace.' They had also asked that the Ukrainian government not undertake any 'degrading relations with our enemies', that the Ukrainian authorities should organize, with the assistance of the Allied military mission, an armed force sufficient to assure 'not only order in the interior' but also to give the country protection from 'outside attack'. The Ukrainian government was to establish relations with other autonomous Russian states, as well as with Rumania, so as to 'present a solid front' to the Central Empires, and also to help support Rumanians. The attitude of the 'great Allied powers towards the Ukraine on the subjects of recognition of her independence, of financial help, and of military collaboration was dependent on the reply to the Allied demands'. The French Minister, Saint Aulaire, added that he had already been authorized to acknowledge the independence of Ukraine and that he was ready to do so immediately on receipt of a satisfactory answer from the delegates.¹⁴⁶ Halip informed Kiev that Saint Aulaire had 'finally admitted that the country ought to be recognized in a formal manner'. Saint

Aulaire had urged that negotiations at Brest-Litovsk be drawn out and indicated that a large loan of gold might be made to the Rada in the near future. He further indicated Saint Aulaire's understanding that the Ukraine could not continue the war. The Entente only wanted to gain time and the assurance that, while making peace, the Ukraine would indeed keep her 'true liberty' from the Germans.¹⁶⁷

The Ukrainian delegation gave no immediate reply and returned to Kiev by air. The negotiations were also held on military lines between General Omelyanovych-Pavlenko, and General Berthelot. The issue was the formation of a 'Ukrainian Legion' of several divisions, to be formed and led by Omelyanovych-Pavlenko.¹⁶⁸ The Ukraine had expressed indifference to Bessarabia, in part to obtain support against the Bolsheviks in Kiev promised by Coanda, but not given.¹⁶⁹ Rumanians had occupied Bessarabia, taking Kishinev on January 13 despite the protest by the Sfat Tsarii; the Ukraine did not protest.

In the Conference at Brest-Litovsk, the Ukrainian delegation pressed their advantage in the discussions. Austria-Hungary was in the midst of a serious economic crisis, and all the world knew it. The delegation felt it could profit by it.

On January 13, the Ukrainians put forward demands for the Kholm province and Podlassie, as well as for a plebiscite in Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovyna and Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, again.¹⁷⁰ Count Czernin categorically refused to discuss the question of the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. He was supported by Kuehlmann, who accused, 'You want no peace, rather war.' General Hoffmann, too, considered the demand for Galicia and Bukovyna 'madness'.¹⁷¹ In the evening session, Holubovych raised the issue of the Kholm province. The Ukrainian delegation stated that the Kholm region belonged to the Ukraine by ethnographic characteristics, and called for a plebiscite. Czernin stated that he held to the principle that the Kholm province belonged to Poland.¹⁷²

Nevertheless, discussions continued in private, while the Ukrainian delegation persevered in its demand in regard to

the north-western border. Czernin cited Polish statistics, while Ukrainians supplied others, and also the map of the German command. Hoffmann, present at the discussions, kept silence.¹⁷³

Other delegations too, attempted to further an understanding between the Ukraine and Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Ukrainian delegation was visited by Popov, the head of the Bulgarian delegation. He complained of the 'bitter Bulgarian fate', of German injustices and of the conditions at Brest-Litovsk where two 'Slav nations cannot even talk freely to each other.' At the same time, he gave the advice of being more 'gentle', to come to an agreement with the Germans for there was no other way out. It is not known whether other Central Powers had exerted pressure upon Bulgaria for the intervention.¹⁷⁴

The matter of French aid to the Ukraine was apparently complicating matters at Brest-Litovsk; on January 12, Berlin received a report from its embassy at Bern that according to a French confidential agent, the Entente has sent 800 million roubles in gold to the Ukraine. The report was wired from Berlin to many offices, in an apparent effort to find some corroboration.¹⁷⁵ The embassy in Sweden wired Berlin on January 15 that, according to the Ukrainian bureau in Stockholm, the Ukraine had rejected the French offer of a loan, over which the Finance Secretary had resigned. As far as the news from Bern was concerned it could have been 'at the most a French offer to take over the gold backing for the bank-notes to be issued by the Ukraine.'¹⁷⁶ A detailed report on the French offer, with the protest of the *Nova Rada* against the action of Tuhon-Baranovsky, discussed earlier, was sent through from Stockholm three days later.¹⁷⁷ The German suspicions appear to have been thus laid to rest for the time being.

At this time the Foreign Office a further report on Ukrainian stability, as contrasted with the stability of the Russian regime, its rival. Keyserlingk, the head of the unofficial German military representation in Petrograd, reported on Janu-

ary 4, 1918, by direct wire to the Highest Command, that the 'Ukraine seems by various descriptions to be the stronger part of the Empire.' He also noted that 'here in Petrograd, the great worry is that we might conclude the peace with the Ukrainians without reference to the North'. Again he reported that the Bolsheviks 'were in a minority' and held their domination (*Herrschaft*), gained through the slogan 'peace', only through 'oppressive power'. They were generally expected to last two-three months at the most.¹⁷⁹

In Austria, matters were going from bad to worse. On January 16, Czernin was talking of the 'unavoidable breakout of the revolution'.¹⁷⁹ A vast strike-movement spread throughout Austria, and even through Hungary, as a result of shortage of food. Three hundred thousand men struck in Vienna on January 16.¹⁸⁰ Czernin stated to the Emperor on January 16, that Austria was 'on the point of revolution'.¹⁸¹ Help was not forthcoming from outside. Hungary continued to refuse to let food be exported to Austria and Germany likewise declared that it could not lend Austria any of her grain. Thus the distress in Austria continued; only from one place could the Austrians hope to obtain the much-needed bread. Czernin wired Vienna that 'he hoped in time to secure some supplies from the Ukraine'.¹⁸² He was receiving messages that in the Ukraine there was a great surplus of grain. 'If we can get (it), the worst may be avoided.' Nor was Czernin alone in his fear. Seidler, the Prime Minister, had wired to him that 'without supplies of grain from the Ukraine, catastrophe is imminent'.¹⁸³

It is of interest that some German officials, too, believed Austria-Hungary to have been on the verge of a revolution at this time. Wedel, the German Ambassador to Vienna wired to Berlin, on January 21, 1918, that the crisis had already become 'latent'. Austrians were unable to help themselves and had to be helped. Wedel went on to say, that 'it looked quite hopeless in Austria and one could say that a collapse was inevitable' in a short while if the government, which had been caught this time 'quite unprepared', did not show itself deci-

sive. As one of the decisive measures taken by the Government, Wedel reported, Hungarian troops were sent to Czechia (Bohemia), 'which are most feared there.' All capable troops on leave had been called up to deal with the emergency.

As a consequence of his awareness that only the Ukraine could solve the problem of the Austrian need, Czernin stated in the talks that while there could be no interference in the internal affairs of the two countries, he was ready to discuss, under the principle of parity, such problems as that of the Polish minority in the Ukraine.¹⁶⁴ This was already an admission of defeat, as the principle of parity enabled the problem of the Ukrainian minority in Austria-Hungary to be brought in. Czernin wrote in his diary that the negotiations with the Ukrainians were moving slowly and that the Ukrainians, in spite of their lack of experience, were showing themselves well able to seize the moment and exploit an opportunity favourable to them.¹⁶⁵ In consequence of the Ukrainian pressure, he asked Hoffmann to become the intermediary. According to Hoffmann, who explained in his memoirs that he was convinced that the conclusion of a separate peace with the Ukraine without reference to Russia would force Trotsky to abandon his reserve, the initiative for the *démarche* was his. 'I suggested to the Count,' wrote Hoffmann, 'that I be empowered, in private conversation with the Ukrainians, first of all to find out under what conditions they would be inclined to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers. To this suggestion, Count Czernin agreed.'¹⁶⁶

Hoffmann took the initiative in direct negotiations with the Ukraine. He invited Sevryuk, and probably Lewytsky (the latter in a subordinate capacity perhaps) for factual discussions.¹⁶⁷ Hoffmann said that he was a soldier and not a diplomat: he had invited Sevryuk in a 'short and factual talk to clear up the probability or the impossibility of peace.' As far as the regions of Kholm, Polessia and Podlassie were concerned, the territories occupied by the German army at the time, Hoffmann was willing to satisfy the Ukrainian demands, on the condition that the Ukraine give up a 'small strip in

Podlassie' (pointing it out on the map on the spot) which was required out of strategic reasons. Sevryuk stated that the government would probably agree.

Hoffmann asked then whether the peace could indeed be concluded on the outline of Czernin, the non-interference in internal Austrian affairs, and the recognition of the old border. Sevryuk did not think so. Hoffmann then stated that Germany would not support the Ukrainian demand of referendum. Sevryuk declared to that, that the Ukraine could not give up its interest in those lands. Hoffmann asked for a suggestion of a workable compromise on the question. Sevryuk asked for a break of a few hours in the discussions.

In the next meeting Sevryuk declared that a compromise could be made with the Ukraine recognizing the old border, but the other side must give up the idea of 'non-intervention in internal Austro-Hungarian affairs'. Hoffmann inquired further what an intervention in the internal affairs would entail. At this point Sevryuk said that the 'Ukrainian demands in Austria-Hungary were generally known', without formulating the demand of the Ukrainian self-governing province. Hoffmann gave Sevryuk to understand that he knew what was in question, by stating unequivocally that the integrity of Hungary (as distinct from Austria, presumably) was not debatable. Hoffmann promised Sevryuk support on this basis, asking him to keep the discussion as private and confidential; Sevryuk stated that he felt it his duty to report on the discussion to his government.¹⁸⁸

The agreement was reached provisionally in the meeting of the Ukrainian, German and Austro-Hungarian delegations on January 18 or 19. The agreement was on the lines of the earlier Hoffmann-Sevryuk agreement. The Ukraine was promised the entire Kholm district. Furthermore, they were to receive a declaration that Austria-Hungary would not hold back the national and linguistic development of Ukrainians living in the land. Finally, they were promised that an 'independent Austrian *Kronland*' would be formed in the districts of Eastern Galicia and of Bukovyna inhabited by Ukraini-

ans.¹⁸⁹ The declaration was made by Czernin on behalf of the two delegations.¹⁹⁰

While making the declaration, Czernin attempted to soften what surely must have been a blow to his own prestige and that of the state he represented by further demanding that the peace treaty be signed by the Ukraine before January 30; the condition was quite unlikely to be objected to by the Ukrainian delegation and government at this point. Furthermore he demanded that trade relations open immediately after the signature of the peace treaty. He also wanted the demobilization of the Ukrainian Army to begin immediately with the signature of the peace.¹⁹¹ This demand was ignored by the Ukraine.

Czernin's declaration was supported by the declaration of Kuehlmann, who insisted that this was the maximum what the Central Powers could give the Ukraine; the agreement on economic matters was the 'necessary condition.'¹⁹² Thus, although agreement had been reached in general, the whole question was still open enough for further presentation of claims.

Czernin's claim for resumption of trade relations with the Ukraine, has been described by Karpenko, a Bolshevik writer, as a demand for 'more exactly, immediate robbery of the Ukrainian land.'¹⁹³ No such conclusion can be drawn from the available archival sources. Czernin did in fact mean a free commerce between the Ukraine and the Central Powers. This is shown, for instance, by an early attempt of his government to gain such trade even before the signature of the peace treaty, potentially very harmful to the negotiating position of Austria-Hungary and Germany. On January 22, the German office in Tarnopol informed the Obost at Brest-Litovsk that two officials of Austria-Hungary had arrive there with orders to go to Kiev to negotiate with the Central Rada on purchasing food supplies. The men in question were the General-Secretary and the Director of the Agricultural Association in Lviv: their non-diplomatic position meant that Austria-Hungary had envisaged purchase in the open market. The

Obost transmitted the news to the Command, added that a further journey by these persons would hardly correspond with German interests; they were temporarily held up. Hoffmann added that the Ukrainian delegation was expected to reach Kiev the next day. The simultaneous appearance of the Austrian buyers would 'naturally strengthen the impression that our allies were in serious straits (*dringender Notlage*) and would only serve to increase the shamelessness of the Ukraine, which was already strong without that.'

The report reached Berlin. The German Ambassador in Vienna was told to inform Czernin that Berlin thought it of the greatest importance that the 'two gentlemen be called back immediately.' If this was not to happen, Berlin warned, Austria would come to see 'at its own expense (*an eigenem Leibe*)' the consequences in the form of 'higher demands of the Ukraine.'¹⁴⁴ It appears that the Austro-Hungarian government ignored the German diplomatic attempt to preserve the bargaining position of the Central Powers. At any rate, five days later, Berlin informed Rosenberg at Brest-Litovsk that Czernin had been told of the 'undesirable consequences of the journey of the two gentlemen to Kiev', while the question was to be settled directly by German military authorities.¹⁴⁵ The German Command finally issued an order prohibiting the passage of the buyers through the front.¹⁴⁶

This then was the situation when Hoffmann presented the meeting of the territorial commission with a provisional border-line in the East. "This line, insofar as whole nations are in our dominion," he said, "that is, as their territories are occupied by our troops—this line represents, in our opinion, their borders." Pointing at a place on the line, he added, "Here, for instance, is the border line of the Lithuanian people."¹⁴⁷

Continuing his report, Hoffmann explained why the line starting from the Baltic Sea stopped at Brest-Litovsk. 'I must, first of all, state that I can talk now only concerning the regions lying to the north of Brest-Litovsk, as at this time negotiations are still being carried on with the Representatives of the Ukrainian Delegation over the regions to the south of

Brest-Litovsk, negotiations which as yet have not been concluded.' In this way, the Soviet delegation was advised that the matter of the Ukraine's border was not considered to be their business by the Central Powers. The Ukrainian National Republic gave them similar notice. Trotsky, speaking for the Soviet Delegates, acquiesced in the border line being subject to German-Ukrainian discussions, but attempted to argue that the matter must also be subject to agreement between the U.N.R. and the Soviet of People's Commissars. His reasoning was specious: 'As the borders are determined by the interested masses of the population, then in each separate case there would have to be an agreement between the Ukrainian democracy and ours. Such is our stand in regard to the regions to the south of Brest-Litovsk.'¹⁹⁸

At this stage in the proceedings, the negotiations were adjourned for ten days to enable all the delegates to receive instructions.

The Ukrainian, Austro-Hungarian and German delegation prepared a joint announcement on the course of the negotiations, issued on January 20. The announcement read that the negotiations held between the delegations of the Central Powers and of the Ukrainian National Republic had a 'hope of reaching agreement on the peace treaty.' The negotiations had reached the point of 'determination of the important bases of the peace treaty' requiring consultations at home.¹⁹⁹

German policy followed the Berlin agreement of January 2. After Chancellor Hertling's statement to the Principal Commission of the Reichstag, that the agreement with the Ukraine was his first hope,²⁰⁰ Kuehlmann could declare in the Reichstag on January 26, that negotiations with the Ukraine would now be pressed to the full. "In our opinion, the Ukraine is as qualified for a diplomatic action as any other state," was his remark upon this occasion,²⁰¹ pointing out that Germans as well as the Bolsheviks had recognized it as an 'independent republic.'

The formation of the Austro-Hungarian policy was more complicated, for in Austria-Hungary the economic crisis was

deepening and was attended by a certain amount of public pressure. On January 19, for example, Seidler, the Prime Minister, had to assure a delegation of workers that 'negotiations with the Ukrainian Republic have been pushed far already and one may expect a rapid peace.'²⁰² And two days later Czernin noted in his diary, 'The impression of the Vienna disturbances is even greater than I expected and is having a catastrophic effect. The Ukrainians are no longer negotiating, they are dictating.'²⁰³

The Crown Council held in Vienna on January 22 in the presence of Czernin, dealing with the treaty, was a stormy affair. The Emperor, chairing the meeting, opened the proceedings by inviting Czernin to report on negotiations. Czernin then stated that the decision on the matters lay not with him but rather with the entire Ministry, and above all with the Austrian Prime Minister, Dr. Seidler. At the same time, however, he did his best to leave no doubt in the minds of the ministry that rejection of the wishes of the Ukrainians would probably prevent an agreement, and hence any peace with them at Brest-Litovsk. He also presented the Ukrainian demands.

Seidler, who spoke next, underlined the necessity of obtaining an immediate peace. He followed up from the parliamentary point of view the line of thought instigated by Czernin's minorities gambit and Western Ukrainian ambitions, and went on to investigate the possibilities of the formation of a Ukrainian province (*Kronland*). Seidler thought that he could obtain the necessary two-thirds majority for the acceptance of such a bill, in spite of the bitter Polish opposition to be expected. Wekerle, the Prime Minister of Hungary, and Seidler's counterpart, then put himself in stiff opposition by taking the part of the Poles. Provoked, Czernin turned on Wekerle and rather pointedly remarked that he would be the first one to agree with him if Wekerle would supply Austria with Hungarian wheat. Seconded by Seidler, he compared the situation of Austria at that time to that of a man who jumps from a third storey window when the house is on fire.

Actually, serious consideration of the 'Polish-Austrian solution' of the Polish problem (necessitating friendship to the Poles within Austria-Hungary), was made impracticable by the policy adopted by the Germans. It would appear that this view, expressed by Gratz, strengthened the position of Seidler and Czernin.

Eventually, Charles summed up the discussions. Peace with Petrograd and the Ukraine was to be striven for above all, and the partition of Galicia was to be made the basis of negotiations with the Ukraine. Count Burian made it clear that although the constitutional structure of the monarchy was indeed to be changed by the war, such a change must come about organically from within, not forcibly from without. If the policy of the partition of Galicia were to be accepted, it ought to be initiated by the Austrians, and the manner in which the agreement was to be made was of importance. He suggested therefore that the clause on the partition should be inserted not into the peace document, but into a secret annex. His advice was respected, and the Crown Council then decided to make the partition thus guaranteed by a secret protocol part of the negotiations with the Ukrainian National Republic. The problem of the northern part of the Ukrainian-Polish border was reserved by Czernin for his own decision.²⁰¹

Two days later, Czernin began to lay the groundwork for the eventual acceptance of the treaty in his report to the Austrian *Delegation*, the responsible committee of the Austrian Reichsrat.

He requested, above all, patience. It was not a question any more of the conclusion of the war on the Ukrainian front, as neither Austria-Hungary nor the Ukraine had any intention of going on with the war.²⁰² Peace with the Ukraine nevertheless remained of the greatest importance. "Peace with St. Petersburg would change nothing in our basic position," he said. The Ukraine, however, had stores of food which they would export once the Austrians recognized its separate existence and could engage in commerce. Czernin could see that

an agreement on peace would help the population of Austria.²⁰⁴ He was evidently ready to engage in discussions with the Ukraine, although the Russian delegation stood its ground and insisted that the old borders of the Ukraine were not at all definitely settled. Czernin assured the *Delegation* that Austria should agree with the Ukrainian Republic that the old border between Austria-Hungary and the former Russian Empire would be maintained.²⁰⁷

The second Russian adventure was to be more disastrous to the Ukraine, and to Eastern Europe as a whole, including Russia. In its consequences, it made the hegemony of the Central Powers in Eastern Europe even more likely than the first. The new general attack planned by Antonov for mid-January was more immediately successful than the previous one. At about the same time, the last troops favouring the Republic were disarmed in Kharkiv, a Red Guard detachment led by Berzin successfully supported a Bolshevik coup centering on the Bryansk factory in the city of Katerynoslav.²⁰⁸ Finally, on January 18, Antonov sent troops from Kharkiv in the direction of Poltava and Kiev, under the command of Muravyov.²⁰⁹ Poltava was taken; however, Muravyov did not think it possible to proceed towards Kiev immediately.

The events in Poltava have been described by Mazlakh, the Chairman of the Bolshevik Committee in the city. According to Mazlakh, on January 19, a significant detachment of Red Guard with 'the majority of Petrograd workers', under the command of Muravyov, quietly occupied Poltava. The 'united Soviet', 'enlarged by representatives of the Red Guard units' met (The irony of occupying troops being represented in the local body, a regular Soviet policy, seems to have escaped the memoirist). In the Soviet, Muravyov, putting his hand on the Mauser gun hanging at his side, and without beginning the speech with the customary term 'comrades', stated.

The civil war has started. The civil war continues. From the Baltic to the Black Sea across the Danube towards Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London, we shall pass with fire

and sword establishing everywhere the Soviet power. By fire and sword we shall destroy everything that would dare to put itself in our way. None of our enemies will be shown mercy.²¹⁰

After this, he ordered the arrest of all non-Bolshevik members of the Soviet. In a truly unique gesture, the Bolshevik members of the Soviet protested and declared that they wanted to be arrested with their fellow members. Muravyov satisfied their wish and arrested the whole Soviet. Finally, the situation was solved by a general amnesty and the order for re-election of the Soviet.²¹¹ In time, an acceptable Soviet was established in Poltava, overwhelmingly Bolshevik.

The conflict between Muravyov and the Rada of Soldiers' Deputies, and the 'right wing' of the united Soviet which had joined it continued and was solved by the former with main force.²¹² This combined Rada had passed a resolution that it did not recognize the Kharkiv body, barricaded themselves, and surrounded the Soviet building with 'artillery and machine-guns'.²¹³ In the words of Muravyov's report to Antonov, 'the defensist (non-Bolshevik) fraction . . . began to tempt me like Christ, and I quietened them down forever'.²¹⁴

The establishment of Russian power in the Ukraine was realized by a reign of terror, begun in Kharkiv. Muravyov reported to Antonov after the occupation of Poltava, 'I have ordered all defenders of the local bourgeoisie to be put to death'.²¹⁵ As will be seen, a similar policy was to be followed in Kiev, on a higher scale. Anticipating events, again, Muravyov's activity in Odessa should be mentioned in the discussion of the Russian terrorist warfare in the Ukraine. After a meeting of workers in Odessa issued a protest against the attempted mobilization by Russian authorities in early February, Muravyov declared to the meeting of the representatives of the Factory Committees and the Trade Unions,

I will not allow you workers to avoid taking up arms. This is not all. I still have the fleet. If we are forced to give up Odessa, I will burn it, I will explode it in the air, I will leave ashes for enemy.

He also declared to the 'representatives of the bourgeoisie' of Odessa, demanding 'ten million roubles over three days.'

I will not give up Odessa. The entire Black Sea fleet is concentrated here and if the need arises, nothing will remain of your palaces, of your lives. . . .²¹⁶

Muravyov, Lenin's commander, appears to have been pathologically unbalanced. Doroshenko, a historian not given to flights of fancy, came to the same conclusion.²¹⁷ Antonov, Muravyov's immediate commander, comments on his extreme irresponsibility while praising his flashes of energy.²¹⁸

Muravyov thus appeared to be an effective choice for the policy of terroristic warfare followed by the Soviet of People's Commissars, and more particularly by Lenin, in the Ukraine. The Russian war against the Ukraine was the first application of terrorist warfare in modern times. The method proved 'effective' in the initial stages; it was only in time that the Ukrainian authorities learned in the course of the extended war to cope with the new method of warfare. In the early stages, however, the terrorist reputation of Leninist troops preceded them, and by instilling terror in the local defenders and the population in general, weakened resistance greatly.

It was on the day of the Russian advance to Poltava that Trotsky obtained a break in negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, to last for ten days. Lenin had requested the break on January 16; he also informed Trotsky that the delegation of the 'Kharkiv Ukrainian Central Executive Committee' was to leave that day. They had persuaded Lenin that the 'Kievan Rada was about to kick off (*dyshit na ladan*)' in Lenin's words.²¹⁹ It would appear, however, that the Kievan Rada did not 'kick off' immediately; it was not until January 21, during the break in negotiations, that the Russian government officially transmitted the information that the Delegation of the Central Executive Committee and the People's Secretariat would be part of the delegation of the Russian republic. It appears that the People's Secretariat was not allowed to con-

tact the powers directly: its protest against the activity of the Ukraine was contained in the Russian note. Thus, the Secretariat stated that the 'General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada could in no case be recognized as the representation of the entire Ukrainian nation.' The Bolshevik grouping did not attempt to force the withdrawal of the Ukrainian delegation; it merely stated that 'all decisions accepted by the General Secretariat without agreement with us' would be void.²²⁰ On the same day, Rosenberg, an official of the German Foreign Office, informed the Foreign Office that a 'new Ukrainian Rada had been formed in Kharkiv' as was known from the press which stood in opposition to the Kievan Rada. He said further that 'two members of this Rada' had arrived at Brest-Litovsk; they were not forming a separate groups but considered themselves as 'Ukrainian members of the Russian delegation'.²²¹

The German Foreign Office was acquainted with the People's Secretariat through its own Manifesto sent by wireless on December 27, and received by the Germans,²²² and through the various protests of Ukrainian bodies sent by wireless at the end of December²²³ (no message of support had been intercepted at his point). Further information was received by the Foreign Office from German officials in neutral countries. Steinwachs reported to Minister Bergen from Stockholm that the 'latest news from the Ukraine confirmed that the Petrograd reports on the Anti-Rada (*Gegenrada*) had been completely distorted (*entstellt*) and that the attempt of the Kievan Bolsheviks to obtain power through an all-Ukrainian Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies had failed miserably.' A detailed report of the work of the Congress of Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine followed. Steinwachs further reported that the indignation against the 'misgovernment of the Bolsheviks was strong everywhere and the most radical revolutionaries of the Ukraine had become implacable enemies of the Bolsheviks'.²²⁴

More information came after the presentation of the new Russian demand, from German ambassadors. Lucius von

Stoedten wired from Stockholm on January 25 that the 'power of the Kharkiv Central Executive Committee' whose attendance at the conference was being 'demanded by Trotsky,' was 'not affirmed even in Kharkiv itself', referring to Ukrainian sources. Committee lacked money, while Trotsky was 'continually sending money drafts to the Kharkiv state bank which the latter would not honour.' It was ordered that all the Ukrainian railroads in Kharkiv be paid in the name of Petrograd, but the order was found to have unreliable. Lucius von Stoedten quoted a telegram from Stalin to 'Comrade Artem, Kharkiv', as an example of the obvious incapacity of the Committee to govern and its dependence upon Russia.

I am sending two million roubles by courier, more through a money draft through the state bank. If the bank should refuse payment arrest all officials. You have enough hands to take the money. No weeping, but revolutionizing.²²³

It should be noted that the telegram was intercepted by German military intelligence.

A similar report came from Vienna. Wedel, the German Ambassador, after consulting with the Ukrainian representatives in Austria-Hungary wired Berlin,

Local Ukrainians judge the so-called Kharkiv parallel-government to be of little importance and see in the Rada in Kiev the lawful government for the Ukraine.²²⁴

The Russian government attempted to further undermine the Ukraine in the peace negotiations by a declaration, probably by Trotsky, sent by wireless on January 23, entitled 'The Ukraine and the Peace Negotiations.' It stated that the embassies and missions of the Entente had supported the Ukrainian Rada against the power of the Soviets with all means. The agents of the Entente, however, were deceived and betrayed by the Rada after 'they themselves had taught the Rada the art of deceit and betrayal'; the Rada had begun secret peace negotiations with Germany and Austria. However, the 'Austro-Hungarian imperialists had miscalculated as well.' While they had attempted to reach an agreement with

the Rada to 'get a free hand against Russia, the Rada had 'perished in the meantime.' The situation was developing to the detriment of the Rada, and at the moment of the signature of the peace treaty between the Central Powers and the Rada, 'Brest-Litovsk would remain the only basis of the government of Mr. Vynnychenko.'²²⁷

Vorovsky, the Russian (Bolshevik) representative in Stockholm, attempted to persuade the Germans once more of the 'imminent fall of the Central Rada and the great progress made by the Bolsheviks against the Ukraine'. Lucius von Stoedten informed Berlin that Vorovsky insisted that now that an agreement had apparently been concluded between the Ukraine and Germany, his government would have to clean up the Ukrainian matter next (*zunächst mit der Ukraine aufzuraumen*) to prove to the Germans that their peace with the Ukraine meant nothing. The German ambassador concluded that apparently there was 'great bitterness against the Ukraine in Petrograd' and that Russians appeared to have the intention to 'persuade us (Germans) by press reports of the overthrow soon to take place in the Ukraine.'²²⁸

Peace in general, and the Ukrainian question in particular, was the subject of debate in the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It was to this body that Trotsky made the public report on the proceedings.

About the Ukrainian participation in the peace negotiations, Trotsky declared that the Russian delegation had known that the Ukrainian delegation had negotiated secretly with the German and the Austrian delegations. The Ukrainians had been told that they would be informed completely of developments, but similar behaviour was demanded from the Ukrainian delegation, obviously without success. A declaration of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine, presented to the Congress, stated that the Soviet of People's Commissars was entitled to speak for the 'entire Russian federation', obviously including the Ukraine. The Congress, taking the reports and the declaration into consideration, approved the

steps taken towards peace.²²⁹ The Congress had heard Lenin declare in his report on January 24 that 'we have survived the organization of power of the Ukrainian Kerenskys'. While the struggle was not yet over, it was plain that the 'bourgeois elements of the Ukrainian Rada were living their last days', 'The victory of the Soviet power of the Ukrainian National Republic over the Ukrainian bourgeois Rada' could not be doubted, according to Lenin.²³⁰ The Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, rejected by the Russian Constituent Assembly, was approved by the Congress of the Soviets, on January 25.²³¹

In Kiev, the situation became more and more serious from the Entente point of view. In the Rada, there were debates as to whether the Ukraine should lean on the Allies or Central Powers; this was as Tabouis saw it. Three articles of the future Universal of Independence were discussed; these were particularly noted by Tabouis: full independence of the Ukraine, socialization of lands and banks and finally, 'friendly and commercial relations'—according to Tabouis—with the Central Powers. Tabouis received orders from his superiors, probably Saint Aulaire, to protest against 'any separate peace, any friendly relations with the enemy'. The protest was approved by Picton Bagge, Masaryk and Bartoszewicz. It seems that neither Coanda, for Rumania (who was in dire straits herself), nor Dimitrievitch for Serbia, nor again Pentimalli for Italy approved of the protest. Tabouis told the President of the Council that the French Government would view it 'with profound regret' if the Ukraine undertook any obligations whatsoever towards the Central Powers. If this were to occur, the French representative threatened, 'France, despite its sympathy for this nation so rich in expectations, could not forget that the Ukraine had given the Central Powers the moral support of separate peace and material aid by the resumption of commercial relations'.²³² The conclusion of peace with the Central Powers would be an act hostile to France and the latter would rescind the recognition of the Republic.²³³ The new Ukrainian government ignored the notes; with Pet-

Iura, a forthright friend of the Entente gone, the pro-Entente sentiment in the Ukrainian government was considerably weakened.²³¹ The government had in fact decided to put off the decision on the French offer of assistance to a meeting to be held on January 24.²³²

The Ukrainian reply, in the Jassy negotiation given about January 23, was that the Ukrainian Peace Delegation had received 'full power to negotiate peace with the Central Powers', while the latter were particularly insistent on resumption of economic relations. The Ukrainian government, being obliged to defend itself against the Bolsheviks by using its weak police powers, 'could not resist the pressure of the Germanic powers'. However, Halip assured the Allies that the Ukraine, 'even after the conclusion of peace', will endeavor to 'safeguard its future, to maintain good relations with the Allied powers', to organize itself with their help, and to limit the amount of provisions sent to the Central Powers. It would also help supply Rumania and further the evacuation of the Czech, Serb and Rumanian armies. The Allied Consuls might well express doubt about the promises, as did Sharp, the Consul of the United States.²³³

The Entente was seriously worried. Pélissier, an old friend of the Ukraine, telegraphed on the Entente's behalf to Shulhyn, that the Entente would hold the Ukraine responsible for the events arising out of the separate peace.²³⁴ The British too, took a stiffer attitude. *The Westminster Gazette*, Lloyd George's supporter, talked of 'the treason of the Ukraine'.²³⁵

The British, and Lloyd George in particular, had kept up the pressure for the crushing of Turkey. The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, with Generals Wilson, Weygand and others met in late January and issued Note No. 12. They held that the crushing of Turkey, if not too long deferred, would enable the Allies to get into 'direct touch with and give effective help to, such elements of resistance as may still survive in Rumania and Southern Russia'. The results of the collapse of Turkey would be worth any effort compatible

with the security of the defence in the West.²³⁹ However, as Lloyd George remarks, it was not possible to 'open the Dardanelles'.²⁴⁰

In the meantime, Francis persisted in his policy of recognition. On January 15, he forwarded to Washington a message from Robins to Thompson, stating that the 'Ambassador has recommended simultaneous recognition of Bolsheviks, Ukraine and present Finnish authorities'. In an explanatory letter, Francis added that Robins had misunderstood him over recognition of the Bolsheviks. What he actually had in mind was the establishment of working relations with the *de facto* governments,²⁴¹ even at this late date.

In Washington, however, Wilson had by now drifted into a position of complete confusion on the events and policy in the former Russian Empire. The United States was thereby withdrawn, as it were, from the developments in Eastern Europe. On January 21, Wilson confessed his confusion to an associate that 'at present the changes taking place in Russia are so kaleidoscopic that I feel that information and advice are futile until there is something definite to plan with as well as for.'²⁴² The United States failed to take any major initiative in the East-European theatre in the balance of the period of the formation of the Republic.

The Ukrainian delegation left Brest-Litovsk about January 20 to go to Kiev via Lviv, for consultations with the government. According to Sevryuk, the delegation felt at this point that it had reached the maximum of demands but that the journey was necessary to maintain prestige, and by this, the negotiating strength of the delegation, and also to attempt to get in touch with representatives of the Western Ukraine. This could not be an easy task in view of the desire of Austria-Hungary to keep the delegation isolated. On the stop-over at Lviv the members of the delegation asked to rest over for a few hours, divided to split the group of Austrian officers given them to 'accompany' them, and went to the various Ukrainian stores, (offices of Ukrainian organizations being off limits to them). In the meantime, several responsible Galician politi-

cians had received news of the delegation, and gathered in the office of the newspaper *Dilo*, which happened to be in the same building of the store visited by M. Lyubynsky; Lyubynsky asked the manager, Dermal, for the politicians, and in a minute met Paneyko, Lozynsky and, probably, Okhrymovych, while Dermal entertained the Austro-Hungarian officer.

Lyubynsky said, "We cannot succeed in obtaining the union," obviously dumbfounding these present. "They will form a *Kronland* under the Hapsburgs", he went on. Paneyko replied on the spot, "We shall prepare for you the statute of the Ukrainian crown land; stop over in Lviv for sure on the way back". Lyubynsky agreed.²⁴³ Insufficient as the meeting was, it gave the added assurance to the Ukrainian officials that their policy was known and approved by the Western Ukraine. The Western Ukrainian politicians had a meeting the same evening attended by experts in constitutional relations; present were Paneyko, Okhrymovych, Stepan Rudnytsky, Tomashivsky and possibly some others. The basic lines of the statute were discussed, and further arrangements made for its drafting.²⁴⁴ The Ukrainian delegation returned to Kiev on the eve of the proclamation of independence of the Ukraine. The delegation presented its report.²⁴⁵

The Fourth Universal, proclaiming independence and approving the conclusion of peace by the Republic with the Central Powers, was debated and approved in a continuous meeting of the Small Rada beginning on January 22 and concluding in the early hours of January 25.

After the proclamation of independence, a new government was formed. Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries decided that the time had come for them to exercise their right to form a government, based upon their overwhelming majority in the Central Rada. The importance of peace was proved by the fact that the former head of the Peace Delegation, Holubovych, became the new Head of the Council of Ministers. A new Peace Delegation was appointed, headed by Sevryuk, and consisting of Sevryuk, Mykola Lewytsky and M. Lyubynsky. As Sevryuk wrote in his memoirs, it was not possible to re-

ceive any definite instructions from the government. The only order was, 'Make peace as soon as possible.' Sevryuk had, however, a serious discussion with Hrushevsky. The latter was sorry to see that the Ukraine would not succeed in adding to its territory certain small parts of the Podlissie, to which Hoffmann would not agree for strategic reasons. Hrushevsky stated that the formation of a separate *Kronland* of Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovyna within Austria²⁴⁶ would be satisfactory. The delegation left Kiev by special train on the night of January 29, running a Bolshevik gauntlet on the way, but succeeding in making their way. Sevryuk had obtained a written authorization for discussions with the delegates of the Central Executive Committee, and made use of it in passing through the station of Shepativka-Podilska occupied by a military train under a yellow-blue flag and under a red flag.²⁴⁷ The border was crossed early on January 31; the same day the delegation received a draft statute for the Ukrainian *Kronland*.²⁴⁸ Brest-Litovsk was reached early on February 1.

The expected proclamation of independence appears to have been the signal for Muravyov's advance towards Kiev, begun on January 24. Romodan and Lubny were taken shortly, and on January 27, the Russian troops took Bakhmach.²⁴⁹ Within Kiev itself, the proclamation of independence of the Republic fed the abortive rebellion to be discontinued by members of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks).²⁵⁰

The rebellion itself appears to have been initiated and coordinated out of Petrograd, as it followed hard upon the suppression of a conspiracy by some members of the Rada with Petrograd, led by Polozov, former member of the peace delegation, Odoevsky and some others. The conspiracy was discovered and some persons were arrested.²⁵¹ The Petrograd government showed its hand, evidently in ignorance of the events in Kiev.

This clearly emerges from a wireless message intercepted by German intelligence on the same day, probably from Petrograd, which stated that the 'Soviet of Workers', Soldiers'

and Peasants' Deputies had received the news 'that the General Secretariat of the Rada had resigned and that a new Secretariat of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks had taken over power'. It would appear that the news of the new government led by Holubovych had not reached Petrograd yet, as the message stated that the government of Vynnychenko was the one which resigned.²⁵² The resolutions of the Third Congress of the Soviets had also referred to this non-existent Secretariat as an accomplished fact in a preamble, dropped from later collections of resolutions.²⁵³

The rebellion of the Bolsheviks broke out early on January 29, having been timed in all probability to coincide with the success of the conspiracy. Whether or not the rebellion had been agreed to in advance with the conspirators is not known.²⁵⁴ The rebellion was led by A. Gorovits, a member of the People's Secretariat, who was thus responsible to the same Secretariat.

Lenin, and the Soviet of People's Commissars took direct action in the new Russian offensive towards Kiev. On January 28, Lenin sent an order to the Sea Revolutionary Committee.

I ask that urgent measures be taken to give immediately into the disposition of Comrade Ter-Artyunyants 2,000 sailors for military action against the bourgeois Rada.²⁵⁵

At the same time, an order went to the People's Commissariat of Finances to give the same commander one million roubles.²⁵⁶ A wire to Antonov and to Ordzhonikidze, 'Commissar of the Ukraine' completed the concerted action against the Ukraine that day, signed 'Lenin'.

For god's sake, take the most energetic and revolutionary measures for sending of *bread, bread and bread!!!* Otherwise, Petrograd could perish. Special trains and detachments. Gathering and bringing together. Accompany trains. Send news each day. For god's sake!²⁵⁷

The left bank of the Dniro off Kiev in direction of Poltava was being defended by troops under Petlura. These were called back to Kiev to help restore order in the city.²⁵⁸ The

way of Muravyov was being checked at this point only by a small detachment of students of the 1st Military school which held the Bakhmach railroad center; these retreated under the pressure of the Russian troops, some 6,000 strong at this point. The students and another small group of Ukrainian troops were met at the station Kruty by the Auxiliary Students' *Kurin'*, recently formed from students of the Ukrainian National University, of the University of St. Volodymyr and upperclassmen of the Ukrainian Academy of Cyril and Methodius. The total number was some 250 students and secondary school upperclassmen, about 100 soldiers and Free Cossacks, 12 cavalymen, and 3 cannon. The command decided to defend the station. The Ukrainian troops were encircled by a mass of Russian troops, and while the more experienced soldiers and Free Cossacks concentrated on one wing were able to retreat, the students were encircled and all except for twenty-seven men, and seven wounded were slaughtered on the spot. The twenty-seven prisoners were tortured and murdered next day, January 30. There were also seven wounded who appear to have been sent by error to Kharkiv, and survived there.²³⁹ The battle of Kruty had a moral importance for Ukrainian independence out of all proportion for the size of the battle, occupying in Ukrainian historical literature the place of Thermopylae. The dead, where their bodies could be found, were given a state funeral on March 19, 1918.²⁴⁰ The surviving part of the group, in retreat towards Kiev, used the time gained to destroy part the railroad track and blow up bridges and railroad couplings.²⁴¹

The Ukrainian defeat of Kruty was greeted by Lenin in a special wire to Antonov, of January 30.

I greet the victory. . . . Direct all efforts to the supply to Petrograd of bread and more bread.²⁴²

In the meantime, the news of the proclamation of the independence of the Ukrainian Republic had reached Germany and was greeted with joy. Lewytsky had informed Rosenberg, the German official at Brest-Litovsk, of the Fourth

Universal. The latter wired Berlin, the news being received there at noon of January 26, that according to Lewytsky's information from Kiev there was supposedly proclaimed on the previous day, 'Universal 4 in which the Ukraine rejected the Russian Federative-Republic and proclaimed itself a fully independent state.'

Wilhelm, the Emperor, wrote on the margin of the Brest-Litovsk telegram,

Bravo! Now we can form so much the sooner an alliance with her (the Ukraine) .

Berlin wired the news of independence on January 27 to its embassies at Stockholm, Vienna, Bern, Sofia and Constantinople.²⁶³ It may be assumed that the ambassadors informed their respective governments of the fact.

Berlin was also informed, by Zaliznyak, that the General Secretariat had decided to send a diplomatic delegation of ten members to governments at Vienna, Berlin, Sofia, Constantinople, Stockholm and Helsingfors: it was to initiate diplomatic relations with the Ukrainian government. The decision was said to have been only in principle, with no date set for the departure.²⁶⁴

Berlin's wish to come to an agreement with the Ukraine was probably strengthened by two independent reports arriving at this point suggesting that it might well be that no peace at all was possible with Russia. Romberg wired from Bern endorsing the views of Stepankivsky, which he outlined; these he found 'very business-like, persuading and truthful'. Stepankivsky had met Trotsky in prison in September 1917, together with many other Bolsheviks. From their conversations, he had learned that the 'Bolsheviks did not have any intention of concluding peace with the present governments of the Quadruple Alliance.' On the contrary, they saw the situation solely from the standpoint of the class struggle, and would want to overthrow the bourgeoisie in all lands. The peace negotiations were to serve only to unmask the conquest planned by the bourgeois governments of both power blocs: they were hoping for revo-

lution, and would be ready then to make peace with the proletariat. In the meantime they would, if necessary, declare war on the entire world after the example of the French revolutionaries. Whether or not Russia was to perish over this was a matter of indifference to them. They were not counting on the permanence of their power, and were prepared for flight. Lenin especially was described by Stepankivsky as being 'completely fanatical and would not be at all content to keep his position'. Trotsky, though more likely to compromise, would be afraid to do so on account of Lenin. The report received by Bussche, and possibly others in Berlin, was deemed important enough to be wired to Rosenberg.²⁶⁵ Another report, from the *Daily News* out of Petrograd, arrived on the next day, January 31. The report said that Trotsky's decision in the current situation would depend not upon military consideration, but from the question whether peace or defence against the enemy would further the general revolution the most. The report also stated that the 'Rada was much more afraid of the Bolsheviks than of the Austrians, and would conclude peace for this reason so much the sooner.' The latter statement was also wired to Rosenberg.²⁶⁶

In Kiev, on the morrow of the battle of Kruty, the government discussed the current international situation. Hrushevsky and Tkachenko, the Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, suggested that the Ukrainian delegation insist that the Germans send an ultimatum to the Soviet of People's Commissars demanding the withdrawal of the Red Army from Ukrainian territory. Porsh, the War Minister, went further and suggested that the government ask for troops from the Central Powers immediately: it appears that the final decision of the government was dilatory, as only the preparation of a special note to the Central Powers was authorized, with the request of the military assistance.²⁶⁷ No such note was approved in the end while the government was in Kiev.

Similar questions were discussed by Vasylyko at Berlin on January 31, probably on his own authority. Berlin informed

Rosenberg at Brest-Litovsk that Vasylko, the 'Ukrainian (Bukovynian) member of the Reichsrat' and Czernin's 'confidant for Ukrainian matters', had given to the Foreign Office his view that Ukrainians would ask Germany for munitions and military assistance if the Ukraine was 'attacked by the Bolshevik government after the conclusion of peace (by the Ukraine) with the Central Powers.' He asked for a wide-ranging support of the Rada, which could not defend itself for the duration against the Bolshevik attack. He said that he had told the same to Czernin: the latter, however, had rejected the outlook and mentioned that he could not 'return home with an eventual war against Russia'.²⁹⁸

The Peace Conference opened again at Brest-Litovsk, this time in the absence of the members of the Ukrainian delegation except for Lewytsky. In the first session on January 30, Trotsky stated that the 'Government of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of the Ukrainian Republic had sent in delegates.²⁹⁹ Thus, new members entered the Russian Delegation—'representatives of the Ukrainian National Republic, Shakhrai and Medvedev'.²⁷⁰ He further let it be known that the Ukrainian 'government', which was being represented as part of the Russian Federative Republic, in agreement with the decision of the last All-Russian Congress of the Soviets.²⁷¹ On the day of his departure from Petrograd, a report had arrived from Kiev stating that the 'Kievan General Secretariat' had offered its resignation. While the final results of warfare were not known, it was plain to Trotsky that the 'peace concluded with the General Secretariat in the present circumstances could in no case be considered a peace with the Ukrainian Republic'. The presence of the representatives of the Ukrainian People's Secretariat in the Russian delegation was said to fully correspond to 'relations prevailing in the Russian Republic'. Nevertheless, if the delegation of Holubovych held, as previously, the mandate of the Kievan Secretariat the Russian delegation would not protest against its further presence in the peace negotiations. 'At any rate', concluded Trotsky, 'only such agreements concluded with the

Ukraine that would be formally confirmed by the government of the Federative Republic of Russia, could be recognized'.²⁷²

Lyubynsky stated in reply that the Ukrainian delegation would answer Trotsky after its return. Kuehlmann proposed that the debates on the declaration of Trotsky be put off until the return of the Ukrainians,²⁷³ while observing that Trotsky did not mention earlier any other body in the question of negotiations. Trotsky replied, that there had not been then any decision of the Ukrainian Soviets. It was not yet known, he added, which delegation would have the, 'final and undoubted right to speak in the name of the Ukrainian National Republic', thus expressing doubt in the viability of the People's Secretariat.²⁷⁴

Czernin had come to doubt whether the Russians were at all willing to come to any agreement. The revolutionary outbursts in Austria and Germany had strengthened the 'hope of the Petrogradians for an overthrow.' The entire tactics of the Russian delegation, he concluded, were inspired by a hope for certain outbreak of the world revolution in the next few weeks, and all their tactics consisted of 'gaining some time.'²⁷⁵

Trotsky raised the matter of the presence of the Ukrainian delegation in the conference again, during the meeting of the Political and Territorial Commission on the next day. There he stated, referring to the presence of Medvedev and Shakh-ray, that the 'attendance of the delegation of the Kievan Rada at the peace negotiations concerns the past rather than the present or the future' referring to some reports received by him, and particularly to a telegram.²⁷⁶ The situation was radically changed with the arrival of the Ukrainian delegation on the same day.

The intermediary in the direct negotiations between the delegation and Czernin was Zaliznyak, this time. The latter had written Vasylo asking him to enable him to go to Brest-Litovsk to help the Ukrainian delegation, and to obtain permission to return to the Ukraine. Vasylo contacted Czernin, and the latter 'was very happy' that Zaliznyak wanted to go,

and asked him for 'only one thing — to help him come more quickly to an agreement with the Ukrainian delegation.' In the meeting with Zaliznyak, Vasyloko asked him to 'explain with all emphasis to the Ukrainian delegation, that Austria-Hungary positively needed peace with the Ukraine,' due to shortage of food. He also said that Czernin was a sincere supporter of peace, and that he had 'a personal order from the Emperor Charles to conclude this peace at any price.' The latter statement was of particular importance in view of the known association of Vasyloko with Czernin: it would appear that Vasyloko then stated that the 'only moment' was at hand when 'your Ukrainians could help us Ukrainians in Austria to gain all that we want', the only exception being any transfer of Galicia to the Ukraine. Vasyloko urged that the Ukrainian delegation put as an irreducible condition of peace, 'separation of Eastern Galicia and its constitution as a separate crown land where all power would belong to Ukrainians.'²⁷⁷

Zaliznyak arrived in Brest-Litovsk on January 30, and saw Czernin immediately, to whom he stated that there was no chance of peace without the solution of the 'matter of Eastern Galicia.' In reply, Czernin stated that he was authorizing him to transmit to the Ukrainian delegation that he was ready for 'separation of Eastern Galicia from the rest of the Polish lands and formation of a separate *Kronland* within the Austrian monarchy'. Zaliznyak visited the Ukrainian delegation, and, on their initiative arranged a meeting with Czernin for the next day. The meeting however was still quite formal, and did not lead to any results.²⁷⁸

Zaliznyak suggested to the delegation at this point that the demand should be presented now, in view of the Fourth Universal and full Ukrainian sovereignty for the recognition of the 'peace delegation of the Central Rada as the delegation of this sovereign state' and that further demands should be presented, as the pre-condition for the continuation of peace negotiations, that the states of the Quadruple Alliance declare 'official recognition of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian National Republic.' The members of the delegation agreed with

him but doubted whether the result could be achieved in view of the declaration by Germany and Austria-Hungary that such recognition could arrive only as a result of the signing of the peace treaty. However, they agreed to authorize Zaliznyak for negotiations with Czernin. Zaliznyak did present the demand to Czernin in a meeting on the same day. He informed him that the delegation was going to present a demand in the plenary session of February 1, that the 'Central Powers recognize immediately the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state and so finally legalize the situation of the Ukrainian delegation.' After some discussion, Czernin agreed, and stated that if the Ukrainian delegation agreed, he would consult with Kuehlmann; he thought that Kuehlmann would not present any difficulties and he would be able to send the text of the declaration to be read in the meeting, the same evening. The Ukrainian delegation had in fact received the written text of the recognition on the evening of January 31.⁷⁹

The same evening, Medvedev, Chairman of the People's Secretariat, arrived for discussion with the Ukrainian peace delegation. Medvedev was a Ukrainian worker, very little developed, and conscious of the national point of view only to a slight degree and 'could not even speak good Ukrainian,' in the words of Zaliznyak. Lyubynsky and Sevryuk informed him that they thought of speaking tomorrow, and began to persuade him that it would be better for him and for the Ukraine if he would enter the Ukrainian delegation, while they had the authorization to accept him. For his part, Zaliznyak showed him some Swedish papers with declarations ascribed to him directed against the Ukrainian delegation, placed, according to him, by Trotsky. Medvedev claimed that he did not make such declarations. Lyubynsky, a Ukrainian Social-Democrat, who had brought Medvedev for discussions in the first place asked him directly whether he, in the 'company of the falsifier Trotsky was fulfilling a Cain's task and betraying the Ukraine and the Ukrainian workers'. If he was not willing to enter the Ukrainian delegation, let him abstain from attacking it, and demand from the Quadruple Alliance the immedi-

ate recognition of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state. Medvedev's resistance broke.

Medvedev promised at this point to call Trotsky to account, for the falsification of his signature; he also promised to present the declaration asked for by the delegation, and asked that they write it for him. At the same time he said that he had wife and children, that he was afraid to return to the Ukraine after this for the 'Bolsheviks would kill him there for sure' and asked whether the 'Ukrainian delegation could assure him and his family a free existence and material support (*zabezpechennya*) even in Galicia.' The delegation could not give him assurance of material support. In the end, Medvedev said that he had to think matters over, and left.²⁸⁰ He did not present the declaration drafted for him by the Ukrainian delegation.

The plenary meeting of February 1 became the decisive meeting on Ukrainian recognition. The discussions began with a statement by Sevryuk, the new head of the Peace Delegation. He pointed out that the 'international position' of the Ukrainian National Republic had been defined by the Third Universal, read in the meeting of the conference on January 10; it was recognized then by the Soviet of People's Commissars and by the representatives of the Central Powers. However, now Trotsky was attempting to protest the rights of the Ukrainian delegation 'referring to some telegram and the presence of a Kharkiv Executive Committee unknown until now'. After spending some time on the rejection of Trotsky's allegations, Sevryuk asked that a measure be taken now in order to prevent any misunderstanding from any side and to forestall for the future similar declarations by the Russian delegation, 'which were contradictory'. The Ukrainians proposed that the 'Ukrainian National Republic be recognized formally and its international situation, as well as the rights of its delegation be conclusively confirmed.'²⁸¹

Following Trotsky's introduction, and on his demand, Medvedev of the 'Government of the Soviets', addressed the meeting. "The People's Secretariat," he said, "is striving to-

wards the creation of conditions under which the entire Ukrainian nation, in the Ukraine, Galicia, Bukovyna and Hungary, freed of the borders now cutting it asunder, may exist as one independent whole, and towards the solution of the future constitutional status of the Ukraine among other states by means of the free vote of the united Ukrainian nation." He further stated that, although Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude towards any attempts at considering the all-Ukrainian problem at this meeting was well-known to him, he nevertheless felt 'a deep persuasion that democratic principles words, the conclusion of his speech to the effect that would finally triumph' in that regard. Despite such forthright words the agreements and treaties with the Kiev Rada would have validity only after their approval and recognition by the delegation of the Soviet Federal Republic.²⁸² This revealed the equivocal nature of his position as the supposed representative of the Ukraine, since his own consent does not seem to have been recognized. A like ambiguity marked the attitude of the Soviet Delegation itself. If the Soviet of People's Commissars (probably for propaganda purposes, and chiefly with the intention of embarrassing the Ukraine) were willing to claim for the Soviet 'Ukrainian National Republic' extension of her western borders to those more ethnographically consistent, Trotsky, speaking after Medvedev, insisted that he could not permit representatives of the Quadruple Alliance to arbitrate the 'internal question of the mutual relations of Russia and the Ukraine,'²⁸³ thus undermining any possibility of effective Ukrainian independence.

Trotsky commented on the question of recognition of the Ukraine, too. The recognition of the independence of a state, according to him, must not be confused with the recognition of one or the other of its governments. Trotsky was again taking the position that the Ukrainian Republic created by the Third Universal had suffered only a change of government in the creation of the People's Secretariat. The uncertainty of the constitutional form of the Republic was due, according to Trotsky, to the fact that the Kievan Rada refused to take part

in the federative Russian Republic, although 'representatives of the Ukrainian people had recognized the Russian state as a federative republic at the Third Congress of Soviets'. Trotsky also reminded the conference that he had referred in the past to the uncertainty in the borders of the Ukrainian state. Until the borders of the Ukraine were definitely settled, an understanding between the Central Rada and the Central Powers was not possible. However, Trotsky went on to say, he held to his previous view of the 'status of the Ukrainian delegation'. 'As long as the Delegation of the Kiev Rada kept its authorization' he would not raise any protest against its 'taking part independently in these negotiations.' Still, when the representative of the Executive Committee joined the Russian Delegation, he repeated 'with redoubled energy', that only such treaties with the Kievan Rada as were accepted by the Russian Delegation would be recognized.²⁸¹

The burden of the defence of the Ukrainian position was contained in the statement of Lyubynsky on behalf of the Delegation. Czernin claimed in his memoirs that he tried to 'get the Ukrainians to talk over things openly with the Russians, and succeeded almost too well.'²⁸² This is certainly an exaggeration of Czernin's role; the conflict between the two delegations depended primarily on the rising conflict between the two republics.

Lyubynsky stated that the members of the Ukrainian Peace Delegation had been consciously refraining from comments on the internal affairs of the enemies and held that internal struggles and events should not, in time of negotiations, be exposed to the view of the opposing party. Although the Delegation had often had reason to protest against the allegations of Trotsky, they refrained from doing so, so as not to weaken 'the authoritativeness of the Russian Delegation'. However, now when the Ukrainian Republic had become fully independent, these matters were no longer internal affairs, and thus it was necessary to protest against the 'false statement presented by Trotsky in the absence of the Ukrainian delegation'.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian Delegation could not refrain from commenting on the internal affairs in Russia not only for their own justification, but to enlighten the public opinion of nations represented in the conference.

Lyubynsky then stated that Russia had become a Republic in 1917, first with various warring governments assisting the Tsar, through Constitutional Democrats and Socialists to the Bolsheviks. These governments had only one common point of view: 'centralist strivings and an overwhelming desire to strangle the renascent nations and to bring them under their mighty hand'. The 'loud declarations' of the Bolsheviks on the complete freedom of the nations of Russia were described as being only 'demagogic'. 'The government of the Bolsheviks, which dispersed the Constituent Assembly and can depend upon the bayonets of their men the Red Guard, would never dare to realize the just principle of the right of self-determination in Russia,' he stated. A reign of terror was proclaimed to exist in Russia. In words which were not likely to move Hoffmann or Kuehlmann, Lyubynsky also stated that 'well-known Socialists and old revolutionaries' were accused by the bolsheviks of 'bourgeoisiveness and counter-revolutionism'.

Turning to the presence of the Executive Committee at the Conference, Lyubynsky stated that the attempts of Trotsky to recant his 'clear and unequivocal words' had not been unexpected by the Ukrainian Delegation. He reviewed the development of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the formation of the General Secretariat, which was described as having been the only government in Russia composed 'exclusively of Socialists'. The demands of the Russian government that would mean that governmental power would pass into the hands of institutions unrepresentative of the Ukrainian people were rejected. Lyubynsky then referred to the 'brilliant victory of the Central Rada over the entire territory of the Ukraine' in the Russian Constituent Assembly, giving appropriate figures from the election returns, referring in particular to the fact that the 'Bolsheviks had received even less than 10

per cent' of the vote. The figures given by Lyubynsky were, on the whole, correct. He also referred to the Congress of Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine, where the Bolsheviks were stated to have had only 80 adherents out of a total of over 2,000 delegates. It was this 'minute group of Bolsheviks, about 80 persons, who left the Congress, went to Kharkiv and proclaimed themselves the new government of the Ukrainian National Republic.' The People's Commissars sent 'unorganized bands of the Red Guard to rob the population of the Kharkiv gubernia, and to protect the Kharkiv government' from the people. Then concluded his speech:

Thus arose the Kharkiv government, and such are the forces upon which it is based. Our future, our history, our heirs and the vast masses of toiling people on both sides of the front will decide themselves which us is innocent, and who is guilty, who is a Socialist and who is a counter-revolutionary, who creates and who destroys.²⁸⁶

Fokke, a member of the Russian delegation, wrote in his memoirs that Lyubynsky created 'an extraordinary effect with the speech,'²⁸⁷ in the conference. Hoffmann, too, thought that Lyubynsky had presented an 'excellent speech'.²⁸⁸ He added that he 'admired the young Ukrainians in those days' for their steadfastness.²⁸⁹ Czernin wrote in his diary: 'The insults hurled against the Russians today by the Ukrainians were simply grotesque.' The speech had also indicated to him 'what a gulf was between these two Governments', and that it was not 'our fault that we have not been able to bring them together under one hat' on the question of peace.²⁹⁰

Fokke described the effect of the debates upon Trotsky. Trotsky was seen completely blanched, with wide open eyes, confusedly scribbling something on a sheet lying in front of him, sweat rolling down his cheeks. After the conclusion there were a 'few seconds of heavy silence', while all eyes turned to Trotsky, who made some inconsequential remark, in confusion.²⁹¹ Czernin wrote too, that the speech made an outstanding impression upon Trotsky. 'Trotsky was so beaten down that one could feel sorry for him. Very pale, he stared fixedly be-

fore him, twisted into a cramped position, and drew nervously on his blotting paper; thick drops of sweat rolled down his forehead.¹²⁹²

Trotsky wrote in his memoirs that he did find that scene 'most distressing'. However, the distressing thing about it for Trotsky was 'the frantic self-humiliation of what was, after all, a body representative of the revolution, before vain aristocrats who only despised them.'¹²⁹³ The statement of Trotsky that at that time he considered the Rada 'representative of the revolution' is quite interesting. It would appear that, at least for the Russian Peace Delegation, and a member of the Soviet of People's Commissars, the Rada was a genuine representative body and not a makeshift group created for the occasion by some group in its own interest. Trotsky's biographer, Deutsch, concluded after a study of Trotsky's correspondence that Trotsky may have wondered at heart 'whether the Rada's spokesman was not justified in claiming that the Ukrainian Soviets were not representative of the Ukrainian people.'¹²⁹⁴ Part of Trotsky's distress probably stemmed from the manifest failure of the Russian policy, and his own. It seems that one of the major aims of Russian policy was the removal of the Ukrainian Republic from the international scene. This will probably explain the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian delegation in forcing the Russian one to recognize its independence and its claim to speak for the Ukrainian people. But as time went on, the pressure upon Russia was maintained, while the Central Powers treated more and more readily with the Ukrainian Republic. Trotsky's failure, when he had formerly expressed recognition of the Ukrainians, was becoming more obvious both at home and abroad. In his memoirs, Trotsky referred to the Ukrainian Peace Delegation in the meeting that day as 'these miserable national democrats who for a moment had been touched with power,' while Kuehlmann, Czernin, Hoffmann and the rest were described as 'breathing heavily, like gamblers at a race-course who had placed bets on the winning horse.'¹²⁹⁵ The 'winning horse' was the Ukrainian Delegation and their Republic. This

was one of the 'vilest scenes' which Trotsky had ever witnessed,²⁹⁶ he stated. Trotsky considered that Kuehlmann's and Czernin's trump card in the last stages of the negotiations, was the 'independent action of the Kiev Rada, which was hostile to Moscow.'²⁹⁷ Since the Soviet badly needed peace, Trotsky was obliged to continue to accept the autonomous role of the Rada, and in fact, of that of the Ukraine.

Although the actual effect of successful diplomacy is generally limited, it hardly be doubted that the debates, through their influence on the participants, and as reported in the press, had a significant influence upon the international status of the Ukraine. The resulting support must have been especially welcome at this point, when the Central Powers had agreed to recognize fully the Ukrainian Republic. The appeal of the Ukrainian socialist government was particularly important for its expected impact upon the socialists of the Central Powers.

Evidence of the recognition occurred immediately after the speech of Lyubynsky. After some preliminary remarks, Czernin outlined the position of the four Central Powers vis-à-vis the Ukrainian Republic, as follows:

In the name of the delegations of the four allied powers, I have the honour to state the following to the expressed declaration of the Ukrainian delegation.... We have no reason to withhold or to limit recognition of the Ukrainian delegation as an independent delegation, and the plenipotentiary representative of the Ukrainian National Republic. We furthermore see good reason to recognize now the Ukrainian National Republic already as an independent, free, sovereign state capable of concluding international treaties by itself.²⁹⁸

By this declaration, the Ukrainian Republic was recognized by the four powers of the Central Alliance: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Shortly after the recognition, a plenary meeting of the delegation of the Central Powers and of the Ukraine was held. No progress was made. Attempting to intimidate the Ukrai-

nian delegation, having invited them to still another meeting, Czernin gave them a draft of a peace treaty and demanded their signatures within 24 hours. He was supported in this by Hoffmann, who added that if Czernin's offer were to be rejected by the Ukrainian delegation, their further presence at Brest-Litovsk would have no object.

The draft consisted of only three points: the conclusion of the war, the formation of diplomatic and consular relations between the Central Powers and the Ukraine, and an engagement on the part of the Ukraine to supply one million tons of grain and other foodstuffs to the Central Powers. No reference was made, of course, to the borders or to Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary. The whole operation was a bluff, and was recognized as such. The bluff was called. Next day, the delegates of the Central Powers received a detailed project for a peace treaty from the Ukrainian delegation. Thus was the ultimatum of the Central Powers rejected.²⁹⁹

The personal characteristics of the members of the Delegation had of course a great deal to do with the maintenance of the Ukrainian position despite extreme pressure. Additional reasons lay in the fact that the delegation was very well informed on the internal conditions within Austria-Hungary (through Zaliznyak, as well as by direct observations in Lviv), and in Germany, where crippling strikes had taken place in the capital. Mykola Lewytsky had gone on a trip to Germany to confer with Social-Democrats of Germany on their attitude towards the peace. He had been under a misapprehension that the latter had opposed the making of peace.³⁰⁰

The counter-proposal, drafted by the Ukrainian delegation, became the basis for the draft of the actual treaty signed eventually; the points of political nature had been drafted by Sevryuk and Lyubynsky, the juridical ones by Lewytsky and the economic ones by Ostapenko.³⁰¹

The counter-proposal included the final agreement between the Ukrainian Republic and the Central Powers. The most important problem was Eastern Galicia. It was decided to demand 'at any price and in an ultimative fashion' from

Czernin the signing of a separate treaty in this matter, and that this treaty was to be drafted and presented by the Ukrainian delegation. By that treaty, Austria was to take up the obligation to realize the partition of Galicia on the ethnographic basis and to form a separate crown land from the Ukrainian part of Galicia and Bukovyna. The Ukrainian concession was that the treaty was to be secret and was not to be part of the official Brest-Litovsk treaty. In the matter of Kholm, it was decided to determine the border according to the instructions of Hrushevsky, on the ethnographic basis, but to make the actual border the subject of eventual diplomatic bargaining. Finally, it was decided to agree to the figure of foodstuffs, but to demand that the obligation was not to enter the peace-treaty itself, but only its appendices.³⁰² Exchange of manufactured goods for food-stuffs appears to have been meant, as the eventual agreement specified the exchange.

After the presentation of the Ukrainian draft, Czernin and Kuehlmann declared that they had to leave on the same day to consult their governments, to reach final agreement on the demands of the Ukrainian delegation, which the latter had declared to be irreducible. They left behind, as their deputies, for further 'negotiations' and the final formulation of all the paragraphs of the (draft)', Rosenberg for Kuehlmann, and the Austrian diplomat von Wiesner for Czernin. Czernin declared that the matter of Eastern Galicia would be discussed by the government, while Wiesner was to reach agreement with the Ukrainian delegation on the borders of Kholm, in cooperation with the German delegation.

There were further negotiations, in political, juridical and economic committees, for the most part. The most important question in the political committee was that of the exact borders of the province of Kholm. The negotiations which followed were conducted by Czernin's subordinate, Wiesner, and by Sevryuk of the Ukrainian delegation, in the presence of Hoffmann. While agreeing in principle with the Ukrainian territorial demands, Wiesner attempted to obtain the concession of some villages, doubtless in an attempt to appease the

Poles. Sevryuk refused to budge from his position. After a separate conversation with Sevryuk, Hoffmann made himself clear to Wiesner. "I have been in the country under question myself," he observed, "I know all the Polish and the Ukrainian villages there, and I can tell Baron Wiesner in all certainty that the Austrians must grant everything, because I consider these claims perfectly well founded. In the name of the Highest German Command, I can declare that negotiations cannot be broken off on account of this question. I would suggest to Baron Wiesner that he takes account of this and accepts immediately the border which I will dictate to him right now".³⁰³ Hoffmann then referred to an ethnographic map of Poland which he had brought with him. Wiesner gave in as Hoffmann read down the villages. Austria-Hungary was in no condition to bargain against the combined Ukrainian and German pressure.

It should also be noted that the Ukrainian Republic attempted to further the interests of Belorussia and Lithuania at the Conference. Delegates of the Belorussian National Rada were included in the Ukrainian delegation and had registered a protest against the planned partition of Belorussia.³⁰⁴ Voldemaras, the future President of Lithuania, was attached as member delegate to the Ukrainian delegation, advancing Lithuanian interests.³⁰⁵ The Central Powers had refused to admit representatives of these lands. They had denied a passport to Voldemaras, as a Lithuanian.³⁰⁶ The latter, as well as the delegates of Turkey and Bulgaria urged a more conciliatory attitude to Germany and Austria-Hungary on the part of the Ukraine, throughout the negotiations.³⁰⁷

In this manner, the Ukraine was recognized by the Central Powers and a mutually advantageous agreement was forged at Brest-Litovsk: above all, independence, freedom and peace were becoming a reality.

NOTES

1. Doroshenko, D., *Die Ukraine und das Reich. Neun Jahrhunderte deutsch-ukrainischer Beziehungen*, Leipzig, 1941.
2. Fischer, F., *Griff nach der Weltmacht*, Duesseldorf, 1962, pp. 155 ff. It should be noted, however, that besides committing elementary errors, such as placing the proclamation of the Ukrainian Republic in the summer of 1917, Fischer's interpretation of German policy towards the Ukraine appears to be based upon a superficial and incomplete reading of German archival material on the policy towards the Ukrainian Republic noted in Fischer's bibliography. No systematic picture emerges, while documents appear to have been chosen either on a hit-or-miss basis (not surprisingly, considering the vast mass of material available), or with an eye to conclusions. The reports of Lersner on the Ukraine, mirroring the information of the Command, have been completely ignored, as has been the mass of reports dealing with the (true) proclamation of the Republic, and various interpretations. Fischer's method, with a blindness to distinctions of motive, aim and policy does little honor to the justly admired German historical scholarship.
3. See Pidhainy, O. S., "Establishment of Relations between the Ukrainian Republic and the Central Powers." *The New Review*, No. 4 (21), Vol. V, pp. 7-29.
4. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 33184, Doc. No. A 33666.
5. *Ibid.*, 1918, Doc. No. A 1533.
6. Zaliznyak, M., "Moya uchast' u myrovykh perehovorakh v Berestyu Lytovs'komu" in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Berestey-s'kyi myr*, Lviv, 1928, pp. 45-142, pp. 134-5.
7. These matters are discussed in greater detail in the article referred to in Note 3.
8. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 36630.
9. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 37151.
10. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 37151.
11. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 36630.
12. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 36661.
13. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 37151.
14. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 37175.
15. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 37312, Doc. following Doc. No. 37171.
16. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 36430.

17. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 38532.
18. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p.572.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 574-5.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 623.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 622.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 622.
23. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 38397.
24. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. zu A 37712.
25. *Russland*, 1917, Doc. No. 38075.
26. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 28997.
27. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. 38204.
28. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 38514.
29. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 38387.
30. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 38219.
31. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 38474.
32. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 38528.
33. *Russland*, 1917, Doc. No. A 39026.
34. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 39371.
35. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 39371.
36. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 39037.
37. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 39462.
38. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 39824.
39. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 39524.
40. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 39558.
41. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 39846.
42. Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 293.
43. Hoffmann, M. F., "Beresteys'kyi myr (Iz tvoru "Viyna prohaynovanykh nahod")", in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Berestey-s'kyi myr*, Lviv, 1928, pp. 243-270, p. 243.
44. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 40106.
45. *Russland*, 1917, Doc. No. A 40602.
46. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 41148.
47. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 41148.
48. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 624.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 625.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 625.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 628.
52. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 40943.
53. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 41590.
54. Doroshenko, D., *Istoriya Ukrainy 1917-1923. rr.*, 2nd. ed., 2 Vols., New York, 1954, Vol. I, p. 204.
55. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 93-4.
56. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A. 1691.
57. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 197-8; *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 1691.

58. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 209.
59. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659, pp. 9-10; Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 94-5.
60. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659, p. 11.
61. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 95, p. 97n.
62. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. AS 4693 following Doc. No. A 41083.
63. *Ibid.*, No. A 41590.
64. Auswaertiges Amt Berlin, "Akta der Kaiserl. Deutschen Gesandtschaften zu Bern betreffend: Stefankowski", 1917, Doc. No. zu A 41607.
65. *Russland*, 1917, Doc. No. A 41837.
66. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A. 41083.
67. *Ibid.*, Doc. following Doc. No. A 41901. The text follows: (words between the brackets had been restored), 'Ukrainer, hinter denen anscheinend starke Kraefte . . . duerfte es zweckmaessig sein, die Ukrainer unserer(s) nicht zu vernachlaessigen, sondern moeglich in u(nmittel)baren Kontakt mit ihnen zu gelangen. Vielleicht . . . moeglich, den bolschewistischen Vertretern klar . . . , dass durch Zulassung der Ukrainer ihre Stellung in Sueden, wo sie bisher wenig Angang zu haben, sche . . . gefestigt wird, und auf diese Weise Teilnahme zu er(reichen). Anheimstelle weiter Veranlassung. Selbstverstaendlich muss jede Verstimmlung der Bolschewiki v(er)mieden werden. U. St. ga. Bussche.'
68. Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 628-9.
69. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 227.
70. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. AS 4936 following Doc. No. A. 42157.
71. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 42231.
72. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 42378.
73. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 42281.
74. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659, pp. 14-6.
75. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. 659, pp. 16-8.
76. *Ibid.*, 1917, Doc. No. A 42036.
77. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43085, Doc. No. A 43232.
78. Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
79. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 631.
80. Sevryuk, O., "Beresteys'kyi myr. (Uryvky zi spomyniv)" in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Beresteys'kyi myr*, Lviv, 1928, pages 143-66, pp. 143-4; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 143-4.
81. Department of State. United States of America, "Records of the Department of State relating to the internal affairs of Russia and the Soviet Union 1910-1929", Doc. No. 861.00/1239, Report No. 3.

82. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A. 659; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, 227-9; Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Doc. No. 861.00/1239, Report No. 3.
83. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. following Doc. No. A 42281.
84. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 42326.
85. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43223.
86. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43433.
87. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 42598.
88. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 42803.
89. *Russland*, 1917, Doc. No. A 43085.
90. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43084.
92. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 43554.
93. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659; Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 97.
94. Manilov, *op. cit.*, p. 448; Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 97.
95. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 98.
96. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 231.
97. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 43554.
98. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 638.
99. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659.
100. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 43659.
101. *Ibid.* Doc. No. A 43627.
102. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43634.
103. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659, pp. 32-3; *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 147.
104. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 659, pp. 33-4; *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 147.
105. *Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 43084.
106. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43948.
107. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43960.
108. *Ibid.*, 1918, Doc. No. A 0003 ff.
109. *Ibid.*, 1917, Doc. No. A 43999.
110. *Ibid.*, 1918, Doc. No. A 151.
111. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 635.
112. Hoffmann, M., *Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors Max Hoffmann*, 2 Vols., Berlin, 1929, Vol. II, p. 205.
113. Ludendorff, E. (ed.), *Documents du G.Q.G. allemand sur le rôle qu'il a joué de 1916 à 1918*, 2 Vols., Paris, 1922, Vol. II, p. 247.
114. Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 207.
115. Czernin, O., *Im Weltkriege*, Berlin, 1919, pp. 375-6.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
117. Kreppel, J. (ed.), *Der Friede im Osten*, Vienna 1918, p. 78.

118. Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, p. 151; Sevryuk, O., "Halychyna v Berestoy'skych peremovakh", *Istorychnyi Kalyendar-Al'manakh Chervonoï Kalyny na 1939 rik*, Lviv, 1938, pp. 61-70, p. 62.
119. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 550.
120. Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-2.
121. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 316.
122. Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
123. Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
124. Dolyns'ky, D., *Borba Ukraïns'koho narodu za Volyu i Nezalezhnist'*, Winnipeg, 1921 (?), pp. 48-9.
125. Fokke, D. G., "Na stsene i za kulisami Brestskoy tragi-komedii", *Arkhyv Russkoy Revolyutsii*, Vol. XX, 1930, pp. 5-207, p. 109.
126. Sevryuk, O., "Beresteys'kyi myr. (Uryvky zi spomyniv)" in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Beresteys'kyi myr*, Lviv, 1928, pages 143-66, p. 149.
127. Dolyns'ky, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
128. Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-50.
129. Dolyns'ky, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
130. Czernin, O., "Berestye Lytovs'ke. (Iz tvorû "Na svitoviy viyni")", in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Beresteys'kyi myr*, Lviv, pp. 179-241, p. 209.
131. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 99.
132. Baer, C. H. (ed.), *Der Voelkerkrieg*, 28 Vols., Stuttgart, 1916-23, Vol. 24, p. 86.
133. Peace Conference. Brest-Litovsk, *Mirnye peregovory v Brest-Litovske s 22 dekabrya 1917 g. po 3 marta 1918 g.*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1920, p. 52.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
135. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 99; Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
136. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 99.
137. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
138. Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
139. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
140. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 1194.

It should be noted that Bergen was a trusted collaborator of Kuehlmann; thus, it was he who had drafted the text of the letter of Kuehlmann to Wilhelm referred to above. Bergen's report, endorsed by Nadolny must be considered to fall into an important category in the matter of the formulation of the German Ukrainian policy. This is not at all the case with the views of Bartenwerffer, Head of the Section Politics of the Command, expressed in late October 1917, to which Fischer appears to pay attention

(Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 636-7) out of proportion to innate importance. Ignoring the context, Fischer fails to follow up on ramifications and consequences; this is a common feature of the method followed throughout the book. Thus, the matter of Bartenwerffer may be followed further at this point to illustrate Fischer's method. Bartenwerffer's original observation was in the nature of the complaint that Berlin failed to view the Ukrainian question as an important one (*Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 35874). As the consequence Berlin asked for further information. Bartenwerffer's views, reaching Berlin through a paraphrase by Lersner, on the importance of the Ukraine within the former Russian Empire, from economic, strategic and other points of view was hardly original. The Foreign Office had received many similar reports, the latest being received on October 8, 1917, an exposé by Lozynsky, entitled "The Ukrainian State in Formation and the Central Powers" (*Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 33301). As Fischer pointed out, 'wide circles of German public opinion had discussed and suggested something similar for years' (Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 637). Bartenwerffer's report of late October, as paraphrased by Lersner, was in fact duly studied, and dismissed rather disdainfully. Berlin informed Berckheim, a liaison officer, that it appeared from the report that the 'General held the Ukrainian question to be extraordinarily important but gives no grounds for his view that the importance of the question was being underestimated by us' (*Unternehmungen*, 1917, Doc. No. A 35874, A 37078). The recommendation of Bartenwerffer to get in touch with Ukrainians via Stockholm was ignored, and no reply was given. No other actions whatsoever was taken in conjunction with this particular report, nor is the report referred to in appropriate archives of the Foreign Office again later.

141. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

142. Sevryuk, O., "Halychyna v Beresteys'kykh peremovakh", *Istorychnyi Kalyendar-Al'manakh Chervonoï Kalyny na 1939 rik*, Lviv, 1938, pp. 61-70, p. 63.

143. Fokke, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

144. Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

145. Baer, *op. cit.*, Vol. 26, p. 86.

146. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 100.

147. Peace Conference. Brest Litovsk, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

148. Mayorov, S. M., *Bor'ba Sovetskoy Rossii za vykhod iz imperialisticheskoy voyny*, Moscow, 1959, p. 191.

149. Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-1.
150. Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
151. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 35, p. 215.
152. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 108.
153. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-4.
154. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 35, pp. 211-2.
155. *Ibid.*, pp. 221-3.
156. *Ibid.*, p. 476.
157. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1918. Russia, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. II, p. 655.
158. For the text of the Fourteen Points, see, Bailey, T. A., *Woodrow Wilson and the Last Peace*, New York, 1944, pp. 333-4.
159. House, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 330-1.
160. Department of State. United States of America, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 657.
161. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
162. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
163. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-8.
164. Benes, Edward, *My War Memoirs*, London, 1928, p. 353; Masaryk, T. G., *The Making of a State. Memoirs and Observations 1914-1918*, London, 1927, p. 177; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 246.
165. Kovzhun, P., "Sprava organizatsii ukrains'koho legionu na botsi Antanty (Spohady)", *Istorychnyi kalyendar-al'manakh Chervonoi Kalyny an 1937 rik*, Lviv, 1936, pp. 106-7.
166. Department of State, United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* 1918. Russia, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. II, pp. 660-3.
167. Borschak, *op. cit.*, No. 7, 1919, p. 80.
168. Kovzhun, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
169. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 240.
170. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 70; Sevryuk, O., "Beresteys'kyi myr (Uryvky zi spomyniv)", in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Beresteys'kyi myr*, Lviv, 1928, pp. 143-66, p. 153.
171. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
172. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 299-300.
173. Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
174. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
175. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 1677.
176. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 2202.
177. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 2628.
178. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 600.
179. Czernin, O., *Im Weltkrieg*, Berlin, 1919, p. 323.

180. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
181. Czernin, O., *In the World War*, London, 1919, p. 239.
182. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
183. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
184. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin, "Akten betreffend: Beziehungen Oesterreich zu Deutschland", 1918, Doc. No. A 3843.
185. Kreppel, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
186. Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 210-11.
187. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-11; Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-5; Sevryuk, O., "Halychyna v Berestes'kykh peremovakh", *Istorychnyi Kalyendar-Al'manakh Chervonoi Kalyny na 1939 rik*, Lviv, 1938, pp. 61-70, p. 64. Sevryuk claims that the discussion was between him and Hoffmann alone.
188. Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-5.
189. Gratz, G. and Schueller, R., *Die aeussere Wirtschaftspolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns. Mitteleuropaeische Plaene*, New Haven, 1924, pp. 141-2.
190. Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
191. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
192. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
193. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
194. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 3200.
195. *Ibid.*, Doc. following Doc. No. A 3909.
196. *Ibid.*, Doc. following Doc. No. zu A 4089.
197. Peace Conference. Brest-Litovsk, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
198. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
199. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 101.
200. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
201. Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 339-41.
202. Borschak, *op. cit.*, No. 7, 1929, p. 72.
203. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 326.
204. *Ibid.*, p. 327.
205. *Ibid.*, p. 406.
206. *Ibid.*, p. 405.
207. *Ibid.*, p. 397.
208. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 108-7.
209. *Ibid.*, p. 133-4, p. 135.
210. Mazlakh, S., "Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya na Poltavshchine", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1922, pp. 126-42, p. 139.
211. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
212. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 140.
213. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
214. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
215. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

216. Kirov, A., "Rumcherod i Radnarkom Odesskoy oblasti v borot'bi za zhovten'", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 5-6, 1927, pp. 235-253; No. 1, 1928, pp. 86-114, p. 103, p. 112.
217. Doroshenko, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 292.
218. Antonov, op. cit., pp. 78-80.
219. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 35, p. 225.
220. Karpenko, op. cit., pp. 23-4.
221. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 3039.
222. *Ibid.*, 1917, No. A 43634
223. E.g., *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 43627, Doc. No. A 43659; *Ibid.*, 1918, Doc. No. A 147.
224. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 1533.
225. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 3552.
226. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 3635.
227. *Ukraine*, 1918, Doc. No. A 3733.
228. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 3690.
229. Fokke, op. cit., pp. 173-6.
230. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. 35, p. 268.
231. *Ibid.*, p. 476.
232. Tabouis, op. cit., p. 158.
233. Doroshenko, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 239.
234. Jenkins, American Consul in the Ukrainian Republic, told his superiors in his report No. 4 that 'both M. Petlura and Mr. A. Schulgin . . . are understood to be pro-Ally'. In his Report No. 5 of January 2, 1918, he reported Petlura's resignation. See, Department of State. United States of America, op. cit., Doc. No. 861.00/1239.
235. Doroshenko, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 239.
236. Department of State. United States of America, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1916. Russia, 3 Vols., Washington, 1932, Vol. II, pp. 662-3.
237. Borschak, op. cit., No. 8, 1929, p. 212.
238. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
239. Lloyd George, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 2749.
240. *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 3171.
241. Kennan, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 398-9.
242. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
243. Sevryuk, op. cit., pp. 65-6.
244. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
245. Doroshenko, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 303.
246. Sevryuk, O., "Beresteys'kyi myr. (Uryvky zi spomyniv)" in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Beresteys'kyi myr*, Lviv, 1928, pages 143-66, pp. 155-6.
247. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-8.

248. Sevryuk, O., "Halychyna v Beresteys'kykh peremovakh", *Istorychnyi Kalyendar-Almanakh Chervonoj Kalyny na 1939 rik*, Lviv, 1938, pp. 61-70, p. 67.
249. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 278.
250. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 140.
251. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 260.
252. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 4698.
253. Fokke, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-6.
254. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 303.
255. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 50, p. 31.
256. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
257. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
258. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 280.
259. *Ibid.*, pp. 283-4.
260. The tradition was begun by Hrushevsky in the funeral oration for the dead at Kruty with classical allusions; Doroshenko's style should also be noted in the description of the battle and the consequences. There exists a very extensive literature on the battle of Kruty. See, Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 284.
261. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
262. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 50, p. 33.
263. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 3831.
264. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 4544.
265. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 4295.
266. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 4494.
267. Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
268. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 4529.
269. Peace Conference. Brest Litovsk, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
270. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 106.
271. Peace Conference. Brest Litovsk, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
272. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 107.
273. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 306.
274. Karpenko, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
275. Czernin, O., "Berestya Lytovs'ke. (Iz tvoriv "Na svitoviy viyni")", in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Beresteys'kyi myr*, Lviv, 1928, pp. 179-241, p. 224.
276. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 108.
277. Zaliznyak, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-81.
278. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-90.
279. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-100.
280. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-3.
281. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 108-9.
282. Peace Conference. Brest-Litovsk, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
283. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

284. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 119-120.
285. Czernin, *Im Weltkrieg*, p. 246.
286. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 110-12.
287. Fokke, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
288. Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 212.
289. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
290. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 246.
291. Fokke, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
292. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 246.
293. Trotski, L., *My Life*, New York, 1930, p. 377.
294. Deutscher, O., *The Prophet Armed. Trotskys 1879-1921*. London, 1954, p. 337.
295. *Ibid.*, p. 377.
296. *Ibid.*, p. 377.
297. *Ibid.*, p. 376.
298. Baer, *op. cit.*, Vol. 26, p. 90; Zaliznyak, *op. cit.*, 115-6.
299. Zaliznyak, *op. cit.*, p. 119; Sevryuk, O., "Beresteys'kyi myr. (Uryvky zi spomyniv)" in Kedryn, I. (ed.), *Beresteys'kyi myr*, Lviv, 1928, pp. 143-66, p. 161.
300. Zaliznyak, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-90.
301. *Ibid.*, p. 122, p. 126.
302. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-2.
303. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-9.
304. Vakar, N., *Belorussia. The Making of a Nation*. Cambridge, Mass., 1956, p. 100.
305. Borschak, *op. cit.*, No. 8, 1928, p. 210. ..
306. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
307. Sevryuk, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONSOLIDATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC IN THE EAST-EUROPEAN PEACE

The recognition of the Ukrainian Republic at the Peace Conference at Brest-Litovsk marked the virtual conclusion of serious official negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. No further plenary conferences were held at all. A meeting of the Political Commission of the Peace Conference was held on February 3, with the German, Austrian and Russian Delegations present. According to Fokke, a participant and a historian of the Brest-Litovsk Conference, discussions 'lacked order'. It was obvious, he stated, that the 'official negotiations were not getting off the ground'.¹ It was his conclusion that both the Russian Delegation and those of the Central Powers found it clearer and clearer than they were on the 'eve of a break and resumption of war'. The secret negotiations, however, were becoming 'more sincere and more definite'.²

Still on February 3, Trotsky received a wireless message from Lenin which informed him that the 'Kiev Rada had fallen', and that 'all power in the Ukraine was in the hands of Soviets'.³ The 'power of the Kharkiv Central Executive Committee in the Ukraine' was declared to be 'undoubted'. The veracity of the telegram was much lessened in the eyes of the Central Powers by the fact that Lenin saw fit to add that 'there was a great swell of enthusiasm among the Petrograd workers about the formation of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in Berlin'. Lenin also stated that rumours were rife that Karl Liebknecht, the leader of the pacifist fraction of the Socialist movement in Germany, 'has been liberated and shall shortly head the German government'. The telegram, wired

openly, was also received by the German delegation by wireless. In conclusion, the telegram also referred to a non-existent 'Vienna Soviet of Workers'.⁴ What can be described as outright amazement at his telegrams was barely concealed in the German diplomatic despatches.⁵

Although the contents of the open wire were of course known to the Central Powers, Trotsky duly informed the Delegation of the Central Powers the same day that, according to a message received by him from the Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars, the Kiev Rada had been finally overthrown, that the 'entire power in the Ukraine was completely and indivisibly in the hands of the Ukrainian Soviets' which were represented in his delegation⁶ (He did not refer to Karl Liebknecht). The Central Powers could well doubt the correctness of the communication of Lenin, since the previous day, February 2, they had picked up a wireless message of the Ukrainian authorities from the Kiev wireless installation stating that the 'revolt of the Bolsheviks who had made the attempt to take the power in the city' had been suppressed by Ukrainians. The Central Rada continued to hold sessions without interruption. Reports of a new ministry headed by Holubovych, the former Head of the Ukrainian Delegation, certainly strengthened the Ukrainian position at Brest-Litovsk. The wireless message also stated that Polish troops were fighting against the Bolsheviks, and that the Bolsheviks were 'withdrawing from the Ukraine and going in the most rapid fashion to Russia'.⁷

The Ukrainian Peace Delegation established contact by direct wire with Kiev the day after Trotsky's allegations. The importance of this contact was underscored by the fact that Hoffmann had informed the Delegation that public opinion would not allow Germany to sign peace with the Ukrainian Republic if Kiev were to fall.⁸ The Delegation informed Kuehlmann's assistant, Rosenberg, of the telegraph connection with Kiev.⁹ The delegation from Brest-Litovsk, in re-establishing contact, wired on February 4 that to hold Kiev was essential for the signing of peace.¹⁰

The Delegation was informed from Kiev by Foreign Minister Shulhyn, that the Bolshevik rebellion had been definitely suppressed; however, Shulhyn added that the situation was serious; he instructed them that the ministerial declaration offered by Austria-Hungary to the Ukrainians was not sufficient; a ministerial declaration depended upon the Ministry in Power. A more binding form of treaty was agreed on, the contents of which would be secret. The demand for one million tons of grain received no comment and thus was obviously left to the judgement of the Delegation.¹¹

The speaker in Kiev seems to have been Shulhyn, judging by the references to the final decision of the Cabinet. Holubovych, the Premier, is mentioned as taking part in the conversation. The agreement on the sale of one million tons of grain to the Central Powers is referred to only incidentally in the discussion of the treaty on Eastern Galicia. Kiev stated in this connection, 'Secret agreement is possible.... At that, if possible, not one million tons.'¹²

Still, another question was dispensed with; Shulhyn informed the delegation that 'the matter had come to nothing', referring obviously to negotiations with the Entente for assistance. 'It seems that they do not have the power.'¹³

The Russian government continued to announce the fall of Kiev. On the same day the connection was established between Brest-Litovsk and Kiev, Lenin sent another open wireless message, in which he stated again that Kiev was 'in the hands of the Ukrainian Soviet power', and that the 'Kiev bourgeois Rada had fallen and dispersed'. The Ukrainian Soviet power was said to have been fully recognized.¹⁴

However, at midnight of the same day, February 4, the Germans picked up a wireless message from the Ukrainian authorities in Kiev. The message again stated that the Bolshevik rebellion had been suppressed, with only occasional shooting. All governmental institutions, the railroad and the arsenal were in Ukrainian hands, Bolsheviks were said to have suffered severe losses, while those of Ukrainians had been very light.¹⁵

The Russian forces had reached Kiev. The Ukrainian Peace Delegation was informed of the progress of the bombardment of Kiev by those forces, while it was proceeding. Holubovych, President of the Council of Ministers, informed the Delegation on February 5 that the situation in Kiev was very serious and hinted that the aid of the Central Powers against the Bolsheviks might have to be used. The Delegation was not, however, instructed to ask for aid at that moment, but Holubovych told them that it should be requested after the signing of the Treaty. Shulhyn informed the Delegation that the Central Rada agreed to make peace; the Ukrainian parties voted for peace, while 16 members of minorities' parties abstained.¹⁶ Thus the delegation was instructed to sign the peace.

Lenin continued to claim in wireless messages that Kiev had fallen. On the same day, February 5, his message informed the world that 'Soviet troops had entered Kiev on January 29'. According to the wire, the troops were led by the People's Commissars for Military Affairs, Shakhrai and Kotsyubynsky. The Kiev garrison, together with the artillery, had united with the troops of Kotsyubynsky and had declared the Kiev Rada overthrown. Furthermore, stated Lenin, 'the General Secretariat of the Kiev Rada with Vynnychenko at the head, abandoned by all, went into hiding'. 'The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Ukraine with its People's Secretariat in Kharkiv have been proclaimed the supreme power'. Both these institutions were said to have settled in Kiev on February 3. A federal connection was resumed with Russia. Furthermore, all troops of the Rada on both fronts had 'dissolved themselves' and both recognized the Soviet institutions. The All-Ukrainian Congress was to open soon in Kiev, while all cities and gubernias in the Ukraine, without exception, had proclaimed readiness to take part in it.¹⁷ This message also was picked up by German forces; it could not but undermine further the credibility of the statements of Russian officials.

In the meantime, Austrians and Germans attempted to come to a final agreement on the current issues, on the basis of the German and Austrian Crown Councils and negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, at a conference held in Berlin on February 5 and 6. Representing Austria-Hungary was Count Czernin, the Foreign Minister, and his advisors, including the military; for the Germans, there was Kanzler Hertling, State Secretary Kuehlmann, General Ludendorff, and others. General Hoffmann, Czernin and Kuehlmann had left Brest-Litovsk on February 4, to go to Berlin.

Czernin wanted a peace that would keep the status quo ante. Ludendorff, however, took grave exception to this suggestion, "If Germany were to make peace without profit, she has lost the war,"¹⁸ he said. The representatives of the German Government were more subdued.

The first complex of problems to be discussed was the course of negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, and the *modus procedendi* for the future. Full agreement was reached on this score. The secret memorandum of the meeting of February 6 stated that 'in view of the lack of food in Austria-Hungary and Germany, the peace treaty with the Ukraine must be signed (as soon as possible) with the cession of the Kholm district to the Ukraine and the formation of the Ukrainian province of Eastern Galicia, with the concurrent assurance of the interests of the Polish minority.'¹⁹

In return, the Ukraine would undertake the prompt delivery of grain. Germany agreed to allow Austria-Hungary primacy in its distribution. The Austro-Hungarian side pointed out 'the immensity of the sacrifice by the monarch towards the common goal, having given up the Kholm district to the Ukraine, and having agreed to the formation of an autonomous Eastern-Galician Kronland, as well as to the difficulties which arise in the Polish question as the result of this....'²⁰

On the whole, Ludendorff was ready to support immediate peace with the Rada as necessary and desirable 'exclusively due to the economic situation'. The minutes of the conference of February 5, drawn up by the Command, de-

scribed the formation of the Ukrainian Kronland as the possibly dangerous first step towards the defederalization of Austria-Hungary, with the observation 'Austria must suffer that sacrifice', as she could not last till harvest without the Ukraine.²¹ The German Government also believed it was sacrificing something. With Ludendorff agreeing, Kuehlmann pointed out that cession of the Kholm district would be harmful to German interests, since Germany wanted to see that no one closed 'the road to the East and the Polish nation, turbulent and needful of expansion towards the East'.²² The reluctance seemed genuine. The German policy had been the support of Polish claims to the East, which were limited by fear of Russia on the one hand, and fear of Prussia on the other. The result: an attempt to displace the Poles eastwards; this was complemented by the Russian policy, which attempted to displace Poland westwards, again limited by the fear of Germany. The expansionist German *Drang nach Osten* had demanded as a corollary, Polish *Drang nach Osten*. The cession of the Kholm district damned the Polish *Drang* at the source, and thus created difficulties for Prussian policy in particular, and Germany's expansion to the East in general.

The other supplementary problem was solved by the decision to give the Ukraine 'military aid against the Russian maximalists' should the Ukraine request such. This aid was given 'within the limits of the possible'.²³ It was also decided that the peace treaty with the Bolsheviks was to be signed post-haste. However, if Trotsky were to persevere in his attitude, the armistice was to be annulled, and the military activity resumed.

'The possibility of a quick peace with the Ukraine' made 'fast solution of the Polish problem' imperative.²⁴ With the expected agreement with Rumania, there remained to 'be considered as spheres of expansion only Courland, Lithuania and Poland'.²⁵ The Ukraine was not 'considered'.

Thus the Berlin Conference further cemented the German-Austro-Hungarian understanding, though it was also plain that Austria-Hungary was being taken more and more

for granted. The final position of the north-western border of the Ukrainian Republic was the consequence of many conflicting interests at this point, including Ukrainian ones, of course. The Kholm province seemed assured to the Ukraine; the Ukrainian Kronland seemed near realization.

On the whole, the preponderance of the civil as against the military German element had been plain in the council. At one point in the midst of Ludendorff's bluster, Prime Minister Hertling said to Czernin, "Leave him be; the two of us can manage together without Ludendorff."²⁶ On February 7, a communiqué stated that the Allies had reached full agreement in all political matters.²⁷

While negotiations were proceeding, defense measures were taken in the Ukraine. Kiev was defended by troops roughly equal in number to that of the advancing Russian troops. Antonov supplies the data on the formation of Ukrainian garrison. We find a cavalry regiment, with supporting infantry of 1,800 bayonets. The garrison also contained five regiments of regular army troops, and regiments of volunteer troops, consisting of front-line soldiers and military academy students. The former were, in the opinion of Antonov, 'disciplined and enraged against the Bolsheviks'. There was also a regiment of Black Sea sailors, the average regiment having the strength of 800 men. The brunt of the fighting was taken by the 2,000 Free Cossacks, each of whose units consisted of some 60 volunteers. Antonov mistakenly numbers the Czechoslovak regiment in Kiev among the Ukrainian troops,²⁸ and fails to mention two other regiments, those of Sahaydachny and Hrushevsky, as well as Galician Sich Sharpshooters, reorganized in early January by Konovalets, Melnyk and others from former Ukrainian prisoners-of-war in Austria-Hungary. There was also a small regiment which made its way from the Western front under Petrov,²⁹ as well as some other negligible units. The regiments accounted for by Antonov had a total strength of some 9,000 troops of infantry and cavalry, over 200 machine-guns, artillery and two armoured motor-cars.

The other units ran to an estimated 2,400 troops, giving a total of some 11,400 troops to defend the capital.

One of the major difficulties was that in the course of the struggle and bombardment of close to ten days, some regiments proclaimed neutrality.³⁰ There was also some overt activity of Bolsheviks, who raised a rebellion which continued intermittently until final suppression on February 4.³¹ The rebellion had some disconcerting influence because one battalion of the Sahaydachny regiment, and some of the Polubotok regiment soldiers, had taken the initiative in the uprising. The memoirs of the commander of the battalion in question, a certain Mishchenko, point out that he was a Bolshevik himself, unknown to his men. The reason for the action is not given by Mishchenko. There was a background of difficulties between the Arsenal Works and the Rada. Mishchenko mentions that, as a member of the Bolshevik revolutionary committee, he was taken by surprise at the initiative of the Polubotok men and of the 'Arsenal workers'. It further emerges from the memoirs that the 'Arsenal workers' were in a minority in the Arsenal fortress where the rebellion originated. The total number of rebels was about 800, while Mishchenko's soldiers could hardly be more than 300 men (allowing 200 men per battalion with Mishchenko claiming 450) and Polubotok soldiers must be allowed a proportionate number.

After the Free Cossacks attacked the Arsenal fortress, the character of the besieged changed. Ukrainian soldiers continued to slip out of the fortress, obviously with the connivance of the Free Cossacks, to the extent that, according to Mishchenko, hardly any soldiers remained in the Arsenal, while they were being replaced by Arsenal men. Mishchenko himself slipped out from the Arsenal in order to negotiate with the Ukrainian authorities, but was quite unsuccessful.³² The Bolsheviks were divided and not very active in the rebellion. On February 3, members of the Gubernia Revolutionary Committee (mostly representing the local Bolsheviks) sent delegates to various Bolshevik centres on February 3 and

told the insurgents 'to go home'. At the same time, some dissident Bolsheviks continued bombarding the city and shooting indiscriminately; among these was the Railroad Works detachment. The Arsenal Works was the main centre of rebellion. Those in the Works were so incensed at the Revolutionary Committee members that these 'were almost shot'. Next day, February 4, Patlakh, the Bolshevik representative of the Railroad Works detachment, visited the Revolutionary Committee; Ivanov and other leading Bolsheviks were present. These declared that there was no knowing when any reinforcements would reach Kiev, and again suggested that 'affairs be concluded'. The Railroad Works detachment followed the advice this time. Patlakh observes in his memoirs that in the evening 'we had to run wherever we could.'³³ In the meantime, the Arsenal continued the rebellion under the leadership of its own Military-Revolutionary Committee, which was under the influence of the People's Secretariat (led by Gorovits, a member of the Central Committee). The Arsenal was stormed by Ukrainian troops, and the Military-Revolutionary Committee and some 300 Bolsheviks were slaughtered.³⁴

After the rebellion was suppressed, peace was re-established in Kiev. The military intelligence of the Ukrainian forces appears to have been faulty, as the troops of Muravyov appeared on the other bank of the River Dnieper without warning.

Masaryk took the opportunity to proclaim the Czechoslovak legion part of the French Army, with the agreement of the French Military Mission,³⁵ on February 3, 1918.³⁶ The decision to make clear the independent and belligerent character of the Czech Army was probably taken in expectation of the approval for the conclusion of peace, given by the Rada on February 4, and especially in view of the unfavorable development of the Russo-Ukrainian war for the Ukrainian Republic. It is quite likely that the Czech legion had better military intelligence and closer contact with the enemy through the Allied units in Muravyov's troops, than the Ukrainian Army, and thus were informed of the very immediate danger.

The new relationship arising between Tabouis and his Military Mission, and the Czech Army, became that between the latter and the French government. The decree setting up the independent Czecho-Slovak Army was issued by Poincaré, the President of the Republic and countersigned by Clemenceau and Pichon, on December 16, 1917. In the Decree the French Republic proclaimed, among other things that, while the political direction of the Army would be by the National Council (Rada), the army acknowledges the 'authority of the supreme French command in military affairs'. The internal government of the Army would be managed according to the same regulations as in the French Army.³⁷ In this manner the French Military Mission, and Tabouis as its Chief, obtained the military command of 50,000 men.

The Entente representatives in Kiev were under no illusions as to the military strength of Muravyov. As mentioned before, Masaryk states simply that the Czechs 'could have smashed... Muravieff and his army before Kiev',³⁸ although not the Bolsheviks at Moscow and Petrograd. It is difficult not to agree with this. The troops of Muravyov were quite disorganized, and as was discussed above, amounted only to some 11,400 men. As against these, the Czecho-Slovak Corps had upwards of 50,000 troops,³⁹ holding defensive positions shielding Kiev from Bakhmach, and some in Kiev itself. In addition to these, there was the French military base at Lubny,⁴⁰ in front of the Czechs, as well as the French and British military missions in Kiev. There were also, Rumanian, Belgian, and Polish units. All these troops had kept a strict neutrality in this warfare, with the exception of a unit of Polish volunteers under the influence of the Polish Socialist Party of Pilsudski.⁴¹ It must be concluded that the Allied Powers had enough forces in the Ukraine, through an unusually favorable disposition, to turn the scales in the struggle, with a minimum number of victims.

The Russian troops appeared on February 5, according to the memoirs of Lapchinskiy, a Bolshevik People's Secre-

tary, who accompanied the troops with three other Secretaries.⁴²

The threat to Kiev appears to have been primarily the result of a successful juncture near the gates of the city of four Russian groups which described themselves as 'armies', the detachments of Muravyov, Yegorov, Znamensky and Kudynskiy. The four 'armies' had been reorganized by Muravyov into three: the second army, led by Berzin, consisted of 3,000 soldiers, 400 sailors and 12 cannon.⁴³ Thus, the four relatively unimportant units had been welded into an effective fighting force, especially in view of the fact that the station Darnytsya, across the River Dnieper, had an artillery base with guns trained directly on Kiev.

It is impossible to establish on the available evidence the exact number of troops besieging Kiev under immediate orders of Muravyov. However, the approximate size may be deduced with some degree of certainty, from the known size of one of the three 'armies', that of Berzin, into which Muravyov placed 3,400 men. Assuming the equal size of the armies, the approximate figure of some 11,200 men is arrived at. The actual strength was probably somewhat higher, as Muravyov had not kept an army for himself; we must assume that his Command had some troops. Thus, the strength of the Russian troops and of the Ukrainian troops was nearly equal. The advantage of the Ukrainians was the favorable defensive position of the city, while the Russians had the artillery park at Darnytsya.

The number of troops is important. Some historians take the weakness of the Ukrainian government for granted, and fail to investigate the actual ratio of Russian and Ukrainian forces. If Kennan is singled out, it is only because he is typical of many historians, such as Komarnicki, referred to above. Kennan writes:

The Bolsheviks set up a rival Ukrainian regime at Kharkov, mounted a military action against the Rada under the leadership of a notorious adventurer, Lieutenant Colonel Muravyov (the same who was military commandant of

Petrograd).... This action should not be thought of as a regular military operation comparable to those in progress on the fronts on World War I. Muravyov commanded only 600 to 800 men, and a motley band they were. But in the chaos and social dissolution that gripped the Ukraine in the beginning of 1918, that was enough.⁴¹

As seen from the above discussion, this is totally incorrect; the number of Russian troops in just one of the three units is definitely known to be at least 3,400 men, four to six times the figure stated by Kennan, while the total Russian force appears to have been underestimated perhaps ten to twenty-fold. The operation must be definitely accounted a 'regular military operation', even allowing for a general scaling-down due to the disorganization mentioned by Kennan, as well as the fact that the Russo-Ukrainian front was, in the conditions of the time, secondary to the Ukrainian-German front. In any case, an operation involving perhaps 25,000 combatants can hardly be accounted minor, or even irregular.

The national composition of troops commanded by Muravyov was Russian. As has been discussed in some detail in a previous chapter. Muravyov's own detachment from Kharkiv was under the immediate orders of Primakov, a Russian from Petrograd, while the larger part of the detachment consisted of Petrogradians with some (about 200 men) recruited in Kharkiv whose nationality is not known. The army of Yegorov consisted primarily of Red Guardists from Moscow and Petrograd.⁴² Kudinskiy himself had left Petrograd sometime in November, 1917. Antonov mentions that Kudinskiy left Novgorod, to the South of Petrograd, leading 10,000 troops, obviously from Russia, of cavalry and infantry to the city of Bryansk⁴³ in Russia, arriving there in December. Kudinskiy must have lost some troops on the way, as we find that he is said to have 'mobilized 10,000 workers' in this Russian city, in late December.⁴⁴ The main contingent of his army was Russian workers of Bryansk, therefore.

Berzin first appears as the commander of the Bolsheviks held in the jail in Minsk, in Belorussia. These were prisoners,

presumably Russian soldiers engaged in anti-war propaganda.⁴⁸ These were probably dedicated Bolshevik troops, as they were used in the destruction of the High Command; Commander-in-Chief Dukhonin was murdered at that time. Berzin proceeded to Gomel, still outside of Ukrainian borders, where there was a concentration of troops.⁴⁹ Arriving there somewhat later in December, Berzin divided his troops into the 17th and 19th columns, moving the 19th column against Ukrainian troops concentrated in Bakhmach, across the border. The eventual defeat and dissolution of the 19th column has been discussed before.⁵⁰ Most of the 17th column was sent against the Don Cossacks, by-passing the Ukraine.⁵¹ With only a few troops remaining, Berzin subordinated himself to Kudinskiy, who was in Bryansk at that time. Kudinskiy placed him over a part of his own troops, that is, Russian workers from Bryansk. It is plain from this that the troops and their commanders were Russian. The troops were primarily from Petrograd, Moscow, and Bryansk, and commanders were Russian. The Russian character of the troops at Kiev was openly acknowledged by the People's Secretariat of the Ukraine at the height of the battle. The appeal 'to workers, to peasants, to soldiers' issued by the People's Secretariat, was published on February 7, 1918, in the official gazette of the Soviet regime in the Ukraine, *Vestnik Ukrainskoy Narodnoy Respubliki* (The Herald of the Ukrainian National Republic). It was signed by People's Secretary Lapchinskiy. The People's Secretariat called on 'all revolutionary Soviet organizations' to send their forces to Kiev', while acknowledging that the troops which 'had approached Kiev' were the 'revolutionary armies sent by the Workers'-Peasants' Government of the Russian Republic on the demand of the People's Secretariat of the Ukraine.'⁵²

The struggle at Kiev was one purely between Russian and Ukrainian armies, directed by the Russian and Ukrainian governments.

The policy on Kiev was determined exclusively by Muravyov. In expectation of the capture of the city, he issued, on February 4, 'Order No. 9 to the Revolutionary Armies of the

Front', which determined the early events. According to Antonov, this order had been issued by Muravyov 'of course, without agreement' with the People's Secretariat. The actions of Muravyov, again according to Antonov, had the more 'unfortunate meaning as in the eyes of the Kiev inhabitants' as he was an 'occupier, foreigner-migrant (*prishelts*) from the Soviet north'.⁵³ In his order, Muravyov commanded his troops 'to exterminate without mercy in Kiev, all officers and students of military academies, 'haydamaks' (referring to the Ukrainian soldiers), monarchists and all enemies of the revolution'.⁵⁴ The order is seen to be very indefinite. The term 'all enemies of the revolution' of course could be applied indiscriminately. We have already commented on the bad relations between the Russian army of occupation and the People's Secretariat. They reached a low point on February 5, when the Soviet of People's Commissars, as was mentioned before, proclaimed in a telegram 'to all' that troops led by Shakhrai and Kotsyubynsky had occupied Kiev.⁵⁵ It must be mentioned that shortly before that, Kotsyubynsky had been named to the post of 'Commander-in-Chief' (possessing neither a chain of command nor staff), but rejected it.⁵⁶ Muravyov in his turn sent a telegram 'to all', informing the world that Kiev was occupied and that 'Kiev workers, imprisoned in the fortress to the number of 500 men, had been liberated' and took to arms against the accursed enemy.⁵⁷ Kotsyubynsky's role was deeply resented by Muravyov, according to Antonov, as the 'obscuration of his own personal accomplishments'.⁵⁸ However, the disagreements appear to have been primarily personal in nature. According to Lapchinskiy, the Soviet Command while at Kiev did 'not dare to attack such a great city as Kiev, with positions so convenient for defence'. After several attempts to cross the Dnieper River (Kiev lay on the opposite side) had been answered by machine-gun fire, the 'Soviet artillery began a merciless bombardment which lasted four days and during which there had been sent out several thousand rounds of three, four and eight-inch caliber'. Later, bombardment of the city began from another side, from the Russian armoured

train. Lapchinskiy considered the aim of these tactics to be to 'conclusively demoralize the enemy, and to force it to evacuate'. Another aim was 'to terrorize the bourgeois part of the population, so numerous and so counter-revolutionary as it had always been in Kiev'. For this reason, the 'artillerymen were ordered to aim principally into the central district, at the state institutions and churches'. Lapchinskiy, a member of the presumptive Ukrainian Soviet government, gave an insight into the policy of the members of the People's Secretariat, in stating in his memoirs that it seemed to him 'as participant and witness of these events', that from then on, the bombardment was considered an 'entirely normal and expedient form of mass revolutionary terror'.³⁹ It is indicative that four members of the Ukrainian Soviet 'government': Under-Secretary for War Kotsyubynsky, Secretary of Internal Affairs Bosh, Secretary of Communications Martyanov, and Lapchinskiy, Secretary for Administrative Affairs, were present with the army and took active part in the events, while two others were at Brest-Litovsk and one (Zatonsky) in Petrograd.

Under the circumstances of the siege, the Ukrainian government turned again to the Allies. On February 6.⁴⁰ Holubovych, the new Prime Minister, explained to Shulhyn that he wanted to appeal to the Allies; as he did not know the foreign diplomats he asked to be presented to them. Shulhyn agreed.⁴¹

Tabouis, Picton Bagge and several Consuls answered the summons. Shulhyn made two proposals at the meeting; first, he asked for a mediation by the foreigners⁴² between the government and the Russian troops, in order to stop the bombardment.⁴³ He asked further for a note explaining the minimum the Ukraine had to do to avoid a break with the Allies. Shulhyn summarizes the replies as promising 'no possibility of help for us'.⁴⁴ Tabouis wrote in his memoirs that it was 'too late'.⁴⁵ Despite these statements, it would seem that the possibility of cooperation at this late date was reasonably good. The Ukrainian government was still in possession of the direct telegraphic line to Brest-Litovsk, while a courier could reach Brest-Litovsk within reasonable time. The Treaty of Peace

was signed the night of February 8-9. The forces of Muravyov were small as compared to any Allied cooperation with the Ukraine, and could hardly withstand a strike of fresh troops, and might even collapse at the threat of such. Was the Ukrainian Republic ready to sacrifice the immediate signing of peace? Under the extreme circumstances of possible destruction of the Republic, and with a modicum of diplomacy, the government could probably be induced to modify its policy.

Tabouis discussed the situation in his memoirs. As he expresses it:

Impossible de prendre moi-même aucun avis; la T.S.F. est entre les mains des révolutionnaires, le central téléphonique est abandonné par son personnel, la gare est dans la zone bolchévique. Je n'ai pas d'avion en ordre de marche. Je suis coupé de tout...⁶⁸

In other words, Tabouis, unable 'to take counsel with any one', refused to take action on his own initiative.

It is, of course, a question whether the French Military Mission could have in fact exercised the authority lodged in it. Masaryk states that 'we were autonomous, yet a part of the French army; we depended on France and the Entente for financial support.... In reality, we were not at that time independent.'⁶⁷ Yet despite this, an unlikely possibility existed that French orders would not in fact be accepted. Masaryk's reasons for non-interference, as well as from French inaction, as given in his memoirs, are many and varied.⁶⁸ The basic reason was perhaps the one given to Shulhyn on the occasion of the Czech protest against the Fourth Universal (on the Independence).

Our army has been formed in agreement with Russia; our soldiers have sworn allegiance to Russia; we were devoted to Russia; and though we did not wish to oppose the Ukraine or its policy in any way, we could simply not transfer our allegiance to it.⁶⁹

Masaryk observes in discussing the reasons for neutrality that the 'Bolsheviks, too, were Russians', concluding, 'in my eyes,

Lenin was no less Russian than Tsar Nicholas; may, despite his Mongolian descent, there was more Russian blood in his veins than in those of the Tsar."⁶

It must be concluded that Tabouis for the French, Masaryk, as his 'subordinate', and the Allies in general, while possessing a possible means of preventing the signing of the Treaty of Peace and thereby liquidating the Brest-Litovsk Conference, did not do so, for purely fortuitous reasons in the case of Tabouis, and because of loyalty to Russia in the case of Masaryk. Since no initiative had been taken by the officers of greatest authority, other Allied representatives could hardly do so.

It is interesting to see that Tabouis saw the need to demonstrate his personal courage and self-sacrifice, while the city was being bombarded. He offered to take a trumpeteer and a white flag and to the enemy and make an appeal to their humanity to stop the bombardment of Kiev. Shulhyn reports the conversation:

— Mais ils vous tueront sur place!

— Je risque. Au moins j'aurais sauvé la ville et la population qui souffre tant.

— Vous ne "risque" pas, mon général; les bolchéviques vous tueront surement.⁷¹

Despite these sentiments, the Czech Army, under the orders of Tabouis and Masaryk, negotiated a treaty with Muravyov across the front line on the next day, February 7. By this treaty, Soviet Russia guaranteed 'armed neutrality' to the Army and 'freedom to leave for France.'⁷² Hereby, the Czech troops in the Ukrainian capital established relations with the Bolsheviks, with whom the Ukrainian Republic was at war. It must be assumed that the agreement was negotiated with the knowledge of the French Military Mission. This agreement, incidentally, formed the basis of Russo-Czech relations for the next several months. As far as the Ukrainian Republic was concerned, the agreement, under the conditions of warfare, was an inimical action, and was much resented. Hrushev-

sky wrote on February 17, obviously referring to the Czech Army and others, that 'all the mercenaries which the Allies had at their disposal on our territory were used to sabotage our defence against the Bolsheviks.'⁷³

Simultaneously with the rising impasse between the delegations of Russia and of the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, the last attempts of accommodation took place; the initiative came from the Austro-Hungarian side. Schueller of the Austro-Hungarian Delegation sought out Trotsky on February 6 and pointed out to him that the agreement on the territories under German occupation in the north was in the nature of an ultimatum; he offered to help towards a compromise. Trotsky declared that the current circumstances were transitory, and would be solved by a general revolution, to which he added that he could 'conclude a peace in which Russia would be violated', but in such case the intention must be pronounced by the other side. 'No certificate of good conduct may yet be demanded from us,' Schueller felt that this opened the way to a 'realistic understanding' and told Trotsky that Czernin would make attempts in that direction.⁷⁴ Although discussions ostensibly concerned only the Polish and Baltic territories, the question of the Ukraine was just beneath the surface.

The next day, February 7, Czernin informed Kuehlmann of still another attempt to come to terms with Russia. Kuehlmann was not unsympathetic. The plan met with the great disfavour of the German military, in particular General Hoffmann. Schueller and Gratz, participants in the negotiations, wrote that these were determined to 'strike down Russia in one last offensive and so to force it to the acceptance of peace' and were strongly 'in favour of peace with the Ukraine'.⁷⁵

Czernin, accompanied by his aid, Gratz, met Trotsky on the evening of the same day, in his apartments. He declared to the latter that negotiations were in danger of breaking down. Thus he decided to attempt, through confidential talks, to find a way that peace might still be achieved. The 'clever theoretical discussions on general political questions' which

had formed the substance of the previous negotiations had not led to the goal. It would be better to push aside the theoretical disagreements and to attempt to find a practical solution of the questions which interfered with the conclusion of peace. Trotsky disagreed.⁷⁶ It was Kuehlmann, stated Trotsky, who had kept the discussions on the theoretical level. Kuehlmann had tried to force Trotsky to admit that the addition of foreign territories to Germany had not been annexations but, on the contrary, had come to Germany as a result of national self-determination. He could never agree to this 'even if the new regime were to go under' over it. The Russian government could indeed bow to certain facts, but it could not declare in the 'first article of the treaty that there were no such annexations and allow such annexations in the second article and remain blind'. For this reason, said Trotsky, he had said in the meeting of the commission that a solution was possible if Germany 'would honestly admit that there were annexations'. In the beginning, he had hoped that a solution would be possible by accepting the idea of self-determination; this proved to have been a false hope, as Germany had played foul. A solution could be found on the basis of annexations, but they must be openly confessed, insisted Trotsky, and added that it was not necessary that Germany do this in the treaty. 'However, I must reserve to myself the right to describe what Germany undertakes as annexations.' This seemed to open the way to an agreement. Gratz then suggested that, in such a case, there should be no statement on this question in the treaty and that it should simply read the 'following territorial changes have been realized'. Trotsky could call it annexation, and the Germans, self-determination. On this, Trotsky declared, "I believe this way is practical".⁷⁷

Gratz and Schueller wrote that Trotsky laid the greatest importance on the question of Ukrainian peace in these talks. However, Trotsky also made demands over the northern territories; from Trotsky's behaviour, it seemed the Austrians that the peace would not fail because of these demands alone (which the Germans were not willing to satisfy).⁷⁸

The chief demand of Trotsky was that no treaty be signed with the Ukraine at the same time. He declared that the Rada, with whose representatives the Central Powers were negotiating, was no longer in existence. Czernin expressed doubt over the statement of Trotsky. Trotsky then read the message from Lenin of February 5, stating that Kiev was in Soviet hands since January 29, and asked that an officer be sent to Kiev to check and report.⁷⁹ The Russian Government would not recognize a peace with the Ukraine, he stated, as the Ukraine was a part of the Russian Federation now and a peace agreement with a body which had rebelled against Russian authority would be an intervention in the internal affairs of the Russian Republic.⁸⁰ He insisted that the Ukraine was no longer in the hands of the Rada, but in the hands of his troops, according to Czernin.⁸¹ Trotsky asked that the peace treaty with the Ukraine not be signed until an officer should report.⁸² When Czernin offered to send an officer of the Austrian General Staff to the Ukraine, Trotsky reneged, and it became evident to Czernin, as he wrote in his diary, that 'the statement of the Bolsheviks that they were already in possession of the Ukraine was but a stratagem'.⁸³ Czernin, indeed, had reason to believe in the unpopularity of the Bolshevik cause in the Ukraine; he had sent 'a reliable confidant' thither six weeks earlier. 'The entire city population and the peasants, in short, everybody who possesses anything, shudders at these red robbers', reported Czernin.⁸⁴ Being informed shortly of the direct Kiev-Brest contact, Czernin could write that Trotsky's stratagem actually 'strengthened in him the decision to sign the treaty'.⁸⁵

It was becoming painfully obvious that the Russian delegation was now using the conference simply to gain time. On February 7, the delegation of the Soviet of People's Commissars appeared in the territorial commission with two new members, Bobinski and Radek. Their role followed that played earlier by Shakhrai and Medvedev, but this time for Poland. Bobinski and Radek were, as Bobinski put it, 'representatives of the proletariat of the Tsardom of Poland', pro-

bably as claimed by the Polish Soviet of Democratic Organizations at the People's Commissariat of Nationalities. When asked if their declaration presented the view of the Soviet delegation, Trotsky replied that it had been submitted as informative 'material', a rather strange allegation which provoked protest.⁶⁶ This interlude showed that relations between Germany and Russia were on the point of collapsing, especially since resistance to the projected peace was rising in Russia; this, of course, endangered Lenin's control of Russia.

The Austro-Hungarian Delegation continued its talks with Trotsky. On February 8, Trotsky was told that although hardly any compromise could be expected on the territorial deadlock, some way could be found to reach a peace which avoided the question of 'annexations or the right of self-determination'. Trotsky declared himself satisfied, still reserving the right to his protest,⁶⁷ obviously according to the agreement of February 7. Trotsky was disappointed completely, however, on the treaty with the Ukrainian Republic.

Trotsky was told that negotiations with Ukrainians had gone too far to allow further procrastination of the signing of peace. Furthermore, it had been proven that the Ukrainian Delegation had received a Hughes telegram from Kiev on February 5, and had a conversation with the Head of the Council of Ministers, Holubovych; thus the Austrian delegates could tell Trotsky his information that Kiev had been held by the Bolsheviks since January 29 (according to Lenin's message), seemed incorrect. At any rate, the Central Powers did not see how the Ukrainian Peace could threaten the Russian Peace. They were simply signing a treaty with the Ukraine over the South-Russian territory. They were also closing another treaty with the Petrograd government over the entire territory over which the influence of that government extended. If matters developed as Trotsky thought, then the Petrograd Treaty would be valid for all of Russia, while the Ukrainian one would be regarded as non-existent.

Trotsky rejected the arrangement proposed. According to him, the Rada was seeking to ensure its right to exist against

the opposition of the Russian government by leaning upon the Central Powers. Russia would not confirm existence of the Rada government through its signature. When it was objected to him that the Russian treaty of peace need not have any reference at all to the Ukrainian one, he continued to maintain the position that the signing of the Ukrainian treaty would be an unfriendly action against Russia and would exclude the possibility of any treaty between Russia and the Central Powers. He had a suspicion, as he stated, that there was an intention of using the treaty as an excuse for intervention. Gratz and Schueller stated that negotiations had to be broken off because Trotsky would not retract his 'refusal to sign a treaty with the Central Powers if the peace treaty was to be signed with the Ukraine at the same time'.

It became plain, according to Austrian observers, that the signing of the treaty with the Ukraine was unavoidable. Trotsky was informed of the fact. Despite this, Trotsky declared that the *modus procedendi* which had been agreed on earlier should be maintained, and that the request that peace be closed without reference to theoretical questions be presented at the next session of the peace conference.⁸⁸ Czernin seemed to be referring to this talk between the Austrians and Trotsky, when he stated in his diary on February 8, that Gratz had told him that Trotsky, with whom he had spoken in the morning, was 'much depressed at our intention of concluding the peace with the Ukraine today after all'. Czernin also stated that Gratz had arranged for a meeting with the Russian Delegation for the next day; 'this would clarify the matter for us, and show us whether any agreement is possible, or if we must break off altogether,' concluded Czernin.⁸⁹

The settlement between the Ukrainian Republic and the Central Powers was a complex one, consisting of several interlocking arrangements, the main one being the Peace Treaty itself. A special clause in the Peace Treaty provided that 'agreements confirmed by this Peace Treaty formed one undivided whole'. The aim of this clause was to guarantee the fulfilment of the other agreements, which became valid with the

conclusion of the basic Treaty of Peace, and although they were drawn up and signed a day or two earlier, they shall be examined in connection with the main Treaty, of which they were subsidiary, though important parts.

After considerable wavering, the Central Powers decided to sign the treaty of peace with the Ukrainian National Republic. The Ukrainian Delegation had renewed the contact with the Government in Kiev on February 6. When Czernin showed signs of wavering on February 8, Vasyloko brought him the tapes of the Hughes telegram of the Brest-Litovsk--Kiev discussions dated February 6.⁹⁰

Germany, too, appears to have been vacillating over whether to sign the Ukrainian treaty in view of the uncertain stability of the Ukrainian regime. This is shown by the telegram from the Chief of the Admiral Command of the Marine; the telegram was addressed to Kuehlmann, State Secretary of the Foreign Office, and others. Coming at an opportune time, the information in the telegram appears to have requested by the State Secretary; on the other hand, the military authorities may have taken the initiative themselves. At any rate, the State Secretary was informed in the telegram from Berlin, dated February 8, that Trotsky had been 'spreading the story that, according to his information, the Ukrainian Rada had been overthrown'. The telegram goes on to state that the 'Ukrainian Delegation were in contact with Kiev yesterday evening', that is, on the evening of February 7, and 'were able to establish that Trotsky's news was incorrect.'⁹¹ The copy of the telegram in the archives of the German Foreign Office bears the registration date of February 9, 1918, when it appears to have reached the office.

Still another telegram was received on February 8 regarding the situation at Kiev, at 10 at night. Rosenberg had wired from Brest-Litovsk that two Ukrainian government officials, Kozarenko and Plevako, were expected. Crossing the border, they stated that they had left Kiev on February 6: they 'looked very confidently towards the future', while the Ukrainian government was said to be complete master of the

situation.⁸² Evidently in reply, the Foreign ministry wired a report from Bern regarding the situation, on February 9. The report of Romberg concerning an interview with Gassenko, the representative of the Ukrainian government in Switzerland, stated that the latter was 'very skeptical' in regard to the news from Bolshevik sources spread by the Havas agency regarding the fall of Kiev. Gassenko also referred to the good garrison at Kiev, and the weakness of the Bolshevik 'Rada'.⁸³ The Ambassador in Stockholm, Lucius, sent a wire to Berlin in the evening of February 8, which, however, did not reach Berlin until the following morning. In it, Lucius transmitted a *dementi* of the Ukrainian Bureau in Stockholm on the fall of Kiev.⁸⁴

It also should be mentioned that Hoffmann had declared to the Ukrainian delegation that peace would not be concluded, if Kiev would fall.⁸⁵ It would appear that Germans were signing peace in good faith. As late as February 12 or 13, Berckheim, an official at Brest-Litovsk, wired to the Foreign Ministry—that 'available news' proved unreliability of the Bolshevik news which had spread lies over the fall of Kiev and of the Rada. 'The situation is not at all clear, the struggle in Kiev is not yet decided', he maintained.⁸⁶

The signing was delayed by a few hours on February 8, because economic agreements between the Ukrainian Republic, Bulgaria and Turkey, as provided for the public Treaty, had to be reached 'at the last moment'. The same day, February 8, Czernin wrote in his diary, "This evening, peace with the Ukraine is to be signed—the first peace in this horrifying war,"⁸⁷ adding that he wondered whether the 'Rada was sitting' in Kiev.

The final decision by the various parties, occurred about 6 p.m. on February 8.⁸⁸ At that time, Berckheim, a German official at the Peace Conference, wired the Foreign office in Berlin that the treaty of peace had been concluded. All that remained was to transcribe the Treaty for the actual signing.

Gratz and Schueller described the feverish atmosphere at Brest-Litovsk in the last hours before the signature.

The German Legationsrat v. Stockhammer and Sektionsscheff Schueller dictated the treaty first to some soldiers, who wrote too slowly, then to Geheimraete and other officials. Everything was finished around 1 o'clock in the night, and the treaty was read through with Ukrainians.⁹⁹

The actual signing of the Treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic on the one side, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the other was signed first by Kuehlmann for Germany, at 1:59 a.m. of February 9, 1918. Thus the contract which had been conclusively formulated on February 8, was dated February 9. The last signature was affixed by 2:20 a.m.¹⁰⁰ Kiev was still the Ukrainian capital at the time.¹⁰¹

In a speech made to the assembled delegates, Kuehlmann declared: "We are signing (the treaty) with a young state arising in the course of the war, to which we wish all good fortune in the future, and hope that this is the beginning of a whole series of treaties beneficent for both parties." However, Sevryuk for the Ukraine in his reply, hinted at the friendliness of the Ukraine with the Entente. The Ukrainian delegation naturally welcomed the peace between the Ukraine and the Central Powers. Still, they were disappointed, because of political circumstances, 'in the hope for a general peace'. He did not express any similar sentiment towards Germany in reply to Kuehlmann's compliment, but simply stated that the deal was 'advantageous for both parties'.¹⁰² The Treaty of Peace was prepared in the four languages of the signatories, that is, Ukrainian, German, Bulgarian and Turkish. The three members of the Ukrainian Peace delegation, Sevryuk, Lyubynsky and Lewytsky, signed for the Ukrainian National Republic. For Germany, the text was signed by Hoffmann as well as Kuehlmann, since he was the 'representative of the Highest German Military Command'. The Treaty was signed by Czernin for Austria-Hungary, and by representatives of Bulgaria and Turkey. The Ukrainian Republic henceforth regarded itself as a neutral state. Thus, when an overzealous Ukrainian, General Zelinsky, stated at an official reception at Brest-

Litovsk two weeks later, in the presence of Hoffmann and the Foreign Minister, Lyubynsky, that he hoped that the Ukraine and Germany would become 'staunch allies' in the near future. Lyubynsky condemned the remark openly, declaring that 'there was no question of any alliance with Germany', eliciting a protest from Hoffmann.¹⁰³

Thus the Ukrainian National Republic established a new status quo in its international position and in the diplomatic system of Eastern Europe, through the Ukrainian Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of February 9, 1918.

'As the Ukrainian nation,' reads the preamble to the Treaty, 'in the course of the present world war, has declared itself independent and has expressed the desire to establish a state of peace between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Powers at war with Russia, the governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey have decided to conclude a treaty of peace with the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic.' By the first article, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand, and the Ukrainian representatives on the other, declared that the state of war between them had been terminated; henceforth, 'the contracting parties were determined to live with each other in peace and friendship'. Proceeding from this general statement to particulars, the Treaty provided for the exchange of diplomatic and consular personnel, and for the 'evacuation of occupied territories—immediately after the ratification of the present treaty of peace'. The western border of the Ukraine was defined. By the terms of the agreement, those borders 'which existed between Austria-Hungary and Russia' before the declaration of the present war were now established as the boundary line dividing Austria-Hungary and the Ukraine. The northern part of this western border, which now divided the Ukraine from the Kingdom of Poland, left the larger, Ukrainian-populated part of the province of Kholm on the Ukrainian side; the line which it was to follow was accordingly described in considerable detail. The border of the Ukraine, beginning at Tarnohrad, ran roughly along the line of Bilohrai

— Shcheshreshyn — Krasnostav — Puhachiv — Radyn — Mezhyrytchya — Sarnaky — Melnyk — Vysoko-Lytovsk — Kaminets-Lytovsk — Pruzhany — Vyhonovske-Ozero. The border would be determined by a mixed commission which would take the ethnographic relations and the wishes of the populace into consideration.¹⁰¹

The Ukraine now included the entire territory in the west, except for the southern portion, with a Ukrainian population formerly within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Treaty was therefore quite favourable territorially to the Ukraine.

The other condition of peace, of a quasi-territorial nature, demanded by the Republic was concerned, as will be remembered, with the position of the Ukrainians still within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was satisfied by the proposal of the Crown Council at Vienna of a Secret Treaty providing for the formation of a Ukrainian state in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Treaty was signed on the same day as the Treaty of Peace and was part of the same. It was signed, on the one side, by the Austrian Delegation, consisting of Seidler and Minister of Foreign Affairs Czernin, and on the other, by Sevryuk, Lyubynsky and Mykola Lewytsky.

'The way in which the negotiations of peace have been carried on,' reads the Secret Treaty, 'persuades the Austro-Hungarian delegates, as well as those of the Ukrainian Republic, that both powers are inspired with the desire to live from now on in peaceful and friendly relations with each other.'

Starting with the recognition that the desired strengthening of friendly relations between the Monarchy and the Ukraine could be greatly furthered by the guarantee of unlimited national and cultural development of the population minorities of both sides, the plenipotentiaries of Austria-Hungary admit that the Ukrainian government has already created laws which guarantee the rights of Poles, Germans and Jews in the Ukraine. On their part, the plenipotentiaries of the Ukraine take into consideration the decision of the Royal-Imperial Government to offer to the Ukrainian

people (*Volk*) in Austria still broader guarantees for their national and cultural development, than those which they already possess by laws now in force.

Then the Royal-Imperial Government promised that by July 20, 1918, at the latest, it would lay before the Reichstag a bill which would effect the separation of the eastern part of Galicia, inhabited by a majority of Ukrainians, from that province (*Kronland*) and the consequent union of these territories with the Bukovyna in a distinct province (*Kronland*). The Royal-Imperial Government would do its utmost to see that this bill became law.

It was further provided that the declaration formed an indivisible whole with the Treaty of Peace and would lapse if only one of the agreements contained in the Treaty of Peace was not sustained.¹⁰⁵

After Czernin had agreed to the conditions of the Secret Treaty, the Ukrainian Delegation presented additional demands, dealing in particular with the territories inhabited by Ukrainians within Hungary, as distinct from Austria. Czernin refused, however, any discussions on further concessions.¹⁰⁶

It is of interest to see that Vynnychenko, the former Head of the Council of Ministers, and usually a stern critic of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who signed the Treaty, considered it quite advantageous from the territorial point of view. He wrote in his memoirs that the treaty had solved the question of the borders of the state both justly and profitably for the Ukraine 'especially with regard to Poland', referring in particular to the settlement of the border in the Kholm gubernia and the Podlassie.¹⁰⁷ Generally speaking, he approved of the Treaty, 'doubtlessly very advantageous for the Ukrainian state, from various sides'. The Ukrainian state had been 'recognized by such serious subjects of this international process as the Central States'. Adding to this the 'recognition of the Ukrainian Republic by Great Britain and France', the Republic could be regarded now as a 'fully impowered, equal member of the world powers'.¹⁰⁸

Kovalevsky, a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary government of Holubovych, was more cautious in his estimate of the Treaty. He agreed with Vynnychenko on the general importance of the Treaty, and wrote that the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty had created, so to say, an 'international basis of the Ukrainian state'. After the 'independence of the Ukrainian state had been recognized *de facto* by England, France and Italy', it was now 'being recognized *de jure* by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.' This was the historical significance of the earlier negotiations with the Entente and the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. However, Kovalevsky underlines the fact that Galicia, Bukovyna and Bessarabia remained outside the Ukrainian borders. According to Kovalevsky, the Central Powers had also taken up the obligation to support Ukrainian interests over Bessarabia¹⁰⁸ which was due to be discussed with Rumania. Bessarabia was finally awarded by the Central Powers to Rumania.¹¹⁰ It signed a preliminary peace with the Central Powers on March 5, at Buftea.

The German thought on the territorial matters of the treaty was exemplified in the memorandum drawn up by Wedel, the German Ambassador to Austria-Hungary for the German Office, on February 11, 1918. Wedel held that the concessions which Count Czernin had made to the Ukraine would have 'unforeseeable consequences for Austria-Hungary'. A threatening precedent (*ein bedenkliches Praecedenz*) had thus been created. The Poles, already greatly upset by the loss of the Kholm region, would be 'as if struck by thunder' when they learned that Eastern Galicia would be lost to them. This would mean a totally new consideration in Austro-Hungarian politics. The government had 'formed a pact with the Poles'. The Poles had been allowed to govern in Galicia 'as they liked' while the 'Ruthenians, constituting almost a half of the population, had been delivered to them.' The economic desires of the Poles had been taken into consideration and the 'sons of the Polish nation obtained desirable offices at the Court and in the Government'. The Poles, in return, were

to support the internal and external policies of the government. That pact had been honoured by both sides, but a 'critical moment, a nervous longing for peace, sufficed to break the pact'. The conclusion was thus drawn that the 'Polish era would find its end', which would strengthen the ties between Germany and Austria-Hungary.¹¹¹

Czernin's evaluation of the territorial terms generally overlapped that of the Germans, though in a somewhat softened and defensive fashion. Thus he wrote that he had 'never promised the Kholm region to the Poles.'¹¹² Polish leaders knew very well that the fixing of the borders depended to a lesser extent upon the decisions of Vienna¹¹³ than those of Berlin. Also, Ukrainians had refused to compromise very much in their demands over the Kholm border. They finally gave up 'their territorial demands on the Monarchy', but maintained them with the 'guarantee of autonomous development for their co-nationals in Galicia.'¹¹⁴ Czernin also stated in his memoirs that he gave in to the 'wishes of the Ukrainians and transmitted the Ukrainian desire for partition of Galicia to the Austrian ministry' under the 'pressure of worry over the food supply'.¹¹⁵ Hungary, through Prime-Minister Tisza, fully agreed with Czernin's policy, according to the latter.¹¹⁶

The territorial settlement of the peace between Ukraine and the Central Powers was connected with the economic settlement. This, too, was contained in both the public and private agreements of Brest-Litovsk.

The great difficulty for the Austro-Hungarian Delegation was to make the 'political concessions' to the Ukrainians formally dependent upon the delivery of grain.¹¹⁷ The first method was suggestion to Ukrainians that the obligation of grain delivery be included in the text of the treaty of peace itself. It was rejected by the Ukrainian Government and hence by the Ukrainian Delegation as was seen above.¹¹⁸ In this manner, then, was the grain delivery problem eliminated as an element in the economic settlement demanding a separate treatment, but was rather incorporated in the entire economic picture.

Clause V of the Treaty of Peace had stated that the contracting parties gave up any reparations of war costs between the Ukraine and the Central Powers.¹¹⁹ In this way was the Ukrainian Republic freed of the possible threat of indefinite subsequent payments. General economic relations were to be resumed. The Central Powers had paid particular attention to the economic agreements. It was the German desire to renew the former Commercial Treaty between Germany and Russia from 1904 to the end of 1930, that is, for twelve years after the conclusion of the Treaty.¹²⁰ The Commercial Treaty had been abrogated by Russia in 1907, in line with the general change of Russian diplomacy from friendship with the Central Monarchies to friendship with the Entente. Germany also wanted various changes made in the Commercial Treaty in her favour. With the support of Austria-Hungary, whose representatives held the German propositions to be 'unrealizable, wearisome and impractical',¹²¹ the Ukrainian Delegation had rejected the German demand, by simply stating that they did 'not want to renew the old Tsarist Commercial Treaty'. Thus, while the Ukrainian Delegation had succeeded in playing off Germany against Austria-Hungary over the disputed territories, they had also succeeded to a certain extent in playing off Austria-Hungary against Germany in economic matters. However, Ukrainian maximum demands were not incorporated in the Treaty either; a certain compromise was reached. The agreements were made provisional and valid only in the event of a new Commercial Treaty within six months after the conclusion of peace with the Western powers.¹²² A most-favoured nation relationship was established, with certain guarantees for the Central Powers, connected with the proposed custom-union between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Most of the important clauses of the old Commercial Treaty between Germany and Russia were placed in the new agreement, with certain negligible changes.¹²³ There was a reference to the comparable treaty between Russia and Austria-Hungary of 1907. Still, the original German demands were not included. On the whole, the Ukrainian Republic had succeeded in im-

proving her position of the 1904 Commercial Treaty, primarily through the promise of the Central Powers that the Treaty required a thorough re-examination, and because of the latter's provisional status.

Following on general commercial matters was the favourable solution of the financial problem. The value of the Ukrainian unit, the *karbovanets* (generally corresponding to a rouble), was fixed quite high, at 100 German Marks (in gold) for 46 Ukrainian roubles (also in gold).¹²¹ Vynnychenko referred to this as a particularly favourable feature of the treaty.¹²²

One very important change in the old commercial treaty was the legalization of transfer in bond of products of the Central Powers to the East, in particular to Persia.¹²³ This was allowed in the Ukrainian Treaty of Peace, and meant the opening of Persia and the East to German economic penetration, and the consequent hostility of the Entente powers, especially Great Britain to the Ukraine. It robbed the Ukraine of the possibility of supplying these countries with her own products. On the other hand, it might mean a considerable gain to the Ukrainian Republic as it put her at the centre of the West-East trade, with consequent increase in railroad traffic as well as a possibility for the future recovery of strength.

Immediate commercial relations were established until July 31, when the new Commercial Treaty was expected, by Clause VII, Point I, by which the signatories had pledged themselves to the mutual exchange of 'surplus of the most important agricultural and manufacturing products for the satisfaction of current needs.' The exchange was to occur through governmental channels. A commission formed of an equal number of members from both sides, was to establish the 'quantity and the kind' of articles which were to be exchanged. It was also to fix the prices, while the exchange was set up at the rate mentioned above.

Actual definition of minimum quantities had been formulated in the secret agreements, which were demanded by

Austria-Hungary in particular, was the signatory and main beneficiary, on behalf of the Central Powers, in view of her territorial and quasi-territorial sacrifices.

A special Protocol was drawn up and signed at Brest-Litovsk, by Lyubynsky on behalf of the Ukraine, and by Wiesner on behalf of the Central Powers. It stated that in the meeting of the Austro-Hungarian-Ukrainian Commission for the Drafting of the Collective Peace Treaty between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one side, and of the Ukrainian National Republic on the other, the Chairman of the Commission, Wiesner had made a declaration, as follows:

In the agreement on determination of Clause VII. Point I, (referring to the exchange of goods), the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance have decided on the basis of facts supplied by the Ukrainian Delegation that the present surplus of grain amounts to at least a million tons, that the Commission to be appointed shall establish the presence of this quantity, and assure its early appearance and transport within the shortest possible time.

The Ukrainian Delegation, the Protocol continues, had taken cognizance of the declaration with the following remark:

On the question of the quantity of the grain which the Ukrainian National Republic is able to deliver, we believe we can declare that the quantity is present; its appearance and transport depend upon whether Ukrainian grain producers receive the equivalent in articles which they need, and if the powers of the Quadruple Powers co-operate on transport, as well as on the improvement of transport organization in the Ukraine.

This then was the contract signed by both parties. Wiesner then continued with the declaration that this part had not been agreed to by the Ukrainian Delegation, nor signed by it. The Protocol stated further that Wiesner had added to the declaration confirmed in the Protocol, still further that the Central Powers would make the ratification of the Peace Treaty dependent upon the execution of the conditions laid

down in the Protocol. The Ukrainian Delegation 'had taken notice of the declaration', but had asked 'insistently' that they not to be expected to co-operate on this part of the declaration of Wiesner, as on 'parliamentary grounds', it was not possible for them to do so. He concluded by restating that they were completely clear on the intentions of the Powers.¹²⁷

Taking an over-all view of the consequences of the Ukrainian Treaty of Peace and of the associated agreements for the Ukrainian Republic, necessarily in connection with her statehood, we see first her emergence upon the world scene. The U.N.R. was now recognized by France, the United Kingdom, Rumania, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Germany and the Soviet of People's Commissars.

The importance of this treaty can hardly be over-estimated in the development of the question of Ukrainian statehood, as can be demonstrated on at least two accounts. First, the Ukrainian Republic was recognized by very well established states. Then, serious consideration of the mechanics of changes in the constitutional basis of the Austrian state, by means of the Treaty of Peace, encouraged Ukrainians within the U. N. R. to consider the treaty as a potential realization of their true unity of interest with the Ukrainians within Austria-Hungary. Eastern Ukrainians were also demonstrating to Western Ukrainians that their interest was real and their support indeed effective. Also, in pressing for a Ukrainian self-governing province contiguous to itself, the Republic was obviously looking forward to the day when the western border of the combined Ukrainian state should cut through Austria and Hungary to follow the River Sian and the western border of the Kholm province.

The Treaty placed the definite limitation upon Polish pretensions to the territory of the Ukraine, and the pre-emption of certain claims by the Ukrainian Republic. What the treaty meant becomes clear when we remember that, only a short time before, leading Polish statesmen had hoped and talked in terms of a Dnieper border, and that the Treaty had

stated that the line was to be determined on an ethnographic basis and that the wishes of the population would be taken into account.

The economic clauses were the most questionable. Czernin appears to have been quite satisfied by these arrangements. In his telegram of February 10, 1918, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he wrote that the peace with the Ukraine gave justifiable hope that Austria-Hungary would be able, with time, to obtain considerable quantities of grain, and counselled caution in the distribution of current supplies, asking for the greatest possible savings.¹²⁸ He concluded in his memoirs that the peace was made under the pressure of imminent famine, and that without it, Austria-Hungary would 'not have been able to carry on until the new harvest'.¹²⁹ On the Ukrainian side, Vynnychenko surprisingly did not condemn the government on their economic management. 'Even the commercial relations had been drawn up rather advantageously for the Ukraine,' he wrote.¹³⁰ There can be no doubt that the economic terms, when fully known, were considered in the Ukraine as far from generous on the whole. Kovalevsky, the minister of supply, who was particularly interested in the matter through his office, wrote in his memoirs that the 'fulfilment of the conditions had understandably called forth a great deal of dissatisfaction among the masses of the people'.¹³¹ On the whole, the economic agreements do not appear to have been unreasonable, especially if viewed in connection with the territorial arrangements and the agreements on the Western Ukraine. All these were to bear fruit in the union of all Ukrainian lands a year later. Although Holubovych had hinted in conversations with the Delegation that military aid be requested after the signing of the Treaty, no intimation to that effect appears to have been given either before the signing of the Treaty or immediately after.

The secret agreement to exchange one million tons of grain for industrial products of the Central Powers should be examined in greater detail. This was not connected with the Treaty as a whole but specifically with the secret quasi-

territorial agreement, whereby a Ukrainian province would be created within Austria, with extensive rights of self-government, and the Kholm province would be awarded to the Ukraine. This was clearly shown by the minutes of the Berlin conference of February 6, where it is stated that the peace with Ukraine had to be signed as soon as possible for the 'transference of the Kholm region to Ukraine and the creation of the Ukrainian province of Eastern Galicia'. The reason for the hush was the 'present lack of food products in Austria-Hungary and Germany'.¹³²

The immense importance to the Ukrainian Republic of the territorial agreements has been discussed in some detail above. It only remains to examine the meaning of 'one million tons of grain' for the Ukrainian economy, to see whether the bargain was advantageous, and whether the agreement could be at all carried out. The question of advantage should be treated with circumspection as it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to measure the value of the full liberation of Ukrainians contributed to by the Treaty. The final union of the Ukrainian nation in the Ukrainian Republic by the Universal of Union of January 22, 1919, was greatly facilitated by the agreements of Brest-Litovsk. An examination of the feasibility of the fulfilment of the Ukrainian side of the bargain would be more illuminating.

According to the most recent study of the revolution by a group of Bolshevik historians the Ukraine had, in early 1918, a 'surplus of grain reaching 510 million poods', that is 8.16 million tons.¹³³ In view of the absence of other evidence, the statement must be taken with some reserve. If the surplus was indeed anywhere close to the figure, an equitable exchange of grain for manufactured products could hardly create great difficulties; in fact, it would be welcomed by the peasant. It should be noted, that the Russian government had considered it possible to collect and export from the Ukraine to Moscow and Petrograd the amount of 50 million poods, or close to the same figure of one million tons (actually 0.8 million) in the

spring of 1919, in conditions of extreme deprivation in the Ukraine.¹³¹

Most importantly, however, the Ukrainian government was presented with the picture that the Russian authorities were pursuing the policy of forced requisition of foodstuffs in the Ukraine, without any serious exchange or limitation in quantity, or even, it appears, without accounting to the regime in the Ukraine.

The demands of Germany in the economic and commercial clauses do not seem to have been too excessive; the provisional commercial treaty with the Ukraine, restoring the relation between the Ukraine and Germany which existed between Russia and Germany before the abrogation of the commercial treaty in 1907, although not overly favourable, was not confiscatory. The hostility of the Entente states to the possible expansion of German influence into Asia through the treaty was a serious disadvantage to the Ukraine.

In addition to the diplomatic, territorial and economic clauses, the Treaty contained many of the others usually contained in peace treaties, including that on prisoners-of-war (who were to be repatriated), on the mutual state debts (which were to be settled by a later agreement), and other less important ones. Also, although the Treaty had provided that evacuation of Ukrainian territory was to occur forthwith, the evacuation would be controlled by a mixed commission and was to take place, by silent agreement, at a later date and gradually. Czernin hence concluded in his report to Vienna that evacuation would be put off 'for any period we wish'.¹³² All three categories of the agreements, interconnected and intertwined, were of paramount importance in the consolidation of the international status of the Ukrainian National Republic.

Once the treaty was signed and the prestige of the four great states was involved, the states considered that their honour required then to help their associate in the peace treaty. The Ukraine was the only state (besides Finland) to have made peace with the Central Powers. Tabouis' protest,

probably sent to him completed by France, accused the U.N.R., as was seen earlier, of offering moral aid to the enemy.

This was still another reason why Germany and the other powers wished to hold to the treaty; the reputation of Germany for ruthless warfare and lack of moral principle was notorious. Its new-found role as a herald of peace and self-determination seriously strengthened its otherwise weak moral position.

Hrushevsky, the President of the Rada, and a commanding figure in the Ukrainian government, especially in the conditions of changing governing parties, held the achievement of peace to be essential for the Republic. We find his evaluation in an article written shortly after the conclusion of peace: "Peace To Our Land." Although the article was written for publication, and thus shows unmistakable tendentiousness, there is no reason to doubt that it represented Hrushevsky's line of thought. The Ukrainian toiling people was said to have been against the war from the start; she had been forced into the war by the Tsarist regime. The war, 'this cursed thing conceived by bourgeoisie world', was well on the way to being ended for the Ukrainian Republic, and the Bolsheviks on the one hand, and the Allies on the other, had been trying by all possible means to prevent the Ukraine from making peace.

Yet the government of the Ukrainian National Republic could not under any threat retreat from the goal so dear to our people. It had promised to give it peace—and did give it, despite all difficulties. A peace of dignity and of honor, a democratic peace which returns its lands to it, assures its international status, its monetary system, and leaves it complete freedom in politics and economic matters.¹³⁰

It is, of course, obvious that the peace negotiated by the Republic was not at all as attractive as it was presented by Hrushevsky. For one thing, Hrushevsky failed to refer to the undertaking of the government to barter one million tons of grain, and to the obvious danger an agrarian Republic like the Ukraine was running by establishing friendly relations with the German Empire, where the junker and specifically

the Prussian and autocratic currents were in the process of gaining the upper hand.

In the general chaos, dissolution and defeat of the World War, the terror of the Russo-Ukrainian war, with the favourable territorial, diplomatic and non-punitive economic conditions, the peace was on the whole acceptable to the Ukraine.

Finally, in evaluating the Treaty, we must guard against a peculiar anachronism. In modern times, puppet regimes in Europe had not been established often before their wide use by the Soviet of People's Commissars. It is to misunderstand the slightly nineteenth-century spirit of the participants in the Conference, to ascribe to them the desire to create and maintain *permanently* a puppet regime in Europe.

The feeling of joy and relief over the Treaty appears to have been genuine in the case of the Austro-Hungarian monarch, Charles, who had inherited the throne just over a year earlier. He wired Czernin from his train on February 9, that he was 'deeply moved, and rejoiced to learn of the conclusion of peace with the Ukraine'.¹²⁷ The Emperor went on to thank Czernin and stated that Czernin had given him thereby the 'happiest day of my hitherto far from happy reign'. Three days later, Charles issued a joyful manifesto to the peoples of Austria-Hungary announcing the peace.¹²⁸ The German attitude to the treaty was much more reserved. Even to consider that Czernin could write in his diary thankfully for a peace with a puppet as mentioned above is to misread completely the temper of the time. This is ignored by many writers. Titus Komarnicki, a Polish historian, is typical. In his monumental study of diplomacy leading to the establishment of the Polish Republic, he finds it possible to ignore the development of the neighbouring republic of the Ukraine, and dismisses the Ukrainian government's role in the peace settlement with the words, 'It is common knowledge that . . . the Germans based their policy (in the Ukraine) on some puppets, without any real backing from the people.'¹²⁹ It is a fact, however, that the negotiation of peace involved serious *quid pro quo* for all parties -- the Ukraine, Austria-Hungary, Germany and the rest.

NOTES

1. Fokke, *op. cit.*, p. 191.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
3. Lenin, V. I., *Polnoe sobranie sochineniy*, 5th ed., Vol. 35, Moscow, 1962, p. 321.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
5. Geheimrat Schueller transmitted Lenin's telegram announcing the fall of Kiev on February 5, 1918, to Berlin with the notation, 'Lenin fuehrt fort in Funkspruechen die Herrschaft der Maximalisten (in der Ukraine) zu verkuenden, *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 5601.
6. *Ibid.*, Document No. A 5117.
7. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 5069.
8. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 316.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
10. Rubach, M. A., "K istorii ukrainskoy revolyutsii. (Zametki i dokumenty; dekabr' 1917 - yanvar' 1918 g.)," *Letopis Revolyutii*, No. 6, 1926, pp. 7-56, p. 32.
11. Rubach, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-5.
12. Rubach, *op. cit.*, p. 34. It should also be mentioned that a significant part of the conversation is found quoted in French in Borschak, E., "La paix ukrainienne de Brest-Litovsk", *Monde Slave*, No. 8, Vol. III, pp. 210-1.
13. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
14. Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 322.
15. *Russland*, 1918, Doc. No. A 5252.
16. Rubach, *op. cit.*, p. 34. It must be pointed out that the subject of aid from the Central Powers appears in the conversation under code symbols 'N', see *Ibid.*, p. 34, and "external force 'P' and external force 'R'", see *Ibid.*, p. 31. The dates of conversations have been established by internal evidence.
17. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 16-7.
18. Czernin, O., *Im Weltkriege*, p. 334.
19. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 434-5.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 435.
21. Ludendorff, E. (ed.), *Documents du G.Q.G. allemand sur le rôle qu'il a joué de 1916 à 1918*, 2 Vols., Paris, 1922, Vol. II, p. 267.
22. Radziwill, S. A., *Les Ukrainiens pendant la guerre*, Paris, 1937, p. 174.

23. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 435.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 436.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 435.
26. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 334.
27. Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 212.
28. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 149-50.
29. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 280-1.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
32. Mishchenko, S., "Yanvar'skoe vostanie v Kieve", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 3, 1924, pp. 23 ff.
33. Patlakh, "Kiev v yanvare 1918 g. (Vospominaniya)", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 6, 1923, p. 23.
34. Tron'ko, *op. cit.*, p. 530; p. 531. Also, Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 285.
35. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
36. Benes, *op. cit.*, p. 267.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
38. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
40. The memoirs of Sers, referred to in Chapter Five, gives a great deal of detail on the French base at Lubny.
41. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 293.
42. Lapchinskiy, G., "Borot'ba za Kyiv — Sichen' 1928 r.", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 2, 1923, pp. 209-19, p. 216; p. 219.
43. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 293.
44. Kennan, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 185-6.
45. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 292.
46. Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 27.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-3.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
52. "Do borot'by za Kyiv. Zvernennyya Narodnoho Sekretariatu", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 1, 1928, p. 293.
53. Antonov-Ovseyenko, V., *Zapiski o grazhdanskoy voyne*, 4 Vols., Moscow, 1924-33, Vol. I, p. 254.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-4. The text in English translation may be consulted as follows, Muravyov, M., "Order No. 9 to the Revolutionary Armies of the Eastern Front," *The New Review*, No. 1, 1964, p. 45.
55. Korolivskiy, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 16-17.
56. Lapchinskiy, G., "Borot'ba za Kyiv — Sichen' 1918 r.", *Litopys Revolyutsii*, No. 2, 1928, pp. 209-218, p. 215.

57. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 251.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
59. Lapchinskiy, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
60. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
61. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 204.
62. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
63. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 204.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
65. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
67. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
71. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, p. 204.
72. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 216.
73. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
74. Gratz, G. and Schueller, R., *Die aeussere Wirtschaftspolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns. Mitteleuropaische Plaene*, Vienna, 1926, p. 144.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-6.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
80. Fokke, *op. cit.*, p. 190.
81. Czernin, O., *In the World War*, London, 1919, p. 248.
82. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
83. Czernin, O., *Im Weltkriege*, p. 336.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 312.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 336-7.
86. Peace Conference, Brest-Litovsk, *Mirnye peregovory v Brest-Litovske*, s 22 dekabrya 1917 g. po 3 marta 1918 g., Vol. I, Moscow, 1920, p. 171 ff.
87. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-8.
89. Czernin, *In the World War*, p. 249.
90. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 316; Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
91. *Ukraine*, 1918, Doc. No. A. 5993.
92. *Unternehmungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 5879.
93. *Ukraine*, 1918, Doc. No. A 5791.
94. *Ibid.*, Doc. No. A 5913.
95. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 316.
96. *Ukraine*, 1918, follows Doc. No. A 6597.
97. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

98. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin, "Akten Krieg 1914. Friedensverhandlungen mit der Ukraine", 1918, Doc. No. A 5891. This file is cited below as *Friedensverhandlungen*.
99. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
100. Fokke, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
101. This matter is discussed in great detail in Chapter Nine.
102. Fokke, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
103. Zelinsky, V., *Synyozhupannyky*, Berlin, 1938, p. 31, see also, *Ukraine*, 1918, Doc. No. A 7811.
104. *Friedensverhandlungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 6053, dated February 9, 1918.
105. Doroshenko, D., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 215-6. An imperfect text of the agreement is found in Ukrainian Republic, *Texts of the Ukraine "Peace"*, published by the Department of State of the United States of America, Washington, 1918, p. 141. The latter text was translated from the imperfect German text appearing in *Neue Freie Presse*, July 7, 1918, p. 7.
106. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
107. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 289.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
109. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 467.
110. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-7.
111. Auswaertiges Amt. Abteilung A. Berlin, "Akten betreffend: Beziehungen Oesterreichs zu Deutschland", 1918, Doc. No. A 6566.
112. Czernin, *Im Weltkrieg*, p. 284.
113. *Ibid.*, pp. 284-5.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 410.
115. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-5.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
117. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
119. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 424.
120. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
122. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 425.
123. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
124. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 425.
125. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 289.
126. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
127. *Friedensverhandlungen*, 1918, Doc. No. A 12900.
128. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-1.
129. Czernin, *In the World War*, p. 251.

130. Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 289.
131. Kovalevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 468.
132. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 435-6.
133. Sobolev, P. N. et al. (eds.), *Istoriya Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii*, Moscow, 1962, p. 436. The authors do not supply any evidence for the statement.
134. Shlikhter, A., "Bor'ba za khleb na Ukraine v 1919 godu", *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, No. 9, 1928, pp. 96-135, p. 103n.
135. Gratz and Schueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-1.
136. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-8.
137. Czernin, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
138. Baer, C. H. (ed.), *Der Voelkerkrieg, Eine Chronik der Ereignisse seit dem 1. Juli 1914*, 28 Vols., Stuttgart, 1916-1923, Vol. XXVI, p. 92.
139. Komarnicki, Titus, *Rebirth of the Polish Republic. A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe. 1914-1920*, p. 195.

CHAPTER NINE

FINAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

While final agreements were being reached at Brest-Litovsk, the Kiev Duma and the People's Secretariat, represented by 'Secretary of Posts and Telegraphs' Martyanov, and Muravyov, were having negotiations. On February 7, according to Martyanov, a delegation arrived from the City Duma and in 'the name of the strengthening of the power of the Soviets asked that the bombardment of the city be stopped'. The reply was that the bombardment might be stopped only if:

Today, February 8, at 3 o'clock, all persons in armed struggle in the street against the revolutionary armies would put down their arms and bring them to a place in front of the passenger railroad station in Kiev. At the same hour to give over those guilty of the counter-revolutionary ferment in the city: the members of the so-called General Secretariat, the ministry, the General Staff and the War Commandant.

Realizing the impossibility of satisfying such demands under the circumstances, Martyanov, the People's Secretary added in his report, 'Of course, the fighting will go on to the end.' He also stated that 'we, together with Muravyov, had worked out these conditions.'

Kotsyubynsky announced on February 8 that certain outlying districts of Kiev were being occupied, that the 'city was badly damaged' from the heavy artillery bombardment and, somewhat prematurely, that 'the wolves from the Rada were running in all directions.'² The Ukrainian government had held on, however. According to Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian

government had made every effort to hold out in Kiev as long as possible in order not to spoil its international position and the task of peace, or 'at least to the moment when the matter of peace was finally decided.'³

The battle and bombardment of the capital continued. The evacuation of the Ukrainian government from Kiev had been decided on in the meeting of February 8, 1918. It had been suggested that further resistance was impossible. The only thing left to do was 'to save one's own life.' Hrushevsky protested violently: "And the Ukrainian Republic? Is it to be left to die? No—if we cannot defend Kiev any longer, we will evacuate it, we will fall back, but we shall not capitulate!" Hrushevsky's plan was accepted.⁴ The evacuation was decided upon hurriedly and many of those affected were not informed. As late as 10-11 p.m. of February 8, 1918, the headquarters of the Free Cossacks had not been informed of the decision.⁵ Khrystiuk implies in his writings that the representatives of the minorities purposely failed to follow the Government and thus ended their cooperation with the Ukrainian institutions.⁶ Tcherikover states that the 'Jewish representatives did not consider it necessary to go with the Rada to Zhytomir.'⁷ Gol-delman appears to refute this interpretation by stating that he, as a member of the Small Rada, had not been informed of the evacuation, and concludes that 'Ukrainian circles did not consider it necessary for (Jewish representatives)... to take any responsibility for the fate of the state in such a difficult moment of its existence.'⁸

The defence of Kiev continued at various points into the early hours of February 9, by the Free Cossacks fighting in the Zvirynets district, and by the artillery.⁹ Whether conscious of its importance or not, they held up the Russian troops until the early morning, when they finally entered Kiev at 10 a.m. of February 9, 1918.

Muravyov assumed the attitude of a conqueror in his official report on the capture of Kiev to Antonov of February 9. Finally, after fighting five days in the streets of Kiev, I made myself master (*ovladel*) of the city.¹⁰ He also reported

on the interim arrangement reached. The substance of this was sent by wireless from Stalin, about 10 p.m. of February 9, where the actual capture of the city was announced. On the same day, Stalin had stated in the telegram to Trotsky that until February 8, 1918, all of Kiev, with the exception of the Pecherskiy district, was in the hand of the Soviets. The rest of the units of the Kiev Rada defended themselves in the Pecherskiy District. He went on to say that on the previous day, on February 8, at 10 o'clock at night, he received from Commander-in-Chief Muravyov the official notice of the occupation of the Pecherskiy district and the flight of the remainder of the Rada, of the occupation of all government institutions and the liberation of Chudnovskiy, Yegorev, Boyarskiy and others. Muravyov had petitioned, on request of the soldiers, to name Yegorev the Commander of the South-Western Front. The Council of People's Commissars granted the petition of Muravyov. All this was said to have taken place 'yesterday on February 8 at 10 o'clock.' Thus, according to Stalin 'nothing remained of the Rada except a sad memory', while the conclusion was drawn that the Kiev Rada in Brest-Litovsk 'represents an empty space'.¹¹

Stalin's claim on the date of occupation, no doubt inspired by political motivation of destroying the validity of the treaty of peace, appears to be a fabrication.

Actually, when the Russian troops entered the city in the morning of February 9, they found that the city had been vacated by the Government and, for the most part, by the Ukrainian troops. Lapchinskiy discusses the matter in his memoirs.

It was only on the morning of February 9, that we entered the city and took it completely. Already, there was no resistance—all enemy units had left it the previous night. It is characteristic that Muravyov, as was found out later, had telegraphed . . . still on February 5 . . . that Kiev had been occupied . . . as is seen from the above, this was complete fabrication (*fantastika*).

Lapchinskiy also wrote that the main force learned only on the morning of February 9, that Kiev had been evacuated. The Duma delegation had told of the evacuation of the city, but according to Lapchinskiy, 'the besieging forces did not have complete confidence in (the report) and did not stop the bombardment'.¹²

Order No. 9 was followed by an appeal by Muravyov, issued after the capture of the city. This appeal proclaims that 'the thunder of the cannon has died today'. Addressed to the 'true revolutionaries, the proletarians of Kiev, so cruelly treated by the mercenaries in the pay of capitalists and the bourgeois Rada' it states that 'for two months we have been advancing in the country by fire and sword and we now establish the power of the Soviets.' Muravyov called upon the 'proletarians' to organize, to arm themselves 'to the teeth'. 'Take arms.' 'I do not admit of a single neutral soldier while your brothers are shot and their blood is flowing in currents... I demand that those hesitating tell me which side they take.' Muravyov further grants that 'excesses and mistakes are possible'. 'The innocents shall perhaps suffer.' 'We still remember thousands of our brothers recently shot by the armies of the Rada.' He asked rhetorically, 'Would I have the right to hold back the sailors in their hatred and thirst (*élan*) for vengeance? No! Comrades, organize quickly, and let us lead the world struggle against the worst enemy of the Revolution: the Bourgeoisie.'¹³

Establishment of the new regime was announced in Order No. 14, signed by Muravyov as the 'Commander of the Eastern Front in the Ukraine':

The fighting in the streets has finished; a new power has been established in the Ukraine: the People's Secretariat, and in Kiev, the Soviet of Deputies of workers and soldiers and the Revolutionary Committee.

Here is the power which we have brought from the far North at the point of our bayonets and where we institute it, we support it by the entire force of these bayonets and the entire material force of the revolutionary and socialist army.

And now, after having liberated the Capital of the Ukraine from the mercenaries of the bourgeois Rada, and after having established the power of the Soviets, we must employ all means to support its authority in entrusting the new power with the methodical struggle against the enemies of the proletariat and the workers of the countryside, and giving it full confidence in the power with which we fight everywhere.

The same order appointed a certain Chudnovskiy as the civil commandant, that is head of the Revolutionary Committee, possessing the actual power based upon the army of the occupation. The statement acknowledged that the 'power' was of foreign (that is Russian) origin coming from the far north, and that the power was based on armed force. Furthermore the totally dependent nature of the People's Secretariat is made plain. At this point, the direction of its activity was defined by the occupying armies. The task was described as 'leading a methodical struggle against the enemies of the proletariat and the workers of the countryside'.¹⁴ At no point, of course, was there any statement of acceptance of the authority of the People's Secretariat.

The order prohibited authorized searches, arrests and lynchings, as of February 10: as the order was actually posted on February 11, an unauthorized terror had lasted through three days.¹⁵ The right of search and of arrest was given to the Military-Revolutionary Committee, in the person of Commissar Chudnovskiy. Chudnovskiy had no direct relation to the People's Secretariat. Chudnovskiy's orders were to be executed through the Commander of the II Army, Remnev, and through the Commandant of the City, Gunko. Gunko had nothing to do with the People's Secretariat, either. The maintenance of law and order in the city was taken over by the Red Guard.¹⁶

The actual power in the city was thus given to Chudnovskiy by the occupying army. The power in the Ukraine was stated to be extended to the People's Secretariat. However, it was not given power over Kiev as such; this was the prerogative of the Soviet. The Secretariat was to be completely ex-

cluded from the government of the actual territory occupied. The same occurred in all other cities occupied in the Ukraine, such as Poltava and so on.

Order No. 14, of Muravyov, is found in whole or in part in at least three distinct Ukrainian sources, Khrystiuk, Doroshenko, Vynnychenko, in three Jewish national sources, Goldelman, Tcherikover, and Goldenveyzer,¹⁷ one French source, Tabouis, and one Bolshevik source, Ravich-Cherkasskiy.¹⁸

The number of victims in the capture of Kiev was quite large. Jenkins reported that the bombardment and the early hours of the capture effected some 6,000 casualties, of whom 2,000 to 3,000 were dead, as had been mentioned, while stating that the figures may be too low.¹⁹ The number of murdered officers on the streets of Kiev was 2,576, as appears from an official Austrian report from Kiev, dated April 2, 1918, which was probably based upon local accounting. The number of victims belonging to the 'national Ukrainian element', in the phrase of the day, is not known.²⁰ According to Doroshenko some 3,000 persons in all were killed in the first day of the occupation of the city.²¹ Thus the number of victims among civilians and prisoners was over ten thousand.

The terror appears to have been directed primarily against national Ukrainian elements, and against officers of the Russian army. Both these categories had been mentioned in Order No. 9 mentioned above. The terror also took the lives of Ukrainians sympathetic to the Soviet regime. Thus, Lapchinskiy, a People's Secretary, mentioned in his memoirs the 'destruction of comrades L. Bochkovsky, Zarudny and Puhachiv — Socialist-Revolutionary-Ukrainians who fought all the time for the power of the Soviets and against the Central Rada. Generally, he stated, there had been persecution of the 'supporters of the Central Rada', where matters were 'much worse' than with former army officers, in which case 'to destroy as many as possible of them, was very much in the interests of the revolution'. In the case of the Rada supporters, 'our soldiers', reports Lapchinskiy, 'were not always able to distinguish well' and thus Ukrainians in general would suffer,

'simply Ukrainian elements, even those favourable to Soviet power.'²²

A characteristic case occurred with two People's Secretaries, Zatonsky and Skrypnyk, who had been in beleaguered Kiev. After the capture of the city, these two members of the Soviet government were halted on the street by a patrol, who checked their papers. People's Secretary Zatonsky showed his mandate issued by the Kharkiv Soviet government, stating that it was from the 'All-Ukrainian Central Rada of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies in Kharkiv'. The order was given to shoot the two People's Secretaries as supporters of the 'Rada'. As Zatonsky reported it, his life was saved through a chance mandate in his pocket with the signature of Lenin, while Skrypnyk's life was spared because he had been recognized by someone.²³

The terrorism of the conquest of the Ukraine, in the name of the Soviet 'Ukrainian National Republic', appears to have been one of the most important reasons for the success of the Bolshevik detachments.

Muravyov stated, with apparent exaggeration, to the newspaper *Izvestiya* after his return to Russia in 1918, that the 'revolutionary Russian army had gone through the Ukraine' wiping out everything with any characteristic of bourgeois-chauvinist separatism in its path. The mere 'approach of Red troops' forced povits, and even entire gubernias, to 'recognize our power'.²⁴

Muravyov's report to Lenin, sent by direct wire two or three days after the occupation, is of interest. Muravyov wrote that he 'transmitted all power established by bayonets, to the Soviet of the Ukraine'. He informed Lenin that he 'took 10 million from the Kiev bourgeoisie' and that he 'gave recompense to the troops from part of the contribution', while stating at the same time that all contributions would be used for the organization of work for the unemployed and to aid families of casualties from the local people as well 'as from my armies'.²⁵ The city was indeed required to give 10 million, while individual merchants, Marshak, Halpern and Radziwill

had to give 180,000, 300,000 and 100,000 roubles respectively.²⁶ On February 17, Lenin, in a telegram to Muravyov gave him another assignment published by the former. Lenin commended Muravyov and his troops for the capture of Kiev.

We do not doubt for a minute that the glorious (doblesnye) heroes of the liberation of Kiev shall fulfill their revolutionary duty. The Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars, Lenin.²⁷

This order commending Muravyov and describing him and his troops as 'the glorious heroes of the liberation of Kiev', was probably in part responsible for what emerges from contemporary literature as general hatred, in this period in the Ukraine, for Lenin individually. It is of interest, in this connection, that Lenin never visited the Ukraine, nor issued any appeals to Ukrainians in the period examined, except the Manifesto with the ultimatum. All other signed appeals from the Russian government were signed either by Stalin, Trotsky, Antonov, or by Krylenko.

The day of the fall of Kiev was also the day of the opening of the Fourth Congress of Soviets of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast, in Kharkiv. As was discussed before, Bolshevik party members in the region agreed only with difficulty to cooperate in the formation of a Ukrainian Soviet government: two contradictory sanctions of the Central Committee of the Party existed at the time, with the later sanction on the organization of one government in the Ukraine prevailing. One of the arguments for the creation of one Soviet government was the existence of the Ukrainian Central Rada, and the necessity to struggle against it. With the fall of Kiev, the Bolsheviks considered the Rada eliminated as an enemy. This was also the view of Antonov, who, as a member of the Soviet of People's Commissars, was one of the most influential members of the Russian government in Ukraine.²⁸

The Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Oblast Committee supported the establishment of a separate republic upon the territory of Kharkiv and Katerynoslav gubernias, together with the iron-ore district of Kryvyi Rih, and the coal-bearing Donets.

Kryvyi-Rih Basin, extending in parts into the territory of the Don Army to include the entire industrial part of Ukraine. This Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic was to be independent from the Ukraine. The sanction for the projected creation of this Republic was obtained from the Central Committee of R.S.D.W.P. (Bolsheviks). Skrypnyk, a leading member of the Kharkiv Bolshevik Committee, stated that the Central Committee gave the sanction when the 'counter-revolutionary character of the Rada had become clear towards the fall of 1917'. According to Skrypnyk, the intended aim in the creation of such a 'Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic' was to create in 'this major centre of metallurgy and coal extraction, a mighty centre of the proletarian dictatorship'. In this way, the agricultural districts of the rest of the Ukraine were being left out to provide for the success of a 'proletarian revolution' in the industrial section. This centre would also serve as a 'mighty fist against the Central Rada.'²⁹ This was, in part, an expression of the Bolsheviks' fear that they might not be able to keep the entire Ukraine, which prompted them to secure at least the more proletarian part.

The policy of the Oblast Committee and the sanction of the Central Committee was also referred to by Magidov, a leading member of the Kharkiv Oblast Committee. While generally corroborating the statement of Skrypnyk that a Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic should be created, Magidov discussed different aims for the creation of the Republic. According to Magidov, chairman Artem of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Party Committee (created in spring 1917), went to Petrograd for consultations with the Central Committee on just this problem. The negotiations were held on the highest party levels. Lenin, with whom Artem had the discussion, supported completely the idea of the separation of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih region into a separate Republic, considering that this Republic would be indispensable in view of the 'conditions prevailing in the Ukraine at that time'. International and political considerations also made Lenin's opinion favourable. The separation of the metallurgical and coal industry from the

Ukraine and their incorporation under direct Russian control was primarily motivated by Russian interests, contrary to the interpretation of Skrypnyk that such separation was solely in the 'economic' interest of the 'proletarian' Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic, as distinct from the 'national' interest. Whether a result of one aim or the other, the projected separation of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Region, obviously meant the weakening of the Ukraine. As far as the regionalism of Bolshevik policy was discerned by Ukrainians, so far did Bolshevik influence among them decline. The policy had as an important consequence, the comparative lack of interest by Bolsheviks in the events in Kiev, and the Central Ukraine as such.

The ensuing events were summarized succinctly by Myshkis, a Bolshevik historian; the summary appears to correspond closely to the truth. This interpretation is corroborated by the analysis of the minutes of the meeting of the Congress devoted to the organization of the 'Oblast Government'.³⁰ Myshkis thus concluded:

With the first victories of the Soviet troops over the Central Rada, and especially after the capture of Kiev and the transfer of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine there, (the Kharkiv and Donets' Bolsheviks) decided that the Central Rada was finished and that, consequently, one could begin Socialist construction at home. On February 12, 1918 (new style), the Fourth Oblast Congress of Soviets, which had proclaimed the Donets-Krivy-Rih Republic, was convened.³¹

The borders of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic included the main industrial regions of the Ukraine. The Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic announced in a telegram of February 13, to the central Russian governmental authorities, that the 'Oblast Congress of Soviets had accepted the resolution to a Soviet of People's Commissars of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Basin as part of the common-Russian Federation of Soviets'.³² The telegram was actually addressed to Sverdlov, the Chairman of the All-Russian Soviets. Sverdlov replied on February 17, that the 'separation' was considered harmful, but at the same time did

not insist on any change. Although he had announced his readiness to go to Petrograd, Sverdlov told him that he 'would stay in Kharkiv'.³³ In this way, the Central Russian Government acquiesced in the partition of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Soviet claimed the territory of the Oblast as the extent of its Republic. It defined the borders in the Protest of the Soviet People's Commissars of April 7, 1918, where it stated that the Kiev government of the Rada had 'invaded the borders of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic'. It should have been well known, said they, to the 'Kiev government that the population of the Oblast proclaimed the Oblast an autonomous part of the Russian Federative Soviet Republic on February 12, and that the government of the Republic was created on February 14'. The limits of this Republic were said to run along the eastern border of Ukraine, as decided by the Kiev Rada 'in the agreement with Prince Lvov and Tereshchenko'. The Western borders of the Kharkiv and Katerynoslav gubernias, including the part of the Kryvyi Rih district with the railroad, as well as Kherson gubernia and the uezd of the Tauria gubernia to the narrows of Crimea, 'have been and are the western borders of our republic'. In the south, the border ran along the Azov sea to Tahanrih, and along those of the coal-bearing Soviet districts of the Don Oblast, along the Rostov-Voronezh railroad; the western borders of the Voronezh gubernia and the southern borders of the Kursk gubernia were others. In this manner then, the industrial districts were partitioned off from the Ukraine and attached directly to Russia. Although the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic, formed on February 12, 1918, suffered from various changes of policy, it was formally maintained for over a year, until February 17, 1919.³⁴

A similar, though more ephemeral, Soviet Republic was established for the area dominated in the past by the Rumcherod, referred to above, that is, the Kherson gubernia and the area near the Rumanian front. Odessa had fallen to Russian units from the Rumanian front, supported by some sailors,

shortly before the fall of Kiev, on January 28-30, 1918. The Soviet of People's Commissars of the Odessa District was formed on January 28, 1918.³⁵

Still another part of Ukraine was partitioned off in the creation of the Soviet Republic of Tauria. It was formed on February 11, 1918, at Sevastopol, where a Bolshevik-dominated Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of the War-Revolutionary Committees of the Tauria Gubernia, had decided to form a 'central Soviet power for the entire Tauria gubernia from the Extraordinary Congress'.³⁶

The successful progress of the war against the Ukrainian National Republic was accompanied by the creation of fictitious Republics formed out of Ukrainian territory, and by the complete partitioning of the Ukraine. In this manner then, the Soviet 'Ukrainian National Republic' had lost, by February 11, 1918, the Kherson gubernia and part of the Podolia gubernia to the Odessa Republic, the continental part of the Tauria gubernia to the Tauria Republic formed around Sevastopol, and most important, the Katerynoslav and Kharkiv gubernias to the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Republic. It must be concluded that the creation of these ephemeral bodies so close to one another in time had occurred on the initiative of the Russian government. It will be remembered that the creation or otherwise of the Donetsk-Kryvyi-Rih Republic had depended on just such a sanction of just such authorities. It must also be emphasized that, while in the latter stages the various 'republics' (consisting for the most part of isolated groups of individuals) could and did base their separateness on the grounds of defence, the need for defence from the outside does not seem to have been foreseen by prominent Russian authorities, as mentioned before.

According to Vynnychenko, Ukrainians believed that the Russian policy at the time of the fall of Kiev was a partition of Ukrainian territory³⁷ reducing it, even in the expected Soviet form, to the borders of the former Ukrainian Land, that

is, the gubernias of Kiev, Poltava, Chernyhiw, Podolia and Volhynia.

At Brest-Litovsk, the Peace Conference continued, after the signature of the Ukrainian Treaty of Peace. In the meantime, the very existence of negotiations by the Germans with the Russians was endangered by developments in Kreuznach and Berlin. Kuehlmann had given the High Command discretion to break negotiations with Trotsky as soon as the Treaty had been signed with the Ukraine; Ludendorff now presented the demand that Kuehlmann act accordingly, but Kuehlmann refused. The matter was further complicated by an untoward incident.

German authorities had intercepted appeals from the Petrograd Government to the German soldiers 'inciting them to revolt, to murder the Kaiser and their generals, and to unite with the soviets.'³⁸ Wilhelm II, the German Emperor, at the urging of Hindenburg, sent a telegram to Kuehlmann, ordering that negotiations be terminated at once, and that further demands be put to the Russians without any reference to the principle of self-determination.³⁹ Kuehlmann refused to do so and offered to resign; however, if no further order was to come, he agreed to lead the peace talks to a conclusion on the basis of previous agreements.⁴⁰ He was allowed to do so.

Kuehlmann also attempted to reach an unofficial agreement with Trotsky. The initiative had actually been Trotsky's; he had authorized tentative probes to see whether Riga and the Moon Sound Islands could be returned to Russia. Kuehlmann sent his assistant, Rosenberg, and requested a written declaration from the Russian Delegation that they would sign the peace immediately if the city of Riga and the Islands were returned. In such a case, the German Delegation would attempt to arrange that. This would mean, of course, that the Russian Delegation would acquiesce in the Ukrainian Republic's treaty with the Central Powers. Trotsky rejected the proposition of Kuehlmann, after some wavering.⁴¹

The Conference met in commission in the morning of February 9. Kuehlmann announced the Treaty formally. Tro-

tsky protested against it.⁴² The discussions were not broken off on this occasion. In fact, a new commission was established to discuss the frontier question, and met twice, without results.⁴³

Austrians made another attempt to get the Russians to accept conditions of peace. Schueller met Trotsky on February 9, when the latter declared that he could not negotiate further, claiming that the Ukrainian Treaty was an interference in the internal affairs of Russia. He also stated that the treaty was to continue the war with Russia. Then, Trotsky passed on to what was apparently the principal point; 'I shall demand that peace be made with Russia as a whole.... By the Ukrainian peace, you wish to secure yourselves supplies of grain, but we too draw supplies from the Ukraine. I am convinced that the intention is to give military support to the Ukraine against us'.⁴⁴

All the negotiations were unsuccessful. Still the question arises whether Trotsky was putting off definite action, and why, in view of the provocation offered to him by the delegation if the Central Powers and the Ukraine. Rather than being a preparation for Trotsky's 'great moment, the scene which had rehearsed for so long', to be 'enjoyed . . . hugely', as Wheeler-Bennett (a historian of the Conference) puts it,⁴⁵ the period was one of great uncertainty and anxiety. On the night of February 9, Trotsky and Karakhan are said to have conferred over the wire with Lenin and Stalin. The text of the telegraph interchange of messages has not been published, but it seems that it was agreed that the Soviet declaration should be delivered the next day.⁴⁶

Earlier in the day, Stalin had sent a wire to Trotsky informing him of the fall of the Kiev Rada. Significantly, there was no reference to any rejection of the Ukrainian Treaty. Rather, Stalin's telegram stated specifically that the 'Kiev Rada in Brest-Litovsk represents an empty space'.⁴⁷ In the evening of the next day, Lenin wired to Trotsky a significant telegram. The telegram is countersigned by Stalin, and must be considered a joint opinion.⁴⁸

Our point of view is known to you; it has only been firmer lately, especially after Joffe's letter. We repeat once again that nothing is left of the Kiev Rada, and that the Germans will be forced to recognize the fact, if they have still not recognized it. Keep us informed.⁴⁹

Lenin's view on the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk is well documented. In the meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. on January 24, 1918, where the last formal review of the question of peace with Germany was passed, Lenin's proposal was 'drag out the signing of the peace in every way', to be contrasted with Trotsky's position: 'stop the war, do not conclude peace, demobilize the army.'⁵⁰ Lenin's proposal received a 12 to 1 majority, while Trotsky's received a 9 to 7 majority, leaving the entire issue unresolved. The telegram would point, therefore, to continued struggle. Unfortunately the letter of Joffe referred to is not available. Lenin, just like Stalin earlier, underlined the fact that the Kiev Rada was destroyed, and that the Germans would have to recognize the fact. It would appear that Lenin did not rule out changes in German policy on the capture of Kiev.

It may well be that Lenin and Stalin, and consequently the Petrograd Soviet of Commissars, were urging further procrastination or even acceptance of the treaty. It is also significant that the Ukrainian Treaty was not immediately denounced publicly by the Soviet of People's Commissars. It was finally repudiated in a wireless message on February 12.⁵¹ It is indeed a valid question whether the Soviet of People's Commissars, by its silence on the Treaty, was intent on recognizing the *fait accompli* as the new status quo, at least during those few days. The break finally occurred on the evening of February 10, 1918. Trotsky delivered a lengthy indictment of the Central Powers, concluding in the name of the Russian Federal Republic and therefore of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic:

In the name of the Council of People's Commissars, the Government of the Russian Federal Republic informs the Governments and peoples united in war against us, the

Allies and neutral countries, that, in refusing to sign a peace of annexation, Russia declares, on its side, the state of war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria as ended.

Trotsky also announced that all Russian troops would, at the same time, be demobilized.⁵² The actual orders of demobilization, signed by Krylenko as Commander-in-Chief, were issued by wireless next day. The order was counter-signed by Shakh-ray, the Military Secretary of the Ukrainian People's Secretariat, and Medvedev, the Chairman of the Secretariat,⁵³ and thus applied to both Russian Soviet troops and 'Ukrainian Soviet troops.

Trotsky's declaration produced consternation in the Conference. No decisions were taken for the time being. Proceedings were concluded.⁵⁴

The Entente representatives in Kiev, in the meantime, established relations with Muravyov. A meeting took place two days after the capture of the city, when the reign of terror was already abating. Muravyov was present on the one side, and representatives of Great Britain, France, the Czechs and Serbia. According to Muravyov's report to Lenin, the representatives expressed full sympathy (*loyalnost*) to Muravyov as representative of the Soviet power. They also condemned the Rada for the issuance of the Fourth Universal, which they did not recognize. In particular, the representatives of the Polish army on the South-Western Front proposed that they be put into the front-lines, together with the Czecho-Slovak corps and the Serbs to fight 'against Austrians or Rumanians.' The representatives were said to have created an 'extraordinarily favourable situation.'⁵⁵ According to Masaryk, representing the Czecho-Slovak corps, the negotiations were held through him as spokesman for the Allies, as the latter did not speak Russian.⁵⁶ Masaryk does not refer to any offer of the Czecho-Slovak Corps to fight, but in view of the actual engagements of the Corps, in common with Russian troops, against the Ukrainian and German troops at Bakhmach,⁵⁷ Muravyov's reference to the Corps was probably a prelude to an

actual undertaking in that regard. In the absence of Picton-Bagge, who came to Kiev on February 13,⁵⁸ Great Britain was represented by the British Vice-Consul. Muravyov asked the Vice-Consul whether Bagge intended to remain in Kiev, and whether it was true that the British had 'recognized the Rada government', Muravyov wished to remain friendly with Great Britain, but that was a question he would have to have answered. The Vice-Consul explained that Bagge was already conferring with the 'Bolshevik commander-in-chief', but as far as he knew Great Britain had not recognized the Ukraine; Bagge had been appointed unofficially to look after British interests. Muravyov allowed himself an apparently humorous remark to Jenkins, who reported that when the commandant was introduced 'to the American Consul', he said something about all the anarchists coming from America to Russia and that perhaps the anarchists would end by putting the Bolsheviks out.⁵⁹

Muravyov's interview with the Allies appears to have been pleasant, and had definite advantages for Muravyov, including eventual armed aid to the Russian troops as well as some for the other parties. Masaryk received a written guarantee on February 16 that the Czecho-Slovak Corps might 'leave for France freely and unmolested.'⁶⁰ Muravyov showed himself particularly friendly to Masaryk. The latter remarks in his memoirs that his relations to 'Muravieff' were the subject of much 'reactionary gossip in Kiev'. Muravyov told Masaryk that he had long known of him by report and through his writings, and that he wished therefore to oblige him.⁶¹ A more probable reason for the marked attention was some 50,000 Czecho-Slovak troops, which were eventually to become a grave threat to the existence of the Soviet regime in Russia.

These troops had been proclaimed part of the French army, as mentioned above, and thus were a source of strength and protection not only to Masaryk but the entire Entente corps present in Kiev. The obvious source of friendly relations between Muravyov and the Allied powers was the fact that

Masaryk had negotiated a status of neutrality for Czech troops, obviously with the approval of Tabouis, while Kiev was under siege.

Kennan discusses relations between Russians and the Entente. He wrote that there had been some apprehension as to what attitude the conquering Bolsheviks would take toward the representatives of the Allied powers. However, the Allied representatives were 'apparently treated with full courtesy and permitted to depart without being molested'.⁶² Kennan refers to the final report of Jenkins, of March 1, 1918, printed in the official American publication. There is no statement of any 'apprehension' on the side of the representatives in that report,⁶³ while the relations between the Russians and the Entente powers, far from being only 'formal', had been very friendly, as discussed above.

The recognition of the Ukraine, described by the British government as being *de facto*, was maintained past the signing by the Ukraine of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On February 7, a month after the appointment of Picton Bagge, the British War Cabinet was considering instructions to Lockhart as the British representative to Petrograd. The Cabinet requested Balfour to prepare a draft of the instructions, which was approved and sent to Petrograd, apparently after the signing of the Treaty. It stated that the British government was prepared to enter into relations with the Bolshevik Government at Petrograd, as 'we have done with the *de facto* Governments of the Ukraine, Finland and elsewhere'. The British Government cannot be compelled to leave 'in the lurch our Allies and Friends in those parts of Russia where the *de facto* government' was not Bolshevik.⁶⁴ A similar instruction was sent to the British Minister at Jassy, to explain the position to the Rumanian Government. The British Embassy in Washington had also received instructions to inform the American government. In its memorandum to the Department of State on February 11, two days after the signature of the treaty of peace between Ukrainian Republic and the Central powers, the British Embassy stated that the British Government would

be entering into relations with the *de facto* Bolshevik government in 'exactly the same way as they had done with the *de facto* Governments in the Ukraine, Finland, and elsewhere.'⁶¹

Like Great Britain, France maintained official contact after the Peace Treaty. Tabouis' departure was motivated by the Russian capture of Kiev. On February 12, a few days after the signing of the Treaty, Tabouis sent a telegram to Berthelot concluding that the 'maintenance of official representation' was absolutely undesirable' now that the Ukraine has been re-established to the Russian Central Government'. There was a place for a Consul, he believed. Maintenance of French units in the Ukraine was considered undesirable, in view of the possible conflicts and the fear of 'political contamination', while some military agents could remain. He had always been optimistic, but this day was 'grand temps de partir en France et pas ailleurs'.⁶²

Neither the French government nor the British government rescinded its recognition. The Ukraine was passing from the orbit of the powers of the Entente, which was why the Allies kept at a distance. However, the fact of the Ukraine's existence could not be avoided in the succeeding months. Relations were re-established through General Berthelot and his subordinates. This was easily achieved after the weakening of the Central Powers. This is outside the period of the formation of the Republic and will not be considered here.

The relations between the Entente representatives and the Kiev authorities were directed exclusively by Muravyov, as the representative of the Russian regime, reporting directly to Lenin. The People's Secretariat was not at all involved in the discussions. There does not appear to be any record of contact between the representatives and agents of the People's Secretariat. The People's Secretariat had no Secretary for Foreign Affairs, although it had sent two members to the Brest-Litovsk conference, as mentioned above, and although Zatonsky had approached the German representatives later on in February.⁶³

Relations between the Allies and Muravyov were generally well-known in the Ukraine, and met with an unfavorable reaction in the Ukrainian government, especially over the agreement made with the Russian forces by the Czecho-Slovak Corps from the besieged city.

Thus, Hrushevsky wrote on February 17: 'When the Bolsheviks seized Kiev, their authority, as reported by the Bolshevik newspapers, was immediately recognized by the Allies.'⁶⁸

The Government retreated from Kiev with the remainder of the loyal troops. The total number involved was a little over 3,000 men.⁶⁹ The number of soldiers was thus small. However, in the universal chaos and anarchy of February, 1918, 3,000 men did represent a considerable force. The figure is quite often contrasted against the number of Ukrainian soldiers represented in the All-Ukrainian Military Congresses: in these, the number of soldiers represented was certainly above a million. The number of 3,000 men appears to be disappearingly small, and is liable to be discounted altogether. It is necessary to remember that the period of mid-February was one of maximum disorganization and anarchy in the conditions of the partial defeat of the army in the Great War, and the disruptive influence of Bolshevik policy with the enemy.

The situation will become clearer if we investigate other armed bodies of men in the East-European region at this time. The loyal anti-Bolshevik Russian army was being re-formed in the region of the Don Cossacks. After the more than two months since the trek of loyal Russians had started after the Bolshevik rebellion, the Volunteer Russian Army, led by the highest available Russian generals, Alexeyev, the Chief-of-Staff of the Highest Headquarters, had very few troops. According to Poole, American Consul in Rostov, the Volunteer Army had only 1,400 to 2,000 men. It had no infantry, while its artillery lacked ammunition.⁷⁰ By the end of February, Alexeyev was obliged to retreat. At the time of evacuation of Kiev, the entire Volunteer Russian Army consisted of some 4,000 men.⁷¹

The situation of the Russian Soviet regime was not much better. The Bolshevik Red Army consisted of 5,500 men, on February 25, 1918.⁷² Perhaps the most eloquent expression of the weakness of the Bolsheviks is found in Lenin's statements. In a talk with the Moscow Soviet over a direct wire, on February 20, 1918, Lenin stated bluntly, in reference to the German advance which had begun on January 18, 1918,⁷³ 'There is no army (*armii nyet*).' In the article 'On the Revolutionary Phase,' published in *Pravda*, on February 21, Lenin stated that the fact of the day was 'de-mobilization of the multi-million man Army and the approach to the creation of a Red Army on a volunteer basis.'⁷⁴ As has been discussed above, no Ukrainian Soviet army was then in existence.

This does not mean that larger units could not be built up for a particular campaign when an agreement could be reached by the largely independent commanders in the field, as had occurred in the case of siege at Kiev. The combination dissolved within a few days after the capture of Kiev.

While discussing the problem of regular armies, which in this period numbered anywhere between 2,000 to some 5,000 men, the question of irregular detachments such as Red Guards used outside their home locality must be kept separate. Much in the same category would be the garrison troops, loyal, in the process of dissolution, or disloyal, as the case might be, as well as the troops in transit from the front, or at the front. Lacking direction in the chaos, the detachments, garrisons or troops in transit could have little significance in the crucial struggle at Kiev.

The evacuation of the capital was carried through in an organized manner. The government and the institution followed the train of the wounded and the sick. Behind these came the troops. The old organization had still been maintained; there was, in theory, an entire army here, 'consisting of several divisions, battalions, detachments of the Free Cossacks, and all sorts of separate units, as well as numerous headquarters of non-existent units'.⁷⁵ None of these units consisted of more than a few hundred soldiers and some, as little as a

few dozen or even as few individuals. The government itself was under the immediate protection of the Galician Sich Sharpshooters, a volunteer unit of Ukrainians from Austria, former prisoners-of-war. A partial reorganization was undertaken by the army outside of Kiev, while the government proceeded directly by motor-car to Zhytomir where it established itself, presumably on February 9, 1918.

The Ukrainian government was at the nadir of its strength at this point. From this point on, the Ukrainian army began to grow again, primarily by recruiting volunteers, and in time by the re-inlistment of former prisoners-of-war returning from the Central Empires. Anticipating events somewhat, we see that in some two months, the Ukrainian army in rebuilding regiments which had fallen to a fraction of their former strength, included, according to its adversary, the Russian Commander Antonov, 'tens of thousands' of soldiers.⁷⁶ This was, however, mostly outside the period of formation of the Republic and is not of immediate concern.

For the time being, the Ukrainian government was faced with a threatening situation. Its position at Zhytomir was endangered by the retreating units of the former Russian VIIth Army. The City Duma, panicked no doubt by the news of the reign of terror in Kiev, requested the Ukrainian government to leave the city⁷⁷ to avoid provoking battle, bombardment or retaliation. Most important, the government was in danger of being surrounded by the Russian troops, and cut off from the possible route of escape, as well as from contact with the former enemies with whom the Ukraine had become friendly. Telegraph communications, by direct wire, were established shortly between the Ukrainian government in Zhytomir and the Peace Delegation which had remained at Brest-Litovsk.⁷⁸ The sphere of the direct military authority of the government was widened continually. The events of the immediate past could be considered in greater perspective. New policies could be developed while the immediate danger subsided, at least for the time being.

It seemed obvious to Ukrainian leaders, Hrushevsky,

Shulhyn, Doroshenko and others, that the immediately past events represented a crisis in Russo-Ukrainian relations, and that a new and completely self-reliant policy was the only alternative. Hrushevsky called this crisis 'Cleansing by Fire', while Shulhyn use the term 'Baptism of Fire', in their respective writings.⁷⁹

The destruction of Kiev in capture, and the policy of the forces of Soviet Russia in general, made an extraordinary impression in the Ukraine, and in the entire former Russian Empire. Lapchinskiy, a People's Secretary, wrote in his memoirs of the impression created by the Russian troops.

The terrifying effect of the five-day-long bombardment, and of the essentially class vengeance of the revolutionary army which had driven the Central Rada from Kiev, was so strong, that remembrances about the 'horrible Muravyov days' in Kiev among the bourgeois Kiev population and among the working classes over the entire U.S.S.R. acquired truly legendary proportions.⁸⁰

Ukrainian society felt the events with particular dismay. Doroshenko, a Ukrainian historian, goes so far as to say that, having occupied Kiev, 'Bolsheviks instituted such a blood-bath in it as the city had not seen since the days of Andrew Bogolyubskiy',⁸¹ the reference being to the sack of Kiev by Suzdalians, in 1169. Yefremov, one of the most respected members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, expressed the horror of Ukrainian society at the havoc created, in an open letter to Yuri Kotsyubynsky, Vice-Secretary for Military Affairs and the one member of the People's Secretariat, who was known by Ukrainian society, as the son of a foremost Ukrainian writer.

Freedom had indeed shone brightly under the Ukrainian sky. And then came those who put this freedom back into the coffin and hammered the lid shut with 40-pound shells. And among them—a man with the name of Kotsyubynsky, a famous father's degenerate son. You... shield the unheard-of criminality which has been done and is being done, with the honest name of your father—all those mountains of corpses which were thrown up in the name of equality and fraternity without any court and trial, those streams of blood which flow in your footsteps....

Yefremov concluded that over these events, the Ukrainian and Russian nations would part.

But know you then, that the seed you planted on your native soil shall not bring forth what you expect, not equality and fraternity, but knives on both sides, hatred and blood....⁸²

Shulhyn had remained in Kiev through the Bolshevik occupation. This minister, who was quite devoted to the Entente and, in particular, to France, reports on the feelings of the society at this time:

One would have asked the devil himself to liberate the Ukraine from this nightmare.... Rumours spread that... Germans and Austrians were going to help (the Republic) to throw out these dark hordes.... One was ready to see the friend of Tomorrow in the enemy of yesterday. After all, these were western peoples and one would direct them already against the red oppressors from Moscow.⁸³

But it was Hrushevsky, the President of the Rada, and the great historian, who discerned the significance of the events in the clearest fashion.

In the government railroad train 'near Sarny', a station in Volhynia, on February 17, 1918, when subsequent events were far from certain, Hrushevsky put down what appears to be the correct appreciation of the situation.

These are, in the main, the setting of the catastrophe through which our Ukraine had to pass on the threshold of its new life, that great cleansing by fire, in which it seems various old prejudices, outlived traditions and views had to burn away.... Not only men are being killed in it, but ideas as well. Not only cities are being destroyed, but traditions too.... There burn historical, cultural, economic and all other ties of the Ukrainian people with the Russian people.... Earlier, the Ukrainian people concerned themselves with bureaucracy and government. Now we, by the most immediate means, must wage the struggle between the nations themselves—Great Russian and Ukrainian....⁸⁴

The period of consolidation in the Republic entered was also one of emancipation from all ties and entrance as an independent state, in form as well as in spirit, into the comity of nations.

The demobilization of the Russian army had important consequences for the situation in the Ukraine. Generally speaking, it rid the Ukraine of many Russian troops. In the words of Antonov, 'General mobilization of the old army was proclaimed and despite all our attempts to keep the soldiers in the ranks of our detachments, they began to go home.'⁸⁵ Thus, Muravyov, sent by two successive orders of Lenin, of February 14 and 17, to fight on the Rumanian front, lost most of his troops on the way. Yegorov, his subordinate, who originally had commanded an imposing body of troops, an 'army' of some 4,000 men, could bring but a handful of these to the Rumanian front. In the words of Antonov, he had brought 'a completely insignificant force, consisting for the most part of Ukrainian guerrillas, considerably inferior in battle-readiness and revolutionary discipline, to the Muscovites and the Petrogradians'.⁸⁶ Referring to the advance towards Rumania, Antonov acknowledged that 'our troops have become considerably fewer'.⁸⁷

Unsuccessful, Muravyov wired from Odessa on February 19, complaining bitterly.

The situation is extremely serious. There are no troops in Odessa. Troops from the former front are disorganized; as a matter of fact, there are (some) headquarters whose whereabouts are not known to anybody. The only hope is for support from outside.... The Odessa proletariat is disorganized and politically unconscious.⁸⁸

The support of the People's Secretariat, and the parallel 'separatist' Soviet regimes in the Ukraine (the Odessa Republic, et al.) quickly vanished. Perhaps the decisive element was the largely non-Ukrainian character of the Soviet troops. Antonov stated that 'the Red Guards of the detachment of Yegorov drove towards home, to the north—they were hurrying to the defence of the native localities which were being threatened by the Germans.'⁸⁹

In addition to the influence of demobilization, and the threat to Russian proper, the Soviet regime in Ukraine had lost one of the main props of its existence. However, the Peo-

ple's Secretariat of the Ukraine, had also lost the basic fighting force in whose van it came to Kiev. In a terse order to Muravyov, on February 14, Lenin severed the very tenuous relationship which bound the troops to the Secretariat:

If there should be no other order from Antonov, act as energetically as possible upon the Rumanian front, in agreement with Rakovskiy and his Collegium.⁹⁰

The Collegium was still another organ, completely independent from the People's Secretariat, whose authority was said to extend over the Rumanian front. In this manner then, the People's Secretariat lost almost its entire armed support; the forces of the Ukrainian government were allowed to regroup, to recruit new volunteers, to re-establish its authority over the centres of communication in North-Western Ukraine, and to keep the field open for contact with the former belligerents. The People's Secretariat, although protesting violently on the departure of Russian troops, did not succeed in reversing the decision.⁹¹ It was therefore powerless to proceed against the Ukrainian government. On February 13, the Keksholm Regiment of the Second Guard Corps entered Kiev,⁹² and was expected to do guard duty in the city. However, it was in the process of retreating and seems shortly to have spontaneously dissolved (there being no record of its withdrawal from Kiev). The military institutions of the regular army were no longer in existence in Kiev. Muravyov informed the Council of People's Commissars and Antonov, on February 12, that he had appointed Yegorov 'to re-form the South-Western Front' but the latter fell sick, so now he was appointing as Commander Gusarsky 'who has speedily begun the formation of the Command of the South-Western Front.'⁹³ The lack of Command meant the loss of any effective coordination of military activity, or of subversion, in the area west of Kiev. With the disappearance of Muravyov and his troops from Kiev, the local military position of People's Secretariat was becoming a phantom. The one unit which the Secretariat appears to have kept was the only one it had succeeded in organizing: the 'Red Cossack Detachment' consisting principally of the Petrograd

Red Guardists led by Petrogradian Primakov. The hold of the People's Secretariat upon this unit appears to have been very weak, as the unit voted in its general meeting four weeks later to rename itself the First Workers'-Peasants' Socialist Regiment of the Red Army.⁶⁴ As the People's Secretariat did not have any such institution, either on paper or in reality, as the 'Red Army', this meant that the only unit to which the People's Commissariat had any claim at all had passed, by the decision of its soldiers, from its jurisdiction. The members of the People's Secretariat were thus left by themselves, in a literal sense.

Immediately after the signature of the Treaty, the Ukrainian Peace Delegation approached the German military representative, General Hoffmann, and requested military assistance against the Russian troops. The German military offered no conclusive answer to the request.⁶⁵ However, conversations continued.

Direct wire contact was quickly reestablished between the Ukrainian Government at Zhytomir and its Delegation at Brest-Litovsk. Various alternatives in assistance were examined by the three parties to the negotiations; the picture of the early course of negotiations is by no means clear. One of these alternatives was unanimously rejected by the Government, pointing to the complicated relations of the time. The alternative involved the suggestion of the German military authorities that the Ukrainian government request assistance by a call for an offensive against Petrograd.⁶⁶ The Ukrainian government expressed particular interest in the Ukrainian Sharpshooters, a Western Ukrainian army formation, and in the troops made up of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war.⁶⁷ Despite the assertion of Khrystiuk to the contrary,⁶⁸ Germans appear to have agreed to the request as we find references to such troops in the immediate future. The Germans and Austrians appear to have pointed out that the former were on the Italian front, while the latter would run into problems of transport.⁶⁹ It should also be pointed out that such units had to be organized, which would certainly require a certain period of time.

Khrystiuk's assertion that the regular German army was suggested at that time does not find any other corroboration. The decision to approach the Central Powers with a formal request for military assistance was taken in a regular meeting of the Government, on February 12,¹⁰⁰ and, was, presumably communicated immediately to the Ukrainian Delegation. Ludendorff appears to refer to this request in his memoirs, stating that the Ukraine had appealed for assistance¹⁰¹ before the Homburg Conference, at which the whole matter of German policy was discussed.

The position of the military appears outlined in the notes of the General Staff for the Conference was held at Homburg on February 13. Ludendorff pointed out that the 'campaign in the west' which the year 1918 would bring, was the most colossal military problem which has ever been set to any army. Even more troops would have to be released from the East; this would not be possible until the 'situation with regard to Russia and Rumania has been completely cleared up'. Furthermore, risks would be taken if the position was to 'remain obscure'. The first risk pointed out was,

We may let Bolshevik Great Russia turn against the Ukraine. It has not recognized the independence of the Ukraine.... We shall endanger our treaty with the Ukraine and therewith the food supplies which we and Austria-Hungary need. We thus make our ultimate victory uncertain.¹⁰²

At the Crown Council, presided by the Emperor, the civil authorities were represented by Hertling, Kuehlmann and Payer, while Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Holtzendorff sat for the military. Kuehlmann's objection against an advance against the Bolsheviks were overruled, while the earlier decision of February 5-6, to give assistance to Ukraine, was endorsed.¹⁰³

The proposal of using Ukrainian prisoners-of-war at this juncture had actually been presented first by Gassenko, the representative of the Government in Switzerland. Thus, Romberg reported to Berlin on February 4, that Gassenko had

requested that 'two army corps' be formed out of the Ukrainians present in the German prisoner-of-war camps. He held that after working with the men for three weeks, he would be able to obtain dependable troops, with which he could 'drive out any Bolshevik troops from the Ukraine'. He also pointed out that it would be to German advantage that the Rada possess strong military forces, rather than having to deal with a Bolshevik body which could cancel the treaty of peace. Romberg appears to have been at a loss whether to take Gassenko seriously, but thought it worthwhile to transmit the request to Berlin for directions. The report was forwarded to Brest-Litovsk by Berlin.¹⁰⁴ On February 10, the Foreign Office wired Romberg that Gassenko's plans were much higher than his means, and should not be taken particularly seriously.¹⁰⁵ However, a few days later, Romberg was directed to inform Gassenko that the use of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war was under consideration.¹⁰⁶ Gassenko had decided to go to Berlin, probably in an attempt to follow up on his suggestion, but, though welcome, was told that 'further military actions were being considered in cooperation with the Central Rada'.¹⁰⁷

In the meantime, negotiations had continued between the Delegation and the representatives of the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. Legation Counsellor Schueller represented the German government, while Hoffmann spoke for the military. On February 14, Schuler reported to Berlin that unfavourable news of the last few days had become even worse. Lyubynsky had told him, in confidence, that the anarchical conditions in the Ukraine made any government impossible, while mentioning that he had wire contact with Zhytomir. The Delegation held that a military advance on the railroad of Kovel—Rovno was the only means to build a point of support in the North-Western Ukraine, to regain Kiev, and to 're-establish the apparently dispersed Government of the Rada'. Discussions were held the same day between the Ukrainians and the military. A plan of operations for the troops to be formed from prisoners-of-war was drafted. The Delegation had also asked for German assistance in the form of troops in Ukrainian uni-

forms. General Hoffmann held that the liberation of Kiev was assured with 'these limited means'. However, he held that the 'taking part by German troops (*Streitkraefte*) would only worsen the situation of the Rada Government'.¹⁰⁸

The immediate consequence of the agreements reached was the appeal for assistance issued by the Delegation, late that same night. The appeal was received at the Foreign Office at 3:20 a.m. of February 15.¹⁰⁹ The document was addressed to the 'German people'; the transmittal paper addressed to Schueller was signed by the entire Delegation, Sevryuk, Lewytsky and Lyubynsky, while the appeal in the Ukrainian and the German languages was signed by Lyubynsky himself 'in the name of the entire Ukrainian Peace Delegation on the basis of the transmitted authority (*povnovlastey*) for associates Oleksandr Sevryuk, M. Lewytsky and for himself'.¹¹⁰ It was dated February 15.

The appeal referred to the peace recently concluded by the nation, which would 'enable it to direct all its forces towards one goal of creation of forms, for its own independent existence as a state'. But the news of the peace treaty did not bring peace into the land; the enemy of Ukrainian freedom had invaded the land in order to subdue the 'Ukrainian nation with fire and sword'. After referring to the dispersal of the Russian Constituent Assembly, the appeal pointed out that the Russian Bolsheviks had proclaimed 'what they call a holy war'—against the Ukrainian socialists.

From the north, hired gangs of the Red Guard break into our land, they unite with renegade Russian soldiers and freed criminals. Under the skilled direction of former policemen and *gens-d'armes* they attack our cities, execute elected representatives and the leaders of public opinion and levy contributions from the population.... This barbaric invasion by our northern neighbour has, as has happened before in our history, with 'holy' excuses, made its goal the destruction of the independence of our state.

The appeal made a pointed reference to German interests. It stated that the Petrograd commissars who had so stub-

bornly defended the welfare of Lithuania, Poland, Courland and other peoples with their words, secretly withdrew their forces to be used against the Ukraine.

We see the fruits of our young Revolution in danger and have to fear for our freedom, barely won. In Volhynia and other centres we are gathering new forces to advance against the gangs flowing in from the north. In this, our desperate struggle for existence, we are looking for aid. We are deeply persuaded that the German people, loving peace and order, will not remain indifferent when they learn of our need. The German army which stands near our northern enemy, has the power to aid us and by its intervention to seal our northern borders from further violation by the enemy.¹¹¹

The delegation had been in touch with the Government the same day. Holubovych had informed it that the Bolsheviks were in power at Kiev, while searches and executions were being carried on. Ukrainian farmers were being terrorized, while all available grain was carted off to the North. The Bolshevik support was said to consist of the criminal element. The business at hand in Zhytomir was the reorganization of the army and the support of the fighting troops. It appeared essential that Rada be re-established. The favorable peace would fall with the Rada; the peace had been taken up very well by the Ukrainian people. This 'diplomatic victory', however, was of no use with the Bolsheviks, who understood only power.¹¹² It would thus appear that the Government strengthened the hand of delegation in negotiations for assistance.

Already at noon of February 15, the High Command had informed the Emperor that an appeal for assistance had been received at Obost. The decision was taken for a reaction to the appeal by the immediate despatch of two detachments toward Pinsk and Rowno.¹¹³ Definite information on the prisoners-of-war was issued to the Foreign Office by Ludendorff, who stated that three groups of 40 officers and 800 men each, armed with hand-weapons, would leave the prisoner-of-war camps in Ukrainian uniforms on February 16. With this as a basis, a mixed detachment would be formed, with German

officers and other personnel and material. The detachment would be led by a Ukrainian general, while a purely Ukrainian appearance would be maintained on the outside. The goal of the operation was Rovno, where Ukrainians were said to count on serious strengthening. Further, 3,600 Ukrainians were expected to be kept on the ready.¹¹⁴ It should be noted, however, that this detachment was expected in Kovel on February 20, or 21. Their advance towards Rovno was not to be expected before the end of the month.¹¹⁵

Finally, on February 16, the Foreign Office sent a circular telegram, to interested offices, with the information that the High Command would give the Ukrainian military assistance. The appeal for aid was also cleared for publication.¹¹⁶ In the meantime the news was received from the German mission in Petrograd that the Bolsheviks had expressed anger in the newspapers over the 'treasonable peace of the Ukraine which was of no validity'.¹¹⁷ The Russian note on non-recognition of the treaty had been picked up by wireless on February 12, but was not forwarded to the Foreign Office by the *Admiralstab* until February 16.¹¹⁸ The appeal to the German people appeared, in fact, in the morning newspapers of February 17.¹¹⁹ It should be also mentioned that the Emperor, in his rather impetuous manner, suggested to the Foreign Ministry that the 'Assistance appeal of the Ukraine be nailed up on information boards as it is addressed to the German people.' With a fine tolerance, the Foreign Office pointed out that in view of the shortage of paper the suggestion should not be followed.¹²⁰ The text of the appeal was forwarded to Vienna, Sofia and Constantinople, at the time of publication.¹²¹

Other Central Powers were also involved in these matters. The situation was somewhat complicated by the rather unfriendly relations between the Ukraine and Austria-Hungary, and by the strained relations between the latter country and Germany. Schueller had reported in the early hours of February 15, that in order to avoid the appearance that the appeal had been made to order for Germany, he wanted to suggest to the Ukrainians to direct similar requests to Vienna and Sofia.

As Sevryuk was making ready to go to Vienna, he asked for immediate direction. Berlin replied that no suggestion was to be made to Ukrainians as the German High Command had raised some objections.¹²² Schueller had apparently not waited for the authorization in discussing the matter with Sevryuk before his departure. On orders from Berlin, he held up now the declarations for Vienna and Sofia, while Sevryuk was certain to refer to the appeals in Vienna. Furthermore, pointing to negotiations on assistance between the Ukrainians and Austrians, he asked again for the immediate sending of the appeals.¹²³

In the meantime, negotiations between the Delegation and Czernin were taking place. It is not clear whether they were undertaken on the Ukrainian initiative alone, or as the results of the suggestion of Schueller. In these negotiations, Czernin had assured Ukrainians of assistance by the Sich Sharpshooters, on February 15. Also, according to Schueller's information, Austria-Hungary had also given permission to the Ukrainianized XXVIth Corps, which had been cut off from the Ukraine, to cross Galicia towards the borders of the Republic.¹²⁴

Schueller received notice of withdrawal of the objections of the High Command the same day. However, the Ukrainian Delegation submitted an appeal 'To the Peoples of Austria-Hungary' to the Austrian representative Mirbach. The appeal pointedly referred thus to the multi-national structure of Austria-Hungary; otherwise it was similar to the German appeal.¹²⁵ On the other hand, appeals to the Bulgarian nation and to the Turkish nation were handed to Schueller with the request to transmit them to the respective governments.¹²⁶ The two appeals were basically similar to the German appeal; however, the request for assistance was couched in more general terms. It expressed the assurance that the Bulgarian and Turkish nations would not 'hold back in struggle against the common enemy nations.' The Turkish appeal contained also a reference to Armenia and Persia, in place of Poland and others.¹²⁷ The

German government in fact transmitted the appeals to the respective governments in *notes verbales*.¹²⁸

It was at that point that the Ukrainian position at Brest-Litovsk was strengthened by the receipt of a wireless appeal of the Ukrainian government to 'foreigners' in which the determination to continue the struggle against Russia was given expression.

The appeal sent out of Zhytomir, the temporary seat of the Government, on February 17, described Bolsheviks as aggressors, and condemned the Russian proceedings in the Ukraine as an expression of the 'age-old historical habit of the avid, insatiable Great-Russian nation, our old oppressor, to rob us and to suck us dry.' The appeal stated that the Bolsheviks did not treat the Russian Don areas in the same manner, 'where, according to the Bolshevik views, only the enemies of the Revolution have gathered.' 'The Ukraine however, consists of the Ukrainian land and population; thus it is attacked and exploited in the Russian manner, although it has organized itself as a social and democratic Republic. Foreigners were appealed to recognize the true character of the Russian Bolsheviks'. 'In Kharkiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav, in Kiev and in many other Ukrainian cities, murder and fire now prevails; each Ukrainian, who had shown himself devoted either before or during the social Revolution, is being persecuted, dragged out from his home, and shot down by the Red Guard.' The foreigners were called on to spread the news: 'if you are friends of the social and democratic freedom where neither the reactionaries or the anarchistic destroyers prevent the voice of truth and of freedom from being heard.'¹²⁹ The appeal was transmitted by Berlin to the press. In addition to the expression of determination for struggle, the appeal had no doubt the value that it appealed to the chivalrous sentiments, and also enhanced the somewhat tarnished image of the military of the Central Powers, who now could see themselves as defenders of the right. This must not be underestimated in the case of some rather impetuous figures, including the Emperor himself.

In the meantime, Austria-Hungary attempted to use the exposed position of the Ukrainian government to secure certain advantages, lost by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Thus, Austria-Hungary informed Germany on February 17, that the Ukrainian government had asked Obost for military assistance, and that the latter had offered to the Austro-Hungarian army an 'operative undertaking'. Count Czernin was said to have agreed, but the military assistance was to be made dependent upon the condition that the 'Ukrainian government make concessions in the question of the border in the gubernia of Kholm which would void Polish *gravimina*'. Austria-Hungary requested that the Foreign Ministry make the 'satisfaction of the Ukrainian request dependent upon the satisfactory conclusion of its negotiations.'¹³⁰ In this manner then, Austria-Hungary was attempting to exercise redoubled pressure upon the Ukraine. However, Kuehlmann refused the request, and informed Hohenloche, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, that the necessary military measures had been already ordered and could not be held up. Still, he added, that he understood that Czernin's negotiations with the Ukrainian government had been proceeding successfully so that early Austro-Hungarian cooperation could be counted on.¹³¹ The High Command was informed of these matters. Kuehlmann had been in fact kept informed of the course of negotiations by an informant in the Ukrainian entourage.¹³²

At any rate, the news had reached Brest-Litovsk on February 18, that Emperor Charles would not allow the expected participation of an Austrian detachment in the operations in the Ukraine.

The German government, however, held to the original plan of armed assistance for the Ukrainian Republic against Russia. The advance guard crossed the front on February 18. Although the advance coincided with the advance against Russia, the Ukrainian operation was quite separate in both organization and realization. The Order to the German troops in regard to the advance stated,

The operations in the Ukraine are thus extension of military assistance to a state which is at peace with us, against the common enemy, the Bolsheviks.¹³³

German troops did not play any serious role in the fighting during February 1918 leading to the recovery of Kiev. For one thing, there was hardly the time to bring in troops. The advance guard crossed the border just six days before the liberation of Zhytomir. The first contact between German and Ukrainian troops took place on February 25,¹³⁴ at Zhytomir where the German troops arrived by train, while the capital of the Republic, Kiev, became free of Bolsheviks only three days later, on February 28, 1918. There was simply no time for Germans to build up a lot of force, while safe-guarding the rear. It was probably in realization of this that Hoffmann reported to Ludendorff on February 26, that the Ukrainians were anxious that the 'reputation of the Rada be heightened in the eyes of their people' and for this reason 'stroved to regain Kiev on their own'. For his own part, Hoffmann was certain this feeling ought to 'be given as much consideration as possible'.¹³⁵ Build-up of German troops increased rapidly, however, in the latter part of March, the Germans had the total of eight divisions in the Ukraine,¹³⁶ Austrians having a smaller number of troops.

Austro-Hungarian policy at this point was fashioned to a high degree by the Polish pressure. The close alliance with Germany was resented by the Poles. Germany was highly unpopular among the Poles of Galicia; the unpopularity was heightened further by the anti-Polish and pro-Ukrainian policy of Germany in the actual circumstances of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. Thus, a demonstration had taken place in Lviv on February 2 and 3, directed in part against German military offices, climaxed by the burning of the German flag by Polish youths. A student was shot to death in the melee, and rumours spread that he was killed by German soldiers.¹³⁷

The signing of the peace treaty brought the Poles of Galicia to the verge of revolution, while Ukrainians were deeply appreciative. The German Ambassador wired to Berlin

on February 11, that the 'Austrian Ruthenians were very much satisfied over the conclusion of peace with the Ukraine; they were bringing out their faithfulness to the Austrian state and are showing tendencies to swing from the opposition to the government camp'.¹³⁸ Heinze, the German Consul-General in Lviv, reported to Berlin that the 'Galician Ukrainians were very glad over the conditions of the conclusion of peace with the Ukraine'. A demonstration was held in Lviv, on February 10, 'with military music, flags and all organizations and schools'. An appropriate speech by Kost Levytsky, a foremost Ukrainian leader in Austria-Hungary, was received with enthusiasm.¹³⁹

Wedel wires on February 12, that the Polish club of the parliament was in 'the greatest of uproars over the Kholm being left over for the Ukraine', while rumours of separation of Eastern Galicia were contributing to the same. There was no doubt, he held, that the Poles in the Reichsrat would enter the opposition; the government would lose its majority. As any change in government would not help matters, the government would have to rule by decree. Czernin might possibly keep his majority in the *Delegation*.¹⁴⁰ Heinze also reported that the 'impression of the conclusion of peace (with the Ukraine) had dumbfounded the local Poles'. They feared that the loss of Kholm would draw with it the loss of the Polish position in Eastern Galicia. In Krakow, the capital of Western Galicia, riots ensued, and, after protests, the German passport office was completely destroyed and looted, with the codes and seals being lost in the melee.¹⁴¹ On February 13, the Polish feeling rose further with the passing of the Polish parliamentary representation into the opposition.¹⁴² Rumours spread that a general Polish uprising was being planned for February 18.¹⁴³ Heinze reported at this time that the mood was being described as revolutionary in Krakow and Lviv.¹⁴⁴

Polish feelings were fired further by the Manifesto of the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland, issued on February 14.

Shortly before, when news of the establishment of self-government and so of Ukrainian power in the Kholm province had been first received in Poland, the government of the Kingdom of Poland, led by Kucharzewski, had resigned. The Regency Council, which accepted the resignation of the cabinet, considered resignation for itself, but decided instead to publish a Manifesto. The Council stated that their demand for a place at the conference table at Brest-Litovsk had been ignored. 'We have not been admitted,' the manifesto read, 'in order that in our absence peace could be concluded at our expense, and the desired security in the East acquired at the cost of the living body of our nation. They have taken a portion of the Polish land and delivered it over to the Ukrainians.' The Council further claimed that Kholm was 'in the greatest part Polish and Catholic,' and protested that 'the country was not asked to which state it wanted to belong; they decided her fate by the stroke of a pen. Thus the principle that nations have the right to dispose of themselves, proclaimed so solemnly and so many times by the German and Austrian diplomats has been abrogated in regard to Poland.'

The Manifesto went on to say that by this the true significance of the acts of the Monarchs in proclaiming of the Kingdom and their protestations of friendship had been reduced into nothingness. The independence of Poland, its existence as a state, its political and economic viability were only empty words from then on, as not only were the interests and rights of Poland being ignored, but even her national territory was not respected. The Council further protested against 'this new partition and refused to recognize it.' They stated that they 'hereby again made clear our persuasion that the spirit and substance of the acts promulgated by the monarchs have been denied, and (they) intended to base the right of exercising the sovereign power of the state upon the national will.' They were sure that the nation wished to possess a symbol of independence and that she was resolved to rally around that symbol. 'It is this will of the nation that we wish to take for the support of our mission and of our efforts'. The Council

also issued an appeal to the Polish soldiers and officers to 'persevere in the service of the homeland,' wherever they might be.¹⁴³

The protests held in Galicia on February 18, in honour of the Manifesto, took the form of a general strike, including the stoppage of the railroads, and of post delivery.¹⁴⁴ The Consulate-General in Lviv was guarded by 150 soldiers armed with grenades and machine-guns;¹⁴⁵ in Krakow, some 100,000 persons took part in demonstrations.¹⁴⁶ The demonstrations were directed against the government as well as Germans. The Ukrainian population 'kept quiet on the day of the demonstration'.¹⁴⁹

It was then with these events as the background that the Austro-Hungarian government was feverishly engaged in negotiations with the Ukraine, risking and receiving a serious rebuff from Germany, and threatening its peace treaty. The agreement was finally reached on February 18. The Ukrainian Peace Delegation made a major concession to the Austro-Hungarian government by conceding that the line drawn through the region of the North-West borderland need not necessarily follow the established line, but that the Commission, formed from representatives of Austria-Hungary, the Ukraine and Poland, may draw a line 'based upon ethnographic relations and the wishes of the populace, to the East of the agreed line between Bilohrai... and Sarnaky'.¹⁵⁰ In this manner, the way was open for saving a part of the Kholm gubernia for Poland. The Peace Delegation agreed to the concession in return for a pledge of aid by Austria-Hungary. The need for aid appears to have been two-fold. On the one hand, there was the military necessity. On the other, Germany had also agreed to give aid, and without a rival power in the same area, she might conceivably become too powerful. The Peace Delegation may well have decided that the dangerous game of playing off two allied foreign powers against each other, which had already brought good results for the Ukraine, might be continued in order to preserve the Ukraine from overly powerful helpers.

The agreement on evacuation of Austro-Hungarian troops was included; it was couched in the form of a declaration by Wiesner on behalf of Austria-Hungary, as part of the Protocol signed by Sevryuk and Wiesner. Thus it was decided that the 'Austro-Hungarian armed forces which were to be sent from their present positions into the territory of the Ukrainian National Republic, would be returned to their present ('today's') positions, as soon as the Government of the Rada should state its desire for this.' Austria-Hungary had demanded the concession that the original text of the secret agreement be transferred out of Ukrainian hands into the safe-keeping of Germany.¹³¹ Austria-Hungary enjoyed the support of Germany in this. Austria-Hungary, and in particular Czernin, could be expected to desire the transfer of the actual text from Ukrainian hands. The news of the agreement spread despite the secrecy desired by Austria-Hungary. Whether the leak was intentional or inadvertent cannot be established.

The Germans became the intermediaries in the matter. Kuehlmann explained to Rosenberg, his subordinate, that he should ask the Ukrainians to give the text to the Germans. He pointed out that Czernin agreed that the Ukrainians should be given assurance at the same time that 'Germany guaranteed the promise given in the document.' There was no risk involved in this *modus procedendi* for the Ukraine, he held; on the contrary, their position would become 'infinitely stronger due to the German guarantee' in this matter.¹³² Rosenberg had a talk with Sevryuk on February 28, in Berlin, in which he carried out the instructions of Kuehlmann.¹³³ The Ukrainians accepted the proposition.¹³⁴ The disadvantage for the Republic was obvious; she lacked physical proof of Czernin's undertaking. However, the gain is indeed impressive. Through the guarantee, Germany became obligated to support her diplomatically, involving her own credit, by intervening in the constitutional relations of Austria-Hungary, intervention was coming perilously close to partitioning of Austria-Hungary.

If the role of the German troops was small in February 1918, the Austro-Hungarian troops were of no consequence

at all in February. Their advance began on February 28, 1918.¹⁵⁵ Hoffmann reported to Ludendorff at the end of February that the Austro-Hungarian army had only a single company of troops in the Ukraine, occupying Zaytsnov, a border town on the River Zbruch.¹⁵⁶

The German military were not at all interested in Austro-Hungarian military participation. Ludendorff protested repeatedly but unsuccessfully against any agreement in the change of the Ukrainian-Polish border, and declared his disinterest in the cooperation of Austro-Hungarian troops. 'The military measures ordered by us must be allowed to progress, of course,' he wrote to the Foreign Office.¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the German government had kept a disinterested attitude in the matter of the border at this point, obviously in view of the hard-pressed condition of the Austro-Hungarian government.

After the withdrawal from Zhytomir, the strategy decided on by the Ukrainian government was to move westwards, clearing the railroads in the province of Volhynia, while enlarging the army by volunteers. In this manner, cities of Sarny and the capital of the gubernia, Rivne, were taken after some skirmishes. Huge supplies of war material were obtained at Sarny when the old army stores passed into the hands of the Ukrainian army.

The situation of the Ukrainian regime was becoming stabilized again after the events of the loss of Kiev. It was decided to proceed against the enemy again, still in the absence of any definite news of the events in the West. Rumours of assistance by Germany had spread already. Sarny were thus reinforced, and, shortly the city of Zhytomir had been re-taken from the Russian forces by the army, on February 24. This put the army again in sight of Kiev, with the other approach, from Berdychiv, still in Russian hands. All Western approaches to Kiev came into Ukrainian hands after Berdychiv was taken after a short fierce battle. The way towards Kiev lay open. The first contact with a train of German troops was made about this time.¹⁵⁸

On February 25, the Ukrainian Government addressed a declaration to the people of the Ukraine in which it stated that in helping the Government in its struggle with aggressors, the armies did nothing inimical to the Ukraine.¹⁵⁹ The Ukrainian delegation issued an explanation in a like manner.

Returning to Zhytomir, the Central Rada passed laws which finally formalized the Ukrainian National Republic. The new calendar was introduced, as was Ukrainian money and the state seal. A law of citizenship was passed. At the same time, the Government instituted a new territorial-administrative division of the Ukraine.¹⁶⁰

At the same time, Germany moved to ratify the Treaty of Peace with the Ukraine. The Main Committee of the Reichstag considered the Treaty in session on February 21. The Treaty was accepted by the votes of all, including Social-Democrats, except for the Independent Social-Democrats, where Cohn and Ledebour voted against the Treaty. The Poles were extremely critical of the Treaty and were absent during the vote.¹⁶¹ Next day, February 23, 1918, the Treaty with Ukraine was ratified by the Reichstag by all votes except for those of the Poles and the Independent Social-Democrats again.¹⁶² The Poles were of course dissatisfied with the provisions of the Treaty in regard to Kholm, while the Independent Social-Democrats appeared to be more sympathetic to the Russian Bolsheviks than the Ukrainian Socialists.

In the meantime, the pressure upon Russia was rising. When the Soviet government had accepted German terms, Stalin wrote on behalf of the Soviet of Commissars to the People's Commissariat. In it, Stalin declared that what the 'Germans want is not Vynnychenko, but the exchange of manufactures for grain and ores.' As he said:

We are all of the opinion that your People's Secretariat should send its own delegation to Brest and declare that if Vynnychenko's adventure is not supported by the Austrians and Germans, the People's Secretariat will not object to the basic provisions of the treaty concluded by the former Kiev Rada.

The note went on to inquire whether the Secretariat would send the delegates, and whether they shared 'our view' of the 'acceptability of the Vynnychenko treaty, but without Vynnychenko and his gang'.¹⁶³ The proposition was accepted: Zatonsky informed Brest-Litovsk on February 27, that the Soviet delegation was on its way to Brest-Litovsk to validate the Ukrainian Treaty.¹⁶⁴ Hoffmann, who had consulted the Ukrainian Delegation in Brest-Litovsk, informed Ludendorff of Zatonsky's initiative and the Ukrainian protest over it,¹⁶⁵ suggesting that the telegram not be acknowledged. Ludendorff agreed. Hoffmann argued that the Rada was a legitimate government.¹⁶⁶

The Foreign Office agreed. However, Kuehlmann took this opportunity to attempt to check the Ukrainian policy of counter-poising Germany and her civil and military interests versus Austria-Hungary, and her interests. Thus, he wired to the Foreign Office representative, Rosenberg, that he was agreeable that the wireless call be ignored. However, he added, if the 'Rada delegates were to attempt further to work with Austro-Hungarians at our costs', they were to be told at an opportune occasion that the 'People's Secretariat, if it would sign the Ukrainian Peace, and place itself on the basis of an independent Ukraine it would represent a government with which one could work eventually'.¹⁶⁷

The advance of the Ukrainian forces was assisted by the uncertainty in the Soviet Russian rear.

Antonov specifically states that a wave of uprisings rolled through the Russian-occupied territory. In particular, Antonov mentions those in Lyubotyn, Slavyansk, Katerynoslav, Elisavethrad and Rostov. The territory covered seems to embrace the entire Left-Bank Ukraine.¹⁶⁸ Antonov describes the events in Elisavethrad, an important Southern city, and the surrounding district. Village administrations issued anti-Russian proclamations, and appeals for resistance. The uprising in Elisavethrad was successful, and resulted in a conclusive suppression of the Russian regime in this area, several hundred miles from the location of the Ukrainian government.¹⁶⁹ Sklyarenko, a

Bolshevik writer, agreed with Antonov, though rather grudgingly. He writes that 'there were cases when counter-revolutionary uprisings, organized by the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, kulaks, while Guardists had sprung up in the rear of the Soviet troops.'¹⁷⁰

Occasionally, the character of the troops can be surmised from contemporary Soviet sources. *Vestnik Ukrainskoy Narodnoy Respubliki*, a Bolshevik newspaper, reported on the struggle for Berdychiv, on February 22, 1918, stating that the battle continued with detachments of Ukrainian troops (*haydamaks* in the text), consisting of four trains, and an armoured train. The detachment consisted, for the most part, of 'former officers'.¹⁷¹ There is no reference at all to any non-Ukrainian troops. The Soviet sources refer to the troops most often as 'German-Vynnychenko bands', as did Kotsyubynsky and the 'Kiev Soviet' in Poltava in the reports of March 5,¹⁷² or as Austro-Germans.¹⁷³ A typical description of the character of the warfare is contained in a futile appeal of the 'Mobilization Department' of the People's Secretariat issued on February 24, three days before the flight from Kiev. It was reported that the 'chieftains of the robbers' nest of the Central Rada, recently thrown out of here; are going towards Kiev'. They 'think of destroying the workers, soldiers and peasants in the Ukraine with the help of the German annexationists'.¹⁷⁴

The relief force moving towards Kiev was basically Ukrainian. The fact that the immediate fighting force was the Ukrainian army is shown by the report of the People's Secretariat to the Soviet of People's Commissars of Russia, dated February 27, 1918. Ukrainian troops are indicated by the term *haydamaki*.

The character of the advance: in the front, organized detachments of *haydamaki* of mixed composition, with a large number of Russian, German, Ukrainian, Austrian, Polish, Hungarian officers — a true international of the armed bourgeoisie. Behind them, go to the *haydamak* troops built up for the most part of Galicians, Western Ukrainians, and Ukrainians—prisoners-of-war from Austria and Germany.

Behind them follow the purely German troops and the vanguard *haydamak* units supported by two German regiments.¹⁷⁵

The report is obviously incorrect about the Austro-Hungarian troops; as seen from a report by Hoffmann, Austria-Hungary had barely crossed the Zbruch River at this time. However, the Ukrainian character of the troops directed to recover Kiev appears indisputable. The German troops appeared in a reserve capacity, having no battle contact with the Russian troops. Their number, at least in the area of the immediate fighting, appears to have been very small, in the neighbourhood of two regiments. Antonov described the loss of the city by the Russian forces.

Kiev was abandoned, it appears, without sufficient grounds, without a worthy defence. Kikvidze (a Russian commander), after a 'successful' three-day long battle with the *haydamak* (Ukrainian) vanguards near Berdychiv, passed through Kiev without pausing—some resistance to the Germans was shown only by an insignificant detachment of Comrade Chudnovskiy—and immediately, having lost all contact with the enemy, (Kikvidze) stationed his detachment, upward to 2,000 bayonets near Romodan.¹⁷⁶

The actual change of government in the city of Kiev, and the consequent re-establishment of Ukrainian power in the capital, took place in an unusual fashion, the telephone playing the key role. On February 28, the Russian military authorities under the command of Antonov attempted to get in touch with the Central Executive Committee in Kiev. As mentioned before in reply to a request on the matter, the local Kiev authorities replied, 'The Secretariat of the Ukraine left Kiev in the night between the 27th to the 28th in an unknown direction (*neizvestno kuda*)'.¹⁷⁷

The flight of the Russian authorities from Kiev, including the People's Secretariat, is corroborated by D'Aux, a member of the French Military Mission, in his memoirs.

En silence, les Bolchéviques évacuent la ville.... Tous les Soviet et l'état-major sont partis. Il n'existe plus la moindre autorité.¹⁷⁸

On the same day, the local Kiev authorities (in this case the City Duma) received notification from Petlura as a Ukrainian military commander that his troops were near, and that he would enter the city shortly. The Kiev Duma, officially took over and entrusted the Georgian National Committee, as a neutral body with the defence of the city until the arrival of the Ukrainian troops.¹⁷⁹ It is significant that the Kiev Duma did not undertake the defence of the City itself, but gave it to a 'neutral' party. The reason for this was probably the feeling that the Kiev Duma, representing the strongly Russified element of the city, as against the Ukrainians of the countryside, should not antagonize the Ukrainian elements, which shared with the Georgians the feature that they were not Russian. The responsibility of defending the city was immediately assumed by the Ukrainian authorities on the re-occupation of the city on March 1, 1918.¹⁸⁰ The Soviet regime in the City had lasted 19 days. The People's Secretariat had stayed in the City officially from February 12 to February 27, or a little over two weeks. The Central Executive Committee does not appear to have gathered in Kiev at all.

The fall of Kiev was announced to Petrograd and to the world by Muravyov in the open wireless message sent on the afternoon of March 1. Muravyov told of the 'almost peaceful occupation of Kiev by *haydamaky* (Ukrainian troops), Austrian Ukrainians and others'. He gave as reasons for this 'easy fall of Kiev', the 'complete disorganization of the Soviet power, which consisted of the People's Secretariat in the Ukraine, as well as because of (the latter's) self-seeking intrigues'. According to Muravyov, Kotsyubynsky declared that he did not recognize Krylenko as Supreme Commander, but that 'he alone was the Commander-in-Chief for the Ukraine'. This had been strongly 'demoralizing' for the troops. Another reason, according to Muravyov, was the 'narrow-minded nationalism', on the part of the Peoples Secretariat, which 'had the effect that everyone in the Ukraine felt that they belonged, not to the (all-Russian) Federation, but to the Ukraine'.¹⁸¹ Hence the fact that the troops 'which were not accounted to be Ukrai-

nians' had been poorly supplied. Muravyov requested that Kotsyubynsky and others be submitted to a 'revolutionary' or a 'party tribunal'. Although the accusation by Muravyov of Kotsyubynsky and others of 'narrow-minded nationalism' may be discounted, as due to the extremely centralist tendencies of Muravyov himself, his reference to the 'easy fall of Kiev', and the widespread patriotism of Ukrainians is of some interest. In this way Ukrainian power in the Capital was re-established.

During the existence of the People's Secretariat, its importance was generally recognized. Thus the Bolshevik newspaper of Kharkiv, *Donetskiy Proletariy*, characterized the People's Secretariat in retrospect.

As far as the Central Executive Committee of Ukraine is concerned, enjoying the career of a tourist at the present time, its comically pathetic role testifies eloquently to its most complete impotence in the solution of political problems. Inclinations of an emigrant which had forced the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine to throw the anchor off peacefulness, after a variety of acting engagements in Rostov, foreign to its influence, these condemn ahead of time all its plans to the most complete lack of success and dissolution. The Central Rada leaves its authority and existence completely out of account.¹⁸²

A somewhat similar view was held by the official newspaper of the government of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic, *Izvestiya Yuga*, which wrote in its editorial in mid-March that the Soviet power of the Ukraine lacked a 'solid basis from the first days of its existence', not possessing 'its own organized power'.

Now when the defeated Rada attempts with the aid of the German bayonet to renew its power, the Soviet power in the Ukraine represented by the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine and the Secretariat have remained without any support from the (even) slightly organized classes of Society. The Soviet power has lost for the nearest future, the agricultural Ukraine completely.¹⁸³

The Bolsheviks from Katerynoslav, too, characterized the behaviour of the Committee as 'the playing at government

of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine'.¹⁸⁴

Still later, the official newspaper of the Donets-Kryvyi-Rih Republic declared that 'to link one's fate with the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine, would be to put oneself in dependence upon a corpse'.¹⁸⁵

The People's Secretariat itself was quite conscious of its lack of any influence in the Ukraine. Thus, in early March, the People's Secretaries Kviring, Lipshyts and Luganoskiy proposed for the consideration of the 'government' a resolution for full liquidation of the People's Secretariat in view of its impotence.

To recognize that the Soviet power has no ground under it whatsoever at this moment. To reach agreement with the Rada on the following conditions: 1) that Soviets of Workers' Deputies be allowed as centre of organization of workers' masses; 2) that there should be no persecution whatsoever of Bolsheviks, and that they be assured legal possibility of their activity.

The resolution was accepted by the 'government' in a formal meeting.¹⁸⁶ However, although the resolution was not withdrawn, Skrypnyk claimed in his memoirs that the majority for the resolution was accidental.¹⁸⁷ This does not appear to be correct, as the People's Secretariat approved by the vote of 4 against 3, with 2 abstaining, the submergence of the Committee in the membership of the Central Rada, in mid-March.

The Soviet power in the Ukraine, established with the help of the armed revolutionary proletariat—chiefly Great Russian, possesses hardly any local forces as the basis for the existence of the Soviet power.

It was held that further struggle with the army of the Central Rada would lead inevitably to the weakening of the democratic position of the Central Rada and might establish the situation where the Fourth Universal might be lost. For this reason, it was necessary to establish peace with the Central Rada uniting its existing membership with the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine elected at the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, and to realize, with com-

mon effort, the principles stated in the Fourth Universal.¹²⁸ The resolution, however, while demonstrating the weakness of the People's Secretariat, was not presented to the Second Congress of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, a non-representative body summoned by Bolsheviks which proclaimed the Soviet Ukrainian Republic independent. The defeatism of the People's Secretariat, its actual lack of influence, and realization of the same by its friends, foes and by itself emerges from the detailed examination of the situation.

The People's Secretariat was not to re-emerge from obscurity in any distinct fashion for the rest of its existence after the Kievan debacle. Finally judgment on its importance and influence may be left to the institutions which actually created it: the Soviet of Commissars of Petrograd, and the Communist party. Stalin, the People's Secretary for the Nationalities Affairs of the Russian Republic, who in virtue of his office had direct responsibility for the People's Secretariat, had stated in early April, no doubt with full justification to Zatonsky, the Head of the Central Executive Committee of Ukraine and a People's Secretary at this time.

Enough of playing at government and Republic; it would seem to be enough; it is time to drop the game (*pora kynyty hru*).¹²⁹

The judgment of Stalin on the importance of the People's Secretariat in the period examined found support in that of the First Congress of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine held in Moscow in July.

In its resolution 'On the People's Secretariat', it concluded that due to a variety of reasons, it was not able to 'become, in the period of civil war in Ukraine, its organizing centre' and considered that its very existence at the time was 'a harmful fiction'. The Congress took action, again demonstrating the fictitious nature of the 'government'. Thus, the party resolved to 'declare the People's Secretariat dissolved'.¹³⁰ In this manner, this ill-starred organization finished its existence. The same fate overcame the other 'governments' in the Ukraine; the Odessa Republic fell with the city; the Donets-

Kryvyi-Rih Republic also fell, but its 'government' was maintained in Russia for another year.

The night after the recovery of the capital, the Ukrainian Premier, Holubovych, arrived at Brest-Litovsk for discussions with the authorities of the Central Powers, though primarily with the Germans, both the military and civilians. Ukrainian demands dealt primarily with two matters. Firstly, according to the report of Rosenberg, a German diplomatic representative to Berlin, they stated that they did not wish to see the Bessarabian question solved 'without the participation of the Ukrainian government'. Ukrainian territorial demands on Bessarabia, or part of it, were brought out here. The other matter was the question of the withdrawal of German troops. Ukrainians asked for a statement from the German government showing the intention to withdraw them from the Ukraine, should the wish be expressed. This was important from the point of the view of public opinion in the Ukraine, and for the Rada which was 'in session in Zhytomir', and was to transfer to Kiev. There was to be an exchange of telegrams relevant to this problem between Holubovych and Hertling, the Premier and the Chancellor respectively. Rosenberg also stated in his report that General Hoffmann, who had contacted the High Command on the matter, was agreeable to the exchange Rosenberg and he agreed, providing the telegram beyond Kiev. (Rosenberg had also informed Berlin that would apply solely to such assistance which might be given further movement in an eastward direction was to be halted while attention shifted toward the occupation of the South to the goal of Odessa).

The text of the telegram exchange agreed to between Holubovych and the German representatives at Brest-Litovsk was approved by Hertling on March 3, and was immediately published. It is of interest that no position was taken in Berlin upon the expressed by Hoffmann's proviso on behalf of the High Command, indicating that the German Government either wished to ignore the matter, which is the more likely possibility, or perhaps did not dare to open the question. At

any rate, the public interchange of telegrams did not provide for any limitation, nor were Ukrainians informed of any such limitation upon the main topic of the exchange. The credit of the German Government was thus clearly engaged in the undertakings assumed.

In the exchange, Holubovych stated to Hertling that he was using the opportunity of the single day in Brest-Litovsk, to inform him that the troops of the Rada had come again into 'our old and our new Capital' and had been warmly welcomed by the population. The liberation of the Capital and of the Land was also a result of the support 'which we had asked for from the Government of your Excellency'. Holubovych then thanked Hertling in the name of the Ukrainian people and their government.

Hertling, on the other hand, said that he had learned of the liberation of the 'old venerable Kiev, the Capital of the Ukraine'. He was in agreement with the German people, he felt, that German troops could take part in the liberation of the Ukrainian people. 'Let the (Ukrainian people) be ever destined to have the freedom and the right to live in peace according to their own law and inclination'. Regarding the German troops in the Ukraine, the Chancellor told Holubovych, 'Ich darf Ihren Mitteilungen entgegensehen, sobald Sie glauben, dass das Werk der deutschen Truppen vollendet ist und der Befehl zu ihrer Zurueckziehung unbedenklich gegeben werden kann'.¹⁹¹

This guarantee of evacuation of German troops on request of the Ukrainian government is of great importance. The German government was bound, by public opinion and diplomatic usage, to withdraw their troops on Ukrainian demand. Whatever may have been the views of the High Command, there does not appear to be sufficient reason to doubt the good faith of both Governments. Further discussions on the matter followed. On March 22, Mumm met Holubovych, the Head of the Council of Ministers, Lyubynsky and Sydorenko. Lyubynsky declared that the time had arrived to settle the details on the conditions of the arrival of German troops, and 'at the

same time to estimate the final date for the evacuation'. Mumm replied that he would consult with Berlin on the matter. Lyubynsky also revealed that a note was being prepared for Austria-Hungary, asking it to withdraw its troops.¹⁹²

On March 24, the Obost, the Command of the Eastern Front, reported to the Supreme Headquarters that Mumm, German Ambassador to the Ukraine, stated that it should proclaim as return for the military aid, its disinterest in Bessarabia, and concessions in military field. Obost, that is, Hoffmann, thought that the upkeep of troops should also be included, in addition.¹⁹³ This expression of opinion was on the lines of Hoffmann's suggestion in late February. At that time, Hoffmann had stated to the Ukrainian Delegation that armed assistance was being extended only to Kiev, and not any farther. He also asked that the Foreign Office begin negotiations with Ukrainians in that sense. What Hoffmann had in mind was negotiations for recompense to Germany, which was to be economic in nature; while the 'blood' of German soldiers could not be equated with gain, still he held, together with others, that Germans had a claim on certain payments to be negotiated.¹⁹⁴

On March 25, Holubovych sent a schema on the 'Convention on Military Assistance' to Mumm, who forwarded it to Berlin. Point Six of the schema was to concern the 'total non-interference of German power in the internal affairs of our Republic'. Point Seven referred to the 'export of all kinds of goods from the Ukrainian state territory'. Further points considered the strength of the German troops, their increase or their decrease. And finally, Point Ten 'dealt with the time at which the evacuation of German troops from the Ukraine was to occur, and in what way'.¹⁹⁵ The Central Powers were given notice that the evacuation of their troops was considered an opportune issue, resulting, no doubt, from the consolidation of the authority of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Treaty of Peace between the Ukraine and the Central Powers was ratified by the Rada in Kiev, in the meeting of March 17, 1918, the first anniversary of the formation of

the Rada.¹⁹⁶ It should be noted that the representatives of the national minorities, the Jewish people, Russians and Poles held their former representation in the Ukrainian Central Rada when it transferred its seat from Zhytomir to Kiev. The general attitude of minority parties towards the Republic remained quite favorable. Thus, *Naie Tseit* stated in an editorial, 'We are citizens of the Ukrainian National Republic, and we shall defend the social and national gains of the free revolutionary Ukraine'.¹⁹⁷

The meeting took place in the presence of members of all Ukrainian, Jewish and Russian parties (except the Bolsheviks), and the Polish group. The Treaty was ratified by the Small Rada, with 7 dissenting votes, including the Russian Social Democrats, Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Bund and the Polish Centre.¹⁹⁸

The Polish Centre voted against the Treaty on the incorporation of the provinces of Kholm and neighbouring districts. Zionists, however, warmly supported the Ukrainian interest in the matter of Kholm. Syrkin, the leader of Zionists, noted down in May, 'In all conflicts which should occur before the peace congress between Poland and the Ukraine with regard to the border lands, we the Jews must stand on the side of the democratic Ukrainian National Republic. If Poland were to want to extend its power to the land of the former Lublin Union, we the Jews must apply all influence to prevent it from doing so... just as in the struggle between centralist Russia and the free principle of federation we have taken the part of the free autonomous Ukraine'.¹⁹⁹ Of the other parties, the Bund voted against it. Rafes again declared, "By your peace, you have sold the Russian people and the border peoples of Russia".²⁰⁰ However, the prevailing part of the Rada voted for the ratification.

The Treaty was approved of in the Ukrainian lands within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation had called a Congress of Notables of the Ukrainian Nation of Galicia in Lviv, for March 25, 1918. All Ukrainian political parties were represented at the meeting.

In its resolutions, the Congress described the Peace of Brest-Litovsk as the first step towards the self-determination of the Ukrainian people. It demanded the immediate realization of the Treaty, and in particular, its ratification in Austria-Hungary. The Congress also demanded from Austria the immediate transfer to the Ukrainian National Republic, as agreed in the Treaty, of the Ukrainian territories of Kholm and Pidlyashya. The Congress also stressed (what was already part of the Secret Treaty) that the national and historical rights of the Ukrainian population of Galicia and Bukovyna demanded that the Kingdom of Galicia, as the inheritance of the former Halych-Volodymyria Kingdom, be immediately freed from administrative connection with the Polish territories of Western Galicia, in particular with those of the Grand Duchy of Krakow and the Duchies of Oswecim and Zator, and that a separate state body be formed from the Ukrainian lands of Galicia and Bukovyna.²⁰¹

The Ukrainian Central Rada, also recognized the elections of all 172 deputies of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly as valid for the territories where they were elected, and ordered the elections of deputies from other gubernias, by the votes of Ukrainian and Jewish parties against the Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists, Independents and of the Polish Democratic Centre.²⁰²

The Ukrainian Republic, with its government in the traditional capital of the Ukraine, and with a large part of its territory in effective occupation, was quickly consolidating itself. The situation of the Ukrainian Republic was admittedly difficult; its territory was still in part occupied by Soviet Russia, with which the Republic was at war. The easternmost city of Kharkiv did not pass from Russian hands for another month or so, on April 7. The troops of states with whom the Republic had been recently at war were still in the land, and above all, the states were largely unsympathetic to the aims of freedom and democracy, the aims of the Ukrainian government; there were also economic and social problems. However, despite all that, the situation was full of hope after the libera-

tion of Kiev on the first day of March. The Ukrainian Republic existed, it was independent, it was at peace, there was some hope of non-interference, and that the exchange of goods, including the million tons of grain, would not be entirely disadvantageous to Ukraine. The Ukraine had passed through a traumatic experience; earlier discussion has shown the depth of revulsion caused by the Russian Bolshevik reign of terror in Kiev, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav and Odessa. This seemed to be 'all over in the early spring, while the Rada with its seemingly fumbling but un-bloodied democracy was about to resume sessions in the liberated Capital of the Ukrainian Republic.

The actual international tendencies of the Ukrainian National Republic were developed in a series of newspaper articles written by Hrushevsky, the President of the Ukrainian Central Rada, and reprinted separately as well. In addition to his position, the immense personal reputation of Hrushevsky as a historian and as a leader of Ukrainian public opinion, suffice to make the considered expression of his views indicative of the trend of opinion and policy in the Ukraine. In these articles, Hrushevsky stated that the end of the 'Muscovite orientation' of the Ukraine had occurred. The final aim of the new orientation was proclaimed to be a 'world federation'. The first step for the Ukraine towards this federation, as dictated by its geographic, economic and cultural position, should be the 'economic and cultural cooperation of the nations of the Black Sea'. It was the Black Sea which united the various lands, which could make up each others' deficiencies. These Black Sea countries, establishing contact, would form an 'exceedingly rich, great and many-sided economic unit'. The old trade routes to India, to Central Asia, to China, to the Persian Gulf, the Syrian coast, Arabia and Egypt—these routes were to be renewed and organized in modern technical forms by means of the local nations. It would be necessary for Ukrainians, or other local peoples not to be only the 'carriers and toilers';²⁰³ 'traffic should be in the hands of the lands through which it goes'. The Ukrainian nation being 'one of the most

orientalized' western nations, like the Bulgarians, Serbs and Spaniards, must not neglect their oriental heritage.²⁰¹ However, the 'school for the Ukraine' was described as being in the west:

Germany and the United States of America—here are the two great schools for us, Germany being more theoretical, America being more practical. The German text-book will be certainly the foremost Ukrainian text-book, and all who look for a more general education and deepening in their specialization would turn there. But as a practical workshop, as a practical school, America would probably predominate.

It is of interest that Hrushevsky, as the President of the legislature of the Ukrainian National Republic, should direct the attention of the Ukrainian public to the United States of America, the country at war at the moment with the lands whose troops were present in the Republic. Still, it appears that Hrushevsky's policy foresaw the United States as an ultimate partner of the projected Black Sea understanding. Hrushevsky was particularly concerned with the possibility that the routes through the Black Sea region would be exploited in the interests of German penetration to the east. Hence Hrushevsky cautioned, as may be seen, that the local nations would not be satisfied with being the passive elements, a necessity for the realization of the vast German concepts. Contact with the United States as the rival of the *Mitteleuropa* complex, would be essential in the development of the Ukraine as an active element, in any compact of nations in the region.

Hrushevsky could write of the United States of America, in March-April 1918, as follows:

This land will doubtlessly have for our future an immense importance—by its extraordinary financial and technical means as well as a school for our people, for the future generations of our technologists, economists and statesmen. More democratic than any other European nation, more full of initiative, more daring in thought and realization, this nation can teach our cadres of workers and statesmen in many fields.²⁰⁵

In this manner then, the leading cares of the Ukrainian National Republic broke decisively with the 'Russian tradition' and were exploring new ways for the Ukraine to develop as a state within the family of nations, the latter still bitterly divided and at the high point of the immense conflicts of the First World War and the East-European Revolution.

The Ukrainian National Republic, having developed internally in constitution and externally in diplomacy, and having in the process consolidated its sovereignty had completed its period of formation and entered as an equal into the world community of states.

NOTES

1. Tron'ko, P. T. (ed.), *Bor'ba za vlast' sovetov na Kievshchine. (Mart 1917 g. — Fevral' 1918 g.) Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Kiev, 1957, p. 533.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 534.
3. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 285.
4. Shulhyn, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
5. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 327.
6. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 127.
7. Tcherikover, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
8. Goldelman, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
9. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 327.
10. Antonov-Ovseyenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 155.
11. The telegram from Stalin was picked up by German military intelligence at the radio station at Koenigsberg, at 10:08 a.m. Petrograd time (9:00 a.m. Central European time). *Ukraine*, 1918. Doc. No. A 6441.
12. Lapchinskiy, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-8. There appears to be a systematic attempt, in recent Soviet historiography, to imply that the troops entered Kiev on February 8, 1918, rather than on February 9, 1918, probably in an attempt to prove that the Treaty of Peace was not valid.
13. D'Aux, René, "Un an en Ukraine", *Revue hebdomadaire*, No. 37, Vol. XIX, New Series, pp. 166-204, p. 198.
14. Tabouis, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-4. Order No. 14 appears in its most complete form in the memoirs of Tabouis. The text may be also consulted in English translation from Tabouis: Muravyov, M., "Order No. 14," *The New Review*, No. 1, 1964, p. 50.
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16. Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 340.

17. Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 149; Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 340; Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 299; Goldelman, *op. cit.*, p. 32; Tcherikover, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Goldenveyzer, A. A., "Iz Kievskikh Vospominaniy (1917-1921 gg.)", *Arkhiv Russkoy Revolyutsii*, Vol. VI, 1922, pp. 161-303, p. 206. Goldenveyzer also noted that Order No. 14 had been criticized by Rafe in an article entitled "Bayonetocracy" ("Shtykokratiya") in a contemporaneous Kiev newspaper; see Goldenveyzer, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
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180. The date of occupation of the city appears from the statement of Rosenberg, a German diplomatic official, who, in his report of March 2, 1918 stated that Kiev had been occupied 'yesterday'; see, *Ukraine*, 1918, Doc. No. A 9470.
181. The wireless message of Muravyov had been sent on March 1 at 4:10 p.m., March 1 at 5:15 p.m. and March 2 at 8:26 p. m. It appeared in various forms (*précis*, translations) in the following documents: *Ukraine*, 1918, Doc. No. A 9465, Doc. No. A 9424, Doc. No. A 9964. The same wireless message is re-worded in Antonov, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 11-12.
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