

THE UKRAINE

*THE GRANARY
OF EUROPE*

E. BAGNALL-BULL, C.B.E.

18,500,000 TONS *of* WHEAT
and other Cereals and
1,670,000 TONS *of* SUGAR
produced annually in
the Ukraine before
the War

The early settlement
of the Ukraine is of
vital importance in the
economic reconstruc-
tion of Europe



75 CORNWALL GARDENS
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THE UKRAINE

The Granary of Europe

Of the former States of the Russian Empire which have, since the revolution of 1917, declared their independence none is so important to the future peace of the world as the Ukraine.

THE Allies having already recognised the independence and sovereignty of Poland and Finland, and the *de facto* Governments of six other States included within the former Russian Empire; it does appear to be somewhat inconsistent and contrary to the principles of the League of Nations Covenant for recognition to be withheld in the case of the Ukraine, whose claims for independence are as substantial and legitimate as those of the more fortunate, though, perhaps, less important States in question.

In addition to Poland, the independence of the following former States of the old Russian Empire has been recognised :—

	Territory. sq. miles.	Population.
Finland..	.. 126,000	3,300,000
Esthonia	.. 18,500	1,750,000
Latvia 25,000	2,500,000
Lithuania	.. 49,000	6,000,000
Georgia	.. 35,000	3,000,000
Azerbaidjan	.. 39,000	4,500,000
Armenia	.. 125,000	4,000,000

THE UKRAINE HAS THE SECOND LARGEST TERRITORY OF ANY OTHER EUROPEAN NATION.

THE UKRAINE occupies a territory of approximately 300,000 sq. miles, compared with :—

	sq. miles.
Great Britain ..	121,400
France ..	207,000
Italy ..	110,500
Germany ..	209,000

THE UKRAINE has a population of nearly 40,000,000 inhabitants, compared with :—

Great Britain	45,407,000
Germany	65,000,000
France	39,000,000

It is submitted that if, in the judgment of the Supreme Peace Council, recognition in the case of eight States was deemed to be in the interests, firstly, of the resettlement of the internal economic and political conditions of the States themselves ; and, secondly, as a step in the direction of the ultimate settlement of the Russian problem, then it must necessarily follow that by the recognition of the Ukraine (whose legitimate claims to be recognised as an independent sovereign State can be established, both on ethnographic, historical, geographical, political and economic grounds) a further stage in the settlement of Russia—and, *therefore, in the future peace of the world*—will have been reached.

SOME ECONOMIC FACTS.

The national income of the Ukraine before the war reached	£	265,000,000
Wheat, sugar and agricultural products amounted to		158,000,000
Livestock		26,500,000
Mining—		
Iron, etc. ..		23,000,000
Coal ..		14,500,000
Dairy produce		3,000,000
Forestry ..		4,500,000
Manufactures		30,500,000
Other sources		5,000,000

THE RECOGNITION OF THE UKRAINE AS AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE FUTURE PEACE OF EASTERN EUROPE.

THE UKRAINE occupies a strong strategic position in Eastern Europe, *and a key position on the way from Central Europe to Asia, Persia and India.* By recognising the independence of the Ukraine, it will be possible to consolidate both the economic and political situation in that part of the world (Eastern Europe) which is causing so much anxiety at the present time. Poland, for example, would immediately derive an enormous advantage by the early settlement of the Ukraine question. The Ukraine being now in the temporary occupation of the Bolsheviks, Poland

is compelled to maintain a big army, which is concentrated along the whole of her extensive eastern border, in order to combat the menace of invasion by the Bolshevik forces. The political resettlement and the economic reconstruction of Poland are being thereby retarded, because not only is this large army a drain upon the wealth of the country, which Poland is not in a position to sustain, but labour is being withheld from more useful and necessary work in the general rehabilitation of the Polish State. The existing state of affairs in Poland cannot possibly continue for long, otherwise there will be a fearful upheaval among the labouring classes, which will, in sheer desperation, turn Bolshevik as a possible way out from the terrible economic conditions prevailing in that country through the high and still rising costs of living.

LANDMARKS IN THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT.

It is unnecessary within the compass of this Memorandum to delve deeply into the history of the Ukraine; but to record here some of the political events connected with the struggles which have gone on uninterruptedly for over 250 years against the Centralistic Governments, first in Moscow, and then in Petrograd, will show to what extent the present movement for independence is no fresh manifestation on the part of the Ukrainian people.

The first important landmark in the history of the Ukraine is the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654). By this Treaty Chmielnitzky, the Hetman of the Ukraine, accepted the Muscovite Tsar as the Protector of the Republic, but the Ukraine retained complete self-government, and also the right of maintaining its own diplomatic representatives abroad. By degrees, however, its autonomous privileges were curtailed, much as were those of Finland at a later period, under the despotic centralisation favoured by a succession of autocratic Tsars, until the Ukraine, as happened in the case of the other Border States, was completely deprived of all semblance of autonomy.

The revolt led by Mazeppa against Peter the Great, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, was the first of the long series of struggles by the Ukrainians to regain their freedom. Then followed the risings against the oppressive rule of Catherine the Second. The Ukrainian people to this day revile the memory of Catherine the Second, because it was during her reign (about 1770) that the Ukrainian people were deprived of all effective voice in the government of their country, and the most oppressive and ruthless measures were adopted to suppress all movements on the part of the people to regain their liberties.

At the commencement of the nineteenth century, political groups and societies were formed throughout the Ukraine, and met in secret to formulate a common programme for securing their freedom. These political groups were persecuted, and the majority of the leaders condemned to long terms of imprisonment in the prisons of Siberia, while others fled to foreign countries for protection.

In the year 1876 was promulgated the Ukase which prohibited the publication of all books and newspapers printed in the Ukrainian language, the object of which was to stifle all national propaganda, in which respect it succeeded. These conditions existed right up to 1905—the year of the first Russian Revolution. In 1906 was convoked the first Duma, before which the deputies sent from the Ukraine repeated afresh the demands which were contained in the programme prepared by the political groups in 1820, and which was regarded in the light of a “Magna Charta” by the Ukrainian people.

In reviewing the political events which preceded the great Revolution of 1917, it is interesting to recall a striking passage which occurred in a speech delivered in the Fourth Duma, in February, 1914, by Milioukoff, leader of the Cadet Party:—

“You close the mouths of the people, and then you say they ask for nothing, that they are quiet. . . .”

“The Ukrainian movement *does exist*. We cannot stay it or change it. . . .”

“The Ukrainian movement has been invented by no one; the Ukrainian movement exists and will exist, and all attempts to deny it will be fruitless. . . .”

“LITTLE RUSSIA.”

The policy outlined by Peter the Great, and studiously followed by his successors, to erase altogether the name of the Ukraine from the map of Europe, and eventually from the recollection of all foreign peoples, has succeeded beyond what even Peter the Great himself must have considered possible at that time. Peter the Great substituted for the name Ukraine the name of “Little Russia,” and henceforward the people were known as “Little Russians.” Few there were outside Russia, or at all events in Western Europe, who up to 1917 had heard of the name of the Ukraine, and fewer still knew that “Little Russia” was merely the name given by Peter the Great in order to further his political scheme in “Russifying” that great country which to-day comprises nearly forty million people.

The Ukraine being so little known to Western Europe, the support that the Ukrainians had a right to expect from the Peace Conference in regard to their claim for independence has probably suffered in consequence.

THE UKRAINE IS RICH IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND POSSESSES THE MOST FERTILE SOIL IN THE WORLD.

Geographically and economically, as the following statistics show, the Ukraine is capable of supporting herself as an independent nation. In normal peace times it is a land of plenty, possessing an enormously fertile soil in the famous "black earth." It is rich in natural resources and mineral wealth. The Ukraine possesses an extensive seaboard with docks and harbours, and is capable of forming a State and of developing its strength. The Ukraine is bound to play in the very near future an important rôle in economic relation to the world markets.

GRAIN.

On a five-years average (1909-1913) the annual quantity of the six staple grain crops *raised* in the Ukraine was :—

18,550,000 tons.

The annual quantity of grain *exported* from the Ukraine to countries outside Russia (on a five-years average) amounted to :—

4,360,000 tons (of which over 3,000,000 tons was wheat).

SUGAR.

In the year 1915 there were 216 beet sugar refineries in the Ukraine. The area under beet sugar culture was :—

1,640,000 acres.

The total output of sugar produced in the Ukraine for the year 1914-1915 was :—

1,672,000 tons.

The Ukraine, after allowing for home consumption, could export, annually, over 1,000,000 tons of sugar.

POTATOES.

In the year 1914-1915 there were raised in the Ukraine over :—

6,000,000 tons.

CATTLE, HORSES, Etc.

The agricultural census taken just before the war showed that there were in the Ukraine :—

8,100,000 horses,

27,600,000 horned cattle, sheep and goats,

6,300,000 pigs.

EXPORTS OF LIVESTOCK, Etc.

Before the war the annual export of livestock and meat, etc., amounted to:—

Horses	15,000 head.
Horned cattle	240,000 "
Hogs	130,000 "
Beef, poultry and pork ..	21,000 tons.
Eggs	65,000 "
Hides	6,500 "

COAL

Important and extensive coal measures are situated in the Ukraine:—

(a) Donetz coal district comprises an area of over 8,000 square miles.

(b) Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov—districts where large quantities of anthracite and steam coal are located.

IRON ORE.

The iron deposits which are being worked cover an area of over 33,000 acres. The ore mine contains from 60 to 70 per cent. of pure iron.

Within the districts of Kryvorozesk, Kirtchen, Ekaterinoslav and Kherson, there are extensive iron foundries.

For the year ending 1914, over 3,000,000 tons of pig iron was produced in the Ukraine.

MANGANESE.

The manganese mines of the Ukraine are the second richest in the world. The Ukraine before the war was one of the chief sources of supply for the steel-producing countries of Europe.

OTHER MINERAL DEPOSITS.

Salt, soda, kaolin (for manufacture of porcelain, china, etc.), clay (for manufacture of building bricks—there were in the Ukraine over 3,000 brick yards), marl and limestone (for the manufacture of cement), graphite, gypsum, phosphates, etc.

THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS NOW PREVAILING THROUGHOUT EUROPE.

Signor Nitti, the Premier of Italy, speaking in the Italian Chamber on March 22nd, repeated what every other European statesman had already said:—

"... the economic situation of Europe was tragic. A profound economic crisis was harassing nations and affecting the masses. Europe has two great sources of energy—(1) Russia, and (2) Germany; the former for raw materials, and the latter for transforming the material. . . ."

The root-cause of the labour unrest which is more or less general throughout Europe is the rising costs of living. Labour, promised a happier inheritance and a higher standard of comfort, imagines itself cheated of the fruits of its exertions, by the continually rising costs of living. The effect which this is having upon Labour is apparent. Labour is restive, and in such a mood is willing, as we have already seen, to use its forces not on the side of reconstruction but on the side of anarchy.

THE UKRAINE CAN RELIEVE THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CRISIS.

When Governments are asked to declare their policy and proposals to combat the causes which are responsible for the rising costs of living, it becomes a platitude, when there still exist untapped sources of food supplies, to declare that the present high costs are due to a world-shortage of commodities consequent upon the war.

Within the Ukraine there exist foodstuffs in quantities sufficient to alleviate the economic crisis prevailing throughout Europe to-day. The Ukraine is ready to place at the disposal of the Allies all the foodstuffs—wheat and other cereals—raw materials, etc., which have been concealed by the peasants since the German occupation in 1918.

The Ukrainian harvest of 1919 was, according to the report of the British Economic Mission, the best on record for the past fifty years. It was estimated that the yield was 33 per cent. higher than for the peace average.

On a five-years average (1909-1913), the annual production of grain in the Ukraine was :—

18,550,000 tons.

The Ukraine, up to the time of the Bolshevik Government, sent about 3,000,000 tons of grain annually to Russia.

In normal peace times the Ukraine exported about 4,360,000 tons of wheat and other cereals to countries outside of Russia.

A moderate estimate of the quantity of wheat and other cereals available for shipment, at present in the Ukraine, would, on the above figures, be from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 tons.

President Petlura, in a letter to A. Margolin, Chief of the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in the United Kingdom, wrote :—

" . . . the peasant sits on his grain as a hen sits on her eggs, and watches it, and becomes angry with anyone who he suspects is going to deprive him of his sole means of livelihood. . . . "

Great Britain possesses the means of inducing the peasant to part with his grain, either in exchange for manufactured goods—machinery, clothing, medical stores, manufactures of all descriptions—of which he is in great need—or of English money, which he knows would be accepted in payment for manufactured goods supplied to the Ukraine by other countries.

The recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian Republic by the Allies is both timely and necessary, for such recognition would strengthen the *authority of the Ukrainian National Government, which was constitutionally elected in 1918*, and enable the Government, in agreement with all the political parties of the Ukraine, to convoke the Constituent Assembly (which up to now the Bolsheviks have not allowed to assemble), and open up Peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks. While the present revolutionary struggle continues between the National Forces under Petlura and other leaders, on the one hand, and the Bolshevik forces on the other, it will be impossible to rehabilitate the economic life of the country and the stocks of wheat and grain, etc., which have been concealed by the Ukrainian peasants, will not be released for shipment to Western and Central Europe.

THE AMERICAN SOURCE OF WHEAT SUPPLIES.

To-day Europe, in the main, is dependent upon America to make up the wheat deficiency between what is needed and what is produced. In a recent circular issued by the French Minister for Agriculture, it was stated that :—

France requires annually for her					
needs	9	million	tons	of	wheat.
The 1919 harvest yielded only ..	5	"	"	"	"
Deficiency ..	4	"	"	"	"

The price of imported wheat in France in 1915 was 45·76 francs per quintal.

The price of imported wheat in France in 1919 was 93·72 francs per quintal.

The price of wheat from America is being affected :—

(1) By the ordinary economic law of supply and demand—there being a European shortage of wheat due to a much smaller production in those countries of Western and Central Europe which before the war were mainly self-supporting.

But the chief cause is due to the stoppage of supplies from the Ukraine.

(2) The adverse New York-Europe exchange.

In 1919 the wheat harvest in America was abnormally good, but what will happen should the harvest of 1920 or of 1921 be bad? The demand for wheat from Western and Central Europe during the next two years will be abnormal; afterwards, provided that Europe settles down and tackles earnestly the problems of reconstruction, the demand should begin to drop once again to normal. What of the position, however, during those two years?

In Europe, for the forthcoming year, it is anticipated that there will be a severe loss on acreage of wheat and rye. The loss is estimated at 12,000,000 acres.

	Acres less.				
France	4,000,000
Germany	2,000,000
Rumania	2,000,000
Austria and Hungary	3,000,000
Poland	1,000,000

In addition to the foregoing, *The United States Bureau Report* estimates a decrease in the yield of winter wheat from the United States of nearly
250,000,000 bushels (6 million tons).

Before the war wheat prices in this country were stabilised by the fact that a shortage in one part of the world was generally counterbalanced by a good harvest in another part of the globe; *but while the Ukrainian market remains closed, this safety valve is shut down.*

Wheat shipped from the Ukraine to Western and Central Europe would reduce, or augment, the quantity of wheat coming from America. In any case, wheat prices would be lowered, and the *price of the loaf* reduced in consequence. Further, the rate of exchange between New York and Europe would immediately commence to improve. The far-reaching economic effects of an improvement in the American rate of exchange upon the trade, industry and commerce throughout Great Britain and the rest of Europe are incalculable.

TRADE AND COMMERCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UKRAINE.

It is of importance, in view of the strategic position of the Ukraine in relation to the British Empire, that Great Britain should promote and foster the strongest ties of friendship possible between the Ukrainians and ourselves. The close relationship which results from trade and commerce is the best promoter of friendship, because the channels of trade will provide a common meeting-place for both nations.

The Ukraine offers the industries and shipping of Great Britain very great opportunities. Before the war, apart from the comparatively few English merchants collected mostly around Odessa, the Ukraine market for manufactured goods was neglected in this country. On the other hand, Germany established colonies within the Ukraine, and practically controlled the whole of the import trade for manufactured goods.

The Ukraine, being first and foremost an agricultural country, will be an exporting country for grain, sugar, dairy produce and raw materials, and in exchange will import manufactured goods. The large population, nearly 40,000,000, which is almost equal to the population of the whole of South America—should afford enormous scope for every branch of British industry, and the Ukraine should become one of Britain's best customers.

MINING.

The mining industry now being carried on within the Ukraine is capable of considerable development, and British mining engineers should find a big opportunity for their enterprise.

RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION.

The railway system of the Ukraine was neglected by the Centralistic Government of Petrograd, and those railways that were built were not constructed with a view to local and economic requirements, but for military and strategic purposes. Consequently we find that the principal railways in the Ukraine converge, not on the Black Sea ports, which are the natural outlets for the Ukraine, but on Moscow and through to the Baltic ports. This is strikingly borne out by the two railways which serve Kiev (the capital of the Ukraine) and Odessa. The direct distance between these two places is 290 miles, but the Western Railway takes a circuitous route of 408 miles, while the Eastern line takes a still more circuitous route of over 450 miles.

A better idea of the inadequacy of the railway system of the Ukraine is obtained by comparing the systems of other countries :—

				Area.	
				sq. miles.	Miles of Rly.
Great Britain	121,400	23,500
Germany	209,000	31,000
France	207,000	31,000
Italy	110,500	11,000
UKRAINE	..	(approx.)		300,000	9,750

The Ukraine offers unique opportunities to our railway engineers, contractors, wagon builders, etc.

Apart from the development of the mining undertakings and railway construction there is the building of suitable roads for motor transport and the improvement of the navigation of the rivers, bridges and canals, the building of grain elevators, cold storage depots, generating stations for electricity, all of which have been neglected in the past.

The Ukraine, as a free, autonomous State, must become a great and powerful nation. Its economic development offers a wide field for our industries, of which Great Britain should know how to take advantage, and through the commercial channels thus open a means provided of securing the close co-operation, friendship and goodwill between Great Britain and the Ukraine.

LET US FACE THE FACTS OF THE RUSSIAN DRAMA.

The Russian Empire of the Tsars never formed a national unit at any time throughout its long history. It was an "Empire" of heterogeneous States kept together by force and oppression, which throughout the ages were ever struggling to regain their national rights and liberties. The national life and national culture of the masses of the people forming the separate States were crushed and their economic development retarded. There is more illiteracy among the people of the old Russian Empire than in any other country in Europe.

The revolution of 1917 has smashed for ever the political organism of the old Russian Empire. When once the force which held the former States together was dissipated, the individual States, by their own volition, without any foreign pressure from the outside, broke away into their separate national units, and declared their independence, on the principle of the self-determination of peoples.

FEDERATION.

In seeking to find a solution for the settlement of the Russian problem, the question has been frequently put forward as to why the former States of the Russian Empire do not form the "United States of Eastern Europe." Before one can speak of confederation of these States it is necessary that the individual States should first be established. Only after their creation and recognition by the Allies can order be restored; and as soon as the present anarchical conditions come to an end, then will be the time for the people to express their will, in a proper constitutional manner, through their constituent assemblies, in regard to the inter-relationship between those States. It must not be forgotten that only free Sovereign States are able to enter into a Treaty of

Confederation, in the same manner as with every other international treaty. The next step in the settlement of Russia is for the Allies to extend recognition to the Ukraine as an independent, autonomous nation.

SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF 1917.

It must be admitted that the course of political events in the Ukraine has not run smoothly since the first Central Rada was convoked in the early part of 1917, but for this the Ukrainian people should not be blamed. Let us take the sequence of events as they occurred:—

APRIL-OCTOBER, 1917.

Immediately following the revolution, there was formed in the Ukraine a Provisional Council—the Central Rada—which was composed of 813 deputies, who were selected from all the Ukrainian parties. The fall of the Kerensky Government, *ipso facto*, made the Rada the Provisional Parliament of the Ukraine.

OCTOBER, 1917—FEBRUARY, 1918.

The Central Rada decided to convene the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. Elections were arranged, and took place in January and February, 1918. (The Bolsheviks having made their first invasion of the country, the elections arranged for in Eastern Ukraine could not be held.)

RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS.

The elections were secret, direct and proportional, and the suffrage was extended to all who had reached the age of 21 years and over. Sixty-five per cent. of the electorate voted; 85 per cent. voting for the Petlura Government (Social/Democrats) and a National Ukraine.

Accredited representatives from France and Great Britain entered into relations in December, 1917, and January, 1918, with the new Government, the independence of which had been recognised during December by the Bolsheviks, who, in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March, 1918), agreed to withdraw all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory.

SINCE MARCH, 1918.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was followed by the German occupation of the Ukraine, and one of the first acts of the Germans was to arrest Petlura and the leading Ukrainian politicians, *all of whom were pro-Ally*.

APRIL 29TH, 1918.

The Germans carried out a *coup d'état*, and General Skoropadski was proclaimed Hetman of the Ukraine.

SKOROPADSKI.

Skoropadski, who was the creature of the Germans and *unknown to any of the Ukrainian political parties*, received neither support from the people nor from any member of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.

MAY 2ND, 1918.

The Cabinet formed by Vassilenko, a Russian Cadet, and Lisogoub, a Russian Octobrist, on May 2nd, 1918, was formed in defiance of the expressed will of the people, who had, in February, voted for the Constituent Assembly. The Cabinet did not contain *one member* of the Constituent Assembly, all of whom refused to serve in a Government which had, by force, usurped the constitutional powers of the properly elected Ukrainian Government.

M. Rjepetski (Cadet), who was the Minister of Finance, stated quite openly at the Congress of Cadets on May 11th, 1918, that :—

" . . . he had taken a personal part in the creation of the Hetman institution, as well as in the attempt to draw near our new Allies (Germany and Austria)."

M. Vassilenko (Cadet), who formed the Cabinet, said at the same Congress :—

" I have been for some time already convinced that the historic circumstances are so formed that our economic and commercial interests are bound to the Central Powers, and principally to Germany. . . ."

" Our history shows us that our interests bind us to Germany in a more forceful manner than to England."

" We are geographically neighbours with Germany, and our interests are bound up in each other. It was thus before the war, it will be so after the war."

This was said by Russian Cadets in May, 1918, when the war in the West was looking very black for the Allies.

The leader of the Cadet Party—M. Milionkoff—wrote (*Kiev Mysl*, August 2nd, 1918, No. 137) :—

" I strongly oppose the doctrinal prohibition which forbids the members of the Cadet Party establishing relations with the Germans. . . ."

THE OVERTHROW OF SKOROPADSKI, DECEMBER, 1918.

It has been necessary to recall what took place in the Ukraine between the election of the Constituent Assembly (February, 1918) and the overthrow of Skoropadski (December, 1918), because of the anti-British policy which was pursued during that period—a policy which did not represent the wishes or the views of the Ukrainian people. It should

be noted, moreover, that the overthrow of Skoropadski was effected through a rising of the three leading Ukrainian Political Parties—Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, and the Independent Socialists.

THE UKRAINE TO-DAY.

The Ukrainians have a very deep sense of the durability of a social order founded upon the liberty of the individual. The backbone of the Ukraine is the peasant small holder class, which forms practically 90 per cent. of the population. This fact is of material importance, because the majority of the people being attached to the land, and of these a considerable section having a definite stake in the country, it was natural for the Ukrainians, at the time of declaring their complete independence in 1917, to have embraced the social and political system of Western Europe, instead of the Bolshevik system now being tried in Russia. In Russia the peasants were accustomed to the *Mir*—the collective ownership of the land—and the step from this to Bolshevism was not so profound as it would be in the case of the Ukraine, where the people are habituated to the system of individual ownership of the land and other property.

While the forces under Denikin were in being, and there was strife between them and the National Forces under Petlura, it may have been embarrassing to the Allies to have taken any effective steps towards recognising the independence of the Ukraine, but now that the forces under Denikin have been eliminated, there does appear to be every reason why Great Britain should now act towards the Ukraine as she has done already in the cases of Poland, Finland, Esthonia, Georgia, Azerbaidjan and the other former States of Russia.

PRESIDENT PETLURA.

It may be said that the Supreme Peace Council was able, in the cases of Poland, Finland, Esthonia and the other former States, to negotiate with the respective "de facto" Governments, but that it is difficult in view of the present confused political situation of the Ukraine to say whether any responsible Government does, in fact, exist with which the Allies could negotiate. With such a contention, even the most ardent supporter of the Ukrainian cause must concur.

It must be remembered, however, that the Ukrainian people (apart from a comparatively small section in the East, where elections could not take place owing to the Bolshevik occupation) had an opportunity of expressing their will in the election which took place as late as February, 1918, and the result of the voting

showed a definite majority—85 per cent. of the votes—in favour of Petlura and the Ukrainian National Party—the Social Democrats.

It can be argued, therefore, that President Petlura, in the absence of a further appeal to the people, still remains the constitutional head of the Ukrainian Republic, and, as such, is the proper person through whom negotiations can be opened. Both Poland and Rumania (which are contiguous countries) have stated that they will recognise the Petlura Government of the Ukrainian Republic.

THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT PETLURA.

It should be possible in these circumstances for the Allies to concede immediately the principle of recognition to the Ukraine as an independent autonomous State. President Petlura should be requested to reconstruct his Government and arrange fresh elections, so as to determine in a proper constitutional manner the wishes of the people in regard to the future constitution of the Republic of the Ukraine. This would then give Petlura the opportunity of opening up anew peace negotiations with the Russian Soviet Government, and thus once again obtain settled conditions throughout the Ukraine.

President Petlura's policy in regard to the future of the Ukraine is one that should commend itself especially to Great Britain :—

(1) To seek the friendly co-operation of Great Britain in the economic development of the Ukraine.

(2) To enter into close trade relations with Western Europe for the exchange of goods.

(3) To enter into economic relations with all the neighbouring States, including Soviet Russia.

(4) To submit to arbitration the question of the future of those frontier regions where there are conflicting claims on the part of the Ukraine and neighbouring States. The question to be decided by a local plebiscite.

(5) Freedom of religion, of speech, and of the Press.

(6) Universal Suffrage.

(7) Constitutional Government founded upon Western European principles.

(8) Equal rights for minorities.

(9) Education of the people.

(10) Standard labour conditions and hours as adopted by Western Europe.

(11) Land for the people—compensation to be given to the owners when large estates are broken up.

(12) Economic development—transport, railways, roads, canals, navigation of rivers, mines, industries, agriculture.

(13) The Ukraine to seek admission into the League of Nations.

(14) The Ukraine to satisfy the legitimate claims of the Allies, and to acknowledge up to 30 per cent. of the National Debt of the former Russian Empire.

President Petlura, who during the German occupation was kept in prison, is inspired by the most patriotic motives in working out the sovereign rights of the Ukraine Republic. He is a popular leader of the people, and throughout the war was unfaltering in his support of and adhesion to the cause of the Allies. He is a staunch friend of Great Britain.

Petlura, the constitutional head of the Ukraine Republic—a nation of over 40,000,000 people—seeks the friendship, guidance and goodwill of Great Britain. Can Great Britain turn away from his entreaties? Would it be good policy to do so? Under the Centralistic Government at Petrograd, the economic progress of the Ukraine was hampered and the cultural advancement on national lines denied to the Ukrainian people; but, given good government, constituted on the same progressive principles which obtain throughout Western Europe, the Ukraine must, because of its great natural wealth, climate and geographical situation, become one of the greatest nations in Europe.

