

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES · 84

Soviet nationality policy, urban growth, and identity change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923–1934

GEORGE O. LIBER



In the early 1920s the Bolsheviks, who were overwhelmingly urban, proletarian, and Russian, believed that rapid industrialization would dissolve the non-Russian national identities and create a solid base of support for the new political order. By the end of the decade, however, the social changes initiated by rapid economic development strengthened national assertiveness.

This book analyzes the precarious relationship between Soviet legitimacy-building and the consequences of rapid industrial development in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the most populous non-Russian republic in the USSR, during the 1920s and 1930s. George Liber traces the impact of rapid urban growth upon the implementation of Soviet preferential policies, *korenizatsiia*. This plan advocated the equality of non-Russian and Russian languages and cultures and sought to integrate non-Russians into the Soviet state by promoting them into leading positions in the party, the government, and trade unions. The author shows how the interplay between industrialization, urbanization, and *korenizatsiia* produced a modern, urban Ukrainian identity. This, he argues, explains why the Stalinist leadership changed its course on the nationality question in the 1930s and gave precedence to the Russians in the USSR.

Soviet nationality policy, urban growth, and identity change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923–1934 examines a significant stage in the early development of the USSR. Many of the issues addressed by George Liber contributed to the end of the Soviet Union and still haunt the current post-Soviet leadership. This book will be read by students and specialists of Soviet, post-Soviet and Ukrainian studies, history, and sociology.

**SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY, URBAN
GROWTH, AND IDENTITY CHANGE IN THE
UKRAINIAN SSR 1923–1934**

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UKRAINIAN SSR 1923–1934**

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To my parents

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Abbreviations

KP(b)U	Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine
KPZU	Communist Party of Western Ukraine
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
n.p.	no place
PSR	Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries
RKP(b)	Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)
RSDRP(b)	Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Bolshevik)
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
<i>SU</i>	<i>Statystyka Ukrainy</i>
Ukr.	Ukrainian
UkrSSR	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
UPSR	Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries
USDRP	Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VKP(b)	All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)


A note on transliteration

In transliterating Slavic words and proper names I have followed the Library of Congress system for Russian and Ukrainian. I have included the soft sign. In the text and notes, however, I have followed common English usage for those names familiar to the general reader, for example, Trotsky and Kharkov rather than Trotskii and Khar'kov (or Kharkiv). I have used the authors' transliteration of their own names as they appear in English on the title or copyright pages. In the notes and bibliography, I transliterated the place of publication from the language of publication. For example, Kharkov is the place of publication of a Russian language work, while Kharkiv is the place of publication for a work written in Ukrainian. The only Anglicized exception is Moscow (not Moskva).


In transliterating geographic designations in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, I have followed closely the usage standardized in Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Arkadii Zhukovsky, compilers, *Map and Gazetteer of Ukraine* (Toronto, 1985). The only exceptions to transliteration directly from the Ukrainian and Kubijovyč's and Zhukovsky's usage are: Kiev (not Kyiv), Odessa (not Odesa), the Dnieper (not the Dnipro), Kharkov (not Kharkiv), and Nikolaev (not Mykolaiv). I have employed Ekaterinoslav to refer to the city prior to 1917; in the Soviet period I designate this city Dnipropetrovs'ke. For the sake of convenience, I have also employed the Russian term "okrug," not the Ukrainian "okruh."



Map 1 Administrative divisions of the Ukrainian SSR by okrugs, 1926



Map 2 Administrative divisions of the Ukrainian SSR by economic regions and most important cities, 1926



Map 3 Ukrainians as a percentage of entire rural population of the Ukrainian SSR, 1926

Introduction

In the third decade of the twentieth century the Soviet Ukrainian writer and literary critic Borys Antonenko-Davydovych (1899–1974) succinctly expressed the Ukrainian dilemma:

One could live one's entire life in a Ukrainian city and not know Ukrainian. You could ask the conductor in a Kiev streetcar a question in Ukrainian and he would not understand or would pretend that he did not understand you. A Ukrainian writer, appearing before a provincial audience, might discover that ninety percent of the audience had never read any of his works or heard anything about him at all.

But it should be axiomatic that it is best and most "natural" to learn Ukrainian in a Ukrainian city, for the most part to hear Ukrainian on Kiev's streets, and for eighty percent of the readers to borrow Ukrainian books from urban libraries. $2 \times 2 = 4$, right? But this equation has yet to be demonstrated under our conditions in the Ukraine. For us, this is still a theorem.¹

Antonenko-Davydovych's frustrations echoed those of all nationally conscious Central and East Europeans in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For them, the city was more than just an economic, cultural, military, political, transportation, and communications center. Cities, especially such historic capitals as Prague, Budapest, Vilnius, and Riga, were the flagships of emergent national movements. Because the overwhelming majority of nationally conscious Central and East Europeans defined their identity by primary language usage, they believed that the language of the cities would have to reflect the language of the surrounding countryside for their national movements to triumph.

In terms of their residents and dominant language, cities were barometers of power, the most visible centers of conflict in Central and East European societies (as in other parts of the world). Inasmuch as the majority of urban residents developed national identities different

from the majority living in the rural areas, a hierarchy based on these identities emerged. Russians, Germans, and Jews occupied the more influential positions, while the indigenous populations possessed those that were less prestigious. In this cultural division of labor, individuals were "assigned to specific occupations and other social roles on the basis of observable social traits or markers." This labor distribution existed "regardless of the level of structural differentiation in society."² As industrialization and urbanization unevenly penetrated the Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian, and Ottoman empires prior to the First World War, nationalist conflicts intensified in the cities.³

As a result of peasant migration into the cities, as well as the successful political struggle of the Central and East European national movements after 1848, the national composition of the cities gradually came to mirror that of the surrounding countryside. The dissolution of the four empires and the establishment of independent states at the end of the First World War legitimized the political and social control wielded by the one dominant national group (or two in the case of Czechoslovakia) over its multi-national cities. Over the course of time, the countryside in effect triumphed over the cities.⁴

By 1920 only Vilnius and the urban centers in Belorussia and the Ukraine defied this phenomenon. Because the Belorussian and Ukrainian national movements were weak and because of White, Bolshevik, German, Austro-Hungarian, Polish, and other interventions, the nationalists could not gain control of the cities and lost their struggles to establish independent and indivisible homelands immediately after the First World War.

One of the most prominent discrepancies between the national composition of the cities and the countryside occurred in the Ukraine. Before the 1920s, Ukrainians dominated the countryside, while the Russians, Russified Ukrainians, and Russified Jews controlled the urban areas. Few Ukrainians found employment in the cities. Those who did gradually absorbed the Russian urban ethos and soon came to identify themselves as Russians.

But as the cities and towns grew in the late 1920s as a consequence of the Soviet industrialization effort, the large number of migrating Ukrainians reversed this process. This migration reinforced the Communist Party's *korenizatsiia* (indigenization or nativization) policy, which advocated the equality of the non-Russian languages and cultures *vis-à-vis* the Russian language and culture and subsidized their development. Most importantly, this plan sought to integrate the

non-Russians into the Soviet state by promoting them into leading positions in the party, the government, and the trade unions.

The symbiotic relationship between the social processes of industrialization and urban growth and *korenizatsiia* produced important long-term consequences. Although the party did not create the non-Russian identities, it did nurture them. By establishing Soviet republics congruent with the homelands of the non-Russians and by promoting the indigenous languages and cultures, the Communist Party highlighted the national, cultural, and political differences between nationalities. By constructing cultural and political symbols in the non-Russian republics, the Communist Party played a decisive role in organizing the institutions which would promote national consciousness among non-Russians. At the same time, by industrializing economically backward regions and collectivizing the countryside, the party introduced millions of non-Russians, willingly and unwillingly, to the cities and the urban way of life. In many cases, the party accidentally jump-started modern, mass national movements among the non-Russians in the 1920s. The most dramatic acceleration of these processes occurred in the Ukraine.

Due to their number and strategic location, the Ukrainians played a leading role in the development of the newly formed Soviet state's nationalities policy. According to the December 17, 1926 Soviet census, Russians constituted 53.0 percent of the USSR's population. Thirty-one million Ukrainians composed 21 percent of the total Soviet population and 45.0 percent of the entire non-Russian population.⁵ Ukrainian peasants, moreover, comprised over one-half of all non-Russian peasants in the USSR.⁶ Geographically the Ukraine was located next to the heartland of Europe, where the Bolsheviks aspired to spread their revolution. With an area of 451,730 square kilometers, it was one of the largest geographic entities in Europe, following the Soviet Union and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in size.

Although the Ukraine formed only 2.1 percent of all Soviet territory, it produced more than 20 percent of the Soviet industrial and agricultural output and one-fourth of its grain. Seven million Ukrainians lived in countries bordering the USSR, especially in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania, and the Soviet leadership could play the Ukrainian "card" to destabilize these bourgeois governments. Most importantly, the Ukrainians – despite nearly three centuries of Russian rule, the sharing of Orthodox religion and culture, and the pressures of Russification – exhibited an unprecedented degree of assertiveness during the revolution and civil war.

But until 1917 a mass “national” assertiveness did not emerge in this region. Because of its location and historical contingencies, the Ukraine experienced a high degree of political discontinuity and social backwardness and a low level of national consciousness.⁷

The majority of peasants living in the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire (the Kiev, Podillia, and Volhynia [the Iugozapadnyi krai, or Right Bank Provinces], Kharkov, Poltava, and Chernihiv [the Left Bank Provinces], and Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida provinces [Novorossia]) could not define their national identity with any great precision. The inhabitants of each of these regions experienced imperial integration at different times and under different circumstances. These uneven political developments in a predominantly agrarian society hampered the formation of a standardized mass Ukrainian memory and identity. As a consequence, these peasants lacked clearly defined criteria which they could easily use to distinguish themselves from the Russians.

What then was distinctively Ukrainian about the Ukrainians? An analyst with the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office submitted a memorandum about the Ukraine to the Imperial War Cabinet in May 1918:

The peasants speak the Little Russian dialect; a small group of nationalist intelligentsia now professes a Ukrainian identity distinct from that of the Great Russians. Whether such a nationality exists is usually discussed in terms in which the question can receive no answer. Were one to ask the average peasant in the Ukraine his nationality, he would answer that he is Greek Orthodox; if pressed to say whether he is a Great Russian, a Pole, or a Ukrainian, he would probably reply that he is a peasant; and if one insisted on knowing what language he spoke, he would say that he talked “the local tongue.” One might perhaps get him to call himself by a proper national name and say that he is “rusски,” but this declaration would hardly prejudice the question of a Ukrainian relationship; he simply does not think of nationality in the terms familiar to the intelligentsia. Again, if one tried to find out to what State he desires to belong – whether he wants to be ruled by an All-Russian or a separate Ukrainian Government – one would find that in his opinion all Governments alike are a nuisance, and that it would be best if the “Christian peasant-folk” were left to themselves. All the big landowners and practically the entire Christian population of the towns speak either Polish or Great Russian. There are no more Ukrainian noblemen or big landowners in the Ukraine than there are Non-Conformist noblemen in Great Britain – the Ukrainian may rise to higher rank, but then he ceases to be what his fathers were . . . As a

rule it sufficed for the Ukrainian peasant to leave his village community in order to lose his marked provincial peculiarities and his dialect. The larger part of the bureaucrats and the school teachers and priests speak Great Russian though they are very largely Ukrainians by birth. Even when going as unskilled labourers to the towns the Ukrainian peasants changed into Great Russians . . . The Ukrainian nationality of the peasant in the Ukraine is linguistic to some extent, but it rests mainly on the intense class consciousness of the peasant, on the herd instinct which he feels within his village community and within his social class. He feels a hatred of the strangers who, like a visitation of God, swarm about the Ukraine – the Polish “pany” (lords), the Jewish traders, the Russian “bureaucrats,” the shady “townees.” At times he doubts whether even the priest, not being a peasant, can be altogether pleasing to Heaven . . .⁸

In a masterful analysis of this report, David Saunders asserts that Ukrainians emerge as “stoutly religious peasants who had their own language and saw themselves as members of a society called Rus’, whose political existence belonged to the mists of time. Anti-intellectual, almost anarchist in their hostility to governmental institutions, they had yet to enter the capitalist world . . .”⁹ Saunders calls the Ukrainian identity a multi-layered consciousness which evolved over centuries and remained distinct from the Russian national identity.

But this consciousness was not definable in precise terms. The peasant could not articulate his views in isolation and only in reference to himself. If pressed, he could present his perceptions only in reference to strangers. As this British official’s report demonstrates, the peasant, unaccustomed to intellectual constructs, when asked what his criteria were in differentiating between Ukrainians and Russians, would shrug his shoulders and divide people into two categories: “us” and “them.” He understood his universe through the prism of this polarization.

There was one major unspoken assumption behind this view of the world: that outsiders, generally from the cities, possessed political and economic control. The Ukrainian peasant, who comprised the majority in the countryside, had neither. In addition to his religion, language, and way of life, powerlessness was the primary psychological bond he shared with his neighbors and kinsmen in the countryside.¹⁰ Thus, the division of labor between the countryside and the alien cities defined the peasant’s comprehension of the relationship between power and national allegiances.

When the agrarian Ukrainian provinces confronted industrial-

ization and modernization in the late nineteenth century, the experience was psychologically disorienting and economically painful for the peasants. More significantly, the elites promoting modernization lived in the cities. But most of the urban residents considered themselves Russians or Jews, rather than Ukrainians. And if the "townees" once came from the countryside surrounding the cities and towns, they had long abandoned the traditions and values of their forefathers and adopted the Russian language and culture, the language and culture of industry, economy, politics, and urban life. Thus, an irreconcilable difference emerged between things Ukrainian and modern, between the Ukrainian and urban worlds. Peasant awareness of this division provoked envy and hatred towards the "townees." Vasyl Shakhrai, a prominent Ukrainian Bolshevik, best described the peasants' hostility toward the cities:

The city governs the countryside and "foreigners" govern the cities. The city attracts all good unto itself and gives the village almost nothing in return. The city sucks in taxes, which are almost never returned to the village, to the Ukraine. . . . In the city you have to pay the bureaucrat bribes in order to avoid insults and red tape. In the city the merchant deceives while selling and buying. In the city the landowners gobble up the goods collected in the village. In the cities fires burn. There are schools and theaters. Music plays. The city puts on clean . . . clothes, as if on a holiday . . . (the city) drinks, and there is much carousing. In contrast, in the village there is almost nothing but poverty, impenetrable ignorance, and hard work.

The city is for the upper classes, for gentlemen, foreign, it is not ours, not Ukrainian. It is Great Russian, Jewish, and Polish – not ours, not Ukrainian.¹¹

For the peasant, people like himself were Ukrainians, however inadequately he could explain this word in intellectual terms. For him, urban inhabitants were non-Ukrainians. This division between "us" and "them" – rural and powerless, on the one hand, and urban and powerful, on the other – was brought home to the Ukrainian peasants between 1917 and 1921. They quickly perceived that the conflict between themselves and these strangers was a struggle to control the food they grew.¹²

Even if the Ukrainian peasants could not rationally explain the boundaries of their identity, their rage at the godless strangers from the cities who spoke a different language while expropriating their grain reached a boiling point. Their fury forced them to conclude that "alien rule is illegitimate rule,"¹³ that those not from the surrounding countryside were interlopers and that only people of their "kind"

should rule. Thus, the Bolshevik problem in the Ukraine was not simply winning the acceptance of their urban-based revolution in a predominantly agricultural region (which was a major problem throughout the USSR), but legitimizing an urban-based revolution nationally alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The Bolsheviks confronted this dilemma throughout most of the non-Russian regions under their control.

In order to establish political authority in the Ukraine and in the other non-Russian regions, the predominantly urban, proletarian, and Russian party had to introduce (in addition to the New Economic Policy) a new moderate nationalities policy, far different from that of its autocratic predecessors. Warily the Soviet authorities encouraged the manifestation of a mass Ukrainian identity. By the early 1930s industrialization and urban growth abolished the dichotomy between the Ukrainian, on the one hand, and the modern and urban worlds, on the other. Now one could be Ukrainian, modern, and socially mobile. This transformation of the Ukrainian identity from an amorphous, reactive identity grounded in the countryside to a dynamic identity welded to the cities occurred under the auspices of the All-Union Communist Party (VKP (b)).

Instead of integrating the Ukrainians into the Soviet order, however, this urban harvest produced different results. The end product – an assertive Ukrainian national communism strengthened by the acquisition of a social base of support in the cities – threatened to delegitimize Soviet Russian control of the non-Russian areas and thwart the Soviet industrialization effort. The modernization and urbanization of Soviet society and the grounding of the Ukrainian elites in the cities challenged not only the Russian *cultural* hegemony in the cities of the Ukraine, but also the Russian *political* hegemony.

Since 1933 Soviet scholars have downplayed and often ignored altogether the national factor in the political mobilization of Ukrainian society in the 1920s.¹⁴ Most of the Western studies of this period have not analyzed the internal tensions within *korenizatsiia* or the full impact of industrialization and urban growth on Ukrainianization.¹⁵ By concentrating on the Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR during the first fifteen years of Soviet rule,¹⁶ this inquiry will investigate the uneasy conjuncture between Ukrainianization and the unintended social and political consequences of rapid economic development.

At the heart of this study is the complex relationship among social identities, social change, and legitimacy,¹⁷ in a post-revolutionary, multi-national state. Which social identities (class, gender, race, or

nationality) should the victorious party emphasize and to what degree?¹⁸ How are state-sponsored identities constructed at the center and accepted by the periphery of a multi-national state? How do these identities change as a result of industrialization and urbanization? Most importantly, how can a socialist regime legitimize an urban-based revolution in a predominantly agricultural, multi-national state by encouraging the development of distinct national cultures during a period of rapid social changes?

By 1921 the revolutionary, predominantly Russian regime had to answer these questions. Appealing to non-Russian national feelings in order to establish legitimacy made political sense at the time. But because the eruption of national consciousness among non-Russians between 1917 and 1921 was not merely a cultural transformation, the Soviet regime's compromises became a Faustian bargain, especially after the radical industrialization and urbanization of the late 1920s.

Part I

Periphery and center

1 The Ukrainian environment, 1861–1921

Cities and the working class on the eve of revolution

The abolition of serfdom in 1861 unleashed uncontrollable social forces that eventually undermined the Russian Empire's stability. This event introduced the Russian economy to capitalism and Russian society to limited political reforms, threatening the economic well-being of the peasants, who received meager amounts of land. Acceleration of these processes at the end of the nineteenth century tore the usually inert peasant from his soil and forced him to enter a more competitive world, to negotiate the alien urban and industrial ways of life.

At first, emancipation lowered the peasant's standard of living. In the Ukrainian provinces 94.0 percent of all peasant households received up to 5 desiatins (1 desiatin equals 2.7 acres) of land, far less than subsistence level.¹ Despite peasant land purchases from the nobility and emigration to Siberia and Kazakhstan, rural overpopulation and poverty intensified in the late nineteenth century. Even though yields grew larger, they increased less than the rural population.² Although the middle peasant (with 5 to 10 desiatins of land) was more common in the Ukrainian than in the Russian provinces, the most acute degree of rural overpopulation and poverty in the entire Russian Empire was centered in the Right Bank Ukrainian provinces of Podillia, Volhynia, and Kiev, where large landed estates survived from Polish times.³ By the end of the nineteenth century over 8 million peasants in the Ukrainian provinces needed additional wages or land to subsist.⁴ As the countryside suffered impoverishment, peasants migrated to Siberia and Kazakhstan.

At the same time, the Russian Empire – and the Ukraine in particular – experienced rapid economic and urban development.⁵ Greater integration of the Ukrainian provinces into the Russian and

world economies, the strengthening of internal markets, foreign investment, railway construction, the development of mining and metallurgical industries, and improvements in agriculture contributed to the long process of urban growth in the Ukraine.

Although industrialization did not necessarily spur urban growth or urbanization, the urban centers in the Russian Empire grew rapidly – from 2.8 million in 1811, to 15 million in 1870, to nearly 24 million in 1910 – an increase of nearly 800 percent.⁶ The urban population of the Ukrainian provinces also expanded – from 512,900 in 1811 to 2,474,030 in 1897 to 3,735,766 in 1910 – an increase of approximately 600 percent.⁷ The greatest increase occurred in the established, large cities.

Industrialization played an important role in the growth of the urban population only in the southern Ukrainian provinces, where the majority of factories and workers were located in the urban areas.⁸ In 1858, only one city had a population of over 100,000 (Odessa); by 1897, there were three more (Kiev, Kharkov, and Ekaterinoslav); by 1905, five altogether (Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Nikolaev).⁹

Despite these economic and urban revolutions in the Ukrainian provinces, Ukrainians did not fully participate in these processes. The cities became more Russian; the countryside remained Ukrainian. This split hampered the emergence of an evenly distributed percentage of Ukrainians in the social structure of the Ukrainian provinces and the development of a strong national movement.

While those who claimed Ukrainian (*malorusskii*) as their mother tongue constituted 80 percent of the total population of the Ukrainian provinces in 1897, they comprised only 32.5 percent of the urban population.¹⁰ At the same time, Russians made up 33.7 percent of the urban population and Jews 27.4 percent.¹¹ Generally, the larger the city, the smaller the Ukrainian percentage of the population. In 1897, Ukrainians constituted 56.5 percent of the population in cities and towns under 20,000, but only 15.9 percent of the population of cities over 100,000.¹²

As the urban population grew, the number of Ukrainians also increased. But, until the 1920s, the number of urban Ukrainians grew at a slower pace than the overall urban population. As a consequence, the Ukrainian percentage of the urban population, especially in the larger cities, declined. In Kiev, for example, the percentage who listed Ukrainian as their native language declined from 30.3 percent in 1874 to 22.2 percent in 1897 to 16.0 percent in 1917.¹³ Only 5.6 percent of the population of Odessa, the largest city in the Ukraine in 1897, identified

Ukrainian as their native tongue. By 1920, only 2.9 percent of its population identified themselves as Ukrainians.¹⁴

Just as the cities became more Russian, so did the working class in the Ukrainian provinces, especially those workers located in the more modern industries of the Steppe.¹⁵ In 1897, of the 1,478,798 person labor force, the largest group lived in the Steppe gubernias (553,695) rather than the Right Bank (499,426) or Left Bank (425,677) provinces.¹⁶ The Steppe attracted the most migrants from outside the Ukrainian provinces.¹⁷

Of the total work force in the Ukrainian provinces, 425,413 were engaged in industrial work. The plurality of this industrial labor force was also centered in the Steppe provinces (201,801) rather than in the Right Bank (117,395) or the Left Bank (106,217).¹⁸

A majority of the non-indigenous industrial workers had never worked in industry before coming to the Ukraine. They came from gubernias with a relatively large agricultural sector, small peasant holdings, and a small industrial base.¹⁹ The majority of migrants from Russia, especially those from the Central Black Earth region, moved to the rapidly industrializing Steppe region. Approximately 83.3 percent of all migrants from the Great Russian gubernias went to the Steppe region, whereas only 10.0 percent went to the Right Bank and 6.6 percent to the Left Bank.²⁰

The Steppe region – with its newly developed steel, metal-working, chemical, engineering, and food industries – attracted the greatest number, approximately two-thirds of all migrants from inside and outside the Ukraine. Most were attracted to the industrial centers which grew rapidly in the late nineteenth century.²¹ Although the Ukraine had the lowest level of industrial development in the Russian empire, its rate of industrial growth outpaced the entire empire, especially in the Steppe, where the number of workers increased seven-fold in the decade under consideration.²² By 1908, the number of factory workers in the Ukraine outnumbered those in either the Urals or Poland under Russian rule.²³ By 1913, the Donbass miners constituted 75.0 percent of all miners, the Kryvyi Rih smelters almost half of all smelters, and the metallurgists of the Steppe provinces almost one-third of all metallurgists within the Russian Empire.²⁴ Although the overwhelming majority of workers in the Ukraine came from the Ukrainian gubernias (according to one scholar's calculations, 70.3 percent were Ukrainians), the non-Ukrainian migrants – especially those from Russia – reinforced the split between the cities and the Ukrainian countryside.²⁵

Ukrainians were also a minority in the new industrial centers of the Steppe and Left Bank Provinces, where the most rapid economic growth took place after 1870.²⁶ These areas constituted a new frontier – a sparsely populated area wrested from the Turks and the Crimean Tatars only a century before. As a result, the new industrial areas did not belong to the Ukrainian core area (the Poltava, Chernihiv, and Kiev provinces), the territory of the former Hetmanate.

The new mines and factories in the Steppe and the Left Bank needed many workers. At first, the managers recruited a seasonal labor force from the surrounding areas, but by the end of the nineteenth century workers were needed on a year-round basis. In order to create this permanent pool of workers, laborers had to be weaned from the land. As a result, managers began to secure their employees from more distant areas, especially neighboring Russian gubernias.²⁷

With the expansion of the mining and metallurgical industries in the Donbass and on the Dnieper River, Ukrainians constituted a smaller percentage of the rapidly expanding work force in these areas.²⁸ Although they comprised 68.9 percent of the population of the Ekaterinoslav province and 53.5 percent of the Kherson province in 1897, Ukrainians constituted only a small fraction in the Ekaterinoslav, Mariupil', Luhans'ke, and Odessa districts, which included the industrial areas.²⁹ And the few Ukrainians who became workers soon began to identify themselves as Russians.

Industrialization brought in Russians, who settled in the manufacturing centers of the Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Kherson provinces and held power disproportionate to their numbers in the cities and in industrial occupations. By 1897, for example, 74.0 percent of the coal miners and 69.0 percent of the metallurgical workers in the Ukraine were Russians.³⁰ Because the majority of these arriving workers settled in urban areas, where Ukrainians constituted a minority in the advanced industrial occupations, these non-Ukrainian migrants to the industrial areas constituted "a cultural agent for de-nationalization."³¹ This analyst optimistically believed that in the near future this process would be reversed and that the national differences between the industrial and agricultural workers would "be levelled in the Ukraine."³²

In the following decade (1913–23), however, the national chasm between the cities and the countryside widened. The migration of Russian workers into the mines and industrial areas, and the assimilation to the Russian culture of those few Ukrainian-speaking peasants who joined the industrial work force increased the psychological

distance between the migrants and the peasants remaining in the countryside. Industrialization and urban growth reoriented the peasants' perceptions and sense of identity. These processes delayed the emergence of a mass-based Ukrainian nationalism.

Ukrainian nationalism, revolution, and the cities

The modern Ukrainian national movement emerged among a small group of intellectuals at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Its development followed the three-stage pattern posited by Miroslav Hroch. Phase A starts when a small number of scholars first demonstrate "a passionate concern . . . for the study of the language, the culture, the history of the oppressed nationality"; Phase B, the "fermentation-process of national consciousness," takes place while a larger number of patriotic agitators diffuse national ideas to the masses; and finally Phase C, when the broad masses have been swept up into the nationalist movement, emerges.³³

Before 1914 the Russian Ukraine (unlike the Austrian Ukraine) never reached Phase C, the take-off point. Due to the high level of rural illiteracy, the overwhelming concentration of Ukrainian language speakers in the countryside, and government prohibitions against publishing in Ukrainian, the Ukrainian movement remained locked in Phase B for nearly fifty years. Patriotic agitators, mostly intellectuals from the cities, could not establish a mass national movement in the countryside, the movement's largest potential base of support.

Despite the tsarist government's success in crushing all political opposition after 1907, the Ukrainian political parties that had formed in the early twentieth century contributed to the development of modern Ukrainian nationalism, which found full and explosive expression during the revolutions of 1917.³⁴ War and revolution accelerated the transition from Phase B to Phase C. The First World War, an industrial economic crisis, high inflation, a decline in agricultural output, the conscription of millions of young men, the spread of literacy and political agitation in the countryside, and the collapse of the tsarist political order stirred the masses and prepared them for nationalist agitation and propaganda.³⁵ Small groups of intellectuals and their clandestine political parties now had the possibility of attracting millions of compatriots to their cause. But these processes were chaotic and incomplete and the mass support achieved by the Ukrainian political parties in 1917 remained mercurial.

On March 20, 1917 (n.s.), barely a week after the revolution in Petrograd, the Society of Ukrainian Progressives (*Tovarystvo ukrains'kykh postupovtsiv*), a small group of intellectuals with moderate political views, helped establish the Ukrainian Central Rada (*Ukrains'ka Tsentral'na Rada*) in Kiev. This organization became the coordinating body for all Ukrainian activities, and attempted to win wide-scale political, social, and cultural rights for Ukrainians within the Ukraine from the Russian Provisional Government.

During the spring and early summer of 1917, numerous Ukrainian cooperative, peasant, educational, military, and political congresses met in Kiev. These congresses confirmed the Rada's self-appointed mandate. In employing the term "the Ukraine," the Rada claimed jurisdiction over all Ukrainian activities in approximately a 200,000 square mile area that contained the provinces of Kiev, Podillia, Volhynia, Kharkov, Poltava, Chernihiv, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, but excluded the Crimea. This territory coincided with the Ukrainian ethnographic territory still under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government.

The area claimed by the Rada, however, was not nationally homogeneous. In the spring of 1917, when the Rada claimed the right to represent all territories which possessed a Ukrainian majority, it did not exclude the non-Ukrainian urban areas from its claims.³⁶ Its political platform, like the platforms of most nationalist movements, could not have recognized this national split between the cities and the countryside as permanent. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, the most prominent Ukrainian historian and the head of the Central Rada, admitted that Ukrainians were in the minority in the urban centers of the territory claimed by the Rada, but asserted that the "cities must follow the majority of the surrounding countryside."³⁷

Without the recognition of the cities and their inhabitants, the Central Rada would remain weak and ineffectual. How could the movement claim an entire region, but exclude its cities and the majority of its urban population from its jurisdiction? How powerful could this movement be if it could not adequately man its own administrative centers and institutions? Was the Ukrainian movement doomed to remain a peasant movement?

The leaders of the two most important political parties within the Rada, the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries (*Ukrains'ka partiia sotsial'-revoliutsioneriv*, or the UPSR), and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (*Ukrains'ka sotsial'no-demokratychna robitnycha partiia*, or the USDRP) undoubtedly raised these

questions. Founded in April 1917, the UPSR supported the idea of a democratic federal Russian republic with national-territorial autonomy for the Ukraine and the free development of the Ukrainian language. Most importantly, it sought the socialization of the land and its distribution among the peasants. The Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries derived their support from the poor and middle peasants and partly from the rural proletariat who identified their deteriorating economic conditions with national oppression. The UPSR attracted very few proponents in the cities. Like the Russian SRs, the Ukrainian party was the most powerful in the countryside, where approximately one in every four Ukrainian adult males voted for it in 1917.³⁸ During the election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in November 1917, the UPSR captured over 60 percent of the votes cast in the Ukraine. Led by two students, Pavlo Khrystiuk and Mykola Kovalevs'kyi, the Ukrainian party's influence was most pronounced in the countryside, not the cities.

The UPSR's main competitor, the USDRP, claimed to represent the working class, especially the urban working class, in the Ukrainian provinces. This claim was rejected by the Bolshevik Party, which did not endorse the organization of a federation of independent social democratic parties based on the national-territorial principle. The USDRP's agrarian policy, advocating the expropriation of large estates and distribution of land among the poor peasants, was similar to that of the UPSR. And during the turbulent course of 1917, the USDRP adopted the idea of an independent Ukrainian state. It was prepared to abandon its social-democratic "purity" for the sake of national unity.³⁹

Based on a small number of nationally conscious Ukrainian workers and radical members of the intelligentsia, the USDRP never became a mass party, but many of its leaders, such as Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, played leading roles in the Central Rada. Although the USDRP directed its attention to the Russified cities and the urban working class, it failed to find mass support there. And as its agrarian program was similar to that of the UPSR, the USDRP unintentionally became a Janus-like party: one face projected toward the cities, the other face – its true face – extended to the countryside.

The non-Ukrainian and Russified Ukrainian urban population, however, did not recognize the authority of the Rada or its executive organ, the General Secretariat. The results of the elections to the city Dumas in the summer of 1917 and to the Constituent Assembly in November demonstrated the political impotence of the Ukrainian

movement in the urban areas. In Kiev, the Ukrainian parties received approximately 21.4 percent of the vote⁴⁰ and 25 of the Duma's 125 seats during the summer elections.⁴¹ At the same time, a bloc of Russian and Jewish socialists won 44 seats, other Jewish parties 12 seats, the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) 10 seats, and a group of Russian candidates with the slogan "away with the Ukraine and Ukrainianization" won 18 seats.⁴² The results were much the same in other major cities, where the Ukrainians won from 4.2 percent (Odessa) to 56.3 percent (Poltava) of the city Duma seats.⁴³

In the elections to the Constituent Assembly held in November 1917, the Ukrainian parties won an overwhelming majority. Of the 8,201,163 votes cast in the Ukrainian provinces, 5,557,560 or approximately 67.7 percent of the voters voted for the Ukrainian parties or for the joint Russian SR-Ukrainian lists.⁴⁴ The countryside provided the bulk of the ballots cast for the Ukrainian parties to the Constituent Assembly, but even here not all the peasants voted along national lines. In the province of Poltava, for example – where the 1897 census listed Ukrainian as the native language of 97.6 percent of the population – Ukrainian parties received approximately 83.3 percent of the vote.⁴⁵ Had all the Ukrainians voted along national lines their percentage of the vote would have been higher. Nevertheless, it is clear that the countryside provided the main base of support for Ukrainian nationalism.⁴⁶

In urban areas, however, the Ukrainian parties received fewer votes than the other political parties. The Ukrainian share of the urban vote in the larger cities never reached more than 38.0 percent.⁴⁷ But even this percentage was inflated inasmuch as a substantial part of the urban vote was cast by the swollen military garrisons, which contained "a large complement of peasant soldiers who were among the most nationalistic of their countrymen and consistently cast a high proportion of votes for Ukrainian socialists."⁴⁸ But these garrisons were continuously in flux, with the peasant-soldiers returning to their homes in an attempt to speed up the redistribution of land. As a result, the overall contribution of the garrisons to sustained Ukrainian political work was almost nil.

Taking into account the Ukrainian military garrisons, these election results demonstrate that the nationally conscious Ukrainians were a minority in the cities. Not all urban Ukrainians, moreover, voted along national lines. The socialist programs of the majority of the Ukrainian political parties may also have aggravated, if not repelled, some members of the urban Ukrainian middle classes. Increasingly, the

cities were surrounded by an increasingly hostile and nationalistic Ukrainian peasantry.

This reinforced the estrangement between Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians. The majority of urban residents had been raised within a Russian cultural environment and, as a consequence, were highly conscious of their place within the imperial political structure. They considered Russian the only legitimate culture. This attitude was fortified by the tsarist government's bans on Ukrainian-language publications and Ukrainian cultural and educational pursuits issued in 1863 and 1876. These measures were rescinded in 1905, and were reimposed with the beginning of the First World War.⁴⁹

As long as the Ukrainian national movement had been weak and largely confined to the countryside, the urban elites ignored it. However, with the mobilization of the Ukrainian population in the spring of 1917 and the consequent conflict over power, these Russian and Russified elites reacted by condemning the Ukrainian movement as a "German creation."⁵⁰ Instead of coming to terms with the regional and national fissures in the Ukraine, the urban elites identified themselves with the goals of various political groupings in revolutionary Petrograd. The national and social radicalization of the Ukrainian countryside in the summer of 1917 endangered the economic, social, and political hegemony of the urban elites. Consequently, the urban elites were forced to respond negatively to the Ukrainian demands for autonomy, and especially to their claim to the non-Ukrainian cities.⁵¹

The urban elites were less opposed to the cultural demands of the Ukrainians than to their aspirations to control the region's administrative organs. Exaggerating Ukrainian demands, the non-Ukrainians claimed that the Ukrainian movement threatened the unity of the Russian state and revolutionary democracy with its "separatist tendencies." At first, the Jews were, for the most part, sympathetic to the Ukrainians. But because they supported the common revolutionary front, they did not want to see it divided along national lines. They hoped that the victory of the revolution would guarantee their own rights and secure their own interests. Given the abolition of the national and religious restrictions of the tsarist past by the Provisional Government, they had little reason to support the demands of the non-Russian nationalities for national-territorial autonomy.⁵²

The Russian and Russified population, being the dominant political and cultural force in the Ukraine, had no inclination to become a minority surrounded by a sea of nationally conscious Ukrainian

peasants. Both the Russian right, which supported a united and indivisible Russia, and the Russian left, which opposed the break-up of the "united" revolutionary front, mounted virulent attacks in the Russian language press on the Central Rada and its demands. Only the Poles attempted to come to an agreement with the Rada and the General Secretariat.⁵³

Urban suspicions directed at the increasingly hostile Ukrainian countryside were matched by rural distrust of the cities. The Ukrainian nationalist leadership recognized the animosity between the cities and the countryside and realized that it restricted the Ukrainian revolution's options and threatened its survival.

The urban-rural split, antagonism of the non-Ukrainians, and the Russification of those living in the larger cities had prevented the Ukrainian nationalists from establishing a monopoly of power. The peasant masses were illiterate, uneducated, undisciplined, and politically unsophisticated. They were therefore incapable of running the new state administration. It was one thing for the Rada to claim jurisdiction over the territories inhabited by Ukrainians, but it was another to create a state apparatus and provide the necessary bureaucrats to govern such a state.

The Rada did not merely have to transform the old tsarist bureaucratic machinery into Ukrainian controlled organs or to replace one set of cadres with another. Rather, it had to begin anew since it possessed no stable armed forces capable of enforcing the Rada's decisions. The military, the police, and the bureaucracy of the old regime, the non-Ukrainian minorities, and the all-Russian-oriented soviets hampered the efforts of the Rada to establish the necessary institutions for the new autonomous order. Like the Bolshevik and non-Bolshevik parties, the Rada needed individuals to man these organs, although it faced a more desperate manpower shortage than did its rivals. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the head of the General Secretariat, expressed the Rada's dilemma:

Where are the forces which would constitute these organs . . . ? . . . There is a need for thousands of experienced, educated, and nationally-conscious people in order to fill all the governmental positions and all the institutions, beginning with ministers and ending up with secretaries in the offices. Where are these people? Where can they be found, when we did not have our own schools and when we had no possibility of having our own mass intelligentsia from which we can select these experienced, educated, and nationally-conscious people? . . . There are probably enough for the

ministers, but after that? [We need] directors, heads of bureaus, commissars, and tens of thousands of public servants – where shall we find them? And by what means shall we pay them?⁵⁴

During the period of revolutionary fervor in the spring of 1917, the leaders of the Ukrainian movement naively believed (as Lenin assumed in regard to the bourgeois specialists) that they would attract the necessary bureaucratic cadres from the assimilated Ukrainian intelligentsia: “Our Russified intelligentsia will join us. We will rouse them, shame them, sensitize them, inspire them, and draw them to work [with us].”⁵⁵ But, during the course of 1917, this anticipated support did not emerge. As a result, the Rada’s bureaucracy consisted of only a small group of political *émigrés* from Galicia and politically inexperienced journalists, teachers, and lawyers.⁵⁶ The Ukrainian movement had to engage in both nation-building (raising the masses’ dormant national consciousness) and state-building at the same time. However, since it had at its disposal only a small number of capable people, it sought to emphasize only nation-building, and to compensate by drawing non-Ukrainians into the state apparatus.

But the Rada’s attempts at nation-building collapsed. Despite the overwhelming victory of the Ukrainian political parties at the elections to the Constituent Assembly, this success was never institutionalized.

Between November 1917 and January 1918, the Central Rada’s support from the peasantry evaporated and at the beginning of 1918 it became politically impotent. Now the Rada had to compete with the Bolsheviks, who viewed most national movements as intrinsically reactionary and who never envisaged the Ukrainian provinces (with their sugar industry, coal, and grain) separating from Russia.⁵⁷ Because the Bolsheviks emphasized the struggle against imperialism and capitalism as their primary goal, they invaded the Ukraine in January 1918. In addition to the Bolsheviks, the Rada had to confront an even more dangerous enemy – anarchy.

Because the leadership of the Rada did not deal decisively with the land question, the Rada lost its authority among the peasants. Taking advantage of this breakdown, the peasants and demobilized soldiers (who had been peasants prior to the war) began to satisfy their land hunger and express their frustration over their inferior socio-economic position by expropriating land and participating in pogroms against local Jews. Despite the pleas of Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, the Minister for Military Affairs, little could be done to curb these killings.⁵⁸ By the winter of 1917–18, most of the Rada’s military forces

had disappeared, as the Ukrainian peasants abandoned their support for the Ukrainian intellectuals in the cities and concentrated their efforts on securing land in the countryside, where anarchy ruled supreme. With little support in the cities, and with mass confusion in the countryside, an organized Ukrainian nationalist movement disintegrated.

The Soviet Russian government's invasion of the Ukraine in January 1918 provoked the Rada to declare its independence from Russia. With this declaration of independence, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi became the country's first president. His major task was to stabilize the chaos by signing a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk. In accordance with the treaty 400,000 Germans and Austrians drove the Bolshevik invaders from the Ukraine and restored order to the countryside.

Although the Rada emerged from hiding and returned in triumph, it could not reignite the peasant enthusiasm it had garnered in the spring of 1917. The land question remained the major stumbling block. Because the Germans and Austrians wanted the Ukrainian harvest to feed their starving population, they did not want the break-up of large estates. The peasants did. The latter, moreover, were reluctant to sow the fields because they were not sure that they would reap the harvest. The Rada found itself in a Catch-22 dilemma: it desperately needed German arms but could not alienate the peasantry, its largest constituency, by abandoning its land reforms.

Officials at the highest levels of the German government cursed the Rada for its "socialist nonsense"⁵⁹ and in April 1918 German commanders in the Ukraine supported General Pavlo Skoropads'kyi's coup against the Rada. Skoropads'kyi proclaimed himself Hetman of the Ukraine, but quickly alienated the Ukrainian nationalists and the peasants. Although Skoropads'kyi was a Ukrainian and during 1917 supported the Ukrainianization of the military units under his command, upon assuming power he promoted anti-Ukrainian nationalists in his administration. They supported the re-establishment of a Russia "one and indivisible" and the return of the pre-revolutionary social order. Skoropads'kyi reintroduced a reactionary agrarian policy and supported reprisals against peasants who divided the landlords' estates.⁶⁰

With the collapse of Austria-Hungary in October 1918, the revolution in Germany, and the armistice on the western front on November 11, 1918, German and Austrian troops wanted to return home as quickly as possible. Since they comprised the bulk of his support,

Skoropads'kyi's days were numbered. After a mass peasant and nationalist uprising coordinated by the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic in November and December 1918, Skoropads'kyi abdicated and fled with the retreating German troops.

But the victorious Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic, led by Petliura and Vynnychenko, was a viable political force for only two months. Driven out of Kiev by the Bolsheviks in early February 1919, the Directory barely survived, controlling only small slices of Ukrainian territory. Over the next two years this geographic area constantly shifted, as did its provisional seat of government.

Political instability followed political instability. The Soviet Russian government's second and third invasions, mass peasant uprisings in the spring of 1919, the emergence of the anarchist bands, the White and Allied interventions, pogroms against the Jews, and the Polish–Soviet War of 1920, easily made the Ukraine one of the primary and most confusing postwar carousels of death.⁶¹ By initiating an anti-Bolshevik blockade, which excluded necessary medical supplies, the Allies contributed to the spread of disease and starvation.

This social chaos reinforced the peasants' desires to withdraw from active political involvement. Because communications were primitive and illiteracy was very high, it was difficult for the peasants to effectively organize themselves outside their rural districts, even if they had wanted to. They turned inward, concentrating on expanding their small landholdings. The national split between the cities and the countryside, political instability, incursions by those people peasants considered "foreigners," and mass slaughter shattered the uneasy alliance between the Ukrainian nationalists and the peasants.

Nationalist collapse

Between 1917 and 1921 Ukrainian nationalism reached, but could not institutionalize, Hroch's Phase C. With the collapse of the tsarist order, the subsequent political disintegration of the revolutionary Russian Republic, and the emergence of the Ukrainian Central Rada, Ukrainian nationalism attracted millions of peasants to its banners. Like the Provisional Government, the Central Rada could not satisfy the tidal wave of expectations and frustrations that emerged from the profound social revolution sweeping across the Russian Empire in 1917. Similarly, the Central Rada – like the Provisional Government – confronted the uncompromising demands espoused by its most critical constituency to institute radical agrarian reforms

immediately. The UPSR's program to nationalize the large estates and then distribute them to the peasants without the participation of the state – whether Russian or Ukrainian – was attractive to the peasants. As a result, the UPSR won absolute majorities at all elections. But the average peasant, according to John Reshetar, "was concerned with obtaining additional land far more than he was with such intangibles as autonomy and federalism. To him, socialism meant obtaining land from the land owner without payment."⁶² The peasants, in short, wanted "their" government to immediately distribute all land; the Rada's hesitancy only infuriated them and isolated it further from the peasantry. The Rada wanted to dominate the cities, but could not win over the Russian and Russified urban dwellers. Forced to rely on the countryside, it alienated both the urban dwellers and peasants.

The revolution in the Ukrainian provinces exhibited fissures not only between the cities and the countryside, but also between provinces and regions that had not been integrated as a single unit. The provinces of Volhynia, Kiev, Podillia, Poltava, Kharkov, Chernihiv, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and the Taurida were provinces of the Russian Empire, not of a unified Ukraine. At its peak the Central Rada was powerful in the Kiev, Poltava, and Chernihiv provinces – the Ukrainian heartland – but far less so in the increasingly nationally mixed areas of the Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav provinces and the Donbass, where significant numbers of people, especially the Russian and Russified working class, considered themselves an integral part of the empire.

As a result of this extreme regionalization, the split between the cities and the countryside, the Russified working class, and the volatile Ukrainian peasants, the revolution was severely fragmented and possessed several conflicting agendas. In reality, in the Ukrainian provinces three separate revolutions emerged: in the Russified cities, in the economically depressed countryside, and among nationally conscious Ukrainians. Each revolution had an ambivalent, if not antagonistic, relationship to the others.

Between 1917 and 1921, Phase C, the fusion of Ukrainian national and economic concerns, experienced a meteoric rise and fall. As a result of their economic and social dislocation, the peasants enthusiastically joined the urban Ukrainian intellectuals in the spring of 1917. But under the chaotic political circumstances, peasant economic demands could not be met. The peasants then divorced themselves from the Ukrainian movement and tended to their parochial concerns. Nevertheless, the invasions, interventions, and occupations by the

Bolsheviks, Germans, Poles, and other Europeans radically dislocated the existing social and political relationships, and inaugurated new antagonisms between groups and radically reinforced the old.⁶³ These migrations into the Ukrainian provinces fueled the long and bitter struggle between the food-producing “natives” (the Ukrainians) and the food-consuming “outsiders” (the Russians, Jews, Germans, Poles, and Bolsheviks), and crystallized Ukrainian national consciousness, which identified itself with the countryside and the “outsiders” with the cities. An astute contemporary observer remarked that “Lenin, Trotsky, and (Khristian) Rakovsky” raised the Ukrainian national consciousness.⁶⁴

Despite the disintegration of the alliance between the urban-centered Ukrainian nationalists and the peasants, peasant sufferings raised their undeveloped national consciousness to the forefront and introduced them to modern nationalism. By the end of the civil war, the economic and national cleavages between the Ukrainian countryside and the Russified cities became double-bonded. Peasants who had identified themselves as *tuteshni* (locals) or *maloruski* (Little Russians) in the nineteenth century now chose to call themselves *ukraintsi* (Ukrainians). Despite the failure of the nationalists to establish an independent Ukrainian state, this national consciousness remained at a feverish level.

By December 1919, after reconquering the Ukraine for the third time, the Bolsheviks had realized that their prime weakness lay in their lack of rural support. They had recognized that control of the cities, which played a pivotal role in the Bolshevik victory over the Ukrainian nationalists, did not necessarily mean control of the whole Ukraine.⁶⁵ And although the Russian dominance of the cities in the Ukraine had a long history, the command of the cities over the countryside in light of the meteoric rise of Phase C among Ukrainians was a precarious one. The pre-revolutionary status quo could not be reestablished. This post-revolutionary volcanic political situation demanded serious reassessment.

2 The Bolshevik response

Violent peasant and non-Russian resistance to Soviet power forced the Bolsheviks to recognize and to deal with the major social disparities within the largest country in the world. Although the tsarist political order collapsed in the spring of 1917, the social, economic and cultural legacy of the old order remained. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Russia annexed territories containing a wide variety of national and religious groups which were not fully developed political entities with a matching political consciousness.¹ Located on the periphery of the empire, these territories differed not only from the center, but also from each other.

Of the 140 million people in Soviet Russia and its allied republics in 1921, 75 million were Russians and 65 million were non-Russians. Of the latter, nearly 30 million were Ukrainians and 30 million were of Turkic background.² The population density varied from 2.4 people per square kilometer in Kirghizia to 53.0 in the Ukrainian republic, which possessed the most densely populated urban and rural populations of all the non-Russian regions.³

Although these areas possessed rich natural resources, they remained economically underdeveloped. A small number of non-Russian regions did not diverge from Russia in industrial development; the majority, however, did. Capitalism barely penetrated most of these areas. As a result, the non-Russians did not possess a native bourgeoisie or their own proletariat. The indigenous populations consisted mainly of peasants or nomads. Those in Turkestan lived a "half-patriarchal, half-feudal life style."⁴

Culturally, the non-Russians varied widely. Some national groups (such as the Poles, Finns, Latvians, and Ukrainians) possessed their own fully developed languages, cultures, and literatures. Other nationalities (such as the Belorussians and Tatars) were at the initial stages of creating their own languages and literatures. Finally, the

third group (which included the Mordvinians, the majority of the mountain tribes of the Caucasus, the Votiaks) did not even possess their own alphabets.⁵ Literacy rates varied from city to countryside, from region to region, from group to group.

The communist leadership recognized that the social, economic, and cultural legacy of the tsarist order generated a greater hostility between the cities and the countryside in the non-Russian areas than in the central Russian provinces.⁶ Cities in the former areas were Russian outposts. Local support was sparse and precarious. Most of what little support emerged came from urbanized Russians.

Bolshevik leaders realized, moreover, that the high percentage of Russians in their ranks in the non-Russian areas transformed the class struggle into a conflict among national groups and hampered the Sovietization of these areas. Local Russian Bolshevik cadres alienated the indigenous population and destabilized the political environment.⁷ The local population viewed these cadres as beneficiaries of the old order. Non-Russians did join the Communist Party, but the percentage in regional party organizations varied from one area to another. In 1922, for example, Crimean Tatars constituted 2.5 percent of the Crimean party organization, while Armenians comprised 89.5 percent of the Armenian Communist Party.⁸ Ukrainians constituted only 23.6 percent of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, but their large number (12,805 in 1922) made them a significant plurality among the 27,645 non-Russians in the fifteen non-Russian party organizations.⁹

In light of these structural divisions along national lines, how would communist power root the predominantly Russian revolution in the non-Russian areas? How would it establish a productive relationship between the Russians and the non-Russians?

Only after the final military victory over Denikin and Petliura in December 1919 and early 1920 could the Bolsheviks reevaluate their nationality policy, especially in the Ukraine. By then it had become evident even to the most doctrinaire Bolshevik that on the national question his Marxist heritage crashed into reality on the Ukrainian steppe. There the economically depressed peasants linked their social and economic frustrations with the Ukrainian identity. This transformation of peasants into Ukrainians confounded Marxist preconceptions.¹⁰

Reality was a sobering experience. Although local support for the Bolsheviks varied from area to area, the proximity of the Ukrainian provinces to the Russian industrial areas (which could mobilize

workers into makeshift armies) prevented Ukrainian nationalism's successful competition with the Bolsheviks.¹¹ Bolshevik strength in the Ukraine, moreover, was concentrated in the large industrial cities (such as Nikolaev, Kremenchuk, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Odessa) and the Donbass. Although the Bolshevik political party received only 10.5 percent of the November 1917 vote to the Constituent Assembly in the Ukrainian provinces (far less than the 25.0 percent they received throughout the rest of the territories still tied to Russia),¹² their support in and control of the urban centers was decisive. Possessing communications centers, railway junctions, sea-ports, warehouses, and armories, the cities became the "strategic keys" to Bolshevik victory over the Ukrainian countryside.¹³ But in light of the explosion of Ukrainian nationalism, this fragile victory did not insure long-term stability. The tensions and hostility between the countryside and the cities had to be defused.

Despite his abhorrence of nationalism, Lenin recognized that the national question could not be ignored simply because the Bolshevik Party could not fit it neatly into its political paradigm.¹⁴ If reality came into conflict with the model of the future, then a compromise between the two had to be reached. For Lenin, procrusteanism did not make good – or successful – politics.

Bolshevik reactions after 1917

After the March Revolution, the Bolsheviks aggravated the tensions between the Provisional Government and the non-Russian nationalities.¹⁵ After coming to power in November, they sought to reincorporate the non-Russian borderlands, which they considered integral parts of Russia. But in light of their ambivalent ideological heritage and the complexity of the situation in the non-Russian areas, the Bolsheviks, especially those in the Ukrainian provinces, were divided over which policies to follow. After much intense factional maneuvering and after being prodded by the Central Committee of the RKP(b), they slowly adapted themselves to the Ukrainian environment and began to compete with Ukrainian nationalism by creating three institutions: the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR), the Communist Party of the Ukraine (KP(b)U), and *korenizatsiia*.

Initially, most Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, primarily located in the Donbass coal fields, ignored the peasants and the national question in their work. One Bolshevik remembered that in the first weeks after the March Revolution, he and his colleagues, residents of Ekaterinoslav,

“did not mention once that we worked in the Ukraine. Ekaterinoslav was for us an enormous city in and only in Southern Russia.”¹⁶ They concentrated only on the class struggle, not on their environment. They considered themselves participants on just another battlefield in the war against capitalism and imperialism. For them, all battlefields were interchangeable.

After November 1917, the Bolsheviks sought to reign in the Central Rada. Abandoning previous declarations of broad provincial autonomy and the right of secession, Lenin and his fellow People’s Commissars delivered an ultimatum to the Rada on December 4, demanding that they stop disarming Soviet regiments and Red Guard detachments, halt the movement of anti-Bolshevik forces across the Ukraine, and cease disorganizing the common front.¹⁷ Bolshevik troops soon invaded the Ukraine. Stalin asserted that the conflict “emerged not between the peoples of Russia and the Ukraine, but between the Council of People’s Commissars and the Rada’s General Secretariat.”¹⁸

Because the Central Rada, declaring a Ukrainian republic, had carried out “petty bourgeois politics in the interests of the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian bourgeoisie,” the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, meeting in Kharkov in December 1917, declared an independent Soviet Ukrainian republic on behalf of workers and peasants. This republic was established “in close solidarity with the working masses of all nationalities in the Ukraine and the working masses of the entire Russia.”¹⁹ Mykola Skrypnyk, a Ukrainian, an old Bolshevik, and a friend of Lenin’s, became the head of the People’s Secretariat of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Kharkov (a major city of the Left Bank Ukraine) became its capital.

But this Ukrainian People’s Republic was a hollow shell, swept away by the advancing German armies after the Rada signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in February 1918. The Bolsheviks “never considered the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as a national republic, but exclusively as a Soviet republic on the territory of the Ukraine . . . tied with the All-Russian Workers and Peasants Republic by means of federal ties.”²⁰

Nevertheless, the creation of a Soviet Ukrainian republic triggered major conflicts among the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian provinces. They split into two factions, the Ekaterinoslavians and the Kievans. Removed from the centers of the Ukrainian national movement, the first group ignored the national question, underestimated Ukrainian nationalism’s strength, and failed to establish a party organization

uniting the Ukrainian provinces. Not surprisingly, the Ekaterinoslavians opposed the creation of the Ukrainian SSR and the KP(b)U. The worker or miner from Ekaterinoslav or the Donbass who oriented himself in the direction of Petrograd and Moscow did not believe that the proletariat in the Ukraine had any special tasks. For him, "the Ukraine was one of the counter-revolutionary fronts on which one would fight in union with the workers from Petrograd, Moscow, and Ivanovo-Voznesensk and only in hopes of their help."²¹

The Ekaterinoslavians were not receptive to the idea of a single, unified Ukrainian Republic. Instead, they hoped to establish several republics from the Ukrainian provinces. After the German occupation of the Ukraine in March 1918, Bolsheviks in the Donbass tried to preempt the Germans by declaring an independent Donbass-Kryvyi Rih Republic, which included the Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav gubernias and parts of the Don oblast, including the city of Rostov. This plan was designed to remove surgically the Russified industrial areas from the rural Ukrainian areas. Another group of Bolsheviks wanted the industrial areas of the Donbass and the Left Bank to join the Russian republic. These Bolsheviks were very interested in the urban areas, and they felt that they could do without the rural areas. In line with this, they asserted that the Donbass had no relationship to the Ukraine and that it was more tightly tied economically to the Central Russian provinces than to the Ukraine.²²

The second group, the Kievans, a minority within the party, recognized that the Ukraine was still a backward region and that the proletariat represented a small percentage of the population. They believed that the proletariat could not win against the Ukrainian "counter-revolution" without the help of the peasantry. Ukrainian peasants, they asserted, would look suspiciously upon all attempts to seize the Ukraine with Moscow's help. Because the Kievans, living in the center of Ukrainian nationalism in 1917, recognized the Bolshevik Party's need to come to terms with Ukrainian aspirations, many of the Ekaterinoslavians accused the Kievans of petty bourgeois attitudes and utopianism.²³

Yet, despite its hostility to all manifestations of nationalism, the Russian Communist Party – reacting to an adverse situation in the Ukraine – inadvertently recognized this nationalism by supporting a unified Ukrainian republic as opposed to creating several Soviet republics in the Ukrainian provinces. The Russian Communist Party placed the national-territorial principle at the base of the USSR's political administration. By vetoing the idea of creating many

republics from the Ukrainian provinces, Lenin recognized the territorial and national integrity of the nine Ukrainian provinces and, in effect, agreed with the position espoused by the Ukrainian nationalists.²⁴ Although Lenin did so for tactical reasons, his action had serious political consequences, not only in leading to the formation of the Soviet Union in December 1922, but also in reinforcing the Ukrainian and other non-Russian national identities in the USSR for decades afterward.

The Bolshevik Party's identification of regionalism with a particular national group was strengthened by the creation of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Shortly after the Germans occupied the area, the April 1918 Taganrog Conference created the KP(b)U, a communist party with an independent Central Committee in the Ukrainian provinces.²⁵ The ties between the KP(b)U and the RKP(b) were established only through the International Bureau of the Third International. Skrypyuk openly identified himself with this position, which the Kievans supported.²⁶ But delegates to the KP(b)U's First Congress, which met in Moscow in July, overturned Skrypyuk's resolution. They defined their organization as "an autonomous (in local matters) Communist Party of the Ukraine with its own Central Committee and its congresses, which enters into the unified Russian Communist Party" and would be supervised by it.²⁷ The Ekaterinoslavians, supported by powerful patrons among the members of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), demoted the KP(b)U from an independent actor to a minor supporting role in the world revolution.

At its First Congress, the KP(b)U claimed to represent party organizations in the Ukraine having a total of 4,364 members.²⁸ Although it grew to nearly 36,000 by May 1919, the KP(b)U's small membership was its major weakness. In 1917, 67.0 percent of the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian provinces were concentrated in the Donbass and the Kryvyi Rih areas, the industrialized and Russified Left Bank.²⁹ The party's influence waned in the Right Bank. And, not surprisingly, because the overwhelming majority of the members of the party were non-Ukrainians,³⁰ they were indifferent, if not hostile, to Ukrainian aspirations. Despite its occasional claims to the contrary, the KP(b)U was a regional organization of the Russian Communist Party.³¹

In addition to creating the KP(b)U, the Taganrog Conference chose its name. Each of the choices before the delegates contained different political connotations. Some of the Kievans, who emphasized the importance of the peasantry and the national question, suggested "the Ukrainian Communist Party." The Ekaterinoslavians, who

represented the Russian or Russified workers, suggested "the Russian Communist Party in the Ukraine." Skrypnyk's suggestion, "Communist Party of the Ukraine," stressed social, territorial, and national factors; the majority of delegates voted for his compromise.³²

In addition to the Ukrainian SSR, a separate Communist Party of the Ukraine emerged during the revolution and civil war. Both institutions were regional components of the larger and more powerful RSFSR and RKP(b), and only nominally independent. Nevertheless, in these institutions the Bolsheviks recognized "the Ukraine" as a separate region with distinct problems. The central and the local Bolshevik organizations reluctantly recognized the Ukrainian reality: the national split between the cities and the countryside, the non-Ukrainian working class which alienated the Ukrainian peasants, and the differences between the Ukrainian provinces. But the creation of the Ukrainian SSR and the KP(b)U remained an inadequate response to the consolidation of Soviet power in the Ukraine.

It was not realistic to expect the Communist Party – which saw victory over the Whites as its first priority (feeding the starving cities was the second) – to re-evaluate completely its Russocentric perceptions during the civil war. Nevertheless, the party – now near the end of the conflict in the Ukrainian provinces – had to analyze the roots of their problems with the Ukrainians and other non-Russians.

This serious re-evaluation of its policies toward the non-Russians began two years after the end of the civil war. By 1923 the political situation improved. The Bolsheviks won the civil war, expelled Allied interventionists, and consolidated their power. The Allied economic blockade and boycott of Soviet Russia came to an end. Introduction of the New Economic Policy in March 1921 created a link (*smychka*) between the cities and the countryside and revived the depressed Soviet economy.

Pressing foreign policy considerations also contributed to this re-evaluation. Just as Turkestan was to be a model of Soviet development for the western colonies in the East, the Ukraine was to be a model for Eastern Europe.³³ By compromising with the Ukrainians, the Bolsheviks also sought to attract their 7 million compatriots who lived in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania to the Soviet order. This magnet became urgent after the Allied Council of Ambassadors legitimized the Polish annexation of Eastern Galicia, a region with 5 million Ukrainians, on March 5, 1923. The Soviet Ukraine, then, became a Piedmont not only for Ukrainian aspirations, but for all who were nationally oppressed in Eastern Europe and Asia. And of all the

solutions to the complex nationality problems which emerged in the 1920s in the newly independent states of Eastern Europe, the Soviet policy of *korenizatsiia* (along with Estonia's 1926 law on national-cultural autonomy) promised to be the most tolerant of minority rights.

Establishing *korenizatsiia*

As the national question was also a peasant question, a successful reworking of Russian/non-Russian relations would strengthen this *smychka*. In the fall of 1922, a major disagreement emerged between two groups supporting differing visions of the future union of the Soviet republics. Stalin and his allies wanted to include all Soviet republics *in* the RSFSR, with the right of autonomy.³⁴ Skrypnyk and his colleagues demanded the creation of a confederation of independent Soviet republics. From his deathbed Lenin proposed a compromise – a federation.³⁵ On December 30, 1922, the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belorussian SSR, and the Transcaucasian Federation established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This agreement replaced the bilateral treaties the RSFSR had signed with the other republics.³⁶

As it emerged in the spring of 1923, the USSR would be a federal state consisting of four sovereign states. The Russian nation would no longer be the ruling nation, but an equal (although the most populous) partner in the new state. A division of labor emerged between the central Soviet organs and the republics. The center would control the major commissariats; the Commissariats of Agriculture, Interior, Justice, Education, Health and Social Security would remain within the competence of the republics. But these concessions were only trappings of sovereignty. Because the RKP(b) was a highly centralized party and because the party actually controlled the Soviet state, the USSR from its inception was a unitary, not a federal state. Russians, moreover, constituted a majority of the population of the USSR and of the Communist Party membership. As part of the compromise to establish the new Soviet state, the RKP(b) guaranteed – in contrast to previous attitudes – broad cultural autonomy for the non-Russians. This “national contract” evolved between 1919 and 1923.³⁷

Recognizing the need to overcome the non-Russian animosity toward Russians, the party leadership first began to attack Russian chauvinism vociferously. This chauvinism, Stalin asserted, was very dangerous because it engendered non-Russian nationalism in the

borderlands. If the party were to destroy Russian chauvinism, then it "will destroy nine-tenths of that nationalism which remains and which is developing in the various republics."³⁸ But attacking Russian chauvinists, Russifiers, and tactless colleagues in the non-Russian areas was not enough. Deep-rooted problems demanded deep-rooted solutions.

Between the Eighth RKP(b) Congress in 1919 and the Fourth Conference of the RKP(b) Central Committee with officials from the non-Russian regions in 1923, the party developed a set of responses to its structural and political problems in the non-Russian areas. The goal would be to abolish these regional social inequities by raising these areas' economic and cultural standards to those of Central Russia,³⁹ by developing cultural institutions operating in the native languages to bring the Communist Party closer to the masses, and by industrializing the non-Russian areas, thereby creating indigenous workers who would bridge the gap between the Russian or Russified city and the non-Russian countryside.⁴⁰ In time, the party would also augment its ranks with non-Russians in the non-Russian regions. The party, in short, aspired to equalize the inequalities produced by four centuries of tsarism.

The Eighth Congress of the RKP(b), held in March 1919, adopted a new program, the first to define its goals after coming to power in November 1917. By abolishing all privileges for any national group and recognizing the complete equality of all nationalities, the party hoped to establish better relations between the proletarians and semi-proletarians of different nationalities.

The party program also recognized the rights of colonies and oppressed nations to political separation. But not all oppressed nations should secede. Only after analyzing the historical development of class relations within each nation (such as whether the nation was evolving from the feudal period toward bourgeois democracy or from bourgeois democracy to Soviet or proletarian democracy) would the RKP(b) decide whether secession was a progressive step.

Whether or not an oppressed nation separated from Russia, the Russian proletariat had to exercise special sensitivity toward the prevailing national feelings of the working masses of the oppressed nations. Only such a policy would create a voluntary and real unity of different national groups of the international proletariat.⁴¹

Ending the privileged status of Russians in the non-Russian areas and the codification of the equality of nations and of opportunities guaranteed the formal equality of nations in the new revolutionary

state. But real equality could be achieved only by adopting measures which would overcome the economic, political, and cultural backwardness of the non-Russians.

The Tenth RKP(b) Congress, meeting in March 1921, began this process of equalization. In order to help the non-Russian working masses conquer their structural underdevelopment, the party resolved to:

- 1 develop and strengthen the Soviet state system in forms which correspond to the national conditions of these non-Russians;
- 2 develop and strengthen the use of the native languages in the courts, administration, economic organs, organs of power, which would be staffed by local people who know the way of life and psychology of the local population;
- 3 develop the press, schools, theaters, clubs and all cultural-educational institutions in the native languages; and
- 4 create a wide net of courses and schools, general education as well as professional-technical schools in the native languages, in order to quickly prepare skilled workers and soviet and party workers from the local population in all spheres, especially in the sphere of education.⁴²

In addition, there was a need to organize and to recruit the indigenous members of the working class and the poor peasantry into the party and into the soviets.⁴³

The final resolution concerning the national question adopted at the Twelfth Party Congress of the RKP(b) in April 1923 discussed the social foundations of Soviet nationality policy in far greater detail than did earlier party resolutions. It emphasized the importance of social conditions and their influence on Soviet nationality policy:

The legal equality of nations, won by the October Revolution, is a great accomplishment for all nations, but it does not in itself solve the entire national question. The number of republics and nations which did not or almost did not experience capitalism, which do not have or almost do not have their own proletariat, and which, as a result, are less developed in state and cultural relations, cannot fully take advantage of the laws and opportunities, that national equality offers them. Without real and constant external help, they cannot raise themselves to a higher level of development and catch up with those more developed nationalities.⁴⁴

This help would consist of establishing industrial centers in the non-Russian republics, with maximum participation of the local population.⁴⁵ Undoubtedly, the Bolsheviks felt that with the development

of the economy, the local population would be modernized, would be proletarianized, would acquire a working-class consciousness, and would be less resistant to the Soviet order. To encourage the natural evolution of this process, special laws were passed which guaranteed the use of native languages in all state organs and in all institutions that served the non-Russian population.⁴⁶ These laws would "prosecute and punish all violations of national rights, especially the rights of the national minorities, with full revolutionary severity."⁴⁷

The Congress resolved that the governmental organs of the national republics and oblasts should include people from the local area; those who knew the languages, ways of life, and customs of the non-Russians. The Central Committee should be very careful in selecting responsible workers in the autonomous and independent republics.⁴⁸

The Fourth Conference of the RKP(b) Central Committee with officials from the non-Russian regions in June 1923 reaffirmed the decisions of the Twelfth RKP(b) Congress. Here Stalin asserted that it was "inadmissible mechanically to transplant Petrograd and Moscow standards into the provinces and republics."⁴⁹ The party must tolerate peculiarities in the non-Russian areas. The party's goal was to bring the apparatus of the party and the soviets, closely identified with the Russians, to the non-Russians. The best way to achieve this goal was to induce the bureaucracy to work in a "language intelligible to the population."⁵⁰

By June 1923 the party created a set of policies promoting the non-Russian languages and cultures, on the one hand, and non-Russian cadres, on the other. These policies overturned previous Bolshevik positions on the national question. These ambivalent positions never advocated maintaining national identities or "preserving the cultural heterogeneity of the world."⁵¹ Inasmuch as social democracy's mission was "to strengthen the international culture of the world proletariat,"⁵² Bolsheviks envisaged their support for non-Russian cultures to be sparing. But after a bitter three-and-a-half year struggle between cities and rural areas, between workers and peasants, and between Russians and non-Russians, the Bolsheviks needed to renegotiate the relationship between the Russian cities and the non-Russian countryside. Due to economic, cultural, and political factors, the peasant question and the national question were intimately connected.

Korenizatsiia sought to overcome the structural problems experienced by the non-Russians in early Soviet society: the high illiteracy rates, economic underdevelopment, cultural backwardness, and the

tense relationship between the Russified cities and the non-Russian countrysides. This indigenization policy was especially conciliatory in the Moslem regions.⁵³ *Korenizatsiia* would be the political solution and industrialization the socio-economic response of the Soviet government to the nationalities problem. These programs were intertwined.

In the long run, the Bolsheviks expected that industrialization would equalize the long-standing disparities between the Russian and non-Russian areas, and that equal opportunities would integrate the nationally diverse peoples of the Soviet Union into the socialist order. But the Communist Party and the Soviet government could not wait until this equalization would take place naturally. Ending inequalities would take a long time.⁵⁴ Measures such as *korenizatsiia* had to be implemented immediately in order to defuse the non-Russian hostility toward the alien cities.⁵⁵ In conformity with this goal, the RKP(b) introduced measures which would outwardly placate the aroused national feelings of the non-Russians, but limit their true political content.

By the summer of 1923 the central party established an implicit "national contract" with the non-Russians.⁵⁶ The non-Russians were "promised 'sovereign' statehood and equality within the federal structure" of the USSR. Specifically, "they were guaranteed the right to develop their cultures and make full use of their native languages, as well as to train and rely on native cadres in their republics; in short, to complete the process of building their nation states within the Soviet federal framework. Furthermore, the imperial Russian legacy was to be disowned, Russian chauvinism kept in check and Russification prohibited."⁵⁷

Towards Ukrainianization

Despite formal Soviet recognition of the right of the non-Russian nationalities to use their languages in the party and the government, the exact position of the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian SSR remained uncertain. During the period of war communism, most Bolshevik government and party officials in the Ukraine refused to recognize the cultural aspirations of the Ukrainian people.⁵⁸

Some members of the KP(b)U, moreover, were Russian chauvinists, who insulted Ukrainian sensitivities. For example, at the Fourth Conference of the KP(b)U, held in Moscow in March 1920, one of the delegates, Dashkovskii, asserted that in the Ukraine "there is no

national question" and that peasant uprisings were "the work of kulaks."⁵⁹ He demanded the liquidation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic and proposed "to abandon all games concerning a Ukrainian government and to discuss openly, clearly, and decisively the question about the fusion of both republics [the Ukrainian and Russian – GL] into one Soviet Republic."⁶⁰ Dashkovskii's colleague, Zalutskii asserted that the Russian workers should closely supervise the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship in the Ukraine because the Ukrainian proletariat "is dependent upon the petty bourgeoisie. He is unable to organize a firm dictatorship or a solid government."⁶¹

Already by 1918 many Ukrainians interpreted the hostility of the Bolsheviks to the Ukrainian movement as an attack on all things Ukrainian. Many members of the trade unions in the Ukraine in 1918 identified the Ukrainian nationality with counter-revolutionary politics and were afraid of being identified as Ukrainians. During a registration of trade unionists some pleaded, "Register me as a non-Ukrainian."⁶²

Even the leadership of the KP(b)U poisoned the atmosphere. In January 1919, Khristian Rakovsky, the Bulgarian-born chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, asserted that the "ethnographic differences between Ukrainians and Russians appear to be in themselves insignificant."⁶³ Later he claimed that the idea of decreeing the Ukrainian language as a state language was reactionary because it violated the equality of the Russian and the Ukrainian languages.⁶⁴ If equality between the languages was to be maintained, he asserted, neither language should become the state language.

Although Soviet laws recognized the equality of the Russian and Ukrainian languages, many Bolsheviks resisted the spread of the Ukrainian language to the cities and to Soviet institutions. Opponents of this equality emphasized the "theory of the struggle of two cultures" in some circles of the Communist Party. Recognizing the sharp national division between the Ukrainian urban and rural areas, this theory favored the Russified, proletarian urban areas over the largely Ukrainian rural areas, by, in effect, describing the Russian culture in the Ukraine as urban, advanced, and revolutionary and the Ukrainian culture as rural, backward, and counter-revolutionary. Not surprisingly, it predicted the victory of the former over the latter. Despite Lenin's warnings against Russian chauvinism by party members in the Ukraine,⁶⁵ this theory gathered many adherents.

Grigori Zinoviev, the chairman of the Comintern, was one of the first to verbalize this idea in November 1920:

We believe that language should develop freely. After a number of years that language which has greater roots, which is more vital, which is more cultured, will triumph. Therefore, our policies are those in which action, not words, will sincerely and honestly show the Ukrainian peasant that Soviet power is not a hindrance to his conversing or teaching his children in any language he pleases.⁶⁶

Despite his hands-off attitude toward Ukrainian language usage, Zinoviev's moderation was more apparent than real. Zinoviev strongly implied that a conflict existed between the Russian and Ukrainian languages, and that the first language was more cultured than the second. Subsequently, the more cultured language would become more equal than the other. Why was this the case? Was it not that the Russian language promised more social advantages to its speakers than did the Ukrainian language? If so, did this not mean a continuation of structural national inequalities? Who, after all, would determine which language had stronger roots, was more vital, or more cultured?

Most importantly, the overriding issue was not, as Zinoviev asserted, the government's prohibition of Ukrainian language usage by the peasants and their children. The real issue was how to create a better relationship between the Russified cities and the nationally aroused Ukrainian countryside. How was equality to be created between the rural and the urban areas in an environment which supported inequality? And since one either supported the policies of Russification and its fruits or supported policies attempting to reverse Russification, one could not remain neutral in this situation. By remaining neutral, Zinoviev indirectly supported Russification.

Even as late as March 1923, Dmitrii Lebed', the second secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U from 1920 to 1924, actively promoted the theory of the struggle of two cultures.⁶⁷ He stated:

Inasmuch as the peasant sometimes demands instruction in the Ukrainian language for his children and inasmuch as it is necessary to go to the countryside and explain to the peasants the problems which interest them in a language understandable to them, then we should come to the conclusion that our party should master the Ukrainian language and conduct culture by means of it. But at the same time we should not forget that for us a language serves as a means of propagating not nationalist, but Soviet, proletarian, and communist influences . . .

Our party is obliged in the conditions prevailing in the Ukraine to examine whether or not use of the Ukrainian language provides any possibility of hastening the cultural process in the Ukrainian nation,

especially among the backward peasantry, or impedes the process, and does not help to master culture . . . Consequently, the party should not allow so-called Ukrainianization in the name of Ukrainianization . . . Setting for ourselves the task of actively Ukrainianizing the party, and necessarily also the working class . . . will serve the interests of the cultural movement of reactionary forces, since nationalization – the artificial dissemination of the Ukrainian language in the party and working class – given the present political, economic, and cultural relations between the cities and villages, means to adopt the lower culture of the village in preference to the higher culture of the city . . . We know theoretically that the struggle of two cultures is inevitable. For us in the Ukraine, as a result of historical circumstances, the culture of the city is Russian and the culture of the countryside is Ukrainian. Not one Communist or honest Marxist can say that “I support the point of view of the victory of Ukrainian culture” if this culture will only delay our progressive movement.⁶⁸

Lebed', like Zinoviev, located the Ukrainian problem squarely in the countryside. It was inconceivable to him that Ukrainian culture could ever have anything to do with the cities. The Ukrainian language was only for communication with the peasants. The cities were Russian outposts, the centers of the progressive proletariat. And who during the struggle on the cultural front “would oppose the proletariat?”⁶⁹

Thus, the Ukrainian language was definitely for peasants only. Although Ukrainian had been prohibited from 1876 through 1905, no amends were to be made for tsarist policy, for the Soviet order did not bear the responsibility for tsarist injustices. Russian culture was progressive, even if tsarism had not been. The Bolsheviks, according to proponents of this theory, were not responsible for developing the nationalities that had been oppressed under tsarist rule.

Due to the Russian dominance of the centers of power in the Ukraine, these views denigrating the Ukrainian language and culture were popular. Although Russians comprised only 9 percent of the population of the republic, their influence was pervasive. The urban and industrial centers were Russian cities. The working class was Russian or Russified. Seventy-nine percent of the Communist Party of the Ukraine⁷⁰ and 95 percent of the governmental bureaucrats were Russian or Russified.⁷¹

Despite the misgivings and hostility of the KP(b)U's rank and file, the party had to find a *modus vivendi* with the hostile Ukrainian peasantry. In an era of national equality and self-determination, the party had to overcome these social and national inequalities. It could

not do so by remaining neutral, by letting social processes "correct" themselves. The Ukraine's social problems demanded a political solution which favored Ukrainians. The Ukrainianization of the institutions which dealt with Ukrainians would win the hearts and minds of the majority of the republic's population.

The Borot'bist Party, the former left wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, carried over the idea of Ukrainianization from the Ukrainian nationalist camp to the Bolsheviks prior to their merger with the KP(b)U in March 1920.⁷² They sought to encourage the development of Ukrainian culture within the Soviet order. The Borot'bists were influential in the countryside, but weak in the cities. Nevertheless, they attempted to become a party of the urban proletariat and compete with the Bolsheviks. The Borot'bists asserted that the proletarian power in the Ukraine

should categorically and clearly place as its task the decisive struggle with the inertia of Russification – this heavy vestige of the capitalistic way of life. This struggle is not an administrative one, it can be conducted only in the form of a wide and systematic help of the development of the Ukrainian form of culture . . .⁷³

Whereas the Borot'bists were concerned with Russification and its consequences, the Russian Communist Party initially attempted to modify the behavior of its members in the Ukraine after the Soviet victory over Denikin in December 1919. Its decree, "On Soviet Power in the Ukraine," resolved to create a more moderate nationality policy in that republic. This resolution was later approved by the Eighth All-Russian Party Conference, held on December 2-4, 1919. An important passage in the decree read:

Inasmuch as nationalist tendencies are observable among the backward section of the Ukrainian masses as a result of the oppression of many centuries, members of the RKP(b) are obligated to treat them with the utmost patience and tact, countering [these tendencies] with a word of comradely explanation of the identity of interests of the toiling masses of the Ukraine and Russia. Members of the RKP(b) in the territory of the Ukraine must indeed adhere to the right of the toiling masses to study and speak in their native language in all Soviet institutions, in every way opposing attempts by artificial means to reduce the Ukrainian language to a secondary plane, striving on the contrary to transform the Ukrainian language into a weapon of communist education of the toiling masses. Steps should be taken so that all Soviet institutions have a sufficient number of employees conversant in the Ukrainian language and so that in the future all employees will be able to make themselves understood in Ukrainian.⁷⁴

Thus, party members were charged with the duty of removing "all obstacles to the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture" and were reminded that those members of the "toiling masses" who were Ukrainian had the right to study and speak in their native language in all Soviet institutions. By removing these "obstacles" the Party – already in late 1919 – sought to encourage the development of the Ukrainian language and culture in the heretofore Russified cities. For the first time the party officially took into account the national characteristics of a region, and sought to overcome the legacy of the tsarist past. The decree, however, failed to reflect the realities. While all obstacles to the free development of Ukrainian were to be removed, the language would never be equal to Russian unless steps were taken to overcome the legacy of Russification.

The decree did not directly address this issue. Although it opposed attempts by "artificial means to reduce the Ukrainian language to a secondary plane," it did little to raise the Ukrainian language to a higher plane. It demonstrated only a superficial concern with the proper political conduct of party members in the Ukraine, and neglected more profound cultural or social changes. Did the Central Committee of the RKP(b) really believe that after a bitter struggle in the Ukraine between the Bolsheviks and various Ukrainian nationalist forces, these nationalist tendencies could be countered by "a word of comradely explanation of the identity of interests of the toiling masses of the Ukraine and Russia"?⁷⁵

Three years later Mikhail Frunze, a member of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U and head of the Ukrainian Military District, formally initiated the Ukrainianization drive at the Seventh Party Conference of the KP(b)U, held in Kharkov on April 4–10, 1923. Frunze attacked the vestiges of Russian imperialism and chauvinism in the Ukraine, demanding that all party members and government officials learn to speak Ukrainian, respect the Ukrainian culture, and draw as many Ukrainians as possible into the party ranks.⁷⁶

The first decree on Ukrainianization was a resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U on June 22, 1923. It specified the steps to be taken to Ukrainianize the various institutions that dealt with agitation and propaganda, with special emphasis on the countryside, and ordered an increase in the production of Marxist literature in Ukrainian as well as the translation into Ukrainian of more textbooks. One of the most important tasks outlined was the publication of political education books directed at the countryside. The resolution also stipulated the creation of Ukrainian studies courses for leading

party members as well as more Ukrainian language newspapers in rural areas and ordered those members of the party who knew the Ukrainian language and culture to be transferred to the countryside. Finally, the resolution required that party centers in the countryside and at the raion level change their language of business to Ukrainian in the course of the coming year.⁷⁷

Following the recent policy to promote non-Russians to top government posts, on July 16, 1923, Vlas Chubar, a Ukrainian, became the chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, replacing Rakovsky, who was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain. Eleven days later, the Ukrainian Council of Peoples' Commissars issued a resolution concerning the Ukrainianization of all educational and cultural institutions, emphasizing the necessity of making the language of instruction at these institutions conform to the nationality of their students. The decree also ordered that more textbooks be published in Ukrainian and in the non-Ukrainian languages spoken in the republic. As envisaged in this decree, the Ukrainianization program would not only further the cultural development of the Ukrainians, but of the non-Ukrainian minorities as well.⁷⁸

The Soviet Ukrainian government issued its most decisive decree on Ukrainianization on August 1, 1923:

The Workers'-Peasants' Government of the Ukraine declares it to be essential to center the attention of the state on the extension of the knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The formal equality, recognized until now, of the two most widely used languages in the Ukraine - Ukrainian and Russian - is not sufficient. As a result of the very weak development of Ukrainian schools and Ukrainian culture in general, the shortage of required school books and equipment, the lack of suitably-trained personnel, experience has proven that the Russian language has, in fact, become the dominant one.

In order to destroy this inequality, the Workers'-Peasants' Government hereby adopts a number of practical measures which, while affirming the equality of languages of all nationalities on the Ukrainian territory, will guarantee a place for the Ukrainian language corresponding to the numerical superiority of the Ukrainian people on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.⁷⁹

The decree obliged all public officials to learn Ukrainian; it also provided for the gradual transition of the language of all official documents and correspondence from Russian to Ukrainian, although Russian and other minority languages could be used at the local level. Subsequent resolutions ordered all state institutions, newspapers, and state-owned trade and industrial organizations to abandon

Russian as a working language and adopt Ukrainian. The Ukrainian Commissariat of Education was to organize Ukrainian-language courses and to create a cadre of translators for minority languages of the region. Within a year, all official business in the Council of Ministers, in central and local institutions, and in the commissariats was to be conducted in Ukrainian. Replies to individual requests in all central and regional organs should be in the language of the original request. The Ukrainian and Russian languages were to be employed in all central and provincial-level courts, the Ukrainian language in regional-level courts. An exception was made for the inhabitants of those regions in which the non-Ukrainian minorities spoke another language. The accused, the victims and their spouses, the witnesses, and the experts had the right to speak in their own native language. From now on, no one who could not speak both Russian and Ukrainian would be hired for any position in any state institution. Those who were already in the civil service and who did not know the two most widely used languages in the Ukraine had to learn them in the course of a year. Those who did not would be dismissed.⁸⁰

There were now two official languages in the Ukrainian SSR – Ukrainian and Russian – which enjoyed equal administrative status. But due to the numerical superiority of the Ukrainians and as a result of the official promotion of that language, the Ukrainian language had the opportunity of becoming the most important language in the republic.

In theory Ukrainianization combatted the conflict of two cultures. By demanding the recognition of national peculiarities and the necessity of the Russified cities respecting, if not learning, the language and culture of the majority of the population of the countryside, this program advocated an end to the *Kulturkampf* between these two areas and integrated the Ukrainian rural and urban areas. For the Bolsheviks, the creation of the Ukrainian SSR, the KP(b)U, and Ukrainianization represented a trinity of “new thinking” on nationality issues.

But in reality a good majority of the members of the Communist Party of the Ukraine still believed (even if they did not publicly admit) that the conflict between the “progressive” urban Russian culture and the “backward” rural Ukrainian culture was inevitable. These Russocentric Bolsheviks supported the former over the latter.

When confronted with peasant hostility, they saw the wisdom of supporting Ukrainianization. But their support was qualified. For them, the program would be limited only to the Ukrainian country-

side. Let the schools, bureaucrats, and local government officials be Ukrainian. Institutions operating in their native language would soothe the peasants. Let more Ukrainian-language newspapers be established. It would then be easier to get the Communist message across. These Bolsheviks were convinced that the cities and the urban working class – as parts of the “higher culture” – would not be affected at all by Ukrainianization. Thus, for people like Dmitrii Lebed’, Ukrainianization was a tactical move. Let the Ukrainians have the countryside – as long as they did not rebel or stop supplying the cities with food. We, they undoubtedly thought, will keep the cities.

Ukrainian supporters of Ukrainianization, such as the Borot’bists and a number of Ukrainian Bolsheviks, saw the policy as a means of legitimizing Ukrainian national aspirations within the socialist framework and of using the countryside as a springboard into the cities. They pressed for the Ukrainianization of the urban apparatus of the trade unions, the party, and the bureaucracy, maintaining that all governmental and party functionaries had to know the Ukrainian language, even those in the Russified urban areas. The cities, they claimed, could not remain isolated from the Ukrainian peasants.

Conclusion

In addition to emphasizing economic development in the non-Russian areas, *korenizatsiia* also emphasized the expansion of non-Russian language use and culture and the recruitment of more non-Russian cadres into the working class, the trade unions, the state bureaucracy, and the party. This preferential policy advocated language and cadres; both were closely intertwined.⁸¹

Language policy became the cornerstone of Soviet mass-based political change in the non-Russian regions. Because the overwhelming majority of this population was uneducated, illiterate, and spoke only their own native language, the party and the Soviet government had to employ the non-Russian languages in order to expand their small urban-based constituency and to mobilize the wary rural population for socialism. There were three ways to expand the use of non-Russian languages: either (a) to encourage the Russians or the Russified to learn the non-Russian languages; (b) to attract more natives to join the political, cultural, and economic institutions; or (c) both. Skrypnyk and Iakovlev advocated the first position at the Twelfth Party Congress.⁸² But inasmuch as the majority of the party consisted of Russians who did not speak any other language and who viewed

the non-Russian languages as less prestigious than (if not inferior to) the Russian, this position was easier decreed than accomplished.

A more feasible plan would be to attract politically reliable non-Russian cadres who could speak their own native language (and hopefully Russian as well!) into the state and party organs, which interacted with the masses. They best knew the "way of life, customs . . . , and language of the local population."⁸³ Unless Russian cadres learned the non-Russian languages, only the natives (especially in Central Asia) could bridge the cultural, economic, political, and psychological distance between the Russian center and the non-Russian periphery. Not all natives who joined the ranks of the state administration or party possessed complete command of their languages; many had assimilated to Russian. But the central party's emphasis on the expansion of the non-Russian languages would determine which groups it would recruit. This factor, together with the radical urban growth which brought millions of peasants into the cities, politicized *korenizatsiia*.

By ordering its cadres to learn the Ukrainian language, the KP(b)U hoped to create a link between the cities and the countryside and anchor itself in the Ukrainian environment. By tolerating Ukrainian "peculiarities," the KP(b)U hoped to popularize itself in the Ukraine. In the long run, the goal was to make the countryside accept, however reluctantly, the party's "right to govern" in order to mobilize the peasants to the goals of the revolution. But this could be done only very slowly, in a subtle manner, and in the peasant's language. "Can we reach the Ukrainian peasantry with the German language?" Volodymyr Zaton's'kyi, one of the KP(b)U leaders, asked in the 1920s. "Try to communicate with the peasants from Tambov and Kaluga in Chinese, even though what you would tell them would be one hundred percent Marxist and Leninist in content."⁸⁴ In order to integrate millions of Ukrainian peasants to the socialist order, the KP(b)U (with the blessings of the VKP(b)) would abandon the use of Russian and employ Ukrainian.

Initially the party oriented Ukrainianization toward the countryside. But the radical social changes unleashed by industrialization and urbanization shifted Ukrainianization's grounding from the countryside to the cities. This national demographic transformation in the volatile 1920s made Ukrainianization, with its emphasis on language and cadres, even more politically significant.

Part II

Social changes

3 Urban growth and national identity

In the 1920s the Soviet industrialization drive transformed the cities in the Ukraine from Russian cities to Ukrainian cities. By 1933, perhaps even by 1931, the majority of the urban population identified themselves as Ukrainians.¹

The question of when the cities stopped being cauldrons of Russification is very significant because these changes possessed serious implications for the political integrity of the Russian-dominated, multi-national Soviet state. The most important social groups and political institutions (the working class, the trade unions, and even the Communist Party of the Ukraine itself) were centered in the cities, and the national transformation of the cities influenced them. These changes strengthened the implementation of Ukrainianization and secured a potential base of support for Ukrainian national communism, which sought to establish its legitimacy in the Ukrainian republic. At the same time, these changes challenged the All-Union Communist Party's efforts to establish an integrated, industrial economy and called into question the party's search for legitimacy among the non-Russians.

Urban growth, 1920–1934

The Soviet Union began its transformation from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society after the social and economic disruptions caused by the revolution and the Civil War subsided.² By 1923, the urban centers in the USSR recovered the majority of their "lost" population and grew.

The Soviet urban population more than doubled between the first and second officially approved censuses of 1926 and 1939. It increased from 26.3 million to 55.9 million, jumping from 17.9 to 32.8 percent of the total Soviet population.³ According to one scholar, the overall

Table 3.1. *Growth of the urban population, 1920–1933*

Date ^a	Urban	Percent Urban	Rural	Percent Rural	Total
1920	3,916,300	15.4	21,459,700	84.6	25,386,000
1923	4,206,100	15.9	22,244,500	84.1	26,450,600
1924	4,608,181	16.9	22,745,049	83.1	27,353,230
1925	4,904,133	17.5	23,114,195	82.5	28,018,328
1926	5,191,076	18.1	23,501,490	81.9	28,692,566
1927	5,487,334	18.7	23,880,721	81.3	29,368,055
1928	5,817,479	19.4	24,200,383	80.6	30,017,862
1929	5,953,467	19.6	24,410,080	80.4	30,363,547
1931	6,098,900	–	–	–	–
1933	7,158,700	22.4	24,742,700	77.6	31,901,400

Note: ^a Usually Soviet demographers calculated the population as of January 1 of each year. The exceptions are: 1923 (March 1), 1931 (March 15), 1920, 1933 (dates are not provided).

Sources: *Estestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniia Ukrainy v 1926 g.* (Kharkov, 1929), p. 2; *Estestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniia Ukrainy v 1927 g.* (Kharkov, 1929), p. 2; *Estestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniia Ukrainy v 1928 g.* (Kharkov, 1930), p. 2; *Suchasna statystyka naseleniia Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1929), p. 2; O. M. Asatkin, ed. *USSR v tsyfrakh: Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1936), p. 388 (Table 1).

urban increase during this period was 29.6 million. He attributed 5.3 million to its natural increase and 1.3 million to the initial population of the reclassified communities. The residual urban increase, caused by immigration from the countryside, amounted to 23 million. In 1939 two-fifths of the urban population were peasants who had come to the cities within the preceding twelve years.⁴

In the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic between 1920 and 1933 the urban population nearly doubled – from 3,916,300 to 7,158,700⁵ (see Table 3.1). The most dramatic increase occurred between 1931 and 1933, when many newly constructed factories and mines came on line and the central party decided to complete the first five-year plan in three-and-a-half years. Although the rural natural growth rate was much higher than the urban growth rate, the rural share of the total population dropped as more peasants left (or died in) the countryside.

In analyzing this shift, it is necessary to differentiate among the various Ukrainian economic regions, all of which experienced urban growth at different rates. Thus, according to published statistical

Table 3.2. *Growth of the largest cities, 1920–1934*

City	Present and permanent residents			Permanent residents		
	1920	1923	1926	1926	1931	1934
Kharkov	285,213	307,800	417,342	398,683	535,822	635,395
Kiev	366,396	423,000	513,637	482,781	539,482	560,000
Odessa	427,831	314,800	420,862	405,795	475,446	487,753
Dnipropetrovs'ke	189,900	150,300	232,925	224,538	322,785	359,747
Stalino	38,100	32,100	105,857	104,260	194,273	288,407
Zaporizhzhia	25,000	43,766	55,744	54,451	162,958	199,940
Mariupil'	55,200	44,718	63,920	62,294	105,921	164,987
Nikolaev	108,820	82,300	104,909	99,734	122,729	140,067
Kamians'ke	n/a	16,908	34,150	33,658	89,107	124,466
Luhans'ke	57,000	44,220	71,765	69,429	96,821	123,475
Makiivka	n/a	11,700	51,471	51,319	81,024	104,583

Source: O. M. Asatkin, ed., *USRR v tsyfrakh. Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 389–90; *Mis'ki selyshcha USRR. Zbirnyk stat.-ekonomichnykh vidomostei* (Kharkiv, 1929), pp. 4–8; *Sotsialistychna Ukraina: Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1937), p. 104.

handbooks, from 1924 through January 1, 1929 the population of the Ukrainian urban centers grew by 29.2 percent. The three primarily agricultural regions had the lowest percentage of urban increase: Polissia (12.0 percent), the Right Bank (19.2 percent), and the Left Bank (14.6 percent), while the three industrial regions had the highest percentage of urban increase: the Steppe (31.9 percent), the Dnieper Industrial Region (46.7 percent), and the Donbass (74.3 percent).⁶ The highest degree of urbanization occurred in regions with highly developed industrial centers – especially in Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Dnipropetrovs'ke, Nikolaev, Mariupil', and the Donbass.

From 1920 through 1934 the number of cities with more than 100,000 permanent and present⁷ inhabitants grew. They also became more important as their share of the entire urban population increased. In 1926, there were six such cities: Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Dnipropetrovs'ke, Stalino, and Nikolaev. They constituted 33.5 percent of the Ukraine's urban population. By January 1934 there were eleven key cities with a population of over 100,000, comprising approximately 40.8 percent of the total urban population (see Table 3.2).

Following the pattern set in the late nineteenth century, the urban centers of the Donbass, the Dnieper Industrial Region, and the Steppe regions outside the historic Ukrainian core area grew at a faster pace than did cities in Polissia, the Right Bank, and the Left Bank, the regions which comprised the heartland. But with the rapid pace of industrialization, collectivization, and the migration of peasants in the 1920s, the cities – breaking the previous pattern – contained more residents who identified themselves as Ukrainians.

Changes in urban national identity, 1920–1926

Even before its alliance with Muscovy in 1654, the Ukraine traditionally attracted a large number of people of non-Ukrainian origin who settled for the most part in larger towns and trading centers. Gradually they dominated the cities, the economy, and the political order, leaving the countryside to the Ukrainians. Between 1897 and 1926, the Russian Central Black Earth gubernias (Voronezh', Kursk, Orlovsk) furnished over 300,000 migrants, nearly one-third of the people who moved to the Ukraine from other parts of the Russian Empire and the USSR.⁸ Most of these migrants established their residence in the cities and the industrial areas, especially in the Donbass.

Most Ukrainian peasants did not. The rural population explosion, soil exhaustion and ever-decreasing plot size⁹ forced the peasant to leave his village. Instead of seeking non-agricultural employment in nearby urban centers, he would most likely migrate to the Northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Siberia, or to the Far East in search of land.¹⁰ This migration to Asiatic Russia began in the late 1880s, and between 1896 and 1916 at least 1,250,000 individuals – 12.8 percent of the Ukrainian population – had migrated to those distant areas.¹¹

This pre-war pattern changed in the early 1920s, when more Ukrainians stayed in the republic. Consequently, both the number and percentage of Ukrainians in the republic's cities grew – from 32.2 percent in 1920 to 47.2 percent in 1926.¹² The percentage of urbanized Ukrainians in 1926 varied inversely with the size of the town or city, reaching 69.4 percent of the population of towns under 20,000 but only 33.0 percent in cities over 100,000 (see Appendix 1).

In the 1920s and early 1930s as the number of Ukrainian migrants came to outnumber other migrants, this rigid pattern broke down. The most dramatic increase in the percentage of Ukrainians took place in the Donbass, the Steppe, and in the Dnieper Industrial Region, where

the percentage of Ukrainian growth far surpassed that of the overall population.¹³ Such dramatic increases in the numbers of Ukrainians among urban dwellers unquestionably contributed to the cultural Ukrainianization of the cities.

A city population's rise and fall was closely tied with its population's national identification and its ties to the land. When the towns depopulated themselves in the wake of the post-revolutionary economic downturn, Ukrainians left in far greater numbers than did other groups, thus causing a decrease in the percentage of the Ukrainian population – especially in the Donbass.

On the other hand, statistics regarding Russian inhabitants of Ukrainian cities, as a rule, demonstrate the exact opposite; during the downturn Russians left in lesser numbers than did other national groups. This difference suggests that Ukrainians, who often came from neighboring areas, had a stronger tie to the land than did the Russians, who frequently came from distant areas. With the economic downturn, the Ukrainians returned to their families and friends in the countryside, which was closer for them than for Russian workers.

The 1926 census (see Table 3.3) showed that 80 percent of the people in the Ukrainian republic identified themselves as Ukrainians, 9 percent as Russians, and 5 percent as Jews.¹⁴ Only 11 percent of the total population lived in the cities. With the exception of the Germans, the Ukrainians possessed the lowest level of urbanization of the five most populous nationalities of the Ukraine, ranking far behind the Jews (77.4 percent urbanized), the Russians (50.0 percent), and the Poles (20.7 percent).

According to the 1926 census, Ukrainians comprised a majority in each region of the republic, ranging from 60 percent in the Donbass to 87.8 percent in the Left Bank. Not surprisingly, the regions with the highest percentage of Ukrainians were the agricultural ones, the Left Bank and the Right Bank. The regions with the lowest Ukrainian percentage were the newly industrialized ones: the Steppe and the Donbass. Ukrainians still constituted a majority in the countryside, but even here their share fluctuated – from 73.8 percent of the rural population of the Steppe to 93.2 percent of the Right Bank. While Ukrainians composed 87.0 percent of the population and households in the countryside, they constituted a plurality of the overall urban population.¹⁵ Ukrainians were a majority of the urban population in the agricultural regions, Polissia and the Left Bank, and a plurality in the Right Bank and the Dnieper Industrial regions. They remained a minority, however, in the Steppe and in the Donbass (see Appendix 2).

Table 3.3. *Urban and rural population of the Ukrainian SSR by nationality, December 17, 1926*

Nationality	Total	Percent of total	Urban	Percent urban	Rural	Percent rural
Ukrainians	23,218,860	80.0	2,536,499	47.2	20,682,361	87.5
Russians	2,677,166	9.2	1,343,689	25.0	1,333,477	5.6
Jews	1,574,391	5.4	1,218,615	22.7	355,766	1.5
Poles	476,435	1.6	98,747	1.8	377,688	1.5
Germans	393,924	1.4	34,253	0.6	359,671	1.5
Others	678,971	2.4	141,730	2.7	537,231	2.4
All groups	29,019,747	100	5,373,533	100	23,646,194	100

Source: *Ukraina: Statystychnyi shchorichnyk 1929* (Kharkiv, 1929), Table 4, p. 22.

After the post-revolutionary economic downturn of the early 1920s, the largest cities in the Ukraine recouped their population losses and grew. Ukrainians increased their influence (see Appendix 3). By 1926, Ukrainians constituted a plurality in Kiev (42.1 percent), Kharkov (38.4), and Dnipropetrovs'ke (36.0), while Russians constituted a majority in Stalino (56.2) and a plurality in Odessa (38.7) and Nikolaev (44.5). Because of their recent history, Stalino-Iuzovka (a company town), Nikolaev (a Black Sea branch of the St. Petersburg shipyards), and Odessa (one of the three most important imperial ports) had been Russian urban strongholds from the start.¹⁶ As these figures indicate, the Ukrainian sanctuary was Kiev, the center of the Right Bank and the Ukrainian heartland.¹⁷

Urban national identity change, 1926–1934

As the cities and towns grew in the years following 1926, so did the number of Ukrainians in them. Because the Soviet and Soviet Ukrainian governments did not publish any substantial statistical data on these changes after 1926, we cannot point to any direct evidence concerning the Ukrainian majority in the cities. This majority emerged as a result of the large-scale migration into the cities from *within* the Ukrainian republic and as a result of the end of unemployment throughout the USSR in late 1930, midway through the First Five-Year Plan.¹⁸ The completion of industrial projects, such as in the Urals (Magnitogorsk) and the Kuznets Basin, created severe labor shortages

throughout the USSR and reduced the flow of migrants from the RSFSR and other republics into the Ukraine. In contrast to the past, large-scale industrialization produced more urban Ukrainians.

As the Soviet government increased investment in urban industrial centers, it attacked the peasant's traditional way of life. With *dekulakization* and collectivization, the Ukrainian peasantry began to stream into the cities, their last hope for survival. The cities, moreover, paid higher wages. One migrant described the appeal of the worker's life in the late 1920s, so different from that of the peasant:

The worker received wages, i.e. something permanent and steady, even if they were low. But the collective farmers worked the same [amount of hours] or even longer hours and did not receive any steady income. During the first years of industrialization the workers were better off. They received potatoes and bread and other food in larger quantities. This was done especially so as to draw in more people into industry.¹⁹

A Soviet Ukrainian official pointed out the salary differences between the agricultural and urban workers:

a responsible worker's pay is 24 rubles . . . The farm laborer receives on the average 5 to 7 rubles per month . . . the farm laborer leaves the countryside and travels to the (city's) labor office, because as a (registered) unemployed person, he receives 13 rubles.²⁰

As these observations show, economic concerns fueled the mass movement to the cities. The most likely candidates for migration were those who were poor, possessing no land or at best small plots (with no draft animals), and those of working age (between 20 and 59). They were persuaded that their socio-economic future lay not in the countryside, but in the expanding urban industrial centers.

On the eve of the industrialization period, approximately half the population of the Ukraine was of working age.²¹ Three-fourths of this population (nearly 13 million people) lived in the countryside.²² Of these, a significant number opted for city life as an escape from poverty. Thus, land hunger, the lack of draft animals, the abundant labor supply in the countryside, and, finally, forced collectivization shifted the previous migration patterns.²³ By the end of the 1920s, as a result of the pull of the cities and the push of the countryside, more Ukrainian peasants entered the heretofore Russified cities.

Migrants moved into the industrial centers, but not all of them permanently. In fact, only where a high level of industrial development already existed in the countryside did the migrants tend to move

into the industrial centers. For example, only 3.3 percent of the migrants from the agriculturally oriented Volhynia gubernia found work in industry in the mid-1920s, while 39.0 percent of the migrants from the Kharkov gubernia and 95.6 percent of the Donbass migrants found industrial employment.²⁴

As these figures suggest, not all of the rural migrants lacked industrial work experience. At first, a significant number of those coming to the cities were actually returning: they were workers who had left the cities in the early 1920s due to unemployment and food shortages. However, as the number of migrants grew, those who had no urban industrial experience began to dominate the rural-to-urban migration.²⁵

Ukrainian migrants dominated the migratory process. By 1933, perhaps even by 1931, Ukrainians constituted over half of the urban population of the Ukrainian republic, especially in the major cities (see Table 3.4). These figures suggest that immigration from the RSFSR and other Soviet republics slowed. Therefore, the dramatic rate of urban growth in the Ukraine after 1926 occurred at the expense of the countryside, where Ukrainians constituted nearly nine-tenths of the 24 million rural population.²⁶

Before 1926 non-Ukrainians were more prone to migrate to the larger towns and cities than were Ukrainians. The Soviet government recast this pattern by introducing policies which forced the Ukrainian peasants out of their native rural areas. By 1931 Ukrainians constituted a majority in all urban centers, although not necessarily in each city.²⁷ Why?

First, as migration to the city increased, so, naturally, did the number of urban Ukrainians. This trend toward increased Ukrainian migration to urban areas intensified after 1926, as the cities became more heavily industrialized and required a larger labor force. Dekulakization, collectivization, and the famine of 1932–33 also pushed hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian peasants into the cities. Secondly, in the fall of 1930, as severe labor shortages emerged all over the country, the number of migrants to the Ukraine from the other Soviet republics decreased.

By the beginning of the 1930s Ukrainians had become a majority in the cities of the Ukraine:

(1) After the publication of detailed analyses of the 1926 census figures for the Ukraine, the Soviet Ukrainian government did not publish any detailed statistical data on the national composition of the Ukrainian SSR.²⁸ The weekly newspaper, *Radians'kyi statystyk*, and the

Table 3.4. Changes in the number and percentage of Ukrainians in five important industrial centers, 1923–1933

City	1923		1926		1933	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Luhans'ke	9,500	21.0	31,200	43.0	71,000	60.0
Zaporizhzhia	12,000	28.0	26,500	47.0	60,000	56.0
Kharkov	122,000	37.9	160,000	38.9	330,000	50.0
Dnipropetrovs'ke	24,500	16.0	83,000	36.0	185,000	48.0
Stalino	2,200	7.0	27,500	26.0	86,000	31.0

Source: S. V. Kosior, "Itogi i blizhaishie zadachi provedeniia natsional'noi politiki na Ukraine," *Pravda*, December 2, 1933, pp. 3–4; and "Radians'ka Ukraina – mohutnii forpost bazy svitovoi proletars'koi revoliutsii – SRSR," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, no. 13–14 (1933), p. 4.

excellent periodical series, *Statystyka Ukrainy*, which produced over 200 volumes in 10 years, ceased publication (and were not replaced) by 1932. The Central Statistical Administration of the Ukraine undertook an urban census in 1931, but when the results were published two years later, they contained no information on the republic's national composition. There were similar omissions on nationality by *Suchasna statystyka naseleunia Ukrainy*, which attempted to survey population changes in the Ukraine from 1924 through January 1, 1929. Khomenko's *Natsional'nyi sklad U.S.R.R.* thoroughly analyzed the national situation in the Ukraine through December 17, 1926, but he did not publish any later figures relating to nationality.

Statistics for the period after 1926 are missing because publication of such data would not have served the purposes of the party. Vasyl Sokil, the managing editor of *Radians'kyi statystyk* from 1928 to 1930, wrote: "It possessed more than enough unpleasant information and facts shameful to the government . . . and, publishing them, really shed light on the processes which were occurring in the country. From that time [March 1930 – GL] all materials of the TsSU (Central Statistical Administration of the Ukraine) became state secrets, and that which was published from time to time was presented in a prepared manner."²⁹ The party leadership, both in Kharkov and Moscow, must have noticed the changes in the national composition of Ukrainian urban areas resulting from the rapid growth of the cities. By withholding the publication of these statistics, the leadership

attempted to keep the pro-*korenizatsiia* faction from pressing for even greater Ukrainianization of the party, the bureaucracy, and the trade unions and from threatening Russian political hegemony in the cities.

(2) An indirect method of determining national change in the Ukraine in the late 1920s and early 1930s is to analyze the increase in the number (up by 2,868 percent!) and circulation (up by 23,357 percent!) of Ukrainian-language newspapers since 1918. It is a simple barometer of change, because it provides an approximate measurement of all those who could read Ukrainian, who nearly unanimously identified themselves as Ukrainians. Since the number of non-Ukrainians literate in Ukrainian was small, an analysis of Ukrainian-language newspapers, especially in the cities, provides an outline of the radical increase of Ukrainians in the cities in the 1920s. But an evaluation of the increase in the Ukrainian-language newspapers measures, for the most part, literate Ukrainians, not illiterate ones.³⁰ The latter, however, must have constituted a significant number, if not majority, of migrants to the cities from the Ukrainian countryside.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the potential market for these newspapers was small. More than half of the population of the Ukraine was illiterate. There were several reasons for this problem: the low level of education in the Russian Empire, the absence of compulsory general education, the small urban Ukrainian population, tsarist restrictions against the use of the Ukrainian language until 1905, the First World War, and revolutionary upheaval. As of December 17, 1926, approximately 39.6 percent of the population of the USSR³¹ and approximately 40.7 percent of the population of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic were literate.³² In the Ukraine, 44.9 percent of the population was literate.³³ The literacy rate of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians was lower than that of the other major groups residing in the Ukrainian SSR (see Table 3.5).

Of the 9,628,040 literate Ukrainians in 1926, 8,109,057 lived in the countryside and 1,518,983 in the urban centers. Of the rural group, 5,605,658 (69.1 percent) were literate in Ukrainian. Of the urban dwellers, 863,141 (56.8 percent) were literate in Ukrainian.³⁴ Thus, a significant number of Ukrainians were literate in Russian.

Taking into account the complexity of bilingualism (or trilingualism) and the linguistic assimilation of millions of individuals, what was the maximum potential market for newspaper readership in the Russian and Ukrainian languages? According to the 1926 census, of 13,008,096 literates of all languages in the UkrSSR, 7,093,977 (54.5 percent) were literate in Ukrainian, but 8,316,933 (63.9 percent) could read and write

Table 3.5. *Literacy and native language literacy in the UkrSSR among the five largest nationalities, 1926*

	Total population	Literate population	Percent rate	Native language ^a literates	Percent of native literates to all literates
Ukrainians	23,218,860	9,628,040	41.5	6,468,799	67.2
Russians	2,677,166	1,486,452	55.5	1,419,444	95.5
Jews (Yiddish)	1,574,391	1,102,227	70.0	668,985	60.7
Poles	476,435	228,798	48.0	141,954	62.0
Germans	393,924	260,901	66.2	245,885	94.2

Note: ^a Native language is defined as the language "which the respondent has the best command of or which he usually speaks." N. Ia. Vorob'ev, *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 g.* (2nd ed., Moscow, 1957), p. 90.

Source: *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, 11: *Ukrainskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Sovetskaia Respublika* (Moscow, 1929), Table 6, pp. 8-9.

Russian.³⁵ Even though Ukrainians outnumbered the Russians and other nationalities in the Ukraine, Russian-language literates predominated (see Appendix 4). While 78.0 percent of the total literate urban population could read Russian, only about one-third was literate in Ukrainian.³⁶

Beginning in 1925, both the number and the circulation (*tirazh*) of Ukrainian-language newspapers radically increased (see Table 3.6) until they reached their peak circulation in 1932. Of course, the creation of new newspapers and increase of newspaper circulations was government-controlled and did not necessarily reflect the reality of market needs. But since many people read each newspaper issue, the readership of the new Ukrainian-language newspapers (as well as the old Russian-language newspapers) was far greater than the circulation statistics given below. Although the increase in the number of Ukrainian-language newspapers was not necessarily due to the migration of Ukrainians to the cities, spending scarce state funds to increase these newspaper circulations in the Russified cities of the Ukraine was an important political decision undertaken by the central authorities.

Because the Communist Party planned to break down the traditional and local ties of the new urbanites and to expose them to

Table 3.6. *Newspapers by language and annual circulation, 1918–33 (in thousands)*

Year	Ukrainian language		Russian language		Other Languages	
	No.	Circulation	No.	Circulation	No.	Circulation
1918	60	n/a	227	n/a	24	n/a
1919	127	n/a	228	n/a	33	n/a
1920	87	2,832	266	34,169	7	889
1921	45	11,223	95	28,866	6	n/a
1922	30	9,741	102	55,367	7	n/a
1923	28	14,373	86	100,440	1	14
1924	36	21,195	95	96,938	26	342
1926	81	53,387	84	121,392	22	3,530
1927	94	72,745	90	119,953	21	5,501
1928	117	111,098	105	123,096	23	5,836
1929	298	208,080	124	113,935	15	10,918
1930	552	349,290	75	85,080	27	21,036
1931	980	464,642	80	37,448	37	20,829
1932	1,278	950,295	169	48,948	82	37,921
1933	1,721	661,495	293	46,091	108	27,867

Source: *Presa Ukrain's'koi RSR 1918–1973: Naukovo-statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkiv, 1974), pp. 176–7; *Presa Ukrain's'koi RSR 1918–1975: Naukovo-statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkiv, 1976), pp. 174–5; and *Presa Ukrain's'koi RSR 1917–1966: Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkiv, 1967), p. 113.

modernizing influences in their native languages, a significant increase in these Ukrainian-language newspapers reflects a rise in the literate Ukrainian population in the cities. This growth was indeed striking. For example, *Kommunist*, the official party newspaper, began to publish in Ukrainian in June 1926, printing 35,000 copies, and increased to 330,000 in June 1931.³⁷ In addition to Ukrainians, the readership also included Russians who wanted to know more about local news and sports, information provided by the Ukrainian-language press and not by the central Russian-language press.³⁸

It is certainly no coincidence that after the influx of Ukrainian peasants in the 1920s, Ukrainian newspapers spread to cities which previously had an under-developed or non-existent press. In 1929 and 1930, the major newspapers in Kharkov, Odessa, Dnipropetrovs'ke, Nikolaev, Zaporizhzhia, and in the Russified factory towns of the Donetsk Basin shifted their language of publication

from Russian to Ukrainian.³⁹ The major exception to this trend was Stalino, although a Ukrainian Komsomol newspaper appeared there.⁴⁰ This was significant in that this newspaper was the Soviet government's first attempt to reach the young Ukrainians who had recently migrated to this area, located outside the Ukrainian national core.

While almost all the newspapers in some cities appeared exclusively in the Ukrainian language, central Russian-language newspapers, such as *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, were always available. In 1925, for example, "150,000 [daily] copies of the former and 200,000 copies of the latter were circulating in the Ukraine."⁴¹ It was not until 1929 that the combined circulation of all Ukrainian-language newspapers outnumbered the combined circulation of Russian-language newspapers published in the Ukraine and those imported from the RSFSR.

Thus, the disappearance of detailed statistics on the national breakdown of population movements in the Ukraine after 1926, and the increase in the number and circulation of Ukrainian-language newspapers, especially in the cities, demonstrate that something was happening *in* the cities. At first glance these trends seem contradictory. Nevertheless, they show that Ukrainians became the majority of the urban population in their own republic by the early 1930s.

Assimilation

A Ukrainian plurality or majority of the urban population did not necessarily mean that Antonenko-Davydovych's equation " $2 \times 2 = 4$ " became a proven theorem in the Ukraine. The language and culture of the cities did not always mirror the self-identification of their inhabitants.

Although Ukrainians constituted 47.2 percent of the total urban population in 1926, Russian culture dominated in the cities. While Russians comprised only 25.0 percent of the overall urban population of the republic, they commanded the governmental apparatus, the party, and the non-agricultural occupations, most notably the urban labor force. Although very few non-Ukrainians assimilated to the Ukrainian language and culture, significant numbers of Ukrainians and Jews assimilated to Russian language and culture.

How many? A comparison of the nationality (*narodnost'*) and native language (*rodnoi iazyk*) categories in the 1926 census demonstrates that many non-Russians linguistically assimilated themselves to Russian. The first category, nationality, was defined "in terms of both national

descent and subjective allegiance; apparently, it was left to the census taker and the respondent to settle between themselves which connotation should take precedence over the other."⁴² Although the second category attempted to measure the respondent's conversational language, it was an imprecise and confusing concept. One analyst wrote, "while most Soviet scholars interpret the term to mean conversational language, many people, including many respondents to the census, apparently regard native language as something else – perhaps as the language used in the family when they were children, the language spoken by their mothers, or the language of their nationality."⁴³ Both categories were subjective.⁴⁴ The difference between the first and the second may "represent a stage in the overall process of assimilation."⁴⁵

Changes in national identity occur when individuals from groups with a lower socio-economic status identify themselves with the dominant or more advanced groups.⁴⁶ Changes of language and national identity do not take place at an abstract collective level, but as the result of individuals making many conscious decisions concerning their own perceived self-interest.

Seldom do people learn a language as a consequence of a deliberate decision to assimilate. Assimilation is merely the long-range outcome of a long series of minute day-to-day decisions to do certain things and shun others. There is no overall mechanistic tendency to assimilate or not to assimilate.⁴⁷

In addition to national change, compromise – the development of stable bilingualism or biculturalism – may also occur. And although national compromise requires "some effort and entails some strains, it can be a viable option too."⁴⁸ Most people, however, "literally 'commute' between ethnies, presenting an assimilated front in one situation, but being 'traditional' in another."⁴⁹

Because national identity is based upon an individual's psychological bonds with a group and because it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure and evaluate these parameters, we should not identify only those whose native language is Ukrainian as Ukrainians. While native language is an important component of national identification, it is not the *only* component. In evaluating national changes, national self-identification is the most objective criterion.

But one's native language retention helps determine the prestige of a given nationality. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the Ukrainian SSR who responded to the native language question on

Table 3.7. *Linguistically assimilated population of the UkrSSR, December 17, 1926*

	Total assimilated population	Percentage assimilated to		
		Ukrainian language	Russian language	Other languages
Urban	1,113,140	3.7	95.6	0.7
Rural	1,018,150	26.6	71.7	1.7
Total	2,131,290	14.6	84.2	1.2

Source: Derived from *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, 11: *Ukrainskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Sovetskaia Respublika* (Moscow, 1929), Table 6, pp. 8–17.

the census had retained their nationality's native language (see Appendix 5). Thus, only 7.4 percent of the total population of the Ukrainian SSR abandoned their native languages in 1926: 4.3 percent of the rural population, but 20.9 percent of the urban population.

Of those who had changed their native language, most felt that the Russian language was more prestigious and more advantageous in the long run than Ukrainian. By far the greatest number of people chose to assimilate linguistically to Russian instead of to Ukrainian, both in the cities and in the countryside (see Table 3.7). Those who assimilated to the Russian language constituted 84.2 percent of all who changed their language. The Ukrainian language assimilated only 14.6 percent, mostly in the countryside. Of those who did abandon their native languages in the countryside, nearly three-fourths chose to assimilate to Russian rather than to Ukrainian. Of the five largest nationalities in the Ukraine, only the Poles assimilated to Ukrainian in any significant numbers. In the cities, however, Poles still preferred to speak Russian.

Perhaps even more telling is the fact that a significant percentage of Jews (22.6 percent) and Ukrainians (5.6 percent) abandoned the use of their own native languages in favor of Russian. The linguistic assimilation of these groups was much higher in the cities, where 28.3 percent of the Jews and 24.7 percent of the self-identified Ukrainians listed Russian as their *rodnoi iazyk*. No significant differences existed between the linguistic assimilation of the Ukrainian men and women, whether in the city or in the countryside.

Although the corresponding figures were much lower for the countryside, even there the Russian language was making inroads.

But it was nonetheless in the cities, where 44.5 percent of the urban residents gave Russian as their native language, that Russification was most prominent.⁵⁰ Cities possess a high population density and interaction among inhabitants is both frequent and impersonal, contributing to the disorientation and isolation of the recent migrants. As a result of such psychological stress

mere convenience favors the use of the dominant language as the *lingua franca*, thus heightening the incentives to assimilate. This explains why cities are ideal melting pots. Stable multi-lingualism seldom survives long in a city. Generally, one language achieves ascendancy – at least as a *lingua franca* in the public domain.⁵¹

Because it was the language of political administration and because it was closely related to Ukrainian, Russian became the native language of a significant proportion of the urban residents in the Ukraine.

Linguistic assimilation, however, should not be confused with total national assimilation, which we might define as a complete or near complete loss of national self-identity in combination with a full or almost total adoption of another. Linguistic assimilation, however, is an integral part of this process. According to one Soviet sociologist:

Linguistic assimilation leads not only to a change of native language but to important changes in national self-identification. The national language and national self-identification are closely related ethnic determinants. While changing one's native language does not in itself signify a reorientation of ethnic self-awareness, it does already testify to profound ethnic changes and the development of an assimilative process.⁵²

Assuming, then, that linguistic assimilation signals the existence of certain attitudes which cannot be measured with statistics, the linguistically unassimilated in the Ukraine, especially Ukrainians, would probably be more likely to support Ukrainianization than those whose national self-identification and *rodnoi iazyk* varied. How much *more* likely is difficult to determine, as this period was quite volatile.

Conclusion

After 1926 the great migration of Ukrainian peasants supplied the cities with the critical mass necessary to maintain and to promote Ukrainian culture in the urban areas. Hundreds of thousands of peasants arrived in the cities in a very short time period. At that point, they were unassimilable. The new arrivals were no longer "peasants,"

but not yet "workers" or "city people." This disorientation, in addition to encountering many different national groups at once, provoked an identity crisis. Competition for housing, education, and employment exposed inarticulate national tensions, and now they were compelled to choose "sides."

By identifying themselves as Ukrainians, they committed not only a political act (which would have been unwise in the late tsarist period), but also opened opportunities (unleashed as a result of Ukrainianization) for themselves. This cultural and political program raised the prestige of the Ukrainian language and culture and fostered the emergence of an urban Ukrainian culture. A small number of those who had previously designated themselves as "Russians" in the 1920 or 1923 census identified themselves as "Ukrainians" in the 1926 census.⁵³ Now they had a vested interest in reaffirming their national origins in light of the rapid urban growth, the huge, unassimilable numbers of compatriots migrating to the cities, the psychological alienation and exhilaration produced by migration, and the party's emphasis on Ukrainianization. Now urban growth and urbanization did not equal Russification. Now the Ukrainian language would have the possibility of becoming the pre-eminent language of the cities.

Already in 1921 Stalin predicted that the cities in the non-Russian republics would eventually reflect the national composition of their surrounding countryside:

It is clear that the Ukrainian nationality exists and that the development of its culture is a communist obligation. One should not go against history. It is clear that if the Russians dominated the cities of the Ukraine until now, then in time these cities will be inevitably Ukrainianized. Forty years ago Riga was a German city, but inasmuch as cities grew at the expense of the countryside and the countryside is the custodian of the [indigenous] nationality, now Riga is a completely Latvian city. Fifty years ago all Hungarian cities had a German character. Now they are all Magyarized. The same will happen in Belorussia, where non-Belorussians predominate.⁵⁴

Although Stalin suggested that the national transformation of the cities and the working class was historically inevitable, he and his colleagues were ill-prepared for the speed or the consequences with which his prediction was realized. They did not foresee the unmanageable social problems (overcrowding, inadequate housing, deterioration of public health standards, and crime) which rapid urban growth engendered.

Most importantly, Stalin did not envision that the massive influx of

Ukrainian peasants and the de-Russification of the cities and major industrial areas would test the political and economic integrity of the Soviet state. Now Ukrainians entered urban political institutions, the party, the bureaucracy, and the trade unions in greater numbers. According to Stalin, Riga took forty years to Latvianize itself. The majority of Ukrainian cities, however, became Ukrainianized in less than ten.

4 The working class and the trade unions

In the mid-1920s the Soviet working class was predominantly a Russian working class. But with radical industrialization and collectivization, millions of non-Russian peasants entered the urban labor force and ended the Russian dominance of the working class in their regions. Massive peasantization and indigenization of the Soviet working class created serious political problems for the Stalinist order.

In 1926 the majority of the 4 million Soviet workers (71.4 percent) lived in the RSFSR. With the exception of the Ukraine, with one-fifth of all Soviet workers, only a small percentage resided in the non-Russian republics and regions.¹ But because Russians constituted either a significant plurality, or a majority of the working class in the non-Russian republics and regions, the number of non-Russian workers was even smaller than these figures suggest. The percentage of indigenous peoples within the working class and among civil servants was lower than their percentage of the population in their region.²

The percentage of Russian workers within each regional working class varied between the autonomous republics and the union republics. Most Russian workers in the non-Russian areas were concentrated in the autonomous republics within the RSFSR and their strength ranged from 17.2 percent in Dagestan to 73.1 percent in Buriat-Mongolia.³ The percentages of Russian workers in the union republics varied from 1.4 percent in Armenia to 35.1 percent in Turkmenia.⁴ The majority of Russian workers outside the national Russian heartland resided in the Ukraine (312,600), where they constituted 29.2 percent of the percentage.⁵

By the early 1930s millions of non-Russians entered the Soviet labor force in all republics. However, the greatest inclusion of non-Russians into the labor force occurred among the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, and Armenians. Between 1926 and 1931, the four groups

solidified their majorities within the working classes of their own republics,⁶ even among industrial workers.⁷ In terms of sheer numbers, the greatest transformation of any regional working class occurred in the Ukraine.

Favorable Soviet investment allocations generated this transformation. At its Fifteenth Congress in 1927, the All-Union Communist Party decided to rapidly industrialize the USSR, emphasizing the economically backward regions in Central Asia and Siberia at the expense of Leningrad, the Central Industrial Region (Moscow), and the Ukraine.⁸ At the beginning of 1928–29, these three industrial regions garnered 65 percent of the total capital invested in Soviet industry. Soviet economic planners hoped to reduce their share in the total capital of the country to 55 percent during the first five-year plan. However, this reduction would benefit the Ukraine.⁹ While the share of the Moscow and Leningrad regions would be reduced substantially, the Ukrainian share would increase only modestly, from 24.5 to 26.2 percent of the total union investment.¹⁰

Soviet capital investment in industry in the Ukrainian SSR grew – from 199 million rubles in 1925–26 to 507 million in 1928–29.¹¹ Central planners designed the construction of over 386 industrial enterprises and 30 large mines in the Donbass, Kiev, Kharkov, and Dnipropetrovsk regions.¹² These increased investments demanded an expansion of the labor force.

Initially, unemployed workers, the children and spouses of workers, and handicraftsmen filled the factories. The limited character of the New Economic Policy and the population pressures which built up in the 1920s encouraged a small number of peasants to leave for the cities. This trickle became a flood during the first five-year plan, begun in 1928, which drew most of its urban labor force from the poverty stricken countryside. At the same time collectivization pushed millions into the cities. Both processes radically transformed the composition of the Soviet working class. From 1928 to 1932, the number of workers and bureaucrats doubled to 24.4 million people.¹³ Peasants constituted 8.5 million of the 12.5 million increase.¹⁴

This huge rural-to-urban migration peasantized the working class. One of the most famous of these migrants, A. G. Stakhanov, arrived in the Donbass in 1927 from one of the Russian gubernias. He wrote:

I went to the Donbass with the hope of earning some more money and returning to my village with my own horse. This notorious “grey horse” was the secret dream of all horseless peasants. Because of him, they lowered themselves with great fear into the “nether

regions" . . . Because of him, they were ready to endure everything . . . because they intended to work underground for only a short time . . . they hoped to earn much money and say goodbye to the mine.¹⁵

Although Stakhanov and millions of his fellow migrants remained in the mines and factories and came to constitute an enlarged working class, initially most retained their peasant traits, which emphasized social conservatism, economic self-sufficiency, and superstition. They did not quickly adapt to the industrial culture which was based on the division of labor, the efficient use of modern technology, and rationality. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the new members of the Soviet working class, like Russian workers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, experienced "deep ambiguities and psychological tensions as to where they properly belonged, and in the case of the new recruits, much disorientation brought about by their strange new way of life."¹⁶

In the non-Russian areas of the USSR, this peasantization also altered the national structure of the working class and trade unions – from a predominantly Russian to a more representative multinational character. This change was particularly marked in the Ukraine, where rapid industrial expansion and collectivization brought millions of peasants (most of whom possessed poorly articulated Ukrainian identities) into the Russified cities. Because they maintained their ties with the countryside, they did not proletarianize themselves quickly.

Due to their large numbers, they brought the mentality of the Ukrainian countryside with them. Here, the number of workers (including migrant agricultural workers) grew from approximately 1,585,900 in 1926 to 4,361,100 at the end of 1932 – an increase of nearly 200 percent.¹⁷ The number of workers engaged in heavy industry (mostly metallists and miners) quadrupled – from 316,500 in 1920 to 1,275,600 by the beginning of 1933.¹⁸ The growth of Ukrainians in the working class paralleled its rapid expansion. In 1926 they constituted nearly a majority of the working class; by 1934 they established a solid majority.¹⁹ And as more Ukrainians joined the urban working class, their peasant alienation in the cities, combined with the government's Ukrainianization program, strengthened their Ukrainian-ness. These developments in turn created serious problems in successfully integrating them to the Soviet order.

Changes in the size of the working class

The First World War, the Revolution, and the civil war decimated the working class in the Ukrainian provinces. During the First World War, nearly 1 million workers from this region died and nearly 2 million became invalids.²⁰ The post-revolutionary dislocation and contraction of the Soviet economy also undermined the solidarity of the working class. Hundreds of thousands of workers returned to their villages.

The reduction of the work force affected the most important sectors of the all-Soviet and Ukrainian economy. In 1913, 2,608,000 workers were engaged in heavy industry in the entire Russian Empire. By 1920, only half of this figure – 1,347,000 – remained. In 1916, at the height of the First World War, 812,500 people were engaged in heavy industry in the Ukrainian provinces.²¹ By 1922, this figure fell to 277,400. During the reconstruction undertaken by the New Economic Policy, however, workers returned and slowly replenished the ranks of heavy industry to 607,900 in 1926.²²

The increase in the size of the working class, especially in construction and heavy industries, in the late 1920s reflected the rapid pace of industrialization and the expansion of employment opportunities.²³ Heavy industry, the heart of Stalin's plan to surpass the advanced capitalist countries, became the most rapidly expanding industry in the Soviet economy as well as in the Ukrainian economy (as Table 4.1 demonstrates). Metallurgy, coal-mining, and machine construction became the dominant sectors within heavy industry. Of these, the latter two grew fastest.²⁴

Although workers in the Ukraine constituted approximately one-fifth of the entire Soviet labor force in 1926, they disproportionately dominated a number of important industries. At the end of 1925, for example, industrial miners in the Ukraine constituted 73.0 percent of all industrial miners in the USSR, workers in the Ukraine accounted for 38.2 percent of all metal workers, and the miners of the Kryvyi Rih Basin alone represented more than 40.0 percent of the Soviet iron mining industry. Workers in the Ukraine, moreover, constituted approximately 79.0 percent of all workers in the Soviet sugar-refining industry.²⁵ Although some of these percentages (especially in mining) later declined slightly, the Ukraine maintained its economic significance into the 1930s, even to the present, accounting for one-fifth of the USSR's industrial output.

With the construction of hundreds of new industrial enterprises at

Table 4.1. *Change in the number of workers and bureaucrats in various branches of the economy, 1925/26–1932*

Branch	Average number of workers and bureaucrats per year		
	1925/1926	1928	1932
Heavy industry	570,600	687,500	1,358,400
Light industry		81,000	61,800
Construction	72,000	122,500	573,900
Agriculture/Forestry		167,100	607,600
Transport	207,700	227,500	407,000
All branches	1,706,000	2,020,300	4,361,100

Source: *Pratsia v URSR: Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1937), p. 10; *URSR v tsyfrakh. Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkiv, 1936), p. 392; *Uprav. narodnohospodars'koho obliku URSR, Sotsialistychna Ukraina: Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1937), p. 111, cited in V. E. Loburets', "Rost chislennosti rabocheho klassa Ukrainy v 1921–1932 godakh," *Voprosy istorii SSSR*, 26 (1981), Table 4, p. 36.

break-neck speed and the introduction of continuous work shifts, the entire Soviet working class experienced turbulent expansion. The demand for labor, especially skilled labor, grew at a rapid pace – one that could not be easily anticipated or satisfied.²⁶ And due to their inexperience with rapid industrialization, managers often miscalculated the number of workers they needed. In 1929 personnel offices in the Artemivs'ke okrug put in requisitions to the Ukrainian Commissariat of Labor for 21,000 workers, but they actually needed 30,000. The Stalino okrug asked for 14,900, but needed 30,000. The Kharkov okrug ordered 14,000 workers, but really needed 20,000.²⁷ Both the calculated and actual need of workers far surpassed the 414,000 skilled workers employed in Ukrainian industries on January 1, 1929.²⁸

In 1930–31, for example, according to one expert, the Ukrainian economy experienced a dearth of 302,000 skilled workers (managers, engineers, technicians, agronomists), but only 168,000 workers were studying in courses to upgrade their skills.²⁹ Another expert indicated that at the end of the first five-year plan, new factories needed 125,000 skilled workers, while the old factories needed an additional 248,000 qualified workers – 373,000 new workers in all.³⁰ The Ukrainian State Planning Commission (*Gosplan*) estimated that the Ukrainian

economy needed another 482,000 skilled workers at the end of the first five-year plan.³¹

The majority of the skilled workers – 54.4 percent – were needed in mining and in the metal industry.³² The percentage of skilled workers in the labor force would increase from 40.2 percent in 1927 to 51.1 percent on October 1, 1933.³³ But in the Ukraine, as in the USSR as a whole, the largest increase in the labor force took place among unskilled workers, not among the more desperately needed skilled workers.³⁴

By the end of 1930, the Soviet labor market shifted from mass unemployment (which at its high point in the 1920s embraced over 10 percent of the employable population) to mass shortages. Except for those between jobs, unemployment ceased to exist.³⁵ The pool of skilled labor dried up. These shortages prompted the government to begin a serious campaign to draft and train new workers.

There were two problems with teaching the unskilled. First of all, the schools and short-term courses for training workers were insufficient in number and quality to meet the demand. Second, the length of time it would take to train qualified cadres precluded a quick solution. It took five years to train an engineer, and at the beginning of the first five-year plan, the Soviet Ukrainian economy needed 10,000 more engineers, technicians, economists, and other skilled personnel. By the end of 1931, over 10,000 more engineers and over 15,000 more technicians were needed.³⁶ Even with the construction of more schools, there was little – outside of teaching rudimentary skills – that these short-term courses could have done to wean the new worker from the peasant to the proletarian way of life in so short a time.

In addition to training skilled workers, the Soviet and Soviet Ukrainian governments sought to increase the unskilled labor force by releasing collective farmers to work in industry, where they would be contracted out for at least one year.³⁷ The collective farms became labor exchanges, serving as middlemen between the peasantry and industrial concerns. By 1931, this organized recruitment drive became the main means of supplying workers, especially peasants on the collective farms, to industry.³⁸ (This, however, did little to professionalize the work force.) In the frenzied seller's market, both the peasants and the industrial plants often bypassed the collective farms and negotiated directly. The government also raised pensions to 75.0 percent of current wages in the professions suffering from the most severe labor shortage,³⁹ and sought to expand the participation of women⁴⁰ and even minors in the labor force, although the inclusion of

the latter was expressly forbidden by a resolution of the All-Union Commissariat of Labor.⁴¹ By 1931, the Ukrainian economy employed almost 1 million women – 27.5 percent of the non-agricultural labor force.⁴²

All regions in the Ukraine confronted the dilemma of labor shortages, but the Donbass was an especially critical area. As a result of labor turnover and the expansion of the economic plan, 20,000 more skilled miners were needed there in the second half of the 1929–30 fiscal year.⁴³ In the 1930–31 fiscal year, this region needed an additional labor force of 100,000 to compensate for labor turnover and reach the assigned production goals.⁴⁴

Where would these new workers come from? With the majority of the skilled Russian labor force already employed in the Urals and the Kuznets Basin,⁴⁵ the Soviet government had no alternative but to draw unskilled workers, even peasants, from the areas where they resided and train them quickly.

This Hobson's choice included Ukrainian peasants. From the mid-1920s until the mid-1930s, the majority of new workers came from the Ukrainian countryside.⁴⁶ The two groups of peasants joined the industrial labor force: those who came for permanent employment and those who came to work temporarily, for five to seven months per year.⁴⁷ By 1926 these migrants bound the cities and the majority of its working class to the countryside.⁴⁸ According to a perceptive worker's expression, those in the industrial labor force tied to agriculture had "their pants and pockets in the factories, but their heads in the village."⁴⁹

According to an analysis of seven large enterprises in the city and okrug of Kharkov in 1930, the majority of peasants (60.0 to 85.0 percent) who found work in the factories came from neighboring villages.⁵⁰ Fifty percent of these workers possessed less than 3 desiatins (1 desiatin equaled 2.7 acres). Only 3.5 percent possessed over 7 desiatins.⁵¹ Thus, those with small portions were forced to find additional income. Finding employment in the industrial labor force, they still – for the most part – considered themselves peasants (and therefore Ukrainian) first and workers second. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of poor and middle strata of peasants in the composition of the new recruits helped integrate the Ukrainian countryside with the Russian cities.⁵²

The greatest flow of migrants from the villages to the factories occurred in 1930 and 1931 when the industrial boom began in earnest and when collectivization overturned the countryside. By 1930–32 peasants constituted 80.0 percent of new miners hired and 63–75

Table 4.2. *Percentage of workers who came from the countryside, fiscal years 1927–1929^a*

Industry	Oct.–Dec. 1927	Jan.–Mar. 1928	Apr.–June 1928	July–Sept. 1928
Coal-mining	38.8	40.7	41.1	40.6
Metallurgy	17.9	21.8	33.3	30.6
Machine-construction	5.2	2.0	7.8	7.6

Industry	Oct.–Dec. 1928	Jan.–Mar. 1929	Apr.–June 1929	July–Sept. 1929
Coal-mining	36.6	41.2	45.4	37.1
Metallurgy	30.9	27.6	33.7	35.5
Machine-construction	1.7	2.1	6.7	4.3

Note: ^a Until 1931, the Soviet fiscal year began on October 1 and ran to September 30 of the succeeding year.

Source: M. Skarubs'kyi, "Do pytannia pro plynnist' robitnoi syly," *Robitnycha osvita*, no. 7–8 (1930), p. 18.

percent of new workers in the metallurgical industry.⁵³ The employment of new workers in 1930 increased the Donbass labor force by one-third.⁵⁴ This massive influx in so short a time increased the labor force's ties with the countryside, as shown in Table 4.2, but at different rates depending on the level of skill necessary for that industry.

By early 1930, peasants composed nearly half the *new* members of the Ukraine's working class.⁵⁵ By the end of 1932, 70.0 percent of all Donbass miners were children of peasants.⁵⁶

In the 1920s, a significant portion of these new peasant workers were young people who wanted to get ahead. Already in late 1926, M. Tomskii, the head of the Soviet trade unions, asserted that peasant youth were "very eager to go to the city for any work at all."⁵⁷ In the spring of 1929, one-fourth of the working class of the Ukraine was 23 years old or younger. In the Donbass, the young constituted one-third of all workers.⁵⁸ The percentage of those new workers in this age group increased after 1929. In 1931, approximately 50 percent of all new entrants into the work force belonged to this age bracket.⁵⁹ That same year in the Donbass coal mines the figure reached 75.9 percent.⁶⁰ As the working class became younger in composition, it also became more Ukrainian.

In light of the composition of the new working class, how close was the bond between the Ukrainian peasant worker and his former village? In the last years of the tsarist regime, the ties were quite strong. The tsarist government's policies against technical education and the Ukrainian language, its actions against the formation of unions, the alien nature of cities in the Ukraine as perceived by the predominantly Ukrainian peasantry, the severe housing shortages in the cities, and the low pay prevented the development of skilled workers and only reinforced the worker's need for continuous contact with his village.⁶¹ Some peasants may have had a circular relationship with the cities. They went to work there while young and permanently returned to the countryside when old. They raised their children in the villages and sent them to the cities when they became old enough to work.⁶²

With the increase in steady employment opportunities, the influx of peasants into urban centers grew at a steady pace and their bonds with their villages depended on their new professions and the distance between the factory and their former village. For example, the percentage of workers having ties with their former villages was significantly higher in the construction, mining, peat-cutting, and in the cement and ceramic industries than in the metallurgical and machine-construction industries.⁶³ These connections were weaker among workers in large industrial centers with large unions, which helped to promote the new industrial ethos among peasant recruits.

Mass peasant entry into the labor force and the continuance of their ties with the countryside prevented their smooth integration to the new industrial order. Labor problems, such as tardiness, alcoholism, simulation of illness, industrial injuries and labor turnover, had already begun by 1926 and productivity slowed as a result of them. These infractions seriously influenced productivity after 1930, when factories began to compete for labor by offering incentives (better pay, housing, conditions, and food).⁶⁴

Turnover increased at the end of the 1920s and early 1930s. In 1928 labor turnover was 96.1 percent, 1929 – 105.6 percent, 1930 – 152.4 percent, and in 1931 – 132.5 percent.⁶⁵ In the Donbass, as a result of high labor turnover, only about half of the plan was fulfilled.⁶⁶

The metal and metallurgical industries experienced severe problems that occurred most frequently among new workers.⁶⁷ These industries, which drew a high percentage of their labor from the countryside, experienced extensive labor infractions and turnover during the sowing and the harvest periods – the third and fourth quarters of each

year.⁶⁸ Not surprisingly, the skilled workers tended to be more stable than the unskilled.⁶⁹

Despite the promulgation of rules and regulations to combat labor problems, they persisted in a labor-short society. These difficulties demonstrated that the peasant-workers were not "imbued with the interests of production and often during the harvest would leave the factories, disrupting the normal work of the enterprise."⁷⁰ This new group of workers had "never worked in factories before and did not have any worker temperament. They were, for the most part, politically backward; they were not interested in all-union goals, only in their own personal interests which they placed above the interests of their own class."⁷¹

Radical peasantization of the working class demanded the raising of the peasant's political consciousness. A. F. Radchenko, the head of the trade unions in the Ukraine, asserted at the Ninth Congress of the KP(b)U in 1925 that a significant group of young people and juveniles "did not experience and do not know the horrors of tsarist autocracy, the horrors of capitalistic exploitation and the horrors of the civil war."⁷² Peasants brought "the old eternal prejudices of the village" with them to the factories.⁷³

These new laborers became members of the working class only in name. And because they came in such large numbers, and maintained physical and psychological ties with the countryside, their peasantness was not just a temporary problem. They retained much of their peasant mentality. By 1930 "heterogeneous" elements, "at times downright hostile to the working class, introducing alien influences, disorganization, at times breaking production,"⁷⁴ emerged within this "half-peasant, half-worker" class.

On the average, forging workers from peasants took three to five years.⁷⁵ In the meantime, chaos reigned as peasants confronted the cities and the factories. In addition to exacerbating social tensions, this massive peasantization also challenged the Marxist notion that these workers possessed a proletarian consciousness.⁷⁶

Changes in the national composition of the working class

As the working class in the Ukraine grew, so did the number of Ukrainians within it. Ukrainians accounted for 84.0 percent of the wage-earning population within the Ukrainian SSR on December 17, 1926 (see Appendix 6). According to a Soviet definition, wage-earners (defined as "economically independent" people by Soviet statistic-

ians) were people with an income – whether from wages, ownership of land, or from the state as in the form of pensions or scholarships.⁷⁷ Ukrainians accounted for approximately half the urban wage-earners in the republic (see Appendix 7). But among the Ukrainians in this category, *one-third were engaged in agriculture*. (At the same time, nearly 90 percent of the total Ukrainian wage-earning population was concentrated in agricultural work, a much higher proportion than that of any other national group in the Ukraine.) These facts underscore the low level of Ukrainian economic development.

In 1926 the strength of Ukrainian workers in the urban centers varied from region to region – from 31.7 percent in the Steppe to 59.2 percent in the Left Bank (see Appendix 8). Ukrainians accounted for a majority of the work force only in the non-industrialized Right and Left Banks. Russians, not surprisingly, constituted a majority of the Donbass and a plurality (42.4 percent) among the Steppe workers.

Ukrainians did not constitute a majority of the working class in any of the six largest industrial centers. They held a plurality only in Kiev, the center of the Right Bank, and Kharkov, the center of the Left Bank (see Table 4.3). The majority of the workers in Nikolaev and Stalino, the major cities of the Steppe and the Donbass, respectively, and a plurality of the workers in Dnipropetrov's'ke and Odessa were Russians.

But the national composition of the working class changed during the 1920s and early 1930s (see Appendix 9). Ukrainians joined the working class in far greater numbers than any other group within the Ukrainian SSR. By 1934 three-and-a-half times as many workers identified themselves as Ukrainians than in 1926, and as a result, the Ukrainian percentage of the working class increased – from 51.7 percent in 1926 to 59.2 percent in 1934. In this 8 year period the number of Russians within the working class also increased, but not as many Russians joined the work force as did Ukrainians.

Despite the increase in the number and percentage of Ukrainians in the Ukraine's working class, the Ukrainian percentage remained considerably smaller than its percentage of the republic's population as a whole. The percentage of Russian and Jewish workers was higher than their share of the total population, so that the Ukrainian influence was not as strongly felt as that of the Russians.

The strength of the Ukrainian element varied by occupation and region. In the metal industry, for example, Ukrainians constituted 45.0 percent of the labor force, while Russians accounted for 42.4 percent in 1926.⁷⁸ Approximately 46.6 percent of the workers in the Dniprope-

Table 4.3. *National composition of wage-earning workers in the six largest cities, December 17, 1926 (percent)*

Cities	Nationality				Total No.
	Ukrainian	Russian	Jewish	Others	
Kharkov	43.0	39.3	12.0	5.7	53,426
Kiev	46.8	26.2	19.3	7.7	51,393
Odessa	16.7	47.8	26.2	9.3	47,387
Dnipropetrovs'ke	35.9	40.0	15.4	8.7	38,672
Stalino	22.4	65.3	3.2	9.1	27,906
Nikolaev	32.0	50.7	12.1	5.2	13,749
All Six Cities	31.1	42.0	16.1	7.8	232,533

Source: *Mis'ki selyshcha USRR. Zbirnyk stat.-ekonomichnykh vidomosti* (Kharkiv, 1929), Table 5, pp. 21–22.

trovs'ke metal works were Ukrainian, while 37.7 percent were Russian; in the Artemivs'ke okrug 59.3 percent were Ukrainian and 33.7 percent were Russian; in the Zaporizhzhia okrug 58.0 percent were Ukrainian and 26.0 percent were Russian; and in the Kiev okrug, 45.2 percent were Ukrainian and 29.4 percent were Russian.⁷⁹

The Donbass, the Dnieper Industrial Region, and the Steppe had long attracted migrant labor from the central and northern gubernias of Russia, even before the revolution. After 1917 new workers still came from the RSFSR and from other union republics. Between 1923 and 1926 the urban population of the Donbass grew by 300,000.⁸⁰ Many Russian workers came to these industrial areas to help reconstruct the ruined mines and factories. Beginning in 1924 and continuing until the late 1920s the number of Russians overshadowed the number of Ukrainians.⁸¹

Between 1926 and 1929, nearly a third – 30.2 percent – of the new workers in eleven of the Ukraine's most developed industrial okrugs came from outside the republic, mostly from the RSFSR.⁸² This was due, partly, to government, Komsomol, and party intervention, which mobilized, for example, 30,000 Komsomol workers for the Donbass mines in 1930 and 1,000 skilled metallists from Moscow, Leningrad, and Gorky in 1931.⁸³ In order to break Russian dominance of the work force in these industrial okrugs, more Ukrainian migrants were needed.

The Ukrainian countryside provided these recruits. In 1926, Russians

Table 4.4. *Change in percent of Ukrainians in the work force of certain industries, 1926–1931*

	1926	1931
Food-industry workers	44.6	49.6
Miners	35.7	49.9
Metallists	44.9	52.6
Railway workers	69.1	76.5
Sugar workers	68.4	82.7

Source: "Iz statisticheskikh svedenii VUSPS o kolichestvennom i kachestvennom sostave rabochikh i sluzashchikh Ukrainy," *Promyshlennost' i rabochii klass Ukrainskoi SSR v period postroeniia fundamenta sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki (1926–1932 gody): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Kiev, 1966), p. 440.

composed 51.0 percent of the Donbass workers, Ukrainians 40.0 percent, and others 9.0 percent. By August 1934 the Ukrainian share increased to 52.6 percent and the Russian share declined to 41.5 percent.⁸⁴ This national transformation was due not only to an increased influx of peasants, but also due to the decreased migration of peasants from the RSFSR. With the construction of new factories and mines in Siberia, the Urals, and in the Moscow Industrial Region, the Russian peasant in the RSFSR had more choices about where to work.⁸⁵ He was replaced in the Ukraine by a Ukrainian peasant.

The highest percentage of newcomers worked in coal mining, which contained large numbers of unskilled workers. Smaller numbers of workers with rural origins worked in metallurgy and machine-construction, industries that required highly skilled workers. This influx of Ukrainian peasants into industrial centers after 1926 swamped several sectors of the Soviet Ukrainian economy (see Table 4.4).

The number of Ukrainians in the centers of heavy industry of the Ukraine rose sharply between 1926 and 1932 – in Kharkov, they more than doubled; and in Stalino, Luhans'ke, and Dnipropetrovs'ke, they grew by approximately three times.⁸⁶ Between 1926 and 1934, the number and percentage of Ukrainians among workers and white-collar employees throughout the Ukrainian economy grew steadily and their majority increased.

Changes in the national composition of the trade unions

The Communist Party considered trade unions "schools of communism," transmission belts between the party and the masses. Because an overwhelming majority of workers belonged to trade unions, they contained the highest membership of all the social and political organizations in the USSR. While the number of trade unionists increased from 10,995,600 in 1928 to 17,769,000 in April 1932,⁸⁷ the proportion of all workers who belonged to them declined, due to heavy migration from the countryside. By October 1, 1932, 74.0 percent of all Soviet workers belonged to trade unions. This figure fluctuated from republic to republic: the Kazakh SSR had the lowest percentage of unionized workers (61.7 percent) and the Georgian SSR the highest (84.4 percent). The RSFSR's percentage (73.7 percent) approximated the all-Union percentage,⁸⁸ as did the Ukrainian percentage, which was between 73.0 and 74.0 percent.⁸⁹

The number of trade unionists in the Ukraine increased from 1,370,500 on October 1, 1921 to 3,493,600 on October 1, 1934 (see Appendix 10). The most significant increases were experienced by the industrial-construction and agricultural-forestry unions, so that from 1928 onward, the members of the industrial and construction unions constituted either a plurality or the majority of the overall membership of trade unions in the Ukraine.

In May 1926 trade unions in the Ukraine conducted a census of their ranks. According to this census, 49.9 percent of all workers in the Ukraine identified themselves as Ukrainians, 31.6 percent as Russians, 12.8 percent as Jews, and 5.7 percent claimed other national affiliations. Overall, Ukrainians constituted almost a majority of the working class of the Ukraine. This situation also applied in the majority of the individual okrugs. In nine okrugs Ukrainians constituted more than 74.0 percent of the trade union memberships, and in nineteen okrugs they constituted between 50.0 and 75.0 percent of all trade unionists. Only in eleven okrugs was the Ukrainian percentage less than 50 percent⁹⁰ (see Appendix 11). Not surprisingly, this low percentage coincided with the most industrialized okrugs.

With the exception of the industrial unions, Ukrainians dominated most of the trade unions in the Ukraine in 1926. Of the twenty-three unions, they dominated seventeen, the Russians, two (mining and construction work) and the Jews, four (sewing industry, tanning, printing, and arts workers).⁹¹

The percentage of Ukrainians within the working class of the

Table 4.5. *National composition of the new trade unionists, July–December 1931 (percent)*

Unions	Ukrainian	Russian	Jewish	Others
Transport/communications	75.8	15.1	6.5	3.1
Construction	67.4	27.0	1.8	3.8
Social/cultural	61.2	18.6	14.7	5.5
Trade/social work	58.9	30.3	7.4	3.4
Industrial	56.1	28.4	10.7	4.8
Agricultural	53.5	12.0	21.5	13.0
All unions	60.8	25.9	8.8	4.5

Source: Sostav novykh millionov chlenov profsoiuzov (Moscow, 1933), p. 100.

Ukraine increased from 49.4 percent in 1926 to 58.7 percent in 1932, while the percentage of Ukrainians in the trade unions of the Ukraine increased from 49.9 in April 1926 to 58.1 in October 1931⁹² (see Appendix 12). However, while the number and percentage of Ukrainians within the trade unions increased, they did not necessarily increase evenly across the various branches of industry. Although still a minority in these industries, the Ukrainians made their greatest percentage gains in the industrial, transportation and communications unions.

Of the 37,119 people who applied for trade union membership during the first half of 1931, 55.7 percent of the newly arrived were Ukrainians (23.9 percent were Russians and 15.8 percent Jews).⁹³ The Ukrainians most likely maintained and increased their percentage within the trade unions into 1932, since the overwhelming majority of the new trade unionists in all sectors in the second half of 1931 identified themselves as Ukrainians (see Table 4.5).

The social origins of the new workers determined why more Ukrainians did not enter the industrial occupations. Of those who started factory work in the first half of 1931, 38.4 percent were children of workers, 44.8 percent children of peasants, 10.0 percent children of civil servants, and 6.4 percent children of domestic industry workers. In 1931 industrial enterprises were filled with children of workers (44.1 percent) and peasants (39.5 percent); the construction industry was filled with children of peasants (68.1 percent); transport was filled with children of workers (41.6 percent) and of peasants (42.5 percent).⁹⁴ The social origins of the new recruits determined which industry to enter. The Ukrainian peasants generally entered the industries that

demanded fewer skills, and if they joined highly skilled industries, they entered at lower, less-skilled ranks.

The influx of millions of Ukrainian peasants into the cities also created a positive environment for the cultural Ukrainianization of the working class. As a result of *korenizatsiia* and the cultural activities of the trade unions, many workers who had previously considered themselves Russians or were confused about their identity now identified themselves as Ukrainians.⁹⁵ As the number of those workers who identified themselves as Ukrainians rose, so too did Ukrainian-language use, which increased slowly in the 1920s.

However, national self-identification was not necessarily an accurate indicator of the worker's conversational language. In 1926 the percentage of those whose native language was Ukrainian was less than the percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians. And by the same token, the majority of those who identified themselves as non-Ukrainians registered Russian as their native language. Of those workers and civil servants surveyed, 60.0 percent spoke Russian, 33.2 percent Ukrainian, 7.5 percent Yiddish, and 3.1 percent other languages. Ten percent of those surveyed spoke two or more languages, and so they were counted twice. Native language use fluctuated by *okrug*. The percentage of those who spoke Ukrainian, for example, varied from 10.6 percent (Odessa) to 77.2 percent (Lubni). In twenty *okrugs* the percentage of those who spoke Ukrainian was less than 50.0 percent. Only one-third of all trade unionists in the Ukraine registered Ukrainian as their conversational language (see Appendix 11).

In 1926 Ukrainian was the language of choice in only five unions, Yiddish in only one (sewing industry workers), and Russian in seventeen.⁹⁶ The percentage of those who spoke Ukrainian or Yiddish was far smaller than the percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians or Jews. Conversely, the percentage of those who claimed Russian to be their native language was higher than the percentage of those who identified themselves as Russians (see Table 4.6).

Between May 1926 and October 1929, the period between the two trade union censuses, the trade unions in the Ukraine experienced a dramatic growth in membership – from 1,800,000 to 3,000,000. Ukrainians constituted a majority in all union groups and their number and percentage increased in all regions and in thirty-four of the forty *okrugs* (see Appendix 13).

Even the predominantly Russified areas such as the Steppe, the

Table 4.6. *National identification and conversational language of trade unionists, 1926–1929 (percent)*

Union group	Those who identify themselves as					
	Ukrainians		Russians		Jews	
	1926	1929	1926	1929	1926	1929
Agricultural/forestry	74.5	79.6	16.4	9.0	2.9	5.9
Industrial	41.6	47.9	40.6	34.4	12.0	11.3
Transport/communications	64.6	73.0	25.8	18.9	3.9	3.0
Intellectual	52.4	58.2	20.7	15.6	21.4	20.5
Other	52.7	53.9	29.6	26.4	11.6	12.7
All groups	49.9	57.2	31.6	25.1	12.8	11.7

Union group	Those who converse in					
	Ukrainian		Russian		Yiddish	
	1926	1929	1926	1929	1926	1929
Agricultural/forestry	68.3	78.0	36.1	15.0	na	na
Industrial	22.2	32.3	72.1	60.0	na	na
Transport/communications	38.5	50.0	71.0	47.9	na	na
Intellectual	43.7	51.1	58.2	40.6	na	na
Other	37.1	34.3	63.3	59.8	na	na
All groups	33.2	43.9	66.0	49.1	7.5	na

Source: *Otchet Vseukrainskogo soveta profsoiuzov. K 3-mu s'ezdu profsoiuzov Ukrainy* (Kharkov, 1926), pp. 47–49; and *Natsional'nyi perepys robitnykiv ta sluzhbootsiv Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1930), p. xvi.

Dnieper Industrial Region, and the Donbass experienced significant increases in the number and percentage of Ukrainians among union members. With the exception of Artemivs'ke, the seven industrial okrugs experienced increases in the percentage of Ukrainians (compare Appendices 11 and 13). With the exception of Dnipropetrovs'ke, Ukrainian as a conversational language increased slightly in the most industrialized okrugs (compare Appendices 11 and 13).

In the period between the 1926 and 1929 censuses, the number and percentage of trade unionists who employed the Ukrainian language increased – from 33.2 to 43.9 percent. Although Ukrainian still maintained its second place behind Russian, the gap was narrowing

Table 4.7. *Percentage of Ukrainians and language usage in the industrial and intellectual unions, 1926–1929*

Percent of	Industrial unions		Intellectual unions	
	1926	1929	1926	1929
Ukrainians	41.6	47.9	52.4	58.2
Those who can speak Ukrainian	22.2	32.3	43.7	51.1
Those who can read Ukrainian	22.1	43.0	66.8	78.9
Those who can write Ukrainian	17.3	38.1	62.1	75.6

Source: *Otchet Vseukrainskogo soveta profsoiuzov. K 3-mu s'ezdu profsoiuzov Ukrainy* (Kharkov, 1926), p. 50; and *Natsional'nyi perepys robotnykiv ta sluzhbovtiv Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1930).

(compare Appendices 11 and 13), in the regions, in the okrugs, and in the various trade union groups. The agriculturally oriented Right Bank and Left Bank remained strongholds for trade unionists who employed Ukrainian as their conversational language. Russian, however, was still spoken by the majority of trade unionists in the industrialized Steppe and in the Donbass; Russian language speakers constituted a plurality in the Dnieper Industrial Region.

In 1929, the Ukrainian language was used predominantly in twenty-seven okrugs – up by seven from 1926 – and the Russian language in thirteen (see Appendix 13), including the seven industrial okrugs. Moreover, with the exception of the Dnipropetrovs'ke okrug, the Ukrainian language had made steady inroads into these seven industrial okrugs in the three-and-a-half year period between the censuses.

Whereas in 1926 only the agricultural and forestry unions had a majority of trade unionists whose native language was Ukrainian, in 1929 all of the unions, taken together, possessed a majority of Ukrainian-language speakers. Even though Ukrainian speakers were a minority within the critically important industrial and “other” unions, the percentage of Ukrainian speakers increased during this period.

In the intellectual unions (which included teachers, doctors, and trade officials), Ukrainians also made progress. The percentage of those who could read or write Ukrainian was higher than the percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians (see Table 4.7). This was due to the successful Ukrainianization of Soviet institutions, where many non-Ukrainian bureaucrats were forced to learn to speak, read, and write Ukrainian.

Conclusion

Rapid industrialization transformed the urban Soviet working class by drawing men and women from the countryside into its ranks. This peasantization submerged the old cadres, those who had joined the working class before 1917, and threatened the Russian composition of the Soviet working class.

As a result of the party's economic and political pressures on the countryside and as a result of the labor shortages in the early 1930s, Ukrainian peasants began to move into urban centers in greater numbers and to join the heretofore Russified urban labor force. These millions of migrants could not be immediately absorbed culturally, politically, or socially into the existing working class. The preponderance of peasants generated mass social problems. Labor turnover and disciplinary problems became rampant, especially for those peasants who retained some connection with the countryside. Because of its disjointed expansion, uneasy integration, deteriorating living conditions, illiteracy, unreliable political consciousness, and declining productivity during accelerated industrial modernization, the working class in the Ukraine, as in the USSR, experienced a "crisis of proletarian identity." According to one analyst:

This crisis was both social and political. First, the overall decline of the standard of living disquieted the working class. Second, the growing movement of "newcomers" into the factories "diluted" the working class socially and politically to an alarming degree. Third, nascent industrial modernization was threatening the status of the older, skilled workers on the shop floor.⁹⁷

The social and political components of this crisis were interrelated. Due to the swift expansion of the Soviet working class in a very short period, the party could not introduce or acculturate the new workers to the proper proletarian consciousness. Without the proper consciousness, their long-term reliability came into question.

In the Ukraine, the working class's acquisition of Ukrainian identity sharpened this crisis. By the beginning of the turbulent 1930s, Ukrainian peasants solidified their majority within the labor force of the Ukraine, including its most industrialized okrugs. They swamped the old, more experienced Russian and Russified cadres, even in the Donbass. Due to their enormous numbers, it was not as easy to integrate them into the Russian industrial culture as it had been in the pre-revolutionary period. Concomitantly, the slow, but steady increase in the number of Ukrainian workers who spoke Ukrainian

and who took an interest in Ukrainian culture fractured the unity of the predominantly Russian Soviet working class. The working class in the Ukraine was becoming a Ukrainian working class.

5 Communist Party membership

As the vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party represented power and control. Whereas the overwhelming majority of workers belonged to trade unions, a smaller number joined the party. The trade unions accepted almost all applicants; the party was more selective. Although Ukrainians never controlled the leading positions in the KP(b)U during the 1920s and early 1930s,¹ they did become the majority of the party's rank and file. This radical increase was significant. Since the party represented political authority, its demographic and cultural Ukrainianization was an important indicator of the party's seriousness in legitimizing itself in the non-Russian regions.

The KP(b)U, the largest non-Russian regional party, was one of the main components of the VKP(b). The Ukrainian party expanded from 54,818 members and candidate-members in 1922 to 550,443 on January 1, 1933,² comprising 13.6 to 17.0 percent of the entire membership of the VKP(b).³ In addition to its size, the party's social composition contributed to its importance. By attracting large numbers of miners and metallists from the Donbass, Dnipropetrovs'ke, Kharkov, Nikolaev, Kryvyi Rih, and other cities in the Ukraine into its ranks, the Communist Party of the Ukraine in the 1920s possessed a higher percentage of members of working-class background than even in the RSFSR.⁴

Significantly, more Ukrainians joined the party than any other non-Russian group. They made impressive strides within the party membership of the republic – from 11,920, or 23.3 percent of the KP(b)U in 1922, to over 300,000, or 60.0 percent by October 1933.⁵ This influx transformed an overwhelmingly Russian organization into one more representative of the national composition of the Ukraine (see Appendix 14).

But despite these serious gains, a higher percentage of the Russian

population of the Ukraine joined the KP(b)U than did Ukrainians. The KP(b)U, like the VKP(b), was predominantly a party of the cities, with an ideological preference for industrial workers. Overall, those Ukrainians who did join the party were more urbanized and more Russified than their compatriots. But as a result of *korenizatsiia*, a radical increase in the number of Ukrainian urban residents in the 1920s and 1930s, and the formation of a Ukrainian working class, Ukrainians slowly came to constitute a majority of the rank and file of the party. However, this transformation was not unilinear or smooth. Tensions emerged "between the need to put down roots among the minority peoples and the danger of swamping the local organizations with 'non-proletarian elements.'"⁶

Changes in the party membership

According to the 1922 party census, the revolution and civil war forged the membership of the KP(b)U. Over 97.0 percent of the 53,495 party members in the Ukraine joined its ranks after March 1917.⁷ Although they were not long-term members of the party, their struggles and deprivations during the establishment of Soviet power created a revolutionary *esprit de corps*. These common bonds and experiences insured, in the eyes of the party leadership, their political reliability. And when in the 1920s newcomers swamped the cities and the working class, the political dependability of the party's new Ukrainian recruits increasingly came into question.

The party grew rapidly in the Ukraine and the numbers of new members dwarfed the founders. According to the party census of January 10, 1927, the KP(b)U possessed 168,087 members and candidate-members.⁸ The majority of the party members (69.7 percent) and candidate-members (99.5 percent) had joined the party in or after 1922 (see Table 5.1). Whereas in 1922 party membership was a phenomenon closely identified with the Revolution and civil war, by 1927 the majority of communists were post-revolutionary recruits.

Thus, as the ranks of the party expanded between January, 1927, and July 1, 1931, this radical increase of nearly a quarter of a million new members and candidate-members diluted the old revolutionary cadres. The majority of these new post-revolutionary recruits did not participate in the Bolshevik underground prior to the First World War or in the battles of the Revolution and civil war. This transformation of a once small, tightly-knit revolutionary party into

Table 5.1. *When party members and candidate-members joined the KP(b)U*

Date of admission	Party members		Candidate-members	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
To 1916	863	0.8		
1917	4,284	3.8		
1918	4,480	4.0		
1919	9,398	8.3		
To 1920	11,060	9.8	126	0.2
1921	3,933	3.5	316	0.6
1922	1,475	1.3	197	0.4
1923	1,532	1.4	555	1.0
1924	15,636	13.8	3,439	6.2
1925	36,957	32.7	27,219	49.2
1926 and after	23,130	20.5	23,290	42.1
Unknown	57	0.1	140	0.3
Total	112,805	100.0	55,282	100.0

Source: *Pidsumky partperezysu 1927 roku* (Kharkiv, 1928), pp. 79, 87.

a mass party exemplified the institutionalization of a revolutionary state.

Throughout the 1920s the party maintained its urban bias by recruiting most of its members and candidate-members from the cities. In 1923, for example, urban party organizations registered two-thirds of all members and one-half of all candidate-members of the KP(b)U.⁹ In the 1920s and early 1930s increased industrialization and urban growth in the Ukraine strengthened this orientation.

As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, KP(b)U strength increased from the predominantly agricultural Right Bank to the more industrialized Left Bank and Steppe regions. Industrial centers generated more party members. Of the twelve party organizations, those in the five most industrialized groups (Iuzovka/Stalino, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, and Dnipropetrovs'ke) contained the majority, 62.6 percent, of the Communist Party membership in the Ukraine in 1922. During the next decade, the party organizations in the industrial areas (which also included the Artemivs'ke and Luhans'ke okrugs) increased their membership and influence within the KP(b)U (see Table 5.3). This increased recruitment was consistent with the VKP(b) policy "to build

Table 5.2. Location of KP(b)U party membership, 1922

Party organization	No. of party members	Percent
Kiev	7,016	12.8
Podillia	3,867	7.0
Volhynia	2,304	4.2
Right Bank	13,187	24.0
Chernihiv	1,900	3.5
Kharkov	8,641	15.8
Kremenchuk	2,859	5.2
Poltava	3,400	6.2
Left Bank	16,800	30.6
Iuzovka/Stalino	10,577	19.3
Dnipropetrovs'ke	3,700	6.7
Nikolaev	3,600	6.5
Odessa	4,388	8.0
Zaporizhzhia	2,566	4.7
Steppe	24,831	45.3
Total	54,818	100.0

Source: *Itogi partperepisi 1922 g. na Ukraine v dvukh chastiakh* (Kharkov, 1922), p. vii.

Table 5.3. KP(b)U members and candidate-members in seven industrial okrugs^a, 1928–1930

Date	No. of KP(b)U members and candidate-members in industrial okrugs	Total KP(b) U membership	Percent of members in industrial okrugs to total members
Jan. 1, 1928	112,269	196,752	57.0
Oct. 1, 1928	127,101	218,049	58.3
Apr. 1, 1930	161,557	272,325	59.3

Note: ^a These were the Artemivs'ke, Dnipropetrovs'ke, Kharkov, Kiev, Luhans'ke, Odessa, and Stalino okrugs.

Source: *Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrah* (Moscow, 1924–32), vols. 4–9, 11.

up the 'proletarian core' of the party,"¹⁰ which it initiated in 1924 and emphasized several times in the 1920s.

Although this policy to recruit "workers from the bench" remained in force for seven years, it was not consistently applied. Through the 1920s, as Stalin associated himself with the pro-peasant orientation of Bukharin and the right, the party sought to recruit more peasants into its ranks. Without "a union with the peasantry," Stalin asserted in 1925, "a dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible."¹¹ After decisively undercutting Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the Left Opposition, Stalin confronted the right and abandoned his pro-peasant policies by supporting rapid industrialization and collectivization.

By the end of the 1920s, Stalin and his allies re-emphasized the proletarianization drive, which was necessary if the party planned to maintain a presence in the factories among the rapidly expanding urban labor force.¹² The leadership of the party sought to include more workers, especially workers with several years' work experience, in its ranks. The party desired at least 50.0 percent of the workers from the shop floor to compose its membership. In the Ukraine this goal was not achieved until 1931.¹³

In light of the ambiguous, if not contradictory, recruitment policies introduced by the VKP(b) in the 1920s, the enrollment of Ukrainians into the KP(b)U produced ambivalent results. Because Ukrainians were under-represented in the urban, industrial working class, this proletarianization policy came into conflict with the mission of Ukrainianization, which sought to recruit and promote more Ukrainians (whether or not they were members of the working class) into the party, state bureaucracy, trade unions, and cultural institutions.

In the 1920s the number of communists in the rural areas increased, but this represented only a slight increase in the total percentage of the KP(b)U membership (see Table 5.4). Between 1922 and 1927 the number of communists in the countryside increased by 400 percent – from 7,072 to 36,730. But in the 23 million-person countryside this increase was statistically insignificant. If in 1925 the members and candidate-members of the Communist Party constituted only 1 percent of the Ukraine's total population, they comprised 3.7 percent of the population of the cities (and 13.3 percent of all adult workers in factories), but only 0.24 percent of the countryside.¹⁴ By January 1, 1930, there were 40,000 members in the village party centers – 16.0 percent of the total membership of the KP(b)U.

But while the number of communists increased in the countryside, only about half of the 40,000 rural party members were peasants.¹⁵ The

Table 5.4. *Urban and rural membership of the KP(b)U, 1922–1927^a*

Area	1922		1927	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Cities	26,740	79.1	131,357	78.1
Rural areas	7,072	20.9	36,730	21.9
Total	33,812	100.0	168,087	100.0

Note: ^a Excludes KP(b)U members on active duty in the Red Army.

Source: *Itogi partperepisi 1922 g. na Ukraine v dvukh chastiakh* (Kharkov, 1922), p. xii; and *Pidsumky partperepysu 1927 roku* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 31, 97.

other half were outsiders who had come from the cities and who were employed as officials in local soviets and party organs and as teachers. This reflected the growing urban political penetration of the countryside, which reached its apogee with collectivization and the subsequent famine in the early 1930s. The recruitment of peasants into the party, however, was a slow and difficult process. In several okrugs during 1927–28, for example, the party cells in the countryside accepted only one to three agricultural laborers into their ranks.¹⁶ Not surprisingly, the KP(b)U expanded its ranks in the cities, not the countryside.

Changes in the national composition of the party

In 1922 non-Ukrainians were over-represented and Ukrainians under-represented within the party. Russians were the largest national group, constituting over half (51.1 percent) of the KP(b)U membership, followed by Jews (18.4 percent), and Poles (2.7 percent). Although Ukrainians accounted for a majority of the KP(b)U membership in the countryside (54.1 percent), here too they were under-represented since they constituted 87.5 percent of the overall population of the countryside. By the same token Russians were over-represented (36.6 percent) in the countryside. Among the party members in the Red Army, 64.6 percent identified themselves as Russians and only 14.0 percent as Ukrainians. Russians constituted the majority among party members who were workers (57.7 percent) by current occupation and held a strong plurality among civil servants (46.5 percent).¹⁷

Table 5.5. *Conversational language of KP(b)U members, 1922*

Language	Workers	Peasants	Civil		Total
			Servants	Unknown	
Ukrainian	2,328	2,116	1,500	110	6,054
(percent)	8.5	22.5	9.7	9.1	11.3
Russian	22,427	6,754	12,472	818	42,471
(percent)	81.7	72.1	80.8	67.9	79.4
Yiddish	1,170	20	665	32	1,887
(percent)	4.3	0.2	4.3	2.3	3.5
Polish	325	44	153	19	541
(percent)	1.2	6.5	1.0	1.5	1.0
Other	849	317	516	52	1,734
(percent)	3.1	3.4	3.3	4.3	3.2
Unknown	338	119	178	173	808
(percent)	1.2	1.2	1.1	14.4	1.6
Total	27,437	9,370	15,834	1,204	53,485

Source: *Itogi partperepisi 1922 g. na Ukraine v dvukh chastiakh* (Kharkov, 1922), p. xii.

Despite the confusion over the 1922 party census question dealing with “conversational language” (many did not understand whether it meant the language the respondent used as a child or the language he presently employed),¹⁸ only approximately half of the Ukrainians – 11.3 percent – claimed to be Ukrainian native-language speakers (see Table 5.5). The overwhelming majority (79.4 percent) of KP(b)U members designated Russian as their native language.

The Russian influence was clearly higher than even these figures might suggest, as only 1.0 percent of all party members did not know Russian.¹⁹ Most surprisingly, over two-thirds of all peasant party members listed Russian as their native language. Because assimilation to Russian and Russian culture was not pervasive in the countryside, these peasants must have been Russian peasants, or resided in mixed Russian–Ukrainian districts bordering the Russian republic. Undoubtedly, more than this number spoke Ukrainian and/or Yiddish as a second or third language. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the overwhelming majority spoke Russian rather than Ukrainian as their first language (see Table 5.5). Since few Russians or Jews learned Ukrainian, the high percentage of native Russian-language speakers within the KP(b)U challenged the successful implementation of Ukrainianization.

Table 5.6. *Nationality and native-language affiliation of the KP(b)U, January 10, 1927*

	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Others	Total
Members	53,050	34,462	14,787	10,506	112,805
Candidate-members	34,135	11,694	5,519	3,934	55,282
Total	87,185	46,156	20,306	14,440	168,087
Claimed Ukrainian as native language	51,539	152	326	508	52,525
Claimed Russian as native language	35,582	45,981	11,909	6,936	100,408
Claimed language of own nationality	51,539	45,981	7,998	6,675	112,193
Claimed other languages	64	23	73	321	481

Source: VKP(b). Tsentral'nyi komitet, *Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia perepis' 1927 goda. 7-i vyp. I. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk chlenov VKP(b) i kandidatov v chleny. II. Sostav kommunistov korennoi narodnosti v natsional'nykh respublikakh i oblastiakh SSSR* (Moscow, 1927), p. 51; cited in Basil Dmytryshyn, "National and social composition of the membership of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, 1918–1928," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, no. 4 (1957), p. 257.

Over the next five years, as the number of Ukrainians increased within the party, the number of Ukrainians with Ukrainian as their native language lagged behind. Whereas the number of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians increased from 11,920 – or 23.3 percent of the overall membership of the KP(b)U – in January 1922 to 87,185, or 52.0 percent of the KP(b)U five years later, the number of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians surpassed those Ukrainians who claimed Ukrainian as their native language (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6).

The chasm between those party members registering Russian over Ukrainian as their native language narrowed in the period between 1922 and 1927. Both in 1922 and in 1927, those who claimed Ukrainian as their native language were fewer than the number of Ukrainians within the KP(b)U because more native Russian speakers joined the KP(b)U than did native speakers of Ukrainian (57,937 vs. 46,471) during this period. Despite their impressive gains during these five years, the Ukrainian-language speakers still remained a linguistic minority within their own party, never exceeding more than *one-third* of the total membership of the KP(b)U. The party did not publish

Table 5.7. *National composition of the newly accepted candidate-members of the KP(b)U, July 1, 1925 – March 31, 1930*

Date	Percentage				Total no.
	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Others	
July 1 – Dec. 31, 1925	54.0	29.8	8.6	7.6	27,150
Jan. 1 – June 30, 1926	55.1	26.8	10.6	7.4	18,362
July 1 – Dec. 31, 1926	52.6	27.4	11.4	8.6	12,348
Jan. 1 – June 30, 1927	48.8	33.2	10.9	7.1	11,359
Jan. 1 – Dec. 31, 1928	52.6	31.1	9.2	7.1	41,124
Jan. 1 – Dec. 31, 1929	53.7	29.1	9.8	7.4	45,333
Jan. 1 – Mar. 31, 1930	54.3	29.7	9.4	6.6	33,436

Sources: For 1925–27: KP(b)U, Tsentral'nyi komitet, *Dva roky roboty. Do X z'izdu. Zvit tsentral'noho komitetu Komunistychnoi partii (bil' shovyktiv) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1927), p. 148; cited in Basil Dmytryshyn, "National and social composition of the membership of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, 1918–1928," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, no. 4 (1957), p. 253. For 1928–30: V. Zhebrows'kyi, *Rist partii* (Kharkiv, 1930), p. 64.

statistics concerning its national composition and native-language affiliations after 1927, but these trends continued into the 1930s with the party's attempt to "proletarianize" itself, reinforcing the high number of Russians and Russified Ukrainians entering its ranks.

After 1925 Ukrainians continued to dominate incoming membership of the party, both in the number and percentage of those accepted as candidate-members and those promoted from candidate-membership to full membership (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8). From 1925 to 1930, the number of Jews in the KP(b)U increased (although their percentage of total members declined). This was undoubtedly due to the rapid expansion of the bureaucracy and the need, consequently, for qualified personnel. The Jews were more literate and better educated than the other national groups, and therefore joined in greater numbers.

In 1928 and 1929, the percentage of Ukrainians promoted from candidate-membership to membership declined, and the percentage of Russians who were promoted increased (see Table 5.8). This decline, however, was only temporary.²⁰ Inasmuch as the Ukrainian percentage of the membership of the KP(b)U increased from 54.0 percent in June 1930 to 58.2 percent in July 1931 to 60.0 percent in October 1933, the influx of Ukrainians, both candidate-members and

Table 5.8. *National composition of those promoted from candidate-membership to membership in the KP(b)U, 1928–1929*

Date	Percentage				Total number promoted
	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Others	
1928	53.3	27.9	11.7	7.1	31,205
1929	50.8	31.1	10.8	7.3	30,514

Source: V. Zhebrovs'kyi, *Rist partii* (Kharkiv, 1930), p. 84.

members, fluctuated between 50.0 and 66.0 percent of the total increase in membership per year. Most importantly, by 1931 Ukrainians constituted 52.2 percent of the KP(b)U members in the industrial regions (up from 43.7 percent in 1927).²¹ According to S. V. Kosior, the General Secretary of the KP(b)U, the large increase of Ukrainians in the party was due to the influx of Ukrainian workers instead of peasants or members of the intelligentsia, as had been the case in the past.²²

This change was important because the increased proletarianization of the KP(b)U weakened the influence of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which had ties to the pre-revolutionary past. Now a new Soviet man would be created in the cauldron of the new urban Soviet Ukrainian working-class culture.

Although Kosior did not elaborate, this influx of Ukrainian workers included a significant number, if not a majority, of Russified Ukrainians. This emphasis on "proletarianization" within the KP(b)U and VKP(b) sought to create reliable cadres, people who could be trusted to carry out the tasks assigned to them. According to traditional Marxist assumptions, only the workers possessed the proper proletarian consciousness and the will to establish a classless society. The party's previous attempts to attract Ukrainians only brought ideologically heterogenous elements, such as members of the intelligentsia and peasantry, into its ranks. Only workers were the party's best political bet.

After 1927 Ukrainians continued to dominate the party in terms of sheer numbers, but it is impossible to ascertain the exact number and percentage of native speakers of Ukrainian. However, we can broadly guess the number of native speakers of Ukrainian within the party by assessing the social anatomy of the new recruits, especially the workers, who constituted a significant majority.

Statistics on social origin are suspect because during the 1920s and later it was very desirable to claim a working-class background and many made this claim falsely. For example, official biographies stated that Mykola Khvyly'ovyi, one of the major writers of the 1920s and a leading proponent of the "Ukrainian road to communism," was of working-class background when his father was actually a school teacher.²³

Taking this into account, what can be gleaned from statistics on social origin and current occupation? The figures demonstrate the party's preference for workers whose social origins and current occupations were urban-oriented. By correlating the national and social parameters, we can conclude that the party had better ties with the Russified cities than with the Ukrainian countryside and that many of the new recruits were predominantly Russified or Russian.

Even if we can make out the national self-identification of the new party members, it is also important to calculate the number of native speakers of Ukrainian among the new recruits. By analyzing statistics on social origins and current occupations, we can broadly estimate that the number and percentage of Russified Ukrainians among the new recruits were significant, because the percentage of non-Russian Communist Party members or candidate-members within the working class was lower than the percentage of workers in the party of the USSR as a whole.²⁴ The discrepancy between social origin and current occupation is a rough gauge of social mobility.

Thus, in 1922, there was a notable discrepancy between the social origin and current occupation of party members. Whereas 28.4 percent of the members claimed working-class origins, the majority of these avowed workers now held administrative positions. In August and September 1922, for example, only 6.7 percent of the overall membership of the Ukrainian party organization and 12.9 percent of its working-class members were employed in industry. The rest were employed in leading party, government, economic, and trade union work.²⁵

As the 1920s advanced, there was a continued divergence between the social origins and current occupations of the members and candidate-members of the KP(b)U²⁶ (see Appendix 15). Despite fluctuations, the percentage of workers who claimed proletarian origins increased – from about 28.4 percent in 1922 to about 70 percent of the entire KP(b)U membership in 1931. At the same time, the percentage of those who admitted to peasant backgrounds declined – from 42.9 percent in 1922 to 22.2 percent on July 1, 1931. The percentage of

white-collar employees by social origin also declined. By current occupation, almost one half of the KP(b)U consisted of workers, one-sixth of peasants, and over one-fourth of white-collar employees.

In 1922, there were more workers by current occupation than by social origin. By mid-1931, in the midst of the mania for proletarian "roots," there were more workers by social origin than workers by current occupation (see Appendix 15). The same was true for peasants. "Clean hands" demonstrated political unreliability in these times, so fewer claimed that their parents were white-collar employees. Whereas in July 1931 there were more workers and peasants by social origin than by current occupation, there were over four times as many white-collar employees by current occupation than by social origin. In 1922, the greatest increase in the divergence between social origins and current occupations was in the working class. By 1931, the greatest increase in the divergence between social origins and current occupations was among white-collar employees.

Those who claimed that their parents were workers (workers by social origin) and those who claimed that they actually had been working at the factory bench at the time of entry into the party (workers by current occupation) dominated the new members promoted from the ranks of candidate-members as they did in the appointment of new candidate-members²⁷ (see Appendices 16 and 17). There were more workers and peasants by social origin than by current occupation among those promoted in 1925 through July 1931. As might be expected, there were fewer white-collar employees by social origin than by current occupation. Until 1928 the white-collar employees were promoted to full membership in the KP(b)U in numbers second only to the workers. After 1928 they were displaced by peasants in the promotion priorities of the party. This trend signified the party's penetration of the countryside during collectivization.

The number of workers by current occupation increased in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In 1931, for example, 123,000 – or 69.5 percent – of the new workers accepted into the KP(b)U were workers by current occupation.²⁸ By April 1, 1932, workers by current occupation constituted 50.8 percent of the entire Ukrainian party.²⁹

The majority of those who requested membership³⁰ and joined the party after 1927 came from the seven industrial okrugs (see Table 5.3 above). As the percentage of Ukrainians in the KP(b)U increased from 52.1 percent in 1927 to 57.2 percent in 1931, the percentage of Ukrainians in the industrial regions also grew from 43.7 percent to 52.2

percent.³¹ The majority of those who applied for party membership and candidate-membership were workers by current occupation and 84.0 percent of their applications were accepted.³² But in light of the ethno-social structure of the Ukraine, the increase in the number and percentage of workers in the KP(b)U was higher than the increase in the number and percentage of Ukrainians. While workers by current occupation admitted to candidate-membership must have numbered over 70 percent³³ in the industrial okrugs, the percentage of Ukrainians admitted was only 47.1. Here, we see that the pressures from above to proletarianize the party came into conflict with the policy of promoting Ukrainians into the party.³⁴

But despite the VKP(b)'s conflict of interests, by 1932 Ukrainians in the party surpassed the other non-Russians in the non-Russian regions in terms of numbers. On July 1, 1932, the KP(b)U comprised one-sixth of the VKP(b)'s 3,200,000 members and candidate-members. Of the 1,444,253 communists in the 34 non-Russian party organizations on April 1, 1932, 622,376 (or 43.1 percent) belonged to indigenous nationalities.³⁵ By October 1933 over 300,000 Ukrainians in the KP(b)U constituted nearly half of the non-Russian membership of the VKP(b).³⁶ In addition to its numerical superiority, the KP(b)U still possessed the greatest number and highest percentage of workers of all the non-Russian parties. As of April 1, 1932, 72.1 percent of KP(b)U members were workers by social origin.³⁷

These workers were long-term proletarians, not peasants who had migrated recently from the countryside and joined the urban labor force. In 1931, 67.7 percent of the workers accepted as candidate-members had worked in the factories for over five years.³⁸ Clearly, the party put a premium not on just any worker, but on workers with long-term experience in the factories. The party considered them more politically reliable than any other social group. Although most of the new worker recruits into the party did not participate in the revolutionary events, the party measured their political consciousness and reliability by the candidate's social origins, skills, and distance from the peasant and bourgeois mentalities. Physical distance from the countryside presupposed psychological distance and the acquisition of the proper political attitudes.

In line with this reasoning, more than half of all party members who were workers were skilled workers, followed by the semi-skilled, and the unskilled. Among the candidate-members the percentage of unskilled and semi-skilled workers was higher than the percentage of skilled workers.³⁹ The level of skill is important because as workers

became more skilled, they also generally became more urbanized and developed a proletarian consciousness. The center considered long-term, urbanized workers to be the most reliable potential recruits into the party.

But Ukrainians were a minority among the long-term proletarians and skilled workers, and those Ukrainians with Ukrainian as their native language were undoubtedly an even smaller group within this minority. Thus, the strong emphasis on proletarian recruitment after 1927 slowed down the *korenizatsiia* of the party membership in the Ukraine and Belorussia. In 1930, Russians in these republics were "still twice as likely to be communists as were Ukrainians and Belorussians."⁴⁰ Thus, the VKP(b), by stressing the "proletarianization" of the party, undermined its Ukrainianization policy, which – in order to be implemented – would have had to attract more peasants and unskilled workers than highly skilled workers.

Conclusion

In the late 1920s and early 1930s the number of Ukrainians in the main political institutions located in the cities – such as the party – increased dramatically. In 1922, Ukrainians comprised 23.3 percent of KP(b)U membership by nationality, but only 11.3 percent by language.⁴¹ Approximately five years later, on January 10, 1927, Ukrainians comprised 51.9 percent of the membership and candidate-membership by nationality, but only 30.7 percent by language.⁴² By 1933, 60 percent of the membership of the KP(b)U was Ukrainian.⁴³ Although the number of Ukrainians more than doubled between 1922 and 1927 and they became the majority of the party, the number of Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians claiming Ukrainian as their native language *never exceeded a third of the party*. Those who identified themselves as Ukrainians and claimed their native language was Ukrainian were a minority in the party. This discrepancy between Ukrainian cadres and the Ukrainian language exemplified the internal ambiguity in the implementation of Ukrainianization. It was far easier for the party to attract self-proclaimed Ukrainians than Ukrainian speakers; far easier to fill quotas than to overcome the structural legacy of Russification. Ultimately, class considerations influenced the selection process. Recruiting Russified Ukrainians who lived in the cities and worked in the factories was less divisive than enrolling Ukrainian-speaking peasants. Thus, native-speaking Ukrainians during *korenizatsiia* never dominated the rank and file of the KP(b)U, much less the centers of power.

Long-term urban residents received the majority of positions in the trade unions, the bureaucracy, and the party. Those who were bilingual (in Ukrainian and Russian), those who identified themselves as Ukrainians but whose native language was not Ukrainian (usually Russian), and those who had lived in the cities for a long period of time were accepted first into the party and promoted first. Ukrainians whose native language was Ukrainian and had recently arrived in the cities had to wait their turn.

Despite the tensions between proletarianization and Ukrainiani- zation, 300,000 Ukrainians joined the party during the 1920s and early 1930s. This increase strengthened Ukrainianization. The majority of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians and whose native language was Ukrainian *most likely* supported Ukrainianization. And because Ukrainianization raised the prestige of Ukrainian culture, which until the 1920s was identified solely with the countryside, and because it opened up new opportunities solely for Ukrainians, a good number of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians but whose native language was Russian *must also have* supported Ukrainiani- zation. They, after all, were the direct beneficiaries of the conflict between Ukrainianization and proletarianization.

They had the best of both policies – identification with Ukrainians and, as a result of their working-class background or long-term urban residence, political reliability. Consequently, many now acquired a vested interest in Ukrainianization. Russified Ukrainians now began to identify themselves with the Ukraine on a national, not just regional, basis.

Between 1922 and 1933, 500,000 men and women joined the KP(b)U, swamping the old party cadres. The large numbers of new commun- ists, their youth, revolutionary inexperience, and untested political consciousness raised the question of their political dependability during the industrialization and collectivization drives. In addition to this problem the party confronted two more ideological labyrinths, political illiteracy and apathy. As a result of the huge increases in the number of party members, the political quality and the ideological preparation of the new recruits was not as high as the old Bolshevik leadership (honed on minute ideological analyses in the pre- revolutionary underground) desired. Already in 1925 the leadership expressed shock at the political illiteracy of its rank and file:

When we put a question to one comrade, what is the supreme authority in the republic, he replied: the Vesenkha [Supreme Council of the National Economy]. In response to a question concerning the Central Control Commission (TsKK), another comrade replied that it

examines and controls the work of the Central Committee (TsK). Further, we asked a third comrade: who are Comrades Zinoviev and Stalin? He declared that Comrade Zinoviev is in charge of education and Comrade Stalin is a member of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee.⁴⁴

As the cities and the working class attracted millions, the Communist Party sought to expand its ranks from these newcomers, especially from the expanded pool of workers who started work in the factories and mines after the October Revolution (up to two-thirds of the industrial labor force). The new recruits also included members of the urban middle class and young workers who had recently arrived from the countryside.⁴⁵ Unlike the old workers who had experienced the Revolution and civil war and who had firm roots in the working class, the new party cadres had to be "educated in the Leninist spirit."⁴⁶

Their political reliability became an open question. Party leaders claimed that workers were the most progressive class in society and the party was the vanguard of the proletariat. As millions of newcomers entered the cities, factories, and mines, the party wanted to maintain the political certainty of its new recruits by emphasizing their working-class background. But even the mass recruitment of workers watered down the political quality of the party.

Korenizatsiia also threatened the party's political integrity. By espousing the promotion of non-Russians (who for the most part had proved unreliable from the party's standpoint during the Revolution and civil war), this policy threatened the old urban-centered Jewish and Russian cadres. In the Ukrainian republic the number of Russians within the KP(b)U increased, but not at the pace of the Ukrainians. The Russian percentage decreased from 53.6 percent in January 1922 to 23.0 percent in October 1933.⁴⁷ This dramatic erosion during industrialization and Ukrainianization raised not only the specter of political reliability, but political loyalty as well.

Indigenous nationality recruitment into the party was closely intertwined with the post-Lenin succession struggle and with the party's policies toward the countryside. After a series of shifts and compromises in the 1920s, the party sought to enroll long-term proletarians over peasants and non-Russians after 1928. In the non-Russian regions, these long-term proletarians were predominantly Russians or Russified natives.

Due to the peasantization of the working class in the Ukraine, Russified Ukrainian workers became the major beneficiaries of the party's fluctuating policies. Unlike most of their compatriots, Russi-

fied Ukrainians found an avenue for upward mobility. But they were a minority. Not all Ukrainians believed that migration to the cities, work in the factories or mines, housing in overcrowded and squalid quarters, impersonal contact with thousands of strangers, or entry into the party was natural. Becoming "modern" had high emotional costs which most Ukrainians did not want to pay. Until forced collectivization and the famine of 1932–33 completely uprooted them, the countryside – with its poverty and traditions – was home. This was their internalized paradigm.

As the party tightened its grip on the countryside in the late 1920s, it recognized the Ukrainian peasant's ambivalence toward industrialization, urbanization, and modernization. Obsessed by a deep-rooted hatred of the peasant way of life, the VKP(b) promoted the most "modern" Ukrainians (Russified Ukrainians) into its ranks. From the party's standpoint, this was an excellent political move. Given the turbulent social transformation of Soviet society, the center believed that these were the most reliable political cadres in the Ukraine. But by the early 1930s Ukrainianization and industrialization threatened to undermine the political reliability of even these Russified Ukrainian workers.

Part III

Political consequences

6 The transformation of the urban Ukrainian identity

Language is a means of communication and the success of this medium depends not only on the message in and of itself, but also on the level of intimacy, a personal point of reference, of the tool. Employing native languages in the non-Russian regions would be the Soviet Union's most effective means of communicating to its large, multilingual population. In addition to pragmatic considerations, native-language use had a political purpose: to neutralize the hostility of, if not win over, the non-Russian peasants and elites by condemning the Russification of the tsarist past. This policy was also a clear demonstration of respect for the languages and cultures of the recently oppressed and nationally politicized non-Russians.

Following this reasoning, the Soviet government and Communist Party expanded the base of their modernization effort by investing heavily in massive literacy campaigns, teaching the non-Russians to read and write in their own languages.¹ In the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East, the Soviet government Latinized the scripts of the North Caucasian (Circassian, etc.), Turkic, Iranic (Ossetian and Tadzhik), and other languages. After subsidizing the standardization and modernization of the non-Russian languages, the government also expanded primary, secondary, and higher education in the indigenous languages. The number and circulation of native-language newspapers, journals, and books expanded greatly, and in some republics more appeared in the non-Russian languages than the number of periodicals published in Russian or imported from the Russian republic. By stressing language and literacy, the Soviet government in effect created and expanded the number of native-language consumers within each non-Russian region. By establishing a previously non-existent cultural infrastructure, the Soviet government and Communist Party created an independent cultural and intellectual universe for these new language consumers. Only in the

future, when the non-Russians became literate in their own languages, could Russian be introduced.

As an integrated linguistic, cultural, and personnel policy, *korenizatsiia* sought to legitimize multi-culturalism in the Soviet Union without creating multiple centers of power. The implementation of this policy during the dislocation wrought by industrialization raised the prestige of non-Russian languages and cultures and created the social bases necessary for multi-culturalism. The establishment of multiple official languages and the emergence of social bases of support for them guaranteed "long-term or permanent linguistic division." *Korenizatsiia*, in effect, "institutionalized and legitimized linguistic conflict and thus maintained it and perpetuated it."²

By emphasizing the official use of the non-Russian languages, standardizing them, and reforming their alphabets, these new communities alienated those who did not speak or read or write the appropriate non-Russian language. In time, *korenizatsiia* may have excluded other national communities whose members still considered the non-Russian languages inferior to Russian.

Korenizatsiia and the social and psychological dislocation produced by industrialization strengthened the national consciousness of the non-Russians and allowed it to develop spontaneously, beyond the control of the central authorities. The difficulty was not in the emergence of a national consciousness, but in the creation of an increasingly spontaneous and uncontrollable national assertiveness. *Korenizatsiia*, moreover, inadvertently politicized national differences based on language, especially in the expanding cities.

In the Ukraine, as a result of rapid economic growth, the influx of Ukrainian peasants swamped the Russian and Russified urban population and loosened the identities that bound people to the social order.³ The process of forging Russians or "Little Russians" from Ukrainians degenerated. In its place, a new, oftentimes contradictory, "state of mind" emerged in the Ukrainian cities. Large-scale migration to the cities during a period of rapid and turbulent social change and the attraction of more Ukrainians into urban political institutions profoundly influenced both newcomers and old-time residents. This social upheaval destabilized the old order, strained the old social, political, and economic relationships, and necessitated the creation of a new equilibrium.

For the newcomers, cities were psychologically disorienting. At first encounter they were stimulating and challenging, but they also produced new tensions. Urban centers quickly became overcrowded.

They attracted an overwhelming number of people who did not know each other and housed them in areas with countless streets where newcomers could lose their way, both literally and figuratively. Cities segmented roles and created new urban relationships. The peasant community, based on small networks of intense personal relationships where everyone knew each other and spoke the same language, was replaced by a hostile environment containing thousands of unfamiliar people who spoke different languages. The large towns and cities deepened the newcomers' sense of rootlessness and highlighted the triumph of the impersonal world over the familiar and personal world.

If life in the countryside followed the order of the seasons, life in the cities was confusing and oftentimes frightening. Divorced from the soil, the peasant urbanites had to adjust to the new rhythms of the cities. And this adjustment was painfully difficult. Urban alienation raised troubling questions: "Who am I? Where do I belong?"

These questions reflected the success of the Soviet modernization effort, which unhinged the social and national identities of the old order. But political environments, like nature, abhor a vacuum. New hierarchies of identities had to be established. Due to the increase in the numbers of Ukrainians in the cities and urban political institutions, the cities became less hostile toward those who identified themselves as Ukrainians.⁴

At the same time, the party reaffirmed the importance of Ukrainianization.⁵ In May 1925, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) removed Emmanuel Kvirng, the General Secretary of the KP(b)U since April 1923, and replaced him with Lazar Kaganovich, who advanced Ukrainianization more vigorously. The implementation of this policy, with its promotion of the Ukrainian language, literacy campaigns, and the Ukrainian-language print revolution, expanded the boundaries of a new identity.

Ukrainian became the dominant language in the educational system and mass media. By the 1929–30 school year, 2,400,000 children (83.2 percent of the total primary school students)⁶ were enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools; by 1933, 88.5 percent.⁷ This was very impressive, since Ukrainian-language schools did not exist before the revolution. Although Ukrainian displaced Russian at a slower pace in the higher educational institutions than in the primary or secondary schools, even in these institutions significant gains occurred. While the pedagogical and agricultural institutions were nearly all Ukrainianized, only 60 percent of the industrial and technical schools were Ukrainianized by 1930.⁸

With the introduction of mass education, the literacy rates rose, especially in Ukrainian (see chapter 3). The percentage of those literate in the critical 16-to-50 age group increased from 74.9 percent in 1930 to 96.0 percent by October 1, 1933.⁹ The rise in Ukrainian literacy occurred at the same time as did a Ukrainian print revolution. The party and the Soviet Ukrainian government ordered newspapers, journals, and book publishers to publish in Ukrainian. Not only did the circulation of the main Ukrainian-language newspapers increase, but even newspapers published in the factories for internal use changed their language to Ukrainian: from 36.0 percent in 1929 to 72.0 percent in 1930.¹⁰ The government also increased the circulation and transformed the operating language of journals. Of the 328 journals published in the Ukraine in 1930, 278 (or 84.0 percent) were published in the Ukrainian language.¹¹

The language of books also changed. By 1926 the Ukrainian language began to dominate the book market in the number of titles, the number of copies, and the number of copies per title. All in all, the Soviet Ukrainian government published more than two-and-a-half times the number of Ukrainian-language book titles between 1923 and 1928 than during the first 120 years of modern Ukrainian publishing (1798–1917). During the 1929–30 fiscal year, 80.0 percent of all book titles were published in Ukrainian and the number of books on technical subjects published in that language also increased.¹² Despite the overall gains *vis-à-vis* the Russian language, a linguistic “division of labor” emerged in regard to the types of books published. Generally, the Ukrainian language dominated *belles-lettres*, the humanities, and mass-produced political brochures, while Russian dominated scholarly, scientific, and documentary publications.¹³

Nevertheless, by the late 1920s the Ukrainian language was becoming a significant factor in the cities, even in the technical, medical, and party schools in the Ukraine. The opera, operettas, theaters, concerts, radio, cultural-educational work in the trade unions, and the mass media were now conducted in Ukrainian. Cities were now in the process of becoming agents of Ukrainianization, not Russification. Some townspeople – by no means all – adjusted to this situation. And rumors spread that even prostitutes began to speak Ukrainian.¹⁴

The Soviet Ukrainian government’s emphasis on education and literacy in Ukrainian and on developing Ukrainian-language newspapers, books, and journals established and enlarged a Ukrainian-reading public, which took on a new and dynamic urban national identity. By emphasizing the equality of the Ukrainian and Russian

languages, Ukrainianization raised the former language's literary dignity and status. The promotion of Ukrainian in the urban centers eroded the linguistic divisions between the Russian-speaking cities and the Ukrainian-speaking countryside. The Soviet Ukrainian sponsorship of the codification of orthography, lexical enrichment, and general standardization of Ukrainian and the acceptance of these changes by Ukrainian scholars outside the boundaries of the USSR in the late 1920s officially defined the boundaries of this language's reading public.¹⁵ As linguists and scholars emphasized the differences between Ukrainian and Russian and as more people learned to read and to use the increasingly differentiated Ukrainian, this Ukrainian-language group of readers became a self-contained community, different from the Russian one. By 1929 one Soviet analyst claimed that few who spoke only Russian were able to understand contemporary Ukrainian.¹⁶

For the first time millions of people began to perceive themselves as Ukrainians (not just peasants) and to imagine their oneness. Because the members of "even the smallest [nation] will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion,"¹⁷ the spread of Ukrainian literacy and the Ukrainian-language print revolution helped these readers form an abstract idea of themselves as members of a single Ukrainian nation containing 23 million men and women.

The establishment of the Ukrainian SSR created a republic with physical boundaries. The Ukrainian-language print revolution generated psychological boundaries. Ukrainianization, mass education, literacy campaigns, linguistic standardization and orthographic changes divided residents of the Ukraine into Ukrainian-language, multi-lingual, and non-Ukrainian readers and speakers. In essence these programs divided people into insiders and outsiders.

The Ukrainian-language print revolution created a large group of people who conceived themselves to be "a community, a deep and horizontal comradeship, a fraternity."¹⁸ This group of readers then integrated the previously fractured rural and urban worlds Ukrainians had inhabited by establishing a pan-Ukrainian concept of a Ukrainian-speaking community. And in an age of popular sovereignty and national self-determination, only members of this group possessed the right to determine their collective future. The medium, in this case the Ukrainian language, *was* the message. The KP(b)U's and the Soviet

Ukrainian government's introduction of the Ukrainian language into the heretofore Russified cities and urban political institutions raised its status and enlarged the pool of those who used Ukrainian. Ukrainization in effect asserted that one could be modern, urban, and Ukrainian.

But this new urban Ukrainian identity was not universally accepted. National identity formation differed from region to region, from city to city, depending on its ties to industry and its proximity to the Russian republic. As individuals confronted the urban world and its modernizing institutions, they combined inherited economic, religious, class, linguistic, and cultural traditions in varying degrees. Their backgrounds and the length of time they spent in cities helped determine why different urban groups responded in different ways to the national transformation of the cities. Maintaining, changing, or reaffirming national identities and behaviors were "not fixed by interests, but shaped by relationships."¹⁹ These clusters of linkages and associations were contingent and accidental. Above all, national identity was (and still remains) a "state of mind" rather than a state of modernization.²⁰ In the 1920s, different individuals and groups formulated different "states of mind."

Russians

Many Russians in the cities experienced psychological shock at losing their cultural and political hegemony during *korenizatsiia*. Even after the painful lessons of the Revolution and civil war, many refused to "psychologically restructure" themselves²¹ or to respect the Ukrainian language and culture. Some considered Ukrainian to be "pure humbug" and believed that Ukrainization would pass and that in its place a "single, indivisible USSR" would emerge.²² Hryhory Kostiuk recounted a conversation he had with a former resident of Kiev:

Lady: "I was told that now in Kiev the opera is in Ukrainian. Is this true?"

Kostiuk: "Oh, yes, madame, everything is in Ukrainian."

Lady (with emotion): "Oh, my God, how is that possible? And Boris Godunov sings and speaks in Ukrainian? And "Faust" and "Aida" are in Ukrainian?"

Kostiuk: "Yes, madame. All operas."

Lady: "But this is unnatural!"²³

What is natural and unnatural is a matter of experience and perspective. The Ukrainian-language opera attracted attention due to its novelty; the crowds followed.²⁴ It soon became a common-place event and, as a result, established its own legitimacy and raised the prestige of Ukrainian culture. This rise in prestige, however, did not persuade many Russians to become Ukrainian.²⁵

Some Russians accepted, however reluctantly, that their world had changed. Russian or Russified civil servants attending Ukrainian-language courses had pragmatic reasons for making peace with Ukrainianization. They wanted to eat, not to decline verbs in a new language.²⁶ But in order to do the former they had to pass a series of Ukrainian-language examinations. Bureaucrats attended two-hour Ukrainian-language classes twice per week during working hours. Later a commission (consisting of a representative of the education section, the language instructor, and a trade union representative) would examine the students. A person who did not pass the test could not remain at work in his institution. Only the directors of institutions and officials on temporary assignment in the Ukraine were exempted from these examinations.²⁷

According to one Ukrainian-language instructor from this period, many Russians "considered Ukrainianization to be a seasonal and an unserious matter . . . Very few failed the tests, although very few received the first (the highest) category."²⁸ After passing the Ukrainian language examination, a significant percentage of bureaucrats, however, lost their command of the language. In Kiev, for example, approximately 15 percent of those who passed the Ukrainian test soon "forgot the language."²⁹ Because of the difficulty of learning an increasingly differentiated language late in life, the overwhelming majority of Russians were therefore indifferent or hostile to the party's pragmatic need to take root in the non-Russian regions.

But even urban Russians who supported the party's nationalities policy, but who did not learn Ukrainian, increasingly isolated themselves in the newly Ukrainianized cities. They (as did long-term Russian settlers in the Baltic republics in the late 1980s) became powerless and psychologically disarmed. One worker complained in 1926:

They made me an illiterate person from a literate one . . . For fifteen years of my conscious life . . . I participated in party organizations on the territory of the Ukraine, listened to lectures, gave talks at meetings, and read the newspapers. I lived among Russian workers and suddenly we stopped understanding the lectures, newspapers, etc., even the inscriptions in the movies . . .³⁰

Inasmuch as the Russian language and culture were still powerful in the Ukrainian cities at the end of the 1920s, this worker exaggerated his situation.³¹ Nevertheless, he raised a serious point. The mass media and the party's and Soviet Ukrainian government's public pronouncements were given increasingly in Ukrainian. And it became obvious to this worker and his friends that the future belonged to Russian-Ukrainian bilinguals or to Ukrainian-speakers. By dividing those who read and spoke Ukrainian from those who would or could not, Ukrainianization created winners and losers. Many Russians lost out when they refused to or found it too difficult to learn Ukrainian late in life.

Peasants

The migration of millions of industrially unprepared peasants into the cities only exacerbated the social tensions and contradictions of this period. Because of their large numbers and recent arrival in the cities, the Russified urban environment could not absorb them, even if the government had made efforts to integrate them. Few peasants who became workers could acculturate, much less assimilate, themselves quickly to the industrial ethos.³² As such, the cities initially reinforced this group's "peasantness" – the behavioral patterns and assumptions associated with rural life – and their primordial identities. The subsequent labor instability prevented their complete psychological transition from the countryside to the city.

Pre-migration conditions, the transitional experience in moving, the migrants' backgrounds, and their reception in the cities determined how well they adapted to their new environment. Their age on arrival in the city, their education and qualifications, their literacy and degree of exposure to the mass media, their urban social networks, and length of residence in the cities also determined their reaction to the cities.³³ Comparing and modifying "attitudes, values and behavior patterns, acquiring a knowledge of the new society's institutions and developing new social networks, all take time."³⁴

This process often encompasses several generations. According to one anthropologist, there "may be one or more hiatuses between the point of departure and that of culmination. While it is relatively easy to discern the beginning of migration for a given family, it is difficult to anticipate its completion."³⁵

For some peasants, migration reflected hope; for others – despair.³⁶ Forced by economic or political reasons to migrate, many peasants

found migration and adaptation to the cities and to city life confusing and alienating. Peasants were anxious, frustrated, and disoriented. They experienced daily humiliations by the city's long-term residents. Adjusting to city life was difficult, as demonstrated by the protagonist Stefan Radchenko in Valerian Pidmohyl'nyi's *Misto*. The village was dark and oppressive, but the city, despite the hero's anticipation, was not the promised land. Instead, it was "a horrible mistake of history."³⁷ Although the author asserted that one "should not despise the city, but conquer it,"³⁸ in the end the city devoured Radchenko and he attempted to return to his village. His experiences and disappointments were typical.

In one of his talks in the 1920s, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, the head of the Central Rada who returned to the Soviet Ukraine in 1924, asserted that only "a nationally conscious and cultured peasant class, entering the mills, factories and mines, will not fall victim to Russification, but will be able to influence the new environment and as a result to create a true Ukrainian working class."³⁹

But not all peasants were as nationally conscious as the Ukrainian intellectuals wished them to be. Despite their heightened awareness of their differences with the Russian White forces and Bolsheviks in the course of the civil war, peasants did not possess a systematic self-conception of their national identity, nor did they participate in Ukrainian culture. Many did not know who they were. The village existed outside of culture, an urban phenomenon. Folklore, not culture, dominated the countryside.⁴⁰ But upon reaching the cities the peasants undoubtedly encountered people who spoke different languages than they did and viewed themselves as superior to the newcomers. These confrontations and the urban process of socialization and education raised the level of national consciousness for the newcomers.

The increasing importance of national identity in cities was not simply a survival of rural practices, not the carrying of a fully formed identity from the countryside into the cities, but a "direct response to the exigencies of survival in a competitive urban economy."⁴¹ The transition from their primordial identities to the new Ukrainian urban identities was a necessary psychological response to the anomie and frustrations of the cities, which demanded a clearer sense of national identity. Ukrainianization provided the means by which inarticulate peasant identities became pronounced urban Ukrainian identities. The peasants became the base of the new social pyramid; Russified Ukrainians attracted to Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian intellectuals became part of the cone.

Russified Ukrainians

Russified Ukrainians constituted a very important group in the cities. They identified themselves as Ukrainians, but admitted that their native language was Russian, not Ukrainian. During the late 1920s, by maneuvering between the Russian and the Ukrainian worlds, they had the best of both. Because they spoke Russian (however poorly) and because they had resided in the cities for long periods of time, the authorities viewed them as politically reliable. At the same time, by identifying themselves as Ukrainians, they enhanced their employment and promotional opportunities and had much to gain from Ukrainianization.

In the course of the 1920s, many Russified Ukrainians, especially workers in the Donbass, encountered Ukrainian culture for the first time. As the number of Ukrainians in the labor force grew, the emergence and development of Ukrainian culture piqued their interest. By the spring of 1930, Ukrainians comprised 70.0 percent of all miners and 51.5 percent of the total labor force in that region; 44.0 percent of the total industrial labor force in the republic listed Ukrainian as their native language.⁴²

By the end of the decade the Soviet government introduced the working class in the Donbass, Nikolaev, and Dnipropetrovs'ke to books, music, opera, and theatrical productions in Ukrainian.⁴³ Many workers became interested in reading Ukrainian-language books, especially Ukrainian classics.⁴⁴ But because less than 10 percent of the books in many trade union libraries consisted of Ukrainian-language books,⁴⁵ worker demand could not be satisfied.⁴⁶ The Ukrainian-language theater also made a positive impression on most workers. Seeing plays in Ukrainian for the first time, they compared them favorably with the contemporary Russian theater.⁴⁷

But not all Russified Ukrainians accepted Ukrainianization's efforts to integrate them with the Ukrainian culture. Despite possible advantages, many still believed in the superiority of Russian culture. In his memoirs, Victor Kravchenko described his reaction to the changes in the Kharkov Airplane Construction Institute, where the authorities ordered all instruction and examinations to be in Ukrainian:

In theory we Ukrainians in the student body should have been pleased. In practice we were as distressed by the innovation as the non-Ukrainian minority. Even those who, like myself, had spoken Ukrainian from childhood, were not accustomed to its use as a medium of study. Several of our best professors were utterly demora-

lized by the linguistic switch-over. Worst of all, our local tongue simply had not caught up with modern knowledge; its vocabulary was unsuited to the purposes of electrotechnics, chemistry, aerodynamics, physics, and most other sciences . . . [We] suffered the new burden, referred to Russian textbooks on the sly and in private made fun of the *opera bouffe* nationalism.

What should have been a free right was converted, in its application, into an oppressive duty. The use of our own language was not merely allowed, it was made obligatory. Hundreds of men and women who could not master it were dismissed from government posts. It became almost counter-revolutionary to speak anything but Ukrainian in public. Children from Russified homes were tortured and set back in their studies by what was for them a foreign language.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, Russified Ukrainians played an important role in raising the status of Ukrainian in the cities and in the urban political institutions. An important segment of Ukrainians who joined the KP(b)U after 1922, for example, consisted of Russified Ukrainians (see chapter 5).

In the wake of industrialization and collectivization, millions of peasants streamed into the Russified Ukrainian cities and transformed the dominant national orientation of the working class from Russian to Ukrainian. As a result of the growing numbers of Ukrainians in the trade unions and of the Ukrainianization policy, Ukrainian rose in status. Russified Ukrainian workers became interested in discovering the Ukrainian language and culture. By 1928, at congresses of metallists, miners, and chemists, speakers often spoke in Ukrainian. According to one journalist on the scene, the audience listened to them and did not "react, as it did only recently, with laughter."⁴⁹ By the late 1920s, a significant number of Russified Ukrainians perceived that identifying themselves as Ukrainians was enjoyable and beneficial. The split between the heretofore Ukrainian-speaking countryside and the Russian-speaking cities and industrial centers was narrowing.

Ukrainian intellectuals

Ukrainian intellectuals, whether born and raised in the city or recently arrived from the farm, recognized that they were at the dawn of a new era. Oftentimes they came from families with conflicting Russian and Ukrainian loyalties.⁵⁰ As members of the Ukrainian-language community, they clearly perceived that the Ukrainian identity would become increasingly an urban and modern one.

Not only were Ukrainian intellectuals the most clear-sighted in imagining and describing this identity, but they (as Russian-Ukrainian bilinguals) were also the most likely beneficiaries of the Ukrainianization's promotion policies. One memoirist, Kostiuk, described his generation in this period:

During our years at the university we worked out a certain aversion to Ukrainian ethnographism and provincialism. We were not against ethnography as a scholarly discipline. We were against ethnographism as a psychological category of Ukrainian cultural and national-political thought. No one among us ever wore embroidered shirts . . . Our women friends never embellished [themselves] with pieces of embroidery or parts of a Ukrainian woman's costume. We considered all of these national attributes to be old-fashioned. Once they were nice and romantic for us, now they had to be collected in museums. We perceived and loved the modern-day Ukraine with its Ukrainian-speaking polytechnical, medical, mathematical, physicist, and metallurgical students, who were beginning their careers, filling the leading positions in state and industrial centers and institutions. Educated in the Ukrainian technical schools, they would spread their modern Ukrainian views to all corners of the Ukraine . . .⁵¹

Ukrainian communists interpreted these processes in a similar manner. Mykola Skrypnyk, the Commissar of Education, agreed with Kostiuk's assessment. He viewed the Ukraine as a modern, urban, and industrial nation within the Soviet framework:

The Ukrainian culture is now not only the culture of song, music, dance, theater, literature, cooperatives, and school teachers. The Ukrainian culture is now a culture of factories and enterprises, the culture of Dneprostroi and the Donbass. This is the culture of millions of new members of the proletarian class. This is the culture of collectivized agriculture and the socialist reconstruction of the entire country.⁵²

Industrialization and Ukrainianization overcame the political, social and economic backwardness of Ukrainians. Urban growth, the emergence of Ukrainian cities and a Ukrainian working class, literacy and schooling in the Ukrainian language and the establishment of Ukrainian cultural institutions equalized the relationship between the Russified cities and the Ukrainian countryside and promoted a modern pan-Ukrainian national identity.

But these processes produced tensions. They overturned the Russian dominance of Ukrainian cities and provoked conflict, especially among those who were literate and who hoped to enter bureaucratic, professional, and managerial occupations.

The Soviet industrial revolution of the 1920s demanded a literate population; in return it awarded employment not only in new factories and mines, but also in the sprawling bureaucracy charged to oversee industrialization. The Soviet system offered equal opportunities for advancement to all who could master literacy. But, by promoting the equality of the Russian and non-Russian languages in the non-Russian republics, the party leadership unintentionally favored Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speakers.

Korenizatsiia made the Russian and non-Russian languages equal. But equalization of previously dominant and subordinate languages is difficult to achieve. Equalization of languages in effect often transforms many previously monolingual positions into bilingual positions. But not everyone can or wants to become bilingual. Competition between the Russian and Ukrainian languages became exacerbated because it was more than a conflict over the Ukrainization of bureaucratic forms. It was a struggle over the composition of the bureaucracy itself.

Since more Ukrainians than Russians were bilingual, measures favoring bilinguals benefited Ukrainians. Because languages are difficult to learn, to change, or to falsify once past childhood and because Russians emotionally resisted having to learn a language they considered inferior, a number of Russians (the total number is difficult to ascertain) were dismissed for refusing to learn Ukrainian.⁵³ Ukrainians would most likely replace them and eventually dominate the urban bureaucratic institutions.

Ukrainianization in effect made some potential state employees (Ukrainians) more equal than others. This preferential policy reversed the established order of dominance in the cities. Not surprisingly, it alienated the monolingual and non-Ukrainian speakers and provoked a Russian backlash.

Conclusion

By the end of the 1920s, the urban revolution began to harvest its crop. Before this period a Ukrainian identity existed, but it was centered in the countryside. By attracting millions into the cities in a very short period of time, rapid industrialization neutralized the process of urban assimilation to the Russian culture. Peasants carried their inarticulate Ukrainian identities into the cities and Ukrainization molded, standardized, and modernized them into a single identity. By means of the Ukrainian-language educational system

and the Ukrainian-language mass media, peasants became Ukrainians.

This new identity was now centered in the cities, reflecting the Ukrainian transition from marginality to majority in the urban centers. Most importantly, the symbiotic relationship between rapid urban growth and Ukrainianization unhinged the old relationships and hierarchies in the cities. The evolution of new ones, especially the emergence of a small (but disproportionately influential) group of Russian–Ukrainian bilingual intellectuals and the attraction of Russified Ukrainians to the Ukrainian culture, had profound implications. In the end, the grounding of the Ukrainian elites in the cities challenged not only the monopoly position of the heretofore dominant Russian language, but also the Russian *political* hegemony.

7 The ideological challenge of Ukrainian national communism

Ukrainianization and the demands of industrialization created a large new intelligentsia and new managerial and political cadres. Catapulted into important positions at a relatively young age, an important group within this new elite committed themselves both to the revolution and to the expansion of the Ukrainian identity.

Present at the creation of an unfettered Ukrainian culture, encouraged and subsidized by the Soviet state, members of the new Ukrainian intelligentsia became – in effect – cultural engineers. They would have a decisive voice in developing a new Ukrainian cultural universe, national in form, but socialist in content. Thousands of decisions, significant and insignificant, had to be made by these new cultural leaders. Most importantly, they were to decide the ends and means of Ukrainian cultural development. How should it develop? What kind of culture should it be? What models should it follow?

The new Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia, which included the poet Pavlo Tychyna, the playwright Mykola Kulish, the theater director Les Kurbas, and the filmmaker Alexander Dovzhenko, pondered these questions. Other members of this new intelligentsia emphasized economic and political matters.

These new cadres now insisted that the VKP(b) treat the KP(b)U and the Ukrainian SSR as equal partners, not subordinates, within the framework of the USSR. Exemplified by the views of Mykola Khvyly'ovyi, Oleksander Shums'kyi, Mykhailo Volobuiev, and Mykola Skrypnyk, they sought to equalize the cultural, economic and political ties between the RSFSR and the UkrSSR by defending the Ukrainian cultural and historical heritage. These Ukrainian national communists attempted to establish a Soviet Ukrainian state, "based on Ukrainian national culture but led by the Communist Party and oriented toward the achievement of Communist political, economic, and social goals."¹

In the 1920s, these four prominent party members presented

different frames of a vision increasingly at odds with Stalin's accumulation of power, centralization, and Russocentrism.² Their defense of Ukrainian prerogatives contained cultural, economic, and political dimensions. Taken together, conflict over these issues led to a struggle for power between members of the indigenous elite and the center. This conflict was the natural (but unintended) consequence of the marriage between the party's preferential policies and socialist development. It led to a crisis of legitimacy in the multi-national Soviet state dominated by Russians.

Cultural priorities

At the beginning of the 1920s, these new Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals and communists confronted several major interrelated problems: What kind of Soviet Ukrainian culture would they establish? What would be its boundaries? Most importantly, how would they establish a Ukrainian proletarian culture when a Ukrainian proletariat did not exist?

Mykola Khvył'ovyi, the most popular Soviet Ukrainian writer of the 1920s, attempted to answer these questions. As Khvył'ovyi interpreted the situation, the basic problem confronting Ukrainian communism was how to implement a Ukrainian cultural revolution in a republic which possessed a small and ethnically alien working class. In the early 1920s the absence of a Ukrainian proletariat impeded the success of Ukrainianization. Overwhelmingly composed of Russians, Russified Ukrainians, and Jews, the working class in the Ukraine was estranged from, hostile to, or indifferent to Ukrainian culture. Despite this problem, the working class was the very foundation of the KP(b)U's beliefs; consequently, the Ukrainian party had to guarantee the working class's ideological supremacy. But the proletariat could never achieve ideological hegemony in the Ukraine unless it mastered Ukrainian culture. How were Ukrainianization and the proletariat's ideological supremacy to be reconciled?

This social and political Gordian knot had a solution. Khvył'ovyi suggested that the Ukrainian cultural revolution could not produce any substantial results until the proletariat learned the Ukrainian language and acquired an appreciation for Ukrainian culture. Without a Ukrainian proletariat, the Ukrainianization of the proletariat was the only way for workers to take charge of Ukrainian culture.

The second major theme in Khvył'ovyi's works concerned the boundaries of Ukrainian culture and the anxiety over Russian influ-

ence. Unlike Russian writers, who were committed to Bolshevik state-building in the 1920s, Ukrainian writers were involved in nation-building. Ukrainian writers had to combat not only the cultural underdevelopment of the countryside, but also the underdevelopment of its national consciousness after centuries of tsarist oppression. With the Soviet encouragement of Ukrainian cultural development, Ukrainian literature was reborn: Ukrainian-language writers were no longer persecuted, Ukrainian-language publishing houses were established, and the Soviet literacy campaigns of the 1920s created a receptive audience for all Ukrainian-language writers. Now Ukrainian literature could develop its own voice and freely experiment without fear of persecution.

This freedom to experiment, according to Khvyli'ovyi, should have no bounds. Inasmuch as the Ukraine was an equal partner with Russia within the USSR, Ukrainian literature should follow its own path of development. He then declared:

Our political union must not be confused with literature. Ukrainian poetry must run away as fast as it can from Russian literature and its styles. The Poles could never have produced a Mickiewicz had they not repudiated any orientation toward Russian art. The essence of the matter is that Russian literature weighted us down for centuries, as the master of the situation who accustomed our psyche to slavish imitation. For our young art to nourish itself on [Russian literature] would thus mean stunting its growth. We know the ideas of the proletariat without Muscovite art; on the contrary, as representatives of a young nation, we will feel these ideas faster and pour them out sooner in a responsible way. Our orientation is toward the art of Western Europe, toward its style, toward its reception.³

This orientation *towards* Europe was specific: "not Spengler's Europe, which is declining and which we all hate, but the Europe of great civilizations – the Europe of Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, Marx, etc."⁴ This was a call for the Ukrainian intelligentsia to open itself to other influences and to displace Russian literature as its only model.

Khvyli'ovyi opposed all cultural influences coming from Russia, and advocated that the Soviet government should support this endeavor. He asserted that the party and government had to maintain a consistent posture. If the party recognized the Ukrainian national renaissance of the 1920s, then to support the development of Russian culture in the Ukraine was counter-revolutionary.⁵ He was alarmed by the party's inability and unwillingness to prevent the spread of the views of the

advocates of Russian supremacy, of alleged Russian hegemony of language, literature, and culture. He believed that if the party did not leash these views, a clash would occur between the Russians and Ukrainians, and between the Russians and the other non-Russian peoples, who having been liberated from colonialism by the October Revolution, would never wish to return to their previous status:

The social processes induced by the New Economic Policy logically lead to a conflict between two cultures. Ukrainian society, once reinforced, will never agree with its actual, if not *de jure* decreed hegemon, the Russian competitor. Consequently, we can not go far with empty phrases. Our task is to prevent this conflict. In other words: we ought to side immediately with the active young Ukrainian society, which represents not only the peasant but also the worker, and thus we should end once and for all the counter-revolutionary idea of building up Russian culture in the Ukraine. All the talk about the equality of languages is nothing but a concealed desire to cultivate that which will never be resurrected. In other words, we ourselves make barriers to socialist construction. We must reject this as soon as possible. By not doing so, we will accelerate within the Ukrainian society a complete ideological break with our side.⁶

For the Ukraine to have its own Soviet culture did not mean that culture would cease to be communist and proletarian, he added. Although the Ukraine was in a political union with Russia, the Ukrainian path to socialism would be somewhat different from Russia's.⁷ He reasoned that if the Ukraine had really been liberated from imperialism then it should develop independently of Russia. According to one analyst of this period, "This seemed to him no more than a corollary of the party's own nationality policy."⁸

Khvyl'ovyi did in fact revive the theory of the struggle of two cultures by emphasizing the dangers of relying on the Russian cultural model. By emphasizing these dangers he attempted to distance Ukrainian literature and culture from the Russian. But in contrast to Lebed's theory, Khvyl'ovyi sought to raise the level of Ukrainian culture to a level equal to that of Russian culture. In order to accomplish this, the cities, and especially the urban working class, had to reflect the national composition of the countryside. And the Ukrainian countryside had to become aware that the working class, not the peasantry, was the model for the future. Khvyl'ovyi's analysis did not anticipate how quickly the urban working class would change its national composition. And when it did, this radical transformation reinforced the importance of Khvyl'ovyi's views.

It is difficult to measure to what extent Ukrainians accepted Khvyl'ovyi's views on the independence of Ukrainian culture and its need to distance itself from Russian culture. His views undoubtedly appealed to a significant number of Ukrainians, especially those members of the creative intelligentsia seriously concerned with establishing cultural boundaries.

In addition to the support given Khvyl'ovyi within the Ukrainian SSR, his views were enthusiastically received in the Ukrainian nationalist press in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Khvyl'ovyi's criticism of the implementation of Soviet nationality policy in the Ukraine nullified Soviet irredentist claims directed toward the 7 million Ukrainians living in these countries and embarrassed the Soviet regime. Khvyl'ovyi's views had serious political consequences, both inside and outside the boundaries of the USSR. They drew sharp, though not public, criticism from Stalin himself. "Khvyl'ovyi's demand," Stalin wrote on April 26, 1926:

for the "immediate de-Russification of the proletariat" in the Ukraine, his opinion that the "Ukrainian party must get away from Russian literature and its style as fast as possible," his statement that "the ideas of the proletariat are known to us without Moscow's art," his infatuation with the idea that the "young" Ukrainian intelligentsia has some kind of messianic role to play, his ludicrous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics – all this and much else like it sounds (cannot but sound!) more than strange nowadays from the mouth of a Ukrainian communist. At a time when the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are in sympathy with "Moscow," the citadel of the international revolutionary movement and of Leninism; at a time when the proletarians of Western Europe look with admiration at the flag that flies over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvyl'ovyi has nothing better to say in favor of "Moscow" than to call on Ukrainian leaders to get away from "Moscow" as fast as possible! And that is called internationalism! What is to be said of other Ukrainian intellectuals, those of the non-communist camp, if communists begin to talk, and not only to talk, but even to write in our Soviet press, in Khvyl'ovyi's language?⁹

Less than two months after Stalin's letter, Khvyl'ovyi was bitterly denounced at the June 1926 plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U. The plenum accused the writer of eight separate deviations, ranging from misunderstanding the proletariat's role as "an active factor, active leader, and creative participant in the cultural construction in the Ukraine" to disseminating the ideas of Ukrainian fascism.¹⁰

Khvyl'ovyi was accused of reviving Lebed's theory of the struggle of two cultures, which had been condemned by the party in 1923. The July 1927 plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U also condemned Khvyl'ovyi for "playing into the hands of the forces hostile to the Soviet Ukraine."¹¹

In February 1928, Khvyl'ovyi sent a letter to the editor of *Komunist* and admitted that he had "revived" the theory of the struggle of two cultures.¹² He managed, however, to condemn his ideas in such a manner as to preserve the essence of his arguments: that in this struggle between Russian and Ukrainian cultures, the party should sympathize with the latter because it will eventually play the hegemonic role in the Ukraine.¹³ He confessed to every deviation attributed to him, but he claimed that he was misunderstood and that his main errors were due to bad phraseology rather than politically incorrect ideas.

Although Khvyl'ovyi's career as an independent literary force ended, he remained an active member of the Ukrainian literary community until 1933. In protest against the growing constraints on Soviet Ukrainian literature, he committed suicide on May 13, 1933. Party apparatchiks later accused him of being a participant in one of many "counter-revolutionary nationalist organizations" in the Ukraine.

Economic priorities

The second dimension of the struggle for power concerned economic issues, especially investment priorities. How should the Communist Party promote the equalization of economically diverse regions over the immense Soviet land-mass? How could the Soviet government overcome the legacy of tsarist colonialism by economic means? Who should decide economic priorities and investment policies? The union republics or the center?

Building on Soviet Ukrainian scholarship, Mykhailo Volobuev argued for a fundamental reappraisal of Russo-Ukrainian economic relations. Born in 1900, Mykhailo Volobuev was a communist of Russian origin, a lecturer at the Institute of National Economy, and a research associate at the All-Ukrainian Pedagogical Research Institute in Kharkov during the 1920s. He was also head of Holovpolitovsita, a large branch of the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education, responsible for all adult education and literacy schools.¹⁴ He was an important official, and the publication of his views in the Ukraine's main party

journal provides evidence that Volobuiev's views reflected those of a significant part of political leadership that wanted increased autonomy for the Ukrainian SSR.

Volobuiev presented his views in two articles, published in early 1928 in *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, the official journal of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U.¹⁵ These articles immediately became controversial and were instantaneously condemned by the KP(b)U.

Volobuiev emphasized that the Ukrainian SSR was an economic entity. He criticized Soviet central planners who used terms such as "the South," "the Southern region," "the Southwest," "Southern European Russia," or the "South Russian economy," instead of saying "the Ukraine." This, he argued, was not a simple disagreement over terminology, but rather the failure of the central planners to understand the history of pre-revolutionary Russo-Ukrainian economic relations and the consequences of Soviet nationality policy enunciated in 1923. This policy sought not only to promote non-Russian languages and cadres, but also to establish industrial bases in the non-Russian regions.

In order to understand the economic relationship between the Ukraine and Russia, Volobuiev had to define the nature of colonialism. Russia, he noted, had been a semi-colony of Western capitalism, but this situation made it no less a colonial power in relation to its own colonies. The most popular model of colonialism posited that a more advanced "metropolis" ruled over relatively backward colonial nations to which it exported capital. But Finland and Poland, Volobuiev reminded his readers, had been more advanced than Great Russia and, despite their colonial dependence, had also been exporters of capital.

As this example demonstrated, a distinction had to be made between colonies to which the metropolis exported capital and from which it imported raw materials, and colonies that possessed their own manufacturing industries, exported capital, and imported raw materials from the metropolis. Despite the reversal of economic roles in the case of Finland and Poland, these countries did not cease to be colonies after the October Revolution. But now they presented a different type of colony.

Volobuiev then drew a fundamental distinction between types of colonies based on their level of development. He designated the more advanced, capital-exporting ones as colonies of the European type, and the more backward raw materials-producing ones, colonies of the Asiatic type. Imperial Russia had ruled over both types of colonies.

Finland, Poland, and the Ukraine represented the first model; Turkestan and Transcaucasia represented the second.¹⁶

The Ukraine had not always been a colony of the European type. Volobuiev then recorded the Ukraine's development from a colony of the Asiatic type to one of the European type. During this economic evolution, Volobuiev claimed, the Ukrainian economy had never merged with the Russian economy. Although dependent on the Russian economy, the Ukrainian economy remained a distinct entity.

Volobuiev then turned his attention to the Ukraine's position during the last years of the Russian Empire in an attempt to show how colonialism had distorted Ukrainian economic development. By examining several sectors of the Ukrainian economy, Volobuiev demonstrated a pattern of economic irrationality that left the Ukraine's internal market firmly in Russian hands. This distorted pattern of economic development occurred, he explained, because the extraordinarily rapid industrialization of the Ukraine during the late nineteenth century had been fueled by West European capitalism more interested in profit than in promoting the balanced development of the Ukrainian economy. Yet, even this distorted capitalist development, Volobuiev asserted, had promoted the national consolidation of the Ukraine as a distinct economic organism.

This discussion led Volobuiev to his main concern: how to overcome the legacy of colonialism in the Ukraine after the revolution. Of Russia's former European colonies, Poland and Finland had become juridically independent (Volobuiev was careful to point out the relative nature of such independence), while the Ukraine had entered the Soviet Union as an independent republic equal to the other founding republics of the USSR. The Ukraine, as the sole former colony of the European type, had different needs from the other Soviet republics which had been Asiatic type colonies. But official Soviet pronouncements on nationalities policy had been composed with the concerns of the colonies of the Asiatic type in mind.

Volobuiev emphasized that the Ukraine was different from the other Soviet republics because it had been a colony of the European type, and so this legacy had to be approached differently. Because the USSR was, in its internal economic life, more than one country, it was a socialist economic system consisting of equal national economic organisms. Within this socialist commonwealth, economic development faced the task of fostering the *relative* (and Volobuiev emphasized the word) autarky of its parts. Such relative autarky under socialism would not be based on the antagonism characteristic of

capitalistic relationships, but on economic cooperation among equals. Inside the USSR national economies had to be treated as separate units – potential, in the case of the former colonies of the Asiatic type; actual, in the case of Russia and the Ukraine.

This theory enabled Volobuiev to compare the present to the past. He noted that the first five-year plan had already assigned the Ukrainian republic a faster tempo of economic growth than it had to the Soviet Union as a whole. The rate of economic development was not the problem. What was needed, Volobuiev insisted, was a reappraisal of the overall Soviet economic policy which maintained economic irrationality by building new factories in the Urals when the same products could be produced more cheaply close to their sources of raw materials in the Ukraine.

Volobuiev then popularized a budgetary analysis demonstrating a massive transfer of investment capital out of the Ukraine. The statistics provided by Volobuiev showed that in the mid-1920s the Soviet Union was collecting about 20 percent more in taxes than it spent in the Ukraine. Volobuiev then asserted that such a massive drain on the Ukraine's resources retarded the Ukraine's own economic and cultural development.¹⁷ Although he did not draw comparisons, he in effect implied that the Ukraine was being exploited by Soviet Russia just as it had been by tsarist Russia. In terms of the economic relationship between Russia and the Ukraine, the revolution changed very little.

Volobuiev believed that the less developed regions of the USSR deserved economic assistance, but he considered the Ukraine's burden disproportionately large, and asked that Russia share a greater part of the expense. He also objected to spending scarce Ukrainian investment funds to build factories in the Urals when it made more economic sense to build them in the Ukraine. That, he argued, merely intensified the economic distortions and irrationalities originally wrought by imperialism.¹⁸

Volobuiev concluded that in the future the Ukrainian SSR, one of the constituent republics of the USSR, should be viewed as a national economic organism created by history. He then listed several concrete proposals to help overcome the legacy of colonialism in the Ukraine: (1) that the future regionalization of the USSR recognize the territorial and economic integrity of the Ukraine; (2) that Ukrainian authorities have full control of the Ukraine's socialized economy; (3) that greater authority be given to officials at the republic level in supervising industry; (4) that the role of Gosplan and other Union organs should be limited to issuing general guidelines in formulating economic

policy; (5) that the Soviet Ukrainian government be given full budgetary authority for all economic activities in the Ukraine; (6) that the plans for Soviet industrialization be reviewed in order to purge them of all Russocentric biases; (7) that the decisions concerning the location of new industry be reached solely on considerations of economic rationality; (8) that a Ukrainian institution be established to manage manpower needs; and (9) that the republics be given real power in shaping the decisions of all-Union bodies.¹⁹

Volobuiev added that economic policy was the central factor in solving the nationality problem. The legacy of colonialism in the Ukraine could be overcome only if the center recognized that the Soviet Union was more than the sum of its parts and that it contained several national economic organisms.

Volobuiev's analysis and conclusions drew bitter replies and denunciations.²⁰ His critics, moreover, compared the economist's views to those advanced by Ukrainians outside the USSR and to the national deviations of Khvyly'ovyi and others. The editorial in the following issue of *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy* asserted that Volobuiev predicted a "struggle of two economies," the Ukrainian and the Russian.²¹ Ievhen Hirchak, the party's hatchet-man, ascribed to Volobuiev eleven heresies, none of which had appeared in Volobuiev's argument. The most damaging included the claim that Volobuiev denied that the October Revolution liberated the peoples oppressed by tsarism, and that Volobuiev in his essays was stirring up hostility between the workers of Russia and the Ukraine.²² Volobuiev produced "an anti-Leninist theory which can be used to fight against the KP(b)U, the VKP(b), the Comintern, and later for venomous work among the workers and peasants of Western Ukraine."²³ By the end of the 1920s, with industrialization and increased political centralization, Volobuiev's views touched a raw nerve. One of his critics best expressed it: "It is wrong that two contrary views, one representing the interests of the USSR and the other – the interests of the Ukrainian SSR – exist and could exist for a communist. This should not be the case."²⁴

Volobuiev published a limited confession of error in a letter to the editors of *Komunist* in 1928. He declared that his facts were correct, but that he failed to realize that they represented the exception and not the rule. The overall situation of the Ukrainian SSR within the USSR, he declared, was quite good. This confession, however, was not enough. Volobuiev then published a complete and detailed repudiation of his earlier views.²⁵ Shortly afterwards, Volobuiev disappeared from public view and died during the purges.

Control, economic equality, and recognition of economic diversity were the three underlying themes in Volobuiev's "heretical" essay. The economist asserted that the Ukraine, an equal partner in the Soviet Union, had the right to control its own resources. If the Soviet authorities wanted to overcome the legacy of the tsarist past, they had to recognize the distinctiveness of the non-Russian regions – not only in comparison to the RSFSR, but also among themselves. With the recognition of the peculiarities of these non-Russian areas, different economic and social policies had to be introduced in each area in order to equalize the opportunities between the more developed areas (such as the Ukraine) and the less developed areas (such as Soviet Central Asia). Without a differentiated policy promoting equalization, the economic and social inequalities would persist, if not expand.²⁶ Without the introduction of a differentiated equalization policy, Volobuiev implied, the communist claim that Soviet power offered a viable alternative to imperialism would be discredited.

Volobuiev's essay was published in early 1928, just as the Soviet industrial juggernaut was about to take off. In preparation for this assault on Soviet backwardness, the VKP(b) began to increase control of the periphery. The center was no longer interested in overcoming the imperialist legacy of the tsarist past in the non-Russian areas if it would delay, however temporarily, the Soviet industrialization drive. Consequently, in the minds of the Soviet party and economic planners, Volobuiev's article was counterproductive, if not counter-revolutionary, because it suggested that the Soviet Union respect the economic diversity of the non-Russian regions by continuing the policy of equalization. To do so, from their perspective, would delay the implementation of industrialization's goals. Due to the economic priorities of the Soviet industrial revolution, the center should not recognize the economic and national differences of the various regions of the USSR.

Political priorities

Oleksander Shums'kyi, the Commissar of Education, and Mykola Skrypnyk, his successor, questioned the political limits of Ukrainianization. Both were concerned with cadres policy; both, despite their disagreements over the speed in which Ukrainianization should be implemented, were interested in dealing with the politically sensitive issue of Russified Ukrainians. Both in effect sought to expand the boundaries of Ukrainianization.

Shums'kyi did not publish much and it is difficult to assess his views completely. Nevertheless, despite the gap in primary sources, we can discern from the comments of his enemies that, as Commissar of Education, he became concerned with two interrelated issues: the pace of Ukrainianization and the question of Ukrainian cadres.

Shums'kyi's interests should not be surprising. As Commissar of Education during 1925–27, he had vested institutional interest in Ukrainianization. The Commissariat's authority was very broad; it supervised institutes, technical schools, elementary and secondary schools, theater, literature, music, art, cinema, and scholarship.²⁷ Because the party, in effect, established a national unit whose frontiers became closed to most who did not speak Ukrainian (exceptions were always made for high-ranking Russians or those in sensitive positions), it, in essence, adopted a policy which created a monopoly for bilinguals and Ukrainian-language speakers, the overwhelming majority of whom were Ukrainians.²⁸ As the man in charge of educational matters, Shums'kyi was also responsible for training Ukrainian-language speakers for the trade unions, party, and bureaucracy. He naturally focused his attention on their employment opportunities in these political institutions.

He expressed his apprehensions concerning Ukrainianization to Stalin in the fall of 1925. Shortly after the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (Komunistychna Partiia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy, or KPZU), the autonomous Ukrainian section of the Polish Communist Party, Shums'kyi accompanied a group of KPZU leaders on a trip to Moscow for a meeting with Stalin. According to Stalin's own account (the only one in existence), Shums'kyi complained that Ukrainianization was progressing "far too slowly."²⁹ Because Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian intelligentsia were growing at a rapid pace, Shums'kyi claimed, the party's control of Ukrainianization would weaken if the Ukrainian republic and Ukrainianization were not headed by those people who wanted to develop Ukrainian culture.

Shums'kyi also expressed his dissatisfaction with the leadership of the party and trade unions in the Ukraine that he perceived to be overwhelmingly non-Ukrainian and anti-Ukrainian. Due to their inability to draw communists who were "directly linked with Ukrainian culture" into party and trade union work, and because they did not support Ukrainianization, he claimed they alienated the Ukrainian masses from the Soviet order. Shums'kyi also expressed dissatisfaction with Lazar Kaganovich, the General Secretary of the KP(b)U and

Stalin's protégé. Although Kaganovich vigorously supported Ukrainianization, his heavy-handed methods, Shums'kyi implied, would lead only to serious conflict in the Ukrainian party.

To correct these shortcomings, Shums'kyi proposed a change in the top governmental and Soviet party leaders in the Ukraine. He suggested that G. F. Grinko, a former Borot'bist and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, be appointed to the post of chairman, and that Vlas Chubar, an Old Bolshevik, be appointed General Secretary of the KP(b)U. Both men were Ukrainians, and both, according to Shums'kyi, would insure the proper implementation of Ukrainianization.

Stalin claimed to sympathize with Shums'kyi's dissatisfaction and fears. He agreed that Ukrainianization should not "fall into the hands of elements hostile to us" under any circumstances, that a number of communists in the Ukraine did not realize the meaning and importance of Ukrainianization and took no steps to implement it, that party and Soviet cadres who possess "an ironical and skeptical attitude towards Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian public life" must change their feelings and that the party must "painstakingly select and build up cadres capable of gaining control of the new movement in the Ukraine."

Nevertheless, Stalin asserted, Shums'kyi committed at least two serious errors. The General Secretary claimed that Shums'kyi wanted to force the majority of the Russian workers in the Ukraine to give up their language and culture, and to accept the Ukrainian language and culture instead. The working class would be Ukrainianized, he stated, but not from above. With the influx of Ukrainian workers from the surrounding countryside into industry, the national composition of the working class of the Ukraine would gradually change. This was a lengthy, but natural process. It could not be sped up. To do otherwise, to force the Ukrainianization of the working class from above, would be a utopian and counterproductive policy, one capable of stirring up anti-Ukrainian chauvinism among the non-Ukrainian sections of the working class in the Ukraine.

In discussing a change in the party and Soviet leadership in the Ukraine, Stalin claimed that while Shums'kyi had the right perspective, he miscalculated the safe speed in implementing Ukrainianization.³⁰ According to the General Secretary, Shums'kyi disregarded the fact "that there are not yet enough purely Ukrainian Marxist cadres for this as yet. He forgets that such cadres cannot be created artificially. He forgets that such cadres can be reared only in the

process of work, and that this requires work."³¹ Stalin agreed that the top echelons of the KP(b)U and the top Soviet bodies be "reinforced with Ukrainian elements," but claimed that Shums'kyi asserted there were no Ukrainians in the leading organs of the party and Soviets. After listing a number of prominent Ukrainians in the party, he asked rhetorically: "Are these not Ukrainians?"

Stalin then accused Shums'kyi of failing to see the "seamy side" of Ukrainianization. As a result of the weakness of the indigenous communist cadres in the Ukraine, Ukrainianization, "very frequently led by non-communist intellectuals," may assume the character of a struggle "to alienate Ukrainian culture and public life, the character of a struggle against 'Moscow' in general, against Russian culture and its highest achievement – Leninism."³² Stalin then emphasized the need to pace Ukrainianization and to combat the seamy side of the program, represented by those, such as Khvyly'ovyi, who wanted to emphasize the distinctiveness of Ukrainian culture. Paradoxically, *korenizatsiia* legitimized, encouraged, and subsidized this very distinctiveness.

A special plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U met and discussed Shums'kyi's charges in June 1926. The plenum rejected Shums'kyi's charges, but reaffirmed the continuation of the party's Ukrainianization policy and the initiation of a struggle against Russian chauvinism, which was responsible for the Ukrainian national deviation. Although he was not vindicated, the principle that he represented, the Ukrainianization of the party and its cadres, was reinforced. Until the party cadres, "learn the Ukrainian language and participate in this cultural process," he asserted, "we will have pressing problems and will not have the strength to harvest this process."³³

In reaction to Shums'kyi's views, the KP(b)U in November 1926 replaced him with Volodymyr Zatons'kyi as editor-in-chief of *Chervonyi shliakh* (Red Path), the first Soviet Ukrainian "thick" journal. In the first months of 1927 the party isolated Shums'kyi. In January, the Ukrainian Politburo condemned Shums'kyi's Commissariat of Education for tolerating national deviations in the cultural sphere. And in March, at a joint plenum of the KP(b)U Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, Mykola Skrypnyk replaced him as Commissar of Education.

The question of power, not speed, represented the core of Shums'kyi's criticism of Soviet nationality policy in the Ukraine. An *émigré* Ukrainian journal characterized Shums'kyi's interpretation of Ukrainianization as "not just a machination, but the Ukrainianization

of the relations of power."³⁴ For Shums'kyi, the most pressing issue was: who would control Ukrainianization? Those hostile or indifferent to Ukrainian culture, or those sympathetic to it?

If Ukrainianization was led by the latter, the "tempo" of Ukraini- zation would be adjusted to conform to the peculiarities of the Ukrainian environment. By promoting those who were sympathetic to Ukrainian culture, the party could retain its commanding heights over the cultural processes rocked by social change and could control, if not neutralize, the "seamy side" of Ukrainianization, whatever its speed.

Mykola Skrypnyk emerged as the most powerful defender of Soviet Ukrainian interests in the 1920s. He believed that the national question was not an isolated, but "an integral part of the totality of questions concerning the class struggle"³⁵ and that the national question was the party's most serious challenge in the Ukraine. Whereas Soviet Central Asia was the model for Western colonies in Asia, the Soviet Ukraine was oriented toward those socially and nationally oppressed peoples in Eastern and Western Europe.³⁶ The Ukraine, according to Skrypnyk, was a "large social laboratory for the Leninist solution of the national question"³⁷ in the USSR; a successful resolution of the national question would strengthen popular support for Soviet power against external aggression.³⁸

How was this popular support to be achieved? By Soviet Ukrainian state-building and nation-building, Skrypnyk replied. He claimed that the proletariat under the leadership of the Communist Party founded and organized the first independent Ukrainian state at the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets of Workers and Peasant Deputies in December 1917.³⁹ This Soviet Ukrainian state, not the state organized by the Central Rada, was the true representative of the Ukrainian people's national and social interests.

The Communist Party had created and defined the boundaries of the Soviet Ukrainian state. It included territories, which while pre- dominantly Ukrainian, had different histories. Skrypnyk asserted that the task of the KP(b)U and the Soviet Ukrainian government was to unite Odessa and the Donbass to "a new proletarian Ukrainian socialist culture."⁴⁰ This Ukrainian state should defend the interests of its citizens and ethnic compatriots, not only those who lived on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, but also the millions in the other republics of the USSR. (Skrypnyk claimed that 7 million Ukrainians lived in the RSFSR.) He believed that the Ukrainian republic should be concerned with their cultural and educational development and that party work among them should be conducted in Ukrainian.⁴¹

The Soviet Ukrainian state should protect and develop Ukrainian culture since it was threatened in the past, and *korenizatsiia* would be the best way of achieving this goal. This program would help develop the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian cultures.⁴² Because national antagonisms should not exist under socialism, Skrypnyk did not believe that this goal would produce conflict.

How was this popular support to be implemented without undermining the hegemony of the working class?

Skrypnyk was well aware of the national composition of the working class in the Ukraine. But because more members of the working class would come from the Ukrainian countryside and be primarily Ukrainian, the working class in the Ukraine would naturally Ukrainianize itself.⁴³ The Ukrainian peasant influx into the working class would establish a new revolutionary legitimacy. The conflict between Czech and German cultures in Bohemia in the nineteenth century provided an historical precedent. Skrypnyk asserted that:

In view of the material culture . . . the German culture in the Czech lands was more developed [than the Czech culture] in the past. The German culture was also more developed in view of the provisional relationship between the cities and the countryside; it was also more developed in view of the contradiction between the medieval feudal village and the new capitalistic city. The German culture was more developed because the new social class – the proletariat of the Czech lands – stood behind it. The German culture was also more developed because this proletariat's leading ranks defended, however they primitively understood, the slogans of internationalism. But inasmuch as the dynamics of economic development supported the Czech culture, it – not the German culture – represented the future. The city maintained its leading role, but the city Czechicized the new working people, who migrated from the countryside. Just as before, the working class remained the vanguard of history – only its national composition changed.⁴⁴

Skrypnyk believed that the same processes would occur in the Ukraine. With the migration of Ukrainian peasants into the cities and into the working class, the Ukrainians would soon constitute the majority of the working class. Now the Ukrainians and the working class would not remain antagonists.

But the demographic Ukrainianization of the working class did not unilinearly lead to its cultural Ukrainianization. Although the Ukrainians began to dominate the working class numerically in the Ukraine by the early 1930s, a significant percentage of its membership, especially the old cadres, identified themselves as Ukrainians but

spoke Russian as their native language. Therein lay the foundations of a very sensitive political issue: how did the Russified Ukrainians fit into Ukrainianization? Most importantly, how were they to be categorized? As Russians or as Ukrainians? This last unspoken question possessed grave implications for the political reliability of the working class of the Ukraine in the long term. Up to now (because of its Russian and Russified working-class membership) it had been the most important social class supporting Soviet power.

The importance of the working class to Ukrainianization was based on three interlocking assumptions: (1) the proletariat was the leading force in the formulation of culture; (2) the proletariat was constructing a Ukrainian culture, national in form and socialist in content; and (3) the majority of the proletariat would become Ukrainian.⁴⁵ As shown above, the last assumption was problematical. While the majority of workers identified themselves as Ukrainians, fewer claimed Ukrainian as their native language. Skrypnyk believed that the discrepancy between these two groups threatened the first two assumptions.

In response to the problem, he asserted that Ukrainianization should serve three groups: the Ukrainians (those whose national self-identification and native language were identical), the non-Ukrainians, and the Russified Ukrainians (those who identified themselves as Ukrainians, but whose native language was Russian).

For the first group, the Ukrainianization policy was to promote Ukrainians into the trade unions, the party, and the bureaucracy and to overcome the social inequality which resulted from the national discrimination of the tsarist past. For the second group, which consisted primarily of Russians and Jews, Ukrainianization would help them learn the Ukrainian language in order to communicate in an increasingly Ukrainian-speaking society. To overcome the linguistic divisions within the working class, all non-Ukrainian workers attending higher schools should learn Ukrainian.⁴⁶ Ukrainianization, however, would not be used to force the non-Ukrainians to assimilate or to change their national identity.⁴⁷ Skrypnyk anticipated that the increasing prestige of the Ukrainian language and culture would attract the non-Ukrainians, who until recently considered Ukrainian to be an inferior language and culture.⁴⁸ This would be a slow, but natural process.

The third group was also very significant. According to the 1926 census, approximately 1,100,000 people identified themselves as Ukrainians, but spoke Russian (in reality a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon which could barely be understood by either Ukrainian- or

Russian language speakers). Skrypnyk asserted that the Soviet Ukrainian state should help these people, a vestige of the policies of Russification of the tsarist past, to learn both languages properly. These people would be "re-Ukrainianized."⁴⁹

As the working class became more Ukrainian, these Russified workers would increasingly identify themselves as Ukrainians. This became the first dramatic step in their reidentification. In time they would learn the Ukrainian language and participate in Ukrainian cultural activities. Freed from the tsarist cauldron of Russification, they would return to their original "roots."

Skrypnyk's logic followed the unspoken assumptions of most minorities who perceive themselves under physical and spiritual siege.⁵⁰ He was well aware that the Ukrainian identity and language were contingent and that the bonds between them were fragile – even during Ukrainianization. He therefore emphasized the ties between the primary language spoken and national identity. For him, to speak one language, but to identify oneself with another national identity was "unnatural."

To rectify this "unnatural" situation, Ukrainianization's backers had to broaden their social and political base of support by solidifying the Ukrainian identity among the Russified Ukrainians. This last group, after all, comprised a significant part of the leading force in Soviet Ukrainian society. Because it occupied a position midway between the Ukrainian and Russian identities, its members became a critical "swing vote" on Ukrainianization. According to Skrypnyk's thinking, because Russified Ukrainians did not know Ukrainian they might in the future return to the Russian fold.

Teaching them the proper linguistic differences between Russian and Ukrainian would accomplish more than just clarify their "proper" Ukrainian identities and divide them from their Russian colleagues. Learning Ukrainian would also deepen their national commitment. It was easy enough to identify oneself as a Ukrainian. But this was only the first step. To become a "real" Ukrainian, one had to make the maximum emotional down payment of learning the Ukrainian language. Because learning to differentiate between two close East Slavic languages late in life was difficult, not everyone wanted to pay this price. In order to overcome the Russified Ukrainians' reluctance to learn Ukrainian, the Ukrainianizers urged the Soviet Ukrainian state to enact social, cultural, and economic incentives and sanctions.

Using political means to overcome the social consequences of Russification was a complex process, fraught with danger, demanding

subtlety and patience. Skrypnyk warned: "But if we forcibly began to Ukrainianize them [Russified Ukrainians], in order to speedily accomplish it, then we would encounter opposition, the inflaming of chauvinism, and they would [fight] against Ukrainianization. Sometimes the question of tempo, the question of emphasis, in nationality politics produces success."⁵¹

As committed Marxists, Skrypnyk and his supporters felt that the working class in the Ukraine should lead the entire cultural process. This could only happen when the working class "would really possess the Ukrainian culture and, especially, the Ukrainian language. If we do not master the Ukrainian culture, it might happen that the proletariat will go one way and the countryside another way."⁵² This was the essence of the Ukrainian problem confronting the Soviets. Thus, in order to prevent a recurrence of the political divergence between the cities and the countryside and between the workers and the peasants, the Russified Ukrainians in the working class had to be "re-Ukrainianized."

Skrypnyk's critics agreed with his policy recommendations in regard to the Ukrainians. In regard to the non-Ukrainians, they agreed only half-heartedly. (They later claimed that Skrypnyk, like Shums'kyi, sought to forge Ukrainians from the non-Ukrainians.) As far as the third group, the Russified Ukrainians, was concerned, they should be left alone and should not be returned, so to speak, to the Ukrainian fold.⁵³ The party could not permit "the forced Russification or forced de-Russification of the proletariat organized in the trade unions."⁵⁴

But what was meant by "forced" Russification or "forced" de-Russification? What constitutes "force"? When dealing with social processes, could the party remain neutral in terms of the effects on Russification or Ukrainianization? If it chose to emphasize Ukrainianization, was it consistent to remain neutral on the issue of Russified Ukrainians? If this group were excluded, what did the party now mean by *korenizatsiia* and, in particular, Ukrainianization? How far was the party now willing to go to overcome the old regime's legacy of Russification? Was the working class now exempt from these processes? These questions demonstrate the central paradox behind the implementation of Soviet policies initiated at the beginning of the 1920s: the party had to legitimize its rule among the non-Russians, especially the Ukrainians, in order to mobilize for *socialism*, but in doing so, it precipitated unintended *national* consequences.

Conclusion

The volatile mixture of rapid urban growth and Ukrainization created an unexpected consequence: an assertive indigenous elite which emphasized Soviet Ukrainian, not all-Soviet, sovereignty. These Ukrainian communists became an important special interest group within the KP(b)U and VKP(b). By asserting the Ukrainian republic's cultural, political, and economic prerogatives, they challenged the center's claim to the total monopoly of power.

Due to Ukrainization and the social changes induced by industrialization, a significant number of members of the newly Ukrainized party began to take their role as defenders of the Ukrainian cultural and historical heritage very seriously. These party members, who in the past had viewed the use of nationalist symbolism as "a tactical expedient to drum up support for a politically isolated leadership,"⁵⁵ now became enveloped by the Ukrainian environment. Appointed by the center, initially they were its loyal agents; in time, however, they adapted themselves to their communities. They possessed divided loyalties. Although they were not elected by their compatriots, they propagated and mobilized a new Ukrainian identity.

By the late 1920s and early 1930s a major disagreement between the central authorities and some members of the local elites arose over the goals of *korenizatsiia*. According to the members of indigenous elites, *korenizatsiia* should: (a) recognize and respect the social, economic, national, and political peculiarities of the non-Russian republics; (b) subsidize and help develop the formerly oppressed and Russified non-Russian cultures; (c) coopt and promote non-Russian party cadres and governmental bureaucrats; (d) raise the political consciousness of the non-Russians in their native languages in order to build socialism; and (e) dismantle Russian nationalist hegemony in the cities of the non-Russian areas.⁵⁶ These goals emphasized differences rather than similarities and in the light of the changing national composition of the cities they signified the non-Russian elites' attempts to gain control of their regions. This interpretation emerged among communists in Armenia, Belorussia, the Caucasus, the Ukraine, and in the Central Asian republics and autonomous regions.⁵⁷

This new "entrepreneurial political elite"⁵⁸ in the Ukraine sought to mobilize the dissatisfaction with Soviet nationality policy in order to carve out some autonomy for themselves and for the Ukrainian institutions and interest groups they represented, "partly as an excuse

for eliminating competitors" and "partly as a political expedient to establish their credentials in the absence of more solid achievements (such as a genuinely independent foreign policy)."⁵⁹ By raising the issue of Ukrainian autonomy within the USSR, they sought legitimacy not only from the Soviet leadership, but also from the Ukrainian public.

Thus, some members of the Ukrainian political elite incorporated their national allegiance into their interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. They – in effect – emphasized the national form within the socialist context. Their ultimate goals still included the building of socialism. Nevertheless, the "idea of the constituency that they were prepared to serve changed from the broader concept of the international proletariat to the narrower confines of the ethnic community."⁶⁰

In legitimizing Soviet rule in the hostile Ukrainian environment, some of the newly promoted cadres in the Ukraine (exemplified by Khvyl'ovyi, Shums'kyi, Volobuiev, and Skrypnyk) discovered that they could no longer differentiate between their true selves and the roles the center assigned to them.⁶¹ Their identities and roles became indistinguishable. And so they chose to emphasize the Ukrainian environment instead of the world revolution.

The views espoused by Khvyl'ovyi, Shums'kyi, Volobuiev, and Skrypnyk possessed a hidden agenda. Although these members of the new political elite stressed the Ukraine's cultural, political, and economic equality with the RSFSR, the essence of their arguments was not located in the realm of equality, but in the question of power. Who was to rule the Ukrainian SSR? Indigenous Ukrainian cadres or cadres from the RSFSR? The question of equality was the road to "home rule."

Volobuiev's advocacy of Ukrainian economic sovereignty and Khvyl'ovyi's, Shums'kyi's, and Skrypnyk's emphasis on Ukrainianizing Russified Ukrainian workers alarmed the VKP(b). These Russian and Russified workers in the non-Russian regions represented the interests of the center. As the weight of these groups became diluted with the mass migration of Ukrainian peasants into the industrial centers and as the old proletarian identity was swept away by new workers with peasant attitudes, the center perceived a new crisis on the horizon. How politically reliable would the newly Ukrainian working class be if this region's mainstay, the Russified Ukrainians, re-Ukrainianized themselves? What would their orientation be in light of the peasantization and Ukrainianization of the working class? Would they still consider Moscow and Leningrad to be the primary centers of political gravity?

The KP(b)U's policy toward the Russified Ukrainian workers and the latter's reception of Ukrainianization would be the critical factor in tipping the scales in favour of "home rule." With power in their hands, the new Ukrainian elite could decisively influence cultural policies, politics, and investment priorities. Each of these issues were inter-related to the others; the question of power wove them together.

In raising the issue of power, Khvyl'ovyi, Shums'kyi, Volobuiev, and Skrypnyk introduced the issue of legitimacy. Even in an era of nationalism and mass politics, the "legitimacy of regimes and governments is conferred more by elites than by masses."⁶² Did the Ukrainians perceive the Ukrainian SSR as reflecting its national and cultural identity? Indirectly all four replied that if the Ukrainian SSR, a co-founder of the Soviet federation, could not actively pursue its own interests in cultural, political, and economic matters, then the answer would be in the negative.

Although the VKP(b) had encouraged these trends by promoting a united Ukrainian SSR, a separate Ukrainian communist party, and Ukrainianization, the leadership of the party naively believed that its recognition of Ukrainian distinctiveness would not lead to separatism. But at the end of the 1920s, at the same time that the Soviet party's primary interests became closely identified with maintaining its political monopoly and with creating a modern industrial base, some very visible members of the Ukrainian party stressed a different priority: the need to emphasize legitimacy of the Soviet order in the Ukraine by means of Ukrainianizing both culture and the power relationship. They never espoused the end of communism or of Soviet rule. At most, they desired full equality with the Russian republic and "home rule." But in the ever-centralizing Stalinist environment, their views represented centrifugal tendencies. With the influx of Ukrainians into the cities, the working class, and the party, and with Ukrainianization's expansion of the Ukrainian identity, these four individuals had a potentially large base of support.

In the early 1920s the central party assumed that political order, industrialization, and promotion of preferential policies would legitimize the Soviet order in the non-Russian regions. But by the late 1920s, as a result of industrialization and rapid urban growth, these three goals came into conflict. As the VKP(b) began to defend Russian national interests, Russian communism and Ukrainian national communism locked heads. Now many influential party leaders at the center advocated that the politics of accommodation and legitimation, the New Economic Policy and *korenizatsiia*, be abandoned.

Part IV

Center's reaction

8 Shifting the anchors of legitimacy

By the end of the 1920s, a series of external and internal crises forced the Soviet leadership to reassess its claims of legitimacy within the multi-national state. Externally, the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany, Polish General Josef Pilsudski's *coup d'état* in May 1926, the Kuomintang's rupture of their alliance with the Soviet Union and persecution of Chinese communists in April 1927, Great Britain's severance of relations with the Soviet Union and cancellation of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement in May 1927, the subsequent war scare, and the surge of the German National Social Democratic Workers' Party reinforced the Soviet Union's diplomatic isolation and contributed to its nightmare of capitalist encirclement. However exaggerated, the threat of recently empowered external enemies invading or intervening in the first socialist state was real.¹

Just as the Soviet leaders lost their external post-revolutionary diplomatic gains, they also lost control over urban food supplies within the country. In the early 1920s the Communist Party and the Soviet government had not provided the necessary incentives for the New Economic Policy to succeed, and by the late 1920s the cities, having attracted millions of new residents, encountered difficulties in supplying them with basic necessities. The economic exchange between the cities and the countryside broke down. Because the cities did not produce the necessary farm machinery or consumer goods, the countryside began to hoard its surplus grain, hoping for a "new deal" during the industrialization drive, which concentrated on heavy industry. As a result, Moscow, Leningrad, and other large cities experienced a severe shortage of basic foods.² Moreover, the cities were totally unprepared to house their new inhabitants. Deteriorating buildings and declining living standards assumed "frightening dimensions."³

Most importantly, Soviet leaders became increasingly frustrated

with the results of industrialization. Despite extravagant claims to the contrary, the first five-year plan fell far short of its assigned, ambitious goals.⁴ At the plan's conclusion in December 1932, the Soviet Union produced only 13.5 million kilowatts of electricity (not 22 million); only 64.4 million tons of coal (not 75 million); only 6.2 million tons of cast iron (not 10 million); only 49,000 tractors (not 170,000); and only 24,000 cars (not 100,000).⁵

Moscow did not identify the true causes of the plan's failure: the lack of economic coordination and the Soviet leadership's reliance on too rapid an industrialization of a peasant society. Peasants could not assimilate the industrial ethos as rapidly as planners wished, but the latter blamed it on foreign interventionists, bourgeois specialists, and the resurgence of non-Russian nationalists.

Instead of creating a homogeneous Soviet Union, industrialization created an increasingly heterogeneous country. The first five-year plan reinforced the social, cultural and the political differences between the Russian center and the non-Russian periphery and blurred the differences between the non-Russian countrysides and the Russian cities.⁶ Massive industrialization drew a great number of non-Russians into the factories of their own republics and regions. From 1926 through 1932 the percentage of Tatars (in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) and Belorussians (in their republic) in the labor force increased by over 240 percent, and the percentage of Uzbeks, Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians, Jews, Kirghiz, and Buriats increased over 100 percent. By 1931, the Armenian, Georgian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian proletariats constituted a majority in their own republics.⁷

As more non-Russians joined the regional communist parties outside the RSFSR, the native communist elites gained greater political leverage. Although Russians held the majority of party membership throughout the 1920s, their percentage decreased from 72.0 percent in 1922 to 52.0 percent in 1931.⁸ By 1933, local nationals constituted over one-half of the communist parties of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Armenia, the Chuvash ASSR, the Komi Autonomous Oblast, and the Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast. The largest numerical increases during the 1920s were made by the Belorussians and Ukrainians.⁹

But the rising number of non-Russians in the regional communist parties did not represent a passing of power to the non-Russians. The party was not a democratic institution and did not follow majority rule. The party, moreover, throughout the 1920s became an increas-

ingly centralized organization. Even though the number of non-Russian cadres increased, they remained symbols of power. Moscow and the Russian or Russified cadres in the non-Russian republics still held the reins of power. In the Soviet environment, the central party never intended the native elites to become independent political actors with strong social bases.

Nevertheless, native communist elites increasingly asserted their regions' cultural, political, and economic prerogatives. Moscow was becoming increasingly concerned over the expression of these demands, especially since they often conflicted with all-Union goals. Now the VKP(b) encountered a stark choice: either accommodate itself to these social trends and attendant conflicts or shift its legitimation strategy. If the party wished to maintain its political monopoly, it had to undertake the latter. Having painfully learned the lessons from the civil war, the party did not want to encourage non-Russian nationalism.

Thus, the complex interplay among industrialization, urbanization, and *korenizatsiia* threatened to replace Stalin's nationalities policy, "national in form, socialist in content," with "socialist in form, national in content." The increasing international uncertainty and internal instability raised the question of political reliability and loyalty and an important subset of questions: who would control the newly expanded working classes of the non-Russian republics? The local elite or Moscow? And how closely should the local elites be supervised? An important complementary question also emerged: in a multi-national state, with increasingly divergent centers of legitimacy, with which group should Moscow shore up its political and economic control?

These questions forced the all-Union party to re-examine the competing claims of legitimacy within the multi-national state and to reassess the post-revolutionary compromises. Well aware that competing nationalisms fragmented the Social Democratic movement in Austria-Hungary by the beginning of the twentieth century, the party leadership stressed party unity. With the left and right opposition eliminated, the VKP(b) now became a Stalinist party, emphasizing that a hardened political will could overcome any real, exaggerated or imagined obstacles. Even though the majority of the party membership joined the VKP(b) after the end of the civil war, the leadership (most of whom had joined before 1917) revived the legacy of "war communism," a heroic and self-sacrificing "golden period" in the immediate Bolshevik past. Slogans advocating speedy implementation of the first five-year plan and collectivization freely employed

war metaphors. Politics had to be remilitarized, opponents confronted. Bourgeois remnants of the past had to be smashed. "Saboteurs," "wreckers," and "class enemies" had to be destroyed.¹⁰ Implementing the goals of the plan, loyalty, and reliability became closely connected, and the central powers of the "statized" revolution expanded.

The rhetoric of war communism demanded an immediate solution of the crises by abandoning the compromises associated with the NEP and *korenizatsiia*. The reintroduction of a fortress mentality at the end of the 1920s demanded the establishment of a strong Soviet military machine, greater centralization, collectivization, and a reassessment of *korenizatsiia*. Stalin soon joined the revisionists in undermining the moderate policy of *korenizatsiia*, developed in 1923.

Stalin's evolution

Although Stalin supported the so-called "autonomization" plan in dealing with the structure of Soviet Russia (as opposed to the more federal Soviet Union) in late 1922, he became identified with *korenizatsiia*. This was not surprising. This popular perception of Stalin was reinforced by the succession struggle of the 1920s, when Stalin's opponents on the Left and Right, Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin, and their supporters, downplayed the national question in their analyses and arguments. Consequently, members of the party perceived Stalin to occupy a centrist position on the nationality issue. Throughout the 1920s Stalin asserted the correctness of *korenizatsiia*.¹¹ In one of his more important articles on this issue, he wrote:

We are building proletarian culture. That is absolutely true. But it is also true that proletarian culture, which is socialist in content, assumes different forms and modes of expression among the different peoples who are drawn into the building of socialism, depending on differences in language, manner of life, and so forth. Proletarian in content, national in form, such is the universal culture towards which socialism is proceeding.

Proletarian culture does not abolish national culture, it gives it content. On the other hand, national culture does not abolish proletarian culture, it gives it form. The slogan of national culture was a bourgeois slogan as long as the bourgeoisie was in power and the consolidation of nations proceeded under the aegis of the bourgeois order. The slogan of national culture became a proletarian slogan when the proletariat came to power, and when the consolidation of nations began to proceed under the aegis of Soviet power.¹²

In the late 1920s, Stalin continued to defend *korenizatsiia*. He asserted that the party supported and would continue to support national cultures within the Soviet Union, that it would encourage the strengthening of the new, socialist nations and guard against anti-Leninist elements of any kind.¹³ In order to do so, it was necessary to develop the schools, the press, the theater, the cinema, and other cultural institutions functioning in the native languages. "Why in the native languages?" Stalin asked rhetorically. Because only in their native, national languages, he answered, could the vast masses of the people be successful culturally, politically, and economically.¹⁴ Stalin then asserted that it was important to staff the party, trade union, cooperative, state and economic apparatuses with non-Russians, to train party and Soviet cadres from their ranks, and to curb all who tried to hinder the party's nationalities policy.¹⁵

While Stalin did occupy a centrist position in the 1920s, his change in national identity from Georgian to Russian profoundly influenced his policies toward the non-Russians.¹⁶ By 1930 he intertwined the interests of Russia and socialism with his theory of "socialism in one country."

As the Soviet Union remained the only socialist state in the world and as hopes of a world-wide revolution faded, Stalin popularized this theory in 1924–25. The party leadership embraced it at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927.

His concept was a response to Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution," which posited that the Russian Revolution was an integral part of the world proletarian revolution and would not be successful in creating a socialist society until revolutions broke out in the advanced industrial countries. Because Trotsky viewed the Russian Revolution in an international context, he felt that its victory was fragile: "Only the victory of the proletariat in the West could protect Russia from bourgeois restoration and assure it the possibility of rounding out the establishment of socialism."¹⁷

Stalin, in contrast, accused Trotsky of being a pessimist in regard to the Russian Revolution. In December 1924, he claimed that his ideological opponent possessed a "lack of faith in the strength and capacities of our revolution, lack of faith in the strength and capacity of the Russian proletariat."¹⁸ In debating with Trotsky, Stalin skillfully identified the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 with Russia and with the Russian proletariat and peasantry and the Soviet Union solely with Russia. Russia/Soviet Union could stand alone in face of intense capitalist pressure and not capitulate. Even without the victory of the

proletarian revolution in other countries, the Soviet Union could still build "a complete socialist society in our country."¹⁹ He accused his critics of "national narrow-mindedness."²⁰ In effect, Stalin identified himself with Russia and implicitly accused his enemies (most of whom were not Russian by origin) of being unfaithful to the socialist fatherland. "Socialism in one country" claimed that Russia and the socialist fatherland became one.

This theory shifted its emphasis from the working class of the world to the primacy of the USSR. It built upon the assumptions behind the March 1918 Treaty of Brest Litovsk, which emphasized the survival of the first socialist state over the demands of the world-wide socialist revolution. Surrounded by hostile states at Brest Litovsk, Soviet Russia had no choice but to negotiate its very survival. It had to compromise its Marxist revolutionary principles by surrendering large chunks of territory for secure boundaries. Behind its frontiers, Soviet Russia had to build a state and a state apparatus in order to preserve and then to expand the fragile achievements of the Bolshevik Revolution. As a result of external danger and internal hostility, the Soviet state could not wither away, as Lenin had predicted earlier. Instead, political circumstances demanded that it had to be strengthened. The Bolshevik Revolution became "statized."

Stalin insisted that the victory of socialism in one country did not create the necessary conditions for the merging of nations and national languages. On the contrary, this period established favorable conditions for the renaissance and flourishing of the nations that were formerly oppressed by tsarist imperialism.²¹ To do otherwise, to attempt to bring about the merging of nations by decree from above, "by compulsion, would be playing into the hands of the imperialists, it would spell disaster to the cause of the liberation of nations, and be fatal to the cause of organizing cooperation and fraternity among nations. Such a policy would be tantamount to a policy of assimilation."²²

Despite his public support of *korenizatsiia* in the 1920s, Stalin became leery of its political ramifications. The private turning point came in 1926; the public one in 1930. In 1926 he expressed the fear that Ukrainianization could become a struggle "against Russian culture and its highest achievement – against Leninism."²³ Stalin's identification of Russian culture and Leninism was significant. Now Stalin implied that Russia was as infallible as Leninism; an attack on the first could be perceived to be an attack on the second.

At the Sixteenth VKP(b) Party Congress in 1930 Stalin reaffirmed

that Great Russian nationalism was the greatest danger to the USSR's stability. He accused Russian deviationists of ignoring the differences among the languages, cultures, and daily life of the non-Russians, of aspiring to liquidate the national republics and regions, and of undermining the principle of national equality.²⁴ But Stalin qualified the party's tolerance of diverse national cultures and languages after the trials of "bourgeois nationalists" in several republics in the spring of 1930. He repeated Lenin's pre-revolutionary analysis of nationalism. "We must give our national cultures the right to develop and to expand, to develop their potential, in order to create the conditions of their merger in one common culture with one common language" – when the proletariat will be victorious across the world and when socialism will come into being.²⁵ Despite his defense of the non-Russian languages and cultures, he now predicted the emergence of one common language *after the final victory of socialism*. Although he did not identify the language, he implied that it would be Russian. According to Stalin, it would be inevitable in the long run.

But even in the short run, "socialism in one country" did not necessarily guarantee the institutional heterogeneity of nations and national languages. By the end of 1930 Stalin clearly identified himself with Russian priorities. He condemned the Russian proletarian poet Demyan Bedny for asserting that in the past Russia was "an abomination of desolation" and that "'laziness' and a desire 'to lie on the oven-couch' are well-nigh national traits of the Russians in general and hence also of the Russian workers."²⁶ Stalin now identified Russia as the revolutionary epicenter of the world:

The whole world now admits that the center of the revolutionary movement has shifted from Western Europe to Russia. The revolutionaries of all countries look with hope to the USSR as the center of the liberation struggle of the working people throughout the world and recognize it as their only Motherland. In all countries the revolutionary workers unanimously applaud the Soviet working class, and first and foremost the *Russian* [Stalin's emphasis – GL] working class, the vanguard of the Soviet workers, as their recognized leader that is carrying out the most revolutionary and active policy ever dreamed of by the proletarians of other countries.²⁷

By 1931, Stalin went public with his defense of Russia. In his impassioned speech of February 1931, Stalin described Russian history as one of "continual beatings" by the Mongol khans, the Swedish feudal lords, the Polish and Lithuanian gentry, the British and French capitalists, and the Japanese barons. They beat Russia

because "of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness."²⁸ He declared: "We are fifty to one hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must cover this distance in ten years. Either we do this, or they will crush us."²⁹ And in his June 1931 letter to *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, he emphasized the world-wide significance of Russian Bolshevism to the workers' movements in other countries.³⁰ He now asserted: "In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have had one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have a fatherland, and we will uphold its independence."³¹

Just as Stalin placed greater emphasis on the Soviet Union than on the world revolution, he also shifted emphasis from a multi-national sense of legitimacy within the USSR to the Russians within the USSR. In order to overcome the crises confronting the USSR, Stalin insisted that the Russians remain at center stage in the multi-national Soviet Union.

It was easier to deal with the demands of one group than with those of one hundred. The Russians, after all, even after the revolution, remained the major group in the USSR. In 1926, they constituted 52.0 percent of the total population of the USSR and a greater proportion of the working class. Most importantly from the center's point of view, over 9 million Russians lived in non-Russian regions in 1926.³² Despite the rapid urban growth throughout the USSR, they still remained an important force in most of the cities in the non-Russian regions. Many Russians in the VKP(b) viewed the Soviet Union as a single whole rather than as a union of equal republics and autonomous regions. They blurred the distinction between Russia and the USSR. As a consequence, the center did not question their group loyalty and reliability. In a multi-national state, the Russians were one of the most powerful centripetal forces in the Soviet Union. The center's reliance on them would help reverse the drift toward regionalism and non-Russian nationalism.

Faced with a choice between order and multi-national legitimacy, Stalin embraced the first. Not surprisingly, he and the party were not prepared to jeopardize their own political survival by attempting to win recognition of the party's "right to govern" during the radical social convulsions which seized Soviet society in the late 1920s and 1930s. Now he increasingly began to lean on hypercentralization, social conservatism, Russian chauvinism, Russification, and anti-Semitism. These would become the anchors for the new Stalinist order.

Dissonant voices

Tensions and conflicts between the VKP(b)'s and Soviet government's recognition of the multi-national nature of the Soviet state and their mutual abhorrence of nationalism, especially non-Russian nationalism, manifested throughout the 1920s, especially at the local level. Inasmuch as the Ukrainian identity was government-sponsored, the content of this identity was a very delicate issue. One could admit his national identity, but had to down-play its political significance. Everything would be fine unless one "emphasized it. You only needed to highlight your belonging to the Ukrainian nation once or twice before you could be in danger of being accused of nationalism."³³

Despite this major caveat, one's options of being a Ukrainian were much broader under Ukrainianization than before the revolution of 1917 or after 1933. Despite party and governmental support, Ukrainianization generated a backlash.

By the end of the 1920s, complaints from Russians and the Russified living in the non-Russian republics concerning "forced de-Russification" were now taken seriously by the center. Vociferous attacks on the excesses of *korenizatsiia*, outbreaks of alleged local chauvinism and nationalism also appeared by the end of the decade. While Stalin's position on *korenizatsiia* evolved in the background, important party leaders began to reinterpret Soviet nationality policy in public. They often contradicted the party's 1923 position on the national question. Although the party criticized these communists, they helped prepare the VKP(b) for its shift from a multi-national legitimacy to a Russocentric legitimacy.

According to these revisionists, with the end of the old ruling classes' hegemony after the October Revolution, the Russian language stopped being a tool of oppression of the non-Russians. After the Bolshevik victory, the Russian language became the "means to introduce the non-Russian cultures to the highly developed Russian culture, which has world importance."³⁴ According to the logic of this thinking, if the Russian language now emerged as a positive tool and a language superior to (but not oppressive of) the non-Russian languages, there was no need for *korenizatsiia*.

Many other prominent Bolshevik leaders criticized the compromises with non-Russian nationalisms and introduced their own interpretation of internationalism. For example, Grigorii Zinoviev, the former Chairman of the Comintern, leader of the so-called "Leningrad

Opposition," and ally of Trotsky between 1926 and 1928, asserted at the June 1927 meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission that Ukrainianization clearly contradicted Soviet nationalities policy and helped the radical Ukrainian nationalists (the "Petliurites").³⁵ He did not provide any solid evidence to support his assertion.

Another prominent communist, Iurii Larin, an economist, cofounder of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) in 1922, and Bukharin's future father-in-law, also complained about *korenizatsiia* and Ukrainianization. In principle, he claimed to support Ukrainiani- zation. It was necessary to know the Ukrainian language "in order to communicate with the peasants, with the state organs, and with [16 percent of the] Ukrainian workers who identified Ukrainian as their mother tongue."³⁶ But he charged that its actual implementation was counterproductive; its forced imposition was unnecessary. He asserted that it created boundaries among different national groups and might lead to counter-revolutionary consequences. Most importantly, neither parents nor children wanted to use "an incompre- hensible or obscure language."³⁷ The displacement of Russian by Ukrainian in the cities, including the transformation of street signs to Ukrainian, violated the rights of a significant portion of the population and the majority of city residents, making them feel like "second-class citizens."³⁸

Larin's defense of the Russian population in the Ukrainian cities highlighted the frustrations ignited by *korenizatsiia*. The social and national transition of the 1920s caused great confusion and uncertainty for the Russian and Russified city-dwellers. Nevertheless, in 1926 (when Larin wrote his article) the Ukrainian language was not the primary language in the cities. Because he did not discuss the Ukrainian plurality in the Russified cities, his concerns were one- sided. His proposed solution, the return of Russian-language hege- mony in the Ukrainian cities, would discriminate against the Ukrainian-speaking peasants migrating to the cities.³⁹

In another attack on *korenizatsiia*, Varshak Vaganian, an adherent of Trotsky, followed the Marxist paradigm and claimed that two cul- tures, bourgeois and proletarian, existed and came into conflict with each other. "Anti-proletarian" and "anti-communist" in nature, the bourgeois culture still covertly existed in the USSR, despite the victory of Soviet power. The nationalist counter-revolution took on new forms.⁴⁰

According to Vaganian, proletarian culture was a culture "created by the entire [working] class in the process of its struggle and its

economic and social achievements."⁴¹ As such, it was an international culture. As a consequence, the main tasks of the Soviet Union were to fight the old, class-ridden national culture and "to create an international culture in different languages."⁴²

In doing so, the party should examine the non-Russian languages because the non-Russian intelligentsia introduced language reforms contradicting common, every-day usage.⁴³ Language reforms posed a grave political threat. The greater the extent to which a language differentiated itself from its neighboring languages, the more it became "difficult to communicate with one another."⁴⁴ This differentiation, Vaganian asserted, was important for the non-Russian nationalist intelligentsias that wanted to protect and isolate their languages. These ideologues replaced generally understood words with incomprehensible foreign ones, produced neologisms in order to maintain artificially long-dead literary languages, or introduced calques (commonly understood international terms) into their native languages.⁴⁵ These activities, according to Vaganian, were nationalistic manifestations, led by the non-Russian bourgeoisie who sought to alienate the masses from the international struggle of the working class.⁴⁶

What then was a real and what was an artificial language? According to Vaganian, the everyday language of the workers and peasants was that language which "our . . . international culture of the proletariat should speak." At the same time, "we should fight with those ideologists of national culture who pull the language of today back to the medieval period, who tear away the language or culture from the language of the working class."⁴⁷ Vaganian did not analyze the problems associated with the non-Russian languages or cultures, or that Russian was the predominant native language among members, even non-Russian members, of the Soviet working class.

The working class had solved the national question and ended national oppression. Now, according to Vaganian, there were no longer any oppressed nationalities in the Soviet Union. In contrast to the tsarist past, the current government was waging a major struggle against the legacy of Russian great-power chauvinism.⁴⁸

According to the author, non-Russian nationalism was on the rise. He denounced scholars in the Ukraine for communicating with their colleagues in Georgia in French. He recommended that Soviet non-Russian scholars should communicate in an international language. Not surprisingly, according to Vaganian, the international language of the Soviet Union was Russian, the "language of the October Revolution." Because the "international element in the culture of the

Russians . . . is extremely strong, really common to all mankind,"⁴⁹ the Russian-language culture became the "national" culture of both the Russians and the non-Russians.⁵⁰ While the current struggle against the consequences of the forced Russification of borderlands during the tsarist period was necessary, this campaign had nothing in common with the struggle against the Russian language, which the ideologists of national culture allegedly practiced.⁵¹ Russian, according to Vaganian, should remain the dominant language within the Soviet Union.

According to the author, pure national languages existed in the USSR. The majority of workers of a given nationality spoke such a language. Since the overwhelming majority of workers in the Soviet Union were Russians or Russified, this "pure" national language spoken by the majority of workers of a given nationality was heavily influenced by Russian. Jewish workers, the workers of Azerbaidzhan, and the masses of the Soviet Ukraine developed their languages under the strong influence of the Russian language and culture, but now the nationalist intelligentsias hoped to resurrect dead cultures and to tear away the non-Russian working masses from the proletariat of Russia.⁵²

As a result, attacks on the hegemony of the Russian language were reactionary and its exclusion from the schools of the non-Russian republics "a victory for nationalist counter-revolution, which is hostile to the Soviet Union."⁵³ The Russian language, Vaganian concluded, should not be tampered with.

S. D. Dimanshtein provided another important interpretation of Soviet nationalities policy. In 1918 he became Stalin's deputy at the Commissariat of Nationalities; he was responsible for Jewish affairs. In the early 1920s he chaired the Main Administration of Political Education and directed the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U. He was also a member of its Central Committee and Organizational Bureau. Until 1930 he administered the Nationalities Section of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and was deputy chief of its Agitation and Propaganda Department. During the 1930s he was deputy secretary of the Council of Nationalities of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. In an article published in 1929, he asserted that as the various non-Russian cultures were becoming internationalist in spirit, they were developing their specific characteristics, differentiating themselves from each other.⁵⁴ He considered this a positive achievement.

One of the most important components of a national culture is language, and languages, like cultures, would experience the process

of differentiation and *rapprochement*.⁵⁵ This latter process, according to Dimanshtein, would happen slowly, depending on the material, economic, and cultural conditions of each nationality.

Dimanshtein examined the development of the Ukrainian language and the work of current Ukrainian writers. A great differentiation between Ukrainian and Russian occurred in the 1920s, especially after the standardization of Ukrainian orthography and language. He claimed that in contrast to the recent past, few Russians would be able to understand contemporary Ukrainian on the basis of Russian since they knew neither Polish nor the Ukrainian dialects of the peasants.⁵⁶

Dimanshtein considered this development to be a completely natural process, not the work of nationalists. "If people want their own language, they naturally pose the question concerning the *purity* of the language."⁵⁷ The search for purity helped to differentiate closely related languages.

During this process of differentiation, according to Dimanshtein, the party members should be vigilant because the surviving capitalists and clergy hoped to spread their influence among the masses.⁵⁸ With industrialization, the author also saw a growth of chauvinism, the growth of nationalism in national cultures.⁵⁹ After a period of this differentiation among nationalities a long period of *rapprochement* and eventual amalgamation would begin.⁶⁰

These discussions concerning the processes promoting differences and similarities among nations in the USSR encouraged those who still believed in the primacy of Russia within the Soviet federation. In response to Dimanshtein's discussion of national differentiation under socialism, another author claimed that Bolshevism stood for the merging (*sliianie*) of different cultures and even supported the establishment of a single language. But this process would be voluntary, without violence and coercion.⁶¹ And until these processes occurred, the party would struggle against Great Russian chauvinism as the greatest danger, while also struggling against local nationalism.⁶²

While Stalin publicly supported *korenizatsiia*, Vaganian and Dimanshtein ideologically built a case against it. They disagreed with each other on the fundamental issue of the increasing differentiation of the non-Russians. Vaganian asserted that the national question was solved. With the victory of socialism in 1917, he felt that there was no need for the Soviet state to encourage the non-Russians to emphasize their differences with the Russians. Dimanshtein disagreed. He believed that differentiation was a positive experience for the non-Russians and for the Soviet state. Despite their disagreement, both

men agreed that in the long run national differences would disappear. At the Sixteenth VKP(b) Congress in 1930, Stalin (who was close to Dimanshtein in his views) also presented this assessment.

The revisionists expressed the all-Union party's ambivalence regarding national identity in the present and in the future. Although they capped their careers in Moscow, Zinoviev, Larin, Vaganian, Dimanshtein, and Stalin were born in the non-Russian borderlands of the Russian Empire. Party work brought some, like Larin and Dimanshtein, to the Russified cities in the Ukrainian provinces. But living and working in the Russo-Ukrainian environment did not generate a sympathy for peasant Ukrainians. They came to understand the complexity of the national question, but they took on the center's perspective. These party leaders, like many in their rank and file, believed that nationalism delayed the development of social consciousness. These leaders adhered to one major unspoken assumption: people possessed a single social identity, not multiple ones. As a consequence, the party did not permanently acknowledge the intrinsic value of multiple national identities.

Confronted with an adverse political reality after 1917, the party under Lenin's leadership recognized separate regional parties, separate national homelands, and the non-Russian cultures. But in light of the eventual disappearance of national differences, fundamental questions emerged. How much support should the Communist Party and Soviet government extend to the culturally underdeveloped non-Russians? How temporary would *korenizatsiia* be? Would it last longer than the New Economic Policy? Perhaps the positions enunciated by Larin, Vaganian, and Dimanshtein were trial balloons for Bukharin, Trotsky, and Stalin. In any case, the party's paradoxical position on the national question doomed *korenizatsiia*.

Conclusion

The acceleration of the first five-year plan to break-neck speed radically transformed all aspects of Soviet society. As a result of the plan's ever-increasing momentum and as a result of its inability to meet its unrealistic targets, the chasm between the party's intended and accomplished goals widened. The migration of millions of industrially unprepared peasants into the cities only exacerbated the social tensions and political contradictions. These discrepancies produced massive frustration, exhaustion, chaos, and dislocation; they prompted a search for certainty and authority. By the early

1930s the All-Union Communist Party instituted a so-called "Great Retreat."

As analyzed by Nicholas Timasheff and Vera Dunham, the 1930s became a period of social deradicalization, as the old mainstays of Russian society were resurrected from the "trash bin of history."⁶³ The party exchanged the socialist anchor, which emphasized the working class of the world, for the Soviet anchor, which in Stalin's words "was (and remains) the nodal point of the world revolution."⁶⁴

This shift of the epicenter of world revolution – from the abstract concept of the working class of the world to the world's first socialist country – occurred at the same time that a parallel shift within the USSR transpired. The party's penetration into the countryside made its previous emphasis on multi-culturalism a secondary issue.

With the abandonment of the New Economic Policy, the central party de-emphasized *korenizatsiia*. At the same time, the party revived Russocentrism, an important social safeguard for the Soviet party, working class, and society still over-represented by Russians. After the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930, the party did not publicly attack Russian chauvinism. With the condemnation of Mikhail Pokrovsky's historical school and with the restoration of Russian national traditions, historians now emphasized what the histories of Russia and the non-Russian regions had in common, rather than each group's separate existence.⁶⁵

Whereas in the 1920s the Soviet state supported programs promoting extensive cultural differentiation in order to integrate the non-Russians, in the 1930s it did not. In the long run, extensive multi-culturalism produced unintended political consequences. Stalin now reinterpreted *korenizatsiia* and redefined his claim to legitimacy by giving precedence to the Russians in the USSR. Concurrently, he introduced mass coercion and terror to overcome the economic and political bottlenecks in Soviet society.⁶⁶ In the Ukraine, "the year 1937 began with the year 1933."⁶⁷

9 Scorching the harvest, 1930–1934

In January 1934, at the very moment when Kharkov achieved clear dominance over Kiev (635,395 for the first vs. 560,000 for the second), Kiev became the capital of the Soviet Ukrainian republic. Delegates to the Twelfth KP(b)U Congress voted unanimously to transfer their governmental and party headquarters from the Russified city of Kharkov to the most important agricultural region of the republic in order to strengthen “Bolshevik Ukrainianization on the basis of industrialization and collectivization.”¹ This shift of capitals represented a new power relationship in the Ukraine and a redefinition of Ukrainianization.

Attacking “bourgeois” nationalists

With the inauguration of the first five-year plan in 1928, Stalin and his allies suspected that former members and sympathizers of the anti-Bolshevik parties of 1917–21 would not be enthused about this brave new world. Their very backgrounds made them suspect. In this increasingly antagonistic environment, proper political credentials became more important than expertise.

To discredit the old order and to popularize the new, the Stalinists staged several spectacular show trials, beginning with the Shakhty Trial of “bourgeois specialists” in May–July 1928. By creating an image of “class enemies” and “capitalist agents” infiltrating all sectors of Soviet society, these trials sought to garner support for Stalin’s “revolution from above.”² Radical attacks on the vestiges of the “capitalist” past in Soviet society included attacks on “bourgeois nationalists” in the non-Russian republics, especially in the Ukraine.

Renewed attacks on Ukrainian nationalism began in the late 1920s. In April 1929 the OGPU allegedly discovered several small underground organizations, including the National Party for the Liberation

of the Ukraine in Vinnytsia. In the same year, the party launched public attacks against academicians Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi and Serhii Efremov; the press accused both, along with many other scholars and writers, of Ukrainian nationalism.

In May 1929 the OGPU began to arrest members of two alleged underground organizations: the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy, or SVU) and the Union of Ukrainian Youth (Spilka ukrains'koi molodi, or SUM). According to the official charges, both groups had branches in the main cities of the republic and were actively working towards sparking an insurrection. The arrests involved up to 5,000 persons, but the Soviet government publicly tried only forty-five men and women in Kharkov from March 9 through April 19, 1930.³ Efremov, a historian of literature, former minister of the Central Rada, leader of the Socialist–Federalist Party, and an Academician at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN), admitted that he was the leader of the SVU.

Most of the accused conformed to Efremov's profile. They were older Ukrainian intellectuals, mostly in their fifties. Many of their fathers were priests (hence they were class enemies by birth). Many were university professors or belonged to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and were members of the former Ukrainian, anti-Bolshevik political parties, such as the Socialist–Federalists, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Social Democrats. They had been prominent members of the Central Rada, Petliura's Directory, and the Ukrainian National Republic.

Efremov and his colleagues allegedly founded the SVU, a successor to various anti-Soviet organizations of the early 1920s, in 1926. These men and women allegedly infiltrated the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Scholarly Language, pedagogical institutes, cooperatives, and the Agricultural, Zoological, Engineering, and Agronomy Institutes, where they could influence the young and recruit members for their youth affiliate (SUM), and prepare an insurrection. SUM, moreover, would spearhead the armed struggle against Soviet power. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, founded in 1921 under Soviet auspices to undermine the declining influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and dissolved in January 1930 by the OGPU for counter-revolutionary activity, was the SVU's military brains trust (many of the Church's bishops and priests had actively fought against the Soviet regime from 1917 through 1921).

The prosecution claimed that members of the SVU hated workers and peasants, and represented the interests of the kulaks, big land-

owners, and the urban bourgeoisie. Their ideology could not come to terms with the Soviet industrialization of the Ukraine. Instead, members of SVU defended the concept of a Ukrainian "agricultural mission."⁴

After an internal insurrection (planned for 1931), assassination of prominent communist leaders (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budenny, Petrov-s'kyi, and Skrypnyk), mass terror against the Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia, and foreign intervention, the SVU would then set up a bourgeois order, modeled after the Ukrainian National Republic. Their program allegedly asserted a complete capitalist restoration in the Ukraine. The SVU allegedly would give the Right Bank Ukraine to the Poles and the Left Bank to the Germans.⁵ At another point during the trial, the prosecutor accused the SVU of preparing a "federation" of the Ukraine with "fascist Poland."⁶

As in the Shakhty case and at the Industrial Party trial, the only evidence presented at the trial of the SVU consisted of lengthy confessions by the defendants themselves, testimony by witnesses, and Efremov's private diary. They had been prisoners of the OGPU for six to ten months prior to the trial and admitted their guilt.⁷ Although they admitted the general lines of complicity and guilt concerning their main goal of restoring the bourgeois order, they qualified their testimony and denied that the SVU was a terrorist organization.

The prosecution's charges were fantastic: a small group of well-known intellectuals hostile to the Soviet government could mastermind an armed uprising after failing to sustain the mobilization of the Ukrainian masses from 1917 through 1921. The prosecution, moreover, could not present a consistent story concerning the ultimate goal of the armed insurrection and foreign intervention. Which would it be? The formation of a Ukrainian National Republic, a "federation" with Poland, or the Ukraine's partition between Poland and Germany? Despite the prosecution's inconsistencies, the SVU trial foreshadowed the Moscow trials of 1936-38. It was nearly flawless: the defendants pleaded guilty and did little to defend themselves. The court then found the defendants guilty and sentenced all of them to three-to-ten year terms in the Solovki Island camps and in Siberia.

The SVU and SUM were the first of fifteen major "underground counter-revolutionary organizations" the OGPU/NKVD discovered in the Ukraine in 1930-37.⁸ According to the accusations, the Ukraine became the international counter-revolution's main theater of operations.

The "discovery" of these organizations besmirched the pre-Soviet

Ukrainian intelligentsia's moral stature and annihilated them as a group. The OGPU compromised Efremov in the SVU trial. One year later the political police implicated Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, the leader of the Central Rada in 1917–18, in heading the Ukrainian National Center. Hrushevs'kyi, who had returned to the Soviet Ukraine from Galicia in 1924 to help "rebuild the Ukraine," abandoned active politics and worked intensively at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The OGPU arrested him in February 1931, but never imprisoned him. Instead, he was ordered to move in March 1931 to Moscow, where he was kept under house arrest for a few months. Later he was released, but forbidden to leave the city. He died in 1934.

The trial of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine in the spring of 1930 and the discovery of many "counter-revolutionary" groups marked the beginning of the end for Ukrainianization. Although the demands of industrialization and Ukrainianization created a new Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia, it was difficult to implement or to expand Ukrainianization without the old pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. The social foundations of Ukrainianization also changed. With the emergence of labor shortages throughout the Soviet Union, pressuring Russian or Russified bureaucrats and workers to learn Ukrainian did not produce the desired results. Those who did not want to invest their time in learning Ukrainian could move on to other positions without penalty.

The political climate also shifted. Stanislav Kosior, a Pole from the Donbass, replaced Lazar Kaganovich as General Secretary in 1928. Unlike Kaganovich, he never learned Ukrainian and did not press for Ukrainianization.⁹ More people became exempt from learning Ukrainian. During collectivization the center sent thousands of workers and party members from the RSFSR to collectivize the countryside.¹⁰ They were not obligated to learn Ukrainian. As collectivization intensified, the political environment hardened.

By trying the political "has-beens" and portraying them as "saboteurs," "conspirators," and "wreckers," the Stalinist leadership hoped to mobilize support for the radical transformation of Soviet life, a transformation which demanded much personal sacrifice on the part of the workers and especially the peasants. In order to do so, it had to discredit the Ukrainian "bourgeois" intelligentsia and their ties to the countryside, the well-spring of Ukrainian nationalism from 1917 to 1921. With growing numbers of Ukrainians moving into the cities and into the urban labor force, it became "all the more necessary to discredit Ukrainian nationalism politically in the eyes of the

workers,"¹¹ the perceived backbone of the Soviet regime. But eliminating the bourgeois "has-beens" was not enough.

Purging the KP(b)U

Having cleaned out the "bourgeois nationalists" as well as the former opposition parties, the VKP(b) turned its attention to the KP(b)U. The central party must have been especially worried about the Ukrainian party and its handling of the republic's economy, which had not fulfilled its production quotas since 1927. Responsibility for this state of affairs had to be assigned; someone had to pay. The prime suspects were the leadership and the leading cadres of the KP(b)U, those who objected to the imposition of increased grain quotas on the countryside. The VKP(b) painted them with the brush of nationalism.

At the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference, held from July 6 to July 9, 1932, Stanislav Kosior, the head of the KP(b)U, Mykola Skrypnyk, the Commissar of Education, Oleksander Shlikhter, the Commissar of Agriculture and the director of the Marx and Lenin Scientific Research Institute in Kharkov, and Vlas Chubar, the head of the Ukrainian government, objected to increased quotas for Ukrainian agriculture. Kosior bluntly declared that there had been "great losses while harvesting," and that now many regions were "seriously short of food."¹² All the other speakers also suggested that the new grain delivery quota of 6.6 million metric tons of the 1932 harvest, recently proposed by Moscow, was exorbitant.¹³ However, Viacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin's emissaries to the conference, placed the full responsibility for the previous year's crop failure on the leadership of the KP(b)U.¹⁴ For these and other loyal Stalinist veterans of the struggle against Bukharin and the right opposition, the Ukrainian resistance to the new grain delivery quota sounded like a Bukharinite defense of agricultural, not industrial, priorities. Since the party pressed for rapid industrialization, Molotov and Kaganovich ordered that the grain procurement plan for 1932 be fulfilled at any cost. There would be no compromises.

The cost was high – too high. The grain quotas fatally over-taxed the Ukrainian countryside. As the amount of grain harvested declined in the early 1930s, the percentage of grain extracted from the Ukraine increased, from 33.3 percent of the total grain harvested in 1930 to 42.5 percent in 1932. Despite repeated protests by the KP(b)U, Stalin pressed his grain requisition campaign even harder. In some regions even seed grain was requisitioned by armed detachments sent by

Moscow. The grain quotas placed on peasants and the collectives were impossible to meet.

As successive grain quotas increased, available foodstuffs declined. By the early 1930s, buttermilk, milk, sugar, and even bread disappeared from the stores in Odessa and other major cities. The government introduced a rationing system, but the allotted portions decreased. They were insufficient for healthy people, but they kept the urban population from starving.¹⁵ The rural population was not so fortunate. The countryside was not subject to rationing and the peasants died by the millions.

Western travellers throughout the Ukraine spoke of “starved children with emaciated limbs and swollen abdomens who were seen along the railroad track, not occasionally, but as a common spectacle; of field mice being in demand for food and thousands unable to work from undernourishment and being, therefore, deprived of rations on the ground of laziness.”¹⁶ People swelled from hunger and died. Hundreds of villages were completely depopulated. Farm animals were slaughtered by the millions. Cats and dogs disappeared. Cannibalism and infanticide became common occurrences, even in the cities. Requisitioned crops had to be protected by armed sentries. Those caught cutting a few ears of corn would be shot or, under extenuating circumstances, imprisoned for at least ten years. To stop the migration of peasants into the cities throughout the Soviet Union, the Soviet government, in December 1932, introduced an internal passport system and the mandatory registration of individuals in their place of residence. In addition, in March 1933, collective farmers were forbidden to seek employment in factories and mines (unless drafted). To stop the migration of Ukrainian peasants into the Russian republic, the Ukraine was quarantined.¹⁷

Tied to the barren countryside the peasants starved to death by the millions.¹⁸ The exact number of deaths due to the famine is unknown. Between the 1926 and 1937 censuses, the total population of the Ukrainian SSR decreased by 622,089 (from 29,019,747 to 28,397,658).¹⁹ The number of people who identified themselves as Ukrainians in the republic in 1937 declined by 1,006,335 (from 23,218,860 to 22,212,525).²⁰ As a consequence, the percentage of Ukrainians in their own republic decreased from 80.0 percent to 78.2 percent (while the number of Russians in the republic increased from 9.2 to 11.3 percent).²¹ The total number of Ukrainians within the USSR contracted by 4,773,764 (from 31,194,976 in 1926 to 26,421,212 in 1937).²² The absolute decrease is not the whole story. Due to the natural increase among

Ukrainians after 1926, migration, and assimilation, the real decrease of Ukrainians as a result of the famine was greater. Recent estimates by scholars of the number who died vary from 4 to 8 million.²³

Stalin's war against the peasants in the Soviet Union reached a feverish pitch in the Ukraine, in the neighboring and largely Ukrainian North Caucasus Territory to its east, in the predominantly German and Tatar Regions of the Volga Basin, and in Kazakhstan. These areas were hardest hit, far surpassing the deaths from the collectivization drive in other areas of the Soviet Union. In the Ukraine, this ferocious war against the peasants became a war against Ukrainians. Here, the center ruthlessly enforced grain requisitions until starvation began and maintained these quotas as millions starved to death. Forewarned of these tragic consequences by the Ukrainian party leaders, the center did not release grain stores. Instead, it directed a strident campaign against Ukrainian nationalism during this period.²⁴

The central party leaders construed the frequent appeals from the KP(b)U requesting a reduction of the quotas and begging for aid for the rural Ukraine as clear manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism. The central leaders asserted that the KP(b)U placed the local needs of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian peasantry above the needs of the first five-year plan and the construction of socialism in the USSR. Consequently, on December 14, 1932, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) adopted a resolution that accused the leadership of the KP(b)U of tolerating a Ukrainian nationalist deviation in its ranks.

On January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) passed another resolution that accused the KP(b)U of being unable to cope with the agricultural situation and blamed it for the Ukraine's failure to fulfil the grain deliveries quotas. To remedy the shortcomings of the party, the resolution appointed Pavel Postyshev, who had worked in the Ukraine from 1923 to 1930 and who had been a member of the KP(b)U Politburo from 1926 to 1930, to the posts of second secretary of the KP(b)U and first secretary of the metropolitan Kharkov party committee.²⁵ The VKP(b) sent Postyshev to the Ukraine in order to "toughen it in its difficult struggle with the peasantry and Ukrainian national feeling."²⁶

The first result of Postyshev's arrival was the public admission by the plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, which met from February 3 to February 7, 1933, that the KP(b)U alone was to blame for agriculture failures in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Committee conceded it had indeed been possible to fulfil all the grain quotas beginning with 1931 – thereby retracting the points made by its

leadership at the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference eight months earlier. The plenum also capitulated to Postyshev's demand for a mass purge of the KP(b)U ranks, calling upon the OGPU to unleash a "merciless blow" upon all enemies. Thus, amidst a devastating famine, a new wave of terror began.

Postyshev's most important victim was Skrypnyk, the person most closely identified with Ukrainianization and the man Postyshev passionately hated.²⁷ On February 28, 1933, Skrypnyk was relieved of his duties as Commissar of Education and was appointed chairman of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission. He still remained a member of the Politburo of the KP(b)U. His transfer to the Planning Commission, however, signaled the beginning of attacks on him.²⁸

On June 10th, Postyshev denounced Skrypnyk in a speech delivered before the plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U.²⁹ He accused Skrypnyk of committing serious mistakes in his writings on the national question, his cultural policies, and his leadership of the Commissariat of Education.

At the same time, Andrii Khvyliia, the head of the agitation and propaganda section of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, condemned Skrypnyk's activities as Commissar of Education and branded as "nationalistic" his 1928 system of Ukrainian orthography, which replaced a spelling system and vocabulary based on the Russian language. Khvyliia accused Skrypnyk of attempting to construct a "barrier" between the Ukrainian and Russian cultures, and, in so doing, attempting to create a division between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.³⁰

Attacks on Skrypnyk continued into June and July. On June 14, before a party meeting in Kharkov, Postyshev harshly attacked Skrypnyk's "mistakes" in the latter's absence.³¹ On July 5, 1933, Panas Liubchenko, a candidate member of the KP(b)U Politburo, devoted his entire speech before the plenum of the Central Committee of the Kom-somol to undermining Skrypnyk's prestige among young communists. Liubchenko claimed that Skrypnyk overestimated the importance of the national question in the USSR.³² Postyshev – in his six months in the Ukraine – united other members of the Ukrainian Politburo, such as Kosior, Zaton's'kyi and Liubchenko, against Skrypnyk and his views, which only recently had been the orthodox party line.

But Skrypnyk remained defiant. On July 7, 1933, during a recess in Politburo deliberations of his views, Skrypnyk committed suicide.³³

The next day all the newspapers in the USSR carried an official obituary of Skrypnyk, issued by the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

The obituary asserted that "Comrade Skrypnyk fell victim to bourgeois-nationalist elements who, disguised as formal members of the party, gained his confidence and exploited his name for their anti-Soviet, nationalistic purposes." Influenced by this circle, he committed a series of "political errors." When he realized his mistakes, "he could not find the courage to overcome them in a Bolshevik manner and thus resorted to the act of suicide."³⁴

At Skrypnyk's funeral on July 8, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee Petrovs'kyi, the Commissar of Education Zatons'kyi, and the Commissar of the Workers and Peasants Inspection Sukhomlin delivered the orations. All reproached Skrypnyk for having fallen victim to the nationalist conspiracy.³⁵

But the November 1933 plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U posthumously transformed Skrypnyk's role from victim to one of the chief protagonists of Ukrainian nationalism. While in June, and even shortly after his death, party spokesmen described Skrypnyk as having "committed errors,"³⁶ in November they branded him a "nationalist degenerate" and the leader of the "nationalist deviation . . . coming close to the counter-revolutionaries, working for the cause of [foreign] intervention."³⁷ Speakers even accused him of sabotaging Soviet nationalities policies since 1922.³⁸

They claimed that Skrypnyk and his followers, by manipulating the language reforms of 1928, artificially differentiated the Ukrainian language from the Russian. With Skrypnyk's support, writers, historians, and artists emphasized the differences between Ukrainian and Russian historical and cultural developments. Ukrainian nationalists, moreover, violated the rights of Russian, German, Polish, and Jewish schoolchildren by forcing them to learn Ukrainian.³⁹

Under the flag of Ukrainianization, "counter-revolutionaries" established cells in the Commissariats of Education, Agriculture, and Justice, and in the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and the All-Ukrainian Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Institute of Shevchenko Studies, and in the leadership of the regional party organizations. Kosior accused Shums'kyi and others of being active members of a counter-revolutionary organization financed by the Polish bourgeoisie and the German fascists. And Skrypnyk, according to the Secretary General, was their protector.⁴⁰ At the Twelfth KP(b)U Congress in January 1934, Postyshev claimed that Skrypnyk and other Ukrainian communists were agents of the kulaks.⁴¹

With Skrypnyk gone, Postyshev began a systematic purge of the

Ukrainian apparatus. The 1933 purge followed five previous purges of the entire party (1920, 1921, 1924, 1925, and 1929–30), in which the non-Russian party organizations were hit harder than those in the Russian industrial regions.⁴² The goal of the 1933 purge was to guarantee an “iron proletarian discipline” within the party ranks by expelling “foreign” elements. According to the decision made by the VKP(b) Central Committee and Central Control Commission, purge commissions were established. They consisted of “politically literate” party members who had never participated in other political groupings or worked in the opposition, and who had been members for over ten years.⁴³ These criteria excluded most Ukrainians.

Who was purged? Most were recent members of the party who worked in village party cells.⁴⁴ Most were also Ukrainian. Of the 104,458 new members and candidate-members of the party since 1931, the KP(b)U purged 37.3 percent.⁴⁵ Since more Ukrainians joined the party in this period, more Ukrainians were also purged in this period. The proportion of Ukrainians in the KP(b)U fell from 60.0 to 57.0 percent between 1933 and 1937, before rising to 63.0 percent in 1940.⁴⁶

Between June 1, 1932 and October 1, 1933, approximately three-fourths of the officials of the local Soviets and the local party committees were dismissed and replaced by newcomers. Most of those dismissed were arrested. The total membership of the KP(b)U dramatically declined from 550,443 on January 1, 1933 to 468,793 on October 1, 1933 to 355,612 on January 1, 1934. The party’s membership reached its lowest point in the 1930s – 241,330 – on January 1, 1936.⁴⁷

The November plenum declared in its resolution that although Russian chauvinism remained the major danger throughout the USSR, “at the present time local Ukrainian nationalism represents the chief danger in the Ukraine.”⁴⁸ This signified a radical change in Soviet nationality policy, which until then, had emphasized imperialist Russian nationalism as the major threat to the Soviet state. At the Twelfth (1923) Congress, the VKP(b) officially adopted Lenin’s emphasis on combatting Russian chauvinism, “which had deep roots in the past,”⁴⁹ and reaffirmed it at the Sixteenth (1930) Party Congress.⁵⁰ Between these two congresses, the party considered local nationalism to be an understandable reaction to Russian chauvinism.

This position changed after 1930. The new centralist course, set by Stalin, called for a transfiguration of Ukrainianization. In December 1932, Stalin and Soviet Prime Minister Viacheslav Molotov sent a telegram to Ukrainian party workers employed among the 6.5 million Ukrainians in the Kuban region, the Kursk, and Voronezh provinces

of the RSFSR, and the Soviet Far East and Turkestan. This telegram instructed the party workers to stop the Ukrainianization of their region, transform all Ukrainian-language newspapers, books, and publications into Russian-language ones, and in the fall of 1933 change the schools and language of instruction to Russian.⁵¹ At the Seventeenth VKP(b) Congress in January–February 1934, Stalin asserted that Skrypnyk's Ukrainian "nationalist deviation" was not an isolated case and that similar deviations had occurred in other non-Russian republics. The Ukrainian "nationalist deviation" was now the greatest danger in the Ukraine.⁵² Clearly, the Ukrainian party (as the largest non-Russian party) was singled out for special attention. The center's purification of this republic would provide an example to the other non-Russian regions of the USSR.

Postyshev announced the reversal of the party's recent policies in the Ukraine at the November 1933 KP(b)U plenum. His statement became a turning point, heralding a new wave of terror against "Ukrainian nationalism." Postyshev concluded that it had become the chief threat to the Soviet state. In accordance with the new policy, Postyshev and Kosior at the November 18–22, 1933 plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, announced that the Ukrainian SSR was no longer a backward Russian colony, but a highly industrialized socialist nation. As such, the Ukrainians were no longer an underprivileged nationality. Further efforts to pursue the old Ukrainianization policy therefore were unnecessary. Although Russian chauvinism had been considered the principle danger in the Ukraine, the greatest threat to the cause of communism in the Ukraine at the present moment was Ukrainian nationalism. Any attempts to justify the latter by references to the pre-revolutionary past or to Russian chauvinism were to be combatted as nationalistic. But a new Ukrainianization – now "Bolshevik Ukrainianization" – would continue.⁵³

Conclusion

Kiev, the "cultural Donbass of the Ukraine,"⁵⁴ became the capital of this Bolshevik Ukrainianization. This shift in capitals was not the victory of the Ukrainian countryside over the Russified industrial centers, as one might expect from social trends and from the experience of Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw in the nineteenth century.⁵⁵ Instead, it was the victory of Soviet power over "nationalistic counter-revolution." Industrialization and collectivization led to a redefinition of Ukrainianization and, ultimately, to a shift in the Ukrainian identity.

By the end of the 1920s, the majority of Ukrainian political and economic institutions, a legacy of the separation of powers between the republics and the center negotiated at the founding of the USSR in December 1922, came under Moscow's control. In the wake of collectivization, for example, the newly established Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR subordinated the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of Agriculture in December 1929. In January 1932, the Soviet government abolished the Supreme Councils of National Economy of the USSR and of the Ukrainian SSR without the Ukraine's formal consent, and established the All-Union Commissariat of Heavy Industry in their place. These changes were part of an extensive pattern of economic centralization strengthened by the first five-year plan. Whereas in 1927, for example, the government of the Ukrainian SSR had controlled, directly or indirectly, 81.2 percent of the industry in the Ukraine, by 1932, it controlled only 37.5 percent.⁵⁶

At the same time that industrialization spurred Ukrainianization, it undermined it. Industrialization demanded that workers and supervisors possess professional competence based on years of education and experience. Dismissing experienced people for not knowing Ukrainian after the emergence of labor shortages was economically inefficient. Labor shortages and industrialization necessitated that technical and political cadres become interchangeable, capable of being moved from one end of the Soviet Union to another. Workers and cadres became common denominators within the Soviet economy.

In order to create common denominators in a multi-national state, language differences (especially in a republic with the largest non-Russian working class) had to be de-emphasized. In view of the center's need to coordinate the all-Union economy, language differences should not become a divisive issue. Inasmuch as the Ukraine was located in a strategic location and was one of the major agricultural and industrial centers of the Soviet Union, and inasmuch as Ukrainian (like Belorussian) was close to the Russian language, policies promoting linguistic differentiation jeopardized the Stalinist command economy. Because Ukrainian, after its language reforms, increased its divergence from Russian, many in the center considered these language reforms (which included a Ukrainianized scientific terminology) to be nationalistic and counter-revolutionary.⁵⁷ Instead of promoting many official languages, the center believed that the Soviet industrial revolution should have one common language.⁵⁸

The party's second major war with the countryside in a decade also

endangered *korenizatsiia's* existence. Since *korenizatsiia* was based on the urban party's need to establish peace between the Russian and Russified cities, on the one hand, and the non-Russian countryside, on the other hand, collectivization upset this complex political equation. Once the Soviet state initiated the struggle against the peasants, "policies to placate the countryside became irrelevant."⁵⁹ Since the party felt itself strong enough eleven years after the revolution to storm the countryside, destroy its class enemies, and collectivize the peasants, there was no need to compromise with the rural areas.

Collectivization and the famine, moreover, broke the tie between the peasants who had migrated into the cities and those who had remained in the countryside. Those migrants who found employment in the urban areas now had no reason to maintain contact with their old, ravaged world. Over time they cut their bonds with their former villages and became more urban in outlook. Once Ukrainianization was de-emphasized in the 1930s, it became easier for them to succumb to the social processes favoring Russification.

The center undoubtedly considered the assertiveness of the Ukrainian party and society to be closely linked to the nonfulfillment of the industrial and agricultural quotas. Political reliability and loyalty were two separate but interconnected questions. Unreliability, according to Stalin and his entourage, was a short step from disloyalty and treason, which lead to "sabotage" and "wrecking." The Ukraine's location on the borders of the capitalist world and its proximity to the Western Ukrainian territories occupied by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania heightened these apprehensions. To insure the Soviet Union's international security and fulfillment of its economic goals, the All-Union Communist Party needed to supervise the situation closely, and maintain order by centralizing its authority and by crushing those who allegedly weakened the USSR's political and economic position. Defenders of local interests, whether "bourgeois nationalists" or Old Bolsheviks, became "class enemies" and had to be destroyed. Stalin's Russocentrism strengthened these notions.

The Stalinist accusation that Skrypnyk and other Ukrainian national communist were "bourgeois nationalists" was false. The truth of the matter was more complex. Skrypnyk and his colleagues were Marxist-Leninists who were Ukrainian and who recognized the peculiarities of their region. Initially, the center appointed them to their posts and considered them its prefects. But as Stalinist centralizing pressures intensified at the end of the 1920s and the early 1930s, the Ukrainian communists stopped being the unquestioning agents of the center.

Some Ukrainian communists then became Ukrainian national communists.

Although Skrypnyk's positions may have temporarily dove-tailed with positions expressed by the old nationalist intelligentsia who were later implicated in the SVU trial, this does not equate the Ukrainian national communists with the Ukrainian nationalists. But Stalin's entourage, men who were not known for their theoretical or political subtlety, did not come to such a conclusion. Instead, the Stalinists claimed to see an alliance between these two groups and tried very hard to discredit both in the eyes of the Soviet Ukrainian public, the rest of the USSR, the world, and posterity.

For Stalin, the Ukrainian national communists, in league with the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia, contained the seeds of a potentially dangerous threat. Even if the Ukrainian national communists did not possess a large number of adherents, they had a major potential base of support with the rapid growth of Ukrainians in the cities, the working class, the trade unions, and the Communist Party of the Ukraine. In Stalin's circle, the emergence of Ukrainian national communism in a workers' state had more possibilities for success and became far more dangerous than the SVU, a group of intellectuals. Stalin's associates then concluded that the Soviet sponsorship of a Ukrainian identity sharply different from the Russian had to be curtailed.

With the radicalization of the party, the political equilibrium, "national in form, socialist in content," between language and cadres changed. The party de-emphasized language and emphasized cadres. Although more people employed Ukrainian, the limitations on the social functions of Ukrainian made this language secondary to Russian. Just as those peasants who wanted to get ahead in the 1920s moved to the cities, those in the cities who wanted to take advantage of available opportunities learned Russian and began to participate in Russian-language activities. Eventually, the cities began to re-Russify their inhabitants.

Although the party de-emphasized *korenizatsiia*, the number of non-Russians increased their presence in the party and state apparatus, even during the purges. This should not be surprising. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union was industrializing at a radical pace, it needed hundreds of thousands of reliable cadres. But the center carefully chose these non-Russians. The new non-Russian recruits did not even have to know the language of their own national group. The criteria of selection stressed political reliability and loyalty to the ideological hegemony of the center. According to S. D. Dimanshtein,

We do not need a "non-Russian in general," we do not need an alien class element of any nationality. We need a non-Russian proletarian, a collective farmer, a fighter for socialism, a fighter for the working class. We need a non-Russian who is educated in the international assignments of the proletarian revolution.⁶⁰

By holding these selection standards, the center could manipulate the level of national consciousness among its new recruits. The center now actively defined the boundaries of the Ukrainian identity. It would not tolerate any orientation in the Ukraine toward any region outside Soviet borders. Within the Soviet Union, no psychological boundaries should exist between the Ukrainians and the other Soviet nations, especially the Russians. No conflict should emerge between Soviet nations, harmony should be established – by force if necessary.

In the final analysis, the conflict between the center's expectation for the Ukrainian party and the regional party's increasing identification with its environment "could be resolved only by maintaining a reign of terror and resorting to periodic purges as an integral aspect of political control."⁶¹ Viewed from the perspective of the party leadership in Moscow, order, and, most importantly, conformity had to be re-established in the Ukraine. Purges, coercion, and mass violence were the means to achieve these ends.

The Stalinist whirlwind then struck the Ukrainian peasantry, the nationally minded intelligentsia, and the Communist Party of the Ukraine. It also destroyed those who supported Ukrainian sovereignty. Although the social preconditions were still largely favorable for the maintenance of a separate Ukrainian identity after 1933, the political climate was not. By 1933 Stalin abandoned the party's search for legitimacy among the Ukrainians and the other non-Russians in the USSR. Instead, he now sought to re-define his legitimacy among the Russians in the USSR.

Conclusion

During the 1920s and early 1930s the Communist Party in the Soviet Union attempted to implement three goals concurrently. The first was to maintain the political monopoly it had won at the end of the civil war. The second was to legitimize its power monopoly where resistance to the Bolsheviks was greatest during the revolution and civil war: in the countryside and in the non-Russian borderlands of the former tsarist empire. The third was to create a socialist economy and establish a modern industrial society in a backward, predominantly agricultural country.

In theory, these three goals were complementary. By establishing industrial centers in the non-Russian republics, the Soviet leadership believed that, with economic development, the indigenous populations would be modernized, would be proletarianized, would acquire a working-class consciousness, and would accept the Soviet order as legitimate. Legal, social, political, and economic equality would shift the focus of the non-Russians from their national identities to an international working-class identity. In the long run, the non-Russians would become Sovietized. In the short run, the Bolsheviks hoped to legitimize their urban-based revolution in a predominantly agricultural, multi-national state by modernizing within a framework of multiple languages and identities.

In the early 1920s the party assumed that order and legitimacy were compatible during industrialization. If judged only by economic indicators, the Soviet modernization effort of the late 1920s and 1930s was an impressive achievement. But the interaction between industrialization and *korenizatsiia* did not fully integrate the non-Russians to the Soviet order. Over the long run, industrialization did not equalize the economic and social disparities among the non-Russians or between them and the Russians. Differences in political culture, education, economic development, and group perceptions

produced different outcomes in different republics.¹ An uneven economic transformation and rapid urban growth in the non-Russian regions, economic and political pressures from the center, and an increased Russo-centrism among party leaders and the Russified rank and file in the non-Russian regions engendered non-Russian assertiveness, even among party members.

By the late 1920s, the programs promoting order and legitimacy came into conflict, especially in the cities. As social and psychological cauldrons, the urban centers played a critical role in the modernization of the non-Russians. They contained the greatest concentration of institutions, such as schools, factories, and the mass media, which challenged traditional peasant attitudes and contributed to making men and women modern.² Cities introduced migrants to new experiences and remolded their identities by teaching them to read and write and by exposing them to new ideas, new techniques, new consumption and production patterns, and new social institutions.³ In the Ukraine, if the national question were a peasant question at the beginning of the 1920s, it became an urban question by the beginning of the 1930s.

Rapid industrialization radically enlarged the economic and administrative functions of the Russified cities and attracted millions of Ukrainians from the countryside. Mass migration broke down the national barriers between the cities and the rural areas, and integrated the distinct regions which constituted the Ukrainian SSR. More Ukrainians entered the cities, the working class, trade unions, bureaucracy, and Communist Party. By 1931 they constituted a majority in each. But, the number of Ukrainians who claimed to speak their native language lagged behind the number of Ukrainians who identified themselves as such.

Nevertheless, cultural Ukrainianization, which enhanced the social functions of the Ukrainian language in the cities, built upon this demographic Ukrainianization. The Soviet government established a very extensive Ukrainian-language educational system, subsidized the publication of mass circulation Ukrainian-language newspapers, journals, and books, expanded the Ukrainian-language theater, and founded the Ukrainian-language radio, film, and opera. In less than a decade, Ukrainianization and the massive influx of peasants short-circuited the process of acculturation and assimilation to the dominant Russian political culture.

By the late 1920s, a new modern, secular, and urban Ukrainian identity emerged under Soviet auspices – established, in part, on the

inarticulated identities that peasants carried into the cities. Without the political support from the center, it would have been impossible to begin the processes of overcoming the centuries of social, cultural, and political Russification. The prestige of Ukrainian culture grew and gained many adherents in the cities and in the industrial centers. Newly arrived, Ukrainian peasant workers kept their language and accepted the new Ukrainian urban paradigm; some Russified Ukrainian workers expressed their interest in rediscovering their "roots." Even members of the Ukrainian political elite operated within the parameters of a self-conscious Ukrainian culture and history.⁴ Juxtaposing the servility of the tsarist past with the national equality in the Soviet present, Vlas Chubar, the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian SSR and a member of the KP(b)U Politburo, could say: "Instead of Little Russia we need to build the Ukraine."⁵

In the Soviet Union as a whole, industrialization, mass migration into the cities, and the establishment of non-Russian cultural infrastructures in the cities and industrial centers institutionalized its multi-national diversity. In the Ukraine, these processes reaped an urban harvest. In this republic, the Soviet multi-cultural modernization effort shifted the focus of the Ukrainian identity from the countryside to the cities. Industrialization, rapid urban growth, and preferential policies favoring Ukrainians eroded the psychological division between the Ukrainian and the modern. The interplay between these policies and processes created an opportunity for the Ukrainians and other non-Russians to overcome their economic, social, and political backwardness, keep their identities, and to enter the modern world as equals to the Russians.

This newly emergent national identity was not intrinsically antagonistic to the center. But, its growing constituency overturned the Russian and Russified economic, social, and political dominance in the cities and industrial regions of the Ukraine. This rapid erosion of the status quo led to conflicts over language rights, cultural self-definition, and the distribution of resources. Multi-culturalism encouraged some influential members of the Ukrainian elite to demand power-sharing with the center. Their proposals challenged the center's increased authority, especially during Stalin's consolidation of power.

Controlling the Ukrainian party was critical for the center. As the third largest unit of the VKP(b) (following Moscow and Leningrad), the KP(b)U recruited the greatest percentage of skilled workers and possessed the highest percentage of workers of all regional parties within the VKP(b). In the early 1920s the KP(b)U was an organization

reliable and loyal to the center. By the end of the 1920s, because its leaders could mobilize its rank and file along Ukrainian lines, the center considered the Ukrainian party unreliable, even disloyal.

From the center's perspective, the most dangerous aspect of the KP(b)U's overtures was Skrypnyk's attempts to "re-Ukrainianize" the Russified Ukrainian working class, the center's powerful surrogates in the Ukraine. The center now feared the emergence of native elites with independent bases of support. Re-Ukrainianizing the Russified Ukrainian working class would have extended employment possibilities for Ukrainian speakers, would have strengthened the social base of the native elites, and would have grounded Ukrainianization's long-term success.

But, in the end, the Ukrainian language and culture did not become hegemonic in the cities. This was due to political reasons rather than to social ones: by the late 1920s Stalin had abandoned the limited cultural pluralism of the NEP period. In order to convert the Soviet Union from an agricultural country to an industrial one, he decided to build socialism from above – by decree, by extortion, and by terror. The peoples of the Soviet Union had to be directed into the proper political channels.

In the wake of Stalinist hypercentralization, Soviet support for multi-national diversity plummeted. The party now stressed the Russian people and language as the most modern, as the first among equals. The non-Russian identities, supported for nearly a decade by the Soviet state, became secondary in importance. These second-class non-Russian identities emerged as a result of the center's political decision after 1933 to emphasize only two of *korenizatsiia's* initial three tracks: (1) increased economic investment in the non-Russian areas; and (2) the inclusion of a representative number of non-Russians in the trade unions, state bureaucracy, and the VKP(b) itself at the expense of (3) the development of non-Russian languages and cultures.

Stalin's insistence on Russian culture as the only key to modernization promoted stratification and ultimately Russification. In the 1920s, non-Russians could perceive themselves as modern and non-Russian; by the end of the 1930s, the Soviet mass media identified modernization solely with Russia and with those who spoke Russian. Since the 1930s, this redefinition of *korenizatsiia* has produced an ambivalent sense of identity (even an inferiority complex) among the non-Russians.

The consequences of this re-evaluation contrasted sharply with

those introduced by the original *korenizatsiia*. Concurrently promoting non-Russian cadres and non-Russian languages and cultures during this period was a potent combination, which profoundly influenced Ukrainian national identity formation.

In the course of the 1920s, the Soviet state expanded the social functions of Ukrainian in the cities and increased the participation of self-identified Ukrainians in the working class, trade unions, bureaucracy, and party. As the number of self-identified Ukrainians increased in these organizations, so did the number of Ukrainian speakers. Although more self-identified Ukrainians joined than did Ukrainian speakers, Ukrainianization (with its emphasis on language) divided the Ukrainian speakers from the non-Ukrainian speakers.

Ukrainianization, moreover, provided economic incentives and opportunities for Ukrainian speakers in the cities and in the expanding state bureaucracy. Language laws emphasized the need for bilinguals who could read, write, and speak Russian and Ukrainian. Since the majority of candidates for such bilingual positions were Ukrainian, they enjoyed a clear advantage. Economic and political incentives to identify oneself as a Ukrainian and to learn Ukrainian created psychological incentives to do the same. Until 1930, when the end of unemployment foreshadowed massive labor shortages, the threat of dismissal for those without the knowledge of Ukrainian bonded language and employment possibilities.

With the redefinition of *korenizatsiia* in 1933, the central party decoupled non-Russian cadres from non-Russian languages. It continued to employ and promote non-Russians into the party, the state, trade union, and party apparatus, but it de-emphasized the need for cadres to learn the non-Russian languages.

In light of the demands of rapid industrialization, the severe shortages of workers (especially the critically important skilled workers) and of party members, the central party advocated the creation of cadres who could be transferred from place to place very quickly as the economic situation warranted. In order to be so adaptable, the cadres and workers had to possess a lingua franca, which would be Russian. By strengthening its control over the industrializing economy and by introducing Russocentric policies, the state effectively undermined the employment opportunities for monolinguals who did not know Russian.

Because the supporters of Ukrainianization did not influence economic decision-making in their own republic, they could not guarantee that the employment opportunities of newly arrived

peasants would be enhanced by using Ukrainian in the factories. This was the *critical* issue for Ukrainianization: language choice determined which groups would have favored access to the best positions.⁶ Ukrainian bilinguals and Russified Ukrainians still benefited from industrialization's employment opportunities, but in the Soviet, not Ukrainian, context.

The symbiotic relationship between the non-Russian languages and cultures and employment opportunities disappeared; this weakened the prestige of the non-Russian languages and cultures in the long term. By the mid-1930s, the Soviet state closed the institutions maintaining and promoting the national identities for smaller groups, such as the Jews. The institutions of the larger groups remained, but the center closely supervised them. With the Soviet state no longer expanding the social functions of the non-Russian languages, or insisting on the use of the non-Russian languages in the work place, party and state organs, Ukrainian became unequal to Russian in the social sphere and marginalized in its own republic. Ukrainianization's accomplishments could not be sustained.

In the course of the 1930s, industrialization provided upward mobility for millions, but national identity became a secondary issue. Industrialization created many opportunities for Ukrainians who did not make an issue of their "Ukrainianness." A new Stalinist generation of Ukrainian cadres replaced the old. Ideological conformity and loyalty to the center became the main criteria for selection. Not surprisingly, the younger generation did not emphasize Ukrainian distinctiveness as much as did their predecessors.

The number and percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainian still grew in the trade unions, in the state apparatus, and in the party during this decade of mass purges. Due to ambitious industrialization plans, which created enormous labor shortages, the Soviet state could not ignore half of its population in satisfying this demand for workers. The training, cooptation, and promotion of non-Russians remained in force after the 1930s. By enrolling Ukrainians who possessed a minimal level of administrative and technical competency, it was very easy to increase the number and percentage of them in the above-mentioned social and political institutions.⁷

Building on the recruitment dynamics of the 1920s, the party admitted into its ranks a greater number of self-identified Ukrainians than Ukrainians who claimed Ukrainian as their native language. It was far easier for the party to attract the former than the latter; it was

far easier and safer to fill national quotas than to overcome the linguistic results of previous Russification. Indeed, by the 1930s, this latter goal did not even appear on the party's agenda.

Stalin did not completely nullify the 1918–23 agreements between the Russian center and the non-Russian periphery. Instead, he left a contradictory legacy for his successors. Even though Stalin's plenipotentiaries purged the indigenous elites and intelligentsias in the non-Russian regions, the multi-national structure of the USSR remained. He did not abandon the commitment to national homelands or the national-territorial divisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Instead, he replaced the more assertive elites (and their potential supporters) with his own compliant ones. Stalin, in effect, forged a unitary state divided against itself. On the one hand, he reintroduced policies which maintained a dominant role for the Russians. On the other hand, he allowed the structures and institutions which could promote non-Russian national consciousness (and eventually national assertiveness) to remain in place.

The introduction of the passport system (in which one's national identity was determined by that of one's parents) in December 1932 "locked in" the Ukrainian identity for generations afterward.⁸ But the center sought to define its contents and its psychological parameters. Relentless attacks on Ukrainian "bourgeois" nationalism and the purges of the supporters of the old Ukrainianization program narrowed the boundaries of the Ukrainian identity after 1933. Now, the Ukrainian identity was not an autonomous actor, but emerged secondary in importance to Russian culture. Now, Ukrainian culture could not "exist independently of Russian culture." It would develop if it "depend[ed] upon Russian culture and receive[d] nourishment from it."⁹ The Soviet state de-emphasized the Ukrainian language and its social functions. Russian became the language of contacts between non-Russians and the source of specialized information.

This political *mankurtization*¹⁰ reduced Ukrainian culture to the status of folklore, to the *hopak* (a Ukrainian peasant dance) and *varenyky* (Ukrainian dumplings). Russian remained the language of the cadres, of the working class, and of the Soviet industrial revolution. The end of the Soviet government's active sponsorship of the non-Russian identities, together with the demands of industrialization, divorced employment opportunities from the need to know Ukrainian. Stalin's violent redefinition of Ukrainianization in 1933, in effect, provincialized Ukrainian culture.¹¹

Ironically, within fifteen years of the Ukrainian Revolution of

1917–20, which failed in large part because it did not have a strong base in the cities, the Soviet Union established this base by means of industrialization and Ukrainianization. By introducing both programs concurrently, the Soviet party and government unintentionally undermined the Russian hegemony of the cities. Because Ukrainianization divided the newly urbanized masses into Ukrainian and Russian speakers, it created a rift between Ukrainian and Russian cultures in the cities. Now the new Ukrainian elite had a base of compatriots in the cities with the highest potential for mobilization. This base and the elite's increasing emphasis on the center respecting the "uniqueness of historical developments in the Ukraine" threatened Stalin's efforts to establish political conformity and a command-administrative economy from above.

Had the Ukrainianization program continued during the height of industrialization, the cities would have become culturally Ukrainianized. They would have followed the pattern Prague and Warsaw set at the end of the nineteenth century. Emerging as major industrial, financial, and transportation centers and concurrently as centers of their respective national movements, they "helped modernize the Czech and Polish peoples without fostering their denationalization."¹²

The social, economic, and political policies introduced by the All-Union Communist Party in the 1920s established the framework for this pattern. Industrialization and collectivization induced millions of Ukrainian peasants to migrate to the modern urban world, which began to operate within the parameters of a Ukrainian identity. Had Ukrainianization continued to operate during this extensive urban growth, the Ukrainian identity would have become more distinct from the Russian. But due to the party's political interventions, this crucial urban breakthrough lost ground.

After 1933 the party retreated from its 1923 commitments by divorcing the promotion of Ukrainian cadres from its promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture in the cities. Then the new economic incentives brought about by rapid industrialization favored Russian over Ukrainian. At the same time, Stalin's ruthless war against the peasants in 1932–33 and his extensive purges of the KP(b)U and the Ukrainian intelligentsia further impoverished the Ukrainian identity established in the 1920s. By starving millions of peasants to death, traumatizing the famine's survivors, and by purging those who could best define and articulate this new Ukrainian identity, these interven-

tions left an indelible imprint on the psychology of the new city dwellers and their descendants.

As millions of Ukrainians became urbanized after 1933, an increasing proportion of them became Russified. For political reasons "two times two" did not necessarily equal four.¹³

Appendices

Appendix 1. *Urban national change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1897–1926 (all urban centers)*

Year	Ukrainians	Percent Ukrainians	Russians	Percent Russians	Jews	Percent Jews	Others	Percent others	Total urban population
1897	849,590	32.5	881,168	33.7	715,444	27.4	167,574	6.4	2,613,776
1920	1,335,588	32.2	1,406,726	33.4	1,225,579	29.0	228,029	5.4	4,215,922
1923	2,182,336	43.2	1,342,577	26.5	1,297,557	25.7	227,594	4.6	5,050,064
1926	2,536,499	47.2	1,343,689	25.0	1,218,615	22.7	274,730	5.1	5,373,533
<i>100,000 and above</i>									
1897	163,648	15.9	550,588	53.4	222,224	21.6	93,918	9.1	1,030,378
1920	146,611	11.0	626,638	46.9	466,581	34.9	96,136	7.2	1,335,966
1923	265,404	18.0	455,741	31.0	373,726	25.5	373,535	25.5	1,168,406
1926	592,811	33.0	622,413	34.7	469,800	26.2	110,508	6.1	1,795,532
<i>50,000–99,999</i>									
1897	111,592	26.2	117,704	27.6	170,535	40.0	26,505	6.2	426,336
1923	147,979	32.0	150,465	32.5	141,002	30.5	23,099	5.0	462,545
1926	276,678	42.9	152,455	23.6	182,003	28.2	34,209	5.3	645,345
<i>20,000–49,999</i>									
1897	217,337	41.4	125,082	23.8	154,990	29.5	28,097	5.3	525,506
1923	313,616	39.7	210,011	26.5	266,759	28.7	39,453	5.1	789,839
1926	387,564	55.9	109,690	15.8	166,950	24.1	28,935	4.2	693,139
<i>Under 20,000</i>									
1897	357,013	56.5	87,794	13.9	167,695	26.6	19,054	3.0	631,556
1926	470,104	69.4	58,225	8.7	131,250	19.3	17,666	2.6	677,245

Sources: *Naselenie Ukrainy po dannym perepisi 1920 goda* (Kharkov, 1923); *Naselennia v mistakh Ukrainy za danymy Vsesoiuznogo mis'koho perepysu 15 bereznia 1923 roku* (Kharkiv, 1925); *Korotki pidsumky perepysu naselennia Ukrainy 17 hrudnia roku 1926* (Kharkiv, 1928).

Appendix 2. Population of the Ukrainian SSR by national identity, region, and urban–rural location, December 17, 1926

Region	Ukrainians	Percent Ukrainians	Russians	Percent Russians	Jews	Percent Jews	Others	Percent others	Total Population
<i>Urban population</i>									
Polissia	226,601	52.8	66,112	15.4	117,686	27.4	18,583	4.4	428,982
Right Bank	709,390	48.9	176,789	12.2	487,039	33.6	76,876	5.3	1,450,094
Left Bank	678,175	60.7	217,101	19.3	187,869	16.8	34,097	3.2	1,117,242
Donbass	344,314	40.4	416,266	48.9	38,806	4.6	86,356	6.1	851,645
Dnieper	228,839	49.3	116,544	25.1	92,656	20.0	25,978	5.6	464,017
Steppe	349,180	32.9	350,877	33.0	294,559	27.7	66,957	6.4	1,061,573
Ukraine	2,536,499	47.2	1,343,689	25.0	1,218,615	22.7	274,730	5.1	5,373,553
<i>Rural population</i>									
Polissia	2,166,189	85.6	124,220	4.9	29,005	1.1	211,045	8.4	2,530,459
Right Bank	7,032,555	93.2	53,400	0.7	195,773	2.6	265,935	4.5	7,547,663
Left Bank	5,526,661	92.9	388,667	6.5	9,556	0.2	24,783	0.4	5,949,667
Donbass	877,486	74.0	222,885	18.8	1,910	0.2	82,326	7.0	1,184,607
Dnieper	1,754,564	91.0	97,109	5.0	19,912	1.0	55,553	3.0	1,927,138
Steppe	3,324,906	73.8	447,196	9.9	99,620	2.2	634,938	14.0	4,506,660
Ukraine	20,682,361	87.5	1,333,477	5.6	355,776	1.5	1,274,580	5.4	23,646,194
<i>Total population</i>									
Polissia	2,392,790	80.9	190,332	6.4	146,691	5.0	229,598	7.7	2,959,411
Right Bank	7,741,945	86.0	230,189	2.6	682,812	7.6	342,811	3.8	8,997,757
Left Bank	6,204,836	87.8	605,768	8.6	197,425	2.8	58,880	0.8	7,066,909
Donbass	1,221,800	60.0	639,151	31.4	40,716	2.0	134,585	6.6	2,036,252
Dnieper	1,983,403	82.9	213,653	8.9	112,568	4.7	81,531	3.5	2,391,155
Steppe	3,674,086	66.0	798,073	14.3	394,179	7.0	701,895	12.7	5,568,233
Ukraine	23,218,860	80.0	2,677,166	9.2	1,574,391	5.4	1,549,330	5.4	29,019,747

Source: Korotki pidsumky perepysu naselennia Ukrainy 17 hrudnia roku 1926 (Kharkiv, 1928), pp. 4–9, Table 2.

Appendix 3. Changes in the national composition of the six largest Ukrainian cities, 1920–1926

City/Year	Ukrainians	Percent Ukrainians	Russians	Percent Russians	Jews	Percent Jews	Others	Percent others	Total population
<i>Kiev</i>									
1920	52,443	14.3	170,663	46.6	117,041	31.9	26,249	7.2	366,396
1923	101,886	25.4	145,210	36.2	128,441	32.1	25,071	6.3	400,608
1926	216,528	42.1	125,514	24.4	140,256	27.3	31,339	7.2	513,637
<i>Kharkov</i>									
1920	57,366	21.3	136,466	50.6	55,474	20.6	20,618	7.6	269,924
1923	121,834	37.9	114,813	35.7	65,007	20.2	19,961	6.2	321,615
1926	160,259	38.4	154,417	37.0	80,964	19.4	21,702	5.2	417,342
<i>Odessa</i>									
1920	12,455	2.9	191,866	44.8	190,135	44.4	33,405	7.9	427,861
1923	21,024	6.7	113,727	35.9	130,041	41.0	51,970	16.4	316,762
1926	73,651	17.5	162,873	38.7	153,194	36.4	31,144	7.4	420,862
<i>Dnipropetrovs'ke</i>									
1920	7,664	4.7	72,281	44.4	72,928	44.8	10,092	6.1	162,965
1923	20,660	16.0	51,991	40.2	50,237	38.8	6,533	5.0	129,421
1926	83,853	36.0	73,371	31.5	61,958	26.6	13,743	5.9	232,925
<i>Iuzov/Stalino</i>									
1920	4,302	11.4	21,439	56.6	9,768	25.6	2,384	6.4	37,893
1923	2,215	6.9	20,255	63.1	7,672	23.9	1,958	6.1	32,100
1926	27,628	26.1	59,492	56.2	11,327	10.7	7,410	7.0	105,857
<i>Nikolaev</i>									
1920	16,683	15.3	55,362	50.8	31,003	28.5	5,772	5.3	108,820
1923	14,193	17.5	41,931	51.7	21,574	26.6	3,407	4.2	81,105
1926	31,368	29.9	46,684	44.5	21,821	20.8	5,036	4.8	104,909

Source: *Naseleння v mistakh Ukrainy za danyymi Vsesoiuznoho mis'koho perepysu 15 bereznia 1923* (Kharkiv, 1925), pp. 3–15; and *Mis'ki selyshcha USSR, Zbirnyk stat.-ekonomichnykh vidomosti* (Kharkiv, 1929), pp. 2–17.

Appendix 4. Literacy and language in the cities and countryside of the Ukrainian SSR, December 17, 1926

	Men	Women	Both sexes
<i>Urban population</i>			
Total population	2,633,348	2,725,892	5,359,240
Total literate population	1,920,002	1,565,046	3,845,048
Ukrainian-language literates	742,265	500,901	1,242,566
Those literate in:			
1 Only Ukrainian	178,377	120,731	299,108
2 Ukrainian and Russian	504,531	337,583	842,114
3 Ukrainian and their native language (but not Russian)	8,053	6,418	14,471
4 Ukrainian, Russian and their native language	51,304	35,569	86,873
Russian-language literates	1,651,095	1,361,288	3,012,383
Those literate in:			
1 Only Russian	894,978	810,395	1,705,303
2 Russian and Ukrainian	504,531	337,583	842,114
3 Russian and their native language (but not Ukrainian)	200,282	177,741	378,023
4 Russian, Ukrainian and their native language	51,304	35,569	86,873
<i>Rural population</i>			
Total population	11,446,711	12,190,589	23,637,300
Total literate population	6,261,144	3,261,904	9,523,048
Ukrainian-language literates	3,943,893	1,907,518	5,851,411
Those literate in:			
1 Only Ukrainian	2,520,698	1,360,822	3,881,520
2 Ukrainian and Russian	1,364,054	510,265	1,874,319
3 Ukrainian and their native language (but not Russian)	33,852	22,220	56,072
4 Ukrainian, Russian and their native language	25,289	14,211	39,500
Russian-language literates	3,573,206	1,731,344	5,304,550
Those literate in:			
1 Only Russian	2,014,846	1,072,824	3,087,670
2 Russian and Ukrainian	1,364,054	510,265	1,874,319
3 Russian and their native language (but not Ukrainian)	169,017	134,044	303,061
4 Russian, Ukrainian, and their native language	25,289	14,211	39,500

	Men	Women	Both sexes
	<i>Total population</i>		
Total population	14,080,059	14,916,481	28,996,540
Total literate population	8,181,146	4,826,950	13,008,096
Ukrainian-language literates	4,686,158	2,407,819	7,093,977
Those literate in:			
1 Only Ukrainian	2,699,075	1,481,553	4,180,628
2 Ukrainian and Russian	1,868,585	847,848	2,716,433
3 Ukrainian and their native language (but not Russian)	41,905	28,638	70,543
4 Ukrainian, Russian and their native language	76,593	49,780	126,373
Russian-language literates	5,224,301	3,092,632	8,316,933
Those literate in:			
1 Only Russian	2,909,824	1,883,219	4,793,043
2 Russian and Ukrainian	1,868,585	847,848	2,716,433
3 Russian and their native language (but not Ukrainian)	369,299	311,785	681,084
4 Russian, Ukrainian and their native language	76,593	49,780	126,373

Source: *Korotki pidsumky perepysu naseleennia Ukrainy 17 hrudnia roku 1926* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. xix.

Appendix 5. Nationality and native language in the cities and countryside of the Ukrainian SSR, December 17, 1926

Nationality	People with a native language									Native language not given
	Of their own nationality			Of another nationality						
	Population	Number	Percent	Ukrainian		Russian		Another		
			Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
A Urban										
Ukrainians	2,536,499	1,888,996	74.5			626,848	24.7	3,687	0.1	16,968
Russians	1,343,689	1,322,100	98.4	13,106	0.1			700	0.05	7,783
Jews	1,218,615	858,732	70.4	7,997	0.6	344,308	28.3	672	0.06	6,906
Poles	98,747	54,472	55.2	15,510	15.7	27,773	28.1	275	0.3	717
Germans	34,253	23,632	69.0	736	2.1	9,427	27.5	225	0.7	233
B Rural										
Ukrainians	20,682,361	19,959,671	96.5			662,031	3.2	10,676	0.05	49,983
Russians	1,333,477	1,305,295	97.9	24,011	0.2			1,307	0.1	2,864
Jews	355,776	336,991	94.7	6,066	1.7	11,892	3.3	136	0.04	691
Poles	377,688	156,027	41.3	214,891	56.9	5,016	1.3	595	0.2	1,159
Germans	359,671	350,446	97.4	3,218	0.9	4,464	1.2	579	0.2	964
C Urban and rural (Total)										
Ukrainians	23,218,860	21,848,667	94.0			1,288,879	5.6	14,363	0.06	66,951
Russians	2,677,166	2,627,395	98.1	37,117	1.4			2,007	0.07	10,647
Jews	1,574,391	1,195,723	75.9	14,063	0.9	356,200	22.6	808	0.05	7,597
Poles	476,435	210,499	44.2	230,401	48.4	32,789	6.9	870	0.2	1,876
Germans	393,924	374,078	95.0	3,954	1.0	13,891	3.5	804	0.2	1,197

Source: *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, vol. 11 (Moscow, 1929), pp. 8-17, Table 6.

Appendix 6. Total economically independent population of the Ukrainian SSR by nationality and occupation, December 17, 1926

	Ukrainians		Russians		Jews		Others		Total number
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
<i>Engaged in</i>									
Agriculture	13,488,868	89.3	776,026	5.1	63,345	0.4	783,685	5.2	15,111,924
Industry	265,976	42.7	248,960	40.0	57,301	9.2	49,995	8.1	622,232
Handicrafts	175,535	44.3	45,901	11.6	149,554	37.7	25,397	6.4	396,387
Construction	29,361	50.8	18,360	31.8	7,458	12.9	2,635	4.5	57,814
Railway Transport	115,638	67.9	42,955	25.2	2,204	1.3	9,490	5.6	170,287
Other Transport	25,275	41.3	17,245	28.2	14,915	24.4	3,789	6.1	61,224
Trade	63,741	27.3	34,774	14.9	122,626	52.6	12,186	5.2	233,327
Institutions	178,841	54.1	74,161	22.4	55,627	16.8	21,748	6.7	330,377
Other branches of the economy/free professions/unknown	198,210	61.9	65,546	20.7	35,682	11.1	20,740	6.4	320,178
Unemployed	75,062	38.6	52,491	27.0	54,557	28.0	12,245	6.4	194,355
Non-agricultural Total	1,052,577	48.0	547,902	25.0	445,367	20.3	145,980	6.7	2,191,826
Total	14,541,445	84.0	1,323,928	7.7	508,712	2.9	929,665	5.4	17,303,750

Source: *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleeniia 1926 g.*, vol. 28 (Moscow, 1930), pp. 3-9, Table 1.

Appendix 7. *Urban economically independent population by nationality and occupation, December 17, 1926*

	Ukrainians		Russians		Jews		Others		Total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number
<i>Engaged in</i>									
Agriculture	363,666	85.5	36,514	8.6	8,210	1.9	16,719	4.0	425,109
Industry	172,786	36.2	215,346	45.0	51,971	10.9	37,766	7.9	477,869
Handicrafts	80,487	34.7	30,946	13.3	108,527	46.8	11,889	5.2	231,849
Construction	15,643	43.8	12,825	35.9	5,802	16.2	1,479	4.1	35,749
Railway Transport	71,760	62.0	34,770	30.0	1,953	1.7	7,144	6.3	115,627
Other Transport	19,857	37.9	16,580	31.6	12,697	24.2	3,287	6.3	52,421
Trade	42,911	24.5	30,361	17.3	93,097	53.1	8,915	5.1	175,284
Institutions	101,809	44.5	62,521	27.3	49,969	21.8	14,721	6.4	229,020
Other branches of the economy/free professions/unknown	113,481	54.4	53,792	25.8	29,337	14.0	12,126	5.8	208,736
Unemployed	57,370	34.2	48,317	28.8	51,771	30.9	10,215	6.1	167,673
 Non-agricultural Total	 618,734	 40.5	 457,141	 29.9	 353,353	 23.1	 97,327	 6.4	 1,526,555
Total	982,400	50.3	493,655	25.3	361,563	18.5	114,046	5.9	1,951,664

Source: *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 g.*, vol. 28 (Moscow, 1930), pp. 3-9, Table 1.

Appendix 8. Nationality of economically independent workers and total labor force in urban centers by region, December 17, 1926

	Total number	Ukrainians	Percent Ukrainians	Russians	Percent Russians	Jews	Percent Jews	Others	Percent others
<i>1. Donbass</i>									
Workers	226,695	73,011	32.2	132,000	58.2	2,620	1.2	19,064	8.4
Total labor	380,309	138,231	36.4	197,580	52.0	15,575	4.0	28,923	7.6
<i>2. Dnieper Industrial Region</i>									
Workers	71,716	33,357	46.5	24,560	34.3	7,548	10.5	6,251	8.7
Total labor	211,527	106,152	50.2	54,195	25.6	37,512	17.7	13,668	6.5
<i>3. Left Bank</i>									
Workers	112,931	66,888	59.2	27,282	24.2	14,226	12.6	4,535	4.0
Total labor	528,429	318,717	60.3	111,308	21.1	79,463	15.0	18,931	3.6
<i>4. Right Bank</i>									
Workers	111,500	57,353	51.4	17,421	15.6	29,248	26.2	7,478	6.7
Total labor	661,820	363,334	54.9	89,465	13.5	169,006	25.5	40,015	6.0
<i>5. Steppe</i>									
Workers	108,770	34,473	31.7	45,896	42.2	20,717	19.0	7,684	7.1
Total labor	496,281	180,841	36.4	162,198	32.7	115,519	23.3	37,723	7.6
<i>Total Ukrainian SSR</i>									
Workers	664,910	282,628	42.5	253,966	38.2	80,106	12.0	48,210	7.3
Total labor	2,467,008	1,217,648	49.4	644,604	26.1	456,326	18.5	148,430	6.0

Source: A. Khomenko, *Natsional'nyi sklad liudnosti USRR* (Kharkiv, 1931), p. 37.

Appendix 9. National composition of the working class in the Ukrainian SSR, 1926–1934

Branch of Economy/Year	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Poles	Others	Total
<i>Industry and construction</i>						
1926	297,000	290,800	86,000	14,300	27,200	716,300
1929	487,000	350,900	115,100	18,200	46,900	1,018,100
1931	907,700	543,900	216,900	31,500	49,000	1,749,000
1934 ^a	866,000	467,300	127,100	10,900	73,300	1,544,600
<i>Transportation/Communications</i>						
1926	154,000	61,500	9,300	3,800	9,800	238,400
1929	200,000	51,700	8,300	3,600	10,300	273,900
1931	249,300	65,100	11,800	3,000	8,100	337,300
1934 ^a	153,200	51,900	12,900	1,900	13,000	254,900
<i>Intellectual work/trade</i>						
1926	205,000	81,000	83,700	6,300	15,200	391,200
1929	287,300	77,000	101,100	7,400	20,800	493,600
1931	299,400	84,200	131,100	10,200	14,600	539,500
1934 ^a	234,400	69,300	92,000	3,200	20,400	419,300
<i>Service sector</i>						
1926	41,900	23,500	9,200	2,100	2,800	79,500
1929	56,000	27,500	13,200	2,700	4,600	104,000
1931	90,700	35,700	17,100	3,500	3,500	150,500
1934 ^a	49,600	20,400	13,000	1,100	5,300	89,400
<i>Agriculture</i>						
1926	120,000	26,300	4,600	4,500	5,200	160,600
1929	229,700	26,000	17,000	6,700	9,200	288,600
1931	345,900	39,200	25,600	10,008	13,800	434,500
1934 ^a	152,200	20,900	6,000	2,600	7,600	189,300
<i>All branches of the economy</i>						
1926	818,800	483,100	192,800	31,000	60,200	1,585,900
1929	1,260,700	532,500	254,700	38,600	91,800	2,178,300
1931	1,893,000	768,100	402,500	58,200	89,000	3,210,800
1934 ^a	1,455,400	629,800	251,000	19,700	119,600	2,497,500

^a Statistics for 1934 include approximately 50 percent of all workers.

Source: O. M. Asatkin, ed., *Narodne gospodarstvo USRR (Statystychnyi dovidnyk)* (Kiev, 1935), p. 386.

Appendix 10. Number of members of trade unions in the Ukrainian SSR, 1921–1934 (on October 1)

Year	Agriculture and Forestry	Industry and Construction	Transport and Communications	Intellectual work	Other unions	All unions
1921	72,500	486,300	305,700	448,000	58,000	1,370,500
1926	208,000	832,400	279,700	426,400	86,800	1,833,300
1928	241,400	1,001,600	284,000	479,700	101,400	2,108,100
1930	285,500	1,155,000	285,600	509,700	103,800	2,339,600
1932	284,200	1,719,600	372,000	634,800	184,600	3,195,200
1933 ^a	296,400	1,666,900	361,200	726,000	175,400	3,225,900
1934	374,800	1,773,200	437,900	679,800	190,100	3,493,600

^a July 1, 1933

Source: O. M. Asatkin, ed., *Narodne gospodarstvo USRR (Statystychnyi dovidnyk)* (Kiev, 1935), p. 475.

Appendix 11. *National composition and conversational language of trade-union workers and bureaucrats, May 1926 (percent)*

Area	Nationality				Conversational language			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Jewish	Other	Ukrainian	Russian	Yiddish	Other
<i>Polissia</i>								
Chernihiv	67.4	12.7	17.0	2.9	35.3	68.7	13.2	0.8
Hlukhiv	67.9	24.5	6.4	1.2	21.8	82.5	5.2	0.4
Konotip	74.6	17.0	5.2	3.2	60.5	55.5	3.8	0.9
Korosten'	51.7	9.3	24.9	14.1	44.1	36.8	22.5	7.8
Zhytomyr	49.3	9.7	27.0	14.0	49.8	31.8	24.1	9.0
<i>Right Bank</i>								
Berdychiv	50.5	9.0	29.0	11.2	51.7	24.1	26.2	6.8
Bila Tserkva	73.7	5.9	14.7	5.7	72.5	12.4	12.8	3.0
Cherkasy	78.6	6.4	12.8	2.2	77.7	23.3	10.8	0.9
Kamianets'	65.8	6.0	20.4	7.8	64.9	27.7	17.5	5.7
Kiev	49.4	24.0	20.3	6.3	35.2	66.8	11.1	2.9
Mohyliv	62.8	5.5	24.4	7.3	61.0	22.1	21.0	4.9
Proskuriv	59.8	6.9	21.5	11.8	56.8	23.8	19.1	8.1
Shepetivka	60.6	6.6	17.6	15.2	61.0	22.9	15.4	9.3
Tul'chyn	65.0	7.2	19.9	7.9	63.8	29.1	18.2	4.4
Uman'	71.0	5.9	17.5	5.6	69.4	20.8	15.4	3.4
Vinnysia	59.0	9.3	23.9	7.8	56.8	31.2	19.5	4.4
<i>Left Bank</i>								
Kharkov	47.5	34.4	14.0	4.1	28.3	77.1	4.7	2.3
Kremenchuk	64.9	10.5	23.0	1.6	47.0	52.7	17.5	0.4
Kupianka	73.6	24.1	1.0	1.3	51.3	53.6	0.4	0.2
Lubni	77.7	6.6	13.2	2.5	77.2	24.1	9.4	0.6
Nizhen	79.6	9.3	8.5	2.6	70.3	41.0	6.1	0.8
Ozium	81.1	14.2	1.5	3.2	58.8	65.6	0.8	1.4
Poltava	77.2	9.1	10.8	2.9	73.4	41.4	5.8	1.0
Pryluka	74.1	8.0	15.5	2.4	73.0	27.8	13.0	0.5
Romen	74.4	7.9	12.9	4.8	67.7	32.3	10.4	0.6
Sumy	84.4	11.2	2.4	2.0	64.1	64.4	1.1	0.6
<i>Donbass</i>								
Artemivs'ke	54.7	26.2	3.0	16.1	25.4	77.2	1.3	3.5
Luhans'ke	38.0	55.9	1.6	4.5	13.9	84.6	0.7	3.5
Stalino	29.5	62.7	2.1	5.7	13.2	77.1	0.8	3.0
<i>Dnieper Industrial Region</i>								
Dnipropetrovs'ke	46.3	34.9	11.7	7.4	43.0	72.6	5.6	2.5
Kryvyi Rih	64.0	30.2	4.4	1.4	38.8	71.4	2.5	0.5
Zaporizhzhia	56.6	24.7	10.2	8.5	38.0	59.9	4.5	5.8
<i>Steppe Region</i>								
Kherson	48.9	31.9	15.4	3.8	24.4	78.4	7.8	1.8
Mariupil'	41.9	40.8	7.4	9.9	15.0	82.2	3.1	4.2
Melitopil'	40.9	35.4	11.9	11.8	23.7	71.1	5.7	8.0
Nikolaev	45.5	33.6	14.6	6.3	15.9	82.0	6.7	3.2
Odessa	23.9	40.0	26.9	9.2	10.6	83.6	14.3	4.2
Pervomais'ke	64.8	10.5	20.0	4.7	56.8	37.9	16.2	2.0
Starobil's'ke	85.1	11.5	1.4	2.0	62.7	49.9	0.4	0.3
Zinovivs'k	66.9	13.2	16.5	3.4	37.4	65.1	10.8	1.1
Total (Ukraine)	49.9	31.6	12.8	5.7	33.2	66.0	7.5	3.1

Source: *Trud i profsoiuzy na Ukraïne: Statisticheskii spravochnik za 1921-1928 g.g.* (Kharkov, 1930), pp. 114-15.

Appendix 12. *National composition of various trade union groupings, 1926–1931 (percent)*

Trade union groups	Ukrainians		Russians		Jews		Others		Total
	1926	1931	1926	1931	1926	1931	1926	1931	
Agricultural	74.5	75.4	16.4	11.5	2.9	8.4	6.2	4.7	100.0
Industrial	41.6	51.9	40.6	31.1	12.0	12.4	5.8	4.6	100.0
Transportation/communications	64.6	73.9	25.8	19.3	3.9	3.5	5.7	3.3	100.0
Intellectual work	52.4	55.5	20.7	15.6	21.4	24.3	5.5	4.6	100.0
Other	52.7	60.3	29.6	23.7	11.6	11.4	6.1	4.6	100.0
Total	49.9	58.1	31.6	25.0	12.8	12.4	5.7	4.5	100.0

Sources: L. Zinger, *Natsional'nyi sostav proletariata v SSSR* (Moscow, 1934), p. 79; *Ukraina: Statystychnyi shchorichnyk* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 229; VURPS, *Profspilky Ukrainy do V Vseukrains'koho z'izdu profspilok. Diiahramy do dopovidi t. Chuvyrina* (Kharkiv, 1932), p. 35.

Appendix 13. National composition and conversational language of trade-union workers and bureaucrats, October 1929 (percent)

Area	Nationality				Conversational language			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Jewish	Other	Ukrainian	Russian	Yiddish	Other
<i>Polissia</i>								
Chernihiv	70.6	13.1	13.6	2.7	47.6	44.9	7.2	0.3
Hlukhiv	71.4	22.4	5.0	1.2	22.9	75.8	n/a	n/a
Konotip	81.1	8.6	8.0	3.3	66.3	29.7	3.5	0.5
Korosten'	49.6	6.1	32.4	11.9	51.4	15.7	27.1	5.8
Zhytomyr	48.6	6.8	28.7	15.9	48.8	18.0	23.7	9.5
<i>Right Bank</i>								
Berdychiv	59.6	4.5	26.3	9.6	64.3	11.5	20.9	3.3
Bila Tserkva	76.8	3.4	15.5	4.3	80.6	6.6	11.6	1.2
Cherkasy	84.0	3.5	11.1	1.4	84.4	8.6	7.2	0.2
Kamianets'	67.8	3.9	21.9	6.4	69.4	10.4	17.5	2.7
Kiev	53.8	17.4	22.4	6.4	37.7	53.2	7.7	1.4
Mohyliv	74.7	2.9	18.0	4.4	77.3	8.0	13.1	1.6
Proskuriv	60.8	4.1	22.9	12.2	63.5	12.1	17.8	6.6
Shepetivka	60.4	4.3	20.7	14.6	66.7	10.6	16.6	6.1
Tul'chyn	71.6	5.8	17.2	5.4	73.2	10.8	14.3	1.7
Uman'	76.7	3.5	16.1	3.7	79.1	7.5	12.0	1.4
Vinnytsia	63.1	6.3	23.3	7.3	65.7	14.7	17.3	2.3
<i>Left Bank</i>								
Kharkov	52.9	28.0	15.3	3.8	33.8	63.2	2.0	1.0
Kremenchuk	69.3	7.4	21.6	4.7	60.0	29.9	10.0	0.1
Kupianka	79.3	17.7	1.2	1.8	68.9	30.9	0.1	0.1
Lubni	83.4	4.8	9.7	2.1	84.9	11.0	4.0	0.1
Nizhen	84.5	6.2	6.6	2.7	81.6	15.8	2.2	2.6
Ozium	82.0	13.1	2.0	2.9	70.6	28.3	0.3	0.3
Poltava	82.2	6.8	8.7	2.3	80.9	16.4	2.3	0.4
Pryluka	81.6	4.7	11.6	2.1	83.2	10.1	6.4	0.3
Romen	82.0	7.5	7.7	2.8	81.4	14.2	4.0	0.4
Sumy	87.6	8.5	2.2	1.7	73.0	26.5	0.4	0.1
<i>Donbass</i>								
Artemivs'ke	49.4	41.4	3.0	6.2	26.3	71.3	0.3	2.1
Luhans'ke	38.3	53.4	2.0	6.3	20.8	75.5	0.3	3.4
Stalino	30.6	59.2	2.6	7.6	18.2	78.2	0.5	3.1
<i>Dnieper Industrial Region</i>								
Dnipropetrovs'ke	54.2	25.3	13.6	6.9	40.8	55.5	2.6	1.1
Kyryvi Rih	76.0	14.3	6.5	3.2	69.0	28.0	2.2	0.8
Zaporizhzhia	58.0	26.0	9.5	6.5	43.5	51.8	1.6	3.1
<i>Steppe Region</i>								
Kherson	63.1	18.3	14.2	4.4	40.3	54.5	3.8	1.4
Mariupil'	39.1	40.6	7.8	12.5	16.7	78.7	1.1	3.5
Melitopil'	47.2	32.3	9.7	10.8	36.8	55.6	1.1	6.5
Nikolaev	47.7	28.3	16.7	7.3	20.3	72.3	4.5	2.9
Odessa	24.3	35.2	31.3	9.2	11.6	77.8	7.7	2.9
Pervomais'ke	68.8	7.2	19.8	4.2	65.9	20.1	12.9	1.1
Starobil's'ke	75.8	20.8	1.3	2.1	65.0	34.3	0.1	0.6
Zinovivs'k	73.2	9.4	14.2	3.2	58.1	35.5	5.8	0.6
Total (Ukraine)	57.2	25.1	11.7	6.0	43.9	49.1	n/a	n/a

Source: *Natsional'nyi perepys robotnykiv ta sluzhbovtiv Ukrainy (zhovten' – lystopad 1929 r.)* (Kharkiv, 1930), pp. 76–81, 96–101.

Appendix 14. National composition of members and candidate-members of the KP(b)U, 1922–1931

Date	Ukrainians		Russians		Others		Total number of members
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Jan. 1922	11,920	23.3	27,490	53.6	11,826	23.1	51,236
July 1, 1924	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	87,589
Jan. 1, 1925	37,537	36.9	44,190	43.4	20,125	19.7	101,852
July 1, 1925	48,678	39.8	49,616	40.6	25,716	19.6	124,010
Jan. 1, 1926	66,455	43.9	57,004	37.4	28,480	18.7	151,939
Jan. 10, 1927	87,185	52.0	46,156	27.5	34,746	20.5	168,087
Jan. 1, 1928	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	196,752
Jan. 1, 1929	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	231,360
Jan. 1, 1930	131,029	52.3	71,176	28.4	48,476	19.3	250,681
Jan. 1, 1931	193,210	56.0	91,084	26.4	60,723	17.6	345,017
July 1, 1931	243,414	58.2	102,669	24.6	71,930	17.2	418,023

Source: RKP(b) v tsifrah (Moscow, 1924–25), vols. 2–3; Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrah (Moscow, 1924–32); vols. 4–9, 11; and V. Zhebrovs'kyi, *Rist partii* (Kharkiv, 1930), p. 52.

Appendix 15. Members and candidate-members of the KP(b)U by social origin and current occupation, 1922–1931 (percent)

Date	By social origin				By current occupation			
	Workers	Peasants	White-collar employees	Other	Workers	Peasants	White-collar employees	Other
Apr. 1, 1922	28.4	42.9	9.9	15.1	51.2	17.5	28.9	2.4
Jan. 1, 1925	71.5	16.4	10.6	1.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
July 1, 1925	73.1	16.1	9.4	1.4	49.2	4.9	35.3	10.6
Jan. 1, 1926	68.2	20.7	10.6	1.0	46.1	7.5	35.4	11.0
Jan. 1, 1927	65.4	22.8	10.9	0.9	42.2	11.3	33.6	12.2
Jan. 10, 1927	65.6	22.8	10.9	0.7	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Jan. 1, 1928	66.3	18.5	13.6	1.6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Oct. 1, 1928	68.5	17.4	13.1	1.0	45.1	10.6	35.0	9.3
Jan. 1, 1930	73.1	15.9	11.0	1.0	50.7	8.3	31.0	10.0
Apr. 1, 1930	74.4	15.6	10.0		51.8	9.2	29.7	9.3
July 1, 1930	73.9	16.7	9.4		51.5	10.7	29.1	8.7
Oct. 1, 1930	71.8	19.2	9.0		51.5	13.4	26.5	8.6
Jan. 1, 1931	71.9	20.1	8.0		49.2	14.1	26.6	10.1
Apr. 1, 1931	71.9	21.1	7.0		48.9	15.4	26.3	9.4
July 1, 1931	71.3	22.2	6.5		48.4	16.4	26.4	8.8

Source: *Itogi partperepisi 1922 g. na Ukraine v dvukh chastiakh* (Kharkov, 1922), p. viii; *RKP(b) v tsifrah* (Moscow, 1925), vol. 3; and *Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrah* (Moscow, 1924–32), vols. 4–9, 11.

Appendix 16. *New KP(b)U members promoted from the ranks of candidate-members by social origin and current occupation, 1925–1931 (percent)*

Date	By social origin				By current occupation			
	Workers	Peasants	White-collar employees	Other	Workers	Peasants	White-collar employees	Other
Jan.–June 1925	88.6	7.8	3.6	0.0	70.7	3.7	17.6	8.0
July–Dec. 1925	82.0	11.9	6.1	0.0	68.9	3.0	22.4	5.7
July–Dec. 1926	67.9	20.5	9.6	2.0	54.5	14.3	22.8	8.4
Jan.–Dec. 1927	61.0	27.3	9.9	1.8	50.8	17.9	23.4	7.9
Jan.–Sept. 1928	65.1	23.1	10.7	1.1	53.0	17.6	17.5	1.9
Jan.–Mar. 1930	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	86.6	8.7	2.6	2.1
Apr.–June 1930	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	71.9	20.5	4.3	3.3
July–Sept. 1930	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	50.0	40.7	5.7	3.6
Oct.–Dec. 1930	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	65.6	28.6	3.6	2.0
Jan.–Mar. 1931	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	69.5	24.7	3.3	2.5
Apr.–June 1931	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	63.5	31.0	3.2	2.3

Source: *Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrah* (Moscow, 1924–32), vols. 4–9, 11.

Appendix 17. *New KP(b)U candidate-members by social origin and current occupation, 1925–1928 (percent)*

Date	By social origin				By current occupation			
	Workers	Peasants	White-collar employees	Other	Workers	Peasants	White-collar employees	Other
Jan.–June 1925	73.2	18.5	6.0		n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
July–Dec. 1925	50.3	36.9	12.8	2.4	45.6	16.6	30.2	7.6
July–Dec. 1926	58.5	28.9	10.2	2.5	50.7	25.1	14.5	9.7
Jan.–Dec. 1927	79.4	17.2	2.5	0.9	72.8	15.0	7.4	4.8
Jan.–Sept. 1928	82.7	14.5	2.1	1.2	78.7	9.7	7.8	3.8

Source: *Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrah* (Moscow, 1924–32), vols. 4–9, 11.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu ukrains'koiu* (Philadelphia, 1955; first published in Kharkiv, 1930), pp. 59–60.
- 2 Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (Berkeley, CA, 1977), pp. 314–15.
- 3 Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism," in his *Thought and Change* (Chicago, 1965), p. 166.
- 4 The author developed these ideas from Charles Tilly, "Town and country in revolution," in John Wilson Lewis, ed., *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia* (Stanford, CA, 1974), p. 289.
- 5 Kommunisticheskaia akademiia, Kommissiia po izucheniiu natsional'nogo voprosa, *Natsional'naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrah* (Moscow, 1930), p. 36.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- 7 The best recent survey of Ukrainian history in English is Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto, 1988). The best short English-language interpretations of Ukrainian history include the articles by Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Arthur E. Adams, and Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, Jr. in *Slavic Review*, 22, no. 2 (1963), pp. 199–262. Also see David Saunders, "What makes a nation a nation? Ukrainians since 1600," in Wendy Bracewell, Anthony Smith, and Tamara Dragadze, eds., *National Identity in Russia, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe* (London, 1992), vol. 1.
- 8 Public Record Office, London, CAB 24/52, ff. 117 and 117 (verso). In his report the anonymous author uses the Russian word "chinovnik," which I translate throughout the text as bureaucrat. I am indebted to David Saunders for providing me with a copy of this document.
- 9 Saunders, "What makes a nation a nation?" p. 10. For an alternate point of view, see Ron G. Suny, "Nationalism and class as factors in the Revolution of 1917," Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Working Paper No. 365 (October 1988).
- 10 Borys Antonenko-Davydovych described a Ukrainian nationalist agitator's play on these feelings of powerlessness in 1917: "'And who are Ukrainians, I ask you?' And again he answered his own question. 'Those who the Empress Catherine and Tsar Peter oppressed two hundred years ago! . . . Catherine's lovers, those damned parasites, took apart the Zaporozhian

- lands [of the Cossacks – GL], and transformed us into Muscovite serfs.'" B. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Pechatka* (Melbourne, 1979; first published in Kharkiv, 1930), pp. 46–47.
- 11 V. Skorovstanskii [V. Shakhrai], *Revoliutsiia na Ukraine* (2nd ed., Saratov, 1919), pp. 7–8.
 - 12 Eugene Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–1947* (New York, 1948), p. 36. Also see Lars T. Lih, *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914–1921* (Berkeley, CA and London, 1990).
 - 13 This phrase comes from Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism in the First World: the present in historical perspective," in Milton Esman, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World* (Ithaca, NY, 1977), p. 32.
 - 14 The most useful Soviet works on this period include: A. B. Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy v bor'be za sozdanie fundamenta sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki* (1926–1932 gg.) (Kiev, 1963); *Istoriia robitnychoho klasy Ukrainy'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1967); S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi, *Uchast' robitnykiv Ukrainy u stvorenni fondu sotsialistichnoi industrializatsii* (Kiev, 1975); A. I. Epshtein, *Robitnyky Ukrainy v borot'bi za stvorennia material'no – tekhnichnoi bazy sotsializmu* (1928–1932 rr.) (Kharkiv, 1968); V. Ie. Loburets', *Formuvannia kadriv radians'koho robitnychoho klasy Ukrainy (1921–1932 rr.)* (Kharkiv, 1974). The most recent exception to this pattern of neglecting the national factor is: V. S. Lozyts'kyi, "Polityka ukrainizatsii v 20–30-kh rokakh: istoriia, problemy, uroky," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 3 (1989), pp. 46–55.
 - 15 The most useful Western studies include: Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918–1953: A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy* (New York, 1956); G. S. N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917–1934* (New York, 1956; 2nd ed., Durham, NC, 1990); Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917–1957* (New York, 1962); James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1917–1933* (Cambridge, MA, 1983); Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (New York and London, 1985), chs. 2–3; and Subtelny, *Ukraine*, chs. 20–21.
 - 16 For a brief study of developments among non-Ukrainians in this period, see A. B. Glinskii, *Natsional'nye menshinstva na Ukraine* (Kharkov–Kiev, 1931).
 - 17 Legitimacy is the population's recognition of the government's right to rule. Dolf Sternberger, "Legitimacy," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (2nd ed., New York, 1968), 9, p. 244.
 - 18 See Leopold H. Haimson, "The problem of social identities in early twentieth century Russia," and the discussion by William G. Rosenberg and Alfred J. Rieber in *Slavic Review*, 47, no. 1 (1988), pp. 1–38; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The Bolsheviks' dilemma: class, culture, and politics in the early Soviet years," and the discussion by Ronald Grigor Suny and Daniel Orlovsky in *Slavic Review*, 47, no. 4 (1988), pp. 599–626. With the exception of Rieber, the authors imply that only class identities are synonymous with social identities and that only the question of class identities dominated the Soviet political scene.

1 The Ukrainian environment, 1861–1921

- 1 M. N. Leshchenko, *Klasova borot'ba v ukrains'komu seli na pochatku XX stolittia* (Kiev, 1968), p. 13.
- 2 Vsevolod Holubnychy, "The 1917 agrarian revolution in Ukraine," in Iwan S. Koropec'kyj, ed., *Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 3–5.
- 3 In 1897 the population density in the Ukrainian provinces was 55 per sq. km. in 1926, 64 per sq. km. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union* (Geneva, 1946), pp. 13, 67. Also see Robert Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest* (Ithaca, NY, 1987).
- 4 Leshchenko, *Klasova borot'ba*, p. 33.
- 5 In tsarist Russia, a clear distinction between urban and rural settlements was never established. Criteria by which a settlement qualified for status as a city were also absent. Beginning with Peter the Great, urban status was determined largely by the needs of the state in administering its territories. As a result, the city as an administrative center and as a relatively complex and multifunctional social and economic entity often did not coincide. By the end of the nineteenth century, very few cities in the Empire were capitalist cities *per se*. For a discussion of the complexity of this problem, see Thomas S. Fedor, *Patterns of Urban Growth in the Russian Empire During the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1975), pp. 1–17.
- 6 Fedor, *Patterns*, p. 40. For a discussion of the deficiencies of these tsarist censuses, see *ibid.*, pp. 13–22.
- 7 I. K. Vologodtsev, *Osobennosti razvitiia gorodov Ukrainy* (Kharkov, 1930), pp. 49, 51.
- 8 Mykola Porsh, "Robitnytstvo Ukrainy: narys po statystytsi pratsi," *Zapysky Ukrains'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyivi*, 12 (1913), pp. 159–62.
- 9 *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 98. For a history of cities in the Russian Empire and in the Ukrainian provinces, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, Alberta, 1980); Michael F. Hamm, ed., *The City in Russian History* (Lexington, KY, 1976); Michael F. Hamm, ed., *The City in Late Imperial Russia* (Bloomington, IN, 1986); Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History, 1794–1914* (Cambridge, MA, 1986); and Daniel Browder, *The Russian City Between Tradition and Modernity, 1850–1900* (Berkeley, CA, 1990).
- 10 This figure is reached by calculating the 1926 okrugs back to the 1897 uyezds. *Korotki pidsumky perepysu naseleattia Ukrainy 17 hrudnia roku 1926* (Kharkiv, 1928), pp. viiff and pp. 204–9, compared the populations of 1897 and 1926. The First All-Russian Census of 1897 did not collect data on national self-identification. The information concerning nationality which follows is based upon the native language (*rodnoi iazyk*) claimed by the respondents. Inasmuch as national identification and language do not necessarily correspond, the 1897 census underestimated the number of Ukrainians. Nevertheless, because few non-Ukrainians learned Ukrainian and because language use is a convenient identifiable badge, language *could* represent a minimal approximation to nationality in the Ukrainian

provinces of 1897. The nationality information compiled from the 1897 census, however, is not completely comparable to those figures obtained from the later Soviet censuses, which contained different questions and took place after complex territorial changes. Sole knowledge of Ukrainian, however, did not coincide with any high degree of national awareness, ethnic cohesion, political assertiveness, or ability to act collectively on the part of the speaker.

- 11 *Kоротki pidsumky*, p. 206.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 *Istoriia mist i sil Ukrain's'koi RSR, Kyiv* (Kiev, 1968), p. 132; cited in Steven L. Guthier, "Ukrainian cities during the revolution and the interwar period," in Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, p. 176.
- 14 Patricia Herlihy, "Ukrainian cities in the nineteenth century," in Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, p. 151; *Mis'ki selyshcha USSR. Zbirnyk stat.-ekonomichnykh vidomostei* (Kharkiv, 1929), pp. 2–17.
- 15 M. Porsh, "Ekonomichni vidnosyny Ukrainy do inshykh raioniv Rossii na robitnychomu rynku," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, 57, books 2, 3 (1913), pp. 313–27, 521–45; and "Robitnytstvo Ukrainy," 10 (1912), pp. 91–157; 11, 12 (1913), pp. 107–62, 131–57.
- 16 Porsh, "Ekonomichni vidnosyny," p. 321.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 325. These calculations, however, do not measure the national composition of the labor force. Not all of the migrating indigenous workers were Ukrainians, nor were all of the workers from outside the Ukrainian gubernias non-Ukrainian. Thus, for example, although the largest contingent of workers who migrated to the Ukraine came from the Russian provinces, not all of the migrants were necessarily Russian. A large number of Ukrainians lived within the Russian gubernias, especially those which bordered the Ukraine. According to Porsh's calculations from the 1897 census, 2,344,000 Ukrainians, 37.1 percent of the total population, lived in Bessarabia and in the Voronezh, Don, and Kursk. Thus, all things being equal, a number of Ukrainians from these regions migrated back to the Ukrainian gubernias. Porsh, "Ekonomichni vidnosyny", pp. 525–26.
- 18 Porsh, "Robitnytstvo Ukrainy," p. 113.
- 19 Porsh, "Ekonomichni vidnosyny," pp. 325–26.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 542.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 325.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 542.
- 23 Ralph Carter Elwood, *Russian Social Democracy in the Underground: A Study of the RSDRP in the Ukraine, 1907–1914* (Assen, 1974), p. 8.
- 24 *Dinamika rossiiskoi i sovetiskoi promyshlennosti v sviazi s razvitiem narodnogo khoziaistva za sorok let (1887–1926 gg.)*, vol. 1, part 3 (Moscow, 1930), cited in Iu. I. Kir'ianov, *Rabochie iuga Rossii (1914–fevral' 1917 g.)* (Moscow, 1971), p. 29.
- 25 Porsh, "Robitnytstvo Ukrainy," 12, pp. 134–5. P. L. Varhatiuk, I. L. Holushiak, and I. F. Kuras, "Na shliakhu do I z'izdu KP(b)U," in *Pro munyle zarady maibutn'oho* (Kiev, 1989), p. 24, assert that 66.0 percent of the labor force was Ukrainian.

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- 26 Varhatiuk *et al.*, in "Na shliakhu do I z'izdu KP(b)U," p. 24, assert that Ukrainians constituted 35.0 percent of the industrial labor force in the Ukrainian provinces in 1897.
- 27 V. I. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad naseleennia Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1965), pp. 43–44.
- 28 Porsh, "Robitnytstvo Ukrainy," 11 (1913), p. 126. For the origins and development of the labor force in the Donbass, see Theodore H. Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, vol. 1, *Life and Work in Russia's Donbass, 1869–1924* (Princeton, NJ, 1989), pp. 193–259.
- 29 P. P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, *Rossii: Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva* (St Petersburg, 1910), vol. 14, p. 182; cited in Michael M. Luther, "The birth of Soviet Ukraine" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1962), pp. 73–74. Semanov-Tian-Shanskii, unfortunately, did not provide any statistics.
- 30 David Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism: A Social and Historical Study of Russian Social-Democracy, 1898–1907* (Assen, 1969), p. 159.
- 31 Porsh, "Robitnytstvo Ukrainy," 12, pp. 134–35.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 135.
- 33 Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 22–23.
- 34 See George Y. Boshyk, "The rise of Ukrainian political parties in Russia, 1900–1907: with special reference to Social Democracy" (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1981).
- 35 Holubnychy, "The 1917 agrarian revolution," p. 6.
- 36 The best study of the Ukrainian Revolution remains: John S. Reshetar, Jr., *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ, 1952).
- 37 Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Takoi my khochemo avtonomii i federatsii?" in his *Vybrani pratsi* (New York, 1960), p. 148. For the best biography of Hrushevs'kyi, see Thomas Prymak, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto, 1987).
- 38 Holubnychy, "The 1917 agrarian revolution," p. 37.
- 39 V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrozhennia natsii* (Kiev–Vienna, 1920), 3, p. 82.
- 40 V. Manilov, ed. *1917 god na Kievshchine: khronika sobytii* (Kiev, 1928), p. 15.
- 41 D. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy, 1917–1923* (Uzhhorod, 1932), 1, p. 143.
- 42 *Ibid.*
- 43 *Ibid.*, 1, p. 144.
- 44 Calculated from Oliver H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge, MA, 1950), p. 79.
- 45 *Ibid.*, pp. 29n, 30.
- 46 See Steven L. Guthier's excellent article, "The popular base of Ukrainian nationalism in 1917," *Slavic Review*, 38, no. 1 (1979), pp. 30–47.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 42. Also Table 4, *ibid.*, p. 43. The same point should be made regarding the votes cast for the Bolsheviks. Because of a large number of Russian troops in Ukrainian cities, their support was magnified.

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- 49 See Fedir Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 roku* (Kiev, 1930), reprinted as Fedir Savchenko, *The Suppression of the Ukrainian Activities in 1876* (Munich, 1970).
- 50 Mykyta Shapoval, *Velyka revoliutsiia i ukrains'ka vyzvol'na prohrama* (Prague, 1927), p. 107; cited in Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution*, p. 329.
- 51 For a fictionalized description of the Russian urban attitudes toward Ukrainians in Kiev in this period, see Mikhail Bulgakov, *The White Guard*, trans. by Michael Glenny (London, 1971), esp. p. 62.
- 52 Solomon I. Goldelman, *Jewish National Autonomy in the Ukraine, 1917–1920* (Chicago, 1968).
- 53 Henryk Jablonski, *Polska autonomia narodowa na Ukrainie 1917–1918* (Warsaw, 1948).
- 54 Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*, 1, pp. 255–56.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 258.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 256.
- 57 Georgi Piatakov, the chairman of the Kiev RSDRP(b) committee and a fierce opponent of Lenin's concept of national self-determination, best expressed this attitude in June 1917: "generally we should not support the Ukrainians, for this movement is not advantageous to the proletariat. Russia cannot exist without the Ukrainian sugar industry, the same can be said for coal (the Donets Basin), grain (the Black Earth belt), etc. The branches of industry are closely connected with all the rest of Russia's industry. Moreover, the Ukraine does not form a distinct economic region, for it does not possess banking centers, as Finland does." "Kyivs'ka orhanizatsiia bil'shovykiv pro natsional'nyi rukh na Ukraini. Zasiadannia kyivs'koho komitety bil'shovykiv 17(4) chervnia 1917 r.," in Kiev, Institut istorii partii, *Istoriia KP(b)U v materialakh i dokumentakh (Khrestomatiia), Vypusk druhyi, 1917–1920* (Kiev, 1934), p. 126. Cited hereafter as *Khrestomatiia*.
- 58 Elias Tcherikower, *Antisemitizm i pogromy na Ukraine 1917–1918 gg.* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 216–18.
- 59 Oleh S. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1918* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1971), p. 124; cited in Holubnychy, *Soviet Regional Economics*, p. 45.
- 60 For an analysis of Skoropads'kyi's rule, see Taras Hunczak, "The Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyi," in T. Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1977), pp. 61–81; and Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East*, esp. pp. 60–183.
- 61 The most useful studies of the Ukrainian Revolution include Arthur E. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918–1919* (New Haven, CT, 1963); Petr A. Arshinov, *History of the Makhmovist Movement, 1918–1921* (Detroit, 1974); Juri Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917–1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination* (2nd ed., Edmonton, Alberta, 1980); Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy*; Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East*; Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921*; Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrains'koi revoliutsii, 1917–1920 rr.*

- (Vienna, 1921–22), 4 vols.; Michael Paliy, *The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918–1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution* (Seattle, WA, 1976); Guthier, “The popular base of Ukrainian nationalism in 1917”; Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Nationalism and Communism, 1917–1923* (rev. ed., New York, 1968); Frantishek Silnicky, *Natsional'naia politika KPSS v period s 1917 po 1922 god* (Munich, 1978); and Vynnychenko, *Vidrozhennia natsii*.
- 62 Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution*, pp. 140–41.
- 63 Geoff Eley, “Remapping the nation: war, revolutionary upheaval, and state formation in Eastern Europe, 1914–1923,” in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988), pp. 205–46.
- 64 Hordii Stepovyk, Matvii Podoliak ta inshi, *Lysty vid ukrains'kykh khliborobiv do ukrains'koi intelihentsii* (Vienna, 1921), p. 46.
- 65 M. Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia kommunisticheskoi partii (b-ov) Ukrainy* (Kharkov, 1923), pp. 123, 126.

2 The Bolshevik response

- 1 See Marc Raeff, “Patterns of Russian imperial policy toward the nationalities,” in Edward Allworth, ed., *Soviet Nationality Problems* (New York, 1971), pp. 22–42; and Marc Raeff, “Un empire comme les autres?” in *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 30, no. 3–4 (1989), pp. 321–28.
- 2 Rossiiskaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (b), *Desiatyi s'ezd RKP(b). Mart 1921 g.* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 215, 578; and Kommunisticheskaia akademiia, *Natsional'naia politika VKP(b)*, p. 36.
- 3 A. Liakhov, “Gorodskoe i sel'skoe naselenie R.S.F.S.R. i soiuznykh respublik,” *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, no. 1 (130) (January 10, 1922), p. 1.
- 4 RKP(b), *Desiatyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, p. 215 (I. Stalin).
- 5 S. Pestkovskii, “Natsional'naia kul'tura,” *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, no. 21 (29) (June 8, 1919), p. 1.
- 6 See *Natsional'naia politika VKP(b)*, pp. 271–72.
- 7 See the talks by Safarov and Mikoian, *Protokoly X s'ezda RKP(b)*, pp. 192–96, 211; and Trotsky, “Mysli o partii. II. Natsional'nyi vopros i vospitanie partiinoi molodezhi,” *Pravda*, March 20, 1923, p. 2.
- 8 See Safarov's talk, *Protokoly X s'ezda RKP(b)*, pp. 152–56 (especially p. 155 where he spoke of Russian kulaks and policemen joining the Bolshevik Party in Turkestan).
- 9 P. S-ich, “Partorganizatsii natsional'nykh raionov,” *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti*, no. 10–11 (1932), p. 144.
- 10 For an analysis of the Marxist ideological heritage on the national question, see Roman Rosdolsky, “Friedrich Engels und das Problem der ‘Geschichtslosen Volker’ (Die Nationalitätenfrage in der Revolution 1848/49 im Lichte der Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung),” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 4 (1964), pp. 87–282; Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist–Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, NJ, 1984), chs. 1 and 2; and Roman Szporluk,

- Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (New York, 1988).
- 11 Iwan Majstrenko, *Borot'bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York, 1954), p. 103.
- 12 Sullivan, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine*, p. 331.
- 13 Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine*, p. 31.
- 14 For Bolshevik attitudes toward the non-Russian nationalities prior to 1917, see Pipes, *Formation*, pp. 1–45; and Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution* (New York, 1984), 2, pp. 398–405.
- 15 I. Kulyk, "Kievskaiia organizatsiia v fevrale–oktiabre 1917 g.," *Letopis' revoliutsii*, no. 1 (6) (1924), p. 197.
- 16 S. I. Hopner, "Katerynoslavs'ka orhanizatsiia bil'shovykiv. (a) Pershi tyzhni revoliutsii (z spohadiv S. I. Hopner)," *Khrestomatiia*, p. 66. In 1910, Ekaterinoslav/Dnipropetrovs'ke possessed a population of 248,355; in 1920 – 189,900. See *Mis'ki selyshcha USSR*, pp. 4–8.
- 17 V. Lenin, "Manifest do ukrains'koho narodu z ul'tymatyvnymy vymo-hamy Rady narodnykh komisariv Ukrains'kii Tsentral'noi radi," *Khrestomatiia*, pp. 209–10.
- 18 I. Stalin, "Vid narodnoho komisara v spravakh natsional'nostei, vidpovid tovarysham–ukraintsiam Tylu i frontu," *Khrestomatiia*, p. 211.
- 19 "Rezoliutsiia I Vseukrains'koho z'izdu rad pro samovyznachennia Ukrainy," *Khrestomatiia*, p. 262.
- 20 "Dekliaratsiia TsVK Radians'koi Ukrainy pro ob'iedennia syl dlia zbroinoi vidsichi avstro-nimets'kym okupantam," *Khrestomatiia*, p. 271.
- 21 Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, p. 55.
- 22 N. Popov, "Ocherk rev. sobytii v Kharkove ot iunია 1917 g. do dekabria 1918 g.," *Letopis' revoliutsii*, no. 1 (1922), p. 23. Also Pipes, *Formation*, pp. 130–36.
- 23 Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, p. 55.
- 24 The Treaty of Brest Litovsk forced Lenin to recognize an independent Ukraine. Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919–1929* (Edmonton, 1983), p. 109.
- 25 For a brief overview of the Taganrog Conference, see Iwan Majstrenko, "Promovchuvanyi iuvilei: Tahanriz'ka narada Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy," *Dialoh* (Toronto), no. 3 (1980), pp. 26–30.
- 26 Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, p. 56.
- 27 "Rezoliutsiia I z'izdu KP(b)U pro partiiu," *Khrestomatiia*, pp. 356–57.
- 28 Pipes, *Formation*, p. 176.
- 29 N. F. Kuzmin, *Kommunisticheskaia partiia – vdokhnovitel' i organizator bor'by ukrainskogo naroda za sozdanie i ukreplenie ukrainskogo sovetskogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1954), p. 6; cited in Holubnychy, "Outline history of the Communist Party of Ukraine," in his *Soviet Regional Economics*, p. 68.
- 30 Pipes, *Formation*, p. 180.
- 31 The Eighth Congress of the RKP(b), meeting in Moscow on March 18–23, 1919, defined the nature of this relationship. *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuzu v rezoliutsiiah i resheniiah s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (8th ed., Moscow, 1970), 2, pp. 73–74.

- 32 Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoria*, pp. 56–57.
- 33 “Tezisy o zadachakh proletarskoi revoliutsii na Vostoke,” *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, no. 24 (81) (July 25, 1920), p. 1; G. Broido, “Ocherednye zadachi v Turkestane,” *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, no. 27 (84) (September 2, 1920), p. 1; and “Resolution on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans,” *The Communist International*, no. 7 (December 1924–January 1925), pp. 93–99.
- 34 See “Dokumenty i materialy o rabote komissii orgbiuro TsK RKP(b) po podgotovke voprosa ‘O vzaimootnosheniakh RSFSR i nezavisimykh respublik’ k plenumu Tsentral’nogo komiteta partii (6 oktiabria 1922 g.),” *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 9 (1989), pp. 192–218.
- 35 V. I. Lenin, “K voprosu o natsional’nostiakh ili ob ‘avtonomizatsii,’” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (5th ed., Moscow, 1964), 45, pp. 355–62. Also see “Vokrug stat’i V. I. Lenina ‘K voprosu o natsional’nostiakh ili ob ‘avtonomizatsii,’” *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 9 (1990), pp. 147–64.
- 36 For the best study of how the Soviet Union emerged, see Pipes, *Formation*.
- 37 The phrase “national contract” was coined by Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* (New York, 1990), esp. pp. 44–59.
- 38 Rossiiskaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (b), *Dvenadtsatyi s’ezd RKP(b). 17–25 aprelia 1923 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1968), p. 494.
- 39 See RKP(b), *Desiatyi s’ezd RKP(b)*, pp. 198–99, 203–4 (Safarov’s speech) and p. 215 (Stalin’s speech).
- 40 RKP(b), *Dvenadtsatyi s’ezd RKP(b)*, p. 486 (Stalin’s speech).
- 41 *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuzu v rezoliutsiiax i resheniiax s’ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, 2, pp. 45–46.
- 42 RKP(b), *Desiatyi s’ezd RKP(b)*, p. 579.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 580.
- 44 “V natsional’nomu pytanni. Rezoliutsiia XII z’izdu RKP(b) vid 25 kvitnia 1923 r.,” *Kul’turne budivnytstvo v Ukraini’kii RSR, naivazhlyvoishi rishennia komunistychnoi partii i radians’koho uriadu: Zbirnyk dokumentiv* (Kiev, 1959), 1, p. 206.
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 See the collection of documents in V. N. Durdenevskii, *Ravnopravie iazykov v sovetskom stroe* (Moscow, 1927).
- 47 *Kul’turne budivnytstvo* (Kiev, 1959), 1, p. 209.
- 48 RKP(b), *Dvenadtsatyi s’ezd RKP(b)* pp. 696, 697.
- 49 J. V. Stalin, “Report at the Fourth Conference of the CC With Nationalities Officials, June 10, 1923, On the Practical Measures for Applying the Resolution on the National Question of Twelfth Party Congress,” in Rudolf Schlesinger, ed., *The Nationalities Problem and Soviet Administration* (London, 1956), p. 75.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 51 Pipes, *Formation*, p. 42.
- 52 “Rezoliutsiia kvitnevoi konferentsii v natsional’nomu pytanni,” *Khrestomatiia*, p. 20.
- 53 In Soviet Central Asia, “much of the traditional way of life was resumed,

- including land tenure, operation of religious courts (Shariat), and free trade exchange." Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Tadzhikistan and the Tadzhiks," in Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers, and Frederic Harned, eds., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York, 1975), p. 328.
- 54 RKP(b) *Desiatyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, p. 198 (Safarov).
- 55 H. Abezgauz et al., eds., *Partiina hramota: Pidruchnyk dlia mis'kykh shkil polithramoty* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 330.
- 56 Nahaylo and Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion*, p. 352.
- 57 *Ibid.*
- 58 See, for example, "Rezoliutsii oblasnoi konferentsii RSDRP(b) Pivdennozakhidnoho kraiu 23 (10) lypnia 1917 g.," *Khrestomatiia*, p. 147.
- 59 Cited in Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, pp. 178–80.
- 60 Cited in "Derzhavni vidnosyny Ukrainy i Radians'koi Rossii," *Khrestomatiia*, p. 625n.
- 61 *Ibid.*
- 62 "Dopovid' predstavnyka Vseukrains'koho partiinoho komitetu orhanyzatsiinomu biuru po slykanniu konferentsii komunistiv Ukrainy," *Khrestomatiia*, p. 342.
- 63 Quoted in Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy*, 4, p. 173.
- 64 *Ibid.* and *Kommunist*, 1920; cited in "Natsional'ne pytannia na Ukraini ta opozytsiia," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, no. 10 (1927), p. 9. Rakovsky later became a defender of Soviet Ukrainian interests. See Francis Conte, *Christian Rakovski (1873–1941): A Political Biography* (Boulder, CO, 1989).
- 65 See V. I. Lenin, "Lyst V. I. Lenina do robitnykiv i selian Ukrainy z pryvodu peremoh nad Denikinym," *Khrestomatiia*, p. 533.
- 66 Cited in "Natsional'ne pytannia," p. 8.
- 67 According to Iwan Majstrenko, Lebed' was a worker from Ekaterinoslav, a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1912. Majstrenko, *Istoriia moho pokolinia* (Edmonton, 1985), pp. 212–13.
- 68 D. Lebed', "Nekotorye voprosy partiinogo s'ezda," *Kommunist*, March 17, 1923, p. 1.
- 69 A. Khvyliia, "Shcho take teoriia borot'by dvokh kul'tur?" in *Budivnytstvo Radians'koi Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1929), 1, p. 161.
- 70 *Itogi partperepisi 1922g. na Ukraine v dvukh chastiakh* (Kharkov, 1922), p. xii.
- 71 *Zvit Robitnycho-selians'koho uriadu Ukrainy za 1923–24 rik do IX Vseukrains'koho z'izdu Rad robitnychykh, selians'kykh i chervonoarmiis'kykh deputativ* (Kharkiv, 1925), p. 13; cited in Lozyts'kyi, "Polityka ukrainizatsii," p. 48.
- 72 For the best history of the Borot'bists, see Iwan Majstrenko, *Borot'bism*.
- 73 Ukrainskaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (borot'bistov), *K razresheniiu natsional'nogo voprosa* (2nd ed., Kiev, 1920), p. 13.
- 74 "Rezoliutsiia TsK RKP o sovetskoi vlasti na Ukraine odobrennaia Vserossiiskoi partiinoi konferentsii," in Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, pp. 226–27. Also cited in Majstrenko, *Borot'bism*, p. 167.
- 75 *Ibid.*
- 76 M. Frunze, "Natsional'nyi vopros," *Kommunist*, April 13, 1923, p. 3.
- 77 "Pro zakhody po zdiisnenniu rezoliutsii XII z'izdu z natsional'nogo pytannia v haluzi partiinoi roboty," in *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, 1, pp. 229–32.

The major governmental laws and party resolutions on Ukrainianization are found in: *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v resoliutsiiakh i risehenniakh z'izdiv, konferentsii i plenumiv TsK* (Kiev, 1974), 1; *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, 1; *Zbirka postanov pro ukrainizatsiiu (Tsentral'nykh i okruhovnykh orhaniv Kompartii i Radolady)* (Kherson, 1929); *Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukraini'kii RSR, 1917–1927: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev, 1979); and *Sobranie postanovlenii i razporiazhenii pravitel'stva Ukraini'koi SSR* (Kharkov–Kiev, 1919–37), part 1. Major discussions concerning Ukrainianization are found in: *Budivnytstvo Radians'koi Ukrainy*.

- 78 “Pro zakhody v spravi ukrainizatsii shkil'no-vykhovnykh i kul'turno-osvitnykh ustanov,” in *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, 1, pp. 239–42.
- 79 “Pro zakhody zabezpechennia rivnopravnosti mov i pro dopomohu rozvytkovi ukrains'koi movy,” in *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, 1, p. 243.
- 80 *Ibid.*, 1, pp. 242–47.
- 81 According to Thomas Sowell, “preferential policies” are “government-mandated for government-designated groups.” They “legally mandate that individuals not all be judged by the same criteria or subjected to the same procedures when they originate in groups differentiated by the government into preferred and non-preferred groups.” Thomas Sowell, *Preferential Policies: An International Perspective* (New York, 1990), p. 14.
- 82 M. Skrypnyk, “Pro spravu Sultan-Galieva,” in M. Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy z natsional'noho pytannia* (Munich, 1974), p. 37; and RKP(b), *Dvenadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b)*, pp. 596–97.
- 83 I. Stalin, “Politika sovetskoï vlasty po nats. voprosu v Rossii,” *Zhizn' natsional'nosti*, no. 31 (88) (October 10, 1920), p. 1.
- 84 V. Zatons'kyi, *Natsional'na problema na Ukraini* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 13.

3 Urban growth and national identity

- 1 Between 1920 and 1933 in the Ukrainian SSR the Soviet government carried out two censuses, in 1920 and 1926, and two urban censuses, in 1923 and 1931. Since the provinces of Podillia and Volhynia were not included because of the many reservations concerning the 1920 census (implemented during the civil war), the available 1920 data have been presented selectively. See V. P. Shibaev, *Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia evropeiskoi chasti SSSR* (Leningrad, 1930), pp. v–vii, for a discussion of the limitations of these data. The most comprehensive statistics are contained in the censuses of 1923, 1926 and 1931: *Naseleniia v mistakh Ukrainy na 15 bereznia 1923 r.* (Kharkiv, 1925); TsSU SSSR, *otdel perepisi, Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda* (Moscow, 1929–31), 11–13; 28–30; and *Pidsumky obliku mis'koi liudnosti URSR 1931 roku* (Kharkiv, 1933). Population statistics for other years are estimates, based on projected natural rates of increase, by Soviet Ukrainian demographers. The 1931 census, unfortunately, does not contain data on nationality.
- 2 See the essays by Daniel R. Brower, “‘The city in danger’: the Civil War and the Russian urban population,” and Diane Koenker, “Urbanization and deurbanization in the Russian Revolution and Civil War,” in Diane

- Koenker, William G. Rosenberg, and Ronald G. Suny, eds., *Party, State and Society in the Russian Civil War: Explorations in Social History* (Bloomington, IN, 1989), pp. 58–80, 81–104.
- 3 Akademiia nauk SSSR, ordena Druzhby narodov Institut etnologii i etnicheskoi antropologii im. N.N. Miklukho-Maklaia, *Materialy k serii "Narody sovetskogo soiuza": Perepis' 1939 goda: Dokumental'nye istochniki Tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennogo Arkhiva Narodnogo Khoziaistva (TsGANKh) SSSR* (Moscow, 1990), part 4, p. 755.
 - 4 Eugene Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–1947* (New York, 1948), p. 107. According to Iu.V. Arutiunian, the overall Soviet urban population grew by approximately 30 million people between 1926 and 1939. Of this total, 5 million constituted the natural urban increase and 6 million comprised the population of communities reclassified from rural to urban ones. Nineteen million people migrated to the cities from the countryside. Most of them arrived during the period of collectivization. Arutiunian, "Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva i osvobodzhenie rabochei sily dlia promyshlennosti," in *Formirovanie i razvitie sovetskogo rabochego klassa (1917–1961 gg.)*. *Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 112–13.
 - 5 In the 1923, 1926, and 1931 censuses, the term "urban center" was defined as "all official cities, small towns, and populated points – although they did not possess an urban or rural soviet – which met the following conditions: (1) more than five hundred people lived there, and (2) more than half of those 'earning a wage' worked in non-agricultural occupations." *Pidsumky obliku*, p. v. Nevertheless, many "urban centers" which did not meet these criteria were included in the Soviet censuses of the 1920s. Thus, these censuses should be used with caution. Although they are not accurate and reliable in all instances, we may ascertain general trends from them.
 - 6 *Suchasna statystyka naseleння Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1929), pp. 2–3, 33–35.
 - 7 Soviet censuses often enumerate both the "present" (*nalichnoe*) and the "permanent" (*postoianno*) populations. The former "comprises all the people actually present in a given area at a given time. The latter is more ambiguous. It comprises all the people who 'belong' to a given area at a given time by virtue of legal residence, usual residence, or some similar criterion." Henry S. Shryock, Jacob S. Siegel, and Associates, *The Methods and Materials of Demography*, condensed and ed. by Edward G. Stockwell (New York, 1976), p. 49, cited in Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "'Permanent' and 'Present' populations in Soviet statistics," *Soviet Studies*, 37, no. 3 (1985), p. 386.
 - 8 A. Hirshfeld, *Mihratsiini protsesy na Ukraini (v soitli perepysu 1926 r.)* (Kharkiv, 1930), pp. 67, 69, 73.
 - 9 See Illia Vytanovych, "Agrarna polityka ukrains'kykh uriadiv rokiv revoliutsii i vyzvol'nykh zman' (1917–1920)," *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, 4, no. 3–4 (1967), pp. 5–60; and Harold Weinstein, "Land hunger in the Ukraine, 1905–1917," *Journal of Economic History*, 2, no. 1 (1942), pp. 24–35.
 - 10 For the best analysis of migration patterns before 1926, concentrating on the 1897–1926 period, see Hirshfeld, *Mihratsiini protsesy*.
 - 11 A. Khomenko, "Natsional'nyi sklad naseleння Ukrainy po novishykh

- danykh," *Chervonyi shliakh*, no. 6–7 (1923), p. 90; *Estestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniia Ukrainy v 1924 g. s ocherkom estestvennogo dvizheniia naseleniia pered mirovoi voinoi* (Kharkov, 1927), p. xii; S. V. Minaev, *Naslidky vseliudnogo perepysu 1926 roku na Ukraini* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 12; Vytanovych, "Agrarna polityka" p. 12; and Donald W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War* (Princeton, NJ, 1957), p. 148.
- 12 *Naselenie Ukrainy po dannym perepisi 1920 goda* (Kharkov, 1923); *Naseleniia v mistakh Ukrainy za danymy Vsesoiuznogo mis'koho perepysu 15 bereznia 1923 roku* (Kharkiv, 1925); and *Korotki pidsumky perepysu naselennia Ukrainy 17 hrudnia roku 1926* (Kharkiv, 1928).
- 13 *Naselenie Ukrainy po dannym perepisi 1920 goda*, pp. 32–35; and *Mis'ki selyshcha USSR*, pp. 2–17.
- 14 The Soviet censuses of 1920, 1923, and 1926 present data in a form different from the Russian Imperial Census of 1897. Whereas the earlier census indicated the respondent's native language (*rodnoi iazyk*), the census takers of the 1920s asked the person to which nationality (*narodnost'*) he belonged, as well as his native language. The Soviet censuses of 1939, 1959, 1970, and 1979 also collected data for both native language and nationality (since 1939 called *natsional'nost'*) by self-identification. Because native language and national self-identification do not necessarily coincide, those who identified themselves as "Ukrainian" in the Soviet censuses of the 1920s are considered Ukrainian. For a comparison of the questionnaires in the 1897, 1920, 1923, and 1926 censuses, see N.Ia. Vorob'ev, *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 g.* (2nd ed., Moscow, 1957), pp. 83–104.
- 15 *Natsional'nyi sklad sil's'koho naselennia Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1927), p. xix.
- 16 See Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa*; and Theodore Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*.
- 17 *Korotki pidsumky*, Table 15, pp. 185–202.
- 18 For a study of this end of unemployment, see L. S. Rogachevskaia, *Likvidatsiia bezrobotitsy v SSSR 1917–1930 gg.* (Moscow, 1973).
- 19 Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, box 6, no. 190 AD/AP, p. 17. For statistics showing the salary increases among industrial workers, see M. I. Buianover, *Stan proletariata na Ukraini pislia Zhovtnevoi revoliutsii* (Kharkiv, 1928), pp. 73–116.
- 20 *Stenograficheskii otchet Kharkovskoi okružnoi konferentsii* (Kharkov, 1925), p. 165.
- 21 Calculated by the author from Table 17, TsSU SSSR, *otdel perepisi, Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda* (Moscow, 1929), 11, p. 62.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 See Arutiunian, "Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva."
- 24 TsGAOR Ukrainian SSR, f. 337, op. 1, d. 5038, 1. 94–95; cited in F. G. Turchenko, "Osnovnye izmeneniia v sotsial'no-klassovoi strukture godorskogo naseleniia Sovetskoi Ukrainy v 1920-e gody" (Kandidat diss., Kharkov State University, 1976), p. 99.
- 25 TsGAOR Ukrainian SSSr, f. 337, op. 1, d. 5038, 1. 92; cited in Turchenko, "Osnovnye izmeneniia," p. 99.
- 26 *Korotki pidsumky; Natsional'nyi sklad sil's'koho naselennia Ukrainy*,

- pp. xvi–xix; and *Pidsumky vesnianoho obsliduvannia sil's'koho hospodarstva Ukrainy v 1928 r. (Vybirkovyi perepys selians'kykh hospodarstv)* (Kharkiv, 1929), p. 4.
- 27 For calculations which provide evidence of this assertion, see George Liber, "Urban growth and ethnic change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923–1933," *Soviet Studies*, 41, no. 4 (1989), pp. 588–89.
- 28 The best analyses of the national composition of the Ukrainian SSR in the 1926 census include: Minaev, *Naslidky* and A. Khomenko, *Natsional'nyi sklad liudnosti USRR* (Kharkiv, 1931).
- 29 V. Sokil, *Zdaleka do bluz'koho. Spohady. Rozdumy* (Edmonton, 1987), p. 81.
- 30 The requirements for categorizing people as literate were very minimal during the 1926 census, which asked separate questions concerning reading and writing. The instructions stated that even someone who could "dissect the printed word, syllable by syllable," or "sign his name" would be considered literate. When the census materials were being prepared for publication, only those who could "read" were included in the statistics on literacy. As a result, the literacy figures provided by the 1926 census grossly over-estimated the true literacy and potential newspaper readership. *Korotki pidsumky*, pp. xviii–xix.
- 31 Calculated by the author from TsSU SSSR, otdel perepisi, *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia, 17 dekabria 1926 g. Kratki svodki, vyp. VII: Vozrast i gramotnost' naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928), p. 12.
- 32 Calculated by the author from *ibid.*, p. 18.
- 33 Minaev, *Naslidky*, p. 77.
- 34 Calculated by the author from Table 6, TsSU SSSR, otdel perepisi, *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, 11, pp. 8–17.
- 35 *Korotki pidsumky*, p. xix.
- 36 *Ibid.*
- 37 *Radians'kyi knyhar*, no. 14 (1931), inside front cover.
- 38 A. Kotlyar, *Newspapers in the USSR: Recollections and Observations of a Soviet Journalist* (New York, 1955), pp. 30–31.
- 39 Steven L. Guthier, "Ukrainian cities during the revolution and the interwar era," in Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, p. 171.
- 40 Knyzhkova palata im. Ivan Fedorova, *Periodychni vydannia URSR, 1917–1960: Hazety. Bibliohrafichnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkiv, 1965), p. 6.
- 41 P. P. Bachyn's'kyi, "Zdiisnennia na Ukraini lenins'koi natsional'noi polityky v kul'turnomu budivnytstvi (1921–1925 rr.)," *Naukovi pratsi z istorii KPRS*, no. 10 (1966), p. 15.
- 42 Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1964), p. 414.
- 43 Brian D. Silver, "The ethnic and language dimensions in Russian and Soviet censuses," in Ralph S. Clem, ed., *Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses* (Ithaca and London, 1986), p. 88.
- 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 75, 88–89.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 89.
- 46 Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, and Ralph S. Clem, *Nationality and*

- Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of the Census Data, 1897–1970* (New York, 1976), p. 92.
- 47 Pierre L. van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (New York and Oxford, 1981), pp. 254, 258.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 258.
- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 254.
- 50 TsSU SSSR, otdel perepisi, *Vsesoiuznaia perepisi' naseleniia 1926 goda*, 11, Table 6, pp. 8–17.
- 51 van den Berghe, *Ethnic Phenomenon*, p. 259.
- 52 A. I. Khromogorov, *International Traits of Soviet Nations* (Moscow, 1970), p. 5; cited in Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist–Leninist Theory and Strategy*, pp. 275–76.
- 53 The actual increase in the number of self-identified Ukrainians living in cities between 1920 and 1926 (1,200,867) was larger than the total urban increase (1,157,611). The number of self-designated urban Russians and Jews declined in this period. See Appendix 3.
- 54 *Stenograficheskii otchet X s'ezda Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii 8–16 marta 1921 g.* (Petersburg, 1921), p. 93.

4 The working class and the trade unions

- 1 L. I. Vas'kina, *Rabochii klass SSSR nakanune sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii* (Moscow, 1981), p. 140.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 148.
- 3 *Ibid.*, Table 53, p. 147.
- 4 *Ibid.*, pp. 144–45.
- 5 *Ibid.*
- 6 Compare Vas'kina, *Rabochii klass SSSR*, pp. 144–45, 147, and L. Zinger, *Natsional'nyi sostav proletariata v SSSR* (Moscow, 1934), p. 11. The Ukrainians increased their hold on the working class from 54.6 percent in 1926 to 58.1 percent in 1931; the Belorussians from 58.9 per cent to 62.6 percent; the Armenians from 80.9 to 85.1 percent; and the Georgians from 52.8 to 59.3 percent.
- 7 *Trud v SSSR. Ezhegodnik [1934]* (Moscow, 1935), p. 357.
- 8 See "O direktivakh po sostavleniiu piatiletnego plana narodnogo khoziaistva," in VKP(b), *Piatnadsatyi s'ezd VKP(b). Dekabr' 1927 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1962), 2, pp. 1441–54; and *Kommunisticheskaiia partiia Sovetskogo soiuzna v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenimov TsK* (8th ed., Moscow, 1970), 4, pp. 31–51.
- 9 See *Osnovni momenty p'iatyrichnogo planu rozvytku promyslovosti USSR (1928–1929 – 1932–1933)* (Kharkiv, 1929); *Shliakhy i tempy rozvytku narodn'oho hospodarstva USSR. Materiialy do pobuduvannia p'iatyrichnogo plany do IX Vseukrains'koho z'izdu rad* (Kharkiv, 1929); *Kontrol'nye tsifry piatiletnego plana razvitiia promyshlennosti USSR (1928–1929 – 1932–1933 gg.)* (Kharkov, 1929); *Protsesty rekonstruktsii v ukrainskii promyslovosti* (Kharkiv, 1930); *Iakisni zavdannia ukrains'koi promyslovosti* (Kharkiv, 1931); and *Itogi vypolnenniia pervogo*

- piatiletnego plana razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza SSR (Leningrad–Moscow, 1934).
- 10 G. I. Grinko, *The Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1930), p. 326.
- 11 Cited in O. B. Sluts'kyi, *Radians'ke i kul'turne budivnytstvo na Ukraini v pershi roky borot'by za sotsialistychnu industrializatsiiu krainy (1926–1929 rr.)* (Kiev, 1957), pp. 19–20.
- 12 Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy*, p. 365.
- 13 Z. G. Likholobova, *Rabochie Donbassa v gody pervykh piatiletok (1928–1937 gg.)* (Donetsk, 1973), p. 33.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 20; *Itogi vypolneniia piatiletnego plana*, p. 174.
- 15 A. G. Stakhanov, *Zhizn' shakhterskaia* (Moscow, 1973), p. 16; cited in *Istoriia rabochikh Donbassa, tom pervyi: Rabochie Donbassa v epokhu kapitalizma i v perekhodnyi period ot kapitalizma k sotsializmu* (Kiev, 1981), p. 245.
- 16 Reginald Zelnik, "The peasant and the factory," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *The Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Stanford, 1968), p. 190.
- 17 Upravlinnia narodnohospodars'koho obliku URSR, *Sotsialistychna Ukraina. Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1937), p. 152; O. M. Asatkin, ed., *USRR v tsyfrakh. Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkiv, 1936), p. 9; VURPS, *Profspilky Ukrainy do V Vseukrains'koho z'izdu profspilok. Diiahramy do dopovidi t. Chuvyryna* (Kharkiv, 1932), p. 11.
- 18 Loburets', *Formuvannia kadriv*, p. 148.
- 19 According to published sources, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number and percentage of Ukrainians in the working class. Pavel Postyshev, the second secretary of the KP(b)U, claimed that self-identified Ukrainians constituted 47.9 percent of the working class in 1929 and 56.1 percent in 1934. "Dopovid' tovarysha Postysheva," in *Komunistychna partiia (b) Ukrainy, XII z'izd Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy, 18–23 sichnia 1934 r. Stenohrafichnyi zvit* (Kiev, 1934), p. 212. According to the statistics compiled by O. M. Asatkin, Ukrainians comprised 51.6 percent in 1926, 57.9 percent in 1929, and 58.3 percent in 1934 (see Appendix 9).
- 20 *Voprosy truda*, no. 7–8 (1925), p. 41; cited in *Istoriia robitnychoho klasu Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1967), 2, p. 100.
- 21 Buianover, *Stan proletariata*, p. 9.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 23 In 1924–25, for example, 43,500 workers were engaged in the construction industry. Three years later, approximately 110,200 workers were thus employed. A. I. Epshtein, *Robitnyky Ukrainy*, p. 4.
- 24 The number of workers in metallurgy increased from 71,384 in 1926 to 155,404 in 1932; in coal-mining from 152,238 to 319,664; and in machine-construction from 84,102 to 325,100. V. E. Loburets', "Rost chislennosti rabocheho klasa Ukrainy v 1921–1932 godakh," *Voprosy istorii SSSR*, 26 (1981), p. 41 (Table 7).
- 25 Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy*, pp. 44–45.
- 26 "Problema kadriv," *Komunist*, June 23, 1931, p. 4.
- 27 "Liudy v defitsyti," *Komunist*, July 14, 1929, p. 3.

- 28 Iu. A. Gorban', "Kommunisticheskaia partiia v bor'be za mobilizatsiiu rabocheho klassa na vypolnenie pervoi piatiletki (na materialakh KP Ukrainy)" (Kandidat diss., Kiev State University, 1970), p. 140.
- 29 D. Petrovs'kyi, "Problema robitnychkh kadriv," *Robitnycha osvita*, no. 4–5 (1930), p. 5.
- 30 Sh. Suponyts'kyi, "Novi zavody vymahaiut' kadriv," *Robitnycha osvita*, no. 6 (1930), p. 6.
- 31 Gorban', "Kommunisticheskaia partiia," p. 140.
- 32 Sh. Suponyts'kyi, "Osnovni rysy piatyrichnoho plianu pidhotuvannia robitnychkh kadriv," *Robitnycha osvita*, no. 9–10 (1930), p. 14.
- 33 *Ibid.*
- 34 V. Chubar, "Piatyrichnyi plan rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva," *Komunist*, April 16, 1929, p. 2.
- 35 Rogachevskaia, *Likvidatsiia bezrobotitsy*, p. 161.
- 36 H. Oleksyn, "Shkidnytstvo u promyslovosti ta borot'ba za promyslovi kadry," *Komunist*, January 12, 1931, p. 4.
- 37 The Sixth Congress of Soviets of the USSR (March 1930) ordered all collective farms to assist peasant migration to the factories, not restrict it. Loburets', *Formuvannia kadriv*, p. 89. See other decrees: "Iak dovodyty do raioniv ta sil', a takozh do kolhospiv plianovi zavdannia ta nariady na vydilennia robitnoi ta tiahlovoi syly dlia roboty v promyslovosti ta radhos-pakh," *Visti Narodn'oho komisariata pratsi U.S.R.R.*, no. 11 (1931), pp. 22–23; for typical agreements between state organs and kolkhozes for labor in industry and construction, see, *ibid.* no. 16 (1931), pp. 15–17, 17–20.
- 38 Gorban', "Kommunisticheskaia partiia," p. 132.
- 39 *Visti Narodn'oho komisariata pratsi U.S.R.R.*, no. 13 (1931), pp. 29–30. These professions included miners, metallists, forestry workers, chemists, printers, railway workers, educators, technical engineers, agronomists, food industry workers, construction workers, and workers in the sugar-refining industry.
- 40 "Pro poshyrennia spysku profesii i posad, shcho na nykh prystosuvannia zhinochoi pratsi treba nabahato poshyryty," *Visti narodn'oho komisariata pratsi U.S.R.R.*, no. 14 (1931), pp. 25–30.
- 41 *Visti Narodn'oho komisariata pratsi U.S.R.R.*, no. 19 (1931), p. 32; and *Trud*, September 20, 1931.
- 42 "Do mizhnarodnoho komunistychnoho zhinochoho dnia 8 bereznia," *Komunist*, March 9, 1932, p. 2. Also see: *Zhinocha pratsia na Ukraini. Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkiv, 1930) and B. Hasko, *Zhinocha pratsia na Ukraini* (Kharkiv, 1932).
- 43 M. Skarubs'kyi, "Do pytannia pro plynnist' robitnoi syly," *Robitnycha osvita*, no. 7–8 (1930), p. 14.
- 44 V. Rusov, "Robitnu sylu Donbasovi," *Pytannia pratsi*, no. 2 (1931), p. 6.
- 45 "Pro zakhodu do zabezpechennia naboru robsyly dlia vuhil'noho Donbasu," *Visti Narodn'oho komisariata pratsi U.S.R.R.*, no. 19–20 (1932), p. 27.
- 46 After 1936 Soviet statistics identify the majority of the new workers in the metallurgical and machine-construction industry of the Donbass as coming

- from factory training schools or as children of workers. *Istoriia rabochikh Donbassa, tom pervyi*, p. 245.
- 47 Z. Mordukhovich (Mokhov), *Plynnist' robochoi syly ta borot'ba z neiu v SRSR* (2nd ed., Kharkiv, 1933), p. 46.
- 48 Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy*, p. 40. Although not all peasants who owned land were tied completely to the countryside, according to Likholobova, "of all of the miners . . . who owned land in 1928 only one-third participated in agricultural work. The majority of them limited their participation in this work to one month or six weeks per year." Likholobova, *Rabochie Donbassa*, p. 37.
- 49 Quoted in Mordukhovich, *Plynnist' robochoi syly*, p. 49.
- 50 K. Burtovyi, "Pro prychny plynnosti robitnoho skladu na pidpriemstvakh," *Pytannia pratsi*, no. 13–14 (1930), p. 7.
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 S. Iozefovich, "Sostav novykh popolnenii promyshlennogo proletariata," *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, no. 1–2 (1932), p. 131.
- 53 Likholobova, *Rabochie Donbassa*, pp. 20–21.
- 54 Iozefovich, "Sostav novykh popolnenii," p. 129, 128.
- 55 M. Chuvyrin, *Profsoiuzy Ukrainy v bor'be za lenins'kuiu liniuu. Doklad na XI s'ezde KP(b)U* (Kharkov, 1930), p. 33.
- 56 Likholobova, *Rabochie Donbassa*, p. 36.
- 57 XV konferentsiia VKP(b), 26 okt. – 3 noiabr. 1926 g. *Sten. otchet* (Moscow–Leningrad, 1927), p. 288; cited in Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928–1932* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 89.
- 58 Gorban', "Kommunisticheskaia partiia," p. 78.
- 59 *Sostav novykh millionov chlenov profsoiuzov* (Moscow, 1933), p. 10.
- 60 *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, no. 1–2 (1932), p. 134; cited in Kuromiya, *Stalin's Industrial Revolution*, p. 215.
- 61 V. Sadovs'kyi, *Pratsia v USSR* (Warsaw, 1932), p. 23.
- 62 For Moscow, see Robert E. Johnson, *Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1979).
- 63 M. Gol'tsman and L. Kogan, *Starye i novye kadry proletariata* (Moscow, 1934), pp. 40–41.
- 64 Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy*, p. 64.
- 65 Mordukhovich, *Plynnist' robochoi syly*, p. 141.
- 66 V. Rusov, "Robitnu sylu Donbasovi," *Pytannia pratsi*, no. 2 (1931), p. 6.
- 67 "Proizvoditel' nost truda i bor'ba za trudovuiu distsiplinu," *Voprosy truda na Ukraine*, no. 12 (1928), p. 1.
- 68 See the table in K. Burtovyi, "Pro prychny plynnosti robitnoho skladu na pidpriemstvakh," *Pytannia pratsi*, no. 13–14 (1930), p. 7.
- 69 Kuromiya, *Stalin's Industrial Revolution*, p. 209.
- 70 Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy*, p. 40.
- 71 M. Volkov, "Peredmovna," in O. Luzhek, *Truddystsiplina i dystsiplinarni stiahannia* (Kharkiv, 1929), p. 4.
- 72 *Deviatyi z'izd KP(b)U 6–12 hrudnia 1925 r.* (Kharkiv, 1926), p. 264.
- 73 *Ibid.*

- 74 Komunistychna partiia (b) Ukrainy, *Stenohrafichnyi zvit. Odyndatsaty z'izd (5–15 chervnia 1930)* (Kharkiv, 1930), p. 251 (S. V. Kosior).
- 75 *Istoriia rabochikh Donbassa, tom pervyi*, p. 254.
- 76 Kuromiya, *Stalin's Industrial Revolution*, p. 106.
- 77 A. Khomenko, *Natsional'nyi sklad liudnosti USSR* (Kharkiv, 1931), p. 36.
- 78 Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy*, p. 42.
- 79 TsGAOR UkrSSR, f. 2595, op. 1, d. 1076, l. 2, cited in *ibid.*
- 80 A. Khomenko, "Do pytannia pro doplyv naselennia v Donbas," *Visnyk statystyky Ukrainy*, no. 3 (1928), p. 100; and Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad*, p. 88.
- 81 In 1926, for example, 63,900 Russians and 33,800 Ukrainians arrived in the Donbass, whereas in the entire 1897–1916 period, 4,200 Ukrainians and 3,600 Russians arrived annually on the average. Khomenko, "Do pytannia," p. 103; Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad*, p. 88.
- 82 Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy*, p. 373.
- 83 *Istoriia rabochikh Donbassa, tom pervyi*, p. 248.
- 84 *Ibid.*, p. 255.
- 85 *Natsional'nyi perepys robitnykiv*, p. 248.
- 86 Slutskii, *Rabochii klass Ukrainy*, pp. 399–400.
- 87 *Sostav novykh millionov chlenov profsoiuzov*, p. 4.
- 88 Zinger, *Natsional'nyi sostav*, p. 9.
- 89 *Ibid.*, p. 9, Zinger gives a figure of 73.4 percent for the Ukrainian SSR. *Trud v SSSR. Ezhegodnik [1934]* (Moscow, 1935), p. 259, gives a figure of 74.0 percent.
- 90 *Otchet Vseukrainskogo soveta profsoiuzov. K 3-mu s'ezdu profsoiuzov Ukrainy* (Kharkov, 1926), p. 47.
- 91 *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- 92 Zinger, *Natsional'nyi sostav*, p. 78.
- 93 "Iz statisticheskikh svedenii VUSPS o kolichestvennom i kachestvennom sostave rabochikh i sluzashchikh Ukrainy," in *Promyshlennost' i rabochii klass Ukrainskoi SSR v period postroeniia fundamenta sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki, 1926–1932 gody: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Kiev, 1966), p. 442.
- 94 *Ibid.*
- 95 For a breakdown of the use of Ukrainian and other languages in the trade union clubs in 1929 and in the cultural activities in the trade unions, see *Pidsumky statystychnoho obslidu kul'tustanov profspilok Ukrainy na 1 zhovtnia 1929 r.* (Kharkiv, 1930), pp. 16–17, 59.
- 96 *Otchet Vseukrainskogo soveta profsoiuzov*, p. 48.
- 97 Kuromiya, *Stalin's Industrial Revolution*, p. 106.

5 Communist Party membership

- 1 Until June 1953, the First Secretaries of the KP(b)U were always non-Ukrainians. For a list of them, see I. F. Kuras, V. Iu. Mel'nychenko, P. Ia. Pyrih, F. M. Pudych, V. F. Soldatenko, eds., *Pro munyle zarady maibutn'oho* (Kiev, 1989), pp. 405–6. For a list of members of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, see *ibid.*, pp. 372–404. For a list of members of the Central Committee, see Vsevolod

- Holub (Holubnychy), *Konspektyvnyi narys istorii KP(b)U* (Munich, 1957), pp. 117–35. According to Holubnychy, the percentage of Ukrainians in the Central Committee of the KP(b)U increased from 16.0 in the spring of 1924 to 43.0 in the summer of 1930. Holubnychy, *Soviet Regional Economics*, pp. 128–29.
- 2 *Itogi partperezepisi 1922 g. na Ukrainie*, p. xii; *Sostav VKP(b) v tsyfrakh. Vyp. XI* (Moscow, 1932), pp. 94–96; *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy: Naochnyi posibnyk z partiinoho budivnytstva* (Kiev, 1972), p. 7; and *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy – boiovyi zahin KPRS* (Kiev, 1976), pp. 15–16.
 - 3 Compare RKP(b), TsK, Statotdel, *RKP(b) v tsyfrakh* (Moscow, 1924–25), vols. 2–3; *Sostav VKP(b) v tsyfrakh* (Moscow, 1924–32), vols. 4–9, 11; and T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1967* (Princeton, NJ, 1968), p. 52.
 - 4 Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, pp. 239–40.
 - 5 *Itogi partperezepisi 1922 g.*, p. xii; P. S-ich, “Partorganizatsii natsional’nykh raionov,” *Revoliutsiia i natsional’nosti*, no. 10–11 (1932), p. 144; and *Pravda*, January 24, 1934, cited in Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 371.
 - 6 Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 367.
 - 7 Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, p. 240.
 - 8 *Pidsumky partperezepysu 1927 roku* (Kharkiv, 1928), pp. 79, 87.
 - 9 *Itogi partiinoi raboty na Ukrainie za 1923 god* (Kharkov, 1923), p. 7; cited in Turchenko, “Osnovnye izmeneniia v sotsial’no-klassovoi strukture,” pp. 108–9.
 - 10 Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 115.
 - 11 *XIV s’ezd*, p. 53; cited in Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 137.
 - 12 Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 168.
 - 13 H. Petrovs’kyi, “Zrist partii i zavdannia komunistiv,” *Visti*, November 14, 1928, p. 1.
 - 14 Klimenko, *Deviaty z’ezd KP(b)U 6–12 hrudnia 1925 r.* (Kharkiv, 1926), p. 70.
 - 15 A. P. Ermak, “Osushchestvlenie leninskoi politiki organicheniia i vytesneniia kapitalisticheskikh elementov goroda i sela na Ukrainie v 1927–1929 gg.” (Kandidat diss., Dnipropetrovs’ke State University, 1974), p. 137; and F. Sherstiuk, *Partiine budivnytstvo na Ukraini v 1926–1929 rr.* (Kiev, 1960), pp. 32, 202.
 - 16 Petrovs’kyi, “Zrist partii,” p. 1.
 - 17 *Itogi partperezepisi 1922 g.*, p. xii, and Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, pp. 241–42.
 - 18 Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, p. 242.
 - 19 *Itogi partperezepisi 1922 g.*, p. xii.
 - 20 James E. Mace suggests that efforts to recruit more Ukrainians as candidate-members of the party were slowed down between July 1, 1926 and December 31, 1928, in order to gain the support of the Russians within the KP(b)U against the United Opposition, a coalition of Stalin’s former partners in the VKP(b) ruling triumvirate (including Grigorii Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev) with Trotsky. Mace, *Communism*, pp. 97–98.
 - 21 *Visti*, June 10, 1931, p. 2.
 - 22 S. V. Kosior, “Politychnyi zvit TsK KP(b)U,” KP(b)U, *Stenohrafichnyi zvit. Odyndatsyi z’ezd*, p. 281.

- 23 I am indebted to James E. Mace for this observation and example.
- 24 *Sotsial'nyi i natsional'nyi sostav VKP(b)* (Leningrad–Moscow, 1928), p. 129.
- 25 *Izvestiia TsK KP(b)U*, no. 9 (17) 1922, p. 2; cited in Turchenko, "Osnovnye izmeneniia," p. 172.
- 26 *Itoги partperezpisi 1922 g.*; *RKP(b) v tsifrah*, vol. 3; and *Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrah*, vols. 4–9, 11.
- 27 *Sostav VKP(b) tsifrah*, vols. 4–9, 11.
- 28 "Pro pidsumky zrostannia KP(b)U za 1931 rik. Postanova TsK KP(b)U," *Komunist*, March 29, 1932, p. 2.
- 29 V. A. Stroganov, "Vyshchyi riven' orhanizatsiino-partiinoi roboty," *Komunist*, July 6, 1932, p. 2.
- 30 V. Zhebrovs'kyi, *Rist partii* (Kharkiv, 1930), pp. 57, 58.
- 31 *Visti*, June 10, 1931, p. 2.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 57.
- 33 See the trends in *Sostav VKP(b) v tsifrah*, vols. 4–9, 11.
- 34 Zhebrovs'kyi, *Rist partii*, p. 64.
- 35 P. S-ich, "Partorganizatsii natsional'nykh raionov," p. 143.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 144; *Pravda*, January 24, 1934; cited in Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 371.
- 37 S-ich, "Partorganizatsii natsional'nykh raionov," p. 146.
- 38 Stroganov, "Vyshchyi riven'," p. 2.
- 39 *Sotsial'nyi i natsional'nyi sostav VKP(b)*, pp. 64–65.
- 40 Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 370.
- 41 *Itoги partperezpisi 1922 g.*, pp. xii, 116; also cited in Pipes, *Formation*, p. 278.
- 42 VKP(b), TsK, Statotdel, *Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia perepis' 1927 goda, 7-i vypusk*, p. 51; cited in Basil Dmytryshyn, "National and social composition of the membership of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, 1918–1928," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, no. 4 (1957), p. 257.
- 43 *Pravda*, January 24, 1935; cited in Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 371.
- 44 Korniushein, *Deiatyi z'izd KP(b)U 6–12 hrudnia 1925 r.*, p. 302 (December 11, 1925). The Communist Party represented supreme authority. The Central Control Commission dealt with complaints concerning "bureaucratic centralism" in the VKP(b) and about party members and officials. It enforced party discipline. Grigorii Zinoviev was a prominent revolutionary and one of three members of the post-Lenin leadership. In 1925 he was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, and headed the so-called "Leningrad Opposition." Joseph Stalin was elected to honorary posts in the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, but from 1917 he worked in the All-Russian, then All-Union Central Executive Committee and as Commissar of Nationalities. Since 1922 he was best known as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RKP(b), then VKP(b).
- 45 P. Postyshev, "Tekushchie zadachi marksistsko-leninskogo vospitaniia," *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, no. 15–16 (1931), pp. 1–11; cited in Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 195.
- 46 Petrovs'kyi "Zrist partii," p. 1.

47 See *RKP(b) v tsifrahk*, vol. 2, and Holub, *Konspektyvnyi narys*, p. 136.

6 The transformation of the urban Ukrainian identity

- 1 As a result of these campaigns, in 1930 "71.3 percent of the people were literate in the Ukraine, 69.0 percent in Belorussia, 52.1 percent in Transcaucasia, 24.5 percent in Turkmenistan, and 19.4 percent in Uzbekistan." Pavel M. Rysakov, *The National Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York, n. d.), p. 50.
- 2 This idea came from Joane Nagel, "The political construction of ethnicity," in Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel, eds., *Competitive Ethnic Relations* (New York, 1986), p. 102.
- 3 Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid growth as a destabilizing force," *Journal of Economic History*, 23 (December 1963), p. 532.
- 4 Cities accepted the new Ukrainian urban identity in varying degrees. Kharkov, for example, drew its population from the RSFSR's Kursk province and remained Russian until the early 1930s. The Russian language dominated the Ukrainian capital. According to one memoirist, even the Russified Donbass was more Ukrainian than Kharkov. Poltava, on the other hand, was the center of the Ukrainian heartland and the Ukrainian language dominated its streets before the 1920s. Ivan Majstrenko, *Istoriia moho pokolinnia* (Edmonton, 1985), pp. 206, 207.
- 5 See Documents 144, 159, 168, 170, 177, 197, and 212 in *Kul'turne budivnytstvo* (Kiev, 1959), 1.
- 6 Stanislav Kosior, "Politychnyi zvit TsK KP(b)U," KP(b)U, *Stenohrafichnyi zvit. Odynadtsatyi z'izd*, p. 276.
- 7 Volodymyr Kubijovič, ed., *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia* (Toronto, 1963), vol. 1, p. 811.
- 8 Kosior, "Politychnyi zvit," p. 276.
- 9 V. P. Zatons'kyi, *XII z'izd Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy. 18–23 sichnia 1934 r. Stenohrafichnyi zvit* (Kiev, 1934), p. 378.
- 10 Kosior, "Politychnyi zvit," p. 277.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 278.
- 12 *Ibid.* Also see G. Liber, "Language, literacy and book publishing in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923–1928," *Slavic Review*, 41, no. 4 (1982), pp. 673–85.
- 13 V. Sukhyno-Khomenko, "Piatyrychka ukrains'koi radians'koi knyzhky," *Krytyka*, no. 10 (1929), pp. 6–7.
- 14 Vasyl Sokil, *Zdaleka do blyz'koho. Spohady. Rozdumy* (Edmonton, 1987), p. 65.
- 15 For brief analyses of the linguistic standardization of Ukrainian, see Henry Kučera, "Language policy in the Soviet Union" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1952), pp. 139–41 and George Y. Shevelov, *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, 1900–1941* (Cambridge, MA, 1989), pp. 131–40. For a list of Ukrainian terms (very different from Russian) introduced in mathematics, theoretical mechanics, and astronomy, see Kučera, "Language policy," pp. 167–72.
- 16 S. Dimanshtein, "Problemy natsional'noi kul'tury i kul'turnogo stroitel'-

- stva v natsional'nykh respublikakh," *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi akademii*, no. 31 (1929), p. 122.
- 17 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), p. 15.
- 18 This idea came from *ibid.*, p. 16.
- 19 Ira Katznelson and Astride Zolberg, eds., *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (Princeton, NJ, 1986), p. 9.
- 20 Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton, NJ, 1955), p. 9.
- 21 This phrase comes from Iurii Poliakov, cited in Bohdan Nahaylo, "Change in Russian views on the nationality problem?" *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 456/88 (October 2, 1988).
- 22 Mykola Kulish, "Mina Mazailo," in his *Tvory* (New York, 1955), p. 171.
- 23 Hryhory Kostiuik, *Zustrichi i proshchannia: Spohady. Knyha persha* (Edmonton, 1987), p. 184. During the 1926–27 season the Kievan opera was Ukrainianized. By 1930, Kharkov and Odessa also possessed Ukrainian-language opera theaters. See Iurii Tkachenko, "5 rokiiv radians'koi ukrains'koi opery," *Visti*, December 24, 1930, p. 10.
- 24 Kostiuik claimed that the Ukrainianized Kiev opera slowly attracted even Russian music lovers and that the opera hall was never empty. Kostiuik, *Zustrichi i proshchannia*, p. 104.
- 25 The most notable Russian intellectual who became Ukrainian during this period was Oleksander Ivanovich Biletskii (1884–1961), one of the most prominent historians of Ukrainian and West European literature. For more information on him, see Kostiuik, *Zustrichi i proshchannia*, pp. 400–4, and Iurii Lawrynenko, *Chorna purha ta inshi spomyny* (Munich, 1985), pp. 59–86.
- 26 Valerian Pidmohyl'nyi, *Misto* (Kiev, 1928; 2nd ed., New York, 1954), p. 117.
- 27 Majstrenko, *Istoriia moho pokolinnia*, p. 183.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 184.
- 29 "Retsydyv ukrains'koi nepys'mennosti – zvychaine iavyshe v kyivs'kykh ustanovakh," *Komunist*, June 6, 1925, p. 4.
- 30 Cited in Iurii Larin, "Ob izvrashcheniakh pri provedenii natsional'noi politiki (v poriadke obsuzhdeniia)," *Bol'shevik*, no. 23–24 (December 31, 1926), p. 55.
- 31 In his memoirs, Majstrenko claimed that Poltava (with a population of 91,984 in 1926) was the only major city where residents spoke Ukrainian exclusively in public during the period of Ukrainianization. Majstrenko, *Istoriia moho pokolinnia*, p. 97.
- 32 On the industrial ethos, see Alex Inkeles and David Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, MA, 1974), esp. p. 109.
- 33 Anthony Richmond, *Immigration and Ethnic Conflict* (New York, 1988), pp. 51, 62.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 62.
- 35 Andrei Simic, *The Peasant Urbanites: A Study of Rural–Urban Mobility in Serbia* (New York and London, 1973), p. 82.

- 36 W. Mangin, "Mental health and migration to cities: a Peruvian case," in Paul Meadows and Ephraim H. Mizruchi, eds., *Urbanism, Urbanization, and Change: Comparative Perspectives* (Reading, MA, 1969), p. 314.
- 37 Pidmohyl'nyi, *Misto*, p. 275.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 39 Quoted in Kostiuk, *Zustrichi i proshchannia*, p. 192.
- 40 Mykyta Shapoval, *Misto i selo* (Prague, 1926), p. 33.
- 41 Z. Bryan Roberts, *Cities of Peasants: The Political Economy of the Third World* (Beverly Hills, CA, and London, 1979), p. 141.
- 42 M. Skrypnyk, "Dlia choho potribnyi trymsiachnyk ukrains'koi kul'tury u Donbasi?" *Statti i promovy*, 2, part 2. (Kharkiv, 1930), p. 151 (hereafter *SP*); and M. Skrypnyk, "Esperantyzatsiia chy ukrainizatsiia?" *SP*, p. 186.
- 43 N. Robichev, "Ukrains'kyi teatr i orhanizovane robitnytstvo," *Radians'kyi teatr*, no. 1 (1929), p. 25.
- 44 Kost Dovhan', "Ukrains'ka literatura i masovy chytach," *Krytyka*, no. 8 (1928), p. 43.
- 45 M. Skrypnyk, *Zavdannia kul'turnoho budivnytstva na Ukraini* (Kharkiv, 1928); N.S., "'Kramators'ka Domna' pro ukrainizatsiiu," *Robsel'kor*, no. 2 (1928), p. 35; and Sluts'kyi, *Radians'ke i kul'turne budivnytstvo na Ukraini*, p. 199.
- 46 Kosior, "Politychnyi zvit," p. 279.
- 47 Robichev, "Ukrains'kyi teatr," p. 25.
- 48 Victor Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York, 1946), pp. 63–64.
- 49 I. Akulov, "Do z'izdu profspilok Ukrainy," *Komunist*, November 30, 1928, p. 1.
- 50 A humorous satire on these mixed mentalities in one family is Mykola Kulish's play, "Mina Mazailo," in his *Tvory*, pp. 105–203. Kulish wrote and staged this play in 1929.
- 51 Kostiuk, *Zustrichi i proshchannia*, p. 242.
- 52 M. Skrypnyk, "Novyi stan i novi zavdannia," *Krytyka*, no. 1 (1930), p. 6.
- 53 In 1926, for example, sixty-three officials were dismissed in Kharkov. Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, *Natsional'na problema na Ukraini* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 4.

7 The ideological challenge of Ukrainian national communism

- 1 Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: an essay on the persistence and limits of Ukrainian national communism," in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York, 1978), p. 106.
- 2 For biographical sketches of Khvyl'ovyi, Shums'kyi, Volobuiev, and Skrypnyk, see Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918–1953*; and Mace, *Communism*.
- 3 *Dokumenty ukrains'koho komunizmu* (New York, 1962), pp. 128–29; also cited in Mace, *Communism*, pp. 149–50.
- 4 Cited in Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, p. 95.
- 5 Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, "Ukraina chy Malorosiiia?" *Vitchyzna*, no. 2 (1990),

- p. 169, and no. 1 (1990), p. 187. This is the first complete published text of Khvyyl'ovyi's 1926 essay.
- 6 E. F. Girchak, *Na dva fronta v bor'be s natsionalizmom* (Moscow–Leningrad, 1931), p. 59; Khvyyl'ovyi, *Tvory v p'iatokh tomakh*, 4, p. 415.
 - 7 M. Khvyyl'ovyi, "Ukrainia chy Malorosii?" *Vitchyzna*, no. 2 (1990), p. 169.
 - 8 Mace, *Communism*, p. 160.
 - 9 J. V. Stalin, "To Comrade Kaganovich and Other Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Ukrainian C. P. (B.)," in J. V. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow, 1954), 8, p. 161; also cited in Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, p. 95.
 - 10 Girchak, *Na dva fronta*, p. 50; cited in Mace, *Communism*, p. 150.
 - 11 *Proletarskaia pravda*, no. 149 (1762), July 5, 1927, as fully reproduced in *Nova Ukraina*, 6, no. 8–9 (1927), pp. 83–84; cited by Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine*, p. 96.
 - 12 *Komunist*, February 27, 1928. Also in *Budivnytstvo Radians'koi Ukrainy*, vol. 1, pp. 199–201.
 - 13 "Lyst do redaktsii 'Komunist'," *Budivnytstvo*, vol. 1, p. 200.
 - 14 Bohdan Krawchenko, "The national renaissance and the working class in Ukraine during the 1920s" (Paper, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton, 1982), p. 30n; cited in Mace, *Communism*, p. 168.
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 - 18 *Ibid.*, pp. 220–26.
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 - 22 Ievhen Hirchak, "Platforma ukrains'koho natsionalizmu," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, no. 6 (1928), p. 29; cited in Mace, *Communism*, p. 181.
 - 23 M. Skrypnyk, "Z pryvodu ekonomichnoi platformy natsionalizmu," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, no. 6 (1928), p. 46, cited in Mace, *Communism*, p. 185.
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 - 25 M. Volobuiev, "Proty ekonomichnoi pliatfomy natsionalizmu (Do krytyky volobuiivshchyny)," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, no. 5–6 (1930).
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- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 162.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 160.
- 33 O. Shums'kyi, "Promova na zasidanni politbiura 20–XI–26 r.," *Budivnytstvo*, vol. 1, p. 107.
- 34 M. Sh., "Chudo sv. Antoniiia i Oleksander Shumsky," *Nova Ukraina*, no. 8–9 (1927), p. 72; cited in Mace, *Communism*, p. 101.
- 35 M. Skrypnyk, "Natsional'ne pytannia v prohrammi Kominternu," in *SP*, vol. 2, part 2, p. 162.
- 36 Skrypnyk, "Na dva fronty u borot'bi z natsionalizmom," in *SP*, p. 380.
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- 39 Skrypnyk, "Desiati rokovyny USRR," *Proletars'ka revoliutsiia na Ukraini*, p. 330.
- 40 Skrypnyk, "Do ukrainizatsii 'Odesskikh izvestii'," in *SP*, p. 238; and "Do choho potribnyi trokhmisiachnyk ukrains'koi kul'tury u Donbassi?" in *SP*, p. 142.
- 41 Skrypnyk, "Za zdiisnennia teorii na praktytsi," *SP*, p. 9.
- 42 Skrypnyk, "Natsional'ne pytannia na Ukraini," *SP*, p. 52.
- 43 Skrypnyk, "Cherhovi zavdannia sotsbudivnytstva i nats. polityky na Rad. Ukr.," *SP*, p. 127.
- 44 M. Skrypnyk, *Do teorii borot'by dvokh kul'tur* (2nd ed., Kharkiv, 1928), p. 18.
- 45 Sydorovych, "Za chitkyi lenins'kyi vklad natsional'noho pytannia," *Komunist*, June 5, 1931, p. 2.
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- 47 Skrypnyk, "Proty perekruchen' polityky partii," *SP*, p. 18; and Skrypnyk, "USRR – Piedmont ukrains'kykh trudiashchykh mass," *SP*, p. 157. For Skrypnyk's attack on the overzealous implementation of Ukrainianization among non-Ukrainians, see "Cherhovi zavdannia," *SP*, pp. 125–26.
- 48 M. Skrypnyk, "Cherhovi zavdannia," pp. 114, 126.
- 49 M. Skrypnyk, "Proty perekruchen' polityky partii v natspytanni," *Metodychni problemy hotuvannia kadrov*, no. 5–7 (1932), pp. 18–19.
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- 51 Skrypnyk, "Cherhovi zavdannia," *SP*, p. 127.
- 52 I. Akulov, "Dva roky roboty VURPS," *Komunist*, December 4, 1928, p. 5.
- 53 P. Liubchenko, "Pro 'derusyifikatsiiu' ta 'polurusiv'," *Komunist*, June 28, 1933, p. 2.
- 54 A. Stoliarov, "Orhanizovanyi proletariat u novomi stani budivnytstva sotsializmu," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, no. 1 (1927), p. 27.
- 55 Andrew C. Janos, "Ethnicity, communism, and political change in Eastern Europe," *World Politics*, 23, no. 3 (1971), p. 510. This chapter follows Janos's arguments very closely.
- 56 Zaton's'kyi, *Natsional'nyi sostav*, pp. 73–74; H. Abezgaut *et al.*, eds., *Partiina*

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- 57 S. Dimanshtein, "Bol'shevistskii otpor natsionalizmu," *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti*, no. 4 (1933), p. 7; and A. G. Titov, "Bor'ba Kommunisticheskoi partii s ukлонami v oblasti natsional'nogo voprosa v perekhodnyi period ot kapitalizma k sotsializmu v SSSR," *Iz istorii partiinykh organizatsii Verkhnego Povolzh'ia*, part 1 (Iaroslavl', 1966), pp. 65–121.
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- 59 Janos, "Ethnicity, communism, and political change," p. 505.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 510.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 519.
- 62 Rothschild, "Political legitimacy," pp. 51–52.

8 Shifting the anchors of legitimacy

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- 2 Michal Reiman, *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution"* (Bloomington, IN, 1987), p. 38.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- 4 See the discussion by Holland Hunter, Robert Campbell, Stephen F. Cohen, and Moshe Lewin in *Slavic Review*, 32, no. 2 (1973), pp. 237–91.
- 5 L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, *Chto eto bylo? Razmysleniia o predposylkakh i itogakh togo, chto sluchilos' s nami v 30-40-e gody* (Moscow, 1989), p. 57.
- 6 Iu. V. Arutiunian, "Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1972), pp. 3–20.
- 7 Rysakov, *The National Policy*, p. 25; and Zinger, *Natsional'nyi sostav*, p. 11.
- 8 Rysakov, *National Policy*, p. 67 and Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 386.
- 9 Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, pp. 369, 372.
- 10 For an excellent analysis of this political radicalization, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931* (Bloomington, IN, 1978).
- 11 See, for example, Stalin's articles: "The foundations of Leninism," 6, pp. 71–196; "Trotskyism or Leninism?" 6, pp. 338–73; "The October Revolution and the tactics of the Russian communists," 6, pp. 374–420; "The fight against the right and 'ultra-left' deviations," 8, pp. 1–10; "Concerning questions of Leninism," 8, pp. 13–96; and "The opposition bloc in the C.P.S.U. (B).", 8, pp. 225–44, in Stalin, *Works*.

- 12 Stalin, "The political tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East," *Works*, 7, p. 140.
- 13 Stalin, "The national question and Leninism. Reply to Comrades Mashkov, Kovalchuk, and others," *Works*, 11, p. 369.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 370.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 369.
- 16 See Z. R. Ditrlich, "Stalin as a Georgian," *Plural Societies*, 7, no. 1 (1976), pp. 13–24; Daniel Rancour-Lafferriere, *The Mind of Stalin: A Psycho-Analytic Study* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1988), *passim*; Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929* (New York, 1973), pp. 137–43; and Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Twenty Letters To A Friend* (New York, 1967), *passim*.
- 17 Leon Trotsky, "Three concepts of the Russian Revolution," in Irving Howe, ed., *The Basic Writings of Leon Trotsky* (New York, 1965), p. 140.
- 18 Stalin, "The October Revolution," *Works*, 6, p. 395.
- 19 Stalin, "Concerning questions of Leninism," *Works*, 8, p. 70.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 72.
- 21 Stalin, "The national question and Leninism. Reply to Comrades Mashkov, Kovalchuk, and others," *Works*, 11, p. 360.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 362.
- 23 Stalin, "Iz pis'ma tov. Kaganovichu i drugim chlenam TsK KP(b)U," in I. Stalin, *Stat'i i rechi ob Ukraine. Sbornik* (Kiev, 1936), p. 209.
- 24 Stalin, "Politicheskii otchet Tsentral'nogo komiteta XVI s'ezda VKP(b)," *XVI s'ezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi partii (b)* (26 iuniia – 13 iuliia 1930 g.). *Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1935), p. 105.
- 25 *Ibid.*, pp. 108–9.
- 26 Stalin, "To Comrade Demyan Bedny," *Works*, 13, p. 26.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.
- 28 Stalin, "The tasks of business executives," *Works*, 13, pp. 40–41.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- 30 Stalin, "Some questions concerning the history of Bolshevism," *Works*, 13, pp. 86–104, especially p. 96.
- 31 Stalin, "The tasks of business executives," *Works*, 13, p. 41.
- 32 *Kommunisticheskaia akademiia, Natsional'naia politika VKP(b)*, Table 7, pp. 44–46.
- 33 Koszeliwec, *Rozmowy v dorozh do sebe*, p. 59. He provides examples of measures employed against nationally assertive Ukrainians on pp. 60–61.
- 34 A. Erukidze, "Partiinye direktivy i natsional'naia politika na mestakh," *Vlast' sovetov*, no. 45 (1925), p. 4.
- 35 Cited in S. Kosior, "Politychnyi zvit," p. 288.
- 36 Iurii Larin, "Ob izvrashcheniakh pri provedenii natsional'noi politiki (v poriadke obsuzhdeniia)," *Bol'shevik*, no. 23–24 (1926), p. 56. In 1926 the percentage of Ukrainian workers who spoke Ukrainian was higher than the 16.0 percent Larin presented. According to *Otchet Vseukrainskogo soveta profsoiuzov*, pp. 47–49, 33.2 percent of all Ukrainian workers claimed to speak Ukrainian.
- 37 Larin, "Ob izvrashcheniakh," *Bol'shevik*, no. 1 (1927), p. 64.
- 38 Larin, "Ob izvrashcheniakh," *Bol'shevik*, no. 23–24 (1926), pp. 59, 57.

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- 40 V. Vaganian, *O natsional'noi kul'ture* (Moscow, 1927), pp. 6, 9.
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- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 61.
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- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 67.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 68.
- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 125.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 126.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 129.
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- 53 *Ibid.*, p. 130.
- 54 Dimanshtein, "Problemy natsional'noi kul'tury i kul'turnogo stroitel'stva v natsional'nykh respublikakh," p. 120.
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- 57 *Ibid.*
- 58 *Ibid.*, p. 124.
- 59 *Ibid.*, p. 127.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- 61 Ostap (sic), "Za pravil'nuiu natsional'noiu politiku partii," *Kommunisticheskaia revoliutsiia*, no. 4 (1931), pp. 69, 70.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 74.
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- 64 Stalin, "Some questions concerning the history of Bolshevism" *Works*, 13, p. 97.
- 65 Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1969), p. 21.
- 66 Moshe Lewin, "The disappearance of planning in the plan," *Slavic Review*, 32, no. 2 (1973), p. 277.
- 67 Lev Kopelev, *The Education of a True Believer* (New York, 1980), p. 277.

9 Scorching the harvest, 1930–1934

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- 2 Kendall E. Bailes, *Technology and Society Under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1917–1941* (Princeton, NJ, 1978), pp. 70–97.

- 3 Vsevolod Holubnychy, "History of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1917–1941," in Kubijovič, ed., *Ukraine*, 1, p. 818.
- 4 "*Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy*." *Stenohrafichnyi zvit sudovoho protsesu* (Kharkiv, 1931), 1, p. 25.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. iii, v.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 153.
- 7 K. Turkalo, "Pered sudovym protsesom Spilky vyzlovennia Ukrainy (SVU)," *Novi dni*, 12, no. 5 (1961), pp. 15–16. Turkalo, a survivor of the trial, emphasized that the defendants experienced psychological pressures to admit their guilt.
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- 9 Majstrenko, *Istoriia moho pokolinnia*, pp. 227–28.
- 10 For an analysis of these workers in the Soviet countryside, see Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (New York, 1987).
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- 13 *Visti Vseukrains'koho Tsentral'noho vykonavchoho komitetu*, July 11–15, 1932.
- 14 V. Molotov, "Rech' tov. Molotova na III vseukrainskoi konferentsii KP(b)U 8 iulia 1932 goda," *Pravda*, July 14, 1932, pp. 1–2; and L. M. Kaganovich, "Zadachi ukrainskikh bol'shevikov v rabote na sele," *Pravda*, July 14, 1932, p. 2.
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- 1932–1933 (Edmonton, 1986); and US Congress, Commission on the Ukraine Famine, *Report to Congress* (Washington, DC, 1988).
- 19 Compare *Ukraina: Statystychnyi shchorichnyk 1929* (Kharkiv, 1929), p. 22; and "Iz Arkhivov Goskomstata SSSR. Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1937 g.," *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 7 (1990), p. 77.
- 20 *Ibid.*
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- 22 Akademiia nauk SSSR, ordena Druzhby narodov Institut Etnologii i etnicheskoi antropologii im. N. N. Miklukho-Maklaia, *Materialy k serii "Narody sovetskogo soiuza": Perepis' 1939 goda: Dokumental'nye istochniki Tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennogo Arkhiva Narodnogo Khoziaistva (TsGANKh) SSSR* (Moscow, 1930), part 5, p. 967.
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- 31 P. P. Postyshev, "Osobennosti klassovoi bor'by na nyneshnem etape sotsialisticheskogo nastupleniia," *Pravda*, July 3, 1933, p. 3.
- 32 P. P. Liubchenko, "Pro deiaki pomylyky na teoretychnomu fronti," *Visti*, July 6, 1933, pp. 3–4.

- 33 Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule*, pp. 64–65.
- 34 *Pravda*, July 8, 1933, p. 4.
- 35 *Visti*, July 9, 1933, p. 2.
- 36 See Postyshev's speech, *Pravda*, June 22, 1933 and Popov's speech, *Visti*, July 12, 1933, pp. 1–2.
- 37 See Kosior's speech, *Pravda*, December 2, 1933.
- 38 S. Kosior, *Itogi i blizhaishie zadachi provedeniia natsional'noi politiki na Ukraine* (Moscow, 1934), p. 46.
- 39 V. P. Zaton's'kyi, *Natsional'no-kul'turne budivnytstvo ta borot'ba proty natsionalizmu* (Kiev, 1934).
- 40 Kosior, *Itogi i blizhaishie zadachi*, p. 37.
- 41 "Dopovid' tov. Postysheva," KP(b)U, XII z'izd, p. 153.
- 42 During the 1929–30 purge, for example, the Leningrad, Moscow oblast, and Siberian party organizations expelled 5.0 percent, 5.6 percent, and 12.7 percent (respectively) of their members. Rural and non-Russian regions fared far worse. Rural cells lost 16.0 percent of their members. At the same time, 13.5 percent were purged in Uzbekistan, 18.0 percent in Kirghizia, and higher percentages (statistics were not given) in Dagestan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 181; "Dopovid' tov. Rozengol'sta," KP(b)U, *Stenografichnyi zvit, Odyndatsyji z'izd*, p. 195.
- 43 G. Aronshtam, "K chistke natsional'nykh partorganizatsii," *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti*, no. 5–6 (1933), p. 18.
- 44 N. Dubrovskii, "Nekotorye itogi chistki partii," *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti*, no. 12 (1933), p. 2; and "Dopovid' tov. Sukhomlina," KP(b)U, XII z'izd, p. 230.
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- 47 *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy: Naochnyi posibnyk*, p. 7; *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy – boiovyi zahin KPRS*, pp. 15–16; and "Dopovid' P. P. Postysheva," KP(b)U, XII z'izd, pp. 216–17.
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- 49 Rossiiskaia Kommunisticheskaia partiia (b), *XII s'ezd Rossiiskoi kommunisticheskoi partii (bol'shevikov)* (Moscow, 1923), p. 446.
- 50 *Shestnadsatyi s'ezd VKP(b)* (Moscow, 1931), p. 299.
- 51 PA PP pry TsK Kompartii Ukrainy, f. 1. op. 1, spr. 2070, ark. 6; cited in Lozys'ts'kyi, "Polityka ukrainizatsii," pp. 53–54.
- 52 Stalin, "Otchetnii doklad tovarisha Stalina o rabota TsK VKP(b)," *Vsesoiuznaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (b), XVII s'ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b)* (26 ianvaria – 10 fevralia 1934 g.). *Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1934), pp. 31–32.
- 53 "Dopovid' I. I. Plysa," KP(b)U, XII z'izd KP(b)U, pp. 66–67.
- 54 This phrase comes from M. Skrypnyk, "Natsional'ni peretnyky," *SP*, p. 304.

- 55 See the Introduction.
- 56 Holubnychy, "History," p. 818.
- 57 A. Khvyliia, "Na borot'bu z natsionalizmom na movnomu fronti," *Za markso-lenins'ku krytyku*, no. 7 (1933), p. 11.
- 58 For the Russification of Ukrainian technical and scientific terms, see Khvyliia, *Vykorinty, znyshchyty natsionalistychni korinnia*, pp. 135–43.
- 59 Mace, "Famine and nationalism in Soviet Ukraine," *Problems of Communism*, 33, no. 3 (1984), p. 43.
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- 61 Janos, "Ethnicity, communism, and political change," p. 519.

Conclusion

- 1 See Arutiunian, "Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii," pp. 3–20; and Katz, Rogers, and Harned, eds., *Handbook*, pp. 435–66.
- 2 Inkeles and Smith, *Becoming Modern*, p. 227. According to Inkeles and Smith, individual modernity includes: "keeping informed about the world and taking an active role as a citizen; valuing education and technical skill; aspiring to advance oneself economically; stressing individual responsibility and seeing the virtues of planning, including family planning; approving and being open to new experience, including the experience of urban living and industrial employment; manifesting a sense of personal efficacy; freedom from absolute submission to received authority in family, tribe, and sect, and the development of newer, non-parochial loyalties; and the concomitant granting of more autonomy and rights to those of lesser status and power, such as minority groups and women" (p. 109). Although Stalin did not tolerate all of these individual consequences of modernity, Soviet society after industrialization was relatively more modern than before industrialization.
- 3 Bert Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (Glencoe, IL, 1962), p. 163; cited in Inkeles and Smith, *Becoming Modern*, p. 218.
- 4 Ivan Dziuba, "Chy usvidomliuiemo natsional'nu kul'turu iak tsilist'?" *Kul'tura i zhyttia*, no. 4 (January 24, 1988), p. 4.
- 5 Cited in "Ukrainizatsiia," *Ukrains'kyi robotnyk*, no. 1 (1926), p. 2.
- 6 These ideas were suggested by Paul R. Brass, "Ethnic groups and nationalities," in Peter F. Sugar, ed., *Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe* (Santa Barbara, CA, 1980), pp. 33–34, 65.
- 7 Similar practices occurred in other non-Russian regions. See by A. P. Kuchkin, "K voprosy o korenizatsii sovetskogo apparata v Kazakhstane v pervoe desiatiletie sushchestvovaniia respubliki (1920–1930)," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, no. 48 (1954), p. 212; and *Bol'shevik Kazakhstana*, no. 11–12 (1933), p. 19; cited in David Lane, "Ethnic and class stratification in Soviet Kazakhstan, 1917–1939," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17, no. 2 (1975), p. 182.
- 8 For the long-term impact of the passport on non-Russian identities, see Victor Zaslavsky, *The Neo-Stalinist State: Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society* (Armonk, NY, 1982), pp. 91–104.

- 9 Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, B5, no. 383, p. 32.
- 10 The word, "mankurt," meaning slave, comes from Chingiz Aitmatov, *The Day Lasts More Than A Hundred Years* (Bloomington, IN, 1983), pp. 124–29. This word, representing the forced imposition of cultural amnesia, has entered Soviet vocabulary.
- 11 Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Hanebnii pam'iaty," Iurii Lavrinenko, ed., *Rozstriliane vidrodzhennia* (Paris, 1959), pp. 920–30; Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Rusyfikatsiia chy malorossianizatsiia?" *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies*, no. 4 (1978), pp. 78–84; and Iurii Shcherbak, "Vremia nadezhd," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, January 19, 1989, p. 3. The most thorough analysis of these processes remains: Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification? A Study in The Soviet Nationalities Problem* (3rd ed., New York, 1974).
- 12 Roman Szporluk, "Kiev as the Ukraine's primate city," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3/4, part 2 (1979–80), p. 846.
- 13 This phrase comes from B. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu ukrains'koiu*, pp. 59–60.

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