

Sources and Documents Series

The Ukrainian Experience in the United States

A Symposium

Edited by Paul R. Magocsi



Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
Sources and Documents Series

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The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute was established in 1973 as an integral part of Harvard University. It supports research associates and visiting scholars who are engaged in projects concerned with all aspects of Ukrainian studies. The Institute also works in close cooperation with the Committee on Ukrainian Studies, which supervises and coordinates the teaching of Ukrainian history, language, and literature at Harvard University.

Preface

Massachusetts is the home of the American Revolution, and it was here that the Bicentennial celebrations began. On the night of April 18, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford officially inaugurated the Bicentennial with a speech at Old North Church in Boston, where exactly two hundred years previously the lantern was hung that gave the signal for Paul Revere to begin his epoch-making ride.

April 1975 also saw Boston begin its observance of the Bicentennial by inaugurating Festival Bostonian, a celebration devoted to each of the ethnic groups that make up the city's population. During each of the next twenty months until the end of the Bicentennial year, a different ethnic group displayed its culture through lectures, art exhibits, films, concerts, and dance performances. December 1976 was designated as Ukrainian month.

The papers represented in this volume were given at a symposium that was the brainchild of Edward Kasinec, Librarian and Research Bibliographer in Ukrainian Studies at Harvard University. In cooperation with the Festival Bostonian Ukrainian Celebration Committee, Mr. Kasinec arranged a four-day symposium devoted to the historical past and cultural achievements of Ukrainian Americans. University scholars and cultural figures, like the actor Jack Palance (born Wolodymyr Palahniuk) who is of Ukrainian descent, came to Harvard to speak about the Ukrainian-American past or to display some of its contemporary cultural manifestations. The symposium received critical acclaim in the local, national, and international media, such as the *Boston Globe*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *Voice of America*.

The papers and discussions that follow represent many aspects of Ukrainian-American life—history, sociology, religion, language, literature. With few exceptions, the papers have remained in the same format as when they were originally delivered at the symposium. As is evident from the program reproduced in the appendix, the original order of the papers has been retained, the sole exception being Professor Novak's remarks which, because of their general nature, seemed more appropriate for the conclusion. The discussions were transcribed by Professor Richard Renoff and then edited so that only the most essential questions and responses appear.

One interesting aspect of this volume is that many of the papers take opposing positions regarding certain issues. This is most readily evident in the choice of terminology—Ukraine or the Ukraine, Russophile or Muscovophile, Carpatho-Rusyn/Ruthenian or Carpatho-Ukrainian. In the tradition of the Sources and Documents Series in which this volume appears, the terminology used by each author has been retained. This may suggest inconsistency and initially many cause confusion for the reader, but out of respect for each author's point of view, the papers have remained basically unchanged.

The transliteration systems for passages taken from the Cyrillic alphabet also differ from chapter to chapter. Some authors favor the Library of Congress system, others the international system. The asterisks that appear in some of the discussions refer to notes supplied by the editor. The affiliations given for speakers and participants (listed on pages ix-x) reflect the status of those individuals in December 1976.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
January, 1979

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**The Ukrainian Experience in the United States
A Symposium**

CHAPTER I

Problems in the History of the Ukrainian Immigration to the United States

Paul R. Magocsi

During the past few years we have all heard about the renewed interest in ethnicity, or the so-called ethnic revival that is taking place in the United States. Many have correctly pointed out that it was the rise of Black-American self-awareness in the 1960's that provided the stimulus for white ethnics to feel less constrained about expressing their own individual ethnic backgrounds. As one colleague remarked: "Now it's chic to be ethnic." And whereas to be a hyphenated American was scorned and avoided just a few years ago, today a myriad of buttons, bumper stickers, and T-shirts proclaim with pride that the wearer is an Italian-American, a Greek-American, a Ukrainian-American, or whatever. Finally, the various celebrations commemorating the Bicentennial of the United States placed an official seal of approval from the highest government circles on the idea of preserving and propagating ethnic diversity.

In a more serious vein, immigration studies at the university level, treated sometimes under the rubric of American social history and which for decades had barely been tolerated as more or less an aberration, have finally come into their own. Projects associated with ethnicity have been deemed relevant; thus, the former small band of immigration specialists have been joined by many newer associates who hope to obtain a portion of the funds that have become available. This new discipline of immigration studies, if that is what it can be called, has been blessed, or cursed, with several new university courses, journals, and individual monographs. What still seems to be sorely lacking, however, is a readily available reference tool on the subject. Where, for instance, can an interested party—whether a student, professor, intelligent layman, or even a committee member for a grants proposal—where can persons like these turn to find out who are the Albanians, the Czechs, the Cape Verdeans, or the Filipinos that live in our midst?

It was with this in mind that Professor Oscar Handlin of Harvard University, Ann Orlov, formerly of Harvard University Press, and Josef Barton of Northwestern University originated the idea of an ethnic encyclopedia, or more specifically an encyclopedia of American ethnic groups. In November of 1974 they organized a conference funded by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to discuss the feasibility of preparing such an encyclopedia. The reaction from the conference participants was generally positive, and as a result, formal requests for funding were made to the National Endowment of the Humanities and to the Rockefeller Foundation. By the spring of 1976 the decision was announced that more than a half a million dollars was granted to fund a three-year project, intended to result in the *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*.¹

The *Encyclopedia* is directed by an editorial board of five members and will include entries for more than 100 groups and about 50 thematic essays. The size of the contributions generally reflects the size or influence of the group in question, so that the Germans and Italians are allotted 20,000 words each, while the Frisians and Georgians are allowed a mere 1,500 words. The Ukrainians fall into the middle range and are allotted 10,000 words. I have been invited to write the articles on the four groups of eastern Slavic origin—the Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians, and Carpatho-Rusyns—and it is in the context of the Ukrainian contribution that I am addressing this seminar today.

Generally, encyclopedias reflect syntheses of knowledge about a given subject. The problem with the *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* is that it will cover many groups about which there is at present an insufficient body of knowledge to synthesize. In the case of the Ukrainians, the situation is relatively good. There do exist several histories of the Ukrainian immigration, ranging from the pioneering classic by Iuliian Bachyns'kyi to shorter studies by Wasyl Halich, Iaroslav Chyz, Vasyl' Mudryi, Vasyl Markus, and others.² There are also detailed histories of

¹To be published by Harvard University Press, 1980.

²Iuliian Bachyns'kyi, *Ukrain's'ka immigratsiia v Z'iedynenykh Derzhavakh Ameryky* (L'viv, 1914); Wasyl Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States* (Chicago, 1937;

various Ukrainian fraternal organizations and churches. Nevertheless, there still remain certain aspects of the problem for which there is either a limited amount or no information available.

I have prepared an outline for the entry on Ukrainians (Table I, pp. 16–18), which basically reflects the guidelines given to contributors to the *Encyclopedia*, as well as a first draft of the essay, and I should like to use this opportunity first to discuss those sections which are problematic and to suggest the kinds of research projects that might be undertaken in the future. Then I shall share with you in more detail my thoughts on religion, especially the subsection entitled “The Church as a Unifying and Divisive Force,” and the last two sections entitled “Intergroup Relations” and “Group Maintenance and Individual Ethnic Commitment.” It is precisely these areas of my encyclopedia entry which are the most interpretive and thus the most open to criticism and revision. In the spirit of a seminar as a forum for an exchange of ideas, I shall benefit from your comments—many of which are based on actual experience as members of the group in question. Moreover, you might find it interesting to see how an outsider views the community in which many of you have developed.

The first and most basic question that arises is: Who are Ukrainians? That is, what do we mean when we say someone is Ukrainian in the context of the *Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*? One, of course, might consider Ukrainians to be all those individuals and groups who themselves or whose ancestors came from lands now within the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Thus, Ukrainians could conceivably be Jews, Russians, Tatars, Poles, Gypsies, or Hungarians as well as persons who identify themselves as Ukrainians. This inclusive, and at the same time, simplistic perception of the concept Ukrainian is not what we have in mind. Ukrainians, or Ukrainian Americans, will be understood to be those individuals who first

reprinted New York, 1970); Yaroslav Chyz, *The Ukrainian Immigrants in the United States* (Scranton, Pa., 1959); Vasyl Mudryi, “Nova ukrains’ka emigratsiia,” in *Ukrainci u vil’nomu sviti: jubileina knyha Ukrain’skoho Narodnogo Soiuzu*, ed. L. Myshuha and A. Dragan (Jersey City, N.J., 1954), pp. 115–136; Vasyl Markus, “Ukrainians in the United States,” in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, vol. II, ed. V. Kubijovych (Toronto, 1971), pp. 1100–1151.

and foremost identify themselves as such. Whether or not they speak the language, they will probably belong to a Ukrainian church, fraternal society, or other organization.

Having accepted this premise, it will not be possible to include two groups of people who originated in territories that are today clearly Ukrainian from the ethnic and national point of view. However, these people left Europe at a time when Ukrainian consciousness in their homeland was not widespread; moreover, after their own development in the United States they have opted for dissociation from the Ukrainian-American community. I refer here to the Russophiles, largely from Galicia, and the Carpatho-Rusyns, or Ruthenians, from Subcarpathian Rus', or what is now the Transcarpathian Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR and the Prešov Region of northeastern Czechoslovakia. The Russophiles in this country have tended to associate with Russians and have identified themselves as such, whereas the Carpatho-Rusyns have generally considered themselves a separate group, despite the fact that the name many of them use, Carpatho-Russian, leads some to believe they are Russians. The Carpatho-Rusyn situation is not unique, for there are several other groups in this country who no longer nor ever were represented in their homelands. For instance, there are no Acadians (Cajuns), Appalachians, Pennsylvania Dutchmen, or, for that matter, Yankees in Europe; yet, these groups will have entries in the *Encyclopedia*.

The Carpatho-Rusyns would not otherwise be an issue except for the fact that of all the lands located within present-day Ukrainian ethnographic territory, the regions inhabited by Carpatho-Rusyns supplied an extremely high percentage of immigrants. Many writers estimate that there are approximately 1,500,000 Ukrainians in this country, about half of whom are Carpatho-Rusyns. Thus, to treat them as a separate entity will, if nothing else, cause a drastic revision in the traditional statistics that are applied to the Ukrainian-American community.

I might also mention that, when describing the Ukrainian-American community, I am referring primarily to the period beginning with the massive immigration of the 1880's and 1890's. Several writers like to emphasize the fact that at least one Ukrainian, if he did not come over on the Mayflower, arrived even earlier—on one of the three ships of John Smith. The

person in question is Dr. Lavrentey Bohun, a physician that Smith was supposed to have met during his escape from a Turkish prison and his flight across the Ukraine back to England. The desire to place the beginnings of immigration at the earliest point in time is typical of all ethnic groups in the United States. In this context, I cannot leave this subject without telling you a tale by a Hungarian, who comes from a civilization known for its penchant for transforming wish-fulfillment into historical fact. Considering my name, Magocsi, the following account should be viewed as unprejudiced. A new series being published by Oceana Press contains chronologically arranged fact-books on each of the ethnic groups in the United States. The one on Hungarians includes the following statement as the first entry:

According to the Chronicle of the Kings of Norway (Heimskringla), the crew of the Leif Ericsson expedition (ca. 1000) included a man named Tyrker who, according to some scholars, may have been Hungarian. He "babbled in Turkish"; and, in Icelandic, "Tyrker" means "Turk." European records of the tenth century refer to Hungarians as "Turks." On the new shore, Tyrker found vines and grapes, and perhaps this prompted Ericsson to name the shore "Vineland" ("Wineland").³

As my daughter, Cindy, would say: "That's a nice story!"

The desire to justify one's place in this country and to prove one's pedigree on the basis of the amount of blue blood that can be found in one's veins is clearly a reaction to the equally pretentious ideas of the Yankee establishment, represented by places like that citadeal of "blue-bloodedom" across the Charles River—Boston. The assumption is, I suppose, that Hungarian Americans can feel more at ease knowing that one of their kind came over with Leif Ericsson, or that Ukrainian Americans can feel the same having a Bohun in Jamestown and knowing that there are "Ukrainian-sounding names"—that catchy phrase—in the records of the Revolutionary War or the first United States census in 1790. All of these tidbits of knowledge may make interesting reading and perhaps foster unfounded pride in some individuals, but it really has little to do with the development of

³*Hungarians in America, 1583–1874: A Chronology and Fact Book*, compiled by Joseph Széplaki (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1975), p. 1.

the Ukrainian community in this country, a process that did not really begin until the 1880's.

One of the greatest problems of immigration studies concerns the number of people who actually came to this country. From the existing published sources there is no way to obtain exact figures on the actual number of members from any specific group who came to the United States. The problems are many. Until 1899 the Bureau of Immigration recorded only the country of origin; thus, we have no way of knowing whether an immigrant from Austria-Hungary was an Austrian, Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, Jew, or one of the eight Slavic peoples living within the boundaries of the Habsburg Empire. After 1899 the Commissioner on Immigration Reports did provide statistics based on the mother tongue of each immigrant, and there is an entry for Ruthenian/Russniak. The census reports beginning in 1910 employ the same principle.

One remark on statistical sources is in order. It has become accepted practice for scholars of European history and civilization to poke fun at United States officials and the American establishment in general for not being aware of the complex ethnic composition of Eastern and Southern Europe, areas from which most of the immigrants came in the early years of this century. In a sense their criticism is unjustified and actually false, because in fact American statistics are some of the most detailed and rival the German or Austrian in their comprehensiveness. In this regard, the classic census reports are those of 1910, 1920, and 1930. Within the chapters entitled "Mother Tongue of the Foreign White Stock" there are included not only the major languages but a wide variety of minor ones. So, for instance, in 1910, there are entries for speakers of Frisian, Icelandic, Romansch, Friulian, Breton, Basque, Bosnian, Herzegovinian, Dalmatian, Montenegrin, Wendish or Lusatian, Lappish, Gypsy, Georgian, and Kurdish. Moreover, there are a series of correlation tables for country of origin and mother tongues. Thus, one can look under Austrian and find out specifically how many Poles, Bohemians and Moravians (i.e., Czechs), Slovenians, Croatians, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Russians, Serbians, "Slavic," and "Unknown" were recorded in this country. Conversely, one can look at another table under Ruthenian, later Ukrainian, and see a

list of eight to ten countries with specific figures for the number that came from there.

In more specific terms, what can the censuses tell us about Ukrainians, or Ruthenians, as they were listed until 1930? Table 2 (page 19) shows the official returns and my revised version. Briefly, let me first point out how the revision for 1930 was devised. The census gave 68,485 as the number of Ukrainians and Ruthenians, both rubrics appearing in this report. Then, if we look under the census tables correlating mother tongue and country of origin, we see that there are several Russians listed as originating from Poland, Austria, and Romania; clearly most of these are of Ukrainian ethnic background. Subtracting the number of Ruthenians listed as originating from Czechoslovakia—these being Carpatho-Rusyns—I arrived at a figure of 95,981. But this represents only the number of foreign-born; that is, it excludes persons born in this country. Thus, it was necessary to determine the ratio of foreign-born to native-born in the immediately preceding and succeeding censuses—1920 and 1940, take the average of that, which is 49.5 percent, and calculate with an algebraic equation, which yields 94,385. This figure, plus the number foreign-born, results in an estimated total of 190,366. Yet, even this revised figure, almost three times that of the official report, is not realistic. For instance, we know from the Committee on Immigration Reports that 259,969 Ruthenians/Russniaks arrived in the United States alone between 1899 and 1915. Subtracting 18.7 percent of those originating from Hungary (i.e., Carpatho-Rusyns) and subtracting an average of 17 percent for those who returned home, we still arrive at a figure of 175,425, not including those who came during the 1880's, 1890's, and after 1915. Yet the number of foreign-born listed in the 1930 census is only 68,485. The reasons for these discrepancies are many: a high percentage of unknown entries or no returns on the census report, the standard margin of error in any census, and the increasingly large number who reported English as their mother tongue.

Given these problems, I was forced to rely on the only other published data, namely church records, but here, too, caution is necessary. It is possible to get a relatively good idea of the number of Ukrainian Catholics, because after 1924 a separate diocese was

established for them. There are also several Ukrainian Orthodox churches for which data are available at least in the post-World War II period. But, of course, there are several other Orthodox churches, primarily Russian, as well as Latin-Rite Catholic and Protestant churches in which there are Ukrainians. As is evident from Table 3 (page 20), estimated percentages have been used for Latin-Rite Catholic and Protestant membership, leaving us with a 1970 estimate of 736,710, the best we can do for the moment.

But more can and should be done. Research projects should be undertaken to analyze ship records, now open, as well as the records of the various fraternal societies and churches, many of which include indications of birth places of the members. Projects like these are not easily undertaken, but the information that would result could provide invaluable concrete data not now available.

Besides using already existing sources, there is the possibility of creating new sources. The U.S. Bureau of Census has since 1940 become increasingly lax in its coverage of ethnic groups. Recently detailed information, including number, place of residence, age, marital status, fertility, profession, and income, is available on Blacks and Spanish-speakers, but little can be done with existing statistics regarding the white ethnics. With the upsurge of interest in the ethnic problem, the Census Bureau must be urged to revise its present questionnaire for 1980. In fact, negotiations are being conducted now between an organization headed and represented by Michael Novak and the Census Bureau about specific ways to gather data on ethnic heritages in the 1980 census.⁴

The present lack of such data makes it extremely difficult to provide sophisticated information under the sections of the outline designated as "Economic Life" and "Family and Kinship." One should like to know, for instance, the types of professions, the median income, and the extent of social mobility in the Ukrainian community. Toward this end a series of sociologically oriented case studies in individual Ukrainian communities throughout the country should be undertaken. The potential

⁴The suggestions submitted to the Census Bureau at a White House Seminar in June 1976 appeared in *EMPAC*, No. 10 (Bayville, N.Y., 1976), pp. 3-5.

number of doctoral and master's dissertations that could arise from such projects is limitless. I trust those of you from other institutions will urge your students to think seriously about such subjects. Similarly, we have no concrete data on the family—specifically the degree of marriage within and beyond the community, the male-female ratio, birth patterns and age distribution. I believe that much could be achieved from both historical and contemporary perspectives by using church records listing births, deaths, and marriages. I understand the Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy based in Philadelphia has on film the records of its three dioceses. Therein is a mine of information awaiting analysis, if the right people can be found to do the job.

Rather than mention other potential research projects and problems concerned with studying the Ukrainian-American community, I would like to share with you some of my thoughts as they appear in the first draft of my ethnic encyclopedia article on Ukrainians. These will be limited only to three sections: religion, intergroup relations, and group maintenance and individual ethnic commitment.

Clearly one of the strongest aspects of Ukrainian-American life is religion. In the European homeland, religion was an integral part of existence, especially at the village level, where church-related functions were embedded in many commonplace activities and daily occupations. It is not an exaggeration to state that the whole life cycle of Ukrainian society was organized around the church calendar, with its many holidays and traditions. It is important to note that religion was less a matter of personal conviction and belief than it was a way of life. Going to church on Sundays and holidays was almost as natural and necessary to one's existence as eating or sleeping.

It was inevitable that Ukrainian immigrants would try to recreate this religious-oriented environment in their new homeland. Characteristically, the church was one of the first buildings constructed and it became the focal point in immigrant communities. The subsequent history of the Ukrainian church was marked by great difficulties, many of which were the result of: (1) the clash between the Old World, rural-based religious way of life and the urban, more secular, and culturally alien environment of American society; and (2) the friction between various factions of

the community caused by disputes that had originated in Europe or arose in the New World. The record shows that the church has been both a unifying and divisive force in the life of the Ukrainian immigration.

On the positive side, it must be admitted that the churches, whether Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant, have done much to maintain the fabric of the Ukrainian community. Still today it is the church, with its basement or adjacent building, that provides the facilities for the dinners, wedding receptions, concerts, plays, bazaars, bingo games, and other social occasions celebrated by the community. Again, it is usually the church, through its all-day parochial school system and Saturday schools, which makes it possible to provide instruction for young people in Ukrainian language and culture. The churches have also contributed to the preservation of Ukrainian culture through: (1) newspapers like the Catholic *Shliakh* (Philadelphia, 1940-present) and *Nova zoria* (Chicago, 1965-present), or the Orthodox *Ukruïns'ke pravoslavne slovo* (South Bound Brook, N.J., 1940-present); (2) annual church almanacs; and (3) individual books, such as the Orthodox sponsored *Ukraina: entsyklopedia dlia moloda* (*Ukraine: An Encyclopedia for Young People*, 1971).

On the negative side, the church has often been the source of controversy, which in certain instances has proved detrimental to the Ukrainian-American community. Other sections of the encyclopedia entry discuss how the acquiescence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church to pressure from the Vatican and American Latin-Rite hierarchy led to the defection of thousands of parishioners to the Russian Orthodox Church, where they generally became part of the Russian-American community. In 1911 the Ukrainian Catholic Church also tried to gain control over the largest lay organization, the Ukrainian National Union, causing dissension within that fraternal society and the alienation or loss of many members.

The Vatican decree of 1929 also sent shock waves through large segments of the Ukrainian community. According to this decree, celibacy was imposed on the clergy and church property was to be turned over to the bishop. The result was a new wave of departures to Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy, as well as a series of court cases to determine who was to have legal control

over church property—the Catholics, the Orthodox, or lay committees. The most recent source of controversy is the call for the creation of a patriarchate for all the Byzantine-Slavic Rite Catholics, the first appointment to be Metropolitan Iosyf Slipyi (b. 1892). The Vatican, as well as a portion of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, is opposed to these efforts, yet supporters of the patriarchal movement, especially from among the more recent immigration, continue to make demands which frequently result in widely publicized protests against Rome.

In the course of these various controversies, many disinterested parishoners, especially young people, have become disenchanted with and embarrassed about the internal religious squabbles that have torn apart the Ukrainian community. The inevitable result is a lessening desire to identify oneself with the church and in some cases avoidance of the ethnic group that has created the controversy. In summary, it must be concluded that while the various churches have done much to preserve and propagate Ukrainian traditions in the United States, they at the same time have done much to undermine the fabric of the community.

The problem of interaction with other groups can be discussed from two viewpoints: Ukrainian relations with other ethnic groups, and Ukrainian relations with American society as a whole. Relationships with other groups have been colored largely by perceptions and experiences brought from Europe. Thus, both in the homeland and in the New World, Ukrainians have not gotten along well with either the Poles or Russians, despite the fact that in American society, particularly in the early years, they were grouped together under the opprobrious term "Hunkies." The causes of friction were twofold: religious and national. Before and even after the various stages in the establishment of a Ukrainian Catholic Church in 1916 and 1924, many Ukrainians belonged to Latin-Rite parishes largely of Polish composition. It was only natural that these churches did not welcome a decrease in their membership and opposed virulently the establishment of "rival" Byzantine-Slavic Rite churches. Similarly, the conversions to Orthodoxy, especially in the early years of this century, when there was no Ukrainian Orthodox Church, meant usually that the converts would identify with Russians. Thus, the struggle be-

tween these two Eastern-Rite churches inevitably produced feelings of hostility between Ukrainian and Russian immigrants. Closely allied with this is the question of national identity. In the earlier years some Polish and most Russian immigrants did not recognize Ukrainians as belonging to a separate nationality. Although since the Second World War the Polish immigration generally has accepted the existence of Ukrainians and even has respected their organizational achievements, Russian Americans (especially those originating from Ukrainian ethnographic territory) continue to view the idea of a Ukrainian-American community as nothing more than a politically inspired aberration of Ukrainians from Galicia who, like their brethren farther east, should be designated and considered "Little Russians." It is interesting to note that the same kind of condescension exhibited by Russians toward Ukrainians is in turn shown by Ukrainians toward the Carpatho-Rusyns in the United States, who are faulted for not considering themselves to be Ukrainian. Ukrainian Americans seem to interact much better with other Eastern European ethnic groups, like the Czechs, Serbs, Latvians, or Lithuanians, with whom they have much in common: they occupy generally the same socioeconomic status in this country, they are perceived as being similar by the larger society, and they all are opposed to the Communist regimes that rule in their respective homelands.

As for other ethnic groups, Ukrainian Americans have continued in this country the symbiotic relationship with Jews that had persisted in Europe. In the earlier years of this century it was not uncommon to find Ukrainian ghettos in which many of the shops, travel and so-called "package-sending" agencies, and local banks were run by Jewish proprietors. Later, as Ukrainians became more socially mobile, they frequently judged their success according to the level of achievement attained by the local Jewish proprietor or former schoolmate. In recent years, Ukrainian Americans have come to share the attitudes of many of their fellow white ethnics, who view with varying degrees of scorn the less fortunate blacks and Puerto Ricans who have moved into the older inner-city ghettos.

As for Ukrainian relations with American society as a whole, the statements made in 1914 by an early historian of the immi-

gration, Iulian Bachyns'kyi, are still very much applicable: "The immigrants live beyond the public life of American society." "Ukrainian immigrants live their own lives."⁵ The reasons for the persistence of such a stance can in large measure be explained by what might be called the respect-disdain syndrome toward American life. On the one hand, Ukrainians, like all immigrants, could not help being impressed by the achievements and general sense of freedom and vitality in this highly industrialized society. These United States truly embraced a New World, so different from the tradition-bound, rather placid and even stagnant rural or small-town environment they left. The fact that in America change, thus seeming instability, was a way of life must have been most disconcerting to the Ukrainian people. Some quickly adapted and prospered in the new society, but most found the adjustments to be too great. As a result, they tried, and to a large degree succeeded, in creating their own world, which was and still is bounded by the parameters of their churches, fraternal organizations, and Ukrainian language newspapers. Thus, functions relating to American society at large were generally kept to a minimum. Moreover, when the mores of the larger society do not coincide with an individual's own standards, the reaction often takes the form of a disdain that establishes a series of polar opposites. The Ukrainian ideals of respect for tradition, including the celebration of holidays, formalized codes of conduct determined by strict social status and the use of titles, and of patriotism toward the homeland, are opposed to those attitudes which supposedly characterize American society: lack of respect for tradition or any emphasis on formal celebration, general avoidance of titles and other social graces that establish and define boundaries between individuals, and pluralist or cosmopolitan attitudes that are sometimes perceived to be anti-ethnic. Given these modes of thinking, many post-World War II Ukrainian immigrants feel safer within their own communities and venture only at great psychological risk into the larger American society.

There are several factors in Ukrainian-American life which reinforce the ethnic commitment of individuals and which tend

⁵Bachyns'kyi, *Ukrains'ka immigratsiia*, pp. 409 and 412.

to ensure the continued viability of the group. The discussion of organizations shows that Ukrainian Americans have for the most part created a society within a society. All kinds of formal structures, whether churches, schools, fraternal societies, publications, social clubs, resorts, or sports teams, have been created so that a Ukrainian American can function relatively well while maintaining only minimal contact with the "outside" American society. Even the Ukrainian language spoken by members of the community is sprinkled with an assortment of organizational acronyms (UNDO, Dvikari, Soiuzanka, Melnykivtsi, Banderivtsi, or UNIHU), conveying a host of political and social nuances that only a member of the community can really grasp. This is perhaps most evident in the satirical journal, *Lys Mykyta*, comprehension of which is not based on knowledge of the Ukrainian language but also on an understanding of its societal basis that only an insider can have.

Another element contributing to group maintenance stems from the large and articulate third wave of immigrants, who have stressed ideology as the basis of their identity. One is not a Ukrainian because one's parents came from areas that then or now may be called the Ukraine, but rather because one associates with the ideals, usually political, of the group. In a survey conducted among the youth of one Ukrainian community, 82 percent of the respondents stated that being Ukrainian meant that they were obligated to work for the future goal of freeing the Ukraine. In this regard, the larger American society also plays a positive role, since quite often other Americans associate the Ukraine and Ukrainians with Russia (sometimes even Poland), and the group member is immediately forced to explain the discrepancy and thus to reinforce his own identity.

Membership in churches also has an effect on group maintenance, since, if only in name, there do exist definable Ukrainian Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant churches. The church building itself is the center of the community. Thus, a member who might not attend Sunday service can still find himself in a Ukrainian environment as a result of participating in a "high" church holiday (like Christmas or Easter); a baptism, wedding, or funeral; Saturday school; a dance group; scout meeting; or other organizational and social function. The church in turn has also

been influenced by the community inasmuch as several priests who otherwise would use English in the service have been forced to maintain or to revert to using Ukrainian at the request of the parishioners.

If the cohesiveness of the group can be judged from the membership patterns in ethnic institutions, then Ukrainian-American society seems to be stable in recent years. After a rapid growth in the size of Ukrainian organizations during the 1950's, there has been a leveling off and slight decline during the 1960's. Between 1960 and 1970 membership in all specifically Ukrainian churches dropped from 445,251 to 406,210. In this regard, it has been suggested that at least 60 percent of all marriages are endogamous; that is, they occur between members of either the Ukrainian Catholic or Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. On the other hand, Ukrainian fraternal societies, despite the death of older members, have registered an increase in membership—from 135,084 in 1967 to 142,123 in 1975—revealing the continued desire of Ukrainians to receive insurance coverage and other advantages from their own ethnic organizations rather than from American companies. A less favorable indicator has been the decline in the size of the influential Saturday school program. For instance, between 1968–1969 and 1975–1976 the total number of students enrolled in Ukrainian day schools and in Saturday schools sponsored by the Educational Council and Ukrainian Orthodox Church declined 32 percent, from 21,036 to 14,484.⁶

These figures are not without significance, since it is for the most part only in these schools that Ukrainian children receive their only formal exposure to the culture of their forebears. It is difficult to forecast developments, but in the eyes of many other ethnic groups, as well as in the opinion of some of its members, Ukrainians still have one of the most vibrant ethnic communities in this country.

⁶Halyna Duda, "Otsinka systemy ridnykh shkil," in *Ukrainians in American and Canadian Society*, ed. Wsevolod W. Isajiw (Jersey City, N.J., 1976), p. 335; "Tryvozhen maibutnie ukrains'koho shkil'nytsva v Amerytsi," *Ridna shkola*, XIV, 1 (New York, 1977), p. 2.

TABLE I
Outline for Ukrainian Group Entry

Origins

1. Ukrainian ethnic territory.
2. Borders at time of massive emigration: Austro-Hungarian empire, Russian empire.
3. Present-day borders: Ukrainian SSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia.
4. Language: various dialects of Ukrainian, though not always identified as Ukrainian.
5. Religion: primarily Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox.

Migration and Arrival

1. Early isolated individuals.
2. Three waves of migration: (1880's-1914); (1920's-1930's); (1947-present). Estimated number.
3. Causes. *First and second waves*: economic hardship, e.g., lack of land, increase in population, demographic increase. *Third wave*: flight from war zone, political exiles.
4. First two waves voluntary; stimulated by letters from relatives; facilitated by agents of steamship companies and American industrial employers. Third wave involuntary, usually via Western European displaced persons camps.
5. Arrival: northeastern seaports, primarily New York.

Settlement

1. First wave sets settlement pattern.
2. Former peasants settle in urban northeast United States where growing industry is in need of labor. Small percentage settle in rural areas.
3. New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey receive biggest concentrations. Table of ten top states 1930 and 1970. Metropolitan areas; ghettos.
4. Recent flight from inner city ghettos to suburbs; still remain relatively close to work place.
5. Ukrainian farm communities.

Economic life

1. Majority (97%) arrive as farmers, unskilled laborers, or servants. Statistical sample for pre-1914 years.

2. Primary mode of employment: mines, mills, factories, other industrial labor. Some small businesses.
3. Increase in small businesses during interwar period. Statistical sample according to type (1936).
4. Higher percentage of professionals arrive after 1947. Statistical sample of professions.

Family and kinship

1. Family considered ideal social unit.
2. Marriage statistics (endogamy prevails) and birthrates available from Canadian sample. Comment on differences between U.S. urban and Canadian more rural based groups.
3. Relationship of grandparents to grandchildren in transmitting culture.

Religion

1. Place of religion in Ukrainian life.
2. Main characteristics of Ukrainian Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant churches.
3. Statistical breakdown of various church groups.
4. Early history: conflicts with American Catholic hierarchy, growth of Orthodoxy, establishment of Ukrainian Church structure.
5. Church as unifying and divisive force. Church as cultural and community center (parochial schools, cultural events, publications). Church as source of conflict and alienation within members of group and with American society (Russian Orthodox vs. Ukrainian Catholic; Ukrainian Catholic vs. Latin-Rite Catholic; churches vs. lay organizations; Vatican decrees; patriarchal movement).

Social Organization

1. National fraternal organizations: Brief history of various fraternals (table of major organizations). Material function (financial benefits). Cultural function (newspapers, publications, cultural events).
2. Professional organizations.
3. Women's organizations.
4. Youth organizations.
5. Regional organizations.
6. Military veterans and sports clubs.

Education

1. Early emphasis on education.
2. Public education and Ukrainian parochial schools (full-time or weekend). Organizational development and present state.
3. Efforts at establishing Ukrainian institutions of higher learning (separate colleges, seminaries, American university courses, Harvard center).
4. Integration of education, religion, and national culture.

Culture

1. Language maintenance (family, schools, organizations, press, publications, radio, TV).
2. Literature: based on the immigrant experience, as part of general Ukrainian belles-lettres (New York school).
3. Painting, sculpture, architecture, folk art.
4. Music, theater, dance.
5. Scholarship in the Ukrainian and American context.
6. Museums, archives, libraries.

Politics

1. Ukrainian internal politics vs. Ukrainians in American politics.
2. Amorphism, internal division, Ukrainian national identity.
3. Concern with fate of the homeland. Material aid to the homeland. Political organizations. Impact on American policy (Second World War, cold war, détente).
4. Limited participation in American politics.

Intergroup relations

1. Cooperation-alienation with other ethnic groups.
2. Limited participation in American society.
3. Respect-disdain syndrome toward American life.

Group maintenance and individual ethnic commitment

1. Ukrainian institutional network as a society within a society.
2. Projections of group maintenance based on Ukrainian school attendance, language maintenance, endogamous marriages, sports and youth programs, membership in fraternal societies.

TABLE 2
United States Census Reports:
Mother Tongue Ruthenians/Ukrainians

	<i>Census Returns</i>	<i>Revised</i>
1910	35,359	52,940
1920	95,458	129,602
1930	68,485 ^a	190,366 ^b
1940 (5% sample)	83,600	c
1950	no data	—
1960 (20% sample)	106,974	d
1970 (15% sample)	249,351	264,643

Notes: The revised figure for 1910 includes Ruthenians from all countries (except Hungary); Russians from Austria and Romania; and 2.5 percent of the "Slavics" from Austria.

The revised figure for 1920 includes Ruthenians from all countries (except Hungary); and Russians from Austria and Romania.

The revised figure for 1930 includes Ukrainians from all countries; Ruthenians from all countries (except Czechoslovakia); and Russians from Poland, Austria, and Romania.

The revised figure for 1970 includes Ukrainians from all countries; and Russians from Poland.

^aOnly foreign born.

^bThis figure was determined by adding a revised number of foreign born (95,981) and an estimated number of native born (94,385). The last figure is an average estimate of 49.5% of the total number of Ukrainian speakers. This average was based on the fact that 41.6% of the total number of Ukrainian speakers were native born in 1920, while 57.5% were native born in 1940.

^cIt is impossible to make a revised estimate, because in the 1940 census Russian and Ukrainian entries are grouped together in the statistics correlating mother tongue and country of birth of the foreign born.

^dThe 1960 census does not include tables correlating mother tongue and country of origin.

TABLE 3
Ruthenian/Ukrainian Church Membership

	<i>1930</i>	<i>1970</i>
Ukrainian Catholic Church	244,118	283,665
Holy Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in Exile		4,800
Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A.		87,745
Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America (Ecumenical Patriarchate)		30,000
Orthodox Church of America (formerly Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of America)	53,775 ^a	210,000 ^b
Russian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A. (Patriarchal Exarchate)		15,000 ^c
Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia		5,500 ^d
Ukrainian Latin-Rite Catholics	35,000	50,000
Ukrainian Protestants	35,000	50,000
Totals	367,893	736,710

^aRepresents 50% of the total church membership at the time (1931).

^bRepresents 35% of the total church membership at the time (1966).

^cRepresents 30% of the total church membership at the time (1972).

^dRepresents 10% of the total church membership at the time (1955).

Discussion

ISAJIW: Toward the end of your presentation you may have implied that Ukrainians were hiding within their own community rather than developing or going out into the American community. It may appear that way, if you look at the Ukrainian community from the point of view of participation in certain organizations. But I think there is a second and, to some extent, third generation which is not that inner-directed. We do not have enough data on this, but there are people who have in fact entered quite fully into the larger American society.

I find your outline solid and comprehensive. In the section on economic life concerning employment, I hope you will also include another aspect of Ukrainian immigrant history: participation of the first Ukrainian mine and steel workers in the American labor movement. This is not very well known, but it is an important page in Ukrainian history in the United States and should be included in your encyclopedia article. There is some data available on this subject, although not a lot.

On family and kinship, I notice that you make reference to Canada, where there are more data. But this raises a question: Do you intend to make comparisons with Canada throughout your discussion, or is this only one instance? That potentially raises all kinds of problems about the comparability of data on Ukrainians in the United States with Ukrainians in Canada.

MAGOCSI: With regard to the question of intergroup relations, you are correct that there is a difference between the degree of integration among first- and second-generation immigrants, or their descendants, and those who have come since the Second World War. This aspect will have to be considered in the revised version of my article. I agree that it is difficult to obtain specific data on this question, and many of my conclusions are by default impressionistic.

As to the mine and steel workers, I would very much welcome input concerning the source material that is available.

A major problem is family and kinship. The only discussion that I have seen is an analysis in the book that you have just

edited.* One is in a quandary here. One can either state, as Markus does in his encyclopedia article, that 60 percent of Ukrainians intermarry within the churches, and leave it to that. Or one can say nothing, because aside from the statement of Markus and a few others, we do not have any concrete data. No one has yet done the necessary statistical research. I hope that someone does, because that section of my article remains unresolved. As I pointed out in the beginning of this talk, some of you may ask whether an exercise in writing an ethnic encyclopedia at this stage of development of ethnic studies is worth doing at all, since there are just not data available on most of the groups. However, this is envisioned as only the first of many editions. The succeeding editions will benefit from more comprehensive and sophisticated information gathered by increasing research on ethnic groups.

WOLOWYNA: In your list of statistical sources (Table 2) you didn't mention the 1970 census, which gave mother-tongue information.

MAGOCSI: The 1970 census was included in Table 2. However, the published census data has limited use, because one cannot distinguish from which countries Ukrainian-speakers came. For instance, one cannot look for a rubric entitled Soviet Union and find that an x number of Jews, an x number of Russians, or an x number of Ukrainians came from the Soviet Union.

WOLOWYNA: As a matter of fact, the possibility exists. The Bureau of Census put out a public sample which contains three types of 1 percent samples. Each 1 percent sample is independent, so you can construct a 3 percent sample tape of people who answered "mother-tongue Ukrainian."

MAGOCSI: Are there also correlations with the country of origin?

WOLOWYNA: You have all the necessary information and can construct a cross-tabulation. As a matter of fact, with the

**Ukrainians in American and Canadian Society*, ed. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Studies of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Ukrainian Center for Social Research, vol. I (Jersey City, N.J., 1976).

cooperation of the Ukrainian Center for Social Research in New York, I have been negotiating with the U.S. Census Bureau to construct such a tape, which I am pleased to say will become available soon. I think it would provide a lot of answers to the questions raised in your talk.

MAGOCSE: I trust that the data on this tape will be analyzed soon, because we urgently need it.**

SYSYN: Does the correlation Austria-Hungary as country of origin and Russian as the mother tongue exist on this tape, can you determine the relative size of the Russophile community to the Ukrainian? Or aren't people listing Austria-Hungary as their place of origin anymore?

WOLOWYNA: For nonnatives the country of birth is given.

SYSYN: Will somebody from Galicia answer "Soviet Union" as place of origin, or will they be subsumed under Poland or Austria-Hungary?

WOLOWYNA: You cannot tell. It depends on how people choose to answer that question. But you can look at other languages like Russian or Polish and find the country of origin. As a matter of fact, I have requested the tapes not only for Ukrainian mother tongue but for other ethnic groups as well.

GAJECKY: I would like to comment on cooperation with the other ethnic groups. In Chicago there is an organization called the Ukrainian, Czech, Polish, and Serbian Alliance. It was originally founded to identify people of common backgrounds whose governments were totalitarian. However, it was apparent after several meetings that this organization was more than just a social or cultural club limited to its own activity. It is an ethnic lobby and it pressures the mayor's office to get funding for the various groups. This is an example of cooperation which has transformed a potentially inner-oriented organization into an

**In fact, a symposium entitled *Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Persons with Ukrainian Mother Tongue in the United States, 1970* was held at Harvard University on November 11-12, 1977. Most of the eleven papers delivered were analyses of the 1970 U.S. Census data. The results are scheduled to be published under the editorship of the symposium's organizer, Oleh Wolowyna.

active group trying to obtain money for funding of the Ukrainian Institute at the University of Chicago, for instance. Similarly, the Poles obtained a donation for a newspaper. Such types of cooperation with other ethnic groups are becoming more common. For instance, we have Ukrainian-Jewish participants in the dissident movement, which is one of these outward-looking projects. It seems you stressed the alienation among ethnic groups rather than the cooperation. These new attempts at ethnic cooperation are mostly organized by young people in order to solve the problems that all ethnics face in America. This type of cooperation is bringing Ukrainians not only exposure in their home states but also is bringing them economic improvements. Such organizations will have great influence in the 1980's.

ARMSTRONG: Given the nature of the *Ethnic Encyclopedia* and the availability of data, I wonder if in fact it might be too soon to compile such an encyclopedia. At the end of the article, would you indicate the incompleteness of current information and data on certain of its aspects?

MAGOCSI: I think that is a wise suggestion, and I will bring it to the attention of the editorial board. Perhaps the last section of the encyclopedia could be titled "Projected Problems in Immigration Research." I should stress again that this is only the first of many editions. Revisions, of course, are planned, but the effectiveness of revisions could be increased by precisely such a suggestion.

ILNYTZKYJ: Your description of the Ukrainian community tends to be static. It would be a good idea to have a dynamic presentation of what has happened to the community. To provide only the structure of the community is to say very little, because although the internal structure may seem exactly the same as fifty or eighty years ago, the community has undergone great changes. One should give some idea of these changes. After all, it is a dynamic organism. As long as you are using a kind of impressionistic technique (since you do lack certain information), it may be a good idea to use the interview as a possible source of information. You could interview not only "representatives" of the community—i.e., people who hold positions in the community organizations—but also the peripheral people in the commun-

ity, say, the youth or organizations which are not exactly tolerated in the community. There is conflict. There is a certain amount of disharmony within the community, and I think that by an interview one can get more of the actual impression of what is happening in the community than by relying solely on published data.

LESAWYER: In my experience, the participation by Ukrainian groups in American society has had a greater effect on the whole American scene than has ever been brought out by Anglo-Saxon writers. For instance, business always sought out the Ukrainian ethnic group for its workers—for their solid, dependable, reliable, hard-working, disciplined character. If you study the records, you'll find the lowest number of unemployed among the Ukrainians. From 1930 through 1940 very few Ukrainians were unemployed. Very few were on relief. There was a very independent spirit. The impact of that type of feeling on the community at the upper levels seems much greater than your analysis suggests.

Also, Anglo-Saxons came to our baptisms or weddings and they had more fun than at any Anglo-Saxon weddings. Ukrainians always had more fun. Our clubs were the most highly spirited. There was a certain disdain for the Anglo-Saxons, not that we considered them outcasts. We just thought: "Well, they still have a lot to learn regarding the ways of life." I don't think this was brought out.

We were called Hunkies by many people not only to demean us, but also to elevate themselves above us when they saw our superiority, particularly in our ability to work hard and to express emotion. There was a little bit of envy. I'm just wondering whether a paper such as yours can record some of these qualities.

RENOFF: My question concerns the church, specifically the 1929 decree on celibacy, *Cum Data Fuerit*, which you said caused deep rifts in the Ukrainian community. My impression was that the conflict among Ukrainians was not as great as it was among Carpatho-Rusyns, nor as great as among Ukrainians themselves prior to 1929. If that is the case, what would be some of the conditions in their society and culture that made the decree less

important. You will remember this decree applied not only to Ukrainians but also to Melkite Syrians, Carpatho-Rusyns, and other Eastern-Rite Catholics.

MAGOCSI: You are asking a comparative question, namely was there more of an effect on the Ukrainian community than there was on the Carpatho-Rusyn community or vice versa. That is something that I cannot answer at this stage.

SYSYN: The foundation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church came before the celibacy issue and now, in 1976, every Ukrainian Orthodox parish is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. The conflicts with Bishop Bohachevsky and probably the marriage controversy were much more important for people from Transcarpathia than for those from Galicia. Celibacy had been introduced in some of the dioceses in Galicia, and it was not totally new. It was coming even in the homeland, whereas in Transcarpathia there was no thought of introducing celibacy.

MAGOCSI: It is true that since the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was established about 1921, there was an immediate outlet. The problem had existed since immigrants began arriving, and we all know the history of the Vatican response then and in 1913. But 1929, I think, was a capstone. I did not mean that for Ukrainians from north of the mountains this controversy began only in 1929. It clearly had begun much earlier.

VOLCHUK: An interesting aspect is the differentiation between the inward and outward orientation. I have always considered the many professional societies, like the Ukrainian Medical Society or Ukrainian Legal Society, to be outward-oriented. Their members take a very active part in American society and are not just members of the Ukrainian community. I was wondering why you reject this interpretation. Also, these societies probably could provide very useful sources of information regarding the ways in which Ukrainians have contributed to the general growth of this country, not only as immigrant laborers but as intellectuals and professionals.

MAGOCSI: In the section on social organization in part 2 (see Table 1) there will be a detailed discussion of the various professional organizations. I find your comments very interest-

ing, because they are exactly opposite to my perception of the situation. You mention, for instance, the Ukrainian Medical Association as being symbolic of interaction with the American community. But physicians from other ethnic groups would join the American Medical Association, and not a specific ethnic medical association. It would be interesting to find out how many other ethnic groups had their own medical associations; for example, is there a Hungarian Medical Association or a Latvian Medical Association? I tend to doubt it. I find the large number of these specifically Ukrainian organizations to be indicative of the need to stay among one's own as opposed to belonging to the larger, less definable American whole.

SYSYN: It is interesting to note the difference in timing. There are Polish professional associations, but they were founded by Polish Americans who had first risen through the American system and only then founded a lawyers' association or a doctors' association. I would bet that very few members of the Ukrainian professional organizations in the United States have gone that route. What we are dealing with is the direct transfer of institutions from Europe to the United States. I have heard members of the Ukrainian Engineers Association say: "In Galicia we had so many members, and now we have this many"—as if they were still in Galicia.

SZÖVÉRFY: I feel that psychological factors must be considered. There is a phenomenon as group psychology, and I do not believe that political, historical, and sociological factors alone would explain the very strong dynamism in Ukrainian society.

VOSKOBIYNYK: I have a different opinion about the inward-oriented organizations of Ukrainian professionals. It seems to me that the membership of all professional groups is twofold. They belong to both Ukrainian and American organizations. Membership in Ukrainian professional organizations is motivated very much by certain Ukrainian national interests. For example, I have the impression that the existence of the Institute at Harvard is very much a product of the efforts of Ukrainian professional organizations. So there is a certain task, a broader task, besides purely professional interests.

In support of Mr. Lesawyer, I feel that it is high time we fought the inferiority complex of many Ukrainians. We must point out the positive qualities of the Ukrainian community in the United States. I have the opportunity to observe the Ukrainian community in the Hartford area, which is about five thousand people. I have never read about any juvenile delinquency among Ukrainian youth in this area. I have never heard about Ukrainians on welfare programs. It is amazing that today when Ukrainians are exposed to so many different influences in the American environment, they still preserve the same qualities of life as in the 1920's and before.

I am a little disturbed about the interpretation of the features of the Carpathian-Ruthenians or the Ruthenian movement in the United States. I am still not convinced that it is a completely ethnic movement. It seems to me it is very much a political movement. The Ruthenian problem is very similar to the Little Russian problem among the Orthodox Ukrainians of the eastern Ukraine. It is a matter of the degree of national consciousness. In Russian Orthodox churches, as many as 80 percent of the parishoners came from Little Russian churches, and they call themselves Little Russians until today. Do you think Carpatho-Ruthenians are a distinct ethnic group or are they something else?

MAGOCSEI: Any nationality consists of varying dialectal and provincial areas determined either by geography or tradition. In Germany, for instance, there is a great difference between Bavarians and Plattdeutsch. In France there is great contrast between the French in the north and those of the Languedoc. Italy is a fantastic example of diversity, ranging from the Lombardians to the Sicilians, who still have not decided whether they are still Italian or not.

The Ukrainian lands are as typical as any other. There are great differences separating Left-Bank Ukrainians, Galician Ukrainians, and Transcarpathian Ukrainians. However, the development of a national consciousness and national identity is a dynamic process. It is impossible, and I would say incorrect, to describe the historical past using conceptualizations of the present.

With regard to immigration from what is now Transcarpathia and eastern Czechoslovakia, inhabitants from these lands began

to perceive themselves as Ukrainians only after the First World War and in many cases not until after the Second World War. Before then, people from this area identified themselves as Rusyns or Russniaks, and in many instances they had no national consciousness. Their identity was limited to the parameters of their native village.

There is one key question: is it possible for Bavarians to become a distinct nationality? Is it possible for residents in the Languedoc, who now in fact describe themselves as Occitans, to become a distinct nationality? Is it possible for Sicilians to become a distinct nationality? In theory, the answer to all these questions is yes. At certain periods of time, if political events had been different, this could have occurred. There are even cases where ethnic groups, which for all intents and purposes have few cultural and linguistic differences from the larger group, become separate nationalities—Luxembourgers and Austrians are such groups. They are no different from other Germanic peoples. The Dutch at an earlier period were no different from Germans. We can go on and on.

In the case of the Carpatho-Rusyns, this process of differentiation was eventually ended in Europe. However, those who emigrated did so at a much earlier period. One might respond: "If they are as close to Ukrainians as some people claim, then it is just a matter of time in the United States before their distinctness will evaporate and they will become part of the larger group." Well, they have been here for eighty years. Not only have they failed to merge with Ukrainians, but in some instances the divisions have become greater.

One comment from a young professor of Carpatho-Rusyn background at Pennsylvania State College is quite apt. He said, "Well, maybe we don't know what we are, but we know we're not Ukrainians." In the *Ethnic Encyclopedia*, it is not the job of the contributors to create or describe a hoped-for situation, but rather to describe one that already exists.

PRITSAK: The dynamic aspect of the group has been suggested. In a sense, there is a kind of dichotomy as far as people from Galicia are concerned. Until the 1890's it was an immigration of religious people. In the 1890's, and especially after 1900, when socialism became very popular in Galicia, a split took place in this

country between the fraternal and other organizations, between those that kept religion as the center of attention, and those that had socialism as the center of attention. In this regard, the contributions of Ukrainians to the growth of socialist movements in the general American structure would be of interest.

As to the problem of membership in Ukrainian versus non-Ukrainian organizations, it has already been suggested that very often we have a double membership. But I think we are dealing with three types. On the one hand, there are those Ukrainian émigré organizations which do not want to have anything to do with American life. It is just an accident that they live in New York. Their members still do not know English. They do not want to. They are in the United States only physically; spiritually they are in the old country. The second type are those who have a double membership. While a third type includes those who belong only to the American societies.

As for the problem of the Carpatho-Rusyns, I agree completely with Dr. Magocsi about the task of the *Ethnic Encyclopedia*. An encyclopedia or any other scholarly work has to register whatever exists. A people who have come from a territory, but who, for one reason or another, have decided to call themselves something else, are of course a different group if they do not participate in the organizations and societies of people from formerly related territories.

In the case of the Carpatho-Rusyns, I would like to make another point. When the immigration began, and even later, because of the special political separation after the *Ausgleich* of 1867, the Carpatho-Rusyns who lived within the Hungarian Kingdom and those Ukrainians who lived in Galicia had hardly any communication. The Galicians did not care about the Carpatho-Rusyns. It was Drahomanov and some Russian Slavists who discovered them. Of course, there were pressures from the Hungarian government, but on the other side there was great inertia. People in Galicia were too involved in their own affairs. When the migration started, and even until 1918, people from Uzhhorod and near-by territories had no perception of any nationality. It was just a question of belonging to a certain village. Even today, many immigrants still refer to their native language as *po-nashemu*—"in our way." At first I did not know what

language it was. There are many other circumlocutions. Sometimes they call themselves Slovak.

If in the United States they could find a common name—Rusyn—I think it would be wonderful. Whatever name they choose, they certainly will not choose—at this stage—the name Ukrainian. Therefore, they cannot be included in an encyclopedia under Ukrainians. How things will develop in twenty or thirty years, we do not know. But it is not the job of the editors to make these decisions. The people themselves have to make it.

DEAL: I noticed that you used primarily American documents and I wondered to what extent you had used, or propose to use, European documents. For example, the Russian Imperial Administration of Immigration and Emigration kept very refined documents. I know, for example, how many immigrants came from Kharkiv province in every year.

Secondly, the absolute figures, even if you were able to calculate them, are rather meaningless unless you know what percent this number of Ukrainians represented out of the total number of immigrants of the total number of Americans at that particular time.

Third, there is another way to get at the kind of statistics that you want to include in your article. One is by adding up, which you have done. The other is by sampling. I wondered if you had considered taking, for example, a community or a church in a certain period of time and finding a sample of that community. From that sample, especially since most Ukrainians probably belonged to that community or that church, you could determine the percent not only of language spoken, but things such as occupational distribution, urban-rural distribution, birth and death rates.

MAGOSCI: With regard to the question of sources, there are sources from both the Austrian and Hungarian portions of the empire that provide information on immigration. However, their numbers are exceedingly low, for several reasons. One is that, after the mass immigration began in the late 1880's and 1890's, both governments, the Austrian portion for Galicia and the Hungarian portion for the Carpatho-Rusyns, passed various laws restricting emigration, mainly because it was upsetting the tax

base and depopulating whole areas. Obviously, in these non-totalitarian societies such laws could be broken relatively easily. The number of illegal or informal departures was inestimable. The number of immigrants who came to the United States in any one year cannot be correlated with the number who departed from Austria-Hungary in any one year. There is too great a discrepancy.

Even if one did establish a given number for legal departures that were recorded, there is no indication of where they went. Not all immigrants came to the United States. Many of them settled in Western Europe, South America, and Canada. The Austro-Hungarian statistics do not provide the destination.

DEAL: Some of the Russian documents do.

MAGOSCI: They may very well, but the crucial point is that the illegal departures greatly exceeded the legal departures.

As to research projects, I have suggested that case studies of communities should be done. However, as you correctly point out, such studies may yield more information about inter-marriage, fertility, birth, etc., but not much about the numbers of people, because you would have to do a large sample to really project the total number of Ukrainians who came and lived in this country.

PETRYSHYN: The outline that you have given for this study is very similar to the work that is being done on ethnicity generally in that it is descriptive and neglects to consider the actual structural changes and the constraints that the host society worked under in order to receive them. In a structural approach one would have to mention the conditions in the United States at the time of arrival of the first generation. What were the conditions in the United States at the time of arrival of the first generation. What were the conditions which prompted the United States to allow immigration? The same applies to the second immigration and the third. In particular, what were the political conditions with respect to the Soviet Union at that time which made the American government consider it desirable to bring in the Ukrainians? What were the motivations of American

society? So I think that the structuralist approach would help to balance your descriptive and functional analysis.

MAGOCSI: What you are suggesting is dealt with in the section on migration and arrival, namely, the interactions: what were the policies of the American government at the time? Was there a need to increase the labor market? Was it necessary to revive American industry in the late 1870's and 1880's and after the Depression? What kinds of exceptions were made in the period after the Second World War?

BANDERA: I have two questions. How did you arrive at the last number for the 1970's? And don't you think it would be interesting to include the Cossacks in the *Encyclopedia*? They are a small East Slavic group which considers itself a separate nation. They have their own publications, even their own encyclopedia.

MAGOCSI: My revised figure for 1970 reveals a contradiction which I am glad you discovered. It is based on the number of Ukrainians plus the number of Russians from Poland. There is a contradiction, because at the beginning of my remarks, I said we were not going to treat Russophiles; yet in my revised figures I did not include all people from Poland who described themselves in 1970 as Russian. I left in this inconsistency in order to provoke discussion about the problem of the Russophiles. What percentage opted out of the Ukrainian community entirely? What percentage are passive members? These are difficult questions, and I have not really resolved them. Of course, if one deleted the Russophiles, the statistics on the number of Ukrainians would decrease even further.

As to the Cossacks, they will be dealt with as a separate sub-heading under Russians in the *Ethnic Encyclopedia*. Here we are dealing with the Don Cossacks. The Kuban Cossacks will be mentioned in the context of Ukrainian immigration in the section entitled "Social Organization; part 5: regional organizations." That section attempts to show that, even within the Ukrainian whole, there are still several groups with their own organizations based on identification with individual towns or with ethnographic groups, such as the Cossacks, or the Boikians, or the

Hutsuls. With regard to the Russian Cossacks, my instinct at this stage is to discuss them as a separate subheading at the end of the article on Russians, but I would have to think about that more on the basis of the Cossack experience in this country before such a decision is made.***

***A separate article on Cossacks will appear in the *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*.

CHAPTER 2

Introductory Remarks

Oscar Handlin

My role this afternoon is very limited. It is that of presenting our speaker in a few introductory comments.

Since 1935 I have been involved in the study of the various groups that form the American people. That is a long time by anyone's calculations, and in the intervening four decades much has changed, not only in scholarship but in the nation as well. It is indicative that our speaker should come from the White House. Forty years ago one would not have found the White House, even under the New Deal, particularly attentive to this subject. It is significant that our speaker bears the title Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs. We did not have that kind of post until quite recently. It is also significant that we should be able to find a scholar of competence to fill such a position because, until quite recently, the number of people who devoted themselves seriously and in a scholarly fashion to problems of ethnic groups in the United States was tiny. When I began, you might have found in the whole country at best eight or ten people interested in the subject. For years Harvard alone provided teaching in this area and offered encouragement for students who wanted to work with these problems.

The various fields within ethnic studies have proliferated, and the number of scholars, books, articles, and journals has increased manyfold. One can look back at this healthy development in American society and American academic life and say it is good. But, while much of what we see developing in this area is healthy and constructive, not everything is. We have to be careful about what occurs in ethnic studies from now on; otherwise, we may get subjects, books, or teaching which may actually be damaging to many people. It is not a question of whether we will have ethnic studies. We will. The question is whether we will have creative and constructive kinds of ethnic studies.

The question we have to begin asking now is what is the purpose, what are we trying to achieve by developing within the

universities and around them this vast array of subjects connected with the different groups which form the American people. For instance, a good deal of effort is justified in the name of developing group pride. Group pride is not a bad thing, although in most contexts we know that pride is not one of the seven virtues. I would say there is dubious merit in a group setting out to discover things in its own past simply to boast about them. Emphasis of that sort tends to be divisive; it tells people they are somehow better or more worthy than others. It tends to reinforce the separateness of the group. This is dangerous, because it agrees with those tendencies in external life, in politics, in society, to establish quotas and to define the status of one group against another. Whatever trends there are within ethnic studies to move in this direction deserve careful scrutiny. And there are such trends.

But there are alternatives. There is a way of studying the group so that the objective is not so much to develop pride but to develop an understanding of the past which will sometimes produce pride and sometimes produce humility. It can produce comprehension of what was achieved and also the comprehension of failure. And, I assure you, in all groups there have been both achievements and failures. Under these conditions, ethnic studies can be a unifying rather than a divisive force, because they can tell us not only what was distinctive and particularistic about a group, but also what it shared with others, what common experiences united it with all groups. That kind of understanding of the past is a unifying element in society because it helps people explore what is authentic and genuine in their antecedents rather than what is mythical and wish-fulfilling in the way they think about them.

I am gratified to see that the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute has carried on its work in a healthy and creative fashion, one which promises much, not only for helping people of Ukrainian descent understand their past but also for helping all Americans understand that part of their past in which Ukrainians participated.

So here we are at the centenary of the Ukrainian immigration to the United States, a term that our speaker is going to question, but it is an appropriate point at which to begin our discussion.

The Centenary of the Ukrainian Emigration to the United States

Myron B. Kuropas

This year the Ukrainian-American community is celebrating the centenary of its settlement in America. It is an anniversary that has great symbolic significance for our community because it represents a great ethnonational triumph. Given the somewhat tragic history of our people, this centenary celebration is indeed a rare and joyous occasion.

Before turning to a consideration of the nature of this triumph, let us first consider the historical accuracy of our *centenary*. Some historians have argued that people from Ukraine were in America in the early 1600's. If this is true, then we are a bit late in our commemoration. If, on the other hand, we are celebrating the centenary of the first mass immigration from Ukraine, then we might have selected any date from the 1970's and been just as accurate. We could have just as easily waited a few years and selected 1984 as our centenary, commemorating the establishment of the first Rusyn community in Shenandoah, Pa. Finally, regardless of the date selected, it is important to remember that prior to 1900, most émigrés from Ukraine did not call themselves Ukrainians. We would be hard-pressed to pinpoint the exact date when the first ethnationally conscious Ukrainian arrived on these shores.

What then are we really commemorating in 1976? About all that we can really say is that we are celebrating the hundredth (or thereabouts) anniversary of the beginning of the first mass immigration from a nation that is today called Ukraine. Stated in different terms, we can also say that we are commemorating the centenary of a process which resulted in the emergence of a nationally conscious Ukrainian American. It is to this ethnonational process that I now wish to turn my attention.

At the time of their first emigration to America, the Ukrainian people had not yet reached the final stage of their ethnonational development. The masses were neither conscious of their national heritage nor were they prepared to exercise their national will.

To understand the nature of that emigration, it would be helpful to review briefly the historical events which transpired in Ukraine prior to the arrival of the first émigrés.

The roots of Ukrainian ethnonational identity date back to the tenth century when a distinct Graeco-Slavonic, religiocultural community based on principles promulgated by the Eastern Christian Church, began to coalesce in what was then called Kievan Rus'. When the Christian Church split in 1054, this unique religiocultural tradition came to be more closely associated with the Greek Orthodox Church in Constantinople than with the Roman Catholic Church in Rome.

Following the fall of Kiev in 1169, the Ukrainian heritage was continued in Galicia-Volhynia, provinces in western Ukraine. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, a new Slavic tradition, neither Muscovite nor Polish, had emerged in that area. The distinct character of this religiocultural tradition was reinforced in 1596 when the Roman Catholic Church, anxious to establish rapprochement with the Greek Orthodox Church, allowed Orthodox Ukrainians to retain their unique traditions—including a married clergy and Holy Communion under two species—in return for a formal return to the Roman fold and recognition of the pope. That segment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which agreed to the provisions of this union—mostly bishops from western Ukraine—came to be called Uniate or Greek Catholic. By granting concessions to Ukrainian Orthodoxy, Rome wished to demonstrate to the Greek Orthodox Church that union with the Holy See did not mean a loss of liturgical identity.

The political autonomy enjoyed by Ukrainians during the various periods of the Cossack era (approximately 1500 to 1775) permitted this unique religiocultural community to reach the people stage of ethnonational development—defined here as a larger group of individuals linked by such complementary bonds as learned memories, symbols, and habits, as well as common facilities of communication. During the Cossack era, Ukrainians were referred to as *Malorossy* (Little Russians) in eastern Ukraine and as *Rusyns* (or *Ruthenians*) in western Ukraine. Both names were ancient derivatives of the term *Rus'* which referred to the polity which existed in Ukraine during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

Russian, Polish, Austrian, Hungarian, and Romanian occupations of Ukraine at various times during the eighteenth through twentieth centuries prevented an early florescence of a national consciousness and a national will—the next stage in the ethnonational development of a people. Ukraine was partitioned among its neighbors, and in each of the occupied areas the ethnocultural revival which usually precedes the ethnonational revival,¹ progressed in a different manner. Under Russian rule, the Uniate Church was spiritually subjugated and the Orthodox Church was subject to the Russian Synod. For this reason, the ethnocultural revival was initiated by the laity, generally poets and scholars who, exposed to romanticism, began to write in the Ukrainian vernacular glorifying the not-so-distant past and attaching symbolic, ethnonational significance to all things Ukrainian. Later, under the influence of socialism and pan-Slavism, a political posture emerged based on national and social reform. Despite the fact that eastern Ukraine witnessed the first articulation of a national will, the masses of that area were, next to the Carpatho-Ukrainians, the least ethnonationally conscious sector of the Ukrainian national movement prior to World War I. Periodic and systematic Russian and Hungarian prohibitions of Ukrainian cultural activities made communication on a broad scale impossible in eastern Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine.

In Galicia, where the Ukrainian Catholic Church was supported by the Hapsburgs and enjoyed ethnocultural privileges unknown under earlier Polish rule, the initiators of the ethnocultural romantic revival were members of the clergy. Later, with the help of an increasingly enlightened laity (mostly scholars and teachers), a number of social, economic, and political organizations with mass appeal were established. There is little question that in Galicia, and later in Bukovina, the historical, social, and economic conditions which existed under the Hapsburgs, were far more suitable for the development of national consciousness than in any other sector of Ukraine. This ethnocultural revival

¹The ethnonational revival refers to the historical process whereby a people becomes conscious of its national identity, expresses its national will, and becomes a "nationality."

was accompanied by a complementary political awakening, leading, in the end, to a call for national self-determination and the achievement of "nationality" status.

Carpatho-Ukraine, initially exposed to the same benefits of Austrian rule as Galicia, began its ethnocultural revival under the leadership of the Catholic clergy. For a time it appeared that the close ties which had developed between the Galician and Carpatho-Ukrainian clergy would lead to the same pan-Ukrainian sentiment that was emerging in Galicia and eastern Ukraine. This, however, was prevented by the return of greater Hungarian control, followed by the infusion of Russian influences. The next stage of the ethnonational awakening in Carpatho-Ukraine was led by a decidedly Russian-oriented intelligentsia. Still later, an effort was made by the laity to develop a unique Rusyn national identity, free of both Russian and Ukrainian influences. A subsequent Magyarization campaign, however, all but eliminated any viable leadership leaving the Carpatho-Ukrainian masses, on the eve of their mass emigration to the United States, with little more than their ancient Kievan religiocultural identity.

Under the Hapsburgs, Bukovina's ethnonational development was similar to that of Galicia. The Ukrainian Orthodox clergy, no longer subordinate to the Romanian Orthodox Church, emerged late in the evolutionary process to participate actively in the ethnonational revival.

Prior to 1914, immigrants from Ukraine came to the United States primarily to better their economic condition. The typical immigrant during this period was single, male, poor, illiterate, and unskilled. He was an agrarian laborer who usually found work in a coal mine in eastern Pennsylvania and who planned to return to his native land after making his fortune here. His sense of self was limited to an identification with his village (or, at best, a vague geographic region) and a religiocultural heritage which, despite centuries of foreign oppression, remained a primary symbol of ethnocultural unity.

Most early immigrants, especially before 1900, were from Carpatho-Ukraine, a province that was under the political and cultural domination of Hungary. Nevertheless, a number of immigrants during this period called themselves Rusyns in deference to their ancient ethnoreligious tradition.

Community life began with the arrival of Catholic priests, who immediately began to establish parishes. Under the leadership of the clergy, three ethnonational streams merged to compete for the loyalty of the Rusyn community: the Hungarian-dominated "Uhro-Rusyn" Catholic stream, the Russian-dominated Orthodox stream, and the Catholic-dominated Ukrainian stream. Of all the emigrants who arrived from Ukraine between 1876 and 1914, approximately 40 percent remained Rusyn in ethnocultural orientation, 20 percent became "Russians," and 40 percent became "Ukrainian." It is to the ethnonational metamorphosis of those Rusyns who became Ukrainians that we now turn our attention.

Two institutions played a major role in the Ukrainianization of the Rusyn-American community during this period: the Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National association, a fraternal benefit society founded in 1894. Significantly, both were led by Catholic priests from Galicia.

The first phase in the making of the Ukrainian American began in 1884 with the arrival of Father Ivan Volansky, a Catholic priest sent to the United States by the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in Galicia, in response to a request from a group of Rusyn emigrants in Shenandoah, Pa. Arriving in America, Father Volansky was rejected by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Philadelphia, who, unable to accept a married priest into his diocese regardless of the legitimacy of the latter's religious office, ordered Volansky to return to Ukraine. Volansky refused to submit to the archbishop's dictates and traveled to Shenandoah, where he established the first formally organized Ukrainian community in America. Building on the strong religiocultural consciousness of the early immigrants, Father Volansky began a series of projects aimed at meeting the immigrants' need for spiritual and educational sustenance and unity. Under Volansky's leadership, churches were constructed, and choirs, reading rooms, schools, and a press were established among Ukrainians living in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Minnesota. Greater group identification was further enhanced by the creation of coops, mutual aid associations, and labor union cells, all of which were designed to meet the immigrants' need for economic stability.

The second phase in the making of the Ukrainian American began in the mid-1890's, with the arrival of the so-called American Circle, eight priests from seminaries in Galicia who had vowed to devote their lives to the ethnonational development of the Ukrainian-American community. Imbued with the spirit of social and national reform then so prevalent among nationally conscious Ukrainian intellectuals in Galicia and aided by the continued growth of various means of social communication—the church, the press, reading rooms, youth organizations, and cultural enterprises—the American Circle held its own against further inroads by the Russophile and Uhro-Rusyn camps and thus paved the way for the establishment of a nationally conscious Ukrainian community. A high point in this effort was reached in 1907, when Rome agreed to appoint an Eastern-Rite Catholic bishop for the Ukrainians and Rusyns in America. Significantly, the priest chosen to assume the episcopacy was from Galicia. His arrival in America resolved the issue of control of the Catholic Church in favor of the Ukrainians, who until this day have the only truly “national” Catholic Church in the United States.

The third and final prewar phase of the Ukrainianization process began during the early 1900's, when the Ruthenian National Association, then under the control of the American Circle, began to assume a decidedly progressive Ukrainian character, culminating in a series of articles in the organization's official newspaper, *Svoboda*, which articulated the nature of Ukrainian self-identity and its significance to the Rusyn immigrant.

Over all, the pre-World War I period, especially prior to 1910, proved to be the most enlightened and productive era in Ukrainian-American history. During this period, an independent Ukrainian national church was established, a Ukrainian identity was adopted by a substantial number of Rusyn immigrants, and community leadership was responsive to the economic and social needs of the immigrants. It is significant that both the church and the Ruthenian National Association were deeply involved in American life, especially in the union movement, in developing reading rooms for illiterates, in establishing choirs, Ukrainian youth classes, and drama groups, and in other activities which reinforced group cohesion. In terms of ethnonational growth, this was an era that would never again be equalled.

The first serious dissension in the Ukrainian community occurred in 1910, when the Ruthenian National Association was divided between those who supported and those who opposed Bishop Ortynsky's proposed takeover of the organization. The opponents formed a "new" Ruthenian National Association (today called the Ukrainian National Association) to protest the bishop's action. Ironically, Ortynsky was never able to gain full control of the Ruthenian National Association and was forced to establish his own fraternal, known today as the Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics.

The cataclysmic events which transpired in Eastern Europe between 1914 and 1923 had a profound effect on the Rusyn-Ukrainian community. A milestone in ethnonational development was reached in 1915, when the Ruthenian National Association officially changed its name to the Ukrainian National Association, formed a National Council, and, following the lead of the Poles and the Czechs in America, began an intensive campaign to gain support for a just settlement of "the Ukrainian question." Later, as a direct result of the involvement of Galicia's Ukrainian leadership, an attempt was made to broaden the base of the council through the convocation of an "All Ukrainian Diet" which would speak on behalf of the entire community. As a result, the Federation of Ukrainian Organizations was organized. From that time on, the paramount issue in the community was no longer *who* was Ukrainian, but rather *who* was *more* Ukrainian.

Efforts to establish an All-Ukrainian representative body in America failed because of the differences which had arisen between religious and lay leaders earlier and because of the growing ideological sophistication of the Ukrainian community. The question of leadership was temporarily resolved after the death of Bishop Ortynsky when another council—the Ukrainian National Committee—was organized in 1916. However, ideological differences, largely overlooked when other priorities ruled the day, now emerged to complicate the ethnonational complexion of the Ukrainian-American community and to prevent a viable coalition of forces.

Between 1916 and 1923, the Ukrainian community was divided into two major ideological fronts—the left-wing Socialist lay element, represented by the Federation, and the moderate clerical and lay elements, represented by the National Commit-

tee. Both groups claimed to act on behalf of the entire Ukrainian community and attempted to devise strategies which would benefit Ukrainian interests in Europe. Like the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and other nationalities in America, these two Ukrainian ideological camps were initially convinced that the United States would make every effort to assure that the Wilsonian principle of self-determination for all peoples in Europe would be fully implemented. However, despite appeals, protests, conferences with congressional and State Department officials, and the collection of hundreds of thousands of relief dollars, the most tangible result of the Ukrainian-American effort during this period was the proclamation of a "Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Day" by President Wilson in 1917.

Ironically, the prewar progressive tradition initiated by the Ukrainian clergy was continued after the war by the Ukrainian Communists. During this period the Communists were politically the best organized of the Ukrainian ideological streams in the United States. They wrested control of the Ukrainian left-wing from the Socialists and established a Ukrainian Communist party apparatus in America that by the mid-1930's rivaled all other Ukrainian organizations in membership, leadership, and dedication. Taking advantage of the postwar political doldrums which gripped the Ukrainian nationalists, the Communists pointed with pride to Soviet Ukraine and were able to convince many Ukrainian immigrants that Ukraine was indeed a political reality and that its existence was the result of a Bolshevik commitment to Ukrainian national ideals. With a program that also appealed to the Ukrainian workingman, the Ukrainian Communists survived the loss of credibility resulting from the 1932-1933 man-made famine in the Ukrainian SSR and, with the help of the Popular Front—as well as the decrease in anti-Communist fervor resulting from America's alliance with the Soviets in World War II—were able to maintain their strong position in the Ukrainian community through 1945.

The Ukrainian Socialists, the most promising of the Ukrainian political factions prior to the war, never really recovered from the Communist takeover of the party. Associated after 1930 with the increasingly impotent Defense of Ukraine organization and the Ukrainian Workingman's Association, the Socialists played a

relatively minor role in the political arena of the Ukrainian-American community.

Recovering from the bitter disillusionment which prevailed after both eastern and western Ukraine failed to gain true independence, the nationalist camp began to reflect on Ukraine's fate and attempted to develop new strategies. One idea which seemed to satisfy a number of Ukrainians in America was the rationale advanced by Viacheslav Lypinsky, a monarchist who argued that the Ukrainian people had not been ethnationally prepared for the creation of a democratic republic. Accepting this premise and still believing that the United States would someday aid Ukrainian Americans in the same way that Polish Americans and Czech Americans had been assisted, a group of Ukrainian immigrants decided to establish a monarchist organization in America which they hoped would be in the forefront of Ukraine's liberation struggle. The organization which seemed to offer the most appropriate vehicle for such an end was the *Sich*, originally established as a democratic, apolitical youth society dedicated to physical culture. The monarchists gained control of the national executive and gradually transformed the *Sich* into the United Hetman Organization (UHO), a well-disciplined paramilitary organization faithful to Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, an exiled Ukrainian leader then living in Germany.

Attacking the subjective "individualism" of Ukrainians and their reluctance to accept and respond to authority, the United Hetman Organization argued that only a monarchist orientation with well-defined, unequivocal goals could properly educate and discipline the Ukrainian people for nationhood. Democracy may be fine for the United States, an educated and powerful nation safe from threatening neighbors, but the Ukrainian people were still a poorly educated mass with no well-defined national program. Ukrainians needed a leader who commanded respect, loyalty, and obedience, argued the monarchists, a leader who had goals and who could help the Ukrainian people become hard-working, pious, family-loving, and self-confident patriots.

One of the main goals of the United Hetman Organization between the two world wars was the organization of a liberation army. Significantly the United States militia, anxious to strengthen its depleted ranks in America's postwar antimilitary environ-

ment, was more than willing to accommodate the UHO in return for militia membership. This response only served to reinforce the Ukrainian conviction that their activities were in no way un-American. If the Irish, Poles, and Czechs could organize military units in America, then so could the Ukrainians.

Another organization which claimed to be the true voice of the Ukrainian national will and which adopted a political ideology developed in Europe was the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODVU). By 1938, this group was the largest and most influential Ukrainian political organization in the nationalist camp, despite opposition from the Communists, the Socialists, the UHO, and the Catholic Church. Like the monarchists, members of the ODVU occasionally wore uniforms, organized military maneuvers, trained pilots, and concentrated their efforts on helping Ukrainians in Europe and in preparing for the great Ukrainian liberation struggle which they believed would soon take place.

To coordinate the efforts of the Ukrainian National Association, the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, and most other organizations associated with the nationalist camp, the United Ukrainian Organizations of America (UUOA) was established. This umbrella organization was primarily concerned with the fate of Ukrainians in Europe. Fund raising, publishing efforts, and protest demonstrations were all geared to call attention to the plight of Ukrainians overseas. Like most of the nationalist camp, the UUOA rarely made a serious effort to address the problems of Ukrainians in the United States.

Unfortunately for the Ukrainian-American community, the political zeitgeist in America had changed considerably during the Roosevelt era. "Saving the world from fascism" had gradually replaced "self-determination for all nations" as the principal clause of American foreign policy. The Popular Front was calling the Soviet Union a "democracy," and many leading Americans agreed. While it had been perfectly "American" for Masaryk and Paderewski to come to America during the Wilson era and to agitate for dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian empire, similar agitation for the dismemberment of the Soviet empire by Ukrainian-American political leaders was viewed by some Americans during the Roosevelt era as "anti-democratic." In the same

vein, efforts to raise "liberation armies" in America during the Wilson administration were no longer considered acceptable during the Roosevelt era. In time, the paramilitary activities of UHO and ODVU, as well as association with Ukrainian political leaders living in Germany, favorable comments concerning Hitler's adoption of the Wilsonian self-determination model, even correspondence from Germany, were enough to convince some Americans that a Fascist conspiracy existed in the Ukrainian-American community. In 1938, the ODVU and UHO came under the investigation of the House Un-American Activities Committee, then headed by Congressman Martin Dies. Accused of Fascist ties on the basis of hearsay evidence, both organizations were subsequently maligned by the American press as subversive. Thus, the Ukrainian-American community's first attempt to pursue actively objectives expressed by the "national will" ended in political disaster.

Another setback during this period was the decline of the Ukrainian Catholic Church as the fount of ethnonational leadership. Gone were such progressive and dynamic clerics as Volansky and the members of the American Circle, who had not only been concerned with the spiritual needs of their community but who also addressed themselves to socioeconomic and ethnonational issues. Part of the reason for the decline in the role of the clergy in the national movement was the growing sophistication of the Ukrainian lay leadership. An ever-increasing number of postwar immigrant leaders had university training, leadership experience in Europe, and an ability to articulate new modes of national expression which appealed to large numbers of Ukrainian Americans. For them, the Ukrainian religiocultural heritage was only one means to a national end.

The primary reason for the diminished leadership of the Catholic clergy, however, seemed to be related to the personality, administrative style, and priorities of Bishop Constantine Bohachevsky, appointed to the Ukrainian-American episcopacy in 1925. For Bohachevsky, the Ukrainian religiocultural heritage was a means to a spiritual end, that is, the salvation of souls. By introducing the rosary, the stations of the cross, and a number of other purely Latin-Rite traditions into the Ukrainian Church, and by his advocacy of a celibate clergy, Bohachevsky came to be

viewed by many Ukrainian Catholics as a "Latinizer." Unable to convince Bohachevsky to rescind what they believed was an anti-Ukrainian policy, a number of priests and many of the laity decided to leave the Catholic Church and convert to Orthodoxy.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had received its first bishop, just prior to Bohachevsky's arrival in 1925. Assigned to the United States by the synod of the newly-organized Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine, Bishop John Theodorovich arrived in the United States at a most opportune time. Within three years, the Ukrainian-American Orthodox population increased some tenfold, largely as a result of Catholic defections.

Although it was considered noncanonical by the rest of the Orthodox world because none of its bishops had been consecrated according to Orthodox tradition, the Autocephalous Orthodox Church offered a religious alternative for many Ukrainian Catholics whose Ukrainianism was stronger than their Catholicism. Other elements of the Catholic community, however, especially the dissident clergy, were still concerned with the preservation of apostolic legitimacy. When Bishop Theodorovich was unable to achieve canonical sanction for his episcopacy, a number of Orthodox parishoners established a second, eventually canonically legitimate Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America.

The political and religious turmoil which prevailed in the Ukrainian-American community between the two world wars, while divisive, was not without certain salutary side effects. For one thing, Ukrainian national consciousness was strengthened by constant political and religious debates. More important, however, was the fact that the Ukrainian national will was tempered. National agendas were articulated by the Communists, the Socialists, the Nationalists, and the Monarchists—all of whom supported the concept of an autonomous if not independent Ukraine—as well as by the Catholic and Orthodox churches. It was a period of open debate, which, while acrimonious on occasion, enabled the Ukrainian-American community to reach new levels of political growth and development.

In the end, however, the political and religious debates proved very damaging to the well-being of the total community. Despite repeated efforts to involve them in the ethnonational process,

American-born Ukrainian youth were never able fully to comprehend the relevance of the debates, and disillusioned, they gradually drifted away from the community. An entire generation of potential leaders was lost in the aftermath of the turmoil.

Another serious setback to Ukrainian-American community life occurred during the Second World War when a number of Ukrainian-American organizations—primarily the UHO and ODVU—came under FBI investigation for alleged Fascist activities. Even though both organizations were vindicated, their membership rolls were severely depleted and neither organization ever fully recovered. The cold war climate which prevailed in the United States after the Second World War permanently damaged the Ukrainian-American Communist community. Many of their leaders fled to Canada, and those who remained went “underground” and have maintained a low profile until the present.

Finding a severely weakened Ukrainian-American community after the war, the new emigrants, who were almost wholly nationalistic in orientation, not only established their own organizations but also assumed some key positions in the older groups. With the exception of the Catholic and Orthodox churches, most Ukrainian organizations are currently controlled by postwar immigrant leaders.

The infusion of new blood into the community after World War II proved to be of great benefit. Today, the Ukrainian-American community can boast of a strong Catholic and Orthodox Church, four active fraternals, three viable youth organizations, summer resorts, youth camps, numerous financial institutions, a statue of Taras Shevchenko in Washington, and, of course the Ukrainian Research Institute and three chairs in Ukrainian studies at Harvard University. We have not been assimilated, and, given the problems our community has had to overcome, we can be very proud of the fact that we are here today to celebrate the centenary of our emigration. We have indeed triumphed, putting an end, once and for all, to the concept of the melting pot as a viable model of ethnic life in America.

As we begin our second century as an ethnic community in the United States, however, we need to look to the future. Much of the turmoil which existed during the 1930's can easily return if we

are not careful. We are already embroiled in another religious debate which seems to be increasing in momentum. This time the question is not who are the better Ukrainians, Catholics or Orthodox, but rather, who are better Ukrainian Catholics, those who subscribe to the Julian Calendar or those who adhere to the Gregorian.

With Communist, Socialist, and Monarchist influence all but non-existent, our current political debate revolves around the question: who are the better Ukrainian nationalists, the followers of Bandera, Melnyk, or Lebed? In this regard, the followers of Stepan Bandera seem to have the upper hand, especially in terms of community organizational control. If the present trend continues, the debate may end, with Bandera's agenda as the only available national alternative. Our young people still appear to be relatively disinterested in Ukrainian-American organizations. If nothing changes, we may suffer a dearth of healthy young minds to take on leadership roles in our community.

These and other problems need to be addressed and solved. Given our national resiliency, our present economic and human resources, and the fact that America is finally recognizing the value of ethnicity, I believe the odds are on our side. Some of our earlier momentum may be regained if we are willing to learn from the past. Let us commemorate our triumphant centenary with heads held high, and let us look to the future with hope, enthusiasm, and a determination to do better during the next one hundred years.

CHAPTER 3

The Rise of Ukrainian Ethnic Consciousness in America During the 1890's

Bohdan P. Procko

In the introduction to his recent instructive study on the rise of Polish and Lithuanian ethnic consciousness in America, Victor Greene stated that the overwhelming bulk of East European immigrants in the nineteenth century were at a very low level of ethnonational awareness.

They both possessed and practiced certain cultural characteristics of their group—for example, a common national language—but they had little or no feeling of membership in an ethnic nation. Whether in Europe or America, they may have sensed that they were different from other nationalities, but when asked for their own group identification, they probably would have responded by naming their regional or local origins—their village or more likely their province.¹

At the same time, Greene also pointed out that there was among the migrating masses a tiny elite segment with a high level of national consciousness.

They were aware not simply of their membership in a separate nation; they also found considerable pride and satisfaction in feeling and broadcasting that identity. This handful of ethnic patriots worked enthusiastically to perpetuate their nation's name.²

It would seem that Greene's generalizations concerning the evolution of national consciousness among the East European immigrants in the third quarter of the nineteenth century is particularly applicable to the Ukrainian immigrants during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

Mass Ukrainian immigration to the United States began only in 1877, when peasants from the mountainous border districts between Transcarpathia and Galicia began arriving as laborers for the mining companies in the anthracite region of eastern Pennsylvania. They were recruited from economically depressed

¹Victor Greene, *For God and Country: The Rise of Polish and Lithuanian Ethnic Consciousness in America, 1860-1910* (Madison, Wis., 1975), p. 3.

²*Ibid.*, p. 4.

peasant communities, where neither literacy nor national consciousness was commonplace.

The very low level of ethnic awareness among these early Ukrainian immigrants was manifested in several ways, and particularly in the way they identified themselves. Upon their arrival, almost none of the early immigrants from Galicia or Transcarpathia were able to reply to the immigration officials' inquiries about their Ukrainian origins. The old name *Ukraine*, which dates at least from the twelfth century, had not yet become the accepted designation in the provinces from which they had emigrated, although the name had by then been generally accepted as the national nomenclature for the rest of the territories of what is now modern Ukraine. The best reply that these early immigrants from Galicia and Transcarpathia could offer was *Rusyn* or *Rusnak*, words derived from an even older traditional term, *Rus'*, from the Kievan period, then still in general use in Galicia and Transcarpathia. The terms *Rusyn* or *Rusnak* could hardly have helped the immigration official, whose job it was to place all immigrants in a national identity category. Thus, many of those immigrants ultimately represented themselves as members of neighboring nationalities—the Poles or the Russians. Others gave the state from which they came; thus, they became Austrians or Hungarians in the immigration records. Still others gave their religious membership as a means of identification; they consequently were referred to as Greeks or Greek Catholics.³ Obviously, the American immigration records are confusing and hardly a reliable source regarding the early history of Ukrainian immigration in America.

Virtually all of the early Ukrainian immigrants were Catholics of the Byzantine-Slavic (Greek Catholic) Rite in communion with Rome. Thrust into unfamiliar and frequently hostile surroundings, the immigrants yearned for their own familiar institutions, in particular their own church, which had been the center of their

³For a useful discussion on the evolution of political consciousness in general among the Ukrainian immigrants see, for example, Omelian Reviuk, "Rozvii politychnoho svitobliadu ukraïns'koho imigranta," in *Propamiatna knyha . . . Ukraïns'koho Narodnogo Soiuzu* (Jersey City, N.J., 1936), pp. 300–323. Of particular interest to our discussion are pages 307–308. The above jubilee book is a valuable source of information on Ukrainian immigrant matters.

social life in Europe. The tiny elite segment that had a high level of ethnic awareness was limited for the most part to a handful of priests, the first intellectuals among the early immigrants. The priests and the churches that they organized became the nuclei from which other institutions and organizations began to sprout in the new world. From these emanated ethnic awareness and, eventually, future Ukrainian-American communities.

Father Ivan Volansky, the first Ukrainian Catholic priest in the United States, began in 1884 to organize and educate the mostly illiterate immigrants from Galicia and Transcarpathia. But the systematic attempt to arouse their ethnic awareness really began with the appearance of Father Gregory Hrushka's newspaper *Svoboda* (*Liberty*) in 1893.⁴ Through his newspaper as the chief instrument of his educational campaign, Hrushka, an emigrant from Galicia who settled in Jersey City, N.J. in 1890, played the leading role in the growth of ethnic-group consciousness among the Ukrainian peasant immigrants. Without this consciousness the rich Ukrainian cultural heritage in America, whose centennial we are commemorating at the Harvard symposium, would hardly have been possible.

To appreciate Father Hrushka's pioneering role in the growth of Ukrainian ethnic consciousness in America, one must be aware of the internal conflicts which began in 1889 among that tiny elite segment of intellectuals and which naturally affected the rank-and-file immigrant. To understand these internal conflicts requires some knowledge of their native background.

In the seventeenth century the old designation *Ukraine* took on a special meaning when the eastern territories of the modern Ukraine became the center of a new national life under the leadership of the Ukrainian Cossacks.⁵ The Ukrainian literary revival of the nineteenth century accepted the term as representing its own national life. Consequently, with the end of the nineteenth century the words *Ukraine* and *Ukrainian* were being more and more widely used in Ukrainian and other literatures,

⁴ The current English spelling of the name became the norm as of March 1894.

⁵ The name *Ukraine* was popularized in the seventeenth century as a result of the Polish-Cossack wars in the 1640's and 1650's, and in particular, by Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan's *Description d'Ukraine* (first published in 1650) and a number of his maps.

pushing out other names, including the older traditional names, *Rus'* and *Rusyn*. On the other hand, in the western Ukraine, in Galicia and Transcarpathia, where political life was different, the words *Rus'* and *Rusyn* were retained much longer. These lands were not in immediate danger of russification, as were the Ukrainian lands in the east; consequently, there was no urgency to break with a name that was also claimed by the Russians. Further, the Austro-Hungarian government resisted the use of the new name in their lands in order to prevent the Ukrainians in Galicia and Transcarpathia from associating themselves ethnically with the Ukrainians in the Russian empire.⁶

There were two distinct groups of early immigrants: those from Galicia and those from Transcarpathia. Each of these groups was further divided into various factions. The Galicians were subdivided into Ukrainophiles and Moscophiles. The Ukrainophiles stood for the idea of a Ukrainian people, distinct from the Russians. They desired to develop the Ukrainian language, literature, and nationality along individual lines. The Moscophiles imitated all things Russian and looked toward Moscow as the seat of Slavic culture.⁷ Among the Transcarpathians, three distinct factions existed: the Rusyns, who were sympathetic to the Hungarians; the Russophiles, who claimed cultural communion with Russia; and the Ukrainophiles, who claimed cultural communion with the Ukrainians.⁸ To a great extent, the conflicts among Galician and Transcarpathian immigrants in the United States were an extension of differences which were born in Europe.⁹

⁶See Isydor Sokhots'kyi, "Ukrains'ka Katolyts'ka Tserkva Vizantiis'ko-slovianskoho obriadu v ZDA," in *Ukrains'ka Katolyts'ka Mytropolia v Zluchenykh Derzhavakh Ameriky* (Philadelphia, 1959), p. 200.

⁷See Andrew J. Shipman, "Greek Catholics in America," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. VI (New York, 1913), p. 749. See also his earlier essay, "Our Russian Catholics: the Greek Ruthenian Church in America," *The Messenger*, XLII (New York, 1904), p. 664, for a variation of this division beginning in 1895.

⁸Stephen C. Gulovich, "The Rusin Exarchate in the United States," *Eastern Churches Quarterly*, VI (London, 1946), p. 463. See also Shipman's essay in *The Messenger*, XLII (1904), pp. 664-665, for substantially similar division.

⁹The material in the preceding two paragraphs appeared with some changes in Bohdan P. Procko, "The Establishment of the Ruthenian Church in the United States, 1884-1907," *Pennsylvania History*, XLII, 2 (Bloomsburg, Pa., 1975), pp.

Hrushka obviously represented the Ukrainophile viewpoint, which, partially due to his aggressive educational campaign, won out among the rank-and-file immigrants from Austrian Galicia and Bukovina. Most of the immigrants from Hungary's Transcarpathia, due to the influence of the Magyarized views of Transcarpathian priest intellectuals, were not affected by the educational campaign of Ukrainian patriots like Hrushka, and their descendants today continue to accept the name *Rusyn*¹⁰ (commonly rendered today as *Ruthenian*). These fall outside the scope of this account.

In the very first issue of *Svoboda*, on September 15, 1893, Father Hrushka explained that the major reason for the existence of his paper was to enlighten the Ukrainian people and to protect their religion, rite, and language.¹¹ His cultural patriotism is unmistakable. From the outset, *Svoboda* used the words *Rus'*, *Ukraina*, and *Rus'-Ukraina*, as synonyms for the Ukrainian lands, with the first term used most frequently. He applied the adjectival form *Rusyn* (*ruskii*), less frequently *Ukrainian* (*ukrains'kii*), and occasionally *Little Rusyn* (*malo-ruskii*), to the people from those lands, including those from Austrian Galicia and from Hungary's Transcarpathia.¹² They were one and the same people in the view of Hrushka. On the other hand, Hrushka employed the words *Russia* (*Rosiia*), *Russian* (*rosiiskii*), and *Moscovite* (*moskovskii*), and infrequently *Great Russian* (*velyko-ruskii*), exclusively for the

143–144. In addition, see Iuliian Bachyns'kyi's useful summary in *Ukrain'ska immigratsiia v Z"iedynenykh Derzhavakh Ameryky* (Lviv, 1914), pp. 431–432; Ivan L. Rudnytsky's detailed discussion "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," *Austrian History Yearbook*, III, pt. 2 (Houston, Texas, 1967), in particular pp. 408–422; and the recent summary in Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (Seattle, 1974), pp. 254–259.

¹⁰Although the Ukrainian immigrants from Transcarpathia were anthropologically and linguistically related to the ancestors of the immigrants from Galicia, cultural and political differences had developed between their descendants because of the dissimilar socioeconomic and political fortunes of those under Hungarian rule and of those under Austrian rule.

¹¹September 15, 1893, p. 1.

¹²In this paper, the modern terms *Ukraine* and *Ukrainian* are used for *Rus'* and *Rusyn*, and for their equivalents. The original Slavic terms employed by Hrushka's *Svoboda* are given in parentheses when it seems appropriate. The transliteration style is that of the Library of Congress.

lands of Russia and the Russians. Hrushka's Slavic terminology is clear and unmistakable. *Rusyny* were the Ukrainians and the *Rosiiany* were the Russians.¹³

The inability of the Ukrainian immigrants to identify themselves properly brought forth a long article in *Svoboda*, on October 15, 1893, entitled "Let's Know Ourselves" (*Poznaimosia*). Hrushka attacked the practice of referring to Ukrainian immigrants by a variety of names: "as Greek Catholic, Greek, Roman Catholic, Uniate, Orthodox, Rusnak, Hungarian. Because of such designations we cannot recognize one another." He insisted, for example, that they were not Greeks and that *Greek Catholic* was not a term for nationality. "We are *Rusyny*."¹⁴ Unfortunately, however, the confusion concerning the identity of the Ukrainian immigrants persisted, at least partly because the attempts to translate the Slavic terms into the English language created new and equally serious misconceptions. Hrushka himself, unwittingly, added to the problem when his newspaper identified itself in the English language, beginning with its first issue, as "The only Russian political paper in this country."¹⁵ Obviously, Hrushka's rendition of the term *Rusyn* into *Russian* conveyed a completely opposite meaning to what he had intended. Due to his own limited familiarity with the English language and a lack of expertise concerning the problem of translation and transliteration from one tongue to another, the identity of the Ukrainian immigrants was unintentionally misconstrued for the American reader by Hrushka himself, the leading advocate of Ukrainian national consciousness in the United States at the time.

To a degree, Americans of Ukrainian descent still have to cope with this problem of national identification. For example, in one of his incisive articles on the Ukrainians in the Pittsburgh area, Clarke Thomas, associate editor of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, quotes a Ukrainian couple from McKees Rocks: "We find ourselves frustrated, because even those who know where the Ukraine is think of it just as a part of Russia." He also attributes to

¹³The spelling of these terms and of their synonyms is far from uniform in Hrushka's *Svoboda*, but the meaning of each term is never in doubt.

¹⁴*Svoboda*, October 15, 1893, p. 1.

¹⁵*Svoboda*, September 15, 1893, p. 3.

the couple's daughter, a junior at Slippery Rock State College, this remark: "Kids argue with me that I'm Russian, but I'm not."¹⁶

To Father Hrushka one of the chief distinguishing marks of a people was its language. Because some of the Ukrainian immigrants seemed reticent to use their native tongue, he was prompted to write acerbically in an 1893 article entitled "Love Your Own":

What sort of patrician (*pan*) has developed out of the poor wretch who tended geese in his village for a bowl of oatmeal but here feels ashamed to speak in his native Ukrainian (*rusky*).¹⁷

Using the terms *Rusyn* and *Ukrainian* (*ruska*, *ukrainsha*) interchangeably in the essay, Hrushka stressed for his readers the many virtues of the Ukrainian tongue.

Our Ukrainian (*ruska*) language occupies a prominent position among all Slavic languages. Our own Ukrainian (*ruska*) language played a role in developing and refining not only the Great Russian language (*velyko-ruska mova*) but also the Polish language. The so-called Ukrainian school (*ukrainsha shkola*) of writers drove out the Latinisms from the Polish language and literature.

The Ukraine (*Ukraina*), a veritable paradise, delighted the Polish poets of that school, and they left behind immortal works taken from the life of our Ukrainian people (*ukrainskoho liudu*). . . .

Our Ukrainian (*ruska*) language, according to one learned professor, Bantysht-Kamens'kyi, is second only to Italian in its mellifluousness.¹⁸

To help protect the Old World heritage of the Ukrainian immigrants, Hrushka frequently called in his *Svoboda* articles for the formation of Ukrainian institutions, such as a Ukrainian national organization, a national home, Ukrainian schools, and so forth.¹⁹ It should be noted, however, that the effectiveness of his crusade was often weakened by anger and vituperousness. He generally did not take criticism gracefully.

¹⁶Clarke Thomas, "Ukrainians Mix Old, New Generations," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, January 22, 1974, p. 25.

¹⁷*Svoboda*, October 1, 1893, p. 1.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹See "Nam treba narodnoi orhanyzatsii," *ibid.*, November 1, 1893; "Narodnyi dom," *ibid.*, February 1, 1894; "Nam treba shkoly," *ibid.*, March 1, 1894.

By 1894 the internal conflicts among the Ukrainian immigrants had seriously worsened, in part because the disagreements over national consciousness were greatly complicated by an equally serious religious controversy that the immigrants were experiencing at the same time. The religious conflicts among the Ukrainian Catholic immigrants during the 1890's loosely paralleled the history of the Irish Catholics in the United States between 1815 and 1860,²⁰ and of the Poles and the Lithuanians between the mid-1860's and 1900.²¹ Like the Irish, Poles, and Lithuanians, the Ukrainians feared that their churches, the center of their social life, were in danger of falling under alien control. The fact that the Ukrainians were Eastern-Rite Catholics, whose traditional religious laws and customs seemed threatened, made the relationship between them and the American Latin Rite hierarchy doubly difficult.

The majority of the Latin hierarchy and clergy in the United States were totally unfamiliar with the traditions of the Byzantine-Slavic Rite. Particularly foreign to Americans was the custom of a married clergy. In turn, the early Ukrainian priests, in part because of their unfamiliarity with the English language, were unable properly to inform the Latin clergy of their Byzantine traditions. This often resulted in outright hostility. It seems probable that a little more willingness in the beginning to understand each other's problems would have helped to prevent more serious misunderstandings. The Latin bishops felt that in order to prevent the erosion of their own authority and the development of chaotic conditions, all priests in the United States must be celibate and subject to them—and they frequently petitioned Rome towards that end. The holy see's first decree relative to the Ukrainian Church in America (October 1, 1890) placed Ukrainian priests under the jurisdiction of the local Latin Ordinary and required the priests in America to be celibate.²² To

²⁰See Andrew J. Shipman, "Immigration to the United States," *A Memorial of Andrew J. Shipman*, ed. Conde B. Pallen (New York, 1916), p. 92. Shipman was one of the early American authors to become intimately acquainted with the problems of the Slavic immigrants.

²¹See Greene, *For God and Country*, pp. 10–13.

²²Letter of Cardinal Ledochowski, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of Faith for the Oriental Rites, to Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore,

some of the Ukrainian priests, such as Father Hrushka, these regulations from Rome represented an attempt to destroy the autonomy of the Eastern Rite and to Latinize the Ukrainians. In effect, the religious controversy became a controversy over Ukrainian identity. Thus, the papal decree added to the difficulties between the two rites and exacerbated the already serious internal disagreements among Ukrainians.

Neither the Galician nor the Transcarpathian priests displayed the necessary tact, patience, and understanding towards each other's views, and by 1894 the differences between the Galician and Transcarpathian priests led to a permanent break. The Ukrainian priests from Galicia founded in Shamokin, Pa., on February 22, 1894, the Ukrainian National Association (*Ruskii Narodnyi Soiuz*) under the leadership of Father Hrushka and other nationally conscious priests.²³ The character of the new association was revealed at its first general convention in Shamokin on May 30, 1894. The Ukrainian national anthem (*Shche ne vmerla Ukraïna*) was sung and the delegates wore blue and gold emblems (the national colors).²⁴ Hrushka's *Svoboda*, unanimously chosen by the convention to become the association's official organ, was issued in blue colors one week and in gold the next. With *Svoboda* as the organ of the national organization, Hrushka's patriotic sentiments could now be disseminated more widely than ever before among the immigrants from Galicia and Bukovina.

At the same time, there seemed to be a gradual transition from merely cultural patriotism to a more politically oriented national consciousness. For instance, when the papacy in its correspondence with the Polish bishops referred to the Ukrainian people in Galicia as "Poles of the Greek Rite," Hrushka printed a refutation in May 1894, under the heading "We were Ukrainians (*rusyny*) and will remain Ukrainians."²⁵ The refutation was an indication not only of rising antagonism toward Rome but also of a growing political consciousness among leaders like Hrushka. And in reply

May 10, 1892, advising the bishops of the United States of the instructions addressed to the Ukrainian bishops in Austro-Hungary in 1890, in *American Ecclesiastical Review*, VII (Philadelphia, 1892), pp. 66-67.

²³*Svoboda*, March 1, 1894, p. 2.

²⁴*Ibid.*, June 6, 1894, p. 1.

²⁵"My Rusyny buli i budem rusynamy," May 11, 1894, p. 2.

to material appearing in the semi-official tsarist Russian newspaper, *Moskovskie vedomosti* of May 1894, *Svoboda* wrote:

It is about time for Russia to know that we in Galicia, or in Bukovina, or in Hungary are not little children and therefore do not need help either from our enemies the Poles, nor from our erstwhile brothers in Moscow. . . . Our hearts are breaking with grief, when we consider, that 20 million Ukrainians in Russia do not have the right to write in their language. . . ! All is forbidden them.²⁶

But Hrushka's nationalism was still provincial. His references are still to provincial languages such as Plattdeutsch in Germany, or Provençal in France, which were not considered by their respective governments as "separatist" and could develop freely.²⁷ He concludes:

One is a fool, who thinks about an independent Ukraine: she is so closely tied with Russia spiritually and materially that such a relationship cannot be broken. . . . But, gentlemen, let us breath freely and don't point at a neighbor, when your own house is in disorder.²⁸

Before the year's end, however, the political goals of the Ukrainians, as far as Hrushka's *Svoboda* was concerned, had moved beyond provincial autonomy. In an article entitled "Why are we, a Ukrainian (*malo-ruskii*) nation of 21 million, at present in captivity: in chains?" the editor declared that

it is the responsibility [of all of us] to open the eyes of the people and point out the unfortunate position the Ukrainian (*ruskii*) nation finds itself in. . . . The Ukrainian (*Rusyn*) who should be free and happy in his own fatherland is today a slave, who is born naked and who dies naked. That is not God's freedom, but only the will of a thief who is stronger, who took what is ours and will not let it go until it is taken back by force. . . .

Beginning today, our paper will be an honest spokesman of the idea of independence and freedom of the Ukrainian land (*Rus'ka kraina*) in Europe.²⁹

Six months later, in a bitter attack on the Magyarized priests from Transcarpathia, *Svoboda* achieves the most unequivocal statement of its political outlook, when it defined Ukrainian identity.

²⁶"Napered spytaisia, a potomu laisia," June 27, 1894, p. 1.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹"Ruska dolia," December 12, 1894, p. 1.

Our common man allowed himself to be easily misled by the name 'russkii', not knowing history, which teaches that the name 'Ruskii' COMPREHENDS TWO SEPARATE PEOPLE: THE RUSSIAN (ROSIISKII) OR MUSCOVITE (MOSKOVSKII) PEOPLE, AND THE RUSYN-UKRAINIAN (RUSKII UKRAINS'KII) OR LITTLE RUSYN (MALORUSKII) PEOPLE.

These two people have nothing in common between them, besides an alphabet, which was composed by Sts. Cyril and Methodius. Today 28 million Ukrainians (*rusyny*) proclaim in one voice to civilized Europe that they are a DISTINCT NATION from the Poles and the Muscovites (*moskaly*) and that they have their own GLORIOUS HISTORY, THEIR OWN LANGUAGE, THEIR OWN LITERATURE; and, although they are today in slavery, nevertheless, they know who has the truth, who has been wronged, and whose children we are. . . !³⁰

The situation became even more complex. Internal conflicts and misunderstandings with the Latin hierarchy had meanwhile provided the Russian Orthodox Mission an opportunity for very lively propaganda among the divided Ukrainians. Beginning in 1891, the mission succeeded in establishing itself on a viable scale in the eastern half of the United States, when individual Ukrainian priests and some of their congregations passed over to Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox Mission's appeals to the Ukrainian Catholics appear to have made an impression even on Father Hrushka. For already in mid-1894, Hrushka declared that if Rome did not recall the Magyarized priests or if it ordered the Uniate priest-patriots, like himself, to submit to and sign over Ukrainian churches to the local Latin-Rite bishops, "then in an hour the entire people will turn to Orthodoxy."³¹ Disillusioned over what seemed to him to be the impossibility of normal relations between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic bishops in the United States, and fearful that Ukrainian Catholics could not retain their national identity under the jurisdiction of the Latin bishops, Hrushka appealed to the Russian Orthodox Church and was formally accepted into Orthodoxy by the Russian Mission on December 21–22, 1896.³²

³⁰"Pravda v ochy kole," May 22, 1895, p. 1. Capitals in the original.

³¹"Kolka slov 'Dushpastyriu'," June 13, 1894, p. 2.

³²For a detailed account of the formal acceptance of Hrushka into Orthodoxy, see "Prisoedinenie k pravoslaviiu iz unii russkago prikhoda v g. Oldfordzhe—vmeste so sviashchennikom o. Gregoriem Grushkoi," *Pravoslavnyi amerikanskii vestnik*, January 13, 1897, pp. 165–169.

Father Hrushka, who thus became the first Galician priest to turn Orthodox, took with him the larger part of the congregation of his new parish in Old Forge, Pa. Hrushka's strong nationalism appeared to have dominated over his religious convictions. After his death in Galicia in 1913, Hrushka was characterized by another Ukrainian pioneer, Nestor Dmytriv, as the first true Ukrainian patriot in America.³³

Although Hrushka had compromised his principles when he defected to Russian Orthodoxy and when he began using his editorial talents to attack his former newspaper and associates, *Svoboda* not only continued but actually expanded its role as the major force in the educational campaign by Ukrainian leaders toward greater national and political consciousness. This was made possible by the fact that in June of 1895, Hrushka had sold his newspaper to Fathers Nestor Dmytriv and John Konstankevych.³⁴

Father Dmytriv was the first of a group of nationally conscious Ukrainian priests (the so-called radical priests) who came from Galicia between 1895 and 1898. Their arrival signified not only a radical clerical leadership in church matters, it also marked a rapid expansion of cultural and national development among the Ukrainian immigrants. Dmytriv became the co-owner and editor of *Svoboda* within months after his arrival. When Dmytriv left for missionary work among Ukrainians in Canada in the spring of 1897, the editorship of *Svoboda* was assumed by Father Stephen Makar, another of the young nationalist priests. In 1900, Reverend John Ardan, the most radical of this group, became the owner and editor of the paper. Thus, through *Svoboda*, which the young, activist priests owned and edited, the educational process towards greater national self-consciousness stimulated by Hrushka in the first half of the 1890's was to be expanded in the second half of the 1890's and into the 1900's.

³³See Nestor Dmytriv, "Pamiaty narodnoho diiacha," *Svoboda*, June 5, 1913. Hrushka went back to Europe early in 1910, and shortly thereafter he left Orthodoxy and returned to the Catholic Church. Eventually he received a Ukrainian Catholic parish in Galicia where he served until his death.

³⁴Konstankevych, who had arrived in America in 1893, joined Dmytriv and his colleagues in their patriotic endeavors.

Hrushka's departure from the scene, it should be noted, was not the end but actually a new beginning in the growth process of ethnic consciousness among Ukrainian Americans.

Commentary

Paul R. Magocsi

At the outset I must state that I was extremely pleased to learn that Professor Procko was invited to deliver a paper at this Harvard symposium. I was later happy to learn that I was being given the privilege to comment on his paper. I say this in earnest, because of all the work on Ukrainians in America that have appeared in recent years, Professor Procko's studies, particularly on early church history, are first-rate pieces of scholarship and perhaps the only ones which take into account the complex problem of terminology and its proper use. The terminological issue is of no mean importance. For terms, especially national designations, are not just words that can be described in simplistic dictionarylike fashion. Rather, they are living entities, with conceptual lives of their own, that may develop and change over the course of time. Moreover, quite often the same term, or national designation, may mean different things to different people.

Among Professor Procko's contributions to clarity are his description of what is now called the Ukrainian Catholic Church. He usually employs the term Catholics of the Byzantine-Slavic Rite or Byzantine-Slavic Church, names certainly more appropriate than Greek Catholic or even Byzantine Catholic. Also, in his articles (although interestingly not in the present paper) he refers to immigrants from Galicia as Ukrainians and those from Subcarpathia as Transcarpathian Rusyns. These are only a few examples of the care he has put into his writings, which make the job of the critic more intellectually challenging and exciting.

Professor Procko's paper is basically a study of the immigrant leader, Reverend Gregory Hrushka, who has been chosen as a prototype of that "tiny elite segment with a high level of national consciousness." I will make clear at this stage that I disagree with Professor Procko's analysis of Hrushka's career. The reasons for our differences are not based on Professor Procko's use of sources—as usual his work is scrupulously documented—rather, what is at issue is a question of perception. I would like to present to you the possibility of viewing Hrushka's career from another

perspective, a perspective which might employ the same source material as Professor Procko but result nonetheless in a considerably different interpretation.

One of the difficulties any historian continually has to face is a problem which may be called the tyranny of historical perspective. Despite serious efforts at objectivity, the tendency to project present-day concepts and levels of understanding upon the historical past is always a danger which creeps into the most conscientiously formulated historical writing. In the case of Professor Procko's presentation of Hrushka's career, I see this being a problem.

Like many other immigrant activists who came from territory which today is inhabited by nationally conscious Ukrainians, Hrushka has been viewed from the standpoint of the Ukrainian-American community as it exists in the United States now. Thus, whatever he did or said that seems to support the idea of Ukrainian consciousness is stressed as being all important, while other aspects of his ideology are given lesser or no attention at all.

As Professor Procko points out in his introduction, the problem concerns the development of the concept Rus' as perceived and understood by immigrants in this country. Rus' is viewed as an older name of Ukraine, while Rusyn is considered the former designation and supposedly the exact equivalent Ukrainian. This may or may not be the case.

While reading Professor Procko's paper, I could not help thinking of the Rus'ka Triitsa, or Rusyn Triad, a group of three leaders who prompted the national awakening in Galicia in the first half of the nineteenth century. Their names, well known to many of you, were Markiiian Shashkevych, Iakiv Holovats'kyi, and Ivan Vahylevych. Each of these men began, and, I would argue, remained Rusyns, that is, individuals who were loyal to the heritage and traditions of their homeland. However, later Ukrainian writers have seen them from an entirely different viewpoint, i.e., from a Ukrainophile viewpoint. As a result, Holovats'kyi is castigated because he rejected the names Ukrainian and Ukraine and was branded pejoratively as a Russophile; Vahylevych is frequently criticized because though remaining loyal to the culture of his people he sought political accommodation with the Poles; thus, only Shashkevych remains a hero to

Ukrainians, most likely because he died prematurely, in 1843, well before the Ukrainian-Rusyn dichotomy became an issue.

What I am trying to point out is that those individuals like Vahylevych and Holovats'kyi as well as subsequent Galician activists like Bohdan Didyts'kyi and Ioann Naumovych were patriots, loyal first and foremost to their homeland, and, in particular, to the names Rus', Rusyn, and *rus'kyi* which embodied not only the ethnonational but also religious aspects of their civilization.

In this context, it is interesting to note the development of immigrants in the United States from Transcarpathia, or Subcarpathian Rus'. They have maintained the ancient names Rus' and Rusyn down to the present day, and have done so primarily as national patriots. Thus, I find it unfortunate to see in Professor Procko's paper, where on page 54 if he does not make a simple one-to-one correlation, there is at least a strong assumption that it was only because Transcarpathians were Magyarized that they maintained the name Rusyn. It should be noted that every history of the Subcarpathian Rusyn people, whether written by a Rusynophile, Russophile, or Magyarone begins with a description of Kievan Rus' as the ancient patrimony. From the Subcarpathian perspective, both in Europe and America, the acceptance of the terms *Ukrainian* and *Ukraine* was a betrayal to traditional heritage. Hence, many Subcarpathians felt that the Galician Ukrainophiles were the ones who opted for a new, separate community.

And now we come to Hrushka, who throughout his writings used the adjective, *rus'kyi*, and substantive, Rusyn, to describe his people. I believe to translate these terms as Ukrainian is incorrect, when we consider the period in which Hrushka wrote and the cultural framework he represented. His subsequent development only confirms this opinion. When during the 1890's highly conscious Ukrainian priests from Galicia like Nestor Dmytriv, Ivan Konstankevych, and Ivan Ardan increased their influence within the Rus'kyi Narodnyi Soiuz (by the way, renamed Ukrainian only in 1914), Hrushka together with another co-founder, Teofan Obushkevych, left to form with other Rusyn patriots from Galicia and Transcarpathia the Obshchestvo Russkikh Bratstv. As the Rus'kyi Narodnyi Soiuz became more Ukrainian-

oriented, Hrushka, now editor of the rival newspaper *Pravda*, stepped up his attacks against what he viewed as a politically inspired betrayal of established Rusyn tradition. Perhaps by accepting Orthodoxy, he felt that such a tradition could be better preserved. Please note, however, that conversion to Orthodoxy was not the earmark of remaining a Rusyn, since Obushkevych and other Byzantine-Slavic Rite Catholics also followed Hrushka in his defection from the Ukrainophile Rus'kyi Narodnyi Soiuz.

Thus, to my mind Hrushka, like Holovats'kyi before him, was *not* a Ukrainian who later in life went astray, but rather an individual who was consistent and until the end loyal to his national principles at a time when it seemed to him that old colleagues and Ukrainophile fellow countrymen were heading toward an entirely new national and cultural direction.

Discussion

PROCKO: I have no basic disagreements with Dr. Magocsi. The problems he mentioned surely exist, and as he pointed out, their interpretation is often an individual matter.

I would like to point out a few of the issues where Dr. Magocsi may have misinterpreted my paper. For one thing, I did not mean to suggest that I no longer retain the strict distinction between Galicians and the Transcarpathians. I insist always that the Galicians were the Ukrainians and the Transcarpathians were the Ruthenians (as they are called today). In the early part of the paper I mentioned that the Ruthenians were outside its scope.

He mentioned that we tend to impose our own contemporary interpretations on past times. This certainly is true, but in the case of Hrushka, I do not know if I can accept that completely. Hrushka himself, in 1901, returned to Europe and received an Orthodox parish in the eastern Ukraine, which was under Russia. However, he soon became disillusioned and decided he had made a mistake. Hrushka returned to the Catholic Church and in 1913 died within it. All the others returned, with the exception of Father Toth. And, when Hrushka did return to the Catholic Church, he admitted that he made a mistake and that Orthodoxy in his experience meant Russification. He wrote an article, which arrived in the *Svoboda* offices after his death in 1913, in which he again praised the work of *Svoboda* in supporting the Ukrainian spirit. So in 1913 Hrushka is right back where he had been during most of the period that we are talking about, supporting *Svoboda*, whereas between 1896 and 1901, he was its chief attacker. During that period he felt that *Svoboda* and the Catholic priests could not continue this national revival if they were subjugated to the Latin hierarchy. He felt it could be done under Russian sponsorship. Whether all this represents consistency or inconsistency is again a matter of interpretation.

I tried to be very careful in my transliteration, and I placed in parentheses the original Slavic terms. Hrushka himself does not rely simply on the term *Rusyn* but uses *Ukrainian* time and time again, obviously with certain connotations. This represented only the beginnings, the origins of national consciousness. You couldn't expect Hrushka to have the level of national consciousness that Ukrainians or Subcarpathians have today.

One more item that I did not discuss is Hrushka's claim that the Rusyns, the Transcarpathians, remained Rusyns. They wanted to remain Catholic, and Hrushka did attack this point. But Hrushka's major attacks on the Transcarpathians concerned what he considered their Magyarization. Whether that was the case or not is another matter. You cannot read *Svoboda* between 1893 and 1895, when he edited it, without seeing bitter attacks on the Ruthenians or Rusyns for their Magyarization. Hrushka felt that Rusyn nationalism could not continue under these circumstances. On the other hand, Dr. Magocsi is certainly correct in stating that the Rusyns, for their part, looked upon the Ukrainians as bringing forth something totally new. This Ukrainian terminology was completely innovative. Thus, both parties had a point of contention.

It is important to keep in mind that all these priests returned to the Catholic Church after their experience with the Russian Mission, because they saw the Russian Mission as leading to Russification.

DEAL: Obviously, the term *Galician* and, to some extent, the term *Ruthenian*, are regional terms. On the other hand, *Ruthenian* and *Rus'kyi* also had cultural or ethnonationalist connotations. At what stage did the term *Ukrainian* begin to take on the same all encompassing ethnonationalist connotation?

PROCKO: It again depends on the period in question. As far as the Galicians were concerned, until 1916 the term *Ruthenian* was generally used. As for the term *Ukrainian*, you cannot place this until the First World War, specifically the Ukrainian Day proclaimed by Reverend Poniatyshyn in 1917. This does not mean that *Ukrainian* was not used earlier. It had been used previously in Europe. In America, the terms were also used, but *Rusyn* and *Rus'kyi* were more generally accepted, because we are mainly dealing with people from the western Ukraine, i.e., Galicia and Transcarpathia.

Were it not for individuals like Hrushka, it is possible that today there would be no Ukrainian communities in the United States. I emphasized Hrushka, because he helped make this new, national designation, which had started among eastern Ukrainians, acceptable to those in the West. Hrushka was the first to call for the new term, and the leaders of the time felt this way too. Dmytriv

and Konstankevych called Hrushka "the first true patriot." Obviously, this is the Ukrainian interpretation. I tried to suggest that Hrushka's process of educating the masses toward Ukrainian national consciousness did not affect the Transcarpathians. So, if you have nine or ten scholars working on this question, it is possible to receive nine or ten different interpretations as to when the term *Ukrainian* acquired general ethnonationalistic acceptance.

PRITSAK: What Dr. Magocsi was pointing out will probably help us to elucidate the problem. There may be different interpretations, but certainly only one interpretation will be true. The problem is very complex. As Professor Procko indicated, the people who immigrated to this country did not have what we call today national consciousness. Perhaps a very few of them had it.

Each of the three ethnically Ukrainian territories underwent different processes caused by cultural, geographical, and political differences. You have the eastern Ukraine as a territory within the Russian empire versus the western Ukraine, which was within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Then again we must distinguish between the Austrian part and the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

In the east, the old term *Rus'* was replaced by *Ukraine*, especially during the intellectual revival of the nineteenth century. This term gained general recognition and replaced the term *Mala Rossiia*.

On the other hand, Galicia and Transcarpathia had no connection with the idea of the Ukraine. The term was transplanted there by émigrés, especially after 1860. One such person was Drahomanov. When the new term *Ukraine* was introduced into Galicia and Transcarpathia, it caused controversy among local leaders, but it is unfair to say that those who defended the old name *Rus'* were Muscophiles. I think they were perhaps better patriots than those who were so eager to change the name. The name *Ukraine* received general recognition only after the activity of Hrushevs'kyi. Yet, one should not forget that there was an initial period when both names, *Ukraina-Rus'*, were used. This was probably very good usage, and we have reason to regret that it disappeared.

I do not agree with Professor Procko that Father Hrushka was inconsistent. I see a very consistent line. Hrushka wanted just one thing: to preserve his own nationality no matter by what name.

CHAPTER 4

Documentation on the Ukrainian
Immigration to the United States:
A Case Study of the Collections
of the IHRC

Halyna Myroniuk

I would like to provide a general description of the Immigration History Research Center (IHRC) and its Ukrainian Collections. The IHRC (formerly known as the Center for Immigration Studies and Immigrant Archives) is unique in its collections of virtually untapped primary sources and rich in its variety of secondary sources.

It was established in 1964 to foster the study of human migration, particularly the immigration to the United States from Eastern, Central and Southern Europe and from the Middle East. At the same time it serves as a central depository for immigrant materials and concerns itself with developing teaching and research programs in immigration and ethnic studies.

Generous support through grants from the Louis W. and Maud Hill Family, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Rockefeller Foundation, as well as from the ethnic communities themselves have made the IHRC the success it is today.

Such funding has made it possible to maintain grants-in-aid and research assistantship programs. So far forty-nine grants-in-aid have been awarded to scholars from Europe and North America to do research at the IHRC. The center also maintains a research assistantship program for graduate students at the University of Minnesota whose interest is in migration and who have proper linguistic skills.

Publications of the IHRC include *Spectrum* (a newsletter issued quarterly), that contains articles on the center's holdings and activities; a *Guide to Manuscript Holdings*; a Serbian bibliography; a bibliography of the Ukrainian-American Monograph collection; and the Ethnic Collections Series. In addition, the center has made available the proceedings of an international conference

sponsored by the IHRC—*The Finnish Experience in the Western Great Lakes: New Perspectives*. The IHRC is also actively involved in microfilming programs, such as the Polish Microfilming Project and the Carpatho-Ruthenian Microfilming Project.

The collection includes subdivisions of twenty-five distinct ethnic groups, and consists of more than 25,000 volumes of published materials (20,000 monographs, 1,700 periodical titles), 2,500 reels of microfilm, and more than 2,000 linear feet of manuscripts. The manuscripts include the records of typical ethnic institutions, such as fraternal societies, churches, and publishing companies, as well as collections of personal papers from ethnic leaders, clergymen, journalists, labor leaders, writers, poets, and politicians.

The Ukrainian collections have an interesting history, for virtually all of the materials have been collected by one individual, the late Professor A. A. Granovsky. An entomologist by profession and a Ukrainian activist, Granovsky devoted much of his time to building a private library and archives. After coming to the United States in 1913, he managed to accumulate a vast amount of Ukrainian materials. Upon his retirement, Professor Granovsky became concerned about the fate of his books and personal papers, and he wanted these materials to be preserved for future research into Ukrainian culture. In the spring of 1965, he was approached by the director of the University Libraries with the idea of depositing his private Ukrainian library in the IHRC, and thereby establishing a Ukrainian-American Collection. This idea appealed to Professor Granovsky, and after the official agreements between the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota and Professor Granovsky, his personal library was deposited in the center.

Granovsky's initial gift consisted of some 858 monographs dealing with subjects on Ukrainian history, literature, ethnic characterization of the Ukrainians with special emphasis on their arts, and Ukrainian immigration to North America. In addition, there were 827 pamphlet titles, 270 serial titles, and 42 newspaper titles. Today, the Ukrainian collections have grown to a sizable library and archives of over 12,000 monographs, some 1,250 serial titles (62 currently received), 170 newspaper titles (16 currently received), and some 48 collections of unpublished

materials which consist of personal papers and organization records. It was only after Professor Granovsky's death that the center received a portion of his personal papers (about 85 linear feet of manuscript materials).

In the early stages of the development of the Ukrainian collections, Professor Granovsky also collected other materials. The University of Minnesota funded several trips whereby he traveled extensively throughout the United States and Western Europe in a concerted effort to "search and obtain for the Ukrainian collections books, periodicals, records and archives."

In 1966, Professor Granovsky visited most of the centers of Ukrainian settlements in Western Europe, acquiring valuable collections from organizations and libraries such as the Central Representation of Ukrainian Émigrés in Germany (CRUEG); the Symon Petlura Library in Paris; the Ukrainian Free University in Munich; the Shevchenko Scientific Society Library in Sarcelles, France; and the papers of Petro Plewako in Paris. At the same time, an appeal was sent to various Ukrainian newspapers in the United States and Canada to promote and inform the Ukrainian communities of the collection in Minnesota, and to emphasize the need to preserve materials that would reflect the religious, social, and political life of Ukrainians.

In 1968, he traveled to the East Coast and negotiated for the archives of the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC), which finally came in the summer of 1972. The UUARC was founded in 1944 to provide aid to Ukrainian prisoners of war and refugees. It managed to resettle over 50,000 persons in the United States during the 1940's and 1950's. Professor Granovsky himself took an active part in the resettlement program. This is the largest manuscript collection that we have, amounting to 260 linear feet of archival material. Other collections acquired or negotiated at this time came from prominent individuals and institutions, such as Professor Mykola Haydak, Matthew Stachiw, Konstantin Klepachivsky, the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association, the Ukrainian-American daily *Svoboda*, the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Professor Wasyl Halich. The Ukrainian immigrant communities responded favorably and have continued to be very generous. The private libraries of Professor M. Haydak, for example,

contained some 848 books; that of Matthew Stachiw had some 600 books, and M. M. Surmach's approximately 446 books.

Although the majority of gifts came directly to the center, people also sometimes sent materials to Professor Granovsky's house, entrusting him with the transfer to the center. He would list each book, item by item, indicating the donor and noting which of these he considered to be rare and how they should be handled. One copy of the list would be sent along with the materials, one he kept for his own records, and one was sent to the donor.

The manuscript collection of the IHRC contains our most valuable materials. There are some 48 Ukrainian manuscript collections. Of these, only three have been processed, although the rest have been brought under preliminary control. It has been our policy to obtain a donor's agreement upon receipt of any manuscript collection. This agreement ensures the donor that these materials will be preserved and organized, according to university library regulations and practice, for scholarly use.

The Ukrainian Collection has become the largest and richest of its kind in this country. Its major strength lies in the materials relating to the Ukrainian immigration to the United States and Canada from the end of World War I to the present. This aspect has been documented in several works found in the collection. Among them are Iulian Bachyns'kyi, *Ukrains'ka immigratsiia v Z'iedynenykh Derzhavakh Ameryky* (Lviv, 1914); Iaroslav Chyz, several articles for the Common Council for American Unity, including "Ukrainian Americans: A Survey of Current Political Attitudes and Activities with Respect to their Country of Origin" (New York, 1951); M. Nastsivs'kyi, *Ukrains'ka immigratsiia v Spoluchenykh Derzhavakh*, (New York, 1934); Wasyl Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States*, (Chicago, 1937); and Myron Kuropas, "The Making of the Ukrainian American, 1884-1939: A Study in Ethnonational Education," (Chicago, 1974). Other publications worth mentioning are O. Kyrylenko, *Ukraintsi v Amerytsi* (Vienna, 1916); K. Kyryllo, *Ridna shkola na emigratsii* (Buffalo, N.Y., 1924); and the Ukrainian National Association's *Propamiatna knyha* (Jersey City, NJ., 1936). Some manuscript collections offer insights into the social, political, and religious life of the Ukrainian community in the United States and Canada,

such as the papers of Professor Mykola Haydak, 1945–1970 (a scholar and active leader in the Ukrainian community); the papers of Professor Evhen Ontazky, 1918– (former diplomat of the Ukrainian National Republic, and until recently editor of *Nash klych*); the papers of Reverend Volodymyr Klodnycky, ca. 1917–1973 (Ukrainian American Orthodox priest, and former officer in the Ukrainian Galician Army); and the papers of Alexander Wallace Yaremko (former president of the Ukrainian Culture Center in Philadelphia). In addition, valuable materials on Ukrainians can be found in the papers of the American Council for Nationalities Service, the Assembly of Captive European Nations, the American Council For Emigrés in the Professions, and the International Institutes of Minnesota, Boston, and St. Louis.

Important secondary sources include extensive collections of newspapers, periodicals, and calendars. These illustrate the particular religious, political, and social alignments of the Ukrainians. Those of religious persuasion that are in the collection include *Ameryka* (Philadelphia, 1943–1974), *Shliakh* (Philadelphia, 1940–1968), *Ukrains'ka rodyna* (Mundare, Alb., 1941–1949); *Syris'kyi dim* (Philadelphia, 1917–1954); *Ukrains'ke pravoslavne slovo* (So. Bound Brook, N.J., 1950–present) and *Ievanhel's'kyi ranok* (Detroit, 1961–1975). The nationalist movement is represented by periodicals and newspapers such as *Samostiina Ukraïna* (Chicago, 1948–1972) and *Novyi shliakh* (Winnipeg, 1935–1971). The Ukrainian women's involvement in community life is recorded in such journals as *Zhinochyi svit* (Winnipeg, 1950–1971) and *Nashe zhyttia* (New York, 1948–1971). The views of the left-wing political groups are reflected in *Osa* (Chicago, 1920), *Ukrainian Daily News* (New York, 1921), and *Tovarysh immigranta* (Scranton, Pa., 1915–1920).

The most important part of the Ukrainian experience in North America has been the resettlement of some 100,000 Ukrainian war refugees who have come to America since 1948. This process is documented in the records of the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (papers, 1945–1960) and the Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigrants in Germany (papers, 1945–1960). In addition to these, there are the papers of John Panchuk

(1933–1955), former chairman of the Michigan Commission on Displaced Persons and former president of the UUARC and Ukrainian Relief Commission of Michigan.

The collection is also rich in secondary works on Ukrainian immigrant musical culture, dance, drama clubs, radical movements, and church jubilee and anniversary albums. Lastly, there are a sizable number of bibliographies and general reference works relating to the Ukrainian experience in North America: encyclopedias, atlases, dictionaries, and directories. One of the most interesting and rare items is a large ethnographic map of the Ukraine, made for the World's Fair in Chicago, 1933, by Ukrainian students of the Ukrainian Polytechnical School in Poděbrady, Czechoslovakia. It portrays traditional costumes in color of each province in the Ukraine.

The University of Minnesota libraries also hold a large collection of Ukrainian published and unpublished materials. Included are some 7,000 monographs, over 700 serial titles (seven currently received), 80 newspaper titles (five currently received), and calendars. Some important newspapers are *Kievskaiia starina* (Kiev, 1882–1906, on microfiche); the official organ of the Cossack National Liberation Movement, *Kozats'kyi vistnyk* (Prague, 1941–1945, on microfilm); *Dilo* (L'viv 1938–1939); *Man'dzhurs'kyi vistnyk* (Harbin); and *Nash klych* (Buenos Aires, 1935–1974). The most valuable journals are *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (L'viv-Ternopil', 1909, 1922–1931, 1948–1949); *Ukrains'ka khata* (Kiev, 1909–1914, complete original set and microfilm); *Iliustrovana Ukraina* (L'viv, 1913–1914); *Tryzub* (Paris, 1925–1940); *Rozbudova natsii* (Prague, 1928–1934); *Tabor* (Warsaw, 1924–1939); and substantial runs of the following calendars: *Istorychnyi kalendar-al'manakh Chervonoï Kalyny* (L'viv, 1920's–1930's); and *Pros'vita* (Buenos Aires, 1950's–1960's).

The manuscript collections are not extensive for this “non-immigrant” section. They include the papers of the Association of Ukrainian Political Prisoners (Munich, 1948–1949), the papers of the Ukrainian Veterans Association (Munich, 1947–1967), and the papers of the Hetmanate Association of Germany and Austria (Munich, 1945–1956). The papers of Professor Evhen Ontazky are also invaluable historical primary sources which

record the events during the Ukrainian Liberation Movement.

The Ukrainian Collection is a valuable resource for students of Ukrainian-American studies and is therefore housed in the same building as the Ukrainian-American Collection. Extensive research in the collection has been made possible through our grants-in-aid program. Four Ukrainians have received these grants in order to work on the following topics: "The Structure and Synthesis of the Ukrainian Experience: A Study of the Ukrainian Community in Metropolitan Detroit," "The Concern of Ukrainians in Canada about the Fate of Ukraine, 1914-1923," "Ukrainian Literature in North America, 1894-1974," and "Progressive and Communist Ukrainian Political Thought in the United States and Canada, 1890-1930." In addition to grant recipients, students from various colleges as well as the University of Minnesota and people from local communities have used our material.

CHAPTER 5

**Organizational Differentiation and Persistence
of the Ethnic Community:
Ukrainians in the United States**

Wsevolod W. Isajiw

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the history of the Ukrainian ethnic group in the United States in terms of the concept of organizational community differentiation. The paper will focus on various types of ethnic organizations—the church, parishes, fraternal-beneficial associations, educational, cultural, and others. The aim is not to present the history of these organizations but to characterize them and to relate their establishment and development to the structure and processes in the American society at large.

An assumption made is that organizational differentiation of an ethnic community does not necessarily retard the process of ethnic adaptation to the larger society, nor does it necessarily hasten the dissolution of the ethnic community itself; on the contrary, it may function to adapt the ethnic community to the society at large, while at the same time acting to perpetuate it from generation to generation.

Until very recently, studies on the assimilation of immigrants have assumed that when individuals assimilate ethnic boundaries disappear. That is, the dissolution of an ethnic community has been perceived as a process by which individuals shed the cultural and value patterns of their fathers, acquire the patterns predominant in society at large, come to be equally accepted into the structures of society, and thus acquire a general societal identity. Disappearance of the ethnic community has been quite often predicated on assimilation of individuals, and inversely, persistence of the ethnic community has been assumed to result, for whatever reason, from individuals' failure to assimilate.¹

¹See Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York, 1964); Norbert F. Wiley, "The Ethnic Mobility Trap and Stratification Theory," *Social Problems*,

Less often, persistence of ethnicity from generation to generation is seen as a question of ethnic organizations and associations themselves, as a question of their relationship to society at large and to each other. One problem in this regard is the concept of assimilation itself, which refers to a phenomenon involving individuals rather than the community. It is individuals who assimilate or remain unassimilated. Communities as such do not assimilate. They rather become disorganized or reorganized.

An organized ethnic community is one whose associations show a viable membership and one which is able to differentiate its associations or activities in associations in such a manner as to embrace the variations in interests and values of all those segments of the community which retain an identity with it. Viable membership exists when members of the association have some vested value-interest in the goals and norms of the association.

On the other hand, an ethnic community becomes disorganized when its membership loses viability and/or its associations fail to articulate the interests and values of large proportions of the community. From the point of view of the persistence of ethnic community from one generation to another, the latter situation takes place when the community's existing associations do not articulate the interests and values of new generations.

A community becomes reorganized when it develops new associations which articulate the interests and values of those segments of the community whose interests and values have not been represented in the old associations.

Assimilation of individuals and the disorganization-reorganization of the ethnic community are, of course, interrelated, but they do not depend exclusively upon each other. On the contrary, both depend also quite directly on the structure and processes in the society at large. Our interest here lies in the variety of types of associations within the Ukrainian ethnic community from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. The assumption made here is that the existence or emergence of various types of ethnic

XV (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1967), pp. 147-159; and John Porter, "Ethnic Pluralism in Canadian Perspective," in *Ethnicity, Theory and Experience*, ed. Nathan Glazer et al. (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), pp. 267-304.

associations is dependent as much on factors exogenous to the ethnic community as on endogenous ones. That is, we want to look at ethnic associations as community structures which have been established and persist as a response to the nonethnic environment, i.e., as a response to the structure and culture of the society at large. Thus, we attempt to understand the differentiation of the Ukrainian community in the United States in terms of both endogenous and exogenous factors. It is in this sense that the history of the Ukrainian community is also part of the history of the general American society.

There are, however, two sets of exogenous factors that have to be taken into account in order to understand the differentiation of the Ukrainian ethnic community. These are factors related to the structure of the general society in North America and factors related to the structure of the general society in the Ukraine, more specifically in the western Ukraine at the time of the large waves of immigration to the United States. Many Ukrainian associations had been created in the Ukraine in the context of specific conflicts there, and then recreated in the United States after immigration. Their persistence here is not simply a leftover; it also conforms with certain structural aspects to the general society.

The history of Ukrainian immigration into the United States has been divided by some authors into four periods; 1877–1899, 1900–1914, 1920–1939, and 1947–1955. These periods are based on the waves of immigrants, the largest wave coming before World War I and the second largest after World War II.

From the point of view of the emergence and development of Ukrainian organizations, one can perhaps divide more meaningfully the history into two distinct periods: pre-World War II and post-World War II. My interest here is in the type and character of organizations which have developed in the two periods.

The organizations of the Ukrainian immigrants of the first period were mainly of two types: church-related organizations and fraternal-mutual benefit organizations. There were also several organizations of a third type, political-ideological, especially those with a left-wing radical orientation. They, however, did not involve any large segment of population, and their activities, although relevant to the study of the history of the

Ukrainian immigration, never succeeded in producing a lasting influence on the entire Ukrainian community.

The church and its organizations were the main corporate bodies which determined the character of the early Ukrainian community. In one sense, the establishment of churches represented a transplantation of the institution which was at the basis of the collective life in the Ukrainian village for hundreds of years. Clergymen were brought over from the Ukraine and the Byzantine rite was practiced. The church again became the center of community activities. Yet, from the very beginning processes developed within the religious and church life of the community which revealed the influence of the new environment and which, with time, changed the nature of community life almost completely. These processes were primarily those of community conflict and of incipient social mobility and they ultimately brought about organizational differentiation. Both community conflict and mobility in this case can be said to have been evoked by a combination of factors exogenous to, yet impinging upon, the ethnic community, and hence the ensuing organizational differentiation and development can be seen as the community's response to them.

The conflict which ensued among the early Ukrainian immigrants proceeded along two lines of social structure. First, there was a conflict between segments of the Ukrainian people who were not integrated into one community even before immigration to the United States. Secondly, conflict emerged within the church structure itself, in particular, the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

With regard to the problem of segmentation, some sociologists have pointed out that for many ethnic groups the immigrant experience has produced a heightened awareness of their common ethnicity. It has meant a reduction of localized attachments especially prevalent among the rural people of the old country, and a development of a common, ethnic ideology. For the early Ukrainian immigrants, this does not seem to have been the case. The major segments of the population, the Galicians and the Carpatho-Ruthenians, who in the Ukraine were geographically and to some extent culturally separate, clashed when they came into contact in the United States. The conflict manifested itself in

ideological terms deriving from political movements in the Ukraine, in particular the independentist and the Russophile movements. It should be remembered that the degree of national awareness among many peasants in the Ukraine at that time was still relatively low, and regional loyalties exerted a competing, if not a stronger influence.

In the sociological sense of the word, the Carpatho-Ruthenians were a minority in their old country in relation to the Hungarians and even the Slovaks. The same thing, of course, can be said of the Galicians vis-à-vis the Austrians and the Poles. However, for the Carpatho-Ruthenians to join together organizationally with the Galicians meant becoming a sociological minority again. Within the structure of American society there was no need for this. On the contrary, American society with its emphasis on organizational voluntarism was much more conducive to independent organizational developments, especially with respect to minority-majority relationships.

The conflict between the two segments of the Ukrainian immigrant population, however, took place in the arena of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. There it became intertwined with the dissention within the church itself, which derived from other bases and influences. The strife between the Carpathians and the Galicians in the church was from the very beginning fashioned by competition among parishes and clergy. Thus, the majority of the first parishes were organized by the Carpathians, as were the majority of early clergy. Also, theirs were the more well-to-do parishes compared with those organized by the Galicians.² Matters came to a head when both sets of parishes were included in one diocese under a Galician bishop. This conflict was in fact resolved by organizational differentiation, that is, the creation of two independent dioceses.

The church as a transplanted organization has come under the influences of forces deriving from the structure of the American society. There were at least four sets of exogenous factors which from the very start have modified the structure of the church organization as compared with its structure in the old country.

²Stephen William Mamchur, *Nationalism, Religion, and the Problem of Assimilation Among the Ukrainians in the United States* (Ph.D dissertation; Yale University, 1942), p. 46.

The first set of factors concerns the fact that in the United States the church became completely dependent upon the support of the parishioners. This included parishioners' investment in the church land, church buildings, church implements, and other church property. This provided a condition for an emergence of various church committees in which members of the parish could, unlike in the homeland, acquire at least some, and, in many cases, much control over parish policies. Secondly, the income of the parish clergy was dependent on the parishioners. Until 1924 parishioners had the power to fire the pastor. Again this is an arrangement which had been common to many American non-Catholic churches, but it has to be understood in terms of the social structure in the old country, where the clergy comprised a social class unto itself, or indeed a caste, while the peasant church member was clearly assigned an inferior status.

The third type of exogenous factors has to do with the relationship of the Latin-Rite Catholic Church to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The Latin Church in America has itself had a minority, and it was under pressure from the Latin Church that at that time was quite concerned with the problem of "leakage" of its faithful. For a long time the Latin Church was not predisposed to accept varieties of Catholicism, and it viewed the Ukrainian Catholic Church with suspicion. The strongest suspicion focused upon the married priesthood. In relation to the Latin Church, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was also placed in the position of a minority, and it was under pressure from the Latin Church that it succumbed to ordaining only celibate clergy.³ This drastically changed the pattern in the old country where the village priest was, as a rule, a family man. Among the villagers of the Ukraine, a celibate priest enjoyed less status than a married one.

The fourth set of factors impinging upon the Ukrainian Church was the pattern of competition for membership by means of individual conversion prevalent among the American Protestant religions. By and large, competition for converts was not a problem for the church in the Ukraine. Efforts to Latinize Ukrainians in the western Ukraine took the form of political

³Wasył Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States* (Chicago, 1937), pp. 98–99, 103; Mamchur, *Nationalism*, pp. 56–72.

pressures on the church or the faithful, rather than that of proselytizing the faith. Door-to-door preaching to its faithful by devoted followers of other religions, especially by the various Protestant sects, was something for which the Ukrainian Church was not prepared.

All these factors produced substantial organizational differentiation within the Ukrainian community in the United States. By 1965, out of a predominantly Catholic community, there emerged seven major church categories, each with a variety of units. They are Ukrainian Catholic dioceses (280,000 members), Carpatho-Ruthenian Catholic dioceses (300,000 members), Ukrainian Orthodox churches (135,000), Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Church (102,000), Ukrainians in Russian Orthodox churches (400,000?), Ukrainian Protestants (50,000?), Ukrainians in the Catholic Church of the Latin Rite (50,000?).⁴ This community differentiation, we can say, has worked to adapt the Ukrainians to the American society. Yet, at the same time, it has been a process of community reorganization, rather than disorganization, and it has worked to maintain the ethnic community in the face of new conditions.

For immigrants who came before World War II, unlike those who followed, religious organizations were the main corporate vehicle of expressive activity, including ethnic educational, cultural, and social life. All church units were further differentiated into parochial committees, brotherhoods, sodalities, clubs, and so forth. As time went on, these organizations brought together individuals of various degrees of assimilation into American culture and society. Hence their activities reveal an interesting combination of retained Ukrainian traditional customs or cultural patterns and American forms of behavior. These local parishes created marginal subcultures. Many of them are, by now, extinct, yet some can still be studied by anthropological methods.

For both the pre- and the post-World War II Ukrainian immigrants, the churches, through religious services—in particular the Sunday Mass—have provided the place and the time to

⁴*Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovič, vol. II (Toronto, 1971), p. 1104.

initiate and maintain personal interaction among parishoners. Deriving probably from their former patterns of peasant social life and probably typical to all peasant societies, Ukrainians have shared an implicit social value that in order to be genuine, personal interaction should be spontaneous rather than pre-planned. Hence, a common pattern among Ukrainians has been to attend the Sunday Mass or other services, so that one could, as it were, accidentally meet one's friends and only then plan or engage in common activities. This has been a significant function which the churches have provided for the ethnic community and in turn, this has worked like "cement" for the churches themselves. Indeed, one can not adequately understand Ukrainian churches sociologically without taking this function into account.

While the churches and their organizations originally represented a process of transplantation from the old country, the instrumental organizations such as the beneficial-insurance associations were a new type of organization for the Ukrainian community. Although cooperative ventures did take place in the old country, the insurance type of community organization was a product of the American environment and served the purpose of adapting the immigrant to it.⁵ Indeed, until today, these have been the first and the last instrumental, rather than purely expressive, organizations established by the Ukrainian community.

The benevolent associations responded to the Ukrainian workers' needs to strengthen the status of their families and to the workers' goals of saving a portion of their income in order to own a house eventually. Thus, they reflected the incipient social mobility of immigrants, i.e., that aspect of one's status that has to do not with occupational shifts but with accumulation of money and property. We can say that these organizations were instrumental in contributing to the shift in the ethnic status of the Ukrainian community.

The concept of ethnic status refers not only to the actual objective economic, educational, and occupational place that one

⁵See Luka Myshuha, "Ukraïns'kyi Narodnyi Soiuz," in *Pro pamiatna knyha . . . Ukraïns'koho Narodnoho Soiuzu*, ed. Luka Myshuha (Jersey City, N.J., 1936), pp. 193-208.

ethnic group occupies in comparison with another but also to the degree of prestige which a group enjoys in relation to other ethnic groups. The status of the early Ukrainian immigrants, on both counts, was certainly among the lowest if not the lowest in the northern United States. Indeed, Ukrainians could be called the "Niggers" of the coal-mining and steel industry of America in the period of its initial expansion.

The constant problem of how to call Ukrainians—Russians, Rusnaks, Bohunks, Hunkies, Slavish people—reflected their low image among the general population. They literally were nameless people; nobody was sure of their identity, not even they themselves. Occupationally, they had no status or prestige. From the perspective of the American elite, their role, for all practical purposes, was that of working animals. In her significant book on Slavs in America published in 1910, Emily Balch tried to capture the popular image of Ukrainians by describing "Ruthenian shepherd lads" (actually Hutsuls) dressed in their costumes:

Lads like these, piping among their sheep, beside a brook or dancing with their sweethearts on the grass, seem to us absolutely Arcadian. On our streets speaking broken and vulgarized English, dressed in ill-fitting, ready-made clothes, bewildered by their strange surroundings, they are too apt to seem to us "stolid," "low," "mere animals."⁶

Quoting a study of the Slavic mine workers, Balch pointed out that even after he became a skilled miner, the Slav worker was still un-American in his ways; he had fewer wants, a lower cost of living, a lower price for his labor, and above all had that characteristic indifference to difficult conditions of work which had made him a useful laborer.⁷

The ethnic status of Ukrainians changed slowly. There was little career mobility for the first generation. The second generation, however, seems to have experienced a substantial degree of intergenerational mobility. Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies to document this. The only data that may be indicative are the Canadian censuses which give statistics on occupational

⁶Emily Green Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens* (New York, 1910), p. 128.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 298; Jerome Davis, *The Russians and Ruthenians in America, Bolsheviks or Brothers* (New York, 1922), pp. 106–107.

distribution of the population by ethnicity. It shows that changes in the occupational distribution of Ukrainians from decade to decade have been significant, although not as substantial as those of the Poles or the Russians.⁸

The benevolent organizations, more than any others, articulated the process of change in the ethnic status of the Ukrainian group. By 1967 there were nine major mutual benefit associations in the United States which were either Ukrainian or included Ukrainian membership: The Ukrainian National Association, Providence Association of Ukrainian Catholics, Greek Catholic Union, Ukrainian Workingmen's Association, Russian Brotherhood Organizations, Ukrainian National Aid, Russian Orthodox Catholic Aid Association, Russian Independent Mutual Aid Association, and Russian Orthodox Catholic Women's Mutual Aid Society. All were founded between 1892 and 1931. By 1962, their membership ranged between more than 1,000 to in excess of 85,000 persons, and their assets, from over \$600,000 to over \$33 million.⁹ In addition, in various periods many local organizations were established, such as credit unions and savings and loan associations, many of which were connected with parishes and churches.

All these organizations performed a double function. On the one hand, they increased the immigrant's economic security. In this way they acted as agencies of adaptation to society at large. On the other hand, they had a fraternal character. They were not just insurance companies or banks. They also had an expressive aspect. All were committed to group maintenance by supporting cultural and community activities.

Such organizations, in particular, gave rise to a new ethnic elite. These were people, who because of their activities in the organizations, acquired prominence in the ethnic community and also became, as it were, speakers for the community to the outside society. Through them the community gained some visibility in the general society. However, the members of this elite

⁸See Wsevolod W. Isajiw and Norbert J. Hartmann, "Changes in the Occupational Structure of Ukrainians in Canada," in *Social and Cultural Change in Canada*, vol. I, ed. W.E. Mann (Toronto, 1970), pp. 96-112.

⁹*Ukraine*, p. 1124.

remained preeminently marginal persons. Two types of this marginality can be observed. On the one hand, there were persons for whom participation in organizations meant a certain degree of prestige mobility within the ethnic community boundaries. For most of these persons the associations were after-hour or part-time work, although their regular employment was not of high status. They showed various degrees of cultural assimilation; a good number of them were of the second generation. On the other hand, there were people in higher positions within these associations who gained a certain and even considerable degree of occupational mobility and structural assimilation into society at large—persons in such occupations as law, business, and the like—who in many ways have still retained disparate Ukrainian values and cultural patterns. Thus, community differentiation along primarily instrumental and secondarily expressive lines has brought to the fore a significant number of persons making up the ethnic elite. In spite of their assimilation, these elites and their organizations function to maintain the Ukrainian community across generations.

The postwar immigration introduced a completely different set of organizations into the Ukrainian-American community. In general, there has been little mixing of membership in the organizations of the prewar and postwar immigrants. The new immigrants have become members of the already established parishes and the benevolent-fraternal and other instrumental organizations. However, in special-interest associations, such as parish brotherhoods and clubs, the membership has remained largely segregated. Similarly, few of the old immigrants joined associations established by the new immigrants.

Almost all the organizations of new immigrants, except for a few "self-help" cooperatives, are of an expressive nature. The new immigrant community has established virtually no instrumental organizations. Those organizations which potentially could be instrumental, such as the professional associations (Association of Ukrainian University Professors and the associations of Ukrainian physicians and engineers), have not developed such activities to any considerable degree but rather tend to engage in cultural and social programs. Unlike in the old immigrant community of the early period, most of the organiza-

tions of the new immigrants are not church related. They have been either of an independent character or else attached to one or another political faction within the community.

Furthermore, until today, most of the organizations of the new immigrants are transplants either from the old country or from the years of transition in Western Europe, especially Germany. The typical pattern has been the transplantation of the old country organizations to the displaced persons camps in Germany, the formation of branches or satellites of these organizations, then the transplantation of all these organizations to the United States and formation of more branches or subbranches. There has been a resistance, often very strong, to the formation of completely new organizations. One could perhaps debate to what extent the professional associations established by the new immigrants, such as the association of lawyers, engineers, physicians, are new; in any case, new organizations as the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute remain unique.

To understand the nature of the organizational differentiation of the postwar Ukrainian immigration, one has first to look at the external factors to which these organizations have been a response at the time of their original formation. The basic difference between the "old" and the "new" Ukrainian immigrants is not simply that the latter were better educated than the former but that the new immigration was made up of people who had gone through the influence and effects of large-scale ideological movements which developed in the Ukraine between the two wars. Regardless of whether specific individuals took an active part in these movements or not, in one way or another the entire population by the end of World War II bore the influence of ideological movements and ideological conflict.

A good number of the organizations established in the United States by the postwar immigration had their origin in the nationalist movement in the Ukraine. It is not appropriate to go into any detailed characterization of that movement. Two observations, however, are relevant. First, the nationalist movement, like any ideological movement, had accepted, applied, and propounded the principle of holism. It strove to subordinate all organized activities to one goal, that of national liberation and independence, and all other goals and activities had to be

legitimized in its terms.¹⁰ This had a double consequence for organizational structures. On the one hand, it created the branching pattern of organizational differentiation by which new organizations would become satellites of older, more general, organizations. On the other hand, it produced a splintering pattern of organizational differentiation whereby a difference of means to achieve the goal would come to be defined as illegitimate and provide ground for establishment of alternative but parallel organizations.

The dynamics of the movement can be seen as a response to the political, social, cultural, and economic disadvantages in which Galician Ukrainians found themselves after World War I. The general educational level of the Ukrainian population had risen. An increased percentage of persons were secondary school- and university-educated and literacy rose in the peasant population. More than ever before, the peasant youth was going to towns to obtain some education or technical skills. Yet, the structure of the society and the policies of the Polish government not only made it difficult to obtain work, but especially in the case of better educated people, to obtain work without compromising one's national identity. Sociologically, the nationalist movement was a response to this situation. In the organizations which resulted, the movement brought together younger intelligentsia—persons qualified for professional work—and peasants. Since the Polish dominated structure of society was inaccessible, involvement in these organizations represented prestige mobility. These organizations thus gave rise to a new elite—persons with secondary and some university education who have become known in the Ukrainian community for their organizational activities rather than for their occupational work. Indeed, an ethos developed which looked down on devotion solely to one's occupation at the expense of support for group organizational activity. The same persons transplanted many organizations and their satellites to Germany after World War II and then to the United States. The persistence of these organizations in the United States is thus still a result of the momentum created by the political and socio-economic forces in the western Ukraine.

¹⁰Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Mizh istoriie i politykoiu* (New York, 1973), pp. 231 ff.

Other factors generated by the structure of American society itself were also at work. The majority of those immigrants who had professional occupations in the Ukraine after coming to the United States experienced, often substantial, downward occupational mobility. They were able to find mostly lower-class jobs. In a study of postwar Ukrainian immigrants in Philadelphia conducted in 1955, it was found that more than 68 percent of all the immigrants held semi-skilled jobs; more than 4 percent, unskilled jobs; 13 percent, skilled; and only about 5.5 percent, professional; 4.5 percent, managerial; and close to 4 percent clerical.¹¹ The professional and managerial jobs were mostly within Ukrainian ethnic institutions and some small independent business. The small proportion of the unskilled occupations, as compared with the old Ukrainian immigration, reflects the economic changes which have taken place since the turn of the century. Significantly, however, the miners of the old immigration have also become semiskilled within a relatively short period of time.¹² Yet, almost 27 percent of the heads of the households and their marriage partners in the Philadelphia sample had at least some university education (13 or more years) and over 24 percent had at least some secondary education (9 to 12 years). Over 46 percent had some elementary education (1–8 years), and only 2.5 percent had no formal education at all.

Most of the new immigrants did not know English well enough to find employment appropriate to their education or former occupation, and American society had no programs for immigrants to upgrade their former training. The structure, therefore, of the general society itself offered no appropriate opportunities to this type of immigrant. Economic security for most new immigrants meant a reduction of occupational status and of related social prestige.

The maintenance of the old organizational structure can thus be seen as a way in which the declassed group of immigrants was able to uphold some level of social prestige, at least in the eyes of

¹¹ Wsevolod W. Isajiw, *Social Status of Recent Ukrainian Immigrants in Philadelphia: A Study in Assimilation*, Research Report, La Salle College, Philadelphia (Social Science Research Council, 1955), pp. 25–28.

¹² Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, p. 298.

their fellow immigrants. Situations in which two floor sweepers address each other by titles of professor and director have not been simply ethnic jokes, but quite real and common. We can say that these two sets of external factors, those in the Ukraine and those in the United States, complemented each other. In both cases, career mobility into the larger society has been inhibited or blocked, and maintenance of organizations of the same character was the result. Many of them are of course the same organizations and the same members.

Such dynamics of organizational life of the postwar immigrants have had two consequences. First, there is a tendency to make paramount the transmission of Ukrainian culture to future generations. The fear of identity discontinuity between immigrants and their children is probably enhanced by the fact that the immigrants have been declassed. The second pronounced tendency involves personal politics. A strong preoccupation exists with being elected and reelected into various positions in the organizations. Although manifestly the younger generation is urged to join the old organizations, its independent initiatives are feared and discouraged. Indeed, quite often it appears that the goal of many organizational activities is not so much to achieve a pragmatic solution to any specific problem as it is to have the names of the participants included in the ethnic papers so that they may be aggrandized by the community. This perhaps also explains the strongly noninstrumental character of most organizations of the new immigration.

The second set of consequences concerns the question: to what extent do these organizations articulate the values and interests of the gradually assimilating second generation? There are no empirical data at all to answer this question adequately. However, if what many organizational leaders say represents the real state of affairs, the proportion of the younger persons in the older organizations has been gradually declining. Yet several new organizational movements have recently appeared which seem to draw on the second generation. The Moroz committees and the committees in defense of the Soviet political prisoners are only two examples. In the same way as the fraternal-benevolent organizations of the old immigration they attempt to link with society at large and achieve their ethnic goals by means of the

structure of that society. Hence, they are of instrumental character. However, whereas the old instrumental organizations developed more of an economic link with the society, the new organizational movements are trying to develop political links by means of human rights action. Although the goals of these organizations are quite specific, they may be indicative of future trends in the Ukrainian community.

In sum, the history of the Ukrainian community in the United States for the past one hundred years tends to support the assumption that organizational differentiation in and of itself neither contributes to the dissolution of the ethnic boundaries nor necessarily retards the assimilation of individuals. In many respects, organizational differentiation is explainable in terms of the structure and processes in the larger society as they impinge upon the ethnic community. Organizational differentiation may function to adapt the ethnic community to society at large. The adaptive efficacy of community differentiation depends upon the type of organizations which it produces and the segments of the ethnic population which these organizations serve.

Community differentiation of the pre-World War II Ukrainian immigration has produced organizations of both expressive and instrumental character. The values of the organizations of the old immigration have been by and large more general than those of the new immigration and hence they have legitimized a greater variety of goals and functions of the organizational units. This is also the reason why at least in some respects they have been able to include in their membership persons of the new immigration. Many of these persons have worked to revitalize the Ukrainian cultural aspects of the old immigrants' associations.

The values of the organizations established by the new immigration have been much more specialized, focusing on the "purity" of Ukrainian culture, language, and activities; hence, they have largely excluded persons of the old immigration. As a consequence, the organizations of the new immigration have been less adaptive to the general society and to changes within it. While they maintain their ethnic identity, by now they appear to be neglecting the values and interests of the second generation, who are becoming more and more a part of the general society. At one end of the continuum, it is possible for an ethnic community

to persist through its organizations even if individuals assimilate culturally to a high degree. At the other end, it is also possible for the ethnic community to persist even if there are few or possibly no organizations. In the Ukrainian community, however, there appears to be a need for further organizational differentiation, but one along more adaptive lines which could bring together the third generation of the old immigration and the second generation of the new immigration, which would be able to relate to and influence the larger society in a more efficient manner.

Commentary

Richard Renoff

Professor Isajiw's paper is somewhat influenced by the sociology of Emile Durkheim.* According to Durkheim, an increase in the complexity of the division of labor leads to a greater interdependence of society's members. Similarly, Professor Isajiw sees another type of differentiation, organizational differentiation, aiding the adaptation and integration of an ethnic community into the society at large. Thus, it becomes dependent upon the larger society while retaining its own different components. This is a perennial yet sound theoretical orientation and his discussion of voluntary associations does tend to support it. For example, ethnic groups such as the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, and Italians, probably do not possess as many various ethnic churches as do the Ukrainians. Similarly, the many Ukrainian fraternal organizations illustrate how this diversity both contributes to the adaptation of the group to American society and perpetuates its special identity. Still, the question remains: do these numerous organizations differ in function or is there a duplication of functions, or even a conflict in functions?

Professor Isajiw is also correct that institutionally complete communities are unlikely to lose their identity. We do not know how long Ukrainians will maintain their institutional completeness. Yet, like the Cubans and the Hungarians, they have experienced a revival of their culture due to the immigration of refugees. This has provided a "clientele" for ethnic associations, many of which are ideological. Based upon Professor Isajiw's data on the educational background of these immigrants, they probably have the organizational skills to keep these associations viable for a good while.

I agree that we should look to etiological factors outside American society when studying both secular organizations and conflict within the church. Professor Isajiw argues that the priests in America were more dependent upon their parishioners than in

*Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (New York, 1964).

Europe. I submit, however that such factors as the physical and social isolation of country villages from each other due to the lack of good transportation and communications facilities made Old World priests more dependent upon their parishioners than Professor Isajiw suggests. Because of this isolation, the rewards for satisfactory role performance emanated from the village itself rather than from a remote hierarchical superior. Nevertheless, Professor Isajiw is right that this dependence became total in America.

Whether they like it or not, minority groups are very dependent upon and influenced by more powerful groups. This is especially true in America, where most minorities—the Mexican-Americans would be an exception—lack a large ethnic territory where they are heavily concentrated. Professor Isajiw recognizes this principle in the American Latin-Rite Church, where such prelates as John Ireland, ordinary of St. Paul, and James Gibbons of Baltimore opposed church organizations based upon national origins. One reason was that certain minorities, e.g., Germans and Italians, were hostile towards non-English-speaking ethnic groups. Another reason, of course, was that the American Catholic Church was aiming for acceptance within the dominant society, and many of its leaders felt that "Anglo-conformity" would lead to greater acceptance of the church by English-speaking Protestants.

Professor Isajiw's discussion of the social cohesion promoted by the church through the social interaction of its members during and after mass is also Durkheimian. Thus, religion binds this ethnic community more closely together. This is especially characteristic of Ukrainians, whose national identity and religion are so closely intertwined.

I do not agree that the conflict between Galicians and Carpatho-Ruthenians refutes Nathan Glazer's thesis that the American immigrant experience produced a heightened awareness of common ethnicity.** The Carpatho-Ruthenians from the disparate villages and counties of pre-World War I Hungary

**Nathan Glazer, "Ethnic Groups in America: From National Culture to Ideology," in *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*, ed. Morroe Berger (New York, 1954), pp. 158-173.

(present-day Eastern Slovakia and Transcarpathia) did develop a common identity in America, that of being Carpatho-Ruthenian (Carpatho-Rusyn), whereas previously they had only a very local identification with their village or county. Although most Carpatho-Ruthenians did not take on an identification with Ukrainians, there was a growing identification beyond their local villages or counties. They became Carpatho-Ruthenians, or in some instances "Carpatho-Russians," not men or women from Spiš, Šariš, Zemplín, or Bereg counties.

Professor Isajiw's own research on the occupational distribution and educational background of Ukrainians in Philadelphia is interesting in light of some pre-World War II (1937) occupational data for Connecticut reported by the late Samuel Koenig.^{***} Although Koenig's approach was very different from Isajiw's, he also found Ukrainians extremely underrepresented in professional and commercial occupations relative to other groups. Isajiw, however, also notes the high educational attainment of post-World War II Ukrainian immigrants. We might say, borrowing the concepts of Max Weber, that the recent Ukrainian émigrés are high in status but low in economic class.

With regard to empirical research, we need studies not only of intergenerational mobility, but also of intragenerational mobility. I am curious whether the post-World War II immigrants have continued in low-status occupations throughout their lives. Let us hope that the United States Census Bureau introduces questions concerning ethnic identity and descent that will be more useful and comprehensive than those used in the past. Only scanty information has been provided by past enumerations on ethnic groups which lack an independent political state in the Old World, for example, Croats, Slovaks, and Ukrainians.

Professor Isajiw mentions certain functions of immigrant mutual aid societies—such as economic security, mediation between the ethnic community and the larger American society. Without contradicting these functions, I would suggest an additional latent function, which occurred to me from his data on the downward mobility of the members of these organizations

^{***}Samuel Koenig, "Ethnic Factors in the Economic Life of Urban Connecticut," *American Sociological Review*, VII (Washington, D.C., 1943), pp. 193–197.

relative to the status these people had in Europe. These organizations not only provide the status lacking in the greater society, but, quite possibly, they also *retard* upward mobility by insulating the members from the status-striving which is present in the larger society. In other words, since these people have a high status within the organization, they are less likely to seek upward mobility in the larger American society. Thus, it is possible that these organizations have promoted both upward mobility, as in the early immigration of peasants, and downward mobility. Thus, in addition to organizational factors, mobility could depend upon both the educational, occupational, and other resources the group brought to America as well as the opportunities for mobility in the host society at the time of the group's arrival. Empirical research is needed on this issue also.

As C. Wright Mills noted some years ago, most American sociologists concentrate on narrow hypotheses in their testing.**** Professor Isajiw cannot be accused of this type of myopia. When examining conflict and change within an ethnic community, he neglects neither the larger American society nor the Old World influences. His use of the "ideal types," expressive and instrumental voluntary associations, will stimulate many more hypotheses than I have time to comment on.

****C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York, 1959), pp. 50-75.

Discussion

ISAJIW: With regard to the Durkheimian model, actually I hadn't thought of my analysis in those terms, but, now that Professor Renoff has mentioned it, I think he is right. My analysis would fit that model.

Professor Renoff asks whether these organizations duplicate functions. This is a very important question, which I haven't touched because it would take too much time to discuss it adequately. It is true that many of them do duplicate functions. Organizations are complex. We must look at both structure and functions. Many of them have different structures which may duplicate functions, but the difference in structure is significant. Very often the difference in structure itself may mean that some people would choose or refuse to belong, whether or not young people may want to join.

The dependence of priest on their parishioners in the Old World villages is a point well taken. The only thing that I would mention is that perhaps the dependence was somewhat different. It is true that there was social dependence, a cohesiveness between the isolated villagers and their pastor. But there was also economic dependence in many ways; the villages would often supply the clergyman's family with meat, poultry, and other foods. Nevertheless, it was not as radical an economic dependence as that of the priest (as Professor Renoff has indicated) in the United States.

I will not go into the Glazer thesis. It is a good point to argue. When I was writing, I thought that the history of the Subcarpathians refutes the Glazer thesis, but, to really prove this, one would have to thresh out the question of localism versus a more universal unit, and which unit is local and which is more universal. Is it just simply village loyalty or is it regional loyalty? Where does *local* start? Where does *universal* start? What are the differences perceived between village, region, and nation?

With regard to the additional functions of the post-World War II organization, by which they retard mobility into the larger society, I quite agree with Renoff. Norbert Wiley has a thesis of branching-out trees and claims that all ethnic organizations of any type, economic or whatever, retard mobility into the larger

society.* That is, instead of moving the person up the trunk of the tree, they move him into the branches. Some branches may be higher than others, but they are just branches out of the total main trunk—society. This is a radical view, and I do not subscribe to it, but such ethnic organizations certainly do retard upward mobility to some extent.

UNIDENTIFIED: Professor Renoff tried to make the point that priests in the old country were overdependent on their parishioners because of the lack of transportation, isolation of the villages and other factors. And Professor Isajiw tried to modify that point, saying that priests in the old country were well supplied by their parishioners with meat, poultry, and agricultural products. But this was not the situation. Priests in the old country were farmers themselves. Each parish had a substantial amount of agricultural land. As a matter of fact, the priest was one of the well-to-do farmers of the village. He served as the center not only of cultural and religious but also of economic activities. Priests and their families actually provided the so-called intelligentsia, from which cultural, national, and other identities of Ukrainians grew.

RENOFF: Yes, I would concur with the questioner. Perhaps, the word that Professor Isajiw and I should have used was "mutual interdependence." Nevertheless during that earlier period—the period before that which Professor Isajiw treated—the priests of Galicia and Transcarpathia were common laborers and worked at regular farming jobs and only recited the liturgy on the Sabbath. Only later did they become more well-to-do. They were economically dependent upon their parishioners. Their parishioners were also economically dependent upon them, so it was a mutual exchange, a mutual interdependence.

KUROPAS: Professor Renoff has correctly pointed out that the Bureau of Census has not tried to obtain the kind of data that are needed for studying ethnic groups in sociology. But I think the Bureau of Census now has the right ethnic advisor on this, Michael Novak. Because of this, more reliable census data will be obtained in 1980.

*Norbert F. Wiley, "The Ethnic Mobility Trap and Stratification Theory," *Social Problems*, XV, 2 (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1967), pp. 147–159.

PETRYSHYN: The dichotomy between the instrumental and the expressive is a very important one. This raises the problem of structure and function. Structural-functional analysis has a number of inherent inadequacies, and I think that this type of analysis is less productive than structural analysis alone. For example, Professor Isajiw's presentation implied that an ethnic group continues on *ad infinitum*. Where it originates is difficult to point out; where it finishes is impossible to predict. I think that is a consequence of the method used in the analysis. It is also difficult to imply cause or origin. It is difficult to supply an explanation for what has happened in the past or a prediction for what will happen in the future. For example, the Cossacks certainly did not exist as an ethnic group and did not have a Ukrainian Cossack ethnic identity. One has to explain why this is so. The Cornish national movement in Britain has not taken on a national form. One must provide a reason why this is so. On the other hand, you have the formation of a Scottish ethnic group or Scottish identity.

I think that the instrumental portion of structural-functional analysis is very useful. It enabled Professor Isajiw to make a number of enlightening statements about it, but, on the other hand, it led him to overemphasize the expressive aspects of the third generation with regard to the recent immigration to the United States and to assume that the expressive component of the third generation is the only factor that functions in it. I, however, would argue structurally for every expressive element in the third generation. There are structural components that make the declassed nature of the younger of the postwar immigration a real social condition. The language tendency of the third generation forces them into cooperative relations. This is a "real" social condition.

The politics of the Ukrainian community in the postwar immigration—which one could say has a purely expressive function—also have a "real" function. It is "real" politics in the sense that it has a "real" impact on the politics of the Ukrainian SSR. The youth organizations created by the postwar emigration also have a real function in terms of the socialization of young people, providing them with a bilingual and a bicultural experience. I am trying to point out that the form of our methodology

can cause us to draw false conclusions about the nature of the subject we are studying, and in this case I would suggest that Professor Isajiw is wrong in concluding that the postwar immigration and its organizations have no structural purpose.

ISAJIW: I think you have confused the two concepts, the structural and the instrumental. I do not identify these two at all. Like the instrumental ones, all expressive organizations and expressive activities have structures. I never said that the expressive organizations have no structural features. I was merely contrasting the expressive and instrumental organizations. Actually, that distinction itself does not necessarily depend upon the structural-functional methodology. I think that one can make these distinctions without structural-functional analysis.

It is true that I have performed structural-functional analysis in my paper because I think that it is the analysis which is appropriate: it sheds light on what is going on, what these organizations do, how they work, how they persist. I believe in using that analysis which is most appropriate, not that analysis which is currently most fashionable. In fact, you will see that when the harshest critics of the structural-functional analysis (among them the neo-Marxists) explain actual social phenomena they do in fact use structural-functional analyses.

I disagree with your claim that we do not get at causes. We do. I tried to get at sets of causes, the exogenous and endogenous causes. The endogenous derive from within the community; the exogenous derive from the relationship between the community and the structure of the larger society. I considered these as actual causes, and they can be causes of origin. I do not believe that there is a single cause that explains everything. There are always a combination of causes at work, and I certainly would not say that the sociological causes that I have singled out are the only ones that explain the nationalist movement among the new immigration. What I am saying is that these are important sociological factors which have to be taken into account when talking about the nationalist movement and which often have not in fact been considered. I do not know why you claim that the structural-functionalist analysis makes this impossible. It makes it quite possible, and one can make predictions because of that.

In terms of real conditions and instrumental organizations, I think what you meant was the extent to which the expressive organizations of the post-World War II immigration influence the situation in the Ukraine today. What I meant by instrumental is that they are not adaptive to society at large in the United States. I would further argue that most of them are not even instrumental in the sense of influencing the situation in the Ukraine. In fact, many of the expressive organizations, although they are oriented toward changing the situation in the Ukraine, are very often completely ineffective precisely because they are not politically instrumental. They remain expressive. And in order to be politically instrumental, one has to develop this relationship to society at large. Some of the newer, younger organizations of the second generation of the post-World War II immigration that I have mentioned have been trying to develop just such an instrumental activity, which has been deficient in the older organizations. That is where it will make a difference as far as the impact on the Ukraine is concerned.

KORCHINSKY: Professor Isajiw emphasized the second, the post-World War II immigration. The newer organizations did not integrate with the so-called older Ukrainian organizations, and he expressed the hope that perhaps the new immigrants and the old immigration will find some common form. While this statement reflects the conditions in our larger communities—Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia—we should also be aware that there are exceptions to the general trend.

Pittsburgh and vicinity had a large first Ukrainian immigration, attracted to the steel mills and mines of Pennsylvania. In this area the new immigration found itself in the minority and was thus forced to integrate itself into the existing organizations. They resisted their otherwise first impulse to form their own “pure Ukrainian” organizations and instead integrated with the old immigration. A further look at what happened in Pittsburgh might be very helpful to see whether we could not transplant that experience to other Ukrainian-American communities.

CHAPTER 6

A Century of Ukrainian Religious Experience in the United States

Vasyl Markus

Commenting on the forced emigration of Zaporozhian Cossacks from their homeland in 1775, the great Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, wrote:

Wandering days and nights, the Zaporozhians,
Upon leaving the Great Meadow and Mother Sich,
Took along the icon of the Divine Mother;
Nothing else did they take with them.¹

This description is in part also applicable to emigrants from the Ukraine who began to arrive in the United States a century ago. The culture and folk traditions they brought with them were deeply permeated with religious values.

The national consciousness and the ethnic identification of most Ukrainians before World War I was blurred by several factors: the conservatism of their leaders, still predominantly clergy; the political systems of their homeland; and the new cultural orientations sometimes influenced by external sources. The ideals of the nineteenth-century national revival touched only marginal segments of this traditional society. Rather, religion and church affiliation, not conflicting concepts of modern nationalism, became the symbols of self-identification for the Ukrainian masses.

This characterization was especially true for Ukrainian regions in the Austro-Hungarian empire. There, the term *Greek Catholic* or *Uniate* was the practical designation for people known presently under the name of Ukrainians. Similarly, the "Ruthenian" Church or Rite were accepted qualifications for the religious organization of Ukrainians. No other label better conveys the

¹Taras Shevchenko, "Irzhavets," *Kobzar* (Kiev, 1958), p. 320.

intimate relationship between nationality and religion in the homeland, as well as in the New World, among early Ukrainian immigrants than that of *rus'ka vira* ("The Ruthenian faith").

Religion and the national church had been the central sociocultural institutions among Ukrainian people until the end of the nineteenth century. Especially in the case of the western Ukraine there was only one church for Ukrainians or Ruthenians. This was the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, united with Rome and popularly called the Uniate or the Greek Catholic Church.

It is not surprising that the first social concerns of the Ruthenian immigrants of the 1870's and 1880's in the Pennsylvania coal regions and other industrial centers were for their religious and spiritual needs. In the homeland, the church accompanied the life of the Ukrainian peasant from the cradle to the grave. His familial, social, and cultural life was unthinkable without the presence of church and priest.

The thousands of early immigrants who arrived here in a more or less chaotic and unplanned process missed the socioreligious context of the old country. Pious by nature and tradition, these people badly needed amidst their harsh life and work conditions a catalyst for their aspirations and an articulator for their spiritual desires. Other religious bodies, including Roman Catholic churches with priests of Polish, Czech, or Slovak origins (who arrived here somewhat earlier than the Ukrainian priests), could hardly satisfy the homesick and community-longing peasants from Galicia or the Carpathian region. Some of these immigrants already brought their wives with them while others established families in the new land, thus laying ground for an organized community. Yet the priest, the church, and the parish, the only social organizations and organizers with which the peasants were familiar, were lacking. Some immigrants might occasionally attend Latin Rite churches, sharply aware that these were not their own but Polish, Italian, Irish, or Hungarian churches. Different rite, customs, and language served only to arouse their nostalgia for a church of their own, with familiar rituals practiced back in their homeland. Oscar Handlin aptly described the state of mind applicable to all immigrants, and specifically to East Europeans:

At home worship had brought to the worshipper a pleasure that was aesthetic in nature. If in the new land he had the occasion, which he had rarely had in the old, to talk about the quality of that satisfaction, the peasant put the words of his description around specific impressions of the service. But such descriptions he knew were inadequate; for beyond the beauty that adhered to these things in their own right was a beauty of essence that grew out of their relationship to his own experience as a human being. Lacking the habit of introspection, the peasant could not set words to that satisfaction. He could only feel the lack of it.²

This nostalgia was expressed even more pathetically in a letter sent by early immigrants from Shenandoah, Pa., who asked the metropolitan of L'viv, Sylvester Sembratovych, to send them a priest:

We are not entirely the same as we were in our country because we are missing something. What we miss is God Whom we could understand, Whom we could adore in our own way.³

The arrival in 1884 of the first Uniate priest from the western Ukraine, Reverend Ivan Volansky, was a turning point in the history of the Ukrainian immigrant community in the United States. In the best tradition of the Ukrainian clergy's activism, Volansky immediately founded a parish and started to build a

²Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston, 1951), p. 121. A Ukrainian historian of the immigration expressed the same idea in more vivid terms: "Nothing has penetrated nor filled the spiritual life of the Ukrainian peasant-immigrant so thoroughly as did the church and the church rite. Back in his village the church and the rite had become part of him. They became his ethical roadsigns, the guidelines of a pious life here on earth which, as he was taught, led to salvation and rewards after death. . . . There [in the church] his life found spiritual food. There he found and even expressed his own aesthetic feelings, amidst all the light, paintings, and glistening clothes of God's servants with their serious, unusual movements of hands and bodies and their incense, bells, and singing. This was such unusual beauty, and he was enraptured by it. In such a state he came to America. And as soon as he found what he came there for—work and money—the first thing he started to look for and began to think about was the church in the way he knew it in his native village. So he began to build them." Iulian Bachyns'kyi, *Ukrains'ka immigratsiia u Z'iedynenykh Derzhavakh Ameryky* (L'viv, 1914), p. 256.

³Cited in *Propamiatna knyha . . . Ukrain's'koho Narodnoho Souzu*, edited by Luka Myshuha (Jersey City, N.J., 1976), p. 34.

church in Shenandoah, followed soon by some seven or eight parishes in other localities. He also started fraternal societies, organized consumer cooperatives, launched the first Ukrainian newspaper in the United States in 1886, and invited other priests from the homeland, along with the first university-educated Ukrainian secular leader, Volodymyr Simenovych, to join him in America. Volansky was the only Catholic priest in that region, who together with his church brotherhood organization, became a member of the Knights of Labor and was actively involved in the miners' union activities.

Since he was a married priest, Volansky from the very beginning came into conflict with the Roman Catholic hierarchy which objected not only to his family status but also to his independent activities. After many complaints to Rome and to the metropolitan in L'viv, this imaginative and dynamic popular leader had to leave the United States. However, during his short residence of five years, Volansky had laid down the foundations for the future of the Ukrainian or Ruthenian Church in this country. These foundations have also extended to the civic and cultural life of the Ukrainian community in America.⁴

The presence of Ukrainian married priests was viewed as a "public scandal" by Latin-Rite bishops and priests. They pressured Rome to recall those married priests who already had arrived here and to prohibit others to come. The Roman Curia decreed such policy as early as 1890, along with instructions aimed at the integration of the Eastern-Rite Catholics into the local Latin-Rite churches. The Metropolitan of L'viv and other Ukrainian bishops were directed by Rome not to send married clergy to the United States. No other ruling of the Roman Curia was less respected by all interested parties. And no other measure by Rome regarding the Ukrainian church caused as much harm as did the prohibition of a married clergy in the Eastern-Rite Church.

At the end of the last century, the increased immigration and intensive communication with the homeland stimulated an inter-

⁴Reverend Volansky's contribution to the Ukrainian immigrant community in the United States deserves a special monograph. All that exists is a modest article by Wasył Lencyk, "Otets' Ivan Volians'kyi," *Dzvony*, no. 1 (Rome, 1978), pp. 34-38.

est about immigrants among young intelligentsia in the Ukraine. In particular, a group of young seminarians in L'viv (eight or nine of them who called themselves the *Amerykans'kyi kruzhok*—the American Circle) became enthusiastic about work in the United States and, deciding to remain celibate, they reached this country as young priests without much difficulty. Theirs was a planned effort of young idealists, motivated more by Ukrainian national and social activism than by purely religious ideals ("to extend a helpful hand to the needy compatriots"). The group, together with other patriotic clergy, known as *popyky-radyhaly* (radical priests),⁵ continued the work of Reverend Volansky, combining pastoral duties with civic and national-political activism.

By the mid-1890's, there were over thirty Uniate priests in America, most of them from the Carpatho-Ukrainian region in Hungary. Only a minority was inspired by the idea of a Ukrainian national consciousness that was emerging among radical priests from Galicia. The other type of Uniate priest in America was a conservatively minded, more church- than community-oriented cleric, politically either Russophile or Magyarophile. These priests also lacked the populist attitude of the Ukrainian nationalist group. A conflict soon developed between these factions, and this extended to lay followers as well. On one hand, this conflict stimulated considerably the religious and civic life of Ukrainian Americans, but, on the other hand, it polarized the ethnoreligious community to the point of serious internal clashes and rifts. It resulted in an erosion of the hitherto integral community.

The history of Ukrainian Americans is to a great extent a constant struggle for self-assertion and for identity, including that in the religious domain. The very first objective of both the Ukrainian leadership (initially mostly priests) and the immigrant masses was to organize themselves along religious ethnic lines as a separate community. This was necessary, because other groups, such as Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Russians, were claiming the allegiance of Ukrainians. With the exception of the Russian group, not many Ukrainian immigrants joined other ethnic communities. Their religion provided them with a satisfactory

⁵The activity of these priests is well presented in Bachyns'kyi, *Ukrains'ka immigratsiia*, pp. 292–293.

framework for social interaction and for developing their own group consciousness. Despite differences in dialects and different political experiences, the common name *Rusyny* (Ruthenians) held together Ukrainian immigrants from Austria and Hungary.

The Ukrainians were psychologically united, and working through a common organizational structure, they won their first battle in trying to assert their religious identity. Against many odds, they succeeded in forming a separate ecclesiastic-ritual identity in the United States—the Greek Catholic, or the Ruthenian Church. This was achieved despite hostile attitudes on the part of the majority of the Roman Catholic clergy and hierarchy, the adverse policy of Rome aiming at the integration of Eastern-Rite Catholics into the existing Latin-Rite Church, and a comparatively weak interest on the part of the homeland in the plight of the immigrants.

The new church community was finally accepted on the parish level not only as an ethnic group, but also as a particular entity within the Catholic Church, although in the eyes of many Latin-Rite Catholics it was an alien body which only temporarily would be tolerated. Yet the attitude of the members of this new church organization was different; they preferred to attend their own services, and they looked for their own priests to baptize children or bury their dear ones. They also built their own churches, even if on the same block there already was another Roman Catholic church. Meanwhile, the Roman Curia pressed for their Latinization and ritual assimilation, even though a decree from Rome stated that such a policy should not result in a formal change of rite. Only thanks to the tenacity and organized activism of Ukrainian Americans did this phase of the struggle end with a substantial concession on the part of the Latin-Rite Church to the Uniates, i.e., the acceptance of a separate rite and church body in the United States. An American Latin-Rite author promptly admitted the predicament of Ukrainian Eastern-Rite Catholics when he stated that the Ruthenians “received a very bad reception or none at all from their Latin brethren in the United States.”⁶

⁶Donald Attwater, *The Catholic Eastern Churches* (Milwaukee, 1935), p. 86.

In order that concessions would not become a temporary compromise, the protagonists of a separate Ruthenian Church had to continue their struggle in order to win the second round, which lasted more than fifteen years. This was the battle for a separate jurisdiction, or, in popular terms, for a Ruthenian bishop.

Wherever a Ruthenian parish and church was established, its priest was subordinated to the Latin-Rite diocesan bishop or to his local representatives who exercised a sort of supervisory role over these "second-rank Catholics." Latin-Rite clerics had no knowledge of the ritual diversity of the Catholic Church nor the complex background of the Ruthenian Uniates; moreover, psychologically they were not ready to tolerate such diversity. They strongly felt that ritual pluralism would hamper the process of consolidation of the American Church. Thus, the presence of a Catholic bishop of another rite, following different discipline and functioning on the same territory, could hardly conform to the mental framework of the "Americanizers."

Yet the establishment of a Ruthenian bishopric was a necessity for both Uniate priests and the faithful. They wanted to have an ecclesiastic organization of their own with the highest authority vested in a Ukrainian cleric. The practical exigencies were related to the question of status: a bishop of their own would undoubtedly enhance the low status of the community. Moreover, because of the traditional absence of their own secular rulers, Ruthenians always regarded bishops as their "princes."

The efforts to obtain a Ruthenian bishop started as early as 1890, when the Uniate priests held their first formal convocation, urging the Holy See to appoint a bishop for the existing Ruthenian parishes in the United States. The petition was reiterated in 1894, following the Curia's decree, which somewhat soberly realized that the Ruthenian Rite could not be completely sacrificed to the Latin Rite as urged by American bishops and clergy. In the face of opposition from American Catholic bishops, it was not an opportune time for Rome to make concessions to Ruthenians regarding the issue of separate bishopric.

The Ruthenian clergy and lay organizations became, however, more impatient and vocal in their demands. They were not satisfied with half-solutions, such as the appointment in 1892 of a

spokesman for the Ruthenian clergy before the American episcopate and Apostolic delegate, or the appointment by Rome in 1896 of a vicar general in the person of Monsignor Andrew Hodobay. The agitation for a bishop continued. Meanwhile, the first defections of the clergy and of entire parishes to the Russian Orthodox Church began.⁷

The prospects of the mass defection and the constant ferment within the Uniate community prompted Rome to reassess its position. Lobbying for a bishop had become the primary issue of the entire community which by 1900 numbered more than 200,000. Clergy and lay representatives convened on several occasions to articulate their demands, and in 1901, the Association of Ruthenian Church Communities was established in Harrisburg, Pa. The association was headed by a Pastoral Council (Dukhovna Rada) with Reverend Ivan Konstankevych as its chairman. The Harrisburg meeting produced a resolution calling for separation from Rome if the Ruthenian demands concerning a bishop were not met. The fraternal organizations and the Ukrainian press echoed strongly these demands. This anti-Rome propaganda led to the excommunication of Reverend Ivan Ardan, then editor of the influential newspaper *Svoboda*. The situation induced the young metropolitan of L'viv, Andrew Sheptyts'kyi, to rebuff the anti-Rome agitation among Ruthenians.

Unpleasant as such developments might have been, they were instrumental in bringing about a solution to the problem. The same Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, with his greater prestige in Rome, worked hard to promote the idea of a Ruthenian bishop in the United States. Finally, in 1907, Rome appointed the first Ruthenian-American bishop, Soter Ortynsky, OSBM, who arrived from Europe in the same year and started the administration of his scattered, and in many respects, divided flock. Very

⁷Reverend Alexis Toth (Товт), a Carpatho-Ruthenian priest, was the first to join the Orthodox Church with his entire congregation in Minneapolis after a serious dispute with local Roman Catholic Archbishop John Ireland. The sociological and religious-cultural composition of Toth's parish (St. Mary's) is presented in Alex Simirenko, *Pilgrims, Colonists, and Frontiersmen: An Ethnic Community in Transition* (New York, 1964).

soon Ukrainians realized that their new bishop did not have a jurisdiction of his own. Ortynsky himself wrote in his first pastoral letter: "As you are aware, my priests, I am a bishop without a diocese."⁸

The papal bull, *Ea semper*, actually granted Bishop Ortynsky the position of vicar general to each Latin-Rite ordinary on whose territory Ruthenians lived. This lack of full jurisdiction, or to put it mildly, a "divided jurisdiction," complicated the task of the new bishop in his effort to consolidate and strengthen the religious life of Ruthenians. It also angered extremist quarters both among the clergy and laity which were already distrustful of Rome's intentions. Agitation continued until in 1913 the Holy See issued another bull, *Cum episcopo Graeco-Rutheno*, which conferred normal jurisdiction on Bishop Ortynsky, thus freeing him from dependence on the Latin-Rite hierarchy.⁹

In the meantime, the Ruthenian Church continued to suffer serious losses because of the defection of its parishioners to Russian Orthodoxy. However, the church also went through a series of internal ferments and divisions of which two were crucial: (1) a conflict between the Galician clergy (including the bishop—a Ukrainian from Galicia) and priests from Hungary (Carpatho-Ukraine); and (2) a conflict between the bishop with his clerical supporters and civic secular organizations.

By 1914 the enhanced status of Bishop Ortynsky in addition to a certain compromise he reached with the Carpatho-Ruthenians might have benefited the church. It seemed that even the clerical-lay controversy could have subsided with time. However, the advent of World War I and Ortynsky's untimely death, followed by an interregnum of eight years without a bishop, fatefully changed the history of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Church in the United States. The passing of Ortynsky led to greater demands among Carpatho-Ruthenians for a bishop of their own. In

⁸Cited in Bohdan Procko, "Soter Ortynsky: First Ruthenian Bishop in the United States, 1907–1916," *The Catholic Historical Review*, LVIII, 4 (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 516.

⁹The two *bullae* and other Roman documents pertaining to the juridical status of the Ukrainian-Ruthenian Church in the United States are reproduced in Walter Paska, *Sources of Particular Law for the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1975).

response, Rome appointed two separate administrators, one for Ruthenians from Hungary, another for Ukrainians from Galicia. The division of western Ukrainian territories after World War I between Poland and Czechoslovakia and the resulting different political orientations of the two communities in America hastened Rome's decision in favor of two ecclesiastic jurisdictions. This culminated in 1924 with the nomination of two bishops: Constantine Bohachevsky for Galician Ukrainians (with an exarchal see in Philadelphia), and Basil Takach for Carpatho-Ruthenians (with a seat in Pittsburgh, Pa.). Since that time two separate developments have characterized the history of a church that is of the same rite and composed of ethnically related people.

Without tracing further the religious history of the two communities, I have to state that the Ruthenian-Ukrainians had scored a victory. (True, from the Ukrainian ethnic point of view the partition was considered a major setback.) After having asserted their will to have a separate church and rite acknowledged in America, Ruthenian-Ukrainians gained canonical recognition for a jurisdiction separate from the Latin Rite. In 1959 and 1969 this fact culminated in the erection of two Eastern-Rite ecclesiastic provinces, i.e., two Metropolia.

The growth of the Eastern-Rite churches was accompanied by an evolution in the attitudes of the American Latin hierarchy towards the Uniate "junior" brethren. This was a positive development from the Uniate point of view. American Latin-Rite Catholicism and the Vatican itself passed through a long period of adjustment to reality. Obviously, not all problems were solved for Ukrainian Catholics, and not all threats to their existence vanished.

From the very beginning, Ukrainian Uniates in America, and, to a lesser degree, their kinfolk who joined various Orthodox bodies, were subjected to processes which may be described as a cleavage between tradition and modernity. In the Orthodox group this dichotomy was less pronounced because their very existence depended on the preservation of true Oriental traditions as opposed to the western Latinizing trends.

In this context, tradition signifies the maintenance of the old ways, institutions, rituals, and discipline proper to the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Church. One can single out, in particular, the fol-

lowing elements of such tradition: the pure Oriental rite (as opposed to the western borrowings in the Uniate Church) in church services, a married clergy, observance of holy days according to the Julian calendar, use of the Church-Slavonic language, and, possibly, synodal church rule.

Originally, all these attributes remained intact when the Church of Rus' (the Kiev Metropolia) or its fragments accepted union with Rome. However, western influence steadily increased in the Ruthenian Church. As a result, by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the church was weakened and even on its own territory became a "junior partner" vis-à-vis the Latin-Rite Church. Some changes in favor of integration and assimilation, mainly structural and administrative, were imposed by the centralized rule of the Roman Church. Others were favored and even decreed by secular rulers in the Polish commonwealth and Austrian monarchy. Still some were postulated by segments of the Ruthenian Church itself, i.e., by members of the hierarchy, clergy, monastic orders, and even some segments of secular intelligentsia.

Each of these issues became crucial in the life of the Uniates, and frequently they constituted rallying points in the struggle for survival. Often the call for the "defense of the venerable heritage" could mobilize more people and energy than a single program for the orderly and prosaic organization of religious life in the community.

The struggle against Latinization of the rite and the preservation of eastern traditions were the underlying principles of Ruthenian-Ukrainian religious life throughout the century. Latinization also took other forms than those of external encroachments or imposition of alien rituals and institutional forms. Slowly, Latinization had evolved into a natural process of adaptation by a weaker group to a stronger one, and as a form of assimilation to allegedly higher forms of culture, order, and organization. In particular, those segments of the clergy and laity who were not well acquainted with their own religious heritage succumbed to Latinization. They were anxious to adopt what they considered their neighbor's more respected standards and values. Also, in the eyes of some people, Latinization was mistakenly viewed as "Americanization."

When certain aspects of Latinization of the Eastern-Rite Church (termed incorrectly as modernization of "antiquated" church practices) became dramatized, they were transformed into causes to fight for or against. Implicitly, rite, tradition, and religious self-identity were raised to the level of the most important spiritual and ethnic values worthy of defense and preservation.

The status of the married priesthood in the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Church may well illustrate the above point. Rome prohibited married priests from performing ecclesiastic duties in the new countries of immigration in the Western Hemisphere, both as a result of pressure by the American Latin-Rite hierarchy and as an extension of its own policy of imposing ritual uniformity (celibacy was also urged upon the Ukrainian clergy in Galicia). This prohibition was reiterated several times despite such harmful results as the frequent defection of priests and parishioners to the Orthodox churches. The 1929 curial ruling particularly hurt the Carpatho-Ruthenian exarchate, leading to a powerful opposition among the clergy and laity and finally to the creation of the American Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, presently under the patriarch of Constantinople. The 1929 measure is still in force and has been recently reasserted, even though more than one hundred married priests were admitted to the Philadelphia exarchate after World War II. Rome considers the latter as exceptions, because of the resettlement of displaced persons from Germany and Austria. At present, the Ukrainian Catholic lay movement and also some clergy, both married and celibate, have set themselves in opposition to mandatory celibacy.

The change of calendar, that is, the introduction of the Gregorian calendar for the celebration of holy days in the Ruthenian and Ukrainian Church, aroused a less dramatic reaction on the national level than did the celibacy issue. Certainly, the calendar issue caused problems in a number of parishes. Sometimes it even led to the creation of a new parish, which would follow the "old calendar" or even to a switch of allegiance from the Catholic to the Orthodox, that is, to one which still kept the Julian calendar. Some bishops and priests, despite their preference for the change, showed a flexible and cautious

approach to this sensitive issue. Others acted high-handedly and created difficulties with conservative parishioners. In this respect, Latinization, or adaptation (depending on one's view), made the greatest advance. Practically all parishes of the Pittsburgh Carpatho-Ruthenian province switched after World War II to the Gregorian calendar, and only one-tenth of the Philadelphia Ukrainian Metropolia still follows the old calendar. Yet civic and cultural groups, as well as the press, continue to respect holidays according to the old calendar to which believers in the Ukraine as well as Ukrainian Orthodox communities in America still adhere.

The use of English as a liturgical language instead of Church-Slavonic or Ukrainian vernacular has become another bone of contention. Carpatho-Ruthenians were the first to experiment with the use of English. As early as 1933 at a religious-national congress in Pittsburgh (which, incidentally, advanced strong demands to Rome—church autonomy, synodal rule, married clergy), the use of English was advocated.¹⁰ But it was only in the late 1940's and 1950's that English was actually introduced into the liturgy without much opposition from either the clergy or laity. Actually, the promoters of this reform were American-born priests and laymen. They acted over the objection of the Oriental Congregation, which at that time was headed by Cardinal Eugene Tisserant, who was favorably disposed to the maintenance of the Eastern heritage. In 1955, Rome finally sanctioned the use of English as a liturgical language, provided that Church-Slavonic would not be completely abandoned. However, in practice the latter was relegated to a marginal status.

The post-conciliar movement in favor of the vernacular, the example of the Carpatho-Ruthenians, as well as the demands by some segments of the Ukrainian clergy to replace Church-Slavonic by Ukrainian vernacular, have strengthened efforts of the younger American-born clergy and laity in the Ukrainian eparchies for the introduction of English. Similar initiatives took place in Canada during the late 1960's. The reaction from both civic-cultural and religious quarters was negative. For instance,

¹⁰Walter Warzeski, *Byzantine Rite Rusins in Carpatho-Ruthenia and in America* (Pittsburgh, 1971), p. 239.

Bishop Joseph Shmondiuk, who was the first to authorize the measure in 1965, felt it necessary to revoke his own ruling. More than the calendar or celibacy issues, the language reform was opposed openly and strongly. Nonetheless, some priests, with the tacit consent of their bishops, are slowly experimenting with the partial use of English. At present, English is not officially used as a liturgical language, and in proportion to Slavonic and Ukrainian vernacular (the latter widespread since 1969) it does not exceed 10 percent. Similar efforts at language reform failed almost completely in Canada. Judging from the reaction of the public, no major changes can be anticipated for the next ten to fifteen years. No doubt, the situation reflects the degree and intensity of the cultural-linguistic component in Ukrainian national ideology that is due largely to the active role of the post-World War II émigrés in the life of the Ukrainian community. Such a component was very inactive among the Carpatho-Ruthenian community, where there was almost a total absence of new immigrants after World War II.

A similar situation can be found in Ukrainian Orthodox Church organizations in the United States. All of them were formed as national or even nationalistic expressions of religious life. Nevertheless, some interest in introducing English is discernible among their third-generation communicants. On the other hand, the Russian Orthodox Church, whose communicants are 60 percent Ukrainian, has introduced English as a liturgical language to the same extent as the Carpatho-Ruthenian Uniates.

The issue of church property has been highly controversial among various church groups, and it has produced a phenomenon known in American church history as trusteeism. The problem is simple: who is the legal owner of the church building and other property of the congregation? More specifically, in whose name is the property deeded and who can dispose of it as well as administer financial matters of the congregation. The congregational self-government with the property's title vested in the parish corporation was traditionally a widespread form of ecclesiastical administration in America, and it is still practiced by most Protestant and Jewish congregations.

Roman Catholics promptly pressed for a centralized and uniform system. Accordingly, the diocesan corporations were to

administer church property through a bishop and appointed counsellors, who were often called trustees, but without the authority of congregationally owned church trustees. Ukrainian churches, built originally by parishioners themselves, experienced several forms of ownership: lay trusteeism, corporation of the Latin-Rite bishops, and the Ukrainian diocesan corporation. All Ruthenian-Ukrainian bishops were quite categorical about the church property issue. They tried to have the parish property transferred to the bishop. Usually the transition was conducted smoothly, but in some cases parishioners opposed it, while in others the matter ended in the courts. These legal disputes sometimes resulted in the change of the church's allegiance by the whole or part of parish membership. Notwithstanding membership losses and legal costs, both Carpatho-Ruthenian and Ukrainian bishops finally achieved (but not till the 1950's) a uniform system for handling church property and financial matters. In recent times, the problem has reappeared in three traditionalist Ukrainian Catholic parishes which have tended to revive the old trustee system, one that still prevails in Ukrainian Orthodox parishes.

Centralist authoritarian rule of bishops, arbitrary transfer of priests, lack of participation by clergy and laity in decision-making on the diocesan level, and a one-man management of parish affairs by the pastor—these issues were often targets of criticism by religious dissidents who favored a vaguely defined congregational system, seemingly characteristic of Orthodox Church organization. It is true that Orthodox splinter groups from the Uniate Church began as democratic organizations with the broad participation of both laity and clergy, but with time those churches limited the original premises of pure congregationalism. However, they all continued to adhere to synodal rule for the entire church body.

Another problem that became prominent in the Uniate Church concerned frequent conflicts between church authorities and the civic leadership—an issue that may be compared with the broader problem of the church-state relations. In the case of the immigrant community in America, it can be viewed as a church-society relationship, which often came down to the simple question of who or what is more important in the ethnic community and

where should the final authority in "national" questions rest: with the church and bishop or with the civic establishment (*hromadianstvo*)?

For example, Bishop Ortynsky experienced difficulty when he attempted to subordinate fraternal unions to the church. Failing to achieve this, he established the church-related fraternal organization *Provydinnia*. Ortynsky went so far as to promote the formation of a church-aligned national committee, an association of civic organizations that was opposed to a secular central representative body known as the *Federatsiia*. Carpatho-Ruthenian fraternal organizations opposed Ortynky because of political and regional considerations. But even when that group had its own Bishop Takach, the latter was constantly forced to neutralize the ambitions and influence of *Soedinenije* (formally called the Union of the Greek Catholic Brotherhoods) and was compelled to bargain with *Soedinenije* leaders for support of his position. Bishop Bohachevsky, likewise, was involved in a strenuous conflict with civic leaders and major secular organizations, including the central body known at the time as *Obiednannia*. Bohachevsky's pro-Hetmanite sympathies and involvement in that movement were a public secret. Thus, the Catholic daily, *America*, became a mouthpiece for Hetmanite conservative ideology in the same way that since the late 1950's it has propagated the nationalist positions of the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

It is noteworthy that the relations between the Ukrainian Church (both Catholic and Orthodox) and civic community organizations have been vitally improved in the last twenty-five years. This has been primarily due to a weakening of Socialist trends in the Ukrainian community along with the growth of a more sympathetic attitude of all civic-political factions towards the church and religion. No less important was the able political policy of the church leaders themselves who succeeded in setting up a "new harmony" between church and secular society. In this regard, the late Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn and the present head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Mstyslav Skrypnyk, have displayed particular ability. Their role and influence in the politics of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the World Congress of Free Ukrainians

(along with the active part of the Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan of Canada, Maksym Hermaniuk) should not be underestimated. The absence of anticlericalism in the civic community (with the exception of a marginal pro-Communist faction) and the fact that Ukrainian churches subscribe, at least in word, to all Ukrainian patriotic platforms, are the two major factors favoring the present harmony between the church and the lay community.

New conflicts among Ukrainian Catholics, however, came from another source. A movement began in the mid-1960's, generated partially within the church itself (among clergy and laity) and supported by some civic quarters, including patriotic organizations. This movement favored the idea of a patriarchal system for the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Having exhausted or achieved some of the previously mentioned religious objectives (defense of rite, church autonomy vis-à-vis Rome, unity of all Ukrainian Catholic entities) and, above all, personally committed to the would-be Patriarch Cardinal Josyf Slipyj, the patriarchal program has acquired the dynamics and combativeness of many previous lay movements. It has seriously undermined the integrity of the Church establishment by questioning the credibility of its leadership. At the same time, it has revitalized many dormant energies and aroused new religious activism among the laity.

The patriarchal issue has also had an impact on the Carpatho-Ruthenian Uniate Church in America. Since the 1940's, that community, which in many respects prospered better than the Ukrainian one, has undergone a process of deethnization. As a result, the so-called Ukrainian menace, that is, the prospect of eventual unification of both church entities under one Metropolitan in America (contemplated in the 1950's by some quarters in Rome), was used by the Carpatho-Ruthenian leadership to further their alienation from the Ukrainian community.¹¹ This has been achieved by formulating a new concept of religious-ritual community (Byzantine Rite) and by deemphasizing the ethnic (Ruthenian) character of the church. In this endeavor, both hierarchy and lay leadership were successful, because not

¹¹The "Ukrainian menace" has been a constant theme among both Carpatho-Ruthenian lay and clerical leadership. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 269.

only did Rome abandon the unification project, it also established a separate Metropolia for the Carpatho-Ruthenians.

In the 1960's and 1970's, Carpatho-Ruthenians again began to feel threatened by their possible absorption into a Ukrainian patriarchate. Once more they asked for, and duly received assurances that such schemes would not be supported by the Vatican. The Carpatho-Ruthenian position was advantageous to the Vatican Curia which opposes for reasons of its own a Ukrainian patriarchate. It is interesting to note that the activities accompanying this move in the Carpatho-Ruthenian community are no longer tied to "deethnization" as they were some twenty years ago. Instead of looking for an escape in the idea of a "Byzantine Rite," the community is now trying gradually to develop a separate Carpatho-Ruthenian ethnic consciousness which could flourish in America's pluralist society. This new outlook has become even more expedient since the Ukrainians fully abandoned their previously common nomenclature (Ruthenian, Rusyn). The Carpatho-Ruthenians feel that their "new" ethnic ideology will protect them against both Ukrainian "imperial designs," concealed this time in the patriarchal movement, and against the attempts of some Slovak nationalists who are intent on identifying the entire Carpatho-Ruthenian community with the Slovak nation.¹²

The Catholic-Orthodox split in the Ukrainian-American community was strongly motivated by political (nationalistic) considerations and influences from both within and without the group. The majority of the Uniate leadership at home and in America tended to identify itself politically with the *status quo*: it was conservative and opportunistic, and generally sought accommodation with the powerholders. The ruling elites in Austria and Hungary soon perceived the Ukrainian national revival in the second half of the nineteenth century as a menace, in that the Ukrainian-Ruthenian masses might be oriented to outside loyal-

¹²This new orientation ("back to ethnic consciousness") is favored by certain clerical circles (as on the pages of the diocesan newspaper *Byzantine Catholic World*) as well as among the secular intelligentsia. The latter has set up the Carpatho-Rusyn Research Center and publishes a quarterly newsletter, *Carpatho-Rusyn American* (Fairview, N.J., 1978-present).

ties (Ukraine or Russia) at the expense of Vienna and Budapest. Thus, a separate ecclesiastic community, closely tied with the Roman Catholic Church, might become an impediment to political infiltration from the East. Moreover, political influences from the East threatened the "catholicity" of the Uniates and opened the possibility for the spread of Orthodoxy.

Preventive measures and sporadic reprisals were undertaken against certain outspoken "schismatics" under Austro-Hungarian rule but not in the United States. In this country, Russian propagandists and Orthodox missionaries took advantage of American freedom in order to foster their double objectives: the propagation of Pan-Russian nationalism and Orthodoxy among Ukrainian-Ruthenian immigrants. Thus the ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church in America were strengthened at the turn of the century by Ukrainians who broke with Rome, partly for nationalistic reasons, partly because their own and outside leaders succeeded in exploiting other valid grievances of the Uniates in the United States. At present, as high as sixty-five percent of the faithful of the Orthodox Church of America are former Uniates who are ethnically Ukrainian-Ruthenians.

On the other hand, it was a Ukrainian ideology which managed to preserve the Uniate Church as a Catholic and national institution, even though this was achieved at great expense. The principal loss occurred in favor of Russian Orthodoxy. Another beneficiary of the internal conflicts among Uniates was a new religious group, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. During the crucial years from 1917 to 1924 in the life of the immigrant community and its European homeland, the lay and patriotic elements who opposed many aspects of the Uniate Church in the United States found a rallying point for their feelings and ideas in the restored Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Ukraine. This institution suddenly became an alternative for the new waves of opposition among Ukrainian Catholics. It was a national church and independent from either Rome, Moscow, or Constantinople.

The next wave of dissent in the Ukrainian Catholic Church that occurred in the late 1920's and early 1930's (as a result of issues such as celibacy, ownership of church property, and Roman centralism) did not strengthen the Orthodox autocephalous

movement. Instead, a separate "canonical" Ukrainian Orthodox Church in America was established in 1929, which aligned itself with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Despite several attempts, unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox community has not been achieved. Moreover, in the 1950's, two more Ukrainian Orthodox splinter groups emerged. Nonetheless, the only viable representative of Orthodox Ukrainians appears to be the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A.

It seems that several defections from traditional Ukrainian Catholicism to both Russian and Ukrainian Orthodoxy, moves which were accompanied by criticism that the former church was not sufficiently national, have produced the desired result. The process of Latinization and deethnicization was slowed down. Whenever the Uniate Church had faced a crisis, its national character was strengthened either by reflex or in the guise of self-defense. True, the post-World War II rise in prestige and status of both Ukrainian churches was as much due to the influx of fresh blood from the ranks of the political émigrés. Also, the recent ferment of the 1960's and 1970's, which does not display secessionist tendencies, has certainly restrained the trend toward "Americanization," Latinization, or superficial "modernization" of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Protestantism as a "religious experience" among Ukrainians is a new and typically "American" phenomenon. Therefore, Protestantism among the Ukrainians should be viewed as part of the group's "Americanization." The existence of complete religious freedom and a liberal approach to as well as grassroots participation in church administration have appealed to many newcomers. Dissatisfaction with institutionalized religion and clergy in the old country has been aptly used by missionaries of several American Protestant groups who found among immigrants an easy target for conversion.

While at first Protestant missionary activity was conducted in Ukrainian, the national element ceased to be relevant as soon as the converts or their children learned English sufficiently. They also did not remain with ethnic congregations, as has been the case among Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox communities. Most Ukrainian Protestants are now dispersed, and only about forty to fifty Ukrainian ethnic congregations still exist. Their leadership

is recruited mostly from post-World War II immigrants.

Nonetheless, two distinct Ukrainian Protestant churches emerged in the 1920's: the Union of Ukrainian Evangelical Baptists and the Ukrainian Evangelical Reformed Church. The latter has had a direct impact on the creation of a body in the western Ukraine. Reverend Basil Kuziv, a pastor in Newark, N.J., was also elected the superintendent of that church in the Ukraine. The Baptist group is now organized in the All-Ukrainian Evangelical-Baptist Fellowship which, in recent decades, under the dynamic leadership of Ukrainian-trained preachers, is conducting prolific religious activities, including the defence of its brethren in faith who are persecuted in the Ukraine. Although organized Protestantism has become a part of Ukrainian life in the United States, it by no means embraces all Protestants of Ukrainian descent. Some also belong to undefinable "Slavic" congregations (with Russian, Ukrainian, Ruthenian, and Belorussian membership) that do not emphasize their Ukrainianism.

In one particular way, the religious life of American Ukrainians was modified as compared to organizational and operational standards in the home country. It adapted to the accepted forms and methods of other religious bodies, and particularly to those of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States. The self-organization of the laity and the grass-roots initiatives were less known in the Ukraine, with a notable exception of the church brotherhoods of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Unlike in the homeland, American religious pluralism and the secular nature of public authorities left the organization, functioning, and, most of all, financing of religious activities to the people concerned. Membership in a new parish became a personal commitment; it was not a collective and usually passive adherence to a local village church as in the European experience. In the new World, one had to register, to pay dues, and make other contributions. Lacking wealthy individuals, new churches were built on donations as well as the work of parishioners, while the management of various parish-related activities (cultural, social, educational, etc.) absorbed the energies of more people than was necessary in the homeland.

As a result, the priest, now more dependent on his congregation, has had to work closer with common people. His image and

standing in the community depend now more on his activism and popularity than on the "authority vested" in him. The priest also has to prove his organizational abilities if the congregation is to survive and prosper. Efficient management and financial self-sufficiency have become accepted standards of a good church entity. The priest-organizer or bishop-administrator are often more esteemed than priests whose talents are limited to pastoral ability or to a solid knowledge of theology.

In accord with the concept that the church in America tends to be a minicommunity, Ukrainians organized a good number of auxiliary organizations. Church-related schools in both Carpatho-Ruthenian and Ukrainian parishes were modeled on the Roman Catholic educational system. The launching of a religious press also emulated other religious experiences in the United States. But although this activism was significant on the local level, rarely did it come into prominence nationally. At that level, an active role was played by *ad hoc* groups, the so-called laymen associations. In general, modernization, or Americanization, at the organizational level has occurred in varying degrees in all church bodies to which Ukrainians belong.

In conclusion, Ukrainian religious aspirations have for almost a century focused essentially on the issue of self-identification and the assertion of cultural-religious values. The search for a distinct religious and ethnonational ideology almost entirely characterized the period, resulting in a number of organizational and conceptual entities: (a) Ukrainian Catholic Church, (b) Catholic Church of Byzantine Rite based on Carpatho-Ruthenian regional identity, (c) Ukrainian Orthodox Church with several jurisdictions, (d) Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Church, (e) Russian Orthodox Church of America, (f) Protestant denominations with ethnic identification, and (g) Catholic Church of Latin Rite without Ukrainian ethnic identity.¹³ Over 1.3 million immigrants

¹³For the religious distribution of Ukrainian-Ruthenians in America and their numerical strength, see my article in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, Vol. II, edited by Volodymyr Kubijovyč (Toronto, 1971), pp. 1108–1121. In the mid-sixties the approximate religious distribution was: Ukrainian Catholic Church (Philadelphia Metropolia) 280,000; the Byzantine Rite Ruthenian Catholic Church (Pittsburgh Metropolia) 300,000; Ukrainian Orthodox affiliations 135,000; Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Church (under the Ecumenical Patriarch) 102,000; Ukrainians in

and their descendents belong to these religious bodies in which they find fulfillment of their spiritual and sociocultural needs.

One may ask whether these religious entities, based to a large extent on ethnicity, are not of an ephemeral nature, and whether their existence is not time-bound. Are they not on the way to absorption by larger parent bodies which have lost or which never possessed an ethnic character? It might be possible to sketch some tentative answers to these rather complex questions. The above mentioned ethnic churches and religious groups will face within the next half century a crucial test of their ability to survive. Their *raison d'être* has been service to distinct communities of people with definite ethnocultural backgrounds and religious traditions. If these churches were to lose this ethnic base, the prospects of their absorption by larger church bodies is very real. On the other hand, if the motivations and needs for distinctiveness continue and if the church leadership is committed to its own ideology, basically inspired by values and attitudes which induced their forefathers to transplant their ancestral faith, then a Ukrainian-Ruthenian Church identity in the United States may survive within the next century.

There exists, however, also a third possibility, that of the evolution of the ethnic church to the point of substantive change in the very character of the church body. The Russian Orthodox Church, now the autocephalous Orthodox Church of America, is undergoing such a change, even though the modifications appear to be more in the domain of language than in Orthodox theological content. Certain quarters within and without Ukrainian-Ruthenian church organizations advance similar alternatives in the form, for instance, of a deethnicized American Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite. Its conceptual foundations, not wholly clarified as yet, may appear to some people as an attractive choice between complete assimilation into the Latin-Rite Church and the petrified ethnic identity of minichurches. The protagonists of such a concept argue that in such an entity the Ruthenian and Ukrainian religious communities might

the Orthodox Church of America and in Russian jurisdictions 400,000; Ukrainians Protestants 50,000; Ukrainians in Latin Rite Catholic parishes, over 50,000.

restore their former unity. However, at what price can this unity be realized?

Thus, the members and leadership of Ukrainian religious communities face today the same problem that had been more or less resolved in the past—the problem of maintaining identity and preserving the transplanted ancestral faith.

CHAPTER 7

The Ukrainian Language in the Emigration

Bohdan Strumins'kyj

We must first explain what is meant by the term *emigration*. Technically, *emigrants* denotes all those who have left their basic ethnic territory. Thus, Ukrainians living in the Soviet Far East are emigrants, while Ukrainians who still live on territories of Russia, Belorussia, Moldavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—which border the Ukrainian SSR—are not emigrants. For practical reasons, we shall limit our discussion to emigrants in the Western world, disregarding emigrants in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, whose conditions are quite different. This differentiation is also consistent with the general understanding of the word *emigration* (емиграція) in the Ukraine.

The language of Ukrainian emigrants (émigré Ukrainian) can be discussed in terms of its number of speakers and in terms of how it is spoken. According to one estimate, the number of Ukrainians in the emigration of 1959 was 2,100,000.¹ But, did all these people speak Ukrainian? Let us examine the case of the United States. The 1970 Census lists 249,351 people for whom Ukrainian was the mother tongue.² However, since Ruthenian was not listed as a separate language, it is probable that this figure includes many Transcarpathians and Lemkians. On the other hand, the figure for people with Russian as their mother tongue may include some Ukrainians. A 1971 estimate places the number of Ukrainians in the United States as 1,317,000.³ It thus turns out that only 18.9 percent of Ukrainians in the United States (whether they call themselves Ruthenians or Russian) list Ukrainian as their mother tongue. The proportion is much higher in Canada. In 1961, 76.3 percent of all Ukrainians listed Ukrainian

¹*Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, vol. I (Toronto, 1963), p. 249.

²1970 *Census of Population: Subject Reports. National Origin and Language* (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 98, 492.

³*Ukraine*, vol. II (1971), pp. 1110–1151. This estimate is based on religious criteria and includes individuals who do not call themselves Ukrainians. A different estimate for 1975—between 1,250,000 and 1,500,000—can be found in M. Buryk, *Ukrainians in America* (Clifton, N.J., 1976), p. 14.

as their mother tongue (361,496 of a total of 473,377).⁴ The number of people who actually spoke Ukrainian was somewhat lower, 71.1 percent (336,831 people).⁵ This suggests that the 18.9 percent figure for Ukrainian-Americans who listed Ukrainian as their mother tongue is not accurate and should be reduced proportionately.

The number of Ukrainians in all other Western countries is estimated at 500,000. Assuming a language retention rate of 45 percent (the median of that in the United States and Canada), we get about 225,000 Ukrainian speakers. Added to the figures for the United States and Canada, we get approximately 810,000 for the period 1960–1970. This figure is considerably larger than the population of L'viv, which is the only large Ukrainian-speaking city in the Ukraine.

These statistics, however, represent the ideal. They say nothing about how well these people speak the language, or whether they actually use it in their daily lives. We have detailed information on these questions only from Canada. In 1967–1968 a sample study was made among Ukrainian students at the University of Alberta. This study revealed that, although the percentage of Ukrainian speakers was greater than that in 1961 (82.4 percent versus 71.1 percent), the percentage of people who had a “very good” command of the language was only 7.8 percent; 19.1 percent had a “good” command; 29.2 percent had a “fair” command; and 26.3 percent reported a “poor” command.⁶ If we combine the first two and the second two separately, we get 29.9 percent “good and very good” versus 55.5 percent “fair and poor.”

Another study conducted in 1971 among Canadian Ukrainians in a few selected large cities revealed the following proportions: 30.7 percent fluent; 58.1 percent partially effective. The total rate of language retention was thus 88.8 percent.⁷ This is better than the earlier study at the University of Alberta.

⁴*Ukrainians in American and Canadian Society: Contributions to the Sociology of Ethnic Groups*, ed. Wsevolod W. Isajiw (Jersey City, N.J., 1976), p. 278.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁷K.G. O'Bryan, J.G. Reitz, and O. Kuplowska, *Non-official Languages: A Study of Canadian Multiculturalism* (Ottawa, 1976), p. 45.

One reason for these higher figures might be Canada's policy of multiculturalism. Another promising feature is the positive attitude of Ukrainian students toward the teaching of Ukrainian in the schools. This idea was supported by 94.6 percent of the students in the study at the University of Alberta.⁸ Within the individual studies there was further differentiation with regard to language ability. In the University of Alberta study, it was discovered that female students speak better than male students: 9.6 percent of the females listed "very good," while only 6.6 percent of the males did so.⁹ A study conducted in rural Saskatchewan in 1968–1972 revealed that Catholics retained the language more than Orthodox people. Among third-generation Ukrainians, 55.6 percent of the Catholics preferred Ukrainian to English (or some other language), while only 36.8 percent of the Orthodox people did.¹⁰ This was supported by a study at the University of Alberta, in which 18.5 percent of the Catholic students were "very good" speakers of Ukrainian, in contrast to 16.7 percent of the Greek Orthodox and 11.7 percent of the Ukrainian Orthodox.¹¹ However, that same study found that the desire for language retention was higher among the Orthodox than among Catholics. In all, 91.2 percent of the Orthodox students at the University of Alberta came out for it, as against 89.6 percent of the Catholics.¹²

There were also differences based on class. The children of farmers agreed with the children of professionals/executives in being the staunchest defenders of the Ukrainian language at the University of Alberta: 53.5 percent and 55.2 percent of them, respectively, felt that Ukrainian should be the language of instruction (in contrast to the overall average of 47.5 percent in support of this view). Similarly, within the category of "very good" speakers of Ukrainian, the two largest groups were children of farmers (10.6 percent of them) and children of

⁸*Ukrainians in American and Canadian Society*, p. 156.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 157.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 171.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 174.

professionals (13.8 percent of them).¹³ Another survey found that, among "fluent respondents" the greatest percentage of "exclusive use" of Ukrainian was with the clergy (61.4 percent).¹⁴ All this leads us to conclude that an alliance of women, Catholics, university students, priests, professionals, executives and farmers might be a "shock brigade" for the preservation of the Ukrainian language.

In order to analyze the current state of émigré Ukrainian, I have chosen to compare it with Soviet Ukrainian. In order to control the data, I selected a short text for translation from English into Ukrainian by an émigré Ukrainian and a Soviet Ukrainian. Both were students at Harvard University. The émigré was 28, born in Germany, and raised in the United States. The Soviet Ukrainian was 32, born and raised in the Soviet Ukraine, and a recent immigrant to Canada. Each had to translate into his own brand of Ukrainian a short article on Lebanon, taken from *The New York Times* (See Table 1.) In presenting the results, I will refer to the émigré raised in the West as the Westerner, while the other person will be referred to as the Soviet Ukrainian.

In alphabet and orthography, the Westerner used the Xarkiv system of 1927–1929, while the Soviet Ukrainian used the reformed Soviet system of 1933–1946, which removed the *r* letter and which restored, under Russian influence, the Old Ukrainian treatment of foreign words.¹⁵ In punctuation, the Westerner followed the English rather than the Ukrainian (Xarkiv) system. The Soviet Ukrainian correctly followed the Soviet Ukrainian (and Russian) system of punctuation, with one exception where he imitated the English model. (See Table 2.)

In morphology, the Westerner preserved the *-a* ending of foreign words like *роля* (role) and *кляса* (class). This agrees with the Xarkiv standard. The Soviet Ukrainian, on the other hand,

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 168, 164.

¹⁴O'Bryan, et al., *Non-official Languages*, p. 65.

¹⁵For example, the Westerner uses *ля* (доларів, клас), *г* (Гверцман, Вашингтон, Конгрес), *ія* (ініціативу, спеціального). The Soviet Ukrainian uses *ла* (класів), *г* (Гверцман, Вашингтон, Конгрес), *іа* (спеціального).

used *поль* with a zero ending, in accordance with the present Soviet Ukrainian (and Russian) norm. The Westerner also used the soft-stem міжнародний (international), which was accepted in Harkiv in 1929 but was later replaced by the hard-stem міжнародний in Soviet Ukrainian, due to Russian influence. The latter form was used by the Soviet Ukrainian.

The parents of the Westerner are Galicians, and so his language naturally represented Galician Ukrainian. A few of his adjectives had a hard stem—всесвітнє (worldwide), крайних (extreme), середних (middle), while the Soviet Ukrainian used the soft-stem середнього, in agreement with the eastern Ukrainian standard. The westerner used the Galician lexeme устійнити (to establish) and many lexical Polonisms (although he does not speak Polish).¹⁶

In inflection, the Westerner used -ю for the loc. sg. of soft neuter nouns: в полегшенню (in alleviating) and в зусиллю (in an effort). This was caused by Polish influence. In syntax, the influences of Polish could also be seen in his overuse of the relative pronoun котрий (which, who) and the copula є.¹⁷ None of these Polonisms appeared in the translation of the Soviet Ukrainian.

Expatriated linguistic communities are usually characterized by conservatism. We can see this in the Westerner's use of the gen.

¹⁶внести "to amount to, to cost," from Polish *Wynieść* (qualified as provincial and quoted from the Galician Ivan Franko in the six-volume dictionary edited by Kyrychenko).

повоєнний, повоєнного, "postwar," from Polish *powojenny*, for which the Soviet Ukrainian uses післявоєнної, післявоєнних (both forms are accepted in the Soviet Ukraine, but the latter, which is closer to the Russian, is more frequent).

як також, "as well as," a calque from Polish *jak również*, in contrast to a також used by the Soviet Ukrainian (which is close to the Russian а также).

поважну роль, "a significant role," from Polish *ważną rolę*, while the Soviet Ukrainian used важливу роль.

шпиталю, "hospital," from Polish *szpital*; the Soviet Ukrainian used the native Ukrainian word лікарні.

The above is a good illustration of the paradox that, for all its Russianization, the Soviet Ukrainian language is sometimes more Ukrainian than the language of émigré Ukrainians.

¹⁷This can be seen in всесвітнє зусилля, котре може внести 300–500 мільонів доларів and in Ліванців високих і середніх клас—котрі повтікали.

sg. fem. pronominal form *цеї* (hers). This is an older variant of *цієї*, accepted in 1929, but now totally replaced by the latter in the Soviet Ukraine. As for the loc. of *що*, the Westerner used *чим*, which is becoming obsolescent in the Soviet Ukraine where the loc. *чому* is much more common.

The Westerner's translation also showed the influence of English syntax. In English, which is characterized by a more rigid word order than Ukrainian, the subject almost always precedes the predicate. The Westerner translated "A worldwide effort . . . will be needed" as *всесвітнє зусилля буде потрібне*. The Soviet Ukrainian, however, used a more typical Slavic word order, with predicate preceding subject: *буде потрібна міжнародна допомога*.

One can see the beginning of the destruction of the inflectional system in the Westerner's failure to decline foreign place names: *в Бейрут* instead of *в Бейруті*. There is a general linguistic phenomenon that the destruction of declension often starts with foreign borrowings and place names. For instance, in Russian, it was probably the influence of indeclinable French borrowings in *-eau(x)* (*Bordeaux* > *Бордо*) that influenced the loss of declension in native Russian proper names in *-o* (e.g., *Бородино*).

Another feature of the Westerner's language was an uncertainty and instability in spelling. He wrote *мільонів* (millions) instead of the correct form *мільйонів*, written by the Soviet Ukrainian. The Westerner also confused unstressed *и* and *е*, writing *Христа* instead of *Хреста*. This tendency to confuse unstressed *и* and *е* is also characteristic of most Soviet Ukrainians but is overcome by spelling habits acquired in Soviet schools.

The language of the Westerner might also be described as "nonterminological." When in need of a technical term, he improvised by calquing, or direct borrowing from English, without referring to established Ukrainian usage. The Soviet Ukrainian had a stock of standard technical terms modeled on

The Soviet Ukrainian used the relative pronoun *який*: *заможні та середнього рівня ліванські громадяни, які залишили країну*. The Westerner's misuse of the copula can be seen in *Америка є готова*, which has been copied directly from Polish: *Ameryka jest gotowa*. The Soviet Ukrainian did not use the copula: *США готові*.

the Russian one.¹⁸

The Westerner had one unexpected and atypical feature: masc. sg. dat. forms in -y: Лівану (Lebanon), комітету (committee), шпиталю (hospital). We would have expected the traditional Ukrainian -ovi. In this, the Westerner is more Soviet than those Soviet Ukrainians who try to defend the -ovi ending against the -y ending,¹⁹ which predominates in northern and eastern Ukrainian dialects and is now expanding due to support from the Russian language. Perhaps this use of -y by the Westerner can be explained by his reading of Russian and Soviet Ukrainian publications.

Besides studying the speech of individuals, one can also study the language of the press. This gives the possibility of collecting very rich materials. In four articles from *Svoboda*, October 19, 1976, I found 100 linguistic items which differ from Soviet Ukrainian usage: 56 lexical; 38 in orthography, phonetics, and morphology, and 6 in syntax and phraseology. These figures are exactly equal to percentages: 56 percent, 38 percent, and 6 percent respectively. Of the 56 lexical differences, 22 are

¹⁸The Russian models for the Soviet Ukrainian are provided in parentheses:

English	Émigré Ukrainian	Soviet Ukrainian
State Department	державного міністерства	державного департаменту (государственного департамента)
cease-fire	припинення боїв	припинення вогню (прекращение огня)
economy	економія	народного господарства (народного хозяйства)
international community	міжнародня громада держав	Організації Об'єднаних Націй (Организации Объединенных Наций)

In the Kiev-based *Radjans'ka Ukraïjina*, October 1, 1976, we find світове співтовариство, which is not recorded in any Soviet Ukrainian dictionaries. This expression is certainly a calque from the Russian мировое содружество. One should always remember that *Radjans'ka Ukraïjina*, like many other Soviet publications, is the work of people of Russian culture and language, who only coincidentally write in Ukrainian.

¹⁹For example, B. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Jak my hovorymo* (Kiev, 1970), p. 31; and O. Kundzič, *Slovo i obraz* (Kiev, 1973), p. 3.

Polonisms in émigré Ukrainian, 5 are Polonisms/Anglicisms, 3 are Anglicisms, 9 are Russianisms, one is a Polonism/Russianism, and 2 are Bohemianisms.²⁰

²⁰There were the following lexical differences: a) Polonisms in émigré Ukrainian (Soviet Ukrainian variant is given second): з рамени/від імені; трактування (політв'язнів)/поводження з; заінтересувань/зацікавлень; полудневих (годинах)/обідніх; становище (до справ)/ставлення; пакунки/посилки; дослівно/буквально usually; мешканевих (кварталах)/житлових; направляти/виправляти; як теж/а також; крайове/загальнодержавне; натомість/з другого боку; видатки/витрати usually; виголосив (заяву)/зробив; трактувати (країни)/розглядати; виміни/обміну; старання/намагання or спроби; підстави/основні; афера/скандал; надужиття/зловживання usually; гіндуси/індуси; умови/угоди; строгих (репресій)/жорстоких; дорогі камені/дорогоцінне каміння; b) Polonisms and/or Anglicisms: репрезентантів/представників; формацій (що боролись)/утворень or з'єднань; рож/троянд; опресії/гнобленню; цивільної (неслужняності)/громадянської; c) Anglicisms: спонзорувала/шефтувала; панелістів/no equivalent; (розвідчими) агенціями/органами; d) Russianisms or dialectal and old Ukrainian words close to Russian: СССР/СРСР; советських/радянських; слідуючому/наступному; примінення/застосування; придержання (злочинців у в'язницях)/затримання; піддержує/підтримує; піддержку/підтримку; додержується/дотримується; повновластей/уповноважень; e) Polonism or Russianism: офіційально/офіційною usually; f) Bohemianisms: заступлені/представлені; меншини/меншості; g) other differences: ЗСА/США, умовин/умов; одинокими/єдиними; вояків/солдатів; перебрати/перейняти; розвідчими/розвідувальними usually; З'єднаний (Союз)/Об'єднаний usually; радше/швидше; проводом/керівництвом; провідники/лідери; меншинної/no equivalent; (телевізійними) сітками/мережами.

Orthographical differences include the following (émigré Ukrainian given first): Вашингтон/Вашінгтон; Спар (personal name)/Спар; Конгресі/Конгресі; негативні/негативні; делегації/делегатії; Ліга/Ліга; енергетичної/енергетичної; Ганді/Ганді; законопроект/законопроект; Вілліяма/Вільяма; доларів/доларів; блок/блок; Деклярації/Декларатії; Цейльон/Цейлон; парламенту/парламенту; стримління/стремління; Волтером/Уолтером; Вотергейтська/Уотергейтська; Европа/Європа; Гельсінкської/Хельсінкської; Александра (Солженіцина)/Олександр; без вісті/безвісті; під час/підчас.

Phonetic differences include: нарід/народ; в (9.30)/о.

Morphological differences include: безнадійності/безнадійності; незалежності/незалежності; меншості/меншості; неслухняності/неслухняності; бюро/бюро; війни/воєн usually; (людського) духа/духу; класи/класу; східня/східна; бюджетового/бюджетного; шістьох/шести usually; 12-ох/12-и usually; мусів/мусив; хоча/хоч usually.

Syntactic differences include: Комісії для/Комісії по; умови з 1973 року/угоди 1973 року; була передавана/передавалась; це є/це.

The one phraseological difference is: від непам'ятних часів/з незапам'ятних часів usually.

I also analyzed a report in *Svoboda* concerning the November 9, 1976, telephone conversation between Mykola Rudenko in Kiev and Bohdan Jasen' in Washington, the respective leaders of Ukrainian groups for promoting the Helsinki Agreements in the Ukrainian SSR and the United States.²¹ This conversation also presented some typical differences. The Kievan Rudenko used лист (letter), an old Polonism, while Jasen' in Washington used письмо, another Polonism, or Russianism; then Rudenko said Україна не була представлена (the Ukraine was not represented [in Helsinki]). Представлена is a Russianism. Jasen' repeated this as Україна не була заступлена. Заступлена is a Bohemianism.

In studying those elements of émigré Ukrainian which have been criticized by anti-émigré Soviet polemicists, I have found that the majority (87 percent) of criticisms concerned the lexicon. The remaining (13 percent) concerned phonological, morphological, and orthographic differences. No syntactic differences were mentioned by Soviet sources; however, Soviet commentators were mostly nonlinguists, and it is well-known that vocabulary is the favorite topic of amateurish linguistic theorizing and disagreements.

Another type of field research is the monitoring of radio broadcasts in émigré Ukrainian. When I lived in Poland, I listened to broadcasts by Voice of America, Radio Canada, and Radio Liberty. I was struck by the number of Anglicisms (both direct borrowings and loan translations),²² as well as the inconsistency in terminology, syntax, and phonetics.²³

I would like to make a few comments on the so-called rule of the

²¹*Svoboda*, October 27–30, 1976.

²²Direct borrowings: імплімент, дестроер, бизнесові фірми; Loan translations: бути на страйку, вийти на страйк, слухання на комісії Конгресу, на програмі, на телебаченні, брати курси, раніше цього року, дозволити специфічній кількості людей емігрувати (from Voice of America).

²³Паливо/пальне (all three stations); постачі (Voice of America)/поставки (Radio Liberty); (нафто)провід (буде) збудований/збудовано; законопроект/законопроект; гарантувати/гарантії; Колумбія/Колумбія (Voice of America).

nine. According to this rule, most instances of the [i] sound in foreign words should be rendered by Ukrainian і—a high, front [i]—except after the consonants ж, ч, ш, ц, з, с, т, д, р. After these nine consonants, the [i] should be rendered by the letter и (lower high [ɪ]). The one exception is foreign proper names, where i is written everywhere. This rule was one of the questionable decisions made at the Xarkiv orthographic convention of 1927. The natural tendency of Ukrainian is to perceive all cases of foreign postconsonantal [i] as [ɪ], which is rendered by the letter и (except before jod). The Xarkiv decree thus imposed a foreign convention on Ukrainian phonetics.²⁴ The later Soviet reform, except for a few concessions like Британія for Брітанія, and більшовизм for більшовізм, did not correct the error of the Xarkiv decree.

If one compares the orthographic standards—both of Xarkiv and of Kiev—with the pronunciation of the Ukrainian announcers of Voice of America and Radio Canada, particularly of the easterners, and with the spellings in the newspaper *Svoboda*, one sees that the natural Ukrainian phonetic tendency is restored by these media.²⁵

A few words may be appropriate on what might be done to improve the state of émigré Ukrainian and to aid in its study. It is generally agreed by Ukrainian linguists and writers in the West that the spelling and grammatical system of 1927–1929 should be retained until a new codification is established in some future Ukrainian state. However, since no one knows how long this provisional period may last, some measures should be taken now. In this regard, the most recent book in the West on Ukrainian

²⁴ Polish was undoubtedly responsible for the adoption of the rule of nine by Ukrainians, as V. Čaplenko correctly pointed out in *Istorijska novoji ukrajins'kaji literaturnoji movy XVII st.—1933 p.* (New York, 1970), p. 256. It was Russian that accustomed many Ukrainians to pronounce епіскоп, etc.

²⁵ Voice of America: Тито, соціологічними, логичний, Мозамбіку, архіві, республікою; публіка, фірми, мисії, комісія, міністр, космічної; Radio Canada: республіка, Ліван, визитом, кипріоти, Бразилія; *Svoboda* (1976): Британії (no. 206), Ліван (no. 206), Флориди (no. 202), Фльориди (no. 201), Сиракузи (no. 196), Аргентина (no. 211), Бразилія (no. 211).

orthography is of little value.²⁶ At least some concessions to natural Ukrainian pronunciation of certain foreign names should be introduced into émigré orthography. For example, place names adopted through Middle Greek should use *и* and not *і*: Ливан rather than Ліван, and Кипр rather than Кіпр. Slavic place names should conform to Ukrainian: Югославія²⁷ instead of Югославія. The prefix *архи-* should be used instead of *архи-*. On the other hand, the rule of the nine should be extended to all foreign place names, so that Аргентина and Вашингтон would be written instead of Аргентіна and Вашингтон. Such changes would not affect the general principles of 1927–1929 and could be achieved through a new edition of Holoskevych's orthographic dictionary, which is the present bible for Ukrainian authors in the West. It is high time for such a new edition, since the old one does not even contain a correct entry for the United States, while the entry for Helsinki is still represented by the Swedish-Russian *Helsingfors* from before 1918.

Another project that is urgently needed is a new, comprehensive Ukrainian-English and English-Ukrainian dictionary, one which would reflect the wealth of present-day émigré Ukrainian (while noting Soviet Ukrainian variants). The Krett-Andrusyshen dictionary of 1957 is totally inadequate to the sophisticated émigré language, as represented by the journal *Sučasnist'* and similar publications. These publications contain hundreds of new, post-World War II Ukrainian words which are not recorded in any earlier, Soviet or non-Soviet, dictionary.²⁸ The profusion of neologisms and new loan-words show that émigré Ukrainian, although terminologically unstable, is an expanding, dynamic, and flexible language in qualitative terms, even if its

²⁶ Pantelejmon Kovaliv, *Ukrains'kyj pravopys* (New York, 1976).

²⁷ There is also a tradition of *юг* and its derivatives in modern Ukrainian; e.g., *Словниці української (або Югово-Руської) мови* by F. Piskunov (Odessa, 1873).

²⁸ For example, *антирежимний*, *великопотуга*, *всесохопний*, *всепоглинаючий*, *дисидентський*, *екстремний*, *капіталовклад*, *кожночасний*, *міжбильоковий*, *надпотуга*, *народовбивчий*, *невдальство*, *незалежницький*, *протизахід*, *рад-янщик*, *розпрозорити*, *самвидав*, *самовизначальний*, *самостійницький*, *сателізація*, *сексотський*, *селенко*, *скрахувати*, *советознавець*, *співгра*, *спростачити*, *узмістовлюватися*, *ходити в (націоналістах)*, *язиколомний*, etc.

position is precarious in a quantitative sense due to the possibility of a further decrease in the number of its speakers. (Although the decrease seems to have stopped in Canada, on the whole, the future of Ukrainian in the West is uncertain.)

There is a nascent awareness among Ukrainians in the West that their Ukrainian has the same right to be relatively independent in detail from the linguistic mother country, as is the case with colonial English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and other languages. One sign of this tendency is the list of the differences between Canadian Ukrainian and Soviet Ukrainian, appended to Duravetz's Ukrainian textbook.²⁹ I understand Mr. Duravetz even received the "blessing" of certain Kievan linguists for a modicum of Canadian-Ukrainian linguistic "separatism."

I doubt that any great rupture between émigré and Soviet Ukrainian could occur. What happened to vulgar Latin in the early Middle Ages or to Dutch in South Africa from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries cannot repeat itself in our age of the mass media, even though foreign radio programs and publications are denied access to some countries. Émigré Ukrainians are increasingly interested in Soviet Ukrainian dissident literature, and Soviet Ukrainians have a growing interest in émigré Ukrainian publications. Evidence of this is the imitation of the terminology used by Ukrainian radio programs from the West, found in a recent issue of the Soviet underground paper *Ukrainian Herald*.³⁰ This mutual interest is a guarantee against fragmentation of Ukrainian into several different languages.

The Ukrainian Institute at Harvard University can play an important role in recording, studying, and codifying émigré Ukrainian.

²⁹G. Duravetz, *Ukrainian: Conversational and Grammatical* (Toronto, 1973), pp. 309–312.

³⁰*Ukrains'kyj visnyk: vypusk VII–VIII, vesna 1974*, ed. Maksym Sahajdak (Baltimore, 1973). Examples from it are: пересилання закордонних радіостанцій (p. 7), радіопересилання "Свободи" (p. 24), забруднення довкілля (p. 31).

TABLE I

<i>Original</i>	<i>Émigré Ukrainian</i>	<i>Soviet Ukrainian</i>
U.S. Is Set to Help Rebuild Lebanon After Settlement	США готові відбудувати Ліван після замирення	США готові подати допомогу у відбудові Лівану після закінчення кризи
By Bernard Gwertzman Special to <i>The New York Times</i>	Написав Бернارد Гверцман	Від спеціального кореспондента "Нью-Йорк Таймс" Бернарда Гверцмана
Washington, Oct. 26	Вашінгтон, 26 жовтня	Вашінгтон, 26 жовтня.
State Department officials said today that a worldwide effort costing as much as \$300 million to \$500 million might be needed to help Lebanon in postwar reconstruction if the present ceasefire proved effective.	Урядові особи державного міністерства сповістили сьогодні, що всесвітнє зусилля, котре може вивести 300-500 мільйонів доларів, буде потрібне, щоб допомогти Лівану в його повоєнній відбудові - це, якщо припинення боїв покажеться тривким.	Офіційні представники державного департаменту заявили сьогодні, що в тому разі, коли досягнуте в даний час припинення вогню виявиться ефективним, для післявоєнної відбудови Лівану буде потрібна міжнародна допомога в сумі від 300 до 500 мільйонів доларів.
These officials as well as Congressional aides stressed that, pending a reliable postwar survey, any figure on assistance could only be a rough approximation. But they said that the United States was prepared to play a significant role in the reconstruction. They estimated that Congress would be willing next year, no matter who was President, to appropriate a fourth of the total finances.	Ці урядові особи, як також конгресові радники, підкреслюють, що до часу коли не буде достовірного повоєнного огляду, кожна цифра щодо коштів цієї допомоги залишається тільки приблизною. Але вони твердять, що Америка є готова відіграти поважну роль в цій відбудові. Вони обраховують, що Конгрес буде готовий наступного року, не зважаючи на те хто буде президентом, покрити одну-четверту всіх коштів.	Вищезгадані офіційні представники, а також асистенти Конгресу, підкреслили, що до підведення остаточних післявоєнних підсумків можна тільки дуже приблизно обчислити розмір такої допомоги. Однак, заявили вони, США готові відіграти важливу роль у відбудові Лівану. Як вони передбачають, наступного року Конгрес дасть свою згоду на покриття четвертої частини загальної фінансової суми, незалежно від того, хто буде президентом.

During the last session, Congress appropriated \$20 million, for a start, and \$10 million additional has been spent by the United States to help the International Committee of the Red Cross and the American University Hospital in Beirut with emergency relief.

In the eyes of American officials, it is for the Lebanese themselves to take the lead in a reconstruction effort. The wealthy and middle-class Lebanese who fled the country during the civil war must be persuaded to return, if Lebanon's economy is to be restored.

The United States has already invited the new Lebanese President, Elias Sarkis, to send a special representative to Washington to discuss what the Lebanese Government would like the United States and the international community to do. So far, no one has been sent and officials here do not expect anyone until the cease-fire seems to hold.

Під час останньої сесії, конгрес асигнував 20 мільйонів на початок (цієї відбудови), а 10 мільйонів було витрачено урядом США щоб допомогти Міжнародному комітету Червоного Хреста і Шпиталю американського університету в Бейрут в полегшенню крайніх потреб.

На думку американських урядовців, Ліван сам мусить взяти ініціативу в відбудовчій зусиллю. Ліванців високих і середніх класів—котрі повтікали з країни під час громадянської війни, треба буде переконати щоб вони повернулися, сказали ці урядовці,—якщо економія Лівану має бути відбудована.

США вже запросили нового президента, Еліаса Саркіса післяти спеціального представника до Вашингтону на переговори, щоб устійнити в чім уряд Лівану хоче щоб США і Міжнародна громада держав допомогли йому. Досі, нікого, ще не прислано і урядові особі тут не очікують нікого аж доки не буде доказів що припинення боїв втримається на даліше.

На останній сесії Конгресу було затверджено аванс у розмірі 20 мільйонів доларів; крім того, США вже витратили додатково 10 мільйонів на забезпечення потреб першої необхідності для Міжнародного Комітету Червоного Хреста та лікарні Американського університету в Бейруті.

З точки зору американських офіційних представників, провідна роль у напруженому процесі відбудови повинна належати самим ліванцям. Ці ж представники вважають, що заможні та середнього рівня ліванські громадяни, які залишили країну під час громадянської війни, повинні усвідомити, що від їхнього повернення залежатиме відновлення народного господарства Лівану.

США вже запропонували новообраному президентові Лівану Еліасові Саркісу відрядити спеціального представника до Вашингтону для обговорення заходів, які, на думку ліванського уряду, були б бажаними з боку США та Організації Об'єднаних Націй. Поки-що не відряджено нікого, і в місцевих офіційних колах нікого не сподіваються, поки триває припинення вогню.

TABLE 2

<i>English</i>	<i>Émigré Ukrainian</i>	<i>Soviet Ukrainian</i>
	до часу коли не буде достовірного повоєнно- го огляду.	
no matter who was Pre- sident,	не зважаючи на те хто буде президентом,	незалежно від того, хто буде президентом.
	одну-четверту	
During the last session, Congress appropriated \$20 million	Підчас останньої сесії, конгрес асигнував 20 мільонів	На останній сесії Кон- гресу було затверджено аванс у розмірі 20 міль- йонів доларів
	10 мільонів було витра- чено урядом США щоб допомогти Міжнарод- ньому комітету	
In the eyes of American officials, it is for the Leba- nese themselves to take the lead	На думку американських урядовців, Ліван сам му- сить взяти ініціативу	З точки зору америка- нських офіційних пред- ставників, провідна роль . . . повинна належати самим ліванцям.
	Ліванців . . . треба буде переконати щоб вони по- вернулися	
to discuss what the Leba- nese Government would like the United States and the international commu- nity to do.	щоб устійнити в чім уряд Лівану хоче щоб США і міжнародня громада дер- жав допомогли йому.	
So far, no one has been sent and officials here do not expect anyone until the cease-fire seems to hold.	Досі, нікого, ще не при- слано і урядові особи тут не очікують нікого аж доки не буде доказів що припинення боїв втрима- ється на даліше.	Поки-що не відряджено нікого, і в місцевих офі- ційних колах нікого не сподіваються, поки три- ває припинення вогню.

Commentary

Omeljan Pritsak

I will not get involved in the microanalysis performed by Professor Strumins'kyj. I would only warn that the representativeness of this analysis is limited. In the sample text, translated by two different people, I wonder to what extent personal and stylistic parameters or a better or worse knowledge of the language played a role. I would hardly agree that text no. 1 is typical of the language of a western Ukrainian who has grown up in exile. Text no. 2, however, undoubtedly does represent the language of a Soviet Ukrainian. These types of studies should be carried out further, and I hope Professor Strumins'kyj will have the opportunity to do so.

Professor Strumins'kyj's analysis involved the standard language, rather than the colloquial language or dialectal differences. There is no doubt that there are such differences in Canada or the United States, and it would be very interesting to record and to compare them with records of corresponding dialects in the territory of the Ukraine and thus to see to what extent dialectal continuity still exists.

But apart from this, the situation of the Ukrainian language is peculiar, even in the Soviet Union. For instance, in Central Asia, e.g., Bukhara, obviously the majority of the population speaks either Uzbek or Tadzhik (the cities are bilingual, while the nomadic villages speak Uzbek). In the Caucasus or in Tbilisi, if anyone tries to use a language other than Georgian he will get into difficulties, unless he is a foreigner. A similar situation exists in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The situation is different only in the Ukraine. Only in the Ukraine is the native language persecuted. There must be a reason for this. There must also be a reason for the fact that every periodical in the Ukraine uses a different spelling system. This is an old problem. Galician publications between the world wars, or earlier, show the same diversity in spelling.

In Galicia, due to the 1848 revolution, demands appeared for the establishment of a chair at L'viv University for what was then called the Ruthenian language and for the publishing of all

official documents in that language. As long as people were still struggling for the rights of Ukrainian as a distinct language there was unanimity. Difficulty arose in 1849, when the government finally acquiesced, establishing the chair of Ruthenian language and philology and allowing the publication of textbooks. This marked the beginning of the "alphabet war." This war was fought over which village dialect would become the standard language. What was not understood is that every standard language is artificial. Every standard language is formed on the basis of some arbitrary rules. And the results usually depend on the intelligence and experience of those who create it. Moreover, a standard language serves different needs and thus should have different styles. When in eighteenth-century Russia the problem of creating a standard language arose, there were qualified people, like Lomonosov, who argued for three styles, depending on the particular purposes: the higher style, in which Church Slavonic terms could be used; the middle style; and the low style. In the Ukraine, the standard language arose in a spontaneous way, without any regulation or careful thought. Those who started to use the language as a medium for literature did not realize that what they were using was going to become a standard language. Even later, those elements of the standard language that were basic and common to all the dialects were never perceived as such. The acceptance of the standard language has always been hindered by provincialism, as illustrated by political organizations.

The *Questione della lingua*, or language question, had emerged in Italy in the fourteenth century, when it became clear that Latin could not satisfy the various needs of communication. At that point, Petrarch and Dante started to use the colloquial language and gradually to establish its appropriate status. By the time of the Reformation, this trend spread to other territories as well. Since then, vernaculars have become standard languages. All those nations which underwent this process shared the same need: the need for a vernacular vehicle for the Bible. No language can by itself be worthy of being a national language. It must first serve as the medium for the transmission of important cultural values. The history of standard Ukrainian does not have

a Ukrainian translation of the Bible comparable to that of King James, or Luther, or the Polish one by Wujek. Although Puljuj and Kuliš did a translation in the nineteenth century, it did not receive approval until the revolution of 1905, which means that it could not be printed in the central and eastern lands. This was further complicated by the turmoil of the revolution and the world wars. Thus, what was normal in all other nations in the sixteenth century did not happen in the Ukraine. It did not benefit from the translation of the Holy Scriptures at a time when people were still believers and the transmission of God's word in a given language exerted a regulating influence on the evolution of the standard language. Neither Kotljarevs'kyj's *Enejida* nor the works of Taras Ševčenko could equal the importance of the Bible.

Now we are in exile, but problems exist both here and in the old country. We have heard how Ukrainian is disappearing in the United States. And we see how the language is underdeveloped in the homeland. The basic issue facing the directorship of this Institute is still not solved and cannot be easily solved. If a German Institute in the United States were to issue a communiqué in German, what spelling system would it use? It would use the latest spelling system, no matter whether established by the Socialist party or any other. Similarly any émigré communiqué published in Spanish while General Franco's regime was still in power would use the spelling system of Franco-ruled Spain, because a civilized language has a unity which transcends political parties. But we have a problem. What language should we at the Institute use? If we use the latest orthography of the Soviet Ukraine, we shall immediately be called Muscophiles or Communists. On the other hand, our Institution is and will not be able to impose rules on the entire émigré press and radio. A second option is to use still another variant developed on the basis of our own scholarship. But nobody will follow us, because this variant will not be Banderite or Melnykite or UNR-ite orthography. Our problems are always politicized. The present Russification in the Ukraine is not so much a matter of coercion as a result of the fact that the Ukrainian language has never had *dignitas* among Ukrainians themselves, many of whom prefer to use the Russian

language because Russian has *dignitas*. For one reason or another, the Ukrainian language simply has not acquired it. So the question remains: Should we use the latest orthography, as all civilized nations do, or should we create still another orthography?

Discussion

STRUMINS'KYJ: I agree with Professor Pritsak's historical analysis. Of course, it is regrettable that these problems were not raised in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, nor adequately solved in the nineteenth century. To me, the ideal Ukrainian standard language in the nineteenth century would have been based on the language of the Severian land, using Galician theory about the nature of a standard language. The Severian land has the purest type of language, the least Polonized, and the most like Old Ukrainian. On the other hand, Galician methods were the most European. The Galicians realized that a standard language is created not only for belles-lettres and nursery rhymes but also for scholarship, the press, government, and so forth. Unfortunately, it turned out that a different place and different methods of formation were chosen. The dialect was located farther to the east—between Xarkiv and Kiev; not bad, perhaps, but not as good as the Černihiv region. The Galician ideas of a multi-functional standard language were not implemented. The consequences of this are still being felt. The Ukrainian language is still a language with limited functions in the Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainian has limited functions in this country, too. There is no Ukrainian language of technology. For example, someone who owns a car is unable to call a single cog by its Ukrainian name. In the Ukraine, Ukrainians call those cogs by their Russian name, in Poland by their Polish name, in Czechoslovakia by their Czech or Slovak names, in the United States by their English name.

With regard to my sample study, its representativeness, of course, was minimal. It indicated only the beginnings of what might be done. The point was to show the possibility of this kind of research.

With regard to studying the standard language versus the dialects, I chose the standard language. Other scholars are more interested in a lower level of language—the everyday speech. Žluktenko, e.g., has studied language that is heavily contaminated with English.* The dialects are more heavily Anglicized than the standard language.

*Jurij Žluktenko, *Ukrajins'ko-anglijs'ki mižovni vidnosyny: ukrajins'ka mova v SŠA i Kanadi* (Kiev, 1964).

If this institute were German rather than Ukrainian, I think it would also have problems because there are differences between East and West Germany. For example, West Germans spell *Slavistik* with a *v* in the old way, whereas the East Germans now use *w*.

Finally, there is the question of what orthography should be adopted. I would object to adopting mechanically the latest orthography used in the Ukraine just for the sake of consistency. If we maintain that there is Russification going on there (I would prefer the term *Muscovization*), which also affects orthography, e.g., the removal of the *r* letter, can we uncritically accept everything that is introduced? If tomorrow something else is removed from the orthography or if it is required that *стуть* be used instead of *стілець*, should this also be accepted? I prefer to keep some distance from the official language in the Soviet Ukraine, while at the same time recognizing its incontestable achievements, particularly in terminology. The ideal orthography would be a compromise between the Xarkiv and Kiev spelling systems. But how to achieve this is another question.

PRITSAK: I basically agree with what has been said, but I have a comment on the letter *r*, which is a sacred cow for Ukrainians. I do not view this as a crucial issue. Let us not forget that the person who concluded that /g/ was not a Ukrainian phoneme was none other than Ivan Ohijenko, minister of education in the cabinet of the Ukrainian People's Republic and later metropolitan of Xolm. It was he, and not the Bolsheviks, who removed the *r* from the Ukrainian alphabet. The Bolsheviks later accepted this. Ohijenko decided on the basis of linguistic studies that there was no /g/ in Ukrainian. Every language has a few words with a pronunciation different from the norm. I don't want to be misunderstood as advocating that we should remove the letter *r*. All I am saying is that we are fighting over a very insignificant matter. The presence or absence of this letter does not change the language in the least. Although the Bolsheviks have indeed done a lot of harm, some damage has been inflicted by other people.

I think that a compromise would indeed solve the problem. The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute is not just an émigré institution but is also a general American institution, and as such it cannot limit itself to the émigré language. Above all, it must deal

with the language of the Ukrainian SSR. One would have to take the latest dictionary now being printed—and which will eventually contain about 120,000–140,000 words**—and republish it with appropriate additions and variants. This practice is followed even in the Soviet orthographical dictionaries. A dictionary of the late 1920's has a more purely Ukrainian form as the first variant and a form closer to Russian as the second one. This second form is used in eastern Ukraine, where a different language character cannot be ignored. Present-day Soviet dictionaries do the reverse. A form closer to Russian is given first, with a more purely Ukrainian form as the second or third variant. I think one could have an intelligently edited dictionary where everything could be contained within an appropriate cross-referencing system. A Ukrainian writer would then use a dictionary where all options are cross-referenced. As we know, every form is part of the literary standard if it is used by a great poet. It can be as bad as the forms used by Gogol in Russian. But since they were used by Gogol, they became part of the Russian literary standard. One should always keep in mind that there is no pure language. Every standard language is a matter of convention. A pure language is found only on the level of the village. At a higher level, compromises are inevitable. If a first-class writer uses a word which violates grammar or syntax, it will become a model for the standard language from that moment on. The decisive factor is talent, because the standard language is a codification of intellect, of the possibilities for artistic expression and forms of communication. It seems to me that a dictionary where all this is codified would be a solution to the problem.

TERPAK: I would like to make a comment on the letter *ɾ*. Last year I was in Kiev, and Professor Žluktenko gave me a reader he had prepared.*** He uses *ɾ* in it. Earlier he had excluded it, but in this reader he included it again. He has also used the declension of all foreign loan words that end in *-o*. Now he declines them, whereas earlier he did not.

***Slovnyk ukrajins'koji movy*, edited by I. Bilodid (Kiev, 1970—).

***The reader in question was probably the manuscript of a new edition of *Ukrainian: A Textbook for Beginners* by Ju. Žluktenko et al. In the first edition of 1973, *ɾ* was read as a phonetic symbol only on p. 42 and foreign words in *-o* were mentioned as indeclinable on p. 77.

STRUMINS'KYJ: In general, there is more liberalism for export than at home. Likewise, *Visti z Ukrajiny* contains stories which would have no chance of appearing in Kiev. But the fact is interesting anyway.

GAJECKY: Professor Strumins'kyj, your list of words that are generally used in exile includes the word *селепко*. I wonder what its etymology is.

STRUMINS'KYJ: Somebody has written that the word originated in the SS-Galician division. Every recruit was contemptuously called *селепко*. Later it was spread by the division's ex-soldiers. *Селепко* was a simple recruit who understood nothing, did not know the military routine. Later it acquired a wider sense and came to be used as "simpleton, not very smart person," sometimes even in the sense of any average exile. *Selep* could be a local phonetic variant, showing pleophany of the root *selp-*. This root appears, for example, in *солопій* (gaper, starrer) and *солопити* (look at stupidly)—compare with *полова* (shaft) and *пелевень* (granary) from **pelv-*; and *Veles/Volas* (god of cattle) from **vels-*. Thus, it might have been an ancient local word, accidentally rediscovered for general public use before World War II, when thousands of Galicians met in the SS-Galician division and exchanged jokes and humorous names.

BAZANSKY: Professor Strumins'kyj has very extensively cited differences in the Ukrainian language, which I think can be reduced to opposed currents. The first current is the Ukrainian language of Kiev. We can sort out some unacceptable forms in it, such as *кафедра*, *Мефодій*, which come from Greek. The Greek should be pronounced as *t*, and so we can hardly accept forms with an *f* pronunciation. Other unacceptable elements are the typical Soviet forms, such as *соціалізм*, *клас*. The second current, the Ukrainian standard language abroad, also refuses to accept these. But it also refused to accept some forms which it should accept, e.g., *гімн*, which comes from Greek *hymnos*. There are many good forms in Soviet Ukrainian which should meet our approval. There are Soviet Ukrainian philologists who do honest research on the Ukrainian language. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of Muscovophilism as well.

You have treated the second group of words too liberally, including the grotesque *селенко*. Not all are accepted by the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, the Ševčenko Scientific Society, or experts in literature. You drew too largely on *Svoboda*, which does not have a linguistic's editor. The articles which you used were written by simple people, not by experts in literature. If a linguist were employed by *Svoboda*, he would probably adapt most of the newspaper to the new literary standard of Holoskevyč. Your extensive quotations would probably have to be based on the standard Ukrainian language abroad which is mostly correct. Of course, not everybody wants to comply with the standard. Linguists have recommended the use of *канадський*, and yet you will find *канадійський* in newspapers. Linguists teach us to use *Бразілія* and *Аргентіна*, which you quoted, because this is the way they are pronounced by native speakers. A controversy has begun about the proper spelling of "Chicago" and "Detroit." If we say that Ukrainian spelling is phonetic, then we should write *Дітройт*. Moreover, we spell Shakespeare as *Шекспір*, and not letter by letter. We should not pick up grotesque words and play with them. Most Ukrainian newspapers that have a linguistic's editor follow the standard, with or without the *r* letter. But there are Muscovophile words that we cannot accept, such as *канікули*, *вертолiт*, which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences smuggles into its scholarly publications.

In summary, we are dealing with two currents: the real standard Ukrainian in Kiev which does exist there, to the exclusion of foreign influence, and our own attempts to produce Ukrainian publications here in a pure Ukrainian language. We need help in eliminating all dialectisms and we need a linguistic's editor at every newspaper.

STRUMINS'KYJ: As far as *кафедра* or *кatedpa* are concerned, I must correct myself. I said that the 1933 spelling system had restored the Old Ruthenian practice. This is basically true, but there are inconsistencies. In Ukrainian church pronunciation one can observe that *θ* (theta) was also pronounced as *ft*, e.g., *Господь Саваофт*. In some cases it was even pronounced as *t*. For example, the members themselves of the St. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood used *t* in the name of Methodius. The Brother-

hood's seal is preserved, and it reads Братство св. Методія. But there are also folk Christian names like Федір or Хведір. So I think that the *f* pronunciation predominated. Granted, the Slavic ф letter corresponding to the Greek θ was used in the original forms, but we cannot always know how it was pronounced.

ŠEVČENKO: Polish influence and tradition were also involved. In medieval Latin of Central Europe, the Greet letter θ was pronounced *t*. This pronunciation entered Polish via Latin in the Middle Ages, and from Polish entered Ukrainian.

STRUMINS'KYJ: What we had is a choice between various traditions and it is rather a matter of convention which tradition we choose. However, the *f* seems to be most deeply rooted in the folk tradition.

Why did I draw so extensively on *Svoboda*? I also referred to *Sučasnist'*, but I concentrated on *Svoboda* for the simple reason that this is the most widely read newspaper in exile. It has contributions from people of various origin, western and eastern Ukrainians as well as people born here. It thus provides a broad cross section of society. Besides, even if someone writes in a language incorrect by literary standards, it is still interesting for a linguist. A linguist is not only interested in the correct language. There is a question in linguistics whether a linguist should be engaged in description or prescription. I think that he should do both.

Should we pronounce *Arhentina* because this is the way Argentinians themselves pronounce it? One of the mistakes of the Xarkiv spelling system was that it recommended the pronunciation of foreign loan words in the way they are pronounced in other languages. This is not always possible because phonetic systems do not correspond to one another. The Ukrainian [y] sound, unlike Russian [y] (orthographically ъ), is a front vowel with a rather high pitch and is not very different from Spanish or French [i]. Therefore the и letter was quite appropriate to render any Western European or foreign *i*. The tendency in the nineteenth century and in Hrinčenko's dictionary to render foreign [i]s by means of the и letter was sound; the *i* letter was introduced by Galicians, who simply followed the Polish practice.

Even the word *Біблія* was sometimes spelled *Библия* in the nineteenth century.

The word *канікули*, used in Russian and Ukrainian, is from Latin. It may very well exist in Ukrainian. It is not so bad. The question is only how strong was the tradition of the word *вакація* in Ukrainian and whether it was necessary to introduce another synonym. *Вертолiт* also exists as *вертолет* in Russian; it is a deft neologism which can be very easily assimilated to Ukrainian. I am not in principle against Russianisms if they agree with the morphology of Ukrainian. They can be assimilated and cause no harm to its system. And this is precisely the case of *вертолет/вертолiт*.

ŠEVČENKO: In practice, how do you envision the existence of a normative center in exile which would appeal to 700,000 Ukrainian-speaking people? This is not a small group. You seem to allude to this in your lecture. Although this would be quite contrary to Professor Pritsak's ideas, it should also be examined.

STRUMINS'KYJ: I see two options here. I once discussed one of them with Professor Pritsak. One option would be to publish a new edition of Holoskevych, trying to correct some obvious mistakes of 1928–1929, to make some additions and utilize the experience of the Soviet Ukraine since that time—some positive experience, because not everything has been negative. The other option is to publish an English-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-English dictionary which might compete with *Podvez'ko*, now the most popular dictionary, and where, as Professor Pritsak said, an alternative would be given to the standard represented by *Podvez'ko*. If such a dictionary gained popularity, it might also be a factor in forming a Ukrainian standard in the world.

PRITSAK: We have such great difficulties, primarily because almost nobody knows the Ukrainian language well and it is almost impossible for anybody to know it well. Every civilized nation has a dictionary of its language for a given century. We will know the Ukrainian language well only if we have a Ukrainian dictionary of the nineteenth century, say, until World War I, a dictionary of the Ukrainian classicists who created the language. Then we will see that most of the words which we now consider to be Russianisms,

including *канікули*, were used by Nečuj-Levyč'kyj and other classical writers. The problem is that *клас* seems horrible to a Galician who thinks that one should only say *кляса*. Hruševs'kyj once wrote: Щоб нам не відділитися, треба відділити "ся" (To avoid being separated from each other, we must separate the *sja* [from the verb]). Every group has its own usage, but the standard language must be accepted by everybody. There is no other way. There are some controversial problems, of course. As an example, I will tell you an anecdote which I heard in Kiev in 1940, apropos of the famous *лампа/лямпа* controversy. The question was whether the article in Arabic names should be written as *al* or *al'*. One orthographic guide published in Kiev in the 1920's, when there was relative freedom, had *al'*, while another had *al*; one had *лямпа* the other had *лампа*. The government did not yet meddle in these things. The permanent secretary of the Academy of Sciences who edited all this was Ahatanhel Kryms'kyj, my former teacher. When he changed *al* into *al'* in a new edition of the orthographic guide, Mychajlo Hruševs'kyj rushed into a meeting of the Academy of Sciences and announced: Панове, в академіка Кримського член* пом'кшав! ("Gentlemen, Academician Kryms'kyj's member has softened!").

*In Ukrainian this word has two meanings: 1. member; 2. article.

CHAPTER 8

New Directions in Ukrainian Poetry in the United States

George Grabowicz

New Directions, the term I use here, is taken as an organizing metaphor, a device to allow us to approach recent Ukrainian poetry in the United States as a literary and cultural phenomenon and to examine, if only in outline, some specific poets and their works. Not everything we will focus on is new or coalesces into a coherent direction, but, in the historical perspective of Ukrainian poetry and literature in general, this is clearly a new and distinct phase. Although in keeping with the overall bicentennial, or centennial, theme of our symposium, this poetry can be seen as an aspect of the Ukrainian experience in the United States, it is in no sense an ethnic phenomenon. It is determined solely by its relationship to the Ukrainian literary tradition. It draws on it, remolds it, rebels against it, and even mocks it, but in its structure it is a continuation of it and, in my opinion, with only a few notable exceptions, it is unaffected by the American cultural milieu.

A periodization of this poetry will illustrate our points. Since the first Ukrainian settlement in the United States, there have been, of course, literary efforts in verse, but for the most part they were crudely folkloristic, as exemplified by T. Fedyk's, *Pisni pro Kanadu i Avstriju*, with such *kolomyjka* strophes as:

Бо Канада є край ситий
Є де красно жити;
І бідному народови
Є де заробити . . . ¹

(This material is not readily accessible, although the archives of *Svoboda* must have a fair sampling. In Canada it has been enthusiastically collected by Yar Slavutych.) That which was not folkloristic was imitative and also crude and, as in the case of Mykola Tarnovs'kyj (no relation to Jurij or Ostap, or Marta

¹*Pisni pro Kanadu i Avstriju z dodatkom Pisnji ta Dumky pro Ščyns'koho*, comp. Teodor Fedyk (Winnipeg, 1914), p. 29.

Tarnav's'kyj), it was exhortatory and socialistic. This can be seen in the lines from one of his poems written in Detroit in 1916:

Прокився вже! Виходь з п'їтьми,
І правди світло пізнавай,
І крикни повними грудьми
—Вставай, робітнику, вставай!²

Poetry, that is, verse with literary value, and especially verse which we can consider as a broad, cultural and not individual phenomenon, appears, generally speaking, only after World War II, more specifically after 1950. It came from Europe with the "new," "political," or "politicized" emigration; more importantly, as far as its literary and cultural values and potentialities were concerned, it came fresh from a remarkable experience—the "small renaissance" of Ukrainian cultural and particularly literary life in the displaced person camps in the period of 1945–1950. It was then, after years of oppression and the horrors of war, that various writers were again at liberty to write and think and, what is very important, exist in centers of Ukrainian concentration, with Ukrainians from various backgrounds and from all parts of the Ukraine. This period saw the prolific publication (in small editions, on cheap paper, but in virtually every area of settlement) of literary studies, poetry, prose, essays, criticism, translations, and of course, a flood of political and polemical tracts. Various periodical publications came into being, devoted in greater or lesser degree to literature, for example, *Zahrava*, *Veži*, *Litavry*, *Steži*, and others. But, what is more important from our perspective, was the creation—already in September of 1945, even before basic services had been restored in war-torn Germany—of a Ukrainian literary organization called the *MUR* (*Mystec'kyj Ukrajin's'kyj Rux*—"The Ukrainian Artists' Movement"). The premises of this organization were, above all, a profound sense of duty toward Ukrainian literature and culture, a concomitant desire to free literary activity from factional orientations (which had indeed been a debilitating and provincializing factor in the interwar period), and secondly, the desire to make Ukrainian literature

²Mykola Tarnov's'kyj, *Vybrane* (Kiev, 1965), p. 96.

part of the general European stream without, however, in any way artificially limiting its unique national character. The activities of the MUR (whose membership included virtually all major writers and critics in the emigration) found its expression in literary almanacs, the monthly journal *Xors*, collective literary publications, and literary and scholarly publications.

In time, polemics and divisions developed, and the MUR eventually died a natural death when a great majority of the writers immigrated further west. But work had been done; thus, when *Slovo*, the Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile, came into being in the early 1950's, it unequivocally cast itself as a continuator of the MUR and its principles. But, even before this organization was formed, Ukrainian poetry was being written and published in the United States by its erstwhile members.

There is yet another crucial factor that needs to be introduced at the outset. Very simply, it is the fact that the poetry in question has no real geographical delimitation. Just as it is not "ethnic" by virtue of the fact that it is defined (and defines itself) by a set of Ukrainian, not American, cultural (and literary) norms and values, it is also not solely American (as the title of this talk suggests). For while many poets, in fact most of those we will discuss, have lived and published in the United States, many now live and publish in other Western countries. But Zujevs'kyj, who is now in Alberta, or Andijevs'ka in Munich, or Vira Vovk now in Rio de Janeiro have lived and published in the United States, and they are all part of one literary community. The latter two, in fact, were prominent members of the New York Group of Poets. Lest I be accused of dissimulation in the wording of my title, I do wish to note that technically and physically the main locus of the poetic activity in question is the United States, but again in its *deep structure*, if we can use that term here, this is simply "Ukrainian poetry in the West." And one should also note at this point, that the designation *émigré* is no longer entirely accurate, because in its most recent manifestations it is not really the poetry of writers who can be considered, or who consider themselves, *émigrés*.

The notion of technical or physical aspects leads us to a final preliminary point—the existence of an unusually large number of publications and channels in which this poetry is made public. It is

large not so much in comparison with other émigré groups (though I assume it is greater than most), as it is large especially in comparison to other periods in Ukrainian literary history. This, however, is something of a real embarrassment of riches, for the plenitude of published collections of poetry bespeaks not only literary vitality and fecundity, but often also a critical absence of quality control. It is most instructive for us when we find an absence of critical judgment even in such putatively critical publications as the two-volume anthology of Ukrainian poetry in the West, *Koordynaty*.³ There is much evidence for the conclusion that the poetry to which we are addressing ourselves exists independently of literary criticism, or any critical "establishment," or even independently of public acceptance or interest. While this is a generalization which does not apply to the major figures, who have both critical and public acclaim—as well as abuse—it is quite clear that there is no consensus among active critics as to even the most general outlines and qualities of the poetry in question; there is only a vacuum in this regard. With few exceptions, Ukrainian émigré critics have come to imitate poets and to align themselves according to poetic schools and sects. And this, of course, makes our task somewhat more difficult.

One of the first steps in studying the material at hand is to classify the Ukrainian poets who have lived and published in the United States; this, however, should not be done according to literary direction or persuasion (for example by recourse to the overused concept of neoclassicism, which for many in the emigration has become synonymous with "good poetry," thanks to the critical writings of Volodymyr Deržavyn, or of symbolism, which in this context is as vague a term as surrealism), nor according to the ahistorical and ultimately impressionistic categories of the "head, heart, and feet" of poetry (as is done by one critic, John Fizer, in his introduction to the anthology *Koordynaty*, wherein he categorizes and ranks various poets by semantic elements or by content, the "head", by emotional moments, the "heart", and finally the formal, prosodic elements, the "feet").⁴

³ *Koordynaty: Antolohija sučasnoji ukrajins'koji poeziji na zachodi*, 2 vols., ed. Bohdan Bojčuk and Bohdan T. Rubčak (n.p., 1969).

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. xxvi–xxxii. The scheme itself is borrowed from the critic John Crowe Ransom.

The most appropriate, the most functional categorization would be by generation. These generations are not determined solely by age, although this is important after all, but by the time and the historical circumstances in which the poets wrote, and the cultural experience which influenced them. The decisive factor is very frequently the moment when the given poet began to write and publish. And this allows us to construct the following scheme.

The first group, or "generation," consists of those poets who began writing and publishing before the Second World War, whether in the Soviet Ukraine, in the western Ukraine under Poland, in Czechoslovakia, or in Poland itself. It includes such major poets (and I use the term *major* with reference to the Ukrainian emigration, not to all of Ukrainian literature) as Malanjuk, Kravciv, Ljaturyns'ka, Os'mačka, Orest, Barka, Lesyč and Kosač; some less prominent ones as Lyman and Veretenčenko; and several quite minor ones (all of which are duly listed in the anthology we have mentioned). Most have published several collections of poetry in this country; for example, Malanjuk has published five, Kravciv three, Barka three, Kosač two, with one more published in Kiev, and so forth. With only a few exceptions, however, these poets took no new directions in their "American" works, and it is very indicative that many of these collections were simply reissues of earlier poetry: Kravciv's *Glosarij*, for example, was written in Regensburg in 1949 and published in the United States twenty-five years later; Os'mačka's *Iz-pid svitu* contained the long poem *Poet*, which was written during the emigration and was published subsequently again in the 1950's; Malanjuk's last collection *Serpen'* contained, along with poems written currently, verse from the 1930's. This publishing background, however, is only tangential evidence of the near-total absence of any development. The basic evidence is manifested in the poetry itself.

Malanjuk provides a good example. He is characterized in much of his late poetry of the emigration, and of the earlier period in Germany, by a general mood of resignation and grief and especially by meditation on the past, on history, on what has been called "an age cruel as a she-wolf" (a favored phrase of many of these writers). Characteristically, he links the personal and the generally historical. His is not an objective but a subjective view of history, which itself stems from the ideology of the interwar

period, principally voluntarism and the notion that the individual makes history. And one can, of course, discover here a real undercurrent of romanticism. If we take, for example, his "Njujors'ki stenohramy," we have a characteristic instance both of *Heimweh* and of a quiet despair:

І от життя веде криву
На злих координатах авеню і стрітів.

1.

В безсоняшних щілинах Мангаттану,
В каньйоні божевільного Бродвею
Ніколи—синява і сонце
—шум дерев
—і подих простору.

Ти, дню важкий,
Ти йдеш так мляво,
Все спотикаючись на перешкодах—
—заснуть—заснуть.
А старість усміхається єхидно.
І наляга велика втома дня.⁵

What is remarkable here—in Malanjud, as in all the poets of this group—is a very basic opposition between the new, the city, and the old, the country, which is usually bucolically depicted. (This strong undercurrent of antiurbanism will subsequently also become a major thematic focus for the New York Group of Poets.) In general, Malanjud is a very competent poet and often a very good one. But he obviously marks out no new directions. The same can be said for Os'mačka. There is a similar deepening of grief and of longing, and the little poetry that he wrote in the 1950's is only a commentary, an elaboration of his earlier works.

Barka, however, wrote much more, in fact, three collections of poetry, two novels dealing with the horror of the 1930's in the Ukraine, as well as essays and literary criticism. But again his poetic output is a clear continuation of earlier themes and works.

⁵ Evhen Malanjud, *Paeziji* (New York, 1954), p. 306.

There is still the influence of folk poetry and the *duma*, and of the Bible, on which he also stylizes his vision of a patriarchal Ukraine, a Ukraine that is idyllic and hermetic, and is the "ideal" counterpart to an unacceptable reality. Interestingly enough, there is also evidence in Barka's work of the influence of Tyčyna (this is all the more noteworthy, because, of all the major Ukrainian poets, Tyčyna had remarkably little influence on this generation).

When we take someone like Orest (who never lived in the United States and is included here only to illustrate his generation), we see that all five collections of his works form a whole; and to answer the question about growth or development in his work, one can cite his editor, the poet Ihor Kačurovs'kyj, who presents the following argument:

Creative growth? But already Orest's first collection which saw the light after a delay of many years, can serve as an example of formal perfection.

A change of style? But that is possible only when an artist is searching for a path to the heights [of poetry] and not when he is already there.

The only formal innovation of the *Pizni vrana* is *vers libre* (in the spirit of the "prosopoeia" of the half forgotten Arno Holz).

Indeed, all five collections of Myxajlo Orest constitute one whole. Among them there are no better or worse ones, stronger or weaker ones.⁶

In a sense, stasis is made into a positive value, and, above all, neoclassicism is now reduced to the notion of perfect poetry. This can only become a formula for poetic ossification. One is reminded of Tyčyna's allusive "definition" of the neoclassicist:

Я "неокласиків" не ганю
Хоч в них не річка, тільки став . . .⁷

Orest, indeed, is very narrow and self-contained, and his range of themes is reduced to meditation on autumn and nature, on melancholy and death. There are, to be sure, some interesting formal searchings, especially in strophes, and some variation on classical prosody, but as far as his lexicon is concerned, it can best

⁶Myxajlo Orest, *Pizni vrana* (Munich, 1965), p. 6.

⁷Pavlo Tyčyna, *V serci u mojim* . . . (Kiev, 1970), p. 155.

be summed up by the comments of an eminent critic of that time Jurij Šerex:

Since it [our émigré poetry] was extraordinarily clichéd in its syntax, it tried to make up for this by searching out uncommon, "poetic" words, carefully avoiding the words of natural speech. It came to such a pass that some poets write in an entirely un-Ukrainian vocabulary. Some only give surface Ukrainian form to typical Russian poetic expressions with their Church Slavonic components (all the *oboloky* and *prjanosti* in Orest), while others pore over dictionaries looking for rarities and forcefully stuff them into their verse (Slavutyč).⁸

Šerex polemicized very strongly with this belated brand of "neoclassicism," and particularly its major apologist, Deržavyn, and his opinion is often bitter. Yet I think it is largely accurate.

There is one large exception, however, to this group of poets and it is Kosač. He, rather than pining for the Ukraine, went back to see it. He broke step with the emigration; and it is immaterial for us whether his pro-Soviet period and ideological vacillations were good or bad. What is interesting is his search for new directions. He does, for example, depict the present-day Ukraine, as a tourist to be sure, not very deeply and with some idealization, but there is at least a confrontation of the past and the present. And what is also significant is that Kosač is the first and (with the possible exception of Lesyč) the only one of his generation to turn to the world around him. Whether his depiction is realistic or socialist-realist is again not all that important, although one can certainly focus on that issue. But the fact that he sees the world around him and takes it to be fitting material for poetry is important. He writes for example on such subjects as Broadway, Kennedy Airport, or a Manhattan bank. In his poem entitled "Broadway," he says:

Поплив він сурмами в столику ніч,
завив волторнами моторів, відвалив
драпіжні брили,
щоб заулки, пащі бірж і темінь брам
заголосили

⁸Jurij Šerex, "Velyka stattja pro malyj vîrs," in *Ne dlja ditej*, (New York, 1964), pp. 401-402.

по заграві, умерлій серед імл,
 по заграві, зів'ялій на світанні.
 І ніч відстукує хвилини куті
 скляними гранями прозорих будівель,
 і ніч, карбована приboями юрби,
 повзе удавом крізь асфальтів плити,
 крізь джунглі камінюччя, звали скель,
 щоб гад слизький, отрутою налитий,
 світлючим черевом життя живе давив.
 О захисте ділка, банкіра і прогнози,
 о шелесте захланного банкнота,
 о всеспустошуючий боже,
 утверджений на кам'яних висотах,
 у почті кациків холодного Уолл-Стріту,
 пливеш, пливеш, мов ідол мертвоокий,
 безоднями безликого Бродвею.⁹

Leaving aside the question of how good this poetry is (and it does have, of course, typical elements of rhetoricism that we also find in Malanjuk), this is a real thematic departure.

The second group of poets are those that started writing during the emigration in the period of 1945–1950, that is, in the displaced person camps. These are: Ostap Tarnavs'kyj, Ihor Kačurovs'kyj (who was never in the United States, but I include him here *pro forma*), Jar Slavutyč, Oleh Zujevs'kyj, Borys Oleksandriv, Leonyd Poltava, and others. To my mind, they are not very remarkable as a group, and in many respects their profile is similar to that of the older generation. They are characterized by a thematic and formal conservatism, and, to generalize rather broadly, they seem to be suspended between two worlds, belonging neither to the old nor the new. It is revealing, perhaps, that almost all of them place major emphasis on translation. Tarnavs'kyj, Kačurovs'kyj, Zujevs'kyj, and Slavutyč all translate and all write literary criticism. It is almost as if they were implying lack of confidence in their own voice and hedging on their poetic stance. A possible exception here might be Oleh Zujevs'kyj. It was already noted by Šerex in 1952 that his poetry is complex and

⁹Jurij Kosač, *Zoloti vorota* (New York, 1966), p. 43.

polysemous, even though basically symbolist (his collection *Pid znakom Feniksa*, published in 1958, is indeed contemporary neosymbolism; interestingly, it too is a retrospective collection, since many of the poems were written in the 1940's). But Zujevs'kyj is not very productive and is also rather static and fixated, and ultimately his recent work does not bear out the high hopes Šerex had placed in him.

It is to the third generation that we must turn to find the "new directions." This generation is largely, if not exclusively, represented by the New York Group of Poets. In order of their first poetic collections they are Emma Andijevs'ka (1951), Jurij Tarnavs'kyj (1956), Bohdan Rubčak (1956), Bohdan Bojčuk (1957), and Patricija Kylyna (1960); the poets Vira Vovk and Zenja Vasylykivs'ka, and the younger "fellow travelers" Oleh Koverko and Marco Carynnyk are also usually included here. Neither the date of the origin nor the date of the disappearance (if there was such) of the New York Group of Poets is clear, but their presence certainly was obvious from the late 1950's through the 1960's. It was clear and strong, and they were also clearly a group, even though frequently in polemic discourse they had occasion to deny their group status. What is very important for the New York Group as a literary phenomenon, is that this group had its organs—a yearly publication, *Novi poeziji*, and to a large extent the journal *Sučasnist'*. Even more importantly, they had their own criticism; that is, they had literary polemics and a literary theory, a theory regarding poetic language and specifically ideas concerning "new directions" for Ukrainian poetry in the West. They were also very conscious and goal-directed in their poetry. They were in that sense true descendants of the MUR, and, for that matter, similar to many of the Ukrainian groups of poets in the twenties.

Although they did not fully accept the American world—inasmuch as they still wrote in Ukrainian—they no longer were émigrés. They were very much in step with current Western poetic developments. At the same time, however, they were not part of the Western world, and this was the reason for the real dissociation of identity which not infrequently occurs in their poetry.

From the very beginning, the New York Group of Poets (and this applies *mutatis mutandis* to all of them) was largely isolated from the Ukrainian community, which found them a fascinating phenomenon. They had supporters and opponents, but no real resonance with it. They were in this world but not of it.

This isolation made them rather militant in their polemics and literary debates. But this is a very good thing: it is a sign of literary vitality, and in this too they were in the best tradition of the literature of the 1920's and of the period of the MUR. In retrospect, their rebellion or "impudence" may not have been as great, and certainly not as efficacious, as it was then perceived. Perhaps they appeared bolder than they really were, but whatever the final judgment will be, it is safe to say now that they did signal a real change in poetic values and direction.

Most evident were their thematic innovations: the city, and its surroundings were seen for the first time. There was, so to speak, an "existential" sense of belonging and of being in the real world, and it is very indicative that the first collection of Jurij Tarnavs'kyj's poetry was called *Žyttja v misti* (Life in the City), and the second *Popoludni v Pokipsi* (Afternoons in Poughkeepsie). There was still, to be sure, an opposition between city and country, city and nature, which runs through the collections just mentioned or through Rubčak's first collection of poetry, *Kaminnyj sad* (The Stone Orchard). The cityscape is horrifying and alienating, and certainly a dehumanizing element.

With the city, however, there is also the introduction of a major new theme—the erotic. We see this in the works of Tarnavs'kyj, Rubčak, Bojčuk, and later Carynnyk. Their poetry does not confine the erotic to love lyrics, however. Frequently the erotic is combined with *angst* and revulsion. An excellent example is Tarnavs'kyj's poem "Ljubov" (Love) from *Žyttja v misti*:

моя любов
банальна,
як смак банана
в роті,
та я мушу
цілувати

холодні уста
 моєї дівчини,
 доторкатись пальцями
 її шкіри,
 як цитрина, твердої
 і казати:
 я кохаю тебе!
 бо я людина¹⁰

From the same collection, the poem "Samota" (Loneliness), has a palpable combination of eroticism and alienation:

самітний гітарист
 під пласким небом,
 який плаче звуками,
 круглими, як сльози,
 людина в юрбі,
 серед поту і жовтих звуків,
 двоє в м'якому ліжку,
 які доторкаються білими животами
 і снять різні сни,
 чи я,
 ідучи вночі,
 а мої кроки,
 як магічне слово,
 повторюване безупинно

що є життя,
 як не будинок,
 повний пустих кімнат¹¹

From this peculiarly qualified eroticism also flows the theme of death, which, in one way, is not at all untypical for young poets, whatever their poetic beliefs. In our case, this is rather symptomatic of what is a basic common denominator for many of this

¹⁰Jurij Tarnav's'kyj, *Poeziji pro niščo i inši poeziji na cju samu temu* (New York, 1970), p. 10.

¹¹*Ibid.*

group, namely, the personal moment—the full emphasis on personal expression, in fact, radical personalism as self-revelation and psychological insight. A premium is put on depicting, in raw and immediate form, the most intimate of feelings. This is a strong counterbalance and corrective for the banality in the older poet's reflexive rhetoric and pathos. Unquestionably this constitutes a new poetic stance and a new sense of poetry.

With radical personalism there also comes an important emphasis on nonthematic poetry, with its major feature being the internalization of the external world. A most striking instance of this is found in the long prose poem *Bez Espaniji* by Jurij Tarnav's'kyj. A typical moment in this poem occurs in the section entitled *Vid'jizd I*, a rumination on the departure from Spain:

Жував дощ, і місто випльовувало мене; по моїх ногах, вгору, від черевиків, спиналися брудні сльози, які я не зумів із себе видобути; пам'ять голодних післявоєнних днів, у формі непрозорих чоловіків, напала на мене і видирала з мого тіла куски м'яса, що негайно перетворювалися на великі болючі банкноти; на дорозі з Більбао сиділа смерть, одягнена у великий грузовик, помальований на червоно, і пінилася (піною зі слини та крові) з люті, що тимчасово я втік від неї; великий кран, як грамофон, що повторює одну фразу, постійно переносив із суші на корабель ящик, що тріщав від моєї душі; мигали крізь мене кімнати, наповнені поверховими ліжками, бачажем, нами самими і, вперше після довгого насу, англійською мовою.¹²

The new directions that are marked out here are evident. Apart from the thematic departures, there is a reliance on a freely associative stream of consciousness, the expansion of the poetic language into prose, or, more precisely, the destruction of the turgid "poetic language" (cf. Šerex) of the preceding generation, and especially the introduction of surrealist poetics—not so much by way of automatic writing as by the focus on innermost

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 131.

unconscious and preconscious experiences.

One might be inclined to see in the poetry of the New York Group a certain modeling on modern Western poets; the names of T.S. Eliot, Garcia Lorca, and Pablo Neruda come easily to mind. With but an occasional exception, however, the Ukrainian poets do not readily admit such influences. Their reluctance to do so seems valid, for at issue are not "influences" as such, but their general willingness to share the premises and concerns of modern Western poetry.

An apparent corollary of this is the structured absence of any depiction or any real interest in everyday reality, in social problems, the *pobut*, as it were, of the communities in which they exist, be it the narrower Ukrainian or the general American one. In this, they differ significantly from the great majority of contemporary American poets, who, it seems, are very much engaged. That this is a *structured*, not accidental absence, is evident. It flows from their perceived and to some extent self-imposed isolation from society (specifically the Ukrainian).

Another element that is largely absent from most of this poetry is humor, including satire and irony. This may well be a result of the characteristic "self-sufficiency" or noninvolvement of this poetry. There is no Galczynski or Edvard Strixa among these poets. Like their émigré predecessors, they take their poetry very seriously; rather than achieving distance and self-control, they are often on or beyond the brink of self-importance—and this, one may submit, is only a natural reaction to the nonstatus that poetry and literature in general has in the Ukrainian community at large. It may also be an aspect of a basic romanticism: for them poetry is above all inspiration and experience and not a social artifact or statement in the vein of a Tyčyna or a Tuwim.

A major development associated with the New York Group concerns their interest in literary theory, specifically the debate conducted mainly in 1969 on the perspectives and "new directions" for modern Ukrainian poetry. Significantly, this occurred much at the same time that a similar debate on the nature and uses of translation was going on in the Soviet Ukraine. The significance lies precisely in the relative simultaneity of these events, which argues for a greater degree of (spiritual) contact

than one might have expected. In short, the thesis was posed, principally by Tarnavs'kyj and Rubčak, that Ukrainian poetry has two possible courses open to it, both predicated on the attitude to language. The first was that the language could be made denser, more elaborate, "more Ukrainian," and the second that the language could be made clearer, more transparent, "more international," more removed from the "baroque complexity" (as the term was used) of the natural language. As opposing critics brought out, this can, in one sense, be translated as making vice into virtue, as justifying the particular linguistic limitations from which the given poet may have suffered. Basically, however, that is an argument *ad hominem*; the issue is theoretically valid and not to be dismissed. While its merits and ramifications cannot be developed here, it must be seen as a significant formulation with particular relevance for the history of Ukrainian émigré literature.

To turn very briefly to the formal aspects of this poetry, one can see that in some respects the practice of the New York Group paralleled the developments in Soviet Ukrainian poetry. This is reflected above all in the dominance of the small lyrical form. There were also cycles of poems, but very few long poems, nothing approximating, for example, the long poems of Klen (*Popil imperij*), Os'mačka (*Poet*), or Barka (*Okean*). (Closest to this are such works as Bojčuk's *Zemlja bula pustošna* and Tarnavs'kyj's above-mentioned *Bez Espaniji*. It is quite significant for the future development of Ukrainian literature in the West, that one of these poets, Emma Andijevs'ka, has also been writing prose, as manifested most recently by two long and intricate novels.) In prosody there was an emphasis on assonance, on oblique rhymes, on blank verse, and on greater modulation of syntax. Poetry was seen primarily as the play of imagery, frequently surreal or fragmented. There was an interesting postulate of mechanization, going so far as to use—or pretend to use—a computer as a co-poetic terminus. The lexicon of some (e.g., Tarnavs'kyj or Kylyna) was greatly simplified, but in contrast to a poet like Tyčyna, it often was not supple. When this charge was raised, it was claimed that the awkwardness that resulted was intentional. Thus, along with the introduction of new devices and means of

expression, there was the still more basic shift in esthetic criteria. The difficulty this caused to the traditional-minded critics was considerable.

One criterion that remains rather fixed is that of the efficacy of the poem. And here the question can be put in the following manner. To take perhaps the most experimental of these poets, Tarnavs'kyj, it is clear that the play of form and composition is *motivated*, it does have a real function, it provides what he intends to provide—namely, immediate emotional contact, self-revelation, and a break with tradition; his poetry, which he calls antisymbolist or "choseist," does *épater le bourgeois* but it also deautomatizes our sense of poetry, for in a paradoxical way one can deautomatize the perception of poetry precisely by automatizing language. But while Tarnavs'kyj is very inventive (more so than any poet of this group, with the possible exception of Andijevs'ka) he is often testing the limits of poetry. The title of a collection of his works, *Poeziji pro niščo i inši poeziji na cju samu temu* ("Poems About Nothing and Other Poems on the Same Subject"), while very much a provocation, is also expressive of this "extremism." The near total emphasis, however, on the rational construction of imagery and language (implicit in the idea of automatizing language, as in a computer) has the great potential danger of reducing or deleting the emotional content of the poem. This, not the flouting of conventions or easy accessibility, is the most serious problem facing his poetry.

It is interesting to note a variation on these searchings in the poetry of Marco Carynnyk. Various themes are continued—for example, the erotic, but new moments are also introduced, most notably humor and irony. Carynnyk, of all the poets surveyed here, is the closest to creating that which has not yet attained full presence in Ukrainian poetry, i.e., nonsense verse—a not at all unimportant phenomenon.

I have left the most difficult of these poets for last, and that is Emma Andijevs'ka. One way to approach her work is to look first at the critical reaction to her poetry—which has been puzzled and contradictory in the extreme. Some, like the critic Emmanuil Rajs have tended to canonize her as a genius; others like K. Mytrovyč

have indiscriminately seen myth and mysticism in her work; for one critic, B. Romanenčuk, her poetry is basically words, nicely put together; for another, V. Lesyč, her poetry has the grace of a fakir dancing on sharp spikes. Attempts to synthesize these views are not very effective, precisely because there is no consensus, but more importantly no real understanding to synthesize. B. Rubčak, however, makes two important points.¹³ One is the accurate observation that Andijevs'ka has a maniacal focus or a maniacal precision of detail; the other is the contention that her world is a world that is constructed with reference to no other criteria, whether historical, social, or conventional; in short, hers is a purely individual world. And one may submit that this is very much like a classical definition of a psychological disorder, clinically called schizophrenia. Now I say this not with humorous intent, and not as a final judgment on Andijevs'ka's work, but as a means for capturing or intimating the disturbing and very frustrating nature of her poetry. If one were to coin a metaphor for it, it would be like hearing a beautiful, well-known tune played on a broken instrument. To illustrate this one can take a very early poem, "Seredn'ovične":

Засувами двері:
Більше нікого не впустять.
З пальців скапують звірі.
Палять—і потом постіль.

По плечі голову в душу.
Ніжність важча олива.
Тільки навіщо дуже
Тільки навіщо голову.

Царствує бубликом племінь,
Свічі з білого грому.
Тіло, як свіжа пляма,
Вставлене в смерть, як в раму.¹⁴

¹³*Koordynaty*, pp. 361–370.

¹⁴Emma Andijevs'ka, *Poeziji* (n.p., 1951), p. 24.

Or one can take a poem written more than twenty years later, for example:

Голос з зеленою ніжкою.
Світло з трикутним копитцем.
За щогою водограю
Жокеї і тінь від ворожки,—
Півроку іде краєвид
До струмка в гості.¹⁵

What is the basic feature here and throughout her poetry? It is, above all, fragmentation of the represented world, of the mood itself, of even a single image. Everything is reflected as in a shattered mirror, in fragments. The technique in virtually all her poetry is to build up—a scene, a mood, an image—and then immediately to shift and before completing it to tear it down. Her works are constructed in a private code, one at least as complex as Mandel'stam's, but a code in which the reference points are not concrete, verifiable phenomena such as historical events, literary allusions, the treasure house of world culture, but instead are dreams, traumas, and generally the life of the unconscious. As difficult as it is, however, her private code can be deciphered, but only when the whole of her *oeuvre* is taken and the pattern of meaning in her images, symbols, and associations is teased out. A skeleton key to this code must be her prose, for it is there that one can find the larger units from which the overall structure of her art and psyche can be deduced. When the attempt is made, and even a partial answer offered, Ukrainian poetry will be seen as having one of the most fascinating talents writing in the world today.

But even without Andrijevs'ka, Ukrainian poetry in the West, specifically in the United States, presents an interesting, complex, and, for all its problems, a basically vital phenomenon. The very fact of a movement, in the most recent writings, from the abstract and "self-sufficient" to a more engaged poetry is a clear sign of vitality. The very fact that the process is dynamic and ongoing also makes it difficult for us to formulate any final opinions. We are still much too close to it to see its full outline.

¹⁵ Emma Andrijevs'ka, *Nauka pro zemlju* (Munich, 1975), p. 38.

Commentary

Leonid Rudnytzky

The scheme presented by Professor Grabowicz, i.e., the division of contemporary Ukrainian writers into three groups or generations, is a sound one. It is in accord with the categorization made by Hryhorij Kostyuk in his address to the Fourth Congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Association (Ob'jednannja Ukrajin's'kyx Pys'mennikov 'Slovo') held in New York on November 28–29, 1970.* It appears to me, however, that the "new directions" in Ukrainian poetry in the United States, which Professor Grabowicz attributes exclusively to the third generation of poets, had their beginnings already in the first two generations of poets.

Let us, for example, take the poetry of the late Evhen Malanjuk. He is usually placed in the traditional camp, and according to Professor Grabowicz, "he obviously marks out no new directions." Thematically that may well be correct; formally, however, that statement may not be accepted without reservations. To be sure, Malanjuk adhered to a balanced metrical system; his stanzas are also close to traditional ones, as are his rhymes, musical devices, and so on. A closer examination of his poetry, however, reveals (as was pointed out by Bohdan Bojčuk in the *Slovo* collection of 1968), that Malanjuk broke all established norms in almost every stanza of his poetry. Even the rhythm of his poetry changes according to the demands of the individual poem. In violating the norms he was able to accumulate the necessary rhythmic voltage to produce quite frequently an almost shocking effect of cataclysm, of pain, of tragedy. Since innovation of form is an important factor in the formation of "new directions," Malanjuk's work is of significance for us.

Professor Grabowicz, perhaps, also somewhat underestimates the significance of Vadym Lesyč, who is still very active. The influence of painting is quite perceptible on his verses lending them a new nontraditional quality, which makes them difficult to classify. Lesyč ranges between expressionism and surrealism, and his poetry contributes to the new dimensions of the Ukrainian lyric. From that generation, too, I should mention Sviatoslav

*Cf. *Sučasnist'*, XI, 9 and 10 (Munich, 1971), pp. 37–63 and 63–82.

Hordynskyj, whose work brought a certain West-European élan to Ukrainian poetry, as well as Bohdan Nyžankivs'kyj, whose contribution will be discussed later. On the other hand, Kosač is, in my opinion, much more important as a prose writer than as a poet.

Professor Grabowicz's remarks on the second generation of Ukrainian poets could have been more generous, although on the whole they are, probably, quite true. However, the fact that all these poets translate and write literary criticism need not imply a "lack of confidence in their own voice." They are for the most part highly educated men, who see a definite need for translations into Ukrainian. Let us not forget that some of the greatest original talents (Goethe, Schiller, and our own Ivan Franko, to name a few), were also very competent translators. In addition to Ostap Tarnavs'kyj (incidentally, he is another poet who was strongly influenced by Tyčyna), who is still quite productive, another name should be mentioned. I have in mind Petro Karpenko-Krynycja, whose work is often neglected by the critics, perhaps, because he is removed from the mainstream of Ukrainian life in the United States. It would appear, that his work falls under the heading "new directions" in Ukrainian poetry. His manner is spontaneous, his attitude antiestablishment, and his poetry thematically innovative and dissociated from Ukrainian tradition. For example, see his *Indijans'ky baljady* (Indian Ballads) written in 1968.

Thus, in a sense, the new directions in Ukrainian poetry which, according to Professor Grabowicz, developed within the New York Group of Poets, have had, it seems to me, organic roots in preceeding generations.

Professor Grabowicz's paper offers numerous insights into the poetry of the New York Group. He is undoubtedly correct when he states that the Ukrainian poets of that group "share the premises and concerns of modern western poetry." This to me is the essence of their "new directions." There appears to be a conscious, or at times, perhaps, unconscious effort on the part of the poets to make Ukrainian poetry consonant with the contemporary poetry of the Western world. In reading Ukrainian poetry written in the United States, one cannot help noticing a spiritual

kinship between Ukrainian poets and those of the United States, England, France, Spain, and other Western countries. These cultural affinities or even influences are manifested throughout. Thus for example, Bojčuk's poetry shows that he did not study T.S. Eliot in vain. Even the title of his collection, mentioned by Professor Grabowicz, *Zemlja bula pustošna*, shows this affinity. Also, the "knifelike" pathos of Spanish poetry, lean and sinuous, not unlike the body of a Spanish matador, has made its imprint on him. But all these external sources are only peripheral to the Ukrainian ethos, which pervades his work.

Similar statements about literary kinship with a non-Ukrainian tradition can be made about other leading poets of the New York Group, in whose works, however, the Ukrainian heritage is not as vibrantly present. Jurij Tarnav's'kyj, for example, owes a debt to Spanish poets, notably to Juan Ramón, Jiménez, and García Lorca; Ženja Vasył'kivs'ka to the Americans and the Spanish; Carynnyk to the Anglo-American poetic world. It is safe to state that these foreign resonances in Ukrainian literature and the accompanying zest for experimentation are, at least partly, responsible for the "new directions" in Ukrainian poetry. Nonetheless, it would appear that the age of exploration of new poetic horizons, in the manner of the New York Group, is presently on the wane. As an example, let us look briefly at Rubčak. His work published over the last few years in *Sučasnist'* indicates a turn toward tradition, one is almost tempted to say, toward a sort of neoclassicism of, for example, a Plužnyk. This could well indicate that the present stage of development of Ukrainian poetry in the United States is completing its cycle. In addition, let me offer a more cogent example. Since 1959, the New York Group of Poets has published a journal of poetry and translations entitled, significantly, *Novi poeziji* ("New Poems"), where in addition to the aforementioned poets the following people published their works: Emma Andijevs'ka, Patricija Kylyna, Vira Vovk, Wolfram Burghart, Oleh Koverko, Jurij Kolomyjec', Danylo Struk, Kateryna Horbač, and others. It was (or is?) a journal which published truly new, experimental poetry mostly by American-based poets, but, as can be seen from the names, also by those living beyond these shores. To the best of my knowledge, the last

issue of that journal appeared in 1971. That is significant. *Novi poeziji* has not appeared for a period of eight years, and here, I believe, is one of the basic problems. In order to develop "new directions," poetry must have a forum, and this is now lacking. *Sučasnist'* is not enough; it is not exclusively devoted to literature, neither is the journal *Novi dni*, and the *Slovo* collections are just that—collections; they simply contain what has been collected and do not stimulate creativity. On the other hand, there is the journal *Lys Mykhta*, and although it is not a literary journal, it has served as a factor in developing what, with certain reservation, may be called a new direction in Ukrainian poetry—namely that of humor and satire. *Lys Mykhta*, I submit, has inspired authentic and rather merciless satirical poetry. It has furthered the development of Nyžankivs'kij-Babaj, who, liberating himself from the influences of Malanjuk and Kravciv, has reached his poetic zenith as a satirist with the collection *Karuselja viršiv* (1976); it has contributed to the poetic maturity of the talented Australian-based poetess Zoja Kohut, and it has given a new impetus to the poetry of Ostap Tarnavs'kyj, who contributes his satirical verse to the journal under the pseudonym Irynej Veres. Thus, there appear to be two new directions in Ukrainian poetry in the United States: a development toward what may be called a "more international" poetry, on the one hand, and toward a new type of ironic, satiric verse, on the other.

In conclusion, it should be added that there are poets who attempt to find a synthesis of traditional and modern ways in both form and content. An example of such a search is the work of Marta Tarnavs'ka. Her poetry has appeared primarily in *Sučasnist'*, and she also has one collection to her credit entitled *Xvalju iljuziju* (In Praise of Illusion, 1972). In Tarnavs'ka's poetry the ancient absolutes have been reduced to two: birth and death. Whatever lies in between—art, religion, literature, love—is illusory. Hers is a philosophical poetry but at the same time direct and immediate, not given to empty abstractions, not to flights of fancy, nor to the shock-effect found in some of the younger writers, e.g., M. Carynnyk. In her cycle entitled *Traveloh*,** Tarnavs'ka manifests her perception of tradition. Her subject

***Sučasnist'*, XIV, 12 (Munich, 1974), pp. 3-6.

matter is old—the Ukraine; her form modern, yet not unrhythmical or cacaphonic, and her treatment of the subject matter—sober and objective, but also quite personal. The image of the Ukraine in her poetry, for example, crystallizes out of various constituent parts, and never once is the name *Ukraine* itself mentioned. Perhaps, the synthesis achieved in Marta Tarnavs'ka's poetry is an indicator of the general direction in which Ukrainian poetry in the United States will continue to develop.

CHAPTER 9

Introductory Remarks

Ihor Ševčenko

In its impact on the majority of Americans (let alone the consciousness of the American elite) the Ukrainian community has lagged behind others, at least until recently. Sociologists categorize Ukrainian Americans as a minor ethnic group—a mere million does not permit a higher rating in a nation as populous as ours. The popular press has never heard of Volodymyr Kronkajtenko or Varvara Val'terovyč. To be sure, Ukrainians can claim Jack Palance, a film star of international fame who is with us tonight, but even this formidable performer cannot singlehandedly change the overall picture. Professional football, that modern form of gladiatorial combat that has been the avenue of social ascent for so many newcomers to the American scene and has sapped the creative energies of so many millions of its viewers (including those of your introducer), has no Ukrainian presence anything like that of some other ethnic groups—Poles, Serbs, or Hungarians, for example. There is a Joe Namath, but no Josyp Nimec'.

In one respect, however, the Ukrainian community in the United States has outdistanced most other ethnic groups, large and small. It completed a couple of long forward passes that placed the ball in the welcoming hands of receivers in Harvard Yard and resulted in the establishment of a Ukrainian Studies Program in Cambridge. Sociologists and cultural historians could provide us with some obvious reasons for this success: the social composition of the Ukrainian immigrant body, especially after World War II, and the premium placed on learning and scholarship by groups deprived of other avenues of achievement in their homelands. But it is not my function to touch upon these points here.

In descriptive terms, this success was the result of a conscious decision and financial efforts undertaken by the *senior pars* of the Ukrainian community, of which you are the chosen representa-

tives: it is therefore proper that this banquet should have been convoked in your honor. All of us should also give credit to the authorities at Harvard who, by supporting our enterprise, showed not only appreciation for a legitimate field of study but also an alertness to the thriving Ukrainian community that exists in the United States today.

The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute cannot neglect its ethnic studies, but neither should it dwell too much upon them. To do so would be to misinterpret both its mandate and Harvard's. The Institute's main task must remain the study of what is an intelligible field of research—the territory of the Ukraine (today a country of 47 million people) in historical time—and that leaves us with at least 2,500 years on our hands. But the mere fact that the Institute exists here at Harvard also requires us not to ignore the growth of ethnic awareness in present-day American society.

In a word, the situation is this: the recipe for success and acceptance in America held out by the spokesmen of 75 percent of the population to its remaining 25 percent is no longer accepted without question or even universally believed. According to that recipe, the old settlers, the "real" Americans of western European stock, set up a society that was in principle exemplary and open to all. In that society, the newcomers' road to success was open, but it led first through assimilation. Today, however, sociologists write books with titles like *The New Ethnicity* and *Beyond the Melting Pot*, and our speaker of the evening shook his finger at the assimilationists among us by writing about the *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*. In short—and I am not expressing a value judgment—the melting pot is no longer willingly and universally jumped into by every newcomer to our country invited to enjoy the bliss that presumably ensues from such an act. At least that is the situation today. But what of the next ten years? The question is not without importance to our enterprise.

No one is better qualified to enlighten us on this topic than tonight's speaker, Michael Novak, Watson-Ledden Distinguished Professor of Religion at Syracuse University. He is himself of Slovak origin and a Catholic, and he does not mind saying so; to the contrary, he finds a source of strength in those two roots and

derives his identity from them. Originally he was destined for the priesthood, studied both at the famous Gregorianum in Rome and at the Catholic University of America, and retained his interest in religious studies throughout his career. During the next stage in his education, which extended from 1960 to 1965, Professor Novak studied at Harvard. He began his teaching career as a professor of humanities at Stanford University, where he was voted their most popular professor on one occasion and their most influential on another. Then followed a number of teaching and research posts, including a professorship at the State University of New York, a distinguished lectureship at the University of California, a scholarship-in-residence at the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, and, finally, his appointment at Syracuse. But Professor Novak is not a mere dweller in the ivory tower: between his studies and his teaching assignments, he wrote a novel, served on the campaign staffs of Sargent Shriver, Edmund Muskie, and George McGovern, and wrote speeches for some of them. In 1974 he was appointed associate director for the humanities at the Rockefeller Foundation; he wrote weekly columns for the National Catholic Feature Service, and was on the editorial staff of the *Christian Century* and of *Commonweal*, among other publications. He is also a holder of two doctorates *honoris causa*.

To the world of nonspecialists, our speaker is best known for his *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (first published in 1971), which provided me with a number of revelations. In that book he is—shall we say—lukewarm in his appreciation of the mainstream culture of America. He advocates a multiculturalism of ethnic groups, and he proposes that we build one around the notions of family and neighborhood; he offers the suggestion that we think small in politics, and he dreams of a Democratic party that would be an alliance of ethnic groups.

As he believes in the ethnic virtue of open expression of one's feelings, in his book he shows no awe for the pundits of the northeastern intellectual establishment. But he knows and quotes—mostly approvingly—all of them: Oscar Handlin, Nathan Glazer, David Riesman, and Daniel Bell. I suspect that he is not displeased with the prospect of speaking his mind tonight on

their own turf.

Professor Novak is a vivid writer and a master of epigram. He tells us, for example, that "the innocence of Johnny Carson's face insults the night," and that "education in America has not been conceived as a search into historical roots. It has been conceived as an indoctrination into superculture." We are in for a treat this evening.

The New Ethnicity: The Next Ten Years

Michael Novak

I am extremely happy and honored to share this evening with you, because all over the country many of us from various Eastern European, Southern European, and other backgrounds, hold in very high esteem what the Ukrainian Americans have done here. Through your achievements you have been a kind of model for many others, and in the future we shall all, I hope, imitate what you have done. I thank you very deeply for that and for inviting me to share this moment with you.

I trust you will forgive me if I try my best not to lecture but to make some remarks with a certain informality and lightness, yet I hope with a certain cogency and substance, because what we are doing here, all around the country, and indeed all around the world, is of exceeding importance not only to ourselves in the United States but to many suffering people on this planet.

I want to make my remarks under three brief headings. The first one concerns the structure of society and the factors which guarantee that ethnicity will be a very important theme for many years to come. The second concerns some of the deficiencies in the way in which the United States of America, this country we so deeply love and to which we owe so much, treats its own pluralism. In principle, there is hardly a better set of principles in the world; in practice, there are severe deficiencies. And, thirdly, I would like to propose some tasks for the future.

First, then, the reasons for the rise in ethnic consciousness. All around the world people were predicting that ethnic-consciousness would come to an end at the close of the twentieth century. Yet the ethnic factor is becoming a dominant force in world affairs. All over the planet there are movements of national liberation, attempts to make the boundaries of states cohere with the boundaries of cultures. But, more deeply still, there is a certain dissatisfaction with one aspect of modernity, with what some have called the Coca-Colanization of the world—the “Pepsification” of the world. You saw the Olympics. Joe Namath was saying, “The world is a smaller place now. All around the

world men are using Brut." "Progress," in a word, "is our most important product." When all the men of the world smell of Brut, it will be a happier and a better place.

No one would deny all the great things that modernity has brought to the human race: longevity, the cheap construction processes that give us buildings like this, that allow us the profits and the affluence to endow academic chairs, and the time to come to such affairs like this evening's. No one wants to turn the clock back. The present revolt against modernity is not against every aspect of modernity.

There is one thing that modernization promised but did not deliver: the myth that in becoming a modern world we would become more humane, more moral. It does not follow that because people are modern, they know how to live. It does not follow that because people have learned all the modern skills they are moral and humanistic persons.

The revolt against modernity is a search for a moral vision. One sees it in Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe. In America too, one sees people turning again to their own guts, to their own memories, to their own traditions, trying to see whether they haven't given up too many things of great value for the sake of modernity and recognizing the fundamental law of human life: that all originality and all creativity and all moral vision come ultimately from the depths of the self.

If people around this planet ask the question: "Who am I? How should I live?" they are led to another question, "Who are we?" because the individual does not create himself. When you begin to discover "Who am I?" you invariably discover that you have been shaped by a culture older than a thousand years.

Before we became conscious of who we are, we had already been shaped by grandparents that we did not choose, by parents that we did not choose, and they in turn by others back through the generations. Ethnicity endures exactly because it has been passed on unconsciously. No books have yet been written telling us how to transmit culture.

As it is, we all pass on ways of looking at the world unconsciously: in the way mothers hold their children, in the way fathers talk to their children, what they encourage them to laugh at, what

they allow them to cry at. In hundreds of unconscious ways, we pass on those tacit elements of human living. Those secret and those quiet ways of human knowing that endure because we are not conscious of them and whose power is so deep that they are the fundamental elements of culture. The greatest musicians, the greatest poets, the greatest artists, are barely able to put into words or sounds or pictures what the people carry with them unconsciously. They do not even begin to exhaust the ¹⁹¹alth and the wisdom which people carry within them. Art is a never-ending pursuit, an attempt to articulate what is essentially inexhaustible.

The new ethnicity differs from the old ethnicity because it is not tribal. Modernity taught us all sorts of things. We cannot go back to the old ethnicity. We cannot go back to being tribal-minded. My mother always told me "Michael, marry a good Slovak girl." It was easier then. A generation ago, one could grow up in neighborhoods in New York, or Cleveland, or Plains, Ga., and never meet anybody outside one's ethnic group.

Modernity means that we have met the others, we have lived with the others, we have assimilated a great deal from the others, we have learned a lot from one another. You cannot survive in New York City unless you have acquired some *chutzpah*, a Yiddish word I would translate as creative arrogance—what Kojak has. But, as Kojak himself shows, you do not have to be Jewish to have *chutzpah*. It can be learned. You don't have to be black to have "soul." The beauty of being an American is that we have the opportunity to adapt from one another's behavior those elements that suit us, and at the same time to remain ourselves.

The new ethnicity is a hunger for moral vision, a hunger for authenticity, for a way of being oneself, of not having to be like all the others, and of defining one's individuality—whether as a politician, a steel maker, or an artist—simply as a human being.

Now, some of you will recognize the truth in the following story, a little overstated perhaps, but a true one, nonetheless. Remember how the press always described Senator Muskie in 1972? They always called him "testy Ed Muskie." I realized all of a sudden that "testy" is a code word for "Polish." Every Eastern European, male or female, as you know, has a moral obligation to

get angry three times a day. Among us, anger is not a deeply inhibited emotion. If you've ever been in a traffic jam in Rome, you've seen people jump out of their cars, yelling and screaming, but never touching one another. There must be sixty different words for "stupid" in Italian. Some people from the North of Europe and from the United States often feel that such conduct is immature. And what we consider mature behavior, for example, is sitting in a traffic jam in New York City with our windows rolled up, listening to our stomach juices drip. Now that's mature.

There are people in the United States who will pay \$120 a weekend to learn how to scream, yell, shout, and cry. If you're born Ukrainian, Jewish, Italian, or Greek, you get that free.

Now it is very satisfying to discover that in the United States there are wide ranges of emotion that are open to some people and closed to other people. You just don't do certain things if you come from a certain part of the country or belong to a certain tradition. Of course, you can learn to do it, but it is very hard.

To reiterate, the new ethnicity offers us a way of being ourselves and at the same time respecting multiple possibilities in the world around us. We cannot go back to being tribal. We are cosmopolitan. The new ethnicity is an appeal to be ourselves, to respect others, and to learn from them, but above all to be faithful to those insights, those points of view, those visions which are original, which constitute the genuine sources of morality. If you don't have a link between the depths of your personality and its outward expression, then something is wrong with the culture, something has been interrupted. And a great many people in the United States have been so blunted. I want to use just one more example, if I may, to emphasize the point.

George McGovern gave a speech once in Los Angeles, at Watts. It was the last day of the primaries in 1972 in California. He had never won the black vote anywhere. Now, George McGovern is as ethnic as you or I. He is Scotch-Irish, Methodist. So is George Wallace, and, except that he's Baptist, so is Jimmy Carter; but McGovern comes from a different region of the country than Jimmy Carter or George Wallace, a region strong in Scandinavian and German traditions, a region where silence is valued, where a man of wisdom is not a man of many words, where a certain

reserve is esteemed. It's hard for George McGovern to make a gesture larger than a wave of the hand without feeling embarrassed. He also has a light voice, like mine.

Well, he came to Watts, almost a sacred place because of the riots, and there was a terrific crowd. It was a beautiful Sunday morning and there was a fantastic rock band, with speakers taller than any two persons in this room. The area was full of black families picnicking. The only white faces were from the press buses and McGovern's staff. To make things more exciting, word had just come down from Los Angeles that Angela Davis, the black activist, had just been acquitted by the courts. So the crowd was ebullient.

Now, McGovern had always lost the black vote to Hubert Humphrey. In California in 1972 his opposition was Humphrey again. So it was an important occasion for him, and he started to speak with the music drowning out his little, light, thin voice, which already put him at a disadvantage. He said, "I've just heard the great news that Angela Davis was acquitted by a court in San Francisco." Tremendous cheers. Then he added, "which only goes to show you that the system of justice still works in the United States." Cheers, but fewer. As he continued with his speech, you could just feel the audience going down, down, down. Now, if Hubert Humphrey had been there, he'd have come out right with the beat of that band, sending out waves to the audience. He knows more American audiences than any other politician. One reason Hubert talks so long is that he'll never stop until he sees every head in the audience nodding "yes." But McGovern wasn't like that, and you could just hear the audience falling away from him. This was capped off by his last line. "I want to take this country back," he said, with all those black faces in the crowd, "I want to take this country back to its ideals of 190 years ago."

Well, there wasn't anybody in that audience who wanted to go back 190 years. If McGovern had said that in white ethnic America, he'd have gotten the same reaction—nobody wants to go back fifty years; go back to our grandfathers' time; go back to the mines, where Jack Palance's father worked; or the mills, where my uncles worked. Joe Namath's father was making \$2,000 a year in a good year in the 1930's. George Blanda's father earned

the same. Who would want to go back? But the America in George McGovern's mind, the America of two hundred years ago, is a beautiful America. Yet we all came to America at a different time. We all came into this mighty river at a different point in its course. And we've all had a different experience of this one same America. Only about 15 percent of the population is Anglo-American. There isn't any vast stream that the rest of us have to enter. It is a nation made up of people from all over the world. Any hurricane, earthquake, tidal wave, revolution, or civil war that occurs anywhere on the globe involves American families. People get on the telephone or they send cables wanting to know how their relatives are. The United States of America is, as it were, the nervous system of the entire planet. Everything that happens on this planet reverberates in American families. If a historian is imprisoned in the Ukraine, there are people in this room who know about it and suffer for it.

Now, you would think, therefore, that the people of the United States would be the most multi-culturally aware, the most sensitive, intelligent, and quick to react to all the bright young poets, all the bright young politicians in the world. You would think that anything that happens in the world would soon become known to the American population through its families. Yet that is where the American system breaks down. We are not as good in fact as we have the potential to be.

The United States might not be the most pluralistic country in the world—perhaps the Soviet Union or China is more pluralistic. But we have an original way of dealing with pluralism in this country, and it may be that we are living out in advance a model of what the whole planet, if it is not to be homogenized, if it is to remain diverse, is going to have to develop.

The first principle of American pluralism stated that all are welcome here, not just individuals, but even communities. The greatest migration in the history of the world happened in the last one hundred years. America may be celebrating its bicentennial, but most Americans are barely celebrating their centennial in this country. Most of us, especially those who came from Eastern and Southern Europe, especially those who came three generations ago, were peasants and serfs. We were serfs at a time when blacks

were slaves. Our families have been free men and free women, able to own land, able to work for themselves, able to enjoy civil rights, for barely one hundred years.

The greatest migration in the history of the world was a migration that came not just by tribes, not just by individuals, but by relatives, by friends, by chains of people. The first principle was: all were welcome, not just as individuals, but as communities.

The second principle stated that we would not set up separatist states. There would be no Quebec here. We would live together, intermix, integrate.

The third principle stated that you were free as an individual to be as ethnic as you cared to be, to be as self-conscious and knowledgeable as you wished to be, or to forget, to work with your community if you cared to. Communal life, yes; but a separate state, separate politics, no.

This leads to my second set of remarks: the deficiencies. You must share the sadness of all immigrant groups when you see the incredible ignorance of most American citizens with regard to their roots. I spent nine years in various graduate schools. When I went back to Slovakia, the land of my grandparents, two years ago, I was shocked by how little prepared I was. I had never seen pictures of those castles in any books I could remember. I don't believe I ever saw a Slovak movie. I don't remember reading any Slovak literature. When I saw the Slovak National Opera House in Bratislava, I was totally shocked. Coming from Johnstown, Pa., I didn't know Slovaks had a national opera house. Nothing in my education prepared me for the visual experiences of that week. How can that be? How can a reasonably well-educated person in the United States be totally ignorant of the culture that shaped him? But it's common.

The first thing I saw in Bratislava, as I crossed the bridge from Vienna, was some big, burly fellows in undershirts, sweating, carrying railway ties for street-car tracks. My first thought was: "Oh my God! Even in Slovakia the Slovaks fix the street car tracks." Again, Johnstown, Pa., coming back. Where we lived, in the valley, when we said "Americans," we meant the Irish. We meant the fellows who ran the taverns and the undertakers. We never met American-Americans until we moved up on the hill. And in Slovakia those houses on the hill were castles. The point

I'm trying to make is the tremendous ignorance that even well-educated people have of whole cultures of the world of which they are a part. They should be reporting to the rest of the people of the United States what's happening in those parts of the world to which they're connected by living tissues. Instead, that connection has been interrupted.

The second point concerns our false consciousness, our inarticulateness about our inner selves. For years I was always uncomfortable when I heard politicians talk about morality. I couldn't articulate it for years, but a feeling went through my stomach: "I don't know how yet, but they're out to get me." Every time I heard somebody talk about morality in politics, I wanted to begin counting the silverware.

Now that preachers have stopped predicting the end of the world, professors have started doing it. When I taught at Stanford, one of my colleagues, Professor Paul Ehrlich, used to predict the end of the world every two years. One year it was because the spray cans were going to destroy the ozone and we would all be burned up. The next year it was because all the waters would be bracken if we didn't stop polluting the oceans. His best prediction was that in fifteen years we were going to die the most horrible death of all—what Barbara Ward calls the "population explosion," those thundering herds of pattering feet, up to our armpits in babies. I know exactly what my grandmother, dead now, would have said, if she had heard his awful predictions. She would have said, "Eh! I knew it all the time." The world is going to have a bad ending. You can't have been brought up in Eastern Europe and not know the world is going to end badly. When, you're not sure, but it's definitely going to end badly.

I'm exaggerating a little, but nothing good has happened in Eastern Europe for a thousand years. We're only happy when things look bad. The grimmer it looks, the more in touch with reality we feel. That's why Eastern Europeans make such good quarterbacks.

But there are a lot of people who feel guilty for feeling bad. I remember what an old Jesuit in Rome told me once: "Michael, remember,"—he was swishing a scotch around in a glass with some ice at the end of a very tiring day—"all things human, given

enough time, go badly." That put into words what my grandmother had represented to me my whole life. After World War II, tomatoes began to be packaged in cellophane, and my mother was impressed. She said, "there's no dirt on them. You cut them open, there's no worms, there's no disease." My grandmother sighed, "But they don't taste like tomatoes." I used to think she was old-fashioned. I didn't realize she was ecologically aware.

The point I'm trying to make is that so many of us have had a false consciousness. The route between our emotions and our instincts and our head has been interrupted. Insights and intuitions which are in touch with reality are not allowed to emerge into consciousness. It is those insights which the United States of America itself is going to need. We're moving into an era in which nature has limits, in which we recognize that there cannot always be progress. We're moving into an era in which we recognize that whoever has power is involved in a great tragedy—you can have innocence or power, but not both. If you have power, no matter what you do, you will be involved in evil. If that's the kind of world we're going to be involved in, then the United States of America is going to acquire, if I may put it this way, an Eastern European mentality. It is going to have to learn to live within limits. It is going to have to live with tragedy. It is going to have to live with irony. It is going to have to mature. The dream of innocence of this new world is going to have to be outgrown.

At one point the Founding Fathers acted in a very Eastern European way. With a deep sense of human evil worthy of Dostoyevsky, they wrote in the Constitution something which all the rest of America has since forgotten: human beings are ineradicably untrustworthy. It is not true that you cannot trust people over thirty. A deep Eastern European wisdom is: Don't trust anybody. Thank God the Founding Fathers weren't totally Eastern European. It would be terrible if the world had to depend on our political wisdom. I pay tribute to the Anglo-Saxon traditions. No traditions in the world have been superior, and we're very lucky to share in them.

But, at one point, the Founding Fathers showed a touch of Kojak. They wrote in the Constitution: "Don't trust presidents. Thou shalt never trust the Congress. Thou shalt never trust the people. Against every power of American life one will put a check

and a balance." And it was embossed in silver, "In God we trust," meaning in nobody else. That was a perfectly Eastern European moment.

If you've ever watched *Kojak*, you've noticed that, unlike any other detective show, it's the only one with a Southern or Eastern European sensibility. Unlike any other detective show, you never get the impression at the end that the world is a better place. You're always given to understand the *Kojak* may have caught one rapist, one mugger, or one murderer, but there are at least ten or twelve more of each, and we won't even know about them until we read the papers tomorrow morning. But you're always given the sense: "It's all right folks, don't worry. It was like that in Constantinople. It was like that in Athens. It was like that in Kiev. It was like that in Warsaw. It's *always* been like that. Don't panic." One doesn't have to believe it's possible to change the world in order to act in a humane and reasonable and dignified way. Even if it all ends badly, even if it's all absurd, it is still worth it to live with dignity and with decency and to do one's job. That's all that matters. In order to have hope one doesn't need to believe that the world will be better, one only needs to believe that the human spirit can live with a certain dignity.

Now, that's a wisdom to which we are heir. It comes from our mother's breasts, so to speak. It comes from our families. You have to put yourself in the place of those of us who were immigrants, unlettered, who didn't carry books with them, who only learned it through parents. When we read it later in literature, it suddenly cohered. We suddenly found expression for this experience.

But for most American students that revelation hardly happened. The literature is not available. The culture is not present. When we read literature, we read about the other Americans. We read about people whose names are Smith. They are lovely people from whom we can learn a lot, but we never read about the Kuscielewicz's and others. The Smith family always has two children and a dog named Spot. And in other families there are so many children. It's like Bill Cosby said—he came from a family of nine children—until he was eleven he thought his name was "Shut up."

Besides the ignorance and false consciousness, there is a third

element: self-hatred. If you go into an Eastern European community, look at the faces of the students, most likely in community colleges. It is very sad to see the defeat already on young faces, to see the bludgeoning that's already been done. They are "stupid Polacks." They are meant to do the heavy jobs. They are not shunted into the academic careers in the high schools. They are not meant to go to the high places in American society. They are not meant to be verbal and articulate.

There is a tremendous silence among the Eastern European populations in this country, and a tremendous self-hatred, of a unique and different sort, difficult to capture in words, but quite apparent when one encounters it. A shame, which does not come from within, but comes from what one sees in the eyes of others. As Sartre says, we learn our identity best from the eyes of others.

And in the eyes of American society, many feel put down or at least learn that they ought to have a very lowered threshold of expectations. And I would like to assure you that this happens at the very highest levels of American society, not just in the mill and mining towns. No part of the world is discussed with such incredible condescension and ignorance as Eastern Europe. The articles in *The New York Times* and elsewhere, when commenting on Eastern Europe, have a tone utterly unlike that used for discussing peoples anywhere in the world.

And finally, there is a power differential. It isn't true that all groups in the United States have the same power and the same prestige. Groups differ proportionally in where they stand in per capita income, in educational projection, in housing, in various institutions.

And we from Eastern Europe lag particularly in an area which you Ukrainians are helping to overcome—in the field of education. Count the number of people in the state of Pennsylvania and then total up the number of students, faculty, and administrators in the universities. If you figure the number of blacks in the state of Pennsylvania and then look at those who are students and faculty, and staff, people will say that we have a *de facto* case of discrimination. If you total up the number of women, the same thing will be said. Thirty percent of the people of Pennsylvania are Eastern Europeans, but, I assure you, 30 percent of the students, faculty, or administration of the university in the state

of Pennsylvania are not Eastern Europeans. But, if you bring that point up, people say "Well, they must not want to go to the university," or "They must not try for the jobs." This represents a fantastic double standard, and it exists in every state. In New York, Eastern Europeans are one of the two or three largest groups in the state, but you would never know that from television. In Pittsburgh, there is not a single announcer on television who is Eastern European, yet about 30 percent of the population of Pittsburgh is Eastern European. During the newspaper strike, the obituaries were read on TV and nobody could pronounce the names. One anchor man said, "It's the first time in the history of Pittsburgh that Slavs have had equal time." There is not a single person in Chicago television who is Eastern European. In the city of Buffalo there was not a single Eastern European above the rank of assistant manager in any bank. Can you imagine that? Forty percent of the population is Eastern European! That was a year ago. Now there are two.

For a number of reasons we have not thought about where we stand politically or socially. It has been such a miracle that Eastern Europeans have been able to come to the United States of America that we have not taken recognition of ourselves as a group. And the same thing is true of many other groups. The more we learn about ourselves, the more parallels we see with others, and the easier it is to understand what other groups are going through.

The point of the new ethnicity is not celebration. Much that we learn by examining ethnicity in the United States is not cause for celebration and much of it is our own fault. So ethnic awareness is not a matter of pride, it is not a matter of celebration. It is simply a matter of trying to find out what is really happening, what is the truth, painful or blessed, whichever it may be.

Finally, some comments on the future. I recently was asked by Arno Press to recommend some books in American Catholic history. What basic documents should Arno Press reprint that might be useful to historians? We have just concluded the project, and almost everything we found was either Irish or English. It is exceedingly difficult to find books about the Eastern Europeans—Catholic, Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Ukrainian Catholic, and so forth—in the United States. To compensate, I and several

colleagues are going to edit a collection of the best essays that are available.

Part of the problem is that some of the basic texts by the immigrants themselves are in the language of origin. To some extent it is because nobody has ever read through the memoirs and letters and newspapers. Nevertheless, Eastern Europeans are probably the largest single group of American Catholics. And, if you understand Catholic as larger than Roman Catholic, then they are clearly the largest group. Hispanic Catholics are the only serious rivals. There are well over 10 million Roman Catholics, not to mention the Ukrainian Catholics, Greek Catholics, and others.

Yet, the historiography of these people is slim. It is very hard to find novels about them. If you are Jewish in America, and young, and you want to write a novel, your problem is: what novel can you write that has not already been written? If you are Eastern European and you want to write a novel about the American experience, anything you write will be a first.

There is a tremendous road to travel in collecting what already exists, and in creating new works in order to give expression to a whole part of the American experience. It seems plain that we cannot overcome the self-hatred, the ignorance, and the false consciousness unless our students, when they are going through the normal course of American literature in high school or college, are introduced to the literature of immigration.

Americans have gone through world wars together; we have gone through the assassinations; we have gone through the depression and many other things. But we have all gone through them from a different perspective. It is very important that the higher studies conducted at elite universities overflow into the basic curriculum and become accessible to everybody. I would not want to see branches of ethnic studies for a few. I would prefer that all American students read about all the American people. You should not go through a course in American literature without reading samples of the literature of the various immigrant groups.

There are other issues, too.

Group entitlement is becoming the way by which America administers its affairs. It does not matter what your merit as an

individual is; it matters what group you are in. I have a friend who is one-eighth Cherokee. On every grant application he puts down "American Indian-Native American," and he always gets the grants.

That is a serious problem for us. We are being asked implicitly to bear the whole weight of the history of slavery. Just when many of our young people are beginning to be able to go to college, scholarships are not available. Their parents make too much money to be eligible for scholarships but not enough money to send them to college. And now, a third generation of children of immigrants is not going to college in the proportion it ought to. And the same is true at every level of the professional ladder. Just when individuals are ready to move into occupations in the universities, the women's rights movement has arisen, and ethnically the distribution is as bad as it ever was. Sexually it is better; ethnically it is worse. This is a terrible trade-off. And it is a peculiarly painful one, because among Eastern and Southern Europeans in America, it is often the women who have the first chance at education and the first chance at politics, such as Ella Grasso in Connecticut, Mary Anne Krupsak in New York, Barbara Mikulski in Baltimore.


This question of group entitlement is one we have to think about very seriously over the next few years, because if the government becomes increasingly entrenched in this policy, the fate of the individual is going to be awful. Everybody is going to be assigned jobs by a grid. I'm very much against quota systems, but, if there are going to be quota systems, then everybody has to be included. We are going to have to ask so many jobs for Eastern Europeans, so many for Southern Europeans, etc., and that's an impossible situation. The country is rushing into something without having thought through all its implications, and the way things are going a lot of outsiders are going to remain outsiders.

My last point concerns what we do in the United States and how it has importance for what happens in Eastern Europe in the future. Public opinion in the United States cannot go on forever being outraged by assaults on human rights in South Africa and Rhodesia without at the same time being outraged by assaults on human rights in Ukrainia and throughout Eastern Europe. Human rights are not so easily divisible. By the same principles

and with the same passion that one defends rights in one place, one must do so elsewhere. Sooner or later, the Eastern Europeans in the American population, numbering perhaps 20 million people, are going to become more and more politically conscious of their role both in the United States and in the world. And that is going to provide a new kind of pressure and a consciousness upon the elites of the media and in Washington. It seems to me so clear that, if the American elites had had a different sort of concern for Eastern Europe in the 1930's and the 1940's, if they had felt that Eastern Europe was really part of their turf, part of their kinship, the map of Europe would be very different today. But, there was not that feeling. There was not that knowledge. There was not that concern. And so, events happened that escaped the power of all of us. So when I go back to visit my relatives in Slovakia, I pass through barbed wire that I would not otherwise have to pass through. And the cemetery at Bratislava is filled with the graves of soldiers of the Soviet Union who would not have been the liberators of Bratislava, if other decisions had been made. And the passage of ideas and of people between my family in this country and my family in that part of the world would be very different.

The time is coming in the United States when a sense of obligation to our brothers and sisters overseas is going to become more apparent to an increasingly better educated and more self-conscious Eastern European population in the United States.

So, what we are doing here has great importance both for our understanding of America and the vision it represents, the kind of pluralism for which it is a model for the world and for the relations of the United States with the rest of the world. We who are immigrants and refugees have received great gifts from the United States. And what the new ethnicity means is that it is now time that we begin to pay those gifts back and to make our own contributions to the life and the ideas, the temper, the values, the morality, and the vision of the United States.



The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
Festival Bostonia Ukrainian Planning Committee
The Mayor's Office for Cultural Affairs

Present a symposium dealing with

**THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES
December 2-5, 1976**

and related events, December 7 - January 20, 1977

THE UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SYMPOSIUM

December 2, Thursday • Seminar Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

4:00 p.m. *Problems in the History of the Ukrainian Immigration to the United States*

Dr. Paul R. Magocsi, Editorial Board, *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*.

December 3, Friday • The Ukrainian Ethnic Group in North America: Workshop in Problems of Sociological Analysis • Seminar Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

9:30 a.m. *An Appraisal of Empirical Studies*

Jeffrey Reitz, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto.

12:30 p.m. *On Theories of Ethnic Groups*

Nathan Glazer, Professor of Education and Social Structure, Harvard University.

Chairman: Wsewolod Isajiw, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto.

3:00 p.m. The Forum Room, Lamont Library

Introductory Remarks

Oscar Handlin, Carl M. Pforzheimer University Professor, Harvard University.

The Centenary of the Ukrainian Emigration to the United States

Dr. Myron Kuropas, Special Advisor for Ethnic Affairs to the President of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C.

8:00 p.m. An Evening of Ukrainian Culture • Boylston Hall Auditorium, Harvard Yard

Films on the Ukrainian Immigration

Slavko Nowytski, President, Filmart Productions, Minneapolis.

Commentator: Ms. Oksana Horodyska-Grabowicz,
Department of Anthropology, University of Massa-
chusetts.

*Dramatic Readings from Ukrainian Literature (in
English translation)*

Jack Palance, Actor, Hollywood, California.

Ukrainian Dances

Maria Magocsi, formerly Dukla Ukrainian Dance
Company and Hardy Margosian, Instructor, Bucking-
ham Browne and Nichols School.

December 4, Saturday • Boston Public Library, New Building,
General Lecture Hall

10:00 a.m. *Introductory Remarks*

Philip J. McNiff, Director and Librarian, Boston
Public Library.

10:15 a.m. *The Early Years of the Ukrainian Immigration to the
United States*

Bohdan Procko, Professor, Department of History,
Villanova University.

Commentator: Dr. Paul R. Magocsi.

11:30 a.m. *Documentation on the Ukrainian Immigration in the
United States*

Lubomyr Wynar, Professor, Department of Library
Science, Kent State University.

Commentator: Edward Kasinec, Research Bibliogra-
pher and Librarian, Harvard University Library and
Ukrainian Research Institute.

*1:00 p.m. Luncheon • Foyer Ballroom, Copley Plaza Hotel
(across from Boston Public Library)

2:30 p.m. *Sociological Observations on the Ukrainian Immi-
gration in the United States*

Wsewolod Isajiw.

Commentator: Richard Renoff, Professor, Depart-
ment of Sociology, Nassau County Community
College, SUNY.

4:00 p.m. *The Religious Experience of Ukrainians in the United States*

Vasyl Markus, Professor, Department of Political Science, Loyola University, Rome, Italy campus.

Commentator: Myroslav Labunka, Professor, Department of History, La Salle College.

7:00 p.m. Banquet (*By invitation only*) • Ropes-Gray Room, Roscoe Pound Building, Harvard Law School (adjacent to Ukrainian Research Institute)

Hosted by Professor and Mrs. Omeljan Pritsak and Dr. and Mrs. Paul R. Magocsi.

Introductory Remarks

Ihor Ševčenko, Professor, Department of Classics, Harvard University.

The New Ethnicity: The Next Ten Years

Michael Novak, Watson-Ledden Distinguished Professor of Religion, Syracuse University.

December 5, Sunday • Seminar Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

1:00 p.m. *The Ukrainian Language in the Emigration*

Bohdan Struminskyj, Visiting Lecturer, Department of Slavic Languages, Harvard University.

Commentator: Omeljan Pritsak, Mykhailo S. Hrushevs'kyi Professor of Ukrainian History, Harvard University.

2:30 p.m. *New Directions in Ukrainian Poetry in the United States*

George G. Grabowicz, Assistant Professor, Department of Slavic Languages, Harvard University.

Commentator: Leonid Rudnytzky, Professor, Department of Modern Languages, La Salle College.

4:00 p.m. Recital • Sanders Theatre, Harvard University

Eugene Gratovich, Violinist and Associate Professor, San Francisco State University.

RELATED EVENTS

December 7, Tuesday • Seminar Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

4:00 p.m. *Ťvorčyj šljax Olžyča* [Olžyč's Creative Path]
Michael Bazansky, Honorary Research Associate in Bibliography and Librarianship, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.
A resumé in English will follow the presentation.

December 9, Thursday • Seminar Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

4:00 p.m. *The Library of Congress Classification and Subject Headings and Slavic and East European Studies*
Dr. Andrew Turchyn, Curator of Slavic and East European Collections, Indiana University, Bloomington.
Commentator: Patricia G. Oyler, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Library Science, Simmons College.

December 11, Saturday • Seminar Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

2:00 p.m. *Čeremšyna, Stefanyk, Martovyč ta jix družba* [Čeremšyna, Stefanyk and Martovyč and their friendship]
Michael Bazansky.
A resumé in English will follow the presentation.

December 14, Tuesday • Seminar Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

4:00 p.m. *The Information Marketplace and the Obsolescence of Traditional Libraries*
Dr. K. Kas Kalba, President, Kalba-Bowen Associates, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Commentator: Richard P. Palmer, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Library Science, Simmons College

December 16, Thursday • Seminar Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

4:00 p.m. *Jurij O. Iwaniv-Meženko and Modern Ukrainian Bibliology*
Edward Kasinec.

(This lecture is dedicated to the memory of Mr. Bohdan Krawciw. A display of Mr. Krawciw's publications will take place in the Exhibit Room.)

EXHIBITS

December 2, 1976 - January 20, 1977

*The Ukrainian Immigration in the United States:
The Documentary Legacy*

The Foyer, Widener Library, Harvard University

"Xrystos Rodyvsja: An Exhibition of Ukrainian Christmas Cards"

The Exhibit Room, Harvard Ukrainian Research
Institute

December 3 and December 6, 1976 (10:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m.)

*An Exhibition of Accessions to the Collection of
Ukrainian Rare Books and Manuscripts, 1973 - 1976*

The Amy Lowell Room, Houghton Library, Harvard
University

All events are free of charge and open to the public.

*Individuals attending the Saturday, December 4,
luncheon will be responsible for the cost of their own
meal.

The program was conceived and organized by Edward Kasinec.

Acknowledgements

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John Bodnar, Director, Ethnic Studies Program, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Bureau of Archives and History.

Francis J. Calverese, Lieutenant Colonel, GS, Chief, Military Awards Branch, Department of the Army, Alexandria, Virginia.

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Natalia Gratovich, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University.

Jacques Hnizdovsky, Riverdale, New York.

Kathleen B. Hegarty, Coordinator of Adult Services, Boston Public Library.

Oksana Horodyska-Grabowicz, Department of Anthropology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota.

Paul R. Magosci, Managing Editor, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies.

The University Marshal's Office, Harvard University.

Olga Kavochka Mayo, Executive Secretary, Carpatho-Ruthenian Studies Foundation, McKeesport, Pa.

Oksana Procyk, Ukrainian Specialist, Harvard College Library.

Richard Renoff, Professor, Department of Sociology, Nassau County Community College, SUNY.

Marta Tarnawsky, Foreign Law Librarian, University of Pennsylvania.

Peter Woloschuk, Department of History, Boston University.

HARVARD UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Monograph Series

- Ievhen Sverstiuk, *Clandestine Essays*, translated with an introduction by G.S.N. Luckyj. Littleton, Colo.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1976.
- Taras Hunczak (ed.), *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, distributed by Harvard University Press, 1977.
- Paul R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948*. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Ivan Zilyns'kyj, *A Phonetic Description of the Ukrainian Language*, translated by W.T. Zyla and W.M. Aycock. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, distributed by Harvard University Press, 1979.

Sources and Document Series

- Proceedings of the Conference on Carpatho-Ruthenian Immigration*, transcribed, edited and annotated by Richard Renoff and Stephen Reynolds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1975.
- Nonconformity and Dissent in the Ukrainian SSR, 1955-1975: A Select Bibliography*, compiled by George Liber and Anna Mostovych. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1978.
- The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate*, 2 vols., compiled by George Gajecky, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1978.
- An Early Slavonic Psalter from Rus': St. Catherine's Monastery, Mt. Sinai*, Volume I: Photoreproduction, edited by Moshé Altbauer and Horace G. Lunt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, distributed by Harvard University Press, 1978.
- The Ukrainian Experience in the United States: A Symposium*, edited by Paul R. Magocsi. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1979.

Occasional Papers

- Omeljan Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, Inaugural Lecture delivered at Harvard University, October 1975. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1976.

HARVARD SERIES IN UKRAINIAN STUDIES

- Eyewitness Chronicle* (Litopys Samovydcja), Part I, edited by Orest Levyc'kyj. Munich: Fink Vlg., 1972.
- George S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol' and Ševčenko*. Munich: Fink Vlg., 1971.
- Myron Korduba, *La littérature historique soviétique ukrainienne*. Munich: Fink Vlg., 1972.
- Oleksander Ohloblyn, *A History of Ukrainian Industry*. Munich: Fink Vlg., 1971.
- Fedir Savčenko, *The Suppression of Ukrainian Activities in 1876* (Zaborona ukrajinstva 1876 r.). Munich: Fink Vlg., 1970.
- The Galician-Volynian Chronicle*, translated and annotated by George Perfecky, Munich: Fink Vlg., 1973.
- Dmitrij Tschizewskij, *Skovoroda: Dichter, Denker, Mystiker*. Munich: Fink Vlg., 1974.

