

THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS



BY LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

The first book to expose the "weakspots" of Colonialist Russia, and how these areas can be utilized to defeat them for peace, with freedom and justice

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Lev E. Dobriansky

"All that is necessary for the triumph
of evil is that good men do nothing."

—Edmund Burke

The book you are about to read is one of the most devastating insights into the Russian imperio-colonialist way of life ever put into print.


Picture, if you can, a gigantic chessboard, with Red and White squares. Russia—just Russia, mind you, with her 112 million population—has the Red balance of power against the non-Russian White opponents, better known as the "captive nations—those in the USSR." These "captive nations," although they have a total population of 123 million, are held in a constant checkmate by the classic Red weapons of deceit, lies, subversive propaganda, and the myth of "peaceful coexistence." The pawns? These represent the rest of the world, which the Red power nibbles on, devours, or casts away.

One of these pawns, unfortunately, is the mightiest nation the world has ever known—the United States of America. Unwilling to fight the Cold War the Russian way, unable to convince itself of the heartlessness of the Russian Bear, the United States, according to Dr. Dobriansky, allows itself to be fooled, used, and thus loses more ground every day in a war which can never be won by lack of involvement.

After all, as the author states, why should Russia start a nuclear war, when she gets what she wants without it? The

(Continued on back flap)

THE RED RUSSIAN EMPIRE



"Not one Red Totalitarian Government could exist for long if, for one reason or another, the Soviet Russian center were to collapse."

Nov. 19, 1967

To My Dear Friend Wlodyka

With warmest feelings
for our mutual fight for
a free Ukraine and best
personal wishes and respect

Sincerely
Jas

THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS

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tion)**

The Crimes of Khrushchev (ed. and contrib.)

Essays on Liberty (contrib.)

Peace and Freedom Through Cold War Victory (contrib.)

THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS

By Lev E. Dobriansky

Georgetown University

Introduction by Hon. Edward J. Derwinski

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To my parents who join in dedicating this book to all
Freedom Fighters, particularly the unsung heroes of the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which in World
War II and after fought for freedom against both
the Nazis and the Russian imperio-colonialists.

Their supreme sacrifice in the spirit of
indivisible freedom render historically inseparable
the far-flung events of our American Revolution, Ukraine's
Independence, and the freedom of every non-Russian nation, as
well as the Russian people, now held captive in the Red Empire.
Had they succeeded, for sure Americans would not have died in
Korea, suffered humiliation in Cuba, intervened in the
Dominican Republic, be perishing in Vietnam and,
tomorrow, find themselves languishing in the
sands of the Middle East, the pit of Africa,
and the hills of Latin America.

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PREFACE

This book is an American answer not only to Moscow's 50th anniversary of the fraudulent Russian Bolshevik revolution but also, and far more important, to the unending Cold War challenge of the world's foremost imperio-colonialists. Its publication is coincidental with the Red event, but its contents will endure and be as timely so long as the *imperium in imperio*, known as the Soviet Union, continues in existence. In connection with the spurious celebration other works have appeared to explain father-daughter relationships, the tyranny of "the Soviet system" or its supposed socio-economic progress, but invariably they manifest all the taints of a Mother Russia complex and miss the principal point of Russia's prime imperio-colonialism.

It wouldn't be surprising to find some of our leaders equating the totalitarian Russian Bolshevik revolution with our democratic American Revolution—all in the spirit of "detente" and "improved relations." This wouldn't be the first, egregious excess. During World War II our President virtually characterized the USSR as a "democracy." Expediency has its place, but it becomes foolishly inexpedient to overstretch it beyond the bounds of elementary truth. Accounting for this in large measure is the fact that the USSR—its nature, composition, origin and development, etc.—has been a blind spot for most of our people, including those at the highest levels of our Government. And Moscow capitalizes heavily on this blind spot.

Scores of examples are provided here to show the scope and seriousness of this blind spot. Some are purposely repeated in different contexts to establish their various shades of meaning. Hundreds of other examples could have been easily included, but this would have been at the cost of necessary interpretation, developed perspectives, and many helpful insights. Every attempt was made to offer the clearest possible exposition of the problem pertaining to our understanding of the USSR, without oversimplifying its several complex aspects and underestimating the habitual power of formed preconceptions and myths.

The excessive repetition of myths in this vital field is justification enough of repetition in the use of determinative data and judgment for their necessary dissolution. In our best educational institutions we have reached a point of developed knowledge about the USSR where it becomes no longer tolerable to witness official utterances on the part of our leaders that are plainly and crassly nonsensical. When, for example, President Johnson referred to his Glassboro meeting with "Chairman Kosygin of the Soviet Union" and stated, "The nations we spoke for are two of the most powerful nations in all the world," he in part spoke nonsense, for even by Kremlin-stamped evidence the Soviet Union is no nation and by fundamental criteria, as advanced in this work, it can scarcely be regarded as "most powerful" ("Count Your Own Blessings" address, Baltimore, June 27, 1967). Twenty-five years ago, in light of our general state of knowledge regarding the USSR, the fantastic conceptions of Roosevelt were certainly excusable; today, similar fantasies are clearly inexcusable and far more perilous.

It is noteworthy that at the end of June, 1967, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union released a 25,000

word policy statement as a guide for the 50th anniversary celebration, and in addition to stressing its deceptive "peaceful coexistence" policy, it emphasized "The domination of imperialism on the world scene has ended"—and this because of the "might of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries . . ." With typical Russian political dialectic, Moscow enshrouds its far-flung empire and unprecedented imperio-colonialism with "might" and "socialism," and feels reasonably sure that not a whimper of contest or protest will be sounded in the West. After its representatives heard President Johnson declare in his December, 1963, address to the United Nations that the "great transition from colonial rule to independence has been largely accomplished," Moscow had solid grounds to pursue this propaganda course to influence millions throughout the Free World. It would seem that the President had been reading a Soviet Russian atlas, with "socialist freedom" extended to only ninety miles from our shores. But this is just one case among many treated in this work.

Although it was necessary to be highly selective with regard to the material advanced here, reserving much for a subsequent work, the contents should serve as a basic background to a sound evaluation of numerous current developments, including the 50th and the fraudulence of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, Kosygin's reported concern at Glassboro over the President's 1967 Captive Nations Week Proclamation, the scandalous Vietnam situation perpetuated essentially by Russian support, the growing illusion on the end of the Cold War, so-called Black Power para-militarism on the very terrain of the Free World leader, Moscow's manipulations in the Middle East, the urgency of an anti-ballistic-missile defense, and the desperate need for a full-scale Congressional hearing

on U.S. policy toward the USSR, which we've never had in our contemporary history. On the basis of what is offered here, it would not be difficult, for example, to perceive the Russian Bolshevik revolution as the incubator of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the fraud of Lenin's promise of "land, bread, and peace," the fraud of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence," and the deceptive ideological tool of communism. So with the other subjects that can be neatly fitted into and assessed within the structure of thought developed here.

The timely completion of this work would not have been possible without the invaluable assistance given unstintingly by Vera A. Dowhan. Her dedication and painstaking efforts in research, editing, and the final preparation of the text made this a published reality. I am both grateful and deeply indebted to her.

Lev E. Dobriansky

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Washington, D.C.

INTRODUCTION

In May 1967 the Moscow publication *Literary Gazette*, evidently irritated by statements I had made against Kremlin suppression of the captive nations, branded me as a "Chicago Red Guard." "His name is Slavic, but in his soul and heart, Derwinski is a Red Guard," the *Literary Gazette* said.

Having been labeled by Kremlin propagandists with one of the nastiest terms in their current phraseology certainly qualifies me to write this introduction for a publication that will surely cause substantial discomfort, if not completely infuriate, the Russian oppressors of the captive peoples within the U.S.S.R.

Coincidental with the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, the Russians will do their best in a world-wide propaganda drive to equate their perverse revolution with our own American Revolution.

The historic facts of the composition of the U.S.S.R. and the subjection by the Russians of the captive peoples within its present boundaries are not treated with sufficient awareness by the Executive Branch, the Congress, or the American public. Professor Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee, more than any other individual is responsible for nation-wide programs alerting Americans to the true history and present conditions within the Soviet Union.

Basic facts, most of which have not received adequate attention before, are pointed out in this descriptive work

on "Russia" by Professor Dobriansky. Fully aware of all the difficulties involved in such a pioneer effort, he has carefully limited it to an effective, analytical review of developments bearing on Russian Bolshevik imperio-colonialism. This well-written, well-organized work should serve as an inspiration for further penetrating analyses of Moscow's empire and thus will have lasting impact.

Recent evidence involving U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, of which the public is aware, include the Consular Treaty, the escape of Svetlana Stalin Alliluyeva, the Middle East maneuvers, and most importantly, the determined Soviet involvement in the aggression against South Vietnam, which is a classical move toward expanding the Red empire.

In view of the questionable and controversial nature of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, Professor Dobriansky effectively substantiates the need for a full review of U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. He places proper emphasis on the need for a Special House Committee on Captive Nations which would permit effective use of the legislative forum on a subject which the State Department is afraid to touch.

Professor Dobriansky is a professional political economist, objective and progressive. He displays practical realism in recognizing the continuing existence of the Cold War and its intensification, and effectively relates the need to win the Cold War as a means of negating hot wars.

This work shows that the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 was foreign to the captive peoples suppressed by Russian colonialism. After 50 years Moscow continues to frustrate new generations, attempting to obliterate the true historic past since the honest pride and traditional wisdom of people is a major impediment

to permanent Communist control. Professor Dobriansky cogently proves that the captive nations within the Soviet Union maintain legitimate pride in their nationalities and in a practical moment would assert their rights and be ready to reassert their proper self-determination under governments of legitimate nationalism reflecting their historic aspirations.

It is hardly surprising that this work will arouse some controversy, since it deals with many personalities still prominent on the world scene. In view of the fact that this picture of the Russian empire is too frequently misrepresented and misunderstood makes it necessary for Professor Dobriansky to sharply hammer home the facts of life.

Of special significance is the description of such diverse subjects as the policies of the Voice of America, the Cold War utility of Captive Nations Week, the confusion in foreign policy exemplified by Secretary of State Rusk, and the interesting behind-the-scenes moves in the Shevchenko affair.

In view of the historic emphasis on the Russian Revolution and its almost completely one-sided presentation, a work by an acknowledged international authority on Moscow's empire and its profound vulnerability because of its unhappy captive nations gives this work dramatic timeliness.

Edward J. Derwinski,
Member of Congress (Illinois)
Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives

THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS

Chapter I
MARX'S OUTLOOK ON THE PRISON HOUSE
OF NATIONS

"The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing."
—Karl Marx

To a large extent these words of the so-called father of Communism are as applicable today as they were in the nineteenth century. They certainly apply to the Free World's level of real understanding of the Soviet Union and its consequent low capability of dealing with this power center of "World Communism." Perhaps more than any other Western writer of his day, Marx displayed a deep perception into the traditional forces of the Russian Empire. Viewing the policy of imperialist Russia as changeless, he warned for his time as well as ours: "Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star."¹

Earlier, the Russian historian Karamsin had noted, "Nothing changes in our [Russian] external policy." Westernization, industrialization, Christianity, capitalism and many other influences have worked over the centuries on Russia, but nothing has really changed its external policy. In effect, behind the mask of Communism, Russia's methods, tactics and maneuvers have changed but little, though

1. Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952, p. 106.

the actors, scenes, and scripts change constantly; and its polar star, as Marx predicted, remains fixed.

Relatively few in the Free World have recognized the crass Russian perversion of Marx and Marxism. Still fewer who are conversant with both the Marxist system of thought and the history of Russia, predominantly an imperio-colonialist history, have detected in this perversion one of our chief ideological weapons against what is spuriously called Communism. The abuse of Marxism for purposes of operational babbity and self-legitimation in the Communist Parties, and also for deceptive penetration in the less advanced areas of the Free World, have not as yet attained matter-of-fact acceptance. Still less accepted is Marx's historical outlook on the Russian colossus, which is today and will be for some time the power base of the so-called Communist world.

To cope with the Russian bear, the United States has, up to now, relied chiefly on economic and military power in what has steadily deteriorated into a policy of patched-up containment. Captive Cuba alone stands as a living symbol of the long-run bankruptcy of this policy. What Alexander I had failed to accomplish in the nineteenth century, Khrushchev achieved in the 1960's by entrenching Russian interests close to our shores. At the rate we are going there will be more of such symbols in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A point will then be reached when we shall have to consider seriously the complete spectrum of cold war engagement. The methodic debunking of the *ersatz* philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, with positive stress on traditional Russian, and also Chinese, imperio-colonialism, would be a cardinal objective.

For reasons shown in the following chapters, there is no more befogging conception of the Soviet Union and

its Russian-controlled motivations than the belief that under it all rests the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This, of course, is what Moscow has always wanted the Free World to believe. In great measure it has succeeded. Recently some analysts have begun to talk about "the erosion of Marxism-Leninism" among the so-called satellites in Eastern Europe. Little do they realize that the "philosophy" has never taken root in the minds of the people there or, for that matter, in those of the Soviet Union itself. However, the operational need for the "philosophy" as a badge of ideological dignity as well as a mode of organizational discourse, is no less persistent and indispensable among the Parties in the "external satellite" area than between those in the "internal satellites" within the USSR.

On this score, Moscow's success in transporting the notions that the global conflict, in the contradictory context of peaceful coexistence, is one of "socialism versus imperialism" actually has been our failure to determine the real nature of the enemy. For this failure we have paid dearly, not only since World War II but also since the end of World War I. President Woodrow Wilson advocated the principle of national self-determination, yet failed to enforce it in many areas of the dissolved Tsarist Russian Empire. This tragic failure, born largely of ignorance, permitted the first Soviet Russian aggressions against numerous independent non-Russian states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In a few years these first victims of "Communism" were forcibly incorporated into the artificial political state known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Twenty-five years later, without profiting in the least from these concrete historical experiences, President Franklin D. Roosevelt committed equally fatal mistakes

that allowed for the further expansion of Russia's empire. His grave blunders stemmed from the same cause. As will be shown later, were it not for the more direct and blunt threats of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism to our national interests, the conceptions evinced by successive Administrations about Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Red Empire would justify Marx's first observation even more. Blind to the "polar star" of traditional Russian policy that has guided and dominated the actors—be they the Nicholases, the Lenins, Stalins, Khrushchevs, Brezhnevs, or future Shelepins—are we to perpetuate the mistakes, seeking accommodation and co-existence to prop up a failing policy of patched-up containment?

MARXIAN INSIGHTS INTO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

A study of Marx on Russia can help immensely in guarding against these repeated mistakes. Fortunately, much literature is appearing today to show how un-Marxian and truly totalitarian Russian the policy and practices of Moscow are. A substantial portion of this literature is based on Marx's own insights into the Russian Empire. Besides gradually demolishing the superficial and erroneous notion that Marx is the source of our troubles with "Communism," this cumulating literature prepares a groundwork for our eventual ideological use in turning Marx against the reality of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.

Above all others, Marx saw the Tsarist Russian Empire as a "prison house of nations." If he were alive today, there can be no doubt about his describing the core of the present Soviet Russian Empire—the Soviet Union—as a prison house of nations. The writings of Marx on Russia, its empire, its past and its future make far more

sense for a current understanding of the threat facing the Free World than the mountains of literature built about Communism, Sovietism, Marxism-Leninism, and Bolshevism in the USSR over the past four decades. They reveal far greater insights into the uncementable cracks in the prison house of nations, whether the jailer is white or red, than can be obtained from private writings and from most official statements in the capitals of the West.

To be sure, Marx's terminology with regard to the various nations in the Russian Empire is found wanting. Ukraine, White Ruthenia and other nations in the empire are referred to in categories arbitrarily set up in Russian historiography. Yet there can be no question about his sensing a compound of conquered nations under the heel of the Russian autocrats. His emphatic empire concept attests to this. In the present situation, where Moscow itself is compelled to recognize the individuality and distinctiveness of these nations, Marx's interpretations would remain the same, although his terminology would now conform with the non-Russian conception of these captive nations in the Soviet Union.

In support of this, one can quote extensively from Marx's writings which in this respect, significantly, are suppressed in the USSR. For example, writing on "Russia and the Social Revolution (1873)," he points out: "When we talk below about Russia, we do not mean to include the whole Russian Empire but only Russia proper. . . ." ² This is like pointing today to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in the USSR. As another example, he observes: "The total acquisitions of Russia during the last sixty years are equal in extent and importance to the whole Empire she had in Europe before that time." ³

2. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

3. *New York Tribune*, June 14, 1853.

On traditional Russian imperialist policy he is quite clear when he says, "One merely needs to replace one series of names and dates by others and it becomes clear that the policies of Ivan III [who ruled from 1462 to 1505] and those of Russia today are not merely similar but identical." ⁴ Marx's close friend, Friedrich Engels, even goes further in disputing Russian claims on Ukrainian territory with a foresighted argument that "at least the Ukrainians did not really speak a Russian dialect but an entirely separate language." ⁵ Marx's frequent use of such terms as *Muscovite* and *Great Russian* readily indicate his appreciation of the empire that most simply called "Russia."

His treatment would be a far cry from the fallacious and misleading handling of this basic material by too many of our contemporary analysts. You could almost pick them at random. Take, for example, a biography of an American millionaire, William Boyce Thompson, who served on the American Red Cross mission to Russia. In 1918 he advocated prompt U.S. recognition of Soviet Russia and close ties with it. Both the author and his subject waxed the illusion of their being "one hundred and sixty million individual Russians, hungry, resentful, bewildered and sick of war." ⁶ This in 1917! There aren't even that many today, over four decades later.

Similar examples abound in our academic and official realms. A textbook used in our universities introduces the subject of the USSR this way: "Its population was estimated in 1940 to be more than 192,000,000, and though representatives of over a hundred nationalities contributed

4. "Revelations of Diplomatic History of the 18th Century," *Free Press*, London, 1856-57.

5. *The Russian Menace to Europe*, pp. 29-30.

6. Hagedorn, Herman, *The Magnate*, New York, 1935, p. 183.

to this total, more than 150,000,000, or nearly four-fifths, are ethnically Russian." 7 Even Red Moscow is more truthful in its 1959 census. There are probably no more than 115 million ethnic Russians in the USSR. This sorry state of American scholarship on the USSR is compounded when former officials in our State Department, who now circulate academically, are possessed with the notion that "the Ukraine is economically as much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is a part of the United States." 8

Judging by his sharp insights into the Russian Empire and the processes of Russification, Marx would consider such observations as bordering on the ludicrous. He would also deplore our incapacity to understand the built-in cold war apparatus of this empire, now red rather than white. For he also understood well the cold war techniques and operations of the Russian imperio-colonialists in his day. He knew that these techniques of bluff, cunning, blackmail, conspiracy, divide-and-conquer, ideologic deception, "eternal peace," and a host of other psychopolitical tools were the products of Russian empire-building, stretching from the fifteenth century to his time.

Here, too, one can quote Marx at length. Apropos to "peaceful co-existence" is this Marxian observation: "The work of Russian encroachments in Europe will once again be confined to the slower but surer processes of diplomacy and intrigue, animated by unscrupulous arrogance on one side and aided by weakness and pusillanimity on the other." 9 On Russian cold war tactics, Marx observes,

7. Vernadsky, George, *A History of Russia*, 3rd rev. ed., New Haven, Conn., 1951, p. 1.

8. Kennan, George F., *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, Chicago, Ill., 1951, p. 135.

9. Doerig, J. A., Ed., *Marx vs. Russia*, New York, 1962, pp. 47-48.

“Russia has now for several months been delaying action under one pretense or another, in order to maintain a state of things which, being neither war nor peace, is tolerable to herself, but ruinous to the Turks.”¹⁰ For those suffering from acute nuclearitis in our day this assessment of the polyglot “Russian” armed forces is also quite appropriate: “It appeared imposing by its numbers, professedly ready for war at any moment, and by the implicit obedience which held this vast machine together. But, alas! What has become of this mighty army, this ‘stern fact’ which so frightened Western Europe?”¹¹ One can go on and on applying Marx to the present.

Marx’s refreshing writings in *The New York Tribune* and other organs pierced the ideologic smoke screens behind which the cold war operators of the Tsarist Russian Empire advanced the world domination interests of Muscovy. “Pan-Slavism,” he wrote, “is a form of Russian imperialism—it is not a movement that strives for national independence but a movement which, directed against Europe, would destroy all cultural values that history has created through thousands of years.” On the basis of Marx’s explicit writings on this subject, there can be no doubt that if he were alive today, he would be a chief proponent urging the psycho-political castration of the Russians.

A Marxian orchiectomy—i.e., the operation of psychopolitical sterilization—on the Soviet Russian totalitarianism is no play on words. In sharp contrast to many of our own contemporary experts, Marx gives every evidence of a working knowledge of these two major phenomena—the prison house of nations and the traditional cold war diplomacy of Russian tyrants, whether native or Russian-

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

ized. Whatever else may be said of Marx, no scholar can deny his perception of and feeling for historical movement and change. Time and time again, Marx senses the concrete experiences and drives of the Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Moslem and other inmates of the colonialist Russian prison. He perceives also the basic psycho-political ways and means by which these peoples were driven into the Russian Empire. In short, the institutional furniture of Russian imperialism from Ivan III to the present—developed, refined, and expanded, to be sure—is properly cast in Marx's analyses of Russia and its empire.

It is little wonder that a collector of Marx's writings on Russia sums up these contributions as follows: "Whether the Russian czar bears the name of an Alexander or a Nicholas, a Stalin or a Khrushchev is of minor importance. Trenchant as was the 1917 break with the traditional Russian social system, the goal of conquest and thirst for acquisition intrinsic in her foreign policy remain unchanged, whether embellished as in Czarist times with the pretext of protecting Eastern Christendom or the Slavic world or camouflaged under the Red Soviet banner of 'liberation of society and the world from the capitalist yoke.'" ¹²

This overall conclusion of Marx's works on Russia should be carefully pondered. By harsh experience its meaning is known by all the captive nations and peoples bordering ethnic Russia today. Without such experience, those in the West and Far East must depend on their intellectual insights into these forces and avoid momentary blandishments emanating from Moscow. As a matter of fact they should read Marx to deepen their insights. Doubtlessly they will in time arrive at the same conclu-

12. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

sion that this editor of Marx's works has: "Even the form of government, constitution, and social structure are irrelevant in the long run. The significant and crucial factor is Russia's age-long drive westward, a drive that is perfectly understandable from the Russian point of view. That is why it has been common ground to all Russian governments and has outlasted every evolutionary change up to the present."¹³

What quite rightly is implied here is that the ultimate solution is the final and decisive break-up of the Russian Empire, whether red, white or whatever hue. Wishful thinking for a peaceful evolution of the Soviet Union, a happy coexistence between West and East, a "non-communist, democratic government in Moscow" is a pursuit of an intellectual mirage. This has become a favorite sport today. It is an old story that fits neatly into Moscow's cold war plans. Indubitably, tomorrow we shall pay for repeating today the mistakes of yesterday.

The great irony of our time is that the Soviet Russian totalitarians predicate part of their ideologic authority on Marxism. In its entirety the Marxian system has really little to do with the colonialist make-up of the USSR economy. Actually, certain of its parts—as, for instance, the concept of surplus value—can be effectively used to demonstrate the immense exploitation of labor in this essentially cold war economy.¹⁴ But the facades of Marxist ideology and Communism are only additional measures of the extent to which the Russian bear will go in pursuit of his polar star. As one writer accurately states it, "Perhaps the greatest error that the Western world has made in its dealing with the Soviets is continuing to believe

13. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

14. See Lichtheim, George, *Marxism, A Historical and Critical Study*, New York, 1961, p. 398.

that Russian Communism is closely allied with the basic Communist philosophy. . . ." ¹⁵

Increasing numbers of students dealing with the Soviet Union are recognizing the basic irrelevance of Marxism to both the policy and the practices of Moscow. However, in many cases the realities of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR still elude them. For example, a work which has been advertised as a text on Communism, but is shot through with these defects, nevertheless makes the worthwhile point that the Russian totalitarian conspirator Lenin turned Marx's ideas upside down.¹⁶

Briefly, if, as some claim, we must go back to Marx in order to comprehend the motivations and operations of the men in the Kremlin, then the only instructive areas in Marxism are its penetrating analysis of the perennial Russian Empire.

THE PRISON'S FIRST COLLAPSE

Although too many of our leaders have yet to understand the sources and nature of the Soviet Union, Marx was uniquely cognizant of these long-run historical sources. In the case of Poland and the other subjugated non-Russian nations he recognized the force of nationalism and the drive for national independence. He well-nigh predicted the inevitable collapse of the Russian colonialist empire. Even Lenin, a thorough Russian by political breed, foresaw at the turn of the century the first collapse of this empire.

15. Bray, William G., *Russian Frontiers: From Muscovy to Khrushchev*, New York, 1963, p. 32.

16. Miller, William J., *The Meaning of Communism*, Morristown, N.J., 1963, p. 30.

The supreme irony in this regard was the totalitarian re-establishment of the Russian prison house of nations by Lenin himself, the supposed heir of Karl Marx—a professed Marxist turned into a Russian jailer! The Russian Empire collapsed in World War I not so much because of the two Russian revolutions in 1917, but chiefly because of the sweeping non-Russian revolution for national freedom and independence. This inevitable revolution raged from one corner of the imperial jail to another, from Poland to the Far Eastern maritime provinces, from Finland to the Caucasus. Every non-Russian inmate broke out into freedom and independence.¹⁷

But Lenin, the professed Marxist, soon emerged as the new Tsar over a re-established empire. This stupendous feat should by itself indicate the capabilities of the Russian bear. When the authors of a constructive work tell us that “even Lenin, we might say, was only an unconscious imperialist,” we cannot but question their familiarity with the facts of 1917-22.¹⁸ Or when an utterly confused product of the *Life World Library* describes Lenin as “an ardent Marxist,” the facts of his crass opportunism belie such a characterization.¹⁹

As a matter of fact, Lenin and Leninism make little theoretic sense in terms of systematic Marxism. The new Russian Tsar manipulated Marxism to mean whatever he wanted it to mean. The backward Russian Empire was the last place Marx had in mind to substantiate his “laws of history.” And the historical accidents surrounding Lenin’s

17. See, e.g., Hrushevsky, Michael, *A History of Ukraine*, New Haven, Conn., 1941, chapters 22-25.

18. Overstreet, Harry and Bonaro, *What We Must Know About Communism*, New York, 1958, p. 276.

19. Thayer, Charles W., *Russia*, Life World Library, New York, 1960, p. 19.

emergence to power, not to mention his political actionism, have actually no place in the determinist prognoses of Marxist thought.

On the other hand, Lenin and Leninism make complete practical sense in terms of revolutionary and conspiratorial Russian activity in the nineteenth century. Lenin assumes intelligible form in line with the conspiracy of professional revolutionists led by the populist Peter Tkachev, the revolutionary activities of Sergei Nechaiev, the tactics of the Blanquists, and the cold war ideas of von Clausewitz, the Prussian general who acquired these ideas in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, Leninism is a codification of the methods and techniques carved out in the growth and development of the Russian Empire over the past five centuries.

A sadly neglected subject is Lenin's Bolshevik exploitation of the captive non-Russian nations issue prior to 1917. The Bolsheviks saw it as one of the major forces contributing to the break-up of the Tsarist Russian Empire. A history which the Red Chinese know all too well, Lenin and his conspiratorial band propagandized and exploited this issue in full. An insight into Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik strategem may be obtained from the following: "If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine," proclaimed Lenin before the break-up, "break away from Russia, there is nothing bad about that. What is there bad about it? Anyone who says there is, is a chauvinist."²⁰ After the break-up, at the Eighth Conference of the Russian Communist Party in 1919, Lenin pontificated in this vein: "Spontaneous national confidence is a trump card of the bourgeoisie that can only be beaten by promises of full

20. Lenin, V. I., *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, New York, 1951, p. 123.

national emancipation. I think that in this hall there is not a single person who would assert that the self-determination of nations is normal and desirable. We consider it an evil which can be avoided."

Yes, Marx truly provides us with a genuine cold war perspective when he stresses, "The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing." At their birth in 1917-22, most of the independent non-Russian nations could scarcely have been expected to protect themselves adequately against the resharpened claws of the Russian bear. But there was every reason to expect that the developed nations of the West would be capable of caging the bear. In his day Marx always saw the necessity of this, if the values of Western civilization were to be preserved. Wrong as it is in its reasoning and conclusions, Marxism is nevertheless founded on these values.

Lenin played it right; the Western nations proved to be capable of practically nothing in securing their own freedom in the long run by literally securing the newly won freedom of Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and the other non-Russian nations. In the case of Ukraine, for example, an astute historian of Soviet Russian politico-military development sums it up this way: "The cause of Ukrainian independence itself crumbled away before the onset of the Russian Bolsheviks, the imperialist claims of the Russian anti-Bolsheviks and the vacillations of the Allied Supreme Council."²¹ What's more, Lenin played every trick in the handbook of traditional Russian cold war policy to rape and subdue one nation after another.

Unfortunately, few of us are acquainted with the early history of Soviet Russian imperialism. What we do know

21. Erickson, John, *The Soviet High Command*, London, 1962, p. 85.

about Soviet Russia and its primary empire, the Soviet Union, has been largely acquired from history texts which ultimately depend on Russian sources. Conditioned by a long tradition of censorship, these sources can hardly be relied upon for objectivity and truth, particularly as concerns the original non-Russian nations imprisoned by Moscow. Yet, with emphasis on the new red prison house of nations, a studious reading and re-reading of this early history would provide us with extremely valuable clues for a psycho-political evisceration of the Russian bear in the cold war.

It is vitally important for us Americans to come to grips with these essential historical facts bearing on the Soviet Union and its threat to our Western civilization, many of which were fully grasped by Marx. First, Communism is but another ideological form of traditional Russian imperialism. Extending Marx's insights into this centuries-old East European cancer, we can soundly underscore this perceptive observation given by a British analyst: "The notion that Russian Imperialism . . . has a sacred mission in pursuing its conquest is centuries-old, and the notion of Moscow as 'the third Rome' and of its ruler as a sort of holy God-King, though no longer expressed in that fashion, has been taken over unchanged by the present regime." ²²

Second, as Marx himself saw, world domination has always been a Muscovite-Russian goal, regardless of the regime in power. The poet laureate of Catherine II, Derzhavin, capsulizes this basic fact in these words: "Of what use are allies to thee, O' Russian? Stride forth, and thine is the whole world." ²³ It is absurd to think that

22. King-Hall, Stephen, *The Communist Conspiracy*, London, 1953, p. 75.

23. Doerig, J. A., *op. cit.*, p. 184.

only with the deceptive ideology of Communism and its materialistic base has the goal of world domination by the Russians arisen. For the ages in which they were launched, the ideologies of religious Orthodoxy and racist Pan-Slavism played similar roles.

The third essential fact is the crucial importance of the peripheral non-Russian nations in the primary empire of Russia. Without White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkestan and others, Russian imperialism could not exist. It would have no immediate colonies to exploit and feed on for further thrusts outward. Speaking of the imperial Russian power, one long-time analyst of Russian imperialism states this cogently: "This is true in the Soviet as it was in the Czarist empire; the locus of political decisions is Moscow and Russians rule over non-Russians. . . ." ²⁴ The notion that Red Moscow first commenced its imperio-colonialist ventures in 1939 smacks of historical myopia. The prevalence of this fallacious idea obstructs our view of the total picture of Soviet Russian imperialism, extending back to 1917-23. With this picture one can easily understand why Moscow cries out, "No interference in our internal affairs," when concern is shown for these primary captive non-Russian nations. Without them its expansionist base would be severely reduced.

Finally, as we concentrate on the experiences and fates of the non-Russian nations in the USSR, we Americans shall progressively understand the real nature of the enemy, his centuries-long background, his policy of conquest and his developed techniques and stratagems. Needless to say, Communism has been a riddle for millions in the Free World. But this can be easily dissipated. For, as

24. Baczkowski, Włodzimierz, *Russian Colonialism*, Beirut, Lebanon, 1959, p. 32.

one writer accurately puts it, "In the light of historical events . . . Bolshevism has not proved so great a riddle to the nations which have been subjugated by Russia . . . these nations have from the beginning assumed the most realistic attitude toward it."²⁵ In short, there is no substitute for experience. We must profit by such experience.

In this period of "negotiations for peace" we might take another leaf from Marx. "Russia," he wrote, "only throws out so many notes to the Western diplomats, like bones to the dogs, in order to set them at an innocent amusement, while she reaps the advantage of further gaining time." Since 1954 a mountain of such bones has been created by Moscow. Action that should have been taken by our government in pursuit of the policy of liberation and for the expansion of freedom has not been taken. Instead, we have been virtually brainwashed by familiar Russian propaganda on "peace," "coexistence or co-destruction," and "the might of the Soviet Union." So much so, that we have now succumbed to accommodating the enemy who, while we amuse ourselves diplomatically, gains time and its precious advantages.

The Khrushchev of the 60's was no different from the Khrushchev of the 50's. His words of 1956 in Warsaw applied to his policy in this decade. They apply to the same policy of his successors. "But of course," he said, "we must realize that we cannot coexist eternally. One of us must go to his grave. We do not want to go to the grave. They don't want to go to their graves either. So what must be done? We must push them to their graves." Pope Pius XII was perfectly correct in describing our state as "the mirage of coexistence."

But there is time yet for us to learn—from Marx,

25. Nananashvili, Vano Jan, *The Strength and Weakness of USSR*, Boston, Mass., 1956, p. 128.

from the captive nations, from the declarations of the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialists themselves. The very first lesson is on the nature of the enemy. Much progress has been achieved in this respect. However, nothing less than precision in thought can be desired. One of our outstanding American journalists emphasizes that "our enemy is not Communism per se, but Soviet imperialism. . . ." ²⁶ True, but not completely. It is not the Soviet Union that is imperialistic, but rather Soviet Russia, which is only a part of the Union. As Marx observed, the fixed star of world domination is a Russian star.

TOWARD THE PRISON'S FINAL COLLAPSE

Since the beginning of World War II, Soviet Russia has successfully constructed numerous additions to the main prison house of nations. These additions are in Central and South Europe and also in Asia and Latin America. It plans to accommodate more captive inmates. Basically, much of this empire-building has been achieved by far-seeing strategy, cold war techniques, subversion, and sheer duplicity and cunning. What is often overlooked is the basis of differentiation and flexible adaptation upon which this empire-building is being conducted, so that even the regimes of Red China, Yugoslavia, and others ultimately depend for their very survival on the Russian power center. In World War II, banking on the known incapacities of Western leadership, Moscow forged ahead with its imperial expansion even in the storm of a hot war. The decisive elements that went into this expansion were not the superficial presence of its troops in Poland, East Germany, Hungary and elsewhere;

26. Sulzberger, C. L., *What's Wrong With U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, 1959, p. 136.

nor were they the changing opportunities of war. They were primarily cold war elements, applied to unsuspecting and trusting allies and directed at the new victims.

The cold war weapons used by the present heirs of the Russian Empire are in reality old weapons. What is new is their field of specific application, their environment for the new kill. We Americans have come to recognize these weapons more and more, but there can be no question of the fact that we still have a long way to go in our understanding of how to blunt these weapons, and with our own weapons of truth and decency to pierce the very heart of the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist system. Cries that the full use of such weapons, adroitly and fearlessly applied, would lead to a hot global war are a measure of not only a dangerous unrealism in this protracted Cold War, but also the efficacy of Soviet Russian propaganda. For too long now we have been telling ourselves that we are about the finest propagandists in the world when it comes to wares and tangibles and about the worst when it comes to ideas and politico-economic intangibles. Yet the chief arena, the area of ultimate decision in the Cold War, is that of all-encompassing psychopolitical propaganda.

We can defeat the Soviet Russian totalitarians in the Cold War. The mainstay of Moscow's ambitions and pretensions has always been its propaganda power. Interpreted in its proper educational sense, propaganda is Moscow's central power. It is a product of political psychology cultivated over centuries that has synthesized outstanding but relatively depthless achievements in diverse fields to transport the image of growing Russian supremacy. Many of the achievements in the military, scientific, cultural, economic and other fields have not even been the results of Russian energy but rather of non-

Russian talent harnessed and exploited within the walls of the USSR. The propaganda exercise in political imagery was practiced by Peter the Great, Alexander I and others in the long line of imperio-colonialist tyranny, but it has been performed best by the Soviet Russian custodians of the empire. The present custodians have expanded the prison house farthest, and they have even bluffed many of us with their pretentious might and determination. Yet all this only conceals their deepest perennial weaknesses—weaknesses we have not begun to exploit, let alone recognize, if we are to win the Cold War.

The Russian Empire collapsed once in a state of a hot war; it can collapse again in the state of a cold war. To bring this to pass, it is essential that there be a balanced combination of five factors: an overall military superiority; continual scientific, technological and economic progress; a political warfare or “polwar” strategy; a broadened knowledge of the chief uncementable cracks in the Soviet Union; and, ultimately, a will to contest the Soviet Russian adversary on his paramount ground of strength, namely, the psycho-political. The first two factors exist—and in much greater comparative strength than most of us realize. The remaining three do not. And it is primarily because of their non-existence that we daily continue to lose the Cold War. However, should this necessary combination of factors for certain victory in the Cold War be realized, we cannot expect the USSR, Moscow’s main prison house of nations, to collapse immediately. What, in truth, took centuries to build and reconstruct, will not crumble in the span of a few years. The final collapse of the Soviet Russian Empire is a crowning objective that will demand years of work and operation.

“REPETITIO EST MATER STUDIORUM”

“Repetition is the mother of studies.” This constructive pedagogic rule on repetition has, with success, been observed since ancient times. The purposeful application of the rule here is both necessary and promising, for there is no single subject more vitally related to the security interests of our nation and which eludes the grasp of our understanding than the basic one of the USSR as a prison house of nations. Repetition in this case is indispensable. I shall prudently utilize the force of repetition in all that follows, within, of course, varying contexts of discussion. The all-important concept of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR is, as we shall see, a central, synthesizing and explosive concept. Where there is a plague or wildfire, we do not hesitate to employ dynamite. The concept of the captive non-Russian nations in Moscow’s primary empire is our dynamite for the Cold War—and again, I repeat for those afflicted by acute nuclearitis, without exploding the world.

When you reflect on it, it is truly amazing that the captive inmates of the main prison house under Moscow have received little attention by our Government. Here is the inner stronghold not only of the Soviet Union but also of the entire captive world, including Red China, Yugoslavia, and Cuba. Logically, a disastrous explosion in the main house would rock all the additions to the ground, just as the collapse of the United States, by isolation or an unusual sudden attack, would mean the end of the Free World. Examples of our official and private inattentiveness—not to say ignorance in some cases—to this primary region of Soviet Russian weakness are cited throughout this work. To be sure, there are many more. It oftentimes appears that a premium is placed on a trained capacity for error.

A good friend of mine, Dr. Stefan T. Possony of Stanford University, who in his own right is one of our keenest minds on the Cold War, several years ago expressed doubt to me about the ability of our people to understand the fundamental idea of captive nations within the USSR. He felt that the concepts and distinctions involved are too difficult for most Americans to penetrate. He failed to convince me then, and he certainly could not convince me of this now.

What is covered here should not cause any intellectual indigestion. My own training in Thomistic philosophy—albeit with an Augustinian bias—makes it difficult for me, too, to stomach theory for theory's sake, ideas for the glamour of ideas, or fleeting speculations about the USSR which are usually contrived in a vacuum of the essential politico-economic realities found in this main prison house. My inclination—as no doubt the reader's is—is for theory to carve the concrete, for the idea to be wedded to act, and our knowledge of the USSR to be founded on facts that are drenched by history and experience. A number of subjects examined here are concretely tested theories. They are not speculative ideas precedent to possible acts and events; they are ideas which generated acts and actual events.

In this Cold War it pains me, as very likely it does the reader, to witness the acutely disadvantageous situations in which our leaders are frequently placed when meeting with the Soviet Russians. A prime example of this, in connection with Soviet Russia's primary empire and its tremendous importance for us in the Cold War, is the visit by former Vice President Nixon to Moscow. A modicum of understanding of Marx on Russia would have helped in this case. Let us now turn to this unforgettable episode in our critical times.

Chapter II
NIXON'S TESTIMONY OF AMERICAN
BEWILDERMENT

"The Captive Nations Resolution was the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour."

—Richard M. Nixon

Conflicting stories about former Vice President Richard M. Nixon and the Captive Nations Week Resolution will undoubtedly be told for many years to come. Since 1959, when the Vice President made his famous tour to the Soviet Union, numerous versions of his negative attitude toward the resolution have been given. In the 1960 Presidential campaign, for example, Senator J. W. Fulbright demanded the release of the official text of the Nixon-Khrushchev conversations on the historic resolution which Congress had passed in July, 1959. It was rumored then that the disclosure would have been devastating to Nixon. Many wonder today why this text has not been disclosed.

Another example is the account offered in 1962 by the columnist Drew Pearson, whose usual analyses of "Russian-American" affairs may well be discounted. On the basis of his interview with the Russian dictator, Pearson maintains that Nixon "actually apologized to Khrushchev for the action of the American Congress. . . ." ¹ The questionable story Pearson related goes as follows:

1. Pearson, Drew, "Faked Photos in Golden States," *The Washington Post*, November 2, 1962, p. D11.

“Naturally I knew about the resolution,” Khrushchev said, “but did not plan to mention it since Nixon was our guest. However, much to my surprise Nixon mentioned it himself and said that Congress was foolish to have passed the resolution.”

“Do you mean to say that members of Congress are fools?”—Khrushchev said he asked Nixon.

“Oh, this is just a private conversation between us,” Nixon said quickly.

One cannot but suspect the validity of this story when it is recalled that even before Nixon’s plane landed in Moscow, Khrushchev had already brought up the resolution. In a stadium rally at the time he bellowed and railed against the resolution and its sponsors. However, part of Pearson’s story appears quite plausible. As far as I know, Nixon has never denied his apologizing to Khrushchev for the passage of the resolution. And it is this point that continually emerges in the many different stories.

THE NIXON STORY

For an American to gauge the damage that was done in Moscow, it is not necessary at all to depend on these many shifting stories of Nixon’s behavior. Nixon’s own qualified account is sufficient for this purpose. Whether the former Vice President has realized it or not, his story is a portrait of self-indictment.

Richard Nixon did not know what struck him when he arrived in Moscow for the American Cultural Exhibition in July, 1959. As his book, *Six Crises*, attests, he still does not understand what happened when Khrushchev

unleashed his attack against the Captive Nations Week Resolution.

It is not, of course, my desire or intention to indulge in personalities or to cast any ill light on their motivations. That unconstructive course never makes for objective discourse. I have the highest esteem for Mr. Nixon—as I do for all public servants who have duties to perform and responsibilities to discharge in behalf of our national interest. I single out Nixon not because of Nixon but rather because of his direct official involvement in, and his subsequent testimony to, an event which continues to bewilder most Americans. Nixon's errors, omissions, and deficiencies may be viewed as a particular personification of the trained capacity for such behavior as demonstrated by the Kennans, the Bohlens and other well-known Russian experts. As Nixon himself tells us, he was briefed extensively by such experts in the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other governmental bodies. What's more, his heavy entourage to Moscow consisted of top-level advisers.

The chapter on Khrushchev in Nixon's book demonstrates clearly the limitations and flaws in the understanding of too many of our leaders with regard to the Soviet Union and the nature of the threat facing us. The concepts and conceptions shown by Nixon reveal only too plainly some of the reasons why the United States has been losing the Cold War since World War II. Throughout the book Nixon is under the illusion that the Soviet Union is populated only by the Russian people. The main prison house of nations is non-existent for him. He seems to gloat over the fact that he was given the opportunity to speak directly to the "Russian people," although he is thoroughly unaware of the additional fact that the several

things he had to say could not but have had an adverse effect on the majority of non-Russian nations in the USSR. Adding imprecision of thought to factual inaccuracy, if Nixon is not talking about the "Russian people," he is employing the equally misleading notion, "the Soviets."

As to ideology and reality, Nixon exudes similar confusion. He reveals to us that "the most important single purpose" of his mission was to convince Khrushchev that "he could not hope to convert the United States to Communism. . . ." ² This is a rather fantastic conception of the problem. The Soviet Russian totalitarians have failed to convert any nation to "Communism," including the entire Russian nation. So why place the United States as an unwary, lamb-like object of mythical conversion?

If, instead of concentrating on the myths of Communism and conversion, Nixon had viewed the problem in its true light, he would have regarded as his most important single purpose the conveyance of our knowledge to Khrushchev about Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and also our determination to beat it in its tracks. This could have been done diplomatically and with knowledgeable resolve. Khrushchev would have respected Nixon for it; for respect from the Russian bear is not obtained by falling prey to his disseminated myths.

THE MAJOR SOVIET RUSSIAN IRRITANT

When it comes to the "major Soviet irritant" throughout Nixon's tour, as he himself phrases it, the limitations and defects come into full bloom. The evidence provided by the participant himself, and reflecting the advice and judgments of countless others, clearly shows how unprepared and short we are in coping with the claws of the

2. Nixon, Richard M., *Six Crises*, New York, 1962, p. 244.

bear. By this evidence Nixon confirms the fact that he fared rather poorly and feebly when he was confronted by Khrushchev's explosion over the Captive Nations Week Resolution. The reader will recall the passage of this measure by Congress immediately prior to the Vice President's departure.

Consider carefully the evidence supplied in Nixon's book. He reports that upon his arrival Khrushchev "was lambasting the United States generally and me personally for the Captive Nations Resolution," which, according to him, "called for prayers for those behind the Iron Curtain."³ He goes on to say how difficult it was for him to imagine "that the resolution truly disturbed the Soviet Premier because it was simply the expression of a well-known opinion in the United States, and not a call to action."

After reading this, one wonders whether Nixon himself had ever read the resolution. First, it should be pointed out that he had nothing whatever to do with its passage. If he was lambasted, it obviously was not personal, but official. Second, the resolution does not explicitly call for prayers. It authorizes public observances which, in practice, include prayers in addition to numerous other activities. Moreover, the unique element in the resolution is its specific reference to the main prison house of nations and its inmates, namely, the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. It is this element that stunned Khrushchev, then and ever since. Contrary to Nixon's assertion, the emancipation of these nations is certainly not a "well-known opinion in the United States."

Finally, the whereas clauses leading up to and predicating the resolve in Public Law 86-90 unquestionably constitute a call to action. It is action for a cold war

3. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

A comparison between these two documents immediate strategy to be pursued until all the specified and other captive nations become free and independent. It is a form of action that Nixon himself called for in his acceptance speech before the 1960 Republican National Convention, but never concretely spelled out.⁴

By no means is this all. Another highlight in Nixon's testimony of American bewilderment is his "pure protocol courtesy visit" to Khrushchev. He gives a vivid account of how the Russian leader immediately lunged into the resolution.⁵ You can visualize the setting. Nixon tells us that the Russian jailer developed "a long harangue" and spoke in "a high-pitched voice," and frequently pounded the table.⁶ Khrushchev is quoted as saying that "the Soviet Government regarded the resolution as a very serious 'provocation.'" He is also quoted on its supposed negative effects upon the Geneva Conference, a peace treaty for Germany, and a "general improvement in relations between our two countries," as though the USSR is a country in the national sense.

Khrushchev, according to this testimony, set the stage for all that was to follow during Nixon's tour. He could not understand why President Eisenhower issued a Captive Nations Week Proclamation if he wanted Nixon "to have a good reception" in Moscow's main prison house of nations. Furthermore, the Russian leader suspected a plot by the U.S. Congress. Evidently, for his conspiratorial mind all of this was too neatly timed. As to be expected, he warned that it would mean war if we intended to "change anything in the USSR or in any other country." He then brought out the warped fiction on "how the Russian people had repulsed what he called United States

4. *Ibid.*, p. 457.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 251.

intervention at the time of the birth of the Soviet regime, during 1919-21, and certainly would do so now."

NIXON AT A DISADVANTAGE

In the course of this first meeting how did the Vice President present our case? First, from his account, he was apparently misinformed on the time Congress passed the resolution. It was not passed on July 6—the day it passed the Senate—but on July 9. Second, Nixon again was taken aback by Khrushchev's fury over the resolution. He did not expect him to bring it up during this "pure protocol courtesy visit." As he puts it, "I had to make a quick decision of how to react to his attack." He actually thought that Khrushchev "was going through an act—that he was using the resolution as a pretext for taking the offensive against me, and that had it not been for this resolution, he would have found some other excuse for doing so." Why so?

Regarding our question, Nixon offers no logical explanation as to why this would have been so. Nor could he. Eisenhower's Paris experience in 1960 does not at all apply to his. It is perfectly sound for one to hold that had there been no resolution in July, 1959, the Vice President would have been wined, dined, and swayed by typical Russian cold war hospitality. There is no reason to believe that a pretext was necessary at that time. Moscow was at the peak of its deceptive peace offensive, and Khrushchev himself was planning to visit the United States. Thus, the pretext argument used by Nixon is more of a post-rationalization for an unexpected attack than anything else.

Worse still is Nixon's admission of the two points he emphasized to Khrushchev. One point is that the resolu-

tion "was a decision made by the Congress over which Eisenhower had no control." The other point reads, "The resolution did not call for our intervention, or even for our support of a revolution in the satellite nations. . . ." Here are perfect examples of how not to approach a Soviet Russian totalitarian, even in the rarefied realm of diplomacy. It is hard to believe that Nixon had to grovel with such low apology by intimating that Congress was wrong in passing the resolution. Equally incredible is the further apologetic note about our intervention. Despite his many assertions about a cold war offensive, this type of feeble behavior on Nixon's part spells the complete defensive in the presence of the prime cold war instigator.

Again by Nixon's testimony, Khrushchev opened himself wide for some pointed retorts. The fiction about U.S. intervention in 1919-21 was a topic which could have been chewed on with particular reference to the re-establishment of the Russian prison house of nations. The jailer's ears could have been pinned back on this one. Concerning the resolution itself, the tactic that was made to order by Khrushchev's numerous utterances, and should have been seized upon by Nixon, is one of stressing competitive ideals and ways of life. Why this awful fear of a Congressional resolution? But such an offensive presupposes knowledgeability. As Marx said, the Russian bear will continue to claw the other defenseless animals.

To be sure, as Nixon attests, Khrushchev kept clawing in this first meeting. He shook his finger at the Vice President, he threatened that Nixon would hear about the resolution for the duration of his stay, he shouted and pounded, he dubbed the resolution, and then "he spelled out what he meant in some earthy four-letter words. . . ." ⁷ Even Troyanovsky, his interpreter, had to blush "bright

7. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

red." Still, at the close of this first meeting, Nixon was in the dark about all this. He completely misjudged the hospitable Moscow keeper and never understood the full import of the resolution.

Khrushchev also kept his word on Nixon hearing about the resolution during his tour. The frightened sought to frighten the innocent. To take a few instances, at the American Exhibition in Sokolniki Park, where the superficial "kitchen debate" occurred, the Russian leader again denounced the resolution. He embraced a workman nearby and declared for all to hear, "Does this man look like a slave laborer?"⁸ While Nixon was concerned with irrelevancies, such as the comparative merits of "the Soviet system" and our economy, his political climb and Khrushchev's, the jailer was very much obsessed by the meaning of the resolution for his compound of imprisoned nations.

THE RUSSIAN JAILER POTEMKINIZES

Later, at Khrushchev's *dacha*, the resolution came up again. The native Russian (Khrushchev is not a Ukrainian; nor is he, like Stalin, an adopted Russian) suggested a boat trip for the Vice President and his party "to see how the slaves live."⁹ The two-hour trip turned into a trip about captives. Mikoyan, according to Nixon, characterized it as "fine river rallies." On eight occasions Khrushchev ordered the boat to be stopped so that he could shake hands with the bathers in the Moskva River and ask them, "Are you captives? Are you slaves?"¹⁰ Naturally, the shouted reply was, "*Nyet, nyet.*" Khrushchev then would

8. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

turn to Nixon, rib him a bit or two, and shout, "See how our slaves live!" Nixon was informed later by Ambassador Thompson that the only bathers allowed to use the river are the élite of the New Class.

The typical Potemkin Village tactics of fraud and fear, as shown here by Khrushchev, are modes of Russian political behavior which we shall observe time and time again in other contexts. The Potemkin Village characterization goes back to the time of Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century, and is synonymous with false appearances. The sorry aspect of all this is Nixon's almost naive interpretations of the clawing he received from the bear. He rationalized that protocol had to be maintained, that Khrushchev was his host and the like. This is no excuse for not demonstrating, ever so politely and shrewdly, one's own knowledgeability about the USSR, its make-up, its uncementable cracks.

When Nixon repeatedly speaks of the USSR as a nation and groups the different national entities of this imperium into the mythical category of "Soviet people," the Russian totalitarian cannot but instantly scent his prey. When Nixon regards Khrushchev as a "cold, hard-headed Marxist," the prime jailer cannot but recognize the solid effects of his smoke-screening propaganda.¹¹ And when Nixon publicly testifies that he was bewildered by Khrushchev's reaction to the Captive Nations Week Resolution, we have a fair measure of validity as well as the gravity of Marx's wisdom about the Russian bear and its victims.

From the viewpoint of psycho-political impact there were many other errors committed by the Vice President. At the request of Herbert Klein, who was then Nixon's press secretary, I submitted a memorandum citing several

11. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

of these errors. Nixon's exclusive concentration on Russia as against the non-Russian countries in the USSR, his mythical, monolithic terms such as "Soviet nation" and "Soviet people," his reference to Ukraine as the Texas of this "nation," his comparison of Novosibirsk—long the hub of slave labor in Moscow's empire—with our free Western frontier towns, and his rags-to-riches attribution to Khrushchev's rise to power, which was actually accelerated by genocide and other crimes in the 30's and 40's, were some of the inexcusable errors pointed out.¹²

We Americans might have contented ourselves with the superficialities of the "kitchen debate," but those in Moscow's primary empire who have long suffered the injustices and indignities of Soviet Russian domination over their homeland, must have been hurt deeply by the words and thoughts of America's then second-ranking leader. Yes, the official text of the momentous Khrushchev-Nixon affair has yet to be released to the American public. As mentioned before, in the 1960 Presidential campaign Senator Fulbright urged its release when he accused the Vice-President of expressing regrets to Khrushchev on the timing of the resolution.¹³ Its release now should make for some interesting and instructive reading. After all, other texts on U.S. prestige abroad and other subjects have since been released.

The Nixon testimony of American bewilderment is only a meager parcel of the misunderstanding and misconceptions held in this country with regard to the Captive Nations Week Resolution. As emphasized earlier, Nixon simply gave high-level expression to this misunderstanding or lack of understanding. Innumerable examples

12. Memorandum to the Vice President, October 30, 1959.

13. "Fulbright Cites Nixon Regrets," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., October 19, 1960.

can be cited from other spheres of our society. To mention one, in 1961 Stewart Alsop wrote an article in *The Saturday Evening Post* in which he stated: "When I was in Moscow during the October Party Congress, Khrushchev once again violently denounced the innocuous Captive Nations Week Resolution, which Congress passes every year to attract minority votes." ¹⁴

It is strange, to say the least, that this popular writer can compress into one sentence such an admixture of truth, specious logic, and factual inaccuracy. It is a significant truth that Khrushchev had not ceased to denounce the resolution. He had been doing it since 1959. But, logically, if this is so, then how could the resolution be deemed "innocuous"? And, in the realm of fact, Congress does not have to pass the resolution every year. Public Law 86-90 is on the books for an indefinite future. Moreover, the resolution, which was passed in a Congressional off-year, was done so with far greater objectives than to attract minority votes. As a matter of fact, this consideration did not even enter into it.

Evidently there is considerable room in this area for proper information and some education. The Nixon case is an excellent starting point for lessons to be learned. No area of our society is exempt in this regard. As to the Captive Nations Week Resolution and its world-wide impact, the next three chapters will attempt to explain the essential aspects of the document and its manifold effect. The chapters beyond will return us to the main prison house of nations and to the possibilities of psycho-politically sterilizing the Soviet Russians, the mainstay of the far-flung Red Empire.

14. Alsop, Stewart, "The Berlin Crisis: Khrushchev's Weakness," *The Saturday Evening Post*, December 16, 1961.

Chapter III

THE STORY BEHIND THE CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RESOLUTION

“This resolution stinks.”—Nikita Khrushchev

Strange is scarcely the word for the misunderstandings and misinterpretations disclosed in the preceding chapter. The story behind the Captive Nations Week Resolution is no mystery. The thinking, the ideas, and the research which are crystallized in this document have been present on our terrain for well over a decade. The resolution points directly and unerringly at the most essential and predominant cracks in the Soviet Russian imperium. As subsequent chapters will show, its contents provide in summary form the basis for a winning cold war strategy. In short, there is no excuse for any of our leaders and public-opinion makers to demonstrate fundamental ignorance on this score. The Khrushchev quote above speaks for itself.

The Captive Nations Week Resolution, passed by the U.S. Congress in July, 1959, is now a vibrant part of living history. Its impact on international events has been unmistakably shown by the reactions it has consistently produced in Moscow. Many have been taken by surprise with these reactions; others have viewed them as the expected.

When it was passed, the resolution and the Presidential Proclamation based upon it were immediately subjected to all sorts of analyses. Some held they were “bad,” a number favored them but contended that the timing was

poor, and many hailed the event in every respect. Most commentators, analysts, and newsmen in this country never really grasped the full meaning and significance of these documents. Worse still, in their typical haste a number of them garbled up the facts leading to the passage of the resolution.

In the judgment of many close observers the world has not heard the last of these documents. Their deep importance has yet to be revealed in thought and action. Their influence will still be felt in many quarters of the world. Vested in them are possibilities and prospects which time itself will unravel and cause to be realized. Particularly here in the United States, the potential developments suggested by these documents are so immense and promising that at this point a methodical exposition of all aspects surrounding the resolution is clearly necessary.

Public Law 86-90 and the First Proclamation

To appreciate the total meaning of the resolution, it is obviously a *sine qua non* for one to read every clause in it. Unfortunately, too many who are quick to comment on it fail to meet this requisite, as their comments plainly show. The resolution—now Public Law 86-90, a law of the land—reads as follows:

Whereas the greatness of the United States is in large part attributable to its having been able, through the democratic process, to achieve a harmonious national unity of its people, even though they stem from the most diverse of racial, religious and ethnic background; and
Whereas this harmonious unification of the diverse elements of our free society has led the people

of the United States to possess a warm understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of peoples everywhere and to recognize the natural interdependency of the peoples and nations of the world; and

Whereas the enslavement of a substantial part of the world's population by Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful co-existence between nations and constitutes a detriment to the natural bonds of understanding between the people of the United States and other peoples; and

Whereas since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which poses a dire threat to the security of the United States and of all the free peoples of the world; and

Whereas the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led through direct and indirect aggression to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others; and

Whereas these submerged nations look to the United States, as the citadel of human freedom, for leadership in bringing about their liberation and independence and in restoring to them the enjoyment of their Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other religious freedoms, and of their individual liberties; and

Whereas it is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and

Whereas the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace; and

Whereas it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such people through an appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and inviting the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities. The President is further authorized and requested to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world.

Having authored this document, I regard the following as the essential ideas of the measure: (1) the unity-in-diversity nature of our own nation; (2) the farce of a peaceful coexistence of nations with an existing Iron Cur-

tain: (3) the belated recognition by our Government of the majority of the captive nations in the Soviet Union; (4) the awareness of the imperialistic and colonialistic nature of Soviet Russia since 1918; and (5) the basic, determining position of the captive nations in our world-wide strategy against Moscow's cold war threat. These views as reflected in the resolution are in complete accord with history and also provide fundamental guidelines for American foreign policy.

In order for one to interpret accurately the reasons for Moscow's outbursts against the resolution, he must first perceive the meaning of these ideas. More than anyone else, the Kremlin has fully and instinctively understood the pointedness of truth in the resolution, and it responds accordingly. Public Law 86-90 not only disturbs Moscow's present plans for politico-psychologically bluffing the American people but also frightens it with adverse possibilities in the Cold War, which it has absolutely no intention of ending. For the Soviet Russian totalitarians to end the Cold War is like taking a motor out of a car and expecting it to operate.

These thoughts must be borne in mind if any sound analysis is to be made of the resolution. Before one embarks on this analysis he should make certain comparative observations between Public Law 86-90 and the first Presidential Proclamation, which was issued by President Eisenhower on July 17, 1959, and which reads as follows:

Whereas many nations throughout the world have been made captive by the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism; and
Whereas the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations have been deprived of their national independence and their individual liberties; and

Whereas the citizens of the United States are linked by bonds of family and principle to those who love freedom and justice on every continent; and *Whereas* it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the peoples of the captive nations the support of the government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations for freedom and national independence; and

Whereas by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a Proclamation designating the 3rd week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world;

Now, therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 19, 1959, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities and urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 17th day of July in the year of our Lord 1959 and of the Independence of the United States of America the 184th.

ately reveals the marks of historical devaluation, a supposedly softening tone, and some befogging of issues and identities. The proclamation was drafted and prepared in the Department of State. By professional bent the Department's members are addicted to diplomatic circumlocution and fringe expressions of the truth that obfuscate calling things by their right names. However, the proclamation had to be aligned with the resolution, and the latitude for verbal sophistry and obfuscation was in this case somewhat more restricted than is ordinarily the case. Nevertheless, many who read the proclamation without having bothered to scan the underlying resolution wind up with the usual platitudes and misconceptions about the captive nations. As a consequence, they miss the crucial point of the whole event, including the reasons for Khrushchev's unprecedented explosion.

It should be evident to the careful reader that certain spurious and imprecise terms were introduced into the situation by the proclamation. For one, "Soviet Communism" is a meaningless abstraction without any objective foundation. The motivation for its use is the misleading desire not to implicate the Russian people for what Moscow does. Stubborn facts show that the imperialistic and colonialist enterprise is peculiarly Russian, but, according to some, it seems we are not to be guided by facts. Curiously, the same objectors have no qualms about using the term "Chinese Communism."

Yet, to cite a few examples from the past, Woodrow Wilson had no theoretical difficulties in differentiating between German imperialism and the German people and thus designating the first as our clear-cut enemy. Nor had Franklin D. Roosevelt any difficulty in identifying Italian Fascism, German Nazism, and Japanese imperialism.

Today, we are asked, in effect, to pursue phantoms rather than be guided by historical experience and the need for properly identifying the enemy. The resolution clearly identifies the enemy; the first proclamation failed to do this.

Another equally and purposely confusing term is "Soviet-dominated." The indiscriminating reader cannot but leave with the impression that this means dominated by the Soviet Union. If, in the light of the resolution this point were raised, the Department of State would probably defend itself by pointing out the general scope of the proclamation, which speaks of captive nations "throughout the world" and alludes to nations "on every continent." Briefly, guarding itself in this manner it would hold that a meticulous reading of the proclamation indicates a complete conformity with the resolution, since all the captive nations are implied by these inconspicuous phrases. On this score its defense would be invulnerable. The drafters of the proclamation could also argue that "Soviet-dominated" means "dominated by Soviet Russia," which in part has been the case since 1918. In this, too, its product squares off with the resolution.

Quite plainly, the letter of the law is satisfied, but the intention to crystallize the truth is different between the resolution and the proclamation. In the Cold War, some fail to realize that tremendous capital gain can be obtained by properly exploiting the truth. Paradoxically, it is usually the same individuals who protest violently against using the methods employed by the deceiving Russians. A proper exploitation of the truth means to face it squarely, precisely, and unqualifiedly. This, more than anything else, can destroy the deceptive designs of Moscow. The resolution does this, and the results prove it.

Despite all this, former President Eisenhower deserves

our highest praise for having issued, forthrightly and courageously, this first historic proclamation. In 1959 his defense of the action taken grew bolder as the days went by. President Kennedy followed with an even less ambiguous type of proclamation. Moreover, there aren't superlatives enough to praise the act of leadership shown by the Congress on an extraordinarily bipartisan basis. In years to come, more so than perhaps now, the wisdom and vision of this act will be fully understood.

BACKGROUND OF THE RESOLUTION

As many have pointed out, the background of the resolution is a most interesting one. The idea was conceived in 1958 when it was my privilege to serve on the faculty of the National War College. Then, as indeed now, I was increasingly concerned over the growing indifference in many American circles toward not only the status but also the strategic value of the captive nations. Then, as now, the chief thrust of Russian propaganda was in the direction of obtaining American accession to the vast empire which the Soviet Russians have built since 1918.

When the Russians speak of "peaceful coexistence," they mean nothing more than American acquiescence to the permanent security of their empire. Their twofold purpose in obtaining this guarantee for the territorial integrity of the empire is to gain time for its necessary consolidation, which would come more easily with the broken wills of the captive peoples, and to secure further their base for cold war operations in the open field of the non-totalitarian Free World. This situation existed in 1958; it exists today.

In planning any such resolution a ripe occasion is always necessary. The occasion presented itself in 1958

with the Soviet Russian murder of Imre Nagy, the former Hungarian premier. I prepared a Concurrent Resolution on Captive Nations' Days and managed to interest Congressman Cretella of Connecticut in it. Mr. Cretella submitted it with an introductory address on July 2, 1958.¹

Those who have called for a Captive Nations' Year, might be reminded that this original resolution was designed to observe the independence and other historic days of the captive nations throughout the year. The aim was to keep the subject of national captivity steadfastly before the American public. When the resolution was considered by the House Judiciary Committee, its chairman broke a tie vote, casting his vote against it. One of the chief reasons given in opposition to the resolution was that it involved too many days of observance. From a psychological point of view this was a valid objection. Obviously, the alternative was to compress the observance within the span of a week.

In 1959 two occasions arose for a propitious re-introduction of the idea, namely, the Geneva Conference and the forthcoming visit of Vice-President Nixon to Moscow. Both occasions were sufficiently close to our own Independence Day, which carries its own symbolic weight. Making allowances for developments in the previous year, the resolution was revised in both form and content, but the essential ideas were preserved. A comparison of the two resolutions would readily show this. The target period was the week following the Fourth.

For several reasons I sought the cooperation of Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois, but I insisted from the start that the measure must be bipartisan. The resolution was also presented to Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York for

1. H. Con. Res. 347, *Congressional Record*, July 2, 1958, pp. 11791-92.

him to co-sponsor it in the Senate, and a similar move for a bipartisan basis was made in the House with Congressmen Bentley of Michigan and Feighan of Ohio. The cooperation extended was exemplary and most encouraging. The resolution underwent some changes in style and wording, but its substance remained intact throughout.

On June 22, Senator Douglas introduced the resolution, which became known as S. J. Res. 111.² Senator Javits joined with him. It was originally planned to have the resolution on the table in the Senate for two days. However, in order to permit extensive co-sponsorships, the period was lengthened to a week. In this time various facilities were employed to inform the majority of Senators about the resolution and of this particular opportunity for their co-sponsoring it. In addition, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, of which I was chairman, alerted all interested organizations and groups as to what had been transpiring. In the meantime, on June 23, Congressman Bentley introduced a parallel measure in the House, classified as H. J. Res. 435. By the end of the week the Senate measure was co-sponsored by Senators Moss, Bush, Lausche, Scott, Hartke, Green, Dodd, Humphrey, Hart, Neuberger, Keating, Young of North Dakota, Engle, Curtis, Langer, Morse, and Case of New Jersey.

With this action completed, increasing attention was given to the measure by individuals and groups across the nation. They communicated to their legislators their support of the resolution. After the resolution had been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, it was decided, because of shortness of time, to amend the observance period to the third week in July. The decision was made to allow time for the preparation of ceremonies in the event the measure passed the Congress and the President

2. *Congressional Record*, June 22, 1959, pp. 10359-60.

issued a proclamation. Concerning the time coincidence with the Nixon visit, Senator Douglas was perfectly correct in stating that this had been unpremeditated. However, as far as I was concerned, it really made no difference whether the Week would be proclaimed immediately after the Fourth or in the third week. Due to the new elements contained in the resolution, Khrushchev would have exploded before Nixon's visit as well as during it.

On July 6 the resolution was unanimously passed by voice vote in the Senate. Senator Eastland, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was in large measure responsible for this expedition. He cannot be thanked enough for his foresight and solid support. On this, the vicious and unbecoming comments on the Senator's role by Walter Lippmann were not taken too seriously. Curiously, Lippmann on one day had written favorably about the resolution and later strongly opposed it. With the momentum increasing in tempo the House Majority Leader, Congressman John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, entered into the picture to facilitate the measure's passage in the House. Meanwhile, Congressman Michael A. Feighan on July 8 introduced H. J. Res. 459 to parallel the amended measure of the Senate.³ Mr. Feighan told the House that in our negotiations with Moscow on Berlin and other issues, it is "nothing short of amazing that the subjugation of the captive millions throughout the Communist empire has not even been mentioned."

The role played by Congressman McCormack was crucial to the passage of the resolution in the House. His efforts, too, cannot be praised enough. When he presented it on July 9, he declared that "this is a very important resolution that will have tremendous effect on the minds of men and women everywhere throughout the world who

3. *Congressional Record*, July 8, 1959, pp. 11849-850.

are subjected to Communist dictation and who desire to be free under their own law.”⁴ Congressman Bentley, a sponsor of the resolution, joined with the House Majority Leader to see its passage through. Congressmen Judd, Walter, and others spoke eloquently in favor of its passage. The measure was unanimously passed by voice vote on July 9. Despite the limited comments of some observers, it was difficult to see how any right-thinking American could have possibly objected to the resolution. The speed with which it passed Congress in itself attested to its solid contents.

As indicated above, President Eisenhower issued his proclamation on July 17. Events moved swiftly the following week. Church ceremonies were held in many cities. And on July 23, Mr. George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, stated: “The observance of ‘Captive Nations Week’ by the American people has provoked Mr. Khrushchev to more bluster and to still louder threats. This outburst by the Soviet dictator is only a demonstration of the inherent weakness of his sprawling slave empire.”

Then, at one of the President’s news conferences the question was raised as to whether Mr. Nixon had a strike against him before his departure for Moscow. The President answered in part: “Well, no, I wouldn’t think of it in that way. . . . I don’t think there is any specific relationship between the two things.”⁵ The fact is that a very definite relationship existed between the resolution and Nixon’s visit. However, it is significant that on the following Sunday the President joined in prayer for the oppressed nations at a Presbyterian Church in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The minister, the Reverend Robert A. MacAskill,

4. *Congressional Record*, July 9, 1959, pp. 11948-950.

5. Transcript of news conference, *United Press International*, July 22, 1959.

keying his sermon to the proclamation, declared: "Communism is doomed. It is doomed because it denies the divine origin of humanity and the authority of God. The verdict is already pronounced."⁶

I sent a telegram to the President expressing my profound gratitude, as the originator of the Captive Nations Week idea and resolution, for his proclamation and for his personal participation in a prayerful observance of the Week in Gettysburg. This telegram was quoted in part in a column by Mr. David Lawrence, in which he lauded both the resolution and the proclamation.⁷ It should be observed that Mr. Lawrence was one of the few commentators who understood the full import of the resolution, and his articles made for worthwhile reading on the subject. Later, there were others, too, who developed its significance. For example, the following month Mr. George E. Sokolsky devoted an article to the captive nations in which he said: "Nevertheless, it has been characteristic of Russian history that what the Russians take, they never give up willingly. Russia has been like a rolling snowball, gathering size as it rolled on and on." He observed further that "all Russians smile when they see Americans. It looks more like a belly-laugh watching the fools part with their money."⁸

THE MUSCOVITE REACTION

Were the resolution and the proclamation embarrassing to the Vice President? Was this operational move ill-timed? Was it an unfair provocation directed at imperio-

6. *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1959, p. 1.

7. Lawrence, David, "U.S. People and Khrushchev," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., August 6, 1959.

8. *These Days . . .*, "The Captive Nations," August 19, 1959.

colonialist Moscow? These were some of the questions raised when the violent reaction set in from the Kremlin. To each of these questions, answers were in the negative. But, before substantiating the answers, it is necessary to review the type of reaction produced by the two documents.

The resolution and the proclamation struck Moscow with the force of a lightning bolt. Khrushchev precipitantly decried the resolution and viewed with apprehension Nixon's aim in coming to Moscow. In Warsaw at the time he foolishly railed, "The only enslaved peoples are in the capitalistic countries."⁹ The blunt speciousness of this statement was sufficient to indicate the complete bankruptcy of his position. A report from Warsaw that the "proclamation of this week as Captive Nations Week in the United States had hit a raw nerve here" could not have been more aptly stated.¹⁰ Radio Moscow screeched, and *Pravda* chimed in with a half-page blast against the United States. Great perturbation was displayed over the "coincidence in the timing" of the proclamation and Nixon's visit. Moscow viewed the resolution as a "new provocative anti-Soviet campaign." One began to wonder who was hysterical when he read these cries of pain and Khrushchev's further spasm that this "hysterical campaign" of "petty provocation" proves that "panic-stricken monopolists . . . are losing the faculty of controlling their own actions."¹¹

Such evidences of Russian political behavior are typical and normal. They confirm an historically based interpretation that once the grizzly bear is cornered, he will howl and bellow, but his fear is self-paralyzing. Peoples and nations who have bordered Russia for centuries, like

9. *The New York Times*, July 22, 1959, p. 1.

10. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1959.

11. *The Washington Post*, July 24, 1959, p. A8.

the Poles, Georgians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and others, know this truth best. Khrushchev's tirade at the Soviet-Polish Friendship Rally in Moscow that Captive Nations Week was a "direct interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs" is an old Russian technique to deflect any world interest from the imperial and colonial spoils of Moscow.¹²

Actually, the affairs of the Soviet Union *per se* are no more internal than those of a jailer incarcerating independent, innocent citizens. Khrushchev knew this all too well, and he feared it morbidly. In fact, as a UPI dispatch well observed, "At the end of his 40-minute speech, as if unable to get the subject off his mind, Khrushchev returned to the 'enslaved peoples' theme." Truly, the marks of a worried tyrant! Such mouthings as "It would be a good idea if Nixon, who has just landed, would come and have a look at the 'enslaved people' gathered at this stadium" are even politically childish. Indeed, his captive audience might well have been doubly captive.

The effectiveness of both the resolution and the proclamation is further seen by the Russian puppet opposition to it. The puppet Czech regime, for example, lodged its protest against Captive Nations Week, dubbing it "a new American provocation and a hostile act."¹³ Other puppets reacted similarly. Needless to say, puppets could hardly react differently, particularly where the survival of all is involved.

In the preceding chapter we noted several of Nixon's observations on the resolution. But further enlightening evidence on its deep penetration was furnished by other reports of the Nixon-Khrushchev exchanges. The bear just kept whining with pain, showing to the world his weakest

12. *UPI*, press dispatch, Moscow, July 23, 1959.

13. *Associated Press*, Prague, July 24, 1959.

organs. Before television cameras Khrushchev again cried, "I cannot go on without saying it—if you would not take such a decision [Mr. Eisenhower's proclamation of Captive Peoples Week] . . . your trip would be excellent." Then the professed atheist blurted, "Why this was necessary, God only knows. What happened?"¹⁴ The answer to his question is quite obvious. The American people have not been as naive as Khrushchev presumed them to be. The theatrics of controlled cultural exchanges, international cocktail parties, futile talkathons, and other superficialities have not blinded many of the American people to the real issues. Without this Captive Nations Week event and its impact Moscow would have kept on deceiving itself in this regard.

The additional exchange at Khrushchev's villa makes for comical reading. As described in part before, the New Class host suggested that Nixon "take a boat ride on the Moskva River" so he could "see how our slaves live."¹⁵ Chuckling, Nixon replied, "Yes, the captives." Later, when they were in the boat, "crowds gathered around and Mr. Khrushchev each time pointed to them and said, 'Captive people.' They replied, 'No, no, peace and friendship.' . . . Mr. Khrushchev poked Mr. Nixon in the ribs in good humor and said, 'Here are your captives. You can see how happy they are.'" These and other mentioned occurrences clearly demonstrated a troubled mind.

So deeply had the resolution and proclamation pierced Moscow's most sensitive chord that lesser lights joined in the bear's whining chorus. When Nixon met the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Matskevitch, this old MVD functionary immediately launched into the Captive Nations Week subject. "The Soviet people," he exclaimed, "were sur-

14. *Reuters*, Moscow, July 24, 1959.

15. *AP*, Ernest Barcella's notes, Moscow, July 26, 1959.

prised and alarmed that the Senate passed the captive people's resolution." ¹⁶ Of course, there was and is no real entity such as the "Soviet people" to be alarmed about anyway. The alarm was sounded in the Kremlin alone. It is also interesting to note that Matskevitch's reference to the resolution is in terms of "captive peoples," although the resolution precisely speaks of nations, including emphatically those in the Soviet Union. In the area of foreign consumption this important distinction has been one that Moscow consistently seeks to avoid.

About this time, too, *Pravda* again assailed the United States for the resolution, calling it a "coarse, dirty venture of American imperialists." Also, worthy of mention is the fact that when Nixon prepared for his Siberian tour, Khrushchev made a flying trip to perennially restless Ukraine to deliver a self-assuring address.

U.S. REACTION TO THE REACTION

The reaction by some of our officials to this Muscovite reaction appeared to be one of puzzlement. As one report had it, "United States officials are somewhat puzzled and slightly annoyed, but also amused, by Soviet irritation over President Eisenhower's proclamation of Captive Nations Week." ¹⁷ It is not surprising that they were puzzled because very little study and imagination have been developed by our Government with regard to the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. Their inclusion, above all, was the new and most vital element in the resolution which stunned Moscow.

At another news conference, President Eisenhower

16. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., July 25, 1959, p. A3.

17. *AP*, July 23, 1959.

gave his reaction in response to a question on timing, one which is most important for us to note. The President asserted: "I said frequently that the United States would never believe and never accept the idea that a true peace had been established in the world until every single nation had the right to express its own views about its own destiny, and I said the United States would always use whatever peaceful methods were available to it to bring about this opportunity."¹⁸ These were extremely powerful words that deserved every measure of careful implementation in deed, especially as concerns the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. No implementation in deed came to pass. Yet, it could be done with a minimum of risk regarding a hot global war.

In the Senate the most eloquent reaction to the Kremlin reaction was expressed by Senator Kenneth Keating of New York. "Mr. President," he stated, "the finest testimonial possible to the importance and effectiveness of Captive Nations Week is to be found in the yelps of anguish emanating from Premier Khrushchev and other Red leaders. We have hit the Communists where it hurts them, and their blistering rejoinders about interference in their internal affairs merely point up what a tender spot the plight of the enslaved peoples is in their wall of iron."¹⁹ The same reaction was expressed by many private citizens. For example, Francis B. Stevens, formerly with the State Department, wrote in the following vein: "For Mr. Nixon, the trip has been even more revealing. He has seen two very sensitive Soviet nerves exposed, as evidenced by Khrushchev's massive abuse of the American interest in the fate of the captive peoples, within and outside the

18. *UPI*, transcript of news conference, July 29, 1959, No. 20.

19. *Congressional Record*, July 23, 1959, p. 12885.

Soviet Union, and the livid rage of the Soviet press at the U.S. standard of living displayed at the American Exhibition.”²⁰ The Vice-President seemed to sense this when in reply to Matskevitch’s troubled utterances he uttered: “We will have differences from time to time. We disagree with your comments on this resolution.”

There were a few newspapers, commentators and others who criticized both the resolution and the proclamation. Curiously enough, some used the very same vacuous points which punctuated the Muscovite reaction. An editorial in *The Washington Post*, entitled “Irritating the Bear,” advanced arguments on poor timing, peaceful co-existence, the exclusive alternative of war, and the embarrassment caused the Vice President.²¹ A number of these arguments have habitually graced Moscow’s propaganda portfolio. Popular reaction in Washington to my reply to the editorial was extremely encouraging and comforting.²² Another example was the article by Henry N. Taylor in the Scripps-Howard newspapers. He questioned, as did Khrushchev in a later article, the inclusion of Ukraine, Georgia and other non-Russian nations in the resolution.²³ Failing to understand the basic importance of this inclusion—to say nothing of the purpose of the resolution itself—Taylor revealed his own pitiful lack of knowledge concerning East European history. He made the supposedly determining point that these areas had been taken over by the Tsars, “some as far back as 75 years

20. *U.S. News & World Report*, August 10, 1959, p. 39.

21. *The Washington Post*, editorial, “Irritating the Bear,” July 24, 1959.

22. *The Washington Post*, editorial page, July 29, 1959.

23. Taylor, Henry N., “We Preach: Do Nothing—United States Gives Lip-service,” July 27, 1959.

before Nikolai Lenin." Compared with the popular American reaction to this whole development, these few critical sources stood out like sore thumbs.

The above review sufficiently demonstrates the undeniable impact and effectiveness of the resolution. The general timing of the resolution could not have been better, though by happenstance the Week coincided with Nixon's visit. Had the observance been two weeks before, the Muscovite reaction would have been the same. Pavlov's dog was not trained in Russia without purpose. Moreover, the resolution was really in no way embarrassing to Nixon. On the contrary, it provided him with a God-sent opportunity, which, as we noted before, he failed to capitalize on to good advantage. Then, too, the President himself saw no embarrassment to Nixon. The parties that were embarrassed and showed it angrily were the Muscovite captors.

Spurred on by what he witnessed, Nixon did decide to visit the only technically captive nation on his tour, namely, Poland. While he was in the USSR, his tour never went beyond the territorial bounds of Russia. Nixon was not allowed by Moscow to travel in the captive non-Russian countries within the Soviet Union. Had he travelled in Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and elsewhere, one wonders whether the reception would not have surpassed his Polish experience. Moscow apparently did not take any chances.

On the subject of embarrassments, the discomfort suffered at the time by the Rumanian Legation, which was undertaking the Rumanian Exposition in New York, or by the Polish Embassy during its fake celebration of the 15th anniversary of the "Manifesto of Independence," actually could not have concerned us less. When Czech

puppets in the diplomatic colony denounced the resolution and proclamation as a "gratuitous insult," it was sufficient to know from where it came.²⁴

Reflecting accurately and impeccably the history of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism these past 50 years, the resolution lists those nations and states as captive which have directly or indirectly fallen under the foreign domination of Moscow. One of its clauses allows for other and new captive nations. Obviously, the basic criterion is the destruction of national independence. In this fundamental sense the Russian nation cannot be construed as captive. There is no doubt that in the sense of a search for surcease from domestic totalitarian tyranny there are millions of Russian captives. But with equal certainty they by and large were not the ones in Khrushchev's packed stadium or those bathing in the Moskva River. It goes without saying that we should always hold out to these individuals the hope for democratic rights and liberties. But the best and most efficacious way to further this hope is by striving to cut the institutional nexus between Russian imperio-colonialism and domestic Russian totalitarianism. The one feeds on the other. This nexus has existed for centuries and has been the key to Russian imperial power whether under the Whites or the Reds.

Regarding the domestic end of this nexus, one of our commentators could not have stated it more effectively when she wrote a few years ago: "One of our problems in dealing with the Soviet Union is that we forget the Russian people's long conditioning to autocratic government and their legacy of ignorance. In 1901, Henry Adams, on his first trip to Russia, wrote of his amazement at the

24. Theroux, Fred, "That 'Captive Nations Week' Has Many Diplomats Puzzled," *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D.C., July 26, 1959, p. C3.

primitiveness and passiveness of the Russian masses. He called them a 'tenth century people.' By now they have leaped across centuries in technical progress, but they have lacked bridges to individual freedom or representative government." Lest we forget, a genuine and non-sentimentalistic friendship with any people presupposes first a true, realistic awareness of their state of being.

With these points in mind let us see wherein the historical significance of both the resolution and the proclamations lies. For the first time our Government has taken official cognizance of the tremendously important fact that the Soviet Union itself is a colonial empire. By these documents we have shown that we are fully aware of the captive status of all the non-Russian nations in the USSR. Indeed, for the first time we have faced the reality that the majority of captive nations are in the Soviet Union and Asia. Historically, the nations in Central Europe, such as Poland, Hungary and others, would never have become captive to Russia if other non-Russian nations, like Ukraine, Georgia, Turkestan and others, had not fallen under the imperialist and colonialist domination of Soviet Russia. This is a stubborn truth we cannot escape. It is an elemental historical truth that these documents confirm. It is this confirmation that rocked Khrushchev.

Unfamiliar with East European and Central Asian history, many of our commentators have interpreted the resolution and proclamation to mean only an observance for the captive nations in Central Europe. Should they bother to read the documents, they would understand that our freedom appeal was and is being made to *all* the captive nations. The appeal of freedom does not arbitrarily stop at the borders of the Soviet Union. Those who think so are pursuing an illusion. What American with a sense of justice would deny the opportunity for national freedom

and independence to the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Turkestan, and others? When Khrushchev wails about interference in "internal Soviet affairs," his cries are as specious as when he bellows about our interference in the so-called Peoples' Democracies in Central Europe. For him, when any country comes under Moscow's imperio-colonialist domination, it then becomes an "internal affair." The truth is that affairs concerning national freedom aspirations both within the Soviet Union or in any other part of Moscow's far-flung empire are essentially international affairs.

It is also instructive for us to note that some of our State Governors who visited the Soviet Union in 1959 continually spoke of it as a nation. Even those in the Kremlin have hesitated to speak in this vein internally. When basic, elementary truths escape us, how much value can be assigned to the conclusions and recommendations made by these touring Governors or other groups? It is patently evident that the legalistic facade of the Soviet Union befogged their understanding of the foremost issues within this substrate empire.

Khrushchev recognized the psychological blow that the resolution represented. For too long he had boasted of the allegedly rapid strides made by Moscow in economic development, in military prowess, scientific achievements, cultural betterment and the like. He compared these with the achievements of our nation. But one need only ask whether Russia's over-inflated accomplishments would have been possible without the captive resources of Ukraine, Turkestan, Georgia and other rich non-Russian nations subjugated within the Soviet Union. If the United States were an empire extending itself northward and southward, it would parasitically avail itself of resources

that would make our achievements unsurpassable. Fortunately, we are not that kind of a nation. As we shall see later, the plain fact is that without the rich resources of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, Russia itself would be a second or third-rate power.

The well-founded perspective laid down in the resolution truthfully devaluates the boasts and bluffs of Moscow's comparisons with the real achievements of our nation. This is what troubled Khrushchev most. On the basis of this historical perspective the economic, scientific and other comparisons made between the substrate empire and our nation are out of real context. Psychologically and politically it is hardly comforting for the Kremlin and its propaganda apparatus to have the world know that Russia's strength, such as it is, is parasitically built on captive resources both within and outside the Soviet Union. Yet this is the moving truth which we have scarcely tapped. The resolution and the proclamations have in themselves begun to tap it.

In 1959 another aspect was educed by an editorial on "Captive Nations Week" in *The New York Times*. The editorial was only partly correct when it stated that the "real purpose of this Captive Nations Week observance, therefore, is to keep the plight of the peoples freshly in our minds."²⁵ Actually emphasizing the less important aspects of the issue, the editorial continued, "It may help them to know that we have not forgotten them. It ought to help us, in the moral sense, if we continue to remember."

All this is true. But the greater purpose is to accentuate the strategic political and military value of all the captive nations, both within and outside the Soviet Union and, necessarily, taken as an aggregate. In the Cold War,

25. "Captive Nations Week," *The New York Times*, editorial, July 20, 1959.

as well as in any hot war, they possess the highest priority on our scale of national interest because their enemy, the imperio-colonialism of Moscow, is our enemy. Without them Russia would be relatively small, harmless, and clumsy.

Made consistently insecure about its captive millions, Moscow would not push as vigorously its borderland policy in Iraq, Iran and elsewhere; and such organizations as the Central Treaty Organization, which replaced the old Baghdad Pact, would not be under the same pressures. Troubleshooters, like Vladimir Y. Semichastny, the defamer of Pasternak, would have to be sent frequently to areas like Azerbaijan to try to deal with recurring upsurges of "bourgeois ideology." For surveillance and control it has been Moscow's policy anyway to place Russians in the second secretaryship of the party in the captive non-Russian republics. For our national interest and the goal of world freedom these and countless other results would manifest Moscow's basic insecurity. We can insure this insecurity by preventing Moscow from ever thinking that we would accede in any circumstances to the permanent captivity of the more than twenty enslaved nations.

Senator Javits offered certain appropriate and striking comments on the resolution when he said in the Senate: "Laid bare, communism is seen to be imperialism by force—but with better propaganda technicians."²⁶ Cutting through all the non-essentials, the Senator struck at the root of the issue by declaring, "We in the West have no fear of such a free expression. Khrushchev can answer this challenge only by allowing free elections under U.N. auspices for self-determination in the captive nations." Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania also put his finger on the basic issue when he observed, "If Mr. Khrushchev says we

26. *Congressional Record*, July 23, 1959, p. 12887.

meddled, then my answer to him is that, in my judgment, it is proper to ask questions of a jailor as to who is in the jail and why they are there." 27

This, then, is the story behind the Captive Nations Week Resolution—the story leading up to and surrounding its passage in our Congress. The story beyond the resolution can fill a separate book. But there are certain highlights in this story that must be described in the next two chapters if we are to appreciate more vividly the abysmal cracks in the Soviet Russian prison house of nations.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 12929.

Chapter IV
THE CAPTIVE SPECTER OVER MOSCOW

"Necesse et ut multos timeat, quem multi
timeant"—Syrus

Regardless of Western illusions about "evolution," "the drift to capitalism," and the like, the captive specter hangs heavily over Moscow. Day and night the shadow of the captive nations in Europe and Asia haunts the remaining imperio-colonialists of the world. Evidence on this has been overwhelming. Each year since the enactment of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, Moscow and its satrapies have indulged in a vituperative excoriation of the resolution and the activities it has inspired. Yes, as the quote above states, "He that is feared by many, must be in fear of many."

When Khrushchev almost burst a blood vessel over the resolution in July, 1959, the press of the world widely publicized the event. And uncounted observers generally surmised that an extremely sensitive chord in the Soviet Russian Empire had been pierced. About this they could not have been more accurate and more acutely perceptive. Though it has been little realized, the ramifications of the resolution extend into every conceivable area—the political, economic, psychological, cultural, scientific, religious, and diplomatic. Extensive captive resources of whatever type, particularly those in the Soviet Union, can hardly be acclaimed as a firm foundation for power and

growth in any human situation. Khrushchev sensed this instantaneously.

But the story did not end there. The Free World press and analysts of the Soviet Union have somewhat overlooked the additional painful cries of Khrushchev and his minions against this gnawing resolution. In large measure they have failed to take note of the real depth of psychopolitical penetration achieved by the Congressional passage of Public Law 86-90.

In a way, the fact that subsequent events pertaining to the resolution have been overlooked suggests in itself the lack of an appreciative understanding in this country of the content and meaning of the document. We seem to prefer to spend an inordinate amount of time and resources on economic, military and other comparisons between ourselves and the Soviet Union which, in most cases, rest on false conceptual premises anyway. In alternate periods warnings of different threats by Moscow are conjured up almost daily, so much so that the mounting development of a deep political neurosis in this country would certainly be no cause for wonderment. Present trends of confusion and exaggerated thought regarding the Soviet Union and its prodigious power were anticipated by the writer soon after the Mikoyan visit in 1959.¹ The acceleration of these trends was also foreseen prior to the arrival of Khrushchev.²

The extent to which naive thinking about Moscow's fraudulent peace intentions has been pushed in many sections of our society, is also a good measure of the Kremlin's propaganda victories here. Ingenious remarks re-

1. See "Post Mortems on Operation Mikoyan," *Congressional Record*, June 29, 1959, pp. A5583-85.

2. "The Khrushchev Invitation," *Congressional Record*, September 14, 1959, pp. A8137-38.

corded daily by the high and the low about Khrushchev and the Kremlin *really* wanting peace are clearly indicative of our defective understanding of the nature of the struggle. As I emphasized in 1959 in an address to the tenth annual meeting of the All-American Conference to Combat Communism, "Khrushchev has so effectively administered tranquilizing cold war pills to major sectors of our society, that an increasing number of Americans are not even aware of the great strides made by imperialist Moscow in this perilous phase of the permanent cold war." ³ The marked incursions made by Moscow in Latin America, South Asia, and Africa are advances of the most serious import.

Indeed, Khrushchev's singular victory of exacting an invitation to this country in 1959 in itself intensified the confusion and doubt here. It entrenched the power of the Russian totalitarians with new airs of respectability and legitimacy. The freedom hopes of millions of patriots in Moscow's empire were scalded, while false impressions of Moscow's power became more widespread among the newly independent nations. Scanning all of this, our most loyal allies situated about the periphery of the Soviet Russian Empire could not but become increasingly uneasy about our world leadership. This result of Khrushchev's propaganda victory was the reason behind President Eisenhower's decision to visit many of these areas. President Kennedy's visits were largely prompted by the same considerations. All of these developments and more have formed the backdrop for Moscow's aim to extricate the one psycho-political thorn lodged deeply in its side—the Captive Nations Week Resolution.

3. AP and *Washington Sunday Star*, "Economist Derides Red Peace Goals," November 15, 1959.

KHRUSHCHEV'S MANIFESTO IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By all evidence the cardinal objective of the Kremlin's maneuvers in the recent period has been the rapid and flexible consolidation of its empire and Western accommodation to it. This, again, has indicated essentially what it means by "peaceful coexistence" and "non-interference in the affairs of others." The fraudulent issue of "Communism versus capitalism" has been Moscow's expedient propaganda deflector, aimed to distract Western attention from the real issue of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and freedom of the captive nations. In these respects Moscow has realized tremendous progress, but the specter has hounded it like a "black cat" crossing its path of progress. Fraught with all sorts of possibilities, the dread of its captives has tormented the Kremlin, and the mirror of this specter was opportunely presented by our own Congress in 1959.

After his July outburst Khrushchev decided to crack this mirror further with certain protestations in his article, "On Peaceful Coexistence," in the *Foreign Affairs* journal. This article was more of a Muscovite Cold War Manifesto than anything else. It abounded with worn-out, trite propaganda generalities which no more dealt with the real issues of the struggle than did a Russian *lunik*. As indicated above, the supposed competition between capitalism and socialism, for example, has no more reality in our day than that between capitalism and mercantilism. Perhaps it is not surprising that the editors of *Foreign Affairs* afforded the Moscow dictator an advance publication medium for his propaganda in preparation for his visit to this country.

In this highlight of the post-resolution period Khrushchev offered a further excellent confirmation of our

thesis about his troubled mind. He hammered away again at the Captive Nations Week Resolution. It was evident that he had been preparing to meet questions in this country that would deal with the non-Russian nations in the USSR. His method was to use the *non sequiturs* in the article and, in true Potemkin style, also to exhibit non-Russians whom he had assembled for his entourage.

The latter technique was used by the ten USSR writers who visited Washington in August, 1959. It was reported then that Alexandr B. Chakovsky, editor-in-chief of the *Foreign Literature* magazine, complained about the Captive Nations Week Resolution and “pointedly indicated two or three fellow writers visiting from the Georgian and Lithuanian Soviet Republics as contented representatives of the ‘captive nations.’ ”⁴ Khrushchev intended to try this same old patent medicine-man trick and, had the occasion arisen, he would undoubtedly have pointed to, say, the Don Cossack writer, Mikhail A. Sholokhov, as a “contented” Cossack. It was not without political purpose that he visited the writer in Cossackia—one of the nations mentioned in the resolution—and invited him to join his tour of America. Judging by the names on the official party list, other puppets were to be put on similar display to discredit the captive designation of these non-Russian nations. The deceptive exhibit would have “proved” as much as the President would have if he were to display a Hall or a Dennis abroad as the personification of Communism in America.

Regarding the Captive Nations Week Resolution, Khrushchev’s comments in the *Foreign Affairs* article are quite illuminating. He writes:

“You disagree with us? Prove by facts that your

4. *The Washington Post*, August 17, 1959.

system is superior and more efficacious, that it is capable of ensuring a higher degree of prosperity for the people than the socialist system, that under capitalism man can be happier than under socialism. It is impossible to prove this. I have no other explanation for the fact that talk of violently 'rolling back' Communism never ceases in the West. Not long ago the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives deemed it proper to pass a resolution calling for the 'liberation' of the socialist countries allegedly enslaved by Communism and, moreover, of a number of union republics constituting part of the Soviet Union. The authors of the resolution call for the 'liberation' of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and even a certain 'Ural Area.'

"I would not be telling the full truth if I did not say that the adoption of this ill-starred resolution was regarded by the Soviet people as an act of provocation. Personally I agree with this appraisal.

"It would be interesting to see, incidentally, how the authors of this resolution would have reacted if the parliament of Mexico, for instance, had passed a resolution demanding that Texas, Arizona, and California be 'liberated from American slavery.' Apparently they have never pondered such a question, which is very regrettable. Sometimes comparisons help to understand the essence of a matter."⁵

A concise, critical analysis of these passages is not at all difficult. In raising the points that he did Khrushchev

5. Khrushchev, Nikita S., "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 1, October, 1959, pp. 6-7.

was banking on the unfamiliarity of his American readers with the realities of the Soviet Union. First, the introductory sentences on socialism and capitalism can be easily dispensed with. As mentioned above, a point of argumentative deflection was introduced here with no real bearing on the issue troubling Khrushchev. A complete and thorough politico-economic comparison between the national economy of the USA and the empire economy of the USSR would lead to a day-and-night conclusion when it comes to the values of "efficacy," "prosperity," and "happiness." Unfortunately, as we shall take account of later, little work along these realistic lines has been done in this country. Nevertheless, it should be noteworthy for the reader that Khrushchev had to inject the deflector before taking up the resolution.

The second point of interest is Khrushchev's own misreading of the resolution, or, if he read it correctly, then his dishonesty in the treatment of its contents. The resolution specifically refers to enslavement by Russian Communist aggression, not by the vague and meaningless concept of Communism. By this honest specification the resolution is grounded in historical fact, not in philosophical vaguery. Moreover, as concerns the liberation of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, nowhere does the resolution contain any specification of "Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and even a certain 'Ural Area.'" It does specify the Turk-
estan nation and Idel-Ural, which consists of the Tatars, Bashkirs and other non-Russian peoples between the Volga and the Urals. It was the realistic inclusion of the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union that primarily caused the Khrushchev explosion in July, 1959. In this article Khrushchev attempted a literary derogation of this most determining point in the resolution.

About his telling "the full truth," whereby the mythi-

cal "Soviet people" regarded the resolution as an "act of provocation," the informed reader could not even extract an eighth of a truth. The note of Khrushchev's humble personal agreement with this imagined consensus is enough to suggest his typical approach toward any truth.

But what is most illuminating in these passages is the Russian's use of a spurious argument that has been characteristically exploited by some anti-Communist Russian emigres and their unwary American friends who seek to preserve the territorial integrity of the basic Russian empire. Khrushchev's implied comparison between Texas, Arizona, and California and comparable areas in the USSR is, except for geography, a speciosity which has hoodwinked many Americans. Some of our leaders in public life have used precisely the same specious argument. According to it, Texas, Arizona, and California are supposed to be comparable to Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia or any other non-Russian nation in the USSR. Implied, too, is the false comparison between our Federal Union and the artificial Soviet Union. Moreover, the unwary reader is supposed to infer that there is no more an enslavement of these non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union than there is of these three states in America.

It should be pointed out first that the only type of parliament in Mexico which would come out with such a resolution could only be one similar to the Moscow puppets in Warsaw, Kiev, Budapest, or Havana. Second—and here Khrushchev's ghost writer slipped on U.S. history—Texas, Arizona, and California entered the American Union voluntarily; Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and the other captive non-Russian nations were conquered by Russian forces and forced into the Soviet Union. Third, our United States has been voluntarily formed into a federal union of states with citizens who consciously identify

themselves as American nationals; the Soviet Union has been and is in reality an empire of many nations under the domination of Russian Moscow, with Ukrainians identifying themselves spiritually and consciously as Ukrainians, Georgians as Georgians, Lithuanians as Lithuanians. In terms of national identity the nomenclature "Soviet" is sheer nonsense.

Fourth, the native language spoken in Texas or Arizona is the same as that spoken in New York or Maryland; the native language in Armenia is Armenian and is not the same as that spoken in Russia, and so with Georgian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian. Fifth, the histories of Texas, Arizona and California can hardly be considered as "national histories" independent of the growing history of the American nation; the genuinely national histories of Lithuania, Georgia, Ukraine, Turkestan and others are not only substantially independent of the history of Russia, but even preceded it by centuries.

In scholarly fashion one can go on and on with these substantive distinctions. They would only serve to devastate Khrushchev's call for a comparison. We are not aware, for instance, of hundreds of thousands of American refugees and escapees in Mexico, but we are fully cognizant of millions of such refugees and escapees from the Soviet Union. Nor are we aware of any independence movement in Texas, Arizona, or California; the evidence of this movement in Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, and the other captive non-Russian nations is mountainous.

Khrushchev posed as a self-confident competitor, unafraid of ideas and ready to accept any challenge. On this score we could have provided him with the challenge of his life. Even now, let us test this comparison between Texas, Arizona, and California and, let us say, Ukraine, Lithuania, and the Caucasian nations (North Caucasia,

Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan—these to compare with the area of California). Under UN auspices and with strict guarantees safeguarding the outcome, let us put it to a vote whether the *natives*, i.e., the permanent residents in these three states want to join Mexico, remain in the United States, or be completely independent. Then, by the same right, Lithuanians in Lithuania, Ukrainian nationals in Ukraine, Georgian-speaking Georgians in Georgia and so forth should be given equal opportunity to vote on whether they wish to remain in the Soviet Union or have their own independent states. Once the outcome is decided upon, the UN is to have complete jurisdiction over the areas in order to permit a steady implementation of the popular decision.

This is just one of the numerous interesting challenges which can be thrown at the vulnerable Russians. It is one result of the Captive Nations Week Resolution. In the forum of world opinion and understanding we can have them on the run. Imagination, initiative, courage, and abidance with the truth are the only necessary weapons. Moscow's *sputniks*, *luniks*, and *missilniks* are, in reality, all relative *puniks* as compared with these weapons. They are available to us for the asking.

During Khrushchev's visit here an informal attempt was made to challenge him on this misleading point.⁶ In fact, at the tea arranged by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the following question was posed by Senator Dirksen of Illinois:

“In your article in *Foreign Affairs* you mistakenly compare Texas, Arizona, and California with certain non-Russian nations in the USSR. Would

6. See “A Comment on the Khrushchev Visit,” *Congressional Record*, September 18, 1959, p. A8328.

you be willing to stage, under U.N. auspices and control, free voting conditions to determine whether the natives of Lithuania, Ukraine, and the Caucasian states want to remain in the USSR or be independent states and whether the residents of comparable Arizona, Texas, and California want to remain in the USA or be completely independent states? Let's compete in ideas and action." 7

Following the tea, Senator Dirksen informed the press that on this and numerous other questions "Khrushchev took a Fifth Amendment stand." Indeed, in the very first phase of his visit Khrushchev showed quite plainly that he was not interested in any free intellectual exchange of ideas. Those who opposed his visit had the foresight to warn of this at the time the invitation was extended. However, even now, through our various media this and other tests should be persistently pressed in a variety of ways.

ANOTHER HIGHLIGHT OF THE SPECTER

At the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, held on October 31, 1959, Khrushchev again saw fit to tear into the Captive Nations Week Resolution. On this point the official text of his cynical report to his captive audience read as follows:

"Now times have changed. Even some of the most active exponents of the 'positions of strength' policy see its futility. Only the most belligerent Western politicians cannot make up their minds to

7. See for other questions "Khrushchev Denies that Non-Russian Republics Are Independent . . .," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, October 1-15, 1959, p. 6.

discard the old formula. In some places one still hears reverberations of the past. Take, for instance, the much-to-be-regretted decision of the American Congress to hold the so-called 'Captive Nations Week' and to pray for their liberation. In this case words other than 'rolling back' were used, but the gist remained the same, the same appeal for interference in other peoples' affairs.

"So you will see from the policy of 'rolling back' they have switched to praying to the Lord. What can it lead to? If the Western leaders pray to God to 'liberate' the peoples of the socialist countries, and we, in turn, pray that He should liberate their peoples from capitalistic rule, we shall thus put God in a quandary. What decision should He make, after all?"⁸

Here, too, the cardinal objective sought by Khrushchev in the period ahead was again evident. His cynical remarks about prayers and God did not conceal his sustained concern about "interference in other peoples' affairs." Such self-insuring interference on our part is in reality directed at the widespread Russian interference in and domination of all the captive non-Russian nations. In brief, Khrushchev again singled out the resolution, and in the abiding hope that "now times have changed" he bade us not to interrupt his colonialist interference with the lives of the captive peoples. Moscow's victory in this fundamental respect would exceed in value all the military might it now has or will have in the future.

8. N. S. Khrushchev's *Report to Supreme Soviet*, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November 2, 1959, pp. 1-2.

MOSCOW SEEKS TO BURY THE RESOLUTION

On the basis of this partial evidence considered here and in the preceding chapter, there can be no doubt that the passage of the resolution by the Congress put an uncomfortable crimp in Moscow's cold war operations. A careful reading of Khrushchev's utterances and statements on the subject shows Moscow's anxiety to bury the resolution as quickly as possible. To its complete liking this would be just the last breath of the past, a document firmly buried under heaps of slogans declaring "peace and friendship."

Before commenting on the Russian "peace and friendship" or "peaceful coexistence" technique, it would profit us to review briefly several additional examples of Red totalitarian reaction to Captive Nations Week from its inception to recent years. At Camp David, in September, 1959, Khrushchev seemed to be obsessed with the resolution. As described by Governor William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania, who then had been attached to the Department of State and accompanied the Russian dictator, the situation appeared as follows: "I think anybody who was connected with this visit in any way will tell you that this particular resolution made more of an impression on Chairman Khrushchev, and he invected against it at a greater rate almost daily while he was here, than any other single thing that America was doing in the Cold War." ⁹

In 1960, more denunciations flowed during the Week's observance, and new tactics were employed by Moscow to deflect world attention from the captive status of nations both within and outside the USSR, namely, the sudden

9. *Hearings on the Captive Nations*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 195.

Moscow-sponsored publication in London of pamphlets titled *The Fifteen Soviet Republics, Today and Tomorrow*—a Potemkin version of their “independence and prosperous growth”—and also Khrushchev’s tirade in the United Nations against “Western colonialism.” The Russian-controlled *Radyanska Ukraina* and the *Perets* derided the U.S. Congress and President Eisenhower for the resolution and law, while another Red publication lambasted the Week and complained that “it was Dobriansky who during the visit of Khrushchev to America prepared the most fantastic lies and base arguments against Khrushchev.”¹⁰

Examples abound for 1961 also. Moscow’s *Pravda* attacked the Week at length and held that “it is not at all fortuitous that this time the farce represented by the ‘Captive Nations Week’ should coincide with the hullabaloo created by American propaganda around the West Berlin question.”¹¹ As another highlight of the period, Khrushchev once again violently denounced the resolution at the Communist Party Congress in October, 1961.

These vehement assaults continued into 1962. For example, the organ of the Soviet government, *Izvestia*, leveled its big guns against President Kennedy for his proclamation of the Week. It characterized the annual event as “unbridled anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slander,” and, dwelling on U.S. armed forces in various parts of the world, it asked, “Are they observing ‘Captive Nations Week?’”¹² In the same year Moscow succeeded in pushing through UNESCO the scandalous publication

10. *For the Return to the Homeland, East Germany*, No. 57/444, August, 1960.

11. *Pravda*, Moscow, July 21, 1961.

12. “Here Is Your Freedom, Mr. Kennedy,” *Izvestia*, Moscow, July 17, 1962.

Equality of Rights between Races and Nationalities in the USSR, a mass of half-truths and bald fabrications about the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR.

Months before the 1963 Captive Nations Week was proclaimed, a Soviet Russian weekly raised the question, "Is it not high time to discontinue the 'Captive Nations Week' in the United States?" Its ostensible reason was: "That is just as much a dead horse as the 'Hungarian Question'."¹³ Immediately after President Kennedy issued his proclamation, the Russian Communist Party organ reacted sharply, claiming that "the President of the United States, losing his sense of reality, has declared a 'week of the Captive Nations' and is trying to turn attention away from the struggle of the negroes for their liberation."¹⁴ The so-called government newspaper followed with a denunciation of the Week as "a propagandistic trick of the American enemies of the freedom and independence of nations."¹⁵ Among the underlings in the Red Empire, North Korea was about the most vicious that year, smearing the President as a "third-class clown," and, over the Pyongyang Radio, calling the Week "a despicable animal campaign of the U.S. ruling circles."

In 1964 the nervous responses were much the same. *Izvestia* rattled along with these choice comments: "With every passing year 'Captive Nations Week' becomes a nuisance" and "The stupid situation in which the Washington legislators and rulers found themselves is becoming evident even for those who earnestly propagate the imperialistic policy of the U.S.A."¹⁶ Wishfully, it concluded, "How long do the Capitol and the White House intend

13. *The New Times*, Moscow, January 23, 1963.

14. *Pravda*, Moscow, July 8, 1963.

15. *Izvestia*, Moscow, July 14, 1963.

16. *Izvestia*, Moscow, July 15, 1964.

to amuse the world with their absurd plans?" And, on the very eve of his ouster, Khrushchev once again had to shout before an audience in Czecho-Slovakia, "In the United States a farce entitled 'captive nations week' is held every year. The people's democratic system has been in existence for twenty years but the imperialists still ramble on with nonsensical ideas of 'liberating' the nations of eastern Europe." ¹⁷

These selected examples for each year form an illuminating background for any consideration of Moscow's propaganda efforts along the lines of "peace and friendship" or "peaceful coexistence."

The reality Moscow refuses to face is that there are too many Americans who know that the traditional Russian political slogan of peace and friendship has for centuries been used to seduce neighboring non-Russian nations into captivity. There are others who, perhaps depending more on sound logic than on historical fact, are aware that in whatever sphere of human existence peace and friendship are the consequent conditions of justice and freedom, not their cause. The condition of harmony necessarily implied by peace and friendship is logically predicated on the real prevalence of justice and freedom—and these requisite conditions do not prevail in the Soviet Russian Empire. These essentials are known by countless Americans and, despite totalitarian Russian wishes, will continue to be forcefully expressed in this country.

However, there are certain realities we must face if we are to thwart Moscow's plans to bury the resolution. It should be recognized that the passage of the measure disclosed two indisputable facts: (1) the acute sensitivity of Moscow about the weakest and yet most vital nerve

17. *Reuters*, Banska Byotrica, Czecho-Slovakia, August 29, 1964.

in its empire, and (2) the complete lack of understanding in some sections of our nation as to the content and significance of the resolution. The Kremlin's denunciations of the resolution from July, 1959 to the present have clearly demonstrated how deeply it has penetrated Moscow's cold war armor. Moscow fears this resolution more than anything else on the politico-psychological front. As we shall see, the chief reason for this is that the law symbolizes enormous and even decisive cold war possibilities.

A point which cannot be mentioned too often is that by this resolution our Government recognized for the first time many hitherto-neglected captive non-Russian nations. They are the ones held in bondage within the Soviet Union itself. Without White Ruthenia, Ukraine, the Caucasian nations, Turkestan and others mentioned in the resolution, Russia and its approximately 110 million population could scarcely be called "the greatest power in the world," as the Moscow propaganda machine calls it. It would be no more comparable in power to the United States than a reunited Germany would be. From a cold war viewpoint the development of this inherent weakness in the synthetic state of the Soviet Union would seriously deflate all the bluster, bluff, and sham of Moscow's economic prowess, military might, scientific achievements, and cultural attainments. Parasitic growth on the basis of captive resources is not exactly alluring in propaganda or otherwise. The Russian totalitarians have the vision to see this; most of us, unfortunately, do not.

Our lack of vision has been amply shown in many respects. As one solid example, the international stir created by the resolution crystallized the low level of our knowledge about the Soviet Union and its *ersatz* political char-

acter. In one instance the writer was impelled to take to critical task a grossly unbalanced editorial in one of our leading newspapers.¹⁸ At the time, many reporters, writers, and analysts inquired to know where Turkestan or White Ruthenia is located. Some wrote as though the minority captive nations in Central Europe were the only nations listed in the resolution. But what could one expect, when on the highest levels of our Government the USSR has been referred to as "the Soviet nation," and the different nations within the Soviet Union have been arbitrarily and somewhat insularly called "the Soviet people" or "the Soviets." Aside from the historical and demographic untruths of these usages the very suggestion of a united, integrated and monolithic power in the USSR is not even an intelligent one from a cold war viewpoint. Moscow could not possibly have something better if it were made to order.

Furthermore, in terms of the resolution and the wealth of evidence underlying it our many economic, military, scientific, and other comparisons between the USSR and the USA are drawn on false premises. We have pointed this out for the military in an article on "Basic Misconceptions in U.S. Military Thought on the USSR."¹⁹ In a later chapter we shall observe that the same criticism applies to our unrealistic economic comparisons. It does not make even elementary sense in scientific identification and description to speak of a GNP (Gross National Product) for the Soviet Union where both objective reality and legal structure clearly underwrite a multi-national arrangement. Moreover, the USSR, in essence an empire

18. See "Author of Captive Nations Week Resolution a Virginian," *Congressional Record*, September 14, 1959, pp. A8121-23.

19. *Congressional Record*, July 2, 1959, pp. A5760-62.

within an empire, is not at all qualitatively comparable to the United States, which is a nation-state. The resolution suggests all this and far more.

As we have stressed above, the development of these real implications can pose a tremendous challenge to Moscow, testing quite peaceably numerous professions and claims of the Russian propagandists. The Russian imperio-colonialists actually fear such tests and take to virtually paralyzing some of us with their coexistence or codestruction propaganda. At the same time Moscow's cold war activities continue undiminished in every quarter of the globe. Worked within a pattern of calculating strategy and tactics, these activities include every imaginable instrument—political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, cultural, scientific, and military. One cannot begin to evaluate the breadth and depth of these activities unless his intellectual approach to Moscow's total activity is an integralist and holistic one. A grasp of the total war being flung upon us is impossible also without a working concept of the Cold War. An effective concept of the Cold War holds that it is a twilight condition of neither real peace nor hot war, one where all the basic elements of a hot war—predatory design, aggressive strategy, tactics, and techniques—are present except for open military combat between states. As long practiced by imperialist Russia, a cold war is the very soul and spirit of a hot war with the massive body of military conflict kept in secondary reserve.

THE PERMANENT RUSSIAN COLD WAR AND THE RESOLUTION

Moscow has reaped impressive cold war successes in the past twenty years. Among the most outstanding has been the increasing and indiscriminating acceptance of the Muscovite notion of peaceful coexistence. Deluded by

Soviet Russian propaganda on the supposed exclusive alternatives of coexistence or co-destruction, many voices in our nation have warmed up to this essentially cold war notion. An additional irony of the current situation is the unavoidable fact that if we are not to be cornered into a hot war, we must face up to the realities of Russia's permanent Cold War. Historically, an unparalleled empire was built over five centuries by established cold war techniques. The Soviet Russian Empire bases its forward pressures on the selfsame techniques.²⁰ We shall note some of these later.

A sound theoretical basis for necessary cold war gaming is provided in the Captive Nations Week Resolution. With an indispensable apparatus, such as a Freedom Commission, the possibilities suggested by the resolution can be developed peaceably and with decisive intent. We cannot stress too strongly that the captive nations throughout the empire, particularly in the Soviet Union, constitute our most formidable weapon in this period of mutual deterrence. These major considerations will also be taken up in subsequent chapters. Our attention for the moment is still centered on some outstanding developments pertaining to the resolution.

20. "Author of Captive Nations Week Resolution Points Way to Defeat Russian Cold War Strategy and Tactics," *Congressional Record*, September 4, 1959, pp. A7753-55.

Chapter V CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

“Ask not what your country can do for you
—ask what you can do for your country.”

—John F. Kennedy

Imperialist Russia exerts every effort to discredit the annual Captive Nations Week observances held in this country. In the United Nations, through its various propaganda media, by diplomatic pressure toward accommodation for its empire, and even in the form of alleged letters from once-free officials in the captive nations, colonialist Moscow strives to achieve this objective.¹ A year does not pass without a heavy barrage of invective against the observance, for, indeed, every observance has served to reinforce the Captive specter over Moscow.

Years before our assassinated President spoke the words quoted above, spirited citizens were at work, not asking of their country but “doing” for it. In the years since 1959 a captive nations ideology and consciousness has emerged in this country. Committees have been established to institutionalize the observance, and interest in the primacy of the captive world for our foreign policy has developed markedly. The ideology is well summed up in the Captive Nations Week Resolution itself. Its *alpha* and *omega* are that Moscow’s vast imperio-colonialist system is the ulti-

1. “Munters’ Letter to *Izvestia* Seen as Harbinger of Crusade to Discredit Captive Nations,” Radio Liberty release, New York, April, 1962.

mate base of further Red aggressions against the non-totalitarian Free World, and that to liquidate this base gradually and to crush Sino-Soviet Russian totalitarianism in the Cold War, the prime target of Free World polwar attention is necessarily the two dozen-plus captive nations in Eastern Europe and Asia. Again, the ramifications of this outlook are totalistic, ranging into the economic, political, diplomatic, cultural, scientific, athletic and many other spheres.

The points of evidence educed here are selectively representative of multiple events and developments. In the course of these years there have been many acts and declarations which militate against the further cultivation of captive nations consciousness and thought. Circles within and outside the United States, which strive to appease Moscow, over-emphasize the political consequences of foreign aid and propagate falsehoods and exaggerations about substantial changes in the Soviet Russian Empire, have been contributing heavily to this dangerous tendency. Fortunately, there have been many other determining events to offset this tendency toward false coexistence. The years can best be characterized as a natural ebb and flow of contending forces, one checking out the other, with a net result of progressive movement in the right direction.

THE *Izvestia* INTERVIEW AND STEVENSON IN THE UN

An excellent example of this situation was provided by two significantly concurrent actions of the Kennedy Administration. The first was the *Izvestia* interview in November, 1961. In this unusual interview President Kennedy entertained questions posed by Alexei Adzhubei, the editor of *Izvestia* and Khrushchev's son-in-law. "Who Interviewed Whom?" could well have been the appropriate

caption to this dialogue, but there was no doubt about the merits and demerits of the President's answers to the Russian's queries. Moscow's editorials and reports criticizing the President attested to the advantages reaped from the interview. However, as concerns the captive nations, the score was almost completely on the loss side. And this interview took place only a few months after the President's first Captive Nations Week Proclamation!

For instance, there was no reason for the President to assert, "Now we recognize that today the Soviet Union does not intend to permit reunification, and that as long as the Soviet Union has that policy Germany will not be reunified." As one of our leading columnists put it, "This unnecessary concession will dash the hopes of the German people and indicate to the world that the United States accepts indefinitely Communist domination not only of East Germany, but of Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and of the other captive nations of Europe and Asia." ² The impact of this utterly unnecessary concession on the captive peoples has far exceeded any wished-for gain to be derived from desirable contacts with the Russian people.

Worse still are the concepts and conceptions revealed by Kennedy in regard to our chief adversary. These aspects have been completely overlooked by otherwise critical observers and analysts. There can be no doubt about Moscow capitalizing on them. First, the President could have displayed a more valid understanding of the Soviet Union when, with reference to World War II, he said: "I will say that the United States also suffered, though not so heavily as the Soviet Union, quite obviously." We can well imagine Adzhubei's reaction to the more valid

2. Lawrence, David, "Kennedy Talk with Soviet Editor," syndicated column, December, 1961.

answer: “. . . though not so heavily as Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Georgia, and Russia.” As a matter of fact, the non-Russian nations in the USSR suffered far more in the war than did the Russian.

Second, the President’s misconception of the Soviet Union, which Adzhubei nurtured skillfully with his carefully phrased questions, was put into full relief when he said: “If the Soviet Union had lost the war, the Soviet people themselves would object to a line being drawn through Moscow and the entire country. If we had been defeated in war, we wouldn’t like to have a line drawn down the Mississippi River.”³ It is evident from this that Kennedy mistakenly believed that the Soviet Union is a nation like ours, the Volga having the same national significance as the Mississippi. Aside from Kennedy’s own contradictions in thought and verbiage on this basic subject, it is truly a sad commentary for the Head of State to reveal to our chief enemy such acute limitations of knowledge concerning the adversary’s environment.

Further assertions by the President that the “Soviet Union is a strong military power”—and that “no one is ever going to invade the Soviet Union again. There is no military power that can do that”—not only furnished a propaganda bonanza to the totalitarian Moscow regime but also betrayed a serious unfamiliarity with the military history of the Russian Empire and with what essentially constitutes “military power” in any empire. These, too, were plainly gratuitous and detrimental statements which can only give comfort and encouragement to the enemy and depress the hopes of the captive nations, especially those in the Soviet Union.

While the President was expounding these false no-

3. *Text of Kennedy Interview with Editor of Izvestia*, The White House, Washington, November 28, 1961.

tions about the Soviet Union, our Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, stunned the Russian delegation with a factual recital of Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism in Eastern Europe and Asia. In his excellent presentation to the UN he faced squarely and courageously the issue of Moscow's colonialism within the Soviet Union. For example, citing the 1917 Declaration of Rights issued by the People's Commissariat on "the right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states," Ambassador Stevenson raised the question, "How did this 'right' work in practice?" He answered, "An independent Ukrainian Republic was recognized by the Bolsheviks in 1917, but in 1917 they established a rival Republic in Kharkov. In July, 1923, with the help of the Red Army, a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established and incorporated into the U.S.S.R." ⁴ Stevenson went on to cover the conquests over Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and other now captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. "During the war," he said, "the Soviets deported entire ethnic groups to the East, fearful that they would use the occasion to fight for their independence." ⁵

In sharp contrast to Kennedy's conception of the Soviet Union, Stevenson's memorandum on Soviet Russian colonialism described Moscow's empire as being barbaric and as enslaving nations in the Soviet Union as well outside it. To be sure, the President in his brilliant UN address raised this signal: "Let us debate colonialism in full—and apply the principle of free choice and the practice of

4. United States Delegation to the General Assembly, United Nations, Press Release No. 3862, November 28, 1961, p. 4.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

free plebiscites in every part of the globe.”⁶ But, judging by the *Izvestia* interview—not to mention other examples—his measure of fullness failed to approach the conception disclosed by Ambassador Stevenson. This example of comparative strides in the development of a captive nations awareness, consciousness, and even an ideology is seen over and over again.

Just four months before the ill-staged interview with Adzhubei the President issued his first Proclamation of Captive Nations Week. It read as follows:

Whereas by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as “Captive Nations Week,” and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

Whereas many of the roots of our society and our population lie in these countries; and

Whereas it is in keeping with our national tradition that the American people manifest its interest in the freedom of other nations:

Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 16, 1961, as “Captive Nations Week.”

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate

6. *Text of President Kennedy's Address to General Assembly, United Nations, New York, September 25, 1961.*

ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of all peoples for national independence and freedom.

Compare the tone, the spirit, the conceptual content of this proclamation with the responses given above in the Adzhubei interview. The discrepancies are quite obvious. What does one conclude from all this? No doubt, questions of intellectual honesty, courage or lack of it, political opportunism, or plain ignorance come to mind. Which of these accounts for this regrettable situation? As indicated earlier, in my judgment the surest source of explanation is a deficiency of exact knowledge, involving even basic, rudimentary factors of the Soviet Union, together with a lack of perspective and vision. In this Stevenson-Kennedy episode the right hand was clearly unaware of what the left hand was doing—almost at the very same time. Later, we shall observe a similar spectacle involving Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

WHY CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK?

The annual Captive Nations Week observances in this country represent marked strides in the cultivation of captive nations consciousness and ideology.⁷ In connection with examples similar to that given above we may well ask ourselves, "Why do we need a Captive Nations Week?" From time to time many people have asked, "What is the significance of this Week?"—"What do you

7. For some substantial reports on the observances see the *Congressional Record*, August 25, 1960, pp. 16445-66; July 24, 1961, pp. 12203-232; August 3, 1961, pp. 13583-88; September 14, 1962, pp. 18392-97; July 15, 1963, pp. 11823-39; August 20, 1964, pp. 20048-62.

hope to accomplish by it?" Complete answers to these questions require a number of preconceptions and perspectives such as appear in the immediately succeeding chapters.

However, in brief terms, one requirement is a fixed conviction about the nature and independence of our own nation. A second is a vivid awareness of the impact made by our history upon Eastern Europe and Asia. Third, an understanding of the dominant ideas underlying Captive Nations Week is necessary. And fourth, a restless will seeking the translation of these ideas and convictions into concrete, imaginative and fearless action is indispensable.

Considering the first requisite on the nature of our own nation, one cannot but recall President Kennedy's remarks concerning our revolution: "We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution."⁸ If you will re-read the clauses of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, you will be impressed by its initial emphasis on the revolutionary symbol of American independence. This symbol cannot be anything but a living and dynamic one, signifying strong motivation to action itself. And such concrete action does not mean passive living "by example" or a mere model. Indeed, it is always worth remembering: "Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country." To repeat, some time before, millions of Americans had asked themselves the implied question, and their answer was in part given in these annual observances of Captive Nations Week.

Their answer to this bestirring call is founded on a fixed conviction about the nature and independence of our nation. When with the utmost seriousness we celebrate our own Independence Day, we look inward, re-

8. Kennedy, John F., *Text of Inaugural Address*, January 20, 1961.

examining our souls and consciences as a free and responsible people. Two weeks later we look outward, counting our blessings and giving thought to the millions who have actually lost their independence and freedom since 1918.

Many who give purpose and direction to the Captive Nations ideology are living evidences of the history of Sino-Soviet Russian aggression. As Calvin Coolidge once said, "Whether one traces his Americanism back three centuries to the Mayflower or three years to the steerage is not half so important as whether his Americanism of today is real and genuine." Whether many of these citizens are products of the Hungarian Revolution, the free voices of a conquered Poland, the escapees of a Russian-genocided Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia, past fighters of a Ukrainian or White Ruthenian underground, or past victims of tyranny and oppression in Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Yugoslavia, or in the Caucasus and Asia and now Cuba—or indeed, freedom-loving Russians who have found a haven here—their Americanism is no less than that of those born and reared here. Together we share a common conviction about the nature and independence of our nation.

Our Day of Independence symbolizes for us, under God, our national freedom, the untampered will of a sovereign people, and a firm determination to meet any enemy who would attempt to destroy this independence. It symbolizes, too, the spiritual and moral power of our great tradition, the just institutions of our country, and the warm humanism of its laws. Oftentimes different peoples throughout the world see the meaning and essence of our nation more objectively and even more perceptively than many of us do, and without troubled feelings about any imputed super-patriotism.

As the Captive Nations Week Resolution suggests, our

nation, built on the free and creative energies of people drawn from every quarter of the globe, is a unique historical experiment—plainly, the great experiment of mankind. This nation is a living revolution that moves the hearts and minds of freedom-loving rather than just peace-loving peoples everywhere, particularly those in captive Eurasia. Placed against this revolution, the so-called Communist revolution is but a dressed-up phantom shielding the most reactionary, barbaric and imperialist forces of all time. The remarkable Stevenson memorandum emphasizes this. Our society, to be sure, is not perfect. But by all evidence it is unquestionably one that has given so much in so many ways to so many within a short span in the history of man.

Contrary to some false notions, we do possess an ideology that inspires our continued growth as a morally leading nation and remarkably equips us to contend successfully with the present threat of imperialist Red totalitarianism. As a systematic order of ideas this ideology is basically and precisely spelled out in our Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. It is highly important for us to reflect continually upon the moral and political principles embodied in these historic documents. Nuclear weapons, missiles, luniks and the whole array of new technological innovations—which by nature are only instruments and means—cannot possibly reshape or antiquate these natural norms of civilized human existence.

But even more important at this time is the conscious application of the perennial principles of national independence and personal liberty to other nations and peoples, for not only is the living application of these principles crucial to the further growth and development of our nation, it is also indispensable to the existence and survival of the non-totalitarian Free World. A persistent

application of these principles by every conceivable medium of communication and contact would dwarf the inflated accomplishments and pretensions of both Moscow and Peking and their respective satrapies.

So, why Captive Nations Week? It is legally provided for in Public Law 86-90; it is a tremendous moral symbol signifying that we Americans will never forget or acquiesce in regard to the captive nations; it concentrates on our nuclear spiritual weapons; it is an effective educational medium about all the captive nations, Sino-Russian imperio-colonialism, and the Cold War; it affords a national forum for the discussion of numerous national security issues; and it aims at a crystallization of measures for concrete action. Need one wonder why the guardians of the Red Empire seek the elimination of the Week?

THE LIVING FORCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN CAPTIVE EURASIA

Moral and intellectual convictions about the United States and the revolutionary symbol of American independence are, of course, not enough. They primarily form a base that in these times demands a structure of certitude, understanding, and a will to act in the community of mankind. The captive peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia constitute a major and, in the cold war sense, a primary part of this community.

Since 1959 many events and works have underscored the additional need for a keen appreciation of the profound impact made by our history upon Eastern Europe and Asia. In Congress and elsewhere they have pointed out what a moving and powerful force our Declaration of Independence has been on the various nations which were subjugated in the empires of the last century and a half.

They have cited the nations in the Tsarist Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires which rose at the beginning of this century to declare their independence with a will to pursue free national existence similar to ours. In significant part this liberation tendency proved to be short-lived as the unchecked surge of totalitarian Soviet Russian imperialism since 1918 has reduced the many non-Russian nations of Eastern Europe and Asia to servility.

It is most important that proper stress be also placed on the first major counterattack against the ravenous forces of Soviet Russian imperialism. This countercheck of 1920 was the Polish-Ukrainian alliance between Pilsudski and Petlura. Had this alliance destroyed Trotsky's Red Army completely and decisively, the course of world developments would surely have been different. The myths of Communism and Marxism-Leninism would have been only a twitter in the arena of human history. As it was, this little-known event had given Europe and other parts of the world a breather of some twenty years before the Soviet Russian scourge began to spread again.

Today the United States itself is seriously threatened by the barbaric Soviet Russian peril. As in past centuries, this imperio-colonialist threat poses as the wave of the future, as the Third Rome of mankind, as the Slav center of culture, power, and might. Worst of all, in their confusion—generated in the greatest degree by the unsurpassed propaganda skill of the enemy—far too many are not even aware of the tremendous opportunities we have to defeat this menace in the Cold War and thus stave off an otherwise inevitable hot global war. The prime and chief forces of patriotic nationalism in Central Europe, in the Soviet Union itself, and in Asia, are our paramount ally. Even in the period of Khrushchevian “liberalism”

Moscow had to kill off leading representatives of these forces.⁹

We have not even begun to tap the enormous potential of non-Russian nationalism within the Soviet Union. The insecurity of Moscow's imperio-colonialist domination over the captive non-Russian nations, from the Danube to the Pacific, would be permanently sealed and intensified once we seriously begin to direct the paraphrased words of President Kennedy to the peoples of the two dozen-plus captive nations: "Fellow citizens of the world, ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man." Regrettably, in relation to the captive nations in the aggregate these words have yet to be expressed with implementative intent.

This necessary togetherness for freedom is well emphasized in the Captive Nations Week Resolution. The observances give crystallized expression to the necessity of working together for freedom, especially in the one area of the world that thirsts for it. Lest we forget, above everything else Moscow craves to have its captive world undisturbed and neglected by the Free World. This is much of the motive behind its unremitting efforts toward negotiations. But it should be obvious that we must never allow this imperio-colonialist power to consolidate its far-flung empire. Moscow's haunting insecurity about the captive nations in our great weapon in the Cold War, not to speak of a hot war. Nor must we ever forget that the field of the Cold War is also Eastern Europe and captive Asia, not just the Free World. More, it is a war not only

9. Reports on Moscow-instigated assassinations: "Former Soviet Spy Confesses Two Assassinations in Munich," *Daily Mail*, London, November 18, 1961; "Bonn Holding Russian in Munich Murders," *New York Post*, November 20, 1961.

between the imperialist centers of Moscow and Peking and the Free World, but also between the captive peoples and the colonialist puppets and satraps imposed on them. Thus, terms such as "Communist nations," "Communist peoples" are pure nonsense.

As its growing observances have demonstrated, Captive Nations Week means all this and more; an understanding of the ideas of the Week must, therefore, be transmitted to all Americans. What Public Law 86-90 calls for is, in essence, a universalized Declaration of Independence. It is based on the knowledge that the captive peoples of Central and Southern Europe—the Poles, Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs, East Germans, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Albanians—have a common bond for freedom with the captive peoples in the Soviet Union, Asia, and Latin American.

We recall from the earlier chapters how in 1959 the self-confident, blustering and cocky Khrushchev reacted violently against the resolution. At every turn he harried Vice-President Nixon with the question: "Are these captives?" Is it not strange that this truly imperio-colonialist ruler of a vast empire, forever boasting about his missiles, sputniks, aircraft, steel—and even donning an ill-fitting military uniform to press his points—should have been alarmed and explosive over a mere Congressional resolution? The reader might well ask himself what, except for the U-2 incident then, had stirred Khrushchev more to this explosive point of fear and anxiety than the ideas contained in the resolution? The fact is that we have begun to focus the spotlight on imperialism and colonialism in the ultimately more important center—Moscow.

As in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere, there is a serious colonial problem within the Soviet Union—in fact,

more so by far. Khrushchev showed his concern about this when he attacked those "who say the Soviet Union's Asian Republics are colonies."¹⁰ If this problem were emphasized more and more in the forum of world opinion and attention, the proper characterization of Russian Moscow as the last major and more powerful imperialist power in the world would be devastating to its propaganda and cold war efforts. The Kremlin well understands this and rants endlessly. However, too many in this country still remain puzzled and bewildered by all this. We have muffed our opportunities on this score before, and we do so now.

Without in the least sounding as an alarmist, one can argue that the hour of decision is rapidly approaching. Millions of Americans are convinced that only a polwar policy of liberation of Moscow's and Peking's captives is the decision for freedom-loving men. As will be dealt with in the final chapter, many have come to hold that this policy is inescapable for victory in the Cold War. And the horrors of a nuclear war only reinforce this position.

Our opportunity will be seized once we actively recognize a number of basic truths. The first is that the issues of colonialism and imperialism in Moscow's empire are prime targets for our national concern and effort.¹¹ The second is the fact that the Soviet Union, which pretends to be an equal of the United States, is an empire in itself, holding in bondage the captive nations of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Cossackia, North Caucasia, and Idel-Ural. Incessantly, the peoples of these

10. Ensz, Reinhold G., "K Suggests To Boost Cotton Crop," *AP*, Moscow, November 19, 1961.

11. "Captive Nations—Moscow's Achilles' Heel," *The Manion Forum*, No. 372, November 12, 1961.

captive nations are being attacked by Moscow for "bourgeois nationalism."¹² It should also be recognized that the only types of warfare that Moscow can wage with success are propaganda and guerrilla warfare. The fourth truth is that the Cold War will endure as long as the colonial imperium is maintained by Moscow from the Danube to the Pacific. And, lastly, the universalization of our Declaration of Independence is the most formidable weapon in this type of war. Again, initiative, positive action, and imaginative ideas can be ours with these fixed and new dimensions of thought.

Although it is held that "the fool's treasure is in his tongue," Khrushchev never uttered a more complete truth when he said in the summer of 1961 that his tongue is his chief weapon. The typical Russian Potemkin Village tactics practiced by him, whether in economic, military, space, cultural or other fields, should frighten no one. His successors use the same tactics. In each of these areas a persistent, continuous, and popular concentration and study by us would easily reveal the breadth and depth of the Russian con game. For instance, as we will note later, the economic boasts of the Kremlin can be easily exploded by revelations of the rampant economic colonialism within the USSR itself, a subject that always appears to upset and even frighten the Russian totalitarians.

But before these and other ideas can be put into practice, a number of outstanding myths must be eliminated. Over the years there have been some rather strange and fanciful notions expressed in relation to both the resolution and the captive nations. We noted a few earlier. Let us consider here a few more. A well-known columnist had this critical comment to make of the Republican Presi-

12. E. g., "Latvians Accused," *Reuters*, Moscow, November 21, 1961.

dential nominee in 1964: "The Senator is historically wrong to imply (April 25, 1963) that Soviet arms seized Azerbaijan, Byelo-Russia, Turkestan, Georgia, the Ukraine the North Caucasus." ¹³ For the purpose of disinforming the American public, Soviet Russian propagandists could not have done better. There is no intelligent controversy about Soviet Russia's conquest of these countries. The historical record is clear and substantial. Aside from an extensive bibliography of scholarly works on the subject, if the columnist had even bothered to scan the official reports of Congress' Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, he would come to realize that his statement makes as much sense as saying that Nazi arms did not seize Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and so on.

Another choice example of myth-making is furnished by an editorial of a Washington newspaper. In an intellectually irresponsible attack against the resolution, the editorial stated, "It also includes 'Cossackia' and 'Idel-Ural' which never have existed as nations except for intervals of German invasion. They are about as much 'captives' of the Soviet Union as Anacostia and Cleveland Park are 'captives' of the District of Columbia. As far as that goes, 'White Ruthenia' and 'Ukraine' are political concoctions that describe aspirations more than a national entity." ¹⁴ Even Moscow is not capable of such crude distortions. The first part does not make rational sense, for it confuses the concepts of "nation" and "state." If Cossackia and Idel-Ural existed as nations during the intervals, then logically they must have been before, between, and after, though they have not attained to statehood. As for the comments on White Ruthenia or Byelo-

13. Sulzberger, C. L., "Barry's Brinkmanship," *San Francisco Sunday Chronicle*, July 19, 1964.

14. "Captive Nations," *The Washington Post*, July 11, 1964.

russia and Ukraine, let us just score it up to unpardonable ignorance. Enough will be said throughout this book to justify this score.

Examples of this type can virtually be picked at random. They go a long way in explaining why our policies toward the totalitarian Russians have been weak and amateurish. But let us look at one more. A writer and former ambassador, who has a capacity for weaving all sorts of fables about the "dismemberment of Russia," "the traditional Russian state," the Yugoslav "nation," and other absurdities, makes this observation: "The Captive Nations Resolution has freed no captive nations, nor is it likely to do so. . . ." ¹⁵ Just a modicum of common sense is needed to perceive the fact that, like proclamations, no resolution will free anyone anywhere. It is one thing to resolve; it is another to act.

ADDITIONAL CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK IDEAS

In Congress, in the public forum, in periodicals and books, the above and many additional ideas have been consistently advanced and disseminated by the Captive Nations Week observances. It is often said by some that the American people do not have the will to prepare for and undertake the tasks that these ideas imply. We do not believe this. Plainly, it is untrue. The observances alone demonstrate a restless will in many sections of our country, seeking the translation of these ideas into concrete, systematic, and constructive action. Our best defense in the Cold War is the offense. But there are many things that are required for the successful development of a cold war strategy.

15. Kennan, George F., *On Dealing with the Communist World*, New York, 1964, p. 19.

For instance, considerable emphasis was placed in the 1961 observance on the necessity of a firm stand, without compromise, on West Berlin. The issue of West Berlin has been part of the issue of a free reunited Germany, and this has been an integral part of the general issue of the captive nations. Initiative in expressing our rights in East Berlin was underscored. Our typical cold war failure to anticipate the walling of East Berlin ensued shortly thereafter. In the 1962 observance heavy stress was also placed on a determined opposition to the admission of Red China into the United Nations. Mainland China has been the largest of all captive nations. Its hope of eventual freedom is in Taiwan. There is nothing inevitable about Peking being in the UN. Here, too, no compromise; here, too, no illusions about any mutual suicide pact between Peking and Moscow.

Essential to the development of the ideology is the passage of Congressional resolutions proposing the creation of a Special House Committee on Captive Nations. Because this forms an important story in itself, we devote a chapter to it later. Nevertheless, for some preliminary thoughts here, the necessity for such a committee has been set forth in considerable Congressional discussion.¹⁶ There is no agency in government or private life that continually and persistently studies and investigates all of the captive nations. We have desperately needed such a body. Both in the 1961 and 1962 observances, as well as in subsequent years, calls for a Special Committee and the passage of the Freedom Commission Bill were vigorously voiced. We shall surely continue to lose the Cold War

16. E.g., "U.S. Government Policy and a Special Committee on Captive Nations," *The Congressional Record*, August 3, 1961, pp. 16495-507.

until we decide to develop a cold war strategy and apparatus. The Red totalitarians have theirs.

Months before Castro made his public confession on being a "Marxist-Leninist," proper attention had been given to Cuba as a captive nation.¹⁷ In the 1961 Week this attention was focused on the re-activation of the Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act with reference to Cuba.¹⁸ What we failed to do at the beginning of the 1950's with regard to the European captive nations, we must do now with regard to Cuba. The fact of a new captive nation existing at our doorstep should awaken us to the need of forming units of Free Cuba, prepared for guerrilla warfare and the process of liberating Cuba. The National Captive Nations Committee, which from Washington guides the nation-wide observances, was severely criticized when it first designated Cuba a captive nation. A year later in his October address on Cuba, President Kennedy himself used the term.

The several observances have also emphasized the need for improving and expanding the *Voice of America* broadcasts to the non-Russian nations in the USSR. This, too, will be considered in detail. But, for the moment, is it not also strange that the enemy in effect determines the shifts in *Voice of America* frequencies? We have witnessed this, for example, in the cases of Africa and Latin America. In the meantime we virtually leave the enemy's vulnerable areas untouched, e.g., Turkestan and the Caucasus. There are over thirty million Moslems in the USSR who

17. December 2, 1961, speech: "I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be one until the day I die."

18. For Kersten Amendment see *Mutual Security Act Extension*, Hearings. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 82d Congress, March-April, 1952, pp. 1075-1080.

deserve our closest attention and whose significance for the entire Islamic world is immense.

Captive Nations Week action has also been directed at the restoration and extension of the Champion of Liberty Stamp series. Over the years the goodwill impact of these stamps had been well demonstrated. The decision of our postal authorities to downgrade the series is mystifying and even irrational, especially when many fighters for freedom among the captive nations should be appropriately honored.

Captive Nations Week action is also aimed at the creation of an executive agency on the self-determination of the captive nations. Such an agency would help in steadily focusing world opinion on the captive nations of Europe, Asia, and Latin America. And by deed it would attest to our policy of never acquiescing to their permanent captivity. By all evidence such an agency would be as important as the Disarmament Agency, if not more important.

The nature and the meaning of the Week, then, are manifested in these and other ideas, projects, proposals, and actions. There is no question that in time most of them will be realized. They stand in the best interests of our nation, for the survival of freedom, and for the avoidance of a cataclysmic hot global war. From decades of experience and evidence colonialist Moscow knows best that it cannot trust its own armed forces. This was shown in World War I, World War II, and in Hungary in 1956. The momentous conflict of our day will not be resolved by military arms but, instead, by non-military means, primarily in the field of psycho-political propaganda. We should seek to propagate a diplomacy of truth, the dynamics of freedom, and the certainty of victory in the most essential area of the Cold War—the area of Mos-

cow's empire. The greatest contribution we can make to the independence and freedom of the approximately 110 million Russian people is to work for the independence and freedom of all the captive non-Russian nations now under the heel of imperialist Moscow. If we do not, in line with the following list we may just as well ask, "Who's Next?" (The year following each country represents the time when it came under Communist domination.)

Armenia	1920	Bulgaria	1946
Azerbaijan	1920	Serbia, Croatia,	
Byelorussia	1920	Slovenia, etc.	
Cossackia	1920	in Yugoslavia	1946
Georgia	1920	Poland	1947
Idel-Ural	1920	Rumania	1947
North Caucasia	1920	Czecho-Slovakia	1948
Ukraine	1920	North Korea	1948
Far Eastern Republic	1922	Hungary	1949
Turkistan	1922	East Germany	1949
Mongolian People's		Mainland China	1949
Republic	1924	Tibet	1951
Estonia	1940	North Vietnam	1954
Latvia	1940	Cuba	1960
Lithuania	1940		
Albania	1946		

Who is next? South Vietnam? Algeria? Colombia? Congo? Laos? Tanzania? Bolivia? Thailand? Guatemala?

In the years ahead the tone and character of the captive nations ideology will be cultivated in terms of a posture suggested decades ago. President Theodore Roosevelt was entirely right when he advised, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." But let us for the sake of world freedom *speak*—continuously, persistently, truthfully. And,

as he also said, "Fear God and take your own part"—for the freedom of the captive nations, for in reality our own freedom. However, let us also not delude ourselves. The fruitful cultivation of this posture will necessarily depend on the breadth of our perspectives and the validity of our conceptions in relation to the only truly formidable enemy threatening the United States. We shall consider such working perspectives and conceptions in the next six chapters. They do not conform with the ones many of us entertain now.

Chapter VI
HISTORICAL OUTLINES OF SOVIET RUSSIAN
AGGRESSION

“Those who do not know or remember the history of Soviet Russian aggression are condemned to repeat it.”—

“History is bunk”—so observed one of America’s foremost industrialists, himself a prominent maker of history. Instinctively and in tune with the first paraphrased quote, we would brush this statement aside, as indeed many in the past have. But actually the extreme observation cannot be written off entirely because, in fact, there is much “bunk” in the written histories of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which constitute primary and basic parts of the composite history of Soviet Russian aggression. In our schools and in the public forum much of this “bunk” is being uncritically transmitted, and the results become clearly and appallingly evident in the bleak record of our struggle with Moscow’s empire.

Many scholars, writers, and leaders with a keen sense of history have pointed to this grave defect in the fundamental history of Soviet Russian aggression. Among them, even President Harry S. Truman has said: “I have several histories of Russia—not one of which has been satisfactory. Most of them are based on ideas that were formed before the man started his book and are not based on facts.”¹ In short, if our historical accounts of Russia, the

1. Hillman, William, *Mr. President*, New York, 1952, p. 232.

power-base of the world Communist conspiracy, are inaccurate and even fictitious, then what can be expected of our higher formulations of thought, concept, policy, and operation regarding this global menace?

“Human history,” said H. G. Wells, “is in essence a history of ideas.” The history of totalitarian Russian aggression is undoubtedly a major episode of human history and in basic essence sharpens the contrast between the ideas of national and personal freedom and those of imperialist domination and totalitarian control. History, one can say, is philosophy teaching by examples. And the examples we shall consider here are not, as the Kremlin would have it, evidence of any mythical contest between Communism and capitalism but are, instead, evidence of a real contest between Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism, on the one hand, and national self-determination and personal liberty, on the other. Truly, those who do not know or remember the history of Soviet Russian aggression are condemned to repeat it.

What then can we learn from this history? What are the general lessons to be gained from this history of Moscow’s planned aggressions? For one, this history provides an indispensable background for our understanding of the motives, aims, and actions of the last towering imperialist power on earth. More than anything else, it answers empirically and concretely the essential question, “How did this menace come to be what it is?” It answers in effect the further crucial question, “What is the nature of the threat?”

Second, the history of Soviet Russian aggression portrays a genetic development of conquest, predation, and exploitation, without which pure analysis remains sterile. In this respect, our short understanding of this history explains in largest measure our persistent misconceptions

of the Soviet Union—as seen, for example, in the absurd use of the term “the Soviets”—as well as our gullibility for skillful Russian propaganda and our constant reactionism to the cold war ventures of the adversary.

A third important product flowing from a complete history of imperialist Russian aggression is keen insights into what the aggressed and the conquered feel and think about the nature of the disease, rather than what we, at a remote distance in time, place, or experience, think it to be. For instance, in 1956 the Hungarian patriot shouted, “Russkie, go home!” instead of wasting his breath on the myth of Communism. Earlier in the same year the Georgian patriot scrawled on the public buildings of Tiflis the positive slogan, “Long live an independent Georgia!” instead of the negative one, “Down with Communism!” These and endless more teachings by example lead to the fourth benefit of this composite history: the additional insights obtained for opportunities of action, of the positive offensive, against the calculating and increasingly confident enemy.

Thus a complete and factually grounded history of Soviet Russian imperialism is indispensable to our thoughts and actions in the permanent Cold War staged by Moscow. It is equally necessary for our behavior and operations in any hot global war. This history is the very basis of justification and confirmation of the sound warning given by the renowned Russian philosopher, Nicholas Berdyaev: “It is particularly important for Western minds to understand the national roots of Russian Communism and the fact that it was Russian history which determined its limits and shaped its character. A knowledge of Marxism will not help in this.”² As one views in outline this his-

2. Berdyaev, Nicholas, *The Origin of Russian Communism*, London, 1948, p. 7.

tory of Russian imperio-colonialism over the years—including even the form of spiritual aggression against certain non-Russian nations prior to 1917—this sober warning sounded by one of Russia's greats in this century cannot be repeated too often. His warning refers to Marx's system of "scientific socialism," not to Marx's outlook on the prison house of nations.

THE TSARIST RUSSIAN EMPIRE BACKGROUND

It is an open secret that we Americans are not exactly conspicuous in the areas of historical research, interpretation, and analysis. In fact, until recently, in our schools and in our daily existence we had even shown a disdain for historical inquiry and understanding. With regard to the reality of Soviet Russian aggression, some of us were awakened only when colonialist Moscow took to overt means of threat and bluff against the interests of the United States following World War II. It has been of little concern to most of us that by private or official agency we have helped substantially to build up this monster from 1917 to the present, either by commission or omission of various deeds and works. Without the indispensable aid of history we have been content to form our illusions. Some of these have thrived to this very day, such as the illusion that the Cold War began in 1947, or the myth that Moscow's aggressions commenced with the Russian invasion of Poland in September, 1939, or the fantasy that if Marx did not exist, we would not be threatened from the Russian and Red Chinese sources today. These and other illusions can be permanently dissolved only by perceiving the major forces and patterns in the history of Soviet Russian imperialism.

As Berdyaev, Struve, and other honest Russians taught,

it is impossible to arrive at such a perception without an intensive analysis of the real, empirical background to the series of totalitarian Russian conquests in our time. The roots of these aggressions by Soviet Russia rest deep in the background presented by the White Russian Empire of the tsars. Berdyaev rightly pointed out, "The very internationalism of the Russian Communist revolution is purely Russian and national. . . ." ³ Marx in his time enunciated a continuing truth when he wrote, "Russian diplomacy has thus rested on the timidity of Western statesmen, and her diplomatic art has gradually sunk into so complete a mannerism, that you may trace the history of the present transactions almost literally in the annals of the past." ⁴

Every conceivable "Communist" technique today has an able institutional precedent in the empire-building enterprise started by Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century. The repertoire includes divide-and-conquer, conspiratorial networks, genocide, Russification, two steps forward and one backward, broken treaties, a self-assuring mystical messianism, smoke screens of totalistic ideologies, political partitionism, the police state, inventions and distortions of history, incitement of class struggles, slave labor, anti-Semitic pogroms, Potemkin Village tactics, "peaceful coexistence"—in brief, the fashioned implementations of cold war gaming aimed at eventual conquest.

Lest we deceive ourselves, we are bucking up against 500 years of cumulative empire-building experience, from which Lenin primarily drew on and the Prussian von Clausewitz distilled his classic cold war formulations. It is an experience based on the institutional nexus of internal totalitarian rule and external imperialism and coloni-

3. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

4. Marx, Karl, *New York Tribune*, July 14, 1853.

alism. It is also an experience masked by a succession of deceptive ideologies: the Third Rome doctrine of Orthodox supremacy, racist Pan-Slavism, and materialistic Communism.⁵ Where it serves Moscow's purposes, each of these is put into use today. For example, the Morros testimony which led to the Sobel spy case in New York brought out the fact that, as Morros put it, the "Russian plot . . . goes beyond communism. They are for Pan-Slavism on a scale more ambitious than Hitler's fanatical dreams of world conquest."⁶ And Morros operated with functionaries on the highest levels of the Kremlin conspiratorial setup. Friedrich Engels, the life-long friend of Marx, observed in the days of the Tsars: "But in truth Pan-Slavism is a smoke screen for world domination, appearing in the cloak of a non-existent Slavic nationality; and therefore our worst enemy."

But more immediate to the first phase in the history of Soviet Russian imperialism is the period from the end of the nineteenth century to the downfall of the White Tsarist Russian Empire. We cannot intelligibly comprehend the first wave of Soviet Russian aggression, unless we come to know and appreciate the powerful force of nationalism which manifested and expressed itself in the empire during this period. Regrettably our studies of this subject are virtually nil. As a consequence, we are ill-prepared today to exploit, in behalf of world freedom, this same force operating within the Soviet Union.

The Tsarist Russian Empire suffered from the same rebellious upsurge of patriotic nationalism that the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires did. We know of the Polish resistance and fight for national freedom in the spirit of Mickiewicz, Kosciuszko, and Pulaski, but how

5. Radzinski, John M., *Masks of Moscow*, Illinois, 1960, p. 268.

6. *The New York Times*, August 13, 1957.

many of us know of the freedom fighters and the resistance against Russian domination elsewhere within the empire? Frankly, few of us are acquainted with the White Ruthenians Kalinovsky and Hryniavetski who assassinated Alexander II in 1881; the Ukrainian Shevchenko and the pervasive spirit of Mazepa in subjugated Ukraine; the jealous independence of the Don and Kuban Cossacks in the spirit of Razin and Pugachov; the freedom star of the Caucasus, Chamyl, and the innumerable revolts of the North Caucasian peoples throughout the nineteenth century; the Muslim Congresses of 1905-1906 through which the Turkestani and Azerbaijani formed a religious common front against Russian colonialism.

Reflect for a moment on this all-important perspective of Eurasian history. Yet this is only a small fraction of the history for freedom in Eastern European and Central Asia—a history that assumes increasing meaning, value and significance in the light of current developments in Turkestan, Georgia, Idel-Ural, Ukraine, and the other non-Russian nations in the USSR. In marked measure the Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War was attributable to the rumblings and dissension of the subjugated non-Russian peoples, and the Revolution of 1905 was in part the explosion of this force of nationalism. A decade later, in World War I, mass desertion of these non-Russian nationals crippled the so-called military steam-roller of the Russian Empire. Over two decades later—after a long period of ostensible Communist indoctrination—millions of these non-Russians deserted again, practically placing the platter of victory before the Germans. Indeed, applicable to these situations and the current one is Marx's insight into the multi-national imperial forces of "Russia": "It cannot be denied that at the very time when Russian influence in European politics was stronger

than ever, the actual feats of the Russian army justified anything but such a political position.”⁷ Even the socialist movement in the Tsarist Russian Empire was split along national lines, such as the Armenian Socialist Party, the Tatarian Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party, and others.

Although we still have to uncover and make use of these facts, in the field of experience the Russian Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, knew them well and used them effectively for their own ends. Today, this account would be condemned by Moscow as “the provocations of bourgeois nationalism”; before the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Empire it was accepted by the forthcoming heirs of the empire in the name of national self-determination. “Russian Socialists who fail to demand freedom of secession for Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, etc., etc.—are behaving like chauvinists, like lackeys of the blood-and-mud stained imperialist monarchies and the imperialist bourgeoisie.”⁸ So wrote Lenin. As today in Africa and Asia, this record on national self-determination had been played over and over again until the overwhelming force of non-Russian nationalism contributed heavily to the break-up of the Tsarist Russian Empire in 1917. But it was not too long before Lenin and the heirs of the empire proved themselves to be outright chauvinists. How Lenin rationalized his perfidy can be gleaned from the following: “Every Marxist, if he is not a renegade, must put the interests of socialism above the right of nations to self-determination. Our Socialist Republic has done what it could for the self-determination of Finland, the Ukraine, and other countries. Nevertheless, if the situation demands a choice

7. Doerig, J. A., *op. cit.*, p. 136.

8. Lenin, V. I., *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, p. 83.

between the existence of the Socialist Republic, which is being endangered, and the right of self-determination of several nations, it is clear that the conservation of the Socialist Republic is predominant.”⁹ By established techniques of lies and deception the Russian Bolsheviks committed a spiritual aggression even before 1917.¹⁰

In addition, most students know of the two Russian Revolutions in 1917, but how many of us are aware of the widespread non-Russian Revolutions for national freedom and independence at that time? Yet the significance of these non-Russian Wars of Independence cannot but have profound meaning for us today. Independent national republics were established in area after area: Idel-Ural, November 12, 1917; Finland, December 6, 1917; Ukraine, January 22, 1918; Kuban Cossackia, February 16, 1918; Lithuania, February 16, 1918, followed in that year by Estonia, White Ruthenia, Don Cossackia, North Caucasia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Poland, and Latvia. In Siberia, on April 4, 1920, the Democratic Republic of the Far East was founded, and in Central Asia a republic was proclaimed by Turkestan on April 15, 1922. With some of these, such as Georgia, Poland, and Ukraine, formal recognition was tendered by Soviet Russia by treaty or official declaration. Yet in a short time only a few of these independent nations and states survived the first wave of Soviet Russian imperialism.

FIRST WAVE OF SOVIET RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

As shown in part by the former Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression of the U.S. House of

9. Lenin, V. I., *Pravda*, No. 34, 1918.

10. See Boyko, Y., et al., *Russian Bolshevism*, Munich, 1961, p. 336.

Representatives, the history of Red Russian aggression commenced with the onslaught by Trotsky's Red Russian army against most of these non-Russian republics.¹¹ States like Ukraine and Georgia were subverted, conquered, and made to appear as independent Soviet Republics by the end of 1920. Familiar techniques of "intensive revolution," infiltration, propaganda distortion, espionage, conspiracy, and planted governments had been in full use before the military blow struck. One republic was picked off after another on the traditional basis of divide-and-conquer. By 1923 the first wars between the non-Russian nations and Soviet Russia were over. On January 31, 1924, the forcible incorporation of these many nations into the new prison house of nations was formally declared with the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A new Red Russian Empire was now in being.

This eventful period—about which much has been written and included in the bibliography of this book but about which little has been read generally—gives us much cause for serious and sober thought. The fruits of our reflections may have considerable bearing on our own future and destiny. The "ifs" of history are just as much parts of reality as the "whens." *If* the leaders of the victorious West had understood the nationalist forces at work throughout the Russian Empire and fully supported them on the principle of national self-determination, it is reasonable to assume that "Communism" would have been only a fleeting event in human history. *If* the Russians had desired to apply their "philosophy" on the legitimate terrain of Russia as in the similar case of Germany, Nazism and non-Germans—surely the non-

11. *Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of the Non-Russian Nations of the USSR*, U.S. House of Representatives, 1954, p. 370.

Russians would not have gone to war over it. *If* these newly independent non-Russian republics had formed a common front against Soviet Russian imperialism, the outcome of world developments would surely have been different. As we noted earlier, it is little appreciated that the first smashing defeat of the imperialist forces of Soviet Russia was registered in 1920 by the Polish-Ukrainian alliance of Pilsudski and Petlura. *If* their combined forces had crossed the proper borders of Russia and completely wiped out the Red Russian Army, Europe and the rest of the world would certainly have benefitted from far more than a twenty-year breathing period. As reflections of historical reality many of these “ifs” have pointed meaning for us today.

Foolish, indeed, is the notion that Soviet Russian aggression starts and finishes with a military war. After the conquest of any non-Russian country the aggression continues—in fact is intensified—against the institutions, the historical past, and the future hopes and aspirations of the conquered people. Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia escaped the ravages of this aggression in the 1920's and 1930's. The other non-Russian nations, now parts of the Red Russian Empire under the guise of the Soviet Union, were not this fortunate. The two decades are historically replete with deportations, slave labor, a horrible man-made famine in 1931-32, severe Russification, the Vinnitsa genocide, and extensive economic colonialism. It is in this period that Khrushchev and other so-called “de-Stalinizers” soaked their hands in the blood of these early and first captive peoples.¹²

It is also in this period that so-called Soviet history

12. *The Crimes of Khrushchev*, Part 2, Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, 1959, p. 69.

was punctuated with recurring uprisings, passive resistance, and the mortal danger of "bourgeois nationalism." Witness the uprisings of 1929-30 and the purges of 1935 and 1937 in Georgia, the revolt of the young Turkestani in the Basmachi underground during 1935-41, the armed revolts of the Azerbaijani in 1925, 1929-30, and 1933, and the persistent opposition of the Ukrainians, which caused a Russian satrap, Kossior, to blurt out in 1933 that "Ukrainian nationalism is our chief danger." Aside from revisionism, the greatest and most enduring of crimes in the Soviet Union today is "bourgeois nationalism." For us it is plain national patriotism.

Most important in this first stage of Soviet Russian aggression is the dominant fact that the imperio-colonialist foundation was laid for subsequent waves of Moscow's aggressions, whether direct or indirect. History was indeed repeating itself. The cycle of Russian conquests in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was again in motion.

It is also important to remember that without these conquered non-Russian areas Russia and its roughly 110 million people could only be a second or third-rate power. Ukraine by itself stands as the largest non-Russian nation both in the Soviet Union and behind the Iron Curtain. It should be noted, too, that the major economic resources in the USSR are largely concentrated in the non-Russian nations. Turkestan, which Moscow deliberately partitioned into five artificial Central Asiatic republics, and has since exploited severely, literally abounds in diverse natural resources. Approximately 120 million non-Russian captives live under the alien yoke of Moscow in the Soviet Union today. About 24 million were added by the second wave of Soviet Russian aggression in World War II.

SECOND WAVE OF AGGRESSION

The second wave of Soviet Russian aggression was really triggered by Moscow signing a ten-year non-aggression treaty with Berlin on August 24, 1939. The treaty paved the way for the Nazi invasion of Poland. The outbreak of World War II followed, and the opportunity for Russian colonialist expansion presented itself in Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States. The paramount feature of this massive aggression was, of course, the forced incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into Moscow's prison house of nations. The fate met by other non-Russian nations in 1924 now, inevitably, befell these nations. Dependent on the fortunes of World War II, it was only a matter of time before others would meet a similar fate of captivity.

Several histories of World War II have been published, and many still are in process. But still to be written for the benefit of the Free World is the struggle for national freedom in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the very course of World War II—a saga of invincible will and heroism. While the war gave Soviet Russia the opportunity to extend its colonialism, it also gave the non-Russian captives an equal opportunity to strike for national freedom. Even many freedom-loving Russians saw their opportunity, too. As in World War I, mass desertions from the polyglot multi-national armed forces of the USSR were the order of the time. White Ruthenians, Cossacks, Bashkiri, Georgians, Tatars, Chechens, Ukrainians, and others, who were supposed to be hopelessly indoctrinated by Communism, deserted in the millions in the hope of fighting for the freedom of their lands. For example, let us listen to the words of a German journalist on the eastern front: "The steady flow of Ukrainian

volunteers for the German forces we ignored. The millions of Ukrainians, who by themselves could have turned the scales in the east, were not only being left unused, but were actually being repulsed and disillusioned.”¹³

Here, in a nutshell, is the explanation of the unsurpassed political blunder in this century. The German Nazis attempted to foist their type of imperialist totalitarianism upon these non-Russian nations and in reality—fortunately for us—it cost them the war and victory. Throughout this period and, as a matter of fact, up to 1950, the national underground systems of Lithuania, Ukraine, White Ruthenia, Turkestan, and others, engaged in guerrilla warfare against both the Russian and German totalitarians, and later against the Russians and their colonial puppets. Our interest in guerrilla warfare today can well be satisfied by a study of the warfare waged by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in that period.¹⁴ To project this further, there is abundant evidence to show that throughout the last decade this resistance and opposition of “bourgeois nationalism” have by no means diminished in the Soviet Union. Arrests for this crime of crimes have continued under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Kosygin. They will continue under any Soviet Russian ruler.

As we now turn to the third wave of Soviet Russian aggression, the tragedy of having won the war but lost the peace should awaken us to some grave defects and failures in our thinking and policy-making regarding imperialist Soviet Russia. Imagine, twice in this century we have suffered this tragedy. The colossal naiveté of some of our leaders was displayed in the Yalta agreements

13. Kern, Erich, *The Dance of Death*, New York, 1951, pp. 103-104.

14. Codo, Enrique M., “Guerrilla Warfare in the Ukraine,” *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November, 1960.

and other unnecessary concessions made to the greatest imperialist power on earth. Up to that time hundreds of agreements, treaties, and promises had been callously broken by colonialist Moscow but, for a variety of reasons, our leaders felt it could not happen to us. The roots of the successive Berlin crises go back to this period, and so does the captivity of many additional non-Russian nations. The causal reasons of ignorance and even degrees of Russophilism still are at work today.¹⁵

THE THIRD WAVE

Because of these circumstances we, the victors of World War II and the advocates of national independence and personal freedom, literally accommodated the third wave of Soviet Russian aggression. As shown in the preceding chapter, the list of victims is as long as that of the first wave in 1920-1923: in 1946, Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and others in Yugoslavia; in 1947, Poland and Rumania; in 1948, Czecho-Slovakia and North Korea; in 1949, Hungary, East Germany and mainland China, where we were told an "agrarian revolution" was under way.

Whether by military occupation or by indirect means of the traditional Russian borderlands policy or "intensive revolution," as seen more recently in Cuba, South Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic, the process of aggression and the end result of conquest and domination of a people are the same. Satraps in most of these areas are Moscow-bred, and although differences have arisen—as in the cases of captive Poland, satellite Yugoslavia, the junior partner Red China, or rascal Albania—who can logically

15. Crocker, George N., *Roosevelt's Road to Russia*, Chicago, 1959, p. 248.

deny that the permanence of the unrepresentative regimes in any of these areas is inseparably bound up with the strength and future of their originator, Soviet Russia? Aggression by indirection was shown in Korea in 1950; it is at work in different stages on all five continents.

The emerging Russian pattern is centuries-old. The characters and circumstances are different, but the weave is the same. Thus, with the inner colonial ring in the Soviet Union and now the outer colonial ring in Central Europe and Asia woven, Moscow has placed itself in position to penetrate—directly or indirectly through its captives, junior partner, satellite or quisling “Communist” groups in the world at large—any area of the Free World, including ours. The world’s masters in empire-building continue to reap incremental successes of indirect aggression, despite our alliances, the United Nations, the horrendous presence of nuclear weapons, and the Maginot Wall of containment. By the use of Moscow’s traditional argument of no interference in “internal affairs,” by skillful propaganda inducing fears of war, and by gaining sanctuary from us in the consolidation of their vast empire, they have a free field for subversion, infiltration, and indirect aggression in the non-totalitarian Free World. The words of Admiral William H. Standley, our former Ambassador to the USSR, are as pertinent today as they were over a decade ago: “Over the ancient skeleton of Russian imperialism, Lenin and Stalin threw a cloak of Communist ideology, but the bones show through. Even as in Czarist times, when the Russian Bear stands on its hind feet with its front paws held up as if in prayer, we must ‘beware of the Bear that walks like a Man.’ ”¹⁶

By our basic policy of containment, badly patched up

16. Standley, Admiral William H., *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, Chicago, 1955, p. 508.

as it is, we accommodate colonialist Moscow in a free aggressive play in the non-totalitarian Free World. Tibet in 1951, North Vietnam in 1954, and Cuba in 1960 are further results of this play, whether executed directly or indirectly. What new nations will be listed into captivity in the near future? Laos, Thailand, Tanzania, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela? These and others are real possibilities for which economic aid, military assistance, the United Nations—singly or in combination—are not the adequate answer.

To approach the adequate answer, it is necessary to keep firmly in mind these outlines in the history of Soviet Russian aggression. Within the framework of these outlines many other detailed acts of aggression can be included, as, for example, in Spain, Greece, Iran, Guatemala, and elsewhere. But whatever additional facts are assembled, it should be clear that as the permanent instigator of the Cold War, Moscow is a constant aggressor. In less speedy times and with less advanced technology the Princes of Muscovy were also on the permanent aggressive, and with patience, skill, fraud, and deception they built an enormous and unique empire. As Marx himself pointed out for his time as well as ours, "In all essential points Russia has steadily, one after another, gained her ends, thanks to the ignorance, dullness, and consequent inconsistency and cowardice of Western Governments."¹⁷ The inheritors of that empire may use different specious arguments, but they employ substantially the same techniques and, above all, have the same patience and propaganda skills. As before, so now, what falls under the Iron, Bamboo, or Sugar Curtain becomes an "internal affair," and what lies outside the curtains of the empire is the field for free aggressive play. What then can we do? Or, in other

17. Doerig, J. A., *op. cit.*, p. 80.

words, what profits us to know the history of Soviet Russian aggression?

As stated before, the “ifs” of history are parts of our reality, for they continually haunt us into wiser and more intelligent action in the present and for the future. *If*, for example, in 1945 our Western leaders had a clear comprehension of the first wave of Soviet Russian aggression and the already long record of Moscow’s broken agreements, their proper action would certainly have spared us, among other things, more captive nations in Europe and the Berlin crises. Such “ifs” sharpen the lessons of history and contribute to its guidelines for our action in the present.

(1) The nature of the threat, the disease, or the cancer—characterized however you will—is the imperio-colonialist system of Soviet Russia, which really also supports that of the Red Chinese. This system has historical roots in 500 years of empire-building. By virtue of its materialistic basis and character the ideology of Communism—in essence a millenarian ideology of economic myth—is only a weapon of deception, though it is more powerful than were the preceding ideological weapons of Orthodox supremacy and Pan-Slavism. However, it is hardly encouraging to know that we are fighting against an ideological myth. In posing the phantom conflict between Communism and capitalism the Russian totalitarians want us to fight the myth rather than the blood-and-flesh reality of totalitarian Russian domination. Philosophically and economically, Marxism bears as much relationship to the Red totalitarian empire as French physiocracy does to our society. As one writer aptly put it, “Like a bull in the arena, we have been concentrating on the red cloth rather than the matador behind it.”¹⁸ Ever so often several of our

18. Radzinski, John M., *op. cit.*, p. xiii.

opinion makers grasp this most essential insight, as did the editors of the *New York Times* when, in an editorial on "Khrushchev vs. Marx," they commented in this fashion: "Now the leader of a supposedly socialist state talks loftily of his nation's 'grandeur' and in the name of the fight for that 'grandeur' threatens to bring death to hundreds of millions, most of them the workers and peasants Marx thought he was going to help. The bitter irony of all this is quite clear. Far from being a Marxist, Khrushchev is actually a Russian Great Power chauvinist, a nationalist intoxicated by his own power much as were some earlier Kremlin residents before 1917." ¹⁹

(2) The paramount challenge is not in the area of comparative military power and build-up but in the determining area of propaganda, political psychology, and psychological warfare. It is in this latter area that images are built, minds are moved, and loyalties shifted. Bred on Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and 500 years of empire-building, the present Russian totalitarians are masters of the politico-psychological art and experts in Potemkin Village tactics, stretching from space to athletics. On the basis of historical and other forms of evidence it is certain that Moscow cannot, with any hope of victory, commit its multi-national armed forces in any serious military engagement. We saw what happened in Hungary, the two World Wars, and the Russo-Japanese War, if a bright hope exists for individual national liberation and freedom. Yet in comparison with these politico-psychological experts we have been but puny amateurs, despite the ace cards available to us. It requires little imagination to call men to arms; it requires much in imagination and vision to exploit the weaknesses of the enemy in order eventually to

19. "Khrushchev vs. Marx," *The New York Times*, August 13, 1961.

strangulate him without the horrible costs of a hot war.

(3) The policy of liberation, accurately construed, is inescapable for our country if we are determined to survive as an independent nation. In addition to the given quantity of armed protection, the greatest weapon we have is the captive nations of Europe and Asia. The case of Hungary proved our failure to implement this policy, not the inefficacy of the policy itself. With good reason, there is nothing more frightening to Moscow than a developing concentration by us on the numerous captive non-Russian nations within the USSR itself.²⁰ In the U.N. Assembly debate on colonialism and imperialism in 1960 the Canadian Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, had the courage to bring up the imperio-colonialism which is rampant in the Soviet Union, and Moscow went into convulsions.²¹ The image of Russian power can be changed overnight with such concentration on Russian colonialism and imperialism within the USSR—and with enormous impact on Asia, Africa and Latin America.²² Many of us still have not pondered well the question, “Why was it that Khrushchev, sitting on a pile of missiles and nuclear bombs and boasting about economic progress and the victory of Communism, almost suffered apoplexy when Congress passed the Captive Nations Week Resolution in 1959?” The answer is found in the call for this kind of concentration.

(4) Based on the salient features of the history of Soviet Russian aggression, and also the unique development of

20. Smal-Stocki, Roman, *The Captive Nations*, New York, 1960, pp. 98-101.

21. “Colonialism in the Soviet Empire,” *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, Switzerland, November 20, 1960.

22. Barton, Paul, “Imperialism in the Soviet Union,” *NATO Letter*, June, 1961 (*Congressional Record*, July 24, 1961, pp. 1225-27).

our nation, it becomes more understandable now that our course of policy and action must be in the explicit and frank terms of a Universalized Declaration of Independence, a declaration aimed primarily at all the captive non-Russian nations in the Red totalitarian empire, and also at the freedom-loving rather than just the peace-loving masses of the Russian nation. Such a policy, oriented toward peace with justice, is both a powerful deterrent against a world holocaust and a formidable means for the expansion of freedom.

Paradoxically enough, Marx recognized a century ago the same problem that faces us today: "They will have learned before that the idea of Russian diplomatic supremacy owes its efficiency to the imbecility and the timidity of the Western nations, and that the belief in Russia's superior military power is hardly less a delusion. . . . There is only one way to deal with a Power like Russia, and that is the fearless way."²³ The fearless way, however, presupposes no abysmal gaps in our knowledge of the enemy. Let us now consider some of these cultural gaps in our armor of understanding.

23. Marx, Karl, *New York Tribune*, December 30, 1853.

Chapter VII
LACUNAE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT ABOUT
RUSSIA

“Russian despotism not only counts ideas
and sentiments for nothing but remakes
facts; it wages war on evidence and triumphs
in the battle”

—The Marquis de Custine

Rewriting history is an old Russian institution. The Marquis' observation in the nineteenth century applies as well to this century. The amount of rewritten and concocted history that has seeped into Western literature is startling. Little wonder that most Americans still think the USSR is “Russia.”

The distance between defective historical understanding and mythical conceptions is a short one. There are numerous and serious lacunae in American thought about Russia.

Although we have dissolved much of the fog in our thinking about Russia during the past ten years, our concept of this global menace still remains distorted by a series of assiduously cultivated myths.

As our historical outlines emphasized, Russia is not the Soviet Union. It dominates the other parts of the USSR, it rules over subjugated nations, but in concept Russia and USSR are not identical. This is the most common myth: using “Russia” and “the Soviet Union” interchangeably as if they were the same territory and the same peo-

ple. It suits the Russian imperio-colonialists just fine when we commit this error.

Russia is only one of the fifteen entities that comprise the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But as the "boss" nation of the synthetic state, it strives to make the world believe that the other nations are *natural* members of one big Russian family whose papa sits in the Kremlin. On this score examples galore are given by Marquette University's scholar, Professor Smal-Stocki.¹

This is not just a semantic quibble. Moscow wants us to forget that its empire began with the gun-point capture (between 1918 and 1923) of over fourteen non-Russian nations that differ, often markedly, from Russia in language, race, history, culture, and religion. Simply stated, these nations are no more Russian than the Irish are English, or than the Japanese are Chinese. Regarding the Moslem nations, for example, they have practically nothing in common with the Russians.² They and the other non-Russian nations were first subjugated by the Tsars, then more terribly resubjugated by Lenin and Stalin, and they are still in captivity under colonialist Moscow.

Some agency in our Government failed to point out these truths when in 1962 we sent Benny Goodman to tantalize "the Soviets." In Georgia, his troupe had to learn them the hard way. "Angry Georgians hooted and whistled in resentment today when Joya Sherrill, vocalist in Benny Goodman's band, sang a Russian song—'Katiusha.'" ³ She changed to an American song quickly. "I was frightened,"

1. Smal-Stocki, Roman, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*, Milwaukee, Wisc., 1952, p. 474.

2. Hostler, Charles Warren, *Turkism and the Soviets*, London, 1957, p. 199.

3. Associated Press, June 9, 1962, Tiflis, Georgian S.S.R.

Miss Sherrill said afterwards. "They must hate the Russians." The Georgians, as shown in one of my writings several years ago, are a proud people who long ago disowned the Georgian quisling Stalin.⁴

When the Georgians and others are misidentified as Russian, it serves Moscow's purpose, because the term Russia bypasses the fact of a Soviet Russian empire and obscures that empire's internal problems and inherent weaknesses. Moreover, when we call the people of the many non-Russian nations "Russians," we in effect ignore their legitimate feelings of national pride and loyalty, and we appear to approve of their forcible absorption into the Russian totalitarian empire. Our Fourth Estate is notorious for these misidentifications. One among a thousand examples is the following: the Cleveland Orchestra arrived in Georgia and was honored by Georgians, but one of our newspapers captioned the event as "Russians Honor U.S. Orchestra."⁵ Such nonsense is rampant in our daily papers.

But even more important, the acceptance of this first myth conditions people to an easy and often unquestioning belief in other myths that build up the false face the Kremlin shows to the world. The myth of "Soviet unity" is just one among many that represent the lacunae in our thought about Russia.⁶ It is strange, indeed, how we make much of the non-monolithic character of the empire in

4. Dobriansky, Lev E., "The Mounting Pressure of Nationalism," *The Great Pretense*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1956.

5. "Russians Honor U.S. Orchestra," *The Washington Post*, April 27, 1965.

6. Dobriansky, Lev E., "The Myth of Soviet Unity," *The Sign*, Union City, N.J., May, 1960.

Central Europe, though the Soviet Union itself has never really been a "Communist monolith."

We referred earlier, for instance, to the Kremlin and its apologists in America spreading the fiction that the USSR is a federal union of states, very much like the United States of America. This fictitious claim is obviously an attempt to equate Russia's armed conquest and forced incorporation of other nations with our union of fifty states and territories that freely willed their own federalization. As was pointed out, ours is a single and freely united nation; the Soviet Union is a multi-national empire, held together by totalitarian brutality but disguised as a federal union.

This myth is unwittingly encouraged by the failure of our press and news commentators continually to emphasize that the Soviet Union is a vast and brutally forged empire within an even more wickedly wrought totalitarian empire. Prominent Americans, on occasion, perpetuate this myth of a Soviet Union of freely federalized states when they refer to Ukraine as "Russia's Texas" and compare Byelorussia to Massachusetts! Worse still is the notion of a former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force that "the Soviet Union is not only the biggest nation on earth; it is also the best protected geographically."⁷ Such a concept could invite the wildest type of indiscriminate bombings in the horrible case of a hot global war.

Part of the price we pay for this thoughtlessness is our failure to convince millions in Africa, Asia, Central and South America that we are not the imperialistic and colonialist monster that the Russian empire-builders charge us with being.

7. Twining, General Nathan F., address, reprinted in *Congressional Record*, July 28, 1953.

THE MULTI-NATIONAL REALITY

Moscow's myth of the USSR being a free federal union similar to the United States of America is supported by what may be called its population myth. This is expressed in such terms as "the national minorities" and "the nationality problem" in the Soviet Union, with the suggestion that it parallels the U.S. minorities situation but is handled with more justice and wisdom, and with much less friction.

Here, again, we see the hand of masterful propagandists, uninhibited by obligations to the truth, turning glib minds away from the fact of the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union, and toward the scarlet fiction that some 235 million Russians lovingly stand together under the hammer and sickle. From the viewpoint of our national interest, let alone a purely intellectual one, it cannot but hurt us deeply to observe the chairman of our Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. William Fulbright, laboring under the illusion that there are that many Russians in the world, not to speak of the USSR alone.⁸ In an address supposedly devoted to exploding myths, Senator Fulbright (who speaks of the USSR as a "nation") reaffirmed the worst of old myths regarding Russia and Communism.⁹ However, his adherence to these myths is not unique. Former President Eisenhower, in a 1962 television interview, stated that Khrushchev "could not possibly just have 200 million Russians hating him."¹⁰ Fortunately, two years later, unveiling the Shevchenko

8. "Fulbright Asks Details of Goldwater's Views," Associated Press, *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., July 25, 1961.

9. Fulbright, J. W., "Foreign Policy—Old Myths and New Realities," *Congressional Record*, March 25, 1964, p. 6029.

10. Cronkite, Walter, Columbia Broadcasting System, Interview with Dwight D. Eisenhower, February, 1962.

Monument in Washington, General Eisenhower viewed all this in a different light.

The facts contradict this Russian-inspired illusion. Easily over half of the USSR's population is non-Russian.¹¹ In fourteen of the Soviet republics non-Russian natives represent a majority of the population. Only a propagandist or an uncritical commentator indifferent to truth would call these nations, with their native majorities, "national minorities." They are nations with distinctive cultures and histories, one of which goes back to the seventh century B.C. But, by referring to them as "national minorities" our analysts further divert attention from the empire Moscow rules and the colonialism it practices as a fixed policy.

It is grimly amusing to note that Karl Marx called the Tsarist empire "a prison house of nations"—an even more appropriate epithet for the system that today pays lip loyalty to Communism's founder.

RED CLOTH FOR THE MATADOR

The Free World's acceptance of these myths is indicated by another common error we make, one the Kremlin totalitarians are content to leave uncorrected: the mistake many anti-Communist individuals and agencies make when they rebuke other fervent opponents of colonialist Moscow who customarily assert that the Free World's enemy is "totalitarian Russian imperialism." The burden of their protest against this characterization is that our real enemy is "international Communism," and that the term

11. See Dobriansky, Lev E., *Nations, Peoples, and Countries in the U.S.S.R.*, Study of Population and Immigration Problems, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 105.

“totalitarian Russian imperialism” lays the crimes of Communism on the Russian nation and people, rather than on the Marxist ideology.

Moscow has no quarrel with this argument. It permits her to continue accumulating slave colonies behind the facade of Marxist historical materialism that has no relationship to the Soviet Russian empire. When we attack “Soviet Communism” as the sole enemy, the Russians have only to reply that the “imperialist West” is opposed to the concept of soviets, which are no more than representative workers’ councils.

But when, in the spirit of the preceding chapter, we point to Russia’s history of imperialism—during the Tsars under the banners of the Third Rome and Pan-Slavism, and since 1918 under the guise of Communism—then the Russian totalitarians can do little more than rage impotently, as they do when we celebrate Captive Nations Week.

Moreover, when we speak of “Soviet Russian totalitarian imperialism,” and refer to its colonialism and the certainty of ultimate Moscow control and empire absorption, then we are dealing with facts that have flesh-and-blood meaning the the world of today. Restless millions of have-nots are more easily aroused against imperialism and colonialism—which they think they have experienced and understand—than against Communism, which they do not know nor understand. How a leader of a once colonial area can be duped on this subject was illustrated in 1961 by President Sukarno of Indonesia. Speaking at a Peking rally, he declared it was “nonsense to accuse Russia and Communist China of carrying out imperialist policies.”¹²

12. “Two Red Powers Not Imperial . . . ,” Reuters Agency, Peking, June 14, 1961.

BIG BROTHER OBSESSION

In order to solidify its empire and lull the suspicions of newly acquired colonies, Moscow has for years circulated the Big Brother myth: the figment that the USSR is an ever-loving brotherhood, with the Russians themselves always the benevolent big brothers.¹³

However, there are some false notes in this sweet song—for example, that the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union do not want to be independent, and that they are grateful to the Russians for whatever they have of well-being. In order to make this campaign more plausible and palatable the Kremlin, following an old Russian political tradition, ordered a rewriting of the early histories of Ukraine, White Ruthenia, and Muscovy (Russia). Moscow not only compiles dishonest records of its own history, but reaches far back to distort and twist the chronicles of earlier times to fit its propaganda.

There is, of course, no special brotherly relationship between the Soviet Union's non-Russian nations and Russia. Nor do they recognize the Russians as their benefactors. In fact, they know that Russia would be a second-rate power if deprived of its economically rich captive nations.

Although the big brother song is crooned primarily to those within the Soviet Union, it is also yodeled in the Free World to discourage us from thinking of Kremlin power as totalitarian, without precedent in history, an empire extending from the Danube to the Pacific. This Russian song is often transmitted free of charge through Western media. Just consider the following specimen of garbled transmission: "A nation needs an ideology—a common enthusiasm that gives it cohesiveness and unity of

13. "Text of Soviet Party's Draft Program," Part II, 4, Tass, Moscow, July 30, 1961.

purpose. Strangely enough, the ideology that holds the Soviet Union together is not Communism, but the 'Mother Russia' concept. For 'Mother Russia' is the common pride of White Russians, Ukrainians and Georgians, all of whom have ample historical reason for mutual hate."¹⁴ Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union is neither Russia nor a nation, nor have the White Ruthenians, Ukrainians, and Georgians any "historical reason for mutual hate," and that the empire significance of the "Mother Russia" concept—whether holy or unholy—is anathema to them. The only force that holds the Soviet Union together is the military occupation of these non-Russian nations by the expediently mixed USSR armed forces and the KGB.

It is no coincidence that the Soviet Russian myths we have been discussing complement and support each other. They are the carefully devised and skillfully circulated inventions of propaganda technicians who employ truth only when it serves their purposes.

Moreover, when we fall into these several propaganda traps, we often then unwittingly do some myth-making of our own in behalf of the Kremlin. For example, we find ourselves dating the beginning of Red Russian imperialism as of the 1940's, when Moscow seized the Baltic States and then moved into Central Europe. We point to the capture of these "satellite" nations and suggest that a just and enduring peace could be established if the Iron Curtain were pushed back to the Soviet Union's pre-war borders. Thus, we imply that the Soviet Union is truly Russian, a freely organized federation of over 230 million Russians and some foreign language minorities such as are found in our own country. The Russians' record of imperialist aggression between 1918 and 1940 is consequently ignored.

14. Jones, Jenkin Lloyd, "Nations Are People, Not Flags," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C. July 23, 1964.

Russia's basic empire goes unremarked upon, while its captives—greater in number than the total "satellite" population—perhaps conclude the world has forgotten them.

THE MYTH OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Finally, the myth of peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the Free World amounts to little more than agreement that the Kremlin shall be permitted to strengthen its empire and perfect its plans for the subversion and eventual conquest of the Free World. Peaceful coexistence is a form of negative support of Russian totalitarian imperialism, flying now under the banner of "national liberation movements."¹⁵ Khrushchev uttered this liberation theme incessantly, and his successors have perpetuated it to the utmost degree. But, as President Johnson has wisely pointed out, with over forty years of evidence to back him up, "In today's world, with the enemies of freedom talking about 'wars of national liberation,' the old distinction between 'civil war' and 'international war' has lost much of its meaning."¹⁶ In the framework of imperial Russian history this meaning was lost centuries ago.

The alternative is not war, but the development of a relentless spirit of revolution against Russian imperial rule and for the independence of the captive nations, both within the Soviet Union and the more recently acquired "satellite" nations. In fact, one of the most powerful deterrents against a global war is our firm support of all the

15. Khrushchev, N. S., *For New Victories for the World Communist Movement*, address, Moscow, January 6, 1961.

16. Johnson, Lyndon B., *Text of Address at Baylor University*, Waco, Texas, May 29, 1965.

captive nations. More than anything else in the paramilitary field it secures the permanent insecurity of both Moscow and Peking.

We can best engender this spirit of revolt against Red tyranny by continually rededicating ourselves to the great traditions that have made us a powerful nation of free men. However incomplete may be our achievement of ideal freedom, nevertheless we will stand before the world—and particularly before the captive world—as an eloquent example of freedom and its rewards.

When we stand on this foundation and resolve it shall not be undermined, we can in all truth and consistency reaffirm our national tradition that all the peoples of the world have the God-given right to determine their own destiny, free of external coercion or interference. And inherent in this tradition is the logical extension that every individual has the basic right freely to choose his own way of life, without dictation from coercive government.

This inspiration, example, actionism, and goal will always remain our major contribution to the freedom of other peoples, and whatever else we do for them should be done within and as an expression of these principles.

Peaceful coexistence, a term first used by the wily Lenin in relation to the occupied non-Russian nations, is a Kremlin cold war propaganda prop with great slogan value, because it appeals to our yearning for peace. But since the phrase properly embraces a free and liberal exchange of cultures, ideas, and information, it is impossible of true realization. The Iron Curtain cannot be lifted without endangering the survival of the Soviet Russian totalitarian empire. And that is all the Kremlin is interested in preserving and expanding.

It is instructive to observe that Moscow attempts no defense of its brazen colonialism, but instead shifts the spotlight from itself to others by shamelessly demanding,

as it did in December, 1960, that the United Nations call for an end to colonialism—this from a power that holds over two dozen nations in direct, ironbound captivity.

Before we survey these weaknesses and vulnerabilities, a healthy glance at the multi-national composition of the USSR is in order. The total population of the USSR today is estimated at about 235 million. The rounded estimates in the breakdown given here are partly based on the 1959 USSR census and, as extensively explained in a quoted official study, conservatively extrapolated to 1965.¹⁷ As everything else issued by Moscow, this census has to be properly interpreted and discounted accordingly. From a political viewpoint alone—though this is not the only criterion—one can hardly expect the cold warriors in Moscow to issue population figures portraying the Russian nation as a minority nation in the complex of the USSR. However, the fact is that as the minority New Class controls and rules that nation, so the Russian minority dominates the Soviet Union, albeit with many Russianized non-Russians doing some political fronting.

Population Figures
Major National Entities in USSR (1965)
(In Millions)

	Russians		110
	NON-RUSSIANS		120
Estonia	1.5	Idel-Ural	15.0
Latvia	2.0	Georgia	4.5
Lithuania	3.0	Armenia	2.5
Byelorussia	10.0	Azerbaijan	4.0
Ukraine	45.0	Turkestan	17.0
Cossackia	10.0	Others	5.5

¹⁷. *Nations, Peoples, and Countries in the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 29-41

This comes from a centrally controlled international conspiracy that plots the subjugation of still more nations, while the Free World, since the end of World War II has added to its rolls over thirty-five former colonies, protectorates, and other dependent areas—with a total population of 800 million people—most of them helped to national independence by the Western powers upon whom they had been previously dependent.

Thus, as the Western nations abandon colonialism, Soviet Russian imperialism retains all of its captives and hungers for more. This incongruous situation will continue as long as the basic lacunae in American thought about Russia persist.

When the world realizes—as it must for its salvation—the colossal hypocrisy that shields Moscow's malevolent ambitions, then we may hope for an end to the terror that bestrides this little star on which we live. This necessary realization must extend, however, to Soviet Russia's prime weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Chapter VIII
SOVIET RUSSIAN WEAKNESSES AND
VULNERABILITIES

“La foiblesse de l'ennemi fait notre propre
force”

—French Proverb

All that has been discussed so far enters as vital data and judgment into the structure of assessing Soviet Russian weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Our discussion here represents a higher plateau of thought and proposed action. The critical importance and value of this discussion to our national security should be obvious. A rounded and secure view of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses is clearly necessary and indispensable. It is on this plateau that the remaining chapters are founded, leading to the final discussion of our foreign policy. One of our guides throughout is the spirit of the quotation above: “The weakness of the enemy forms a part of our own strength.” Common sense would dictate that we enhance this form of strength.

STRENGTH-WEAKNESS-VULNERABILITY FORMULA (SWV)

In analyzing the Soviet Russian colossus it is necessary to distinguish, at the outset, between weakness and vulnerability. The two are not identical and should not be confused. A weakness is a condition of defect and impairment which does not in itself constitute a vulnerability. For it

to develop into this state requires an active external agent, a stimulus seeking to take advantage of the condition. No doubt there are many deep and open weaknesses in the totalitarian Soviet Russian Empire, but so long as they remain untapped—indeed, in many critical instances unnoticed and even ignored—they cannot by logical definition be deemed vulnerabilities. Thus, in terms of a working formula of thought, policies of patched-up containment, evolution, and wishful thinking on the coming break-up of the so-called Communist bloc, serve only to guarantee the inconvertibility of imperial Soviet Russian weaknesses into vulnerabilities. The active external agent, the powerful stimulus or catalyst, is lacking.

There is little difficulty in taking an item-by-item inventory of weaknesses in the Soviet Union and enumerating them in the ideologic, political, economic, sociologic, military, and other spheres of this substrate empire. Essentially, this bookkeeping approach would be meaningless, devoid of perspective and weighted proportion and virtually useless for pragmatic objectives in our struggle for survival. By far the more effective and meaningful way is to rank the paramount points of weakness and possible vulnerability in some order of logical importance, revealing the main and crucial spots of each in a particular critical area.

What results from this realistic approach is the strength-weakness-vulnerability formula. According to this formula, the points of Soviet Russian strength increase in some direct proportion to our failure to convert its weaknesses into vulnerabilities, and can substantially decrease in inverse proportion to our success in staging such conversions. Truly, the prodigious irony of the current situation is the fact that beneath the surface of most Soviet

Russian accomplishments and points of strength rest their most profound weaknesses.

As will be shown by concrete fact and experience rather than by dangling theory or speculation, it is my aim here to emphasize one area of strength and also actual weakness over others. This is not because of any special attraction to this area. Rather, it is because this most critical area still is quite vague and unfamiliar to most of us. It is also because in history, logic, and strategy the area of totalitarian Soviet Russian domination and influence over the two dozen captive non-Russian nations still is the primary battleground between the forces of freedom and totalitarian imperialism. The areas of Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America are only secondary and tertiary battlegrounds of the enemy's choosing. Further plans and expenditures to mend the fences of freedom in these areas are necessary, but they are also, in the context of the Cold War, expressions of inadequacy under a shortsighted policy of patched-up containment.

To assess with meaning and a ruling sense of proportion the strength and real weaknesses of imperialist Soviet Russia, it is indispensable for us to bear constantly in mind the permanent cold war context. Outside of this existential context, predicated by the backward political institutions of Russia itself, the accomplishments and weaknesses of Moscow fall short of significant meaning. As some of us have taught for over a decade, we should consciously recognize that, given our own military build-up, the future will not be one of any global military holocaust involving the insecure forces of Moscow. Instead, it will be one of more or less intense cold war activity, whereby the Russian totalitarians will seek in the best tradition of Russian empire-building to frustrate and sap the will and determi-

nation of their targeted victims. This applies even more to Red China, which, contrary to popular opinion, is less given to adventures such as the Russian one in Cuba.

Looking back over the past twenty years, one would be justified in writing a book on our foreign policy under the title "From Air Supremacy and Atomic Monopoly to Non-Victory." This is not a pretty title, but neither is our sad record of losing the peace and also parts of the Free World, piece by piece, twice in this century. Rarely in the history of mankind has a country spent so much in life and treasure for peace and freedom, and yet has lost so much in so little time, than our nation since World War II. Policies have their results and consequences, and ours have spelled increasing failure to halt the enemy, not to speak of defeating him. There is not only no indication of any necessary substantial change in our policy today, but also no evidence of a complete grasp of Russian cold war activity.

When we focus our attention on the major strengths and also weaknesses of the Soviet Union and Moscow's extended empire, let us again remind ourselves of the real "ifs" of history as well as the "whens." If President Wilson had an accurate knowledge and understanding of the Tsarist Russian Empire, there can be no doubt that he would have listened to the French and applied the basic principle of national self-determination to all the non-Russian nations in that empire. The mythology of Communism and the reality of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism would surely have been but brief episodes in contemporary history. If President Roosevelt had understood the make-up of the Soviet Russian Empire under the legalistic disguise of the USSR, there can also be no doubt that he would have utilized our overwhelming power to place Moscow under increasing pressures of freedom. Instead,

duped by Moscow's artful propaganda and diplomacy, he acquiesced to the power-politic thought of dividing the world into spheres of influence. As the files of Cardinal Spellman show: "China gets the Far East; the United States, the Pacific; Britain and Russia, Europe and Africa. But as Britain has predominantly colonial interests, it might be assumed that Russia will predominate in Europe." ¹

And, as will be shown, our operational understanding of Moscow's colonial empire and its effective techniques have not improved much since. This situation is certainly a source of tremendous comfort and encouragement to Moscow and its polyglot satraps. It indicates to them that if they can largely realize their various economic plans, if they can improve and expand their military hardware, if for propaganda and other reasons they can continue their spectacular explorations into space, they will enjoy even greater successes in the Cold War with the diverse instruments and resources produced in these fields. Through these means and more they will, in time, expand their empire, whether it will be in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, or Latin America, and at the same time avoid any hot global conflict. After all, lest we forget, part of their totalitarian empire lies only ninety miles from our southern border.

Cuba is an actual example. But for a possible example, if, as a result of Russian-supported subversion and agitation, Iran should fall under the process of a gradual overtake, what really could we do? Would we send SAC or the marines to Iran? Would we employ nuclear weapons? In short, with all our armaments and economic handouts, are we not neutralized on the world scale by the special type

1. "The Cardinal Spellman Story," *Look* magazine, Vol. 26, No. 6, March 13, 1962.

of cold war activity Moscow—not to mention Red China—wages? The sudden discovery of the uses of guerrilla warfare—fifteen years after many of us advocated it in connection with the captive nations—is on this scale an open invitation to miniature Koreas or Vietnams along the broad front of the Free World.

We cannot too often stress the fact that the techniques of Russian cold war activity are in form and substance old techniques. They are scarcely the creation of self-designated Communists. They are in essence the techniques by which Russian imperio-colonialists were able to build up an unprecedented empire in the past, from Ivan the Terrible down to 1917, and the present empire is substantially a continuation and expansion of the past one. As then, so now, they skillfully utilize deceptive ideologies to mask themselves and their colonialist movements; as then, so now, they employ Potemkin Village tactics, whether in the military field, the economic, diplomatic, or even athletic field, to disarray, confuse, and frighten their targeted victims; as then, so now, they make full use of conspiratorial, infiltrative, subversive, and blackmail methods. These techniques of incessant cold war aggression are plainly not the products of irrelevant Marxism or of Pavlovian psychology. They are the fashioned tools of centuries of cumulative experience in successful empire-building.

The real decision before this nation is not whether to push or not to push into space, to disarm or not to disarm, to negotiate or not to negotiate, to trade or not to trade with the Red Empire. Instead, the basic and real decision is whether to meet or not to meet the full cold war challenge of colonialist Moscow. Once we make this decision, all other subordinate decisions will fall into place. When and if the real decision is placed before the nation and we should resolve seriously to engage the enemy in the

total context of the Cold War, it would not and could not be a matter of fighting this war only on our side of the fifty-yard line. In any league the best defense is the offense, and it should be obvious that the defense of freedom is being battered from Viet Nam to Cuba, because our mere defensive and reactive posture is not the best defense. And this is held in full knowledge of all the fears crystallized by such nominal symbols, as "escalation," "confrontation," and "nuclear co-destruction"—repeated symbols which are enough to paralyze the will of any nation.

Where, then, do Soviet Russian achievements and correlative weaknesses enter into this analytic framework? Quite clearly, a cold war offensive would not permit Moscow's imperialism—and to a lesser extent the Red Chinese one—to nibble away at us, for such an offensive necessitates the conversion of well-known weaknesses in the enemy's empire into vulnerabilities, and the systematic exploitation of these vulnerabilities toward his eventual destruction. We would have to seize upon these formed vulnerabilities with the same caution, skill, and courage as they do in the Free World, this despite the overhanging presence of thermonuclear weapons. Put another way, we must study the weaknesses and the associated achievements of the avowed enemy to convert them into vulnerabilities which can be exploited for our national self-preservation and the survival of freedom. A further manifest irony of our present situation is that we would not think twice about attending to this necessity if we were suddenly catapulted into a hot global war, but in the more insidious Cold War of our time this necessity is being virtually overlooked. Instead, some seem to content themselves with philosophical exhortations about the spreading disease of freedom and the human penchant for diversity.

FIVE AREAS FOR RATIONAL ANALYSIS

There are five major areas for our analysis: (1) the ideologico-propaganda; (2) the empire; (3) the so-called economic race; (4) the military-space field; and (5) the party apparatus. Applying to each our working formula of strength-weakness-vulnerability, let us consider the first, the ideologico-propaganda. The strength of Moscow's ideologico-propaganda drive is admitted as being superior to ours by most students of the subject. Moscow's tremendous feat in this all-encompassing area is the sustained impression and opinion generated in too many parts of the Free World that a new way of life, a new philosophy, and new methods and operations of social order are represented by the Soviet Union and other sectors of Moscow's empire. The way of life is socialism in transition to Communism; the philosophy is Marxism-Leninism with unspecified revisions now and then; and the new methods and operations are ostensibly the products of a planned economy. Our personalist way of life, our democratic philosophy, and our capitalist methods and operations stand in contradiction to those essentials of so-called Soviet society.

With his grandiloquent and constant babble Khrushchev enlarged this ideologico-propaganda achievement by convincing many unsuspecting Americans and others that the momentous contest is between two social systems—socialism versus capitalism—in the atmosphere of peaceful co-existence. We are supposed to be in an economic and technologic race, the outcome of which is predestined by Moscow's interpretation of history. As in the case of Hitler and his 1,000 years of the New Order, the Russian totalitarians see themselves riding the wave of the future.

To prevent this, we spend considerable time, capital,

and energy in the simple belief that we are fighting international Communism, or, at best Communist imperialism. Clouding up the situation further is the notion that our adversary is "the Soviets," that is, councils of workers and peasants. No one will deny that to confuse, deceive, and distract one's chosen opponent is a basic accomplishment in and of itself. As concerns the nature of the struggle and its manifold ramifications, the Russian totalitarians have succeeded in this with us. In the past Russian tyrants cloaked their totalitarian rule and imperialist conquests with equally fictitious ideologies of super-religious Orthodoxy and racist Pan-Slavism. Today it is millenarian Communism, interspersed at times with these old ideologies in what suits the occasion.

We have uncritically accepted all this, and inadvertently impute philosophic respectability and dignity to what is essentially not the ideology, but the mythology of Communism. The pendulumic swings of attitude in the United States, viewing the Russians as four-footers at one time and eleven-footers at another, indicate both our uncertainty of knowledge and our susceptibility to Moscow's manipulation of half or isolated truths. On the one hand, we deprecate Moscow's activities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as "mere propaganda" while, on the other hand, we complain that our story is not reaching the university students and the peoples of these areas. We have still to appreciate the central importance and significance of propaganda in the Cold War. The heirs of Pushkin, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and other practical psychologists, have remarkably developed this basic art, to make a relatively backward state with really inferior resources appear as a prime contender to the slumbering American giant, to make the worst empire of its kind appear as the

great proponent of national liberation and independence, and to move the minds of millions throughout the world in the belief that all this is so.

However, the weaknesses of Moscow's ideologico-propaganda are deep and fundamental. These have been disclosed time and time again by experience and events, not by theory or speculation. Let us recount a few of these weaknesses. After twenty years of so-called indoctrination, millions of Ukrainians, Georgians, Russians, and others deserted colonialist Moscow in World War II; after ten years of heavy propaganda, Hungarian students and workers staged the 1956 revolution, shouting, "Rusky, go home"; after years of enslavement in the Vorkuta, Karaganda, and other labor correction camps, inmates of all different nations struck for freedom. These outstanding examples are only a few of the hundreds proving the utter bankruptcy of what we uncritically call Communist ideology. Without iron curtains, walls, and the oppressive apparatus of totalitarian rule this existential bankruptcy would come into full bloom, the Hitlerian totalitarian and imperialist nature of so-called Communism would be clear to all, and this Trojan horse of thought and weapon of deception, with no basic relevancy to nineteenth century Marxism, would become transparent even to the newly independent nations and peoples who know little about Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.²

Nevertheless, Moscow continues to capitalize on this massive deception, chiefly because of our failure to develop these weaknesses into critical vulnerabilities. As we shall see later, such development requires a realization of the central importance of propaganda—a forceful, well-planned propaganda of truth and fact—and also a recog-

2. See Possony, Stefan T., "Communist Vulnerabilities," *Report*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1961, pp. 95-107.

nition of the real nature of the threat stemming from Eastern Europe. Our Voice of America is but a pygmy compared to Moscow's communications media. To make matters worse, the policies of the United States Information Agency run counter to the task of developing vulnerabilities in the USSR. For example, by virtue of Congressional hearings in 1958, the USIA was stopped in its attempt to curtail and eliminate Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Georgian, and other non-Russian broadcasts to the USSR.³ It sought to have the captive non-Russian peoples listen to the language of their Moscow captor.

The opportunities for demolishing the image Moscow casts of its empire are many. For one, we can easily show the theoretic Russian perversion of Marxism and the vacuity of so-called Communist ideology. Points on economic determinism, the technocratic elite in the USSR, the appeal to underdeveloped areas in the name of socialism, surplus value and economic and colonialist exploitation in the Soviet Union, state versus society, are only a few to establish the Russian mythology of Communism. As one writer puts it: "Bolshevism evidently stems from the traditional messianic and universalist outlook of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, which fastened upon Marxism as an instrument of its own will to 'change the world.'" ⁴ The fact is that Soviet Russian mythology is a Comtean impulse to reorganize as much as possible the societies of other nations in the image of backward and barbarian Russian institutions.⁵ The combination of op-

3. *Review of U.S. Information Agency*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., September-October, 1958, pp. 102-122.

4. Lichtheim, George, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

5. Dobriansky, Lev E., *Veblenism: A New Critique*, Washington, D.C., 1957, pp. 85-86.

pressive institutions and modern technology, the latter largely the creation of the West, has produced a mythology which in every fundamental respect is Hitlerian totalitarianism. Economic rearrangements in the empire, even with emphasis on profits, would not contradict this statement.

If we are to win the Cold War—a thought many Americans have come to abhor—we must recognize and constantly stress the real threat which Soviet Russian mythology conceals. And this is the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist system of totalitarian rule. Make no mistake about this. This is not a matter of academic theorization and speculation. As the preceding chapters have in part shown, it has been successfully tested and, indeed, more tests are in order so that this fundamental truth would be ingrained in the minds of our people and the people of the world. It is scarcely comforting to learn, alas, that we are fighting against a mythology, but it is reassuring to know that along with all the captive nations in Moscow's empire we have pierced through the mythological facade of Communism to the real enemy, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. Red Chinese imperio-colonialism is also quite real, but not nearly as powerful.

Our most powerful weapon against this last remaining empire in the world is the ideology, the system of ideas and truths, embodied in our own Declaration of Independence. In the early 50's we called for a universalization of the Declaration, aimed particularly at the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union.⁶ The evidence of the past decade and more has proved the soundness of this position. However, when we find Secretary of State Rusk speculating that Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia are tra-

6. "Universalized Declaration of Independence: America's New World Revolution," *Congressional Record*, February 18, 1953, pp. A781-82.

ditional parts of the Soviet Union—meaning, in effect, that we should not disturb Moscow's eminent domain over these captive areas—we cannot but wonder about the understanding and vision of some of our leaders.⁷ We shall pursue this illuminating story later. It is evident that such confusion of thought inhibits us from converting a major weakness into a critical vulnerability. It is such a cross-purpose operation that causes men like Madariaga to say, "This is a war of ideas, brains, and heart. The West's foreign policy is passive and flaccid. It will never get an understanding with Russia. How about Russian imperialism? It's the worst imperialism the world has ever known."⁸

MOSCOW'S EXPANDED EMPIRE

Well, how about Russian imperialism? Let us take another look at it. The second general area of Moscow's obvious strength is its expanded empire. Contrary to much wishful thinking about Red China and Albania, about "the slow fragmentation of the Communist bloc," the Soviet Russian Empire continues to consolidate itself in substantial terms of economic integration, military accretion, and an expedient exploitation of nationalist forces. One of Moscow's chief goals in recent years has been to gain Western acquiescence to the permanence of its present empire, and the increasing indifference in some of our official quarters toward the captive nations has helped in this.

In the chapter on historical outlines we saw that, since

7. "State Proves the Necessity of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations," *Congressional Record*, March 7, 1962, p. 3265.

8. de Madariaga, Salvador, *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., May 26, 1961.

its accidental inception in 1917, Soviet Russia has reduced to captivity one non-Russian nation after another. We also observed that the history of Soviet Russian conquest began with most of the nations now held in bondage within the Soviet Union itself—White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Turkestan, and others—and that this process, either directly or indirectly, has continued in South Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and elsewhere. The most significant development in all areas of the empire has been the emphasis the Russians have placed on the old formula, “national in form, socialist in content.” To attract the instinctive nationalist forces in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, North Korea, etc. to the global ambitions of Moscow, the Russian totalitarians have been accommodating themselves to the stress of national heroes and events of the past. In this they hope today to prove that the future of these captive nations rests with them rather than with “the imperialist powers” of the West. Moscow exploits past and present national grievances to its own advantage, constantly telling Poles and Ukrainians, for example, about the German atrocities of the past and constantly reminding Azerbaijani and Armenians about their claims against Iran and Turkey, respectively.

Moscow plays every angle to strengthen its hold on the empire, on both the captives within the Soviet Union and on captives outside it. Feelings of Pan-Slavism, religious Orthodoxy, national pride, past hatreds, and national uncertainty toward the future are exploited. Disagreement with Red China and Albania is more of a proof of this overall tendency of expedient accommodation than of any basic disintegrative tendency. Whether in Georgia or Azerbaijan, Ukraine or Turkestan, Moscow often has tried

to persuade the non-Russian nationals there that they are "independent."

Those who now preach that the Soviet Russian Empire is showing signs of disintegration, that the future is with us, that all that is required is a military build-up and trade with this empire, are gravely misleading the citizens of this country. There is no substantial evidence of this. In fact, all the important and basic evidence of increasing empire strength points the other way. Of course, Moscow has its problems. Who hasn't? It had even graver problems at Stalin's death and during the Hungarian Revolution, but it nonetheless continued to build up its composite power.

Yet beneath the surface of this imperial power and strength lies the most profound weakness of the Soviet Union and of the entire structure of Moscow's imperio-colonialist rule. This weakness is the immense, latent power of genuine patriotic nationalism, both within and outside the Soviet Union. This weakness is so deep that despite his public disclaimers of Stalinist terrorism, Khrushchev deemed it necessary to have two Ukrainian nationalist leaders in exile murdered. It is this power of patriotic nationalism which is our strongest weapon against Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism; it certainly is not the superficial disagreements between Communist Party satraps and the prime Russian power.

Despite the unmistakable clues given by Moscow itself, we have yet to translate this fundamental weakness into a vulnerability. As we have seen, the most important and conclusive test has been Moscow's haunting fear of any implementation of the Captive Nations Week Resolution. Remember, our Presidents and other leaders had spoken in behalf of some of the captive nations before 1959, but

this produced no sensitive reaction from Moscow. It was only when Congress had included all the captive nations, the majority of them in the Soviet Union, that the Russian totalitarians and their Communist Party satraps exploded. And they have been erupting over this ever since, because they know, if we do not, the disastrous effects that a methodic implementation of this resolution would have on their world-wide propaganda operations and on the nations within their empire. Several means of implementation will be considered in later chapters.

Few Americans are aware of the vicious denunciations made by Moscow and others against the 1965 Captive Nations Week. Here are some choice examples: Mikhail Suslov, chief Russian ideologist and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, declaimed, "Especially disgusting in the villainous demagogy of the imperialist chieftains of the United States. Each year they organize the so-called captive nations week, hypocritically pretending to be defenders of nations that have escaped from their yoke." ⁹ The Polish Communist Party daily newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, painted the Week as an "annual, pitiful undertaking." ¹⁰ A Ukrainian daily viewed the Week as a period of "hypocritical speeches" and "propagandistic distortions." ¹¹

POLITICO-ECONOMIC CHARADES

Turning now to the economic area, it should be readily recognized that for cold war objectives the empire economy of the Soviet Union is strong, secure, and increas-

9. *Tiesa*, Vilnius, July 18, 1965.

10. *German News*, Munich, September, 1965.

11. *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, July 25, 1965.

ingly threatening. This and other aspects will be described in detail in the next chapter. However, to fill in our general picture here, let us scan some of the fundamental economic elements of Soviet Russian strength-weakness-vulnerability.

First, the usual comparisons about their surpassing us in this or that are of barren meaning, a source of much economic illusion. The USSR economy is and always has been a war economy in essence. With a gross imperial product of only about forty-five percent of our GNP, with an industrial output of about fifty-five percent of ours and requiring over twenty percent more labor, with an agricultural output below ours by about one-third and requiring fifty percent of their labor force as against ten percent of ours, with available goods and services only thirty-three percent of ours and on a per capita basis only twenty-five percent of ours, and with the inevitable problems of growth yet to be fully experienced by it, Moscow has a long way to go to match our economy. However, being a totalitarian and essentially a war economy, the USSR poses an increasing threat as 12 to 20 billion dollars of additional output becomes annually available to it for cold and hot war purposes.

Second, weaknesses in this economy are many, but most fundamental are the disparities of real income and status between the New Class of the ruling elite and party functionaries and the underlying population. There is also rampant economic colonialism to which the captive non-Russian peoples are subjected. In combination with other weaknesses, these can be transformed into vulnerabilities as we concentrate on the Russian people and the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. Such concentration, by way of focusing world-wide attention and

opinion on these two major economic weaknesses, would provide important political leverage to the liberal Russian and nationalist non-Russian forces within the USSR.

Perhaps even clearer and more distinct SWV aspects appear in the military-space field. The general and specific strengths of the USSR in this area are the consummate result of top priority allocation in this war economy. Matching our total military expenditures in dollar volume, over twenty percent of the gross product in the USSR goes to military pursuits. Every weapon, every means from ICBM's to pistols, receives high qualitative and quantitative development. In space exploration, tremendously expensive in itself, Moscow made an early start under the rule of inordinate concentration. In all these areas the technological achievements are basically and almost entirely Western. They have little or nothing to do with so-called socialist economy or Communist pretension. Their further development presents, nevertheless, certain dangers, particularly in significant breakthroughs capable of magnifying the military power of the imperio-colonialist tyrant.

Behind the military technocracy in the USSR lie deep weaknesses which no amount of nuclear blackmail or military display can hide. Before World War I the Russian Tsar virtually terrorized the capitals of Western Europe with the threat of the great Russian "steamroller," the vast imperial forces of the Russian Empire. Today, following in the paved traditions of Russian cold war diplomacy, Moscow threatens us and the world with "global missiles." It has been so effective in propagandizing the empire's military and space feats that in addition to naive and pacifist groups doing work for the Russian imperio-colonialists in the free nations, even our own leaders invoke, from time to time, the pangs of nuclearitis as an excuse for

the absence of a well-defined and developed cold war policy.¹²

However, the innovation of present military-space technology in no way alters the persistent weaknesses in the armed services of the USSR. Complete and striking military power is not just a conglomeration of new weapons. The ultimate weapon still is man and his morale, loyalties and will. No one is more aware than Moscow of the overriding fact that, despite changing military technology, in all three major wars in this century the motley and multi-national forces of the Russian Empire, whether Tsarist or Soviet, disintegrated early. As was indicated before, in the Russo-Japanese War and the two World Wars, political factors associated with the freedom of the Russian people and the independence of the non-Russian nations accounted for this record. About forty-three percent of the USSR's armed forces is non-Russian, and, despite the fact that the Constitution of the USSR calls for separate Republic war ministries, troops are carefully intermixed and dispersed.

Our conversion of this vital weakness into a vulnerability rests, obviously, on a broader program directed at the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. Along with this is required a full and superior development of all our arms, nuclear and conventional. We committed a grave error in accepting a nuclear test ban, and disarmament in the realistic context of the Cold War is a political myth. The only sure and safe way to preserve the gray peace and to move forward toward cold war victory is by our attaining unquestioned superiority along the entire spectrum of military technology and weaponry, together with a dispersion of nuclear weaponry to our most trusted

12. "Text of President's News Conference," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., February 14, 1962.

allies. Our economy can flexibly accommodate this; the empire economy of the USSR cannot. In space, with dozens of our earth satellites as against a handful of theirs, we already enjoy an overall superiority. As in so many other respects, the Russians potemkinize their firsts and demonstrate in time their lack of depth. There is no common sense reason why we or the Free World should cooperate and share our space discoveries with the Russian totalitarians. Whether we like it or not, even space is not excludable from the Russian cold war matrix.

The final major area for SWV analysis is the Communist Party. Not unlike the Nazi Party under Hitler, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the cohesive agent of totalitarian Soviet Russian strength. There are some twelve million in the Party today, but this figure is misleading. Predominantly Russian, the Party consists of members with families, relatives, and associates who, though not members, share both material and spiritual interests in the strength and power of the Party. And these number well over thirty-five million. The Party, thus, is the strong vehicle for totalitarian rule in the empire and for subversive conspiracy beyond it.

However, the Party is not without weaknesses that, along with others, can be developed into fatal vulnerabilities. The perennial problem of succession, intra-party feuding, the pressures of national parties in Ukraine, Georgia, and elsewhere, and infiltration of party councils and machinery lend themselves to such a development. Here, as elsewhere, our offensive in the Cold War would necessarily have to be organic, composite, and totalistic. Pursuing one weakness as against others would be both foolish and wasteful. But it will be noted that involved in each of these major weaknesses is the basic cross-sectional problem of the captive non-Russian nations in the

USSR. The problem exists also in other sources of weakness and vulnerability, as, for example, organized religion.¹³ These sources can be fitted into any of the respective five categories established here.

These, then, are the facts. We are not dealing with academic theories and speculations inscribed in some newly written book. It was painful for me, as indeed to others, to see how thoroughly incapable Vice-President Nixon was, in his encounter on these problems with Khrushchev in July, 1959. It is equally painful to observe how, today, we continue to miss our opportunities for eventual cold war victory. Nevertheless, there is not the slightest doubt that with more shock treatments and an aroused citizenry, the dominant facts of international life and these predominant weaknesses in the Soviet Russian Empire will lead us to the pursuit of an inescapable policy of emancipation, and a cold war strategy designed for decisive victory. All the elements, all the outlines for such a policy and strategy are available to us. Once again, all that is necessary is will, courage, and an understanding of the Soviet Russian Empire, which, after all, is our prime foe and the world's cancer.

Now for a closer look at one of these sources of weakness—the economic, where dubious symbols of “socialist victory” were raised in meat, butter, and milk.

13. See Galter, Albert, *The Red Book of the Persecuted Church*, Westminster, Md., 1957.

Chapter IX
ECONOMIC STRESSES AND PAINS IN
MOSCOW'S EMPIRE

“Supreme excellence consists in breaking
the enemy’s resistance without fighting”
—Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu, an immortal Chinese strategist in his own right, provided the words that express best the nature of both Red Chinese and Soviet Russian political warfare. He set forth an ideal of behavior by which we should be guided in the interest of our own survival. Whether we will, only time will tell.

Each of the sources of Soviet Russian weakness and vulnerability can be developed in minute factual detail. The conclusions would be no different, but the additional facts might be novel to some. They would simply augment the array of factual material put forth in the chapters of this book. Within the purview of this work it is possible only to develop the economic area more intensively. Since so much significance and value have been assigned to this basic subject, we should dwell on it a bit more, especially in view of the recurring illusion that the USSR and some other Red states are going “capitalist.”

To begin with, there are absolutely no grounds for American complacency about the expanding economic base of imperialist Russian totalitarianism, this despite its agricultural and other difficulties. To some this may

seem to be an extreme and perhaps an alarmist statement, particularly in the light of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities summarized in the preceding chapter. But the overall fact is that in the context of present and foreseeable conditions, the increase of economic power and resources in the Soviet Union is a serious growing threat to the security interests of the United States and the Free World. By virtue of a totalitarian disposition of resources, this threat becomes magnified even in the face of any accelerated economic growth in the Free World. Those who smugly display an indifference to this threat are usually not only unfamiliar with the total economic picture of the Soviet Union, not to mention all of Eastern Europe, but also are incapable of relating the economic data to the permanent cold war being waged by Moscow. As a matter of fact, it would amaze them to learn that the danger on economic grounds had existed even before the appearance of the hysteria-inducing *sputniks*.

For one to maintain this position does not mean placing any credence in the blustering propaganda issuing from the twisted lips of Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and the lesser minions. Their propaganda on the growing superiority of the "Soviet economy" over that of the United States, on the vibrancy of their economic system as against the alleged senility of Western capitalism, on the winning competitive strength of socialism over capitalism, indeed on their progress toward Communism itself, can safely and without serious rational question be relegated to the department of Potemkin Village economics. As all other matters, economic data are subject to the distortions and exaggerations of Moscow's propaganda, which still serves as the prime vehicle for the Russian cold war enterprise. Its use of such data is not

unlike that of its progress in missiles, calculated to instill fear, sow doubt, spread confusion, and, above all, to mold a respectable impression among the nations and peoples in the Free World of a monolithic, invulnerable, and invincible power. The USSR itself has never been a monolith, but the combination of Moscow's propaganda and the West's egregious misconception of the USSR has made it appear so.

Yet, stating all this in no way contradicts our initial point on the senselessness of remaining complacent toward the type of economic achievement realized so far by colonialist Moscow. In this respect, the foremost problem facing us is that of carefully separating the propaganda chaff from the true grain of economic reality. Its solution involves not only a balanced handling of the economic data on the Soviet Union, but also a scrupulous observance of certain distinctions grounded in an historico-political framework of analysis. Once having accomplished this we shall find ourselves in analytic position to assess validly the economic achievements of imperialist Russia and to take seriously the growing economic power of its empire. This realization will in turn necessitate a systematic search for economic weaknesses which can be feasibly converted into active vulnerabilities conducing to our favor in this sealed struggle. A valuable by-product of this kind of methodical investigation would be the vastly stronger position we could assume in countering Moscow's propaganda in the sphere of economic ideology, particularly among the underdeveloped nations.

Consequently, for our purposes here it is necessary to follow closely the above line of analysis. It is unfortunate, in a way, that most of our economic analyses of the USSR are pursued in a vacuum of semi-abstractionist

thought.¹ This ignores the most fundamental historical and political developments surrounding Moscow's domination over the captive nations and peoples. From a formal point of view this somewhat uncritical, abstractionist approach has of course certain advantages; from a policy-making viewpoint it is most misleading, especially for the purpose of utilizing opportunities of cold war advantage as provided by the enemy's economic weaknesses.

ECONOMIC ESSENTIALS OF THE USSR

The usual definitional assumption that the economic structure in the Soviet Union is a national one like ours is a fundamental error. Comparisons built on the basis of this assumption lead to a distorted economic picture which benefits the aims of Russian propaganda and also conceals certain intrinsic weaknesses in this structure. For the present, however, we shall view the economy in the USSR as an entitative object, and any comparisons drawn between it and our economy will be made with this major reservation.

Some economists refer to the USSR economy as a "command economy," essentially a centrally directed economy with the highest priorities determined by political objectives. With the same thought in mind, it is more precise to call it a war economy, one which has continually functioned to meet the cold war requirements of totalitarian Russian imperialism. As we saw earlier, the cold war phenomenon did not originate in 1947, when most Americans first became aware of its existence. In

1. E.g., Spulber, Nicolas, *The Soviet Economy*, New York, 1962, p. 311; Nove, Alec, *The Soviet Economy*, New York, 1961; Katkoff, Vladimir, *Soviet Economy 1940-1965*, Baltimore, Md., 1961.

plain fact, other nations and peoples had been targets of it even before Soviet Russia salvaged the territorial base of the old Russian Empire and built the legalistic facade known as the Soviet Union. It is no wonder that for almost fifty years the standard of living of the different nations and peoples in the USSR has lagged far behind that of the smaller European countries, to say nothing of the larger ones. Increases in industrial capacity and production over these years have not redounded in the form of consumer goods dividends to the underlying population. Unlike that of the United States, the USSR economy has been a cold war economy where consumer interests possess no directive force in its orientation. Further concessions made to the consumer under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime will not alter substantially the top priorities of military and space allocations.

This last point cannot be too strongly emphasized. By the very nature of things—chiefly the imperio-colonial structure of the USSR—the top priorities of military prowess, space breakthroughs, and heavy goods advancement will be served by “profits incentive,” industrial and agricultural reorganization, and consumer market orientation. The growing illusion that these changes represent a capitalistic drift is another one of the outstanding myths we wish to live by.

In our period there has been much discussion about the economic benefits of Khrushchev's so-called liberalization program and the subsequent Kosygin incentive plan. Those impressed by them immediately point to the doubling of the house-building rate, added investments in food production, the reduction of hours of labor, greater job mobility, the institution of installment credit, some market determination of production, the profit mo-

tive, and increases in pensions and peasant incomes.² Some go even further to project these marginal concessions into a tendency of evolutionary development that by some magic will transform the Soviet Union into a more democratic, humane, and peaceful state, even perhaps a "capitalist" one. The bounds of human illusion are sometimes indefinable. Nonetheless, no one can deny that the extent to which these concessions are made, to that extent some consideration must be given to their marginal effects upon investments in heavy industry. To be sure, in absolute terms some diversion of scarce resources is involved. But to expect the Moscow regime to seriously sacrifice some of its global political requirements by any such major diversion of resources would be rather naive.

As shall be seen, the pressure for a higher standard of living in the USSR is an important factor with which Moscow is attempting to reckon by means of balanced calculation and pragmatic control. The pitifully low standard of living there has always been a sore and weak spot in Soviet Russian propaganda. It is true, as one writer puts it, "To Khrushchev and his colleagues, the concessions which have been made are part of the search for the most effective way of pursuing the aim of overtaking the West and winning the support of the uncommitted world."³ Yet, for Moscow's global cold war objectives, as well as for a correlative impact upon the underdeveloped countries, the emphasis is—and will indefinitely continue

2. For some data, see *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, Hearings, Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 292. Also see *The Many Crises of the Soviet Economy*, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 1964.

3. Nove, Alec, *Communist Economic Strategy*, National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., 1959, p. 8.

to be—on more product for expanded industrial capacity in a hectic rush for recorded “growth” and an ostensible proof of the type of system the underdeveloped areas should imitate and adopt. This emphasis will provide additional resources for Moscow’s world-wide cold war operations. The concessions, in addition to concealing somewhat the propaganda sore spot, are primarily purposed to function as a carrot dangling before an exploited donkey, in the hope that more intensified efforts might be exacted from the laboring populace. The so-called capitalist innovations are also aimed at enhancing productivity for even more successful cold war undertakings.

Viewing the forest rather than the trees, this is the only interpretation that can rationally be given to the available data. Moscow’s statistics, though somewhat more informative now than in the past, continue to be marked by fraudulent distortions. As other media of formed impressions, they are a tool of Moscow’s propaganda. Nevertheless, from them one can glean the salient economic directions of Soviet Russian totalitarianism as outlined above. Our official estimates place the Soviet GIP (gross imperial product) at about 50 percent of our GNP (gross national product) or roughly, in 1965, about \$335 billion. This is a liberal and disputable estimate; a lower GIP, under \$300 billion, is truer to fact.⁴ On the basis of analyzed directives of the scrambled Seven Year Plan the GIP was to rise to about 50 percent of our GNP by 1965 and to 55 percent by 1970. In the past decade the Soviet GIP ostensibly increased to an annual average rate of

4. *Current Economic Indicators for the USSR*, a Congressional Joint Economic Study (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June, 1965) estimated the 1963 USSR GIP at \$265 billion or 46 percent of the U.S. GNP (p. 1).

approximately 7 percent, roughly double the increase of the U.S. GNP. Its industrial growth was supposed to be higher, at about 9 percent. And assuming a U.S. industrial growth of $4\frac{1}{2}$ percent per annum, it was estimated that by 1970 Soviet industrial output would reach about 60 percent of ours.

Despite Moscow's boasts of operating at over 50 percent of our present annual gross product and despite our liberal official estimates of "about 50 percent,"⁵ it is reasonable to maintain that the present GIP of the USSR is approximately 45 percent of our GNP and Soviet industrial output about 55 percent of ours. In characteristic Potemkin Village economic display the cultural exhibits of the USSR have shown, by far, more of what Moscow would like to have than what it currently has or in this decade could have in depth and impressive volume. Moreover, from 1962 through 1965 the Seven Year Plan was in substantial rout and the rates of growth were about half of the projected rates.

Judging by these estimates and without even making the necessary basic definitional qualifications of the economic entities and the mix of goods compared, it would seem that there is not much cause for undue concern on our part. No doubt, estimations and guesstimations have their sparkling aspect of a numbers game in the field of USSR economics. Growth increases always imply some base level, and we know that the base of industry in the USSR still is a comparatively low one, regardless of the growth sustained. Qualitatively, Soviet industry is a good thirty years behind ours. Also, without raising the pertinent and rudimentary question of "growth for what?"

5. *USSR Falts in Economic Growth Race with the U.S.*, U.S. Department of State, September, 1965, p. 3.

equally spectacular examples of economic growth for the past decade can be found in West Germany, France, Japan, and the Republic of China.

Moreover, considering the relatively few commodities analyzed, the comparisons usually drawn between the USSR and the United States are on an inadequate statistical basis. The rich diversity and quality of goods produced here are conspicuously lacking in the Soviet Union. In terms of fundamental human values and the function of any economic system to serve personal ends efficiently and equitably, there is really no basis of comparison between our system and the totalitarian technocracy in the USSR.⁶ And when we are concerned with the question of vulnerabilities in the USSR, quantitative indicators of output, growth, and so-called economic progress are certainly not reliable indicators of the real power and strength of a contrived political body such as the Soviet Union. This is a most crucial point when an analysis of comparative power is made.

Admitting all this, our totalistic viewpoint cannot but stress the danger involved in the economic development of Russian technocratic totalitarianism. This composite viewpoint insists that the most basic economic factors and their relationships be constantly borne in mind. As shown by this writer and others, these factors are the volume of investment, the distribution of the additional resources, and the standard of living.⁷ For comparative worth the

6. See the very instructive article by a former Soviet Ukrainian economist, Konstantyn Kononenko, "New Plans of Moscow Attest to Failure, Not Success," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 3, September, 1959, pp. 226-240.

7. Discussion by Leon Herman, Hans Heymann, and Lev E. Dobriensky on "Soviet Russia's Seven Year Plan," *Congressional Record*, June 4, 1959, pp. 4747-49.

total amount of output is not as important as its peculiar distribution. In the recent, disintegrated Seven Year Plan, the total capital investment by 1965 was to amount to about 1,970 billion rubles (using the old ruble), or about 81 percent over the 1952-58 total. In 1959 capital investment in the Soviet Union about equaled U.S. industrial investment. What is significant, however, is the fact that the percentage distribution of investment by economic sector in the USSR was to remain the same as in the 1952-1958 period. About 43 percent of the total investment was destined for heavy industry as against only 3 percent for light industry, the rest being allocated to agriculture, transportation, and housing. The major direction continued to be one of rapidly expanding capacity, and herein lies the threat by virtue of the added resources that would accrue to Moscow's use in its global cold war operations.

Working on a new Five Year Plan for 1966-70, Moscow would have us forget the striking lessons of its recent Seven Year Plan. It is not our intention to analyze the Seven Year Plan here, but, despite subsequent plans, the problems suggested by it are essential to our understanding of the possible areas of Soviet Russian economic vulnerability. The plan itself was in part a cover-up for the failure of the Sixth Five Year Plan. As concerned the needs and wants of the underlying population it substantially repeated the promises of all previous plans, except for the carrot-dangling concessions noted earlier and which very likely will be broadened in the future. It promised an increase of about 40 percent in average real income, but this was largely predicated on a 70 percent increase in total agricultural output by 1965, an outcome that proved to be a complete illusion. Although consumer goods were increased in absolute amounts by

1965, the 3 percent allocation of investment in light industry indicated in itself the planned neglect of many consumer items even up to 1970. In 1958 the population in the Soviet Union had available to it only about one-third of the total goods and services consumed in the United States, and its per capita living standard stood at about one-fourth of ours. The total income of the Soviet populace has increased over that of 1928, but it is evident that the purchasing power of the average wage income—now about \$100 per month—has lagged noticeably behind. Moscow's propaganda on the 1970 goal of approaching U.S. living standards has been as brash and fatuous as was Khrushchev's television appearance in Washington at the close of his visit in 1959.

Over forty years of promises in material betterment for the population under Moscow rule are definitely an area of vulnerability. A new high-income class has emerged at the expense of the laboring population, whose efforts are exploited to advance the dubious glories of the ruling Russian state. Also, the adverse effects of any marked increase in general standards of living upon totalitarian socialist planning and enterprise are being adroitly precluded.

The inherent weakness in the technocratic totalitarian structure nevertheless exists. Khrushchev himself occasionally took public cognizance of it. "Comrades," he said to an audience in Czecho-Slovakia, "would it be bad if to a good theory of Marxian-Leninism we attach a piece of meat and a good piece of lard, along with a little milk; then even the most thick-headed, lazy good-for-nothing could learn Marxist-Leninist theory." Aside from the ideological trappings, Marxism has nothing to do with the operations of technocratic Russian totalitarianism. What is important is the essential fact that a heavy ex-

plotation by taxation—on the average, easily over 40 percent of every ruble value in a consumable good—exists to maintain Moscow's totalitarian structure and imperialist ambitions. Western propaganda has not sufficiently developed these aspects, especially among the underdeveloped countries, to justify calling this weakness a live vulnerability.

By dangling the carrot of consumer goods concessions, Moscow hopes to inspire an increase in the productivity of labor where sheer mechanization could not. In the past Seven Year Plan, as under preceding Five Year plans, such enhanced productivity was necessary to the realization of the USSR's production goals. The recent plan contemplated a per capita increase of about 47 percent in industrial productivity. It was most doubtful at the end of the 1950's—and later amply confirmed—that this carrot-dangling would contribute in any pronounced measure to this productivity objective. In industry, the USSR employs about 20 percent more labor than the United States and produces, using even a liberal estimate, over 45 percent of our production.

Heightened labor productivity also involves a residual factor. Just as extensive mechanization is no complete substitute for a fair remuneration to workers, so the process of expanding capacity and increasing capital per worker cannot in itself guarantee the necessary changes in the skill, application, and training of labor, nor in efficient management. These, too, affect labor productivity. Traditionally being excellent copyists and wholesale borrowers from others, the Russians will attempt to rapidly institute automation on a large scale in order to cope with the general problem of increased productivity. Pinpointed in the machine tools industry at relatively little cost, such an attempt will doubtlessly produce some

quick results. On a grand scale, however, the endeavor requires the heavy capital of time.

The USSR economy is afflicted with numerous problems, but this does not mean that consequently there are an equivalent number of points of possible vulnerability. The same applies to our economy and its many problems. For the USSR outstanding problems of adequate and economically distributed labor and capital resources, imbalances and stresses, short mineral supplies, rational allocation, the prospect of diminishing returns, the need for accelerated agricultural production, and many other problems can be cited. The recurring promise of a reduction in labor hours to 35 hours per week by the end of this decade appears rather hollow in the face of acute labor shortages in many sectors. Due to birth losses, the heavy death toll in the last war has left its mark in the smaller current intake of new labor. The little appreciated record of Soviet Russian genocide has also taken its substantial toll in this respect.⁸

In the mad rush to maximize industrial growth, the economy has been greatly overstrained, and the mass of disproportions and uneconomical relationships accumulated over the years is now being acutely felt. A greater portion of gross investment in the future will necessarily have to account for the depreciation and obsolescence of old factories. In addition, the noticeable trend toward diminishing returns will be only partially offset by new techniques, such as synthetics, plastics, and the like. Decentralization efforts, such as they were prior to 1965, and another reorganization with renewed centralism have by

8. See Dobriansky, Lev E., *Nations, Peoples, and Countries in the USSR*, Study of Population and Immigration Problems, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 105.

no means resolved the perennial problem of a rational allocation of resources, and the sins of regionalism and "localism" continue to reflect the deep-seated organizational strains in the structure of the economy. Resources in short supply, as, for example, coking coal and iron ore, will doubtlessly require increasing investment costs. And agriculture, an area of long-standing lag, difficulty, and undoubted economic scandal, has failed to provide both the produce for a higher standard of living and trained labor for industry, which to meet past 1965 goals demanded an additional 12 million.

A detailed examination of each sector given above cannot but produce results which, in the aggregate, would show a highly dislocated economy simmering with numerous basic weaknesses. These in turn form the economic explanation of Moscow's play for indispensable time and "coexistence" in the diplomatic sphere. They demonstrate, too, a good deal of foolishness in the uncritical comparisons made between the U.S. economy and that in the USSR. Where, for instance, in the former only 10 percent of the labor force is required to produce farm output that exceeds, at that, by one-third the total agricultural output of the USSR, which employs about 40 percent of its total labor contingent, or over 35 million farm workers, comparisons on the basis of sound economic principles are almost precluded.

To take another illustration, road-building has multiple uses and requires enormous capital, but in the distorted economy of the USSR the amount of paved roads still is far behind that of Great Britain. One can easily multiply these examples to prove the different natures of the economies in the United States and the USSR. Except for the one particular mentioned earlier, the growth of the USSR economy is surely not a real cause for neurotic

thinking even among our academic economists. A long-run perspective is alone necessary in this regard. The average annual rate of growth per man-hour in the United States has been 2.3 percent since the turn of the century, while in the USSR it has been 1.7 since 1928. Compound interest projections, as one writer urges his readers to engage in, may make for mathematical calisthenics as concerns the recent growth trend in the USSR, but this exercise is, quite plainly, poor economic thinking.⁹ Such thinking is as warped as the overproduction thesis used by Varga and others to predict a deep crisis in the United States in 1958.¹⁰ As a matter of fact, the data of the 1960's show a conspicuous slowing down in the average annual growth of the economy in the USSR.

SWV TARGETS

Weakness, whether economic or any other type, is only a potential vulnerability. In a sense it is subjective, and for it to become a real point of vulnerability an objective stimulus is required. As noted above, numerous weaknesses exist in the USSR economy, but these, within a totalitarian framework, cannot be regarded as actual vulnerabilities. Many of them have existed for some time, and the myopia and failures of Nazi German policy during the war showed that a wholesome stimulus was required to convert them into active and decisive vulnerabilities.

Thus, simply to cite economic weaknesses in the usually misleading comparative analyses is virtually worth-

9. E.g., Campbell, Robert W., *Soviet Economic Power*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 53.

10. *The Western Economy and Its Future as Seen by Soviet Economists*, ed. by Richard G. Stolt, Montreal, 1958, p. 21.

less in terms of present requirements in the unending Cold War. The most important weaknesses must be concentrated upon in our propaganda and intensively analyzed for the world at large to become concretely familiar with them. At the present stage nothing less than this could decisively place Moscow on the defensive and actually on the run, both with regard to its pressures from within and its connivings in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. If we fail to do this now, vainly hoping that changes in the Soviet Union would somehow meet our illusory expectations, there is no doubt that at a considerable disadvantage we shall be compelled to do this later.

Programmatic action designed to transform economic weaknesses in the Soviet Union into vulnerabilities would necessitate, however, a radical change in our conceptions with regard to the economy of the USSR. Maximum returns from such action can only be realized by the adoption of a realistic conceptual context in line with historical development and truth. As pointed out before, much of the present economic output on the USSR is actually produced in a historical vacuum. In effect, it serves the end of economic information without adequate and realistic interpretation and perspective. From our complete socio-economic viewpoint, to compare the economy in the USSR with that of the United States, to speak in terms of comparative gross "national" products, to suggest that compared outputs in industrial and agricultural pursuits represent true yardsticks of relative power positions is not only conceptually misleading but for sane policy purposes also nonsensical.

The economy in the USSR is an empire or imperio-colonial economy, not a national one. In the light of persistent integrationist trends beyond the borders of the USSR, the imperial economic threads woven by Moscow

even extend beyond the USSR as such. Thus, for pure, conceptual reasons apart from obvious, pragmatic ones, to compare the economy in the USSR with ours makes as much sense as comparing the economy of the United States in the nineteenth century with that of the British Empire. Yet, this is the state of our analyses today. Although his conclusions are politically wanting, Walter Kolarz at least shows soundness in basic concept by titling his work on the Soviet Union, *Russia and Her Colonies*. His economic observations make real sense because of his historical grasp of the situation. This is shown, for example, when he points out that the "heroes of the October Revolution and of the Civil War in the non-Russian territories of what is now the Soviet Union were primarily Russian or people of non-Russian nationalities who had severed their links with their nation of origin and adopted Russian culture."¹¹ Of the latter, in reality prototypical quislings, there were only a few.

It is not enough, therefore, to stress that ours is a consumer-oriented economy, whereas theirs is a cold war economy. For the purpose of developing vulnerabilities it is essential to bring into sharp contrast their empire economy as against our national economy. The captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, which have long been subjected to the economic colonialism of Moscow, by far meet the standards underlying the idea of a nation than most of the emerging independent states in Africa. Yet, considering the enthusiastic interest shown by many circles in the United States in these emerging states, which in itself is important and proper, it is evident to what extent our concepts err and our primary interests are misdirected. Moreover, the valid empire concept allows for a more ac-

11. *Russia and Her Colonies*, New York, 1952, p. 8.

curate and realistic comparison in economic strength between the Soviet Russian Empire, which in an ultimate sense includes mainland China, the captive nations of Central Europe, South Europe, and Latin America, and the Free World Alliances. The total industrial production of the Empire is only about 25 percent of total world output. In 1965 it was only slightly higher, with the Free World still producing over 70 percent of the total. On this conceptually sounder basis of comparison, rather than the invalid basis of United States vis-a-vis USSR, the economic picture assumes a different light, although the aforementioned danger in the use of augmented resources still remains.

In addition, many students uncritically turn to individual commodities for their usual comparative analyses. Without its internal colonies and "satellites," Russia's production of steel, for example, would be less than that of Free Europe alone. On the total empire scale, in 1958 aggregate world production of steel amounted to 273 million metric tons, of which the Soviet Russian Empire accounted for only 30.2 percent (USSR 20.1 percent, external captives 6.1 percent, mainland China 4.0 percent). Though a poor year for us, the United States alone accounted for 28.4 percent and Free Europe 32.1 percent. By 1972 the USSR is supposed to produce close to 120 million tons; U.S. capacity in 1959 was already over 140 million tons, though aluminum and other substitutes were already making marked inroads in the steel market. Employing the realistic conceptual scales advanced here for other individual commodities, our analysis would show even more glaring discrepancies, so chasmic in character that past exaggerations of so-called Soviet economic growth would look worse than pallid. But, again, this thesis for

a balanced socio-economic picture in no way depreciates the danger involved in Moscow's totalitarian canalization of resources for cold war objectives.

PRIME EMPIRICAL POINTS

The empire concept and the framework of reference embraced by it call for a different and more rewarding direction of research than what is currently taking place. Economic relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and any or all of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR would now be the focal point of scholarly attention. Its results on colonialist exploitation and economic imperialism within the USSR would form the basis for a very pragmatic cultivation of one of the foremost weaknesses of the Soviet Union.¹² The countervailing impact of this on Moscow's economic propaganda in Asia, Africa, and Latin America would unquestionably be tremendous and at relatively little cost to us. The Kremlin's many fatuous utterances on the superiority of the Soviet system, accelerated economic growth over the past fifty years, socialist happiness, and similar absurdities would instantly boomerang against this background of Free World information and propaganda.¹³

Under the guidance of this empire concept, research and study would reveal, too, the unusual concentra-

12. E.g., Rossotti, Charles O., *The Communist Theory of Economic Colonialism and Its Applicability to the Soviet Union*, graduate dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Spring, 1962, p. 113.

13. See author's lecture on "The Vulnerabilities of Russian Communism," before the National Strategy Seminar, reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, September 15, 1959, pp. A8253-55.

tion of vital resources in Russia's non-Russian colonies. Without these colonies and resources, I repeat, Russia itself would be only a second or third-rate power. Economic parasitism and exploitation enable it to bluff diplomatically a great power status, and most amazing is the degree to which Free World powers have fallen for this. Without Ukraine, Turkestan, White Ruthenia, the Baltic nations, and the Caucasus, Russia's agricultural base would, relatively speaking, be no more than that of a united Germany. The coal deposits in Ukraine's Donets Basin, Turkestan's Karaganda, and elsewhere would be a heavy subtraction from its annual coal output. The iron ore of eastern Ukraine and Transcaucasia, the oil of Azerbaijan and Idel-Ural, the manganese of Georgia and Ukraine (90 percent of USSR output), the copper, lead, zinc, silver (one-half of USSR output), and other resources in Turkestan, all these and more play the major role in Moscow's pretension as a great power. One cannot find a circulating text in our universities that realistically enumerates these basic resources in terms of the useful Russian/non-Russian categories advanced here. The few more specialized and historical works available on this score are helpful introductions to the type of work needed.¹⁴

A sufficient yardstick of the importance attached to this type of analysis is furnished by the national economy of Ukraine, the largest non-Russian nation in the USSR. Of all-Union production in 1958, it accounted for over one-half pig iron output, 56 percent ore mining, 31 percent manganese, 43 percent hard coal, 53 percent coke, 27 percent mineral fertilizer, 47 percent caustic soda, 23

14. E.g., Kononenko, Konstantyn, *Ukraine and Russia*, Milwaukee, Wisc., 1958, p. 240; Chirovsky, Nicholas L., *The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia*, New York, 1957, p. 178.

percent tractors, 78 percent long-haul locomotives; and in agriculture over 25 percent meat and milk and 70 percent sugar beets.¹⁵ In per capita production of wheat, sugar beets, potatoes, milk, and butter this nation of over 45 million even exceeded the United States.

Present stress on metallurgy, chemicals, and natural gas production indicates that Ukraine has assumed equally important percentages of all-Union product in these fields. In exports the *national economy* of Ukraine—and in the USSR it is designated as such—sends products to about fifty-five countries. Its percentage ratio of total USSR exports for 1958 was rather high in many commodities: pig iron 93.8 percent, rolled steel 56.5 percent, iron ore 98.2 percent, coal 47 percent, coke 53.4 percent, sugar 68.1 percent. It appears that Moscow utilizes its colonies to the utmost in implementing its global objectives. Their role in the type of economic warfare being built up by Moscow against the Free World is nigh crucial.

POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES IN MOSCOW'S EMPIRE ECONOMY

Through propaganda and various political and diplomatic means the Free World, and particularly the United States, can easily convert the many economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union into active vulnerabilities. Of all the weaknesses the most essential for development is the economic colonialism that prevails in the USSR. At a time when Moscow is attempting to impress the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America with its brand of economy, a full-scale development of this inherent weakness appears almost the natural thing to do.

In addition, the exploited peasantry and agrarian individualism, the burdensome arms cost, and politically

15. *Radyanska Ukraina*. Kiev, December 3, 1958, p. 2.

motivated scientific feats of disproportionate cost are points of weakness worth exploiting. In a basic economic sense, dealing with human values, the situation in the USSR today is substantially no different—by degree and in aspects it is even worse—than that of the previous Tsarist Russian Empire prior to 1917. Some American scholars, such as Thorstein Veblen, had a sound comprehension of the Russian Empire then, and their observations can be easily applied now.¹⁶ This is singularly lacking in much of our current economic output, a good deal of it being developed on false and unrealistic premises and, consequently, of little use in cold war programming.

Speaking of cold war programming, let me give just one example in this respect. When all is said and done about economic statistics, comparisons and appraisals on the economic development and growth of the USSR, one stark truth emerges to drown out all such analytic sophistication: the colonial empire economy of the USSR, as well as its satrap and satellite economies in Europe and Asia, has conclusively demonstrated its inability to feed its subjugated populations with adequate consistency. We do not think once about the accessible food appearing on our tables daily. What would we think of our economy if such easy accessibility were periodically interrupted?

In the spring of 1962 every so-called Communist economy, with the exception of Poland's, was plagued by this fundamental incapability of feeding adequately its captive population. Had we been astute and determined not to permit our adversary any breather under cover of "accommodation," the President could have issued a Food for Freedom Declaration, putting into sharp contrast before the eyes of the world the comparative food capabili-

16. Dobriansky, Lev E., *Veblenism*, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 357.

ties of the U.S. economy alone and of all the so-called Communist economies combined—including Poland's. The declaration could have offered food to any captive people, including the Russian people, on condition that it be stamped "Food for Freedom" and distributed by the International Red Cross. Just think of the impacted consequences of such action in the Cold War!

To conclude, then, our failure to reshape our basic conceptions with reference to the USSR will doubtlessly lead us into several short-sighted ventures contributing to the further expansion of the economic monster which we have only too often helped in the past.¹⁷ Expanded and liberal East-West trade, so reminiscent of our foolhardy trade with the Axis powers before World War II, is such a venture.¹⁸ This course will insure only a minimum of vulnerability, despite the existence of numerous economic weaknesses. It will afford Moscow the time it is playing for to consolidate and to some extent overcome its present economic problems. Nevertheless, the time will come when, after a series of shock treatments, we shall be forced by disadvantageous circumstance to consider the course of working for and building up vulnerabilities. There can be no doubt of this. The wiser thing to do, of course, is what must be done now.

17. A forceful presentation of this is provided in a short thesis which deserves publication: Wilkerson, Sister Marie Jerome, *The United States Contribution to the Soviet Economy*, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisc., p. 53.

18. Dobriansky, Lev E., "Five Perspectives on East-West Trade," *East-West Trade*, Part II, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 94-104.

Chapter X THE RUSSIAN IMAGE

“Bolshevism is the third appearance of Russian autocratic imperialism, its first appearance being the Muscovite Tsardom and its second the Petrine Empire.”

—Nicolas Berdyaev

The type of analysis developed for the economic area of the Soviet Russian Empire can just as readily be applied to all other essential areas—the military, the cultural, Party politics, the scientific, the arts and literature, even athletics and the Olympics. Parasitical Russian totalitarians have always fed themselves on the resources and talents of non-Russian peoples. Political umbrella concepts such as “the Russians” and now “the Soviets,” which arbitrarily embrace the captive non-Russian nations, have enabled them to conceal this parasitism from the world. Once in thought and action we pierce these befogging concepts, messianic Russia—and we mean Russia—will be properly reduced to size.

Berdyaev, the eminent Russian philosopher of this century, gives in capsule form the ideological images of traditional Russian imperialism over the past 500 years. The above quote accomplishes what tomes on “Russia” have failed to do. Its stress on appearances succinctly points up the essence of habitual Russianistic imagery.

For years I have held, and still do, that the major clue in beating imperio-colonialist Moscow is found in the field

of psycho-political propaganda. Elements derived from all the mentioned areas are skillfully synchronized by Moscow to project an image that is thoroughly Potemkinistic, which, as we saw earlier, is a term that signifies contrived, false appearances. There is nothing new in this. The White Tsars indulged in similar political psychology to advance the messianic goals of Russia. The Red Tsars have been even more competent in this, embracing Communism, science, technology, and totalitarian control.

As for ourselves, we continue to be a colossal and confused paradox. In this age of imagery we clearly showed during the 1960 Presidential campaign how concerned we are about the image we project throughout the world. But at the same time, in the Cold War, we display little concern about the ways and means of demolishing the potemkinized Russian image which instills both fear and awe in the minds of millions about the globe, including our own United States.

Here and in the next chapter we shall examine several major aspects of this contest in imagery. The growing interest on the part of American readers in these aspects and the myths pertaining to Russia is both gratifying and surprising. Naturally, it is quite satisfying to witness the amount of interest stimulated by even a single article on the subject.¹ But, more important, it is surprising to observe some of the critical reaction and the bewilderment shown in response to it. Some have taken the writer to task for maintaining that Soviet Communism is a complete myth. Others have severely criticized him for extending the captive nations thesis beyond the commonly accepted limits of the so-called satellites in Central Europe. The majority who have corresponded with me express

1. Dobriensky, Lev E., "Nine Lingering Myths on 'Russia,'" *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Summer, 1960, pp. 125-138.

mental discomfort over the myths they have been clinging to and readily admit that their impressions of "Russia" have been badly shaken.

This, of course, is all to the good. But even the majority are not totally convinced that their mythical conceptions of "Russia" and its image and appearances are thoroughly invalid. Somehow most of our people cannot believe that the notions and impressions they have become accustomed to are rooted in sand. In this respect they are not alone. Confronted by the same situation, millions of others in the Free World react in the same way. Nevertheless, one of our primary aims in the Cold War should be the demolition of the Russian image carried on in the minds of Americans who have become special objects of methodical Russian propaganda.

PROPAGANDA UNPARALLELED

Guided by sheer evidence, one can truly say that, perhaps more than anything else, the passage of the Captive Nations Week Resolution crystallized what we Americans do not really know about "Russia." As we noted earlier, this event signified for the first time official recognition of the existence of the majority captive non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union itself. The resolution lists most of them. Yet, when it was passed, our citizens in general were stunned by the new names in the family of captive nations. Many had never heard of White Ruthenia or Cossackia, and others inquired as to where Turkestan or Idel-Ural is located. "Holy Mother Russia" exponents in this country seized upon this condition and had the brash mendacity to claim that no such entities exist. In the early 50's they used the same technique of obscurantism with reference to Ukraine. Meanwhile, a

number of writers and analysts continued along their merry but blind way to apply the resolution solely to the minority of captive nations in Central Europe. Muddled as our situation was, the Russian totalitarians, above all, clearly understood the content and meaning of the resolution, particularly as concerns their projected image of Russia, and they have been exploding ever since.

Speaking of their exploding, they now use the technique of having associated Red governments protest their own "independence." For example, after the 1965 Captive Nations Week, both Warsaw and Kiev shared the brunt of denouncing the annual event. A Ukrainian organ, the counterpart of Russia's *Crocodile*, sarcastically observed, "Let the haze remain for at least a week, while the freedom charter is being altered. For a week, yearly, until such time when 'all captive nations receive their freedom and independence.'" ²

How does one account for this blatant disparity in reaction and understanding? On the one hand, Moscow fumingly displays troubled concern over this action; on the other hand, millions of Americans are literally mystified by the action, no less the commotion. There is no doubt but that the answer lies in the dangerous lag of our knowledge and understanding of the many nations imprisoned in the Soviet Union. We are faced by an enemy who consistently capitalized on this lag. Yet he is openly frightened by the prospect that the captive nations resolution would spell the end of this free capitalization and convert his propaganda profits into serious losses.

The importance of this lag was touched upon in 1960 by President-elect Kennedy in a message sent to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America on the occa-

2. Borocenko, O., "The Hazy Week," *Pepper*, Kiev, Ukraine SSR, August, 1965.

sion of its twentieth anniversary celebration. In part it read as follows: "I stated . . . that I deplored the monolith term often used by the Republican Administration in Washington, 'Soviet nation' or 'Soviet people.' In essence, it is contrary to the captive nations week resolution enacted last year. Its use implies that we condone the *status quo* of the Communist takeover of all the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain." ³ This statement struck at the spurious Russian image. But it was not long thereafter that in a report on his European talks President Kennedy, with reference to the USSR, spoke of that "*nation's* achievements in space" and of "the Soviets." ⁴ Worse still in terms of distortions of history was his later utterance: "We recognize the Soviet Union's historical concerns about their security in Central and Eastern Europe, after a series of ravaging invasions—and we believe arrangements can be worked out which will help to meet those concerns." ⁵ Knowledge, we teach, is in large measure intellectual conviction.

Regardless of these pitiful errors on the highest level of our Government, the *ersatz* Russian image must be destroyed. This demolition is one of the most pressing necessities challenging U.S. propaganda efforts, such as they are. It is no exaggeration to say that if, God forbid, we should lose in the Cold War to Moscow—an attainable outcome through psycho-political isolation of American power in the world—it would be basically the result of this intellectual lag in our appreciative understanding of the non-Russian nations in the USSR, rather than of any "missile gap," sputnik superiority, or economic

3. *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, New York, November 1-15, 1960, p. 1.

4. *Text of President's Report on European Talks*, the White House, June 6, 1961.

5. TV-Radio Broadcast to the Nation, July 25, 1961.

catch-up. Also, without an iota of exaggeration, the present supremacy of Soviet Russian propaganda is based on the existence of this lag.

Since Khrushchev's visit to the United States, Russian propagandists have been depicting the USSR as "the greatest power in the world." Despite lagging economic growth rates, an agricultural mess, and intra-family difficulties with totalitarian Red associates, Moscow sells itself as the wave of the future. Don't think for a second that there are not an increasing number of people throughout the Free World who are taking this seriously on its face value. Even here in the United States, where uncritical and even puerile projections of advertised Soviet growth rates were made for several years, the belief is spreading that this may be so in ten years. The above lag in understanding serves Moscow's purposes neatly. As a perceptive tourist to the Soviet Union has put it, "Communist China and Soviet Russia's understanding of the value of constant repetition, of association of ideas, of persuasion, indicates a profound knowledge of human reactions." ⁶

But knowledge, too, is power. And a working knowledge of the basic politico-economic realities of the Soviet Union certifies to a blustering giant with essentially clay feet, a basically underdeveloped economy with overdeveloped ambitions, a fundamentally Spartan society with politico-psychological cunning. This is not to suggest that the clay-footed giant is not a real threat to our free national existence. On the contrary, it is and will continue to be as long as we fail to know and analyze its synthetic nature; even beyond this, as long as we fail to act upon our acquired knowledge, primarily in the all-important fields of methodic propaganda and psycho-political war-

6. "Reds Held Expert in Some Ad Fields," *The New York Times*, July 19, 1960.

fare. By analogy, our posture today in these basic fields is what our military posture was before Pearl Harbor. Further, Red takeovers in the years ahead will, in part, be the direct result of this state of unpreparedness. Nineteenth century thinking and action in terms of military might and treaty negotiations will not prevent them.

In a very real sense Russia's Iron Curtain extends to our shores as concerns a working understanding of what is unthinkingly called "Russia." It may, for example, astonish the reader to learn that, despite the fact that over half of USSR's population is non-Russian, the policy planning group in our Department of State scarcely bothers itself with the majority non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union.⁷ A later chapter on Secretary Rusk's missives will give some evidence of this. The author's own experiences have shown that our policy-makers know more about diverse peoples in Asia and Africa—most of them of secondary importance in terms of the major struggle—than they do of the different nations and cultures in the USSR. In short, as the French under Napoleon in the nineteenth century and the Germans twice in this century, we are missing the boat when it comes to understanding "Russia." Little wonder that we are continually being fooled by Russian propaganda.

IMPRISONING CONCEPTS

Common sense dictates that in contending with any opponent, we first examine his background and record, his make-up, his weaknesses and strengths. We certainly must do this if his weaknesses are to be transformed into real vulnerabilities. We then form certain accurate con-

7. On the population issue, see *Nations, Peoples, and Countries in the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 37-38.

ceptions of him, which are to guide our behavior toward him. The same logical process applies to "Russia." The concepts we employ in relation to it are the true reflectors of our understanding—or misunderstanding—of it.

Descartes, the eminent seventeenth century philosopher, once said that men become prisoners of their own thoughts. Since thoughts without concepts are impossible, men thus become prisoners of their ruling concepts. Perhaps nowhere is the force of our habitual concepts stronger than in the field of the Soviet Union, Russia, and the captive non-Russian nations. Indeed, after one gives his intellectual assent to all that has been said regarding each of these entities one invariably slips back into the groove of his accustomed concept of "Russia," and his momentary understanding again becomes blurred and distorted. Obviously, time is required for us to alter our concepts for more effective insights into the issues discussed here.

One need not look far for the standard and also misleading concepts used by our opinion-makers. Take as another example the report released by the President's Commission on National Goals.⁸ The report is studded with similar conceptual inaccuracies, and the section on "Communist-Dominated Areas" is almost worthless. The section displays no understanding of the strategic nature of the captive nations nor what to do with them.

In the report one finds the usual prosaic references to Communist doctrine and orientation, as though Communism were the real ideological threat. From a propaganda viewpoint, the Red totalitarians couldn't be happier than to have the struggle interpreted in the very sense they have been advancing it, namely, as a conflict

8. *Goals for Americans*, Report of the President's Commission on National Goals, New York, 1960, p. 18.

of ideologies and social systems. It is clearly evident that the commission failed to avail itself of many sources which have established the myth of Communism. As a matter of fact, it could have profited from those who have had the closest association with imperialist Russian totalitarianism in one form or another. For instance, let us refer again to the experiences of Boris Morros, which led to the Sobel spy case. Because of their impact and currency these alone would have been most instructive to the commission in demonstrating the ideological expediency of totalitarian Moscow. "I want to emphasize," Morros said in 1959, "that the Russian plot is far more strongly organized in this country and throughout the world than is generally understood by our people. I say 'Russian plot' because the schemes of the present military dictatorship in the Soviet Union go beyond communism. They are for Pan-Slavism on a scale more ambitious than Hitler's fanatical dreams of world conquest. The Russians are realists. . . . The present regime in Moscow has been hatching a vast imperialistic plot for a Slav-dominated world." ⁹ He described Pan-Slavism as "the bill of goods which has been sold to the Communist leaders in control of all the Slav countries which are Russian satellites." This and related views easily show that the Russian image of "Communist power," cast by the Moscow propaganda machine and uncritically accepted by too many circles in the Free World, is only the modern mask of Russian totalitarianism.

Read any newspaper, listen to radio and television comments, pick up any periodical dealing with Eastern Europe or Central Asia, and you cannot but be impressed by the ignorant confusion of the Soviet Union and Russia. In pointing this out one could almost sense the

9. *The New York Times*, August 13, 1957.

usual immediate reaction: "Oh, why be so technical? This stress on semantics appears picayunish." The fact is that this is not a matter of superficial semantics but, fundamentally, a matter of sound and realistic conception. Also, words do have meaning, so powerful that lives are sacrificed for what they presumably mean. Surely, if you are a gentleman or a lady and someone persists in calling you a coarse sot or a harlot, thereby harming your reputation, you would not with any sense of honor shrug it off by just saying "Oh, just a matter of semantics," that is, if pride with dignity and personal integrity is at all determining. Words expressing a false conception of you, your background, your character and intentions—and some even denying them—may prove to be quite provoking, morally and otherwise. So with peoples and nations. The non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union have suffered too much for the very preservation of their identities, not to mention the advancement of their aspirations. Even the Russian totalitarians have had to take careful notice of this undying instinct for national self-preservation. Nationalist symbols of the captive non-Russian nations are adroitly exploited by the Reds both within and outside the USSR.

In addition, concepts and conceptions which are not in rational conformity and distinguishable realities hardly form a basis for intelligent action. Not only do defective concepts disclose an equally defective understanding, they also preclude the possibility of imaginative thinking along lines of alternative courses of action. This has been for too long our dire plight in connection with the Soviet Union. Many opportunities for effective action in the United Nations and elsewhere on issues of imperialism, colonialism, and the like have been actually muffed and

lost because of the trained inability to see things in a different and truer light.

Vice President Nixon, in 1956, uttered precious words when he declared: "We must be ready to meet Soviet moves, but we must also be prepared with all peaceful and honorable means to take the initiative in advancing *everywhere* the cause of human freedom. Our record in support of the dignity of man and the independence of peoples needs no apologies any place in this world."¹⁰ Much the same was uttered in his acceptance speech in July, 1960. But at no time in this period was the electorate given an inkling into the concrete content of any program based on these principled propositions, particularly in relation to the Soviet Union. And yet much could have been offered without inciting any scare of a precipitated war.

Yes, as we have seen again and again, even on the highest levels of our Government the above plight exists. Our leaders in public and private life parrot the same errors which can only benefit Moscow. It is not necessary for one to study intensively the histories of Eastern Europe and Central Asia to become aware of the fact that many different nations exist in these areas. One does not have to become a scholar to know that the Soviet Union is not a nation. For this purpose all that is required is a quick glance at the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to read some of the speeches intended for "home" consumption.

To easily satisfy his critics, the writer can offer scores of examples illustrating this plight in the highest echelons of our Government. Many have been given in the preceding chapters. Here let us just cite another one, a State

10. Address before the 1956 Republican Convention, *The New York Times*, August 24, 1956.

Department pamphlet titled "Realities of Soviet Foreign Economic Policies." With reference to the USSR, it begins a sentence in this vein: "Thus, because of its economic system, the world's second largest industrial nation in its dealings. . . ." According to this conception, if Poland were forcibly incorporated into the USSR, as had a dozen other non-Russian nations since 1923, "the world's second largest industrial nation" would supposedly become that much greater. And some economists would, no doubt, absurdly continue to apply the concept of GNP (gross national product) to the still more extended USSR. Fortunately, some governmental strides are made to offset this protracted ignorance concerning the vital captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. A publication prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress presents numerous essential facts and perspectives about these nations and unequivocally states, "Western scholars of Soviet affairs agree on the imperial-colonial character of the U.S.S.R." ¹¹ However, much more remains to be done.

ROOT CAUSES OF MISCONCEPTIONS

Now, as before, it should be quite evident that there is something radically wrong with our conceptions and concepts of "Russia." They are inaccurate and perilously misleading, because we do not fundamentally know and thus fail to appreciate with critical understanding the real make-up of the Soviet Union. First and foremost, the basic fact that the Soviet Union is in essence an empire of many subjugated nations escapes most of us.

11. *The Soviet Empire, A Study in Discrimination and Abuse of Power*, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 166.

For our various analyses, policies, and objectives there is a world of difference between the false view of the USSR as a nation or even as a natural state and this historically grounded fact. It is amazing how many have apparently forgotten the forcible incorporation of the three Baltic nations into the USSR in 1940-41. Yet, this imperialist annexation by Moscow should in itself suggest the empire nature of the USSR. But it is not surprising that few of us are aware of how the Soviet Union was established in the first place. The Russian image is entirely different when the USSR is viewed from the imperio-colonialist angle as against that containing myths spawned by Moscow. What can one expect for this necessary adjustment, when the minds of our young high school students are conditioned by drivel such as this: "Until World War II, the Soviet Union had remained the world's only Communist-governed nation."¹² The Soviet Union is not a nation, and Outer Mongolia was also a state under so-called Communism.

Moreover, it should always be recognized that, although officially the Soviet Union is paraded about as a federal union of republics, in reality it is nothing more than a legalistic facade for Moscow's primary empire. The USSR is no more a voluntary federal union than the captive nations in Central Europe are independent peoples' democracies. The concept of USSR is just an expedient and thin legal line between Moscow's external captives in Central Europe and its internal captives within the territorial confines of the USSR. The new economic arrangements in Central Europe, designed to bolster the Red regimés, do not contradict this fact. Let us not forget that at the close of World War I the

12. "That (UN) Certain Feeling in Moscow," *World Week*, A Scholastic Magazine, New York, October 21, 1965, p. 12.

internal captives also were newly independent states. Like Poland, Finland and others, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia, and other non-Russian nations in the collapsing Tsarist Russian Empire, declared their independence and founded their free republics. Ukraine and Georgia were even recognized by Lenin's Soviet Russia.

A true orientation toward the USSR also demands the steadfast retention of another essential general fact. The fate that befell independent Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, and others in the 40's had been the tragedy of the similarly independent republics of Georgia, Ukraine, White Ruthenia, and others in the early 20's. Trotsky's Red Russian Army picked them off one by one after they had been softened up by infiltration, subversion, ideological deception, and additional techniques of "intensive revolution." Many of these cold war techniques we have been witnessing now for years in every quarter of the Free World, including South Vietnam.¹³

If the Russian image is to be exploded and its propaganda nullified, it is important to remember constantly, too, the dominant fact that, following this first wave of Soviet Russian imperialism, by 1923 these non-Russian nations were forced into the Potemkin federation called the USSR. It should be quite obvious that, considering their population and resources, these nations formed the captive base for Moscow's further imperialist thrust into Central Europe. Today they constitute the base for Russian colonialist designs and operations in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. It is certain that we would not be concerned today with any threat from any USSR—and thus Red China; the others are strategically inconsequential—had the Allied Powers, on the very basis of the Wilsonian

13. Nanuashvili, Vano Jan, *The Strength and Weakness of U.S.S.R.*, Boston, Mass., 1956, p. 125.

principle of national self-determination, actively supported these new non-Russian states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia following World War I.

Not ever to be forgotten either is the history for freedom on the part of these non-Russian nations since 1923. Including the 50's and 60's, there hasn't been a decade when serious friction, resistance, pressure, "localism," and even rebellion have not scalded Moscow's hold over these non-Russian colonies. The data on this are simply overwhelming. Most outstanding, of course, were the millions of non-Russians who deserted to the supposedly liberating Germans in Ukraine during the earlier stages of World War II.¹⁴ Trotskyism, Bukharinism, and other threats to the Moscow regime faded away long ago, but "bourgeois nationalism" or, in our words, the drive for national independence by these non-Russian peoples has been persistent and is undying. A month does not pass without some attack against it by Moscow and its Red dependents. It is this perennial, patriotic nationalism that basically pressured Stalin to bid for the inclusion of Ukraine and Byelorussia as charter members of the United Nations. As we shall see, from time to time Moscow simulates the independence of the non-Russian republics. Amendments to the USSR Constitution, prepared under Stalin, provide for their own war ministries and the right to enter into direct diplomatic relations with other states.

With these several determining observations in mind it obviously does not make sense for us to show more interest in the independence urges of the Bakongos and the Watusis in Africa than of these non-Russian nations in the USSR. In the latter case we are dealing with large populaces whose histories extend back even before Christ and whose forebears enjoyed their periods of national

14. See Shandruk, Pavlo, *Arms of Valor*, New York, 1959, p. 320.

freedom. Ukraine alone has a population of about 45 million, qualifying it as the largest non-Russian nation both in the USSR and behind the whole Iron Curtain. When the Kremlinites speak of 177 or 182 different nationalities in the USSR, they are dealing out a myth. Small tribal units scattered about the Arctic and in Asia can hardly be classified as national units. On a unifying religious basis there are about 35 million Moslems who offer another point of distinction to the little more than 110 million Russians. Moscow distortingly exploits this fact in its policies toward the Islamic world; we are not even aware of it.

Also beyond the ken of our appreciative understanding and bolstering the Russian image is the economic and military significance of this non-Russian/Russian ratio in the USSR. As we have seen, our present economic and military comparisons between the USSR and the United States make as much qualitative sense as comparing the British Empire and the United States in the nineteenth century. An economy based on extensive captive resources is hardly comparable in nature to our free national economy. Briefly, the Russian image is not by far what it appears to be.

REALITIES FOR SUPERFICIAL ACTUALITIES

Thus, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that our crucial need is the substitution of realities for superficial actualities in our thinking and doing about the Soviet Union, which is and for many years will continue to be the primary survival base for the entire Red Empire. It does not require much imagination to see that propaganda out of Moscow on the economic, scientific, military, and other progress of the USSR would take on different

color and meaning if it were subjected to the prism of the realities surrounding the fundamental colonialism and imperialism within the USSR. In the military field, with about 43 percent of the armed forces in the USSR being non-Russian—and aside from likely individual Russian defections—the so-called military might of the USSR would definitely take on a different shade of meaning if the facts were properly utilized. Hungary furnished only the most recent example of Ukrainian, Russian, and other defections. In field after field the Russian image can be deflated to conform with concrete reality.

Quite plainly, then, the fundamental problem is one of political psychology, not rival philosophies, comparative economics, an arms race, and the like. The struggle today is being waged primarily on the psycho-political level in Viet Nam, the Dominican Republic, and every where else. The minds and hearts of men are the chief targets. This kind of warfare has always been Russia's empire-building mode of attack, copied in turn by the Red Chinese and the lesser lights. We can crush it once we begin to substitute realities for the actualities of our misconceptions about "Russia." The Captive Nations Week Resolution is such a start. Moscow fears it profoundly. Much, much more can and must be done to unmask the Russian image, if the United States is to win the Cold War and avoid a hot global war. But this, among other things, will require taking intelligently to heart and mind, even in this nuclear age, the words on appearances quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

Now for even a still closer look at the criticisms and thoughts developed here—and from other angles, too.

Chapter XI
NEW FRONTIERS OF UNDERSTANDING
THE USSR

"What man dare, I dare: Approach thou like
the rugged Russian bear." —Macbeth

By now you may well be saying, "Propaganda? This could not possibly be the major clue for beating the Russians in the Cold War. After all, propaganda is just propaganda, words and more words which cannot resolve any issues." Sometimes a further thought is added: "Let them propagandize; we'll maintain our military strength. Propaganda won't help us, but superior military strength will." Shakespeare in *Macbeth* showed a keener insight.

Statements of this type miss the whole point of the Cold War. First, look up the definition of propaganda. It is not the offensive or meaningless word you may think it to be. Propaganda means ideas, concepts, doctrines, systems of thought which, regardless of their validity or lack of validity, ultimately determine and shape the behavior and actions of men, whether rationally or irrationally. All revolutions owe their birth and development to propaganda; men have laid down both their lives and arms because of propaganda. Invariably, the groundwork for Moscow's imperio-colonialist takeovers is primarily prepared by propaganda. The broadest range of possibilities for positive action is the result of well-directed propaganda. Propaganda can even neutralize "superior military

strength." We have enjoyed such strength since 1943, yet observe how much we have lost since then.

Keeping these points in mind, it should be evident by now that one of the most strategic concepts in our psychopolitical warfare against imperialist Moscow is the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. Herein lies the new frontier of understanding and combating the USSR. There is no question but that this will become the primary concept in our cold war operations against the Soviet Russian Empire. It is only a question of time—time for more shock treatments administered by colonialist Moscow in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America; time for more Red totalitarian takeovers in any of these areas via the classic imperialist Russian cold war principle of *divide et impera*; time for a sobering realization in the United States that man with all his complement of ideas, will, convictions, faith, courage, and cunning will always be the ultimate weapon.

The groundwork for the full development of this concept has already been laid in the Captive Nations Week Resolution. As we have seen, the degree to which the mere passage of the resolution pierced the cold war armor of Moscow was demonstrated openly to the world by Khrushchev's phrenetic outbursts at the time and ever since. Thus, the evidence on the powerful efficacy of this strategic polwar concept became unmistakably clear and incontrovertible. For those who now grasp the concept and understand the essence of the resolution, the next phase is simply the concrete implementation of it as Public Law 86-90.

Before we elaborate further on the concept, let us glance at an interesting side development to all this. Not only did imperialist Moscow, its puppets, associates, and traitorous "Communist" parties throughout the world

rise in arms against the resolution but also, mind you, so did certain Russian emigre groups residing in various parts of the Free World, including the United States. Several years ago an expert on polwar wrote: "If Russians who claim to be anti-Communists refuse to extend the goal of freedom to non-Russians, then we must wonder whose side such Russians will be on when a showdown comes."¹ The author of this observation was himself at first skeptical about the contention that a basic common denominator exists between the Russian totalitarians in Moscow and a sizable number of empire-minded Russian emigres in the Free World. This denominator has been the preservation of the primary Russian Empire now paraded about as the Soviet Union. Close experience helped to dissolve the author's early skepticism.

Now added to the mounting evidence is the emigres' opposition to the resolution. To be sure, not all Russian emigre groups oppose it. Some have the wisdom to recognize its merits and seek solely to include Russia, which properly and technically speaking is not a captive nation. The plain fact is that no foreign army or subversive machine had ever overtaken Russia in the imperialist manner that the Soviet Russian aggressors invaded the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Poland, and others, whether directly or indirectly. The Bolshevik Revolution and all that followed was thoroughly and completely a Russian phenomenon. However, those who have opposed the resolution on grounds of such familiar and deceptive cliches as "dis-membering Russia" and "anti-Russianism" are actually motivated by the same imperio-colonialist considerations as any Kremlinite is. Like him, they have viewed with

1. Burnham, James, *Containment or Liberation?*, New York, 1953, p. 236.

horror the prospect it and its strategic concept pose for the empire.

THE CAPTIVE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS IN THE USSR

In a sense this essential polwar concept of the non-Russian nations in the USSR is not new. For some time it has been tied up with the righteous cause of the subjugated nations in the Russian Empire, the right of national self-determination and similar objectives. Naturally these ends are indispensable to the existence of the concept. But in an instrumentalist and operational sense there has been no thorough and systematic development of the concept along lines of a planned strategy against the modern totalitarianism and colonialism of Moscow. The Germans made a haphazard attempt at it, and disclosed documents of World War II well attest to its character.² Elevated as an instrument of thought and action, and logically distinguished but not divorced from certain moral and political ends, the concept is a most powerful device in the propaganda field, which in the Cold War—the war to move minds and win hearts—encompasses all else. And with methodic and imaginative application it stands to reduce the Soviet Russian totalitarians to real proportions.

Considering the inertia of human thinking, it cannot be repeated enough that the geographical territories and peoples embraced by the concept of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union constitute one of the most crucial areas of the world. No matter whether maintained in a cold war context or a hot global one, from a geopolitical viewpoint this area is the most important for

2. Kamenetsky, Ihor, *Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine*, Milwaukee, Wisc., 1956, p. 13.

decisive operations in the current conflict. It forms a substantial and economically superior part of the forced entity called the USSR. In present as well as future circumstances the relentless pursuit by Moscow to foist the Soviet Russian image upon the non-totalitarian Free World will only serve to underscore the urgency of properly characterizing the Soviet Union as it really is and of formulating plans of positive action accordingly. The main character of Moscow's policy is propagandistic and psycho-political; its military power is in reality secondary. This character is in complete harmony with the traditional cold war nature of Russian diplomacy.

In developing the strategic non-Russian concept our approach must systematically consider the peculiarities of current thinking on the USSR, the major trends in critical thinking about the Soviet Union, the requisites for an indispensable reorientation in thought and outlook and, lastly, the new frontiers of initiative and a positive offensive.³ It is obvious that the discernment of possibilities for positive action, short of a hot military conflict, is logically predicated on insights of understanding and a framework of working knowledge attuned to both fact and reason. Moreover, these requisite bases must constantly reflect the experiences of the respective peoples involved, not what we imagine them to be.

The peculiarities of current thinking on the USSR, both in the United States and in Western Europe, are four in number. One is the careless and literal confusion of nation and state. Second, in a persistent historical void, "Communism" continues to be unrealistically reified.

3. See *The New Frontier of Understanding the USSR*, Addresses by Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Representative Daniel J. Flood, et al., at the 43rd Anniversary of Ukraine's Independence, Washington, D.C., 1961, p. 52.

Third, the ramifications of monolithic imputations to the USSR extend into every imaginable sphere—the political, economic, cultural, scientific, and so forth. And fourth, a double standard is knowingly or inadvertently maintained in connection with different areas of U.S. relations. Taken in combination, these peculiar aspects portray a distorted picture of the Soviet Union, reinforce the image Moscow seeks to establish permanently of its own empire, and insure a major disadvantage for us in the cold war contest.

Considering the first, the habitual confusion of the terms “nation” and “state” is perhaps evidence enough of the vagueness and imprecision of our official thinking with regard to the Soviet Union and other areas. We recall that former Vice President Nixon saw no political significance in his repeated use of such terms as “Soviet nation” and “Soviet people.” His remarks in Moscow and other Russian cities were literally studded with these mythical nomers. Contrary to past practices, even Khrushchev was emboldened by this event to employ within the Soviet Union the incongruous term “Soviet nation.”⁴ Constitutionally the Soviet Union is supposed to be a federal state, but it has never been put forth as a single nation by any Kremlin leader. The practical consequences of this confusion are numerous and, without question, do not work in our favor. It is seen, for example, in our insular legalistic restriction of the captive nations concept. Most of all, the unfavorable impact on the millions within the Soviet Union, who have suffered much to preserve their national identities, should not be difficult to assess.

Another outstanding example of the first peculiarity is President Kennedy’s contradictory statements. As we observed, during the 1960 Presidential campaign he de-

4. Associated Press release, Moscow, August 5, 1959.

plored the Eisenhower Administration's use of such terms as "Soviet nation" and "Soviet people." ⁵ Yet, in his State of the Union address he declared, "I now invite all nations—including the Soviet Union—to join with us. . . ." ⁶

Concerning the second peculiarity, the reification of Communism, it would seem that the spectacular Hungarian Revolution alone should have convinced us of the objective sterility and vacuity of Communism.⁷ Unfortunately, this impression was not lasting, for in the period following, especially in 1959, the unreal contest between "Communism" and capitalism was revived, and many continued to be prepossessed with the notion of "fighting Communism." Despite the fact there are no such real entities, terms such as "Communist nations" and "Communist peoples" became rampant in Western use. They have served only to strengthen the myth of Communism—or with qualification "socialism"—in some objective existence.⁸ The effects of this basic error have shown up particularly in the appeal of "Communist ideology" among the unsuspecting and uninformed in the so-called neutralist countries. Yet, the stark discrepancies between Communist ideological espousals and practices were realized as far back as the early 1920's among the non-Russian nations now in the Soviet Union. The bankruptcy of Communism long preceded the Hungarian episode.

In classes at Georgetown University and elsewhere, the writer has for many years insisted on a concretist defini-

5. *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, p. 3293.

6. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., January 30, 1961, p. A-7.

7. See Heller, Andor, *No More Comrades*, Chicago, Ill., 1957, p. 126.

8. Trotsky, Leon, *The Revolution Betrayed*, London, 1937, p. 311.

tion of Communism from those who uncritically apply the term to the Soviet Union or any other sector of Moscow's empire. Even Soviet Russian tergiversates cannot define concretely what everyone seems to bandy about loosely. In 1961 they conjured up this moonshine definition: "Communism is a classless social system with one form of public ownership of the means of production, and full social equality of all members of society; under it, the all-round development of people will be accompanied by the growth of the productive forces through continuous progress in science and technology; all sources of public wealth will gush forth abundantly, and the great principle from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs will be implemented."⁹ There is more to this "definition." The colossal irony here is the verbal conjuration of impractical idealism by self-proclaimed philosophical materialists whose own environment carries all the marks of negating even momentary dreams of such pies-in-the-sky.

Our basic misconceptions of the USSR underlie, in turn, the unrealistic imputations of monolithic substance and activity to the Soviet Union. As frequently indicated above, the ramifications of these imputations can be seen in almost every treatment of the USSR. In the political realm, we saw how the USSR is equated by many with the United States, a federal union of states with diverse ethnic groupings. In the economic area, we also saw how terms such as "the Soviet national economy," "the gross national product," and similar inept and inaccurate usages are uncritically employed. In the military field the armed forces of the Soviet Union are erroneously likened to nationally integrated forces such as characterized Nazi

9. Text of Soviet Party's Draft Program, July 30, 1961.

Germany or Japan. Many other examples can be provided in other areas and fields, including the multi-national athletic teams sent here by Moscow.

The final peculiar aspect, our double standard, is a highly vulnerable point in U.S. foreign relations. In fact, its presence makes for manifest contradictions in our official utterances and policies. For instance, our Presidents have frequently held out for the freedom and independence of all nations, large and small, but when concrete projects arise in connection with most of the non-Russian nations in the USSR, a vague and self-defeating position of non-predetermination is maintained. We are quick to recognize the independence of entities in Africa, which could hardly be deemed nations, but we are afraid to uphold the long-established independence aspirations of real national organisms in the immediate environment of the avowed enemy. In the permanent Cold War our virtual disregard of the force of wholesome nationalism in the Soviet Union has been well nigh appalling.

PATHWAYS OF CRITICAL THOUGHT

For the past ten years there have been certain major trends in critical thinking about the Soviet Union. As shown by the partial bibliography in this work, scholarly and popular literature on the real nature of the Soviet Union has mounted in quantity and quality. Through Congressional hearings, reports, and investigations, a growing public awareness of the imperialist structure of the USSR has been kindled. Projects along the lines of the Captive Nations Week Resolution have intensified this awareness and have also precipitated objective evidence of the sensitive qualities of Moscow's domination over the non-Russian nations in the USSR.

About Moscow's acute sensitivity to this subject, let

me cite a few more experiential examples to those already given. Several months after the Captive Nations Week explosion in 1959, Moscow suddenly began publishing and distributing through London sources a series called *The Fifteen Soviet Republics, Today and Tomorrow*. From December, 1959 to April, 1960 these booklets were prepared in typical Potemkin Village style. Puppet ministers of the non-Russian republics introduced their respective domains to the reader. Thus, for example, the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, N. Kalshenko, presented the "happy and prosperous" conditions of Ukraine, which, for him, "is one of Russia's biggest industrial areas."¹⁰ (Underscoring supplied.) Later, with more shrewdness and political intelligence, his counterpart in Georgia, G. Djavakhishvili, did the same for the Caucasian republic, but with considerable emphasis on that nation's historic past.¹¹ Moreover, there is no question but that Khrushchev's prime mission in the U.N. Assembly in 1960 was to deflect attention from colonialism in the USSR by concentrating on colonial vestiges in the Free World. This was his way of replying further to the Captive Nations Week Resolution.¹² Even the USSR Embassy in Washington has come into the potemkinistic act for the benefit of Americans showing an interest in the strategic non-Russian concept.¹³ The scandalous UNESCO study prepared by subsidized "Red scholars" in 1962 would make a story in itself.¹⁴

10. *Ukraine*, Soviet booklet, London, January, 1960, p. 5.

11. *Georgia*, Soviet booklet, London, February, 1960.

12. *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, p. 3287.

13. *Soviet Life Today, USSR*, Washington, D.C., January, 1962.

14. See Tsamerian, I. P. and Ronin, S. L., *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*, UNESCO, The Netherlands, 1962, p. 106.

It is most important to recall that in that 15th General Assembly of the United Nations, both Prime Minister John Diefenbaker of Canada and the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador, Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang, only scratched the surface of the captive non-Russian nations issue, but both immediately became targets of Moscow's tirade.¹⁵ On the dominant question of colonialism and imperialism, the subject of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR was a natural one for us to advance in order to gain a strong offensive in the debate. But, unfortunately, we scarcely raised it.

Despite the progress made in such critical thinking, a great deal remains to be done in the way of research and skillful operational use of the data uncovered. As concerns the former, the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, which is sustained by Radio Liberty (formerly called the American Committee of Liberation) in New York, has gone a long way in uncovering material with regard to some of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. But even this progress has not met the standards of adequacy and depth warranted by the subjects at hand, particularly regarding Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism in the USSR.

These developments and more have led to certain initial, though apparently short-lived alterations in the official State Department outlook toward the captive non-Russian nations. For some time the Department has clung to that sterile legalistic notion which unjustifiably restricts the captive nations concept to the so-called satellites in Central Europe and the three Baltic states. In recent years, however, it has taken notice of the other captive peoples in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Whether this development will jell into a reformulation of policy is dependent

15. *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, pp. 3297-303.

upon numerous factors and circumstances in the future.

But it is illuminating that in 1960 the then Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon, referred to these captives and said: "The Armenians, the Georgians, the Ukrainians, the Tatars, the Turkomans, Uzbeks, and Tadzhiks—and many others who attempted to escape from the Czarist 'prison-house of nations,' as Marx called it—were thrust by force into the Communist straitjacket."¹⁶ Regardless of some conceptual inaccuracies in the statement, it is nevertheless a decided mark of progress, an advance in our official thinking about the Soviet Union. After all, only a few years before the Department taught, in its *Soviet Affairs Notes* (No. 158): "The term 'Ukraine' is itself a modern political rather than a historical term. It was invented in the nineteenth century by nationalists seeking to detach the southwestern borderlands of Russia from the Tsarist Empire."¹⁷ How pitiful this is can be gauged by the fact that French, German, English, and other writers employed the term since the seventeenth century. For example, Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan, a French author, produced a work titled *Description d'Ukraine*.¹⁸ However, an enduring advance requires a major and sustained change in our intellectual orientation toward the Soviet Union. The breadth and depth of this reorientation can only be measured by a revamping of our concepts, and thus conceptions, regarding this entity. This in turn presupposes a concentrated knowledge of the areas involved.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 3295-97.

17. Dobriansky, Lev E., "Captive Nations—Moscow's Achilles Heel," *The Manion Forum*, November 12, 1961, p. 3.

18. Sichynsky, Volodymyr, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth Century*, New York, 1953, p. 67.

REQUISITES OF REORIENTATION

Based on these trends in critical thinking about the USSR, there are four necessary requisites which can insure this indispensable reorientation toward the Soviet Union. They themselves are in the best possible conformity with the dominant tendencies seen at work in the international field. In addition, the pragmatic employment of these requisites will serve to reinforce several of these tendencies, as well as perform the role of an efficient agent for the rapid acquisition and collation of data in the vital area of the USSR. In short, their progressive currency would steadily offset and eventually cancel out the peculiar aspects of popular thinking discussed above.

The four requisites are: (1) the strategic polwar concept of the non-Russian nations in the USSR; (2) emphasis on Moscow's totalitarian imperialism; (3) the full exposure of Soviet Russian colonialism; and (4) the development of a universalized Declaration of Independence and all that this implies. The sorry confusion of state and nation with reference to the Soviet Union is readily resolved by the adoption and use of the determining concept of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. The concept also counteracts the use of such baseless terms as "the Soviets," "the Soviet nation," "the Soviet people," and the like. It is noteworthy that in the preceding empire of Muscovy the subjugated non-Russian nations had to struggle against the stifling term "Russians." Like the Irish, whose national identity was threatened by subsumption under the term "British," the Ukrainians and others had to fight against the tendency of being called "Russians." Today the equivalent of this is the term "the Soviets,"

which conceals the multi-national differences and cleavages within the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, it makes little rational sense to hail the new states of Africa and at the same time to either overlook or minimize the importance of the nations which are situated at the very base of the enemy of the Free World. The African states have far less national sinews of historical continuity, geographical contiguity, religion, customs, language, mores, law, common experiences of war and peace, heroes, and arts than the majority captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. With respect to these criteria of the national concept, a not too difficult case can be made out for the applicability of more of these criteria to the non-Russian nations in the USSR than, indeed, to our own nation. Language and religion, as well as the length of historical tradition, are obvious points of difference.

Emphasis on Moscow's totalitarian imperialism is a second workable requisite. It is totally in accord with historical fact and current political reality. Such emphasis is obviously related as a necessary support to our primary concept. We noted before that when the Hungarians revolted in 1956 the battle cry was both "Freedom!" and "Russki go home." When the Georgians rioted in March and May of the same year, public buildings in Tiflis were chalked with the slogan, "Long Live an Independent Georgia."¹⁹ When the Germans invaded Ukraine in 1941, they were greeted with flowers and mass cries for independence from the Russian masters. These cases can be multiplied indefinitely, going back to the conquest of the

19. See Dobriansky, Lev E., "The Mounting Pressure of Nationalism," *The Great Pretense*, Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, 1956, pp. 113-17.

first array of non-Russian nations at the beginning of the 20's. Foreign domination with totalitarian reins—meaning Russia—is the crucial and overall fact in all of these cases. One need not think twice about the enormous psychopolitical impact that a United States-sponsored resolution for a thorough U.S. investigation into all the captive nations would produce throughout the world. Yet for some reason Moscow's totalitarian imperio-colonialism is not brought into full relief. Instead, vague and meaningless references to "international Communism," "Communist imperialism," and "Soviet imperialism" are habitually made; and concrete facts remain clouded while the ghost of Communism is helped to persevere.

Beyond the propaganda smoke screen of "independent socialist countries," including even the non-Russian nations in the USSR, is the opaque reality of Soviet Russian colonialism. Knowing the usual output of Western scholars, I cannot agree with the observation made by a quoted official study that "Western scholars of Soviet affairs agree on the imperial-colonial character of the U.S.S.R." ²⁰ This condition, too, is interwoven with the polwar non-Russian concept. Moscow has been the center of imperialist conquest over all the captive non-Russian nations now being fallaciously represented as "the socialist countries." Whatever the form and appearances of "increasing satellite independence," it is the center of colonialist control over these spoils. Of course, every endeavor is made by Russian propaganda to conceal the empire character of its colonial domain, but the ruling fact is that essentially and ultimately decisions of whatever basic type are Moscow-determined and Moscow-cleared. Even so-called Rumanian independence is not beyond this, since the Russians, in

20. *The Soviet Empire*, p. 166.

contrast to the Red Poles and Germans, have been least opposed to Rumanian industrialization.

The full exposure of Soviet Russian colonialism would further reveal the existence of an extended Soviet Russian empire with different sets of relationships contained within, such as that of the Russian and non-Russian within the USSR, that of Moscow and the so-called satellites in Central Europe, and the Moscow-Peking, Moscow-Belgrade, Moscow-Havana relationships. Whatever the motivation behind them, oft-used references to "the Soviet bloc," "Communist bloc," indeed, even "the Soviet Empire," lack the existential pungency and operational significance of the conception advanced here. The infrequent criticism in a few circles that this requisite implicates the Russian people is without logical point in this context. The oppressed Russian people, as a whole, have little to do with this political phenomenon. Moreover, continual stress on the empire character of the Soviet Union and its legalistic extensions in Central Europe and Eastern Asia leaves no room for the imputation of monolithism in any form.

Finally, the development of a universalized Declaration of Independence would reveal its power by sheer contrast of meaning to the two preceding Russian phenomena. As we observed earlier, our Declaration of Independence provides us with an ideology construed as a body of truths, ideas, and principles. In basic reality it underlies our continued growth as a Free World leader and enables us to stand up best to the mortal threat of Moscow's imperio-colonialism. A program of action within a realistic context of psycho-political warfare can easily be worked out on the basis of this universalization. Without exaggeration it would spell disaster for Moscow's and Peiping's political warfare enterprises.

Mention should be made here of another conclusive and pragmatic test of the determining concept of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. In 1960 the writer succeeded in having a measure passed by Congress honoring Taras Shevchenko.²¹ A century ago our own great tradition of independence, freedom, and constitutional government rubbed off on this heroic Ukrainian poet and humanist. The Congressional tribute vexed Moscow so much that a whole barrage of verbal assault against the author and others was launched.²² Because of the pragmatic value of the test and the fact that this story is yet to be fully understood, a whole chapter is devoted to the subject. The new frontier of understanding and combating the USSR will become even more clear.

FRONTIER OF THE POSITIVE OFFENSIVE

Although the concept developed here still is not generally understood with intellectual conviction and appreciation, there is no doubt in the writer's mind that sooner or later it will be adopted and put into full application. This will develop more likely by force of circumstance rather than by forceful persuasion. In any event, the literature on the subject will continue to grow, and the intellectual grounds for imaginative action bearing on it will be steadily broadened.

The more one studies this basic subject, the more he comes to realize that it represents Moscow's most vulnerable point of weakness. He begins to appreciate why Moscow is so acutely sensitive to it. I repeat, there can be

21. *Europe's Freedom Fighter*, Document No. 445, U.S. House of Representatives, 1960, p. 45.

22. "Reds Decry Ukrainian's Statue Here," *The Washington Post*, March 7, 1961, p. 19.

no question of the fact that one of the main motivations behind Moscow's offensives in the United Nations for debates on colonialism have been to deflect world attention from the very scourge that prevails throughout the Soviet Russian Empire. In this it has been banking on the superficiality of the Free World's rebuttal in any discussion of the same, particularly with reference to the Soviet Union itself. Yet a methodical concentration of effort on the subject would be abundantly rewarded by the opening of many new frontiers of initiative and a positive offensive in the Cold War for the leader of the non-totalitarian Free World.

Whether there be a Stalinist or a Khrushchevian climate in the Soviet Union and other sectors of Moscow's empire, cultivated psycho-political means can be employed with uncanny flexibility and maneuverability. As we shall see, on the diplomatic level, in one situation we might be compelled to sever relations with the master and dependent Red capitals in the empire; in another, such as now, we should be extending these relations to the non-Russian capitals in the USSR. By taking this latter step, we would be fully recognizing the nations involved and thus reinforcing the national pride and appetites of these non-Russian peoples.

Turning to the propaganda level, far greater emphasis should be placed on the histories and aspirations of these captive nations than is being done at present. Here, too, as we shall observe, the Voice of America should be markedly expanded in this direction since it is officially admitted that—when we have something of real substance to say—greater jamming is exerted on our shortened non-Russian language broadcasts to the USSR than on the Russian broadcasts. Also, the *America* magazine should be circulating in the languages of the non-Russian republics

as well as in Russian. In the economic and military areas the picture of colonialism and occupation should be respectively portrayed, and manifest contradictions between constitutional provisions in the USSR and actual practices should be accentuated.

These are only a few indications of the possibilities and opportunities open to us in this deadly contest. Even these in combination stand to demolish the spurious "Russian image" being built by adroit Moscow propaganda. But before a successful program along these lines can be launched, sound working conceptions and concepts must first anchor our thoughts and perceptions in relation to the problem facing us. Without this, we can only hope to drift aimlessly from project to project at considerable cost to ourselves. And second, a new frontier or a real bridge of understanding is yet to be reached by our successive Administrations in the region of foreign affairs. Our fundamental concept points to the new frontier—a genuine bridge of understanding peoples and nations rather than Red regimes—in U.S. foreign relations. How, in a preliminary way, the march to it is to be undertaken and with what equipment are the subjects of the next two chapters.

Chapter XII

THE NEED OF A FREEDOM COMMISSION

“No! the secret victory does not reside in instruments of destruction. It is a power old as the world, yet always young, more redoubtable than arms; apt to give birth to great surprises, because it creates in an hour the most unexpected means of action, the most varied artifices, applying them to circumstances with admirable precision. It is Moral Power resulting from three forces: the Intelligence which conceives; the Will which executes; the Courage which faces death.”
—Colonel Maillard

“What can we do?” is a frequent question raised by people who are intelligent enough, at least, to recognize that we are in a war for keeps. There are some, of course, who raise the same question for rhetorical reasons. One such reason is to cover up their incapacities, their errors, their omissions or their plain lack of vision and imagination in these matters.

The clear answer to the question is that many, many things can be done to defeat Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, and through this defeat that of the entire Red Empire, including Red China. Remember, the base of so-called Communist power is the USSR, not Red China nor any of the others in the empire. Some of these things have already been suggested. In this and subsequent

chapters several additional items for clear-thinking and programmatic action will be advanced. Even at that we will only be scratching the surface.

How to cope with the Cold War thrusts and maneuvers of Moscow has been a vexing problem for some time. By no means has the problem, in any real sense, been resolved. In fact, our Government has not faced up squarely to all the demands and issues involved in the problem. No clear-cut decision has been made on how to meet it, and no apparatus or coordinating body exists at present to adequately deal with it. Our dearth of operation can only accommodate a defensive reaction to the successive challenges staged by Moscow, as seen in the Congo, in part in the Dominican Republic, Viet Nam and elsewhere. In each instance some gain of a psycho-political nature accrues to the enemy. This could not be otherwise since our defensive posture can only serve to minimize, not prevent entirely, his inroads into the broad field of operation offered by the simply reacting Free World.

The problem is not one that can be competently and satisfactorily handled by any existing executive agency. Moscow's cold war activity embraces military factors, to be sure, but much of the bluster, bluff and blackmail built about USSR's military prowess plainly indicate that in this context the military is essentially a tool for the furtherance of broader political and psychological objectives.¹ This dimension does not fall as an object of primary study, let alone operation, in our military establishment. We have become so obsessed by the fear of "escalations" that Moscow can rightly credit itself with a propaganda job well done. It would do well for many to memorize the Maillard quote above, which may

1. A constructive work on this subject is Atkinson, James D., *The Edge of War*, Chicago, 1960, p. 318.

quite appropriately emblazon a United States Freedom Academy.

As another example, Moscow's unleashing of economic warfare against the Free World creates a similar dimension in its cold war activity. The economic tool is utilized to achieve the same psycho-political objectives. Our Departments of Commerce and State are properly concerned with these economic penetrations into the Free World. But the most that one can hope for in either department is a subsidiary study of this phase of the problem. The same may be said for the propaganda and information phase, cultural exchange, education, science and other fields of enterprise in the Cold War. Studies will continue to be piecemeal; interest in one aspect or another will fluctuate in response to the tune played by Moscow; and much of the effort and capital invested in these lines will yield less than maximally productive results for want of central purpose and an efficient coordination of thought at the very least.

If one dates somewhat inaccurately the beginning of the Cold War period as 1947, the picture depicted above is not a pretty one. The picture is scarcely exaggerated; if anything, it is incomplete. After over a decade of experience with cold war activity, we find ourselves still stripped of the necessary means to engage intelligently and competently in it.

Just a few years ago some legislators on the House Appropriations Committee were amazed to receive a State Department request for funds to establish a section for the purpose of studying Communist tactics and techniques. As one of them pointed out, he had been under the natural impression all these years that appropriations made along these lines were being continually applied to this primary and necessary end. The obvious

moral here is that in these matters one should not be guided by natural impressions and, in effect, take things for granted. As a matter of fact, if the Department had actually conducted such regular studies, there was little likelihood that they could have assumed any concrete operational significance. The problems of coordination and forming a composite picture of Russian cold war operation would still have remained unsolved. The Foreign Service Institute maintained by the Department is no answer to the demands of cold war education.²

There are numerous reasons accounting for this state of affairs. For one, the nature and scope of cold war activity continue to elude the understanding of many Americans. Some, weak in their understanding of Russia's historical background, view it as part of a "strange new force" that has entered our world—"the strangest and most enigmatic in all history."³ When, for instance, any Kremlinite makes an actor's plea for "the lessening of international tensions," they find it difficult to understand that this gesture is only another purposeful maneuver in Moscow's cold war operations. The zag—after the zig—is nothing new in Russian (not just in the so-called Soviet) history, and the end has had both political and psychological import. When Moscow or its totalitarian dependents crave for trade with the Free World, it is surely not for our politico-economic interest.

We Americans naturally crave for real peace. When it suits the calculations of their next operational move,

2. "Statement of Alan G. Grant, Jr." *Hearings on Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy, Part I, Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, US GPO, 1964, pp. 971-973.*

3. E.g. Overstreet, Harry and Bonaro. *What We Must Know About Communism*, New York, 1958, p. 9.

the Russians are prepared to soothe this popular craving. The process misleads, confuses, softens, and gains time and advantage for a concurrent or subsequent move. Moscow's controlled cultural exchange program and recourse to economic aid and competition play on additional American instincts, with much the same results. Even the conduct of diplomatic negotiation is, for Moscow, a traditional cold war instrument. But many of our leaders, steeped in Western traditions, continue to believe that a high level conference with the Russians is an appropriate occasion for settling differences of view on particular issues. They fool not only themselves but also a sizable portion of our populace. The great proponent of "peaceful coexistence," Nikita Khrushchev, gave expression to the standard Kremlin line when he declared, "We do not negotiate on the basis of the give-and-take principle. We have nothing whatsoever to give—we will not make any concessions because our proposals do not form the basis of a barter deal."⁴ In Russian eyes negotiation is itself a cold war instrument, designed for the "soft chance" of gaining an advantage or merely demonstrating "peaceful intentions."

Another reason for our lack of a cold war apparatus is the expressed distaste our people have for Russian methods and techniques. It is frequently argued that we could not succumb to the use of such methods. The filth of lies, distortions, callous murders, and general immoral behavior is beyond our political upbringing. Thus we must depend upon our standard ways. In reply, one can say that in a hot war we wouldn't hesitate to employ any ruse or means of killing where this would serve the ends of our survival and self-preservation. Why should we be

4. Address in Tirana, Albania, May, 1959.

so discriminating under conditions of “neither peace nor war?”

However, to overwhelm the Russian—and thus the Red Chinese, Castro Cuban etc.—cold war threat, a condescension to such methods is not necessary. On the contrary, we possess powers of truth, knowledge, and resources that have not been fully used for want of organization, implemental zeal and imagination. In other words, we haven't as yet developed an efficient apparatus for the utilization of these powers in the most effective ways possible.

Differing views as to the administration of a full-fledged cold war undertaking constitute a third reason for the absence of such a program. Those having these views are in complete agreement that such a project is a must; but to a greater or lesser extent they do disagree as to its content. For example, this writer sees nothing really new in the cold war techniques and methods of the Soviet Russian colonialists. There has been nothing peculiarly “Communist” about them. Unfortunately, people learn this when their fate is sealed. “We were becoming victims of a deception,” writes Juana Castro, “since, in spite of Fidel's public denials of the communist character of the revolution, we could see as the days passed how the country was being delivered to Russian imperialists.”⁵

Except for accidental variations of refinement and intensity, the substantive content of these techniques was provided by totalitarian Russian politics as far back as the sixteenth century. These tools had been the key to an understanding of Muscovy's phenomenal creation of a vast empire long before Lenin and the Bolsheviks ap-

5. Castro Ruz, Juana. “I Accuse My Brother Fidel,” *Free Front*, Manila, Philippines, October-November, 1964, p. 17.

peared on the scene. Nonetheless, this perspective has awaited expression and treatment through facilities which are yet to be adequately established. The "newness" of Soviet Russian techniques has resided in the fact that Americans had never encountered them before. For East Europeans of the traditionally subjugated nations these have been and are historically old methods.

Many exclamations over the years that something creative and different must be done, have clearly indicated a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with existing agencies on this score. Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington has soundly declared that "We have never been in the same league with the Russians in the psychological war of wits and words." The columnist David Lawrence has often made the point expressed in these words: "What a spectacle the Western governments are making of themselves these days as they flounder indecisively in the midst of Soviet threats and ultimatums, seemingly afraid to meet squarely the challenging issues of the hour!" At one time, the then Senator Lyndon Johnson gave eloquent expression to this growing restlessness about our operational inadequacies when he urged a summit meeting of Free World heads of state. Also, at the dedication of the Hoover Presidential Library in 1962, former President Herbert Hoover, in an inspiring address, called for a Council of Free Nations including "only those who are willing to stand up and fight for their freedom."⁶

These and numerous other evidences simply show that the requirements and demands of the current situation are not and cannot be met by our existing agencies. These agencies are functionally fitted for other respective ends.

6. *Text of Address by former President Herbert Hoover, West Branch, Iowa, August 10, 1962.*

This does not mean, of course, that with a new agency created for the specific purpose of dealing with the realities of cold war operation, the fringe efforts of the existing departments would not be embraced. On the contrary, for policy-making reasons a close coordination would be mandatory.

THE PROTRACTED STRUGGLE

A paramount means in the march toward the new frontier of understanding and combating the USSR—indeed, in fortifying ourselves to cope with and to win the Cold War—is the Freedom Commission project. In both the 86th and 87th Congresses some realism in the Cold War was manifested in the measure known as the Freedom Commission Bill.⁷ This measure was sponsored in the House of Representatives by Congressmen A. Sydney Herlong, Jr. of Florida and Walter Judd of Minnesota. In the Senate its sponsors were Senators Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota and Paul H. Douglas of Illinois. The bill called for the creation of a Freedom Commission, the establishment of a Freedom Academy, and the formation of a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee. The basic idea of a commission was first advanced by the Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, led by Congressman Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin. Later, Senator Douglas sponsored a bill seeking the realization of the idea. The immediate stimulus given to the more recent bills was inspired by a Florida group called the Orlando Committee for the Freedom Academy. In the 88th and 89th Congresses further action was taken on the measure,

7. *Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy*, Hearings, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 1959, p. 181.

with massive, expert testimony being overwhelmingly in favor of the new institutions.⁸

All of this action has been aimed at providing much-needed facilities for the strengthening of our cold war position. As its objectives imply, the measure would correct the glaring inadequacy that exists in our executive realm. The Freedom Commission itself would be an independent agency composed of six members and a chairman. The members and chairman would be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. It has been emphasized that one of the prime functions of the Commission would be the establishment and supervision of a Freedom Academy. Training at the Academy would concentrate on knowledge of Soviet Russian political warfare techniques and ways and means of counteracting them. The students at the Academy would be carefully drawn from governmental, private, and foreign areas. Other recommended functions of the Commission include the establishment of an information center to aid organizations and groups in an understanding of Soviet Russian conspiracy and a broad spectrum of psycho-political operations, the conduct of research and surveys, and a host of additional tasks designed to realize the objectives of this national project. The Joint Congressional Freedom Committee, consisting of seven Senators and seven Congressmen, would oversee the work and development of the Commission.

There is no question about this measure realistically filling in some serious gaps in our Government when it comes to the subject of cold war preparation. Also beyond question of doubt is the determining point that no educa-

8. See *Providing For Creation Of A Freedom Commission And Freedom Academy*, Parts 1-2, Hearings, Committee On Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 1964; further hearings under same title, 89th Congress, 1965.

tional institution in our Government or in the private sector can be compared by nature and operation with the proposed Freedom Academy. Moreover, no existing executive agency is equipped by administrative bent or facility to undertake the functions prescribed for the Freedom Commission. And lastly, since cold war progress is just as important and essential—if in the long run not more so—as atomic progress, the need for a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee would be well satisfied.

MEANING OF COLD WAR EDUCATION

In the permanent Cold War this measure of realism has a broader significance than what may appear on the surface. First, it should be recognized that it isn't impossible for this country, and with it the Free World, to suffer disastrous defeat at the hands of the Soviet Russian Empire. The possibility of such defeat is not necessarily grounded in any precondition of a hot global war. As a matter of historical fact, the great advances in the expansion of the Russian Empire, both past and present, have been achieved primarily through systematic subversion, duplicity, and conspiracy rather than by military means. Thus, by way of argument, if the defeat of the United States should come to pass, the chances are that this tragedy would not be the result of lapsed missile production, of any technologic lags, a deficiency in conventional arms, retarded space exploration, domestic economic difficulties, or a fictitious economic victory by Moscow. As one speculates on this, with appropriate weight given to each of these factors, he cannot but logically conclude that this possible defeat would be the consequence of a stubborn misunderstanding about the traditional nature of the enemy, how he grew to be what he is, and the trained

cunning of his diplomatic, political, economic, and conspiratorial ways and techniques. With the well-grounded projection that our deterrent power in military means will be of declining importance over the long run, the soundness of this observation becomes even more striking.

Throughout this book one example after another is offered to illustrate this stubborn misunderstanding or, better, protracted lack of understanding with regard to the nature of the main enemy. It is a veritable blind spot, accruing enormously to the advantage of the power center of so-called world Communism. This Western blind spot contributed to the formation of the Soviet Russian Empire in the form of the USSR, following World War I. It preserved this empire in World War II. Read any of the memoirs by World War II leaders on the Western Allied side, and you can begin to understand why this empire expanded, despite its military and political inferiority. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt nor Eden understood how profoundly weak, politically, Stalin and his gang were. Here is a prime example of Stalin's basic fears: "Stalin: If you say that you might well say tomorrow that you do not recognize the Ukraine as forming part of the U.S.S.R." "Eden: That is a complete misunderstanding of the position. It is only changes from the pre-war frontiers that we do not recognize. The only change in the Ukraine is its occupation by Germany, so of course we accept the Ukraine as being part of the U.S.S.R." ⁹ With this indication of Western myopia, Stalin knew he had an open field for further expansion.

Clearly, if the estimate given here is correct, then the significance and indispensable value of the Freedom Commission come into full view for the precarious period ahead. To live up to its expectations, the Commission

9. Eden, Anthony, *The Reckoning*, Boston, 1965, p. 343.

would have to probe into one of the strangest phenomena characterizing America's role in international politics. In this country, curiously enough, with all its rich traditions of freedom, national independence, and principled opposition to colonialism and imperialism, the real chasm that exists between imperialist Russian totalitarianism and freedom-aspiring non-Russian nationalism seems to escape the minds of many, including many on the highest levels of Government.

In these cases, which perhaps are far too numerous than the present critical situation can tolerate, it appears that their deficiency of knowledge concerning Russia *qua* Russia is exceeded only by their lack of insight into the traditional spirituality and living revolution of our own nation. Well exemplifying this were some of the receptions given in this country to Mikoyan and Khrushchev in 1959. Fortunately, however, this inexcusable condition is being steadily, though slowly, overcome by various contributions made in this field at our universities and in group action.¹⁰ The basic forces of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and non-Russian nationalism, in the USSR especially, would necessarily be a high priority item for the Commission. The meaning of a genuine cold war education is summed up in this priority item.

UNUSED POWERS OF KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

As mentioned earlier, the argument of submission to the filth of Russian totalitarian behavior is grossly untenable. With honorable means and techniques the Commission could begin to utilize some of our unused powers of knowledge and truth to inflict severe damage upon Mos-

10. E.g. Hryshko, Vasyl, *Experience With Russia*, New York, 1956, p. 180.

cow's cold war campaigns. In this respect its first area would be domestic. As we have seen, there is an intricate labyrinth of false preconceptions and disinformation concerning Russia and the USSR and their relations to the United States.

To cite another example on a high level of our Government, Professor W. W. Rostow, who was appointed by President Kennedy to the position of chief in the policy planning body of the State Department, personifies this labyrinth well. He evidently still labors under the illusions that "Russian peoples" inhabit the USSR,¹¹ that the "Soviet Union" is "Russia" and thus "a nation,"¹² that economic growth in the USSR is a "Russian" phenomenon,¹³ and in another work, mind you, that "the national minorities "show little or no aspiration for political independence."¹⁴ If anyone seeks the acme of confusion on this subject, the cited works provide it. We can perhaps afford errors on a university campus, but we certainly can ill-afford them in the State Department. When fundamentals escape us, baseless higher judgments will offer us little escape from tragedy.

Doubtlessly, this labyrinth cannot be dissolved in short order. Time, patience, and persistent effort are required. Not only an educational but an historical process is involved. This field of knowledge on the USSR seems to excel all others in this country in confusion, misunderstanding, and even unpardonable ignorance. In its pursuit

11. Rostow, W. W., *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge, 1960, p. 132.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

13. Rostow, W. W., *The Process of Economic Growth*, Oxford, 1960, pp. 318-19.

14. Rostow, W. W., *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*, New York, 1953, p. 216.

of objective studies, the Commission would have to consider whether Communism or imperialist Soviet Russian totalitarianism is the threatening reality, whether the USSR can be identified as any other state, whether—all sentimentalism aside—Russians can in any decisive manner be attracted to the responsibilities of freedom while the empire of their capital is maintained. Andrei Sinyavsky, a Russian literary critic under the pen name Abram Tertz, has stated the problem succinctly: “In the name of the Purpose, we turned to the means that our enemies used: we glorified imperial Russia, we wrote lies in *Pravda*, we set a new Tsar on the now empty throne, we introduced officers’ epaulettes and tortures.”¹⁵ These and other basic issues would have to be sufficiently clarified by the Commission if we are to adopt those approaches to techniques, via understanding, that would incisively penetrate and weaken the present Soviet Russian empire.

This first step would be the heaviest and at the same time the most constructive responsibility of the Commission. In the order of first things first, unless we begin to rectify our own inbred misconceptions, we can’t help but perpetuate old errors. In this field of knowledge the failure of many scholars and writers to comprehend the empire character of the Soviet Union has led to all sorts of distorted and slanted observations.¹⁶ Briefly, the actual is scarcely penetrated to grasp the real; the superficial is accepted in preference to the essential. For purposes of meaningful interpretation and action the Commission, if it is to achieve a balanced coverage of the enemy and his techniques of deception, would necessarily have to consider

15. “Inquisition in Moscow,” Editorial, *The Washington Post*, October 23, 1965.

16. See Manning, Clarence A., *A History of Slavic Studies in the United States*, Milwaukee, 1957, p. 117.

alternative frameworks of analytic reference than those presently used.

Logically, this first step could not be constructively undertaken without the simultaneous development of the whole area of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. This area of study would have to be developed economically, politically, historically, and culturally. The cultivation of such study, which is virtually nil in this country, would undoubtedly produce many interesting results for national perspective and policy alike. One important result would be a general awareness that both out of ignorance as to the nature of the non-Russian revolution in the crumbling Tsarist Russian Empire and out of half-hearted determination, the United States failed to support the ideas and principles of our own tradition in concrete application to independent Georgia, Armenia, White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan and other non-Russian nations, which had determined themselves at the end of World War I.¹⁷ These nations, as we saw, were soon again individually subverted and subjugated by the imperialist successors to the White Tsar.

But the manifest significance of that period rests in the fact that the Soviet Russians built upon this failure and our mistakes of over forty-five years ago and now threaten the very life of our own nation. They are executing a subtle policy of genocide against the very nations we should have supported. Kosygin furnishes powerful evidence of the fundamental continuity of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist policy when he declares, "We proceed steadfastly on the road of developing each Soviet people's national culture to the point where the communist ideal, namely the merger of all nations into one (Russian) super-

17. Manning, Clarence A., *Twentieth Century Ukraine*, New York, 1951, p. 243.

nation will become reality.”¹⁸ What should have been a second or third-rate power is today, largely on the basis of accumulated captive resources, a contender for the world. More ironical still is the fact that the sole real imperialist power in the world today, has actually stolen the American banner of the idea of national self-determination and freedom and successfully parades it in Asia and Africa. Plainly, then, the Freedom Commission in its positive concern for freedom everywhere would be morally obligated to launch some studies of this long neglected and yet vitally strategic non-Russian area in the Soviet Union. It is expected, of course, that the Freedom Academy would take the lead on this all-important subject in the field of instruction.

PROSPECT OF REDRESSING A SAD RECORD

In addition to its broader significance and opportunities, the Freedom Commission would have the tremendous prospect of redressing somewhat the sad record of American relations with “Russia.” Whether one recognizes it or not, the successes of totalitarian Soviet Russian imperialism have been imposing and sweeping. These successes from 1918 to the present provide a concrete measure of fault and incompetence on our side.

Beginning with the 1920’s, soon after our negative contribution to the establishment of the revived Russian Empire, we inadvertently saved the Russian Bolshevik regime by our unqualified charities through the American Relief Administration. In the 30’s we furnished industrial know-how and capital to the empire and cloaked the new imperial regime with the respectable bonds of diplomatic concourse. In the 40’s we spent billions to save Stalin, and

18. Address, Riga Opera House, Riga, Latvia SSR, July 18, 1965.

overlooked our own determining power by virtually allowing the Russians to expand their empire to the Danube and the China Sea. Our naive faith in Russian words and intention accommodated the leakage of the most vital atomic and missile secrets; and in the 50's we witnessed the evaporation of our monopoly power in these fields. Finally, our ill-advised participation in the Geneva Summit Conference built up the international prestige of Stalin's criminal successors, who are today strengthened by the *sputnik*, *lunik*, and intercontinental missiles. Regardless of the rationalizations offered for each of these developments, the record is a sad and almost incredible one. And in the mid-Sixties we're repeating many of our errors of the Thirties.

To repeat, it can scarcely be argued that we as a nation did not lose much in the shortest period of time for any leading power. The reasons for this have, in part, been given above. There are others. But had there existed all this while an administrative entity comparable to the proposed Freedom Commission, the results would have been immeasurably different. The nature of the enemy revealed itself decades ago. Nevertheless, to win the Cold War means in some notable measure to redress our sad record. And the Freedom Commission is designed to realize such victory.

Failing establishment of the Commission, one shouldn't be surprised by any future extension of the long list of captive nations. The Red imperio-colonialists maintain some 6,000 schools in political warfare, and some 150,000 professionals in this art are planted about the Free World. Eventual takeover is a full-time job with them. As of now, we have only amateurs to contest them. One major lesson we must learn in all of this is that Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist policy never changes in substance. A Kosygin

or a Brezhnev or a future Shelepin is bound to the essence of this fundamental policy as was so lucidly stated by Khrushchev in 1961: "Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists . . . These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable . . . The peoples can attain their freedom and independence only through struggle, including armed struggle . . . We recognize such wars and will help the peoples striving for their independence. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can . . . But these are wars which are national uprisings . . . What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with peoples waging liberation struggles." ¹⁹ This statement reveals Russian double-talk at its best.

Before we turn to the second major means capable of preparing us for victory in the Cold War, we should recall how strange it was that only in the very recent period the State Department requested funds for the specific purpose of studying "communism." It is doubly strange that after a Gallup poll in 1962 had disclosed wide popular support for the Freedom Commission and Academy, the Department suddenly decided to conduct its own "courses" on communist techniques and strategy, and also set up a hollow decoy in a legislative measure to create a Foreign Service Academy. It appears that some people in the Department fear any popular checks on its known errors, omissions and shortcomings, much of this the result of overburdening routine operations. As we shall see, perhaps the most ridiculous mistake committed by the Secretary of State was in connection with a Special Committee on the Captive Nations, the second of America's indispensable media for victory in the Cold War.

19. Khrushchev, Nikita S., "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," Moscow, USSR, January 6, 1961.

Chapter XIII
A PEOPLE'S CAPTIVE NATIONS COMMITTEE

“Iron rusts from disuse, stagnant water loses
its purity, even so does inaction sap the vig-
ors of the mind.”

—Leonardo da Vinci

The work of a Freedom Commission would obviously be quite comprehensive and all-embracing. Such a body couldn't possibly devote all the time and resources needed for American and Free World concentration on the one billion captives—the one billion of our allies—in the Eurasian Empires of Moscow and Peiping. This special task of continual investigation into the so-called people's democracies and republics must necessarily be assumed by a people's committee on the captive nations. And in our constitutional framework the appropriate place for such a committee is in the House of Representatives.

Mid-Sixties illusions in America about “the growing independence of the ‘satellites,’” “the surge of nationalism in Central Europe” and similar myths bring to mind the quoted words of da Vinci. Skillful Soviet Russian maneuvering in Central Europe has abetted these illusions and has misguided our policy-makers into a policy of inaction toward the captive nations, the peoples themselves, as against their totalitarian Red governments whose ultimate hope of survival rests in the Russian power center.¹

1. Dobriansky, Lev E., “Captive Nations vs. Red States,” *American Security Council Washington Report*, July 19, 1965.

It would please Moscow and its Red associates if we would forget the very nomer "captive nations."

Since 1960 much has been written and said about the necessity of establishing a Special Committee on the Captive Nations in the United States Congress.² House Resolution 211, submitted in March, 1961 by Representative Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania, was the original measure calling for the formation of such a committee.³ At the time thirty-nine identical or similar resolutions were offered by other members of Congress. The Republican Congressional Policy Committee placed itself early on record for the passage of this important proposal.⁴ In addition, thousands of letters from Americans in all sections of the country were received, favoring and urging the establishment of this committee. A legislative week didn't go by without many of these letters appearing in the *Congressional Record*. All of this continued the following years right into the 89th Congress of 1965-66, with over forty new resolutions advocating the same idea.

In the 87th Congress the several hearings which the House Rules Committee had conducted on these resolutions brought out many solid arguments justifying a special committee.⁵ At no point did the opposition to this proposal come before the Rules Committee to present, in rational outlay, any of its counter-arguments. The able and distinguished chairman of the committee, the Honorable Howard W. Smith, afforded those opposing the resolutions

2. "Freedom," *Congressional Record*, August 25, 1960, pp. 16445-16465.

3. *Congressional Record*, March 27, 1961, pp. 4637-4638.

4. "Captive Nations Week," *Congressional Record*, June 14, 1961, p. 9685.

5. "Popular Support For House Resolution 211 Establishing a Special Committee on Captive Nations," *Congressional Record*, May 10, 1961, pp. 7218-7225.

every fair opportunity to register their objections and possible refutations in the open. There were no takers. Instead, as we shall see in the next chapter, all sorts of maneuvers were resorted to behind the scenes to delay, stall, defeat and even whitewash the proposal for a Special Committee on the Captive Nations.

Despite these maneuvers, the movement for a special committee gained strength by the day. Inquiries and expressions of popular support have steadily poured into the offices of Congressman Flood and others during this whole period. In 1965 the majority of the House Rules Committee (four Democrats and four Republicans) expressed itself in favor of the measure, but the chairman refused to recognize this formally, claiming the leadership and behind it the White House and the Department of State are opposed to such a body. It is, therefore, extremely important for more and more citizens to know and understand the salient answers to the question, "Why a Special Congressional Committee on the Captive Nations?" Some of these answers we shall now consider in detail.

With reference to imperial Moscow's vast empire we have observed that the basic principle of national self-determination is our most formidable weapon in the Cold War.⁶ As concerns the issue of a hot global war or no, this moral and political principle is a weapon which we have scarcely begun to use. From many angles it is far more potent and determinative than our nuclear armaments and even war-equipped space satellites. We have given endless lip service to this principle, but we have been acutely short on instrumentalizing it for victory in the incessant Cold War. The persistent application of this principle to

6. "Russian Colonialism and the Necessity of a Special Captive Nations Committee," *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, pp. 3286-3311.

the imperium in imperio—the Soviet Union itself as “an empire in an empire”—escapes most Americans.

The continuing irony of our times is that the negator of this principle—the Soviet Russian totalitarian—puts this weapon to far greater instrumental use than we do. Yet it is obvious that this overpowering psycho-political weapon belongs to us and our traditions and not at all to colonialist Moscow. By its methodic and popularized investigations into the captive nations of both Europe and Asia, a Special Committee on the Captive Nations would bring the immensity of this weapon into full and clear relief. This people’s committee would steadily show the tremendous possibilities and opportunities open to us in a peaceable engagement of ideas and truths with colonialist Moscow and Peiping. Its primary impact would be on the consciousness of our own people, concerning the strategic value and importance of all the captive nations to the security interests of the Free World.

Moreover, the facts and data assembled by such a working committee would prove to be of enormous value to our own Department of State. The two Rusk letters, which in another context we shall examine in the next chapter, give every evidence of faulty conception and understanding of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. As indicated in Chapter XI, the writer offered, on a radio network, a couple of examples illustrating the factual deficiencies which have accounted for the misconceptions and misunderstandings of the Department.⁷ Also, with particular regard to the many captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, what Secretary Rusk stated in a letter to the Governor of Minnesota is categorically untrue, that “The study of the problems of these peoples has long been a major

7. Dobriansky, L. E., “Captive Nations—Moscow’s Achilles’ Heel,” *The Manion Forum*, November 12, 1961, pp. 2-3.

preoccupation of both governmental and non-governmental experts, and of regularly constituted and other committees of the Congress.”⁸ What has been done is spotty, unconcentrated, and from a scholarly viewpoint, disorganized.

PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT OF CAPTIVE NATIONS STUDY

Presidential authority constitutes a second good reason why a Special Committee on the Captive Nations should be in existence. President Eisenhower issued two Captive Nations Week Proclamations during his term of office. As shown in Chapter III, in the 1959 proclamation the President explicitly summoned the American people “to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the people of those captive nations.” This urgent theme was widely repeated in the 1960 Captive Nations Week observances.⁹

There can be no better agency or medium for such popular study of the captive nations than what has been provided for in H. Res. 211 and all subsequent resolutions. A special committee would quickly become the chief source of information on the subject. Its reports and studies would be made available to every American and foreigner seeking them. The educational value of the committee’s operations would be of incalculable worth; its results and products would furnish the basis for new and sound legislation governing our relations with the totalitarian Red Empire. President Eisenhower’s summons would be more than satisfied.

8. *Communication*, Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Governor Elmer L. Andersen, June 11, 1962.

9. *Congressional Record*, August 25, 1960, pp. 16445-16463.

Even before his election, President Kennedy also recognized the significance of such studies. During the campaign of 1960 he stated: "I am, of course, in agreement with the Presidential proclamations. The captive nations should be studied intensively. If a Joint Congressional Committee on the Captive Nations is the best way to insure such popular study, I would naturally not be opposed to it."¹⁰ In the 1961 observances of Captive Nations Week this feeling of the President was reflected in his proclamation, which was warmly received throughout the country.¹¹ In it he pointed out that "it is in keeping with our national tradition that the American people manifest its interest in the freedom of other nations." He also urged our people "to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of all peoples for national independence and freedom." Part of this was repeated in the President's second proclamation of Captive Nations Week in 1962, for which Moscow's propaganda organ, *Izvestia*, sharply attacked the President.¹²

Undoubtedly, a Joint Congressional Committee on the Captive Nations would be a perfectly proportionate response to the nature and value of the subject. However, there are too many vexing problems and hurdles to surmount in attempting to form any type of joint committee. On a more modest, but nonetheless adequate scale, a special committee formed in the House of Representatives would serve the aims and purposes of this necessary cold war project. Surely, paraphrasing some of the President's words, it would be the best means for the American people to manifest their indispensable interest in the captive

10. *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, p. 3292.

11. "Captive Nations Week, 1961, and the Necessity of a Special Committee . . .," *Congressional Record*, July 24, 1961, pp. 12203-32.

12. *Izvestia*, Moscow, USSR, July 17, 1962.

nations, and thus recommit themselves through their elected representatives. Such a committee would best reflect the popular will and, what's more, there is an adequate number of legislators in the House with competent knowledge of the subject. The demanding tasks of the committee would be most satisfactorily met through this means.

Another powerful answer to the question about the people's committee rests on a survey of our requirements in relation to the captive nations. In my reply in 1961 to some of Secretary Rusk's allegations concerning the adequacy of our studies on the captive nations, I stated: "On this I publicly challenge Secretary Rusk to produce any comprehensive study dealing, for example, with Soviet Russian economic colonialism within the Soviet Union."¹³ Many Americans repeated this challenge to him in follow-up letters. To date there has been no reply to the challenge, nor can there be, for no such study exists. It is interesting to note that our Presidents have felt the need for more intensive captive nations studies, but the Secretary of State alleges that enough is being done.

The fact is, of course, that no private or public body is engaged in aggregate studies of the captive nations, taking the family of captive nations as a whole. What we do is largely piecemeal, sporadic, and isolated. Indeed, the fundamental perspective of considering and viewing the captive nations in the aggregate is nowhere present. We are so enamored with our own illusions about "the disintegration of the Communist World," "the break-up of the Communist monolith" and similar fantasies that we have lost sight of the fundamental distinction between the captive nations—the peoples themselves—and the imposed totalitarian Red regimes and their states. To put it suc-

13. Op. cit., *The Manion Forum*, pp. 2-3.

cinctly, we are suffering from an intellectual gap in this regard, and only the enemy can profit by this. The tremendous and necessary task of studying systematically, objectively, and continually all the captive nations, notably those in the USSR, is being undertaken nowhere.¹⁴

If we are serious about the captive nations, if we are determined not to ever acquiesce to Moscow's permanent domination or fundamental influence over these nations, if we are intent to find all means to win the Cold War, then only a special committee can fulfill the tasks of this responsibility for popular study of our allies behind the Red Curtains of Europe, Asia and Latin America. Fleeting and basically superficial hearings on some of the captive nations by something less than this make only a political football of the subject.

FIRST BROAD IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC LAW 86-90

Scores of informed Americans are aware of the fact that the Captive Nations Week Resolution, almost a decade now Public Law 86-90, deserves considerable implementation by our Government. Much can be done along these lines, and in time much will be done. About this the writer entertains no doubt. In fact, the establishment of a special committee would represent the first broad implementation of Public Law 86-90 by our Government. And this is another persuasive reason for such a committee. Congress passed the Resolution, and it should be for Congress to implement it and realize some of its implications.

The actual being of such a committee would in itself

14. "Proposal For the Establishment of a Special House Committee . . . ," *Congressional Record*, August 3, 1961, pp. 13585-13588.

certify to the meaning and intent Congress had in mind when it passed the Resolution. It would symbolize the determination and resolve of our legislators, the elected representatives of the people, to further the eventual emancipation and freedom of the captive nations. Millions in this country will never forget the fearful reaction of Moscow and its Red dependents to the Resolution. Missiles, satellites, and nuclear bombs seem to be inadequate to curb Moscow's fears of our implementative steps in this direction. On the other hand, our stress upon captive nations and the basic idea of national self-determination, seems to send chills down their spines.

As pointed out earlier, it was no accident that one year after the passage of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, Khrushchev chose to concentrate on the issue of colonialism in the United Nations. He aimed not only at currying the favor of certain Asian and African states, but also at shifting the spotlight of colonialist rule from his own empire. He even permitted his Ukrainian puppets in the U.N. to speak for the first time in the Ukrainian language. And, scarcely to our surprise, a Mr. Podgorny, who was supposedly a representative of the "sovereign and free State" of Ukraine, seized the occasion for a heavy attack against the Captive Nations Week.¹⁵

By no means should we be afraid to probe this deep fear on the part of the Soviet Russian totalitarians and their Red dependents. Given this evidence and more, we should be greatly encouraged to pursue the several ramifications of Public Law 86-90. The first, logical step is a people's committee, a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. It would furnish many more concrete

15. Address, *United Nations General Assembly*, October 4, 1960, pp. 11-20. Podgorny is now the *potemkin* president of the USSR.

answers to the questions raised in the minds of countless Americans who stood bewildered by Khrushchev's explosion in July, 1959. It would go a long way in clarifying for the general American mind statements of this type appearing regularly in Moscow's controlled organs: "We consider the Russian nation the cementing force that unites the nations of the Soviet Union." ¹⁶ The concentrative work and activity of such a committee would bring into full relief the further concern of Red regimes toward the 1965 Captive Nations Week observance as disclosed in the following: "First there were the American Congressmen, who broke their pens in their haste over the so-called 'problem of the Baltic republics.' Later on much noise was made in connection with the observance of 'Captive Nations Week.' All these were covered by the one deceitful slogan of 'freedom and justice.'" ¹⁷

American thought about the captive world has advanced considerably in recent years, despite the myths of "independence" and "nationalism" of the Central European states. Increasingly the concept of captive nations is not being narrowly synonymized with the few so-called satellites in Central Europe. The aggregate concept of captive nations is being progressively accepted. In many quarters it is now recognized that the captive nations in Central Europe form only a minority in the large family of captive nations. White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkestan and others in the Soviet Union itself are being currently mentioned along with North Korea, mainland China, Tibet, North Vietnam, and Cuba.

This aggregative concept has been harmoniously ac-

16. *Pravda*, Moscow, USSR, July 8, 1965.

17. Hryshyn-Hryshchuk, I., "Life Story of a Moderate Racist," *Literaturna Ukraina*, Kiev, Ukraine SSR, September 3, 1965.

commodated by the original H. S. Res. 211 and all subsequent resolutions. With a forward look they have been realistically founded on this concept, embracing the captive nations inside the USSR as well as outside, in Asia as well as in Europe, and Latin America. Moreover, the resolutions have emphasized the primary strategic value of the captive nations *in toto*, from the viewpoint of our security interest. The further development and elaboration of this key concept have formed additional reasons why a special committee should exist. Although he failed to do much in this respect, Kennedy was quite glib when he said "My many statements on the freedom of all peoples and nations should indicate that we cannot afford to overlook any. If you would consult the *Congressional Record* as far back as 1953 (August 4), you will find that I have supported ideas of freedom relating to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Armenia, and other captive nations. Then, as now, I have been of the firm conviction that we must do everything possible to keep alive the spirit of independence and freedom of these nations." ¹⁸

Although nowadays we don't hear anything about the "New Frontiers," we nonetheless observed earlier that a genuine and real frontier continues to exist in connection with our understanding of the USSR. A special committee would be in the most advantageous position to develop and exploit this new frontier. A full-scale exposure of Moscow's colonialist rule in the Soviet Union would unquestionably be in the highest interest of securing peace with justice. Nothing could contribute more to a solid improvement of relations with the USSR than a live awareness, on our part, of Moscow's colonialist and imperialist domination over nations within the USSR itself. As shown

18. *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, p. 3293.

in the next chapter, Ambassador Stevenson made a heavy contribution in this regard with his unique memorandum on Russian colonialism in 1961.¹⁹

COLD WAR IN THE SOVIET RUSSIAN EMPIRE

The creation of a people's committee on the captive nations is also justified on additional Cold War grounds. Invariably when we speak of the Cold War, we have only one dimension in mind, namely the so-called communist world and the Free World. But there is another extremely important and basic dimension, that between the captive peoples and their unrepresentative governments. The Cold War, therefore, is not just between Moscow's totalitarian empire and the non-totalitarian Free World but also, in fact most fundamentally, between the captive peoples and their quisling governments. That is why a policy of building "bridges of understanding," and ending with re-inforced Red regimes, works against the captive peoples.

It would be myopic, to say the least, for us to be misled by Moscow's cold war zig zags. The hot-and-cold treatment is part and parcel of the cold war game. To accede to Moscow's deceitful blandishments in its moments of trouble, whether it is brought on by forces within the USSR or by Red China, is tantamount to losing a round to an opponent. This would be rank foolishness. Thus, in fact, this is the time for a peaceable offensive, and a Special Committee on the Captive Nations would unquestionably provide such an offensive in thought, ideas, and legislative action. It definitely would produce a necessary and prudent leverage for the captive peoples in their Cold War

19. "Comments by the United States Delegation on the Soviet," *Memorandum Circulated as Document A/4889*, United Nations General Assembly, November 25, 1961.

against colonialist Soviet Russian domination. This would be particularly true, as the Honorable Douglas Dillon once intimated, in the prison house of nations, otherwise known as the Soviet Union.²⁰

Unthinking utterances about precipitating premature revolutions or igniting a hot global war as a result of such action, are only a score for the enemy. Incidentally, when does a revolution become mature? No one seems to be able to answer this. For too long the tremendous power of propaganda has been a virtual Russian monopoly. Here, too, it is ironic how easily we become aroused by partially false notes on the USSR's scientific, space, and economic performance, growth or supremacy; but Moscow's real superiority in the manipulation of ideas, which is basic to all else, scarcely moves us. Without any exaggeration, the outcome of the Cold War hinges on operations in this psycho-political area.

A special committee could not, of course, be a psycho-political or propaganda agency. But, undeniably its impact in the field would be inevitably great. The truths, facts, perspectives and findings educed by it would strongly counteract and demolish the half-truths and lies disseminated by Moscow, Peiping, and the lesser Red lights. This people's committee would give constant lie to the propagandized and overblown Russian and Red Chinese images in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It would undoubtedly fix the spotlight of world attention on the colonialism and imperialism rampant throughout the Red totalitarian empire. For example, by now an overstrain of vision is not required to see the effects of the committee's intensive inquiry into the over thirty million captive Moslems in the USSR. These effects could not be anything but salutary in the entire Moslem world. Lest we forget again, Moscow's

20. *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, pp. 3295-97.

fear of such concentrated, studied concern was amply and surprisingly revealed after Canada's Prime Minister had addressed the U.N. in 1960.²¹ As in the case of the Captive Nations Week Resolution in 1959, relatively few realized how deeply sensitive Moscow is to discussion about its own flagrant imperio-colonialist policies.

When we turn to the likely effects of the committee's work on the Free World and its engagement in the Cold War, the probability is high and strong for a series of further salutary results. By concentrating on the imperio-colonialism of Soviet Russia and Red China, the people's committee would go a long way in enlightening our own people on the area, depth and significance of the captive nations. They would begin to appreciate the motivations behind such Red reactions to the 1965 Captive Nations Week observances: "They are beating the drums again across the sea, filling columns in newspapers and delivering long hypocritical speeches. For the umpteenth time the governing circles of the United States are holding the so-called 'Captive Nations Week.' And the machine of propaganda is deafening the citizens with the 'atrocious' inventions about the fate of nations who are 'suffering under the yoke of the Kremlin regime.' " ²² A Mr. Tronko, chairman of the Delegation of the Ukrainian SSR in the United Nations, had this to say, "And we Ukrainians, must feel surprised and indignant when in the United States, at the official level, annual observances are held for an anti-popular regime which the Ukrainian people discarded to the refuse heap of history half a century ago." ²³ Fifty

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 3302-04.

22. Kasiyan, Vasyl, "Your Efforts Are Futile, Gentlemen," *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, Ukraine SSR, July 25, 1965.

23. Tronko, P. T., "The Duty of the U.N. Is To Strengthen Peace." *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, Ukraine SSR, October 9, 1965.

years have passed and he's still worrying. Moreover, the colossal hoax of Communism would be clearly shown on the basis of data pertaining to all of these nations.

In 1961, in his first State of the Union message, President Kennedy emphasized: "We must never forget our hopes for the ultimate freedom and welfare of the eastern European peoples." Of course the captive peoples of Asia and Latin America should have been mentioned, too. But the point here is that a well functioning Special Committee on the Captive Nations would give concrete form to the former President's admonition, and by its works would guarantee that our people shall never forget these hopes. As has been said over and over again, the very existence of such a committee would also be a permanent reminder to Moscow and Peiping that we do not now nor will we ever write off the captive nations. There still are many appeasers in our country who would not like to have such a determination symbolized in this way.

Also, it should be evident from the nature of the cumulative evidence offered in this work that a special congressional committee would be of invaluable service to our executive organs. Its productive and, in many respects, pioneering work would also serve our U.N. delegation, our representation in UNESCO, and bodies in many other spheres of our Government. Without question its material would be drawn on by foreign governments and representations. In this connection the interests of our country would be enormously advanced if many other Free World representatives were to speak out with the same scholarly tone and presentation as did Ambassador Tingfu F. Tsiang of Free China in the 1960 U.N. debate on Russian colonialism.²⁴

24. *Congressional Record*, March 8, 1961, pp. 3300-02.

A PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE IN CONGRESS

Congress has a remarkable opportunity to serve the people and our national interest through a Special Committee on the Captive Nations, in every respect the people's committee. Such action would mean the first concrete implementation of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, which Congress itself passed in 1959. The special committee would definitely have legislative intent and purpose. Its work, studies, and investigations would lead to many specific findings and conclusions. These in turn would predicate recommendations which would form specific legislative proposals for U.S. conduct in the Cold War. The range of the committee's investigations would be largely determined by numerous uncovered and undeveloped aspects of the totalitarian Soviet Russian empire. A committee of this kind would certainly focus citizens' attention on the ludicrous character of many studies on which the taxpayer's money is wasted. For example, one prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency arrives at this incredible conclusion: "Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the capability of the Soviet police system to keep law and order over 200 million odd Russians and many additional millions in the satellite states. The breakup of the Russian Communist empire today would doubtless be conducive to freedom, but would be a good deal more catastrophic for world order than was the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918." ²⁵

Based on the integralist premise of the new captive nations concept, such a special committee would, by nature and function, encroach upon no standing committee

25. "Special Committee On The Captive Nations," *Congressional Record*, September 23, 1964, p. 21967.

in the House. With the ruling concept of captive nations in the aggregate, the committee would work along inter-related and more organic lines of inquiry and fact-finding than is possible with any of the standing committees. Its unique orientation, founded in the spirit and essence of the Captive Nations Week Resolution itself, would facilitate investigations into phenomena which have been left untapped by existing committees. Again, the excellent case in point is the phenomenon of rampant economic imperialism and colonialism in the USSR. Another is the Moslem problem in the Soviet Union. Many others related to the so-called satellites and the Asian captive nations can be cited.

Furthermore, objective and far-seeing legislators in Congress recognize that the range and depth of work before such a committee would make unusual demands on its members. A great deal of time, effort and dedicated application would be necessary. No standing or some *ad hoc* committee could possibly assume such burdens. Fortunately, there are many legislators with deep convictions about the captive nations. Congressmen Derwinski of Illinois, Feighan of Ohio, Bray of Indiana, and Flood of Pennsylvania, to mention only a few, represent the type necessary. They would gladly specialize in this field, albeit at costs of time, effort and much inconvenience. Only a special committee can efficiently enlist and utilize the knowledgeable services of such legislators.

With Moscow's empire rumbling with troubles, the time for the full use of this people's committee is now. Time is in our favor now, to do what must be done. Nothing else will do. As concerns the captive nations, this people's committee would be the real, effective agency in people-to-people contact—the free speaking to and for the silenced.

Chapter XIV
RUSK'S DUSK VIEW OF THE USSR

“Moscow and Petersburg succumbed easily to Bolshevism . . . There must have been something in the Great Russian tradition that provided more food for Bolshevism than the soil of the rest of the Empire . . .”

—George Fedetov

In the light of all that has been discussed so far, these next three chapters might well be grouped under a super-title “How Not To Beat the Russians.” Three substantial pieces of evidence are elaborated upon to show this. Doubtless, there are many others. But these representative pieces are adequate for our purposes of comparison and contrast, of sensible evaluation and judgment.

The first piece of evidence is the Rusk letters. These letters reveal unmistakably the rather dusk and feeble view held by the Secretary of State toward our chief adversary. They measure well the intellectual and psycho-political lag we spoke of before.

As events have shown, the Rusk letters have been a topic of considerable interest and discussion in quarters concerned with the substance and directions of U.S. foreign policy. Officials in the diplomatic colony in Washington, particularly the French, attempted to assess these letters from the viewpoint of our relations with the Soviet Union. Scholars in our universities have begun to inquire

into their background and the causal reasons for their preparation and dispatch. And private citizens in many sections of the country have written directly to the Department of State in search for further explanations of the unusual contents in the two letters.

Since the letters sent by Secretary Rusk to the Rules Committee in the House of Representatives have stirred up this widespread interest, it can be safely held that in time much more will be written and said about them. They are prominently indicative of the type of thinking we find on the highest levels. The letters deal with the subject of captive nations, and all Americans who are absorbed in this subject will assess the Administration's position in the light of these communications. These significant letters are also related to the subject we have just discussed, the Special House Committee on the Captive Nations.

The Rusk letters came into being as a result of the concentrated action in the 87th Congress for a Special Committee on the Captive Nations. You will recall that in March, 1961, the original measure proposing this was submitted by Congressman Flood of Pennsylvania. Soon, thereafter, thirty-nine similar or identical resolutions were offered. Then, two months later, the chairman of the House Rules Committee, Congressman Smith of Virginia, called for hearings on the proposal. Proponents of the measure appeared in open hearing and accredited themselves with a strong case for approval. Those who for one reason or another had opposed a special committee never made their appearance before the committee. Later, in the month of May, the Republican Congressional Policy Committee placed itself on record in full support of a special committee.

As popular support for the proposal grew, efforts in-

creased in Congress for a favorable reporting of the measure by the Rules Committee.¹ During the observances of Captive Nations Week in July, for instance, the formation of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations was highlighted as the first concrete official implementation of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, which Congress itself had passed. However, maneuvers were then resorted to in the hope of delaying any action on the proposal.

One maneuver was to plan for further hearings that would afford opponents the opportunity to state their case. Of course, they had previous opportunities to do this. These additional hearings never took place, since the opponents refused to air their views in the open. Then, by the beginning of August, a second maneuver was initiated to table the measure. A motion was made to this effect in the Rules Committee and was defeated.

In this strategy of delay and postponement the third maneuver led to the first Rusk letter. The maneuver called for an opinion on the project by the Department of State. It had been generally known that the Department looked upon the special committee proposal with a jaundiced eye, but in the interest of delay and postponement this step was urged. A counter-motion was offered and carried to have a departmental representative in person before the Rules Committee. This never came to pass. Instead, the Secretary of State chose to respond to the committee's invitation by way of a letter.

1. "Action On The Creation of a Special Committee . . . ," *Congressional Record*, August 10, 1961, pp. 14314-14322.

RUSK'S OPEN MISSIVE

Dated August 22, 1961, and addressed to the Honorable Howard W. Smith, the letter reads as follows: ²

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate the opportunity offered in your letter of August 9 to comment upon the proposed establishment of a special committee on the Captive Nations as called for in H. Res. 211.

I have carefully considered the possible role of such a committee in our continuing efforts to deal with the major foreign policy problems represented by the Soviet dominated areas. I have reluctantly concluded that the formation of such a committee would not be helpful.

As the United States Government seeks to deal with the threat posed by recent Soviet actions concerning Berlin, it is of utmost importance that we approach any consultations with our allies or negotiations with the Soviet Union in an atmosphere which best lends itself to an acceptable settlement. In this context, I believe the establishment of such a committee at this time would likely be a source of contention and might be taken as a pretext for actions by the Soviet Union which would interfere with the resolution of the present crisis concerning Berlin.

The position of the United States Government in refusing to accept the *status quo* of Soviet domi-

2. "State Proves The Necessity of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations," *Congressional Record*, March 7, 1962, pp. 3265-3267.

nation over other countries within the Soviet bloc as a permanent condition remains clear and firm. This Government has consistently recognized and upheld the right of these peoples to national independence, to governments of their own choosing, and to the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedom. The interest of the United States Government in their cause is deep and abiding and the Department of State has given constant attention over the years to policies and courses of action designed to convey this interest to the peoples of these areas.

The study of the problem of these peoples has long been a major preoccupation of both governmental and non-governmental experts, and of the regularly constituted and other committees of the Congress.

The President and I have both expressed the conviction that a final settlement of the problem of Berlin, of Germany and of Central Europe must take into account of the right of self-determination of the peoples concerned. However, the United States Government's position is weakened by any action which confuses the rights of formerly independent peoples or nations with the status of areas, such as the Ukraine, Armenia or Georgia, which are traditional parts of the Soviet Union. Reference to these latter areas places the United States Government in the undesirable position of seeming to advocate the dismemberment of an historical state.

Let me emphasize that our judgment concerning H. Res. 211 is based upon thoughtful consideration in the light of the complex situation which we face and will continue to face in the coming months.

I hope that you will let me know if I can be of further help to you.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

Now, a careful analysis of this unusual letter serves only to reinforce the justification of a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations—the people's committee on the captive nations. Regardless of the letter's actual authorship, the Secretary realized this when public disclosure of such an analysis prompted him to send a second letter to the chairman of the Rules Committee. As we shall see, this didn't help either.

At this juncture, in all probability the reader can quickly discern for himself the dusk points of this first Rusk letter. With the Berlin crisis under way the Secretary expressed concern over the prospect that Moscow would not react favorably toward the creation of a special committee. This would be true in any circumstances. After all, the prime objective of such a committee has been to fix the spotlight of world attention on Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism.³ It becomes rather tiring to witness our country berated throughout the world, including Viet Nam, for "American imperialism," while the worst imperio-colonialist power in modern history, Soviet Russia (an imperialist within the USSR itself), is saved from righteous indignation because of protracted ignorance, as demonstrated by this Rusk missive. Also, it is strange, to say the least, that even in the pursuit of facts and truth for popular enlightenment within the United States itself, we have to predicate our supposedly sovereign actions on the feelings of colonialist Moscow. What ap-

3. "U.S. Government Policy and a Special Committee . . . ," *Congressional Record*, August 30, 1961, pp. 16495-16507.

pears to elude the Secretary's understanding is that our determination to investigate all the captive nations would be another effective weapon to deter Moscow from any rash deeds about Berlin or anywhere else.⁴ From every viewpoint the occasion was seized upon as an excuse for not acting "at this time."

Second, the Secretary's allegation that both governmental and private sources have long been studying this subject in the manner advocated by the original H. Res. 211 is simply not in accord with fact. As indicated earlier, he was publicly challenged to produce any comprehensive study on Soviet Russian economic colonialism with the USSR. To this day he has avoided the challenge. The fact is that there is no such study. The same can be said for other fundamental topics bearing on the captive nations.

In addition, his allegation misses one of the basic arguments for a special committee in this regard. And this is the need of a thorough, systematic study of every captive nation for popular consumption and understanding both here and abroad. What impact on the thought and consciousness of the average American, be he worker or student, have the intermittently written and oftentimes unknown studies of a few specialists had? It would seem that the State Department is fearful of having methodic fact-finding studies on the captive nations brought to the attention of the American people.

From my own experiences in the classroom and the public forum, I can say that well over fifty per cent of our students and even adults don't know or have forgotten the fate and identity of the Baltic nations. Well over ninety-five per cent are unaware of the targeting of these nations as far back as 1918. "Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

4. "Moscow's Colonialism and a Special Committee . . .," *Congressional Record*, September 5, 1961, pp. 17053-17061.

stand in Russia's path to Western Europe," wrote the editors of the Soviet Russian government organ. They continued, "They separate revolutionary Germany from Soviet Russia . . . The conquest of the Baltic countries will enable Soviet Russia to carry the revolution to Scandinavia." ⁵ Time without conscious activity does cause people to forget and deprives youth from ever learning.

Third, there is good cause for fear when one reads about our Secretary of State characterizing Ukraine, Armenia or Georgia as "traditional parts of the Soviet Union." Then, of all things, he suggests that a contrary thought would place "the United States Government in the undesirable position of seeming to advocate the dismemberment of an historical state."

In this one statement the Secretary reveals a number of things. The well-substantiated independence drives of Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia, not to mention other non-Russian nations in the USSR, are apparently of no importance to State's policy planners. Furthermore, on the face of this statement, we have the ridiculous notion expressed that the Soviet Union, which has been barely in existence for forty-five years, is "an historical state." If, logically, we give the Secretary the benefit of doubt on this statement, so that the USSR is properly viewed as a continuation of the Tsarist Russian Empire, his difficulty becomes compounded. On this ground what he is in effect saying is that the Russian Empire in its present primary guise as the USSR must not be dismembered. Perhaps one shouldn't be too hard on the Secretary when an acclaimed world historian, Arnold Toynbee, also thinks the USSR is "Russia" and even goes so far on an emotional tangent to say "Americans are the only Western imperialists left, except

5. *Izvestia*, Moscow, December 26, 1918.

for the Portuguese.”⁶ Is it any wonder that Moscow can rely on its deceptive peaceful coexistence program?

The dead-alley into which the Secretary drove himself with this letter can be no one's gain except Moscow's. The letter contradicted President Kennedy's many rhetorical declarations on supporting "the just aspirations of all peoples for national independence and freedom." It has also contradicted the Captive Nations Week Resolution passed by Congress. Not only this, his views are completely out of line with our own revolutionary American tradition. When these views are compared with the position taken by the United States in the United Nations on the Portuguese Angola issue, the incongruities and inconsistencies of our official thinking become even more glaring. But, then, our foreign policy record of the past thirty years is hardly something to gloat over. In terms of losses to Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism it is incredible.

THE STEVENSON INTERLUDE

Now, in terms of time sequence, it is most revealing that soon after the fantastic contents of Rusk's first letter had been made public, our Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, released a memorandum to Delegations in the U.N. which in every respect was unique and unprecedented. As we have noted in other contexts, this memo, dated November 25, 1961, bore heavily on Moscow's imperio-colonialism and cited fact after fact about this system in the Soviet Union itself.⁷ In short, the

6. "Toynbee Calls U.S. Paranoid on Reds," *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1965.

7. "Spotlight On Moscow's Imperio-Colonialism . . . ," *Congressional Record*, March 7, 1962, pp. 3250-3252.

contents of the Stevenson communication have also stood in sharp contradiction to the notions expressed in the first Rusk letter.

One need just scan some of these contents to appreciate the blatant contradictions. On the matter of national self-determination Stevenson cites the record of Soviet Russian colonialism and imperialism. "An independent Ukrainian Republic was recognized by the Bolsheviks in 1917, but in 1917 they established a rival Republic in Kharkov. In July 1923, with the help of the Red Army, a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established and incorporated into the U.S.S.R." On the fate of Georgia, Stevenson observes, "In 1921, the Red Army came to the aid of Communists rebelling against the independent State of Georgia and installed a Soviet regime." With regard to the other so-called traditional part of an historical state, Armenia, our U.N. Ambassador remarks, "In 1920, the Soviet army invaded, and Armenian independence, so long awaited, was snuffed out."

The Stevenson memo was truly a most welcome one. On record, it is the best yet given by any of our Ambassadors to the United Nations. However, how does one account for the obvious discrepancies of thought and conception existing between Stevenson's memo and Rusk's first letter. If anything, they show a lack of unity in expressions of U.S. foreign policy toward the U.S.S.R. Regardless of the causal explanations, they certainly substantiate further the rational basis of a people's committee on the captive nations.

MORE DUSK WITH RUSK

Following these eye-opening developments, a second letter was sent by Rusk to Congressman Smith, the chairman of the House Committee on Rules. Dated December 27, 1961, the letter reads as follows: ⁸

Dear Mr. Chairman:

It has come to my attention that certain passages in my letter to you of August 22, 1961, concerning the proposed establishment of a special committee on the Captive Nations have been cited as evidence that this Government is reducing its support for the national aspirations of the minority peoples of the U.S.S.R.

There is no change in the United States Government's long-established policy toward the peoples of the U.S.S.R. As in the past, the United States Government continues to support the just aspirations of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R., without attempting to prejudice the political arrangements which might be preferred by those peoples if they were free to choose them.

My letter of August 22, 1961, did not signify any change in this policy, and the present letter is designed to reaffirm our continuing policy as set forth above. The Department plans to respond to any further inquiries about the matter by stating that the Committee has been informed to this effect.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

Here, too, a careful reading of this letter shows that
8. Op. cit., *Congressional Record*, March 7, 1962, pp. 3265-3267.

every new communication sent by State to the Rules Committee has only afforded more evidence and ammunition for the proponents of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations. One, the false notion that the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR are merely "minority peoples of the U.S.S.R." again suggests a poor level of knowledge and understanding with respect to these nations.⁹ Stevenson's letter-memo validly recognizes them as nations with statehoods destroyed by imperialist Soviet Russia; Rusk sees them as "minority peoples," kin members to a given "nation" and "country" but in the minority.

According to Rusk's untenable logic, if—as Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and other non-Russian states before—Poland were forcibly incorporated into the USSR, the Polish nation would undergo a transformation into a "minority people." By this reasoning even our own country would be converted into the status of merely a "minority people" if, by surrender or otherwise, we were forced into a World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The *reductio ad absurdum* of this line of reasoning is reached when one raises the pertinent question, "Who constitutes the majority?" On the level of national entities, not to speak of population statistics, the Russians are definitely in the minority in the USSR.¹⁰

What is amazing, too, in this Maginot Cold War of ours is the extent to which we accommodate the avowed Muscovite enemy by our fallacious commissions or pusillanimous omissions. We are supposed to be winning the minds and hearts of all peoples and nations in the cause of freedom and our own survival. Yet one finds colonialist

9. "The Captive Nations and House Resolution 211," *Congressional Record*, October 17, 1961, pp. A8290-8292.

10. "Colonialism, Imperialism, and a Special Committee . . . ," *Congressional Record*, September 5, 1961, pp. 17053-17061.

Moscow rarely, if ever, employing the fictitious term "minority peoples" with reference to the non-Russian nations in the USSR. But our Department of State, as though seeking not to befriend the nations immediately bordering our enemy, falls short of recognizing their nationhood, not to mention their nominal statehood. Remember, only a few years ago State's house organ *Soviet Affairs Notes* claimed that "the term 'Ukraine' is itself a modern political rather than a historical term. It was invented in the nineteenth century by nationalists seeking to detach the southwestern borderlands of Russia from the Tsarist Empire."¹¹ Fantastic, isn't this, when for centuries the term has been in general use.¹² If all this isn't an irony and perhaps more that deserves investigation, one cannot find anything comparable to it.

Moreover, it is a source of bewilderment to many observers that the Secretary of State addressed himself to the Rules Committee on the subject of "the United States Government's long-established policy toward the peoples of the U.S.S.R." Such policy matters fall within the jurisdiction of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This "long-established policy" bears no direct relationship to the proposal for a Special Committee on the Captive Nations which has been before the Rules Committee. Judging by the complete vagueness of the statement on this policy in Rusk's second letter, it would still be most constructive for the Foreign Affairs Committee to inquire into it. Surely the record of this policy is enough to justify such an inquiry.

From all this it should be quite evident that the State

11. *Soviet Affairs Notes*, January 22, 1954, Number 158, p. 1.

12. Again, see Sichynsky, Volodymyr, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions, from the VIth to XXth Century*, New York, 1953, p. 236.

Department fears the work and operations of a people's committee, a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. It fears the factual findings of such a committee, which would throw light on the limitations and fictions of the Department's research and other branches as concerns the USSR. It also fears a closer congressional check on its policy-thinking and policy-making with regard to the USSR. Above all, it seems to fear the impact such a committee would have on the American people. The dusky Rusk letters certainly are the evidence of all this and more.

MANEUVERS AD NAUSEUM

After all this had backfired, a fourth maneuver was launched at the beginning of 1962 to sidetrack the issue of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations. Suddenly the subcommittee on Europe in the Foreign Affairs Committee came to life and decided to hold hearings on the captive nations. Witnesses were called in at random to give testimonies on present developments in some of the captive nations. The obvious aim of this maneuver was to detract from the movement for a special committee and also, in a year of congressional elections, to rationalize before the electorate that, after all, something was being done about the captive nations.

This desperate maneuver couldn't work for several good reasons. First, one needn't play up the fact that the State Department showed a most cooperative attitude toward the "unexpected" decision of this subcommittee by sending Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler to be the first witness. We recall that in response to the Rules Committee's invitation only letters were seen fit. The reasons are more solid than this. One is that the reports of this subcommittee could in no way match the aims, objectives and en-

visioned work of a special committee. A conglomeration of haphazardly requested testimonies is no substitute for detailed, documented studies of each captive nation. In addition, a subcommittee on Europe could scarcely concern itself with captive nations in Central and Eastern Asia and Latin America. Its purpose obviously negates the aggregative concept of captive nations. And one could hardly expect any results in terms of aggregative data covering vital religious, cultural, military, economic and political subjects.

"How Not To Treat The Captive Nations" was the fitting title of an analysis criticizing sharply the motivations and methods of this House subcommittee on the captive nations. One of its conclusions was: "Against the solid contributions of preceding Congresses that made possible the Katyn massacre inquiry, the Kersten investigation, and Public Law 86-90, the sub-subcom products of the 87th Congress are well nigh disgraceful." ¹³ The operations and output of this makeshift sub-subcommittee in the subcommittee on Europe have been a sorry response to the calls for freedom in the Red Empire. Nowhere, for example, is there any serious thought given to Moscow's Pan-Slavist policy, one which both Marx and Engels recognized over a century ago. Yet this is standard policy as can be gleaned from the following. Stalin "spoke very little or not at all about Parties, Communism, Marxism, but very much about the Slavs, about the ties between the Russians and the south Slavs . . ." ¹⁴ Or as Penkovsky, the Western spy in Moscow, related, "Marshal Varentsov made the following comment: "They say we must give our brother

13. Dobriansky, L. E., "How Not To Treat The Captive Nations," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1962, pp. 299-310.

14. Djilas, Milovan, *Conversations With Stalin*, New York, 1962, pp. 95-96.

Slavs missile weapons. So we give them missiles now, and later they will stick a knife in our back.' " 15

Also, the value that some attach to the subject of the captive nations is measured by the resources and means they employ to develop and utilize the subject. If a subcommittee dealing haphazardly with a critical subject as this is the means considered proportionate to the strategic value of the captive nations, then it should be obvious that we have nothing but a political football on our hands. Plainly, this constitutes an attempted whitewash of the subject of captive nations. It is certainly not in accord with the spirit and intent of the Captive Nations Week Resolution.

Nevertheless, the lessons to be learned from all this are equally plain. We see the Secretary of State being more indulgent with fictitious "historical concerns" of the USSR than with realities containing the seeds of this empire's demise.¹⁶ We also see the serious lag that has existed in our understanding of the USSR—our chief adversary! The overall lesson derived from this evidence is, of course, how not to defeat your enemy.

15. Penkovsky, Oleg, "Data Helped JFK in Cuban Crisis," *The Washington Post*, November 2, 1965.

16: "Special House Committee On Captive Nations," *Congressional Record*, August 28, 1961, pp. 16182-16183.

Chapter XV

THE VIENNESE DANCE OF THE COLD WAR

“The willing dancer is easily played to.”

—Servian

Diplomatic summitry has consistently been a bane for the United States. Just look at the record going back to World War II.¹ We are improving, however, in that the real estate of others is not being as swiftly transferred as in the past. The object now seems to be to just keep talking while Moscow and Peking carry their work forward in the Free World. For our part we are to indulge in the self-delusion that all is going well or, as in Viet Nam, resort to last minute military reactions.

The summit meeting of President Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna, in 1961, will very likely go down in history as the Viennese dance of the Cold War. In short time there was much movement of bodies and tongues, some of it polite and graceful and even colorful, but after the swift rendition of culturalistic pomp and palaver there was really nothing to record but the motion itself. What had been well known prior to the meeting was in no way altered or supplemented by the diplomatic dance. From a propaganda and cold war viewpoint the gain, as usual, was Moscow's, not ours. Then, now, and very likely in the future in Viet Nam and elsewhere, “The willing dancer is easily played to.”

1. Josephs, N. Henry, *Criminal Optimism and The Four Summits*, New York, 1962, p. 28.

Despite the Sorensen and Schlesinger accounts of this episode, which are really superficial, and at that contradictory observations of what actually transpired, the Vienna meeting demonstrated the cold war naiveté of the President. It also showed up his grave misunderstanding of the nature of the enemy, not to mention his fallacious view of the USSR itself. The “peaceful coexistence” plague that afflicts us today received a substantial impetus from this meeting.

For what reason did the President accommodate the head of the greatest empire in the world by this meeting? Following the Cuban fiasco, the Laotian retreat, and the lowering of U.S. prestige to the lowest level yet, the timing of this fruitless meeting was the worst conceivable. Moreover, many Americans did not forget the words of candidate Kennedy who on October 21, 1960, had boldly stated, “I believe we should not go to the ‘summit’ until there is some reason to believe that a meeting of minds can be obtained on either Berlin, outer space, or general disarmament—including nuclear testing.” On empirical grounds alone the value of this campaign statement is obvious. Indeed, as we shall see, the increasingly marked discrepancies between overflowing words—sometime in logorrheal proportions—and expected deeds by the Kennedy Administration caused grave concern in many quarters of the nation as to sheer integrity of word, let alone competence, in cold war conduct and activity. The controversial nuclear test ban treaty was the result of other pressures, and the price we will pay for this still is an open, morbid question.

Always bearing in mind that the scale of our political arithmetic has encompassed the captive world as well as the Free World, it was anticipated that Moscow would gain in terms of propaganda from this inconsequential

conference. On the very eve of the meeting the propaganda drums of Moscow and its Red associates began beating the familiar tunes. Radio Sofia in Bulgaria let it be known to the captive peoples that "President Kennedy knows from his own experience—exactly 100 days after his inauguration—where actions from a position of strength may lead." Sarcastically, it had in mind Cuba and Laos.

This theme on Kennedy being compelled to shift from a "position of strength" policy to one of "peaceful coexistence"—and all that this implies from the Red totalitarian viewpoint—was repeated throughout the Empire's radio and press networks. For example, the Czech newspaper *Rude Pravo* wrote, "The time has come for Washington to realize that things do not work out with the present kind of policy." The net effect of this kind of propaganda on the audience within the captive world and also in several parts of the Free World should not be difficult to perceive. The image cast was one of increasing weakness in the position of the United States and thus, relatively, one of enhanced strength in that of the Soviet Russian Empire. With this and the platform provided by the meeting itself, Khrushchev was afforded a good vantage point from which to launch again his pressing campaign on Berlin and to lay the groundwork for the eventual takeover of Laos, an event that we may still witness in time.

Under close examination none of the reasons offered for Kennedy's meeting with Khrushchev had any actual validity. One would have to be quite naive to believe that a face-to-face meeting was necessary to impress upon Khrushchev the dangers of miscalculation. In the past, as now, Russian cold war policy has been firmly based on such an awareness. Logically, the only guarantee against the incurrence of a mistake is the cessation of this policy.

But in the nature of things Moscow *qua* Moscow neither can allow it nor has any intention of changing it. As a matter of fact, since the beginning of 1961 down to a few weeks prior to the summit meeting, when the Russian leader addressed the Georgians in Tiflis, Khrushchev had been volubly predicting the victory of what he called Communism. And this, naturally, can only mean a permanent Cold War.

Significantly, a year after this Viennese dance Khrushchev took a calculated risk in Cuba. He almost got away with a successful nuclear blackmail of the United States itself. The fact that he made this bold attempt is an historical measure of the impressions he received in Vienna. Those who take pride in our "success" in this confrontation would do well to contemplate the thought that the bold try should ever have occurred. Had Khrushchev succeeded, with one flip the fate of the Free World would have been sealed. Wasn't this worth the try—from the Russian viewpoint?

The other reasons given, such as personally sizing up his opponent and reaffirming our positions on a variety of subjects, were equally specious. If the President by then hadn't a working knowledge and understanding of Khrushchev, his background, ways and motives, then surely a brief meeting was inadequate to meet this deficiency. Transient impressions acquired in such a situation, no matter how informal, are hardly the basis of knowing the policies and aims of an avowed enemy. As to reaffirming our positions, Khrushchev did read translations of our newspapers and periodicals in which these positions were plainly expostulated. He was far more familiar with them than many seemed to realize.

For substantiation of these critical observations one

need only turn to the President's report on his trip.² A close reading of the report shows nothing more than a repetition of these reasons with the usual and rather overdone stress on the "responsibility of the Presidency of the United States." Aside from the ever-present danger of concluding secret agreements, which a favorite predecessor of his indulged in, Kennedy asserted that "No new aims were stated in private that had not been stated in public on either side." Without revealing anything new we were also told that "the Soviets"—whoever they are—attach different meanings to the words of war, peace, democracy and so forth, even intimating in a following paragraph that the rational, thinking processes of the Russian totalitarians are different from ours!

The extent to which the President failed to comprehend the nature and character of the enemy is seen in his references to the USSR as a "nation" and to the myth of the "dynamic concept of world communism" which he imputed to Khrushchev. Finally, as became more and more apparent, his pontifical remarks on self-determination and independence awaited concrete deeds. The policy of patched-up containment that he advocated in this report scarcely indicated a working comprehension of the nature of the Cold War. The continued shell-out of billions for foreign aid and even our own military build-up have certainly not been the adequate answer in this type of war.

EXEMPLARY CONFUSION

In the report, President Kennedy made the point that he "wanted to make certain Mr. Khrushchev knew this

2. "Text of President's Report on European Talks," *The Washington Post*, June 7, 1961.

country and its policies, that he understood our strength and our determination, and that he knew that we desired peace with all nations of every kind." This obviously was an old record that had been played over and over again to justify Khrushchev's scandalous visit to this country two years before. In fact, as indicated above, quite a number of old records were played in the statements and outlooks of the Kennedy Administration. What was most disturbing was not only the widening gap between word and deed, but also an accented protraction of confusion regarding the Cold War. This was seen in the President's conception of the enemy and the Soviet Union. It was also seen in his reaffirmation of the containment policy, the lack of a cold war strategy, the absence of a cold war apparatus, and the Administration's almost total neglect of support for necessary projects pertaining to the captive nations. Except for our belated and dillydally effort in Viet Nam, much the same can be said for the succeeding Johnson Administration.

When viewed against the background of confusion and varying attitudes in this country during the 1959-61 period, the Vienna meeting cannot but be regarded simply as a puny dance. In terms of certain basic essentials of cold war operation, the inherent Russian cold war policy, and the Captive Nations Week Resolution, the dance had all the appearances of a masquerade. It symbolized the quasi-appeasement that has continued to afflict us. It also showed that we are ready to abstain from creating and generating any troubles for imperio-colonialist Moscow in the domain of its pragmatic, imperial realm, and at the same time wishfully hope that it would abstain likewise in the area of the Free World. This has been the level of our blissful naiveté, not to say perhaps ignorance of the nature of Soviet Russian totalitarianism and its

cold war coefficient. This is the protracted state of our confusion and quasi-appeasement.

To gauge the twists of the dance and the tenuity of our present state, let us survey, then, this background of confusion, shifting attitudes, and quasi-appeasement. It can be accurately held that since the Mikoyan visit to this country in 1959 many quasi-appeasement forces have been pressing on with increasing confidence. When one looks back over these years, one finds, for instance, some openly stating that there were or are no slave labor camps in the Soviet Union.³ Others tried to convince us that Khrushchev was simply appalled by the crimes committed by Stalin, as though the notorious hangman had never committed a crime himself.⁴

At the same time we had numerous other Americans in economics, science, and education actually peddling, whether they were aware of it or not, the very things that Moscow had sought to disseminate. Even in the present, many of them are really doing Moscow's propaganda work at no cost to the central Red regime. The Krem-linites have so effectively tranquilized an increasing number of Americans that they aren't even aware of the net advantages accruing to Moscow from their innocent campaigns for "peace," nuclear test bans, total disarmament, and trade with the Red Empire.

You will recall that in this period we also heard a great deal about peace and friendship. Nixon used it at great length on his tour of the "Soviet Union," really only the R.S.F.S.R., i.e. Soviet Russia, itself. However, before we uncritically accept this disarming slogan, we

3. A moving personal account on the subject is Nicholas Prychodko's *One of the Fifteen Million*, Boston, 1952, p. 236.

4. For some of these crimes see, Campaigne, Jameson G., *American Might and Soviet Myth*, Chicago, 1960, pp. 143-144.

should also look at its significance not only in these times but in the course of history. A sober American would say: "Yes, peace and friendship, but first, justice and freedom." As we noted earlier, the traditional Russian political slogan of peace and friendship (мир и дружба) has for centuries been used to deceive non-Russian nations into captivity. It is indicative of our lack of cold war insight and imagination that we have failed to turn this slogan to our account. Peace and friendship are and can only be the consequents of justice and freedom, not their causes. The harmony implied by peace and friendship is logically based on the dictates of justice and freedom. The Soviet Russians have, with typical deception, put the cart before the horse, and some of us are uncritically amenable to be taken for a ride in the cart. And this wasn't the first time in the course of these past forty-eight plus years.

When one looks back at these evidences of error and confusion, he should begin to reflect on certain essential points. The first point, which we noted before, is that the Cold War is not new. It's not a new institution. It wasn't started in 1947, despite the fact that it then began to affect the United States. Actually, it hadn't even commenced in 1917. Historically and analytically one could show Russian cold war techniques going as far back as the sixteenth century. The second point is that the development and refinement of these techniques have been linked with the expansion of an empire. These techniques have a tradition and have served to build an empire, with military power always having been kept in secondary reserve.

The third point is that unless we develop a perspective and an understanding of these techniques, to see the whole background to what we now call protracted conflict

or the Cold War, we can only hope to indulge in make-shifts and constantly react to the perpetual initiative shown by the enemy. In such a case we shall find much to our surprise and also dismay that military power can virtually be neutralized. Even superior military power can really prove to be of little avail, as, to some extent, we have learned in Viet Nam. In exposing ourselves to this real long-run possibility we truly risk an eventual hot global war with greater probability of defeat. Most of this made little dent on Kennedy and his dance in Vienna; it has been no more understood since.

DOMINANT U.S. ATTITUDES

In the United States there have been five dominant attitudes toward the world struggle. These are: (1) wishful cold war cessationism; (2) accommodationism to Moscow's empire; (3) military hardwarism; (4) evolutionism; and (5) cold war realism. In many cases, of course, these attitudes tend to overlap. The Viennese dance of the Cold War was permeated with the first two and the fourth—wishful cessationism in the spirit of global pluralism, accommodationism, and evolutionism.

Considering the first, the wishful cessationists erroneously believe that "understanding," cultural exchanges, and a search for agreements, completely marginal and inconsequential, will secure peace.⁵ They argue as though these did not prevail in far greater degree with regard to Nazi Germany prior to World War II. In that period we had cultural exchanges and a very close and intimate understanding with the German people, and yet these

5. See the excellent article by Mosely, Philip E., "Soviet Myths and Realities," *Foreign Affairs*, New York, April, 1961.

factors were not sufficient to avert the outbreak of a war. The plain fact is that the Cold War is at Moscow's instigation and, contrary to what its propagandists now say, it certainly has never been at ours. Understanding and people-to-people programs are important. But when one begins to understand that the cultural exchange program in itself continues to be an instrument carefully manipulated and used by Moscow for its own benefits, particularly in realizing net advantages of scientific and technological information and training, then it will be appreciated that this can hardly produce that kind of understanding which presumably will pave the road to a genuine peace. In his urgings for "lessened tensions" and "pluralism in the world," Kennedy brought this cessationist spirit with him to Vienna. This was an American variant of "peaceful coexistence," which also could prove to be of expedient worth to Moscow. After the venture in Cuba in 1962, Moscow seized upon this variant and has played it in tune with its own brand of "peaceful coexistence." With deep economic and political troubles in the empire demanding a breather with the West, the Soviet Russian totalitarians have exploited this variant well.

The second group consists of the accommodationists, many of whom prodded the President into the Viennese dance. They have never learned from historical experience that this form of appeasement only encourages the enemy to bolder ventures. We have many of them in this country, in official circles and beyond; their loud voices have been heard on Viet Nam, and they'll re-emerge again and again. They contend, "Well, if we can only accommodate them. They've expanded far enough. We could make a deal with them. This is your sphere, and this is

ours." Curiously enough, this is the very thing that Moscow has been seeking and demanding for its own advantage.

A third group is made up of the military hardwarists, who quantitatively are more prominent in civilian life than in the military. These hardwarists obtusely ignore the forces of spirit, will and ruse which so often in the past have undermined even a mighty fortress. In the armed forces there are those, of course, who follow in the path of the now retired Admiral Burke. They recognize that the decision of tomorrow will not rest in the military but, instead, in the area of the non-military, the psychological, propaganda or what we properly call the Cold War. This view is reinforced immensely by mutual military deterrence as construed in quantitative terms alone.

Then, fourthly, there are the evolutionists. Many, without declaring whether they are random or selective evolutionists, are equally wishful in their desire that history will for some inscrutable reason be on our side. This position certainly stimulates passivity. It exudes the wishful hope that somehow there'll be a strong liberalizing process at work in the USSR, either through consumer good production or education and the rest of it, followed eventually by an institutional blend. This, too, fails to recognize the nature of what we call the protracted conflict and only contributes to what is the protracted confusion. At Vienna, Kennedy was prepossessed with this evolutionist preconception, and his successor, with his "bridges of understanding," has nurtured the same illusion. While there is a Communist Party network in control of governments, random evolution can only be a mirage. Selective evolution leading to inevitable revolution is part and parcel of a forward-looking policy of liberation. But Kennedy never understood this policy.

Finally, the fifth group, the cold war realists, are guided by the evidence not only of today, of yesterday, or even of over forty-five years of Soviet Russian conquest, but also of centuries of established Russian cold war techniques. The evidence precedes any volitional act of hope. It also demands action proportionate to the danger.

Quite plainly, in some circles of our Government and elsewhere, there is no firm general grasp of what a Cold War means, what it involves, and what it calls for. Lacking a working concept, it is no wonder that, on the one hand, there is scarcely any appreciation of its long background of methods and techniques. On the other hand, it is clearly comprehensible why we continue to operate in aimless, haphazard, makeshift and piecemeal fashion, incurring seen and unseen losses as we hobble along. A further imposing irony of our situation is that while Moscow carefully plans its cold war tactics and maneuvers in the broad context of its fixed cold war strategy and objectives—including even the lessening-of-tensions maneuver—we are engaged in no such cold war gaming, and don't even possess the apparatus for it. As was said before, in a hot war we wouldn't think twice about immediately creating such an apparatus.

Yet, by our definition a cold war is a twilight condition of neither peace nor hot war, where all the basic elements of a hot war—predatory design, aggressive strategy, tactics and techniques—are present, except for open military combat between states. A cold war is in essence the soul of a hot war with the military employed largely for propaganda effect. A cold war entails objectives and the will to realize them. It embraces all the techniques of ruse, subversion, infiltration, cunning, treachery, plotting, fraud, bluster, blackmail and indirect aggression. It includes every conceivable thing as an instrument—the

psychological, the economic, the ideological, demographic, the political, scientific, educational. And it also allows for action on two levels: the level of official pretext, like Khrushchev coming here as head of State and, second, the level of sub-official cold war operation, viz., Khrushchev as the head of a world conspiracy.

Many of us rightly lean on the authority of Clausewitz, the Prussian genius, to gain insights into the nature of the cold war. Lenin studied him closely and quoted him often. And Khrushchev, a professed Leninist, must have seen himself in the mirror of Clausewitz's words: "A conqueror is always a lover of peace; he would like to make his entry into our state unopposed." But few of us know that Clausewitz obtained his cold war knowledge in Russia's military service. With Russia's military position much weaker than Prussia's at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and yet the Tsar extending his domination over nations, Clausewitz asked himself, "How could this be?" He entered Russia's military service to obtain the answers that would save his own Prussia. When he returned in 1814, he rejoined the Prussian Army, and by 1818 was already commandant of the General War School in Berlin.

Some of Clausewitz's classic observations make for mandatory and refreshing reading in the America that has been floundering these past fifteen years. He offers a "maxim which should take first place among all causes of victory in the modern art of war: 'Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination.'" ⁶ For us, this can only be the universalization of our Declaration of Independence aimed at the heart of the enemy—Moscow and its captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. He then

6. von Clausewitz, Carl, *Principles of War*, Harrisburg, Pa., 1942, p. 19.

writes: "Generally speaking, the chief aim is the certainty (high probability) of victory, that is, the certainty of driving the enemy from the field of battle." ⁷ Khrushchev had a glimmer of this in 1959, if we didn't.

The heirs of Lenin, who was bred on Clausewitz, breathe these principles and maxims daily. In Vienna, Kennedy reiterated, "My ambition is to secure peace," without comprehending that the genuine peace he sought can only be secured through cold war victory, the one thing Khrushchev and any Leninist can soberly understand. The President's world pluralism was no match, in any calm discussion, with a Soviet Russian's "war of liberation." ⁸ The thesis of an unfinished war of liberation, particularly in the USSR, is the only argument of strength and determination that Khrushchev or any of his successors can respect. Pluralism has philosophical attraction, but it is only "bourgeois" weakness in the context of the Cold War.

RUSSIAN COLD WAR TRADITION

In essence, the cold war methods employed by Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Shelepin etc.,—in Viennese dance salons or elsewhere—are no different from those developed by Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great and other Russian tyrants. In looking at these techniques one has to consider again that traditional and institutional nexus in the empire—the nexus between internal totalitarian tyranny and external imperialist expansionism. The two have always worked hand-in-hand, one feeding upon the other. Substantially the

7. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

8. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., "Kennedy and a Pluralist World," *The Washington Post*, January 28, 1966.

techniques have not changed. In content, by virtue of technological changes over the centuries and especially in the recent period, marked changes have, of course, taken place. But this fact of technologic change shouldn't blind us—as it appears to do for some—to the basic continuity of cold war policy in imperio-colonialist Russian politics.⁹

The methods are in substance psychological, propagandistic, political and of several other veins. The military, on the other hand, has always been kept in reserve, marching in, if you will, at the climax of a situation. In this respect there is that classic by which many of us could profit immensely. We cannot quote too often this work on the *Journey For Our Time*, written by a French traveler in the Tsarist Russian Empire, the Marquis de Custine. It provides his diary notes on the Russian Empire of the last century. Their timeliness will amaze the reader.

With changes for a few characters, you would believe that he is describing the present Russian situation. For example, he says in one place: "I try to analyze the moral life of the inhabitants of Russia. The Russian thinks and lives as a soldier . . . a conquering soldier."¹⁰ The essentially military and cold war economy in the USSR today depends on this institutional strand. In another passage, which is very appropriate to the Kremlin's exchange visits and the hospitality involved, he writes, "Once again I say, everything is deception in Russia, and the gracious hospitality of the Czar, gathering together in his palace his serfs and the serfs of his courtiers, is only one more mockery."¹¹

9. E.g., Karpovich, Michael M., "Russian Imperialism or Communist Aggression?" in *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*, New York, 1960, pp. 186-195.

10. *Journey For Our Time*, New York, 1951, p. 150.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

The cold war methods we want briefly to observe for every century since the sixteenth—the methods of ruse, subversion, infiltration, indirect aggression, fraud, bluster, blackmail—have been adroitly employed to build up an unprecedented empire. The tyrants of the past left a wealthy legacy of cold war techniques for the Soviet Russian totalitarians, no matter who sits in the Kremlin. By these methods the contemporary tyrants of Moscow have extended the empire and are now threatening the independence of our own nation. As shown earlier, the smoke screen ideologies of the Third Rome and Pan-Slavism were used in the same deceptive way that the mythical ideology of Communism is manipulated today. It would do well for our people to learn more about the growth of the Russian Empire, both past and present, than to waste some time with Marxism and comparative economic systems. Such learning would reveal the secrets of empire-building, which are the cold war techniques that, in large measure, eluded Kennedy and others. Frontal military aggression has always been secondary. It is secondary today, for Moscow places considerably less trust in the power of its mongrel armed forces than we do. How little President Kennedy understood all this can be gleaned also from his acceptance of Walter Lippmann's suggestion to refer to the Russian-controlled USSR as an "adversary" rather than an "enemy."¹² The contest is more deadly than a wrestling match.

A full cold war perspective requires an historical comprehension of traditional Russian cold war techniques; yes, in substance, even leading up to the 1961 Viennese dance and its fiction of peaceful negotiations. Let us take one illustrative case for each century. In the case of Basil

12. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., "Kennedy and Eisenhower Conferred," *The Washington Post*, January 19, 1966.

III and Ivan the Terrible, the groundwork for the swift expansion of Muscovy was laid in the sixteenth century. The real starting point was 1519; the target and victim was Kazan, the citadel of the great Golden Horde. For thirty-three years Moscow worked at it in "peaceful co-existence," using infiltration, subversion, and intervening support for a contender (Shah Ali), against the possessor of the throne. Finally, in October, 1552, the Muscovite forces simply walked in when Kazan was so weak that it couldn't even defend itself.

There's a definite similarity here between this technique and the one employed by Khrushchev in the Middle East. Khrushchev first played up to Nasser with the aim that through him he would be able to neutralize the area and thus exclude the influences of the United States, Britain and others. Then, later, Moscow would build up a contender in the area—in Turkey or Israel perhaps—in order to provide the contention and the clash that would lead to division and chaos. Ultimately, as a ripe apple, the area would drop into the laps of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.

Following this first case, four years later, in 1556, by the same techniques and in support of the contender Derbish Ali, Moscow managed to take over Astrakhan. The entire area of Siberia and also the Middle East were at that time opened up to further aggression.

Here is a representative case for the seventeenth century. This case is very appropriate in view of the fact that in our time—1954—in the Soviet Union and throughout Moscow's empire, a whole year of celebration was conducted in observance of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654. Theses were produced and had to be taught and learned in cells throughout the Soviet Union as well as in the

so-called satellite states.¹³ The theses glorified the alleged union of two Slav nations, namely Russia and Ukraine. One not knowing the history of the Pereyaslav Treaty would certainly not be in position to evaluate the reason why, in 1954, a 300th anniversary of this event was put on. Of what significance, of what value to Moscow was there in putting on such a gala event throughout the empire?

Well, the fact is that Moscow characteristically twisted the meaning of the treaty to show, today, an indissoluble union between these two nations. Yet historical facts show that when the treaty was consummated in 1654, it was only a military alliance, a mutual security pact, between Muscovy and Ukraine against hostile Polish and Turkish forces.¹⁴ In four years that pact was violated by Moscow. We speak of treaties being violated by Moscow in our day. When one looks at the history of the growth of this empire, he finds the same long series of gross violations. As a further example, in 1559 a war took place—an inevitable war—between Ukraine and Muscovy. Hetman Vyhovsky, who was the head of the Ukrainian forces, declared then: "The treacherous action of Moscow was apparent in preparing for us a slavery, primarily by means of instigating a civil war in Ukraine." How many instances do we know of instigated civil wars, many that are currently going on, indirectly if you will, in Asia, Latin America and numerous other places? Again, a solid precedent for the present.

Let's now look into the case of Poland in the eight-

13. "Theses on the Tercentenary of the Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia," *Tass*, January 13, 1954.

14. "Ukraine and Pereyaslav Treaty," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1954, New York. This whole issue is devoted to the subject.

eenth century. We know of the Polish partitions, but how many of us know, for example, about the operations of the Russian "Smiling Mike" of that day? The Russian Ambassador in Warsaw, Reprin, had manipulated the religious issue of Orthodoxy to divide the Catholics against the Orthodox in Poland until, finally, he successfully managed to bring about the first partition in 1772. Immediately thereafter, his successor, Ambassador Stackelberg, had operated just as Vishinsky did in 1940 when he entered Latvia and by ultimatum "legalized" the situation. Stackelberg had the Polish Sejm "legalize" the first partition. Later, with the second partition, in 1793, a new issue had been infused fifty years before Marx even made his name. Discord was sown between the social classes of the boyars and the peasants. Obviously these are old techniques, no matter how you might attempt to grace them and perhaps seek to change them. Can you imagine a Senator Fulbright, who thinks there are "200 million Russians" in the USSR today, and who hasn't the slightest inkling of this necessary background, as our Secretary of State? Yet Kennedy "had almost decided on Fulbright" as his Secretary of State, if it wasn't for the Senator's segregationist stigma.¹⁵ Just another indication of the man who went to Vienna to meet face-to-face the hardened product of this imperial background.

For those who think they can trust the Russians, another interesting case, by way of illustration, was that preceding the conquest of Georgia in 1801. From 1768 on, Russia had been at war with Turkey and then allied itself with Georgia. Catherine the Great aligned the Russian forces with the Georgians to thwart the Turks. On the eve of battle the Russian forces under General Todleben with-

15. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., "President-Elect Had a Yearning for New Talent," *The Washington Post*, January 18, 1966.

drew, leaving the Georgians exposed. Let us recall that over a century and a half later, in 1945, an agreement between the Polish underground and Moscow's forces was consummated to destroy the Nazis in Warsaw. The agreement had specified a certain time of uprising for the two to wage together a war against the common enemy, only to be deceitfully broken by Moscow.

As one goes through these cases and scores of others, one cannot help but be impressed by the techniques that have been used to build up an empire. The least important technique is that of frontal military assault. Numerous other examples can be given. One is reminded of the case in Persia toward the close of the nineteenth century because of the operations of Moscow surrounding Iran today. You might have noticed that on the economic level Moscow has been offering Iran 85 per cent of the oil profits. The highest is about 60-65 per cent for mutual oil exploitation in the Middle East. In its divide-and-conquer strategy Moscow is even willing to build dams and numerous other projects so long as Iran refuses to set up any missile bases.

In the 1880's the Russian Ambassador in Persia played a very instrumental role. It led to the bombing of the parliament, the abdication of the Shah, and the withdrawal of the Constitution. The division of the country between the Russians and the British soon followed. A repetition of such division occurred in Iran in the 1940's. The old borderlands policy of using non-Russian peoples within the Russian Empire against adjoining territories has been a standard one for Moscow. Just as it is attempting today to use the Kurds in Iraq and elsewhere, so, with the Azerbaijani, Moscow seeks to divide Iran.

Even for this century, many of us fail to realize what transpired immediately prior to World War I and in that

very fateful period of 1917-1923. This whole chapter of twentieth century history is a blind spot for most Americans. In the post-war period many of the so-called "republics" now in the Soviet Union were independent states. Georgia entered into a mutual security pact with Soviet Russia. Ukraine was promised by Moscow that its sovereignty would be respected. One by one, through infiltration, subversion, and ideological deception, they were raped and have since been kept in a submerged state within the Soviet Union.

With this background one can easily assess the weakness of Kennedy in Vienna. Khrushchev well knew the lack of any perceptive understanding on his part and that of his advisors regarding Russia's fundamental weakness in the USSR. Not too long after the Viennese dance Kennedy again demonstrated it when in his interview with the Russian leader's son-in-law he blindly declared, "If the Soviet Union had lost the war, the Soviet people themselves would object to a line being drawn through Moscow and the entire country. If we had been defeated in war, we wouldn't like to have a line drawn down the Mississippi River."¹⁶ This is a classic in misplaced analogy. It shows how little the President knew about contemporary USSR history, let alone the past. A line drawn about ethnic Russia in the USSR would be thunderously hailed by all the non-Russian nations in that empire.

AMERICA'S HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY

Also, with this background one can now appreciate more than ever the fact that the passage of the Captive Nations Weeks Resolution in 1959 disclosed two indisput-

16. Text of Kennedy Interview with Editor of *Izvestia*, November 28, 1961.

able truths. One is the sensitivity of Moscow to the weakest and most vital nerve in its empire. The second is the lack of understanding in many sections of our nation with regard to the significance and power of the majority captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. The sole basis for Moscow's dread of the resolution is that Public Law 86-90 is fraught with enormous and even decisive cold war possibilities, primarily on the colonialist issue.¹⁷

Clearly, then, if you don't know the nature of your opponent, how could you expect to convert his weaknesses into real vulnerabilities—at Vienna or elsewhere? Let's take another instance. For public consumption, the editors of *Life*, in their garbled World Library edition on *Russia* impress on their readers that the USSR is a united, integrated and monolithic power. They even call it Russia; what is worse, the already confused reader is told the Soviet Union is a "nation."¹⁸ Concrete facts and also proofs show the very opposite. The mere assumption of monolithism is not even an intelligent one from a cold war viewpoint. So you see, we're like the fighter entering the ring with an obscurantist disregard of the information given him. His opponent has several loosely patched-up broken ribs, but he prefers to pursue operation disadvantage. More, like him, we even refuse or fear to test the data. We recall how in 1961 Kennedy asked for a full debate on colonialism in the U.N., but he never followed up on it.

Khrushchev feared such a test and virtually paralyzed some of us with his coexistence or co-destruction propaganda. Significantly, at the same time Moscow's cold war

17. See "Colonialism in the Soviet Empire," *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, Switzerland, November 20, 1960.

18. *Russia*, Thayer, Charles W., Life World Library, New York, 1960, p. 96.

activities continued undiminished in every quarter of the globe. And, to repeat, these activities include every available instrument—political, diplomatic, psychological, demographic, economic, cultural, scientific, military. The Resolution and certain subsequent developments, which we shall treat later, have shown conclusively how the Russians can be easily thrown on the defensive.

If eventually we are not to be cornered into a hot global war, we must face up to the realities of the Cold War. An unparalleled empire was built up over 500 years by cold war techniques. With modern technology and communications it could expand in a short time. A sound basis for necessary cold war gaming is provided in the Captive Nations Week Resolution. With an indispensable initial apparatus, such as the Freedom Commission and the Special Committee on the Captive Nations, the possibilities suggested by the resolution can be developed peaceably and victoriously in the name of justice and freedom first. Common sense dictates that genuine peace and friendship can only be derived from these primary conditions.

Surely, Viennese dances of the '61 vintage will not insure the successes and achievements of America's historic opportunity in our time. We must look now to 1976, the 200th anniversary of our own Declaration of Independence. It would seem that in these years ahead we ought to endure a period of moral and political re-dedication, in order to show the tremendous will and stubborn patriotism of the American people. The old age that Khrushchev ascribed to us is only an old Russian mirror of the senile institutions that make up his empire. This period is one for us to prepare for and courageously meet the many challenges that will certainly present themselves.

And this task means background, perspective, real understanding, and will.

In terms of our own moral and political principles, as enshrined in our Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights—not to speak of the importance of preserving our own national independence—we have a global field for the most successful endeavor in history. Its gigantic success will depend on our ability to express these principles adroitly, skillfully, and in a peaceful manner. We haven't even begun to use the full power of our economic, political, scientific, and spiritual resources. The entire Red Empire, including even the Russian people, is ripe for the spiritual drive of independence. For the Russians, independence from centuries of tyranny, oppression, and slavery; for the non-Russian nations, both within and outside the Soviet Union, national independence and freedom. To quote Clausewitz again, "Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination."

These objectives constitute a tremendous opportunity for America. With the proper kind of re-dedication we can begin to implement the means whereby we could seize this opportunity. Remember, no team on any football field has ever won a game playing on its own side of the fifty yard line. We've been doing just that for over a decade. It hasn't been a winning proposition. There are many avenues—many feasible avenues—for our kind of pressure for freedom. As it was once said, *si vis pacem para bellum*—if you wish peace, prepare for war. And the war we have to prepare for in the case of Russia is primarily a Cold War. The symbolic Vienna meeting, in the light of all this, was simply a Viennese dance.

Chapter XVI
THE VOICE OF—AMERICA?

“The voice of the pigeon on the spit is not
like the voice of the pigeon on the tree.”
—Woloffs

Our third major piece of evidence on how not to cage the Russian Bear is provided by the Voice of America. I'm aware of the fact that the United States Information Agency has been the whipping boy for many groups and individuals. Here, as elsewhere, it is not my intention to indulge in unwarranted and unconstructive criticism. My sole objective is to show how often we miss the boat that can transport us toward victory in the Cold War. In this case it is certain that most of our people have been unaware of the type of in-fighting which has been waged for us to catch that boat. Following Woloffs' wisdom, we should prefer the pigeon on the tree than that on the spit.

Truly, then, is the Voice of America really and completely the Voice of—America? This is no play on words. Nor does the question, as posed, imply in any way that the Voice or the United States Information Agency is riddled with sabotaging “communists” and subversives. This thought is passé and rather superficial at this time. In fact, to clarify the question more, we can go a step further. As the record shows, the writer has consistently

supported the Agency in its needs for expansion and improvement.¹ To be sure, I've also criticized it on many occasions but always with constructive intent.²

Now for the story. In 1958 the USIA decided upon certain policy directions for the Voice, which caused many to raise the question in the above form. These directions have been dangerous, ill-advised and even a bit absurd. They haven't been officially rescinded, and the possibility of their further execution persists. In effect, a truce on this matter has existed since the end of 1958.

We don't at all believe that the decisions arrived at by Mr. George V. Allen, who was then the director of USIA, and also by the Department of State, have been the results of any subversive "communist" or pro-Russian influence operating within these areas. But we are convinced that they have been the products of a grave misunderstanding as to the nature of the mortal enemy and the fixed aspirations of the captive nations, both within and outside the Soviet Union. It is little wonder that the modes of effective appeal to the subjugated non-Russian peoples in the USSR have been largely neglected by the USIA.

After all, as we have seen, the broad non-Russian periphery of the Soviet Union is the solar plexis of the Soviet Russian Empire. Its sons and daughters make up about 43 percent of the armed forces of the USSR. In over four decades of Soviet Russian domination the non-Russian colonies in the USSR have consistently and steadfastly

1. E.g., Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1960, Hearings, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Washington, D.C. 1960, p. 794.

2. E.g., "The Voice of America and Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1955, pp. 35-45.

resisted Russian imperial power and rule.³ From these and a host of other facts it should be obvious that in behalf of U.S. security interests alone the non-Russian nations in the USSR really constitute a high priority target for U.S. information and propaganda. A broad and imaginative aim at this target would successfully turn the tables on counterfeit Russian propaganda about colonialism, nationalism, and independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁴ Unfortunately, this was not evident to Mr. Allen; nor is it evident to the USIA today.

TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE POLICY

The reason why we have lagged far behind Moscow in effective propaganda appeal and have committed blunder after blunder was intimated in 1958 by Vice President Nixon himself. He stated, in effect, that the way to combat Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism is to revitalize the American Revolution, a thought we might seriously consider as we approach the 1976 American Revolution and Independence Bicentennial. He urged that we should be standing for, not against, the nationalist movements in foreign countries. As he put it, "It is ironic in the extreme that the United States should ever be cast in the role of opposing legitimate nationalist movements. Many of the ideas which motivate today's nationalists stem from Amer-

3. See, e.g., *Ukrainian Resistance*, New York, 1949, pp. 142; *Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of the Non-Russian Nations of the U.S.S.R.*, Hearings, Select Committee on Communist Aggression, Washington, D.C., 1954, p. 370; *The Soviet Empire*, Committee on Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 197.

ican history and have been taught in American universi-

4. "Soviet Insists U.N. Check on Colonies," *The New York Times*, February 28, 1962.

ties at home and abroad . . . We, rather than the Soviet Union, should be the natural champion of legitimate nationalist movements.”⁵ How true and yet how thoroughly negated this American view is by what has been going on in the Voice as concerns, particularly, the non-Russian nations in the USSR.

In marked degree, the policy of the USIA has worked to Moscow’s advantage. The restrictions it has placed on non-Russian language broadcasts to the USSR really conduce to Moscow’s aims as was conveyed by Khrushchev to Adlai Stevenson on the latter’s visit to the Soviet Union. “Mr. Khrushchev was saying,” Stevenson reported, “that whatever goes on in the Communist world is a family affair and doesn’t concern outsiders, that Soviet suppression of the uprising in Hungary in 1956 was not interference, and that Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia to conform to Moscow is not a case of meddling in another country’s affairs. But Khrushchev also made it clear that what went on in the free world is a proper concern of the Soviet Union.”⁶ This is an old Russian stance on non-interference in its imperial affairs. Whether the USIA is aware of it or not, its restrictive actions have served these aims. These have been the same aims that Moscow has endeavored to realize through summit meetings.

On the information and propaganda front, our policy should concentrate on the captive nations, especially those in the USSR, the chief source of the world’s problem on peace or war. It should be completely attuned to our own Revolution and Independence, which for decades have had special meaning for the captive nations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It should highlight the farce of

5. *Text of address to Harvard Business School Association*, September, 1958.

6. *The Evening Star*, Washington ,D.C., August 27, 1958.

Moscow's traditional non-interference theory. None of these ingredients holds an essential place in USIA policy today. In fact, the words American Revolution and Independence in relation to the captive nations are studiously avoided, the USSR is looked upon as a "nation," Moscow's spurious theory is largely upheld, and the Voice continually prides itself as being a non-propaganda medium, as though propaganda is a dirty and meaningless word.

THE ISSUE

About the issue in background and detail, it must be emphasized that it has absolutely nothing to do with official talk and programming leading to "premature revolt" and the like. But it has to do with policy wisdom and propaganda efficacy. The Voice is not only a technical instrument for the transmission of factual information. It is also—or should be—a psycho-political weapon employed for the prime purpose of influencing minds and hearts to the justice and political integrity of our side in the global struggle. Anyone listening to USIA spokesmen explain the purposes of the Voice often leaves with the distinct impression that the Voice is simply an innocuous medium, set up to inform the rest of the world about what Americans are doing in their everyday existence.⁷ This is about the best way to lose friends who have any human emotion or envy.

One certainly does not see sufficient evidence of propaganda skill and acumen aimed at progressively weakening the enemy by carefully designed programs and words. In a real sense the enemy isn't even looked upon as one.

7. *Review of United States Information Agency Operations, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., 1959, pp. 25-68.*

There isn't that ardor or fervor in the Agency that qualifies it to undertake those things implied by Nixon or by President Kennedy himself. Our leaders talk a great deal about the spirit of the American Revolution; but here, of all places, the spirit has been lacking, and the goal of defeating the enemy by word and thought is virtually nonexistent. Indeed, when, in 1958, I discussed with Mr. Allen the problem of strengthening our USSR non-Russian broadcasts, he was more concerned about the unfavored prospect of "splinterizing" the Soviet Union than about anything else. A strange bias for the head of our ostensible propaganda agency, but nevertheless true.

Let's, then, look at the issue which has continued down to the present. In early 1958 it was decided by the USIA and the Department of State that certain changes in Voice broadcasts to the Soviet Union would be effected by the beginning of October. The changes were to be: (1) the elimination of the regular fifteen minute daily program in the Moslem Uzbek language beamed from Munich to Central Asia, (2) the reduction of one hour each in the daily Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Ukrainian programs, and (3) an increase in English-language programs beamed to the USSR as well as a half-hour increase in the Russian-language program.

Doubtlessly, these changes would have some unfavorable effect on the Moslemic peoples, those who are not only in the USSR but also in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Their impact would be equally adverse on the other non-Russian nations which are held captive in the USSR.

These changes, about which Secretary of State Dulles seemed to be unaware, have lacked justification. In fact, they have possessed all the earmarks of the first step in a policy of psycho-political disengagement, as regards the entire Soviet Russian Empire. Today, the areas of the

inner captives; with this success, tomorrow, the outer captives in Central Europe. It is noteworthy that after six months of private discussions on the subject, these changes were announced in July, 1958, immediately after Congress had made its appropriations to the USIA. For the time being, at least, this tactic precluded any public airing of the issue. But this was not for long. Thanks to Congressmen Judd, Hays, Bentley, and Mrs. Kelly, a hearing was held in October of that year.

What, then, are the given reasons for these changes, which in largest measure have persisted to the present? Mind you, some of these changes might still be enlarged upon, if the USIA felt it could get away with another full-scale hearing. Concerning the Uzbek program, the alleged reasons are: (a) to maximize our use of available transmitters, (b) "insufficient evidence" as to whether this program was "being heard to an appreciable extent," and (c) scarcity of "available funds, or transmitters or of qualified personnel." On the basis of these reasons the Uzbek program has actually been eliminated.

However, on close examination, these reasons for having eliminated the Uzbek program are weak, to say the least. This change is further evidence of our gross ineptitude in the propaganda field. The height of this ineptitude is revealed by the fact that while Moscow today enjoys tremendous radio facilities in Tashkent to influence the free Moslem world to its ways of thinking, we are stripped of even a meager program in VOA aimed at the unfree Moslems in Central Asia.⁸ A *New York Times* editorial indicated in 1958 the absurdity of this

8. See "Soviet Steps Up Radio Campaign in Mideast to Five Hours a Day," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1958, p. 10.

change.⁹ Instead of displaying greater interest in the enslaved brethren of the free Moslem world, by this step we have chosen to ignore them.

If transmitters are to be usefully maximized, they certainly should be in the direction of the Moslems in Central Asia, Idel-Ural, and Azerbaijan. There is considerably more evidence proving Turkestanian opposition to Moscow and its imperio-colonialism over the past forty-five years than can be shown in favor of the Russians, to whom we devote a disproportionate amount of VOA time and facilities. By any political analysis of requirements for victory in the Cold War, the over 35 million Moslems in the USSR have a higher target priority over most of the areas in the Free World to which we beam VOA broadcasts.

Furthermore, the reason of "insufficient evidence" on the reception of this program raises the question as to what kind of evidence the USIA is seeking? The puny operation it had in the 15-minute Uzbek program is hardly the stimulus for any evidence. As always, the Agency relies heavily on the lack of resources plea, thus no effective program. Clearly, if it understood this problem, it would recognize that the cause-and-effect sequence is really the other way around. By way of logic alone, this is a vitally important target area; thus we must have an effective program; therefore, resources must be made available to it, even at the cost of less important areas.¹⁰ The resources, both human and physical, can be made available.

9. "Khrushchev and the Moslems," Editorial, *The New York Times*, July 22, 1958.

10. See Sulzberger, C. L., "Moscow's Huge Colonialist Hoax," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1958.

Let us now look at the USIA's reasons for cutting down the Baltic and Ukrainian language programs. One highly informed legislator, the Honorable Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois, has pointed out, "Presently, the Voice of America beams only one-hour of Ukrainian a day, which is a most impractical policy, in view of the fact that the Ukrainians are the largest non-Russian nation held captive within the U.S.S.R." ¹¹ In the past it was argued by USIA that such reductions permit a more concentrated use of transmitters for the purpose of overcoming the *heavy jamming* of these programs. Since June, 1963, Moscow ceased jamming, but the cut-back in hours has remained. The second reason was that "the concentration of transmitters on particular programs necessarily decreases the number of programs which these transmitters can carry." With no logical compunctions by USIA, the extra time, however, was devoted to English language programs beamed to the USSR and, by way of a half-hour increase, to the Russian language program. Significantly, both of these programs were not subjected by Moscow to heavy jamming. As in the preceding case, these reductions have been equally unjustified and unwise for our interests.

A point which should have been of keen interest to any legislator voting on USIA appropriations is, "Why did Moscow jam these particular non-Russian broadcasts most heavily, whereas our English and Russian language broadcasts were less or not jammed at all?" One can only reasonably infer that Moscow has feared these latter broadcasts less. This striking fact of disproportionate jamming, supported by USIA's own admissions, is indeed a sound point of departure for an inquiry into these cases and also the

11. *Independence for the Largest Captive Non-Russian Nation in Eastern Europe*, Speeches, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 18.

relative contents of these programs. Indeed, the time is long overdue for another intensive congressional review of the USIA and the VOA. Reasons for Moscow's de-jamming, the largely innocuous character of VOA broadcasts, the question of its propaganda status, its present uneconomical structure and other points deserve another public airing. It is true that the Kremlinites have been complaining that the "poisonous seeds of bourgeois ideology are hitting us through various channels," but it still is a question whether these complaints are genuine or are for outside consumption to have the politically innocuous programs continued.¹²

Common sense would have dictated steps of concentration and expansion of the non-Russian broadcasts because of the excessive jamming. Our authorities preferred not to follow such dictates. Instead, on the flimsy pretext of transmitter shortage, they decided to reduce these sensitive programs and, of all things, to allocate the extra time to the far less sensitive English and Russian language broadcasts. In the case of the Ukrainian broadcast, this was done at the very time when Radio Kiev in Ukraine expanded its facilities to reach the millions of Ukrainian background everywhere in the Free World. It is highly significant, too, that Moscow has placed top priority on Ukrainian language broadcasts to North America.

At the time, USIA made the plausible point that these changes, by virtue of transmitter concentration, had enabled us to overcome in some degree the heavy jamming. This was all to the good. But it did not in itself justify the allocation of the extra time to the English and Russian language broadcasts. With a concentration of

12. E.g., Grose, Peter, "Leaders in Soviet Fear West's Radio is Ensnaing Youth," *The New York Times*, March 25, 1966.

transmitters for the non-Russian language broadcasts, this time and more should have been devoted to these evidently more sensitive programs. As in the Moslem case, there again has been much more evidence to show that we have considerably more to gain by concentrating on these Baltic, Ukrainian, and other non-Russian broadcasts to the USSR than on either the English or Russian language programs. That is, unless our self-defeating goal is eventually to imitate the British Broadcasting Company and have these captive non-Russian nations in the USSR listen in the language of their captor. The unrescinded changes have pointed in this direction of psycho-political disengagement. While from Moscow, Ukrainians have been told to like the Russians, it now appears that from Washington they are being told to listen like Russians.¹³

The second reason offered by USIA is not without a certain logical flaw. For the moment let's agree that transmitter concentration *necessarily* decreases the number of programs. Still, why more time and programs for Russian and English language broadcasts? For, applying USIA's own formula, this presumably means more programs on fewer transmitters per program. Or, are more transmitters per more programs the rule for them and not for the particular non-Russian programs? Here, too, one runs into a priority valuation. Very simply, if it is conceded that the USSR has top priority for our broadcasts, then why can't more transmitters be made available to our USSR broadcasts at the expense of less sensitive programs to areas with lower priority? This is another sensible alternative and in accord with the view of every legislator who believes "that the purpose of this Agency was to combat the propa-

13. "Ukrainians Are Told to Like the Russians," *New York Herald Tribune*, March 14, 1958.

ganda of the Soviet Union.”¹⁴ Instead, down to the very present, we have been dispersing our radio efforts over practically every continent at the cost of necessary concentration on the Soviet Union and the nations within it.

MINORITY LANGUAGES: FACT AND FICTION

As the record conclusively shows, in USIA's view the languages of the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Turkestanians are “minority languages” of “minority groups.” This, perhaps more than any other fact, explains these unthought changes. Introductory studies by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression show that the non-Russian nations have striven desperately to preserve their distinctive languages and other cultural identities against the Russification programs of Moscow.¹⁵ Ironically enough, and regardless of its alleged reasons, the Voice abets, in effect, Moscow's Russification program by emphasizing communication in Russian to the subjugated non-Russian peoples. This seems to be the best way to alienate your natural friends and aid your enemy.

Strange as it may seem at this late date, there is no Byelorussian desk in VOA, and the Byelorussian nation of close to 10 million, even an original charter member of the United Nations, receives no American attention. The Moslem nations in the USSR are completely ignored by us, while Moscow strives to wipe out memories of great Moslem national heroes such as Sheikh Shamil, whom Karl Marx called a “great democrat” in the mid-1850's, and Moscow now paints as a “black reactionary, who was

14. *The Congressional Record*, August 20, 1958, p. 17253.

15. *The Soviet Empire: Prison House of Nations and Races*, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., 1958, p. 72.

in the pay of foreign imperialists.” Also, on the curious VOA scale of proportioned time, some small countries of less than five million receive the same as or more broadcast time than does Ukraine with over 45 million people.

The recourse to expanded English broadcasts to the USSR appears equally ludicrous in terms of the global psycho-political conflict. Are we perchance attempting to Anglicize the peoples behind the Iron Curtain? The present movement in American education is to have our people learn the languages of other peoples primarily in order to understand them better, to make warm contact with them. Evidently the tendency in the Voice has been contrary to this movement and its objective. The USIA’s fantastic formula is: reduce the programs in the language of the masses, have them listen more in the language of their captor, and the relative few who wish to perfect their English—very likely for political ends against our own interests—let’s accommodate them, too. Fitting means in a grandiose policy of accommodation!

On the basis of these facts and more is it little wonder that we lag pitifully behind the Russians in the propaganda field? Dealing with this subject several years ago, Senator Paul H. Douglas stated: “On the occasion of meeting with Secretary Dulles, he expressed agreement with the proposals made in the memorandum, one of which was the strengthening and expansion of the foreign language broadcasts—particularly in the non-Russian language programs—of the ‘Voice of America’ . . . It is, therefore, shocking to learn that the ‘Voice of America’ is now engaged in a series of actions which do violence to one of the major proposals with which Secretary Dulles expressed his agreement.”¹⁶ What the Senator sought then hasn’t been realized yet. General Eisenhower is only partly right when he

16. *The Congressional Record*, August 22, 1958, p. A7898.

says, "If we are going to win the cold war, we must spend whatever is necessary on this job (communications through the USIA)—a half billion or even a billion a year if it takes that much." ¹⁷ More money alone will only perpetuate basic structural and functional defects in the Agency.

THE ISSUE DIVIDING THE WORLD

Really, in a complete sense, have we a Voice of America? President Kennedy voiced the conscience of America when on July 4, 1962 he declared: "If there is a single issue that divides the world today, it is independence—the independence of Berlin or Laos or Viet Nam—the longing for independence behind the Iron Curtain . . ." ¹⁸ This longing for independence by the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR is treated by USIA with reduced and ineffectual programs, omissions of the captive nations of Turkestan, Idel-Ural, Azerbaijan and White Ruthenia, taboos on the very use of the word "independence" in regard to Ukraine, Georgia and others, and wasteful discrimination of time and volume among VOA's various desks.

When the Captive Nations Week Resolution was passed by Congress in 1959, VOA went out of its way to play down the reference of the resolution to the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. It has played this role since. Yet, as one outstanding Cold War analyst has put it before a congressional committee: "A vigorous and imaginative implementation of the congressional resolution establishing Captive Nations Week is but a single example of the kind of opportunities that abound in strategic political

17. "USIA Called Vital Link With World," *The Washington Post*, October 10, 1965.

18. *Text of address given at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, July 4, 1962.*

communications for the leadership of the free world—opportunities for creating ‘trouble at home’ for the Soviets without the slightest risk of encouraging futile revolt or of escalating into a hot war.”¹⁹

Wordmanship can carry even more power than hydrogen bombs or superior economic performance. Words contain the explosive power of meaning for which men are willing to die. Propaganda, in contrast to mere information, is essentially the articulated array of meaningful words, and it can influence, affect, and alter men and situations in ways that other means are incapable of. Propaganda, not sputniks, lunicks or missiles, is Moscow’s chief powerful weapon. We haven’t even begun to fashion ours. And in the main psycho-political context of today’s type of war we shall continue to suffer from this basic gap until we overcome our insular disdain for propaganda and recognize its fundamental value in the Cold War. The power of words can silence guns and overthrow empires.

19. *Winning The Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive*, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Part I, Washington, D.C., 1963, p. 105.

Chapter XVII
THE POTESKIN VILLAGE OF NON-RUSSIAN
SOVIET REPUBLICS

“When you travel with a Russian, make sure
you carry an ax”

—old Kazakh proverb

“If there is a single issue that divides the world today,” said President Kennedy, “it is independence . . .” But in the reality of men’s minds, hearts, and goals it also divides the captive world. It divides the Soviet Russian Empire and, in this ultimate sense, it divides the Soviet Union itself. While our officials fear the mere mention of independence for the many captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, Russian totalitarians and their puppets prance up and down the Soviet Union, assuring their non-Russian captives that they are “free,” “independent,” and “sovereign.” Trite as the saying may be, where there’s smoke, there’s fire.

In the preceding chapters we witnessed three good examples on how not to emasculate the Russian totalitarians. Now in the remaining chapters let’s examine a few of the many things that can be done to seize the offensive in this basic psycho-political struggle, with nothing less than victory in the Cold War as our grand objective. Because it is the largest captive non-Russian nation in the USSR (actually in Moscow’s Potemkin Village of Non-Russian Soviet Republics) Ukraine will be used as a fitting example of what can be done. Similar applications can be

made to any other captive nation, with obvious needs for adjustment to national differences and circumstances. We now know the USSR is an imperium in imperio—an empire in an empire. Thus our opportunities there are boundless.

One of the most dependable measures of the real depth and strength of the Ukrainian movement for genuine national independence is the remarkable degree to which the Soviet Russians have extended themselves to simulate the independent statehood of Ukraine. In the course of their genocidal domination over this largest non-Russian nation behind the Iron Curtain they have set up this diplomatic and political Potemkin. The show of "independence" on paper and on the world stage has been played to conceal the absence of real independence. Russian totalitarians have always been expert in Potemkinism, that is, building a strong front for a deep, concealed weakness. This flare for political hypocrisy and cunning is why, to the tune of the above proverb, you must always carry an ax in any dealings with Russian politicians.

Aside from conclusive historical circumstances that surrounded the popular establishment of the truly independent Ukrainian National Republic in 1918, an analysis of systematic Russian simulation of Ukrainian independence is sufficient to convince one of the solid reality of this national movement and its explosive revolutionary implications.¹ From a logical viewpoint alone it should be evident that if there were no empirical cause for this pretense, Moscow would scarcely squander its time and energies in a patently irrational undertaking. Then, too, it makes little sense to think that if Africans and Asians, who are just forming their nations, treasure independent state-

1. Reshetar, John S., *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920*, Princeton, 1952, pp. 263-316.

hood, the strategic Ukrainian nation, formed 1000 years ago, hasn't the same natural yearning.

The significance of this calculated pretense, manufactured for both quisling Ukrainian and Free World consumption, is manifold. For one, in the light of such increasing simulation of the dominant objective of the Ukrainian nation itself, the reactionary use in certain quarters of the Tsarist myth, "the peoples of Russia," is shown to be not only misleading but plainly foolish. The obvious contrast devolves to the advantage of Moscow and its propaganda as a leader of nations. When President Johnson employs this Tsarist myth to state that "The common interests of the peoples of Russia and the United States are many . . ." you can judge how off base we are.² Moreover, the successive refinements of this pretense have served to reflect the enduring strength of the underlying cause. This clearly has been the patriotic and national consciousness of the Ukrainian people.³ This consciousness has stubbornly sought concrete and valid fulfillment in a political state unhampered by foreign influence and dictation. Thus, a firm objective base exists in this quarter of Europe for successful American efforts in psycho-political strategy.

POLITICO-ECONOMIC POTESKINISM

One of Moscow's first major acts of political-economic Poteskinism found expression in the Union Constitution of 1923. Significantly, it was only a short period after the wars for national independence had come to an end. As

2. "Text of President's Speech on U.S. Aim to Keep Peace," *The Washington Post*, June 4, 1965.

3. Manning, Clarence A., *Twentieth Century Ukraine*, New York, 1951, pp. 13-98.

we've seen, the independent Republics of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Turkestan and others then became the first forgotten victims of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.⁴ Lenin, who had denounced the overt "Great" Russian chauvinism of Kerensky and other alleged democrats, never fulfilled his own promise of November, 1915. You will recall, at that time he righteously declared: "We demand the freedom of self-determination, i.e., independence, i.e., the freedom of separation for the oppressed nations, not because we dream of an economically atomized world, nor because we cherish the ideal of small states, but on the contrary because we are for large states and for a coming close, even a fusion of nations, but on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is unthinkable without the freedom of separation."⁵ Lenin had condemned others, but he himself degenerated into a chauvinist.

The aspirations of the long subjugated non-Russian peoples were, nonetheless, too deeply rooted. During the war against the Ukrainian National Republic, Moscow applied its traditional divide-and-conquer tactics by establishing, with the help of quisling Ukrainian "communists," a rival Soviet Ukrainian government in Kharkov. This Russian technique of precipitating a "civil war," undermining the legitimate government, setting up a contending political body with a military arm engaged in guerrilla warfare is, almost fifty years later, what we Americans have to face in Viet Nam. It is no mystery. Practically all the leaders of the totalitarian Red government in Hanoi are products of Russian political warfare education. Nor is it a mystery that many Americans, both in public and private

4. See also Dushnyck, Walter, *In Quest of Freedom*, New York, 1958, p. 94.

5. Lenin, V. I., *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*, New York, 1951, p. 72.

life, are unaware of all this. They never received an education in it.

However, the independence of Ukraine, proclaimed on January 22, 1918, had been so favorably accepted by the Ukrainian people that after the final defeat of the Ukrainian Republican Army the puppet Soviet government of Ukraine decided with Moscow's approval, of course, to feign the independence of Ukraine.⁶ It was only by 1923 that Ukraine was forced into the new Russian Empire, the Soviet Union.

Against this immediate background the semblance of independent national will appeared in Article 4 of the First Constitution. The constitution provided that "Each one of the member Republics retains the right to freely withdraw from the Union." "In such conditions," Lenin wrote in December 1922, "it is very natural that the 'freedom to leave the Union,' with which we justify ourselves, will prove to be just a piece of paper incapable of protecting people of other nationalities from the incursion of that true Russian, the Great Russian, the chauvinist, in essence, the scoundrel and the despoiler which the typical Russian bureaucrat is. There can be no doubt that an insignificant percentage of Soviet and sovietized workers will drown in this sea of chauvinistic Great Russian riffraff, like a fly in milk."⁷ Contrary to this piece of cynical Machiavellianism, the percentage hasn't been insignificant. It is also important to note that the ethnically nonsensical and reactionary concept of "peoples of Russia" was prudently abandoned by the Russian Bolsheviks.

The second major step in Moscow's political Potemkinism occurred in the drafting of the Stalin Constitution

6. See for complete account Doroshenko, Dmytro, *History of Ukraine*, Edmonton, 1941, p. 702.

7. *Kommunist*, CPSU Central Committee, Moscow, June 1956.

of 1936. With the rise of Ukrainian "Titoism" in the period of 1928-32 and the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian peasants in the man-made famine of 1932-33 still echoing in the halls of the Kremlin, it is no wonder that this step was taken.⁸ In November, 1936, Stalin spoke on the Draft Constitution in this vein: "But since the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper." The note of independent will has continued by implication in Article 17 of the new constitution: "The right freely to secede from the USSR is reserved to every Republic."

It is simply a matter of plain understanding and insight that if the occupied non-Russian nations were to enjoy the liberty of exercising this nominal right, the artificial Soviet Union would quickly vanish from the face of the globe. Very simply, too, what has constituted the source of Moscow's foremost fear, as well as that of the incorrigible Holy Mother Russia lovers, is the specter that one day this note of independence will ring in liberty for all the freedom-seeking non-Russian peoples. Without question, this will also contribute heavily to the long-awaited independence and freedom of the Russian people—in fact, more than any other single force. Ukraine, the largest of the captive nations in Eastn Europe, apparently has an historic role to play.⁹

Economically, the same sort of Potemkinistic fraud has been applied. The non-Russian republics ostensibly work up their Republic economic plans and refer to their economies as "national economies." In practice, they are mere

8. See *Famine In Ukraine*, United Ukrainian Organizations in New York, 1934, p. 32.

9. Chamberlin, William Henry, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation*, New York, 1944, p. 91.

colonies of Moscow, where the overall economic plan is determined and to which the Republic plans are subordinated. Each Republic economy is viewed as only a "specialized part" of the total USSR economic structure. As one Soviet economist only recently stated it, "It is, of course, inexpedient to create more or less fully developed industrial complexes in the smaller republics, which are developing as integral parts of the basic economic regions of the country."¹⁰ In short, full-balanced economic development of a national republic is taboo; relative underdevelopment in the non-Russian economies is the rule. Khrushchev's "decentralization" plan of 1957, which was to distribute economic power to the republics, was another Potemkinistic hoax.

TECHNIQUE OF NOMINAL CONCESSION

What is actually an applied technique of nominal concession was heavily relied upon by Moscow in the 40's and 50's. This experience underlies its behavior and maneuvers with respect to the captive nations of Central Europe in the late 50's and 60's. As in the above instances, later additions to Russia's Potemkin scenario of Ukrainian independence were preceded by certain phenomenal events. The mass desertions, military resistance, and general national rebellion that occurred during World War II in the non-Russian regions of the Soviet Union, form a separate chapter in the unfolding saga of world freedom.¹¹ Whether deliberate or not, many an American movie confused the non-Russian partisans, who fought both the

10. "Soviet Socialist Economics," *Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Ekonomika*, Moscow, 1957, p. 516.

11. See Armstrong, John A., *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945*, New York, 1955, p. 322.

Nazis and the Reds, with the Russians. These developments necessitated several major amendments to the Stalin Constitution. Also, more than any other factor, they led to the nominal representation of Ukraine and Byelorussia in the United Nations.

Consequently, on February 1, 1944, Article 18a was instituted by decree, providing that "Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange representatives with them." Furthermore, Article 18b was made to stipulate that "Each Union Republic has its own Republican military formations." In the provisions of Article 60 the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic was vested with power to decide and determine these matters. Soon, thereafter, the Union Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia were represented individually and as original charter members in the United Nations under the guise of independent states. Like the representatives of the so-called satellite states, their puppet representatives have displayed a striking unity of mind and spirit with the chief Soviet Russian delegation.

It should be noted here that the spotty interest of our Government in Ukraine and its people, as demonstrated by the establishment of the Ukrainian section in the *Voice of America*, seemed to cause a marked uneasiness in the Kremlin. For no sooner had the section been created in November, 1949, within the next five months Ukraine was endowed with a new "Ukrainian" anthem, a distinctive emblem of state, and an individual national flag with a broad band of blue across the lower third. A Potemkin Ukrainian War Ministry was also established. All the fineries and institutional furniture of an independent state were provided in this wave of Russian appeasement, but

the substance and spirit of independence, which is the very antithesis of the forced union in existence, were naturally lacking.

Frequent contributions to this process of political Potemkinization have been made by Moscow's puppet organs. For example, the official organ in Ukraine, *Radyanska Ukraina*, at one time called upon Western Ukrainians to be "eternally grateful to Stalin" who "liberated them from the Polish yoke" and "enabled them to live in a truly independent Ukrainian state." The same publication has often declared in its editorials that "It is due to the great Russian people, headed by their heroic working class, that the road was opened for the Ukrainian people to fulfill their centuries-long dreams for statehood . . ." Clearly, these and similar assertions have been merely parts of a colossal fraud perpetrated to enshroud the true subservient state of Ukraine. They have certainly been designed to offset—through the favorite Soviet Russian medium of the lie—the wholesome movements that are at work, both within Ukraine and without, for the national independence of the major Ukrainian nation.¹²

Could you visualize Hitler in the heyday of the Nazi German Empire flouncing about from one occupied country to another, telling his captives that they have found freedom and independence under him? Khrushchev became a master at this. He traveled regularly to Turkestan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and elsewhere in this basic empire to assure the captives of their "freedom" and "independence." In Ukraine, for example, his theme song was: "The toilers of Ukraine, under the leadership of the Communist Party, have within forty years created their own

12. For a background analysis, see Mirchuk, Ivan, *Ukraine and Its People*, A Handbook, Munich, 1949, pp. 380.

people's socialist and truly *free* and *sovereign* nation . . ." ¹³
When he played on the bugbear of German militarism, one often heard him say "then Ukraine would surely have been dismembered and enslaved by Western European imperialists; she would not possess national independence and could not exist as a sovereign and free nation of toilers . . ." ¹⁴

Manifestations of this political Russian Potemkinism can be traced in almost every sphere, from the Moiseyev ballet and the Ukrainian Dance Ensemble tantalizing crowds in the United States, to the appointment of a Ukrainian, Dobrynin, as USSR ambassador to the U.S. It is seen brilliantly in the U.N. with the Palamarchuks ¹⁵ and the Podgornys "representing" the "free and sovereign" Ukrainian SSR, and also specializing in the condemnation of the Captive Nations Week Resolution! ¹⁶ Placing the Ukrainian quisling Podgorny as the President of the USSR is another stroke of Russian political Potemkinism.

ON DEPOTEMKINIZING

No doubt you will now ask, "All right, what can we do about this?" Before we answer this, in the light of these facts first read the resolution below. It summarizes the facts we considered and lays the basis for a story in itself, the highlights of which are treated in the next chapter.

13. Khrushchev, N. S., "An address to the Jubilee Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR," *Radyanska Ukraina*, December 25, 1957, p. 5.

14. Read many other excerpts of this kind in the "Fortieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of Ukraine," *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, Prolog, New York, August, 1958.

15. UN Address by Palamarchuk, Luka, *UN General Assembly*, September 30, 1959.

16. *Congressional Record*, July 24, 1961, p. 12210.

The resolution calls for positive action on the diplomatic front.

Whereas the Soviet Government in Moscow fosters through the media of its divers organs the appearance of independent will and status on the part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic; and

Whereas in the historical order the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was known to have manifested its complete sovereignty as a signatory, along with the separate states of Poland and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, to the treaty of Riga in 1921, the official text of which appeared in three languages—Ukrainian, Polish and Russian; and

Whereas on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the semblance of sovereign and independent will was vouchsafed to the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R. in Article IV, Part II, Chapter II of the First Union Constitution of 1923, which declared that “Each one of the member Republics retains the right to freely withdraw from the Union”; and

Whereas it is known that in November, 1936, Mr. Stalin in his examination of the draft constitution imputed reality to the sovereign and independent wills of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Byelorussian S.S.R. by his averment that “since the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper”; and

Whereas the note of national sovereignty and independence applied to the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Byelorussian S.S.R. again is verbally sounded in Article 17 of Chapter II in the Stalin Constitution of 1936, providing that "The right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to every Union Republic"; and

Whereas in the nature of a reinforcing amendment, decreed on February 1, 1944, Article 18a of the Soviet Constitution provides, with implied historical reference to the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R., that "Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange representatives with them"; and

Whereas the additional amendment, Article 18b in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, renders further nominal affirmation of the sovereign and independent wills of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Byelorussian S.S.R. by stating that "Each Union Republic has its own Republican military formations"; and

Whereas partaking of the fundamental law as expressed in the Soviet Constitution, Article 60, in its application to the highest state organs of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R., provides that "The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic; e) Decides questions of representation of the Union Republic in its international relations; f) Determines the manner of organizing the Republic's military formations"; and

Whereas in contrast to some conditions prevailing in other Soviet Republics, the distinctive national banners and emblems of state maintained

by the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Byelorussian S.S.R. are presumed to manifest symbolically the sovereignty and independence of these states; and

Whereas this Government recognizes the delegations selected to represent the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R. as accepted members of the United Nations; and

Whereas the American people welcome the genuine sovereignty of the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians as a direct consequence of the ideas expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, and therefore would be happy to render these peoples, as also all peoples in the Soviet Union, any assistance for the strengthening of their freedoms and economic development; and

Whereas it is clearly incongruous from every viewpoint to maintain the recognition by this Government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R. in the United Nations without the opportunity to establish direct diplomatic course with their respective capitals of Kiev and Minsk; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that this Government proceed to the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with the Governments of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Byelorussian S.S.R. and to the creation of posts of representation in the capitals of Kiev and Minsk respectively.

Are you for or against it? To merely retort "I am by principle against the recognition of any communist government" misses the point of this whole discussion. The

resolution obviously summarizes all the essentials presented in this chapter. It represents one of the numerous means by which we can work with imagination and vision at depotemkinizing Moscow's village of happy coexisting nations. In the Cold War, the tremendous leverage that can be provided by such action to the forces of freedom in Ukraine and elsewhere in the USSR is incalculable. Such action has been in the making. But before we see what has happened to it, a few preliminary pros and cons on the project might change your mind in the meantime.

PROS AND CONS

Should this resolution become the sense of Congress, it would undoubtedly serve as a powerful psycho-political weapon in the Cold War. It would unquestionably generate grave concern in the Kremlin over America's demonstrated interest in the two most important and yet unreliable national areas in the Soviet Union. Despite the hidden overtures made by the British on this score in the late 1940's, the utter novelty of this particular step would enhance the significance and power of our cold war resolve. By strong implication it would also help to expose immediately, or, in time, the fraud built on the alleged independence of these two major captive non-Russian nations in the Union.

It isn't generally known in this country that since 1963 the Chinese Reds have seized upon this Russian/non-Russian issue in their conflict with Moscow. Strange that an issue of freedom and independence should be exploited by the Peking totalitarians, albeit toward their own ends, rather than by us, still the leader of the Free World. The Chinese Party Central Committee has condemned Moscow for pursuing a policy of "preserving the hegemony of the

so-called 'superior race' over oppressed nations"—under the Potemkin slogan of "Soviet patriotism," the Russian over the non-Russian.¹⁷ Signaling in concrete and specific form our interest in the peoples of Ukraine and Byelorussia this resolution would definitely offset, through underground and other media, the spurious propaganda now being circulated to the effect that their hopes and aspirations lie with Moscow, in a sort of Pan-Slavic trinity, rather than Washington. To a great extent it would solidify their natural alliance with us.

Furthermore, the realization of this resolution would in some respects test the current peaceful intentions of Moscow. "Peaceful coexistence" should be a two-way street in the Cold War. For our part it would concretely express an intent to establish peaceful relations with the capitals of two presumably independent states which we recognize as members of the U.N.

In the event of Moscow's acceptance of American diplomatic representations in the mentioned capitals, we would gain additional listening posts in two critical areas in the Union. One of the chief reasons offered for recognizing Outer Mongolia is the need for such a post. How much more important this is in the USSR itself. A consular convention would play into Moscow's hands and alienate the non-Russians.

There is no ground for argument here that Moscow might wish to apply this principle of representation to the other republics, for the resolution is conceived solely within the present legal framework of our recognition of the two republics in the U.N. Later, depending on how all this works out, there is no reason why the principle shouldn't be generalized to include Armenia, Georgia and others. Nor can this issue be haphazardly confused with

17. *Pravda*, Moscow, July 14, 1963.

that of mainland China's recognition. We already recognize the Chinese nation through the Republic of China; we still have to recognize these nations directly.

As to some cons, this proposal would never be published by the empire's press and radio. In the event of Moscow's refusal it would be distorted by its media, with thus negligible propaganda effects, from our viewpoint, on the underlying peoples. Moreover, the operation would involve the establishment in the U.S. of two additional communist missions. This would have a detrimental effect on the psychological disposition of the American people. The action would also expand Moscow's espionage here.

In addition, a rejection of the proposal by Moscow could be effected in the name of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian governments. This would only reinforce the fiction of their sovereignty. Also, the proposal would lay a basis for the Russian government to advance the admission of its puppet republics into international organizations.

These are some of the arguments, pro and con, that have been raised and receive a closer analysis in the next chapter. The issue is over ten years old but, like depressed areas, medicare and other issues of much longer existence, it is a basic one that in time will be similarly resolved, one way or another. Now, let's see what has happened.

Chapter XVIII
AN AMERICAN ZIG, THE RUSSIAN ZAG

"The sacred duty of the party is . . . The strengthening of our multinational socialist state . . . The resolute and irreconcilable struggle against every expansion of bourgeois nationalism."

—Pravda

"Bourgeois nationalism" in Russian political lingo means opposition to Moscow's alien domination over the non-Russian nations. So-called crimes of Trotskyism, Bukharinism and the like have long vanished as objects of Moscow's condemnation, but bourgeois nationalism has persisted. The reasons for its persistence are obvious. All that has been said about the patriotic national consciousness of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, their invincible aspirations for genuine independence and freedom, forms these reasons.¹ What imperio-colonialist Moscow condemns as bourgeois nationalism, we uphold and esteem as national patriotism and love of country. What the colonialist Russians prescribe as "national in form, socialist in content," the captive non-Russians describe as "national in form, Russian in content." Our formula in the Cold War can only be "national both in form and content." The *Pravda* quote clearly defines Moscow's formula.

The proposal establishing diplomatic relations with

1. O'Conner, Edward M., "The Golden Era of National Independence," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, June 1958, pp. 108-123.

Ukraine and Byelorussia is founded on our formula of true independence. Like a waft of fresh air, it represents an American zig capable of determining some Russian zag.

"Whenever they (the Russians) zig, we zag," declared former Defense Secretary Robert A. Lovett in his apt characterization of American foreign policy before a Senate committee. The passive art of zagging has been the conspicuous monopoly of the State Department. Under the perpetuated dominance of the "zaggistic" containment crowd in the Department, this art of diplomatic indolence is the very thing a sizable portion of the American people have been determined to eliminate at the polls since 1952. During each presidential campaign they were repeatedly and in explicit language promised the substitute and imaginative art of zigging. So that whenever we zig, the colonialist Russians would zag. Unfortunately, the unfolding record still shows that this promise has yet to be realized. Mere reactive utterances of "back up your words with deeds," which govern the psychology of the present in our relations with the mortal enemy, are in essence not of the diplomatic species of zigging but rather that of the usual zagging. Again, in their "peace offensive" the Russians have zigged, and we with little show of tangible initiative have just zagged, allowing them to reap all the advantages of the "breather" they need and enjoy. No matter how commendable in themselves, the Peace Corps, the atoms-for-peace proposal, food-for-peace and other weak cold war ventures are all of the zag species. It is most noteworthy how we have shied away from a Freedom Corps, an atoms-for-freedom proposal, the original food-for-freedom and other solid cold war undertakings of the zig species.

STORY OF THE SMITH RESOLUTION

The resolution you read in the preceding chapter was prepared by the writer and originally became to be known as the Smith resolution. The story of the Smith resolution was both illuminating and instructive. The complete story has not yet come to an end. In 1953 Representative Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin sponsored House Concurrent Resolution 58. As some viewed it then, the resolution suggested that we play some diplomatic poker with Moscow by proposing, as we have seen, the establishment of American diplomatic missions in Kiev and Minsk, the capitals of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia. As noted before, these two nations we had already recognized in the United Nations.

On the surface the resolution appeared at the time to be an appeasing gesture. But when thought was given to its background and implications, it represented, as Felix Morley described it, "a clever legislative proposal, well-calculated to create difficulties for Soviet Russia . . ." ² For a time the resolution was pigeonholed in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. However, growing public interest in the proposal soon led to formal hearings. Many who had bothered to reflect on this proposed diplomatic zig became convinced that the Smith resolution constituted the first solid test of American initiative in the Cold War. Investigating the reaction to it at the State Department, Mr. Morley learned that "2 months after the introduction of the resolution it has been discovered by the State Department. And several alert officials there are of the opinion that the proposal should be seriously pressed . . . Now

2. "Three Envoys to Russia," *Barron's*, April 13, 1953.

policy planners at the State Department are saying: 'Why didn't we think of that ourselves?' " 3

This and other disclosures were naturally most encouraging. They seemed to indicate that the new Administration would have the courage and imagination to initiate diplomatic zigs instead of relying on the old zags. Since the new policy planners in the State Department saw in the Smith resolution the great advantage "that for once it would put the Kremlin on the defensive and give the West the opportunity to call the tune," then little delay in its formal support by the Department was expected. Many thought such support would represent a marked departure from the unimaginative and timid position assumed by their predecessors. It certainly promised to dispel the lingering impression that no basic change in thought and orientation had taken place in the make-up of the Department. It would surely have served notice that, in its dedication to a more dynamic foreign policy, the new Administration would not passively await any Soviet Russian deeds to justify hollow words of peace. Indeed, such positive action would have pointed to the fact that the most effective course open to us was the selection of deeds we would want them to perform. So that, regardless of their performance or no, a *net* advantage would nonetheless accrue to our advancing position in the Cold War.

Without question of doubt, this sensible rule of net advantage for an advancing position in the Cold War was almost perfectly served by the Smith resolution. In fact it was made to order. As we saw earlier, the contents of the measure were historically founded and prudently arranged to precipitate a Russian choice. Also, by nature of its content, the resolution was not predicated on any particular

3. "Diplomatic Poker in the Cold War," *Congressional Record*, April 23, 1953, pp. A2251-2.

climate of relations with the USSR in the Cold War. Rather, it was adapted to varying situations punctuated by the presence or absence of any Soviet Russian "peace offensive." In short, the Smith resolution was in substance a potent diplomatic zig, capable of causing much zagging *within* the Soviet Russian Empire.

But, what happened? Contrary to all expectations, in response to an invitation issued by the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to participate in forthcoming hearings on the resolution, the State Department sent a letter stating a negative position on the subject. Addressed to the chairman, the Honorable Robert B. Chip-erfield, the letter advanced five arguments against the resolution.⁴ These were: (1) it would bolster the Soviet myth of the sovereignty of Ukraine and Byelorussia, (2) it would enable Moscow to push other republics in the USSR into international organizations, (3) it would require a "large expenditure of money" to set up missions in Kiev and Minsk, (4) it would lead to two more "communist missions" in the United States, and (5) all this would arouse "adverse sentiment and criticism" among our people. The hearing nevertheless took place on July 15, 1953 before a special subcommittee chaired by the Honorable Frances P. Bolton of Ohio. The members of the subcommittee were, of course, swayed by these arguments. Yet these and other arguments were carefully examined at the hearing. It would do well for us to summarize the analysis here.

4. For full text of letter see *Favoring Extension of Diplomatic Relations With the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia*, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., 1953, pp. 78-79.

POINTERS ON WE ZIG, THEY ZAG

The best way of perceiving the full import of this potent diplomatic zig is by answering the typical questions and issues which have been raised by the State Department and people in various walks of our national life. The questions and issues appear to group themselves into ten general types, and undoubtedly after reading the preceding chapter you're entertaining some of these questions. Let's consider each in true question form.

1. *Isn't this proposal an appeasement gesture toward the Soviet Russian aggressors?*

No. On the contrary, it is the very opposite. It is obviously not without good reason that the Smith resolution itself referred to a policy based on our revolutionary Declaration of Independence, the spirit of which had been manifestly conveyed by President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, numerous other leaders of the preceding Administration, and many Democratic spokesmen. The proposal penetrates the front-yard of the imperialist Soviet Russian base by concerning itself with two highly sensitive national areas in the Soviet Russian Empire. Such demonstrated interest in the weakest links of Moscow's imperio-colonialist chain can only produce apprehension and grave concern in the Kremlin. The proposal would definitely place the Soviet Russian rulers on the spot. It would in any case give the lie to statements made regularly in the U.N., such as those in Mr. P. T. Tronko's maiden address, claiming that "The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a sovereign and free nation in the great brotherly family of Soviet Republics."⁵ However they

5. "The Duty of the U.N. Is To Strengthen Peace," *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, October 9, 1965.

may choose to zag, the net advantage, as measured by the penetration of a double-edge razor into their propaganda fabric, cannot but be ours.

2. *We refuse to recognize Red China, so why should we recognize Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia?*

Because the two cases are by no means parallel. The fact is that we already recognize these two Soviet republics in the United Nations, while we have rightly resisted similar recognition of Red China in the same body. The legal framework which differentiates the two cases was really a justifying basis of the Smith resolution.⁶ The provision immediately preceding the body of that resolution itself alluded to this. It read: "Whereas it is clearly incongruous from every viewpoint to maintain the recognition by this Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic in the United Nations without the peace-oriented opportunity to establish direct diplomatic concourse with their respective capitals of Kiev and Minsk: Now, therefore, be it Resolved . . ." ⁷ Of course this legal argument is not sufficient in itself to warrant the step recommended by the proposal, but it obviously answers this and similar points of criticism. We mustn't forget, too, that our mission in the Republic of Free China is a recognition of the Chinese people and nation, both on Formosa and the mainland. We extend no comparable direct recognition to the peoples and nations of Ukraine and Byelorussia. Speaking of Red China, let us also remember its cynical exploitation of the Russian/non-Russian volcano in the USSR, so much so that Brezhnev and Kosygin chastised it for aiming "to dis-

6. "House Concurrent Resolution 58 Consistent With International Law," *Congressional Record*, April 14, 1954, pp. A2811-12.

7. *Hearing*, op. cit., p. 2.

turb the friendship among the nationalities in the U.S.S.R.”⁸ The issue in the volcano is one of genuine independence and freedom, not Parties’ squabbles.

3. *As the State Department claims, wouldn’t this proposal pave the way for more USSR representation in the U.N. and other international organizations?*

No, since none of the other non-Russian republics in the Soviet Union enjoy current recognition in the U.N. The point on whether they should is another but extraneous issue. There is no ground for argument that the Russians would be justified on the basis of this proposal to press for the representation of their other republics. They can do this without the proposal, and have done so in the past. As emphasized earlier, the measure is conceived solely within the present legal framework of our actual recognition of the two republics in the U.N. Resistance against any such Russian efforts can be effectively based on this crucial fact.

It is interesting to observe the campaign in the United States for our direct recognition of Outer Mongolia. This Russian “satellite” is a member of the U.N., brought in about twenty years after Ukraine and Byelorussia. Secretary Rusk stated in March, 1966, that we continue to weigh the matter of granting diplomatic recognition of this Red state,⁹ and a Washington newspaper editorialized in this vein: “Recognition would advance the stated American desire to “build bridges” to Communist lands, and thereby promote their nationalism and our influence, too.”¹⁰ These double-standard exponents oppose, how-

8. “Russia’s Secret Blast at Peking Revealed,” *The Washington Post*, March 22, 1966.

9. “Rusk Contrasts Viewpoints of Russia, China,” *The Washington Post*, March 26, 1966.

10. “Recognize Mongolia,” Editorial, *Ibid.*, March 25, 1966.

ever, the same action toward Ukraine and Byelorussia where on every point—population, history, strategic importance, etc.—it would count vastly more. But what can one expect when the editors of the same organ wallow in the conceptual ignorance of “the Soviet Union as a nation.”¹¹

4. *Very well, now what could we gain with two more Ambassadors in the USSR?*

A tremendous leverage for our maneuvers toward the victory of peace, understanding, and freedom in the Cold War. That is, of course, if the Soviet Russian sponsors of the “peace offensive” are willing to accept this grounded offer of peaceable relations. As Hanson Baldwin and many others have stressed, our long range planning must take heed of the necessity for a “psychological and political offensive in the Ukraine and satellite states . . .”¹² We should bear in mind, too, that the Ukrainian and Byelorussian capitals are the only “U.N. capitals”—capitals of countries represented in the United Nations—to which diplomats of the free countries have absolutely no formal access.

We stand to gain immeasurably by acquiring additional listening posts and, from the viewpoint of psychopolitical advantage, by magnetizing the hopeful support of two rabidly anti-Moscow populations. With regard to the former, Kiev and Minsk are about 300 miles apart and nearly 500 miles from Moscow. The obvious advantage of this geographical factor is that, with alert observers stationed in these two capitals, much could be learned about developments in the western non-Russian periphery of the Soviet Union. Significant, too, are the facts that Minsk is

11. “Moscow’s Middle Course,” Editorial, *Ibid.*, March 30, 1966.

12. Baldwin, Hanson W., “War or Peace: Some Basic Issues,” *The New York Times Magazine*, April 18, 1954.

closer to the Baltic area, while Kiev lies in the shadows of Rumania and the Balkans. The sources of information could be multiplied to build scores of bridges of understanding. With reference to the non-Russian populations of the two republics, one of the witnesses before the Bolton subcommittee captured the spirit of the resolution when he declared that "Resolution No. 58 is demonstrating an equitable American liberation policy for the nationalities oppressed in the USSR."¹³ As we'll see in the last chapter, a U.S. policy of liberation is not, as so many mistakenly think, a war-inducing policy but rather a war-preventing and peace-guaranteeing policy.

"PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" IN REVERSE

5. Good, but what benefits would we derive if Moscow should refuse to accept our offer for peaceful relations?

The benefits we would derive in the event of Moscow's refusal would be almost equivalent in force to those hinging on its equally possible acceptance. One, this step would undoubtedly produce acute embarrassment for the highly vocal, puppet delegations representing Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia in the U.N. In fact, we would gain a powerful propaganda weapon. As Bob Considine evaluated the Smith resolution in his syndicated column, "It would put Russia on the spot in a variety of ways."¹⁴ This surely would be one.

Second, a Soviet Russian refusal would provide an additional lie to its protestations of peace. We would stand to capitalize on this throughout the entire Free World. Third, this circumstance would formally expose the fraud

13. *Congressional Record*, May 12, 1953, p. A2642.

14. "Encouragement for Slaves," *The New York Journal American*, April 27, 1953.

built on the alleged independence of these two major, captive non-Russian nations in the Union. Here, let it also be emphasized that Soviet Russia's acceptance of the offer would by no means constitute any verification of genuine sovereignty and independence in these two states. With American Ambassadors in Kiev and Minsk, Ukraine and Byelorussia would functionally be no more independent and sovereign than are Poland and Czecho-Slovakia where we do have missions. The illogic in the State Department's argument on this is quite evident.

Either way, the simple posing of this problem to colonialist Moscow would unquestionably reflect the beginning of a seasoned American recognition of the tremendous power which resides in the centrifugal forces operating within the fabric of the Soviet Union. These forces are best represented by these two large non-Russian nations in that forcibly contrived entity. Should Moscow accept the proposal, the two captive peoples would be heartened and encouraged by our interest. "Peaceful coexistence" in reverse would be the order of the day. Should it reject the proposal, the reaction of the peoples concerned would still be the same. Either way, the advantages would accrue to our favor.

As was said before, signaling in concrete form our interest in the eventual freedom of these two nations, the offer would enormously offset the hate propaganda now being circulated in these areas by Moscow. Here are a couple of examples. "While we keep love of our fatherland in our hearts and will keep it as long as those hearts continue to beat, we will always carry hatred on the points of bayonets." ¹⁵ The chairman of the Politburo, N.V. Podgorny, suffers no sense of restraint in saying "American imperialism, having assumed the function of world gen-

15. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 26, 1965.

darme, is prepared to resort to any and every arbitrary act in order to terrorize peoples and suppress their liberation movements.”¹⁶ While “peaceful coexistence” is cynically preached, Moscow’s propaganda machine carries on an unparalleled hate campaign against the United States with such choice venomia—“Yankee gangsters,” “butchers,” “murderers” and so forth.

6. *Didn't the British Government attempt this in 1947 and fail?*

Not exactly. Although the British Government made certain gestures in the same general direction, its meager effort had by no means been exerted along the lines of strategic psycho-political advantage as proposed in the Smith resolution, nor had it at all been formalized in terms of the data which were incorporated in the resolution. The animus and substance of the British attempt were wholly different. Had it been otherwise, in the way presented here, it could not reasonably have failed.

7. *On refusing our offer, wouldn't Moscow distort this whole matter to the detriment of our real interest in the peoples of Ukraine and Byelorussia?*

To say the least, we should anticipate such action on the part of the Muscovites, but this should by no means deter us. It is part of the battle of ideas and cunning, truth and falsehood, and the fundamental elements are, beyond peradventure of doubt, in our favor. For example, we can profit from the evaluated testimonies of scores of non-Russian defectors and escapees. We know that in these hostile areas a heavy percentage of Moscow’s news material on events in the Western World is discounted and even inverted to attain factual truth. This condition, in turn, is facilitated by the element of contradiction when Western broadcasts—VOA, Italian, BBC, Spanish

16. *Izvestia*, May 9, 1965.

Radio Nazionale, Radio Liberty, the Vatican, etc.—penetrate to contradict directly the official Soviet Russian newscasts. Even heavy jamming can't completely stem the flow of truth.

In addition, known underground channels would prove to be most resourceful in conveying the whole truth to the people. Nor should it be overlooked that the latitude of distortion is determined to a measurable degree by the essence of the proposal. In this case, formed almost entirely with data drawn from Soviet Russian sources, the proposed resolution lends itself to only a small margin of distortion. As a rule Moscow's propaganda has observed the line of consistency and does not relish excessive indulgence in self-contradiction.

We have noted the State Department's contention that, should the Soviet government reject—or even accept—this proposal in the name of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian governments, this would bolster the fiction of their independence and consequently nullify one of the propaganda benefits mentioned above. This is a patently groundless objection. It is common knowledge among the captive peoples themselves that these governments are no more independent of the dictates of Moscow than are the governments of Poland, Hungary and so forth. Therefore, a refusal through such means, regardless of all the fabrications surrounding it, would have rather affirmative effects.

8. *Would the accrued benefits justify the costs of maintaining two more missions in the Soviet Union?*

They would more than justify the costs. The general arguments presented here should convince one of this. Of course, with a background of knowledge and understanding of these two major areas in Eastern Europe one would not even be disposed to entertain this question. He would recall from captured Nazi German documents and numer-

ous other sources the strategic importance that has been attached to Ukraine alone in any world conflict, be it hot or cold.¹⁷ To be sure, this and the evidence given in this work are only small parts of the mountainous evidence that exists in connection with this country's invincible fight for freedom and independence. But it surely is enough to indicate the insular aspects of this question. Strange, isn't it, that this should be a major State Department argument?

Furthermore, the argument implied by this question is scarcely tenable at a time when we find ourselves in the greatest state of peril conceivable. The proposal points to an extremely sensitive area—significantly, one situated at the very heart of the Soviet Russian Empire. Need more be said about insignificant costs of ambassadorial maintenance? Curiously enough, in its attempt, since June 1964, to obtain Senate ratification of the Consular Convention with the USSR, the Department has been silent about the future cost of several consular establishments in the USSR.

9. *Wait now, wouldn't the presence of two more Communist missions in the U.S. increase our internal danger?*

Not really. As a matter of fact, when the U.N. Assembly is in session, the delegations of Ukraine and Byelorussia establish themselves as separate missions in New York. Any opportunity they might have to engage in espionage in a sense already exists. On the merits of the case one cannot compare two additional American embassies in the Soviet Union, situated in Kiev and Minsk, with two more Iron Curtain embassies in Washington, certainly not from the viewpoint of impact on and importance to the specific

17. See Kamenetsky, Ihor, *Secret Nazi Plans For Eastern Europe*, New York, 1961, p. 263.

peoples involved. The environments of the respective embassies are not in the least similar. The area of contacts for American missions in Ukraine and Byelorussia is virtually virgin territory, while that of a Ukrainian or Byelorussian embassy in Washington has surely been exploited well beyond the point of diminishing returns by the USSR embassy. Moreover, espionage is a two-way street. The argument implied by this question seems to suggest American inferiority in the art, a thesis one would find difficult to accept.

10. *Speaking of allies, how would they react to this offer?*

Quite favorably. After all, the proposal constitutes on our part an open intention to establish peaceful relations with the capitals of two allegedly independent states, which we and they recognize as members of the U.N. Indeed, it opens the way for our allies to do the same. Moreover, they couldn't help but recognize that this resolution would serve as somewhat of a valid test of the highly publicized intentions of peace on the part of the Soviet Union. They, need it be stressed, with all the misdirected trading and negotiating they do with the Red regimes, are by and large scarcely in any position to oppose this.

NOTHING TO LOSE, EVERYTHING TO GAIN

By now, in thinking through the Smith resolution, you are probably of the feeling that actually there was nothing for us to lose, everything to gain. You are not alone in this feeling. For example, serious-minded students of the Georgetown University International Relations Club had this feeling, and addressed a number of questions on the subject to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegates at the

U.N.¹⁸ Result?—as anticipated, no reply.¹⁹ These “independent” spokesmen could not decide whether their “independent” countries are open to American diplomatic representation. In a sense, unofficially we zigged and they couldn’t even zag. Many others viewed the resolution in the same favorable light. As one editor emphasized at the time, “It deserves a better fate than to be laid on the shelf. It should be studied on its merits.”²⁰

Well, it wasn’t shelved. As we noted earlier, the Smith resolution was studied by the Bolton committee. And on the basis of the hearing the committee unanimously approved the resolution and recommended that the full Committee on Foreign Affairs submit it to the House for a vote. At this point, in the closing days of the first session of the 83rd Congress, the State Department intervened with an urgent request to Mr. Chipfield that it be given time to study this matter before any further action is taken. Despite all that had transpired months before, the request was granted and no final action was taken.

The sudden death of Congressman Smith interrupted action on this vital proposal for some time. Other issues emerged to prevent the concentration of effort required in such an undertaking. Normally it has always taken time for those concerned in advancing U.S. goals along these lines to become familiar with the characteristics and nuances of this subject. How difficult this has been can be gauged by the fact that in these years some of our leaders, like Senator Alexander Wiley, for a time chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the then U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., thought that

18. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1953.

19. *Congressional Record*, May 25, 1953, pp. A3067-69.

20. Editorial, *The Democrat and Chronicle*, Rochester, New York, March 30, 1953.

Ukraine is like Texas and Byelorussia like Wisconsin or Massachusetts.²¹

In the spring of 1958, Congressman Leonard Farbstein of New York revived the resolution and inquired about the long-awaited study by the State Department. The letters received from the Department indicated that no written study had been made. Assistant Secretary William B. Macomber stated "The Department has no record of a study such as you described having been made subsequent to this time."²² He also enclosed a copy of the March 13, 1953 letter, containing the old arguments of the Department. Macomber's reply confirmed a discussion this writer had in 1956 with Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, who admitted that State had not pursued any study of the matter since the 1953 hearing. Later, Congressman Barratt O'Hara of Illinois also introduced a similar resolution. For some unknown reason the Committee on Foreign Affairs had not acted on these resolutions. The proposal, however, has remained very much alive and will again be legislatively formalized, so that an American zig can precipitate a Russian zag in the advancement of our own cold war interests.

The far-reaching effects of the Captive Nations Week Resolution in 1959 absorbed the energies of those concerned with these issues and, along with the passage of another pertinent measure in 1960, postponed action on this until 1965. In this year similar resolutions by Congressmen Leonard Farbstein, Edward J. Derwinski, Barratt O'Hara, and James G. Fulton, all members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, called for such diplomatic relations "in terms of 'people-to-people relations' and

21. *Review of the United Nations Charter*, Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 1830.

22. Macomber, William B., *Communication*, June 26, 1958.

'bridges of understanding with the peoples of Eastern Europe.'" An unimaginative State Department reply to an inquiry on the subject by Congressman William T. Murphy repeated the same position, about tending "to support the Soviet myth that the constituent republics of the Soviet Union are sovereign in the field of foreign affairs."²³

Over ten years ago, a diplomatic correspondent for *Newsweek* emphasized that "serious American thought also must be given to the nationally conscious Soviet components such as the Ukraine and Byelorussia. The fact that these two nations have their own representatives in the U.N. has never been properly utilized by the United States. To encourage their independence and to strive for the decentralization of the Soviet Union into its separate though not necessarily unfriendly components, is likely to become one of the chief United States objectives."²⁴ If we were to wait for the State Department to study this, another glorious opportunity would be lost. Fortunately, the proposal remains very much alive and will be acted upon so that an American zig can precipitate a Russian zag in the advancement of our own Cold War interests. How this can be done was demonstrated again in 1960, an interesting episode to which we now turn.

23. MacArthur, Douglas, II, *Communication*, July 13, 1965.

24. Weintal, Edward, *Newsweek*, August 29, 1955.

Chapter XIX
U.S. ZIGGED, MOSCOW ZAGGED ON SHEVCHENKO

“When will we receive our Washington
With a new and righteous law?
And receive him we will some day . . . !”
—Shevchenko

It is a fact that strong propaganda winds were taken out of Moscow's sails when the U.S. Congress passed in 1960 the Shevchenko resolution. But who's Shevchenko? Don't worry, you'll hear a great deal more about him in the years ahead. In the meantime you can get acquainted with him here and also thank God for congressional leadership in these vital matters. Like the Captive Nations Week Resolution, this, too, is a realistic story of what can be done to reduce Moscow and its puppets to proper size. On this, the record shows that we had certainly zigged, and they zagged, rocked and rolled. If anything, this legislation also demonstrated how weak and vulnerable the Russian totalitarians are when intelligent and intrepid action is directed at their timorous bowels. They can't capitalize on ignorance and blustering blackmail where the facts are known and acted upon, and this applies to the entire spectrum from athletics to space. Let's then, first see how we zigged and later how they zagged on Shevchenko who, as the quote indicates, revered our Washington.

As reported by the national press, on September 13, 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed a resolution

which had been passed by Congress, authorizing the erection of a statue of Taras Shevchenko on public grounds in Washington, D.C.¹ The resolution, authored by the writer, was sponsored by the Honorable Alvin M. Bentley of Michigan and progressed through Congress as House Joint Resolution 311. It came to be known as Public Law 86-749. This far-seeing action prepared an official groundwork for the celebration of a significant centennial in 1961, the observance of the death of Taras Shevchenko on March 10, 1861. Shevchenko is widely revered as Ukraine's poet laureate and one of Europe's outstanding freedom fighters. The essence of the whole project can be found in the law itself. "What's in a statue?" some might ask. Well, just follow us.

The law, as was passed and approved, reads as follows:

86th Congress, H.J. Res. 311, 74 Stat. 884
September 13, 1960
Joint Resolution

Whereas throughout Eastern Europe, in the last century and this, the name and works of Taras Shevchenko brilliantly reflected the aspirations of man for personal liberty and national independence; and

Whereas Shevchenko, the poet laureate of Ukraine, was openly inspired by our great American tradition to fight against the imperialist and colonial occupation of his native land; and

Whereas in many parts of the free world observances of the Shevchenko centennial will be held during 1961 in honor of this immortal champion of liberty; and

1. E.g., *The Washington Post*, September 14, 1960, p. A-12.

Whereas in our moral capacity as free men in an independent Nation it behooves us to symbolize tangibly the inseparable spiritual ties bound in the writings of Shevchenko between our country and the forty million Ukrainian nation; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that (a) any association or committee organized for such purpose within two years from the date of the enactment of this joint resolution is hereby authorized to place on land owned by the United States in the District of Columbia a statue of the Ukrainian poet and national leader, Taras Shevchenko.

(b) The authority granted by subsection (a) of this section shall cease to exist, unless within five years after the date of enactment of this joint resolution (1) the erection of the statue is begun, and (2) the association or committee certifies to the Secretary of the Interior the amount of funds available for the purpose of the completion of the statue and the Secretary determines that such funds are adequate for such purpose.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed to select an appropriate site upon which to erect the statue authorized in the first section. The choice of the site and the design and plans for such statue shall be subject to the approval of the Commission of Fine Arts and the National Capital Planning Commission. Such statue shall be erected without expense to the United States.

A close reading of the whereas clauses immediately shows the meaningful framework in which the resolution was cast. Without it the measure would have met with a stillbirth. It was within this framework that reasons and arguments for the passage of the resolution were formulated. Anyone familiar with the processes involved in the consideration of such statutory measures can readily appreciate the almost insurmountable difficulties and obstacles that lie in the path of their successful passage. Hundreds of such bills fall by the wayside each session. The author sensed from the start that the justification for a Shevchenko memorial in the Nation's capital must be couched in essential historical terms. Congress responded favorably to this introduction of Shevchenko. But this, of course, constitutes not even a tenth of the story.

ASCENT TO PASSAGE

The unusual experience in this operation is worth a book in itself. If you're thinking of supporting a statue in Washington, this experience may be worthwhile to you. The measure's ascent to passage is most important for an evaluation of the heated controversy that ensued several years later.

Actually, the background to the passage of H.J. Res. 311 discloses a number of important truths. First, it reveals the pointed meaning of the Shevchenko memorial to the United States and, by implication, to the non-totalitarian Free World in the present mortal conflict with totalitarian Russian imperialism. If Washington refuses to come to Shevchenko's homeland, Shevchenko came to his spiritual homeland. Second, it shows the foresight and clear vision of the many who quickly perceived this meaning and with cooperative dispatch took a hand in the passage of the

resolution through many difficult stages. Third, the vigorous support of various groups and individuals throughout the country for the success of this undertaking forms an indispensable part of this background. And, lastly, the long ascent to the passage of H.J. Res. 311 is suggestive not only of the splendid opportunity that has been presented for demonstrating to the world the real colonialist nature of Moscow, but also of the heavy responsibility that has been placed on the shoulders of those who guided the memorial project.

As indicated in the history of bills enacted into public law, H.J. Res. 311 was introduced on March 17, 1959.² The House Administration Committee reported it out on June 2, 1960, and the House passed the bill on June 24. Subsequently, the Senate Rules and Administration Committee reported it out on August 29 and two days later, on August 31, the Senate passed it. Two weeks later the President signed it, and the measure became Public Law 86-749. Needless to say, this chronology of the progress of the resolution scarcely describes the real history of it.

The substantive history of the Shevchenko bill actually did not commence until March, 1960. Soon after its introduction in March, 1959, Congressman Omar Burleson of Texas, the chairman of the House Administration Committee, indicated the desirability of holding a hearing on the measure and referred it to the Honorable Paul C. Jones, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Library and Memorials. However, the hearing, which had been planned for June of that year, was made contingent on the early receipt of recommendations and reports on the measure from the Commission of Fine Arts and the Department of the Interior. The bill had circulated among a number of executive agencies for almost a year and, as a

2. *Congressional Record*, September 21, 1960, p. D775.

result, the hearing did not take place until March, 1960.

Considering the vast amount of bills of this type which are introduced annually, the Department of Interior quite logically assumed an initial negative position toward the Shevchenko proposal. It can't be denied that a cemetery of statues would be the blight of the Nation's capital if an easy policy were pursued in this respect. Members of Congress recognize this as well as responsible private citizens. This writer was fully aware of this consideration at the time he formulated the resolution, and could not rationally disagree with the Department's decision on this ground.

As it turned out, this was not the only ground for careful consideration. Thanks to the insight and quick perception of the Honorable Roger Ernst, the Assistant Secretary of Interior, and his knowledgeable associates, the historic meaning of Shevchenko in the context of the psycho-political struggle was almost instinctively grasped. The Department finally withdrew any opposition to the measure. Its representatives were particularly impressed by the argument that in the forthcoming 1961 centennial we shouldn't allow the Russians and their colonial puppets to exploit the name and honor of Shevchenko who has rightfully belonged to us. In that period a meeting of the rather awkwardly termed Government Republic Committee for Preparation and Carrying Out of the T. H. Shevchenko Jubilee was held in Kiev under the chairmanship of Academician M. P. Bazhan to hear progress reports on their observance.³

The next important stage of development was the hearing conducted by the Subcommittee on Library and Memorials under the astute chairmanship of Congressman Jones of Missouri. The hearing took place on March 31,

3. *Pravda Ukrainy*, August 12, 1960.

at which time consideration was also given to the Theodore Roosevelt memorial project.⁴ Participating in the Shevchenko hearing were the Honorable Alvin M. Bentley of Michigan; Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki of Marquette University and president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society; Mr. Dmytro Halychyn, president of the Ukrainian National Association; Mr. George Wolynetz, Jr., commander of the Ukrainian American War Veterans; and the writer, representing the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. In addition, excellent statements in support of H. J. Res. 311 were submitted by the Honorable Jacob K. Javits of New York and Mr. Mykola Lebed, president of Prolog. Quite understandably, some members were unfamiliar with Shevchenko, but in short order they began to understand what he historically represents.

Following the hearing, some unfavorable reports appeared in the press. One paper ran a story under the caption “‘Graveyard’ of Statuary Here Scored” and stressed that “Interior Department officials fear that Washington is becoming an overcrowded graveyard of statuary.”⁵ It quoted Assistant Secretary Ernst as saying, “We have nothing against Shevchenko, but we thought it good time to bring the subject of statues to the attention of Congress.” In reality, as we noted above, Mr. Ernst was emphasizing what had already been generally known in Washington; he was recommending a more formal procedure of disposition for such bills. The Department had previously recognized the value of erecting a statue in honor of Shevchenko, and in this first lap in Congress a similar recognition was emerging.

By the beginning of May the members of the subcommittee approved the resolution and presented it favor-

4. *Congressional Record*, March 31, 1960, p. D259.

5. *The Washington Post*, April 2, 1960.

ably to the full Committee on Administration, chaired by Congressman Burleson. The chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Jones, and its members have deserved the highest praise for their critical evaluation of the resolution and their patient inquiry into all of its aspects. As indicated earlier, Congressman Burleson perceived the value of the measure at its very inception. Moreover, the salutary impressions created at the March hearing had evidently been so forceful that an authorization for the publication of a biographical documentary on Shevchenko was introduced by Congressman John Lesinski of Michigan. The vital role played by this distinguished legislator was appreciated by everyone.

On June 1 the Committee on House Administration met in executive session and ordered favorable reports to the House on both H.J. Res. 311, authorizing the erection of the statue, and H. Res. 524, authorizing the biography of Shevchenko as a House document.⁶ The following day Congressman Lesinski submitted the reports on both measures in the House. Report No. 1741 covered the Shevchenko statue.

Because of certain unexpected developments concerning the House calendar, the memorial bill was not considered for a vote until later in the month. This seriously complicated the project in connection with the Senate. The complication led to an intensive effort to apprise by every conceivable means the members of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee as to the forthcoming passage of the bill in the House. The authorization for the biography was passed earlier.

It was on June 24 that the House passed H.J. Res. 311 without objection.⁷ A fine statement on the event was

6. *Congressional Record*, June 1, 1960, p. D487.

7. *Congressional Record*, June 24, 1960, pp. 13188-89.

made by Congressman Lesinski who declared that such "an idealistic undertaking should understandably be endorsed by the Congress as a very important factor during this cold war of ideologies between the United States and the Kremlin."⁸ The success realized at this stage in the passage of the bill would surely not have been possible without the cooperative and understanding efforts of all those mentioned above and also of Congressman John McCormack of Massachusetts, the House majority leader.

The next stage was, of course, the Senate. With talk of adjournment rife in the air, the mentioned complication can now well be appreciated. A further embarrassing difficulty was the fact that S.J. Res. 54, an imitative but bare and un-descriptive measure, failed to be reported out favorably by the Senate Rules Committee. When H.J. Res. 311 reached the committee on June 27, it was clearly evident that in this complicated situation only the most concentrated action could reap full success for the bill.⁹ Every means was seized to expedite the measure. There aren't words adequate enough to express public gratitude for the superb cooperation and deep understanding displayed by Mr. Gordon F. Harrison, chief clerk and counsel of the Rules Committee, Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York, Senator Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island, and their respective staffs. In this phase, and the subsequent one, their efforts were indispensable and most praiseworthy.

Once it was decided that a recess would take effect, prudence dictated that this action be postponed until August. In this period of time a more expanded base of familiarity with Shevchenko's works and significance was formed. Remember, at the time, few knew about Shev-

8. *Congressional Record*, June 25, 1960, p. A5518.

9. *Congressional Record*, June 27, 1960, p. 13364.

chenko. In the month of July the writer edited and prepared the House biographical document on the poet. This definitely provided a broader foundation of understanding concerning the man and his contributions. Advance copies were sent to every member of the Rules Committee prior to the re-convening of the Senate. Moreover, letters from groups and individuals continued to pour into the Senate in support of the resolution. These and other preparations were made to assure the successful passage of H.J. Res. 311 in the final days of the 86th Congress.

Finally, on August 29 the Senate Rules Committee reported out favorably H.J. Res. 311 in its Report 1930.¹⁰ Two days later, on August 31, the then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, who played an instrumental role in the expedition of the bill, moved that it be considered for a vote, and the resolution was passed.¹¹ On that occasion Senator Javits addressed the Senate with a concise statement containing all the essentials about Shevchenko. In addition to the sustaining support given by the popular Senator of New York, the wholehearted efforts and aid of Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut, and their staffs, as well as of Mr. Harry C. Burke, in the Office of Secretary of the Senate, will be long remembered and valued.

As in the House, many other legislators in the Senate were properly informed about the bill and expressed their willingness to support it. Their backing led to a speedy affirmative vote on the measure, which then was quickly cleared for the President's signature.¹² In short, many of our representatives quickly grasped the meaning of Shevchenko's works in East European history. They also per-

10. *Congressional Record*, August 29, 1960, p. D729.

11. *Congressional Record*, August 31, 1960, p. 17236.

12. *Ibid.*, p. D742.

ceived Moscow's planned intention to distort and exploit them.

EUROPE'S FREEDOM FIGHTER

One of the most significant developments in this story was the publication of the biography, *Europe's Freedom Fighter, Taras Shevchenko 1814-1861*.¹³ As indicated above, this was made possible through the efforts of Congressman Lesinski who introduced House Resolution 524 on May 11, 1960. The measure was agreed to on June 7. Congressman Lesinski made a solid contribution in this regard since many Americans are totally unfamiliar with the champion of liberty. In preparing the booklet this writer received the finest cooperation from Mr. John F. Haley, then a staff member of the House Administration Committee.

This valuable biography of Ukraine's poet laureate and national hero is so arranged that any reader can quickly detect the greatness of Shevchenko. The articles incorporated in it deal with the major facets of his life and work. The booklet consists of the resolution sponsored by Congressman Lesinski, a foreword, the text of Public Law 86-749, an impressive illustration of Shevchenko, seven select chapters, an appendix, a short bibliography, and a useful index. It makes for easy reading and should prove to be informative to countless citizens in the years ahead.

Early public reactions to both the statue and the booklet were exceedingly favorable. Featured on the first page of *The Evening Star* in Washington was an article

13. *Europe's Freedom Fighter, Taras Shevchenko 1814-1861*, Document No. 445, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 45.

titled "Free Man Or Slave? Cold War Warming Up Over Obscure Poet," with a photo of Shevchenko.¹⁴ In it the writer accurately stressed that "As far as the West is concerned, Shevchenko's poetry reflects man's aspirations for liberty and national independence." Shortly, thereafter, another extensive account appeared on the editorial page of *The New York Herald Tribune*.¹⁵ The writer of this article also pointed out the cold war significance of the Shevchenko project. As he put it, "Next year will see a new twist in the East-West Cold War . . ."

Soon a mounting reaction resulted from the nationwide distribution of the Shevchenko booklet. Most of it was favorable. Once the value of the Shevchenko memorial was understood in terms of the man himself and U.S. national interests, the popular feeling could not be but sympathetic. This has been the objective which the booklet was designed to serve. Thus, to cite a couple of examples, Robert Young wrote a long feature article titled "Dead Poet Now A Live Issue" in *The Chicago Sunday Tribune*.¹⁶ This was read throughout the Midwest. Months later William Gill of *The Pittsburgh Press* followed through with a similar feature in the *Pittsburgh Family Magazine*.¹⁷ And so it went on the American stage. Now, how about the Russian zag?

14. McKelway, John, "Free Man Or Slave?", *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., September 28, 1960, pp. A1, 7.

15. Wingenbach, Charles E., "A New Twist in the Cold War," *The New York Herald Tribune*, October 15, 1960.

16. Young, Robert, "Dead Poet Now A Live Issue," *The Chicago Sunday Tribune*, November 6, 1960.

17. Gill, William, "Dead Poet Becomes Live Issue," *Pittsburgh Family Magazine*, May 7, 1961, pp. 4-5.

MOSCOW AND PUPPETS ZAG

While all this was going on here, Moscow and its Potemkin puppets in Ukraine and elsewhere within the empire were making plans to exploit Shevchenko during the 1961 centennial. Moscow knew all too well the historic symbol of the poet's works for Ukrainians and other subjugated non-Russian peoples in its empire. The legislation in Washington spurred Moscow to decide on a Shevchenko monument in the empire's capital. It was anticipated that the towering Ukrainian patriot would be painted as merely a "revolutionary democrat," an opponent of "Tsarism and serfdom," indeed, as a precursor of the "glorious October Revolution." And, naturally, it would be fitting for all the happy coexisting nations in the empire to honor this former serf, this fighter for the toiling classes. This crass distortion of Shevchenko was actually fed to American readers of the USSR magazine.¹⁸

The planned Russian zig really turned into a gigantic zag because of the action taken by our own Congress. The Canadians helped in this, too, with their far-seeing preparations for a Shevchenko memorial in Winnipeg. The reaction in the USSR was, as usual, violent and vituperative. Over a period of eight months Moscow and its puppets railed against Washington for taking Shevchenko as one of its own.¹⁹

Here are a few examples. In *Sovietskaya Kultura*, supposedly a top periodical on culture, an article on "Taras Shevchenko and Champions of the 'Cold War'" lambasts us for our "murky part" in honoring this great poet

18. Kirilyuk, Yevgeni, "Taras Shevchenko, Poet and Revolutionary," *USSR*, Washington, D.C., February 1961, pp. 26-28.

19. "Reds Decry Ukrainian's Statue Here," *The Washington Post*, March 7, 1961, p. 19.

truthfully.²⁰ Another in the *Kommunist*, the theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, depicts Congress' work as one of "the most incredible and filthy distortions."²¹ The *Literaturna Hazeta* sees it as a "filthy whimsical invention"²²; Kiev's *Literaturna Hazeta* dubs the American zig as a pack of "lies about the great revolutionary-democratic poet"²³ and in an earlier issue sees it as the work of "real American business cynicism"²⁴; *Robitnycha Hazeta* depicts Senator Javits as a "reactionary-minded uncle" for his part in this²⁵; *Perets'* honors the writer with some juicy, scurrilous epithets—"skunk" will do here²⁶; and, as to be expected, *Komunist Ukrainy* retorts, "Shevchenko was an implacable enemy of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism . . ." ²⁷

In their distorted ways Moscow and the Potemkin puppets honored Shevchenko—in Soviet Russia, Ukraine, Red China, Poland, Bulgaria and in every other part of the vast empire—but a pall of smoke fell over the staged

20. Parkhomenko, M., "Taras Shevchenko and Champions of the 'Cold War,'" *Sovietskaya Kultura*, Moscow, December 24, 1960.

21. Novichenko, L., "Our Contemporary," *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1961.

22. Quoted by Mazurkevich, Olexandr, "And You Will See Again," *Literaturna Hazeta*, Kiev, No. 2, January 6, 1961.

23. Bazhan, Mykola, "The National Renown of the Bard," *Literaturna Hazeta*, Kiev, March 21, 1961, pp. 1-2.

24. Novichenko, Leonid, "Shevchenko and They . . ." *Ibid.*, March 7, 1961, pp. 1-3.

25. Diachenko, I., "Get To Your Senses, Madmen," *Robitnycha Hazeta*, April 8, 1961, p. 3.

26. Mykolenko, B., "The Coward Dobriansky . . .," *Perets'* Kiev, No. 7, 1961, p. 7.

27. Ostrianyan, D., "The Great Ukrainian Thinker and Revolutionary Democrat," *Komunist Ukrainy*, Kiev, No. 2, February 1961, pp. 71-81.

celebrations after Congress had decided to smoke out the truth. The story of the Shevchenko memorial has not as yet reached its finis. There was the later controversial chapter, and there will surely be a future chapter in the course of our national celebrations of the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence during this next decade.

THE SHEVCHENKO MEMORIAL

The House document on Shevchenko's biography represents the first official Western publication in honor of any Ukrainian national hero. For those familiar with this East European figure this is a new and encouraging development. For those who are not, the opportunity now exists to advance our common goal in achieving an understanding between peoples and nations. In fact, as this opportunity continues to unfold itself, there will be little excuse for any intelligent American not to know the history, the people, and the drives of the largest non-Russian captive nation in Eastern Europe. Through Shevchenko, this is easily attainable; through a knowledge of Ukraine, a vivid understanding of the plight in which all other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR have found themselves will come in due course.

The historic memorial to Shevchenko on the soil of his Washington is permanently established. The Shevchenko Memorial Committee in New York, which was created by the nationally organized Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, ably undertook this project with the aid of many outstanding sculptors, artists and scholars, such as Mr. Robert B. Hale, curator at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York; Mr. Gilmore D. Clarke, sculptural director for the 1964 New York World's Fair; and Dr.

Erik Larsen, internationally known scholar of the fine arts at Georgetown University. The monument in Washington, at 23rd and P Streets, N.W., is both of majestic art and of practical contribution to the beauty of the community. The Fine Arts Commission approved it unanimously. When in Washington it will be worth your cultural while to visit the memorial.

It should be kept in mind that the man we Americans have honored by these various deeds was a contemporary of Lincoln. Shevchenko, too, sought emancipation—not only the emancipation of the serf, the oppressed Jews, and deprived women, but also the emancipation of his nation and other non-Russian nations from the scourge of traditional Russian imperio-colonialism. The honor we have paid him has penetrated the very souls of millions of patriots for freedom, not only in Ukraine, but also throughout the Red Empire. How this truth completely escaped the editorial purview of a powerful Washington newspaper and led to a most revealing controversy, showing how a paper might misguide its readers, is the subject of the next chapter in this episode. The pen and ignorance can be as deadly as fire and oil.

Chapter XX
THE SHEVCHENKO AFFAIR

“For my hope is that your magnificent march from the shadow of the Washington Monument to the foot of the statue of Taras Shevchenko will here kindle a new world movement in the hearts, minds, words, and actions of men.”

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

To denigrate and destroy the Shevchenko statue project in Washington, the editor-in-chief of *The Washington Post* chose to entitle his first editorial “The Shevchenko Affair.” Obviously, the title was to imply something illicit and depraved, something requiring immediate rectification, according to the dictates of an instructed but arrogant individual wielding a newspaper. The title was indeed an appropriate one to initiate a vicious campaign that lasted unremittingly for a period of three months. For “the affair,” as developed by this individual and those behind him, stands as an indelible blemish upon the authority, judgment and reputation of the organ.

When the Shevchenko monument was unveiled on June 27, 1964, the day was not only one of glorious triumph for the interests of the United States in relation to the goals and tactics of the Soviet Russian totalitarians; in every respect it was also a moment for tranquil rejoicing in behalf of a free press and the victory of truth over both error and base motivation. How foolish supposed

opinion-makers can be gleaned from this attack on the "Ukrainian-American sponsors" of the statue: "They are using it to advance their own peculiar notion of how to fight communism and their own implausible goal of Ukrainian nationhood."¹ Any serious student who has studied the Soviet Union, knows that the 45 million Ukrainians have and enjoy nationhood. What they haven't regained is their independent statehood. But these sophisticated, basic distinctions escape the editor, and a pathetic muddle of notions is presented to confuse the general reader. How is the editorialist expected to understand this cold war way of fighting what he unthinkingly calls Communism?

This example of "the affair" is only a fraction of the disinforming nonsense that was published in *The Post*. For the alert citizen to assess this intriguing episode, he would have had to examine the whole background to the unveiling of the Shevchenko statue. As we, in part, did in the preceding chapter, he would have had to investigate the way this came about and to read with care the various testimonies that were submitted in favor of the statue's erection. As described earlier, the testimonies presented all the essential arguments in favor of the Shevchenko resolution, and their convincing character laid the grounds for speedy Congressional approval. Indeed, at the time, *The Post* reported all this; so there was no mystery about the origin and development of the project.

THE SECOND STATUE OF LIBERTY

In the documentary biography of Shevchenko which this writer prepared in 1960, the type of irrational think-

1. "The Shevchenko Affair," *The Washington Post*, October 18, 1963.

ing reflected in *The Post* editorials is exactly what he had in mind when he wrote: "There is a good deal of foolishness in our thinking about the Soviet Union. Our lingering misconceptions and myths about this uneasy empire structure only contribute to the success of Moscow's worldwide propaganda of deceit and lies." ² *The Post's* editorials and editorialized reports on the Shevchenko subject fit this description with precision.

What the paper could not combat was the whole array of convincing arguments that were used with necessary repetition in support and defense of the project. Shevchenko's affinity to our own George Washington, the cultural and political prowess of his poetry and prose, his historical position as a powerful advocate of freedom in the very period of our own Abraham Lincoln, Poland's Mickiewicz, Hungary's Kossuth, Italy's Mazzini, and other freedom fighters, the idolization of Shevchenko by every patriotic Ukrainian down to this day, the tradition of freedom he represents in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the crucial importance of his works for the eventual liberation of all the captive nations in the present Soviet Russian Empire, the need then to throw Moscow off balance in its calculated attempt to distort and disfigure the Ukrainian national hero—these were only a few of the arguments advanced for the passage of the legislation. They were more than enough to mirror the puerile tirades of *The Post*.

The paper was correct in its assertion that the erection of the statue was not merely to satisfy a cultural end. We stated this from the very beginning, and repeated it openly and frankly to the time of the unveiling. Again, quite plainly, the supreme fact about the Shevchenko statue in our Nation's capital is that this permanent monument in

2. *Europe's Freedom Fighter, Taras Shevchenko 1814-1861*, p. IV.

honor of Ukraine's poet laureate is a towering political symbol of freedom. Not to comprehend this dominant fact means a failure to understand not only the prime purpose for this memorial in the capital of the Free World, but also the full compass of Shevchenko's works and their all-embracing message. One deludes himself if he believes the stature of this East European freedom fighter is exhausted in the narrow precinct of his cultural brilliance, poetic beauty, or philosophical humanism. For, in truth, all these real treasures in Shevchenko are integrally sublimated by his comprehensive and unifying idea of political freedom. He genuinely applied what Aristotle had wisely taught, that in his total essence man is a political animal. Thus, when after the groundbreaking ceremony in September, 1963, *The Post* spoke of "poetic injustice" in its inept editorial comparison between Shakespeare and Shevchenko, it was evident then that its editor wrote in complete darkness.

To go a step further, the statue is truly a crowning achievement of the work and efforts of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. From the very start, this American organization properly emphasized the consummate political significance of the statue. Congress, as well as millions of Americans, clearly saw the need for maintaining the purity of Shevchenko's freedom message. In the Cold War they realized the urgency of combating the inevitable distortion of Shevchenko and his works by colonialist Moscow and colonial Kiev. The successful action taken was a purely American phenomenon, but *The Post*, like the papers of Moscow and Kiev, attempted rather foolishly to portray it as an emigré undertaking, as though this would have been harmful to American interests.

As was anticipated, the Russians and their Ukrainian

puppets disfigured the poet in ceremonies celebrating the 150th anniversary of his birth. They stressed his fight against Tsarist Russian tyranny but concealed the potency of his ideas against existing Soviet Russian tyranny and serfdom. They emphasized Shevchenko's fight for social and economic reforms but ignored his broader fight for the freedom and independence of Ukraine and of all other captive non-Russian nations in the present Soviet Russian Empire. In Kiev the freedom fighter was hailed as a "revolutionary and democrat"—in the twisted Russian sense, not the sound patriotic and nationalist sense.³ In the classic *Post* editorials, however, these fundamental distinctions were blindly cast aside.

Briefly, then, the American statue of Shevchenko in the capital of the Free World symbolizes the undisfigured Shevchenko: patriot, nationalist, freedom fighter, the soul of freedom-living Americans and freedom-aspiring Ukrainians and millions of other captives in Europe and Asia. In sharp contrast to statues of him elsewhere, it is one of youth, vigor, and promise of the future. It was unveiled in a confident atmosphere of triumph and unprecedented performance. With the exception of inaugurals, breaking the record for all marches in the capital, 35,000 paraded down Pennsylvania Avenue to the monument; breaking another record for statue attendance, over 100,000 witnessed the unveiling itself. In its irresponsible editorials *The Post* constantly spoke of a "tiny group," not really knowing how many Americans of Ukrainian descent to account for. Well, this was what the supposedly tiny group produced in the annals of American history. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who signed the Shevchenko measure in 1960, unveiled the statue and delivered a

3. Shabad, Theodore, "Kiev Honors Poet Who Fought Czar," *The New York Times*, May 31, 1964.

stirring address, from which the captional quotation was made and continued in these terms, "A never-ending movement dedicated to the independence and freedom of peoples of all captive nations of the entire world." ⁴

EXAMPLE OF IGNORANCE

Now who were the instigators of "the Shevchenko affair?" Who attempted to place this vitally important project in the mould of "controversy?" Without exaggeration, it is generally recognized, even among those who were scarcely familiar with Shevchenko in mid-1963, that the so-called controversy over the statue engendered on the surface, but in significant terms, a basic ratio of something like a million for and two against. Aside from the futile protests of the Russian ambassador, "the affair" was overtly developed by two individuals. One was Mr. James R. Wiggins, the editor-in-chief of *The Post*, and the other was Mr. Walter C. Louchheim, Jr., a member of the National Capital Planning Commission. Needless to say, there were probably many who gullibly swallowed their fiction, but there were scores of others who didn't. Our ratio still holds.

If this is the basis of an affair or controversy, then obviously nothing in life is beyond either one. Two or more creatures can always be found objecting to God, virtue, women and the New York Yankees. In the course of his campaign, Wiggins complained that he was entitled to his opinion. That right can be denied no one. Logically, however, it is one thing for anyone to have just an opinion, it is quite another for a person in a responsible position to advance an opinion that is grounded in fact, evidence,

4. *The Shevchenko Statue of Liberty in the Nation's Capital*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 3.

and rational support. In most cases, the former scarcely warrants serious consideration, the latter represents the only type of opinion capable of generating wholesome controversy. Such controversy was never inspired by the affairists. Instead, they simply indulged in the crude technique of dubbing the statue and Shevchenko himself as being "controversial."

Without doubt, both Wiggins and Louchheim don't know how Lenin turned an earlier Shevchenko dispute into a real controversy, albeit to serve his sinister political ends. In 1914, the previous government of the Russian Empire outrightly refused the Ukrainian people permission to observe the centennial of Shevchenko's birth. This aroused the Ukrainian nation and evoked the following from Lenin: "The denial of celebration of Shevchenko's Day was such a first class successful measure from the standpoint of agitation against the government that one cannot imagine a better one. I think that all of our best social democratic agitators against the government could never have achieved such complete success in so short a time as this measure alone has attained. After this measure, millions and millions of 'dwellers' began to turn into conscious citizens, convinced in the righteousness of the saying that Russia is 'the prison of nations.'" ⁵

Of course, contemporary Russian subtlety in observing "Shevchenko's Day" does not signify the non-existence of the prison of nations. We are dealing now with a cagier and more dangerous Bear. As indicated above, one of the paramount reasons for honoring Shevchenko in this country was the need to preserve the purity of his stature and meaning. Moscow and its puppets have disfigured Shevchenko, have painted him as a forerunner, a precursor of the Russian Bolshevik revolution; they have perverted the

5. Lenin, V. *Sochineniia*, Vol. XX, Moscow, pp. 14-15.

patriotic and nationalist freedom fighter for their own psycho-political ends. This, of course, is not new with the professional perverters in the Kremlin, Kiev and elsewhere. The honored names of Lincoln, Jefferson, Washington, Shakespeare and dozens of others have been blemished in like manner. Distortion of works and names is an old Russian trade. The pity of all this is the gullibility with which people and papers, like *The Post*, accept these distortions in the full interest of Russian objectives.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE AFFAIR

All the details of "the affair" have been candidly set forth in a Congressional publication.⁶ Whereas *The Post* purposely suppressed hundreds of replies to its scandalous editorials, this publication accommodated both the editorials and the replies. Here, it is both impossible and unnecessary to treat every specious argument and accusation that was raised over the three-month period. As this writer points out in the opening page of the book, "You and your colleagues know well the perversions committed by the Soviet Russians and their puppets. Their perversion of Shevchenko, whose greatness lies in his poetic teachings of universal freedom, still is little understood by a few in our country. It is hoped that the Shevchenko monument to world freedom will in time enlighten even these few."⁷ This was addressed to our legislators who also viewed with concern the naive acceptance of the Russian perversions by *The Post* and a few others.

In fact, although every conceivable argument was con-

6. See *Shevchenko, A Monument to the Liberation, Freedom and Independence of All Captive Nations*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

cocted against the statue and its sponsors, some being of the most malicious sort, the affairists relied ultimately on two main contentions which were repeated over and over again. Evidently, by sheer repetition, they hoped to make these fallacious points appear plausible and rationally acceptable. The extremes to which Wiggins went in abusing the facilities of *The Post* can be seen from the editorialized report of the placement of Shevchenko's statue: "Sponsored by anti-Communist Ukrainian-American groups, the Shevchenko memorial has been opposed on the grounds that the poet was both anti-Semitic and the idol of the Communist Party." ⁸ Several days later, the same was repeated under a slanted caption.⁹ In short, the pattern of editorial comments and supposedly objective reports was the same: "controversial," "anti-Semitic," and "the idol of the Communist Party." Significantly, *The Post's* campaign along these lines stirred up little interest in its favor.

We can dispense quickly with the "controversial" aspect of this pattern of attack. That the statue is allegedly controversial obviously rests on the validity or invalidity of the two main contentions—the anti-Semitic and the idol of the Communist Party. Merely to reiterate that the statue is controversial is no support of its alleged character. As we've noted earlier, the ratio of a million for and two against is not an impressive fact. Moreover, if one were to analyze patiently the comedy of journalistic error and bias as portrayed in the quoted Congressional publication, he would be even more impressed by the apparition of controversy surrounding the statue. The technique of

8. "Shevchenko Statue Ready for Pedestal," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 1964.

9. "Controversial Statue Placed On Its Pedestal," *The Washington Post*, June 4, 1964.

crying “controversial” is too obvious. But desperate as they were, the affairists were in need of some outlet for their frustrations.

Most noteworthy is the way Wiggins developed his almost hysterical assault. His self-contradictory maneuvers patiently represents a full confession of ignorance—worse, ignorance mixed with bold arrogance. Thus, in his first editorial, he claimed that he stands second to none in his esteem for Shevchenko and for Ukraine. However, since the city of Washington “found precious space for the Ukraine’s national poet,” he laments the fact that no statue is being erected for Shakespeare.¹⁰ Although Britain’s great has been honored in so many different ways, our reaction was nevertheless sympathetic. Of course, if Wiggins were terribly impassioned by his own proposal, he should have been laboring for it ever since. Obtaining legislation for a national statue entails heavy toil and hard work, but there is no evidence to the present date that the sedentary editor of *The Post* has embarked on it. How he would handle the attempt of East German communists to prostitute Shakespeare’s plays for propaganda ends, much in the way that Moscow has sought to pervert Shevchenko, is a question of intriguing importance.¹¹

The editor’s knowledge of the fight over Shakespeare between the East German Reds and the free Germans is probably equivalent to his understanding of the Shevchenko issue. It was quite evident from the first editorial that Wiggins didn’t know what the Shevchenko statue was all about. He actually admitted as much. The second editorial on October 18 confirmed all this, and the subsequent

10. “Poetic Injustice,” *The Washington Post*, September 23, 1963.

11. “Germany’s Split on Shakespeare,” *The New York Times*, January 11, 1964.

ones of November 1 and 12 proved not only his fundamental deficiency in knowledge and understanding of the subject, but also his ugly motivations regarding the poet. The editorials contained every trick in the trade of journalistic smearing, even going so far as to degrade Shevchenko and alleging him to be offensive to numerous American groups. For example, after stating clearly fabricated reasons why the statue should not be erected, Wiggins wrote: "These reasons, to be sure, make one wonder why gullible Senators and Representatives should have approved such a memorial, when all of the offended minorities are among their constituents." ¹²

As a true monument to ignorance, the editorial failed miserably in its endeavor to evoke any response from "the offended minorities." No self-respecting group fell for this smear technique. The maneuver backfired, adding another blemish on the integrity of the newspaper. The comedy was also featured by the distinct contradiction of these editorials to the lengthy article written by one of *The Post's* outstanding writers, particularly on the matter of Shevchenko's alleged anti-Semitism.¹³ In a most erratic fashion, the editorials contradicted themselves. For the whole array of these contradictions, the reader should scan the quoted Congressional publication on Shevchenko.

Now for the anti-Semitic slander against Shevchenko. In a sense it was rather amusing to witness an ostensible Shakespearean devotee accusing Shevchenko of anti-Semitism because of a passage or two in his poems about hated Jewish tax collectors. As a poet and a perceptive observer of reality, Shevchenko recorded in these few passages the

12. "Monument to Ignorance," *The Washington Post*, November 8, 1963.

13. Rosenfeld, Stephen S., "A Ukrainian Poet Gets Statue Bill-
ing," *The Washington Post*, September 29, 1963.

feelings of people who despised those whom they regarded as their exploiters. In the tyrannical, Russian-imposed system of serfdom it was not difficult to find a scapegoat, particularly a Jewish collector. Shakespeare bore the same poetic responsibility. Beyond his poetry, not once but several times Shevchenko helped and defended Jews at the risk of his personal safety and comfort.¹⁴

Actually, during the battle over the statue, we were waiting for the affairists to begin quoting Shevchenko on this ugly subject. Both Wiggins and Louchheim committed a grave injustice to the poet laureate by concocting this anti-Semitic slander. Nowhere did they dare quote Shevchenko out of context. The slander was perched completely on vague, verbal generality. The reference to Jewish traders in the poem "The Caucasus" wouldn't have helped them because it poetically expressed the misconception of the times. In "Yarema," the money-making obsessions of a Jewish innkeeper are depicted no differently from those found in Shakespeare and other world-celebrated writers. His poem on the "Confederates" yields little for the affairists since a Jew is shown being mistreated by the existing gentry. And in the foreword to "Haydamaky," Shevchenko summarizes his own feeling toward all this by saying "Thank God that it is passed . . . Let our sons and grandsons see that their fathers erred."

Those who know the history of anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire, both Tsarist and Soviet, can well evaluate the service rendered to it by this ignorant accusation heard on these shores. Moscow couldn't have done better. It is an unforgettable credit to the objectivity and high purpose of our Jewish American institutions and organiza-

14. See the very instructive article by Vasylenko, P., "Taras Shevchenko, Defender of Freedom of All Peoples," *Svoboda*, New Jersey, March 25, 1961.

tions that they refused to be drawn into this murky business, as that initiated and sponsored by professed "liberals."

Along with the anti-Semitic slander, the spurious claim was made that Shevchenko is the idol of the Communist Party. As far back as the fall of 1962, one of the affairists, Walter Louchheim, who admitted knowing nothing about the poet, quickly made up his mind that a statue here would serve Russian interests. Even after a concise briefing was given before the National Capital Planning Commission on Shevchenko as a Ukrainian poet of universal acclaim, Louchheim still dreaded the thought of having a statue in honor of a "Russian poet." Later, when Wiggins came into the act, *The Post* amusingly transformed itself into a rabid anti-communist organ, protesting Shevchenko as an "idol of the Communist Party." Many recalled that on the basis of association, it was Senator McCarthy who referred to *The Post* as "The Washington Pravda." Under the title of "Association Again," the fair-minded editor of the other major Washington paper alluded to this experience and frankly declared, "But the fact is there is much more to the Americans than their Anglo beginnings . . . We are also Ukrainian." ¹⁵

Surely enough has been said on the disfigurement of national heroes by Moscow and its puppets to indicate the pathetic character of this affairist contention. Moreover, if Wiggins were at all familiar with the literature on this battle since 1960, he would have learned that our effort has unmasked the hypocrisy and cynicism involved in Moscow's manipulation of this Ukrainian hero. Furthermore, to inform the reader that thousands of collective farms, factories, streets and what have you bear the Shevchenko name in the USSR, and that this fact proves he is a communist idol, is one of the worst forms of twisted rea-

15. "Association Again," *The Evening Star*, December 4, 1963.

soning. One would perhaps expect too much of this editor to grasp the meaning of this fact. The vast majority of these places are in Ukraine, where naturally they should be, and the Shevchenko nomer has served conspicuously to preserve the national identity of 45 million people, who even today are being subjected to Russification. For this great "anti-communist" organ to overlook these essentials is scarcely cause for wonderment.

SOME SALUTARY EFFECTS

The effects of the affair were clearly salutary, as indeed shown by the huge success of the unveiling itself. For one, the affairists contributed heavily to a popular familiarization with Shevchenko and his works. The interest of countless citizens in Washington and beyond was stirred up by "the affair." Later, the unveiling received nation-wide coverage and reporting.

Another effect was the impact of our freedom of the press. This came into play to offset the irresponsible and unfounded contentions of the affairists. Substantial credit is due Mr. Robert J. Lewis, writer for *The Washington Star*, who instantly sensed the malicious character of *The Post's* editorials and articles, and in the November 10, 1963 issue of his paper presented an accurate account on "The Status of a Statue." Subsequent articles in *The Star* upheld the sound judgment of our Congress and executive agencies. All this well demonstrated that in a democracy forces of reason and justice are always present to combat their negators. As Lewis eloquently pointed out, with the statue we "will also have cause to rejoice that human brotherhood and understanding once again have affirmed the cause of freedom." ¹⁶

16. Lewis, Robert J., "The Status of a Statue," *The Sunday Star*, November 10, 1963.

By way of an educational effect, the affair also revealed the extent to which arrogant ignorance in our midst can serve as ready fodder for Moscow and its puppets. When Wiggins foolishly began to write about askewed nationalism and the like, the perverters saw their chance of horn-ing in on the Shevchenko project. The Ukrainian puppet in the U.N. spoke his piece, and a group in Ukraine sought to intervene in the final festivities of the project. The prevalence of arrogant ignorance in positions of public responsibility is always a tool for our cold war enemies.

Then there is an effect of futural import. The erection of Shevchenko's statue is only a phase in the battle of knowledge and understanding in America with regard to Ukraine and the other captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. The "affair" lucidly revealed the nature and character of this battle. The absurd editorial on "The Captive Nations" in the July 11, 1964 issue of *The Washington Post* is another excellent example of what to expect in the future. Nevertheless, the statue is a fixed monument calling for victory in this battle, which in every respect would be our victory in behalf of the basic interests of our Nation. One flays the meaning and significance of the statue if he interprets it narrowly as an end in itself. On June 10, 1964, Nikita S. Khrushchev, "the Russian Hang-man of Ukraine," didn't unveil Shevchenko's statue in Moscow out of any cultural attachment. The timing itself was suggestive.

For Khrushchev and all Russian totalitarians, the Shevchenko monument in Moscow stands "among monuments to such geniuses of Russian culture as Pushkin," the glorifier of Russian imperio-colonialism; for us Americans, the Shevchenko monument in Washington stands "as a second statue of liberty," with the inscription "Dedicated to the Liberation, Freedom and Independence of All Captive Nations." This is the crucial difference in the battle of

the statues. This also constituted the death of "the affair."

How ramifying this subject of Shevchenko has been can be gleaned from the fact that even a North Vietnamese organ published material on the poet and his encounter with the Russian Tsar.¹⁷ This shouldn't be surprising. Though too many Americans still don't understand it, the front of the unending Cold War is everywhere. It is the height of stupidity to divorce what has transpired in Viet Nam from what has been experienced by millions of others in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This and other relevant issues become clearer when we consider the essence of our problem in this cold and even somewhat hot war, the overall topic of our concluding chapter.

17. "Russian Tsar and Poet Taras Shevchenko," *Van Nghe*, No. 99, Hanoi, March 19, 1965, p. 18.

Chapter XXI A POLICY OF COLD WAR VICTORY

“A house divided against itself cannot stand.”
—Abraham Lincoln

Properly applied in our time to the world at large, these words of the Great Emancipator have more profound and extensive meaning for humanity than they did in his time. And where a house divided against itself “cannot endure permanently half slave and half free,” the present division of the world between the Red Empire and the Independent Nations points to an inevitable resolution that may be cast either in armed conflict or psychopolitical action. The theme developed throughout this book stresses the latter, points out just some of the opportunities we can realistically avail ourselves of, and indicates how fixed and groundless preconceptions, rooted in antiquated thought, blind us to these and numerous other opportunities for successful psycho-political action and thus Cold War victory. In this final chapter, the reasons for and the outlines of a policy of Cold War victory are succinctly advanced at a time, indeed a passing phase, when a Grand Illusion has enveloped many minds in the United States and elsewhere that the Cold War has receded and that by appeasing the prime enemy, the Russian imperio-colonialists, through what is euphemistically called “co-engagement,” the Cold War will come to an end.

Time favors the Soviet Russian and Red Chinese imperio-colonialists, not the world's exponents of democratic freedom. Time for economic acceleration, also time for further nuclear development, perhaps a scientific breakthrough, and anti-missile defense, and certainly time for methodical subversion and psycho-political preparations—all these developments require time and in time will produce further Red takeovers. On our side it is well to recall that cultural exchange, trade, diplomatic acquiescence, self-imposed restraints on military, economic, and political power, and other measures of peace-building were applied in even greater degree to the German, Italian, and Japanese totalitarians, and they failed. What rational ground is there for believing that these same measures will succeed in application to the Soviet Russian and Red Chinese totalitarians? In this calculus of basic power and maneuver Red puppets and associates in themselves count for little, and the total context of power play is far more disadvantageous to the Free World today than it was over a generation ago.

In a politically contrived address on improving relations with Eastern Europe, President Johnson placed favorable emphasis on a number of factors which will inevitably intensify this disadvantage and thus repeat the grave errors of only thirty years ago.¹ The first and most significant is the continuity of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. "Under the last four Presidents our policy toward the Soviet Union has been the same," he said approvingly. Relate this policy to demonstrative facts, particularly the grossly disproportionate growth in the power and influence of the USSR, and there is every empirical

1. Address, *National Conference of Editorial Writers*, New York, October 8, 1966.

reason to demand a necessary change in this misleading policy.

Second, for an heir of the American Revolution to declare outright "Our purpose is not to overturn other governments but to help the people of Europe to achieve together a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work shoulder-to-shoulder together for the common good . . ." goes a long way in explaining why Moscow can look forward to a comfortable period of rapid build-up for world-wide Russian Cold War aggression. The President's additional stress on liberalized trade, cultural exchange, and tourism has nothing on the British use of these means in relation to Nazi Germany during the 30's.

Most noteworthy was Senator Fulbright's endorsement of this presidential address. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who also is under the illusion that the USSR is a "nation," could hardly restrain his delight in blessing the address and in quoting from the President's previous Idaho Falls speech where Johnson underscored the need for "cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the benefits of such cooperation, the whole world would share and so, I think, would both *nations*." ² Could you have visualized the United States "cooperating" with Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, powers that were not as dangerous and insidious as the Russian apparatus is? Then, too, what are we to "cooperate" in? There is little or nothing for us to gain from the Russian copyists, but there are immensities of knowledge, skills, and technology they stand to gain from us.

Lest we forget, we cooperated with Moscow during World War II; today we should stand aghast at the results

2. Fulbright, J. W., "Shift From Coexistence to Peaceful Engagement," *Congressional Record*, October 11, 1966, p. 24974.

of that alliance. The continuity of policy toward the USSR which President Johnson makes so much of is, in the light of cumulative evidence, the best guarantee for additional future disasters and a truly inevitable hot World War III.

It is startling, indeed, how little perspective has been shown regarding this virtually pro-Russian policy, whose roots really extend back to President Woodrow Wilson. One should judge any policy, whether it's based on false assumptions and loose principles or no, by its concrete results. This is the only final and rational approach to a critical evaluation of any policy. To laud the continuity of a policy that has already led to heavy losses for freedom borders on the irrational. By the record we have nothing to take pride in our insular policy toward the USSR.

Just consider a few highlights of this record. The spectacular expansion of the Soviet Russian Empire—from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the USSR to the Danube, the Pacific, and Cuba—within the brief span of 50 years and with patently inferior resources, is a hallmark of political art and genius, regardless of its immoral qualities. Fifty years are but a second in historical time; quite objectively, the empire-building achievements of the Russian totalitarians must be given due and full credit, again despite their brutal and unethical aspects.

A sober contemplation of this all-dominant fact cannot but demand a consideration of its numerous causal reasons. Salient among them are the pronounced American contributions to Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, derived both from errors of commission and omission. Sowing the seeds of our present policy toward the USSR, Woodrow Wilson committed one of the two colossal political blunders of this century when, out of plain ignorance, he failed to apply the principle of national self-

determination to the many subjugated non-Russian nations in the Russian Empire. The firm application of this principle would have effectively guaranteed the newly-won freedom and statehood of these nations, and thus have prevented the formation of a new Russian Empire under the guise of the USSR and fraudulent Communism. How different the course of 20th century history would have been had the cause of national independence been founded on knowledge and understanding! We still are suffering from this knowledge gap today; needless to say, the price of Wilson's failure still is being paid by us today. A continuity of error is as real as one of truth.

In this broad perspective, the original Wilsonian error was compounded and added to by U.S. economic contributions to the growth of the Soviet Russian Empire (now in the form of the USSR, 1920's-40's), America's diplomatic recognition of this empire-state, Roosevelt's unconditional support of the tyrannical empire during World War II, and his naive trust in Russian words at Yalta and Teheran. Few Americans appreciate the incalculable assistance provided by American capital, skill, and technology in the construction of the industrial foundations of the present chief enemy.³ Today, self-seeking interests are once again clamoring for liberal trade with "Russia" and the Red Empire, which in the nature of things can only mean more efficient technology for the totalitarians to pursue more effectively their Cold War aggressions on all continents of the Free World. The grave error we committed in our economic relations with the totalitarian Axis powers, as

3. See the excellent survey by Naleszkiewicz, Wladimir, "Technical Assistance of the American Enterprises to the Growth of the Soviet Union, 1929-1933," *The Russian Review*, No. 1, January, 1966.

well as the USSR, would be repeated again if these interests were to have their way.⁴ In fact, as the writer emphasized in Senate hearings on the issue, we're walking into an economic bear trap set by the Russians in a methodically staged economic strategy which in turn is only an integral part of their overall Cold War strategy.⁵

Those who argue for the recognition of the Red totalitarians in Peiping and elsewhere in the empire, might do well to review the deception and adverse results of our earlier diplomatic recognition of the Russian totalitarians. Progressive humanization and genuine peaceable relations, not to speak of opportunities for expanded freedom, were the lost objectives of that venture. The 1933 step broadened the field for Moscow's Cold War operations against the U.S. Moreover, the cruel aspects of humanitarian America recognizing the USSR while millions of Ukrainians, Cossacks, North Caucasians and others were starving and dying in a massive Russian man-made famine was of no concern to those bent on honoring the world's outstanding genocidists. How foolishly we squander the uses and power of diplomatic recognition was again demonstrated in October, 1956, when the occasion of the Hungarian Revolution called for a strategic withdrawal of such recognition from the USSR. As the most powerful nation in the history of mankind it behooves us, out of self-respect if nothing else, to place greater weight and value on this instrument than we have in the past. Occasions will certainly arise in the future to warrant such prudent discrimination. In this decade so far, we certainly have not shown such prudent discrimination when the U.S. Senate, for

4. See Dobriansky, Lev E., "Historical Lessons in Totalitarian Trade," *Intercollegiate Review*, November-December 1966.

5. *East-West Trade*. Hearings, Part II, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 89th Congress, 1965, pp. 94-104.

example, ratified the U.S.-USSR Consular Convention and, in effect, placed its stamp of diplomatic approval on Moscow's inner empire and also reasserted the myths of the 30's.⁶

Roosevelt's unconditional support of this tyrannical empire during World War II and his unbelievable naiveté at Yalta and Teheran are matters of public record now. However, what is not sufficiently understood is that these repetitive aberrations constitute the continuity of our policy toward the USSR. Roosevelt, too, clung to the basic fallacies in viewing the USSR as a "nation-state," its population as consisting solely of Russians, its policies oriented fundamentally to socio-economic rather than imperio-colonialist objectives, and its capability of evolving into a peaceable, democratic state and yet remain an imperial network. Turned obversely, these ingredient assumptions of the continuous policy toward the USSR spell a protracted ignorance of the nature of that state, the multinational composition of the population, the widespread condition of rampant imperio-colonialism, and the institutional nexus between internal predation and external aggression, whether in direct military form or by indirect paramilitary means.

Clearly, Roosevelt's errors formed the second colossal, political blunder in this century. They opened up the dikes for the third wave of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the two preceding ones being the 1918-22 and 1939-40 periods. The conquest of Central Europe, mainland China, North Korea and others are traceable to this egregious blunder. You will recall from an earlier chapter, as Anthony Eden plainly shows in his memoirs, the very

6. See author's statement in *Consular Convention With The Soviet Union*. Hearings. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 90th Congress, 1967, pp. 145-185.

first thing that troubled Stalin was the allied attitude toward the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR! In the chapter appropriately titled "The Bear," Stalin is quoted as saying, "If you say that, you might well say tomorrow that you do not recognize the Ukraine as forming part of the U.S.S.R." To which Eden replies, "That is a complete misunderstanding of the position. It is only changes from the pre-war frontiers that we do not recognize."⁷ This in the aftermath of the Atlantic Charter and its four freedoms for all peoples and nations! Being assured that his inner fortress would remain intact, Stalin then planned with ease and in patient time the further expansion of the Soviet Russian Empire. What transpired from 1945 on is now prologue.

Almost in the nature of a political cycle repeating itself after a generation, measures being considered today are once again placing us on the brink of re-committing past errors. The whole illusory concept of "detente with Russia," the U.S.-USSR Consular Convention, increased trade with the empire-state, and notions of an alliance with "Russia" against Red China are based on the false assumptions and preconceptions underlying the continuity of U.S. policy toward the USSR. These and other facets of the mid-60's Grand Illusion are argued for on the basis of "changes sweeping Eastern Europe," but few bother to distinguish logically between substantial and accidental changes, between those leading to the elimination of Communist Party monopolies, which are not at all evident, and those actually strengthening the Red states under these political monopolies, which are quite abundant. The presence of nuclear weapons in the current picture is extraneous to the issue at hand and cannot logically be introduced as a basis of rationalization for perpetuating old myths.

7. Eden, Anthony, *The Reckoning*, Boston, 1965, p. 343.

In toto, our record of relations with Eastern Europe generally and the USSR in particular is an exceptionally pitiful one. It is as though, through ignorance and inadvertent errors, America has become the historic guardian of the Russian Empire. It is most difficult to see what President Johnson has to gloat about this record. We won two World Wars at heavy cost of life and treasure, but because of political unpreparedness and habituated myth-making, we also lost the peace twice. Following World War II we enjoyed atomic monopoly and air supremacy; no power in the world, including the USSR, could have successfully opposed our generated pressures for expanded freedom; yet within the short span of a decade both the monopoly and unrivaled supremacy quickly evaporated. It is doubtful that any nation in history has lost so much in so short a time as we. And the end is not yet in sight.

Simple as it may seem, the chief key to peace, victory and freedom is a principled and rational policy toward the USSR. The major source of trouble and threat to the peace of the world is not Peiping, Havana, Hanoi, Cairo and what have you, but solely and exclusively Moscow. A bit of reflection will show that the prime and determining power base of the Red Empire is Moscow's inner empire, the Soviet Union itself. In ultimate terms of distributed power the rest of the empire, including mainland China, depends for its survival upon this base. The USSR stands in the same relation to the entire Red Empire as the United States does to the Independent Nations; the collapse of either would mean the collapse of its respective field. Nevertheless, this power center is so profoundly fraught with vulnerabilities that a sane policy toward the USSR could insure an essential surcease in Russian Cold War aggression in the Free World, a drastic weakening of the total empire itself, and paramount strides in the direc-

tion of world peace and freedom. An equation such as USSR — Ukraine (largest captive non-Russian nation in both Eastern Europe and the USSR) = 0 would then begin to make sense to most Americans; the miserable military record of the polyglot Russian armed forces in this century would also become more intelligible to most of us; and, among other things, the so-called enigma of Russia would be permanently dissolved. Appeasement of the Soviet Russian Empire via “cooperation” and “agreement” only whets the appetite of the Bear more, for it signifies weakness in will and vision. It has been so in the past; it will be so in the future.

In short, a sane U.S. policy toward the USSR would become the focal point of a general American policy of unfinished liberation. Within the USSR, for over forty years most of the captive non-Russian nations have been seeking liberation from Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, and the Russian nation itself stands to be liberated from five centuries of negated freedom, a liberation necessarily predicated on that of the conquered. In the outer reaches of the empire, extending to the Western Hemisphere, liberation from the manacles of Russian power inflames the heart of every patriotic Hungarian as well as that of a North Korean, every Polish patriot as also his North Vietnamese and Cuban counterpart. And in all the common denominator, both historically and analytically, is their captivity to the ultimate Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist power. There is an aggregate power in the captive nations, taken as a whole, which far exceeds all the power of nuclear weapons now existing. We have not even begun to tap this tremendous power as, indeed, we have failed so far to use effectively our other forms of power, be they technologic, economic, military, and moral.

LOGIC AND REASON OF LIBERATION

For the past two decades comedy and tragedy have marked the discussions, formulation, and effects surrounding general U.S. foreign policy. The tragedy has been in its effects, as seen in Korea, scandalously in Viet Nam, and in the Dominican Republic, where unnecessary expenditure of American lives took place in situations that could have been prevented. In this respect, there will be more Koreas, Viet Nams, and Dominican Republics if we fail to change our policy. Curious, isn't it, that Russian lives are not as freely spent in diverse parts of the world? Nor will they be, so long as the old Russian borderlands policy in its modern Red version of Communist Party transmission belts continues to succeed.

As to comedy, the American people have been entertained by a rapid succession of slogans dealing with our foreign relations. On the scale of reorganizing concepts, it brings to mind the words of Petronius Arbiter, uttered 2,000 years ago: "I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization." The verbal parade has included "containment," "liberation," "peaceful liberation," "containment without isolation," "massive retaliation," "peaceful coexistence," "the Geneva spirit," "competitive coexistence," "mutual deterrence," "evolution," "escalation," "disengagement," "bridges of understanding," "competitive engagement," "co-engagement" and many other scintillating terms. What the semantic mill will disgorge tomorrow is anyone's guess. Similar to the annual dress fashion or auto shows, old ideas evidently require new verbal dresses and bodies. But whatever the dress or body the basic structure of ideas has

remained the same. This has been so true for our "changing world," our "nuclear age," our "new horizons"; as though all of the past has been static.

We Americans do not generally go in for rigorous conceptual analyses. The reasons for this condition perhaps are many. However, this quick succession of conceptual constructs indicates the prevalence of much confusion of thought, not to mention an inability to draw proper logical distinctions. Beyond containment and liberation the other concepts are essentially reducible to the one or the other. Careful reflection will show that the unresolved issue still before this nation is fundamentally between the continuation of simple containment in all its patched-up appearances and the projection of liberation, which presupposes and mutually reinforces containment itself. Yet it is amazing how few have understood this.

The evident reason for this condition is that too many of us have not sufficiently comprehended the basic meaning of liberation and what it entails. To those who have devoted considerable thought to the policy of unfinished liberation, it is logical, experientially sensible, and, assuming a will to survive as an independent nation, it is inescapable. The policy is really the only realistic alternative to either relative co-destruction or peaceful and piece-by-piece surrender. Since Korea the traditional American instinct for clear-cut victory has lapsed badly, but the assumption holds inasmuch as the instinct can be easily reactivated. As to choice, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk thinks the only two alternatives to his policy of patched-up containment are a hydrogen war and old-fashioned American isolationism, he clearly reveals the limitations of our leadership.⁸ Unfortunately, he also dis-

8. "Rusk Asks His Critics What They Would Do," *The Washington Post*, June 1, 1962, p. A19.

closes his own unfamiliarity with the literature and developments bearing on this crucial issue.

What are the prospects for liberating the captive nations not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Red Empire as a whole—and without precipitating a global holocaust? Though time is steadily running out, the prospects nevertheless are still bright. There can be numerous opportunities for us if we exert the knowledge, understanding, will, and courageous determination to plan for them and to implement accordingly. The situation calls for a different type of leadership than what we have been getting. Because of our unpreparedness to seize upon fortuitous opportunities, we missed the boat, for example, during the spectacular Hungarian Revolution. The agent of freedom, Oleg Penkovsky, who largely penned the now famous volume, *The Penkovsky Papers*, was not wrong in saying that the Russian General Staff had opposed the “Khrushchev adventure” in Hungary and that if “the West had slapped Khrushchev down hard then, he would not be in power today and all of Eastern Europe could be free.”⁹ From the viewpoint of ideological considerations, it is interesting that the former Russian leader, aided by the West’s ineptitude, rationalized his delayed action on the basis of Tsar Nicholas I’s intervention in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848.¹⁰

The logic and reason for a policy of unfinished liberation can almost be formulated into a syllogism. The first proposition is that, whether we like it or not, or wishfully think that by appeasement we can end it, we are in a persistent Cold War with a messianic enemy, the Soviet ver-

9. Excerpts from *The Penkovsky Papers*, *The Washington Post*, November 5, 1965, p. A23.

10. “Some Aides Questioned Steps in Hungary, Khrushchev Says,” *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1959, p. A4.

sion of traditional Russian imperio-colonialism.¹¹ The second proposition is that war, whether cold or hot, is a situation that poses the inescapable issue of victory or defeat. Then the third proposition is that as a nation, it is necessary for us—in fact, we cannot but logically seek—to defeat the enemy. In our times the nature of this defeat means political defeat, the political and decisive defeat of the Soviet Russian enemy. All this appears quite simple and clear, and indeed it is. As time will tell, it is a delusion to believe that victory on net balance is not achievable and that the totalitarian Red syndicate, considerably strengthened in time, would sit to gaze at the erosion of its power through “evolution.”

Each of these propositions has been extensively supported by elaborate documentation and rational discourse. In the field of human action, however, logic and reason form just one part of the story; intuitive perception, vision, and will form the other, usually the more important part. But common sense and experienced judgment are sufficient to justify these propositions. Taking the first, we read of the Cold War in the papers, hear about it over the radio, and even discuss it. So there is at least a verbal recognition of the fact that we are in a Cold War. Many engage in wishful thinking about its cessation as, for example, one educator who has proposed a presidential proclamation commencing with these words, “I hereby declare that the cold war is over.”¹² It sounds foolish, and it is; but this indicates how much has yet to be learned about

11. For a penetrating account of this tradition see Tomasic, Dinko, *The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism*, Glencoe, Illinois, p. 75.

12. Hutchins, Robert M., “A Declaration to End the Cold War,” *Congressional Record*, November 8, 1965, p. A6301.

Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, which alone is the original cause of the Cold War.

On the other hand, the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Patrick Henry Dean, shows common-sense realism in warning of "a continuing cold war" and underscores "independence as the final goal" for international society.¹³ The independence of nations and individuals he speaks of is not the image that has blinded some editorialists into thinking that the captive nations of Central Europe are no longer captive because some associates of the Red syndicate have begun to flex their muscles.¹⁴ Disconcerting as it may be, the Cold War will continue as long as the Soviet Union exists. As we saw earlier, Russian cold war activity is not new; it was an essential institution of the White Tsars as it has been and is now of the Red Tsars. The fact that the Bear on strategic occasions cries "peace" doesn't mean its forthcoming. It would do most of us well to re-read Rudyard Kipling's poem about the bear that walks like a man:

"When he stands up as if pleading, in wavering,
man-brute guise;
When he veils the hate and cunning in his little
swinish eyes;
When he shows as seeking quarters, with paws like
hands in prayer,
That is the time of peril—the time of the Truce of
the Bear!"

Sheer common sense dictates that once catapulted into

13. Address Commemorating Colonial Revolt, Williamsburg, Virginia, May 30, 1965.

14. E.g., "Satellites No Longer?" Editorial, *The New York Times*, July 24, 1965.

a war, whether hot or cold, the issue of victory and defeat be faced by the challenged, and the objective of positive victory be adopted as his consuming goal. Anything less than these will only postpone matters to the accruing advantage of the challenger. If we think that we have won in Korea or Laos, or are winning in positive net balance terms in Viet Nam, we are only deluding ourselves. Being primarily concerned here with the Cold War, there should be no question that victory is possible and attainable. The very nature of the Soviet Russian menace predetermines the choice of either victory or defeat. Its victims amply attest to this truth, and its own oft-repeated determination to win is enough to pre-judge our resolution to do likewise. By the third proposition it follows that for survival as a nation we must logically seek positive victory in the Cold War, i.e., net balance gain, or, barring last-minute recourse to military arms and the likelihood of a hot global war, be ready in time to surrender even in a state of ignoble compromise to the enemy. To read the words of the Secretary of State—"Sometimes it seems to me that some of those who talk about a 'no win' policy want to participate in a hydrogen war"—one cannot but wonder about the deep impression created by Moscow's propaganda machine and its coexistence or co-destruction myth on minds in this country.¹⁵ The possibility of such a war scarcely inhibits Red Cold War strategy and tactics throughout the world.

Our third proposition certainly cannot at present be supported by much empirical evidence. There is no Cold War apparatus proportionate to the demands of the objective. The proposition's ultimate support rests in the directions of common sense, the ideals of freedom, and in our dedication to these ideals. Unfortunately, here in the

15. *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1962, p. A28.

United States we have to some extent lost these requisites, along with a temperate sense of national patriotism. Nevertheless, this indispensable dedication has been one of the very springs of our American democracy, going back to the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. It takes these documents seriously and inspires us to uphold the ideals of freedom by deeds rather than just by occasioned words. Still, much of this dedication has been sapped and, as a consequence, we have had almost everything within the range of irrational excesses, extending from myopic Kennanism over to the unrealistic Fortress America concept.¹⁶

Knowing that this is a war, albeit a Cold War with the main adversary, if we are not dedicated to the defeat of the enemy, then it obviously follows that we are prone to compromise ourselves morally and politically. Logically, there is no middle ground. We are fooling ourselves to believe otherwise, and the Maginot Wall of patched-up containment won't protect our fooleries. We have already developed a sense of compromise in our willingness by omission of deed to accept the status quo of slavery in a substantial part of the world, praying that "evolution" (selective or random?, no one knows) will somehow set things aright. By this we wishfully look for peace where there can be no peace. And as this inclination deepens, we shall continue to compromise more and more until the only alternative will be "I'd rather be dead than Red" or "I'd rather be Red than dead," depending on one's patriotic or cowardly proclivities. The policy of unfinished liberation offers the choice of being both alive and free.

To avoid both comedy and tragedy in our foreign

16. See on Kennanism a pamphlet by Feighan, The Hon. Michael A., *The Kennan Fables*, Washington, D.C., 1958; also Burnham, James, *Containment or Liberation?*, New York, 1953, pp. 13-73.

policy, this basic logic of unfinished liberation sets forth five factors which support its dominant thesis. The factors constitute in a sense the argument's irreducible general abstracts. The first is adequacy of arms. The McNamara numbers game in the nuclear ratio exemplifies mathematical obtuseness in the fixed framework of psycho-political warfare, and the type of computer thinking that will lead to more hot wars, big and small. It isn't necessary for Moscow to enjoy any clear-cut superiority in all arms, including nuclear ones, to realize its goals. For its Cold War purposes a given adequacy of arms to achieve its ends is enough, though its imperio-colonialist economy will surely provide more.

At the beginning of the 50's we hid behind the fact that we had a distinct superiority in arms. We spoke effusively of physical deterrence, the great deterrence against the Soviet Russian wave of the future. It was a plain fact that we had overwhelming material superiority; it was also plain that we squandered its uses in the Cold War because of a lack of understanding, timidity, and short vision. Since the sputniks, ICBM's and so forth the deterrence has become "mutual." Regardless of a 3:1 ICBM ratio in our favor now—through a more accurate, a far lower ratio embraces also total megatonnage, IRBM's, SLM's, space weapons, and strategic bombers—there has been a relative decline in our power of overall physical deterrence which has shifted the power play to other elements in the psycho-political warfare arsenal. Unquestionably, the arms race will continue with inevitable Soviet Russian superiority in some lines of weaponry, particularly anti-missile missiles and all its obvious implications.

The second factor in this calculus is our accommodation of the empire's progressive build-up, both negatively by failing to adopt the policy of unfinished liberation and

positively by repeating errors of the past, such as liberal trade, the consular convention, cultural exchange and the like. Our present irresolute posture guarantees for the Russians the steady consolidation of their empire, albeit with its recurring difficulties and problems. Remember, they had even worse problems under Stalin. In other words, the Maginot-Wall policy of patched-up containment has us in effect saying "let history do it—evolution, you know," "don't make any firm decision," "let us see pragmatically—day by day, expediently, playing by ear—how things will work out, and let's shift accordingly," "by all means, no long-range plans, no fixed and set objectives; we mustn't appear inflexible." This is the usual jargon you hear in many governmental areas, sometimes spiced up with thoughtless gibberish like "escalation," "confrontation," and "flexible responses." In short, we have unmistakably declared ourselves: in behalf of the captive nations as against the Red states, do nothing of serious import to disturb the consolidating processes within the vast Soviet Russian Empire which, despite family quarrels and the like, includes mainland China, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Cuba, where none of the imposed governments would last for long without the ultimate strength of the USSR.

An integral part of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is its international conspiracy under the guise of Communism and the Communist Parties network. We mustn't overlook nor depreciate this fact despite Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" pretensions. The undercurrent of international conspiracy continues unremittingly, for investment purposes if nothing else. Multi-billions of rubles haven't been spent for fun to train professional revolutionaries in the hundreds of thousands, prepare "sleepers" and potential assassins on every continent, and provide unlim-

ited facilities for the Day as determined by conditions and chance. Moscow persistently plans for political and violent sabotage at the appropriate moment. Spawning a network of subversion, conspiracy, disloyalty, espionage, and sabotage has been a traditional Russian stock in trade both in times of so-called peace and a hot war. Based on the old divide-and-conquer principle, operatives in the network are the cadres forming the enemy from within, and within the United States they are operating as already shown in several dress rehearsals featuring civil rights and Viet Nam war dissent.

Our fourth factor is the highly concentrated psychopolitical propaganda waged by Moscow and the syndicate. We have really to match it; yes, even lumping together the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe. Russian propaganda is essentially faucet-like, adroitly adjusted to changing conditions and tactical considerations. For example, in 1954 there was an intensive political offensive for peace emanating from the Kremlin. Immediately thereafter, Moscow prostituted everything that had been said and the Spirit of Geneva expired. Then, at Moscow's initiative, the West was lured into another phase of summit fever, followed again by the turbulences of the U-2 incident, the Khrushchev visit, U.N. theatrics, and the Cuban and Berlin crises. With economic and political problems piling up in its empire, Moscow was forced to shift gears and sue for a breathing period under the umbrella of "peaceful coexistence." This same umbrella has also served as an effective shield for anti-American propaganda and psycho-political, subversive penetrations on every continent. Its effectiveness will undoubtedly wear out at the point of another major takeover attempt. Meanwhile, Moscow will continue to breed confusion, doubt, and debate, and sow seeds of disunity in the United

States and the Free World. After all, this is the essence of the Russian Cold War against the still independent nations of the world; too, it is the life-blood of survival for both the inner and outer spheres of the Soviet Russian Empire.

Shocking though it may seem, the final factor is the real advantage of the first shot which we also guarantee to Moscow. For various reasons we have shunned from action along lines of a preventive war, although early advocates may be proven right by subsequent history. The Russians are in position to develop their weaponry and seize the real possibility of firing the first nuclear shot. This possibility of a nuclear Pearl Harbor for America cannot be ruled out in the event of a major technologic breakthrough or an advanced Russian system of anti-missile defense. Also, the power of blackmail looms large here.

Briefly, then, when one reflects on these five factors pinned to our present policy of patched-up containment, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that two real frightening possibilities will face us in time. One is for the United States to suffer military defeat, given a peculiar complex of events and situations. But this will be unlikely as long as we maintain our uninhibited progress in military technology, and the passage of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty does not eventuate into a fatal mistake. The other possibility, the much more likely, is a progressive, psychopolitical isolation resulting from successful Red takeovers, and this, too, would spell disastrous defeat. The Common Market in Europe, the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and several other similar developments in the Free World are no guarantees against this possible outcome. In fact, they engender tendencies of euphoria, apathy, indifference, and eroded vigilance that could accelerate it.

Obviously, no rational person would hold that a foot-

ball team can possibly realize victory by constantly playing on its own side of the fifty-yard line. This is precisely what we have been doing. Building bridges of understanding to the control points of the Red Empire neither advances the enemies' already complete understanding of us, our weaknesses and strength, nor does it place us on the field of real play in the power game of the Cold War. It is that crucial point of really entering the game peaceably, competitively, and for win-keeps, that clearly distinguishes the policy of unfinished liberation from that of patched-up containment and its self-defeating bridge-building contraptions.¹⁷ Under the latter, all the major crises and the world's tensions are really on this side of the empire's fences. In Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America—and even here—tensions are being created or aggravated as we are led by the enemy's initiative to spend ourselves reacting and tending to this tension today, that one tomorrow, and so forth ad infinitum. In the meantime, the enemy enjoys psycho-political sanctuary, guaranteed that there will be no precipitation of disturbances or tensions within his imperial domain. This is hardly in the tradition of the American Revolution.

BACKGROUND OF THOUGHT

Despite Mr. Rusk's mistaken belief, there is a rich background of thought on the policy of unfinished liberation. What it is, what it calls for, and how to do it are incorporated in this literature. There is no excuse for not knowing it. There is every reason to become familiar with it now because once the present phase of appeasing the Russians is over, with of course a price to pay for our lack

17. See author's contributions to *Decisions For A Better America*, New York, 1960, pp. 151-53.

of real leadership, the liberation policy will be our only alternative. Those responsible for our present errors of both commission and omission will be written off, and self-legitimations in the name of having pursued "peace" will be found groundless. Lost time, repeated errors and blunderous assists to the Red Empire cannot be whitewashed by mere "peace" utterances.

Most of us, even those in high places, are unfamiliar with the Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act, passed by Congress in August, 1951. The amendment has the distinction of being the first concrete measure aimed at a psycho-political offensive—five years before Hungary! It was designed to attract young escapees from the captive world, rehabilitate them, and form respective national military units, essentially freedom corps with prime psycho-political significance.¹⁸ The Russians feared the implications of this to such a degree that almost half of the U.N. Assembly sessions in Paris that year were exhausted by Vishinsky's tirades against it. To quiet them, President Truman sent, as his personal representative, Congressman Mike Mansfield, to explain to the Assembly that we had no intention of really interfering in the captive nations! However, Russian interference was tolerated and the amendment was never executed.

Had the measure been properly implemented, we would have had a powerful lever in assisting the Hungarians to regain their freedom. In 1957, Senator Russell revived the idea in his Armed Services Committee, but it did not receive any encouragement from the Eisenhower Administration. In implemented form the idea could have been used to thwart the erection of the Berlin Wall during the period of Red hesitancy in August, 1961. It cer-

18. *Mutual Security Act of 1952*, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, pp. 501-521.

tainly could be applied to captive Cuba today. It is an idea to keep in reserve for application in the future.

In the period of 1952-54 much was written and discussed about the policy of liberation. Months before John Foster Dulles' article on liberation appeared in *Life* magazine in May, 1952, this writer had prepared for the Republican National Committee tracts on liberation which were later distributed at the Republican Convention in Chicago and during the subsequent campaign. Although much utterance was given to the new policy, it became apparent that very few, even at the highest echelon, grasped its essence and ramifications. General Eisenhower spoke in terms which are applicable to our present deteriorated situation. "Our determination," he said, "must go beyond the negative concept of containment to the positive concept of expanding by peaceful means the areas of freedom. If this is not done, we will once again find ourselves at war. It must be done. It can be done." ¹⁹ Because of what had not been done, we were already in a war when these words were uttered. For the same reason a little over a decade later we found ourselves in another war. And there still will be additional hot wars if we fearfully cling to simple but negative containment.

Mr. Dulles also spoke in the same general vein. "But liberation from the yoke of Moscow," he said, "will not occur for a very long time, and courage in neighboring lands will not be sustained, unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur." During the Eisenhower Administration it was made known, but without substance, understanding, and vision. Lip service was in abundance; concrete implementation was naught. For example, our policy toward the USSR was as erroneous then as it is now. Briefly, the policy

19. *New York Times*, October 21, 1952.

of liberation was never applied, and thus it is unfinished in two senses: (1) the invincible dedication to liberation by the captive nations and (2) a realistic application of the policy by us.

Regardless of the timidity of the Eisenhower Administration to implement the liberation policy, various and diverse works appeared to explain its contents and purposes. The book by James Burnham on *Containment or Liberation?* advanced public enlightenment to a notable degree. The reports of the Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives are of historic contribution. They appeared in 1954-55 and will be useful in years to come. In May, 1955, General David Sarnoff presented to the President an extensive memorandum which furnishes much detailed expression to the policy.²⁰ About this time, too, Senator Douglas of Illinois took steps in the Senate to propose a Freedom Administration on the basis of a two-level concept. It was pointed out that Moscow has operated on two levels, the Communist Party with its world-wide conspiratorial network and the conventional diplomatic level. Why couldn't we have a Freedom Administration, subverting for freedom, if you will, with the blunt instruments of truth? Moreover, the Orlando group in Florida was already at work then for the creation of a public Freedom Academy to offer instruction in psycho-political warfare.

Millions of our citizens took to heart the words uttered by President Eisenhower in 1956, "the peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been and will continue to be a goal of United States foreign policy." But the search for its concrete implementation continued as individuals and groups developed further the concept and its operational

20. See author's analysis of "The Sarnoff Memorandum: A Year Later," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, September 1956, pp. 203-210.

modes. *Decisions For A Better America*, congressional hearings on the Freedom Commission and Academy, the annual Captive Nations Week observances, and numerous other books and pamphlets carried forward to this day the thought on the unfinished liberation policy. The reservoir of thought created shall have to be tapped once this wasteful period of appeasement and error ends in disillusionment and reawakened sobriety.

Before it will be too late, by then most will have learned that the best way to prevent a hot global war is to win the Cold War. Contrary to the notions of some writers, they will have understood that the liberation policy never theoretically rejected the concept of containment.²¹ It is necessarily founded on containment, though its advocates have consistently pointed out the inherent insufficiency of containment and the need for its reinforcement through liberation. Events have proven them right as we witness the Red totalitarians leaping over the Maginot containment wall into the Middle East, Cuba, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. Simple containment now is a badly patched-up affair, and the coarse and unsophisticated, last-minute resort to U.S. military assistance, as in Viet Nam, will inevitably and rightly tax the good patience of the American public itself. And lastly, in sharp contrast to our present policy of "building bridges of understanding," in itself a desperate variant of crumbled containment, the liberation policy is firmly oriented toward the revolutionary aspirations of the captive nations and not the further strengthening and entrenchment of totalitarian Red regimes which, in effect, the hopeless Johnsonian policy sponsors.

21. E.g., Alsop, Joseph, "Liberation Versus Containment," *The Washington Post*, August 28, 1961.

SOME FLEXIBLE LINES OF IMPLEMENTATION

It is always a source of amusement in any discussion of this subject to be asked "Yea, what can be done about liberating the captive peoples?" As a pharmacist preparing pills in a drug store for the remedy of a lingering condition, you're supposed to offer quickie formulae and solutions. There are none, no more than can be found in any process of human action. As there are no short cuts to learning and living, so there are no short cuts in liberating and enlarging the environment of world freedom. In both, expressed principles, definite goals, methodical planning, and resolute action are the interrelated ingredients of success. The policy of unfinished liberation demands these ingredients and at the same time, in contrast to mere containment, offers the widest latitude for flexibility, initiative, and creative imagination, traits which are in keeping with our American tradition.

For a simple, direct answer to the above question one would say "start reading and thinking." If you were investing your money wisely, you wouldn't hesitate investigating the prospect thoroughly. Here we are dealing with the most fundamental investment of all—your freedom and security. Though the literature is replete with things that could and should be done, there is no simple blueprint of action, nor is it desirable or feasible to have one. The utmost flexibility requires the following: firm principles, fixed goals, a complete, essential knowledge of the enemy (chiefly the USSR and its greatest vulnerabilities), a whole spectrum of operational devices, prudence in the use of these devices as determined by time and circumstance, and a dedicated commitment to win. Strong and enlightened leadership in our democracy can insure a flexible, interlocking relationship of these basic elements. Anything less

will always develop into a rigid will to compromise with an in-time, uncompromising challenger.

In outline form here, the policy of unfinished liberation is structured by all of these elements. Its firm principles are those enshrined in the Declaration of Independence itself: national self-determination and independence, religious freedom, personal liberty under just law, and individual freedom of speech, economic investment, association, and representation. Moral and political responsibility grafted in justice is at the base of each principle. Almost predetermined by these principles are the following fixed goals: the universalization of our Declaration of Independence, the liberation of the captive nations, national independent states, the encouragement of regional cooperation in whatever suitable form, and a genuine United Nations of free nations. The realization of these goals would mean the end of all imperio-colonialist systems and with this, probably the end of any major threat to world peace. Certainly the freedom and security of the United States would be guaranteed for the long future.

As to an essential knowledge of the enemy, enough has been said here on the urgent necessity of altering our misleading policy toward the USSR. There is an urgent need for a Great Debate on our policy toward the USSR, one we have never had in our recent history. There is also a similar need to eliminate our strange official mentality that with double-standard unabashedness upholds independence for African states bearing a nation-less character but skirts the independence of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. The mythologies of Communism and of the USSR as a "nation-state" or a genuine federated state must give way to the truths of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and the tyrannical empire that exists in the USSR. The steady dissemination of these truths is a *sine*

qua non for the success of the liberation policy and for our victory in the Cold War. After all, the USSR is the heart of the Red octopus; our sporadic absorptions with its tentacles in Asia, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere would not in themselves bring us substantially closer to victory. In fact, it is central to Russian strategy to have us spread ourselves thin and on the fringes, while powerful nationalist trends within Russia's inner empire go virtually unnoticed in the public forum and certainly unexploited by our government.²² There is tremendous work to be done in this area of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, even that of educating many of our columnists.²³

Finally, in the implementation of the policy a whole spectrum of operational devices already exists and, as pointed out above, would be used prudently but with a dedicated commitment to win. The usual superficial arguments about precipitating "premature revolutions," escalating into a hot global war, and being unable to help Hungary are well taken account of. It is not difficult to rebut each of these. The first two point up the contradictions inherent in the narrow policy of patched-up containment, which really has not contained the aggressive influences of imperialist Russia. The general counterargument to all of them is that without careful cold war planning and execution over the years you can scarcely expect a minimization of risks in a contingent world which is becoming increasingly fraught with risks, the greatest being the risk of losing our independence.

22. For an occasional incisive report see Zorza, Victor, "Nationalist Trend Worries Kremlin," *The Washington Post*, April 24, 1966.

23. E.g., Drummond, Roscoe, "Captive Nations Cause," *New York Herald Tribune*, August 19, 1964.

Subject to conditions, "climate," and circumstances, these devices and their uses include the Kersten freedom corps idea, a Freedom Commission and Academy, a Special Congressional Committee on the Captive Nations, a revitalized Voice of America and a Radio Liberation as propaganda media, aid to underground resistance groups, a communications network ranging from secret printing to space satellites, economic warfare, diplomatic manipulations, the U.N. forum, facilities of friendly and like-minded countries, subversion of Red control centers, utilization of labor unions, churches, veteran groups and other private channels, money counterfeiting, bribery programs and so forth. The devices are endless, and the enormous difference between our use of them and the enemy's use of some of them is that we could enlist vastly more among the captives to participate than he can among free men. Of incalculable advantage to us is the other important dimension of the Cold War, namely between the captive nation and the Red-controlled state. Building the Johnsonian bridges of understanding helps the state, not the people or nation.

INSURANCE AGAINST A HOT GLOBAL WAR

Now, would this course of psycho-political action lead to thermonuclear war? No. Indeed, it is the best insurance against a hot global war. In the 50's, when we enjoyed clear-cut atomic monopoly and air supremacy, opponents said such action would lead to war; mind you, while the Korean War was in vogue. Now in the 60's, with the enemy a member of the nuclear club and its empire more extended, the same short-sighted opponents say the same thing. They offer nothing new and urge us to sit tight on the self-contradictions of patched-up containment. How

far behind they are of real developments in Eastern Europe is indicated by this choice observation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman: "the Soviet Union and some of the Eastern European Communist countries are beginning to free themselves from the blinders of Marxist-Leninist ideology and to look at the world and at their own societies in somewhat more realistic terms."²⁴ Like many others, the poor Senator, who hasn't the slightest conception of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and thinks both the USSR and Yugoslavia are "nations," finds it difficult to understand that Marxist-Leninist ideology is only one tool among many used by the Russian totalitarians, when and where it suits their purposes.²⁵ Its impact in the USSR was lost under Stalin over 30 years ago, though Khrushchev and his twin successors have lip-serviced it on appropriate occasions.

It must take some "blinders" and lack of realism to recreate an empire and extend it with relatively inferior resources within the short span of 50 years, and in the process rob atomic secrets from an "ally," bamboozle it with nuclearistic fear, contest the most powerful nation in space and power gaining, as in Cuba, and threaten its whole security with increasing success in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. What all this has to do with "Marxist-Leninist ideology," only the Senator can tell, and perhaps also academicians who like to read Lenin's imperialism into these real developments; they have everything to do with 500 years of Russian empire-building experience and wisdom in psycho-political warfare. By all essential evidence the "blinders" rest on the

24. Fulbright, J. W., "The Basic Issue In Foreign Affairs," *Congressional Record*, September 8, 1964, p. 21018.

25. Marton, Endre, "Fulbright Backs Ties to Yugoslavia," *AP*, July 20, 1965.

eyes of those lauding the continuity of U.S. policy toward the USSR, naively seeking bridges of understanding studded with Red toll gates and, like innocent sheep, prone to be sucked into another Russo-American alliance to guard the Soviet Russian Empire, i.e. the USSR, against "the yellow peril."

Some may find a glimmer of hope on the Administration level by referring to the President's awareness that "In today's world, with the enemies of freedom talking about 'wars of national liberation,' the old distinction between 'civil war' and 'international war' has lost much of its meaning."²⁶ This is progress, but don't bank on it because subsequent addresses nullify it and thus demonstrate the uncertainty and confusion that reign at the steering wheel. The fact is that we are guided by no well thought-out policy and, as a consequence, are resorting to old errors and approaches that will make a hot global war inevitable. Our state of "mutual deterrence," as long as it exists, necessitates more than ever before the policy of unfinished liberation. To avert hot wars, whether hydrogen, conventional or guerrilla, we must decide to enter the ring where the totalitarian Russians are at their best—the ring of methodical, psycho-political action.

It is only a question of time before the further cumulation of evidence in rationalized failure, compromise, and no-win psychosis will move sufficient minds to adopt this realistic policy. This breeds the additional question of moment, whether by then we'll have the time to do what must be done without squandering more lives and treasure for the mistakes now being made. In the meantime we can learn from Marx that "The prestige of Russian diplomacy and the renown of Russia's military strength can be main-

26. Johnson, President Lyndon B., Address at Baylor University, May 29, 1965.

tained far more easily and securely in peace than in war. . . . A system of intimidation is far less expensive than actual warfare." As suggested in the first chapter, were Marx alive today, he would unquestionably rank as a foremost anti-communist because his insights into Russian imperio-colonialism and cold war activity hold true today as they did in his time. In substance, many things have changed since then, but these two fundamental forces have remained essentially unchanged. They are the ultimate sources of this world's major tensions, threats, dangers, and fears. They can be eliminated in peaceable time.

APPENDIX

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1959

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Whereas many nations throughout the world have been made captive by the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism; and

Whereas the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations have been deprived of their national independence and their individual liberties; and

Whereas the citizens of the United States are linked by bonds of family and principle to those who love freedom and justice on every continent; and

Whereas it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the peoples of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations for freedom and national independence; and

Whereas by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall

have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world:

Now, therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 19, 1959, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 17th day of July in the year of our Lord 1959, and of the independence of the United States of America the 184th.

By the President:

[SEAL]

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
Secretary of State

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1960

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Whereas many nations throughout the world have been made captive by the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism; and

Whereas the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations have been deprived of their national independence and their individual liberties; and

Whereas the citizens of the United States are linked by bonds of family and principle to those who love freedom and justice on every continent; and

Whereas it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the peoples of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations for freedom and national independence; and

Whereas by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world:

Now, therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 17, 1960, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 18th day of July in the year of our Lord 1960, and the independence of the United States of America the 185th.

By the President:
[SEAL]

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
Secretary of State

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1961
A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Whereas by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

Whereas many of the roots of our society and our population lie in these countries; and

Whereas it is in keeping with our national tradition that the American people manifest their interests in the freedom of other nations:

Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 16, 1961, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America

to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of all peoples for national independence and freedom.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this 14th day of July in the year of our Lord 1961, and the independence of the United States of America the 186th.

By the President:

[SEAL]

JOHN F. KENNEDY
DEAN RUSK

Secretary of State

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1962

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Whereas by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

Whereas there exist many historical and cultural ties between the people of these captive nations and the American people; and

Whereas the principles of self-government and human freedom are universal ideals and the common heritage of mankind:

Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 15, 1962, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 13th day of July in the year of our Lord 1962, and of the independence of the United States of America the 187th.

By the President:

[SEAL]

JOHN F. KENNEDY
DEAN RUSK

Secretary of State

CAPIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1963

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Whereas by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

Whereas the cause of human rights and dignity remains a universal aspiration; and

Whereas justice requires the elemental right of free choice; and

Whereas this Nation has an abiding commitment to the principles of national self-determination and human freedom:

Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 14, 1963, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 5th day of July in the year of our Lord 1963, and of the independence of the United States of America the 188th.

By the President:

[SEAL]

JOHN F. KENNEDY

DEAN RUSK

Secretary of State

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1964

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Whereas the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorizes and requests the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

Whereas the cause of human rights and personal dignity remains a universal aspiration; and

Whereas this Nation is firmly committed to the cause of freedom and justice everywhere; and

Whereas it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the people of the captive nations the support

of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations:

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 12, 1964, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 18th day of June in the year of our Lord 1964, and of the independence of the United States of America the 189th.

By the President:

[SEAL]

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DEAN RUSK

Secretary of State

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1965

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Whereas the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorizes and requests the

President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

Whereas all peoples yearn for freedom and justice; and

Whereas these basic rights unfortunately are circumscribed or unrealized in many areas in the world; and

Whereas the United States of America has an abiding commitment to the principles of independence, personal liberty, and human dignity; and

Whereas it remains a fundamental purpose and intention of the Government and people of the United States of America to recognize and encourage constructive actions which foster the growth and development of national independence and human freedom:

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 18, 1965, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 2nd day of July in the year of our Lord 1965, and of the

independence of the United States of America
the 190th.

By the President:

[SEAL]

LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DEAN RUSK

Secretary of State

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1966

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Whereas the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorizes and requests the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

Whereas freedom and justice are the inalienable rights of all peoples; and

Whereas these basic rights are presently denied to many peoples throughout the world; and

Whereas the United States of America, from its founding as a nation, has firmly subscribed to the principles of national independence and human liberty; and

Whereas in keeping with this tradition, it remains an essential purpose and a fundamental policy of the United States of America to sustain these

principles and to encourage their realization by all peoples:

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 17, 1966 as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this 8th day of July in the year of our Lord, 1966, and of the independence of the United States of America the 191st.

By the President:

[SEAL]

LYNDON B. JOHNSON
DEAN RUSK

Secretary of State

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1967

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

Whereas the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorizes and requests the Presi-

dent of the United States of America to issue a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

Whereas freedom and justice are basic human rights to which all men are entitled; and

Whereas the independence of peoples requires their exercise of the elemental right of free choice; and

Whereas these inalienable rights have been circumscribed or denied in many areas of the world; and

Whereas the United States of America, from its founding as a nation, has had an abiding commitment to the principles of national independence and human freedom:

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 16, 1967 as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all peoples for national independence and human liberty.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twelfth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-second.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

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
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Dr. Lev Dobriansky is a man who, in his middle 40's, has left an indelible mark in the annals of time and history. Probably the easiest way to cover this man's tremendous scope of learning, knowledge and accomplishments are to list them as follows:

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