

Alexander Okhloblyn

TREATY

of

PEREYASLAV

ALEXANDER OHLOBLYN

TREATY OF PEREYASLAV 1654

COMPLIMENTARY

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INTRODUCTION

300 years ago — in January, 1654 — there opened at Pereyaslav the negotiations (completed in March of the same year in Moscow) between the Ukrainian State represented by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Tsar of Muscovy, Alexei Mikhailovich. They resulted in what is known in history as the Pereyaslav Treaty.

This treaty determined for long decades and even centuries the relations between two states — the Ukraine and Muscovy — and between two peoples — the Ukrainians and the Russians. The consequences of the Pereyaslav agreement have influenced the life of those peoples and those states up to the present day. Moreover, in one or another way, they weigh heavily on the fate of Eastern Europe and even affect the rest of the world.

These facts awake a natural public interest in the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 and oblige a historian to examine "*sine ira et studio*", the agreement itself as well as all the circumstances which brought it about, accompanied it and, eventually, determined its further fate.

It would be too much to say that Ukrainian, Russian and foreign historians were not interested in the Pereyaslav agreement. Scores of books have dealt with this question and it seems that all the details have been investigated thoroughly — as far, of course, as was possible by the condition of the sources which are at our disposal.

On the other hand, however, it would be probably difficult to find another question leading scholars to such diverse and even contrary conclusions as did the Pereyaslav agreement. There is not only a serious divergence of opinions between the Ukrainian and Russian historiography as far as the general appraisal of that agreement is concerned, but also individual scholars, whatever their nationality, disagree about its legal and political definition.

How can this situation be explained?

In the first place, the Pereyaslav problem is connected with the entire complex of Ukrainian-Russian relations during

the three centuries of their history and the specific historical event which took place in 1654 at Pereyaslav and Moscow has often overshadowed by these intricate, acute and painful conflicts.

It has also been caused by the fact that historians have at their disposal only a part of the documentary sources and, what is of the utmost importance, all the documents dealing with the agreement itself (the record of the negotiations and the texts of the treaty) have been produced only by the Russian side. The few Ukrainian documents have reached us only in Muscovite translations, the accuracy of which cannot be ascertained. As far as the text of the treaty is concerned, not a single original document is extant either in the Ukraine or in Moscow and we have to rely on copies, rough copies and drafts, all drawn up in Moscow. It should also be added that even this limited number of sources has not been thoroughly studied, while some of them have been probably never completely disclosed. Things became even more complicated as a result of the fact that in 1659 a forged document was fabricated, designed to serve the objectives of the Muscovite policy of that time. It was improperly named "The Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" and the Muscovite government recognized it as the authentic text of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654.

It is pretty obvious that this state of affairs was extremely disadvantageous to both Ukrainian and Russian scholars.

Finally, the study of the Pereyaslav agreement was undoubtedly influenced by political factors, both Ukrainian and Russian. Moscow has always viewed the Pereyaslav agreement as the "reunion" of either two tribes of "one Russian people", or two "Russian" states, and has interpreted accordingly the Pereyaslav treaty of 1654.

The Ukrainian side was also to escape the influence of the political factor. The late Vyacheslav Lypynsky stressed with characteristic frankness and ability that "we have grown used to viewing the Pereyaslav agreement in the light of the Pereyaslav legend, which came into being later..., when the Cossack state was about to fall, and assumed its present ideological form only after the rout of Poltava and the final suppression of the aspirations of Ukrainian Cossack aristocracy for independence and statehood in the time of Mazepa". Comparing the Pereyaslav legend with its "spiritual sister" — the

"Lublin legend" of 1569, Lypynsky observes that "the Pereyaslav legend played the same role in the history of the Ukrainian Cossack aristocracy in the Russian Empire", since it "saved the Ukrainian aristocracy ideologically and juridically, after the bankruptcy of its own state, from the position of a conquered, subjugated and subjected class in a foreign state. These legends in both cases enabled our aristocracy to enjoy all the rights and privileges of the aristocracy of the ruling nation since it ostensibly joined those states voluntarily, without any compulsion."¹)

There can be no doubt that a certain connection was bound to take place between the Ukrainian and the Muscovite version of the Pereyaslav legend, even if it did not exist at the beginning, and it could not fail to be reflected in historiography.

Those difficulties in the field of methodology, of the study of sources and of ideology have affected our historiography up to the present. In some respects — namely as far as sources are concerned — the position of Ukrainian historiography has become even more unfavorable, since the archival materials of the Pereyaslav agreement are now inaccessible.

On the other hand, however, Ukrainian historiography has succeeded, to a great extent, in ridding itself of the influence of Pereyaslav legend — even of the Ukrainian version. It is a long time since the Ukrainians have been able to see through the delusion of the Pereyaslav "unification" and now we have no difficulty in separating the Pereyaslav of 1654 from, let us say, the Pereyaslav of 1954. The tremendous achievements of Ukrainian historiography during the last decades in the study of the age of Khmelnytsky — the works of Mykhaylo Hrushevsky (esp. vol. VIII and IX of his monumental "History of the Ukraine-Rus"), Vyacheslav Lypynsky ("Ukraine at the Crossroads"), Ivan Krypyakevych ("Studies on the State of Bohdan Khmelnytsky"), Mykola Petrovsky (Essays in Ukrainian History", 1930, and numerous articles published in the 1920-ies), Andriy Yakovliv (esp. his "Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties in the XVIIth and XVIIIth c.") and other scholars,

1) V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads, 1657-1659*. Notes on the history of the building of the Ukrainian State in the 17th century, Kiev-Vienna, 1920, pp. 28-29.

and, beyond the scope of Ukrainian historiography, the famous works of the Polish historian Ludwik Kubala — have opened a wide vista of the Ukrainian revolution of national liberation in the XVIIth c. and the building of the Ukrainian Cossack State which not only obliges but also enables the new generation of Ukrainian historians to examine and solve the problem of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654.

The purpose of this short essay is not so wide and ambitious. We only wish to outline a brief historical account of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 — a survey of the circumstances which brought it about, of the negotiations through which it was arranged and of the treaty with which it was completed.

How did the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 occur and what was its real meaning? These are the questions to be answered in this study.

I.

CAUSES OF THE UKRAINIAN-MUSCOVITE ALLIANCE

The great Ukrainian revolution of national liberation which began in 1648 brought about a complete change in the political picture of Eastern Europe. The brilliant victories of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky over the Poles at Zhovti Vody (May 6, 1648), Korsun (May 16, 1648) and Pylavtsi (September 13, 1648)¹⁾ dealt a severe blow to the Polish Commonwealth, not only militarily, but also politically and ideologically. They demolished the old idea of the Jagiellons which was based on the coexistence of three peoples — the Poles, the Lithuanians and the Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Byelorussians) — within one Commonwealth. The Ukrainian Cossacks, who as early as the end of the 16th century assumed their historical mission as the national spokesmen of the Ukrainian people, after 1648 became the dominant force in the Ukraine, the leading class of the Ukrainian people and the representatives of state authority on its territory.

The creation of the Ukrainian Cossack State as an heir of the old Rus (Kievan) Empire was the greatest political achievement of the Ukrainian people after long centuries of stateless existence and national oppression. This tremendous success placed on the shoulders of all classes of Ukrainian population and, especially on the Cossacks, the heavy burden of continued armed and political struggle against Poland and of building of a new state under extremely difficult international conditions in Eastern Europe and accompanied by great social and political changes in the Ukraine. Therefore the chief objective of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's activity was to maintain and expand the Ukrainian Cossack State, to defend it both militarily and by legal and political means, and to safeguard further development of the Ukrainian nation by extending Ukrainian state authority over all Ukrainian ethnic territories and by establishing Ukrainian political and economic influence in the hole area between the Baltic and Black Seas.

This extensive program demanded much time, work and

blood. In the course of the following years the Ukrainians won many glorious victories and suffered many serious defeats. However, the most critical was probably the year 1653, "the year of the (Polish) King, adverse to me and all my plans," as B. Khmelnytsky characterized it.²) This year dealt heavy and painful blows and inflicted serious losses on the Hetman and the whole Ukraine.

In September, 1653, Tymish Khmelnytsky, the Hetman's eldest and favorite son and the mainstay of his political and dynastic plans, was killed during the siege of Sochava (Moldavia). Even more fatal to the Ukraine was the new betrayal (the third after Zboriv and Berestechko) by the Crimean Khan, an ally of Khmelnytsky. The Polish army headed by King Jan Kazimierz, besieged at Zhvanets (Podolia), was saved from inevitable capitulation by the shrewd moves of Polish diplomats who succeeded, by means of bribery and promises, in reaching an agreement with Khan Islam Girey and concluding a separate peace treaty with him, very onerous for Poland, but even more burdensome for the Ukraine. Poland refused to recognize Khmelnytsky as an equal partner in the negotiations and Ukrainian representatives were not admitted to the conference table. In vain did the Hetman protest and argue that "he, the Hetman, summoned the Khan for help against his enemy, the (Polish) King, and that he, the Hetman, ought to make peace with the King, and not he, the Khan". The Zhvanets agreement between Poland and the Crimea (December 15, 1653) formally provided for a renewal of the Zboriv treaty, but it permitted the Tartars to plunder the Ukrainian territory "as far as the Bar district" (in fact, the Tartar plunder and abduction of slaves spread over the whole of Podolia, Volhynia and even Polissia). What was most important, it once more isolated the Ukraine and exposed it to the danger of a new war, face-to-face with Poland, without any ally. The Ukrainian territory was threatened with a general Polish offensive ("for the Pacification of the Ukraine") which was planned for the beginning of the next year — 1654.³)

However, the difficulties were not limited to the military and strategic situation of the Ukraine. The country experienced an internal economic and political crisis. The six years of a desperate and exhausting war with Poland, the total mobilization of the Ukrainian population, Polish punitive expeditions,

Tartar depredations and obductions and, finally, various natural calamities had seriously damaged the Ukrainian economy. Unfortunately, we have no detailed information as to the economic situation of the Ukraine in the time of Khmelnytsky. However, numerous droughts, bad harvests, epidemics and other calamities, the large-scale purchases of foodstuffs abroad (Muscovy),⁴⁾ the destruction of many industrial enterprises (particularly mines⁵⁾ and glassworks), and, most of all, the almost complete isolation of the Ukrainian economy from the markets of Central and Western Europe not only ruined the economic structure of the Ukraine, but also threatened to paralyze further military struggle for the independence of the Ukrainian State.

This was the ground on which the fatigue and dissatisfaction of the broad masses of the population developed. They were exhausted and discouraged by the long and seemingly hopeless war. Particularly, the migration of the Ukrainian population to the east and south-east assumed wide proportions which were dangerous to the new state. The population from the northern regions and from Poltava province went to work in the apiaries around Putyvl, the potash boileries of the Sievsk and Trubchevsk districts and the saltworks of the Donets region (Bakhmut and Tor);⁶⁾ the border towns of Muscovy were filled with Cossacks who did not wish to serve in the army and were looking for another occupation. Even more important were mass migrations from the Right Bank Ukraine to the vast and quieter steppes of the Slobozhanshchyna and the Donets region.⁷⁾ In vain did the Ukrainian government try to stop this migration. There is no denying that the Ukrainian colonization of the vast areas of the Slobozhanshchyna and the Donets region played an important part in the ethnic and territorial expansion of the Ukrainian people. However, M. Hrushevsky observed, not without reason, that "the cause of the independent Ukraine was lost at the expense of its territorial expansion", for "the incorporation of Ukraine with Muscovy and later compromises with Poland and Muscovy were prejudiced to a certain extent by this migration."⁸⁾

Under such unfavorable circumstances, the internal conditions — both social and political — inevitably became more acute. Although the "Cossack sword" destroyed the authority of the Polish nobility over the Ukrainian peasantry, the foundations

of the social and economic order remained unchanged. In addition to this, the renewal of the hereditary rights of the gentry and the statute labor of the peasants according to the agreements of Zboriv and Bila Tserkva, as well as the active support of the Cossack authorities in enforcing those rights and obligations, roused general protests not only among the common people but also among the Cossacks. These protests frequently developed into bloody riots and even uprisings directed against both the gentry and the Cossack authority. These events reverberated also in the Zaporizhia ("Land beyond the cataracts"), where the spirit of opposition to the policy of the Hetman government continued to subsist (the uprising of Khudoliy in 1650 etc.).

Even more fraught with danger was the political opposition among the Cossack elders. It is true, the Ukrainian Cossack State was already in existence; the Cossack organization embraced all branches of administration, legislation, jurisdiction and economy. The whole Dnieper Ukraine recognized the authority of the Cossack Army and its Hetman — "our Sovereign, His Lordship Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Cossack Army" (1651)⁹), as he was usually called by local Cossack officials, "Sovereign and Hetman of Great Russia (1650), as he was pompously named by the representatives of the Orthodox patriarchs of the East.¹⁰)

However, the Ukrainian Cossack State came into being through revolution and, though it was already gaining international recognition (particularly from the Ottoman Empire whose Sultan accepted it under his protection in 1651), its fate depended to a great extent upon the military successes of the Cossacks. The very authority of the Hetman, who changed his position from that of the leader of the Cossack Army to that of the ruler of the Ukrainian State, was not yet legally enacted and met with considerable opposition, particularly among the Cossack elders, to say nothing of the gentry and higher clergy. Khmelnytsky had to deal with that opposition from the first months of the uprising; its power and its dangerous ambitions increased in proportion to the intensification of social discrepancies and the deterioration of the military situation of the country. This opposition was even more dangerous because it originated not with the Polonophile camp (it had been smashed in the first years of the revolution), but among those comrades-

in-arms of Khmelnytsky who had shouldered the burden of the first years of the struggle and now looked with misgivings and fear at the increase of the Hetman's authority. The opposition of the elders to the policy of Khmelnytsky was intensified after the Zboriv agreement, at beginning of 1650 (colonels Matviy Hladky of Myrhorod, Danylo Nechay of Bratslav, and others). In March, 1651, the Swedish envoy, Johann Mayer, allegedly heard some of the elders (Nechay, Hladky and others) make the following remark to Khmelnytsky: "Look, Khmelnytsky: the Polish King is our King and master and will remain our lord and King, while you never will be a king and will remain our brother and comrade."¹¹⁾

The Moldavian policy of the Hetman was particularly unpopular with the Cossack elders. When Khmelnytsky went in 1653 to the rescue of his son Tymish, the colonels declared that they "should not defend a foreign country (Moldavia) and leave our own without protection". The indignant Hetman "drew his sword and slashed the left arm of Colonel Yessko of Cherkassy".¹²⁾ Only the rank-and-file Cossacks to whom the Hetman appealed supported him, saying: "Our Lord Hetman, be it according to your will, all of us are ready to follow you."¹³⁾

The Polish government was evidently well informed about these events and tried, for its part to strengthen this opposition. It was not without reason that even after the Pereyaslav agreement Pavlo Olekshych, a Polish informer, wrote to Colonel Ivan Bohun that "Khmelnytsky, who used to be your comrade, has now become your master" (March 16, 1654).¹⁴⁾

Until that time Khmelnytsky coped successfully with this opposition. However, even while struggling against it, he could not ignore it, especially during the critical time of the struggle with Poland (the second half of 1653).

The main problem with which the Ukrainian government had to deal was that of Ukrainian-Polish relations, to wit, the problem of final victory over Poland. No compromise was possible: "two walls will collide — one will fall in, another will remain standing" — those words, uttered by Bohdan as early as 1649,¹⁵⁾ had now an ominous meaning. At one time he believed that "Poland would perish and Rus would rule before long, in this very year" (1649).¹⁶⁾

However, the experience of six years of difficult struggle

convinced the Hetman that the Polish Commonwealth could not be conquered with one blow, the more so since the international situation of Poland, unfavorable before 1648, had now improved. The young Ukrainian state needed powerful and concentrated support from without. Both military and political help was required since the political support of Turkey was inadequate and military aid from the Crimea proved to be extremely precarious and even harmful to the Ukraine.

Thus the problem of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance assumes a special significance in the military and political plans of Khmelnytsky.

This problem was not a new one. In the very first months of the uprising Khmelnytsky turned his attention toward Muscovy. The Hetman knew that a treaty of defensive alliance was in existence between Poland and Muscovy (it had been concluded by Adam Kysil in Moscow in 1647). This treaty was directed against the Crimea; however, since the beginning of 1648, the Crimea had been an ally of Ukraine, and thus the Polish-Muscovite agreement could also be used as a weapon against the Ukrainian revolution. As early as December, 1647, when the news came of the threat of a Tatar invasion and a tense situation in the Ukraine, the Polish government demanded that Moscow honor the treaty (*casus foederis*) and a Muscovite army of 40,000 men was concentrated near Putyvl to protect the Muscovite frontier. The Don Cossacks refused to help Khmelnytsky, pleading the Tsar's prohibition.¹⁷⁾ True, Moscow did not intervene in the Ukrainian-Polish war, but it was prevented from doing so by internal disorders inside the Muscovite State and, above all, by Khmelnytsky's victories over the Poles in 1648.

The main task of Khmelnytsky at that time was to prevent a common Muscovite-Polish action. Therefore in the summer of 1648 he asked Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich not to help Poland, but to profit by the opportunity and retake Smolensk or lay his claim to the Polish throne, then vacant after the death of King Wladyslaw IV.¹⁸⁾ Later Khmelnytsky took measures to induce Moscow to give Ukraine active support against Poland. This help became necessary at the beginning of 1649, in connection with Khmelnytsky's ambitious plans to restore the old Rus State embracing the whole Ukrainian ethnic ter-

ritory. They were revealed in an outspoken and determined way to the Polish embassy headed by Adam Kysil at Pereyaslav in February, 1649¹⁹). At the beginning of that year Syluan Muzhylovsky, Ukrainian envoy to Moscow, suggested to the Muscovite government the occupation of the northern regions of the Ukraine since "the people in those towns are living in freedom and the land belongs to them, the Cossacks, and not to the Poles or the Lithuanians".²⁰) Making this suggestion to Moscow, the Ukrainian government aimed not only at protecting the Ukraine from the north (Lithuania), but also at breaking the Muscovite-Polish alliance and involving Moscow in the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. As a minimum performance in return for this concession, Muzhylovsky asked for the diplomatic intervention by the Muscovite government, and the protection of the rights of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine and the whole Polish Commonwealth.²¹)

However, Moscow did not help the Ukraine. Numerous attempts by Khmelnytsky in the following years to persuade Moscow to take a stand against Poland also proved futile. The Muscovite government used as an excuse the "permanent peace" with Poland and limited itself to general assurances, vague promises and some privileges for Ukrainian commerce in which Muscovy itself was interested, especially as far as its border districts were concerned. The Muscovite government viewed with apprehension the victories of the Ukrainian revolution and the growth of the new Cossack state. The former frightened Moscow because of its social radicalism while the latter endangered Muscovite claims to the "heritage" of the Kievan State. Being preoccupied with its internal affairs, Moscow did not wish and was unable to turn against Poland, although it was apprehensive of the possibility of a Polish-Ukrainian agreement or a common action by the Crimea and Ukraine against Muscovy which might prove very dangerous to its security. Khmelnytsky was well aware of these fears and more than once played this card during the Ukrainian-Muscovite negotiations.

The accounts of Muscovite envoys and various agents (both laymen and clergymen) in the Ukraine as well as the dispatches of Muscovite governors of the frontier areas in 1649-1651 report many threatening statements made by the Hetman and rumors directed against Moscow which were

current among the broad masses of the Ukrainian population. After the Zboriv agreement with Poland (August 8, 1649) Khmelnytsky, dissatisfied with Moscow's failure to help him in the war against Poland, told the Muscovite envoy that "he, the Hetman, was now going to wage war against Muscovite Tsardom" and would "smash everything — the Muscovite towns and Moscow itself, and even he who sits in Moscow (i. e. the Tsar) would not evade him."²²)

However, even later Khmelnytsky did not lose hope that Moscow would eventually help him and threatened it with war when his expectations did not materialize. "Nobody annoyed me as much as the Tsar of Muscovy", the Hetman used to say in the autumn of 1650 during official banquets and intimate talks, in the presence of Arseny Sukhanov, a Muscovite abbot, and Greek clergymen. "If the Tsar does not accept us under his protection..... what will happen to him if I conclude alliance with the Turks, Tartars, Wallachians, Moldavians, Hungarians and lay waste his country like Wallachia?" (The Hetman referred to his recent expedition into Moldavia).²³)

A similar statement was made by the Hetman in 1651, during a new war with Poland. He swore before an icon and in the presence of the Muscovite envoy, Nestor, that he would go to war against Moscow and "devastate it more terribly than Lithuania."²⁴)

Khmelnytsky probably had some designs against Moscow. The Crimean Khan (and, possibly, also Turkey) continually persuaded him to make war on Muscovy. Poland, too, turned the Hetman's attention in the same direction. The Greek clergy, who took a rather hostile attitude toward Moscow's claims to the role of the "Third Rome", supported these anti-Muscovite feelings of Khmelnytsky.²⁵) It was obviously in connection with these plans that the Hetman granted friendly reception and shelter to the junior clerk Timothei Akundinov, a pretender to the Muscovite throne who claimed to be a son of the late Tsar Vasily Shuisky, and refused to extradite him to Moscow notwithstanding all the persuasions and demands of the Muscovite government.²⁶)

Moscow continued to bide its time and watched closely all developments in the Ukraine. As the famous Russian historian, V. Kluchevsky, puts it, "for six years Moscow watched attentively, with immovable curiosity, how the cause of Khmel-

nytsky, damaged by the Tartars at Zboriv and Berestechko, was about to fall; how the Ukraine was laid waste by its allies, the Tartars, and the savage, inhuman, intestine war. Finally, when the Ukraine was utterly ruined, it was accepted under (Moscow's) 'exalted arm' so that the ruling classes of the Ukraine, the rebels against Poland, might grudgingly become the subjects of Moscow."²¹) Quoting this passage, M. Hrushevsky makes the following remark: "The whole course of East European history could have taken a different and more auspicious turn if the Ukraine had entered into political union with Moscow at the beginning of its struggle with Poland, while still full of strength, with a population who had not yet lost faith in their leaders and in their cause, while still able to oppose Moscow, to assert itself and not to allow itself to be degraded to the position of a province. Muscovite politicians allowed the Ukrainian Cossacks and Poland — either unintentionally or on purpose — to struggle against each other and reach the point of almost complete mutual destruction, as was distinctly revealed during the last campaign (of 1653 — A. O.), so that (Moscow) might intervene, with its power still unspent, in the struggle between the exhausted adversaries and accept the Cossacks not as an equal ally, but as a subordinate who could be degraded to the position of a servant, a subject, a 'kholop' (serf)."²⁸)

Moscow was meanwhile very interested in an alliance with the Ukraine. First of all, this alliance safeguarded the military interests of the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian army which numbered over 300,000 experienced, battle-hardened soldiers²⁹), was a first-class military force, one of the best on the European continent and undoubtedly having no match as far as Eastern Europe was concerned. The Ukrainian-Polish union was dangerous to Muscovy, as was proved by the experience of the Moscow expedition led by Prince Wladyslaw and Hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaydachny in 1618. Even more fraught with danger was a Ukrainian-Crimean and, to be sure, Ukrainian-Turkish alliance. On the other hand, Moscow's alliance with Ukraine not only secured the southern frontier of Muscovy, but also opened the road toward the south, in the direction of the Black Sea.

In addition, an alliance with the Ukraine enabled Moscow to achieve its traditional political objectives in the West. The

ancient struggle between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian State for the domination of Eastern Europe could not be decided without the participation of Ukraine. The acquisition of the Kievan "inheritance" and the further realization of the Muscovite ambitions to become the "Third Rome" were impossible without the conquest of the Ukraine and the subjection of the Ukrainian Cossack State to the political ascendancy of Moscow.

Moscow also had certain economic interests in the Ukraine, particularly in the Black Sea commerce and in the use of southward and westward transit routes through the Ukraine.

Moscow was also interested in an alliance with the Ukraine for security considerations. The Muscovite government was aware of the fact that the social upheaval in the Ukraine constituted a danger to the system of serfdom in Muscovy. Moscow was afraid lest the idea of social freedom, popular in the Ukraine, should reach Muscovite territory. It was only jointly with the Ukrainian authorities that the Muscovite government could regulate Ukrainian colonization in the Slobozhanshchyna and the Donetsk region. Moscow also needed the assistance of the Ukrainian government in tracking down and sending back numerous Muscovite refugees (mostly peasants-serfs).

Finally, few of the more prominent representatives of Moscow society were aware of the cultural superiority of the Ukraine, particularly of the importance of the educational and scientific center at Kiev (the Mohyla College); they were inclined to enlist its help in the interests of Moscow and, what was even more important, to subject it to their control.

In any case, Moscow needed an alliance with the Ukraine. The events of 1653 convinced the Muscovite government that it was high time to act and that no further delay was possible. Ukraine, exhausted by war and revolution, was facing the mortal peril of a Polish invasion. It was obvious that Ukraine's freedom of choice was limited to two possibilities: either complete subordination to Poland or dependence upon Turkey. The first choice was selfevident and Khmelnytsky warned Moscow that he might decide in favor of the latter course. Both possibilities were unacceptable to Moscow. Thus, when the last attempt at diplomatic intervention the Muscovite embassy of Prince B. Repnin-Obolesky to Poland in 1653 proposing Moscow's

mediation in settling the Ukrainian-Polish conflict according to the provisions of the Zboriv agreement, at the cost of some insignificant Muscovite concessions to Poland) had failed, Moscow finally made up its mind. On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor (National Assembly), convoked in Moscow, decided to accept Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army with their towns and lands, according to their request, "under the exalted arm of the Sovereign."³⁰) This was the Muscovite formula for accepting Khmelnytsky's proposal to conclude a military and political alliance between the Ukraine and Muscovy.

II.

NEGOTIATIONS AT PEREYASLAV AND MOSCOW (JANUARY AND MARCH, 1654)

Fulfilling the decision of the Zemsky Sobor, the Muscovite government sent to the Ukraine an extraordinary diplomatic mission — the "great embassy" — composed of the privy boyar and governor of Tver Vasili Vasilyevich Buturlin, okolnichy (nobleman of the second rank) and governor of Murom Ivan Vasilyevich Olferyev and the dyak of the дума Larion Dmitrovich Lopukhin, with a large retinue. The mission was also accompanied by the Muscovite clergy: "archimandrite Prokhor from the Preobrazhensky monastery at Kazan, protopresbyter Andrean from the Rozhdestvensky cathedral, priest Jonah from the monastery of Sava Storozhevsky, and deacons". They traveled with their icons, crosses and banners and carried with them "the icon of our Saviour given by the Tsar".¹⁾

The embassy went to accomplish an important mission: it had to deliver to the Hetman an official letter from the Tsar, to conduct preliminary negotiations, to accept the oath of allegiance from the Hetman and the Council of Officers, to present to the Hetman the insignia of his authority and the gifts from the Tsar for himself and his senior officers, to administer the oath to be taken by the local population etc. Accordingly the embassy received detailed instructions (later partly modified). After the fulfillment of their mission, the envoys were to report to the Tsar. This report, the so-called "stateyny spisok", has been preserved and is the primary source

of our information about the Ukrainian-Muscovite negotiations at Pereyaslav (January 7-13, O. S., 1654).²⁾

The "records" of the Muscovite diplomats of the 17th c. have been duly appraised a long time ago. A well-informed junior clerk of the Posolski Prikaz of that time, Grigory Kotoshikhin, gives the following account of the reliability and objectivity of this source: "They (the agents of the Muscovite government) write in their records about things not as they happened, but wisely, beautifully, glorifying their own cleverness. They cheat in order to obtain from the Tsar honors and great rewards and are not ashamed of doing such things since nobody can inform against them."³⁾ The report of Buturlin should also be approached very carefully and the information it contains must be subject to thorough critical analysis. However, notwithstanding this reservation there is no denying that the general picture of the negotiations at Pereyslav given in the report of the Muscovite embassy is pretty clear and very colorful.

The envoys reached the Ukrainian border on November 1 (O. S.), 1653, and spent almost two months at Putyvl, keeping in touch with the Ukrainian government. The envoys awaited the return of the Hetman from the Polish campaign and the arrival of many additional items from Moscow (instructions, insignia etc.). They had trouble with the banner which was to be presented to the Hetman: it got wet during the journey, the paint stuck together, and a new banner had to be made in Moscow.⁴⁾ It was not yet agreed upon where the negotiations were to take place. The Muscovite government wanted the negotiations and the oath of the Hetman to take place in Kiev, in solemn circumstances. Buturlin was instructed to "go to Kiev and ask Khmelnytsky to come to Kiev."⁵⁾ However, the Hetman chose for that purpose the town of Pereyaslav. Obviously, he took into account the opposition of the higher Ukrainian clergy and nobility as well as a possible surprise attack from Lithuania. Moreover, the Hetman wanted to avoid the inevitable solemn celebrations in Kiev which would magnify the whole affair to untrue proportions. The business negotiations in which the Ukrainian government was primarily interested could be more easily conducted at Pereyaslav, a quiet Cossack town situated beyond the Dnieper, a fortress and main stronghold of Ukrainian artillery, with large gunpowder magazines.⁶⁾

This was a town with which Khmelnytsky himself was closely connected⁷) and where the office of colonel was held by Pavlo Teterya, a confidant of Bohdan (his future son-in-law) and a relation of the Secretary-General Ivan Vyhovsky.⁸)

In the last days of December (O. S.) the embassy left Putyvl for Pereyaslav. When it reached a distance of some four miles from Putyvl, it learned "in the steppe", already on the Ukrainian side of the border, that the Hetman had concluded a peace treaty with Poland according to the terms of the Zboriv agreement.⁹) This news was very unwelcome for the envoys. It brought to naught the whole idea of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement; it made the whole mission purposeless and put its members in an illegal and dangerous situation. However, on that very day it was established that the news was not true and the embassy continued their journey. On December 31 they reached Pereyaslav where they were solemnly welcomed by Teterya. On that very day in Moscow the Tsar declared war on Poland.

The Hetman was not yet in Pereyaslav. He had to make the arrangements for the funeral of his son Tymish at Chyhyryn (Jan. 1, 1654), and then drifting ice on the Dnieper detained him at Domontiv. It is possible that the Hetman did not wish to meet the envoys during the Christmas holidays and wanted to avoid their presence during religious services and festivities connected with Yuletide. He arrived in Pereyaslav only on the eve of Epiphany, and Vyhovsky with the senior officers came on the following day (January 7). The Hetman's wife Anna, and the wife of Vyhovsky, who had also planned to be at Pereyaslav did not arrive. This enabled Khmelnytsky to avoid any intimate meetings with and receptions for the envoys with the exception of business negotiations and official ceremonies. Even Buturlin's report shows that all negotiations at Pereyaslav were strictly official, dull, without any trace of the traditional Ukrainian hospitality of which Bohdan was so fond. There were no receptions, either official or private; neither the Hetman nor the host, the local colonel Teterya, invited the envoys to any party, formal dinner or banquet. It seemed that the negotiations were being conducted by former enemies rather than by future allies.

The first informal meeting between the Hetman and the envoys took place in the afternoon of January 7 at the quarters

of Buturlin. It was arranged by Khmelnytsky himself. There both sides reached an agreement about the official meetings and ceremonies scheduled for the following day. On the morning of January 8 a meeting of the Council of Officers was to take place. Later the Hetman had to go to the assembly hall¹⁰⁾ to accept the official letter of the Tsar. Later another meeting of the Council of Officers (colonels and other officers) had to take place, after which the Hetman was to arrive at the cathedral and take an oath of allegiance to the Tsar.

However, the order of the day was suddenly changed. In the morning of January 8 a secret meeting of the Hetman with the colonels and senior officers took place. It was resolved to make an agreement with the Tsar of Muscovy — "to accept the protection of the Tsar", according to the report of Buturlin ("bowed under the high hand of the Sovereign").¹¹⁾ However, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon an unexpected event took the envoys completely by surprise: the beat of the drums summoned the population of Pereyaslav — Cossacks and townsfolk — to a general assembly ("meeting of all the people"). This was the famous Pereyaslav Rada (Council). The account of this assembly in the report of the envoys is very colorful; it contains, however, some very suspicious details and rhetorical embellishments.¹²⁾ The envoys were not present at the meeting and learned about it probably from Vyhovsky. The popular assembly could, of course, only approve the decision of the Hetman and the Council of Officers.

It was only after this peculiar plebiscite (limited to Pereyaslav) that the Hetman and the officers appeared in the assembly hall where the official audience took place. The Tsar's letter was accepted by the Hetman and read aloud by Vyhovsky. There was an exchange of speeches by Buturlin and the Hetman. The former in a long speech gave an account of the Muscovite-Polish negotiations of 1653 and enumerated the motives which prompted the Tsar to take the Ukraine under his protection. He assured the Hetman that the Tsar would "ever keep him and the whole Cossack army in his favor and defend them against their enemies."¹³⁾ The Hetman stated briefly that "he, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the whole Cossack army were willing to serve the Tsar and lay down their lives for his prosperity and to take oath and obey the Tsar's will in everything."¹⁴⁾ After that the Hetman

and the envoys proceeded in a carriage to the Uspensky Cathedral where the Muscovite clergy and the protopresbyter of Pereyaslav Hryhory Butovych, with the local clergy, were already awaiting their arrival.

It was there, at solemn moment, that an incident took place which took the Muscovite envoys by surprise and cast an ominous shadow on the Pereyaslav negotiations and on the whole Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement. When "the clergy, having put on their vestments, wanted to begin the administering of the oath according to the official book sent them by the Tsar", the Hetman demanded from the envoys that they should first take an oath in the name of the Tsar that "he, the Sovereign, would not abandon them — the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Cossack army — to the Polish King, but would defend them and never violate their liberties, and whether nobleman, Cossack or townsman, whatever rank or property he had, all should remain as before, and the Great

In other words, the Hetman demanded from the Tsar a solemn formal confirmation of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance, a pledge to defend the Ukraine (particularly against Poland) as well as a recognition and promise to safeguard all the rights and internal constitution of the Ukrainian Cossack State. This demand showed not only the full equality of both sides but also a certain lack of confidence, and some apprehension among the leading circles of the Ukrainian State as to the true intentions of Moscow. There can be no doubt that this demand, as well as the time and place when it was put forward, had been approved by the Council of Officers.

The Hetman's declaration created great confusion among the Muscovite embassy. Buturlin firmly declined to take an oath in the name of the Tsar and stressed that "never before did it happen and it never would happen that anybody should presume to take an oath in the name of the Great Tsar, and that he, the Hetman, should not even speak about it, since every subject should take an oath (of allegiance) to his sovereign", and that "the Great Tsar..... would show his gracious favor toward them and protect and defend them against their enemies, and would not take away their liberties, and would allow them to keep their properties as before".¹⁶) If we put aside the official Muscovite phraseology, we see plainly that Buturlin, while refusing to take an oath in the Tsar's name,

did solemnly promise in his sovereign's name to fulfill all the demands of the Ukrainians.

However, Buturlin's answer did not satisfy the Hetman. He said that he "would discuss this with the colonels and with all those who were together with him (i. e. with the Council of Officers), and having left the church went to the house of the colonel of Pereyaslav, Pavlo Teterya, and talked this over with the colonels and all the people a long time, while they (envoys and clergy) stood in the church".¹⁷⁾

This was something more than a public affront for the embassy: it was probably the most critical moment of the Pereyaslav negotiations. The initiative was now in the hands of the Ukrainians. It is enough to recollect the great importance attached by Moscow to questions of procedure to be able to understand the mood of Buturlin and his colleagues who waited "a long time" for the decision of the Hetman and the Council of Officers.

In the meantime the Hetman sent to the cathedral the representatives of the Council, the colonels Teterya and Hryhory Lisnytsky (of Myrhorod), who "having come to the envoys..... said the same thing... that they should take oath in the Tsar's name."¹⁸⁾ This means that the first answer of the envoys did not satisfy the Hetman and the Council. An interesting discussion started between the envoys and the colonels. To the remark of the Ukrainians that "the Polish kings always take an oath to their subjects", the envoys replied that "it was not fitting to refer to such an example since these kings were infidels (i. e. not Orthodox) and not autocrats and did not keep even that to which they bound themselves by an oath". The envoys again refused to take an oath in the Tsar's name, and added that earlier "nobody even mentioned such improper things and even now it was not fitting for the Hetman and the colonels to discuss them since the Tsar never changed his word."¹⁹⁾ This was a new, solemn declaration on the part of the envoys: it had to replace the formula of the Tsar's oath which was unacceptable to the Muscovite side.

Teterya and Lisnytsky now made their last attempt to persuade the envoys. They told them that "the Hetman and they themselves believed it, but the Cossacks did not and wanted them to take the oath."²⁰⁾ It is difficult to say whether this was only a pretext; after all, one should not discount the

possibility that the Pereyaslav Rada did not go as smoothly as the Muscovite report seems to suggest. It is clear, however, that some caution and reserve were shown by the Ukrainian side at the very beginning of the alliance with Moscow.

Buturlin answered the colonels that "even if the ignorant people said improper things inappropriate for such a great occasion, they (the colonels) should show their devotion to the Great Tsar and persuade the ignorant people not to engage in such talk."²¹) With this reply the colonels returned to the Hetman.

The short winter day was coming to an end and night was approaching. It was high time to come to a decision. "And after that", the report of the envoys continues, "Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky came to the church together with the colonels, the captains, the essauls, the atamans and the Cossacks." The Hetman and the officers told the envoys that they believed "the Tsar's word" and were willing to take the oath. They also stressed their determination to appeal directly to the Tsar and state their case before him. Then the Hetman and the Council of Officers took the oath "to be under the Tsar's high hand with their properties and cities for ever."²²) The ceremony ended with a prayer for the prolongation of the Tsar's life, recited by a Muscovite deacon.

The question of the alleged oath-taking by the Muscovite envoys at Pereyaslav has two different and contradictory traditions, as manifested by the dispute of historians in the 19th and 20th c. Did the Muscovite envoys take the oath at Pereyaslav as the Hetman and the Council of Officers demanded, or did they not? The Muscovite reports are positive that no such oath was administered. On the other hand the Ukrainian tradition, both official and private, considered this oath-taking an accomplished fact. A contemporary account by Makary Krynytsky, a monk at the Kiev-Petchersk monastery and messenger of Metropolitan Sulvester Kosiv, who left Kiev for Lutsk on January 15, 1654, reads as follows: "On the 8th of January Khmelnytsky, together with Vyhovsky, took the oath of allegiance to the Tsar and the envoys took a reciprocal oath."²³) The so-called articles of Zherdev (1659), a Ukrainian draft of a new treaty with Moscow under Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky (an official document), contain a reference

to the agreement "reached at Pereyaslav under the late Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of glorious memory and confirmed by oath from both sides" (art. 1).²⁴) Samiylo Velychko also writes in his "Narrative of the Cossack war against the Poles" (1720) that "after that oath Khmelnytsky was given by the plenipotentiary envoy boyar Buturlin a banner and a mace from the Tsar and other important gifts were bestowed on behalf of the Sovereign on Khmelnytsky himself, all the officers and the common people present (at the meeting) together with the Sovereign's word and assurance under oath that he would keep Little Russia and the whole Cossack army under his protection and respect without violation all its ancient rights and liberties and assist and defend it against all foes with his armies and treasures."²⁵) The well-known manifesto of Hetman Pylyp Orlyk to the governments of Europe dated April 4, 1712, shows that this was the official version of the Mazepa period. It reads in part as follows: "It is common knowledge that His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of immortal memory voluntarily, and not compelled by anyone, placed the Ruthenian people and the Cossack nation under the Tsar of Muscovy. In a solemn pact Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich affirmed under oath that he would shield forever under his protection the Cossack nation and the Ruthenian people."²⁶) This tradition was maintained in the Ukraine throughout the 18th c., and the author of the "Istoria Rusov" wrote: "They (the articles of the treaty with the Tsar) were written down and after approval by the Hetman and the Council were submitted to the Muscovite envoys who, having accepted their contents, affirmed with their oath, given in the name of the Tsar and the Muscovite Tsardom, that these agreements would be kept permanently and inviolably."²⁷)

Taking into account this old tradition, some Ukrainian historians (especially Kostomarov) maintained that the Muscovite envoys at Pereyaslav did take some form of oath. True, the statement contained in the official report of Buturlin according to which the envoys refused to take oath is too positive to be disregarded. Had the envoys taken the oath on January 8 in the Pereyaslav cathedral in the presence of numerous witnesses (especially those from Moscow), this fact would have become well-known and it would have been impossible for Buturlin to conceal it. Moreover, such an oath

did not conform with the idea of an autocratic ruler which was generally accepted at that time.²⁸⁾

There are, however, many facts confirming the opinion of M. Hrushevky that "Buturlin made greater promises in a more definite form than that mentioned in his report, and only refused to take a formal oath 'according to the official book'. In the words of the Hetman that Buturlin "assured us and through that oath (assurance) strengthened our determination" one could see a cautious implication that something like an oath-taking really took place."²⁹⁾ In our opinion Prof. A. I. Yakovliv is entirely correct when, having analyzed this problem, he reaches the following conclusion: "The repeated reference of the envoys to the word of the Tsar which was then considered equivalent to a sovereign's oath, confirming the inviolability of the rights and freedoms of the Cossack army and stating that the Tsar would not abandon the Cossack army to the Poles and that the political and social order in the Ukraine would not be changed, were interpreted and appraised by Khmelnytsky and the officers as an act equivalent to an oath on the part of the Tsar."³⁰⁾ This was probably sufficient at that early stage of the Ukrainian-Muscovite negotiations at Pereyaslav, all the more since it enabled the Hetman to conduct further negotiations with the Tsar in Moscow.

After the oath the Hetman went with the envoys in the same carriage to the "assembly hall", where the colonels and other officers also assembled. It was there that the banner, the mace, the coat and the cap sent by the Tsar were handed to the Hetman. Other personal gifts ("sables") were also bestowed upon the Hetman and his officers. This was actually a kind of investiture of the Hetman (according to the Polish and Turkish tradition) as the ruler of the Ukraine. "You are the commander of the pious army and of all the people", as Buturlin said in his official speech when handing the mace to the Hetman.³¹⁾

Thus the ceremonies of the day ended and the Hetman, accompanied by the officers and "many other people" retired to his quarters.³²⁾

Next day (January 9) "captains, essauls, clerks, Cossacks and townsfolk" took the oath in the same cathedral. Those absent (officers, Cossacks, as well as "townsfolk and people

of various ranks") were made to take the oath a few days later.³³⁾

This is the picture of the Pereyaslav Council of 1654 as given in the official account of the Muscovite embassy. Even that subjective report was unable to conceal the clashes which transformed the first steps of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance into a dramatic spectacle. Fortunately, however, we possess other documents (also of Muscovite origin) which enable us to imagine the real character and dimensions of the ceremonies at Pereyaslav. The Muscovite version of the Pereyaslav legend speaks of the assembly attended by "all the people": at the meeting (Rada) there "assembled a great multitude of people of all ranks", in the church (during the oath of the Hetman) there was a "multitude of people of male and female sexes"³⁴⁾ etc. However, the same Muscovite source notes that the oath was taken at Pereyaslav by "Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, military judges, quartermasters, colonels, nobles, Cossacks and townsfolk — in all, 284 people."³⁵⁾ These were "all the people" of the Pereyaslav Rada of 1654.

M. Hrushevsky found in the archives of Moscow an extremely interesting document, namely the lists of names of those who took the oath at Pereyaslav.³⁶⁾ They were, beside the Hetman himself, all the officers of highest rank: Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, judges Samiylo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Fedir Loboda (?), quartermaster (obozny) Korobka, essauls Missko and Pavlo (Yanenko?), colonels Trushenko of Chyhyryn, Parkhomenko of Cherkassy, Starodub of Kaniv, Hulanytsky of Korsun, Polovets of Bila Tserkva, Pishko of Kiev, Podobaylo of Chernihiv, Ivan Zolotarenko of Nizhyn, Voronchenko of Pryluky, Lisnytsky of Myrhorod, Pushkar of Poltava and Teterya of Pereyaslav.³⁷⁾ They were joined in the next few days by colonel Dzalaliy, retired colonel Ivan Fedorenko, 37 regimental officers, 97 captains, nobles, ordinary Cossacks, clergy and townsfolk, in all 284 persons.³⁸⁾ This was the "great multitude" referred to by Buturlin.³⁹⁾

The following days were devoted to negotiations between the Hetman and the Council of Officers on one side and the Muscovite envoys on the other. Although in the report of the envoys these negotiations look like rather unsystematic talks between two allies on various topics concerning their alliance, one cannot help noticing that both sides were really discussing

a series of questions which were to be the subject of further parleys in Moscow.

Both sides conducted the negotiations (even according to the Muscovite report) as independent and equal partners. In this connection we must stress the unusual significance of a formula used by the envoys and put in black and white in their account: "the Muscovite State of the Tsar and the Cossack Army of the Ukraine."⁴⁰) On one side there was the Tsar (in the person of his envoys) as the representative of the Muscovite State; on the other side we see the Cossack Army (in the person of its Hetman) as the representative of the Ukrainian State.

The main topics of the Pereyaslav negotiations were international affairs (particularly Poland and Crimea) and military matters. The envoys were interested in Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Crimean relations. The Hetman affirmed that no peace with Poland had been negotiated at Zhvanets.

He thought it possible to preserve his alliance with the Khan of Crimea — a hope which, as is well known, failed to materialize. In Khmelnytsky's opinion Lithuania was likely to follow the Ukraine in accepting the Tsar's protection (this did not occur). It is also interesting that the Hetman hoped to persuade the Kalmucks (obviously, he had connections with them) to join the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance and had the same plans with regard to the Nogay Tartars. It was also planned to enlist the support of Moldavia and Byelorussia (Vyhovsky was particularly interested in the latter possibility because of his family ties and personal connections with Byelorussia; he probably discussed this matter with the envoys with the Hetman's knowledge and permission). This was an extensive program aiming at the creation of an anti-Polish coalition. It is not known whether it was sincerely, or with a touch of humor, that the Hetman told the envoys: "I would be glad to see the whole earth under the high hand of the Tsar."⁴¹) This idea is repeated in the Hetman's letter to the Tsar (February 17, 1654) expressing his wish that the Tsar "might have all earthly kings for his servants."⁴²) Everything possible was done in order to bring about the fall of Poland and prevent the renewal of the Muscovite-Polish alliance.

Military matters were even more important. A new Polish attack seemed to be in the making even before the Pereyaslav

agreement. Now it was practically inevitable and the Hetman wanted to press Moscow to speed the beginning of the military operations against Poland. During the negotiations at Pereyaslav preventive measures against a Polish attack were discussed. In his earlier correspondence with Moscow the Hetman had expressed a desire that the Tsar should send his troops to Kiev. Obviously he was interested not so much in the military as in the political side of the question: the appearance of the Tsarist military commanders in Kiev would have brought about not only the actual beginning of a Muscovite-Polish war, but would have also shown everybody in the Ukraine and abroad that the Tsar was determined to defend the Ukraine with all the resources of the Muscovite State. Buturlin reminded the Hetman of his demand but distorted it by ascribing to the Hetman the wish to have the Tsarist military commanders not only in Kiev but also in other Ukrainian cities (this did not correspond with the facts). The Tsar agreed to fulfill the Hetman's wish and Buturlin informed the Ukrainians that 3,000 Muscovite troops headed by Prince Kurakin and Prince Volkonsky were to arrive in the near future. The Hetman confirmed his invitation and added: "the more troops, the better."⁴³)

However, the Hetman made the envoys understand quite clearly that the technical details of the defensive measures against the Polish attack were none of their business. When the envoys asked questions about the quantity of military supplies in each city, number of guns and magazines for storing gunpowder, the Hetman replied that they (the Ukrainians) "had military supplies in their cities", but did not give any specific numbers as to guns or munitions. "This he did not reveal", the report observes. "They had, however, but little gunpowder and lead in their cities" and for this reason the Hetman asked to "supply the cities with gunpowder and lead."⁴⁴)

However, the Pereyaslav negotiations were not limited to international and military questions. The Ukrainian side put forward a series of internal political problems. Obviously these questions caused much concern to the Ukrainians who were now facing the new, incomprehensible political world of Muscovy. The refusal of the envoys to take the oath and the emphasis with which Buturlin stressed in his specific

Muscovite terminology the autocratic character and nature of the Tsar's authority were alien the Ukrainian political consciousness, which had developed from the democratic conceptions of the Polish nobility. These incidents were bound to cause certain apprehensions among the Ukrainian leading circles. Some signs of this discontentment can be found even in the Muscovite account of the negotiations and discussions at Pereyaslav. After the envoys had given a solemn assurance in the name of the Tsar that he would not violate the political and social order of the Ukraine, those "rights and liberties" which were so highly valued by the Cossacks and other classes of the Ukrainian population, the Hetman and the Council of Officers raised other specific questions concerned with sounding the ground and looking like an attempt to put to a full and particular test the sincerity and reliability of the general declarations made by Moscow. The question about a Cossack register (standing army) of 60,000 men put forward by the Ukrainian government (the most ambitious of all contemporary plans and demands) had also some importance for the military alliance between the two countries. On the other hand, the questions concerning the assignment of the Chyhyryn regiment (or rather corresponding administrative subdivision) to the Hetman's mace and other similar matters⁴⁵) which normally should have been within the exclusive sphere of action of the Ukrainian government were discussed now not so much because of the precedent established by the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations (a view accepted by some scholars, notably M. Hrushevsky and A. Yakovliv)⁴⁶), but rather because of the apprehensions of the leading Ukrainian circles at the uncertain prospects of the negotiations with Moscow and the unknown future of Muscovite-Ukrainian relations in general. It was necessary to clarify what exactly were Moscow's views concerning those Ukrainian rights and liberties and to what extent it was ready to respect and protect them. In our opinion, these questions were intended to serve as a touchstone of the Ukrainian-Muscovite relations, although there is no doubt that their discussion and clarification at Pereyaslav could have formed a precedent and basis for further decisions to be taken in Moscow. Such was indeed the later course of events.

This was plainly shown on January 12. On that day "Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, military judge Samoylo, colonels

Pavlo Teterya of Pereyaslav, Hryhory Sokhnovich (Lisnysky) of Myrhorod and other colonels," i. e. almost the whole Council of Officers in a body, called on the envoys and made the following statement: "Since you have refused to take the oath in the name of our great Sovereign..... give us now the letters written with your own hand that our liberties, rights and properties should remain as before..... In the past they had agreements with the (Polish) king and the nobles and received charters from the senators; now you have been sent from our great Sovereign..... with plenary powers and have full authority to do this." The Council of Officers stressed that it was necessary "for each colonel to show something after his return to his regiment." Should the envoys refuse to give them such a charter, "the stewards and (Muscovite) nobles need not bother to go to the towns (to accept the oath of the Ukrainian population) since all the people in the towns would be confused". In order to intensify their pressure upon the envoys the officers connected their demand with the alleged danger of a Tartar invasion. Vyhovsky informed Buturlin that "the Hetman today received letters from Bila Tserkva and other towns that the Tartars were advancing and the stewards and nobles would be afraid to go to those towns."⁴⁷)

This was something in the nature of an ultimatum — another typical incident which helps us to understand the real atmosphere of the negotiations at Pereyaslav. However, the Muscovite envoys could not taken back so easily. Buturlin gave the officers the following reply: "It would be improper for us to give you a letter written by ourselves and it is unbecoming for you to talk about it. We have told you before and the Tsar has ordered that in your towns..... there will be your officials as before and the trials will be conducted according to your laws, and your properties will not be taken away from you."⁴⁸) It is interesting that Buturlin's answer to the general demands of the Council and the repetition of his declaration of January 8 about the Tsar's recognition and preservation of the political and social order in the Ukraine were made this time in more specific and detailed terms. As to the threat of the Tartar invasion, Buturlin's answer was as follows: "Should the Tartars appear in any town, they (the Muscovite officials)) would not go to that town."⁴⁹) The ultimatum was rejected.

It must be observed that the sending of the Muscovite officials to the Ukrainian towns on an extremely delicate mission (to accept the oath of allegiance from the local population) was generally disagreeable to the Ukrainian government. In order to find out the real intentions of Moscow the officers asked the envoys how long the stewards and nobles intended to "stay in their towns" (it is interesting that special emphasis was put on the fact that the Ukrainian towns were theirs, the Cossacks"). Buturlin declared that the Muscovite officials 'had no need to live in the Cherkass (Ukrainian) towns: having administered the oath to all the people, they would leave those towns.'⁵⁰⁾

The official character of these negotiations was manifested not only by the composition of the Ukrainian delegation (the Council of Officers) but also by the fact that it was acting according to the instructions of the Hetman. After the conclusion of the talks Vyhovsky and his colleagues declared that they would go to the Hetman and "report what they had been told to the Hetman and the colonels (i. e. to a plenary meeting of the Council of Officers) and would inform them (the envoys) about the decision of the Hetman and the colonels."⁵¹⁾

After that a meeting of the Council took place which arrived at the final decision in this matter. Colonel Hryhory Lisnysky informed the envoys on behalf of the Council that "the Hetman and the colonels relied in everything upon the Tsar's will" and also agreed to the sending of the Muscovite officials who were to administer the oath.⁵²⁾

Was this really a surrender on the part of the Ukrainian government as it might seem to a reader of the Muscovite report? In our opinion, it was not. In order to be able to understand correctly the real meaning and significance of the Pereyaslav negotiations which took place between January 9 and 12, one has to remember the fact that the principle of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance had already been accepted by both sides. The solemn declaration made in the name of the Tsar by Buturlin (January 8) and dealing with the defence of the Ukraine by the Tsar and his recognition of Ukraine's state right and her social, political and economic order as well as the Hetman's declaration of the same day about the transfer of the final negotiations to Moscow are also of great significance.

These facts show plainly that the demand of additional guarantees (in writing) from the envoys was made in order to compel the Muscovite government not only to specify its commitments and promises but also to make greater concessions during the negotiations in Moscow. In this the Ukrainians were probably successful for, although Buturlin's report does not mention it directly, the Hetman wrote in a letter to the Ukrainian envoys in Moscow (March 21) as follows: "You remember, however, Your Worships, how Vasili Vasilyevich Buturlin assured us with the word of His Majesty the Tsar that His Majesty was going not only to confirm our age-old rights and privileges and preserve our ancient liberties, but would also graciously bestow his special favors on the people of all ranks."⁵³)

This shows that the Ukrainian government held the initiative in its hands throughout the Pereyaslav negotiations.

However, at Pereyaslav there appeared also the first breach in the common Ukrainian front. We refer here to an action of the Ukrainian gentry which is described in the report of the envoys and we quote this account in its entirety: "The gentry came to boyar Vasili Vasilyevich at Pereyaslav and told him that the gentry should occupy a privileged position among the Cossacks and be tried according to their own laws and own their properties as before. And they brought a written list of their names and distributed among themselves governments of provinces and offices. And boyar Vasili Vasilyevich told the gentry that they were acting in an improper manner: before anything was settled, they had allotted to themselves provinces and offices, a thing which they should not even have dreamed of doing; and boyar Vasili Vasilyevich and his colleagues would tell the Hetman about this for heretofore the Hetman did not petition the Tsar about this matter. And the gentry begged him not to tell his to the Hetman since they were acting on their own and not by the Hetman's order, and it depended upon the Tsar's will; they went to take the oath and would sign their names."⁵⁴)

Now, after the research of M. Hrushevsky, we know the names of the gentry who took the oath of allegiance to the Tsar at Pereyaslav (January 11).⁵⁵) They were: the old Ostap Vyhovsky, Ivan's father, with his son Danylo, Syluyan Muzhy-

lovsky, a known Ukrainian diplomat, envoy to Moscow in 1649 and 1653, to Lithuania in 1649, to the Ottoman Porte in 1651, to Sweden in 1653 and to Crimea in 1653,⁵⁶) with three of his relatives, Stepan Mykhaylovych Mazepa, a landowner of Bila Tserkva and the father of the future hetman, Hunashevsky, a junior clerk in the Hetman's Chancellery, and other "unimportant people."⁵⁷) Hrushevsky does not mention the importance of this action and considers it a "family scheme of the Vyhovskys."⁵⁸)

Of course, the importance of this diversion of the Ukrainian Cossack gentry should not be overestimated. The Pereyaslav gentry certainly did not represent the influential circles of the Ukrainian nobles who, together with the higher clergy, kept apart from the Pereyaslav negotiations and generally took a negative attitude toward the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. However, the significant fact is that it was the gentry who had joined the Cossack movement, i. e. that part of Ukrainian gentry which, though not influential in itself, had at the very beginning tied its fortunes to the national revolution and thus was able to exert an important influence upon the policy of the Ukrainian government. It is enough to mention the names of the Vyhovskys and Muzhylovsky to understand that the action of the gentry at Pereyaslav was connected in some way with the higher circles of the Cossack officers. It was precisely because of these circumstances that this diversion of the gentry was dangerous to the Ukrainian cause. While Buturlin rejected their demands, he did so only because Moscow knew who wielded the real power in the Ukraine and understood the nature of that power. It was primarily interested in a speedy conclusion to negotiations with the Ukrainian Hetman government. However, Moscow took note of this fact and, in due course, took advantage of the differences among the leading circles in the Ukraine in order to promote its own interests.

Thus ended the Pereyaslav part of the Ukrainian-Muscovite negotiations. On January 13 the Hetman, accompanied by the officers, called on the envoys and after a brief, formal speech handed Buturlin a letter to the Tsar. He thanked the Tsar for taking him and "the whole Cossack Army" under his protection ("mighty hand") and asked him "to defend them against all the foes." "And whatever we have discussed with

the privy boyar of Your Majesty and his colleagues, they will report at full length to Your Majesty."⁵⁹)

There was nothing more left to be done at Pereyaslav. "And on that day (January 13) Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky left Pereyaslav for Chyhyryn." Next day (January 14) Buturlin and his colleagues "went to Kiev", accompanied by the colonel of Kiev and the Cossacks."⁶⁰)

Buturlin received, for his part in the Pereyaslav negotiations, the high office of the "dvoretski s putem" (Lord High Steward) and many other rewards.⁶¹) The Muscovite envoys undoubtedly accomplished successfully their mission; Moscow indeed won a great victory at Pereyaslav. However, neither this success nor the general significance of the Pereyaslav negotiations should be overestimated. They merely marked a stage (not of primary importance at that) in the history of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654. Moreover, this alliance did not originate at Pereyaslav and the negotiations were not completed there. On the way to its realization there still lay Chyhyryn and Moscow.

The Pereyaslav negotiations solved two essential questions: 1) the military alliance between the Ukraine and Muscovy (guaranteed by the protection of the Tsar over the Ukraine), and 2) the pledge on the part of the Tsar to preserve all the rights and liberties of the Ukrainian State.

However, many questions remained unsolved and indeterminate, particularly those concerning the practical realization of the military alliance, a more specific definition of Ukrainian rights and liberties and, finally, future relations between the Ukraine and the Tsar of Muscovy. What was of the utmost importance, the Pereyaslav negotiations did not give the Ukrainian government any official document, any written guarantee of the oral commitments and promises made by the Muscovite envoys in the name of the Tsar. This was especially important to the Ukrainian government since it had to show some concrete achievement to the Cossacks, the gentry, the townsfolk and other classes of society. The situation was even more urgent because of the enemy propaganda from Poland and Lithuania and because of the danger of a Polish or Polish-Tartar invasion. The Hetman realized that it was necessary to obtain formal guarantees of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance as well as the official pledge of the Tsar to protect the Ukraine.

According to the decision taken by the Council of Officers at Pereyaslav, the Hetman in February, 1654, sent an embassy to Moscow and entrusted it with this urgent task. The sending of the embassy was preceded by the deliberations of the Hetman and the Council of Officers in January and February at Korsun and Chyhyryn; unfortunately, no full and detailed account of these meetings has been preserved. At first it was planned that the embassy would be headed by Ivan Vyhovsky.⁶²⁾ However, the chief envoys sent to Moscow were Samiylo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, a military judge, and Pavlo Teterya, the colonel of Pereyaslav, who both played an active part in the Pereyaslav negotiations.

The Muscovite government evidently hoped that the embassy would be made up of more prominent persons. It was somewhat irritated by Vyhovsky's absence and wanted the Hetman himself to come to Moscow. However, Bohdan Khmelnytsky found an excuse for not coming — the Polish invasion — and never visited Moscow during his lifetime.⁶³⁾ Obviously he was unwilling to go there and did not wish to commit himself. It was probably for that reason that he did not send Vyhovsky.

Beside Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teterya, the embassy had the following members: Hryhory Kyrylovych, essaul of Bratslav, Kindrat Yakymovych, the Hetman's stepson, Herasym Haponovych, ataman of Chyhyryn, Illya Kharkiv (Kharitonovych), and Ivan Ivanovych. The embassy was accompanied by Yakiv Ivanovych, an army interpreter, Sulvestr, the abbot of the Spassky monastery at Novhorod Siversky (probably acting as a chaplain for the embassy), 12 "companions" (including, a son of judge Bohdanovych-Zarudny), a secretary, 24 ordinary Cossacks, 2 trumpeters and 11 "boys". A deputation of the town of Pereyaslav headed by its mayor traveled together with the embassy.⁶⁴⁾

The embassy arrived in Moscow on March 11. On March 12 an official entry into the city took place and on March 13 the envoys had an official audience with the Tsar. Beside the gifts from the Hetman (5 valuable Turkish horses — "argamaks")⁶⁵⁾, they brought also his letter of February 17, written in Ukrainian ("in Byelorussian writing"), which served also as their official credentials, a Ukrainian draft of the treaty (the so-called "23 Articles") and many other letters and

documents, including the acts of the Zboriv agreement. Unfortunately, the original copies of these documents have not been preserved in the archives of Moscow and we have to rely on Muscovite translations.

In his letter to the Tsar the Hetman addressed him on behalf of himself, the Cossack Army and the whole "Orthodox Russian" people (according to Hrushevsky, the original expression was "Ruthenian").⁶⁶) He mentioned "lengthy negotiations dealing with various matters"⁶⁷) with Muscovite envoys at Pereyaslav and stressed that "this boyar (Buturlin) and his colleagues assured us and strengthened our unshaken faith." Reminding the Tsar of Buturlin's promise that "His Majesty would bestow upon us more liberties and properties than the Polish kings and the ancient dukes of Russia," the Hetman asked him to "confirm and secure for ever with his charters the rights, statutes, privileges, liberties and titles to property enjoyed by clergymen and laymen, in whatever rank and position they might be, which they have held for centuries... bestowed by princes, pious lords and the Polish kings, for which we have shed our blood, having inherited them from our grandfathers and great-grandfathers and determined not to lose them." First of all, however, the Hetman asked the Tsar to "protect, maintain and defend us with his mighty hand and his Tsarist army from all our foes who hate and insult us and wage war against us." The remaining requests and proposals were to be submitted to the Tsar orally by the envoys.⁶⁸)

One can agree with Prof. Yakovliv who observes that the official letter of the Hetman of February 17 "makes an impression of coherence and is written in terms which embrace the whole Ukrainian State including all classes of society."⁶⁹) It is very important to note that the Hetman is acting as the spokesman for his "Ruthenian" state. He emphasized this fact before the Tsar, and that circumstance proves that both Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Muscovite government understood and expressly recognized that the Ukrainian State had not ceased to exist, even after the Pereyaslav agreement.

The "Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" of February 17 consist of an introduction and 23 articles.⁷⁰) Since this document has been preserved only in a Muscovite translation, it is not impossible that the order of the articles could have been changed. The Muscovite version is an unsystematic hodge-

podge which prompted M. Hrushevsky to make some very critical remarks.⁷¹⁾ More correct is Prof. Yakovliv who observes that "the underlying idea of the whole draft of the treaty (i. e. 23 articles) was to establish such a mutual relationship between the Ukraine and Muscovy as would guarantee full external, and especially internal, independence of Ukraine on condition that the Tsar would exert a certain amount of control over international relations, and receive tribute for military protection against external enemies."⁷²⁾

Here it must only be added that this document had, in its original form, a different title. It was not mentioned in Hetman's letter to the Tsar and it was delivered by the envoys to the Muscovite government ("sent by Cossack envoys") on March 15,⁷³⁾ the third day of the negotiations (earlier, on March 13, the envoys made only an oral statement). It is enough to examine closely the text of the 23 articles to come to the conclusion that this was not so much the draft of a future treaty (and certainly not a petition to the Tsar) as an "order", an instruction to be used by the envoys during the drafting of the treaty. The original copy was "under the Hetman's hand and seal";⁷⁴⁾ this document was later translated in Moscow — probably in a very careless manner. Thus, e. g., one cannot fail to notice the lack of uniformity in the form of address. In art. 1 the Hetman addresses the Tsar directly, as he does in articles 3, 4, 9, 12 and 15. On the other hand other articles mention the Tsar only in the third person or do not mention him at all, while articles 16-21 are undoubtedly part of the original instruction. Thus, in our opinion, the present (Muscovite) version of the document containing the 23 articles cannot be considered the original (Ukrainian) draft of the treaty. Hrushevsky observes that it "shows traces of various changes and additions which resulted from long discussions, conducted by many different persons, who represented various views, moods and trends of thought within the army."⁷⁵⁾ We should like to add that the negotiations between the envoys and the boyars in Moscow (March 13-14) also influenced the contents or, at least, the form of the "23 articles".

However, notwithstanding all these reservations, the document covers all the questions which the Ukrainian government considered necessary to submit to the Tsar in order to obtain his written pledge and approval. In this respect it can

be considered a specification of the Pereyaslav agreement made by the Ukrainian side.

A masterful analysis of the "23 articles" made by Prof. Yakovliv⁷⁶⁾ enables us to detect two essential ideas underlying this document. The idea of the external independence of the Ukrainian State is embodied in articles 6 (free election of the hetman as the head of the state and the government), 14 (the right to maintain international relations with foreign countries), 15 and 16 (the payment of tribute to the Tsar who was to receive a certain amount of money in one payment or had to rely on the local officials to collect the "revenue" for him "in the same way as the Turkish Sultan used to collect from the Hungarian, Moldavian and Wallachian lands"), 13 and 17 (the inviolability of the rights and privileges of the whole Ukrainian population and their confirmation by the Tsar's charters). Professor Yakovliv also mentions art. 21 (money payments to the officers and the Cossacks).⁷⁷⁾

The second part of the articles concerns the internal independence of the Ukrainian State and "the idea of political autonomy is embodied in the privileges of various classes of the population."⁷⁸⁾ These are the following articles: 1 (inviolability of the rights and liberties of the Cossacks in administration, law courts and civil law proceedings), 7 (property of Cossack widows and orphans), 3 (rights and liberties of the gentry), 4 (rights of self-government for towns and cities), 18 and part of 13 (the rights of the clergy and their head — the Metropolitan of Kiev), 17 (the legal position of the peasants and the "subject" population). "All these articles taken together were, according to the draft of the treaty, to secure the inviolability of the political and social order and the privileges of the entire population of the country."⁷⁹⁾ Prof. Yakovliv is entirely correct in his assertion that they "guaranteed the fullness of the internal autonomy of the (Ukrainian) state and eliminated any interference by a foreign authority — the authority of the Muscovite Tsar — with the internal affairs of the state."⁸⁰⁾

The third group of articles, dealing with the defence of the Ukraine, were directly connected with the chief purpose of the treaty as a military alliance. These are the following articles: 19 (military plans for a war against Poland), 20 (the maintenance of a hired defense force of 3,000 or more on the

Polish frontier after the end of the war), 22 (a military plan to deal with a Tartar attack), 23 (garrison of the fortress of Kodak and the Cossack's headquarters for the protection of the southern frontier of the Ukraine).

Finally, the document contains some articles which remind one of the old Cossack "ordinations" (art. 1 about a Cossack standing army of 60,000, art. 5 about the placing of the Chyhyryn district under the Hetman's jurisdiction, art. 8-12 concerning titles to mills and estates and payment of a specific amount of money for the maintenance of the offices of military secretary, colonels, judges, assaults, quartermaster and artillery staff).⁸¹) In our opinion it is necessary to stress that the problem of a standing army was not a purely internal matter but was also directly connected with the main objective of the treaty as a military alliance. The approval of a standing army of 60,000 actually amounted to the legalization of a new ruling class in the Ukraine. If we remember that these class privileges were also to be enjoyed by the families of the Cossacks and were to influence their numerous body of dependents, it will become clear that this was actually the creation of a new privileged class embracing some 300,000, i. e. approximately 15-20% of the population of the Dnieper Ukraine at that time.

The placing of the Chyhyryn district under the Hetman's jurisdiction was connected not only with the role of Chyhyryn as the residence of the Hetman and the government or with the material security of the Hetman's office in the future, but also with the personal property interests of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whose estates (both inherited and acquired by purchase) lay in that district.

Articles 8-12 were important not only as far as the material security of certain offices was concerned, but also because they dealt with the remuneration of the holders of these offices. This was in conformance with the spirit and practice of that time.

For the conduct of the negotiations with the Ukrainian envoys the Muscovite government appointed a delegation consisting of Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetzkoy, privy boyar and governor of Kazan, one of the most prominent Muscovite boyars, boyar V. V. Buturlin (former head of the "great embassy" at Pereyaslav), Peter Petrovich Golovin, okolnichy and governor of Kashira, and Almaz Ivanov, a dyak of the

Duma and "the most distinguished among the Muscovite diplomats of that time."⁸²) Evidently these negotiations were regarded in Moscow as a matter of primary importance.

The first conference took place on March 13, after a solemn audience with the Tsar. The minutes of this meeting (in a rather inaccurate Muscovite transcription) have been preserved in two versions: the original short one (the 16 points mentioned by M. Hrushevsky)⁸³), and the longer version (20 points) made for the use of the Boyarskaya Duma (edited by G. Karpov).⁸⁴) The proposals made by the envoys generally reflected the instructions of the Hetman (23 articles), but in the course of the discussion some of them were clarified and defended with very interesting arguments.

The most controversial question was that concerning the Muscovite military commanders (voyevodas) in the Ukraine and the limits of their authority. The envoys revealed that the Ukrainian government was obviously unwilling to have the foreign voyevodas inside the country. They agreed that "the voyevodas of the Tsar should be in Kiev and Chernihiv" (probably because these were the old capitals of the Grand Dukes and later the residential cities of the Polish governors), but demanded that "they.....should not be stationed in other cities." And if the Tsar agreed to have no voyevodas in Little Russia (here we see undoubtedly the influence of Muscovite official terminology), the Hetman would rule as before and send the money collected yearly to the Tsar" (short version). In the course of the discussion various possible solutions of this question were examined. The Ukrainian government wanted that "the voyevodas in the Cossack towns should be of their own stock, prominent people, loyal and well-versed in Cossack affairs,"⁸⁵) who would "collect the revenue for the Tsar". "If however, the Tsar should not agree to this and insist on having his voyevodas in the Cherkass towns," then "the court proceedings should be conducted by Cossack officials", and "the gentry, Cossacks and townsfolk should be tried according to their laws and not by the Tsar's voyevodas," unless they preferred a trial by the Tsarist officials. Revenue, too, "should be collected by their own people (Cossacks)" and then given to the Muscovite representatives. The best solution, however, would be (according to the view of the Ukrainian government) for the Tsar to "let Hetman rule as before". Then "the Hetman and the

army would pay (tribute)..... as the Turkish Sultan uses to collect from the Hungarian, Moldavian and Wallachian lands, having computed in advance how much should be taken from each place." The Tsar would only "appoint his man to compute all that revenue" (longer version).⁸⁶⁾

The envoys also put forward Ukrainian demands concerning the international diplomatic relations of the Ukrainian State. This was a matter of primary importance. It is formulated in the "23 articles" as follows: "The Hetman and the Cossack Army should have the right to receive envoys who from time immemorial have come to the Cossack Army from foreign countries with good intentions and His Majesty the Tsar should not be offended by this; if there should be anything against His Majesty, we should let H. M. know" (art. 14).⁸⁷⁾ The Muscovite version of the minutes of the conference formulated the Ukrainian demands in its own way: "when the envoys from any country come on important business, the Hetman will send them to the Tsar; and let the Tsar allow the Hetman to receive and send away the envoys who come on business of smaller importance and take no offence against him" (short version; the wording of the long version is almost indetical).⁸⁸⁾ This attitude of the Muscovite government probably met with strong objections on the part of the envoys, for the resolution of the Boyarskaya Duma was essentially in line with the demands of the Ukrainians: "To receive and send away envoys who come on right business and write to the Tsar what their business was and what was the result of their mission; and if envoys should be sent from anybody on business adverse to the interests of the Tsar, they should be detained and the Tsar should be informed about this; and they should not be released without the Tsar's permission." To this was added another reservation: "have no relations with the Turkish Sultan and the Polish King without the Tsar's permission."⁸⁹⁾ This limitation is quite understandable, especially as a part of a military alliance. Both countries — the Ukraine and Muscovy — were at war with Poland and the possibility of separate negotiations with the enemy had to be excluded. As far as Turkey was concerned, the Ukraine earlier had been under the protection of the Turkish Sultan and the conclusion of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance quite naturally made Turkey the enemy of both Moscow and the Ukraine.

The clause dealing with lease and mortgage contracts has aroused many doubts on the part of Ukrainian scholars and prompted them to some critical remarks. As early as the Pereyaslav negotiations the Hetman mentioned this to the envoys: "wherever a business has been leased in two or three towns for a set term and the term is not yet up, but two or three years are still to run, the Tsar should allow the tenants to keep the rented business and not take it away before the set term expires."⁹⁰) Hrushevsky considers this a proof that at Pereyaslav "the officers helplessly and impotently drifted between a consciousness of their actual position of leadership which had developed as a result of the revolutionary practice of the recent years..... and the juridical state of affairs: the former pre-revolutionary constitution of the Polish Republic... It seems there was nobody to cry out: 'Stop — that's the limit. Here are the bounds of the Ukrainian statehood.'⁹¹)

This question also emerged in the course of the negotiations in Moscow. "If anybody has leased or mortgaged his property and the creditor is in possession thereof, he should be allowed to collect the revenue for the years in which it was not collected" (short version). The longer version explains some details: "If anybody had leased or mortgaged his property and the tenant did not derive benefit from the lease due to war circumstances, or the mortgagee did not take possession of the mortgaged property, all these people should be allowed to hold these leases and mortgaged properties and the revenue for the Tsar should not be collected thereof before the set term expires."⁹²) Hrushevsky correctly observes that this article "explains in more detail the question concerning the unexpired leases which were discussed at Pereyaslav and in the written petition (the "23 articles") and enables us to understand the whole matter better."⁹³)

However, this question probably had a greater importance. The fact is that many estates belonging to the gentry and those which were formerly owned by magnates as well as many trade establishments (mostly potash boileries) were rented by foreign merchants. Even before the epoch of Khmelnytsky the Danzing merchants, Daniel Ryka and Heinrich Marquardt, took on lease the production of potash boileries in the Ukraine east of the Dnieper which belonged to the Polish and Ukrainian magnates.⁹⁴) An identical situation prevailed in the part of

Ukraine west of the Dnieper. Thus, e. g., the Danzing merchants Bernhard and Jacob Schultins rented before 1648 the towns Stary and Novy Korostyshiv which belonged to Ludwik Olizar-Volchkovich. As a result of the events of 1648-49 the conditions of the lease were not fulfilled (or, at any rate, the tenants collected no revenue). However, in 1650 the heirs of the Schultins, Daniel Ryka and Georg Bronswick, merchants and citizens of Danzig, arrived at Korostyshiv. In 1651, Bronswick assumed possession of the rented property in spite of the fact that the original term of the lease had already expired and continued to use it up to the middle of the 1660-ies (it is not known whether there were any interruptions). Of course all this happened with the knowledge and permission of the Ukrainian Cossack government.⁹⁵) There were probably more similar cases and the Ukrainian government, anxious to fulfill its economic engagements and to maintain its international economic and political interests and connections, had to make stipulations to this effect during the negotiations with Moscow.

This shows that some apparently purely internal questions put forward by the Ukrainian side in the course of the negotiations with Moscow actually went beyond the limits of Ukrainian internal affairs and interests. Without a detailed knowledge of the conditions prevailing at that time (particularly in the field of economy which remains almost unexplored), we have to be extremely cautious in making general inferences and conclusions.

Also the delicate question of the Tsar's pay for the Cossack army can be explained quite simply if we read attentively the minutes of the Moscow negotiations. They were particularly concerned with the payments to the Cossacks "when they are in the Tsar's service, by the Tsar's order" (i. e., under Muscovite command, "not for their own defence, but when serving in foreign countries").⁹⁶) It is evident that this was the question of Moscow's financial support in case of Ukrainian (or common Ukrainian-Muscovite) military operations beyond the borders of the Ukraine. It must be also added that the financial matters were one of the most controversial topics discussed during the Moscow negotiations.

Much attention was also paid to military matters (in connection with the war against Poland).

Further conferences took place on March 14 and 17. In

the meantime the envoys were treated to a military parade (March 15), a banquet with the Tsar at the "Golden Palace" (March 18), a dinner with the Patriarch (March 19) etc.⁹⁷⁾ On March 17 the envoys handed over to the boyars the acts of the Zboriv agreement and some other documents.⁹⁸⁾ On March 18 the Boyarskaya Duma discussed the proposals put forward by the Ukrainian envoys (the "23 articles," i. e. the instructions for the embassy which were hastily rehashed by the envoys into a petition to the Tsar).⁹⁹⁾ The demands of the Hetman were, on the whole, satisfied and Moscow asked for additional explanations only with regard to a few articles. The Muscovite government for its part put forward two proposals: 1) the return of Muscovite refugees ("those of the Tsar's men of any rank who should flee to the Tsar's Cherkass (Ukrainian) towns and places should be sought after and returned")¹⁰⁰⁾, mostly serfs who fled from their landlords, and 2) the despatch by the Hetman of an auxiliary Cossack force headed by colonels Zolotarenko of Nizhyn and Teterya of Pereyaslav to participate in the Tsar's expedition against Smolensk. These proposals were accepted by the envoys.¹⁰¹⁾

On March 19 the Tsar received the envoys in a farewell audience.¹⁰²⁾ Later there was another conference with the boyars who "announced the Tsar's orders in response to their (the envoys') articles."¹⁰³⁾ The basic demands of the Hetman were accepted by the Tsar, though with some modifications in Moscow's favor (mostly in financial matters, e. g. concerning the computation and collection of the revenue from Ukraine).

The Ukrainian embassy remained in Moscow until March 27, although the Hetman urged the envoys to complete the negotiations and return as soon as possible.¹⁰⁴⁾ They waited for the preparation of the Tsar's title-deeds, charters and other documents. They were probably also delayed by Holy Week and it was not until March 27, the second day of Easter, that the embassy left Moscow for the Ukraine.¹⁰⁵⁾

The envoys received the following documents (all dated March 27):

- 1) the Tsar's charter for the Hetman and the Cossack army, the so-called "zhaluvana gramota";
- 2) 11 articles with Ukrainian proposals and the Tsar's resolutions;

- 3) the Tsar's charters for the Ukrainian Orthodox gentry;
- 4) the Tsar's deed granting the Hetman the title to the Chyhyryn district;
- 5) the Tsar's charter for the town of Pereyaslav;
- 6) the Tsar's title-deed granting to Bohdan Khmelnytsky the Hadiach district¹⁰⁶⁾ and confirming his ownership of Subotiv, Novoselytsia, Medvedivka, Borky and Kamenka;
- 7) 3 letters from the Tsar to the Hetman about the activity of the Ukrainian embassy in Moscow (this was in a sense a dismissal letter for the embassy) and the sending of a new state seal for the Ukraine, about the declaration of war on Poland and the sending of an auxiliary Cossack army of 18,000 headed by Teterya, about the sending of the Metropolitan of Kiev to Moscow for explanations concerning his conflict with the Muscovite voyevodas at Kiev.¹⁰⁷⁾

Professor Yakovliv adds to this list a "copy of the treaty draft of February 17 with the signatures of the Tsar and the boyars under its 23 articles."¹⁰⁸⁾ In our opinion this document could not have been handed over to the envoys, at least not in the form known to us. These were the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma and they were, of course, kept in the archives of Moscow. Only the orders ("ukazy") of the Tsar had the character of an official document for the embassy and for the Ukrainian government and they were recorded in the charter issued to the Cossack Army and in the "11 articles". We shall return to this question in the next chapter.

The Moscow negotiations in March, 1654, put into official form the Pereyaslav agreement and its ratification by the Tsar. The Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance was now completed.

III.

THE UKRAINIAN-MUSCOVITE TREATY OF 1654

The problem of the legalization of the Pereyaslav agreement has not been settled by scholars in a uniform way. First of all, the original treaty documents are missing; only the Muscovite drafts and copies or translations of some of the corresponding Ukrainian documents have been preserved.

Another question that remains obscure is of which documents the official text of the treaty consisted. Prof. A. Yakovliv analyzes this question most thoroughly, particularly in his recent book on the Pereyaslav Treaty. In his opinion, "the Treaty of 1654 was made up of... three documents different in form"¹⁾, and "the complete and final text of the Treaty of 1654" consisted of the following documents:

- 1) draft treaty of February 17, 1654,
- 2) the Tsar's charter of March 27, 1654,
- 3) the 11 Articles composed at the Posolsky Prikaz in Moscow and dated March 27, 1654.²⁾

This opinion arouses some doubts. Is it possible to consider "the draft treaty of February 17, 1654", i. e. the famous "23 Articles" of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, a part of the "final text of the treaty of 1654"? Prof. A. Yakovliv himself observes that the "proposals" of B. Khmelnytsky of February 17 (the 23 Articles) "were treated in a most exhaustive way... in the general terms of the Tsar's charter and in the 11 Articles with the Tsar's resolutions of March 27, 1654."³⁾ In this case (and Prof. Yakovliv has proved this by his analysis of the respective documents)⁴⁾, the "draft treaty of February 17, 1654" cannot be a part of the "final text of the treaty of 1654", accepted and confirmed by the Tsar (Prof. Yakovliv speaks fittingly of a "ratification instrument of the Tsar's authority")⁵⁾.

In this connection one is inclined to wonder what happened to the document containing the 23 Articles which bore the signature of the Hetman and the seal of the Cossack Army (i. e. the original copy) and which was delivered to the Muscovite government by the Ukrainian envoys. The original of this document is not extant. In 1709, when the Tsar Peter I. ordered a search in the archives of Posolsky Prikaz, he was informed that it was not there.⁶⁾ Only a translation (copy from Byelorussian writing)⁷⁾ of these articles has been preserved in Moscow and it was published several times during the 19th and 20th centuries.

Professor Yakovliv thinks that the "23 Articles" (translated into Ukrainian) with the resolutions of the Tsar and the boyars were handed to the envoys together with other documents on March 27, 1654.⁸⁾ The same opinion was expressed at one time by G. Karpov.⁹⁾ However M. Hrushevsky

does not mention the "23 Articles" among the documents which were handed to the envoys on March 27¹⁰) Prof. Yakovliv himself also says nothing about the handing of the "23 Articles" to the envoys in his earlier book on the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties.¹¹)

In our opinion Karpov's assertion, repeated by Professor Yakovliv, is not correct. The "23 Articles" with the resolutions of the Tsar and the boyars could not have been handed to the envoys either as a part of the basic text of the treaty or even as an ordinary document. It has already been stated above that the "23 Articles" in their present form are partly the instructions ("order") of the Hetman to the envoys and partly the petition (or proposals) made by the Hetman or his envoys to the Tsar. This document is extant only in a Muscovite translation which was undoubtedly made for the Boyarskaya Duma. The resolutions of that body with the usual formula "the Tsar has directed and the boyars have decided" have been preserved in a copy of the "23 Articles" in the archives of the Posolsky Prikaz. It is highly improbable that a copy of these articles and the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma should have been handed to the envoys (for the use of the Hetman). The contents and the form of the resolutions both militate against this assumption. Let us quote some examples:

"The Tsar granted their petition; and concerning the judges: ask how many judges" (art. 10).

"The Tsar has directed and the boyars have decided: to tell the envoys about the expedition of the soldiers, on what day the Tsar himself, the boyars and the soldiers will leave Moscow and not to write to the Hetman" (art. 19).

"To ask in what places at the border (the army) should be stationed" (art. 20).

"The Hetman mentioned this in their presence, in the presence of the judge and the colonels, and it is not necessary to speak to them about it" (art. 21).

Also, in some other articles we find similar expressions: "to tell" (art. 22), "to ask" (art. 23). Finally, the concluding passage of the document: "the boyars were told to report to the Tsar: the Tsar's subjects of any rank who should flee to the Tsar's Cherkass (Ukrainian) towns and cities should be detected and given up."¹²)

Thus it may be said that we have before us something like the minutes of the Boyarskaya Duma which discussed the Ukrainian proposals. It is obvious that such a document could not be sent to the Hetman. It was prepared for the use of the Muscovite government and had to be deposited in the archives of Moscow. It was on the basis of the Ukrainian draft treaty (the "23 Articles") and the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma as well as the conferences with the Ukrainian envoys that the charter of March 27, 1654 and the "11 Articles" with the decrees of the Tsar were drawn up. They were delivered to the Hetman by the Ukrainian envoys. These two documents comprise the final text of the Treaty of 1654 and are, in their original form, its official copy prepared for the use of the Ukrainian government. On the other hand, the "23 Articles", prepared by the Ukrainian government and bearing the signature of the Hetman, were confirmed by the resolutions of Boyarskaya Duma and other acts of the Tsarist government. They were the official Muscovite copy of the treaty and thus had to be left in Moscow.¹³⁾

Another rather interesting question concerns the language of the acts of the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaty of 1654, particularly that of the charter of March 27 and the "11 Articles". According to Prof. Yakovliv, "both documents were written in Moscow in 'Byelorussian writing' and handed to the Cossack envoys on March 27, 1654."¹⁴⁾ It is difficult to accept this point of view. The "11 Articles" were undoubtedly translated into Ukrainian and in this form handed to the envoys. The Muscovite copy of the "11 Articles" contains the following note: "This letter was given to the envoys. Written in columns in Byelorussian writing, without the registration of the dyak. Written by Stepan, Timophei and Mikhailo."¹⁵⁾ On the other hand, there is no documentary evidence that the Tsar's charter for the Cossack Army was written in Ukrainian. The extant draft of the charter in the Moscow archives bears the following inscription: "The signature of Almaz Ivanov, the dyak of the Duma... Alexei Mikhailovich, by the grace of God the Great Tsar and Grand Prince, autocrat of the whole of Great and Little Russia. Sealed with the new seal... Written by Andrei Ivanov."¹⁶⁾ Had this charter been composed in Ukrainian (obviously we cannot speak of a translation), other charters and title-deeds, particularly those for the gentry and the town

of Pereyaslav, would also have been written in that language. It would have been important precedent in Muscovite diplomatic practice which was never to recur.

Thus the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 consisted of two separate and seemingly unlike documents. Scholars have repeatedly discussed the question which was the basic act of the treaty, the charter or the "Articles". One may agree with M. Hrushevsky that "the Muscovite government considered the charter the basic act"; on the other hand, the "Articles" were a "supplementary, subsidiary" act.¹⁷ Both documents represented the Muscovite answer to the Ukrainian draft treaty (the "23 Articles") and undoubtedly constituted a single whole. This is clearly proved by their contents. The "Articles" are a continuation of and supplement to the Charter. As the charter puts it, "what concerns other articles (beside those mentioned in the charter — A. O.), which were humbly presented to us by the envoys and delivered to the boyars, we, the Great Tsar, have graciously taken them into consideration and ordered to write under each of those articles what we have decreed with regard to each and that those articles with our Tsarist decree should be given to the envoys Samoylo and Pavlo."¹⁸ The charter for the Cossack Army was also composed in the same manner (the proposals or petition of the Hetman and the answer or resolutions of the Tsar).

The Tsar's charter for the Hetman and the Cossack Army dated March 27, 1654,¹⁹ answered the request made by the Hetman in his letter to the Tsar of February 17: "May it please Your Majesty to confirm and secure for ever with your Tsarist charters".²⁰ Later in a letter to the envoys of March 21, the Hetman reminded them "that everything should be done according to order and the privileges of His Majesty should be sent by Your Worships without any delay."²¹ This was also stressed by Secretary-General Vyhovsky in his letter to Teterya of March 21: "if they grant anything, they should grant it at once and confirm the privileges without any delay."²² This is quite understandable. The Tsar's charter was a documentary act; it (not only) solemnly corroborated the constitutional rights of the Cossack Army (and, taken together with charters granted to other classes, those of the whole Ukraine), but also contained the pledge of the Tsar of Muscovy to recognize and respect those rights. This was

the guarantee demanded by the Ukrainian government from the Muscovite envoys at Pereyaslav and at the same time the ratification instrument of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement, approved and confirmed by the Tsar.

In addition to the general confirmation of all the rights and privileges of the Cossack Army, "granted by the Polish Kings and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania",²³⁾ the charter recognized and confirmed the class jurisdiction of the Cossacks in its entirety: "we have decreed that they should be tried by their elders, according to their former laws."²⁴⁾ The charter also recognizes the Cossack register (standing army) of 60,000 ("and we have decreed, according to their petition, that the number of the registered Cossack Army should be 60,000, always kept up")²⁵⁾, the election of the hetman should be free ("and if the Hetman should die, according to Divine judgment, we, the Great Tsar, have allowed the Cossack Army to elect a new hetman in accordance with their old customs, from their own ranks; and they should write us whom they have elected and the new hetman should swear the oath of allegiance and loyalty to the Great Tsar in the presence of a person designated by us")²⁶⁾, and all property rights of the Cossacks should be guaranteed ("we have decreed that the properties and lands of the Cossacks which they use for their living should not be taken away from the widows left by the Cossacks and their children, but should be left to them as before").²⁷⁾

If we consider in this connection also the charters and title-deeds granted to the Ukrainian Orthodox gentry,²⁸⁾ townsfolk (the charter for the town of Pereyaslav was obviously to become a model for other towns)²⁹⁾ and the clergy (this question was settled in principle during the March negotiations in Moscow but the deed was issued somewhat later in the year³⁰⁾), the specification of which entirely corresponded to the political concepts of that time and the social order of the Ukrainian State, it will become obvious that the charters (particularly that for the Cossack Army) recognized and confirmed the sovereign rights of the Ukraine notwithstanding their form and the ceremonial phraseology. After all, the charters fully upheld the right of the Cossack Army to represent the whole Ukrainian State and its classes and confirmed the life-long character of the authority of the Hetman.

The second part of the treaty, the "11 Articles" (also dated March 27, 1654), had a somewhat different character.³¹⁾ Although the Muscovite copy of these Articles (preserved in the archives of the Posolsky Prikaz) attributes its origin to the Ukrainian embassy ("in the letter which was sent... to the privy boyars... by the envoys of the Cossack Army")³²⁾, there can be no doubt that we have before us a Muscovite composition. "The clauses of the 11 Articles," M. Hrushevsky writes, "are a Muscovite rehash made in connection with the preparation of the charters. The notes clearly show that these Articles were worked out by the Muscovite clerks, simultaneously with the charters, as a supplement"³³⁾. Prof. Yakovliv also thinks that the 11 Articles "were not worked out by the envoys of the Cossack Army but are, together with the charters, the answer of the Tsar to the draft treaty of February 17, delivered by the envoys in Moscow on March 14"³⁴⁾. One could even say that the "11 Articles", in their present form, were drawn up after the final text of the charter for the Cossack Army had already been settled. After all, Article 5 dealing with the right of diplomatic relations was contained in the original text of the charter and was only later transferred to the "11 Articles". Moreover, this Muscovite composition had become necessary only because a number of articles of the Ukrainian draft treaty (the "23 Articles") was inserted in the charters. Thus the "11 Articles", with the Tsar's resolutions, were a supplement to and direct continuation of the charter issued to the Cossack Army.

It is easily noticed that the "11 Articles" included those clauses of treaty which were, for the most part, of comparatively secondary or temporary importance and could be later changed or rescinded. It was for this reason that they were not inserted in the charter which was to remain the unchangeable, basic law of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. These were the clauses dealing with the costs of maintenance of the general and regimental officers (art. 2 and 3), artillery (art. 4), the date of the Muscovite expedition against Poland (Smolensk) (art. 7), the troops to be used for the protection of the Ukrainian-Polish border after the conclusion of the war against Poland (art. 8), the payments for the Cossack troops sent beyond the borders of the Ukraine (art. 9), provisions for the defence of the Ukraine against the Crimea (art. 10) and the

securing of the defence of the Sich (art. 11). All these questions were positively settled; only articles 9 and 11 caused some misunderstanding and the former was discussed in a long explanatory letter written in the name of the Tsar³⁵). The Muscovite government particularly stressed that "much money from the Tsar's treasury had been spent" on Muscovite troops which were to "defend" the Ukraine and wage war against Poland ("many Russian, German and Tartar troops"). For this reason it was "to no purpose to speak about the payment... for the Cossack Army", all the more since the Hetman himself had stipulated during the negotiations at Pereyaslav that "they would not ask payment from the Tsar"³⁶). Thus the Muscovite government refused as a matter of principle to give the Ukraine financial assistance in the common struggle against Poland. As far as Ukrainian financial sources were concerned, the Tsar indicated that they were unknown to him ("and what revenue there is in Little Russia in towns and cities, His Majesty does not know"). When "the noblemen of His Majesty will compute and mark all the revenue", then "His Majesty will issue a decree about the payment for the Cossack Army."³⁷) It is well known that the Ukrainian envoys were determined in insisting upon their demands during the Moscow negotiations and the Tsar finally agreed "to send his gratuity in golden coins to... the Hetman and the whole Cossack Army."³⁸) Notwithstanding the fact that this clause was formally not settled according to the Ukrainian demands, the Tsar's decision was, in fact, in line with the Ukrainian proposals and created a precedent for the future.

Similar, too, was the Tsar's resolution in response to the demands of the Ukrainian government to make provision for the defence of the Sich "with foodstuffs and gunpowder" (art. 11). "His Majesty will issue a decree... concerning that article when it shall be made known what supplies and in what quantity used to be sent to those places and how much revenue will be collected for His Majesty."³⁹) Thus, in the opinion of the Muscovite government, the supply of foodstuffs and war material for the southern border of the Ukraine was to come from Ukrainian sources.

However, in addition to these technical questions subject, for the most part, to the terms of the military alliance and war conditions, the "11 Articles" also included two clauses

which were fundamental in their nature and had great political significance. The Ukrainian draft treaty demanded full financial and diplomatic independence of the Ukraine. The first question was discussed at length in Moscow, but was finally settled in a satisfactory way: "the officials in towns, mayors, burgomasters, councillors and assessors should collect all the revenue in money and grain for His Majesty the Tsar and deliver it to the Tsar's treasury to those persons who will be sent by His Majesty the Tsar"; they should "look after those collectors so that they act honestly" (art. 1).⁴⁰ Thus in collecting taxes the Tsar reserved for himself only the right of control.

Even more important was article 5 dealing with the diplomatic relations of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian government demanded the right to maintain diplomatic relations with all countries, under a pledge to "inform His Majesty the Tsar" about that which "would be adverse to His Majesty."⁴¹ The resolution of the Tsar generally recognized this right: "to receive and dismiss the envoys (who come) on right business." However, "on what business they came and with what (answer) they were dismissed should be communicated truthfully and immediately to His Tsarist Majesty."⁴² Here, too, the Muscovite government reserved to itself the right of control. To be sure, "the envoys who should be sent from some (other country) on business adverse to His Tsarist Majesty, those ambassadors and envoys should be detained by the (Cossack) Army and it should be written immediately to His Tsarist Majesty for his decree; and they should not be dismissed without the decree of His Tsarist Majesty."⁴³ It was, however, forbidden to "have relations without the decree of His Tsarist Majesty with the Turkish Sultan and the King of Poland" (art. 5).⁴⁴ This limitation was quite understandable and it was probably made because the Ukraine was earlier a part of the Polish Commonwealth and it was also well known that Bohdan Khmelnytsky acknowledged at one time the protectorate of the Turkish Sultan.

Finally, article 6 of the "11 Articles" deals with the question of church property. It is known that "an oral instruction was given to the envoys concerning the Metropolitan of Kiev" and the envoys demanded "in their speeches" that "His Majesty the Tsar... should order that a patent be issued for his (the

Metropolitan's) possessions". The Tsar's resolution was that "a Tsarist patent should be given to the Metropolitan and all clergy for the possessions which they own at present."⁴⁵⁾

While article 6 of the "11 Articles" was actually a kind of certificate and was inserted in the "11 Articles" mainly because the patent issued to the Metropolitan was not yet dispatched, the very fact that the articles 1 and 5 were included in the "11 Articles" seems to support the view that the Muscovite government was anxious to reserve for itself a free hand in the future as far as these important questions were concerned and for this reason did not include them (especially art. 5) in the charter. On the other hand, however, this enabled the Ukrainian government to disregard all those limitations which were contained in the Tsar's resolutions dealing with these articles.

The form of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 has caused many misconceptions and is responsible for many disagreements in historiography. Some scholars (mostly Russians) denied on the strength of the formal data the contractual nature of the agreement and eo ipso rejected the idea of the equality of rights of the contracting parties. However, Ukrainian historiography always regarded the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 as a treaty. Thus, e. g., Kostomarov spoke of the "Pereyaslav treaty".⁴⁶⁾ Hrushevsky stresses that "recent historians and jurists agree that, notwithstanding the formal side..., what originated at Pereyaslav and was completed in Moscow had the nature of a treaty and was recognized as such by the Muscovite side."⁴⁷⁾ Muscovite official documents of the 17 and 18th centuries call the agreement of 1654 the "Pereyaslav treaty" (1659), "treaty articles" (1663-1669), "resolutions" (1711), "treaty" (1722), "articles proposed and made binding as a treaty" (1722), "treaties of Khmelnytsky" (1722), "treaty of B. Khmelnytsky" (1722) etc.⁴⁸⁾ The contractual nature of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654 is stressed in numerous Ukrainian official documents of the 17th and 18th cents. in the works of Ukrainian political thinkers and, finally, in Ukrainian political tradition. A similar point of view was prevalent abroad. Thus, e. g., Charles Gustavus, the King of Sweden, wrote in his letter to Bohdan Khmelnytsky dated July 15, 1656: "We have been informed that a certain treaty was concluded between the Grand Duke

of Muscovy and Cossack nation."⁴⁹) A thorough analysis of the form and contents of the Pereyaslav treaty made by Prof. Yakovliv leaves no doubt that "the act of 1654 was really a treaty between the Cossack Army and Moscow."⁵⁰) To be sure, the form of the Pereyaslav agreement complied with the conditions and usages of that time and, above all, took into account the different political systems of Muscovy and the Ukraine and the different nature of authority exercised by their rulers — the Tsar, an absolute monarch, and the Hetman, the leader ("dux") of the Cossack Army, which represented the Ukrainian State.

The form of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 was influenced to a great extent by the Zboriv Treaty of 1649.

M. Hrushevsky mentioned in 1922 "interesting resemblances" between "the articles of 1654 submitted to the Muscovite government" and "the articles of Zboriv of 1649."⁵¹) This does not only concern the contents of some of the basic "articles" (the first two of the "23 Articles" of 1654 correspond with the first articles of the Zboriv agreement, esp. art. 1 and 2, the so-called "Puncta o potrzebach Woyska Zaporozkiego"⁵²) but also the form of these two treaties. One can agree with M. S. Hrushevsky and A. I. Yakovliv that "the Muscovite government followed the acts of the Zboriv agreement between the Cossack Army and the Polish King as a model."⁵³) Hrushevsky observes that the Zboriv treaty "became a pattern for the settlement of Cossack-Ukrainian requirements during the Ukrainian-Muscovite-Polish negotiations of 1653" and at the same time "a series of details concerning military organization", which were "an archaic survival of the former 'ordinations of the Cossack Army' passed through sheer inertia to the Zboriv treaty" and "became mixed up with the negotiations between the officers and Moscow."⁵⁴) It was the Ukrainian government itself that suggested this form to Moscow. It was not without reason that the envoys brought with them to Moscow the acts of the Zboriv agreement.⁵⁵) "It was quite natural", Prof. Yakovliv writes, "that, while such strict attention to outward forms prevailed in Moscow, the Muscovite dyaks did not dare to suggest to the Tsar a formula different from that used by the Polish King... The Muscovite chancellery used in drawing up the treaty with the Cossack Army the form used for the Zboriv agreement, copying it even in detail. Thus,

as it was at Zboriv, decrees were issued which confirmed the articles and, in addition, a charter was granted, similar in form to the Zboriv 'privilege'.⁵⁶⁾

We may also add that the "23 Articles" of the Ukrainian government (1654) corresponded to the "Puncta o potrzebach Woyska Zaporozkiego" of Zboriv,⁵⁷⁾ the Tsar's charter of March 27, 1654, to the royal privilege for the Cossack Army of August 8, 1649, and the "11 Articles" of 1654 to the "Declaration of the King's grace given in response to the articles of petition of the Cossack Army" of 1649 which, by the way, consisted also of 11 articles.⁵⁸⁾

The Treaty of 1654 (in its Muscovite version) was not ratified by the Ukrainian government. Hrushevsky stresses that "the Hetman... and the officers did not accept either the articles or the charter."⁵⁹⁾ These documents were not published in the Ukraine. After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, during the Chyhyryn Assembly of August 25, 1657, (according to a Muscovite account) "the officers... and army... spoke among themselves... that the Hetman's son (Yuri Khmelnytsky) and the Secretary (Vyhovsky) should show to the whole army all those articles which Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Army requested from the Tsar through their envoys — for we... do not know what the Great Tsar granted us in response to that army petition". The following day "the articles sent from His Majesty the Tsar in response to the petition of the Hetman and the whole Army through Judge Samiylo and Colonel Pavlo Teterya were read out at the assembly."⁶⁰⁾ Bohdan Khmelnytsky recognized this treaty only in so far as it tallied with the Pereyaslav agreement and the demands made at Chyhyryn by the Ukrainian government.⁶¹⁾ All limitations of the sovereign rights of the Ukraine as specified by the Muscovite documents of March 27, 1654, (particularly those concerning the right of foreign relations and the payment of the tribute to the Tsar) "were not put in force and remained a dead letter."⁶²⁾

It has been observed more than once that the term "Pereyaslav treaty" used in connection with the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 is rather inappropriate since the treaty was formally concluded in Moscow. It was suggested that the terms "Moscow treaty"⁶³⁾ or the "treaty of Pereyaslav and Moscow" should be used, or that any attempt at local definition should be abandoned.⁶⁴⁾

We use, however, the traditional term — the “Pereyaslav agreement”. True, the term “Pereyaslav treaty” appeared for the first time in Moscow in 1659⁶⁵) and no written treaty was drawn up at Pereyaslav in 1654. There is, however, no doubt that an agreement concerning the basic provisions of the treaty was reached already at Pereyaslav⁶⁶) and that only specific and technical questions were decided upon during the Moscow negotiations. Even more important is the fact that Bohdan Khmelnytsky regarded as binding only the clauses agreed upon at Pereyaslav. This is the reason which prompts us to adhere to the old term which is intelligible to everybody.

IV.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE PEREYASLAV AGREEMENT OF 1654

The appraisal of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 in both historical and historical-legal literature has been by no means uniform. Most discrepancies and even contradictions have been caused by the legal definition of the Pereyaslav agreement. As far as this point is concerned, the opinion of the scholars vacillates between the conception of a complete incorporation of the Ukraine with Muscovy according to the Pereyaslav agreement and that of a simple military alliance between two independent and sovereign countries. All varieties of opinion can be reduced to two principal groups:

The first group, represented for the most part by Russian scholars, supports the theory of a union or, at least, more or less close ties between two unequal countries, while the second one, composed chiefly of Ukrainian scholars, defends the conception of contractual relations between two more or less independent and sovereign countries.

To the first group belong the conceptions of the incorporation of the Ukraine with Russia, either complete (D. Odynets, V. Myakotin in his later works) or incomplete (I. Rosenfeld), and of autonomy of the Ukraine within the Muscovite Tsardom and, later, within the Russian Empire (Baron B. Nolde and others).

The second group includes the conceptions of an real

union between two states — the Ukraine and Muscovy (M. Diakonov, O. Popov), their personal union embodied in the person of the Tsar of Muscovy (V. Serheyevych, R. Lashchenko and others), vassalage (Korkunov, V. Myakotin in his earlier works, Sokolsky, M. Pokrovsky, partly M. Hrushevsky, partly Professor Krypyakevych, M. Slabchenko, Professor L. Okinshevych, Professor Yakovliv in his earlier works, and others), protectorate (partly M. Hrushevsky, partly Prof. Krypyakevych, partly D. Doroshenko, Prof. B. Krupnytsky, Prof. Yakovliv, to a certain extent V. Lypynsky in his later works), pseudo-protectorate (Dr. B. Halaychuk), and, finally, that of a military alliance between two nations, Ukraine and Muscovy, consolidated by the protection of the Tsar (V. Lypynsky, Prof. I. Borshchak, Prof. Yakovliv, Dr. S. Ivanytsky and others in part).¹⁾

Most prevalent in modern Ukrainian historiography are the conceptions of vassalage-protectorate and military alliance. Prof. L. Okinshevych is entirely correct when he observes that "vassalage and protectorate in the relationship between two states are formally close to each other."²⁾ Prof. Yakovliv is also of the same opinion when he stresses that "vassalage and protectorate occurred quite often in international relations, also in the form of a purely nominal dependence, where the dependence of the vassal state was limited to the use of certain titles by the monarch, to an alliance and to the obligation (or simply a promise) to pay tribute."³⁾ In his opinion, "the relations between Ukraine nad Muscovy are, according to the literal contents of the treaty, very close to those of nominal vassalage or protectorate."⁴⁾

V. Lypynsky, in his analysis of the whole complex of the Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Muscovite relations in the time of Khmelnytsky, reached the conclusion that "his (Khmelnytsky's) agreement with Moscow in 1654 was a chance alliance, directed against Poland and concluded in order to liberate Ukraine from Polish domination, like all his former alliances with the Crimea and chiefly with Turkey."⁵⁾ For this reason Lypynsky considers the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 a "military alliance against Poland and the Tartars, guaranteed by a formal protectorate."⁶⁾ Prof. Yakovliv also admits that "all historical facts show quite clearly that Khmelnytsky regarded this agreement as a simple treaty of protection which

was quite familiar to him since he had more than once concluded similar treaties in the past, as a temporary military alliance of two states"; however, "since Ukraine was at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1654 much weaker than Moscow, this military alliance acquired some attributes of vassalage and protection," though "actually this dependence... manifested itself very seldom and was more apparent in the demands of Moscow than in Khmelnytsky's voluntary acts." Later, "during the years following the conclusion of the treaty and especially in the last year of Khmelnytsky's life (1657), that dependence had become purely nominal, in proportion to the increase of the power of the Ukrainian State," and "Ukraine was, in fact, independent from Moscow."⁷⁾

If we consider the specific tasks and peculiarities of history and jurisprudence and review the most recent publications of the younger representatives of the latter (Dr. B. Halaychuk⁸⁾, Dr. S. Ivanytsky⁹⁾), it is possible to state that modern Ukrainian scholars have appraised the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 in a more or less uniform way.¹⁰⁾

The two basic opinions about the Pereyaslav agreement as represented by the Ukrainian and the Russian scholars have remained unchanged. They proceed from a marked discrepancy in the national and political interests of the Ukraine and Muscovy at the time of the conclusion of the treaty and from their different political objectives after that event. It is "in this discrepancy in the relations between both contracting parties and their way of looking at the Pereyaslav treaty as a temporary agreement which could later be modified and changed according to their wishes, that the difficulties of a legal and political definition of a new mutual relationship lie."¹¹⁾ However, a legal definition of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654, even if scholars had a uniform opinion about it, is still inadequate for a historical appraisal of the Pereyaslav treaty. In order to "explain the real legal nature of the Treaty of 1654 as well as the actual mutual relationship which resulted from that treaty, we have to consider not only the literal contents of the agreement but also that actual relationship inasmuch as it replaced the unfulfilled provisions of the treaty. The appraisal of the treaty by the contracting parties and their neighbours is also of a certain importance," Professor Yakovliv writes.¹²⁾ Thus in order properly to define and appraise the

Pereyaslav agreement it is necessary to examine not only the documents of the treaty but also its historical circumstances.

How did the Pereyaslav agreement change the political situation of the Ukraine? First of all, we must state that after 1654 the Ukraine remained separate, independent state, with its own head — the Hetman, who was elected for life, with a distinct tendency toward making his office hereditary in one dynasty, with its own government, army (one of the best in Europe), foreign policy (the restrictions of the Pereyaslav agreement concerning the relations with Poland and Turkey were not put into effect), social and economic order, legislative power and jurisdiction, finances (the obligation to pass the revenue from towns "to the Tsar's treasury" was not enforced) and, finally, with its own religious and cultural life. It is very important that all restrictions of Ukrainian sovereignty specified in the agreement (or, strictly speaking, in the Tsar's charter for the Cossack Army and in the "11 Articles") were not recognized by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and that the Muscovite government evidently did not consider this a violation of the agreement on the part of the Hetman. The only indication or symbol of the supremacy of the Muscovite Tsar in the Ukraine was his new Ukrainian title — "Tsar of Little Russia, Grand Duke of Kiev and Chernihiv" — and the presence of Muscovite troops in Kiev.¹³⁾

The chief symbol of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State was the person of the Hetman in his capacity as the head of the state and its government. He was invested with full state authority in both internal matters of the state and its foreign policy, which he conducted independently. The Hetman's authority increased even more after 1654. He retained his legal power as "Sovereign and Hetman" of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) State. In Ukrainian official documents he is referred to as the "sovereign", the "supreme ruler and sovereign of our fatherland", "supreme lord", "commander-in-chief".¹⁴⁾ His supremacy and authority were recognized by the higher Ukrainian clergy and the Ukrainian nobles. He was, in the words of Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv, the "chief and commander of our country".¹⁵⁾ After his death, Prince Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky, the chamberlain of Bratslav and a leader of the Ukrainian nobility, referred to him as "His Excellency, Worthy of Remembrance, His Grace, Lord Khmel-

nytsky, the Great Hetman, Defender of our Orthodox faith."¹⁶) Foreign rulers styled the Hetman "Illustrissimus Dux" (Most Serene Prince).¹⁷)

....
In his letter to the Hospodar (Potentate) of Wallachia dated June 18, 1657, Bohdan Khmelnytsky calls himself "Clementia divina (by the grace of God) Generalis Dux Exercituum Zaporoviensium."¹⁸) His letter to (the Elector of Brandenburg), Frederick William, (June 21, 1657), in which the Hetman calls himself "a friend of the Elector", is signed "Dux Cohortum Zaporoviensium."¹⁹)

"The Hetman is like a prince or a king in his country, as the Tsar is a sovereign in his. He has conquered his country with his sword and liberated it from the (Polish) yoke", Vyhovsky told the Muscovite envoy (as quoted by Szebeszy, envoy of the Prince of Transylvania, on June 28, 1657).²⁰) Hetman Pylyp Orlyk writes in his "Exposition of the rights of the Ukraine" (1712) that Bohdan Khmelnytsky "made the Ukraine an independent principality and contented himself with the title of the Hetman of the Cossack Army which his son inherited from him, and the estates of the said principality continued to elect their princes after his death and no nation claimed the right to object to it."²¹)

How was the Pereyaslav agreement appraised in the Ukraine and abroad?

A contemporary and fully authoritative Ukrainian appraisal of the Pereyaslav agreement appears in the well-known manifesto of the Ukrainian government to the nations of Europe (1658): "We had not accepted the protection (protectionem) of the Grand Duke of Muscovy for any other reason but in order to preserve, with God's help, for ourselves and our descendants the freedom, won by arms and sanctified with our own blood which we have shed so many times... Because of religious ties and our free and voluntary submission we hoped that our subjection would be a just one, based on a genuine and sincere friendship, without encroachments on our freedom; we hoped, moreover, that it would continue to increase, according to their promises."²²)

In spite of the unfortunate experience of the Ukrainian-Muscovite relations after the conclusion of the Pereyaslav agreement and a gross violation of that treaty by Moscow, the Ukrainian government was anxious both in the time of

Khmelnysky and after his death to maintain the alliance with Moscow, Khmelnysky, while concluding a military convention with Sweden, an enemy of Moscow, in 1655, declared that the alliance with Moscow remained in force since it was advantageous to the Ukraine.²³) An obvious example of this attitude was the Korsun agreement between Ukraine and Sweden (October 6, 1657). Concluding a treaty of "alliance and military association" with Sweden, the Ukrainian government made a reservation to the effect that the commitments which it had assumed under that treaty had no bearing upon its relations with "His Serene Highness the Duke of Muscovy to whom the Cossack Army is bound by a close (formal) alliance and will remain unalterably faithful to him."²⁴) Even in the Hadiach agreement with Poland (September 6, 1658) the Ukraine, while returning to membership in the Commonwealth as the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, made a reservation that "if the estates of the (Polish) Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had to go to war against the Tsar of Muscovy, the Cossack Army would not be forced to participate in such a war;" only "if the Tsar should refuse to return the provinces of the Commonwealth and attack it, then all the forces of the Crown, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Ruthenian Cossack Army under the command of the Hetman should combine and go to war."²⁵)

It was Moscow's open military aggression against Ukraine in the autumn of 1658 that forced the Ukrainian government to break the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. In a manifesto issued in October, 1658, to all nations, the Cossack Army cited numerous instances of Muscovite perfidy and made the following declaration: "Thus have been exposed the perfidy and fraud of those who, without any fault on our part, prepared for us the yoke of servitude, at first by fomenting civil war in our midst and then by open armed aggression. So that this may be properly understood, we profess our innocence and praying for divine help declare that we have been forced to defend steadfastly our rightful cause and ask our neighbors to help us to defend our freedom... We are not responsible for this war nor is it our fault that, having been and wishing to remain faithful to the Grand Duke (the Tsar of Muscovy), we have been forced to take up arms."²⁶)

Very interesting was the appraisal of the Pereyaslav agree-

ment of 1654 by the Ukrainian statesmen of the time of Mazepa. They had generally a high opinion of the lifework of Bohdan Khmelnytsky²⁷⁾ and connected directly their own struggle for national liberation with the great Ukrainian revolution of 1648. This attitude is reflected in numerous state documents of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, in the writings of his antagonist Petryk, in literary works and various other historical materials of that time. A striking instance of this attitude toward the epoch of Khmelnytsky is the well-known preamble to the "Bendery Constitution" of April 5, 1710.²⁸⁾

Hetman Pylyp Orlyk also paid a great deal of attention to the Pereyaslav agreement and to the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654 in general. In his manifesto to the governments of Europe, dated April 4, 1712, the Hetman wrote: "It is known to everybody that His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of immortal memory voluntarily, and not compelled by anyone, placed the Ruthenian people and the Cossack nation under the Tsar of Muscovy (...a soumis le peuple ruthene et la Nation Cosaque au Czar Moscovite). And Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich affirmed in a solemn pact under oath to guard forever under his protection the Cossack nation and the Ruthenian people." However P. Orlyk continues, "it is common knowledge that after the death of His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of blessed memory the Muscovite State violated in various ways the rights and liberties of the Cossack nation which it had itself formerly confirmed; the Tsar of Muscovy wanted to enslave the free Ruthenian people."²⁹⁾

In his famous treatise "Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine" (1712), Orlyk gave a brilliant analysis of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654: "The strongest and most invincible argument and proof of the sovereignty of Ukraine", he writes, "is the solemn treaty of alliance concluded by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich on the one side and the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Estates (les Etats) of the Ukraine on the other. This treaty was concluded in 1654 and was signed by authorized representatives. It seemed that this solemn and detailed treaty which was named a permanent agreement ought to have established for ever peace, freedom and order in the Ukraine. This would have happened if the Tsar had executed it as scrupulously as the Cossacks believed he would. They

handed over their fortresses to the Muscovite troops and combined their troops with those of the Tsar for the sake of the common cause; however, the Tsarist generals took advantage of their confidence, seized by cunning devices a great number of other fortifications and then began to command like masters in the whole country. Nevertheless the Cossacks retained a shadow of sovereignty and even after the death of Hetman Khmelnytsky the Tsar granted a charter to the Estates of the Ukraine."³⁰)

Hryhor Orlyk, an assistant to his father and continuator of his lifework and tradition, wrote in his "Memoirs" for Louis XV. of France (February 12, 1741): "It is certainly known to Your Majesty that the Cossack nation under Hetman Khmelnytsky after a prolonged war with Poland seceded from that Commonwealth... Hetman Khmelnytsky foresaw that the power of his nation, which he had founded, could not prevail against that of its neighbors and deemed it more advantageous to safeguard its security by the protection of Russia which he accepted on terms most favorable to his nation."³¹)

In his "Remarks on the Ukraine and the Cossacks", which Prof. Borschak considered to be fragments of a history of Ukraine, Hryhor Orlyk wrote: "In the name of the rights of his nation Khmelnytsky rebelled against the (Polish) Crown which was chastised by God with defeats, for Khmelnytsky was a leader of genius and had the backing of the whole Cossack nation who believed in the justice of their cause... After ten (sic) years of war which made the name of the Cossacks known throughout the world, Khmelnytsky accepted the protection of the Tsar of Muscovy for the country and the nation with all the rights of a free nation. However, the perfidy of the Tsar of Muscovy was the cause that immediately after Khmelnytsky's death the rights of the Cossack Nation began to be violated by the Muscovites and then these people who value freedom more than anything else in the world revolted, and war continued a long time in the Ukraine..."³²)

To the statesmen of the age of Mazepa, the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 was something in the nature of a prototype of the Ukrainian-Swedish agreement of 1708. The King of Sweden substituted for the Tsar of Muscovy and "took forever this people (Ruthenian nation) and the Cossack Army under

his protection, guardianship, patronage and custodianship in order to throw off the Muscovite yoke."³³) The Bendery Constitution, too, confirmed the permanent protectorate of the Swedish kings over Ukraine.³⁴)

Generally speaking, the nature of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 was correctly understood in 18th century Ukraine. Both the government of the Ukrainian State and the broad masses of the population knew that the alliance between Ukraine and Muscovy, which resulted from the Pereyaslav treaty, was an association of free and equal partners. Hetman Demian Mnohohrshny told Taneev, a Muscovite envoy, on the occasion of the Andrusiv agreement of 1667 (which, among other things, provided for the return of Kiev to Poland): "The Sovereign did not conquer us with his sword: we submitted to him voluntarily, because of our common faith. If he has no use for Kiev and other Ukrainian towns and gives them back to the (Polish) King, we shall look for another ruler."³⁵) This declaration was repeated almost word for word by Petro Ivanenko (Petryk), later the Hetman of the so-called "Khan's Ukraine"³⁶), in his letter to the chief ataman of the Sich (1692): "The Muscovite Tsars... have not conquered us by sword, but our ancestors submitted to them voluntarily, for the sake of the Christian faith".³⁷) Hryhory Pokas, an army clerk, stresses in his "Description of Little Russia" (1751) that Ukraine "joined the Russian state of its own will."³⁸) Hryhory Poletyka speaks of "voluntary submission, based on treaties concluded by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Little Russia people."³⁹)

Semen Divovych, a translator with the General Chancery of the Army and the author of the famous "Discourse Between Great Russia and Little Russia" (1762), makes his Ukraine say the following words: "I have submitted to your Sovereign, not to yourself... Do not think that you are my mistress, but the Tsar is our common ruler, both yours and mine."⁴⁰)

The Ukrainian tradition of the Pereyaslav agreement has been vividly recorded in the "Istoria Rusov". It is emphasized throughout this memorable production of Ukrainian national and political thought. "The whole world knows that the Ruthenian people and its Cossacks, having been at the beginning a sovereign nation, dependent only on itself,... joined Muscovy voluntarily, merely because of the common faith;

now, after we have made it what it is today, it unscrupulously and shamelessly scorns and offends us."⁴¹⁾

The idea of the independence of Ukraine and of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State continued to live among the widest circles of the Ukrainian people in the 17th and 18th centuries, beginning with the head of the state, the Hetman, and ending with the rank-and-file Cossacks. Thus, e. g., Hetman Ivan Samoylovych uses the expression "our state" and strives for the "extension of its bounds."⁴²⁾ Petro Ivanenko concludes in 1692 a treaty of alliance with the "Crimean State" on behalf of the "Little Russian State."⁴³⁾ The elders and townfolk of Poltava who complained to Hetman Mazepa (in 1690) about harsh treatment by the settlers from the Right Bank Ukraine, were indignant because such things happened in a country which was not "stateless" or "lawless."⁴⁴⁾ A common Cossack of the village of Yukhniv in the district of Novhorod Siversky relates in 1721 "how the Poles were brought to ruin in our Little Russian towns" and how "the (Roman Catholic) priests fled from this state to Poland."⁴⁵⁾ And when a Ukrainian monk died in distant China (Peking), it was recorded on his tombstone that he "was born in the Kingdom of Little Russia, regiment (district) of Nizhyn."⁴⁶⁾

It was on this foundation of Ukrainian statehood (although it was oppressed by the imperialist centralism of Moscow which had violated the Pereyaslav agreement) that the idea of sovereign "Little Russian nation" developed — a notion which was characteristic of the Left Bank Ukraine in the 18th century.

The independence of the Ukrainian State was also recognized by Moscow both during and after the Pereyaslav negotiations. The Muscovite formula "King Jan Kazimierz... violated his oath and thereby freed his subjects — you, Orthodox Christians — from subjection"⁴⁷⁾, was a peculiar, but indisputable recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. We have already mentioned the formula "the Muscovite State of the Sovereign and the Ukraine of the Cossack Army", used in Buturlin's report (Stateyny spisok).⁴⁹⁾ During the Moscow negotiations the Muscovite government undoubtedly recognized that the Hetman of the Cossack Army had the right to represent all the estates of the Ukraine and it was as a result of his petition that those estates received Tsarist charters. The "subjection" of the Hetman and the Cossack

Army together with the whole Ukrainian population did not change this situation. Professor Yakovliv correctly observes that the formula "subject of our Tsarist Majesty", as the Tsar styled the Hetman after 1654, was used in Moscow "with reference to kings or rulers of those countries and states which entered into contractual relationship with the Tsar of Muscovy, seeking his protection against their enemies."⁵⁰) According to the concepts of international law of that time, a "sovereign who was under someone's protection" did not cease to be a sovereign.⁵¹) It is, therefore, no wonder that the Muscovite government, even at a later time, recognized the existence of a separate Ukrainian State. Thus, e. g., in 1666 Steward Kyril Khlopov, Muscovite voyevoda in Starodub, wrote: "in the Little Russian State, in the town of Starodub..."⁵²)

To be sure, the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 brought something new as far as the legal aspect of the relationship between Ukraine and Muscovy was concerned. The Ukraine recognized the protection of the Tsar of Muscovy. In one of the Muscovite patents of 1654 (granted to the guilds of Kiev) we find the following formula: "how by the grace of God the Grand Duchies of Kiev and Chernihiv, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the whole Cossack Army and the whole Little Rus have come under Our Sovereign exalted arm (protection)."⁵³) In this connection important changes were made in the title of the Tsar of Muscovy who thenceforth began to style himself the Tsar of "Great and Little Russia" — a formula aptly described by M. Hrushevsky as "the Ukrainian title" of the Tsar.⁵⁴) V. Prokopovych observes that this title was "as though presented to the Tsar by the Ukrainians."⁵⁵)

In the opinion of Professor Yakovliv, at that time "a new idea began to manifest itself in connection with the treaty of 1654... the conception of the return under the rule of the Muscovite Tsar of his 'ancestral patrimony which had been torn away — Kiev',"⁵⁶). In this connection the additional formula 'Grand Duke of Kiev and Chernihiv' appeared in the title of the Tsar.⁵⁷) This notion, in the minds of the autocrats of Muscovy, later replaced the idea of the treaty of 1654, the only historically correct basis of Muscovite-Ukrainian relationship."⁵⁸)

Such are, indeed, the facts of the case; however, the idea of the "patrimony of Kiev" was by no means new in the dynastic state policy of Moscow. The Muscovite branch of the Rurik

dynasty first laid their claim to the Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Commonwealth (i.e., all the territories of the former Kievan State) in the time of Ivan III. In the 16th c. this idea became the practical program of the Muscovite theory of the "Third Rome"⁵⁹), although the "Smuta" (time of disturbances) at the beginning of the 17th c. dealt a severe blow to this theory and the revival of the Ukrainian State in 1648 was even more dangerous to its realization.⁶⁰) The Pereyaslav agreement opened new far-reaching prospects to the Muscovite policy and, what was of the utmost importance, offered real possibilities for attaining them. The Ukrainian and, before long, the Byelorussian territories of the old Kievan Empire passed under the rule of the Tsar of Muscovy. It was only little by little that Moscow put this project in a prominent position. The help of certain Ukrainian circles, particularly of some members of the Ukrainian Cossack gentry and of the secular clergy, considerably contributed to the success of this policy.⁶¹)

Bohdan Khmelintysky at first did not oppose this development since it furthered to a certain extent his main objective: to embroil Moscow with Poland, impair the power of the Polish Commonwealth and unite all Ukrainian (and, perhaps, even Byelorussian) territories under the rule of the Cossack Army.⁶²) However, after some time he began to realize the danger of these Muscovite encroachments.

It was probably because of the unfortunate experience of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654 that the Ukrainian government later paid more attention and attached more importance to the problem of titles. It was not without reason that in the Ukrainian-Swedish agreement of 1708 there was, according to Orlyk's "Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine", a reservation to the effect that the King of Sweden, the protector of the Ukrainian State, could not use either the title of the Duke of Ukraine or the coat of arms of the Ukrainian State (art. 5).⁶³)

V. Prokopovych observed in his very valuable work "The Little Russian Seal" (unfortunately unfinished and till now unpublished)⁶⁴) that Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich used his new (Ukrainian) title only in documents dealing with Ukrainian matters (beginning with February 9, 1654). In the official documents of the Muscovite State as well as in his decrees "to

the people of all ranks in the Muscovite State" the Tsar "obstinately and consistently adheres to the old formula 'Autocrat of all Rus' which was worked out as a result of centuries of usage". Thus, e. g., "the order to the appropriate office in Moscow about the 'dismissal' of the Ukrainian envoys (19. 3. 1654) was issued in the name of the Tsar and Grand Duke of 'all Russia', but at the same time it was stated in the instruction to the Dyak of the Duma (State Secretary) Almaz Ivanov concerning the audience with the Ukrainian embassy that he "should introduce that embassy and greet on its behalf the Tsar as 'the Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia'." "A special seal of the Tsars of Muscovy which was used only in the intercourse between Moscow and Ukraine," Prokopovych writes, "shows that Moscow treated the Cossack Army as a state organism separate from the Tsardom of Muscovy and that certain ties existed between Ukraine and Muscovy, just as separate seals used by Holy Roman Emperors in their intercourse with the kings of Hungary and Bohemia bear witness to the fact that these kingdoms enjoyed an independent existence within the Empire."⁶⁵)

It is a well known fact that Moscow's relations with the Hetman of the Cossack Army, like those with foreign monarchs, were conducted by the Posolsky Prikaz, the Muscovite Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, as Professor Okinshevych writes, "this intercourse was so frequent and its subject so special that Moscow soon decided to separate it from the apparatus of the Posolsky Prikaz and concentrate it in an office specially established for this purpose." This was the Prikaz of "Little Russia" (later known as "Malorossiysky Prikaz"), established in 1663. Professor Okinshevych stresses that the Malorossiysky Prikaz "was not one of those Muscovite departments which controlled and managed certain territories (as, e. g., the Prikaz for Siberia, Smolensk etc.)," since "Russia could not directly govern the Ukraine which had its own state apparatus." In his opinion, "the Prikaz of Little Russia was actually another department in charge of foreign affairs which operated side by side with the Posolsky Prikaz", but "was not subordinated to the latter."⁶⁶) While this statement is essentially correct, we must add that the Malorossiysky Prikaz was not a substitute for the Posolsky Prikaz, but had its own special functions.⁶⁷) Diplomatic relations between the Ukraine and Muscovy

continued to be handled by the Posolsky Prikaz.⁶⁸) In our opinion, the Malorossiysky Prikaz could be described as the Muscovite ministry for Ukrainian affairs or as the chancery of the Tsar of Muscovy in his capacity as the Tsar of "Little Russia". This distribution of functions between two offices, separate and independent from each other, was caused by the political and legal duality of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations in the second half of the 17th century.

V. Prokopovych stresses that the Great State Seal and red sealing wax were always used in Moscow's official correspondence with Ukrainian Hetmans, while the privy seal in black wax was usually affixed to the official letters to the Crimean Khan and the princes of South-East Europe. According to Prokopovych, "the pompous title" of the "Lord Keeper of the Tsar's Seal and Privy Councilor" which replaced that of the former "keeper of the seal", "was created especially for intercourse with foreign monarchs and the Hetman of the Cossack Army."⁶⁹)

It is also very important that the Ukraine continued to be separated from Muscovy by international boundary and customs barriers. Muscovy merchants who arrived in the Ukraine had to pay import duties like other foreigners, while Ukrainian merchants were not allowed to trade freely in Muscovy and the Russians were forbidden till 1709 to acquire landed property in the Ukraine.

In foreign countries the nature and importance of the Pereyaslav agreement were interpreted correctly. Professor Yakovliv states that "foreign nations and monarchs treated Ukraine as a free and independent state, separate from Moscow, and its Hetman as an independent ruler; they regarded the Treaty of 1654 as a contract of alliance or protection which was, according to the conception of that time, purely nominal and did not prevent them from maintaining diplomatic relations with the Ukraine as a competent subject of international law."⁷⁰) The vast documentary evidence collected by the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian students of the epoch of Khmelnytsky, in particular by M. Hrushevsky in the 9th volume of his "History of Ukraine-Rus", leaves no doubts as to the full independence of foreign policy of the Ukrainian State after 1654 and of the independent and decisive part played by the Ukraine in contemporary political

events in Eastern Europe. The growth of the Ukrainian State, the consolidation of the authority of the Hetman and the increase in the stature of Bohdan Khmelnytsky both as a statesman and an individual furnished sufficient evidence to enable official foreign circles and public opinion to appraise correctly the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654.

This situation was probably best understood in Sweden. Charles Gustavus, the King of Sweden, wrote to Khmelnytsky on July 15, 1656: "We have been informed that a certain treaty has been concluded between the Grand Duke of Muscovy and the Cossack nation but that it was of such a nature that the freedom of the people has remained complete and inviolable... Relying upon this free condition of your (people), we wished to correspond with Your Serene Highness quite openly, even with the knowledge of the Grand Duke of Muscovy..."⁷¹) Very interesting in this respect are so-called "Swedish projects" (dating approximately from the end of 1655 and 1656) which deal with the future political status of the Ukraine, its place in the system of East European states and the future Ukrainian-Swedish relations. They give several possible variants of the future constitution of the Ukrainian State and all describe the Ukraine as a "free and separate state" or "Cossack Republic", without even mentioning its alliance with Muscovy.⁷²) The treaty of alliance with Sweden concluded at Korsun on October 6, 1657 (signed when Vyhovsky was Hetman but based on spade-work done by Khmelnytsky) recognized the Ukraine as a "free nation, subject to nobody" ("pro libera gente et nulli subjecta").⁷³)

This was the general opinion prevailing in Europe at that time. It was accepted in Austria, whose envoy, Archbishop Baron Parchevich, sent on a mission to Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1657 called the Ukraine a "renowned and martial Republic"⁷⁴) in Transylvania, Prussia (Brandenburg), Moldavia, Wallachia, Turkey, the Crimea and other countries.

We know, thanks to the research of Professor Borshchak, that French official circles and public opinion appraised the Pereyaslav treaty as a military alliance between Ukraine and Muscovy and were well aware of the fact that Khmelnytsky needed it only to get a temporary respite in his struggle against Poland.⁷⁵) The well-informed "Theatrum Europaeum" reported that Khmelnytsky's chief objective was to become the

master of the Ukraine and rule over that country ("Indem er anderst nicht gemeynet als ueber die Ukraine selbst ein Herr zu seyn und darinnen zu dominiren"), that the Tsar wanted to seize the whole Ukraine in defiance of the treaty of alliance and that this brought about a conflict between them and prompted Khmelnytsky to ask Turkey for its assistance.⁷⁶) In Poland, Khmelnytsky's desire to create a "separate state" in the Ukraine was realized even more clearly and the Polish government warned the Hetman that "this way of changing 'protection' would not secure his independence."⁷⁷)

The historical destiny of the Pereyaslav agreement and the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance is a well known subject and we do not propose to deal with it in detail in this essay. While the immediate objectives of the agreement — both military and political — were realized somehow or other and the restrictions imposed upon Ukrainian sovereignty by the Muscovite version of the treaty were not put into effect, "further political objectives of both sides... were absolutely different" and therefore "both sides began to interpret the Pereyaslav agreement differently, each in its own way."⁷⁸) The Ukrainian government firmly and consistently supported the principle of "actual statehood of the Ukraine."⁷⁹) It was during the years following the Pereyaslav agreement that the greatest successes in the building of the Ukrainian state and most remarkable achievements of its foreign policy took place which made the Ukraine of Bohdan Khmelnytsky the decisive factor in contemporary events in Eastern Europe.

However, the Muscovite government pursued a policy of "incorporation of the Cossack Ukraine and its transformation into an ordinary province of the Muscovite Tsardom."⁸⁰) This course was not perceptible at once, but it was bound, sooner or later, to bring the Pereyaslav agreement to nothing. The most serious blow to the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance and an indisputable violation of the Pereyaslav agreement was the treaty of alliance between Moscow and Poland, concluded in 1656 at Vilno and directed against Sweden, an ally of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian envoys were denied admission to the Vilno negotiations; this affront aroused a storm of indignation in the Ukraine and prompted the Ukrainian government to lodge a formal protest. The Vilno agreement was "formidable for the Ukraine."⁸¹) it not only obstructed the realization of

Khmelnysky's desire to unite all Ukrainian territories under the rule of the Cossack Army but also frustrated the chief objective of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance: to make impossible a common policy of Poland and Muscovy directed against Ukraine. In this respect the Vilno agreement was the direct forerunner of the Andrusiv agreement between Poland and Muscovy (1667), which proved fatal to the Ukraine, and of the so-called "permanent peace" between these nations (1686).

An even more serious violation of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 (at least as far as the formal or legal side of the matter is concerned) was the falsification of the Pereyaslav treaty by Moscow which took place in 1659, while a new agreement with Hetman Yuri Khmelnysky was being negotiated. This problem was at one time extensively discussed by scholars⁸²), the majority of whom (both Ukrainians and Russians) is of the opinion that the so-called "Previous Articles of Bohdan Khmelnysky," fourteen in number, which were promulgated at the Rada in Pereyaslav on October 17, 1659, by Prince Alexei Trubetzky (the former head of the Muscovite delegation during the March negotiations of 1654), were "a forgery, falsification of the authentic articles of the Treaty of 1654," designed to "bring about very important changes in the terms of that treaty, tending to restrict the rights and liberties of the Cossack Army."⁸³) A detailed analysis of this question in the works of Professor Yakovliv has proved this beyond any doubt.⁸⁴) This falsified text was misrepresented by Moscow as the authentic treaty of 1654 and thrust upon Hetman Yuri Khmelnysky together with the "new articles" which restricted even more the rights of the Ukrainian State. For the sake of being on the safe side Prince Trubetzky was ordered to print in the Pechersk printing shop in Kiev the "old" (1654) and the "new" (1659) articles together and "send those printed books to all the Cherkass (Ukrainian) regiments so that those articles might become known in all regiments to the whole Cossack Army."⁸⁵) A protest by the Ukrainian government against the falsification of the Pereyaslav treaty of 1654 was of no avail, but the recollection of this forgery was preserved for a long time in Ukrainian tradition.⁸⁶)

Finally, after many violations of the Pereyaslav treaty

by Moscow in the 17th and 18th c., Empress Catherine II. "abolished (in 1764) the treaty of 1654, forced Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovsky by a threat of punishment for 'high treason' to renounce his office and, notwithstanding the protests of the representatives of the Ukrainian people elected to the 'New Codification Commission,' carried out a complete incorporation of Ukraine."⁸⁷) The Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance, concluded in 1654 by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, ceased to exist.

Let us sum up the historical evidence.

The Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 was a treaty of military alliance between two independent nations, the Ukraine and Muscovy, guaranteed by the protection of the Muscovite Tsar over Ukraine and legalized by the new (Ukrainian) title of the Tsar.

However, the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations did not live up to the spirit of the Pereyaslav agreement. The national and political interests of the two allies as well as their objectives and aspirations were too much at variance. The military and political alliance between the Ukraine and Muscovy was gradually transformed into Moscow's domination over Ukraine. The Pereyaslav agreement, concluded in order to secure the independence of Ukraine, actually proved to be its undoing. It marked the beginning of that tragic complex of Ukrainian-Russian relations which transformed the ties of a free alliance into the shackles of three centuries of servitude and enmity.

And yet the Pereyaslav agreement was neither a tragedy nor a disgrace to the Ukraine. A historian has to judge events by their causes and not by their consequences. The more Moscow departed from the spirit and letter of the Pereyaslav treaty while persistently clinging to that handy springboard for the domination of Eastern Europe, the greater importance was attached to it by the Ukrainian side. For the "Pereyaslav Constitution" (as it was dubbed by M. Mikhnovsky)⁸⁸), though falsified, disfigured, mutilated and violated by Moscow, has remained forever, according to the words of a great Ukrainian patriot and statesman of the 18th c., "the strongest and most invincible argument and proof of the sovereignty of the Ukraine."⁸⁹)

APPENDIX I.

UKRAINIAN DRAFT TREATY OF 1654.¹⁾ A BYELORUSSIAN COPY OF THE ARTICLES SENT BY THE COSSACK ENVOYS SAMOYLO BOHDANOV AND PAVLO TETERYA ON THE 14th DAY OF MAY, 7162 (A. D. 1654)

To Alexei Mikhailovich, by the grace of God Great Sovereign and Grand Duke, Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, and the Sovereign and Ruler of many states:

we, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Cossack Army, the whole Cossack Army and the whole Christian Russian world humbly petition Your Tsarist Majesty.

We have been greatly pleased with the great reward and countless favors which Your Tsarist Majesty deigned to bestow upon us. We greet most humbly you, our Sovereign, and will serve forever Your Tsarist Majesty in all matters according to your orders. We only beg most earnestly, as we did in our letter, that Your Tsarist Majesty deign to grant us and show us His Sovereign favor in everything what our envoys will petition.

1. At the beginning deign, Your Tsarist Majesty, to confirm the rights and liberties which have been enjoyed from ancient times by the Cossack Army, including trial according to their own laws and privileges as to property rights, so that no voyevoda, boyar or steward should interfere with their army courts and that they should be tried by their elders: where there are three Cossacks, two of them shall try the third one.

2. That the number of the Cossack Army should be fixed at 60,000, to be always at full strength.

3. That those of the gentry in Russia who have taken the oath of allegiance to you, our Great Sovereign, to Your

1) The "23 Articles" are the Ukrainian draft of the treaty with the Tsar of Muscovy; therefore they are reproduced here without the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma which are included in the Muscovite copy of this document. Also omitted is the final note of the Boyars concerning the return of Muscovite refugees.

Tsarist Majesty, according to Christ's immaculate commandment, retain their liberties and elect their elders to serve as officials with the courts and enjoy their properties and privileges, as they did under the Kings of Poland, so that other (peoples), seeing such favors of Your Tsarist Majesty, may also submit under the rule and under the exalted and mighty arm of Your Tsarist Majesty, together with the whole Christian world. Rural and town courts should be directed by officials chosen voluntarily by themselves, as before. Also those of the gentry who invested their money in leased property, should either have their money returned or be allowed to use the properties till the lease expires.

4. That in towns the officials be chosen among our people who are worthy of it and who shall direct and rule the subjects of Your Tsarist Majesty and collect due revenue for the treasury of Your Tsarist Majesty honestly.

5. That the district of Chyhyryn, which was assigned to the Hetman's mace with everything that belongs to it, should now remain under its authority.

6. In case the Hetman should die (which God forbid) — for all men are mortal and this is inevitable — that the Cossack Army be allowed to elect (a new) Hetman among themselves and by themselves and notify His Tsarist Majesty and that he take no offence since this is an ancient custom with the Army.

7. That the properties of the Cossacks be not taken away from them and that those who own the land and its produce receive titles to these properties. That the children of the widows left by the Cossacks keep the liberties of their ancestors and fathers.

8. That the Secretary of the Army be assigned through the kindness of His Tsarist Majesty 1,000 Zloty (gold coins) for his clerks and a mill for their sustenance, since he has great expenditures.

9. That a mill be assigned for each colonel since they have great expenditures and, if such be the kindness of Your Tsarist Majesty, even more than that, according to the discretion of Your Tsarist Majesty.

10. That the justices of the Army should also be each assigned 300 Zloty and a mill and the secretary of the court, 100 Zloty.

11. We also beg Your Tsarist Majesty that the assaults

of the Army and those of each regiment, who are always busy in the service of the Army and cannot till land, be assigned a mill each.

12. Concerning the artillery of the Army, we beg Your Tsarist Majesty graciously to provide for the winter quarters and food of the cannoneers and all the artillery workers; also 400 Zloty for the quartermaster (of the artillery).

13. That the ancient rights granted to both clergy and laymen by dukes and kings be not violated in any respect.

14. That the Hetman and the Cossack Army be free to receive the envoys who come to the Cossack Army from foreign countries with good intentions and that His Tsarist Majesty take no offence because of this; and in case there should be something adverse to His Tsarist Majesty, we should notify His Tsarist Majesty.

15. We should prefer that, as it is done with regard to tribute in other countries, a specified amount be paid by those who belong to Your Tsarist Majesty; if, however, it can not be done otherwise, then no voyevoda should be allowed to deal with these matters. (We suggest) that a voyevoda should be chosen among natives, a worthy man, who would deliver all that revenue honestly to His Tsarist Majesty.

16. Our envoys have been instructed to talk over this matter, because if a voyevoda should come and violate their rights and introduce (new) customs, it would be a great annoyance to them since they cannot soon grow accustomed to a different law and bear such burdens; and if officeholders should be natives, they will rule in accordance with local laws and customs.

17. Formerly the Polish Kings did not persecute our faith and oppress our liberties and all of us always enjoyed our liberties and therefore served (the King) faithfully; now, however, because of the violation of our liberties we have been forced to submit under the mighty and exalted arm of His Tsarist Majesty and our envoys have been instructed to beg earnestly that His Tsarist Majesty give us privileges written on parchment, with suspending seals, one (charter) for the liberties of the Cossacks and another one for those of the gentry, so that they remain inviolable forever. Having received these (charters), we shall ourselves check (the register) and who-

ever is a Cossack will enjoy Cossack privileges, while peasants shall fulfil their duties with respect to His Tsarist Majesty as before. Also (it should be stated) concerning all those who are subjects of His Tsarist Majesty what their rights and privileges should be.

18. They have to mention during the negotiations the Metropolitan (of Kiev) and our envoys received oral instructions concerning this matter.

19. Our envoys have also to entreat His Tsarist Majesty that His Tsarist Majesty deign to send his army to Smolensk at once without any delay in order that the enemy should not prepare themselves and be joined by others because the troops are now ill-prepared. They should not believe any (enemy) blandishment if (the Poles) make recourse to such.

20. It is also necessary that soldiers be hired, about 3,000 or even more, at His Tsarist Majesty's will, to protect the Polish frontier.

21. The custom exists for the Cossack Army always to receive a salary; and now they beg His Tsarist Majesty that he should appropriate to the colonels 100 thalers each, to the regimental essays, 200 Zloty, to the army essays, 400 Zloty, to the captains, 100 Zloty, to the Cossacks, 30 Zloty.

22. In case the horde should invade (Ukraine), it would be necessary to attack them from Astrakhan and Kazan; likewise the Don Cossacks should be ready, however, the peace with them should not yet be discontinued and they should not be provoked.

23. That His Tsarist Majesty would now graciously supply food and powder for the guns at Kodak, a town built on the Crimean frontier, where the Hetman permanently keeps a garrison of 400 men, providing them with everything. That likewise, His Tsarist Majesty would graciously provide for those who guard the Cossack's Headquarters (Kish) beyond the cataracts, since it cannot be left without a garrison.

Acts pertaining to the History of Southern and Western Russia. Vol. X, Document XI., pp. 446-452).

APPENDIX II.

THE TSAR'S CHARTER GRANTED TO HETMAN BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY AND THE COSSACK ARMY. MOSCOW, MARCH 27, 1654 (7162)

By the grace of God We, the Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia, have granted (this) to Our Tsarist Majesty's subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hetman of the Cossack Army, and the Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, and the Justices of the Army and the Colonels, and the Essauls, and the Captains, and to the whole Cossack Army that in this year 7162 by the grace of God, he, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army have come under Our exalted Sovereign arm and have sworn an oath of everlasting allegiance to Us, the Great Sovereign, and to our children and Successors. And in the month of March he, the Hetman, and the whole Cossack Army sent to Us, the Great Sovereign, to Our Tsarist Majesty, their envoys, the Judge of the Army Samoylo Bohdanov and Pavlo Teterya, the Colonel of Pereyaslav; and in their letter to Us, the Great Sovereign, to Our Tsarist Majesty, the Hetman wrote and his envoys begged humbly that We, the Great Sovereign, grant our favor to him, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the whole Cossack Army and confirm all their former rights and the liberties of the Army which had been established from ancient times under the Grand Dukes of Russia and the Polish Kings and their liberties and property rights in the courts, so that they might be tried by their elders without any interference with their Army courts; and that (we) confirm and do not violate their former rights which had been granted to clergy and laymen by the Grand Dukes of Russia and the Polish Kings, and grant them a charter of confirmation of those rights with our sovereign seal; and that the number of registered Cossacks should be fixed at 60,000, and that this quota be always at full strength. And if the Hetman should die by God's judgment, We, the Great Sovereign, (were asked to) allow the Cossack Army, according to the old custom, to elect the Hetman among themselves and by themselves and to notify Us, the Great Sovereign, as to who shall have been elected; that (we) order that the Cossack properties and lands which they use for their livelihood not be taken from them

and that the children of the widows left by the Cossacks keep the rights of their grandfathers and fathers. And We, the Great Sovereign, Our Tsarist Majesty, have granted our favor to our subject, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, and to the whole Cossack Army of Our Tsarist Majesty and have ordered them to be under the exalted arm of Our Tsarist Majesty, according to their former rights and privileges which had been granted to them by the Polish Kings and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania; and We have ordered that these rights and privileges must not be violated by any means and that they should be tried by their elders, according to their former rights; and We have decreed that the number of the Cossack Army should be fixed at 60,000, according to their own petition, and that (this quota) be always at full strength. And if the Hetman should die, by God's judgment, We, the Great Sovereign, have allowed the Cossack Army to elect a Hetman, according to their former customs, by themselves and from their own ranks, and to write to Us, the Great Sovereign, who shall have been elected; and the newly elected Hetman shall swear an oath of allegiance and loyalty to Us, the Great Sovereign, before the person whom We, the Great Sovereign, shall appoint. We have also forbidden the Cossacks, their widows and their children to be deprived of their properties and lands which they use for their livelihood and (have decreed) that they should be left to them as before. And through Our Tsarist Majesty's graciousness the subjects of Our Tsarist Majesty, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, and the whole Cossack Army of Our Tsarist Majesty should be under the exalted arm of Our Tsarist Majesty, according to their former rights and privileges and all the articles which have been written above, and they should serve and be loyal and wish everything good to Us, the Great Sovereign, and Our son, the Lord Tsarevich, Prince Alexei Alexeivich, and Our Successors, and whenever We should issue our sovereign order, they should go to war against our enemies and fight them, and obey Our Sovereign will in everything forever. And concerning those other articles which the above mentioned envoys Samoylo and Pavel in the name of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, have presented to Us, the Great Sovereign, to Our Tsarist Majesty, and submitted to the privy boyars of Our Tsarist Majesty, the Boyar

and Governor of Kazan, Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy, the Boyar and Governor of Tver, Vasili Vasilyevich Buturlin, the Okolnichy and Governor of Kashira, Peter Petrovich Golovin, and to the Dyak (state-secretary) of the Duma (privy council) Almaz Ivanov, We, the Great Sovereign, have listened to those articles with favor and ordered to write under each of those articles what we have decreed with regard to each, and have commanded that those articles with the decree of Our Tsarist Majesty be handed to the same envoys Samoylo and Pavel, and it is Our desire to keep Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army in Our Tsarist Majesty's gracious favor, and they shall trust in Our Sovereign favor."

(*Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire*, vol. I, pp. 325-327).

Appendix III.

THE MOSCOW "ARTICLES" OF MARCH 27, 1654 (7162).

"His Tsarist Majesty's subjects, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Hetman of the Cossack Army, and the whole Cossack Army, and the whole Christian Russian world, most respectfully beg the Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, the Autocrat of the whole of Great and Little Russia and the Sovereign and Ruler of many states that His Tsarist Majesty may grant them what their envoys will petition, and they will serve His Tsarist Majesty, according to his sovereign orders, forever. His Tsarist Majesty's resolutions concerning each articles are written after each one.

1.

That in towns the officials be chosen among the natives who are worthy of it and they shall rule the subjects of His Tsarist Majesty and collect revenue for the Tsar's treasury honestly. (This is) for the reason that if a governor of His Tsarist Majesty should come and begin to violate their rights, it would be a great annoyance to them; and if the natives themselves should be officeholders, they would rule in accordance with their rights.

And concerning this article His Tsarist Majesty ordered that it should be according to their petition: there shall be

officials in towns, mayors, burgomasters, councillors, assessors, and they shall collect for His Tsarist Majesty sundry taxes in money and grain and pass them over to his sovereign treasury through the persons sent by His Tsarist Majesty; and the persons sent by His Tsarist Majesty for receiving the money shall supervise the collectors so that they act honestly.

2.

The Secretary of the Army is to receive through the kindness of His Tsarist Majesty 1,000 Polish Zloty (gold coins) for his clerks, and 300 Polish Zloty for the justices of the Army, and 100 Polish Zloty for the secretary of the court, 50 Zloty for the secretary and for the standard bearer of (each) regiment, 30 Zloty for the standard bearer of each hundred, 50 Zloty for the master of the Hetman's insignia.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered according to their petition; and the money should be appropriated from the local revenue.

3.

That a mill be assigned for the sustenance of the Secretary, the two justices of the Army, for each colonel, for the essauls of the Army and those of each regiment, because they have great expenditure.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered according to their petition.

That concerning the artillery of the Army His Tsarist Majesty would graciously provide for the winter quarters and food of the cannoneers and all the artillery workers; also 400 Zloty for the quartermaster of the artillery and 50 Zloty for the standard bearer of the artillery.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously ordered that this amount should be appropriated from local revenue.

5.

That the Hetman and the Cossack Army should be free to receive envoys who for many years have come to them from foreign countries in case they have good intentions; and that

only in case there should be something adverse to His Tsarist Majesty should they notify His Tsarist Majesty.

Concerning this article His Tsarist Majesty has ordered that the envoys who come on right business should be received and dismissed and it should be written truly and immediately to His Tsarist Majesty on what business they came and with what they were dismissed; if the envoys should be sent by some (foreign ruler) on business detrimental to His Tsarist Majesty, those ambassadors and envoys should be detained by the Army and it should be written about them immediately to His Tsarist Majesty for his decree; and they should not be dismissed without His Tsarist Majesty's decree; and there should be no (diplomatic) relations with the Turkish Sultan and the Polish King without a decree of His Tsarist Majesty.

6.

Concerning the Metropolitan of Kiev the envoys were given an oral instruction; and the envoys begged in their speeches that His Tsarist Majesty graciously grant a patent for his possessions.

His Tsarist Majesty graciously granted his patent to the Metropolitan and all clergy for the estates which they now possess.

7.

That His Tsarist Majesty deign to send his army to Smolensk at once without any delay in order that the enemy should not prepare themselves and be joined by others because now the troops are ill-prepared. They should not believe any (enemy) blandishment of (the Poles) make recourse to such.

His Tsarist Majesty has graciously decided to set forth personally against his enemy, the Polish King, and to send his boyars and vovodas with many troops as soon as the roads will be dry and there will be forage for horses.

8.

That soldiers be hired, about 3,000 or even more, at His Tsarist Majesty's will, to protect the Polish frontier.

His Tsarist Majesty's soldiers are always on the frontier for the protection of the Ukraine and will be stationed (there) permanently.

9.

The custom used to exist for the Cossack Army always to receive a salary; and now they humbly beg His Tsarist Majesty that he should appropriate to the colonels 100 thalers each, to the regimental essauls, 200 Zloty, to the army essauls, 400 Zloty, to the captains, 100 Zloty, to the Cossacks 30 Zloty.

The following note follows after this article:

In previous years Hetman Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army had sent (envoys) to His Tsarist Majesty and begged many times that His Tsarist Majesty show them favor for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith and the holy churches of God and intercede for them and accepted them under his exalted arm and help them against their enemies. And in that time our great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, was unable to accept you under his protection since there was a permanent peace between His Tsarist Majesty and the Polish Kings and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania. And whereas on the part of the Kings many insults and offences were committed with regard to the father of His Tsarist Majesty, the Great Sovereign Tsar and Gand Duke Mikhail Fedorovich, autocrat of all Russia and ruler and possessor of many states, of blessed memory, and with regard to our Sovereign's grandfather, the Great Sovereign and holy Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Filaret Nikitich, of blessed memory, and with regard to our Great Sovereign, the Tsar and Duke Alexei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Russia, His Tsarist Majesty expected an apology for all (these insults) in accordance with the King's letters and the Diet's resolutions and constitution and the treaties; and (the Tsar) desired to reconcile Hetman Bohdan Kmelnysky and the whole Cossack Army with the Polish King through his ambassadors in the following way: in case King Jan Kazimierz should make peace with them, according to the Zboriv treaty, and would not persecute the Orthodox Christian faith and would remove all the Uniates, in that case His Tsarist Majesty was ready to grant amnesty to those who, by insulting his sovereign honor, deserved capital punishment. And in this matter (the Tsar) sent to King Jan Kazimierz his great and

plenipotentiary ambassadors, the boyar and Governor of Great Perm, Prince Boris Alexandrovich Repnin-Obolensky with associates. And those great plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty spoke to the King and his Lords in Council about that peace and actions offering various ways (of settlement). And King Jan Kazimierz and his Lords in Council did not accept any proposal and thus brought this great thing to naught, and dismissed those great and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Tsarist Majesty without any result. And our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, in view of such numerous instances of incorrectness and rudeness and falsehood on the part of the King, and because of his desire to protect the Orthodox faith and all the Orthodox Christians from the persecutors aiming at the destruction of God's churches and the annihilation of the Christian faith, the Latins (Roman Catholics), has accepted you under his exalted arm.

And now Our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, having collected numerous Russian, Tartar and German troops for your protection, is setting forth in person against the enemies of Christianity, and is sending his boyars and voyevodas with many troops as well and for the organization of these armies, according to his sovereign decree, large sums have been distributed; therefore they, the envoys, seeing the graciousness of His Tsarist Majesty for the sake of their protection, should not now mention the matter of payments of the Cossack Army. And when the Sovereign's privy boyar and Governor of Tver, Vasili Vasilyevich Buturlin, visited Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with his colleagues, the Hetman talked with him concerning the quota of the Cossack Army (and suggested) that it be set at 60,000; (he also said) that even if this number should be increased, the Sovereign would not incur losses since they would not ask for pay from the Sovereign; and they, Samoylo and Pavel, and other persons who at that time were with the Hetman, know about this; of what concerns the revenue from the cities and towns of Little Russia, His Tsarist Majesty does not know anything, and our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, is sending his nobles to tabulate the revenue; after they have tabulated and computed various revenues, a decree will be promulgated as considered by His Tsarist Majesty concerning the salary to the Cossack Army. And now His Tsarist Majesty, showing his favor to the Hetman and the whole

Cossack Army, intends to send a salary to the Hetman and the whole Cossack Army in gold coins, according to the old custom of his ancestors, the Great Sovereigns, Tsars, and Grand Dukes of Russia.

10.

In case the Crimean Horde should invade (the Ukraine), it would be necessary to attack them from Astrakhan and Kazan; likewise the Don Cossacks should be ready; however, the peace with them should not yet be discontinued and they should not be provoked.

The decrees and order of His Tsarist Majesty have been sent to the Don Cossacks; if there should be no provocation on the part of the Crimean people, it is not allowed to attack them and provoke them; in case, however, the Crimean people should be stirred up, His Tsarist Majesty would then issue orders for a campaign against them.

11.

That His Tsarist Majesty would now graciously supply food and powder for the guns at Kodak, a town on the Crimean frontier, where the Hetman permanently keeps a garrison of 400 men, providing them with everything; that, likewise, His Tsarist Majesty would graciously provide for those who guard the Cossacks' Headquarters (Kish) beyond the cataracts, since it cannot be left without a garrison.

With regard to this article His Tsarist Majesty's decree will be issued in the future after it is established what quantities of what supplies used to be sent to these localities, and how much revenue will be collected for His Tsarist Majesty.

And concerning (the matter) which has been mentioned in your petition: as soon as our Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, will grant to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Cossack Army his Sovereign charters of your liberties, you must muster your men (and determine) who will be (registered) as a Cossack and who will be (counted) as a peasant. And with regard to the 60,000 quota for the Cossack Army, the Great Sovereign, His Tsarist Majesty, has accepted and decreed it. As soon as you envoys come back to Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, you are to inform him that he is to

muster the Cossacks immediately and make the lists of their registration and send the lists certified by his signature to His Tsarist Majesty."

(Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire, vol. 1, pp. 322-325).

NOTES

CHAPTER I: CAUSES OF THE UKRAINIAN-MUSCOVITE ALLIANCE

- 1) All dates are given according to the old style.
- 2) V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, p. 27.
- 3) M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, vol. IX, part II. Kiev, 1931, pp. 689-720; V. Lypynsky, *op. cit.*, p. 27. See also O. Pritsak, *The Truce of Zhvanets According to Turkish Cronicler Naima'u.* — *Bulletin of the UVAN*, No. 11-12, 1947, pp. 15-18.
- 4) M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, vol. VIII, part III. Kiev-Vienna, 1922, p. 248; vol. IX, 2, p. 697.
- 5) See our article "Iron Industry in the Right Bank Ukraine at the Epoch of Khmelnytsky". — *Memoires of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, vol. 156, Munich, 1948, pp. 129-134.
- 6) See our article "The Archives of the Bakhmut and Tor Salt-works." — *Arkhivna Sprava*, IX-X, Kharkiv.
- 7) See V. Yurkevych, *Ukrainian Emigration to the East and the Settlement of the Slobidshchyna in the Time of B. Khmelnytsky*, Kiev, 1931.
- 8) M. Hrushevsky, *History of the Ukraine-Rus*, vol. VIII, part 2, Kiev-Vienna, 1922, p. 78.
- 9) M. Hrushevsky, *History of the Ukraine-Rus*, vol. IX, part 1, Kiev, 1928, pp. 270-271 and vol. IX, 2, p. 1544. Many documentary materials in vol. III of the "Acts (Documents) of South and West Russian History" and in vol. II of the "Documents of the Muscovite State."
- 10) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 1, p. 121.
- 11) *Ibid.*, p. 158; V. Lypynsky, 269-270. This refers to the notorious plot of M. Hladky who was executed at the beginning of 1652 together with the colonels Lukian Mozyra of Korsun and Adam Khmieletsky of Pavoloch (*ibid.*).
- 12) Yessko (Yassko) — Yakiv Parkhomenko, colonel of Cherkassy.
- 13) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 660. In 1653, there was executed Colonel Mykola Fedorovych, acting commander-in-chief of the Cossack troops in Moldavia (V. Lypynsky, 270).
- 14) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 833.
- 15) *Ibid.*, VIII, 3, 175.
- 16) *Ibid.*, 144.
- 17) *Ibid.*, 7-8, 26.
- 18) *Ibid.*, 112. See V. Lypynsky, 190.

- 19) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, VIII, 3, 146.
- 20) *Ibid.*, 137.
- 21) *Ibid.*
- 22) *Ibid.*, 243. The Cossacks told the Muscovites: "We shall go to war against you with the Crimeans. There will be a great war between you and ourselves because you did not help us against the Poles" (*ibid.*).
- 23) *Ibid.*, IX, 1, 122. See *ibid.*, 111, 120.
- 24) *Ibid.*, 255-256. "And other Ukrainians," a Muscovite informer reported, "when they get drunk in the inns, say... that they will make war upon your (the Tsar's) border towns and wear the coats of the Russians". (*ibid.*, 157, footnote 2).
- 25) *Ibid.* See O. Ohloblyn, *Muscovite Theory of the Third Rome in the 16th and 17th cents.*, Munich, 1951, pp. 38-41.
- 26) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 1, 111-124.
- 27) V. Kluchevsky, *A Course in Russian History*, vol. III, p. 150; quoted after Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, IX, 2, p. 760.
- 28) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 760.
- 29) I. Krypyakevych, *Studies on the State of Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, pp. 148-149 (reprint from the *Memoires of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*).
- 30) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, pp. 610-649, 1529-1536.

CHAPTER II: NEGOTIATIONS AT PEREYASLAV AND MOSCOW (JANUARY AND MARCH, 1654)

- 1) "Acts Pertaining to the History of Southern and Western Russia", (ASWR), vol. X., p. 215.
- 2) *Ibid.*, pp. 215-250.
- 3) A. Yakovliv, *Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties in 17-18 cents.*, Warsaw, 1934, p. 9.
- 4) M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, IX, 2, p. 728.
- 5) *Ibid.*, p. 1548.
- 6) I. Krypyakevych, *Studies on the State of Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, p. 117.
- 7) There is some reason to believe that Pereyaslav was Khmelnytsky's native town (Compare Szajnoch, *Dwa lata dziejow naszych*, vol. II, Lwow, 1869, App. 40). Here he married his first wife — Hanna Somko.
- 8) Teterya's first wife was Vyhovsky's sister.
- 9) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 730.
- 10) This was probably the regimental headquarters.
- 11) "Acts Pertaining to the history of S. and W. Russia", X, p. 217.

- 12) *Ibid.*, pp. 217-219.
- 13) *Ibid.*, p. 224.
- 14) *Ibid.*, p. 220.
- 15) *Ibid.*, p. 225.
- 16) *Ibid.* pp. 225-226.
- 17) *Ibid.*, p. 226.
- 18) *Ibid.*, p. 226.
- 19) *Ibid.*, pp. 226-227.
- 20) *Ibid.*, p. 227.
- 21) *Ibid.*, p. 227.
- 22) *Ibid.*, pp. 227-228.
- 23) A. Yakovliv, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
- 24) *Ibid.*
- 25) *Ibid.*
- 26) I. Borshchak: "Orlikiana" — Khliborobska Ukraina, IV. 1922-23, Vienna, p. 386.
- 27) *Istoria Rusov*, Moscow, 1846, p. 119.
- 28) M. Hrushevsky and A. Yakovliv mention in this connection that George II. Rakocsy, Prince of Transylvania, notified in 1656 his envoy to Khmelnytsky that he would not confirm his friendship for the Ukraine with an oath since he was an "absolute ruler (autocrat)" and "with God's help nothing but death could change his position." (see Yakovliv *Ukrainian-Muscovite Agreements*, p. 14, footnote 10).
- 29) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 758.
- 30) A. Yakovliv, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
- 31) *ASWR*, X, 231.
- 32) *Ibid.*, p. 232.
- 33) *Ibid.*, p. 233.
- 34) *Ibid.*, pp. 217-219; 228.
- 35) *Ibid.*, p. 293.
- 36) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 734-736.
- 37) Among those who did not take the oath at Pereyaslav there were the colonels of Bratslav and Uman who guarded the borderland against the Tartar raiders, colonel Sulychych of Pavoloch who was then with an embassy in Transylvania and colonel Ivan Bohun of Kalnyk who, according to Hrushevsky, took the oath somewhat later. (M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 735).
- 38) Here some interesting data about the representation of the individual regiments: from the Pereyaslav regiment, the oath was taken by the colonel, the regimental officers(quartermaster, essaul, master of stand-

ards, secretary), the town commander, 14 captains and 37 Cossacks; from the Chyhyryn, Korsun and Kaniv regiments (beside the officers), altogether 8 Cossacks; from the Kropyvna regiment, besides the colonel and 3 officers 5 Cossacks; from the Nizhyn, Kaniv and Korsun regiments, in addition to the officers and captains (11), 18 Cossacks (January 10); from the so-called "Hetman regiment" — one captain and two Cossacks. From other regiments there were only the colonels and other officers (with no Cossacks present), and the Uman, Pavoloch and Kalnyk regiments were without any representation. Thus the army was represented at Pereyaslav by some 200 men (100 captains and 100 other officers and ordinary Cossacks). The remainder of those who took the oath was made up of noblemen (24), clergy and townsfolk — in all, 84 persons. (M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 734-736).

39) It is interesting to compare these numbers with contemporary data given by Paul of Aleppo. He writes as follows: "The colonel of Pereyaslav (Teterya) told our Bishop (Patriarch Makarios of Antioch, then on a visit to the Ukraine) that he ruled over nine towns and more than 500 villages and had under his command 40,000 soldiers. If necessary, he added, he could raise as many as 100,000." (M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 1009).

40) ASWR, X, p. 235.

41) *Ibid.*, p. 249.

42) *Ibid.*, p. 436.

43) *Ibid.*, p. 238.

44) *Ibid.*, p. 244.

45) We do not discuss in detail the Pereyaslav negotiations since they had a preliminary character and all specific questions were to be decided during the negotiations in Moscow which will be discussed later.

46) M. Hrushevsky, pp. 755, 756, 766; A. Yakovliv, p. 18.

47) ASWR, X, pp. 246-247.

48) *Ibid.*, p. 247.

49) *Ibid.*, p. 247.

50) *Ibid.*, p. 247.

51) *Ibid.*, p. 247.

52) *Ibid.*, pp. 247-248.

53) *Ibid.*, 553.

54) *Ibid.*, p. 248.

55) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 743.

56) For more information about him see M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, vol. IX, pp. 14, 473, 493, 499-502, 534, 545-548, 552-555, 561, 565-569, 610, 614, 741, 743, 929, 963.

V. Lypynsky, *Ukraina na perelomi*, pp. 127-128; "Ukraina", 1914, II; *Z dziejow Ukrainy*, Cracow, 1912, pp. 316-317.

57) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 743.

58) *Ibid.*, p. 744.

59) *Ibid.*, p. 743 (see ASWR, X, p. 281).

60) *Ibid.*, pp. 250, 251-252.

61) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 750-751.

62) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, IX2, p. 795.

63) *Ibid.*, pp. 795-796.

64) *Ibid.*, p. 795.

65) *Ibid.*, pp. 795, 801.

66) ASWR, X, p. 433; M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, IX, 2, p. 792.

67) Hrushevsky observes correctly that "razgavor" is a diplomatic term... used to denote diplomatic negotiations." (*Ibid.*, p. 793, footnote 1).

68) ASWR, X, 432-436. See M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, IX-2, 792-794.

69) A. Yakovliv, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

70) ASWR, X, 446-452.

71) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 789-792.

72) A. Yakovliv, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

73) M. Hrushevsky (*op. cit.*, 784-785) and Prof. Yakovliv (p. 25) think that the "23 articles" were delivered by the envoys on March 14. However, the ASWR, X, 445, show that this happened on March 15.

74) This was probably the "real order" given to the envoys, mentioned in the Hetman's letter of Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teterya of March 21, 1654. (ASWR, X, 553, 558).

75) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 789.

76) A. Yakovliv, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.

77) *Ibid.*, p. 22.

78) *Ibid.*, p. 22.

79) *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

80) *Ibid.*, p. 23.

81) M. Hrushevsky, p. 789, A. Yakovliv, p. 23.

82) M. Hrushevsky, p. 801.

83) *Ibid.*, pp. 801-808.

84) ASWR, X, 437-446. See also M. Hrushevsky, 801-808.

85) Similar demands were made by the Cossack gentry at Pereyaslav (see above).

86) M. Hrushevsky, pp. 802-804.

87) ASWR, X, 446-452.

88) M. Hrushevsky, p. 804.

89) ASWR, X, 446-452.

90) ASWR, X, 244-245. Buturlin agreed to this in the name of the Tsar. (*Ibid.*, 245).

91) M. Hrushevsky, p. 766.

92) *Ibid.*, 804-805.

93) *Ibid.*, 805.

94) ASWR, v. III. See our article on potash industry in the Ukraine at the time of Khmenytsky (*Proceedings of the Historic-Philological Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Science*, vol. X, Kiev, 1927, pp. 303-310).

95) Kiev Central Archives of Ancient Deeds, liber 19, folio 227, 229, liber 20, 240-242, liber 21, folio 52, 53, 130, 174-179.

96) M. Hrushevsky, p. 806.

97) *Ibid.*, 808-809, 811.

98) *Ibid.*, 808.

99) *Ibid.*, 809, footnote 2.

100) ASWR, X, 446-452.

101) M. Hrushevsky, 811.

102) *Ibid.*, 810.

103) *Ibid.*, 811.

104) *Ibid.*, 830. See also ASWR, X, 553-556.

105) M. Hrushevsky, 829.

106) Thus Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky became the owner of the property of Alexander Koniecpolski, his personal enemy. It is possible that this was the reason why the Hetman asked the Tsar for a title-deed to this property.

107) ASWR, X, 477-506. See M. Hrushevsky, 819-829. In addition to this the envoys had with them the letters to the Hetman from some of the eminent Muscovite boyars (Boris Morozov, Illya Myloslavsky, the Tsar's father-in-law). According to Hrushevsky there was also "undoubtedly" a letter from Patriarch Nikon which has not been preserved (p. 829).

108) A. Yakovliv, *The Treaty Between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Muscovite Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich*, New York, 1954, p. 37. Earlier Prof. Yakovliv was of a different opinion (see his *Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties*, p. 32).

CHAPTER III: THE UKRAINIAN-MUSCOVITE TREATY OF 1654

1) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty...*, p. 7.

2) *Ibid.*, p. 40.

3) *Ibid.*, p. 39.

4) *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

5) *Ibid.*, p. 39.

- 6) M. Hrushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 784, footnote 2.
- 7) Hrushevsky (*op. cit.*, 835) calls it a "semitranslation".
- 8) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty...*, pp. 8, 37, 78.
- 9) G. Karpov, *Peregovory ob usloviakh soyedyneniya Malorossii s Vyelikoy Rossiei*. See also Yakovliv, *Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties*, p. 29.
- 10) See M. Hrushevsky, pp. 813, 819-820, 828-829.
- 11) See A. Yakovliv, *Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties*, p. 32.
- 12) ASWR, X, 446-452.
- 13) The Ukrainian original of the "23 Articles" was evidently left in Moscow. Its further fate was, in our opinion, connected with the notorious Muscovite falsification of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 (see below). Prof. Yakovliv, comparing "the 1659 version with the draft treaty worked out at Chyhyryn and handed to the boyars by the envoys of B. Khmelnytsky on March 14, 1654 (the "23 Articles" with Khmelnytsky's signature))", came to the conclusion that the 1659 version resembled rather closely the text of the treaty but differed from it by its exposition. Obviously the author of the 1659 version used the draft treaty and the Articles in the 1654 version and made rather accurate rendering of the contents of the treaty. However, he also "made very important changes in the clauses of the treaty of 1654 and in the decrees of the Tsar; he added, moreover, new clauses and new decrees of the Tsar which, together with the alterations made, considerably limited the rights of the Cossack Army as specified by the Treaty of 1654." (A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, pp. 82-83). The authentic document containing the 23 Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky probably disappeared (was lost or destroyed) at the same time.
- 14) A. Yakovliv, *Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties*, p. 33. See also his *Treaty...*, p. 38.
- 15) ASWR, X, p. 484.
- 16) *Ibid.*, p. 494. M. Hrushevsky does not speak anything about the alleged "Ukrainian" language of the Charter.
- 17) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 812, footnote 1.
- 18) ASWR, X, pp. 493-494.
- 19) ASRW, X, pp. 490-494. See also Appendix 2.
- 20) *Ibid.*, 435.
- 21) *Ibid.*, 553.
- 22) *Ibid.*, 558.
- 23) *Ibid.*, 492.
- 24) *Ibid.*, 492. Further it was written in the first version of the Charter "and our boyars and voyevodas will not interfere with those military courts." (*Ibid.*).
- 25) *Ibid.*

26) *Ibid.*

27) *Ibid.*, 493. The rough copy of the Charter preserved in Moscow has two additional articles dealing with the placing of the Chyhyryn district under the Hetman's jurisdiction and the right of diplomatic relations enjoyed by the Cossack Army. These articles in the rough copy were "underlined with ink" according to G. Karpov who published them in *ASWR*, vol. X. (p. 492, footnote). They are not included in the official edition of the Charter in the *Complete Code of Laws of the Russian Empire* (vol. 1, pp. 325-327); they are not taken into consideration by the students of the Pereyaslav agreement (particularly Prof. Yakovliv — see his *Treaty*, appendix 2, pp. 101-103). On the contrary, M. Hrushevsky thinks that they were left in the final text of the Charter (see his *History of the Ukraine-Rus*, IX, 2, 822). It is difficult to decide without the authentic text of the Tsar's charter which articles were included in its final version. However, the two articles in question were finally for some reason included in the separate charter granted to the Hetman and in the "11 Articles", respectively.

28) *ASWR*, X, 495-496.

29) *Ibid.*, 533-534.

30) *Ibid.*, p. 480, footnote xx).

31) *ASWR*, X, 477-484. See Appendix 3. In the Muscovite copy, these articles are dated March 12; however, Karpov proved that this date was impossible (*Ibid.*, p. 477, footnote). He proposes another date — March 21 (*Ibid.*). It would be possible to accept it if these Articles had been actually delivered by the Ukrainian envoys. Since this did not occur, we have to accept the common date of all acts of the treaty — March 27. See A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, pp. 35-37.

32) *ASWR*, X, 477.

33) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 813. See *ibid.*, pp. 812-813.

34) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 37.

35) *ASWR*, X, 481-483.

36) *Ibid.*, 483.

37) *Ibid.*, 483.

38) *Ibid.*

39) *Ibid.*, 484.

40) *Ibid.*, 479.

41) *Ibid.*, 446-452.

42) *Ibid.*, 480.

43) *Ibid.*

44) *Ibid.*

45) *Ibid.*, 480-481.

46) See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 754.

47) *Ibid.*, p. 755.

48) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, pp. 43-44.

49) Quoted according to Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 63.

50) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 41.

51) M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, v. VIII, part 3, 210-211.

52) *Ibid.*, 210, footnote 1.

53) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 41.

54) M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, IX, 2, p. 789.

55) The envoys brought to Moscow the following documents: the royal privilege granted to the Cossack Army at Zboriv, the royal assent to the Zboriv pact, confirmation of the rights to the Terekhtemyriv foundation and placing of the Chyhyryn district under the jurisdiction of the Hetman. They were "in the official copies made at Kiev where they had been registered in March, 1650." (M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 792). These documents were handed by the envoys to the boyars on March 17, 1654 (*Ibid.*, p. 808).

56) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 41. It is interesting that Moscow recognized and even stressed the contractual nature of the Zboriv agreement.

57) From the 23 Articles of 1654, 18 articles dealt with constitutional matters (like the "Puncta o potrzebach", which had also 18 articles). The remaining five had a purely military significance.

58) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, VIII, 3, pp. 215-217.

59) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 812, footnote 1.

60) M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus*, X, Kiev, 1937, pp. 32-33.

61) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 3, p. 756.

62) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 54.

63) See E. Borshchak, *La legende historique de l'Ukraine — Istorija Rusov*. Paris, 1949, p. 138, footnote 5.

64) See M. Andrusiak, "Pereyaslav or Moscow Treaty", *Svoboda*, 1954 No. 15. A. Yakovliv, "Moscow or Pereyaslav Treaty?" — *Svoboda*, 1954, No. 21.

65) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, 87, 91.

66) See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 758.

CHAPTER IV:

AN APPRAISAL OF THE PEREYASLAV AGREEMENT OF 1654

1) Mykola Mikhnovsky came after a detailed analysis of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 (he uses the term "Pereyaslav Constitution") to the interesting conclusion that it had all the distinctive marks of a "union of states". (M. Mikhnovsky, *Independent Ukraine*, 1948 ed., p. 20; see also *ibid.*, pp. 19-23).

2) L. Okinshevych, *Lectures on the History of Ukrainian Law*, Munich, 1947, pp. 33-34.

3) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 67.

4) *Ibid.*, p. 68.

5) V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, p. 67; see also *ibid.*, p. 121.

6) *Ibid.*, p. 30. D. Doroshenko (in his *Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, Prague, 1923, p. 211) speaks of Lypynsky's "brilliant" analysis of the Pereyaslav agreement.

7) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, pp. 68-69.

8) B. Halaychuk, *The Treaty of Pereyaslav in the Light of International Law*. Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Historical-Philosophical Section, vol. 1, New York-Paris, 1951, pp. 102-105 (an abstract of the author's more detailed work on this subject).

9) S. Ivanytsky, *The Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654, 1954*. See also "The Juridical Aspect of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (concluded in 1654 between Russia and Ukraine)". — Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, vol. 1, pp. 106-108 (an abstract).

10) Prof. Yakovliv writes in one of his most recent publications on the Pereyaslav agreement: "Only V. Lypynsky's appraisal of the Treaty of 1654 as a military alliance between Ukraine and Moscow tallied with developments both before and during the time when the treaty was being negotiated and its authentic text. I have also subscribed to Lypynsky's opinion and have merely added that the treaty showed some influence of the idea of the protectorate of the Tsar with certain signs of nominal vassalage (oath of allegiance, tribute)." (A. Yakovliv, "On the 300th anniversary of Khmelnytsky's treaty with Moscow," *Svoboda*, 1954, No. 75).

11) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2.

12) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 55. See also *ibid.*, p. 61.

13) It is necessary to observe that the presence of Muscovite troops (garrison) in Kiev did not violate the sovereign rights of Ukraine. It was stated in the Tsar's order to the Muscovite voyevodas assigned for duty in Kiev (January 30, 1654) that the Tsar "according to the petition of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky..... sent them (the voyevodas) to Kiev and ordered that soldiers should be with them in Kiev in order to protect (it) from the arrival of the Poles and various military men." (*ASWR*, X, 355).

14) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*.

15) *ASWR*, X, 709.

16) V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, p. 203. See *ibid.*, 201-3.

17) See *Archives of South-Western Russia*, part. 3, vol. 6.

- 18) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 1549.
- 19) D. Olyanchyn, "Two Letters of Hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovsky to Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg". *Khliborobska Ukraina*, vol. 5, p. 378. Vienna, 1924-1925.
- 20) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 1439.
- 21) I. Borshchak, "Exposition of the Rights of the Ukraine by P. Orlyk". — *Stara Ukraina*, Lviv, 1925, I-II, pp. 5-9.
- 22) Archives of S.-W. Russia, part 3, vol. 6, p. 363. In 1763, during a broadened assembly of the Council of Officers at Hlukhiv, one of the participants said: "Who could have expected that at the very time when we hoped to find our well-being, our peace and security through this subjection (to the Tsar of Muscovy — A. O.), there began our misfortune and the violation of our peace and prosperity." (*Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, vol. 159, p. 34. Munich, 1949).
- 23) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 1109.
- 24) Archives of S-W Russia, part 3, vol. 6, 333. See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, X, 63-66.
- 25) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, X, 354-367.
- 26) Archives of S.-W. Russia, part 3, vol. 6, pp. 368-369. See Appendix IV.
- 27) "We" — Ukrainian patriots of the time of Mazepa used to say — "always pray to God for Khmelnytsky's soul and bless his name."
- 28) Readings of the Moscow Society of Russian History and Antiquities, 1859, 1.
- 29) I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana", *Khliborobska Ukraina*, vol. 4. 1922-1923. Vienna. (p. 366).
- 30) I. Borshchak, "Exposition of the Rights of the Ukraine by. P. Orlyk." — *Stara Ukraina*, Lviv, 1925, I-II, pp. 5-9. P. Orlyk later obtained the restitution of the Pereyaslav agreement (I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana", 353-354).
- 31) I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana", p. 368.
- 32) I. Borshchak, *Hryhor Orlyk*, Lviv, 1932, p. 146.
- 33) M. Vozniak, "The Commission of Bendery After Mazepa's Death". *Mazepa*, Warsaw, 1938, vol. 1, p. III.
- 34) Readings of the Moscow Society of Russian History and Antiquities, 1859, 1. 246, (article 2).
- 35) M. Kostomarov, *Ruthenian History in the Biographies of Its Principal Personages*, vol. 3, Lviv, 1877, p. 22, footnotes on pp. 22-23.
- 36) "Khan's Ukraine" — the territory in the south of Ukraine between the rivers Boh and Dniester. It was a part of the Crimean State and had its own Hetmans appointed by the Khan of Crimea.

37) Moscow Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Little Russian Original Documents", 1892, No. 35/3.

38) See our article "Hryhory Pokas and his 'Description of Little Russia'. Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., I, New York, 1952, pp. 67-69.

39) M. Hrushevsky, *The Pereyaslav Agreement Between Ukraine and Moscow in 1654*, Kiev, 1917, p. 22.

40) *Kievskaya Starina*, 1882, II, 342. An interesting formula was used in official documents of the second half of the 18th century: "Little Russian Service of Her Imperial Majesty" (1766).

41) *Istoria Russov*, Moscow, 1846, pp.209, 210 *passim*

42) N. Kostomarov, *Collected Works. Historical Monographs and Studies*, vol. 15, St. Petersburg, 1905, p. 537.

43) See O. Ohloblyn, *Sketches on the History of the Rebellion of Petro Ivanenko (Petryk)*, Kiev, 1929, p. 24.

44) Moscow Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Little Russian Original Documents", No. 729/712.

45) *Records of the Statistic Committee of the Chernihiv Province*, vol.1. Chernihiv, 1866, pp. 254-255.

46) I. Svit, An interesting Ukrainian monument in Peking, Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., I, New York, 1952, pp. 116, 117.

47) *ASWR*, X, 223.

48) *Ibid.*, 224.

49) *Ibid.*, 235.

50) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 58.

51) See E. Borshchak, "A little known French biography of Jurat Khmelnytsky, "Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., vol. III, No. 1 (7), 1953, p. 517. Prof Borshchak quotes the opinion of Vicfort, a well-known authority on international law in the 17th cent.: *L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions*, La Haye, 1680, livre II, part IV, §3.

52) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 61.

53) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 850.

54) M. Hrushevsky, "Great, Little and White Rus", *Ukraina*, 1917, I, p. 11.

55) V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal", part 1, On the question of the authenticity of the "Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" in the version of 1659 (manuscript).

56) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 62.

57) On the strength of the decree of Sept. 3, 1655, the Tsar of

Muscovy began to style himself also "the Grand Duke of Lithuania, White Russia, Volhynia and Podolia" (V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" — manuscript).

58) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 62.

59) See O. Ohloblyn, *The Moscow Theory of the Third Rome in the 16th and 17th cent.*, Munich, 1951.

60) *Ibid.*, pp. 38-41.

61) See, e. g., the speech by Hryhory Butovych, protopresbyter of Pereyaslav (Dec. 31, 1653) in M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 732, or speech of Pavlo Teterya in Moscow on August 4, 1657 (M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 12-13).

62) See ASWR, X. 216-217.

63) L'on n'innovera rien a ce qui a ete observe jusqu'a present au sujet des Armes et du Titre de Prince de l'Ukraine. S. M. R. ne pourra jamais s'arroger ce Titre ni les Armes" (I. Borshchak, "The Exposition of the Rights of the Ukraine" by P. Orlyk, *Stara Ukraina*, Lviv, 1925, I-II, pp. 5-9).

64) V. Prokopovych, *The Little Russian Seal*, part 1, On the question of the authenticity of the "Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" in the 1659 version (in manuscript). An abstract of this work (Prokopovich, "Pechat Malorossiyskaya — The Little Russian Seal") appeared in the *Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, I, 72-75. See also V. Prokopovych, *Sphragistical Anecdotes*, Prague, 1938, pp. 17-18.

65) V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" (manuscript).

66) L. Okinshevych, *Lectures*, 46.

67) See *ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

68) See O. Ohloblyn, *New Materials on the History of the Rebellion of Petro Ivanenko (Petryk)*. Augsburg, 1949, pp. 8-11.

69) V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" (manuscript).

70) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 63.

71) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 1280.

72) *Collected Materials on the History of South-West Russia*, vol. 1, Kiev, 1911, pp. 107-116. ("Documents of the Epoch of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 1656-1657," published by I. Kamanin). See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 1290-1294; V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, 118-248, 270-272, 294.

73) *Archives of S-W Russia*, part 3, vol. 6, 332-337. See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, X, 63-66.

74) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 1344.

75) "The Pereyaslav Council of 1654 and France", a paper read by Prof. I. Borshchak at the 1953 Session of the Shevchenko Scientific

Society. (See V. Y., Scientific Session at Sarselles, America, 1953, No. 229).

76) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, 775-776.

77) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 62.

78) V. Lypynsky, *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, 30.

79) M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2.

80) *Ibid.*

81) V. Lypynsky, *op. cit.*

82) See M. Hrushevsky, *History*, IX, 2, p. 813.

83) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 90.

84) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, pp. 71-92. See also "The Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the 1659 version" by the same author (UVAN Book of Homage to Academician M. Hrushevsky, vol. I, Kiev, 1928) and his "Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties in the 17th and 18th cents." Warsaw, 1934.

85) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 77. See V. Danylovych, "Little known Ukrainian incunabula" (Memoires of the Historical-Philological Section of UVAN, Kiev, 1929).

86) S. Velychko mentions interpolations in the "Articles of B. Khmelnytsky" in the 1659 version (see A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 91). Hryhory Pokas in his "Description of Little Russia" (1751) writes: "If you should find in the negotiated and accepted articles of Hetman Zinovi Bohdan Khmelnytsky an his envoys... anything different from what they had actually been,... (it is because) these articles passed through many hands and perhaps did not escape those which were unfriendly to his (Ukrainian) people." (Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., I, p. 68). Evidently, Pokas was acquainted with the Lavra edition of the "Articles" (1659).

87) A. Yakovliv, *Treaty*, p. 8.

88) M. Mikhnovsky, *Independent Ukraine*, pp. 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.

89) "L'argument et la preuve la plus forte et la plus invincible de la souverainete de l'Ukraine" (P. Orlyk, Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine).



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